XIII

THE CRUSADE OF
THEOBALD OF CHAMPAGNE
AND RICHARD OF
CORNWALL, 1239–1241

The crusade of 1239–1241 was indeed a strange expedition. Prepared and launched in a maze of confusion and cross-purposes, it was viewed without enthusiasm, if not actually with distaste, by the two chief potentates of Christendom, the pope and the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. Its two leaders, Theobald, king of Navarre and count of Champagne, and Richard Plantagenet, earl of Cornwall, never met during the course of the expedition. The crusaders spent most of their time peacefully in camp at Acre, Jaffa, and Ascalon, confining their military activities to two skirmishes—one a minor victory, the other a disastrous defeat. The crusading barons were divided by mutual jealousy and paid little or no attention to the orders of their chosen leader. The prelates and barons of the kingdom of Jerusalem and the masters of the three military orders disagreed with the crusaders on most questions of diplomacy, strategy, and tactics, and quarreled furiously among themselves. Many of them were at open war with the official representative of


463
their young king's father and guardian, the Hohenstaufen Frederick II. In short, if one wished to write a burlesque of the crusades, one could do no better than to give an accurate account of this expedition. Yet this crusade accomplished more for the Christian cause in terms of lands and fortresses recovered from the Moslems than any other except the First Crusade. One can easily understand why Armand of Périsgord, master of the Knights Templar, called the outcome a pure miracle wrought by God.

The background of every crusade consisted of three chief elements — the situation in the Holy Land, the policy and actions of the pope and the secular princes of Europe, and the motives, resources, ability, character, and political position of the crusaders. The third of these elements was always complicated, but the first two were often fairly simple. In the case of the expedition of 1239–1241 all three were truly magnificent mixtures of confusion, uncertainty, and cross-purposes.¹

In November 1225 emperor Frederick II had married Isabel of Brienne, queen of Jerusalem, daughter of Mary of Montferrat and John of Brienne. Isabel had died in 1228 leaving her son Conrad as heir to the throne under the guardianship of his father. In 1229 Frederick had concluded a truce for ten years with al-Kâmil, sultan of Egypt, by which he had obtained possession of Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Nazareth with corridors connecting these places with the sea-coast. But Frederick had no intention of contenting himself with the carefully limited suzerainty enjoyed by the kings of Jerusalem. As a result he had soon fallen out, before leaving Syria for the west in 1229, with most of the prelates and barons of the kingdom. The quarrel had grown more bitter when Frederick seized control of Cyprus by replacing John of Ibelin, lord of Beirut and regent for the young king Henry of Lusignan, with Cypriote lords who supported the imperial cause. John — the ablest, most influential, and most powerful of the barons of Jerusalem — re-conquered Cyprus in 1233 after a long and savage war.² Until his death in 1236 he led the opposition to Frederick, who was far too occupied at home to give adequate support to his agents in the Levant. In the Holy Land itself, the Christians were thus divided not only by the chronic quarrels between the Templars and Hospitalers but also by those between the barons of the kingdom and the agents of Frederick II.

¹ The major part of the material for the discussion of the background of the crusade has been drawn from the Registre de Grégoire IX (ed. Lucien Auvray, Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 2nd series).
² On the kingdom of Cyprus during this period, see below, chapter XVII, pp. 610–613.
The death of al-Kāmil (1238) led to an equally grave division among the Moslems. His two sons, al-Ādil Abū-Bakr and as-Sāliḥ Aiyūb, became respectively masters of Egypt and Damascus, but their uncles and cousins immediately prepared to contest this division of the Aiyūbid domains.

The treaty of San Germano in July 1230 had temporarily reconciled Frederick II and pope Gregory IX, who now sincerely tried to bring peace to the kingdom of Jerusalem. But the pope was never really reconciled either to the truce with the Moslems or to Frederick’s attempts to rule in Jerusalem. On September 4, 1234, Gregory dispatched a letter to the people of England to urge them to prepare for a new crusade. He pointed out that when the truce between the emperor and the sultan should expire in July 1239, the Holy Land would have need of Christian troops. All who went on the crusade would receive indulgence for all venial sins duly confessed. Those who could not go but contributed money would receive the same benefits. The persons and property of crusaders would come under papal protection. No usury was to be collected from crusaders. In November similar letters were sent to the people of France. All the clergy were directed to preach the crusade, but apparently the pope’s chief reliance was on the Dominican friars. The preaching was so successful that in September 1235 the pope was obliged to order the prelates of France to prevent crusaders from starting before the appointed time.

Pope Gregory well knew that one could always persuade a fair number of barons to embark on a crusade. But few barons could afford it. Hence the chief problem was to raise money, as became particularly apparent in the summer of 1235. The most important lord who had assumed the cross was Amalric, count of Montfort and constable of France, who not only had no money but was overwhelmingly in debt. The pope had already authorized the men preaching the crusade to permit those who could not go in person to buy absolution from their oaths, but he doubted that these “redemptions” would yield enough. In June 1235 he wrote to all prelates to say that he hoped to maintain an army in Palestine for ten years after the end of the truce (1239). Every Christian who was not a crusader was to pay a denarius a week for this purpose. For each year in which this tax was paid the payer would be relieved from two years in purgatory. As time went on and more and more impecunious barons took the cross, Gregory was obliged to think of other financial expedients. The clergy were asked to pay a series

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3 For a detailed account of Aiyūbid affairs, see below, chapter XX, pp. 705–706.
of subsidies varying from one twentieth to one thirtieth of their annual incomes. In 1237 king Louis IX of France wrote to the pope to say that his conscience was troubled. When he received money from his Jews, how could he be sure some of it was not the product of usury? Gregory suggested that he could solve this by giving a generous sum for the crusade. In the autumn of the same year the episcopal sees of southern France were asked to pay off the debts of Amalric of Montfort.

It was usual to assign to a crusading baron the money collected in one or more dioceses except for sums that came from lands of other crusaders. As a rule part was to be given to the baron to prepare for the crusade and the rest sent to him after he reached the Holy Land. It is not surprising that this practice should have led to considerable confusion. The papal records were not kept very carefully. In February 1238 Gregory was obliged to admit that he had assigned the revenues from the diocese of Poitiers to both Geoffrey of Argentan, an English knight, and Peter of Dreux, count of Brittany (termed duke by the Bretons). Peter had the prior claim. The count of Mâcon was assigned the money raised in the province of Lyons, but later three of its dioceses were ordered to give their funds to the duke of Burgundy.

By the 1230’s, the Albigensian Crusade was over as far as the need for armed force was concerned — it was in the hands of the Inquisition. Although the continuous wars against the Moslems in Spain and the attacks on the Prussians continued to call for men and funds, the chief rival for the resources and men destined to relieve the Holy Land was the Latin empire of Constantinople, where the emperor John of Brienne was facing a Bulgarian-Nicaean coalition. He had sent his son-in-law and co-emperor, Baldwin II, to the west to get help. In the late summer of 1236 pope Gregory decided to assist the Latin empire. On October 23 he wrote to Peter of Dreux, who had apparently already agreed to lead an expedition to Constantinople, to assure him that he would not be obliged to obey the orders of the emperor, the patriarch, or the doge of Venice. On December 9 the pope wrote a rather vague letter to the most important French baron who had taken the cross, Theobald, king of Navarre and count of Champagne. He did not actually ask Theobald to go to Constantinople instead of to Palestine, but he begged him in general terms to aid Baldwin in any way he could. On May 9, 1237, Henry of Dreux, archbishop of Rheims and brother of Peter, was directed to finance the count of Bar if he

* See above, chapter VI, pp. 218–220.
decided to go to the aid of Constantinople. The next day a letter
to bishop Hugh of Séèes directly ordered him to change his vow
and go to Constantinople. The expedition was to start in March
1238.

Thus by the spring of 1237 pope Gregory had two crusades on
his hands. If he had hoped to persuade all the crusading barons to
go to Constantinople, he had not succeeded. This situation led to
some confusion. On May 27, 1237, Gregory wrote Louis IX,
asking him to see that crusaders going to either the Holy Land or
Constantinople were given a respite in payments on their debts. In
February 1238 the pope wrote the archbishop of Rheims that count
Henry of Bar was going to lead one hundred knights on one of the
two crusades. In March bishop Aimo of Mâcon was authorized to
permit Humbert, lord of Beaujeu, to change his destination from
the Holy Land to Constantinople. In short there were a number of
crusading barons in France, but no one was quite sure who was
going to Palestine and who to Constantinople.

The next problem was to decide when the armies should start.
The first change in plan seems to have been made suddenly. On
October 30, 1237, Gregory directed the prior of the Dominicans in
Paris to urge all crusaders to Constantinople to be ready in March.
The next day he directed Baldwin to defer his journey until August.
On December 17 he wrote to the bishop of Séèes informing him of
the new date and indicating that the change had been made at duke
Peter’s suggestion. Meanwhile in November 1237 the expedition
to Palestine had encountered a serious obstacle. The French barons
who were to lead the crusade had pointed out to the pope that they
would need the cooperation of the German emperor — passage
through his lands, shipping facilities, and supplies. But Frederick II
had no desire to see a crusading army in Palestine a full year before
his truce with the sultan expired. He refused all aid. Hence on
November 4 the pope informed the archbishops of Sens and
Rheims that the Syrian crusade was postponed for a year, until
August 1239. On December 7 the emperor wrote to the pope
stating that he had promised the crusaders not to ask for another
delay beyond the year. When the time came, he would give them
every assistance. In fact he would either lead them in person or send
his son Conrad as his representative. Thus by the end of 1237 the
departure for Constantinople was set for August 1238 and that for
the Holy Land for August 1239.

The expedition to Constantinople did not start in August 1238
nor was it led by Peter of Dreux. Just what did happen is obscure.
On January 12, 1238, the pope wrote to Peter asking him to reduce the contingent he expected to lead to Constantinople in August. The bishop of Sées was informed that the emperor Baldwin II needed money more than troops. On May 14 the bishop was directed to give Peter at once one third of the funds collected by him for the relief of Constantinople and to pay him the rest when he reached his destination. Nothing more is heard of this expedition until July 5, 1239, when Louis IX sent agents to count the crusaders who had gathered around the banner of Baldwin. Some time later Baldwin set out for Constantinople. The only barons known to have been with him were Humbert of Beaujeu and Thomas of Marly. Peter of Dreux was in the host bound for Palestine.

During the years 1234 through 1238 pope Gregory had been devoting a large part of his attention to his plans for the two crusades. But early in 1239 came a serious diversion in the form of a renewal of his quarrels with Frederick II: the basic issue between them remained unsolved, as Frederick was resolved to make himself absolute master of Italy, and the pope felt obliged to support Frederick’s enemies in northern Italy. On March 20, 1239, he excommunicated Frederick.

This situation was, to say the least, confusing to the crusaders who were bound for the Holy Land. The pope was the initiator and patron of the expedition. Many of the usual ports of departure for Palestine were in Frederick’s domains, and he was the guardian of his son Conrad, the young king of Jerusalem. While the barons had probably never expected that Frederick would actually lead their host, his cooperation was extremely important. Hence the crusaders must have been sadly perplexed when they gathered at Lyons in July 1239. Matthew Paris, who was no friend to Gregory, states that both the pope and the emperor asked the barons to postpone the crusade. But in a letter of April 1240 addressed to king Henry III of England, Frederick himself stated specifically that he had asked the crusaders to wait until he or Conrad could lead them, and that they had been about to accede to his request, but that the firm insistence of Gregory had persuaded them to start. When Frederick wrote this letter, the expedition had met a serious reverse, and he may well have wanted to throw the blame on the pope, whose own letters to the crusaders have not survived.

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6 *RHGF*, XXII, 596.
If Frederick did indeed ask the crusaders to delay their departure, he took it in good part when they refused to follow his advice. He wrote to them that the pope’s support of the Lombard rebels had thrown his realm into such confusion that he could give them little aid. He offered them passage through his lands and ports. Moreover, he would write to his bailie of Jerusalem directing him to aid them. The emperor closed with some sharp remarks about the citizens of Acre, who had steadfastly refused to acknowledge his sovereignty. Some months later he congratulated the crusaders on their safe arrival at the city he had warned them against. He was much too short of funds to finance the fortification of Jerusalem, but they could buy what supplies they needed from his domains. In January 1241 he directed his agent in Sicily to allow the purchase of supplies for the crusading army in Palestine. In view of the difficulties besetting Frederick, he seems to have done what he could for his not entirely welcome allies.

The crusading barons who gathered at Lyons formed an imposing group. At their head stood two peers of France, one of whom wore a crown — count Theobald IV of Champagne, since 1234 king of Navarre, and Hugh IV, duke of Burgundy. With them were two great officers of the realm, Amalric, count of Montfort and constable of France, and Robert of Courtenay, butler of France. Below these lords in feudal and official dignity but fully their equal in prestige came Peter of Dreux, once count (duke) of Brittany and earl of Richmond. Although by 1239 Peter was simply lord of La Garnache and Montaigu, he was generally called count of Brittany. Then there were a group of counts of secondary rank — Guigues of Forez and Nevers, Henry of Bar, Louis of Sancerre, John of Mâcon, William of Joigny, and Henry of Grandpré. Among the important men below comital rank were Richard, viscount of Beaumont; Dreux of Mello, lord of Loches and Dinan; Philip of Montfort, lord of La Ferté-Alais; Andrew, lord of Vitré; Ralph, lord of Fougères; Simon, lord of Clermont; Robert Malet, lord of Graville; and William, lord of Chantilly. With some overlapping these lords fall into three classes — officials and servants of the French crown, relatives and former vassals of Peter of Dreux, and vassals of Theobald.

Theobald IV was an excellent poet, an ineffective warrior, and an irresolute and shifty politician. By 1234 he had lost through a

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combination of ineptness and bad luck an important part of his vast patrimony, and had earned the distrust of every group in the feudal politics of France. Only his status as a crusader had saved him from severe punishment for rebellion against Louis IX. One can only guess at Theobald's motives in taking the cross. He came of a crusading family. His uncle count Henry had been ruler of Jerusalem, and his father Theobald III had died while preparing to go to the Holy Land. Theobald quarreled with the church less than most feudal princes and was an enthusiastic burner of heretics. Perhaps he felt grateful to Divine Providence for the kingdom of Navarre. Perhaps he was chiefly interested in papal protection in case his rebellion against king Louis failed. Certainly nothing in his record gave any hope that he would furnish wise, determined, or consistent leadership to the crusading host.

Peter of Dreux was a noted soldier and a skillful and unscrupulous politician. He loved power, wealth, prestige, and strife of all kinds. Born a younger son of the house of Dreux, and hence a relative of the Capetian kings, he had spent his life struggling to obtain and keep a position that would satisfy his ambitions. Husband to Alice, the heiress of Brittany, he had forced its almost independent counties into a centralized feudal state. Her death reduced his rights in the duchy to those of guardian of his young son John. Having failed at rebellion against Blanche of Castile and Louis IX, Peter retired to his second wife's domains in Poitou. His reasons for taking the cross are not hard to guess. He needed the pope's friendship to aid him in settling his numerous quarrels with the church, and he wanted more action than his petty fiefs in Poitou would be likely to supply. Few barons can have had greater need of the crusader's indulgences. As an experienced and competent soldier with no affection for useless risk Peter was a valuable addition to the crusading host.

Amalric of Montfort was a bankrupt hero. Son of Simon, who had led the Albigensian Crusade and won the title count of Toulouse, Amalric had been obliged to surrender his rights in Toulouse to the French crown. Although he enjoyed the dignity of constable of France, his lands were small and he was deeply in debt. His crusade was financed by the pope and king Louis. Perhaps his reputation as a soldier was more a reflection of his father's glory than the result of his own prowess, but he was undoubtedly considered the first soldier of France. Duke Hugh of Burgundy had little fame as either a soldier or a statesman. But he came of a family

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8 See above, chapter VIII, pp. 314-324.
noted for its enthusiasm, courage, and perseverance as crusaders, and he was to prove himself a worthy member of it. Count Henry of Bar had probably done more fighting with less success than any other baron of France.

In a letter which we should probably date October 6, 1237, the chief barons and prelates of Jerusalem who were opposed to Frederick II gave Theobald advice, in answer to questions he had asked them. They saw no point in delaying the expedition until the end of the truce, as Saracens never kept truces anyway. Marseilles or Genoa seemed the best ports of departure for a French army. They then suggested that the crusaders land at Cyprus and there take counsel with the leaders of the Christians in Palestine. At Cyprus supplies were plentiful and the army could rest after its voyage. Moreover from Cyprus it was equally easy to strike for Syria or Egypt, whichever seemed more promising. Apparently Theobald had not asked about political conditions in either the kingdom of Jerusalem or the Ayyūbid state, but if the advice to stop at Cyprus had been followed, the crusaders would have been able to inform themselves on these matters before they reached Palestine.

In another letter Armand of Périgord, master of the Knights Templar, informed Walter of Avesnes that the sultan of Egypt was a man of no valor and was held in general contempt. The lord of Transjordania was at war with the sultan of Damascus. Several of the Ayyūbid lords whom Armand would not yet name were anxiously awaiting the coming of the crusaders and had promised to submit to them and receive baptism. The references to a feeble sultan of Egypt and to an independent sultan at Damascus show that this letter was written after the death of the sultan al-Kāmil in March 1238. It is not clear that Walter of Avesnes was connected with the barons who were planning the crusade, but the letter appears in the chronicle of Aubrey of Trois-Fontaines, whose chief interest lay in Champagne and its vicinity. It may well have been the knowledge that different sultans ruled at Damascus and in Egypt that led the crusaders to abandon any idea of attacking Alexandria or Damietta and moved them to sail directly to Acre.

10 E. Martène and U. Durand, Thesaurus novus anecdotorum, I (Paris, 1717), 1012-1013.
11 R. Röhrich, Regesta regni Hierosolimitani, p. 282, dates this letter 1238. The letter tells the crusaders not to delay because of the truce. But the crusaders had postponed their departure to August 1239 as early as November 4, 1237. To accept the date of 1238 it is necessary to believe that this news took eleven months to reach Acre. Moreover, to justify his date Röhrich makes an emendation in the list of men who sent the letter. October 1237 seems an acceptable date that removes all difficulties.
12 Aubrey of Trois-Fontaines (MGH, SS., XXIII), p. 945.
There was little point in attacking Egypt if its sultan did not control the Holy Land.

The crusaders left France in August 1239. While a few took advantage of emperor Frederick II’s offer to use the ports of southern Italy, the majority sailed from Marseilles. As the fleet neared its destination, a storm scattered it over the shores of the Mediterranean. If one is to believe the Rothelin manuscript, some ships were driven as far as Sicily and Sardinia. Theobald reached Acre on September 1, and soon the army was concentrated there. At Acre the crusaders were met by the potentates of the Holy Land — the prelates and barons of the kingdom of Jerusalem and the masters of the three great military orders, the Templars, the Hospitalers, and the Teutonic Knights. The most prominent of the local barons as far as relations with the crusaders were concerned was a recent arrival in Palestine to whom Frederick had given the county of Jaffa, Walter, count of Brienne, nephew of John of Brienne, former king of Jerusalem. Walter was a vassal of Theobald for his county of Brienne and must have been well known to most of the crusading lords. With him were Odo of Montbéliard, constable of Jerusalem, and two of the chief members of the great house of Ibelin, Balian, lord of Beirut, and John, lord of Arsuf, as well as their cousin, Balian of Sidon. Balian of Sidon also had connections in the crusading host. His mother Helvis of Ibelin’s second husband had been Guy of Montfort, younger brother of Simon, count of Toulouse, and he was thus a half-brother of Philip of Montfort, lord of La Ferté-Alais.

The most immediate necessity facing the crusaders was to attempt to secure the safety of Jerusalem. Frederick had obtained possession of the holy city by his truce with al-Kāmil, but either because of penury or from a desire not to annoy the Moslems he had neglected to fortify it. When the truce expired, the only defensible post in the city was the Tower of David, which was held by a small garrison under the command of an English knight, Richard of Argentan. Although the alarmed citizens had done what they could to improve the defenses, they had succeeded only in erecting some flimsy works at St. Stephen’s Gate. As soon as Theobald landed at Acre, he wrote to Frederick II to notify him of his safe arrival and to ask for money to rebuild the walls of Jerusalem. Meanwhile the Moslems had decided to anticipate any possible action by the crusading host. Attacking the city in force, they easily overthrew the light works that had recently been erected, but the Tower of David held
out against them. Soon imperial agents arrived to ask for an extension of the truce. Although these officers persuaded the Moslems to abandon their attack on the Tower of David, it is not clear whether or not they retired from the city.\footnote{It is impossible to reconcile fully the different accounts of the events in Jerusalem during this crusade. Rothelin Eracles, pp. 529–530, states clearly that both the city and the Tower of David were taken shortly after the crusaders arrived at Acre. All the other chroniclers both Christian and Moslem place the fall of Jerusalem after the battle of Gaza. The only possible solution seems to lie in a passage of the Annales de Dunstable, p. 150. It tells how Richard of Argentan and his men were saved by the imperial envoys. Obviously the Rothelin Eracles may have confused this Moslem attack with the later one that captured and destroyed the Tower of David. As Richard’s lands lay near Dunstable, the priory’s chronicler may well have based its account on a letter from him or a report by one of his men.}

The news of the attack on Jerusalem reminded the crusaders who were resting quietly at Acre that they had come to the Holy Land to conduct a campaign against the Moslems. Theobald summoned a council of the crusading lords and the prelates and barons of the kingdom of Jerusalem to decide on a course of action. The chroniclers tell us that a whole day was passed in fruitless debate, and that many divergent views were presented, but they do not say what these views were. Presumably the possibility of fortifying Jerusalem was discussed. Perhaps the local barons, who were all members of the anti-imperial party, had no enthusiasm for saving the city for Frederick, with whom they were at war. Perhaps Theobald felt that he lacked the resources required for so great a task. Then it seems likely that there were some who wanted to attack the sultan of Damascus, while others preferred a campaign against Egypt. As the two sultans were on very bad terms, a good argument could be advanced for a vigorous attack on one of them in the hope that the other would stay neutral. The final decision looks like a compromise. The army would first march down the coast to Ascalon and build a castle there, a scheme that was of particular interest to the chief local lord in the council, Walter of Brienne, as Ascalon covered his county of Jaffa from Egyptian attacks. Then the host would proceed against Damascus itself. The chief objection to this plan was that it was likely to antagonize both sultans. The sultan of Egypt would naturally be alarmed at having the host camp on his frontier, and he probably had no desire to see a castle built at Ascalon. Under the circumstances annoying the sultan of Egypt seems a poor way to prepare for an attack on Damascus.

It was November 2 before the army commenced its march toward Ascalon. Except for the two days spent debating their plan of campaign there is no information about the barons’ activities during the two preceding months. Acre was a pleasant city, noted
for its easy moral standards. Theobald was a poet and had in his train two fellow rhymers, Ralph of Nesle, younger brother of count John of Soissons, and Philip of Nanteuil. Peter was probably not a poet himself, but he was a patron and friend of poets. The town was full of noble ladies such as Alice of Champagne, daughter of count Henry by Isabel, queen of Jerusalem. The widow of king Hugh I of Cyprus, she had been briefly married to Bohemond V, prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli. Before the crusade was over she was to marry Ralph of Nesle. Although Theobald composed a poem bemoaning his absence from his lady, it seems likely that local consolation was available. Certainly the ordinary knights whose funds were rapidly being spent were impatient at the leisureliness of their noble leaders.

On November 2, 1239, the host left Acre on its march towards Ascalon. There were some 4,000 knights, of whom more than half were supplied by the local barons and the military orders. Like most crusading armies it was short of horses and provisions. Apparently the sultan of Damascus had learned that the crusaders planned to lay siege to his capital, and ordered his vassal chieftains to bring supplies to the city. On the second day after leaving Acre, Peter of Dreux learned that a large convoy of edible animals bound for Damascus was passing within striking distance. The army’s need for supplies and probably his own desire for action and glory moved Peter to decide to intercept the convoy. As he was unwilling to share either the glory or the booty, he did not mention his plan to his fellow barons. Late that evening he left camp with a force of two hundred knights and mounted sergeants. At dawn they reached the castle where the convoy had spent the night. Apparently there were two possible routes from the castle toward Damascus. Hence Peter divided his forces. A party under the poet Ralph of Nesle lay in ambush on one road while Peter himself watched the other. At sunrise the Moslems left their stronghold and took the road held by Peter’s party. When their leader found that he was intercepted by a force smaller than his own, he decided to give battle rather than risk the loss of his convoy by retreating to the castle. Peter had taken up a position where the road emerged from a narrow defile. This gave him a great tactical advantage. By catching his lightly armed foes in a narrow place, he had robbed them of their chief asset, speed of maneuver. The Moslem leader sent forward his archers in the hope of holding off the French knights until his

cavalry could clear the defile, but Peter’s charge cut them to pieces and caught the main body in the pass. The fight became a hand-to-hand combat with sword and mace—the type of struggle most favorable to the heavily armed crusaders. But the Moslems fought well, and Peter felt obliged to sound his horn to call up his other contingent. The arrival of Ralph and his party decided the battle. The enemy was routed and fled toward the castle. Peter and his men entered the castle with the fugitives, killing many and taking the rest. Then he returned to camp with his booty. The fresh supplies, to say nothing of the victory, were very welcome to the crusading host.

By November 12 the crusading army had reached Jaffa. There they learned that the sultan of Egypt had sent a strong force to the vicinity of Gaza to hold the frontier of his lands. A number of barons, jealous of the glory that Peter of Dreux had acquired by his raid, decided to go out ahead of the army, attack the enemy, and rejoin the host at Ascalon. Apparently the two most ambitious leaders were the counts of Bar and Montfort, but they were joined by Hugh, duke of Burgundy; Walter of Brienne, count of Jaffa; Balian, lord of Sidon; John of Ibelin, lord of Arsuf; Odo of Montbéliard; the viscount of Beaumont; and many lesser lords. Estimates of their force range from 400 to 600 knights. When Theobald, Peter of Dreux, and the masters of the three military orders learned of the plan, they protested strenuously. They wanted the whole army to move as a unit to Ascalon and then attack the enemy if it seemed feasible. But the adventurous barons would not listen. Not even Theobald’s plea that they remember the oath they had taken to obey him as leader of the crusade had any effect. Not only did they defy Theobald as leader of the army, but even some of his own vassals were among the rebels.

The party left Jaffa in the evening and rode all night. They passed Ascalon and came to a brook that formed the frontier of the kingdom of Jerusalem. The count of Jaffa’s desire for adventure had cooled by this time. He pointed out that the horses were tired and suggested that they retire to Ascalon. But the crusaders insisted on going on. Count Walter led his men over the stream, deployed them, and covered the crossing. Once across the brook the army halted. The barons spread cloths on the ground and dined. They had chosen a most unfortunate spot for their rest, a sandy basin surrounded by high dunes. Apparently not even the count of Jaffa, who had conducted the crossing in so military a manner, thought to send out patrols or even to post sentries on the dunes.
The Egyptian commander had not been so negligent, and his scouts soon informed him of the crusaders' position. He promptly covered the dunes with crossbowmen and slingers. Their presence was first discovered by Walter of Jaffa; perhaps he had belatedly sent out a scout. The call to arms was given, and the leaders assembled in council. Walter and the duke of Burgundy wanted to retreat, but the counts of Bar and Montfort refused to do so. They said that the enemy was so near that only the cavalry could hope to escape. Retreat would mean sacrificing the infantry. Thereupon Walter of Jaffa and Hugh of Burgundy departed for Ascalon, leaving their colleagues to fight the battle. It seems likely that Balian of Sidon, John of Ibelin, and Odo of Montbéliard went with them. Walter's objections to crossing the Egyptian frontier lead one to wonder whether he and his fellow Syrian barons had not joined the expedition in the hope of curbing the recklessness of the crusaders, and saved themselves when they found it impossible.

Amalric of Montfort ordered his crossbowmen to clear the foe from the dunes. The men opened fire and were making good progress until they ran out of crossbow bolts. Amalric then noticed a deep, narrow passage between two dunes where his troops would be sheltered from the enemy's fire. The knights charged toward this place and easily scattered the infantry holding it. By this time the Egyptian cavalry had arrived on the scene, but its leader knew better than to charge the heavily armed knights in their narrow pass. Instead, he tried the time-worn trick of a feigned retreat. Completely duped, the crusaders rode out of their position in full pursuit while the Moslem infantry seized the pass behind them. The battle was over. The Moslem cavalry turned around, surrounded the crusaders, and cut them to pieces. Count Henry of Bar was killed. The count of Montfort, the viscount of Beaumont, some eighty knights, and many sergeants were captured.

When the main body of the army reached Ascalon, it met the count of Jaffa and the duke of Burgundy, who told them of the desperate situation of the counts of Bar and Montfort. With the Teutonic Knights in the vanguard, the army at once moved toward Gaza. Soon they met scattered fugitives and then the pursuing Moslems. But the Egyptian commander did not feel strong enough to fight the whole crusading army, and he retired while the crusaders occupied the corpse-strewn battlefield. Theobald was inclined to pursue the retreating enemy, but the Templars and Hospitallers pointed out that in that case the prisoners would probably be killed by their captors. Reluctantly Theobald accepted their advice and
returned to Ascalon. Soon the army retired up the coast to Jaffa and then went all the way back to Acre.

This retirement to Acre is extremely puzzling. The army had marched to Ascalon in order to build a castle there. Certainly the loss of a few hundred men did not weaken it so seriously that it could not carry out its plan. One reason for the retreat may well have been lack of supplies. The army had started from Acre without enough provisions, and Peter's booty cannot have lasted long. But it seems likely that the perpetual conflict between crusaders and local lords was an even more important factor. The barons of Jerusalem and the military orders were in general inclined to let the Moslems alone when they could. Their interest lay in defending their own lands rather than in aggression, and long experience had given them a deep respect for the military capacity of their foes. No doubt the Templars and Hospitallers considered the idea of pursuing the victors of Gaza into Egypt utterly foolhardy. The prisoners captured at Gaza blamed the two orders for their plight.16

While this was obviously unfair, it seems clear that the orders saw no reason for risking a large army in the vague hope of rescuing a small number of prisoners. But not even the non-aggressive tendencies of the orders and the local barons explain the retirement to Acre. The fortification of Ascalon was to their interest. It seems more likely that the determining factor was the civil war between the local barons and Richard Filangieri, the imperial bailie. Filangieri was holding Tyre, and the local barons were anxious to recover it. The Ibelins and Odo of Montbéliard may well have felt that they had spared enough time from their private war. It is interesting to notice that Philip of Novara in his chronicle mentions the crusade of Theobald only in connection with the arrival in the Holy Land of Philip of Montfort, who was to become an important baron of Jerusalem.17

At Acre the crusaders settled down once more to enjoy the pleasures of the city. Either they had forgotten the plight of Jerusalem or they were too discouraged to attempt to do anything to save it. A month or so after the battle of Gaza, an-Nāṣir Dā'ūd of Kerak, lord of Transjordania, advanced into the city and laid siege to the Tower of David. The garrison was small and poorly furnished

17 This rests on a distinction drawn between Philip of Novara's own work and later additions to it. See Charles Kohler's edition of *Les Mémoires de Philippe de Novare, 1218–1243* (Les Classiques français du moyen-âge, no. 10, Paris, 1913), p. xii, and cf. in general John L. LaMonte and Merton J. Hubert, translators, *The Wars of Frederick II against the Ibelins in Syria and Cyprus by Philip of Novare* (Records of Civilization, no. xxv, New York, 1936).
with provisions. When an-Nāṣir offered them safe passage to the coast in return for the surrender of the fortress, they felt obliged to accept. The Moslems then razed the Tower to the ground. The holy city was once more in the hands of the Saracen.

While Theobald and his followers were sitting in Acre for two months, marching down the coast to Ascalon, and retiring ingloriously to their starting point, fortune was at work paving the way for them to achieve an entirely undeserved success. During these months the confusion in the Aiyūbid states had been steadily increasing. About the time the crusaders arrived at Acre, aṣ-Ṣāliḥ Ismā’īl, brother of the late sultan al-Kāmil, had driven his nephew, aṣ-Ṣāliḥ Aiyūb, from Damascus. Late in October the unfortunate Aiyūb had been captured and imprisoned by his cousin, an-Nāṣir Dā’ūd of Transjordania. Ismā’īl had promptly set to work to consolidate his position as sultan of Damascus. This led to a fierce civil war between his supporters and those of Aiyūb. From this quarrel came the crusaders’ first promising opportunity.¹⁸

Al-Muẓaffar Taqī-ad-Dīn, lord of Hamah, who had been a loyal supporter of Aiyūb, found himself attacked by the lord of Homs, al-Mujāhid Shirkūh, who had joined the new sultan of Damascus. Al-Muẓaffar looked around for aid and decided to deal with the crusaders. He sent a Tripolitan clerk named William to Acre to ask Theobald to march towards his lands. When the crusaders arrived, he would turn his fortresses over to them and turn Christian. If Theobald was still seriously thinking of attacking Damascus, this offer deserved investigation. Otherwise the lord of Hamah was not important enough to waste time on. In any event, Theobald led his forces northwards and camped before Pilgrim Mountain just below Tripoli. From there he sent messengers to al-Muẓaffar. As the crusaders’ advance into Tripoli had diverted the attention of al-Mujāhid of Homs, al-Muẓaffar of Hamah felt no further need for aid and refused to carry out his promises. Annoyed and discouraged, the crusaders stayed a while at Tripoli as guests of its count, Bohemond V, prince of Antioch, and then returned to Acre. The sources supply no dates for this period. All one can say is that Theobald was back in Acre by early May 1240.

About this time, an-Nāṣir Dā’ūd of Transjordania and his prisoner Aiyūb came to an agreement. An-Nāṣir was to back Aiyūb in an attempt to conquer Egypt. Their project met with immediate success. The sultan of Egypt, al-‘Ādil Abū-Bakr, was deposed by

¹⁸ See below, chapter XX, pp. 706–707.
his men, who promptly welcomed as-Sāliḥ Aiyūb as their new sultan. This sudden reversal of fortune was most disturbing to sultan as-Sāliḥ Ismā'īl of Damascus. The man he had driven from Damascus had become master of Egypt. Ismā'īl immediately decided to seek the aid of the crusading host.

The sultan's offer was very tempting. He would surrender at once the hinterland of Sidon, the castle of Belfort (Shaqīf Arnūn), Tiberias, and Safad. Eventually he would turn over to the Christians more lands and fortresses. The master of the Templars writing to the preceptor of the Templars in England stated that all the territory between the coast and the river Jordan was to be recovered. 19 Certainly the sultan promised to return all Galilee, Jerusalem and Bethlehem with a wide corridor to the coast, Ascalon, and the district of Gaza without the city itself. Although the lists of places mentioned in the chronicles include several fortresses in Samaria, there is no evidence that this district as a whole was to be ceded to the Christians. 20 As all these regions except Galilee were actually in the hands of the lord of Transjordania and the sultan of Egypt, their return to Christian rule would have to await the victory of the new allies. The crusaders were to be allowed to buy supplies and arms in Damascus. They were to promise not to make any peace or truce with the sultan of Egypt without the consent of the sultan of Damascus. The crusading army was to go to Jaffa or Ascalon to cooperate with the sultan in defending his lands from the Egyptians. Theobald accepted the terms and marched his army south once more.

This truce between the crusading leaders and the sultan of Damascus met with opposition in both camps. The Moslem religious leaders in Damascus protested against it as treason to their faith. The garrison of Belfort refused to surrender the castle, and the sultan was obliged to reduce it by siege in order to turn it over to its Christian owner, Balian of Sidon. On the Christian side there were two centers of opposition, the Knights Hospitaller and the friends of the men captured at Gaza. The reasons for the Hospitalers' attitude are not clear. Safad was a great Templar castle, and the Hospitallers may have felt that they had been neglected. Perhaps the mere fact that the Templars favored the truce may have turned the rival order against it. The protests of the other group

19 Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, IV, 64.
20 This account of the lands promised by the sultan of Damascus is based on the assumption that the chroniclers were correct in stating that the later agreement with the sultan of Egypt conveyed the same territories as the truce with Damascus. The longest list of places recovered is found in Matthew Paris, Chronica majora, IV, 141-143.
are easily understood: the truce condemned the count of Montfort and his fellow prisoners to indefinite captivity.

In accordance with his agreement Theobald led his host down the coast to the vicinity of Jaffa, where he was joined by the army of the sultan of Damascus. An Egyptian force advanced to meet them there. Just what happened is far from clear. Apparently the followers of the sultan resented the alliance with the crusaders, and deserted in large numbers to the other side. The Christians, left without allies, took refuge in Ascalon. Moslem writers speak of crusaders killed and captured, but the Christian historians fail to mention any serious fighting.

Meanwhile the Hospitaliers and the friends of the count of Montfort had been at work on the irresolute Theobald. Without too much difficulty they persuaded him to make advances to the sultan of Egypt. The sultan was anxious for peace. He had not yet had time to consolidate his control over the vast lands ruled by his deposed brother, and he had many problems more pressing than the situation on the Palestinian coast. If he could obtain peace by freeing his prisoners and confirming the lands the crusaders had already been promised by his rival at Damascus, it was well worth his while. An agreement was soon reached, and a truce concluded on these terms.

This treaty also met fierce opposition in the Christian army. The Templars and some of the local lords refused to accept it, and insisted on keeping the previous agreement with Damascus. Both parties could advance excellent arguments. From the point of view of the crusading barons who had come to the Holy Land to extend the territory held by the Christians, Theobald’s action was wise. The sultan of Damascus had already surrendered Galilee, which was in Christian hands. But he had also shown that he could not persuade his army to cooperate with the crusaders against the sultan of Egypt and the lord of Transjordania, who controlled Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and the Gaza region. The truce with these two princes secured the rest of the lands that had been promised, and freed the prisoners. The question of good faith is more difficult to assess. Theobald could argue that the desertion of the crusaders by the sultan’s troops released him from his agreement. Moreover, there is a suggestion in the chronicles that Isma'il of Damascus had been negotiating privately with an-Nāṣir of Transjordania. In any event, Theobald’s truce with the sultan of Egypt secured for Christendom the lands and fortresses obtained by Frederick II in 1229 and about as much more in addition. Nevertheless it is not hard to understand
the position of the Templars and the local lords. The Templars had received Safad, and the lord of Sidon had possession of Belfort. They might well feel obliged to hold to the agreement that gave them these places. The sultan of Damascus was nearer at hand than the sultan of Egypt and hence a more direct threat to the orders and the barons of Jerusalem. Certainly a war with him would hamper the barons in their contest with Frederick’s officials.

The agreement between Theobald and the sultan of Egypt provided that the lands, castles, and prisoners should be surrendered within forty days. But Theobald and many of his fellow barons were thoroughly tired of the expedition. The endless quarrels of the orders and the local lords would have been enough to discourage a far more determined man than the king of Navarre. Perhaps too there was some truth in Matthew Paris’ suggestion that Theobald had no desire to face the debates over the chief command that were bound to arise when earl Richard of Cornwall arrived with his English crusaders. Whatever their reasons may have been, Theobald and Peter of Dreux did not wait to see the agreement carried out. They made a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and embarked at Acre about the middle of September 1240. It is not clear how many of the crusaders went with them. The duke of Burgundy and count Guigues of Nevers stayed at Ascalon to build the castle there. There is conclusive evidence that Theobald left some of his own followers there under the command of a deputy.\(^{21}\)

Theobald and his fellow crusaders had won no glory. Their own very moderate efforts had accomplished nothing whatever. But the presence of their host, while there was bitter rivalry between the Aïyûbîd princes, had brought great gains to the Christian cause. Without either fighting or active diplomacy Theobald had achieved far more than had Frederick II in 1229. One must not dismiss the possibility that this was according to Theobald’s plan. He was no ardent lover of battle. He had arrived at Acre to find the barons of Jerusalem and the imperial bailie in the midst of a bitter civil war. The master of the Templars had been saying for some time that the quarrels of the Aïyûbîd princes would give great opportunities to the crusaders. Very possibly Theobald decided that his best course was to do little or nothing and wait for his chance.

The master of the Templars wrote an exultant letter to his preceptor in England announcing the truce with the sultan of

Damascus. As the messenger who bore it sailed over the Mediterranean, he passed the crusading fleet of Richard, earl of Cornwall, brother of king Henry III of England. Richard’s preparations had been fully as confused as those of his French colleagues. He had taken the cross as early as 1236 with his brother-in-law, Gilbert Marshal, earl of Pembroke, John le Scot, earl of Chester and Huntingdon, and William Longsword, usually called earl of Salisbury. In January 1237 king Henry III expressed his pleasure that the Jews of England had offered an aid of 3,000 marks for Richard’s crusade. But the king and the English barons were doubtful of the wisdom of letting the earl go. The official reason was that he was the heir apparent to the throne. This may have had some weight, but it seems far more likely that he was the only effective balance between the king and the baronial opposition headed by Gilbert Marshal. At any rate on February 25, 1238, earl Richard, William Longsword, and Simon of Montfort, earl of Leicester, younger brother of count Amalric, were informed by the pope that their vows were suspended, as the king needed them in England. Apparently this did not please the earl, for on April 20 the pope ordered Henry III to give every assistance to his crusading brother.

Meanwhile Frederick II had informed Richard of the postponement of the crusade to August 1239. The emperor hoped that Richard would join in this postponement, and, when he started, would pass through Frederick’s lands. By November there was more to confuse the poor earl. Pope Gregory suggested that he give up his crusade, and contribute to the aid of Constantinople the money he would have spent. But Richard’s determination was immovable. Matthew Paris suggests a possible reason. When some of the English barons tried to persuade him to stay home, the earl replied that England was in such a mess that he would have gone even if he had not taken the crusader’s vow. He was tired of trying to arbitrate between the king and his advisers and the baronial opposition. On November 17, 1238, the pope granted him protection as a crusader and protection for his heir until he reached the age of 25. In a rather mournful letter to his legate in England the pope directed that, as Richard refused to commute, he would have to be given the money raised in England for Constantinople.

As his quarrel with Frederick II grew more acute, Gregory

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22 The background of earl Richard’s crusade is drawn chiefly from the Registres de Grégoire IX and Matthew Paris, Chronicæ majora.
was less anxious to have the English crusaders pass through his Italian domains. The empress, Isabel Plantagenet, was the sister of Richard and the sister-in-law of the other English leader, Simon of Montfort. Early in February 1240 Gregory ordered archbishop Walter of York to see that the crusaders did not start until the pope gave the word. Apparently this had no effect on the crusaders, and they continued their preparations. Simon sold his wood of Leicester for £1,000 to raise money for the expedition. After a series of conferences in which he made at least temporary peace between the king and Gilbert Marshal, who had apparently given up his crusading plans, Richard of Cornwall left England on June 10. With him were William Longsword and some dozen English barons. Simon of Montfort seems to have gone by himself with his own party. Together they are said to have led 800 knights. Richard was well received by king Louis and proceeded to southern France. According to Matthew Paris, he was met there by archbishop John of Arles, who in the pope’s name forbade him to cross, but there is no other evidence to support this, and Matthew must be used with caution because of his violent anti-papal bias. In any event Richard kept carefully out of the quarrel between Frederick and the pope. Despite his brother-in-law’s invitation, he did not enter the imperial lands, but sailed from Marseilles about the middle of September and landed at Acre on October 8. Simon of Montfort, on the other hand, went to Brindisi. While there is no positive evidence that he ever reached Palestine, one document suggests his presence there. In May 1241 a group of Palestinian barons wrote to the emperor requesting that earl Simon be made bailie of the kingdom.

When Richard of Cornwall reached Acre he found the situation extremely discouraging. Theobald of Champagne and Peter of Dreux had sailed for home some two weeks before his arrival, taking with them a fair part of their troops. The two great military orders were engaged in a bitter feud. The Hospitallers, who favored the truce with Egypt, had withdrawn their forces to Acre, while the Templars, who supported the agreement with Damascus, were at Jaffa. Richard seems to have asked the lord of Transjordania whether or not he considered the truce in force and to have received a negative answer. At any rate he marched down the coast to Jaffa. There he was met by the envoys of the sultan of Egypt, who conveyed their master’s offer to confirm the truce made with Theobald.  

24 The fullest account of earl Richard’s crusade is found in the earl’s own letter to Baldwin de Redvers, earl of Devon. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, IV, 138–144.
Richard took counsel with the duke of Burgundy, the leader of the French crusaders, Walter of Brienne, and the masters of the two great orders. All except the Templars agreed that it was wise to accept the sultan’s offer. Late in November earl Richard dispatched messengers to Cairo to notify the sultan of his decision. Then he marched to Ascalon and set about completing the castle.

The sultan of Egypt was apparently in no great hurry to complete the negotiations for the truce. It was not until February 8, 1241, that Richard’s messengers returned to Ascalon to report that the agreement was finally concluded. Meanwhile the earl had been pressing the work on Ascalon castle. The chroniclers note that he restored it just as it had been built by his uncle, king Richard I. By the middle of March the task was done. Then Richard faced a perplexing problem — to whom should he entrust this important frontier fortress? According to the custom of the kingdom of Jerusalem the liege men, that is the barons, of the realm should have custody of the royal fortresses during the minority of king Conrad. But this theory had never been accepted by Frederick II, and Richard was the emperor’s brother-in-law. Hence the earl sent a messenger to Jerusalem to summon Walter Pennenpié, the emperor’s agent in the city, to come to Ascalon and take custody of the castle. Just how Walter had become installed in Jerusalem is unknown. Presumably Theobald and Peter of Dreux had decided to stay neutral in the contest between the barons of the kingdom and the emperor, and had returned the holy city to its most recent Christian guardians, the imperial agents.

On April 13, 1241, the Christian prisoners captured at Gaza were finally exchanged for the Moslem captives in the hands of the crusaders. Earl Richard had already done what he could for those who had been slain in the battle. He had sent men with carts to collect their bones and bury them solemnly in the cemetery of Ascalon. Then he made provision for daily masses for their souls. Matthew Paris assures us that this act of considerate piety gained the earl great popularity in France. Once the prisoners had been returned, Richard felt that his work in the Holy Land was finished. On May 3 he took ship at Acre for the journey home.

Richard had accomplished nothing that Theobald could not have easily done had he been less impatient to get home. He had simply completed with efficiency and resolution the tasks that Theobald had left unfinished. But he could have thrown the whole situation into

confusion by listening to the Templars and renewing the alliance with Damascus against Egypt. While Richard’s vanity moved him to attempt to minimize Theobald’s accomplishment, he did not try to undo his work in the hope of achieving glory for himself. Theobald’s truce with Egypt was a great victory for the Christian cause, and Richard had the good sense to satisfy himself with consolidating the gains made by it. In short, Richard of Cornwall deserves some credit for what he did but far more for the mistakes he did not make.

The kingdom of Jerusalem had been strengthened by the addition of lands and castles. The truce would give the Christians time to fortify the places that had been recovered. This had been done at a considerable cost in money and men. The crusade also supplied the kingdom of Jerusalem with a future very feeble bailie, Ralph of Nesle, husband of Alice of Cyprus, and one of its most effective barons, Philip of Montfort. But all the results both major and minor were produced by fate — or in the words of Armand of Périgord, by God’s will. The crusaders themselves had had little to do with their own accomplishments.
14. The Fifth Crusade, 1218–1221 (Map by the University of Wisconsin Cartographic Laboratory)

15. The Crusade of Louis IX, 1249–1250 (Map by the University of Wisconsin Cartographic Laboratory)