During his lifetime Saladin had already distributed the provinces incorporated in his empire to members of his own family, with virtually sovereign powers. Three of his sons held the chief governments in Egypt and Syria: al-Afdal 'Ali, the eldest, at Damascus, az-Zahir Ghazi at Aleppo, and al-'Aziz 'Uthman in Egypt. The fourth major government, that of the Jazira with upper Mesopotamia and Diyar-Bakr (with its capital at Maiyafariqin) was held by his brother al-'Adil Saif-ad-Din, whose son al-Mu'azzam Isa governed his second province of Kerak and Transjordan as al-'Adil's deputy. Three lesser provinces in Syria were held by other relatives: Hamah by al-Manfur Muhammed (son of Saladin's nephew Taqi-ad-Din), Homs by his cousin's son al-Mujahid Shirkuh II, and Baalbek by al-Amjad Bahram-Shah (son of his nephew Farrukh-Shah).  

On Saladin's death (March 4, 1193) the unity imposed by his personality and authority was disrupted, and all the provinces (except that of Kerak) became in effect separate and independent principalities. The consequence was to endow Syria with a new kind of political structure. Outwardly it resembled in its fragmentation

No detailed study of the Aiyubid period has yet been made, and many of the principal contemporary sources are still in manuscript, particularly the history of Ibn-Wasil of Hamah (partially reproduced in the chronicle of Abul-Fida'), the chronicle of Sibt ibn-al-Jazari (facsimile ed., Chicago, 1907), and that of Kamal-ad-Din ibn-al-'Adim of Aleppo (tr. E. Blochet, Paris, 1900). Of less importance are the Kamil of Ibn-al-Athir (vol. XII, Leyden, 1853; portions ed. and tr. in RHC, Or., II, 1; ends in 1234), the continuation of the Raudat al-Ain of Abu-Shamah (Cairo, 1947; portions ed. and tr. in RHC, Or., V), and other surviving minor chronicles. Some materials from sources no longer extant are found in later general chronicles, especially those of adh-Dhahabi and al-Maqrizi. For general European works covering the period see the bibliography to chapter XV.

1 All the Aiyubid princes were designated by an attribute following the title al-malik, and by an honorific substantive compounded with "ad-Din", followed by the proper name. For brevity and consistency their names will be given as above (where al-Afdal 'Ali, for example, stands for al-malik al-Afdal Nur-ad-Din 'Ali ibn-Yusuf), except in the few cases where the compounded title is the more commonly used, as in the case of Saladin himself (an-Nasir Shalal-ad-Din Yusuf ibn-Aiyub) and his brother al-'Adil Saif-ad-Din (Abu-Bakr ibn-Aiyub).

2 The ninth Aiyubid province in southern Arabia (Yemen) lasted only until 1229, generally under Egyptian suzerainty, but in 1232 another was set up at Hisn Kaifa in Mesopotamia, which lasted until the Ottoman conquest of Iraq under Sulaiman the Magnificent.
the pre-Selçukid period; and the superficial disturbances caused by rivalries within the Ayyūbid family, by the ambitions of some of its members, and by the struggles of the princes of Damascus and Aleppo to maintain their independence against their more powerful kinsmen in Egypt and Mesopotamia, give the history of the Ayyūbid period an appearance of anarchical disorder. But in reality it was closely knit together by a basic family solidarity, reinforced by intermarriages and by the moderating influence of a powerful religious bureaucracy, which carried on the traditions of Nur-ad-Dīn and Saladin. The lesser princes, especially those of Hamah and Homs, played an important part in maintaining the balance between rival forces (primarily in order to preserve their own principalities from absorption); and even when the Ayyūbids themselves were crushed out of existence between the Mamluks and the Mongols, the structure which they created survived in the institutions of the Mamluk empire.

The stability of the Ayyūbid regime is shown further by the rapid growth of material prosperity in Syria and Egypt, and the remarkable expansion of literary, artistic, and intellectual culture. The former was due largely to the enlightened policy of the princes in promoting agricultural and economic development and their fostering of commercial relations with the Italian states. The corollary of this policy was the maintenance of peaceful relations, as far as possible, with the Frankish states in Syria, and there are few, if any, occasions during the whole period on which Ayyūbid princes took the offensive against the Franks.

A further stabilizing factor, at least in the long run, was the emergence in each generation of one leading member of the family, who succeeded in time in imposing his authority over all or most of the others, though at the cost of increasingly violent effort and opposition in successive generations. In the first generation the keystone of the whole Ayyūbid structure was Saladin’s brother al-’Adil Saif-ad-Dīn, who had been during Saladin’s reign his chief counselor and, next to him, the strongest and most able personality in the family. Not only did he enjoy great prestige, as against the youth and inexperience of Saladin’s sons, but, having at different times governed Egypt, Aleppo, and Kerak, he was familiar with the internal conditions of all the principalities. He was particularly anxious to add to the possessions of all the princely families at his disposal; and for this purpose he in particular sought to hold the Jazira, his immediate task after Saladin’s death was to defeat the attempt of the Zengids ‘Īzz-ad-Dīn of Mosul and ‘Imād-ad-Dīn of Sinjar to exploit the opportunity to recover their former possessions in Mesopotamia. With the aid of his nephews at Aleppo and
Damascus, he stabilized the situation in the eastern provinces, although the Zengids regained for a time their independence in their own territories.

During the next six years al-ʿĀdil extended and consolidated his power in Syria and Egypt. Averse to warfare, he used as his chief weapons diplomacy and intrigue, for the exercise of which the rivalries of Saladin’s sons gave him ample scope. Al-Afḍal ʿAlt at Damascus, as the eldest, was regarded as head of the Ayyūbīd house, but his misgovernment and weakness turned Saladin’s troops against him and led to an expedition against Damascus by al-ʿAzīz of Egypt in May 1194. Al-ʿĀdil joined the coalition of Syrian princes against al-ʿAzīz, and on his withdrawal remained with al-Afḍal in Damascus. A second attempt was made by al-ʿAzīz in 1195, this time in concert with ʿaz-Ẓāhir of Aleppo; after breaking up the coalition by intrigue, al-ʿĀdil followed al-ʿAzīz to Egypt and stayed with him until the next year, when they combined to drive al-Afḍal out of Damascus (June 1196); al-ʿĀdil remained in Damascus as viceroy of al-ʿAzīz. When the war with the crusaders was renewed in 1197, therefore, he was able to take the field at once, to capture Jaffa (September 5), and to send troops to reinforce Egypt against an invasion. After the surrender of Beirut by its commander to the German crusaders and their investment of Toron at the end of November, he obtained reinforcements from Egypt and all the Syrian princes, forced the raising of the siege (February 2, 1198), and negotiated a fresh truce in June for five and a half years. Then, leaving his son al-Muʿazzam ʿĪsā as his deputy in Damascus, he returned to the Jazira to complete the restoration of Ayyūbīd control in the east.

On the death of al-ʿAzīz (November 29, 1198), leaving only a minor son, al-Manṣūr Muḥammad, there was a split in the Ayyūbīd forces. The Asadi regiment called in al-Afḍal as regent; the Ṣalāḥi emirs in the meantime summoned his uncle al-ʿĀdil from Mesopotamia, while al-Afḍal, at the instigation and with the support of his brother ʿaz-Ẓāhir, marched on Damascus. Al-ʿĀdil had barely time to throw himself into the city before it was invested by al-Afḍal, and was besieged for six months until the arrival of his son al-Kāmil Muḥammad with the Mesopotamian troops; he then pursued al-Afḍal to Egypt, defeated him at Bilbais, and entered Cairo (February 6, 1200).

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3 A report of al-Maqrizī states that in the same year the fortifications of Ascalon were razed by agreement between al-ʿĀdil and al-ʿAzīz. On this truce see above, chapter XV, pp. 530–531.
On August 4 al-'Adil was formally proclaimed sultan of Egypt and Syria. All the territorial princes recognized him except az-Zahir of Aleppo, who now joined with al-Afdal in a last attempt to assert the claims of the house of Saladin. In the spring of 1201, after seizing Manbij and Qal'at Najm, they made the mistake of attacking Hamah, but, failing to capture it, marched on Damascus in August, supported by the Salahi troops in Palestine, who joined themselves to al-Afdal in resentment at the deposition of young al-Manṣūr Muḥammad by al-'Adil. Once more al-'Adil succeeded by intrigue in breaking up the coalition, at the end of September, and, having regained the adherence of a section of the Salahiyyah, determined to pursue his advantage. At the invitation of al-Manṣūr of Hamah he followed az-Zahir and threatened to besiege Aleppo until he agreed to recognize al-'Adil as sultan (end of January 1202). In return az-Zahir was left in undisturbed possession of Aleppo, and al-Afdal was given the minor sief of Samosata, where he died in 1225. Hamah and Homs were left to their own princes, and the other provinces were distributed to sons of al-'Adil: Damascus to al-Mu'azzam Isā, Egypt to al-Kāmil Muḥammad, the Jazira to al-Ashraf Mūsā, Diyar-Bakr to al-Auḥad Aiyūb, and the fortress of Qal'at Ja'bar to al-Ḥāfiz Arslan.

Although a final rupture between Saladin's sons and al-'Adil was thus averted, the continued distrust of az-Zahir was shown by his activity in fortification, notably the reconstruction of the walls and the powerful citadel of Aleppo, and of the frontier fortresses of Qal'at Najm on the Euphrates and Apamea on the Orontes. The principal theater of al-'Adil's activities, on the other hand, was Mesopotamia, where his sons were in conflict not only with the Zengids but also (after al-Auḥad's occupation of Akhat in 1207) with the Georgians. In 1209 he led the combined armies of the Aiyūbids in an attack on Sinjar; but the arrival of a coalition of the eastern princes and a direct order from the caliph to withdraw led him to make peace, the more readily as az-Zahir was being tempted to combine with the Zengids and to join them in substituting the suzerainty of the Selçukid sultan of Rüm for that of al-'Adil. Before the latter's return to Syria, however, the Georgians were crushingly defeated (1210) by al-Auḥad, and compelled to sign an undertaking to maintain peace for thirty years. With this success the Aiyūbid supremacy in Mesopotamia was definitely assured, and on al-Auḥad's death shortly afterwards the whole province was placed under al-Ashraf.
All these preoccupations played a large part in determining the policy of the Ayyubids towards the Franks. The reduction of the outlying Frankish possessions, especially in the south, had removed any real menace from their local forces; the only danger to be apprehended (and it remained vividly present to al-‘Adil, with his memories of the Third Crusade) was the possibility of fresh crusades from overseas. Like Saladin before him, al-‘Adil’s chief concern was for Egypt (no doubt reinforced by the naval raids on Rosetta in 1204 and Damietta in 1211), and his Egyptian troops were for the most part retained on garrison duty in Egypt. His fear of stirring up new invasions, together with his habitual aversion to becoming involved in serious warfare, even led him to make concessions for the sake of peace, as in the retrocession of Jaffa and Nazareth in 1204. Like Saladin again, he favored the commercial interests of the Italian states, with the double object of increasing his own revenues and war potential, and discouraging them from supporting fresh crusades. Commercial treaties with Venice and Pisa are attested in 1207–1208, and when in 1212 the Frankish merchants at Alexandria were arrested as a precautionary measure their number is put at 3,000. The greater part of his reign was covered by a series of truces with the kingdom (1198–1204, 1204–1210, 1212–1217), during which the defenses of Jerusalem and Damascus were reorganized, notably by the construction of a new fortress at Mt. Tabor (aṭ-Ṭūr), begun in 1211. Most of the active fighting during this period was between the Hospitallers of Krak des Chevaliers or Bohemond IV of Antioch and Tripoli and the princes of Hamah and Homs, who could rely if necessary on the support of az-Zahir. Only once, in 1207, was al-‘Adil himself drawn into active intervention, when he captured al-Qulai‘ah, besieged Krak des Chevaliers, and advanced up to the walls of Tripoli before making peace with Bohemond on payment of an indemnity.

Meanwhile az-Zahir at Aleppo also had his own reasons for maintaining peace with Antioch. Alarmed by the growing power of the Armenians of Cilicia, and always on the look-out for potential allies against his uncle, he had readily answered Bohemond of Tripoli’s call for reinforcement against the Armenians in 1201; and again in 1203 and in 1205–1206 he was instrumental in defending Antioch against Leon II. On a combined invasion of Cilicia by Selçukid and Aleppine forces in 1209 compelled Leon to sue for terms, but the struggle in and for Antioch continued, and

* On this alliance, see above, chapter XV, pp. 533–537.
in 1211 pope Innocent III himself appealed to az-Zāhir to support the Templars. Az-Zāhir also was in treaty relations with the Venetians at Latakia, who were permitted to maintain a fondaco in Aleppo.

Al-ʿĀdil, however, had long disapproved of his nephew’s alliance with Bohemond and had discouraged it by diplomatic means. In 1214 Bohemond, after the murder of his eldest son Raymond by Assassins in Tortosa, led a combined attack on the Ismaʿilite castle of al-Khawābī. The Assassins appealed to az-Zāhir, who sent reinforcements and enlisted al-ʿĀdil’s support for a diversionary raid in the south. This ended the alliance, and when Leon entered Antioch in February 1216 az-Zāhir, anxious to secure the succession for his infant son by al-ʿĀdil’s daughter Daifah, was obliged to refuse the invitation of sultan Kai-Kāʾūs I to cooperate in an invasion of Cilicia. A few months later, on November 11, 1216, az-Zāhir died, leaving the reputation of an energetic and capable, but harsh, sovereign.

A mass exodus of the merchants of Alexandria to Acre in 1216 gave the Moslem princes sufficient warning of the approaching crusade. Al-ʿĀdil remained on guard in Egypt until the crusaders mustered at Acre (1217) and began operations towards the east; even then he left the great bulk of his forces with al-Kāmil and moved up with a small contingent to support al-Muʿazzam.5 The troops at his disposal were too few to oppose the crusaders, and while they besieged Banyas and raided over the Jordan he guarded the approaches to Damascus, detached al-Muʿazzam to Nablus to screen Jerusalem, and called for reinforcements from the northern princes.

After a brief respite during the winter (1217–1218), and as al-Ashraf was moving down to support the defense, the situation was suddenly transformed; the Aiyūbids found themselves engaged on three fronts simultaneously. On learning of the descent on Damietta al-ʿĀdil sent back the Egyptian troops under his command and instructed al-Muʿazzam to destroy the fortress of Mt. Tabor, as it locked up too many men and military stores. Al-Ashraf was diverted to attack the northern territories of the Franks, and raided Chastel Blanc and Krak des Chevaliers. But in the meantime a party at Aleppo, opposed to the child prince al-ʿAziz Muḥammad and his atabeg Shihāb-ad-Dīn Tughrul, seized the opportunity of al-ʿĀdil’s difficulties to negotiate with al-Afḍal and the Seljuqid sultan. Early in June Kai-Kāʾūs seized Raban and Tell Bashir and

5 On the operations in Palestine in 1218 and 1219, see above, chapter XI, pp. 389–396.
marched on Aleppo; al-Ashraf hastened up to its defense and with the aid of Arab contingents defeated the sultan and his allies at Buzā'ah (early July) and regained the captured territories. From this time he was regarded as suzerain of Aleppo, but left its government in the loyal and capable hands of Tughrul and sent the rebellious emirs to join al-Kāmil’s army in Egypt.

Al-Mu'azzam at first remained on guard in Palestine, and gained a minor success towards the end of August at Caymont (Qaimūn) near Ramla. Immediately afterwards he was recalled to Damascus by the news of al-‘Ādil’s death there (August 31, 1218) and resumed its government, but loyally recognized his brother al-Kāmil as successor to the sultanate. As the situation in Syria was again stabilized, al-Kāmil, faced with a worsening position at Damietta, sent out fresh appeals for assistance and received reinforcements from Hamah and Homs. Before al-Mu'azzam could arrive, however, al-Kāmil himself withdrew from Damietta in consequence of a plot to dethrone him, led by the son of Saladin’s Kurdish emir al-Mashūb. Al-Mu'azzam’s arrival in February 1219 was followed by the banishment of Ibn-al-Mashūb and the renewal of operations before Damietta, but al-Ashraf was engaged in Mesopotamia by conflicts at Mosul, followed by disturbances in northern Syria due to Ibn-al-Mashūb’s intrigues with al-Afdal. So few troops were now left in Syria that it was decided to dismantle Jerusalem and remove all military stores (March 1219), in case it should be attacked by the Franks.

The capture of Damietta in November 1219 seems to have led, curiously, to a relaxation of tension on the Moslem side. Al-Kāmil, it is true, disappointed by the rejection of his peace offers, called for a general levy of combatants “from Cairo to Aswan”; but a similar call by al-Mu’azzam at Damascus met with no response, and al-Mu’azzam himself returned to Syria, where during the next year (1220) he harassed the crusaders, capturing and destroying Caesarea and twice attacking Château Pèlerin (Athalith). Al-Ashraf was still detained in Mesopotamia by operations against the Artukids of Mardin and Amida and Ibn-al-Mashūb, who had rewarded the sultan’s clemency in the previous year by allying himself with the princes of Mardin and Sinjar. After capturing Sinjar (July 1220), al-Ashraf marched to Mosul with the army of Aleppo and remained in its vicinity for several months, engaged in negotiations with the

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6 On the early stages of the crusade at Damietta, the death of al-‘Ādil, and the plot against al-Kāmil, see above, chapter XI, pp. 397-408. That Ibn-al-Mashūb’s punishment was banishment rather than death is typical of mild Ayyūbid justice.
Zengid princes and with Gökböri at Irbil. By the beginning of 1221 he felt so secure in his province that he yielded, though unwillingly, to the arguments of al-Mu‘azzam; leaving Akhlat and Diyār-Bakr under the government of his brother al-Mużaaffar Shihāb-ad-Dīn Ghāzī, he accompanied al-Mu‘azzam and the other Syrian princes to Egypt and rejoined al-Kāmil at Mansurah at the end of July.

In the interval, al-Kāmil, lacking effective support from his brothers and with an increasingly disaffected and war-weary army,7 had continued to negotiate with the crusaders for the sake of peace. Even after the arrival of al-Mu‘azzam and al-Ashraf he was in no mood to become involved in heavy fighting, and in spite of their remonstrances and the hopeless position of the invading army willingly accepted the crusaders’ offer of surrender rather than face the prospect of a prolonged siege to recover Damietta. At the end of August the terms of peace were duly signed for a period of eight years, with provision for a general release of prisoners, and Damietta was reoccupied on September 8, 1221.8

With the removal of the crusading threat the minor causes of friction between the Ayyūbids reasserted themselves. Al-Ashraf had remained in Egypt with al-Kāmil, and al-Mu‘azzam felt himself in danger of being squeezed between his more powerful brothers in Egypt and Mesopotamia. After a successful expedition in June 1222 to force Guy of Jubail to adhere to the peace, he made the false step of attempting to seize Hamah (January 1223) and of occupying Ma‘arrat-an-Nu‘mān and Salamyah. Forced to desist from the siege of Hamah and to surrender his conquests by order of al-Kāmil, he revenged himself by forming an alliance with Gökböri of Irbil (possibly with the connivance of the caliph an-Nāṣir) against al-Ashraf, and by encouraging Ghāzī to revolt at Akhlat. The rebellion was quickly put down by al-Ashraf with the assistance of Aleppine troops, and al-Mu‘azzam, after a demonstration at Homs, was again restrained from further operations by the threats of al-Kāmil (1224). In order to escape from this unwelcome control, he entered into communication with disaffected elements in the Egyptian army and paralyzed al-Kāmil by openly boasting of the success of his intrigues and challenging him to march into Syria if he dared. Against al-Ashraf he adopted the dangerous

7 Al-Maqrīzī notes that at Mansurah more fighting with the crusaders was done by the “commons”, i.e. the auxiliaries and volunteers, than by the regular troops (Ṣulūk, I, 206).
8 On this phase of the crusade, see above, chapter XI, pp. 408-423.
9 See above, chapter XI, pp. 423-428.
policy of inviting the Khorezm-Shâh Jalâl-ad-Dîn (whose ruffianly adventures with his Khorezmian braves are related in another chapter)\(^9\) to seize Diyâr-Bakr. In 1226 he again attacked Homs, while Gökböri moved on Mosul and the Artukids on the Jazîra. Al-Ashraf parried the attack on Homs with the troops of Aleppo and appealed to the Selçukid sultan Kai-Qobâd I for aid against the Artukids, but himself subsequently came into conflict with him. In desperation he made his submission to al-Mu‘azzâm, but too late to prevent Jalâl-ad-Dîn from investing Akhlat, the garrison of which, however, not only held the city but retaliated by occupying Khoi and other places in Azerbaijan after the Khorezm-Shâh’s withdrawal.

It was now al-Kâmil’s turn to feel alarmed at the coalition between the Syrian princes (from which, however, Aleppo held aloof), especially when al-Mu‘azzâm recognized the suzerainty of Jalâl-ad-Dîn. At the same time he was aware of the preparations of emperor Frederick II for a crusade. In the early months of 1227 the only avenue that seemed open to him was to renew to Frederick the offer, which he had already made to the crusaders at Damietta, to cede Jerusalem with part of Palestine. But in a few months the whole situation changed. In May al-Ashraf succeeded in escaping from his gilded captivity at Damascus, at the price of breaking his solemn engagements. As the princes of Homs and Hamah also turned against al-Mu‘azzâm, he, finding himself isolated in opposition to the crusading armies now beginning to assemble at Acre, destroyed the fortifications of Jerusalem and other castles. But before Frederick’s arrival, and to the deep distress of the troops and citizens of Damascus, he died on November 12, 1227, and was succeeded, with al-Kâmil’s approval, by his son an-Nâṣîr Dâ‘ûd.\(^10\)

The restored concord between the princes did not last long. Dâ‘ûd began badly by refusing al-Kâmil’s request for the cession of Krak de Montréal (ash-Shaubak), but the casus belli was supplied by a conflict over Baalbek, where al-Amjad was attacked by al-‘Aziz ‘Uthmân of Banyas. When Dâ‘ûd ordered al-‘Aziz to desist, he appealed to al-Kâmil, who marched into Palestine in July 1228 and occupied Nablus and Jerusalem. Al-Ashraf, summoned by Dâ‘ûd, came down to Damascus from Mesopotamia; al-Kâmil fell back to Tall al-‘Ajûl and was there joined by al-Ashraf. The conclusion of their conference was that al-Ashraf should take over the

\(^{9}\) See above, chapter XIX, pp. 672–674.

\(^{10}\) On the varying circumstances of al-Kâmil’s negotiations with Frederick, see above, chapter XII, pp. 448–450.
government of Damascus, while al-Kāmil should occupy Palestine, and their nephew Dā’ūd be given the Jazira in compensation. When Dā’ūd refused these terms, al-Ashraf laid siege to Damascus towards the end of the year, with the support of the troops of Aleppo.

During all this time the Syrian princes seem to have paid little attention to the crusaders; except for a skirmish at Acre in February by the troops of al-‘Aziz of Banyas, they did not interfere with the works of fortification on the coast, nor even when the Moslem population of Sidon was driven out. After Frederick’s arrival al-Kāmil remained in Palestine to conduct negotiations over the fulfilment of his offer in the altered circumstances. Five months of hard bargaining resulted in the compromise treaty of February 18, 1229, which was received in most Moslem circles with violent indignation and certainly helped to stiffen the resistance to al-Ashraf at Damascus.11 Nevertheless, the qadi of Hamah, in what may be a transcript of al-Kāmil’s circular letter, applauds the statesmanship of the sultan in securing at such small cost the supreme boon of peace for the Moslems of Syria; he adds, as a summary of the terms, that the cession was limited to Jerusalem alone, “including neither much nor little of its territories and dependencies”, and on the stipulations that Franks should not rebuild in it anything whatsoever, “neither wall nor dwellings”, nor pass beyond its moat, that Friday prayer should be observed in it for the Moslem population, that no Moslem should be hindered from visiting it at any time, and that no money should be exacted from any visitor.12 Certainly, after Frederick’s visit to Jerusalem13 and return to Acre in March, al-Kāmil was able, at al-Ashraf’s request, to join in the siege of Damascus (April), and prosecuted it with such severity and destructiveness that Dā’ūd was forced to surrender the city on June 25 in return for the grant of Transjordan and eastern Palestine, including Nablus and the district of Jerusalem.

Al-Ashraf’s occupation of Damascus was followed by a major redistribution of territory. He remained in possession of Akhlat and Diyār-Bakr and retained his suzerainty over Aleppo, but surrendered the Jazira to al-Kāmil, who also annexed western Palestine along with Tiberias. It is not quite clear what was the purpose of

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11 On this treaty, see above, chapter XII, pp. 452–458.
12 Shihāb-ad-Dīn Ibn-ābī-d-Damm, Bodl. MS. Marsh 60, ad annum 625. The clauses quoted by Gerald do not seem to be mentioned in any Arabic source.
13 The original text of Sībīt Ibn-al-Jauzi, in which the incidents of Frederick’s visit are described, differs to some extent from the free adaptations derived from later sources in Michaud (Bibliothèque, IV, 431–432) and Grouset (Histoire des croisades, III, 316–317). Ibn-Wāšil also gives a first-hand account of the visit.
this interweaving of the possessions of the two most powerful Ayyūbid princes. Most probably it was a device to re-insure each against the other, but in effect it gave al-Kāmil an indisputable supremacy—a supremacy further enhanced by his siege of Hamah in August 1229 and reinstatement of the lawful heir al-Muẓaffar Taqī-ad-Dīn II, whose place had been usurped by his younger brother an-Nāṣir Killīj Arslan during the Damietta campaign, under the protection of al-Ashraf. Then, while al-Ashraf was expending his forces on a lengthy siege of Baalbek, al-Kāmil occupied his new possessions in the Jazira. Simultaneously Jalāl-ad-Dīn attacked Akhlat again; the garrison, receiving no support from their own prince al-Ashraf and only belated and insufficient help from al-Kāmil, surrendered after a seven-months' siege (April 1230), and the entire population was massacred or carried off. At this juncture the Selchūkid sultan Kai-Qobād offered an alliance to al-Kāmil against Jalāl-ad-Dīn; al-Ashraf, hurrying to the north, took command of the Ayyūbid armies and joined the sultan near Erzinjan. In a furious battle the Khorezmians were totally defeated (August 10); Jalāl-ad-Dīn fled to Tabriz and al-Ashraf reoccupied the ruins of Akhlat.14

The opportunity of al-Kāmil’s absence in the north was seized by the military orders (who were not covered by the treaty) to make attacks on Baʿrīn (December 1229) and Hamah (July 5, 1230), which were repulsed by al-Muẓaffar. In the following year they raided Jabala, and there were counter-raids on al-Marqab and Valanža from Aleppo (February 1231), until a truce was signed in June. On the other side, Arab tribesmen, stirred up by demagogic preachers, attacked pilgrims in Jerusalem and on the roads until they were brought under control. But on the whole public security was completely re-established, and in 1232 al-Kāmil and al-Ashraf were able to resume their campaign to strengthen Ayyūbid control in Mesopotamia and Diyār-Bakr, which were threatened by the Mongol armies in Persia and Transcaucasia. The Artukids were finally deprived of their strongholds of Amida and Ḥişn Kaifā, and the latter was bestowed on al-Kāmil’s eldest son, aş-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb.

Al-Kāmil was now at the height of his power, courted by the princes of Persia, and visited by ambassadors even from India and Spain. It would not be surprising if, as is sometimes suggested, his head was turned and his ambitions excited by this success. A crisis was not long in coming. The Selchūkid sultanate also had reached an apogee of power under sultan Kai-Qobād, and now

14 For the Khorezmians and Selchūkids in 1230, see above, chapter XIX, pp. 673, 683.
shared a common frontier with the Aiyūbids. To find employment for the Khorezmian bands who had been driven by the Mongols, after the death of Jalāl-ad-Dīn, into Anatolia, Kai-Qobād seized Akhlat (1233). All the Aiyūbid princes rallied to al-Ḵāmil’s summons in the summer of 1234, but against the Seljuq defenses their armies could not force a way through the Taurus passes. As he withdrew al-Ḵāmil sent a detachment to defend Kharpoot; it was routed and Kharpoot itself captured in August by the Seljuq forces. These reverses added fuel to the private resentments of the princes of Syria against al-Ḵāmil, and al-Muẓaffar of Hamah (who had been the chief sufferer from the failure at Kharpoot) took the lead in opening negotiations with Kai-Qobād. The intrigue was discovered by al-Ḵāmil, who returned to Egypt in anger, and the armies broke up. Without resistance Kai-Qobād overran the whole of al-Ḵāmil’s province of the Jazira and carried off its population. In the next year, however, al-Ḵāmil made his peace with the Syrians; in concert with al-Ashraf he reoccupied the Jazira in January and February 1236, sent 3,000 Seljuq prisoners to Egypt, and invested aš-Ṣāliḥ Aiyūb with the government of all his eastern possessions. After his withdrawal the Seljuqids again attacked Amida and destroyed Dara (August), probably in retaliation for the destruction of several fortresses belonging to Mardin, the only remaining Artukid principality in Diyar-Bakr.

On November 26 al-‘Aziz Muḥammad of Aleppo died, leaving a seven-year-old son, with the name and honorific epithets of his great-grandfather Ṣalādīn, an-Nāṣir Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn Yūsuf, under the regency of his grandmother Daifah, the sister of al-Ḵāmil. Suspecting, rightly or wrongly, that al-Ḵāmil had designs upon Aleppo, she formed an alliance with al-Ashraf, who for his part was dissatisfied with the division of the Artukid territories. Al-Ḵāmil riposted by inviting an-Nāṣir Dā‘ūd from Kerak to Egypt and investing him with the government of Damascus. As on the previous occasion, the Syrian confederates sought the support of the Seljuqid sultan Kai-Qobād, and on his death (May 31, 1237) that of his successor Kai-Khusrau II, against the intervention of al-Ḵāmil, to whom they addressed a warning not to move into Syria. Only three months later (August 28), however, al-Ashraf died, leaving the government of Damascus to his brother aš-Ṣāliḥ Ismā‘īl. The Syrian confederacy was weakened by the defection of al-Muẓaffar of Hamah to the side of al-Ḵāmil, who laid siege to Damascus in November and pressed the attack until Ismā‘īl surrendered on December 29 and was transferred to Baalbek. The
troops of his Syrian allies were allowed to withdraw unmolested, but al-Muzaffar was dispatched to exact retribution from Homs, while al-Kāmil prepared to march on Aleppo. Its governors made all preparations for the expected siege and had enrolled Turkoman and Selçukid troops for the defense of the city, when al-Kāmil himself died at Damascus on March 9, 1238.

The character of al-Kāmil is one of the most complex problems of Aīyūbid history. Even Sibṭ Ibn-al-Jauzi, who preached the sermon against him at Damascus when news arrived of his treaty with Frederick, speaks of him in admiring terms as brave and sagacious, a lover of learning, and just and generous in the highest measure. He imposed such respect and awe as no Aīyūbid before him, and such discipline that on his expeditions none of his soldiers, it was said, dared take a blade of straw from a peasant. Loyal to his own word, he exacted from his kinsmen the loyalty due him as sultan; in warfare he was always victorious in the end, but he detested war and intrigue, and preferred to gain his objects by negotiation. He was remarkably matched with Frederick in some respects, especially, perhaps, in his aloofness from the passions of his age and his cold superiority to his contemporaries. It was not only for his outrage to public opinion by the cession of Jerusalem, but rather by contrast with the open and warmly human character of his brother al-Muʿazzam, that he was regarded without affection by his subjects and never sure of the loyalty of his troops. Four years before his death he had even had to remove his eldest son and heir, aš-Ṣāliḥ Aīyūb, from Egypt on suspicion of enrolling mamluks to revolt against him, but characteristically reconciled him by giving him a new and open field for his talents in Mesopotamia.

The removal of al-Kāmil’s controlling personality at once threw the Aīyūbid princes into violent and confused rivalries. His son al-ʿĀdil Abū-Bakr II, whom he had appointed as his successor in place of aš-Ṣāliḥ Aīyūb, was recognized as sultan by the Egyptian officers, who also nominated al-Jauwād Yūnus (a grandson of al-ʿĀdil I and the husband of al-Ashraf’s only daughter) as prince of Damascus, and drove an-Nāṣir Dāʿūd back to Kerak. The army of Aleppo turned from the defensive to the offensive, seized Maʿarrat-an-Nuʿmān, and besieged Hamah, while its governors renewed the alliance with sultan Kai-Khusrau II and rejected the overtures successively of aš-Ṣāliḥ Aīyūb, al-ʿĀdil II, and al-Jauwād. Aš-Ṣāliḥ Aīyūb was in difficulties with the Khorezmians, who had left the service of Kai-Khusrau and joined Artuk Arslan of Mardin; he
fled to Sinjar, but when Badr-ad-Din Lu’lu’ of Mosul besieged him there he dispatched the qadi of Sinjar in disguise to appeal to the Khorezmians to take his part. They marched on Sinjar, defeated the forces of Mosul, then drove out a Selchukid army which had laid siege to Amida, and captured the fortress of Nisibin and the Khabur province for as-Salihi Aiyub; in return he made over to them the province of Diyar-Mudar (the western Jazira).

Towards the end of the year 1238 al-Jauwad, fearing an Egyptian invasion in concert with an-Nasir Da’ud, invited Aiyub to take possession of Damascus in return for certain districts in Mesopotamia. But already Aiyub had acquired a reputation which gave alarm to the neighbors of Damascus. Consequently, when, after establishing himself in Damascus, he advanced into Palestine to organize an invasion of Egypt, his uncle as-Salihi Isma’il reappeared from Baalbek, accompanied by al-Mujahid of Homs, and seized Damascus from Aiyub’s son al-Mughith ‘Umar (September 30, 1239). Aiyub, deserted by all his troops except eighty mamluks, was captured at Nablus by an-Nasir Da’ud and imprisoned in Kerak.

At this juncture the treaty negotiated with Frederick for a period of ten years, five months, and forty days from February 18, 1229, expired, and crusading activities were resumed under Theobald of Champagne. In October al-‘Adil II sent a force into Palestine which inflicted such severe losses near Ascalon on the crusaders (November 13) that they abandoned their project of refortifying it. In the same month, after the Franks had begun to rebuild the defenses of Jerusalem, an-Nasir Da’ud laid siege to it, and in the middle of December succeeded in storming the Tower of David and reoccupying the city. In spite of these local successes, however, the Aiyubid princes and principalities were in no trim to engage in any serious operations. In Egypt especially, under the young sultan al-‘Adil II, things were going from bad to worse. By reckless extravagance he dissipated the considerable reserves (estimated at six million dinars and twenty million dirhems) left by al-Kamil, and between the Kurds and the Turks in the Egyptian army there was open hostility. The mamluks were aggrieved and mutinous, and the contempt of the troops for al-‘Adil went so far that when his black ewer-bearer on one occasion gleefully showed the patent which he had just received for a military fief to the emir Rukn-ad-Din al-Hijawi (the general who had defeated the crusaders at Ascalon), the emir slapped his face and took the patent out of his hands.

16 See above, chapter XIII.
The initiative in injecting some new vigor and purpose into the Aiyūbīd system was taken by al-Muẓaffar Taqī-ad-Dīn II of Hamah. Faithful to the policy of alliance with Egypt against the now traditional confederacy of Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo, it was for him a matter of the first importance to have a strong sultan installed in Egypt, and all his hopes were centered on aṣ-Ṣāliḥ Aiyūb. His appeals to an-Nāṣir Dāʾūd were successful; on April 11, 1240, Dāʾūd released Aiyūb on a sworn agreement that in return for Dāʾūd’s assistance in establishing him in Egypt he would make over Damascus and Mesopotamia to Dāʾūd. At the same time messages were sent to the Khorezmians, urging them to attack Aleppo and Homs. Fortune, hitherto so perverse towards Aiyūb, now suddenly smiled; as al-ʿĀdil prepared to march into Palestine to meet Dāʾūd and Aiyūb, he was arrested at Bilbais by his Turkish troops on May 4, and an urgent call was sent to Aiyūb. On May 18 he entered Cairo and was saluted as sultan.

Aṣ-Ṣāliḥ Aiyūb’s success in Egypt was profoundly alarming to his uncle aṣ-Ṣāliḥ Ismāʿīl at Damascus, who feared, not without reason (although Aiyūb had already quarreled with Dāʾūd), that he was determined to oust him also. As the Khorezmians were already operating on the frontiers of Aleppo, he could hope for little support in that quarter. He turned accordingly to the crusaders, and in return for the surrender of Safad, Belfort, the rest of Sidon, and Tiberias, Theobald and the Templars agreed to a defensive alliance against Egypt; the joint armies assembled at Jaffa. Ismāʿīl even allowed the crusaders to enter Damascus to purchase arms, an action which gave great offense to its Moslem population.

Aṣ-Ṣāliḥ Aiyūb, however, was fully occupied in reorganizing his kingdom and his army. His experience with the Kurds, who had deserted him in Palestine in the previous year, and the indifference and disloyalty of the Aiyūbīd regiments in Egypt towards his father and his brother, had convinced him that no reliance could be placed upon them. After dealing vigorously with the disorders of the Arabs in upper Egypt and restoring financial stability, he set himself systematically to create a new regiment of picked Turkish mamluks, to appoint them to fiefs and offices in place of the emirs of the Kāmilī and Ashrafi regiments, and to construct a new citadel and barracks for them on the island of Roda, close to Cairo. So far from concerning himself over events in Syria,16 such of his attention

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16 On the supposed battle between the Egyptians and the crusaders and forces of Damascus in the summer of 1240 see Stevenson’s note in The Crusaders in the East, p. 321, n. 1.
as aş-Sâlih Aiyûb gave to foreign affairs was directed to sending a
mamluk force to drive the Yemenites out of Mecca and to preparing
a fleet at Suez for an expedition to Yemen. The negotiations opened
by Richard of Cornwall in December 1240 doubtless removed any
fears he may have entertained, and his delay in agreeing to recognize
the crusaders’ occupation of Ascalon and to release the prisoners
held in Egypt was perhaps due to the employment of the prisoners
on his military works.

During these negotiations aş-Sâlih Aiyûb’s northern allies, the
Khorezmians, attacked the territories of Aleppo, severely defeated
the army of Aleppo (commanded by Saladin’s son al-Mu’azzam
Tûrân-Shâh) at Buzâ’ah on November 11, 1240, plundered the
 countryside of Aleppo, and captured Manbij. The new prince of
Homs, al-Manşûr Ibrâhîm, whose father al-Mujâhid had just died,
moved up to support his kinsmen, and additional troops were sent
from Damascus.17 When the Khorezmians made a second plundering
raid in January, in the course of which they devastated the
regions of Sarmîn and Shaizbar, the allied forces pursued them
across the Euphrates and defeated them near Edessa on March 6,
1241. The cities of the Jazira were divided between the victors
and Badr-ad-Dîn Lu’lu’ of Mosul; the army of Aleppo then
combined with a Selchûkid force against aş-Sâlih Aiyûb’s son and
deputy Tûrân-Shâh, who was compelled to surrender Amida to the
Selchûkid sultan Kai-Khusrau II. A few months later the Khorezm-
ians, after refitting at Ana, allied themselves with al-Mu’azzar
Ghâzi of Mayafarîqîn and attacked Amida (August 1241); after
an indecisive campaign of Aleppo and Selchûkid troops in the
autumn, al-Manşûr of Homs again came to the rescue in the
following spring, and defeated them even more signally near al-
Majdal on the Khabur on August 22, 1242. But their depredations
in the Jazira continued until in the spring of 1243 the Selchûkid
sultan, threatened by a Mongol invasion of Anatolia, hastily con-
cluded an agreement by which the Khorezmians were given Kharpût,
and Akhlat was assigned to al-Mu’azzar Ghâzi. With the
crushing defeat of Kai-Khusrau by the Mongols on July 2,18
however, the situation in the north was entirely transformed; the
Mongols occupied both Amida and Akhlat and seriously threatened
the whole of Mesopotamia.

17 The historian of Aleppo, Kamal-ad-Dîn, links up the agreement with Damascus with
the release of the Templars imprisoned at Aleppo, though not directly: Zuhdat al-halab
(tr. Blochet), p. 213.
18 Ibid., p. 226; Ibn-Bibi gives June 26. On the battle of Köse Dagh and its consequences,
see above, chapter XIX, pp. 691-692, and below, chapter XXI, pp. 725-732.
Ch. XX

The struggle in the north had its repercussions also in the south. Ismā‘īl of Damascus, deprived of the support of Homs, remained inactive, and operations were reduced to mere skirmishing. An Egyptian expedition from Gaza was met and defeated near Jerusalem by Dā‘ūd of Kerak and the Templars in May 1242; a few months later, however, after a raid by the crusaders on Nablus (October 31), Dā‘ūd joined with the troops of Gaza in retaliatory raids on their territories. The victory of the Mongols momentarily shocked the Aiyūbids into an attempt to compose their rivalries, but negotiations fell through owing to aṣ-Ṣāliḥ Ismā‘īl’s suspicions of Aiyūb. He renewed instead the alliance with the Franks and in the spring of 1244 gave them full possession of Jerusalem, in agreement with Dā‘ūd of Kerak and al-Manṣūr of Homs. What had been outrageous perfidy in al-Kāmil fifteen years before was now taken for granted, even to the extent of surrendering the Dome of the Rock.

Aṣ-Ṣāliḥ Ismā‘īl’s suspicions were well-founded. In June 1243 al-Muẓaffar of Hamah, almost certainly acting in concert with aṣ-Ṣāliḥ Aiyūb, had dispatched an embassy to the eastern princes and Baghdad, with instructions to its leader to contact the Khorezmians on his way, and to invite their chief Berke Khan to support Aiyūb against his Syrian enemies. In the summer of 1244 over 10,000 of them swept down through the Biqā‘, captured Jerusalem after a short siege (August 23), occupied Palestine, and joined the Egyptian troops at Gaza. Al-Manṣūr of Homs again took the lead in organizing a coalition of Syrian Moslems and Franks against them, and the combined armies of Homs, Damascus, Kerak, and Acre advanced to Gaza. The Khorezmians and the Egyptians under the emir Rukn-ad-Dīn Baybars broke through the Moslem troops on the left and center; the Khorezmians then surrounded the Franks, and only some fifty of the Templars and Hospitallers escaped (October 17).

Baybars at once led his contingent to besiege Ascalon, while Palestine was taken over by aṣ-Ṣāliḥ Aiyūb’s governors. Shortly afterwards Aiyūb’s son al-Mughith, who had been held in Damascus ever since 1239, died in prison; Aiyūb, in violent anger, reinforced his troops and directed them, along with the Khorezmians,

19 This Baybars is not to be confused with the Mamluk sultan of the same name and honorific; after his treacherous alliance with the Khorezmians a few months later he was seized and died in prison. The future sultan entered the service of aṣ-Ṣāliḥ Aiyūb only in 1247, when his master al-Bunduqdar was exiled and al-Bunduqdar’s mamluks were enrolled in Aiyūb’s guard (adh-Dhabābi, ad annum 645) — hence his epithet Bunduqdarī.

20 On the battle of Ḥarblyah, see above, chapter XVI, pp. 562–564.
to march on Damascus. After a bitter siege, which lasted the whole of the following summer, Ismā'īl and al-Manṣūr surrendered on terms (October 2, 1245), Ismā'īl being assigned Baalbek and Bosra, to Aiyūb's intense displeasure. Damascus was occupied by the Egyptian commander Mu'in-ad-Din ibn-ash-Shaikh, whose first action was to bar the Khorezmians from entering the city, in order to save it from their violence, and to assign western Palestine to them. The Khorezmians, balked of their anticipated booty, mutinied and, after sacking part of the Ghūṭah, won over the Egyptian commander at Gaza, Rukn-ad-Din Baybars, allied themselves with Dā'ūd of Kerak (who in consequence regained Jerusalem, Nablus, and Hebron), took service under aṣ-Ṣāliḥ Ismā'īl, and besieged their former associates in Damascus on his behalf.

But the prospect of a Khorezmian sack of Damascus was too much for al-Manṣūr of Homs. Breaking with Ismā'īl, he allied himself with Aleppo and prepared to cooperate with the Egyptians in raising the siege. Before they could unite, the Khorezmians, who had besieged the city for three months, withdrew to deal with al-Manṣūr, plundering and destroying as they went. Outside Homs they were met by the troops of Homs and Aleppo, reinforced by squadrons of Arabs and Turkomans, and totally defeated (May 19 or 26, 1246). This was the end of them as a fighting force; the remnants dispersed to find what service they could. Aṣ-Ṣāliḥ Ismā'īl fled to Aleppo, leaving Baalbek to be occupied by the governor of Damascus, and his sons to captivity in Egypt, but an-Nāṣir Yūsuf refused Aiyūb's demand that he should surrender Ismā'īl to him. Dā'ūd of Kerak was met and defeated by an Egyptian force at aṣ-Salṭ on September 11 and besieged in Kerak, which he was at length allowed to keep at the price of surrendering all his other territories and the Khorezmians who had joined him. In March 1247 aṣ-Ṣāliḥ Aiyūb began a progress round his Syrian dominions, making benefactions to schools, religious establishments, and notables, while his troops under Fakhr-ad-Din ibn-ash-Shaikh captured Tiberias in June after a spirited defense, and went on to besiege, capture, and dismantle the newly-rebuilt castle of Ascalon (October 24).

A month after his victory over the Khorezmians al-Manṣūr of Homs had died of consumption, and his young son al-Ashraf Mūsā II was completely dominated by Aiyūb. The reduction of Homs to vassal status and the virtual elimination of Kerak gravely altered the balance of forces in Syria to the disadvantage of the young and ambitious an-Nāṣir Yūsuf of Aleppo. In 1247 the
fourteen-year-old prince of Hamah, al-Manṣūr Muḥammad (who had succeeded on al-Muẓaffar’s death in October 1243), was drawn into the orbit of Aleppo by a marriage with his cousin, Yūsuf’s sister ‘Ā’ishah. In the next year, when as-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb, already suffering from his fatal disease, had returned to Egypt, an-Nāṣir Yūsuf formed an alliance with Badr-ad-Dīn Lu’lū’ of Mosul and laid siege to Homs. Since the promised Egyptian reinforcements were delayed, al-Ashraf Mūsā was compelled to surrender Homs and to accept instead Tell Bashir as Yūsuf’s vassal. In spite of his severe illness, Ayyūb marched to Damascus and laid siege to Homs in midwinter, but the state of his health and the reports of the massing of the crusaders in Cyprus induced him to accept the intercession of an envoy from the caliph al-Mustaʿṣim and come to terms with Yūsuf. On April 19, 1249, he was carried back to Egypt, and at once gave orders to furnish Damietta with stores of weapons and provisions and to fit out a river fleet at Cairo.\(^{21}\)

The unexpected and unexplained retreat from Damietta of the Egyptian commander Fakhr-ad-Dīn ʿibn-ash-Shaikh on the day after the arrival of the crusading fleet, and the consequent evacuation of the city, left as-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb with no option but to concentrate his forces at the fortified camp of Mansurah. During the long pause that followed, his Damascus troops besieged and captured Sidon (July–August), and Daʿūd went to join an-Nāṣir Yūsuf at Aleppo, leaving Kerak to be fought over by his sons and eventually occupied by an Egyptian governor. Ayyūb’s death on November 22 did not affect the immediate situation, thanks to the efficient fighting machine that he had created and the strong personality of his concubine Shajar-ad-Durr, who concealed his death and controlled the administration in his name. In concert with the Bahri mamluks, she summoned his son Tūrān-Shāh from Ḥisn Kaifā, but he did not arrive until the end of February.

In the meantime the strenuous campaign at Mansurah, in which the regular troops were supported by bands of Egyptian volunteers, stirred up to enthusiasm by the preaching of the Moroccan shaikh ʿAlḥamd al-Badawi, had produced a significant realignment of forces in the Egyptian army. During the battle on February 8, 1250, when the crusaders crossed by a ford and attacked the Egyptian camp, the death of Fakhr-ad-Dīn was followed by a panic among his troops, but the position was restored by a vigorous counterattack of the Bahri mamluks, led by Rukn-ad-Dīn Baybars Bunduqdārī. From this moment the Bahriyyah were in the saddle, and it was they who

\(^{21}\) On the crusade of Louis IX, see above, chapter XIV, pp. 494–504.
reaped the greatest credit from the destruction of the crusading army at Fāriskūr on April 6. They were in no mood, consequently, to submit to Türān-Shāh's attempts to replace them in the offices of state by his own Mesopotamians. Tempers rose on both sides, and when Türān-Shāh sent a threatening message to Shajar-ad-Durr it was the last straw. Believing themselves marked down for removal, the mamluk officers, led by Baybars, attacked and killed Türān-Shāh on Monday, May 2, and proclaimed Shajar-ad-Durr sultanah of Egypt and queen of the Moslems. The negotiations with Louis IX were brought to a conclusion by Aiyūb's former deputy, al-Hudhbāni, and Damietta was reoccupied on May 6.\(^{22}\)

The theatrical manner in which the Aiyūbid dynasty of Egypt was terminated tends to conceal the evolution which reached its climax with the murder of Türān-Shāh. In effect, as-Ṣālih Aiyūb had already broken with the principles of the Aiyūbid regime. Lacking the personal qualities upon which the authority of his predecessors had rested, and which had maintained the solidarity of the Aiyūbid house, he attempted to supply the deficiency by building up a military machine (which he controlled with merciless severity) to impose his will. The other Aiyūbid princes he treated not as kinsmen but as enemies (with the exception, perhaps, of al-Muẓaffar of Hamah), and thus inaugurated a personal regime not unlike that of the Mamluk sultans who followed him. The officers and troops of his new mamluk corps had no sense of loyalty to the Aiyūbid house, but only to their own leaders; and as soon as their position was challenged they asserted themselves and disposed of the royal power in their own interests.

It was not to be expected that the Aiyūbids of Syria or their Kurdish supporters would tamely accept the extinction of their Egyptian branch at the dictation of the Turkish mamluks. The governor of Kerak set up al-Mughîth 'Umar, a son of al-ʿĀdil II, as sultan in Transjordan, while the Kurdish troops at Damascus invited an-Nāṣir Yusuf of Aleppo to take over the city, admitting him into it on July 11. On July 30 Shajar-ad-Durr married the Turkoman generalissimo Aybeg and abdicated in his favor. He was at once recognized as sultan by the troops, with the honorific of al-Muʿizz, but in view of the reactions in Syria the emirs decided to associate an Aiyūbid prince with him and selected for the purpose a grandson of al-Kāmil, al-Ashraf Mūsā III, then six

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\(^{22}\) On this settlement, see above, chapter XIV, pp. 503–504; on the Mamluk sultans, see below, chapter XXII.
years of age. A short time later he was quietly dropped again and disappeared.

The first movement of an-Nāṣir Yūsuf’s forces from Damascus to Gaza was countered by the Baḥriyyah in October. He then formed a coalition of all the Syrian Ayyūbids and again set out for Egypt in December. It is admitted that the sympathies both of the population and of most of the army were on his side; but on February 2, 1253, after a confused fight on the Egyptian border, he was put to flight by the mamluks. In the rout of the Syrian army many of the Ayyūbid princes were captured, among them aṣ-Ṣāliḥ Ismāʿīl, who was executed by order of Aybeg, and the veteran Tūrān-Shāh, son of Saladin, who was honorably set free, together with the other Ayyūbids. The Egyptian forces then moved up into Palestine, but withdrew again as an-Nāṣir Yūsuf marched on Gaza for the third time and occupied Darum, apparently before the end of the same year. From the western sources it appears that this third expedition was aimed not at an invasion of Egypt, but at preventing the junction of the Egyptian army with Louis IX, who, having received satisfaction from Aybeg of his demand for the release of all Christian prisoners, had rejected an-Nāṣir’s offer to cede Jerusalem in return for an alliance. The Arabic sources scarcely mention the activities of Louis in Palestine during these years.¹³ For more than a year the Egyptian and Syrian armies lay opposite one another while negotiations were proceeding; finally, about the end of March 1253, an-Nāṣir conceded Jerusalem to Aybeg,¹⁴ and made peace. Except for the harassing actions of the Syrian forces on their way back to Damascus, Louis was left to pursue his work of fortification undisturbed, and before returning to France signed a peace with Damascus for ten years, six months, and forty days.

In 1255 the violence and indiscipline of the Baḥri mamluks in Egypt led to an open breach with Aybeg. After his execution of their commander the majority of the Baḥriyyah fled to Damascus, where an-Nāṣir Yūsuf welcomed them as allies against Egypt. During the renewed tension John of Ibelin engaged the Egyptians at Gaza in skirmishes and border raids, but when Aybeg restored peace with an-Nāṣir in 1256 by surrendering Palestine to him, the ten-year treaty with the Franks was renewed and extended to include Egypt also.

For nearly four years more the house of Saladin, in the person

¹³ See above, chapter XIV, pp. 504–508.
¹⁴ ᾄ H-Dhahabi (ad annum 650) states definitely that Nablus and its regions were to remain under an-Nāṣir, but cf. below, chapter XXII, pp. 742–743.
of his great-grandson an-Nāṣir Yūsuf, was supreme in Syria, although involved from time to time with al-Mughīth of Kerak, chiefly owing to the capricious transfer of their services from one prince to another by the Bahri mamluks. Summoned to present his homage to the Mongol Hulagu after the capture of Baghdad in 1258, an-Nāṣir sent his son al-‘Aziz Muḥammad in his place, but when Hulagu opened his western campaign in 1259 an-Nāṣir left Aleppo to be defended by Tūrān-Shāh and took up a position outside Damascus, with al-Manṣūr II of Hamah, at the same time sending an envoy to the new Mamluk sultan Kutuz to beg for help. After the Mongol sack of Aleppo in January 1260 al-Manṣūr withdrew with the Syrian troops and the Bahriyah to join the army of Kutuz. Damascus was occupied on March 1, and Banyas, ‘Ajlūn, Nablus, and other fortresses fell in their turn; an-Nāṣir, who had fled to Transjordan, was seized and surrendered to the Mongol general Kitbogha by his own Kurdish attendants. In August Kutuz marched into Syria, accompanied by al-Manṣūr, who distinguished himself in the decisive battle at ‘Ain Jālūt (September 3) and was restored to his principality of Hamah. Al-Ashraf Mūsā II of Homs, though he had at first joined Hulagu, was also restored to Homs, but Aleppo was placed under non-Ayyūbid government.

A year later a second Mongol army was dispatched from Mesopotamia into Syria and recaptured Aleppo (November 1261). Al-Manṣūr fell back to Homs and there joined forces with al-Ashraf. In a battle outside Homs the two Ayyūbid princes defeated the Mongol forces (December 10) and drove them back beyond the Euphrates. With this not inglorious exploit the active history of the Ayyūbids in Syria comes to an end. In 1263 the Mamluk sultan Baybars perfidiously killed al-Mughīth and seized Kerak, and on the death of al-Ashraf Mūsā in the same year the principality of Homs was suppressed. Al-Manṣūr alone, in consideration of his loyalty and his services, was allowed to retain his principality at Hamah, where, with one short interruption, the house of Taqi-ad-Din survived until 1341.

25 He was executed by Hulagu on receiving the news of the defeat of the Mongol army at ‘Ain Jālūt.