

*Statement at Geneva by Secretary of State Dulles, on Germany and European Security, October 29, 1955*¹

Mr. Chairman, I feel that we have made considerable progress during the two days of conference which we have so far had—two days of discussion of our proposals—and that the last statement made by Mr. Molotov poses the question, a very proper one at this stage, as to how do we really make progress from now on.

We are not here to engage in polemics, and to show how smart we are, either as lawyers or as diplomats. We are here on a very serious task. And, in that spirit, I would like to say this: I think that the three Western Powers in their proposals have gone very far in presenting the position which their governments hold, on both the subject of the reunification of Germany and on the subject of security, and, while I do not suggest that those proposals are by any means complete, they do, I think, constitute a very full exposition of the point of view of our three governments.

I think that most of the questions which Mr. Molotov has put, either yesterday or today, have been answered as adequately as is appropriate to answer them at the present stage of our debate. When we get down to discussing the detailed elaboration of a security treaty, a treaty of assurance, along the lines we have proposed, then it will naturally be appropriate to have further more detailed exchanges of views as to just how certain articles should be drafted.

It seems to me that the important thing at this stage is to know the position of the Soviet Union with reference to the reunification of Germany. It is quite true that our proposals start from the premise that Germany will be reunified and the assurances which we have suggested are assurances which depend basically, not upon Germany's entry into N.A.T.O. but they do depend basically upon the reunification of Germany.

We do not yet know the position of the Soviet Union on the question of the reunification of Germany and while we know that the head of the Soviet Government agreed in the directive that Germany should be reunified through free elections, we do not know just what proposals the Soviet Union will now make to give effect to that provision of the directive.

Mr. Molotov says that he has a proposal to make in that respect and it seems to me that from the standpoint of making progress it would be very useful if Mr. Molotov could let us see what that proposal is.

There is, I know, a difference of opinion between us as to the relative order of importance of European security and the reunification of Germany but there can be no difference between us on the proposition that there is a close link between the two, because that has already been decided for us by our superiors.

There are, one might say, two sides of a single coin, one side of which is European security and the other side of which is German reunification. We have tried to present our view as to the pattern of both sides of the coin, the pattern of European security, the pattern of German reunification. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned only one side of the coin is as yet visible; that is, the one that has the pat-

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 73-74.

tern of European security. I think, in order that we can really proceed in a businesslike way, which I know we all want, that it would be extremely useful if the Soviet Union would show us the other side of its coin, the one that has the pattern of German reunification. Then we can see whether there is a basis of agreement there. Because in our case, it has been made clear, German reunification is the premise of our proposed security treaty.

If we cannot reach agreement about the reunification of Germany, then obviously our security proposals are irrelevant because they are predicated upon the reunification of Germany, and in that case it is academic to attempt to elaborate proposals because the foundation may not exist. But if, as I hope, a foundation exists in our being able to find agreement about the reunification of Germany, then the hypothetical questions which have been put can be developed because we will know on what premise it is permissible to proceed.

Statement at Geneva by Foreign Minister Molotov and Revised Soviet Draft Treaty on Security in Europe, October 31, 1955¹

Mr. Chairman, we have had an exchange of opinions on the proposal by the Soviet Union on the establishment of a system of collective security in Europe as well as on the relevant proposal by France, Great Britain and the USA. This exchange has shown that the necessary agreement among the members of the Meeting on such an important problem as that of ensuring security in Europe is still lacking. Though all members of the Meeting stated their desire to seek agreed ways to solve this problem, the difference in the approach to its solution has nevertheless become evident.

The Soviet Government is of the opinion, as it was heretofore, that the interests of improvement of peace in Europe are best satisfied by the establishment of such a system of security in Europe, in which all those European states that wish to participate in it, irrespective of their social and state order, including the United States of America, would participate.

The USSR Government is convinced that it is this path, the path of joint efforts of European states, instead of the preservation of military groupings, that is capable of ensuring stable guarantees for the peaceful development of European nations.

In spite of the fact that we have not yet reached the necessary agreement among us on this point, the Soviet Delegation holds that possibilities of achieving positive results on European security at our Meeting are not exhausted.

The Soviet Delegation proposes to discuss the possibility of concluding a security treaty for Europe with the participation, in the first instance, of a more limited group of the states concerned. It is known that the Directives agreed upon by the Heads of Government instruct us to consider various proposals aimed at achieving European security, including a security pact both for Europe and "for a part of Europe". In raising this question, the Soviet Government takes account of those constructive suggestions that were made at the Geneva Conference of the Heads of Government, in particular by Sir

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 76-82.