Some years ago, our late colleague John L. LaMonte remarked that modern crusading historiography has expanded notably in two directions.\(^1\) First, the chronological scope has been extended to include not only the background of the eleventh century and even earlier, but also what have sometimes been called the "later crusades" of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Second, there has been in recent years a more extensive consideration of those aspects of civilization in the eastern Mediterranean and its hinterland which affected both the launching of the crusades and the development of the Latin states. The present volume, the first in the series, illustrates both these tendencies. It is appropriate, for example, that it include a discussion of the manifold problems which confronted the government of Constantinople, the origins and consequences of the schism of 1054, and the stake of Byzantine diplomacy in the Near East. Equally significant are such matters as the history of the Selçukid Turks, the vicissitudes and divisions of the caliphate, and the major movements within Islam.

Within European Christendom two lines of development were to converge in the First Crusade: pilgrimage and the holy war. The first is the older of the two, indeed, nearly as old as Christianity. As the practice developed it received direction and ultimately became associated with the penitential system of the church. Deeply ingrained in western thinking, the idea of pilgrimage inspired even the most worldly of the crusaders. The Norman adventurer, Bohemond, did not assist his fellow warriors in the capture of Jerusalem because he was busy securing valuable territory elsewhere for himself. But he did fulfill his vow to visit the Holy Sepulcher later. In papal exhortations and in medieval narratives the crusade is a pilgrimage, the "way to Jerusalem". The notion that war against the infidel could be a holy thing is in Christian history a distinctively western development. The Byzantine emperor Heraclius, it is true, restored the Holy Cross to Jerusalem. And something resembling the crusade idea seems to

\(^1\) John L. LaMonte, "Some Problems in Crusading Historiography," *Speculum*, XV (1940), p. 60.
have animated the great military emperors of Byzantium in the
tenth century. Notwithstanding, Constantinople generally regard-
ed the Moslem states much as it had formerly regarded Persia.
They were established powers with whom it was necessary to deal.
War was often mandatory as an instrument of policy. But so also
was diplomacy; and the latter was preferable. Significantly it was
a western historian, William of Tyre, who commenced his narrative
of the crusade with Heraclius and the restoration of the Holy
Cross, and a continuation of William's story came to be known as
_L'Estoire de Eracles Empereur._

Perhaps western Europe with its inferior military and political
organization during the feudal age felt itself more endangered than
did Byzantium. For a long time it was vulnerable in Spain, in
Sicily, even occasionally on the southern Mediterranean littoral. But
clearly there was something more to the concept of holy war which
developed in the west than a heightened sense of urgency. Euro-
pean feudalism was an expansive thing. And it was belligerent.
Peace of God and Truce of God were of little avail. Equally futile
were ecclesiastical prohibitions of tournaments. As subsequent
pages will demonstrate, Italian merchants were not pacifists. Thus,
it would appear that war gradually came to be accepted as an
honorable occupation. By the eleventh century war against the
infidel was already regarded as in some way religious. Pope and
Italians launched a "crusade" against North African ports. Norman
expansion in Sicily received ecclesiastical approbation as, of course,
also did the Spanish reconquest. Therefore, when toward the end
of the eleventh century a great pope spoke to western knights
urging them to a new war against Islam, the astonishing response
represented everything that western feudal civilization had come
to be, all its energy, its religious zeal, its belligerence.

When the goal had been achieved some warriors elected to
remain in the east, and they and their successors faced the mani-
fold tasks of a "colonial" administration. Vastly inferior in num-
bers to the heterogeneous native population, they created in an
eastern environment a civilization which was fundamentally west-
ern. Ties with Europe were close. Pilgrims, fighting men, and
churchmen travelled back and forth. Italian merchants were pro-

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2 A significant discussion of the development of the holy war idea in western Christendom
is C. Erdmann, _Die Entstehung des Kreuzzugsgedankens_ (Stuttgart, 1935). For a review of the
equally significant subsequent discussion of "Erdmann's thesis" see M. W. Baldwin, "Some
Recent Interpretations of Pope Urban's Eastern Policy," _Catholic Historical Review_, XXV
(1940), 459-466, and A. C.Krey, "Urban's Crusade, Success or Failure?" _American Historical
Review_, LIII (1948), 255-259. The subject is also considered in chapter VII, below.
fitably established in all the major ports. Notwithstanding, these Europeans of the east, these "creoles", to use the expression of Rubió y Lluch, Grousset, and others, inevitably acquired something of the viewpoint of the eastern Mediterranean. Basically western and no less brave than their forbears, they nevertheless lost much of the crusading ardor of the men of 1095 or of those who came from Europe in later expeditions. A cleavage between "natives" and "newcomers" was evident in the middle of the twelfth century and was especially prominent during and after the Second Crusade.

Despite their more oriental attitude, western colonials were never able for long to act in concert with Byzantium. During the period covered in this volume there were, it is true, many apparently fruitful diplomatic exchanges, marriage alliances, and the like. But more than one favorable opportunity for increasing the military security of the Latin states or even of extending their frontiers was lost because Latin and Greek could not agree. By the end of the first century of the crusades little hope remained of healing the breach. It is difficult to overemphasize the significance of this failure. As much as any other single factor the break-down of the military alliance between Jerusalem and Byzantium underlies the ultimate loss of the crusaders' states. And the failure goes deeper. Western Europe's brilliant achievement in the middle ages, of which the crusades were a part, was not accomplished without the loss of its former eastern half. Although blame may be attached to both sides, certainly the crusades were an element in a schism whose consequences are felt to this day.

The present volume describes what might be called the classical period of the crusades. It carries the reader from the great surge of the eleventh century and the establishment of colonies to the Moslem counter-offensives of Zengi, Nur-ad-Din, and Saladin. The cultural and institutional history of the Latin states will be found in later volumes, as indicated by Professor Setton in the Foreword. Here, rather, is a narrative of war, diplomacy, and politics. It was precisely these matters which most interested contemporaries and which fill the pages of the chroniclers. Accordingly, the contributors to this volume are following in the footsteps of illustrious predecessors in presenting one more "continuation" of the crusade story. Moreover, like the crusaders themselves they are men of different national backgrounds who have joined together in a common enterprise.

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