

X

THE POLITICAL CRUSADES OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

What is a political crusade? In one sense, of course, every crusade is political, for every crusade aims at conquest, at replacing the rule of unbelievers by that of Christians. But there is an obvious difference between a crusade against the Saracens — or even against the Albigensians — and a crusade against Manfred or Peter of Aragon. In the first case, political means are being used for a

The political crusades are so closely connected with the general history of the thirteenth century that a complete bibliography would be impossibly long. The most important documents are in the papal registers. Those of Innocent III were edited by Bréquigny and reprinted in Migne; the registers of most of the other thirteenth-century popes have been published by the Écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome. J. L. A. Huillard-Bréholles published the acts of Frederick II and his sons in the *Historia diplomatica Friderici secundi* (7 vols. in 12, Paris, 1852-1861). J. F. Böhmer, *Regesta imperii*, V: *Die Regesten . . . 1198-1272* (ed. Julius Ficker, 2 parts, Innsbruck, 1881-1882) contains useful material, especially for the period after 1250. The MGH for this period give not only important chronicles, but also some collections of documents such as the *Constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum* (Legum Sect., IV), and the *Acta pacis ad S. Germanum anno MCCXXX initae* (Epistolae selectae, IV). Italian chronicles may be found in the MGH or in Muratori, *RİSS*. The important life of Innocent IV by Nicholas of Carbio (or Curbio) was first published by Muratori (*RİSS*, III); there is a better edition by Pagnotti in the *Archivio della Società romana di storia patria*, XXI (1898). English chronicles are in the Rolls Series; of these, Matthew Paris is especially important for the documents given in his *Additamenta* (vol. VI of the Rolls Series edition). French chronicles are printed in the *RHGF*; this series also includes useful documents, especially on the crusade of 1285. The *Layettes du trésor des chartes* and Winkelmann's *Acta imperii inedita* (Innsbruck, 1880-1885) contain less than might be expected. The same may be said of the documents of the Angevin kings edited by G. Del Giudice, C. Minieri Riccio, and G. Silvestri. There is some useful material in I. Carini, *Gli Archivi e le biblioteche di Spagna, in rapporto alla storia d'Italia in generale e di Sicilia in particolare* (Palermo, 1884-1897). Finally, the letters of Albert von Beham, edited by C. Höfler (*Bibliothek des litterarischen Vereins in Stuttgart*, XVI, 1847) throw some light on German affairs in the 1240's.

The only book which gives a general survey of material covered in this chapter is H. Pissard, *La Guerre sainte en pays chrétien* (Paris, 1912), and Pissard is more concerned with the development of canonical doctrine than with the details of the crusades. In spite of its title, O. Volk's *Die abendländisch-hierarchische Kreuzzugs-idee* (Halle, 1911) refers to our topic only occasionally. It does discuss the inchoate political crusades of the eleventh century, and for this problem P. Rousset, *Les Origines et les caractères de la première croisade* (Neuchâtel, 1945) and C. Erdmann, *Die Entstehung des Kreuzzugs-gedankens* (Stuttgart, 1935) should also be consulted. E. Jordan, *L'Allemagne et l'Italie au XII^e et XIII^e siècles* (Paris, n.d.) and K. Hampe, *Deutsche Kaiser-geschichte in der Zeit der Salier und Staufer* (Leipzig, n.d.) are both excellent

religious end — the redemption of the holy places or the destruction of heresy. The political consequences are not part of the primary plan of the church: Urban II is not working for the establishment of a kingdom of Jerusalem, nor does Innocent III particularly desire the creation of a great principality for Simon of Montfort. The second type is doubly political in that neither means nor end has any direct connection with the spiritual objectives of the church. The popes may talk about punishing association with heretics and Saracens, but what they really want to do is to replace a disobedient king with one who will not defy their policies. The crusade against infidel and heretic is waged for the good of

general accounts of the thirteenth-century struggle between the papacy and the Hohenstaufen rulers. The last part of the conflict is discussed in detail in Jordan's very solid work on *Les Origines de la domination angevine en Italie* (Paris, 1909). Information about Innocent III's crusade in Sicily may be found in F. Baethgen, *Die Regentschaft Papst Innocenz III. im Königreich Sizilien* (Heidelberg, 1914) and T. C. Van Cleve, *Markward of Anweiler* (Princeton, 1937). There is no good general account of the crusades against Frederick II; biographers such as Kantorowicz mention them only in passing. W. Koester, *Die Kreuzablass im Kampfe der Kurie mit Friedrich II.* (Münster, 1912) deals with one aspect of the crusades in both Germany and Italy. C. Köhler, *Das Verhältnis Kaiser Friedrichs II. zu den Päpsten seiner Zeit* (Breslau, 1888) is not very helpful. For Italian crusades, see J. Felten, *Papst Gregor IX.* (Freiburg, 1886); H. Frankfurt, *Gregorius de Montelongo* (Marburg, 1898); and, best of all, C. Rodenburg, *Innocenz IV. und das Königreich Sizilien 1245-1254* (Halle, 1892). Material on the crusade in Germany may be found in O. Hintze, *Das Königtum Wilhelms von Holland* (Leipzig, 1885), and F. Reh, *Kardinal Peter Capocci* (Berlin, 1933). The crusade against Ezzelino of Romano is described in O. Canz, *Philipp Fontana, Erzbischof von Ravenna* (Leipzig, 1910). For the crusade against Manfred, see, in addition to Jordan, K. Hampe's fine study on *Urban IV. und Manfred* (Heidelberg, 1905) and R. Sternfeld, *Karl von Anjou als Graf von Provence* (Berlin, 1888). The best account of the brief crusade against Conradin is in Hampe, *Geschichte Konradins von Hohenstaufen* (Leipzig, 1942). The plans of Charles of Anjou to attack the Byzantine empire are discussed in C. Chapman, *Michel Paléologue* (Paris, 1926); F. Carabellese, *Carlo d'Angio nei rapporti politici e commerciali con Venezia e l'Oriente* (*Documenti per la storia di Bari*, X, Bari, 1911); and W. Norden, *Das Papsttum und Byzanz* (Berlin, 1903). There is a good chapter on the crusade against Aragon in Ch.-V. Langlois, *Le Règne de Philippe III le Hardi* (Paris, 1887); see also J. R. Strayer, "The Crusade against Aragon," *Speculum*, XXVIII (1952), and W. Kienast, "Der Kreuzzug Philipps des Schönen gegen Aragon," *Historische Vierteljahrschrift*, XXVIII (1933-1934), 673-698. For the historical background to the Sicilian Vespers, with much useful bibliography, see H. Wieruszowski, "Politische Verschwörungen und Bündnisse König Peters von Aragon gegen Karl von Anjou am Vorabend der sizilianischen vesper," *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken*, XXXVII (Tübingen, 1957), 136-191. A recent account in English is S. Runciman, *The Sicilian Vespers* (Cambridge, 1958).

Material on the financing of the crusades is collected in W. E. Lunt's fine study of *Financial Relations of the Papacy with England to 1327* (Cambridge, Mass., 1939), and (less satisfactory) in A. Gottlob's *Die päpstlichen Kreuzzugs-Steuern des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Heiligenstadt, 1892). Gottlob's *Kreuzablass und Almosenablass* (Stuttgart, 1906), while dealing more with earlier periods, has some useful data on indulgences for political crusades. The analyses of papal and imperial propaganda, such as F. Graefe, *Die Publizistik in der letzten Epoche Kaiser Friedrichs II.* (Heidelberg, 1909), are not very helpful for our problem. Far more useful is C. Merkel, "L'Opinione dei contemporanei sull' impresa italiana di Carlo I d'Angiò," *Atti della R. Accademia dei Lincei*, ser. 4, Classe di scienze morali, storiche, et filologiche, IV (1888), which gives a good summary of the opinions of chroniclers and poets about the crusades against Manfred and Conradin. Finally, G. Digard's two volumes on *Philippe le Bel et le Saint-Siège* (Paris, 1936), though not definitive, contain much evidence on the deterioration of relations between the papacy and France.

Christendom as the pope understands it. The crusade against Hohenstaufen and Ghibelline is waged to protect the states and the political authority of the papacy.

The difference between the two kinds of crusades is not merely a modern refinement; it was apparent to men of the thirteenth century. The great canonist Henry of Segusio, usually known as Hostiensis, who had seen political crusades at close hand, states the distinction very clearly in his *Summa*.¹ He reports that he found many men in Germany who argued that a crusade against Christians was neither just nor decent. These men admitted that crusades against infidels, or even heretics, were justified, but denied that there was any legal basis for a crusade against rulers who were merely disobedient to the pope. Hostiensis gives the official answer, that disobedience to the commands of Christ's vicar on earth is almost sure to lead to heresy, and that attacks on the unity of the church are far more dangerous than loss of land, however holy, overseas. But he is not very optimistic about the effectiveness of these arguments and concludes that the overseas crusade will always seem more desirable to the "simple", even though the crusade against disobedient Christians is more reasonable.

More reasonable, perhaps, but the church was not so rationalistic before the thirteenth century. There had been some talk of remission of sins for the soldiers who died fighting for Leo IX against the Normans, and Gregory VII had given full absolution to the opponents of Henry IV, but in neither case was there the full equivalent of the crusade indulgence. Moreover, churchmen of the twelfth century were less willing to use force than the eager leaders of the eleventh-century reform movement. Gratian is clearly embarrassed in discussing the problem of the use of force against heretics and excommunicated Christians. He concludes that war against such enemies of God and the church is just, but he does not equate it with the crusade in the Holy Land.² Bernard of Clairvaux is even more doubtful. He admits that a defensive war against heretics may at times be necessary, but he prefers the methods of peaceful persuasion.³ On the whole, except for a half-hearted and unsuccessful attempt of Alexander III (1159-1181) to organize an army to attack the Albigensian heretics, the popes of the twelfth century were not inclined to use the crusade against inhabitants of Christian Europe. Even when Barbarossa drove

¹ Hostiensis, *Summa aurea*, III, 34 (de voto), paragraph 19 (in quo casu).

² *Decretum*, secunda pars, causa XXIII. See especially quest. V, c. 47, and quest. VIII.

³ H. Pissard, *La Guerre sainte en pays chrétien* (Paris, 1912), pp. 22-23.

Alexander from Italy and installed an anti-pope at Rome, there was no talk of a crusade against the emperor.

Here, as in so many other cases, the great innovator was Innocent III (1198-1216). Determined to be obeyed, sure of his rights, he took without hesitation the momentous step of proclaiming a crusade in order to preserve what he regarded as the political rights of the church. In 1199, hardly a year after his election as pope, Innocent first threatened, and then actually ordered, a crusade against Markward of Anweiler and his adherents. The opponents of Markward wore the cross and received the same indulgences as those who fought in Palestine. It is true that Markward had touched Innocent on two of his most sensitive spots. A loyal follower of Henry VI, he had attempted to keep control of the march of Ancona after the emperor's death, even though Innocent was determined to add it to the states of the church. Driven from the mainland by Innocent, Markward took refuge in Sicily and began harassing the regency which Innocent had set up for his ward Frederick II. But why was Innocent so sensitive on these two points? It took almost a decade to convince him that a crusade against the Albigensian heretics was the only solution to a difficult problem. Why did he react so promptly against Markward, who was far less dangerous to the faith? The only possible answer is that Innocent had become convinced, during the pontificate of his predecessor, that it was absolutely essential to the security and independence of the papacy to gain direct control over central Italy and to make the most of its feudal suzerainty over the kingdom of Sicily. These convictions became a settled part of papal policy, and were the cause of most of the political crusades of the thirteenth century.

Innocent's action was more important as a precedent than as a military operation.⁴ A few hundred soldiers sent against Markward accomplished nothing. Innocent then turned to Walter of Brienne, who had a claim to Taranto and Lecce, and Walter enlisted a small group of Frenchmen who were given crusading privileges. But Walter was far more interested in conquering his fief of Taranto than in fighting Innocent's enemies, and the affair dragged on until Markward removed the chief reason for a crusade by dying

⁴ If Innocent threatened a crusade against John at the height of the crisis over Stephen Langton (1212), then he was ready to follow and expand his own precedent soon after it was made. But it is not certain that he did so; see S. Painter, *The Reign of King John* (Baltimore, 1949), pp. 188-192, and C. R. Cheyney, "The Alleged Deposition of King John," in *Studies . . . presented to F. M. Powicke* (Oxford, 1948). The writer's own belief is that Innocent went no further than to threaten deposition; certainly, no crusade was formally proclaimed.

in 1202. Innocent had not been able to give much support to his Sicilian crusade. The great Fourth Crusade was being organized just at this time, and while Innocent once threatened to divert the whole army to Sicily, it is doubtful that he really meant it. Possibly some of Walter's men had originally taken the vow to go overseas, and were allowed to substitute an expedition to Sicily, but we know nothing of these details. We can say that Innocent, unlike some of his successors, did not sacrifice an overseas crusade to an Italian war, and that he used only the barest minimum of the prestige and money of the church in his attack on Markward.

And yet the precedent was there, and it was to be followed, even down to the excuses which Innocent gave to justify his action — the alliance of Markward with the Saracens of Sicily and the need to have Sicily in friendly hands if the Holy Land was to be saved. During the thirteenth century five popes in succession were to preach political crusades, crusades to preserve the independence of the states of the church and the dependence of Sicily on the papacy. There were good reasons for inaugurating this policy, as for everything Innocent did, and yet one may wonder whether the welfare of the church was really so dependent on political arrangements in Italy. Peter Damian had given a warning at the beginning of papal involvement in Sicilian affairs which should have been remembered: if the martyr may not fight for his faith, how can the church fight for worldly and transitory goods?⁵

Two other precedents set by Innocent were important for the future of the political crusades. In the first place, that same year 1199 which saw the crusade against Markward also saw the first income tax imposed by the pope on the clergy. This tax was for the Holy Land, but it showed later popes how to raise money for the great political crusades against the Hohenstaufens. In the second place, the Albigensian Crusade, while not primarily political, had such important political results that in many ways it set a pattern for the purely political crusades of later years. In order to break the power of feudal rulers who were alleged to be either heretics or abettors of heresy, Innocent elaborated a brief sentence in the *Decretum* into a fully developed theory of what might be called ecclesiastical forfeiture. Gratian said that Catholics might justly take the property of heretics; Innocent claimed the right of "exposition": that is, if a ruler failed to repress heresy, and if his superior would not or could not force him to do his duty, then the pope might offer the territory to any zealous Catholic who

⁵ P. Rousset, *Les Origines et les caractères de la première croisade* (Neuchâtel, 1945), p. 48.

would assume the obligation of conquering it.⁶ Such a theory allowed the pope to organize armies to carry out his policies in European countries, and by the end of the century it was being used not only against heretics, but also against rulers who were merely disobedient.

Thus Innocent III had worked out all the essential theories and practices of the political crusade. His successors showed, at first, some reluctance to follow his example. Honorius III (1216-1227), in spite of repeated provocation, never found it necessary to preach a holy war against his Italian opponents. The much more sharp-tempered Gregory IX (1227-1241) hesitated to use the full crusade vocabulary in his first struggle with Frederick II from 1228 to 1230. He was thoroughly angry with Frederick for disobeying papal orders, and he was beginning to worry about the strong position which the emperor was acquiring in Italy. Gregory accused Frederick of grave crimes: he was oppressing the Sicilian church and making a mockery of the overseas crusade by iniquitous pacts with the Saracens. He was breaking his most solemn promises by invading the papal states and trying to regain lands ceded to the church. And yet, in his denunciations and appeals for help, Gregory never used the word "crusade". Frederick was denounced unsparingly; he was the enemy of the liberty of the church, he was guilty of *lèse-majesté* against God. His subjects were released from their oath of fidelity and the pope suggested that he had deprived himself of the imperial dignity through his treaties with the Saracens. These were accusations which in the next decades invariably preceded a political crusade, but Gregory did not take the final step of offering the cross and overseas indulgences to those who fought against Frederick.

Short of this, however, there was nothing which he did not do. He raised, in his own words, "three armies" to clear the papal states of imperialists and to invade the kingdom of Sicily. He asked for military aid from the Lombard League, Genoa, an Infante of Portugal, German magnates, and French bishops. His letters of 1229 to archbishop Robert of Lyons and bishop William of Paris on this subject are especially interesting; they show exactly where Gregory drew the line. They are ordered to bring the pope a suitable number of armed men, in virtue of obedience and for the remission of their sins and those of their soldiers. But while Gregory

⁶ Pissard, *La Guerre sainte*, pp. 37-40; *Decretum*, secunda pars, causa XXIII, quest. VII, c. 2.

speaks of remission of sins in general terms, he avoids the precise language of Innocent III, who had promised opponents of Markward the same remission of sins as that granted to those who fought the Saracens in Palestine. Even in writing to the Lombards Gregory shows the same restraint; they are promised remission of sins but not a full crusade indulgence.⁷

This war for defense of the church, to stay within Gregory's terms, did set one important precedent. It was financed, as crusades were coming to be financed, by an income tax imposed on the clergy by the pope. The tax could not be collected in lands which remained under the emperor's power, but we know that the clergy of Sweden, Denmark, England, and northern Italy all paid a tenth of their revenues in 1229 to support the war. The case of the French clergy was a little different since they were already paying a five-year tenth, imposed in 1225 for support of the Albigensian Crusade. That crusade had ended in 1226, and Gregory asked that the final payments be sent to him for the war against Frederick. He was fairly successful in this request and received about 100,000 *livres tournois* from France. At the same time, he asked for financial aid from king Eric Läspe of Sweden, and the king and barons of England. Laymen had no enthusiasm for his war and it is doubtful that he received anything from these sources; the English refused his request with some indignation.

Laymen might protest, but the clergy had to obey. A crusade tax had been used to support a papal war in Italy; a tax for a crusade against heretics in France had been diverted to raise an army to punish a rebellious emperor. The pope had discovered the way to finance his military operations, to pay for the secular support which he had to have in order to achieve his political objectives. For the first time, the papacy could afford a first-class war.

The initial struggle with Frederick II, however, was not entirely successful. The papal armies started with real enthusiasm. Wearing the sign of the Keys of Peter (here again Gregory avoided crusade symbols) they stormed into the mainland territories of the kingdom of Sicily. Frederick's prompt return from Syria frightened them into retreat, and the papal army was getting decidedly the worst of the fighting when peace was arranged in 1230. Frederick was conciliatory and did not, at this time, desire an all-out war with the papacy. Gregory was still suspicious of the emperor, but he was running short of men and money. The bishops of Beauvais and

⁷ Lucien Auvray (ed.), *Les Registres de Grégoire IX*, I (Paris, 1896), cols. 211 ff. (nos 350, 351, 352).

Clermont brought a few men from France, but it is doubtful that there was much response to Gregory's appeal in Germany, even though Frederick forgave some Germans for fighting against him. The Lombards were slow in sending help, and in the end gave only a few hundred men. The greater part of the papal army must have been composed of Italians from Tuscany and the papal states, men who were interested primarily in the affairs of their own communes, not in the pope's plans for the future of Italy. Gregory secured a rather favorable peace, considering his military position, and could at least console himself with the thought that prompt defense had saved the states of the church from Frederick's aggression.

Gregory's behavior in 1228 and 1229 suggests that this notable canonist was not quite sure that it was proper to preach a crusade against a Christian ruler, however disobedient. But while Gregory as a canon lawyer may have had scruples, Gregory as a politician must have wondered if a promise of crusade indulgences would have produced a better response to his appeals for aid. At any rate, in his next struggle with Frederick, Gregory no longer tried to make a distinction between a crusade and a war for the defense of the church, and offered the same indulgences as those received by crusaders in Palestine.

The real causes of the great papal-imperial war, which began in 1239, were Gregory's invincible distrust of Frederick, and Frederick's attempts to extend his power to northern Italy. If Frederick had confined himself to Sicily, there would have been friction — since he treated the Sicilian clergy harshly — but perhaps no complete rupture. But when Frederick tried to make good the claims of the empire to rule Lombardy, he created an exceedingly dangerous political situation for the pope. As the emperor himself said, he needed control of Lombardy in order to bring German troops into Italy. With a continuing supply of German soldiers, paid for with the wealth of Sicily, Frederick could dominate the peninsula and wipe out the independence of the papal states. The pope would have had these suspicions in any case; Frederick did his best to confirm them by his singularly tactless behavior. He won a great victory over the Lombard towns in 1237, but instead of accepting a reasonable settlement he insisted on complete submission. He tried to stir up the Romans against the pope; he tried to acquire Sardinia (claimed by the papacy) as a kingdom for one of his illegitimate sons. Gregory could not let the Lombards be crushed; they were the one force in Italy which could fight the emperor on even terms. He could

not believe Frederick's promises to respect the rights of the church, for Frederick had already demonstrated an unhealthy ability to wriggle out of the most solemn engagements. So, on March 20, 1239, he excommunicated the emperor, and began a war which was to end only in 1268, with the execution of the last male Hohenstaufen.

From a purely political viewpoint, Gregory was undoubtedly right. Frederick already had nearly absolute power in the south and he was close to gaining full control of the north. If he had been able to dominate Lombardy, it would have been difficult to preserve the independence of the states of the church, and even of the city of Rome. From the viewpoint of the church as a religious organization, the decision was more doubtful. In the first place, Frederick's permanent success was by no means assured. Many able men were to try to unite the turbulent cities of northern and central Italy; none of them ever succeeded in building up more than a temporary and unstable domination. Even if Frederick had been successful and had gained control of all papal territory, he would not have controlled the church. The popes of the twelfth century who had taken refuge in France in times of trouble had gained rather than lost prestige; as Bernard of Clairvaux said, it had not hurt them to exchange the City for the world. The kings of the west would not have tolerated an assertion of imperial authority over the church in the thirteenth century. By making war, Gregory preserved the states of the church and the independence of the Italian towns, but he involved the papacy in political operations which, in the end, weakened its influence.

Gregory, as before, began hostilities with excommunication and the release of Frederick's subjects from the oath of fidelity. He took special pains to make sure that all western Europe learned of his act, and the reasons for it. Frederick, of course, circulated his version of the quarrel, but neither side gained much support by this appeal to public opinion outside Italy. The first mention of a crusade seems to have come early in 1240,⁸ almost a year after the excommunication, when the emperor was threatening Rome. Gregory, like every thirteenth-century pope, was not sure of the loyalty of the Romans and tried to stir up their zeal for the church by a great religious procession. At the end he showed them the holiest relics of the Roman church — the heads of the apostles Peter and Paul — and called on them to defend the liberty of the

⁸ It is possible that the crusade was first preached in Lombardy late in 1239; see W. Köster *Der Kreuzablass im Kampfe der Kurie mit Friedrich II.* (Munster, 1913), p. 21.

church against this "new Herod". Crosses were distributed among the multitude, and for a brief period the city was almost unanimous in its support of the pope and hostility to the emperor. The papal legate in Milan was permitted to preach a crusade in order to raise an army to support the papal cause in Lombardy, and crusade preaching was also authorized in Germany.

We have no detailed description of the benefits offered in 1240 to crusaders against Frederick, but a papal letter of February 12, 1241, shows that by this time Gregory was making every possible concession to gain support for his crusade. Crusaders against Frederick were to have the same indulgences as those granted to defenders of the Holy Land. When papal agents in Hungary complained that their attempts to gain recruits were hampered by the fact that many Hungarians had taken the vow to go to Palestine, Gregory authorized them to commute such vows to a crusade against Frederick. He also suggested that crusade vows might be redeemed for appropriate sums of money, and authorized such redemptions in order to raise funds for defense. In short, by February 1241 at the latest, he was not only preaching a full-fledged crusade against Frederick, but was giving it priority over a crusade overseas.⁹

Before Gregory had fully developed the idea of a crusade against Frederick, he began to ask the churches of the western kingdoms for financial aid in his war against the emperor. Much of his correspondence on this subject is lost, but while he accused Frederick of heretical behavior and of attacking church lands, he does not seem to have used a crusade as an excuse for his demands. The English clergy were asked for aid late in 1239. A tax of one fifth of their revenues was imposed on foreign clerks beneficed in England, but the native clergy were allowed to discuss the amount they would offer. There was great opposition to the pope's request, and it took most of 1240 to secure grants from the clergy of the different dioceses. Many objected that there was no clear case against the emperor and that the pope was setting a bad example by shedding Christian blood. In the end they all had to agree to make some contribution — in most dioceses a twelfth of their revenues — but collections were slow and Innocent IV was receiving arrears as late as 1244. Grants were also made in Scotland and in Ireland, though the rate is not definitely known. The clergy of France gave the pope one twentieth of their revenues, but some

⁹ *Les Registres de Grégoire IX*, no. 5362; the complete letter may be found in A. Theiner, *Vetera monumenta historiam Hungaricam sacram illustrantia*, I (Rome, 1859), 178 (no. 327).

of the money was reserved for other expenses. There was even an attempt to collect a fifteenth in some German dioceses, but Frederick forbade the clergy to pay, and they were probably quite willing to obey. Even in countries which were willing to pay, collection of the grants was slow; at least Gregory was heavily in debt when he died.

The war did not go well for the pope despite his efforts to stir up enthusiasm for the papal cause. The preaching of a crusade had only fleeting results. It roused the people of Rome and of Milan to drive back imperial armies early in 1240, but it did not produce a permanent army which could be used for a long campaign. Outside Italy the crusade had even less effect. The Germans were distressed by the conflict and tried to mediate between pope and emperor. When this effort failed, they gave little support to either side and rejected papal suggestions that they should choose a new king in place of Frederick. In other countries the laity did not even discuss the question of aiding the pope. Meanwhile the war in Italy degenerated into a series of local conflicts in which each side tried to hold its own towns and capture those of the enemy through surprise attacks or alliances with disgruntled minorities. Frederick had somewhat the better of this game, and Gregory realized that a new effort was necessary. On August 9, 1240, he issued a summons for a general council, to be held at Rome in March of the following year.

A general council was a serious threat to Frederick. He had been insisting that his quarrel was with the pope, not the church, that Gregory's personal hostility and vindictiveness were the only cause of the war. Condemnation by a council would make it harder to maintain this position, and might lead to increased support of the pope in the trans-Alpine kingdoms. But while Frederick had reason to fear the meeting of a council, the steps which he took to prevent it hurt him almost as much as the meeting could have done. Many of the clergy called to the council were proceeding to Rome in Genoese ships, since the emperor's control of northern Italy made land travel unsafe. A Pisan fleet, under Frederick's orders, routed the Genoese near Monte Cristo, and captured most of the prelates, including two cardinals. Gregory had to spend the few remaining months of his pontificate in seeking release of the prisoners, and the plans for the council were dropped.

Frederick had killed the council, and in doing so had more or less killed Gregory IX. The old pope, working feverishly to recover from his defeat, wore himself out and died in August 1241. But

Frederick paid a high price for his temporary success. He had attacked the church in the person of its bishops; he had changed his personal quarrel with Gregory into an irreconcilable war with the papacy. He had seriously offended the rulers of the northern kingdoms, notably Louis IX of France, by capturing their subjects. Peace with the church was now almost impossible, and in the long war that was to follow public opinion was less favorable to Frederick than it had been before. The Germans, who had tried to preserve neutrality under extreme papal pressure, began to turn against the emperor after 1241, and opposition in northern Italy became more dangerous.

These were long-run results; the immediate effect of Frederick's blow was to shatter the confidence of the college of cardinals. They were not sure how to deal with their terrible opponent, and their uncertainty made it difficult for them to agree on a new pope. The vacancy lasted almost two years (not counting the fifteen-day pontificate of Celestine IV), but the cardinals finally picked, on June 25, 1243, an able and uncompromising head of the church. Sinibaldo Fieschi, who took the name Innocent IV (1243-1254), was a canonist, like most of the popes of his century, and had worked out a strong theory of papal supremacy. He was also a Genoese and was determined not to sacrifice the people of northern Italy to the emperor. It is difficult to believe that Frederick had any illusions about the pope's pliability, but he at once began negotiations for peace, in line with his contention that Gregory IX alone had been responsible for the quarrel.

As long as the negotiations were confined to generalities some progress was made, but when acts were required, neither side would make real sacrifices. Frederick would not give up the eastern part of the papal states; Innocent would not allow him any real power in Lombardy. The pope finally decided that negotiation was useless, and determined to put himself and the Roman curia in security before renewing hostilities. He slipped away to Genoa and then took refuge in the even safer city of Lyons. There he issued a call for a general council to meet in June 1245.

This time Frederick could not block the meeting. Lyons was not yet French, but it could easily be protected by the French king, and Louis made it clear that he would not permit a repetition of the scandal of 1241. The bishops assembled without difficulty, and accepted the papal decree deposing Frederick from all his thrones — the empire, Sicily, and Jerusalem. The charges were much the same as before — oppression of the clergy, attacks on

papal lands, bad faith, undue intimacy with Saracens, and suspicion of heresy — but back of the formal charges lay Innocent's conviction that he could not be really pope while Frederick dominated Italy. The deposition was a declaration of war and was accepted as such by both sides.

There were three main areas where Innocent hoped to weaken Frederick. The first was Germany, where imperial power was already low and where the great princes had virtual autonomy. Here he set up anti-kings — first Henry Raspe of Thuringia, then William of Holland — and used the wealth of the church to buy soldiers and alliances for his puppets. This tactic was never entirely successful, though William of Holland gained control of a large part of northwest Germany, but it did deprive Frederick of badly needed support. He had few ardent adherents in Germany, and these men were so busy defending themselves against papal attacks that they could not send military aid to the emperor.

The next field of action was northern Italy. Here the intensity of local interests and rivalries made it impossible to carry out any general policy. The Lombard League still existed, but it no longer functioned as a unit. Each town had to defend itself; the most it could hope for was to receive reinforcements in time of great danger from a few of its nearest allies. Innocent had a capable legate in Lombardy, Gregory of Montelongo, but Gregory had to spend his energy in organizing the defense of one threatened town after another. Fortunately for the pope, the emperor was in exactly the same situation, and the war in northern Italy resolved itself into a long series of sieges, captures, and defections of individual towns. Frederick had somewhat the worst of the struggle, especially after his defeat at the siege of Parma in 1248, but he always retained the allegiance of parts of Lombardy and Tuscany.

The third area of conflict was the kingdom of Sicily, which included all southern Italy. Legally, Innocent had a better case here than anywhere else. Sicily was a fief of the church, and the pope's right to confiscate the lands of a rebellious vassal was much clearer than his right to depose a hostile emperor. But Frederick had a stronger hold on Sicily than on any other of his domains, and he had protected his frontier by seizing a large part of the papal states. The march of Ancona and the duchy of Spoleto had to be regained by papal forces before anything could be attempted against Sicily, and this task absorbed most of the energy of the papal legates in central Italy. Innocent's only hope of gaining Sicily was through a general rebellion of Frederick's subjects or a full-scale invasion by

a papal army. Both methods were tried, and both proved unsuccessful. A rebellion, encouraged by the pope, failed completely in 1246, and an invading army, led by the cardinal-legate Peter Capocci in 1249, never got far beyond the frontier.

During the war with Frederick, Innocent used crusade preaching and crusade propaganda most intensively in Germany. From the middle of 1246 to the death of the emperor in 1250 a steady stream of papal letters urged the preaching of the crusade in Germany and dealt with the financial and administrative problems caused by the taking of crusading vows. In Italy, on the other hand, while the crusade is mentioned occasionally, it seems much less prominent in papal plans. It was not greatly needed in Lombardy, where the towns would fight for independence in any case, and it was of no use in Sicily as long as Frederick kept the clergy of the kingdom under his thumb. It was used mainly as a device for heartening the inhabitants of threatened towns and for enabling papal legates to raise relief expeditions. The crusade was most effective in the papal states, but even there it produced no large, permanent army.

Even in Germany, where the crusade was vigorously preached, and where the energetic legate Peter Capocci used his very full powers to persuade large numbers of men to take the cross, the pope relied on other weapons much of the time. Threats of excommunication or interdict, promises of church offices, and dispensations from impediments to marriage were at least as useful in bringing princes to support the anti-kings as talk of crusade benefits. In the sporadic fighting between the imperialists and William of Holland the crusade was seldom mentioned. The army which took Aachen for William in October 1248 was full of crusaders, and William later received some help from Germans who had taken crusade vows, and who satisfied them by fighting under his banner. But in Germany as in Italy, the crusade produced momentary bursts of enthusiasm rather than a permanent army. The crusaders from the Low Countries went home as soon as Aachen was taken, and William of Holland was often short of soldiers in the following years.

This lack of emphasis on the crusade is curious, given Innocent's conviction that Frederick was the great enemy of the church and that any means could be used against him. It is probable that he was embarrassed by the fact that Louis IX was engaged in an overseas crusade during the very years that the struggle with Frederick reached its climax. The overseas crusade was still the only real crusade in the eyes of the "simple" (as Hostiensis pointed out), and

it would have been unwise to push a political crusade at the expense of an expedition against the infidel. As it was, the French were unhappy about the competition between the two movements and Innocent had to act carefully to avoid antagonizing them. Thus, while he ordered his legate in Germany to stop preaching the crusade against the Saracens in order to clear the way for a crusade against Frederick, he also told him to keep the order secret. While, in Germany proper, vows to serve in Palestine could be commuted to vows to fight the emperor, Innocent forbade commutation in the border dioceses. He seems to have been especially bothered by the case of the Frisians, even though they were subjects of William of Holland. He first gave them permission to change their vow, then ordered them to aid William, then reversed himself completely and insisted that they go to Palestine. Such hesitations made it hard to carry on the crusade in Germany with any enthusiasm.¹⁰

On the other hand, while the crusade against Frederick did not result in any great military operations, it was successful as an excuse for raising money. A contemporary biographer estimates that Innocent spent 200,000 marks in his struggle with Frederick. Some of this may have come from ordinary papal revenues, but the greater part must have been raised by redemptions of crusade vows and by special taxes imposed on the clergy. We know that Italians benefited in trans-Alpine countries had to contribute a fourth or a half of their income, depending on the value of the benefice. The English clergy promised a subsidy of 11,000 marks, and this did not include payments from exempt monasteries. The clergy of Poland and Hungary also paid a subsidy, and large sums were raised in German dioceses which were not controlled by the Hohenstaufens. But the wealthy church of France could not be asked to contribute, since it was already paying a tenth to Louis for his crusade overseas.

In spending the money he collected, Innocent again concentrated on Germany, where Frederick was weakest. Large sums went to the anti-kings and their supporters: Henry Raspe was given 25,000 marks and William of Holland 30,000. This left the papacy relatively weak in Italy; one reason for the failure of the papal invasion of Sicily in 1249 was lack of money. Innocent needed far more money than he had, but he could not increase his demands on the clergy. There had been violent protests against papal taxation at the Council of Lyons in 1245, and the protests continued during

¹⁰ Élie Berger (ed.), *Les Registres d'Innocent IV*, I (Paris, 1884), cols. 439 ff. (nos. 2935, 3054, 3779, 3967, 3968, 4070).

the next five years. The pope could force the clergy to pay, but he could not force them to be silent, and excessive complaints might have swung public opinion back to the side of the emperor.

When Frederick died at the end of 1250, the pope had not won a clear-cut victory. Sicily was still firmly under Hohenstaufen control, and the imperial position in northern and central Italy, while weakened, was by no means hopeless. Frederick had regained many towns in the march of Ancona in the last year of his life, and he still had allies in Lombardy. The pope had won his greatest advantage in Germany, where William of Holland had gained enough support to absorb most of the energy of the imperialists. After 1250 the popes did not have to worry about Germany, and they chose not to worry about Lombardy. Instead, they concentrated on the strong point in the Hohenstaufen position, the kingdom of Sicily.

This concentration on Sicily forced a change in tactics. As long as the papal-imperial war was fought mainly in northern Italy and Germany, a carefully organized papal army was not absolutely essential. Lombardy and Germany were full of natural enemies of the Hohenstaufens; all they needed was a little papal encouragement. But Innocent had learned that Sicily was so well organized, so bound by its old habits of obedience, that successful rebellion was impossible, and the only way to gain control of the kingdom was to attack it with a large army. The pope could not raise such an army in his own states or in Italy; outside help was needed. And to obtain such an army the full use of crusade techniques was essential. Up to 1250 the political crusade had been a device for stirring up momentary enthusiasm to repel an immediate danger and an excuse for raising money. After 1250 political crusades were planned and organized exactly like overseas crusades; large armies were raised, paid for with clerical tenths, and sent to conquer the enemies of the church.

The need for this new policy was only gradually realized by the popes. To the end of his pontificate, Innocent IV swung back and forth between two plans, now seeking the aid of English or French princes, now attempting to conquer Sicily with his own resources. After his death in 1254 there was less hesitation, and Urban IV (1261-1264) definitely committed the papacy to the policy of calling in a large crusading army to settle the Sicilian affair.

Frederick's death caused a shift in the direction of the papal attack; it did not end the war between the papacy and the Hohen-

staufens. Innocent was too deeply committed to the policy of annihilating Hohenstaufen power; as early as 1247 he had promised the Lombards that neither Frederick nor his sons would ever be allowed to rule as king or emperor.¹¹ Papal prestige was at stake; if Frederick's deposition was valid, his sons could not inherit any of his realms. An atmosphere of suspicion and hate had been created in which it was hard to imagine that any pope could ever trust any Hohenstaufen. Innocent did not hesitate for a moment. In February 1251 he ordered the crusade preached throughout Germany against Frederick's heir, Conrad IV, and authorized the use of all papal letters directed against Frederick for the new war. In March he repeated his solemn promise — this time to the Germans — that the apostolic see would never allow any descendant of Frederick to rule in Germany or Italy. But while he kept up the pressure on Conrad in Germany, Innocent's real interest had shifted to Sicily. Manfred, an illegitimate son of Frederick II, was ruling the kingdom as regent for his half-brother Conrad, and Innocent could hope that an untried ruler with incomplete power might be vulnerable to a papal attack. A rebellion was started in the Terra di Lavoro (Caserta province), and archbishop Marino of Bari was told to encourage the rebels by preaching a crusade against the sons of Frederick. Meanwhile cardinal Peter Capocci was to raise an army in the march of Ancona and invade the kingdom from that base.

Both moves failed. Manfred gradually suppressed the rebellion (except in Naples and Capua), and the cardinal's army was too weak to advance far beyond the border. Innocent then tried negotiating with Manfred, hoping to play on his reluctance to surrender the kingdom to his brother. Manfred might have gone over to the papal side if he had been offered enough, but Innocent promised him only the principality of Taranto, which was his anyway by the terms of Frederick's will. So Manfred continued his resistance, and when Conrad landed at Siponto in January 1252 the regent dutifully surrendered the kingdom. The pope had gained little by his efforts, and when Naples surrendered in 1253, he lost his last foothold south of the papal states.

This experience convinced Innocent, for the moment, that he needed outside help. He continued to talk of the crusade against Conrad — crusade preaching was ordered in Germany in both 1253 and 1254 — but he did not take it very seriously. It was little more than a device which made it possible to raise money for William of

¹¹ *Les Registres d'Innocent IV*, no. 3024.

Holland and his supporters. In 1252 and 1254 he carried on some rather useless negotiations with Conrad, useless because Conrad insisted on being recognized as king of the Romans, and Innocent could not abandon his candidate, William of Holland. But the pope's real policy was to be found in another set of negotiations, which were being conducted, secretly and skillfully, by a papal notary, Albert of Parma. Albert was commissioned to offer the kingdom of Sicily, with proper guarantees of papal rights, to either an English or a French prince and to promise the recipient full crusading privileges and the financial support of the church. This time there was to be a real attack on the center of Hohenstaufen power, not a mere demonstration by a small papal army.

Albert first approached Richard of Cornwall, brother of Henry III of England. Richard showed little interest in the scheme, so Albert turned to the French king's brother, Charles of Anjou. Charles was an ambitious and able politician, always anxious to increase his wealth and power; he was quite ready to listen to Albert's proposition. He carried the negotiations to a point where Innocent was almost sure that he would accept, bargaining shrewdly to decrease the restrictions placed on his power and to increase the financial aid given by the church. But Charles began to lose interest as he realized the difficulties, and a disputed succession in Flanders and Hainault, which gave him an opportunity for easier and quicker gains, made him decide to abandon the project. When he was offered the county of Hainault in return for helping countess Margaret of Flanders, he broke off negotiations with Albert in the fall of 1253.

The pope had to turn back to England. The new candidate was Edmund of Lancaster, the second son of Henry III. He was still too young to lead an army; Henry himself would have to organize the expedition. This was not an ideal solution; Henry had been both incompetent and unlucky as a military leader, and he was not on good terms with his barons. Albert seems to have been a little doubtful, and let the negotiations drag, even though Henry demanded much less than Charles in the way of financial support. Innocent had good reason to be grateful to his envoy for the delays, because Conrad IV died on May 21, 1254, just as the pope was about to confirm the grant of Sicily to Edmund.

This unexpected death — Conrad was only twenty-six — gave Innocent a chance for another quick reversal of policy. Conrad's heir was a baby in Germany, and he left a German, Berthold of Hohenburg, as regent of Sicily because he did not trust his half-

brother Manfred. Berthold was not a man of great ability and was handicapped by being a foreigner. Manfred, who was able and popular, had no official position, and was anxious to save his principality of Taranto. Innocent at last had a chance to take over the kingdom peacefully, since there was no strong leader to oppose him. He played skillfully on Sicilian dislike of German rule, and so weakened Berthold's position that he resigned the regency to Manfred. By that time so many nobles had gone over to the pope that Manfred felt he could not risk a war. He made the best bargain he could for himself — he was to keep Taranto and be vicar of most of the mainland — and then surrendered the kingdom to Innocent.

The pope entered the realm on October 11, 1254, and was accepted everywhere as the rightful ruler. Apparently the long struggle had ended with a complete victory; the Hohenstaufens had lost their main source of strength and the pope had added a rich kingdom to the weak and poverty-stricken states of the church. But Manfred had been left in a difficult position; he was not fully trusted by the pope, and his rights were not fully respected by the more ardent supporters of papal rule. A dispute over land led to a fight, and when Manfred's men killed one of his chief adversaries, Manfred was sure that the pope would seize this opportunity to deprive him of all his holdings. After all, he was a Hohenstaufen, even though an illegitimate one, and Hohenstaufen excuses had not been very acceptable to the popes for the last quarter-century. Manfred fled to the hills, raised a rebel army (including his father's old Saracen body-guard), and soon was able to attack the papal forces. A victory early in December almost dissolved the papal army, and Innocent died in Naples a few days later. Manfred gained ground steadily, and it soon became apparent that the church could not keep control of the kingdom. The whole wearisome "Sicilian business" had to be taken up again by the new pope.

As frequently happened, the cardinals chose a mild and easy-going successor to an energetic and uncompromising pope. Alexander IV (1254-1261) had belonged to the party among the cardinals who favored compromise rather than fighting, and as pope he patiently endured aggressions which would have enraged Gregory IX or Innocent IV. That such a man felt that he had to continue the war with Manfred is an indication of the momentum which the Italian policy of the papacy had acquired. At first Alexander kept up the fight with his own resources, but he soon

saw that outside help was needed. He turned again to Henry III and Edmund, and on April 9, 1255, formally granted the kingdom of Sicily to the English prince. Henry promised to send an army to Italy by the fall of 1256, and to pay all papal war expenses until his soldiers arrived. These were finally estimated at 135,541 marks. In return, his vow to go to the Holy Land was commuted to a pledge to support the crusade against Manfred. He was to receive a tenth of the revenues of the English clergy for five years, and the usual small change from proceeds of redemption of crusade vows, legacies for the Holy Land, and estates of crusaders who died without fulfilling their vows.

The story of Henry's attempt to fulfill these conditions is more important in English history than in the history of the crusades. He never raised enough money to pay the pope's war expenses, much less enough to send an army to Italy. The collection of the tenths made the English clergy angry with both pope and king, and the request for a grant from the laity led directly to the barons' rebellion in 1258. English money did make possible a brief campaign by a papal army in 1255, but this was completely unsuccessful and ended with the capture of the cardinal-legate Octavian at Foggia. By 1258 both Alexander and Henry were completely discouraged. Henry was ready to give up his son's claims if the pope would restore some of the money he had received. Alexander naturally rejected this request, but in the next year he suspended Edmund's claim to Sicily until Henry paid all he owed.

Meanwhile Manfred had gained complete control of the kingdom. At first he claimed to be acting in the interests of his nephew Conradin, but in 1258 he took the title of king. Even worse, from the papal point of view, he began to form alliances and to claim authority as imperial vicar in Tuscany and Lombardy. There was no legal justification for this claim, since imperial authority was not hereditary, and even if it had been, Manfred was not Frederick's heir. But, in the confused state of politics in northern Italy, no one worried greatly about legality; Manfred was able and successful, and the remnants of Frederick's old party rallied around him.

Alexander had no idea of how to deal with Manfred. When the English alliance, which had been prepared by his predecessor, failed, he could find no substitute. But while he had no success in dealing with Manfred, he was able to gain a little ground in Lombardy, which had been rather neglected by Innocent IV in the last years of his pontificate. There the first tyrants were beginning to

appear, and the two most powerful, Ezzelino of Romano and Oberto Pallavicini, were closely connected with Manfred. Ezzelino was a tyrant in every sense of the word, so detested by most of the Lombards that a crusade preached against him late in 1255 stirred up real popular enthusiasm. Venice, Ferrara, and Mantua furnished large contingents; many individuals joined the army, and Alexander picked an able, if worldly, legate, Philip Fontana, to lead the crusade. Padua was taken from Ezzelino in June 1256, but this success exhausted the interest of the Lombards in the crusade. Personal and municipal quarrels broke up the union against Ezzelino, and while the crusade was continued for another three years, it had little effect. In the end Ezzelino was defeated by an alliance between the pro-papal Este family and the pope's other great Lombard enemy, Oberto Pallavicini. This removed the most dangerous tyrant, but Pallavicini remained a power in Lombardy until the advent of Charles of Anjou.

The death of Alexander IV in 1261 enabled the cardinals to make another sharp shift in policy. They chose the patriarch of Jerusalem, James Pantaléon, a prelate who was not a member of their college, but who had gained a reputation as a vigorous administrator. They clearly wanted a more energetic pope; perhaps they also hoped, by electing a Frenchman, to gain the support of the strongest European kingdom for the church's war with the Hohenstaufens. The choice was a momentous one for the future of the papacy and of Europe. James Pantaléon, as pope Urban IV, perfected the technique of the political crusade and prepared the way for the conquest of Sicily by Charles of Anjou. He did this at the price of greatly increasing French influence on church policy and in the college of cardinals.

In the first year of his pontificate, Urban had to adopt a conciliatory policy toward Manfred. The Greeks had just retaken Constantinople, and the Christian foothold in Palestine was threatened by the growing power of the Mamluk sultans. Both the dispossessed Latin emperor Baldwin II of Constantinople and the barons of the kingdom of Jerusalem had powerful friends and relatives in western Europe, especially in France. They could bring great pressure on the pope; they could appeal to the widespread opinion that it was criminal to abandon Latin Christianity in the east in order to gain a political victory in Italy. Urban was forced to negotiate with Manfred, and he did so, though with extreme ill-will. He had no hope and little desire for a peaceful settlement; all he wanted was to demonstrate that it was not his fault if the war

continued. Manfred was a little more willing to compromise, but was just as suspicious of the pope as the pope was of him. Real concessions were impossible for either side. Urban was committed to the established papal policy of uprooting the Hohenstaufens and preventing the establishment of a strong secular power in Italy. Manfred felt that he had to keep a foothold in central and northern Italy in order to protect his kingdom from the pope. The negotiations dragged on into 1263, but by this time Urban was already seeking the aid of Charles of Anjou. He had shown that he was a lover of peace, on his own terms; he had proved, to the more pious at least, that Manfred was an incorrigible member of the "viper race". Now he was free to strike.

The negotiations with Charles of Anjou were long and complicated. Charles wanted money for his army and a free hand as king of Sicily; the pope wanted to give as little money as possible and to keep close control over his new vassal. Charles secured some concessions, but the pope gained his main point. Sicily was to be a real vassal kingdom and to give important service to the pope. Neither Charles nor his heirs were ever to acquire the lordship of Tuscany or Lombardy, much less of Germany. Supported by a docile vassal in the south, confronted by only local powers in the north, the states of the church would be entirely safe, and the popes could forget the fear of encirclement which had dogged them since the beginning of the century.

With this important point settled, the pope could be generous in regard to other terms. Charles was to have full crusade privileges for himself and his men, and there was to be crusade preaching in both Italy and France. He was to receive a tenth of the income of the clergy for three years in France and in the ecclesiastical provinces of Lyons, Besançon, Vienne, Embrun, and Tarentaise. Manfred was to be publicly condemned and all those who adhered to him after proclamation of the papal sentence were to forfeit their lands and goods. An argument over Charles's election as a senator of Rome delayed the public announcement of these terms, but essential agreement had been reached by Urban's death on October 2, 1264.

Meanwhile Manfred had begun to harass the pope. He had allies in Tuscany and in the states of the church; his raiders had come very near the city of Rome. Urban had had to preach a crusade against him in central Italy early in 1264. This had produced, as usual, a sudden flash of popular enthusiasm, and Manfred's bands had been driven back from the city. But the war

continued, and Urban, in June, had demanded contributions from the Spanish clergy to carry on the fight. Spain had not been asked to contribute to earlier political crusades, but, with England torn by civil war, and French revenues pledged to Charles, it was the only possible source of money.

Urban had been perhaps a little too ready to rely on crusades as a means of achieving his objectives. In 1263 he had had a crusade preached against the Byzantine empire, and another crusade against Manfred's supporters in Sardinia. In the same year he had threatened a crusade against the English barons, if they rejected the efforts of his legates to end their dispute with Henry III. But, while he may have overestimated the efficiency of crusade appeals, he had a clear understanding of the problems of organizing a crusade army. Fervent preaching might recruit soldiers, but only regular pay would keep them beneath the banner of the cross. Papal legates or vicars might beat off a raid on the states of the church, but only an experienced lay general could conquer the kingdom of Sicily. Urban had spent the last months of his pontificate in making sure that Charles of Anjou would have a solid financial base by which to support a large and well trained army. He had not only imposed the tenth on the French clergy (May 3, 1264), but had also used the power of the church to build up a party among Tuscan bankers which would support his plans. By forbidding the faithful to pay their debts to uncoöperative bankers he had almost destroyed the Ghibelline party among Tuscan financiers, and, once these men were committed to the papal side, they were bound to put their resources at the disposal of Charles of Anjou. They made large loans to Charles, guaranteed by the pope, and this money made it possible to carry on through the difficult period before the clerical tenths began to come in. If Charles's expedition was the most successful of all the political crusades, it was largely due to Urban's skill in financing it.

The cardinals hesitated four months before picking Urban's successor. Stronger pressure from Manfred might have prolonged their indecision, but Manfred withdrew most of his troops on hearing of Urban's death. It is difficult, however, to see how basic policy could have been changed; the church was already deeply committed to Charles. In the end the cardinals made as little change as possible: they picked another Frenchman, Guy Foulcois, who became pope Clement IV (1265-1268).

Clement carried on Urban's policy without a break. The formal agreement with Charles was made in April 1265, and Charles

himself came to Rome to receive the investiture of Sicily on June 28. He had only a small force with him, and Manfred might have caused him much trouble with a full-scale attack, but the Hohenstaufen ruler merely skirmished in the papal states, and so missed a real opportunity. Meanwhile the main body of Charles's army crossed the Alps in November and marched slowly through Lombardy and Romagna to Rome.

There were still adherents of the Hohenstaufens in these regions, but Clement took the precaution of having a special crusade preached against anyone trying to bar the march of the Angevin army. Papal protection and the strength of the army discouraged opposition; Charles's forces crossed northern and central Italy almost without fighting. In fact, the greatest difficulties during 1265 were financial rather than military; the tenth was paid so slowly that Clement had to pledge the treasures of the churches of Rome for Charles's final loans.

Charles had at least one quality of a great general; he never wasted time. His forces reached Rome only in January 1266; early in February he was already leading them into the kingdom. Manfred met him at Benevento on February 26, with about equal forces, but the French proved superior in fighting ability. Manfred was killed in the battle, and there was no one left to prolong the struggle. The inhabitants of the kingdom accepted Charles as their ruler; the papacy had achieved its great political objective.

Charles's quick success had not completely discouraged the opposition. Two years later the sixteen-year-old Conradin, son of Conrad IV, made a sudden raid into Italy to claim his inheritance. He was received with surprising enthusiasm by many Italians, and was even welcomed in Rome by a friendly senator. Meanwhile a serious rebellion broke out in the island of Sicily and most of the barons of the mainland rose against Charles. Events came so rapidly that there was hardly time to organize a crusade, but Clement did his best for Charles. Crusade preaching was ordered on April 13, 1268, and many Tuscans joined Charles's army as a result. Charles's loans from Sienese bankers were guaranteed by the pope. But Charles was saved by his own generalship and the skill of his French soldiers rather than by the forces recruited through the crusade. He met Conradin near Tagliacozzo on August 23, three days after the young prince had invaded the kingdom. Charles was probably outnumbered, but, by throwing in his reserves at a critical moment, he won a hard-fought battle. Conradin was captured a few days later, and was condemned and executed in Naples in

October. His execution and the fact that the pope made no effort to save him show how badly he had frightened both Charles and Clement.

Charles was an ambitious man, and during the decade and a half which followed the conquest of Sicily the popes at times wondered whether they had really gained by substituting the energetic Frenchman for the rather feckless Hohenstaufen. He was just as eager as Manfred to make his influence felt in northern and central Italy, and his irreproachable orthodoxy, combined with the prestige of his victories, made him much more difficult to oppose. Charles's efforts to extend his power in Italy, however, had no direct influence on the history of the crusades. His other expansionist project, the conquest of the restored Byzantine empire, did have a direct impact on every crusade plan made between 1266 and 1282. It also led, indirectly, to the Sicilian Vespers and thus to the crusade against Aragon in 1285.

In trying to gain control of Greece and the Balkans, Charles was following the example of both his Norman and his Hohenstaufen predecessors. The situation in the east seemed to invite a renewal of Sicilian intervention. Michael VIII Palaeologus held only a fraction of the old Byzantine empire and was especially weak in its western portions. His bitter opponents, the Angeli, ruled Epirus and Thessaly. Western princes, survivors of the Latin empire, held large parts of Greece and many of the islands. The Serbian and Bulgarian states in the northern Balkans were eager to extend their boundaries and were potential allies of any invader. Against this host of enemies the emperor Michael could oppose only his diplomatic skill and his possession of interior lines, which enabled him to use his small army with great effectiveness.

Charles began making plans for an invasion of Byzantine territories within a year of his conquest of Sicily. He realized that his first objective must be to unite all the potential opponents of the Palaeologi. By the treaty of Viterbo (1267) he gained most of the rights of the deposed Latin emperor Baldwin II, including suzerainty over the Frankish principality of Achaëa.¹² He also took over Manfred's holdings in Albania, most important of which was Durazzo, and succeeded in having himself elected king of Albania in 1271 or 1272. This title added little to his strength, though he

¹² J. Longnon, "Le rattachement de la principauté de Morée au royaume de Sicile en 1267," *Journal des Savants*, 1942, p. 136; *idem*, *L'Empire latin de Constantinople*, pp. 236-237. On Charles's relations with Achaëa, see above, chapter VII, pp. 255-261.

tried to push inland from his Albanian coastal bases on several occasions. Finally, by persistent diplomatic activity, Charles tried to obtain the support of Hungary, Serbia, and Bulgaria, and the assistance of the Venetian fleet.

Charles's plans were perfect in theory, but it was difficult to coördinate all these operations to produce the overwhelming attack which would have annihilated the Byzantine empire. There is an element of high comedy in the diplomatic history of the years between 1267 and 1282; again and again Charles was almost ready to strike when some unforeseen event forced him to postpone his plans. Charles, of course, was not entirely free to concentrate all his attention on the east. He had to safeguard his interests in Italy and he had to have the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the pope. Michael Palaeologus understood this situation perfectly, and many, though not all, of Charles's setbacks were caused by Michael's adroit maneuvers in the west.

The first check was Conradin's invasion in 1268. This was quickly disposed of, but by that time Louis IX was well advanced in his plans for a new crusade. An account of his negotiations with Charles is given elsewhere;¹³ it is enough to say here that Charles could not avoid postponing his eastern expedition and joining in the crusade, although he did succeed in modifying its objective. Louis's death at Tunis freed Charles from any obligation to continue the crusade; he made a quick and profitable peace and returned at once to Sicily. He might have persuaded some of his fellow-crusaders to join him in an attack on the Byzantine empire, but the great storm which sank most of the Franco-Sicilian fleet at Trapani made the expedition impossible. By the time that Charles could rebuild his fleet the crusade had long been dispersed. Troubles in northern Italy and a war with Genoa (which was allied to emperor Michael) kept Charles occupied for the next two years.

The next major obstacle to Charles's plans came from an unexpected quarter, the papacy. Both Gregory X (1271-1276) and Nicholas III (1277-1280) were worried by the extent of Charles's power in Italy and saw little advantage to the church in allowing Charles to increase his power by conquests in the east. Gregory X, in addition, was anxious to save what was left of the kingdom of Jerusalem. He had been legate in Syria at the time of his election and he realized that only the united efforts of all western rulers could stem the Mamluk advance; a diversion against Constantinople

¹³ See below, chapter XIV, pp. 508-518.

would be fatal to his hopes of restoring the Christian position in Palestine. He devoted his whole pontificate to an attempt to promote a new crusade; he used Charles's ambitions only as a means of furthering his main objective. If the threat of an Angevin invasion could frighten Michael Palaeologus into coöperating with the Roman church so much the better, but Gregory was not going to allow any large expedition to waste western resources in an attack on the Greeks.

Michael made almost the same estimate of the situation as the pope, which made it easy for Gregory to carry out his policy. Faced with the Angevin threat, the emperor agreed to the union of the churches in 1274 and suggested that he might aid the new crusade. The union was bitterly opposed by the Greeks, but Michael was harsh enough with the dissenters to convince the pope of his good faith. Gregory could not prevent minor skirmishes in Greece and the Balkans, but he did restrain Charles from launching a major expedition. Nicholas III followed the same policy, even though by his time it was apparent that the union would be a failure.

Charles must have suffered during these years of frustration, but he never made the mistake of directly and openly opposing the pope. He waited patiently, gained all the support he could in the college of cardinals, and finally reaped his reward. In 1281 the Frenchman Simon of Brie, an old friend of the Capetian family, became pope under the name Martin IV. At last all the pieces of the long-planned combination against the Byzantine empire were going to fit into place.

At first all went well. The Greek emperor was excommunicated for his failure to make the union effective. Venice joined the alliance against the Byzantines and promised important naval support. Charles began to raise money and troops. The pope granted him the crusade tenth in Hungary and Sardinia, and crusade legacies and redemption of vows in Sicily and Provence. There was a certain ambiguity in these grants; Martin IV declared that they were to be used against the "infidel", and thus did not directly sanction a crusade against the schismatic Greeks.¹⁴ The official French historian, William of Nangis, took the same view; he ignored Charles's obvious plans to attack the Byzantine empire and declared that he was going to fight the Saracens and reconquer the kingdom of Jerusalem.¹⁵ But Bartholomew of Neocastro,

¹⁴ *Les Registres de Martin IV*, Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, ser. 2, vol. XVI, part 1 (Paris, 1901), nos. 116, 117.

¹⁵ *RHGF*, XX, 516. For Charles's claim to the kingdom of Jerusalem, see below, chapter XVI, pp. 583-591.

speaking for the Sicilian opponents of the Angevins, was not deceived. He asserted that this would have been a political crusade of the same sort as the one against Manfred. The cross Charles bore was not the cross of Christ, but that of the unrepentant thief, and in its name he was going to attack the friendly Greeks, just as in its name he had shed innocent blood in his earlier wars.¹⁶

The combination of Charles's careful planning and papal support might have been irresistible; certainly Michael Palaeologus had never been in a more dangerous position. He was saved by the great rebellion known as the Sicilian Vespers, which made it forever impossible for the Angevins to attack the Byzantine empire.

Charles of Anjou had been no easier master to Sicily than his Hohenstaufen predecessors; like them, he had imposed heavy taxes in order to carry on an ambitious foreign policy. His use of French officials added to his unpopularity, especially in the island of Sicily. Many natives hated him; many foreign rulers had cause to fear him. In the period just before 1282 a complicated and still imperfectly known plot was formed against him, involving exiles from the kingdom, old allies of Manfred in northern Italy, the Byzantine emperor, and Peter III of Aragon. Peter was the most dangerous of these enemies; he had a claim to the kingdom through his wife Constance, the daughter of Manfred, and he possessed the best navy in the Mediterranean. The plotters probably hoped that when Charles launched his long-planned attack against Constantinople the kingdom would be left relatively defenseless, but before Charles could sail or they could strike a popular uprising in the island of Sicily upset all plans. The famous Sicilian Vespers of March 30, 1282, wiped out the French garrison of the island, but the king of Aragon did not profit immediately from the rebellion. The rebels at first talked of substituting a league of communes under papal suzerainty for the monarchy; only when Charles launched a dangerous counterattack did they become convinced that they needed a protector. They offered the crown to Peter of Aragon; on August 30 he landed at Trapani and took over the island.

Martin IV, as a Frenchman and supporter of the Angevins, probably reacted more violently to the Sicilian revolution than an Italian would have done. Looked at cold-bloodedly, the establishment of the Aragonese in Sicily was by no means an unmixed evil for the papacy. Charles of Anjou had not been an easy ally; his

¹⁶ *Historia Sicula* (ed. Giuseppe Paladino, *RISS*, XIII, part 3), 10-11.

attempts to gain the hegemony of northern Italy had worried several popes, and his hope of conquering Constantinople had for many years been a disturbing factor in European diplomacy. A reduction in his power could be advantageous to the papacy, especially as it became clear that Peter of Aragon did not have the slightest chance of conquering the mainland and renewing Hohenstaufen aggression against the papal states. But Martin took his stand on higher ground than that of expediency. A papal vassal had been treacherously attacked; the papal sentence denying Sicily to anyone of Hohenstaufen blood had been flouted. The Capetian dynasty, the bulwark of the church, had been injured, and if the injury were not avenged, the French might be less willing to act as champions of the papacy in the future. Martin did not hesitate to take extreme measures. Peter was excommunicated in November 1282, and deprived — in theory — of his kingdom of Aragon on March 21, 1283.

Martin hoped at first that these threats, combined with a new counterattack by Charles of Anjou, would discourage Peter. He soon saw that more force was needed, and sent a legate to France to organize a crusade against Aragon. The negotiations followed closely the pattern set by Urban IV in his dealings with Charles of Anjou. Aragon was to be a papal fief, held by Charles of Valois, the second son of Philip III ("the Bold") of France, on terms very like those under which Charles of Anjou had received Sicily. The French clergy, and those of most dioceses of the old Middle Kingdom, were to pay Philip a tenth of their revenues for four years to finance the expedition. Philip and his followers were to have full crusade privileges. There was some haggling over terms, and some opposition in the royal council, but in February 1284 Philip accepted the throne of Aragon for his son.

Philip faced the same financial problem which had annoyed Charles; he needed large sums of money before the crusade tenths were fully paid. He solved it more easily, thanks to the strength of the French monarchy. An aid was paid by his lay and ecclesiastical vassals, and "gifts" were taken from the towns. His subjects lent him large sums of money, probably on easier terms than the Tuscan bankers had offered Charles. He hired a large number of ships, recruited an army of at least 8,000 men, and was ready to begin his expedition in the spring of 1285.

Peter was in a difficult position. The nobles of Aragon were trying to limit his power and resented his interest in Sicily; they responded badly when he called them to arms. His strongest

weapon, the navy, was being used to protect Sicily from the Angevins. In the circumstances, he conducted a remarkably skillful campaign. He delayed Philip as long as he could at the line of the Pyrenees, but refused to risk a pitched battle when his position was turned. Philip advanced rapidly through Catalonia, but was halted again at the strongly fortified position of Gerona. The French army wasted the summer in besieging this town; illness and incessant raids by Peter's troops diminished its strength. By early September Peter was able to recall his fleet to the western Mediterranean, where it almost annihilated the ships in the service of France. Since Philip's army was supplied largely by sea, this blow forced him to retreat. He withdrew most of his army safely, but he himself died at Perpignan on October 5, 1285.

The new king of France, Philip IV ("the Fair"), had probably opposed his father's decision to engage in the crusade. In any case, the events of 1285 must have convinced him that the attack on Aragon was futile. He did enough talking about the crusade to gain a new three-year grant of tenths from the French clergy, but he did not repeat the invasion of Aragon. He was quite ready to make peace, and eventually a settlement was reached in which Charles of Valois was indemnified for his claim to Aragon by receiving the county of Anjou from his cousins of Naples.

The popes were less willing to face facts. For the rest of the century they continued to support the Angevins with men and money, and at one point a quarrel between the heirs of Peter III gave them great hopes of regaining Sicily for their favored dynasty. In the end, however, they had to accept the division of the kingdom. Sicily remained in the hands of a younger branch of the Catalan-Aragonese royal family, while the descendants of Charles of Anjou ruled at Naples. No strong power was left in Italy, either to oppress or to protect the states of the church. This was not an unmixed blessing, as the turmoil of the fourteenth century was to demonstrate, but at least it removed the need for large-scale political crusades.

In spite of the failure of the crusade against Aragon, the papacy had, on the whole, achieved its political objectives. Both the empire and the mainland half of the kingdom of Sicily had been taken away from the unfriendly Hohenstaufens and placed in the hands of rulers who were obedient to the church. Both the empire and the kingdom had been so weakened that they could not threaten the papal states, even if they were to fall again under the control of enemies. But the church had paid a high price for this political victory. It is not fair to blame the disunity of Germany and Italy

entirely on the popes of the thirteenth century — tendencies in that direction were already strong before 1200. But, insofar as the thirteenth-century popes encouraged the growth of disunity and opposed efforts toward unification and strong government, they can be blamed for the Italian anarchy which prolonged the Avignonese exile of the papacy and for the German anarchy which made possible the Reformation.

Even more important, the political crusades were one of the factors which weakened the leadership of the church and encouraged the transfer of basic loyalty from the church to the secular state. We know little about the state of public opinion in thirteenth-century Europe, but what little we know suggests a growing antipathy to the political program of the papacy and a weakening loyalty to the ideal of a Christian commonwealth. The complaints of chroniclers and poets about the avarice and ambition of the popes are not conclusive; there are not enough of these to prove general opposition to papal policy. For one Matthew Paris, who criticizes the papacy, there are a dozen chroniclers who give at least tacit approval to the war against the Hohenstaufens. In any case, a chronicler or poet speaks only for himself; we cannot assume that he represents the opinion of a large group. When we turn to protests by churchmen, and official acts of kings, we have better evidence. Bishops and ecclesiastical assemblies did not oppose the pope unless they felt sure of some support; kings did not tax the clergy until they were convinced that their barons would back them in attacking the liberties of the church. During the second half of the thirteenth century we find both protests by large numbers of churchmen and interference with ecclesiastical privileges by kings.

The English clergy made repeated protests against the demands of Innocent IV and Alexander IV for subsidies for their Italian wars. The French clergy paid the tenths for Charles of Anjou grudgingly; Clement IV complained of the ill-will of the bishops and the lack of zeal of the collectors. One cleric of Rheims argued that the claim that the tenth was needed for the defense of the faith was false, since a war against Manfred did not concern the faith. Many pious churchmen agreed with archbishop Giles of Tyre that it was scandalous when men who had taken a vow to go overseas were urged to join the expedition against Sicily or when legacies for the Holy Land were used to make war on Manfred.¹⁷ If the

¹⁷ Pierre Varin, *Archives législatives de la ville de Reims* (Collection de documents inédits sur l'histoire de France, ser. 1, histoire politique, I, Paris, 1840), 452-453; E. Jordan, *Les Origines de la domination angevine en Italie* (Paris, 1909), pp. 538-539.

clergy were discontented, the laity cannot have been enthusiastic about papal policy. Moreover, the more the clergy felt oppressed by the pope, the less they were willing to oppose the growing interference of secular rulers in ecclesiastical affairs. Why should they risk exile and loss of revenue to defend the rights of their churches, when the pope ignored those same rights whenever it suited his interests? The churchmen, who had paid tenths to the pope for his wars were not especially shocked when lay rulers demanded similar contributions for their wars.

The behavior of lay rulers supports the conclusion that loyalty to the church had been weakened by the political crusades. The crusades were not the only cause of the decline in papal prestige, but there is a direct connection between them and certain assertions of lay supremacy. From 1245 on, the popes had granted tenths to French and English princes to enable them to fight for the church; by the end of the century the kings of France and England had become accustomed to receiving these subsidies and insisted that they could impose them for their own purposes. The attempt of Boniface VIII (1294-1303), in the bull *Clericis laicos*, to stop this practice was completely unsuccessful. Laymen paid no attention to his orders, and the clergy begged him to revoke a ruling which made them odious to the people. Boniface, in the end, had to admit the right of kings to take tenths for defense of their realms. The use of crusades in secular politics had made it easy for kings to take over the crusade tax on the clergy.

Soon after *Clericis laicos* a political crusade helped revive the quarrel between Philip the Fair and Boniface VIII. Two cardinals who were members of the great Roman family of the Colonna had not been pleased by the election of Boniface VIII. Boniface resented their attitude, and in 1297 used an act of brigandage by a lay member of the family as an excuse to demand the complete submission of the Colonnas. The cardinals, instead of giving in, resisted, and issued public statements claiming that Boniface was not the rightful pope. Boniface preached a crusade against the Colonnas, and succeeded in capturing their castles and driving them into exile. But Philip the Fair did not assist the pope in this political crusade, as his ancestors had done. Instead, he let the Colonnas take refuge in his territory and used them in 1303 in his attack on Boniface at Anagni. And in accusing Boniface of heresy, in trumping up charges and seeking public support against him, Philip used many of the tricks of propaganda which the popes had developed in their political crusades.

Papal taxation and petty crusades in Italy had certainly weakened papal prestige, but it could be argued that the expedition against Aragon in 1285 had done it more harm than had anything else. On the Spanish side, the excommunication of Peter III and the proclamation of a crusade against him had had very little effect. Even though the barons of Aragon had been quarreling violently with their king, they had had no use for an intruder imposed on them by the pope. On the French side, the crusade had led to a strong reaction against papal policy. The expedition had been opposed by Matthew, the influential abbot of St. Denis, and, probably, by the heir to the throne. In any case, the failure of the crusade and the death of his father must have made a strong impression on Philip the Fair. He was only seventeen when he became king; the unhappy memories of the crusade and the diplomatic and financial problems into which he was plunged may well have made him unfriendly to the church. Certainly he began by asserting firmly his authority over his own clergy; during the first five years of his reign the popes made repeated protests against his attacks on the rights of French churches. He showed little interest in crusades or Mediterranean politics. This weakened the alliance between the papacy and France, which had been the dominant feature of European politics for three generations. By depriving the popes of French military support he made it impossible for them to pursue an active policy either in Italy or overseas. Philip was a pious Christian in his private life, but as king he put the interests of the French monarchy far ahead of those of the church. When the two clashed he did not hesitate; he was determined to be master in his own kingdom and to reject any outside interference. Anagni and the exile at Avignon were the logical consequences of the political crusades.