VIII

THE CRUSADE OF VARNA

The defeat of the crusaders under king Sigismund at Nicopolis on September 25, 1396, ended, for almost half a century, any concerted military opposition to Ottoman expansion in the Balkans. The European provinces that had been overrun by the Turks remained tributary


vassal states, while sultan Bayazid I concentrated on consolidating his control over Anatolia, in which the Ottoman state had emerged as the most powerful among the many Turkish principalities.\footnote{See Halil Inalcik, chapter VII, above.} Consolidation meant conquest of the Selchukid and Turcoman emirates that had
evolved during four centuries of Turkish invasions. Bayazid conquered and annexed the two largest of these states, Karaman (1397) and Sivas (1398), thereby extending an empire that stretched from the Euphrates to the Danube.

provides a fairly reliable chronology of events. Sadeddin (1536–1599) wrote a universal history entitled *Crown of History*, relying heavily on Neshri and valuable for the policies of Murad II; part of his history was translated into French by Antoine Galland in the 18th century as *Annales ottomanes*, and exists in manuscript in the Bibliothèque nationale, Salle des manuscrits, Fonds français 6074 and 6075.


The Islamic world now had two major powers, each claiming hegemony. Timur the Lame (1369–1405) had established his empire in Central Asia and on the Iranian plateau, and as heir of the Il-khánid power claimed sovereignty over Anatolia. The dispossessed Anatolian emirs fled to Timur’s court, appealing for the restoration of their territories and charging Bayazid with violating the faith of Islam by attacking fellow Moslems engaged in the holy war. In 1402 Timur moved his army into Anatolia, and Bayazid wheeled to meet him on the Anatolian plateau. At Ankara on July 28 the Ottomans were decisively defeated and Bayazid was taken prisoner, remaining a captive until his death in 1403.

The political situation was suddenly altered radically: the emirates were restored and the remaining Ottoman territory was divided by Timur among Bayazid’s sons Suleiman, Musa, and ‘Isa. The impetus toward further Ottoman conquest was removed for a generation as internecine strife occupied the Turkish princes. Musa eliminated ‘Isa and, in 1411, Suleiman, only to be defeated and killed in 1413 by his younger brother Mehmed I. After the latter’s death in 1421 two claimants surfaced; his son Murad II besieged Constantinople in 1422, but lifted the siege to fight and defeat his “uncle” Mustafa (called “the Impostor”) in 1423, thereby emerging as sultan (1421–1451) of a unified empire.2

After the defeat at Nicopolis king Sigismund pursued a defensive policy in the Balkans until his death in 1437. One notable exception to this policy occurred in 1428 when he began fortifying Golubats, intending to make it a Hungarian stronghold and establish control over northern Serbia, nominally a vassal of Hungary, while a civil war raged between rival claimants to the Serbian throne. The Ottomans had re-

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garded Serbia as a tributary state since 1389, when Murad I defeated the Serbs at Kossovo Polje. Thus challenged, Murad II led an army against Golubats, which he captured, almost taking Sigismund prisoner in the process. A peace was made which recognized George Brankovich as the despot (1427–1456) of a Serbian kingdom that served as a buffer between the two powers. Sigismund now established Belgrade as the bulwark of Hungarian defense against the Turks; Murad fortified Golubats, while Brankovich established himself at Smederevo, at the confluence of the Danube and Morava rivers. Sigismund concentrated his efforts on fighting the Hussites, who at Dojamlice on August 14, 1431, decisively defeated a crusading army led by the papal legate, cardinal Julian Cesarini.

When the peace between Hungary and Serbia expired in 1431 Sigismund claimed territory in Serbia, Bosnia, and Bulgaria. These small principalities found themselves caught in a conflict between two empires with little chance of continued independent existence. By 1434 Murad had decided on a more aggressive policy in the Balkans. His objective was to expand the Ottoman territory and transform tributary vassal states into provinces of the Ottoman empire, a pattern followed in subsequent expansion. The more immediate objectives of the new aggressiveness were to halt Venetian advances in the Morea (Peloponnese), occupy the strategic Serbian fortresses as a prelude to an attack on Transylvania, and strengthen Ottoman control over Wallachia. Byzantium still attempted to play the role of a great empire, although the territory of the “empire” amounted to little more than the capital and the Morea. The Ottomans repeatedly besieged Constantinople, but their sieges were doomed to failure since the city could be supplied by sea and the Ottomans had not yet developed a significant naval force.

The Byzantines sought aid from Catholic Europe; however, they realized that little was to be expected from the west until the schism that had since 1054 separated the Latin and Orthodox churches was healed. Moreover, the disunity of western Europe, competing nationalism, and the desolation caused by the Hundred Years War had con-


vinced the Byzantines that any significant military aid was highly unlikely. The only source from which Byzantium could expect concerted military action was the papacy, so Manuel II Palaeologus had continued negotiations concerning union, sending emissaries to the Council of Constance. With the removal of the Ottoman threat after Ankara, all initiative for union had vanished, and negotiations were postponed. Manuel made few effective diplomatic overtures to the west between 1402 and 1417, though he did send representatives to the Council of Constance, but not to the Council of Pisa. He concentrated his efforts in the east, recovering Thessalonica, rebuilding the Hexamilion wall, and consolidating Byzantine power in the Morea.

The Byzantines could not, however, reasonably expect aid to be sent until union was achieved, an objective that Manuel nevertheless attempted to postpone and otherwise prevent from reaching fruition. He realized that for the Byzantine populace and clergy this was an unacceptable price to pay for military aid, and he warned his son and heir that it was an unattainable objective.

The accession of Murad II meant for Byzantium a period of renewed warfare. Almost immediately Constantinople was besieged, from June 10 to September 6, 1422, but the city could not be taken as long as the Turks could not maintain a naval blockade. In the following year the Turks destroyed the Hexamilion, overran the Morea, and attacked Thessalonica. In a desperate effort to save the city, the despot Andronicus Palaeologus gave it to the Venetians, from whom Murad II, nevertheless, captured it in 1430. And yet the conciliatory gestures of pope Martin V (1417–1431), including the suggestion of convening an ecumenical council that would have met the requirements of the Greeks and defraying the cost of the Byzantine delegates, met with evasiveness in Constantinople. On July 1, 1425, Manuel died and John VIII became sole emperor (d. 1448), and negotiations continued. When Mar-

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7. On June 15, 1422, Martin V appointed Anthony of Massa as apostolic nuncio to Constantinople. Although he had an audience with Manuel on September 16, by November 14, with Manuel recovering from a stroke, John VIII and the patriarch replied that only an ecumenical council could settle the differences between the churches. On November 8, 1423, these discussions were reported to the fathers at Pisa, and further discussions were postponed. Cf. Gill, *op. cit.*, pp. 327–330.
tin V died on February 20, 1431, a Greek embassy was en route to Rome to discuss a union council. It turned back at Gallipoli when news of the pope’s death reached the emissaries.

Eugeniuss IV (1431–1447) continued Martin’s policies, and fully accepted the concept of convening an ecumenical council to end the schism and reunite the Latin Catholic and Greek Orthodox churches. In competition with the conciliariest prelates of the Council of Basel, who “deposed” him on January 24, 1438, he conducted lengthy and intricate negotiations with John VIII, resulting in the emperor’s arrival at Ferrara in March 1438, accompanied by the patriarch Joseph II and other Greek prelates. On April 9 the council, considered by the papacy but not by the conciliariest a continuation of the Council of Basel, was formally opened. Early in 1439 fear of the plague led it to move to Florence, where intensive discussion culminated in a decree of union, signed on July 5 by Latin and Greek participants, including the emperor.

This act of union represented an agreement based on political necessity, which was accepted by the higher Greek clergy. It did not take into account the hatred of the Latins by the Byzantine population and the regular clergy, who would unite successfully to prevent its implementation. Nevertheless, Eugeniuss could point to a very solid achievement, one which tipped the scales decisively in his favor in his struggle with the conciliariest. Thereafter Eugeniuss steadily re-established papal authority. He could claim the overwhelming acceptance of union by the Byzantine hierarchy, supported by the patriarchs of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem, as well as envoys of Alexius IV Comnenus, the emperor of Trebizond, the Georgians, Ruthenians, and Wallachians. John left Florence on August 26 and sailed from Venice on October 19, arriving home on February 1, 1440, only to learn of his wife’s death and to face strong opposition to union.

In January 1439, well before the formal consummation of union, John VIII had had Isidore of Kiev open negotiations for aid from the papacy and the western rulers. Eugeniuss had responded with a delegation of three cardinals, who promised that the pope would provide the Greeks with transport and with three hundred soldiers and two ships as a permanent garrison for Constantinople. If the city were attacked, Eugeniuss would send ten ships for a year or twenty for six months, and if an army were needed the pope would attempt to have the European rulers send contingents to form a united army. John agreed to these proposals and requested that this agreement be placed in writing and sealed, and that arrangements be made with banks in Venice,
Genoa, and Florence for its fulfillment. All parties to these negotiations realized that if Constantinople were to be adequately defended, both a land army and a naval squadron acting in unison would be needed.

Any land offensive against the Ottomans would have to cross the Balkans, presumably starting from a base in Hungary, which was part of emperor Sigismund's domains. Sigismund of Luxemburg had acquired a claim to the Hungarian crown in 1385 by his marriage to Maria, daughter of king Louis the Great of Poland and Hungary, and in 1387 had been recognized as king by the Hungarian estates. He had added the title "king of the Romans" in 1410 and that of Bohemia in 1419, though the latter was not accepted by the Czechs until 1436, after a series of unsuccessful crusades against the Hussites. He was finally crowned emperor in 1433. After Maria's death he had married Barbara of Cilly, who in 1410 bore him a daughter, Elizabeth, the heiress to his kingdoms. In 1411 he obtained from the Hungarian estates the promise that they would recognize the right of Elizabeth to the throne and elect a man to rule with her, a stipulation that was to be important during the events of 1439–1440. Elizabeth married Albert V of Hapsburg, duke of Austria, in 1422, and in 1434 the estates agreed to Sigismund's proposal that Albert should succeed him, though insisting on a formal election at the time of his accession.

By late autumn 1437 Sigismund was in Prague, sick, and realized he was dying. He sent a message to Elizabeth and Albert to meet him at Znojmo in Bohemia, where he planned to hold a meeting of the Bohemian magnates and elicit from them recognition of the couple's rights to the throne. He reached the city on November 21, gravely ill, and obtained the promises he sought, although a formal election would still be necessary. He died on December 9 and was buried in Grosswardein (Nagyvárad) in Hungary. At his death the imperial throne and

8. Georg Hofmann, ed., Epistolae pontificiae ad Concilium Florentinum spectantes, 3 parts (Rome, 1940–1946), II, 67, in Concilium Florentinum, Documenta et scriptores. On June 5 Eugenius indicated to John that loans of 10,000 florins had been negotiated from Florence and Venice. On September 23 Eugenius wrote to John VIII mentioning the promises that had been made; cf. ibid., II, 113–115 and 117–120, where the pope wrote to the Council of Basel, on October 7, outlining his plans for a crusading army supported by a fleet.

9. The original agreements are lost, and we are dependent for our information on a letter written by Elizabeth during the civil war to Frederick III, published in Adam F. Kollarius (Kollâr), ed., Analecta monumentorum omnis aevi Vindobonensis, I (Vienna, 1761), 915 ff. The 1434 agreement is also mentioned in a letter from Gaspar Schlick to Frederick III, in Deutsche Reichstagsakte, IX, 421. For the arrangements at Sigismund's death see W. Ebstein, "Die letzte Krankheit des Kaisers Sigismunds," Mitteilungen der Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung, XX (1906), 678–682.
those of Hungary and Bohemia fell vacant. The papacy now sought to encourage and support the claims of Albert to Sigismund’s possessions in the hope that Hungary, Bohemia, Germany, and Austria would be united, and thereby more effectively oppose Ottoman expansion.

After the burial Albert and Elizabeth went from Grosswardein to Bratislava to meet with the Hungarian estates, which made Albert promise to devote his energy to Hungary and not to accept the German crown without their express permission. He was to reside in Hungary and to keep the border between Austria and Hungary unchanged, lest Hungary become absorbed into the empire. In mid-December 1437 Albert and Elizabeth accepted these conditions and were elected king and queen of Hungary; they were crowned on January 1, 1438. On March 18 Albert was unanimously elected “king of the Romans”, and with Hungarian approval he accepted the German throne on April 29. As for Bohemia, the estates were divided between adherents of Albert and of Casimir, the thirteen-year-old brother of king Vladislav III (Władysław) of Poland. Albert was elected king by a majority of the diet on December 27, 1437, but the Utraquists—the radical Hussites led by archbishop John Rokycana—held a rump election in March 1438 and elected Casimir king.

Albert accepted this throne in Vienna on April 16; then on April 20 the Polish estates accepted the throne for Casimir and opened hostilities by sending two armies into Bohemia in support of his claims. At this time the most powerful person at the Polish court was the bishop of Cracow, Zbigniew Oleśnicki, a devoted conciliarist who worked to have the abuses of the church corrected by the council. He sought the union of Poland and Hungary, under Polish hegemony, but opposed Casimir’s acceptance of the Bohemian throne from the Hussite “heretics”. Albert was crowned in Prague on June 29, and on August 12 defeated the Polish invaders at Kutná Hora. A Polish army of possibly twelve thousand men under Vladislav then invaded Silesia, but was thrown back by the Hungarians under Stephen Rozgonyi, who in October stopped another Polish army which had advanced to within one mile of Breslau. Although the Polish estates led by Oleśnicki urged Vladislav to make peace, his Polish army again invaded Silesia in the early summer of 1439 while the Ottomans were attacking Transylvania and Serbia, convincing Albert and the Germans that the Poles and Turks had formed an unholy alliance. Finally a truce was arranged under papal auspices, since the Ottoman threat had now assumed serious proportions.10

10. See Janssen, Frankfurts Reichs correspondenz, I, 465, for Vladislav’s appeal for recog-
In the summer of 1438, as the Council of Florence debated theology and Albert was occupied in Bohemia, Murad II crossed into Europe with a large army, intent on subjugating Transylvania. He compelled Vlad II Dracul, the voivode of Wallachia (d. 1446) and a vassal of Hungary, to accompany him with his army. Although unsuccessful in attempts to take Hermannstadt (Sibiu) and Kronstadt (Brashov), the Turks burned and pillaged for over six weeks, and captured, by unreliable contemporary estimates, between seventy and eighty thousand prisoners. Fearing that the sultan planned to attack Serbia and Hungary, Albert invested John Hunyadi with the banat of Szőreny and the responsibility for defending the border.

Murad then demanded that George Brankovich, despot of Serbia, surrender to him the city of Smederevo, on the Danube east of Belgrade. Brankovich fortified the city but then, realizing that it could not withstand a siege, fled to Ragusa and on to Hungary, leaving his son Gregory to defend the city. At the end of May 1439 Murad invaded Serbia, besieged Smederevo, and sent raiding parties to devastate the territory between the Danube and Temesvár. Albert summoned the royal army and the Hungarian nobles to join him at Szegedin, which he reached on July 29, finding there only twenty-five thousand men. Defections and dysentery reduced their number to six thousand, too few to relieve Smederevo, which Gregory surrendered to Murad on August 29. The sultan decided on a permanent extension of the empire, establishing Bosnia and Albania as Ottoman provinces under a governor at Skoplje.

Albert withdrew to Buda and traveled toward Vienna, fatally ill with...
dysentery. After writing a will to safeguard the heritage of the child Elizabeth was expecting, he died at Neszméty on October 27, 1439, at the age of forty-two. His preoccupation with securing the crowns of three kingdoms had permitted the Turks to expand their Balkan conquests at the expense of Hungary, and had thwarted Eugenius’s hopes for a crusade. The struggles over the succession to the Hungarian throne were to delay the crusade for another five years, and diverted the energies of the papacy to involvement in Hungarian and Polish affairs.

Elizabeth sought to have herself proclaimed regent in Austria and Hungary, but she realized that Bohemia would not accept her nor her future child. On February 22, 1440, she gave birth at Bratislava to a son, Ladislav (V) “Posthumus”. After Albert’s death the Hungarians had invoked the agreement of 1411 and opened negotiations in Cracow for Elizabeth’s marriage to the sixteen-year-old Vladislav III of Poland, which remained stalled during her pregnancy. Then, on March 8, these negotiations culminated in a treaty recognizing Vladislav as king Ladislav (László) IV of Hungary, but the thirty-six-year-old Elizabeth refused to accept him as husband or king, and appealed for recognition of her son Ladislas, whom she placed under the guardianship of duke Frederick III of Hapsburg, Albert’s successor as king of the Romans (1440–1452, emperor 1452–1493). Both Ladislas and Vladislav were crowned by the rival Hungarian factions, which were respectively supported by the Austrian and Polish armies. As Elizabeth and Vladislav opened hostilities, Murad II besieged Belgrade, the key fortress protecting Hungary. Under the command of Janós Thallóczy the garrison defended the fortress for six months, during which the Turks reportedly lost thirty thousand men.

For two years the civil war continued indecisively, with actual warfare limited to occasional skirmishing as each army devastated the lands of its adversaries. Elizabeth steadily lost ground, as her support in Hungary was eroded by the open illegality of her actions and the destructiveness of her German troops and Bohemian mercenaries, while Vladislav and Oleśnicki won her adherents over with acts of leniency and grants of clemency. In the spring of 1441 Eugenius attempted

13. Elizabeth was supported by the voivode Desiderius Losonczy and by the Székler counts Michael Kusoli, Francis Csáky, and Stephen Rozgonyi; cf. István Katona, Historia critica.... regum Hungariae: Stirpis mixtæ, XII (Pest, 1791), 924.
15. Katona, op. cit., XIII, 150, and Długosz, Historia polonica, XII, col. 759. Elizabeth sold
unsuccessfully to negotiate a truce; on February 12, 1442, with the civil war at its height, he appointed cardinal Julian Cesarini legate to Hungary with a twofold commission: to establish peace and to organize the crusade against the Turks, under the leadership of Vladislaw.\textsuperscript{16}

After an effort to enlist Venetian support for the planned crusade, and an unsuccessful attempt to meet Frederick III in Vienna, Cesarini joined Vladislaw at Buda on May 27, and with Oleśnicki away at Cracow soon became the principal adviser of the young and highly impressionable king.\textsuperscript{17} By August he had arranged a ten-month truce and a meeting between the two monarchs to enter into a permanent peace. On November 24 Vladislaw and Elizabeth met at Győr, where they negotiated for three weeks under Cesarini’s auspices; on December 16 they signed a treaty of peace. Suddenly, on December 24, 1442, Elizabeth died; her supporters claimed she had been poisoned on Vladislaw’s orders.\textsuperscript{18} Cesarini sought to have the treaty accepted by Frederick, who was carrying on the war in the name of Ladislas, but not until May 1444 did Frederick confirm it, under pressure from Eugenius. Only then was Vladislaw free to turn his full attention to the Ottoman threat.

Following his unsuccessful attempt on Belgrade in 1440, Murad had taken Novo Brdo with its valuable silver mines in 1441, while Turkish raiding parties plundered as far as Belgrade before being defeated by Hunyadi, who pursued them to Smederevo.\textsuperscript{19} In 1442 Murad sent Mezid Beg into Transylvania with a large army, which plundered and burned as far as Hermannstadt (Sibiu) and then moved northwestward. On March 18 they defeated Hunyadi near Alba Julia (Weissenburg), killing its bishop George Lepès, but a week later Hunyadi and Nicholas of Ujlak (called Ujláki) decisively defeated them at Szent Imre, killing the royal jewels to pay her mercenaries, who plundered everywhere. Kollár, Anecdotae, II, 832, indicates that on August 3 she pawned the “house crown” for 2,500 florins. By December she had borrowed 2,000 guldens against her Austrian estates, and by 1442 she had sold Oldenburg to Frederick for 8,000 florins; cf. József Teleki, Hunyadiak kora magyarországon (12 vols., Pest, 1852–1894), X, 112–113, and Ignaz A. Fessler, Geschichte von Ungarn, ed. Ernst Klein (Leipzig, 1869), 463 ff.

\textsuperscript{16} Hofmann, Epistolae, III, 92–93.
\textsuperscript{17} See Mols, “Julien Cesarini,” loc. cit., and the funeral oration of Poggio, which is factual but undistinguished, in Mai, loc. cit. See Cieszkowski, op. cit., pp. 61–62, for the response of the Venetian senate to Cesarini. For the truce see Elizabeth’s letter of August 14 to Nicholas Ban and Stephen Báthori from Bratislava (Pressburg).
\textsuperscript{18} Cf. Jacob Caro, Geschichte Polens, IV (Gotha, 1875), p. 331, in Geschichte der europäischen Staaten, and Ladislaus von Szalay, Geschichte Ungarns, III (Budapest, 1875), 51, for a discussion of the allegations.
\textsuperscript{19} Werner, op. cit., p. 227, and Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire, p. 20. See Wilhelm Schmidt, Die Stammung der Hunyadis in Siebenbürgen . . . (Hermannstadt, 1865). At Vladislav’s accession Hunyadi was count of Temesvár; he was named voivode of Transylvania by Vladislav (1440–1456).
Mezid Beg. Later in 1442 Hunyadi defeated two other Ottoman armies which had been devastating Wallachia. On January 8, 1443, Cesarini wrote to Venice announcing the treaty signed by Vladislav and Elizabeth, the latter’s death, and Hunyadi’s third victory on December 7.

The legate and the Venetians had been planning, throughout the fall of 1442, a crusade consisting of a land army setting out from Hungary supported by a fleet stationed in the Dardanelles. The fleet’s objectives were to cut communications between Anatolia and Europe, protect Constantinople, and join with the crusaders to capture the Turkish fortresses on the Danube while the main Ottoman forces were kept in Anatolia. In the reign of Murad II his European fortresses and cities were normally garrisoned sufficiently to defend the area; however, the sultan’s army was kept in Anatolia during the winter months, coming to Europe only for a specific campaign. Thus a crusading army stood a good chance of overwhelming the Turkish garrisons if a naval blockade was established in the Dardanelles, since the Ottomans did not possess a navy to oppose a fleet. Constantinople could always be supplied by sea during a siege and communications with the west kept open. On September 15 the Ragusans offered, in a letter to Cesarini, to arm one galley to join a fleet in support of a land army for the duration of the campaign; they estimated that a fleet of twenty-eight ships would be required to blockade the Dardanelles effectively.

On January 1, 1443, with the civil war ended, Eugenius issued a bull levying a tenth on the entire church in order to raise funds for arming a fleet. On January 2 the Venetian senate wrote to duke Philip III of Burgundy (1419–1467) requesting aid for the crusade, and on Janu-
ary 9 Eugenius requested ten galleys from Venice, to be armed at papal expense and sent to the Dardanelles. On April 3 the senate wrote Eugenius, confirming their offer to provide the ten galleys if the pope would pay to have them armed. On May 8 Eugenius appointed his nephew, cardinal Francis Condulmer, legate and captain-general of the papal fleet. On June 14 Eugenius and Alfonso of Aragon and Naples concluded peace and an agreement whereby Alfonso was to send six galleys to the Dardanelles for six months; they were, however, never sent. By July both the pope and the senate realized that preparations for a crusade could not be completed in 1443, and on December 17 Eugenius wrote to Ragusa that he hoped to have a fleet in the Dardanelles by the following summer.

In addition to the pope and Venice, duke Philip of Burgundy supported the crusade. Since the crusade of Nicopolis in 1396, when Philip’s father John the Fearless was taken prisoner, the idea of a military expedition against the Turks had been a recurrent theme of Burgundian eastern policy. In 1421 Philip and the duke of Bedford, John of Lancaster, had sent Gilbert of Lannoy to the east, and in 1432 Philip had dispatched Bertrand de la Broquière to Palestine, Syria, and Anatolia to report on the military situation. In 1439 John VIII sent his chamberlain John Torcello to the duke with a plan for a war against Murad and the deliverance of the Holy Land.

Philip was also supporting the Knights Hospitaller in defense of Rhodes against the Mamluks of Egypt. In 1440 Murad signed a treaty with the Mamluks aimed at Rhodes. The lack of a navy had prevented the Ottomans from attacking the knights, who could not be placed on the defensive by Egyptian warships. Early that year sultan Jakmak az-Zahir (1438–1453) sent a fleet of nineteen galleys against Castellorizzo, an island belonging to the Hospitallers off the coast of southwestern Anatolia. The knights dispatched eight galleys and four smaller ships, and forced the Mamluks to retire. On September 25, 1440, an Egyptian fleet appeared off Rhodes, but soon retired to Cyprus, and

26. Iorga, *Notes et extraits*, III, 121–122. Leonard Venier was a Venetian ambassador at the papal court. The previous October 30 the senate had learned of Hmaydī’s victories from Vladislav; see ibid., III, 105–106. News of the last victory was circulated throughout western Europe: Huber, “Die Kriege,” pp. 159–207.


28. Iorga, *Notes et extraits*, III, 128–129. On May 20, 1445, the Venetians wrote to Condulmer stressing the importance of having a fleet in the Dardanelles to support the crusading army; see ibid., III, 126–127, and III, 134, for Leonard Venier’s letter of July 6 concerning sending a fleet the following year.

then to Egypt. The knights prepared to repel a second expected attack and appealed to the duke of Burgundy, who sent three ships under Geoffrey of Thoisy. This squadron sailed from Sluys to Bruges, then to Lisbon, where Geoffrey inspected some ships the duke was having built there, then into the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Little fighting occurred, and the squadron returned to Villefranche in mid-1442, Geoffrey having gained some knowledge of the eastern Mediterranean.

Meanwhile, the Byzantine envoy Theodore Caristinus again visited the duke at Chalon-sur-Saône early in 1443 and appealed to him to send warships in support of the planned crusade. Philip responded by sending an emissary to Venice to request four galleys, which he would pay to have armed. He informed Caristinus of this decision and offered to send in addition the three galleys and one galiot that were being built at Villefranche and two of the ships that had been sent to Rhodes, making a total of ten ships to form the Burgundian squadron. Thus by the spring of 1443 diplomatic efforts had resulted in commitments for a fleet of twenty-one ships, including one from the Ragusans, seven less than the Ragusan government deemed necessary to establish an effective blockade of the Dardanelles.

As preparations for the fleet progressed, Cesarini sought to have the army mobilized. In early January 1443 and again on April 9 he addressed the estates in Buda, urging them to undertake an expedition against the Turks, who had been defeated by Hunyadi in 1442, and informing them of the tithe levied by the pope to support a fleet. At first the estates declined to take action, postponing a decision until their next meeting in June. During that meeting letters arrived from Ragusa and from Hunyadi in Belgrade, informing the Hungarians that sultan Murad II had crossed to Anatolia, handed over the government to his young son Mehmed (II), and retired to Bursa. Hunyadi advised them that the Rumelian fortresses were lightly garrisoned and that an

30. Ettore Rossi, Storia della marina dell' ordine di San Giovanni di Gerusalemme, di Rodi e di Malta (Rome, 1926), p. 19. Thoisy, whose appointment is dated March 25, 1441, had accompanied Lannoy to the Levant; he was a Knight Hospitaller and governor of the ducal galleys.


32. This number is based on the estimate made by the Ragusans in a letter to Eugenius dated February 10, 1444, found in Bariśa Krekić, Dubrovnik (Ragusa) et le Levant au moyen âge (Paris and The Hague, 1961), p. 336, and Gelich and Thallóczy, pp. 451–454. The diplomatic efforts of that spring were intense indeed. Theodore Caristinus had visited the duke of Burgundy, while Eugenius had effectively put together an alliance of Venice, the papacy, Burgundy, and Ragusa. Even Alfonso of Aragon had joined. See Marinescu, "Notes sur quelques ambassadeurs byzantins," Annaire de l’Institut de philologie et d’histoire orientales et slaves, X (1950), 421.
army of thirty thousand could drive the Turks out of Europe.\textsuperscript{33} These reports led the estates to vote a subsidy and support for a crusade.

The sources for the first “long expedition” are sparse. We have a letter from Hunyadi to Ujláki, Vladislaw’s report to the doge of Venice, a poem by Michael Beheim, and the chronicles of Callimachus, Długosz, and Chalcocondylas.

Vladislaw issued a royal summons to his vassals, and Cesarini and Brankovich left Buda with the royal army on July 22, 1443. Długosz reports that the king spent the rest of the summer arming his men, obtaining horses, and awaiting the contingents he had summoned from Poland and Wallachia.\textsuperscript{34} Estimates of the size of the army range from Beheim’s of fourteen thousand to Długosz’s of twenty-five thousand (which is too large), with about six hundred supply wagons. The army moved southeast, probably passing through Szegedin, crossing the Danube at Petrovaradin (Peterwardein), and sometime in October arriving at Belgrade, where they joined forces with Hunyadi, designated by Vladislaw as “capitaneus exercitus generalis”. From Belgrade the army proceeded southeast to the Turkish stronghold of Kraguyevats, which they captured and burned. Thence the army continued southeast along the Morava river to Aleksinats, where news reached them of the approach of a Turkish force. Vladislaw and Cesarini decided to encamp while the two voivodes, John Hunyadi and Ujláki, reconnoitered with a force of twelve thousand men.

The voivodes reached Nish, which was held by a small Turkish garrison, and took the city, which they plundered and burned. They learned that three Turkish armies were converging on Nish to meet and march against the crusaders, but succeeded in defeating all three before they could link up. On November 3 word was brought that yet another Turkish force, combined with the remnants of the defeated armies, was advancing past Hunyadi’s left flank toward the royal camp. Hunyadi returned to Nish, where he defeated this fourth attack,\textsuperscript{35} capturing Murad’s chancellor and many Ottoman officers. Hunyadi, it is

\textsuperscript{33} Chmel, Materialien zur österreichischen Geschichte aus Archiven und Bibliotheken (Vienna, 1837), I-2, 114 ff.

\textsuperscript{34} Długosz, Historia polonica, XII, col. 755, “... plures gentes ex regno Poloniae et terris Wallachiae.” See the poem of Michael Beheim in Thomas von Karajan, ed., Quellen und Forschungen zur vaterländischen Geschichte, Literatur und Kunst (Vienna, 1849), pp. 35–36, and Ducas, ed. Bekker, p. 217, for estimates on the number of troops.

\textsuperscript{35} Kupelwieser, Die Kämpfe, pp. 69 ff. Hunyadi wrote of his exploits to Ujláki on November 8 when he had returned to the royal camp; see Katona, op. cit., XIII, 251–254. He states that he had twelve thousand men, had captured Nish, and had defeated the force under Isa Beg,
said, took four thousand prisoners and brought the king nine Ottoman banners as trophies. Vladislav wrote to Venice of victories over Ottoman armies numbering thirty thousand men. We are not sure of the precise dates, but Aeneas Sylvius states that these battles all took place by November 3, 1443.36

Hunyadi returned to camp sometime before November 9, when he wrote to Ujláki. The army now marched southeast from Nish past Bela Palanka and Pirot to Sofia, which they reached in late November or early December. They stormed the city, which they sacked, plundering and burning everything.37

Then the crusaders advanced toward the Maritsa river, through the pass of Trajan’s Door, planning to attack Philippopolis (Plovdiv) and then march down river to the Turkish administrative headquarters in Rumelia at Adrianople (Edirne). Murad, who had resumed the throne and crossed the Straits with a large army, had his troops block the key pass, through which the old Roman road ran to Adrianople. The Hungarians swung east toward the Zlatitsa pass into the Topolnitsa valley, but this pass was blocked by trees and ice and defended by an army under Murad’s son-in-law Khalil Pasha, beglerbeg of Anatolia.38 The Hungarians attempted unsuccessfully to force the pass, and were halted for three days at the castle of Sladagara. The sources agree that the main battle took place on December 24, 1443, lasting all day and into the night. The crusaders used artillery in an attempt to dislodge the Turks, who threw trees, boulders, and ice into the pass and showered arrows down on them. From subsequent negotiations we know that the sultan’s son-in-law was taken prisoner.39 Unable to advance farther in winter, short of food and supplies, the crusaders decided to return to Hungary and attempt another expedition in the spring.

As the crusaders returned to Hungary the sultan sent Kasim Pasha at the head of Rumelian cavalry and Anatolian troops to attack the

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36. Information on these battles is given by Aeneas Sylvius in a letter dated January 15, 1444 (in Wolkan, Der Briefwechsel, LXI-2, p. 281). In a letter to bishop Leonard Laiming of Passau, dated October 28, 1445, ibid., pp. 562–579, he states that thirty thousand Turks were killed.
39. Dfugoza, Historia polonica, XII, cols. 77f ff., gives an account of this battle. Aeneas Sylvius describes the battle in his letter of October 28, 1445, saying that Hunyadi and his men tried to force the pass. Chalcocondylas, ed. Bekker, p. 413, states that the Hungarians could not get through the pass and were forced to turn back because of a lack of supplies; cf. Ducas, ed. Bekker, p. 219.
crusader army, which they followed over the Iskar and the Nishava, joining battle at the Kunovitsa pass. Brankovich was guarding the rear, which the Turks attacked. Hunyadi and Vladislav, who were already through the pass, left the wagons guarded by infantry and joined the battle near the river on the eastern side of the pass. The engagement ended in a complete victory for the crusaders. The battle, the last of the “long expedition”, took place on January 5, 1444, under a full moon.  

40 Short of supplies and horses, the crusaders burned much of their baggage and wagons before returning to Belgrade, where Hunyadi and his men remained for the winter. He refused Brankovich’s request to winter in Serbia and help him reconquer it. Vladislav and Cesarini returned to Buda, where they arrived in February and were greeted as conquering heroes. A service of thanksgiving was held in the cathedral, where a “Te Deum” was sung and the captured Turkish weapons were displayed. The victories were announced to the European princes, long accustomed to hearing only of Christian defeats at the hands of the Turks.

One result of the victorious campaign of 1443 was the successful revolt of the Albanians under George Castriota, known as Scanderbeg (d. 1468). Castriota had been sent from Albania as a hostage to the sultan’s court and trained at the military academy of Enderum in Adrianople, where his accomplishments earned him the title of beg (tacked onto his Turkish name of Iskander as Scanderbeg). He was co-commander of one of the armies defeated by Hunyadi near Nish. After the battle he fled to Albania, where he gathered forces and captured Croia from the Turks. By the summer of 1444 he was leading a revolt against the Turks with the aid of the Venetians and Alfonso V of Aragon, king of Naples. Some historians have claimed that Scanderbeg formed an alliance with Vladislav, but this has been proved false through letters included by Aeneas Sylvius in his work describing the events of Kossovo in 1448 (which Marinus Barletius, who first printed them, confused with Varna in 1444).  

41 Scanderbeg was in no position at the time of the second campaign to create any sort of diversion in support of the crusade.

Letters of congratulations and embassies arrived in Buda during the next few months praising the victories and urging the king to undertake another expedition in the spring.  

42 The victories had demonstrated


42. Cesarini wrote to the Venetians about the victories, and on January 15, 1444, the senate decided to send a secretary to Buda to offer the republic’s congratulations; see Iorga, Notes et
that Turkish arms were not invincible. The sultan had, however, been able to halt the crusaders by crossing into Rumelia with his army. It was now clear that any future success against the Turks would depend on preventing the Ottoman forces from crossing the Dardanelles, which could be accomplished only by a naval blockade. Without a navy the Ottomans were powerless to challenge such a blockade.

Now work on the galleys was accelerated, with the objective of having a fleet in Levantine waters for the 1444 campaigning season. The victories of the so-called “long expedition” of 1443 resulted in an upsurge of diplomatic efforts to gain military support. On February 8 Ragusa offered to arm two galleys to join the combined fleet, and on the tenth in a letter to Eugenius urged the pope to hasten the arming of his galleys so that they would be stationed in the Dardanelles by summer, when the crusaders were in the field, since this was the only way to halt the transfer of Turkish reinforcements from Anatolia. They also advised Eugenius to urge Vladislav to have his army in the field by the time the fleet would be ready.

On March 3 the Venetian senate learned that Cesarini and Vladislav had returned to Buda. They appointed John de’ Reguardati emissary on March 6, instructing him to proceed there with all possible speed; even his route was specified. He was to assure Cesarini that the senate had done all in its power to have the papal galleys armed, and had already prepared the hulls and levied the tithe in its territories. He was to encourage the Hungarians to undertake a second expedition; he was to keep Venice’s allies informed of progress on the galleys and to report back to Venice on preparations undertaken in Hungary; and he was to negotiate for the territories requested by Venice when victory was attained.

On March 13 the senate decided to have ten galleys chosen in the

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extraiti, III, 145–147. On March 25, 1444, Alfonso of Naples sent a letter of congratulations based on information he had received from Ragusa; see Gelcich and Thallóczi, Diplomatarius, pp. 363–364.

43. Iorga, Notes et extraits, III, 156–157. On January 15, 1444, the senate sent an emissary to Buda and voted to permit the collection of the tithe in Venetian territory. On February 2 they urged Conulmer to arm those galleys for which he had funds; see ibid., III, 149–150. Meanwhile the Ragusans wrote to Eugenius on February 18, offering to arm two galleys which would join the allied fleet, and urging the pope to complete the arming of his galleys.

44. Krekić, Dubrovnik, p. 336; Gelcich and Thallóczi, Diplomatarius, 451–454. The Ragusans acknowledged the pope’s letters of November 9, December 13 and 17, in which he solicited support and named Christopher Garatoni as legate.

45. Sime Ljubić, ed., Listine o odnosnjih izmedju južnoga slavenstva i mletaške republike, III, in Monumenta spectantia historiam slavorum meridionallium, IX (Zagreb, 1878), 183–186, for the appointment of John de’ Reguardati. On March 26 Reguardati was further empowered to present his credentials to Brankovich: ibid., 186–187.
arsenal, armed, and dispatched as quickly as possible, even though funds from the pope had not arrived; Condulmer was authorized to select the commanders for these papal galleys, subject to the senate’s approval. On March 21 the Venetians voted to permit Condulmer to spend the twelve hundred ducats collected in Venice on arming the papal galleys. The senate had also ordered the preparation of four galleys for the duke of Burgundy, informing him on March 21 that his envoys had found them ready, and that the ten unarmed galleys were ready for the pope. The senate and the duke were concerned about Eugenius’s preparations, and they responded to his inquiries of February 10. With Condulmer in Venice, the senate expressed the hope that their arming would soon begin. The senate knew nothing certain about efforts by any other Italian cities, but claimed that these fourteen galleys would suffice to guard the Dardanelles. Venice would not promise to send Venetian ships for a predetermined time, although the republic was prepared to offer some of the galleys at sea near Gallipoli. On April 20 duke Philip appointed Walther of Wavrin captain-general of the “auxiliary army” (i.e., the Burgundian squadron) being sent to Constantinople, and instructed him to go to Venice to oversee the work on the galleys requested by him. Sometime after April 20 he left Bruges with thirty-one Burgundian emissaries with money for sixty days for the trip from Bruges to Venice.

On May 12 the senate wrote to Reguardati in Buda that the papal galleys would sail from Venice in a few days, to be joined in the Levant by Venetian ships. They reported that the Burgundian envoy, Wavrin, had arrived in Venice to oversee the arming of the four ducal galleys and had informed the senate that Philip the Good was having an additional three galleys and one galiot refurbished at Nice (more accurately, at Villefranche), to be joined by another warship. The senate instructed Reguardati to urge Vladislav to start the expedition soon, since the time was favorable and the galleys were being completed; however, they could accomplish nothing without the land army that they were meant to support. On the same day the Venetians responded to Cesarini’s letters of April 25 and 28 informing them of Vladislav’s firm intention to undertake a second expedition in the summer. The senate reported to Cesarini on the imminent departure of the papal, Venetian, and Burgundian galleys.

47. Cieszkowski, op. cit., 1–3, 85–89.
Thus, throughout the spring of 1444 the Venetians were encouraging the Hungarians to begin a second offensive, pressing the arming of the papal galleys, and overseeing the departure of their own ships. After the encouraging news from Hungary the Venetians decided to commit their own galleys, thus engaging the sultan in a full-scale war. They realized that any delay in the departure of the fleet would be disastrous, and so ordered the galleys to sail no later than May 21 under penalty of heavy fine to the patrons, while protesting vigorously to Condulmer the lack of payment for the arming of the papal galleys.  

On June 4 and 5 the legate informed the senate that the papal galleys were armed, and that some had sailed and others were ready to sail, while two galleys were still awaiting the remainder of their rigging. On June 17 the doge wrote to the duke of Crete, Thomas Duodo, instructing him to use the tenth collected there to purchase biscuit and bread for the fleet. By June 17 the Venetian galleys were prepared to sail, and the senate instructed their captain, Alvise Loredan, that both he and Wavrin, as commander of the Venetian and Burgundian galleys, would be under Condulmer’s command. The republic, however, wanted to avoid war with the Mamluks, which would endanger their Levantine possessions, so Loredan was not to attack Mamluk ships at sea; the fleet had been armed for war only against the Turks. Loredan was not to allow the galleys to touch at Rhodes although Condulmer would probably request them to do so. The galleys were not to attack Mamluk ships encountered in the Dardanelles supporting the Ottomans, nor were the Burgundian galleys to be allowed to go to Rhodes, as had been agreed to by duke Philip.  

We know from a letter of the senate to Cesarini dated July 4 that Condulmer sailed from Venice on June 22 with seven papal galleys and eight Venetian galleys; the Burgundian galleys were to leave in two or three days. The senate agreed to Cesarini’s request to send eight or more galleys from those that were to be stationed in the Dardanelles up the Danube to Nicopolis to support the crossing of the crusaders.  

50. Iorga, Notes et extraits, III, 169–170. On May 25 the senate accused the pope of delaying work on the galleys. The Venetians reminded Condulmer of their efforts, and remarked that the galleys should fly the banner of St. Mark since they were armed with Venetian money.  
51. Iorga, Notes et extraits, III, 172–173, and Thiriet, Régestes, III, 112. The fleet was expected in Ragusa by early July, and preparations were under way there for its reception; see Krekić, Dubrovnit, p. 339.  
52. Iorga, Notes et extraits, III, 173–174, and Thiriet, Régestes, III, 114. The senate threatened the patrons with death if they disobeyed these orders.  
53. Iorga, Notes et extraits, III, 175–176. This plan was discussed in Venice before the fleet sailed and had there received Wavrin’s support. This letter was addressed to Condulmer, who was at Pola.
Venetians again wrote to Reguardati instructing him how to proceed in the negotiations concerning those territories requested by Venice, which included Gallipoli and Thessalonica. The Byzantine envoy, who had denigrated Venice's contributions, was to be reminded that the republic had spent thirty thousand ducats for the papal fleet in addition to six to eight galleys sent under the banner of St. Mark.  

By July 5 the two Ragusan galleys had been outfitted and were ordered to sail the next day. The great council gave instructions that the funds collected from the clergy of Ragusa were to be given to Condulmer to be used for provisioning the galleys en route. With victory in the air the Ragusans now put in their bid for territories they wanted.  

Wavrin left Venice on July 6 with one galley; on July 7 the senate ordered two other Burgundian galleys to sail during the night, while the last was to leave at noon on the eighth.  

The Burgundians had promised the Byzantine ambassador to send four additional ships, and early in 1443 the duke had appointed Geoffrey of Thoisy and Regnauld de Confide, a Knight Hospitaller, captains of the three galleys and one galiot that were at Villefranche. They were to oversee the arming and repair of these ships and sail to the Adriatic to join Wavrin, under whose command they were to proceed to the Dardanelles. At the same time the duke chose Alfonso de Oliveria, a gentleman of the household of the Portuguese-born duchess Isabella, to oversee the arming of the two additional ships at Villefranche. In the summer of 1444 rumors were in the air of a planned Mamluk attack on Rhodes. The grand master, John of Lastic, appealed to Eugenius, who had the cardinal “of Thérouanne”, Jean le Jeune (Johannes Juvenis), write to Wavrin at Venice requesting him to go to Rhodes to aid the knights and then to proceed to the Dardanelles. This the Venetians forbade, instructing Loredan not to touch at Rhodes. Wavrin communicated this to the cardinal of Thérouanne, who wrote to Geoffrey and Regnauld directing them to sail directly to Rhodes. They left.
Villefranche in July and sailed along the coast of North Africa to Lampedusa, where news reached them that a Mamluk fleet had attacked Rhodes. The Burgundians sailed to the island, where they engaged the Egyptian fleet and then joined the knights in a successful defense of the city, after which they sailed on September 28 to join Wavrin at Constantinople.58

By July 17 the two Ragusan galleys had joined the papal-Venetian galleys at Modon in the southern Morea, and on August 19 the Ragusan government instructed its captain to remain with the fleet for six months.59 By late August the fleet had reached the Dardanelles, as the Ragusan reported to their ambassador at the Bosnian court on August 20, informing him that the galleys would be at Gallipoli by the end of the month. From the information reaching them the Ragusans thought that more than twenty-five galleys would be in the Dardanelles by early September, and this was an accurate estimate: ten papal galleys, eight Venetian, two Ragusan, four Burgundian under Wavrin, four Burgundian ships under Geoffrey of Thoisy, and another two under Oliveria made a total of thirty ships.60 It was a fleet sufficiently large to block the Dardanelles effectively and prevent an Ottoman army from crossing.

In the spring and summer of 1444 peace negotiations were begun between Murad II on the one hand and Vladislav, Hunyadi, and Brankovich on the other. These negotiations caused apprehension among Hungary's allies, and have remained a subject of contention not only among contemporary writers but among historians ever since.61

Although the "long expedition" did not achieve a lasting success, it had reversed the almost uninterrupted series of Ottoman victories.

58. For an account of Geoffrey of Thoisy's activities see Marinescu, "Du Nouveau sur 'Tirant lo Blanch'," pp. 137-205; Iorga, "Les Aventures 'sarrazines'," pp. 9-56. The Mamluks attacked the city of Rhodes on August 10, 1444, and besieged it for forty days. After a decisive battle on September 10 the Mamluks withdrew on September 14. The news of the unsuccessful siege reached Venice on October 14. Jean le Jeune, bishop of Thérouanne (1436-1451), was created a cardinal in 1439 but kept his bishopric.

59. Krekić, Dubrovnik, p. 341. On July 14 the Venetian senate permitted the government of Corfu to open negotiations with the Turks and the inhabitants of Avlona (Valona) and Argyrokastron in order to obtain these places and to offer the Turks pensions if they had already left their castles. The approach of the fleet had caused panic among the Turkish garrisons: Iorga, Notes et extraits, III, 179-180.

60. Krekić, Dubrovnik, p. 341.

61. The significant modern literature on the negotiations at Szegedin includes Halecki, The Crusade of Varna; Dąbrowski, L'Année 1444; Palli, "Cirico d'Ancona e la crociata contro i Turchi"; Angyalfalvi, "Le Traité de paix de Szeged," pp. 374-392; and particularly Palli, "Autour de la croisade de Varna," pp. 144-158, where he convincingly disproves the thesis of Halecki.
In the spring of 1444 Murad was thus under attack from the Hungarians, in Albania, in the Morea, and from Ibrahim Beg in Karaman. While Vladislav and Cesarini were en route back to Buda in January 1444, a Turkish emissary arrived in camp and requested the king to set a date for the reception of an embassy from the sultan. Again in March a Greek monk arrived from Brankovich’s daughter Mara, one of Murad’s wives, repeating the sultan’s offer to restore her father as despot, and to return his sons Gregory and Stephen, who had been blinded. 62 He found these proposals acceptable, since he urged the Hungarian diet to accept peace when it met in Buda in mid-April. Vladislav and Cesarini did not want peace and, on April 25 and 28, the legate wrote to Venice that the king and the barons had sworn to him that they would lead another expedition against the Turks in the summer. 63 The senate accepted this assurance and continued with the preparations for the fleet. Nevertheless, sometime in May and June emissaries did arrive in Adrianople from Vladislav, Brankovich, and Hunyadi, even though the latter was voivode and a vassal of the king. Our sources for these negotiations are the reports of Ciriaco de’ Pizzicolli (1391–1452) of Ancona, an Italian humanist who was present in Adrianople at the sultan’s court in May and June, and who sent reports to his friend Andreolo Giustiniani-Banca of Chios, enclosing copies of important official documents.

Around June 12 Ciriaco wrote to his friend that Vladislav’s Serbian emissary Stojka Gisdanich arrived in Adrianople with Vitslao, representing John Hunyadi; Athanasius Frashak, metropolitan of Semendria (Smederevo), and another unnamed emissary; and Bogdan, Brankovich’s chancellor, escorted by sixty horsemen. Gisdanich’s credentials were dated April 24—nine days after Vladislav had sworn to lead an expedition—and empowered him to conclude a treaty, which was to be sworn to by Murad in the royal emissary’s presence. 64 In his report on these negotiations the papal collector Andreas de Palatio wrote that Hunyadi and Brankovich were carrying on these negotiations without consulting the king. 65 However, the letters of credence prove other-

62. Krekić, Dubrovnik, p. 337. On March 5, 1444, the government of Ragusa placed a boat at the disposal of a monk who is described as a messenger from Mara. He was to be taken to Spalato (Split) and from there to the despot George; the grand council confirmed this decision on March 6.


65. Lewicki, Codex epistolaris, II, 460, and Długosz, Historia polonica, XII, col. 701, who repeats the statement “... tractatum pacis... habuerunt inconsulto rege.”
wise. It is probable that Vladislav regarded the embassy as unimportant, as merely a tactic to induce the sultan to leave Rumelia.

Brankovich requested the release of his sons, the return to him of the conquered towns and fortresses, particularly Golubats on the Danube, and the granting of favorable terms to Vlad Dracul, voivode of Wallachia. Brankovich and Vlad were, however, to remain Turkish vassals. Negotiations stalled on the surrender of Golubats, which with Belgrade guarded the routes that armies invading Hungary would take. On June 12 Murad agreed to all the requests and swore to a ten-year truce, appointing Suleiman Beg and Varnas, a Greek, his emissaries to Vladislav to obtain his oath. On that day Murad wrote to Vladislav informing him of his emissaries' appointment and looking forward to a ten-year peace. Murad wanted peace with the Hungarians so that he could move his army to Anatolia, without concern about an attack on his European provinces. By granting generous terms to Brankovich he deprived the allies of the Serbian army, and ruptured the alliance erected by Cesarini.

Ciriaco wrote to the Hungarians of the threat to Murad in Anatolia, and reported the events to John VIII Palaeologus. The Byzantines had planned to create a diversion by attacking the Turks from the Morea, the attack to be led by the two despots, the emperor's brothers Theodore (now lord of Selymbria) and Constantine Dragases, who was the more powerful in the Morea.

In February 1444 Constantine successfully established his power north of the isthmus of Corinth, crossed the Hexamilion, and reduced Boeotia and Thebes. The Byzantines had been encouraged by the victories of 1443, and were alarmed at the news of a peace treaty, but not seriously enough to halt their attack. Only the Ragusans instructed their ambassador in Buda to secure the city's interests in any peace that was concluded.

The treaty that had been negotiated in Adrianople on June 12 was concluded in the hope of inducing the sultan to cross to Anatolia, thereby assuring the forthcoming crusade a greater chance of success. This was recognized by Ciriaco, who wrote a letter to John Hunyadi that same day from Adrianople, informing him of what had occurred and wishing him success on the forthcoming expedition. Ciriaco had

66. See Halecki, *The Crusade of Varna*, pp. 88–90, for the sultan's letter of June 12, 1444, to Vladislav. The Turks agreed also to return prisoners.
met the Christian envoys, and still looked forward to a crusade. He did not expect the peace to be kept by the allies, and when he reached Constantinople on June 24 he wrote again to Hunyadi more openly than he had been able to from Adrianople. In this letter he spoke of the peace which Murad had had to accept in order to protect Rumelia from attack while he was fighting Ibrahim Beg. Ciriaco reported that the sultan did not believe the peace would last long. Indeed Adrianople’s defenses were being strengthened. As soon as Karaman had been subdued Murad would invade Hungary, and take revenge for the crusaders’ victories. This peace was simply a means by which the sultan could buy time. Again Ciriaco urged the voivode to attack the Turks that year.70

The treaty had meant as little to Vladislav, who, throughout June and July, continued to prepare for the crusade. He wrote to the Florentines and the king of Bosnia, Stephen VI Thomas, reassuring them of his preparations for a second expedition.71 Vladislav had been informed by letters and by the return of his envoy of the agreement concluded at Adrianople, by which he was bound by the letters he had given Gisidanich. He was invited to come to Szegedin on August 1, where he would meet the Turkish envoys and swear to the treaty. Vladislav arrived there sometime in late July, and what occurred there is best described in the most reliable contemporary accounts: the report of the Venetian ambassador Reguardati and Cesaroni’s report to the senate, which was summarized in the instructions it sent to Alvise Loredan on September 9. Reguardati’s report to the senate confirms Cesaroni’s, thereby establishing its accuracy, and both were used by the senate as the basis of the instructions issued to the captain of their fleet. The senate was concerned about the negotiations; Loredan was, nevertheless, instructed to support the crusaders if they should set out. Whatever had occurred the Venetians continued to plan for hostilities against the Turks.72

There has been controversy among modern historians about whether or not Vladislav ratified the treaty of June 12 in Szegedin in late July. Some Polish historians have attempted to prove that he did not ratify it and, therefore, did not perjure himself in the manifesto he issued on August 4. Nevertheless, it has been convincingly demonstrated that Vladislav did just that. He ratified the treaty around July 26, then swore

71. Iorga, II, 404–405, for Vladislav’s letter to Florence on July 2, 1444, and Iorga, II, 407, for the letter of July 24 to the king of Bosnia, in which Vladislav again confirmed his intention to lead the crusade.  
72. Iorga, Notes et extraits, III, 187. The text is in Ljubić, XXI, 871–873.
a few days later to lead a crusade.\textsuperscript{73} Even if Vladislav had not ratified the treaty, this would have broken the promise given in the letter to his emissary Gisdanich of April 24, and thus, one way or another, this emotional young king had perjured himself. Other contemporary sources charged that the king had indeed perjured himself, and these sources had unusually good access to persons close to the events.\textsuperscript{74}

On August 4 Vladislav issued a manifesto in which he renewed his oath to lead a crusade, naming September 1 as the date on which this crusade would start out. It mentions the closed and sworn treaty and the arrival of the Turkish emissaries who sought his oath. Throughout the events of the spring and summer the king had behaved in a confusing and often contradictory manner. On April 15 he promised the diet to lead a crusade, yet on the 24th he issued letters to Gisdanich giving promises to the sultan. By July he assured the Florentines of his intentions to fight, and on the 25th left for Szegedin to receive Turkish emissaries who would obtain his oath to confirm the treaty. Then on August 4 he again swore to lead a crusade.

Hunyadi had used the negotiations as a tactic to induce Murad to go to Anatolia at the head of his army. It also provided him the time to make sure the allied fleet would be in the Straits by the time the land army took the offensive. Eugenius had put together a powerful naval alliance that could effectively mount a blockade, although it was not always certain he was one of its most consistent supporters.

News of the peace caused doubts among the allies. Wavrin learned of it from some Turks at Gallipoli. Cesarini put these doubts to rest by writing to Condulmer, to whom he stated that peace had not been concluded. On September 5 he wrote to John VIII Palaeologus, who was further reassured by letters from Vladislav and Hunyadi. Ciriac of Ancona wrote to king Alfonso at Naples, and wrote to Cesarini on September 19 informing him of the victory of the Knights Hospitaler over the Mamluk fleet, in which the Burgundians had played a prominent part.\textsuperscript{75}

What is certain is that George Brankovich had achieved his own objective through the peace negotiations. He ratified the treaty on August 15, after Vladislav had decided to proceed with the crusade. Murad

\textsuperscript{73} See Pall, “Ciriacó d'Anconá,” pp. 62–63, for the convincing arguments advanced to support the ratification of the treaty by Vladislav.

\textsuperscript{74} Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini wrote of the king's perjury; see Wolkan, Der Briefwechsel, epistolae 170, 172–174, 186–189. For Wavrin's testimony see Hardy, ed., Croniques, V (1864), 41–43.

\textsuperscript{75} From a copy of Ciriacò's Commentarii odesporici in the Bibl. Apost. Vaticana, Cod. lat. 5250, fols. 11v–11v, cited by Setton, Papacy and the Levant (1204–1571), II, 87, note 22.
had also bought time and had succeeded in splitting the alliance. Branko-
vich’s defection resulted in the loss to the Hungarian army of 8,000
men, almost a third of the entire force of the “long expedition”. This
loss was to prove a fatal one to the crusaders. He entered Smederevo
on August 22, and soon thereafter his sons were restored to him.76 In
addition to depriving the crusaders of important forces, the remaining
Turkish garrisons were strengthened by the soldiers freed from defend-
ing the Serbian fortresses. Some places along the crusaders’ route would
now be able to withstand their attack.

The neutrality of Serbia also meant that the crusaders, rather than
cross the mountains to Adrianople, would have to take the route down
the Danube across Bulgaria to the Black Sea, and from there to Con-
stantinople to join the fleet. This route was protected by well-garrisoned
castles and cities, necessitating long sieges and the resulting delays. Once
the land forces had joined the fleet then, in conjunction, they would
attempt to conquer the Ottoman strongholds.

Throughout the spring of 1444 Vladislav prepared for war and as-
sured his allies of his intentions, in spite of the negotiations. The Hun-
garian nobles, as we have seen, were summoned to a diet in Buda on
April 15 to discuss support for a crusade, for which it voted approval
and levied a special tax. Some of the most powerful ecclesiastical and
lay magnates agreed to accompany the king. Venice was informed of
these events by Reguardati by early May.77 However, the negotiations
at Adrianople in June and the meeting in Szegedin in late July delayed
the expedition beyond the normal campaigning season, and thereby
seriously impaired its chances for success. The sultan crossed to Ana-
tolia on July 12, and thus the delay in the commencement of the ex-
pedition had achieved the important objective of removing Murad across
the Straits. It had, however, also given him the time he needed to at-
tack Karaman and end the danger there by concluding a peace treaty.
The two months of June and July were to prove a serious loss to the
crusaders; however, the fleet was in position in the Straits by late July.

Our main source for the route of the crusaders and the climactic
battle is Andreas de Palatio, the papal collector of the tithe, who ac-
companied Vladislav and was an eyewitness to the battle. His letter
from Posen dated May 16, 1445, describes these events in detail.78

Vladislav was still in Buda on July 24 when he wrote to the king of

78. Printed by Lewicki, *Codex epistolaris*, II, no. 308.
Bosnia.\textsuperscript{79} In early July he had planned to have his troops assembled at Grosswardein by the 15th. At Szeged on August 4 he issued a manifesto designating September 1 for the start of the expedition. His Polish subjects, however, opposed his undertaking another expedition against the Turks. When the Polish diet met at Piotrków on August 26, Oleśnicki led the campaign to have the magnates request the return of the king to Poland. Cesarini’s influence over the king meant that a successful crusade would strengthen the pope’s position, a result completely at odds with Oleśnicki’s support of the conciliarists. Moreover, there were serious problems in Poland—a dispute with Lithuania over Podolian territory that he asserted required the return of the king. Vladislav had written to the diet reporting the peace terms offered at Adrianople, and on August 26 the diet sent a message urging him to accept the terms and return to Poland.\textsuperscript{80} This the king refused to do, replying to the diet on September 22 en route to Varna. The king was, however, supported by Polish nobles who had accompanied him: Jan Koniecpolski, the chancellor, and Peter of Szczekociny, the vice-chancellor, who together directed the foreign policy of Poland. The decision of the diet did deprive Vladislav of some Polish reinforcements, which were not significant even in 1443.

The commencement of the crusade caused panic in Adrianople. Orkhan, a grandson of Bayazid who had taken refuge with the Byzantines, was freed and went to the Dobruja, where he attempted to raise a revolt against Murad. In Adrianople the sultan’s twelve-year-old son was not able to control events when a power struggle broke out between the grand vizir Chandarli Khalil and his rivals Zaganuz and the beglerbeg of Rumelia. Then a fire in Adrianople, caused by rioting of the janissaries, destroyed a considerable part of the city.\textsuperscript{81}

From Szeged the crusaders proceeded to Temesvár and headed southeast, crossing the Danube at Orshova on September 20 with sixteen thousand knights and two thousand wagons.\textsuperscript{82} The army had much the same contingents as the previous year, although depleted by the defection of the eight thousand Serbs.

On September 24 they crossed the Timok river, which formed the frontier with the Ottoman vassal state of Bulgaria, and reached Florentin, then marched to Vidin on the Danube by September 26. It was

\textsuperscript{79} See Iorga, \textit{Notes et extraits}, II, 407, for the report of the Ragusan ambassadors at the Bosnian court to their government.

\textsuperscript{80} Lewicki, \textit{Codex epistolarius}, I, 141–142. The estates reminded Vladislav that they had agreed to his acceptance of the Hungarian throne because of the Turkish threat.

\textsuperscript{81} Inalcik, \textit{The Ottoman Empire}, pp. 20–21.

\textsuperscript{82} Długosz, \textit{Historia polonica}, XII, col. 800; Iorga, \textit{Notes et extrait}, III, 188–189.
decided that, because of the time of year and the necessity of joining the fleet, they would not attempt to take the city. The route led east to Nicopolis; to turn south there across the Balkan mountains would have been the quickest; however, the two thousand wagons prevented them from taking this route.

On October 16 the army reached Nicopolis. Since Vladislav did not have sufficiently powerful artillery to attack the strong walls, he contented himself with burning the suburbs. Vlad Dracul, the voivode of Wallachia, had met the king near Nicopolis with four thousand mounted soldiers who were to accompany the crusaders under the command of Vlad’s two sons. He was apparently shocked to realize the smallness of the crusading forces, and Długosz reports that Vlad attempted to persuade Vladislav to turn back by remarking that Murad was able to bring more men on a hunting party than Vladislav had brought for a crusade. Vlad, who had offered no support the previous year, was probably supporting Vladislav as a result of Hunyadi’s efforts at Adrianople to have Wallachia included in the agreements and accorded favorable terms.

The crusaders remained at Nicopolis for two or three days, then followed a Roman road to the coast. It is possible that the army marched along the Danube, crossing the Yantra river, turning southeast to Shumen (Szumla) and thence east to Novi Pazar. Callimachus has Hunyadi leading the army with three thousand Hungarians and the Wallachians, followed by the wagons with the king leading the remainder of the troops. The crusaders plundered and burned all along their route, not even sparing the Orthodox churches. On October 24, according to Długosz, Vladislav addressed an offer to the Turkish strongholds of Shumen, Mahoracz, Provadia, Varna, Kavarna, and Galata offering the defenders safe conduct to Adrianople if they surrendered these places without a struggle; he used Turkish prisoners to deliver his messages, which were spurned.

Around October 25, according to Michael Beheim, the crusaders were at Shumen, where they assaulted the city for two days, capturing it the third day. A tower with fifty Turkish soldiers was bitterly defended until the crusaders set it on fire, thereby killing the defenders. Here Vladislav encamped for seven days. He sent a detachment of five hundred men to attack Tarnovo, but three hundred of them were lost in the unsuccessful attack on the town.

83. Długosz, Historia polonica, XII, col. 800; Palatio, in Lewicki, Codex epistolaris, II, 24.
85. Michael Beheim in von Karajan, ed., Quellen, p. 133.
On November 4 the crusaders again started out, crossing an arid plateau and reaching a castle (possibly Kaspichan) which was taken by storm. The army remained here for two days besieging and then plundering the castle. On November 7 the army arrived at the city and castle of Provadiya, which was located atop a high mountain. The crusaders opened a breach in the wall through which they gained entrance, capturing the castle and—according to Palatio’s report—killing five thousand Turks. There Cesarini received a letter from Francis Condulmer reporting that the sultan had made peace with the emir of Karaman and on October 16 had crossed the Bosphorus with his army, consisting of thirty thousand to forty thousand men.

En route to the Dardanelles Wavrin’s galleys had stopped at Tenedos (Bozja-ada) to search for the site of ancient Troy, arriving at the entrance to the Dardanelles two days later. There Gauvin Quiéret, carrying the duke’s pennant, landed and successfully engaged the Turks. Then the Burgundians sailed to Gallipoli, where they joined with the papal fleet and where they found cardinal Condulmer suffering from fever. Condulmer and Wavrin, each with two galleys, sailed to Constantinople to meet with John VIII. Wavrin left the Burgundian galleys under the command of Gauvin Quiéret and Peter Vas, who together with the papal galleys maintained the blockade at Gallipoli. Here in late September they were joined by the galleys from Rhodes under Geoffrey of Thoisy. By September 19 the victory at Rhodes was known to Ciriaco at Constantinople. On September 27 he visited the Christian fleet at Gallipoli.

At Constantinople, according to John (Jehan) of Wavrin’s chronicle, the plan of the blockade was decided upon. The papal galleys, those of Venice, and two Burgundian galleys were to patrol between Gallipoli and Lampsacus, in the Dardanelles. Some of the galleys, possibly the Ragusan, were stationed in the Bosphorus. Early in October news reached the fleet that the sultan was marching toward the Dardanelles with the intention of forcing a crossing there. Wavrin left the galleys under Vas and returned to Constantinople with Quiéret to confer with the galleys captains stationed there. Wavrin and the others realized that the gal-

86. Callimachus, ed. Kwiatowski, p. 148. Dlugosz, Historia polonica, XII, col. 802, and Leunclavius, Historiae musulmanae Turcorum (Frankfurt, 1591), p. 513, confirm that the city was taken by storm.
87. Estimate of the number of men in the sultan’s army taken from the funeral oration delivered by Poggio Bracciolini, in Mai, Spicilegium, X, 374–384.
88. Wavrin, ed. Hardy, V, 38.
leys stationed in the Bosporus were in serious danger of being sunk by cannon which the sultan had had mounted on the Asiatic shore. The strait was narrow enough to enable the Turks thereby to prevent the ships from remaining on patrol there. During Wavrin's inspection the Turks demonstrated the effectiveness of this tactic by firing on them from the Anatolian fortress of Anadolu Hisar. Quiéret and Jean Bayart, another Burgundian, returned to John VIII to persuade him of the necessity of having Byzantine troops secure the European shore of the Bosporus: "Il est impossible que galees se puissent tenir au destroit tant que les deux rivages seront occupez par les Turcz." So pitiful was the state of the emperor's resources that all he could promise was two Byzantine galleys; he had no other support to give.

Unable to cross at the Dardanelles, the sultan and his army marched to the Bosporus. On October 15 Khalil Pasha with seven or eight thousand Turkish soldiers, with cannon and artillery, were taken across by the Genoese of Pera in their boats and occupied the European shore of the Bosporus.

On October 16 the sultan arrived at the Anatolian shore with what Wavrin estimates at three or four thousand soldiers and five to six hundred camels. During the night the Turks had moved cannon into place on the European shore, and on the morning of the sixteenth they began bombarding the galleys. The fleet attempted to advance but, being bombarded from both shores, was forced to retire. Moreover, it was hampered by adverse winds and the unwillingness of the Venetians to risk their ships' being sunk by cannon. Thus, the fleet made no serious attempt to prevent Murad's forces from crossing. The sultan with his troops then crossed under the walls of Anadolu Hisar, the narrowest point of the strait, where Europe and Asia almost touch. On the evening of the sixteenth a storm arose which forced the Christian galleys into port, thereby enabling the hardier Turks to cross over unopposed. The Byzantine galleys, which had attempted to come close to shore, were badly damaged by the cannon. The fleet had waited in vain for two or three months for the arrival of the crusaders. Had Vladislav not delayed crossing the Danube until the third week in September,

Société des antiquaires de Picardie, XXXVIII (1939), 42 ff. "Peter Vas" was a Castillian named Pedro Vasquez de Saovecha.

91. Wavrin, ed. Hardy, V, 47, "... la mer y estoit si estroite que une cullevrine porroit tyrer dun bort a l'autre, cest a seavoir de la Turkye en Grece, et de Grece en Turkye, et que journelement les Turcz du neuf chasteel tyroient canons quy passoient par dessus les gallees." See ibid., pp. 47-51, for the crossing by the Turks.

but crossed on September 1, the crusading army could have been at Constantinople by October 16 and effectively prevented the Ottoman crossing.

Murad joined his son Mehmed and Khalil Pasha, who had gathered all the available troops in Rumelia, numbering seven to eight thousand additional men. Loredan dispatched a letter to Cesarini, but by the time it reached him Murad was already close to Varna.

Meanwhile, on November 8 the crusaders stormed the castle of Michelich, perhaps located on the upper Devnya lake about four miles from the sea. Palatio reports that a detachment of crusaders found and burned on the Kamchiya river a Turkish flotilla of twenty-eight ships, which were apparently to be used on the Danube. On November 9 the king arrived at Varna, where the city and Galata, Marcpopolis, and Kavarna surrendered to him, the Turkish garrisons having fled. Vladislav and the crusaders encamped in front of the city. On the evening of November 9 the crusaders saw the campfires of the Turks about half a mile away. Vladislav ordered the outposts of the camp to be strengthened, all soldiers to remain armed, and a council of war to be called for the early morning of November 10.

Murad had arrived in Adrianople in late October and from there marched to Nicopolis, whence he followed the crusaders; on November 5 he was at Shumen. On the night of November 9 he encamped in the position from which he intended to attack, controlling the heights above Varna with the crusading army between him and the sea. The only line of retreat, to the north, was a wasteland.

The crusaders decided to take the offensive, and formed their line in a crescent stretching from the lake in front of the walls of the city back toward the Black Sea. On the far left was Hunyadi, with five banners of his soldiers and the Hungarian barons. In the middle was Vladislav with his Hungarian and Polish troops. Here where the king’s banner flew, together with the banner of St. George carried by Stephen Báthori of Transylvania, some two thousand troops were stationed. The right wing was composed of Hungarian troops under five banners, including Cesarini’s. Between the king and Cesarini were stationed the banners of the bishop of Bosnia, Rafael Herczeg; Simon Rozgonyi, bishop of Erlau; and Francis Thallóczy, ban of Croatia. At the far right were John Dominis, bishop of Grosswardein, and some Polish

94. Długosz, Historia polonica, XII, col. 803.
95. Palatio, in Lewicki, Codex epistolarius, II, 29.
troops. Hunyadi kept a reserve force of Wallachians behind the center of the line. The entire line stretched for about five thousand feet and thus was inadequately defended by twenty-five thousand men. The army had only light artillery, which consisted of small-caliber cannon and catapults and which do not seem to have been used in the battle.

Opposite the left wing of the crusaders the sultan stationed the European mounted cavalry under Davud Pasha, to the left of which were the Anatolian mounted troops under Karaja Beg. Facing the right of the crusader line were the akinjis, irregular mounted troops who served for plunder and fought in a freewheeling manner, outside the discipline of the regular Turkish soldiers, and the azebs, Turkish footsoldiers from the provinces. In the center behind the mounted Anatolian and European cavalry stood the sultan, surrounded by the janissaries. The cavalry were arranged in rectangles, each divided into squadrons. 96 The Ottoman army may have numbered sixty thousand, although it is uncertain how many men the sultan actually had under his command.

For three hours after stationing themselves the crusaders awaited the Turkish attack. The battle began with an attack by the akinjis and azebs on the crusaders’ right wing, which was thrown back by Rozgonyi and Thallóczy. Reportedly at one point Murad contemplated flight from the battlefield, and was constrained by his janissaries. When the akinjis attacked, the Anatolian sipahis moved forward; after the first assault failed the akinjis again attacked, engaging the forces under Thallóczy and Simon Rozgonyi. Then Cesarini and Thallóczy were attacked from the left by the sipahis; their lines broke and they sought the refuge of the wagon barricade. The bishops of Grosswardein and Erlau could not maneuver quickly enough and were caught between the city and the lake. Both attempted to make it across the swampy terrain to Galata and failed; apparently they were killed. 97 The Turks reached the seacoast and the barricade of 2,000 wagons, defended by only two hundred men.

Meanwhile Hunyadi and Vladislav attacked the Anatolian sipahis, driving them back some four thousand feet, killing Karaja Beg, and effectively driving the Anatolians from the field. The camels of the sultan’s army apparently frightened the horses of the crusaders, preventing the king and Hunyadi from moving forward. Hunyadi placed Vladislav in his former position, requesting him not to move without his instructions. The left wing of the crusader army was engaged in battle with the Rumelian sipahis. Hunyadi charged to the attack there,

97. Długosz, Historia Polonica, XII, cols. 804–805.
leaving the king with his household troops as a reserve force. This attack resulted in a forward movement of the Hungarian force, driving the entire right wing of the Ottoman cavalry from the field and leaving only the janissaries with Murad in the center.

Chalcocondylas relates Vladislav's Polish troops urged him to attack the janissaries and not to allow Hunyadi all the glory of victory. Vladislav charged into the janissaries, who unhorsed him and beheaded him, placing his head on a lance held above the army. Hunyadi was unable to come to Vladislav's aid quickly enough, and when the news of the king's death spread the army panicked and fled the field. The wagon barricade may not have been taken until the next day, when Stephen Báthori was killed. The Turks did not follow the retreating crusaders; Murad remained for three days on the battlefield and then returned to Adrianople. Sometime during the battle or soon thereafter Cesarini was killed. Various reports of his death circulated; the only certain fact is that he did not leave the area alive. Hunyadi fled and reached the Danube, where he was taken prisoner by Vlad Dracul, who released him after some time.

Incredibly, the crusading army had nearly carried the day. Had Brankovich and his 8,000 Serbs been at Varna with Vladislav, it is possible that the victory might have been a Christian one. The Turks had suffered heavy losses, and had turned possible defeat into victory through the reckless act of the king. Even then the triumph was not immediately evident when, at the day's end, both armies withdrew to their camps. Indeed it was reported that Murad was not sure that he was the victor for three days. But if the Turks had suffered heavily, the crusaders had been crippled. They could not have withstood another battle. At Varna the Turks had employed muskets for the first time.

The failure of the crusade sealed the fate of Byzantium nine years later. Varna brought the Turks to the walls of Belgrade in 1448 and to the walls of Vienna in a generation.

99. Callimachus, ed. Kwiatkowski, p. 159, states that Cesarini was killed while fleeing the battlefield. Wavrin, ed. Hardy, V, 57, says that Cesarini made it to the Danube where he was drowned by the Wallachians; Thuróczi, op. cit., p. 257, says merely that he was killed. On June 1, 1445, Aeneas Sylvius wrote to Guiniforta Barziza in Milan that Cesarini was killed by the Hungarians (in Wolkan, Der Briefwechsel, LXI-2, 506); Długosz, Historia polonica, XII, col. 810, says that he was killed by the Wallachians. By November 13, 1444, news of the battle had reached Vienna, since on that date Aeneas Sylvius wrote to the duke of Milan reporting that the fleet was being accused of treachery. They were, however, not able to keep guard because of a lack of provisions, and Murad was able to cross into Europe with forty thousand men. He reported that there was no certain news about Vladislav and that Cesarini had been killed (in Wolkan, Der Briefwechsel, LXI-2, pp. 487-490).
100. Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire, p. 21.