WHAT we are doing today in Germany is indeed an experiment in history—this effort to establish a democratic government under an occupation—but it is an experiment which must succeed. There can be no other solution.

Much has been said of our policy in Germany to prove that it is inconsistent. It is difficult to understand how, on the one hand, you can disarm Germany, reduce its industrial potential largely through the removal of surplus capacity built up for war; punish its Nazi leaders and those who assisted them to gain power and wage aggressive war; while, on the other hand, you encourage the growth of German government from the village to the nation which is responsible to the German people, thus placing rapidly in their hands, their own future.

However, a considered analysis will show that there are no real inconsistencies in such a policy unless parts of the policy have been overemphasized by those of us responsible for its execution.

GERMANY had to be disarmed, and that part of its industry which had been built up to support aggressive war had to be removed. Its large combines had to be disbanded into smaller units more responsive to their local surroundings not merely because they were large but because they had used their power internally and externally to foster the growth of Nazism. Otherwise the fears of Germany’s neighbors would insure their reluctance to accept a recovered Germany as a free nation with its heart in the West.

If we desired democratic leadership in Germany then the Nazi leaders and those who carefully evaded entering their names on party rolls but gave their financial and moral support to the Nazi leaders, had to be removed from public life. For more than 12 years they had prevented the emergence and development of new leaders from the ranks. They now must be kept out of the way so that the German people may find that they have within their ranks those qualified to lead Germany back to a self-sustaining economy and to a peaceful existence. This is the way to peace in Europe. This is the way in which a new Germany may yet be received back in the family of nations devoted to the preservation of freedom.

THIS BROAD POLICY was supposedly the basis upon which the four occupying powers would govern the whole of Germany until a German government could be established. General Eisenhower and I entered into this quadripartite government with hope in our hearts and with determination to make it succeed. We made every effort to gain the friendship of our Soviet colleagues and to dispel their suspicions. If quadripartite government in Germany could be successful, it required close cooperation among all four occupying powers. It was our intent to do all within our power to secure cooperation. Unfortunately our efforts were of no avail. We learned all too soon that one of these four powers had a concept of the term “democracy” which can be described only as totalitarianism, the rule of a single party.

We also found very soon that capital reparations in the form of plants to be removed from Germany as agreed at Potsdam did not satisfy the Soviet government. This was understandable. Its war damage had been heavy. Its people had suffered greatly. However, our desire for friendship was real, and perhaps a way to assist the Soviet government could have been found. That way did not lie in permitting the production of Germany, then far below German’s minimum needs, being directed to meet Soviet requirements at the same time that with unparalleled generosity we were contributing large sums of money to procure the food necessary to keep the people of Germany alive and to make production possible.

OUR FAILURES to reach a common understanding in Berlin were discussed at several meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers. At these meetings, first Secretary Byrnes and then Secretary Marshall with almost superhuman patience, listened hour after hour to Soviet tirades, because they were seeking an understanding which could lead to peace in Europe. While these meetings were in session, Communist parties not only in Germany but wherever they had been able the secure footings were endeavoring to tear down established government and to prevent economic and political recovery which would have facilitated the desire of people everywhere for freedom.

Finally at London in December 1947, it became evident that it was not then possible to obtain an agreement for a unified Germany in terms which would insure a freely-elected democratic and decentralized government, and the Council of Foreign Ministers adjourned without setting a date for a further meeting.

For some months prior to this meeting of the Council of Foreign...
Ministers, it had become increasingly apparent that the economic unification of the three western zones of Germany was essential if these zones were to recover rapidly and soundly. It also seemed apparent that the economic recovery which was needed not only in the interests of Germany but also in the interests of all Europe could be expected to proceed more surely under a large measure of German political responsibility than under the arbitrary rule of occupying powers, no matter how justly that rule was applied. Also long delayed measures such as currency and tax reforms which had been planned for all of Germany had been stopped for many months by Soviet veto. These measures were essential to recovery in the western zones.

Moreover, the United States had already announced its willingness to assist in financing European recovery. Unselfishly, this plan had been offered to all of Europe. Of course, it was rejected by the Soviet government which also used its strength to align its satellites in opposition to the program. Thus, clearly had been demonstrated the true opposition of the Soviet government and the Communist Party to economic recovery in Europe. They knew that with the return of economic security, the desire for freedom would make totalitarianism impossible.

The success of this European Recovery Plan depended in substantial part on recovery in Germany. Much of the idle capacity for production remaining in Europe was in Germany, and without the restoration of trade between Germany and its neighbors, a normal economy in Europe was impossible. When the Soviet government and its satellites rejected our aid, there remained to participate in the recovery program the free countries of Europe. Germany, economically, belonged to this group. It was impossible for all of Germany to be brought into the European Recovery Program.

For these reasons, the decision was made to bring the three zones of Western Germany into the organization for European recovery, and to unify these three zones as soon as possible so that they could recover under the leadership of their own representatives. If we desired to recreate a democratic Germany, and this was our declared intention, we had new to start the process. We had to give Western Germany the opportunity to establish its own government under a constitution approved and accepted by its people.

It was expected that Soviet reaction would be immediate. The almost certain rapid economic recovery in Western Germany would prevent the chaos and confusion on which totalitarianism depends, and which might make possible a police state in Germany.

Moreover, the desire of the peoples of Western Europe to support governments of their own choice was gaining everywhere. Stimulated by the promise of economic assistance from the United States, the victories of free parties in elections throughout Western Europe proved that Communism had reached its high tide and was receding. Only by the re-creation of fear could this recession be stopped. The logical place to apply fear was in Berlin which, by virtue of its location in the heart of the Soviet Zone, could be reached by land and water only by passage through the Soviet Zone.

The Soviet government deliberately picked Berlin as the place to apply pressure to check the political and economic recovery of the free countries of Europe. If the Western Allies could be forced from Berlin, then indeed the impression would be created that they could be forced out elsewhere. The voices of freedom would become weak and lose their strength through fear.

Soviet planners knew that our reserve stocks in Berlin were low. They believed that with rail and highway and canals all closed, these stocks would quickly disappear. To avoid the starvation of the Berlin population under our responsibility, we would have no choice but to give up Berlin.

However, the Soviet planners failed to recognize our strength in the air. They did not understand the determination of the Western Allies to fulfill their obligation to the peoples under their charge. They did not reckon with the will of several million Germans in Berlin to resist being placed under a police state.

Berlin had known this type of government for 12 years. However, in three and one-half years they had learned that there were freedoms still remaining in the world; that there were great countries who still knew that freedom could survive. Berlin made its choice. It wanted no part of Communist-imposed rule and, with great courage, its people and their leaders showed their determination to stand firm and to maintain their freedom even if to do so, brought great economic loss and severe physical hardships.

Thus, we started the airlift to Berlin as a demonstration of the will of the Western Allies to hold their rightfully earned position in Berlin and to keep alive and free the people of Berlin for whom they were responsible.

The airlift to Berlin is not a make-shift operation. It is a well organized, efficient, and precisely-timed operation which can provide the minimum essentials for the people of Berlin indefinitely. It has made the Soviet attempt to blockade only an attempt. Our airmen (and when I say our airmen, I include their British comrades) who fly the lift, our airmen who service the planes, our soldiers, our civilians, and the many thousands of Germans who bring the supplies to the lift, are working in a team of high efficiency. They are entitled to be proud of their accomplishments. They have not wavered in bad weather; nor in the face of contemptible threats. They will not waver until there is no longer need for their services.

It is true that the airlift is expensive in terms of dollars. Measured in terms of prestige, measured in the courage which it has brought to millions of people who desire freedom, measured indeed in comparison to our expenditures for European assistance and to our expenditures for national defense, its cost is insignificant. It can, it must, be continued until there is a stability in Europe which assures peace.

Meantime, Europe is regaining stability. Particularly in Western Germany, which was far behind the rest of Europe, is this now apparent.
First Cargo Plane Lands at Tegel Field

Twenty thousand pounds of cheese for Germans in the three western sectors of Berlin were carried into the blockaded city by a US Air Force C54 which landed on the Tegel airstrip Nov. 5, heralding the final phase of the construction of the airbase.

The Tegel project in the French Sector was started Aug 9 to provide a fourth airlift terminal in Berlin for planes bringing food, coal and other necessities into the city completely cut off on land and water by the Soviet blockade. The facilities of the expanded Tempelhof Airport in the US Sector and of Gatow Field in the British Sector were taxed to capacity, and cargo-carrying seaplanes were using the Havel, a lake in the city.

The 5,500-foot runway at Tegel was originally scheduled for completion by Dec. 15 but US Army engineers under command of Col. Reginald Whittaker, engineer of the Berlin Military Post, got it ready for use nearly six weeks ahead of schedule. However, normal flight operations will not begin until completion of the unloading apron within a few weeks.

Highlighting the ceremonies held in connection with the inaugural flight was the inspection of the French Honor Guard by General Clay. Flags of the three western Allies flew from staffs on either side of the runway as the French Military Band played "God Save the King," "Marseillaise," and "The Star Spangled Banner."

The strong can be patient, and we are strong.

It is not my lot as a soldier to make war or to create the incident which may lead to war. I am proud of the forces which I command in Germany because I know that they have high discipline, sense of purpose, and can be depended upon to take no hasty action. At the same time, they stand firm in position as the evidence of the sincere belief of the American people in freedom, and of their readiness once again if necessary to prevent free people from being trampled down by aggressive forces.

There is no easy road to lasting peace. It cannot come overnight. Nor can it be obtained by written agreements left to be interpreted by each participant in his own way. It can only come about when the free people of the world are strong and thus able to defend their own freedoms; and that day is approaching rapidly.

Certainly never in the past, and perhaps never again in the future, will the responsibility of America to preserve the beliefs it holds most dear be as great and as difficult to exercise as today. However, with wisdom and with unity rare in our history among major parties and national leaders, our determination is becoming clear to all the world. It is providing courage and faith for those who now have freedom, to hold it dearly; and for those who do not now have it, to keep alive and desire in their hearts.

We live today in a troubled world not of our own making. We can be proud as a people of our integrity of purpose to preserve freedom, of our willingness to give of our strength and resources to bring about the stability which may make a long peace possible.