TURKEY

U.S. POLICY TOWARD TURKEY

303. Memorandum of Conversation

US/DEL/MC/1

Ankara, January 26, 1958, 6:15 p.m.

US OBSERVER DELEGATION
FOURTH SESSION, MINISTERIAL COUNCIL,
BAGHDAD PACT

US Participants

The Secretary
Ambassador Warren
Mr. Rountree

Turkish Participants

Prime Minister Menderes
Foreign Minister Zorlu
Secretary General Esenbel

SUBJECT

The Secretary’s call on the Prime Minister

Mr. Menderes warmly greeted the Secretary and expressed great pleasure on the part of the Turkish Government that he was in Ankara. After responding appropriately, the Secretary emphasized the high regard in which Turkey was held by the United States. He said there were many questions which could be discussed, but one which was particularly on his mind as a result of messages which we had received, was developments concerning Syrian-Egyptian union. He asked Mr. Menderes what his present view of the situation was.

Mr. Menderes responded that this was a very disquieting factor. It reflected in yet another way the seriousness of the situation in Syria. He said the main pressure for union came from Syria, that the Soviet Union and Syrian Communists were behind that pressure. Nevertheless, the willingness of the Egyptian regime to go along with the idea demonstrated that Egypt was collaborating with the Communists. He said the plan was being pushed by Syria and Egypt “to fight the Baghdad Pact.”

Mr. Zorlu remarked that he had been asked by the press what his attitude toward union was, and he had responded that he would be happy to see all Arab countries cooperating together; that while Turkey had nothing to say with particular respect to the proposed union, it

Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Rountree. The meeting was held in Menderes’ office.

1 On November 18, 1957, parliamentary bodies in Egypt and Syria approved the merger of the two states into the United Arab Republic. The new state was formally proclaimed on February 1, 1958.
would be happy if the union meant that Syria was going to get out of the Soviet orbit.

The Secretary asked Mr. Rountree to review the Department's present thinking on the pros and cons of the US making a public statement on this matter and, while not endorsing union, making it clear that the US would not oppose any such developments which were brought about by the free will of the peoples concerned. Mr. Menderes felt that a statement along these lines might be interpreted as an endorsement of the plan, which he was certain was the work of Communists. He agreed fully with the Secretary's observations that perhaps at this time we should maintain flexibility in our position, awaiting further developments and particularly the public attitude of other Arab governments. The Secretary thought it possible that we might have to make a statement at some later time criticizing the plan.

At this point the Secretary and the Foreign Minister were required to depart for the Secretary's courtesy call on the Turkish President.

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2 Dulles commented on the merger of Egypt and Syria at his February 11 press conference; for text of his statement, see Department of State Bulletin, March 3, 1958, p. 332.

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304. Memorandum of Conversation

US/Del/MC/2

Ankara, January 26, 1958, 6:45 p.m.

US OBSERVER DELEGATION
FOURTH SESSION, MINISTERIAL COUNCIL
BAGHDAD PACT

US Participants
The Secretary
Ambassador Warren
Mr. Rountree

Turkish Participants
President Bayar
Foreign Minister Zorlu
President's Interpreter

SUBJECT
The Secretary's Call on President Bayar

President Bayar began by telling the Secretary how delighted he was to have him in Ankara at this time. He said that "quite apart from

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Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Rountree. The meeting was held at the President's Palace.
the usual reasons for the Turkish pleasure in receiving the Secretary," it was important for him to be here to add strength to the Baghdad Pact. He was particularly gratified that the Secretary had gone to Iran before attending the Baghdad Pact meetings, as it was highly important that Iranian resolve be strengthened.

The Secretary responded by referring to the importance which the United States attached to its relations with Turkey. The United States, he said, considered Turkey one of the staunchest allies. Also, he was pleased to demonstrate by his presence at the Baghdad Pact meetings the strong interest and support of the United States in the Pact.

The President observed that Mr. Dulles' last visit to the Middle East had been five years ago, and that since then there had been a marked deterioration of the situation in the area. The Secretary said that it was, of course, true that there had been a deterioration in certain aspects, but he did not feel that the overall situation had worsened as much as was often thought. He recalled that during his visit five years ago, eggs were thrown at him by Communist demonstrators in Cairo, and the Lebanese Government had asked him not to visit the American University because of expected Communist demonstrations. He had then felt it necessary to omit Iran from his itinerary since Iran under Dr. Mosadegh was under the heavy influence of Communists. He said that among the changes that had taken place in the Middle East in the interim, the situation in Iran had been completely reversed and the attitude of some Arab governments toward unfriendly elements in Egypt and Syria had improved. There were, as he had said, factors which obviously were serious, but we should not be too pessimistic.

The President agreed that there was both good and bad in the situation. He felt that developments in Iran had been particularly gratifying, all the more so since Iran was now a member of the Baghdad Pact. He recalled that during a visit to Jordan some time ago, he, himself, had been the object of attacks similar to those made against Mr. Dulles in Egypt. Jordanian elements were violently outspoken against him and against any Jordanian association with Western organizations such as the Baghdad Pact. He had been greatly impressed by the fortitude shown by King Hussein, and by the change which had taken place in Jordan. The Secretary concurred fully with the President's comments about King Hussein, and commented upon the helpful influence of his mother.

2 Dulles visited the Middle East May 11–28, 1953.
3 Iran joined the Baghdad Pact on October 12, 1955.
4 Apparently during Bayar's November 1955 visit to Jordan.
The President felt that Saudi Arabia was very much concerned about its position, and thought that King Saud would like to draw closer to Turkey. The difficulty, however, was that the King was surrounded by bad elements whom he did not trust. He was therefore afraid to speak freely.

Mr. Zorlu described his recent visit to Saudi Arabia during which he had long discussions with King Saud. He said that he had gained the impression that King Saud was favorably disposed toward the Baghdad Pact, and was irrevocably at odds with Nasser, but that he was immensely cautious because of the dangerous position brought about by having so many bad elements surrounding him.

At this point the Secretary made a move to depart, but the President asked him to stay on for a few minutes longer. He said that he had had long and earnest thought as to whether he should discuss with the Secretary a matter which had been very much on his mind, he had concluded that because of its importance and because of the nature of the close relations between our two countries, he should frankly bring it to the attention of the Secretary. He wished to ask the Secretary to give his personal attention—he repeated “personal attention” several times—to the question of economic and financial assistance to Turkey. He said that he could “do nothing but express his appreciation” for American military and political aid and “even economic aid.” He then made a rather cryptic statement to the effect that the differences which have existed in the past on this question should be forgotten, and the situation should be considered as it was at present. Continuing in this cryptic vein, he said he was sure that there had been mistakes on both sides but that they should be forgotten. In urging the Secretary to look into the matter he said that even though additional assistance might not be realized, friendly relations would of course continue between our two countries.

The Secretary said the President could be assured that he always gave close personal attention to the broad aspects of United States-Turkish relations. He felt that no country, people or government in the world today reacted more firmly and effectively to the Soviet Communist menace than did the Turks, and he considered Turkey a highly important American ally. When, however, it came to technical economic and financial questions, the Secretary was not a technician. He felt that the development of a sound economy must in any event be at least ninety percent the responsibility and the role of “the home government.” There was a marginal role for foreign assistance, and the United States had gladly endeavored to participate in that role. While he could not then comment in detail regarding the question of American assistance, it was his earnest desire always to solve questions between Turkey and the United States on a basis of friendly cooperation, trust and confidence which characterized relations between the two countries.
305. Operations Coordinating Board Report


REPORT ON TURKEY
(NSC 5708/2, Approved June 29, 1957)¹

(Period Covered: From November 8, 1956 through January 29, 1958)

A. Summary of Operating Progress in Relation to Major NSC Objectives

1. Summary Evaluation. In military and political matters there was continuing progress towards meeting our major objectives during the period under review. However, in economic matters there was little progress towards the achievement of the stable Turkish economy which NSC 5708/2 set as a goal. (See Annex B) U.S. policy toward Turkey as set forth in NSC 5708/2 has been reviewed from the standpoint of operating considerations and in light of operating experience to date and of anticipated future developments. No review of policy is recommended.

2. Turkey's alignment with the West continued to be close and effective, becoming increasingly so as the Syrian Government drifted into a firm pro-Soviet position. As Russian propaganda pressures on Turkey increased, Turkish dependence on Western support was made even more apparent. Despite the delivery of two Soviet notes containing veiled threats concerning the Turkish attitude toward Syria, there has been no appearance of weakened will to resist communist invasion or subversion.

3. The security arrangements of NATO and the Baghdad Pact have received wholehearted Turkish support, and Turkey has continued to press for strengthened military capabilities of the Baghdad Pact and wishes to see additional Arab state membership in that body. The Turkish military effectiveness as regards a Soviet-supported Arab attack on its southern border has been increased while capability to resist a Satel-

lite attack on the Straits remains high. Some delaying capability exists in the event of a direct Soviet attack or a Soviet-supported attack by its satellites.

4. U.S. access to Turkish military facilities remained good. Handling of incidents involving members of the large American community indicates the Turkish Government’s determination to avoid permitting such incidents to harm U.S.-Turk relations.

5. As concerns Cyprus, despite approaches by the U.S. Government stressing the need for flexibility and further compromise on the part of all parties, the Turkish Government continues to maintain a very firm position in favor of partition as the only feasible solution. Turkish-Greek relations continue to be strained, and any resort to full-scale violence by EOKA (the Greek Cypriot revolutionary organization) is likely to be met by counter-action by Turkish Cypriots.

B. Major Operating Problems or Difficulties Facing the United States

6. Stabilization of the Turkish Economy. The Turkish effort to finance a large economic development program and a substantial military program has seriously strained the country’s internal and external financial position. The resultant increased demand for resources has caused a steady price inflation accompanied by rather severe shortages of both imported and domestic goods. Defaults and arrearages in foreign payments have damaged the country’s international credit. Essentially Turkey’s major economic problem involves adjusting its programs to its available real resources. Greater economic stability, accompanied by increased production, could be achieved by cutting back the military or the economic development programs, particularly if such cutbacks were accompanied by effective fiscal and monetary measures. At the present time Turkey has much new productive capacity that is either unutilized or underutilized as a consequence of the lack of raw materials and spare parts. U.S. efforts to encourage Turkey to adopt more effective financial measures, including a more realistic exchange rate, in order to live within the limits of Turkey’s available resources hitherto have not been successful and have been a source of friction.

For more than a year prior to the October 1957 national elections, the Menderes Government gave first priority to electoral considerations, and virtually abandoned all efforts at internal economic stabilization. In fact, the Government’s economic policies and programs, associated with election campaign efforts, accelerated the country’s inflation. Recently the Government of Turkey has resumed efforts to control prices particularly of certain food items. However, these steps have not been accompanied by more basic corrective measures although the Government’s attention has been focused on the serious economic situation. On December 4, Prime Minister Menderes presented the program.
of his Fifth Government to the Grand National Assembly. Although the program does not explicitly point to bold new measures it speaks of the Government’s objective to keep prices in line, control bank credit, and review the State Enterprise programs with a view to placing them on a self-sustaining basis. These measures coupled with the proposed FY 1958 budget which is more conservative than last year’s budget are good signs. However, it must be recognized that the success of the measures depends on the Government’s determination to follow through with actions which are often politically unpalatable.

7. Cyprus. In our continuing efforts to promote a settlement to the Cyprus problem we have found that the Turkish Government has taken an extremely firm stand in support of partition as the only feasible solution. Only recently this has been reiterated by the Turkish Prime Minister in high level private conversations and in public pronouncements. This stand has the support of all opposition parties in Turkey, and it is clear that the Turkish Government considers this problem a “national” issue.

The Turkish Government counts heavily on friendly and allied nations to support its position on Cyprus and reacts strongly to any support given the Greek position. This was demonstrated when Greece introduced a resolution in the recent session of the UN General Assembly\(^2\) which, as amended, called for the renewal of negotiations with a view to having self-determination applied to the Cyprus case. This was strongly opposed by the Turks and the British. The resolution was approved by a majority in the Political Committee but failed of a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly. (The United States abstained on both votes.) Despite the public position that the vote represented a defeat for Greece, the sensitivity of the Turkish Government on the subject of Cyprus was well illustrated by its reaction to the positive votes cast by Iraq and Lebanon in the Political Committee, i.e., a strong protest was made to Iraq, Turkey’s partner in the Baghdad Pact, which resulted in an Iraqi abstention in the vote in the Assembly; and in the case of Lebanon, a bill in the Turkish legislature authorizing the transfer to Lebanon of a small quantity of arms and ammunition was withdrawn.

8. The Turkish Military Establishment. The Turkish defense authorities have yet to appreciate the need for a reduction in the number and size of conventional-type units in phase with the introduction into the Turkish forces of costly modern weapons. In addition to present NATO force goals, the Turks have pressed for four additional destroyers (in addition to four obtained from U.S. MDAP and four to be obtained from the British) to permit a forward strategy in the Black Sea and a mecha-

\(^{2}\) U.N. doc. A/3616 (XII).
nized corps for the southern border facing Syria. The U.S. Government has taken the position that it can only support those forces which are designed to carry out the approved strategic concepts of the United States. Pending a redetermination of NATO objectives for the Turkish Ground Forces, the FY 1959 military assistance program is primarily directed toward fulfilling the matériel deficiencies in the M-Day (first priority) forces.

It is anticipated that General Norstad will shortly be making recommendations relating to the stationing of IRBM's in the NATO countries. Should Turkey be chosen as a possible location for such units, the Turkish authorities will probably be eager to accept the missiles and will probably agree to providing the sites, but will consider this move as strengthening their hands with the U.S. in bargaining for aid.

*Note: National Intelligence Estimate for Turkey is: NIE 33–56, Turkey As An Ally, February 21, 1956.*

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3 Not printed. (Department of State, INR-NIE Files)

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306. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey


2807. Embtels 2239, 2257, 2293 and 2299. Your discretion you should inform GOT as follows:

1. U.S. pleased at indication GOT may now be seriously prepared to take vigorous action achieve economic stabilization.

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 882.00/2-2658. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Leddy; cleared with nine offices in the Department of State and with the Departments of Defense and Treasury, the ICA, the Export-Import Bank, and the International Monetary Fund; and approved and initialed by Dillon. Repeated to Bonn, London, and Paris for the Embassy and USRO. The time of transmission is illegible.

1 In telegram 2239 from Ankara, February 23, Warren reported on a discussion with Zorlu during which Zorlu recounted his talks with European officials. (Ibid., 862A.0082/2-2358) In telegram 2257 from Ankara, February 26, Warren reported that Zorlu had assured him that the Turkish Government was prepared to take “drastic measures” to stabilize its economy. (Ibid., 882.00/2-2658) In telegram 2293 from Ankara, March 1, Warren reported on Turkish preparations for approaches to the OEEC for a stabilization loan. (Ibid., 882.00/3-158) In telegram 2299 from Ankara, March 2, Warren requested the U.S. position on the Turkish aid problem. (Ibid., 882.00/3-258)
(2) U.S. considers approach by Turkey to both IMF and EPU–OEEC most effective method exploring possibility help from Western European creditors and international institutions on assumption there will be fully adequate Turkish stabilization program. Assume Cahan’s visit to Ankara indicates agreement by OEEC and GOT that discussions between them will take place. In U.S. opinion it would also be useful for GOT to consult with IMF at early date since exchange rate problem most appropriately discussed with latter institution. (FYI we feel consultation with IMF more likely to bring into discussion GOT financial and economic officials most interested in corrective action. End FYI)

(3) Consider essential that GOT make clear the concrete steps it will take and appropriate timing.

(4) On assumption adequate GOT program satisfactory to IMF and OEEC–EPU, U.S. prepared to consider any assistance in light of availabilities and so as to coordinate any such assistance as may be available with aid to be provided by European countries. Cannot make advance commitment any specific amount aid. U.S. will not make U.S. financial aid available for refunding or refinancing outstanding Turkish indebtedness to other countries.


Dulles

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2 The OEEC Deputy Secretary General visited Turkey on March 4.

307. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Irwin) to Secretary of State Dulles

Washington, April 11, 1958.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5638/4–1158. Top Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.]
308. Memorandum of Conversation

USDel/MC–18

Copenhagen, May 6, 1958, 9:45 a.m.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE 21st MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Copenhagen, Denmark, May 5–7, 1958

PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary
Ambassador Burgess
Mr. Porter

Turkey
Mr. Zorlu, Foreign Minister
Mr. Sarper, Amb. to NATO
Mr. Esenbel, Sec. Gen of Foreign Office

SUBJECT
Turkish Financial Difficulties

Mr. Zorlu said that Turkish officials are meeting with the IMF on this subject, having taken our advice in the matter. He said it was now essential to get U.S. support to make matters go quickly. Turkey was having trouble internally as rumors of an impending devaluation had begun circulating. The Prime Minister had spoken on this subject and the situation was momentarily stable but the market remained nervous.

Ambassador Burgess said that the EPU and the Fund are working together on this problem, which is a difficult one. It is enormously important, the Ambassador continued, to have European countries working together on it. Mr. Zorlu agreed but added that U.S. backing was needed as well as that of Germany. The Secretary made no comment on this.

Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Porter. The meeting was held at the Christiansborg Palace.
309. Letter From President Bayar to President Eisenhower


MR. PRESIDENT: You are doubtless aware that Turkey is one of the countries which has most suffered from the aggressive policy pursued by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics after the second world war and which is closely exposed to the dangers created by that policy.

Thus, Turkey, although the war came to an end, has had to endure heavy military burdens. The very low standard of living of the Turkish people and a yearly population increase of 3 per cent in addition to its retarded economy make it more difficult for Turkey to bear these military burdens.

It is also well known to Your Excellency that Turkey is able to bear this heavy burden only through the patriotism and unlimited willingness of sacrifice of the Turkish Nation.

But, these burdens which have caused the lowering of the standard of living of the Turkish Nation were certainly conducive to a future hard to bear.

The Turkish Governments, especially those since 1950,¹ aware of this situation, have deployed great efforts to achieve a rapid development of the Turkish economy by making use of the foreign payment means procured from the United States of America and other friendly countries and to give Turkey a healthy economic structure capable of meeting the economic problems caused by the increase in population and of facing the burdens necessitated by its defense requirements.

As a result of these efforts Turkey, while increasing its industrial capacity, several times, has also made great progress in the field of agriculture. In addition, it has succeeded in expanding, within the limits of possibilities, commensurate to its production, its almost non-existent infrastructure.

But, all these efforts deployed by Turkey have not brought the expected full results from the economic development, because of droughts in four consecutive years and of continuous falls in the prices of primary commodities, especially of those exported by Turkey.

On the other hand, the fact that Turkey, while making its investments, was unable to obtain long term credits as other countries were in

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¹ Bayar’s Democratic Party assumed power in Turkey in 1950.
the proper time, as well as the falls in the prices of raw materials that are exported by Turkey, have worsened the situation.

Failing to obtain a positive result from its approach to the Government of the U.S.A. to secure long term credits, Turkey, in order to effect the foreign payments necessitated by the investments already started, had to allot its scarce foreign exchange to the repayment of installments. And consequently the supplies of oil, spare parts and raw materials disappeared completely. Thereupon, Turkey found itself in a state of living from day to day. No supply of goods exists presently in Turkey.

On the other hand, a great part of the investments which, when totally completed, would meet a substantial part of our needs are finished to the extent of 90–95 per cent. The completion of the remaining part of these investment projects is delayed on account of lack of foreign exchange.

Therefore an aid granted to Turkey today would not only help Turkey to relieve itself from its economic difficulties but would also assure to Turkey of the future a healthy economic structure.

It is very obvious that foreign aid requirements of Turkey present today a special nature and expediency. It is for this reason that I felt the necessity of personally approaching Your Excellency.

Turkey, beside the Government of U.S.A. with which it has constantly been in cooperation in the political as well as economic field, has also expounded this situation at length to the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Federal Republic of Germany considered favorably our approach but expressed the opinion that it would be more pleased to grant this assistance within the framework of the O.E.E.C.

Upon our inquiry the U.S.A. Government informed us that it was in agreement with the views and recommendations of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in this respect.2

Turkey in accordance with these recommendations has approached the O.E.E.C. as well as the I.M.F.

Studies have been undertaken in this respect within the O.E.E.C. for the last one and a half months.

The I.M.F. has also informed us that it could enter into negotiations with our Government in June 1958.

Despite the long period since elapsed, no serious discussions on the substance of the matter could be started. In now appears as a necessity to assemble into a long term repayment programme our foreign debts and

2 Apparent reference is to the instructions sent in telegram 2807 (Document 306). In telegram 2357, March 10, Warren reported that he delivered the instructions to Zorlu on March 9. (Department of State, Central Files, 882.00/3–1058)
installments which have heavy effects on our balance of payments and relief from which is indispensable for the Turkish economic development.

There is no doubt that the OEEC and the IMF have achieved many positive results and enjoy our full confidence and respect. However, as is known to Your Excellency, these institutions do not only have limited possibilities of assistance but also, as a result of their structural composition, examine questions from a technical angle rather than attributing enough importance to their political considerations and exigencies. But I have no doubt that Your Excellency would also agree with me that the economic problems of countries cannot be considered apart from their political impacts.

The relatively small amount of aid which might be secured from these institutions can be raised to a level responding to the fundamental needs of the country only through the support of the Government of the United States of America and that of the Federal Republic of Germany which has already promised assistance to us in this respect.

Among other member countries of the OEEC, only Austria and Italy have so far appeared to be willing to help to a certain extent. As regards the assistance from the other member countries, it is very likely that this would be in the way of consolidating our commercial debts to them.

The explanation which I have just given shows clearly that the above-mentioned two institutions depend entirely on the suggestions and the initiatives of the Governments of the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany to adopt any decision.

While recently returning the visit of His Excellency Theodore Heuss, President of the Federal Republic of Germany,3 I have come to know that consultations have been undertaken with our friend and ally, the United States Government, concerning Turkey’s request for aid. I was indeed very happy with the thought that the suggestions of the two great and friendly countries would have very positive and decisive influence on the decisions of the International Institutions while Turkey’s case is examined before them. In fact in my opinion, such an initiative would help to channel the work of these institutions in this respect into the right direction and facilitate and expedite the results. Without this initiative, I am afraid it would be highly difficult to obtain the desired results.

In view of these circumstances, I feel it as my duty to kindly request Your Excellency that the United States Government extend the maximum assistance in favour of Turkey in the course of the discussions of

this question within the OEEC and try to secure the result in the shortest possible time by rendering simpler in form the procedures regarding the examination of the matter.

On the other hand while Turkey’s request is examined before the OEEC and the IMF in the normal way, I deem it very appropriate that the negotiations should be undertaken between Turkey and the Governments of the countries friend and ally to Turkey and particularly those of the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany who are familiar with the economic and political questions of Turkey and in a position to furnish substantial aid to it in order to help to obtain the desired results in the shortest possible time.

The Turkish Government is firmly determined to realize its economic development in a sound and stable manner. It will never hesitate to take every necessary measure for this purpose. I would, however, like to point out that, as Your Excellency would agree, the efficiency and the success of the measures adopted in the economic and fiscal fields depend largely upon the obtention of additional means of foreign exchange. It therefore becomes a necessity to determine the scope of external credit facilities together with internal measures to be adopted simultaneously.

My Government is ready, as it has always been, to discuss jointly and rapidly this matter with the United States Government and is ardently awaiting this.

I would be extremely happy if my Government is given this opportunity.

Please accept, Mr. President, the expression of my highest regards and esteem.

C. Bayar
310. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS
President Heuss
Dr. von Brentano
Secretary Dulles

After dinner when I was talking alone with President Heuss, he recalled the visit of President Bayar to Germany\(^1\) and his (Heuss') feeling that Turkey was in a desperate financial position and that something should be done to help Turkey. I asked that Foreign Minister von Brentano join us because von Brentano, whom I sat next to at dinner, had referred to the fact that he had seen the Turkish Ambassador that day here in Washington.

Dr. von Brentano joined us. He, too, expressed the view that Turkey's situation was very bad and that she should not be pushed over the brink. I said we agreed with that and that the United States was giving a very substantial amount of assistance in one way or another to Turkey, but that we felt that it was imperative that Turkey should take more positive measures to put its own house in order. I said I felt that it would be a mistake if Germany should, on a bilateral basis, extend financial assistance to Turkey without regard to the views of the International Monetary Fund or the OEEC as to the over-all financial and economic position. Dr. von Brentano said that he quite agreed that there should be no bilateral assistance to Turkey by the Federal Republic, and that anything that was done should be coordinated with the Monetary Fund or with OEEC. He seemed to have in his mind the OEEC rather than the Monetary Fund.

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Dulles. Heuss and Brentano were in Washington June 4-7 on a State visit. The meeting was held at the German Embassy.

\(^1\) May 7-15.
311. Letter From President Eisenhower to President Bayar


Dear Mr. President: I have read with great interest and care your letter delivered to me on June third concerning the economic problems of your country.

The desire evinced by you, Mr. President, and your Government to provide your country with a strong and healthy economy that will better the life of the Turkish people and enable them to bear their share of the collective defense effort, has always received a most sympathetic response by the Government and people of the United States. The aid which we have extended and continue to extend to Turkey, our friend and ally, has been given in the spirit of the partnership which characterizes our very close relations.

I have naturally been following with close interest recent developments having a bearing upon these matters. I have been concerned over the fact that, notwithstanding the progressive increase in the amount of aid rendered to Turkey, the economic difficulties have become still more pressing. I believe there is a general recognition now that the answers to these problems do not lie solely in the amount of aid which might be extended by Turkey's friends, but rather, to a very important degree, in measures of economic stabilization which, I am pleased to learn, are being considered by your Government. The importance of effective measures of this kind is underlined by the fact that it has become more and more clear that your economic problems have acquired such a scope that outside help alone will not be able to cure these problems, however sympathetic we and your other friends may be.

I am, therefore, glad to know that you have enlisted the assistance of the International Monetary Fund and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, and that the missions representing these organizations are visiting Turkey. The views of these respected international institutions will be of great value, not only directly to your Government, but also to your friends, in considering how, together, we can effectively assist. I sincerely hope that your Government will be able to put before these missions an integrated program to stabilize the Turkish economy so that external resources can be successfully used in support of this objective.

I can assure you that, in the spirit of cooperation which always prevails in our relations, we will be prepared, in collaboration with our

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 64 D 149, Bayar. Secret.

1 Document 309.
other friends and with the international organizations, to do what we can to help Turkey in implementing a specific and effective program to restore the stability and good health of the Turkish economy. Within this context I need not emphasize that my Government will always be happy to discuss this matter with its friend and ally.  

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

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2 In telegram 3670 to Ankara, June 13, the Department of State instructed Warren to show to Menderes the President’s reply and informed him that Dulles’ reply to Menderes’ letter would be deferred until after OEEC and IMF representatives met with Turkish officials. (Department of State, Central Files, 782.5-MSP/6-1358) Warren reported on Bayar’s response to the Eisenhower letter in telegram 3112 from Ankara, June 17. Bayar assured Warren that the Turkish Government was ready to take whatever steps were necessary to stabilize Turkey’s economy. (Ibid., 782.5-MSP/6-1758)

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312. Operations Coordinating Board Special Report

Washington, June 18, 1958.

TURKEY’S CURRENT ECONOMIC POSITION

1. The economic position of Turkey continues to become increasingly serious with little evidence that the country’s political leaders really understand the need or the urgency for comprehensive Turkish reform measures. In approaches to the U.S. and to international agencies in connection with a proposed stabilization program, they have emphasized the need for substantial financial assistance. However, the U.S. advised the Turks that they must develop and assure implementation of a

Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Turkey. Confidential. A title page, covering memorandum, a table of selected indicators on the economic situation in Turkey, and six charts are not printed. In the undated covering memorandum, Elmer Staats noted that the Board discussed a June 4 draft of this report at its June 11 meeting together with a draft letter to the Turkish Government containing a “firm restatement” of U.S. policy, and agreed to defer the next OCB report on Turkey until it could survey the results of the IMF and OEEC missions. Apparently the draft was of Eisenhower’s letter to Bayar (Document 311). Minutes of the June 11 meeting are in Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Minutes VI.
stabilization program before consideration could be given to such additional assistance. In recent weeks the Turks have had informal discussions in Washington with the IMF and with representatives of the U.S. Government. The Turks also presented their request for external assistance to the Managing Board of the European Payments Union at its April meeting. Thus far, however, they have devoted greater efforts to seeking foreign aid than to developing a stabilization program. Both the OEEC-EPU and IMF are scheduled to send missions to Turkey in June to examine the over-all Turkish economic situation and explore possible Turkish proposals for a stabilization program. The U.S. Government is following closely the progress of Turkish consultations with these international bodies.

2. Domestic confidence in the Turkish lira is diminishing rapidly. In the first four months of 1958 the black market value of the currency has fallen by one-third. Although Parliamentary pressure for increased budgetary expenditure was held to a minimum and a relatively conservative budget has been adopted, with expenditures in real terms lower than last year, Central Bank credit creation is growing about as rapidly as in 1957 when it rose by 24 percent during the full year. In the first four months of 1958, Central Bank credit has expanded 4.2 percent, compared with 4.4 percent during the comparable period of 1957, and a slight decline the previous year. The amount of currency in circulation is growing at a faster rate than last year. There has been greater stability in the cost of living in recent months, however, with an increase of only 1.7 percent since the beginning of the year, as compared with increases of 6.5 percent and 8.1 percent in the same periods of 1957 and 1956 respectively.

3. On March 31 the Central Bank’s freely disposable cash dollars on hand amounted to only $4.1 million and the Bank was believed to have a temporarily uncovered position in meeting its mid-April payment of the $6.8 million March EPU deficit. As a result of reduced imports, Turkey ran an export surplus equivalent to $16 million in the first two months of 1958, compared with a deficit of $4 million in the first two months of 1957. This forced reduction in imports led to some repayments of foreign debt but did not improve Turkey’s credit capacity to any extent and severe shortage of imported raw materials, spare parts and consumer goods continued to plague the economy.

4. Turkey’s present economic difficulties are caused by a complex of several factors, primarily the following:

   a. investment ambitions that exceed domestic savings;
   b. subsidization of the current output of the economy; and
   c. the accumulation of large foreign short and medium term debts, which call for repayments far in excess of any Turkish repayment capacity.
Inflationary financing of a. and b., accompanied by imposition of artificial price controls which have to be administered and enforced by a thin layer of skilled personnel, misdirection of investment in the absence of a rational over-all development program and creditors' claims on Turkey's current export proceeds for payments on debts and arrears have resulted in the shortages, under-production, and disparity between internal and external prices that now exist. The semi-autonomous State enterprises under whose direction the bulk of economic development projects are undertaken have been incurring both capital and current deficits, financed in large part directly or indirectly by Central Bank credit. Turkey's ambitious municipal redevelopment schemes are also believed to be making heavy calls on Central Bank credit. A meaningful Turk program of economic and financial reform would require broad remedial action to deal with these basic causes.

5. In order to assure POL supplies through the summer, ICA has agreed to allocate the last $15 million of the $70 million Turkish Defense Support program for petroleum. Turkey's principal—and most competitive—exports, tobacco and chrome, are now meeting strong buyer resistance in US and other Western markets due to their high prices at the unrealistic official rate of exchange. ¹

¹ A note on the source text reads: "2.8 Turkish lira = 1 dollar."

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313. Telegram 119 From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, July 10, 1958, 3 a.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.5–MSP/7–1058. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

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314. Editorial Note

On July 21, representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany met in Paris to dis-
cuss assisting Turkey in meeting its economic problems. The United States announced its willingness to provide $100 million in aid for Turkey if matched by European loans. The European representatives agreed to consult other OEEC nations in an effort to match the U.S. offer. After further discussions among the Europeans and between the U.S. and Turkish representatives July 28–31, a common aid program was approved to assist the Government of Turkey in carrying out the economic stabilization program that it had submitted to the OEEC, IMF, and U.S. Government. The OEEC agreed to provide $100 million in loans, the IMF granted Turkey drawing rights of up to $25 million, and the United States agreed to provide Turkey with a total of $234 million in loans, grants, supplies, and debt waivers.

The program was announced by the OEEC, Turkish Government, U.S. Government, and IMF in separate statements on August 4. For texts of these statements, see Department of State Bulletin, August 25, 1958, pages 322–324. Documentation on the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Turkish stabilization program are in Department of State, Central File 882.10. Letters from Prime Minister Menderes and President Bayar to the President and Secretary of State, both dated August 5, thanking the United States for its participation in the negotiations are ibid., 110.11–DU and 711.11–EI.

315. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, September 5, 1958, 4 p.m.

804. Re Embtel 803.¹ In my talk with Prime Minister Menderes September 4, I stated next three or four weeks would subject Menderes administration and Prime Minister in particular to tremendous pressures to avoid hard measures which implementation stability program requires. I stated to Prime Minister I had mentioned this to Foreign Minister Zorlu, and desired to repeat, that if necessary measures for implementation were not adopted within short time, $359 million would be gone and Turkey would be worse off than before.

¹Telegram 803, September 5, reported on discussions with Menderes on the Turkish economic stabilization program. (Ibid., 882.10/9–558)
Prime Minister scarcely let me finish before interrupting to state he already feeling pressures, which will become even more intense and from every quarter, but that he was not going to yield. He emphasized his administration well aware transition period will be difficult but that they will do all necessary in order implement program.

Comment: I believe Prime Minister sincere in his determination.

Warren

316. Memorandum of Conversation


SUBJECT
Turkish Economic Program

PARTICIPANTS
Hasan Polatkan, Turkish Minister of Finance
Ali S. H. Urguplu, Turkish ambassador
Hasan Isik, Assistant Secretary General, Turkish Ministry of Finance
Memduh Aytur, Director General, Turkish Treasury
Munir Mostar, Inspector, Turkish Ministry of Finance

The Secretary
Owen T. Jones, Director, GTI

Mr. Polatkan opened the meeting by conveying the greetings of the Turkish Prime Minister to the Secretary. He then thanked the Secretary for the financial assistance recently arranged for Turkey in Paris, which formed the basis of the important economic program his government was presently undertaking. The Minister commented particularly on the assistance and cooperation of the American officials in Paris. This, he said, represented an example of United States efforts to raise the standard of living of countries such as Turkey and proved wrong the Russian...
propaganda that the United States was not prepared to help its friends. The Minister stressed that for the program’s success it was essential that the new resources be speedily realized in order to assure the continued flow of goods. This was essential not only to sustain economic activity but to assure a favorable psychological impact for the program on the business community. There had been some delay among the OEEC members in making such resources available. The Minister concluded by saying that Turkey desired to be strong economically and militarily and hoped to eventually carry out programs to these ends out of Turkey’s own resources.

The Secretary expressed gratification over the Turkish efforts to regularize their economic affairs. There had been concern, he said, in recent years that though the Turks were stout of heart, their economy was not a healthy one, due in part perhaps at one time to an over-ambitious development program. The balance of resources for investment in healthy economies was always small and austerity was frequently required in order to achieve an order of investment of desirable proportions. Such austerity was difficult in a democracy. The courage and wisdom of the Turkish Government in now facing up to its economic problems was recognized here and the United States was glad to contribute to the success of the program even though we had budgetary problems of our own. The Secretary commented on the cost of our defense and research programs, which we were not doing solely for ourselves but for our allies as well. As a consequence, our budget had gotten temporarily out of balance, perhaps because of the recession, but we still felt justified to divert a part of our resources to help our friends.

In parting, Mr. Polatkan expressed again his government’s determination to carry out its economic measures, said that they knew that they had a friend in the United States to help them, and that they knew of the United States’ wishes that they carry out their program with determination.
317. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 12, 1958.

SUBJECT

Turkish Economic Stabilization Program

PARTICIPANTS

C. Douglas Dillon, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
John M. Leddy, W
Owen T. Jones, Director, GTI
Howard J. Ashford, Jr., GTI
Turkish Finance Minister Hasan Polatkan
Turkish Ambassador Ali S. H. Urguplu
Assistant Secretary General for Economic Affairs Hasan Isik
Inspector General of Ministry of Finance Munir Mostar

In the course of a final discussion with Minister Polatkan at the conclusion of his three-day visit, Mr. Dillon made the following points:

1. U.S. officials had estimated that, in addition to the $25 million of special assistance, $50 million of defense support assistance would enable the Turkish Government to finance a first quarter import quota of $171 million. Steps were therefore being taken to release $50 million out of this year's $75 million defense support program at once. It these estimates were proven wrong, we would undertake to also release the remaining $25 million. Otherwise, it would be held for utilization later on.

2. The U.S. was not able at this time to handle POL financing. However, $5 million of the $25 million special assistance would now be made available to the Turkish Government in the form of a cash check. This would be done on the understanding that it would be used by Turkey to settle EPU deficits in conjunction with the $25 million EPU credit.

3. Steps would be taken to relax the ICA bidding requirements in connection with the U.S. small business regulations so that they would not be a serious obstacle to imports under the first quarter of the new import regime. The exact details would have to be worked out in the next few days.

4. In response to the Turkish request for the release of 272 million Turkish liras of PL 480 counterpart, steps would be taken to release 225

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 882.00/9–1258. Confidential. Drafted by Jones on September 13.

Polatkan made a presentation of Turkey's needs and program at a September 11 meeting with Dillon and representatives of the ICA, Export-Import Bank, and DLF. A memorandum of the conversation is ibid., 782.5–MSP/9–1158. No record of Polatkan's meeting with IBRD representatives has been found.
million Turkish liras, leaving the remaining 47 million Turkish liras subject to further negotiations. This release would have to be made for military purposes but it would enable the Turkish Government to utilize for development purposes an equivalent amount of lira from their own accounts.

5. In connection with the Turkish request for additional assistance for the Turkish Industrial Development Bank in Istanbul, the limited amount of funds available to the Development Loan Fund precluded immediate action on this. If, however, funds became available either through supplementary appropriations early in 1959 or through the cancellation of existing commitments, this project, i.e., the IDB, was of the type to which we would want to give immediate consideration.

Minister Polatkan appeared to be genuinely pleased with the foregoing, thanked Mr. Dillon warmly, and in leaving reaffirmed his Government's determination to press firmly forward in the implementation of its economic stabilization program.¹

¹ For text of a statement issued at the conclusion of Polatkan's visit, see Department of State Bulletin, October 6, 1958, pp. 533-535.

318. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, September 29, 1958, 6 p.m.

678. From Dillon. Had useful discussions with Turkish officials in Ankara.¹ Turks were full of gratitude for US economic assistance, both direct [and] with other OEEC countries. Both Zorlu and Polatkan made long trip to airport to welcome and see us off. At request Zorlu and Men- deres that some joint statement be issued upon conclusion of visit which would indicate long-term nature of Turkish development effort and US desire to assist Turks in this effort, joint communiqué issued on departure. Embassy Ankara requested cable text to Department.² Following were main points raised in discussions.

² Not found.

¹ Dillon visited Turkey September 27-29, during an 11-nation trip to study the work of the Mutual Security Program.
1. Stabilization plan. Turks repeatedly expressed determination live up to requirements of plan. They apparently fully satisfied with arrangements reached Washington since had never mentioned limitations of ICA waiver to 20th November 15 date. Presumably this date fully satisfactory to them. They showed concern, however, for delays in implementation EPU part of bargain. They were particularly concerned by six percent rate of interest presently being asked by EPU. They said Turkish public opinion would consider this usurious rate. They indicated they understood all countries except Britain prepared give 5-1/2 percent rate and they requested further US assistance in Paris to expedite negotiations. I told Turks that we would make further effort in Paris to expedite conclusion of arrangements so that funds would become available promptly. Comment: I believe Menderes is facing serious political problem if he is forced accept unduly high rate of interest. Therefore think it advisable for us to use best efforts with British reach agreement on 5-1/2 percent rate. Turks informed us that rate of French loan early this year was 4-1/2 percent. This makes acceptance of 6 percent rate particularly difficult. Turks have real need for prompt receipt of funds from EPU countries. This has been fundamental to success of plan all along. Recommend strong representations in Paris in view of fact US has fully released its share of funds. Turks should be kept informed of any action taken by US in this regard.

2. Purchase of new textile factory in USSR. This matter discussed at some length with high-level Turks who at first professed ignorance. Menderes sent special representative to airport to give me detailed information. According to this information new plans were part of overall clearing arrangements on current trade with Soviet Union. Equipment being purchased for three new factories has value of roughly $11 million. This not yet been cleared by Finance Minister or Coordination Committees but I expect it will receive approval their committees. I made strong point that all dealings with Soviets having to do with investment projects should be carefully considered by Coordination Committees so that they would not impose additional burden on stabilization program. Turks agreed that this would be the case and seemed impressed with my concern about this particular matter.

3. Development Loan Fund. Turks inquired re status DLF loans and we assured them that early action expected on some of projects. In view prompt action by EXIM Bank I hoped DLF would take action to approve some Turkish projects in immediate future. This also basic to success our overall plan. Please cable me at Delhi résumé of actions taken at October 3 DLF meeting.³

³No telegram has been found.
4. BP project. We were informed that Turkish and Iranian Governments had submitted project for Turk-Iranian railroad on September 26. We assured Turks that DLF prepared give this project prompt and serious attention. I told Turks in view of size of project it might be necessary to accomplish financing in stages.

Comment: In view of earlier US pressure in BP Economic Council to expedite submission of this project it is important that DLF commence studies promptly and treat this as priority matter.

5. I was highly impressed with attitude of MAAG toward MAP program. MAAG at all echelons are fully aware economic implications of MAP program and are working with some success to find ways to reduce unnecessary military expenditures. MAAG made clear that if we really desire to increase Turk military capacity at most rapid rate as result Secretary’s commitments in London\(^4\) this can best be done by substantial increase in training personnel and not by stepped up deliveries of military equipment which Turks are not prepared to utilize. (Thus MAAG has prepared delivery schedule for APC carefully coordinated with ability to utilize which should permit deferring funding of considerable portion to FY 60. Detailed recommendations on this subject made to EUCOM (information D/A in ARBP-C’s 23)\(^5\) for substantial increase in training personnel. MAAG recommended increase of about 300.) This is desired by Turks and will make very favorable impression of our determination to strengthen Turkish armed forces. Situation here has fundamental similarity in Iran in that there are not enough trained technical personnel available to Turkish armed forces. Therefore greater training effort should have priority.

Wailes

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\(^4\) Apparent reference to commitments made at the London meeting of the Baghdad Pact July 28–29, 1958. For documentation, see volume XII.

\(^5\) Not found.
319. Memorandum for the Files

Washington, October 17, 1958.

SUBJECT

Review of Turkish Debt Conference

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Murat W. Williams, Deputy Director, GTI
Mr. Francis F. Lincoln, GTI
Mr. A. Guy Hope, GTI
Mrs. Louise Sissman, GTI
Mr. Robert Yost, RA
Mr. Robert Meyer, ED
Mr. Maynard Gilman, FN
Mr. Vinton Mitchell, Department of Treasury
Mr. Howard J. Ashford, Jr., GTI

Mr. Hope opened the meeting with a review of cables recently sent from Paris by members of USRO and himself concerning plans for the consolidation and scheduling of Turkish debts. He noted in passing the British approach with regard to oil indebtedness, the position of the United States in the conference, and the activities of the statistical working party. Commenting upon the atmosphere of the conference, he said that there was no doubt that it would be a laborious operation, that there was difficulty in relating facts as understood by the individual delegations, and that there was still work to be done in smoking out unilateral positions. He noted that at one point of the conference, the Turks had indicated a sensitivity to the effect that they were being treated as the "vanquished". He referred to the distractions occasioned by disagreement as to the interest rate to be charged on the new loans from OEEC countries and noted the British position re 6 percent. In this connection, it was reported that the German delegation had earlier supported 5-1/2 percent but now appeared to support 6 percent in view of evident British pressure which turned on a quid pro quo re discriminatory shipping practices. The recent cable from Mr. Dillon while visiting in Turkey, noting the apparent unreasonableness of the 6 percent position, was cited.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/10-1758. Secret. Drafted by Hope and Ashford.

1 Representatives of the European nations that had contributed to the Turkish stabilization loan met with U.S. and Turkish representatives in Paris October 8–10 to work out a repayment schedule and an interest rate.

2 USRO reported on the conference in Poltos 944 and 946, October 11. (Both ibid., 882.10/10–1158)

3 Document 318.
Mr. Hope cited the Turks' obvious concern over ship mortgages, payments on which become due in November of this year, held by the Maritime Administration and the Transatlantic Finance Corporation. The Turkish delegation has pleaded that the Government of Turkey not be pressed for current payments on this indebtedness at this time on the argument that to do so might prejudice the entire program. Mr. Hope reviewed the participation of Mr. Kearns, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, and said that Mr. Kearns had made an excellent appearance at the conference, and in conversation with the Turks had stressed the desirability of scheduling reasonable payment terms with private creditors, including interest payments.

Mr. Hope passed on to a discussion of the desirability of forming a creditors' organization, the resolutions of which might be made morally binding on American creditors. Mr. Williams asked whether or not the United States Government would in principle be opposed to such a conference. Mr. Hope replied that there were many issues to be worked out including representation. Mrs. Sissman noted that perhaps one approach might be to seek some means in which to induce the idea of a spokesman for the American creditors either as a whole or as individual groups. In this connection, Mr. Hope referred to the European system of export guarantees in which the British and Germans have been particularly active. He noted that the Germans were now engaged in compiling the results of a polling of 2,000 German creditors to ascertain the level of German commercial debts.

Reference was made to the move within the OEEC group for a Steering Committee to be comprised of the British, French, and German chief delegates and the Dutch conference chairman. Mr. Hope noted that while the United States representatives had not been invited to participate in the smaller group, there is not much doubt that we could join if we so desired. There are two sides to this issue. If we were willing to participate in such a group we could, on the one hand, keep the conference from moving away from us and would be in better touch with developments, but on the other hand, the United States Government might find itself rigidly bound by decisions taken within the Steering Group. The atmosphere of the Steering Group, if formed, would probably be initially dominated by the British "hard" position. Mr. Hope cited then the other side of the issue: we could preserve greater flexibility and our position as amicus curiae to the parties might be more respected if we did not become a part of a "bloc".

Mr. Hope then continued by reporting on a conference he had with Mr. Stanley Metzger of the "L" area. On anti-trust aspects of a creditors' committee, Mr. Metzger felt there would be no problem involved. On an oil company proposal for settlement, there might be questions if cooperation among the oil companies were to be fixed on a basis of a quid pro
quo with the Turkish Government but not if the plan was followed only in order to reduce arrears. As to the question as to what action the United States could take at the conclusion of the conference, since it is evident that the Europeans want some sort of conference agreement or bilateral understandings to emerge from the conference, it was Mr. Metzger’s feeling that, in the manner of the Italian debt settlement, we could write a letter to the Government of Turkey stating that we found the final settlement proposals fair and equitable. With respect to the U.K.-Dutch scheme to pay creditors from a special account, Mr. Metzger felt that a Turkish fund in the United States for commercial accounts might be liable to legal attachment. Mrs. Sissman queried whether or not a Swiss depository could be used. Mr. Hope answered he assumed no legal objections. The key to the U.K.-Dutch scheme was to have an account established in a British bank and presumably thus be readily accessible to the British Government for checking on Turkish payments.

Mr. Mitchell asked what were the Government of Turkey’s views with regard to infringement of its national sovereignty in a debt settlement. Mr. Hope replied that Turkish sensitiveness was excited by a French idea for a set-aside of a percentage from Turkish exports to meet scheduled indebtedness. The Turks had made invidious comparisons of this idea to the Ottoman Debt Commission.5

Mrs. Sissman noted that it could well be that the British creditors are free from their real arrears problem with the U.K. Government picking up the check. It was noted, however, that this amounted to a transfer of the debt and was not a true solution in itself.

Mrs. Sissman asked whether there had been any discussion as to the definition of the types of debts to be included, for example, those not represented within the present make-up of the conference. Mr. Hope said that a delegate had made a reference to this matter and had said it would be thought about “at some appropriate moment”. Mr. Mitchell asked why the British position on the 6 percent interest rate was so firm and Mr. Hope replied that it seemed to hang on the Indian Commonwealth Loan which was reportedly “in that area”. Mr. Hope referred to the German idea of a possible tie-in with a munitions loan in which Germany would take part of the proceeds and use them, half and half, for Germany and for the other European creditors. Mr. Mitchell asked re the magnitude of the debt. Mr. Hope replied that figures which had been developed so far were being reported from Paris. He discussed

4 Presumably a reference to the 1925 settlement of Italian debts to the United States arising out of World I.
5 Reference is to the Council for the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt, established in December 1881 by European creditor nations to liquidate the outstanding debts of the Ottoman Empire and encourage new investments.
some of the projections of debt and repayment which had been prepared by various delegations and the Secretariat.

Mr. Yost inquired further as to what might be the nature of the Steering Group, insofar as it may be a part of European backstage planning. Mr. Hope referred to the dinner of the delegates in which the British, French, German, and the Dutch chairman had evidently given some initial thinking to this course. Mrs. Sissman raised the question as to whether we should permit a Steering Group, should it be formed, to apparently dominate the thinking of the conference in view of the size of the conference itself. Mr. Hope said that the U.S. position in the conference is still not well-defined. The German delegate had stated that the Steering Group would advise the United States delegation of its decisions, then communicate them to all OEEC members, and finally to the Turks, acting as a restricted Working Party. He felt that the Steering Group as such would probably not be a formally constituted body.

Mr. Yost also raised the question as to whether Messrs. Kaplan and Sanderson needed help in the conduct of the negotiations. Mr. Hope said that some consideration would probably have to be given to this matter but that it would hinge in part on the role any Steering Group might take, and that the question should be left open for the time being.

Mr. Mitchell asked in what connection the Maritime Administration loan had come up. Mr. Hope replied that in the process of making our position clear to the Turks as to secured creditors, Mr. Kaplan had mentioned claims secured in various ways, and the Turks had then pressed the ship mortgage question, stating the Germans had agreed to the Weser mortgage payments being deferred during the moratorium. Mrs. Sissman suggested that the Weser position was probably now that of being a German guaranteed credit.
320. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, October 23, 1958, 1 p.m.

2221. From Dillon. In conversation with Macmillan this morning accompanied by Ambassador Whitney I mentioned Turkish interest rate problem and told Macmillan I thought it was vitally important for political reasons to make some gesture to Turks which would give Turkish Government reason for accepting relatively high rate of interest. I said that if UK could agree on 5-3/4 percent rate and at same time make statement that if they were making a loan of similar size and duration to a Commonwealth country at this time the rate would be 5-3/4 percent Turkish Government would then have a valid reason for accepting. Macmillan had obviously been briefed on this subject and while there was no commitment I had definite impression that we will be able reach agreement along these lines since Macmillan offered no objection to procedure as outlined.

Whitney

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 882.10/10-2358. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris for USRO, Ankara, and Bonn.

1 Dillon was in London for discussions with the U.K. Government about the future of a European free trade area.

2 No final decision was taken at the October 23–25 meeting of the creditor nations on the interest rate.
321. Operations Coordinating Board Report

Washington, November 12, 1958.

OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD REPORT ON TURKEY
(NSC 5708/2)¹
(Approved by President, June 29, 1957)

(Period Covered: From: January 29, 1958
Through: November 12, 1958)

A. Summary Evaluation

1. The U.S. gave substantial support to a comprehensive Turkish economic reform program, which was announced on July 31 following Turkish consultations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and member countries of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). Despite the many difficulties to be expected in implementing an economic reform program and the necessity to follow the program closely, a major step finally has been taken toward the achievement of a stable Turkish economy.

2. During the Lebanese operation,² the Turkish Government gave permission for full use of the Adana air base as a staging area for U.S. airborne troops enroute to Beirut and for the storage of overflow supplies. This was a concrete demonstration of strong Turkish identification as an ally of the U.S. but at the same time there are indications that local attitudes toward U.S. service personnel are changing from acceptance to hostility. Although incidents involving U.S. service personnel provide the focal point for outbursts of popular resentment and bitter press comment, wide disparity in standards of living, sharply contrasting social mores, a formidable language barrier and alleged special privileges for American military personnel are continuing factors exacerbating community relations.


²On July 15, President Eisenhower sent U.S. military forces into Lebanon in response to the request of the Lebanese Government.
3. Even though the recently adopted reform program carries hope for better economic conditions in Turkey, widespread dissatisfaction due to the hardships endured by the populace for the past three years has brought internal political strains including some dissatisfaction within the party in power. A traditional sense of national unity has been disrupted as the opposition party headed by former President Ismet Inonu has replied to steamroller parliamentary tactics on the part of the party in power by openly splitting on major issues including foreign policy.

4. No progress was made on the Cyprus issue involving Greece, Turkey and the U.K. and Turkish-Greek relations have remained strained.

5. No review of policy is recommended.

Annex A

DEVELOPMENTS UNDER PARAGRAPH 28 OF NSC 5708/2

Policy Guidance

9. Paragraph 28 of “U.S. Policy Toward Turkey”, approved on 29 June 1957, states, in part, that “... the United States should review the possibility of achieving a reduction in NATO-approved force levels for Turkey and, in phase with the effective integration of advanced weapons in the Turkish armed forces, appropriately revise Turkish force levels in the light of NATO requirements.” U.S. civilian and military representatives, both at home and abroad were provided with this policy guidance in order that they might influence the action by NATO committees. Further, the matter was more emphatically brought to the attention of our high officials in Paris by other means. At the time the policy guidance was approved, the major combat units in the DOD-approved force objectives for Turkey were generally in accordance with NATO goals. They were 20 8/3 divisions, 65 naval vessels and 21 squadrons of combat and support aircraft.

Other Directives

10. Subsequently, actions were taken by the U.S. on directives from the highest level, at the time of Syrian union with Egypt, to accelerate

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3 Ellipsis in the source text.
U.S. aid to Turkey. The Iraqi coup resulted in even greater efforts to enhance Turkey's military posture. The U.S., among other actions, delivered one of the four Honest John battalions programmed for Turkey at a much earlier date than originally contemplated. Training for the two Nike battalions for Turkey is continuing. It is yet to be established that Turkey can absorb by 1963 any modern weapons beyond these six battalions, despite the various recommendations from the NATO and others.

NATO Action

11. By 9 May 1958, the North Atlantic Council approved for planning purposes, a document entitled MC 70\(^4\) which concerns only NATO-committed forces and does not cover national requirements or the requirements of other pact organizations. The major Turkish combat units called for in MC 70 are 16 8/3 divisions, 65 combat vessels and 20 squadrons of combat and support aircraft. This indicates a reduction of four divisions and one squadron from the DOD, and previous NATO-approved, force goals listed in paragraph 9 above.

Turkish Army

12. The Turks recently deactivated two infantry divisions, and have plans to deactivate a cavalry and a mountain division in the near future. These divisions were below strength, poorly equipped and in a priority receiving no additional MAP build-up. Personnel were assigned to other duties in the Army. Actually, the Turkish army budget is not greatly changed whether their manpower is divided among 10, 20 or 50 divisions. From the U.S. point of view, since we program only for the 10 8/3 M-day divisions, plus certain essential training requirements for first echelon divisions, our contribution through MAP to the Turkish Army is relatively unaffected by additional units over and above those planned for early commitment in event of hostilities. There is indirectly some cost to us for the various national units maintained by the Turks over and above recognized force objectives. However, considerable progress has been made in reducing these forces by the deactivation of certain pill-box battalions, frontier regiments, etc.

Turkish Navy

13. Although MC 70 calls for an identical number (65) of combat vessels as does the DOD-approved force goals, the MC 70 Navy proposal is more attractive to Turkey. While MC 70 reduces by four each the number of patrol vessels and motor torpedo boats, it increases by eight

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\(^4\) The MC-70 Program established a Minimal Essential Force Requirements Plan for the period 1958-1963 for all NATO member states. Documentation on the implementation of MC-70 is in volume VII, Part 1.
the number of destroyer/escort types. The economic burden on both Turkey and the U.S. would be increased considerably if MC 70 goals were implemented for the Turkish Navy.

**Turkish Air Force**

14. The MC 70 proposal for the Turkish Air Force indicates a more apparent rather than real reduction. MC 70 calls for three transport squadrons of 16 aircraft each while the DOD-approved force levels include four transport squadrons of 12 aircraft each. MC 70 and the DOD-approved force goals are in agreement as to the eventual composition of the combat squadrons. This is to be accomplished by conversion of existing squadrons to more advanced high performance aircraft, and the economic burden on both the U.S. and Turkey will be considerable.

**Turkish Government**

15. The Turkish Government has reservations concerning the adequacy of forces proposed in MC 70. Specifically, they are concerned with the problem of defense on two fronts, one of which has been extended by events in Syria and Iraq. The Turkish Minister of Defense has expressed the view that this situation requires a mobile corps of two divisions and an armored brigade as well as two all-weather fighter squadrons and a fighter-bomber squadron. However, it is not clear as to whether these units are to be within or over and above the MC 70 goals. In addition, he considers that the Turkish Navy requires twenty-nine combat vessels more than listed in MC 70. Consideration of the Turkish attitude toward its armed forces must include the manner in which they have cooperated in the establishment of unilateral U.S. peripheral observation points in their country, their continued support of our UN objectives in Korea, as well as their wholehearted support of the Lebanon operation as indicated elsewhere in the Progress Report.

**Summary**

16. In summary:

a. The possibility of achieving a reduction of NATO-approved force levels for Turkey has been reviewed with some measure of apparent success with respect to ground forces;

b. This apparent success in the NATO review was more than offset from an economic point of view by the naval and air units listed in the resultant MC 70;

c. Despite the heavy costs of maintaining and operating the forces listed in MC 70, the Turkish Government proposes Navy and Air Force, if not Army, goals even higher; and,

d. Whereas the policy guidance was preceded by a discussion of the desirability of reducing economic burdens, MC 70 calls for expenditures above those previously contemplated in the U.S. policy paper on Turkey, and the SHAPE International Staff is urging a joint U.S.-Turk program to achieve the more costly MC 70 objectives by 1963.
Operations Coordinating Board Report


OPERATIONS PLAN FOR TURKEY

I. Introduction

A. Special Operating Guidance

1. Objectives.
   a. Continuance of Turkey's independence, territorial integrity, identification with the Free World, and will and ability to resist Communist invasion or subversion.
   b. Continued Turkish cooperation in NATO and in strengthening other Free World regional security arrangements.
   c. Continued maintenance of Turkish armed forces capable of resisting direct Soviet attack as part of a concerted allied defense, withstanding an assault by satellite forces, protecting the vitally important Straits, protecting Turkey's southern flank, and maintaining internal security; thereby also assisting Baghdad Pact defense.
   d. Continued access by the United States and its allies to Turkish resources and military facilities necessary for the preservation and further strengthening of the Free World.
   e. Improved Turkish relations with Greece, the Arab States and Israel.
   f. Achievement of a stable Turkish economy which can support an increasingly greater share of its defense expenditures, while maintaining investment outlays at realistic levels.

2. Economic Reform and U.S. Program
   a. On July 31, 1958, the Turkish Government reached agreement with the IMF and OEEC on the elements of a stabilization program. In support of this program $359 million was promised Turkey. Of this amount, the United States was to provide $234 million. The reform program involved the establishment of an exchange rate system which

Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Turkey. Secret. A title page, covering memorandum, statement of purpose and use of the operations plan, a financial annex, and an MSP pipeline analysis are not printed. In the undated covering memorandum, Roy Melbourne, Acting Executive Officer of the OCB, noted that the Board had revised and concurred in the Operations Plan for Turkey at its November 12 meeting, and that this plan superseded the November 6, 1957, Operations Plan for Turkey. Minutes of the OCB meeting are ibid., Minutes.
would bring into balance Turkey's import and export prices; the establishment of firm credit ceilings on both central and commercial bank financing; a reexamination of State Enterprise practices; and the establishment of a global import system on the basis of highest priority requirements and available resources, as well as machinery for the coordination of investment planning for public enterprise. A de facto devaluation was carried out on August 3, bringing the official effective import rate to TL 9 to $1, and establishing three effective export rates of 4.90, 5.60 and 9.00 to $1. There are indications that progress is being made in the other areas.

b. The primary problem which faces the U.S. over the next few months is to find a way to influence or persuade Turkish officials to vigorous and continuing application of stabilization measures. U.S. representatives in Turkey should develop continuing consultations with Turkish officials in all those offices which have stabilization responsibility and continually encourage those officials to vigorous support of their economic reform program. They should report back periodically on the progress of stabilization and relate particular elements in U.S. aid activities constantly to stabilization support. U.S. representatives should be constantly attentive to progress in the Turkish import quota system, and to the availability of non-U.S. credit, reporting back to Washington sufficiently in advance of suspected developments to enable the U.S. to exercise what influence it can on other external authorities in making assistance available.

3. Turkish Requests for Assistance. Of the $100 million Defense Support portion of the July 31 commitment, $75 million had been obligated by October 3. The remaining $25 million is expected to be provided after January 1, 1959. In view of the magnitude of the Turkish 12-month post-stabilization import quota, U.S. representatives in Ankara should be alert to the degree to which non-U.S. sources of promised credits are made available. It is possible that in the event Turkey's earnings fall below expectations, or that non-U.S. sources of promised credit fail to eventuate, requests for additional assistance may be made by the Turkish Government. While any such request would have to be considered on its merits, U.S. representatives should bear in mind that MSP funds for such additional assistance are not presently available.

4. Turkish Political Development. As internal stability is essential to Turkey's continuing its present role in NATO and Free World affairs, governmental restrictions on parliamentary discussions, freedom of assembly and press1 should be carefully watched, particularly should fur-

1 Reference is to libel and press laws enacted on June 7, 1956, and to restrictions on political assemblies enacted on June 27, 1956.
ther restrictions occur which might lead to covert opposition activity. Despite the sensitivity of leading Turkish officials, opportunities should be taken as suitable by Embassy officers to reaffirm to those officials U.S. feeling that a strong democratic process should be permitted to develop in Turkey.

5. Cyprus. The question of the future political status of Cyprus has seriously strained relations between Greece and Turkey, and thus weakened the strength of NATO in the eastern Mediterranean. The United States has attempted to act as a moderating influence among the three interested countries and should continue to exert its influence on the Turkish Government to reach an accord with the U.K. and Greece for a settlement of the Cyprus problem. The U.S. must continue to recognize the depth of Turkish feeling on the Cyprus question and the fact that any action taken by the U.S. which can be construed by the Turkish Government as U.S. support of the Greek position will have an adverse effect on U.S.-Turkish relations. The importance which the U.S. attaches to making progress toward a solution should, however, be stressed to the Turkish Government and the point made that greater flexibility and further compromise on the part of all parties, including Turkey, are essential.

6. Turkish-Arab Relations. Turkish relations with the Arab states remain varied. Special efforts are being made by the Turks for improved relations with the North African countries. Turkish leaders are distrustful of the new Iraqi regime and are concerned over the possibility of Egyptian-Iraqi collaboration in encouraging foment among the Kurds resident in Turkey and Iran. Developments in Syria\(^2\) have further exacerbated the already troubled relations between Turkey and Syria. The United States shares Turkey's concern over the implications of these developments and should continue to consult with Turkey regarding possible courses of action which might be taken to prevent a further deterioration of the Western position in the Middle East. At the same time, the United States should discourage Turkey from taking any unilateral or precipitate action with regard to Syria.

7. Military Commitments. In discussions with the Prime Minister, leading officials of the Foreign Office, cabinet ministers and defense authorities concerned with military aid, the Ambassador and other U.S. representatives designated by him should make efforts to discourage the Turks from initiating military programs beyond the country's capacity to absorb, or in the long run support. Emphasis should be placed on the need for reviewing at all times the question of balancing the increased costs and additional strength derived from more modern weap-

\(^2\)Reference is to the federation of Syria and Egypt into the United Arab Republic.
ons against the maintenance of a large military establishment. In this connection, the heavy costs of maintaining and operating modern weapons in terms of foreign exchange and personnel should be painstakingly explained to Turkish officials. Operating personnel should keep in mind at all times the fact that the U.S. currently is reviewing the possibility of achieving a reduction of NATO-approved force levels for Turkey, in phase with the effective integration of advanced weapons in the Turkish armed forces. Specific commitments to the Turks should be made only on an annual basis.

8. **Technical Training Needs.** a. One of the principal factors inhibiting Turkey’s ability to strengthen its defense posture by the use of modern weapons is the Turkish soldier’s general lack of technical knowledge. Basis education is at a low level. Priority should be given to those U.S. programs designed to improve the educational base of the country and raise the educational level of the military forces, but in the meantime the Turkish authorities should be made to recognize that the consequent lack of ability to use and maintain modern weapons will place severe limitations on the number and type of modern weapons which the U.S. will be prepared to include in its military aid program.

b. Special note is taken of the inquiry, made on the occasion of their visit by the members of the Turkish financial mission, on technical assistance in the management and operation of State Enterprises. U.S. representatives in Ankara should develop in the shortest possible time specific proposals in this regard. U.S. representatives in Ankara should explore the possibilities of providing technical assistance to Turkey in the development of institutions for the mobilization of domestic capital, such as savings, insurance, etc. The formation of local private capital over the next few years will be essential to a successful investment program.

9. **Turkish Labor.** The Turkish Government has recently evidenced some softening of its “hard” attitude toward organized labor in Turkey. For example, it has not yet objected to the recent first international affiliation of a Turkish labor union, that of the Turkish Petroleum Workers Union, with the International Federation of Petroleum Workers, whose headquarters are in Denver, Colorado; similarly, the Turkish Government has recently sent its General Director of Labor, accompanied by two professors from the University of Ankara, to the U.S. to study American labor-management relations. While keeping U.S. activities in the field of Turkish labor within the scope acceptable to the Turkish Government, these initial Turkish moves toward modern labor-management relationships should be discreetly encouraged. Ties between Turkish labor and anti-communist international labor federations such as the ICFTU and International Trade Secretariats (ITS’s) should also be encouraged because these organizations can provide the young inexpe-
rienced Turkish trade unions with guidance as to their true goals, which should be economic rather than political, and with help in combatting any internal infiltration by communist elements.

10. **Attitudes Toward U.S. Personnel Overseas.** a. The Operations Coordinating Board has given particular attention over the past several years to ways and means of improving foreign attitudes toward U.S. personnel overseas. This involves both the positive actions which can be taken to improve these relationships as well as the removal of sources of friction and difficulties. The special report prepared by the Board, "United States Employees Overseas: An Inter-Agency Report," dated April 1958, is an effort to provide on an over-all governmental basis a common approach and guidance in this field. All supervisory employees in the field should familiarize themselves with the substance of this report and all U.S. personnel should know the substance of the Conclusions and Recommendations set forth in Section V, Volume 1. Attention is directed to the President's remarks in the Foreword of the report.

b. The present and planned community relations program in Turkey, including orientation of U.S. personnel, traffic safety campaign, binational committee on community relations, visits by U.S. military bands, athletic teams and other special event attractions, information and cultural programs supporting the community relations theme and participation in the semi-annual European Working Group meetings on Community Relations; should be given continued emphasis and support. In addition, it should be noted that the number of U.S. official personnel and dependents now approaches 13,000 of whom 12,000 are military personnel and dependents. All agencies will continually review their programs in Turkey, with a view to ensuring that the number of U.S. employees does not exceed the minimum required to achieve U.S. objectives.

11. **Information and Cultural Programs.** U.S. information and cultural programs should seek to convince the Turkish people that the U.S. appreciates the staunch Turkish support of U.S. policies, that it favors a Turkey which is strong militarily, politically and economically, and that the U.S. is doing all it can, in the light of many obligations, to assist Turkey to attain its goals. Recognition should be given to the staunch anti-communist stand of the Turkish Government, but the public should be reminded, through USIS output, of communist successes in subverting nations through Soviet cultural presentations and economic assistance. As the Turks resent their being taken for granted, cultural programs should demonstrate that the U.S. does not by-pass Turkey because it is a

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3 A copy of this report, which outlined legal, personal, and community relations problems facing U.S. personnel overseas, is in Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Overseas Personnel.
reliable ally, and such programs should assist Turkey in achieving the goal of increased westernization of its culture. Although “grass roots” appeal is desired, the principal effort should be directed to Turkish media officials and Turkish leaders in the political, professional and educational fields, who are in turn capable of reaching large segments of the population. Information and cultural programs also should be to the extent possible increase popular understanding of the NATO and Baghdad Pact alliances.

12. Internal Security Program Guidance. The progress of the U.S.-financed public safety program in Turkey over the past 3 years is gratifying. When this program was begun it was anticipated that it would terminate at the end of 3 years. U.S. representatives in Ankara have been advised that if the Turkish Government requires certain communication or transportation equipment in connection with public security, it should consider those commodities for financing under the Defense Support program. Substantial justification will be required if it is intended to continue the services of technicians in connection with this program beyond FY 1959.

B. Selected U.S. Arrangements With or Pertaining to Turkey


a. NATO. In accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the United States is committed to regard an armed attack against Turkey as an attack against itself and to take “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security” of Turkey.

b. Baghdad Pact. The United States indicated its support for the area Baghdad Pact countries by State Department press release 604 dated November 29, 1956, which stated in part:

“...The United States reaffirms its support for the collective efforts of those nations to maintain their independence. A threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of the members would be viewed by the United States with the utmost gravity.”

c. Middle East Resolution. The United States by a Joint Resolution on the Middle East, signed by the President on March 9, 1957, announced its determination to assist Middle Eastern nations to maintain their independence. The Resolution declared that the U.S. is prepared to commit its military force, on the determination of the President, against

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4 See State Department publication Treaties in Force for additional arrangements. [Footnote in the source text.]
5 For text of this statement, see Department of State Bulletin, December 10, 1956, p. 918. The ellipsis in the quotation that follows is in the source text.
6 See footnote 8, Document 239.
overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism whenever a victim requests such aid.

d. At the Ministerial Council meeting in London in July 1958, the Secretary of State joined with the Prime Ministers of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and the United Kingdom in signing a declaration accepting the obligation of cooperating with those states in their security and defense, and expressing U.S. willingness to enter into bilateral agreements with those states to effect this undertaking. Appropriate bilateral agreements are now being discussed.

14. U.S. Commitments for Funds, Goods or Services. a. The U.S. has offered and the Turks have accepted a total of four Honest John battalions, two Nike battalions, two additional F-100 squadrons and two additional submarines under the recently passed Ship Loan Act.

b. The Richards Mission informed the Turkish Government that the U.S. is prepared, in principle, to furnish assistance to regional economic activities, including grant aid towards completion of the Turkish portion of regional communications system, the Turkish-Iranian rail link and the Turkish-Iraqi highway link.

c. In support of the Turkish stabilization program, the U.S. on July 31, 1958, agreed to extend to Turkey certain financial facilities amounting to $234 million, as follows: (a) For FY 1959, $100 million Defense Support; (b) $75 million development assistance from the DLF and the EXIM Bank; (c) postponement of payments under previous ECA-MSA loans amounting to $44 million, and (d) sale of agricultural products for payment in lira amounting to $15 million.

15. Other Arrangements.


b. Status of Forces. In accordance with the agreement signed between the U.S. and Turkey on June 23, 1954, the NATO Status-of-Forces agreement is in effect between the U.S. and Turkey.

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7 For text of the declaration, released July 29, see Department of State Bulletin, August 18, 1958, pp. 272-273.


9 In addition, through OEEC, other governments agreed to extend to Turkey credits equivalent to $100 million and the IMF made available to Turkey the equivalent of $25 million. [Footnote in the source text.]

10 For text, see 3 UST 4660.

11 For text, see 5 UST 1465.
c. Economic Cooperation. Agreement signed July 4, 1948.\textsuperscript{12}

d. Atomic energy. Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy signed May 6, 1955, effective June 10, 1955.\textsuperscript{13}

II. Current and Projected Programs and Courses of Action

Individual action items when extracted from this Plan may be downgraded to the appropriate security classification. All actions are continuing unless otherwise noted.

A. Political

16. Continue to encourage development of the Baghdad Pact. While recognizing that Iraq has not participated in Pact deliberations since the coup d'état of July 14, 1958, we have agreed that the determination to remain or withdraw from the Pact should be left to the Iraq Government without pressure of any kind.

\textit{Assigned to: State, Defense}
\textit{Support: ICA, USIA}

17. Consult with the Turkish Government, whenever feasible and appropriate, on matters of mutual interest in the Middle East, with particular reference to the Arab countries.

\textit{Assigned to: State, Defense}

18. Utilize, as appropriate, visits of Turkish officials to other Middle Eastern countries as a means of advancing U.S. objectives in those countries.

\textit{Assigned to: State, Defense}

19. Continue to exercise influence on Turkey to reach an accord with Greece and the U.K. on the Cyprus problem.

\textit{Assigned to: State}

20. Limit the number of American personnel to the minimum required to achieve U.S. objectives, and ensure that newly assigned U.S. personnel receive orientation, with dependents receiving appropriate indoctrination in the field.

\textit{Assigned to: All agencies}

\textsuperscript{12}For text, see 62 Stat. 2566.
\textsuperscript{13}For text, see 6 UST 2703.
B. Economic

21. Carry out continuing consultation with Turkish Government officials to encourage vigorous support by the Turkish Government of its decision to pursue a comprehensive financial program designed to eliminate inflation and restore financial stability.

Assigned to: State, ICA, Treasury

22. Take whatever steps appear feasible to ensure that non-U.S. credit sources provide the assistance promised Turkey under the stabilization plan.

Assigned to: State
Support: ICA

23. Continue to carry out the defense support program consisting primarily of raw materials, basic commodities and spare parts to keep agricultural and industrial sections of the economy operating during critical period of foreign exchange shortage. (See Pipeline Analysis Annex for financial data.)

Assigned to: State, ICA

24. Continue to carry out the technical cooperation program which endeavors to improve Turkish capacity in the fields of operations, management and administration. The program will be kept under constant surveillance to make it responsive to current needs with special reference to stabilization support. In this regard, consideration will be given to new activities in the fields of capital formation and help to State Enterprises management. (See Pipeline Analysis Annex for financial data.)

Assigned to: ICA

25. Review Turkey’s current situation in connection with the internal security program, taking into account that (1) the internal security program for Turkey was started with the expectation that it would be a three year program; and that (2) any further assistance in response to Turkish requests will be based on a review of the program and justification for its continuance.

Assigned to: ICA

26. Negotiate sales agreements for a Title I, PL 480\textsuperscript{14} program under the July 31 agreement.

Assigned to: State, ICA, Agriculture, Treasury

\textsuperscript{14} For text of P.L. 480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, see 68 Stat. 454.
27. Encourage Turkey to create the climate which will encourage the movement of private domestic and foreign capital into productive enterprise.

*Assigned to:* ICA, State  
*Support:* Commerce

28. Consider qualified American capital investments in Turkey under the Investment Guarantee Program in the context of a coordinated use of foreign resources.

*Assigned to:* ICA

29. In publicity efforts stress the achievements which Turkey has made unilaterally and establish the principle that Turkey must seek to achieve a self-sustaining economy.

*Assigned to:* USIA  
*Support:* ICA

30. Encourage the development of appropriate Turkish national programs in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, including as appropriate support for suitable research and training programs in the application of atomic energy to agriculture, medicine, industry and science.

*Assigned to:* AEC  
*Support:* ICA, USIA

C. *Military*

31. Continue to review the possibility of achieving a reduction in NATO-approved force levels for Turkey and, in phase with the effective integration of advanced weapons in the Turkish armed forces, appropriately revise Turkish force levels in the light of NATO requirements, bearing in mind the importance of adequate military support of the Baghdad Pact organization.

*Assigned to:* Defense  
*Support:* State

32. Implement Military Assistance Programs for maintenance and improvement of forces, taking into account Turkish absorption and support capabilities in the rate of any military build-up.

*Assigned to:* Defense  
*Support:* ICA

33. Implement the delivery to Turkey of the commitments listed in paragraph 14 above.

*Assigned to:* Defense  
*Target Date:* As soon as feasible
34. Exert maximum influence with Turkish Armed Forces to obtain best utilization of personnel in view of the lack of personnel available for induction and a definite shortage of qualified personnel for advance technical training. Continue efforts toward specialized training as well as training to improve the literary and general schooling of armed forces personnel.

*Assigned to:* Defense

35. Continue training on a carefully screened basis in U.S. installations both in U.S. and overseas of qualified Turkish military personnel selected to further self-sufficiency in Turkish training programs.

*Assigned to:* Defense

36. Continue emphasis on maximum maintenance and upkeep of matériel by Turkish armed forces, with encouragement of maximum local use of existing facilities and resources to meet their own requirements, particularly with respect to POL and ammunition storage facilities.

*Assigned to:* Defense

*Support:* ICA

37. Encourage cooperation between Turkey and Afghanistan in the military training field and, in particular, encourage the Turkish Government to continue its Military Mission in Afghanistan.

*Assigned to:* Defense

*Support:* State

38. Encourage Turkey to take full advantage of information on subversive personalities, techniques and activities which is available through the Countersubversive Committee and other activities of the Baghdad Pact.

*Assigned to:* State, ICA, Defense

39. Strengthen the present troop-community relations program.

*Assigned to:* Defense

*Support:* USIA

**D. Information and Cultural**

40. Provide appropriate information and other public relations support for political, economic, and military policies and programs set forth elsewhere in this Operations Plan.

*Assigned to:* USIA

41. Strengthen information activities aimed at maintaining Turkish public acceptance of U.S. military personnel and installations in Turkey.

*Assigned to:* USIA
42. Continue information programs which include (1) operation of libraries and library programs; (2) distribution of books, periodicals and wireless file material; (3) production of periodicals, pamphlets and unattributed newsreel footage; (4) support of Voice of America and production of radio programs for VOA and local use; and (5) publication of selected American books by Turkish publishers with emphasis on the "ideological shelf."

Assigned to: USIA

43. Develop extensive personal contacts with Turkish media representatives at all levels to facilitate placement of material favorable to U.S. objectives.

Assigned to: USIA
Support: State

44. Publicize the mutual benefits accruing from Turkey's adherence to NATO and the Baghdad Pact.

Assigned to: USIA
Support: Defense

45. Continue the Informational Media Guaranty Program.

Assigned to: USIA

46. Through binational centers and modest cash grants assist and encourage Turkish groups seeking to organize or sponsor local Turkish-American organizations capable of contributing to understanding of U.S. objectives and development of a more widespread English-teaching program. Provide more adequate facilities for the Binational Center in Ankara, by new construction, utilizing PL 480 funds when available.

Assigned to: USIA

47. Provide advice to Ankara and Istanbul Universities in establishing curricula on U.S. history, literature, etc.

Assigned to: USIA

48. To strengthen existing cultural ties arrange for and support visits of American musicians, writers, artists and others under the President's Special International Program.

Assigned to: USIA

49. Continue the Exchange of Persons program under PL 402 emphasizing educators, members of Parliament, journalists and lawyers.

Assigned to: State, USIA
50. Support U.S. educational institutions in Turkey, utilizing funds as available under Section 104 of PL 480.

Assigned to: State, USIA

Note: See National Intelligence Estimate 33–56, Turkey As An Ally, February 21, 1956.\(^1\)

\[^{15}\)
Not printed. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files)

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323. Message From Prime Minister Menderes to Secretary of State Dulles


[Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Menderes. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

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324. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 33–58


PROSPECTS FOR TURKEY\(^1\)

The Problem

To estimate the present situation and probable developments in Turkey over the next few years, with particular reference to Turkey's political and economic stability and its role in the Western Alliance.

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. The cover sheet indicates this is an advance copy of NIE 33–58. A note on the cover sheet reads in part as follows: "Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff. Concourred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 30 December 1958."

\(^1\)
This estimate discusses Turkey's prospects primarily in the light of events since the publication of NIE 33–56, "Turkey As an Ally," dated 21 February 1956. [Footnote in the source text.]
Conclusions

1. Turkey remains the strongest friend of the US in the Middle East. Its firm anti-Soviet policies enjoy wide domestic support, and there is little likelihood that Soviet gestures will weaken the Turks’ basic distrust of the USSR or their policy of alliance with the West. (Paras. 9, 33, 45–46)

2. Internally, the country faces serious problems—most of them arising from its efforts to become a modern state quickly. There is growing antagonism between Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and the opposition over Turkey’s critical economic problems and the government’s political repressions. Popular dissatisfaction over these issues is apparently strengthening the opposition Republican Peoples Party of former President Inonu. Meanwhile, the adroit Menderes faces dissensions and possible defections within his own Democrat Party but he has at least an even chance of keeping control of his party. (Paras. 10–13, 17–18)

3. We do not believe that these troubles will lead to a revolutionary situation between now and the next elections, which are not due before late 1961. Barring drastic economic deterioration or extreme political provocations, the chance of a military coup remains slight. (Paras. 15–16)

4. Turkey’s severest problems are economic. Brought near to bankruptcy by mismanagement and overambitious development efforts, it gained a reprieve in 1958 with the commitment of $359 million in US and other Western credits and aid, as well as agreement by its foreign creditors to reschedule pressing debt payments. In turn, the government is pledged to a soundly-conceived stabilization program designed to bring spiraling inflation under control, improve Turkey’s critical international financial position, and renew the flow of essential imports. It has already taken promising first steps, such as a long-overdue devaluation of the lira. (Paras. 11–12, 20, 23)

5. On balance, however, there is little more than an even chance that the government will sustain the effort needed to achieve the program’s objectives in the face of the political risks involved in adhering to the required austerity measures. There will be continuing Turkish pressures on the US to liberalize the terms of the aid already committed, and a persistent belief that in the last analysis aid would not be cut off even if Turkish performance falls short. (Paras. 20–22, 36)

6. Turkish-Greek tensions over Cyprus continue. So long as this situation exists, military cooperation between the two in NATO will probably remain minimal. However, recent informal talks between the Turkish and Greek foreign ministers have resulted in a tentative plan for
a solution which offers some hope that progress may be made in the controversy.² (Paras. 37–39)

7. In the Middle East, Turkey is not likely to abandon its policy of resistance to Nasser and the movement he represents. Cooperation with Israel regarding Middle East problems is likely to increase. Turkey views the growth of Communist influence in Iraq as a serious threat to Turkish security. Turkey would probably be critical of any US moves, especially in the Arab world, which it construed as being soft on neutralism. (Paras. 40–46)

8. There has been some strengthening of Turkey’s armed forces, but substantial improvement depends largely on overcoming the serious shortage of personnel trained to maintain and operate the advanced equipment furnished by the US. (Paras. 29–32)

[Here follows the remainder of the estimate.]

² For documentation on the Zorlu–Averoff conversations and the solution of the Cyprus crisis, see Part 1, Documents 169 ff.

325. Editorial Note

On January 15, 1959, the National Security Council heard a presentation on the situation in Turkey by Karl G. Harr. Harr’s briefing was based on the OCB Report on Turkey of November 12, 1958 (Document 321). The memorandum of discussion reads:

“Upon conclusion of Mr. Harr’s briefing, Secretary Anderson cited a number of illustrations of how Turkey and other countries in similar economic difficulties were wasting their resources by putting their scarce money into elaborate and superficial projects such as vast avenues leading nowhere instead of putting their resources into worthwhile development projects. This was obviously one cause of the severe inflation in Turkey.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)
326. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, January 16, 1959, 7 p.m.

2045. Joint Embassy/USOM message. OEEC/IMF missions have now departed Turkey. Based on conversations with various members of group, we believe their impressions can be summarized as follows: (Sturc returning directly to Washington and will doubtless contact interested US officials.)

1. Principal GOT officials remain determined to carry through with stabilization program, in some cases on basis conviction, in other cases on basis commitments which they cannot politically disavow.

2. Credit restrictions being felt by business community but no basic change in ceilings appears desirable, at least until second import quota has been financed. It will probably be desirable to reexamine situation in several months.

3. GOT progress in drawing up investment program very disappointing. This problem requires immediate and increased attention by GOT since so many factors in stabilization program will be affected by nature and size of investment program.

4. GOT balance of payment projections CY 1959 seem fairly realistic. They show about $50 million available for servicing all capital obligations.

5. On balance missions not dissatisfied with progress of program despite disappointment over investment program.

Warren

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 882.10/1-1659. Confidential. Repeated to Paris for USRO and to Istanbul.
327. Letter From Secretary of Defense McElroy to Secretary of State Dulles


DEAR MR. DULLES: This will confirm my recent conversation with Mr. Murphy1 in which I expressed the Department of Defense views with regard to deployment of IRBM’s to Greece and Turkey as proposed by General Norstad. During this conversation, we discussed briefly the reasons why this Department is unable to concur in the view of the Department of State that there are serious financial problems justifying delay in proceeding with the arrangements proposed by General Norstad. Moreover, we do not believe that there exist any technical questions which would require examination of the currently approved program for deployment of IRBM’s to NATO.

As you may recall, the Department of Defense has already funded eight squadrons of Thor and Jupiter IRBM’s. Our remaining problem is one of Department of Defense bookkeeping involving transfer of the financial burden from the Department of the Air Force to the Military Assistance Program. This can be accomplished over a period of two or three years as the flexibility permitted under Military Assistance Program legislation allows reasonable freedom as to the date of the official turnover and hence the timing of any charge against the Military Assistance Program. The fact that definitive funding arrangements cannot be established at this time does not, in our opinion, provide reason for failing to proceed with implementation of the Presidential offer of IRBM’s to NATO countries which he made at the December 1957 Heads of Government meeting.

In the event that the above does not sufficiently clarify Defense’s position concerning the technical and financial aspects of the subject, I shall be most happy to discuss the matter with you further at your convenience.

Sincerely yours,

Neil McElroy

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1 No record of this conversation has been found.
328. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to President Eisenhower


SUBJECT

The Turkish Republican People's Party (RPP)

The present opposition party in Turkey, the Republican People’s Party (RPP) was organized in 1922 by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, founder and first president of the Turkish Republic. Until 1945 it was the only political party permitted and as such was used by Ataturk, and later by President Inonu, to maintain tight control on the government.

The first openly contested elections in Turkish history, held in May 1950, swept the Democrat Party (DP) into power with a complete change in government leadership. It has been in power continuously since then. The DP was organized by a group of dissidents from the RPP who disagreed with the party’s emphasis on state control of industry and the slow pace of Turkey’s political development. During the past several years the arbitrary tendencies of Prime Minister Menderes have alienated many of his former supporters and brought added strength to the RPP. The next national elections are scheduled for 1961.

The RPP, as the only major opposition party in Turkey, has a nationwide organization and considerable popular support, as indicated by the attached list of recent Turkish national election results (Table I). In 1954 the party received 35 percent of the popular vote but, because of the Turkish electoral system, won only 6 percent of the deputy seats in the unicameral Grand National Assembly.

The RPP remained somewhat eclipsed from 1950 until 1957 when it emerged from the national election with nearly 30 percent of the seats in the Assembly. This expression of popular support, or at least dissatisfaction with the regime of Prime Minister Menderes, reinvigorated the party, which had become almost moribund following its defeat in 1950 and the debacle of 1954. RPP leaders feel that they have a popular mandate to protest against the policies of the Menderes regime and the party is attempting to assume the mantle of democracy.


1 Not printed.
Seventy-four-year-old Ismet Inonu—former army general, principal aide to Ataturk in founding the republic, Ataturk’s political heir, and former president and prime minister of Turkey—is president general of the RPP. Inonu is the man chiefly responsible for Turkey’s successful and orderly transition from dictatorship to “democracy”? He is regarded as a sincere and conservative elder statesman. In international relations, Inonu has always expressed his belief that the interests of Turkey can best be served by cooperation with the West; he feels, however, that Turkey is not getting as great a quid pro quo from the United States under Menderes as it should be receiving.

Allen W. Dulles

2 The quotation marks and question mark were apparently added by Eisenhower.

329. Memorandum Prepared in the Policy Planning Staff


[Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Owen H. Chron. Top Secret. 7 pages of source text not declassified.]
330. Memorandum for the Record


SUBJECT
Conversation with Mr. Adnan Menderes, Prime Minister, Turkey

TIME
1030 to 1130 hours, Thursday, 5 February 1959

PLACE
Prime Minister's Office, Ankara, Turkey

INDIVIDUALS PRESENT
Mr. George McGhee
Admiral Arthur W. Radford
Ambassador Fletcher E. Warren
Mr. Rustu Zorlu, Turkish Foreign Minister
Mr. Melih Esenbel, Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

After a friendly welcome, the Prime Minister entered into a full scale discussion on Iran with Mr. Zorlu's participation.

The line taken by the Prime Minister corresponded to that reported in recent conversations by Ambassador Warren. The Prime Minister stated that the Turkish government viewed the present situation in Iran with utmost seriousness. To the Turkish government it represented a crisis of the greatest magnitude. If the Shah signs an agreement with the Soviets, the Baghdad Pact would be rendered negative and the way would be opened for ultimate domination of Iran by the Soviets. Under such circumstances, Pakistan, and probably Afghanistan, would eventually fall under Soviet domination. In Iraq, where he was already pessimistic, the government would also, in all probability, fall under Soviet control. He considered that the Arab states were already lost to the West. Nasser could not be counted on at all. He was asking as his price for cooperation with the West impossible terms including support

Source: Department of State, Turkish Desk Files: Lot 61 D 37, Prime Minister and Cabinet. No classification marking.

1 A subcommittee to study the Middle East, composed of McGhee and Radford, visited Turkey January 31–February 7.

2 Apparently reference is to a conversation on Iran between Warren and Zorlu on February 1. Warren reported on this discussion in telegram 2185 from Ankara, February 1 (Department of State, Central Files, 788.5/2–159) and telegram 2190 from Ankara, February 2 (ibid., 601.8287/2–259). No record of a conversation with Menderes has been found. The Prime Minister had been out of Turkey for most of the previous 2 weeks.

3 Reference to a proposed non-aggression pact between Iran and the Soviet Union.
against Israel; nationalization of oil, and dominance in the Middle East. (Later, however, he indicated that although there were no assurances that Nasser would change, every effort should be made to obtain reorientation of his policy.)

The Prime Minister pointed out the serious adverse effect on Turkey’s position if Iran left the Baghdad Pact. He pointed out that the Turks had largely been responsible for persuading Iran to join the Pact, but that Iran had not gotten the economic and military aid they hoped for. The US should do everything it could to supply them, basing its policy on support of the Baghdad Pact.

He pointed out that if Iran comes under Soviet domination, Turkey would be vulnerable both from Iran, Iraq and Syria. This would, he implied, create need for an increase in Turkish military requirements. Although he recognizes the weaknesses of the Shah personally and his position in Iran, the Turkish government sees no alternative but to try to persuade the Shah, who is Western orientated, to remain in the Baghdad Pact. The Shah was dominated by fear of Russia and his present effort, although misguided, was directed toward alleviating Russian pressure. He could only do this if he had adequate US support, which could take the form of increased assurances from the US through the Bilateral Agreement and increased economic and military aid.

In discussing American military and economic aid to Turkey, the Prime Minister indicated gratitude for aid given in the past, which he felt had been effectively utilized by the Turks. He felt the Stabilization Agreement was a useful and necessary step and gave assurance that the Turks were going to carry it out scrupulously. He stated that he had no apologies for Turkish economic and development policy prior to this agreement. The Turkish government could have taken no other course.

In discussing his forthcoming trip with Mr. Zorlu to Switzerland to meet with the Greek Prime Minister and Foreign Minister on Cyprus, the Prime Minister expressed determination to reach agreement on this issue. He expressed some concern as to whether the Greek officials had a similar determination. He did not volunteer any other details of the issues outstanding with the Greeks and was not questioned on this point.

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331. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 6, 1959.

SUBJECT
Deployment of IRBM's to Greece and Turkey

PARTICIPANTS
Defense—Mr. Quarles, Mr. Holaday, Mr. Knight, Mr. Shuff, Brig. Gen. Whisenand, Brig. Gen. Martin, Col. Colsen, Col. Billingslea
State—Mr. Murphy, Mr. Rountree, Mr. Mathews, Mr. Timmons, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Magill, Mr. Porter

Mr. Murphy said that the Department had been considering this question urgently from both a political and a funding point of view. We had made progress in clarifying the political considerations and expected to be able to reach a political decision shortly after the Secretary returned from Europe. If a favorable political decision were reached, the question of moving ahead would then turn on the possibilities for MSP funding of the deployment. Meanwhile, we wished to share with Defense some of the political factors involved and to obtain some information from Defense bearing on certain of these factors.

Mr. Rountree said that there were, of course, both favorable and negative factors to be taken into account, and that we were in the process of evaluating these. He enumerated a number of considerations being given particular attention. He said that while his listing of these factors might imply his feeling that the disadvantages were more apparent than the advantages, no such conclusion had been reached. In fact, we were aware of strong political arguments favoring the proposal.

Mr. Quarles emphasized the military importance of IRBM's and said he believed we should remind ourselves of the State presentation at a NSC meeting two and a half years ago in which State stressed the urgency of meeting the Soviet IRBM threat. Mr. Murphy observed that State was certainly disposed to favor any military moves that would increase the deterrent strength of the U.S. and NATO.

Mr. Quarles indicated the possibilities of hard-basing IRBM's in the mountains of Turkey. Mr. Murphy asked, in this connection, whether it

Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Turkey. Secret. Drafted by Magill. The meeting took place in Quarles' office at the Pentagon. A note on the source text reads: "Uncleared Memo."

\(^1\) Apparently a reference to discussion of defense policy at the 288th Meeting of the NSC on June 19, 1956. The memorandum of discussion is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
would be necessary to locate the IRBM sites near Izmir and Adana where there are already large numbers of U.S. military personnel. Brig. Gen. Martin replied that no decision could be made until there had been a survey on the ground and consultation with the Turkish authorities, both of which were precluded at present. He indicated that there would be some flexibility but that any site should have adequate access by rail, road or air.

In response to questions regarding requirements for U.S. personnel, Defense representatives stated that one IRBM squadron would require initially about 1250 men, of which 600 would be military personnel, 350 support personnel and 300 civilian contract personnel. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

[2 paragraphs (29-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Wilson reviewed MSP developments which would make it difficult to absorb IRBM costs of the various magnitudes that had been indicated thus far (some of which have been as high as $120 million per squadron). He stressed that a firm indication from Defense of the magnitude of these costs was more important than information on the timing of MSP reimbursement to a decision by Mr. Dillon on MSP funding of IRBM’s. Mr. Wilson pointed out that a decision might well involve a choice between IRBM’s and other high priority military aid needs for Europe.

Mr. Quarles said he did not think the MSP cost for two squadrons of IRBM’s would be anything like as high as $250 million. He did not feel that the cost should be the controlling consideration, but recognized Mr. Dillon’s need to know what it would be. He thought the MSP cost would probably be no more than about $60 million per squadron (presumably for the specialized equipment), and said he would provide firm estimates early in the following week so that they could be taken into account by State in reaching its decision.

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2 A copy of Quarles’ February 12 letter to Murphy outlining Department of Defense estimates of the cost of basing IRBMs in Turkey and Greece is in Department of State, Central Files, 711.56382/2-1259.
332. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey

Washington, March 4, 1959, 9:09 p.m.

2786. Deptel 2304 to Ankara.¹

Deliver following letter from Under Secretary Dillon to Foreign Minister Zorlu:

"March 5, 1959

Dear Mr. Minister:

As a result of our discussion last December² when you explained to me the desire of the Government of Turkey to allocate TL 632 million of counterpart funds to meet a projected deficit in the 1959 budget of the Ministry of Defense, the United States gave intensive and careful consideration to this problem in the light of the Turkish economic stabilization program which the Government of the United States has strongly supported, directly through its own financial resources and indirectly through its participation in the International Monetary Fund and the organization for European Economic Cooperation.

I concluded at that time, that although the programs agreed upon with the IMF and the OEEC contemplated that the budget would be financed from revenue, and that the financing of new investments of the State Enterprises would be made from non-inflationary sources including Defense support counterpart, an increase in the allocation of counterpart to the Ministry of Defense to a level not exceeding TL 350 million would not jeopardize the stabilization program as a whole. (The figure of TL 350 million is, of course, a relatively high one. It represents an increase of more than 100 percent in the amount of counterpart funds of TL 170 million allocated to the Ministry of Defense during the Turkish Fiscal Year 1958, as well as a significant increase in the ratio of U.S. support to the Defense Ministry's proposed budget, even at its higher level. In addition to counterpart financing, the United States is contributing to the defense budget through sizeable amounts of military hardware and common use items.)

I had assumed, also, that if the Turkish Government nevertheless decided upon a level of defense expenditure higher than could be financed from the sum of TL 1,156 million in Turkish revenue already al-

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¹ See footnote 4 below.

² December 9, 1958. A memorandum of their conversation is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
located to the Defense Budget, plus the TL 350 million from the
counterpart funds, the Turkish Government would, in accordance with
its undertakings to the IMF and the OEEC, find the necessary revenue
elsewhere in the budget without creating a budget deficit which would
involve recourse to the Central Bank with consequent inflationary ef-
ficts.

When I learned that Prime Minister Menderes had conveyed to Sec-
retary Dulles and Secretary Anderson his satisfaction with the results
of our December discussions, I was happy to conclude that the matter
had been settled.

I was, therefore, surprised to note in Your Excellency’s letter on
January 5 that the Government of Turkey still desires to finance a de-
fense level of TL 1,788 million in expenditures by requesting the use of
counterpart to meet the whole of an estimated deficit of TL 632 million.

The use of additional United States defense support counterpart as
an exceptional emergency measure to meet the deficit of the Ministry of
Defense could easily leave exposed a more dangerous potential source
of inflation in Turkey, namely, the investment programs of the State En-
terprises. As you and Minister Polatkan will recall, a key factor in the
Turkish stabilization program was the intention of the Turkish Gov-
ernment to avoid recourse to the Central Bank as a means of financing
either a budgetary deficit or the investment program of the State En-
terprises, and substantial reliance was to be placed on the use of the lira
counterpart of foreign financial aid for the non-inflationary financing of
this investment program. If, however, too large an amount of counter-
part is diverted to the budget, there may not be enough available to sup-
port the investment program of the State Enterprises and possibly other
necessary activities.

The fundamental objective that has guided United States thinking
on this subject is that the United States wishes to provide the maximum
support to Turkey’s effort to achieve its economic stabilization program,
not only for greater stability in the present, but also as the most effective
foundation on which both economic and military strength can be built in
the long run. Unfortunately, we do not have information as to the pro-
jected level of the investment programs of the State Enterprises and
manner in which the Government intends to fulfill its determination

3 Apparently reference is to a December 18, 1958, message from Menderes to Dulles
in which Menderes expressed his thanks for the release of counterpart funds to Turkey. A
copy of the letter is ibid., Presidential Correspondence, Lot 66 D 204.

4 No copy of this letter has been found. However, the substance of the message was
reported in telegram 2304 to Ankara, January 21. In the letter Zorlu requested an increased
allocation of counterpart funds to the Turkish defense program. (Ibid., Central Files,
782.5-MSP/1-2159)
that these programs will be financed in a non-inflationary manner. I
think you will agree that, viewing the stabilization program as a whole,
it would be most unwise to reduce unduly the counterpart available for
financing these investment programs until the scope of these programs
is known. We are reluctant, therefore, to agree to a release of additional
counterpart (i.e., beyond TL 350 million) until it is clearer that all sectors
will be financed without recourse to inflationary financing.

The United States Government would welcome a fuller picture of
Turkey’s over-all financing requirements and resources, including the
investment programs of the State Enterprises, so that defense and in-
vestment needs can be weighed against available non-inflationary fi-
nancing before any change in the current United States proposal for
utilizing remaining counterpart is made.

I am happy to note from your letter that you have discussed these
matters in a preliminary way with the United States Operations Mission
Director and other United States representatives in Ankara. I would
hope that you will continue to consult with them.

I am sure you know that the United States Government wants to see
a satisfactory solution to the budgetary and other problems faced by
Turkey in its efforts to maintain an adequate defense posture while de-
veloping the economic structure to enhance the well-being of the Turk-
ish people.

With kindest personal regards,
Sincerely yours, Douglas Dillon
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs"

At time of delivery letter you should state US hopes that in course
of consultations referred to in letter a careful joint review could be made
by Minister of Defense and Chief of US Military Assistance Group in
Turkey to discuss military consequences of alternative levels of defense
expenditure. FYI. It is understood that in conducting such discussions
U.S. officials would keep in mind our over-all objectives in assuring ef-
fектив stabilization of the Turkish economy. End FYI. 5

Dulles

5 In telegram 2630 from Ankara, March 13, Warren reported that he had delivered
Dillon’s message to Zorlu on March 7, and that on March 11 Islak indicated that the Govern-
ment of Turkey was committed not to finance State Enterprise through the central bank.
(Ibid., 782.5–MSP/3–1359)
333. Editorial Note

On March 5 at Ankara, the United States signed bilateral Agreements of Cooperation with the Governments of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. These agreements were developed pursuant to the July 28, 1958, declaration signed by the member states of the Baghdad Pact at its Ministerial Meeting in London. The text of the agreement with Turkey is in 10 UST 320. For text of a Department of State press release explaining the background of these agreements, see Department of State Bulletin, March 23, 1959, pages 416-417. For text of the July 28, 1958, declaration, see ibid., August 18, 1958, pages 272-273.

334. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon) to Acting Secretary of State Herter


SUBJECT
IRBM's for Greece and Turkey

You will recall that the IRBM program for Greece and Turkey was held up pending clarification of the financial implications involved. Defense has come up with a firm figure of about $225 million for the two squadrons, the only variable in this figure being the cost of construction which we estimate to be somewhat higher than the figure presently used by Defense. This could lead to an increase in the total gross to somewhere around $250 million. Defense has also worked out a schedule whereby these costs would be payable by the Mutual Security Program over about a four year period beginning next year. We also obtained final cost figures from Defense on the IRBMs in England and Italy.

The combined impact of the remaining payments for IRBMs in Italy and the U.K. and the first increment of construction costs in Turkey and Greece which would have to be met next year indicates a need for $53 million for IRBMs in the FY 1960 Mutual Security Program. There were no funds provided for these IRBMs in the Military Assistance Program of $1.6 billion submitted to the Congress.

In agreement with Defense I have held up State concurrence in the instruction to Norstad to commence negotiations with the Turks until

such time as a decision is taken on the Supplemental recommended by the Draper Committee. The $53 million for IRBMs is included in the list of items submitted by Defense for this Supplemental. I felt it important vis-à-vis the Congressional presentation not to undertake this extra expenditure for FY 1960 until we have some indication that the funds would be available.

We are now faced with the possibility that there will be no Supplemental request by the President. Should the joint State—Defense recommendation for a Supplemental be turned down, Defense would still very much want to go ahead with the IRBMs in Greece and Turkey, and I think we should make every effort to meet their request. My specific recommendation is that if in talking with the President regarding a Supplemental, it appears that the decision will be against the Supplemental that you specifically mention the IRBM problem in Greece and Turkey and the need for continuing funds for this program. You might point out that it will be impossible to finance this program out of Mutual Security without eliminating most other modernization requirements for NATO, unless future levels of Military Assistance are considerably higher than this year’s request for $1.6 billion. I would hope that you would then recommend to the President that we authorize Norstad to go ahead with the program, realizing this budgetary implication for the future. This would put us in a better position when the FY 1961 Military Assistance Program comes around. As soon as the decision is taken on the Supplemental I would recommend that you authorize Defense to allow Norstad to initiate negotiations with the Turks immediately.

I think you are aware that NEA and S/P are not very happy politically about the decision to go ahead with the IRBM’s in Turkey and Greece,¹ but that after exhaustive consideration of the pros and cons of the matter, both Mr. Murphy and I came to the conclusion that we should go ahead as soon as the financing problem is straightened out.

In case anything comes up on this matter Mr. Bell is fully familiar with every aspect of it and I suggest you call on him. It may be that Defense will want to jump the gun, but my feeling is that we should wait the few days that are required before the decision is reached on the Draper Report.

CDD

¹ At the February 3 Secretary’s Staff Meeting, the question of IRBMs for Greece and Turkey was discussed:

"Mr. Murphy pointed out that NEA and S/P are opposed to the introduction of IRBMs into Greece and Turkey. Consultation with Defense will be necessary and there may be a strong reaction there.

"[7 lines of source text not declassified]" (Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)
335. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
IRBM’s for Greece and Turkey

PARTICIPANTS
Secretary Quarles
Secretary Irwin
Secretary Dillon

I explained to Secretaries Quarles and Irwin our continuing concern regarding the IRBM program for Greece and Turkey. This concern arises from the fact there is no assurance that Congress will in fact vote sufficient mutual security funds in coming years to finance both the IRBM’s and other items of modernization required by NATO. I said that in the event insufficient funds were voted we felt that alternative methods of financing the IRBM’s for Greece and Turkey should be seriously considered, specifically the prospect of declaring these two squadrons surplus thus acquiring them at no expense to the Mutual Security Program, with the Air Force replacing the lost funds through its regular appropriation procedures. I said I thought we should discuss this with the President so as to alert him to this problem if it should arise in the future.

Both Messrs. Quarles and Irwin agreed that we should maintain full flexibility regarding the funding of the IRBM’s should military assistance funds be substantially inadequate in future years. However, both felt it better from their point of view not to raise the question of declaring IRBM’s surplus with the President at this time as this would inevitably involve the Bureau of the Budget. In their view this would mean that the Bureau would press for this action irrespective of what appropriations might be available and would attempt to force them to take it into account in requests for future appropriations. They said they were prepared to agree generally with me that they would give serious consideration to this prospect if it should prove necessary because of inadequate appropriations.

Mr. Quarles suggested that a brief letter be forwarded indicating our agreement to proceed with the IRBM’s based on the understandings reached in our conversations, and he said he would note on his copy of the letter the general tenor of our conversation.

I also raised the question of location of the IRBM squadron in Turkey. Both Messrs. Quarles and Irwin said that they would be glad to give assurances that this matter would be given serious consideration, and they would reach an agreed solution on a location with the State Department. However, they pointed out that, if it was necessary to decide on a location before General Norstad could take the matter up with the Turks, it would lead to considerable delay and also might well be inconclusive since the location would be in any event a matter of mutual agreement between the United States and Turkey. They recommended that they be authorized to proceed on the understanding that the matter of site be left for further agreement between State and Defense at which time State’s views regarding the necessity of avoiding large concentrations of American personnel in one area would be taken fully into account.

I agreed to this procedure and told them that I would promptly prepare a letter along these lines authorizing them to proceed with the Greek and Turk IRBM programs.¹

¹In his April 23 letter to Quarles, Dillon noted:

“I am prepared to agree to your informing General Norstad that he is free to initiate negotiations with Greece and Turkey for the deployment of one IRBM squadron in each country. I would appreciate your having the message to General Norstad cleared by my office.”

In Department of Defense telegram 958716, April 24, CINCEUR was instructed to proceed with formal discussions with the Greek and Turkish Governments for the deployment of IRBM squadrons. (Both ibid.)

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336. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Dillon to Secretary of Defense McElroy


Dear Mr. Secretary: The close cooperation between the United States and Turkey in defense matters has made it possible in recent years to undertake in that country a number of highly important military projects which have resulted in a steady increase in the numbers of

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.5/4-3059. Secret. Drafted by Rountree.
American personnel assigned there. Thus there are now in Turkey American military personnel and their dependents numbering over thirteen thousand.

It is inevitable that the presence in any foreign country of so many Americans would involve difficult problems of community relations. In Turkey, however, the increasing number of incidents has caused me, and I am sure has caused you, very real concern, as has the disquieting rise in antagonism on the part of the Turkish public toward foreigners on their soil which has resulted from these incidents. While we have had, and continue to have, excellent cooperation on the part of the Turkish authorities, I am greatly concerned that if the situation continues not only might general Turco-American relations be impaired but, with particular reference to our military operations in that country, we might find ourselves in real difficulty in maintaining highly important facilities which we now enjoy.

I believe it would be wise for our Departments to give new and serious thought to how the problems which I have mentioned can be minimized. One of the difficulties has, I believe, been the absence in Turkey of a single United States military command. The result has been to have in Turkey units reporting to several separate authorities with consequent inability of any single commander on the spot to direct programs of discipline which might serve to avoid many of the incidents which have occurred. Perhaps the time has come when there should be implemented in Turkey the recommendation made in the Nash Report ¹ for a single United States military command, irrespective of location, mission, or Service branch. It might, of course, be necessary to exclude from this command personnel assigned to NATO, but in that case perhaps directives and procedures could be closely coordinated between the two commanders concerned.

I believe that in studying this problem we should give earnest consideration to the possibility of reducing the numbers of American military personnel and their dependents now in that country. If plans for the stationing in Turkey of IRBM units materialize, there will be dispatched to that country substantial additional forces which inevitably will increase the community relations problem. It may be that a careful survey will disclose possibilities for substantial reductions in other projects which would, at least in part, compensate for the introduction of the new personnel. I earnestly hope that in the future additional personnel assignments will be made to Turkey only for most essential purposes.

¹ Reference is to the December 1957 report by Frank C. Nash, United States Overseas Military Bases: Report to the President.
where the advantages to our national interest clearly outweigh the obvious disadvantages of an increasing American community there.

Perhaps by undertaking a new and imaginative public relations program, deterioration of our community position might be arrested and a climate created in which our present access to facilities can better be assured. I have in mind in this respect the notable success of the SETAF unit in Italy.

In order that these and related problems bearing on our American community in Turkey may receive continuing consideration and coordination in Washington, I should like to propose the establishment of an inter-agency working group of interested agencies, with representation from the Department of Defense and, if you desire, the three Service arms, the CIA, USIA, and ICA, in addition to the Department of State. I propose that the Departments of Defense and State be represented on this group at the Assistant Secretary level, with appropriate levels of representation from the other agencies whose personnel programs also would be reviewed along with those of the Departments of Defense and State. It might be further desirable at an appropriate stage to arrange for consultation with the group in Washington by a representative or representatives from our mission in Ankara.

I should be grateful to have your comments on these observations and suggestions.²

Sincerely yours,³

² In a September 25 letter to Dillon, Irwin reported that the Department of Defense had studied the recommendations in Dillon's April 30 letter, and concluded that most of the U.S. personnel in Turkey were already under two commands, that the number of U.S. personnel could not be reduced, and that the rate of incidents between U.S. personnel and Turks was the lowest in Europe. Under these circumstances, the Department of Defense could not agree to the establishment of an interagency committee, but would agree to the creation of an informal State-Defense working group. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56382/9-2959) This study group began operations on September 29.

³ Printed from an unsigned copy.
337. Editorial Note

On April 24, the Board Assistants of the Operations Coordinating Board approved a revised Operations Plan for Turkey. The revised plan was discussed and approved by the OCB at its May 6 meeting. The Board took particular note of problems arising from "an increase in the number of incidents involving U.S. forces and Turkish citizens," concurred in the necessity of taking actions to ameliorate the problem, and instructed the Departments of State and Defense to keep the OCB informed of developments in this area. Minutes of the OCB meeting of May 6 are in Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, M/OP Informal Notes. A copy of the revised Operations Plan for Turkey is *ibid.* Lot 62 D 430, Turkey. The Operations Plan of November 19, 1958, is printed as Document 322.

338. Editorial Note

On May 11, the Turkish Government and representatives of 13 European nations signed at Paris an agreement for the repayment of outstanding Turkish commercial debts. Under the terms of the agreement, Turkish repayments for debts incurred prior to August 5, 1958, were to be repaid at an annual rate of interest of 3 percent until January 1, 1964. Beginning on January 1, 1964, the payments schedule would be revised and remaining creditors would receive 1/7 of the outstanding amount due to them until 1970 when the debt would be liquidated. Simultaneously, the Turkish Government would liquidate its outstanding debts to U.S. firms. The plan for the debt settlement and its application to U.S. firms was outlined for Acting Secretary of State Herter in a memorandum from Rountree, June 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 882.10/6-459)

339. Editorial Note

According to the memorandum of discussion at the 406th Meeting of the National Security Council on May 13, the Council was given a re-
port on Turkey by General Charles P. Cabell, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence:

"General Cabell reported that rising political tension in Turkey is currently endangering the political stability of that country. The Democratic Party is restricting the activities of the major opposition party, the popularity of which is increasing. Criticism of the government is growing and riots and other disturbances are becoming more frequent. The opposition party maintains that the government is trying to have Mr. Inonu lynched. The Turkish Defense Minister recently remarked that the military leaders may have to intervene if the tension continues. If Inonu were killed, a revolt could take place in Turkey." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

340. Memorandum of Conversation


SUBJECT
Message from Turkish Prime Minister re Counterpart

PARTICIPANTS
Ali S. H. Urganlu, Turkish Ambassador
Douglas Dillon, Acting Secretary
William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary, NEA
G. E. Robert Meyer, ED
Owen T. Jones, GTI

The Ambassador explained that he was calling to deliver a message that the Prime Minister had asked Mr. Zorlu\(^1\) to deliver the day before. Because of Mr. Dillon's unavailability, Mr. Zorlu had discussed the matter generally with Mr. Rountree on the telephone and then, prior to his departure, had asked the Ambassador to deliver it personally to the Acting Secretary.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.5-MSP/5-2959. Confidential. Drafted by Owen Jones.

\(^1\)Zorlu was in Washington for the funeral of former Secretary of State Dulles on May 27.
The substance of the message, according to the Ambassador, was that Turkey would like to have released as soon as possible half of the counterpart for the financing of State Enterprise investment. The Ambassador stressed the urgency of this need because of the various pressures being felt on the Turkish economy in the course of the implementation of the stabilization program. The Ambassador expressed the hope that Mr. Dillon would be able to respond favorably and as soon as possible to this request.

Mr. Dillon recalled his March 5 letter to Mr. Zorlu, as well as the April 1 luncheon with Zorlu at the time of the NATO meeting and repeated what he had said to Zorlu on that occasion, i.e., in order for the United States to take any action with respect to the release of counterpart it would be necessary for us to obtain a fuller picture of Turkey's overall financial resources and requirements, including the investment program of the State Enterprises. After expressing satisfaction on the reports that appropriate material bearing on this problem was now under active preparation by the Turkish Government and would be forthcoming shortly, Mr. Dillon said it might be possible after having preliminary review of this data to make some partial releases of counterpart to help Turkey cope with the pressing needs now facing her.

The Ambassador thanked Mr. Dillon for his comments and indicated that Mr. Dillon's suggestion was a reasonable one. Indeed, he said, following Zorlu's telephone conversation with Mr. Rountree on May 28 he had called the Prime Minister stressing the urgency of getting before us appropriate material that would provide a basis for our being helpful on the counterpart release problem.

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2 See Document 332.
3 The memorandum of their conversation is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1235.
341. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Jones) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Rountree)

Washington, June 17, 1959.

SUBJECT

Status of IRBM's for Turkey

The purpose of this memorandum is to restate and amplify somewhat the oral report that I gave you last week concerning the present status of our implementation of the decision to proceed with negotiations with Turkey on IRBM's.

The Turkish Government has indicated to General Norstad that it desires to have the IRBM's and on May 6 General Norstad requested the United States Government to proceed with the necessary bilateral negotiations.

EUR, which has the responsibility with the Department for the bilateral negotiations, is now working on a Circular 175 authority\(^1\) which will have two attachments: a proposed note to the Turkish Government concerning the IRBM installation in general and a proposed annex to the note having to do with certain financial aspects of our arrangement with the Turks. It is the latter, the financial annex, that is giving us the most difficulty at the present time here within the Department. There appear to be two broad issues involved in this financial annex.

The first has to do with the location of the proposed installation in Turkey and a more precise estimate of the costs of construction. This information will have to be supplied by Defense. It is likely that the cost of construction may be significantly influenced by the location that is finally agreed upon. You will recall that Defense undertook to consult with State on where the IRBM unit would be located. Information out of Paris indicates that at least the Air Force is thinking in terms of the Izmir area which, you will also recall, is one of our community relations problem areas. I believe the Department should press the Department of Defense for a decision on the location and then for a more precise estimate of construction costs, both foreign exchange and local currency.

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\(^1\) This circular, dated December 13, 1955, outlined procedures under which the Department of State granted authority to its representatives abroad to conclude treaties or other formal agreements with foreign governments.
The second has to do with the method of financing. I believe there is general acceptance of the principle, within the Department at least, that all construction costs, whether foreign exchange or local currency, should be borne by the United States Government. The insistence of EUR that a formula be devised that would permit the retroactive application of the concept of infrastructure common funding limits somewhat our freedom of action. If it were possible to waive the infrastructure common funding problem (and there is real doubt whether there will ever be an opportunity to apply it retroactively), the financing operation would be relatively simple. MAP funds could be made available directly to the U.S. Army Engineers for both the foreign exchange and the local currency components.

In order to preserve the infrastructure common funding concept, it is necessary to go through the fiction of having the Turks make the expenditures themselves, with the United States providing the financing. The most feasible way of doing this thus far suggested appears to be through additional Defense Support money. This has a number of political and practical disadvantages. It will represent another significant increase in Defense Support funds which Turkey's undiscriminating neighbors, Greece and Iran, will interpret as further aid to Turkey. It will also be an awkward arrangement that cannot be assured of working as planned. On the foreign exchange element of cost, it involves our putting up Defense Support funds up to $10 to $15 million or more to finance needed Turkish imports and thus free an equivalent $10 to $15 million of Turkish foreign exchange for IRBM expenditures. This assumes Turkey now has or will have that much free foreign exchange. I doubt if this assumption can safely be made. We might well find ourselves in the position of putting up Defense Support funds without the Turks being able to put up the free foreign exchange for the IRBM's. On the local currency element of cost, to the extent US-owned counterpart were inadequate it involves for the first time in Turkey our tying Defense Support funds at the outset with counterpart generation to be used solely for a military requirement. This is a slippery slope to get onto and one from which it might be difficult to disengage ourselves at a later date. In both political and practical terms, we in GTI believe that direct MAP financing would be an infinitely simpler and more desirable way of financing this project and we have expressed the hope that EUR can find a way to accept this concept.

There are two issues here: (a) should construction costs be financed with MAP or Defense Support funds, (b) should we ascertain from Defense their thinking on location and costs before opening negotiations
with the Turks. We cannot open negotiations with the Turks without an answer to the first question. I don’t believe we can answer adequately the first question without getting more precise information from Defense on the proposed location and on the total and composition of construction costs.¹

²In a July 22 letter to Knight, Murphy outlined Department of State plans for funding construction costs for IRBMs and requested Department of Defense “current thinking” on security and housing. (Department of State, Central Files, 782.65/7-2259)

342. Memorandum of Conversation


SUBJECT

Turkish Economic Affairs

PARTICIPANTS

C. Douglas Dillon, Acting Secretary
Ali S. H. Urguplu, Ambassador of Turkey
Mr. Hasan Isik, Deputy Secretary General for Economic Affairs, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs¹
Owen T. Jones, Director, GTI

Mr. Isik opened his short call on the Acting Secretary by referring briefly to the worthwhile discussions that he and his colleagues had been having with the IMF. He then recalled his Foreign Minister’s recent letter to the Acting Secretary on counterpart releases,² thanked the Act-

¹Isik led a five-man mission to the United States for discussions with the IMF. Documentation on the Turkish mission’s discussions with representatives of the Department of State, ICA, and Treasury is ibid., Central File 782.5–MSP.

²In the letter, dated July 12, Zorlu requested the “liberation” of counterpart funds to the Turkish Government. The letter was delivered by Isik to the Department of State apparently on July 22. A copy of Zorlu’s letter is ibid., 782.5–MSP/7–1259. Dillon replied to Zorlu in an August 6 letter that stressed the need for the Turkish Government to plan and coordinate an investment program and to make up its arrears in payments to the counterpart fund. (Ibid., 782.5–MSP/8–659)
ing Secretary for the action subsequently taken, and expressed satisfaction with the various meetings that he had had with various U.S. Government officials while here in Washington this week.

The Acting Secretary responded by expressing pleasure with the progress that the Turkish Government had been making in the implementation of its stabilization program. He observed that there were still several fields in which some problems needed to be worked out and mentioned specifically the problem of investment coordination and planning and counterpart deposits. With respect to investments, he noted the need for a rational investment program that would indicate priorities and that would serve to round out the broad program that the Turkish Government had undertaken last year to regularize its economic affairs. With respect to counterpart arrearages, the Acting Secretary commented on the dangers in getting behind in something like this, and the advantages of getting it cleared up as soon as possible, noting in passing possible Congressional interest here in the United States if these arrearages were allowed to drag on. The Acting Secretary said he was glad to learn that Mr. Isik had already indicated here that an investment program would be available soon and that the counterpart account would soon be brought up to date.

Mr. Isik confirmed these intentions in both respects, saying that with respect to the investment program, his Government would first address itself to the public sector and that it would probably be some time later before it could come up with anything useful with respect to the private sector.

The visit closed with Mr. Isik expressing the hope that the Acting Secretary would be able to visit Turkey again at an early date.

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3 On July 20, the United States authorized the release of 362 million lira of counterpart funds to the Government of Turkey.

4 Isik discussed the counterpart problem at a July 21 meeting at the Department of State. A memorandum of this conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 782.5-MSP/7-2159.
343. Letter From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Knight) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)


DEAR MR. MURPHY: I was pleased to note in your letter of 22 July\(^1\) that you anticipate early action on clearance of a formal Circular 175 authority to negotiate an IRBM agreement with Turkey. We will take prompt action on the papers when they arrive.

The best estimate we can now make on the number of U.S. military personnel likely to be stationed in the Izmir area during the next five years, exclusive of those assigned to the IRBM squadron, is 920. This figure represents an increase of 60 over the current strength of 860. The IRBM squadron will require an initial assignment of approximately 1,100 personnel. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]

The question of financing the family housing for U.S. personnel to be stationed in Turkey to implement the IRBM agreement is under study. However, MAP funds must be excluded from consideration since it has been determined that they cannot be made available for this purpose.

The USAFE Team currently making an on-the-spot survey has been directed to go into the questions of alternative sites, cost figures, and other pertinent information. Your staff has received copies of the cable directives for this team. I will provide additional details on control techniques together with family housing financing proposals as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours,

Robert H. Knight

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/7-3159. Secret
\(^1\) See footnote 2, Document 341.

344. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 17, 1959.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 882.131/8-1759. Secret; Limit Distribution. 4 pages of source text not declassified.]
345. Telegram 602 From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, August 29, 1959, 4 p.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 882.131/8–2959. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. 5 pages of source text not declassified.]

346. Memorandum From Secretary of State Herter to President Eisenhower


SUBJECT

Completion and Announcement of IRBM Agreement with Turkey during Khrushchev Visit

On September 10 our Embassy in Ankara was authorized to open negotiations with the Turkish Government for an agreement on the deployment of IRBMs in Turkey. Draft texts of a proposed U.S.-Turkish agreement were transmitted to the Turkish Government for its consideration. Prior to the opening of the U.S.-Turkish negotiations, the Turkish Government had indicated to SACEUR its readiness to accept his recommendation for deploying IRBMs in Turkey.

Our Embassy in Ankara now reports that the Turkish Government has accepted, apparently without change, the draft proposed by the United States. Our Embassy also reports that the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mr. Zorlu, is very anxious to sign the agreements before Saturday, September 19, when he departs for the U.N. General Assembly in New York.


1 Khrushchev was scheduled to visit the United States September 15–27.
2 The authorization was sent in telegram 771 to Ankara, September 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.8297/9–1059)
3 No copy of the draft text has been found.
4 In telegram 738 from Ankara, September 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.8297/9–1559)
York. It may be technically possible to complete all arrangements on the U.S. side in time to permit signature this week, although the mechanics are such that this is not certain. In any event, we should be ready to sign in the very near future. At the time of signature, it would be normal practice to issue a brief press statement, subject to Turkish agreement, announcing that the U.S. and Turkey had concluded an agreement on the deployment of IRBMs in implementation of the NATO Heads of Government decision of December 1957 to equip NATO forces with the most modern weapons. Such a press announcement is desirable at the time of signature because of the serious risk of press leaks after the agreement is concluded.

It is of course recognized that this procedure would probably result in a public announcement on deployment of IRBMs in Turkey during the Khrushchev visit. On the other hand, the deployment of IRBMs for Turkey is part of the long-agreed program for making the most modern weapons available to our NATO allies. Implementation of this program has been carried forward hitherto at a regular rate without allowing the program to be impeded by Soviet actions. Agreements on IRBMs and atomic stockpiles have been signed as soon as negotiations were completed; failure to do so would have delayed the actual deployment of the missiles themselves. I therefore believe it would not be wise to delay in any way in implementing this particular step in the program because of the presence of Khrushchev in the United States. Furthermore, it is impossible to predict now whether circumstances might be better after the Khrushchev visit; they might well be less favorable than those which now prevail.

I would appreciate your approval of the above course. 

Christian A. Herter

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5 The agreement was signed without publicity on September 20.
6 An annotation by Goodpaster on the source text reads: “17 Sept 59. State notified of President’s approval. G”
347. Memorandum of Conversation


SUBJECT
Turkish Economic Problems

PARTICIPANTS
Fatin Rustu Zorlu, Turkish Foreign Minister
Hasan Isik, Turkish Foreign Ministry
The Under Secretary
Owen T. Jones, GTI

The conversation turned largely on Turkish relations with IBRD, Turkish investment coordination and planning, and means by which Turkey could get additional short-term financing.

Mr. Zorlu opened the meeting by referring to the negative results of his meeting with Mr. Black and the fact that this might also affect the availability of Turkish credits with the IDA. In the course of the conversation, Zorlu said this news would not be well received in Turkey by President Bayar, who probably would not be pleased to learn of any contact whatsoever with IBRD. Zorlu then recalled the acrimonious luncheon that President Bayar had with the IBRD when he was in Washington in 1954 and reviewed generally the negative attitude that IBRD had taken toward Turkey.

The Under Secretary said that in talks with the IBRD since Mr. Zorlu’s meeting with them, he had not gained the impression that they intended to extend their remarks to any possible credits from IDA. IBRD’s principal concern had to do with the heavy foreign exchange servicing requirements of external obligations over the next six to eight years. IDA would present no problem in that respect, since the servicing of its obligations would be in local currencies. Neither had it been his impression that IBRD intended to shut the door indefinitely to Turkish loans. Rather the door was left open to a continuing reappraisal leading to the extension of IBRD credits after several years and an easing of the external debt servicing pressures. Moreover, credits opened after an interval of several years would call for payments beyond the present six- to eight-year period that troubled the IBRD particularly.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 882.00/10–759. Confidential. Drafted by Jones and approved in U on October 14.

1 Zorlu and Menderes were attending the 7th session of the CENTO Ministerial Council in Washington (October 7–9).

2 No documentation on this meeting has been found.

3 January 26–29, 1954, during a January 24–February 27 visit to the United States.
Meanwhile, Mr. Dillon went on to say, we had hoped the IBRD would be able to provide Turkey some guidance and help in investment planning and coordination and in the development of an investment program. Given the strong feelings in Turkey toward the IBRD, Zorlu said there was little prospect of Turkey's seeking such guidance. Mr. Dillon then suggested that Turkey might want to do what Iran and Pakistan had done in utilizing Ford Foundation grants to retain Harvard University teams headed by Professor Mason to help in formulating and coordinating an investment program. Among the advantages of this type of arrangement was that these people would be working for the Turkish Government and thus afford the Turkish Government more freedom of action. In expressing interest in this proposal, Zorlu said they themselves had considered the possibility of retaining the services of a Dutch economist by the name of Professor Tinbergen. This part of the discussion closed with Mr. Dillon saying that the important thing was to have an investment program developed. There were a number of ways by which this could be done.

The discussion then turned to United States aid. After noting the United States aid level of $80 million to Turkey, Mr. Zorlu pleaded that the United States make an additional amount immediately available by dipping now into the reserve fund that Mr. Dillon had mentioned in their last meeting. In this connection, the Foreign Minister stressed the fact that Turkey had no reserves right now and needed some short-term financing immediately to give it more elbow room. Mr. Dillon explained at some length the problems that we have in administering the reduced amount of funds made available to us by Congress this year, referring specifically to the defense support money and to the contingency fund. He pointed out that actually there was only a small uncommitted amount left from these sources and that while Turkey's desire for funds now was understandable, it was essential that the United States preserve this small residual uncommitted amount to meet, when they arise, possible emergencies such as the Taiwan crisis of last year. As the year went on, we would be prepared to review the problem. If there were still funds available, we would be happy to consider giving Turkey some further supplemental assistance.

In view of our shortage of funds, Zorlu then asked if we could ease the situation for Turkey by releasing a part of the aid level of $80 million on the same basis that we released the special allocation of $25 million last year. Mr. Dillon thought this would be possible and said we would look into it. This seemed to satisfy Mr. Zorlu, for he went on to say that if

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4 Apparently a reference to their December 9, 1958, meeting in Washington. A memorandum of their conversation is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
they got an immediate release of some of the $80 million they could wait for the remainder.

In connection with this problem of short-term financing, the Foreign Minister also asked Mr. Dillon to speak to the Germans on behalf of Turkey. It was Zorlu's feeling that Germany was prepared to help Turkey, but for political reasons it was deterred from taking action independently of and possibly contrary to the consensus of the other OEEC member countries. Indeed, he felt that there had been some collusion among the OEEC members in withholding further credits to Turkey, such credits being, he felt, a logical corollary to the successful implementation of the stabilization program. Mr. Dillon said that we would speak to the Germans via our Embassy in Bonn.5

5 No message to Bonn has been found.

348. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 9, 1959.

SUBJECT

Turkish Prime Minister's Call on the President

PARTICIPANTS

The President
His Excellency Adnan Menderes, Turkish Prime Minister
His Excellency Ali S. H. Urguplu, Ambassador of Turkey
His Excellency Fatin Rustu Zorlu, Turkish Foreign Minister
The Honorable Christian A. Herter, Secretary of State
The Honorable G. Lewis Jones, Asst. Secy. of State for NEA
The Honorable Fletcher Warren, United States Ambassador to Turkey

Mr. Menderes, who had met the President when he was Commander at SHAPE and on two other occasions, greeted the President warmly. He did all the talking for the Turkish party, except for a few interpolations by Mr. Zorlu.

Mr. Menderes wished to thank the President (a) for receiving him, (b) for having the CENTO meeting in Washington, and (c) for the un-

wavering support which the United States has given to the regional CENTO states. Mr. Menderes stressed to the President the excellent atmosphere prevailing among the regional members at the Conference. He said the Pakistanis displayed a greater peace of mind than at previous meetings and that all of the members were leaving in a better frame of mind.

The President brought up the question of the radio propaganda attacks against Iran. The Secretary referred to the special declaration issued by the CENTO Council of Ministers in this regard. Mr. Menderes confirmed that these propaganda attacks were continuing and said that they had had the interesting effect of stiffening the resistance of the Iranian people and causing a "rallying to the throne". The President then spoke to the Secretary regarding the editing of a statement re Iran which the President was to issue after seeing Eghbal.

The President told Mr. Menderes that nothing would give him greater pleasure than to visit the CENTO countries. The trouble was that he was bound to his desk. He could not delegate his responsibilities to the Vice President. If it were possible to make the Vice President Acting President then Mr. Eisenhower would not be abroad as President. If he went abroad he would have to be pursued by a stream of papers on which only his signature would serve. Moreover, once he started visiting countries he would have to visit many countries. "It is impossible to visit 10–12 countries for two days each." Mr. Menderes said that Turkey understood the President's problem, but nonetheless hoped sincerely it would be possible for him to visit Turkey at some stage. He said, "Your visit to the CENTO countries would be worth three American divisions."

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1 For text of the CENTO declaration on radio propaganda transmitted from Communist bloc states, see Department of State Bulletin, October 26, 1959, p. 586.
349. Preliminary Notes of a Meeting of the Operations Coordinating Board

Washington, November 18, 1959.

[Here follows agenda item 1.]

2. Report and Operations Plan on Turkey (Secret)\(^1\)

Mr. Oliver Marcy, Deputy Director, and Mr. A. Guy Hope of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs were present for the OCB discussion of the Turkish papers.

There was a prolonged discussion of the recommendation by the Working Group that there is no need for the NSC to review US policy toward Turkey (NSC 5708/2)\(^2\) at this time. The Acting Chairman, Mr. Harr (White House) said he could not reconcile important sections of the policy paper with the Working Group’s recommendation. In developing his thesis Mr. Harr, supported by Mr. Gray, alleged that some current operations were not wholly consonant with policy particularly with regard to MSP guidance such as on force levels and support; further that events have overtaken the policy, or will shortly. Mr. Harr thought that decisions which the NSC should make are being taken elsewhere and that the OCB, by foregoing NSC policy review, is, in effect, precluding the NSC from exercising its function with regard to Turkey, a decision which Messrs. Harr and Gray felt only the President himself should make.

In response to Messrs. Harr and Gray, the other members of the Board commented as follows: Mr. Reinhardt noted his understanding that only three NSC papers dealt with force levels; it would appear, therefore, that these instances were exceptions rather than the rule. Mr. Williams (Defense) said that Defense considered the policy guidance was adequate for their operations, although they would not be opposed to a policy review. Mr. Reinhardt indicated that the same was true for the Department. Mr. Saccio (ICA) noted that it was a daily function of the Mutual Security Coordinator to make decisions within NSC policy guidelines with regard to MSP programming levels.

On Mr. Reinhardt’s recommendation, the Board approved the Operations Plan but withheld approval of the Report pending further

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Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, M/OP Informal Notes 1959. Secret. The approved minutes of the November 18 meeting, dated November 25, are ibid.: Lot 62 D 430. Minutes VII.

\(^1\) A copy of the Operations Plan for Turkey, dated November 25, is ibid., Turkey. The approved report on Turkey is printed as Document 352. No copy of the draft report was found.

study of the problems posed and upcoming consideration by the NSC of the Annual MSP Report to the National Security Council.

There was also a discussion of the problem of community relations in Turkey. Mr. Marcy gave an oral report on the conclusions of the State-Defense Working Group. Mr. Gray wondered if the problem were amenable to solution or if it were an inherent consequence of having American troops overseas. Mr. Allen (USIA) said that frictions could be eased if not wholly eliminated. Mr. Williams said the Defense Department sincerely regrets the incidents occurring in Turkey and has made a real effort to reduce them. He cited figures which indicated that the number of incidents in Turkey is the second lowest in Europe. There were some expressions of incredulity at this information. Mr. Marcy noted a formal report would soon be made by the Special Working Group to their principals. He believed that the recommendations of the Working Group would be of assistance in meeting the problem of community relations.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

350. Editorial Note

President Eisenhower visited Turkey December 6–7, during his 11-nation good will tour (December 3–23). The President and his party arrived at Ankara from Italy at 3 p.m. on December 6. After an airport greeting from President Bayar and ceremonial functions, including a wreath-laying at the tomb of Ataturk, the President met with Bayar, Prime Minister Menderes, and Foreign Minister Zorlu at the Presidential Palace. (See Document 351) After this meeting, the President attended a formal dinner given by Bayar at 8:30 p.m. He returned to his residence at 11 p.m. At 7:30 a.m. on December 7, the President, accompanied by President Bayar, left by helicopter for Esenboga Airport. He left Ankara for Karachi at 8:10 a.m., following brief airport ceremonies. For text of the joint communiqué issued after Eisenhower’s talks with Turkish leaders, see Department of State Bulletin, December 28, 1959, pages 932–933. Eisenhower’s recollections of the meeting are in Waging Peace, pages 492–493.
351. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Ankara, December 6, 1959.

OTHERS PRESENT

President Bayar, Prime Minister Menderes, Foreign Minister Zorlu, Secretary
General Eisenbel, Mr. Benler, Mr. Berkol, Secretary Murphy, Ambassador
Warren, Mr. Cowles, Mr. Hagerty, Major Eisenhower

President Bayar opened the meeting by welcoming President Eisenhoweerto this country and inviting him to give his views first.

The President said he sees the problems of our time to be mainly
two: the first is the need for disarmament. He holds the conviction there
is no change in the basic purpose of the Soviets. A great danger, then, lies
in over-optimism. Therefore, for an indeterminate period, we must keep
up our level of armaments, even though they are burdensome. Even
Khrushchev feels these burdens and recognizes a need for some disarm-
ament. The main difference in approach lies in the fact that Khru-
shchev wants disarmament on a "trust" basis. He is, however, willing to
negotiate even if he accrues no benefits other than a temporary advan-
tage. From this the President concludes that we must still negotiate to-
wars a world disarmament but that we must do so with our eyes open
to avoid duplicity.

The second great problem in the world is that of the underdevel-
oped nations. These nations, since achieving independence, are discov-
ering that they have more problems than they had bargained for.
However, despite their difficulties they have attained a vision that peo-
ple do not have to suffer want. They have seen in other places the poten-
tial dignity of man and desire to attain this with every possible speed.
The result is an explosive situation which could end up in anarchy or in
the underdeveloped nations turning to the Soviets for help. Soviet help
in fact turns out often to be an empty promise. Since 1954 the Soviets
have promised aid totaling $912 million aggregate to these nations but
have actually distributed only some $250 million to $300 million. This
aid furthermore is often given in such a way as to be hardly useful. Items
are sold at prices set by the Soviets and they often drive a hard bargain in
exacting repayment. The significance of this is that the free world must
join together now to plan how to raise its overall economic strength. This
cannot be done strictly on the basis of financial aid. All countries must
work together in their own way. The Turks, for example, contribute by
maintaining large military forces. Many countries in Western Europe

Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International File. Secret. Pre-
pared by Major Eisenhower.
have developed capital accumulations which can be used for the benefit of all, but the use of these reserves requires coordination. A study is needed to determine how this coordination should be accomplished.

The President concluded by saying that although his trip is labeled as a “good will” trip, he has an important secondary objective of portraying to the nations he visits his views on our great cooperative problem.

Mr. Zorlu then took the floor. He expressed pleasure at the importance the United States attaches to the security and wellbeing of the smaller nations. He feels another significance of the President’s trip is his showing, prior to a summit meeting, that he is desirous of furthering the welfare of the Middle Eastern countries. Mr. Zorlu analyzed Soviet motives in seeking a détente at this time as follows: first, there is the pessimistic approach (from the Soviet viewpoint). Here the Soviets found that they cannot push us further without risking war and they have been unsuccessful in efforts to create dissonance among allies by a series of crises. The optimistic approach concludes that the Soviets have developed more confidence in themselves by economic accomplishments and now feel that by cutting defense expenditures they will attain greater possibilities of challenging the West economically. By so doing they can prove the superiority of communism. Perhaps the Soviets feel that they are ahead of the free world militarily. A relaxation and an end to the arms race will make this lead permanent. Either analysis of Soviet motives produces the same results. The Soviet goal is still domination of the world and the free world must be able to maintain its solidarity. Any dissonance among allies encourages the USSR. Mr. Zorlu cited such examples as the disagreements between the OEEC and the Outer Seven and the French efforts to join the “nuclear club.” He expressed gratitude that U.S. diplomacy, particularly that of the President, has kept solidarity among the allies. He predicted a favorable verdict of history on the President’s trip.

With regard to a summit meeting, with efforts to work toward eventual disarmament, Mr. Zorlu is not against this. He feels it wise to cut back military expenditures so long as disarmament is coupled with guarantees. He fears, however, that a summit alone without bilateral relationships would cause suspicion, not so much in Turkey as in other countries. Some nations might feel abandoned, particularly if a series of conferences were to give the impression of a world directorate. This would make blackmail easy. In this regard he feels that bilateral relations and CENTO will counterbalance the bad efforts of the summit.

Mr. Zorlu then expressed fears regarding the effect of a détente on trade. The “have” countries have a dynamism which will cause them to trade with Communist countries. Particularly harmful to the free world is the extension of long-term credits to the Communists. This deprives
underdeveloped nations from aid, gives the USSR a chance to “leap forward,” and gives the Communists a chance through this economic expansion to penetrate underdeveloped countries. He expressed great interest in the President’s idea of coordinated aid. Mr. Zorlu feels that there are two kinds of underdeveloped countries. One is the kind which is “on the line.” These are committed to the West and are located in contact with the USSR. They are in a better position than the uncommitted countries to receive and make use of aid. The Marshall Plan was successful because it was concentrated (like the administering of a drug) in necessary countries where it could help. He made a special plea for Turkey and Greece as areas of concentration in contrast to spreading a little bit of aid everywhere.

Mr. Zorlu then said the Middle East nations feel more secure than ever before. This is particularly true since the CENTO meeting in Washington. Iran and Pakistan are stronger than previously and inclined to solve their problems with their neighbors. He cited the Pakistan-India and the Iran-Afghanistan relationship. He recommended that the President use all influence possible on the Afghans. They are not willing to be Soviet satellites, but fail to realize the danger of cooperation with the Communists. The Turks are attempting to encourage help from NATO in influencing the Afghans. He said the Iranians and the Pakistanis are more anxious about the Afghans than are the Turks. The Turks take comfort in the recent visit of the Afghan Foreign Minister to Pakistan and the fact of the President’s visit.

Mr. Zorlu expressed concern over Arab disagreements. This is largely the result of aggressive intentions on the part of Egypt despite efforts which Nasser makes to improve relations on the surface with the West. He blames Egyptian pressure largely for the weakness shown by Iraq. Zorlu fears the Iraqis less than the Egyptians because the Iraqis have no desire to dominate their neighbors. NATO is dedicated to preserving the status quo; Egypt is not. Therefore Egypt’s fate will be linked to the USSR. A strong measure in Zorlu’s view to remedy this situation would be for the United States to become a full member of CENTO.

Regarding the economy of Turkey, Mr. Zorlu expressed thanks for U.S. aid and economic stabilization the next year, and was gratified that they received such aid again this year with only a small cut in the special fund. In talks with Mr. Dillon the Turks have obtained the impression that these cuts might be restored. Turkey’s problem is that of coordinating the help which might come from Europe, particularly from Italy and Germany. While these countries have expressed willingness, they have

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1 Eisenhower was scheduled to visit Afghanistan on December 9.
2 Afghan Foreign Minister Naim visited Pakistan on November 20.
shown no results thus far. A recent economic conference in Berne brought forth short-term credits only, aside from an effort to avoid duplication of aid between countries. If the U.S. would lead in coordinating economic aid to Turkey, the Turks would be most grateful. The Turks would like to enter the Common Market and again they desire our help. Some elements in NATO are conservative. This causes difficulties. The Marshall Plan would never have been implemented if it had been left up to the bankers.

The President said he had heard of the Turkish ambition in this regard, recognizes the need, and is sympathetic to the project. He mentioned that Mr. Clarence Randall is studying the problem now. Clarence Randall has advised thus far that this type of thing should be done through private capital. A strong advantage held by Turkey in attracting private aid is the fact that these companies have faith in the Turkish Government. However, these companies do require a capital accumulation of $125–130 million. The President concluded by saying that he is personally sympathetic to the project, and will have the problem studied as a matter of urgency. Experts will get together to study priorities and requirements.

The President told Mr. Zorlu that he shares Zorlu’s suspicion of summit meetings, particularly when they replace broader consultation. He has not been to one since 1955. He disapproves the idea of a few nations dividing the world. He does, however, firmly believe in the value of personal contact between heads of nations. With regard to advice to Afghanistan, he pointed out the distance of the United States plus its lack of common heritage and religion. He advised that Turkey might prove a better advisor to Afghanistan than the United States.

Regarding military strength, the President does not believe that the Russians at this time consider themselves superior to the U.S. Our retaliatory power is far greater than theirs. While our ICBMs may be somewhat slower in development, we do have IRBMs and the Atlas. The Atlas has now achieved a fantastic accuracy. Further, we have advanced type bombers with air-to-surface missiles. The Soviets believe that general war would result in their destruction and the current technique is to distract people from the military situation and to compete economically.

The President said he favored trade with the Soviet Union when our side gets the best of the bargain. He does not condone giving secrets or aiding “leaps forward.” He is against the extension of long-term credits.

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3 Not further identified.
4 Turkey applied for EEC associate membership on October 31.
The President said he favors coordination of economic aid and will be glad to help. He has mentioned this to Macmillan, Gronchi, Segni and Pella.

Mr. Zorlu clarified his position on trade. He had not referred to normal trade but to trade through credits. The President reiterated that the United States has objected strenuously to the provision of five-year long-term credits by the UK to the USSR.

Zorlu expressed appreciation that the President will talk with Adenauer in favor of economic aid to Turkey. Some people feel that economic aid is injurious to an alliance. The Turks do not agree with this and are willing to accept aid from the NATO allies. Mr. Zorlu expressed pleasure with our military aid. He is glad to have the IRBMs. He has allocated the fields for its deployment; and wants to get them set up as soon as possible. He does not visualize much additional aid from Germany in the military field.

Regarding cultural relations, Mr. Zorlu spoke a word for the Middle East Technical University (METU) as a good place for help. Students come from all over the Middle East and are probably better off here in Ankara than they would be if they were students in the United States. He expressed pleasure at our aid to Ataturk University. The President said he was looking for a chance to commend this type of enterprise in a speech. Mr. Zorlu said there are three institutions of this type—the Middle East Technical University, the Middle East Institute of Administration, and Ataturk University.

Mr. Menderes in speaking for his government cited the remarkable identity between the Turkish and U.S. views, his pleasure at the President’s trip, and his pleasure at the President’s apparent realization of the dangers of détente. Since no other country is so much “in line” with the United States as is Turkey, there is really very little to talk about.

It was decided that a communiqué would be worked out between Mr. Murphy and Mr. Zorlu to be released when finished. With some cordial remarks on the objects of the trip, the meeting ended.

John S. D. Eisenhower
OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
REPORT ON TURKEY (NSC 5708/2)¹
(Policy Approved by the President—June 29, 1957)

(Period Covered: From: November 13, 1958
Through: Date of Board Action)

1. General Evaluation. Progress has been made toward attaining most of the U.S. policy objectives for Turkey, particularly with the Cyprus agreement and the resultant improvement of Turkish relations with Greece and the advances made by Turkey in the economic stabilization program. To allay Turkish anxiety prior to the Khrushchev U.S. visit,² the Secretary of State consulted with the Turkish Foreign Minister in Paris.³ For its part, Turkey strongly supports Free World security arrangements, and the U.S. and its allies enjoy continued access to Turkish resources and military facilities.

2. Area Relations. Since the Cyprus agreement, Turkish-Greek collaboration on other outstanding issues has taken a generally encouraging direction. Turkey’s relations with its Near Eastern neighbors continue to be affected by the Turks’ distrust of Nasser, whom the Turkish Government regards as ultimately as great a threat to the security of the area as Communist subversion on the assumption that Nasser will eventually fall under Moscow direction. Turkey has maintained close contact with the Qasim Government in Iraq and continues to urge the U.S. to support Qasim’s efforts to maintain his independence of both Moscow and Cairo. Turkey, through CENTO, is urging increased support to Iran by the U.S. and with other regional members is urging increased U.S. and U.K. support to that organization.

3. Economic Stabilization Program. a. Turkey has been reasonably successful in the implementation of the stabilization program

Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Turkey. Secret. A title page and an undated covering memorandum are not printed. In the covering memorandum, Bromley Smith noted that the Board concurred in sending the report to the NSC after revision of paragraph 6 and noted the State—Defense belief that the policy did not need NSC review. Minutes of the OCB meeting of December 9 are ibid., Minutes VII. Smith also noted that the NSC “noted and discussed” the OCB report at its January 7 meeting; see Document 353.

² Khrushchev visited the United States September 15–27.
³ A memorandum of this conversation, September 4, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1458.
announced in August 1958. The control of credit and reduction of excessive liquidity accompanied by a flow of goods to the market and some withdrawal of non-economic producers, have resulted in the substantial establishment of a market economy in which prices and costs are important factors. If Turkish officials continue to pursue firm fiscal and economic policies, a steady rate of economic growth through higher levels of production could be expected.

b. The support promised by the U.S. in connection with the stabilization program has been forthcoming: $100 million of procurement authorizations have been issued for the import of basic commodities, raw materials and spare parts. This represents $75 million of Defense Support and $25 million of special emergency assistance to replace depleted inventories; of the $75 million in credits available for development, $13.0 million in loans have been authorized by the Export-Import Bank and $31.3 million in loans have been approved by the DLF. Projects for the remainder of the credits are being examined by the two lending agencies; a PL 480 sales agreement for $35 million was concluded in February 1959; and arrangements were made through the Export-Import Bank to reschedule the payment of $44 million on principal and interest on early ECA-MSA loans. In addition, through OEEC, other governments agreed to extend to Turkey credits equivalent to $100 million and the IMF made available to Turkey the equivalent of $25 million.

c. On the other hand, progress has been uneven and there has been some loss of "forward momentum." The most conspicuous deficiency is in the planning and coordination of investments, particularly in the public sector. However, it is hoped that the expressions of concern in this connection from the OEEC, the IMF and from the U.S. and German Governments will influence the Turkish Government toward the development of a rational investment program. In order to develop such a program the Government of Turkey is now seeking to obtain foreign expert assistance. This inability of Turkey to determine priorities for competing investment, consumption and defense demands on the limited resources available can be expected to create continued problems for the U.S. For example, acceleration of the advanced weapons program and other increased military activities, unless offset by reduced expenditures for existing defense programs, can be expected to result in larger Turkish defense budgets. At the same time, even though they do not have a coordinated, rational investment program to provide resources to priority public and private needs, the Turks also can be expected to continue to increase expenditures for capital investment.

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4 For text of the agreement, see TIAS 4175.
4. **Military Aid Program.** The initial equipping of Turkish conventional forces is essentially complete insofar as the Turkish Army and Air Force are concerned. The MAP force goals were recently reduced by four divisions. Some small craft are yet to be delivered to the Turkish Navy. Future military assistance will be directed almost entirely toward modernization and replacement of equipment as it becomes obsolete or worn out. The accelerated deliveries incident to the Iraqi coup demonstrated anticipated shortcomings in Turkish ability to receive, catalog and distribute the increased flow of equipment delivered. A considerable augmentation of the MAAG field advisory effort throughout the logistical support area, as well as with major tactical units of the Army and the Air Force, is improving the quality of the forces. A basic literacy training course for inductees has been inaugurated on a countrywide basis and is expected to permit further improvement. The first surface-to-surface atomic delivery unit, an Honest John battalion, is now operational in Turkey. Training for the two Nike battalions and three additional Honest John battalions is underway or programmed. An agreement with the Turkish Government has just been concluded for the IRBM deployment.\(^5\) A major problem requiring resolution is the method of funding the construction of family housing for U.S. personnel who will initially man the squadron and for those who must remain for training and warhead custodial duties even after the Turkish Air Force assumes the manning.

   a. **Relationship between military programs and economic resources.** The problem in Turkey over recent years has been to achieve a balance between Turkish consumption demands, desires for economic development, an adequate military program and available resources including anticipated levels of external assistance. Recommendations for MAP and defense support for FY 1961 have taken these factors into account along with that of limited availability of U.S. assistance.

5. **Community Relations Problems.** Incidents involving U.S. service personnel continue to cause serious public relations problems. The arrest and subsequent trial in Izmir of U.S. servicemen for violating Turkish currency laws\(^6\) resulted in much publicity adverse to the U.S. relating to the servicemen's charges of mistreatment by the Turkish police, the widespread blackmarketing operations charged to American military personnel and the alleged infringement of Turkish sovereignty implicit in the inquiry being conducted by CINCEUR officers. A joint State–Defense team is meeting regularly to consider, among other things, courses of action designed to ameliorate this situation.

\(^5\) The agreement was concluded on September 20.
\(^6\) The trial of four U.S. servicemen on currency smuggling charges was continuing in Izmir.
6. Policy Review. The Operations Coordinating Board concurred in
the report and in its transmittal to the National Security Council, in or-
der to call to the attention of the Council the fact that force levels have
been lowered since the approval in 1957 of the National Security Policy
with Respect to Turkey. The Board also noted that the Departments of
State and Defense believe that operational decisions taken since ap-
proval of the existing policy are not of such nature as to require a review
of the policy by the National Security Council.

353. Memorandum of Discussion at the 430th Meeting of the
National Security Council


[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and
agenda items 1–4.]

5. U.S. Policy Toward Turkey (NSC 5708/2; OCB Report on NSC
5708/2, dated December 16, 1959)¹

Mr. Harr summarized the reference OCB Report on the subject, em-
phasizing the conclusion that the report had been transmitted to the
Council in order to call attention to the fact that force levels have been
lowered since the approval in 1957 of NSC 5708/2. The OCB also noted
that the Departments of State and Defense believe that operational deci-
sions taken since approval of the existing policy are not of such a nature
as to require a review of the policy by the NSC. Mr. Gray said this OCB
Report raised the question whether country papers should or should
not have provisions relating to force levels. The policy on Turkey did
have provisions for Turkish force levels. If the Council now decided not
to review U.S. policy toward Turkey, it would be making a procedural
decision to drop the provisions on Turkish force levels out of the paper,
since those provisions were now obsolete. The President said he had
less faith in the "numbers racket" in connection with Turkish force

The OCB Report is printed as Document 352.
levels than in perhaps anything else. The force level figures did no more than indicate the amount of equipment which we should ship to Turkey. He was not very strong for including provisions on force levels in the policy paper on Turkey. Mr. Gray said it was correct that the purpose of the force level figures was to give a measure of the quantity of the military assistance which should be provided. Secretary Gates said the force level figures were rather misleading. Mr. Irwin said a more accurate guide was the JCS force levels. He felt detail as to Turkish force levels was not needed in the policy paper and pointed out that the reduction of four divisions in Turkish forces was in reality only a “paper” reduction of some five hundred men.

The National Security Council:  

a. Noted and discussed the reference Report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board.

b. Agreed that a review of NSC 5708/2 is not required at this time.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

Marion W. Boggs

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2 Paragraphs a–b constitute NSC Action No. 2171. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

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354. Letter From the Ambassador to Turkey (Warren) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant)


[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.5–MSP/2–1660. Secret; Official–Informal. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]
355. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, April 19, 1960, 3 p.m.

2266. Internal politics. Turbulent GNA session afternoon April 18 discussed DP group motion establish GNA investigatory committee to investigate alleged RPP “subversive” activities and recommend remedial legislation, 15-man committee to have full powers suspend all political activity if necessary during three-month investigatory period. Session marred by shouting, scuffles, fisticuffs. After second Inonu speech charging powers proposed committee illegal, undemocratic and unacceptable, he led all RPP deputies in walkout. Motion then passed by 300-plus DP deputies, with only two votes against.

Following GNA vote new investigatory committee inter alia (A) suspended all political activity for three months and (B) banned all publicity re activities of committee. Ulus (RPP) went ahead and published text Inonu GNA speeches and entire April 19 issue promptly confiscated.

Membership of committee weighted in favor of jurists and men previously known in DP circles for extremist views re opposition, press, judiciary. Embassy seeking clarify authority of committee decisions via-à-vis construction, other GNA laws.

GNA action climaxes intensive weekend political activity during which both party assembly groups issued proposed investigatory motions, generating blazing press, radio commentaries:

(1) DP assembly group April 15 issued communiqué reiterating full list charges against RPP and calling for investigatory committee with sweeping powers. Among communiqué’s usual arguments particular emphasis given new charge that RPP attempting wreck Turco-American friendship by attacks on bilateral agreements, SOFA, by widespread calumnies re offenses committed by US Forces Turkey.

(2) Above theme stressed in DP Radio Gazette program broadcast over state radio evening April 15. Office of Prime Minister took unusual step telephoning DCM same evening, calling Embassy attention to broadcast and offering provide text. Implication was that this program would show official government line re Turk-American relations issue in domestic politics.

(3) RPP assembly group April 16 retaliated by issuing proposal for GNA investigatory motion to impeach Prime Minister Menderes before High Court Justice for alleged totalitarian violations constitution and laws designed perpetuate him in power and destroy all opposition.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/4-1960. Confidential; Priority. Transmitted in two sections.
(Summary extracts above motions and radio program follow by airgram.)

(4) Before returning Ankara [April] 16, Inonu in Istanbul visited by 14 retired generals and admirals. Addressing visitors Inonu praised military as proud defenders nation's ideals and progress, called on them defend to utmost trust nation puts in them. Radio Gazette 17 charges retired officers call was prearranged political demonstration designed involve army internal politics, which illegal.

Comment: DP embarking on frontal propaganda and legislative attack on existence RPP as presently constituted, using its heavy GNA majority to give legal sanction its partisan objectives. Speed and effectiveness of DP action shows careful advance planning and determination carry through. Sixty-four dollar question remains "what will Republicans do now?" Embassy believes Inonu led walkout indicative only remaining nonviolent recourse left to RPP as form passive resistance or nonparticipation in government. Embassy does not foresee RPP resort violence at this juncture.

Almost formal injection anti-American issue disturbing. As well-known to Department, both sides have endeavored use American presence Turkey for partisan ends. DP has sought identify self as procurer American aid, and therefore indispensable to Turk economic well being. RPP line is that DP "sold out" Turk rights to US, and despite RPP friendship for US and support for alliances, will not tolerate DP "misuse" thereof. Until recent RPP official pronouncement (Embtel 1894) which DP carefully ignores, RPP had taken no positive steps restrict extremist views within RPP which indiscriminately attack both US and DP. New DP charges, however, serve formally join issue with RPP on anti-Americanism and will inevitably lead to rehash old arguments which Inonu foreign policy statement had almost laid to rest. For moment, both parties apparently more interested making political capital out of Turco-American relations than in objective furtherance thereof. This undoubtedly harmful US interests here, but Embassy remains convinced both parties basically loyal to American alliance principle, despite current tactics.

Tactically, DP apparently hopes its plan crush opposition by charging RPP with anti-Americanism will enlist USA sympathy. Noteworthy Prime Minister's Secretary told Embassy officer re Radio Gazette 15th: "Instructions are bring this your Ambassador's attention." Prime Minis-

1 The Embassy in Ankara reported on the activities of the Grand National Assembly in airgrams G-503, April 22 (ibid., 982.61/4-2260), and G-507, April 22 (ibid., 782.00/4-2260).

2 Telegram 1894, February 29, summarized Inonu's speech in which he condemned neutralism, endorsed Turkish membership in NATO and CENTO, and reaffirmed Turkey's ties with the United States. (Ibid., 682.00/2-2960)
ter's Secretary also supplied Embassy April 18 with English translations from provincial press as examples RPP anti-American approach.

Embassy has communicated informally with Consuls Istanbul, Izmir and Iskenderun, calling situation their attention and reminding they should join Embassy endeavor avoid American involvement with either side this controversy.

Warren

356. Telegram 2313 From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, April 23, 1960, noon.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/4–2360. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. 5 pages of source text not declassified.]

357. Editorial Note

The political situation in Turkey was the subject of discussion at the meeting of the Operations Coordinating Board on April 27. During the meeting: "Mr. Hare gave a short briefing on the present political situation in Turkey noting that the approaching national elections make the domestic activity fairly typical. He cited the need to exercise care to avoid US involvement with either side. Mr. Dulles (CIA) outlined certain developments which, if elections were to be held immediately, the opposition could be able to use effectively to come out on top.

"Mr. Gray thought it was generally understood that the present situation is not serene, neither is it at a spark-producing stage. All agreed on the desirability of close observation of the scene." A copy of
the preliminary notes on the meeting, from which this quotation is
taken, is in Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, M/OP Infor-
mal Notes. A copy of the briefing paper from which Hare spoke is ibid.:
Lot 62 D 430, OCB Luncheon Items.

Allen Dulles commented on the instability in Turkey during his
briefing at the 442d meeting of the NSC on April 28:

"Turning to Turkey, Mr. Dulles reported that that country might
find itself in a critical situation sometime during the next few years.
Since early 1960 the opposition party in Turkey, the Republican People’s
Party of ex-President Ismet Inonu, has been increasingly oppressed by
the government. Some questions have arisen as to the validity of the last
election in Turkey, although the situation is not as bad as it was in Korea.
The Turkish Government has now appointed a committee to investigate
subversive activities. This committee, exercising wide powers, has been
moving against Inonu and his party. Mr. Dulles felt this problem re-
quired careful consideration by the U.S. Government in the future. The
Turkish Army was probably behind the government; however, there
was a strong popular feeling in favor of Inonu. Unless constitutional
procedures are more carefully followed in Turkey, a situation similar to
that now existing in Korea might develop. The Inonu Party may attempt
demonstrations at the time of the NATO Council Meeting in Istanbul." (Memorandum of discussion; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC
Records)

358. Editorial Note

On April 28, mass demonstrations broke out in Istanbul against a
new law that authorized the Grand National Assembly’s Commission
of Inquiry to censure and suppress newspapers. The demonstrations
were led by Turkish university students. At 3 p.m. that afternoon, the
Government of Turkey imposed martial law in Istanbul and Ankara.
Police and troops using small arms and tear gas dispersed the anti-gov-
ernment rioters in a series of quick but bloody actions. Demonstrations
resumed on April 29 and 30. By May 1, the demonstrations were con-
tained. Warren’s reports on worsening internal conditions in Turkey are
in Department of State, Central File 782.00.
359. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State
      Herter, at Istanbul

      Washington, May 1, 1960, 4:21 p.m.

      Tosec 56. Pending Embassy’s assessment of recent developments in
      Turkey, we are passing on for Secretary’s use how we now see these
developments from this vantage point.

      Recent Turkish domestic political developments appear to have
      their longer term origin in Menderes’ intolerance of Opposition and
      Bayar-Inonu personal feud. Their more immediate origin we believe
      lies in alleged misconduct of 1957 elections and their results and in
      subsequent maneuvering for next election. It seems to us important to
disentangle basic causes, such as Government’s posture towards political
opposition generally, from more immediate symptoms such as student
demonstrations which in this case may have been inspired in part by the
coincidence of immediately preceding Korean developments.

      Aspects of recent Turkish developments that give us special trouble
are:

1. Deterioration of morality in Turkish politics that threatens the
   multiparty system which first came to flower with organization of DP in
   1946. Sweeping powers accorded special GNA investigative committee
   appear threaten present constitutional framework;

2. Doubts that Menderes’ tactics cast upon his stability as individ-
   ual and his capacity to sense temper of important segments of Turkish
   political life and world opinion. We are particularly concerned over
   possibility his taking drastic action against prominent and respected
   leaders of Opposition;

3. Reported injection of anti-Americanism in Turkish domestic po-
   litical struggle. It is not clear to us whether RPP is as deeply involved as
   DP suggests or whether DP is imputing this to RPP in order involve U.S.
   Government.

4. Anti-Government and particularly anti-Menderes tone of stu-
   dent demonstrations. Noteworthy also is persistent character of demon-
   strations which now have extended through three days;

   authoritarianism and further bloodshed might revive in U.S. ugly
   memories of past Turkish treatment of minorities and create serious dif-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/5–160. Secret; Priority. Drafted by
Owen T. Jones, cleared in draft by Easum of S, and approved by Hart who signed for Act-
ing Secretary Henderson. Repeated to Ankara. Herter was in Istanbul to attend the North
Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting.
difficulties for U.S. Government in dealing constructively with Turkish-American problems, particularly in aid field.

6. Dangers of protracted political stalemate with RPP going underground and promoting civil disobedience; this might have serious implications for future operations U.S. missions in Turkey as well as U.S. access to Turkish facilities.

With respect to demonstrations themselves, we have been reassured by lack of anti-Americanism, apparent loyalty and restraint of Army, and failure of movement to spread significantly beyond student nucleus. With respect to DP posture towards Opposition, we find little grounds for reassurance either in type of actions taken or in sense of timing. It seems to us that net effect of recent Turkish domestic political developments has been clearly negative in terms of orderly development of democracy, Menderes' domestic and international influence, and U.S. maneuverability in dealing with Turkish problems.

At this distance there appear to be number of things that GOT might do to liberalize and relax political climate in Turkey. Any suggestions on our part along these lines would in all likelihood be regarded as intervention in Turkish domestic affairs. At moment, struggle between top leadership in DP and RPP appears so bitter and of such depth that we would be well advised to stay out. We believe best U.S. posture for time being is to regard recent developments as an internal political affair and as part of uneven progress to be expected in political evolution of young democracy.

Within these limitations, Ambassador Warren's timely initiative on April 23\(^1\) might be followed up when responsible Turkish leaders seek to discuss their problems with us. While making clear at such times that we view this as an internal political problem, and making our points in spirit of comment rather than that of suggestion, we might inform both sides of this internal struggle of its unfortunate impact on American and world public opinion and damage it does to Turkish influence here and elsewhere abroad.

Henderson

\(^1\) See Document 356.
360. Editorial Note

A small anti-government protest took place outside NATO headquarters in Istanbul on May 2 at the beginning of the NAC Ministerial Meeting. The protest was quickly dispersed by Turkish security forces. On May 3, the Turkish Government relieved the Commander in Chief of Turkish Ground Forces, General Cemal Gursel, of his position.

Allen Dulles reported as follows to the National Security Council on the situation in Turkey at the 433d Meeting of the NSC on May 5:

"Mr. Dulles believed the situation in Turkey was becoming more normal, with the army firmly in control of public order. However, the leaders of the Republican People’s Party (Inonu’s Party) are apprehensive of the future to such an extent they have discussed asylum in the U.S. Embassy with U.S. representatives. It has been reported that the government party is split regarding the oppressive measures being carried out against Inonu’s party. One hundred thirty of the 409 representatives of the government party are said to be opposed to these repressive measures." (Memorandum of discussion; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

361. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, May 6, 1960, 5 p.m.

2477. Foreign Minister Zorlu called for me at 1645 May 5. We talked alone for 45 minutes. It was not quite clear why he had called me (I had just attended his lunch for visiting NATO group). However, we discussed present situation. I gathered following:

1. All Turkey is quiet.

2. General Inonu is beginning be worried by course events. He had expected tremendous public support for the student demonstrations. The masses did not rally round. Turk people are beginning sense that demonstrations and disorder time NATO Conference are causing loss foreign respect for Turkey. They are seeing matters clearly and more un-
favorably for General Inonu and his friends. Inonu is intelligent old soldier with life-time experience. He has always followed course arousing others, allowing their arousal run its course and, if move turns out well, he claims credit or, if it turns out badly, he denies any connection. His method of incitement students was say in GNA he would not revolt but others would do so. The General is loyal Turk but some of his men like Coskun (Kirca) and his son-in-law Metin Toker are unprincipled. Zorlu stressed that addressing press he had refrained charging Inonu unprincipled or disloyal. Turk public, he said, would have reacted badly any such statement just as they are reacting unfavorably Inonu’s exaggerated assertions. On other hand, he mentioned Prime Minister’s having difficulty restraining forceful speech from certain DP Deputies who are displeased with Inonu’s words and actions.

3. There are some 50 foreign newspapermen in Turkey now. Today they are in Golcuk. They want see Inonu. Probably they will come Ankara interview him. They will, of course, be able do so. However, Zorlu does not believe their doing so will contribute peace and calm here and will increase unfavorable press abroad for GOT. He wondered whether there was anything Embassy Press Section could do dissuade American pressmen from seeing Inonu. I said I could understand effect which such an interview by foreign correspondents might have, but that I was sure any effort our part in that direction would result some such reaction as this: “Mr. Ambassador, we members of American press do not need any suggestions from you on how to do our job.” (Zorlu also told press in Istanbul Sunday they could see Inonu.) I asked whether Inonu might travel Golcuk meet pressmen if group does not come Ankara. He considered moment and responded he thought not. I agreed. Thought was that unless press group comes Ankara, Inonu probably will not see them.

I then said there was one thing which if done could balance scales. He asked me what it was. I said that if Prime Minister would see press group following talk with Inonu, he would have opportunity present fully and fairly government’s position on all that opposition is pouring into ears foreign and domestic press. I pointed out that American correspondents have no trouble in getting opposition viewpoint but greatest trouble in getting top GOT reaction. Zorlu said he understood but reminded me that he had held recent press conference in Istanbul. I replied I understood that but in all respect I should say talking to him was not same as talking with Prime Minister. Then he smiled and said I know this and I have explained it. I knew he meant he had explained it to Prime Minister. Evidently Prime Minister had not agreed with Zorlu’s suggestion.
4. I told Zorlu I appreciated his calling, discussing this matter and that I wanted to say one thing: My endeavor and endeavor entire Embassy during this present difficulty is, that Americans do not become involved this controversy. We must remain apart. I did not believe Americans want become involved. We remind them that we are in foreign country and these political matters are not our business. I believe we could walk narrow path we have selected for ourselves. However, if someone got off path, I wanted him know what our endeavor is. He nodded his head in approval and thanked me. I finished my thought on this subject by saying I wanted him know that whatever Embassy did or said present controversy, it would always be in interest of peace and calm Turkey.

5. The conversation touched on part played recent events by Turkish Army and General Erdelhun (see ARMA telegram May 4). I said GOT, Turkish people, USA as Turkish ally, and entire West could be thankful for excellent work done by Turkish Army and General Erdelhun. I made clear that without Erdelhun we might have had an entirely different and most unfavorable situation existing today. He agreed.

6. At several points in conversation, we talked about Kasim Gulek. Zorlu feels Gulek is spreading information about Turkish situation which not accurate and does not contribute to peace and calm. I was able say in sincerity that I had recently seen Gulek at parties, not in Embassy, and that he had not criticized GOT. I added my feeling today Gulek is not well-informed what taking place highest RPP councils. Zorlu agreed and said that for sometime Gulek has been in conflict with Inonu and has not shared his confidence. He implied Inonu had decided sacrifice Gulek long before Gulek was actually separated his post RPP Secretary General.

7. Zorlu referred lunch with Bayar which Secretary Herter had May 4 aboard Presidential yacht. Evidently Bayar and Zorlu felt reassurances re Secretary’s understanding present situation in Turkey.

8. We also referred my departure NATO Conference May 2 and return Ankara. We mentioned attention which Istanbul press had given this unimportant move. Zorlu said this only illustrates readiness domestic press build up something of interest regardless whether it is based on fact. He knew I had not returned Ankara see Prime Minister as press said. This gave me opportunity say I would want see Prime Minister soon as enough time had elapsed discourage press from connecting my visit with my departure NATO Conference.

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1 Not found.

2 No record of this conversation has been found. Herter met Bayar and Zorlu just prior to his departure from Turkey for Athens.
9. I requested Foreign Minister call me any time he might want me during present controversy.

Warren

362. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, May 10, 1960, 9 a.m.

2514. Over past week Embassy has had several long conversations with representatives RPP Research Bureau (who close to RPP thinking) and RPP Deputies which seem give important lead on present thinking RPP. On May 4 Coskun Kirca came to Embassy for long conversation (Embtel 2463),

1 returning later to see political counselor with Osman Okyar whom RPP Secretary General Aksal described on earlier occasion as person who spoke for him. Both were seen again over past weekend and Embassy representative has been in regular contact with Turgut Yegenagac, as well as seeing Bulent Ecevit and Turhan Feyzioglu. From these conversations the following points stand out [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]:

1. RPP considers next two weeks to be most critical in present period of political unrest with much depending on how far government will attempt to go in carrying out “repressive measures” against opposition.

2. Inonu has give firm instructions that there are to be no RPP demonstrations or riots until selection of local events becomes more clear.

3. RPP particularly worried about possible uprising in east as stories of Istanbul/Ankara demonstrations penetrate or as students return their villages. They fear that should demonstrations start in east they would take much more serious form than rather mild student demonstrations so far observed.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/5–1060. Confidential. Repeated to Istanbul, Izmir, and Iskenderun.

1 Telegram 2463, May 6, reported on the analysis of the situation in Turkey by RPP leaders and concluded that it was unlikely that Menderes would willingly bow to the opposition. (Ibid., 782.00/5–560)
4. RPP would obviously like some statement from USG disassociating itself from present government repressive measures. Kirca proposed suspension economic assistance, while Okyar frankly stated this appeared going too far but he feared for complete harmony future Turk/American relations if US would not at least in public statement express (A) concern over recent public demonstrations and (B) hope that solution could be found in free elections. (Both Kirca and Okyar told in some detail by Embassy representatives that we considered this problem to be settled by Turkish people and US would not intervene in internal affairs of sovereign ally.)

5. Kirca confirms that feelers for Inonu/Menderes meeting have been advanced through RPP Deputy and RPP journalist (Embtel 2484). He says reply would be RPP trusts neither Menderes, Bayar nor Koraltan but would meet with any other responsible DP leader on basis of returning to legislative situation which prevailed in Turkey May 14, 1950. (Reported approach for Menderes/Inonu meeting has circulated so widely in Diplomatic Corps over weekend that Embassy instinctively questions it and certainly reply outlined above would not under present circumstances make any such meeting a possibility.)

Warren

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2 Dated May 7. (Ibid., 782.00/5-760)

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363. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, May 20, 1960, 3 p.m.

2639. Within last week I sent Prime Minister word by our Consul General Istanbul and Minister Defense Menderes I would like see him as soon as it could be done without being connected with domestic political developments. He asked for me 1730 hours May 19 and received me alone.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/5-2060. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in two sections.
I found him excellent spirits and physically fit. He looked relaxed, rested although he had returned 2230 hours night before from exhausting Izmir area trip. I repeated reason why I had not asked see him sooner after Tehran and NATO meetings and commented favorably on those meetings. He then took up conversation, making following points:

A. Too bad Istanbul Conference had come this particular juncture Turk political developments. However, Turk NATO allies were able see circumstances under which GOT has operate and nothing bad had occurred. He would have preferred meeting take place under normal Turk conditions.

B. Situation now entirely under control. GOT and army have accomplished this with maximum restraint and minimum abrasive action. Only one student killed Istanbul. Postmortem shows he died result ricochet bullet. (He did not mention another student death resulting from student being crushed when falling from tank he attempted mount. F. W.) This, the Prime Minister thought, minimum casualty that could be expected from such demonstration at Istanbul. He thinks worst of recent controversy now passed, that calm will perforce return Turkey.

C. Recent controversy not between two parties but between GOT and group determined subvert present government. For many months GOT has been telling people this taking place. Group spoke of revolution, ousting government, people taking over. All this went back to one 80-year old man, an aged man, Inonu. His course about run. He had depended upon army but army supporting constituted authority. Group spoke about constitution but group was the force working against constitutional government. However, Inonu too old have anything value offer present Turk Army. Army will not become anti-American or Arabian. It knows its role Turkish society and will play that role to letter.

D. Group now defeated. Peace and calm will return Turkey and cost lives, casualties will have been minimum. Next will come elections. He did not give me impression elections imminent but replying my question stated clearly elections now in train. He also declared his recent trip Izmir had shown him individuals who originally disposed support Inonu and his group all now becoming divorced from any support for group undertaking.

E. After asking for and hearing my résumé events connected U–2 affair,¹ he said convinced from what information GOT has that Khruzhchev actions Paris motivated internal conditions USSR. Reaffirmed Turkey’s friendship, alliance with USA this affair. Showed same imper-

¹Reference is to the shooting down by the Soviet Union of a U.S. reconnaissance intelligence aircraft and the subsequent breakdown on May 16 of the four-power summit conference in Paris.
turbidity re Soviet attitude as heretofore and same calm confidence USA. (I have never known a better ally. F. W.)

F. Referred visit here May 20 Prime Minister Nehru. Said much water run under bridge since he last saw Nehru India. Thinks many his ideas may have changed (context what had been said made me think he had in mind Chinese-Indian border difficulty, Nehru’s talks with Nasser, and U-2 summit developments. F. W.). At any rate he stated would take pleasure talking with Nehru effort sound him out.

G. He referred Inonu and Gulek. Said enough indicate he has not very high opinion Gulek. Started say something about latter and Inonu, smiled and continued “I don’t need say that about them”.

My efforts were confined encourage Prime Minister talk, so I said little. However, I did make two observations:

1. In connection B and C above, I stressed remarkable performance Turk Army in handling student demonstrations. I said Turkey, USA, entire West could be grateful that well-led and understanding Turk Army had acquitted itself so well present controversy. A differently led, differently acting military could have produced an entirely different, deplorably different result. Menderes nodded assent.

2. When Prime Minister speaking re opposition in C and D supra, I asked how he foresaw “group” could escape from present intransient position. He said that is group’s problem. When one insists rubbing his nose against stone wall he should not be surprised he must pull back after a while. I said I understood but endeavor being to restore peace and calm it would be easier do so if group given an easy exit. I repeated easy exit idea twice. I do not recall he responded. (I did not take notes this conversation. Foregoing reproduced from memory. F. W.)

Warren

364. Editorial Note

On May 21, cadets from the Ankara War College joined a number of officers in an anti-government demonstration. The demonstration by members of the armed forces broke up only after an appeal by the War College commander to the cadets to return to their barracks. A subsequent civilian demonstration was broken up with tear gas and the Turk-
ish Government imposed strict new curfews in Ankara. In telegram 2673 from Ankara, May 23, Warren reported that he had been in daily contact with the Chief of the Turkish Army Staff who insisted that the army was non-political and would continue to support the Government of Turkey. (Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/5–2360)

Turkey's continuing political unrest was discussed at the May 24 meeting of the National Security Council. In a survey of significant world developments affecting U.S. national security, Allen Dulles summarized the situation in Turkey:

"Turning to Turkey, Mr. Dulles reported that tension between the government and the opposition was a continuing danger. The personal feud between Inonu and Premier Menderes had now become a constitutional crisis. Student demonstrations had increased and non-students were now joining in the rioting. Even some military personnel is participating in the demonstrations. There appears to be considerable antagonism between the Turkish police and Turkish military forces. The Turkish Army is divided, with senior officers inclined to remain loyal to the government and lower level officers divided between the government and the opposition. Premier Menderes apparently does not realize the extent of discontent. Mr. Dulles believed that the Turkish situation would deteriorate further and that it was even possible that the army would eventually take over." (Memorandum of discussion; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

Dulles again brought up the political crisis in Turkey on May 25 during an OCB discussion of a proposed Operations Plan for Turkey:

"Mr. Dulles (CIA) stated that, in view of the 'really disturbing' political situation in Turkey, he desired the Board be on record as having discussed the implications of current events. He requested an evaluation from Mr. Jones. Mr. Jones gave an assessment of developments as reported by Embassy Ankara, which was supplemented by Mr. Merchant who said the question really is whether there is more than meets the eye. Mr. Merchant thought Ambassador Warren had shown 'admirable initiative' and taken effective influencing action on the spot. Mr. Gray said he judged it was State's position that the employment of the 'assets represented on the OCB' did not appear to be required at this time.

"There followed a brief discussion of Mr. Riddleberger's observation that he and Mr. Dillon would soon have to make a decision on the Turkish request for additional defense support for 1960 and cited the political problems which could result. He also noted the substantial reduction in the illustrative figures proposed for fiscal 1961. Mr. Merchant wondered whether the sharp decline for FY 61 might be cushioned by having an increase for FY 60 appear to Turkey as within the FY 61 sum.

"Mr. Dulles then requested another assessment by Embassy Ankara of short and long-term political and economic developments. He believed it important to have an assessment of the attitude of the Turkish army. Mr. Merchant suggested that as the Embassy had already been asked for assessment on several subjects, it would be preferable to wait before the Board addressed itself to this question. It was decided
the Board would again discuss Turkey in about three weeks and ask Mr. Jones to summarize the assessments from the field."

Informal notes on the discussion at the May 25 meeting are in Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, M/OP Informal Notes 1960. A copy of the Operations Plan discussed and approved at the May 25 meeting is *ibid.*: Lot 62 D 430, Turkey.

The Government of Turkey was overthrown by a military coup on May 27. Most of the members of the government, together with the leadership of the Democratic Party and President Bayar, were arrested in Ankara. Prime Minister Menderes and Finance Minister Polatkan, who were away from the capital on a tour, were arrested later in the day while attempting to escape from Turkey by car. In telegram 2743 from Ankara, May 27, Ambassador Warren reported:

"In unusually well organized coup Turkish military forces took over government 0400 May 27 apparently without serious opposition and loss only about 50 lives Ankara. President Bayar, President GNA Koraltan, members Cabinet, Chief Staff Erbulun taken into protective custody. Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir quiet; no discernible organized opposition. At this juncture, Embassy believes revolt motivated by purely internal considerations; no evidence any anti-Americanism. On contrary, member Military Council assured Embassy this morning of Turkish Armed Forces friendship for USA and desire fulfill all Turkey's international commitments, especially NATO and CENTO." (*ibid.*, Central Files, 782.00/5–2760)

A provisional government was announced on May 28. General Cemal Gursel, former Commander in Chief of Turkish Ground Forces, assumed the positions of Prime Minister, President of the Republic, and Chairman of the National Unity Committee of military officers who had planned the coup and would supervise the operations of the new government. Gursel pledged the new government to work for a quick return to democracy and announced that the leaders of the former government would be placed on trial for corruption.

On May 28, Melih Esenbel, Turkish Ambassador in the United States, informed Under Secretary of State Dillon that the new government intended to honor all Turkey's existing commitments. Dillon indicated to the Ambassador that the United States might prefer, as in other similar cases, to continue relations as usual without a formal announcement. A memorandum of Dillon's conversation with Esenbel is *ibid.*, 782.00/5–2860.

The United States granted recognition to the new Government of Turkey on May 30.
365. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, May 28, 1960, 11 p.m.

2775. Reference Embassy telegram 2772. Sarper and I went in my car to General Gursel’s office in General Staff Building. He received us alone. I had seen him before but never had known him well. If one could remove Turkish features and forget certain haughtiness characteristic of German military, he might well be German. He spoke slowly, reasonably and with evident careful consideration. His reception was cordial and all that one could expect under circumstances. Sarper acted as interpreter.

General opened conversation and said he was pleased that I had come for informal talk. He explained briefly what had happened yesterday. He added that he felt that in view of course which Menderes Government was following he had no other choice after he had earlier tried influence Menderes Government but to lead movement which succeeded in overthrowing regime. He asked me in so many words what I thought of what I had seen. I commenced by referring to my service in Latin America and many coups which I had seen there. I said that if I were a military man and forgot purpose of movement, I would be pleased and proud of way it had gone off. It was by far most precise, most efficient and most rapid coup d’etat I had ever witnessed. I did not mention to him what I had said to Sarper with regard to Ankara military actions which displeased me. (I had told Sarper before we left his office that I would not bring this up.) I said I believe, from information available to us that revolutionary movement had complete control of entire country. Gursel nodded his head. I said furthermore as best I could judge people in Ankara were happy with result. I went on say I thought easiest part of job had been done, that from now on he would be heading into real difficulties. I did not mention recognition as I had agreed with Sarper beforehand. (I think Sarper told Gursel in Turkish before we started conversation that I would not mention recognition.) I said his difficulties would be many and would in many cases involve both Turkey and US and perhaps West. I wanted him know I foresaw these difficulties and that Washington had not sent me out here to cause difficulty, rather to try to find solution for them whenever they might arise and

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/5-2860. Secret; Priority; No Distribution Outside Department. Transmitted in three sections.

1 Telegram 2772, May 28, reported on Warren’s talks with Selim Sarper, the new Foreign Minister. Sarper recounted his experiences during the military coup and Warren and he discussed the future course of Turkish foreign policy. (Ibid.)
that during trying months ahead my attitude would be try help his endeavors, junta and succeeding government meet problems. He thanked me.

Gursel then began longer explanation why revolutionary junta led by him had done what it did. It had felt Menderes Government had forgotten about rights of individual, freedom of press, constitutionality of its acts and in fact had embarked upon series of legislative acts (he never said those acts were unconstitutional) which had for their purposes further repression of people of Turkey. He said we in army were hurt, distressed, deeply concerned about course and goal toward which Menderes Government headed. I (General is great on use of "I") tried, he stated, persuade Menderes Government follow different course action but I failed. Finally, I concluded only thing left was course which we revolutionaries followed.

Again I thanked him for speaking frankly and to point. I said I believed I understood what had been thinking of military and I wanted to tell him something in that connection but, before making this statement, I must say certain other things. He nodded his head. I said I started my work out here with idea that it was relationship between Turk people and American people that was important. I felt Turkey had an importance to USA and free world difficult to overstate. It was equally important to Turkey maintain that relationship. Furthermore, I could not but have utmost respect for Turk military because of my association with American military here in Turkey. One big reason why Turkey was important to free world, particularly to US, was its stability and the Turk army tradition of not intervening in political affairs. By its coup yesterday Turkish military had broken with that tradition. It had opened Pandora's box. No one could foresee what would come out. I felt this morning that neither military nor people of Turkey had any conception of long-range importance of what had been done yesterday morning. This brought me to statement I wanted make: I have served many years in Latin America. I have seen many coups d'état. I know how over years Latin American nations have developed in addition to legislative, judicial, and executive divisions of government, a fourth division—that of military. I said military in Latin America sits alongside and above other three government divisions. When military reached decision that things are not going right in average Latin American country, it moves in: There is coup d'état; military carries on; and, ultimately way is found back to civil administration. This, I said, meant that army was balance wheel, or last court of resort in Latin American country. Since Atatırk Turkey had never been in that position and had prided herself in not being there. Now she was in exactly that position. I felt in future military would find it exceedingly difficult not to become involved any divisive political controversy that might involve Turk people. This idea worried
me more than coup itself. When Sarper had interpreted this, Gursel nodded his head and said go ahead. I continued I could not foresee what effect this Turk military action would have in US, Great Britain and rest Western world. Perhaps, I added, realization of effect what occurred yesterday will not become apparent for months but I feared effect on American Congress when it votes funds for use in Turkey will not be good. The military by its coup has removed one of Turkey's principal qualifications for our present free world grouping. I meant, of course, its reputation as stable people.

At this point I mentioned there was, however, one important source support for military junta in present situation, namely, the American, British and other foreign press had so disapproved Menderes government, and fought it so long, that without doubt press had put most favorable interpretation on what had taken place in Turkey. This would be true at least in initial stages work of junta and its succeeding governments. Earlier in conversation Gursel had said in passing that there had been no mistreatment of President, Menderes, Cabinet or other high officials. I now noted his statement was very important and that it would create fine impression abroad for his junta if there were no mistreatment Menderes government officials. He said, "I assure you that there has been no mistreatment and there will be no mistreatment. I am going to supply each of them with seashore cottage with bath where he can reside in comfort (with his family if he desires) until matters are cleared up." I next mentioned elections, saying I had nothing but admiration for bulletins broadcast by BBC and other radios stating purpose and interest of coup d'état. They spoke of elections. It would further increase prestige of junta abroad if it moved quickly to a fair and honest election. He said that would be done, reassuring me in strongest terms. He went on say that first thing he had done yesterday when he reached Ankara from Izmir was call group of professors from University of Istanbul to draft new constitution (Sarper had already told me it would provide bicameral legislature and supreme court empowered pass on constitutionality of acts of legislature). He hoped professors would move quickly and new constitution be [garble]. He stated he would reveal tomorrow names Cabinet members new provisional government. (Both he and Sarper implied they do not consider present junta as government.) He has long considered that basic principle for Turks is close cooperation with USA. He ended that he likes Americans and acts that way.

Gursel then came to final subject his conversation. He said previous administration for which he not responsible left junta [country?] in awful financial mess. He had asked Under Secretary Finance how much money he needed on June 1. He replied he had 23 million lira available but needed 180 million lira to meet civil and other payrolls. Gursel said I
need not tell you how important it is for new government meet that first payroll. He asked me whether it would be possible for US advance its usual payment in such way and in time help government meet its June 1 deadline.

I said “Sir, I think I fully realize how important it is for military junta or provisional government be able pay those first salary checks. I must tell you, however, that certain things remain to be cleared up before question of financial assistance can be considered. (I had in mind, of course, question of recognition.) However, I shall keep in mind what you have said and when moment arrives I will use information which you have given me”. General responded he understood and thanked me again. My final words to him were these: As I have said, I am here not create difficulties but to try help solve them. With your predecessors in government I was always available when needed. Any time when you want see me, I shall be available. I thank you again for bringing me here for this frank talk. General then said I thank you not only for coming but for giving me benefit your wise advice. You may be sure that what you have said will be kept in mind as we go along.

Warren

An advance in counterpart funds was made to the Turkish Government by the United States.

366. Editorial Note

The military coup in Turkey was discussed during the 446th Meeting of the National Security Council on May 31, by Robert Amory of the CIA:

“Mr. Amory reported that the coup d’état in Turkey had been planned for several months in the Istanbul War College, but had not moved very fast until May 21. The moving forces behind the change in government were young officers who brought senior officers in only at the last moment. The young officers were motivated by antagonism toward Menderes’ suppression of the opposition, sympathy to Inonu, and by distaste for corruption in the Menderes’ government. Inonu was not an active participant in the plot, though he may have been consulted. Members of the former government now under arrest may be tried, but
there will probably be no blood bath in Turkey. No significant opposition to the present government has appeared, but the Kurds may attempt to capitalize on the current confusion. The new government consists of fifteen civilians and three officers, including General Gursel, who has had a strictly military career. Mr. Amory believed that the new government was sincere in declaring that it would turn power over to an elected government as soon as elections could be held. Our Embassy believes the new Turkish government to be a sound, well-balanced and capable one. The new government intends to revise the Turkish Constitution, incorporating some features from the U.S. Constitution. Mr. Amory believed that Turkey would remain loyal to her alliances."

Allen Dulles reported on the situation in Turkey to the 447th Meeting of the National Security Council on June 8:

"Turning to Turkey, Mr. Dulles reported that the new regime was now less sure of itself and may be facing a period of instability. The situation in Turkey is characterized by growing resentment on the part of senior military officers against the committee which is in control and which consists largely of junior officers. The government is under considerable pressure from vengeful elements who are demanding severe measures against the officials of the old regime. Turkey has indicated that it intends to replace its brigade of 5000 men in Korea with a token force because its troops are needed at home for internal security purposes. Moscow is encouraging the new Turkish regime to improve Turkish relations with the USSR. Apparently the Soviets have just invited General Gursel to visit Moscow. Soviet propaganda toward Turkey is a mixture of cautious approval of the new regime and attacks on the stated Turkish intention to maintain its alliance with the West. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Sarper, has asked us to issue a statement of solidarity with Turkey in order to offset Soviet propaganda."

Memoranda of discussion at these meetings are in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
367. Letter From President Eisenhower to President Gursel


Dear Mr. President: My several visits to Turkey have given me a deep and abiding interest in the Turkish people and the problems that over the years have confronted them. When you recently became head of state, I followed with particular interest the constructive public statements which you made to your countrymen and to the world at large.

Your expressed determination to hold elections and to turn over the government administration to the newly-elected authorities has been welcomed by all of Turkey's friends. It is the deep hope of all of us that these elections and the new constitution being prepared under your authority will mark another milestone in the development of democracy in Turkey.

The intention of your government to preserve Turkey's ties with NATO and CENTO was also a source of great satisfaction to me and to all those associated with Turkey in these collective security organizations dedicated to the defense of the free world. My government looks forward to continuing cordial relations with Turkey in the tradition of friendship and cooperation that has always marked the relations of the Turkish and American people.

You have, Mr. President, my warmest wishes for success in realizing the high ideals to which you have dedicated your government, and in dealing with the problems now confronting it.

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower
368. Preliminary Notes of a Meeting of the Operations Coordinating Board


[Here follows agenda item 1.]

2. Oral Briefing on Turkey (Secret)

Mr. Owen T. Jones, Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs, gave an oral assessment to the Board on developments in Turkey since the May 27 coup. (On May 25 the Board had considered the Operations Plan for Turkey and, at that time, had requested a reassessment of the Turkish political situation.)\(^1\) Mr. Jones told the Board that the initial relief and optimism resultant from the actions and statements of the military junta had later been followed by anxiety which itself had later subsided.

He said the US has recognized the new regime which has the power but that to pinpoint its location within the junta is difficult. He thought that what comes to be the new government’s attitude toward the Status of Forces Agreement and the question of access to facilities might reveal whether there will be a changed line. Mr. Jones noted that it would be difficult to hold elections as one of the two major political parties had been shattered. He predicted that within a few months it should be easier to forecast the government’s orientation. He pointed out that Menderes had sought personnel reductions in the brigade in Korea.

Mr. Harr (White House) said it appeared we would have to proceed in our operations by making various assumptions regarding the new government. Mr. Riddleberger (ICA) noted we would have to go ahead with our planning and present program figures to the Congress. He considered his reports from Turkey somewhat encouraging. Mr. Harr raised the possible fate of the deposed Turkish leaders and suggested we seek means to ensure clemency for Menderes. Mr. Jones observed that, in this regard, we were operating in the realm of speculation. We did not know what the charges against Menderes might be but do know the Turks are unusually sensitive to outside interference.

Mr. Macy (Budget) noted that the Operations Plan had not indicated a “cash squeeze” on May 25 but that now the new government was pressing for immediate assistance,\(^2\) and Budget was being asked to

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1 See Document 364.

2 In a note delivered to the Department of State on June 10, the Government of Turkey reported that its deficit would reach $53.7 million by August 31. (Department of State, Central Files, 882.00/6-1060)
"juggle the books." Mr. Jones said the money involved was for Defense purposes which had been well staffed in Washington. He suggested it would be unwise to have a confrontation with the new government at this particular time. The Turks were making a reassessment of their financial standing and would undoubtedly communicate with us when completed. Mr. Harr said a query to the field appeared to be in order. The Board agreed that the Operations Plan in which it concurred on May 25 be sent to the field with a covering memorandum indicating its provisional nature.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

369. Memorandum of Discussion at the 449th Meeting of the National Security Council


[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and discussion of unrelated subjects.]

General Cabell said the new military regime in Turkey continued in firm control of the country. However, personality and policy conflicts in the Committee of National Unity constituted a potential threat to the government and to the stability of Turkey. In the middle of June, twelve members of the Committee either withdrew or were dropped in a disagreement over taking an oath to return the government to civilian authority as soon as elections can be held. The recent publication of the names of members of the Committee of National Unity was regarded by some members as a breach of faith. The Committee insists that it will hold elections and restore civil government as soon as possible but early 1961 now appears to be the earliest possible date for elections. One difficulty in the Turkish political situation is the fact that the Democratic Party has been discredited. A political balance can only be restored by reviving the prestige of the Democratic Party or by creating a new opposition party. Inonu's Republican Party is now quite concerned over its

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1 Reference is to reports that the CNU had originally comprised 50 members. These reports arose after a May 30 meeting in which Turkey introduced some 20 officers who had planned the coup. Many were not on the list of CNU members issued June 12.
relations with the Committee of National Unity since some of the members of the Committee are firmly opposed to Inonu and may not permit his participation in a new civil government. If a proportional representation plan, which has been under consideration, is adopted, the result may be a divided government. The Committee of National Unity has recently appeared to be unsure of itself, uneasy over possible disaffection, and inclined to produce a great deal of publicity designed to make itself acceptable to the people. The Committee is now coming more and more to realize that it will probably have to liquidate the leaders of the deposed government. A struggle for power in the Committee of National Unity, a decision to liquidate the old leaders, or the resurgence of authoritarianism all present dangers to Turkish stability. The present regime is not as enthusiastically pro-Western as was the Menderes regime, although 38 members of the Committee of National Unity have attended Army schools in the U.S. U.S. officials have not been able to establish close relations with the new regime with the result that our sources of information are not as good as they were under Menderes.

Mr. Gray then reminded the Council that the Planning Board was reviewing our 1957 policy toward Turkey (NSC 5708/2)\(^2\) at the request of the OCB. Last week the Planning Board discussed the timing of the review and decided to go ahead with it promptly, despite uncertainties in the Turkish situation. Various Planning Board members felt that policy guidance was needed with respect to our interest in Turkish democratic institutions and how we can mesh our activities with the new government’s financial activities, force goals for Turkish armed forces, and economic aid.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

370. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, July 13, 1960, 5 p.m.

84. Paris for USRO, CINCEUR, Thurston, Finn. When FonOff telephoned July 12 re desire Pres Gursel see me (Embel 78 July 131 para 2 under comments), it asked me be at PriMin 1100 hours with capable interpreter and Gen Morin. Last named being absent I proceeded Gursel’s office with Lt Col Fred Haynes Asst Naval Attaché as interpreter and Col Tate JUSMMAT as rep Gen Morin. FonMin Sarper joined us at Ministry. Gen Gursel received us all. He had as interpreter Col Turkes, member CNU. However Sarper frequently assisted with interpretation.

(FonMin had told me by telephone he had informed Gursel of our conversation reported Embel 78.)

Gen Gursel opened conf by explaining that serious overage of senior officers exists in Turk Armed Forces and that it necessary, if armed forces to be revitalized, eliminate as much overage as possible. Gursel used pyramid by way illustration and stated that to have an effective officer corps, it must resemble pyramid, being broad at base and ending in point at top. He said that case of Turk Armed Forces was opposite, i.e., pyramid upside down. He proposed that to rid services of this unhealthy situation approximately 10 percent to 15 percent of the Colonels and above be compulsorily retired. In order effect this retirement 100,000,000 TL will be necessary. Money will be used make up difference between present income of officers to be retired and income they would expect to receive, if allowed to continue service until normal retirement.

Gursel emphasized point that no past government had been willing face this problem and no future government could be expected take action. He sees present as opportunity accomplish badly needed reform, in order produce effective Turkish fighting force. As he put it, the “vote hunters” would simply never touch problem, that his government could solve it, and that we would lose opportunity forever if we did not take advantage of present pol setting.

In course of conf Gursel made several other points:

A. That compulsory retirement of so many officers (he mentioned specifically 2,900 Colonels and Navy Captains) had absolutely no connection with today’s pol affairs.


1 Telegram 78 reported on Warren’s discussions with Sarper on the proposed reductions in the Turkish officer corps and on public support for the new provisional government. (Ibid.)
B. That those selected for retirement would be selected without reference to political affiliations.

C. That, somehow, rumors of proposed compulsory retirement had already leaked and that he very concerned over morale of armed services as result. He used this point as indicator of urgent requirement for action.

D. That forced retirement of so large a group older officers could be accomplished with minimum dissatisfaction on part of officers retired only if GOT could offer these men their families same money and benefits they would have gotten through the course of a routine military career.

E. That armed forces had not fought a war in 30 years and that, having been left alone, touched neither by wars nor politics it had grown fat, top heavy, badly needing, as he put it "a surgical operation".

F. That US trained Turk officers retired under the proposed program would be held to a bare minimum.

I expressed my concern over problem as presented by Gen. Gursel and told him of deep interest US had in Turkey's position as part of the Western bastion against Communism. I stated that I would make every effort present case properly to USA Govt. In this regard I raised following points:

A. That we were concerned over fact that Turk Armed Forces presently have only 60 percent of authorized officer strength. If additional 10 percent to 15 percent were retired, it would appear to weaken the structure. I asked Gen. Gursel if compulsory retirement were accomplished, "would the Turk Armed Forces be able to fight and maintain themselves in full scale war?" Gursel replied that retirement program would increase rather than decrease fighting capability by getting rid dead wood at top.

B. That we were not sure we could legally contribute funds for use in retirement scheme. I also pointed out that supply of USA money for foreign aid not inexhaustible, and that, at any rate, approval of Congress required in foreign aid. I further stated that trend of Congressional thinking of late has been to reduce foreign aid.

C. That base of officer pyramid at present is relatively weak. I asked Gen. Gursel what his intentions were with regard to increasing input and retention of junior officers, so as produce sound structure from bottom to top. Gen. Gursel replied that it was his intention change law as follows:

1) To have all men eligible for military service enter armed services as enlisted men.
2) Through selection process, to pick officer candidates for various branches armed services and then send officers schools for final training.

3) That graduates technical high schools and the like would either be commissioned as technicians or kept in enlisted ranks as special fields technicians.

Gursel pointed out this would immediately provide an increase in qualified officers for various branches of service and at same time would increase the technical personnel base, both officer and enlisted. Gen Gursel said he hoped have input of 600 more officers this year, 800 next year and an excess of 1000 following year. (Gursel did not make clear source from which these officers would come.)

D. In concluding my comments on problem I said I would like discuss matter with Gen. Morin; and if there were further questions involved, I might ask for additional conference with Gursel.

I further stated that I would report conference immediately to Washington and would outline Turk views in manner Gen. Gursel had presented them.

Colonel Tate asked if Gen. Gursel cared expand his ideas broadening officer base, increase of technicians and increasing services authorized strength. This opened entirely new facet, to which Gen. Gursel addressed himself as follows:

A. He stated past GOT had been hoodwinked NATO, that Turk armed forces cannot possibly meet MC-70 goals and he personally wishes explain situation to Gen. Norstad.

B. He said that if MC-70 goals are reached in 1963, total of 7 billion TL would be required just maintain Turk armed forces. He pointed out that present national budget is 7 billion TL and this is a tremendous burden. If budget of 7 billion TL for armed services alone were contemplated, Turkey would end up being army without country.

C. Gursel dealt some length with the unrealistic goals that [garble] the Turk Armed Forces and how Menderes government had carefully hidden truth from NATO and other friends of Turkey.

In conclusion, Colonel Turkes stated that within two days he would furnish me with approximate figures on number officers proposed be retired from each of three services.

The meeting ended with an expression of mutual friendship between the US and Turkey. Both Gen. Gursel and I expressed hope that this problem could be solved. I again indicated I would do my best present case properly to Washington.

Comments: I believe all three us Americans were impressed by Gen. Gursel’s simplicity, sincerity, stubbornness of purpose. I doubted deeply whether he understands political implications and possibilities his proposed action.
After consultation with Gen. Morin, JUSMMAT and USOM, Embassy will submit third message containing further comments.²

Warren

² In telegram 90 from Ankara, July 14, Warren commented on the implications for the United States of a decision to provide assistance to the Gursel government in its efforts to streamline the Turkish Army, warning that it "would have to share whatever opprobrium results" from the forced retirements of so many officers. (Ibid., 782.5/7-1460)

371. Special National Intelligence Estimate


SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR TURKEY

The Problem

To assess the present situation and to estimate likely developments in Turkey during the next year.

The Estimate

I. Political

1. The military junta which overthrew the Turkish Government in a smoothly executed coup on 27 May appears to be firmly in control of Turkey, and there is no evidence of significant organized opposition to its rule. The coup had been in preparation for some months by a group of relatively junior officers who constituted themselves the Committee for National Union (CNU). It was stimulated primarily by Prime Minis-

Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads in part as follows:

"Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff. Concurring in by the United States Intelligence Board on 19 July 1960."
ter Menderes' increasingly ruthless suppression of his principal opposition, Ismet Inonu's Republican People's Party (RRP), by growing signs that Menderes was preparing to use the army and security forces to crush his opponents, and by mounting disaffection for the regime on the part of students and other urban groups. Except for a handful of top officers who owed their positions directly to Menderes, the Turkish armed forces promptly gave their support to the new government, and it has received impressive indications of popular approval as well. The rank-and-file of Menderes' supporters have made no significant moves against the junta, despite its arrests of the leaders of the Democratic Party (DP), including virtually all Democrat members of the former Grand National Assembly.

2. It was probably only shortly before the coup that the CNU brought in General Gursel, recently retired as Chief of the Ground Forces, to head the operation. Soon after the coup, the CNU promulgated a provisional constitution giving itself the powers of the Grand National Assembly until such time as a new constitution is adopted and an assembly elected under new electoral laws. General Gursel, Chairman of the CNU, was also designated head of state. The cabinet appointed immediately after the coup included three military and 14 civilian members.

3. Most members of the CNU have avoided publicity, and the group's inner workings are carried on with a secrecy which makes it difficult to obtain information on its personalities, power relationships, and basic intentions. Gursel himself is considered a forceful man, who had made his disapproval of the Menderes regime well before the coup. Despite recurrent reports that one or another of the CNU officers exercises the real power behind the scenes, we believe that Gursel, as active operating head of the Provisional Government, is in fact the key figure and at least first among equals in the CNU. After Gursel, the most publicized figure in the CNU is Colonel Turkes. Another leading figure is Major General Madanoglu, who probably played a central role in organizing and executing the coup.

4. Gursel and his colleagues originally indicated their intention to hold national elections and to restore civil government in the shortest possible time. Nevertheless, the group has clearly become more cautious about how and when to take the step, and more impressed with the difficulties of doing so. While substantial progress has been made in

1 Colonel Turkes is an ardent Turkish nationalist. He was arrested by Inonu in 1944 for his activities in the Pan-Turkism movement, which aims at uniting the Turkish speaking peoples, particularly those living in the USSR, with Turkey. He has been friendly toward the US and West Germany. [Footnote in the source text.]
drafting a constitution, important questions remain to be resolved—e.g., whether to have proportional representation. Initial suggestions that a new constitution might be promulgated in July and elections held late this summer or early fall now appear premature. Elections may be put off until next spring or even later.

5. On the whole, we believe that the regime remains sincere in its desire to restore civilian government. Indications are that the CNU does not intend to establish lasting control on the pattern of Nasser’s free officers. The bulk of the evidence is that the junta’s efforts are still directed at the eventual transfer of power rather than the prolonged consolidation of its own. Undue delays would run counter to one of the major reasons for staging the coup—the restoration of political freedom—and would invite the strong disapproval of former President Inonu, whose leadership of the RPP and whose association with Ataturk give him enormous prestige and authority among Turkish civilian and military elements alike. Inonu has carefully avoided identifying himself and his party with the military regime.

6. There are personality clashes and some policy differences among the members of the CNU, as well as a certain amount of nervousness and lack of self-confidence. This sort of thing is inevitable at this stage in a politically inexperienced military regime. Some opposition to the regime is likely to appear from time to time. It is also probable that some senior military officers resent the power of the junta’s predominately junior membership. There is probably apprehension within the civil service over the uncertain outlook. On the present evidence, however, we do not believe that either internal disputes or possible opposition will be allowed to imperil the regime’s control of the country. Nor do we believe that the government’s power will be threatened by organized uprisings, for example among the Kurds or Democrat Party elements.

7. Though the CNU has declared its intention to restore civil government, its members probably differ on when this should take place and on the nature of the government to be established. There is probably disagreement between those who favor the return of Inonu and the RPP, and those who take the view that the coup was not simply aimed at installing the RPP in power. The junta almost certainly wants to avoid a single-party system, and with the DP largely disorganized and discredited, members of the present regime may attempt either to encourage such lesser forces as the Nation Party, to revitalize the DP after disposing of its former leaders, or even to sponsor a new political movement. Establishing party organizations in the provinces is an onerous job. It is more likely that CNU members with political ambitions will retire from the armed forces and seek to use their prestige to establish a position in one or another of the existing political parties.
8. In any case, at least some members of the junta are likely to play roles of importance in future Turkish affairs. Not only are they likely to develop some taste for power and an interest in seeing that their program is not abandoned, but they are probably also uncertain about their future under any new Turkish government. They will thus almost inevitably be concerned with the course of Turkish political affairs, though opinions as to how they should make their influence felt are probably still being formed and changed. The original objectives and attitudes of those in power will remain subject to modification by the press of circumstances and the interplay of personalities. Decisions in these matters are likely to require some time, and may easily provoke dissension within the group, though we do not consider it likely to prove fatal to the junta's control.

9. The outcome of a national election will depend to a large extent on the role played by the CNU. If it merely oversees the holding of free elections, the RPP—being strong in its own right and the most likely gainer from the DP's near-disintegration—would probably gain control of the government. If, on the other hand, the CNU actively encourages lesser parties, and particularly if proportional representation is established, the RPP's power would probably be limited. Nevertheless, if an election is held within the next year or so, we still consider the RPP the most likely winner.

II. Military

10. The coup has inevitably diverted to some extent the energies and attentions of the military from their primary mission. A number of competent officers are engaged full time in overseeing the operations of civilian ministries and in other nonmilitary duties arising from the new situation. Moreover, the removal of a handful of top military officers and reassignment of others has created some organizational dislocations, including some disruption of liaison with JUSMMAT. There are indications that the regime intends to go through with long-standing plans to reorganize the armed forces, involving the retirement of a considerable number of officers. On the whole, however, we foresee no significant weakening of Turkey's military capabilities, except in the unlikely event that the regime is forced to use the armed forces to put down some large-scale uprising against its authority.

III. Economic

11. The provisional government's principal immediate economic problems are Turkey's weak financial position and the stagnation of business activity which began early this year. The government is attacking its economic problems with considerable determination. Competent civilians have been appointed to key economic positions and given commensurate authority. The government has taken the politically coura-
gious step of resisting pressures for the higher agricultural subsidies which Menderes had planned. It has also announced plans to improve its financial position by selling bonds to the public and sharply curtailing government spending, rather than by raising taxes. While its re-trenchment program probably will cause some discontent, this is unlikely to be a major problem unless the present economic stagnation turns into a recession. If, as seems more likely, business confidence returns as uncertainty about government policies fades, the economic prospects for the rest of 1960 will be generally good. Harvest prospects are excellent. The stabilization program inaugurated in 1958, while only partially adhered to, has curtailed inflation, improved Turkey's export position, and enabled Turkish industry to expand production. Nevertheless, the actions taken by the new government will not of themselves overcome the weakness of Turkey's financial position and its chronic foreign trade deficit, and continued foreign aid will be necessary.

12. More important for the long run are the steps being taken to substitute an integrated economic development plan for Menderes' over-ambitious and uncoordinated spending program. A National Planning Office has been established to draw up this plan with the aid of experienced foreign experts and UN organs. Projects which are in their early stages have been halted until it can be determined whether they will fit into the new program. The government plans to curtail deficit financing and to minimize subsidies to state-owned enterprises. While these policies will yield only limited results in the near future, they should place Turkey's economic development efforts on a sounder if less ambitious basis. Should the RPP succeed to power, it would probably accept and continue this more restrained and realistic approach to economic development.

IV. Foreign Policy

13. Immediately after the coup, the provisional government gave assurances that it would honor Turkey's international commitments and that no change in Turkish foreign policy was contemplated. In general, we think this is likely to be the case. Turkish participation in NATO and CENTO councils has continued without interruption and with no discernible change in tactics or purpose. The same has been true with respect to Turkish participation in multilateral negotiations concerning Cyprus. The regime's decision to reduce Turkey's contingent in Korea from a brigade to a company was taken in the face of US opposition, but we do not believe it augurs any weakening of Turkey's essential commitment to the Western Alliance. Turkey has a shortage of regular officers, and in view of the military's increased responsibilities in civil affairs, the government probably does feel that the brigade, especially its officers, is needed at home.
14. The decision about the brigade in Korea does, however, illustrate one likely difference between the present regime's attitude on foreign policy and that of its predecessor. Gursel and his colleagues, though desirous of maintaining the same basic ties with the Western Alliance as did Menderes, will almost certainly prove more independent and less readily amenable to US influence on certain issues. They will, for example, probably show more sensitivity about Turkish sovereignty in matters arising from the presence of US troops in Turkey, and be less inclined toward informal arrangements. On the other hand, cooperation in economic matters may improve. Thus while the course of US-Turkish cooperation may be less easy than in the past, the basic relationship is not likely to be undermined.

15. The USSR is seeking to exploit the situation. Khrushchev has sent two letters to assure the new regime that Soviet aid is available, and some officials are already pointing to Soviet offers as cogent reasons for stepped-up US assistance. Basically, however, we think that the present government is as anti-Russian as its predecessor and no more likely to become neutralist. However, it might accept limited Soviet aid, as did the Menderes government. Should the RPP come to power, it, too, would probably pursue a more independent course than Menderes, at the same time preserving the broad framework of cooperation with the West.

372. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, July 25, 1960, 2 p.m.

157. Paris for USRO—Thurston and Finn. I saw General Gursel for one hour at 1600 hours July 24. I obtained appointment through Secretary General Kuneralp who accompanied me. Colonel Turkas also present and acted as interpreter. I had prepared talking paper covering Deptel 127. Three us went over paper carefully. General Gursel heard


1Telegram 127, July 19, outlined a suggested reply to the Turkish program for forced retirements and suggested that a carefully timed program "might well minimize potentially damaging effects of a widespread reaction that PGOT engaged in a political purge." The telegram further informed Warren that the United States "would not in any event wish to finance and thus become identified with any such program." (Ibid., 782.5/7–1460)
me out attentively but with about as much expression as Hittite idol. He did not interrupt. When I had read portion regarding "an effective, modest plan" I asked him if he understood. He nodded assent but it later proved he had not. He again nodded when I finally mentioned MC 70 and General Norstad visit.

When I had finished my paper I inquired whether there were any questions or comments. He then said in effect: I asked USG for 100 million TL. Do we or do we not get money? Whereupon I went back to my seventh paragraph regarding "an effective, modest plan". We went over it again. Kuneralp helped Turkes at one point with interpretation. When we had completed, I believe Gursel understood. I also believe Kuneralp and Turkes comprehended first time. During second try Turkes stated "But we need the money quickly; we have an election next year". To which I responded: "And we have one this year".

Following second run Gursel said: "I have no comments".

I then spoke along these lines: USG had been helpful as it could with previous GOT. It wanted be just as helpful PGOT. Message which I had transmitted was an expression that desire be helpful. He could see every point which he had raised our previous meeting had been considered. We had not been able accede his request for 100 million litas but Washington had indicated possible method procedure. Kuneralp attempted explain Turkish language what I had twice said and, when Turkes pressed urgency, asked whether carefully phased program could be completed one year. I said I thought process could not be completed one year since Washington spoke in terms carefully phased and timed personnel program. However Washington did appreciate urgency matter and no doubt had considered carefully Turkey's need in overall demands on USG. Gursel animadverted "Turkey is far away from USA. Perhaps USG does not understand." I responded that in 1960 Turkey just as close USA as Mexico. Her strengths and weaknesses were same concern for UGS as strengths weaknesses any part American union. Strengths weaknesses one ally is concern all allies. I was sure Joint Chiefs Staff and US [National] Security Council considered Turkey needs as carefully conscientiously as it did our own. I was equally certain our common opponent (USSR) considered that any military attack it might make against Turkey would be considered an attack against Turkey's allies.

General Gursel then decided what I said was very important and that loss Turkey could also mean loss Arab world. I agreed.

I proposed that General Gursel have my talking paper translated, studied by his experts, and be followed by plan which I could submit

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2 July 25. For Norstad's report on the visit, see Document 374.
Washington. He did not promise. I said he had asked for one lump sum liras which USG unable supply but it had suggested plan which might be helpful. Turkes commented money needed now and “We shall find that money somewhere”. I then stated that my earlier answer to Kuneralp may have been made too quickly. I was thinking one year was too short a time for a feasible plan to work out. Perhaps I was wrong. That could be determined when a Gursel plan is submitted for USG consideration.

I again suggested PGOT try working out plan which I could submit. Also said I ready try answer any additional questions or seek replies from Washington. Gursel did not say he would submit such a plan neither did he refuse do so. I asked that he let me know if he needed me further about plan or otherwise. He said he would. As I arose to go I said “Let’s try find way get funds you need.” He smiled.

Comment: Gursel could not have been more [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] unyielding [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] more provincial in his interest get money as he had requested. I could detect no flexibility his attitude or understanding US position. He certainly left me understand he is going ahead as PGOT had planned. I would not be surprised by any move he might make.

Turkes, who rumor says is PGOT’s strongest man and replacement Gursel some day, showed more emotion and as much determination as Gursel. He is giving no thought position USG or its commitments. He only sees need which PGOT has and US failure supply funds. I am sure any course action which he recommends will be solely unilateral its consideration.

Kuneralp was watching his P’s and Q’s and seemed slightly embarrassed throughout meeting. I am sure he will take or recommend no course action which he foresees will get him into trouble with Gursel, Turkes or CNU.

Query: Can Department advise quickly whether it considers that any such plan could be encompassed within one year?

Warren

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3 In telegram 174 to Ankara, July 27, the Department of State replied that it would withhold comment on Warren’s request pending discussions with Norstad. (Department of State, Central Files, 782.5/7-2560) Regarding the meeting between Norstad and Department of State and other U.S. Government officials on August 2, see Document 374.
373. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, July 25, 1960, 4 p.m.

158. When I saw General July 24 re Deptel 127 and completed my presentation I mentioned upcoming trial leaders former government and constant rumors certain number them will be executed. I proceeded thus:

PGOT had requested USG for 100 million liras connection compulsory retirement plan. There would be other requests (I had in mind urgent need for 34.4 million dollars foreign exchange). As in present retirement proposal, each request would be carefully considered and USG would be as helpful as possible. Our being helpful, however, depended upon USA Executive getting funds from Congress. In turn appropriations by Congress depend upon USA public opinion. That opinion is greatly influenced by American and international press. Proposed trials would be reported by US and European press. I had tried point out to previous GOT leaders importance this relationship between USG funds and public opinion influenced by press. In same way and in same spirit of friendship I wanted do likewise today. I was speaking without instructions but with a friend’s understanding of USA public opinion and that other countries allied with Turkey. Should former leaders be executed there would be a revulsion of feeling in Western world that would influence amount help which USG could give Turkey when Congress under new administration makes appropriations and deterioration USA–Turk relations.

General Gursel listened attentively. When I had finished he looked first at Turkes, then Kuneralp, and smiled. He remarked in English “I thank you very much.”

Comment: I did not sense meaning Gursel’s smile. Both Minister Cowles and I have mentioned this matter to Foreign Minister Sarper. I have now done so to Gursel. I have reason believe British, [garble] Italian, Swiss, Pakistani, Israeli and perhaps others have raised subject with Sarper or Gursel, or both.

I do not intend mention matter again unless Department instructs me do so.

Warren

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.5/7–2560. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Istanbul, Izmir, and Iskenderun.
1 See footnote 1, Document 372.
2 See Document 372.
374. Memorandum of Conversation


SUBJECT
Turkey

PARTICIPANTS

Department of State

The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Mr. Ivan B. White, EUR
Mr. Gerard Smith, S/P
Mr. Philip Farley, S/AE
Mr. Robert Bowie, S
Mr. Jack Bell, U/NOSC
Mr. Russell Fessenden, EUR/RA

SHAPE

General Norstad, SACEUR
Mr. Ray L. Thurston, Political Adviser to SACEUR
Joint Chiefs of Staff

General Twining, Chairman

Atomic Energy Commission

Mr. McConne, Chairman

Deputy Secretary of Defense
Douglas
Assistant Secretary of Defense Irwin
(OSD/ISA)
General Miller, OSD/ISA
Colonel Billingslea, OSD/ISA

General Norstad said that he had recently paid a one-day visit to Turkey. While recognizing that his visit had been a brief one, he had some very definite impressions which he felt it important to pass on. He had managed to meet during his brief visit every member of the Committee of 38, comprised of young colonels and lieutenant colonels. He had found them to be a very bright, loyal and enthusiastic group of young officers. [1 line of source text not declassified]

A major immediate problem facing them is the large group of excess senior officers. These officers are not opposed to the Revolution; the difficulty is simply that they are excess to the real needs of the Turkish Army. Gursel is most desirous of retiring them from the Army and wishes U.S. assistance in this project. General Norstad said that he asked Gursel for a paper setting forth a definite plan for the retirement of the surplus officers. General Norstad emphasized that this plan should not in any way be a "purge" but should be a systematic approach to the problem, providing a fair and equitable program for retiring the officers. It should be presented as a plan for streamlining the Turkish Army.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/8-260. Secret. Drafted by Fessenden and approved in S and U on August 12.

1 July 25.
General Norstad then made a plea for U.S. assistance to help the Provisional Government implement its plan for retirement. U.S. assistance, which would probably amount to about $10 million, should be of course conditional upon the Provisional Government's coming up with a fair and equitable plan. Such U.S. assistance at this particular early stage in the life of the Provisional Government is most important. The group of young officers in charge is well disposed toward the U.S.; many of them speak English, having received training in the U.S. They give the impression of wanting and expecting U.S. leadership and assistance, and it is most important to step in at this early stage [Text not declassified].

It was pointed out to General Norstad that there is a legal bar to using U.S. aid funds for purposes of paying pensions in foreign countries. General Norstad then suggested that our aid be indirect, i.e., that we support some other element in the Turkish budget in order to make available the funds necessary to pay the pensions.

General Norstad also said that, during his recent visit in Ankara, Ambassador Warren had told him that he would be leaving his post about the end of this year. General Norstad expressed the hope that his successor would be young and enthusiastic, able to gain the confidence of the members of the Provisional Government and to inspire them. In reply to a question as to whether our contacts with the new Government should be through civilian or military channels, General Norstad said he felt that they should be through civilian channels.

General Norstad said that the young officers he had talked with were most concerned with the state of Turkey's finances. They told him that everywhere they turned they discovered new and heavy obligations which the previous Turkish Government had incurred. General Norstad said that he had taken with him to Turkey the present Ministers of Commerce and Finance. He had been most favorably impressed with both men and felt that the Provisional Government would make a real effort to put Turkey's finances in order.

General Norstad also made a passing reference to Sarper, the present Foreign Minister. Sarper is essentially a technician in the present regime. Since General Norstad had known Sarper well in Paris, he had taken the occasion to call upon his wife and daughter in Turkey. He had done this deliberately in order to show the Provisional Government military authorities of his high regard for Sarper.

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2 Ekrem Alcan and Cihat Iran, respectively.
375. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey

Washington, August 4, 1960, 10:23 a.m.

233. Following for immediate delivery is text of message to Gursel from President. Advise date and time delivery.

"August 4, 1960
Dear Mr. President:

I have just had an opportunity to talk with General Norstad about his recent visit to Turkey and the fine discussion he had with you at that time. I was particularly gratified at General Norstad's report of your very friendly and cooperative attitude toward the United States.\(^1\) I appreciate the many problems you are now facing and wish to assure you that we have a sympathetic understanding of them and are ready to study the ways in which we might be helpful.\(^2\)

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower"

White House does not wish this message to be made public. Observe Presidential Handling.\(^3\)

Herter

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\(^1\) See Document 374. In telegram 255 from Ankara, August 9, Warren reported that he was concerned with Eisenhower's use of the expression "cooperative attitude," warning that the new Turkish Government had in a number of instances been "short on cooperation." (Department of State, Central Files, 611.82/8–960)

\(^2\) In telegram 228 to Ankara, August 3, the Department of State reported that after consultations with Norstad it was willing to make approximately $10 million available to Turkey to assist indirectly in financing the retirement operations by providing financing for other parts of the Turkish budget. (Ibid., 782.5/7–2760)

\(^3\) In telegram 230 from Ankara, August 5, Warren reported that Eisenhower's message had been delivered to the Foreign Office. (Ibid., 882.00/8–560)
376. Letter From the Ambassador to Turkey (Warren) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Jones)

Ankara, August 11, 1960.

DEAR LEWIS: This is the letter to you which I mentioned in my communication of August 4, 1960.¹

The Provisional Government of Turkey has been in power almost two and a half months. It has been an important and critical period for Turkey and for her allies. At first, no one in Turkey, outside a small esoteric group, realized the relationships between the Committee of National Union, which staged the coup, General Gursel, who was called to head up the Government, the Cabinet and the Turkish Military. Particularly we diplomats did not know who were the principal figures in the Committee of National Union. We were not sure whether Gursel was a stooge, a disgruntled military man, or a patriotic Turk whom unusual forces had brought to the head of the Government. We did not have worries regarding the international policies which the Provisional Government said it had in mind following. For this fact I think we can thank Selim Sarper, the Secretary General of the Foreign Office who became the new Minister of Foreign Affairs. We did wonder about the ultimate acceptance by the Turkish population of the new Government. I knew that the coup was the most successful, the most efficient of the many I had seen in my service (if my memory serves me rightly, I saw seven presidents in thirteen months in Paraguay).²

This morning, August 10, 1960, many facts and much information regarding the PGOT are known to us. For instance, in the Embassy I believe it is the consensus that Gursel is a real leader. He is learning fast. He acts like a Chief of State. He conducts himself very well. He considers carefully, speaks slowly, and makes decisions that stick. He is nobody’s stooge. Sarper told me on May 29, two days after the coup d’état, that Gursel was not a great brain. I am sure Sarper has had to revise upward his estimate of this man. I do not particularly like him but I respect him, consider him to be an intelligent, loyal, patriotic Turk. But he is a Turk, in everything that the word implies.

Gursel is very much the Head of State and Head of Government. He is the leader, in my opinion, of the Committee of National Union, al-

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¹ Not further identified.
though he may not have been a prime mover in bringing the CNU to the successful action of May 27, 1960. I believe he is able to make his desire prevail in the CNU on any matter which he thinks of prime importance. The CNU doubtless has schisms and varying opinions. The group is too inexperienced, too young, too impressed with its mission for it to be otherwise. Next to Gursel I would rank Colonel Turkas as the most important CNU member. He is the man with the fanatical zeal, the inferiority complex, the rankling feelings that will supply energy and motivation for much that the CNU will do or want done. He is my choice for runner-up to Gursel. Should there ever be a serious split in the CNU or if Gursel's course is ever seriously challenged, I would expect Turkas to be the man doing the maneuvering. In the CNU there are General Madanoglu and one or two Colonels who come to our attention from time to time. One of our current jobs is to try to ferret out information that will enable us to determine the principal figures in the CNU. Thus far it seems to me that, considering the manner in which the CNU came into being and the herculean task which it has assumed, it has done remarkably well in what it has accomplished and in maintaining unity in its councils.

Turning to the Cabinet, I believe most Americans of experience in Ankara are impressed with the loyalty, the patriotism, the technical and professional qualifications of the individual members of the Cabinet. It is a Cabinet above the average, I would say. It contains some good friends of the United States. There are no doubt a few weak sisters, but they will be eliminated as the months go by. One matter of concern is that two of the best men in the Cabinet, Iren and Koper, strong friends and admirers of the United States, are already under fire from within the Government. They may be able to weather the storm. If they do not, it will be a cause for concern on the part of the Americans. This Cabinet does not, I think, have the power of the preceding Cabinet because it has been made clear that the Cabinet is the instrument of the Committee of National Union. For instance, the Foreign Office under Sarper does not have the power it exercised under Zorlu.

It might be well to recall here that the CNU has taken the place of the Grand National Assembly of the Turkish Republic and that as such it is the repository of the sovereignty and all the powers of the Turkish people. Every other office and institution of the Turkish Government is subordinate to the CNU. This means that Gursel can only be the true leader and dominate the situation if he is the master of the CNU. If he cannot impose his will on that body, he will not be able to command the situation.

When the PGOT came to power, the press, the intellectuals, the teachers, the students and the Army hailed the accomplishment of the coup d'etat. There was nothing but admiration for the thirty-eight members that made up the CNU. They were all heroes, patriots. We were un-
able to discern among these admirers any trepidation with respect to the CNU or to the new situation which it brought to hand. The military, in particular, looked upon the CNU members as splendid examples of Turkish manhood who had the courage and the bravery to risk their lives to accomplish what needed to be done. It wasn’t long, however, before the military realized that the members of the CNU who had been given a hero’s welcome could not return to the barracks and their commands. Captains, majors, lieutenant colonels and generals who, as members of the CNU, were giving orders to the old pashas, to the entire military establishment, to the nation of Turkey, could not return to their former jobs. Since this realization began to emerge there has been a widening separation between the CNU and the military as an institution. Today, the military is still supporting the CNU and the PGOT but with the realization that the interest of the CNU and the military are not identical. This is an important realization not only for Turkey but for the Western World.

When the coup d’etat was a successful accomplishment at 8 o’clock on May 27 this year, the CNU and its admirers thought that in a short time it would be possible to turn over the reins of authority to a new Government. There is some indication that the CNU thought it would not be necessary to organize a provisional government because the reins of authority within a few days could be turned over to a new civilian government. The revolutionists soon found this was impossible. They then set up the Provisional Government of Turkey. It was the publicized intent of this Provisional Government to turn over power to the civilians at the earliest possible moment. However, in order to turn over power to a civilian government, it was necessary to hold free elections. Free elections meant participation by more than one party in those elections. The principal parties were the DPs and the RPPs. Participation by the DPs without leadership was impossible. Their leaders, however, were and are all cooped up on Yassi Ada. They could not be released until they had been tried. In order for them to be tried there had to be investigations, selection of judges, establishment of the rules for the trial, etc. All this meant weeks and months of hard work. Furthermore, in order to justify the coup d’etat, the DP leaders and assemblymen had to be proven guilty. This raised the question of whether or not they had violated the Constitution. Inspection of the Constitution, in the light of a conviction that already existed, made it necessary that one of the first projects of the Provisional Government of Turkey must be the drafting of a new constitution. As of August 10 that work has not been completed and the exact date of its completion is yet unknown. All of this meant that the PGOT, after looking forward to turning over the reins of government in a few days has found that a few weeks or a few months are not enough. General Gursel in an Istanbul speech on August 8th said
that the target date for the new elections is May 27, 1961, the anniversary of the coup d’etat. We already hear that in circles most friendly to the Government there exists the feeling that even May 27 will be too soon. One report reaching the Embassy is to the effect that perhaps it will take ten to fifteen years for the PGOT to bring up a new generation that will be capable of taking over the affairs of state and managing them in keeping with the spirit and the purposes of the revolution.

I believe it is not too much to say that the PGOT has now reached the point in its thinking where it will be disposed to continue in office as long as necessary to insure that what it considers to be the aims of the revolution are safeguarded or accomplished. In stating this, it must be kept in mind that many of the aims of the revolution have been developed since the PGOT came to power. This is not to say that Gursel is not sincere in stating that the target date for elections is May 27, 1961. The PGOT has been both pragmatic and empirical in its actions. It must continue to be until it has reached a plane of stability.

The PGOT will not reach a plane of stability until it has justified in its own mind the revolution. This can only be done by proving the leaders of the Menderes Regime a bunch of scoundrels, scalawags, thieves and traitors. Furthermore, the PGOT will not reach stability until an assured future is found for all the members of the CNU (for instance, they are toying with the idea of making themselves members of the new Senate, the tenureship to be for one, or two terms, or even life). This stability would require the Military to be brought completely under control. This the CNU is endeavoring to accomplish by a system of compulsory retirements. Such retirements would give the Military the much desired pyramidal structure. Incidentally, it will enable the CNU to get rid of every officer whose loyalty to the regime may be in doubt. Another factor in insuring stability will be the conversions of the Turk peasantry and labor classes to supporters of the present regime. Finally, the CNU members must be sure when the elections are held that the RPPs do not win. In the thinking of many members of the CNU and the PGOT, the RPP is just a little less bad than the DP.

As of today the new Constitution, the investigations for the trials, the trials, and the future of the CNU members remain the “musts” of the present Government. Since the accomplishment of these “musts” is requiring much more time than the perpetrators of the coup foresaw, they are becoming habituated to a new life with new privileges, perquisites, prerogatives and powers. I doubt if they would return to their former positions even though there were no difficulty. As this habituation has taken place they have found many other attractive projects that can be undertaken, each one of which can be tied to the aims of the revolution and justified as being in the patriotic interest of their country. We now hear talk of agrarian reform, reform of the civil ministries, the Economic
Planning Committee, the indoctrination and education of the peasantry and the illiterate, and other undertakings. Naturally as the PGOT enters a new field that field inevitably broadens and invites to other projects. Consequently, in the thinking of the members of the Government the need for the elections becomes less pressing and the desire of the members of the CNU to find security for themselves is even more exigent. For these reasons we may not soon see elections in Turkey.

I have said that the Americans in Turkey are, almost without exception, favorably disposed toward this new Government. Embassy Ankara has reported to Washington that this is a friendly Government. We know that there are important Cabinet members who are drawn to the United States by education, commercial, ideological ties. This is not to say that the PGOT is as close to the United States Government and people as was the Menderes Regime. Contrariwise, it must be stated that there is in this Government an inclination to be suspicious of the United States because relations between Turkey and the United States have been so satisfactory. The Turk is oriental enough to be naturally suspicious of a close relationship between someone he doesn’t like and someone that he does like. This tendency of the CNU members and others to suspect the relationship between the United States and Turkey during the Menderes Regime was partially engendered and successfully played upon by Inonu and his supporters during their campaign after the elections of 1957 until the coup. I think the record will show that Embassy Ankara reported to the Department that Inonu and his supporters were not playing fair in that criticism of the United States. We considered that the RPPs thought that once they were elected they would make their peace with the United States. Embassy Ankara also believed that after a period of readjustment the United States Government would be able to work successfully with a new Inonu government. Today, I see results of the Inonu tactics reflected in the attitude of the Provisional Government of Turkey. This results in the PGOT, more properly the GNU, being determined that the PGOT will not be too close to the United States. The Provisional Government intends to maintain a reserve that will prevent PGOT being a stooge of the United States. This attitude has found expression to such an extent that I do not consider that the PGOT is presently cooperative with the USG. There is an Ankara telegram in the Department which lists 12 instances of the lack of cooperation on the part of Gursel Government.\footnote{In telegram 255 from Ankara, August 9. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.82/8-960)}

\footnote{In telegram 255 from Ankara, August 9. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.82/8-960)}
culties, questionings of our actions during the Gursel Regime than we ever encountered under the Menderes Government.

What is said in the preceding paragraph does not mean that the leaders of the Gursel Government have decided against American assistance. On the contrary, General Gursel has publicly stated that PGOT looks to the United States and other allies for assistance and that the United States could and should help Turkey more than it does. At the same time, Gursel and some of his Cabinet members have emphasized that they expect in the long run to ask us for less assistance than did the Menderes Government. Thus far, proportionately, I should say they have asked for more in the short time they have been in office. This, too, is understandable because the Gursel Government has more and pressing problems than the previous Government of Turkey. However, there is without doubt a spirit of aloofness in their determination to accept the least possible aid from the United States. This means frustration, obstacles, reservations in our future dealings with Gursel and his assistants.

I have said that the PGOT has more and more pressing problems than did the Menderes Regime. These problems call for outside assistance—that is, foreign assistance. In today’s unhappy world that signifies for the most part assistance from the United States. We have been helpful without precedent to the Menderes Government, to the Gursel Government and intend to continue to assist in any way we can. However, our assistance must be within appropriated funds given us by the American Congress and in the light of our world-wide commitments and obligations. From my experiences since 1956, I would say that this fact means we will not be able to supply to Turkey all the assistance which she will really require. I am sure we will do our best. However, I am afraid that our best will not be sufficient to enable this Provisional Government to hold the line. In saying this I am not forgetful of the declared and sincere determination of the PGOT to live within its national budget.

Turkey does not yet have a balanced economy, a balance of imports and exports. It might be said that Menderes was following the Franklin Roosevelt method of meeting this problem. The Menderes method had much reminiscent of our own WPA days. PGOT is more orthodox in its economic thinking. It is somewhere between Herbert Hoover and Dwight Eisenhower. The PGOT is sincere in its thinking and in its endeavor to do conventionally what Menderes was trying to do by his method. The PGOT has embarked on this economic course with conviction and determination. I am not sure it realizes the tremendous effect which this course may have on the people of Turkey. It has been reviewing intensively investment projects of government ministries and State Enterprises, making reductions wherever feasible. In general, new government projects will await the time when the budget is
balanced, exports and imports are in balance and the economic state of
the nation warrants new investments. This undertaking almost certainly
means less persons on the government payroll, less persons employed
by contractors, what might be called collateral unemployment, and a
contributory effect on agriculture and the peasantry. Of course, one
salutary effect will be a reduction in inflationary pressures and in the
demand for imports. One wonders whether, under such conditions, the
revenues of the state will be as large as estimated. The payments gap
will continue. It can only be closed by greater sacrifices on the part of the
people in general and particularly the peasantry (who have lost their
great friend, Menderes). Will the Turkish people endure such additional
sacrifices from a Government from which they expected so much?

If the Gursel Government finds, as I am afraid it will, that it must
have more aid than we are prepared to give, what can it do? We know
that the Soviet Government is ready to supply and is urging the Gursel
Government to accept as much as 500 million dollars at three percent
interest per year. How long can a Provisional Government whose origin
is a coup d'état, a Government feeling the stresses and strains that exist
in the Turkish economy today, resist the tempting offer of the Soviets.
We know from experience that, once it does accept such aid, the bars
will be down. The United States and the Western World will have suf-
f ered a major and tragic defeat.

But the danger from the Soviets is not the only one that faces Turkey
today. Heretofore, Turkey's main qualification as an ally in NATO and
in CENTO was her stability deriving from the character of the Turkish
people and the reliability of the Turkish Army. By the coup d'état the
Military, at one stroke, demolished the record the Turkish Military had
made since the time of Ataturk. Turks had been proud of the fact that the
Turkish Military supported duly constituted authority. Every man in
the CNU broke his oath when he took part in the coup d'état. I believe
that the psychological result of breaking that oath has had an unbeliev-
able effect on the members of the CNU and the Army in general. At any
rate, once the Army has stooped to revolt, there is no way to convince
dissident groups that the Military would not be justified in staging an-
other revolt. I have indicated above the problem which the PGOT has in
reaching a plane of stability. It is retiring, compulsorily, 90% of the Gen-
erals, 55% of the Colonels, 40% of the Lieutenant Colonels, 5% of the Ma-
jors. If this body of former officers becomes disgruntled, there is no
mental bar to their overthrowing the PGOT. Turkey now has a coup
d'état Army.

Another danger for the PGOT has been mentioned but should be
explained a bit. I have in mind the need which the press, the intellectu-
als, the educators, the students and the Military feel to justify the coup
d'état. Evidently they are not finding the crimes which they expected to
uncover. We now hear that one of the crimes which they hope to be able to prove is treasonable activities on the part of the Menderes leaders during the riots of September 5–6, 1955, a date more than two years before the last elections at which the Menderes Government was returned to power. It is hard for an American to understand the overpowering need which the mentioned Turks have to justify the revolution but it is a fact. In all my service I have not found elsewhere the hate which there is among the intelligentsia and the Military today for Menderes and his leaders. People, who in another country would be the ones expected to stand up for impartial trials, leniency, moderation, today in Turkey are calling for the execution, the hanging, of Bayar, Koraltan, Menderes, Zorlu, Polatkan. This is frightening and it lends a new light on the ferocity of the riots of ’55. This feeling is behind the revolutionary zeal, the post facto changing of the law to permit the execution of Bayar, the procedures and methods set up for the trial, the mass imprisonment of an entire party representation in the National Assembly. It makes possible the mass trial of members of the Grand National Assembly and probably others. But I do not want to get too deeply into the question of the trials. They will speak for themselves when they are held. It is sufficient for me to say here that one wonders how reliable an ally is a country whose Government is motivated by hate and can only see the trial of the culprits of the previous regime in the light of that hate.

There is another danger which causes me much concern. I have hinted at it already. I am thinking of the situation that could confront this Government if the retired military officers, the peasantry, the laboring classes, the small businessmen and all those who may be disaffected for whatever reasons, should get together. Immediately it is said, but this Government has the Army with it; with the Army and a determined Government matters should be kept in hand. In view of which I cannot but recall that Menderes and Bayar thought the same thing. The Army is no longer what it was.

There is another danger: that the Turkish Military as a result of the tremendous changes arising from compulsory retirements does not have sufficient qualified and tested men to fill the vacancies which have been created. It is entirely possible that the Army in time will become what both General Gurpel and American officers want it to become but, pending the development of capable officers, there is a void that could be tragic for Turkey and the allies depending upon her.

There is a great danger, just now being sensed by some Turks, which could make inevitable international trouble. The Turkish people

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4 Reference is to anti-Greek rioting at Istanbul and Izmir set off by a bomb attack on the birthplace of Ataturk.
do like a strong dictating, not to say dictatorial, Government. When the coup came the classes that had wanted a change could not have been happier. They accepted gladly from the new Government restrictions which would have been denounced to high heaven had they been imposed by the Menderes Regime. Those restrictions today I believe to be as bad as anything the Menderes Government imposed. I would say that in two months and a half the PGOT has reached the point in repression that it took the Menderes Regime ten years to attain. I know that the American press would immediately call attention to the freedom of the press. I think, however, that an impartial observation of what took place in the Menderes Regime and of what is taking place in Turkey today would find that there is little difference. Thus far the PGOT has achieved its control of the press by talking to its members. However, under this system of freedom the PGOT has locked up fourteen or fifteen Democratic newspapermen because they were Democratic. The other day some seventy students wanted to demonstrate in behalf of Hacavdis, the only important DP newspaper attempting to publish today. The demonstration was broken up and six or seven of the students were jailed. So, by and large, the PGOT is just as repressive as was the Menderes Government. Sooner or later the Turkish people will come to realize the present state of affairs and then, with a coup d'état as a precedent, I am afraid they will do something about it.

There is a danger not quite so evident but one concerning which some observers, among whom I am included, have fear. That is, that party activities in Turkey are going to be radically changed. The RPP welcomed the coup d'état because it felt that it certainly would come to power as soon as elections were held. Now, I am pretty sure that the principal leaders of the RPP, from Inonu down, are beginning to have much doubt as to where their party stands and for its future activities. There is talk that what Turkey needs is not political parties but an absence of parties so that the people could vote their desires uninfluenced by party activity. This would mean, of course, candidates supplied by the Government. What is more likely, I would think, is the emergence of a National Union Party, or some other such organization to which the present CNU members and other Government officials can flock in order to insure their future security. Almost certainly such a development would mean that those in power are going to make sure that the RPP does not become strong enough to win the election.

I have tried to set forth above the concern which developments since the coup are causing me. Embassy Ankara will watch all future developments in an endeavor to assess accurately what is taking place. My concern, I believe, is shared by some of my colleagues but I must use the greatest care in what I say to anyone, diplomatic or not, lest it unfavorably affect this Government. The people of the United States is a
friend of the people of Turkey. Each people needs the other. With the USSR acting up today we need Turkey more than ever before. The people of Turkey gave us the Menderes Government to work with. We worked with it faithfully and loyally. We were as helpful to the Turkish people, through the Menderes Government as we were able to be. Now we can say, by a stretch of the imagination, that the Turkish people has given us the Gursel Government with which to work. We intend to work with it just as loyally and faithfully as we did with the Menderes Regime. We intend to be just as helpful to the Gursel Government as we were to the Menderes Government. It might be said in parenthesis that, when the Gursel Government goes, we shall endeavor to be in a position to work in the same friendly, cooperative way with the succeeding government (if it is not Commie). I do not like the course of events in Turkey today. I am afraid that Gursel cannot see the forest for the trees any better than could Adnan Menderes. The Turkish official doesn’t seem to be able to gauge the response of his own people. Nevertheless, so far as we can see, there is no alternative to the PGOVT. If this Government is overthrown, no one can foresee what we would get. One thing is certain, and that is that the Soviets are better able to cash in on a state of confusion and political disaffection than is the Western World. The interests of the United States and the Western World demand that we be as considerate, as helpful to the Gursel Government as we can be. We will have to try to be even more perceptive and understanding of what is taking place in Turkey than is the Government itself. In doing this we must not forget that the attitude toward the United States is being determined by a group of inexperienced men (members of the CNU) who basically feel that they should pull away from the United States as much as possible. We must bear with this Government, try to see that it doesn’t succumb to Commie blandishments and that it remains loyal to the United States, to CENTO, to NATO.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

Fletcher Warren

5 Printed from copy that bears this typed signature.
377. Memorandum of Conversation

SecDel/MC/7


SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE FIFTEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York, September 19–24, 1960

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Mr. Achilles
Mr. A. Guy Hope
H.E. Mr. Selim Sarper, Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister

SUBJECT

Turkish Internal Affairs

Foreign Minister Sarper expressed his gratification at being received by Mr. Herter. He declared the Government of Turkey is anxious to continue its close and friendly cooperation with the U.S. Government. He looked forward to working with our representatives in the General Assembly and was happy to note that his old friend Ambassador Wadsworth is now the Chief of the U.S. Mission to the U.N.¹

Mr. Sarper indicated his awareness that there had been considerable interest and speculation among Turkey’s friends about the meaning of the coup d’etat and the establishment of a provisional government. He noted that the coup had come off without any bloodshed or other violent action of the kind which had accompanied the upsetting of regimes in countries near Turkey, and stated that there had been a good deal of pent-up emotion which might have taken a more violent turn. He was happy to report that some fifteen days ago the Committee of National Union had chosen correctly between the two roads open to it² and he felt optimistic about the future course of Turkey in both its domestic and foreign affairs. He commented particularly that General Gursel had shown himself firm in electing a proper and moderate course for his country.

¹ James Wadsworth was appointed Ambassador to the United Nations on August 27.

² Presumably a reference to the CNU’s decision that Turkey would continue its strongly pro-Western orientation in foreign policy and limit contacts with the Soviet Union.
From the first, Mr. Sarper said, the CNU and the provisional government had reiterated Turkey’s continued support for its NATO, CENTO and bilateral alliances. He felt confident these were firm undertakings from which there would be no retreat.

On elections, the Foreign Minister said that there had been considerable speculation in the world press and he thought the Secretary should have the true story. When General Gursel, on assuming power, had talked originally of holding elections within three months after the May 27 coup, Mr. Sarper had gone to him pointing out that this was an impossibility and could only create misunderstandings when the CNU realized the difficulties of writing a new constitution, holding trials of members of the former regime, and taking the necessary organizational steps to hold elections. He had anticipated that postponement was inevitable and that there would be world reaction unfavorable to General Gursel and his colleagues because people would think that they had gone back on their promise because they enjoyed the taste of power. General Gursel had recognized the validity of this point and had agreed that it would be desirable to set the elections definitely for the anniversary of the coup, May 27, 1961. However, the professors who were drafting the constitution had run into the usual difficulties encountered by academic people with their heads in the clouds, and their work was too slow to allow elections by that date. However, Gursel had undertaken to have elections soon enough thereafter to permit transfer of power on October 29, 1961 to the duly elected permanent administration. In the meantime, a “sort-of parliamentary body” was being established to advise the CNU. There would be two representatives from each vilayet (province).

Turning to the trials of members of the Menderes government, Mr. Sarper said he was offering comments because he knew of our concern about this subject. The Secretary, noting that he was reassured by Mr. Sarper’s optimism about the correct road which the Turkish Government was selecting, said that the U.S. interest in the trials is a somewhat narrow one. We are concerned that arrangements which we entered into with the previous administration should not be treated in the trial as a part of activities considered detrimental to Turkey and publicized in such a way as to cast reflections on our alliance. Mr. Sarper said that Ambassador Warren had already spoken to him along these lines\(^3\) and that on instructions from General Gursel he had discussed the matter with

\[^3\text{Warren reported on his discussion with Sarper regarding the fate of members of the Menderes government in telegram 126 from Ankara, July 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/7-2060)}\]
the Minister of Justice. He undertook to stress the point again with the appropriate officials.

The Secretary inquired about the charges which would be brought against the officials of the Menderes administration. Mr. Sarper said that the basic charge would pertain to violation of the constitution, but would also include murder (killing of the students), attempted murder (of Inonu), attempt to provoke civil war (relating to the distribution of uniforms and the creation of an unauthorized militia and to the subsidizing and free transportation to workers in Izmir for trouble-making purposes), and abuse of power (relating to corruption on the part of five or six cabinet members). Mr. Sarper declared the trials, which he expected to open at the end of the first week of October, would be as fair and humane as possible. Within the limits of space (600 people or so), representatives of foreign embassies and the Turkish and foreign press would be permitted to attend along with the close relatives of the accused. Nine professional judges, some military, would sit. (In order to avoid undue influence on them, the names of the judges were not being made public; they would be elected from a panel.) Each defendant would be permitted to have three attorneys. The Chief Prosecutor would be a professional attorney. Proceedings would be broadcast. Despite speculation and false statements about capital punishment, no decision had been taken and in the nature of things it could not be until the degree of guilt had been judicially determined.

Mr. Sarper turned to the question of the Turkish debt consolidation. He said that the Minister of Finance was coming to Washington on September 22 to explore in an informal way, without any specific proposal to be advanced at this time, the possibility of the reconsolidation of the Turkish external indebtedness, perhaps to include the billion dollar debt which had not been included in the OEEC debt settlement program agreed to in 1959 (that settlement having included less than $500 million). He stated that the previous administration had known very well that it could not meet the debt schedule set up in the OEEC negotiations, which required Turkey to pay $140 to $150 million a year. Turkey needed $400 million annually to carry on and could only earn $200 to $300 million. It seemed to him illogical that the U.S. and other friends of Turkey should be making funds available with the one hand while requiring them to be paid back into the other. If the U.S. should prove receptive to a consideration of ways and means out of this dilemma, the Government of Turkey would consider approaching European creditor nations along the same line, talking to France, Germany and Italy bilaterally, then to the U.K. and perhaps finally to the OEEC.

The Secretary said that he was not acquainted with the details of this situation and assumed that the Minister of Finance would be taking it up with those in Washington who specialized in financial problems.
Mr. Sarper said that he wanted to inform the Secretary in advance of Turk thinking about this problem and did not expect any specific comment at this time.

Mr. Sarper said that another problem which was troubling his Government greatly concerned Algeria. He felt that the kind of stalemate which had persisted could not go on and that if the Afro-Asian bloc should produce a sensible solution, Turkey this year would have to go along with it. He had found no flexibility on either side of the question. In talking recently with Tunisians in Ankara, he had heard mention again of a possible federation of Algeria with Tunisia and Morocco. He was not sure how this could work (he compared it with the U.S. having Canada join it without the consent of the U.K.) but thought the Tunisians were serious and that it might offer a new approach to the problem. The Secretary said he was not aware of any such proposal, but responded to Mr. Sarper’s request for advice on the problem by saying he would be glad to ask Ambassador Wadsworth of the USUN staff to consult with the Turks about it. Mr. Sarper said he would like to keep in step with the U.S. on this.

The Secretary inquired whether there was anything new in Turk relations with the USSR. Mr. Sarper responded that very little had happened since the Gursel–Khrushchev exchange of letters. He had felt that Khrushchev had put his own interpretation on General Gursel’s remarks and had “put words in his mouth”. After studying the matter, the Government of Turkey had thought it advisable to “dot the i’s” and then to publish the exchange of letters. They had waited about a month before publishing them because they had not had an Ambassador in Moscow and were interested in the Russian reaction. What Sarper had attempted to set out was that while the Turkish Government was firmly committed to its NATO, CENTO and bilateral obligations, and intended to remain so, there was an area between this stance and the usual Soviet posture where better “neighborly relations” could be encouraged. He thought the Russians had received this approach favorably and they had made no difficulties about the publication of the letters. He commented that Turkey was genuinely unafraid in its dealings with Russia, and the Secretary complimented the Turkish people for their sturdy and courageous attitude.

The Secretary expressed the hope that problems arising inevitably out of the presence of U.S. military personnel in Turkey would not be allowed to create problems between us. Mr. Sarper said there was a feeling abroad in Turkey that U.S. servicemen were given better treatment

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4 For texts of Khrushchev’s June 28 letter and Gursel’s July 8 reply, see RIIA, Documents on International Affairs, 1960, pp. 418–422.
in the courts than that accorded to troops of other NATO countries. He wondered if it might be possible to revise the treaty between the U.S. and Turkey to assure that the treatment was equal. Mr. Hope commented that the NATO Status of Forces agreements were uniform among NATO partners and that we had been seeking for some time to get the Turks to implement their undertakings so that U.S. servicemen would receive treatment equal to that accorded to them in other NATO countries. Mr. Sarper wondered if there could not be further discussions about this subject at the Ambassadorial level. The Secretary agreed it might be useful.

Mr. Sarper commented that he thought the Russians had done very well in their propaganda about the U-2 business. The Secretary thought we would be hearing more about this subject in the next few days. Mr. Sarper said that he had understood that while such airbases as Incirlik and Adana had been mentioned at the Powers’ trial, they had not been identified as being located in Turkey.

In concluding the visit the Foreign Minister said that his role in the provisional government was not an easy one, although it offered many satisfactions. He had been surprised that when Gursel and the CNU dismissed ten Cabinet members recently, he had not been removed from office nor would General Gursel permit him to resign. He stated that he was the prime agitator in the dissatisfaction expressed by the dissident Ministers and indicated that he expected to continue to speak freely. He thought it was a good sign that the provisional government was prepared to accept his criticism and to take considerable guidance from him on foreign policy matters. He hoped the Secretary would help him on his difficult road, for example by seeing that there was favorable press service coverage of his visit with the Secretary and otherwise publicizing his influence with high officials of the U.S. Government.

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5 Reference is to Soviet actions in bringing the U-2 incident before the U.N. Security Council and the August 17-19 public trial of U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers.
378. Memorandum of Discussion at the 461st Meeting of the National Security Council


[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1–3.]

4. U.S. Policy Toward Turkey (NSC 5708/2; NSC Action No. 2215–c; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 3, 1960; NSC Action No. 2255–b; S/NIE 33–60; NSC 6015; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated September 27, 1960)\(^1\)

Mr. Gray presented the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 6015. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this Memorandum.)\(^2\) In the course of his briefing Mr. Gray read Paragraphs 4 and 5 of NSC 6015 dealing with the orientation of the Provisional Government of Turkey and asked whether Secretary Dillon wished to comment on this problem.

Secretary Dillon said that when the Provisional Government of Turkey first assumed power it had announced that it would continue the pro-Western orientation of the government which it replaced. Subsequently, the Provisional Government, after it learned something about the complexity of foreign affairs and after it had investigated the activities of the preceding government, began to consider the possibility of a slight change in Turkish orientation in the direction of greater receptivity to Soviet overtures. However, an important meeting of the Committee of National Union (CNU) held two or three weeks ago decided that Turkish pro-Western orientation should be continued. Mr. Dillon

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\(^1\) NSC 5708/2 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XXIV, pp. 720–727. NSC Action No. 2215–c, approved April 9, instructed the NSC Planning Board to revise all current NSC papers for the incoming Presidential administration. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) The Executive Secretary’s June 3 memorandum, which recommended revision of NSC 5708/2, is ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5708. NSC Action No. 2255–b, approved July 6, instructed the NSC Planning Board to revise NSC 5708/2. (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) S/NIE 33–60 is printed as Document 371. A copy of NSC 6015, “U.S. Policy Toward Turkey,” September 14, 1960, is in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 6015. The Executive Secretary’s September 27 memorandum, which transmitted the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is ibid., NSC 5708.

\(^2\) Not printed.
said that the Turks had been dealing with us on a more “forthcoming” basis since the CNU reached this decision.

After describing the economic sections of NSC 6015, Mr. Gray asked whether Mr. Scribner wished to make any comment. Mr. Scribner said he did not have much to add. A great deal of pressure had been required to induce the Menderes regime to take the steps necessary to put the Turkish economy in order. The Menderes regime had not been in power long enough to complete these steps but the present Provisional Government of Turkey seemed to be carrying on the reforms undertaken by the Menderes government in the economic field. Secretary Dillon remarked that the Provisional Government had been able to eliminate certain unnecessary public works projects which had been personally linked to Menderes.

Mr. Gray then described the split in Paragraph 42 of NSC 6015 dealing with the possibility of reducing NATO-approved force goals for Turkey.

Mr. Staats said the Budget position had been well described by Mr. Gray. Budget agreed that an overall review of Turkish force goals would take place whether or not a provision for such review appeared in NSC 6015. However, Mr. Staats felt no damage would be done by providing for this review in the paper. He felt there was a danger that Turkish force goals may be unrealistically high. The main argument against Paragraph 42 as proposed by Treasury and Budget had been that Turkey would not make as much effort to reach the NATO-approved force goals if there was provision for their review. Mr. Staats felt, however, that this argument might be turned around; it could be said that Turkey would not make much effort to achieve unrealistically high force goals which were not specifically subject to review. Mr. Scribner said the U.S. had provided assistance to Turkey averaging $277 million a year for the last five years. The new five year military assistance plan contemplated an increase in assistance to Turkey up to $400 million a year. Mr. Scribner doubted that we would be able to provide this level of assistance and doubted whether Turkey could absorb this amount. From a reading of NSC 6015 it appeared that such a high level of assistance could not be provided for Turkey unless international institutions or countries other than the U.S. shared in giving the assistance. He was concerned lest the goals be set so high as to be unobtainable, with the result that shortfalls would be inevitable. He felt that setting the goals at too high a level would defeat rather than advance the objectives of our assistance to Turkey.

Secretary Gates felt it was difficult to disagree with the wording of the Treasury-Budget proposal which read “consider the possibility of reduction.” He felt the question to be considered was what are the NATO requirements. These requirements were at the present time un-
der review by General Norstad. Moreover, NSC 6015 in Paragraph 44–a–(6) spoke of "reducing or eliminating non-essential military elements." Secretary Dillon said the State Department agreed with the remarks of the Secretary of Defense. Consideration was constantly being given to the possibility of reducing force goals. Moreover, Paragraph 42 proposed by Treasury and Budget emphasizes ability to absorb. In Mr. Dillon's view, ability to support is also an important consideration. Paragraph 42 contains the implication that the U.S. should not provide any assistance which Turkey cannot itself support. Turkey, however, will not be able for a long time to come to support the kind of military force it should have. Finally, Mr. Dillon believed that it was not wise to single out Turkey as the only country to which we applied a provision calling for consideration of the possibility of reducing force goals.

General Twining noted that SACEUR and the JCS kept Turkish force requirements under constant scrutiny. Turkey had been making a great effort to achieve NATO-approved force goals and had been making considerable progress in that direction. General Twining was anxious to see Turkey reach the NATO force goals if Turkey could absorb sufficient assistance to enable her to do so. Secretary Dillon said he had been assuming that a training program would enable Turkish forces to learn how to handle the new equipment they would receive.

The President asked what Turkey thought about its force goals. Did Turkey want to continue building its forces up regardless of the situation? General Twining replied that the new government was not interested in building Turkish forces to unrealistic levels. Secretary Dillon said that Turkey wanted a smaller, harder-hitting force. Turkey has informed General Norstad that it will not be able to meet the NATO-approved force goals and that the latter must be revised. Mr. Dillon added that State objected to Paragraph 42 because of its emphasis on Turkish ability to absorb and support the military program without any mention of requirements.

Mr. Scribner said he believed the increases in assistance to Turkey envisaged in the five year military assistance plan were unrealistic. Secretary Gates pointed out that these increases simply brought Turkish assistance back to the level at which it had previously existed. Mr. Scribner said he believed U.S. assistance to Turkey over the last ten years had averaged about $250 million a year. Secretary Gates pointed out again that Paragraph 44–a–(6) would seem to solve the problem since it referred to "reducing or eliminating non-essential military elements". Mr. Scribner thought it would be unwise to establish force goals which would not be attainable either because of Turkish inability to absorb the requisite assistance or because of our inability to provide enough economic assistance in support of military assistance.
The President thought that in revising Turkish force goals, it would be necessary to consider Turkish economic capacity as well as the amount of assistance which nations other than ourselves could contribute to Turkey. Secretary Dillon said Paragraph 42 would not be objectionable to him if it read as follows: "In reviewing NATO-approved force goals for Turkey, consider the possibility of a reduction in those goals in relation to Turkish ability to absorb and the overall ability of the NATO alliance to support the military program." There was no objection to the revision suggested by Mr. Dillon.

Secretary Dillon said he wished to bring out two more points. First, the State Department's latest information was that a recent CNU meeting had postponed the elections in Turkey until October 1961. Second, the Development Loan Fund was making progress on the project for building in Turkey a new steel mill which would produce 360,000 tons of steel a year. This steel mill would be a joint enterprise with DLF, U.S. private interests, the Turkish Government, Turkish private interests, and French private interests all putting up a share of the money. Chase Manhattan Bank and the U.S. steel companies were cooperating. Mr. Dillon believed the steel mill project was very significant for Turkey.

_The National Security Council:_

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 6015; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of September 27, 1960.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 6015, subject to the following amendment:

_Page 17, paragraph 42: Delete the brackets and the footnote thereto, and revise to read as follows:

"42. In reviewing NATO-approved force goals for Turkey, consider the possibility of revision in those goals in relation to NATO requirements, as well as to Turkey's ability to absorb and the overall ability of the NATO Alliance to support the military program."

_Note: NSC 6015, as amended by the action in b above, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 6015/1 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and referred to the OCB as the coordinating agency._

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

Marion W. Boggs

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3 Paragraphs a–b and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2311. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Actions by the National Security Council)

4 NSC 6015/1 is printed as Document 379.

NSC 6015/1 Washington, October 5, 1960.

STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD TURKEY¹

General Considerations

1. Turkey is of great importance in the U. S. effort to build a position of strength in the Middle East. Throughout modern history the Turks have had an unwavering desire to be accepted by Western Europe (and more lately the United States) as a member of the Western community. Strategically located astride the Bosphorus-Dardanelles water passage from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, Turkey has contiguous land frontiers with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Bulgaria, and historically has been at odds with Russia. Since World War II, concern over Soviet pressure on the area has caused Turkey to maintain a staunch pro-Western, anti-Soviet foreign policy.

2. Turkey has maintained armed forces designed to cope with direct Soviet attack as a part of a concerted allied defense and has granted extensive use of military facilities to the United States. Air facilities in Turkey extend U. S. capabilities to mount effective air strikes in the event of hostilities with the USSR. Turkey is a link in the chain of U. S. military global communications. The United States has also been granted the use of naval facilities. Turkey freely granted the use of facilities at the Incirlik Air Base at Adana in 1958 for staging troops to Lebanon. In addition, the headquarters of the NATO Commander Allied Land Forces Southeast Europe and of the Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force are located at Izmir.

3. Turkey, since the end of World War I, has been experiencing an extensive social, economic and political revolution. Government leaders have sought to create a modern state, replacing Turkey's traditional economic and social systems with Western practices. Single-party rule existed from 1924 to 1946, when Turkey inaugurated a multi-party system. In 1950, the administration changed hands peacefully following the victory of the Democrat Party (DP) over the incumbent Republican Peoples Party (RPP) of Ismet Inonu. The trend toward the development of democratic institutions and practices was halted in recent years, how-

¹The current situation in Turkey is dealt with in considerable detail in this paper due to the recent political upheaval there. [Footnote in the source text.]
ever, as Prime Minister Menderes increasingly suppressed opposition elements, especially the RPP. Growing indications that Menderes was preparing to use the army and the security forces to crush his opponents led a group of military officers, despite aloofness of the military from politics since the time of Ataturk, to carry out the May 1960 coup.

4. A major question confronting U. S. policy is whether the new regime will continue to cooperate closely with the United States and NATO. The provisional government of Turkey (PGOT) is likely to continue its fundamental cooperation with the United States but is likely to be more independent than the previous government in assessing its own interests. It announced that it would honor Turkey's international obligations, specifically naming NATO and CENTO, and stated that it would relinquish power as soon as it could prepare the way for the election of a civilian government. The extent to which the military government lives up to these commitments will influence the U. S. policies required to obtain our objectives in Turkey. General Cemal Gursel has reaffirmed that substantive changes in foreign policy are not planned. In general, this seems to have been the case although there is evidence to indicate some differences in emphasis. There has so far, however, been no apparent change in Turkish tactics or purposes in the NATO councils nor, for that matter, in its participation in the UN and in CENTO.

5. Their centuries of experience under the Capitulations have caused the Turkish people to be especially sensitive to any inference that foreigners in Turkey enjoy privileged status. In consequence, in connection with our efforts to cooperate with Turkey, special attention has been devoted by all U. S. agencies to the development and strengthening of programs designed to promote conduct and attitudes among U. S. personnel conducive to good will and mutual understanding. It may be noted that the present military leaders may well prove more independent and less readily amenable to U. S. influence on issues related to the American presence in Turkey. They may be less inclined toward informal agreements and they may look more closely at U. S. use of Turkish military facilities.

6. The coup was organized by a group of middle-level officers who enlisted the aid of a number of high-ranking officers. The Committee of National Union (CNU), as the officers who seized power called themselves, has amended the Constitution of 1924 to legalize itself and has assumed the powers of the former Grand National Assembly (GNA). The CNU is clearly the locus of power in the Provisional Government of Turkey. An initial cabinet, composed largely of able civilian

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2 These extraterritorial privileges exempted foreigners from taxes and enabled them to trade freely, practice their religion, and live by their national laws without regard to the central Ottoman authority.
technicians, was formed the day after the coup. Political activities have been banned for the present. Leaders of the former regime are in custody and are to be tried.

7. On its assumption of power, the CNU invited a group of prominent law professors to write a new constitution and a new electoral law. At the same time, the CNU, which has emphasized its non-partisanship in domestic politics, declared its intention to hold national elections as soon as possible and to restore civil government. It now appears that these elections will not be held before the spring of 1961 at the earliest, not only because of the time required to draft and promulgate the new constitution and electoral law but also because of the increasing emphasis the regime places on its role in reforming Turkey's military, economic and political institutions. There are also growing indications that the CNU realizes that the trials of the former government leaders must be completed prior to the holding of national elections.

8. While the military leaders apparently are sincere in their desire to restore civilian government, and seem clearly to want to prevent one-party rule, which might well be the result of an early election in view of the strength of the RPP and the near-disintegration of the DP, the CNU itself apparently has not fully decided on its future political role. It is, however, likely to attempt to encourage the growth of one or more lesser parties, and may even start a new political movement. Should the members of the CNU seek to perpetuate their power indefinitely by non-democratic means, widespread political instability could result because of the strong desire of the Turkish middle classes for representative political institutions. It is in the over-all U. S. interest for Turkey to have a form of government responsive to the will of the people as soon as practicable.

9. Since the coup, the USSR has sought to exploit the situation. Immediately following the coup, the Soviet Union made renewed offers of extensive economic assistance to help the provisional government strengthen Turkey's weak economic position. Offers of a high-level exchange of visits were also made. To date the PGOT has not accepted these offers. It may accept limited Soviet economic aid.

10. Turkey has retained a position of influence among the non-Arab states in the Middle East. It has taken a leading role in the activities of CENTO, and has repeatedly urged the United States to adhere to the organization. It has also urged the United States to give greater military and economic support to CENTO members, at the same time attempting to impress on Iran and Pakistan the limitations on U. S. assistance in view of our world-wide responsibilities. Turkey, in collaboration with the United States, has used its historical position of influence in Afghanistan to urge the Afghans to settle their quarrels with Pakistan and
to exercise caution in their dealings with the USSR. Turkey's relations with Israel have remained correct.

11. Turkey, along with Greece and Yugoslavia, is a member of the Balkan Pact. The military government has privately restated Turkey's belief that the maintenance of the Pact, even in its present dormant status, is in the interests of the Free World and does not favor any action by either Greece or Turkey which might lead to Tito's denunciation of the Pact. Turkey is also influenced by its desire to maintain a toehold in the Balkans.

12. Turkey's general attitude toward North Africa and the Middle East is influenced by the Ottoman Empire's historical position in these areas. While the Turks argue that Nasser is too closely aligned with the USSR and insist that any increase in Nasser's influence in the Middle East would increase Soviet influence in the area, there can be little doubt that behind their attitude lies the fact that the Turks have historically believed that a strong Pan-Arab state would be an intolerable threat to their southern flank. Turkey shares the U.S. position of favoring an Iraq free of domination from any quarter and has, therefore, been active in attempting to strengthen Iraq's will to resist Soviet and UAR threats and blandishments. The new Turkish regime apparently hopes to improve its relations somewhat with the Arab states, probably by attempting to keep more aloof from inter-Arab quarrels, but no basic change in Turkish policy toward the Arabs is likely. Turkey has been a cooperative and useful member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC), although the provisional government, ostensibly in accordance with its hope of improving its relations with the Arab states, has hesitated at this time to send a Turkish representative on a PCC mission to the Arab capitals.

13. Following the Cyprus agreements, Greco-Turkish relations have steadily improved and the two countries are cooperating in such areas as their approach to the EEC (European Economic Community). Nonetheless, historical disputes and suspicions remain between the two countries and can be expected to be a restraining influence on the improvement of their relations. The new government, like its predecessor, continues to support the London–Zurich Agreements as the best resolution of the Cyprus issue. Under the treaty structure created by those agreements, Turkey is a guarantor of the independence of the island together with Greece and the United Kingdom and maintains a token contingent on Cyprus as does Greece.

14. Despite serious problems, Turkey has made considerable progress in developing its economy over the past decade. Between 1950 and 1958 industrial production doubled and agricultural output increased by at least 60 percent. Although Gross National Product (in terms of constant prices) expanded at a very high rate during 1950–1953, since then
the rate has been significantly lower. This growth in output has made possible some increases in Turkey's relatively low living standards, even though the population growth has been nearly 3 percent per year.

15. However, a combination of financial mismanagement, an attempt to carry out over-extended and badly organized investment, and the maintenance of a heavy military establishment kept the economy under strain which became particularly severe in the years 1955–1958. The development of a crisis in 1958 forced the adoption of a comprehensive economic stabilization program undertaken by the Turkish Government with aid provided by OEEC\(^3\) nations, the EPU (the European Payments Union), the IMF (International Monetary Fund), and the United States. Although the Menderes Government tended to regard stabilization primarily as a series of austerity measures which were often annoyingly incompatible with its own politically-motivated free-spending plans, its performance in implementing stabilization measures from 1958 until the end of 1959 was satisfactory in many respects. The principal shortcomings in the Menderes Government's performance stemmed from its continuing failure to recognize the significance of, and pressing need for, coordinated investment planning as well as its relaxation of budgetary discipline early in 1960.

16. The Menderes Government's economic policies contributed to a decline in the confidence of creditors in the wisdom of new loans to Turkey. During the later years of the Menderes regime, the IBRD's concern over the Government's economic and financial policies and over Turkey's prospects led to sharp differences between IBRD and Turkish officials.

17. On the basis of its actions thus far, the provisional government is showing a much more promising approach to Turkey's economic problems and is taking advantage of U.S. and Western European advisers. Plans have been announced for sharply curtailing government spending, and pressures for the higher agricultural subsidies, which Menderes had planned, have been resisted. Steps have been taken to establish a government planning mechanism and to formulate an integrated development program. The government has agreed to work out a new stabilization program with OEEC and IMF in the fall of 1960.

18. The change in government presents the United States and the OEEC countries with an opportunity to encourage and assist the Turkish Government to make organizational changes, particularly in the investment planning field, which can make an important contribution to the solution of Turkey's economic problems. The emphasis which the present military regime is placing on fiscal responsibility and on the

\(^3\) Organization for European Cooperation. [Footnote in the source text.]
proper planning of investment decisions and resources allocation should, if implemented by appropriate measures and continued by successor regimes, create a new climate and help to restore the confidence of investors in the prospects for future investment in Turkey. This climate would be further improved if these policies are continued and parliamentary government is resumed. This emphasis may also help to enable Turkey to satisfy Free World financial institutions, particularly the IBRD, that it meets their normal criteria. Resumption of IBRD longterm development loans to Turkey should in turn further enhance the confidence of other investors, both public and private.

19. Improvement in the economic climate in Turkey will also strengthen Turkey’s case for association with the EEC.4 Successful association of Turkey with the EEC would be in the U.S. interest since Turkey’s trading position would be strengthened, thereby lessening the danger of Turkey’s ever becoming excessively reliant upon Soviet Bloc markets for disposing of its exports. Furthermore, association would probably lead to additional development funds for Turkey and generally to the acceptance by the EEC countries of greater responsibility for Turkey’s economic and political fortunes.

20. Turkey continues to depend for its foreign exchange earnings largely on exports of agricultural commodities which are subject to variation owing to the weather and world market conditions, and there is a heavy structure of external debt to be financed. Moreover, the pace of Turkey’s progress is limited by such basic obstacles to growth as the shortage of technical and administrative skills, the general level of education and long-established customs involving inefficient production techniques. Nevertheless, the economy does have resources which can be developed, and as progress toward stabilization continues, the government will have increasing opportunities to direct its attention more fully to the balanced development of these resources. Over the coming years, maintenance of an acceptable pace in economic development which preserves reasonable price stability should enable Turkey to make available more of its own resources for economic development and military expenditures, to obtain and productively utilize capital from private and international lending sources, and to reduce its dependence on foreign assistance, although an economy capable of generating the real and financial resources needed for the maintenance of present military forces and a sound development program without external assistance is not likely to be attained in the foreseeable future.

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4 Turkey applied for associate membership in the Common Market on October 31, 1959.
21. In order to promote balanced continuing growth, current conditions require a vigorous re-emphasis on the maintenance of price stability. On this basis economic growth would expand the resources base for the national budget and provide additional funds for defense. The Turkish Government can and should endeavor to improve the efficiency of state enterprises and to increase its revenues through suitable taxation measures, particularly by taxing the agricultural sector. In the Turkish development program, further industrial expansion would be desirable since Turkish agriculture cannot continue indefinitely to absorb more people and alternative employment opportunities must be created. In addition, selective development of industry capable of supplying some military as well as civilian needs may be desirable.

22. The PGOT has removed the former repressive measures against Turkish trade unions and permitted Turk-Is (The Turkish Federation of Labor) to affiliate with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). The PGOT is currently preparing legislation on labor-management relations which is understood to include collective bargaining, the right to strike, a "fair wage" policy, and a social security system. It thus seems possible that labor will have a more influential role in Turkish political, economic, and social affairs than in the past.

23. The United States furnishes the Turkish Armed Forces included in Military Assistance Program objectives with virtually all of the military supplies and equipment which are not domestically produced. Therefore, the GOT incurs no or very little foreign exchange expenditure for its defense establishment. The GOT has, however, during the past few years tended to rely increasingly on the counterpart of U. S. aid to provide local currency support for the defense budget while devoting more of its own budgetary resources to economic and other items of expenditure. However, the United States considers that the local currency costs of the defense program should be viewed primarily as the responsibility of the GOT.

24. The Turkish Government has committed Turkish ground and air forces to NATO wartime tactical command, and its naval forces under national command are assigned NATO missions in time of war. The NATO-recommended force goals and U. S. strategic force objectives are designed primarily to defend Turkey so as to maintain its integrity in concert with NATO and CENTO. Forces capable of achieving the above missions should also be capable of providing some support to

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5 Since 1957 the NATO-approved force levels for Turkey have been reduced by 4 Divisions and 17 Ships. Negotiations in connection with the approval of MC-70 resulted in this reduction. [Footnote in the source text.]

6 Determined by the JCS and approved by the Secretary of Defense. [Footnote in the source text.]
Iran. Turkey also maintains additional Army and Navy forces which are not encompassed within U. S. or NATO-approved force goals, although it is possible that a reorganization of the armed forces which is contemplated by Turkey may substantially reduce these forces.

25. Turkish Armed Forces are deeply patriotic, well-disciplined and physically tough. Although the effectiveness of the Turkish defense establishment has been greatly improved as a result of the U. S. Military Aid Program, much remains to be accomplished before the Turkish Armed Forces will be capable of fully carrying out U. S. or NATO-approved missions. Further, they are now entering a transitional phase during which the emphasis will switch from less sophisticated to more advanced weapons. Since the Armed Forces lack educated and technically-trained manpower, this change will place considerable strain on Turkey’s manpower resources. Accordingly, the U. S. Military Assistance Program has, and will continue to, put a great deal of emphasis on technical training while restricting the deliveries of military equipment to a level and at a rate which the Turks are judged capable of absorbing. Turkey’s limited absorptive capacity, and the necessity to relate deliveries to this capacity, will retard progress toward meeting NATO-approved force goals.

26. The Five-Year (FY 1962–1966) MAP for Turkey, which has been developed as a basis for planning, projects a shortfall (costed at approximately $140 million) against NATO-approved force goals as of the 1963 target date of two Lacrosse, one Redstone and two Corporal/Sergeant battalions and eight destroyer/escort vessels. Measured against U. S. strategic force objectives, the shortfall during the 1962–1966 period (costed at approximately $225 million) will consist of two Lacrosse, two Sergeant, four Little John (or substitute) and one Redstone battalion; four patrol vessels, 14 minesweepers, four torpedo boats, two tactical fighter squadrons and a SAM substitute for a BOMARC squadron. These shortfalls represent those portions of the prescribed force goals which cannot be effectively supported by the Turkish Armed Forces due to manpower, technical and financial limitations.

27. There are, however, certain measures which, if taken by the GOT, would contribute to an amelioration of the manpower problem. One such course, which requires legislative enactment, would terminate the long-standing regulation precluding the induction of high school graduates into the Armed Forces at lower than commissioned officer rank. Another measure would be to lengthen the period of service for conscripts by an amount of time at least sufficient to compensate for the amount of time spent in literacy training. A third would involve the reduction or the elimination of units which are not included in U. S. or NATO-approved goals, thereby making personnel available for higher priority needs. However, real relief from the shortage of trained man-
power will come only gradually and as a result of fundamental improvements in Turkey's educational system. The military regime is restudying the utilization of manpower by the Armed Forces. Its first decision affected the officer corps. The government recently has retired a large proportion of general and field grade officers of the Armed Forces prior to their normal date of retirement. The PGOT states, and the United States also considers, that such action will result in an increase in the operational capability of the Turkish Armed Forces.

Objectives

28. Continuance of Turkey's independence, territorial integrity, identification with the Free World, and will and ability to resist Communist invasion or subversion.

29. Continued Turkish cooperation in NATO and CENTO, including continued access to military facilities required by the United States and its allies.

30. Continued maintenance of Turkish Armed Forces capable of contributing to the maintenance of Turkey's territorial integrity in support of U. S., NATO and CENTO agreements and plans, and of maintaining internal security against subversion by Communist or other elements hostile to U. S. interests.

31. Achievement of a stable, democratic government representing the will of the people.

32. Vigorous economic growth within the framework of reasonable price stability which will permit the achievement of the above objectives for Turkey and will reduce, and eventually eliminate, Turkey's need for external economic assistance.

Major Policy Guidance

General

33. Continue to encourage Turkish recognition of the fact that the United States regards the security of Turkey as an important part of the security of the Atlantic Community and intends to continue the development of an increasingly effective defense posture with Turkey within the available resources of the two countries.

34. Administer U. S. assistance and support in developing the long-term economic and military strength of Turkey so as to help Turkey assure its independence and counteract Communist attempts at penetration and subversion.

35. Urge the Turks to grant to the United States and its allies continued access to Turkish military and other facilities important to the Free World.
36. Encourage the holding of free elections and continuance in Turkey of a democratic form of government, impressing upon the Turks, wherever appropriate, the advantages of individual freedoms and democratic institutions and practices and the fact that these are desirable internally as well as in the interest of Turkey's international influence and prestige.

37. Avoid over-identification with any political faction and involvement in Turkey's internal politics, and so conduct our relations that we are able to do business not only with the administration in power but also with any successor government.

38. Encourage continued control over Communist elements in Turkey.

39. Continue to regard community relations as a particularly delicate aspect of our activities in Turkey.

40. Encourage the Turkish Government to improve Turkey's educational system, with particular attention to the educational program of the Turkish Armed Forces.

Military

41. Continue military assistance consonant with Turkish capabilities to absorb and support the military program, recognizing that this limitation may not permit meeting NATO-approved goals.

42. In reviewing NATO-approved force goals for Turkey, consider the possibility of revision in those goals in relation to NATO requirements, as well as to Turkey's ability to absorb and the overall ability of the NATO Alliance to support the military program.

43. Continue as necessary to press the Turkish Government to adopt those legislative and administrative changes needed to improve the efficiency and composition of the Turkish Armed Forces.

Economic

44. Promote orderly economic development in Turkey, aimed at building a stable economic base on which Turkey can pursue its further growth, maintain strong military forces, and reduce its dependence on grant foreign assistance.

a. Encourage Turkey to further its own economic development by:

(1) More effectively stabilizing its economy through pursuit of firm budgetary, monetary, and credit policies.
(2) Improving the efficiency of state enterprises.
(3) Increasing revenues through appropriate tax measures, particularly taxation of agriculture.
(4) Developing a rational and coordinated investment program to utilize more effectively the resources available for development.
(5) Creating an improved political and economic climate to restore the confidence in Turkey's economic prospects of foreign private inves-
tors, governments, and Free World financial institutions, and particularly the IBRD.

(6) Reducing or eliminating non-essential military elements.

b. Continue U. S. technical assistance programs, with particular emphasis on assisting Turkey to strengthen its investment planning mechanism, and to develop an over-all manpower program to meet its needs.

c. Encourage efforts by Free World financial institutions to bring about desirable economic and financial reforms, and support credits to Turkey by these institutions where consistent with relevant U. S. policies covering loans by these institutions.

d. Encourage the industrial countries of Western Europe to take maximum responsibility for promoting Turkey’s economic stabilization and development, urging these nations to provide a large share of financial assistance, and consulting and cooperating closely with them as appropriate.

e. Be prepared to provide U. S. loans consistent with relevant loan policies.

f. Encourage and support the GOT’s efforts to strengthen Turkey’s economic ties with the Free World, including association with the EEC in an arrangement which would be compatible with U. S. national trade policy and interests.

45. In the implementation of U. S. aid programs: (a) encourage the expansion of Turkey’s industrial establishment with suitable emphasis on those industries capable of supplying both the military and civilian sectors of the economy; (b) encourage the GOT to facilitate the development of the private sector of industry; and (c) encourage and support Turkish efforts to increase agricultural output.

46. Be prepared to negotiate surplus agricultural commodity sales under P. L. 480 as an aid in accomplishing U. S. objectives in Turkey.

47. Continue to provide defense support to sustain political stability, to promote economic development and to help maintain military forces to meet the objectives in paragraph 30. While continuing when necessary to utilize a portion of the Turkish currency generated by this assistance to support the Turkish defense budget, continue to regard the local currency costs of the Turkish defense program as primarily the responsibility of the GOT.

48. While bearing in mind Turkey’s need to maintain its investment outlays at a satisfactory level, encourage the GOT to accept an increase in the proportionate share of its contributions to the Turkish defense program.

49. Urge Turkey to continue to deny or limit exports of strategic commodities to the Sino-Soviet Bloc in accordance with U. S. economic
defense policy, and discourage Turkey from (a) accepting Sino-Soviet Bloc aid in certain particularly sensitive fields of a kind or on terms which would be damaging to their security, and (b) engaging in trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc at levels sufficient to create undue economic dependence on the Bloc, or on terms or under conditions seriously prejudicial to U. S. interest.

50. Encourage as appropriate mutual exchanges of American and Turkish government and trade union officials and others in the labor field. Continue to provide technical assistance and advice in the labor field in ICA programs, urging the GOT as appropriate to initiate suitable labor legislation, bearing in mind that U. S. or Western European legislation is not necessarily appropriate to the Turkish situation. Encourage the participation of Turkish trade unions in the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the various international trade secretariats (ITS's), not only for the technical aid this will bring to them, but also to provide an additional firm friend of U. S. labor in those organizations.

Turkish Relations with the Free World

51. Continue to demonstrate an awareness of Turkey's contribution to Free World defense, regarding the Turks as full sovereign partners in NATO and the UN, while recognizing that Turkey forms a connecting link between the NATO defense effort and CENTO and that it occupies a special position of influence with certain Middle East countries which it willingly uses to advance Western interests.

52. Encourage Turkey to assist in the maintenance of a pro-Western outlook on Cyprus as a means of preserving present Free World interests on the island by such actions as are set forth in U. S. Policy Toward Cyprus (NSC 6003). 7

53. Encourage the continuance of Turkey's good relations with Greece, Israel and Iran, and improvement of relations with the Arab states, particularly those Arab states with which Turkey has traditional ties and a position of historical influence and with which it can serve as interpreter for the West.

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7 Printed in Part 1, Document 347.
380. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, October 31, 1960, 8 p.m.

1715. Eyes only for Secretary. Ankara eyes only for Ambassador. From Thurston. At end of conversation with Gursel reported Embtel 1714, General Norstad on his own initiative raised question of current trials against former Government leaders. He said he was going to presume on his friendly relationship with Gursel and that he was going to talk as one soldier to another, frankly, undiplomatically, and even bluntly. During his travels in the NATO world in the last six months, Norstad continued, he had been impressed by the fact that the eyes of the world were on Turkey. He had been impressed with the support and good wishes that all allies of Turkey were ready to give and with their disposition to help in every possible way as they followed the course of reforms and constitutional development on which the new regime was working. In the same family spirit the allies of Turkey were following the current trials. It is hope and prayer of all friends of Turkey and her NATO Allies that in this particular crisis Turkey will show "restraint, generosity and wisdom". Norstad concluded by asserting that what Turkey does now at the conclusion of these trials can advance the standing of Turkey as a nation in the family of nations "by at least a generation".

Gursel did not appear to be offended by the foregoing remarks. He commented simply that "we shall do our best" and that "we know you are our friends and have our interest at heart".

In later discussion with Sarper, latter told Norstad that he had not "lost any capital" by making this plea. Norstad told Sarper that he was not exaggerating the foreign reaction to the trials and also that this reaction was not merely based on personal feelings towards this or that member of the old government. Sarper reacted somewhat sharply, stating crimes had been committed against Turkish people and not against foreigners. Norstad replied that basic criterion should be what course of action will advance the cause of Turkey. Drawing upon his conversation of the day before with the King and Queen of Greece (but not mention-
ing them), Norstad pointed out that though trials had led to revelations of anti-Greek activities of former Turkish Government, he had found in talking with Greeks that they nevertheless hoped that trials would not lead to extreme sentences.³

Houghton

³ The trials at Yassiada continued until September 15, 1961, when the court handed down 15 death sentences, 31 sentences of life imprisonment, and 418 lesser sentences. All of the death sentences were commuted except those of Menderes, Zorlu, and Polatkan. Zorlu and Polatkan were hanged on September 16, 1961; Menderes on September 17.

381. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, November 5, 1960, 11 a.m.

686. Paris pass USRO Thurston. Rome for Rood. Farewell call¹ on General Gursel morning November 4 turned into very relaxed pleasantly in which Gursel tried to place before US Government his major domestic and international concerns. Foreign Minister Sarper only other person present. At outset Gursel said all appropriate things about my departure, wishing me happiness in retirement, etcetera, to which I was able to respond in proper fashion.

Gursel then launched into discussion of domestic scene stating that having staged revolution to achieve certain freedoms for Turkey CNU had found many internal problems and difficulties. He clearly implied that these were much greater than military leaders had imagined. He said CNU is doing everything it could to solve these problems and would continue to do what it could but meanwhile trusted that Turkey's friends and allies fully understand nature of these problems and sincere efforts being made to solve them.


¹ On September 14 the White House announced the resignation of Warren, effective November 15.
Turning to international front, Gursel said his biggest problem concerned his largest and toughest neighbor to North. Turkey was not under direct attack but was subject to constant Soviet pressure. This pressure no longer took form of threats but constituted insistent offers and urgings to accept assistance. This approach included Soviet effort to persuade Turkey to forego NATO and join bloc not aligned against USSR. Soviets insisted Turkey would be safer on this course.

Gursel then noted that Turkey had been placed in unique position both through geography and will of God. To North and East it faced powerful, tough nation with Black Sea coast virtually direct frontier. To south Turkey faced in Nasser another strong, tough leader cast somewhat in image of Khrushchev. He said Turkey was doing what it could with its Arab neighbors so they would not succumb to blandishments of Nasser. Turkey had to recognize that this threat existed and endeavor to minimize it by improving relations with Arab states. In this way Arabs might be led away from Nasser.

Again he emphasized that Turkey needed comprehension of friends and allies with respect to position in which Turkey found itself. He said he constantly tried to study and act on these international problems while at same time attempting to solve various domestic problems which had arisen as result of their accession to power as revolutionary government. I thanked Gursel for his frankness in discussing these issues with me but added that his remarks were no surprise to American Embassy. I said I thought his domestic problems were greater than those of previous administration and that we were sympathetic in his endeavors to solve them. On international front I understood Turkey’s difficulties and could say in confidence that we had reported sympathetically almost precisely what he had outlined concerning Turkey’s international position.

I went on to say that I did not foresee that change in US administration which would take place as result of elections next week would lead to any great change in US foreign policy. I felt that we might find more dynamism and more acute consideration of problems under whichever administration came to power but I did not predict any deviation from major lines of Eisenhower foreign policy.

Gursel then asked me to convey personally his warm greetings to President Eisenhower and Secretary Herter which I said I would take pleasure in doing. In turn I wished him personal good fortune, good luck in what he was trying to do and success for Turkish people.

Warren