

on the other side that the terms of the conference have implicitly, or, indeed, explicitly, excluded that.

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Q. Mr. Secretary, would the United States accept an agenda item using the same language as the previous Summit meeting on European security and Germany, and is it correct that it is "Germany" or "German reunification"?

A. The label on the item was "European security and Germany." Under that label there appeared a rather full discussion of German reunification. So it is quite apparent that that label carries with it the concept of German reunification. Also, that is made clear in the preceding sentence, the prelude which leads up to that, where the powers, it is said, recognize the close link between European security and the reunification of Germany.

Q. Would we accept such an item for the agenda then?

A. I don't want to be absolutely categorical about any of these matters. I think that when I have said that we thought that a second Summit meeting should begin where the last one left off, it is fairly clear what our view is. But these matters are all subject to discussion with our allies. There is another meeting of the NATO Council on this general subject, I believe, tomorrow. I don't like to take unilaterally positions which ought in the first instance to be discussed with our allies.

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Declaration Presented by the British, French, and United States Ambassadors to the Soviet Government, Regarding Preparations for a Summit Meeting, March 31, 1958¹

The present international situation requires that a serious attempt be made to reach agreement on the main problems affecting attainment of peace and stability in the world. In the circumstances a Summit meeting is desirable if it would provide opportunity for conducting serious discussions of major problems and would be an effective means of reaching agreement on significant subjects.

It is clear that before a Summit meeting can meet in these conditions preparatory work is required.

This preparatory work could best be performed by exchanges through diplomatic channels leading to a meeting between Foreign Ministers.

The main purpose of this preparatory work should be to examine the position of the various governments on the major questions at issue between them, and to establish what subjects should be submitted for examination by Heads of Government. It would not be the purpose of these preparatory talks to reach decisions but to bring out, by general discussion, the possibilities of agreement.

The Foreign Ministers, assuming they have concluded the preparatory work to their satisfaction, would reach agreement on the date and place of the Summit meeting and decide on its composition.

¹ Department of State press release 159, March 31, 1958. The declaration had previously been approved by the NATO Council.

If this procedure is acceptable to the Soviet Government it is suggested that diplomatic exchanges should start in Moscow in the second half of April.

Note from the American Ambassador (Beam) to the Polish Deputy Foreign Minister (Winiewicz), on the Rapacki Plan, May 3, 1958¹

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Rapacki's note of February 14, 1958, enclosing a memorandum elaborating on the Polish Government's proposals concerning the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe.

Recognizing that the initiative of the Polish Government stems from a desire to contribute to the attainment of a stable and durable peace, my Government has given these proposals serious and careful consideration. On the basis of this study it has concluded that they are too limited in scope to reduce the danger of nuclear war or provide a dependable basis for the security of Europe. They neither deal with the essential question of the continued production of nuclear weapons by the present nuclear powers nor take into account the fact that present scientific techniques are not adequate to detect existing nuclear weapons. The proposed plan does not affect the central sources of power capable of launching a nuclear attack, and thus its effectiveness would be dependent on the good intentions of countries outside the area. The proposals overlook the central problems of European security because they provide no method for balanced and equitable limitations of military capabilities and would perpetuate the basic cause of tension in Europe by accepting the continuation of the division of Germany.

An agreement limited to the exclusion of nuclear weapons from the territory indicated by your Government without other types of limitation would, even if it were capable of being inspected, endanger the security of the Western European countries in view of the large and widely deployed military forces of the Soviet Union. Unless equipped with nuclear weapons, Western forces in Germany would find themselves under present circumstances at a great disadvantage to the numerically greater mass of Soviet troops stationed within easy distance of Western Europe which are, as the Soviet leaders made clear, being equipped with the most modern and destructive weapons, including missiles of all kinds.

The considerations outlined above have caused the United States in association with other Western powers to propose that nations stop producing material for nuclear weapons, cease testing such weapons and begin to reduce present stockpiles. The United States has further proposed broader areas of inspection against surprise attack, including an area in Europe, roughly from the United Kingdom to the Ural mountains. We remain willing to do this. You will recall, moreover, that the Western nations offered at the London disarmament negotiations to discuss a more limited zone in Europe. With regard to missiles you will recall that over a year and a half ago the United States proposed that we begin to study the inspection and

¹ Department of State press release 242, May 4, 1958.