DISCONTINUITIES IN DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS
AND MASS SOCIETIES

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INTRODUCTION

The linkages between democratic political systems and mass societies are explored in this paper. Specifically, an attempt is made to show that there are serious discontinuities between the political system and the social system by examining certain interactions of these two systems. The paper itself is divided into three parts. The first section is largely analytic. It attempts to elucidate the environmental and cultural features that led to the presence of a democratic political system within the context of a mass society. The driving force behind this development has been, and remains, economic modernization. The result of this movement into an industrial culture has been a serious dislocation between the political and social spheres. Although it is widely recognized that certain conditions must be met before it is possible for a democratic political system to emerge, it is not recognized to the same extent that these conditions are not the same as the conditions that sustain a mature democratic political system. Both sets of conditions are set forth and explored in this section.

The second section of the paper describes the discontinuities between the democratic system and mass society. It tries to do this in three principal ways. First, it is argued that democratic theory has remained very stable and has undergone little evolution since the Industrial Revolution. This is not the case with the structure of society. Indeed, it would not be incorrect to say that there have been fundamental changes in the social system. The second method used to describe the discontinuities between the political and social system examines the internal structure of both a traditional society and a mass society. Finally, the discontinuities are described by noting the violations of the laws of social change. The conclusion that is reached is that the dislocations occurred as the result of the failure of democratic theory to evolve, rapid social change, and the fact of inadequate response to the demands generated by the industrial culture.

The third, and final, section is largely prescriptive. This part of the paper tries to show what steps need to be taken in order to bring about a realignment between the political and social systems.
The underlying assumption here is that the political system, or more precisely, the government can bring about the necessary changes.

Since this section is prescriptive, the values behind it should be spelled out. These values are only made explicit here. Neither here nor in the body of the paper are there any arguments to sustain these values. They are simply posited. The values are: that abundance is better than want; that ecological balance is better than ecological imbalance; that fraternity is better than prejudice; and that peace is better than war.

The discussion in this part of the paper centers around four primary areas; the need for new myths to replace the exploded ones; the strengthening of voluntary associations, the basic instrument of the democratic system; the need to stabilize our growing population which aggravates myriad other problems; and a necessary change in our foreign policy from militarism to economic assistance. In short, we must more successfully address ourselves to the changes, and the consequent problems, wrought by the Industrial Revolution.

This research is cross-disciplinary or inter-disciplinary in nature. The footnotes will provide ample evidence of that. With few exceptions, however, the bulk of the research was done in either the behavioral sciences, or those fields with a behavioral orientation. Survey data from opinion polls conducted by both academic and commercial pollsters were an important source that were used in this analysis. The data from these polls were used in two ways: first, as evidence supporting the arguments presented in the body of the paper; and secondly, as an empirical “screen” for assumptions made by authors who either did not utilize such data, or did not consider such data germane to their subjects.

I

Democratic political systems have been in existence for roughly three hundred and fifty years. We can date the emergence of democratic political systems from the seventeenth century where the conflict between absolutism and liberalism was first resolved in favor of the latter.¹ These democratic systems were linked with traditional societies until the advent of the Industrial Revolution. To describe the conjunction of the political system and the social system in this pre-industrial era such terms as classical democracy, aristocratic democracy, and even traditional democracy have been

used. Nevertheless, the root meaning of democratic theory remained the same regardless of the social system qualifier used. The qualifiers though did introduce some confusion. This confusion centered around the failure to distinguish clearly between what constituted the political system and what constituted the social system. Indeed, this failure to distinguish between the political and the social has persisted to this day. Although not a part of this paper, the same confusion and failure of discrimination exists in regard to the linkages between the political system and the economic system in the minds of many people, and not all of them laymen.

Thus, by keeping the concepts political system and social system distinct in our minds, we can see that it is both possible and probable that democratic political systems can be and will be linked with social systems having radically different internal structures. This does not mean that such conjunctions will necessarily be harmonious ones. Indeed, the opposite is true in certain cases where dislocations are bound to exist.

The Industrial Revolution can be viewed as the watershed in terms of the internal structure of social systems. Prior to the Industrial Revolution there was only one type of society, the traditional society, although many variations of this type existed. The advent of industrial modernization destroyed this single form of social organization. There now exists three primary types of social systems. First, there still remains the traditional society which is pre-industrial and has not yet begun the move toward economic modernization. Next, there is the transitional society which is gripped by internal conflict between the traditional elite and the industrial managers over the issue of the modernization of the economy. Finally, there is the modern, or the mass, or the industrial society. The terms are used interchangeably in this paper. In this form of social organization economic modernization has been, or is virtually completed. There are, of course, many variations on each of these major types. Indeed, in any organization as complex as a social system it is unlikely that a "pure" type exists.

Thus, the Industrial Revolution created an environment that led to the emergence of mass societies linked with democratic political systems. This development has been accompanied by serious dislocations between the political and social systems. The structure

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of the social system linked with a democratic political system changed radically while the structure of democratic theory underwent little change. It should occasion no surprise that the discontinuities in the linkages between the two systems stand in dire need of realignment.

Despite the fact that industrialization led to the transformation of the structure of social systems, it did not immediately work the same transformation on the structure of political systems. Indeed, the effect of industrialization on the structure of political systems was a conservative one. The structure of both democratic and non-democratic systems remained relatively stable. Overall, industrial modernization had two primary effects on political systems. First, modernization did not lead to the decline of non-democratic political systems. Secondly, the transformation of the social system that led to discontinuities between the social system and the political system in democratic systems produced the same results in non-democratic systems.

Thus, the societal conditions that act as part of the linkage between the political and social system, and that make a democratic political system possible can be considered only as necessary conditions. They are not the necessary and sufficient conditions. Indeed, the possibility of the emergence of a democratic system does not mean the necessity nor does it indicate the degree of probability of such emergence. These societal conditions, then, permit development of radically different political systems. The impact of the Industrial Revolution, which transforms the structure of society, merely continues the further development of these different political systems. Historically, the political systems that have continued their development since the drive toward economic modernization began range from syncratic politics on the right of the political spectrum to stalinist politics on the left. This development has included the linkage of democratic systems with economic systems as different as capitalism, socialism, and the welfare state.

The linking conditions that make a democratic system possible are not the same conditions that sustain a mature democratic political system, that is, a democratic system linked with an industrial mass society. By examining first the conditions that make a democracy possible, and then, the conditions that sustain a mature democracy, it will be possible to observe the discontinuities in part of the linkages between the political and social systems. The conditions that make a democracy possible are four in number. First,

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6 A. F. K. Organski, The Stages of Political Development (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), pp. 7–16. The terms are broadened to include all totalitarian systems regardless of their stage of economic development.
there must exist some measure of widespread economic security. In other words, the biological requisites of food, clothing, and shelter must be met in a relatively satisfactory manner. Widespread poverty and want is not conducive to political freedoms. The biological drives of survival and hunger are the two strongest instinctual drives in human beings. If these drives occupy a position uppermost in a man’s mind, he will not have time for, or be concerned with, such luxuries as freedom of speech and freedom of association. There exists a hierarchy of needs for human beings, and economic needs must be satisfied before humans concern themselves with political ideals.

Second, the society as a whole must have a relatively high literacy rate. There are no precise parameters to indicate how high this literacy rate must be, but it is safe to assume that it must be well over fifty percent. Literacy is an essential element in the socialization process that must occur if a society is to view itself as a political unit, and as fit to govern that political unit. Without a relatively high literacy rate, this socialization process cannot occur among the entire society, it will be restricted to an elite. Literacy makes possible the communication and interchange of political ideas throughout the entire structure of society.

Third, an acceptance of the dignity of human life is necessary if a democracy is to succeed. The first two conditions seem to be necessary if this one is to be recognized. However, the notion of an intrinsic moral worth of every individual is so central to democratic theory that it must be stated separately. This condition provides the framework for the ideal of political equality—that all men are equal. More than this is meant, however. Men are more than equal to one another, they are brothers. The relationship between democratic citizens is one of fraternity. Non-democratic systems are always paternalistic in some way. The relationship between rulers and ruled in a democracy is one of equals. The same relationship is a non-democratic system is one of superordinate and subordinate.

The final condition that makes a democratic system possible is that there must be a widespread acceptance of the exchange system. This involves a consequent rejection of the threat system. The key difference between a democratic system and a non-

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democratic system in regard to this condition is that use of the threat system is viewed as normal in a non-democratic system whereas in a democratic system threats, force, and the use of violence are considered extraordinary, and thus, illegitimate. The basic instruments of democracy are the bargain and the compromise, which are the heart of the exchange system.

These, then, are the societal conditions that make a democratic system possible. The democratic systems that emerged were linked with a traditional society. With the coming of the Industrial Revolution the internal structure of society was radically altered. Following industrialization, democratic systems were linked with mass societies. The conditions that sustain a mature democratic system, as noted above, are not the same as the conditions that make a democratic system possible. By contrasting the sustaining conditions with the necessary conditions, the dislocations between the democratic system and the mass society will be readily apparent. The sustaining conditions are also four in number.\textsuperscript{11} First, symbols and forms that have continuity and that speak men's language, that is, excite their imagination, must exist. Economic modernization is a traumatic experience. Without the appropriate symbols, that shock may be more than the political system can absorb. The process of modernization necessarily involves the debunking of myths found in the traditional society. The modern democratic system has failed to replace the symbols that have been displaced.

Second, a mature democracy is sustained by a modernized economy and culture. Modern democracies have faltered here because industrialization is an uneven process. Certain parts of the economy are left relatively unaffected by modernization. It is the task of democratic government to direct the forces of industrialization to those parts of the economy. A modernized culture is a by-product of the industrial process. By removing economic backwardness, democratic government insures that the culture does not remain backward.

Third, there must be a reasonable distribution of wealth and power in the community to sustain a modern democratic system. The necessary conditions for a democracy call for a widespread measure of economic security. In a mature democracy the concern shifts from economic security to the distribution of wealth and power. The concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a few violates the pluralism that is an essential part of a modern democracy.\textsuperscript{12} The power to redistribute the resources of a modern


\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
society rests only with the government. The mature democratic systems have failed to act on this responsibility. By not acting in a resolute manner democratic governments have actually encouraged the drift toward greater inequalities in wealth and power. This drift will not correct itself; governmental action is necessary to redress the inequalities.

Finally, mature democratic systems are sustained by civil liberties and a framework of vigorous private groups and associations. The basic civil liberties are effective instruments for maintaining men’s loyalty to a political system even when they disapprove of many of the actions of that system. The erosion of civil liberties, and the stifling of dissent, destroys that loyalty and undermines the very basis of democratic government—government by consent. The basic instrument of the democratic citizen, the instrument through which he exercises his civil liberties, is the voluntary association. Democratic governments have been vigorous in protecting civil liberties. The same is not true for voluntary associations. Thus, the exercise of one’s civil liberties is often an exercise in futility. Freedom of speech is ineffective without freedom of association.

The role of the government, then, marks the greatest contrast between the democratic system linked with a traditional society and the democratic system linked with a mass society. In the traditional democracy, the role of government is essentially a negative one. It allows, or permits, and in rare cases, promotes, the transition from a traditional society to an industrial society. In the mass democracy, the role of government is essentially a positive one. In addition to promotion, it must also regulate and supervise many of the activities that occur in an industrial society. The contrast between the necessary conditions and the sustaining conditions reveals this change in role very vividly. A large share of the discontinuities between the democratic system and the mass society can be directly attributed to the extreme reluctance of both political leaders and followers in accepting this necessary change in the role of democratic government. These vestiges of cultural lag can be eradicated only by a social learning process that will reeducate both the political leaders and the masses as to the proper role of government in a mass democracy. However, before this social learning process can occur, the seeming stability of democratic theory in the face of extensive structural changes in society must be broken down. That is the task of the second section of this paper. But before turning to that task the figure presented on next page will summarize the arguments of the paper to this point.

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The evolution of the democratic political system has been retarded by the lack of fundamental change in democratic theory. Despite the widespread changes occurring in the economic and social systems, democratic theory has remained very stable. The proof of this stability can be demonstrated by examining four different facets, all of which concern democratic theory. First, the authors writing about democratic theory today are merely restating what authors since the seventeenth century have been saying.\(^\text{14}\) In some cases it is refinement of the basic tenets of democracy, and in other cases, it is a working out again of the logical consequences of those basic tenets. In either case, however, the basic tenets of democratic theory—popular sovereignty, limited government, and political equality—have remained virtually unchanged.

Next, democratic political systems have manifested different institutional arrangements, yet the same theory is used regardless of the institutions in the system.\(^\text{15}\) Indeed, a particular institutional arrangement takes on a definitional aspect when it is defined as something a democracy is not, such as, democracy is not separation of powers, checks and balances, federalism, and judicial review. This diversity of institutional arrangement in the political system and the unitary quality of democratic theory seems to suggest that the linkages between systems and theory are in need of further exploration. If such an exploration were successful, it might be found that different democratic systems are supported by different democratic theories. On the other hand, the results might show why a single theory permits diverse institutional arrangements to develop.

Third, democratic systems have been linked with economic sys-

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\(^{15}\) Schumpeter, op. cit., chap. xxi.
tems that are radically different. Thus, the same argument that was used in the second point would seem to be valid here. Without satisfactory knowledge of the linkages between the political system and the economic system, it is impossible to say why democratic systems are linked with different economic systems. The traditional response to the problem posed here, and in the second point, is to assume that democratic theory remains the same, that is, stable, while the economic system evolves independently of the political system. The fact of the matter might be that democratic theory only appears to be stable, it is quite possible that it evolves right along with the social and the economic systems.

Finally, the greatest revolution in democratic systems since the Industrial Revolution, it seems, has concerned the role of the mass citizenry. This revolution has often been confused with a revolution in the tenets of democratic theory. However, that is not the case. The tenets have remained the same. In the traditional democracy, it was assumed that the citizen was highly interested in, and informed about, political issues. This atomistic individual made rational decisions in pursuit of his self interest. The voting behavior studies have shown that the mass citizenry do not conform to this model. Despite these findings, the voting behavior studies have not brought about dramatic changes in democratic theory. The response has been a call for participatory democracy. The thrust of this movement has been an attempt to remove the obstacles blocking participation in the system. Through it all, again, democratic theory appeared to remain unchanged.

Thus, the stability of democratic theory has contributed to the discontinuities between the democratic system and mass society. By examining first, the structure of a traditional society, and then the structure of a mass society, the dislocations between the political and social systems can be described in a second way.

A traditional society is characterized by extended family ties, a face-to-face society, and mechanical solidarity. Social cohesion and integration is the result of the sharing of a common culture or way of life. In this type of society there is very little mobility either in terms of geography or social status. Given this limited mobility there are strong ties to, and a strong sense of, community. Control of behavior is not normally a problem because of the reliance of the internalization of the community’s norms. This is

16 Schumpeter, op. cit., chap. xxii.
18 Faunce, op. cit., pp. 28 and 170.
the result of a socialization process that stresses internal, or primary, controls rather than external, or secondary controls.

One of the ideals of the traditional society was that of craftsmanship, or imitation. Thus, the pace of change was very slow. Innovation was not a major virtue. Indeed, it occupied a very low place in the hierarchy of communal values, and in some cases, it was even suspect. Thus, continuity, rather than change, was institutionalized in the social system. The coming of the Industrial Revolution transformed the structure of society. The process of economic modernization destroyed the traditional society, and in its place, a mass society arose.

Mass society means more than simply density of population. It means a society where the traditional controls have been shattered. Control of behavior becomes a problem, and increasing reliance is placed on external controls. The specific form of these external controls is the modern bureaucracy. These controls are necessary because there is confusion over the values of the society.

More particularly, a mass society means the breakdown of extended family ties, and the loss of the face-to-face mechanical society. These are replaced by the nuclear family, and the “faceless”, organic society. This type of society, for the most part, rests on the fact of interdependence and not on a sense of community. Social cohesion is imperfect and social integration is never fully accomplished. The result is the loss of a sense of community. The effects of this loss are compounded by the shift of the population from small rural towns to large urban centers. Thus, the industrial society is characterized by a high degree of mobility both in terms of geography and social status. Social change is very rapid due to the institutionalization of change at all levels of the society. Innovation replaces continuity as the leading virtue.

The democratic system fails to keep pace with the changes that are occurring, and have occurred, in the social system. The result is serious dislocations between the two systems. Up to this point in time, the democratic systems have still failed to adequately respond to the challenges of industrialization.

The causes for the divergence between democratic systems and mass societies can be described by a third method. That method is to examine the violations of the laws of social change. First, industrial societies, and non-industrial societies that have been affected by economic modernization, have failed miserably to check population growth. Even the most successful countries have only slowed such growth. No country has stabilized its population nor has any country been able to reduce its population.

19 Ibid.
Second, although it is widely known today that the culture patterns of a society are transmitted mainly through the instrument of the family, the transition from a traditional to a mass society altered the basic structure of the family almost without notice. This alteration in basic structure left the family unable to adequately carry out its historic function of acculturation. Due to the fact of rapid social change, society also seems incapable of developing the necessary adjunct to the family that would work together with the family to carry out this socialization process.

Third, organizations of all kinds have an optimum size. In the social system today, the most acute problem is how to organize large masses of people without sacrificing liberty and even decency. The political system is faced with the breakdown of its hierarchy. Large democratic organizations with an elaborate hierarchy are faced with a dual problem: the failure of communications from ruled to ruler (and vice versa); and the obvious fact that hierarchy violates the democratic principle of political equality.

Next, there is the social law of oligopoly. This law states that if the number of independent interacting organizations is few a situation of acute instability and conflict will be created. The economic systems of most mass democracies are dominated by oligopolistic firms. The international political system is dominated by three or four great powers. The instability in both of these systems is too obvious to need further comment.

On the other hand, the social law of instability states that the uncontrolled interaction of a large number of organizations produces unacceptable consequences. The Great Depression, for example, was one of those unacceptable consequences. Thus, the political system, or more precisely the government, must steer a middle path between the instability caused by oligopoly and the instability caused by unregulated interaction.

Finally, there is the social law of the persistence of role. Despite the transformation of the social system, the political system has persisted in its role developed for an earlier time. This problem is essentially the same one that has been discussed from two points of view; the stability of democratic theory, and the changes from traditional society to mass society. Therefore, any further discussion of this problem will be unnecessarily redundant.

To say that the causes of the divergence between the political and social systems are clear does not mean that the remedies are going to be easy to implement. Indeed, here is the crux of the problem. We have not developed any instruments that can exercise effective control over these causes. The laws of social change are known to us, but are not controlled by us. The techniques and innovations that are necessary to insure the continuance of demo-
ocratic systems within the context of a mass society have not yet been discovered, or if discovered, have not been fully utilized and implemented. We have for too long a period of time worked at cross purposes with our biological and social natures. The challenge of our times is to see that mass democratic systems meet and master the problems generated by the industrial culture. If the mass democracies fail, the world will surely turn to the obvious alternative, the non-democratic systems, to view their response to this set of problems.

To summarize the conclusions up to this point, we can state that the discontinuities between the democratic system and the mass society occurred as the result of the failure of democratic theory to evolve, the transformation of the structure of society, and the violation of the laws of social change. Here is a classic example of cultural lag. The ideas of society have not kept pace with technical innovation. This is a consequence of social inertia, that is, a tendency to persist in past modes of thought, and vested interests, a conscious attempt on the part of a few to block change in order to preserve the status quo. It is the task of the final section of this paper to point out some ways which will reduce cultural lag and bring about a better alignment between the political and social systems.

III

The relationship between the democratic system and the mass society as this paper has shown is not one of isomorphic models. Societal changes have led to discontinuities between the two systems. The problem, simply stated, is to remove those discontinuities. The solution to this problem will not be a final one. The best that can be hoped for is that we can bring our problems under rational control and then keep them manageable. It seems rather senseless to waste our time searching for permanent solutions. In a dynamic system change is inevitable. But, given the fact that change is inevitable, we can learn to cope with the dislocations that will occur. Our first step must be to bring the industrial culture under rational control.

An optimum strategy would seem to call for at least the implementation of the following four points. All of these points call for vigorous leadership by the government. The need for such positive government was demonstrated earlier. As these points are operationalized other features may be called to our attention that need amelioration. But the time is past for continued speculation, there is a need for action now.

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First, there should be a deliberate attempt made to foster new symbols and ideologies for our democratic system. We need new myths to replace the ones exploded by the process of industrialization and by the transformation of society from a traditional base to a mass base. This problem is an especially acute one since politics has replaced religion as the central concern of our time.

It is useless to try to reconstruct the solidarity of the face-to-face society. The unit upon which society relied for the transmission of cultural patterns, the extended family, has been destroyed for the most part by the Industrial Revolution. Even if the extended family had remained intact throughout the transition it would still be impossible to retain the solidarity of the face-to-face society because the values transmitted by such a family structure are the ones that were broken down in order that the process of economic modernization might occur. There is no going back, new values must be fostered, not old ones recaptured. The family unit, now the nuclear family, will still be the primary transmitter of values, but it will be transmitting new values.

What must these new values be like? First, it must be accepted that these values stand somewhere between science and religion, but not contradicting either. Second, these new values must be viewed as relative values and not absolute ones. There is no set hierarchy involved, nor is there a definite content to these values. We must learn to live with openness (uncertainty) and forsake comprehensiveness. Finally, we must also forsake some of the logical constraints of ideology. Democratic values necessarily involve a tension between competing values such as liberty and order, or excellence and equality. There can be no final resolution of these tensions. The incomplete nature of these values allows for their continued evolution. This is a process that is unending if the lessons of history remain true.

Second, the basic instrument of the democratic citizen, the voluntary association must be strengthened. The failure of the democratic system to provide mechanisms that will enhance private groups is one of the discontinuities between the political and social system that is felt most strongly. As mentioned earlier, one of the key differences between traditional society and mass society is the transition from the face-to-face society to the “faceless” society. In this transition there is lost what is perhaps the heart of the traditional society—a sense of community. A sense of community is built on voluntary rather than economic relationships. In the mass society, economic relationships dominate interactions between

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22 Frankel, op. cit., pp. 20–22.  
24 Frankel, op. cit., pp. 64–71.
citizens with only one clear exception, the nuclear family. Economic relations do not seem capable of providing the milieu in which a sense of community can develop. Part of the inadequacy of democratic theory is its failure to recognize the need for a sense of community, that is, vigorous private groups and associations. The principal tenets of democratic theory are clearly negative in character. They have allowed or permitted the rise of a mass democracy but they have not fostered nor encouraged the voluntary associations that would make for a healthy mass democracy.

Specifically, how do we strengthen voluntary associations? First, we must counter non-democratic forms of organizations in our private groups. These groups are the training grounds for democracy, and if they are allowed to deteriorate the socialization process necessary for democratic participation is sure to deteriorate also. Second, participation in a voluntary association must foster more than a sense of involvement, it must also foster a sense of efficacy. Democratic governments can encourage this development by recognizing the vital role voluntary associations play. Private associations are effective intermediaries between the democratic citizen and democratic government when the government is influenced by the opinions of the group. Refusal by the government to listen to the petitions of private groups is sure to lead to feelings of alienation and helplessness. Finally, democratic governments can encourage voluntary associations by providing easier access to the mass media. The technical facilities for strengthening the organizations of private groups are available. We are not making full use of our technical capabilities at a time when it is most important that we do so.

Third, there is a crying need to stabilize the population of mass democracies. As noted earlier, the problem of controlling the size of the population is basically unsolved; no country has a stationary population. Without a stable population it will be nearly impossible for a democratic (or a non-democratic) government to cope with the institutional problems of an industrial society. Such ecological problems as air, land, and water pollution cannot be brought under control when confronted with ever greater and greater demands upon these resources. Many of the urban problems of our society such as waste disposal, education, crime, traffic, and housing are aggravated by population pressure.

The problems of population pressure go beyond national boundaries. Population control is perhaps mankind’s most serious long-run problem. We have been practicing death control in both developed and under-developed countries. Indeed, one of the first

\[\text{Boulding, The Meaning of the Twentieth Century, pp. 121–37.}\]
“benefits” of a developed society that is introduced into an underdeveloped country is death control. Unfortunately, neither society is practicing birth control. One of the effects of unrestricted population growth is the exacerbation of international conflicts. Who can forget Hitler’s cry for “Lebensraum.” Factions who oppose birth control must face the fact that they are engaged in dangerous warmongering.26 One author goes so far as to say that the only sound biological solution to the problem of war is massive depopulation.27

It would seem that population equilibrium will be achieved only if we can accomplish some of the following: first, we must reform those factions who oppose birth control. This will mean, for example, that the Catholic Church must be convinced of the necessity of adopting a more realistic attitude. Next, we must create social institutions to control population growth. It is social institutions which are dominant in determining population growth and not mere individuals with knowledge of the physiology of reproduction. Thus, the “pill”, or other methods of contraception, alone are not enough. Such groups as Planned Parenthood must be fostered, and others created, to insure efficacious population control. Finally, a vast reeducation on the role of marriage and the family in society must be undertaken. Marriage and the family must be viewed now and in the future as primarily an institution of companionship and not procreation. For this reason, the Women’s Liberation Movement ought to be supported.

The fourth and final step that is proposed here as necessary to realign the democratic system and mass society calls for a shift from a militaristic foreign policy to one based on economic assistance.28 It seems a stark fact of life that huge defense expenditures have not increased our security. Increasing defense expenditures beyond what they are today would merely continue a counterproductive policy. Internally, outsize defense expenditures have seriously distorted our domestic priorities. Social and economic inequalities persist, and in some cases, are exacerbated by lack of funding for programs designed to eliminate or reduce these inequalities. In terms of international relations, the “traditional” policies have been miserable failures. This is especially the case with “Third World” countries. Racism and poverty are at least as important a factor as ideology, whether left or right.29 The white-have world cannot continue to confront the non-white, have-not world with a policy designed to contain communism. That policy does not fit

29 Ibid.
the facts very well. We desperately need to return to a foreign policy similar to that carried out under the Marshall plan. Simply stated, instead of continuing arms shipments we should shift to capital investment and technical aid in a scheme of planned international trade. This would enable underdeveloped countries to combat totalitarianism by meeting the requisites of democracy. The surest defense against communism is economic security and not military security. This does not mean we should neglect military security but rather that we should recognize that it is of a lower priority than economic security. The limitations of, and after a point, the counter-productive nature of military security should have alerted us a long time ago to the need for a more viable defense policy.

CONCLUSION

The crisis of our times is not, as commonly depicted, one of ideological confrontation. It goes far deeper than that and actually dwarfs ideological clashes. Indeed, the crisis is more "revolutionary" than the struggles that are occurring. The crisis of our times is the fact of inadequate response on the part of mass democracies to the challenges generated by the industrial culture.30 This paper has made an attempt to analyze the way in which the discontinuities between the political and social system developed. These discontinuities in the linkages between the two systems were described and the reasons for their persistence, and in some cases, for their exacerbation, were examined. The results of this examination revealed the causes for mass democracy's insufficient reaction to the problems of industrialism. Finally, some of the steps that will be necessary to bring about a realignment of the democratic system and mass society were spelled out. Unless the dislocations between the two systems are removed, it will be impossible for a mass democracy to successfully meet the challenges wrought by the Industrial Revolution. The resources which are necessary to launch this challenge already exist. This paper has demonstrated there is information enough for action. All that is apparently lacking is political will.