



3. The Straits and the Aegean

II

BYZANTIUM AND THE CRUSADES, 1261–1354

From the first the Byzantine empire had been intimately connected with the movement of the western crusades to the Holy Land. It had perhaps even been the appeals of Alexius I Comnenus for aid against the Selchükid Turks that had put into the head of pope

The principal Greek historians for the period 1261–1453, of primary importance for the Byzantine aspect of the later crusades, are George Pachymeres, *De Michaelē et Andronico Palaeologis libri XIII* (ed. I. Bekker, *CSHB*, 2 vols., Bonn, 1835); Nicephorus Gregoras, *Byzantina historia* (ed. L. Schopen and I. Bekker, *CSHB*, 3 vols., Bonn, 1829–1855); John Cantacuzenus, *Historiarum libri IV* (ed. L. Schopen, *CSHB*, 3 vols., Bonn, 1828–1832); George Sphrantzes, *Annales* (ed. I. Bekker, *CSHB*, Bonn, 1838, and ed. J. B. Papadopoulos, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1935–1954) [while his *Chronicon minus* is accepted as authentic, the *Chronicon maius* is disputed, and has been termed a later compilation by Macarius Melissenus]; Laonicus Chalcocondylas, *De origine ac rebus Turcorum* (ed. I. Bekker, *CSHB*, Bonn, 1843, and ed. E. Darkó, *Historiarum demonstrationes*, 2 vols. in 3, Budapest, 1922–1927); and Ducas, *Historia byzantina* (ed. I. Bekker, *CSHB*, Bonn, 1834, and ed. V. Grecu, *Istoriia turco-bizantină 1341–1462*, Bucharest, 1958). All of these are also published in Migne, *Patrologia graeca* (*PG*). Further source material is cited in F. J. Dölger, *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des oströmischen Reiches . . .*, parts 3–5 (Munich and Berlin, 1932–1965).

Very little has been written specifically on Byzantine attitudes toward the later western crusades; see V. Laurent, "L'Idée de guerre sainte et la tradition byzantine," *Revue historique du sud-est européen*, XXIII (1946), 71–98; P. Lemerle, "Byzance et la croisade," *Relazioni del X Congresso Internazionale di Scienze Storiche*, III (Florence, 1955), 595 ff.; and J. Bouquet's brief "Byzance et les dernières offensives de l'Occident contre Islam," *Congrès de l'Ordre International Constantinien* (Zurich, 1961), pp. 1–15.

Western sources and monographs, on the other hand, which touch on the Byzantine involvement in the later period are extremely numerous; only a few can be cited here. First we note the general works by A. S. Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages* (London, 1938), covering the entire movement but emphasizing the western and Arab sides; J. Delaville Le Roulx, *La France en Orient au XIV^e siècle* (Paris, 1886); N. Iorga, *Philippe de Mézières (1327–1405) et la croisade au XIV^e siècle* (Paris, 1896); A. Luttrell, "The Crusade in the Fourteenth Century," in J. Hale et al., eds., *Europe in the Later Middle Ages* (London, 1965), pp. 122–154; and P. Lemerle, *L'Émirat d'Aydin, Byzance et l'Occident* (Paris, 1957). Other works touching on various of the later crusades and Byzantium are D. Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West 1258–1282* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959); U. Bosch, *Kaiser Andronikos III. Palaiologos* (Amsterdam, 1965); and E. Dade, *Versuche zur Wiedererrichtung der lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel im Rahmen der abendländischen Politik, 1261 bis etwa 1310* (Jena, 1938); also G. Bratianu, "Notes sur le projet de mariage entre l'empereur Michel IX Paléologue et Cathérine de Courtenay

Urban II the idea of launching the First Crusade.¹ The armies of this initial expedition and of the Second Crusade, as well as portions of

(1288–95),” *Revue historique du sud-est européen*, I (1924), 59–63; and C. Marinescu, “Tentatives de mariage de deux fils d’Andronic II Paléologue avec des princesses latines,” *ibid.*, 139–140. On Charles of Valois’s plans see Delaville Le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, pp. 40–47, and H. Moranvillé, “Les Projets de Charles de Valois sur l’empire de Constantinople,” *Bibliothèque de l’École des chartes*, LI (1890), 63–86. Other modern works dealing in part with the subject are M. Viller, “La Question de l’union des églises entre grecs et latins depuis le concile de Lyon jusqu’à celui de Florence (1274–1438),” *Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique*, XVI (1921), 260–305, 515–532, and XVIII (1922), 20–60; J. Gill, *The Council of Florence* (Cambridge, 1959); O. Halecki, *Un Empereur de Byzance à Rome, 1355–1375* (Warsaw, 1930); J. Smet, *The Life of Saint Peter Thomas by Philippe de Mézières* (Rome, 1954); and F. J. Boehlke, Jr., *Pierre de Thomas: Scholar, Diplomat, and Crusader* (Philadelphia, 1966). On the crusade of Peter I of Cyprus and the Byzantine reaction, see Iorga, *Philippe de Mézières*, and on Amadeo VI of Savoy, see K. Kerofilas, *Amadeo VI di Savoia nell’impero bizantino* (Rome, 1926), P. L. Datta, *Spedizione in Oriente di Amadeo VI* (Turin, 1826), and E. L. Cox, *The Green Count of Savoy: Amadeus VI...* (Princeton, 1967). On the battle of Kossovo and Byzantium, see H. Grégoire, “L’Opinion byzantine et la bataille de Kossovo,” *Byzantion*, VI (1931), 247 ff., and on Nicopolis, besides A. S. Atiya, *The Crusade of Nicopolis* (London, 1934), and G. Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State* (Oxford, 1956), which is useful for the entire period, see R. Rosetti, “The Battle of Nicopolis (1396),” *Slavonic Review*, XV (1937), 629 ff., and G. Kling, *Die Schlacht bei Nikopolis im Jahre 1396* (Berlin, 1906). For the entire later period, see E. Pears, *The Destruction of the Greek Empire and the Story of the Capture of Constantinople by the Turks* (London, 1903); M. Silberschmidt, *Das orientalische Problem zur Zeit der Entstehung des türkischen Reiches nach venezianischen Quellen* (Leipzig, 1923); A. Grunzeweig, “Philippe le Bon et Constantinople,” *Byzantion*, XXIV (1954), 47–61; A. G. Mompherratos, *Diplomatic Activities of Manuel II...* [in Greek] (Athens, 1913); and J. W. Barker, *Manuel II Palaeologus (1391–1425): A Study in Late Byzantine Statesmanship* (New Brunswick, 1969). For Boucicault’s expeditions, see especially *Livre des faits du Maréchal Boucicault*, ed. J. F. Michaud and B. Poujoulat, in *Nouvelle collection des mémoires pour servir à l’histoire de France*, II (Paris, 1836), 205–232. For a collection of articles on the fall of Constantinople, including appeals to the west for a crusade, see *Le Cinq-centième anniversaire de la prise de Constantinople (L’Hellénisme contemporain*, 2nd ser., VII; Athens, 1953); also the articles in Greek and French by R. Guillard on Constantine XI, such as “Les Appels de Constantin XI Paléologue à Rome et à Venise,” *Byzantinoslavica*, XIV (1953), 226–244; see also S. Runciman, *The Fall of Constantinople, 1453* (Cambridge, 1965). On Humbert’s crusade, see U. Chévalier, *La Croisade du dauphin Humbert II* (Paris, 1920). Other works of importance are J. Gay, *Le Pape Clément VI et les affaires d’Orient* (Paris, 1904), and W. Miller, *The Latins in the Levant* (London, 1908); for Catalan designs on Constantinople in the 15th century, see especially F. Cerone, “La Politica orientale di Alfonso di Aragona,” *Archivio storico per le province napoletane*, XXVII (1902), 3–93, 380–456, 555–634, 774–852, and XXVIII (1903), 154–212, and for documents, A. Rubió i Lluch, *Diplomatari de l’Orient català* (Barcelona, 1947). There are some pages of interest in G. Schlumberger, *Byzance et croisades* (Paris, 1927), and F. Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne au moyen âge...* (Paris, 1959); finally, for general source material, see N. Iorga, *Notes et extraits pour servir à l’histoire des croisades au XV^e siècle* (6 vols., Paris and Bucharest, 1899–1916); the propagandistic account of William Adam (“Brocardus”), *Directorium ad passagium faciendum*, in *RHC, Arm.*, II (1906), 367 ff.; and Marino Sanudo “Torsello,” *Istoria del regno di Romania*, ed. C. Hopf in *Chroniques gréco-romanes* (Berlin, 1873), and Sanudo’s *Secreta fidelium crucis*, in J. Bongars, *Gesta Dei per Francos*, II (Hanover, 1611), 1–281.

1. See P. Charanis, “Aims of the Medieval Crusades and how they were viewed from Byzantium,” *Church History*, XXI (1952), 123–134. This covers the first crusades.

the Third, all passed through Constantinople. And indeed, in 1204, western leaders of the Fourth Crusade, instead of going to Jerusalem, had diverted their forces and attacked and captured Constantinople itself. Thereafter, all the way to 1453, Byzantium, willing or not, would remain in one way or another inexorably bound to all western crusading movements.

In 1261, after more than a half century of Latin occupation, Constantinople was reconquered for the Greeks by Michael VIII Palaeologus.² After this date the original purpose of the early crusades was somewhat altered. For though the primary goal of subsequent expeditions still remained Jerusalem, the term "crusade" began also to be applied to western projects to reconquer Constantinople and restore the Latin empire. Such a perversion of the original crusading ideal was justified even for the more religious-minded westerners on the grounds that the city of Constantine had now fallen into the hands of "Greek schismatics," in effect semi-infidels. By this criterion a crusade against Christian Constantinople became either a worthy goal in itself or—as crusader-propagandists of the fourteenth century came to emphasize—a preliminary step to uniting eastern and western Christendom so that, with the greatest possible force, the "holy war" could be carried to the Moslems in Jerusalem.

After 1261 western leaders of the crusading movement, with some notable exceptions, were not unduly troubled by the need for finding an ideology for their expeditions. To the politician of the west, be he prince or pope, the crusade all too often became merely a political or military effort of which the primary goal was the aggrandizement of the leader himself or of the institution he represented. The old religious zeal of the west, the contagious piety so important in launching the First Crusade, had now conspicuously diminished. The crusades had become secularized.

Among the Byzantines what might perhaps be considered proto-crusades, expeditions to recapture Syria and Palestine, had been conducted as early as the seventh century by their emperor Heraclius and in the tenth century by Nicephorus Phocas and John Tsimiscès. Nevertheless, despite these "holy" wars, the ideology of a crusade in the western sense of the word, as an expedition preached by the church to recover the Holy Sepulcher, with remission of sins promised to the expedition's participants, was totally alien, indeed almost incomprehensible, to the Byzantines.³ It does not have to be noted

2. See volume II of this work, pp. 228-232.

3. See V. Laurent, "L'Idée de guerre sainte," pp. 71-98; Lemerle, "Byzance et la croisade," pp. 595 ff.; and A. Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine Empire* (Madison, Wis., 1958), especially pp. 389-400. P. Alphandéry and A. Dupont, *La Chrétienté et l'idée de*

that in these tenth-century Byzantine expeditions to Syria and Palestine, the Greek soldiers did not wear the cross as a badge, nor did they term their wars "crusades."⁴ Rather, behind their expeditions was not so much the concept of freeing the Holy Land from "the pollution of the infidel" as the desire to restore to the authority of the basileus certain lost areas of the *Basileia*, the sacred empire, in particular Syria and Palestine.

The Byzantine lack of appreciation for the religious aspect of western crusading ideology may already be seen during the First Crusade. Even the usually astute Anna Comnena demonstrated a certain lack of insight when she viewed all the western knights merely as predatory, bent only on looting the empire. Nor does the sophisticated emperor Alexius I seem truly to have appreciated the extent of the genuine piety in crusader motivations. He was, to be sure, amazed at the masses of westerners who left home and family to take the cross. But he always suspected that the motive of self-aggrandizement, the personal ambition of the leaders, was at the bottom of all crusading ventures, despite the outpouring of pious fervor that manifested itself on the surface. Alexius's worst fears of Latin motivations were confirmed by the aggressive actions of Bohemond—fears transmitted to his grandson, Manuel I, and from him to all subsequent Greek emperors. By Manuel's time (1143–1180) there was greater reason for the Byzantine suspicion of the crusading movement. For during the Second Crusade (1147) Louis VII of France had contemplated taking Constantinople, and similarly in 1185 the late Manuel's archenemy, the German emperor Frederick I Barbarossa, encamped before the walls of the capital, had pondered whether to assault the city. After the Fourth Crusade in 1204, with its unparalleled looting of Constantinople and enforced Greek conversion to "Catholicism," Byzantine suspicions and fears of the Latins had become so ineradicably a part of their psychology that nothing thereafter seemed able to assuage them.

Accordingly, from the time of the Greek recovery of Constantinople by Michael VIII in 1261 until the final fall of the city in 1453,

croisade: Les premiers croisades (Paris, 1959), is of little help on the Byzantine side. See also S. Runciman, "The Byzantine Provincial Peoples and the Crusade," *Relazioni del X Congresso Internazionale di Scienze Storiche*, III (1955), 621–624.

4. Possibly the first, or one of the first, Byzantine uses of the western term crusade is in Nicetas Choniates (*staurophoroi*: bearers of the cross), referring to the western knights of the First Crusade coming to Constantinople. This term is not used during the 9th- and 10th-century Byzantine campaigns in Syria and Palestine, and the Greek church, though it blessed the Greek armies and was anxious for the recovery of the holy places and holy relics, did not promise any special rewards such as remission of sins to the expedition's participants.

whenever the Byzantines heard of western plans for a new crusade they at once assumed a negative, defensive posture. With few exceptions most Byzantines paid no heed at all to the idealism, the pious words of pope Gregory X (1271–1276) or of certain enlightened western crusader-propagandists like Humbert of Romans (d. 1277) and Marino Sanudo Torsello (d. 1334). Almost pathologically the mentality of the Byzantine man on the street came to be deeply conditioned by the conviction that the crusades were merely organized expeditions of bandits aimed at the resubjugation of Byzantium. Whatever their guise might be—whether an overt attempt to restore the Latin empire, a crusade to take Smyrna, or plans to attack Egypt—all mass movements to the east on the part of western arms and men were for the Byzantines suspect and potentially terrifying.

The history of Byzantium's connection with the later crusades may be divided into three major phases. The first, from 1261 to 1331, the death of prince Philip of Taranto, grandson of Charles I of Anjou and heir to his aspirations, was dominated by the attempts of western claimants to restore the Latin empire. In the second phase, extending from 1331 to the battle of Nicopolis in 1396, western expeditions to the east were motivated both by papal fears and by the commercial interests of Venice, whose eastern trade and colonies were increasingly threatened by the advance of the Ottoman Turks. Hence arose the dual aim of clearing the Aegean of Turkish pirates and establishing a Latin beachhead in Asia Minor—considerations leading to the remarkable western-Byzantine coalition of 1334 and the crusade to Smyrna in 1344. Byzantium was, to be sure, not directly involved in all these expeditions, and never really responded positively to appeals for a crusade, although a change in the situation had effected a partial alteration of the Byzantine attitude. With the end, in 1331, of overt western attempts to restore the Latin empire of Constantinople, some Greeks began to realize that their own fate might well depend on whatever results western arms might be able to achieve against their oppressors, the Ottoman Turks. The once mighty Byzantine empire had by then become in large part merely an onlooker, one which gazed as if mesmerized yet was almost powerless to do anything about events directly affecting its own destiny. In the third phase, from 1396 to 1453, the overwhelming problem which cast everything else into the shade was the ever-growing threat of the Ottoman Turks, who had almost completely encircled Constantinople and who, if Constantinople should fall, would even menace the west. Growing increasingly fearful of the Turks, the leaders of Latin

Christendom launched or helped to launch two major expeditions to aid the Byzantines: the luckless crusade of Nicopolis in 1396,⁵ and the essentially Polish-Hungarian crusade of Varna in 1444.⁶

The Byzantine point of view in connection with the crusading expeditions from 1261 to 1453 has not hitherto been dealt with systematically. Though any direct Byzantine involvement in these events is usually difficult to ascertain, it was, nevertheless, often greater than appears on the surface. Indeed, if one judges strictly from the Byzantine viewpoint, all three phases from 1261 to 1453 may be characterized as a Byzantine struggle for survival—in the first, to preserve Greek independence in the face of threats from western pretenders to the throne of Constantinople, and in the two subsequent phases, to protect the empire against the advancing Ottoman Turks.

Byzantine statesmen from Michael VIII to 1453 realized that Byzantium had become too weak to stand alone and must therefore secure allies from the only source that could provide effectual help, the west, in particular its leader the pope. At the same time the Byzantines understood that from him no aid would be forthcoming unless they were willing to pay his price, ecclesiastical union, entailing subordination of the Greek church to Rome. Hence, as we shall see, in all three periods a basic, sometimes the most significant, factor was the repeated proposals of the Byzantine emperors to the popes and western rulers for union of the churches. And it is this factor, with its accompanying and often complex diplomatic negotiations, that seems always to be intertwined with, at times even to predominate in, the history of Byzantium's involvement in the later crusades.

The majority of the Byzantine populace, however, remained so deeply hostile to the Latins that any attempt at union, for whatever reason, was rejected out of hand. It was not only the persistent fear of a possible new Latin invasion that aroused the Greeks against ecclesiastical union, but even more, it would seem, the belief that union meant the dilution of the purity of the Orthodox faith and thus, through this beginning of a process of Latinization, the loss of their identity as a people. Paradoxically, as the medieval Greeks became weaker and weaker politically and militarily, more than ever they clung tenaciously to their religion, believing that loss of the Orthodox faith would bring with it the destruction of the empire itself. By 1400, in fact, certain segments of the populace, especially

5. See above, pp. 21–25.

6. A chapter on the crusade of Varna is planned for volume V of this work, in preparation.

among the lower classes, came to prefer as the lesser of two evils the possibility of Turkish occupation to a renewed Latin domination. In any discussion of Byzantium and the later crusades, therefore, many complex factors must be considered: political, social, economic, and religious. In the final analysis, however, it is the last-mentioned factor, the question of accepting or rejecting union with Rome, that always seems to lie near the surface, and gives an element of continuity to the total picture.

The reign of Michael VIII Palaeologus (1261–1282),⁷ which opens the first phase of Byzantium's involvement in the later crusades, is in a sense the prototype for all east-west relations up to 1453. It was he who established that pattern of imperial diplomacy, so often to recur, of offering religious union to the papacy in exchange for support in thwarting the designs of external enemies against Constantinople. Almost immediately upon recovering Constantinople in 1261 Michael had to face the problem of western attempts to restore the Latin empire, often through the launching of a new crusade. For in conquering Constantinople Michael had not only ended Latin rule but had, at the same time, terminated papal jurisdiction over the Greek church, a control which at least technically the popes had exercised since 1204. From 1261 onward it was the aim of almost all popes to seek by one means or another the return of the "schismatic" Greeks to the "bosom of the Roman church," an aim which many western ecclesiastics believed could best be accomplished through the medium of a new crusade.

The immediate reaction of pope Urban IV, on hearing of the Greek recovery of Constantinople,⁸ was to look to the preservation of the remaining Latin possessions in Achaea, Negroponte, and the Aegean islands, while at the same time taking measures to secure western support for the dethroned Latin emperor Baldwin II. To this end Urban commanded the preaching of a crusade in France, Poland, and Aragon—a crusade whose stated goal was not, as before, the Holy Land, but the recovery of Constantinople.⁹ Urban's directive is significant because it is the first in history to order the preaching of a crusade specifically against the Greeks. Though, to be sure, in 1204 Innocent III had finally sanctioned the conquest of Constantinople by the western armies of the Fourth Crusade, his earlier, more

7. On Michael's relations with the west, especially the papacy, see Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael*.

8. *Ibid.*, chap. V.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 139–142.

immediate reaction had been to excommunicate the Latin troops. Now, however, in the time of Michael VIII we see pope Urban justifying a crusade against Constantinople not only on the grounds that the "schismatic" Greeks had again fallen away from Rome, but—as the pope wrote to Louis IX urging him to join the anti-Byzantine expedition—because "if the Greeks seize all of Romania, the way to Jerusalem will be barred."¹⁰ In a subsequent letter sent to bishop Henry of Utrecht, Urban was in fact to proclaim that he would promise "to all who personally [assist in the restoration of the Latin empire] the remission of sins, the same privileges granted to those aiding the Holy Land."¹¹

To preserve the Latin territorial possessions in the east and restore Latin rule over Constantinople, Urban now took a very active part in forming a coalition consisting of the Latin princes of the Morea (the Peloponnesus), the dethroned emperor Baldwin II, and the Venetians of Negroponte. In May 1262 and subsequently in July of the same year, these parties, the pope among them, signed at Viterbo an agreement prescribing joint action against Michael in the Morea.¹² But their efforts bore little fruit; the Greco-Latin struggle over the Morea was to last almost until 1453.

Urban's plan to launch a crusade against Constantinople never really got off the ground. The most respected ruler of the west, the French king Louis IX, was not disposed to fight a Christian emperor, even a Greek "schismatic," believing that all military efforts should instead be directed to recovering Jerusalem.¹³ But a more basic deterrent to a crusade against Constantinople was the preoccupation of the papacy itself with its struggle against the Hohenstaufen heirs of Frederick II, notably Frederick's illegitimate son Manfred, king of Sicily. Urban therefore shifted the focus of his attention from a Byzantine crusade to a crusade against the papacy's more immediate antagonist, Manfred;¹⁴ for the next seven years almost all papal political maneuvers would be motivated by the desire to crush the Hohenstaufen.

From the first, Michael VIII was aware of the powerful western enemies his capture of Constantinople would evoke. Hence directly after his recovery of the city, he sent two envoys to the pope bearing

10. *Ibid.*, p. 142.

11. J. Guiraud, ed., *Les Registres d'Urbain IV (1261–1264)*, II (Paris, 1901), no. 577, pp. 292–293 (dated 1264).

12. *Ibid.*, II, 47–48, and cf. II, 292–293.

13. R. Sternfeld, *Ludwigs des heiligen Kreuzzug nach Tunis, 1270* (Berlin, 1896), p. 308, and Dade, *Versuche*, p. 11.

14. W. Norden, *Das Papsttum und Byzanz* (Berlin, 1903), p. 431, and Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael*, pp. 143 ff.

letters promising to establish ecclesiastical union with Rome if the pope would recognize his possession of Constantinople.¹⁵ Neglecting no diplomatic opportunity, Michael also made overtures to Manfred, offering an alliance against the papacy. When negotiations with Manfred proved futile,¹⁶ Michael redoubled his efforts vis-à-vis the pope, even proposing, in addition to union, his aid for a crusade to recover Jerusalem, an astute maneuver because at that time Urban was himself promoting the launching of a crusade against the Greeks.¹⁷ Realizing the papacy's power, Michael indicated in his letter to the pope his readiness to subject all the eastern patriarchs to Rome.¹⁸ Fearful of Manfred's increasing power in Sicily, Urban on his side seized upon Michael's offers of union. But soon the appearance in Italy of the new papal champion Charles I of Anjou, to combat the Hohenstaufen, swung the pope again away from Palaeologus, and Urban announced his intention to reestablish the Latin empire as soon as Manfred was defeated.¹⁹

With the death of Manfred in 1266 at the battle of Benevento and the execution at Naples in 1268 of the only surviving legitimate successor of Frederick II, the young Conradin, Byzantine relations with the Latin west entered a more critical period. The new master of southern Italy and Sicily, Charles of Anjou, the shrewd, energetic, and intensely ambitious brother of Louis IX, now became captive to the old Norman-Hohenstaufen dreams of conquering Constantinople. Thus almost immediately after his enthronement Charles began to muster a tremendous coalition of forces against Michael Palaeologus, a coalition including Michael's Latin enemies, many of the Italian communes, Byzantium's Slavic neighbors, and, finally, even the Venetians, who hoped to displace their rivals the Genoese in the lucrative Byzantine trade. Arranging a diplomatic marriage between his son Philip and Isabel, the heiress of William of Villehardouin, prince of Achaea, Charles in 1267 signed the treaty of Viterbo, the terms of which purported to give Charles and Philip legal title to Byzantium and called for Charles to attack Constantinople and restore the Latin empire.²⁰

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 140–141, quoting Pachymeres, *De Michaelē . . .*, II, 36 (CSHB, I, 168–169).

16. Pachymeres, III, 7 (CSHB, I, 181, 183).

17. Guiraud, *Registres d'Urbain IV*, II, no. 577, pp. 292–293; Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael*, p. 176.

18. Guiraud, *Registres d'Urbain IV*, II, 357.

19. Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael*, p. 184 and pp. 164–165, notes 14, 16.

20. Treaty printed in G. del Giudice, *Codice diplomatico del regno di Carlo I e II d'Angiò*, II (Naples, 1863), 30 ff. See also J. Longnon, "Le Rattachement de la principauté de Morée au royaume de Sicile en 1267," *Journal des savants*, 1942, 134–143; Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael*, pp. 197 ff.

One very important figure was still lacking in Charles's alliance, the pope. As spiritual head of Christendom his sanction was indispensable if Charles's expedition was to be blessed as a crusade. Moreover, as the pope was Charles's direct feudal overlord for Sicily, his approval was all the more necessary for a Greek campaign. For the next fifteen years Charles and Michael were to pit their formidable diplomatic talents against each other, each in the aim of winning the papacy to his side. Michael VIII continued his policy of holding out the bait of union to the popes. Under Urban's successor Clement IV, moreover, he again brought up the question of a crusade to the Holy Land. But this time Michael offered to participate personally in the expedition as well as to enlist the support of the strategically situated Christian king of Cilician Armenia, Hetoum I. He assured the pope that with the participation of the Greeks, Latins, and Armenians, the Mamluks of Egypt were sure to be defeated. In exchange Michael asked the pope to provide him with guarantees that Byzantium would not be attacked by Latins while he himself was away on the crusade.²¹ The negotiations between emperor and pope, which had progressed far, were suddenly brought to a halt in 1268 by the death of Clement.

Clement's demise removed the chief obstacle to Charles's plans for a Greek expedition, and the Angevin monarch now began anew to muster his forces. Michael, however, agilely responded by sending appeals to the brother of Charles, Louis IX of France. Realizing Louis's unfaltering desire to lead a crusade to the Holy Land, Michael shrewdly pointed out to the French king that an attack upon Constantinople by Charles would adversely affect Louis's own plans for a crusade. "If the forces of both Charles and Michael are set at war with each other," Michael told the king, "neither can contribute to the security of your own expedition." Envoys from Michael appeared before Louis's camp in Tunisia during the latter's ill-starred crusade in North Africa in 1270, bearing splendid gifts and hoping to enter into direct negotiations. Before anything could be discussed Louis succumbed to the plague and Michael once again had to face an unrestrained Charles of Anjou.²² Only an act of fate, a storm

21. E. Jordan, ed., *Les Registres de Clément IV (1265–1268)* (Paris, 1893; repr. 1945), no. 1201, p. 404; A. L. Tăutu, ed., *Acta Urbani IV, Clementis IV, Gregorii X (1261–1276)* (Vatican City, 1953), no. 25, pp. 71–72.

22. Jordan, *Registres de Clément IV*, no. 1201, p. 404. Also L. Bréhier, "Une Ambassade byzantine au camp de Saint Louis devant Tunis," *Mélanges offerts à M. Nicolas Iorga* (Paris, 1933), p. 140; Pachymeres, V, 9 (*CSHB*, I, 362–364); O. Raynaldus (Rinaldi), *Annales ecclesiastici*, ad ann. 1270, no. 33; Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael*, pp. 224–227. See also volume II of this work, pp. 509–518.

which shattered Charles's fleet off Trapani in Sicily, now spared Michael's capital from invasion.²³

Charles, though disappointed, was undaunted and immediately began to rebuild his fleet and refurbish his alliances. But he was again frustrated when in 1271, after a papal interregnum of three years, Gregory X was elevated to the papal throne. Strong-willed, pious, and able, Gregory had himself long been consumed by a desire to recover Jerusalem from the Moslems, and he tended to view everything else as subordinate to this aim. Not only would good relations with Byzantium, as he saw it, be beneficial to Christendom, but, more important, only with Greek support could Jerusalem be retaken and maintained.²⁴ To halt Angevin designs against Byzantium Gregory now even pushed Charles into making a truce with Michael.

The negotiations taking place between Michael and Gregory culminated in 1274 in the celebrated Council of Lyons, at which religious union was signed by the pope and Michael's envoys, headed by his grand logothete George Acropolites.²⁵ We omit discussion of the theological aspects of the council in order to examine its implications for the crusade. As far as Michael was concerned, Lyons was primarily an act of political expediency entered into in the aim of saving his throne and empire. For Gregory, on the other hand, perhaps the only truly sincere actor in the drama transpiring at Lyons, now that the two churches of east and west were finally united, it was only natural to expect that both would join in a great crusade to overwhelm the Moslems and restore Jerusalem to the Christians.

As has already been emphasized, the underlying religious motives for a crusade were not grasped by the Byzantines. Thus Michael, fearing a repetition of the Latin conquest of 1204 if massed western armies should again appear in the east, demanded that Gregory assure the integrity of his empire. Michael's surprising confidence in the pope's intentions therefore seems to have been based on what he believed to be Gregory's power and authority, on the pope's sincerity of motive, and, no less important, on the belief that Gregory would personally lead the crusade through the Byzantine territories.

23. Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael*, pp. 227-228; William of Nangis, "Gesta Philippi tertii francorum regis," in *RHGF*, XX, 480.

24. V. Laurent, "La Croisade et la question d'Orient sous le pontificat de Grégoire X (1271-1276)," *Revue historique de sud-est européen*, XXII (1945), 105-137, and his "Grégoire X (1271-1276) et la projet d'une ligue antiturque," *Échos d'Orient*, XXXVII (1938), 257-273.

25. On Lyons, see Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael*, pp. 258-276, and volume II of this work, p. 584.

But all was for naught. The union of the two churches was accomplished only on paper. Most Greeks insisted that, since the four eastern patriarchs had been unrepresented at Lyons and since no later council had pronounced it ecumenical, Lyons was nothing but a "robber council." Thus for them the act of union subscribed to by pope and emperor was invalid. Far more basic than this legal technicality, however, was the deep-seated emotional aversion of the Greeks for anything Latin. Near civil war resulted upon the return of Michael's envoys to Constantinople. Violently rejecting the results of Lyons, the Byzantine populace believed that effective union with the Latins would corrupt the purity of their faith. Worse, they insisted that if the faith were corrupted, Constantinople, the city "guarded by God," would itself be doomed because of the loss of divine favor. The unionist patriarch John Beccus acutely reflected this feeling when he wrote, "Men, women, the old and the young consider the peace [with the west] a war and the union a separation."²⁶ Even the idea of a cöoperative effort by Greeks and Latins to recover Jerusalem was derided by the people. The Virgin, the protectress of Constantinople, would never, the Byzantines believed, sanction an expedition against territories rightfully belonging to themselves if it were launched in alliance with Latin "heretics."

Yet in courting the pope Michael had at least achieved his immediate aim. The act of union proclaimed at Lyons acted as a powerful brake to the aspirations of Charles of Anjou. With the Greeks again apparently reconciled to the Roman church, any expedition Charles launched against Byzantium would not be regarded as a true crusade. Rather, in the eyes of Gregory at least, it would be a fratricidal war between two "Catholic princes," a war which, instead of promoting a crusade against the Moslems, would actually weaken the Christians. With Byzantium in effect now a kind of papal protectorate, Charles, as a vassal of the pope, could hardly contravene Gregory's orders to desist.²⁷

Negotiations moved forward regarding the question of a crusade. Shortly after the signing of union at Lyons the papal legate to Constantinople, Bernard Ayglier, abbot of Monte Cassino, returned to Rome with a report that Byzantine ambassadors charged with discussion of the crusade would soon follow.²⁸ The imperial envoys,

26. Pachymeres, V, 23; V, 14; VI, 23 f.; III, 11; VI, 24 (*CSHB*, I, 401 ff., 379 ff., 482 ff., 192-193, 489 ff.).

27. Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael*, chap. XII. On Charles's career see also S. Runciman, *The Sicilian Vespers* (Cambridge, 1958).

28. Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael*, pp. 285-286.

George Metochites, archdeacon of Constantinople, and the grand intendant Theodore, met in 1276 with Gregory, probably first in southern France and later at Lausanne, where they witnessed the western emperor Rudolph of Hapsburg taking the cross.²⁹ Already at Lyons Gregory had proclaimed that the arms of both the eastern and the western emperors would crush Islam, and Michael in turn had promised that Byzantium would contribute provisions, revenues, troops, and whatever else was necessary for the *passagium* to the Holy Land. Undoubtedly Michael had at first suggested the general idea of a crusade as an inducement to curry favor with Gregory. Now, however, his envoys came forward with a striking new proposal: that the Latin crusaders, instead of crossing by sea, should proceed by land across the Balkans to Constantinople and thence through Asia Minor.³⁰ Apparently Michael had in mind a repetition of what had been achieved by his predecessor Alexius I: reconquest from the Turks, by means of the crusader armies, of the former Byzantine territories in Anatolia. Execution of such a plan would not only restore Asia Minor to Byzantine rule and avert the danger of the Turks in general, but at the same time serve to thwart the growing menace of the Mamluks of Egypt, who were now penetrating Cilician Armenia.

According to Metochites' report, pope Gregory seemed favorable to the plan. Impressed by Michael's plea for the recovery of "the hallowed Christian cities of Asia Minor," Gregory agreed that the land route would avoid for the western armies the hardship and danger of a long sea voyage as well as providing a strong base of operations from which to take and maintain Jerusalem. Moreover, the grave problem of finding enough ships to transport the western armies across the Mediterranean would be solved.

To insure complete accord on the plan, pope and emperor, it is interesting to note, were to meet personally for discussions either at Brindisi on the Adriatic or at Avlona in northwest Epirus.³¹ But the death of Gregory in January 1276 removed the possibility of a united Christendom opposing the Turkish advance in Asia Minor. Not that such a joint venture would easily have succeeded. The

29. M. H. Laurent, *Le Bienheureux Innocent V (Pierre de Tarentaise) et son temps* (Studi e testi, 129; Vatican City, 1947), pp. 269, 440.

30. See report of Metochites in V. Laurent, "Le Rapport de Georges Métochite, apocrisiarce de Michel VIII Paléologue auprès du pape Grégoire X (1275–1276)," *Revue historique du sud-est européen*, XXIII (1946), 233–247, and V. Laurent, "Grégoire X"; cf. Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael*, pp. 287–289.

31. M. H. Laurent, *Le B. Innocent V*, pp. 439–440; Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael*, pp. 288–289.

mutual distrust of Latins and Greeks, the probable unwillingness of Latin leaders to relinquish territories taken by their arms, the constant temptation for the crusaders to seize Constantinople for themselves, and finally the ill-will, if not overt hostility, of the Byzantine population to the entire expedition—all these factors would have seriously hampered the success of any such joint action, and perhaps even resulted in war between Greeks and Latins.

Under the new pope, Innocent V, the plan for a land expedition through Anatolia was abandoned. Apparently Michael VIII had confidence only in Gregory, or the new pope may have distrusted the Greeks. Moreover, the western leaders may have believed that a sea route was more practicable.³² Nevertheless, negotiations for some kind of joint expedition were continued by Michael and Innocent. Now, however, Michael raised many questions as to the participation and attitude of western rulers. He also sought to clarify the question of the future of Egypt, since Michael himself was then in alliance with the Mamluk sultan Baybars. To these complex political factors was added the question of how the union of Lyons was to be implemented in the Byzantine areas. This was a particularly touchy matter since Charles of Anjou was continuously pressing the pope to unleash him against Michael on the grounds that the emperor was reneging on or lax in fulfilling his promises to implement the union.³³

Several popes succeeded Innocent, and with all of them Michael exchanged numerous embassies. In 1277, however, he encountered a really intransigent pontiff, Nicholas III. While expressly forbidding Charles to attack Constantinople, Nicholas demanded that Michael, in accordance with papal stipulations, impose on his empire complete uniformity of (Latin) dogma and liturgical custom. To this end the pope sought to dispatch a cardinal-legate to Constantinople and even to demand from each Greek ecclesiastic a personal oath of submission to Rome.³⁴ Meanwhile Charles, impatient at all the years of

32. Actually the land route was no longer practicable for the west, especially as Adalia, on the southern Anatolian coast, had been in Turkish hands since 1207. Thus after 1204 Cyprus was considered even more precious than Constantinople. But when Michael VIII reigned, Constantinople was again considered necessary for a crusade to Jerusalem. See V. Laurent, "La Croisade et la question," p. 133, and his "Grégoire X," pp. 265–267; also the 13th-century theoretician Fidenzio of Padua, *Liber de recuperatione Terrae Sanctae*, in G. Golubovich, ed., *Biblioteca bio-bibliografica della Terra Santa e dell' Oriente francescano*, II (Quaracchi, 1913), 51. M. H. Laurent, *Le B. Innocent V*, p. 273, does not think Gregory was well informed as to the risks involved on the land route.

33. M. H. Laurent, *Le B. Innocent V*, pp. 256–286. Pachymeres, V, 26 (*CSHB*, I, 410) describes Charles as pressing the pope against Michael.

34. E. Van Moé, "L'Envoi de nonces à Constantinople par les papes Innocent V et Jean

waiting, launched a premature attack across the Adriatic against the Byzantine town of Berat in Albania, presumably with the ultimate aim of driving along the Via Egnatia to the Byzantine capital itself. At Berat Michael was, however, able to achieve a stunning military victory over Charles.³⁵

Still not daunted, Charles, at the death of Nicholas III, was able at long last to arrange for the elevation in 1281 of a pontiff favorable to his political aspirations, Martin IV. Soon after his enthronement Martin, repudiating the union of Lyons, excommunicated Michael and “urged” Charles to lead a crusade against “the Greek schismatics.”³⁶ The death knell of the Byzantine empire seemed about to sound, for in addition to the papacy Charles’s many allies now included the powerful Venetian fleet. But Michael was equal to the challenge. For some time he had been pursuing a diplomatic policy of allying himself with the pro-Hohenstaufen, anti-Angevin elements in Sicily, and also with king Peter III of Aragon, son-in-law of Manfred. Michael poured Greek gold into the coffers of the Aragonese king and at the same time subsidized the Hohenstaufen party in Sicily. Finally, on Easter Monday, March 30, 1282, a dramatic event, the Sicilian Vespers, occurred, the Sicilians rising in revolt against the hated Angevin rule. They were joined shortly by the forces of Peter of Aragon, and soon Charles’s troops were completely expelled from the island.

In this celebrated event the fine hand of Michael, even if active only behind the scenes, undoubtedly played a significant role.³⁷ Thus Michael VIII Palaeologus, largely through his diplomatic genius, saved his empire from Charles I of Anjou, whose plans constituted, in the entire period from 1261 to 1453, the most serious attempt to reestablish Latin rule over Byzantium. Charles’s preparations received considerable publicity in Constantinople and did a good deal to embitter the Byzantine attitude toward the west. More than ever the Greeks came to believe that any military succor coming from the west would ultimately be directed against Constantinople. Moreover,

XXI,” *Mélanges d’archéologie et d’histoire*, XLVII (1930), 48 ff.; V. Grumel, “Les Ambassades pontificales à Byzance après le II^e concile de Lyon (1274–1280),” *Échos d’Orient*, XXIII (1924), 437–447; J. Gay and S. Witte, eds., *Les Registres de Nicolas III (1277–1280)*, part 1 (Paris, 1898), pp. 76–86; Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael*, pp. 305–324.

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 329–334.

36. Bull of excommunication in Raynaldus, *Annales ecclesiastici*, ad ann. 1281, no. 25, and F. Olivier-Martin, ed., *Les Registres de Martin IV (1281–1285)* (Paris, 1901–1935), p. 100, no. 69, and p. 115, no. 78.

37. On Michael’s role in the Sicilian Vespers, see Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael*, pp. 344–367 and the bibliography cited there.

after Michael's attempt to ram the union of Lyons down the throats of the Byzantines, the latter became even more certain that a western crusade would bring with it the attempted conversion of the Greeks to Catholicism—the final result of which would be the Latinization of the Greek people. The Greek rabble, significantly, had shouted to Michael's legate on his return from Lyons: "*Efrangepses!*" ("You have [through accepting union] become a Frank!").³⁸ For the Latins, on the other hand, the memory of the Byzantine disavowal of the union of Lyons undoubtedly served to increase western suspicions of the Greeks, and thus the next two centuries, as we shall see, would witness failure after failure on the Latin side to provide Byzantium with any effective aid against the Turks.

Under Michael's son and successor Andronicus II Palaeologus (1282–1328) there was, as might be expected, a violent reaction in Byzantium against what appeared to be the pro-western orientation of Michael. No longer endangered by the threat of an Angevin crusade, Andronicus, reflecting popular sentiment, now reverted to a policy of overt anti-Latinism. The Greek churches were purified of "contamination" from association with the Latins, and it was the turn of Michael's adherents to be incarcerated, while the former anti-unionists returned to power from exile or imprisonment.³⁹ All that remained of the eight years of attempted communion with Rome was a growing Greek hatred of the Latins, which increased the more as subsequent popes excommunicated the Greeks⁴⁰ and accorded favor to a series of French pretenders who began to claim the Byzantine throne. Indeed, the popes of the late thirteenth century and the Avignonese popes of the early fourteenth continued the policy of Martin IV. In place of a precarious entente with the Greeks, they generally preferred a military effort at restoration of the Latin empire, their French orientation making them automatically partisans of the Valois claimants to the throne of the Latin empire of Constantinople.

One pope, however, Nicholas IV (1288–1292), did seek a peaceful solution to the problem—through a diplomatic marriage which, if we can believe a western source, he himself proposed between Catherine

38. Report of Metochites in M. H. Laurent, *Le B. Innocent V*, p. 424, note 23.

39. Nicephorus Gregoras, VI, I (*CSHB*, I, 160). The anti-union reaction was not complete: see Pachymeres, *De Andronico* . . . , I, 7 (*CSHB*, II, 22–23), emphasizing a celebration attended by Greeks and Latins in which only some of the Greeks gave candles to the Latins.

40. Clement V, the first Avignonese pope, excommunicated Andronicus II in 1307, and actually awarded the crusaders going against Byzantium the indulgences of an expedition to the Holy Land (Raynaldus, *Annales ecclesiastici*, ad ann. 1306, no. 25; ad ann. 1307, nos. 6–7).

of Courtenay, the titular empress of the Latin throne, and the Greek heir-apparent, young Michael (IX) Palaeologus.⁴¹ Andronicus II, on his side, riding the current of anti-Latinism, was at first uncertain of what policy to follow with respect to the pope,⁴² although one Byzantine source implies that the initiative was his.⁴³ In any event, he showed interest when he realized the possibility, through this marriage, of warding off a western threat to Constantinople in the person of a princess who, as granddaughter to the last Latin emperor, Baldwin II, had fallen heir to his claim to the Latin throne at the death in 1283 of her father Philip. The negotiations collapsed, however, the overpowering anti-unionist sentiment in Constantinople making it impossible for Andronicus to fulfill the papal condition for the marriage—recognition of the pope's supremacy over the Greek church. Soon thereafter, in 1295, Michael IX married Rita ("Maria Xenia"), a sister of king Hetoum II of Cilician Armenia, thereby foreclosing this opportunity to achieve a solution to the political disagreement between east and west.⁴⁴ Thereafter Andronicus, occupied with Byzantine internal affairs, remained largely indifferent to western developments until later, when the danger from the west once again became pressing.

As for Catherine, a succeeding pope, Boniface VIII, reverting to Martin IV's aggressive policy toward Constantinople, sought to marry her to a powerful western prince able to arouse Europe to a crusade against Byzantium. Indeed, according to one modern authority it was following a suggestion originally contained in a memoir (composed c. 1300) of the French legist and propagandist Peter Dubois, that in 1301 a marriage was concluded between Catherine and Charles of Valois, brother of the French king, Philip IV the Fair, thus giving Charles a claim to the Latin empire of Constantinople.⁴⁵ Dubois in another work, *De recuperatione Terre Sancte*, advised king Philip that on the return of the French "crusading" armies from recapturing Jerusalem they should, under Charles of Valois, stop on the way

41. See Bratianu, "Notes sur le projet," pp. 59–63, and Marinescu, "Tentatives de mariage," pp. 139–140.

42. In 1284 Andronicus II himself married Yolanda ("Irene"), daughter of William VII, marquis of Montferrat, so as to do away with the Montferratine claims to the Byzantine throne. Nicephorus Gregoras, VI, 2 (*CSHB*, I, 167–168) says that the pope withheld his approval.

43. *Ibid.*, VI, 8 (*CSHB*, I, 193), however, implies that the initiative was taken by the "king of Italy," Catherine's father. He says that the negotiations failed because of the excessive demands made by the westerners ("dia ta hyper to prosekon zetemata").

44. *Ibid.*, VI, 8 (*CSHB*, I, 193 ff.); cf. Bratianu, "Notes sur le projet," pp. 59 ff.; Marinescu, "Tentatives de mariage," pp. 139–140.

45. Dubois was ostensibly discussing how Philip IV could acquire universal domination. On all this see Delaville Le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, pp. 48 ff. On the memoir, see E.

and capture Constantinople from its unlawful ruler "Palerlog" [Andronicus II].⁴⁶ The might of France was to be thrown into the balance behind western designs against Byzantium.

Two western protagonists now arose to revive the old aspirations of Charles I of Anjou. Their support came from France and the Angevin kingdom of Naples. Philip of Taranto, the son of Charles II of Anjou, king of Naples, held Angevin territory in Epirus and claimed suzerainty over Latin Greece. In alliance with the Catholic Albanians Philip carried on minor military operations in the Balkans but accomplished little. More significant was the activity of Charles of Valois,⁴⁷ brother of Philip IV and husband of Catherine of Courtenay, who in 1306 entered into alliance with Venice, the enemy of Andronicus and of his Genoese allies. Venice could not resist the temptation to revert to its aggressive anti-Byzantine policy of 1204, especially in view of the fact that after 1261 Michael VIII had bestowed upon the Genoese most of the old Venetian privileges in the Byzantine empire. In June 1307 Charles of Valois prevailed upon pope Clement V, the first of the Avignonese popes, to support the projected undertaking by excommunicating Andronicus II and even offering to the "crusaders" who would combat Byzantium the same indulgences accorded to crusaders going to Jerusalem.⁴⁸ The anti-Byzantine alliance being organized won the adherence of Naples and of the Serbs under king Stephen Urosh II Milutin. Charles was even able to number among his supporters certain Byzantine nobles,⁴⁹ a circumstance revealing the degree of internal disorganization in Byzantium at this time.

Only a few years before, the famous Catalan Grand Company had appeared in the east.⁵⁰ A small but reckless and powerful group of adventurers from Catalonia and Aragon who had fought in the long war which culminated in the Sicilian Vespers, they had been deprived

Boutaric, *La France sous Philippe le Bel* (Paris, 1861), pp. 411–413; it is apparently still unpublished.

46. English trans. by W. I. Brandt, *The Recovery of the Holy Land* (Columbia University Records of Civilization, no. 51; New York, 1956), p. 172.

47. On Charles of Valois's plans, see Delaville Le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, pp. 40–47; Moranvillé, "Les Projets," pp. 63–86; and J. Petit, *Charles de Valois, 1270–1325* (Paris, 1900), pp. 114 ff. Cf. Ostrogorsky, *Byzantine State*, pp. 440–441.

48. Raynaldus, ad ann. 1306, nos. 2–5; ad ann. 1307, nos. 6–7: letter of Clement V to archbishop Reginald of Ravenna; cf. Viller, "La Question de l'union," *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, XVI, 270, note 2. See also Bouquet, "Byzance et les dernières offensives," p. 5.

49. Ostrogorsky, *Byzantine State*, p. 441: the governor of Thessalonica and the commander of Sardinia.

50. See below, pp. 167–171.

of employment with the signing of peace in 1302 at Caltabellotta between the Sicilian Aragonese and the Neapolitan Angevins. They then made their way to the east, where they offered their services to Andronicus. Most of the provinces of Byzantine Asia Minor had already been overrun by the advancing Ottoman Turks; the Ottoman peril to the remnant of Asia Minor had brought Byzantine affairs to a grave crisis, once again necessitating reorientation of Byzantine policy toward the west. Hence Byzantium's interest in any new Latin plans for a crusade.

The Mongol invasion of the mid-thirteenth century had stirred up the entire Near East. As a result several nomadic Turkish tribes had been pushed into Asia Minor, where they came into collision with the Selchükid principalities of the area or, farther west, with the Byzantine territory in Anatolia. The old Byzantine system of border defense utilizing the so-called *akritai* (border-defenders) had fallen into decay, in large part because of Michael VIII's preoccupation with the western danger. Michael's removal, in 1261, of the Byzantine administrative center from Nicaea to Constantinople had itself served to reduce the Byzantine powers of resistance in Asia Minor.⁵¹ After Michael's death in 1282 the meagerness of the funds in the imperial coffers brought about a further reduction of Byzantine military forces. Finally, the internal factor of the loosening ties between the central government and the provinces, or what has been termed the growing "feudalization" during the Palaeologian period, also hastened the decay of the Greek military freeholdings on the Anatolian frontier. These combined financial, social, and political considerations helped to undermine the Byzantine system of administration and defense in the east, the result being that by 1300 almost all Asia Minor had succumbed to the Turkish flood. Only a few Greek fortresses on the Aegean seacoast remained, along with the several Selchükid principalities.

At this critical juncture the leader of the Catalan Grand Company, Roger de Flor, offered his services to Byzantium against the Ottoman Turks in Bithynia. With the acceptance of the proposal by emperor Andronicus in 1303, the Catalans proceeded to defeat the Turks in several campaigns in Asia Minor. But emboldened by their success and disgruntled by the irregularity of their pay, the arrogant Catalans began to pillage Byzantine territory around Constantinople. Rela-

51. G. Arnakes, *The First Ottomans* (in Greek; Athens, 1947). Pachymeres, *De Michaelae* . . . , II, 28 (CSHB, I, 149) quotes the Byzantine writer Senacherim as seeing the supplanting of Nicaea by Constantinople as the chief cause of the weakening of the eastern frontiers.

tions between Greeks and Catalans grew increasingly tense until 1305, when suddenly Roger was assassinated in the palace of the imperial prince, Michael IX.⁵² Open warfare now broke out, with the Catalans plundering a wide range of Byzantine territory and even sacking the monasteries of Mount Athos.⁵³

It was in this period of acute distress for Byzantium that Charles of Valois reached an agreement against Andronicus with representatives of the Catalan Grand Company. In 1308 Charles's plenipotentiary, Theobald of Cépoys,⁵⁴ arrived in Euboea with Venetian vessels, whence he proceeded to Cassandrea, in Macedonia, in order to receive an oath of fealty from the Catalan Grand Company.⁵⁵ But the Catalans, indifferent to Charles's plans, did not implement the alliance. Instead, after ravaging Thessaly, they unexpectedly moved on to the weakened Burgundian duchy of Athens. On March 15, 1311, in a notable battle at the Cephissus river, they annihilated the numerically superior forces of the Frankish nobles. Thenceforth Frankish power in Thebes and Athens was replaced by Catalan; the principality they established at Athens and Thebes was to endure for over seventy years.⁵⁶

The withdrawal of the Catalans to Frankish Greece not only brought relief to Byzantium but left high and dry the aggressive plans of Charles of Valois.⁵⁷ Meanwhile, the legal claim of the Valois to the crown of Constantinople had, on the death early in 1308 of Charles's wife, Catherine of Courtenay, passed to her daughter Catherine of Valois. In 1313 the latter, though still a child, was married to Philip of Taranto, who thereupon formulated more intensive plans for the conquest of Constantinople.⁵⁸ Indeed, with the death of king Philip IV of France in 1314, and of his brother Charles of Valois in

52. Sources are Nicephorus Gregoras, VII, 3 (*CSHB*, I, 220 ff.) and Pachymeres, *De Andronico* . . . , V, 12 (*CSHB*, II, 393 ff.) for the Byzantine viewpoint. The Catalan Raymond Muntaner participated in the expedition (*Crònica*, ed. K. F. W. Lanz, Stuttgart, 1844; new ed. by "E. B.," Barcelona, 1927-1951, 9 vols. in 2; trans. J. A. C. Buchon in *Chroniques étrangères relatives aux expéditions françaises pendant le XIII^e siècle*, Paris, 1875). There is a large literature on this; see Ostrogorsky, *Byzantine State*, p. 439.

53. Vasiliev, *Byzantine Empire*, p. 606. No wonder the Byzantines feared the crusades: a few thousand trained Catalan troops could keep their formerly great empire in a state of anxiety and ruin. See below, pp. 167-169.

54. J. Petit, "Un Capitaine du règne de Philippe le Bel, Thibaut de Chépoy," *Le Moyen âge*, ser. 2, I (1897), 231-236, and his *Charles de Valois*, pp. 114 ff.

55. Ostrogorsky, *Byzantine State*, p. 441.

56. K. M. Setton, *Catalan Domination of Athens* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948); A. Rubió i Lluch, *Diplomatari de l'Orient català* (Barcelona, 1947). See below, chapters VI and VII.

57. Moranvillé, "Les Projets," pp. 63 ff.

58. L. de Mas-Latrie, *Commerce et expéditions militaires de la France* (Collection de documents inédits, Paris, 1880), pp. 62-78. For letters on the projected expedition to Constantinople, see Viller, "La Question de l'union," *RHE*, XVI, 270.

1325, Philip of Taranto remained as the only prince interested in a crusade to recover the Latin throne of Constantinople. In 1318 Philip allied himself with the Angevin king of Hungary, Charles Robert, and, in 1320, bought certain rights in the principality of Achaëa. He even secured papal support to call upon Frederick II, king of Sicily and a papal vassal, for help against Byzantium.

But Philip of Taranto's projects, though supported by the power of France and Naples, did not advance beyond the preparatory stage. The political and internal conditions of the west were simply not right for such an expedition. Thus the schemes of both Charles of Valois and Philip—pale imitations, one might say, of those of their more able predecessor Charles I of Anjou—eventually disappeared like smoke. Even avaricious but realistic Venice had in 1310 signed a ten-year non-aggression pact with Andronicus II.⁵⁹ Never again, in fact, was Venice to attempt to revive the now hopeless schemes of the Fourth Crusade. And in 1324 Venice, her traditional interest in the restoration of the Latin empire shelved, went so far as to inform Andronicus that the western princes had no intention of attacking the imperial city.⁶⁰

As for the papacy, its attempt to return to the policy of Innocent III had become anachronistic and could not be implemented in this century of "dé croisades." Indeed, the only westerners who now seemed eager to go to the east were merchants and mercenaries. This marked the end of any really serious attempt at western restoration of the Latin empire, though an occasional pretender to the Latin throne of Constantinople was not lacking even as late as 1494, when the French king Charles VIII would launch his fateful invasion of Italy, with Constantinople his probable ultimate objective.⁶¹

Despite the end of the ambitious designs of Charles of Valois and Philip of Taranto, sporadic but abortive attempts to use force against Byzantium continued to be made from time to time. Thus, in 1323 Andronicus learned that a French fleet in the service of pope John XXII and under the command of Amalric of Narbonne was on the point of setting sail for Constantinople.⁶² Alarmed by what he

59. On all this, see Ostrogorsky, *Byzantine State*, p. 442.

60. See Bouquet, "Byzance et les derniers offensives." But note, however, the Venetian Marino Sanudo Torsello's plans for coöperation between Byzantium and Venice for a crusade to recover Jerusalem, in his *Secreta fidelium crucis*, ed. Bongars, II, 281; cf. especially Sanudo's letters (dated 1324 and 1326) to Andronicus II on church union and the crusade (II, 299, 301).

61. See M. Gilmore, *World of Humanism* (New York, 1952), p. 151.

62. L. Bréhier, in *Cambridge Medieval History* (1927 ed.), IV, 614, and C. Diehl *et al.*, *L'Europe orientale de 1081 à 1453* (Paris, 1945), p. 223.

pope as his envoy the Genoese bishop of Kaffa in the Crimea, in order to assuage John's hostility by reopening the *pourparlers* for religious union.⁶³ In view of the calamities and dangers to his empire, it is not surprising that Andronicus felt he could not maintain to the end his uncompromising attitude toward the Latins of the earlier part of his reign. The pope's immediate reaction to Andronicus's *démarche* is not known, but several years later Andronicus made still another proposal. For, in 1326 (or 1327?), despite the categorical statement of Venice as to the cessation of western aggressive designs on Byzantium, king Charles IV the Fair of France had himself taken the cross. And it was this event, leading Andronicus to believe that French forces would soon be directed at Constantinople, which evoked the Greek emperor's new initiative. As his envoy the Greek emperor in 1327 sent to Paris a noble Genoese, Simon Doria,⁶⁴ who in diplomatic terms affirmed "the emperor's desire to live in peace with all Christians" and especially with the French ruler—in other words proposing a treaty of non-aggression together with a plan to seek union of the churches. At Paris and Avignon this was exaggeratedly interpreted as a promise of ecclesiastical union.⁶⁵

In the same year, acting in accord with pope John XXII, the French monarch, Charles IV, sent to Constantinople as his envoy a Dominican professor of the Sorbonne, Benedict Asinago of Como, with full powers to conclude a union of the churches.⁶⁶ When Benedict arrived in Constantinople, however, he found the capital torn by dissension, a virtual civil war having broken out between the old emperor Andronicus II and his young grandson Andronicus (III). Neither of the two antagonists wished to risk his position with the people by entering into negotiations with the papal envoy regarding union. Benedict's mission was therefore over before it had even begun and he returned empty-handed to France. A western monk, Philip Incontri, then living in Pera, across from Constantinople, explains in the following manner the reason for the reluctance of Andronicus II to deal with Benedict:⁶⁷ "The emperor, fearing that

63. Simon Doria (see below) may be the "bishop of Kaffa" sent by Andronicus, rather than Jerome, listed by C. Eubel, *Hierarchia catholica medii aevi* . . . , I (2nd ed., Münster, 1913; repr. 1960), 154, as elevated in 1322 and dead by 1324.

64. Bouquet, "Byzance et les dernières offensives," p. 6. The bishop of Leon, Garcla of Ayerbe, expressing his opinion on the crusades to Charles IV of France, said that the crusaders should go by land and envisage a Tatar alliance; they should first conquer the Greeks and then turn on the Moslems (Delaville Le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, p. 83).

65. Bouquet, *op. cit.*, p. 6, and cf. Diehl, *L'Europe orientale*, p. 223.

66. Bouquet, *loc. cit.*

67. See Thomas Kaeppli, "Deux nouveaux ouvrages de Frère Philippe Incontri de Péra," in *Archivium Fratrum Praedicatorum*, XXIII (1953), 172–173.

the Greeks of Constantinople would rise against him and deliver the empire to his grandson, Andronicus III, pretended . . . that his envoy [to the west] had imperfectly understood and had not in fact reported his exact words."⁶⁸ The implication in this statement seems to be that Andronicus II had previously made some kind of secret commitment regarding religious union to the pope and the French king, from which he was now seeking to back away.

As the report of Benedict states, Andronicus protested that the present time was inappropriate for realization of the union "because of the suspicions that our people generally have [for the Latins]" ("propter suspicionem quam haberet generaliter populus noster.").⁶⁹ To justify his conduct, Andronicus wrote to the French king explaining the state of affairs in Byzantium and enclosing a letter of apology.⁷⁰ The result was that pope John, after hearing the report of his emissary Benedict of Como, abandoned his plans for religious union.⁷¹ The French king himself died the following year (1328). Fate had again intervened to relieve Byzantium of another enemy seeking to conquer the empire under the guise of a crusade. This episode, though inconclusive, is significant because it shows that once more the west had given in to the illusion that the "conversion" of the Greek emperor would *ipso facto* guarantee that of his subjects.

The difficulties experienced by the pope in raising an army in the west—despite the several claims to the Latin throne of Constantinople—were due in great part to the internal political situation of the west. France and England were preoccupied with the quarrel which would culminate in the Hundred Years' War. Emperor Louis IV the Bavarian had withdrawn Germany from papal influence, while the papacy itself, in exile at Avignon, was unable to control even Italy. Venice and Genoa, the only two powers that could in any way be counted on, were more interested in assuring their profits than in undertaking a hazardous expedition of conquest.⁷² Moreover, the competition between Venetians and Genoese in the east was often encouraged by the Byzantine emperor himself when it served his purposes. Merchants of the two cities even trafficked with the Turks

68. Also H. Omont, "Projet de réunion des églises grecque et latine sous Charles le Bel en 1327," *Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes*, LIII (1892), 254-257.

69. *Ibid.*, p. 255.

70. Andronicus wrote two letters: Omont, "Lettres d'Andronique II au pape," *ibid.*, LXVII (1906), 587.

71. A curious passage in Cantacuzenus, II, 4 (*CSHB*, I, 335, line 16) relates that in 1328 the Germans sent an envoy to emperor Andronicus II asking monetary aid on the basis of an old alliance.

72. W. Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen-âge* (trans. Furcy Raynaud, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1885, repr. 1923, 1936, Amsterdam, 1967), *passim*.

in defiance of papal fulminations against the practice, and western knights, for the sake of adventure, not infrequently became mercenaries of the Turkish sultans. Finally, though the Venetians and Genoese were repeatedly able to put into battle against each other thirty to forty galleys, when called upon to fight the Turks they could contribute only three or four vessels for the service of Christendom. The "ecumenical" spirit of the earlier Middle Ages—a crusade presumably for the benefit of the west as a whole—seems to have almost completely evaporated.

In Byzantium, meanwhile, Andronicus II had been deposed by his grandson, who in 1328 assumed the imperial throne as Andronicus III. Once in power the latter reached a decision to continue the policy of friendliness to the Latins characteristic of the latter part of his grandfather's reign, and especially to reestablish friendly relations with the papacy—relations which had not really been cordial since 1281, the failure of the union of Lyons. Andronicus's policy was dictated by his preoccupation with the Turks, whose progress in Asia Minor during the reigns of Michael VIII and especially Andronicus II had become increasingly disastrous for Byzantium. Another factor affecting Andronicus's decision may well have been the influence of his second wife, Anna of Savoy, who as a Latin princess had formed a pro-unionist party in Constantinople.

In the same year (1327) that the shadow of Charles IV of France was cast over Constantinople, efforts had been initiated in the west to form a league against the Turks which would bring together those Latin powers with vital interests in the Levant.⁷³ The Turks, in order to attack the coastal Byzantine cities of Asia Minor more successfully, had taken to piracy and were now harassing both the Greek and the Latin possessions in the Aegean and Mediterranean seas. To protect the Latin crusader states in the east in the face of this danger, the pope and especially Venice sought to form a union to fight off the Turks. This proposal for an anti-Turkish front was implemented in Rhodes on September 6, 1332,⁷⁴ an agreement being signed by a representative of the Hospitallers of Rhodes and by Peter da Canale, the plenipotentiary of Venice, who found himself, in a complete reversal of Byzantine policy, also the representative of emperor Andronicus III.⁷⁵ The event is especially meaningful because it was the first time since before the Fourth Crusade that Byzantium had

73. Lemerle, *L'Émirat d'Aydin*, p. 54.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 92.

75. *Diplomatarium veneto-levantinum (1300–1454)*, ed. G. M. Thomas, I (Venice, 1880; repr. New York, 1965), no. 116, pp. 225–229.

become associated with any west European project for a great coalition, such as had long constituted its gravest danger. The realization had apparently finally dawned on at least a few Byzantines that the primary threat to Byzantium's existence lay not so much in the west but rather in the farther advance of the Turks.

The terms of the treaty were as follows: the Greek emperor—and this is extraordinary in view of the precarious state of Byzantine finances—was to furnish ten galleys for a period of five years; Venice was to provide six, the Hospitallers four. The fleet was to assemble at the port of Negroponte on April 15 of the following year (1333), and the commander was to be a Venetian.⁷⁶ But the coalition was not ready to take action until May of 1334, at which time the several signatories were joined by three more powers, king Hugh IV of Cyprus, king Philip VI of France, and the pope, John XXII, whose role had actually been decisive behind the scenes during earlier negotiations.⁷⁷ According to the anti-Latin Byzantine historian, Nicephorus Gregoras, the emperor felt compelled to join the coalition after receiving a menacing embassy from the western powers calling upon him to join his forces to theirs under penalty of being considered an enemy. The same author notes that Andronicus had to press his subjects hard to collect the gold required to equip a fleet of twenty ships.⁷⁸ Yet in the spring of 1335 when the fleet was in readiness the Latins, because of problems arising among themselves, defected.⁷⁹

Nevertheless, some naval operations, resulting in occasional debarkations in Asia Minor, did take place, with the result that for some months a certain protection was afforded to the Christian population, both Greek and Latin, of the Aegean area, along with greater security of navigation.⁸⁰ One of the more important achievements of the enterprise was the destruction in the gulf of Adramyttium of the Turkish fleet under Yahshi. The return of the allied fleets to their home ports, however, was not followed by the reconstitution of the expedition, since on December 4, 1334, pope John XXII died.⁸¹ For some time events in the west, especially the

76. *Ibid.*

77. Lemerle, *loc. cit.*; cf. Delaville Le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, pp. 97 ff., which gives different figures for negotiations at Avignon. The famous *Directorium ad passagium faciendum* of William Adam (ascribed to "Brocardus"; see below) was written as a guidebook for the king of France on the expedition.

78. Nicephorus Gregoras, XI, 1 (*CSHB*, I, 524).

79. *Ibid.* (I, 523-525): "Thoryvous kai tarachas hoi Latinoi choletentes apraktoi kai pseutheis peri tas eppaggelias ephanesan."

80. Lemerle, *L'Émirat d'Aydin*, p. 98.

81. Delaville Le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, p. 100.

hostility between France and England, prevented either power from joining a common naval front against the Turks. The final result was the dissolution of the coalition and the resumption of Turkish piratical activity in the Aegean.⁸²

With respect to the crusade, it should be noted that in this period the idea of a crusading expedition against the Greeks was gradually giving way in the west to the idea of a common Greco-Latin enterprise against the Turks menacing the Christian eastern possessions, both Greek and Latin. As we shall see, this attitude would be the prelude to the concept of saving Constantinople and the Balkans from the Turks by means of a crusade. The reasons for this significant change are to be found, as we have seen, in the awareness of the many difficulties involved in reestablishing the Latin empire of Constantinople, and, more especially, in the growing realization that perhaps more could be accomplished against the Turks through the collaboration of east and west on a plane of friendship and alliance. With respect to the last point, the influence of certain western theoreticians and promoters of a crusade was significant; in general they tended to discourage overt Latin aggression against the Greeks and to emphasize rather the importance of acquiring a knowledge of the east, its language, and its people. For this purpose missionaries were to be sent to the east.⁸³

Nevertheless, some of the most important crusader theoreticians—like William Adam and especially Raymond Lull—though accepting the need for collaboration with the Greeks, insisted that the Greeks first must be converted to Catholicism, by force if necessary. William Adam even suggested a kind of “brain-washing” of the Greeks, by sending one child from each Greek family to the west to be raised in the Latin faith. Later, Peter Dubois recommended that noble, educated Latin girls go to the east to do charity work in hospitals, the most comely to marry leading Greeks (clerics in particular!) in order ultimately to convert the entire east to the Catholic faith.⁸⁴

82. On these matters Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*, has been corrected by Lemerle, *L'Émirat d'Aydin*, p. 100, note 1.

83. Especially Golubovich, *Biblioteca bio-bibliografica*.

84. On all these see Geanakoplos, *Byzantine East and Latin West* (Oxford, 1966), p. 2. It should be noted that scholars now agree that the *Directorium ad passagium faciendum* was not written by “Brocardus.” According to Ch. Kohler, he never existed; see “Documents relatifs à Guillaume Adam archevêque de Sultaniyeh . . .,” *Revue de l'Orient latin*, X (1903–1904), 16–56, especially p. 17, and his “Quel est l'auteur du *Directorium ad passagium faciendum*?” *ibid.*, XII (1909), 104–111. But not all scholars agree that it should be attributed to William Adam; see F. Pall, in *Revue historique du sud-est européen*, XIX (1942), 27–29 (of offprint), and cf. below, p. 543, where it is attributed to “William Adam or (more probably) Raymond Étienne.” It is referred to hereafter, however, as the work of

In 1333, Andronicus III had entrusted to two Dominicans returning from a mission to the Mongols a message for pope John XXII.⁸⁵ Andronicus's letter was received favorably by the pope, who thereupon wrote to the principal dignitaries of the Greek empire, seeking to open negotiations for union through his envoy, the Genoese Pisani. The two Dominicans had returned to Constantinople with instructions from the pope, directing them to hold public discussions with the Greek clergy. But the mission of the papal ambassadors was rendered ineffective because of the intervention of the scholar Nicephorus Gregoras, who in an eloquent and lengthy speech argued against putting trust in the words of the Latin envoys. As Gregoras himself put it in his history: "In 1334 there came to Byzantium two bishops from the pope to discuss the peace and unity of the churches. When the people of Constantinople saw them they became excited. The patriarch and the bishops, ignorant of Latin, called upon Gregoras [who knew Latin] to talk with them. I, however, not considering their proposal worthy of attention, decided not to waste my time. However, to satisfy the patriarch and bishops, I got them together and gave a long speech explaining why they should pay no heed to them. . . ."⁸⁶ As the result of Gregoras's intervention, the negotiations came to nothing.

In 1335, in order to demonstrate his good will and at the same time not lose the possibility of future western help, Andronicus III consented to participate in a new crusade to recover the Holy Land, being organized under the leadership of the new pope Benedict XII and Philip VI, king of France. Philip's intentions regarding a crusade were probably more sincere than had been those of his uncle Philip IV the Fair.⁸⁷ For where Philip IV had used the crusade as a façade to gain other ends for the crown—church tithes, destruction of the Templars, and, probably, the conquest of Byzantium through his brother Charles of Valois—Philip VI seems to have desired a *passagium* (a full-scale crusade) to the Holy Land at least in part for religious reasons.⁸⁸ Pope John XXII, impressed by Philip's apparent zeal, had promulgated two bulls which gave the king the right to levy the tithe on church property for a period of two years. In 1333 the privilege was renewed for six years. Thus for this crusade all the

William Adam. On Lull, see S. Cirac Estopañán, "Ramon Lull y la union con los Bizantinos: Bizancio y España," *Cuadernos de historia Jerónimo Zurita*, III (Saragossa, 1954).

85. On earlier messages from this pope to the Mongols, see below, p. 543.

86. Nicephorus Gregoras, X, 8 (*CSHB*, I, 501 ff.).

87. S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, III (Cambridge, 1954), 1440.

88. Delaville Le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, p. 86.

resources of the church—revenues from tithes, church benefices, and indulgences—were put at the service of the French king.

Already in 1331 Philip had written to Venice to ascertain the conditions under which the Venetians would be willing to participate. But Venice took six months to answer. In fact it was less the Holy Land that interested Venice than her commerce in the Aegean, which was now endangered by the raids of the Turks in the area. In order to have a plan for the crusade Philip had asked for the drawing up of memoranda setting forth a definite program.⁸⁹ Among the propaganda writings produced was a detailed, carefully worked out scheme submitted by William Adam (erroneously ascribed to one Brocardus), who had lived in Lesser Armenia (Cilicia), and whose primary aim was the achievement of a religious union of the Armenians with Rome. William Adam's scheme was grandiose and interests us here primarily for what he had to say about Byzantium and the crusade. In his eyes an essential preliminary for the success of any western crusade to the Holy Land was the conquest and conversion of Byzantium.⁹⁰

In 1339 Andronicus, growing more and more fearful of the Turkish advance, which by 1338 had reached the Bosphorus across from Constantinople, sent a secret mission to pope Benedict XII. The embassy's aim was to secure western aid for a joint crusade against the Turks. It was the turn of the Greeks to take the initiative for a joint Greco-Latin expedition. Andronicus's envoys were the Venetian Stephen Dandolo and one of the most famous of Byzantine humanists, Barlaam, the Calabrian monk and *hegoumenos* of the monastery of the Savior in Constantinople. Arriving in Avignon the envoys eloquently pleaded the cause of Byzantium before the pope.⁹¹

In his plea Barlaam, the chief envoy, proposed two main points: the convocation of a general council at which the question of religious union would be discussed, and the organization of a crusade not only to recapture the Holy Land but to deliver the Christian towns of Asia Minor from the Turks. Andronicus's tactics are clear: he sought from the beginning to allay the deep anti-Latin fear of the Byzantine populace through the convocation of an ecumenical council—a council in which all the patriarchs would appear and open discussion would be held. Moreover, through the organization of a

89. *Ibid.*, pp. 86–87, and Lemerle, *L'Émirat d'Aydin*, pp. 90–91; Bouquet, "Byzance et les dernières offensives," p. 8.

90. *Directorium ad passagium faciendum*, in *RHC, Arm.*, II, 367 ff. Cf. Marino Sanudo's plan for Byzantine-Venetian coöperation for a crusade to Jerusalem, in his *Secreta fidelium crucis* (see above, note 60).

91. Gay, *Clément VI*, pp. 49–50.

crusade he envisaged, following the precedent of Alexius I and the plans of Michael VIII, the recovery of Byzantine provinces of Asia Minor from the Turks. Most important in his proposals was his insistence on discussions to be entered into before the consummation of union, a point directly contrary to papal policy, which insisted on the conclusion of union first and then discussion. These points, which were made in two speeches to the pope and the assembled cardinals of the curia, deserve at least to be summarized because Barlaam here states more clearly than anyone else the difficulties lurking in the minds of the Byzantines with respect to religious union. As he put it to the pope:⁹² "The emperor does not dare to manifest publicly that he desires union with you. If he did declare this, a great number of princes and men of the people, in the fear that he would renew the experience of Michael Palaeologus, would seek an occasion to put him to death."

As Barlaam realized only too well, the problem for the emperor was, in accordance with papal demands, to find the means to promise union and to begin its execution without at the same time irritating his subjects. For they did not want to hear even the suggestion of a Latin rapprochement.⁹³ Thus on behalf of the emperor, Barlaam proposed a formula that might without violence lead the Greeks to union and at the same time show the pope their sincerity. It was the suggestion of a general council to be held in the east. As he said,

You have two means peacefully to realize the union. You can either convince the scholars, who in their turn will convince the people, or persuade both people and learned men at the same time. To convince the learned men is easy, since both they and you seek only the truth. But when the scholars return home they will be able to do absolutely nothing with the people. Some men will arise who, either from jealousy or from vainglory, and perhaps believing they act rightly, will teach all exactly the opposite of what you will have defined. They will say to the Greeks, "Do not let yourselves be seduced by these men who have sold themselves for gold and are swelled up with pride; let them say what they wish, do not change anything of your faith." And they will listen to them. . . . To persuade therefore both the people and the learned men together there is only one way: a general council to be held in the east. For the Greeks admit that all that has been determined in a general council conforms to the faith. You will object, saying that already at Lyons a council to treat of union was held. But no one of the Greeks will accept that the Council of Lyons was ecumenical unless another council declares it so. The Greeks present at Lyons had been delegated neither by the four patriarchs who govern the eastern church nor by the people, but by the emperor alone, who, without seeking to gain their consent, wanted to

92. PG, CLI, cols. 1341 ff.; cf. Viller, "La Question de l'union," *RHE*, XVIII, 21-24.

93. Pears, *Destruction of the Greek Empire*, pp. 69-70, says that on his arrival at Avignon Barlaam pointed out that the Turks had seized four metropolitan sees and suggested that, as a condition for religious union, the Turks be expelled from Asia Minor.

achieve union by force. Therefore send legates to the four patriarchs; under their presidency a general council will be held which will make union. And all of us who will have been present at this council will say to the people, "Here is what the Holy General Council has decreed. It is your duty to observe its decisions." And all will submit.⁹⁴

At this point Barlaam added a crucial stipulation—that no such council could take place until the Latins first aided the Greeks to evict the Turk from the towns of Asia Minor. But the provision was flatly rejected by Benedict XII and his cardinals, who insisted that it was not proper to put in question an article of the faith which had already been defined.⁹⁵ Curiously enough, Gregoras was later to turn the same phrase against the Latins. Barlaam had not been given full authority to negotiate for the emperor, and in effect spoke in his own name. Andronicus III, in fact, afraid of public reaction in Constantinople to such a report, had dispatched him secretly to Avignon. Benedict and the curia argued every point raised by Barlaam, upholding the papal principle of conversion first, then military assistance. Despite the intense interest generated, the interview in the end produced only vague promises, and no concrete results came about.

Nevertheless, though his proposals were not accepted, Barlaam's speech remains of the utmost significance for understanding Byzantine psychology with respect to union. Having lived for long periods in both east and west, and being possessed of an equally good knowledge of both Latin and Greek, he was supremely qualified to assess the fears and hopes of each side. His program reflected accurately not only the political realities of the situation, but more important, the Greek attitude and complaints against the Latins, which sometimes they themselves perhaps did not fully understand, emotional as they had become in their psychology of a dominated people. As he put it so well: "The Greeks feel they have been wronged and it is up to you to offer a concession to them first." But Barlaam's words fell on deaf ears. He was too far ahead of his time—ahead of the Greeks because he realized that in order to save their empire, they had to overcome their deep prejudices and unite with the Latins to repulse the common enemy, the Turk. He was ahead of the Latins as well, since the west would not really begin to interest itself in the fate of the east until the Turks had approached so close as to begin to threaten the western European territories.

94. *PG*, CLI, cols. 1332 ff.; Viller, "La Question de l'union," *RHE*, XVIII, 22–23; also C. Giannelli, "Un Progetto di Barlaam per l'unione delle chiese," *Misc. Giovanni Mercati*, III (Studi e testi, 123; Vatican City, 1946), 171 and note 22.

95. Viller, *op. cit.*, *RHE*, XVIII, 23, quoting Nicephorus Gregoras, X, 8 (*CSHB*, I, 501); *PG*, CXLVIII, col. 717.

In the end the discussions failed, and Barlaam and his companion returned empty-handed to Byzantium. In his *pourparlers* Barlaam had emphasized that the Greeks, if they learned of the papal refusal to attend a general council, would accuse the Latins of being afraid of the truth.⁹⁶ And exactly as he had foreseen, the Greeks, especially Gregoras, turned against the pope his refusal to meet at a common council. Indeed, only a few decades later the influential Nilus Cabasilas, Greek metropolitan of Thessalonica, in his works *On the Causes of the Division of the Church* and *On the Primacy of the Pope*, would insist that one of the two basic causes for the schism was this very refusal of the pope to submit controversial doctrine to the judgment of a general council.⁹⁷

For several years following Andronicus's death in 1341 Byzantium was again the scene of civil war, this time between the usurper John Cantacuzenus and the widow of Andronicus III, the Latin empress Anna of Savoy, who sought to protect the rights of her minor son John V. If we can believe the testimony of Anna's bitter enemy, the emperor-historian Cantacuzenus, Anna during this civil strife (on October 21, 1343) dispatched to pope Clement VI an ambassador, the Latin Philip of St. Germain, bearing letters from her and from her minister the grand duke Alexius Apocaucus.⁹⁸ Expressing her devotion and that of her son to the Roman church, she asked the pope's mercy (*elaion*) for the "heresies" of the Greeks and pleaded for the dispatch of a fleet and army to defend Constantinople from the usurper John Cantacuzenus. The latter adds in his history that she affirmed to the pope that after the defeat of Cantacuzenus negotiations for religious union could openly (*phaneros*) be entered into. Clement responded favorably to her advances without however promising support other than in general terms.⁹⁹ Whether Anna at this time envisaged the launching of a full-scale "crusade" on her own behalf is doubtful; rather, in the Byzantine tradition, she too seems to have intended the dispatch of mercenary troops.¹⁰⁰

96. Viller, *op. cit.*, *RHE*, XVIII, 24.

97. PG, CXLIX, cols. 684 ff. Cf. L. Petit, "Les Évêques de Thessalonique," *Échos d'Orient*, V (1901), 94.

98. Not all scholars agree that she sent letters to the pope; Iorga, "Latins et grecs d'Orient et l'établissement des Turcs en Europe (1342-1362)," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, XV (1906), 183, accepts that she did.

99. Cantacuzenus, III, 87 (*CSHB*, II, 539-540); see Lemerle, *L'Émirat d'Aydin*, p. 183, for careful analysis.

100. There is a question here of "false" letters written by Anna's minister Apocaucus against the regent Cantacuzenus and borne secretly to Clement VI by a certain *praipositos* (Lemerle, *L'Émirat d'Aydin*, p. 183, note 1).

Whether or not we accept Cantacuzenus's statement that Anna had no scruples whatever in making promises to the pope, her sending an envoy to the pope seems only logical, given her hard-pressed situation. From Clement's correspondence with Anna, we may sense the illusions that were entertained at Avignon regarding the Greeks. Even before Anna's approach to the pope she had sent still another ambassador to Venice, seeking military aid against the Turks. Responding to her letter on May 12, 1343, the senate declared that Venice would do its best to aid her and that in fact a new anti-Turkish league composed of Cyprus, the Hospitallers, and king Robert of Naples was then in process of formation under the auspices of the pope. Anna's envoy also asked that Venice intervene with Stephen Dushan, ruler of the Serbs, to enlist his aid against Cantacuzenus. Again Venice reacted favorably, the senate designating a Venetian, Marino Venier, to accomplish the mission.¹⁰¹

Meanwhile Clement VI, reacting to Anna's proposals for religious union in exchange for aid against Cantacuzenus, sent out a series of individual letters, all looking toward the end of the schism. One was dispatched to Anna's crafty minister, Apocaucus, another to all the Greek bishops, still others to the monks of Mount Athos, to the commune of Pera, to the Venetian bailie in Constantinople, and finally to the Franciscan and Dominican convents in Pera. All were invited to aid the apostolic delegate in the task set before him.¹⁰² On October 27, 1343, Clement wrote again to Apocaucus, announcing to him that he was looking forward to the end of schism and that the Catholic confessor who was to be chosen by Apocaucus himself would have the power in the name of the pope to remit all of his (Apocaucus's) sins¹⁰³—as if this "concession" mentioned by the pope would have been a spur to Apocaucus, who was, if anything, even wilier than other Byzantines of the period! A few days later, on November 15, 1343, the pope also wrote to Demetrius Palaeologus, a relative of the emperor, encouraging his zeal in favor of the Roman faith. In this case, however, the pope prudently charged the Genoese podestà, the Dominican abbot, and the commune of Pera to work on

101. *Ibid.*, pp. 182–183. On August 8, 1343, Clement VI announced to Venice the formation of a new league—to include the Hospitallers, Cyprus, and himself—and requested Venice to contribute five or six galleys (a total of twenty ships were to meet at Negroponte but Euboea, Melos, and Paros were to furnish their own contingents). The Byzantine emperor rallied to this later; the league was to last three years. Meanwhile Genoa, Pisa, and Aragon loaned vessels to the pope (see Iorga, *Philippe de Mézières*, p. 40).

102. Lemerle, *L'Émirat d'Aydin*, p. 183.

103. E. Déprez, ed., *Clément VI (1342–1352): Lettres closes, patentes et curiales se rapportant à la France* . . . , fasc. 1 (Paris, 1901), no. 493, and cf. nos. 467, 491.

Demetrius in order to keep him well disposed to the question of union.¹⁰⁴

Evidence indicates that Clement was sincere in his desire for union with the eastern church. Thus in the letters he wrote to the titular Latin patriarch of Constantinople, Henry of Asti, then in residence at Negroponte, to the Dominicans of Pera, and even to the Venetian and Genoese colonies of Constantinople, the pope urged them to exert every effort to prepare for the union.¹⁰⁵ His unionist enthusiasm notwithstanding, Clement nevertheless demonstrated precisely the same point of view as his papal predecessors in his insistence that the sending of military aid to Constantinople must be contingent on the eastern church's prior abjuration of the schism.

In the same year (1343), and probably even before receiving the appeal contained in Anna's letter, Clement authorized the preaching throughout western Europe of a crusade against the Turks.¹⁰⁶ For this purpose he made plans for the reorganization of the old naval league which had been formed in 1334 at the instance of pope John XXII. This was the first step in the initiation of the famous crusade against the important Turkish-held port of Smyrna in Asia Minor. For such an enterprise it would have been logical for Clement to seek adhesion to the coalition by Byzantium, that is, by its regent Anna of Savoy.¹⁰⁷ It is clear, however, that Byzantium took no active part in the expedition that was soon launched. Actually the aim of the campaign was twofold: to crush the growing menace of the Selchukid principality of Aydin, of which Smyrna was the chief port, and to suppress the resurgent Turkish piracy in the Aegean, for which Smyrna was the primary base. At the head of the papal galleys Clement placed the Genoese lord Martin Zaccaria. From the Byzantine view this was an affront, since he hated the Byzantines, who had expelled him in 1329 from his possession of Chios.¹⁰⁸ As supreme commander of the entire expeditionary force, however, the pope appointed the patriarch Henry of Asti,¹⁰⁹ who had strict orders not to permit the deflection of the expedition to any other objective.

104. *Ibid.*, nos. 522-523; cf. Lemerle, *L'Émirat d'Aydin*, p. 183, note 2.

105. See Lemerle, *loc. cit.*, and Cantacuzenus, *loc. cit.*

106. A papal bull authorizing contributions for a crusade was launched on September 30, 1343 (Iorga, "Latins et grecs," p. 189; *Philippe de Mézières*, pp. 40 ff.).

107. In 1343, during negotiations with Anna, the Dominican Philip Incontri of Pera (Kaepelli, "Deux nouveaux ouvrages," pp. 172-173) wrote the pope that the crusading forces being prepared for Smyrna should make a demonstration before Constantinople and that the recalcitrant people would then obey Anna.

108. Iorga considers his appointment a mistake ("Latins et grecs," pp. 190-191).

109. Lemerle, *L'Émirat d'Aydin*, p. 187. Iorga ("Latins et grecs," pp. 192 ff.) errs in

John Cantacuzenus was the ally of the Selchükid emir of Aydin, Umur Pasha, and it was therefore to the interest of Anna and her court at Constantinople to spur Clement in every way possible to a crusade against Smyrna.¹¹⁰ We shall not enter here into the complexities of the campaign against Smyrna. In a preliminary naval battle the Turks are supposed to have lost as many as fifty ships.¹¹¹ Martin Zaccaria, the papal naval commander, who hated Cantacuzenus, would have liked to use the papal galleys in the reoccupation of Chios, which he contended could be used to advantage as a base against Smyrna. The pope, however, refused his suggestion, not only because it was contrary to the original plans but more especially on the grounds that it would compromise the hope for reunion of the Greeks with Rome and might even push the Greeks into an alliance with the Turks.

The crusading expedition to Smyrna had been long and secretly prepared, and the Turks of Umur were taken by surprise. Cantacuzenus had gotten wind of the expedition, but the letter he wrote from Demotica to his ally Umur apprising him of the western advance came too late.¹¹² His letter reveals that in the Greek east, in any case, the preparations of the west for the crusade were known. The expedition remained purely Latin, however, there being no record that Byzantine ships—those of Anna—participated.¹¹³ Cantacuzenus of course was considered an enemy by the Latins. After some fighting, the western fleet finally took the port area of Smyrna, and the town itself, but the Turks continued for many years to hold a fort situated high on a nearby hill, commanding the city.¹¹⁴ Thus the crusade was not yet over, for the crusaders in the city, who were under pressure from the Turks in the fort, had to be relieved, and an

preferring Peter Thomas, on whom see the biography by Philip of Mézières edited by Smet, and the studies by Iorga and Boehlke cited in the bibliographical note.

110. On Byzantium and the league of 1343, see Iorga, *Philippe de Mézières*, p. 40, notes 6, 7; Raynaldus, *Annales ecclesiastici*, ad ann. 1344, no. 2; and Heyd, *Histoire du commerce*, I, 383. For works on the crusade to Smyrna, see Gay, *Clément VI*; Iorga, "Latins et grecs," pp. 179–222; Chevalier, *La Croisade du dauphin Humbert II*; Iorga, *Philippe de Mézières*, pp. 33–62; Delaville Le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, pp. 103–110; C. Faure, "Le Dauphin Humbert II à Venise et en Orient (1345–1347)," *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire*, XXVII (1907), 509–562; Lemerle, *L'Émirat d'Aydin*, pp. 187 ff. Also see B. T. Goryanov, "An Anonymous Unpublished Byzantine Chronicle of the Fourteenth Century" [in Russian], *Vizantiiskii Vremennik*, II (1949), 276–293.

111. Atiya, *Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*, p. 293. On these events cf. Nicephorus Gregoras, XIII, 13 (*CSHB*, II, 689), and Cantacuzenus, III, 68 (*CSHB*, II, 420–423).

112. Lemerle, *L'Émirat d'Aydin*, p. 186.

113. Although the absence of affirmative evidence cannot be considered conclusive proof of Byzantine non-participation, other considerations make such participation improbable.

114. Atiya, *op. cit.*, pp. 294–298.

adequate permanent garrison installed. Moreover, the pope had additional plans in mind; he intended, it seems, to strengthen the league by securing more troops. At the same time he sought to assist the Genoese in defending their colony of Kaffa in the Crimea, which was being invested by the Tatars.

At this critical juncture for the Latin states in the east, there came onto the scene a man who was to remain at the center of events for some years, the western noble Humbert II, dauphin of Viennois. He was imbued with the old crusading spirit and fervor but was incompetent as a military commander, a fact which was to result in the ultimate failure of the crusade. Humbert had taken the cross at Avignon and had been named by the pope captain-general of the apostolic see and chief of the army of the Christians against the Turks.¹¹⁵ Recent scholarship has shown that a supposed victory on his part over the Turks at the Greek island of Lesbos in full winter at the start of February 1346 is mere legend.¹¹⁶ At any rate, in June of 1346 he finally arrived before Smyrna. Regarding the events which followed, western accounts differ remarkably and Byzantine sources offer little help.¹¹⁷ We shall concentrate here only on those events which involved or had a direct influence on the Byzantines. After leaving Smyrna, having accomplished nothing, and while spending the winter of 1346-1347 at Rhodes, Humbert wrote to Clement at Avignon. In his response the pope made the very firm point that, despite Humbert's request for papal permission to intervene on behalf of Anna against Cantacuzenus, he did not feel it to be proper, certainly not until the treaty with the Turks had been concluded.¹¹⁸ Clement's remark reveals his sensitivity to the delicate power balance in the east, especially his desire to keep on good terms with both sides so as not to destroy any prospect for union.

The commander of the Venetian fleet in the crusade of Humbert, Nicholas Pisani, had in the meantime gone with a companion to the court of Constantinople in an attempt to persuade the empress Anna

115. Lemerle, *L'Émirat d'Aydin*, p. 194, note 3, remarks that on these events Atiya (*op. cit.*, pp. 303-318) is insufficiently critical. Humbert sought command of this crusade, offering troops and 1,000 arbalesters (Iorga, *Philippe de Mézières*, p. 45, note 3).

116. Lemerle, *L'Émirat d'Aydin*, pp. 195-196, on the basis of *Storie pistoresi*, ed. S. A. Barbi, in Muratori, *RISS*, XI, pt. 5 (Bologna, 1627; rev. ed. 1907-1927); cf. C. Faure, "Le Dauphin Humbert II," p. 529.

117. Lemerle uses here a new Turkish source on Umur, the *Düstürnâme* of Enveri, published as *Le Destân d'Umûr Pacha*, ed. and trans. I. Mélikoff-Sayar (Bibliothèque byzantine, documents, no. 2; Paris, 1954).

118. Lemerle, *L'Émirat d'Aydin*, pp. 199-201, note 1: the pope instructed Humbert to lie off Constantinople and not to interfere in the civil war between Cantacuzenus and Anna.

to cede, temporarily, to the crusader forces the adjacent island of Chios as a base of operations against the Turks.¹¹⁹ Evidently the tension between the Greeks of Anna's party and the Latins had slackened somewhat and the possibility of an anti-Turkish entente between east and west had grown stronger. Clement's letter to Anna,¹²⁰ dated June 15, 1346, seems in any case to give this impression. Any such possibility was, however, quashed by the Genoese, who coveted Chios in the interests of their own trade. And so the Genoese in the same year dispatched a fleet to Chios and seized it from the Greeks for themselves. The Greeks, as well as the Venetians and the other western powers involved in Humbert's expedition, were angered.¹²¹

It is noteworthy that while Humbert was in the east he made attempts to treat with the Greeks personally on the problem of ecclesiastical union. The talks appear to have been of little consequence, however. And soon afterward, irritated by the constant bickering of his Latin allies, Humbert sought and received permission from the pope to retire from the crusading expedition.¹²² This ended any actual or potential connection of Byzantium with the ill-fated crusade. Nevertheless, Humbert's interest in the Greek east seems to have been long-lasting, for on his return to France in the summer of 1347 (he entered a Dominican convent) he set up scholarships at the University of Paris, many of which he reserved for young men belonging by birth to Greece and the Holy Land. These men were to teach Greek in the Dominican convents of France and do missionary work in the east.¹²³ Despite his keen interest in the Levant, however, Humbert was out of step with his age. A genuine idealist, he would have been more at home in the crusades of the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries. His inability to act independently and the lack of scruple exhibited by the Italian cities of Venice and Genoa brought his crusading efforts to nothing. Nevertheless, he is one of the first examples of a western layman who, as a result of personal contact with the east, encouraged the study of Greek in a Latin university and who took a special interest in missionary activity. With respect to the problem of the crusade, though, the whole expedition of Humbert was futile; its primary

119. Atiya, *op. cit.*, p. 311.

120. Letter of Clement commending the crusaders to Anna: see Gay, *Clément VI*, pp. 70-71, and Atiya, *op. cit.*, pp. 311-312.

121. Nicephorus Gregoras, XV, 6 (*CSHB*, II, 765-767; *PG*, CXLVIII, col. 1005); Cantacuzenus, III, 95 (*CSHB*, II, 582-583; *PG*, CLIII, col. 1269).

122. Iorga, "Latins et grecs," pp. 202-204.

123. Atiya, *op. cit.*, p. 317.

importance lay in its indication that the pope and the western church were finally ready to regard an expedition to Asia Minor as a genuine crusade. The attention of the west had thus definitely shifted from the Mamluk Turks of Egypt and Syria to the Ottomans and other Turks of Asia Minor. For the Byzantines the expedition was important because as a result of it they had lost Chios and Phocaea to the Genoese. Nevertheless, since the Greeks were the principal victims of the Turks in that area, prospects were now brighter for the formation of a joint Byzantine-Latin front against the Turks. From such a coalition the Byzantines would naturally derive the chief profit.

After a prolonged civil war John Cantacuzenus was finally able to crush the party of Anna and on February 3, 1347, to return victorious to Constantinople. He then established himself and young John V as co-emperors. The civil war, so destructive to the Byzantine state territorially, economically, and morally, was temporarily ended. During the conflict Cantacuzenus had taken an action which at the time did not seem fraught with real danger for the Greeks. In the winter of 1344–1345 John Cantacuzenus, after obtaining the approval of his close friend and ally Umur, emir of Aydin, had sought an alliance with his former enemy Orkhan, the Ottoman emir of Bithynia. This new alliance Cantacuzenus sealed with the marriage of his daughter Theodora to the sexagenarian Orkhan. It was Orkhan's assistance that helped to produce his triumph over the Latin-oriented party of Anna. But it is important to note that as a result of the new alliance between Orkhan and Cantacuzenus the Ottomans, as Cantacuzenus's mercenaries, were now for the first time brought across the Dardanelles into Europe.¹²⁴

Cantacuzenus was nonetheless worried over the reaction of the pope and the western rulers to his alliance with the Ottomans. Indeed, after his triumphal entrance into Constantinople he confided his apprehensions to Bartholomew of Rome, former vicar of the Latin patriarch, who had previously been sent by Humbert to Anna. Evidence is to be found in two letters sent by Bartholomew at this time or soon after to pope Clement VI and Humbert, from which it may be inferred that Cantacuzenus informed him that he intended not only to reestablish the union of the churches but even to fight on the side of the papacy against the Turks.¹²⁵ But Cantacuzenus was a Byzantine in the convoluted diplomatic tradition of Michael VIII, and so he at the same time continued to maintain his relationship

124. Ostrogorsky, *Byzantine State*, pp. 463–464.

125. Cantacuzenus, IV, 2 (*CShB*, III, 12–20); cf. Lemerle, *L'Émirat d'Aydin*, p. 224.

with Orkhan, which was of use to him in his conflict against the Serbs.

Our knowledge of the negotiations between John VI Cantacuzenus and Clement was formerly derived only from John's own history, which is certainly biased and often chronologically confused. But information from documents published recently enables us to see the drift of Cantacuzenus's negotiations with the papacy. In meetings held in Constantinople (September 1 to October 9, 1347) before the emperor, between Bartholomew of Rome and John's three ambassadors—the protovestiarius George Spanopulus, the official Nicholas Sigerus, and the Latin knight from Auvergne, Francis du Pertuis—Cantacuzenus recognized "the primacy and universality of the Roman church" and engaged himself to observe toward Rome the same obedience as the king of France.¹²⁶ So what the Greek emperor had so long feared might now come to pass. Cantacuzenus would, according to this affirmation, be regarded as simply another ruler subservient (like those of the west) to the pope. In order to end the schism he proposed the calling of a council to be held in a maritime city situated halfway between Constantinople and Avignon.¹²⁷ While requesting that the pope intervene with the Serbian ruler Stephen Dushan, who had "unjustly" occupied Greek territories, Cantacuzenus offered to participate personally in a crusade against the Turks,¹²⁸ evidently even against his own ally, the emir of Aydin. In another letter (March 5, 1348), John repeated his earlier offers and for a crusade proposed to furnish either four thousand men or fifteen to twenty thousand, depending on whether the west at this time envisaged only a *parvum passagium* with a limited objective or a full-scale crusade (*generale et magnum sanctum passagium*).¹²⁹

Clement quickly acknowledged reception of Cantacuzenus's embassy, but, well informed as to the situation in the east, he was apparently suspicious of Cantacuzenus's motives and thus gave only a vague answer to his proposals. Indeed, a considerable period was to elapse before Clement in turn dispatched representatives to Constantinople, with instructions to begin negotiations for union. What is important in all these complex negotiations is that Cantacuzenus had made a secret, solemn commitment to fight in person with all his forces against the Turks, even against his old ally Umur, the emir of Aydin.

126. R. J. Loenertz, "Ambassadeurs grecs auprès du pape Clément VI (1348)," *Orientalia Christiana periodica*, XIX (1953), 180–184; cf. Lemerle, *L'Émirat d'Aydin*, p. 225.

127. Loenertz, *loc. cit.*; also Pears, *Destruction of the Greek Empire*, p. 83.

128. Cantacuzenus, IV, 9 (*CSHB*, III, 53–62).

129. Loenertz, *op. cit.*, pp. 178–196; cf. Gay, *Clément VI*, pp. 104 ff.

More important from the papal side, Clement reacted favorably to the suggestion for the calling of a council. This was the first time in centuries that a pope had agreed to this condition of the Greeks. The way was now open not only for a full-scale east-west crusade to eject the common enemy from Asia Minor but, no less significant, for the holding of an ecumenical council which could finally and irrevocably unite the long-separated churches. Once more, however, the time was not propitious. The disruptive situation in the east, the turmoil in France and England of the Hundred Years' War, and the perennial internal troubles of Italy, not to speak of the devastation sown throughout all of Europe in 1348 by the Black Death—at least one third of the entire population of Byzantium and the west perished of plague—conspired to delay any such coöperation. Negotiations, nevertheless, continued between the papacy and Byzantium, to be terminated only in 1352 with the death of Clement.¹³⁰

For the west, all that remained of the complex campaigns and negotiations connected with the crusade to Smyrna was the Latin occupation of the port. The Greeks, on the other hand, who had technically stood aloof, gained little or nothing. Indeed, they had lost the important island of Chios, and Phocaea as well. Nevertheless, later in the fourteenth century, the famous Byzantine scholar and statesman Demetrius Cydones, seeking to emphasize to his countrymen the advantages of a new Greco-Latin alliance, would point back to the Latin possession of Smyrna as an example of the efficacy of Latin military intervention in the east.¹³¹

A direct result of the Latin possession of Smyrna was an embassy sent to the pope in 1352, shortly before Clement's death, by the Greek inhabitants of the Anatolian city of Philadelphia. In this embassy, which was received by Clement's successor Innocent VI, the Greeks sought succor from the pope against the persecutions of the Turkish emirates, which had now completely encircled their city. Papal sponsorship of the expedition at Smyrna must have made a considerable impression on the population of Philadelphia. For in exchange for papal protection the Philadelphians sought to place themselves and their city, in perpetuity, under the hegemony of the pope "in all that concerns temporal affairs (*ad temporalia*)," that is, to become "vassals" of the pope but without abandoning their

130. Gay, *Clément VI*, pp. 107 ff.; Lemerle, *L'Émirat d'Aydin*, pp. 226 ff.

131. When Cydones later urged the Byzantines to accept the aid of Amadeo VI of Savoy, he reminded them of the effectiveness of Latin aid at Smyrna (*PG*, CLIV, col. 981; Loenertz, *Les Recueils de lettres de Démétrius Cydones*, Vatican City, 1947, pp. 111-112). Cydones says the Greeks reaped the profit (*kerdos*) of the Latin sacrifices in the taking of Smyrna.

Orthodox faith. Innocent VI, with rather unwarranted severity, wrote back to Philadelphia emphasizing his demand that its people should first abandon the schism and recognize the primacy of the Roman church "in order to avoid eternal punishment, which is something much graver than the peril of the Turk." Once this was done, he affirmed, God would imbue them with enough strength so that one man alone could triumph over a thousand Turks. After abjuration of the schism let them (the Philadelphians) send new envoys, after which the pope in turn would dispatch Latin theologians to instruct them, and perhaps one day he could also aid them to secure victory.¹³² The pope's answer seems to us today rather callous in view of the near-desperate situation of the city. In any event, this dramatic plea of Greek citizens to the pope from a city in far-off Asia Minor, though in itself not of much importance, enables us to see with great clarity the dilemma of the Greeks—desperate in their need for military aid but at the same time unwilling to accept the western demand to relinquish their traditional faith, a faith which to them was their mark of identity. How much more severe the punishment of God would be, they must have thought, were they voluntarily to give up the purity of their own faith in exchange for papal aid.

The installation of Cantacuzenus on the Byzantine throne,¹³³ besides ending the civil war, had still another result: it confirmed the triumph of the hesychastic movement. Hesychasm, which emphasized a kind of spiritual union of man and God already in this life, had been flourishing mainly among the monks of Mount Athos, and at the council in 1356 it was proclaimed as official Orthodox doctrine. The entire empire had been drawn into the religious discussion over hesychasm. One side, the anti-hesychasts, are sometimes viewed as representing the Latinophile outlook;¹³⁴ Barlaam was their spokesman, while Gregoras had come forward as the leader of the hesychastic, pro-nationalist outlook. In contrast to Michael VIII, who was considered sympathetic to the Latins, Andronicus II and John VI may be considered as proponents of the Orthodox, more conservative outlook.

This period of struggle between rival claimants to the Byzantine throne permitted the rise to power of the Serbian ruler Stephen Dushan. Assuming the imperial title itself—he styled himself "emper-

132. On the exchange of letters, see Lemerle, *L'Émirat d'Aydin*, pp. 236–237.

133. Cantacuzenus evidently used German mercenaries (I, 20; *CSHB*, I, 98).

134. Not always justifiably, as the division between pro-Latin and anti-Latin did not invariably correspond to the beliefs for and against hesychasm; see, for example, J. Meyendorff, *A Study of Gregory Palamas*, trans. George Lawrence (London, 1964), p. 16.

or of the Serbs and Greeks”—Stephen conquered almost the whole of Macedonia (except Thessalonica), Albania, Epirus, Thessaly, and other areas. At the end Dushan had control of more than half of the old Byzantine territories.¹³⁵ He lacked Constantinople, but for its capture he needed a fleet. Nevertheless, despite all his blandishments in their direction the Venetians, whose fleet he coveted, did not intend to see the weak Byzantine empire replaced with a strong Serbian power.

Conditions in other spheres also worsened for Byzantium. At sea the Genoese, as we have seen, had recaptured Chios in 1346, and the Byzantine naval power, which had revived under Andronicus III and been further strengthened by Cantacuzenus at heavy cost, was destroyed. Hemmed in at sea between Venice and Genoa, two enemies constantly at war in Greek waters, Byzantium had now sunk to a pitiful state, while on land she was defeated and humiliated by the Ottomans and the Serbs. Even worse was the economic status of the empire: Byzantine trade was ruined (most of it being usurped by the Genoese of Galata), the population was in no position to pay taxes, agriculture was in a state of ruin, and the value of the hyperper (*hyperpyron*) itself was diminishing daily. The depths to which the Byzantine state had sunk are almost unbelievable.

In the dissolution of the Byzantine empire in this last century of its life the effects of the constant Venetian-Genoese wars should not be underestimated. Ensconced in Galata, across from Constantinople, the Genoese, formerly the allies of Michael VIII Palaeologus, were able to interfere frequently in Byzantine affairs, especially when their extensive trading privileges were affected. But this brought them into constant collision with their rivals, the Venetians, who controlled Modon and Coron in the Morea, Euboea, and especially the islands of the southern Aegean. Of course the antagonists in this intense commercial rivalry took no note of the weakening effect it had on Byzantium and of the opportunity it offered the Turks. All was subordinate to the profits that could be extracted from the corpse of Byzantium. Cantacuzenus struggled against the Genoese as the more dangerous of the two rivals, but the empire could not free itself from the Genoese yoke.¹³⁶ A war broke out over Genoese attempts to block the passage of foreign—especially Venetian—vessels through the Dardanelles and Bosporus into the Black Sea, particu-

135. Ostrogorsky, *Byzantine State*, pp. 466 ff. In 1354 Dushan sent to Avignon offering his submission to Rome if the pope would name him captain-general against the Turks; nothing came of this (Iorga, "Latins et grecs," p. 217).

136. Ostrogorsky, *Byzantine State*, p. 471. Cantacuzenus had converted the Byzantine part of the Morea into a semi-autonomous despotate.

larly to the port of Kaffa. Aragon, Venice, Genoa, and indirectly Orkhan were all involved, the only result being the further humiliation of Byzantium and a Byzantine promise to cede to Venice the island of Tenedos.

All this was rendered even more complicated by the renewal of the civil war between John VI Cantacuzenus and the legitimate emperor, his son-in-law John V Palaeologus. Sentiment in Constantinople began to favor the legitimate dynasty, especially after the advance of the Ottoman Turks across the Dardanelles and their seizure of Gallipoli. The population of Constantinople was seized by panic and the position of the usurper Cantacuzenus became untenable. The prominent scholar-statesman of the period Demetrius Cydones testifies that lamentations resounded throughout Constantinople as the citizens wailed, "Are not all of us within the walls caught as if in the net of the barbarians?"¹³⁷ John V, meanwhile, to secure Genoese support, had promised them the Greek island of Lesbos, and in November 1354, with Genoese help, the partisans of John V were able to force their way into Constantinople. Compelled to abdicate, John Cantacuzenus entered a monastery and thenceforth took no further part in politics, spending his last years writing his famous history and theological tracts defending hesychasm. The Byzantine empire seemed on the verge of complete collapse.

137. *PG*, CLIV, col. 1013.