Impressions and views of six months in the Soviet Zone of Germany and previously in the Soviet Union were described to Western correspondents by a 32-year-old Russian engineer after he recently sought political asylum in Western Germany. Eugeny Sergeyevich Volchansky, born in Leningrad and educated as a mechanical engineer, had progressed rapidly in his profession in his native city and in Odessa until he was offered in 1951 a job with the Soviet armed forces in Germany. Twice he refused but accepted the third time under pressure. After working six months in Germany where he directed the work of 150 East Germans, he decided to seek asylum in the West. At a press conference in Bad Godesberg July 15, he made the following statement.

Life in the Soviet Zone

By Eugeny Sergeyevich Volchansky

The East Germans lack any idealistic or nationalistic inducements to fight for Soviet Russia. Therefore, the Stalinists and their East German puppets are borrowing methods used by the Soviet Army: rigid discipline and mechanized minds will characterize the East German Army.

As for the principal reason behind the creation of the buffer zone between East and West Germany, I believe this was done to seal off East Germany to prevent young men from escaping conscription. This reason is far more likely than their announced one of preventing spies and agents from entering East Germany.

Soviet military and civilian workers in Germany are indoctrinated to believe that they are living in enemy territory among people who hate the Soviets and use every occasion to harm the Soviet Union. Every German is considered by the Soviets as a capitalist agent, and all connections between Soviet and German personnel, except those who have official contact, are strictly prohibited.

Were a policy of real friendship followed in Germany, the result would bring greater harm to the Soviets than the present isolation policy. Suppose that the Soviets allowed their people to mix freely with the Germans. Very soon the Russians would learn how far higher standards of living are in the West than in the Soviet Union. They would learn of the freedoms people enjoy, even now, in East Germany. Naturally, they would compare these features with their lives in the USSR, and the Soviets cannot afford comparisons. Were Soviet lies thoroughly exposed to Russians stationed in Germany there would definitely be a total spiritual disintegration among all ranks.

Another equally important reason why the Soviets bar Russian-German friendships is because those Germans who still believe that the Soviet system might bring improvements for the working classes would rapidly become disillusioned had they the opportunity to talk to Russians and learn of the incredibly difficult conditions in the Soviet Union and to hear of the worthlessness and the untold costs to the Russian people of the so-called "achievements" the Soviet regime has been able to make through the 35 years of its existence. All such believing Germans would soon become bitter enemies of the Soviet system.

Although I do not believe that there will be war for many years, since the idea of war is so completely repugnant to the Russian people, I believe that Russians would fight if they were convinced that they were again defending their homeland. And because the Soviets have the greatest propaganda apparatus known to man, it is highly conceivable that they could be so convinced.

Soviet leaders today do not concern themselves with the theory and practice of classic Communism. The false lures of achieving better conditions for humanity through Communism are employed now only to get sympathizers in foreign countries — the starry-eyed idealists, the miserable and oppressed, and the misguided dupes. The Russian people have had Communism for 35 years, and they are thoroughly fed up with it.

Stalin desires others to fight for his objectives. If he decides, however, that a favorable time for war has come, he will then use Soviet troops.

Any international dissension between Western nations, any apparent weakness in any individual nation is seized upon by the Soviets. Each possibility is thoroughly exploited for Soviet ends. If these dissensions ever become serious enough to give the Soviets the advantage, then war would erupt.

One deterrent to the Soviets’ starting a shooting war — and a very important one — is the fact that revolution within the USSR would be possible under war conditions. Today, revolution is unthinkable because of the entanglement of controls, exercised over the people. In wartime, a disturbed and resentful people would be able to liberate themselves upon receiving arms.

If the cold war lasts, and a hot war is averted, there is a long-range possibility that revolution without war can occur in the Soviet Union. This can only happen if the people can organize themselves, find adequate leadership, run frightful risks and arm themselves.

Meanwhile the Soviet authorities continue frantically to rearm and prepare for the favorable advantage that will allow them to wage aggressive war.”