VII
THE POPULATION OF THE CRUSADER STATES

Population pressure was stressed by pope Urban II in his famous speech at Clermont. Speaking of the condition of France, he is alleged by Robert the Monk to have said: "This land in which you live, surrounded on one side by the sea and on the other side by mountain peaks, can scarcely contain so many of you. It does not abound in wealth; indeed, it scarcely provides enough food for those who cultivate it. Because of this you murder and devour one another, you wage wars, and you frequently wound and kill one another. . . . Begin the journey to the Holy Sepulcher; conquer that land. . . ." 1 This overpopulation was hardly true of northern France, whatever the condition of the area near Clermont, but it may have been true of the fighting class from which the crusaders were drawn, although too many of the others went along. Since each knight was drawn from almost

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a thousand persons, a considerable population was required to provide a financial base for the crusading armies and to pay their very heavy expenses. Their opponents had the same problems, but without the extra cost of transportation to the scenes of battle and pilgrimage. This population had a definite bearing on the ultimate results of the ventures. Its analysis helps explain why the Syrian expeditions failed, why the campaigns against Moors, Albigensian heretics, and pagan Slavs in eastern Europe succeeded, and why the political crusades resulted in something like a draw.

Demographically, the crusades occurred at a time of great population increase, the period 1000–1348. The period is somewhat deficient in demographic data, despite the existence of occasional collections such as the Domesday Book in England. Except for a slow but steady increase in total population, conditions were fairly stable and probably much the same throughout the crusading areas east and west.

Usually there were more men than women, except in the cities. In part this was caused by the shorter life of women, but even allowing for this, the numbers of females appear inordinately low, a major demographic mystery. The sex ratio (number of men to 100 women) often was as high as 120. The average length of life of males was about thirty to thirty-five years, while the females lived about five years less. Of course the heavy infant and maternal mortality was responsible for shortening the average length of life. If a man lived to be twenty, he could well hope to make it to forty-five or fifty years of age. If he lived to be sixty he still had about a ten years’ expectation. Half of the people were under the age of twenty. On the average, four to five children were born to a family, but the number in a simple family (man-wife-children) at any one time was about three and a half. If the grandparents or other relatives lived with the family, the number in the household was higher. It can be seen that some conditions were quite different from those we know today.2

Not much different, however, was the span of life, the approximate number of years attained by those who lived longest. Long before the crusades, the pillar saints (Stylites) of the Holy Land had provided examples of how long men could live under favorable conditions of life isolated from contact with communicable disease. The pillar saints lived on platforms on the tops of pillars, sheltered by a roof above and protected by a railing around the top of the column. They were saved from contagion by their lofty position and their infrequent communication with persons below. They might live close

to a hundred years. By the time of the crusades this movement was largely spent. Of secular persons in the east the famous fighter and writer Usâmah Ibn-Munqdid lived until he was ninety-three, while his nurse was alleged to have lived to be nearly a hundred. His uncle, Sulûân, lived between seventy-two and eighty-five years, but his father Murshid only sixty-nine. No crusader is known to have lived past seventy. In the west, persons occasionally lived a hundred years. Table 1 gives the age at death of those crusaders for whom it is known, while the ages of death of Moslems are from Syria and nearby Islamic countries, derived mostly from the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Since they include scholars and other civilians who survived childhood, they are not quite comparable to the western crusader list, but the notable difference in age expectancy can hardly be explained by differences in types of occupations. Shortness of life among the crusaders often led to troublesome minorities, wardships, and short terms for holders of fiefs, preventing consistency of policies. Failure to adjust to the climate must be reckoned among the foremost crusading problems.

The indication of the healthiness of upper-class Moslems is paralleled by some information about the Syrian peasants, although the sample is small. In a few villages near Tyre fourteen family units show ten men who had twenty-one sons. Since three of the children are indicated as being four or five years of age, we may assume that all the children were under twenty. Contemporary English experience

4. Phillip K. Hitti, tr., *An Arab-Syrian Gentleman and Warrior in the Period of the Crusades* (CURC, 10; New York, 1929): p. 21 for Usâmah's age; p. 5 for his father; p. 6 for his uncle, who was born before Usâmah's grandfather died in 1082 and after his father's elder brother was born in 1068; p. 218 for Usâmah's nurse Lu'lû'ah, who was alleged to have lived to nearly 100 Moslem lunar years, equivalent to 97 of our years.
5. The one reputed octogenarian associated with the crusades has been reduced in age: James M. Buckley, "The Problematical Octogenarianism of John of Brienne," *Speculum*, XXXII (1957), 315–322.
6. The 35 Christians were (in alphabetical order) Alice of Champagne (1192/7–1246); Amalric 1136–1174; Baldwin I (1061/6–1118); Baldwin III 1130–1163; Baldwin IV 1161–1185; Baldwin V 1178–1186; Bohemond II 1108–1130; Bohemond III 1144–1201; Bohemond VI 1237–1275; Fulk of Anjou 1092–1143; Godfrey of Bouillon 1061–1100; Henry I of Cyprus 1217–1253; Henry II 1271–1324; Hugh I of Cyprus 1195–1218; Hugh II 1252–1267; Humphrey II of Toron 1177–1179; Isabel (of Jerusalem) 1172–1205; Isabel of Brienne 1211–1228; Isabel of Lusignan 1219–1264; John I of Cyprus 1267–1285; John I of Ibelin (1176/1180–1236; Joscelyn III 1134–1200; Mary of Montferrat 1192–1212; Melisend 1110–1161; Philip of Ibelin (1176/1180)–1227; Pons of Tripoli 1098–1137; Raymond of Poitiers (ca. 1116)–1149; Raymond of St. Gilles 1043–1105; Raymond II of Tripoli (ca. 1117)–1152; Raymond III of Tripoli 1139–1187; Reginald of Châtillon (1124/6)–1187; Sibyl (of Jerusalem) 1159–1190; Tancred 1075–1112; William of Tyre (ca. 1130–1187); and an unnamed son of Amalric, less than a year. On the span of life in late medieval England see Russell, *British Medieval Population* (Albuquerque, 1948), pp. 192–193.
would suggest that twenty-one sons would normally replace twelve fathers. If the twenty-one here were replacing only the ten men said to be fathers, Syrian conditions were probably healthier. Since English conditions were better than average, this sample of Syrian conditions suggests that they were good enough to increase the population.  

The populations of the European areas which provided those active in the crusades may be estimated as follows (in millions):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A.D. 1000</th>
<th>A.D. 1200</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France and Low Countries</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany and Scandinavia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Isles</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iberia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This excludes the Byzantine empire and the Balkans, which were largely neutral, although the empire did help the Franks at times. The populations of Islamic territory were roughly as follows (in millions):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A.D. 1000</th>
<th>A.D. 1200</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anatolia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even here much of Anatolia was either Christian or under Byzantine rule, although areas like that of Mosul and even Baghdad might have

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helped to offset the Anatolian situation. The population of Egypt was increasing rapidly in this period; there is no certainty about the size of the North African population. The weight of western population should have led to the conquest of the Near East in 1095, especially since the Islamic world was badly splintered.

Probably the growth in numbers of the fighting class in the west was even greater than that of the population at large. In the first place, there was a change in nursing which saw the growing use of wet nurses, especially in royal and noble families; mothers who nursed their own children gave birth less frequently than those who allowed wet nurses to care for them. This meant a large increase among the upper classes in the number of younger sons, ideal candidates for the crusades. Except for the church, medieval society had few places for younger sons. Later, of course, the increase in royal authority offered openings for the more ambitious among them as mercenaries, officials, and lawyers, while the tremendous increase in the regular clergy in the new orders absorbed thousands. But in 1095 the crusades offered exceptional opportunities, both religious and secular.

Even though the members of the military class in 1095 were numerous and eager, they had some habits and customs which were undesirable in pilgrim-crusaders. They had no inhibitions, as the pope had noted in his Clermont address, against fighting other Christians. The urge to pillage any convenient locality was very strong and, of course, the right to pasture animals at will was assumed. What chance then was there for armies of such men to pass day after day, particularly in a foreign land, without getting into trouble, even in Christian lands? Retaliation from countries as powerful as Hungary, Byzantium, and even the Serbs and Bulgars might be serious.

Furthermore, the northern fighter seldom considered water transit. One exception was the abbot of Cerne, who was said to have bought a ship for himself and his associates. More typical was Joinville, who meditated somewhat fearfully on the perils of the sea: “Soon the wind filled the sails and had taken us out of sight of land, so that we could see nothing but sky and water; and every day the wind took us farther from the homes in which we were born. How foolhardy . . . for when

11. The subdivisions of parishes and the increase of schools also opened places for thousands.
you go to sleep at night you do not know whether you may find yourself in the morning at the bottom of the sea."12 This aversion, if not outright fear, must be taken into account when one tries to explain why crusaders continued to go east by land.

The demographic implications of the crusades as pilgrimages to the east are of importance, particularly with respect to the several countries through which the crusaders passed. Years ago Professor Duncalf showed that the pope had a plan for the First Crusade which included meeting at Constantinople in the spring of 1097. Recently H. E. J. Cowdrey has confirmed that the main objective was Jerusalem, whether the plan was primarily for a pilgrimage or for holy war.13 Since the objective was clear, the meeting at Constantinople meant war against Turkish forces in Anatolia with its demographic problems.

While one may assume a very considerable ignorance by medieval man about geographic conditions even in his own country,14 the pope must be assumed to have been as well versed in traveling conditions as anyone in his day: he said at Clermont that it was now a two months' journey through the conquered land (of Anatolia presumably). His messengers were constantly traversing the ecclesiastical world, especially in the east, since Urban II was on good terms with the emperor and in touch with him. Pilgrims also went to Jerusalem regularly in the century before the crusades. In planning for such a great expedition, considerable attention should have been paid to the problems of moving a large army toward the chief objective, Jerusalem. This is of importance because one did not have to pass through Anatolia to reach Jerusalem: there was the alternative, even from Constantinople, of going by sea.

It is an axiom of medieval economic history that travel by sea was less expensive and usually faster than by land. Already by 1085 the great cities of Venice, Genoa, and Pisa had sent ships to the east, so that regular patterns of sailing had emerged to take advantage of Mediterranean winds and to avoid fog, rain, and bad weather. Usu-


ally one round trip a year was made to the east. Ships were apt to sail east either in the spring, or — more likely — in the early fall, not to return until the following spring. Later crusades followed similar patterns. In 1239 French crusaders sailed from Marseilles in August and were at Acre in September. Even faster, the next year Richard of Cornwall left England on June 10, 1240, spent three months getting to Marseilles, but sailed from that city in mid-September and landed in Acre October 8. In 1248 Louis IX left Aigues-Mortes about August 25 and was in Cyprus by September 17. Returning a few years later he sailed from Acre on April 24, 1254, and “after a long and dangerous voyage he landed at Hyères in Provence early in July.” The great Italian cities all sent fleets which operated successfully within the first decade of the crusading period.

From Venice to Antioch was probably a sea voyage of about sixteen to seventeen hundred miles, from Genoa perhaps a hundred miles more. The trip by sea (which, of course, could be planned ahead) took from three weeks to over two months, to judge from the instances above. These were fair samples, since they involved crusading armies with their horses and weapons. Although Louis IX obviously had the means to prepare very carefully for the journey, the other two expeditions probably would not have been able to prepare as thoroughly. To the time needed for crossing from the Italian seaports to Syria, the march from Paris to Genoa or from Cologne to Venice would add 500 miles. The crusaders probably marched in several groups since they did not need guidance or protection. The march might have taken two months, since the Alps had to be crossed. In short, the journey from the west to Antioch would have been a matter of four months, possibly five to allow for delays at the port of embarkation.

The demographic implications of the sea voyage should not have been very serious. Before embarkation, the crusaders were in their own or friendly countries, presumably in small enough groups so that they had ample market facilities and knew the languages well enough for communication to be simple. At sea there were the usual problems of heavy weather and Moslem corsairs, even though the Italian cities had mastered the Mediterranean quite well. The problem was that they occasionally went ashore and were apparently ready to fight.

15. In the fourteenth century the compass would allow winter navigation; see Frederic C. Lane, “The Economic Meaning of the Invention of the Compass,” American Historical Review, LXVIII (1963), 605–617.
16. See volume II of the present work, p. 472.
17. Ibid., II, 483.
18. Ibid., II, 493, 508.
with little reason. Richard I of England took Messina by storm and sacked the city while arranging for winter quarters, and then captured Cyprus the following spring; one division of his fleet aided the Portuguese in capturing Silves as it passed by. His forces thus had considerable practice on the way. Even the saintly Louis IX had difficulty getting to Palestine: he captured Damietta on his first expedition before losing his army in the Nile delta, and died fighting at Tunis on his second expedition. Thus one may wonder whether, had the First and Second Crusades gone by sea, they would have passed between Crete and Cyprus on one side and Egypt on the other without yielding to temptation. Crusaders had great psychological difficulties in getting to the Holy Land without fighting. This made the size and strength of the population, which they could not resist fighting, a matter of considerable importance.

According to Sir Steven Runciman, “land travel was always cheaper than sea travel, and the Byzantine roads through Anatolia down into Syria were excellent.”19 Perhaps for a pilgrim or small groups of pilgrims begging their way it was cheaper, but for any who paid their way this is very doubtful. Consider merely the energy involved. If a man sailed from Venice or Genoa, he sat or slept on the ship for a few weeks, needing a minimum of food. If he went by road he used his own energy or that of a horse. Food for both, as part of a large migrating group, was expensive; many crusaders complained of the high price of food or even of its lack. The very size of the great caravans caused scarcity of which the local people took advantage. If the crusader slept out, he had to carry his shelter, which meant more horses and servants. If he slept in inns, it was often expensive. The reasons for choosing the land rather than the sea route must be sought in medieval habits of traveling and thought rather than in considerations of cost.

The journey by land was quite different from the land-sea voyage from western Europe, even if both went through Italy. The great German pilgrimage of 1064–1065 was probably what the pope and crusaders had in mind as a precedent for the First Crusade. The pilgrims left Regensburg in the middle of November and reached Jerusalem on April 12, a journey of only about five months. Apparently they sailed part of the return journey. One pilgrim, bishop Gunther of Bamberg, died in Pannonia on July 23, a few weeks’ journey from Regensburg.20 From that city to Constantinople must have been a

19. Ibid., I, 73.
thousand miles, with another six hundred to Antioch, and two hun-
dred more to Jerusalem. If one started from Paris another four hun-
dred miles had to be added. It took at least six months to go the
2,200 miles from Paris to Jerusalem. Those who went by Italy and
the Balkans had about the same distance, not counting in some cases
the crossing of the Alps. Most pilgrims who set out for Jerusalem
were probably veterans whose trip was the culmination of a career
of lesser pilgrimages to the shrines of the west. Their experience and
traveling ability would hardly be duplicated by a crusade of the feu-
dal lords and lesser folk often setting out for the first time on such
a venture.

In the spring of 1097 five crusading armies converged on Constan-
tinople, a city of perhaps 100,000.21 The population of the Byzantine
empire in Europe was probably about four to five million, although
this included some Serbians and Bulgarians. In Anatolia the imperial
subjects probably numbered a couple of million: Turks held Nicæa,
not far from the capital. The population of Anatolia was probably
about seven million, of which the Turks, although a minority, were
masters of perhaps four million. The crusaders at Constantinople must
have numbered at least 2,500 knights as part of a mass of perhaps
20,000 persons of all sorts, even after the initial venture of Peter the
Hermit across the Bosphorus had been crushed.22 Granted that the
attitude of Byzantium and the crusaders to the Turks was hostile,
what was the degree of hostility? Even more interesting, how did the
parties to the coming confrontation on the march between Nicæa
and Antioch regard their relations: as a holy war to drive the Turks
from Anatolia or as the passage by a hostile armed force bent primar-
ily on a pilgrimage? The Byzantine empire probably had many more
in Anatolia who were favorable to it even if subject to the Turks.

Subject to more careful study, the demographic connotations would
seem to be in favor of the thesis that all three parties viewed the
crusading expedition as essentially an armed pilgrimage rather than
a holy war, despite the pope’s emphasis on helping Byzantium. The
Byzantines apparently doubted that a combination of empire and cru-
saders could destroy the Turkish power; this rather suggests a lower
estimate of the size of the crusading army. Still, the Byzantine em-
peror Alexius Comnenus hoped that the Turks would be so weakened
by the crusaders that they would not threaten the empire, while if

Historical Essays, pp. 84-85.
the crusaders were hurt badly, the Turks might not blame the empire for helping them. The Turks hoped to damage the crusaders as much as possible, and to avoid being hurt so badly that the empire would profit. The crusaders, in no mood to go all out to restore the Byzantine empire in Anatolia, were not eager to fight the Turks to the finish. In fact, however, the demographic situation would have favored success of a joint crusader-Byzantine venture in 1097, a success that might have prevented the development of the Ottoman power later and given the crusaders a better chance to capture all Syria and hold it a much longer time.

The First Crusade suffered serious losses while crossing Anatolia. The three ventures of 1101 and the two in 1147 all experienced disastrous failures: apparently only the faster mounts escaped, and few fought another day. In 1190 Frederick I, in spite of sending embassies to the Turks, had serious trouble before he drowned near the end of the journey, after which only a small fraction of his army got through. Actually until 1187 the enemies of the crusaders were stronger in Anatolia than in Syria.

Once the armies were in Syria the character of the crusading project changed abruptly from pilgrimage to holy war. It was nearly a year from the time the siege of Antioch began until they captured Jerusalem. Feudal customs and habits of fighting at the end of a short journey no longer handicapped the crusaders; in fact they were almost ideal for the situation in Syria, a land of small Moslem communities each independent and fighting to preserve or to enlarge its own territory. The crusading armies, even after they suffered losses crossing Anatolia, were still probably larger than any later ones, perhaps in the neighborhood of three thousand knights and twenty thousand others, some reinforcements having come directly by sea. The demographic questions now concerned the number and social status of those who came and remained, the number and attitude of the mass of Syrian peasants, and the size and distribution of Moslem armed forces in the country.

Once the crusaders took over an area and were reasonably successful in their fighting, they could apparently count upon the local people to supply the usual payments and services which they were accustomed to pay to any dominant group. There was little danger of disaffection from even the local Moslems unless the crusaders were losing badly. On the other hand they could not count upon the undying support of Armenian or Syrian Christians, who had done well

under Moslem rule. The control of the country centered about walled
cities and castles or other strongly fortified places; they were local
administrative centers as well as military strongholds. Their strength
made them difficult to assault, and the custom of avoiding winter
fighting made lengthy sieges impractical and unusual. Thus the size
and character of the area taken in the First Crusade was vital, since
the Moslem forces were caught unprepared and at their weakest while
the crusading strength was at its highest. The adjustments made in
the first few years would not be easily altered. If we assume that the
Syrian population, like that of western Europe, would support about
one knight or horsemn of first rank to each thousand of the popula-
tion, its size can be related to the position of the two contending
groups.24

The population of Syria has been estimated at about 2.7 million.25
The estimated size of the ten largest cities, shown in table 2, is based
on the area within their walls (at 125 people per hectare, except Tripoli),
since the constant fighting probably made for relatively little extra-
mural building. Hebron was about the size of Acre. Many famous
towns are not included in this list; their population is sometimes hard
to estimate for the crusading period, since older walls of great extent
remain. A quick survey will show how small many of the remaining
cities were.

Several places, although experiencing some of their greatest days,
were still quite small. One of these was Ascalon. The Byzantine city
may have been only ten hectares in area; under the crusaders it prob-
ably reached about twenty-four hectares with a population of about
three thousand. The chronicler who tells of its siege in 1099 says that
of ten thousand killed, two thousand seven hundred were residents
of the town. In 1111 it had to pay only 7,000 dinars to a besieging
force, a relatively modest sum. William of Tyre tells of its mighty
walls and trained defenders, who were said to have been double the
number of the crusaders’ besieging army in 1153; it is possible that
troops poured into the city in time of siege.26

24. A good discussion of this appears in Raymond C. Smail, Crusading Warfare (1097-1193)
26. Encyclopaedia of Islam, 1 (Leyden, 1908), s.v. “Askalan”; Palestine Exploration Fund,
Quarterly Statement (1921), p. 72a, and (1913), p. 20a. Plans exist in both Emile Isambert,
Itinéraire descriptif, historique et archéologique de l’Orient (Paris, 1882), III, 215, and Rey,
pp. 48-49. For the year 1111 see Sibt Ibn-al-Jauzi, in RHC, Or., III, 541. For 1153 see William
TABLE 2
Estimated Size of the Largest Syrian Cities about A.D. 1200*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Hectares</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Antioch</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>40,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Edessa</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Damascus</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Aleppo</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Homs</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Hamah</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>6,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>6,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>5,625</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*From Russell, Medieval Regions and their Cities, pp. 201–205. The density of Tripoli is assumed to be only 100 (instead of 125) persons per hectare, because the move from the old city to the new must have thinned the density.

Three other cities besides Homs which had served as provincial capitals under the Fatimids were quite small in this period: Qinnasrin, Ramla, and Tiberias. Qinnasrin had become very small, although its exact area is not known. Ramla was the capital of Moslem Filistin and, al-Idrisi said in 1154, was the largest city in Filistin after Jerusalem, perhaps 160 hectares in area. It had been wrecked in 1133 by an earthquake, which apparently destroyed a third of it. Saladin is said to have destroyed it anew in 1187. Tiberias was a long narrow city beside the Sea of Galilee; although once capital of the province of Jordan, it enclosed only about eighteen hectares. The mighty fortress, Krak des Chevaliers, covered only thirty-five hectares.

Other cities were small in the crusading period although they had been famous at an earlier date. Sidon comprised about fifteen to twenty-five hectares in this period, but Caesarea only about ten. Yaqut said in the thirteenth century that Caesarea was only a village although it had once been a fine city. Jaffa had a walled area (probably medieval) of about the same size. More is known about Tyre, which had perhaps three thousand inhabitants. Four inland places which had been

better known earlier were also quite small during the time of the crusades. Baalbek was a small Arab village scattered among the four-hundred-hectare remains of the city. Jericho, if its medieval walls were no more extensive than the ancient walls, comprised about thirty-six hectares. Bosra, although a rather important desert center, covered only about twenty-two hectares, while Palmyra, well out in the desert, probably had comprised about twenty.\textsuperscript{30} In general the border areas next to the desert seem to have been drier during the period of the crusades than earlier.

The areas of some of the other places may also be estimated. Beirut, to judge from the obviously medieval area of the modern city, may have comprised about thirty-five hectares, but some of this area may have dated from the later medieval period. Gezer (Mont Gisard) had perhaps twenty-seven hectares.\textsuperscript{31} Jubail (Byblos) seems to have covered only five to seven hectares. Nablus was a fair-sized city of perhaps thirty-six hectares, again judging from the medieval appearance of a section of a modern map, while Tortosa enclosed about fifteen to nineteen hectares.\textsuperscript{32} As can be seen, information is usually accidental for the smaller places: there were many places for the size of which no information seems to remain. In the north, particularly in the Edessa-Aleppo area, even larger places existed about which little data remain.

The size of the inhabited area of Syria is hard to estimate because of the desert next to it and the mountainous character of the land itself. Perhaps it included about 100,000–110,000 square kilometers. If we divide the largest estimate for the village units (12 square km) into the smallest estimate of habitable land (100,000 square km), this gives about 8,300 villages. Dividing 110,000 square km by 7 square km gives about 16,000 villages. The range between these is thus quite large. The average population of the villages has been estimated as

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[30.] Michel M. Alouf, \textit{History of Baalbek} (Beirut, 1890), pp. 4, 7 (tr. L. Mooyaart, 1898); Jericho: Palestine Exploration Fund, \textit{Quarterly Statement} (1931), p. 196b. The modern inhabited area of Bosra is about twelve hectares but the earlier area apparently was larger; see Isambert, \textit{Itinéraire}, III, 529; Palmyra (Tadmor): Theodor Wiegand et al., \textit{Palmyra} (Berlin, 1932), I, 15; Isambert, \textit{Itinéraire}, III, 653.
\item[31.] Karl Baedeker, \textit{Palestine and Syria} (Leipzig, 1876), plan of Beirut on p. 436; Isambert, \textit{Itinéraire}, III, 585.
\item[32.] Isambert, \textit{Itinéraire}, III, 595 (Jubail), 395 (Nablus), 695 (Tortosa); Rey, \textit{Étude}, pl. xxi (Tortosa); Rey, \textit{Les Colonies franques}, p. 441 (Jubail), p. 131 (Tortosa). For Jubail see also Maurice Dunand, \textit{Fouilles de Byblos}, I (Paris, 1937), pl. cciv, an estimate of the medieval portion of the city.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
about 200–210 persons. At this size the total village population would vary from a low of about 1.7 million to perhaps double that. Given the mountainous character of the land, an estimate of about 2.3 million for the total village population of Syria would seem reasonable, if very approximate, living in perhaps 11,000 villages. This would mean a horseman to each four or five villages (much like the support of a knight in the west) and two foot-soldiers to a village, assuming about seven foot-soldiers to each knight.

The assumption then is that table 3 gives a fair model of the Syrian population. The military establishment is estimated at 2,500 horsemen, a little higher than the ratio of one to a thousand despite the mountainous character of the land. It is assumed that each horseman would have about four retainers and the footmen one apiece. The top ten cities would have about 137,000 and the next sixty-five or so (those above a population of a thousand) about 130,000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>No. of Units</th>
<th>Total in Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Horsemen</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their retainers</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot-soldiers</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their retainers</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First 10 cities</td>
<td></td>
<td>137,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next 65 cities</td>
<td></td>
<td>130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villagers</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2,777,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the first years of the initial crusade the crusaders took six of the ten largest cities, which probably represented about the same proportion of the land. The estimated population of the cities held by the two sides was (in thousands):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crusader</th>
<th>Moslem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antioch</td>
<td>Damascus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edessa</td>
<td>Aleppo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>Homs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>Hamah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The crusaders thus held about 68 percent. If one estimates a total knight service for all Syria at about 2,500, this proportion would sug-

gest 1,700 crusader knights, and about 800 for their enemies. In fact, the crusaders set up a system of military service approximately as follows (in number of horsemen):\(^3^4\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kingdom of Jerusalem</th>
<th>647–675</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antioch &amp; Edessa</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temple &amp; Hospital</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,747–1,775</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The coincidence is reasonably close: a part of the support of the Temple and Hospital came from the west.

The situation was complicated because both crusading and Moslem groups were divided among principalities which sometimes fought intra-faith battles. Aleppo was in a notably weak position and might well have been captured by the crusaders if the three crusades of 1101 had not all broken up fighting in Anatolia. The disastrous effect of crossing Anatolia was never worse, for from that date the crusaders were, in general, on the defensive. The struggle in the north saw outside forces from Mardin, Mosul, and even Baghdad intervening and offsetting the inherent initial advantage of the crusaders within Syria. The metropolis was Mosul, a great commercial center of Iraq in the ancient Assyrian part, a city probably the size of Antioch. Eventually the combination of Mosul and Aleppo under Zengi was too much for the crusaders, who lost the large city of Edessa to him in 1144. Even within the crusading states this now produced an approximate equality of lands supporting horsemen. Still, the distance of Mosul and even Edessa from Antioch and Palestine made it difficult for the Moslem forces to take over all of Syria; Kerbogha’s army from Mosul arrived too late to prevent the Frankish conquest of Antioch.

The great growth of the Egyptian population made the eventual conquest of the crusading states inevitable. Unlike Syria, which seems to have grown only slowly during the period of the crusades, Egypt grew very rapidly by medieval standards: this seems clear from surveys of land taxes then, which suggest a population of about a million and a half at the time of the First Crusade.\(^3^5\) Egypt was very weak both demographically and militarily; despite its later growth in population, the low opinion which the crusaders had of it never changed. By the time of Saladin its population had reached about two and a

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34. For horsemen see Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, pp. 89–90, 89 note 3, 96 note 8. The range of estimates varies about these figures: see volume I of the present work, pp. 351, 375, 381, 402, 424, 520, 565, 585, 608–609, and especially 599. This is about Prawer’s estimate, *History of the Latin Kingdom*, I, 459–461.
half million, in part because of a great expansion along the west border of the delta and up the Nile river. By the end of the thirteenth century, surveys indicate that the population had reached four million. The Egyptian population grew only as fast as its commerce, so the large population had a strong economic base. Saladin’s use of the power of both Egypt and the Moslem parts of Syria was obviously too much for the crusaders: only his death and the subsequent difficulties of his successors postponed the end. The victory by the Mamluks under Baybars in 1260 over the Mongol hordes, a victory no other force between Japan and central Europe could match, indicates the great strength of the Egyptian-Syrian army. Even if the crusaders had possessed all of Syria, their defeat would merely have been postponed. The attempts of the crusaders after the two captures of Damietta to go on to Cairo must be classed as gross miscalculations.

Most of the holy wars proclaimed outside the Holy Land dealt only with enemies within the country or within relatively easy journeys. Chief among these were the Reconquista of Iberia from the Moors, the war against the Albigensian heretics of southern France, and the conquests of the pagans in Prussia and the Baltic region by the Teutonic Knights and their associates. The reduction of the enemies of the church was rewarded by granting much the same privileges to these expeditions as the eastern crusaders received. For the governments in each of these cases there were secular rewards in making the conquests parts of the kingdoms and in some cases taking the actual possessions of the defeated. The losers had to join the church and pay the tithe, the heaviest regularly collected tax in the west. The shortness of the journeys, the extent of the rewards, and the religious advantages made these crusades much more attractive than the adventures in the east, except as pilgrimages to the holiest of Christian shrines.

The demographic picture of the Iberian peninsula during the Reconquista is quite complicated except at the beginning and the end of the Middle Ages. At first and occasionally thereafter for three centuries the population of a single state, the emirate and caliphate of Cordova, was pitted against a group of small states in the north. At the end, for more than two centuries, the kingdoms of Aragon, Castile, and Portugal dominated the emirate of Granada. At each of these times the demographic picture is rather simple. In between, the problem is complicated not only by the confusion of many states within the peninsula but by the appearance of help or aggression from outside—the Berbers, such as the Murābītūs (Almoravids) and the Muwaḥḥīds (Almohads), of North Africa and the French and other crusaders from
northern Europe. Both sides were occasionally willing to accept help from outside, but generally neither side was particularly happy to have massive invasion: the invaders too frequently stayed as rulers.

Islam was always a religious and cultural minority, although many Christians (renegados) were converted to Islam or accepted its presence and coexisted with it. On the other hand the connections of Spanish and Portuguese Christianity with other parts of the Latin church were a matter of no small importance.

Demographically, two developments influenced the situation. The first was the more rapid growth of population in the northern half beginning in the tenth century, a growth evident throughout Europe.\(^{36}\) The second was the Christian colonization of lands taken from the Moslem governments, which accelerated the momentum of the drive southward. This included an extensive substitution of conquerors for conquered, as in parts of the Balearic islands and some of the cities: Valencia, Seville, and others. In addition, villages and surrounding farm lands were distributed by land charters which designated the area and the types of colonists permitted. This probably gave the Spanish the experience which made them such successful colonists in the New World.

Europe in the Middle Ages was primarily an area of regions with metropolitan cities as the driving forces. The history of late medieval Iberia reflects such a pattern, with the regions of Barcelona, Toledo, and Lisbon impinging upon and gradually taking over the region of Cordova. Even this development was helpful to the Christians, since the division, as mentioned above, left the Moors with only one great center in the peninsula. Furthermore, the demographic developments of outside forces were in favor of the Christians: France, England, and Germany were all rapidly increasing in population while North Africa seems not to have changed much. Certainly the latter after 1200 showed little tendency toward territorial expansion.

In the Iberian peninsula the institutionalization of crusading zeal led to the creation of several military orders which eventually acquired great stretches of land and vast wealth. The leaders of the orders were among the great and influential men of the realms. From the standpoint of social classes the result of the crusading effort, so long and so successful in Iberia, was to raise in prestige the religious-military values at the expense of those of the commercial classes. We know who acquired the holdings in and around Seville, for instance,\(^{37}\) but

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not who lost the holdings, although they were probably men of commercial interests. The military, non-commercial character of the new men is evident. The great decline of seventeenth-century Spain was certainly exacerbated by the deterioration of the commercial classes in the peninsula.

The reduction of the Albigensians was, of course, on a much smaller scale both chronologically and demographically than the Reconquista. It occurred in the south of France, while the crusade came largely from the north, especially from the regions of Paris and Dijon.\(^{38}\) The north of France, like that of Iberia, grew much more rapidly from 1000 to 1348 than did the south. By 1200 the region of Paris was one of the most thickly settled areas of northern Europe. The problem of crushing the relatively weak Albigensians and their local protectors was difficult only before Peter II was killed at Muret in 1213. It hardly needed a crusade, but the expeditions provided advantages for the crusaders. The people of Carcassonne left the city “taking with them nothing but their sins”: obviously many in the army of the crusaders received more than absolution for their sins.\(^ {39}\) Probably Béziers was the object of similar exploitation. The demographic factor was a minor one: other factors easily explain its quick success.

The order of the Teutonic Knights began their campaign to convert and conquer Prussia at just about the time of the conclusion of the Albigensian Crusade, although earlier German groups had had permission to lead crusades east. Here the conquered were largely pagan in religion and Slavic in race. The paganism of the conquered made the conquest a virtuous act and the thinly settled character of Slavic culture made it a relatively easy matter. The crusade was, indeed, merely a continuation of the *Drang nach Osten*, much like the work of the Iberian military orders in southern Spain. In fact, one could compile a single account of the military orders as a whole: there were many common developments inspired by the success of the earlier orders. The Prussian military groups descended from the Teutonic Knights functioned in German history much like the Iberian military orders in Spanish and Portuguese history. But of these, the Teutonic Knights were the most successful in that they became the ruling class of a great area south and east of the Baltic. Demographically, the thinly settled character of their lands allowed the order to rule until the rapid increase in the population of neighboring Poland and Lithu-

38. “No useful estimate of the size of the army can be made; in their report to the pope the legates describe it as the greatest army ever assembled in Christendom” (Austin P. Evans, in volume II of the present work, p. 287, from *PL*, 216, cols. 138–139).

ania enabled those nations to crush the order in the battle of Tannenberg of 1410.

The political crusades of the thirteenth century, declared by the popes against Hohenstaufen and Aragonese leaders who seemed to threaten the papal states in Italy by enveloping them, do have interesting implications. By 1239 it was clear that the regions of Venice, Milan, and Florence included a very powerful group of cities in an area with a total population of perhaps four million. Even as early as 1176 a group of them known as the Lombard League had defeated Frederick Barbarossa and his powerful German army. In the thirteenth century these cities were stronger while the German imperial government was much weaker and, indeed, sent little help to Frederick II. In his kingdom of Sicily, which included southern Italy, Frederick II ruled a population of perhaps 2.5 million. In energy and in strength, even in warfare, the south was no match for any important combination of northern Italian cities. Parma, alone, a city of perhaps twenty thousand, practically wrecked the imperial expedition in 1248 by a single sally. Under the circumstances it is difficult to believe that the papacy was really threatened by the emperor’s attempt to conquer Italy. The attempt to exterminate the Hohenstaufens was an irrational, vindictive policy which blinded the curia to the danger of its side effects.

From an Italian standpoint the imposition of a French prince, Charles of Anjou, as king of Naples and Sicily and defender of the papacy was unfortunate. The region of Paris was, as mentioned earlier, a thickly settled area with a population of probably over five million. To it the crown had already added much of the regions of Toulouse and Montpellier and even part of the region of Dijon. The population of the kingdom of France in the second half of the thirteenth century must have been well over ten million. This made it twice as large as any other political unit in western Europe except Germany, which at the time was chaotic politically. France had an aggressive policy; Louis IX tried first to conquer Egypt and then Tunisia, and was active in the extension of royal power in France. Shortly after entering Italy as king of Sicily, Charles of Anjou achieved a dominant position in the peninsula, threatening the papacy there and the Byzantine empire across the Adriatic. He was thwarted only by a series of

accidents. French influence inevitably increased within the church, especially during the seventy years that the papacy was in Avignon and during the schism which followed. In the long run the papacy escaped from France only because of the incredible inefficacy of the French army, which was tied up by England, one-third the size of France.

With the exception of the papal crusade against the Hohenstaufens, the crusades in western Europe were sound demographically. They were undertaken by populations in France and Germany with both weight of numbers and momentum in their favor. Neither the Albigensian heretic, the Moor, nor the pagan Slav could offset that disadvantage. These thirteenth-century armies were much better disciplined than the more purely feudal forces of the preceding centuries.

Demographically, the crusades provide an interesting study. The great superiority of western Europe, particularly of feudal families, made it possible for the First Crusade to draw at least three thousand knights and perhaps seven times as many others to Constantinople in 1097. The combination of those armies with the Byzantine should have succeeded, as Urban II had planned, in clearing Turkish rule from Anatolia. Whatever the failure, it was not demographic. The armies which reached Syria, supplemented by men and supplies brought by the Italian cities, should have been enough to conquer all Syria: they failed to take Aleppo, Homs, Hamah, and Damascus, or to colonize the conquered countryside. Later expeditions, from 1101 to 1189, did not take account of the military strength of the Turks based on the large population of Anatolia; the same armies carried by sea would have reached Palestine in a few weeks with relatively little danger. They attacked Egypt just when it was increasing rapidly in population and in military strength. Even when they captured Damietta and could probably have traded it for Jerusalem, they twice tried to go on to Cairo and foundered in the Delta. The crusades failed in the east, not from lack of manpower, but from failure to take into consideration demographic realities, notably in Anatolia and Egypt.