Six Points of US Policy

Address
By JOHN J. McCLOY
US High Commissioner for Germany

I WANT TO DISCUSS BRIEFLY the outlook and tasks ahead for Germany and to outline the policy of the United States in Germany.

Six years ago the obstacles to the rebuilding of Germany seemed to be staggering. The tasks of restoring order from chaos, of preventing the starvation and death of millions of people, of cleaning up the physical and moral debris of war looked almost hopeless.

Look at your country today. It is easy to criticize, but you must see the situation in perspective. The progress since 1945 is astounding. More people are now gainfully employed than ever before in Western Germany. Hundreds of thousands of new dwellings are going up everywhere in the Federal Republic. Restrictions on almost all kinds of production, including shipbuilding, have fallen. Much, to be sure, remains to be done to reduce unemployment, to reach a better equilibrium in the price-wage scale, to provide more housing. But the simple fact is that your economy provides you with unrationed food, clothing and other consumer goods on a scale at least equal to that of other Western European countries, and far greater than that achieved anywhere behind the Iron Curtain.

Politically, you have created a free democratic community in the Federal Republic. The individual is safe from the arbitrary will of one man or of one party. Men and women are free to speak and to take active part in the affairs of their country.

The Federal Republic is gaining increasing respect abroad. Your position as a full member of the European Council now seems assured. Two weeks ago your Chancellor was received in Paris as an honored guest to negotiate on a basis of equality with the ministers of five other European countries.

THE REBIRTH OF GERMANY in the past six years has been a great constructive accomplishment. It has been the result of hard work by the German people and their representatives, aided by the great economic and moral contribution from the free world. It has been achieved without slave labor, without fear of a secret police, without false promises of five-year plans. If there were a way to do so, the vast majority of the millions of Germans in the East zone would try to share in the economic and political progress made by the republic.

The outside world has noted these achievements of postwar Germany. The German people should take pride in them. The fact that Germany is obliged to pay a portion of the costs involved in the occupation or that a peace treaty is not in the immediate offing does not lessen these gains. The threat posed by the Communists by their control of the East zone makes the situation here much more complicated, for example, than the case of Japan.

In the next period the task of Germany will be twofold: First, to maintain and extend at home the gains already achieved, especially in strengthening and modernizing economic and political institutions. The second main task is to forge strong and enduring links with the free world. In this connection, I want to outline to you briefly how the policies of the United States in Germany are designed to help carry out these tasks:

1. IT IS THE POLICY of the United States to support the integration of Germany with the other free countries of Europe. The European countries themselves must join together to solve their joint problems. Here the Schuman Plan represents a striking example of the possibilities of such cooperation. In American eyes the Schuman Plan is a test of the sincerity and ability of European countries to act as one community.

In a basic sector of the European economy, the Schuman Plan will consolidate the economic strength of Western Europe, free markets and develop new economic opportunities. It will create employment, not unemployment. It is fantastic to assert, as some have, that the United States, which has poured billions into Germany to help revive production, would favor a plan to put people out of work or hamper German industrial development. Politically, it marks Germany's emergence as an equal partner in a great European project.

If this bold, imaginative concept were rejected, it would be a serious and perhaps fatal blow to the hopes built up slowly during the past few years. It would create the danger of a disunited, weak Europe and an isolated Germany.

Farsighted leadership on both sides of the Rhine has carried the Schuman Plan concept thus far. It is now a matter for debate by the various parliaments. I hope that through this process all of you will become fully aware of the character of the plan and its high objectives.

2. IT IS THE POLICY of the United States to assure the peace and to deter aggression by supporting and participating in the effort to create a strong Western European security system. It is our policy to resist any armed attack on West Germany or West Berlin.

The necessity for defense preparations is an unpleasant fact we must all face. Korea has shown—and the new Communist offensive shows again—that aggression in any part of the world affects European and German security.
The NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) forces are being built up in Europe to deter aggression, not to institute it. The power of the Western world will come into action only in the event of aggression against any member. But if attacked the power of each country will become the strength of all.

3. THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZES the right of Germany to participate in her own and in the common defense within an integrated European defense system under conditions of equality.

We are firmly opposed to any revival of German militarism or of any German army which would be independent of an international security system and we, together with the German people, will guard carefully against any such development.

We believe that German participation in an integrated European force is a decision which the German government and people must make for themselves. We are not attempting to buy or force and do not intend to buy or force such participation.

We believe it must be obvious to the German people that the nature, and the efficacy and extent to which Germany can be protected depend in a large measure on German participation in its own defense. Neutrality has never been an effective bar to aggression against an unprotected country.

4. IT IS THE POLICY of the United States to support the development of a democratic Germany and to aid all democratic elements in Germany to safeguard against the revival of Nazism or the imposition of Communism. The German people have shown their rejection of Communism in every free election which has taken place in Germany.

Once identified, the Communist approach is always repudiated. This is now so clear that the Communists have resorted to their familiar tactic of using false fronts, such as neutrality, pacifism, and peace plebiscites to cover up their own imperialistic designs. These attempts are cynical frauds, just as the Communist cry for German unity is a fraud when, at the same time, free elections are outlawed.

Equally sinister is the threat from other totalitarian groups composed in large part of former Nazi activists. In certain areas of Germany small groups are again trying to spread the evil doctrines, the old slogans and tactics, which brought Germany to ruin and will do so again if they should ever prevail.

The German people, through their democratic governments, must be aware of these developments and be prepared to deal effectively with them. The German people cannot ever again permit such forces to gain control in their country. Nor will the democratic world permit it.

5. IT IS THE POLICY of the United States to help German youth to recognize that its future opportunities can be found only in a democratic Germany within a great European community in a united, free world.

We recognize that a majority of German youth is eager to attach its loyalties to affirmative objectives; that it will not be deceived again by glittering promises that only a decade ago caused the destruction of its hopes and ideals. For that reason the United States has made large contributions, including financial support, to German organizations which assist youth. We do not seek to control, to propagandize or to regiment youth. We seek only to give German youth a chance for a better life.

For their part, the German people and their governments — city, county, state and federal — should, in my judgment, take greater interest in the problems of youth, spend more money on projects to help youth and give youth greater opportunity for self-development.

Young men and women should not be barred by their elders from office simply because of their youth, restricted in their participation in public affairs, or have their freedom to engage in a trade or profession arbitrarily circumscribed.

6. IT IS THE POLICY of the United States to help the city of Berlin. The free world has been profoundly impressed by the fortitude of the people of Berlin in their determination to stand up for and defend their freedom. I hope and I am confident that the Federal Republic will do everything possible to aid the city and to strengthen ties with it.

These aims of the United States are not complex, and in no one of them is there the slightest suggestion of aggrandizement or extension of American power.

The condition of our aid, the condition of the maintenance of our policy is likewise simple. It demands only that the German people and their government put their great energies and capacities into the making of a liberal, tolerant community, in which all men can walk with dignity and freedom.

The following is a list of addresses, statements, interviews and letters by US High Commissioner John J. McCloy which have appeared in previous issues of the Information Bulletin.

Germany Today .......... December 1950.
Progress Report on Germany .... February 1950.
Stuttgart and Boston Speeches .... March 1950.
Free Vote for Unity .......... April 1950.
Germany in a United Europe .... May 1950.
ERP Marks Second Anniversary .... June 1950.
Ruhr Industry's Problems .... August 1950.
Germans Jolted, But Morale Stable .... September 1950.
Fallacy of Stockholm Resolution .... October 1950.
Adding the Human Element .... October 1950.
New Status of Germany .... November 1950.
Tasks for the Coming Year .... November 1950.
An International Aspect (Hamburg and Kiel addresses) .... December 1950.
Unity and Strength .... January 1951.
Statement on Landsberg Case .... February 1951.
Youth and German Defense .... February 1951.