US Policy on Germany

— Integration with Free Peoples

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THE GERMAN PROBLEM cannot be disassociated from the general problem of assuring security for the free nations. No approach to German problems can be adequate which deals only with Germany itself and ignores the question of its relationship to the other nations of Europe. The objectives of United States policy toward the German people are intertwined with our interest in, and our policies toward, the other peoples of Europe. Here the basic considerations are the same whether they can extend to all of Germany or must be limited to Western Germany.

We have made clear our desire to aid the free peoples of Europe in their efforts toward recovery and reconstruction. We have made clear our policy to aid them in their efforts to establish a common structure of new economic and political relationships. To these ends, we are providing temporary economic assistance through the European Recovery Program and are proposing to participate with them in our common defense through the North Atlantic Pact.

In this setting, it is the ultimate objective of the United States that the German people, or as large a part of them as possible, be integrated into a new common structure of the free peoples of Europe. We hope that the Germans will share in due time as equals in the obligations, the economic benefits, and the security of the structure which has been begun by the free peoples of Europe.

We recognize that the form and pace of this development are predominantly matters for determination by the Europeans themselves. We also recognize that effective integration of the German people will depend upon reciprocal willingness and upon their belief in the long-range economic benefits and the greater security for all which will accrue from a joint effort.

THE MAINTENANCE of restrictions and controls over the German economy and a German state, even for a protracted period, cannot alone guarantee the west against the possible revival of a German threat to the peace. In the long run, security can be insured only if there are set in motion in Germany those forces which will create a governmental system dedicated to upholding the basic human freedoms through democratic procedures.

These constructive forces can derive their strength only from the renewed vitality of the finer elements of the German cultural tradition. They can flourish only if the German economy can provide sustenance and hope for the German people. They can attain their greatest effectiveness only through a radically new reciprocal approach by the German people and the other peoples of Europe. This approach must be based on a common understanding of the mutual benefit to be derived from the voluntary cooperative effort of the European community as a whole.

Through all of this effort, our basic aim with respect to the Germans themselves has been to help them make the indispensable adjustments to which I have just referred. We have tried to help them to find the way toward a reorganization of their national life which would permit them to make the great contribution toward progress which they are unquestionably capable of making. But it is important for us all to remember that no one but the Germans themselves can make this adjustment. Even the wisest occupation policy could not make it for them. It must stem from them. It must be a product of their own will and their own spirit. All that others can do is to help to provide the framework in which it may be made.

THESE are the conditions we consider essential for the long-term solution of the German problem. The purpose of the Washington agreements, and of the other decisions taken by the Western Powers, is to bring about these required conditions at the earliest practicable time. This has been the consistent purpose of the United States Government.

This government made earnest efforts for two and a half years after the war to resolve the major issues arising from the defeat of Germany and to achieve a general settlement. During that period we participated in the four-power machinery for control of Germany established by international agreement in 1945.

By the end of 1947 it appeared that the Soviet Union was seeking to thwart any settlement which did not concede virtual Soviet control over German economic and political life. This was confirmed in two futile meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow and London. It was emphasized in the Allied Control Authority in Berlin, where the Soviet veto power was exercised three times as often as by the three Western Powers combined.

The resultant paralysis of inter-Allied policy and control created an intolerable situation. Germany became divided into disconnected administrative areas and was rapidly being reduced to a state of economic chaos, distress and despair. Disaster was averted primarily by American economic aid.

The German stalemate heightened the general European crisis. The European Recovery Program could not succeed without the raw materials and finished products which only a revived German economy could contribute.

By 1948 it became clear that the Western Powers could no longer tolerate an impasse which made it impossible for them to discharge their responsibilities for the organization of German administration and for the degree of German economic recovery that was essential for the welfare of Europe as a whole. These powers determined to concert their policies for the area of Germany under their control, which embraced about two-thirds of the territory and three-fourths of the population of occupied Germany.

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These common policies were embodied in the London agreements, announced on June 1, 1948. This joint program, I wish to emphasize, is in no sense a repudiation of our international commitments on Germany, embodied in the Potsdam protocol and other agreements. It represents a sincere effort to deal with existing realities in the spirit of the original Allied covenants pertaining to Germany.

THE LONDON agreements constitute a set of arrangements for the coordinated administration of Germany pending a definitive peace settlement. The execution of this program, now in progress, should restore stability and confidence in Western Germany while protecting the vital interests of Germany's neighbors. It seeks to ensure cooperation among the western nations in the evolution of a policy which can and should lead to a peaceful, and fruitful association of Germany with Western Europe. It is a provisional settlement which in no way excludes the eventual achievement of arrangements applicable to all of Germany.

The London agreements established a basic pattern for future action in the West. The Bizonal Area, formed by economic merger of the American and British Zones in 1947, and the French Zone were to be coordinated and eventually merged. The western zones were to participate fully in the European Recovery Program. An international authority for the Ruhr was to be created to regulate the allocation of coal, coke and steel between home and foreign consumption, to ensure equitable international access to Ruhr resources, and safeguard against remilitarization of Ruhr industry.

THE GERMANS were authorized to establish a provisional government, democratic and federal in character, based upon a constitution of German inception. It would be subject, in accordance with an Occupation Statute, to minimum supervision by the occupation authorities in the interest of the general security and of broad Allied purposes for Germany. Coordinated three-power control was to be established, with the virtual abolition of the zonal boundaries.

Of exceptional importance were the guarantees of security against a German military revival, a point sometimes overlooked in present-day talk about the hazards inherent in rebuilding German economic and political life. The London agreements provide that there is to be consultation among the three occupying powers in the event of any threat of German military resurgence; that their armed forces are to remain in Germany until the peace of Europe is secure; that a joint Military Security Board should be created with powers of inspections to insure against both military and industrial rearrangement; that all agreed disarmament and demilitarization measures should be maintained in force; and that long-term demilitarization measures should be agreed upon prior to the end of the occupation. It should be observed that these far-reaching safeguards are to accompany the more constructive aspects of the program and assure that the new powers and responsibilities assumed by the Germans may not be abused.

DURING the last ten months notable progress has been made in Western Germany which is apparent to all the world. An entirely new atmosphere of hope and creative activity has replaced the lethargy and despair of a year ago. Much of the London program is well on the way to realization. An agreement establishing the international authority for the Ruhr has been drafted and approved. The Military Security Board has been established. The Bizonal and French Zone are participating fully in the European Recovery Program. Agreements have been reached with respect to such difficult and controverted issues as the protection of foreign property rights in Germany, the revision of lists of plants scheduled for dismantling on reparations account, and determination of restricted and prohibited industries.

A short time ago we all felt that we should have a fresh look at the German problem. This was done in Washington while Mr. Bevin and Mr. Schuman were there earlier in the month. The genuine readiness of the participating governments to sacrifice special points of view to the common good has made it possible to reach a degree of accord far exceeding what could have been hoped for only a month or two ago.

There were three particularly important features about the agreements on German policy which resulted from these conversations. The first was the striking harmony in essential outlook. The second was the removal of the obstacles to the fulfillment of the constructive London program which had developed through diverse Allies' disagreement. Thirdly, the three governments acknowledged the need for the termination of Military Government and its replacement by a civilian Allied Commission at the time of the establishment of the German Federal Republic. This last is a great step forward toward peace, in my opinion.

WITH RESPECT to my first point, the harmony of view reached by the three governments on a common policy for Germany, you all know that matters of German policy have been, in the past, issues of great controversy. I suppose that it is a result of the depth of the historical background, the emotions and passions that have been aroused as a result of German's aggressive wars and the inevitable importance attached to the course of German developments. It is, therefore, not strange that there should be distinct American, British and French views on Germany.

But I see in the successful outcome of our recent Washington talks the prospect that France, Great Britain and the United States are developing a common policy toward Germany based on mutual understanding and reasonableness. The continuation of this development of a common policy, which I am convinced will occur, and toward which I shall lend every effort, is an essential element in an enduring peace in central Europe.

THE AGREEMENT in Washington on the text of an Occupation Statute has removed one of the major obstacles to the establishment of the German federal republic. The Parliamentary Council met at Bonn on Sept. 1, and has been working diligently to draft a basic law or provisional constitution for a federal German government. Since last December its leaders have requested the text of the Occupation Statute which had been promised to the Parliamentary Council before completion of its work.

The three occupying powers have been discussing the Occupation Statute since last August. In the course of these many months the draft Occupation Statute had become a very heavy, complicated and legalistic document. The three foreign ministers approved the text of an Occupation Statute in a new and simpler form which was then transmitted to the German Parliamentary Council at Bonn.

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