POSTWAR EFFORTS TO UNIFY Germany may be divided into two general phases. The first encompassed the period 1945-48 in which German unification was sought on the basis of the economic and political principles of the Potsdam Agreement. These attempts came to a halt in 1948 with the imposition of the Berlin blockade and the breakdown of Four-Power control. The second phase is represented by the efforts during 1949 and 1950 to carry out the much more limited steps toward unification called for in the modus vivendi for Germany agreed upon at the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in 1949, and the Western Allied and West German initiative in 1951 and 1952 which culminated in the appointment by the General Assembly of the United Nations of a commission to investigate and determine whether conditions for free elections exist throughout Germany. This article deals primarily with the latter phase of developments relating to German unification.

At the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in May 1949, the delegations of the United States, France and the United Kingdom offered a proposal for restoring the political and economic unity of Germany. The Three-Power proposal called for the unification of Germany in accordance with the German Basic Law, which had been promulgated a short time before, by the making of appropriate arrangements enabling the states of the Soviet Zone to accede to it.

The proposal further stipulated a number of principles which would apply to such accession of the states of the Eastern zone, such as freedom of person, freedom of speech, freedom for all democratic political parties, freedom of elections, and the independence of the judiciary. In addition, the proposal provided for the prohibition of "all police formations exercising political activities." The proposal also included provisions for a Four-Power Occupation Statute with reserved powers, a quadrupartite High Commission operating with majority vote, an agreement prohibiting certain industries and restricting production in others, provision for the delivery of reparations, and the return to German ownership of industrial enterprises acquired after May 8, 1945.

THE SOVIET PROPOSAL for economic and political unity called for the re-establishment of the quadrupartite Allied Control Council on its former basis as the organ representing supreme authority in Germany, as well as the re-establishment of the Inter-Allied Kommandaturat. The Soviet proposal also provided for (a) the creation of an all-German State council on the basis of the economic organs existing at the time in the Eastern and Western zones of Germany and (b) the re-establishment of the Magistrat of Berlin.

No agreement was reached at the Paris meeting on the question of German unity.

Following the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Soviets intensified their propaganda campaign designed to convince the German people that the USSR and the Communist parties in East and West Germany were the only true proponents of German unification, the conclusion of a peace treaty, and the withdrawal of Occupation Forces. Through the persistent efforts of the "National Front" committees and the Soviet and Communist-controlled German press in both East and West Germany, the Soviets tried to keep the initiative on German unity. The Soviets have sought to gain popular support through appeals which follow the traditional lines of the policy of German-Russian friendship. Gustav Stresemann's idea of Germany as a bridge between East and West, and attempts at German-Russian cooperation during the Weimar Republic.

Faced with these developments and impressed by the necessity for restating the position of the Western Allies on the reunification issue, the US High Commissioner for Germany released a statement calling for the political reunification of Germany on the basis of free, all-German elections. Issued on Feb. 5, 1950, the McClory statement deplored the Soviet device of "the so-called National Front" as a "means to democratic unity" and decreed Soviet exploitation of the natural wish of the German people for unity while denying to them the free and democratic processes by which unity can be obtained. Mr. McClory also emphasized the readiness of the United States to "assist the German people to achieve unity based on true democratic principles and reflecting the aspirations of the entire German nation."

ON MARCH 22 the Federal Republic of Germany issued a statement which supported the US High Commissioner's proposal, and embodied a concrete program for the achievement of German unity. This program called for: (1) all-German elections for a national constituent assembly to be

This review is reprinted from the Department of State Bulletin of April 14 for the information of US personnel in Germany. The author, Henry B. Cox, is officer-in-charge, Division of German Information, Office of German Public Affairs, Department of State. He formerly served in the Office of German Political Affairs, where he specialized on German-Soviet policy. The text of the US note of March 10, as well as the press conference statement by Secretary Acheson of March 26, are from the April 7 issue of the Department of State Bulletin.
proclaimed following promulgation of an election law by the four Occupying Powers; (2) supervision of the elections to the National Assembly by election commissions established by the four power Occupation Powers or representatives of the United Nations; and (3) preparation by this assembly of a draft German constitution to be ratified or rejected in a free national referendum. To these proposals, the Bonn Government added four conditions which it considered as prerequisites for the conduct of free election. Public reaction to the Bonn offer was generally favorable in West Germany, but as expected, the response of the Soviet Zone government was to reject the Adenauer proposals.

On May 25, 1950, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, US commandant in Berlin, delivered a letter on behalf of the US High Commissioner for Germany to Gen. V. I. Chuikov, Soviet commandant for Berlin, on the question of German unity and all-German elections. The letter referred to the discussion of German unity by the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France and the United States, at their London meeting and attached the text of their conclusions on German unification and the manner in which it might be accomplished. The letter also made reference to the public communique released by the three Western foreign ministers on May 14 which stated that the Western Powers did not contemplate the conclusion of a separate peace treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany, in particular because such a move would involve continued partition of Germany — a concept with which the Western Powers did not wish to associate themselves.

The letter to General Chuikov further called attention to Paragraph I of the March 22 declaration of the Federal Republic suggesting that the four Occupation Powers should assume the responsibility for framing an electoral law under which all-German elections might be conducted. The US Government, the letter indicated, was prepared to engage in conversations on the High Commission level for the purpose of framing such an electoral law, pointing toward the formation of an all-German government "in conformity with the principles set forth in the attached statement of the foreign ministers."

No reply was ever made to this letter.

ADDRESSING THE BUNDESTAG (Federal Assembly) of the Federal Republic on Sept. 14, 1950, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer condemned the elections to be held in the Soviet Zone of Germany on Oct. 15 and referred again to the Federal Republic's March 22 proposals for holding all-German elections along democratic lines.

Immediately following Chancellor Adenauer's speech, the Bundestag passed a resolution calling upon the Federal Government to make a formal request to the Occupation Powers to arrange in their zones of occupation for the holding of "free, universal, secret and direct elections to an all-German parliament, under international control, and in which everyone will have an equal vote."

In accordance with the resolution of the Bundestag, the federal chancellor addressed separate letters to the four commissioners on Oct. 1, noting with satisfaction that the four governments taking part in the occupation of Germany had repeatedly expressed their willingness to strive toward the goal of the restoration of the political and governmental unity of Germany. Chancellor Adenauer stated that "the first and indispensable step to achieve this end is the convocation of a constituent German national assembly," and suggested the following measures to achieve this end:

(1) All-German elections to a national constituent assembly shall be announced following enactment of an electoral law by the four Occupying Powers.

(2) Elections to the national constituent assembly shall in all parts of Germany take place under the supervision of commissions composed of representatives of the four Occupying Powers or of representatives of the UN.

(3) The role of the national constituent assembly shall be the drafting of a German constitution. This draft constitution shall be submitted to the German people for approval.

In addition to the measures cited, the letter set forth certain guarantees of personal and political freedom of movement and activity as prerequisite for the holding of all-German elections.

AFTER CONSULTATION, THE US, UK and French high commissioners dispatched separate communications dated Oct. 9 to General Chuikov referring to their as yet unanswered letters of May 25 and enclosing copies of the Adenauer letter of Oct. 1, the Bundestag resolution of Sept. 14 and the Adenauer statement made in the Bundestag on the same date. The three high commissioners indicated their endorsement of the Federal Republic as a "government freely elected by the people" and "entitled to speak for Germany" and commended to the attention of General Chuikov and the Soviet Government the aforementioned documents as "pronouncements of the German people."

In conclusion the three Western Powers indicated that they shared the views of the Federal Republic on the Oct. 15 Soviet Zone elections and informed the Soviet Government that it must bear full responsibility for obstructing the accomplishment of the reunification of Germany in accordance with its obligations under Potsdam.

The next important development on the unity issue came with the release on Oct. 21 of the Prague communique at the conclusion of the meeting of Soviet and satellite foreign ministers. In brief, the communique referred to the Sept. 19 communique issued in New York by the three Western foreign ministers and charged that the chief concern of the New York meeting was "the question of re-creating the German army, the question of the remilitarization of Western Germany."

The communique also charged that the question of ending the state of war with Germany was being brought up "in order to postpone as long as possible the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and thus the unification of Germany." In conclusion the Eastern-
foreign ministers stated that they regarded it as an immediate necessity that —

Firstly, the United States, British, French and the Soviet Governments should publish a declaration that they will not permit the remilitarization of Germany or its inclusion in any sort of aggressive plans, and that they will definitely endeavor to see that the Potsdam Agreement regarding the creation of prerequisites for the formation of a united, peace-loving, democratic German state is really carried out;

Secondly, all restrictions that are obstructing the development of peacetime German economy be removed, and the restoration of German war potential not be permitted;

Thirdly, a peace treaty with Germany be forthwith concluded, with a restoration of the unity of the German state in conformity with the Potsdam Agreement, and the occupation troops of all the great powers be withdrawn from Germany within a year of the conclusion of the peace treaty.

Fourthly, an all-German constituent council be formed from representatives of Eastern and Western Germany on the principle of parity, for the purpose of preparing the formation of provisional, democratic, peace-loving, all-German sovereign government, this council to submit the proper proposals for common approval by the Governments of the USSR, the United States, Great Britain and France, and, until such time as an all-German government is formed, to be included in discussions on the working out of a peace treaty. With regard to this proposal, the German people may, under given circumstances, be consulted directly.

On their side, the Governments of the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Hungary and the German Democratic Republic will do everything possible to facilitate the solution of the immediate tasks in the interest of consolidating peace and international security.

THE PRAGUE MEETING, convened for the announced purpose of discussing "the remilitarization of West Germany," followed closely on the heels of the delivery on Oct. 19 of a Soviet note rejecting the protest made by the three Western Powers the preceding May against the existence in the Soviet Zone of paramilitary police. In their reply, the Soviets charged that the Western Powers themselves were engaged in establishing a German army and concluded by stating that "the USSR will not tolerate such measures."

As a logical follow-up to the Prague conference, the Soviets delivered notes to the US, UK and French Governments on Nov. 3, enclosing copies of the Prague communiqué and calling for a Four-Power meeting to discuss the demilitarization provisions of the Potsdam Agreement. The Western Allied reply and the Soviet note of Dec. 31 then followed.

Meanwhile, on Dec. 1, Otto Grotewohl, premier of the "German Democratic Republic," had a letter delivered to Chancellor Adenauer at Bonn. Referring to the "national emergency brought about by the division of Germany, which is accentuated by the remilitarization and inclusion of West Germany in plans for preparation for war" and citing the need for a German solution to the treaty contained in the note of the United States Government of March 13.

The Soviet note has led the United States to reaffirm in its reply its policies toward Germany and Europe. The peace and prosperity of Europe demand that unity among its peoples shall supersede the play of national interests and national forces which have brought so much distress to the European Continent.

Certain aspects of Soviet policy pursued since the close of the war have strongly tended to accent the need for a rapid development of a close European community. The US Government has supported and will continue to support measures for the formation of a community in Europe designed to develop the economic strength and defensive capacity of the participating countries as a whole.

Germany must be allowed to play its part in building a strong European community capable of developing its freedoms and of defending itself from aggression or subversion. The US Government is convinced that such a community is entirely defensive in character and purpose.

The Soviet proposal, with its emphasis on national forces, points to the past and away from the establishment of a new Europe in which national rivalries would be subordinated to the interests of the entire area. The US Government firmly believes that the European approach represents the most constructive means of eliminating dangerous tensions. It has, accordingly, sought to make clear in its reply that it will not be deflected from pursuing this path of peace.

Statement by Secretary Dean Acheson

US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, at his press conference in Washington March 26, made the following statement concerning the US reply to the Soviet proposal.

I should like to anticipate your questions and speak for a moment on the reply to the Soviet note of March 10 on Germany which the representatives of the United States, United Kingdom and France in Moscow delivered yesterday to the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

One of the primary purposes of the reply is to seek clarification of Soviet intentions with respect to procedures and conditions which would permit all-German elections, under international supervision, and the establishment of a democratic and free Germany. The Soviet note has dealt with this subject in an unclear manner and all our efforts during the past several years to obtain Soviet acceptance of satisfactory procedures have been unsuccessful. As pointed out in our note, it has seemed to us that Soviet cooperation with the UN Commission of Investigation would be especially significant as a touchstone of Soviet intentions.

When the Soviet Union suggests that the four powers "discuss" a German peace treaty, the US Government cannot but be reminded of the seven fruitless years of discussions with Soviet representatives about an Austrian treaty. It would be an encouraging augury for any future discussion about a German treaty if the Soviet Government were to respond favorably to the proposals for an Austrian
German problem, Mr. Grotewohl proposed the formation of an all-German constituent council with participation on the basis of parity of representatives of East and West Germany.

This council would prepare the formation of an “all-German, sovereign, democratic and peace-loving provisional government” and would submit proposals to the Governments of the USSR, US, Great Britain and France for common ratification. At the same time it would consult with the named governments until the formation of an all-German government on the draft of a peace treaty. Mr. Grotewohl further suggested that a plebiscite of the German people on this proposal could be carried out.

On Jan. 15, 1951, Chancellor Adenauer replied to the Grotewohl letter by issuing a public statement. In brief, Chancellor Adenauer referred to the March 22, 1950, declaration of the Federal Republic which contained proposals for the achievement of German unity under conditions of freedom, pointed to the failure of the Soviets to respond to the Bundestag proposals for German unification forwarded to General Chuikov on Oct. 9, 1950, and stated clearly that the West German government could enter into talks on German unity “only with those who are prepared to recognize and guarantee without reserve a constitutional order, a free form of government, protection of civil rights and preservation of freedom.”

The Communist propaganda campaign on unity was continued when on Jan. 30, 1951, the People’s Chamber of the East German government passed a resolution addressing to the West German Bundestag, in which it indicated its willingness to conduct negotiations “concerning all questions connected with the creation and tasks of the all-German Constituent Council.”

The Federal Republic issued a statement on the same date indignantly rejecting the right claimed by the East German parliament to speak “in the name of true democracy and of the whole German people.” It further called upon the German people “not to allow themselves to be confused by actions of the kind contrived by the Soviet Zone government.”

Having decided that it would not reply directly to the People’s Chamber appeal, the Bundestag on March 9 passed a resolution which referred to “the contemplated conference of the four Occupation Powers” and called upon the Federal Government to submit to the Four Powers a petition for the preparation and execution of free, all-German elections. On the same date the Bundestag approved the text of a note addressed by Chancellor Adenauer to the Allied High Commission which echoed the Bundestag resolution, calling upon the Four Powers to arrange for all-German elections as soon as possible and stressing that genuinely free elections could only be held if “the indispensable freedoms” were guaranteed in the Soviet Zone.

In a speech before the People’s Chamber on March 4, 1951, East German Premier Grotewohl rejected the Federal Republic’s proposals for free, all-German elections and accused Mr. Adenauer of ignoring the will of the German people.

The next major development in East-West exchanges on the unity question resulted from the meeting of the foreign ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States which was held in Washington from Sept. 10 through Sept. 15, 1951. At the conclusion of this conference, the three ministers issued a communique in which they “noted with satisfaction the results already achieved by their three countries, together with the other free nations of the world, in order to insure their common security and to safeguard the peace.”

In addition, they indicated that they had agreed upon instructions to the Allied High Commission for Germany for the negotiation of mutually acceptable agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany, the effect of which will be to transform that relationship completely. In this connection they also referred to their hope that current negotiations with the Federal Republic would result in Allied-German agreement on a German contribution to Western defense.

Reacting quickly, East German Premier Grotewohl denounced the Western communique at a special session of the People’s Chamber on Sept. 15 as “a gross deception of the German people” which should not be allowed to succeed. Reflecting obvious Communist concern over the results of the Washington conference, Mr. Grotewohl declared: “What San Francisco achieved for Japan, Washington is to accomplish for Germany.”

On Sept. 27 Chancellor Adenauer replied indirectly to the Grotewohl People’s Chamber proposals in a speech before the Bundestag in which he stated that “the supreme aim of the policy of the Federal Government is and remains that of re-establishing German unity a free and united Europe. This unity should be based on the free decision of the entire German people.”

Chancellor Adenauer then referred to the repeated proposals of the Federal Government for free, general, equal, secret and direct elections for a constituent national assembly and cited the rejection of these proposals by the Soviet Zone authorities and failure of the Soviets to reply to any of these proposals. He then declared that the Bonn government would submit an election procedure for all-German elections which would in its essential points embody safeguards to insure all the necessary freedoms. These points were then spelled out in detail by Chancellor Adenauer.

He indicated that it was the position of the Federal Republic that really free elections were possible only if the prerequisites for the free expression of the will of the people are fulfilled in fact in the Soviet Zone, and called for the creation of a “neutral international commission under the supervision of the United Nations” to examine, in the Soviet Zone and in the territory of the Federal Republic, “in how far existing circumstances permit of free elections taking place.”
The Adenauer statement was adopted by the Bundestag by an overwhelming majority, together with a motion by the opposition Social Democratic Party (SPD) calling upon the Federal Government to forward to the four Occupying Powers a request "to provide the German people with the earliest opportunity to conduct free, general, equal, secret and direct elections under international control" for a constituent assembly. Another SPD motion called for free elections in Berlin.

On Oct. 4, in accordance with the Bundestag resolutions, Chancellor Adenauer addressed a letter to the Tripartite Allied High Commission, requesting the governments of the four Occupation Powers to arrange for all-German elections. In this connection, Chancellor Adenauer called upon the powers represented in the Allied High Commission to propose the establishment by the UN of a commission to carry out investigations in the Soviet Zone and the Federal Republic to ascertain to what extent prevailing circumstances permit the holding of free elections.

The Allied High Commission replied to the Adenauer letter on Oct. 15 assuring him that the three governments would, at the first suitable opportunity, place the views of the Federal Republic before the United Nations and would propose that the United Nations undertake an investigation over the whole area of Germany as suggested in the Adenauer letter. In fulfillment of this pledge, the United States, the United Kingdom and France presented a resolution at the sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the appointment of "an impartial international commission to carry out a simultaneous investigation in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Berlin, and in the Soviet Zone of Germany in order to determine whether existing conditions will make it possible to hold genuinely free elections throughout these areas."

This resolution, which was adopted on Dec. 20, 1951, by the overwhelming vote of 50 to 6, resulted in the appointment of a commission composed of representatives of Brazil, Iceland, the Netherlands, Pakistan and Poland. The Polish Government declined to designate a representative.

Following its constitution, the Commission held its first meeting on Feb. 11, 1952, at Paris. On Feb. 23 from its permanent headquarters at Geneva it addressed communications to the chairman of the Council of the Allied High Commission for Germany for transmittal to the authorities of the Federal Republic and to the authorities of West Berlin, and to the Soviet Control Commission for transmittal to the authorities of the Soviet Zone of Germany and the authorities of East Berlin.

Both the Western Allied and German authorities in West Germany and Berlin responded promptly, assuring the Commission of their complete cooperation in facilitating the task assigned to it, and subsequently welcomed the Commission's members at Bonn and Berlin.

In sharp contrast to this reaction, neither the Soviets nor the East German authorities have responded to three requests on the part of the Commission for permission to enter the Soviet Zone of Germany and the Soviet Sector of Berlin. Moreover, through their various propaganda mouthpieces — both human and journalistic — the Soviets and their East German puppets have so far rejected the Commission and sought to malign its members. It remains to be seen whether the Soviets will revise their attitude toward the Commission and permit it to fulfill its important mission which is so crucial to future progress toward the realization of German unity.

* * *

On March 10, 1952, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko handed to Elim O'Shaughnessy, US charge d'affaires at Moscow, a note containing proposals for a treaty of peace with Germany. Identical notes were handed to the British and French ambassadors at Moscow. On March 25, the US, British and French embassies at Moscow delivered identical notes of reply to the Soviet Government.

Text of the US Government's reply to the Soviet Government's proposal follows.

The United States Government, in consultation with the Governments of the United Kingdom and France, has given the most careful consideration to the Soviet Government's note of March 10, 1952, which proposed the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. Any such treaty would disentangle the Government of the German Federal Republic and the representatives of Berlin.

The conclusion of a just and lasting peace treaty which would end the division of Germany has always been and remains an essential objective of the United States Government. As the Soviet Government itself recognizes, the conclusion of such a treaty requires the formation of an all-German government, expressing the will of the German people. Such a government can only be set up on the basis of free elections in the Federal Republic, the Soviet Zone of Occupation and Berlin. Such elections can only be held in circumstances which safeguard the national and individual liberties of the German people. In order to ascertain whether this first essential condition exists, the General Assembly of the United Nations has appointed a Commission to carry out a simultaneous investigation in the Federal Republic, the Soviet Zone and Berlin. The Commission of Investigation has been assured of the necessary facilities in the Federal Republic and in Western Berlin. The United States Government would be glad to learn that such facilities will also be afforded in the Soviet Zone and in Eastern Berlin, to enable the Commission to carry out its task.

The Soviet Government's proposals do not indicate what the international agreement on an all-German government would be before the conclusion of a peace treaty. The United States Government considers that the all-German government should be free both before and after the conclusion of a peace treaty to enter into associations compatible with the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

In putting forward its proposal for a German peace treaty, the Soviet Government expressed its readiness also to discuss other proposals. The United States Government has taken due note of this statement. In its view, it will not be possible to engage in detailed discussion of a peace treaty until conditions have been created for free elections and until a free all-German government which could participate in such discussion has been formed. There are several fundamental questions which would also have to be resolved.

For example, the United States Government notes that the Soviet Government makes the statement that the territory of Germany is determined by frontiers laid down by the decisions of the Potsdam conference. The United States Government would recall that in fact no definitive German frontiers were laid down by the Potsdam decisions, which clearly provided that the final determination of territorial questions must await the peace settlement.

The United States Government also observes that the Soviet Government now considers that the peace treaty should provide for the formation of German national land, air and sea forces, while at the same time imposing limitations on Germany's freedom to enter into association with other countries. The United
States Government considers that such provisions would be a step backwards and might jeopardize the emergence in Europe of a new era in which international relations would be based on cooperation and not on rivalry and distrust.

Being convinced of the need of a policy of European unity, the United States Government is giving its full support to plans designed to secure the participation of Germany in a purely defensive European community which will preserve freedom, prevent aggression, and preclude the revival of militarism. The United States Government believes that the proposal of the Soviet Government for the formation of German national forces is inconsistent with the achievement of this objective. The United States Government remains convinced that this policy of European unity cannot treat the interests of any country and represents the true path of peace.

Unofficial translation of the Soviet note of March 10 follows.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to direct the attention of the Government of the United States of America to the fact that although about seven years have passed since the end of the war in Europe a peace treaty with Germany is not yet concluded.

With the aim of eliminating such an abnormal situation the Soviet Government, supporting the communication of the Government of the German Democratic Republic to the Four Powers requesting that Germany be expelled on its part addresses itself to the Government of the United States and also to the Governments of Great Britain and France with the proposal to urgently discuss the question of a peace treaty with Germany with a view to preparing in the nearest future an agreed draft peace treaty and present it for examination by an appropriate international conference with the participation of all interested governments. It is understood that such a peace treaty must be worked out with the direct participation of Germany in the form of an all-German government. From this it follows that the USSR, USA, England and France, who are fulfilling control functions in Germany, must also consider the question of conditions favoring the earliest formation of an all-German government expressing the will of the German people.

With the aim of facilitating the preparation of a draft peace treaty the Soviet Government on its part proposes for the consideration of the Governments of the USA, Great Britain and France the attached draft as a basis of a peace treaty with Germany.

In proposing consideration of this draft the Soviet Government at the same time expressed its readiness also to consider other possible proposals on this question.

The government of the USSR expects to receive the reply of the Government of the USA to the mentioned proposal at the earliest possible time.

Similar notes have also been sent by the Soviet Government to the Governments of Great Britain and France.

Enclosure
Draft of Soviet Government Of Peace Treaty with Germany

Almost seven years have passed since the end of the war with Germany but Germany still does not have a peace treaty, finds itself divided, continues to remain in an unequal situation and is subject to other governments. It is necessary to end such an abnormal situation. This responds to the aspiration of all peaceful peoples. It is impossible to assure a just status to the legal national interests of the German people without the earliest conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

Conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany has an important significance for the strengthening of peace in Europe. A peace treaty with Germany will permit final decision of questions which have arisen as a consequence of the second world war. The European states which have suffered from German aggression, particularly the USSR, USA, Britain and Germany, will resolve in the solution of these questions. Conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany will aid improvement of the international situation as a whole and at the same time aid the establishment of a lasting peace.

The necessity of hastening the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany is required by the fact that the danger of re-establishment of German militarism which has twice unleashed world wars has not been eliminated in as much as appropriate provisions of the Potsdam conference still remain unfulfilled. A peace treaty with Germany must guarantee elimination of the possibility of a rebirth of German militarism and German aggression.

Conclusion of the peace treaty with Germany will establish for the German people permanent conditions of peace, will aid the development of Germany as a unified democratic and peace-loving government in accordance with the Potsdam provisions and will assure to the German people the possibility of peaceful cooperation with other peoples.

As a result of this, the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, Great Britain and France have decided urgently to set about working out a peace treaty with Germany.

The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the United States of America, Great Britain and France consider that preparations of the peace treaty should be accomplished with the participation of Germany in the form of an all-German government and that the peace treaty with Germany should be formed on the following basis:

Basis of Peace Treaty With Germany

Participants
Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States of America, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Holland and other governments which participated with their armed forces in the war against Germany.

Political provisions
(1) Germany is re-established as a unified state thereby an end is put to the division of Germany and a unified Germany has a possibility of development as an independent, democratic, peace-loving state.

(2) All armed forces of the Occupying Powers must be withdrawn from Germany not later than one year from the date of entry into force of the peace treaty. Simultaneously all foreign military bases on the territory of Germany must be liquidated.

(3) Democratic rights must be guaranteed to the German people to the end that all persons under German jurisdiction without regard to race, sex, language or religion enjoy the rights of man and basic freedoms including freedom of speech, press, religious persuasion, political conviction and assembly.

(4) Free activity of democratic parties and organizations must be guaranteed in Germany with the right of freedom to decide their own internal affairs, to conduct meetings and assembly, to enjoy freedom of press and publication.

(5) The existence of organizations inimical to democracy and to the maintenance of peace must not be permitted on the territory of Germany.

(6) Civil and political rights equal to all other German citizens for participation in the building of peace-loving democratic Germany must be guaranteed. No conscientious objection may be made by any German army, including officers and generals, all former Nazis, excluding those who are serving court sentences for commission of crimes.

(7) Germany obligates itself not to enter into any kind of coalition or military alliance directed against any power which took part with its armed forces in the war against Germany.

Territory
The territory of Germany is defined by the borders established by the provisions of the Potsdam conference of the Great Powers.

Economic Provisions
No kind of limitations are imposed on Germany as to development of its peaceful economy which must contribute to the growth of the welfare of the German people.

Likewise, Germany will have no kind of limitation as regards trade with other countries, navigation and access to world markets.

Military Provisions
(1) Germany will be permitted to have its national armed forces (land, air and sea) which are necessary for the defense of the country.

(2) Germany is permitted to produce war materials and equipment, the quantity and type of which must not exceed the limitations required for the armed forces established for Germany by the peace treaty.

Germany and the United Nations Organization
The governments concluding a peace treaty with Germany will support the application of Germany for acceptance as a member of the United Nations Organization.