

CHAPTER XLI.


HOW THE REGULARS ARE TRAINED.

REDUCED EXPENSES ON THE CESSATION OF INDIAN HOSTILITIES—THE NOGALES DISTURBANCE—
 TROUBLES AT SAN CARLOS RESERVATION—THE EMERGENCIES OF PRESENT MILI-
 TARY SERVICE—WHY INDIANS ARE DIFFICULT TO CAPTURE—FIELD SERVICE
 AND ITS VALUE—THE FIELD MANEUVERS OF 1887—ORDERS FOR
 THE SAME—THEIR SUCCESS, VALUE, AND RESULTS.



AFTER the cessation of hostilities in 1886, the expenses of the Department of Arizona were reduced at the rate of over a million dollars per annum. The troops belonging to the Departments of Texas and California were returned to their respective stations, and over four hundred enlisted scouts were discharged. In December, 1886, California, south of the thirty-fifth parallel was added to the Department of Arizona, and the headquarters were fixed at Los Angeles, California.

In March, 1887, a disturbance occurred at Nogales, Arizona Territory. This town is situated on the national line between the United States and Mexico, and at that time the population was about equally divided between Americans and Mexicans. Several officers belonging to the Mexican army crossed over to the American side of the town, and engaged in a shooting escapade with certain local civil officers. Prompt action was taken by the Mexican authorities, and the offenders were speedily punished; but as Nogales was an important place and other difficulties were likely to occur at any time, I stationed a company of infantry in the vicinity of the town, with the most gratifying results. During this same month, a young Indian named Nah-diz-az became



SAN CARLOS MILITARY CAMP.

dissatisfied with the division of farming land made by Second Lieutenant Seward Mott, Tenth Cavalry, who was on duty at the San Carlos reservation, and in charge of Indian farming on the upper Gila River. Owing to this dissatisfaction and the fact that his father had been confined by Lieutenant Mott for disobedience of orders and using threatening language, the Indian shot this young officer on the 9th of March, wounding him so severely as to cause his death the following day, and thus one more brave soldier, the victim of savage passions, found a last resting place

"Beneath the low green tent
Whose curtain never outward swings."


On the San Carlos reservation, in a mountainous, arid country, were more than five thousand degraded, barbarous Indians divided into various tribes, chiefly San Carlos, Yumas, Mojaves, Pimas and White Mountain Indians.

Captain Pierce, who had charge of the reservation, managed their affairs well, and was wonderfully successful considering the circumstances in inducing them to work. Nevertheless, for some time they had been a menace to the white settlers in the country. Several disturbances had occurred, and there had been a general demand for their removal on the part of the principal white people of the territory. Early in the summer of 1887 an outbreak took place that threatened to be of the most serious nature.

It occurred in this way. About six months previous to this time there had been a "tiswin drunk" among the Indians at San Carlos, in which a very popular chief, Toggy-da-shoose, was killed. The friends of the victim in their turn quickly and unhesitatingly despatched the murderer, and in this way a deadly feud was created between two bands.

On the evening of May 28, five enlisted

Indian scouts belonging to the same band with Toggy-da-shoose, after another carouse of tiswin, went without permission to Arivaypa Cañon, and there killed an Indian named Rip, who, they claimed, had been the cause of the chief's death. In addition to this they threatened the life of a young warrior named Kid who formed one of the attacking party.



TONTO WARRIOR.

Five other Indians accompanied the scouts, and they were all absent about five days.

On their return they went to the tent of the chief-of-scouts, followed by some eight or ten other Indians, to await the arrival of the commanding officer. When Captain Pierce appeared he ordered them to lay down their arms and take off their cartridge belts. They had already complied with this command when some commotion arose and one of the Indians in the rear fired a shot. At this the chief-of-scouts stepped back into his tent and seized his rifle, a general breakout occurred, and a fusilade of shots was fired. The Indians continued to fire as they ran, some scouts about the camp returning the fire. The insurgents then fled to the mountains east of the agency, where they were quickly followed by a detachment of troops under Lieutenant Hughes.

Upon news of the affair reaching headquarters, troops from the various posts were ordered to occupy the country through which it was likely the rebellious Indians would pass. There were at first only ten men in the party, two or three of whom were on foot, but these were afterward joined by others. They were pursued rapidly and incessantly over the most rugged and mountainous region on the continent; no matter in what direction they turned they found that troops had made the country unsafe for them, while a pursuing command was always close behind them. In some respects this raid varied greatly from all previous ones, as the Indians stole but very little, frequently passing through herds without molesting the cattle, and only two white men were killed during the entire time they remained outside the reservation. On one occasion, while camped on the crest of the Rincon Mountains at a height of about seven thousand feet above the sea level, their camp was surprised by the troops under Lieutenant Carter P. Johnson and all their property, including their horses, was captured. But the Indians themselves escaped by sliding or crawling down over ledges of rock. From this point they traveled along the mountain ranges on foot, crossing the narrow valleys at night, and endeavored to take refuge in the Indian camps on the reservation, but were trailed and hunted down by the troops to their retreat.



MOQUI INDIAN GIRL.

On the 13th of June I left my headquarters to visit San Carlos, in order to personally inquire into the circumstances attending the disturbance, and to direct the movements of the pursuing forces. I found that from a thousand to twelve hundred Indians had left their camps, abandoned their fields, and had congregated at a place called Coyote Holes, where they assumed a most threatening attitude. Here they held their nightly orgies and Indian dances and were harangued by their medicine men, whose influence was decidedly prejudicial to peace. But no actual outbreak occurred, as troops were stationed at proper points to check any further disturbance.

On the 18th of June one of the renegades surrendered. As he had been absent nineteen days, I sent him to the guardhouse for the same length of time, but on the second day following he practically turned State's evidence and gave information concerning the movements of himself and others, so I remitted his sentence. On the 22d eight others surrendered, followed by Kid with seven companions on the 25th. It was believed that a Yaqui Indian named Miguel was the instigator of the whole affair. According to the best obtainable evidence he had fired the shot that opened hostilities, and with his own hand had killed the two men who had been murdered. The outbreak was evidently unpremeditated on the part of most of the Indians, and this, added to the fact that they had committed such a small number of depredations, entitled them to some consideration. Although the scouts did not fully comprehend the responsibility of their obligations as enlisted men, I ordered an investigation by a general court-martial as if they had been white soldiers. One of the culprits was afterward condemned to suffer death but this sentence was afterwards remitted, and the others were given sentences of from two to twenty years' imprisonment. The disaffected and hostile element were finally persuaded and forced to return to their former camps without serious hostilities, and thus once more it was found better to avoid war than to end one.


Two tribes on the San Carlos agency, the Yumas and Mojaves, had for years been pleading to be allowed to return to their former homes. The place where they were located along the Gila River was so intensely hot, arid, desolate and sickly that the troops on duty there were obliged to be changed every few months in order to preserve their health. The excitement of these Indians over the general condition of affairs was greatly increased by the earthquakes which occurred in that vicinity about this time. Part of these Indians were anxious to be returned to the Colorado

River to join others of their own tribes at Yuma and Mojave, while still others desired to go to the vicinity of their former home on the Fort Verde reservation.

The White Mountain Indians who had been forced to go to the Gila Valley declared they would rather die than live there. They were told that they could not have rations if they did not remain, and they said they would rather go back to their own country, if they had to starve. They did go back, and for years made a most heroic struggle to live without receiving rations from the government. They cut wood and hay for Fort Apache, and I have seen their women go long distances and cut grass with knives and pack it on their backs to the post, although the amount of money they received for their labor was exceedingly small.

The Navajo Indians of New Mexico were among the largest and most powerful of all the tribes, numbering twenty thousand souls, with at least four thousand men capable of bearing arms, while they were at the same time rich enough to supply themselves with the most improved rifles, with an average of one thousand rounds of ammunition per man. This being the case, even though they were practically at peace, I deemed it best to concentrate as many of the cavalry as possible in that vicinity.

Whenever emergencies had arisen, requiring active field service, it was a common occurrence for requests or reports like the following to be received at headquarters: "Request authority to employ scouts;" "Guides;" "Experienced trailers;" "Men familiar with the habits of the Indians and topography of the country," etc.: "Trail scattered;" "Lost trail and command returned to station;" "Misled by guides," etc. The condition of affairs indicated by such applications and reports ought not to exist. Troops serving any considerable length of time in a department should themselves excel in an accurate and thorough knowledge of the country and in skillful pursuit of the enemy. While garrison duty, target practice, drills and parades in garrison are important, yet there is another service of vital importance the moment a command takes the field, and to this all other duties are really preparatory. In order to render this service entirely effective I required the troops to devote special attention



MOJAVE RUNNERS.

to field service for a number of years, and with the most gratifying results.

The element of strength that was possessed by the Indians against which the troops found it most difficult to contend, was their skill in passing rapidly over the country, noting every feature of it, and observing the movements and strength of their enemies, without allowing themselves to be discovered. This faculty was the natural outgrowth of the fact that generation after generation of the Indians had followed the life of the hunter and warrior. The superior intelligence of the white man renders him capable of acquiring the same art in an almost equal degree if given the opportunity.

While the chief motive of drill in this field service was to give the troops practice that would enable them in times of actual hostility to render the country untenable for the Indians, yet it was also a training invaluable to the officers in case they should be called upon for service in civilized warfare; for, owing to the small size of the regular army, the same officers that might in this practice or in actual Indian campaigning be in command of a small detachment of troops, are liable at any time to be suddenly required to lead a division or a corps, should the necessity suddenly arise for greatly increasing the army.

For these reasons I determined to give special attention to field maneuvers, and, therefore, while in command of the Department of Arizona in 1887, I issued the following orders:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ARIZONA, }
LOS ANGELES, CAL., August 20, 1887. }

GENERAL ORDERS No. 24:

I. During the months of September and October of this year the troops of this Department will be considered as on field duty, and will be instructed and exercised in all that pertains to the practical requirements of field service. During those months all other drills and duties will, as far as practicable, be suspended, except the target and signal practice required by orders of the War Department, which will be regulated so as to admit of this field service.

II. On September 1st, post commanders will occupy their districts of observation by the location of outposts, signal and heliograph stations, and establish communications with the nearest signal stations of the adjacent posts.

III. During the first fifteen days of that month post commanders will, if necessary, make themselves familiar with the topographical features of the district of country within their charge, and give such instructions to the troops of their commands regarding every detail of field service as will render them most efficient and afford them a knowledge of the general features of the country in which they are serving, and give to them that general knowledge of the geography and topography of the country as will enable them to pass over it readily without the aid of guides, compass or maps.

IV. Cavalry troops will be specially instructed in movements by open order formations. To this end care will be taken to make the trooper and his horse the unit rather than to adhere constantly to the close formation of a troop, with a view of training the horses to act separately and independently of the close column.

V. After two weeks of this kind of practice, the commanding officer of Fort Huachuca, Arizona, is hereby directed to send out a detachment of troops to march from that post to Fort Apache, Arizona, and return, via. the route indicated in this order. This raiding party will consist of two officers and twenty enlisted men, well mounted and provided with extra horses, and sufficient pack animals to carry the necessary baggage and camp equipage. Pack animals will not be required to carry more than one hundred pounds per mule, all superfluous articles being left in the post, including sabers, revolvers, curb bridles, hobbles, nose bags, extra horse equipments and camp equipage of every kind that can be dispensed with. The detachment will be properly rationed and is authorized to obtain necessary supplies en route in the usual form and to carry forty rounds of ammunition per man, with the necessary clothing. It will start from Fort Huachuca at noon on September 17th and will march east of Fort Bowie, west of Fort Grant, touching the limits of the Fort Lowell district, east of Fort Thomas, west of Apache to a point north of that post, should they reach that point without being captured.

The commanding officer will then notify the commanding officer, Fort Apache, by courier, of the presence of his detachment. He will then select an agreeable camp and send to Fort Apache for supplies. After remaining there ten days they will return, passing east of Fort Apache, west of Fort Thomas, east of Fort Grant, and west of Fort Bowie, and east of Dragoon Station, on the Southern Pacific railroad to Fort Huachuca. In starting from Fort Huachuca they will be allowed from 12 m. September 17, until 6 a. m. the day following, before being followed by the troops from Fort Huachuca. After 6 a. m. September 18, they will remain in camp until 12 m. of that day, and after that time they will be limited in marches to the hours between 12 m. and midnight of each day. The commanding officer of the detachment will select (within the above described limits) his own line of march and conceal his men and camps according to his own judgment. Both officers and men of the detachment should fully understand the course to be taken and places of rendezvous, in order to assemble again, whenever it becomes necessary to separate because of close pursuit, or to avoid discovery.

VI. Post commanders will conceal their troops and establish lookouts in such way as to discover, surprise and capture the detachment above mentioned, if possible, and in any event they are directed to have the raiding party pursued until a fresh command is on the trail. Information concerning the party to be pursued will be communicated with the least possible delay by heliograph, telegraph or courier to the different post commanders and to all troops placed to intercept them.

VII. Reports will be made by post commanders by telegraph to these headquarters daily, of any observation of the raiding party, their movements and efforts made to capture them. The party or any portion of them will be regarded as captured whenever another detachment or command of equal numbers gets within hailing distance or within bugle sound.

The Commanding Officers at Forts Bowie and Grant, will send one officer or non-commissioned officer, provided with two horses each, to accompany the party and act as witnesses in case any question should arise as to the rules to be followed or results. In case

of capture the detachment will march to the nearest post and another raiding party will be immediately ordered from these headquarters.

Similar movements will be made in the District of New Mexico by a detachment of cavalry from Fort Wingate, N. M., moving around Fort Bayard and returning to its station; also one from Fort Stanton around Fort Bayard and return to its station, each going at some time within ten miles of that post and orders for marching and concealment of each will be the same as those directed for Fort Huachuca.

Care will be taken to avoid breaking down either the troop horses or pack animals, or stampeding or injuring any stock or property of citizens.

At the close of the period for field practice, post commanders will call for suggestions from officers and men of their commands, and make brief reports of results and mention any defects in the equipment of their command or anything that would tend to promote their efficiency.

Post Commanders will retain communication with their detachments sufficient to enable them to recall them to their stations without delay in case of necessity.

By command of Brigadier-General MILES:

J. A. DAPRAY, Second Lieutenant Twenty-third Infantry, A. D. C.
A. A. A. General.

An officer in command of a raiding force was credited with the capture of a military post if he succeeded in getting his command during daylight within one thousand yards of the flagstaff of that post.

The movements directed during the months of September and October were continued during parts of October and November, and embraced the country between Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and Fort Stanton, New Mexico, and between Fort Wingate, New Mexico, and Fort Apache, Arizona, a mountainous region three hundred miles in extent east and west, and nearly the same distance north and south.

This series of practical maneuvers, considering their initiatory or experimental nature were in the main very satisfactory, and the experience gained by officers and troops engaged in them were of incalculable value. The results of ten distinct field manoeuvres covering an area of hundreds of miles in extent may be stated in brief as follows: On five different occasions the raiding parties were overtaken and captured by the troops in pursuit, commanded respectively by Captains Chaffee, Wood and Stanton, and Lieutenants Scott and Pershing, notwithstanding that every device was adopted to annoy and deceive the pursuers by dispersing, destroying trails by having herds of cattle driven over them, by false maneuvers, etc.

On five occasions different detachments commanded by Captains Wint, Wallace and Kendall, and Lieutenants Richards and McGrath, misled and eluded their pursuers, but were discovered and intercepted by the troops in advance who were lying in wait for them.

Captain Wallace started from Fort Bayard, New Mexico, captured the command sent in pursuit of him, and avoiding the troops in advance succeeded in reaching Fort Stanton, New Mexico, but was captured by Lieutenant Pershing in endeavoring to return.

Captain Wint started from Fort Lowell, Arizona Territory, and escaping from his pursuers and eluding the troops sent to intercept him, remained several days in their vicinity in the Graham Mountains, and finally succeeded in reaching Fort Apache, with the loss of but four men, captured. Returning, he skillfully misled and avoided the command in pursuit, capturing a second command endeavoring to intercept him, but was finally captured by a third command to which one of his captives had deserted and given information of his presence. This was one of the longest and most successful expeditions of the series.

Lieutenant C. P. Johnson made one of the most successful and remarkable raids, exhibiting much originality in planning and skill in executing.

He started from Fort Grant to circle or capture Fort Lowell (distance approximately one hundred miles to the south of west); to accomplish this same with Fort Huachuca (distance approximately one hundred and twenty miles), and also Fort Bowie, forty-two miles south of Fort Grant.

Starting from Fort Grant he scattered his command, partially obliterating his trail by getting his command upon a heavy, sandy road that ran north and south but a few miles west of the fort; under cover of night he moved north instead of southwest, as he was expected to do. This sandy road was used by heavy teams hauling copper ore from Globe to Wilcox on the Southern Pacific road.

The troops that were put in pursuit from Grant moved west and southwest, lost the scattered trail and spent two weeks in endeavoring to find some trace of this lost command.

The commanding officer went to Fort Lowell for supplies and finally gave up the pursuit in despair.

Notwithstanding troops were on the lookout for Lieutenant Johnson from Grant, Lowell, Huachuca and Bowie, he was for three weeks as completely lost as if he had disappeared in a cavern in the earth, or in mid-air. Instead of going in the direction of Fort Lowell, as he pretended to do, he reversed his course, struck the Globe and Wilcox road, moved past his own station (Grant), and within a few miles of it, going north about thirty-five miles to the crossing of the Gila River, then moved down the river for about twenty miles, leaving no more trail behind him than a bird in the

air. This skillful movement brought his command a long distance to the northwest and in a broken, mountainous country.

In this section he concealed his command, moving still further to the west under cover of the Santa Catalina Mountains and timber and the darkness of the night with as much celerity and secrecy as an Indian or a panther. Gradually bearing south, in the gray of the morning he passed to the west and south of Fort Lowell, thus encircling that military post as he rode rapidly through the town of Tucson, about eight miles from Fort Lowell, while the occupants of that town were wrapped in blissful slumber.

Knowing he would be pursued by troops from Lowell he made rapidly to the southwest for twenty-five miles to the Santa Rita Mountains, where he again scattered his command and by a series of false movements, decoys and skillful maneuvers, threw his pursuers off his trail and threatened Fort Huachuca, and while pretending to circle that post to the south he suddenly disappeared and, moving west a good distance, made a forced march across country and surprised Fort Bowie.

Under the rule he was allowed to remain ten days for rest. The colonel commanding Fort Huachuca reported this young officer as having disregarded his orders and that he had not circled that post, little thinking that the maneuvers were intended as a blind.

After quietly resting ten days Lieutenant Johnson apparently made all preparations to move north from Bowie to Grant. After leaving the former post he suddenly reversed his course and moving rapidly and secretly across the country, succeeding in getting his command within a thousand yards of the flagstaff of Fort Huachuca, surprised and captured the post and garrison of six troops of cavalry.

It is needless to say that the chagrin and envy felt by the officers of the garrison was very great, for they were a proud, spirited and enterprising class of men. In fact, the feeling amounted almost to hostility against this officer, though they were very gracious to him and extended to him every civility and hospitality during his stay of ten days for rest and recuperation.

He had still a most difficult problem to solve. He was more than one hundred miles from his own station, and when once he started from Huachuca he was sure to be pursued by the picked troopers from that garrison, and in addition to this he must contend against the vigilance of those on the lookout from Bowie and Grant, for he must return to his own post either as victor or captive.

After a good rest and ample time to study the maps and topography of the country between Huachuca and Grant, Lieutenant Johnson marched

out at twelve o'clock, noon, for his movement against Fort Grant. Under the rule he was allowed eighteen hours before he could be pursued—six hours of day and twelve hours of night.

Sleuth hounds never tugged harder at the leash, thoroughbred racers never champed the bit with more impatience than did those Fourth Cavalry troopers to be set loose on the trail or in pursuit of the successful raiders, while there was the wildest excitement concerning its success on the part of the pursued party, and the most intense enthusiasm on the part of the pursuers. Fortunately the command was entrusted to an able and experienced cavalry officer, Captain A. Wood, who demonstrated his skill and good judgment, who instead of following the circuitous trail and false maneuvers, with the disadvantage of a stern chase, moved directly across country by a forced march of seventy miles to a pass in a range of mountains that he believed Lieutenant Johnson would pass through but not where any of his trails would indicate he was going. Towards this gap Captain Wood's troop marched at a rapid pace and reached it as the sun was low in the afternoon. Now the thing to be accomplished was to find if Lieutenant Johnson's command was concealed in the vicinity.

In these maneuvers it was not uncommon for the commanding officer to bribe the citizens to make false reports, or to give them erroneous information in order that they might convey the same misleading intelligence to their pursuers.

Lieutenant Johnson had evidently missed one civilian for, as Captain Wood was looking for signs of the pursued party or for some trace of the raiders, he discovered a lone missionary traveling through that country, who, on being questioned whether he had seen anything of a command of soldiers, stated that he had passed a small company just going into camp in a little pocket of the mountains about five miles away. This was a revelation and a boon for this accomplished cavalry leader and within a very short time his bugles sounded the command for Lieutenant Johnson's surrender after his very long and very successful raid.

Thus, Captain Wood's good judgment, enterprise and hard ride of seventy-five miles was rewarded with most gratifying and most creditable success.

This ended one of the most skillful of the interesting practical field maneuvers. Lieutenant Johnson is a fair representative of those Virginians like Stuart, Ashby and other brilliant cavalry leaders. He informed me that while a part of his plan was to capture the department commander, in which he was, however, not successful, he believed if he could destroy the telegraph lines he could make a successful raid from

Arizona to the Atlantic seaboard and avoid the troops in the intermediate districts of the country.

It is to be regretted that the untimely death by a cruel and painful disease has deprived the service of so accomplished an officer as Captain Wood, whose record, during the great war, on the Western frontier and in the field of military literature was most creditable and valuable.

The results attained in this field maneuvering were most pleasing. The excellent judgment and intelligence displayed by the commanding officers of the districts of observation in the disposition of their troops, the use made of the means of observation and communication, the zeal and skill exhibited by officers in the field, and the very great interest taken in these operations by the troops, were all most gratifying.

