On the 8th of May, 1947, the Maharaja of Patiala visited the Viceroy at his palace in New Delhi and voiced the concerns of his people, the Sikhs, concerning the forthcoming partition of their homeland in the Punjab between the Hindus and Muslims. When the Viceroy informed him that there was no way of preventing the forthcoming partition the Maharaja replied:

Patiala: In that case I greatly fear the Sikhs will fight.

Viceroy: If they do... they will have to fight the Central Government; for I and my Government are determined to put down any communal war with a ruthless iron hand; they will be opposed not only by tanks and armored cars and artillery, but they will be bombed and machine-gunned from the air. You can tell your Sikhs that if they start a war they will not be fighting the Muslim League, but the whole might of the armed forces.¹

So did the last Viceroy of India, Admiral the Right Honorable the Viscount Mountbatten of Burma and cousin to King George VI, promise a terrible response from the military forces under his command. Yet, three months later, as Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims were killing each other in the Punjab, the group of infantry brigades which formed the Punjab Boundary Force could not fulfill Mountbatten’s promise of retribution. Great Britain’s failure to ensure a peaceful transition for India from a colony to an independent dominion paved the way for bloody events to come: three major conflicts between India and Pakistan; a bitter religious hatred which includes both Mohandas K. Gandhi (d. 1948) and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (d. 1984) amongst its list of victims.

What happened? Why did Mountbatten’s words count so little in stopping a civil war which left hundreds of thousands of dead and millions of refugees? Why could not the Punjab Boundary Force prevent or at the very least suppress the civil war which destroyed the prosperous Punjab?

The Punjab Boundary Force was the last remnant of the old Imperial Indian Army. The Indian Army in 1947 mustered over 500,000 troops and its existence as a unified force of Hindus, Sikhs, Muslims, and British personnel was threatened by independence and partition. The British element, over 60,000 strong in 1939 would be withdrawn. The British Officer Corp of over 10,000 officers would also leave. Finally, the Muslim contingent, representing 33.8% of the enlisted ranks and 23.7% of the officer corp would be extracted and organized into the new Pakistani Army.² Partition meant that a large portion of the army could not be used in any military action until the reorganization was complete. In a paper compiled on the division of the armed forces, the Commander-in-Chief in India, Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck, pointed out that while some infantry battalions and armored regiments were entirely Muslim or Hindu (Sikh included), most were mixed and in none of the formations were all of the officers Muslim or Hindu. All of the units would have to be broken down and gradually rebuilt. His concluding statement made this point: “During the process of division India will be virtually undefended.”³
India would be "virtually undefended" from any external or internal threat. The only protection India would have consisted of a small reserve of mixed troops to be used in case of emergency. One of those units not communally divided was the 4th Indian (Infantry) Division. The commander was Major General T. W. Rees, and he had been in command for about two years. The division had seen major combat action in North Africa, Italy, and Greece. In late May of 1947, in response to the Governor of the Punjab's pleas for additional troops, the headquarters of the 4th Division and two infantry brigades were ordered to the north. The 4th Indian Division would become the nucleus of the Punjab Boundary Force.

"The whole might of the armed forces" was what Mountbatten had promised to use against the Sikhs should they start civil war. The 4th Division did not represent the "whole might" of the armed forces. However, a full strength infantry division would be a powerful arm for the government to use against the violent Sikhs and Muslims. Unfortunately none of the brigades under its command were at full strength. Most of the battalions were at half strength and in the reorganization process the division had lost its British battalions; its artillery contingent had been withdrawn, and both the division's armored reconnaissance regiment and one of its infantry brigades (7th) were omitted from the division's marching orders.4

The order of battle, despite the low combat strengths appeared impressive. The Punjab Boundary Force mustered the Headquarters of the 4th Division, the 5th Infantry Brigade, 11th Infantry Brigade, 14th Parachute Brigade, 42nd Lorried Brigade, 114th Infantry Brigade, and the 18th Cavalry Regiment (a tank formation). The five infantry brigades deployed sixteen infantry battalions. They were to police the Punjab, an area with thirty administrative districts of which eleven required "special military measures." The eleven districts alone covered an area of 37,500 square miles with a population of over 14,500,000.5

Traditionally, the military was used to supplement, not replace, the civil administration during times of crisis. The massive rioting in Calcutta the previous year had had infantry battalions assisting the police in clearing the streets. The situation in the Punjab was very different from the violence that plagued Calcutta. The population was spread all across the province and while local police corps were responsible for vast areas they were usually understaffed. The police in Calcutta had been reinforced by Gurkha (Nepalese) Gendarmerie and were fairly reliable. The police in the Punjab, who in August numbered over 24,000 constables, began to lose their impartiality under the barrage of propaganda from the various religious communities. Over 74% of the police force was Muslim and as independence approached large bodies of constables began to desert.6 On the 10th of August, in Jullundar district 7,000 constables fled their posts and demanded safe conduct to Pakistan.7

The loss of the police represented the physical disintegration of the civil administration in the Punjab. Troops could not replace police since very few of them were properly trained to arrest or search within the limits set by civil law. Within a week after the first mass desertions by the police (August 14th) the violence in the Punjab changed from peasant armies attacking military units to a campaign of mass terrorism. In the cities, people were being knifed or shot down in the streets or market places. In the countryside, whole villages were burned and scores of bodies littered the ground. The absence of the police meant that troops had to take over safeguarding refugees from attack. The elaborate plans for crushing resistance with the use of tanks and bombers were now irrelevant in stopping the violence.

However, the Viceroy had ordered the
Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Smith, to send mechanised units to the Punjab:

"... I wished to have tanks, armoured cars, and aircraft used so that the poorly armed insurgent armies would feel that their resistance was futile since they were being mown down without a chance of killing any of the armed forces..."[11]

At first, Sikh and Muslim Jathas (battle groups of several hundred or more men) did attack mechanized army units and consequently suffered enormous casualties. In one encounter, an army detachment supported by a tank killed 69 Sikhs, wounded 10 and captured mortars, machine guns, sub-machine guns, and rifles from the enemy dead.9 Once the Jathas realized the futility in attacking armored units they stopped, and instead began attacking trains or ambushing refugee columns.

Why were the Sikhs and Muslims killing each other? History reveals that the Punjab, while peaceful during the century of British rule, was a violent region before the British Army arrived in the 1840s. The Mogul Emperors in the sixteenth century oppressed the Sikhs to the extent that their 5th Guru (spiritual leader) led a revolt against the Muslim rulers. Upon his death in 1606, a period of constant war persisted as both faiths fought to achieve martial supremacy. When the Sikhs conquered the Muslims in 1767 their rule was so oppressive that the Muslims in turn rose in revolt. Despite the arrival of the British, religious tensions were exacerbated during the Sepoy Mutiny in 1857. While Muslims joined Hindus in the mutiny the Sikhs remained loyal to the British and had many opportunities to kill rebel Muslims.[10]

A century of peace did not dissipate communal fears as the populations of both faiths (Sikh-Hindu and Muslim) abandoned their homes rather than live under the rule of their new masters. Hindus and Sikhs abandoned over 6.7 million acres of land worth over 5 billion rupees in the West Punjab (Pakistan). Conversely, Muslims abandoned over 4.7 million acres of land worth over 1 billion rupees.[11] The number of refugees, by early October totalled over 8 million people. With the desertion of the police the Punjab Boundary Force had to protect these refugees from attack. Tanks and bombers can make up for any deficiency in numbers when it comes to suppressing poorly armed peasant Jathas. Now the crisis demanded large bodies of troops to protect these refugees. The Governor of the Punjab revealed how weak the P.B.F. had become.

"... I estimated that we should need at least two divisions of full strength and on a War footing—i.e. a minimum of about 20,000 effective fighting men. The effective strength of the P.B.F. is at present about 7,500 or including static troops and training centres about 9,000. ... Fire power is really less important than numbers."[12]

Sir Jenkins went on the say that neither the railways nor the main roads were safe and that it was impossible to control the village raiding without a great display of force.

Reinforcements were needed: the question was where they would come from. The General Officer Commanding of Eastern Command, Lieutenant General Sir Francis Tucker (and former commander of the 4th Division), sent as reinforcements the 123rd Infantry Brigade (3 infantry battalions), the 1st Mahar battalion, the Headquarters of the 161st Infantry Brigade, and an artillery regiment. Field Marshal Auchinleck also ordered the movement of another infantry brigade and a mixed (tanks and armoured cars) armored squadron to the Punjab but in his report to the Viceroy he stated that no amount of troops could stop the indiscriminate butchery nor could additional reinforcements be sent since the Army was stretched to its fullest extent and it would be difficult, if not impossible to find more troops.[13]

Sikh and Muslim Jathas inflicted considerable losses amongst the packed groups of
refugees and every effort to protect them seemed beyond the capacity of the P.B.F. The Intelligence Officer (GSO 1) of the 4th Indian Division, Lieutenant Colonel P.S. Mitcheson, counted between 400 and 600 corpses along a fifty mile stretch of highway and witnessed an ambush against some refugees:

“In a few minutes fifty men, women and children were slashed to pieces while thirty others came running back towards us with wounds streaming. We got up a tank of 18 Cavalry which killed six Sikh attackers…”

Even in refugee columns escorted by troops, refugees (whether Muslim or Sikh-Hindu) were cut down by their attackers. General Rees, in his report described how the Jathas were deployed in ambushing Indian refugees:

“As the crops were high it was simple to ambush marching columns of refugees. The attackers would remain concealed until the last moment and then pour in a stampeding volley, usually in North-West Frontier fashion… In spite of the best efforts of the escorts to hold them together the refugees would scatter in panic; whereupon the ambush parties would dash in with sword and spear. With attackers and attacked inextricably intermingled the escort usually was unable to protect its charges.”

It was no safer travelling by train. There were numerous incidents where mobs, as large as 3,000 in number, halted trains and butchered their passengers. Field Marshal Auchinleck reported that over 324 people had been killed in train attacks during the morning hours of the 15th of August. Train crews did not report to duty for fear of losing their lives. Despite the placement of escorts, the mobs would either overwhelm the guards, or worse, the guards would permit the mobs to enter the trains unopposed. On the 22nd of August, the military picket near Khalsa College, Amritsar, and the escort of a Muslim refugee train was overwhelmed by a Sikh-Hindu Jatha. The combined unit (2 officers, 2 NCOs, and 27 enlisted men) expended all of its ammunition before being overrun. All of the refugees were either killed or injured. On the early morning of the 1st of September when a refugee train arrived in Ampla, the escort of 1 NCO and 14 enlisted men permitted a Hindu mob to attack the train. Over 183 people were killed. When the 2/1st Gurkhas arrived, the escort was put under arrest.

A major fear was that communalism would affect the troops of the P.B.F. Apparently it did not occur to high ranking commanders that troops who might have originated from the Punjab were unlikely to remain impartial after seeing their homes burned or their families murdered. Of the troops in the twenty-three infantry battalions in the Punjab Boundary Force: 20% were Sikhs, 25% were Hindu, and Muslims the remaining 55%. Almost all of the Sikh personnel originated from the Punjab and a majority of the Muslim troops were Punjabi Muslims. An officer in a brigade headquarters noted that many Sikh soldiers had asked for help for their families marooned in Pakistan while many Muslim troops had families trapped on the Indian side of the province. In a telephone report from General Rees on the 11th of August, he reported (optimistically) that the troops were unaffected by the communal tension. Field Marshal Auchinleck did not share his optimism. He commented to Rees’ statement, “troops are unaffected” with the question “How Long?” Reports began to arrive at Supreme Headquarters that Hindu or Sikh officers and men were becoming unreliable. It required the direct intervention of British officers before the troops would open fire on mobs of their own faith. Muslim officers and men also become reluctant to shoot their own kind. Open mutiny was considered a serious possibility.

When it became evident that the P.B.F. was no longer an effective military force the Partition Council decided to dissolve the
force and allow the armies of both Dominions to accept responsibility for escorting refugees. On the 1st of September, 1947, the Punjab Boundary Force was officially disbanded. The last Indian Army units under British command came under Indian (Hindu) or Pakistani Army control.

The P.B.F. faced major difficulties that were not foreseen by the Supreme Command. Its problems included: Army battalions which were understrength; mechanised units unable to adapt to their new duties; communalism; lack of training to handle police duties. These were major problems that affected the Punjab Boundary Force. How could the Viceroy’s Government have acted differently in preventing this disaster?

A larger military force would have eased some problems. The P.B.F. mustered seven infantry brigades, a tank regiment, air and artillery support. It is questionable whether the force reached 55,000 troops but it is likely the conclusion would have been the same. Thousands of troops were needed to pacify the Punjab. Had the P.B.F. and the police been at full strength, they would have mustered 79,000 men (55,000 troops, 24,000 police) to police an area (the eleven districts requiring “special military measures”) covering over 37,500 square miles. That would be a ratio of two men per square mile. In comparison, the population of 14,500,000 would average 386 people per square mile. The actual number of troops and police deployed were 17,000 (9,000 troops, 8,000 police) or a ratio of two men per five square miles.

With the disintegration of the police and the collapse of the civil administration the number of troops needed to keep order were immense. To appreciate how understrength the P.B.F. was one can look to another British Colonial post that was plagued by civil war: Palestine. Palestine covered an area of over 8,000 square miles. There were 70,000 troops and 5,000 police guarding the Colonial administration in 1947 and the ratio was nine men per square mile. Yet the Army was unable to suppress the Irgun, the Jewish terrorist army which harassed and bombed the British Government in Palestine. To equal the commitment in Palestine the Supreme Command needed to deploy over 300,000 troops to achieve an equal nine men per square mile ratio.

Did the Viceroy and his council really believe that seven brigades were sufficient to suppress the civil war? Was the Governor of the Punjab negligent in informing New Delhi of the serious situation in the province? On the contrary, Sir Evan Jenkins, the Governor of the Punjab, informed the Viceroy’s Chief of staff, Field Marshall Lord Ismay of the need for more troops. Sir Jenkins’s army advisor had told him that it would require four operational divisions (i.e. at wartime strength) with an army headquarters to deal with the civil war. The Punjab Boundary Force had seven weak brigades and a divisional headquarters to execute its duties. Lord Ismay felt he could speak for the Viceroy and concluded that the appeal for additional troops had no merit to be reviewed by the Viceroy and it never reached his desk. While Ismay had been Chief of the Imperial General Staff under Prime Minister Winston Churchill, it was the Viceroy and not he who had the last word in any major decision. Still, Mountbatten took no action to countermand Ismay’s decision nor was there any record of a reprimand by the Viceroy either in Ismay’s memoirs or in Mountbatten’s personal log.

Ismay had turned down Sir Jenkins’s request for more troops on the basis that there were none available. Great Britain was no longer at war. It is true that Great Britain was war weary and military garrisons were deployed in Palestine and Western Europe but reserves were available. 1947 was a year when troops were withdrawn from occupation duties and reserve battalions from the Territorial Army were demobilized. In Palestine alone, seven infantry battalions and an armoured regiment were withdrawn and returned to Great Britain. Five of those
seven battalions were demobilized by October, 1947, after the War Office had ordered all line regiments to demobilize to battalion strength.\textsuperscript{21} They were a potential pool of reserves that could have bolstered the understrength formations in India but neither the Viceroy nor his generals considered petitioning the War Office for reinforcements.

There was also the British Army in India. The Army in India was weakened due to peacetime demobilization and while many of the troops and officers were recent conscripts or newly commissioned they represented a formidable military force. According to the accords set by the British Government, the British contingent in India would after 15 August no longer be used in suppressing communal affairs. Thus these troops were available for other duties. The British contingent deployed six independent brigade groups, twelve independent infantry battalions, four armoured regiments, and other support units.\textsuperscript{22} Four infantry divisions equal forty infantry battalions, four armoured regiments, and other support troops. The British Army in India plus the reserves from Palestine would have fielded a force of thirty-seven infantry battalions and five armoured regiments. However, the entire British contingent in India and the reserves from Palestine would still not have brought the Punjab Boundary Force to a force of 300,000 troops.

If there was no solution militarily, what other alternatives were available to the Viceroy’s Government that could have averted the civil war?

The Sikhs of the Punjab had the most to lose from the partition of their native homeland. They are a small, religious, tribal people who, during the course of history produced disciplined warriors who fought off many invaders. After the British Army crushed the Sikh forces at the end of the 1840s the sons of those earlier warriors enlisted in the ranks of the Imperial Colonial Army to continue the tradition inherent in their religious-military society.

With the end of British rule the Sikhs realized that the Viceroy’s Government had made no provision to protect their interests in the Punjab. Partition would place over 50% of the province in Muslim hands. Many religious shrines and temples, including the birthplace of their first Guru (teacher) would be defiled by Muslim Pakistani control. The Sikhs responded to this potential blasphemy by waging total war against the Muslims. The Sikhs maintained a small but efficient army which evenly matched the larger but less disciplined Muslim League National Guards. In Amritsar district alone, by 25 August nearly 100 Muslim villages were attacked by Sikhs while only 7 Sikh villages had been attacked by Muslims. In one case a Muslim village of 350 people was attacked by a Sikh Jatha (battle group); there were only 40 survivors.\textsuperscript{23} General T. W. Rees commented that the organization of the Sikhs was superior to the Muslim League National Guards and that:

\textit{“... both during and after the war there had been heavy smuggling of modern arms into India... The Jathas therefore possessed hard cores of skilled fighters armed with rifles, grenades, tommy guns and machine guns. Although the Punjab Mussalmans (Muslims) also possessed firearms and trained men... they lacked the cohesiveness of the Sikhs.”}\textsuperscript{24}

Had the Sikhs not been abandoned by the British and had a plan been conceived ensuring that some of the Sikhs’ demands could be met the religious hatred might have been mitigated. Throughout the official papers of the Viceroy’s Government and including Mountbatten’s personal log there is not a single mention of an attempt to assist the Sikhs nor a plan to ease the agony over the partition of their homeland.

Why did not the Viceroy’s Government commit the available British Army units in India to the Punjab? The transition of power on the 15th of August meant that British troops were no longer part of the Indian Army, but the Punjab Boundary Force was
the last Imperial Indian Army force still under direct British control. The P.B.F. commander did not hand over his command to a native Indian (or Pakistani) Army General nor did lower ranking British Indian Army officers relinquish their commands to equivalent native Indian Army officers. The P.B.F. was under the supervision of the Commander-in-Chief in India, Field Marshal Auchinleck, who, in turn, reported directly to the Viceroy. Neither the Hindu Indian nor Muslim Pakistani civilian or military authorities had any jurisdiction over the Punjab Boundary Force. There would have been no problem in placing British troops under P.B.F. control. Why was it not done?

The Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Smith, issued a secret Army directive dated 29 July 1947 for all British Army officers in command from Battalion level to Army level. No more than sixty British officers ever saw this directive. It dictated that under no circumstances could British Army units be used in suppressing communal riots to save native Indian lives. The only exception was in situations where British lives were in danger. All copies of his directive were to be destroyed and no native Indian Army officers were to gain access to the directive. Both Field Marshal Auchinleck and the Viceroy knew of its existence. Both could have overridden the “no circumstances” policy since they had the authority to commit British troops to the Punjab. While defendants of British policy could argue that it was not proper to shoot one’s hosts, i.e. citizens of the new India and Pakistan, at the same time it also meant that the Vicerecy’s Government would not sacrifice the lives of British troops to save the lives of thousands of their former crown subjects, i.e. the Indians.

The Punjab Boundary Force had to stop the civil war with its own limited resources and without reinforcements. The P.B.F. was sent to the Punjab to support the civilian government of Sir Evan Jenkins. When the government collapsed was it not the responsibility of the Army to assume control of the government and declare martial law? Was Sir Jenkins negligent in reporting the state of the government in the Punjab to the Viceroy?

The P.B.F. was a peacekeeping boundary force, not a group of heavily armed and mechanised police. Neither was it an army of judges, lawyers, or civil servants nor was it ever meant to be one. When the military declares an area to be under “Martial Law” the military judicial system integrates with the civilian judicial system. The reason is that the military judicial system deals with violations of Military Law, not civilian law. While certain rights and privileges under civilian law are suspended during martial law the civilian courts still try and convict civilian miscreants under the established procedures of civil law. Both Sir Jenkins and General Rees advised against the declaration of martial law. In his report of 4 August, 1947, Sir Jenkins wrote:

“We are not at present dealing with a situation in which Troops can act decisively... There is no short-cut by Civil or by military procedure; for neither a Civil Governor nor a General administering Martial Law can properly shoot innocent people merely because they... live near the scene of an outrage.”

Martial Law was useless since without an existing civilian court system there was no way for military officers to legally convict and sentence people for crimes that were not applicable under Military Law or nor to establish criteria for criminal convictions that met civilian requirements.

If martial law could not be declared then how could the Punjab Boundary Force deal with the civil war? Did not the Governor, Sir Evan Jenkins, inform the Viceroy of the impending collapse of the government? Indeed, he had informed the Viceroy that not only the civilian administration was collapsing but also that the police was becoming scandalously corrupt and negligent, and discipline was disintegrating. The courts were
unable to convict felons since magistrates refused to sentence law breakers of their own faith. This report was sent to the Viceroy on the 25th of June, 1947. Mountbatten had five weeks to prepare for the upcoming state of chaos and yet nothing special in terms of orders or personnel was prepared to counter the collapse of the civilian government.

A prosperous province was laid waste and old religious hatreds were reawakened in a civil war which brought nothing but death and destruction to its inhabitants. While the victims were Indian, key Government leaders were British. The Viceroy, most of his staff officers, most of the provincial governors, and all of the Senior Army officers were British. With the withdrawal of British sovereignty these people no longer had a future in the new India or Pakistan. Mountbatten personified that feeling. Mountbatten had been anxious to set a time limit in his appointment since he feared that he would lose seniority by his appointment to India and that being the last Viceroy would not count favorably towards promotion. Over 10,000 British Indian Army officers, 1,600 British Indian Civil Service officials, and 50,000 civilians faced a future in which Indians, not British, would be the rulers. Very few were willing to be part of the new India’s future. Sir Evan Jenkins, in his report to the Viceroy dated 16 April, 1947 read:

“Every British official in the I.C.S. and I.P. (Indian Police) in the Punjab including myself, would be very glad to leave it . . . no British official intends to remain in the Punjab after the transfer of power. Six months ago the position was quite different.”

The civil war had a major influence in the decisions of these men, but the feeling was similar in the British Officer Corp. Out of 11,400 officers in the pre-partition Army, 8,200 were still serving in the ranks by Independence. Yet fewer than 2,800 volunteered to remain with their units in the new Indian and Pakistani Armies. Many of these officers could not accept the lack of a British Indian Army.

Mountbatten personified the withdrawing British by his lack of proper direction, organization, and preparation in the creation of the Punjab Boundary Force. Mountbatten’s failure to deal with the Sikhs meant that there was no peaceful option to prevent the civil war. Mountbatten’s failure to assert his privilege as Viceroy and countermand the secret Army directive forbiding British troops to save Indian lives crippled the P.B.F. in its attempt to find reinforcements. Defenders of the Viceroy may argue that the P.B.F. was no longer under British Army control but that argument is invalid since the evidence indicates the P.B.F. was still under British, not Indian or Pakistani, control.

The Punjab Boundary Force was not a special army that was sent to reinforce the formations already in the Punjab. Rather, it was a title conferred on formations already deployed in the Punjab. There was no consideration concerning the religious composition of the troops, the weak formation strengths, the imminent collapse of the Punjab Government, nor contemplation of an alternate plan in mustering army reinforcements for the Punjab (aside from mobilising the British Army units in India). Proponents defending the Viceroy could argue that Mountbatten did not know of the situation in the province nor have any control in the Boundary Force’s mandate. However, the evidence suggests otherwise. Mountbatten was updated every week by the Governor and he personally visited the devastated areas. The intelligence was accurate, its analysis of the forthcoming violence precise, but the Viceroy’s Government chose to ignore or reject it.

The civil war in the Punjab was perhaps unavoidable but the British Government did little to mitigate the consequences. Instead of preparing for the worst in the Punjab, Senior Government and Army officials were concerned about the unknown future that lay before them. It was understandable that
to have one's career swept away by Independence was traumatic but these men forgot one important thing: their duty. Their negligence permitted 8,000,000 people to become refugees and over 200,000 (some estimates total 600,000) people to lose their lives. Perhaps no sizable body of troops could have suppressed the civil war, but the Viceroy and his generals did not attempt to find additional reinforcements (e.g. from Britain). Instead they did only what was absolutely necessary in crushing the civil war. Unfortunately it was not enough to mitigate the tragedy in the Punjab nor prevent the failure of the Punjab Boundary Force.

NOTES

4 G. R. Stevens, Fourth Indian Division. (McLaren and Son Ltd., Toronto, 1948), 403.
5 Ibid., 405.
7 G. R. Stevens, Fourth Indian Division, 408.
9 Ibid., Vol. XII, 704, 735.
13 Ibid., 737.
14 G. R. Stevens, Fourth Indian Division. 408.
15 Ibid., 406.
16 Francis Tuker, While Memory Serves. (Cassell, London, 1950), 483.
17 2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkha Rifles (Regiment).
19 Francis Tuker, While Memory Serves. 448-449.
21 Ibid., 8.
22 Ibid., 20.
23 SIKHS' "JUST RIGHTS," The Times (London), (August 27, 1947), 4.
24 G. R. Stevens, Fourth Indian Division. 406.
26 Ibid., 526.
27 Michael Edwardes, The Last Years of British India. (World Publishing Co., Cleveland/New York, 1963), 156.
29 H. V. Hodson, The Great Divide. 416.