THE PHILOSOPHY OF F. H. JACOBI.

By Prof. W. G. Sawyer.

Nothing is quite so real to an animal as the food he eats and
the bed he sleeps upon. We are all animals and something more,
but there is a popular tendency among us to cherish the grossness
of the animal, and to smother and starve the heaven-born part
that struggles for recognition through perceptions more ethereal
than the animal knows, and longings that the animal cannot feel
and that material things can never satisfy.

Assured that the meat by which man really grows is not that
which nourishes the body, we do well to sit at the feet of those
masters who offer to guide us out of this thralldom to the physi-
cal, and open our eyes upon the less palpable, but no less real,
world in the midst of which we so unconsciously walk; for

"The spirit world is not locked up;
Thy feelings are closed, thy heart is dead."
—Goethe's Faust.

F. H. Jacobi has the distinguished merit of establishing against
Kant the following point: The "Critique of Pure Reason" de-
nies that any casual nexus can be found between thinking and
any noumenal object or subject, while the "Critique of Practical
Reason," ignoring the principle already laid down, boldly assumes
the transcendental as revealed by the phenomenal. Kant at-
ttempted to find some impossible demonstration for that which is
undeniable and needs none, and thus threw a character of uncer-
tainty upon the most positive knowledge that we have.

The work entitled "Divine Things and. Their Revelation," was
Jacobi's last, and probably contains the best exposition of his
distinguishing doctrines, especially his "faith-philosophy." For
this philosophy its author never claimed a place beside other sys-
tems, but, perhaps even too hastily and modestly, granted the
argument to philosophers whose conclusions were revolting to
him, but whose methods seemed to him valid. He thus occupied
an anomalous position, which must be explained in one of these
two ways, namely, either Jacobi was in error in supposing that
the head positively demanded pantheism and the heart Christian-
ity, or we are constituted with a cruel and irreconcilable antinomy,
waging perpetual war in the center of our being, and setting one
member against another in a manner for which no development
theory can account, and of which no beneficent Creator could be
guilty. This is the most important error of which Jacobi can be
convicted, as he himself clearly saw. He was fully aware that his
doctrines must break into two opposed systems, one of which
must be false, by the most positive principles of logical opposition.

An antinomy may well lie under the suspicion of being nothing
more than a convenient name under which to cover the short-
sightedness of men. Can God's laws conflict? or can it really be
that both the affirmative and negative of any given proposition
can be supported with equally strong proofs. By any given man,
perhaps they may. In a boys' debating club they often are; but
even the boys usually think that, if they knew all, the scale would
promptly turn to one side or the other. With what reason, then,
do men talk of antinomies as soon as the pros and cons seem to
balance? It is clear that the data upon which rests one of the
conflicting judgments must be either inaccurate or inadequate,
unless there is a fallacy in the logic.

A supposed conflict of laws is sometimes attributed to the error
of applying reason to matters beyond its sphere, as though there
were spheres where reason could mislead, or where it were better,
forsooth, to be unreasonable. Both Locke, in his "Essay Con-
cerning the Human Understanding," and Kant, in his "Critique
of Pure Reason," have given expression to views of which this
would be a bald, but perhaps not altogether unfair, statement.
Not the excess, but the deficiency, of reason leads to error; and
laws which really conflict must be human. The Creator of the
macrocosm created also the microcosm, and "I doubt not through
the ages one increasing purpose runs." Rob the world of the
faith that all things fit into the harmonious plan of the Author of
all, and the philosophy of history, and the grand system of cor-
related sciences, which thrill us with enthusiastic delight as they
unfold before us, would, like bright dreams or punctured bubbles, vanish from the earth. All forms of matter, and all the faculties of the mind, must be supposed to be governed by harmonious laws, and enter, as co-ordinate elements, into the plan of the universe; else we impeach either the power, wisdom, or goodness of God.

Jacobi's philosophical creed developed at a time when the prevailing philosophy was Kant's, with all the admiration that belonged to its freshest triumphs. No other theme was so prominent as that to which, a century earlier, Locke had drawn very general attention—the question of the powers and limitations of the human understanding. After making experience the basis of all our knowledge, Locke was so unfortunate in his explanation of the origin of our ideas that Cousin easily convicted him of laying an excellent foundation for that sensationalism for which Hobbes and Condillac acknowledged their indebtedness to him, however distasteful such thanks might be.

It may not seem unnatural that Hobbes should derive from Locke's representative theory of perception his subtle corporeal spirit to replace the second member of Descartes' dualism, but it is far more startling to find Bishop Berkeley, with "every virtue under heaven," establishing upon the same basis a thorough-going idealism, and successfully maintaining his ground against the whole sensational school. To exhaust the strange possibilities of the case, Hume, again, accepting both Locke and Berkeley, advanced one fatal but inevitable step further, and, consigning mind to the same fate that matter had suffered at the hands of Berkeley, established a skeptical nihilism, which no subsequent philosopher has been able to refute without revising the whole foundation of the system upon which it rested. This task called for the genius of a Kant. He was able to reconstruct the principles of knowledge upon the ruins to which Locke's system had been reduced by the twofold *reductio ad absurdum* of Berkeley and Hume. In doing so, however, though he gained the foremost place among the metaphysicians of his age, he committed an error hardly inferior to Locke's, and quite as difficult to throw off. Locke perceived only images of things, that, so far as he could show, might
have no corresponding external objects behind them. Kant, on the other hand, perceived only phenomena, and knew nothing of the things in themselves, which are manifest only in the phenomena. For both alike objects were implied as the originals of the images of the one, and as the principals behind the phenomena of the other. Both alike have furnished a basis upon which logical minds have built up systems that have violated the plainest dicta of common sense. Every body but a few philosophers thinks he knows that he walks in an actual physical world, and among other men like himself, while, according to Locke and Kant, pure reason teaches nothing of the sort; but rather that the world which we see is within us, and that we may be dreaming as truly in our waking as in our sleeping hours. Goethe appreciates this situation very well when he makes Faust say that this philosophy leaves him "as great a fool as he was before;" and then, in despair of knowing anything, turn to the sensual enjoyments of the world.

From the particular error of Locke philosophy has largely, but not altogether, recovered; and from Kant's it is slowly recovering. To this end Jacobi has contributed the earliest and best assistance, by showing that sensation testifies not more positively of the so-called secondary qualities of bodies than of their objective actuality, as will be more fully shown in the proper connection.

But Fichte contributed toward the correction of Kant's error in a way similar to that in which Berkeley had exposed the weakness of Locke. 'Fichte inquired whether it was true that an actual objective world caused the subjective phenomena, as Kant evidently assumed. In his investigation of this problem he found in his consciousness the sensation, and from these inferred the objective, not in the relation of cause, but as the effect or product of the active mind. He accordingly gave a confident negative to his own query, and adopted the full consequence of the error in the central doctrine of his philosophy—that "all cognition is a self-activity which perceives only its own self-activity."

When Schelling replied to Fichte's reasoning, that we might with equal propriety reverse his process, and suppose the sub-
jective to result from the objective, then the claims of both to priority were recognized as equal; and both Fichte, in his latter days, and Schelling, admitted that an absolute existence underlies all phenomena.

A very important further modification of the philosophy of knowledge was achieved by Hegel, and still attracts great attention. He united the subjective and the objective into such a union that the latter was implied in the former. The phenomena which we perceive were regarded as having the same character objectively as subjectively. "The ground of their being," said Hegel, "is not an unknown essence immediately behind the phenomena, but the absolute idea." Thus constituted, absolute idealism makes a radical contrast with the subjective idealism of Fichte.

This system of Hegel, first offered for publication in Jena, during the bombardment of that city by Napoleon, is a little later in its origin than the faith philosophy of Jacobi; nevertheless, Jacobi is, in a certain sense, the representative of an elementary form of the latest philosophic thought. What the philosophy of the future is to be, no man can confidently tell; but it may not be too bold to predict that what Jacobi felt, but dared not say he knew, will yet find many to recognize its philosophic validity.

The chief claim of Jacobi to recognition among philosophers rests upon his doctrine that we have a direct intuitive knowledge of the supersensible—that we see it with the "reason" as truly as we see physical objects with the eye. This doctrine has usually been regarded as enthusiastic, and its author sometimes set down among the Mystics of Germany. The degree of reproach implied in the terms enthusiastic and mystic varies with the persons who use them. When enthusiasm is charged as equivalent to fanaticism, and mysticism as implying obscurity and error, they simply beg the question at issue. A legitimate enthusiasm is what Jacobi claimed; and if we translate the Greek elements of the word (ἐν θεῷ) as "God within," the meaning is rescued from all implication of error. Fanaticism is as far from the best sense of enthusiasm as rage from anger—to borrow a simile from Voltaire.
The quest of philosophy has ever been, before all else, for the efficient cause of nature. This cause does not appear in the nebular hypothesis, or in the atomic theory; for science cannot account for the first movements of either. Locke did not find it, for he had no secure hold upon anything objective. Kant did not find it in the pure reason, for pure reason could know nothing of any thing in itself. Jacobi found a first cause, he was sure, but only in his heart—there was not quite room enough for it in his head. He claimed that this, together with some other knowledge, is impressed upon the soul without the intervention, in any way, of physical organs. The philosophy of Locke does not willingly admit any impressions upon the tabula rasa of the mind apart from the products of sensation and their combinations. Jacobi's claims must, accordingly, be positively refused, or some of the principles abandoned which have been maintained, or tacitly admitted, by a multitude of philosophers. The tabula-rasa simile has been convicted of fault in the implication that the mind is a cold and dead slate, that simply holds, without addition or change, whatever is committed to it. If this were so, there would be for us no external world—all primary qualities of matter would be forever shut out of the mind, for no sensation ever resembled any one of them. Secondary qualities are purely subjective. They not only do not resemble in the least their immediate physical causes, but even these do not reside in the bodies to which we refer the qualities as by instinct, while the inferred concourse, which is in the body, is beyond the reach of our investigation. It must be, then, that we are indebted to certain original energies of the mind for all that we know of the external world, even after sensation has revealed all that in the nature of the case is possible.

Kant insists upon the testimony of sensation as essential to the validity of mental products. Jacobi insists that he sees a light, which to the physical eye is invisible. Is he mistaken? or is Kant's requirement unessential?

A sensation is a feeling awakened in the mind through the medium of an organ of sense. This sensation becomes a perception when referred to the external object which occasioned it; thus do we acquire all our knowledge of the outward world. What,
then, are the essential elements in the formation of any perception? Before all, something must be impressed upon the consciousness. Sensations depend solely upon the nerves to convey them to the conscious subject. Any interruption of their career toward the brain puts an end to them, or rather, there being no sensation in the consciousness, none exists anywhere. If, therefore, sensation is essential to perception, then nerves are likewise essential. But nerves are only the menial organ which serves mysteriously to convey impressions to the mind, without, in ordinary perceptions, revealing themselves to the consciousness. Some perceptions, moreover, such as the perception of relations, are generally recognized as being independent of all sensation. So, too, causation, time, and identity, must be perceived, if at all, without the help of any mechanism, since in their nature they are impalpable. No particular character in the object, therefore, can be pronounced essential to mental perception; immaterial principles are perceived as clearly as granite hills.

It thus appears that the practical objective conditions which now limit perception may be purely casual. Only two elements remain which can be shown to be essential in the perception of all things objective. These are feeling and reflection; feeling, because it is the condition of both sensation and consciousness, and whatever is not felt in either of these ways cannot in any manner make itself known; and reflection, because feeling is not thought, and no knowledge can result from feeling simply as feeling, any more than we can become cognizant of a present physical object without looking upon it to discover its qualities. Reflection interprets feeling into terms of thought. This is done spontaneously, to be sure, and seems to attend rather than follow the feeling—what obviously follows being inference rather than intuition.

Both these essential conditions being met, the source or cause of the feeling does not affect the validity of the consequent perception. The feeling itself is sufficient evidence of the actuality of its cause; its nature is a distinct problem. "Whoever says he knows," observes Jacobi, "we properly ask him whence he knows. He must then depend at last upon one of these two things, either upon sensation or upon soul-feeling." All knowledge resting on
the latter Jacobi denominated "faith," and he doubtless enjoyed the same assurance of his "faith" as of his material possessions. Yet it was Jacobi who cast upon this assurance the reproach of being unphilosophical. That reproach commends the modesty of the philosopher more than his logical powers. It must be set down as his weakness that he dared not maintain as legitimate the firmest convictions of his soul, simply because the method by which he reached them was not philosophically orthodox in his day.

The best use of philosophy is, doubtless, to regulate human conduct; and that which is unphilosophical should accordingly be abandoned. Why not, then, abandon every thing which is given us by the intuition of reason and from no better source? Why not give up the notion of an external world? Simply because the universal conviction of the race makes it impossible. Men do not wait for the formal decisions of philosophers upon questions which find uniform answers in their own clearest intuitions. No contradiction of this decision would command their respect. Again, why not abandon the notion of a First Cause presiding over the universe and governing it according to the intelligent determinations of an unrestrained volition? The answer is to the same effect as the former. Because all races and tribes under the sun hold some faith in a god to whom they are responsible and expect to give account. The argument from common consent must not be despised. Philosophy cannot ignore it without itself being rejected. It rests upon intuitions which are universal and necessary, and which no authority is competent to gainsay.

Jacobi allows a logical validity to the pantheism of Spinoza, but it affords no satisfaction to the desires of his soul. His spirit rejects pantheism, while his reason accepts the demonstration on which it rests. His spirit, on the one hand, clings to the "faith," which his understanding cannot approve. Fully conscious of this paradox, Jacobi declared, "There is light in my heart, but when I attempt to bring it into my understanding, it goes out." What loyalty to the conclusions of a syllogism built upon false premises and doing violence to the strongest and purest intuitions of the soul! A weaker "faith" would have surrendered to so strong
a conviction of the demands of the understanding. A stronger logical faculty would have scorned the ambiguous position which Jacobi under protest occupied. It may not be evident which was the weaker, his "faith" or his reason, but his preference between the horns of his dilemma was unmistakable and strong. The sphere of the simple understanding he plainly calls inferior, since it sadly disappoints the highest aspirations of which we are capable. These are satisfied in the intuitions of the divine, in which Jacobi realizes the highest of all possible objective revelations. To rescue these intuitions from the fatal monism of Spinoza, Jacobi deliberately sacrificed his philosophy, such as it was, in favor of his faith. From that moment he formed a marked contrast with Spinoza. The latter knew no personal God; Jacobi ever felt his presence and heard his voice. Spinoza knew no causes except as immanent in matter and necessary; Jacobi recognized a Final Cause, and was conscious of his own freedom, and of his own accountability. Spinoza consequently enjoys a passionless repose, fearing nothing and hoping nothing, and witnessing the dissolution of his body with a stolid resignation, regarding his decay as another proof of his brotherhood with the clod. Jacobi, however, quick with the pulsations of an endless life, stretching eagerly forward to catch glimpses of the dawning of the bright to-morrow of his soul's desire, is by no means satisfied with the realizations of this life, but is more than satisfied with its hopes.

With Fichte and his ideal projection of subjective images Jacobi felt considerable sympathy. Fichte's soul was quick to recognize the spiritual forces of the universe, but he did not perceive their objective character. At this point Jacobi resists again an apparently valid conclusion in the clear light of his own intuitions. He was sure he saw, in the moral order of the world, a Father's hand; Fichte saw only a reflection of his own volitional activity. Such intolerable consequences of the reasoning of his metaphysical contemporaries, Jacobi escaped by resorting to the oracles of a higher authority. "There dwells within us," he said, "a spirit sent immediately from God, constituting the most essential part of our human nature. As this spirit is present to man
in his highest, deepest, and most personal consciousness, so the
Giver of this spirit, God himself, is present to man through his
heart just as nature is present to him through his senses. No
sensible object can so seize upon the mind and irresistibly prove
itself real, as those absolute objects, the true, the good, the beau-
tiful, and the sublime, which can be seen with the eye of the
spirit. We venture the bold speech that we believe in God be-
cause we see him, although he cannot be seen with the eye of
this body.” This spiritual vision is quite as clear as the physical;
it is attended with no less feeling immediately produced in the
soul, than comes to the soul through the office of the outward
eye. It is not the eye that sees, but the soul by means of the
eye. Such seeing is mediate, while Jacobi, if he sees God at all,
must see him immediately, with no Moses and no organ of sense
to stand between. Actual perception is not denied to sensation
when it is referred to its cause. Who shall dispute that this in-
tuition of an invisible Deity possesses at least as high claims to
the character of a real perception as the sensations, exposed as
they are to the defects of the physical body? May not the in-
tuition even have some advantage, in the certainty of the objective
existence over mediate knowledge, at least to the subject of it?

Sir William Hamilton maintains that in intuition cognition is
given unconditionally as a fact, while, in all representative per-
ception, the cognition is problematical. Should it be objected
that Hamilton assumed, in the intuition of which he speaks, that
the mind is conscious of only its own modification without rela-
tion to any object beyond the sphere of consciousness, it ought to
be sufficient to show that Jacobi’s claims find ample room for
realization under the careful definitions of this most astute phi-
losopher. We do not understand Jacobi to claim that his intu-
tions reach to a cause, which, as perceived, is outside of himself,
but rather that this knowledge is simple, and contains in it, as
Hamilton himself says, “nothing beyond the mere consciousness,
by that which knows, of that which is known.” This conscious-
ness of necessity cannot reach out and take hold of the external;
but if the external be spiritual in its nature, as it cannot impress
itself upon any physical sense, so no physical barrier can obstruct
its approach to the center of thought and feeling. Accordingly, Jacobi can say that “God himself is present to man in the heart,” and that the human spirit contains “a shadow of the divine knowledge and will.”

In this light we can understand our philosopher’s meaning when he maintains that man reveals God, while nature conceals him:

“But is it unreasonable to confess that we believe in God, not by reason of the nature which conceals him, but by reason of the supernatural in man, which alone reveals and proves him to exist? Nature conceals God; for through her whole domain nature reveals only fate, only an indissoluble chain of mere efficient causes without beginning and without end, excluding with equal necessity both providence and chance. . . . Man reveals God; for man, by his intelligence, rises above nature, and in virtue of this intelligence is conscious of him: if as a power not only independent of but opposed to nature, and capable of resisting, conquering and controlling her. As man has a living faith in this power, superior to nature, which dwells in him; so has he a belief in God, a feeling, an experience of his existence.”

This doctrine is perfectly consistent, as Jacobi claims, with the criticism of Kant, though it cannot be harmonized with the doctrines of Spinoza. Indeed, Kant’s demonstration that the pure reason finds no certainty in practical things, not only admitted but even called for Jacobi’s doctrine of a direct intuitive cognition of things-in-themselves. This intuition tramples upon the mechanism theory of the universe, and, rising above the defects of demonstration, gazes boldly upon the revealed face of the one great Cause that reason had long ago declared to be immanent in all forms of being and becoming.

This noblest function of the soul Jacobi did not uniformly denominate “faith,” especially in his later writings. This term was too liable to be understood to imply a blind, irrational belief on the mere authority of others. To avoid so great a misconception of his doctrine Jacobi used the term “reason” (Vernunft), meaning, not the logical faculty, but the power to perceive directly in contrast with the understanding which is confined to the range of the demonstrable. The term “faith,” therefore, when used by Jacobi, implied the surest possible kind of knowledge, but a knowledge which in its very nature cannot be communicated to
another by a syllogistic method. This is why the light in the heart was quenched when brought into the understanding. That light conveyed the divine image, which in the order of nature must be felt in order to be known. We cannot always describe what we have seen with our natural vision; much less can we expect to impart to another the first fruits of our spiritual seeing. The Apostle Paul said it was not lawful to utter the things which were revealed to him when “caught up into paradise.” Similarly, doubtless, it is unlawful — impossible on account of the disabilties of our nature — for a man to formulate and communicate to another all of the religious experiences of his heart, even after they have so entered into his being that torture and death cannot induce him to deny them. This is the philosophy of the believer’s testimony, daily declared in the sanctuary and daily disputed in the mart, “I know that my Redeemer liveth.”

Owing to a lack of this experience the unbelieving naturally question the legitimateness of this faith, or at least ask the believer to prove a necessary connection between the mental phenomena on which he rests his faith and any objective cause. Suppose we make a similar demand of themselves. Can they show any necessary connection between the best established facts in science and any objective cause? All knowledge hangs upon a chain, some links of which are hidden, so that, without the exercise of a large practical faith, no science would be possible. When we trace the phenomena involved in a single perception of an outward object through the eye, we are charmed with the delicate offices of different parts of that organ; but when the light, in obedience to optical laws, has painted a beautiful inverted image of the object on the fine tissue of the retina, the physical phenomena of vision can be traced no further; they cease or disappear as motion, or physical change, and re-appear at once as intellectual perception — something which bears no discoverable resemblance to any of the physical phenomena of seeing. The chain of causes in all perceptions goes out of sight, some links are hidden.

According to Lotze,¹ “We shall never be able to prove that it

¹ Mikrokosmus, vol. i., p. 161; Leipzig. 1856.
lies in the nature of any motion . . . of itself to cease as motion and be reproduced as illuminating brilliancy, as sound, or as sweetness of taste.” The motion here referred to is the sensible or physical part of the phenomena of sensation. The causal nexus between a wave, whether in the eye or in the air, and the mental conception of light, no man has ever discovered, but the scientist and the philosopher alike, together with universal humanity, accept with a practical assurance that cannot be shaken the testimony of their consciousness to the objective reality of the things perceived through any organ of sense. In unscientific terms, then, we may say that we know the things within reach of our senses because we feel them.

Feeling is the function of all the afferent nerves, and in some mysterious way we hear, taste, see, etc., by feeling. All the mechanism of our organs of sense is necessary to bring the physical within the grasp of the spiritual. By the aid of this mechanism we feel, as science insists, not the object, but some quality of the object appropriate to the sense in exercise. The universal consciousness, however, will have it that we feel a body thus and thus conditioned or qualified. Science says we feel the broad waves of light, or, practically, the redness of a physical body. Consciousness maintains that we see a red body. It is hazardous to quarrel with universal consciousness. Moreover, it would be unreasonable to reject, concerning the character of the phenomena, the testimony of the only authority by which its actuality had been, or could be, established. We dare not, therefore, banish the physical universe from our philosophy; we cannot banish it from our consciousness. God himself, in fashioning us so that we are thus compelled to recognize in our daily lives an objective universe, has involved his own veracity in the validity of these intuitions of our consciousness.

If we admit, as we seem forced to, that mind and matter can communicate, while their natures are so very unlike, much less should it be thought incredible that mind should be able to convey thought to another mind of the same nature. No mechanism can simplify or explain the perception of the physical; it simply makes it mysteriously possible. The same intuitional power that
magically reveals to us a physical universe and enforces its acceptance may similarly discover the Cause of the universe and enforce a belief in that Cause. This it does, and no human race is known that has not some notion of God.

Clearer and more full than this universal faith are the direct revelations to the spiritually minded, who, like Socrates and Jacobi, seem to have found a shorter way to the knowledge of God than through the regularly accredited prophets. This personal inspiration seems to resemble, in the strength of the conviction which it carries, that instinct which Kant has denominated "the voice of God." Brute instinct is concerned with nothing but what is essential to the well-being of the species. All this it fails not to supply. Birds know how to build nests, but they do not know how they know, or what principles require them to build as they do. Men no more about the instincts that supplement reason in their own species. God supplies whatever is out of reach that is essential to any of his creatures. In endowing man with a soul God fixed upon him another necessity quite as urgent as the preservation of his body, namely, the preservation of his soul. The Creator is, then, under an equal, or still greater, obligation to supply whatever is demanded by the interests of our spiritual nature. It is not unreasonable, therefore, that we should listen for the voice of God in a new revelation. Jacobi and millions more say they hear it. They find revealed in it the Almighty and an endless life. They touch, as it were, the suprasensible, and know it by a sort of spiritual empiricism. They are profoundly convinced. The demonstrations of the spirit are irresistible, but if denied, they can no more be forced upon a skeptic than the axioms of geometry.

We cannot too highly applaud the opinion of Victor Cousin, that "the error of Jacobi's school was not to see that this truth-speaking enthusiasm is only a purer and higher application of reason, in such manner that faith has its root in reason." This "enthusiasm," in the mouth of Cousin, suggests no reproach, but rather implies a reason which flies while the syllogism creeps. It must be conceded also that this slower method is, by its very nature, debarred from ever demonstrating the infinite, and thus
solving the most essential problems of religion and philosophy; for by the syllogism we can advance to no conclusion except through a more general conception. The term which must thus be included under another cannot contain the Deity, or satisfy the conditions of monotheism. The Highest, therefore, cannot possibly be reached through formal reasoning, and some other resource must be depended upon for this necessity of the soul. Nothing but Jacobi's intuitive cognition can yield the personal apocalypse of God.

When the clear testimony of consciousness is universally recognized as valid, then not only will Jacobi command an unqualified respect among philosophers; but objective science, as well as religion, will find a rational foundation, and, according to the claim of Drobisch, we shall realize in the philosophy of religion "the key-stone of the philosophical arch."