IX

THE OTTOMAN TURKS AND THE CRUSADES,
1451–1522

A. Mehmed the Conqueror’s Empire,
1451–1481

At the accession of Mehmed II to the throne in 1451 all the enemies of the Ottomans were confident, remembering the desperate condition of the Turkish state during his first sultanate (1444–1446).\(^1\) Ottoman client states in the Balkans and Anatolia, as well as Byzantium,


On Mehmed the Conqueror see Criotobulus and Bombaci (above), and Tursun Beg (a high official, close to the sultan), *The History of Mehmed the Conqueror*, publ. with tr. by Halil Inalcik and Rhoads Murphey (Minneapolis and Chicago, 1978), the most detailed and authoritative

issued threats and even launched attacks against the Ottomans. In Anatolia Ibrahim Beg of Karaman not only seized control of several fortresses in the Hamid area, but also encouraged pretenders to intensify their activities in the provinces of Germiyan, Aydin, and Menteshe. Under these threatening circumstances Mehmed II moved to confirm the treaties made during his father’s reign with the Serbs and the Byzantines. He agreed to cede Alaja-Hisar (Krushevats) and some other frontier fortresses to the Serbian despot George Brankovich (1427–1456). As for the Byzantine emperor Constantine XI (1448–1453), not only did he take control of areas extending as far as Chorlu, but he also demanded that a yearly payment of 300,000 akcha should be paid to meet the expenses of the pretender Orkhan Chelebi, who was sequestered in Constantinople.

Mehmed sent Karaja Pasha to Sofia to counter a possible attack by the Hungarians, while he himself set out with the army in May to deal with the situation in Anatolia. As Mehmed marched eastward the Byzantine envoys made new demands on him, threatening to release the pretender Orkhan Chelebi. By ceding the port and fortress of Alanya, Mehmed sought to make a peaceful settlement with the Karamanid Ibrahim Beg, and he made preparations for a prompt return to Adrianople (Edirne). When the janissaries demanded increased wages, he reorganized the corps, giving decisive evidence of his resoluteness and power. But as a ghazi leader he needed prompt military


victories as proof of his ability and his commitment to restoring Islamic superiority in the Balkans.

In order to establish his authority Mehmed and his former tutor Zaganuz resolved to take the offensive. On returning from the Karaman campaign he gave orders to Chandarli Khalil Pasha in August 1452 for the construction of a fortress, Rumeli-Hisar, on the European shore of the Bosphorus opposite Anadolu-Hisar, as a first step toward a siege of Constantinople. Thus the city was completely cut off from the sources of its food supply in the Black Sea, and reinforcements to the Ottoman army could pass unhindered from Anatolia.

Chandarli Khalil Pasha, a capable diplomat, had already taken steps to ensure Venice's neutrality by renewing the terms of the Venetian-Ottoman agreement on September 10, 1451, and had accommodated Venetian demands with regard to the question of wheat export, a sensitive issue for Venice. Similarly, a three-year armistice with Hungary had been signed on November 20, 1451, again granting concessions. In the fall of 1452 the Ottoman frontier lords in the Morea took the offensive, but although the Byzantine emperor had sent an envoy to Venice in the winter of 1451–1452 he had been unsuccessful in stirring the west into military action. There was a general belief in Christian Europe at this time that the Ottomans would not immediately undertake the siege of Constantinople.

Actually Mehmed II thought that the grand vizir, Chandarli Khalil, presented the greatest obstacle to his plan for the conquest of Constantinople. Chandarli feared that in the event of a successful conquest he would lose all his influence, whereas a major military setback would place the Ottoman state in a dangerous position. The young sultan believed that Chandarli might not fully cooperate with him in his attack. In a war council before the siege, the sultan's warlike policy was received with enthusiasm by those such as Zaganuz who expected their own power to benefit from the changes which victory would bring. The more cautious party, represented by Chandarli Khalil, laid stress on the impregnability of the walls, as well as on the dangers from the west, but the war party, with the sultan at its head, was in the majority and Chandarli had to acquiesce.

During the actual siege, which lasted for fifty-four days (April 6–May 29), these opposing viewpoints would again come to the fore at two critical junctures. The outcome of the siege depended largely on the time factor. Both the Byzantines and the Ottomans were influenced throughout the course of the siege by rumors of the approach of land or sea forces in aid of the city. In the final week of May word that
John Hunyadi had crossed the Danube and that a crusader fleet had set out for the Bosporus was spread among the Ottoman army. These rumors and the sultan’s attempts to secure the surrender of the city through peace offers engendered concern and unrest among the Ottoman troops, who criticized the young Mehmed for “exposing his people and the state to utter destruction by entering into an undertaking whose accomplishment was impossible”. In the war council which was then convened Chandarli again drew attention to the dangers involved in provoking the western world, and emphasized the necessity of ending this dangerous war by reaching some sort of understanding with the Byzantines. Chandarli’s arguments were countered by Zaganuz, who stated his conviction that the Christian rulers would, as in the past, fail to unite for common action, and that even if they were able somehow to field an army the superior Ottoman forces were equal to the challenge. Thereupon, the decision was taken to make a general assault on May 29, and it was left to Zaganuz to organize the attack. The sultan proclaimed it in these terms: “the stones [buildings] and the land of the city and the city’s appurtenances belong to me; all other goods and property, prisoners and foodstuffs are booty for the troops.” Three days of sack were granted.²

The western and the Turkish sources agree that the eventual success of the Ottomans came chiefly as the result of two events: the breaching of the walls by the Ottoman artillery bombardment, and the disputes which arose between the Byzantines and the Latins defending the city. After the wounding and withdrawal from the fight of the Genoese supreme commander John Giustiniani-Longo the whole defense collapsed. The Ottoman army entered the city through a large breach made by bombardment in the wall. Emperor Constantine was killed in hand-to-hand combat. The Ottoman and Byzantine sources also agree in reporting that Mehmed the Conqueror (Fâtih) felt sadness as he toured the looted city, his future capital. The inhabitants were enslaved and taken away, either into the tents of the army outside the city or onto ships. After he visited Hagia Sofia he proclaimed “to his vizirs and

his commanders and his officers that henceforth his capital was to be Istanbul”.

The conquest of Constantinople opened a new chapter in the history of crusading activities in Europe. Until the death of Mehmed II in 1481 the popes did their utmost to convince the western nations that organization of a crusade under papal leadership was the most immediate and pressing task facing Europe. In this new phase of crusading activities the keynote was that now western Christendom itself was in direct danger from an aggressive Islam and that a crusade, if launched, would defend Europe and its Christian civilization. The immediate goal of a crusade was no longer the deliverance of the holy places but of Constantinople, and the expulsion of the Turks from Europe. In his vow for a crusade Calixtus III (1455–1458) would seek forgiveness for postponing for a time the sacred goal of recapturing the holy places.

The Ottoman success radically altered the strategic situation at the expense of Christian Europe. For western Christendom, perhaps the most important consequence of the Ottoman conquest was the loss of European control of the Straits, which deprived the west of an important strategic advantage, the ability to cut communications between the European and Asiatic territories of the Ottoman empire. Though this strategy had never proved as effective as crusading plans had called for it to be, largely because of Genoese intransigence, nevertheless it had had a restraining effect on the Ottomans. Even more important than its effect on military strategy, Ottoman control of the Straits isolated the Italian colonies on the shores of the Black Sea and left them at the mercy of the Ottomans.

In his plans to build a “universal” empire, Mehmed fully appreciated the strategic significance of the Straits as a check on Venetian seapower. During his thirty-year reign he created a series of defense lines from Tenedos to the Black Sea to make Istanbul invulnerable from the sea. With bases at Gallipoli, İzmit (Nicomedia), and Istanbul, and protected by these strong defenses, his strengthened navy became a real challenge to Venetian seapower and an effective instrument in his empire-building. In 1454 Mehmed sent his navy, fifty vessels in all, to the Black Sea to compel the submission of the states and colonies there. The navy first attacked Akkerman, forcing the submission on October 5, 1455, of Peter III Aron, voivode of Moldavia, to the sultan with a yearly tribute of 2,000 gold ducats.

As a result of his capture of the seat of the Caesars, Mehmed considered himself their successor, and laid claim to all the territories which the Byzantine emperors had formerly ruled. The inspiration for his
expanded empire may be linked to several sources, including the Turco-Mongol concept of empire and the Islamic caliphate, but we know for certain that the possession of the Byzantine throne carried a great personal significance for Mehmed. In directing his conquests against the Christian world of the west, Mehmed was now able to justify his claim to be the successor to the Roman empire. The idea of founding a "universal" empire always lay behind Mehmed’s plans in his efforts to pursue his conquests and military campaigns and to raise the ruined city of Istanbul to the status of a great and wealthy capital city, sometimes at the expense of the other cities of his realm.

As successor to the Byzantine emperor, Mehmed concentrated his immediate efforts on eliminating, one by one, all the dynasts who were in a position to lay claim to the throne of Byzantium. First he disposed of David Comnenus, the last emperor of Trebizond (1458–1461, d. 1463), next the two despots in the Morea, and then the Gattilusi family in Lesbos and Aenos, whose sons had married into the Palaeologian house.

In the concept and methods of Mehmed II’s conquests the outstanding feature is his abandonment of the beylik system of semiautonomous rule by local magnates and princes in Rumelia and Anatolia in favor of outright annexation, by which he attempted to accelerate the process of establishing a centralized empire. By so doing Mehmed revived the aggressive policy of Bayazid I (1389–1402), which had been abandoned in favor of a policy of compromise during the civil war of 1402–1413 and the sultanates of Mehmed I (1413–1421) and Murad II (1421–1451). The capture of Constantinople had signified the final victory of the group of military men who pursued a policy of war and annexation over the group favoring caution and compromise. It was not until somewhat later in his reign that Mehmed was able to realize his centralizing ambitions in Anatolia, but he proceeded without delay in the Balkans.

Following the old Ottoman policy Mehmed incorporated into the imperial war machine the pre-Ottoman military groups. Both among the timariot cavalry forces and as separate and intact groups, Christian soldiers played an important role in his army. The proportion of Christian timar-holders in the Balkan provinces as recorded in the survey registers of Mehmed II’s time ranged from three percent to over thirty percent. The voyniks, who had constituted a group of lesser importance as peasant-soldiers, were present in large numbers in Bulgaria,

Macedonia, Albania, and Serbia. The registers also show that the system of rewarding certain groups with tax exemption in return for service to the state was to a large extent preserved under the Ottoman regime. Mehmed’s reason for leaving the local institutions and groups intact in certain areas such as Serbia and Bosnia was his concern to preserve these areas as secure and loyal frontier zones along the borders with Hungary.

During Mehmed II’s reign more than at any other time the Ottoman state took on the role of champion in the holy war against the Christian world. He was aware that in the west the idea of European unity and of combining forces in a crusade was embodied by the pope, whom the Ottomans considered their arch-enemy. The cornerstone of Mehmed’s strategy was to avoid a crusade from the west, and in particular to escape the necessity of battling simultaneously on two fronts, in Rumelia and in Anatolia.

The fall of Constantinople was looked upon as a major disaster in the west, and stirred up a strong reaction throughout Europe. Pope Nicholas V (1447–1455) was successful in establishing peace and a league among the Italian states in 1454, and invited all the governments in Europe to the preparation of a crusade. There is no doubt that the Ottoman court was well informed about these initiatives. Mehmed quickly moved to sign a treaty with Venice on April 18, 1454, in order to neutralize the republic and ensure that it would not provide the naval support on which success of the crusader plans so heavily depended. Venice for its part benefitted from the treaty, which recognized its trade privileges within the Ottoman empire, with only a minimal customs fee of two percent for goods entering and leaving the empire. The republic also retained the right to maintain a bailie in Istanbul as a permanent representative at the Porte to look after Venetian interests. By agreeing to pay tribute for their colonies in the Black Sea and in the Aegean, the Genoese also reached an understanding with the sultan. However, the Knights Hospitaller of Rhodes, on the direct orders of the pope, announced that they would never pay a yearly tribute. An Ottoman naval campaign of 1454 into the Aegean under the command of Hamza Beg accomplished little.

It appears that in January 1455, when Mahmud Pasha was appointed grand vizir, a more decisive policy toward the Aegean islands, aimed at direct Ottoman control, was adopted. Mehmed had already declared war against Rhodes and Chios, and now, accusing Domenico Gattilusio,

the lord of Lesbos, of siding with the Chians, he also threatened him with invasion. Lesbos managed to secure a reprieve by agreeing to raise its tribute to ten thousand ducats. Still pursuing the new more aggressive policy, however, the Ottomans occupied Old Phocaea in December 1455 and Aenos toward the end of January or February 1456, in addition to the islands of Imbros and Samothrace, which belonged to a branch of the Gattilusi family. The Ottoman initiative seems to have been prompted by both a dynastic rivalry over the possession of these islands and Ottoman concern over an attack by the crusader fleet which was being readied by the pope. Under the eunuch Ismail the Ottoman fleet also occupied Lemnos upon the invitation of the Greek islanders, who rose up against Nicholas Gattilusio in May 1456. The unsuccessful intervention against the islanders by Nicholas’s brother Domenico, prince of Lesbos, enraged the sultan.

The fate of the northern Aegean islands had become a major concern in the papal court too. After the fall of Imbros and Samothrace the island of Lesbos itself was in imminent danger. Domenico sent urgent appeals for aid to Genoa and the pope. Genoa sent a warship with reinforcements, and Calixtus III gave priority to this issue, giving orders to accelerate the pace of preparations of the papal fleet. Alarmed by the implications of the Ottoman advance for the security of EuBoea, Venice considered for a moment the occupation of Lemnos and Imbros for itself. The sultan’s new policy of direct control was obviously motivated by his concern to safeguard his western flank and Istanbul before setting out against Belgrade, as planned for the following spring. Control of these islands was to be one of the principal issues between the Ottomans and Christian Europe for the next two centuries. Actually preparations for such a naval attack had been on the drawing board ever since the fall of Constantinople in 1453.

Despite the peace achieved in Italy by the treaty of Lodi on April 9, 1454, and conclusion of a defensive and aggressive alliance against the Ottomans for a period of twenty-five years among the Italian powers on February 25, 1455, realistic statesmen such as Francis Sforza, duke of Milan (1450–1466), Cosimo de’ Medici in Florence (1434–1464), and

5. Ducas, Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks... 1341–1462, tr. Harry J. Magoulias (Detroit, 1975), p. 254.
8. Ibid.
Alfonso I of Naples (1442–1458) were not convinced by the exaggerated reports of an imminent Ottoman invasion. Outside Italy in Christian Europe we find the same indifference to the pope’s call for the crusade. While Venice and the papacy were interested in heightening crusading zeal for their own purposes, these potentates coolly considered the Ottoman threat as a check against the ambitions of their powerful rivals in Italy. Their indifference has puzzled modern historians, but in actuality an Ottoman invasion of Italy in 1453 was only a remote possibility, in view of the fact that the Christian powers, principally Venice and Aragon, had a clear naval superiority in the Mediterranean. In addition, Christian outposts in Albania, the Morea, and the Aegean posed a serious obstacle in the way of any Ottoman advance. Also Hungary, which was threatening the Ottomans in Serbia, had become Mehmed’s main concern at this time.

The preparation of the papal fleet, for which the date of departure had been fixed as March 1, 1456, was as usual delayed by various mishaps. The fleet, consisting of sixteen galleys with 5,000 soldiers and 300 cannon, was finally able to put out to sea only in mid-June 1456. One goal of the expedition was to divert some of the Ottoman forces from the Hungarian front, and another was to release Chios and Lesbos from their submission to the sultan, and secure their co-operation in recapturing the northern Aegean islands occupied by the Ottomans. In this way the revival of the Christian League against the Turks in the Aegean would be realized.

Chios, however, would not agree to repudiate its allegiance to the sultan and join the papal forces. It had already agreed to pay Mehmed 30,000 ducats in indemnity and to raise its yearly tribute to 10,000 ducats. The Chians were anxious not to jeopardize their trade with the sultan’s dominions, which was vital to their existence.

The papal fleet occupied Lemnos and Imbros by agreement and Thasos by force, and left garrisons for their defense. The Turkish navy was absent during all these operations, obviously because it was engaged on the Black Sea during the Belgrade campaign in the summer and because of the mariners’ annual abandonment of their ships in the autumn. Despite a tendency among western historians to minimize the importance of this papal intervention in the Aegean, the sources indicate that it created a grave situation for the Ottomans, especially in view of developments in Lesbos. Upon the arrival of the crusaders’

10. Nicolae Iorga, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches nach den Quellen . . . , I (Gotha, 1908), 85; Pastor, op. cit., II, 256; Ducas, tr. Magoulias, p. 256.
navy at Mytilene, Domenico and Nicholas Gattilusio, as Critobulus informs us, declared their repudiation of the sultan’s authority.\textsuperscript{12} Nicholas, who had been expelled from Lemnos by Mehmed, advocated a policy of resistance to the Ottomans. Twelve triremes of the papal fleet stayed on at Mytilene.\textsuperscript{13}

Mehmed sent a powerful fleet under Ismail, governor of Gallipoli and admiral of the fleet, against the Gattilusi in the spring of 1457.\textsuperscript{14} Judging from the great preparations for the Ottoman fleet, it can be said that the sultan had in mind annexing Lesbos as he had the other northern Aegean islands. The papal squadron retreated to Chios. The Ottoman admiral laid siege to the fortress of Molybdos without result and subsequently left the island, returning to Gallipoli on August 9. Domenico, declaring that the papal navy was incapable of protecting him, turned to the sultan and offered his submission by sending a tribute; in 1458 Nicholas accused him of aiding Mehmed, and had him executed. During the course of 1457 both the Chians and William II Crispo, the duke of the Archipelago, had followed in Lesbos’s footsteps and agreed to submit to the Ottomans.\textsuperscript{15}

Lemnos and Thasos, still in Christian hands, were put by the pope under the protection of the grand master of the Hospitallers after the return of the papal fleet to Italy in 1458. The Venetians and the Catalans each wanted these strategic islands for themselves, but Calixtus III refused their request. After Calixtus died, the new pope, Pius II (1458–1464), planned to put them under the Genoese.\textsuperscript{16} At any rate, in 1457–1459 the Latins were trying to create on these islands bases for defense and for attack against the Ottomans, but in 1459–1460 Mehmed occupied them, ending the squabbles. A compromise with the Greek population, who resented the Latin occupation, enabled the sultan to take over these islands easily: he agreed that the despot Demetrius Palaeologus, an Ottoman protégé in the Morea, would take possession of the islands in return for recognition of Ottoman suzerainty, with the payment of a yearly tribute of three thousand ducats.

Upon the conclusion of the agreement Zaganuz Pasha, the new Otto-

\textsuperscript{12} See Critobulus, tr. Riggs, pp. 138–139. Miller, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 435–436, thinks that the Gattilusi continued paying their tribute to the sultan, but the tribute was taken to the sultan in August 1456 (Ducas, p. 256) before the papal fleet arrived at Mytilene in the autumn.

\textsuperscript{13} Ducas, tr. Magoulias, p. 256; Miller, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 434, thinks that the fleet departed in August.

\textsuperscript{14} The fleet comprised 156 sail and carried cannon and siege engines.

\textsuperscript{15} For the dates see Miller, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 435; Critobulus, tr. Riggs, p. 139, puts it after the campaign against the Morea in 1458.

\textsuperscript{16} Miller, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 434.
man admiral, came with the fleet and without difficulty occupied Thasos and Samothrace with the cooperation of the local Greek notables. In 1460, when the sultan conquered the Morea, the four islands and Aenos were granted as an appanage to Demetrius.\textsuperscript{17}

Despite paying tribute to the sultan to prevent an attack, Nicholas Gattilusio, the new master of Lesbos, took every measure to put the island in readiness while he urgently requested aid from Genoa. The sultan, accusing Nicholas of making secret agreements with the Italians and letting the Catalan corsairs use the island as a base,\textsuperscript{18} made a decisive attack on Lesbos in 1462. While the grand vizir Mahmud arrived with a powerful fleet\textsuperscript{19} and began the siege of the fortified city of Mytilene, the sultan himself came by land with the main part of the army and made camp on the mainland at Ayazmend in August. The walls were not able to withstand Mehmed’s powerful artillery, and once the lower fortress Melanoudion had succumbed, Nicholas surrendered.\textsuperscript{20} The whole island was immediately put under direct Ottoman rule.\textsuperscript{21} Although a Venetian fleet was closely following the Otto-

\textsuperscript{17} The main source for all this is Critobulus, tr. Riggs, pp. 143–145, 149, 159–160, who was personally involved in the negotiations. Emphasis should be put on the agreement with the Greeks; the point is missed in Miller, Babinger, and Kenneth M. Setton, \textit{The Papacy and the Levant (1204–1571)}, II (Philadelphia, 1978), 223–224, 238.

\textsuperscript{18} Critobulus, tr. Riggs, p. 180.

\textsuperscript{19} According to Ducas, tr. Magoulias, p. 261, the Ottoman fleet then consisted of 7 warships and 6 triremes and biremes. According to an Ottoman survey of Gallipoli dated 1479 (Istanbul, Belediye Library, Cevdet K. no. 079), the Ottoman fleet based there was composed of four types of ships: \textit{kadırga} (galley), \textit{galyata} (galliot), \textit{kayık} (fusta), and \textit{at-geçimisi} (cargo ship). Captains of \textit{kadırgas} numbered 32, of \textit{galyatas} 5, of \textit{kayiks} 11, and of \textit{at-geçimis} 59. Transports were also called \textit{palandarie} or \textit{parandarie}. The \textit{bölük}, crew, of the admiral’s flagship included 20 \textit{azeb} or marines, 7 \textit{mehters} or the military band, and 5 \textit{kumis} (for \textit{comte} see Auguste Jal, \textit{Archéologie navale} (Paris, 1840), p. 474); each \textit{kadırga} included an average of 196 \textit{kirekçis} (oarsmen) and 100 \textit{jenkijis} (fighters). For the naval terms mentioned above see Henry R. Kahane and Andreas Tietze, \textit{The Lingu franca in the Levant: Turkish Nautical Terms of Italian and Greek Origin} (Urbana, 1958); and Hans A. von Burski, \textit{Kemal Re’s: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der türkischen Flotte} (diss., Bonn, 1928), pp. 34–36.

In 1453 at the siege of Constantinople Mehmed II’s navy was composed of 12 galleys, 20 galliots, 70 fuste, and 20–25 \textit{palandarie}. According to Critobulus, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 96, in 1454, in the expedition against Rhodes, the fleet under Hamza numbered “eighty warships besides quite a few cargo ships and other ships carrying cannon”. In 1480 the fleet under Gedik Ahmed heading for Otranto included 28 \textit{galee} and 104 \textit{fuste et palandarie} with 4,000 cavalry; see “Donato da Lezze” (Giovanni-Maria Angiolillo), \textit{Historia turchesca}, ed. Ion Ursu (Bucharest, 1910), p. 110.

\textsuperscript{20} Critobulus, tr. Riggs, p. 183.

man military operations, it was under orders to avoid direct confrontation with the Ottoman forces.22

Pius II showed himself just as enthusiastic and determined as Calixtus III for a general crusade of all Christian nations “to free Europe from the disgrace of Turkish domination”. According to Ferdinand Gregorovius, “the deliverance of Constantinople was the ideal of his pontificate.”23 The congress summoned by the pope for this purpose convened at the time when the Ottomans were in the process of evicting the papal forces from the northern Aegean islands.24

The news of the fall of the Serbian despotate in June 1459 and the arrival in Mantua of the envoys from the directly threatened kingdoms of Hungary and Bosnia galvanized a short-lived Christian European alliance. To muster the forces needed to overcome the now powerful army of the Ottomans was considered impossible, yet, prompted by cardinal Bessarion, a Greek refugee in Rome, the decision was taken to declare a general crusade of European nations for three years starting in 1460. However, before setting out on his campaign against Trebizond, Mehmed was able to sign an armistice with the Knights Hospital of Rhodes.

Meanwhile in Albania the struggle against the Ottomans continued. Up until 1463, when Venice openly took the Albanian rebels under its own protection, both the king of Naples and the pope were actively involved on that front. They provided the rebel leader Scanderbeg with money and supplies and even sent troops. Before setting out on the Trebizond campaign, however, Mehmed also negotiated an armistice agreement with Scanderbeg.

The pope had convinced Hungary, the Ottomans’ major rival in Europe, that it should participate fully in the planned crusade. Conflict between the Ottomans and Hungary was inevitable because of the rivalry over Serbia. In 1451 when Mehmed II came to the throne the Serbian despot George Brankovich had seized the fortress of Alaja-Hisar (Krushevats) and its environs, but on learning of the Ottoman capture of Constantinople he offered to return it. The sultan responded by sending an ultimatum in which he laid hereditary claim to all knez Lazar’s former territories in the Morava river valley including Smederevo and Golubats, but promised to give up to Brankovich the Vuchitrn-Lab region (Vilk-ili), which had belonged to the despot’s father, Vuk.

1 22. Miller, op. cit., p. 439; Ottoman eyewitness accounts are given by Enveri in Düstürnâme, pp. 100-101, and Tursun Beg, op. cit., pp. 101a-103a.
24. Ibid., III, 85-96.
During Mehmed’s campaign into the Morava river valley in 1454, the fortresses of Omol (Omolridon) and Sifrije-Hisar (Ostrovitsa) were captured by the Ottomans, and the despot took refuge in Hungary. When the Ottoman army withdrew, John Hunyadi from Belgrade and the Serbs in the Kossovo area turned to the offensive in the fall of 1454. Hunyadi devastated the Vidin-Nish area, but the Serbs were beaten in the south.

In Mehmed’s second Serbian campaign in 1455 he concentrated his forces against southern Serbia and Vilk-ili. He took possession of a number of silver-producing towns, Trepcha, Novo Brdo (June 1, 1455), and the Lab valley. The despot’s desperate appeal for a crusade did not yield any result and he had to give up all hope of recovering the silver mines of Novo Brdo, the source of his wealth and power. By limiting his demands to the return of Vilk-ili to the Ottomans, Mehmed managed to reach a unilateral peace agreement with Brankovich to the exclusion of the Hungarians. The despot also agreed to pay a very large yearly tribute and to provide troops.

Once the Serbian despotate was neutralized, Mehmed II prepared a major campaign to oust the Hungarians from Belgrade and invaded Hungary in 1456. Twenty-one cannons, as well as a fleet of two hundred vessels, sixty-four of them galleys, were to be used in the campaign. Although internal dissension and hostility with the emperor Frederick III (1452–1493) weakened Hungary’s defense, it received strong support from the papacy with the declaration of a crusade against the Ottomans and the sending of a papal fleet to the Aegean. The fiery preachings of the Franciscan friar John of Capistrano and the arrival of crusaders whom he had recruited from among the populace of Hungary and Germany gave the movement much the appearance of the earliest crusades. Mehmed’s huge army caused panic in Italy, where many thought that Hungary could not resist the sultan’s attack and that he intended to move his army into Italy after conquering Hungary.25

Although Mehmed’s guns demolished Belgrade’s defenses and a group of janissaries actually entered the city, Hunyadi was able to bring in reinforcements by breaking the blockade on the Danube (July 14). Thus the general assault was repulsed (July 21) and the sultan was forced to retreat (July 23).26

26. While Catholic sources (see Babinger, Der Quellenwert, and Setton, The Papacy, II, 179–182) give credit for the victory to John of Capistrano and his “crusaders”, the Ottoman chronicles (especially Tursun, Ibn-Kemal, and Idris) confirm the Venetian and Hungarian sources by relating Hunyadi’s key role. The Ottoman sources stress that Hunyadi first upset the sultan’s
This major victory sent powerful vibrations throughout Christian Europe. Pope Calixtus III wrote that now he looked forward “not only to the recovery of Constantinople but also to the liberation of Europe, Asia, and the Holy Land.”

The activity of the pope’s fleet in the Aegean in 1457 was thought to be a preliminary to the deliverance of Constantinople. Pope Pius II made contact with Uzun Hasan, ruler of the Akkoynu Turomans (1466–1478), and the Georgians in an attempt to encircle the Ottomans from the east.

In 1456 George Brankovich died and a dispute over the Serbian succession brought on a new crisis, with Mehmed supporting George’s son Gregory against his brother Lazar II (1456–1458). About this time another dispute which had arisen between the two Greek despots in the Morea, Demetrios and Thomas Palaeologus, had confused the situation in the south, so Venice intervened and claimed the Morea as part of its own sphere of influence. In Albania too the situation had deteriorated for the Ottomans in 1457, when Scanderbeg defeated the Ottoman forces in Albaniana. In response to these threats the sultan in the spring of 1458 sent Isa Beg with reinforcements against Scanderbeg, while he himself set out for the Morea with an army, and he dispatched the pretender Gregory to Serbia with an army under Mahmud Pasha. In response to a number of concessions on the part of Mahmud Pasha the Serbs surrendered a few fortresses in various parts of the country, including Golubats. However, an army under the personal command of the Hungarian king Matthias Corvinus ( Hunyadi, 1458–1490) in nearby Smederevo continued to pose a threat, and Mahmud withdrew his forces to the area around Nish.

At this juncture the sultan, having conquered those areas in the Morea formerly subject to emperor Constantine XI, arrived with his forces in Skopje (Üsküb) and met with Mahmud Pasha. Matthias, following his father’s example, waited to act until the onset of autumn and the expected annual disbanding of the Ottoman army. Mehmed II,

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however, responded with exceptional measures, and remained in Skoplje until at least November 1458. The king, who crossed the Danube and attacked Tahtalu, was forced by the Ottomans to retreat. In the spring of the following year the sultan himself led an army into the field against Smederevo. The Serbs came to Sofia in June 1459 to surrender the keys to the fortress; the Serbian despotate was once again annexed to the Ottoman empire. Next Mehmed crossed to Anatolia and took Amasra (Amastris) on the Black Sea from the Genoese without a battle.

Pope Pius II received the news of the surrender of Smederevo as an unmitigated disaster for the west, and consequently during the deliberations at the Congress of Mantua in 1459 the launching of a crusade was officially announced. As a result of the establishment of despot Thomas’s control over the Morea with western support, Pius regarded the Morea as an excellent base for operations against the Ottomans. The sultan, however, invaded the Morea in 1460 and annexed the entire region, with the exception of a few fortresses on the coasts which belonged to Venice. The capture of Argos by the Ottomans finally convinced the Venetians of the necessity of declaring war (July 28, 1463).

Meanwhile, new developments in Wallachia and Bosnia had made inevitable the outbreak of an open conflict between the Hungarians and the Ottomans. In 1461 Mehmed had sought to regain the allegiance of the voivode of Wallachia, but Vlad III Tepesh (“the Impaler”) had responded by allying himself with the king of Hungary instead, and even went so far as to take advantage of the sultan’s absence during the Trebizond campaign to attack Ottoman outposts across the Danube. Consequently, in the summer of 1462 Mehmed invaded Wallachia, and appointed in Vlad’s place his brother Radu III (“the Handsome”), who was living in the Ottoman palace. The king of Bosnia, Stephen Tomashevich (1461–1463), who espoused the western Catholic cause against the Ottomans, did not hesitate to hand some fortresses over to the Hungarians (1462). But because of the internal religious division his situation was hopeless, and Bosnia too was conquered by the sultan in 1463.

By 1463 this uninterrupted series of invasions convinced the Ottomans’ two great rivals, Hungary and Venice, that the time had come for decisive action on their part. At long last the pope’s efforts bore fruit, and Venice and Hungary signed a mutual offensive and defensive pact. The pope now believed that the crusade would become a reality. Signing an agreement with Venice and Burgundy, he set May
1464 as the date for the departure of a crusade. A plan was even prepared for dividing the lands of the Ottoman empire among the Christian states in case of victory. It provided that Venice would take the Morea, Boeotia, Attica, and the coastal part of Epirus; Scanderbeg would take Macedonia; the remaining parts of the former lands of the Byzantine empire (mainly Thrace and Thessaly) would be divided between the Greek dynasts; and Hungary would take all of Serbia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, and Wallachia.

The western powers, promising Scanderbeg financial support, persuaded him to go on the offensive, thereby disregarding the terms of his agreement with the sultan. The major rival to Ottoman power in eastern Anatolia, Uzun Hasan, ruler of the Akkoynulu Turcomans, entered into negotiations with Venice for a pact against the sultan. As early as the autumn of 1463 the allies began their offensive. Venice retook Argos in September and the walls of the Hexamilion were quickly reinforced. A number of towns and cities in the Morea rose up in revolt and sided with the Venetians, and the Moslems remaining in the peninsula had to take refuge in a few fortresses over which they maintained control. On December 16 the king of Hungary attacked and captured the Bosnian capital Yaytse (Jajce). The Venetian fleet patrolled the waters outside the Dardanelles, threatening to strike at any moment.

Mehmed, faced with these threats on all sides, took drastic steps. Despite the fact that winter was already near, he immediately sent Mahmud Pasha with a strong army to the Morea. In order to strengthen the empire's naval forces he established a new shipyard at Kadırga-limanı in Istanbul, and in order to assure the safety of Istanbul he ordered that matching fortresses be built on either side of the Dardanelles at Kilidubahr and Sultanıye (Chanakkale). The Venetians were defeated in the Morea, and were once again forced to give up the peninsula to the Ottomans. While the sultan himself was on the way to the Morea to reinforce Mahmud Pasha, on reaching Zeitounion he learned of the successful conclusion of the campaign and changed the direction of his march toward Bosnia. In the summer of 1464 he besieged Yaytse in an attempt to expel the Hungarians but was unsuccessful. On his return to Sofia in September he learned of the Hungarian king's entry into Bosnia and sent a force under the command of Mahmud Pasha, who forced Matthias to withdraw. Thus Mehmed had achieved success in meeting the allied threats on every front. Pope Pius II, who had hoped to lead the crusader army in person, died at Ancona August 15, 1464, and the crusade collapsed.

During 1465 Mehmed opened peace negotiations with Venice and Hungary because of the need to deal with the confused situation in
Karaman, but no agreement could be reached. In the spring of 1466 he set out against Albania to punish Scanderbeg. After conducting operations against the Albanians in the highlands, he constructed a strong fortress, Elbasan, in the low country in central Albania, as a base against those Albanians who were continuing resistance from their strongholds in the mountains. After the sultan’s departure Scanderbeg, with support troops sent by Venice, defeated Balaban Beg, who was pressing the fortress of Croia, and besieged the newly constructed fortress of Elbasan. Outraged by Scanderbeg’s actions, the sultan himself set out on his second Albanian campaign in 1467. In order to intimidate his enemies, he attacked the Albanians mercilessly and sent raiding parties against the Venetian ports, including Scutari and Durazzo. Thus Albania became one of the principal arenas of the Venetian-Ottoman war. Venice achieved little military benefit from the alliance with king Matthias, but as a result of the agreements reached with Uzun Hasan and Pir Ahmed, the emir of Karaman, it was now possible to mobilize a large land force in Asia against the sultan.

Before Uzun Hasan emerged as an ally, Venice had taken advantage of the sultan’s Karaman campaign of 1468. In 1469 Venice had sent out its fleet from Euboea and struck repeated blows against the Rumelian coastline. The islands of Lemnos and Imbros were occupied, and the important commercial centers of Aenos and New Phocaea were sacked and burned. Then the Venetian fleet moved on to the Morea and, after capturing the fortress of Vostitsa, reinforced it as a base for future actions. At this time the Ottoman fleet had been occupied in operations in the Black Sea against the Genoese.

This daring attack led Mehmed to a decision to retaliate with a major blow against the enemy, and he chose Negroponte on Euboea as the target of his attack. During this campaign the Ottomans achieved tactical superiority, and while his fleet monitored the movements of the Venetian fleet, a land force under the personal command of the sultan built a bridge linking the island with the mainland; thus he was able to bring over his army, which succeeded in subduing the fortress on July 11, 1470. The loss of Negroponte aroused great concern not only among the Venetians but throughout the west, and there was general fear that the Ottomans had now established complete control of the Aegean. On Christmas day 1471 pope Sixtus IV (1471–1484) assigned six cardinals to the task of stimulating interest in Europe for the launching of a crusade against the Turks. A pact was signed between Venice and Naples for the formation of a crusader fleet, but the rest of Europe remained aloof.
Aware of the dangerous situation during his campaigns in the east, the sultan tried to neutralize his western rivals by peace offensives. In July 1471 he sent an envoy to Venice to offer peace. Since he insisted on complete control of the Aegean islands, the Morea, and Albania, and in particular on the payment of a yearly tribute, the negotiations broke down in March 1472.

Uzun Hasan, engaged in a life-and-death struggle with the Ottomans, the outcome of which would determine the future of eastern Anatolia, readied himself for battle with every military and diplomatic weapon at his disposal.\(^{29}\) In the winter of 1470–1471 an Akkoyunlu embassy visited Venice, Rome, and Naples seeking an agreement against the Ottomans. Under the impact of the fall of Negroponte, and despite the sultan’s peace offensive in 1471 and 1472, Venice reached an agreement with Uzun Hasan which included the following cardinal points. To aid Uzun Hasan with firearms Venetian ships would bring arms and a small landing party to the coast of Karaman, to be met there by forces sent by Uzun Hasan. After his expected victory Uzun Hasan was to become master of most of Anatolia and make the Ottoman sultan promise to refrain from building fortresses on the coasts and to allow free access for Venetian shipping into the Black Sea. In addition to this, he was to secure the return to Venice of the Morea and Eubeoa as well as Lesbos. The Venetians assured Uzun Hasan that they were capable of entering the Straits and capturing Istanbul. In the summer of 1472 an Akkoyunlu-Karamanid army invaded Ottoman territory as far as Akshehir in central Anatolia, but on August 14 the invading army was routed by the Ottomans.

The large crusader fleet, composed of about 87 galleys from Venice, Naples, Rhodes, the papacy, and Cyprus, had been wreaking havoc along the Mediterranean shores of the Ottoman territories all summer. Adalia (Antalya) was sacked and burned in August and Smyrna (İzmir) on September 13. In the spring of 1473 the fleet, in cooperation with the forces of the Karamanid Kasim Beg, took the fortresses of Corycus, Sığın, and Seleucia (Silifke). The sultan took all possible measures to counter the Akkoyunlu-Christian attack. In the winter he had hastily sent a force of raiders (ağınjis) from Rumelia to the area around Sivas, and in the spring he arrived in person with his large army and advanced in the direction of Erzinjan against Uzun Hasan. The Akkoyunlu were cut off from communication with the Christian force which landed at Corycus, near Tarsus on the Mediterranean coast.

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\(^{29}\) For Uzun Hasan and his struggle against Mehmed II see Woods, The Aqqunyunlu, pp. 87-137.
At the decisive battle of Bashkent on August 11, 1473, Mehmed emerged triumphant and imposed harsh terms on Uzun Hasan. The latter was to cede the fortress of Kara-Hisar and to promise never again to violate Ottoman territory.

Mehmed took a defensive stance vis-à-vis Hungary in the period 1471–1473. Despite Matthias's attempts at intervention, the sultan managed to build a strongly fortified castle on the Danube at Shabats (Bögürdelen) to ensure the security of Bosnia. In the years after 1471 he sent his raiding forces not against Hungary but against the Austrian lands of Matthias's rival emperor Frederick III, and even sent an envoy to Matthias proposing peace. In 1473 a Hungarian envoy was sent in return but he was kept waiting until the completion of the Uzun Hasan affair, and was not granted an audience with the sultan.

After his victory against Uzun Hasan Mehmed listened to the envoy's demands, which included the abandonment or demolition of the two fortresses on the Danube, the Avala (Havâle) ramparts opposite Belgrade and the fortress of Golubats (Gügerjinlik). Not only were these demands rejected by the sultan, but he countered with a demand of his own for the ceding of the fortress of Yayte in Bosnia, and ordered a raid against Hungarian territory. In this raid (winter 1474) Mihal-oghlu Ali advanced as far as Varád. Because of his ongoing war with Poland, Matthias was unable to capitalize on the opportunity in 1473, and had to leave the raid of 1474 unanswered. It was not until 1475 that the king was free to launch his counterattack. He captured the fortress of Shabats on February 15, 1476.

Meanwhile the sultan, who was busily making preparations for a campaign against Moldavia, made an offer of peace. Disregarding the offer, the Hungarian king proceeded to build three wooden forts on the Danube for the purpose of gaining control of the Smederevo region. The sultan, upon his return from the Moldavian campaign, immediately set out for Smederevo, disregarding the exhaustion of his troops, and demolished the three forts. Thereafter Hungary was neutralized by Matthias's war against the Hapsburgs. Not only did Matthias withhold his support from the Venetians, but he let his father-in-law, the king of Naples, make an agreement with the sultan. But after formalizing the peace with Venice in 1479 the Ottoman raids against Hungary were resumed. While the frontier begs attacked Transylvania the new governor of Bosnia, Davud Pasha, accompanied by a large akinji force, crossed the Sava river and carried out extensive raids in Hungary.

From 1474 on the sultan intensified the war against Venice. In 1477
Suleiman Pasha was sent against the Venetian possession Lepanto, but as a result of the timely arrival of naval assistance it was able to resist capture. Evrenuz-oghlu Ahmed blockaded the Venetian fortress of Croia in Albania, and managed to repel naval reinforcements as they attempted to land on the shore. In the autumn of 1477 Iskender Pasha, the governor of Bosnia, led an army against Venetian territory in northern Italy and advanced over the Isonzo and Tagliamento rivers, wreaking havoc on the plain opposite the city of Venice itself. In the following year a similar raid was carried out against Friuli.

Finally in April 1478 the sultan himself set out on campaign against the Venetians in Albania. Proceeding directly to Scutari he immediately besieged the fortress, which resisted all the assaults. After cutting off access to it from the sea by a blockade Mehmed returned with the main part of the army. Helpless to save Scutari and fearful because of the recent raids for Venice itself, the republic resumed peace negotiations in December 1478. On January 15, 1479, a peace treaty was signed, bringing an end to this long war; its principal provisions were that Venice agreed to evacuate Scutari and hand it over to the Ottomans, gave up claims to Croia and the islands of Lemnos and Evoe, and agreed to pay a yearly tribute of 10,000 gold ducats, in return for which it was to enjoy freedom to engage in commerce.

Since the sultan had by this peace treaty effectively neutralized the major enemy sea power, he was now able to turn his attacks against Rhodes, Italy, and the papacy without worry. The rivalries existing among Naples, Venice, and Milan, as well as their general opposition to the policies of the papacy, played into Mehmed's hands, and Venice encouraged him to take immediate action against the kingdom of Naples.

In the spring of 1480 he sent Mesih Pasha with a fleet against Rhodes while simultaneously launching Gedik Ahmed Pasha with another fleet against southern Italy, thus opening a new phase in his conquests. After a fierce ninety-day siege starting on May 23, 1480, the Ottomans were forced to retreat from Rhodes with severe losses.

Gedik Ahmed, the conqueror of Karaman and the Crimea, managed to capture the islands of Leucas (Santa Maura), Cephalonia, and Zante belonging to the Tocco dynasty, and also found an opportunity to meddle in the internal politics of the kingdom of Naples in 1479. In the summer of 1480 he set out from Avlona with a fleet of 132 ships carrying 18,000 men and on August 11 captured Otranto. After reinforcing the fortress and transforming it into a base for operations, he began carrying out raids. The capture of Otranto was regarded as the first step toward the capture of Rome, and the pope fell into a panic,
even thinking of fleeing to safety outside Italy. Gedik Ahmed returned to Rumelia in order to collect fresh troops for renewed attacks, but in the spring of 1481, as he was preparing to cross the Adriatic with reinforcements, the news of Mehmed's death was sent by his son, the new sultan Bayazid II (1481–1512), along with an urgent request for his return to the capital to meet the threat posed by Bayazid's brother Jem Sultan. Otranto was quickly retaken by the Neapolitans, and Italy was spared further Ottoman invasions.

B. The Ottomans, the Crusade, and Renaissance Diplomacy, 1481–1522

The death of Mehmed the Conqueror on May 3, 1481, gave rise to an internecine struggle for the throne between his sons Bayazid and Jem. Bayazid II, supported by Ishak Pasha, Gedik Ahmed, and the janissaries, who had rebelled at the death of Mehmed, succeeded in taking control of the capital. Jem's attempts to challenge his brother's control in the years 1481 and 1482 met with defeat at the hands of Bayazid, who had collected the main forces of the empire under his banner. The state of civil war in the Ottoman empire gave rise to great expectations in the Christian world. The papacy was hopeful that the civil war would lead to a territorial division of the empire, and it was believed that this was the most opportune time to strike a decisive blow against the Ottomans. After his final defeat at Ankara in June 1482, Jem took refuge in Rhodes, relying on the promise of the Hospitallers that he would be transferred to Rumelia to continue the fight.

Actually the Hospitaller grand master, Peter of Aubusson, kept him as a prisoner because Bayazid made generous offers to the knights in exchange for their promise to keep him guarded. Up until the time of his agreement with the knights of Rhodes (December 14, 1482), fol-

32. Thusaes, Djem-Sultan, pp. 80–95; obviously Jem was deceived by the knights. See his biography, Vakı'at, ed. Mehmed Arif (Istanbul, 1914), pp. 7–8.
lowing the execution of the overbold Gedik Ahmed Pasha (November 18), sultan Bayazid’s position both internally and internationally was weak, as the janissaries, the ‘ulema, and other factions reacted against any continuation of Mehmed II’s centralizing policy. The knights of Rhodes immediately began negotiations with the other leaders of the Christian world for the undertaking of a crusade against the Ottomans. There were two courses open to the western powers: they could either follow a war policy and send a crusader army against the Ottomans with Jem as a figurehead, or else simply use the threat of sending Jem to check the sultan, forcing him to seek peaceful relations with the west. In effect, the sum of 45,000 gold pieces sent annually by the Ottoman sultan, ostensibly for the maintenance expenses of prince Jem, acted as a kind of tribute which softened the stance of the western powers and led them to choose the second alternative. Nevertheless, the position of Jem as a hostage in the hands of European states gave rise to new developments in relations between western governments and the Ottomans.

The Ottoman diplomatic efforts were on the whole successful in realizing their primary aims, which were to prevent a crusade and to keep Jem from joining forces with either the Mamluk sultan of Egypt or the king of Hungary, the two principal rivals of the Ottomans, who were both in a position to use Jem in a most effective way against Bayazid. To achieve this goal, the Ottomans made use of diplomatic means as well as military threats, seeking to exploit for their own benefit the rivalries existing among the Christian powers in Europe. During this period the Ottomans did everything in their power to deepen the divisions between the Italian states, encouraging and giving their support to the weaker states in their struggle against the dominant powers in the Italian scene. These weaker states constantly used the threat of Ottoman intervention on their behalf as a check against the incursions of their enemies.

Bayazid confirmed the peace treaty with Venice on January 16, 1482. Several new concessions not present in the 1479 agreement were added at this time, a sign that Bayazid indeed felt the need for continuation of peaceful relations with this maritime power. The advantageous terms granted to the Venetians achieved the effective neutralization of

33. Pfefferman, Die Zusammenarbeit, pp. 84-90.
34. Bayazid agreed to forego the 10,000-gold-piece tribute paid by the Venetians to Mehmed II and lowered the customs duties for Venetians from five percent to four; see Bombaci, “Nuovi firmani greci di Maometto II,” pp. 298-319.
the republic, which was perennially the Ottomans’ principal rival on the sea, as the Hungarians were on the land.

Since both the Ottomans and the Venetians were at war with the king of Naples, the agreement took the form of an alliance. From the Ottoman documentation it appears that Bayazid would even have been content to have Jem in the custody of Venice. The Venetian authorities kept the sultan informed of Jem’s movements in Italy and France, and of the progress of the major powers’ intentions and plans, but naturally all this was done in such a way as to influence Bayazid’s policy in favor of Venetian interests. Taking care to preserve their friendly relations with the Ottomans, the Venetians, as a rule, would not participate in the councils being convened to make plans for a crusade. But they too appreciated the value of the custody of Jem in western hands as a check on Ottoman actions, especially on the sea.

Under the circumstances, the peace agreement concluded in 1484 between Bayazid and Ferdinand (Ferrante) I, the king of Naples (1458–1494), can be considered a further Ottoman diplomatic success. The invasion of Otranto by the Ottomans in 1481 had caused panic in Italy. The news of Mehmed II’s death had reached the pope on June 2, 1481. Sixtus IV did not, however, relax his efforts to organize a general crusade against the Ottomans. This crusade was to be joined by all Italy, and, if possible, by the entire Christian world. After recapturing Otranto from the Ottomans on September 21, 1481, king Ferdinand, following the traditional policy of the Aragonese dynasty, set about stirring up a rebellion in Albania. Accordingly, Klada set out from Naples, captured the Albanian coastal fortresses of Himara and Sopot, and established contact with Albanian leaders in 1481. Despite the pope’s wish that the crusader naval force which set sail to subdue the Turkish garrison at Otranto be sent on against Avlona, the Ottoman naval base in Albania, his desires were not heeded. By this time the papacy had already made plans to arrange with Venice for the removal of Ferdinand from the throne of Naples. Because of the ensuing war of Ferrara in Italy, enthusiastic invitations for a crusade following the capture of Jem by the Hospitallers produced no result.

Hüseyn Beg, Bayazid’s ambassador to European governments in con-

35. Letter in Ertaylan, Sultan Cem, from Topkapi Sarayi archives (cited hereafter as TKS), no. 5457: “why do the Venetians not capture Jem while there is a chance for it? It is time for them to show their friendship”; cf. Vladimir Lamansky, Secrets d’État de Venise (St. Petersburg, 1884; repr. New York, 1968), p. 202; Thuasne, Djem, p. 106.


37. Ibid., IV, 374. It is noteworthy that the 500 Ottoman soldiers who joined Naples’ forces as mercenaries played a significant role in the battle of Campomorto (1482).
nection with Jem’s affairs, reported that the king of Naples was very anxious to make peace with the sultan.  

38. Ferdinand enthusiastically acknowledged the receipt of the peace and friendship offers of Bayazid and stressed “the friendship and brotherhood which exists between the two of us”.  

39. He also added useful information about Jem which he had collected through his spies.

The Ottomans, however, in the winter of 1484, probably as a result of Venetian encouragement, prepared a large fleet, and it gave rise to the fear of an imminent Ottoman invasion in Italy. Thereupon the pope informed Ferdinand about his move to prepare a crusader fleet and invited the Italian states, excluding Venice, to contribute to the expenses, estimated at 200,000 ducats.  

40. Actually, this was a plan to organize an Italian coalition under the pope’s leadership, against Venice as well as the Ottomans. Ottoman diplomacy, in its turn, skillfully made use of the fear aroused by the naval preparations to guarantee Jem’s firm detention. In the following years the Hospitallers and Venice were able to keep the Ottoman fleet from entering the Aegean by use of the threat of sending a crusader army with Jem. It appears that in these years, Bayazid’s great fear was that Mamluk sultan Ka‘itbay of Egypt (1468–1496) might gain control of Jem. Bayazid, therefore, made attempts to have his brother assassinated. The grand master Peter of Aubusson, judging from his correspondence with Bayazid,  

41. purported to cooperate with this plan in order to obtain extra money from the sultan.

All during this period Bayazid sought particularly active diplomatic relations with all Christian governments involved with Jem and the proposed crusade. He created a spy network to keep himself informed of political developments in various countries of the west.  

42. Since the sultan personally conducted all these activities, the seraglio replaced the divan (imperial council) in foreign affairs.

In order to assure himself of Jem’s confinement, Bayazid addressed a letter to the French king in which he said: “It has been agreed between us and the grand master that a specified amount of money shall
be regularly sent to him for the livelihood of my brother on condition that he be kept guarded in a safe place within your domains and never let leave for another country. . . . Our hope is that friendship between the two of us be established.” However, Hüseyn Beg, Bayazid’s envoy in the west, was not able to see the ailing king Louis XI, who died on August 30, 1483, after which events took a new turn.

At the time of Bayazid’s accession to the throne in May 1481, the Ottoman state was at war not only with the king of Naples and the knights of Rhodes, but also with Hungary. Bayazid’s first move was to announce a campaign against Hungary and to order his troops to assemble at Sofia under the command of the beglerbeg of Rumelia. Actually these activities might be considered as a strategy to combine under his command the military forces of the empire for the impending struggle for the throne. Taking advantage of the situation Stephen “the Great”, the voivode of Moldavia (1457–1504), entered Wallachia in the summer of 1481 and marched as far as Turnu on the Danube, raiding the Ottoman territory to the south of the river. In the autumn king Matthias Corvinus of Hungary too gathered a large force along his southern borders (according to his letter, 32,000 men), entered Serbia, and advanced as far as Krushevats. This raid greatly worried the Ottoman government, and the grand vizir Davud Pasha hurriedly returned to Sofia from the battle against Jem. Frontier warfare continued in 1482 and 1483. The king of Hungary controlled all northern Bosnia, including Yaytse, and further planned to occupy Herzegovina and establish it as an independent kingdom for his bastard son. In the meantime he was awaiting aid from Italy and Germany to complete the large-scale preparations for war against the Ottomans.

Despite Matthias’s moves to take Jem into his custody, Jem was transferred to France, whence he later made fruitless attempts to es-

43. TKS, no. 6071, in Ertyalan, op. cit., p. 186; it must have been written in early 1484. Hüseyn was in France in the summer of 1483, and returned to Rhodes on January 28, 1484; see Thuanus, Djem, pp. 110–115.
44. Rüstem Pasha tarihi, MS. in Istanbul, University Library, 45a.
45. Constantin Jireček, Geschichte der Serben, II (Gotha, 1918; repr. Amsterdam, 1967), 251.
47. During the period 1481–1483 Turkish raiders in the Austrian districts of Carinthia and Styria were particularly active; see Leopold Kupelwieser, Die Kämpfe Ungarns mit den Osmanen bis zur Schlacht bei Mohács, 1526, 2nd ed. (Vienna, 1899); Franz Ilwof, “Die Einfälle der Osmanen in die Steiermark,” Mitteilungen des historischen Vereines für Steiermark, IX (1859), 179–205; Wilhelm Neuman, “Die Türkeneinfälle nach Kärnten,” Südost-Forschungen, XIV (1955), 84–109.
cape to Hungary and to enter Rumelia. 49 On their part, the knights of Rhodes took great precautions to assure that Jem would not escape or be kidnapped. 50 The danger of Jem’s entering the Balkans through Hungary was ever-present. Bayazid was well aware of the plan through the reports of his spies. 51 With this in mind, he sent a sizeable force with orders to build two fortresses on the banks of the Morava river, located on the main route of advance of Hungarian armies through Serbia into the heart of the Balkans. The sultan himself waited in readiness in Sofia until the completion of the two fortresses in the spring of 1483. 52 Finally, in the autumn of 1483, Matthias signed a five-year armistice with the sultan and turned all his military might against the German emperor, whom he accused of attempting to instigate the Ottomans to attack him. After a series of victorious battles he entered Vienna in June 1485. It is noteworthy that during this period the Ottoman frontier warfare against Hungary stopped. It was agreed that raids involving less than four hundred men should not be considered a cause of war.

In fact, Bayazid did not want to be involved in a dangerous war against Hungary, the mainstay of the crusading armies. In order to strengthen his own control over the Ottoman throne, however, he was obliged to initiate a holy war against Christians; the janissaries were exerting pressure on him to declare such a war. He chose to attack the weakest Christian enemy, and made his war objective the principality of Moldavia. In his effort to establish control of Wallachia, Stephen, though an Ottoman vassal, had rebelled and launched an attack against the Ottomans in 1481. But before initiating the campaign, the sultan had to be certain of the Hungarians’ neutrality, and therefore made the offer to Matthias of a five-year armistice, no mention being made of Moldavia. Bayazid conducted a successful campaign in Moldavia, and annexed Kilia and Akkerman to his empire (1484).

Matthias, who was fully involved in the west with the war against the emperor, was obliged to renew his armistice with the sultan and to recognize the de facto situation and be content with the sultan’s promises that Stephen would be “treated well”. 53 The Moldavian voi-

50. Ibid., pp. 106–112.
52. These two fortresses were called Ibn-Kemal Koblos and Hiram (today Rama) cf. Iorga, Geschichte, II, 261.
53. Matthias threw the blame for the Moldavian defeat on his chancellor, Peter Váradi, the archbishop of Kalocsa, whom he accused of neglecting the terms of the peace agreements made with the sultan of 1483. It is difficult to ascertain whether the Ottomans undertook the Mol-
vode was left no alternative but to turn to Poland for assistance in his struggle against the Ottomans.

In May 1485 Jem had been moved to the Hospitaller castle of Boisfay, but early in 1486 the grand master and Innocent VIII (1484-1492) agreed in theory that he should be brought to Italy. In 1487 the pope began serious efforts to bring Jem to Rome as a solution to his domestic problems. The war with Ferdinand had again taken a serious turn, posing a severe problem for the papacy. Ferdinand then tried to present himself as Bayazid II’s ally in Italy, giving the sultan his full cooperation in the matter of Jem. From then on, the king steadily informed the Ottoman court on the project of the pope for a crusade with Jem. By pursuing this policy of friendship with the sultan, he protected his lands from the danger of Ottoman raids, thus being able to concentrate his forces against the pope. The plans for cooperation with the Ottomans envisaged by the condottiere Boccolino Guzzoni, who had captured Osimo in the papal territory, caused great concern in Rome. Guzzoni first approached the Ottoman governors in Albania, and finally established relations with the sultan in 1487. Word spread that Guzzoni was prepared to seize the March of Ancona in the papal territory, Jem’s planned place of residence. It seems that Guzzoni’s offers were not taken seriously in Istanbul. All the same, the pope tried to take advantage of the alarm aroused in Italy by the incident, and to get Venice to move into action against Ferdinand of Naples. The papacy’s best chance was to bring Jem to Rome and take command of a crusade participated in by the Christian states of Europe. While the pope, Matthias, and the Egyptian sultan were each striving to get hold of Jem and to use him for their respective political objectives, Bayazid now saw that it was best to keep Jem in France.

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54. The pope claimed that members of the Neapolitan aristocracy, tired of Ferdinand’s oppression, thought of calling the Ottomans to their aid, and that the pope dissuaded them (Pastor, op. cit., IV, 260).
55. Thuasne, Djem, pp. 138-141.
56. Ibid., pp. 150-157.
57. Bayazid II promised to send the French king some sacred relics from Istanbul, which became an object of diplomacy during this period; see Babinger, “Reliquienkammer am Osmanenhof im XV Jahrhundert,” Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse: Sitzungsberichte, Jahrgang 1956, II (Munich, 1956); idem, “Sultan Mehmed II. und ein Heiliger Rock,” ZDMG, CVIII (1958), 266-278.
In his attempts to obtain Jem, the Mamluk sultan chose as his go-between Lorenzo de’ Medici (1469–1492), apparently because of Lorenzo’s influence in the courts of France and the papacy, as well as his extensive banking operations. In the spring of 1488 Lorenzo Spinelli, one of Lorenzo de’ Medici’s agents in France, offered the French king one hundred thousand gold ducats in the name of Ka’itbay for the delivery of Jem.58 Since papal nuncios had already been granted permission to take Jem to Rome by the French government, which believed that this was in the best interest of Christendom, the Egyptian and Hungarian requests were declined. In order to foil his enemies’ plans, Bayazid had instructed his envoy, Anthony Ciritho, to say that he was ready to sign a peace agreement with king Charles VIII of France (1483–1498) and to make peace with the entire Christian world, as well as to pay a considerable sum of money.59 Moreover, Bayazid offered a military alliance, promising the king aid against his enemies. Even more surprising was the Ottoman sultan’s promise to deliver the city of Jerusalem to the French, after its capture from the Mamluks. All of this would be in exchange for the king’s promise to keep Jem guarded in France.60 The sultan’s offers impressed the king’s council, and orders were sent out to stop Jem on his way to Rome. But in the end the nuncios succeeded in putting Jem aboard a boat belonging to the knights of Rhodes, bound for the papal state. The Ottoman prince entered Rome on March 13, 1489.

Jem’s transfer from French territory to Rome to be put directly under the pope’s custody was considered in Istanbul as the beginning of a crusade, and caused alarm. Bayazid II, sending an envoy to Rhodes, declared the transfer of Jem to Rome a breach of the pact between the Porte and the order, and took a threatening attitude toward the Hospitallers. On the other hand, the negotiations of the Mamluk ambassador in France and later in Rome to obtain Jem to use against the Ottomans were followed with anxiety that this was a greater and more immediate danger.

The Mamluks of Egypt were involved from the beginning in the intense international struggle to obtain Jem to use him in their fight against the Ottomans. Especially after war broke out between the Ottomans and the Mamluks in 1485, Ka’itbay, sultan of Egypt (1468–

1496), did his utmost to bring Jem to Egypt. After Jem’s transfer to Rome in 1489, he seemed to prefer to join Ka’itbay, a Moslem ruler, rather than Matthias, for his fight against Bayazid. Even if Ka’itbay could not use Jem directly in the Egyptian campaign against the Ottomans, Jem’s participation in a crusade from the west would divert Ottoman forces from the Egyptian front. This cooperation between Christian Europe and the Islamic state of Egypt, once the sole protagonist of Moslem holy war against Christendom, indicates that during the fifteenth century, in the east as well as in the west, political expediency superseded strict religious idealism.

Now that Jem was in Rome, the power and influence of the pope were greatly enhanced, and papal diplomacy became increasingly complex. While Matthias was pressing the pope to deliver Jem to him as the only power capable of fighting against the Ottomans, the pope declared his decision to convene a congress to be attended by the delegates of all the Christian states in Europe to prepare a crusade. At the same time, the Egyptian ambassador in Rome proclaimed Ka’itbay’s willingness to join an anti-Ottoman league, should Jem be delivered to him, and promised to return all the Christian territories conquered by the Ottomans.

The Türkengrass, which opened in Rome on March 25, 1490, was the logical outcome of the papal diplomacy of bringing Jem to Rome. The pope declared that this was the most favorable moment to take action against the Ottomans. It was believed that Jem was prepared, in the event that he obtained the Ottoman throne through Christian help, to withdraw from the Balkans, even to give up Istanbul. Sultan Ka’itbay of Egypt would be invited to participate in the war against the Ottomans. But with the unexpected death of Matthias Corvinus on April 6, 1490, all the plans for the crusade fell through. In addition, the struggle between Charles VIII and the emperor Maximilian (1493–1519), as well as that between Ferdinand of Naples and Innocent VIII, started up once again.

While the Ottoman war against the Mamluks in Cilicia continued, a crusader attack from the west would have created a most dangerous situation for the Ottoman empire. Ottoman tactics all during the Jem

61. Jem’s mother Chiechik Khatun, a refugee in Egypt, was urging the sultan through his wife to free her son and bring him to Egypt; see an intelligence from Egypt to Bayazid II: TKS no. 6008/3, signed by Ya’kub; for Chiechik Khatun in Egypt see Ibn-Iyyas, Bad’i az-zuhăr fi wakālāt ad-duhūr; ed. Mohamed Mustafa, III (Cairo, 1963), 390.
crisis were to neutralize the west by aggressive diplomacy, sending envoys with lavish promises, presents, money, and relics on the one hand, and to discourage Christian attack by showing strength by building up a strong navy ready to strike and launching large-scale raids on the Danube and Bosnian frontier on the other hand. Friendly relations were sustained with Venice, whose seapower was thought to be of crucial importance for a crusade against the Ottoman empire.

In the face of the dangerous situation following Jem’s transfer to Rome in 1489, Bayazid used the same tactics and found Innocent VIII quite amenable to negotiation. The grand master of Rhodes, Peter of Aubusson, who was the central figure in east-west relations during the Jem crisis, now offered his mediation in drafting an agreement between the sultan and the pope. Bayazid promptly sent his envoy to Rhodes. The prime concern of the grand master and the pope at that time apparently was to neutralize an Ottoman offensive against Rhodes and Italy. Moreover the pope, always short of money, wanted to receive a regular and substantial income for acting as custodian of Jem Sultan. The earliest document attesting to Innocent VIII’s interest in establishing relations with the sultan is dated December 21, 1489.

To negotiate with Bayazid, the pope employed Giovanni Battista Gentile, a Genoese merchant in Istanbul. In a letter dated May 17, 1490, the sultan wrote to Innocent VIII that through the grand master he had learned with great satisfaction of the transfer of Jem to Rome, and that he was hoping that an agreement about his custody would soon be reached with the pope. Later a Genoese Dominican, Leonard of Chiavari, who apparently lived in Pera, was employed as an envoy in the pope’s relations with the sultan. In the late spring or summer of 1490, Leonard came to Rome in the company of an Ottoman envoy to negotiate the terms of Jem’s custody.

Upon the transfer of Jem into the custody of the pope in Rome, the Porte had lost the guarantee under the pact with the grand master of Rhodes that Jem would not be delivered to the enemies of Bayazid II. Innocent, in his turn, needed an agreement with the sultan to receive the yearly payment of forty thousand gold ducats which he was entitled

64. Thusnæ, Djam, p. 264.
65. For the pope’s financial difficulties see Pastor, op. cit., III, 270–272, 281–285; Thusnæ, Djam, p. 189; Pfeiffer, op. cit., p. 89.
66. Babinger, Spätmittelalterliche Briefschaften, pp. 64–75.
67. Ibid., pp. 68–69.
68. Ibid., pp. 69–71.
to receive in accordance with the concord signed with the French king. 69

Bayazid had chosen for this crucial mission an important man of his court, the kapıği-bashi Mustafa Beg, and was ready to send him to the pope via Rhodes in March. But because of Innocent’s crusade maneuver, the Ottoman embassy was delayed four months, until the Türkkenkongress ended its sessions in Rome on July 30, 1490.

Mustafa’s visit to Rome made it possible for Bayazid to establish direct contact with the pope and to disclose the secret practices and pretensions of the grand master. Mustafa’s disclosures proved that Peter of Aubusson was concealing his special agreements with the sultan, which were all secret and verbal, and that he had received much more money than was stipulated in the written agreement. Also, in another meeting between Mustafa and Innocent, in the presence of the cardinals, Mustafa’s clarifications demonstrated that the grand master’s claim that Bayazid II wanted only the Hospitallers to be the guardians of Jem was not true. It became evident that in all his dealings Peter had regarded Jem as his own personal prisoner rather than the prisoner of the order or of any other authority.

In his letter to the pope, 70 Bayazid II said that he was pleased to learn that Jem had been conveyed to Rome, and hoped that Jem was being maintained at the Vatican on the same terms as the grand master had undertaken his custody some years before. The sultan’s ambassador declared that if the conditions were accepted, which meant the relinquishment of the idea of using Jem in a crusade against the Ottoman empire, the sultan would keep peace with Christendom. Mustafa himself, in the information he gave to the historian Idris, 71 claimed to have made an agreement with the pope, sworn to by an oath as is required in the Christian religion, to the effect that Innocent would keep Jem in custody and not let him attack Bayazid’s lands, and that in return the sultan would not harm the pope’s country. 72

In the secret instructions given by the pope to his envoy, 73 his nephew

70. The letter was written in Greek; for a Latin version of it see Setton, The Papacy, II, 418, note 7.
71. Hasht Bhishit, TKS, MS. Hazine 1655.
72. For many years the Ancona area within the papal state was a target of Ottoman raids; see Iorga, Notes et extraits pour servir à l’histoire des croisades au XVe siècle, 1470-1500, V (Bucharest, 1915), 157-159, 163-164; Jean Delumeau, “Un Ponte fra Oriente e Occidente: Ancona nel Cinquecento,” Quaderni storici, XIII (Ancona, 1970), 26-48; Setton, The Papacy, II, 397.
73. See the text of this important document in Setton, The Papacy, II, 419, note 10, and 421, note 13.
Giorgio Bocciardi, Innocent gave details of how the “pension” or “tribute” should be paid—in Venetian gold ducats every year on December 1. The pope’s dispatch of a nuncio to collect Jem’s pension can be considered as a positive indication that an agreement, verbal and secret, was reached between the pope and Mustafa.74

As a result of the agreement made by Mustafa in Rome in January 1491, the Ottoman Porte believed that a crusade was not likely in the near future, and this belief must have encouraged the Turks to resume their aggressive policy against Hungary. The internal conflicts and Maximilian’s invasion of Hungary following Matthias Corvinus’s death in 1490 had created extremely favorable conditions for the Ottomans to consolidate their position on the Danube. Inactive for a long time, the frontier forces were impatient to resume their raids into Hungary, which they believed was now incapable of putting up serious resistance. The Hungarian ambassador to the sultan, Emerich Czobor, was unsuccessful in his attempt to renew the truce ending in 1491.75

In the same year Bayazid II concluded a peace agreement with Egypt and made large-scale preparations for a campaign on land and sea for 1492. The secret preparations, construction of a large fleet—“eighty sails including thirty galleys”76—in particular, gave rise to speculations in Italy about the real target of the Ottomans. Venice and Naples took defensive measures, and both demanded that, for their common safety, the pope use the instrument in his hands, Jem Sultan.77 By June the Venetians were reassured about the sultan’s plans.78

Suleiman Pasha, the Ottoman frontier lord at Smederevo, had invited the Hungarian ban of Machva, Nicholas of Ujlak, an opponent of king Ladislas VI (1490–1516), to recognize Ottoman suzerainty, and surrender Belgrade, promising to add to his possessions the Ottoman fortresses of Alaja-Hisar (Krushevats) and Zvornik. Bayazid, who himself did not give much credit to the reportedly favorable disposition of the ban, suggested that, in case the ban changed his mind about surrendering Belgrade, the army should change its destination toward the Adriatic Sea to crush Albanian rebels and subjugate Montenegro. When in Sofia at the head of his army, he received the news that the Hungarian ban had indeed changed his mind, and that the Hungarians were united to resist the sultan, so he set out with the bulk of his

75. See Ignaz A. Fessler, Geschichte von Ungarn, ed. Ernst Klein, III (Leipzig, 1874), 249.
76. According to a Venetian intelligence report of May 7, 1492; see Setton, The Papacy, II, 425. In Idris: 20 coques, 5 barcas, 80 galleys, and about 200 smaller ships or transports.
78. Ibid., II, 426, note 26.
army to invade northern Albania. On the Hungarian front, raids under the frontier begs Mihal-oghlu Ali and Suleiman Pasha, as well as the blockade of Belgrade, were foiled by stiff Hungarian resistance.

Before he left Istanbul for this campaign on April 6, 1492, Bayazid had shown his intention to keep peace with the pope by sending an envoy to Innocent VIII with 40,000 gold ducats along with valuable relics, including the alleged iron head of the lance which pierced Jesus’s side at the crucifixion, which Innocent had specifically requested through his ambassador Bocciardi. The delivery of the 40,000 ducats and the generous gifts was indeed a positive indication of Bayazid’s appeasement policy toward the pope and of the existence of an agreement between the two parties about the custody of Jem and keeping peace.

Venice, the only maritime power able to curb the Ottomans, chose to avoid conflict, and continued to honor the 1479 agreement. It was undoubtedly Venice among all the western powers which best exploited the Jem situation vis-à-vis the Ottomans. While functioning as an indispensable source of information for the sultan concerning Jem’s position in Europe, Venice used the conflict between the Ottomans and Mamluks, nominal suzerains of Cyprus, and in 1489 managed to bring the island under its direct rule. Neither the Mamluks nor the Ottomans, who were at war with each other, were in a position to challenge the Venetian takeover of Cyprus. While the pope was encouraged by the republic to enter into negotiations with the Mamluk sultan for the delivery of Jem, a Venetian ambassador, Peter Diedo, was hurriedly sent to Cairo to explain to the Mamluk sultan Ka’itbay that the Venetian claim of sovereignty over Cyprus was a move taken only to prevent the island’s falling into the hands of the Ottomans. Further, Diedo claimed that since the Mamluks lacked a fleet to protect Cyprus, Venetian possession of the island would be beneficial to both parties. Venice agreed to all the conditions which had been imposed by the Mamluks on the Lusignan dynasty of Cyprus, including the payment of a yearly tribute of 8,000 gold ducats.

The loss of Cyprus to Venice was, until 1571, an irreparable setback to the Ottomans in the eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, Venice strengthened its position on the vital waterway between Avlona and Italy by forcing the Porte to recognize Venetian sovereignty over the island of Zante by an agreement reached on April 22, 1494. It also strengthened the fortifications of Corfu, key point of the Venetian mari-

time empire. Thus a naval operation against Venetian possessions in the Morea and the Adriatic Sea, as well as an Ottoman attack on Italy, was made strategically impractical, and the threat from Avlona, the only important Ottoman base outside the Dardanelles, was greatly reduced.

From 1491 on, however, Venetian-Ottoman relations had become increasingly strained. The rivalry for control of the Albanian and Montenegro coast, as well as the uneasy situation in the Morea, where Venice controlled the most important ports and naval bases, including Navarino, Modon, Coron, Monemvasia, and Nauplia, were among the factors which created an explosive atmosphere. The arrival of the Ottoman fleet on the Albanian coast and the unexpected invasion of Albania by an army under the command of the sultan himself posed a direct threat to Italy and the Venetian possessions in the Adriatic Sea. A Venetian fleet was sent to Corfu, and the fortifications on the island were substantially strengthened. The landing of an Ottoman frontier force at Gasha, only fifteen miles from Senj itself, caused alarm in Venice, and the republic requested that the pope demand, using the threat of Jem, that the sultan evacuate the fortress. By 1493 the fear of an Ottoman invasion of Italy brought Venice, Milan, and the papacy closer together, and a league was formed on April 25. Venice now actively supported the pope in his crusade effort, and assured him of its full participation. It even requested that the pope mention in the agreement that Jem would be handed over to Venice. The republic promised to open hostilities as soon as Maximilian declared war against the Ottomans, for according to Venetian strategy, Austria had replaced Hungary as the strongest land power in such a crusade.

The resumption of ghazā activities by the Ottomans had annoyed not only Venice but also Maximilian, who after the death of Matthias Corvinus in 1490 had emerged as the protector of the Christian lands in Central Europe. Maximilian, as a result of the large-scale attacks of the Ottoman frontier forces against neighboring lands on the Danube, became an ardent advocate of a crusade against the Ottomans. On the eve of the French invasion of Italy, he even favored the idea of Jem's delivery to the Mamluk sultan in exchange for promises to join the Christian league.

82. For Maximilian's instructions to his ambassador to Rome, Marquard Breisacher, see Thusatne, *Djem*, pp. 441–446.
Ottoman aggressiveness after 1492 can be explained by several factors. The Ottomans had concluded peace with Egypt in 1491, at the urgent request of the Hafšid ruler Zakariya' II of Tunisia, alarmed by the Spanish reconquista. The fall of Granada on January 31, 1492, celebrated as a Christian retaliation for the conquest of Constantinople, gave rise to intensification of the ghazā spirit in the Islamic world in general. Moreover, following the death of Matthias Corvinus and the ensuing internal confusions in Hungary, the Ottomans hoped to capture Belgrade, thus increasing pressure through the frontier forces’ operations against the Austrian and Hungarian dominions.

In 1492, during a large-scale raid in Croatia, heavy Ottoman casualties, reportedly ten thousand men, were suffered when the army fell into a trap near Villach. But the successful raid in 1493 under the able general Ya'kub Pasha, governor of Bosnia, into Slovenia, Croatia, and lower Styria was crowned with his victory at Corbova (Krbava) on September 9. In the following year the large-scale raids continued in Croatia and Transylvania, and Paul Kinizsi, Hungarian frontier commander, made retaliatory raids into Ottoman Serbia. Thus a serious situation had arisen in Central Europe too, about which pope Alexander VI (1492–1503) expressed great concern during his negotiations with the Porte. A truce between Hungary and the Ottomans was concluded only at the beginning of 1495, when Charles VIII’s invasion of Italy caused a general reaction against France in Europe. The Ottomans then concentrated their forces against Poland.

In 1494 the pope and the king of Naples had united against the French in an attempt to stop Charles VIII in his invasion of Italy, and had used the threat of Ottoman intervention. Now Alexander’s Italian policy was in open conflict with the crusade plan. In response, the pope’s adversaries, Charles VIII and the pro-French cardinals, denounced the pope for betraying the interest of Christendom by establishing secreties with the Ottoman sultan. Indeed, the papal policy of attempting to use Ottoman power against its immediate enemies, while at the same time continuing its crusade plans, is a spectacular example of Renaissance Italy’s pragmatic balance-of-power diplomacy.

Threatened by a French invasion, the new king of Naples, Alfonso II (1494–1495), now backed by the pope, hurried his agent Camillo Pandone to Istanbul to request military aid, a contingent of six thou-

83. Milan Japunčić, Kratka povijest Like e Krbave (Gospic, 1936); Johann C. von Engel, Staauskunde und Geschichte von Dalmatien, Croationen und Slawonen (Halle, 1798), pp. 564–567; details in Ottoman sources—Idris, Ibn-Kemāl, and the anonymous chroniclers.

84. The pope for his part wrote to Bayazid II that Alfonso’s territories should be spared;
sand Ottoman soldiers. He said he was ready to pay them, that is, to employ them as mercenaries, a practice employed for centuries by other Christian governments in Byzantium and the Balkans.

Alexander’s envoy, the Genoese Giorgio Bocciardi, was already in Istanbul.85 Using the excuse that he needed money immediately in order to prepare the resistance against the French invasion of Italy, the pope requested that the year’s allowance for Jem be sent in advance. The pope’s envoy told Bayazid that the French king planned to capture Jem, take the kingdom of Naples, and from there attack the Ottoman empire.86 Alexander also called on Bayazid as a true friend to put pressure on Venice to abandon its neutrality and join the resistance against the French.87 Bayazid reacted promptly and sent three ambassadors to Italy to encourage the papacy, Naples, and Venice to resist Charles VIII. The ambassadors arrived in Italy in November 1494, at the time when Charles entered Florence (November 17). In Venice, on November 21, the Ottoman envoy, who was anxiously watched by the French ambassador Philip of Commines, criticized the republic for its neutrality and threatened to launch an Ottoman attack on Italy should Venice refuse to join the resistance.

On November 20 Kasim Chawush, who had been sent with the money requested for Jem (40,000 gold ducats), accompanied by Bocciardi, was attacked by French partisans near Ancona. All the money and the sultan’s letters to the pope were captured.88 The next day in Florence, the French king, attempting to rival Maximilian, made a declaration before his march to Rome that his purpose in this campaign was to fight the Turk and deliver the holy places, and that his expedition to Naples was only a necessary first step.89 In order to humiliate Alexander, the seized letters, five in number, together with Bocciardi’s testimony about the fulfillment of his embassy, were immediately published in Florence. The document most incriminating for the head of the church was the sultan’s letter proposing that the pope assassinate

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85. He left Rome in June and stayed in Istanbul till the end of September 1494; see Thusaune, Djem, p. 320.
86. In September Charles VIII invited Peter of Aubusson to come to Rouen from Rhodes to give him his expert opinion on the king’s plan for a crusade against the Ottomans; see Thusaune, Djem, p. 328.
87. Ibid., pp. 325–327; Pastor, op. cit., V, 427.
Jem and offering 300,000 ducats for the delivery of the corpse to the sultan’s men at one of the Ottoman ports. Bayazid also promised that no Christian state would be the subject of attack, and in order to show his good faith, the sultan had even taken an oath on the Koran in the presence of Bociardi. While there is no doubt about the authenticity of the other letters, written in Greek with the sultan’s monogram, this particular one, in Latin, is believed by some scholars to be a forgery.

Deserted by the Christian powers, the pope finally had to agree, on January 15, 1495, to all the points insisted upon by the French king, as preliminary to his plan for the crusade against the Ottomans—the delivery of Jem and free passage through the papal territory for the occupation of the kingdom of Naples. Charles VIII entered Naples in triumph on February 22. Three days later Jem suddenly died, evoking the usual accusations of murder; the basis for the containment of Bayazid died with him. Charles abandoned plans for a crusade against the Turks, and turned his attention to his European enemies, but not until 1499 was Jem’s body returned to Bayazid by Frederick, king of Naples (1497–1501).

The anti-French coalition of March 31, 1495, linking pope Alexander VI, emperor Maximilian, Venice, Milan, and Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain in a so-called Holy League against Islam, was followed by the outbreak of the Italian wars, involving western Christendom in a long internal struggle from which sultan Suleiman I, “the Magnificent” (1520–1566), would benefit by expanding his empire into Central Europe. The new pattern of diplomacy in the west, introduced in Renaissance Italy during the fifteenth century, would in the sixteenth bring the Ottoman empire into the European state system in an alliance with France against the Hapsburgs.

After Jem’s death the Ottomans continued to be one of the important elements in the balance of power in Italy. They followed with great concern the progress of the negotiations for an alliance between Venice and Louis XII against Milan, for an alliance between the great naval power, Venice, and France might indeed lead to the realization of a crusade. Bayazid took a supportive attitude toward the anti-Venetian dispositions of Naples, Mantua, and Florence, rivals of the republic. In return for Ottoman military assistance—that is, the


supplying of mercenary forces—these states offered to pay annually 50,000 gold ducats.

The Ottoman government strictly enforced its prohibition of grain export to Venice, which was of vital importance to the republic. Anxious to avoid the outbreak of a war with the Ottoman empire, Venice brought forth several proposals for conciliation. In 1497–1498 the Venetian ambassador Andrew Zanchani offered a yearly tribute of 3,000 gold ducats for the peaceful possession of Cephalonia and Cattaro (Kotor), while agreeing to give up its claims on the territory of Montenegro. However, in confirmation of its sovereignty over the coastal areas in Montenegro, Venice sent out a fleet to the bay of Cattaro in June 1497.92

The Ottomans realized throughout the period of the Jem affair that without a strong navy they could not feel secure in their position in the Balkans and exert an effective influence on the course of events in Italy. After 1489 the Ottomans feverishly pursued their efforts to strengthen their fleet. In 1497 they started the construction at the Istanbul shipyards of two huge köke (coques or naves) of 1800 tons, considered to be the largest warships of the time.93 On June 16, 1499, the Ottoman fleet finally set out from the Dardanelles toward Tenedos (Bozja-ada), causing alarm to spread from Rhodes to Egypt and Venice. After the arrest of all the Venetian subjects in the Ottoman dominions, which meant a declaration of war against Venice, it was learned that the real objective of the expedition was the Morea. While a sizeable force was sent as a distraction against the Venetian possessions in Dalmatia and Albania under Iskender Pasha, the frontier commander in Bosnia, another army under the command of the beglerbeg of Rumelia, Mustafa, was simultaneously directed toward Lepanto.

The success of the military operations depended on the ability of the Ottoman navy to repulse the Venetian sea forces and to complete the encirclement of Lepanto from the sea. The sultan himself, on the summer pastures of Greece, impatiently awaited news of the arrival


93. On the sultan’s fleet and the two coques, the Ottoman and Venetian sources give details; in particular see von Burski, op. cit., pp. 33–40. The Ottoman fleet, 260 or 300 vessels, was larger than the Venetians’ fleet, but the latter had a greater number of warships.
of the fleet. As the Ottomans had no base in the Morea, the fleet experienced great difficulty and delays in getting supplies and reinforcements along the way to Lepanto. At the sea battle, which took place near the island of Prote (Prodano or Barak-ada) on August 12, 1499, the Venetians were not successful in intercepting the Ottoman fleet, and suffered losses. On three separate occasions the Venetian fleet, reinforced by the French and Rhodian squadrons, attempted to block the progress of the Ottoman navy toward the Gulf of Corinth. From each of these skirmishes the Ottomans emerged successful. On August 25, after thirty-three days of constant pursuit by the allied fleet, the Ottoman sea forces eventually reached Lepanto, and the Venetian fleet withdrew to its base at Corfu. On seeing the arrival of the Turkish navy and the withdrawal of the Venetian fleet, the commander of the place surrendered on August 28, 1499. The victory was particularly significant since it was the first time that the Ottoman navy had been able to challenge the Venetians successfully on the open sea.

The fall of Lepanto caused deep concern about the Ottoman danger in Europe. In the autumn of 1499 pope Alexander VI appealed to the European states to unite for a crusade and in May 1500 ordered the collection of a crusading tithe. In his crusading bull of June 1, 1500, he put stress on the danger of the invasion of Italy by the Ottomans, since he said that the Ottomans now had a stronger navy and had started to seize all the strategic ports on the coasts.94 The Venetians, for their part, were doing their utmost to convince Ladislas, the Hungarian king, to join the crusade and fully to involve the French king Louis XII, their ally (1494–1500), in the Venetian war against the sultan; a French squadron had already cooperated with Venice against the Ottomans in 1499. Venetian diplomats were also trying to induce John Albert, king of Poland (1492–1501), to join the crusade, since as a result of the king’s ambitions in Moldavia, Poland had twice been invaded by large armies under the frontier beg Bali Beg in 1498. Bayazid thought he could foil the crusading plans by diplomacy, sending one envoy to pressure the Hungarian king to sign a peace treaty and another one to Rome in February 1500 to try to see the pope.95

In the following year, when the Venetians and French made proposals of peace, the Ottomans responded haughtily, demanding the payment of an annual tribute as well as the surrender of Coron, Modon, and Nauplia in the Morea. In the face of these excessive demands, Venice sought to convert its war against the Ottomans into a

95. Ibid., II, 524.
full-scale European crusade. Now the pope undertook serious steps for its preparation among the Christian nations, including Wallachia, Moldavia, and even Russia. On his part, Bayazid encouraged Venice's rivals in Italy and permitted the establishment of a Florentine consul in Istanbul, besides promising a large amount of military aid to Naples—but insisting in return that they surrender Otranto. Thus, after having eliminated the Jem question, the Ottomans unhesitatingly returned once more to the expansionist policy of the time of Mehmed the Conqueror.

In the following campaign season the Ottoman goal was the capture of the fortresses of Modon and Coron in the Morea. As a result of the delays in the arrival of the heavy artillery transported by the ships, the siege of Modon, heavily fortified by the Venetians, was drawn out. Although the siege had begun in March, the fleet did not arrive until July 17; only after its arrival was the fortress surrounded by both land and sea. Despite the intervention of the Venetian fleet Modon fell after a final assault on August 10, 1500. Following the Ottoman capture of Modon, Coron surrendered without resistance a week later.

Upon the arrival of the news of the fall of Modon and Coron, the pope dispatched three legates to European governments to urge them to join the crusade and cooperate in collecting crusading tithes. Alexander was particularly eager to join the French in Naples against king Frederick (1497–1501) for the partition of the kingdom of Naples, so he joined the French-Spanish League on June 29, 1501. The allies declared that the partition was a necessary step to secure peace and unity against the Ottomans, while Frederick put his hopes in the sultan's intervention and aid. Lodovico, duke of Milan, who was also known as the sultan's protégé, tried to break the Venetian-French alliance by promising Venice his good offices for a peace with the Porte.

A crusader fleet composed of French, Venetian, papal, and Spanish ships set out in the fall and easily seized the island of Cephalonia and the fortress of Navarino (on December 3, 1500), which had been in Ottoman hands since August. The Ottomans were on the alert, however, and had assigned Khadhim Ali to guard the Morea while Iskender Pasha attacked the Venetian possessions in Dalmatia.

In 1501 Christian fleets individually undertook raids, causing the Ottomans difficulties. The Venetian forces, attempting to land at Aitol, were destroyed on August 15, 1501, by the Ottomans, who then conquered Durazzo. An allied squadron of eighty ships, including forty galleys, landed forces on Lesbos and began the siege of Mytilene, its capital. This move threatened Istanbul itself. The French ships, twenty-six in number, set sail for the Dardanelles to block the arrival of the
Turkish navy, according to an Ottoman report. The Ottomans experienced great difficulties in bringing reinforcements to the besieged from Anatolia. Besides, since it was outside the regular campaign season, it was hard for the Ottomans to mobilize the navy. Eventually, when a land army under Hersek-zade and the beglerbeg of Anatolia reached the shores opposite the island, they found that the enemy had already raised the siege and left the island with their fleet. Meanwhile on May 28 an Ottoman fleet, under the command of the famous seaman Kemal Reis, captured Navarino in cooperation with the land forces. In this battle three galleys and one galleon were captured from the Christians. The Spanish fleet under the command of Gonsalvo Fernando, raiding the Anatolian coasts, inflicted great damage by burning and plundering. Ottoman sources report that in July 1501 the Christian fleet landed at Cheshme near Smyrna and slaughtered the population.

It is noteworthy that in these years the Christian nations attacking the Ottoman homeland and the Dardanelles demonstrated, on the whole, their naval superiority and control of the seas. In 1502 this became even more pronounced. While a Venetian fleet was making a surprise attack against Thessalonica and Makri (on the Thracian coast), the main allied fleet—Rhodes, France, the pope, and Venice—made a landing at the island of Leucas (Santa Maura) and seized the fortress. Under these circumstances the Ottomans were well disposed toward Venetian peace offers. In 1502, while Bayazid threatened Venice with the preparation of a huge armada of five hundred ships, his vizirs mentioned to Valerio Marzello, the Venetian bailie, now released from prison, the advantages of peace. At the same time, the Hungarian ambassador in Istanbul was exerting pressure on the sultan for peace, and a treaty was concluded at Istanbul on August 10, 1503.

An agreement with Venice was drawn up in September 1502 and signed December 14, but due to the Ottoman insistence on the return of Leucas and on payment of a war indemnity, the final ratification act was delayed until August 10, 1503. In the end Venice agreed to return Leucas and, as in the 1479 treaty, to pay an annual sum of 10,000 gold ducats to the Ottomans. In return, the Ottomans agreed to permit the residence of a permanent bailie in the Ottoman capital and to return the goods confiscated during the war, as well as to give up the island of Cephalonia to the Venetians. The Ottomans, however, retained their conquests in the Morea—Lepanto, Modon, and Coron—and Durazzo in Albania.

96. Tansel, op. cit., p. 220 (TKS, no. 5027, facsimile copy, no. 23).
The conclusion of the peace agreement between the Ottomans and the Venetians met with the disapproval of the pope and the rest of the Christian world. Without Venice the crusade could not be continued. Despite the efforts of pope Julius II (1503–1513) Venice remained faithful to the peace with the sultan. At the same time, following in the footsteps of Timur and Uzun Hasan, Shāh Ismā'īl (1501–1524), the founder of the Safavid dynasty in Persia and a formidable rival of the Ottomans in the east, approached Venice for a joint attack against the Ottoman empire. In 1508 the shah’s ambassador to Venice was well received by the doge, Leonard Loredan (1501–1521). While expressing interest in future cooperation with Persia, the doge explained that it was not the time for Venice to break off the peace agreement with the Ottomans.

The next few years were marked by intense diplomatic activity but no major hostilities. The League of Cambrai against Venice (1508) tried to enlist both Hungarian and Ottoman support. The emperor Maximilian I promised Dalmatia to Hungary, but it chose neutrality in Europe and a peace treaty with the Turks, for one year in 1510 and then for five years in 1512. Maximilian declared himself, at the diet of Augsburg in the spring of 1510, the leader of still another crusade against the Turks, but secretly attempted to secure joint action with the Ottomans against Venice, which in turn requested Turkish frontier forces for use as mercenary troops.98 Neither side achieved its objective.

Paralyzed by a struggle for the succession among the Ottoman princes, and by a terrible insurrection in 1511 of the Turcoman Kizibash heretics in Anatolia, the sixty-four-year-old sultan Bayazid II had to pursue a peace policy in Europe, making sure that none of the rival powers emerged strong enough to launch a crusade. Shāh Ismā'īl of Persia threatened his eastern borders, and, as spiritual leader of a powerful şūfi order, helped incite the Turcoman revolt. Bayazid was thus fully occupied in defending the empire and developing its commercial and economic strength. Having established Ottoman naval power in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean, he supported the “Moriscos” of Spain and the Moslems of North Africa against Spanish attacks, sending sea-ghazis who eventually became the Barbary corsairs.99

In the Indian Ocean the Portuguese not only terrorized Moslem merchants and pilgrims, but entered the Red Sea and threatened Mecca and Medina. A Mamluk fleet was destroyed by the Portuguese in 1509

at Diu, off the Gujerat coast, and the Egyptian sultan Kansuh al-Ghurî had to accept aid and experts from his Ottoman foes to build a new fleet at Suez to drive the Portuguese out of the Red Sea.  

Bayazid’s orderly administration, resembling that of his grandfather, Murad II, rather than that of his father, Mehmed II, earned him the sobriquet ‘Adli, “the Law-Abiding”, in contrast to his father’s “the Conqueror”. His son Selim I “the Grim” (Yavuz), despising Bayazid’s pacific policies, won the janissaries’ support and deposed his father in April 1512. By massive military campaigns he defeated the Safavids of Persia in 1514 and destroyed the Mamluk state in 1516–1517, doubling the territory and financial resources of the empire by annexing eastern Anatolia, Syria, Egypt, and the Hejaz. He thus won the distinction of being the protector of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and assigned his admiral Selman in 1517 to defend Jidda against a Portuguese fleet. Selim completed the transformation from a frontier state to a powerful empire, easily a match for the Holy Roman empire of Maximilian I (1493–1519) and Charles V (1519–1556). During his brief reign he paid little attention to Europe, however, and thus does not figure importantly in crusades history.

At his premature death in 1520 he was succeeded by his son Suleiman I “the Magnificent” (or “the Law-Giver”, Kanuni; d. 1566), who in true ghazi fashion inaugurated his reign with the conquests of Belgrade (August 30, 1521) and Rhodes  


100. See Inalcık’s review of Ayalon, Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom, in Belleten, XVII (1956), 501–505.
