Germany in World Defense

Address

By JOHN J. McCLOY
US High Commissioner for Germany

Following is a digest of the transcript of the talk
given by US High Commissioner McCloy at the Third
Resident Officers' Conference in Frankfurt July 16. A
summary of the conference activities was published in
the Information Bulletin, August 1951 issue.

I have returned recently from a trip to the
United States where I testified before, what seemed
to me, innumerable committees; more particularly, the
House and the Senate Appropriations Committee in
respect of our budget, and also before the Senate For-

eign Affairs Committee and the Senate East-West Trade
Committee. While I was there I had the opportunity of
speaking to many leading members of the executive
branch of the United States and the legislative mem-
bers of the government in the Senate and the House,
both Republicans and Democrats.

I arrived in the country just after the reactions at-
tending the recall of General MacArthur, and I left just
as the proposals for a cease-fire in Korea had been
received and just as Congress was about to consider
the President's vast proposal for foreign defense aid.
I think you may be interested somewhat in my impres-
sions of the situation at home and the attitudes of our
leaders; as far as I can, in a very brief period, I'll try
to convey them to you.

Basically, the world situation facing us today is about
the same as it was at our last meeting, nine months ago.
Little has happened to make the world look much
brighter than it was last October. The ultimate purposes
of the Soviet Union have clearly not changed. All around
the world in the satellite countries, in Indo-China, Mal-

aya, Tibet, Iran, Iraq, Yugoslavia, there remain power-
ful signs of unrelenting pressure and constant scheming
to achieve totalitarian aims.

Nothing on the horizon would give any reasonable
basis for looking forward to an early succease of strain,
or the ending of the need for rapid build-up of our
strength to counter the still heavy preponderance of the
Soviet forces. To be sure, the Soviets have sharply step-
ped up their emphasis upon peace in their propaganda.
But by peace, they apparently mean a condition by
which their own aims could not be successfully opposed.
They are plainly concerned over the stimulus that Korean
aggression has given to the defense measures of the West.
The United States has become the main butt of their
hypocritical attacks, but their objective is to create and
exploit disagreements, conflicts of policy, confusion of
opinion wherever they can be found in the free world.

To this end the Soviets, and those working with the
Soviets, have made proposals designed to give the
appearance of a desire to seek peaceful settlements of
burning issues, but when reasonable and concrete steps
are to be taken, they appear to draw away, as was evi-
denced at the recent meeting at Paris. I can't comment
on the negotiations in Korea, which I see by the morn-
ing's paper have been resumed, but there does appear
to be an aroma of distrust about them which, together
with the undoubted build-up of forces in northern Korea,
does carry an ominous note.

In short there is no evidence that though the Soviet
or the Communist tactics may shift, there is any
abandonment of their fundamental policy of seeking to
find areas where new pressures may be applied and
new strains may be induced. Germany remains today,
as it has for the last few years, the main objective, or
at least the main intermediate objective, of their policy.

In the face of the Soviet menace, the country at
home seems to be convinced that the inescapable task
is to build up our nation's defense and to strengthen
the ability of all free nations, who show a will to
defend themselves, against Communist aggression. There
is, of course, criticism of policy and programs, but none
of it seems to me to cast any doubt on the determina-
tion of the people or of the government to go on with
the work in hand. There is much informed talk about
the new equipment, new aircraft, tanks and some amaz-
ing developments in the field of atomic energy; a deep
sense of shock over the way things have gone in Asia,
and much uneasiness over the situation in Iran.

But the hearings on the MacArthur recall seem to
have had a very interesting and somewhat sobering
effect on the people as a whole. Originally prompted
by the criticism, by many people, of General Mac-
Arthur's recall, or at least the manner of it, the inves-
tigation has turned, as you know, into a rather complete
analysis of our Far Eastern policy. The testimony that
has evolved was frank, most detailed, and the questions
were often very penetrating. But, in the end, I gathered
the impression that the responsible leaders who testified
held their own, if they did not increase their stature,
in their appearance before the committee.

This emphasis upon Asia apparently led some Euro-
pceans to fear that Europe might be overlooked or
neglected, but this, I think, is clearly a mistaken view. The
threat to Europe, and the importance of helping Europe
meet the threat, are fully recognized by all with whom
I talked. The most immediate concern was with Euro-
pcean security and the measures needed to strengthen it.
This is recognized as a problem not only of the present
emergency but of the long term and requires not only mil-
itarv strength but economic strength and social stability.
Viewing it in this light, there is a widespread conviction in the United States that Europe cannot long play a decisive role as a mere series of independent states. They see every state in Europe, including Germany, heavily dependent upon outside help in order to maintain its economy. They see on every side emphatic assertions by each country of its inability to defend themselves without outside aid. Yet they see that together these countries represent enormous strength in material resources, manpower and cultural development.

It may be oversimplification, but the conclusion for the thinking people in the United States is that Europe must find some way, some pattern or formula by which its strength can be constituted in effective unification. The American people recognize that the difficulties along this route are very great, but they see no alternative. I think they are influenced not only by the limitations of the individual states but by the fact that this is the trend of the times.

With the vast areas of the East drawn together, they see the necessity of marshaling the great resources and energies of Europe, to enable Europe to maintain adequate defense without undermining its living standards and its great social fabric. In Europe, as elsewhere in the world today, it is useless to seek protection in a national shell when bombers will shortly be built to encompass the world with about the ease that they have only recently been crossing the Atlantic.

While I was home I had the privilege to attend the Harvard commencement exercises, and to hear a number of speeches. There was one by Thornton Wilder. I wish I could do justice to it. It was a speech, very eloquent, somewhat explosive and very poignantly expressed; so I can’t really do it justice by trying to repeat it here. His theme was the necessity of facing all problems on a world basis. He emphasized the fact that there were no longer any areas in which one could find refuge.

Now this attitude, I think, explains why in the United States the Schuman Plan has been so widely hailed. The attitude toward it is almost universally favorable or enthusiastic. Economically, it is viewed as the first radical attack on the splitting up of Europe by boundaries, tariffs, cartels and other barriers and restrictions against the most efficient use and development of industry and the economic resources and talents in Europe. Its concept of a common market for coal and steel is considered as a forerunner of similar steps for other commodities and services.

Even more, perhaps, the support for the plan comes from its political implications. The fact that the six nations have undertaken to surrender some part of their sovereignty to European institutions charged with fostering the common interest is looked upon by many as the first step toward European federation. Finally the plan is considered as a fundamental step in creating peaceful Franco-German relations by the joint recognition of their joint interests in the large European community.

For all these reasons, the United States and its people are keenly watching the actions toward ratification as a sort of test of whether the European countries are yet prepared to work together in creating a progressive European community which will advance the interests of all and overcome the cleavages of the conflicts of the past.

For similar reasons, there is great interest in the United States in the proposal for a European defense structure, now under discussion in Paris. This too, if it can be created on a sound and effective basis, would be a tremendous further stride on the road to European unity and Franco-German rapprochement.

An army with a genuinely European, rather than national, outlook, under the control of European agencies, would cause many of the doubts which confront us about rearming of the Germans to disappear. Aside from the purely military aspects, such a system would greatly facilitate the mobilizing and use of the available resources of Europe for its defense. With such agencies, the task of organizing defense production efficiently should be much easier than it could possibly be under any system of separate national character. Consequently, the necessary defense could be obtained with less cost and less effect on the standards of living of the European countries.

In view of the necessity of protecting themselves from internal unrest as well as external attack, this element of cost is a matter of very important consideration. It is, of course, true that any such organization, if it is to be created, must be fully efficient, flexible and capable of fitting into the NATO organization.
NOW THIS GENERAL FRAMEWORK of views is a setting for the attitude toward Germany. Those to whom I've talked at home fully recognized that Germany was the major target of Soviet aggressive policy. For that reason the members of the Appropriations Committee, with whom we discussed our expenditures of both dollar, and this time, counterpart funds, were greatly interested in the programs to improve community life in Germany, especially for the youth, and seemed to support our programs in this field to the full.

The fact that so much of our budget was now directed to what one might call the spiritual and the social rebuilding of Germany rather than to the commercial and economic rehabilitation of the country was, I should say, generally applauded; but running through all the questions, all the questioning and all the comments, were the thoughts of the Senators as to what we were really accomplishing in Germany.

How realistic is the new German state? Can we expect that it will take a respectable and helpful part in the maintenance of Western civilization and the preservation of its liberties?

What is the real attitude of the Germans toward military participation and defense of the West?

Is it true, as we so frequently hear, that German nationalism is on the rise?

What real significance was there in the recent expression of neo-Nazism in Lower Saxony?

Will there emerge from the new state a liberal, democratic, tolerant nation, or do we have to endure once more from Germany some new political aberration that will mark her fundamental unreliability, as a world partner?

IF THESE QUESTIONS could be answered favorably, there would be utmost good will available for Germany. I found that the leading figures engaged in formulating our foreign policy were quite prepared to relinquish to Germany wide authority and powers, very wide indeed, if convinced that the trends in Germany were solidly developing in the right direction. The feeling was general that if we could not be satisfied as to these trends we ought to maintain our controls even though it would mark to some extent the failure of our efforts. But every hope was cast in favor of relinquishment.

I think our leaders are convinced that there is no realistic defense of Western Europe, including West Germany, without some form of German participation. This is as much, I think, a matter of propriety as it is a matter of physical power. They recognize that if Germany does participate, her political status should be substantially changed, and she should be given an honorable and self-respecting role in any defense system. There is a very clear-cut determination to permit such participation only within a larger organization and only if based on a true democratic support.

The fear of Germany's going off on a military venture of her own, in the light of past experiences, has not completely died out, even though it may appear un-

Heiko Goebel of Klein-Heubach, near Miltenberg, Bavaria, snaps photo of Mrs.McCloy as the wife of the US High Commissioner emerges from building where she attended German women's meeting. (Photo by Willi Klein, Munich)

realistic at the moment. I would not say that anyone has drawn a deadline in the matter, but there is a general sense of urgency to restore the balance of strength in the world, and that whatever it is necessary to do to bring that about we should be doing now and not later. Time is growing short to make these decisions, but again the recognition is complete that it is a decision which the Germans must make for themselves. It cannot be induced or dictated from the outside.

2,500 Participants in Youth Forum Cast 98 Percent Vote for United Europe

Participants in a recent youth forum in Regen disproved any criticism of political apathy when 98 percent of the 2,500 participants voted for a united Europe. The vote was taken after a series of lectures and discussions.

Delegates included representatives of youth organizations in the United States, France, Greece, Finland and Norway as well as various parts of Germany.

The discussions brought out that the seeming indifference of young people today toward political affairs apparently stems from different ideals of politics as opposed to the older political philosophy. The participants agreed that in the political work in communities, state or federal governments, the attainment of a common goal is hindered by the ambitions of political parties.

The forum in the small Bavarian town went almost unnoticed by the organized political parties. However, German daily newspapers called the meeting "a remarkable result."