

21. Persia and Adjacent Regions (*Map by the University of Wisconsin Cartographic Laboratory*)

XIX
THE TURKS IN IRAN AND ANATOLIA BEFORE THE MONGOL INVASIONS

A. The Iranian Principalities, Georgia, and the Caliphate

At the conclusion of the chapter on the Selchükids, we remarked that the history of the eastern Moslem countries in the twelfth century had little direct connection with that of the Mediterranean region.[1] A few pages must be devoted to it, however, for the thirteenth century would see the brusque reëntry of Central Asia into

For a summary chapter of this kind, a bibliography can only be indicated in an even more summary way. The sources are for the most part those already noted in the chapter on the Selchükids in volume I, together with, for the western continuation of Irano-Mesopotamian history dealt with here, those indicated in the various chapters relative to Syria in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; for the Selchükids of Anatolia see below, p. 675. For Iran especially, see the history of the Khorezmians contained in al-Juvainī, *Ta'rīkh-i-Jahān-Gushā* (ed. Mirzā Muḥammad Qazvīnī, vol. II, Gibb Memorial Series, XVI, 2, Leyden and London, 1916, now translated by J. A. Boyle, *The History of the World Conqueror* [Manchester, 2 vols., 1958]) and an-Nasawī, *Sīrat as-sulṭān Jalāl ad-Dīn Mankubirtī* (ed. and tr. O. Houdas, Publications de l'École des langues orientales vivantes, series 3, vols. 9–10, Paris, 1891–1895); and, for Mesopotamia, Sibṭ Ibn-al-Jauzī, *Al-muntaẓam*, vols. IX and X (Hyderabad, India, 1940), and Ibn-as-Sā'ī, *Al-jāmi' al-mukhtaṣar* (ed. Père Anastase-Marie and Mustafâ Jawād, Baghdad, 1934). On the other hand we have the good fortune to possess three collections of *inshā'* (administrative correspondence) emanating from the government of Sanjar and the first Khorezmians. The appreciable results of the latest archaeological researches on Khorezm are collected in S. P. Tolstov, *Po sledan drevne Khorezmiiskoi tsivilizatsii* [*On the Traces of the Old Khorezmian Civilization*] (Moscow, 1948); in German translation by O. Mehlitz, *Auf den Spuren der Altchorezmischer Kultur* (Berlin, 1953).

As for secondary works, there exist only a few studies other than partial or superficial ones which need not be cited here. Besides W. Barthold's *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, cited in volume I, we need note only the article by Fuad Köprülü, "Hârizmšâhlar," in *İslâm ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul, 1941 ff.; in Turkish); M. Altay Köymen, *Buyuk Selçuklu imparatorluğu tarihi* (Ankara, 1955; in Turkish); and, for an-Nāṣir, F. Täschner, "Futuwwa, eine gemeinschaftbildende Idee im mittelalterlichen Orient und ihre verschiedenen Erscheinungsformen," *Schweizerisches Archiv für Volkskunde*, LII (1956), 122–158; and Claude Cahen, "Note sur les débuts de la futuwwa d'an-Nâcir," *Oriens*, VI (1953), 18–22. On Georgia, see W. E. D. Allen, *A History of the Georgian People* (London, 1932); Alexandre Manvelichvili, *Histoire de Géorgie* (Paris, 1951); J. Djavakhichvili, *History of the Georgian Nation* (2nd ed., Tiflis, 1948; in Georgian); and V. Minorsky, *Studies in Caucasian History* (London, 1953).

[1] See volume I of the present work, p. 175.

Mediterranean history, briefly with the Khorezmians, and then more lastingly with the Mongols, and the reader should be provided with sufficient data to preserve continuity between the Selchükid invasions in the eleventh century and those of the thirteenth, described in a later chapter.[2]

What gradually replaced the disintegrating state in the western half of the Selchükid territories was a cluster of principalities, some originating with officials of the sultanate appointed as atabegs (regents) for minors, others founded by chiefs of the freed Turkomans — a Turkoman resurgence connected with the successes achieved at the same time by the Oghuz in Khurasan, though not materially dependent on them. The progress of these Turkomans did not take the same form everywhere. On the Azerbaijan-Armenia frontier, the powerful Īva groups agreed to serve the princes of Azerbaijan and of Mosul, and even the 'Abbāsid caliph in Mesopotamia, before becoming the irreconcilable adversaries of the Khorezmians, who eventually decimated them. In Khuzistan, the Avshars of Shumlah resisted both the last Selchükid sultans and the caliphs, but their lands lay too near the latter, and so they were finally subjected at the close of the twelfth century. In Fars a true principality was established, first through the growing autonomy of its Selchükid governors, then through the emergence of a Turkoman tribe, the Salgurs, who preserved it up to the beginning of the fourteenth century, at first independently but later as vassals of the Mongols. Elsewhere the new principalities were founded by atabegs. The atabeg of Damascus, Tughtigin, has already been dealt with, as has Zengi of Mosul and Aleppo, who divided his activities between Syria and Mesopotamia;[3] his successors at Mosul, as distinct from those at Aleppo, pursued a lack-luster existence into the thirteenth century, by chance finding a historian, however, in the great Ibn-al-Athīr. The regime was to continue into the time of the first Mongols under a former slave of the last Zengids, Lu'lu'.

In the first half of the twelfth century Azerbaijan gradually became autonomous, ruled at first by Selchükid princes holding appanages or in rebellion, and later by enfeoffed military chiefs. In the middle of the century the atabeg of one of these Selchükids, Īldegiz (or Eldigüz), founded a dynasty there which, together with the last sultans, controlled all of central Iran; weakened, however, at the beginning of the thirteenth century by the same causes which weakened the sultans themselves, it collapsed before the

[2] See below, chapter XXI. [3] Volume I, chapters V and XIV.

Khorezmian assaults. To the west of Azerbaijan the "Shāh-i-Armīn" of Akhlat maintained an autonomous principality on Lake Van up to the beginning of the thirteenth century.

These changes on the political scene were relatively superficial; they did not entail any changes of fundamental importance beneath the surface. The atabegs, possibly even the Salgurids, essentially continued the trends of the Selchükid administration, in their military organization, their orthodox religious orientation, and the like. In some respects the Turkish conquest, though now roughly stationary in extent, continued in depth. Where the Turks were few in number, Selchükid decadence did, it is true, allow strong native groups to acquire a certain independence. Typical were the Shabānkārah Kurds and the Lurs, the former in Fars, the latter in the Zagros mountain ranges to the east of Baghdad. But elsewhere the Turkish chiefs worked tenaciously toward the gradual elimination of local Arab or Kurdish lords and the substitution of their own men. Even in Iraq, after the death of Dubais following the downfall of the caliph al-Mustarshid, neither the Mazyadids nor any other Arabs played a role comparable to that of the 'Uqailids when Malik-Shāh had been obliged to leave Mosul in their hands. Nor would the revival of the caliphate in any way herald an Arab renascence.

From another point of view, it is noteworthy that the political fragmentation of the Iranian domain did not result in a cultural decline: this was the time when the poet (an-)Niẓāmī of Ganja was living on the northwest frontier, and when Sa'dī was born. It was also the period when there flourished several of the great mystics, such as 'Abd-al-Qādir (al-)Gīlānī, well-springs of popular Iranian religion down to our own day.

The chiefs of Azerbaijan and their Moslem neighbors to the west faced a task somewhat comparable to that which challenged their fellows in Syria. A Christian state existed at their very door, the kingdom of Georgia — an indigenous state, but just as enterprising as the Frankish principalities. The history of the Franks and that of Georgia are linked not only by their parallel struggle against the Moslem princes, but by the modest assistance they rendered each other, to the point at least of forestalling a complete coalition of enemy forces on either of their two fronts. One of them might even draw off an enemy dangerous to the other: thus in 1121 Īl-Ghāzī, having beaten the Franks, was called on to participate in an anti-Georgian coalition and was there defeated in turn. In spite of the near impossibility of direct contact, such a sense of solidarity

developed on each side that early in the thirteenth century they could envisage concerted operations. Moreover, the Georgians had already engaged Frankish mercenaries, for example in 1121, undoubtedly in the Constantinopolitan market.

In a sense the Turks themselves had contributed to the power of the Georgian kingdom. They had destroyed the feudal principalities on its periphery without touching the very heart of the country, protected by its forests, its mountains, and its access to the sea. Thus by the time of the First Crusade David the Restorer (1089–1125) had been able to establish a relatively strong monarchy, cementing his power by leading his diverse subjects to the reconquest of lost lands and the expulsion of Turkoman raiders. David's victories had reached their climax in 1122 when, after crushing the combined Azerbaijan and Artukid armies, he had been able to make Tiflis, after four centuries of Moslem domination, a Christian city once again, and thereafter his capital. He had concluded alliances with the Byzantines as well as with the Moslem Shirvān-Shāh Minūchihr, whose lands lay between Georgia and the Caspian. David had repeopled the newly won provinces while assuring them military protection by maintaining a large establishment of Kîpchaks — those same Kîpchaks of the north Caucasian steppes among whom the Moslem states regularly recruited a large proportion of the slaves destined for their armies. His successes had made him master also of the Armenian peoples. Unable to regain their own lost national independence, they willingly rallied to him, though he was a Christian of another church. And he knew quite well how to treat the Moslems of old stock living in his territories, with a tolerance which won for him the astonished approval of their co-religionists elsewhere.

For the next hundred years the Georgians warred intermittently with the Moslems of Erzerum, Kars, and Ani, and especially of Akhlat and Azerbaijan; during this century Islam appears to have been, on the whole, rather on the defensive. In the twelfth century the stake was often possession of Ani, where the old Kurdish dynasty of the Shaddādids, though on good terms with its Armenian subjects, had difficulty in maintaining itself. At one time briefly held by David, the town was again taken by the Georgians in 1161 after a victory over the combined forces of Azerbaijan and eastern Anatolia, but was lost once more in a return engagement four years later with the same coalition. It was finally annexed by the Georgians at the beginning of the thirteenth century, when, under the illustrious queen Tamar, Georgian policy was particularly expansionist,

owing to the decadence of the Azerbaijan principality and regional quarrels over the possession of Akhlat, which the distant Aiyūbids eventually acquired. Tamar carried on vigorous operations, sometimes in the direction of Erzerum, but generally against the more accessible Akhlat and the towns of Azerbaijan — less campaigns of conquest than raids intended to intimidate and to obtain booty. Sometimes Georgian territory suffered Moslem raids too; in general, however, Georgian attacks and counter-attacks were the more violent, to say nothing of an almost lunatic escapade which once took a Georgian force up to the very borders of Khurasan.

It is impossible to say how much headway Georgian power might have made had it survived the disastrous Khorezmian and Mongol invasions. It was a golden age in the history of this small Caucasian people, a period which saw, aside from its military exploits, a remarkable development in art and literature in which native traditions blended with Byzantine and Iranian influences, and which saw also the birth of the national epic, *The Knight in the Panther's Skin* by Shoṭa Rusṭveli, reflecting, like those of so many other countries, the character of a fighting aristocracy.

In Mesopotamia, Selchükid decay benefited the caliphate, the full restoration of which culminated in the long reign (1180–1225) of the only caliph after the ninth century to emerge as a really strong personality, an-Nāṣir. He carried on the work of his predecessors by liquidating the last of the unsubdued Turkomans, making Iraq a state truly subject to the caliphate. In Iran itself he conducted, first against the last Selchükid, Tughrul III, and then against the Khorezmians, diplomatic and military policies more effective than any which had been associated with the Commanders of the Faithful for some decades. Moreover, and most important, he took full advantage of the implications of this title and, while resigning himself to the inevitable political fragmentation of Islam, at least attempted to repair the religious divisions of the Moslems under his personal moral leadership.

The destruction of the Fāṭimid caliphate, which had come about just before his succession, favored his efforts, but he was prompted especially by the Mesopotamian and Iranian situations. The Shī'ites, although politically shackled by the Selchükids, remained numerous. In sympathy with their views, an-Nāṣir at one time entertained the idea of having himself recognized as their head as well as that of the Sunnites. Orthodox opposition was so violent, however, that he was forced to give up this scheme. Still, he reached an accord with the Ismā'īlites of Alamut, among whom there was a

growing inclination towards compromise, and obtained from the grand master, Jalāl-ad-Dīn al-Ḥasan, a recognition which made him something like the head of this autonomous sect. But the achievement best known today and possibly the most fruitful, though in a way he undoubtedly could not foresee, was his reorganization of the *futūwah*.

This was the word long used for the moral principle of chivalric fraternity on which the organizations of "youths" were based and from which they often derived their name (a concept also implicit in the etymological root of *futūwah*). These groups primarily embraced important segments of the small artisan class in the towns, for whom such organizations represented a mixture of initiatory and interconfessional brotherhoods, societies for mutual aid, and semi-private militias. They were in general frowned upon by men of social standing, who gave them names signifying bandit or footpad. At Baghdad, however, among other places, they acquired such strength that when constituted authority failed they actually took over certain quarters of the city and eventually drew to themselves some important people. Moreover, among the many *futūwah* organizations in Baghdad and throughout Islam there was considerable diversity, ranging from the strictly orthodox to the extremely heretical.

It was an-Nāṣir's ambition to unite this entire conglomeration, to reorganize it into cadres dependent upon himself, and to use these organizations of the "masses", hitherto disruptive of order, to establish order. Under his influence various accounts were written, developing the principles of the *futūwah*. Moreover, he tried to associate in his undertaking the princes whose coöperation would be necessary to extend the reform beyond the boundaries of Iraq. To conform with their customs he made of the *futūwah* something of a chivalric order, whose members were distinguished by a special costume and were accorded the exclusive right to participate in certain of their favorite sports. This aspect, because of its superficial similarity to certain elements of western chivalry, has often caused a misunderstanding of the nature of an-Nāṣir's work; it was, however, its most ephemeral characteristic. On the other hand, the "democratic" organizations of the *futūwah*, in certain areas such as Anatolia, followed a development certainly attributable to greater and more profound influences than the personality of a single caliph, but the place always reserved for an-Nāṣir in their traditions shows that in some respects he was indeed the renovator of the institution.

One can discern the efforts of an-Nāṣir throughout the whole range of Islamic religious life. He strove to control education by granting licenses to teach. He encouraged his spiritual collaborator Shihāb-ad-Dīn 'Umar (as-)Suhrawardī to found a religious order. But in completing the practical development of a society in Iran and Mesopotamia distinct from that of Syria, he was remarkably indifferent to the idea of a Holy War against the Franks. The Moslem princes of Syria respected him and notified him of their victories; he sent them some assistance, but the *jihād* never played a part in his religious propaganda.

It was inevitable that an-Nāṣir's activity, in some respects such a novel departure, won him many enemies. When the Mongols suddenly burst on the scene, he would be accused of having deliberately brought on the disaster in order to crush the Khorezmians.

B. *The Khorezmian Empire*

Once again it was in Central Asia that violent upheavals occurred, the repercussions of which would ultimately spread to the shores of the Mediterranean. One such repercussion resulted in the replacement of the Ghaznavids by the Ghūrids. It was among the recently subdued and converted wild men of the upper valleys of the Hindu Kush that the Ghaznavids recruited a part of their forces, as the caliphal generals had done among the tribes of Dailam at an earlier time, and as the Turkish chiefs of the Zagros mountains often did among the Kurds. The chiefs of the valleys of Ghūr thus came to sense their own strength, established autonomous principalities, and finally, after the total destruction of Ghaznah, supplanted the Ghaznavids throughout all their Hindu possessions. Their military flair even led them to extend their conquests into the upper valley of the Ganges, representing a new political extension of Islam in India. No more than the other rulers of their time, however, could they avoid using Turkish slaves for a large part of their army. At the beginning of the thirteenth century, profiting from the crushing of the Ghūrids outside of India by the Khorezmians, these "mamluks" carried their chiefs to power in India proper, and set up a military regime somewhat analogous to that which the more famous Mamluks of Egypt would establish a half century later. The slave dynasty at Delhi endured until the beginning of the sixteenth century, when it was destroyed by the Mughuls ("Grand Moguls", from "Mongols").

Much more serious consequences for Iran, however, resulted from changes in Central Asia by which Islam, no longer victorious, found itself on the defensive and forced to retreat. A Mongol people, whom Moslem authors call the Kara-Kitai (Persian, Qarā-Khitāy, or Black Cathayans), driven from China, where at one time they had carved out a vast kingdom, now turned back to the west, destroying the Kara-Khanid kingdoms, which had been weakened by internal rivalry and tribal disorder. In vain did the Kara-Khanids of Transoxiana call the Selchükid Sanjar to their aid; in 1141 he was crushed. Although for the most part pagan, the Kara-Kitai numbered in their ranks many of those Nestorians who were for many centuries so influential, from the point of view of religion, in Central Asia, and who periodically renewed their ties with their brethren of Iran and Mesopotamia. The defeat inflicted by this partially Christian army on Sanjar, until then the most powerful prince of Islam, made a considerable impression everywhere. The

chief of the Kara-Kitai bore the title Gur-Khan, and the accounts of his victory, spreading throughout the west, gave rise to the legend of the famous "Prester John", who would later be sought wherever there was believed to be, far to the rear of the Moslems, a powerful Christian kingdom, still thought in Marco Polo's time to be just beyond the Mongols, but later transferred to Abyssinia.

The subjection of Transoxiana as far as Khorezm by the Kara-Kitai had little effect on the life of these areas, where the conquerors allowed the princes to reign as vassals whom they controlled firmly. By the very nature of things, however, it marked a certain decrease in the amount of assistance which Islam could count on from these lords against other faiths, or orthodox Islam against heretical sects. On the other hand, it brought about a new southward movement by a certain number of Oghuz Turkomans, some of them perhaps still pagan. They took refuge in the territories of Sanjar. But his strength had just been shattered, and these Turkomans, like their ancestors under the Ghaznavids, could only be a still further cause for concern, finally breaking out in open revolt. Sanjar, forced to fight, became their captive in 1153. Although they apparently always recognized him as sultan, he could not prevent their subjecting the country to their exactions. He escaped in 1156 but died soon afterwards, and his nephew and successor Maḥmūd Khan, a Kara-Khanid whom he had adopted, could not repair the damage.

Unlike their eleventh-century predecessors, the Oghuz masters of Khurasan proved to be incapable of producing founders of states. Their victory was one of destruction and anarchy only. It extended to Kerman, where the local Selchükid line was destroyed; and it may have had repercussions, though how great we cannot tell, on the Turkoman movements in areas further west. This victory, however, had an opposite and profitable effect on a dynasty located to their rear. Once again Khorezm, protected by its girdle of desert, became a secure and prosperous oasis.

In spite of all its progressive Turkification and manorialization, Khorezm apparently still preserved the essence of its traditional agricultural, commercial, and cultural prosperity. It was governed by a family which was descended from Anushtigin, a Turkish slave installed there by Malik-Shāh, and which, though it had revived the old native title Khorezm-Shāh, had remained more or less vassal to Sanjar despite periodic friction. The Khorezmian dynasty had to become vassal to the Kara-Kitai also, which made it possible for it to complete its emancipation from Sanjar when his power declined. Amid the disasters of Oghuz victories, the Khorezm-Shāhs

maintained a solid and undivided principality, indeed strengthened by the fact that to all those who desired the restoration of order it seemed the only hope. And at this very moment the disintegration of the power of the Kara-Kitai themselves, brought on at the end of the twelfth century and the beginning of the thirteenth by new movements of peoples in the Asian steppes, resulted in the complete independence of the Khorezm-Shāhs.

This situation apparently forced the Khorezm-Shāhs to develop a powerful army. Its maintenance meant exactions difficult for the population to endure, but bearable thanks to growing prosperity and victories abroad. This army was composed primarily of a huge recruitment of Turks from their neighbors to the northwest, the Kîpchaks. There was not always time to buy them young and bring them up as proper Moslems, a practice generally followed by those princes who employed such Turkish warriors. Those who came to be called Khorezmians on battlefields far distant from Khorezm were not such ethnically or culturally. They were to acquire a reputation for ferocity; but circumstances would allow them no means of subsistence other than this very ferocity.

In these circumstances the Khorezm-Shāh Töküsh (or Takash) managed, around 1190, to occupy Khurasan, where he brought the Oghuz under control. With Iran in an extreme state of fragmentation at the time, this conquest immediately made him the great power of the day, to whom one could turn in case of need. The last Iranian Selchükid, Tughrul III, tried to rebuild his authority at the expense of the atabeg Abū-Bakr of Azerbaijan and the caliph an-Nāṣir. The latter appealed to Töküsh, who conquered Raiy and Hamadan, and it was thus that in 1194 the namesake and last descendant of Tughrul-Beg was killed. But Töküsh then felt himself called upon to take up the Selchükid heritage, and demanded of the caliph an-Nāṣir his own recognition as sultan at Baghdad. This was certainly distasteful to an-Nāṣir, who was not incapable of resistance. A rupture ensued which, at the outset, differentiated the political position of Töküsh, enemy of the caliph, from that which Tughrul-Beg had enjoyed as the caliph's protector — a situation rife with consequences for the Khorezm-Shāh, who thus alienated the orthodox Moslem groups.

It was during the reign of Muḥammad, who succeeded his father Töküsh as Khorezm-Shāh in 1200, that all the effects of this policy made themselves strikingly evident, a policy the success of which derived more from the existence of a political vacuum abroad than from any compelling drive from within. In fact Khorezmian rule

was now the reign of an army encamped on hostile soil. The Khorezmians occupied Transoxiana and almost all the non-Hindu regions of the Ghūrid states; they extorted recognition from the independent Kïpchaks; they contributed to the ruin of the Kara-Kitai, with the exception of some who entered Khorezmian service and ended by founding an autonomous dynasty at Kerman, destined to last as a vassal of the Mongols down to the fourteenth century; they became masters of all central Persia; they fought the Kurds in al-Jibāl. In brief, they established a wide-flung empire which, though it included neither Azerbaijan nor any Arab country, extended in the opposite direction to the very confines of India, thus joining to much of the former Selchükid dominions a part of the territories of the Ghaznavids and the Kara-Khanids.

But this military state was supported by none, opposed by all. A new struggle with the caliph, from which he managed to emerge undefeated, completed the Khorezmian break with orthodoxy. On the grounds of alleged contacts of the caliph with Kara-Kitai pagans directed against himself, a Moslem, Muḥammad declared an-Nāṣir dethroned, and proclaimed an anti-caliph chosen from the descendants of 'Alī, son-in-law of the prophet Mohammed, whom the Shī'ites had always considered the prophet's legitimate heirs, as opposed to the 'Abbāsids. But since the initiative had been taken on no doctrinal basis and without any previous agreement with the Shī'ites, there was no real rapprochement with this sect, which had in any event been somewhat weakened by a century and a half of orthodox repression.

Meanwhile the Kïpchak soldiery was making itself more and more unbearable to the population. The Khorezm-Shāhs had preserved the Selchükid administrative system, which could not fail to conflict with the growing exactions of the military horde. For a long time Muḥammad's mother Turkān Khātūn, who enjoyed great prestige, defended the vizir Niẓām-al-Mulk and his principles of administration. But the break with orthodoxy served also as the pretext for a break with this princess and the vizir and for the dislocation of the existing bureaucracy, for which there was no substitute available. Among the people — as much the civil aristocracy, of Bukhara for example, as the general mass — there was a longing for liberation. When it became known that the governor of a frontier post, whose action the Khorezm-Shāh did not repudiate, had ordered the massacre, ostensibly for spying, of a whole caravan of Moslem merchants returning from Mongol territory, this caused a rupture with the commercial classes, and the

feeling spread that the Islamic cause might be revenged upon Muḥammad, the pseudo-Moslem, through the pagan Mongol Genghis Khan (Chinggis Khan or Qan). Possibly Mongol strength would have broken Khorezmian power anyway; it is difficult to say, since Khorezmian power was only in its infancy. In any case things would not have happened as they did, that immediately after the first defeat by the Mongols it became obvious that there was no resistance to them anywhere, and that the Khorezmian edifice no longer rested on any foundation whatsoever. Muḥammad, a hunted man abandoned by all, died in 1220 on an island in the Caspian Sea.

This still did not mark the end of "Khorezmian" history, or at least of the princes and bands to whom posterity has given this name. There followed an era of savagery comparable to that of the Italian or German condottieri, or the Grand Companies of the Hundred Years War. And chance has decreed that it would be better known than earlier Khorezmian history, thanks to the talented narrator it found in the person of an-Nasawī, secretary of the last Khorezm-Shāh. The Mongols gave no quarter when resisted, and the Kîpchak warriors had no alternative but to flee, try to regroup elsewhere, plunder everywhere in order to exist, and try to conquer other territories to put under tribute. Muḥammad had given his son Jalāl-ad-Dīn Manguberti (or Mangbartī, Mengübirdi) the rule of the lands taken from the Ghūrids. It was around him that the "Khorezmians" gathered. Now came a succession of barbarous raids, and of desperate flights before the Mongols alternating with hasty and destructive conquests, always further westward, of new kingdoms which there was never time to organize.

Jalāl-ad-Dīn escaped Mongol pursuit by fleeing across the Indus. He tried to deprive the slave kings of their kingdom, but then abruptly wheeled about and made for Kerman, then on to Fars and al-Jibāl where his brother Rukn-ad-Dīn Ghūrshānchī had blazed the trail for him. In his turn he naturally clashed with the caliph, and then with the caliph's ally Uzbeg, the atabeg of Azerbaijan. He did not invade Iraq, but defeated the atabeg himself and annexed Azerbaijan (1225), which promptly became the base for a destructive but ephemeral conquest of Georgia. No sooner was this achieved than suddenly the Mongols appeared just behind him on the Iranian plateau, though at this time merely a vanguard which could be checked in battle.

Still the Khorezmians sought safety farther west, and so began a new struggle, now with the Aiyūbids of Mesopotamia, from whom they wrested Akhlat on Lake Van, not without still more devasta-

tion. It must be said that among the Aiyūbids, as among the Syrian and Mesopotamian princes in general, there was no concord, and that some had appealed to Jalāl-ad-Dīn. Al-Mu'aẓẓam of Damascus, in league with the lord of Irbil, Gökböri, and with the Artukids of Mardin and Ḥiṣn Kaifā, systematically used the Khorezmians against his brother al-Ashraf of the Jazira and Lu'lu' of Mosul. Al-Ashraf once had to get help against them from the Selchükid sultan of Rūm (Anatolia), Kai-Qobād I. The Khorezmians, masters of one of the principal routes into Asia Minor by virtue of their possession of Akhlat, planned to conquer Rūm, and Jahān-Shāh of Erzerum, the enemy of his cousin Kai-Qobād, made an advance agreement with the would-be conquerors. Kai-Qobād was the most powerful Selchükid Anatolia had known, but this did not stop him from appealing to al-Ashraf; together they crushed the Khorezmians west of Erzinjan in 1230. Now the Mongols appeared again, and fell on Azerbaijan itself; the Khorezm-Shāh had no time to regroup his forces, and fled to Diyār-Bakr. There, in 1231, the man who had struck fear into half the Moslem world met an obscure death at the hands of a Kurdish peasant.

But the Khorezmians were still not destroyed. Their chiefs, thenceforth without fixed bases, saw no hope but to offer their services to any prince who might agree to give them semi-autonomous refuge in his territories; and princes were to be found who thought it better in this way to avoid their depredations and especially their employment as a military force by rivals. For a time they served al-Ashraf, but soon accepted a more advantageous offer sent them by Kai-Qobād, who hoped to use them to defend his Armenian frontier against the Mongols. It would soon be obvious, however, that they had no stomach for the job, and he had to establish them, mingled with the rest of his forces, in the interior of his states. They at least played a prominent role in the struggle he now had to sustain against the Aiyūbids in Anatolia and in upper Mesopotamia. But the successor of Kai-Qobād, Kai-Khusrau II, fell out with them, whereupon they withdrew, and went off to write yet another chapter of adventure in the Jazira.

Here they fell anew into a hot-bed of intrigue. For a while at first they fought for anyone; finally they joined the Aiyūbid aṣ-Ṣāliḥ, against whom almost all the other princes of Syria and upper Mesopotamia were leagued. It was a lasting alliance which earned the Khorezmians possession of Diyār-Muḍar, lying within the great bend of the Euphrates, and allowed aṣ-Ṣāliḥ Aiyūb to extricate himself from some difficult situations first in the Jazira, then in

Syria, whence he finally took Egypt (in 1240, without Khorezmian aid) from his brother al-'Ādil II. The Khorezmians were then used to round out this victory by bloody operations against the principality of Aleppo, with some early success which soon turned into defeat, however, forcing them to retreat to the Euphrates boundary of Iraq in the territory of the caliph. From there they were recalled by another Aiyūbid, Ghāzī of Maiyafariqin, in his turn at war with Aleppo, Mosul, and the Selchükids of Rūm. Again, disaster. But their old ally, aṣ-Ṣāliḥ, now hoped to take Syria from his relatives and enemies of Kerak and Damascus, and called upon them. They were guilty of frightful excesses when they fell on Syria, took Jerusalem from the Franks, who had been called to the rescue by the princes threatened by aṣ-Ṣāliḥ, and finally inflicted on this coalition the terrible rout near Gaza in 1244. Naturally it was aṣ-Ṣāliḥ's turn to fear their exactions, all the more terrible for their sense of revived strength. He came to an understanding with the Aleppans, who were used to fighting the Khorezmians; the latter now suffered a new and final disaster under the walls of Homs in 1246. Decimated, with their chiefs slain and their ranks thinned by the toll of warfare and age, some of the Khorezmians hired themselves out to the Mongols, others to an-Nāṣir Dā'ūd, prince of Kerak, who, two years earlier, had resisted aṣ-Ṣāliḥ, while still others served in the regular army of aṣ-Ṣāliḥ in Egypt. Their last survivors would be found at the victory of 'Ain Jālūt over the Mongols in 1260. Forty years earlier Khorezm, their starting point, had become a Mongol province.

Not only did their trek result in the spread of ruin and the destruction of old kingdoms, facilitating the more lasting Mongol conquest which ensued, but in their passing they had also jostled Turkomans such as the İvas of eastern Armenia. Either drawn forward or pushed back, these Turkomans, when the Khorezmians had passed, remained to constitute, together with the new migrations forced by the Mongol conquests, a reinforced Turkoman element in the western areas, with all the difficulties of adjustment which would follow. The effects of this were felt in Selchükid Anatolia, for instance, which they would weaken on the very eve of the Mongol assault, and also in Syria at the time of the crusade of Louis IX.

Thus the eruptions of Central Asia, moving westward step by step, brought chaos even to the Mediterranean countries; but it would not be for the Khorezmians to give a new and stable form to this world in upheaval. That would be the role of the Mongols, pressing on their heels.

C. The Selchükid State of Rūm[4]

Those interested in the history of the crusades may know the princes of Arab Syria and Egypt, but they are often unaware that in Anatolia at this time a Turkey was being born quite unlike the rest of the Moslem world. Obviously the Turks of this region did not have the same day-to-day contacts with the Franks of Syria and Palestine as did the Moslems of Aleppo and Damascus. As we have seen, however, they at least fought with them and made peace with them, and moreover their contacts with the Byzantines would naturally interfere with the course of Franco-Byzantine relations.

Even in histories of the Moslem world Selchükid Rūm appears only as a country cousin, except of course in those works specifically dealing with Turkey. Nor is this by chance. On the contrary, it reflects the basic fact of a Turkey growing up as something of a stranger to the traditional Moslem world, which has consequently left us almost no reliable information about it. Since for the twelfth century we do not yet have any historical literature written in the Selchükid milieu, we are forced to rely on Byzantine or native Christian sources of information, as prejudiced as they are precious. Indigenous Moslem materials on Anatolia do exist for the thirteenth century, but the historians of the rest of the Moslem world ignore them. The fact that they are not even written in Arabic, but in Persian, reinforces the impression of belonging to another world, one of minor interest only. It goes without saying that this very

[4] For the twelfth century, the sources are primarily Christian: Byzantine (Anna Comnena, John Cinnamus, Nicetas Choniates), Armenian (Matthew of Edessa), and above all Syriac (Michael the Syrian), to which may be added some data of a numismatic, epigraphic, and archaeological nature.

For the pre-Mongol thirteenth century we finally have a Moslem chronicle from Anatolia, that of Ibn-Bībī, composed, however, under the Mongol regime: *Saljūq-nāmeh* (ed. Th. Houtsma, Leyden, 1902; tr. by H. W. Duda, *Die Seltschukengeschichte des Ibn Bibi* [Copenhagen, 1959]); to this might be added the evidence of Arab historians such as Ibn-al-Athīr, *Ta'rīkh ad-daulah al-atābakīyah mulūk al-Mauṣil* [*History of the Atabeg State of the Lords of Mosul*] (*RHC, Or.*, II, part 2), of Kamāl-ad-Dīn ibn-al-'Adīm, *Zubdat al-ḥalab fī ta'rīkh Ḥalab* [. . . *History of Aleppo*] (*RHC, Or.*, III), and of the Syriac historian Bar-Hebraeus, *Chronography* (tr. E. A. W. Budge, London, 1932), as well as the account of the missionary Simon of St. Quentin as preserved by Vincent of Beauvais, and a few archival pieces.

There exists no thorough history of medieval Turkey. *Gosudarstvo Seldzhukidov Maloi Azii* [*Selchükid Rule in Asia Minor*] by V. Gordlevskii (Moscow, 1951) unfortunately was written before documentary publications of more recent date, and like its predecessors incorrectly confounds, it would seem, the pre-Mongol and post-Mongol periods. Important discussions can be found in *İslâm ansiklopedisi*; in Paul Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire* (London, 1938); in Fuad Köprülü, *Les Origines de l'empire ottoman* (Paris, 1937); and in a review of some problems in two articles published by the present writer in the *Journal d'histoire mondiale* (UNESCO), II (1954), nos. 2–3, and in *Mélanges L. Halphen* (Paris, 1951). See also O. Turan, "Les Seljukides et leurs sujets non-musulmans," *Studia Islamica*, I (1953), 65–100; and C. Huart, "Épigraphie arabe d'Asie Mineure," *Revue sémitique*, II (1894) and III (1895).

fact ought, paradoxically, to attract us to the history of Turkish origins, and that a treatment of the medieval Near East would be incomplete which does not give their due to the founders of one of the more vital states of the modern world. Furthermore, it is obvious that a knowledge of these origins is indispensable to a larger understanding of the history of the crusades and the Latin east itself.

The basic facts of Turkish settlement in Anatolia have been given in the preceding volume:[5] established, yet shut in, in the area of the plateaus; cut off from the coasts; almost cut off from the Arab world; and maintaining only a precarious though real tie with the Iranian lands behind. Furthermore, they were divided into the more numerous true Turkomans, devoted to raiding the "infidel" and hostile to all ideas of an administrative state, and the Selchükids, seeking to form in Anatolia for their own benefit a state like that of their Iranian cousins, at least insofar as persistent Byzantine tradition and the absence of non-Turkish Moslems experienced in territorial administration might allow.

The Selchükids pursued a policy of neutrality — even temporary alliance — with the Greeks, in the interests of establishing their domination over the greatest number of Moslems possible. The usual Turkoman tendency was to favor the Dānishmendid family, which controlled the routes throughout the north; that of the Selchükids, to follow the descendants of Sulaimān, established for the most part around Iconium (Konya). Admittedly, the distinction between the two was not always clear; and it certainly came to be blurred, first because Selchükid strength itself was to a large extent based upon the Turkomans, who were consequently given a free hand, especially in the frontier marches called *uj*; also, because the leading Turkoman chiefs themselves, such as the Dānishmendids, could not avoid gradually becoming Moslem territorial princes; and finally, because the rivalries of cliques and individuals within each camp led to permanent alliance between the main adversaries. Still it may be said that the struggle between Selchükids and Dānishmendids dominated the first three quarters of the twelfth century, roughly divisible into two periods.

For the major portion of the reign of the Selchükid Mas'ūd (1116–1155), who, following a few chance-comers, eventually succeeded his father Kilij Arslan I, the Dānishmendids formed a united front under a single head, Gümüshtigin Ghāzī (1105?–1134 or 1135), and then Muḥammad (d. 1140). They constituted the

[5] See volume I, chapter V.

dominant power in central Anatolia. Mas'ūd actually accepted the protection of Gümüshtigin Ghāzī, which he paid for by allowing the latter to retake Melitene (Malatya) at the expense of a Selchükid cadet (Tughrul Arslan) in 1124; and, in spite of a temporary rupture, he maintained the alliance with Muḥammad. From the outset hostilities continued without cease against the Franks and Armenians to the south and the Byzantines to the west, and periodically against Trebizond to the northeast. Mas'ūd's predecessor Shāhan-Shāh paid with his throne and his life for attempting a reconciliation with Alexius Comnenus. There followed a revolt against Mas'ūd and Gümüshtigin Ghāzī by one of Mas'ūd's brothers, Arab, and then momentary discord between Mas'ūd and Muḥammad. This allowed John Comnenus, less trammeled on his European side than his father had been, and with no thought of undertaking any Syrian enterprise before clearing the routes of Anatolia, to convert into an effective and fortified reoccupation the ill-defined reconquest of the western areas effected on the morrow of the First Crusade, and to push his inland frontier northeastward as far as the province of Kastamonu. Given the nature of Dānishmendid power, this was not much of a set-back. In 1135 the caliph consecrated their position with the title *malik*, reconciled, it is not known how, with Selchükid authority, which the caliph surely did not contest, although it is not certain that he recognized their title of sultan.

After 1140, however, the Dānishmendids were divided, Yaghī-Basan,[6] a brother of the dead Muḥammad, against Dhū-n-Nūn, the son, and other princes of his family. True, at the death of Mas'ūd in 1155 his son Kïlïj Arslan II was in his turn opposed by a brother, who possessed Ankara as an appanage and enjoyed the support of Yaghī-Basan. The latter's death in 1164 clearly swung the balance in favor of Kïlïj Arslan. During these struggles Mas'ūd and Kïlïj Arslan tried to conclude peace with the new Byzantine emperor, Manuel Comnenus, who at first continued to press hard — the expedition of 1146 reached the very gates of Iconium. The news of the approach of the Second Crusade made agreement more attractive to both parties, and not only did peace reign between Greeks and Selchükids in subsequent years, but the Selchükids occasionally assisted the Greeks against their enemies, such as the Armenians of Cilicia. Still, aside from the hostilities which continued

[6] Yaghī-Basan's father Gümüshtigin Ghāzī was the son of Malik-Ghāzī.

sporadically to pit Byzantines against Dānishmendids on the Black Sea coast, there were other local but constantly spreading struggles between Byzantines and the frontier Turkomans who threatened either the Byzantine borders or the routes of communication between Constantinople and Syria, and it was difficult for Kilij Arslan to keep these Turkomans under control. Finally, around 1160, Manuel Comnenus prepared an expedition of considerable size to reconquer part of the Anatolian plateau. Kilij Arslan then gambled everything on one throw: he made formal promises to Manuel to guarantee his frontiers; he promised to send contingents against the imperial enemies in Europe; he offered, by a visit to Constantinople itself, to proclaim to the world his deference to the empire.[7] Like all Byzantines, Manuel was fond of prestige, and in addition he was nagged by the persistence of other imperial problems; he accepted, and there followed a sensational reception in 1162 which changed nothing basically, but prolonged the official peace between the two sovereigns for fourteen years.

The relative sacrifices this policy cost Kilij Arslan were compensated for, as under Mas'ūd before him, by the new opportunity it afforded for meddling in the Dānishmendid conflicts — which had led, under Mas'ūd, to recognition of his suzerainty by the Dānishmendid Dhū-l-Qarnain of Melitene and to the annexation of Ankara, the appanaged holder of which, Shāhan-Shāh, would, however, ally himself with Yaghi-Basan — and for interfering on the Syrian and Euphrates borders of his kingdom. Like Mas'ūd, Kilij Arslan profited from the successes of Nūr-ad-Dīn against the Franks, in which he had assisted by taking the Franks in the rear, by claiming, along with the northern places of the ex-county of Edessa to the west of the Euphrates, a fringe of territories on the north Syrian plain neighboring the mountains of Anatolia.

It is evident that Nūr-ad-Dīn could not allow this new power to compete for influence in territory he considered his own. Hence relations between them quickly cooled, and making a show of a furious desire for the Holy War, the Syrian prince soon caused the condemnation of Kilij Arslan, in the eyes of pietists, as a friend of the Greeks. In 1164, thanks to the growing division among the Dānishmendids, Kilij Arslan took Ankara from his brother, and from Dhū-n-Nūn his territories in Cappadocia. Naturally the latter appealed to his only possible ally, Nūr-ad-Dīn, who, having conquered Egypt, no longer had to exercise great caution on his northern frontier, and who apparently obtained very large territorial

[7] On this visit, see volume I of the present work, chapter XVII, p. 545.

concessions in this direction by official act of the caliph. Reinforced by contingents of his vassals or allies of the Jazira and Cilicia, his armies three times from 1171 to 1173, and finally he himself, invaded Selchükid territory.[8] Kilij Arslan had to agree to allow Dhū-n-Nūn to be installed at Sebastia (Sivas) with a garrison and an agent representing his protector Nūr-ad-Dīn. Always the diplomat, Kilij Arslan paid this price for a reconciliation with his Moslem neighbors, possibly exchanging mutual promises with them, in order to maintain the balance requisite for a common renewal of the Holy War against the Christians of both Syria and Byzantium. Then fate smiled on Kilij Arslan. In 1174 Nūr-ad-Dīn died, and the unity of Moslem Anatolia, except Armenia, could be molded to the benefit of the Selchükids without fear of resistance.

But as might be expected, relations with Manuel Comnenus worsened. All the old differences persisted. The treaty of 1173 between the Moslems had of course aroused the suspicion of the emperor and had brought a menacing demonstration. Now the death of Nūr-ad-Dīn seemed to provide a favorable opportunity, since it deprived Kilij Arslan of a possible ally, while the Selchükid unification of Anatolia seemed likely to result if the Byzantines continued their policy of toleration toward Kilij Arslan. The threat demanded quick action. For once, Europe was tranquil. The invasion bases of western Anatolia had been strengthened. Any uprising of Dānishmendid subjects could be discounted in advance. All these reasons incited Manuel Comnenus to undertake a powerful expedition, the major army of which, in 1176 under his personal command, moved on Iconium. Partly through his own fault the army met with irreparable disaster in the defile of Myriokephalon. It was a replica of the defeat at Manzikert a century earlier. Myriokephalon marked the complete collapse of Byzantine pretensions, never renounced in theory, to dominion in Anatolia, and foreshadowed the ascendancy of the Selchükid state of "Rūm". Kilij Arslan did not want to annex the devastated west, but in 1177 he did annex Melitene to the east and resumed his policy of extending his influence in the countries of the Euphrates. Moreover, in 1180 Manuel Comnenus died, and the troubles which followed upon his death weakened Byzantium seriously in the face of pressure from frontier Turkish elements.

As scanty as our documentation may be, it is at least sufficient to show not only that Myriokephalon was an obvious manifestation of Selchükid military strength, but that beneath the surface the

[8] On Nūr-ad-Dīn and Kilij Arslan, see volume I, chapter XVI, p. 527.

Selchükid state was also beginning to establish administrative institutions, develop Moslem forms of culture, and stimulate economic activity, the full development of which is clearly visible in the following century, thanks to the greater adequacy of our sources. And yet this time of expansion was also a time of crisis — a duality which runs through the whole of the history of Selchükid Rūm. The submission of the Dānishmendids had added to the Turkoman element within the Selchükid dominions. In addition, the Turkomans of eastern Anatolia may have been influenced by the agitations of their Iranian cousins; at all events, there began in 1185, to continue for several years, a vast Turkoman movement. Starting from upper Mesopotamia, it spread through Armenia as far as the Georgian border, and down into Selchükid Cappadocia, with extensions into Cilicia and northern Syria. The chief was one Rustam, of whom we know nothing else.

At this critical moment Kilij Arslan, getting on in years and possibly obliged to satisfy the demands of impatient sons, thought it wise to divide his entire realm, under his continuing suzerainty, into eleven appanages for the benefit of his nine surviving sons, one brother, and a nephew (1190). But immediately jealousy sprang up among the brothers, and with it a strong temptation to employ Rustam's Turkomans. This is what Quṭb-ad-Dīn Malik-Shāh of Sebastia, the eldest son, did. Anxious to obtain the future succession, he forced Kilij Arslan to take him as his associate in the capital of Iconium, which the old prince had kept for himself.

It was in this situation that the crusade of Frederick Barbarossa supervened. For twelve years the German emperor had maintained good relations with Kilij Arslan against the common enemy, the Byzantine empire; in 1189–1190 the old sultan still asked nothing more than to arrange a passage for the crusaders under his friend. But this attitude was naturally not shared by the Turkomans, eager to pillage the Christian army, nor by Saladin's emissaries, influential among the pietists and seeking to break up the expedition before its arrival in Syria. The German army thus clashed with the *uj* Turkomans, and then, more seriously, with Quṭb-ad-Dīn himself, supported by the troops of Rustam. The German attack on Iconium forced him to let his father arrange matters after a fashion; Barbarossa reached Cilicia. Considerably weakened, Quṭb-ad-Dīn now engaged in rather pointless hostilities with certain of his brothers, in the course of which his father escaped the semi-captivity in which his son had held him. The old sultan led a wandering life, from son to son, seeking to reconcile them. He was finally taken in by

Ghiyāth-ad-Dīn Kai-Khusrau (I), to whom, perhaps because of his Greek mother, he had given the government of the new acquisitions on the western border. After promising him the succession, Kilij Arslan died in 1192 at the age of seventy-seven.

Naturally, the inevitable war matched Kai-Khusrau with Quṭb-ad-Dīn, and then, when he died in 1192, with their brother Rukn-ad-Dīn Sulaimān II, who finally expelled Kai-Khusrau from Iconium (1196) and forced him to seek refuge in Byzantine territory. Sulaimān then refashioned the unity of Selchükid territory to his own advantage at the expense of his other brothers. Hardly had he done so when he died, however (1204), and Kai-Khusrau, recalled from his asylum among the Greeks, with the support of the *uj* Turkomans and the descendants of the Dānishmendids, fell heir to the entire realm, which thereafter was to remain undivided in his hands and in those of his descendants. If this crisis proves clearly the weakness of the monarchical institution, it is typical, however, that far from interrupting the Selchükid and Turkoman expansion it actually encouraged it.

During the lifetime of Kilij Arslan the Selchükid administration had established itself behind the Turkomans in Greek strongholds which, surrounded by flat country impossible to hold, had finally had to surrender. Sozopolis, at first held of Kai-Khusrau as a fief, under the new name of Burghlu (modern Uluborlu), provided a base upon which a new province was organized. Meanwhile, to the southwest, the Turkomans reached the coast stretching east from the shore facing Rhodes up to the environs of Adalia (Antalya). In the disorders of the Byzantine empire under the Angeli, Greek frontier lords rebelled and paid homage to the Turks in order to obtain reinforcements; it was through a suppliant of this kind that Kai-Khusrau obtained Laodicea, soon to be supplanted by the new town of Denizli which would menace all the area of the Maeander. Farther north, Dorylaeum ceased to be Greek; the Byzantines held only the shore line of the Black Sea without any part of the hinterland at all; and even here, in the center, the Turks had reached the sea, possibly occupied Samsun briefly, and cut distant Trebizond off from its dependence on Constantinople. All this was expansion of the Turkoman type, yet always to the profit of the Selchükids.

Rukn-ad-Dīn, more faithful to the paternal tradition, appears to have sought to turn his energies toward acquisitions in Moslem areas to the east; as a result, he took the principality of the local Saltukid dynasty of Erzerum, whence, it is true, he next made a demonstration in force against the Christians of Trebizond and

Georgia. He did not think it judicious, however, to annex Erzerum outright for the moment, but installed his brother Mughīth-ad-Dīn Tughrul-Shāh there, in exchange for his appanage. At Erzinjan the Mengüchekid dynasty continued but, thenceforth surrounded, was reduced to the role of vassal.

Thereafter, the frontier to the west for more than half a century not only found a new stability in fact, but, it seems, was officially recognized by both sides. It would appear that, for Byzantium, or rather for the Nicaean empire (the Asian successor of Byzantium as opposed to the Latin empire of Constantinople created by the Fourth Crusade in 1204),[9] this policy involved the recognition of a free hand for the Selchükids in the east, perhaps including the lands of other Greeks there who were hostile or indifferent to the Lascarids. Although Kai-Khusrau was led once again to break with his old supporters the Greeks, and in 1211 fell in battle against them on the western front, no hostility would mar the relations between his descendants and Nicaea thereafter. No major crusade after that of Frederick Barbarossa crossed Anatolia.

The Selchükids now were concerned first with acquiring a firm hold on the coasts, south and north; next, with renewing the policy of conquest of, or influence over, Moslem countries to the southeast. Already in 1207 Kai-Khusrau had been able to annex Adalia without arousing any Nicaean reaction, providing a Selchükid base for trade with Egypt. His son 'Izz-ad-Dīn Kai-Kā'ūs I (1211–1220) added Sinope on the Black Sea, a stronghold on which a Selchükid military, and to some extent commercial, domination could be based. His brother 'Alā'-ad-Dīn Kai-Qobād I (1220–1237), whose reign was the most glorious of his dynasty, extended his possessions on the southern coast of Anatolia up to the shore opposite Cyprus and to the Cilician Gates, and in a place which he renamed 'Alāyā (originally 'Alā'īyah, from his honorific; modern Alanya) established one of his principal residences. On the Black Sea he took those Greek towns of the Crimean coast which had swung to Trebizond after the fall of Constantinople and had hampered merchants from Selchükid territory; this was the object of a memorable maritime expedition. In another direction, Kai-Khusrau I, Kai-Kā'ūs I, and Kai-Qobād I pacified and consolidated the Taurus frontier facing the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia, also at the height of its development. They aligned themselves with the Franks of Antioch against Cilicia, with the Latins and Venetians of Constantinople against the Greeks of Nicaea, and with the Cypriotes; they hired Frankish

[9] See above, chapters V and VI.

mercenaries; and they corresponded with the papacy and welcomed Latin missionaries, in an effort to detach their Greek subjects from their Byzantine connections. These three Selchükids, and their successors under Mongol domination, may thus be said to have been generally favorable to Franks, neutral toward Greeks, and hostile primarily to their fellow-Moslems. In particular, they again undertook, on a large scale, the policy of expansion southeastward, begun in the middle of the twelfth century but abandoned during the dynastic troubles; they were helped now by the discord of the princes of Syria and the Jazira.

With aẓ-Ẓāhir Ghāzī of Aleppo both Kai-Khusrau and Kai-Kā'ūs pursued a policy of alliance against Leon II of Armenia. From this alliance the Aiyūbid hoped also to derive some protection eventually against his uncle al-'Ādil I. On the death of aẓ-Ẓāhir in 1216, Kai-Kā'ūs wished to support the candidature of another son of Saladin, al-Afḍal, vassal of the Selchükids at Samosata since 1203, but lost out because of the intervention of al-Ashraf, son of al-'Ādil. Kai-Qobād returned to the old policy and in alliance with al-Ashraf took from the Artukid Maudūd of Amida and Ḥiṣn Kaifā his strongholds beyond the Euphrates as far as Chemishkezek to the south of Erzinjan. He annexed Erzinjan at the same time (1228), three years after the death of its elderly lord Bahrām-Shāh. In the midst of all this there appeared a new factor in west Asian politics, the Khorezmians led by Jalāl-ad-Dīn Mangubertī.

So long as the Khorezmians threatened only Erzerum, with whose prince Kai-Qobād was embroiled, or even the northeastern possessions of al-Ashraf, such as Akhlat on Lake Van, the Selchükid sovereign had no reason to be ill disposed to Jalāl-ad-Dīn. Things changed when it appeared that Jalāl-ad-Dīn, become master of Akhlat and seconded by Jahān-Shāh of Erzerum, now his client, prepared to invade Anatolia. Kai-Qobād succeeded in persuading not only al-Ashraf, who came in person, but the government of Aleppo, and the head of the Aiyūbid family, al-Kāmil of Egypt, to send reinforcements, and the combined armies routed the Khorezmians to the west of Erzinjan in 1230. Dragged down in the defeat, Jahān-Shāh lost Erzerum, which this time was annexed outright; the territory of Kai-Qobād now stretched to the borders of Azerbaijan. The Georgians perforce had also sided with the Khorezmians; an energetic demonstration forced them, as well no doubt as their allies of Trebizond, to adopt thenceforth a more favorable attitude toward Kai-Qobād.

But the victors soon fell out. Al-Ashraf, wrapped up in Syrian

affairs, lost interest in his distant states, now devastated by the approaching Mongols. Kai-Qobād thought he could employ the Khorezmians, who had no leader and no lands, to occupy Akhlat, a key to the invasion routes. On the other hand, al-Kāmil took Amida and Ḥiṣn Kaifā from their Artukid ruler Maudūd (1232) because of his alleged pro-Khorezmian leanings. Thereafter, with no motive for coöperation, Selchükid and Aiyūbid ambitions were diametrically opposed.[10] In 1233 al-Kāmil hoped to invade Selchükid territory, which some Syrians who had been there in 1231 said was poorly defended; stopped in the mountains north of Syria, he swung toward the northeast, where the Artukid al-Khiḍr of Kharput had called upon him for assistance. The two allies were crushed and Kai-Qobād annexed Kharput, thus moving across the Euphrates. He even briefly put a garrison in the heart of Aiyūbid country, at Harran (which al-Kāmil was able to recover, however, without trouble), and then besieged Amida.

After the death of Kai-Qobād I in 1237, his son Ghiyāth-ad-Dīn Kai-Khusrau II broke with the Khorezmians, who fled to the Jazira; but thanks to the deaths, one after the other, of al-Ashraf and al-Kāmil, he was able, by taking part in an almost general coalition of Syrian and Jaziran princes against al-Kāmil's son aṣ-Ṣāliḥ Aiyūb and the Khorezmians, to enter Amida itself, the strongest place in Diyār-Bakr, and to lay siege to Maiyafariqin beyond the Tigris. Selchükid territory thus reached in Armenia almost those boundaries which the Byzantine empire had had, and, toward Mesopotamia, even surpassed them (attaining almost those of modern Turkey), corresponding closely to the area of relatively strong Turkoman settlement.

Under Kai-Qobād I and, in spite of the growing Mongol danger, at the beginning of the reign of Kai-Khusrau II, the Selchükid state thus stood at the height of its military power and territorial expansion, ringed by vassals or allies, Moslem Aleppo and the Jazira, Christian Cilicia, even briefly Trebizond, Nicaea, and Cyprus, which sent contingents of military reinforcements when called on. This was also the period when the organization of institutions was perfected, and when economic life and civilization came of age. We know much of this now from the chronicles, some archival documents (exceptional for the Moslem world), and accounts of such travelers as Simon of St. Quentin. It is to this aspect that we now turn.

[10] On the Aiyūbids, see below, chapter XX, pp. 703–704.

D. *Selchükid Society in Anatolia*

First of all, we are in "Turkey" — contemporary observers are all in accord here. Undoubtedly there remained important groups of earlier peoples, often in the majority: Greeks to the west, Armenians to the east, Monophysite Syrians in the upper Euphrates districts. There were, however, many reasons why the name Turkey was commonly applied to the Selchükid state of Rūm, but not to any of the neighboring states no less ruled by Turkish dynasties. Turkish settlement, particularly in the frontier zones dominated by Turkomans and in the few large towns on which the administrative institutions of the regime were based, very quickly became relatively important, following the thinning out of the older population. The other peoples formed only local agglomerations cut off from contact with any greater whole, with no political role, those Armenians with a desire for independence having emigrated to Cilicia, and the Greeks having collaborated willingly, it would seem, with the new masters. And as a result of mixed marriages, of the taking of prisoners in frontier warfare, and of religious conversions, a part of the native population had been more or less made over and absorbed into the new regime.

It is noteworthy, however, that in the upper ranks of society this Turkish character made less impression within the Selchükid state than outside it. As we shall see, the administrative personnel and the culture of the urbanized Turks were Iranian, to the extent that within leading circles there was a tendency to restrict the appellation "Turk" to the rough uncivilized Turkomans, and to look down on them with contempt. This proved to be a source of difficulty, and we shall note the fragility it imparted to the Selchükid structure despite its many elements of strength.

As for the native populations, though they had obviously suffered much in the anarchy of the conquests, they later had no more cause for complaint than those of neighboring Moslem states. So long as they were not connected with foreign political powers, their religious leaders, who were at the same time directors of their communities in all matters of civil law, could carry on. The Monophysites, for whom there was no foreign support, kept intact their clergy, and the churches and monasteries which they had held before the Turkish conquest. The Armenian and Greek groups were much more disorganized, but not systematically eliminated, and worship was in no wise impossible for any religious group. Nevertheless, the Selchükid state was a resolutely Moslem one. In the beginning, in

the Turkoman principalities, the ineptitude of the conquerors had left in Christian hands what remained of local administration; eventually, the systematic call for Iranians or their spontaneous influx allowed the Selchükids to build a state based essentially on Moslems. Moreover, the heresies which tore the old Moslem countries had little effect among the aristocracy, which was morally united behind the principles of Ḥanafite jurisprudence.

It does not follow, however, that the Selchükid state of Rūm was a carbon copy of the state of the Great Selchükids. The present condition of scholarship hardly lets us frame questions, let alone suggest answers, but it is evident that the settlement of the Turks in a territory with a background other than Moslem brought them face to face with problems with which the traditions of old Moslem countries were not prepared to cope; on the other hand, the new conditions could suggest to them original solutions. One might then ask what part was played in these solutions by Byzantine, Iranian, and Turkish influences, and what was new; and national or religious prejudices have not always been absent in such discussion. To be sure, the central and provincial adminstration corresponded in the main with the model of the Great Selchükids of Iran; the only thing original was the office of the *pervāneh*, who distributed the sultan's concessions. But the economic and social realities upon which the regime was based are almost completely obscured. It is likely that the desertion of fields at the time of the conquests, and the collectivist traditions of the tribes, subsequently put a considerable proportion of the land into the hands of the state (to the extent that the state was organized) without, however, destroying either the large individual holdings of Moslem magnates or, around the towns, the small holdings available without religious distinction to townsmen. The state thus had the means of making large land-grants (Arabic singular, *iqṭā'*) to its soldiers and officials without unduly weakening itself; but no doubt wages in specie also played an important role. Indeed, it seems to have been original with the Selchükid state of Rūm as compared with the neighboring Moslem states, to have maintained numerous foreign mercenaries alongside a servile military establishment, in this perhaps following the Byzantine example. It could afford to do this because it did not lack other resources.

We know almost nothing about the incidence of taxes, except that the large number of "infidels" made the head tax, which fell on such people in all Islamic countries, an important source of revenue. But what was the land tax? Were the taxes levied on

Turkoman herds and flocks regularly collected? We do not know. What we do know, however, is that, thanks to the maintenance of public order, the mineral resources and the commercial possibilities of Anatolia were intensively exploited, and brought considerable revenue to the state. Iron, copper, alum, salt, and wood were products all the more valuable for the fact that the Moslem areas to the south were almost entirely without them. In addition, products of Russia, in particular slaves destined for Egypt, often crossed Selchükid territory, while caravans passed through carrying the luxuries of the Far East from Iran to Sinope or Constantinople for reëxport, or to the court of Iconium and major centers like Caesarea (Kayseri). Sebastia was one of the great commercial crossroads of the Near East. On the main routes the Selchükid sultans and the magnates had mighty caravanserais built, serving as inns, entrepôts, and fortresses combined. Even allowing for exaggeration in the enthusiastic descriptions of, say, Simon of St. Quentin, it is sure that in the first half of the thirteenth century the Selchükid state of Rūm was one of the richest in the east.

An exact appreciation of the character of this state is made difficult because most of the documents date from the period of the Mongol protectorate, that is, at the beginning of a process of disintegration and the substitution of new forms. On the other hand, there has been too great a tendency to apply to the Selchükids of Rūm what is known about the Selchükids of Iran, of which, we believe, the features have not themselves always been clearly visualized. The result is that some have professed to see in the Selchükid state of Rūm a feudal state, for example, or, to be more precise in terms of eastern institutions, a state conceding to high officers, mostly military officers, large quasi-autonomous holdings which were more or less inheritable. The author hopes to suggest, in connection with the research he has done on this problem in the rest of the Moslem world, that the facts, *before* the Mongol period, are quite different.

For the Turkoman chiefs who were gradually subdued in the twelfth century, the Selchükids substituted appanaged members of their own family; then these, who became too independent, gave way to military commanders primarily of servile origin. They were able to constitute hereditary seignories in certain marches (for example, at Marash), and to endow with extensive powers the commanders of the *uj* territories or of the coastal provinces. Nevertheless it appears very likely that in most cases these commands were effectively bestowed and exercised in conditions permitting

central control and revocation at any moment, and excluding all inheritance. Even in the special cases of districts formally granted as *iqṭā'*, it is apparent that these grants were never so absolute as to confer on their holders independent power, and were only exceptionally passed on to their children. In sum, we are dealing with a strong state comparable in this respect to the state of the Great Selchükids before its disintegration, or that of the Comneni as it still was in the twelfth century, and, within its narrow limits, that of the Lascarids of Nicaea in the thirteenth — without, however, our being able to decide to what extent their examples may have affected the policy of the Selchükids of Rūm. It is evident, however, that this policy would have been impossible without the resources they had at their disposal.

The towns were the pivot of the system. Several of them, not to mention the capital Iconium, acquired or regained, under their old names now Turkified, or under entirely new names (there were also some cases of a really new town replacing an old ruined town near by), an importance for which there is still evidence in the impressive succession of mosques, schools, caravanserais, walls, and the like, remains of which cover Anatolia.

It was in the towns that the *akhi* ("brotherhood") was organized, an institution which took full form and is well known to us only during the Mongol period, although its first development came earlier. The akhis were connected with the general mass movement of the *futūwah* groups discussed above in connection with the caliph an-Nāṣir. The name appears to have designated the superior initiates in a kind of mystical order which had probably developed in northwest Iran in the eleventh century. But why did the akhis (the brothers) here form around themselves groups on which they even bestowed their name, groups like those which evolved elsewhere without akhis as a nucleus? It is impossible to say. We can only note the unparalleled development of the institution to the point where, after the disintegration of the realm, the akhis would become the dominant force in certain towns. We may note also their apparent unity, explained by the homogeneity of members' backgrounds, unlike corresponding organizations in the rest of the Moslem world. Finally, though they represented a popular element which the aristocracy and sometimes the government distrusted, and tended to accept religious traditions of every origin, heretical as well as orthodox (and sometimes not even Moslem), they were organized by leaders who for the most part did belong to the Sunnite aristocracy, and they certainly did not systematically oppose

the government. In the thirteenth century they were one element the government could apparently play off against others, and they defended Selchükid urban civilization on occasion as well against the Mongols as against the Turkomans. This last feature would evidently change when, in the fourteenth century, the Turkomans became masters almost everywhere. In brief, we have here an institution which in principle is related to the rest of the Moslem world but which in Anatolia in the course of the thirteenth century took an entirely original bent.

In the domain of culture, there is no doubt of the predominant, almost exclusive, influence of Iran, or more precisely of Khurasan, at least among the aristocracy. But here lay one of the weaknesses of this aristocracy and of this culture: the gulf between the upper classes and their Persian culture on the one hand, and the masses, Turk and Turkoman, on the other. For although the latter spoke only Turkish, in upper circles everything written was in Persian (except works of theology and law, and some public acts, for which Arabic, the language of the Koran, was used). The national Persian literature so thoroughly permeated the culture that the Selchükid sultans of the thirteenth century bore names of historic or legendary Iranian heroes. This Persian influence continued to grow as a result of the influx of refugees from Transoxiana and Khurasan fleeing the Khorezmians and the Mongols. In particular they brought with them the latest developments of the great mystic movement in which Iran was caught up at the time. They found a rich soil in which to resow its seeds in this new Moslem society which had in its traditions none of the "rationalist" movement of the Islam of earlier centuries. It was during the reign of Kai-Qobād I that one of the greatest "Persian" mystics, Jalāl-ad-Dīn (ar-)Rūmī, began his activity, which would culminate after the Mongol conquest in the creation of that order of "whirling dervishes" which has colored a part of Turkish life down to modern times.

In the realm of art the orientation was the same, although more subtly so. Here also we lack data which might justify firm conclusions. The relations of Selchükid art with the art which flourished simultaneously in Iran are obvious. But our conclusions tend to vary, depending on whether, in this larger artistic realm, we accord a more or less prominent place to earlier Iranian traditions, or to Turkish methods, or to the methods of Central Asia, Moslem or not, introduced by the Turkish conquest into the whole Moslem world, such as the use of bare brick. We can be sure that the general conception of the mosques and madrasahs is that of the

whole Irano-Turkish world of the time. Though many of the architects who built them and artists who decorated them came from Iran, many were either natives or local Moslems. It is *a priori* very likely, therefore, that the modes of construction or decoration of Byzantine times were conserved in Selchükid buildings. As for figured ornamentation, however, this was common, as we know, to all works of art influenced by the Turks and Iran (each in their own way) as opposed to Semitic Moslem art. Be this as it may, the remains of mosques and other monuments in Iconium, Caesarea, Sebastia, Divrighi, and elsewhere bear witness to the degree of technical perfection and artistic delicacy which the builders of the Selchükid monuments of Rūm had attained; and the same can be said respecting their ceramics, metal wares, carpets, and other products.

But as we have noted, there was in all this civilization a serious weakness: it had not assimilated the Turkomans. These, the conquerors of the country, could no longer participate in the regime which they had established there. They clung to their own form of popular Islam, mixed with pre-Islamic customs and beliefs transported from Turkestan, and they listened to their *babas*, the preachers-sorcerers-judges who lived among them in their tribes. Certainly, in the rest of the Moslem world, the cultural cleavage between townsmen and beduins was hardly less; but at least the former wrote the same language the latter spoke, and prided themselves on being part of a common tradition. In Anatolia, on the contrary, there was no such contact. Even before the Mongol period the Turkomans did not have the beginnings of a Moslem Turkish literature which their Transoxian brothers could understand, and what literature did exist was written in a language they themselves did not comprehend. We need not dwell on the evident contrasts in social structure and manner of life; they are characteristic of that whole Moslem world where sedentary people and nomads live in proximity, the nomads hostile to the administrative procedures, conceptions of property, and taxes, to the blessings of which the settled population tries to introduce them. We shall see this gulf more clearly under the Mongol protectorate because, with the Selchükid aristocracy crushed, the Turkomans then developed quite differently. But the gulf existed before this, and had already manifested itself at the time of a grave crisis under Kai-Khusrau II.

It was at this very moment, in fact, that the links binding the Turkomans to the Selchükid state weakened and snapped. The Khorezmians and Mongols had driven into flight a great number

of Turkomans who had been living in Central Asia or Iran, and who now flocked into Anatolia. Unable to adjust to Selchükid institutions, these newcomers reinforced the anti-Selchükid attitude of the Turkomans of Rūm. In addition, the settlement of these "displaced persons" posed difficult economic and social problems which were aggravated, in the eastern provinces, by the ravages of Khorezmians and Mongols. Partly perhaps to dam this movement from the east, the last Selchükids annexed the Armenian principalities. By doing so, however, they incorporated into their state more Turkomans than other Moslems. They spread them around as best they might, in part apparently to the newly conquered frontier provinces, but often this seems only to have extended the difficulties over a wider area. All we know for certain is that around 1239 all central Anatolia was caught up in a vast Turkoman revolt, led by one Baba Isḥāq, about whom we know very little. They resisted the entire army for two years, and Frankish mercenaries among others were needed to put an end to the revolt. But this was not merely an isolated episode. Obscure as the origins of the religious and political movements of the Turkomans during the Mongol period may be, there is no doubt that many of their founders had been connected in one way or other with the circles in which Baba Isḥāq had been nurtured, or with those which he had himself created. And this confers on him an importance certainly greater than one might think on first reading the few bald comments of the aristocratic chroniclers.

Unfortunately for the Selchükid state, at the very moment when, behind its imposing façade, it was thus weakened internally, the Mongol danger loomed in the east.[11] Their raiders had already penetrated Selchükid territory in the last days of the reign of Kai-Qobād I; internal difficulties of the Mongols gave Kai-Khusrau II a few years of respite. But in 1242 Erzerum succumbed, and in 1243 the great invasion was on. Taken up with his wars in Diyār-Bakr, Kai-Khusrau had made no provision for it. He hastily collected the largest force possible, comprising contingents of every origin including the Franks again, and met the Mongols at Köse Dagh on the traditional invasion route between Sebastia and Erzinjan. The morale of these troops was perhaps better than that of many others, who were beaten in advance by the reputation of the Mongols for an almost supernatural invincibility and the fact that they had never been defeated even by the greatest princes. On the morrow of the battle, however, nothing remained of the

[11] For the Mongols in Anatolia, see below, chapter XXI, pp. 725–732.

Selchükid army, and the Mongols gave themselves up to the pillage of Sebastia and Caesarea, while the panic-stricken Kai-Khusrau abandoned all his treasures and fled to Adalia and from there toward the Greek frontier. His vizir Muhadhdhib-ad-Dīn was made of sterner stuff, however, and went to the victorious Mongol general Baiju, and with him to the Mongol prince Batu Khan, whom Baiju served. From the prince he got a treaty of peace which allowed the Selchükid state to continue in exchange for a tribute and undoubtedly a promise of reinforcements whenever called for. And so Kai-Khusrau reëntered Iconium, and soon was even able to revenge himself on the Armenians, who had handed over to the conquerors his mother,[12] a refugee among them. In appearance things went on as usual, and one might speak of the date 1243 only as that of a lost battle. In reality, it sounded the knell of the Selchükid state. It marked the beginning of a long process of Mongol encroachment which gradually grew into direct administrative control. But even that remnant of the state which the Mongols were quite willing to let endure was internally so feeble that it disintegrated rapidly under the impact of forces which the Selchükids were too weak to contain, the Mongols too indifferent.

[12] Cf. above, chapter XVIII, pp. 652–653, where other sources indicate that Kai-Khusrau's wife and daughter, rather than his mother, were handed over to Baiju. On Māh-Perī Khātūn, mother of Kai-Khusrau, see *Encyclopaedia of Islām*, II, 639, citing her tomb at Caesarea, and Vincent of Beauvais's remark that she was a concubine.