XI

THE CRUSADE OF 1101

With the capture of Jerusalem on July 15, 1099, the crusaders had gained their principal objective, and their victory over the Egyptians at Ascalon four weeks later removed for the moment the most immediate threat against the Christian holdings. The official report of the campaign, written by Daimbert and others from Latakia in September, was triumphant in tone and justly so. The sources for the Crusade of 1101 are about as plentiful as those for the First Crusade, but in general were written at second hand. Some of the chroniclers of the First Crusade included also an account of the later movement. The best of these are: Bartolf of Nangis, *Gesta Francorum expugnantium Iherusalem* (RHC, Occ., III); Fulcher of Chartres, *Gesta Francorum Hierusalem peregrinantantium* (ed. H. Hagenmeyer, Fulcheri Caruonensis Historia Hierosolymitana [1095–1127], Heidelberg, 1913); Guibert of Nogent, *Gesta Dei per Francos* (RHC, Occ., IV); Ordericus Vitalis, *Historia ecclesiastica* (ed. A. Le Prevost and L. Delisle, vol. IV, Paris, 1852); Radulf [Ralph] of Caen, *Gesta Tancredii* (RHC, Occ., III); William of Malmesbury, *Gesta regum Anglorum* (ed. W. Stubbs, Rolls Series, 2 vols., London, 1887–1889); William of Tyre, *Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum* (RHC, Occ., I, and tr. E. A. Babcock and A. C. Krey, *A History of Deeds Done Beyond the Sea: by William, Archbishop of Tyre*, Columbia University, Records of Civilization, 2 vols., New York, 1943). Ekkehard of Aura was a participant during part of the crusade; his *Hierosolymita* (ed. H. Hagenmeyer, Tübingen, 1877) is valuable in spots but is less useful than the author’s reputation would suggest. Albert of Aix, *Historia Hierosolymitana* (RHC, Occ., IV), is by far the fullest and most interesting account. His version of this story was attacked as erroneous and inconsistent by H. von Sybel, *Geschichte des ersten Kreuzzuges* (2nd ed., Leipzig, 1881), but defended effectively, it would seem, by B. Kugler, *Albert von Aachen* (Stuttgart, 1885).

The continuators and minor crusading historians add nothing of value.

Detailed information about the participants may be found in a number of local sources—cartularies and annals. Of the latter, the following are the most useful. For the Lombards: Landulf of San Paolo, *Historia Mediolanensis* (MGH, SS., XX); Caffaro de Caschifalone, *De liberatione civitatis orientis liber* (RHC, Occ., V). For the French: *Chronica prioratus de casa Viccomitii* and *Chronicon S. Maxentii Pictavensis* (both ed. P. Marchegay and E. Mabile, *Chronques des églises d’Anjou*, Paris, 1869); *Gesta Ambazienium dominorum* (ed. L. Halphen and R. Poupardin, *Chroniques des comtes d’Anjou*, Paris, 1913). For the German: *Annales Augustini* (MGH, SS., III); *Annales Melicenenses* (MGH, SS., IX); Otto of Freising, *Chronica* (ed. A. Holmeister, Hanover, 1912); *Historia Welforum Weingartensis* (MGH, SS., XVI).


Christian position was far from secure, however, and this the magnates recognized as they set about organizing the new state. Most of the important seaports, upon which their control of Syria and Palestine ultimately depended, had yet to be taken, and recent acquisitions inland needed to be consolidated. For the tasks at hand there was not enough manpower: some westerners had elected to stay on in the Levant but most of them, homesick and pilgrims at heart rather than colonizers, turned homeward as soon as their vows were fulfilled and as transportation became available. Within a few months Godfrey’s army had shrunk until he could count on no more than a few hundred knights and one or two thousand footmen. In 1100, when Baldwin became king, Fulcher of Chartres believed, not unreasonably, that there were not enough Christians left to defend Jerusalem from the Saracens “if only they dared attack us”.

Long before this rapid demobilization the leaders of the crusade had felt the need for reinforcements. Their letters home as they moved into enemy territory had punctuated stirring accounts of victories with pleas for prayers, subsidies, and recruits. These requests they continued to send westward by letter and word of mouth as pilgrims returned after the taking of Jerusalem. Even earlier than the princes, Urban II had understood that the hot flame of enthusiasm he had kindled on the plain outside Clermont would not insure the permanent conquest of the Holy Land. After the departure of the hosts in 1096 he had continued to urge, by letter and by voice, the Jerusalem way. He had thus enlisted the aid of the maritime cities of Italy, without whose ships Jerusalem could not have been taken or held, and he had tried as well to raise additional armies. In his last councils, at Bari (October 1098) and Rome (April 1099), Urban introduced crusading business, and it is possible that he considered seriously the invitation to come out with fresh recruits and assume command of the crusade he had launched.¹

It was Urban’s tragedy that he died on July 29 without learning of the victory at Jerusalem a fortnight earlier. His work went on without a break, however. New armies were recruited in Europe and marched out bravely toward the Holy Land. Fulcher of Chartres referred to the movement as a second crusade and so it was, though modern usage has preferred the less accurate desig-

nation of Crusade of 1101. Whatever it be called, the expedition was an utter failure which drew sharp criticism from historians of the time and scant attention from those of later centuries. But there is some value in describing that failure in order to make clear the difficulties inherent in the overland approach to Jerusalem.

Urban’s successor was Rainerius of Blera, who was enthroned as Paschal II on August 14, 1099. As a young monk — whether of Cluny or Vallombrosa is uncertain — Rainerius had favorably impressed Gregory VII. Called to Rome, Rainerius had advanced rapidly in the papal curia, being named cardinal-priest of St. Clement’s. He had enjoyed Urban’s favor too, serving as his legate in Spain, and it was reported that Urban had suggested Rainerius as his successor. With his background, it was inevitable that Paschal should continue the crusading policy of Urban and should use the techniques that had already proved successful.²

Paschal must have heard of the crusaders’ crowning success soon after his elevation, but it was late in 1099 before Daimbert’s report was brought to him by Robert of Flanders. Paschal’s reply, dated April 28, 1100, accredited to the crusaders a new legate, cardinal-bishop Maurice of Porto, and urged that the Christian forces stay on in the east to complete their task. Several months earlier, as he learned from returning pilgrims something of the precarious situation in the Holy Land, the pope had addressed a letter to the clergy of Gaul, directing them to preach a new crusade. All soldiers should be asked to enlist, with a promise of the privileges instituted by Urban, but special pressure was to be used on all who had failed to make good crusading vows taken earlier. In spite of the threat of excommunication, this latter group seems to have been quite large. It included laggards who had never left home, faint-hearted pilgrims who had deserted in Italy or elsewhere along the road and, most odious of all, the “rope-dancers” who had fled the siege of Antioch. Letters from the east had been particularly insistent that the slackers be returned to combat; for the sake of discipline and morale Paschal was forced to stress their case, though he hoped also to attract a large number of new volunteers.³

In retrospect his task appears less difficult than Urban’s had been in 1095. True, Paschal could count on little help from the

³ Hagenmeyer, Epistolæ, XVIII, XIX, XXII, pp. 103ff.
monarchs of western Europe. His attitude toward Henry IV was as stern as had been that of his predecessors. Philip I of France was sunk in sloth and at odds with the papacy because of his matrimonial ventures. In England William Rufus was as cynically realistic as he had been in 1095; when Henry I succeeded him in August 1100, it was without regard for the claims of Robert of Normandy and in apparent contradiction of the latter’s crusading privileges. The Spanish monarchs had Saracens enough along their own frontier. Paschal, who knew something of the unending demands of the reconquista, released from their crusading vows knights from Castile and Leon, sent home others who had already started for Jerusalem, and made plain to Alfonso VI that his task was in Spain. But these handicaps were not prohibitive. The First Crusade had succeeded, as Guibert of Nogent observed, without benefit of kings; what was needed now was not so much ambitious monarchs, with their interests rooted in Europe, as a supply of soldiers and colonists willing to serve under experienced leaders in the Levant. And to attract such recruits Paschal had a signal advantage in the manifest success of Urban’s expedition. References in contemporary sources — chronicles and charters, sermons and songs — show how widely the news of the capture of Jerusalem spread; that news moved many to follow the heroes whose names were soon to be legendary in Europe. Some of the recruits were repeaters, largely from northern France, but for the most part they came from regions moved only lightly by the excitement of 1095–1096: from Aquitaine and Burgundy, from Germany and Lombardy.

In that last region there was little left for the new pope to do. A center of opposition to the reform papacy, Lombardy had contributed few troops to the First Crusade, but sentiment had changed as the movement had prospered. A few months before his death Urban II wrote to Anselm of Buis, a staunch supporter who had recently been installed as archbishop at Milan, asking him to lead his people on crusade. This plea was seconded by letters from the Holy Land circulated in Lombardy by the Genoese late in 1099. Anselm accepted the invitation, named a suffragan to act in his stead, and levied on the income of his clergy to help defray expenses. The archbishop’s preaching won over men of all ranks, who took the cross singing “Ültreja, ültreja!” At least two bishops went, William of Pavia and Guido of Tortona, and many clergy. There were women too, and children, and the chroniclers — not

4 Migne, PL CLXIII, col. 45 (letters XXV and XXVI) and col. 63 (letter XLIV).
7. The Near East during the First Crusade, 1097–1100 (Map by the University of Wisconsin Cartographic Laboratory)
8. The Near East during the Reign of Baldwin I, 1100–1118 (Map by the University of Wisconsin Cartographic Laboratory)
Italian — were to accuse the Lombard host of poor discipline and lack of stamina in battle. The lay leaders were of respectable rather than exalted rank: count Albert of Biandrate, with his brother Guido and his nephew Otto Altaspata; Hugh of Montebello; and count Albert of Parma. This last Albert has been identified as a brother of the anti-pope Guibert, who died just as the crusaders marched off in September of 1100, and Albert’s enlistment has been cited as a posthumous token of Urban’s victory.\(^5\)

It was in France that Paschal II made his chief effort and had his chief success, though it is impossible of course to say how much that owed to the formal campaign of the church, how much to an aroused public opinion. In response to Paschal’s encyclical letter archbishop Manasses II of Rheims wrote to bishop Lambert of Arras, repeating the pope’s call for soldiers and adding the pleas of Godfrey and Arnulf from Jerusalem. Presumably Manasses wrote also to his other bishops. Perhaps other Gallic metropolitans did likewise: our information in the case of Rheims results from a chance survival of a bishop’s correspondence. At any rate when Hugh of Die, archbishop of Lyons, convoked a synod at Anse in the spring or summer of 1100 four archbishops and nine bishops joined him in promulgating Paschal’s crusading decree. Hugh had served both Gregory VII and Urban II as legate in France, but Paschal had decided to use Italians rather than natives in that office so Hugh took the cross, later obtaining the pope’s permission to make the pilgrimage and an appointment as legate in Asia.\(^6\)

Soon after the meeting at Anse, Paschal’s new legates, the cardinals John of St. Anastasia and Benedict of St. Eudoxia, arrived in France. They held a council at Valence toward the end of September and, passing through Limoges, came to Poitiers where they convoked another council on November 18, fifth anniversary of the opening of Clermont. At Poitiers certainly, and apparently at the other cities, the legates preached the crusade, “violently exciting the people that they should quickly aid the faithful in God’s war.” As at Clermont, the response was im-

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\(^5\) Landulf of San Paulo, Historia Mediolanensis (MGH, SS., XX), p. 22; Caffaro, De liberatione, xii (p. 58); Ekkhard, xxii (p. 221); Albert of Aix, VIII, i (p. 539); Riant, “Un Dernier triomphe d’Urban II,” Revue des questions historiques, XXXIV (1882), 247–254. Bishop Aldo of Piacenza was probably in the army too: G. Tononi, “Actes constant la participation des plaisanciens à la première croisade,” AOL, I (1881), pp. 395–401.

mediate and enthusiastic: nobles, clergy, and simple folk “assumed the sign of Christ’s cross.”

The most powerful layman to enlist at Poitiers was William IX, duke of Aquitaine and count of Poitou. He had resisted Urban’s call in 1095, staying in France to prey on the lands of his crusading neighbor, Raymond of Toulouse. William, a light-hearted young man who has since become famous as the first of the troubadours, had been in trouble with the church, and now incurred further displeasure by his belligerent defense of his suzerain Philip I before the legates at Poitiers, so that some have thought that his vow was in expiation of his violence at the council. But there is evidence to show that he had tried to raise funds for a crusade by mortgaging his duchy to William Rufus before the latter’s death on August 2, and it seems probable that the duke was moved more by reports of glorious deeds done in the east than by ecclesiastical strictures.

William was able to muster a large army from his own and neighboring territories. Among the leaders were count Geoffrey of Vendôme, Herbert, viscount of Thouars, and his brother Geoffrey, Hugh of Lusignan (a half-brother of Raymond of Toulouse who apparently bore no bitter grudge against William), and many clergy including bishops Reginald of Périgueux and William of Auvergne. The clergy added a not unneeded touch of respectability, for while some crusaders set out with their wives, William IX left his spouse to manage his estates and took with him a bevy of damsels.

Save in the case of a few princes there is no information concerning the circumstances under which men vowed to go to Jerusalem. One would suppose that French preachers, local or itinerant, repeated the pope’s message as others had done in 1096. For example, two of the most celebrated pulpit orators of the day — Robert of Arbrissel and Raoul Ardent — were at Poitiers and the latter is supposed to have gone to the east with his patron William IX; it would have been strange if such men had not helped speed the new call. Enthusiasm was aroused in many

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7 Vita B. Hilarii (RHGF, XIV), p. 108; Vita B. Bernardi abbatis de Tironio (ibid.), p. 166; Chronicon S. Maxentii Pictavensis, ad ann. 1100, p. 420; Geoffrey of Chalard, Dictamen de primordiis ecclesiae Castellensis (RHC, Occ., V), p. 348.
places by the display of relics brought back from Outremer, and everywhere by the tales of the returning veterans.\textsuperscript{10}

In northern France, whence many volunteers had gone out in 1096, there were quite a few deserters who now reenlisted, though the inordinate attention they received from the chroniclers stemmed from their rank and notoriety rather than from their great number. Best known of the group were Stephen of Blois and Hugh of Vermandois. Clerical threats were strongly reinforced by popular indignation over their supposed cowardice and, in the case of Stephen — if we may believe the report of a gossipy monk who certainly was no eyewitness — by complaints uttered by his spirited wife during their most intimate marital relations. Another defaulter from Antioch, Guy Trousseau of Monthéry, was represented by two kinsmen: Guy II ("the Red"), count of Rochefort and seneschal to Philip I; and Miles of Bray, viscount of Troyes, probably second of that name and grandson of Guy I. Other nobles from the region, with no stigma of desertion, included Odo Arpin, viscount of Bourges, Hugh Bardulf II of Broyes, Baldwin of Grandpré, Dodo of Clermont, and Walbert, seneschal of Laon. There were three bishops in the host: William of Paris, Ingelrand of Laon, and Hugh of Soissons; William had attended the synod at Anse, the other two that at Poitiers.\textsuperscript{11}

The response in eastern France was equally enthusiastic. William II, count of Nevers, Auxerre, and Tonnerre, enlisted; the contingent he raised from his territories, while not so numerous as that from Aquitaine, was to act as a separate army. Volunteers from neighboring Burgundy, on the other hand, joined with Stephen of Blois’s forces. The two most important leaders were Odo, duke of Burgundy, and Stephen, count of Burgundy and Mâcon. Unfortunately the chroniclers have confused these two persons so that it is usually impossible to determine which is referred to, but charters of the time show that both were among the crusaders who left in 1101. Duke Odo was a veteran of the Spanish wars against the Moslems and a sometime benefactor of Molemes and Citeaux, but he had recently incurred papal dis-


\textsuperscript{11} Ordericus Vitalis, X, xix (IV, 118); Guibert of Nogent, VII, xxiv (p. 243); Albert of Aix, VIII, vi (p. 563); Suger, Vita Ludovici (ed. H. Waquet, Paris, 1929), pp. 37–39; Gallia Christiana, VII, 55–55; IX, 533–534, 525–526.
pleasure by infringing on the lands of Cluny in spite of the complaints of his sainted uncle, abbot Hugh. Excommunicated by the legates at Valence, Odo had made retribution and had taken the cross. Count Stephen had been ruling for his elder brother Reginald, who had gone out to Jerusalem; another brother, archbishop Hugh of Besançon, accompanied Stephen in 1101.18

In Germany, as in Italy, the favorable reaction to crusading propaganda was in some degree a measure of the increased prestige of the papacy. As Ekkehard of Aura noted, it was the strife between emperor and pope that had kept the Germans aloof during the First Crusade. Germany was now enjoying a respite from civil war, and at the death of Guibert in 1100 there was for a time some hope that the papal schism might be healed. At any rate, Henry IV interposed no objections to enlistments in Germany (he was to propose a pilgrimage himself two years later), and some of his adherents were among those who now took the cross. One small band was led by Conrad, called Henry's constable but otherwise unidentified. There was a second and much larger army. Chroniclers speak of recruits from all the duchies, but most of the persons actually named were from Bavaria and its marches. The ranking layman was Welf IV of Bavaria. The old duke had fought first for Henry IV, then on the papal side, but had latterly made his peace with the emperor and now had determined to go to Jerusalem in expiation of his sins. He was accompanied by Ida of Austria, widow of Leopold II and mother of the ruling margrave, Leopold III; by count Frederick of Bogen and the burgrave Henry of Regensburg; and by one Bernhard, sometimes identified as count of Scheyern. Among the many clergy attached to the army were archbishop Thiemo of Salzburg, bishop Ulrich of Passau, abbot Giselbert of Admont, and, fortunately for us, the historian Ekkehard of Aura.19

Welf's army was accounted large by contemporaries. So for that matter were the forces raised at the same time in other lands.

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19 Albert of Aix, VIII, vi (p. 562), and VIII, xxxiv (p. 579); Ekkehard, ix (pp. 109-113), and xxii (p. 227); Historia Welorum Weingarensis, xiii (MGH, SS., III), p. 13; G. M. Knonau, "Jahrbücher ..., Heinrich IV und Heinrich V" (7 vols., Leipzig, 1890-1909), V, 134-136; S. Riesler, Geschichte Bayerns (Gotha, 1878), I, 560-562.
The medieval man had many virtues, but accuracy in statistics was not one of them. No scholar today accepts the huge figures cited by the chroniclers. Some have made ingenious attempts to scale such numbers down to a more reasonable estimate, but this author is skeptical of the utility of such an exercise, at least in the case of the armies of 1101. Not only are the grand totals fantastically large; even in dealing with small groups where one might expect some semblance of accuracy the chroniclers too often use symbolic numbers such as 700. Albert of Aix says that Conrad's band numbered 2,000 and that of William of Nevers 15,000. The absence of other important magnates in either force would suggest, as Albert is saying, that these groups were smaller than the other armies, but there is no reason to suppose that the sizes varied in proportion to his figures. Indirect evidence in the sources — rather than the numbers cited — and the population of the several areas drawn from seem to indicate that the Lombard and Aquitanian armies were the two largest to set out. Ekkehard thought that the total forces were almost as great as those of 1096, Guibert of Nogent that they were quite as large. A rough comparison of the status of the leaders in each case makes either estimate sound reasonable; unfortunately we do not know how many went out in 1096. On one point the sources were in complete agreement — that in each of the bands in 1101 there were too many noncombatants. In spite of the advice of experienced crusaders and contrary to papal decree, the fighting men were accompanied by many women of varying degrees of honesty and by children. The clergy who went along may have served a more useful military purpose, but they were too numerous.

On the whole the crusaders seem to have been adequately provided with funds; at least they were able to purchase supplies wherever a normal market existed and they still had rich treasures when defeated in Asia Minor. Financing was done partly by the individual pilgrim, partly by aid from the wealthy leaders. Other prelates probably followed the practice of Anselm of Milan and Hugh of Lyons in exacting a subsidy from their clergy. For most

14 Ekkehard, xxii (p. 221); Guibert of Nogent, VII, xxiii (p. 243). The figures cited for the Crusade of 1101 are as follows. Albert of Aix: Lombards, 30,000; Lombards and northern Franks, 260,000, of whom 60,000 were slain in the battle that almost annihilated the army; Aquitanians and Bavarians, 160,000; Nivernais, 15,000; Conrad's Germans, 2000. Ekkehard: Lombards, 50,000; Aquitanians and Bavarians, 160,000; total forces, 300,000. Anna Comnena: Lombards and northern Franks, 50,000 cavalry, 100,000 infantry. William of Malmesbury: Aquitanians and northern Franks, 60,000 cavalry, more than that number of infantry. Ordericus Vitalis: Aquitanians, 300,000 departed, but when joined by other Franks and Lombards, only 50,000. Fulcher of Chartres: 100,000 killed in Asia Minor. Ibn-al-Athir, 300,000 in Christian army.
laymen it was a matter of raising money from their estates. William IX, balked in his plan to borrow from William Rufus, was said to have given up his questionable title to Toulouse in return for a lump sum. Odo Arpin sold his vicomté of Bourges to Philip I for an alleged sum of 60,000 solidi in one of the first permanent accretions to the royal domain.\(^{15}\) The cartularies, which are the richest mine for this sort of information, show how large a part the monasteries played in financing this crusade, as men sold or hypothecated, under terms that seem not disadvantageous to the abbey, a field or vineyard here, an alld or meadow there. The charters tell too of pious donations made on the eve of departure and they sometimes add a bit of precise detail to enliven the dry narrative of the chronicles.\(^{16}\)

There is no record to show that Paschal had a general plan for the crusade. There was some effort to coördinate the movements of the several armies, and for that he may have been responsible. As in 1096 there was no single layman to command the hosts; there was not even the unity furnished by Adhémar of Le Puy, for Hugh of Lyons, Paschal’s legate to Asia, seems to have reached Jerusalem without traveling with any of the large bands. But the various leaders operated according to a plan based on that of the First Crusade, whether by papal direction or by common knowledge of what had happened before. They knew something of the intentions of each other and in some instances planned a rendezvous along the route through eastern Europe; all expected to gather in Constantinople before beginning the trek across Asia Minor.

The Lombards, first to muster, were first to leave, departing from Milan on September 13, 1100. They marched northeastward, crossing Carinthia with permission of the duke, Henry of Eppenstein, and passed peacefully through Hungary, probably down the Sava to join Godfrey’s earlier path at Belgrade. On entering Bulgaria, the Lombards sent messengers to Alexius, requesting market privileges as they traversed his realm, and this, subject to good behavior, the emperor granted. He specified as open markets the


\(^{16}\) These are too numerous to cite in full, but for interesting examples see the following: Das Saalbuchs des Benediktiner-Stiftes Gottweig (Fontes rerum Austriacarum, II, Abt. VIII), pp. 14–15; T. Mayer, “Einige Bemerkungen über die Familie der Stifter von Seitenstetten,” Archiv für österreichische Geschichte, XXI (1859), 372; Codices traditionum ecclesiae Patavensis, no. XLVI; Monumenta Boica, XXIX, iii; Recueil des chartes de l’abbaye de Cluny, V, no 3737.
following towns: Roussa (Keshan), Panidos, Demotika (Didymoteikhon), Philippopolis (Plovdiv), Adrianople (Edirne), Rodosto (Tekirdagh), Selymbria (Silivri), and a place called “Natura”. The crusaders wintered in Bulgaria; in spite of their agreement with Alexius they began to pillage. They seized cattle and fowl without paying for them — a not unusual practice for soldiers whether in friendly or enemy territory — and they compounded their felony by eating the meat in Lent and on fast days. They turned then to graver crimes, violating Greek shrines and committing sordid atrocities. These disorders were at least in part the work of camp-followers and without the sanction of the Lombard leaders; when Alexius learned of the misdeeds, he ordered the Lombards to proceed to Constantinople directly, and the leaders obeyed.\(^{17}\)

The army arrived at the capital late in February or early in March and by imperial command pitched camp outside the city on the Arm of St. George. There they remained for two months, awaiting reinforcements from Germany and France. Again the Lombards began to pillage and Alexius attempted, as he had in 1096–1097, to move his guests across the strait where they might stay in safety at Civetot (Cibotus) or “Rufinel” until joined by the other bands. When the Italians refused to move, Alexius cut off their market privileges and after three days of hunger they armed themselves and attacked the imperial palace of Blachernae, where they killed a young kinsman of the emperor and a pet lion — an act that was responsible for Ordericus Vitalis’s quaint belief that Alexius had a bodyguard of lions. Embarrassed by this violence, Anselm, Albert of Biandrate, and other leaders rounded up the rioters — who included knights as well as common folk — and got them back to camp. The leaders then went to Alexius and, having cleared themselves of guilt by an oath, attempted to assuage his wrath. The emperor still insisted on ferrying the crusaders across the strait and resorted to his usual practice of reinforcing his requests with rich gifts, which only Anselm refused. Eventually concord was reached, partly through the good offices of Raymond of St. Gilles, count of Toulouse.

Count Raymond had left the Holy Land in August 1099 after the capture of Jerusalem and the subsequent victory at Ascalon. His Provençal troops were anxious to return to their homes, and Raymond himself was far from happy over the installation of

\(^{17}\) Albert of Aix, VIII, i–iii (pp. 559–560); Ekkehard, xxiii, p. 227; Notae S. Mariæ Mediolanensis (MGH, SS., XVIII), p. 386 (giving the date of departure).
Godfrey as Advocate of the Holy Sepulcher. He had come to Constantinople from Latakia in the summer of 1100 and was now a firm ally of the emperor. Indeed, as preceding chapters have indicated, Raymond had always favored a close association with Alexius. A more recent bond between them was their dislike of Bohemond, who had thwarted them both.

Thus it was that amid mutual promises of peace, Alexius restored to the crusaders the right of buying supplies and a few days after Easter (April 21) the army crossed the Bosporus and camped at Nicomedia. There they were joined by the German band led by Conrad, who had brought his troops through Greek lands without serious trouble and, after a favorable reception by Alexius, had crossed into Asia Minor. Much larger reinforcements arrived from France, the forces led by Stephen of Blois and those from Burgundy. Apparently they had left home early in the spring, but of their march to Constantinople we know nothing. At the request of the crusaders, Alexius gave them Raymond of Toulouse and the Greek general Tsitas as advisers and a force of mounted native auxiliaries known as Turcopoles—estimated at five hundred—to serve as guides. The European reinforcements came in May; and early in June the host moved out.

Stephen of Blois and other men of experience proposed to follow the familiar route along which they had marched in 1097. The Lombards had other ideas. At Constantinople they had learned of the capture of Bohemond the previous summer by Malik-Ghazi ibn-Danishmend, the Turkish emir of Sebastia (Sivas), who now held him at Pontic Neocaesarea (Niksar). They were determined to invade Pontus or, as they called it, “Khorassan,” to release Bohemond and perhaps conquer that land. Stephen, Raymond, and Alexius tried to dissuade the Lombards from this foolish diversion, but in vain; rather than split the host, in which the Italians constituted the most numerous force, the French magnates finally acquiesced.

The crusaders left Nicomedia early in June with Raymond and the Turcopoles in the van. Provisions were plentiful, discipline lax. On June 23 they came through the mountains to attack Ankara. After almost wiping out the Turkish garrison they re-

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18 See above, chapters VIII, IX, and X.
19 Albert of Aix, VIII, ii–vi (pp. 560–563); Ekkehard, xxiii, (p. 227); Anna Comnena, (RHC, Grecs, I) pp. 70–71; Ordericus Vitalis, X, xix (IV, 120–124); Ordericus Vitalis, who shows throughout a curious and garbled affinity with Albert, puts the Aquitanian army with the Lombards in these incidents. H. Hagenmeyer, “Chronologie de l’histoire du royaume de Jérusalem,” ROL, IX (1902), no. 573, p. 437, dates the crossing at “about” June 3.
stored the town to the Greeks in accordance with the oath which Alexius usually exacted from western princes. Turning northeasterward, the crusaders came to Gangra (Chankir); they found the fortifications too strong to storm and had to content themselves with burning the crops in the neighborhood. From this point on, the westerners were constantly harassed by the soldiers of Kilij (or Kilâch) Arslan, the Selçukid sultan of Rûm.  

When the Turks began to cut off stragglers, the Christian leaders set a vanguard of Franks and a rear guard of Lombards. The latter broke under a sudden attack and permitted the mounted Turkish archers to slaughter many of the road-weary pilgrims. The rear guard then became the post of honor with the several leaders rotating in command there. First the Burgundians, then Raymond’s Provençals and Turcopoles, performed more creditably in that assignment than had the Italians, and by tightening up their line of march the crusaders were able to go forward without excessive losses.

It is impossible to reconstruct from the sources the exact route followed. From Gangra the direct way to Neocaesarea went eastward across the Halys (Kizil) river and through Amasya. But Albert reports that after the crusaders had passed several towns and castles which he could not identify, Raymond was bribed by the Turks to lead them astray and that thereafter the way led through wilderness and desert. The Christians now began to suffer from shortages of food. There was no lack of money but they found no markets, and only those wealthy persons who had brought provisions by cart from Nicomedia or Civetot had plenty. Lesser folk had to forage, a difficult way of life, what with the rough country and the even rougher Turks. By Albert’s account the army had gone far north of the road to Neocaesarea—at least he shows one large body of footmen searching for food in the vicinity of Kastamonu. Intent on gathering young barley (in the grain but not yet ripe in July) and crabapples, the Christians were trapped in a valley and burned to death in a great brush fire.

20 The account that follows in the next few paragraphs derives chiefly from Albert of Aix, VIII, vii–xxi (pp. 562–577), and Anna Comnena (RHC, Greeks, 1), pp. 70–72. Most of the other sources tend to confuse this battle with the defeat of the other Christian armies. See, for example: Fulcher of Chartres, II, xvi (pp. 430–432); Ordericus Vitalis, X, xix (IV, 125–128); Guibert of Nogent, VII, xxiv (pp. 243–245); Ibn-al-Athir, p. 203; Matthew of Edessa, xxii (pp. 56–57). Hagenmeyer’s date of August 5 is logically derived but by no means certain (“Chronologie … du royaume de Jérusalem,” no. 586). On the geography of this campaign, see W. Tomaschek, “Zur historischen Topographie von Kleinasië im Mittelalter,” Sitzungsberichte der kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, philos.-hist. Classe, XXIV (1891), 87–88, and Kugler, Albert von Aachen, pp. 313–314.
The news of this slaughter frightened the crusaders; having been a fortnight on the march from Gangra they turned back to the road toward Neocaesarea. After crossing the Halys they came to a town inhabited by Greek Christians. These the westerners allegedly slew in a senseless massacre. Six days after the ambush below Kastamonu the army debouched from the mountains of Paphlagonia and camped on a plain below. Here for the first time they met the main Turkish army, comprising troops of Malik-Ghāzī of Sebastia, Rīdvan of Aleppo, and Karaja of Harran. It had been the internal dissension among the Selçukid sultans and the local emirs that had made possible the success of the First Crusade; now the cooperation between the Moslem princes of Anatolia was the undoing of the Christians.

Albert of Aix's detailed account of the fighting thereafter has an epic quality that may derive from a source more literary than the tales of survivors that he cites; his details are suspect, but the general picture receives some corroboration from Anna Comnena. The battle lasted several days during the early part of August. On the first day the Turkish horsemen surrounded the camp, yelling horribly after their fashion and shooting at the Christians with their bows of horn and bone. By holding together compactly the crusaders repulsed this assault. Next day a very large foraging party under the German Conrad and his nephew Bruno attacked and seized a Turkish stronghold in the neighborhood of Mersivan (Merzifon), taking what victuals and plunder they found, but they were trapped during their return to camp and lost all their spoils and many men. On the morrow both armies rested; Albert says it was Sunday and one may marvel at this curious observance of the Truce of God.

On Monday the archbishop of Milan preached to the whole crusading host, exhibiting a relic of St. Ambrose and the "Holy Lance" which Raymond had brought along, and exhorting the multitude to confess. The army was then ordered in five "battles": the Burgundians, Raymond and his troops, the Germans, the western Franks, and the Lombards. The Lombards, placed in the van, were driven back after heavy fighting and so in sequence were the Germans, Burgundians, and French. Toward dusk Raymond took refuge on a crag whence he in turn was rescued by Stephen and Conrad.

The Christians had sustained heavy losses and the day had certainly gone to the Turks, but the latter had suffered too and the issue was still in balance as each force settled in camp for the
night. Then panic struck among the crusaders. According to Albert it was Raymond who began the flight; Anna Comnena says the other leaders first sought from Raymond and Tsitas the location of some imperial stronghold whither they could flee. Regardless of who ran first, the flight became general as the horsemen rode off leaving behind their women and children and the infantry. The nonchalance with which the knights deserted their ladies in this and subsequent battles (without serious chiding from the chroniclers) is a sad commentary on the practices, as opposed to the theories, of chivalry.

The Turks, learning during the night of the stampede, swarmed into the crusaders’ camp at dawn. There was a wild scene of rape and carnage. Some of the handsomer women and youths were saved for the slave market and the rest were killed. Then the tents were looted. After these important preliminaries the Turks went in pursuit of the broken army. The footmen they cut down like ripe grain. One small band held together and fought its way to Byzantine territory, but most of the Christians perished in the battle or the rout. Albert lists a number of knights killed: Baldwin of Grandpré, Dodo of Clermont, Walbert of Laon, Eraldus and Enguerrand of Châlons-sur-Marne, Arnulf, and Walter of Châtillon. These were all from northern France; presumably the other contingents suffered equally.

Many of the magnates escaped, however. Raymond fled northward to the Black Sea port of Bafrá and thence to Sinope where he embarked for Constantinople. Stephen of Burgundy, Stephen of Blois, Guy of Rochefort, Hugh Bardulf, Anselm, the bishops of Laon and Soissons, and others made their way to Sinope. With such followers as they could round up, they then returned overland to Constantinople. There they were received in kindly fashion by Alexius, who tried to make good their losses by his gifts and an offer to support them until they could continue their pilgrimage. The archbishop of Milan, worn out by the campaign, died on September 30 and was buried at Constantinople.\(^{21}\)

Most of the western sources, written in an atmosphere unfriendly toward the Greeks, accuse Alexius of complicity in the defeat near Mersivan. This charge will be examined later in the context of similar disasters to the other armies of 1101. Here it is appropriate to note that Albert, like other authors, links Ray-

\(^{21}\) Albert of Aix, VIII, xxii–xxiv (pp. 573–574); Anna Comnena (RHC, Greeks, I), p. 73.

The date for Anselm’s death is given in Catalogus archiepiscoporum Mediolanensium (MGH, SS., VIII), p. 105.
mond with the basileus in his alleged act of perfidy. But Albert is not consistent. He shows the emperor and Raymond opposing the Lombards in their mad diversion toward Pontus, and Raymond fighting valiantly against the Turks even after his alleged agreement with them. His flight was no more disgraceful than that of the other magnates, yet Albert shows the emperor upbraiding Raymond for having deserted his companions. There is no real evidence of a plot on the part of the emperor or his Provençal ally. The crusaders were defeated because of their own willful stupidity.

Meanwhile other crusading forces had passed through Constantinople. That led by William of Nevers poses a peculiar problem. Among the chroniclers it is only Albert of Aix who treats the Nivernais as a separate army, and for want of substantiating evidence some scholars have supposed that they went out with either the Burgundians or the Poitevins. But most of the chroniclers tend to confuse the various contingents, sometimes to the extent of joining them all into one huge force; even Ekkehard knew little about the armies after they entered Asia Minor. Albert’s account on the contrary is circumstantial and consistent enough to warrant some credence.

A charter to Molesme indicates that William of Nevers was preparing to set out for Jerusalem on January 30, 1101, and he probably left soon after. He led his troops down through Italy to Brindisi and crossed to Avlona. The way then was by Thessalonica, the same that Bohemond had followed in 1096. William’s army maintained excellent discipline and received decent treatment from the natives. The emperor received the crusaders with kindness, giving them a camp site on the Arm of St. George, but after three days insisted that they cross the strait. On the Asiatic shore they camped for a fortnight while William was in daily attendance upon Alexius.23

By Albert’s chronology, the Nivernais had arrived toward the middle of June — about the 14th by Hagenmeyer’s reckoning. At that time the German and Poitevin bands had already begun to assemble at Constantinople, and it would have been natural for William to have joined forces with them. Instead, shortly after June 24, he led his troops to Civetot and then hurried on in an attempt to overtake the Lombard-Frankish army. By the time he reached Ankara William had found that effort hopeless and after

23 Cartulaire de l’abbaye de Molesme, II, 40–43; Albert of Aix, VIII, xxy–xxvi (pp. 574–575); Le Blanc, Recherches historiques et statistiques sur Auxerre (Auxerre, 1830), I, 147–153; Hagenmeyer, “Chronologie ... du royaume de Jérusalem,” no. 574.
a day’s stop turned south toward Iconium (Konya), where he
might await reinforcements. While on this leg of the journey his
army was attacked by Turks, perhaps local troops rather than
(as Albert says) the victors from Mersivan. After a running fight
of three days the Nivernais arrived in mid-August at Iconium,
where they found the citadel so strongly garrisoned by Turks that
attempts to storm the wall failed. The army moved on to Heraclea
(Ereghli, east of Iconium) which the enemy had deserted after
destroying all sources of water supply. When the Christians had
been weakened by several days of thirst, the Turks surrounded
them and attacked in force. After a vain defense the Frankish
cavalry broke and fled, leaving the infantry and noncombatants
to be slain or captured. As at Mersivan, many women were carried
off as slaves. William, with his brother and a standard-bearer, Wil-
liam of Modena, led a small group of knights in flight southwest-
ward to Ermenek. There he hired some imperial Turcopoles to
guide the party to Antioch, but the guides proved faithless, rob-
b ing the pilgrims and leaving them naked and afoot in the wilder-
ness.23

Eventually the unhappy pilgrims found their way to Antioch,
where Tancred was ruling in Bohemond’s stead. Tancred made
good part of their losses and entertained William at his court for
a while. The count stayed on at Antioch through the winter,
gathering other fugitives who like himself wished to go on to
Jerusalem in the spring. By that time their number had been swel-
ed by the remnants of a third defeated army.

The Aquitani ans under William IX had left home in the sec-
ond week in Lent, March 12–19, and marched overland, apparent-
ly through northern Italy and Carinthia. Somewhere along the
route they joined the main Bavarian army led by Welf IV, which
had set out about April 1, and the combined forces went together
peacefully through Hungary. In Bulgaria, which they entered
ey early in May, the westerners were greeted by friendly messengers
from Alexius, but they were also dogged by his mounted merce-
naries, Pechenegs and Kumans. Ekkehard of Aura, travelling
with a German group in the wake of Welf’s army, complained of
attacks by these soldiers; this was no more than retribution for
the misdeeds of those crusaders who had preceded him. The
Poitevins, an “unrestrained and incorrigible people,” got into a
fight with some Bulgarians and injured their leader, Guzh. Ac-

23 Albert of Aix, VIII, xxvii–xxviii (pp. 575–578).
cordingly, when the crusaders reached Adrianople and wished to enter, they found the long bridge leading into the city blocked by Guz and his troops. The Poitevins attacked, firing the suburbs and attempting to push across the bridge. Ralph of Saintonge, a relative of William's, was killed, Ardouin of St. Médard and others were captured. But Guz was taken by the Poitevins and after some parley peace was restored and prisoners were exchanged.24

Relations between the crusaders and the Byzantines seem to have been improved by the blood-letting. Guz allowed the westerners to enter Adrianople and buy supplies, and he furnished an escort which led them to Constantinople without further difficulty.

The main army reached the capital about the beginning of June and was augmented during the next fortnight by the daily arrival of new troops. Alexius received the princes as "sons" and showered them with gifts, but he also exacted from them an oath of fealty similar to that sworn by the crusaders in 1097. Several of the chroniclers picture William IX as a haughty young duke who refused to take the oath and offered gratuitous insults to the emperor, but there is no evidence of any disorders. Alexius distributed money among the lesser folk and made markets available to all, but he also hurried the pilgrims across the straits. The stay in the environs of Constantinople dragged on for five weeks while the pilgrims purchased supplies for the journey and the leaders met in daily council with Alexius. It was probably during this long halt that William of Nevers passed through the capital and his failure to unite with the Poitevins and Bavarians can perhaps be explained by their inordinate delay.25

Nor was William's the only band to go on alone. During their long halt the Germans — probably the rank and file rather than the princes — became suspicious of Alexius. They had heard no news of the Lombards, but they suspected — wrongly — that the Greek had forced the crusaders into enemy territory before the arrival of reinforcements; now the Germans began to fear that Alexius was preparing to betray them to the Turks. The pilgrims were seized with panic. Some sold their horses and bought passage

24 Albert of Aix, VIII, xxxiv—xxxvi (pp. 579–580); Ekkehard, xxii—xxiii (pp. 226–232); Historia Welforum Wengartensis, p. 462. The date of William IX's departure is accepted from Chronica prioratus de casa Vicecomitis, ad ann. 1101, p. 347, in preference to William of Malmesbury's erroneous estimate of September. Cf. Cesta regum, IV, 283 (II, 447). On the German departure, see Hagemeyer, "Chronologie ... du royaume de Jérusalem," no. 548.

25 Matthew of Edessa, xxii (pp. 58–59); Ordericus Vitalis, X, xix (IV, 123); Guibert of Nogent, VII, xxiii (p. 243); William of Malmesbury, IV, 383 (II, 447–448); Narratio Floriacensis de capitis Antiocha et Hierosolyma (RHC, Occ., V), p. 360.
on ships bound for the Holy Land. When warned that Alexius could destroy them at sea as well as on land, many who had already boarded ship debarked and refitted themselves, at great loss, for the overland trip. Ekkehard describes, with evident emotion, the terrible confusion as the German army, already less numerous than the Aquitanian, split into two groups. He himself, after much wavering, elected to go by sea with a sizeable party and arrived safely at Jaffa after a voyage of six weeks.26

The more important German leaders and a majority of their followers chose to march on with the French. The combined forces left about the middle of July, having accepted from Alexius a band of Turcopole guides. According to Ekkehard, who now is dependent like Albert on reports from survivors, the army then turned away from the southeasterly road through Rüm and marched east toward Pontus. This was what William of Nevers had done shortly before and like him William IX and Welf were perhaps hoping to join the Lombards. Albert mentions no such deviation from the main military road to Syria. He shows the crusaders marching by way of Nicomedia and Nicaea, and thence to Philomelium (Akshehir), which they destroyed. The early part of the journey was pleasant enough, but after entering enemy territory the Christians began to suffer. The provisions they brought from the coast ran short; the Turks burned the ripe grain and ruined cisterns, wells, and springs. Squadrons of Turkish cavalry punished them in harassing attacks without risking a pitched battle. Passing Iconium, the crusaders destroyed Salamia (Ismil), then headed for Heraclea, early in September.

Near that city they came to a river where they hoped to slake their thirst. But Kılıj Arslan and his allies lay in ambush among the growth along the other bank and just as the Christians drew near the water the Turks loosed a volley of arrows and charged. Caught by surprise and weakened by hunger and thirst, the crusaders could not stand up to the fierce assault. After a desperate stand in the marshy land along the river (where their heavy equipment must have been a hindrance) the army dissolved. Some crusaders tried vainly to hide in the marsh grass, some escaped by following the stream up to its source, and others fled into the mountains. Most of the Christians were either killed or enslaved.27

26 Ekkehard, xxiv (pp. 235–239).
27 Ibid., xxv–xxvi (pp. 239–253); Albert of Aix, VIII, xxxvii–xxxviii (pp. 580–581); Narratio Floriacensis (RHC, Occ. V), p. 361; Matthew of Edessa, xxii–xxiii (pp. 59–61); Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, pp. 74–75; Bartolf of Nangis, lvi–lvii (pp. 532–533). Kugler, Albert von Aachen, pp. 312–313, 332, explains satisfactorily Albert’s apparent mistake in the
Among the many women reported to have been carried off into captivity were Corba, wife of Geoffrey Burel, and Ida of Austria. Albert was not certain whether Ida had been captured or killed, but others came to believe that she had lived on in the harem of a Moslem prince to whom she bore a famous son, Zengi. This is an early instance of what was to become a conventional literary theme; it is matched in interest — and lack of credibility — by the legend of Thiemo of Salzburg. The archbishop was carried off by a Turkish emir and being a metal worker of sorts, he was commanded to repair a certain "Mohammedan idol". When the idol began to speak blasphemously, Thiemo broke it and for this he was martyred.\footnote{For Corba, see Gesta Ambaziensium dominorum, p. 103. For Ida, see Albert of Aix, VIII, xxxix (p. 581), and Historia Welforum Weingartensis, p. 462. For Thiemo, see Passio Thiemonis archiepiscopi (MGH, SS., XXI), p. 462. There are a number of versions of this story. See Riant, "Le Martyre de Thiemo de Salzbourg," Revue des questions historiques, XXXIX (1906), 218–237. Otto of Freising, who accepted the tradition in a general way, had the good sense to point out that the Moslems did not have idols. Cf. Chronic, VII, vii (ed. Hofmeister, pp. 316–317).}

As in the previous defeats, an undue proportion of those who escaped were leaders, perhaps because of their superior horses. The bishop of Auvergne, however, walked out. Welf got away by shedding arms and armor and riding through the mountains. Two of his counts, Bernhard and Henry of Regensburg, made their way to the coast. William IX fled with a single squire and reached Longiniada, the port for Tarsus, then ruled by Bernard the Stranger. Bernard treated them well. After a few days Tancred, learning of William's misfortunes, sent an escort of knights to conduct him to Antioch, where the duke was lavishly entertained. Less certain is the case of Hugh of Vermandois. He was wounded in the knee by an arrow, but escaped to Tarsus, where he died on October 18 and was buried in the church of St. Paul. The chroniclers tell of his reënlistment in France and of his death, but nothing of his activities on crusade. The context suggests that he was with William IX at Heraclea, but the record is none too clear.\footnote{Albert of Aix, VIII, xxxix-xl (pp. 581–582); Ekkehard, xxvi (p. 247); Matthew of Edessa, xxii (p. 61); Fulcher of Chartres, II, xvi (pp. 431–433); William of Tyre, X, xxiii (p. 418); Radulf of Caen, Gesta Tancredi, cv (p. 680); Guibert of Nogent, VII, xxiii (p. 243).}

With the disaster at Heraclea the military significance of the Crusade of 1101 vanishes. Remnants of the several bands continued their way to Jerusalem but in effect the crusade had become a pilgrimage. Ekkehard saw some of the survivors at Rhodes, Paphos, Jaffa and other ports. But for the magnates, with such follocation of the cities in question. Cf. Tomaseck, op. cit., p. 89. In the Chronica prioratus de casa Vicicomitis, p. 342, the battle site is identified as "valles Lampadarium". Matthew calls it the plain of Aulos.
lowers as they could muster, Antioch served as a new rendezvous. During the autumn and winter, stragglers who had fled overland from the defeats in southern Asia Minor were joined by those fugitives from the first army who had returned to Constantinople and had come on from there by ship to St. Simeon. By the end of February 1102 the newly formed band, which included Albert of Biandrate, Conrad, Stephen of Blois, Stephen of Burgundy, William of Aquitaine, Welf, Raymond of Toulouse, and a number of prelates, was ready to depart.30

Raymond’s welcome had been less than cordial. Landing at Longiniada, he had been seized by Bernard the Stranger and delivered to Tancred at Antioch. The charge was that Raymond had betrayed his comrades to the Turks; the real reason lay in the feud between Raymond and Bohemond, and the anxiety with which Tancred viewed Raymond’s arrival with a band of warriors and the backing of Alexius. The crusading princes interceded for Raymond as they had earlier at Constantinople, and the Latin patriarch, Bernard, added his pleas. Tancred then released his prisoner, first exacting from Raymond a solemn oath that he would not attack any territories between Antioch and Acre.

The crusaders, thanking Tancred for his kindness, marched southward with Raymond in their band. With the aid of a Genoese fleet they attacked Tortosa and after a short siege captured the city. Anxious to get on to Jerusalem, the pilgrims gave the city into the custody of Raymond, who remained there. If Albert’s description of the oath is accurate, this constituted an early breach of the agreement; perhaps the chronicler was wrong in believing that Tancred’s interest extended so far south as Acre. At any rate, Tortosa was to be the base for further operations on count Raymond’s part, leading ultimately to the foundation of the county of Tripoli.31

Duke Welf of Bavaria had avoided the siege, going to Jerusalem in the company of Reginald of Burgundy, the brother of count Stephen who had come out earlier. Reginald died on the journey, but Welf performed his devotions at the Holy Sepulcher. He then

30 Fulcher of Chartres, II, xvi (p. 433); Albert of Aix, VIII, xli (p. 582); Bartolff of Nangis, lvii (p. 532); Radulf of Caen, cxvii (p. 709). Albert puts the date “mense Martio inchoante”.
Hagenmeyer, “Chronologie ... du royaume de Jérusalem,” no. 529, puts it at “about February 10.”
31 Albert of Aix, VIII, xlii (p. 582); Matthew of Edessa, xxii (pp. 57, 58); Fulcher of Chartres, II, xvii (pp. 433–435); William of Tyre, X, xiii (p. 418); Caffaro, xxiii (p. 69). Albert says Bernard captured Raymond at St. Simeon, but this is evidently an error for Longiniada. See Cahen, La Syrie du nord à l’époque des croisades (Paris, 1940), pp. 232, note 10, and 233, note 12. On count Raymond and the establishment of the county of Tripoli, see below, chapter XII.
began the voyage home but died on the island of Cyprus and was buried at Paphos.\textsuperscript{32}

The other crusaders, leaving Tortosa, went by way of ‘Arqah, Tripoli, and Jubail. Near Beirut they were met by king Baldwin, who had waited there for eighteen days to escort them through a dangerous pass at the Dog river. This service was at the request of the pilgrims themselves; it was a measure of their failure that instead of bringing substantial aid to Baldwin they should now be dependent on his small army. After a joyous meeting the combined forces went on to Jaffa. They reached that port on March 23 to find that some crusaders had already arrived by ship. They stayed a week at Jaffa, celebrating Palm Sunday there on the 30th.

Next day they went on to Jerusalem, where they spent Holy Week in prayer and fasting. They were joined by two belated comrades, Conrad and bishop Ingelrand of Laon, and on Easter all united in celebrating the resurrection of the Lord. While offering thanks for their own safe arrival, the pilgrims persuaded Baldwin to negotiate with Alexius for better treatment of those who might follow in their steps.\textsuperscript{33}

Thus the pilgrims had released themselves from their vows and few felt any obligation to stay on. Soon after Easter the group began to break up, as individuals sought some way to return home. A number of them secured passage at Jaffa. William IX sailed from that port either for Europe, as seems more likely, or for Antioch where Albert says he was with Tancred in September. In either event he had arrived at Poitiers by October 29, 1102.\textsuperscript{34} Some were less fortunate, being held back by adverse winds. These rejoined Baldwin and during an Egyptian counter-attack in May they were drawn willy-nilly into the defense of the realm.

Baldwin, relying on faulty intelligence, underestimated the strength of the Egyptians as they marched from Ascalon toward Ramla. Without waiting for the considerable force available at Jaffa, he decided to attack with the small body of knights who were with him at Jerusalem. Among them were some survivors of

\textsuperscript{32} Albert of Aix, VIII, xliii (p. 583); Ekkehard, xxvi (pp. 249–250); \textit{Historia Welforum Weingartensis}, p. 462; \textit{Annales Augustanani} (MGH, SS., III), p. 135. Three brothers from the comital family of Burgundy died in the Holy Land during this year: Reginald, Stephen, and Hugh of Besançon. See the letter of pope Calixtus II, who was a fourth brother, cited in Mann, \textit{Lives of the Popes}, VIII, 144.

\textsuperscript{33} Fulcher of Chartres, II, xviii (p. 435); Albert of Aix, VIII, xlii–xlv (pp. 583–584); Bartolf of Nangis, lvii (p. 533); William of Tyre, X, xix (p. 428).

\textsuperscript{34} William of Tyre, X, xix (p. 428). The date of his presence in France is taken from J. Besly, \textit{Histoire des comtes de Poitou} (Paris, 1647), Preuves, p. 416. For William’s reputation thereafter, see Cate, “A Gay Crusader,” \textit{Byzantium}, XVI, 523–528.
the recent crusading armies: Stephen of Blois, Stephen of Burgundy, Hugh of Lusignan, Geoffrey of Vendôme, Conrad, and others. Stephen of Blois advised caution but his sound advice was flouted now as it had been earlier by the Lombards; his flight from Antioch had stamped him as a coward whose counsel was overly timid.

When Baldwin discovered the size of the Egyptian army it was too late to retreat. He and his knights charged impetuously and with some momentary success. But against tremendous odds they could do little more. Those who survived the first onslaught fled, some to Jaffa, Baldwin and others to Ramla. This was on May 17. That night Baldwin escaped and two days later reached Arsuf. The remnants of his band sought refuge in a tower in Ramla. The Egyptians broke into the city and attempted to fire the tower. After enduring heat and smoke for two days the Christians sallied forth to sell their lives as dearly as possible. After a desperate mêlée they were overwhelmed. Most of the knights were killed — Hugh of Lusignan, Miles of Bray, Geoffrey of Vendôme, and Stephen of Blois, whose death did something to brighten a tarnished reputation.\(^{35}\)

A few were carried off into Egypt as captives. Among these were Conrad, whose prowess had impressed the enemy, and Odo Arpin. They were kept at Cairo for three years and then released through the intercession of Alexius. Both returned to Europe, Conrad to serve his emperor again and Odo Arpin to enter Cluny in gratitude for his deliverance.\(^{86}\) From various bits of evidence we learn of the eventual return to Europe of other pilgrims: William of Nevers, who later refused to go on the Second Crusade in 1147; Hugh Bardulf; and a number of prelates — Hugh of Lyons and the bishops of Soissons and Laon. The only person of importance whom we know to have remained in the east was Joscelin of Courtenay, later to become count of Edessa.

Judged by any standards, the Crusade of 1101 had been a failure. Of the thousands who had marched eastward only a few hundreds reached Jerusalem; still fewer stayed on to give Baldwin the help he had hoped for. Their one achievement was the capture of Tortosa; their one battle for Baldwin, that at Ramla,

\(^{35}\) Fulcher of Chartres, II, xvii—xx (pp. 436–446); Albert of Aix, IX, i—vi (pp. 591–594); William of Tyre, X, xx—xxii (pp. 429–435); Bartholomew of Nangis, iviii (pp. 533–535), who gives judgment on Stephen; Ibn-al-Athir, A. H. 495, pp. 213–214; William of Malmesbury IV, 384 (II, 448–450); Ordericus Vitalis, X, xxxi (pp. 132–136).

\(^{86}\) Albert of Aix, IX, viii (p. 593), and X, xxxix (p. 649); Guibert of Nogent, VII, xxiv (p. 245); Ordericus Vitalis, X, xxii (pp. 137–139); Ibn-al-Athir, p. 214.
was a defeat. Chroniclers found this failure an unpleasant contrast to the marvelous success of the First Crusade, and they believed that the destruction of the armies of 1101 was God’s punishment for their manifest sins: their pride, their atrocities against fellow Christians, their wantonness. God’s agent, though an evil one, was the emperor Alexius.

Friction between the Latins and Greeks, rooted in ethnic and cultural differences, had been in evidence during the First Crusade. The antagonism had been sharpened in 1101, largely through the undisciplined actions of the crusaders and Alexius’s precautionary moves. Most of the western writers who describe the Crusade of 1101 accuse the basileus, either directly or indirectly, of betraying the armies of that year to the Turks. Those authors, writing at some remove from the events, were infected by the growing hostility to Alexius, the result partly of Bohemond’s propaganda in the west in 1106, partly of an earlier incident described by Albert of Aix. When the pilgrims at Jerusalem in April 1102 had asked Baldwin to negotiate with the emperor, the king had complied. He sent an embassy to Constantinople and in the conversations which followed Alexius cleared himself by oath of all charges and promised to deal kindly with future pilgrims. Among Baldwin’s ambassadors was a bishop whom Albert calls Manasses of “Barzenona”; his name first appears as one of the Italian prelates who survived the battle at Mersivan and reached Antioch early in 1102. Manasses was commissioned to exonerate Alexius before Paschal II on his return to Europe, but he became piqued over an imagined affront and at the Council of Benevento later in the year impeached rather than defended the emperor. The charges, Albert reports, were spread throughout Gaul. 37

Some of the sources that repeat those charges contain details so fanciful that they deserve no credence. Ekkehard, the only western author who was an eye-witness, knew of rumors of treachery but had no evidence. Albert of Aix repeats the charges in several places but tends to disprove them by other statements. He and other authors show that Alexius and Raymond, far from sending the first army off on a wild goose chase into Pontus, had pleaded with the leaders to go directly to Syria. These statements are corroborated by the emperor’s evident interests. His negotia-

37 Albert of Aix, VIII, xlii (p. 582), and VIII, xlv-xlvi (pp. 584-585). Albert speaks in the first citation of “Manases de Barzenona, alii quoque episcopi Italiae.” I cannot identify him. Certainly Albert does not mean Barcelona in Spain, whose bishop, Berengar, was then in his own see. Cf. D. S. Puig y Puig, Episcopologio de la sede Barcinonense (Barcelona, 1925), pp. 135-137; Runciman, Crusades, II, 35, note 1.
tions with the princes and the oaths he secured from them at considerable expense show clearly that he expected to profit by their fighting as he had by the victories of the earlier crusaders. He was not the man to destroy potential allies out of spite because of their disorders and insults, and certainly he was not the man to send them out to rescue his archenemy Bohemond.38

The failure of the crusade can be explained without making a traitor of Alexius. The crusaders had planned to meet at Constantinople, but the several armies missed the rendezvous by a very narrow margin of time; this was partly the result of their own behavior, partly a matter of chance. Separately they fell before a temporary alliance of Moslem princes; together they might have fought their way through to Syria. Perhaps they would not have been able to do so. Their leadership was poor, their knowledge of the enemy's territory and tactics slight. For any army so long a march through a rugged and skillfully defended area is a prodigious task that requires good organization, a sound system of logistics, and a bit of luck. The crusaders of 1101 had no organization, no system, no luck, and so they set a pattern of failure that was to be followed by those of 1147 and 1190. Of more immediate importance was their failure to reinforce the Latin kingdom. The newly established states of the crusaders were forced, therefore, to rely largely on their own resources for both defense and administration. These resources were very limited, and herein lies the major problem of the ensuing years.

38 For Alexius' character I have relied heavily on F. Chalandon, Essai sur le règne d'Aleixis 1er Comnène (Paris, 1900), especially chapter VII, which deals with the Crusade of 1101, and on his brief treatment in the Cambridge Medieval History, IV, chapter xi.