

XXI

THE MONGOLS AND THE NEAR EAST

The Mongol empire, the most extensive known to history, stretched from Korea to Poland, and from Tonkin to the Mediterranean. Its birth, like that of so many empires of nomadic origin, had all the earmarks of the miraculous, but while others vanished as quickly as they appeared, leaving few traces worth noting, the Mongol empire lasted no little while and placed its stamp on many generations to come. Needless to say, its formation marked a critical moment in the history of the crusades and of the relations between east and west. Although we cannot trace the history of the Mongol empire here, even in general, we can sketch those of its features of greatest importance for the subjects dealt with in these volumes.

Before the thirteenth century, the Mongols were hardly known except to their immediate neighbors in China and Central Asia, and to a few merchants and missionaries, Moslem or Nestorian.

For Anatolia, see the bibliography given above for the Selchūkids of Rūm, chapter XIX, p. 675. Up-to-date references are furnished in the Turkish *İslâm ansiklopedisi* and, to the extent that it has appeared, the new edition of the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. There exist only special studies, often in Turkish; one may find, however, some important general observations, not always in agreement, in F. Köprülü, *Les Origines de l'empire ottoman* (Paris, 1937), and P. Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1938). As for the sources, one may read the English translation of Bar Hebraeus by Sir Ernest A. Wallis Budge, *The Chronography of Gregory Abū'l Faraj, the Son of Aaron, the Hebrew Physician, commonly known as Bar Hebraeus* (2 vols., London, 1932); the French translation by C. Defréméry and B. R. Sanguinetti (4 vols., Paris, 1853-1858, reprinted 1879-1914, 1954) of the *Voyages of Ibn-Battūtah*, now being translated into English by H. A. R. Gibb, *The Travels of Ibn Battūta, A.D. 1325-1354*, I, Works Issued by the Hakluyt Society, 2nd series, CX (Cambridge, 1958); and for a translation of Ibn-Bibi's chronicle, see H. W. Duda, *Die Selttschukengeschichte des Ibn Bibi* (Copenhagen, 1959). The works of W. Barthold, *Histoire des Turcs de l'Asie centrale* (Paris, 1946), and *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion* (London, 1928), remain indispensable, as do his numerous articles in Russian.

For the Il-khanid state, one need only refer to Bertold Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran* (2nd ed., Berlin, 1955), where there may be found all the bibliographical references necessary; to which add, for the Mongol thrust toward western Asia, R. Grousset's and S. Runciman's histories of the crusades, and C. Cahen's *La Syrie du nord*. One of the principal sources, part I of the *Ta'rikh-i-Jahān-Gushā* of Juvaini, has been translated into English by J. A. Boyle (Cambridge, 1957). See also D. Sinor, "Les Relations entre les Mongols et l'Europe jusqu'à la mort d'Arghun," in *Cahiers d'histoire mondiale*, III (1956), 39-62.

Their social ideas and way of life differed little from those of the Turkish nomads to the west of them. Their religion consisted merely of a few vague notions and animistic practices directed by magic-working wise men or shamans, and left them highly susceptible to foreign beliefs. There was nothing readily apparent to mark out one of their tribal chieftains, Temüjin, for a noteworthy role in history, but he succeeded, after about twenty years of petty warfare and intrigue, in uniting a certain number of tribes which were attracted by his success and the lure of booty and new pasturages. To this nucleus, he rapidly added neighboring peoples who had been a part of former Turkish or Turco-Mongol (Kitai) kingdoms. The influence of the traditions of these peoples, as well as his own victories, bred in him an ambition for conquest which, as always with nomads, scorned political frontiers. In 1206 he took the title of Genghis Khan (Chinggis Khan or Qan), the Universal Emperor. Then his followers set out to conquer the world.

The swift mobility and apparent invincibility of these men from an unknown land, who overthrew one "eternal" empire after another, filled their victims with a terror which was in itself one of the principal factors in their victories. Genghis Khan, like other leaders of anarchic nomads in the first flush of victorious conquest, succeeded in imposing discipline on his men, and a respect for the law formulated in the *yasa*. The army had a simple organization in groups of tens, hundreds, and thousands. Its extreme mobility usually allowed it to launch an attack before the enemy could have adequate warning. Furthermore, the Mongol chief was adept in obtaining information from merchants, and in using agents, spies, and accomplices. Thanks to his conquered subjects, he was able to transport swiftly unheard-of quantities of siege material. Finally, the alternatives of protection or massacre and frightful ravage, depending on whether one submitted completely or resisted, speeded the surrenders. The Mongols, or Tatars as they were sometimes called after one of their component groups, also joined a certain prudence to their daring. They did not try to establish their dominion in any area where they could still only make advance raids. They backed off when destruction seemed to threaten. But their courage was boundless; there were no captive Mongols, only victors or dead.

It was in 1211-1212 that northern China, including Peking, fell to some tens of thousands of these men. The occupation of the territories in Central Asia recently subject to the Kara-Kitai soon

put the Mongols in contact with the Khorezmian empire. In 1219–1220 they conquered Transoxiana and Khurasan, and launched raids across Iran as far as Azerbaijan. In 1221 Ghaznah fell, and Jalāl-ad-Dīn Mangubertī escaped the invader only by putting the Indus between them.¹ Meanwhile another force set out from Azerbaijan, this time without Genghis Khan, and undertook a remarkable expedition from 1220 to 1223, crossing the Caucasus and spreading terror across southern Russia, in the Crimea, and then among the Bulgars along the middle Volga, before returning to Central Asia around the northern end of the Caspian Sea without having made a geographic mis-step. The death of Genghis Khan in 1227 hardly interrupted the conquests. His four sons, with the third, Ögöдай, as suzerain, continued them. From 1231 to 1234 came the liquidation of the Kin dynasty of northern China and the annexation of Korea, and about the same time, from 1230 to 1233, the occupation of all Iran. From 1237 to 1239 the Mongols conquered central Russia, and in 1240 the Ukraine. The invasion of Poland and Hungary and the defeat of the German armies at Liegnitz in Silesia came the next year. The death of Ögöдай in 1242 resulted in the evacuation of central Europe, but not of Russia, which would remain under the Mongol sway. And in 1243, the Mongols of Iran destroyed the Selchūkid army of Rūm at Köse Dagħ, transforming Anatolia into a Mongol protectorate.

Dissensions between Ögöдай's successors stopped the advance briefly, but under Möngke it started again. One of his brothers, Kubilai, carried on long and difficult operations in China which were to lead, around 1280, to the Mongol conquest of all southern China and even the establishment of a protectorate over Tonkin and Cambodia. Meanwhile another brother, Hulagu, achieved in western Asia victories of major import for Moslems and Christians alike. The Assassins of Alamut, before whom all rulers had trembled for a century and a half, fell in 1256.² In 1258 the caliphate of Baghdad, five centuries old, perished in a blood-bath inflicted by an army to which Moslem vassals had had to supply reinforcements. Between 1258 and 1260 upper Mesopotamia succumbed, and in 1260 the Mongols invaded Syria, sacked Aleppo, frightened Damascus into subjection, and destroyed the Aiyūbid principalities of Syria and Palestine.³ After 1243 the Armenians of Cilicia did

¹ On his further exploits, and those of his "Khorezmian" Kipchaks, see above, chapter XIX, pp. 672–674.

² On the Assassins, their overthrow at Alamut, and their later activities in Syria, see volume I of the present work, chapter IV.

³ For the Aiyūbid principalities, see above, chapter XX, pp. 712–714.

homage to the Mongols, and brought in their wake the Franks of Antioch, who participated in Mongol operations in Syria.⁴

It was in Palestine, however, that the Mongol advance was finally stopped. The death of Möngke in 1259 had obliged Hulagu to leave too few forces for his general Kitbogha to hold the country effectively. Egypt remained a powerful point of defense, strengthened by the very collapse of the Syrian principalities. In September of 1260, at 'Ain Jālūt, the Mamluks crushed Kitbogha, and occupied almost all of Syria. The moral effect of the victory was considerable, but the material effect was not overly great, since Mesopotamia remained Mongol, and Syria itself was often threatened and invaded. Nevertheless, trial and error gradually taught the best defense against the Mongols. Possibly, too, the invaders lost certain elements of their initial superiority, since they now began a struggle among themselves over the division of their conquests. They were never able to surpass the western frontier established in 1260, nor the eastern frontier of about 1280. Of course, it was physically impossible to expand indefinitely an empire in which a commander on the western frontier already needed almost two years to travel to and from the capital of the Great Khan, Karakorum in Mongolia.

The Mongol conquest represented far more than a simple change in overlordship. For a time the political unity of the Mongol state allowed travel through Asia from east to west without the crossing of a single political boundary; and this endured even after the empire was divided into four realms following Möngke's death. This gave trans-Asian commerce a new lease on life, and made possible cultural exchanges throughout the entire area from Peking to Tabriz. The conquest had brought widespread destruction, of course, but the return to stability often allowed the rebuilding of ruined cities, although not always completely. With regard to Moslems in particular, while a great number of Turkomans had been pushed back (with serious consequences on the Byzantine frontier), many others, more numerous than the Mongol tribesmen themselves, were caught up and swept along with the conquerors. As a result the nomadic element increased in places, preventing the return to agriculture of lands emptied by the first devastations. Furthermore, just as the indifferent regime of the Kara-Kitai had tolerated all faiths and, as far as Islam was concerned, all its rival branches, so now this was repeated throughout a much vaster area and under a much more effective government.

⁴ For Armenian-Mongol relations, see above, chapter XVIII, pp. 652-659.

The Mongols also finished what the Selchūkids had started, the separation of Iran from the Arab world. Arab Baghdad became nothing more than a peripheral dependency of Iran, no longer the heart of Islam. In opposition to this Iranian Mongol world, the bastion of orthodox Islam and of Arabic culture now became Mamluk Egypt, which itself was altered by the reaction against the Mongols, the Mongol destruction of Moslem Syrian states, and to some extent the Mongol example.⁵ The Mongols now cast their shadow over "international" relations, particularly those between the Mamluks and the crusaders. One's attitude toward the Mongols became the decisive criterion. In contrast to the forbearance of the Aiyūbids, the Mamluks were grimly determined to finish once for all with the Franks, who had helped bring in the Mongol hordes, considered by the Mamluks the destroyers of all civilization. There is hardly an area where the arrival of the Mongols did not mark the opening of a new period.

Neither Mongol unity, however, nor certain of the features of the primitive Mongol regime were to last forever. Of the four realms into which the empire was divided under the theoretical suzerainty of the Great Khan at Peking, we are interested here only in the state of the Īl-khans of Persia, occupying Iran, Mesopotamia, and Moslem Anatolia.

The Īl-Khanid state, so called from the title of its rulers, was established by the descendants of Hulagu, who died in 1265. At first its capital was at Tabriz; later, after the reign of Öljaitu (1304–1316), it was transferred to the new city of Kangurlan (Persian, Sulṭāniyeh), still flourishing in northwestern Iran. Its foreign policy encompassed endless hostilities with the Mongols of Russia, better known as the Golden Horde;⁶ sporadic enmity with the state of Chaghatai in Turkestan; attacks and counter-attacks against the Mamluks for possession of the borderlands between Syria and Mesopotamia; and finally, rather good diplomatic relations with the Byzantine state in common opposition to the Golden Horde and the Mamluks, and also with the western Christians specifically against the Mamluks. Of especial interest, however, are the religious and economic policies of the Mongols, because these had the greatest international repercussions.

As already noted, the Mongols originally had no religion, at

⁵ On the Mamluks, see below, chapter XXII.

⁶ For the Golden Horde, see B. Spuler, *Die goldene Horde* (Leipzig, 1943), and G. Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia* (New Haven, 1953).

least in the sense of the great universal religions. As a result, they had tolerated these great religions indifferently. From the very beginning, however, they tended for political reasons to lean on the Christians or the non-orthodox Moslems, since these groups had suffered under the old regime and therefore were more likely to support the new. There is no doubt whatsoever that the Nestorians in Iran and Central Asia, as well as the Armenians in Cilicia, supported the Mongols and were favored in turn. Though Hulagu personally leaned toward Buddhism, his wife Toqūz Khātūn was a Nestorian, and the Il-khanid household included many Christians. On the other hand, Sa'd-ad-Dīn, vizir under Arghun (1284-1291), was a Jew who remained unconverted.

As had happened elsewhere, however, it was Islam which finally won the Mongols over, although not without difficulty. Hulagu's son Tegüder (1282-1284), probably with some hope of bringing the war with the Mamluks to an end, embraced Islam, and paid with his life for his premature step. But Ghazan (1295-1304) could become a Moslem without danger, and all his successors would follow him. There were many reasons for Islam's victory among the Mongols. That it was the dominant religion among their subjects was a factor, but the importance of this must not be exaggerated, since conquering minorities, beginning with the Arabs, did not always adopt the religion of the conquered majorities, even though it might be on a spiritual level equal to or surpassing their own. The Mongols of the Golden Horde had been converted to Islam even more quickly than the Il-khanids, thus creating a barrier between themselves and the indigenous Russian populations, who were, it is true, primarily subjects of vassal principalities which the Mongols did not administer directly. Insofar as the influence of native peoples is concerned, in fact, we must concentrate chiefly on the Turkomans if we are to explain the Islamization of the Mongols. In southeastern Russia, as well as in Iran, the Turkomans were much more numerous than the Mongols themselves. They were almost all resolute Moslems, and because of the similarity in way of life they largely absorbed their conquerors very early. Modern Iran conserves scarcely any trace of the Mongols, and in southern Russia those today called Tatars are all Turkish-speaking people. Essentially, the Islamization of the Mongols thus appears as one aspect of their Turkification.

Even though they became Moslems in faith, however, the Mongols did not act like the Moslem rulers whom they had replaced. While reestablishing the legal inferiority of non-Moslems

in a Moslem state, they strove to favor them as much as possible in order to get the diplomatic support of Christendom. The Mamluks were therefore justified in looking with suspicion on these Mongol converts to Islam; the convert Ghazan carried out in Syria the most formidable of the Mongol invasions, and took as vizir Rashid-ad-Din, also a convert, but thought to be covertly loyal to his original Jewish faith. In addition, some of the Mongols became Sunnites and others Shi'ites. Since Hulagu, as a patron of the astrologers, had protected the great Khurasanian Shi'ite scholar, Nāsir-ad-Din (aṭ-)Tūsī, for whom he had founded the observatory of Maragha, the Shi'ites had regained some of the ground lost in the two preceding centuries. This was a prelude to that evolution which, from the sixteenth century to the present, was to make of Persia officially a Shi'ite Moslem state, cut off in consequence from the rest of the Moslem world, and especially from its neighbor the Ottoman empire, where Shi'ism was persecuted.

The diplomatic effects of this religious toleration were widespread, and were of special significance for relations with the west. At the first appearance of the Mongols, westerners had been of varying opinions. They were not unaware of the frightful ravages perpetrated by the invaders, and knew that in Europe these fell on Christian peoples and churches. On the other hand, they quickly saw that a Mongol defeat of nearby Moslems was almost as good as a Frankish victory, and Franks who derived their information from the Nestorian Christians of Central Asia were aware of the advantages which a Mongol occupation brought to Christians. Those who had allied themselves with the Armenians of Cilicia were inclined to share the pro-Mongol attitude held by the Hetoumid dynasty since its inception. Further, the legend of Prester John helped to fashion prevailing attitudes. We have noted its Kara-Kitai origin in the twelfth century,⁷ but in the west the legend had become — and all the more so since the Kara-Kitai had departed from the scene — a manifestation of an ardent but confused belief and hope, fed periodically by distant echoes of the Nestorian church, in the existence of a Christian power lying beyond Islam. That there were Nestorians among the Mongols who publicly practised their religion helped to confer upon them this role. Added to which, there was the incredible simplicity of missionaries who, convinced of the obviousness of their Truth in the eyes of all men of good will, took for an imminent, inward conversion to the faith of Christ even the tritest expression of friendliness.

⁷ See above, chapter XIX, pp. 668-669.

The approach of the Mongols happened to coincide with the moment when, under the combined effect of the failure of the crusades and the spirit of the growing mendicant orders, the papacy undertook a missionary policy which, if not at first aimed at the Mongols, could not avoid establishing contacts with them and the Christians under their domination. Innocent IV later sent to Mongolia, through Russia, the Franciscan John of Pian del Carpine, and through Anatolia the Dominican William of Rubrouck, whose accounts remain priceless sources of information. The Mongol response was somewhat disconcerting. The Great Khan, drunk with victory, demanded the submission of all — kings,⁸ emperors, and pope — as though they were ordinary lords, without obliging himself to offer them, as he might to lesser lords, even a distant protection. As can be imagined, this demand met with a rather chilly reception, but relations were reestablished on a more realistic basis after 'Ain Jālūt (1260).

The Mongols now sought an alliance which would produce a concerted effort by the Christians of Europe and themselves against the Mamluks. Abagha (1265-1282) sent ambassadors to the pope (Clement IV) in 1267, to king James I of Aragon in 1269, and to the Council of Lyons in 1274, proposing campaigns against the common enemy — campaigns which, however, it was impossible to organize in sufficient strength or to synchronize, owing to the great distances involved and the many internal difficulties of the parties concerned. Pope Nicholas IV took up the idea once more, however, and Arghun's response went west in the hands of the Nestorian Mar Yabhalāhā III, who visited the Genoese, the kings of France and England, and the pope in the course of an embassy the valuable account of which we still possess.⁹ Negotiations still went on under Ghazan and even, somewhat perfunctorily, between pope John XXII and Abū-Sa'īd (1316-1335), who had, however, made his peace with the Mamluks. The presence of western negotiators facilitated contacts with the Mongols, as did the sending of missionaries such as Ricold of Monte Croce, and even the constitution, officially accepted by the Il-khan, of a hierarchy of bishops *in partibus infidelium*, under an archbishop of Sultaniyeh.

⁸ On the efforts of Louis IX of France, and later of Edward I of England, to concert operations with the Mongols against the common Moslem foe, see above, chapter XIV, p. 507, and chapter XVIII, p. 654.

⁹ P. Pelliot, "Les Mongols et la papauté," *Revue de l'orient chrétien*, XXIII (1922/1923), XXIV (1924), and XXVIII (1931/1932); the Syriac *Histoire de Mar Yabhalaha III* (tr. J. B. Chabot, Paris, 1895); and E. A. W. Budge, *The Monks of Kublai Khan* (London, 1928). The kings were Philip IV and Edward I; the pope was Honorius IV, who had just died when Mar Yabhalāhā reached Rome (1287).

In the territory of the Golden Horde missionaries compiled the *Codex Cumanicus* (a Latin-Turco-Tatar dictionary). It was, in fact, a prince of Chaghatai's house who communicated to Philip IV the Fair of France an unrealistic plan for Asian peace, inviting him to prepare a European equivalent. And it was under the Mongols that Christian missions and a Latin episcopate were established in China.

In the commercial sphere, there was a parallel growth. The Mongol concern for traders from the very outset is illustrated by the episode of the caravan massacred under the Khorezm-Shāh,¹⁰ or, in the early years of the state of Chaghatai, by the long administration of a vizir of merchant origin, Mas'ūd-Beg. This interest in trade was to some extent common to all nomads, and was naturally emphasized by the immensity of the Mongolian conquests. It is difficult to know whether or not trans-Asian commerce in the Mongol period was substantially greater than that of preceding periods. There was no Iranian or Mesopotamian maritime rebirth; in fact, it was to the Genoese that the Mongols looked on one occasion to challenge the Mamluk fleet in the Indian Ocean.¹¹ The land caravans were perhaps more direct now; instead of turning their goods over to others in the passes between Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang) and Moslem Central Asia, as they had formerly had to do, merchants could go from the Mediterranean as far as Peking if they chose. The rise of the Italians, Mongol toleration, and this characteristic of caravan unity explain how Italian merchants could penetrate deep into Asia — even, like Marco Polo, as far as China — and thus bring back new and valuable information. It does not necessarily follow that there was any significant economic change in this trade; Asians had hitherto carried it on exclusively and continued for the most part to dominate it.

It is not our concern here to deal with Italian mercantile activity, either along the northern routes controlled by the Golden Horde, or along the southern, controlled by the Il-khanids.¹² We need only point out that because these routes ran from west to east, the state of quasi-permanent war between the Golden Horde to the north and the Il-khanids to the south had little effect on this commerce. The routes which originated along the north shore of the Black Sea crossed the lower Volga at Serai, the capital of the Golden Horde. Those which passed through Iran began either at Trebizond on

¹⁰ See above, chapter XIX, pp. 671-672.

¹¹ Bar Hebraeus, *Chronography* (tr. Budge), p. 575 (ad annum 1290).

¹² This trade will be treated in a chapter of volume IV, in preparation.

the south shore of the Black Sea, or else at Ayas (Lajazzo) in Cilicia. The real meeting-places for the traders were Sebastia (Sivas) in Anatolia, and especially Tabriz, even after it had ceased to be the political capital. For political as well as economic reasons the Mongols improved the organization of transportation and communications. The establishment of relays, caravanserais, and high-way police benefited merchants as well as the state. More debatable, however, was their fiscal policy, the merits of which did not outweigh its defects. This led to a brief experiment which, from our point of view, is particularly interesting — the use of paper money, or to be more exact, silk money, already common in China. In the unprepared climate of Iran, however, and because of an undeveloped technique, the scheme collapsed before the unanimous opposition of the merchant class.¹³

Even in the realm of culture the horizons broadened. We need note only that the Mongol period saw the culmination of Sa'di's life and the early career of Ḥāfiz, two universally recognized poets. It has left to us some of the most notable masterpieces of Iranian architecture. Persian miniature painting now took its rise from the fusion of the Iranian heritage with Chinese contributions, while Bar Hebraeus combined elements of Syriac, Arabic, and Persian culture in his writings. The Mongol period also witnessed the composition, under the direction of Rashid-ad-Dīn, of the only history of completely universal scope (and not strictly limited to the Moslem world) that Islamic culture has produced, in which, side by side with some rather perfunctory notices of the "Franks",¹⁴ there is much more complete and valuable information on the Chinese and the peoples of Central Asia, especially the Turks and the Mongols.

If the influence of the Mongol conquest was lasting, the political structure of the Mongols was not. Though stable, the regime could not avoid the economic and military difficulties which had paralyzed its predecessors, aggravated by the growth of a nomadic element which was always ready for new adventures. In the second quarter of the fourteenth century the Il-khanid state passed away. The state, if we can call it that, of Chaghatai collapsed at about the same time. A half century later, however, there would emerge from its ruins the last of the great leaders of Central Asia, Tamerlane (Timur-Lenk). The atmosphere, however, would be quite different, marked especially by Moslem fanaticism. The Timurids could play

¹³ K. Jahn, "Das iranische Papiergeld," *Archiv Orientalny*, X (1938), 308-340.

¹⁴ Tr. K. Jahn, *Histoire des Francs* (Leyden, 1951).

the part of restorers of the Mongol empire, and witness the spread of a healthy Iranian culture; but nothing could revive the exceptional climate of religious interpenetration and the free movement of men and goods which had characterized the Mongol period.

Consequently, there is little point in dealing here with the history of Iran and more distant Asia after the fall of the Il-khanids. One of their dependencies, however, although remote from the focus of their empire proper, deserves a special and more detailed treatment. Not only was Anatolia, because of its location, in constant touch with the Christian west, but it was under the conditions created there by Mongol rule that there arose the Ottoman empire, whose impact on European history was to be so great.

To summarize the chaotic events which followed the catastrophe of Köse Dagħ in 1243 and the death, two years later, of Kai-Khusrau II, is very difficult. Anatolia was so removed from the center of their empire that it never occurred to the Mongols to suppress the Selchükid government. Mongol exactions made its effective continuance impossible, however, even though no Mongol administration was set up to replace it at the outset. In addition, and unfortunately for Rüm, Kai-Khusrau II left only minor heirs, giving free rein to the rival ambitions of the magnates. Some of these advocated submission to the Mongols; others looked to the Turkoman instinct to resist, or hoped for Greek aid. The anarchy allowed Turkoman emancipation on the borderlands and the organization of akhis in some towns. Only gradually did order return, under a condominium of one of the Selchükid magnates and a group of Mongol generals, but the situation remained precarious and soon dissolved again. Only then did the Mongols turn their attention to the establishment of a direct administration, during which the puppet Selchükid dynasty died out. Since, however, Anatolia continued to be of secondary importance to the Mongols, and since they themselves were divided and weakened, there could be no regaining of lost ground, and the beginning of the fourteenth century saw a new situation out of which the Ottoman state would gradually take shape.

The principal stages of this evolution were as follows. From 1246 to 1256 the vizir Shams-ad-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī, and after his death (1249) the old emir Kara-Tai, beneficiaries of the Selchükid regime and the real heads of government, succeeded after a fashion in maintaining the old order of things, except where the Turkomans were concerned on the Cilician, Syrian, and Euphrates

borders. This they did in spite of opponents who obtained the intervention of the Mongols in support of Kai-Khusrau's second son, Rukn-ad-Dīn Kīlīj Arslan IV, at the expense of the first-born, 'Izz-ad-Dīn Kai-Kā'ūs II, who alone had been proclaimed sultan at first.

In 1256, the arrival of new Mongol armies in Iran, under the command of Hulagu, and the preparations for the conquest of Mesopotamia and Syria, led Baiju, the Mongol chief of Azerbaijan, to demand permanent quarters in Anatolia for his troops. On the whole, the proponents of submission were dominant in the more immediately threatened eastern part of Anatolia, while the resistance party's strength lay in central Anatolia. Within this latter group were orthodox Moslems, disturbed by the "paganism" of the Mongols and the favor they showed Christians, who were still very numerous in Anatolia; Christian Greeks, who counted on assistance from Nicaea; and finally the Turkomans, whose pasturages were threatened and who were always ready for a brawl anyway. Moreover, many Turkomans had only recently fought the Mongols in other areas whence they had been driven west. Naturally there was no question of a real alliance among these diverse groups, with their generally conflicting interests. It was this irreconcilability which gave to the resistance organized around Kai-Kā'ūs its complexity and its weakness. He was defeated and fled to Byzantine territory while the Mongols enthroned his younger brother Kīlīj Arslan.

The Mongols, however, soon accepted the idea of a division between the two sultans, the more submissive Kīlīj Arslan receiving the eastern part of the Selchūkid state, the more important part as far as the Mongols were concerned. They needed security on their flank while, from 1258 to 1260, they invaded Mesopotamia and Syria. In 1261, however, they took steps to get rid of Kai-Kā'ūs permanently. The unhappy sultan fled first to Constantinople and then, his hopes dashed by Michael VIII Palaeologus, who had become reconciled with the Mongols of Persia, ended his life as an exile in the Crimea under the protection of the Golden Horde, who were on bad terms with their cousins of Iran. From this crisis, enemies and refractory subjects derived most of the profit. Trebizond retook Sinope. The anarchy of the Turkomans, buttressed by Kurdish anarchy to the east, reigned from the Euphrates to the Byzantine frontier. An autonomous group organized itself between the upper Maeander and the Mediterranean shore across from Rhodes. Another mastered the Taurus, from its Isaurian end to

the approaches of the Cilician Gates; its chief was Karaman, whom a tradition, acceptable in its wider implications, at least, associated with the heretical circles stirred up by Baba Ishāq.¹⁵ Others, on the Syrian borders, plundered indiscriminately the subjects of the Selchūkids, the Aiyūbids of Aleppo, the Armenians of Cilicia, and the Franks of Antioch, not to mention the Mongols themselves when their power declined. It seemed as if everything were falling apart.

From 1261 to 1275, however, there was a certain steadying, associated with the person of Mu'īn-ad-Dīn Sulaimān, called the Pervāneh from the name of the first high office of state which he had held. The Pervāneh seized and wielded power as a dictator with Mongol backing, first under the nominal rule of the sultan Rukn-ad-Dīn Kilij Arslan IV, then under his son Ghiyāth-ad-Dīn Kai-Khusrau III. He maintained his position with the aid of Mongol armies, in place of the old Selchūkid army, which could no longer be relied on. He was a firm Moslem, raised in the Selchūkid state, who exercised authority to the apparent satisfaction of Mongol financial and military demands, but strove at the same time to preserve Selchūkid traditions and institutions, at least as far as possible. He was unable to suppress the Turkomans, but at least he kept them within tolerable limits. He retook Sinope and reestablished order. Favored by the general growth of trade among the Mongols of Persia, commerce in Anatolia developed equally. Cultural and religious life returned to the norms of the preceding period. It was difficult, however, to maintain unity. The magnates had profited from the financial disorganization to get provinces which they now held as quasi-fiefs in lieu of salaries. The Pervāneh himself held the old Dānishmendid province and Sinope, and the vizir Fakhr-ad-Dīn 'Alī had had his children invested with the whole Byzantine border area to the west. And there were others, not least of all the representative of the Mongol fisc who administered the province of Kastamonu directly as security for the repayment of loans. If these personages had their petty disputes, they at least managed to avoid outright civil war. There followed fourteen years of relative stability.

In 1276, however, came a new and more serious crisis, stemming from the growing rivalry between the Pervāneh and certain other magnates. Moreover, the terrible Mamluk sultan Baybars, who had already expelled the Mongols, harried the Franks and Armenians, and established his authority throughout Egypt and Syria

¹⁵ See above, chapter XIX, p. 691.

with effective brutality, now sought to deal permanently with the Mongol menace by cultivating all their adversaries.¹⁶ Both the Pervāneh and his rivals followed the two-faced policy of negotiating with Baybars in case they should fall out with the Mongols, while denouncing to the Mongols such negotiations by the other side. Finally Baybars was provoked into launching a campaign against Caesarea (Kayseri) in 1277, which opened with a bloody victory over the Mongols. Besides this, the Turkomans were still very much in evidence, and the Karamanids in particular constituted an available force which certain of the Pervāneh's enemies, as well as Baybars himself, tried to stir up. It goes without saying that they asked for nothing better than to fish in troubled waters, obviously with their own interests in mind. All told, this was the most serious aspect of the crisis. Baybars, getting less support than he had hoped for from the Selchükid provinces, where fear of the Mongols persisted, was unable to hold his own; but the Karamanids held the field for two years. They put forward a Selchükid pretender known as Jemri, the "poor fellow", a sobriquet given by his enemies. They succeeded in occupying Iconium (Konya) briefly (1276). Almost all the Turkomans of southwestern Anatolia participated in the movement, and while after a long, hard struggle the Selchükid-Mongol government did wrest back the great towns of the plateau, nothing could dislodge the Turkomans in the frontier zones, especially in the Karamanid Taurus.

Though order was finally reestablished, Anatolia was left in a situation quite different from that which had prevailed under the Pervāneh. Since he was considered responsible for the initial Mongol set-back, he was executed. He had no successor. Rather than restore those of high rank such as Fakhr-ad-Dīn 'Alī, who had given no cause for suspicion, the Mongols gradually themselves took over the high offices of state, controlled them, introduced their own fiscal institutions, and, in short, slowly took over the direct administration of the country. For some time Selchükid sultans continued to reign, chosen and replaced by the Mongols at will, and exercising less and less authority. The last sultan disappeared at the beginning of the fourteenth century so obscurely that most of the chroniclers know neither the date nor the circumstances of the end of this once-glorious dynasty, now more than two centuries old. Nevertheless, the Mongol seizure of power did not have the characteristics it might have had fifty years earlier; the Mongols,

¹⁶ For Baybars, see below, chapter XXII, pp. 745-750, and above, chapter XVI, pp. 574-586 (for the Franks), and chapter XVIII, pp. 653-655 (for the Armenians).

in fact, were becoming more and more converts to Islam, and their government therefore no longer aroused in rigorist circles the same resentment that it had.

Yet the authority of the Mongols, the heirs of the Selchükids, did not extend over the same area nor penetrate as deeply. Though they held eastern Anatolia firmly, they were concerned with the more remote west only to the extent that they thought they could derive from it profits greater than the costs of occupation. In other words, they were concerned with holding the large towns of the plateau, but had little interest in the peripheral Turkomans. At the same time, Byzantine defenses in Asia Minor were weakening. When, therefore, the eastern Turkomans fled westward before the next wave of invading Mongols, under Timur, there soon appeared outlines of Turkoman principalities as far west as the Aegean coast. Furthermore, the Karamanids were far from being destroyed, and at the beginning of the fourteenth century they finally occupied Iconium. Other principalities emerged, especially in the mountains of southern Anatolia, not to mention that of the Germiyan Turkomans, who had been brought in from the border region between Armenia and the Jazira in 1276 to combat a Turkoman revolt in western Anatolia, and naturally became in their turn quite independent.¹⁷ These principalities, much less affected by Iranian or Mongol influences than the large towns of the old Selchükids, constituted a refuge and a base for the rise of a sort of "Turkism", thus accentuating the ever-present contrast between the Selchükid cities and the *uj* territories of the Turkomans.¹⁸

Even over these towns and cities of the plateau, however, the Mongol hold remained relatively lax. The akhis were less circumscribed and held in check than under the Selchükid regime. Without in any way constituting actual "communes", as some scholars once thought, they became, in the absence of any real authority, an element of great influence in the life of the cities. Although their influence was exercised, in general, against the Turkomans, it also tended toward the limitation of Mongol power, though without going so far as revolt. Later, when there emerged Turkoman principalities, in which the towns enjoyed a good deal of internal independence because of the non-urban character of the Turkomans, the movement would be able to accommodate itself to their domination without difficulty.

¹⁷ For details, see C. Cahen, "Notes pour l'histoire des Turcomans d'Asie mineure . . . ; III," *Journal asiatique*, CCXXXIX (1951), 349-354.

¹⁸ A chapter on these principalities and their Ottoman successors is planned for volume III of this work.

Thus, there was no real substitution of a Mongol state for the old state of the Selchükids. Of course, certain Mongol institutions left a strong impress on the country, but politically Mongol unity fell far short of what had prevailed under their predecessors. New poles of attraction appeared: Armenia gravitated toward Iran or Mesopotamia, while Anatolia was drawn to the Turkoman principalities on its periphery. Nor did the disintegration stop there, for in the fourteenth century the Mongols became weak and divided in turn. In Anatolia their generals struggled against one another, as elsewhere in the İl-khanid empire, to such an extent that there was a tendency toward disintegration even in the area which remained Mongol. In some cases Mongol chiefs seized power, as did Eretna at Sebastia, or local notables succeeded in elevating themselves as petty princes, as did the vizir of Eretna's grandson, the qadi Burhān-ad-Dīn, at Sebastia in the last decades of the fourteenth century.

Except for a few lasting institutions of a fiscal nature, then, the Mongol regime in Anatolia represents on balance a destruction of the territorial and human collectivity which the Selchükid sultanate of Rūm had gradually built up. The interior was now divided into three parts, themselves in political disintegration: the eastern portion, no longer looking to the west, but rather to the east and south; the great central cities, which maintained Selchükid-Mongol traditions, though reduced now to regional importance only; and the domain of the Turkomans in the west, with the plateau no longer the focal point, but rather a dependency, of the frontier areas.

Economic developments reflect this political evolution. Not that commercial activity declined prior to the fall of the İl-khanid empire. On the contrary, the favorable conditions created by Mongol unification and toleration, and the development of western undertakings, created a current of exchange from Central Asia to the Mediterranean probably greater than before. But the direction of the carrying trade through Anatolia was thrown into confusion. The north-south trans-peninsular route across Anatolia toward Egypt via Adalia declined considerably, as did the drawing-power of the court of Iconium. The caravans now made for Trebizond, only touching a corner of the old Selchükid territory at Erzerum, or for Ayas in Cilicia. Despite political discord, however, trade continued between the north and south shores of the Black Sea, above all in Armenian and Italian hands. Sebastia therefore remained an important crossroads for international commerce. The

more western areas, however, were forsaken, and meanwhile the dislocation of the Mongol empire likewise endangered the commerce of the eastern areas.

We are too poorly informed on social changes to do more than suggest one or two hypotheses. In part, the Mongol state replaced the Selchükid state, and Mongol magnates replaced Selchükid magnates, as the proprietors of the soil. This altered the pattern of development from one adapted to the promotion of general prosperity within the country to one of exploitation for the benefit of foreigners, who were for the most part in temporary residence only. The final disintegration of the İl-khanid empire, however, made this feature transitory. It would be more important to know in what measure the anarchy, especially the disbursements and speculations, of the Mongol chiefs converted into private property the properties of the old state and in particular the old *iqṭā'* grants. Probably we shall be able to answer this question only after a complete study of conditions in the Ottoman period. Joined with this is the question, to what extent Moslem institutions were deprived of their endowments (Arabic singular, *waqf*) by the neutral, even anti-Moslem, religious policy of the first İl-khanids. And also, during the same period, what changes were made by the westward extension of Turkoman domains. The impression of the present writer is that there was no radical upset, but much remains to be learned. The condition of agricultural workers, in any case, must have been little modified by changes which for them meant simply an exchange of masters. As for the towns, the development of the akhis, which reached its apogee in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, is naturally of great importance.


Finally, the cultural continuity with the preceding period was quite marked, but here too there was evolution and a fusion of the inheritances of the past. Even though, in the eastern provinces, the policy of the first İl-khanids encouraged a fleeting restoration of the Armenian communities, the Moslem character of the upper classes and of the institutions was in no way compromised. The illustrious Moslem vizir of Mongol sovereigns, Shams-ad-Dīn (al-)Juvainī, himself helped to multiply and consolidate Islamic foundations in Anatolia. It is not certain that common Mongol rule facilitated the continuation of contacts with Iran, for the Iranian scholars remained at home. What contacts there were, however, at least served to accentuate the division from the Arab world.

Literature, too, remained Persian, and indeed now bore the full fruit of the growth begun in the Selchükid period. It was now that

Jalāl-ad-Dīn (ar-)Rūmī composed the greater part of his mystical poems, to which may be added those of his son, Sultān Veled, and the literature of mysticism was enriched, with the growth of the akhis, by the invaluable *futūwah* books. It was now, too, that the chroniclers Ibn-Bibī and (al-)Aqsarāyī produced those works without which we would know so little about the society in which they lived. Moreover, contact was now established between the mystical currents of the Iranized elements and the Turkish masses. More popular than Jalāl-ad-Dīn was Hajjī Bektash, of whom we know nothing except that his name would later serve to designate one of the most important dervish orders in the organization of Ottoman society. What is even more important, there began to appear works in Turkish which adapted for a Turkish public the offerings of Persian mysticism. If we are still far from the time when Turkish would become a literary language, authors such as Yūnus Emre and Shaiyād Ḥamzah nevertheless bear witness to a cultural elevation of the Turkish masses connected with their political rise in the Turkoman principalities.¹⁹ And it was also around 1300 that the semi-legendary Naṣr-ad-Dīn Khoja lived. He has remained from that time forward the symbol of the bantering common-sense of the people.

The successive collapses of the Selchūkid and Mongol regimes should not, therefore, be looked upon as the collapse of a civilization, but rather as its progressive rearrangement along new territorial lines and in new cultural patterns. The picture we get from Ibn-Baṭṭūṭah and the Egyptian official al-‘Umari, in the years 1330–1340, shows how completely the Anatolian world was cut off from Arab Islam. To a lesser extent, the fall of the Mongol empire would cut it off from Iran also. Though held fast by certain old traditions, the independent Ottoman state would take its rise on the frontiers of a sealed-off world.

¹⁹ A. Bombaci, *Storia della letteratura turca* (Milan, 1956).



22. The Mongols in the Near East, to 1291 (Map by the University of Wisconsin Cartographic Laboratory)