THE CRUSADE OF
FREDERICK II

After the loss of Damietta the Christian world fastened its attention and hopes upon the emperor Frederick II. Less importance might have been attached to his activities had the papal legate


On Frederick and the popes, several of the works listed in the bibliography of the preceding chapter continue to be relevant. In addition, the following are especially useful: C. de Cherrier, *Histoire de la lutte des papes et des empereurs de la maison souabe* (2nd ed., 3 vols., Paris, 1858–1859); A. Hauck, *Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands*, IV (Leipzig, 1903); R. Honig, *Rapporti tra Federico II. e Gregorio IX. rispetto alla spedizione in Palestina* (Bologna, 1896); W. Knebel, *Kaiser Friedrich II. und Papst Honorius III. in ihren gegenseitigen Beziehungen von der Kaiserkrönung Friedrichs bis zum Tode des Papstes 1220–1229* (Münster, 1905); C. Kohler, *Das Verhältnis Kaiser Friedrichs II. zu den Päpsten seiner Zeit* (Breslau, 1888); J. Marx, *De vita Gregoriæ IX* (Berlin, 1889); and C. Rodenberg, *"Kaiser Friedrich II. und die Kirche* (Historische Aufsätze, dem Andenken an Georg Walz gewidmet" (Hanover, 1886).

Pelagius conquered Cairo and the inland regions of Egypt, or the crusaders accepted the sultan’s offer to exchange Damietta for Jerusalem. But now Frederick’s chances stood out in bold relief against the background of failure of an expedition which for more than seven years had absorbed the attention of the western world. He alone, the leading sovereign of Europe, emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, was in a position to redeem the losses by employing the resources and the arms of the west in the reconquest of the Holy Land.

Six years before (July 15, 1215), at the height of the efforts of Innocent III to stir the peoples of Europe to take the cross, and while crusading preachers were active throughout Europe, Frederick had received the German crown at Aachen. He had previously been crowned in Mainz on December 9, 1212, but this second coronation was carried out in such a fashion as to emphasize the legitimacy of his election, and to direct the attention of the Christian world to him. The newly crowned king astonished those in attendance at Aachen, as well as the pope, by taking the cross, and called upon the nobles of Germany to follow his example.

At the time, and again some twelve years later, Frederick said that he had taken the cross in order to express his gratitude for the many blessings bestowed upon him. He insisted that in doing so he had placed both his person and the whole of his authority at the service of God by obligating himself to work unremittingly for the recovery of the Holy Land. Later the pope and the curia were inclined to question the sincerity of his motives. In his encyclical of October 10, 1227, pope Gregory IX was to remind Frederick that he had accepted the cross spontaneously, without urging by the apostolic see and without its foreknowledge.

For the moment Innocent chose to ignore the action of his protégé, although he was bending every effort to rally the kings

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1 On these events see above, chapter XI, pp. 403–428.
2 E. Winkelmann, Geschichte Kaiser Friedrichs des Ewigen und seiner Reiche 1212–1235 (Berlin, 1863), pp. 69–70.
3 Huillard-Bréholles, III, 39.
4 Ibid., III, 25.
and princes of Europe to the cross. When setting forth his plans for the crusade during the Fourth Lateran Council, the pope made no mention of Frederick as a crusader. Perhaps Innocent wanted to retain the leadership of the crusade in his own hands, solely as a papal enterprise; perhaps he regarded Frederick's action as the generous but impracticable gesture of a youthful monarch, as yet unaware of the full implications of his obligation. Frederick was useful to Innocent primarily as a foil against his former protégé, Otto IV, now discarded. With conditions in Germany still gravely unsettled, and likely to remain so long after the date designated by the Lateran Council for the departure of the crusade, Frederick could hardly have hoped to go to the east. Indeed, he had no illusions about the difficulties which lay ahead in Germany or about the dangers which might arise in his Sicilian kingdom were he to leave the west. There is abundant evidence that at the time of his coronation Frederick had little enthusiasm for the crusade.5

Why did he take the cross? No doubt he was grateful to God for the sudden change of fortune that had restored his heritage, denied him since his father's death in 1197. But it could scarcely have been gratitude alone that moved him. His Hohenstaufen ancestors' ambitions for world empire had necessarily been linked with plans for imperial crusades. Frederick at twenty-one fully realized that the taking of the cross was almost essential to the dignity of his new office, and that Europe expected it of him. The man who aspired to be leader of Europe had also to be leader of the crusade.6 Moreover, the taking of the cross, insofar as it asserted Frederick's claim to lead the new crusade, as emperor, was a kind of declaration of independence from the papacy, a timely, if not tactful, announcement that he had emerged from papal tutelage. Though a good many German nobles had already taken the cross, Frederick's example now led many others to do so, including archbishop Siegfried of Mainz, four bishops, and the dukes of Lorraine, Meran, Brabant, and Limburg.7 Little wonder that Innocent was annoyed at the implied menace to his own desire to make the new crusade a purely papal enterprise. Since the pope could hardly express his annoyance, he passed over Frederick's action in silence.

After the death of Innocent (July 16, 1216), his aged successor,

6 Kestner, Der Kreuzzug Friedrichs II., pp. 14 ff.
7 Chronica regia Coloniensis, p. 236; MGH, SS., XVII, s28.
Honourius III, at first excluded the emperor from his crusading plans, taking no account of Frederick's action at Aachen. Indeed, it was the emperor himself who took the initiative when he sent an embassy to Rome, at the beginning of the year 1217, to offer his official condolences on the death of Innocent. His envoys reported his desire to discuss with Honourius plans for a new crusade. On April 8, 1217, the pope replied that in the near future he would send a legate to take up with Frederick the question of assistance for the Holy Land.\(^8\) He made no mention of an active role for Frederick as a crusader, and, indeed, there is no evidence that the proposed discussion ever took place.

If Honourius, and Innocent before him, refrained from mentioning Frederick's vow solely out of a considerate realization that, while Otto IV lived, it would be impossible for Frederick to absent himself from his kingdom, then why did neither pope at least praise Frederick's generous gesture, which had influenced so many of the noblest of his German subjects to take the cross? Or are we to assume with von Raumer that almost all the correspondence between Honourius III and Frederick II for the years 1217-1218 is lost?\(^9\) Or did both popes want to preserve the crusade as an exclusively papal enterprise?

In any case between July 15, 1215, and the end of 1218 neither pope made any mention of Frederick's crusading vow. Then, with apparent suddenness, Honourius broke the silence by an urgent appeal to Frederick to fulfill his pledge. Why? Was it because the death of the Welf Otto IV was presumed to have freed Frederick from his preoccupation with Germany? This is unlikely because Henry of Brunswick still actively represented Welf interests and still retained the royal insignia. Was it not rather because the crusading expedition in Egypt was now in dire need of new aid and leadership? Had not the crusading effort, undertaken solely as a papal enterprise, failed, and thus necessitated the appeal to Frederick? Unfortunately, Honourius's appeal itself is lost, but Frederick's reply of January 12, 1219 — the beginning of a regular correspondence on the subject — leaves no doubt that the pope had stressed the urgency of the need of assistance in Egypt.

In December 1218 at Fulda Frederick had already dealt in a preliminary way with the problem of the crusade, and proposed to consider the subject more thoroughly and more fruitfully in a

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\(^8\) Huillard-Bréholles, I, part 2, 504: "per quem tam super iis que ex parte tua nobis fuere proposita quam super Terre Sancte succurreru. . . ."

\(^9\) von Raumer, Geschichte der Hohenstaufen, III, 117.
diet to be held at Magdeburg the next March. Once more, as at
Aachen, he was the independent, self-confident ruler, acting not
under pressure from the curia but wholly on his own initiative. He
was certain that the nobles would accept his decisions respecting
the date and the circumstances of the departure for the Holy Land.
He advised the pope to make all princes and prelates who had
taken the cross subject to excommunication if they had not fulfilled
their vows by the following June 24. No one was to be released
from his vow unless, in the judgment of the king and princes, he
was considered essential to the protection of the realm. Honorius
took immediate steps to put into effect all of Frederick’s rec-
ommendations.¹⁰

For reasons which are not apparent in the sources, the meeting
at Magdeburg did not take place. Perhaps Frederick was detained
in Alsace, or purposely postponed the diet until the papal legate
had successfully extracted the royal insignia from Henry of Bruns-
wick. Moreover, shortly afterwards he asked Honorius for a post-
ponement of the crusade to September 29, on the grounds that
preparations could not be completed before that time. In a letter
of May 18, 1219, the pope agreed. Meanwhile, on May 10,
Frederick had acquainted the pope with his desire to have his son
Henry crowned before his own departure for the Holy Land. He
explained to the pope that his objects were to ensure that the
kingdom should be well governed during his absence, and to
facilitate Henry’s succession to the German heritage in case of his
own death while on crusade.¹¹ The pope appears to have offered
no objection to this.

On September 6, Frederick again took up the subject of his son’s
coronation and requested a further postponement of the crusade to
March 21, 1220. Honorius once more yielded to the king’s request,
indicating that, despite obvious difficulties, the earnestness of
Frederick’s preparations was indicative of his good intentions. At
the same time he warned that further postponement would subject
Frederick to the ban which he himself had recommended as the
penalty for those who persisted in delaying the fulfillment of their
vows.¹²

Through the remainder of 1219, and well into 1220, Frederick,
encouraged by Honorius’s benevolent comprehension, displayed a

¹⁰ J. F. Böhmer, Regesta imperii, vol. V: Die Regesten des Kaiserreichs unter Philipp
Otto IV., Friedrich II., Heinrich (VII), Conrad IV., Heinrich Raspe, Wilhelm und Richard,
1198–1273... (eds. J. Ficker and E. Winkelmann, 5 parts, Innsbruck, 1881–1901),
part 3 (1892), nos. 6323–6325.
¹² Ibid., I, part 2, 691–693.
feverish activity. During a diet at Nuremberg, in October 1219, he gained many recruits from the German nobility for the projected expedition. The port cities of southern Italy were called upon to produce the required ships, and the crusading preachers were urged to greater zeal in their efforts among the people. But on February 19, 1220, Frederick reported to Honorius that he could not launch the crusade at the time agreed upon, because the German nobility had proved so apathetic. Honorius’s acceptance of the excuse—though he did warn against further delay—indicated that he was not unaware of the widespread indifference prevalent not only in Germany but throughout Europe. For the fourth time, therefore, he agreed to a postponement, setting the new date for May 1. Even before the arrival of Frederick’s letter, Honorius, who by now knew that Damietta had fallen, had sent the scholasticus Conrad of Mainz as crusading preacher to spur on the faltering crusaders of Germany, instructing him to deal gently with dilatory pilgrims, but not to detain them beyond the new deadline even if Frederick should find himself unable to go.

Frederick’s own departure clearly depended upon the coronation of his son Henry as king of the Romans, and his own coronation as emperor. It was only after many preliminaries, much negotiation, and the award of special concessions to the spiritual princes that in April 1220 a brilliant diet at Frankfurt elected Henry king, and made arrangements for Frederick’s voyage to Rome, which was to culminate in the imperial coronation, and to coincide with the setting out of the crusading expedition. At the same time many thousands took the cross. Although not previously informed and far from pleased with the proceedings at Frankfurt, the curia accepted the fait accompli. When Frederick again failed to depart on crusade, however, the pope notified the chancellor, Conrad of Metz, that excommunication impeded, but in fact imposed only a penance. All along, Honorius seems to have recognized that he would have to crown Frederick emperor before the latter would go on crusade. Though the pope objected to Frederick’s sending a mere abbot to discuss the plans for the coronation, he agreed that the cause of the Holy Land and the general peace required that Frederick be crowned. On August 28 Honorius further consented to crown queen Constance empress. At the end of August Frederick

13 Röhrich, Beiträge, I, 7.
15 Ibid., I, part 2, 783–784.
16 Chronicon Lelandianum (RHGF, XVIII), p. 635. See also Hampe, Deutsche Kaisergeschichte, pp. 222 ff. (10th ed., pp. 262 ff.).
left for Italy, and on November 22, 1220, Honorius crowned him and Constance in St. Peter's.

Honorius had been reminding Frederick that the crusaders at Damietta were in danger so long as their conquests were not extended inland (which was Pelagius' view), and had also notified Pelagius that the emperor's departure was imminent. At his coronation, Frederick took the cross a second time, from the hands of cardinal-bishop Ugolino of Ostia, later his determined adversary pope Gregory IX, and agreed to set sail the following August (1221), meanwhile sending ample reinforcements to Damietta in March.\(^\text{17}\)

Having achieved his political aims, Frederick resumed his journey southward. His extraordinary activity must have reassured Honorius that the long delays were over. The emperor ordered the necessary ships made ready in the Sicilian ports; he sent a representative to northern Italy to assemble troops and money; and from Salerno he appealed for support to his faithful subjects of Germany and especially to the cities of Lombardy and Tuscany. Those who would remain in his favor should follow his example: "Therefore, true soldiers of the empire, take up immediately the weapons of Christian knighthood; already the victorious eagles of the Roman empire have gone forth. Twofold rewards await you: the grace of the emperor and eternal bliss. Let yourselves be admonished, let yourselves be moved by entreaty and inspired by the love of Christ, whose bride, the church, your holy mother, is held wretchedly imprisoned in that land: Remember also how the Roman emperor, in ancient days, with the help of his soldiery, loyal unto death, subdued the whole earth."\(^\text{18}\)

The princes and nobles who had renewed their crusading vows at the time of the coronation in Rome embarked for Damietta, probably at Taranto, sometime in April 1221, under the leadership of duke Louis of Bavaria, instructed to begin no new undertaking prior to Frederick's arrival.\(^\text{19}\) In early June the pope almost apologetically reminded him once more of his obligations, citing the current gossip that he was delaying his preparation and hoped to obtain a new postponement.\(^\text{20}\)

\(^{17}\) Böhmer, Regesta imperii, V, part 3, nos. 6366, 6373, 6384, 6394; Winkelmann, Kaiser Friedrich, I, 52 ff., 109-111; Huillard-Bréholles, II, part 1, 52 f., and 82 f.

\(^{18}\) Ibid., II, part 1, 122 ff.

\(^{19}\) See above, chapter XI, pp. 423-424, and Huillard-Bréholles, III, 40, while for evidence that Frederick had given notice to the army in Damietta to expect his arrival, see ibid., II, part 1, 221: "unde propter expectationem tui subsidii quod etiam per litteras tuas promisisti exercitui sepe dicit." 

\(^{20}\) Ibid., II, part 1, 190.
sent forty more ships, commanded by the chancellor Walter of Palear, the admiral Henry of Malta, and the marshal Anselm of Justingen, who were entrusted with the funds gathered from the crusading tax.21 On July 20 Honorius thanked Frederick for sending the ships, but reminded him that they should have been sent earlier, all the more so if he had intended to delay his own departure.22 The readiness with which the pope now forgave the emperor for his failure to accompany the expedition suggests that he was not wholly displeased, and may have hoped that the reinforcements already sent to Damietta could conquer Egypt without Frederick. The extraordinary haste with which Pelagius sought to push forward the conquest of Cairo during July 1221 lends weight to this interpretation.23

The virtual anarchy facing Frederick in Sicily after an absence of eight years amply explains his reluctance to depart for the east. He had to redeem the royal lands, which since the death of Henry VI had been recklessly dissipated; reexamine the systems of taxation and trade regulations, and reassert royal prerogative; break the power of the feudal barons on the mainland and repossess the strategic fortifications which they had taken; subdue the Saracens and drive them from their mountain fastnesses; and rid Sicily of the privileged Genoese and Pisan merchants established in the vital seaports. It was to prove a three-year task. The two fleets which he had dispatched to Egypt during the year 1221 were for the moment his only contribution to the crusade.24 Yet as these galleys made their way from the Sicilian ports, Pelagius by pressing the attack on Cairo precipitated disaster;25 so the crusaders were compelled to accept a humiliating truce for eight years (until 1229). However justly Frederick II may be criticized for failing to fulfill his crusading vow punctually, he cannot be held responsible for the loss of Damietta. It was Pelagius and the other crusading leaders who yielded to his insistent demand, or else to his threat of excommunication, who were to blame.

Pelagius’ decision to attack Cairo had been taken in Damietta before he could have known that Frederick had remained behind, and at a moment when he had every reason to believe that reinforcements and perhaps the emperor himself were already en

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22 Böhmer, Regesta imperii, V, part 3, no. 6472; MGH, Epp. pont., I, 124.
23 See the statement by Winkelmann, Kaiser Friedrich, I, 151, in support of this view. See also above, chapter XI, pp. 423-424.
24 For the details of Frederick’s Sicilian problem during these years, see Hampe, Kaiser- geschichte, pp. 224 ff. (10th ed., pp. 264 ff.).
route. Perhaps Frederick’s presence could have given to the Fifth Crusade the unity and coherence and, indeed, the responsible leadership which it had so signally lacked since the capture of the chain tower. No doubt Frederick, like king John of Jerusalem, would have recognized that the Damietta expedition was useful only as a strategic approach to the conquest of Palestine. It is in this negative sense only that Frederick may be held responsible. Honorius and the curia, who certainly must be made to share Pelagius’ responsibility, obviously felt compelled to defend him by shifting the blame to Frederick. Although only a short time before Honorius had praised the emperor for his zeal, he now reproached him with the failure. Much contemporary popular criticism was directed at Frederick; it appears in some of the poetry of the troubadours, who reminded him of his repeated failures to fulfill his vow. But Honorius, the curia, and Pelagius bore the brunt of the sharpest attacks. Thus the author of the long poem “The complaint of Jerusalem against the Court of Rome”, writes:

Rome, Jerusalem complains of the greed which dominates you, and Acre and Damietta too, and they say that because of you it continues to be true that God and all his saints are not served in this land — They [the Saracens] are in possession of Damietta because of the legate, our enemy, and Christians are overtaken by death — and know well that this is the way it is: that they have betrayed king John in whom dwells excellence and valiance.

Another sharply attacked the military leadership:

For, when the clergy take the function of leading knights, certainly that is against the law. But the clerk should recite aloud from his Scripture and Psalms and let the knight go to his great battlefields.

The Christian world was stunned by the reversal in Egypt. Enthusiasm, stirred by the unremitting efforts of propagandists during the previous years, and kept alive by favorable reports from Damietta, now gave way to profound disillusionment. This reaction, perhaps more than anything else in the thirteenth century,


27 Attributed to Huon of St. Quentin, Bartsch and Horning, La Langue et la littérature françaises, col. 373.

28 Guillaume le Clerc, Le Besant de Dieu (ed. E. Martin, Halle, 1869), p. 73, also verses 2547 ff.; tr. Throop, Criticism of the Crusade, p. 32.
symbolizes the end of an era. Henceforth, crusades were to receive their impulse, not from papal leadership, but from the realistic policies of ambitious temporal rulers.\textsuperscript{29} The bitterness of Honorius III found expression in his letter to the emperor of November 19, 1221, in which he reminded Frederick that for five years the Christian world had hopefully awaited his departure for the Holy Land, and yet he had failed to fulfill his vow, thus subjecting both the pope and himself to criticism. Honorius declared that he himself had been remiss in failing to exert greater pressure, and added that he could no longer remain indulgent. Even before receiving this letter, Frederick had written to the pope in October expressing his desire to take immediate steps to send aid to the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{30}

In December Honorius sent cardinal-bishop Nicholas of Tusculum to Frederick, and in the following April (1222) they returned together to Veroli, where Frederick conferred at length with the pope. Honorius informed Pelagius that they had reached agreement on all points, and that Frederick would busy himself speedily with efforts to recover the Holy Land. He mentioned also another meeting to be held in November 1222, at Verona, to which princes, prelates, and vassals had been summoned, to consider the projected expedition.\textsuperscript{31} This meeting, however, took place not in Verona but in Ferentino and not until March 1223. It was attended not only by the pope and the emperor, but by king John of Brienne, Ralph of Mérenchourt, patriarch of Jerusalem, the masters of the knightly orders, and many others.

Frederick renewed his crusading vows, and the new date for the expedition was set for June 24, 1225. At the same time, as the empress Constance had died in June 1222, arrangements were made for his marriage to Isabel, daughter of John of Brienne and heiress to the kingdom of Jerusalem. This marriage would give Frederick a very substantial interest in the future of Jerusalem, and thus afford a guarantee that he would fulfill his vow. John of Brienne, who was only titular king, might expect to strengthen his own position, while the curia could feel reassured as to the ultimate recovery of the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{32} Once more, crusading preachers were sent into all parts of Europe to seek to restore interest in a crusade which, this time, the emperor himself would lead.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{29} See especially the elaboration of this by Kestner, \textit{Kreuz. Fried.}, pp. 15–16.
\textsuperscript{30} For the two letters, see Böhmer, \textit{Regesta imperii}, V, part 3, no. 6489, and Huillard-Bréholles, II, part 1, 206–207, 220 ff.
\textsuperscript{31} Böhmer, \textit{Regesta imperii}, V, part 3, no. 6510; \textit{MGH, Epp. pont.}, I, 137.
\textsuperscript{32} Richard of San Germano (\textit{MGH, SS., XIX}), p. 343, and Röhrich, \textit{Beiträge}, I, 11.
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Chronica regia Coloniensis}, p. 242: "... cum glorioso imperatore Frederico parati sint mare transire." Also in \textit{MGH, SS.}, XVII, 837.
Although still actively employed in disposing of various problems in Sicily, Frederick continued his preparations for the crusade. By the spring of 1224 a hundred galleys and fifty transports, capable of carrying 10,000 foot-soldiers and 2,000 knights, were ready. He offered liberal inducements to crusaders, including free transportation and provisions.\textsuperscript{34} King John, recently arrived from Syria, actively furthered the crusading effort by visiting France, England, Spain, and Germany.\textsuperscript{35} While received everywhere with acclaim, and enjoying a personal triumph, he had but little success in the main object of his mission. True, Philip Augustus, who died shortly after the arrival of his illustrious guest, made significant bequests to the kingdom of Jerusalem as well as to the Templars and Hospitallers. But the Albigensian war and the hostile relations with England, and a feeling of indifference, if not of positive aversion, toward the crusade, soon convinced John of the futility of his mission in France. In England the regents of young Henry III and the barons were deeply involved in internal quarrels or else engaged in conflicts with the French, while Spain was still occupied with her own fight against the Moslems. The preaching friars were held in contempt, partly because of their lowly origin, partly because of their insufficient ecclesiastical dignity and lack of authority to grant pardon for sins. In many places also the friars had repelled the better classes by their reckless and often obscure statements which encouraged the belief that taking the cross insured immunity from punishment for every sort of criminal action.\textsuperscript{36}

Partly of his own choice, and partly as a result of pressure from the curia, Frederick had to push forward by himself his preparations for a crusade. He apparently planned to go into Germany, and by his own presence to influence many of the nobles to take the cross, but was delayed until he could complete the arrangements for the deportation of the Sicilian Saracens into Apulia. Meanwhile he received discouraging reports from king John and the master of the Teutonic Knights, Hermann of Salza. Frederick was too well aware of the determination of Honorius, still mindful of Damietta, to expect that he could be made to understand the seriousness of these difficulties. Accordingly, he moved with the utmost caution in seeking further postponement of the expedition.

\textsuperscript{34} Röhricht, \textit{Beiträge}, I, xi ff.
\textsuperscript{35} For his itinerary and his efforts in behalf of the crusade see especially L. Böhm, \textit{Johann von Brienne, König von Jerusalem und Kaiser von Konstantinopel} (Heidelberg, 1938), pp. 69 ff.
\textsuperscript{36} See especially the letter of Frederick to the pope (March 5, 1224) in Huillard-Bréholles, II, part I, 429 ff.; also von Raumer, \textit{Geschichte der Hohenstaufen}, III, 158 ff., and Röhricht, \textit{Beiträge} I, 12.
He sent Hermann of Salza to visit the pope and to acquaint him with the true situation. Influenced by Frederick's complaints concerning the shortcomings of the crusading preachers, Honorius sent cardinal-bishop Conrad of Porto as his legate to Germany, at the same time urging the clergy of Germany to put forward their utmost efforts in behalf of the crusade, assuring them that he was sending crusading preachers with full authority. He also wrote an urgent letter to king Louis VIII of France, to order the French crusaders to join the expedition of Frederick, and tried to end the hostile relations between Raymond VII of Toulouse and the church as well as the Anglo-French conflict. But these efforts were vain, and the response in Germany was unsatisfactory.

Not only Frederick but king John, and apparently patriarch Ralph of Jerusalem as well, were convinced that no crusade could be launched at the time agreed upon at Ferentino. Accordingly, Frederick sent an embassy to the pope consisting of Hermann of Salza, king John, and the patriarch to arrange for a postponement. At the same time he summoned the prelates, including many who were likely to influence the pope unfavorably, to a conference in Apulia, where he held them until his embassy to Honorius had successfully accomplished its mission. On July 18, 1225, the pope, at the time in exile at Rieti, at last agreed to postponement, and ordered a conference to be held at San Germano to consider the details. The new agreement respecting the crusade was drawn up at San Germano on July 25, 1225, just ten years after Frederick had received the crown at Aachen and had first taken the crusader's vow.

Frederick promised to depart with an army fitting to his imperial dignity on August 15, 1227, and pledged himself to carry on the war against the Saracens for two years. During this period of two years also he was to maintain in Syria 1,000 knights at his expense or to pay 50 marks in lieu of each combatant wanting to complete this number. He agreed to provide fifty fully equipped galleys and a hundred transport ships sufficient to carry 2,000 armed men with three horses for each, together with their squires and valets. As a special guarantee of his good faith also, he agreed to hand over 100,000 ounces of gold in five installments to the custody of Hermann of Salza, king John of Jerusalem, and the patriarch. This was to be returned to him upon his arrival in Acre to meet the

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37 Chronica regia Coloniensis, p. 253; also in MGH, SS., XVII, 835–836. See also Böhmer, Regesta imperii, V, part 3, nos. 6569, 6570.
38 Röhricht, Beiträge, I, 12–13.
expenses of the war. If, however, for any reason, including his death, he failed to go on the expedition these funds were to be employed for the needs of the Holy Land.

Upon the completion of the reading of the terms, Frederick advanced to the high altar and, with his right hand upon the Gospels, and in a clear voice, swore to undertake the crusade on August 15, 1227. As double assurance of his sincerity, Reginald of Spoleto swore also “on the soul of the emperor” that the terms of the agreement would be executed, in good faith and without reservations, under penalty of excommunication. Finally, in a letter to the pope, Frederick recapitulated the terms and accepted the ban voluntarily if, in the event of his failure, the crusade did not take place. Since taking the cross at Aachen in 1215, each new postponement had tightened the hold of the curia upon Frederick until, at length, at San Germano he committed himself beyond all retreat.

The terms of the agreement are unique in their harshness, and reveal a want of consideration for the imperial office unparalleled in papal-imperial relations. Frederick pledged the resources of his empire to the limit of its capacity, and assumed as his personal responsibility a burden which the whole of Christendom had been unable to bear. No provision was made to relieve him of the full force of the penalty if, through illness, he should find it impossible to undertake the crusade. In case of his death his successors were bound. Frederick’s action at San Germano suggests his acquiescence in a theory of papal-imperial relationships which was to obtain wide currency under Innocent IV and his protégés, the extreme canonists of the later thirteenth century. Although already discernible in the decretals of Innocent III, it is somewhat surprising to find this theory translated into action at San Germano under the milder Honorius III. It is still more surprising that Frederick himself, otherwise the most independent sovereign of the Middle Ages, should, at least where the crusade was concerned, voluntarily have accepted a subservient position as “officialis” and vicar of the holy see, while at the same time recognizing, apparently without protest, the authority of the pope as “judex ordinarius”. It seems certain that between the meeting of the emperor’s ambassadors with the pope at Rieti, when Honorius was conciliatory, and the conference at San Germano, extraordinary pressure from within the curia had

40 See also the interpretation of Kestner, Kreuz. Fried., p. 22, and Röhrich, Beiträge, I, 62, n. 77.
been brought to bear upon Honorius to treat Frederick more severely. Probably Pelagius, still smarting under the humiliation of his defeat at Damietta, or else Syrian representatives present at the council were responsible. Only the acceptance of these terms enabled Frederick to obtain the desired postponement. Gregory IX himself several years later referred to the agreement of San Germano as imposing "very great and extraordinary obligations".  

In August 1225 Frederick sent fourteen galleys to escort his fiancée, Isabel of Brienne, from Syria. At Acre bishop Jacob of Patti gave Isabel Frederick's ring, and performed the marriage. There were many who marveled, says a contemporary, that two people should thus be married when one was in Apulia and the other in Syria, but "the pope had so ordered it". At Tyre, in accordance with her father's wishes, Isabel received the crown, and sailed for Brindisi, where Frederick and her father met her, and the marriage was celebrated anew on November 9.  

If, as has been conjectured, it had been the Syrian nobles who had taken advantage of Frederick's strained relations with the pope to have the harsh terms of San Germano imposed upon him, Frederick was now in a position to adopt a policy no less embarrassing to them. The Syrian magnates and the curia intended Frederick to assume the duties of king of Jerusalem only after his arrival in Syria and his coronation there. But immediately after the marriage Frederick took the title king of Jerusalem, changed his imperial seal to include the new title, and shortly afterwards had himself crowned in a special ceremony at Foggia. John of Brienne had apparently relied upon the assurance, said to have been given him by Hermann of Salza, that the emperor would permit him to hold the kingdom for life. It is probable also that John may have been the more easily persuaded to accept this promise because of the law of the Assises that the coronation of the king of Jerusalem should take place in Syria. But Frederick now chose to adopt a purely legalistic attitude. The claims of John of Brienne rested solely upon the inheritance of his late queen Mary and, after her death, upon his rights as guardian of their daughter. Frederick now claimed those rights as his own. Undoubtedly his inconsiderate treatment

41 Huillard-Bréholles, III, 26.  
42 The details of the marriage are given in the "Relation française du mariage de Frédéric II avec Isabelle de Brienne et ses démêlés avec le roi Jean," in Huillard-Bréholles, II, part 2, 921 ff.  
44 Huillard-Bréholles, II, part 2, 922-923.
of John violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the San Germano agreement, but the legality of his claim appears to have been supported by precedents already established in the cases of Guy of Lusignan, Conrad of Montferrat, and Henry of Champagne. 45

Such precedents, however, did not serve to reconcile king John, who first remonstrated with Frederick, and then denounced him in unbridled language, calculated to destroy for all time the possibility of a reconciliation. John then fled to Rome to seek the aid of the pope. 46 Honorius sympathized with John, and wrote to Frederick, characterizing his conduct as scandalous—"no less prejudicial to your own reputation than to the interests of the Holy Land." 47 The pope ignored Frederick’s assumption of the new title, and that this was an intentional rebuke may be inferred also from the fact that Gregory IX, Honorius’s successor, made reference to the title only in August 1231, after Frederick had been reconciled to the church. 48 Meanwhile Frederick sought and obtained the oath of fealty from the Syrian nobles who had accompanied the queen to Brindisi. Although they might well have insisted that, upon a strict interpretation of the 

Both the pope and the Syrian magnates must have recognized that, despite the harsh terms of San Germano, the emperor had made important gains through his marriage. He was now in a position to accomplish the expedition to the Holy Land, not merely as leader of a crusade in the traditional sense, but as a royal conqueror seeking to regain possession of his own. Frederick’s first royal decree confirmed the possessions of the Teutonic Knights in Syria, on behalf of Hermann of Salza, the master, and the brothers of that order. At the same time he bestowed new privileges upon them. 49 The Teutonic Knights now won a place in the east comparable to that which the Templars and Hospitalers had so long

45 Von Raumer, Geschichte der Hohenstaufen, III, 169.
46 Ibid., and Huillard-Bréholles, II, part 2, 923 and n. 2. See also Salimbene, Cron. (MGH SS., XXXII), p. 41.
47 Huillard-Bréholles, II, part 1, 597-598.
48 Ibid., III, 298: “Friederico illustri Romanorum imperatori, semper augusto, Hierusalem et Sicilie regi . . .”
49 Röhrich, Beiträge, I, 15, appears to have little support for his statement that at this time, “Allein der Adel und Klerus des Königreichs Jerusalem war mit Friedrich nicht zufrieden . . . .” It was only later, when there was reason to fear his interference in Cyprus, that there was a definite manifestation of dissatisfaction. Concerning the Ibelins, see G. F. Hill, History of Cyprus, II, 90.
50 Huillard-Bréholles, II, part 1, 531 ff.
enjoyed. Although at first he left Odo of Montbéliard unmolested in his duties as bailie, Frederick later replaced him with Thomas of Acerra, whose conduct, as the emperor’s representative in Syria, suggests that he had been charged especially with the duty of curbing the power of the Templars.  

Frederick’s position as king of Jerusalem also influenced the strategy of the new expedition. In 1224 plans for the crusade had still contemplated a return to Egypt, and the ships constructed for the expedition were therefore designed to meet the requirements of a campaign in the delta of the Nile. After Frederick’s coronation, however, Jerusalem became his immediate goal, and it was increasingly apparent that, as in most of his imperial projects, “Sicily would supply the money and Germany the men” for the expedition. He looked hopefully also to the Frisians as potential crusaders, recalling their signal successes in the assault on the chain tower, but his call to them evoked only a mild response, since the spiritual impulse from the scholasticus Oliver was no longer effective. In northern Germany only the most earnest appeals of the emperor, combined with offers of fiefs and money, restored some degree of peace among the warring factions. Commissioned by the pope as crusading preacher, bishop Conrad of Hildesheim also won support for Frederick, who later rewarded him richly. Landgrave Louis of Thuringia and duke Walram of Limburg, stimulated by the visit of Hermann of Salza, succeeded in rallying some 700 Thuringian and Austrian knights as well as many prelates and ministeriales to the crusade, which also drew forces from Cologne, Worms, and Lübeck. Despite the somewhat disappointing initial outlook, the number and prowess of the crusaders from Germany inspired hope for the success of the expedition.

Crusading preachers, actively engaged in England during 1226–1227, persuaded large numbers to take the cross, although we may well doubt the assertion of Roger of Wendover “that 40,000 tried men marched from England alone”. The English were inspired by the apparition in the sky of a shining cross upon which was “the body of Our Lord pierced with nails and with a lance”, which

52 Chronica regia Colonieos, p. 253: “et, si opus fuerit, erectis velis intrare possint flumen Damiate vel aliud aliquod flumen.” Cf. also MGH, SS., XVII, 837.
54 Huillard-Bréholles, II, part 1, 540 ff. See also H. Hoogeweg, “Die Kreuzpredigt des Jahres 1224 in Deutschland . . .”, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, IV (1890), 74.
55 Huillard-Bréholles, III, 20, no. 1.
56 Röhricht, Beiträge, I, 18–19.
suggests that the major portion of the crusaders were simple and lowly. Shortly after Easter they left England under the leadership of bishops Peter of Winchester and William of Exeter.\textsuperscript{57}

In Lombardy the ancient feud between the cities and the Hohenstaufens could always be easily revived at the slightest evidence of an extension of imperial authority. A summons for Easter 1226 to a diet at Cremona — ostensibly to consider the crusade, and to implement the laws against heresy which had been promulgated at the time of the imperial coronation — occasioned great unrest and suspicion among the Lombard cities, which now re-formed the Lombard League. The cities, led by Milan, were declared guilty of breaking the peace and of hindering preparation for the crusade, and the bishop of Hildesheim, employing his plenary powers as crusading preacher, placed them under the ban. The emperor also declared their privileges forfeited and the terms of the treaty of Constance nullified. With difficulty, Frederick at last succeeded in obtaining the intervention of the pope. The Lombards yielded to papal authority, and peace was temporarily restored. The emperor was assured papal protection of his interests during his absence in the east, and the Lombards were ordered to obey the imperial laws against heresy and to equip 400 men for a period of two years’ service on the crusade. The ban was then lifted from the cities, the detailed terms of agreement were prepared, and formal ratification of the document by the various contracting parties was begun.\textsuperscript{58}

But the death of Honorius III on March 18, 1227, before the agreement had been ratified, enabled the Lombards to ignore the papal command. The new pope, Gregory IX, forceful, learned, and energetic, included in the letters announcing his election ringing appeals in behalf of the crusade.\textsuperscript{59} He admonished Frederick to fulfill faithfully his crusading vow, warning him in unmistakable terms of the penalty of the ban. But circumstantial evidence suggests the possibility of a secret understanding between the curia and the Lombards. Moreover, there is no evidence that the 400 fully equipped crusaders from the towns, required by the papal order, took part in the expedition.\textsuperscript{60}

Frederick, however, busied himself with the final preparations


\textsuperscript{58} For the compromise, see Huillard-Bréholles, II, part 2, 703 ff. See also Röhrich, Beiträge, I, 15–17.

\textsuperscript{59} For a brief characterization of Gregory IX see F. Gregorovius, Geschichte der Stadt Rom im Mittelalter (4th ed., Stuttgart, 1892), V, 138 ff. For detailed accounts of Gregory see J. Felten, Gregor IX. (Freiburg, 1886), and J. Marx, De vita Gregorii IX (Berlin, 1889).

\textsuperscript{60} Röhrich, Beiträge, I, 17, n. 91.
for departure. Crusade taxes were levied, especially against the wealthy cloisters. Monte Cassino is said to have been taxed to the amount of 450 ounces of gold. Frederick took over as mercenaries some 250 mounted troops, formerly in the pay of the pope, from the kingdom of Sicily. Together with the 700 knights from Germany, the 100 in the immediate following of the emperor, and others, the total number may have exceeded the 1,000 required by the agreement of San Germano. By midsummer of 1227, the crusaders had assembled in large numbers in the vicinity of Brindisi, designated by Frederick as the port of embarkation. The Germans arrived in August in far greater numbers than had been anticipated. The crowded conditions, the unbearable heat, the insufficient supplies of food and, above all, the unaccustomed ways of life soon led to widespread disease and to many deaths, including that of bishop Siegfried of Augsburg. Discouraged by the heat, or terrified by the plague, many returned home, leaving numerous ships empty in the harbor. But by the middle of August the main body of the crusaders sailed from Brindisi.

The emperor and his retinue, including many Sicilian knights, were delayed while the fifty ships designed for their use were made ready. On September 8 they also sailed southward along the coast toward Otranto. Both the emperor and the landgrave of Thuringia had been stricken by the plague before sailing from Brindisi. Before reaching Otranto, the landgrave died, while Frederick, whose condition had grown worse, put into port at Otranto, resolved to await his recovery. Fearful that this might delay the sailing beyond the favorable season, he placed twenty galleys at the disposal of Hermann of Salza and Gerald, the new patriarch of Jerusalem, and designated the equally new duke Henry of Limburg as commander of the crusading army pending his own arrival. He immediately sent the archbishops of Reggio and Bari and Reginald of Spoletto to the pope to explain his failure to depart for Syria. Gregory refused to receive them and thenceforth would not listen to Frederick's side of the story. On September 29, 1227, he excommunicated Frederick.

Legally, there can be no question that failure to fulfill his vow subjected the emperor to the ban. Morally, the pope committed an injustice if, as appears to be the case, Frederick was seriously ill and was in fact compelled to stay behind. Gregory apparently did not inquire — or care — whether Frederick was ill or not, and so

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62 Huillard-Bréholles, III, 43.  
63 Ibid., III, 44; Richard of San Germano (MGH, SS., XIX), p. 348.
lent weight to the suspicion that he was seizing this opportunity to destroy a political enemy. Perhaps Gregory obtained greater satisfaction from Frederick's failure than he would have from his success. His letter to the emperor, written in late October 1227 and setting forth conditions for the lifting of the ban, referred less to the crusade than to Frederick's alleged violations of papal claims in Sicily.

In his circular letter publishing the excommunication, Gregory branded Frederick as the wanton violator of his sacred oaths taken at Aachen, Veroli, Ferentino, and San Germano, and held him responsible for the sickness and death of innumerable crusaders at Brindisi. Gregory charged him with delay in providing and equipping the necessary ships, and alleged that he had feigned illness, preferring the pleasures of Pozzuoli (where he had moved from Otranto) to the rigors of a crusading expedition. Finally, he accused him of failing to enlist the specified number of troops and to meet the financial requirements imposed upon him at San Germano. Some of these charges, however, are flimsy. The 700 German and Austrian knights, together with the 250 Sicilian mercenaries, the 100 from Frederick's household, and the others recruited probably exceeded the number agreed upon. Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate that the pope, prior to this time, had expressed dissatisfaction with the handling of the pledged sums. The wanton misrepresentation in these instances subjects the entire list of charges to suspicion. In contrast with the pope's unrestrained anger, the defense offered by Frederick in his letter "to all crusaders" of Europe leaves the impression of a straightforward factual statement, the sincerity of which is emphasized by the appeal to the Germans to prepare to join him in May for the expedition which he would lead at that time.64

Meanwhile the fleet which had sailed in August 1227 had probably arrived in Syria in early October. The second fleet, that of the Teutonic master and the patriarch, touched first at Limassol in Cyprus, where the constable of Jerusalem, Odo of Montbéliard, Balian of Sidon, and other notables awaited the emperor. Upon learning of his delay, they accompanied the fleet to Syria.65 The absence of the emperor, "the crowned king from the west", who,

64 For the pope's circular letter or encyclical of Oct. 10, 1227, see Huillard-Bréholles, III, 23 ff., and for Frederick's letter defending his actions see ibid., pp. 37 ff. The letter of the pope to Frederick concerning his alleged misdeeds in Sicily is in ibid., pp. 32 ff. The contents of this letter clearly indicate the readiness of Gregory to readmit Frederick to the fellowship of the church provided he submit to the papal demands with regard to Sicily. See also Kestner, Kreuz. Fried., pp. 37 ff.
65 Röhricht, Beiträge, I, 20.
by the terms of the agreement of Damietta, alone might break the truce, left to the crusaders a difficult decision. Duke Henry of Limburg, while fully aware of the dangers in breaking the truce, was powerless to resist the demand of the masses of the crusaders: the German knights no less than the ordinary crusaders clamored for either an attack on the Saracens or a speedy return home. Already many crusaders, discouraged by the emperor’s delay, had decided to leave, although probably not as many as 40,000, the figure given by the pope in a letter of December 27, 1227. Most likely, large numbers reembarked at Acre almost immediately in the ships in which they had arrived.  

The leaders clearly believed that action was necessary to prevent the disintegration of the army. They decided not to mount a direct attack against Jerusalem. Instead, the duke of Limburg led the main body of the crusader army to Caesarea and Jaffa to carry on the work of restoration of the abandoned fortifications along the coast.

These activities were obviously contrary to the spirit, if not the letter of the treaty, but they did not provoke an attack from the Moslems, because of the sudden death of al-Mu’azzam, the governor of Damascus, in November 1227. This also hastened the decision of a group of French crusaders, who had remained in Acre, to attack and reclaim the whole of Sidon, half of which had been under the jurisdiction of Damascus. They hoped to restore the ancient fortifications, but in the language of Ernoul, “there was too much to do there”. They decided instead to fortify the island of Qal’at al-Bahr, just outside the harbor. About the same time, German crusaders began the reconstruction of the mountain fortress, Montfort (Qal’at al-Qurain), northwest of Acre, later to become “Starkenburg”, the headquarters of the Teutonic Knights in Syria.

While the crusaders were thus engaged in Syria, Frederick, now recovered from his illness, was actively preparing to set out the following May (1228). The outlook for the swift reacquisition of the old kingdom of Jerusalem had, however, brightened unexpectedly. For, amazingly enough, at the very moment when the pope was exerting every effort to thwart the plans of the emperor, a representative of the sultan al-Kāmil had arrived in Sicily with an urgent appeal for assistance and with tempting promises in return for immediate aid. After the defeat of the crusaders at Man-

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66 See the pope’s letter in Matthew Paris, Chronica majora (Rolls Series, LVII), III, 128 ff.  
67 Ernoul, Chronique, p. 459; Grousset, Croisades, III, 288, and notes 1, 2, 3.
surah in the summer of 1221, the three Aiyūbid brothers, sons of the late sultan al-'Ādil, who had wiped out the threat from the forces of the Fifth Crusade, soon fell out among themselves, al-Kāmil, sultan of Egypt, feuding with al-Mu‘azzam, governor of Damascus, while the youngest brother, al-Ashraf, governor of Akhlat, cleverly shifted his allegiance back and forth. By 1225 al-Kāmil was convinced that al-Mu‘azzam was plotting to seize the sultanate, while al-Mu‘azzam was seeking an alliance with Jalāl-ad-Dīn, the ruthless shah of Khoresm, and so threatening, as al-Kāmil saw, the destruction of the entire Aiyūbid house.

Under these circumstances, almost in desperation, al-Kāmil had in 1226 sent the emir Fakhr-ad-Dīn to the emperor to ask him to come to Acre; he promised to give to him many cities of Palestine which belonged to the Moslems if he would attack al-Mu‘azzam. Another Arab historian adds that al-Kāmil specifically promised Frederick Jerusalem. Frederick had sent to al-Kāmil archbishop Berard of Palermo and count Thomas of Acerra, the emperor’s bailie in Syria, who had given the sultan rich gifts from Frederick, including a favorite horse with a saddle of gold, inlaid with precious stones. After a ceremonious reception, al-Kāmil had entrusted to them presents of great value from India, Yemen, Iraq, Egypt, and elsewhere in token of his esteem for the emperor. Arabic sources reveal also that archbishop Berard had continued his journey to Damascus in October 1227. He here had attempted negotiations with al-Mu‘azzam, who had dismissed him with the curt message: “Say to your master that I am not as certain others, and that I have nothing for him but my sword.”

Al-Mu‘azzam had then endeavored, unsuccessfully, to make peace with his younger brother, al-Ashraf; while al-Kāmil, apprehensive over Berard’s visit to Damascus, had hastily dispatched Fakhr-ad-Dīn on a second mission to Frederick in the autumn of 1227. It may well have been at this time that Frederick knighted Fakhr-ad-Dīn. For, in describing the emir some years later, Joinville says of him: “his banner was bendy and on one of the bends were the arms of the emperor, who had knighted him.” But hardly had Fakhr-ad-Dīn fulfilled his mission when Frederick received word from Thomas of Acerra of the sudden death of al-Mu‘azzam. He

69 Badr-ad-Dīn al-‘Aīnī, Tīqā al-jamān (RHC, Or., II, part 1), pp. 185–186. This entire subject is treated by E. Blochet, “Relations diplomatiques des Hohenstaufen avec les sultans d’Égypte,” Rev. historique, LXXX (1902), 53 ff.
70 Al-Maqrizi, “Histoire d’Égypte,” ROL, IX, 511.
must have perceived at once that the removal of al-Mu'azzam would serve to improve the outlook for al-Kâmil, while weakening his own bargaining power. It was doubtless this realization that led him to send the marshal Richard Filangiari with 500 knights to Syria in the following April and to hasten his own preparations. 73

In November 1227, an emissary from Frederick, acting “with the consent of the Roman people and the senate,” 74 publicly read in Rome the imperial manifesto explaining and justifying the delay. Perhaps this stimulated the pope to send two cardinals to Frederick in late December, but Frederick refused to receive them. Apparently he had concluded that he could obtain reconciliation with Gregory only on terms that were too humiliating to be acceptable. His diet at Capua in December decreed that each Sicilian fief should provide eight ounces of gold for the crusade, and each group of eight fiefs one armed knight to be ready to sail for Syria in May. In Swabia the emperor’s circular letter announcing the departure in May had recruited a good many ministeriales for the crusade. 75 But Frederick could not hold the diet at Ravenna, announced in the circular letter, because the Milanese and Veronese blocked the Alpine passes to the Germans, and Gregory IX threatened to place under interdict all villages or towns in which the emperor might stay. 76 We are told, however, that Frederick celebrated Easter 1228 “with all joy and exultation.” 77

In Sicily his measures of retaliation against the papacy, threatening the confiscation of the property of those who obeyed the papal decrees, met with general acceptance. 78 In Rome itself Frederick’s powerful supporters, notably the Frangipani, and his many friends among the populace, whom he had fed during the famine of 1227, rioted against Gregory IX and hounded him out of the city, first to Viterbo and then to Rieti. 79 Frederick knew perfectly well that in his absence all his German and Sicilian enemies would join with the pope in an effort to destroy him. Indeed, Gregory had made his plans for the invasion of Sicily, and had been trying to find a Welf protégé in Germany. 80 At Barletta in the late spring of 1228,
Frederick publicly read his will to a huge outdoor assembly. During his absence in Syria, Reginald of Spoleto was to serve as regent. If Frederick should die, his son by Constance, Henry, the king of the Romans, was to be his heir; second in line was the newly born infant Conrad, son of Isabel and so heir to Jerusalem. The nobles present swore to uphold these terms and to secure similar oaths from their vassals.81

On June 28, 1228, the emperor with forty ships set sail from Brindisi for Syria. Although Gregory IX, deeply chagrined at Frederick’s obstinate determination, said of his departure that he went “without anyone’s knowing for certain whither he sailed,” actually we are exceptionally well informed by the eye-witness account of a fellow passenger concerning the day-to-day voyage. First pausing at Otranto, the fleet sailed by Corfu, Cephalonia, Crete, and Rhodes, and finally on July 21 entered the harbor of Limassol in Cyprus,82 where Frederick was met by the marshal Richard Filangieri, who had sailed during the previous April with a considerable part of the army.

On Cyprus he spent five weeks, quarreling with John of Ibelin, lord of Beirut, regent for the young king. John bravely defied Frederick’s demand for Beirut and for money, as illegal.83 Though the episode led to tension, king Henry and John of Ibelin and many Cypriote barons accompanied Frederick when he sailed for Acre on September 2, 1228.

On September 7 they arrived in the port of Acre, where Frederick was received with much ceremony by the Templars and the Hospitallers, as well as the clergy, although he was denied the kiss of peace because of the ban.84 Thus the shadow of Gregory’s hatred darkened the path of the emperor. To show his Syrian subjects his own good-will in the matter, Frederick yielded to the pressure to make overtures to the pope, and sent to Rome the admiral Henry of Malta and archbishop Marino Filangieri of Bari to announce his arrival in Syria and to request absolution, naming duke Reginald of Spoleto, his regent in Sicily, as minister pleni-potentiary to negotiate with the pope. The papal decision, however, had already been made. Upon Frederick’s departure from Brindisi, Gregory had notified the patriarch of Jerusalem and the masters of

81 Richard of San Germano (MGH, SS., XIX), pp. 349–350.
82 Brusav chronicon de rebus Siculii, in Huillard-Breholles, I, part 2, 898 ff.
83 See below, chapter XV, pp. 543–544.
84 Roger of Wendover, Flores historiarum, II, 351: “non ei communicaverunt in osculo neque in mensa . . . .”
the military orders that the ban was to remain despite the emperor’s arrival. At the same time he admonished them to have no part in the emperor’s Syrian plans.\footnote{Richard of San Germano (MGH, SS., XIX), p. 324;} \footnote{Huillard-Bréholles, III, 83 ff.} 

A sharp division in the crusading army was inevitable. While the German and Sicilian knights stood firmly behind the emperor, the common soldiers, even some Germans, were moved by the religious implications of the expedition and adhered to the papal party, as did the patriarch Gerald, the Templars, and the Syrian bishops. The Pisan and Genoese inhabitants of Syria, doubtless recalling the bungling leadership at Damietta and their resulting commercial losses, supported the emperor, as did the Teutonic Knights, under Hermann of Salza. The English, including the clergy, wavered in their loyalties, at first supporting the emperor but shifting to the papal party. It was this impossible situation which Frederick endeavored to overcome through a clever move. He gave nominal command of various units of the expedition to faithful adherents who were free of the embarrassments of the papal ban: Hermann of Salza, Richard Filangieri, and Odo of Montbéliard.\footnote{The choice of Reginald, who even at that time was engaged in combating the invading forces of the curia in Sicily, indicates how little the emperor was disposed to permit the papal claims in Sicily to be injected into the discussion. Diplomatically, the choice of Reginald would doubtless have destined the negotiations to failure even had the pope been otherwise disposed to a reconciliation. See also Ernoul, Chronique, p. 452.} 

This made it possible for the crusaders to avoid jeopardizing their own position in the eyes of the curia.

Frederick was not in a position to seek a victory through the force of arms. His army was small. Already he was committed to diplomatic rather than military action in his relations with the sultan of Egypt. Since 1226 he had been fully informed of developments in Syria through diplomatic exchanges with al-Kāmil. Indeed his friendly relations with the emir Fakhr-ad-Dīn, begun in 1226, had continued; from the autumn of 1227 until the emperor’s arrival in Acre, Thomas of Acerra had carried on the negotiations. We do not know exactly what al-Kāmil had promised, nor whether al-Mu‘azzam’s death in the previous November had changed his arrangements. At least during the initial stages of the negotiations, Frederick probably hoped to regain the conquests made by Saladin in Syria, and thus to reëstablish the kingdom as it had been before the battle of Hattin. The Arabic sources mention specifically the

\footnote{The assumption of Schirmacher, Kaiser Friedrich der Zweite, II, 183, that the pope ordered this arrangement is untenable. For not only would the pope have chosen leaders other than the most faithful of Frederick’s followers, but Frederick himself would not have submitted willingly, even meekly, to having the army taken from his command by order of the pope. See Kestner, Kreuz. Fried., p. 43, n. 2.}
restoration of Jerusalem, but add the vague mention of “several other places”. After al-Mu‘azzam’s death, an-Nāṣir, al-Mu‘azzam’s son and his heir as governor of Damascus, endeavored vainly to make peace with his uncle al-Kāmil, who then invaded Syria and took possession of Jerusalem. An-Nāṣir sought aid from his other uncle, al-Ashraf, but the two uncles now joined in plundering their helpless nephew, besieging the city of Damascus, and planning to divide the spoils (early September 1228–May 1229). Al-Kāmil’s position was now much stronger than when a year before he had appealed to Frederick for aid. He could now use Jerusalem to bargain with the crusaders for the greater security of Egypt. He could hardly have been fully aware, however, of the weakness of Frederick’s forces, nor could he fully have comprehended the seriousness of the singular factional conflict in the ranks of the army arising from Frederick’s excommunication, although he had some knowledge of these differences.

Frederick sent Thomas of Acerra and Balian of Sidon to inform al-Kāmil of his arrival and to request the fulfillment of the sultan’s promises with respect to Jerusalem. Although receiving the embassy with courtesy, and obviously seeking to impress them by a ceremonial display of his armed forces, al-Kāmil let his visitors depart without committing himself with regard to their mission. His acceptance of Frederick’s gifts and his own generous presents in return, including an elephant, ten camels, and ten horses, as well as silks and other rare stuffs, indicate his desire to maintain friendly relations. Shortly afterwards Frederick received the ambassadors of the sultan, including his old friend Fakhr-ad-Din, in his camp at Recorde near Acre. Displaying a consummate skill in the usages of Arabic diplomacy, Frederick, through his rare eloquence and extraordinary learning, impressed favorably both al-Kāmil and his clever representative Fakhr-ad-Din. Al-Maqrīzī, the Egyptian historian, says the emperor was learned in geometry, arithmetic, and other exact sciences, and reports that Frederick sent several difficult questions on geometry, the theory of numbers, and mathematics to the sultan, who gave them to men of great learning for appropriate answers which he returned to the emperor. His learning as well as his unorthodox views on religion astonished the Moslems as they dismayed the Christians. These, together with the secrecy with which he carried on the negotiations with the

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87 See below, chapter XX, pp. 701–703.
congenial Fakhr-ad-Din, aroused the suspicions of the crusaders. Even Freidank, the Swabian poet who “always spoke and never sang”, generally well disposed toward the emperor, expressed his sorrow that Frederick veiled his actions in secrecy.\(^6\)

Having committed himself to extensive concessions of territory, al-Kāmil could no longer defend his earlier promises in the face of criticism from his subjects. This consideration for Moslem opinion now became his chief concern. When Thomas of Acerra and Balian of Sidon were again sent to resume the negotiations, the sultan left his headquarters at Nablus and went to his camp at Ḥarbīyah northeast of Gaza in order, as the Eracles reports, “to keep at a distance the emperor and his words.”\(^7\)

Frederick now prepared to impress the sultan by a show of force. He planned to use, as bases for operations against the city of Jerusalem, the cities of Caesarea and Jaffa, which in October 1227 Henry of Limburg had begun to refortify. In November 1228 Frederick set out on a march from Acre to Jaffa. The masters of the Temple and the Hospital, Peter of Montaigu and Bertrand of Thessy, refused to associate with the excommunicate, but followed at a distance of a day’s journey. In the vicinity of Arsuf, however, Frederick, recognizing the dangers to his small following, yielded to pressure from some of the leaders and induced the Templars and Hospitallers to join the main body of the army, agreeing that future orders would be issued not in the name of the emperor but “in the name of God and Christianity”.\(^8\) The expedition moved successfully to Jaffa, where the work of fortification was pushed forward. Although at first heavy storms hindered the landing of supplies, by the close of the year 1228 abundant provisions flowed into the city.\(^9\)

As the work on the coastal fortifications was nearing completion in January 1229, disquieting dispatches arrived from Italy, where John of Brienne, who since 1227 had served the curia as Protector of the Patrimony, was reported to have taken San Germano and to be threatening Capua. Ordering a part of the fleet to be held in readiness, the emperor appealed to his loyal subjects in Italy to hold out until his return. At the same time he ordered his admiral, Henry of Malta, to send twenty galleys to Syria by the following Easter.\(^10\) Frederick’s situation was now most awkward. If he delayed too long

\(^{6}\) Bezenberger, Freidankes Bescheidenheit, p. 211. For the attitude of the patriarch toward Frederick’s Saracen relations, see Huillard-Bréholles, III, 104.

\(^{7}\) Eracles (RHC, Occ., II), p. 372.

\(^{8}\) Ibid., pp. 372 ff.

\(^{9}\) Huillard-Bréholles, III, 90–91.

\(^{10}\) Eracles (RHC, Occ., II), pp. 373–374.
in Syria, he risked losing his Sicilian kingdom, but if he abandoned the Holy Land, he would be dishonored and his position weakened in the eyes of the Christian world. Fortunately for him, al-Kāmil himself was still busy besieging Damascus.

When negotiations were resumed, they led, therefore, to a peace described by an Arabic source as "one of the most disastrous events of Islam".\(^5\) Al-Maqrizī says that al-Kāmil was universally blamed for the treaty, "and his conduct was severely judged in all countries".\(^5\) Unfortunately, no complete copy of the treaty survives either in Arabic or in Latin. It is possible to reconstruct it only from extracts included in letters to the pope from the patriarch Gerald and the Teutonic master, Hermann of Salza, and in a letter of Frederick to the king of England, as well as from occasional references, with differing emphases, in both Arabic and Christian sources.\(^7\) Al-Kāmil surrendered Jerusalem, giving Frederick the right to make such disposition of it as he desired — obviously including the right to fortify it. In writing to the king of England, Frederick said, "we are allowed to rebuild the city of Jerusalem in as good a state as it has ever been . . ."\(^8\) Frederick also received Bethlehem and Nazareth, with the villages along the routes to Jerusalem, part of Sidon district, and Toron, dominating the coast. All these places, with the exception of Toron, he could refortify, while al-Kāmil, as Frederick puts it, was not allowed "till the end of the truce, which is agreed on for ten years, to repair or rebuild any fortress or castles".\(^9\)

The settlement with respect to the city of Jerusalem, although drawn up in a spirit of tolerance almost inconceivable of the thirteenth century, evidently proved to be a chief difficulty in the negotiations and the item least acceptable to Christians and Moslems alike. Al-Hāram ash-Sharif, the sacred enclosure, including both the Aqṣā mosque and the Qubbat as-Ṣakhrah (the Temple of Solomon, or Dome of the Rock) remained in the possession of the Moslems, with full freedom to worship there, provided they were

\(^{6}\) "Histoire d'Égypte," *ROL*, IX, 326.
\(^{7}\) For the fragment see Huillard-Bréholles, III, 86 ff.; for the letters of Gerald and Hermann, *ibid*., pp. 90 ff. and 101 ff. Frederick’s letter is in Roger of Wendover, *Flores historiarum*, II, 365 ff. See also the useful analysis of the treaty in J. LaMonte’s notes to Philip of Novara, *The Wars of Frederick II against the Ibelins*, pp. 36 ff., n. 44 and below, chapter XX, p. 702.
\(^{8}\) Roger of Wendover, *Flores historiarum*, II, 367. The question of the refortification of Jerusalem is obscure, some of the Arabic sources stating positively that it was not permitted. See Grousset, *Croisades*, III, 318 ff.; and below, chapter XX, p. 702.
\(^{9}\) Roger of Wendover, *Flores historiarum*, II, 367.
unarmed, while the Christians were permitted to enter it to pray.\textsuperscript{100} Jerusalem presented a peculiarly difficult problem because of the Moslems who, since 1187, had made their homes there. The sultan endeavored to secure for them a degree of autonomy, safeguarding both their system of justice and their religious customs. A magistrate (qāḍī) was to reside in the city to represent their interests, and non-resident Moslems were to receive protection while making pilgrimages to the mosques.

The other Christian states, Tripoli and Antioch, apparently were to receive no aid from Frederick in case of war with the Moslems. Indeed, the emperor seems to have pledged his support to protect the interests of the sultan against all enemies, including Christians, for the duration of the truce. Certain strongholds of the Hospitallers, such as Krak des Chevaliers, al-Margab, and Chastel Blanc (Burj Šāfithā), as well as Tortosa, held by the Templars, were to be left in statu quo, and aid was not to be given them from any source.\textsuperscript{101} Finally, prisoners of war, taken either during the Damietta conflict or more recently, were to be released. The provisions relating to the various strongholds of the Templars and Hospitallers suggest that Frederick was revenging himself on them for their long opposition to him. It is less clear why Antioch and Tripoli, the possessions of Bohemond IV, should have been similarly treated, though Bohemond's unwillingness to swear fealty to Frederick may explain it.

The German and Sicilian followers of Frederick were satisfied with the treaty, and Hermann of Salza in his letter to the pope tried eloquently, though in vain, to convince Gregory that much had been gained for the Christian cause. As the crusading poet Freidank put it: “What more could sinners desire than the Holy Sepulcher and the victorious cross?”\textsuperscript{102} Frederick himself badly wanted a reconciliation with the patriarch, both because he hoped to be crowned in Jerusalem, in accordance with the honored custom, and because of the urgent necessity of his immediate return to Italy. He was willing to make important concessions if only the patriarch would accompany the army to Jerusalem. Again Hermann of Salza was entrusted with this delicate mission. Gerald declined, however, to give an answer until he had been shown a copy of the treaty. He was then provided, not with the entire treaty, but with an abstract. The contents of this so stirred his anger that he could no longer behave rationally. His condemnation of the treaty was as thorough

\textsuperscript{100} Al-Maqritzi, “Histoire d'Égypte,” \textit{ROL}, IX, 525.
\textsuperscript{101} See the fragment in Huillard-Bréholles, \textit{III}, 89, par. 6 and par. 9, and Kestner, \textit{Kreuz. Fried.}, pp. 53 ff.
\textsuperscript{102} Bezenberger, \textit{Freidankes Beschidenheit}, p. 214. lines 7–32.
as, in many instances, it was unreasonable. Gerald’s letter to the pope in particular reveals that he was opposed to the concluding of any sort of peace with the sultan. For him the paramount purpose of a crusade was to shed “infidel” blood, not to engage in conciliatory negotiations that recognized the rights of Moslems within the city sacred to the name of Christ.

The Templars, not wholly for the same reasons, were in sympathy with Gerald’s views. It was a tenet of their faith, the raison d’être of their order, that they were to fight unremittingly against the “infidel”. The acceptance of Frederick’s terms would impose upon them peaceful relations with the Moslems for at least ten years. Already they had experienced hardships and suffered disease and privations in winning control of fortified places from which they could pursue the conquest. Now, at a single stroke, a Christian emperor, notoriously friendly with Moslems, had set their achievements at naught, ignored their rights, perhaps, indeed, pledged himself to prevent their further conquests. It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that both the patriarch and the Templars felt keenly that the treaty had ignored their special interests. The patriarch was not secured in his former possessions, and the Templars had profited, at most, to the extent of one or two insignificant villages. Moreover, Frederick had made concessions to the Saracens which, as the Templars believed, would make Christian occupation of the holy city difficult, and expose it to reconquest by the enemy.

It was no difficult matter for the patriarch and his supporters to depict Frederick as a betrayer, an enemy of the church, and to treat his recovery of the Holy Land as an illusion. Even though Gerald may have recognized some positive gains for the emperor, he dismissed them as of no account to the church. When, therefore, Hermann of Salza approached him with a sincere proposal for a reconciliation, Gerald saw only trickery and deceit. From this point on he sought to destroy Frederick and all his works. His first effort was to prevent the emperor’s triumphal entry into Jerusalem by forbidding the army, under the threat of excommunication, to follow, and by placing the city itself under interdict. It was with this object that he sent archbishop Peter of Caesarea post-haste to the crusading army. But Frederick had moved more swiftly than the patriarch had anticipated.

When Hermann of Salza had failed to win Gerald over, Frederick set out immediately with the crusading army and a great body of

\[108 \text{ See Böhmer, } \textit{Regesta imperii}, \text{ V, part 3, introd., p. xxxvii.}\]
pilgrims for Jerusalem, which he entered on March 17, 1229. Here the agent of the sultan, the qadi Shams-ad-Din, awaited his arrival to make the formal surrender. The German pilgrims hailed the event with unbounded rejoicing. In his letter to the pope, Gerald would refer somewhat scornfully to these German pilgrims, "who had fought only to visit the Holy Sepulcher". On the morning of March 18, the army and the pilgrims proceeded to the church of the Holy Sepulcher. Frederick entered and, advancing swiftly to the high altar, took the crown and placed it upon his own head. Hermann of Salza then read to the congregation, first in German and then in French, the emperor's statement reviewing events from the moment of his taking the cross at Aachen. He described the harsh measures of the pope in opposing him, placing the blame not upon the pope, but rather upon those who had falsely informed the pope. By implication then, his bitterest remarks were directed at the patriarch and his followers, described as false Christians who had endeavored to blacken Frederick's character and who had maliciously hindered the peace.104

Leaving the church and still wearing the crown, the emperor proceeded to the palace of the Hospitallers, where he began negotiations with the English bishops, the masters of the Teutonic Knights and the Hospitallers, the preceptor of the Templars, and others, respecting the fortifications of the city. No decision was reached, and time was asked for consideration until the following day, March 19. Gerald's plans had gone awry, for it was not until the morning of the 19th that the archbishop of Caesarea arrived to proclaim the interdict. But the time had passed when this could check the plans of the emperor; the interdict could serve only to stir the anger of the people. Frederick was now in a position to place the responsibility for the imbroglio squarely on the patriarch. After his later reconciliation with Frederick, Gregory IX himself had to take steps against the obstinate Gerald as a source of discord in the Holy Land.105

It is from the account of Gerald that we learn of Frederick's movements on March 19. Early in the morning he betook himself and his entire following outside Jerusalem. To everyone's astonishment he was preparing for an immediate departure. Perceiving this, the representatives of the orders with whom he had been negotiating concerning the fortifications hastened to him, offering to support

104 Huillery-Breholles, III, 100, 109, and Roger of Wendover, Flores historiarum, II, 365 ff., 373.
105 MGH, Epp. pont., I, n. 467. See also Röhricht, Königreich Jerusalem, p. 799, n. 7.
his plans. Evidently he suspected an ulterior motive in their sudden change of attitude. He merely replied that he would discuss the plans in detail at another time. Then mounting his horse he rode so rapidly in the direction of Jaffa that those accompanying him had great difficulty in keeping up.

Mysterious as Frederick's conduct appears, his sudden departure is to be attributed not to the interdict, but rather to his urgent desire to return home as swiftly as possible to secure his Sicilian kingdom. He did, however, leave some of the knights of the crusading army behind to defend Jerusalem. Moreover, at least a beginning was made in the restoration of the fortifications, apparently by the Teutonic Knights. The Templars' last-minute offer to cooperate reflected no desire to work with the emperor, but rather their intention of seizing a favorable opportunity to further their own interests. Indeed, both patriarch and Templars had recognized that the gains which Frederick had made could be turned to their own advantage.

Frederick hastened by way of Jaffa to Acre, where he found the patriarch using the funds bequeathed by Philip Augustus to the kingdom of Jerusalem — which had been placed in his hands for safekeeping — in an effort to raise and equip troops, with which he hoped to make himself master of Jerusalem. The Templars were only too eager to lend their aid to such plans. When Frederick demanded an explanation, Gerald offered the excuse that the treaty had been made with the sultan of Egypt, not with the governor of Damascus, who was still in a position to attack Jerusalem. When the emperor ordered him to desist, the patriarch replied that he owed no obedience to an excommunicate. Through heralds Frederick now summoned the crusaders and the inhabitants of the city and, in a large assembly before the city gates, attacked the patriarch and Templars for their recalcitrance. He ordered all knights who were armed against him to leave the country, and authorized Thomas of Acerra to inflict severe punishments upon those who resisted the order.

Despite these measures, the opposition continued and Frederick now resorted to force. He had the gates of the city guarded by his followers and forbade anyone of the opposing party to enter. In the city itself his men occupied positions from which to attack the palace of the patriarch and the houses of the Templars. Gerald

106 This is revealed in a letter of the pope to the Templars, February 26, 1231: Huillard-Bréholles, III, 267.
107 Huillard-Bréholles, III, 98.
108 Ibid., III, 137 ff.
complained that even the churches were taken over as vantage points. Monks who had been authorized by the patriarch to preach in opposition to the emperor were seized and whipped. Messages sent by Gerald to the pope were intercepted by Frederick; Gerald had to send multiple letters, employing several messengers.\textsuperscript{109} But Frederick was unable to check the opposition, and Gerald was now so angry that he would accept nothing short of abject surrender.

From Italy came word that John of Brienne, leading the papal forces, had entered Apulia, and now was in the process of seizing the ports with the object of taking the emperor prisoner upon his arrival.\textsuperscript{110} Forced to sail for the west, Frederick ordered all surplus weapons, siege machines, and other instruments of war taken to the ships or destroyed to keep them out of Gerald’s hands. He named Balian of Sidon and Warner the German as bailies of Jerusalem, and sold the bailiwick of Cyprus for a term of three years to longstanding foes of the Ibelins. He left a strong garrison to protect the imperial interests in Acre and, as a counterbalance to the Templars, helped the Teutonic Knights to redeem the territory around their stronghold, Montfort, which dominated the city of Acre.\textsuperscript{111}

On the first day of May the emperor embarked from Acre, not without some hostile demonstrations from the inhabitants. Cypriote sources relate that, although Frederick had arranged to depart secretly at an early hour, he was followed to the harbor, through the streets of the butchers, and pelted “with tripe and bits of meat most scurrilously.” John of Ibelin, who accompanied the emperor to his galley, had to intervene with force to restore order.\textsuperscript{112} These accounts, however, appear to have been written deliberately to emphasize the degradation of the emperor and the strength and gallantry of John of Ibelin. The seven galleys proceeded first to Cyprus, where Frederick was present at the marriage — apparently by proxy — of the king to Alice, the sister of the marquis of Montferrat. Then, after a rapid voyage, the emperor landed secretly, on June 10, at Brindisi. Frederick had been in Apulia a month before Gregory IX had even heard of his departure from Acre.\textsuperscript{113}

Although the emperor’s coming had taken the pope unawares, his subjects in Sicily responded so fast and so favorably to his

\textsuperscript{109} Huillard-Bréholles, III, 110 and 138 ff.

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., III, 112. One must conclude with Kestner, Kreuz. Fried., Beilage I, p. 70, that this information came directly from Reginald of Spoleto.

\textsuperscript{111} Eracles (RHC, Occ., III), p. 375; Huillard-Bréholles, III, 117 ff.

\textsuperscript{112} Philip of Novara, Mémoires, p. 24, par. XLIII. See also P. Amadé, Chron. (ed. R. de Mas Latrié, Documents inédits sur l’histoire de France, 1st ser., Paris, 1891), I, 135–136.

\textsuperscript{113} Brevez chronicon de rebus Siculis, in Huillard-Bréholles, I, part 2, 902–903; Burchard, Urpurgensium chronicon (MGH, SS., XXIII), p. 383; Huillard-Bréholles, III, 146.
appeals that, with German troops driven into Brindisi by storms on their way home from the east, they scored success after success against the papal forces. By the autumn of 1229 Frederick stood in full possession of his kingdom. It was now only necessary for him to make his peace with the defeated pope. Although rebuffed in his first efforts, the faithful master of the Teutonic Knights, Hermann of Salza, eventually obtained an armistice, Frederick displaying conciliatory behavior and refraining from encroachments upon the papal domains. The German princes guaranteed the emperor's good faith. In May 1230 peace terms were drawn up, and on August 28 the ban was lifted; on September 1 at Anagni the "disciple of Mohammed" was once more received as the "beloved son of the church".\footnote{For details of the reconquest, see Richard of San Germano (MGH, SS., XIX), 355 ff. See Röhrich, Beiträge, I, 48 ff. For the reconciliation with the pope, see Chronica regia Coloniensis, pp. 262–263; also in MGH, SS., XVII, 842; Brev. Chron. Sic. (Huillard-Bréholles), pp. 903–904.}

The crusade of Frederick II is unique in the history of the Middle Ages, reflecting not so much the spirit of the age as the complex and cosmopolitan character of the emperor. The primary aim of any crusade was the restoration of Jerusalem to the Christians, and this had been achieved with a skill and brilliance all the more remarkable because the methods of accomplishing it were so little characteristic of the thirteenth century. Opposed at every step by the church, whose interests the crusade was intended to serve, Frederick achieved, without bloodshed, the object which the whole of Christendom most ardently desired. But in doing so, he earned for himself only opprobrium in the eyes of the leaders of the church. He was charged with sacrilege, with preferring the worship of Islam to the Christian faith, with betrayal of the crusading cause, with plundering, and with blasphemy. His outlook on life, the result of his contact since infancy with the rich and varied culture of the orient, elevated him far above the bigotry and the narrow prejudices so characteristic of Gregory IX, of the patriarch Gerald — indeed, of most of the clergy of the age. Again and again Frederick's letters, no less than his deeds, reveal his sympathies with the recovery of the Holy Land as a symbol of the Christian faith. But loyalty to this ideal did not deprive him of his capacity to understand that many of the places within Jerusalem were no less sacred to the mind and heart of the Moslem.

It is perhaps paradoxical that Frederick II, subjected to the bitterest reproaches for his ant clericalism, was able to attain
through tolerance and conciliation what the leaders of the church believed to be possible and desirable only through the shedding of blood. For, in all the denunciations of Frederick by the patriarch, none was more bitter than the charge that he came not to slay the Moslem but to treat with him as a friend. It is a flaw in Frederick’s achievement that his failure to arrive earlier, before the death of al-Mu’azzam, when his presence in Syria would have aided al-Kāmil, deprived him of the opportunity to regain the unconditional possession of all the former Christian lands in Syria. It is also to his discredit that he displayed no capacity for conciliation with the Franco-Syrian knights who might well have become his staunch allies in the maintenance of his conquest. Failure to achieve this friendly alliance, indeed his almost contemptuous and brutal treatment, particularly of the Cypriotes, contributed immeasurably to subsequent conflicts and to the ultimate loss of Syria.

The greatness of Frederick’s achievement was marred, above all, by the impossible situation in which he found himself as an excommunicate. Inability to unite the forces of Christendom, to enter upon the expedition with the full authority of the church behind him, compelled him to accept not the settlement which he most desired, but rather that which the sultan felt compelled to grant. One may well inquire with Freidank:

“O what in the world can a kaiser do,
Since Christians and heathen, clergy too,
Are striving against him with might and main?”

For the imperfections of the treaty the pope and the curia, far more than Frederick II, were responsible. At the most crucial moment in the crusading efforts of the thirteenth century, so vigorously launched by Innocent III, so zealously supported by Honorius III, the opportunity for a lasting success was sacrificed by Gregory IX to what, in his view, was a more desirable end, the chastisement of the Hohenstaufen emperor. Twice during the first three decades of the century the recovery of the Holy Land lay within easy grasp of the Christians through conciliation. Both times the curia failed to accept it. Pelagius had nullified the successes in Egypt, and Gregory IX, in his unyielding hatred of Frederick II, had deprived the Christian west of the full benefits of his achievement.

115 From the translation by T. L. Kington, History of Frederick II, Emperor of the Romans (2 vols., Cambridge and London, 1862), I, 334, from Freidank’s Bescheidenheit:

“Was mac ein kaiser schaffen
Sit kristen, heiden unt paffen
Streitent guoec wider in?”