Cyprus

UNITED STATES INTEREST IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS
DISPUTE

115.  Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy
in the United Kingdom

Washington, January 27, 1955—6:40 p.m.

3865. Department feels Ninth GA’s disposition Cyprus ques-
tion has gained some time which should be used in effort avoid
even more difficult situation if matter is raised at next GA. This
view expressed informally to British Embassy officer here who
reported that within next few weeks, perhaps through planted
question in Commons, Colonial Office probably will reveal current
thinking on possibilities introducing new constitution in near future.
In meantime and before UK has gone publicly on record with new
plans, Embassy requested pursue question in similar vein with Fon
Off.

Embassy might make following points:

1) US believes Cyprus question will almost certainly be raised
by Greeks next GA. Greek Fon Min has already publicly stated this
intention and there has been suggestion Greeks might attempt enlist
co-sponsors for item. If no progress has been made in improving

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1 For previous documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. VIII, pp. 674 ff.
2 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1–2755. Secret. Drafted by
Wood, Mangano, and William L. Hamilton of the Office of British Commonwealth
and Northern European Affairs. Repeated to USUN and Athens and pouch to
Ankara and Nicosia.
3 During the Ninth Session of the General Assembly, September 21–December 17,
1954, Greece submitted an item concerning the principle of equal rights and self-
determination in the case of the peoples of Cyprus. Although the General Assembly
included the item in its agenda, it did not adopt any resolution on the subject. For a
summary of the disposition of the Cyprus question at the Ninth General Assembly,
see Yearbook of the United Nations 1955, pp. 77–78.
situation, we would be confronted with more serious difficulties in UN and possibly on island itself.

2) In these circumstances we believe it probably unrealistic expect GA could be prevented from consideration substantive resolution.

3) Eventual US position naturally not yet formulated.

4) Meanwhile we very much hope UK may be able establish better basis understanding with Cypriots.

5) We wish be helpful on this in any appropriate way and would welcome opportunity hear UK plans for improving political situation on island. In that connection would welcome further consultation with British at working level in London or Washington.⁴

Dulles

⁴ In telegram 3355, January 31, the Embassy in London informed the Department that in view of the fact that the British Government was aware of the "gravity" of the problem and the extent of U.S. "anxiety" about it, it hesitated in approaching the Foreign Office regarding the substance of telegram 3865. In order to avoid "almost certain risk counter-productivity," the Embassy concluded, "we assume Department will approve our confining our approach at this time to a further inquiry of the Colonial Office as to whether there is anything new in Cyprus." (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1-3155) On February 3, the Department informed the Embassy that it was prepared to accept the Embassy's advice that an approach to the Colonial Office be limited to an inquiry, but that it hoped that any conversation would be broadened to encompass the points included in telegram 3865. (Telegram 3980 to London; ibid.)

116. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece ¹


2275. Department impressed restraint parliamentary debate Cyprus. While this apparently reasonable mood lasts and before expected March 25 oratory suggest you consider démarche following lines adapted to your previous conversations.

Department continues follow Cyprus question closely since it continues as cause tension within NATO family. In this connection U.S. Government has been favorably impressed general tenor parliamentary debate. We intend retain reasonably flexible attitude re Cyprus so we will be free exercise our influence usefully. In general we anxious preserve harmony in NATO and are interested seeing

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3-1555. Confidential. Drafted by Wood. Repeated to London and pouched to Ankara and Nicosia.
orderly and evolutionary development political rights Cypriot people. In balancing these two important considerations we are convinced Cypriot tactic avoiding all contacts and conversations with British is seriously mistaken. Cypriots should understand their aspirations will not be endangered if they adopt a reasonable attitude toward the British. In examining problem U.S. must weigh heavily whether Cypriots willing to adopt constructive long range attitude. Does not appear sign of political maturity to ask that British promise plebiscite before holding discussions. This attitude will only restrict their opportunity develop political experience and responsibility. If Cypriot leaders adopt reasonable and patient attitude there is opportunity real progress.

Cypriots ask sympathy of free world, but should remember that any increase freedom requires equal increase responsibility and cooperation.

FYI Any démarche should scrupulously avoid discussion UNGA aspects this problem.

Embassy will receive copy letter Jernegan to Foster (London) discussing British side question. 2

Dulles

2 Not found in Department of State files.

117. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and the Greek Ambassador (Melas), Department of State, Washington, May 25, 1955 1

SUBJECT

Cyprus

Ambassador Melas spoke of the landing of the Greek airmen on Cyprus and of the treatment they received from the British authorities. Without stressing the incident, he indicated that the British would not have acted as they did unless they had general U.S. support on the Cyprus question. As a result of Greek reaction his Government had had to cancel the visit of the British fleet scheduled for June 2.

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/5–2555. Confidential. Prepared by Wood on May 31.
On the overall Cyprus question the Greeks were exasperated because the U.K. had not given them the island as promised in the past and because of incidents such as the above. However the main source of dissatisfaction was the belief that the U.S. supported the U.K. This was causing a very serious situation in Greece and would affect Greece’s support of U.S. policies. The Ambassador believed our position was due to U.K. and French pressure and doubted if it reflected our real feelings. He quoted the President as having told him he was surprised that the U.K. had not found a solution to the problem. ² The Ambassador spoke sincerely of his admiration for the U.S. and of his belief that with the formation of Western Union, America’s freedom of action had been increased. Only the U.S. could do something constructive about Cyprus. He said Greece did not necessarily want public debate and desired to be reasonable. This was a question on which it would be easy for the U.S. to be on the right side.

The Secretary replied that we had sincere friendships for both Greece and the U.K. and that we do not act arbitrarily. We act from one dominant motive: our desire to keep the Free World free and strong. Greece knows this from the time when she was in danger. It is not easy to keep a coalition of free states together. Our actions are not due to favoritism. It is incorrect to assume that our actions are dictated by the U.K. Some things go on beneath the surface.

The Secretary emphasized two points:

1. We pay careful and sympathetic heed to what has been said.
2. Our action will be based on what we think is the best way to meet the overriding peril of our time.

We sympathize with the aspirations of those wanting self-determination. We appeal to Greece to keep this matter within reasonable bounds.

² Not further identified.

118. Editorial Note

On June 21, Secretary Dulles, attending the Tenth Anniversary Meeting of the United Nations at San Francisco, June 20–26, raised the problem of Cyprus with British Foreign Secretary Macmillan. Dulles expressed United States interest in resolving the problem and in any British proposals toward that end. According to Macmillan,
he had a plan that he could not reveal before Cabinet consideration. The Foreign Secretary added that he hoped that if the plan materialized it would “relax the tension.” (Secto 11 from the United States Delegation at San Francisco, June 21; Department of State, Central Files, 747C.006–2155)

119. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece ¹

Washington, July 1, 1955—2:33 p.m.

4. Your 2853. ² Greek Ambassador Melas called in emotional state yesterday and denounced UK invitation re Cyprus in bitter terms and at length, due to inclusion of Turkey. He was informed that acceptance was naturally question for Greek Government to determine but we felt his Government should consider matter carefully and we hoped invitation would be accepted. He was reminded that Greece should not make it difficult for her friends to support her and that discussion of defense questions made inclusion of Greece’s ally Turkey not inappropriate. He was in no way mollified and went away repeating imprecations against UK for “once more following its policy of divide and rule”.

You may inform Greek Government that . . . since our opinion is requested we regard invitation as progressive step and believe it is important to accept the invitation and enter negotiations in good faith. This is first time British have been willing discuss Cyprus with other powers and if Greeks refused offer they would not only lose sympathy but would place themselves in difficult position as members of UN, NATO and Balkan Pact. Acceptance invitation does not commit Greeks on policy matters. Greece, Turkey and UK have primary interest in area and to us it seems eminently reasonable they


² In telegram 2853, June 30, the Embassy at Athens informed the Department that it conveyed to the Greek Government the views outlined in telegram 3463. The Embassy also noted that it believed it important to be in a position to convey the “considered” views of the Department to the Foreign Minister and if appropriate to the Greek Prime Minister not later than July 1. (Telegram 2853, ibid.; telegram 3463 to Athens, June 29, ibid., 747C.00/6–2955)
should discuss their problems. We favor discussions but take no position on their substance.  

Dulles

\[\text{Footnote: In telegram 24 from Athens, July 2, Thurston conveyed the U.S. position along the lines outlined in telegram 4 to Panagiotis Canelopoulos. Thurston reported that Canelopoulos read an instruction prepared by him and the Prime Minister that outlined the Greek position on the British proposal. According to Thurston, the "essence" of the Greek position is the acceptance in principle of Britain's invitation with "certain reservations" about the rights of Turkey on the subject of self-determination. (Ibid., 747C.00/7-255)}\]

120. *Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State*  

*Paris, July 16, 1955—3 p.m.*

Secto 20. Re Athens 131 to Department, repeated Paris 3. Secretary met with Stephanopoulos before NATO meeting at latter's request. Stephanopoulos said that at Strasbourg Macmillan had told him that the Cyprus conference might be convened during first ten days of August. Yesterday British informed Greeks that conference could not meet before August 29. It was also obvious that UK and Turks had consulted and agreed before informing Greeks. Stephanopoulos said delaying conference to August 29 would create major public opinion problem in Greece. If the British were unwilling to advance date the Greeks would feel obliged to table the Cyprus question with the UN prior to August 20. Although tabling it, the Greeks would agree not to act on complaint until it was clear that Cyprus conference was not productive. If productive Greeks would withdraw complaint. Stephanopoulos asked Secretary to urge Macmillan to advance date of conference to 10th or 15th and Secretary

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 474C.00/7-1655. Secret. Repeated to Athens. Dulles was in Paris en route to Geneva to attend the Geneva Conference, July 18-23.

2 In telegram 131 from Athens, July 15, Ambassador Cannon informed the Department that the British decision to set the Cyprus conference for August 29 had greatly distressed Greek officials. According to the Ambassador, these officials had indicated that Greek public and official circles felt that the proposed conference was merely a device to forestall U.N. action this year. (Ibid., 747C.00/7-1555)

3 On June 3 it was announced in Strasbourg that the Greek Government had brought a complaint before the Human Rights Commission of the Council of Europe accusing Great Britain of human rights abuses on Cyprus.
agreed to discuss with Macmillan. Secretary pointed out if Greeks did not table Cyprus on UN agenda before August 20, they were not debarred from doing so later since they could always raise question in UN under the "urgency" procedure. Stephanopoulos replied if meeting were delayed to August 29 Greeks, for public opinion reasons, would have to raise question at UNGA.

Subsequently Secretary spoke to Macmillan re Cyprus talks. Macmillan said he could not advance the date of the conference and that it was up to the Greeks to do what they wanted re UNGA agenda. He thought that if they put Cyprus on the agenda before the talks it would not be a friendly or constructive act but it was up to them.

Dulles

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121. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece ¹

Washington, August 8, 1955—12:33 p.m.

365. Secretary and British Ambassador discussed Cyprus August 1. ² Makins stressed following: 1. British seriously intend bring tripartite talks to successful conclusion but doubt Greeks equally prepared discuss matter constructively. Hope we will urge Greeks this end. 2. British believe there is evidence Stephanopoulos and Kanellopoulos thought U.S. favored or was sympathetic inscription GA agenda, hope they can be disabused this score. 3. In Greece anti-British propaganda re Cyprus continuing at high level despite Greek assurances it would be toned down. U.K. would appreciate our pointing out to Greeks forcefully as possible this does not help final solution.

FYI Secretary inquired whether British have plan for Cyprus. Makins answered he had no information. End FYI.

You are requested make forceful presentation points contained paragraph 1 above. Manner presentation your discretion, but re point 3 suggest discussion radio broadcasts to Cyprus.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8-855. Secret. Drafted by Wood and Baxter. Repeated to London and USUN and pouched to Ankara and Nicosia.
² The full text of the memorandum of Dulles' conversation with Makins is ibid., 747C.00/8-155.
You should also point out that continuing demonstrations and disorders in Cyprus will have effect prejudicing Greek position in tripartite talks. By sponsoring Cyprus cause in international forum and claiming right speak for Cypriots with UK, Greece has implicitly assumed some responsibility for Cypriot behavior. Greek Government protestations it has no power influence Cypriots cannot be accepted at face value. This is two way street. If Greek Government policies can be influenced by pressures from Cypriots and ethnarchy it also has responsibility exert influence on population Cyprus through all means available.  

Dulles

3 In telegram 345, August 11, Ambassador Cannon informed the Department that, with the exception of point 2 in telegram 365, he had covered the substance of the Department’s instructions to Stephanopoulos in a discussion on August 2. According to the Ambassador, the Foreign Minister had several “interesting” things to say. Among them, Cannon noted, was Stephanopoulos’ fear that the Turks might prove “obdurate”, his inquiry as to the likelihood of the United States sending an observer to the proposed conference, and the Foreign Minister’s belief that a conference was the “only first step” toward a solution. (ibid., 747C.00/8–1155)

122. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State  

London, August 10, 1955—2 p.m.

503. In course of conversation yesterday Permanent Under Secretary 2 stated that HMG’s tactics at forthcoming conference regarding Cyprus would initially be to obtain formal declarations by Greece and Turkey of their respective positions. Cabinet had taken no decision about any hard and fast British plan but great deal of thought had been given to problem and many combinations and permutations had been considered. Therefore it could be “played by ear” following Greek and Turkish declarations. He emphasized that HMG certainly did not wish to produce a plan which would be acceptable neither to Greece or Turkey and if Greece’s only position was enosis in near future then conference would be abortive. On other hand Kirkpatrick indicated that Macmillan was particularly

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–1055. Secret. Repeated to Athens and Ankara.
2 Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick.
anxious to reach acceptable solution. He said he understood that Greek cabinet was divided on issue and in this connection he referred to recent articles in Turkish press to effect that if Greece felt free to abrogate unilaterally Treaty of Lausanne there were articles which Turkey for its part might wish to change. This has in turn been taken up in Greek press.

Since British undoubtedly know what position Turkey will take at Conference their tactics are obviously designed to force Greece to define its attitude. If it is arbitrary and unreasonable Great Britain will not have lost Turkey’s support. If it provides basis for compromise meeting could well be productive.

Butterworth

3 On July 24, 1923, Turkey signed a treaty of peace with Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. Among its other provisions, the Treaty of Lausanne resulted in Turkish recognition of Britain's 1914 annexation of Cyprus and the renunciation of Turkey's claim to control the island. For text of the treaty of Lausanne, see the League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 28, p. 11.

123. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, August 25, 1955—7:05 p.m.

1057. London authorized inform Foreign Office substance paragraph 2 Ankara’s 231 repeated London 38. May wish stress Turks called in our Ambassador and raised subject. If queried re statement “time is on side of Greeks” may explain this our frank long range evaluation in view strong current world opinion favorable self-determination. We have said this to Turks because we feel if they enter talks without some willingness be flexible, talks may well fail. Cyprus situation and British-Greek-Turkish relations would then

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8-1855. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Baxter and Wood. Also sent to Ankara and Athens and pouch to USUN, USRO, and Nicosia.

2 In paragraph 2 of telegram 231, August 18, Warren reported that he informed Foreign Minister Zorlu that the United States “strongly” hoped that the parties would not come to the London Conference with “fixed and irreconcilable positions” and although the Department had not formulated a policy on the question, it believed that “time is on the side of the Greeks”. (Ibid.)
deteriorate rapidly. If talks fail, prestige Stephanopoulos and Rally would be seriously jeopardized. Turks have stated they desire only continuation status quo.

London, Ankara may convey any or all following: On August 23 Turkish Ambassador Gork saw Secretary and referred Ambassador Warren’s remarks reported Ankara’s 231 which disturbed Turkish Government because they seemed imply change U.S. policy from last year’s position in UN. Also referred indications Greeks believed they would receive U.S. support in UN this year. Gork asked we tell Greeks prior London talks they should not expect such support.

Secretary replied situation changed by U.K. invitation which we welcomed. Hoped all participants would show sincere determination to work out solution. Concluded by stating we could not formulate UN position until outcome London talks known.

London, Athens, may convey any or all of following: On August 23 Greek Ambassador saw Asst. Secretary Allen and expressed fears of Turkish obduracy. Allen stated belief time on side Greeks and they could therefore afford to be reasonable. Melas apprehensive internal political pressures exerted on present Government. Allen referred Turkish insinuations that if Greece obtained Cyprus, would later demand other Turk territory. Melas strongly denied. Allen reemphasized necessity of patience.

On August 24 Greek Ambassador saw Secretary who also urged moderation. Without suggesting Greeks not pursue their aims by legitimate means he referred to progress already made (change in British attitude) and urged Greeks not press so rapidly as to destroy other valuable elements (Greek relations with U.K. and Turkey, NATO harmony). Referred violence Greek press. Reiterated need for moderation and desirability recognizing forthcoming talks not final chance resolve differences over Cyprus but forward step in process of peaceful evolution.

British Colonial Office representatives discussing UN questions in Department August 24 informed our position Cyprus would await outcome talks.

London: Department agrees with paragraphs 3 and 4 Athens 409 repeated London 17. Embassy may express substance paragraph three

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3 A conservative political group established in 1951 by Marshal Alexander Papagos and Spyros Markezinis. The Rally won a plurality of the vote in the elections of 1951 and remained in power since its victory in the 1952 elections.

4 The text of the memorandum of Allen’s conversation with the Greek Ambassador on August 23, is in Department of State, Central File 747C.00/8-2355.

5 Telegram 409, August 20, contains information on Ambassador Cannon’s August 18 meeting with Stephanopoulos and the Embassy’s thoughts on Britain’s tactics in the proposed conference on Cyprus. (Ibid., 747C.00/8-2055)
to Foreign Office. Department agrees informal liaison arrangements sufficient (your 556).  

Dulles

6 In telegram 556, August 15, Butterworth informed the Department that he was "loath to establish a shadow conference" in the Embassy and expressed the hope that the Department would agree to "informal liaison arrangements." (Ibid., 747C.00/8-155)

124. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, September 7, 1955—8 p.m.

929. Foreign Secretary sent for me late this afternoon to describe reaction at today's session tripartite Cyprus conference 2 to his proposals of yesterday (Embel 906 3 repeated Athens 32 Ankara 31 Nicosia 10). Macmillan indicated that Stephanopoulos had reacted as favorably to proposals as could be expected and in fact Macmillan had advised him privately not commit himself further than this without consulting his cabinet colleagues. Stephanopoulos took line that although Greek Government's views concerning British proposals remained to be decided, he knew his government would be disappointed and concerned over failure of British proposals to give categorical assurance self-government and specific date for promulgation constitution.

On other hand Macmillan said that he had to speak very straight and very forcefully to Zorlu in order to prevent him from breaking up conference then and there. It was obvious that Zorlu was under strict instructions from Menderes and did not feel free to move without Ankara's authority. Both Turks and Greeks had agreed to communicate their governments detailed reactions in writing. Zorlu had carefully avoided commenting on substance British

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9-755. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Athens and Ankara and pouch to Nicosia.

2 Regarding the conference on Cyprus, see footnote 4, Document 284.

3 Telegram 906 from London, September 6, transmitted a summary of a statement made by Macmillan at a restricted session of the Cyprus Conference on that day. The Foreign Secretary's statement outlined two proposals: first, self-government for Cyprus based on a new and "liberal" constitution, and second, the establishment of a special tripartite and continuing committee to be set up in London to consider problems relating to self-government in Cyprus. (Ibid., 747C.00/9-655)
proposals, indicating that given tension and violence in Cyprus created by enosis campaign pre-condition for consideration was withdrawal by Greece of claim for annexation.

Zorlu asked Macmillan in course of meeting whether United Kingdom believed in all circumstances in self-determination to which Macmillan replied in effect that this was one of basic principles on which British policy founded but it was not necessarily in all circumstances over-riding principle. He cited as example that he had recently at Vienna participated in conclusion of treaty which specifically denied Austria right of self-determination because peace of Europe in matter of Anschluss was more important than right of self-determination for six million Austrians. I imagine that improvisations on this theme will be numerous in days to come.

Macmillan said that he had indicated that as chairman he proposed to “suspend” conference which would give him freer hand after statements of Greeks and Turks are received. This he hoped to have accepted at conference to be resumed tonight when communiqué will be agreed and publication of pertinent documents authorized. In this instance British are pressing for full publication all substantive statements. 5

Naturally events in Salonika, Istanbul and Izmir considerably clouded today’s proceedings. Stephanopoulos expressed profound regret over incident in Salonika and gave assurances Greek Government doing everything possible maintain law and order. Zorlu said regrettable tension over Cyprus had resulted in violence in Turkey—implication being that ultimate responsibility lay primarily with Greeks.

Turk delegation departs tomorrow for Ankara and Greek probably Friday for Athens.

Butterworth

4 For documentation on the Austrian State Treaty signed in Vienna on May 15, 1955, see vol. v, pp. 1 ff.
5 On September 7, the Tripartite Conference was suspended until the Greek and Turkish Governments could consider British proposals for self-government on Cyprus. A summary of the views of the British, Turkish, and Greek Foreign Ministers, including Britain’s proposals for Cypriot self-government, and Macmillan’s and Zorlu’s exchanges on Britain’s attitude toward self-determination for Cyprus were made public that same day. Documentation is in Department of State, Central File 747C.00.
125. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey

Washington, September 9, 1955—7:47 p.m.

447. I. You are requested make representations Prime Minister along following lines:

U.S. Government has taken note Turkish Government’s statement regarding recent events Istanbul and Izmir and welcomes intention offer full reparations. At same time we wish Turk authorities to know, in all friendliness and frankness, that U.S. Government shocked over these events, especially over apparent lack effective police intervention in what appears to have been result coordinated planning. Concern felt over detrimental effect of quarrel between two members of NATO as well as of Balkan Alliance, with obvious advantage only to USSR. Moreover we are disappointed over apparent failure Turkish Government to recall realistic example of Ataturk in submerging historic animosities in favor of Greek-Turkish friendship and to counter irresponsible and inflammatory press statements.

II. Following views should also be brought attention Turkish Government:

It is our understanding London Conference suspended while UK Government awaiting definitive reply from Greeks and therefore still possible for Turks make further considered reply. In circumstances we wish Turkish Government to know U.S. Government considers three countries most concerned with Cyprus question will best serve their own interests, as well as those of all free world, by maintaining flexible positions and evidencing willingness consider proposals put forward in good faith to ameliorate problem which is becoming dangerous to stability in Eastern Mediterranean. Proposals put forward by U.K. are in accordance principles UN Charter and in our view do not compromise basic Turkish position. We understand British proposed institution tri-partite committee to discuss possible forms self-government for Cyprus. This considered reasonable and fruitful suggestion. Re international status Cyprus, British proposal that three parties agree to disagree records Turkish objection to any

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/9-955. Confidential. Drafted by Crain and Snyder. Repeated to Athens, London, and Paris Topol and pouch to Nicosia.

2 On September 7, the Turkish Government expressed regret for the damage done to Greek property and promised quick compensation to those individuals who had suffered.

3 Mustafa Kemal, popularly known as Ataturk, founder and President of the first Turkish Republic.
change in status and in no way infringes Turkish position on this issue.

US Government asks Turkish Government weigh most seriously advantages of continuing negotiations re self-government in tripartite committee against disadvantages providing opportunity for exploitation of issue in UN where countries inimical to West in general and to colonialism in particular would undoubtedly exacerbate problem. In these circumstances UN action may well go beyond moderate modus vivendi possible under U.K. proposals. Such UN action would seem more than likely in view recent events Turkey which have caused world sympathy to redound to Greek benefit. Early, moderate and responsible action by Turkish Government would seem timely when world opinion focused on Turkey.  

Hoover

4 In telegram 381, September 12, Warren informed the Department that, in Menderes’ absence, he had communicated to Zorlu the substance of paragraph 1 of telegram 447 and an aide-mémoire incorporating the substance of paragraph 2. According to the Ambassador, Zorlu’s reaction was “strong and unfavorable.” Turkey could not be asked, Zorlu noted, to make all the sacrifices. However deplorable the rioting in Istanbul and Izmir, Turkey “had already been principal sufferer” and these incidents should not be used to compel Turkey to make substantive concessions contrary to its interests and to the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean. (Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/9–1255)

126. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, September 9, 1955—7 p.m.

975. In its reconsideration of situation in eastern Mediterranean in wake of collapse of Cyprus conference and flare-up of ancient Greek-Turkish hatred, Department may wish to take into account following factors affecting British position primarily.

1. Complex of Middle East problems, including failure of MEDO, 2 conclusion of Suez evacuation agreement, 3 and now

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–955. Secret. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia.

2 In October 1951, the United Kingdom, the United States, and France, in an effort to formulate a regional plan for Middle East defense, proposed the idea of a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) to Egypt. No Arab states were receptive to the initial plan. This plan, sponsored under the auspices of the United Kingdom
Greek-Turkish imbroglio in its present incandescence, in British eyes give Cyprus under firm British control a strategic importance which it has not had since 1878. While some observers here (and not only Labor critics of government's Cyprus policy) challenge this thesis on grounds island has many defects as base under modern conditions, Cabinet's adherence to this view accounts for Macmillan's emphatic repudiation of intention to apply principle of self-determination in Cyprus within foreseeable future. Embassy believes government recognizes Cyprus might be virtually useless as base in event outbreak of third world war but assesses its present vital importance in terms of United Kingdom's peace-time strategic posture toward Middle East and operations short of major war it might be called upon to undertake to live up to its commitments there.

2. Hardly anyone here in or outside government has been or is happy about Cyprus policy but recriminations or cries over split milk seem likely to take form that British concessions (willingness to discuss situation with Greeks and liberality of self-government proposals) might have been enough to reach agreement 2 years or even year ago though no British Government could have given up both Suez and Cyprus simultaneously and successfully faced a general election. In existing situation Embassy anticipates bipartisan support for government's contention that any weakening on self-determination issue in near future would not only vitiate usefulness of base but even more serious would invite unilateral Turkish action and communal explosion on island. In other words British flexibility now would evoke disorders rather than calm them.

3. Embassy recognizes of course difficulties in way of realization of British desideratum, namely, attempt to shelve self-determination theme in order to concentrate on development of self-government. Our impression is however that British are in earnest about quickly increasing prerogatives of Cypriots while assuring rights of Turkish minority and will go further than now indicated once they are assured self-government will not mean Communist coup on lines of British Guiana. 4 To best of Embassy's knowledge Turks have not until recently opposed constitutional advances in Cyprus and Greeks

and the United States, was realized in February 1955 with the conclusion of the Baghdad Pact between Iraq and Turkey. For documentation on the origins of the Middle East Defense Organization, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. v, pp. 1 ff.

3 On October 19, 1954, the Governments of Egypt and the United Kingdom concluded an agreement regarding the British evacuation of the Canal Zone. Among its provisions, the agreement provided for the complete withdrawal of all British forces from Egyptian territory within 20 months. For text of the accord, see Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1954, pp. 248-254.

4 In 1953, the East Indian-supported People's Progressive Party of Dr. Cheddi B. Jagan came into power in British Guiana. Later the same year he was removed because of British fears that the party had pro-Communist tendencies.
have no sound reason for refusing to increase political experience of their Cypriot blood brothers as prelude to further study of island’s future status.

4. If Department concludes that U.S. should intervene directly in this hornet’s nest, I suggest that effort to preach benefits of sweet reason . . . is too narrow an approach. More promising would be confidential and discreet approach to both Athens and Ankara on basis: (a) Put aside self-determination for time being; (b) British have belatedly but now evidenced sincere intention to improve political status of all Cypriots and their proposals deserve serious study; (c) Reply to British in noncommittal fashion which will enable Macmillan to reconvene conference after considerable interval to discuss only self-government for Cyprus; and (d) Utilize conference to explore and test British constitutional plans.

5. From Embassy’s viewpoint it is most undesirable to leave Greeks with any idea that U.S. believes United Nations discussion of issue could be fruitful or serve to diminish tensions. Whereas last year British were on defensive about their weak position, they now are almost sure (hotly supported by Turks) to reiterate issue is within their domestic jurisdiction and to contend that their proposals for self-government provide a fair and attractive basis for eventual reconsideration of principle of self-determination once representative institutions in Cyprus are functioning democratically and efficiently.

Butterworth

127. Message From Athens

September 12, 1955—3:11 p.m.

1. The destruction in Istanbul is massive following the anti-Greek rioting on 6 September but vigorous measures are being taken to clean up the city prior to the opening of the IBRD-IMF Bank Conference on 12 September. Preliminary size-up of the situation, which is subject to confirmation as further facts are known, is as follows. After Cypriot-Turkish demonstration in London, the Turkish Government presumably felt it important to have corresponding demonstrations in various points in Turkey. Demonstrations got under way in Istanbul and Izmir particularly, with the acquiescence

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782C.00/9-1555. Secret; Priority.
of the local police. Rioting quickly got out of hand and the police possibly had no instructions to take vigorous action. Meanwhile rabble elements and professional looters took over and looting became indiscriminate.

2. Although the primary target was Greek, the Armenians, Jews and some foreigners had a rough time of it and even some Turks suffered. Finally the army intervened and the mobs dispersed. The army will probably continue to maintain order during the forthcoming Bank conference; it is not probable that the representatives at the conference are in any physical danger. Tanks and troops are very much in evidence and will presumably be held ready to meet any emergency.

3. Long range consequences are hard to judge and might be most serious. Leading Turkish elements are apparently deeply humiliated and distressed and there appears to be an opportunity to reestablish situation without lasting harm to NATO or Balkan Alliance if properly exploited and if Greek reaction remains reasonably tempered. This will require wisdom and restraint in a highly volatile and explosive situation. It is doubtful that the Communists had a directing hand in this situation but they undoubtedly will endeavor to profit by the general confusion resulting from these incidents.

128. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Greek Ambassador (Melas) and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan), Department of State, Washington, September 12, 1955

SUBJECT

Cyprus

The Greek Ambassador called today immediately after returning from his participation in the London talks on Cyprus to recapitulate briefly the course of the conference and its disappointing outcome. He said that Greece had an absolutely clear conscience as to its behavior. It had gone to London with the sincere intention of making a constructive contribution and it had stated its views with

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9-1255. Secret. Drafted by Baxter.
such moderation as to evoke praise from the British participants
themselves. The Ambassador contrasted the Greek restraint with the
"fantastic" charges and wild statements made by the Turks. The
Greek record certainly proved, he said, that his country had stead-
fastly based its policy on the ideals of that great statesman, Venize-
los, whose vision had laid the foundations of modern
Greek-Turkish friendship. Furthermore, Greece had recently taken
the lead in bringing Yugoslavia into a Balkan Alliance when the
memory was still fresh of armed Communist aggression on Greece
originating from Yugoslav territory. The Ambassador could not
accept, he stated emphatically, any imputation that Greece had done
anything to threaten the security of Turkey or to justify the hostile
Turkish attitude.

The Ambassador said his Government did not envisage success
from a conference to which Britain had invited a country which had
no right to discuss Cyprus. The Greeks had repeatedly given assur-
ances of special treatment for the Turkish minority, but the basic
issue of the self-determination of the Cypriots was a question to be
discussed solely by Great Britain and Greece. The Ambassador was
convinced that Secretary Dulles, who had worked so hard to get
these talks started had at no time envisaged that they would be
tripartite.

The British proposals, when they were finally made, ostensibly
suggested self-government, but they were, according to the Ambas-
sador, the very negation of self-government: they recommended the
establishment of a control committee in London. This was nothing
but a condominium arrangement, in which the minority and the
British would dominate the majority (Greek) interest. As a further
indication that the British were not "serious" in their proposals, the
Ambassador said that, in the final London meeting, the Turks were
"made to ask questions" which elicited answers from the British
Government to the effect that the question of the international
status of Cyprus or self-determination were not to be discussed in
the foreseeable future. This proved that, despite the constructive
attitude with which Greece had approached the conference, others,
"with encouragement from various sources", had no intention of
trying to work out a solution.

In this connection Mr. Jernegan said he must take issue with the
Ambassador's interpretation. All of our information indicated that
the British had suggested the talks and entered into them in good
faith. (The Ambassador obviously refused to accept this.) Mr. Jerne-
egan added that he believed the conference had not been completely
negative; the British proposals represented some progress and he

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2 Eleutherios Venizelos, Greek statesman and former Prime Minister.
hoped everyone concerned would give very serious consideration to them.

When the conversation turned to the recent unfortunate anti-Greek riots in Istanbul and Izmir, the Ambassador said the fact that demonstrations began simultaneously in widely scattered areas and that "bombs" were set in Greek churches indicated advance planning. He also denied in most vehement terms that the dynamiting of the Turkish Consulate in Salonika was "done by a Greek hand."

Mr. Jernegan said that we were shocked by the outbreak of violence in Turkey. Our views had been made known to the Turkish Government, and at the same time we had urged that they do everything in their power to prevent worsening of their relations within NATO and in the Balkan Alliance. As the Ambassador probably knew, we had informed the Greek Government of our gratification at the steps taken by the Greek Government to prevent retaliatory demonstrations in Greece and to protect Turkish property. However, we were greatly concerned at the growing indications of the revival of old animosities which the Greek Government—and the Ambassador personally—had done so much to suppress. It was understandable that emotions were running high at the present time, but it appeared to us that all of the reasons which had existed in the time of Venizelos for trying to bring about close Greek-Turk friendship still obtained. Any attempt to assess responsibility for the present situation was irrelevant when larger issues were at stake. The gravity of the situation was unmistakable when the Greek Foreign Minister informed us that, if the Turkish Government refused to accept the revised version of a Note which it rejected in its first form as containing unacceptable aspersions on Turkish officials, the Greek Government would sever diplomatic relations with Turkey. The Greek Ambassador was visibly shaken by this information, which he had not heard from his Foreign Office. Mr. Jernegan said that, according to a subsequent message, the Greek Cabinet had, for the time being at least, rejected the idea of a break in diplomatic relations, but the fact that such a step was seriously considered and might still be a possibility indicated the degree to which relations had deteriorated. Mr. Jernegan also referred to the Greek announcement that its forces would not participate in NATO maneuvers. This would be a great blow to Allied unity, and he hoped the Greek Government could reconsider its decision. To justify the Greek position, the Ambassador pointed out the danger of unfortunate incidents if Greek and Turkish units should participate in joint military exercises at this time.

As the Ambassador left he asked Mr. Jernegan how he felt about the forthcoming UN meeting. Mr. Jernegan said he contemplated the prospect of discussion on the Cyprus question with
consternation and fear. He believed further public debate could serve no one’s interests and would only exacerbate feelings now at fever pitch. He would hope that the question could be discussed in some other forum than that of the General Assembly. It was noteworthy that Mr. Melas, though not agreeing to this suggestion, did not immediately state that his Government could under no circumstances agree to keeping Cyprus off the UN agenda. 3

3 On September 13, Ambassador Melas called on Hoover and Murphy to discuss Cyprus. The Ambassador covered the same ground as he had with Jernegan except that he made a strong plea for the United States to exert pressure on Great Britain and Turkey in an effort to change their attitudes toward Cyprus. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199) The following day, Melas discussed Cyprus with Merchant and read a telegram he had received from his government stating that it was necessary that the Cyprus situation be brought before the United Nations. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., Central Files, 747C.00/9–1655)

129. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, September 13, 1955—4 p.m.

653. Foreign Ministry official who is aware of US representation in Ankara 2 told us today that Greek Government, and most particularly Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos, are deeply concerned over heightening pitch of opposition and press attacks (A) on US for failure make public expression of shock over recent events in Turkey and (B) intensity of campaign to smear Stephanopoulos as US stooge responsible for failure and humiliation at London and subsequent Turkish riots. Official pointed out that Stephanopoulos is carrying all the blame from every quarter and risks having to resign for being too pro-American, an ironical situation which would have been inconceivable a few months ago.

Official made strong plea that US find a way to let Greek people know true feelings of US. He also suggested that it was in US interest to support Stephanopoulos since if he were to go result could only be less moderate Greek position and serious diminution US influence.

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.81/9–1355. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London and Ankara and pouch to Salonika.

2 Presumably the reference is to the instructions in telegram 447, Document 125.
Comment: There is no doubt US prestige and influence has taken sharp downward turn in Greece. Greece pride has been hurt that leader "civilized" world has not voiced expected humanitarian sense of shock at Turkish actions. Behind this is a real feeling of abandonment and isolation due failure US to speak out which would have encouraged others step up and be counted. We would hope that Department will find way quickly to meet and reverse this mounting tide of feeling.  

Thurston

3 On September 17, in telegram 823 to Athens, the Department instructed the Embassy to deliver a personal message from Secretary Dulles to Prime Minister Papagos. In the message, Dulles indicated that he had followed the "deterioration" of Greek-Turkish relations over the Cyprus issue with "concern" and noted that regardless of the causes of the dispute the unity of NATO must be restored without delay. The Secretary added that over the past decade Greece and Turkey had cooperated to deter "Communist ambitions" in the eastern Mediterranean and noted that he found it difficult to believe that both countries would allow this cooperation to end over the events of the past several weeks. Dulles reminded the Greek Government of the consequences of weakening that strong bulwark and urged the Prime Minister to make sure that the "effectiveness" of the Greek-Turkish partnership was not ruined by present conflicts. An identical message was also sent to the Turkish Prime Minister. Telegram 823 also transmitted the text of a statement that the Department planned to release to the press on September 18. It indicated that the Department had expressed "deep concern" over the violence in Istanbul and Izmir and noted that the Secretary sent personal messages to the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey. (Department of State, Central Files, 681.82/9-1755)

130. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, September 16, 1955—6 p.m.

694. Department pass USUN. In exploring areas in which progress might be made on Cyprus issue, we believe NATO and UN mechanisms hold greatest promise.

All responsible Greeks fully appreciate overriding importance for Greece of maintenance NATO relationships and are determined do everything possible to maintain them within limits imposed by Greek public opinion. Nevertheless, Greeks say further public expression of contrition by Turks is essential to progress. View these

attitudes and because army is strongest single element in this country, we should maintain pressure on Greeks and Turks through NATO mechanism. For the moment, however, possibilities for progress through NATO mechanism are additionally limited by fact that in last few days Greek press, including government papers, has intensified anti-NATO campaign. Indications are Greek Government encouraging this line in large measure because they consider it as most likely method pressure US into some public expression reaction to recent events. (As Department is aware, US silence on events in Turkey has become dominant theme here, second only to shock and revulsion at riots themselves in emphasis given by government, opposition, army, press and man in street.) Now, more recently, this plea for public voicing US views on events is coupled with expression of hope that we will not take public position against Greece at UNGA.

With approach UNGA, Greek Government increasingly worried over cumulative effect possible US position at GA adverse to Greece, on top of continued US silence on Turkish events. While government believes it can hold the line until GA convenes, it seems clear that Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos’ political future depends on his achieving something in New York. Moreover, Rallis, Minister to Prime Minister, told me yesterday he fears demonstrations here if things go badly for Greece in UN.

Given situation outlined above, we believe UN mechanism offers best immediate hope for progress. Since US attitude is key to problem, we strongly urge that most serious consideration be given to reaffirmation our traditional position by affirmative vote for inscription Cyprus issue on GA agenda, accompanied by explanatory statement expressing US hope that interested parties will devote intervening period of time prior reaching item on agenda to serious exploration (or re-examination as case may be) of British proposals or other fruitful avenues leading to development representative Cypriot political institutions.

Affirmative vote on inscription would not only accurately reflect true present status Cyprus issue as situation clearly involving maintenance international peace and security but also would put US in position to exert useful influence for solution of problem. View London conference and subsequent events, it will be difficult support position this year that Cyprus question falls within scope Article 2 (7) UN Charter. 2

2 Article 2 (7) of the U.N. Charter stipulates that nothing in the Charter authorized the United Nations to intervene in matters that were essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.
We suggest possible uses such influence along following lines: US to use its good offices to get Greek and UK delegates together to try and work out a mutually acceptable formula which could then be put up to the Turks in such a way as to make it difficult for latter to reject. Meanwhile, similar quiet efforts could be made with Turks to lead them away from their present intransigent attitude.

We believe both Greek and British sincerely desire find some solution Cyprus issue (strong indication Greek desires this respect contained recent statement by Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos (see Embtel 687 \(^3\))) demonstrates realistic effort prepare Greek public for possible disappointment at UNGA and keep door open for further negotiations with UK. As to British, they appear severely shocked by outcome of events and willing to do something about it. Moreover, they apparently intend to go ahead with constructive steps in Cyprus, if necessary alone. In recent conversation British Embassy officer told us that while his indications are Greeks will turn down British proposals, he thought Greeks would be smart to take more flexible position and leave door open, thus “leaving Turks out on limb.” Queried re probable UK reaction such flexible Greek position, he said UK considers Cyprus question as kind of poison in bloodstream of Anglo-Greek relations which UK would do good deal to get rid of “if given half a chance by Greeks.”

Times and timing call for injection catalytic agent, which only US can supply.

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\(^3\) Telegram 687, September 16, transmitted the highlights of Stephanopoulos’ speech replying to the opposition. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9-1655)
131. Message From Foreign Secretary Macmillan to Secretary of State Dulles


I expect you will have had a full report on the Tripartite Conference on Cyprus from your people here, with whom we have been in close touch. I deeply regret that we were not able to persuade the Greeks and the Turks to accept our proposals for a settlement, but I still hope that with time they will come round to accepting them as at least a basis for further discussion. In our desire to find a way out of this most unfortunate and dangerous dispute, we took an unprecedented step in agreeing to discuss with two foreign governments the internal affairs of an indisputably British territory. We also invited them to join with us in working out a system of self-government. This offer remains open. We are very grateful for the support which our efforts received through your Embassies in London, Athens and Ankara. Meanwhile, although we still await the official reply from Athens, the indications are that the Greek Government are determined to reject our proposals and to go ahead once more with their appeal to the United Nations. I am convinced that it could only make matters worse if the Greeks succeeded in getting the matter debated again in the United Nations. There is no hope that this would lead to a solution, while it is certain that the discussion would further inflame Greco-Turkish relations and increase the strain upon their co-operation in the North Atlantic alliance. It would certainly encourage further disorder and terrorism in Cyprus.

On the other hand, if the Cyprus item can be kept off the General Assembly’s agenda, there would be a chance for passions to cool, and progress to be resumed. For our part, we will continue to make it clear that the British proposals still stand; that we are prepared to consider amendments or counter-proposals; and that we intend to resume negotiations with the other two Governments as soon as conditions allow.

For these practical reasons and not simply because of Article 2(VII) of the Charter, we are bound to oppose the Greeks on the inscription of the item. I very much hope that you will take the same view. It is likely that the attitude of the United States Delegation towards inscription will be decisive. This dispute with

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1 Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan to Dulles Correspondence 1955–1959. Confidential. An attached note to Dulles from Macmillan reads:

"I am sending you a message about Cyprus today. I do hope you will be able to help me. I hope you have had a good holiday."
Greece is a great sorrow to us in this country, who have such a long tradition of friendship with the Greek people. But we cannot lose sight of the fact that it is the internal exigencies of Greek politics which have inflamed the situation in and about Cyprus and that the trouble will go on so long as the Greeks continue to foment it. The only thing which will make them pause is a clear rebuff by a good majority at the United Nations. We assume that you will support us in any case on the substance of the question as you did last year. But in view of the really grave consequences which could so easily follow from debating Cyprus in the United Nations at the present time, when passions are running high, I do most sincerely hope that you will use your great influence to prevent the item from securing inscription.

132. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, September 17, 1955—7:18 p.m.

1516. In reply personal message to Secretary from Macmillan delivered by British Embassy September 15 requesting US vote against inscription Cyprus item in GA agenda, following letter from Secretary delivered today to British Embassy here for urgent transmittal to Foreign Secretary:

Begin text:
I returned last night from my vacation, and at once considered the Cyprus matter in light of your personal message to me. It would be contrary to our general policy to oppose inscription. Indeed, I do not now recall that we have ever done so. We are also deeply concerned as to repercussions in Greece and on Greek relations with its NATO partners of a negative vote by the United States. Can you quickly tell me what your Government is planning to say in the General Committee as to your program for Cyprus? If this is to be something reasonably precise and constructive, it would certainly help us in coming to a conclusion. If you have your statement already prepared and can get it to us by Monday noon,

1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9-1755. Secret; Limit Distribution. The text of the message was delivered to the British Embassy in Washington for transmittal to Macmillan.

2Supra.
that would be useful so that I can discuss it with my associates here before leaving for New York Monday afternoon. End text.

Dulles

133. Message From Foreign Secretary Macmillan to Secretary of State Dulles


Thank you for your personal message about Cyprus question. Nutting’s statement before the General Committee will be along the following lines.

The United Nations themselves decided that it was inappropriate to discuss this question last year. It is even more so now. It seems to us clear that public debate of this most difficult problem can only make matters worse. The best hope of reconciling the conflicting views of the three Governments primarily concerned and of promoting a settlement must be through diplomacy and confidential talks. It was with this conviction that we took the unusual step of calling a conference to deal with a matter of strictly British jurisdiction. After the first days had revealed the different positions we put before the conference constructive proposals which made the most of the considerable area of common ground.

Nutting will explain these proposals. You will have seen them but I would like to draw your attention particularly to the following points which we will emphasise:

(a) The constitution is to be a liberal one designed very sincerely to lead to the fullest measure of internal self-government compatible with the strategic requirements of the present international situation.

(b) There would be from the outset an Assembly with an elected majority. All departments of the Cyprus Government would be progressively transferred to Cypriot Ministers responsible to the Assembly, with the sole exception of foreign affairs, defence and

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1 Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan to Dulles Correspondence 1955-1959. Secret. An attached note from Macmillan to Dulles reads:

"Thank you for your message about Cyprus. I am sending you a long reply which gives the arguments we propose to develop. I hope you will think them, as I do, overwhelming. If the United Nations cannot debate China, nobody here will understand why they should debate Cyprus.

2 Supra.
public security. These must be reserved since the Cypriots could not alone sustain these responsibilities. But otherwise it is certainly our intention to make as rapid progress as conditions allow.

(c) A Cypriot Chief Minister would head the new Cypriot administration.

(d) Since it is only too clear that constitutional progress in Cyprus depends upon the cooperation of [or] at least the tacit assent of the Greek and Turkish Governments, we proposed a tripartite committee with the following tasks:—

(I) To examine the detailed proposals to be drawn up by Her Majesty’s Government for new constitutional instruments for Cyprus;

(II) To consider a suitable system of minority guarantees;

(III) To investigate any possibilities for closer links between Cyprus and the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey. We had in mind for example ideas which have been mooted for enabling Cypriots to enjoy special status and rights in Greece or Turkey as well as their British citizenship;

(IV) To act as a standing body for consultation and cooperation between the three Governments on Cypriot problems.

Our statement will not deny that the first results of the conference were disappointing. But although formal tripartite discussions seem difficult to arrange at this moment, Her Majesty’s Government are determined to persevere with friendly and informal consultation. The conference is suspended not ended. Our proposals stand, and we are prepared to consider amendments or counter proposals at any time.

Finally we proposed that when self-government was in working order the full conference should meet again with the advantage of the presence of representative Cypriots to discuss the whole position.

All these proposals taken together seem to us a fair and generous basis for advance. We feel therefore that discussion at the United Nations can only hinder and not help. The situation is extremely delicate. The relations between friends and allies are strained; if irreparable damage is not to be done, tempers must be given time to cool.

So much for what Nutting will say. He will also have my speech at the conference on September 6 to guide him. Since events have shown that the success of self-government in Cyprus largely depends on the attitude of the Greeks and the Turks it would surely be unwise to go into any further detail especially on such questions as the protection of minorities which will require very delicate negotiation. The Turks believe that our proposals go too far and are premature. Any attempt to go further would meet the sharpest reaction in that quarter.
I know that you do not see eye to eye with us on the principle of opposing the inscription of items of this kind on the agenda of the United Nations. But I do feel that by any standard the case against the inscription of the Cyprus item is overwhelming. We have just received the Greek reply to our London proposals. It is a tendentious document, which chooses to misinterpret our proposals by underrating the constitutional offer and alleging that the tripartite committee is designed to impede rather than promote self-government. The reply refers specifically to the Greek "success" in getting the Cyprus item inscribed on the agenda of the United Nations last year. This, I think, proves how much last year's inscription of the item has had to do with the uncompromising attitude which the Greeks have adopted since. If the Greeks get the same encouragement this year it can only make them more intransigent and, conversely, make the Turks even more rigid. That is why I feel so strongly that it is in the interest of all of us to keep the item off the agenda.

I can assure you that I am as unhappy as you are about the effect of this Cyprus dispute on Greece's relations with N.A.T.O. As regards the internal situation in Greece I think it suffers partly from there being no effective Prime Minister and partly from the shock caused by the tragic events in Istanbul and Smyrna. I do not think that discussion at the United Nations is going to help on either of these points. I must say frankly that I do not see what more we can do to make things better as long as the Greek Government reject our proposals for self-government unless accompanied by an immediate pledge of self-determination. This ignores the facts of life; including British strategic needs and the Turkish determination not to see the last of their off-shore islands pass into Greek hands. In any case I find it hard to believe that the Greek Government's ultimate loyalty to N.A.T.O.—from which Greece derives such immense advantages—really depends upon their having their whole way over Cyprus.

The Greeks themselves recognised during the London Conference that we must retain sovereignty in Cyprus in the immediate future. Any resolution by the United Nations, short of an outright rejection of inscription would, however moderate its terms, make our task in Cyprus that much the more difficult. Rioting and terrorism in Cyprus, and the inevitable measures to suppress them must make Anglo-Greek relations still more difficult. The repercussions in Turkey could be equally grave.

Indeed the position in Turkey gives no less case for anxiety than the position in Greece. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has just told me of a talk he has had with the Turkish Prime Minister. There is no doubt at all that at the moment Cyprus is the essential issue in
Turkish politics. The Chancellor was deeply impressed by the Prime Minister’s concern over the internal situation in Turkey. I think we ought to give equal importance to the Turkish as to the Greek aspect of this unhappy business.

For all these reasons I must ask you to use your great influence against the inscription of this item. The present indications are that the vote will be a close one and that the attitude of the United States will probably be decisive. Acting in harmony we could, I believe, prevent further discussion of this vexed problem in an atmosphere which is full of such explosive possibilities.

134. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece

Washington, September 20, 1955—10:45 a.m.

840. In present circumstances, I am convinced General Assembly discussion Cyprus question would lead to intemperate debate and might well cause incidents in Greece and Turkey which would destroy remains of Greek-Turkish cooperation. Importance free world unity and threat to NATO far exceeds that of Cyprus question. I have therefore decided we must seek persuade Greece not press for consideration Cyprus item in GA and that we must actively seek prevent inscription if Greeks insist upon pressing consideration Cyprus item this session. In reaching this conclusion I am aware U.S. will be criticized for opposing aspirations dependent people and that SovBloc may take advantage situation. Also realize that for present we will probably lose ability influence Greek Government. However importance maintaining maximum possible free world unity is overriding.

I therefore ask you use best efforts persuade Greek Government not press for consideration Cyprus item this session and suggest approach somewhat as follows:

In U.S. opinion present grave crisis between Greece and Turkey would become even more serious if discussed in GA. We believe this might be fatal blow Balkan Pact and cause grave breach NATO defense which is basis our unity and strength. Also such a public

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9-2055. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Wood, Baxter, and Jernegan. Repeated to Ankara and London and pouched to Salonika and Nicosia.
discussion Cyprus question now would make possibility any solution even more difficult. We convinced that after recent deplorable events best and most statesmanlike course is to let question remain in abeyance for immediate present as far as UN is concerned. We do not feel question should be ignored or forgotten. We are not supporting colonialism or opposing self-determination.

It is our belief sincere efforts of parties most concerned to work toward mutually satisfactory solution represents best and perhaps only feasible way of resolving Cyprus problem. This is also within spirit UN, whose members are pledged to employ all possible methods of solving problems among themselves before resorting to UN forum. In our considered opinion recent UK proposals represent progress and development self-government for Cypriot people offers best prospect for ultimate solution acceptable to parties concerned and in interests free world unity. We have been assured by UK that, despite inconclusive outcome London talks, UK prepared proceed with sincere and determined efforts give self-government to Cypriot people and UK further prepared give sympathetic consideration to any amendments or counter-proposals to suggestions they made in London. UK position can be interpreted as carrying implication that international status Cyprus need not remain unchanged in perpetuity. We believe Greek Government, which we know desires eventual application principle self-determination to Cyprus, would be well-advised to cooperate now with UK and use its influence with Cypriot people to participate in orderly steps toward self-government. We can further assure Greek Government that U.S. will actively and vigorously use its influence induce and assist UK to move toward this end.

We hope Greek leaders will continue show statesmanship by remembering free world unity must be placed ahead problems existing between individual members. Since this our conviction, we ask Greek Government not press for consideration Cyprus this session and must state that in view shortness time we cannot delay making known confidentially to other delegations we intend oppose inscriptions Cyprus item. We hope Greek Government will quickly decide not press question so that we will not have to come into open opposition and actively oppose inscription. If Greek Government agrees, we will do all in our power assist it to carry out this decision with dignity.

There are at least two ways in which Greeks could do this.

1) It would be possible Greeks send letter to SYG informing him Greek intention not press for consideration Cyprus item. President General Committee (Steering Committee of GA) would merely notify General Committee receipt communication by SYG this effect
and no action would be taken on matter in GC or subsequently in GA.

2) Greece could make statement of its position this matter in GC. We would hope such statement would be as non-controversial as possible and would conclude with statement by Greece of its decision not to press consideration Cyprus item at this time with view permit parties renew efforts find solution problem. Statement might also stress Greek desire to maintain free world unity as basis for this desire. No further action would then be necessary by Assembly.

Hoover

135. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece

Washington, September 20, 1955—10:59 p.m.

853. Secretary informed Stephanopoulos in New York today that United States, after most careful consideration, had decided to vote against inscription of Cyprus issue on UNGA Agenda. Stephanopoulos predicted, in highly emotional reaction, four immediate results following announcement of vote, probably September 22 or 23: (1) Government would undoubtedly fall; (2) he himself would immediately resign; (3) Balkan Alliance would collapse; and (4) serious anti-American riots would break out in Greece.

U.S. decision will probably become known to Greek public soon. Suggest you notify American civilian and military personnel promptly and advise them to take all feasible precautions. You may, at your discretion, also call on Greek authorities to grant every possible protection.

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff is not alerting service personnel or naval vessels through Service channels because notification through you, as authorized herein, is considered most likely way to avoid precipitating events. If situation warrants, any US naval vessel in vicinity could render assistance.

Immediately following telegram is verbatim text of statement which Secretary read to Foreign Minister and handed him copy.  

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2 Highlights of this meeting were transmitted in Delga 8 from New York, September 20. (Ibid., 747C.00/9–2055)
3 Telegram 854, September 20. (Ibid., 320/9–2055)
in your opinion public statements by Embassy should appear desir-
able, you are authorized to use material contained therein at your
discretion, but without attribution to source or verbatim release of
text. 4

Hoover

4 On September 20, at 12:10 p.m., Dulles telephoned Allen. A transcript of the
conversation reads:

"The Secretary telephoned Mr. Allen to inquire about the status of the cables to
Greece. The Secretary said he was not clear as to whether he should do anything
about them or not. Allen said they had taken care of the basic one instructing Cannon
to try to get the Greeks not to press the case. The other cable deals with what line to
take should there be a leak.

"The Secretary said we would be working on a statement which Lodge will make
on the subject. It would be a better statement of our position. The Secretary said he
would rather have that wait until we see what we work out here. Allen said if the
thing leaks we can give out a paraphrase. He said the cable on the press statement
would be held up." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, General Telephone Conversa-
tions)

136. Message From King Paul to Secretary of State Dulles 1

Athens, undated.

This is a private message for your personal information owing
to my deep concern about the present situation.

My talks with the Government and leaders of the opposition
have reinforced my conviction that your assistance in securing
inscription of the Cyprus question at the United Nations would be
the most effective means by which the United States can help to

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–2055. Top Secret. A
memorandum to Dulles transmitting this message noted that it had been delivered by
the King with the request that it be forwarded immediately to the Secretary. A
notation on the source text indicates that Hoover telephoned Dulles in New York at
1:07 p.m. on September 20 to read him the text of the message. A record of the
conversation follows:

"Mr. Hoover said there was a message in from King Paul of Greece, a private
one, about inscription. He said that the Greek people felt they were being abandoned.
He said there was more than we realized in the way the Greeks felt about this
situation. The Secretary said he feared we were committed re inscription. Hoover said
we were going to have to put our thinking caps on as to what line to take to make up
for this action. The Secretary agreed, saying what we said in this connection would
have a great deal of significance. They also discussed the Secretary's conversation
with George Allen this morning and about holding up the statement." (Eisenhower
Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations) See footnote 4, supra.
stop an alarming trend towards neutralism in Greece. There is
general bitterness towards NATO. The positive sign of friendship
evidenced by your support at the United Nations would counteract
this disturbing tendency at a time when the serious illness of the
Prime Minister is also likely to cause a political crisis in the near
future.

The feelings of indignation of the Greek people with respect to
the Turkish atrocities and feeling of abandonment by our friends run
far higher than you may realize.

137. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department
of State

Athens, September 21, 1955—4 a.m.

752. Department pass USUN. Attention Baxter (GTI). Deptel
840 ² decoded at 11 pm and I talked with Canellopoulos, Deputy
Prime Minister, shortly after midnight leaving him at 1:30.

I told him of Under Secretary's decision and, in course of long
discussion punctuated by many bitter but not emotional rejoinders, I
marshalled all pertinent arguments. After bringing him away from
three successive attitudes, none of which was acceptable even to
himself, we centered talk on what might be productive under UK
assurances backed by US promises of inducement and assistance
(paragraph 4 reference telegram). He said this was only possible
stand on which Greek Government would dare to face people if
inscription position abandoned. He said these assurances as stated in
rreftel would be scornfully rejected in present tense atmosphere, and
11th hour pressures in form of promises after recent bitter experi-
ences, would be highly suspect even though personally he, and he
thought Stephanopoulos, would like to work with US on that basis.
Nonetheless he would ask Stephanopoulos to explore with Secretary
whether more specific and concrete proposals can be obtained as
only possible alternative government could defend before public.

Note that immediate decision is not possible. Stephanopoulos
recommendations must be debated before Council of Ministers and
if accepted must have approval of bedridden Field Marshal, itself a
major task since he is unable to participate in discussions and

² Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9-2155. Confidential; Nlact.
² Document 134.
perhaps in no condition to grasp some of considerations involved.
Message to Stephanopoulos however going forward still tonight.

Following are my personal observations:

Department telegram does not take into account gravity of
situation here. Reaction to Secretary’s message on Turkish outrages
delivered Sunday 3 has been most violent and inscription is now
basic issue in both foreign and domestic policy. Canellopoulos said
flatly and with no hysterics that with abandonment inscription on
no better grounds than presented in reference telegram, government
would not last one hour and I believe him. That by itself might be
tolerable, but the alienation to [?] Greece might not be as temporary
as assumed in reference telegram. To me this would be great blow to
our entire post-war foreign policy which found both concrete and
symbolic expression in Greek-American cooperation leading to expu-
ulsion of Communist guerrillas from Greece in 1947–1949. Our
intervention in Greece in 1947 marked turning point in steady
expansionism of Soviet in post-World War II years. As a symbol of
US determination to stand firm against Soviet Communist power,
Greece is unique.

Greece, contiguous with Soviet Eastern European bloc, has many
historical, religious and cultural affiliations with countries in that
bloc. We can hardly assume that given a deterioration in US-Greek
relations, Greece could not by process of peaceful infiltration become
either a people’s democracy or a neutralist fellow-travelling state.
Greece is already the object of a two-sided though not necessarily
coordinated campaign from Belgrade and Moscow. Social and eco-
nomic conditions here are such as to constitute no real obstacle to
the loss of Greece to the Communist bloc if we allow our own
influence to be destroyed by an insensitive unrealistic policy.

The fall of the present government at this time would open
field to leftist and anti-US elements. The more moderate and pro-US
political leaders who might under other circumstances form a new
government would be completely discredited and silenced. In short,
in opposing Greek request for inscription, we take great risk of
setting in motion forces which will seriously threaten entire system
of security in this part of world without active cooperation of Greece
is beyond our comprehension. Spectacle of US abandoning Greece
will have worldwide repercussions.

While question of US position in UN generally falls outside
purview of US-Greek relations, we cannot help wondering whether
taking a position that question which demonstrably is disturbing
international peace and security should not be discussed would at
some future time come to haunt us in UN deliberations. For exam-

3 September 18; see footnote 3, Document 129.
ple, since a year and a half our protestations that we are not opposing self-determination have met only cynical response. Is it not in our interest to maintain the principle in connection with captive nations now under Soviet control on a question which we might one day wish to press within UN framework?

We are equally concerned with possibility that despite efforts of US to prevent inscription of Cyprus issue on UN agenda, question might nevertheless be inscribed by virtue of support that Greece may receive from Afro-Asian, Soviet and Latin Americans. Canellopoulous mentioned this and, as for himself, rejected with disgust the thought that Greece could so be separated from her allies on whom her future welfare as well as her moral standing in world depend. A successor government may well decide differently. If in present strained situation Greeks find they can achieve success for their national effort through support from those countries against opposition of their NATO allies, it is not difficult to conjecture where opportunistic foreign policy might lead them.

Cannon

138. Editorial Note

On September 21, at the request of Greece, the General Committee of the General Assembly opened discussion on the question of including the Cyprus issue on the Assembly’s agenda. That day in his address before the committee, Ambassador Lodge stated that inscription of the Cyprus issue at this time would not contribute toward the peaceful settlement of international disputes. The text of Lodge’s statement is in Department of State Bulletin, October 3, 1955, pages 545–546.

On September 23, the General Assembly, by a vote of 28 to 22 with 10 abstentions, adopted the General Committee’s recommendation not to inscribe the Cyprus question. Both the United States and the United Kingdom voted against inscription.
139. Message From President Eisenhower to King Paul


In the present difficult situation, I desire to assure Your Majesty that I remain deeply convinced of the paramount importance of the ties of strong friendship which unite Greece and the United States. Even if there are differences of opinion over how the Cyprus question should be handled, we shall not let this one issue trouble our deep friendship and sympathy for Greece.

With kindest personal assurances,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9-2155. Secret. Transmitted in telegram 325 to Athens, September 21, which is the source text. The Embassy was instructed to deliver the message to the King and to inform him that he was at liberty to make it public if he so desired. The Department added that it would not release the message unless King Paul indicated his approval.

2 In telegram 839, September 30, Ambassador Cannon reported that the President's message had been delivered to King Paul the previous day. According to the Ambassador, the King was "pleased and impressed" with the message and was "disposed" to make it public. Cannon added, however, that in view of the present "diplomatic political crisis" in Greece, the King was reserving that decision until after consultation with the two Deputy Prime Ministers. ([ibid.], 611.81/9-3055)

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140. Editorial Note

On September 26, Secretary Dulles met in New York with Foreign Secretary Macmillan, who raised the question of Cyprus. According to the memorandum of conversation prepared by Dulles the next day, the following exchange occurred:

"Macmillan took me aside, and said he wished to express his deep appreciation for our help on the Cyprus matter. He said that he had sent me a written message, but he wanted to reinforce it personally. I said that it had been a difficult decision to take, but having taken it, we went through with it in helping to get the votes necessary to succeed. Otherwise, the British would have been defeated. Macmillan said he was well aware of that fact. He went on to say he was determined to carry the thing through to a successful conclusion, and would make some constructive proposals in the very near future." (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)
141. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Foreign Secretary Macmillan


DEAR HAROLD: I wish to thank you for your friendly and helpful messages of September 19 and 20 on the subject of Cyprus. Although the Greek Government has received a serious blow, it is certainly better, in the present atmosphere, that the subject was not allowed to drag on in the General Assembly. However, after our conversation in New York on September 27, I know you will agree with me that the Cyprus situation remains a cause of concern not only on the island itself, but as it affects NATO and the Balkan Pact. I realize the importance of the move which the United Kingdom has made in seeking to work towards a solution of the problem in consultation with the Turkish and Greek Governments, but I fear that neither of them are likely to agree on any steps towards self-government in the near future. Such steps would be too much for Turkey and not enough for Greece. Therefore I am glad to have heard from you that the United Kingdom will soon decide on its own initiative to take some steps towards self-government. Also, I recall the Eisenhower-Churchill Declaration of June 29, 1954 that they would "earnestly strive by every peaceful means to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire and are capable of sustaining an independent existence. We welcome the processes of development, where still needed, that lead toward that goal." 4

I have written frankly, believing that this is the best basis for working out mutually satisfactory positions on this matter. I need not emphasize the traditional and popular feelings in the United States on colonial questions. I sincerely hope that we shall both find the means to continue our cooperation on the Cyprus question.

Sincerely yours,

Foster

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9-1955. Secret. Drafted by Wood and Dulles.
2 The September 19 letter is printed as Document 133; the September 20 letter is in the Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Eden-Macmillan-Lloyd Correspondence 1955-56.
3 No record of Dulles’ conversation with Macmillan concerning Cyprus has been found in Department of State files. According to Dulles’ Appointment Book, the Secretary met with Macmillan, Shuckburgh, and Russell on September 27 at 4:40 p.m. to discuss the situation in the Middle East. No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.
4 For the full text of the declaration, see Department of State Bulletin, July 12, 1954, pp. 49-50.
DEAR FOSTER: It was good of you to let me have, in your letter of October 5, your thoughts on Cyprus. I agree entirely with you that the Cyprus situation remains a cause of concern both in the island itself and because of its effects elsewhere.

The rejection by the Greek and Turkish Governments, for opposite reasons, of our proposals for self-government in Cyprus is bound to remain a cause of real difficulty. There are perhaps grounds for hope that the new Greek Government may be less uncompromising than its predecessor. But there remains the Turkish objection to any form of self-government until the Greek demand for self-determination has been withdrawn. This is a formidable obstacle.

Nonetheless we have every intention of doing whatever is possible to break the deadlock in Cyprus. The new Governor has lost no time in consulting the leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities. He has also explained the meaning of the British proposals in a broadcast of which I enclose a copy. I commend to your attention especially the concluding passages of this broadcast, in which Harding makes it clear that we are closing no doors.

To our regret (and perhaps also to his own) Archbishop Makarios has told the Governor that he cannot accept our formula as satisfactory. This is unfortunate, the more so as there is some reason to believe that the Archbishop personally may now be willing to consider some compromise solution. But so long as the extremists are dominant and men of goodwill are intimidated, it is hard for the leaders to be conciliatory. Thus our first task in Cyprus is to restore conditions of security and order in which reason and conciliation can gain a foothold.

However, the new Greek Foreign Minister has asked to see me in Paris, and we have heard from our ambassador in Athens that he

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10-2155. Secret. The type-written source text signed by Macmillan was apparently delivered to Dulles in Paris; see footnote 1, infra.

On October 24, the Embassy in London transmitted the text of Macmillan’s message in telegram 1652. (Ibid., 747C.00/10-2455)

2 Supra.

3 The text of the broadcast by Field Marshal Sir John Harding, appointed September 25 as Governor of Cyprus, is not printed.

4 On October 6, following the death of Papagos, Constantine Karamanlis organized a new government with Spyros Theotokis as Foreign Minister; see Document 287.
would like to take a more helpful line. I am not without hope that the talks with the Archbishop may be resumed.

Meanwhile we are working on the details of the constitutional arrangements which I outlined at the London Conference last month. Just when these will be published must partly depend on circumstances, including political developments in Cyprus and any changes in the attitudes of Greece and Turkey. But, despite the obstacles, it is our firm intention to press forward, and in this I know we can count on your continued understanding and support.

Yours ever,

Harold Macmillan

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143. Memorandum of a Conversation, Ambassador's Residence, Paris, October 24, 1955, 7:30 p.m.¹

USDel/MC/1

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The Secretary
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Russell

Greece
Mr. Theotokis
Alexis S. Liatis

SUBJECT

Meeting with Greek Foreign Minister

The Greek Foreign Minister opened the conversation by asking the Secretary whether he felt confident about the success of the coming discussions in Geneva. The Secretary said that he thought there was about an even chance that some good might come out of them although he was not encouraged by the recent course of action of the Soviets in the Middle East.

Mr. Theotokis said that he wished to speak about a few developments concerning Greece and that he regretted things were not as good as they could be. Public opinion in Greece had been extremely disturbed since the unfortunate outbreak in Turkey a month ago and, with the prospect of new elections in Greece, the

¹ Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 564. Secret. Drafted by Russell on November 1. The location of the meeting is from a copy of the memorandum ibid., Central File 396.1-GE/10-2555. Dulles was in Paris en route to Geneva to attend the Foreign Ministers Meeting, October 27–November 16.
Communists were exploiting the situation. The Communist Party in Greece is a strong one and used with skill from Moscow. The government is anxious to reestablish the situation as nearly as possible as it was before last month. To do this it needs help, both moral and material. On the first score, the Greek Government appreciates the help which the U.S. furnished in convincing the Turks to take the various steps which they did. Mr. Dulles remarked that unfortunately a number of things which we said in voicing our repugnance at the things done by the Turks were never adequately reported by the Greeks; for example, the letter which the Secretary sent to Senator Capehart and statements made in the UN. The Greek press portrayed the U.S. as indifferent and as equating the victim and the wrongdoer. Mr. Theotokis said that the press in Greece is not subject to government discipline and that the things which the Secretary mentioned did not reflect the spirit of the government. In reply to the Secretary's statement that there was undoubtedly a strong tendency on the part of the Greek people to feel deserted, Mr. Theotokis said that the Greeks are a sentimental people; sometimes this sentimentality is an obstacle and sometimes an advantage. It is up to us now to exploit it to our advantage and it must be made clear to the Greek people that the moral part of the situation has been set straight. The Secretary commented that the ceremony that day at Izmir had been a fine idea for which he congratulated the Greek Government.

Mr. Theotokis then referred to the present financial difficulties of the Greek Government. He said he understood that the Turks have asked for aid. The Secretary commented that they have been asking for aid for some time but that we had not been persuaded it was necessary. Mr. Theotokis said he did not wish to imply that it might not be necessary but that any action to assist the Turks should be considered in the light of the Greek financial problem. The Secretary said he could give Mr. Theotokis assurance that the United States will do nothing precipitate and that we will do nothing in this respect without relation to Greek sensibilities. He said a telegram would be sent immediately to the Department informing it of this assurance. Mr. Theotokis said that because of the relationship of the Greek financial picture to Greece's responsibilities in the NATO organization, he had informed Ambassador Perkins that unless Greece received financial help it would have

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2 Not found in Department of State files.
3 On October 24, the Turkish Government, in an attempt to compensate for the damage resulting from anti-Greek disturbances of September 6 and 7, sponsored a ceremony at Izmir to honor the Greek flag.
4 Transmitted in Sect 19, October 25. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 564)
difficulty in maintaining its present economic index figure, balancing its budget and supporting its currency. He said that he had taken up with Ambassador Perkins the consideration of offshore procurement of munitions in Greece which is an important item in Greek manufacturing. He said he had also presented the full picture to Ambassador Cannon. He expressed the hope that the Secretary would consider the problem as urgently as possible, since delay would create a situation that would affect the Greek elections next year. He commented that the Greeks know Communists from several years of guerilla warfare and that it was clear that the next election would be fought on the question of international relations.

Mr. Theotokis said that the last matter he wished to raise was Greek relations with the British. He commented that the gap between the British and the Archbishop of Cyprus is deep but not very wide and that he was seeing Foreign Minister Macmillan tomorrow. The Secretary said that he felt the Cyprus situation had gone sour because the Greek Government had pushed it too hard and fast and because the British had moved too slowly. Mr. Theotokis said he was asking the U.S. to help in getting the negotiations between Field Marshal Harding and Makarios resumed. Such negotiations are the best way to proceed. If the meeting is handled from Greece it makes the Cypriot nationalists traitors. Mr. Theotokis said that while the negotiations were going on the Greek Government might hold discussions with the British behind the scenes. He said he might later ask the Secretary to intervene to give the negotiations a final push. The Secretary said he would try to honor any reasonable request of that nature. We had said in the UN that such negotiations were the best way to handle the problem. He could not, however, guarantee that he would act because he did not know what the exact nature of the request might be. Mr. Theotokis said that it was important to get the Cyprus question settled because the Communists were using it as they always did the colonial issue. The Secretary agreed that it was the type of thing the Communists were eager to exploit. In the U.S. our sentiments are almost always on the side of colonial peoples, although sometimes we have to keep our sentiments under control as we also have ties with colonial powers. It is important to find peaceful solutions to colonial issues. If they break out into violence the Communists know how to use that. Mr. Theotokis said it was important for Macmillan to understand that the Greek Government has its public pressures just as Macmillan has.

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5On September 25, the Colonial Office announced that Field Marshal Harding had been appointed Governor of Cyprus to replace Sir Robert Armitage. Early in October, Harding arrived in Cyprus and had a series of discussions with Makarios on October 4, 7, and 11. On October 11 and 12, Harding and Makarios, in separate statements, indicated that they had been unable to reach agreement.
his. The Secretary said critics of the present British Government were attacking it for giving up the Suez base and pointing out that no sooner had the base been taken over by Egypt than the Communists had moved in. Similarly, with respect to Cyprus, it is important to make sure that it did not pass under Communist control.

Mr. Theotokis said that he expected that he would be queried by the press about his conference with the Secretary and that he intended to say that this was the first opportunity he had had to meet the Secretary and that they had discussed a broad range of matters, including the forthcoming conference in Geneva.

144. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State


Secto 25. Following NATO meeting October 25, Secretary met with Macmillan. Latter said he was seeing Greek FonMin October 26. Macmillan believes Cyprus situation is ready for next round and has indications they would like to have it calm down. First meetings between Harding and Archbishop went well. Harding said much same thing British had said before making effort find new formula for resolving issue between elections and self-determination. Harding trying drive wedge between Moderates presumably represented by Archbishop and two types extremists, Communists and ultra-Nationalists. Macmillan says he will tell Greek FonMin British desire reopen discussions. British position will be self-government now and willingness consider question self-determination later. They will aim at elections within next year or so, which might show strong Communist vote. This might help sober Moderates. While British want agreement with Greeks they must be careful to handle in way not to arouse Turks who have not been helpful.

Secretary said Greek FonMin made good impression on him in meeting previous day and that we have high regard for Greek PriMin; combination as good as likely to get. Secretary expressed hope progress could be made in Cyprus discussions. On question of self-determination, Secretary recalled Potomac Charter signed by

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1 Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 615. Secret. Repeated to London and Athens.

2 See supra.
Eisenhower and Churchill which contains phrase supporting independence those people capable sustaining it. Secretary suggested that phraseology might be basis of formula. Secretary also said he had mentioned to Greek FonMin many conflicting interests and cited as reason for caution British experience Suez Base where British moved out and Migs moved in as reason for caution. Secretary said he believed Greeks were aware of problem and he felt formula could be found combining principle with reality.

Dulles


145. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, November 10, 1955—4 p.m.

1226. Reference: London’s 1907 to Department. In conversation with me October 19, before Harding’s departure from Cyprus for consultation in London, Prime Minister Karamanlis made strong plea for exercise by U.S. Government of its influence with UK in order bring about resumption of talks between Makarios and Harding. He pointed out that initiative in this respect should come from British side. Since press accounts indicated Harding consultations would probably lead to resumption of talks with Makarios we refrained from recommending US intercession on that point.

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11-1055. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London and Geneva.

2 In telegram 1907, November 8, Aldrich informed the Department that the Greek Ambassador at London had asked him to approach the Department and the Secretary in hopes that some formula might be found to resolve the situation in Cyprus. According to Aldrich, the Greek Ambassador found this a particularly opportune time in view of the fact that British officials, including Prime Minister Eden, were discussing the Cyprus question in London. Ambassador Aldrich informed the Department that he had told the Greek Ambassador that he was certain that in view of the strategic importance of Cyprus, Macmillan and Dulles would have the problem of Cyprus on their minds in their forthcoming talks in Geneva. The Ambassador added that all he could do was to inform the Department that Field Marshal Harding would soon be returning to Cyprus. (Ibid., 747C.00/11-855)
Assuming from London’s refel that Cyprus may come up in Secretary’s talks with Macmillan Embassy submits following general observations.

Cyprus question is becoming central national issue of Greek electorate in approaching elections. Whatever may have been true in earlier years, I am convinced Cyprus question is genuine political and national problem of paramount importance in both Greek internal and external policy. We have done our best to warn Greek authorities of danger to Greece of permitting Cyprus question to become touchstone of their relations with outside world and particularly of their relations with US, which are of such tangible benefit to Greece in economic and military spheres. Leader of present government is fully aware of this danger but is perhaps at moment even more keenly sensitive to deep-seated sentiments of electorate on which he will depend so soon for his political future. . . .

Because of this situation it is of utmost importance that we be as clear-headed as possible as to fundamentals of our position on Cyprus question and that we not be tempted to take positions either diplomatically or publicly which we may later have to modify or abandon. While present Greek bitterness and resentment over our position on Cyprus is largely irrational and unjustified, they do have some grounds in reproaching us for, as they see it, our strong pressure in inducing them take part in London tripartite talks since they reason that we should not have done so unless we had sufficient assurances re British and Turk intentions to make sure conference would not be the unmitigated failure they felt it to have been.

As a case in point I would refer to Deptel 840, September 20, 3 which, as part of our endeavor to persuade Greeks not put Cyprus on UNGA agenda, authorized me to assure Greek Government that “US will actively and vigorously use its influence induce and assist UK to move toward” self-government. I did so inform Greek Government. In US “talking paper” handed to the Greek Foreign Minister at about same time in New York, 4 the US merely pledged itself “to continue to interest itself in the Cyprus situation”. Similarly restrained language was used by Ambassador Lodge in his public presentation before UNGA general committee.

That we shall continue to interest ourselves in Cyprus question is obvious. If, however, we intend to adopt an active and vigorous policy, that is another matter. These differentiations are not lost upon Greeks.

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3 Document 134.
4 Not found.
The same talking paper refers to deep embarrassment of Turkish Government over anti-Greek riots and its disposition seek amends, and accepts this assertion as an argument in favor of Greece's pursuing quiet policy on Cyprus. Turkish Government has recently made it known that its position on Cyprus remains unchanged. We have also noted that in Macmillan's letter to the Secretary, October 21, Turkish objection to any form of self-government until Greek demands or self-determination withdrawn is described as "a formidable obstacle". If Turkish position remains as stated and is accepted by Britain as virtual veto, there would appear to be little point in encouraging Greeks to believe that a solution is in sight. Moreover fact that British Government persists in belief that it is "internal exigencies of Greek politics which have inflamed situation in and about Cyprus and that trouble will go on so long as Greeks continue to foment it" (Macmillan's recent message to Secretary) shows that British Government appraisal of situation fundamentally different from ours. (See paragraph 3 above.)

Unless we have intention and capability of giving Greece effective support on Cyprus issue within the limits of a formula including early self-government plus some assurance for an evolution which could lead to self-determination, we should refrain from risky course of holding out hopes which British and Turks can frustrate.

Deptels 1364 and 1365 just received appear to make more cogent value of careful delimitation scope our efforts henceforth.

For Department only. This message should be considered as follow-up to paragraph 2 (B) Embtel 1136.

Department repeat other interested posts at discretion.

Cannon

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5 Document 142.
6 Telegram 1364, November 9, contained instructions to repeat Delga 231, from New York, November 7, to Athens. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11-755) Delga 231 contained Lodge's recommendation that Aldrich call on Eden to urge his support for Harding's plan that Cyprus be given dominion status. Lodge added that Aldrich should point out that it would be impossible for the United States during an election year to assume the "strong anti-Greek" position that it took the previous year. (Ibid.)

In telegram 1365 to Athens, November 9, the Department replied that in view of Dulles' past representations to Macmillan for progress on the Cyprus issue and the Foreign Secretary's "clearly expressed" intentions to make headway on the issue of self-government for Cyprus, further representations to the British before Macmillan had a reasonable time "to make good" would be counterproductive. The Department instructed the Embassy to inform the British that it considered "closing no doors" and continuing discussions between Governor Harding and the Cypriots the best way to resolve difficulties in view of the problems of the tripartite approach. (Ibid.)

7 Paragraph 2(B) dealt with Cyprus. Telegram 1136, November 2, is not printed. (Ibid., 781.00/11-255).
146. Letter From the British Ambassador in the United States (Makins) to Secretary of State Dulles


My Dear Secretary of State: As I expect Harold Macmillan told you, Her Majesty’s Government, following on the talks between the Governor and Archbishop Makarios, have been working on a new formula for the settlement of the Cyprus question.

The Archbishop has just returned to Cyprus from Athens, and the Governor is accordingly communicating to him today the text of a formula (of which I enclose a copy).

I am asked to emphasise the need for absolute secrecy on this matter until the formula is published by Her Majesty’s Government.

Yours sincerely,

Roger Makins

[Enclosure]

Her Majesty’s Government adhere to the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, the Potomac Charter and the Pacific Charter, to which they have subscribed. It is not therefore their position that the principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their position that it is not now a practical proposition both on account of the present strategic situation and on account of the consequences on relations between NATO powers in the Eastern Mediterranean. They will therefore have to satisfy themselves that any final solution safeguards the strategic interests of the United Kingdom and her Allies.

Her Majesty’s Government have offered a wide measure of self-government now. If the people of Cyprus will participate in the Constitutional development, it is the intention of Her Majesty’s Government to work for a solution which will satisfy the wishes of the people of Cyprus, within the framework of the treaties and alliances to which the countries concerned in the defence of the Eastern Mediterranean are parties. Her Majesty’s Government will be prepared to discuss the future of the island with representatives of the people of Cyprus when self-government has proved itself a workable proposition and capable of safeguarding the interests of all sections of the community.

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–2155. Top Secret.
147. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

_ATHENS, NOVEMBER 23, 1955—8 P.M._

1315. Reference Deptel 1478 and Embtel 1297. In relaxed post-prandial atmosphere last night, I had opportunity discuss recent Cyprus developments at some length with Karamanlis and Theotokis. There was little need to dwell on favorable features latest British formula since Prime Minister and Foreign Minister share our belief that it represents real step forward. Uppermost in their minds now was the problem facing them as result of rejection of the British proposal by Makarios about which they had heard from Peake. They greatly feared that any attempt on their part to change negative Makarios attitude would be exploited to jeopardize their chances of success in forthcoming elections.

Theotokis did say that he would be prepared include in Greek Government public statement opinion that British formula represented progress but that this would have to be qualified by expression to effect that decision in matter up to Cypriot people.

In latter part of conversation Theotokis inquired whether it would be possible to bring American influence more directly to bear upon Makarios. He thought this could take both public and private forms. He seemed to have in mind that whatever was said by the US Government publicly on latest British formula should be devised with eye to possible impact on Makarios and his followers in Cyprus.

Re "private approach" he wondered whether appropriate American official might not be able to convey to Makarios a warning that Cyprus case could hardly expect to receive any wide support in UN now if such forward move by British should be rejected so summarily. Asked whether he thought any American advice would be effective with Makarios, Theotokis recalled that he and Makarios had recently discussed possibility that at some difficult stage in negotiations American assistance might be required, and Makarios had agreed that this might be beneficial.

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11-2355. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN.

2 Telegram 1478, November 21, transmitted the British formula on Cyprus printed as an enclosure to Makins’ letter, supra.

3 Telegram 1297, November 22, contained a report of a meeting between Peake, and Foreign Minister Theotokis concerning the British proposal on Cyprus. Commenting on the meeting, Ambassador Cannon noted that the British formula, "though less specific than some people hoped, is definite step in direction sought by Greeks and, if saner judgment could prevail, by Cypriots themselves." (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11-2255)
While I made it clear to Theotokis that course he was suggesting was untried and would require careful weighing of implications, and I therefore gave him no encouragement, there may in fact be some merit in such intercession with Makarios at appropriate time, perhaps through some suitable unofficial American having background which would facilitate mission.  

Cannon

4 In telegram 1507, November 24, the Department informed the Embassies at Athens, Ankara, and London and the U.S. Consulate at Nicosia that the British Ambassador asked the Secretary of State to instruct Ambassador Cannon to urge the Government of Greece to recommend the Cyprus formula to Makarios. The Department instructed Cannon to make this approach as well as any other moves that would keep the British plan alive. (Ibid., 747C.00/11-2455)

148. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the British Ambassador (Makins) and Secretary of State Dulles, Department of State, Washington, November 30, 1955  

SUBJECT
Cyprus

Sir Roger called at his own request on the Secretary this morning. He handed the Secretary the attached copy of the Greek Prime Minister’s letter to Sir Anthony Eden in connection with the latest British proposal on Cyprus,2 together with a copy of the reply which Sir Anthony was dispatching to the Greek.3 Sir Roger said that London was extremely grateful for the effective and active support which had been given to the British initiative in this matter both by our Ambassador in Athens and our Consul on Cyprus. He

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11-3055. Secret. Drafted by Merchant.
2 The letter from Karamanlis to Eden, November 28, noted that although the British formula acknowledged the right of self-determination, Karamanlis could not recommend it to Makarios because it had “no chance” of being accepted by the people of Cyprus. The full text of the letter is attached to a note from Robert G. Barnes to Allen, November 30. (Ibid.)
3 Eden’s reply to Karamanlis, dated November 28, was found attached to the note from Barnes to Allen cited in footnote 2 above. Eden wrote “We find ourselves unable to understand your reference to ‘impediments on the road to self-government.’ There are none. It has been made plain that we are ready at any time to institute a wide measure of self-government and to discuss the working of it with representatives of the people of Cyprus.” (Ibid.)
asked that they be instructed to continue their support since Sir Anthony believed that it should be possible by keeping the pressure on (which his reply was designed to do) and with some help from us the Greek Government might change its position. He described the government as well-intentioned but weak.

The Secretary replied that he would consider this request but that he could not give an immediate reply. He mentioned the impending Greek elections as one element which must be taken into account in deciding whether or not in our view additional pressure on the Greek Government would be productive.  

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4 In telegram 1962 from Rome, December 1, Ambassador Luce informed the Department that during an informal dinner for King Paul, the King had remarked that he had done his best to persuade Karamanlis to accept the British proposal. According to Luce, he indicated that although Karamanlis found the formula to be a "reasonable" basis for discussion, the Greek Prime Minister concluded that he could not commit himself before the elections because the opposition would make "great political capital" out of the "national unity" theme. (Ibid., 747C.00/12-155)

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149. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom ¹

Washington, December 3, 1955—3:58 p.m.

3113. Re Athens 1381, rptd London 113, Nicosia 26.² Department encouraged by indications reftel that Karamanlis and Makarios remain anxious seek some understanding with Harding. Also it is politically important for Karamanlis make some progress re Cyprus before elections. Feel stiff tone Eden message November 28³ may be fatal unless we move rapidly.

Accordingly request London promptly tell Foreign Office we have indications that despite apparently negative attitude Karamanlis and Makarios they desire achieve an understanding by talks between Harding and Makarios. We aware British do not intend go beyond formula but feel would be proper hold talks for purpose clarifying formula and exploring method application. Theotakis has told us (reftel) that if HMG can assure him door open to clarification and discussion he would recommend to Makarios that he approach

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12-155. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wood. Also sent to Athens and repeated to Nicosia and USUN.
² Dated December 1, not printed. (Ibid.)
³ See footnote 3, supra.
Harding before Commons debate. We suggest most earnestly this opportunity not be lost. We hope HMG will promptly instruct Peake to make approach (with Thurston if desirable) to Theotokis and/or Karamanlis to assure that door remains open and that in HMG’s view Harding–Makarios talks for purpose clarification (but not expansion) formula and its application are desired and that indeed purpose of formula was to elicit such talks. Thurston hereby instructed support any request that GOG recommend to Makarios he see Harding before Parliamentary debate.

London should also discuss possibility rephrasing formula along lines refTel not to expand it but to make Makarios acceptance easier.

Athens authorized promptly inform GOG that we are approaching HMG to request they show willingness leave door open and discuss clarification but not expansion. Accordingly U.S. Government strongly urges GOG and Makarios avoid public comments formula and take no steps which would reduce possibility of progress.

Department will await suggestions from Athens re further approaches by Courtney to Makarios but feels preferable present initiative come only from GOG without apparent U.S. coordination.  

Dulles

4 In telegram 296 from London, December 5, Aldrich informed the Department that he had met with Macmillan on December 4 regarding telegram 3113. According to the Ambassador, the Foreign Secretary had instructed the Foreign Office to prepare a telegram to Athens that would follow the suggestions contained in the second paragraph of telegram 3113. Macmillan also included a paragraph in the proposed telegram that indicated his view that the Greek Government was attempting to “hustle us” into making changes in the British formula. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–555)

In telegram 1405 from Athens, December 5, Thurston informed the Department that he had conveyed the contents of this telegram to Karamanlis and that the Prime Minister expressed “warm appreciation” for active U.S. interest in the Cyprus problem; referred to the Greek Government’s decision not to submit the Cyprus question to the U.N. General Assembly on an emergency basis in this session; indicated that a reply to Eden’s latest message was being prepared; pressed Thurston for his views regarding the nature of new British approaches; and expressed the hope that the debate on Cyprus in the House of Commons on December 6 would be “low key” with an “emphasis on fluidity and delicacy of present situation.” (Ibid.)
150. Telegram From the Consulate at Nicosia to the Department of State

Nicosia, December 8, 1955.

Informant mentioned my unnumbered telegram November 26 told me he had long talk . . . with Archbishop December 3. Said following:

1. Archbishop unquestionably desires reach agreement soon with British and now prepared try obtain it by further negotiations from present offer.

2. Makarios apparently had almost decided to go to London and seek negotiate there. Informant strongly advised him stay here where he can retain command his own forces and continue discussions initiated by Governor. Believed he had succeeded in so persuading him.

3. Archbishop now more confident he can control extremists and support for negotiated settlement. This connection informant considered EOKA promise to follow Archbishop reported Contel 111 Genuine and significant. On other hand Makarios (despite his contrary assertion to me as to others) concerned over threat from Communists: this a reason impelling him seek settlement.

4. At time this meeting Archbishop had not heard from Greek government but was not in fact distressed its reported rejection of request for UN appeal nor prospect it would seek to support continuance negotiations.

5. Makarios mistrust of British of course basic. He had higher regard for Harding than any other Britisher he had dealt with. (Archbishop had said to me he did not doubt Harding’s good will and faith.)

6. Makarios not only gratified but genuinely encouraged to seek compromise by both nature US interest and manner its expression. Informant characterized our action as “excellent.” He also urged that I call on Archbishop again soon, if only “socially,” to display continuing interest.

7. Archbishop’s ultimate objective is to achieve complete independence for Cyprus with freedom to make its (his) own choice—not necessarily simple enosis on Greek terms. This of course on presupposition he retains position of national leader. He did not in

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1 Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 58 D 766. Top Secret. A notation on the source text indicates it was received on December 9 at 8:45 a.m.

2 Not found in Department of State files.

3 Telegram 111, December 2, reported that new EOKA leaflets indicate that the organization is prepared to accept any solution that Archbishop Makarios considered satisfactory. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–255)
fact want to face any personal challenge whatsoever in an election
and he is not anxious for early plebiscite.

8. Informant strongly counseled Archbishop (a) that present
British proposal was his opportunity and (b) he should avoid historic
fatal mistake of over reaching himself. Felt he may have made
impression re (a), doubted whether he convinced him of (b).

End informant's statements.

I believe they were in good faith.

Department doubtless has noted contrast between some of
Archbishop's public remarks December 4 and November 30, as well
as different tone of Ethnos December 4 and Alithia December 5.
(Contels 110, 114, 115 4) Also believe Archbishop's statement yester-
day (Contel 117 5) does not close door. Do not know whether any
move made toward further Harding-Makarios meetings. Have not
discussed matter with Governor for several days. Suggest if other
considerations make it advisable another call by me on Archbishop
on appropriate occasion could be useful. Such occasion might occur
if British had advance proposal relating rewording of formula. De-
partment please pass this information to other interested posts as
desired.

4 In telegram 110, December 1, the Consulate reported that Makarios had charged
that the British were imposing "totalitarian rule" in an effort to prolong their control.
(Ibid., 747C.00/12-155)

Telegram 114, December 5, noted in part that the Archbishop had indicated in a
sermon on December 4 that British force could only prolong the occupation but could
not establish "normality". (Ibid., 747C.00/12-555)

In telegram 115, December 6, the Consulate transmitted the statement of the
nationalist weekly Alithia, which appealed to the British to accept Makarios' plan to
acknowledge and implement self-determination for Cyprus. (Ibid., 747C.00/12-655)

5 On December 7, Makarios issued a statement that no settlement of the Cyprus
problem would be acceptable unless it secured self-determination. (Telegram 117 from
Nicosia, December 8; ibid., 747C.00/12-855)
151. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, December 17, 1955—1 a.m.

Secto 7. At luncheon meeting with Secretary December 15, Macmillan said that Greek Government had been weak and timid in recent discussions on Cyprus and he hoped Secretary would tell Theotokis that point had been reached where necessary for them to agree on something and not keep discussions going forever. Theotokis should be urged to tell Archbishop to see Harding and move on toward agreement. Secretary said his reports indicated there had been encouraging progress and he hoped UK as well as Greeks would continue to bear in mind essentiality of early agreement.

Secretary saw Greek Foreign Minister Theotokis this morning. Latter said British proposals put in such a way as to be practically unintelligible. Macmillan had stated UK position in satisfactory form in House of Commons debate. Formula should be couched in such a way as to be understandable by public. Principal objections were to double negative in first paragraph, dependence of future action toward self-determination upon views of other countries in area and absence of specific length of time at end of which decision would be made re self-determination.

Secretary said he could not get into middle of question of drafting. That was for Greece and UK to work out. He felt that double negative was awkward but that rest was not too bad. He said present draft represents tremendous advance in substance from which Greek Government could take great satisfaction. It had achieved substance of victory and should not risk losing it by striving for too much perfection in wording. Extremely important get matter settled quickly.

Subsequently Macmillan agreed with Secretary to eliminate double negative.

Dulles

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12-1755. Secret. Repeated to London and Athens. Dulles was in Paris to attend a Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council on December 15 and 16.
152. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Prime Minister Karamanlis and the Chargé d’Affaires in Greece (Thurston), Athens, December 19, 1955

SUBJECT

Cyprus

The Chargé d’Affaires called on the Prime Minister on December 19, 1955, at 11 a.m.

Mr. Thurston said he had been instructed by his Government to ask the Prime Minister to be good enough to exert his influence over Archbishop Makarios in order that the Archbishop might resume his negotiations with Marshal Harding. Mr. Thurston added that the American Government felt that the revised formula put forth by the British offered good hope for the attainment of a solution of the Cyprus question, and that it would be most desirable that negotiations be resumed at this time. The Prime Minister replied very curtly that he did not think so at all. Had the British formula been a good one, Makarios would have already resumed negotiations. Mr. Thurston reminded the Prime Minister that the revised formula was a distinct improvement over anything that had been offered by the British so far, since it assured self-government at once and self-determination in the future. The Prime Minister remarked that he had no means of bringing pressure upon or even influencing Makarios to resume negotiations. He wished Mr. Thurston to understand that this was not a case for his Government to decide upon. Had it been so, everything would be much simpler. He would have been able to take decisions himself and on the spot. He pointed out to Mr. Thurston, should the Archbishop turn down any such recommendation, that would automatically blow up his Government. He went on to say, . . . that nothing would have pleased him more than the resumption of discussions between Makarios and Harding, but that as things stand at present there is nothing he can do to influence Makarios. He, the Prime Minister, . . . is forced to work for almost 22 hours out of every 24, and 6 to 8 hours a day are devoted to Cyprus. He cannot possibly continue in this way, and

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–2155. Secret. Drafted on December 21 by Thurston and Stephen Calligas, Embassy interpreter. Transmitted to the Department on December 21 in despatch 581. (Ibid.) Thurston also transmitted the substance of this conversation to the Department in telegram 1557, December 19. (Ibid., 747C.00/12–1955)

2 Transmitted in telegram 1629, December 9. (Ibid., 747C.00/12–555)

3 The text of the revised formula is attached to a note of December 8 from Barbara Salt to Chalmers Wood. (Ibid., 747C.00/12–855)
particularly on the eve of elections. He referred to the difficulties in communicating with Makarios as another exasperating factor.

At this point Mr. Thurston said he would venture to quote certain excerpts from a report concerning a conversation with Makarios during the first week of December. This Mr. Thurston did in confidence and added that the source was a reliable one. Mr. Thurston stated that according to this report, Makarios unquestionably wished to reach an agreement soon with the British and was ready to try to obtain it by further negotiations of the present British offer. Furthermore, Makarios was reported as being on this occasion more confident that he could control the extremists and get support for a negotiated settlement. In this connection he was not disturbed by the prospect that the Greek Government would seek continuance of negotiations. It would appear, said Mr. Thurston, from what Makarios had said in the course of this conversation, that the Archbishop might be prepared to resume his talks at this time, particularly after the clarifications made by the British in their revised formula. Mr. Thurston laid some emphasis on that part of the conversation with Makarios in which the Archbishop had said that he had great esteem for the personal integrity of Governor Harding. It could be, added Mr. Thurston, that Harding is the man with whom Makarios would prefer to pursue his negotiations. If that were the case, the Prime Minister asked, why had Makarios not already done so? Mr. Thurston remarked that—perhaps the Archbishop has felt all this time that something is happening and has purposely postponed the resumption of talks—or, it could well be that he is just waiting for a word of encouragement from the Greek Government.

The Prime Minister expressed great interest in this estimate of Makarios' attitude . . . . He said that he had asked the Foreign Minister this morning to look into the possibility of resuming negotiations with the British on the basis of their revised formula and of his own memorandum of December 5. He added that he would ask Mr. Theotokis to get in touch with Mr. Thurston on this subject.

The Prime Minister said that he was greatly concerned over the new rise of anti-American feeling amongst the people in the course of the last two or three days. This, he thought, was a most aggravating symptom, particularly after the very great effort he had made personally to calm public opinion during the last two months. He asked Mr. Thurston very earnestly to realize that it is of the

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4 Presumably a reference to the conversation reported on in Document 150.
5 The text of the British memorandum was transmitted in despatch 542 from Athens, December 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12-655)
utmost importance that the Greek people should always believe that the U.S. are at their side . . . It is of the greatest importance not for himself or for the sake of his Government, but for Greece as a whole, as well as for Turkey and for the Balkan Pact. It is the only way for Greece to remain faithful to her alliances. What Greece needs at present is a little “patting on the back”. With the feeling of bitterness and hatred which exists toward the British, the Turks, the French, and others, nothing will stop the people from turning toward Russia if they should be led to believe that the U.S. no longer stands at their side. The Prime Minister had just asked the Foreign Minister to make a public statement denying the reports which had appeared in the press of the last two days in connection with the NATO talks in Paris, with a view to dispelling the fears and doubts which had again begun to seize the people. 6 Mr. Thurston remarked that surely the Prime Minister remembers the assurances given on numerous occasions of the sympathy with which the U.S. Government views the Cyprus issue, as well as the belief that time is working on Greece’s side, while at the same time his Government reserves for itself the right to use its own judgement as to the advisability of this or that policy or method followed by Greece. He assured the Prime Minister that the U.S. Government will continue to use its influence in all directions with a view to bringing about a relief of tension and an ultimate satisfactory settlement for all parties concerned. Proof of the continued interest of Mr. Dulles himself is that even after his meeting with Mr. Theotokis and with Mr. Macmillan, the Secretary again used his influence with the result that an improvement is in prospect with regard to the wording of the first paragraph of the revised British formula.

The Prime Minister said he would soon send an envoy to Makarios. At the same time, he asked Mr. Thurston for his Government’s assistance in convincing the British to resume negotiations on the basis of their revised formula and of his recent memorandum. Mr. Thurston made an appeal to the Prime Minister for the resumption of negotiations at this time. The Christmas holidays are approaching, he said, and the Western world is in bad need of some good news, particularly in the light of recent Soviet moves. His Government feels that this is a historic opportunity which should not be lost. If allowed to drag on, there is no way of knowing what the present situation may lead to. Governor Harding may be forced to take still further measures, and bombs now exploding in Constitution Square are certainly not going to help matters for any one of the parties concerned. Mr. Thurston asked the Prime Minister how

6 Not printed.
the Greek Government could now assume the grave responsibility of refraining from encouraging Makarios to resume talks.

The Prime Minister referred to the deterioration in Greece's relations with Turkey. The statements recently made in Ankara had been very badly received by the people (he was obviously referring to the recent Menderes-Inonu debate in the Turkish Chamber). He was concerned about the disclosures made by the judiciary of Salonika with regard to the explosion in the Turkish Consulate. Unfortunately, he said, the judiciary had rendered their decision.

Just as the Chargé d'Affaires was taking his leave, the Prime Minister remarked very casually that he did not think a solution would be found for the Cyprus issue until after elections. He asked Mr. Thurston if he agreed with him. Mr. Thurston replied that he believed that the sooner negotiations were resumed and a solution found, the better it would be for all concerned. The Prime Minister did not seem to think that would be possible. Anyway, he said, it would not be long before elections are held. He had almost made up his mind either to have an election or to resign in a fortnight or so. He went on to say that he liked to get things done and that he could not put up with the present state of affairs much longer. Everything was at a standstill, he said. In the course of the next fifteen days he would either decide on elections or he would resign.

The interview terminated at 12 noon.

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153. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece

Washington, December 23, 1955—3:43 p.m.

1785. I am seriously disturbed at reluctance Greek Government to accept what seems to me a substantial victory for Greece in Cyprus problem. I believe modified UK formula represents such a victory and will lead inevitably to self-determination for people of Cyprus. Differences between UK and Greek positions are too small to permit continuation of dispute which may jeopardize long-term

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–2355. Secret; Nlact. Drafted by Allen and Baxter and signed by Dulles. Repeated to London, Ankara, and Nicosia.
interests of Greece and endanger vitally essential free-world alliances.

I have done my best to urge UK to bring its policy more in line with Greek and Cypriot desires and I believe my efforts have borne fruit. However it will be difficult for me continue to argue Greek case with conviction if Greek Government is unable accept a formula which concedes the application of eventual self-determination or if Greek Government and Makarios insist on definite time schedule.

Cannot Greek Government take position that in getting UK to offer such a formula it has won recognition of principle of self-determination for Cypriot people? I fear Greeks would really lose many of their friends if it became known they refused a British formula which would generally be interpreted as reasonable.

Furthermore this may be high tide for Greece on Cyprus problem and if Greek Government does not try to ride into harbor now, it may find no such favorable opportunity for some years to come. Present British Government and future ones might not be willing make such a good offer as now stands. Certainly a worsening of situation on Cyprus will make concessions by either side more difficult.

Unless you perceive objections I should like you to express orally and in your own words to Prime Minister and Foreign Minister such foregoing views as you deem appropriate.

If in your considered opinion approach along foregoing lines would be futile or counterproductive I would like your recommendations as to alternate courses of action. Do you think Karamanlis genuinely desires solution now or prefers keep problem open until after elections?

Even if he prefers keep question open for political reasons he should at least do everything in his power to terminate violence and bloodshed during interim.2

Dulles

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2In telegram 1626 December 24, Cannon informed the Department that he had personally conveyed the contents of telegram 1785 to Karamanlis. The Ambassador reported that the Prime Minister was “agonizingly anxious” that the Cyprus talks be resumed and that he would indicate to Makarios the need for “constructive, flexible and patient” attitude in the negotiations; that Karamanlis noted that he had two “main obstacles”—distrust of Britain’s good faith and increasing domestic tensions as Greece approaches elections. Cannon added that the Foreign Minister asked him, in the name of the Prime Minister and himself, to express to Dulles their “deep appreciation” for his “personal interest and great effort on Greece’s behalf”. (Ibid., 747C.00/12–2455)
1072. Department seriously concerned at steady deterioration Greek-Turk relations. Tone and nature recent exchanges between these two NATO and Balkan Pact partners, if not moderated, may lead to extreme positions from which neither country can retreat. Department recognizes both governments extremely sensitive to local public opinion in view upcoming Greek elections and recent Turk Cabinet crisis. However, in our view both governments must share blame for utilizing radio and press to openly criticize acts considered internal affairs by Greece Turkey respectively. Department wishes Ambassadors in both capitals continue appeal to statesmanship respective government leaders and impress upon them need for greatest possible restraint in official statements to prevent further aggravation already tense situation.

Embassy Ankara should take appropriate occasion commend Foreign Office for recognizing Greek actions in coming weeks will be greatly influenced by electoral campaign issues (ref Embtel 1043 ²). At same time you should point out in US view there is one serious stumbling block to improvement Greek-Turk relations, i.e. lack prompt action in reasonably concrete form on reparations issue. Department recognizes Turk Cabinet crisis held up presentation pertinent legislation but believes now new government installed and GNA in full swing enabling legislation should be promptly introduced in order renew Greek confidence in Turk bona fides and give Greek Govt something to use in placating Greek public opinion. In this connection you may refer to declaration by Minister of Finance November 24 (Ankara’s Embtel 883 ³) and Koprulu’s recent confirmation of Turk intention to introduce necessary legislation. Aside from beneficial effect such action would have on Greek-Turk relations, it could be expected considerably influence public opinion in third countries and help restore Turk prestige.

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 681.82/12–2855. Confidential. Drafted by Brewster and Crain. Also sent to Athens.

2 In telegram 1043, December 23, the Embassy transmitted the highlights of a discussion with Nuri Birgi. Among other things, Nuri Birgi indicated that the Turkish Government agreed that there was little hope of an improvement in Greek-Turkish relations until after the upcoming Greek elections. (Ibid., 781.00/12–2355)

3 In telegram 883, November 30, the Embassy reported that the Finance Minister had informed the press that a Turkish Committee of inspectors was presently examining the various-declarations of losses and that the draft bill under preparation for the Turkish Assembly would authorize the government to compensate losses not covered by the aid committee. (Ibid., 782.00/11–3055)
Embassy Athens in anticipation early concrete action by Turk Govt may wish on appropriate occasion appeal to Greek Govt leaders to deal with sensitive Greek-Turk relations, and more generally Balkan Pact and NATO matters, in dignified and enlightened manner with due regard for Greece’s best long-term interests. US recognizes considerable heat will be generated in forthcoming electoral campaign and opposition candidates can be expected cause Karamanlis serious trouble by exploiting Cyprus issue and Greek-Turk relations. In view fact elections not to be held for two months, possibility maintaining uneasy status quo until then seems dim. Greek Govt faces genuine internal difficulties on Cyprus issue but prospects for détente with Turkey appear feasible. Assuming Turk expressions of desire restore harmonious relations made in good faith, which we have no reason to doubt, Department believes Karamanlis might increase his stature with Greek public if he could make acceptable progress in this field.

Dulles

155. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, January 9, 1956—7:35 p.m.

3757. Personal from Secretary for Selwyn Lloyd.

When Harold Macmillan and I discussed Cyprus question in Paris at last NATO meeting Harold asked me to use my good offices with Greek Foreign Minister. I then talked with Theotokis at Palais de Chaillot and reported to Macmillan, who sat next to me at Council table, that Theotokis had made three objections: (1) the double negative; (2) the possibility that Turkey might have veto power; and (3) the vagueness of the timing.

Harold told me that they could change the double negative, that there was no basis for inferring a Turkey veto power and that timing could not be made definite. ²

Thereupon immediately following Council meeting I talked with Theotokis, reported the above and urged Greek acceptance of the formula with the double negative eliminated. Theotokis said they

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1–956. Secret; Priority.
² See Document 151.
would think it over. It was my impression that Harold knew I would report to Theotokis, as above, and desired me to do so, although of course all of this took place in somewhat hurried and very informal atmosphere and it is possible a misunderstanding may have occurred. In any case I continue to believe HMG should give serious and urgent consideration to alternate phraseology which, in my view, would not alter substance of formula. I suggest that this controversial sentence in formula could be redrafted and if necessary lengthened so that HMG’s offer to meet wishes of Cypriots could be set forth more positively and more clearly; having in mind that it will one day become public. Frankly, I understand that Greek Government is somewhat suspicious of present wording. Finally, in event question again comes before UN, I believe such change would improve HMG’s position.

Ambassador Cannon believes that if Harding and Makarios meet, it would be helpful if they could agree on a joint communiqué summarizing the considerable progress which has already been made, based on the facts that during the past year direct talks have occurred; principle of self-determination has been recognized as applicable at some time to Cyprus; it has been agreed both that self-government should be established as a first step, and that final solution should be worked out between HMG and the elected representatives of the Cypriots taking into account complex of strategic and political considerations.

I realize present situation on Cyprus very difficult, but hope you will not desist in your efforts.  

Dulles

3 The Embassy at London transmitted Lloyd’s reply in telegram 2809, January 11, which reads: “Thank you very much for your personal message conveyed to me today by Mr. Barbour. I am carefully considering it and will answer more fully in a day or two. Harding had a not unprofitable discussion with Makarios yesterday.” (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1-1156)
Washington, January 13, 1956—6:45 p.m.

Nicosia 155 rptd Athens 89 London 81.  
Department has reviewed reasoning reftels and it is appreciated that Courtney should not appear too closely identified with British. This depends on his timing of visit to Makarios and nature his démarche. Department doubts too much reliance should be placed on Makarios commitment consult GOG prior any final break. Not clear why approach to Harding re joint communiqué would make visit Makarios unnecessary. Department aware if formula fails and U.S. publicly identified as supporting it, U.S. may be criticized. In Department view revised formula represents fair offer and in U.S. interest to continue work for understanding based on it, despite risk adverse publicity. If we use our good offices rather than co-sponsor formula, we can avoid some of this odium.

Center gravity Cyprus question has now shifted to Cyprus, a development U.S. has long favored and it appears Harding and Makarios both desire reach an understanding.

In view these considerations Courtney authorized approach Makarios with Governor’s consent. Coordination with Embassy Athens desirable if time permits. In any discussion with Makarios, Courtney should seek primarily increase Makarios confidence British good faith. Might review situation without appearing take sides or go into details. Explain U.S. believes in principle self-determination and Department is of opinion HMG has now publicly recognized principle for Cyprus. Having done this HMG cannot indefinitely delay application due to pressure of world opinion (UN) and especially opinion in England. Department has had extensive discussions with HMG re Cyprus and believes British offer made in good faith. Department appreciates Makarios has come long way in past year to meet British. U.S. Government has pushed HMG on this question for some time and Department extremely doubtful British will yield further. Understand if some basis for agreement not reached soon, Harding may feel compelled take more repressive measures. This

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1-1356. Secret. Drafted by Wood. Also sent to Nicosia, repeated to London, and pouched to Ankara.

2 In telegram 1743, January 7, the Embassy recommended to the Department that any decision on Courtney seeing Makarios after the Archbishop had resumed talks with Harding be postponed until those discussions were under way. (Ibid., 747C.00/1-756)

3 Not printed. (Ibid., 747C.00/1-556)
would only lead to more bloodshed and violence which no one desires. Gap now narrow and Department believes Makarios has prestige and strength to reach an understanding and to convince his people that it is acceptable. Such an understanding resulting in decrease in bloodshed and opening way to eventual self-determination would do him great credit as churchman and statesman.

Above may be used by Courtney as he thinks best.

Re timing, next few days might be good choice while discussions suspended and no irrevocable decisions taken. Since Harding apparently awaiting further instructions from London, Courtney would not appear to be acting in concert with British.

Athens comments requested.

Courtney also authorized inform Governor substance Secretary’s message to Selwyn Lloyd (Deptel 3757 London rptd Athens 1926 Ankara 1126 Paris Topol 796 Nicosia 111 USUN 4394) to show Secretary’s thinking on double negative and more especially on joint communiqué.

Courtney may wish ask Governor whether it would be possible explain to Makarios that while HMG convinced in view NATO relations and Cyprus proximity that Turkish views must be given most careful consideration, HMG does not intend that Turkey or any other country should have veto power.5

Dulles

4 Supra.

5 In telegram 1818, January 14, the Embassy at Athens informed the Department that it agreed that the center of gravity of the Cyprus issue had shifted to Cyprus and added that it is in the interest of all concerned that it be kept there “to fullest possible extent”. The Embassy also noted that the type of approach for Courtney to make to Makarios outlined in the third paragraph of telegram 1963 represented an excellent way of avoiding the danger mentioned in telegram 1743. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1-1456)
157. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 16, 1956

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
Miss Barbara Salt, British Embassy
Mr. MacArthur, C

In the course of a call on the Secretary about several unrelated matters, Sir Roger Makins mentioned that the Secretary had sent a message to Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd on Cyprus, and that the latter had sent an interim reply through our Embassy in London. Sir Roger said he now had a further reply for the Secretary from Mr. Lloyd, and handed it to the Secretary (see Attachment A). The Secretary glanced at this message from Mr. Lloyd but did not comment on it.

Sir Roger then said that in addition, he was instructed to give the Secretary an account of two meetings Sir John Harding, the Governor General of Cyprus, had had with Archbishop Makarios on January 9 and 13. Sir Roger indicated that he thought the most satisfactory way to inform the Secretary of these two meetings was to give him copies of Sir John’s reports, which he then handed to the Secretary (January 9 meeting is Attachment B; January 13 meeting is Attachment C).

Sir Roger summarized these two meetings briefly by saying that at the first one Sir John and the Archbishop had had a go at a formula, and that the Archbishop had raised three points which HMG had taken into account in revising the formula discussed at the January 9 meeting. At the second meeting on January 13, the revised formula (Attachment D) had been given to the Archbishop, but Sir John had reported that this meeting was profoundly unsatis-

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1-1656. Top Secret. Drafted by MacArthur.
3 Lloyd’s message, dated January 15, expressed Britain’s disappointment with Makarios’ attitude toward British proposals on the Cyprus question. According to Makins, Makarios continued to find major objections with British revisions in the formula. Lloyd believed that the chances of agreement would be increased if Dulles would instruct the American Consul to see Makarios before his next meeting with Harding and to express the view that the United States hopes that the Archbishop would accept the formula as a “fair basis for cooperation and political development in Cyprus.”
4 Neither printed.
factory. The Secretary inquired whether the three points raised at the January 9 meeting by the Archbishop were the same three points which had been raised with him by the Greek Foreign Minister in Paris (i.e., the double negative; Turkish veto; and vagueness of the phrase on timing). Ambassador Makins said the Archbishop had not raised the double negative and that the points mentioned at the January 9 meeting were different from those which the Greek Foreign Minister had raised with the Secretary in Paris. All this, he said, was clear in the report of that meeting which he had given the Secretary.

Sir Roger then said he wished to sum up Field Marshal Harding's conclusions as follows:

1. Sir John Harding is convinced that the Archbishop will not accept any formula which recognizes Turkish interests;

2. Sir John is also convinced that if the formula given the Archbishop on January 13 is amended, the Archbishop will raise further objections. In other words, if the British amend the formula further, and risk a violent adverse objection by Ankara, the Archbishop will simply raise further objections and will not accept a reasonable formula;

3. Sir John is profoundly dissatisfied with the Archbishop's attitude regarding the use of violence and terrorism, and is convinced that the Archbishop will not give up terrorism as one of his negotiating weapons;

4. Sir John recommends that HMG stand pat on the formula put to the Archbishop on January 13, and instruct him to make it as the final UK offer.

On this basis, London instructed Sir Roger to approach the Secretary and to stress the Archbishop's attitude on terrorism. The British Government is not asking the US Government to take any new position. It is grateful for the instructions which have already been sent to Consul Courtney on Cyprus to support the Governor General. The Governor General is in touch with Consul Courtney and has said that if Courtney could intervene and could see the Archbishop just before Harding's final meeting with him to put the January 13 formula as the final UK offer, it would be very helpful. Sir Roger stressed that HMG was not suggesting that the US Government take a new position, but that it authorize and instruct Consul Courtney to see the Archbishop again just before Sir John makes his final offer on the basis of his present US instructions.

The Secretary asked Sir Roger's view as to what extent the Archbishop is operating on his own and to what extent is he working with the Greek Government. Sir Roger replied that he could not answer this precisely. The Archbishop had his own council. He

5 Supra.
believed that the Greek Government was not prepared to put pressure on the Archbishop to go further than the latter was willing to go. In other words, in this matter the Archbishop was the tail wagging the Greek dog. Sir Roger added that the UK Ambassador in Athens had been instructed to give the Greek Government a full account of Sir John’s meetings with the Archbishop on January 9 and 13.

He also said that the UK Government agreed with Sir John that they were getting to the end of the discussions with the Archbishop. UK public opinion would not understand why talks were going on when terrorism involving British deaths was continuing unabated. The British Government could not justify the negotiations dragging on indefinitely and believed the time had come to bring the discussions to an end on the basis of making the January 13 formula as a final offer.

Sir Roger then asked the Secretary his reaction to what he had said, and the Secretary replied that he could not give him an immediate reaction but would have to study the papers and memoranda which Sir Roger had given him. The Secretary said that during the 1930’s he had written a book on war, peace, and change, pointing out that when change was indicated, it was necessary to go out to meet the situation and not to let it wait, because the longer it waited, the more difficult it became. If changing situations could be recognized in advance, and met, frequently solutions could be obtained on a basis which was no longer practicable as the situation deteriorated. The French had not recognized this, and this had been to a considerable extent responsible for the difficulties in Indochina and North Africa. The Secretary said he was not prejudging the British position with respect to Cyprus, but was stating a general principle in which he believed.

Sir Roger said he agreed with this principle and the British had followed it in many places including, most recently, Malaya. He said the British were taking a serious risk in Malaya and Kenya by moving toward self-government when terrorism was still continuing, but this risk they felt obliged to take to keep in step with the times. The Cyprus situation was different, however, in that it did not just involve the simple problem of colonial rule in dependent territory evolving toward self-government, since Turkey was involved. There were limits beyond which the British could not go without having the Turks blow up, which would create real UK-Turkish problems, increase the present difficulties between Greece and Turkey, and hence impair and undermine the whole NATO foundation.

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It was left that the Secretary and the Department would study the papers and would communicate with the British in due course, particularly with respect to their request that the US Consul in Cyprus be instructed on the basis of his present substantive instructions, to approach the Archbishop just before Sir John Harding saw the Archbishop again.  

Attachment D

CYPRUS

The following is the text of the formula presented to Archbishop Makarios on January 13 by Governor Harding. This text was revised to take into account points raised by the Archbishop at his interview with the Governor on January 9. Insertions and deletions are shown by means of underlining and square brackets—those parts in brackets being the old, and those underlined the new text.

"Her Majesty’s Government adheres to the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, the Potomac Charter and the Pacific Charter, to which they have subscribed. It is not, therefore, their position that the principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their position that it is not now a practical proposition, [both] on account of the present strategic and political situation [and on account of the consequences on relations between the N.A.T.O. Powers] in the Eastern Mediterranean.

"Her Majesty’s Government have offered a wide measure of self-government now. If the people of Cyprus will participate in the constitutional development, it is the intention of Her Majesty’s Government to work for a final solution consistent with existing Treaty obligations and strategic interests of Her Majesty’s Government and their allies, which will satisfy the wishes of the people of Cyprus. Her Majesty’s Government will be prepared to discuss the

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7 On January 19, during a discussion of Cyprus at the Secretary’s Staff meeting, the following exchange occurred:

"The Secretary asked Messrs. Merchant and Rountree what action had been taken as a result of the British Ambassador’s recent call regarding Cyprus. Mr. Rountree said we had instructed our Consul at Nicosia to coordinate his activities with General Harding to ensure that the talks were not broken off and to make a further approach to Archbishop Makarios if necessary. The Secretary asked whether we had indicated our view that the present British proposal is an extremely negative document. Mr. Rountree said we had advised Embassy London and our Consulate at Nicosia of this view and that our present task is to convince General Harding that if the document were less negative Bishop Makarios would back it." (Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

The Department’s instructions to London and Nicosia are in telegrams 3950 to London and 115 to Nicosia, January 18. (Ibid., Central Files, 747C.00/1-1456)

8 Underscoring printed here as italics. All brackets in this document are in the source text.
future of the Island with representatives of the people of Cyprus when self-government has proved itself [a workable proposition and] capable of safeguarding the interests of all sections of the community."

158. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate at Nicosia

Washington, January 28, 1956—4:04 p.m.

123. You are requested see both Archbishop and Governor earliest. Although order which you see them left your discretion if you see Harding first you should seek obtain from him as much detail as possible regarding points set forth numbered paragraphs below.

You should inform Makarios US views as follows. US Government firmly convinced both he and UK desire settlement current difficulties in Cyprus. This evidenced by very considerable concessions both sides during past year. Believe in view good faith shown by both parties, settlement is well within reach. It would in our view be tragic if, having come so close, two parties could not bring talks to successful conclusion. US Government therefore hopes most earnestly Makarios will be able accept British proposals.

Inform Harding of contents your démarche to Makarios and say US fully sympathetic to Harding’s desire bring halt to terrorist activities Cyprus, achieve restoration order and proceed to institution self-government, but hopes he will consider following points in “clarifying sessions” with Archbishop.

1. From examination his report January 13 meeting with Archbishop, and Archbishop’s own report that same meeting, would appear chief remaining obstacle in context present proposed formula is phrase re treaties. It would seem reasonable for Harding explain which treaties meant and repeat that there are no secret clauses involved.

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1-2856. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Crain. Repeated to Athens, London, and Ankara.

2 Not printed, but see supra.

3 Telegram 168 from Nicosia, January 15, contained Courtney’s impressions of an “informant’s” account of the Archbishop’s meetings with Harding on January 9 and 13. According to the informant’s report, Makarios’ account accorded “fairly closely” with Harding’s version. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1-156)
2. Department concurs in considerations explained Athens telegram 1937 and urges that full weight be given Makarios' judgment on how he can best use his influence to stop violence. We believe Archbishop should be given sufficient opportunity consider text his public undertaking in reply to Governor's letter. This connection we reassured by Harding's remarks to Courtney reported paragraph 2 Nicosia's 178.

3. Moreover, we think pressure for reply by February 1 might have effect of enhancing violence in Makarios' eyes as bargaining weapon, and give exaggerated impression British concern.

In view coming Greek elections and threat posed by formation popular front electoral coalition including commie front party, we hope that it will be possible avoid any publicity indicating negotiations have been or may be suspended.

Dulles

\[4\] In telegram 1937, January 25, the Embassy at Athens informed the Department that it considered the British intent to instruct Harding to modify the objectionable wording of the revised British formula, provided Makarios denounced terrorism and cooperated on self-government, a "constructive step." The Embassy added, however, that it was concerned about the attempt to force the Archbishop to "denounce" terrorism, as it was not realistic to expect the Archbishop to condemn publicly the Cypriot nationalist movement as "terroristic". The desired result might be achieved, the Embassy concluded, if Makarios could give the assurance that he would use his influence to end the violence on the island. (Ibid., 747C.00/1-2556)

\[5\] Paragraph 2 of telegram 178 from Nicosia, January 27, reads:

"Harding said he would make quite clear that discussions could be kept open for purpose further clarification, if necessary, and that he was not presenting time ultimatum. At same time he wished also make clear to Makarios that initiative for response would now rest with latter, and Harding would suggest that if possible Makarios might give him some answer by, say, February 1. (Possible advantage to that, from British viewpoint, would be that Eden could be informed of answer while still in Washington.) He recognized of course that Archbishop might consult with Greek Government, which might entail more time." (Ibid., 747C.00/1-2756)
126. Your 185. After discussing general idea of following with Governor you should, unless you believe it would not be helpful, talk to Makarios along following lines:

In Department's view Archbishop would be well advised in interest improving over-all situation on island to make clear his acceptance of principles of formula as means by which Cypriots and British can start work of evolving form self-government which would be fair to all groups on Cyprus. By doing this he would reserve full rights Cypriots negotiate for type self-government best suited their needs. Negotiations on constitution would be test of whether principles in formula will actually be implemented. He also would ease present dangerous tensions by giving public indication progress already made. Reduction tensions would facilitate future negotiations.

You may add that Archbishop in approving general principles embodied in formula would not commit himself in advance to any particular form of constitution. This would be subject future negotiations within framework principles of formula. Also, if form of constitution is evolved through gradual negotiation it more apt to be useful than if Archbishop and his advisors hastily lay down conditions on which they require advance assent.

Department appreciates Archbishop's desire see constitution before supporting formula, but suggests he would be in stronger position should he accept formula and reserve right negotiate on form self-government. If he publicly states in advance conditions under which self-government would be acceptable, he would be exposed criticism from extreme nationalists on grounds he did not

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1-3056. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Wood. Repeated to Athens, London, and Ankara.

2 Telegram 185, January 30, reported a meeting between Makarios and Courtney. Among other things, the Archbishop indicated that as a statement of British policy, which he was not required to endorse, the British formula was now acceptable. Makarios noted, however, that the formula could not be "detached" from the nature of the proposed constitution and on this subject the British had not shown "good will". (Ibid.)
ask for enough and from communists who would take same line in order stir up trouble and reduce chances acceptance.  

Dulles

2 In telegram 190, February 2, Courtney reported that he had met with Makarios and conveyed the Department instructions set forth in telegram 126. The Consul informed the Department that Makarios had indicated that he knew "beyond question" that London had no intention of implementing genuine self-government for Cyprus. According to Courtney, the Archbishop was not convinced by the Consul's arguments that an acceptance of the principles of the British formula would be the first step toward the realization of that goal, would fully reserve Cypriot rights, and would result in negotiations which would provide a test of implementation and afford an opportunity to develop the best form of a constitution. (Ibid., 747C.00/2-256)

160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate at Nicosia

Washington, February 3, 1956—7:25 p.m.

131. Re Cyprus: In Department's view effort at this point should be avoid breakdown negotiations and subsequent public recriminations. Addressee posts requested make this point to governments as seems best. May wish consider following:

London: Embassy may inform HMG that while it is realized Makarios' reply discouraging, it does not close door. We earnestly hope means be found keep negotiations alive. Hope HMG will consider some way publicly assuring Cypriots proposed constitution is democratic and representative. It is believed basic difficulty is Cypriots doubts re British intent permit democratic constitution. We inclined to think eventual agreement should be possible without meeting Makarios' exorbitant demands.

Athens: Karamanlis letter to President indicated acceptance possible if formula changed, but now Makarios raises new and far-

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2-356. Secret. Priority. Drafted by Wood. Also sent to London and Athens and repeated to Ankara.

2 Telegram 3247 from London, February 4, informed the Department that the Embassy had conveyed the substance of this telegram to the Foreign Office. It reported that the Foreign Office took note of the Department's hope that the discussions would not breakdown and the suggestion that Great Britain might consider giving possible public assurances regarding the "democratic character" of the proposed constitution. The Foreign Office noted, however, that in its view the British had already made it clear on several occasions that they considered the proposals "democratic and representative". (Ibid., 747C.00/2-456)
reaching demands re constitution. In Department’s view this may well cause breakdown negotiations and thus increase Karamanlis difficulties before elections. Although not directly involved, US has tried to be helpful because Cyprus question threatened broad interests free world. In our view Greece as member NATO and free world must now take its proper share responsibility to resolve this problem which has troubled Eastern Mediterranean for many years and now, after long negotiations, balances precariously between grave deterioration and achievement reasonable understanding. Situation now so difficult we urge GOG again attempt influence Makarios to avoid breakdown negotiations.  

Nicosa: Approach Governor as suggested to London. Believe there should be no further approach Makarios this time.

Dulles

3 In telegram 2141, February 7, Cannon informed the Department that he had met with the Greek Foreign Minister and urged the Greek Government, along the lines of this telegram, to use its influence with Makarios to prevent a breakdown in negotiations. According to the Ambassador, Theotokis seemed ready to help, but wondered what could be done since the Greek Government was under heavy attack for its reported pressure on the Archbishop. Cannon told the Department that it was unrealistic to expect the Greeks to do anything “but follow Makarios” until after the Greek elections. (Ibid., 747C.00/2–756)

4 In telegram 199, February 7, Courtney informed the Department that he had met with Governor Harding as instructed in this telegram. According to the Consul, Harding had no intention of permitting the negotiations to breakdown and even appeared optimistic about their chances for success. According to Harding, Makarios did want an agreement, would compromise, and would finally agree to British proposals with some bargaining. (Ibid.)

161. Message From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Karamanlis


DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I have read your letter of January 25, 1956, 2 on the subject of Cyprus with close attention and

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2–2056. Transmitted in telegram 2456 to Athens on February 20 with instructions that the Embassy recommend to the Greek Government that it not release the letter on grounds that the United States could play a more useful role in the Cyprus dispute “without publicity”. Pouched to London, Ankara, Nicosia, Paris for USRO, and USUN.

2 Not printed. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File)
interest. The emotions of the people of Greece in this question find a ready response among Americans, who have always treasured the ideals of freedom and self-rule.

Your letter was timely, since it enabled me to have your thoughts at an appropriate moment. The Joint Declaration issued during Prime Minister Eden's visit stated our belief in "the basic right of peoples to governments of their own choice." This pertains to the people of Cyprus as well as to any other.

At the same time, it is our view that the legitimate interests of our allies and of all the groups on the island must be respected. On appropriate occasions we have sought to reconcile the various points of view through quiet diplomacy rather than through public debate.

I believe that the Cyprus question can be solved only when those who are primarily concerned have come to the point where they trust and understand each other sufficiently to cooperate in achieving a just solution. In this vital respect, I congratulate you on the real progress which is being made. We shall continue our active interest in the question.

Please accept, Mr. Prime Minister, my personal regards and good wishes at this important time in the affairs of Greece.

Sincerely yours,

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3 For text, see Department of State Bulletin, February 13, 1956, pp. 231–232.
4 In telegram 2289, February 22, Cannon informed the Department that he had delivered the President's message to Theotokis and Karamanlis. According to the Ambassador both were "genuinely pleased and expressed deep appreciation". He added that the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister had informed him they would acquaint Makarios "in confidence" with the substance of Eisenhower's letter in the hope that it would be helpful. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2–2256)

162. Telegram From the Consulate at Nicosia to the Department of State


216. Reference: Deptel 142. I read to Archbishop in confidence

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2–2856. Secret. Repeated to London, Athens, and Ankara.
2 In telegram 142, February 24, Courtney was instructed that since the basic problem continued to be "mutual distrust", he might wish to read to Makarios Eisenhower's letter to Karamanlis, and to emphasize that no agreement could be reached until each party was willing to trust the other. The Consul was also asked to indicate to Makarios that the Department had observed the negotiations closely and it
President's letter to Karamanlis\textsuperscript{3} and in course hours discussion urged repeatedly and as strongly as I could that if agreement now to be reached, which we firmly believe possible, each side must place necessary degree of trust on other. Department's caution was timely and he was at pains to make explicit that US was not underwriting British offer; nor was I either advocate for British or attempting to act as intermediary. Makarios said he had not been advised by Greek Government of President's letter.

Makarios turned immediately to question of constitution and concentrated with great earnestness on point of proportionate representation in legislature. He asked if I could tell him what form of constitution US Govt would regard as providing genuine self government. I said that I could not of course give him either official statement or personal opinion on specific constitutional provisions, but as he knew and President said Americans believed fundamentally in ideal of self-rule and right of peoples to governments of their own choice. Moreover, again there was no doubt in my mind what British intended and there was no rush carry out intention to give wide measure of self government and, in their words, work for final solution which would include satisfaction of wishes of people of Cyprus. I understood British position to be that exact definition of composition of legislature was one of several matters which could be accomplished only in open discussions and they had stated principles which they believed constitution should contain in such way as to make possible necessary cooperation of all elements. Makarios acknowledged that mutual trust was required but insisted that permission merely of "an elected majority" was not sufficient guarantee, only opened up danger of dispute with Turks later, was not necessary for Turk's agreement now to cooperate, and did not give him sufficient reason for his confidence and understanding which I was requesting. He said this several different times in different ways but did not deviate at all from his contention, and said this was a fundamental matter of substance. Repeatedly he asked "if British intend government to be self government why can they not now make clear statement on this point?" He indicated no wish to bring up any other constitutional points and virtually said this was only remaining difference.

On question of amnesty he apparently now was quite flexible dismissing it as "subject for later discussion and agreement reached

\textsuperscript{3} Supra.
on constitution” and at least implying that he could not expect it to obstruct cooperation.

Comment: So far as this discussion with Makarios was concerned I could see no reason to think he meant anything less than he said. (Although it may be reflected that Makarios was quite categoric in his statements to me Feb 23 re amnesty—Contel 211 ⁴—whereas he now appears to be much more moderate.)

Believe fact that British spokesman at September London Conference (Macmillan) used phrase “proportionate representation” and they have since eliminated it, is a direct factor in reviving Makarios mistrust and has, besides, weakened their bargaining position vis-à-vis him (however necessary it might be for bringing Turks along at this juncture).

Moreover, whether Makarios right or not in contending that acceptance now of elected majority provision would mean difficulty later with Turks, it would seem dangerous if British do actually intend that Greek Cypriots should have majority in Assembly (which I believe they do) but at same time allow Turks to have impression that protection their minority rights could include device of numerically equal legislative representation.

Courtney

⁴ During a discussion with Makarios, Courtney learned that in the Archbishop’s view, “total amnesty” meant that no death sentence for “political” offenses would be carried out; all sentences for “political-criminal” activities set by regular courts would be reviewed; all sentences imposed under emergency regulations would be lifted; and all political prisoners and detainees would be released. (Telegram 211 from Nicosia, February 23; Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2–2356)

163. Message From Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary of State Dulles ¹

London, undated.

We have decided that we must make a statement of our position on Cyprus in the House of Commons early next week. This will almost certainly be on March 5. ²


² The text of this statement is in Documents (R.I.A.) for 1956, pp. 686–687.
I know how anxious you were lest a statement on Cyprus should prejudice the Greek elections. These are now over and despite the most earnest efforts on our part, including a visit by the Colonial Secretary to Cyprus, there are evidently still difficulties in the way of full agreement between the Archbishop and ourselves, though until the Colonial Secretary has returned and been able to report in person, we cannot tell just how wide the gap still is.

In all the circumstances we cannot delay further before making our position public. Parliament is deeply interested in this question and has shown great forbearance. They should not be kept in the dark longer than is absolutely necessary especially since there have been many leaks from the Greek side. The correspondence with the Archbishop, which we intend to publish in full with the Archbishop's agreement, will show the extent of common ground as well as the remaining differences. It may thus be expected to reassure the moderates in Cyprus and so strengthen the Archbishop against the extremists. I am also mindful of the positions of the Greek and Turkish Governments both of whom have their internal difficulties.

Our objective remains of course to reach agreement with the communities in Cyprus. Meanwhile I think our statement will have the advantage of clearing the atmosphere and I hope it will be beneficial not least in making apparent the sincerity of our position.

I am indeed grateful for the assistance you have given us in this long and difficult negotiation. I was especially grateful for your support over the important amnesty question.

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2 See footnote 2, infra.

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164. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece

Washington, March 2, 1956—4:25 p.m.

2565. You should urgently inform Prime Minister of following US views:

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3--256. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wood and Baxter. Repeated to London, Ankara, and Nicosia.
In our opinion chances Cyprus settlement are remote unless Greek Government assumes greater responsibility for achieving understanding on island within next few days. Situation likely to go over to extremists unless Greek Government takes firm and courageous action which Prime Minister indicated he would be able undertake after elections. \(^2\) Without agreement now emotions will intensify and extremists on island likely seriously impair Makarios influence. Unsettled situation likely to continue unresolved for indefinite future, seriously weakening prestige Karamanlis Government and jeopardizing its chances achieve constructive government program.

US has done everything possible to reconcile opposing views and cannot see anything further it can do to bring about rapprochement of parties primarily concerned. Greek Government should in our opinion assume responsibility and act now if it wishes avert gravely adverse consequences. Although US cannot take official position on British proposals it is our informal view that offer is one which gives Cypriot people possibility of orderly steps toward self-government within framework which may eventually lead to complete self-determination and that Cypriot people should capitalize on present UK offer. It is also our belief that when full explanation of British offer made public in Parliament world opinion will interpret it as generous and enlightened policy in colonial field meeting legitimate claims put forward by Cyprus and by Greece on behalf Cypriot people.

London should inform Foreign Office after Athens reports approach has been made that US has urged Greek Government support for proposals. British should not be told precise line taken in view possibility we might at some later time have suggestions to make to them if some modification position would without impairing essential British interests contribute to settlement. \(^3\)

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\(^2\) On February 19, Karamanlis' National Radical Union won 161 seats of a total 300 in the Greek Chamber of Deputies.

\(^3\) In telegram 2378, March 3, Cannon informed the Department that in the absence of the Prime Minister, he had conveyed the points contained in this telegram to the Foreign Minister. Among other things, the Ambassador urged Theotokis to
165. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1

London, March 9, 1956—8 p.m.

3861. Shortly after news broke on ticker Foreign Office informed Embassy Makarios, Bishop of Cyrena and two others had been deported from Cyprus. 2 Seychelles as destination to be kept secret for time being. Sec and Department to be informed today and given explanation of British action.

Foreign Office regretted lack of advance information. Plan had been to inform Department as soon as Archbishop off island but delay in transmission of Governor's cable caused news to appear first on ticker. Late this afternoon Colonial Office issued long press statement emphasizing Harding continued negotiations over 5 months during which direct and circumstantial evidence accumulated pointing to Makarios direct involvement in terrorist EOKA organization.

Foreign Office added that action taken on Harding's recommendation who argued no purpose served in continuing negotiations with individual who refused to halt violence and was deeply implicated with terrorists. Commons will debate Cyprus March 14 on Labor resolution deploring government's failure in negotiations especially "after major issue of self-determination has been resolved".

obtain Karamanlis' permission to make it clear to Makarios that Greece needed to take advantage of every possible improvement in the Cyprus situation. Of the three major differences that had emerged out of the recent negotiations—amnesty, public security, and legislature—Cannon noted the latter was really the most crucial and the one which aroused Greek and Cypriot mistrust. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3-356)

On March 5, Cannon, reporting on what the United States could do to mitigate the consequences of the current break in the Cyprus negotiations, noted:

"We can also show that problem has been narrowed to few points. In describing these we can help British get Turks off their high horse on crucial demand for "equal" representation. Latter point goes to heart of question since there can be no solution if British continue to let Turks retain their hidden veto over a forthright expression of HMGs true intent." (Telegram 2395; ibid., 747C.00/3-556)

In telegram 3733 from London, March 5, the Embassy informed the Department that it had made the approach as indicated in this telegram. The Foreign Office's only comment was that the Greek Government was taking the same line as Makarios—accusing the British of being intransigent and causing the breakdown of the discussions. (Ibid.)

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3-956. Secret. Repeated for information to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia.

2 On March 9, British authorities on Cyprus, claiming that Archbishop Makarios was involved in the terrorist campaign organized by EOKA, arrested the Archbishop and began steps which would lead to his deportation to the Seychelles. Documentation on the British action and U.S., Greek, and Cypriot reactions is ibid., 747C.00.
Government’s actions in Cyprus since March 5 statement particularly deportation before Parliament has reviewed situation will probably evoke violent labor party reaction.

Barbour

3 See footnote 2, Document 163. The text of the communiqué issued by Harding on the deportation of Makarios is in Documents (R.II.A.) for 1956, p. 689.

166. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, March 12, 1956—9 p.m.

2505. I wish to supplement recent Embassy factual reports on local developments with personal assessment showing significance and prospects immediately ahead. Sequence of events may well be drawing Greece into real crisis in its relations with Western allies and we must expect that US relationship with Greece will be subject severe strain in coming months.

Breakdown of Cyprus negotiations and arrest Makarios have created atmosphere even more inflamed and embittered than that which followed Istanbul riots last September. Prospects that Karmanlis Government would have opportunity get itself organized and get down to work now jeopardized as popular passions mounting to peak which some local observers say unknown since Italian invasion 1940. Thus far government has kept cool head and police and military authorities are in control of situation, but government leaders are finding themselves impelled to give consideration to courses of action in foreign policy which likely prove injurious US interests.

For example, serious study being given proposal to send Cabinet Minister on special mission to Arab Capitals to make sure Arab support for Greek-Cypriot cause. Greek church has, as previously reported, appealed to Moscow Patriarch for support. Greek journalist has been informed by Yugoslav military Attaché that Tito trying to arrange meeting with King Paul in Corfu (where King arrived today).

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–1256. Secret; Niact.
Under pressure of violent press and popular emotionalism government will thus find it hard not to risk some dramatic move aimed at showing "independent" Greek foreign policy. I feel sure Greek Government will not yield to this temptation if provided with some tangible evidence that Greece is not isolated or "abandoned" by all her remaining firmly within NATO family lies in US willingness to accord to Greece a generous degree of moral support and understanding.

In connection with foregoing I noted with special interest comments made by Department (Deptel 2665 2) to Greek Chargé and was able to draw upon them in an informal meeting yesterday with a large visiting group of US newspaper and radio personalities. Embassy has prepared a brief summary of my remarks for release to local press which has been clamoring for official US reaction. Of course, if Department planning issue public statement US position current Cyprus impasse in immediate future, this would have far greater impact than what I propose do locally tomorrow. Could Department give me niact some indication its reaction?

Cannon

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2 Telegram 2665, March 10, informed the Embassy of calls by the Counselor of the British Embassy and the Greek Chargé regarding the deportation of Makarios. Regarding a conversation with the Greek Chargé, Department officers reported that while they "refused to be drawn into position of passing judgment on latest British move", they stressed that the United States recognizes that the "breakdown of negotiations and British arrest of Makarios are tragic setbacks in path toward solution" and that the United States hoped that "all diplomatic decisions will be weighed carefully in light of ultimate objective of restoring atmosphere in which meaningful negotiations can be resumed." (Ibid., 747C.00/3-1056)
Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) to the President


SUBJECT

Cyprus

In commenting on recent developments in the Cyprus question, the Department has maintained impartiality as between the British and Greek positions and, without assigning blame to either, has focused United States concern on the ultimate objective which is the re-establishment of an atmosphere in which negotiations could be resumed. A statement along those lines read to the press on March 12 is enclosed.

On the following day, after an interview with the Greek Foreign Minister, Ambassador Cannon issued a statement in Athens (enclosed). Although we are confident Ambassador Cannon intended to follow the Department line of impartiality, the tone of the statement and certain phraseology give it a partisan ring, which is capable of exploitation as an implied criticism of British moves. We understand that the British Foreign Office has instructed Ambassador Makins to ask for an explanation of this statement.

In order to set the record straight, you may wish to make a statement along the lines of the enclosed draft at your press conference on March 14. If you do not consider it appropriate to issue the statement yourself, I hope you will authorize its release by the Department of State.

Herbert Hoover, Jr.
[Enclosure]

STATEMENT RELEASED BY AMERICAN EMBASSY, ATHENS

March 13, 1956

American Ambassador Cavendish W. Cannon called on Foreign Minister Theotokis shortly after noon today to discuss matters of mutual interest. He took occasion to express the sympathetic concern of the United States Government and the American people over the recent developments in Cyprus and to convey to the Foreign Minister the text of the statement issued in Washington yesterday by the State Department.

This statement emphasized that the United States Government had no advance information of the deportation of Archbishop Makarios. It disclosed that the United States is making a careful study of the situation and expects to make certain recommendations when that study is completed. It recalled the continued interest of the United States in the establishment of a government truly representative of the people of Cyprus, and said that until the negotiations were interrupted recently the United States had been encouraged by the steady progress made during the last few months.

The Ambassador himself, in reviewing this progress, recalled that agreement had been reached on the principle of self-determination, on a wide measure of self-government as a transitory stage and on satisfying the aspirations of the Cypriot people in the final solution.

The Ambassador expressed the confident belief that, taking into account the very substantial progress along the lines of these broad principles, a way could surely be found to work out the details and the timing, complicated and difficult though these may be. The important thing is to re-create an atmosphere in which the questions can be calmly re-examined.

Finally, Ambassador Cannon said he had taken particular note of the dignity and statesmanship with which the Greek Government had dealt with the current situation.

PARTICIPANTS

Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office
Mr. George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary of State, Washington
Mr. Walworth Barbour, American Minister, London
Mr. Evan M. Wilson, First Secretary, London

SUBJECT

Cyprus

Mr. Allen asked whether the Foreign Office saw any signs of a solution of the Cyprus question. Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick said that he was very concerned over the problem of “squaring the circle”, by which he meant how to reconcile Turkish and Greek interests. . . .

Sir Ivone continued that the Turkish point of view was not sufficiently appreciated in the United States. The plain facts were that Cyprus could not be given to Greece without provoking a war between Greece and Turkey. Sir Ivone said he wished to make it plain that he was not defending the Turkish point of view. Mr. Zorlu and Mr. Birgi had taken the position at the London conference that Turkey did not want either self-determination or self-government for Cyprus and that if the British did not agree with the Turkish position, Turkey would have to reconsider its relations with Britain. Birgi had said as much right in Sir Ivone’s office and Sir Ivone had had to reply “with some acerbity”. The Turks insisted on equal representation for Turks and Greeks in any legislature that was set up in Cyprus. At the same time, the Archbishop in the negotiations had insisted on a Greek majority and the negotiations had broken down when the British, having in mind their pledge to the Turks to consult them regarding this point, had had to tell the Archbishop that they could not agree to his conditions in advance of the proposed constitutional consultations which were to be carried out by Lord Radcliffe.

Sir Ivone commented that as far as the Turkish attitude was concerned it was necessary to recall that for five hundred years the Greeks had been “shouting it from the house tops” that they would like to conquer and dismember Turkey. It was natural in view of this history that the Turks should oppose the cession to Greece of

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–1556. Confidential. Drafted by Wilson.
2 Allen accompanied Dulles to Karachi to attend the SEATO Council sessions. On March 12, he left the Secretary’s party, departing from Colombo for Cairo, then to Paris, and finally to London.
the last remaining block of Greek-speaking people outside Greek possession. Mr. Allen said that he was aware of this feeling on the part of the Turks but he wondered how justified it was. Sir Ivone replied that regardless of the justification, the feeling existed. . . .

Sir Ivone went on to read from a telegram in front of him which gave the text of a proposed U.S. Senate resolution regarding Cyprus, in which reference was made to the traditional American support of the principle of self-determination. He said that he would like to point out that the United States had not always supported the principle of self-determination in every given case, any more than had Great Britain. There were cases where national security or the preservation of world peace were overriding considerations. He cited the Sudeten Germans, Trieste, and Austria as instances in which the United States had not supported the principle of self-determination. . . . Mr. Barbour and Mr. Allen took issue with Sir Ivone's comments regarding the exceptions which he had cited, pointing out that the Trieste problem had been solved along lines which very largely gave the Italians to Italy and the Slavs to Yugoslavia and that the United States had not been a party to the 1938 Munich agreement on Czechoslovakia. Mr. Allen agreed with Sir Ivone that Austria presented a difficult problem but expressed the personal view that if in the future the Austrian people should decide overwhelmingly that they wanted to join Germany it would be hard to deny this. Sir Ivone rejoined that while it was true that the Trieste problem had eventually been settled more or less along ethnic lines, neither the United States nor Great Britain had been very worried about the wishes of the inhabitants of the Zone at the time of the 1948 Italian elections, when we had come out in favor of the entire territory going to Italy. As far as the Sudetens were concerned, he thought that our concurrence in 1945 in the return of the territory to Czechoslovakia was proof of our real attitude.

Mr. Allen commented that while there might be some exceptions, it was certainly true that in the vast majority of cases the United States had been in favor of self-determination. With regard to the deportation of Archbishop Makarios to the Seychelles he said that some people in the Middle East and Asia were concerned over this development since they thought of other nationalist leaders like Zahhloul 3 who had been sent to the Seychelles and who had eventually returned to their countries with increased stature. Sir Ivone remarked that he did not think it was possible for the Archbishop to have greater stature than he already possessed in

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3 Sa'd Zahhloul, Egyptian politician and prominent nationalist, who was exiled on two occasions for his nationalist activities—once to Malta in 1919 and a second time to Aden and Gibraltar in 1922.
Cyprus, and in Greece, where he was able to give orders to the Greek Government. He said that one thing which had struck him in talking to the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Lennox-Boyd, after latter’s return from a recent trip to Cyprus, was the extent to which it was commonly believed all over the Island that the Archbishop was behind the terrorists. Whatever the actual connection of the Archbishop with the terrorists the point was that this was the general impression in Cyprus. This of course greatly increased the standing of the terrorists in the community.

Mr. Barbour inquired whether it would not be possible to make public more of the evidence which the British Government apparently had, linking the Archbishop with the terrorist movement. Sir Ivone said he could see Mr. Barbour’s point, but the release of the information might raise certain difficulties. At all events, there was enough evidence, he felt, to show that the Archbishop was supporting the terrorists and was supplying them with money, especially money which he obtained in the United States, although whether he was actually directing the terrorist operations was another question. He was probably more the “chairman of the board” than the “managing director”.

Mr. Allen inquired regarding Sir Ivone’s reference to the collection of money by the Archbishop in the United States and said that he did not recall this. Sir Ivone said that the last time the Archbishop had gone to the United States, about eighteen months ago, he was reported to have raised and brought back considerable funds.

Mr. Allen said that he wanted to assure Sir Ivone that we fully understood the fact that the British were dealing with an immensely complex problem in Cyprus and that we were anxious to be as helpful and sympathetic as possible in bringing about a reasonable solution. Sir Ivone expressed his appreciation for this statement.
169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece

*Athens, March 20, 1956—12:08 a.m.*

2765. You should at time you consider most propitious and in manner you deem most effective inform Theotokis and Karamanlis that while USG recognizes restraint GOG has used in maintaining order in Greece since deportation Makarios in face highly inflamed public opinion, we think positive efforts to exert influence in cause amicable settlement are also needed. In view USG participants were very close to agreement. As subsequent developments have shown Makarios’ refusal condemn violence was regrettable and resultant British decision deport him served further aggravate situation. Both decisions basically caused by mutual mistrust. USG still believes both sides want agreement and British offer was made in good faith and as evolved during negotiations remains fair basis from which further negotiations might proceed.

While realizing difficulties faced by GOG during pre-election period, USG regrets that GOG did not feel it could use its influence with Makarios more firmly during negotiations and hopes GOG as well as other interested parties and friends will use every possible influence abate violence on island and create atmosphere conducive settlement issue of grave concern to all western allies. As minimum at present USG would hope for avoidance by GOG of any acts tending further aggravate situation. This would be first step in reversing downward trend. USG sympathetically aware political difficulties which GOG now faces, but there is no doubt present situation demands greatest courage.

Responsible Greek leaders must realize that without such courage present situation with implication of possible withdrawal from NATO and weakening of Greek resistance to Communism threatens very basis Greece’s own freedom and sovereignty.

Since there can be no real solution Cyprus without trust between parties, goal all concerned should be considered steps reestablish trust.

FYI In view your tel 2538 2 Dept realizes GOG probably feels it

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–1456. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Taylor G. Belcher of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs and Wood. Also sent to London and repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, USUN, and Paris for USRO.

2 In telegram 2538, March 14, Cannon reported that on March 13, the Greek Foreign Minister had indicated that national feelings on the Cyprus question could no longer be kept under control. According to Theotokis, the government was under pressure to “cut loose” from NATO, break relations with Britain, and establish more open and “equal” relations with “other great powers”. (ibid.)
cannot take positive action now. However to restore position impartiality which USG needs to be useful in this situation, it is believed our first move should be to GOG. Embassy London will then be able inform Foreign Office general substance this démarche. Also this would be responsive to Nutting representations (London’s 3964, Athens 119). 3 End FYI.

For London: You may inform Foreign Office after Athens reports this approach has been made and in doing so also make following points:

As foregoing indicates we do not think public statement requested by Nutting can be helpful at this juncture. We are concerned that HMG as well as British press are apparently confusing our position on negotiations and responsibility for their break off with our attitude toward developments following deportation. As reflected through our instructions to Courtney, we fully appreciate and have supported British efforts reach an understanding with Makarios. We agree it regrettable Greek Government did not undertake more constructive role in negotiations. Our statements since deportation were designed solely to restore atmosphere permitting resumption negotiations and to keep sights set on future to extent possible. Recognition of GOG’s internal problem and effective measures taken to prevent public demonstrations (which Communists were ready to exploit) from getting out of hand, was complementary to that effort, as was recital of our belief that progress had been made and solution could be found.

Hoover

3In telegram 3964, March 14, Ambassador Aldrich reported that during a discussion with Nutting, the latter suggested that when a suitable occasion arose, the United States might consider issuing a statement to the effect that the British proposals on Cyprus seemed “reasonable and fair.” Nutting also noted that the British were not responsible for breaking off the negotiations, that the Greek Government never helped in the discussions with Makarios, and that Cyprus was of great strategic importance to the United Kingdom. (Ibid.)
170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey

Washington, April 4, 1956—12:59 p.m.

1638. Polto 1621. ² Dept has been giving careful thought to question of NATO assuming role in Cyprus dispute. In so doing we have taken account views various member countries as expressed NAC Mar. 14, Athens 2602 ³ and Ankara’s 1591. ⁴ We recognize growing feeling NATO should not sit idly by while this divisive dispute continues with all its implications for future unity and cooperation. At same time we feel we must realistically assess prospects for NATO playing constructive role in solution of problem before committing Organization’s prestige and setting in train procedures which might sharpen already divisive tendencies. In particular we are impressed by following considerations:

1. US has consistently taken position that Cyprus dispute is primarily matter between UK and population of British Crown Colony.

2. Any procedure which could be unanimously agreed in NATO would have to be on basis recognition there are three parties to dispute (i.e. UK, Greece and Turkey). We doubt prospect for solution of problem would be enhanced by such recognition, since we would be creating situation in which Greek Government might well reject any solution which did not clearly provide for eventual union between Greece and Cyprus. By same token we would probably invite Turkish veto any solution which did not deny possibility Greek-Cyprus union.

3. No solution Cyprus problem could be justified which does not take views of Cypriot population into account and command its support. We find it most difficult envisage how this aspect of problem could be handled without involving NATO directly in whole question of return of Makarios or, alternatively, trying to find other Cypriot leaders whom Greeks Turks British and local population would accept as representative.

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¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3-356. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Palmer. Also sent to Ankara, Athens, London, and Paris for the Permanent Representative to NAC.

² Polto 1621, March 15, transmitted the highlights of a meeting of the North Atlantic Council devoted entirely to the question of Cyprus. (Ibid., 747C.00/3-1556)

³ On March 21, in telegram 2602, Cannon reported that a number of Greek Foreign Office officials had indicated that they were “cool” regarding the prospect of NATO intervention. Among their objections was their view that NATO consideration of the Cyprus question would allow the United Nations to “back away” from the issue. (Ibid., 747C.00/3-2156)

⁴ Dated March 23. (Ibid., 747C.00/3-2356)
4. Discussion within NATO of procedures for dealing with Cyprus problem might well lead to further substantive discussion. By much same process of reasoning as that contained Athens 2602 Dept fears that such discussion, with attendant bids for support by three parties, might lead towards situation in which weight of support would gravitate toward UK primarily because of colonial issue. Should this happen Greece would tend feel isolated within Organization, thereby increasing its sense of frustration and prejudicing its cooperation.

Dulles

171. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Greek Ambassador (Melas) and Secretary of State Dulles, Department of State, Washington, April 5, 1956

SUBJECT
Cyprus

The Secretary commented briefly on his recent trip. 
Ambassador Melas thanked him and then made the following comments on the Cyprus question: The British move involving Archbishop Makarios had been sad and unexpected. As a result things were now at a total standstill and the situation was worsening. The Government of Greece was seeking to be moderate.

The Secretary's efforts during the negotiations had not been without result; Makarios had played a moderate role in the negotiations.

The Government of Greece was grateful for the statements which were made after the deportation by Ambassador Cannon and

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4–556. Secret. Drafted by Wood.
2 Dulles attended the SEATO Council meeting in Karachi, March 6–8. Following the meeting, the Secretary traveled to India, Ceylon, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines, the Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, and Japan before returning to Washington on March 21.
the State Department; President Eisenhower’s remarks had been especially appreciated.  

The Government of Greece was now showing its loyalty by its participation in the NATO maneuvers at Malta and it was being attacked for this by the opposition in Greece. Prime Minister Karamanlis had recently made his first major policy speech to the Greek Parliament. This was a very important statement. It reflected Greece’s admiration for the United States and the importance which it attached to full participation in NATO.

Ambassador Melas then referred to the debate on Cyprus in the British House of Commons and mentioned the statements of Messrs. Clement Davis and Noel-Baker as indications that Makarios had negotiated in good faith.

Ambassador Melas next spoke of a press interview held on March 18, 1956 at the Turkish Embassy in Washington which was attended by the Turkish Ambassador, Gök, and Ambassador Sarper. The reports of this meeting indicated that Turkey would be willing to go to war if Cyprus became independent or was granted self-determination. Ambassador Melas said that with the previous knowledge of Mr. George V. Allen he had issued a press communiqué in reply which Mr. Allen had acknowledged to be moderate.

In general Ambassador Melas said his Government felt negotiations had come so close to success that it was regrettable that they were now in abeyance. Ambassador Melas wondered when the British Government would commence real self-government on the Island of Cyprus in which each community would be proportionately represented. He concluded by emphasizing that only two things were needed to restore the situation: first, the restoration of Archbishop Makarios, whom no one could replace; and, secondly, real self-government for Cyprus.

The Secretary replied that these developments had occurred while he was away, but that he had since tried to acquaint himself with them. It had seemed that for a moment agreement was very close. He did not want to express judgment as to the responsibility for the breaking of the negotiations, but it was certainly regrettable. He believed that the ground which had been gained could be recaptured and further advances made.

It was important to do away with the mood of terrorism and violence. He hoped the Government of Greece could contribute as this would help to achieve the result which they wanted. He said

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3 For text of the President’s remarks on the Cyprus question at a news conference of March 14, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956, p. 56.

4 For texts of the statements, see H.C. Debs, 5th series, vol. 549, cols. 1715–1723.
that the Government of Greece had shown a responsible attitude on the whole, but did feel that the radio broadcasts had been inflammatory. He asked that the Government of Greece do all it could as he was confident the matter could be pushed through to a successful conclusion.

Ambassador Melas replied that the Greek Government was not pulling the strings which caused the EOKA violence on Cyprus. He mentioned British methods on the island, such as the deportation of the Archbishop, the use of dogs in searching Cypriot churches, and the curfew, as things which in themselves were contributory to the violence.

The Secretary replied that he did not mean to suggest that this was one-sided. Referring to Greece’s participation in the Malta maneuvers and to Prime Minister Karamanlis’ statement, the Secretary said that Greece had made a real contribution.

Ambassador Melas referred to President Eisenhower’s statement in his press conference of April 4, 1956 to the effect that peace could only be preserved in the Middle East if all the people of that area had the opportunity of achieving their legitimate aspirations. The Ambassador supposed that this would apply to Greece and Cyprus.

After the meeting Mr. Wood asked the Ambassador what the Greek Government was planning to do about the inflammatory broadcasts to Cyprus. The Ambassador said that he had no comment.

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5 For the full text of Eisenhower’s news conference of April 4, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956, pp. 368–378.
172. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, April 28, 1956—5:04 p.m.


1. London should advise FonOff U.S. has no intention raising Cyprus at NATO Ministerial meeting, nor have we indication any other NATO country has decided do so. FYI Dept does not feel it would be wise attempt dissuade other NATO countries from discussing Cyprus, although we doubt that at present juncture such discussion would be helpful, and might well increase Greek feeling of isolation. (You will recall recent bitter discussion in Council in Europe.) At worst it could be exploited by Greek opposition parties to effect Greece cannot expect justice in NATO, etc. End FYI.

2. If Cyprus is in fact introduced into discussion, any U.S. statement would be based on following considerations: Cyprus important question and it in NATO’s interest that progress should be made as soon as possible. NATO could of course only play a helpful procedural role if there was unanimous agreement among members primarily concerned. We consider responsibility for settlement rests with parties primarily concerned, but we willing offer any practical assistance, or participate in practicable NATO role. We hope any Council discussion can be kept in low emotional key, emphasizing harmful effect Cyprus dispute on NATO unity, need for progress toward constructive solution, and readiness NATO to play procedural part. FYI Dept feels any attempt force a “NATO solution” at present time, arising out of feeling that NATO as an organization must respond to an admittedly serious situation, would be counterproductive. NATO may well be able play useful role if and when lines of a solution have been developed through private diplomatic channels. Otherwise premature NATO initiative risks having

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4-1656. Secret. Drafted by Timmons and signed by Dulles. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, and Paris for the Permanent Representative to NAC.

2 In telegram 4673, April 16, the Embassy at London reported that the Foreign Office was acting on the assumption that Cyprus would be raised at the NATO Ministerial meeting to be held in Paris in early May. The Embassy added that a Foreign Office official had inquired if the Department anticipated that Cyprus would be raised at the meeting and in that event what position the Department planned to take. (Ibid.)

3 On April 27, during discussion at the Secretary’s Staff meeting, Cyprus was raised. According to the minutes of the meeting, the following discussion occurred:

“Mr. Allen said that he believes the time has come when we must press the UK to take some steps in the solution of the Cyprus question and that they should be informed that unless some progress is made, the US may be obliged to take a
Greeks and Turks reiterate their well-known positions, with additional twist that neither could accept a "NATO solution" which did not fully meet its demands. End FYI. 4

Dulles

different position on the question when it comes up in General Assembly. In this connection, Mr. Hoover mentioned that the Secretary believes that this is perhaps a question which could be most effectively handled within the NATO framework rather than in the UN." (Ibid., Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

4 In telegram 4978, April 30, the Embassy at London reported that NATO members, "not well briefed" on the Cyprus dispute, but eager to expand the organization’s role might cause "harmful substantive intervention". (Ibid., Central Files, 747C.00/4–3056)

173. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1

Paris, May 4, 1956—3 p.m.

Secto 14. Secretary accompanied by Rountree met May 3 with Theotokis assisted by Greek Ambassadors to Paris, London and NATO. After brief exchange re need for NATO to adapt itself new Soviet economic and psychological offensive and undertake planning for countermeasures, discussion related entirely to Cyprus.

In general Theotokis pursued line taken May 2 in meeting with Perkins which reported Polto 2006, May 3. 2 He repeated in substance comments upon Greek Turk relations, apparent lack good faith on part of British during negotiations with Makarios, and three points re elements of possible settlement based upon assumption Makarios released.

Secretary commented that while Theotokis’ views appeared logical he had some doubt re establishing date for self-determination (point 3 Polto 2006 3). Aside from fact that this would impose new condition which would be difficult to negotiate, United States’ experience in Philippines had shown us trouble in establishing any

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/5–456. Secret. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, and London. Dulles was in Paris for the NAC meetings, May 4–5.

2 Not printed. (Ibid., 747C.00/5–356)

3 In point three Perkins reported that Theotokis indicated that there would have to be a fixed date for self-determination. Although the Foreign Minister noted that Makarios had dropped the insistence on a fixed date, the Greek view was that Cyprus issue could never be resolved until some date had been set.
such timetable since situation might arise whereby it would be impractical strictly to adhere to it. Theotokis thought that date might be established with "force majeure" clause and would be implemented in absence overriding considerations.

In reply Secretary's question, Theotokis said he was ready present Cyprus case to NATO Council if it advisable, but felt unless something constructive could be expected it would be unwise particularly since airing dispute between Greece, Turkey and United Kingdom would be exploited by Soviet propaganda and perhaps weaken NATO. Secretary agreed it not wise raise question for debate since it would not advance solution to problem. He might himself refer to issue in passing merely to identify the kind of problems with which we were confronted. He said discussion of issue was not end in itself but merely means to an end, and thought Theotokis wise in not precipitating debate unless it would be helpful. He felt matters of this nature should be of concern to NATO, but at much earlier date. Situation should never have been permitted to reach present state, and in planning for future of NATO we should endeavor avoid possibility disputes this nature reaching stage where free world collaboration impeded.

Theotokis asked that United States endeavor improve Turkish attitude, and hoped we could inform United Kingdom that if Cyprus again raised in United Nations they could not expect United States attitude would be same as in past. He also hoped we would urge upon British necessity for finding prompt solution. He said Greeks did not want to take matter to United Nations since that might create new strains in relations between NATO members, situation of which USSR would take full advantage.

Dulles

174. Message From Secretary of State Dulles to Foreign Secretary Lloyd

Washington, June 6, 1956.

Dear Selwyn: I continue to be apprehensive with regard to the many facets of the Cyprus question which are of the utmost

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-656. Secret. Transmitted in telegram 7372 to London.
importance not only to Britain, but also to the entire Western Alliance. As you know from our several talks on the subject I am well aware of the difficulties which it presents to you. I have clearly in mind the importance of Cyprus as a British base.

I would greatly appreciate hearing from you with regard to the results of any further examination of this problem which you and your colleagues may have made in light of our conversation in Paris, and of recent events in Cyprus and Greece.

It would seem that now, even more than when we spoke about it on May 3, would be a propitious time to take steps which might break what appears to be a deadlock between violence and its suppression. In considering such steps I hope that the possibility of finding some way to resume negotiations with Archbishop Makarios will not be excluded. I realize that this presents very great difficulties, but it seems to me improbable that another person can in present or foreseeable circumstances carry on negotiations in his absence with any degree of support among the Cypriots. Such a person would have to win away the loyalty which the Archbishop now receives from the Greek populace and, during a time when passions are high, achieve a reasonable understanding which would be supported by the people.

I am taking the opportunity to write you again on this unhappy subject in the earnest belief that a frank exchange of views is in our mutual interest. I would also reiterate that we stand ready to use our best influence to facilitate the attainment of an understanding.

Sincerely yours,

Foster

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2 Reported in Secto 8, May 4. (Ibid., 747C.00/5-456)
3 Presumably a reference to the increase in terrorism and communal tension on Cyprus in April and May. On May 27, as a result of opposition to the Greek Government’s policies on Cyprus, Theotokis resigned. The government was accused of failing to support the case of self-determination for Cyprus.
4 In telegram 5664, June 7, Aldrich informed the Department that he had delivered Dulles’ message to Kirkpatrick in Lloyd’s absence. According to the Ambassador, Kirkpatrick emphasized two points: first, that the “Turkish factor” had not been given sufficient consideration, perhaps because the Turks were less “vociferous” than the Greeks; second, that from the British point of view, the restoration of public order was essential. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–756)
DEAR FRIEND: John Harding is here and we have had some long
talks over this anxious Cyprus business. I would like to give you for
your own personal information one or two conclusions which
emerge. First, as to the security situation. We have now reached the
stage at which we are able to hit back at the terrorists, and to
continue this process. Our forces had a marked success against the
guerilla bands about a week ago. The whole operation was planned
with great care and was well executed. As a result we have broken
up two of the bands and have captured the leaders of two more.
Harding estimates that there are probably five or six more bands, of
moderate size, in various parts of the island, but their total strength
is probably not more than sixty full-time terrorists. Therefore this
aspect of security should continue to show improvement over the
next few months.

On the other hand, there has always been a real anxiety about
Greek and Turkish communal riots in Cyprus. Though the Turks say
less than the Greeks it does not mean that they feel less, and their
anxiety about their future has put them into a highly excitable state.
They are violently determined against Enosis. There is also a consid-
erable population of Turkish-Cypriots in Turkey itself which plays
its part in moulding Turkish opinion. I believe they number a
quarter of a million or more. If anything in the nature of widespread
communal disturbances were to break out this would put a heavy
and most disagreeable task upon our forces which would have to try
to keep the parties apart and restore order. This could be more costly
in casualties than anything we have to cope with now, and would
divert our forces from operations against the terrorists.

We are of course also discussing the various political aspects of
this problem. The truth is that the offer which we made to Makarios
at the end of our last negotiations went beyond what the Turks
themselves thought we should have offered. This the Turkish Prime
Minister has said publicly. To attempt to get results by offering
more in this direction would inevitably entail strong Turkish reac-
tions which would have very serious consequences for the security
and stability of the Middle East as a whole. Nor would I feel
confident of facilities in Cyprus under present conditions unless we
had control of internal security. Athens Radio has made it plain

1 Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Top Secret. Trans-
mitted under cover of a note from Makins to Eisenhower on June 7.
enough that the Greeks would not in any event be willing to allow our facilities in Cyprus to be used for any purposes connected with the Middle East. That is just what we might want them for. A N.A.T.O. base by itself would meet only part of our needs.

I do not think that either of our countries would be really happy if we were only able to counter a threat to vital oil supplies in the Persian Gulf from landing grounds in Arab lands.

You will know that Kuwait by itself has now twenty per cent of the proved oil reserves of the world, and all the indications are that the economy of Western Europe will increasingly depend on oil supplies from that area over the next twenty years or more. I just cannot take the risk of finding ourselves unable to protect these supplies should the need arise. But I did want you to know that I am working hard and will attempt to find some means of reconciling our needs with rival Greek and Turkish aspirations in the island.

If any new thought emerges from all this effort I will not hesitate to let you know, and of course Selwyn Lloyd will keep in touch with Foster.

John Harding asks to send you respectful greetings.  
Kindest regards,
Yours ever

Anthony

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2 On June 7, at 4:30 p.m., Dulles met with the President. Among the topics of conversation was Cyprus. According to the memorandum of conversation, the following exchange occurred:

"We went over the letter from Eden about Cyprus which we agreed was not very informative. We discussed generally the weakening British position, both political and economic.

"In the course of a somewhat rambling discussion, the President raised the question as to whether it was feasible to separate the Turkish population from the Greek. I said my recollection was that this was not regarded as practical because they were working in the mines and were part of the general life of the island. We discussed the proximity of the island to Turkey and the strong opposition that Turkey would have to its becoming Greek." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

In telegram 5670, June 8, Aldrich reported from London that Kirkpatrick had shown him a copy of Eden's message to the President and that he was struck by the length and lack of substance of the Prime Minister's communication. According to the Ambassador, the message was an attempt to impress the President with the fact that Britain was giving serious consideration to a solution of the Cyprus problem. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–856)

3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
5818. Eyes only for Secretary. Selwyn Lloyd called me to FonOff today and advised for your strictly confidential information, since he said he was not authorized by his colleagues to do so, that the Cabinet has approved proposed next step on Cyprus forecast in my telegram 5803. However, there was one significant change in procedure, namely that British approach to Turks would be undertaken before you had an opportunity to comment. Cabinet felt that you might prefer not to be associated with the approach to the Turks and thus be in a position to deny foreknowledge. Lloyd was concerned that this procedural development might be contrary to promise he had given me that no steps would be taken without first receiving US comments. It was of course one of main purposes my conversation reported Embtel 5803 to head off British action without reference to Washington. On other hand he did make clear on that occasion that views he was expressing and the substance of the proposal were yet to be determined by cabinet.

Only substantive addition to proposed statement resulting from Cabinet meeting appears to be that, in addition to other stipulated conditions for eventual transfer sovereignty, it would also be provided that a security treaty relating to the island would be concluded.

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1856. Secret; Priority.
2 In telegram 5803, June 15, Aldrich reported that during a meeting with Lloyd he had learned of a proposed British approach on the Cyprus problem. The British planned to make a public statement on Cyprus that would indicate they were prepared to proceed with the formulation of a constitution and that Lord Radcliffe was ready to travel to Cyprus for that purpose. Aldrich reported that the constitution would provide a bicameral legislature with the first chamber on a proportional basis according to population and the second divided equally between Greeks and Turks. Unless the Turkish reaction to the proposal was so negative as to make it completely unacceptable, Aldrich continued, the British planned to indicate that after a suitable period, possibly 10 years, they might refer the matter to NATO to discuss whether transfer of sovereignty of the island, if approved by a plebiscite, would be “strategically feasible.” (Ibid., 747C.00/6–1556)
between the British, Greeks and Turks. This designed assure Turks that they would ultimately have major say in transfer together with UK and Greece.

British Ambassador Ankara has been instructed to raise proposed statement with Turks today, and if he is successful in reaching them, British anticipate instructing Makins to see you tomorrow. With regard to British course in the event of a strongly adverse Turkish reaction, Lloyd said that he anticipates the Turks may “go through the roof”. If they do so, British will, as forecast Embtel 5803, revise statement to omit section on self-determination. However, before making such revision they will wish to take into account estimate of British Ambassador in Ankara, on whose judgment they rely heavily. If he really considers statement on self-determination would result in Turkish withdrawal from NATO, statement will be revised. Lloyd’s attitude implied, however, that if the Turkish reaction seems likely to entail almost anything less drastic than withdrawal, British will proceed with statement as now contemplated.

Aldrich

177. Editorial Note

On June 16, William P. Boteler, American Vice Consul at Nicosia, was killed by a bomb thrown by an unidentified assailant in a restaurant in the Old City of Nicosia. Three other Americans were injured in the attack. According to preliminary police reports, there was no evidence that Boteler or any other American was selected as a target. (Telegram 372 from Nicosia, June 19; Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1956)
Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 19, 1956

SUBJECT

British Plan for Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Chargé d’Affaires Coulson, British Embassy
Mise Barbara Salt, Counselor, British Embassy
Chalmers B. Wood, GTI

Mr. Coulson presented the Secretary with a statement (enclosed) which outlined the British proposal for a solution of the Cyprus question. The Secretary read this proposal very carefully.

He asked what was the relative size of the Turkish population on the Island and was told that it was about one-fifth. He said that this would then not give the Turkish Cypriots a veto on the question of self-determination since a two-thirds majority was required. Mr. Coulson agreed. The Secretary then observed that this was obviously an important statement which he desired to study and on which he would want advice. Minister Coulson then described the statement as being the absolute limit to which the British would go. He said it was imaginative; that it might, with the support of our friends, win world opinion. He continued by saying that the British Government had shown it to the Turkish Government yesterday and that it had had a “rough reception.” The Turkish Foreign Minister had said he wished to study it but felt the plan was dangerous since it was apt to make the Greeks more intransigent.

The Secretary then asked if the treaty provisions of the plan did not give the Turks in effect a veto, since if they did not adhere, the plan would not commence. Mr. Coulson agreed that this was so.

Mr. Coulson said that, acting on instructions, he had two questions to ask:

1. Can you make any useful approach to the Turks?
2. Is ten years too short a time?

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–1956. Secret. Drafted by Wood.
2 Not found attached. The British statement, dated June 19 (infra), was attached to a note from Coulson to Dulles, June 19, transmitting a message from Lloyd to Dulles. The message indicated that the main British problem in handling Cyprus was the Turks. According to Lloyd, the new British proposal provided “reasonable safeguards” for the Turkish position, but the Turks would need “a lot of persuading” if they were to accept this. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK Officials Corres. with Secy. Dulles/Dulles/Herter 7/54 thru 3/57 Vol. I Incoming)
The Secretary answered that in order to understand the proposition better he would like to ask a few questions himself. He asked whether the defense treaty would run on beyond the date of "so-called self-determination?" Mr. Coulson replied in the affirmative. The Secretary then asked whether if at some future date the Island wanted to join Greece would the United Kingdom still be responsible for external defense? The answer was "Yes." The Secretary then asked about the provision that the question of self-determination should not be raised or discussed publicly or between the three powers involved. Minister Coulson answered that this was to prevent the Greeks from pressing the question. He believed something of the sort had been done for the Saar. Miss Salt added that this provision was for the benefit of the Turks and to prevent the question from being raised in the United Nations.

The Secretary asked whether the British had had an exchange of views with the Greeks. Minister Coulson replied "No," because the British Ambassador in Athens had reported that the Greeks would want to negotiate immediately. The Secretary observed that we have no voice in this question except as the British Government desired us to have one. Mr. Coulson replied that the British Government was very anxious to hear our answers. The Secretary said that we would like time to think the matter over. Mr. Coulson indicated that they expected a formal answer from the Turks fairly soon. Miss Salt added that there was already a good deal of accurate press speculation and that the British would have to act fairly quickly. The Secretary indicated that he would attempt to give an answer the following day.

Mr. Coulson then asked if the Secretary would agree not to give any details of this plan to the Greeks or our Embassy in Athens since there was a considerable danger of leaks. The Secretary indicated that he would restrict the information as requested.  

3 On June 19, Dulles transmitted the substance of his earlier conversation with Coulson to the Embassy at London and informed Aldrich that it was his initial impression that the United States would not want to be in the position of endorsing the plan unless there were some reasonable chance of its acceptance by Greece. Dulles concluded that he thought the plan had little chance of acceptance unless discussed privately with the Greek and the Turkish Governments. (Telegram 7620 to London, June 19; ibid., Central Files, 747C.00/6-1956)
179. Text of Statement To Be Made by Her Majesty's Government on the Cyprus Question


Her Majesty's Government intend to press ahead with the framing of a constitution for Cyprus on the lines which have been previously offered for consideration. For this purpose they have decided to ask Lord Radcliffe as Constitutional Commissioner to start work forthwith on the framing of a constitution. It is their hope that, at an early stage, the Constitutional Commissioner will be able to bring into consultation representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus.

Her Majesty’s Government will put such a constitution into effect as soon as possible, provided that terrorism has been eliminated and law and order have been fully restored.

As regards the future status of the Island, Her Majesty’s Government have already accepted the principle of self-determination. It shall be a condition of any change in the international status of Cyprus that a treaty shall be concluded between the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, regulating in their common interest the use of Cyprus for military purposes. Such a treaty, which would be terminable only by agreement between the parties, would provide that the United Kingdom should continue to be responsible for the external defence of Cyprus and to enjoy such facilities in the Island as may be necessary for this purpose and for that of discharging British Treaty obligations in the Eastern Mediterranean or the Middle East. Provision would be made in the Treaty for defence zones over which the United Kingdom would retain permanent sovereignty.

It shall similarly be a condition that the implementation of a decision to change the international status of Cyprus would be made dependent on a special treaty arrangement by which the interests of minority racial groups were fully safeguarded.

At the end of ten years from the date on which the new constitution comes into effect, Her Majesty’s Government will be prepared to raise with their fellow members of N.A.T.O. the question whether, in the situation then obtaining, a change in the international status of Cyprus would be compatible with the interests of Western defence in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

If not fewer than two-thirds of the members of N.A.T.O. answer the question put to them in the affirmative and the treaties referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 above have been concluded, a plebiscite will be

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held with satisfactory safeguards against improper political or personal pressure on those entitled to vote. A majority of not less than two-thirds of those voting would be required in order that a decision involving a change in international status should take effect.

   It is an essential element of this plan that:—

   (i) The question of self-determination shall not be raised internationally by the three governments, or be discussed between them, during the intervening period of ten years, and

   (ii) All parties concerned shall cooperate sincerely in the restoration and maintenance of law and order in Cyprus.

180. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 22, 1956

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
EUR—Mr. Elbrick
NEA—Mr. Rountree

During a meeting between the Secretary and Ambassador Makins on June 22, in the course of which various other subjects were discussed, the Ambassador raised the question of Cyprus. He referred to the meeting which Mr. Coulson had had with the Secretary on June 19 when Mr. Coulson presented the draft text of a proposed British announcement which already was under discussion with the Turks. (The Secretary had at that time made certain observations concerning the British proposal but said that he wished to consider the matter further before expressing his considered judgment. Mr. Coulson called on Mr. Allen, in the Secretary's absence, on June 20 and was informed of the Department's reaction to the suggestions

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–2256. Secret. Drafted by Rountree.

2 The highlights of the Department's reaction to the latest British proposals on Cyprus were transmitted to London in telegram 7694, June 21. (Ibid., 747C.00/6–2156) Among the Department's objections to the proposal was the statement that no move in the direction of self-determination should be made before the conclusion of a British-Turkish-Greek defense treaty. This condition, the Department argued, would be interpreted by Greece as an attempt to give Turkey a "built-in veto" with which to block any progress toward self-determination.
which had been put forth by the British. Ambassador Makins wished to pursue this discussion with the Secretary.)

The Ambassador said that the British thus far had received no answer from the Turks, although there were indications that the Turks would be most reluctant to acquiesce in the proposals. He said that, as he understood it, three reservations had been expressed by the Department: (1) upon the wisdom of the “built-in veto” which the Turks would have over the implementation of the self-determination feature of the proposal after the expiration of a ten-year period of self-government; (2) upon the British view that the plan should not be discussed with the Greeks before it was made public; and (3) regarding the arrangements for assuring an elected majority in the Parliament under the proposed Constitution.

Continuing, the Ambassador said that it was extremely difficult to evaluate the Turkish position since, on the whole, they were extremely inarticulate and often failed to make a case for themselves. It appeared, however, that the Turks felt that the safeguards incorporated in the plan were inadequate for their purposes.

The Secretary observed that the principal objection to the British proposal, as he saw it, was the provision that settlement of the question of self-determination would depend upon a British-Greek-Turkish treaty, even in advance of NATO consideration of the problem. He said that at present the Turks would have no legal basis to obstruct a settlement, but that under the terms of the proposals, if they were accepted by the Greeks and Turks, they would know that they would have the legal power to stall the implementation of the self-determination feature. Thus, the British would be depriving themselves of their present sole legal responsibility in the matter and would bring about a divided authority which might cause trouble in future years.

The comment was made to the British Ambassador that, aside from the question of the Turkish attitude, it might be conceivable that the situation in ten years would be such as to render it inadvisable for the Greeks themselves to have the veto power implicit in the proposals. The plan as now worded would, for example, effectively preclude the establishment of Cyprus independence under dominion status or as part of the Commonwealth if the political situation in Greece or the attitudes of the Cypriots themselves in the years ahead should render it otherwise feasible to consider a solution along those lines. The Secretary remarked that the British goal was highly commendable, that he fully appreciated the difficulties confronting the British Government in trying to work out a solution to this enormously complicated problem, and that he knew the proposals put forward had been formulated in good faith and in an earnest effort to find some satisfactory course. He was, nevertheless, seriously concerned over the possible implications.
The Ambassador commented that he thought neither the Greeks nor the Turks could effectively block implementation of the plan at the expiration of the ten-year period in view of the fact that they could not withstand the international pressures for a just solution. He remarked, in this connection, that NATO itself would be seized with the problem and would apply pressures against the Greeks and the Turks to undertake the proposed treaty.

The Secretary commented that neither the Greeks nor the Turks were nearly as sensitive to international pressures as the United States or Great Britain; he doubted that it would be safe to rely upon this as an assurance that the treaty would be concluded. He pointed out that, according to his understanding of the proposals, the matter would not be referred to NATO in the absence of the treaty itself; thus it would be difficult to envisage a situation in which NATO could effectively pressure the Greeks and Turks to come to an agreement.

The Ambassador said that while some difficulties might be involved in concluding the treaty, a ten-year period was provided for an introduction of a constitution and the establishment and refinement of self-government. That in itself would be a great gain. He indicated, in response to the Secretary's question, that the self-government aspects of the proposals could go forward in the absence of a Greek-Turkish agreement either to undertake a treaty for the defense of Cyprus, or an agreement on the part of the Greeks and Turks not to raise the question of self-determination during the ten-year period mentioned in the proposals. The Secretary observed that he had not understood the proposed statement to indicate that to be the case.

Responding to further questions by the Secretary, the Ambassador expressed his understanding that Greek and Turkish agreement was not needed to put into motion the self-government provisions, but that they merely had to “acquiesce.” The Secretary asked what the situation would be, for example, if two years following the institution of self-government, the Greeks should press the question of self-determination and ask that this matter be inscribed on the agenda of the UN. The Ambassador's reply was that the British would naturally oppose inscription, but it was not clear as to the effect such Greek action would have upon the time schedule for carrying out the self-determination feature of the plan.

The Secretary said that he assumed the primary question which had been put to him was whether we would urge the Turks to accept the British proposals. The Ambassador responded that it was whether we would use our influence with the Turks in this matter and persuade them to acquiesce in the proposals. The Secretary said that he frankly had grave reservations about the merits of the proposals. He believed that confusion would be compounded if an
arrangement were concluded whereby the concurrence of both Greece and Turkey would be needed before any determination were made on self-determination, rather than maintaining a situation in which the UK would retain its present rights. He thought that under the plan both Greece and Turkey would be given legal rights which they do not now possess, and that this would greatly decrease the flexibility of the British in disposing of the problem. He repeated that he appreciated the great effort which the British were making and realized that, from the British viewpoint, they had proposed a considerable step forward. From his viewpoint, however, he frankly doubted that the plan would work.

At this point, the British Ambassador commented with a smile that he was inclined to say "What would you have us do?" The Secretary, also jokingly, replied, "While you may be inclined to do so, you have not asked the question." The Ambassador responded that he did not have instructions to put this question to us.

The Secretary summed up his position by saying that he did not think it was a good idea to diffuse the present role of the British and create a situation in which three powers, rather than one, would have legal authority for agreeing to any course of action. He felt that even if Greece and Turkey should accept the present plan, which appeared unlikely, it would create a situation which ten years hence would be more insoluble than that existing at the present time. He expressed considerable doubt that, even if Turkey should acquiesce, the Greek Government would do so. In the circumstances, he questioned the wisdom of the US undertaking to persuade the Turks to accept the plan.

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181. Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden

Eden


DEAR ANTHONY: Thank you very much for your letter of June seventh concerning Cyprus. Despite my present physical difficulty, I have studied it with much interest. I know your deep concern with this problem and it is a concern which I, too, share.

2 Document 175.
3 On June 8, President Eisenhower suffered an attack of ileitis which required surgery on June 9. The President remained at Walter Reed Hospital until June 30.
Foster has told me of the statement which you propose to make on the Cyprus question. He has, I think, some questions which he has raised with Roger Makins. Is it wise, I wonder, for you to dilute your own authority by giving both Greece and Turkey what amounts to an indefinite veto power over any future change in the international status of Cyprus? Might not that further complicate a problem already complicated enough? Of course, they have legitimate interests which should be taken into account. But it seems to me important that the United Kingdom should retain a sufficient initiative and flexibility in its own hands to meet the changing circumstances which are bound to occur in a situation as complicated and as charged with emotion as is this one. Could you not therefore avoid giving an inflexible veto power to anybody?

I know it is much easier to put questions than to answer them. But I want you to know of my interest and our desire, as far as I properly can, to help at the right moment and in the right way to achieve some acceptable solution which will relieve NATO of the great risks which have developed around the present situation.

At last I can report that I seem steadily to regain my strength. With warm personal regard,

As ever,

Ike E. 4

4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

182. Memorandum of Conversations Between the British Ambassador (Makins) and Secretary of State Dulles, Dulles' Residence, Washington, June 23 and 25, 1956 1

June 23, 1956.

The Ambassador called pursuant to my telephone call to him in order to pick up the message from the President to Sir Anthony Eden about Cyprus. 2

I said to the Ambassador, in giving him the message, that I thought he should know that this was not a perfunctory message,

1 Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Dulles.
2 Supra.
but that the President had given considerable thought to the problem and that we had discussed it together over the telephone. I also said that while I had made a first draft of the message, the President himself had changed it around so that it would, he thought, accurately reflect his thinking in the way he would like to express himself.

The Ambassador spoke of the "leak" of our criticism of their proposed Cyprus statement on the ground of a "built-in veto". He said the Foreign Office was much upset by the fact that it had become known that they had consulted us on this and that we had been critical of it.

I expressed my surprise that there should have been any such "leak", which the Ambassador said was in the London Times. I said I would look into the matter.

June 25, 1956.

Following the signature of the Agreements regarding St. Lucia and Ascension Islands, I told the Ambassador I had looked into the matter of the "leak" regarding the Cyprus situation. I said that what had happened was that a Reuter's correspondent had come into the Department and seen a very junior officer, bringing with him a Drew Middleton dispatch about Cyprus. This Middleton dispatch itself disclosed a considerable amount about the British intentions. The correspondent then tried to draw out the Departmental official as to what the attitude of the United States would be. I was reliably informed that he had said he had no idea, but there then followed what the officer thought was a purely informal conversation about the Middleton dispatch, in the course of which this officer had expressed it as his personal view that such a plan as Middleton reported might be deemed objectionable because it gave the Turks a built-in veto against a change in the international status of Cyprus.

I said that while I greatly regretted what had happened, it was not a "leak" of anything that had taken place between the Ambassador and me, as to which the officer in question was totally ignorant.

\(^3\) In telegram 5924, June 23, Aldrich reported that Lloyd had asked him to call regarding an article in the London Times, which indicated that the Department had been kept informed of British moves to break the Cyprus deadlock. Lloyd noted that reference to the idea of a "built-in veto" in the article, suggested that the writer must have had a direct conversation with someone in the Department. According to Aldrich, Lloyd was requesting Makins to express to the Department Britain's grave concern on this matter. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–2356)
Dear Friend: Thank you so much for your message about Cyprus. I feel distressed that you should have been inflicted with this at this time.

Harding is making good progress in restoring law and order, but he has told us that if he is to get a constitution working, the issue of self determination must in some way be put into cold storage. Hence the period of years and a submission to NATO on certain conditions at the end of it.

You will have heard that the initial Turkish reaction to our proposals was sharp and tough. Although it was more violent than I expected, I am not entirely surprised. The Greeks are good talkers, the Turks are not. But they have a habit of boiling slowly inside. When the lid of the kettle finally blows off, it can be very unpleasant for anyone nearby. Our Ambassador has warned us of the danger of a serious crisis in Anglo-Turkish relations.

All this is troublesome to us because we certainly need the Turks both for the Baghdad Pact and for NATO. Indeed I am sure that you will agree that if anyone holds a strategic position it is they.

However we have done all we can to put arguments for our proposals to them and expect to have their considered reply in a day or two. It may be that they will produce some suggestions of their own.

Meanwhile I do not propose to make any kind of public statement, difficult as it will be to refuse our Parliament any information.

It was because I am sure that we will never get this matter solved without agreement on military matters that we introduced the conception of a Tripartite Treaty. I do not think that there is anything very new in this.

Our formula has much to recommend it to the Greeks. No doubt they will always ask for more. But, all else apart, I am sure

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2 Document 181.

3 In telegram 2169 from Ankara, June 22, the Embassy transmitted the preliminary reaction of Foreign Ministry Secretary General Birgi to the British proposals. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6-2256)
that we cannot go further in placating them without disaster in our
relations with the Turks.

The best news of all is of your improving health. It gladdens the
hearts of millions here, and especially,

Yours ever,

Anthony

184. Editorial Note

On July 4, Vice President Nixon, on a trip to the Far East
visited the Philippines to participate in the commemoration of the
tenth anniversary of Filipino independence. Returning to the United
States, Nixon stopped overnight in Ankara on July 9 and 10. On
July 10, the Embassy in Turkey informed the Department that the
question of Cyprus was among the subjects discussed in an informal
exchange of views among Nixon, President Celal Bayar, Prime
Minister Adnan Menderes, Acting Foreign Minister Etem Menderes,
Foreign Office Secretary Nuri Birgi, and Ambassador Warren. Ac-
cording to the Ambassador, both Bayar and Prime Minister Mender-
es stressed the importance of Cyprus from a political, strategic, and
national point of view and expressed Turkey's determination to
prevent the island from passing to the Greeks. Both leaders empha-
sized that Turkey was satisfied with the status quo under the British
and would not accept the transfer of Cyprus to Greece. Ambassador
Warren reported that he had the impression that the Turkish Gov-
ernment would not yield on this matter and would act decisively
"with possible serious consequences" before it would permit the
island to be transferred to Greece. (Telegram 80 from Ankara, July
10; Department of State, Central Files, 782.5-MSP/7-1056)

On July 12, at the 290th meeting of the National Security
Council, Nixon briefed the Council on his trip to the Far East.
During the discussion he referred to his visit to Turkey:

"Apropos of his visit to Turkey, the Vice President said that he
was amazed to find that the Turks had a positively pathological
attitude on the Cyprus problem. The Prime Minister had even gone
so far as to suggest that if Cyprus was joined to Greece, the Turks
would go to war to prevent it. He had subsequently modified this
statement. The reason for Turkish alarm over Cyprus, said the Vice
President, was rather the closeness of the island to the Turkish
mainland than concern for the Turkish minority living on Cyprus.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Memoranda of Discussion)

185. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 13, 1956

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
Miss Barbara Salt, Counselor, British Embassy
The Secretary
Douglas MacArthur II, Counselor
George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary, NEA
William O. Baxter, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
William C. Burdett, Acting Director, NEA

When the British Ambassador called this afternoon he said he would like first to bring the Secretary up to date on the latest Cyprus developments. The British Government had felt that it must try some new initiative in this matter and had worked out a plan which it had hoped would be acceptable to Turkey. The British Government would have liked United States support for its proposals with the Turks and eventually with the Greeks. The Ambassador wished the Secretary to know that all available arguments had been used with the Turks to obtain their acceptance but without success. The British had often thought the United States under-estimated the depth of Turkish feeling on Cyprus, but the Turkish reaction had been so strong that it appeared even the British may have been guilty of the same fault. The Turkish response to the proposals, though courteous, was exceedingly strong. In fact, they put the blunt question as to whether it was British policy to abandon Cyprus.

When it was apparent no progress could be made along these lines, the British Government had reluctantly decided to abandon this attempt. Finally Mr. Eden made this position clear yesterday in Parliament and at the same time announced the British intention of moving ahead with the drafting of a constitution and the immediate

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7-1356. Secret. Drafted by Baxter.
dispatch of Lord Radcliffe to Cyprus for preliminary soundings.\(^2\) This move involved a calculated risk because it was embarked upon without awaiting the complete cessation of terrorist activities and might be interpreted as a weakening of British policy with respect to Cyprus. HMG hoped to find some support from the United States in this new move.

The Secretary said that he would be prepared to give support to what appeared to be a sound and constructive step forward. He was sorry that we had not been able to support the previous proposals with the Turks but he doubted whether, even with United States support, the Turks could have been persuaded to agree. The Ambassador knew, the Secretary said, of our reservations on the proposals, which appeared to give both the Greeks and Turks a permanent power of veto and which therefore restricted British freedom of action and flexibility in moving ahead on the question. The Secretary asked whether the Ambassador had any concrete suggestion as to the form of United States support for the new British step. The Ambassador indicated that a public statement would be most welcome, and the sooner the better. The Secretary said he saw no reason why one could not be issued at once.

In reply to a question about Archbishop Makarios, the Ambassador referred to Eden’s statement yesterday that, if Makarios were willing to condemn violence, a new situation would be created. In this connection Sir Roger mentioned secret minutes of Ethnarchy Council deliberations recently captured by the British which seemed to indicate clearly that Makarios had not been negotiating in good faith. He also referred to the Department’s earlier comments\(^3\) on the section of Eden’s statement which referred to the Lausanne Treaty. He had called our comments to the attention of London but apparently the text had not been changed. He pointed out that Eden had not stated a British position but had merely summarized the Turkish view on the Lausanne Treaty, which was that any change in the status of Cyprus would, by invalidating one provision of the Lausanne Treaty, open up other provisions. In this connection, they had specifically mentioned Western Thrace, the Patriarchate and Greek community in Istanbul, and the Aegean Islands.

\(^2\) For text of Eden’s statement of July 12, see H.C. Debs. 5th series. vol. 556, cols. 595–602.

\(^3\) Not further identified.
186. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Greek Ambassador (Melas) and Secretary of State Dulles, Department of State, Washington, July 16, 1956

SUBJECT
Cyprus

The Greek Ambassador called today at his request to inform the Secretary that the statement issued by the Department on Saturday (attached) had greatly disturbed his Government, which felt that it denoted an alarming change in United States policy on the Cyprus question. He considered it at variance with the earlier friendly remarks of President Eisenhower at the time of the Makarios exile, when he said that the United States stood ready to help its two friends, Britain and Greece, who were at odds over the Cyprus question. This new pronouncement, taken within the context of the Eden statement, seemed to support the British and Turkish view that Turkey had a right to have the deciding voice regarding the fate of Cyprus. The Ambassador referred to the “pre-arranged proposals” which had been discussed with the Turks and not with the Greeks.

The Secretary informed the Ambassador firmly that he was incorrect if by “pre-arranged” he meant to imply that the United States knew about these proposals before they were made to the Turks. He emphasized that we had no knowledge of them or their content until after they had been presented in Ankara by the British. The Ambassador hastily explained that he meant the proposals had been pre-arranged between the British and the Turks in order to make it appear to the world that no self-determination could ever be granted to Cyprus.

On the question of the statement, the Secretary said that the British also objected to our statement, but for different reasons, because it did not indicate support for anything in the British policy except the offer of early self-government. The Secretary said that our position with respect to self-government was well known: that we wanted more self-government everywhere in the world where people were far enough advanced to have a voice in running their own affairs. The United States, he thought, was entitled to have its policy on this matter without regard to the opinions of other governments, and to state publicly at any time our support for

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7-1656. Confidential. Drafted by Baxter.
2 Not found attached. The statement released on Saturday, July 14, reads: “The United States welcomes the intention of the British Government, as announced by Prime Minister Eden, to proceed with the development of self-government on the island of Cyprus.” (Telegram 171 to Athens, July 14; ibid., 747C.00/7-1456)
moves toward self-government. He assured the Ambassador that United States policy toward Greece remained unchanged.

The Ambassador, after thanking the Secretary for his assurances, commented that the Turks were "getting out of hand." They had been making threatening and belligerent statements during recent weeks which went quite beyond the limits of comprehension. He referred to the communiqué just issued by the Assembly group of the Turkish Democrat Party, which stated that, if Greece attempts to annex Cyprus, Turkey will lay claim to Western Thrace and the Dodecanese. The Ambassador pointed out that of course there was no question of "annexation" and spoke emotionally of Turkey's having renounced categorically and in perpetuity any rights to Cyprus when it signed the Lausanne Treaty. Turkey now pretended that any change in the status quo on Cyprus would permit Turkey to ask revision of other articles of the Lausanne Treaty, specifically those dealing with Western Thrace, the Aegean Islands and the Patriarchate. The Secretary indicated that his legal advisers were inclined to believe there was no sound basis in international law for the thesis that modification of the status quo on Cyprus would automatically reopen the Treaty.

187. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President


SUBJECT

Skouras Talks with Eden on Cyprus

Spyros Skouras has requested that you be informed of talks on Cyprus which he has had with Prime Minister Eden and with Prime Minister Karamanlis of Greece. Since you are interested in the question and since he may wish to discuss it with you, a summary follows:

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7-2056. Secret. Spyros Skouras, President of Twentieth Century Fox Films, had undertaken, on his own initiative, a mission to persuade the Governments of Greece and Turkey to disengage from the Cyprus problem and to allow the British and the Cypriots to settle the issue. Although Skouras had contact with Eisenhower and Dulles as well as other Department of State officials, his mission was undertaken as a private citizen. Skouras saw Eden on June 20. A report of Skouras' conversation with Karamanlis was transmitted in telegram 53 from Athens, July 6. (Ibid., 747C.00/7-656)
Eden said that a satisfactory solution depended on (1) an end of terrorism, (2) some means of satisfying the Turks and (3) British sovereignty over base areas to be retained permanently following self-determination.

Skouras transmitted this to Karamanlis and obtained the following reply:

Greece believes a solution would be possible if the British (1) clearly recognized self-determination, (2) agreed to a plebiscite within eight years (date to be determined by NATO considering the international situation), (3) returned Makarios in time to sign agreement, (4) retained only Foreign Affairs and Defense during the period of self-government and granted a progressive amnesty.

If the plebiscite favored union with Greece, Turkish interests (according to the Greeks) could be secured by (1) a NATO limit on Greek forces on Cyprus, (2) creation of a free port to protect Turkish trade, (3) Turkish civil rights to be protected by the UN.

In reporting the above to the British Ambassador to Athens, Skouras put in the suggestion that Makarios could be returned to London instead of to Cyprus.

Comment: Only after we learn the results of Mr. Skouras’ visit to Ankara² can we evaluate the prospects of agreement that may be developed from this series of conversations.

John Foster Dulles³

² A notation at this point on the source text in an unidentified hand, but bearing Dulles’ initials in quotation marks reads: “if he is admitted”. For Skouras’ report on his travels, see Document 196.

³ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.
188. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State


SUBJECT

Cyprus: Our Goals and Steps To Attain Them

Discussion

As you requested, I attach a paper setting forth our intermediate and eventual goals in the Cyprus question and the steps we think we should take to reach them.

We believe the controversy is now at a point where the disputants are unlikely to come to any settlement unless they have outside help. If you agree, I feel strongly that Julius Holmes should be asked to undertake as soon as possible the secret, high level talks outlined in Part III of this paper as necessary to achieve a solution of this problem.

Recommendation

That you approve the procedure suggested above.

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7-3056. Secret. Drafted by Williams, Wood, and Laingen and sent through S/S and G.

2 On August 8 at 11:30 a.m., during a conversation with the President, Dulles raised the subject of Cyprus. A memorandum of the discussion reads:

"In connection with the attitude of Greece, I spoke of the Cyprus matter and said that there was a recommendation to me that the US should try to get into the solution of the Cyprus problem and take some initiative and offer its good offices to the three principal parties. The President said this was all right if we had what we thought was an answer. However, we should not get in unless we had some pretty clear idea as to where we could come out." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

3 There is no indication on the source text that Dulles approved the memorandum.
[Tab A]

Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, undated.

I. GOALS IN THE CYPRUS DISPUTE

A. Our Intermediate Goals

1. To have talks between the parties resumed and in such a state of progress before the November United Nations General Assembly that acrimonious conflict in the United Nations can be avoided.

2. To achieve a success in promoting a Cyprus solution that can be presented as a tangible accomplishment of NATO, thus giving encouragement for the future of the alliance.

3. To relieve the Karamanlis Government in Greece of serious dangers from an opposition that is subject to neutralist and communist appeals based on this issue.

4. To strengthen the Allied position in the area and to free the British forces now tied down in Cyprus for general defense operations in the Middle East.

B. Our Eventual Goals

1. To end the Cyprus controversy as a divisive element affecting both NATO and the Balkan Alliance.

2. To guarantee that bases in Cyprus will be at the permanent disposal of Great Britain...for protecting its interests to the East.

3. To provide the inhabitants of the Island with guarantees of their rights of self-determination with full protection for minorities.

4. To insure for the future that Cyprus will not be considered by the Government of Turkey as a threat to its security.

II. PROPOSED PLAN FOR CYPRUS SETTLEMENT

In order to achieve these goals, the United States should take the initiative, without delay, in presenting privately to the British, Turkish and Greek Governments a concrete plan which may have a good chance of leading to a solution of the Cyprus problem.

Such a plan has been set forth in the Holmes memorandum (Tab B). In brief, it would provide for the following:

Drafted by Williams, Wood, and Laingen.
Self-Government:

A. Election of a Constituent Assembly for Cyprus

1. Call by the UK for election of a Constituent Assembly to frame a Constitution, based largely on Lord Radcliffe’s investigations, for immediate self-government. Election to be under supervision of a Commission of from three to five NATO members, not including the UK, Greece or Turkey.

B. Drafting of Constitution

1. To assure Turkish cooperation in electing Assembly, general lines of Constitution, providing adequate safeguards for Turkish minority, would be laid down in advance of elections.
2. The UK would announce its intention to reserve control over only foreign affairs and defense and the right to intervene to restore public order. Exercise of this right might be made to depend upon a finding by SACEUR.
3. Agreement would need to be reached on Amnesty and Cessation of Violence.

C. Establishment of Self-Government

D. Return of Archbishop Makarios to Cyprus

1. The Archbishop would have been kept advised of the constitutional discussions and his assent obtained to final draft. Conditions for his return would have to be clearly established.

Self-Determination:

A. Plebiscite to Determine Future International Status of Island

1. At time of calling elections above, UK would announce that at end of ten years of self-government, plebiscite would be held under NATO supervision to determine future of Island.
2. Plebiscite would permit choice of any of following:
   a. Union with Greece
   b. Local autonomy under the Greek Crown
   c. Full Independence
   d. Self-government within the Commonwealth

Safeguards:

A. Military Use of Island

1. Announcement by UK that specified areas in Island would remain, in perpetuity, under UK sovereignty for the maintenance of military bases.
2. It would be understood that the UK, if it chose, could make joint-use agreements for the use of these areas by any other NATO country (for example the US).

3. Even should the plebiscite result in union with Greece, Greek forces would not be stationed on the Island, unless requested by NATO.

B. Protection of Minorities

1. Negotiation of a Tripartite Treaty between the UK, Turkey and Greece, providing guarantees for minorities on the Island in addition to those guarantees spelled out in the Constitution.

2. There should also be a provision for the minority’s appeal, on questions involving constitutionality of legislative acts, to higher authority, such as a panel of eminent jurists named by the NATO powers.

C. International Guarantee

1. The entire settlement to be guaranteed by the NATO countries.

III. Procedure

1. We should designate an emissary who will be empowered to undertake discussions with British, Turkish and Greek authorities at a high level. These discussions must be secret, with every precaution against the publicity that can arouse popular emotions and force the governments concerned into rigid positions. Our envoy should have appropriate cover.

2. The first step might be to have our representative sound out the British, starting with an informal exploratory approach to Ambassador Makins in Washington. If in Makins’ view, HMG may see merit in the plan, our envoy should go to London to seek British support and British assurances that HMG will press the Turks at the appropriate time to accept a reasonable solution.

3. If the talks in London are successful, he should go to Athens, where there is a growing disposition to accept a compromise solution. . . .

4. Our emissary must line up his strongest arguments for his talks in Ankara, where opposition to the plan will be most intense. He must seek Turkish agreement by using the following main arguments:

   a. The plan provides concrete guarantees against Cyprus falling under military control hostile to Turkey.

   b. The plan does not necessarily lead to Enosis. (The economic argument here is a powerful one.) The inhabitants of the Island will have ample opportunity to choose another destiny, which at end of
a ten-year cooling-off period might well be something other than Enosis.

c. The Turkish minority, in any case, will be afforded ample protection under international guarantees.

d. Turkey must recognize that in the interests of NATO and Western defenses, the United States and United Kingdom must go ahead with a settlement and that Turkey has no legal or moral right to block it. The Allied Powers are doing all possible to safeguard Turkey's legitimate interests.

5. In Turkey our envoy may find it useful to discuss variations on the plan in order to find an arrangement suitable to Turkey. . . . He may also discuss other means of fixing a date for the self-determination plebiscite in lieu of the ten-year limit prescribed in Part II.

6. At one point in the negotiations, British, Greek and, possibly, an American representative should go secretly to the Seychelles Islands to obtain Makarios' approval. Timing of this trip might be determined in consultation with Greek authorities.

7. If agreement is reached, it should first be made public by NATO in order that that body may get appropriate credit.

[Tab B]

Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Holmes) to the Secretary of State\(^5\)

*Washington, July 30, 1956.*

**SUBJECT**

Cyprus

I recommend that we take the initiative in an attempt to bring about an early settlement of the dispute over Cyprus. It is not likely that the disputants will be able to reach an agreement without outside help, and if a solution is not found the damage to the NATO alliance and to the British position in the Middle East will be very great. There is every advantage in finding a solution before the next General Assembly of the UN and before the report of the

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\(^5\) Secret. A notation on the source text indicates that Dulles saw this memorandum.
Committee of Three is considered. Events in Egypt make a settlement more urgent and more likely of attainment.

The benefits to be derived from an early settlement are very great. If a solution can be brought about under the NATO aegis and announced to the world as a NATO settlement, it will go far toward meeting the universal expectancy that some striking result will emerge following the creation of the special Committee of Three Foreign Ministers. Such an important, tangible success would give great encouragement and confidence for the future of the coalition. Another beneficial result would be to assure the United Kingdom of a strong military bastion in the Eastern Mediterranean not plagued with local hostility. The British position in the Middle East has been seriously weakened and it is vitally in the interest of the West that it be salvaged and strengthened. If this is not done, the availability of Middle East oil to the UK and Western Europe may be seriously threatened.

We should commence by discussing prospects of settlement secretly with the British, and if general agreement is found, subsequently with the Greeks and Turks. The latter will be the most difficult. At some point it would probably be necessary for representatives authorized to speak for the UK and Greece to go secretly to the Seychelles Islands and obtain the approval of Makarios to any agreed solution. I suggest that discussions be begun based on the following:

A general election called by the sovereign power, the United Kingdom, should be held, under NATO supervision, of a constituent assembly; the Committee of Supervision to consist of from three to five members, not including British, Greek or Turkish representatives. After the election, the constitution would be written and self-government given to the island; the British Governor reserving only control over foreign affairs, defense, and the right to intervene to restore public order in the event of a really serious threat. (If necessary to obtain Greek agreement, this right might be further qualified by making its use dependent on a finding by SACEUR that the disruption of public order was of such character as to endanger Western defense.) The constitution would include the usual, recognized guarantee for minorities to protect the Turkish population.

6 At the Ministerial meeting of the NAC in May 1956, a Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation was established to advise the Council on ways to improve and promote cooperation in nonmilitary areas and to encourage greater unity within the NATO community. The committee, often referred to as the “Three Wise Men”, was composed of the Foreign Ministers of Canada, Italy, and Norway—Lester B. Pearson, Gaetano Martino, and Halvard Lange.

7 Presumably a reference to Egyptian President Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal Company on July 26, 1956.
Additional protection and assurance to the Turkish Government could be given by provision in the constitution which would accord the minority in the legislative assembly the right to appeal against certain categories of legislation, the broad definition of which would be any act which discriminated against the minority. I believe it is possible for qualified constitutional lawyers to produce definitions of such legislation. As it is probably not feasible to create a Supreme Court with power to pass on the constitutionality of legislative acts, a substitute could be found in a panel of eminent jurists named by each of the NATO powers. A prescribed number of these jurists would be empowered to give a binding decision on the appeal. A petition signed by a pre-determined percentage of members of the legislature, calculated to represent a majority of the number of Turkish representatives, would constitute a judicial appeal.

It would be agreed that this period of self-government would run for ten years during which time there would be no change in the international status of the Island. At the end of the ten year period, a plebiscite would be held, again supervised by NATO, under which the population of Cyprus would have the right to vote for: (1) union with Greece; (2) local autonomy under the Greek crown; (3) full independence; or (4) a self-governing status under British sovereignty, all to continue minority guarantees.

The British would agree to concentrate their military establishments in a given area which I believe they are already doing, including adequate port facilities. This area would continue to remain under British sovereignty regardless of the outcome of the plebiscite. As these bases would be sovereign British territory, it would be understood that the UK would make arrangements for joint use of any facility with any NATO nation. In return for the specific recognition by the British of the right of self-determination, the Greeks would agree that even in the event the plebiscite resulted in union with Greece, Greek armed forces on the Island would be limited to police. They would agree not to fortify or to send troops except at the request of the NATO Council or on agreement by the NATO Council.

The entire settlement would be guaranteed by the NATO powers. This would have to be done by individual governments—we should have to go to the Senate—but the guarantee should be made to appear to be a collective action in so far as possible. It might also be found necessary to include the island in the NATO area, although this is not likely.

A further protection for the Turkish minority might be provided by a Tripartite treaty among Great Britain, Greece and Turkey.

The general settlement would also have to include arrangements for amnesty and the cessation of terror. It would probably be
necessary and even advisable for the British to agree to Makarios’s return to Cyprus.

Domestic political pressures impel the British and Greek Governments to seek a genuine solution. On the other hand domestic political pressures impel the Turkish Government to oppose any solution. It is strongly committed to the continuance of the British presence on Cyprus, failing which it claims the Island should revert to Turkey. In the troubled domestic political and economic situation in Turkey, this is the one subject on which all elements agree. The Turks object to another Greek island so close to their coast and to Greek domination of the Turkish minority on Cyprus. They claim that the Treaty of Lausanne created a balanced pattern for the Eastern Mediterranean which should not be disturbed. They insist on a “maintenance of the status quo”. They are stubborn.

However, they are also realists and will probably accept a changing situation if they realize it is inevitable. When it appeared that the Harding-Makarios talks might succeed last winter, their attitude was described by the British Ambassador at Ankara as “grudging acceptance of a fait accompli”.

Before a plan is proposed to the Turks, a concerted effort should be made to convince them that we consider they have a legitimate, but not decisive, interest in the evolving political situation on Cyprus. This interest is based on geography and the Turkish minority, not on the Treaty of Lausanne. We consider it unrealistic to talk of maintaining the status quo. The Island has already changed in two years from a peaceful British Colony to a place where 18,000 British troops are having difficulty in keeping order. British public opinion will not indefinitely support the use of so many troops for this purpose and therefore the situation will inevitably continue to change. We fully support the British intention of maintaining troops on the Island and share the British belief that to restore stability the population must be allowed, under British and NATO supervision, to work out its own political problems. If this evolution is encouraged to proceed peacefully, we believe that tensions on the Island will decrease . . . . It could also be pointed out that the extensive Turkish minority in Metropolitan Greece has been well treated by the Greek authorities.

If the Turks make a point of the Treaty of Lausanne, we will have to make clear that this Treaty simply recognized British sovereignty over Cyprus which had existed de facto since it was annexed by the British on November 5, 1914. We consider that Lausanne
gave the British complete sovereignty including the right to make any changes in its status which it may wish.

The elements of this approach which should appeal to the disputants:

1) *To All Three*: End to a bitter quarrel. Not only the saving of the NATO Alliance from disruption but giving it a new lease on life.

2) *To the United Kingdom*:

   a) The elimination of bitter domestic criticism not only by the opposition but by British public opinion in general.
   
   b) The end of terrorism in Cyprus, thus freeing the forces there for their proper function.
   
   c) The assurance of a strong military base in the Eastern Mediterranean.
   
   d) Restoration of good relations with Greece and Turkey.

f) Granting the principle of self-determination would reduce criticism from anti-Colonial sources.

3) *To Greece*:

   a) An explosive political problem would be substantially eliminated.

   b) The right of the Greek population of Cyprus to self-determination would be acknowledged.

4) *To Turkey*:

   a) The British military position on the Island would be assured for the indefinite future.

   b) Assurance would be obtained that Cyprus would not become a Greek military base.

   c) The Turkish minority would be protected.

Recommendation:

I recommend that this plan be discussed informally with Roger Makins to obtain his personal views as to its feasibility. Depending on his reaction, we could consider subsequent steps.  

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8 This memorandum was approved by Elbrick, Bowie, and Allen. There is no indication on the source text of Dulles' approval.
189. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, August 24, 1956—6:32 p.m.

1325. Following instructions are based on assumption Secretary did not make suggested démarche to HMG re Cyprus. If he did present instructions should be modified your discretion.

In Department view recent events Cyprus will result slipping away unexpected opportunity offered by EOKA truce for progress toward settlement. Believe it of importance to prevent loss this opportunity by some rapid UK move designed appear as positive response EOKA truce without appearing as concession to violence. British surrender terms alone seem likely to lead to renewed violence and increased Greek and Cypriot distrust (Athens 669).

You should inform HMG of above plus following:

UK position has been no further negotiations possible until violence ended. Violence has ended but main UK response has been what amounts to, in eyes EOKA, additional demand for complete surrender, resulting in confirmation Greek distrust British motives. While weakened state EOKA (Nicosia 55) may mean this threat is only bluff, Greek and Greek-Cypriot attitude has now hardened reducing chances for progress (Athens 675). If no positive UK response soon EOKA may indeed resume violence regardless present strength.

You should urge UK consider immediate announcement, preferably from London and from highest level, reiterating that it would be unfortunate if present improved prospects for progress toward

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–2356. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Laingen, Wood, and Williams. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, Ankara, and pouched to Paris for USRO and to USUN. Dulles was in London for the Suez Canal Conference, August 16–23.

2 On August 22, in Tedul 19, the Department suggested that Dulles’ visit to London might provide an opportunity to test Britain’s receptivity to the proposed U.S. plan on Cyprus as outlined in Holmes’ memorandum of July 30 and Rountree’s of August 13 (supra). The Department added that the present halt in violence called by EOKA might support Britain’s view that it could solve the problem on Cyprus and that London might be in no mood to consider the U.S. plan. (Ibid., 747C.00/8–2256)

3 Dated August 23. (Ibid., 747C.00/8–2356)

4 In telegram 55, August 20, Courtney reported from Nicosia that Governor Harding had indicated to him that the EOKA truce resulted from the organization’s own recognition of its weakness. British operations waged against it, Harding noted, had harassed and disrupted EOKA’s campaign of terror. (Ibid., 747C.00/8–2056)

5 In telegram 675, August 23 (subsequently renumbered as 674), the Embassy informed the Department: “We believe precipitate British advance from truce to surrender may have seriously compromised chances for progress toward solution. As was to be expected, latest British move being seized upon by opposition to charge government with complicity, if not treason.” (Ibid., 747C.00/8–2356)
self-government resulting from truce are now lost by renewal violence as threatened by EOKA. For this to be convincing to Greeks and EOKA, such announcement might be accompanied by indications from UK that surrender terms do not constitute condition which must be met before further progress made but are part of machinery providing opportunity for terrorists extricate themselves from present circumstances and eventual return to normal life, either in Greece or Cyprus. (Would be preferable if three-week limitation were not mentioned.)

In addition some UK compromise gesture, if nothing more than reaffirmation intention press ahead with proposals for self-government coupled with announcement of early Radcliffe return to Island seems essential.

In absence some such British moves now there is danger increased bitterness both sides likely remove any possibility progress before next Session GA.

Hoover

190. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, August 28, 1956—9 p.m.

732. Prime Minister asked me call this morning to discuss the crisis he and his government face as result recent developments Cyprus issue. Throughout two hour conversation he was calm and deadly serious, at times I detected a note of despair.

He said recent events in Ankara (penetration of Greek Embassy files) and London (publication of EOKA documents) obliged him either to formulate a definite policy as to how his government

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–1856. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Nicosia, Ankara, Paris, and London.

2 In telegram 593 from Ankara, August 29, the Embassy informed the Department that according to press reports unknown person or persons had entered the Greek Chancery on August 25 and removed four “unimportant” files. (Ibid., 601.8182/8–2956)

3 On August 26, the British Colonial Office announced that it had possession of a diary of Colonel George Grivas, leader of EOKA. According to British authorities, the diary entries indicated that Makarios was intimately involved with the founding of the organization and its operations. The Colonial Office subsequently published extracts from the diary.
should face Cyprus issue, or to step down, leaving the task to others who might be better able to cope with it. If he stays, one policy would be to accept the humiliations heaped upon Greece and to abandon Cyprus cause. This he excluded. The other would be to "fight back" and to accept support from any quarter. He was now weighing his second line of policy.

Noting that British had sought absolutely no contact with him since February elections and that he was completely in dark re their intentions, and that he is definitely not threatening to turn toward Russia, he stated that it was only natural that he should turn to US Government for help and protection. What is US point of view on how solution can be found, and what is US willing to do about it? He wished me convey to my government his request that US undertake role of mediation between Greece–UK on Cyprus. Could he have an answer within one week? What ever nature of reply or even if no reply forthcoming, he had within next week or ten days to make fundamental decisions re his future course.

In replying to Karamanlis I reviewed many occasions on which US active interest Cyprus question had been manifested and assured him our efforts were not at an end. He asserted belief we have failed influence British and expressed doubt latter wanted solution. This led to discussion in which I stressed damage done to Greek position by EOKA terrorism and Athens radio broadcasts. Karamanlis categorically denied that his government in any way involved in EOKA violence. Wherever responsibility for violence might be, it was resorted to because British refused give democratic self-government to Cypriot people. Where was Radcliffe’s famous constitution? If British really intend to give self-government to Cyprus, why have they taken so long to produce this document? Its publication would prove British bona fides in an instant. Instead they offer life sentences and concentration camps.

Key to problem is liberal constitution and amnesty. Self-determination can be postponed indefinitely and be worked out over years between Cypriots and British or by NATO. Cypriot people may in end not wish sever British tie for economic and other reasons. Perhaps they will decide for independence in Commonwealth, . . . There is impressive range of solutions and Greek position not inflexible. But only political solution will stop violence and further deterioration in Greek-allied relations.

Embassy attaches importance this plea from . . . Prime Minister. While not advocating kind of formal mediation Karamanlis requesting, we do believe that personal message from Secretary to Karamanlis indicating our intentions pursue this matter vigorously would go far help control situation here. Acceleration of British
plans for self-government (London’s 30^4) would in Embassy’s view be most expedient move at this time.

Thurston

^4 Telegram 30, July 23, reports on an unrelated matter. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7–2356)

191. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece

Washington, September 3, 1956—4:45 p.m.

855. Athens tells 755, 733,^2 732, ^3 609, ^4 Despatch 66. ^5

Athens: Deliver following personal message to Averoff from the Acting Secretary and emphasize request that text be treated as confidential:

“In the absence of the Secretary I should like to acknowledge your message of August 18 concerning the Cyprus situation. Our Chargé, Mr. Thurston, has reported on the conversations which the Prime Minister and you held with him on August 28, and I am also informed of the proposals which you transmitted through Ambassador Cannon.

I would like to assure you that we are at this moment considering the Cyprus question urgently. Although some of the recent developments have been discouraging, we are fully determined to do what we can in the endeavor to find a solution. We recognize the real importance to all of us that some concrete improvement be achieved as soon as possible.

We are gratified at the attitude of the Greek Government reflected in the proposals which you gave to Ambassador Cannon, as

^1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–2856. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Rountree, Wood, and Laingen. Also sent to London; repeated to Ankara, Paris, and Nicosia; and pouch to Belgrade, Vienna, and Naples.

^2 Regarding telegram 755, see footnote 6 below. Telegram 733, August 28, is in Department of State, Central File 747C.00/8–2856.

^3 Supra.

^4 Telegram 609, August 19, transmitted a message of August 18 from the Foreign Minister. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–1956)

^5 Despatch 66 from Athens, July 30, contained a memorandum outlining Greek conditions for a solution to the Cyprus dispute. Among other things, the memorandum called for unreserved recognition of the principle of self-determination, granting of a “truly liberal” constitution, a general amnesty, and endorsement of the plan by Makarios. The original of the memorandum was given to departing Ambassador Cannon for transmittal to Dulles. (Ibid., 747C.00/7–3056)
supplemented by your remarks to Mr. Thurston. We are also assured of the British desire to improve the situation on Cyprus. In the circumstances there should be a considerable possibility of a better understanding.

We will be in touch with you again soon to convey our further thoughts.

Please convey my respects to Prime Minister Karamanlis. Sincerely."

London: You may inform HMG that GOG has requested US "mediation" in Cyprus question but we have no plans to accede. You may at your discretion inform British of general substance message above. You should then make strong request that HMG seek reestablish contact with GOG and give latter some indication its present plans. . . . You should seek answer from HMG. Department would also appreciate receiving from HMG as complete information as possible UK plans and intentions for Cyprus (Athens 755).  

FYI It our view Cyprus problem not likely be solved by formal mediation, since prior consent our intervention by all concerned needed. We therefore not giving consideration Karamanlis request. Appears GOG also does not expect this (Athens 755). Department actively studying other possible US action meet worsening Cyprus and Greek Government situation. End FYI.  

Hoover

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6 Telegram 755, August 30, expressed the Embassy’s view that there was a need to “smoke out true British intentions.” (Ibid., 747C.00/8-3056)

7 In telegram 963 from Athens, September 19, Thurston reported that the Acting Greek Foreign Minister had informed him that the Prime Minister was anxious to receive a progress report on Cyprus. (Ibid., 747C.00/9-1956) In telegram 1072, September 21, the Department replied that it was sympathetic to the Prime Minister’s desire for information on the U.S. position, but that Karamanlis could not be given any additional information at this time. (Ibid.)
192. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State


SUBJECT

Procedure for Dealing with Cyprus Question

Background

This paper is an attempt to evaluate the basic factors and probable development of the Cyprus question as affecting the United States and NATO and to assess whether there is any useful action which the United States should take.

Discussion

A. Present Situation

The United States as the leader of NATO is witnessing a dispute which for a year has made real cooperation between two NATO members and a third member impossible. It has weakened NATO internally and has also weakened outside respect for NATO as a cohesive group.

The differing positions of the three members have become so hardened by mutual mistrust and by mutual public condemnation that agreement is unlikely without outside assistance. Certainly the history of the Cyprus question for the past two and a half years shows steady deterioration. A permanent improvement is unlikely unless these countries are helped to reestablish contact, discussion and some understanding. For the past year there have been no useful discussions between Greece and the United Kingdom or Turkey. Even if the British are now able to restore order and to offer a fair constitution, it is unlikely that the Cypriots would accept it without considerable encouragement from Greece. Greece and Turkey almost certainly cannot extricate themselves from their present public positions and assume more useful roles in finding a solution without an active display of American interest. All this would be worsened by a third and more vehement quarrel in the U.N. General Assembly.

B. Possible U.S. Role

Thus the Cyprus situation will almost certainly not be improved unless the U.S., as the leading power in NATO, assumes a more

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–456. Secret. Drafted by Williams, Wood, and Rountree on September 1.
active role in bringing its allies together. The following considerations would bear upon the decision as to what the United States might do:

1. Both the British and Greek Governments are under pressure to achieve some form of settlement and seem to desire a settlement.
2. The Turkish position has hardened since the United States has been less active in recent months and as the Greek attitude has become more flexible. Turkish realism would probably dictate a less intransigent attitude if faced by joint US-UK proposals for a reasonable settlement which would take into account Turkish interest in and sensitivity over the matter.
3. The general feeling among all NATO members that the difficulties emanating from this relatively small island should be settled could probably be turned to good account.

Experience has demonstrated that the mere dispatch of messages to the several parties in the dispute is not an effective means of dealing with the matter. It is also clear that a meeting of the three powers would probably be counterproductive and would lead to highly publicized intemperate oratory. It would seem in the circumstance that the United States should designate an experienced officer to go to London, Athens and Ankara to have talks quietly and informally.

This officer should seek to find and widen such common ground as may form the basis for a solution. He should report on his findings before committing U.S. prestige to any major understandings. He should avoid publicity and for this purpose a NATO cover might be useful.

The officer will see that the two main focuses of dispute have been (a) the Greek and Cypriot demand for immediate self-government for the island and (b) the Greek and Cypriot desire for self-determination. (There is little real dissension on continued use of British bases.) Of the two, the issue of self-determination is the more difficult since the Turkish Government has taken a strong stand against it. On the other hand, the British Prime Minister has publicly recognized that the principle of self-determination is applicable to Cyprus under certain circumstances. Our own position is defined by the President's letter to Karamanlis (Tab A) stating that "the basic right of peoples to governments of their own choice" (Joint Declaration of Washington) is applicable to Cyprus. The Greek Government, moreover, has indicated its willingness to put settlement of this matter aside for ultimate disposition by the British and Cypriots or by NATO. It may be possible with U.S. assistance

\[\text{Tab A}\]

\[2\text{ Not found attached, but printed as Document 161.}\]
to reduce to manageable proportions the emotions involved in the self-determination issue.

On the issue of self-government, our negotiator will find considerable common ground. The U.K. already has asked Lord Radcliffe to draft a constitution. The Greek Prime Minister has said that requirements for a solution are a liberal constitution and amnesty for the revolutionaries. If the British can expedite the promulgation of a liberal constitution with a minimum of power reserved to the British Governor, our representative may find that the Greeks can be persuaded to accept such a solution. The Greeks, moreover, may come to see that the gap between a full measure of self-government and self-determination is not great. As for the Cypriots, there is reason to believe that Greek influence over the Cyprus Ethnarchy may now be sufficient to obtain acceptance and to bring an end to the current violence. The Turks, we believe, should be urged by us to agree on at least two important grounds: (a) that self-government has now become a cardinal principle of British colonial policy, from which there should be no exception in the case of Cyprus; and (b) that self-government is a right that can hardly be denied in the free world which the Atlantic Community protects. It must, of course, be recognized that Turkish agreement regarding self-government would depend upon the nature of the protection afforded to the Turkish minority.

Recommendations:

In sum, the present impasse may result not so much from the absence of a common ground for a settlement as from the absence of a channel through which the parties can privately explore a solution without the obstruction of public confrontation and popular demagoguery. We, therefore, recommend:

1. that an experienced officer be designated to explore this problem unobtrusively in London, Athens, and Ankara with a view to discovering or tactfully inducing sufficient common ground to produce an acceptable solution;
2. that Mr. Julius Holmes be the officer designated for this mission. \(^3\)

\(^3\) A notation on the source text by Rountree indicates that Dulles approved this memorandum.
193. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, September 6, 1956—5 p.m.

1328. Vienna for Penfield. Regarding Deptel 1602. I had long conversation today with Kirkpatrick and set forth U.S. concern at deterioration Greek Government position, referred to reports of recent conversations of Greeks with our Embassy Athens in which Greeks appeared prepared to take more reasonable attitude than heretofore with regard to Cyprus and emphasized our feeling that any opportunity to capitalize on such Greek conciliatory attitude toward solution of Cyprus problem should in our view be seized upon. I informed him that Greeks sent message to Secretary asking U.S. "mediation" but that U.S. has no present plan to accede to such request. I summarized substance Acting Secretary’s response, specifically our expression gratification at attitude Greek Government reflected in current proposals they have made to U.S. which I noted are largely consistent with British position as set forth to me by Kirkpatrick on various occasions. . . . Regarding Cyprus I inquired extent of British current contact with Greek Government and whether British have any plans to take advantage present atmosphere to confer with Greeks specifically in regard to steps toward self-government on island.

Kirkpatrick . . . confirmed that reports reaching British from Greek sources, including those from British Embassy Athens, suggest that Greek Government is currently taking line that it is prepared to support more reasonable arrangement for self-government than heretofore and not to insist on implementation of self-determination at this time. . . . practical steps would be either for Greeks to make their position public or at least to make known their attitude to Etnarchy and Greek Cypriots. At present he said there is every evidence that Greek Government is continuing to take contrary line publicly and with Greek Cypriots. I suggested it might be difficult for Government of Greece to take public line until they are aware of whole nature of self-government package which is to be presented to Greek Cypriots but that it seemed to us that British might well explore possibilities more directly and more specifically with Greek Government now on basis of current indications of its attitude. I asked whether British have any intention of discussing with Greek Government Lord Radcliffe’s proposals for constitution. Kirkpatrick

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9-656. Secret. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, Paris, and Nicosia.
2 Printed as telegram 855, Document 191.
replied in negative. Radcliffe’s plan is to proceed to Cyprus second time within next 2 weeks and to endeavor to discuss his concepts with Greek Cypriots and other elements on island. Kirkpatrick said he would hope that if Greek Government’s attitude is genuine it might be possible for that government to facilitate such discussions rather than as at present letting it be known on island that Greeks coming forward for such discussions are traitors to Greek cause.

Kirkpatrick emphasized that British have not made any decision to go to UN. They are apparently concerned at possibility UN consideration would give Soviets undesirable opportunity to raise issues regarding Malaya and other empire areas. I reiterated United States concern that if Cyprus is taken to UN, United States and United Kingdom may find themselves separated on colonial aspects of problem, and inquired how British would envisage presenting case to UN in such fashion as to contribute to solution rather than as purely negative commendatory action.

Specifically I asked whether British would envisage seeking resolution favoring self-government. He doubted British would be prepared to go that far and again stated that no decision has been taken and matter still under consideration.

Conversation then turned to extent British current contact with Greek Government which I had mentioned earlier. Kirkpatrick said Embassy Athens has relatively normal contact and that there is some indication that Greeks are considering re-establishing Ambassador in London. He noted Greek opposition circles have been criticizing government on grounds that its views on Cyprus are now largely represented in London by British Parliamentary opposition elements and urging that Greek Ambassador return to London. I again took occasion to emphasize United States conviction that, whatever reasons for apparent more conciliatory attitude Greek Government and even if attitude is more apparent than real, interest of all dictate every effort be made to take all possible steps to ensure that no opportunity is overlooked to advance Cyprus problem toward solution. While I am not wholly sanguine that British disposed move ahead this matter as fast as we would like and while it is obvious that Suez developments have an impact on British thinking tending to make them even more cautious in taking any steps which would prejudice firmness of their control over Cyprus base at this time, it is my view that they are in fact steadily moving toward some sort of realistic constitution for island and that Lord Radcliffe’s efforts in that direction are being expedited. Subsequent to drafting the foregoing, Eden told me at lunch today that Harding is returning London
next week to discuss constitution with Radcliffe. Eden agreed Greeks appear more conciliatory this moment and, although noting Cyprus problem not of importance Suez, professed concur my view that no opportunity should be lost to move toward solution and that critical situation regarding Suez itself makes progress in Cyprus issue more necessary. Have just received Deptel 1647. 3 Believe substance thereof covered in my conversation with Kirkpatrick. I went over with him Greek proposals as set forth to us, specifically (1) reaffirmation of British acceptance principle self determination at appropriate time which seemed to be covered by Harding's broadcast; (2) reservation to British of police powers for some period in addition to indefinite continuance defense and foreign affairs in British hands to reassure British and Turks that self government is not step on slippery slope to enosis, and (3) bi-cameral parliament with upper house having veto over minority rights, education, religion, etc. I indicated this position seemed generally close to line British have been taking for some time. As indicated above Kirkpatrick's response was to effect that Greek professions in this direction would be more valuable and could be taken more seriously if they were prepared to state this position publicly or effectively to Greek Cypriots.

Barbour

3 Not printed.

194. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France

Washington, September 8, 1956—4:14 p.m.

907. Holmes and principal officers only. Following message for Julius Holmes:

Secretary authorizes you explore Cyprus problem secretly and at highest level with Governments concerned along lines suggested in NEA memorandum September 4 2 which you saw before your departure. You should be present with Senator George in Paris at time answers to US questionnaire are discussed with Wisemen September


2 Document 192.
17. We believe you could undertake Cyprus mission at any time thereafter. You should seek for and attempt widen such areas of common understanding as exist and may form basis for solution. You may find progress on Cyprus being hindered more by lack of private communication than by lack of common ground. You should base yourself on general US position set forth in President’s letter February 20, 1956 to Prime Minister Karamanlis and NEA memorandum of September 4. These documents being pouchoned to you separately Paris. Ben Wood available as you require him.

You should not attempt formal mediation which would require prior consent all parties, but suggest rather your mission should in beginning be primarily exploratory. You should talk with HMG before going to Athens or Ankara and should proceed latter capitals only if British do not object. Suggest use NATO cover as appropriate, perhaps indicating visits Athens and Ankara for orientation purposes in connection your NATO responsibilities. You should of course report on your findings and give us your suggestions before assuming commitments.

Other addressees: Existence above authorization must be kept absolutely secret. Assist Holmes as needed. Background by pouch.

Dulles

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3 Senator George was appointed by Eisenhower as the President’s personal representative and special ambassador to advise him on the activities of the Committee on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO. The Committee of Three had circulated questionnaires to the member states to solicit their views and announced it would hold meetings in Paris to discuss the replies. The U.S. Delegation was composed of Senator George, Ambassador Perkins, and Julius Holmes. The delegation left for London and Paris on August 31.

4 Document 161.

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195. Editorial Note

On September 6, during the course of a discussion with the President, Dulles raised the problem of Cyprus. According to the memorandum of conversation, the following exchange occurred:

"I discussed the Cyprus matter with the President along the line of the recommendation to me of Mr. Rountree of September 4, 1956. I referred to the prior talk I had had with the President when he said that before we got in we should have some idea where we might perhaps come out. I said it seemed the Greeks might now be willing to settle on a basis which would deal with self-government..."
but leave at status quo the question of self-determination. If so, this
might provide a basis for settlement. Certainly the present Govern-
ment was the best one to deal with and unless something could be
worked out with it it might fall and a government with considerable
Communist influence take its place.

"... The President agreed that under the circumstances it
would be in order to proceed. I said I assumed we would talk first
with the British and not go further unless they were acquiescent. I
said the recommendation was that Julius Holmes be asked to take
this. The President thought he would be a good negotiator for the
purpose." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the
President)

196. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Spyros Skouras
and Secretary of State Dulles, Department of State,
Washington, September 10, 1956

SUBJECT
Skouras on Cyprus

Mr. Skouras had two purposes in calling on the Secretary:
First, he gave the Secretary a brief review of his travels this
summer. During these travels he had called first on the British Prime
Minister and the British Foreign Minister.

On June 20th Prime Minister Eden hinted to Skouras that the
British had a plan which would lead to eventual self-determination.
This referred to the British proposals which were submitted to the
Secretary on June 19th. 2 Skouras said that later these plans had
appeared in the British press and that there had been a strong
Turkish reaction against them. Next Mr. Skouras saw Prime Minister
Karamanlis and Foreign Minister Averoff in Athens on about July
5th. He gathered from them that the Greek Government felt heavily
burdened by the Cyprus question and was looking for any reason-
able solution which would permit them to save face and not be
weighed down with this problem. Finally he saw Mr. Koralta, the
President of the Turkish Parliament. He explained to Mr. Koralta
the Greek proposals as contained in Athens Embassy Despatch No.
66. 3 He said that Mr. Koralta was interested. Mr. Skouras was

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/19-1056. Secret. Drafted by
Wood on September 11.
2 See Documents 178 and 179.
3 Not printed, but see footnote 5, Document 191.
unable to see Prime Minister Menderes or President Bayar and admitted that the Turkish attitude was extremely stiff. He attempted to show them that good relations between Greece and Turkey were infinitely more important than the Cyprus question and urged that the Greeks and Turks should try to work this problem out between them. This suggestion does not appear to have been taken up.

The second point in Mr. Skouras' discussion was that as a result of his trip he had become convinced that the only way in which the Cyprus question could be solved would be to give the island Commonwealth status. He realized that HMG felt Cyprus was too small to be a Commonwealth, but he felt this consideration should not be conclusive. He pointed out that if Cyprus were given Commonwealth status within the British Commonwealth of Nations Turkey could not reasonably object and he was sure that the Greek Government would accept. He also claimed that the Cypriots would accept. He said this latter belief was based on what Prime Minister Karamanlis had told him. It was pointed out to Mr. Skouras that if Cyprus were to be given Commonwealth status it would have the right to leave the Commonwealth and that in effect this might be the same as eventual enosis.

Mr. Skouras said that he would submit a full report to the Secretary later. 4

4 In a letter to Dulles, September 14, Skouras forwarded a report on his activities and noted that a similar report had been submitted to the President. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–1456)
197. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 26, 1956

SUBJECT

British Request for Information regarding United States Position on Cyprus in the General Assembly

PARTICIPANTS

Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
Miss Barbara Salt, Counselor, British Embassy
The Secretary
Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, EUR
Mr. Chalmers B. Wood, GTI

Sir Roger said HMG remained anxious to avoid a Cyprus debate in the General Assembly. It was avoided last year mainly due to the decisive assistance which HMG received from the United States. Now the question had again been inscribed by Greece and there was considerable risk that there would be a damaging debate. However, if the United States were able to give HMG the same support as last year, it might be possible to avoid a debate. On the other hand, if this was not to be the US position, the debate might result in a diplomatic defeat for HMG. To avoid this HMG might put an item of its own on the Agenda to show Greece’s role in the Cyprus question. HMG had not yet decided but, if it were to inscribe such an item, it would have to do so by October 12 and would have to make its decision about ten days before October 12. Sir Roger realized this was difficult for the United States, but it was important for HMG to know since the American attitude would be decisive.

The Secretary pointed out that there had been a big change in the composition of the General Assembly which would probably result in increased support for Greece. Miss Salt agreed, although HMG had not analyzed the situation in detail. The Secretary asked if the Department had analyzed the question of our ability to prevent inscription and was told this had not been done. He pointed out to Sir Roger that the item could be submitted after October 12 as a matter of urgency and emphasized that this had been done a good many times before. Miss Salt replied HMG was thinking in terms of an indictment of the Greek Government for inciting violence on Cyprus by Athens Radio and by other means, which had occurred over a long period. It would thus be difficult to maintain that an emergency had arisen after October 12. The Secretary asked if the item could not be inscribed now in general terms. Miss Salt

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1 Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Wood.
replied that, in view of Article 2(7) of the UN Charter [Intervention in Matter of Essentially Domestic Jurisdiction], it would have to be aimed specifically at Greece.

The Secretary said he could not now say what our position would be. Generally, our basic view on inscription was pretty liberal and last year's decision to oppose inscription had been difficult; also, there was the practical question of how many members of the General Assembly could be persuaded. He said the Department would analyze the situation in terms of the chances of keeping the question off the Agenda. Sir Roger asked if he could receive an answer in a week or so. The Secretary said within a week he could probably go over with him our analysis of the situation as compared with that of the Foreign Office. . . . There might possibly be some developments in the solution of the question itself. . . .

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2 Brackets in the source text.
3 On October 2, an addendum to this memorandum was prepared by Wood. It reads:

"The Secretary concluded to Sir Roger that it also would not seem to be wise to campaign actively against the inscription of the Cyprus question unless there was a good chance of success since an unsuccessful effort would deplete any reserve of good will with other nations without compensating advantage." (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)

198. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, September 26, 1956—8 p.m.

1692. Paris for Dillon and Perkins only. Athens and Ankara principal officers only. Barbour and Holmes met yesterday evening with Lloyd, Lennox-Boyd, Nutting, Kirkpatrick, Peake (British Ambassador to Greece) and Young (Head Southern Department). Agreed cover was call on Nutting to discuss NATO affairs.

Holmes briefly explained mission and then raised question of whether in light of Suez situation, Her Majesty's Government anxious for early solution of Cyprus or whether it was considered in British interest to hold line on island and proceed in unhurried

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.154/9-2656. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Paris, Athens, and Ankara.
manner with Radcliffe constitution. There was no direct answer to this question, which probably indicates that relation Cyprus and Suez had not been thought through.

Lloyd mentioned British query to Department concerning our attitude inscriptions of Cyprus item by Greece on provisional agenda General Assembly. It was explained that one objective our suggested informal examination of situation was to determine U.S. position in U.N. Speaking direct to Lloyd, Nutting said he thought it essential that British complaint against Greece should be inscribed before final date of provisional agenda October 12. Lloyd and Lennox-Boyd seemed to agree and although British may delay until near deadline, there seems no doubt they will submit their complaint. They feel their case against Greece is a strong one and that there is a possibility that its inscription may result in a negotiated removal of it and the Greek item or the postponement of both to the tail end of the agenda.

Lennox-Boyd reported that Radcliffe had departed for Cyprus and would return in about a week. He expected that within 4 or 5 weeks from now Radcliffe would submit his draft constitution to Her Majesty’s Government. If the government approved the draft, he was willing to show it to the Greek Government before promulgation. In response to questions, he stated that personally he would be willing to accept Greek comments, and if there was real evidence of good faith by Greece, he would be willing to allow non-substantive changes if by so doing Greece’s ability to influence the ethnoarchy would be strengthened. Although he could not predict what Radcliffe’s recommendations would be, he felt certain that his draft constitution would be a truly liberal one.

Lennox-Boyd then volunteered his position with respect to Makarios: it was never intended that the exile would be permanent; if the Archbishop would denounce terrorism now and for the future, he would be allowed to return to Cyprus, but only after the new constitution was in force and working; if even after constitution in force and working, he still failed to denounce terrorism he would nevertheless be released, free to go where he chose, except he would be barred from Cyprus.

The Colonial Secretary then said he saw some possibility of a settlement if Greece would completely separate self-government and self-determination, settling now for the former, and if Turks could be convinced that self-government was not an open door to self-determination and that minority really protected.

Holmes pointed out that from what Karamanlis and Averoff have told our representatives in Athens, the appeal to the U.S. to mediate remarks by Averoff to Committee of 3 in Paris and to Senator George and him, it was our opinion that Greek Government
is very anxious for settlement, fears its political position and feels that when circumstances right it can influence Cypriots. Peake opinioned that Karamanlis is in no great danger of being ousted and that talk of losing power and painting black picture of what might succeed him was designed to "make our flesh creep". No one expressed agreement with this view.

There then followed general discussion of how Greek sincerity and influence with Cypriots might be tested. Kirkpatrick suggested that they might be asked to send word secretly to Bishop of Kitium that leading Cypriots respond to Radcliffe's invitation to consult on constitution.

The meeting lasted an hour and of course there was much more general conversation of the complex subject under discussion. It ended with Lloyd saying that they would discuss the matter, think it over and communicate with us as soon as possible.

The meeting was cordial, serious and our desire to be helpful was clearly appreciated. ²

Aldrich

²In telegram 1254, October 5, for Holmes and principal officers only, the Department made a number of comments on telegram 1692 that were intended for possible use in discussions with the British. Among its comments, the Department noted that if the United Kingdom was determined to inscribe the item regarding Greece's intervention in the Cyprus problem, it might be best to make the item of a general character without naming Greece. With respect to Makarios, the Department added, any proposals must be ultimately acceptable to the Greek Cypriots whose representatives insist that there can be no progress without the Archbishop. (Department of State, Central Files, 120.1540/9–2656)

199. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom ¹

Washington, September 29, 1956—5:48 p.m.

2340. For Holmes and principal officers only.

Holmes may make following points to HMG re Cyprus in manner he considers most suitable:

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1540/9–2956. Top Secret; Priority. Limited distribution. Drafted by Wood and Williams. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia and pouch to USUN.
1. Secretary has informed Holmes Makins démarche September 26 (Deptel 2 this subject). He authorizes Holmes carry on discussions this topic in order avoid risks misunderstanding and delay which might result from simultaneous talks in Washington and London.

2. HMG has inquired whether US would again undertake lobby actively against inscription Cyprus by GOG. As HMG aware campaign against Greek inscription would be contrary our policy not opposing our allies when they wish raise subject in UN which they consider important. Last year we reluctantly decided oppose GOG at last moment on grounds quiet diplomacy could be more fruitful than heated public debate. After fourteen months we would probably not be able use this argument effectively unless quiet diplomacy had led to real hope successful steps would be taken on Cyprus towards implementing “basic right of peoples to governments of their own choice.” (Quote from Washington Declaration of February 1, 1956. 3)

3. Furthermore if we should nevertheless decide oppose inscription, we do not believe such argument would be as convincing as last year and are not inclined to adopt it without real possibility success. Vote last year 28 against inscription, 22 for, 10 abstentions. As HMG has indicated we may have been able to influence the few votes needed for this majority, but since our argument will have been weakened by time and since composition of General Assembly has been considerably changed, we do not believe we could attain same result if attempted. Our preliminary analysis shows that if vote were as favorable as possible from UK viewpoint it would go against UK by narrow margin. Would appreciate British assessment. More on this later.

4. However unless we decide make such attempt, which would be both contrary to our principles and not likely to succeed, we understand HMG may decide submit item to show GOG violated Article 2(7). 4 While understanding HMG’s desire avoid what Makins described as “diplomatic defeat” in General Assembly, we must point out that British decision indict Greeks in UNGA might delay still longer solution HMG is seeking in Cyprus question. Whatever else might result, it is our belief that such a move would so harden attitude of GOG and Greek Cypriots that any progress would be impossible for indefinite future.

5. It is US view that there are many possibilities between extremes outlined above. Main factors for success some intermediary course would appear to be time and determination. For present we request understanding HMG will not submit item against Greece

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2 Telegram 1152 to Athens, September 28, repeated to London as telegram 2321, transmitted the highlights of Dulles’ conversation with Makins on September 26. (Ibid., 747C.00/9–2856)


4 Article 2, subparagraph 7 of the U.N. Charter reads: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.” For text of the Charter, see 59 Stat. 1037.
until latest moment since it could be inscribed as “important and urgent” question even during session.

6. Delay will provide time for Holmes proceed with mission and determine what possibilities exist for solution acceptable to Greeks, Turks, Cypriots and British. He may find grounds to justify UK-Greek agreement to defer or at least remove sting from UNGA debate.

FYI 1. Department will send comments on your 1692, 5 but for present consider most urgent problem is to obtain from British more time for your mission.

2. On September 11 Greek UN Rep submitted item re “violations of human rights set forth in the UN Charter.” This likely be Greek move permitting them to attack British re Cyprus indirectly should their motion for inscription Cyprus item be defeated. It adds to importance of seeking obtain some understanding between British and Greeks before UNGA meets. End FYI. 6

Dulles

5 Supra.
6 In telegram 1776, October 1, the Embassy at London reported that Barbour and Holmes met with Nutting to discuss the points raised in this telegram. Nutting noted that the United Kingdom was agreeable to the Holmes mission as long as discussions were confined to self-government on the basis of a liberal constitution with the issue of self-determination “indefinitely postponed” although the principle itself reaffirmed. (Department of State, Central Files, 120.1540/10–156)

200. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State 1

Athens, October 5, 1956—2 p.m.

1158. Paris for Dillon and Perkins; London, Ankara and Nicosia for principal officers only. Holmes and I spent 3½ hours with Karamanlis today going over Cyprus question. In morning session, which had to be broken off so that Prime Minister could attend memorial services marking first anniversary of death Papagos, Karamanlis gave strongly subjective and sometimes vehement account Greek side of question. Though he made clear his distrust of British, he readily recognized their vital interests deeply involved and ex-

pressed opinion that important to West in general and Greece in particular that they remain strong in this part of world. He was most appreciative of US interest and efforts and fully understood significance Holmes mission and need for his viewpoint as well as other parties to maintain strictest secrecy. In more relaxed evening session he indicated increased confidence his own political position.

Though atmosphere and substance of Karamanlis’ conversations somewhat different from talk with Averoff yesterday (latter engaged in no histrionics, took softer line on implementation self-determination principle, felt amnesty could be worked out along lines recent Harding proposals, and stressed efforts he making to influence Cypriot opinion in order prepare it for settlement short of self-determination), discrepancies not important as obviously deep desire of both for settlement of Cypriot issue.

From conversations to date Greek position on Cyprus problem emerges as follows:

1. Immediate introduction of self-government based on majority principle.

Greeks appear to have intimation that Radcliffe constitution will be liberal and are principally concerned with need that they be shown document in advance of publication in order make use this fact to strengthen their position with Greek public opinion, with Makarios, and with the Cypriots. They flatly state they will be willing to agree to any safeguards for Turkish minority. They accept without question reservation Defense and Foreign Affairs powers to British and recognize necessity for British continue have jurisdiction over internal security but would like understanding that after a stated period (three years was suggested) discussions take place between HMG and Cypriot Government for gradual turn-over of police power to Cypriots with British to retain indefinitely right to intervene in event emergency.

3. Amnesty

Though Averoff critical of Harding’s recent “surrender terms” he agreed that in connection broad political settlement similar arrangement might be acceptable if stated in somewhat different terms. He felt those affected would rather come to Greece as national heroes than remain in Cyprus and be tried for murder. He insisted that apart from Grivas very few Greeks were involved EOKA. Karamanlis’ attitude on amnesty was to emphasize that along with inauguration full self-government amnesty essential to stop fighting. Asked about Harding terms, he replied that best solution would be simple blanket amnesty for all concerned. He indicated willingness, however, give further consideration matter which he
recognized not as simple as he put it and expressed confidence amnesty solution could be reached if British really well disposed and anxious for settlement.

4. Makarios

Karamanlis and Averoff both believed it virtually impossible bring Cypriots to accept settlement without some form of blessing by Makarios. ... Karamanlis quite clear, however, on readiness (even eagerness) Greek Government send emissary to Seychelles posthaste if grounds of agreement found between British and Greeks and to authorize emissary to pursue strong pressure tactics on Makarios. ...

In conversations Greeks showed no apparent awareness of British intention to inscribe complaint against them in UNGA. They fully cognizant, however, that in UNGA debate British will attack them vigorously and would like to avoid it if at all possible. Unless solution can be found within next two or three weeks, however, Greek Government feels impelled press for inscription on final UNGA agenda.

While not admitting Turkish right to have determining voice in Cyprus matter, Karamanlis fully understood Turks have to be taken into account and expressed desire improve Greek-Turkish relations. He felt that if substantial Anglo-Greek agreement achieved, Turks would make necessary adjustments in their position.

At end second session with Karamanlis, Averoff joined us and there was brief discussion of tactics and procedures. Greeks stressed need to avoid unilateral announcement by British of any settlement and strongly advocated simultaneous announcements in both capitals. They again placed great weight on need for consultation concerning Radcliffe constitution.

Just prior Averoff's entry on scene, Holmes, bearing in mind need bring Averoff's helpful influence to bear, had obtained Prime Minister's consent to procedure under which we would draw up brief summary of Greek Government position (with view of showing it to British) and to going over this paper first with Foreign Minister. Objective this procedure to reconcile differences between positions of two Ministers and to obtain a clear and agreed statement of Greek position without asking for formal commitments this time. Text paper will be cabled Washington when it takes final form after it has been reviewed by Averoff and a probable last going over with Karamanlis.

Holmes believes that in light discussions here it would now be more productive to return to London before proceeding Ankara unless Department has contrary view. Should be able complete work here today and to fly London this weekend.
Reference: Department’s 751 to Ankara, Holmes recommends that Embassy Ankara start preparing Turks along lines suggested therein without, of course, making reference Dr. Holmes visit. Both Holmes and this Embassy appreciate need avoid appearance presenting Turks with fait accompli although if it is found possible to achieve broad agreement between London and Athens, this should strengthen Holmes hand with Turks.  

Thurston

2 Telegram 751, October 3, noted that the Department was concerned over the "increasing vociferousness of the Turkish attitude on Cyprus" and indicated that it was still the U.S. view that Turkey must be prepared to modify gradually its position. (Ibid., 747C.00/10–156)

3 In telegram 1271, October 6, the Department concurred that, Holmes should return to London before proceeding to Ankara. (Ibid., 120.1540/10–556)

201. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary’s Office, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, October 7, 1956, 7:30 p.m.  

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

US Side:

The Secretary
Ambassador Lodge
Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Tyler

UK Side:

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
Sir Pierson Dixon
Mr. Coulson, British Embassy
Two Other Advisers

Mr. Lloyd said that although it had been possible to defeat inscription of the Cyprus item last year, he thought that this year would probably not be possible.

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.001/10–756. Secret. Drafted by Tyler. Dulles and Lloyd were in New York to attend a Security Council meeting on the Suez Canal situation.
The Secretary agreed and said that it looked as though that would be the case. Mr. Lloyd said that if the battle for inscription were lost this would hamper the prospects for peace. Therefore, the UK intended to put forward a counter-item, which would be directed against the Greek broadcasts and Greek help to terrorists. He said that while the UK did not want "a public wrangle" on the subject, he hoped that each item would cancel the other out and that this would discourage the Greek Government from pressing its item. The title of the item the UK had in mind was "Support from Greece for terrorism in Cyprus".

Ambassador Lodge questioned this title which suggested that the Greek Government was being indicted.

The Secretary suggested something like "Support from Greeks of terrorist activities in Cyprus". He said that the US is satisfied that the present Karamanlis government is sick to death of the Cyprus business. At the same time it is subject to pressure by Greek public opinion. He did not exclude the possibility that something might be worked out between now and the time at which the General Assembly convened which might lead to a settlement. But if an item were inscribed under an inflammatory title it would place the Greek Government in a position vis-à-vis Greek public opinion where the Greek Government would have no freedom of action. He, therefore, hoped that the UK would find a title which would not inflame them. He understood the reasons why the UK might feel compelled to put forward a counter-item but suggested that if they had to do so it might be something like "Support from without Greece of illegal activities within Cyprus".

Mr. Lloyd questioned whether the US was psychologically right in its estimate of the situation. He thought that perhaps the prospects for a settlement would be improved if we seemed prepared "to beat Greeks over the head".

The Secretary repeated that it was our view that the present Greek Government is sick of the whole Cyprus business and was groping desperately to find a way to settle matters. . . . He questioned the advisability of publicly appearing to challenge a government's integrity and honor.

Mr. Lloyd said he was inclined to agree and suggested another variant: "Support from overseas of terrorism in Cyprus". This, he said, would not be provocative and would leave the Greeks concerned about what might be said. After a little further discussion with his advisors, Mr. Lloyd said he would suggest to London the formula: "External support for terrorism in Cyprus". He added that he would see what support he could get for the above title from London.
202. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, October 7, 1956—1 p.m.

1181. Paris for Dillon and Perkins. London, Ankara and Nicosia for principal officers only. Device of putting down on paper our understanding of Greek position on Cyprus following talks reported Embtel 1158 had interesting repercussions. ... They endeavored to introduce language ... and providing that within 8 years NAC would be definitely obligated to set date for plebiscite.

When it became clear from talk with Averoff yesterday that he was having difficulty in obtaining Prime Minister's approval of our initial draft, Holmes and I suggested joint meeting with both Karmanlis and Averoff which took place today and lasted more than 3 hours. As agreed, I took strong line at outset that Holmes here because of impression gained by Embassy in many meetings with Prime Minister and his Foreign Minister that only small differences existed between positions Greek and British Governments, and that Greek Government was fundamentally prepared to go ahead with self-government now and to postpone application of self-determination principle to indefinite future. If this was not, in fact, Greek position, then Holmes was wasting his time. Latter then stated that in his opinion British would not agree to any proposal which committed them definitely to hold plebiscite.

This approach had good effect, and session ended with Karmanlis dictating to Averoff statement of Greek position for Holmes to give British. ... Upshot this procedure was Greek paper text of which being cabled next following message. Holmes authorized transmit this to British; he also will convey orally following points:

1. Regardless outcome plebiscite UK military facilities to be guaranteed in perpetuity by Greece.
2. In event plebiscite results in enosis Greeks would agree to NATO control militarization island including presence Greek forces.
3. In event Greek emissary sent to Makarios would have authority exert strong pressure.
4. Greeks would exert their best efforts obtain Turkish concurrence.
5. In event enosis Greeks would accord generous economic privileges to Turkey and Britain.

2 Document 200.
3 See footnote 2, infra.
In final go-round with Averoff late last night he was generally optimistic (conversation withIk sel reported Embtel 1178 had given him more hopeful attitude re Turkish position). However, he expressed personal belief that if agreement reached, political crisis would be inevitable. If election forced, he was confident Karamanlis would fight hard and succeed.

Holmes raised question whether anything could be done now by Greek Government to improve climate while negotiations proceeding. For example, if return Radcliffe were made occasion for favorable public utterance by British, could Greeks respond by sending their Ambassador to London? Averoff said he had been seeking opportunity to just that but with UNGA imminent it was very difficult for Greek Government to “break vicious circle”. Public suspicion would be aroused that Greek position weakening. This would lead to internal political complications.

Meetings were discreetly held in private houses and Holmes’ presence in Athens has not been noted. There has been no inquiry from press and it has not been necessary to use NATO cover. Holmes flying London today.

Thurston

4 Telegram 1178, October 6, reported that during a discussion between Ik sel and Averoff, the latter indicated it might be possible to postpone the question of enosis for the future. Ik sel noted that this might be a way to resolve the problem. (Department of State, Central Files, 601.8281/10-656)
5 In telegram 810 from Ankara, October 11, the Embassy informed the Department that it was likely that the Turkish Foreign Office was well aware of Holmes’ mission and of his recent travels and talks. The Embassy expressed its concern that the “recent procedure” had greatly reduced the likelihood of achieving a satisfactory formula regarding Cyprus at this time. (Ibid., 747C.00/10-1156)

203. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1

London, October 8, 1956—9 p.m.

1918. Principal officers only. Paris for Dillon and Perkins. Barbour and Holmes with Nutting and Kirkpatrick this afternoon. Holmes gave an account of his impression of the Greek attitude with

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1540/10-856. Top Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Paris, Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia.
regard to the Cyprus question with special emphasis on the vulnerability of Karamanlis vis-à-vis opposition and public opinion, concluding with the statement that he was convinced that Greeks are genuinely anxious for settlement.

Holmes handed Nutting copy of Greek position which had been authorized by Karamanlis. He then added the points which the Greeks had authorized him to convey orally (Athens nos. 1181 and 1182 to Department).

There followed a general discussion consisting principally of comments that the three-year period was too short a time for self-government to begin to function properly, and paragraph 7 of the Greek paper which was considered as giving Makarios veto power over any Anglo-Greek agreement which might be reached. Holmes said that he thought it might be possible to obtain a longer period than three years from the Greeks if a counter proposal did not depart too radically from the basic formula on self-determination. He went on to say that he had told Averoff that he doubted that the British would accept the proposal concerning consultation with Makarios as set forth in paragraph 7. A discussion then followed as to the advisability of insisting with the Greeks that if an agreement is reached with them it will be applicable regardless of the final attitude of the Archbishop.

Holmes then told the British that he had been authorized by Averoff to say that Greeks felt it imperative to go ahead with the inscription of their item on the GA agenda, that Averoff had stated he thought they would be successful in obtaining inscription but that he would make a formal commitment that the Greeks would immediately move to place the item at the end of the agenda. Averoff pointed out that this would give 2 or 3 months during which a negotiated solution might be reached. Nutting said that the British had definitely decided that they had no alternative but to inscribe their complaints against the Greeks. Holmes suggested for British consideration that they inform the Greek Minister advance of their intention to inscribe, saying that they understood the Greeks would move to have their item placed at the end of the agenda and that if this were confirmed British would do likewise. Nutting appeared to be impressed by this suggestion.

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2 The text of the Greek position was transmitted in telegram 1182 from Athens, October 7. Among the points enumerated in the Greek position were direct and unreserved recognition of the principle of self-determination, application of self-determination to be made by a three-fifths vote in the NAC or by the British Government and the elected government of Cyprus, and the granting of a liberal constitution. (Ibid., 747C.00/10–756)

3 Supra.

4 See footnote 2 above.
There were several remarks made about the difficulty of the position which the Turks would likely take particularly on the formula on self-determination but nothing new emerged in this part of the discussion.

The general reception of the Greek terms was non-committal but was not negative. Nutting said that the matter would be considered by HMG and he would communicate with Embassy as soon as possible.\(^5\) Department may care pass UN portion this message to New York.

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\(^5\) See infra.

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204. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State \(^1\)

London, October 25, 1956—7 p.m.

2280. Paris for Dillon and Perkins. Principal officers only. Barbour and Holmes met with Nutting, who was accompanied by Young this afternoon. Nutting was profuse in his apologies about delay, saying that he literally had not been able to get the appropriate ministers together to consider the Greek proposal. He also expressed regret that the reply was so negative in character.

He handed over a memorandum, the text of which is being transmitted in the next following telegram.\(^2\) It was interesting to note that the copy handed Barbour had as a heading the following: “revised formula for reply to Mister Juliet Holmes”, while the original did not bear this heading.

After reading the memorandum, Holmes observed that the 3-year period proposed by the Greeks, as compared with the 10-year period in HMG's proposals of last June, was obviously a starting point by the Greeks and was certainly susceptible of negotiation. He also took issue with the statement that the Greek proposal did not take into account British continuing interest in Cyprus and the

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\(^1\) Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10–2556. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia.

\(^2\) Telegram 2281, October 25, transmitted the text of the British rejection of the Greek proposals, which noted that the proposals did not “form a realistic basis for a settlement.” (Ibid.)
eastern Mediterranean or of Turkish interests. Clarification was asked on these and other points in the text, but none was forthcoming. Nutting said at this point that the Greek proposals were also less favorable than the British plan of last June in that they did not contain the security pacts. Holmes observed that he had no reason to believe that the Greeks would not be willing to accept such pacts.

Both Barbour and Holmes tried repeatedly to get over the point that it might be worthwhile for the British to make a counterproposal which would be acceptable to them and which would be as nearly acceptable to the Turks as possible. These suggestions met with no response.

Nutting made a great deal of the known adamant attitude of the Turks, bringing out a memorandum of conversation between Lloyd and Birgi shortly after the conclusion of the last Suez conference in which Birgi recited the well-known Turkish opposition to any change in the status quo.

Nutting indicated that it was a substantially firm decision by HMG that they would go ahead with the Radcliffe constitution, saying that it was better to take one step at a time. He felt certain that the truly liberal constitution which would be developed would be unsatisfactory to the Turks and they expected a serious disagreement with them about it. In response to a question, Nutting said that Radcliffe would probably submit this report and draft constitution to the government within about 10 days time. Holmes then asked whether or not it was the intention of HMG to consult with the Greeks and Turks or at least to show them the constitution before its promulgation. Holmes suggested the possibility that prior consultation with the Greeks might win their support for the constitution, and through them it might even be possible to get Makarios’ approval and hence contribute to the cessation of terrorism and the acceptance of the constitution by the Cyprus population. Nutting replied that no decision had been made on the question of consultation but gave it as his personal opinion that it would probably be better to promulgate the constitution unilaterally, possibly with showing the text to the Greeks and the Turks an hour in advance.

It was clear that the British have decided not to attempt a negotiated solution at the present time but on the contrary intend to proceed unilaterally. Presumably they believe that by the publication of a liberal constitution their public position will be improved.

There followed some discussion about the inscription of the Greek and British items on the agenda of the UN, and in response to a direct question, Nutting replied that although the Greeks had been notified in advance of the British intention to inscribe, there had been no understanding with them to postpone both items to the end of the UN Agenda. He said that although HMG had not yet decided
on the position it would take, he felt that it might prove to be advantageous to have the debate early in the General Assembly. To Holmes query as to whether or not this meant that the British had given up any hope of a negotiated settlement, Nutting replied that even if the debate occurred at the end of the session, the time available would be only 3 months and he doubted that there was any chance of getting a settlement in that period of time.

We believe that the attitude described above is a part of the current British mood of self-assertion in anything having to do with the Middle East. As has been shown in the Suez matter, they have taken the position of “thus far and no farther”. All arguments tending to show the advantages of an agreed settlement met with no success.

Nutting asked Holmes whether or not he intended to go to Ankara for talks with the Turks. Holmes replied that he was not inclined to discuss the Greek proposals with the Turks in the light of the flat British rejection of them. He felt that it might be worthwhile to make a general sounding of the Turkish position, that he would decide about this later and let Nutting know whether or not he intended to go to Ankara.

Holmes feels that it would nevertheless be desirable to discuss these developments generally with Turks. If any appreciable give in Turkish attitude should be forthcoming, we would be justified in going back at British in view of importance for British position they have represented as attaching to Turkish adamancy. Another reason for doing this is the fact that according to report from Embassy Ankara, Birgi has a good idea of Holmes omission and it not be in US interests to fail to consult with the third principal party to the Cyprus controversy. Unless instructed by the Department to the contrary, Holmes will proceed to Ankara on Sunday. ³

We feel that some statements should be made immediately to the Greeks with regard to the reception of their proposal in London, and suggest that if Department agrees instruction be sent to Allen to tell the Greek Government that the British have not found the Greek position acceptable, that one of the important considerations in reaching this attitude was British conviction that the Turks would find them wholly unacceptable, and that Holmes is going to Ankara

³ October 28.
to have a general discussion of the problem with the Turkish Government.4

Aldrich

4 On October 26, the Department informed the Embassies at London and Athens as follows:

"To London: Approve suggestion penultimate paragraph Section 2 ref tel. Department envisages Holmes returning to London for further attempt persuade HMG reconsider. May wish stop Athens en route Ankara to London for exploration with GOG British objections re time period and Turk interests.

"To Athens: Approve suggestion last paragraph Section 2 ref tel." (Telegram 1498 to Athens, October 26; Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10-2556)

Subsequently the Embassy at Athens informed the Department that Karamanlis and Averoff were both in Salonkia until October 30 and suggested that Holmes proceed to Ankara. In telegram 939 from Ankara, October 30, Warren informed the Department that Menderes would not be able to meet with Holmes before November 1. (Ibid., 747C.00/10-3056)

205. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State1

Ankara, November 3, 1956—8 p.m.

1002. Principal officers only; Paris for Dillon and Perkins. Holmes and I had an hour's conversation alone with Prime Minister evening of second.

Holmes explained mission and Menderes response was immediate and cordial, saying that it was understandable that the "head of the family should take the initiative in settling a family row". He went on to say that Turkey was anxious to bring the Cyprus dispute to a successful conclusion and, although Turkey's interests in the problem were vital and that the issue had become one of first importance in terms of internal politics, Turkey, nevertheless, was prepared to do everything possible to contribute to a solution. Menderes confirmed reports from Athens that Hacopulos, a Greek member of the Turkish Parliament, was acting as go-between in an endeavor to get Prime Ministers of Turkey and Greece together in hopes of making progress on Cyprus and improving relations in general. He said that Hacopulos was in Ankara and was to depart November 3 for Athens to transmit agreement for meeting. Prime

Minister said that it would not be possible for him and Karamanlis to meet without publicity but that arrangements would probably be made for Etem Menderes, Acting Foreign Minister, to meet Averoff, possibly some place in Europe on latter's return from UNGA. He went on to say that it might later be decided for Etem Menderes to attend GA, in which case he and Averoff would have ample opportunity for discussion in New York. Prime Minister intimated that this exchange with Greeks was on Turkish initiative and pointed to this fact as evidence Turkish desires to improve situation.

Holmes outlined his personal opinion as to present Greek and British attitudes, saying that he was convinced that Greeks were very anxious to dispose of Cyprus matter and prepared to accept any reasonable formula which Karamanlis could justify with Greek public opinion. He pointed out that the British were proceeding with Radcliffe constitution and that in his view UK would inevitably be obliged institute self-government Cyprus as soon as local conditions would permit. He offered purely personal suggestion that delay in coming to grips with the problem would benefit no one and that it might be advantageous to assist the present British Government in setting a pattern of self-government, particularly in the light of the public commitment of the British Labor Party to self-determination and the possibility, at least, that should Labor come to power a solution favorable to Turkey might be more difficult of attainment than with the present Conservative government. Menderes attitude was extremely friendly, including repeated assurances of the importance to Turkey of the NATO alliance and particularly the relationship with the US. He said he would discuss our conversation with the President and his colleagues, and see us again November 3.

Holmes and I were called to the Foreign Office at noon today and had an hour and a half with Acting Foreign Minister Etem Menderes and Birgi. Much of the conversation of the evening before was repeated with Birgi acting as interpreter. Holmes went a little further in offering as his own purely exploratory idea of a possible formula which would consist of the UK consulting both Greece and Turkey with regard to the Radcliffe constitution and giving both these governments an opportunity to comment. The purpose of this consultation would be to permit Turkey and Greece to approve the constitution. This would perhaps enable the Greek Government, having once agreed, to persuade Makarios to support the self-government plan and to call on the Greek Cypriots for a cessation of violence. The British Government would make a public statement reaffirming the applicability of self-determination to Cyprus but saying that circumstances do not permit its application now; that the problem must be approached in a gradual and orderly manner and the first step would be self-government; that after self-government
had proved a success and when political and strategic conditions in eastern Mediterranean permitted, HMG would address itself to the problem of self-determination. This formula would have the virtue of postponing the question of self-determination to the indefinite future but would set the pattern for a period during which self-government could be developed, peace would reign on the island, and an opportunity would be had for a reestablishment of friendly relations between Greece and Turkey and between the UK and Greece.

Preceded by a long explanation of the background of Greek behavior and the deterioration of Greco-Turkish relations, wherein all the blame attached to Greece, Etem Menderes said that in his view such a formula would not be accepted by Turkish public opinion as it would be construed only as a corridor leading to Enosis.

......

After more general discussion, Holmes asked Menderes whether or not he agreed that the Cyprus problems should not be allowed to run on and that steps should be taken forthwith to finding a settlement. To this he agreed, which is at least a step away from rigid position of no change in the status quo which the Turks have taken up to now. The Prime Minister’s attitude was more conciliatory and forthcoming than the Foreign Minister’s position today. Whether this balance was introduced by design, it is difficult to say. It may be significant that Birgi was not present at the conversation with Prime Minister but was present with the Foreign Minister. It should be noted that in this last discussion, Birgi acted as interpreter and made little or no contribution of his own to the discussion.

The interview ended with an invitation from the Foreign Minister for Holmes and me to dine with him and Birgi privately evening of November 4. He expressed hope that the Prime Minister could join us. I shall do what I can to encourage the Prime Minister’s
attendance as we believe the meeting will be more productive if he is there.²

Warren

²In telegram 1015 from Ankara, November 5, Warren reported the substance of a November 4 meeting among Holmes, Acting Foreign Minister Etem Menderes, and Birgi. At the meeting the Turks expressed a willingness to arrange a meeting between Averoff and Etem Menderes in Europe after the Greek Foreign Minister’s return from the General Assembly. Warren noted: “Our assessment of the Turkish attitude as presented last night is that there is definite move away from the rigidity heretofore expressed. We believe that direct US interest in this matter has influenced them to be somewhat more forthcoming in working toward settlement.” (Ibid., 747C.00/11–556)

In telegram 1027, November 6, the Embassy at Ankara reported that Holmes left for Athens that morning. (Ibid., 120.1540/11–656) That evening Holmes met with Averoff to convey his impressions of his talks with the Turks. According to Ambassador Allen, Holmes informed the Greek Foreign Minister of the genuine Turkish desire to effect a settlement of the Cyprus problem. Averoff reportedly agreed and added that arrangements had been made for him to meet with Etem Menderes in Paris. (Telegram 1632, from Athens, November 7; Ibid., 120.1540/11–756)

206. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State ¹

London, November 13, 1956—5 p.m.


Holmes described his conversation with Turks and Greeks, particularly former, reporting that although their basic position concerning their contention that any form of self-government was a “corridor to Enosis” had not really changed, he found a less intransigent attitude than they had previously displayed. He told Kirkpatrick of the arrangement for a secret meeting between Etem Menderes and Averoff in Paris on the latter’s return from the UNGA. Kirkpatrick said that about a week ago the Turkish Ambassador had informed him of this arrangement and had made a formal request on behalf of his government that the British not publish the Radcliffe report until after the Greco-Turkish meeting takes place. Kirkpatrick had referred this request to Ministers but as yet it had not been considered. When asked concerning HMG’s intentions

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–1356. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris, Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia.
regarding publication Radcliffe report, Kirkpatrick replied that it had not yet been considered by Cabinet and no decision has as yet been made. Upon further questioning, he said that it had not been decided whether or not the Greeks and Turks would be consulted on the constitution prior to publication. Barbour and Holmes both urged that this be done. Holmes asked Kirkpatrick whether or not he was right in assuming that in fact HMG had not put its mind to the Cyprus problem. Kirkpatrick replied that this was so, but added that he felt that they mean do so without further delay.

Kirkpatrick said that he felt that HMG would not be inclined toward partition as a solution, or in any event would much prefer self-government. He then asked Holmes whether or not in his opinion the Turks could be brought to approve of self-government with the question of self-determination left for the very indefinite future. Holmes reply was that although it would be difficult to obtain Turkish concurrence, he felt that it was very much worth trying and that if other circumstances were right, strong representations from the United States and United Kingdom might bring the Turks around. Kirkpatrick said that he suspected that the Turks hoped to make some progress in the secret meeting with the Greeks and then proceed to partition as a solution. He agreed with Holmes that it would be useful to get Greeks and Turks talking, and that even consideration of partition as a possible solution might tend to move them both from their present positions.

Kirkpatrick said that as far as he knew HMG had not decided on its tactics in the GA and presumed that this would be decided by Lloyd on the spot. Although he personally favored adjournment of both the Greek and British items to the end of the agenda, he was not sure that the British delegation would act to bring this about. He pointed out that the memorandum which was tabled by the British delegation yesterday was one of explanation required by United Nations procedure, and that it should not be construed as British intention to force an early substantive debate on Cyprus.

We believe that it is clear that the negative attitude expressed by Nutting and reported in London's 2280 to Department\(^2\) is explained by the fact that the British decision to intervene in Egypt had at that time been made. Although Nutting may not have been

\(^2\) Document 204.
privy to the decision, the Cabinet had clearly decided not to touch the Cyprus question at that time.

Holmes feels that there is nothing more for him to do until (1) the British have decided what they are to do regarding the Radcliffe report, (2) until the Averoff-Menderes meeting takes place, and (3) until the Cyprus position in the United Nations is more clear. He therefore feels that he should return to Washington to report to Department and unless instructed to the contrary will leave London Wednesday evening.³

Aldrich

³November 14.

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207. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)¹


DEAR CABOT: As you know, the problem of Cyprus has been under intensive discussion in diplomatic channels, and I thought it would be useful to review briefly what has been happening before the Assembly convenes.

If present plans materialize, Prime Minister Karamanlis of Greece should arrive in New York on November 10² for the opening of the Assembly’s regular session. Foreign Minister Averoff arrived on the eighth. Karamanlis originally planned to remain until about November 19. He is very anxious, however, to call on the President while here and will stay on after the 19th if necessary to suit the President’s schedule. The Department hopes that the President will be able to see him and has sent a memorandum to the White House requesting an appointment.

One of the reasons for Karamanlis’ decision to head his delegation is to strengthen himself at home by enhancing his prestige

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11-1356. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Laingen on November 9.
²Apparently no change was made here in the language drafted on November 9.
internationally. He will undoubtedly make a speech during the
general debate. He evidently is confident that the Greek request for
inscription of the Cyprus question will succeed, and he therefore
intends to follow a moderate course here. He apparently thinks that
British policy in the Middle East area is so unpopular that he can
safely demonstrate restraint in his public pronouncements at the UN
with respect to Cyprus and still be sure of sufficient support for
inscription. He also will probably want to make some general
statements on the world situation . . . Further, the Greek Govern-
ment, which refrained from participating in the Suez conferences,
now has informed us that it will support our efforts to seek a
peaceful settlement through the UN. The Greeks are interested in
sending a contingent to the international police force.

If these are Karamanlis' intentions, you will probably wish to
encourage him. The Department has already suggested to Ambassa-
dor Allen in Athens that Karamanlis be urged to follow a moderate
course in his statements at New York. (Deptel 1643 to Athens,
repeated info to USUN.)³

If we can get this sort of restraint from Karamanlis, and from
British and Turkish delegates as well, it should help a great deal,
both to get the delay we are hoping for in substantive debate on
Cyprus until late in the session and also to help in bringing about
some progress in the interim toward a settlement of the Cyprus
question through other channels. You are acquainted with our recent
efforts. Surprisingly there has been very little leakage. We think
things are going fairly well, in spite of the setback caused by British
rejection of proposals advanced privately through us by the Greek
Government. We do not know what the effects of the recent Middle
East developments⁴ will be on the British position, but Karamanlis
has indicated much discouragement to Ambassador Allen over their
present attitude.

On the other hand, there are grounds for optimism in indica-
tions from both Greek and Turkish leaders that they are increasingly
aware of the fact that a peaceful solution to the Cyprus question is
dependent in large part on direct Greek-Turk contacts and improved
relations between them. I refer particularly to Athens 1632 and
Ankara 1015.⁵ Previously the Greeks have tried to ignore the Turks
and pretend that a solution depended entirely on the British. Amb-
asador Allen has reported that he has made progress with both
Averoff and Karamanlis in convincing them of the need for such

³ Dated November 9. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10-2956)
⁴ Presumably a reference to the October 29 Israeli attack in Sinai and resulting
British and French military operations against Egypt.
⁵ Neither printed, but see footnote 2, Document 205.
direct contacts. (Athens 1526) He hopes that we will continue the process of so convincing Karamanlis and Averoff while they are in the United States. We certainly subscribe to this suggestion, and hope there may be occasion for such talks during the Assembly session.

Karamanlis also wants to talk about general economic aid problems and has asked if appropriate Washington officials might come to New York to discuss this subject. (Athens Telegram 1649) If he raises this with you, you might indicate that this is being arranged.

Sincerely yours,

Francis O. Wilcox

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6 Dated November 2. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–256)
7 Dated November 8. (Ibid., 747C.00/11–856)
8 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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208. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 15, 1956, 10:30–11:10 a.m.¹

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

Constantine Karamanlis, Prime Minister of Greece
George V. Melas, Greek Ambassador
Phedon Cavalierato, Counselor, Greek Embassy

Robert Murphy, G
William M. Rountree, NEA
C. Burke Elbrick, EUR
Walter N. Walmsley, IO
Ernest A. Lister, BNA
Owen T. Jones, GTI
Murat W. Williams, GTI
Chalmers B. Wood, GTI

The Prime Minister emphasized the justice and moderation of the Greek position. “Everybody knows we are right, but by talking about it we give people a headache.” He had held to a moderate course and done nothing “to hurt a solution” for fourteen months.

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–1556. Confidential. Drafted by Wood. Karamanlis arrived in New York on November 10 to head the Greek Delegation to the Eleventh Session of the U.N. General Assembly.
Time was running out. He asked if Mr. Murphy had any suggestions.

Mr. Murphy said we were not in a position to offer a solution, but we felt talks between Greece and Turkey were important.

The Prime Minister avoided this and cited as an example of Greek reasonableness their willingness to let NATO decide on the nature of guarantees for bases and minorities on Cyprus. This could be done by NATO two, three or four years after self-government was established. At this time the question of how and when to hold a plebiscite could also be decided. In reply to a question he said he did not intend to discuss Cyprus at the NATO Council Meeting in December.

He cited the British deportation of Makarios a week after his election and said, “this was the work of our allies.”

Mr. Murphy agreed that this had been hard on the Greek Government and said the US supported the idea that people are entitled to their own government. It was a question of procedure.

The Prime Minister mentioned that after the use of Cyprus as a base for operations against Egypt, the question of using Cyprus as a base has become more difficult for Greece.

As to the UN, he expected the debate would not take place until after Christmas. If there was no substantial improvement by then, Greece would have to fight in the UN. He raised the question of US support for Greece in the UN and suggested that the US inform the British that a settlement was definitely possible and that if the UK did not move quickly towards such a settlement, the US would have to oppose the British in the UN.

Mr. Murphy said we questioned the value of an acrimonious public debate, which would be exploited by the Soviets. We understood the factors involved and would support every effort to reach a settlement.

The Prime Minister said that if the British wanted a solution, they would start by releasing Makarios.

Mr. Murphy replied that events in the Middle East had not lightened the British load.

The Prime Minister said that Makarios had sufficient prestige to lead the Cypriots in any decision he made. It would be difficult for the Greek Government to find a solution without him. If the British wanted to prove their good faith to the Americans and to the world, they could begin with such a gesture. It would improve the situation by fifty percent.

Mr. Murphy said, “We may explore this with our friends.”

Mr. Karamanlis said he would continue to do his best, but did not know how long he could stand. The day before (November 14) in the Steering Committee he had given orders to avoid debate
although if he had fought, it would have been very popular in Greece. The Cyprus situation was becoming more serious the longer it remained unsettled. Time was important.

In conclusion Mr. Murphy replied, "Your approach shows you are exercising great statesmanship. We have nothing to gain by the prolongation of this unhappy crisis between our three friends. Time is important and although the overall situation is not favorable for a settlement of the Cyprus situation, we will do our best."

209. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey

Washington, November 15, 1956—8:05 p.m.

1102. Principal officer only. Embtel 1115. Memorandum conversation October 24 sent Ankara recounts Rountree Gork conversation Cyprus.

As Department indicated Deptels Ankara 901, 772 and 748, inscription Greek British items re Cyprus anticipated. US position traditionally is not to oppose discussion question of interest several nations. In this specific case, US also recognized fact inscription practically assured. US opposition would produce nothing positive and reduce reservoir of goodwill for US on grounds we opposed discussion cardinal US principle right of self-determination. For these reasons it was decided at highest level support both Greek British items. Department hopes Turks as practical men will appreciate logic US position. (Department's conclusion inscription likely was borne out when General Committee by common consent November 14 recommended (1) combining Greek and British items as sub-items "Question of Cyprus" and (2) inscription on GA agenda. Sarper did

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11-1556. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by John F. O'Grady of GTI. Repeated to Paris, London, and Athens and pouch to Nicosia.

2 In telegram 1115, November 13, the Embassy at Ankara reported that the Turks were disturbed by reports that the United States might not oppose inscription of the Cyprus item on the agenda of the forthcoming U.N. General Assembly. The Embassy added that, in its view, inscription of the Cyprus item might endanger Greek-Turkish relations, interfere with the Holmes mission, and not serve Western interests. (Ibid., 747C.00/11-1356)

3 Not printed. (Ibid., 747C.00/10-2456)

4 Dated October 23, 5, and 3, respectively. (Ibid., 747C.00/10-2356, 747C.00/10-556, and 747C.00/10-356)
not oppose inclusion but expressed fear GA debate would worsen Greek-Turkish-UK relations, to which Turkey attached great importance.)

Dept continues hope debate on Cyprus items will be delayed until near end of session in order afford opportunity for some agreement be reached in interim. Department and embassies should advocate restraint with Greek Turk governments and express our hope all parties will endeavor reach early solution Cyprus problem.

Hoover

210. Editorial Note

On November 14, in a briefing memorandum prepared for the President regarding the visit of Prime Minister Karamanlis and a luncheon reception planned for the following day, Hoover noted that the United States had not supported Greece as firmly as that country wished on the issue of Cyprus; nevertheless Greece had remained "firmly aligned" with the United States. The Under Secretary referred to the Holmes mission and noted that although there was no agreement between Greece and Turkey, officials seemed willing for the first time to have secret talks. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

On November 15, President Eisenhower gave a luncheon reception for Prime Minister Karamanlis at the White House. On November 17, during the course of a conversation with Secretary Dulles, the President referred to his talk with the Greek Prime Minister, a conversation that presumably occurred during the luncheon. According to a memorandum of the conversation:

"The President reported briefly on his conversation with Prime Minister Karamanlis of Greece. The Prime Minister had said that it was essential that in the near future the British make a generous gesture with regard to Cyprus. He had also stressed that the British attitude was the key to the situation. If they wanted a settlement one could be reached. The Prime Minister did not anticipate any great difficulty with the Turks if the British genuinely desired a settlement." (Ibid.)
211. Memorandum From the President's Special Representative (Holmes) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, November 19, 1956.

SUBJECT

Report on Cyprus Mission

Pursuant to instructions contained in Department's top secret telegram 907 to Paris, September 8, \(^2\) and oral instructions received from the Secretary in London on September 21, I undertook to explore the positions of the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey with respect to the Cyprus dispute. Cables which I sent from Missions abroad contain a record of my discussions and this memorandum-report will be brief. I visited London three times; Athens twice; and Ankara once.

The Suez crisis occurred in the midst of these conversations and was, in my opinion, the principal element which handicapped progress. It is now clear that at the time of my first substantive discussion with the British \(^3\) the decision had already been taken to intervene with the French in Egypt, and they were unwilling to discuss Cyprus which was their base for the military operation.

My estimate of the positions of the three disputants follows:

The controlling factor in the British attitude is that the members of the Government have been giving their undivided attention to the Middle East situation and have not put their minds to the possibility of a negotiated settlement in Cyprus. The Radcliffe Constitution and report have been completed and transmitted to HMG. At the time of my departure from London on November 14, they had not yet been considered by Ministers. The question of when a constitution for Cyprus would be promulgated had not been decided nor had the proposal to consult the Greeks and Turks about the constitution been considered. This indecision was brought about not only by preoccupation with Egypt but also by the absence of Ministers, Nutting's resignation, etc. . . . I believe, however, that such a settlement would not commend itself to HMG except as a last resort.

. . . When I got down to specifics with Karamanlis and Avr-off, . . . they did give me a proposal which I was authorized to present to the British and which might have served as the beginning of a negotiation had the British felt able to make a counteroffer. Although the Greeks appear willing to settle for self-government

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\(^1\) Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11-1956. Top Secret.
\(^2\) Document 194.
\(^3\) See Document 198.
now with the question of self-determination put off to the future, they would insist on some definite commitment that the principle of self-determination would be applied to Cyprus at some time. I think there is no doubt that, although the Greeks are prepared to take a reasonable attitude for the time being, there is no doubt of their ambition to incorporate Cyprus into Greek sovereignty. I have the impression that Karamanlis now feels that he has the British at a disadvantage because of the criticism leveled at the UK for its action in Egypt.

I found the Turks, particularly the Prime Minister, considerably less intransigent than their previous utterances had led us to believe. Although much less adamant in their statements, I found them unwilling to agree to any formula of self-government accompanied by anything that resembled a commitment with regard to self-determination for the future. Even the suggestion of the mildest kind of statement which might be made by the UK was immediately construed as being "only a corridor to Enosis". .

Although there is no specific progress toward agreement to report, I believe that certain favorable results have emerged from my conversations.

(1) Relations between British and Greeks and Greeks and Turks had become so strained that there had been no recent attempt to approach agreement. They all, particularly the Greeks and Turks, were pleased at this informal attempt on the part of the United States to be of assistance and as a consequence spoke quite freely. I feel that all three of the Governments involved now understand the attitudes of the other much better than previously.

(2) The fact that the Secretary had sent a special representative to discuss the Cyprus question impressed the Turks particularly, and I believe was influential in softening their attitude.

(3) There is some prospect of an improvement in Greco-Turkish relations as an agreement has been reached for a secret meeting between the Turkish Acting Foreign Minister and the Greek Foreign Minister in Paris where Averoff will stop on his return to Athens from the General Assembly in New York.

(4) As a result of this mission, it is reasonable to expect that none of the disputants will take any radical action without consultation with us.

(5) I think that this mission contributed to the calming of positions at the UN and that we may reasonably expect that debate on the Cyprus issue will be postponed until toward the end of the
General Assembly, thus giving additional time to try for a negotiated solution.

On March 13, 1956, Greece requested that the General Assembly place the Cyprus issue on the agenda at its Eleventh Session. On October 12, the United Kingdom requested that an item entitled, “Support from Greece for terrorism in Cyprus”, be placed on the Assembly’s agenda. On November 14, the following item was placed on the General Assembly agenda: “Question of Cyprus: (a) Application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the Island of Cyprus; (b) Complaint by the United Kingdom of support from Greece for terrorism in Cyprus.”

Hoover responded to Holmes in a letter of December 1 that he found this memorandum a useful and timely summation of the situation and that this difficult problem deserved all the attention Holmes could give it. (Attached to a memorandum from Rountree to Hoover, November 29; Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11-2956)

212. Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Department of State


Dulles 14. Eyes only Acting Secretary for President.

Dear Mr. President:

The NATO Council spent this morning mostly in a wrangle about Cyprus which was inconclusive. However, during noon recess I had a good talk with the Greek Foreign Minister. He strikes me as being very reasonable. He indicated that the Greeks were prepared to support the constitution, which presumably will be proposed by the British, and apparently not press at this time for any action on self-determination. He said however that the result would depend very much upon whether Makarios supported it or not. He said if Makarios supports a bad settlement, his view will prevail, and if he opposes a good settlement, then, too, his view will prevail. He was very anxious that the British should consult Makarios and said they

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/12-1256. Top Secret. Dulles was in Paris to attend the Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, December 11-14.

2 According to Dulles, Averoff noted that the Greek Government was willing to agree to any “reasonable” solution to the Cyprus question and added that the Karamanlis government had taken political risks in attempting to maintain a flexible position. Averoff asked for U.S. assistance in urging the United Kingdom to consult with Makarios and the Greeks on Radcliffe’s proposals for a constitution. Dulles agreed to speak with Lloyd. (Secto 16 from Paris, December 13; ibid., 747C.00/12-1356)
would, if permitted, send someone to Makarios to urge him to come out in support of the present British plan. Also, he indicated that if the Turks wanted partition, the Greeks would be willing to consider that.

I hope to get a chance to talk to Selwyn Lloyd about this before we break up.

[Here follows the remainder of Dulte 14.]

Dulles

213. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, December 14, 1956—9 a.m.

Secto 20. (Telegram based on uncleared memorandum of conversation.)

During meeting with Secretary December 13 Menderes and Birgi discussed Cyprus at length. Menderes asserted some solution must be found to avoid debate in United Nations which could only make situation more complicated and perhaps more dangerous. Secretary said he had received today copy of Radcliffe constitution and understood Greeks and Turks had also. Constitution did not prejudge issue of self-determination and he hoped Turkey would find it an acceptable basis to get over present crisis. Menderes insisted that question of self-determination must be settled now. If left open it would only cause trouble for future and Turkish people would think Greece had received gift... He stressed importance of Cyprus to security of Turkey. Turkey could accept Radcliffe proposal as draft provided it understood at same time that when self-determination implemented it would be through partition. He thought British desire for haste in making public statement on constitution would only create added difficulties... Said he recognized that constitution could not be total solution. He stressed importance of immediate proposal. Said he hoped Turkey could look favorably now at Radcliffe constitution leaving partition for future. Menderes replied he would consider matter.

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12-1456. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, and Nicosia.

2 The memorandum of conversation is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 181.
Secretary gave Menderes copy of Department reply to Turkish memorandum (Deptel 2210 to Paris\(^3\)). Said Turkey could count on United States taking more active part in Middle East and making its presence more felt than before. Had just issued firm statement on Baghdad Pact. Did not exclude possibility adherence to Pact at some later time but question of ratification by Senate posed difficulties. Although no decision had been reached we considering joint congressional resolution giving President authority to use our forces in area. We would like to see Saudi Arabia in area grouping since confident King Saud anti-Communist, anti-Nasser and willing work with UN. King in difficult position and to some extent unable to do all he would like. Menderes also thought Saudi Arabia with West but in difficult position. He described instability in Arab countries with Syria almost Soviet satellite. He said must express again his deep conviction that if United States joined Baghdad Pact, it would bring tranquillity to area and greater safety.

Menderes referred to Nehru’s coming visit to United States.\(^4\) He described Nehru as able but most dangerous man, champion of Baghdad Pact opponents and intent on isolating Pakistan.

\(^3\) Printed as telegram 1339, Document 352.

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214. Editorial Note

On December 14, Dulles was approached by Greek Foreign Minister Averoff. According to the memorandum of conversation, the following exchange occurred:

"The Greek Foreign Minister spoke to me after the meeting this morning and said that his Government, after having studied the British report for a Cyprus constitution, felt that it was totally unacceptable and virtually reserved plenary powers for the Governor. They were bitterly disappointed.

"I asked what the Greek thinking was about partition, and he said they were giving some sympathetic study to that possibility.

"He strongly urged United States “neutrality” in the forthcoming United Nations debate. He said of course he would like United States support but knew how difficult it would be for us to oppose the United Kingdom." (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 814)
Later that day, the Secretary of State reported the following to the Department of State in Secto 22:

"Averoff told Holmes this morning that he had read Radcliffe Constitution and was very disappointed. He said that although he was the most conciliatory person in the Greek Government on Cyprus he could not recommend its support. He felt confident that Makarios would never approve the document. Averoff stated that in order for such a constitution to work the governor would have to be a saint as such a much power was reserved to him. He said that he was going to telephone Karamanlis in Athens to give his opinion. Holmes recommended against hasty judgments based on one reading and suggested that further study of draft constitution might well lead to more favorable reaction. Averoff agreed to look again but restated his conviction that Radcliffe plan unsatisfactory." (Ibid., Central Files, 747C.00/12–1456)

215. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Greek Ambassador (Melas) and Secretary of State Dulles, Department of State, Washington, December 21, 1956

SUBJECT

Radcliffe Proposals for Constitution for Cyprus

In his call on the Secretary today, the Greek Ambassador severely criticized the Radcliffe proposals for a constitution for Cyprus, terming them a "mockery" and "very sad". He said that on instructions from his Prime Minister he wished to ask the Secretary to reconsider the apparent intention of the Department to issue a statement that might be construed in any way as favorable to the proposals.

In reply, the Secretary said that we must make some kind of statement. However, he assured the Greek Ambassador that whatever statement we made would be kept on a very low key. The Secretary added that we had hoped that the Greek Government would not feel it necessary to reject the Radcliffe proposals out of hand. When the Ambassador retorted that they had studied them fully, the Secretary replied that the proposals could not have been given very much study since the Foreign Minister had told him last week almost immediately after the proposals had been received that Greece could not accept them. The Secretary added that he thought in such matters as these the

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–2156. Confidential. Drafted by Williams.
test was often in the administration of a constitution. He also thought that in the Radcliffe proposals there was at least a basis to ask for further clarification. The Secretary was sorry that the Greeks had felt they had to reject them so hastily without seeking that clarification.

The Greek Ambassador responded by again denouncing the proposals as offering a "phony constitution".

The Secretary advised him that in these matters the important thing was to get the momentum started or, in other words, to get a foot in the door of independence. The Secretary also referred to the British Government's present difficult situation which must be recognized as a fact that did not provide a good climate for a Cyprus solution. Referring again to the possibility of a public statement, the Secretary agreed that we might be able to postpone it until further Greek views were presented, but he reiterated to the Ambassador that some sort of statement would have to be made. It was suggested that we could hold off for at least a day or two. The Secretary further said that he would like to see more analyses—both Greek and our own—of the Radcliffe proposals.

In reply to a question from the Secretary regarding our study of the proposals Mr. Williams stated that we had made an analysis and had found some features which were good and others not so good such as the fact that the whole matter of education seemed to be entirely in the Governor's hands. In general we felt that a great deal would depend upon the manner of administration.

In leaving, Mr. Melas undertook to obtain promptly from his Government its further views regarding the statement we felt impelled to make.  

2 In a December 21 memorandum to Dulles, Rountree noted that the Radcliffe proposals included only draft recommendations for a constitution. The British would retain full control over external affairs, internal security, and defense. Greek Cypriots would have an elected majority in the legislature. Rountree added that the proposals did not discuss self-determination. (Ibid.) A study prepared by the Division of Research for Near East, South Asia, and Africa on the Radcliffe proposals is attached to a memorandum from J.D. Iams to Wood, December 19. (Ibid., 747C.00/12-1956)

2 On December 19, the Department informed the Embassies at Athens, Ankara, and London that the British Foreign Secretary had requested that the United States issue a public statement expressing support for the Radcliffe proposals. The British believed that such a statement would assist Greece with respect to public opinion in taking a position of greater flexibility vis-à-vis the proposals. Although the Department noted that its estimate of the situation was "less sanguine" it instructed the Embassy to inform the Greek Government that the U.S. Government felt obliged to issue a statement that in its view the Radcliffe proposals offered an opportunity "to take important step in direction of self-government and eventual peaceful and satisfactory solution Cyprus problem." The Department added that it believed it would be against the interests of all parties for the proposals to be "summarily" rejected. (Telegram 2329 to Athens, December 19; ibid.) In telegram 2246 from Athens, December 20, Allen, in reply to telegram 2329, noted that if the United States issued a statement supporting the Radcliffe proposals at this time, Karamanlis would "very probably" resign. (Ibid., 747C.00/12-2056)
216. Editorial Note

On December 27, Lincoln White, Acting Chief of the Department's News Division, made the following statement to correspondents:

"The United States has noted with sympathetic interest the long and earnest labors of Lord Radcliffe to find a formula for self-government for Cyprus. The making by the United Kingdom of proposals for self-government could be the first step toward an eventual peaceful and generally acceptable final solution of the Cyprus problem. The formula now produced by Lord Radcliffe seems to be unacceptable in certain respects by some who are concerned with the matter. Nevertheless, the United States still hopes that our three allies who, together with the people of Cyprus, are deeply concerned with this issue, will strive to agree upon a way of moving together toward a solution which is so important to themselves and to the entire free world." (Department of State Bulletin, January 14, 1957, page 54)

On December 29, Allen reported from Athens that Averoff, on instructions from Karamanlis, had asked him to call on December 28. According to the Ambassador, Averoff made a "strong but friendly" protest against the United States statement on the grounds that the United States had taken sides with Turkey and the United Kingdom against Greece. According to the Foreign Minister, the statement had caused great embarrassment to Karamanlis. Allen informed Averoff that he had personally opposed the statement, but that there were bound to be differences among nations and if every nation protested each time another took a position in the United Nations or elsewhere, "we would spend all our days protesting". (Telegram 2324 from Athens, December 29; Department of State, Central Files, 747.C.00/12-2956)

On January 18, Secretary Dulles had a conversation with Foreign Minister Averoff. A memorandum of conversation reads:

"At the Greek Ambassador's dinner for the Greek Foreign Minister, I spoke alone to the Foreign Minister before dinner during the cocktail period, saying that I was greatly surprised that the Greeks had interpreted the State Department's statement about the Radcliffe Plan as endorsing that plan. I said that, in fact, it did not do so and to do so had not been our purpose. Mr. Averoff passed the matter off merely saying that we were here for a social dinner and not to discuss business, and the Cyprus matter was not again mentioned either before dinner or after dinner during our talk." (Ibid., 747.C.00/1-1857)
217. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

Athens, January 28, 1957—6 p.m.

2632. During long discussion of Cyprus with Prime Minister this morning, at his request, I believe progress was made toward narrowing gap here between Greek and Turkish positions. . . . He said he could accept any solution Cyprus people wanted. He doubted that many Cypriot Turks wanted partition but he was ready and anxious to find out what they wanted through plebiscite. I said I did not believe Turkey was demanding partition but merely plebiscite offering partition as one possible alternative. . . .

I asked whether Greece would ask for UN troops to supervise plebiscite. He said that while UN troops would not be necessary, some kind of UN commission would have to be authorized to conduct or perhaps supervise or observe plebiscite.

Karamanlis said Averoff's latest reports from NY were discouraging because he had not been able to obtain any indication what attitude US would take in UNGA debate. I reminded him that British and Turkish Governments were undoubtedly equally anxious to obtain this information and I doubted Averoff had any more reason for discouragement than they.

Karamanlis reemphasized that if US takes negative position against Greece during UN debates, demand for new elections here will be irresistible. He said he was not concerned whether his government stayed in office or not but he was deeply concerned about future orientation of Greek foreign policy. He predicted that if solution is not found to Cyprus now, problem will become very much greater international issue within 3 to 6 months and might even jeopardize new Eisenhower doctrine re Middle East. I asked why. He said Arab States, with strong support of Moscow, would demand independence and demilitarization of Cyprus to prevent its being used again as military case against Arabs.

I said I felt confident US would not take position hostile to Greece in UNGA but was concerned that if we did not support Greek position 100 percent, local press and politicians would construe this as hostile. . . .

Allen

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/1-2857. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, London, Paris for USRO, Nicosia, and USUN.
218. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, January 28, 1957—9:07 p.m.

5201. Re Cyprus in UN General Assembly.

1. During last year’s UNGA debate US pledged “to continue an active interest in the Cyprus question.” It would be consistent for US, especially in present Cyprus impasse, to take positive initiative. Present trend Cyprus increasingly harmful and in US interest continue seek constructive approach.

2. Therefore to maintain control over Cyprus UNGA discussion, and forestall proposals unacceptable to parties involved (e.g. possible Greek self-determination declaration, British condemnation Greek intervention, Indian proposal calling for independence of Cyprus), believe US should initiate immediate consultations on basis draft resolution, with objective endorsing direct discussions between British and Cypriots. Resolution emphasizing renewal of direct negotiations does not commit US to any of controversial “solutions” e.g. independence or partition, and amounts to UN suggestion that UK attempt settlement without substantive role by UN or participation any of its members (i.e. Greece or Turkey).

3. Resolution along following lines would appear serve above purpose:

“The General Assembly

“Noting that earnest efforts through several procedures have been made in order to reach agreement on the Cyprus question.

“Expresses the hope that renewed negotiations between the British authorities and representatives of the principal segments of the population of Cyprus, may lead to concrete progress in achieving a solution.”

4. Unless objection perceived Embassy London hereby instructed promptly discuss with HMG.

5. Embassy should inform UK that in conjunction with such approach US disposed consider its opposing amendments of type that might be submitted by Greece, Turkey or others which would involve UN directly in subsequent discussions Cyprus or tend favor any particular type solution. For example, Department assumes

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/1-2857. Secret. Drafted by Brown and Wood and signed by Dulles. Repeated to USUN, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia and pouched to Paris for USRO, Rome for McSweeney, and Valetta.
(Athens’ 2487) GOG may propose add language re self-determination. Present language aimed at fact a beginning needs to be made in negotiations and does not exclude any eventual solution. US would therefore probably oppose such amendments when debate commence.

If HMG refers to Radcliffe proposals, Embassy should say basis for talks should be decided by HMG.

Embassy should convey following:

We realize HMG does not wish release Makarios from Seychelles until he condemns violence, but it is now 22 months since violence started, 10 months since Makarios deported and many more months may be required restore law and order. Meanwhile continuation violence will inevitably cause further hardening and distrust on both sides rendering eventual achievement any understanding increasing difficult. We therefore urge HMG seriously consider resumption talks with Makarios and leaders other Cypriot groups with understanding HMG desires continue talks until agreement reached. We also urge clear announcement promising eventual self-determination.

In making such suggestions emphasize Department view that if no progress re Cyprus when UNGA reconvenes in September 1957 it then will, in our view, more difficult to handle successfully in the Assembly. For this reason if negotiations with Cypriots have not been fruitful within reasonable time US will seriously consider how NATO might play useful role and will be prepared take initiative. At present we are informing HMG, but no other Government, of this possibility.

After approach to HMG, Athens and Ankara will be instructed promptly inform the Governments and our efforts should thereafter be centered in New York. There should be no discussion above with representatives Governments other than UK until further instructions received.

Dulles

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2 Telegram 2487, January 14, transmitted the highlights of a meeting among Karamanlis, Averoff, and Allen on the Cyprus question. Allen reported that according to Averoff, the Greek demand for self-determination for Cyprus would only be for “home consumption”. Karamanlis argued that any resolution acceptable to Greece would have to call for the release of Makarios or at least negotiations with him. (Ibid., 747C.00/1-1457)

3 In telegram 4012, January 30, the Embassy at London informed the Department that Barbour had discussed with Kirkpatrick the Department’s views on the U.N. Cyprus item in accordance with this telegram. Although Kirkpatrick reportedly expressed no significant objection to the U.S. position, he noted that it would only provide Britain with a temporary respite. He expressed a personal preference for a resolution calling on the three governments to resume negotiations. (Ibid., 320/1-3057)
I am worried at the effect upon Anglo-American relations of the forthcoming debate on Cyprus in the United Nations. We agree, I know, that it would be much better to have no debate at all, but it would appear most unlikely that that will be achieved. The fact of Greek support for terrorism is generally acknowledged here. A hundred United Kingdom citizens as well as a large number of Cypriots have been murdered in this campaign of deliberate violence. Therefore if the United States vote against a Resolution calling for the cessation of Greek activities, it will be regarded here as an unfriendly act and will cause most unfavorable comment. I cannot prejudice the question whether the British Resolution will be pressed to a vote but I do hope that the United States Delegation will make it clear beyond doubt in the course of the debate that the United States Government does not condone the Greek behaviour and urges that it should stop.

Forgive me troubling you with a personal message on this matter, but I am most anxious that nothing should happen to hinder the development of our good relations.  

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1 Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, UK Officials Corres. With Secy Dulles/Herter 7/54 thru 3/57 Vol. 1 Incoming. Confidential. Sent under cover of a note dated February 8 from Caccia to Dulles.
2 On February 10 at 1 p.m., Dulles telephoned Rountree regarding Lloyd’s message on Cyprus. According to the transcript of the conversation, the following occurred:

"Re Lloyd’s message on Cyprus. The Sec said what are we going to do about that. The Sec said he thought we would abstain. That we would say we had worked hard to find a resolution that would be constructive but have not been able to do so; we have no resolution of our own and will abstain from any resolutions with substantive implications. The Sec said of course it is always possible in the course of the debate to change our minds but that is the way we feel now.

"The Sec said R. was to be sure to get some rest; he was to do no more work that day. We would be in real trouble if he collapsed.

"Re the Lloyd message again, the Sec asked if he had to answer it or only acknowledge it. ... The Sec asked when the Cyprus question would come up at the UN. The Sec said Lodge was trying to get extra time on the Israeli matter. If Algeria was finished Monday, probably Cyprus would come up Tuesday [Feb. 12]." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations—General)
220. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 9, 1957

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

Nuri Birgi, Secretary General, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Fatin Rustun Zorlu, Deputy, Turkish Grand National Assembly
Nehat Erim, Special Advisor to Turkish Prime Minister on Cyprus
The Secretary
William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary, NEA
Owen T. Jones, GTI

Mr. Zorlu opened the meeting with a brief reference to proposed Turkish revisions to the United States resolution on Cyprus that had been circulated by the United States Delegation in New York last week. The Secretary did not comment on the Turkish suggestions. Instead he expressed doubt that it would be wise for the United States to present any proposal. He pointed out that we had tried hard to help the parties in arriving at a solution to the Cyprus problem and that all our efforts had come to nought. It was tragic to see this dispute go on for it not only involved the solidarity of NATO but threatened the position of the present Greek Government and endangered the entire Mediterranean area. These, he said, were the real stakes here. The three interested parties were putting something of lesser importance ahead of the greater issue and until they were prepared to make some compromises he did not feel the United States had any responsibility to continue its efforts to find a solution.

Mr. Zorlu responded by saying that he thought it was a good idea for the United States not to put forward a solution. He contrasted the passive Turkish attitude on the Cyprus matter over the last two or three years to the manner in which the Greeks had pressed the matter, supported terrorism, and maintained inflammatory radio broadcasts out of Athens. The Greeks had persisted in this course of action in the face of Turkish pleas that the present equilibrium not be disturbed. The Turks, Zorlu asserted, have more rights and are making more sacrifices on the Cyprus issue than the Greeks and they want to see this matter quieted down.

The Secretary then asked his Turkish visitors if they were satisfied that, given a continuation of the present situation in Cyprus, a Western-oriented government in Greece could be expected to

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2–957. Confidential. Drafted by Jones on February 11.
continue. Mr. Zorlu asserted that the Greeks were only exploiting their internal political situation to attain their objectives in Cyprus and that public opinion would not be aroused in Greece if the Greeks did not get their own way on Cyprus. The Secretary declined to accept this judgment. He took a grave view of the Greek situation. He pointed to the serious implications of a Greek shift from the West and cautioned the Turks not to come to the United States for help if the United States were proven right in its estimate. Dr. Birgi broke in to acknowledge that Greek political disturbances growing out of the Cyprus issue were possible but went on to say that political instability was inherent in Greek political life and that even if the Cyprus problem were solved another situation would be created to feed this chronic restlessness. The Greeks had put their pretensions too high. . . . Dr. Birgi emphasized that Turkey is not seeking the defeat of Greece on this matter but rather a reasonable solution that would provide safety for the Turkish Cypriots and security for Turkey itself. The Secretary closed this part of the discussion by again pointing out that disaster was impending that was so great that Cyprus paled in comparison. The Greeks, Turks and British apparently did not share this view. They may be right. Since no one else shared our view on the gravity of the situation, the United States should then sit back and watch.

At this point Dr. Birgi asked the Secretary what was his advice to Turkey at the present time. The Secretary replied that first of all the UNGA debate should be kept as calm as possible. Birgi and Zorlu agreed with this and with the view that any substantive action by the UNGA would be damaging. After the UNGA debate, the Secretary suggested that the matter might be taken up by NATO. It was essential, he said, that NATO be capable of dealing with its own problems. It had expressed an interest in a lot of problems far away, such as Formosa, but had thus far shied away from immediate vital problems such as Cyprus. When Mr. Zorlu pointed out that NATO discussions had thus far been friendly and had been on subjects on which there had been a wide range of agreement and that the injection of the Cyprus issue would therefore be dangerous, the Secretary replied that if NATO was so fragile that it could not discuss matters vital to its future then this in itself pointed to a vital weakness in NATO. He went on to say this highlighted again the fact that the three countries were putting second things first and until the magnitude of the peril inherent in the Cyprus situation was realized no solution was possible.

When Dr. Erim referred briefly to the Radcliffe proposals and stated that the Greeks want only Enosis, the Secretary disagreed. The Secretary thought the Greeks would accept self-government, perhaps even without assurances of self-determination, but the point
in the Radcliffe proposals that worried the Greeks was the broad powers reserved for the executive. The Secretary went on to say that it was hardly possible to prepare a constitution without some provision calling for the invasion of the rights of one branch of the government by another in the event of an emergency. If because of the lack of trust and confidence every such constitutional ambiguity were regarded as a booby-trap, then no effective constitutional framework could be established. The core of the present problem was this lack of mutual confidence.

The Secretary closed the meeting by paying tribute to the wisdom, orientation and dependability of present Turkish leadership. He lauded Dr. Birgi’s effective work at the London Conference and expressed the hope that on the Cyprus problem the Government of Turkey would manifest the same mature statesmanship.

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221. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 11, 1957

SUBJECT
Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Mr. Rountree, NEA
Mr. Williams, GTI
Mr. Nunley, EUR
Ambassador Caccia, British Embassy

Ambassador Caccia called at the Secretary’s request. The Secretary told Ambassador Caccia that Mr. Rountree plans to see Mr. Coulson and bring the British up to date on the recent discussions between US officials and King Saud. The Secretary also reviewed briefly his talk with Ambassador Eban of Israel and described certain assurances which the US would be willing to give Israel if Israel will promptly withdraw from Egyptian territory.

The Secretary then opened a general discussion of the Cyprus problem, with particular reference to its current status in the UNGA.

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2-1157. Secret. Drafted by Nunley.
2 King Saud of Saudi Arabia made an official visit to Washington January 30–February 1.
He referred to his recent talks with representatives of the Turkish Government and also made reference to the message from Foreign Minister Lloyd urging the US not to vote against the proposed UK resolution calling for a cessation of terrorist activities in Cyprus. The Secretary pointed out that the US has tried in various ways to be helpful on the Cyprus issue but has thus far been unable to find any satisfactory approach. Therefore, the present disposition of the US Government is to announce at the beginning of the Cyprus debate that the United States will not vote on any resolution at all. In other words, the US is inclined to abstain on any substantive resolution concerning Cyprus, whether sponsored by the Greek Government or the British Government.

Ambassador Caccia asked whether it will be possible for the US representative, during the course of the debate, to make a statement indicating US opposition to terrorist activities and external interference in Cyprus, perhaps along the same general lines as the statement made by Ambassador Lodge in the debate on Algeria. The Secretary replied that some general statement on terrorism may be possible. He added, however, that the US may also have to express its general support for the principle of self-determination, in approximately the same terms used in the Potomac Charter. Ambassador Caccia expressed the hope that any expression by the US on self-determination would include a recognition of the fact that the Radcliffe proposals are aimed at the achievement of self-determination for Cyprus. The Secretary said it would be impossible for the US to pass judgment on particular constitutional proposals, since the value of any constitutional system depends primarily upon its practical application. He pointed out that any constitution is capable of abuse, and made reference to the Soviet Constitution. The Secretary indicated that the content of the US statement has not yet been determined, but stressed the impossibility of dealing with any single aspect of the Cyprus problem outside the context of the total situation and said the principal purpose of any US statement will be to avoid making a bad situation worse.

The Secretary went on to emphasize the grave dangers to the whole Western world inherent in the present Cyprus situation. Unless some kind of solution to the Cyprus problem can be found, he said, Greece may be lost to NATO. This would breach the southern flank of NATO and might permit the Communists to cut across the Mediterranean. The Secretary expressed the view that there has been far too much emotionalism associated with the

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3 For text of the Potomac Charter, a Declaration by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, June 29, 1954, see Department of State Bulletin, July 12, 1954, pp. 49–50.
Cyprus question—so much, in fact, that the governments concerned have been unable to consider the issue in a broad perspective and seem unwilling to subordinate minor considerations to major considerations.

The Ambassador asked whether the Turks had indicated willingness to make any concessions on the Cyprus question. The Secretary replied that he has observed no definite indications of this kind, but feels there is some possibility that the Turks would be willing to accept a “NATO solution”. The Secretary expressed the view that it would be far better for all parties to deal with the problem through NATO than through the UN. He added that the Turks seem willing to agree to a solution based on partition.

Ambassador Caccia asked whether the Turks and others have considered the practical consequences of partitioning an island as small as Cyprus. He suggested that a proposal for partition is a “council of despair” and should be considered only as a last resort.

The Secretary then repeated the basic US objectives in the current UNGA debate on Cyprus. He pointed out that we do not believe any UNGA action is likely to contribute to a solution of the Cyprus problem and said that we may make a statement to this effect at the beginning of the debate. He reminded Ambassador Caccia that the US long opposed subjecting this issue to public debate, and now hopes that the debate can be terminated with a minimum of acrimony and without perpetuating UN involvement. For these reasons, the US is disposed to abstain on any substantive resolution presented, although the final US position will depend upon the course of events. The US may undertake some new initiative if it appears that doing so will serve a useful purpose.

Mr. Rountree emphasized the important difference between the current US disposition to abstain on any substantive resolution and the earlier US position, which was to oppose actively any such resolution. Ambassador Caccia, however, did not comment upon the implications of this change in US intentions.
222. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations

Washington, February 12, 1957—7:42 p.m.

619. Following is Department’s present thinking re Cyprus:

As friend of parties involved and in earnest effort be helpful in developing arrangements which would have least adverse effects upon NATO and cooperation among its allies, US in recent past has put forward for consideration various proposals all of which have been strongly opposed by either Greeks British or Turks. These developments have underlined reluctance of Greeks British and Turks to make necessary compromise essential to agreed solution. In our view major issues of preserving NATO solidarity and forestalling communist penetration of Mediterranean are being subordinated to lesser issue of Cyprus and more narrow interests of three parties concerned therewith. Unless and until parties recognize magnitude of peril involved in continuation of Cyprus stalemate and are prepared make necessary compromises, US efforts toward finding solution will continue be frustrated.

Department has concluded that in present circumstances it cannot, without jeopardy to more important considerations, play affirmative role at this time with respect proposals which have been put forward by parties. It had intended making clear at outset GA debate that we would vote against any condemnatory resolution (such as British condemnation of Greek Government for interference Cyprus) or any other resolution of substantive character (such as one calling for immediate self determination). In view opposition to this position US now disposed abstain on any such resolutions and at appropriate stage in UN discussions we would explain our position. As debate develops it might prove advisable for US to take some initiative. We have in mind that future attitude would depend largely on development opportunities for constructive action and on whether our friends are able to avoid taking extreme and harmful positions. We would be governed mainly by our continued desire keep debate in low key and minimize US involvement in Cyprus.

Secretary on February 9 met with Birgi, Zorlu, Erim and Gork at Turk request and spoke along foregoing lines. He emphasized extreme dangers in Greek situation and importance to Turkey of Western oriented Greece. Turks declared they were not seeking

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2-1257. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Jones and Rountree and signed by Dulles. Also sent to Athens and repeated to Ankara, London, and Paris Topol and pouches to Nicosia, Rome for McSweeney, and Valetta.
impose difficulties upon Greece and asserted history of Cyprus question shows Turkey has played issue in lower key, has more rights and has made more sacrifices than Greece. Turks endorsed US not putting forward resolution itself and agreed debate should be kept to minimum and hoped no substantive action would be taken. They hoped that as various resolutions submitted our respective delegations would keep in touch on tactics. (Separate telegram contains fuller account this conversation.\(^2\))

On February 11 Secretary met with British Ambassador Caccia and discussed Cyprus matter in context personal note from Selwyn Lloyd\(^3\) asking in very strong terms that US not vote against resolution condemning Greek support of terrorism. Secretary reviewed situation as above and informed Caccia present US attitude re abstaining not only on UK condemningatory resolution but also on other substantive resolutions. Caccia asked whether US would in its statement say something in opposition to terrorist practices. Secretary thought we could do “something of the sort” but made no specific commitment. He indicated we probably would like to say something also of general character as in Potomac Charter re rights of peoples to governments their own choosing. (Separate telegram contains fuller account of conversation.\(^4\))

Department has not discussed its latest thinking with Greek representative. Foreign Minister Averoff has requested appointment with Secretary and it planned meeting will be arranged within few days. He plans speak along lines taken with UK and Turk representative but will not give assurances that US will abstain on all resolutions as debate develops. He will thus avoid any basis Greek claim that subsequent US attitude contrary to assurances given to GOG. Secretary will express hope any Greek resolution and manner in which it put forward will be as mild as possible and will express opinion preferable that UK not be named. He will emphasize that in final analysis solution Cyprus question will be understanding achieved outside UN among parties concerned. If one party takes extreme position it will be harder reconcile others later. Ambassador Allen may wish discuss matter along similar lines with GOG, emphasizing that while we wish be as helpful as possible to Karmanlis Government, situation is such that we cannot at this juncture give assurances which they have requested, including abstaining from voting.

\(^2\) Telegram 1854 to Ankara, February 12. (ibid.)
\(^3\) Document 219.
\(^4\) Telegram 5614 to London, February 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2-1257)
Suggested US statement Cyprus debate will be contained in subsequent telegram.⁵

Dulles

⁵Transmitted in telegram 641 to USUN, February 18. (Ibid., 320.5747C/2–1857)

223. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 13, 1957¹

SUBJECT
Cyprus and the UNGA

PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Evangelos Averoff, Greek Foreign Minister
Ambassador George Melas, Greek Embassy
The Secretary
Mr. Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary, IO
Mr. Murat W. Williams, Deputy Director, GTI

When Mr. Averoff called on the Secretary this afternoon, he said first that he was grateful for Mr. Wadsworth’s message yesterday ² regarding American neutrality in the Cyprus debate. He appreciated the delicacy of the problem for the United States and therefore asked only our neutrality and not our support. Of course, from a friend, Greece would have preferred support.

He added that the present problem in the United Nations was to get out of the debate without damage to a settlement and with some help towards it. “We want,” he said, “to have a discussion without insulting each other too much.”

The Foreign Minister said Greece must, of course, press its resolution for self-determination for Cyprus. As a second choice, he would want a resolution favoring renewal of negotiations. He insisted that a resolution calling for three-power talks with Turks and British would be dangerous, because Syria and Egypt were already insisting that they should be included since Cyprus was strategically important to them as well as to Turkey. Mr. Averoff reiterated that

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2–1357. Confidential. Drafted by Williams.

²In Gadel 137, February 8, the Department instructed the Mission at the United Nations to make clear to the British, Greeks, and Turks that the United States planned to take no further initiative at this time. (Ibid., 747C.00/2–657)
the best negotiations would be between the British Government and the Cypriots. A resolution to this effect should be sought, with a provision that the Secretary General should report to the next Assembly on the progress of negotiations.

Beyond the Assembly, he recognized Turkey’s three main arguments against self-determination and against possible enosis for Cyprus: (1) the strategic argument that Greek islands would “besiege” Turkey, which he would meet by proposing demilitarization of Cyprus with only NATO bases; (2) the argument of Turkey’s trading interests, which he thought could be met by arrangements for a customs union; and (3) the minority argument, which could be settled by providing to the Turkish minority all the privileges that Turkey herself wanted to fix under a UN guarantee, with possibility of dual nationality and protection against military service in Greece.

Mr. Averoff then said this was a period of high fever and one must seek to reduce the fever. If that is possible, one can—with good will—solve the problem.

He referred to the question of bases and said that though Greece in the past had not been opposed to British bases on Cyprus, Greece now felt that the bases on the island should be NATO bases, since UK bases only caused “foreign irritation”. (He reported that Nasser had said he had nothing against NATO bases in Cyprus, though he objected to British bases there.) Averoff also said the bases and the island might come under some NATO administration.

Steps towards a solution could be taken, said Mr. Averoff, either through NATO, which required “quiet, old-fashioned diplomacy” or through the return of Archbishop Makarios, whose influence was obviously very great on the island.

In response to Mr. Averoff’s presentation, the Secretary remarked that the Greek Foreign Minister had gone much more deeply into the substance of the Cyprus controversy than he himself was prepared to go and had demonstrated the wide range of the problem. The Secretary added that he had been particularly impressed by Mr. Averoff’s remark that one must get the temperature down.

The Secretary made the following additional points:

(1) Debates in the UN were most useful if they avoided emotional attacks and merely exposed problems to world opinion. The educational value of debates was often much greater than the advantage gained by pushing through some resolution by a narrow margin.

(2) In the past few days we had told both Turkish and British representatives that in this matter big issues were being lost sight of and too much heat was directed to minor issues. If each party is
ready to make concessions, the harm to them individually would be much less than the harm that might come to all from the greater dangers.

(3) Mr. Averoff’s willingness to find a solution within some NATO framework was welcomed.

(4) Although Mr. Averoff had remarked that in this dispute between our three friends there might be some embarrassment, we had shown lately that in order to do the right thing we were willing to take sides even against a friend.

The Secretary further remarked that Mr. Averoff had spoken in a spirit of great moderation.

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224. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to the Secretary of State


SUBJECT
Cyprus

Discussion:

The GA Political Committee began discussing Cyprus February 18. Three resolutions have been submitted: a Greek proposal asserting the right of self-determination for the Cypriots; a British proposal calling for Greece to take measures to prevent support for terrorism; and a Greek proposal calling for establishment of a fact-finding committee to investigate the UK charges of terrorism against Greece. It is currently unclear whether the UK would still regard a vote against its terrorism resolution as an “unfriendly act” or whether it would accept a negative vote as the price for a negative US vote on the Greek self-determination resolution and the Greek resolution on a fact finding commission.

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2-1957. Confidential. Drafted by Elizabeth A. Brown of UNP.
2 For texts of these three resolutions, see U.N. Docs. A/C.1/L.168, A/C.1/L.170, and A/C.1/L.169, respectively.
3 On February 19, during the course of the Secretary’s Staff meeting, Walmsley raised the question of Cyprus in the United Nations. The notes of the meeting read: “Mr. Walmsley reported that the British called on Mr. Wilcox yesterday and asked that we reconsider our present position of abstaining when the UK resolution and the two Greek resolutions come to a vote in the UNGA. Mr. Walmsley said the
Meantime our Delegation in New York will make clear in its statement, without, however, disclosing how the US will vote, that the US does not believe any of the resolutions, irrespective of their possible merits, would contribute to a solution, and will express the hope their sponsors will not press them to a vote. Our estimate is that the Greek resolution on self-determination would be adopted if the US abstains. In its present form the Greek resolution would set a dangerous and undesirable precedent that any territory may determine its own future independently of other interests involved.

In these circumstances there are two alternatives; the first is preferable:

(1) If the UK can accept a negative US vote on its proposal or decides not to press it to a vote, the preferred course would be for the US to initiate, preferably through others, but if necessary itself, a procedural-type resolution which would refer to the necessity of good relations between nations and peoples and express the view that appropriate negotiations should be undertaken to achieve a solution. Whether the US or others submit the resolution, we should make sure we can maintain control of its content.

(2) If the UK continues to insist that the US not oppose its proposal, we should seek to persuade Greece, as the price for a US abstention, to accept amendments to its self-determination resolution that will rephrase it to include the need for the restoration of peaceful conditions; to refer to the legitimate interests of those concerned; and to place the principle of self-determination in its Charter context.

The attached telegram instructs the Delegation in this sense, and includes the texts of suitable resolutions to cover both alternatives.

Recommendation:

That you approve the attached telegram.

British now recognize it would be better if we voted against all three resolutions, for they have come to the realization that if we abstain, the Greek resolutions will in all likelihood be approved. The Secretary said we must approach this issue with caution since he had received a note from Foreign Minister Lloyd that a US vote against the UK resolution would be considered "an unfriendly act." The Secretary also noted that we had announced our position privately to the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers and Ambassador Caccia and said that if we change our position at this juncture it will be necessary to take it up with all three parties. Mr. Rountree remarked that the British and Turks would welcome such a change but the Greeks would be infuriated. He also emphasized the need for a quick decision since the matter could come to a vote in the General Assembly today. The Secretary reiterated that he wanted this matter handled with great care." (Department of State, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

4 Gadel 149, February 20, not printed. (Ibid., Central Files, 320.5747C/2-2057)
225. Editorial Note

Between February 18 and 22, the First Committee of the General Assembly held ten meetings to consider the Cyprus item. During the course of the discussion, four draft resolutions submitted by Greece, the United Kingdom, and Panama were considered by the Committee. No vote was taken on any of the resolutions. On February 22, India introduced a resolution (1013 XI) that was approved by a plenary session of the General Assembly on February 26, by a vote of 76 to 0. The resolution noted that the General Assembly hoped that a "peaceful, democratic and just solution" would be found to the problem of Cyprus. It also expressed the hope that negotiations would be continued toward this end. For a summary of developments at the United Nations and the full text of the resolution, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1956, pages 121–124.

226. Editorial Note

On February 21, at the 313th meeting of the National Security Council, Allen Dulles, in his review of significant world developments affecting United States security, raised the question of Cyprus.

"Mr. Dulles turned to the critical situation of the Karamanlis Government in Greece. As a result of the Cyprus debate in the UN, the chances of the survival of this government were very poor. . . ." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Memoranda of Discussion)
227. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece

Washington, March 2, 1957—5:56 p.m.

3194. Principal officer. Athens 2956. Before deciding whether to dispatch Holmes on another exploratory trip Department would like to have Embassy London’s estimate of British intentions re Cyprus. We desire info (a) specifically re any changes of view on return of Makarios to London or Cyprus and plans for instituting self-government, and (b) whether the British consider the termination of the UN debate provides psychological opportunity to press for settlement. Also desire info re restoration of peaceful conditions on island. Even if indications are that our intervention might be useful at this point, Holmes would probably not be sent unless British wished him to undertake again such a mission.

In planning our next move, it would be desirable also to have further info on any change in Greek or Turkish attitude . . . . Athens may particularly inquire as to FonMin proposals for independence with anti-Anschluss guarantee. We appreciate advisability of taking advantage of present lull in mutual recrimination, but Department is not prepared to make any new commitment before learning views of British. Athens may wish to reiterate our desire implement offer made by USUN to assist in constructive manner. Department prepared to consider any suggestions including some form assistance through NATO.

Dulles

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2-2857. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Williams and Marcelis Parsons, Director of BNA. Also sent to London, Ankara, Nicosia, and Paris Topol.

2 In telegram 2956, February 28, Allen informed the Department that as far as Greece was concerned, this was the “psychological moment” to create a more “constructive” atmosphere for the consideration of the Cyprus question. According to the Ambassador, a “prompt” move on the part of the United States might now be useful. (Ibid.)
228. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

*Athens, March 13, 1957—11 a.m.*

3060. Prime Minister Karamanlis and Foreign Minister Averoff asked me to meet them at Prime Minister’s house today for long discussion on Cyprus. Prime Minister handed me personal letter from King Paul to President Eisenhower (being transmitted under covering letter to Secretary) which expresses appreciation for US offer of good offices in Cyprus question and urging President to request Macmillan during Bermuda talks to release Makarios.  

Prime Minister emphasized that next two months will provide best opportunity to settle Cyprus issue. Advantage should be taken of UN resolution to act now and avoid complications which arise every year beginning in June or July regarding further Cyprus debates in UN. Prime Minister re-emphasized that release of Makarios is only possible way to achieve results and expressed confidence that following such release acceptable solution will be found. It is clear that both he and Averoff are now thinking almost exclusively along lines of independence. Karamanlis said he was confident Makarios himself preferred independence to Enosis and that as soon as GOG could make contact with him it would make useful suggestions to him.

Averoff is confident that British are looking [for] face-saving formula to give them excuse for releasing Makarios. British Ambassador asked him last week what GOG could do to make this possible. In parliamentary debate last night, Averoff expressed confidence that fighting in Cyprus would stop if Makarios were released. Opposition is attacking him today on ground that he has offered to bargain for release of Makarios, and he admits that this was purpose of his statement as assurance that Greek Government would make every effort to obtain cease-fire if Makarios is released. Karamanlis added that more and more people, including President of UNGA, are pressing British to release Makarios and that everyone concerned with Cyprus question would feel great surge of enthusiasm if this step taken. I expressed doubts that Turks would show much pleas-

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2 A copy of this letter is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Referring to Makarios, King Paul noted: “According to the Greek mentality, there is no other personality or authority that could be found in Cyprus or Greece, under present circumstances, to take any decisions that could ever be accepted by all concerned.” Eisenhower was scheduled to hold discussions with Prime Minister Macmillan on Bermuda, March 21–24.
ure since they do not regard him as spokesman for all Cypriots. Averoff said Turks also want satisfactory Cyprus settlement and must be aware that no progress towards either partition or independence is possible without Makarios.

I said I believed most Americans thought Makarios should be released but question was how strongly this be pressed on Government of UK. Karamanlis said we should stand up for our political principles.

Comment: I have come with some reluctance to conclusion that British hope of finding more tractable elements to deal with in Cyprus have proved unjustified. Makarios appears to be gaining strength among Greek Cypriots, much as exiled Sultan did among Moroccans. Makarios has achieved too well-established position among Cypriots to be either supplanted or put aside. Since British must eventually deal with him or else continue to have sullen, uncooperative and quarrelsome majority on Cyprus even after organized resistance is put down, they would save much trouble for themselves and everyone else by bringing Makarios to London now.

I am still not happy about independence as solution and reminded Prime Minister today that Soviets would start intriguing in Cyprus at first possible opportunity. Moreover, many Cypriots will continue to agitate for Enosis and internal turmoil result, much as it did in Texas, where annexation of Republic finally brought on war with Mexico.

Despite foregoing I agree that Cyprus problem must be solved some way and if Greece and Turkey are willing to accept guaranteed independence, ... if supported by Makarios, with whom British should reopen talks as first order of business under UN resolution.

Allen

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229. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, March 15, 1957—11 a.m.

4891. Limit distribution principal officers. In considering possible next steps regarding Cyprus and reports of views, suggestions

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–1557. Top Secret. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, and Paris Topol.
and comments from various sources involved (Department telegram 6197, Athens 3060 and 3067 and related), it seems to us that undue emphasis may be centering on procedural aspects of the problem with a view to reactivating negotiations between the parties, without at the same time our having a clear idea of the substantive aspects of the solution we should seek or our having sufficient evidence of the acceptability of such a solution to all parties to warrant our seeking means to achieve it. We have in mind that the proposed NATO establishment of a team of wise men, the release of Makarios from exile, efforts to agree on a cease-fire with Grivas, are all designed to set the stage for further negotiations envisaged in the UN resolution. Meanwhile, however, we have no reason to believe that, if the stage is so set, the Greek, Turks and United Kingdom are any more likely than heretofore to negotiate for a given solution, for example, self-government with integral self-determination after reasonable period, which is the United Kingdom and Turkish position, of some concept of independence, toward which the Greeks appear to be moving and we wonder whether it might not be a more fruitful line of approach for United States to endeavor to narrow the substantive issues than to concentrate on procedural aspects of further negotiations between United Kingdom and Cypriots (Makarios), which in view of the history of this problem do not seem likely to be successful if renewed substantially on the same basis as where they left off.

We confess that the above reasoning is to some extent conditioned on the shifting positions that it seems to us the Greeks (read also Makarios) have taken in previous rounds of negotiation which we fear might well be rationalized by the Greeks as the optimum strategy toward their manifest long-term objective of enosis. In addition to record of direct negotiations with Makarios we are

2 In telegram 6197 to London, March 8, the Department suggested beginning negotiations on self-government with the Cypriots rather than initiating tripartite talks with the Greeks and the Turks. The Department added that if a de facto truce could be arranged with EOKA, then it might be possible to bring Makarios to London in an effort to see whether he would urge the continuation of nonviolence. If he agreed, then negotiations might begin with leaders of the Cypriot communities. (Ibid., 747C.00/3–457)

3 Supra.

4 Dated March 13, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–1357)

5 In Polto 2135, March 12, Perkins reported from Paris that during a conversation with Ismay, the Secretary General noted that he planned to write letters to the three Permanent Representatives to the NAC from Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom in order to initiate procedures for settlement of the Cyprus dispute. According to Perkins, Ismay planned to propose appointing three “outstanding citizens” to perform “good offices”. (Ibid., 747C.00/3–1257) Polto 2252, March 22, transmitted the text of Ismay’s letter to the Department. It contained Ismay’s idea of a three-man commission. (Ibid., 747C.00/3–2257)
mindful Karamanlis insistence last autumn that Greeks could accept self-government with nod towards future self-determination and their present talk of independence.

In circumstances, we question whether progress can be made toward solution by working, essentially procedurally, for improvement atmosphere until we ourselves anyhow determine what substantive solution we are aiming at, are prepared to try to hold the Greeks to and to sell to the United Kingdom and Turks. We would, therefore, recommend that United States (1) determine solution we believe most desirable and durable in light all factors of situation, and (2) embark on campaign to achieve its acceptance by all parties.

Realize this suggested re-direction course our efforts involves more direct involvement in problem than would be desirable if we could avoid it. However, if we estimate importance of solution is sufficient to warrant play for stakes risks would seem to be acceptable. In absence some such United States leadership we see no end to matter and United Kingdom imposed self-government with consequent continual Greek agitation and further exacerbative interallied feud.

Whitney

230. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece

Washington, March 20, 1957—7:16 p.m.

3415. Your 3154. You should strongly urge GOG reserve its position re NATO initiative Cyprus on grounds (if public statement necessary) GOG will not reject any reasonable offer leading towards constructive solution. As member NATO alliance GOG determined work out solution Cyprus problem not only for benefit Cypriots, but also to restore NATO unity.

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–2057. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wood. Repeated to London, Nicosia, Ankara, Paris Topol, Rome for McSweeney, and Bermuda for the Secretary with the U.S. Delegation and pouch to Valetta.

2 In telegram 3154 from Athens, March 20, Allen reported that during a conversation with the British Ambassador to Greece, the Ambassador noted that Britain was prepared to make a statement indicating that Makarios would be released if he renounced violence. (Ibid.)
You may point out that as member NATO GOG would be in poor position if it refused cooperate in attempt being made within alliance restore unity of members, especially if refusal occurs before there has even been chance to explore what role NATO may play, which exploration itself Greeks may find helpful to bring about UK-Cypriot talks.

It is our understanding Ismay intends proceed cautiously and with consent governments involved therefore GOG views will be thoroughly respected. It is our hope British-Cypriot negotiations re immediate steps towards self-government may develop simultaneouly with NATO explorations re long range problem of eventual status Cyprus. We would envisage that any agreement on eventual status would give Cypriots full opportunity express their desires. We believe settlement eventual status an international affair and may be possible work it out less painfully within NATO than by direct confrontation of British Greeks and Turks. We do not regard NATO as substitute for British-Cypriot talks on self-government, but rather as necessary complement since self-government question probably cannot be settled until there is also understanding re eventual status. FYI only. In this connection if British-Cypriot negotiations commenced on self-government, NATO might at same time play useful role in persuading the three countries and possibly some other NATO members to join in treaty whereby within fixed term of years (say 7 to 10) there would be plebiscite to determine future status Cyprus. Prior to plebiscite signatories and representatives principal segments Island’s population would meet on equal terms to agree on terms of plebiscite. Treaty might also provide that if signatories and representatives Cypriots cannot agree, question would be taken to NAC. Such meeting might lead to plebiscite whose choices might include some form guaranteed independence (i.e. Cyprus government and some or all of NATO powers would sign treaty declaring that Cyprus would not become a part of any other country without consent signatories and that its independence would be protected by the signatory powers) or independence within Commonwealth. End FYI only.

Our hope is to encourage simultaneously British-Cypriot negotiations on self-government and long range arrangement within NATO which will lead to clearer definition of eventual status Cyprus and will allow Cypriots proper opportunity exercise eventual choice. If GOG rejects latter, we will be disinclined continue press HMG on former.
Re paragraph 1 your 31343 we do not consider that NATO role in Cyprus question as outlined above would in any way be contrary requirements UN resolution, which did not specify shape negotiations should take.

USDel Bermuda may wish utilize pertinent arguments from foregoing during discussion Cyprus item.

Herter

3 The first paragraph of telegram 3134 from Athens, March 19, reads:

"Karamanlis told me last night he had instructed his Ambassador to NATO to return to Athens for consultation in order to gain time before making definitive answer to Ismay's letter re Cyprus. He has rejected Ismay's approach preliminarily and expects to reject it outright since NATO involvement would lead to negotiations between governments, including Turkey, whereas UN resolution called specifically for negotiations between UK and Cypriots. He suspects British are trying to use NATO channel to avoid carrying out clear requirements of UN resolution." (Ibid., 747C.00/3–1957)

231. Editorial Note

On March 20, during the course of dinner conversation at the Mid-Ocean Club in Hamilton, Bermuda, Eisenhower, Macmillan, Dulles, and Lloyd discussed the Cyprus problem. A memorandum of the conversation reads:

"Mr. Macmillan stated that they were growing more and more doubtful as to the strategic value of Cyprus. With the increasing range of aircraft, Cyprus became less important and he did not know that it was worth the risks. President Eisenhower raised the question of Malta and indicated that he felt that with Malta plus Turkey and perhaps Libya, the UK–US position would be adequately served. Mr. Macmillan said that Malta was by no means a sure thing for the long-range future; there were problems. . . . Mr. Macmillan suggested that Greek-Turkish relations were now so intertwined in so many places that each in a sense had a hostage in terms of the interests of the other and that he hoped would be sufficient to prevent a war breaking out between the two about Cyprus." (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 865)
Memorandum of a Conversation, Mid-Ocean Club, Bermuda, March 21, 1957, 3:45 p.m.\(^1\)

[Here follow a list of participants and discussion of unrelated matters.]

The question of Cyprus was discussed next. Selwyn Lloyd began by stating that the British welcomed Ismay's initiative, but unfortunately the Greeks turned it down although their reply may not be final. He believed that the Turks would accept Ismay's initiative, and mentioned the other details of the British statement on Cyprus just made in London.\(^2\)

The President said that he had received many representations from various sources emphasizing that if Makarios were returned to Cyprus, real progress toward a solution of the present problem could start.

Selwyn Lloyd replied that Makarios had been the origin and foundation of terrorism in Cyprus, that there were now indications that this terrorism was failing, and that not all Cypriots are prepared to accept Makarios as their spokesman. The British think that terrorism is much weaker now than before, and that the populace of Cyprus is getting fed up with it. Lloyd added that the British believe that the Turks take Cyprus very seriously and would be unwilling to let Greece have this island, which is so close to their coast. The British therefore regard themselves as a sort of "trustee".

The Prime Minister confirmed that the British are not greatly interested in Cyprus except for the military importance of the island, a factor which is changing and probably now less than before. Were it not for the Turks, the British probably would have gone much further by now toward a solution. Macmillan also emphasized that he is not without hope that Makarios may accept the latest British offer.

The Prime Minister and President agreed that the military importance of Cyprus today has become rather less, though it was still useful to have a base there.

The Prime Minister urged that the US should try and influence the Greeks to accept Ismay's initiative.

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\(^2\) Lennox-Boyd noted that the British were prepared to release Makarios if he agreed to renounce the use of terrorism. For text of the Colonial Secretary's statement, see Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1957, pp. 411-412.
The President indicated that he would certainly be willing to consider doing this, and urged the British to free Makarios. In any case, he added, the US believes what the British leaders have just said about their real aims regarding Cyprus, is sympathetic with the British problem in Cyprus, and would certainly do its best to try and help.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

233. Editorial Note

On March 21, the President wrote a diary entry recording his impressions of discussions held that day at the Bermuda Conference. It reads:

“The Prime Minister outlined the major factors in the whole Cyprus problem. They are quite complicated and he asserts that Britain wants nothing more to do with the island except to keep its base there, but any action that the British can suggest up to this moment antagonizes either the Greeks or the Turks. The British believe that the antagonisms that would be created by dropping the British responsibility in the island might even lead to war between the Turks and the Greeks.

“I told them that I had certain important messages, particularly from the Greeks, asking me to urge upon Macmillan the importance of freeing Archbishop Makarios. I told them that in my opinion I didn’t believe they were gaining much by keeping him prisoner, so I would just turn him loose on the world. At the very least this would prove to the world that the British were trying to reach a solution to this problem. My impression is that they are probably going to turn him loose, but subject only to his agreement not to go back to Cyprus and to abjure violence.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)
234. Memorandum for the Record, by the Secretary of State


The President let Mr. Macmillan read the cable from George Allen (from Athens to Department 3204) with reference to Cyprus and Makarios. The President urged him to let Makarios go. Macmillan said that they had received a long and contentious communication from Makarios. He was, however, personally disposed to put the most charitable interpretation on it and to let him free. He was cabling the Cabinet to take no contrary action pending his return. The President urged that the UK stature would be enhanced if they dealt with the matter in a broad and liberal way. The President said that Macmillan was on the whole quite pleased with the contents of the Allen cable.

1 Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 868. Secret. A notation on the source text indicates that the memorandum was read to Rountree.
2 Dated March 22. (Ibid., Central Files, 747C.00/3–2257)
3 The text of Makarios' statement of March 22 is printed in Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1957, pp. 412–413.
4 A memorandum of a March 23 dinner conversation among the President, Dulles, Macmillan, and Lloyd on Cyprus reads:

"Mr. Macmillan brought up the question of Cyprus, indicating his strong hope that the US could in some public way express its support of the initiative of Lord Ismay, the former NATO Secretary General. Neither the President nor I made any response to this request, hearing it in silence, and Mr. Macmillan did not press the point." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File)

235. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece

Washington, March 29, 1957—2:47 p.m.

3526. Presidential handling. Please deliver following message from the President to King Paul. Confirm date and time of delivery.

"March 29, 1957.

Dear King Paul:

I would like to tell you that I very much appreciated your letter of March 15, 1957. Your views on the Cyprus problem, especially with respect to Archbishop Makarios, were of great value to me and

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3–2957. Secret; Priority.
2 See footnote 2, Document 228.
my associates at Bermuda and during the Conference I took the opportunity of urging that the Archbishop be released.

It is encouraging to learn that the Archbishop has recently been offered the opportunity of leaving the Seychelles. His release presents a great opportunity and, as you stated in your letter, marks 'a definite step toward a possible solution of this thorny problem'. I sincerely hope that with your advice and encouragement the Greek Government will do everything possible to use this opportunity for the purpose of creating an atmosphere which will lead to constructive negotiations between the leaders of the Cypriot communities and the British authorities.

Further, I would urge you to consider the possibility that NATO could at the same time play a useful role in considering the international aspects of this question. If the domestic and international aspects of the problem could be more clearly separated, and if they are approached with courage and resourcefulness, I believe that this painful problem can gradually but certainly be solved in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Thank you again for your letter. Please accept the best wishes of myself and Mrs. Eisenhower and convey our greetings to Queen Frederika.³

Sincerely,
Dwight D. Eisenhower”

Dulles

³ In telegram 3267, April 1, Allen reported:

“King Paul was highly pleased to receive President’s message, which I delivered to him at Tatoi last night. We asked if he could show it to Prime Minister Karamanlis. I said President would undoubtedly expect him to show it to Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Averoff but that existence of this exchange of letters should be held secret in absence of agreement to contrary. In order to draw King out I asked to what extent he felt he could give advice and encouragement to GOG. He said President’s letter would enable him to advise Karamanlis to be more willing for NATO to consider international aspects of Cyprus problem. He said he would call Karamanlis to palace today to discuss President’s letter.

“King noted with obvious relish President’s statement that during Bermuda Conference had urged release of Makarios.” (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4-157)
236. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

\[\textit{Washington, March 29, 1957—4:54 p.m.}\]

6822. Presidential handling. Please deliver following message from the President to Prime Minister Macmillan. Confirm date and time delivery.

"March 29, 1957.
Dear Harold:
I have noted with great interest your decision to release Archbishop Makarios. I know that this entailed great difficulty for you. I earnestly hope that his release will bring about a substantial improvement in the atmosphere relating to Cyprus, with greater prospects for a satisfactory settlement of this problem.

I want you to know that we will do all we can to encourage others concerned to approach the matter in a constructive and conciliatory manner so that the opportunities afforded by this action on your part will not be lost.

With kind regard,
Sincerely,
D.E."

Dulles

\[1\text{Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Eisenhower to Macmillan Correspondence 1957–1958, Vol. II. Secret; Priority.}\]

237. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower

\[\textit{London, March 31, 1957.}\]

DEAR FRIEND: Thank you for your letter about Archbishop Makarios.\(^2\) As you say, this was a difficult decision for us and you will have seen that it was not taken without loss to the Government. I do not believe that the Archbishop has changed his views in the Seychelles; he is the Bourbon of Cyprus. But events in the island

\[1\text{Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Top Secret. Transmitted under cover of a note from Caccia to Eisenhower, dated March 31.}\]

\[2\text{See telegram 6822, supra.}\]
and in the world are surging past him. Harding has beaten terrorism militarily, and the world now recognizes that Cyprus is an international problem.

I am sure that your aid in persuading all concerned to face reality could be of decisive help. Of course my right-wing assume that we released the Archbishop at your request, so private pressure by you would be better than public statements.

Warm regards, as ever,

Harold Macmillan

3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

238. Editorial Note

On March 22, the Department instructed the Embassy at Ankara to raise with the Turkish Government the United States views that all the parties should try to overcome past resentments; that it did not seem possible that the problem could be settled without simultaneous negotiations between the British and the Cypriots and between the concerned governments, possibly within the framework of the NATO conciliation plan; and that the history of the problem indicated that negotiations could not succeed without the objective of reaching some understanding regarding the status of the island. (Telegram 2220 to Ankara, March 20; Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/3-2257)

On March 25, Ambassador Warren called on Melih Esenbel and reported to him the substance of telegram 2220. Among other things, Esenbel noted that the Turkish Government did not agree to summoning a conference in which the leaders of the various Cypriot communities would participate, that Makarios and other Cypriot leaders should be excluded from the conference, and that the Government of Turkey had accepted Ismay's proposals in principle. (Telegram 2234 from Ankara, March 28; ibid., 747C.00/3-2857)

On April 4, the Embassy at Ankara transmitted the text of a Turkish aide-mémoire on Cyprus that had been delivered to the Embassy by Esenbel that day. The aide-mémoire indicated that the Turkish Government was in complete agreement with the United States regarding the need to solve the Cyprus dispute in a peaceful manner. It also noted that the Greek Government and Makarios, and
the "terrorists" were still working to attain enosis and as long as
these attitudes and actions persisted, unilateral acts of good faith
would be of no avail. (Telegram 2290 from Ankara, April 4; ibid.,
747C.00/4-457)

In telegram 2353 to Ankara the Department transmitted an aide-
mémoire in response to the Turkish aide-mémoire of April 4. The
Department noted that the Turkish aide-mémoire was still under
study and that the United States hoped that all parties agreed on the
need to solve the Cyprus dispute in a peaceful manner. (ibid.)

239. Editorial Note

On April 14, the Embassy at Ankara transmitted the text of a
note that the Turkish Government delivered to the Government of
Greece regarding Cyprus. The Turkish note indicated that the Gov-
ernment of Turkey considered that the "enosist designs" of Greece
were aimed directly at Turkey, and that the Greek Government was
in "close collaboration" with Makarios. The note also added that the
attitude of the Greek Government, which was to make declarations
in international organizations and then to deny them "before its
proper public opinion", is "a manifest proof of its ill-intentions."
(Telegram 2371 from Ankara, April 14; Department of State, Central
Files, 747C.00/4-1457)

On April 16, during the course of discussion at the Secretary's
Staff meeting, William Rountree raised the matter of Cyprus. Ac-
cording to the notes of the meeting, the following exchange oc-
curred:

"Mr. Rountree reported that relations between the Greeks and
the Turks have reached an even more acute stage as the result of a
very strong note delivered by the Turks to the Greeks on the subject
of Cyprus and Makarios. Mr. Rountree said that . . . he felt that
the Greeks were now aware of the seriousness with which the Turks
regarded the situation. The Acting Secretary indicated he felt we had
a definite responsibility to do what we can to resolve this situation.
Mr. Rountree said that he was thinking of sending a communication
to the Greeks noting that Makarios' release was due to our interces-
sion and that in return the Greeks should attempt to exercise some
restraint on their part. However, he said we are stopped from doing
this because of the strong British objection to any indication that the
US played a role in arranging the release of Makarios. He felt the
only channel open to us at the moment was to King Paul and some
consideration was being given to a further approach through him." (Ibid., Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

On April 17, at the 320th meeting of the National Security Council, Director of Central Intelligence Dulles in his review of significant world developments affecting United States security, raised the subject of Cyprus. A memorandum of the discussion reads:

"The return of Archbishop Makarios to Athens has stepped up the tension between Greece and Turkey. The Greek Government is seriously worried over the outbreak of trouble with Turkey as a result of inflammatory speeches and pronouncements by Makarios." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Memoranda of Discussion)

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240. Editorial Note

In an April 15 letter to President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Macmillan wrote:

"It was a great grief that Bobbety Salisbury felt unable to agree to let out Archbishop Makarios. I am bound to say I don’t much like letting him out, and he will be a great nuisance when he gets to Athens, and still more when he comes to London. I expect he will turn up in New York and Washington too. But I don’t quite see how we could have kept him in Seychelles indefinitely, and the break in the EOKA morale seemed a very good moment to throw this fish back in the sea.

"As for the long term solution of Cyprus, we are working hard on this, but it is not easy to find just the right thing to do. However I am quite hopeful that we shall be able to have a definite plan and I would like to write to you about it as soon as I can." (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan to Eisenhower Correspondence 1957–1958 Vol. II. On March 29 Salisbury resigned because of the decision to release Makarios.)

President Eisenhower responded to Macmillan’s letter on April 28 as follows:

"I share your disappointment that Lord Salisbury resigned because of the release of Makarios. While I think that the latter is far from a statesman and can probably stir up quite a bit of mischief, still I think that Britain, as a great country, is in better position in the matter than she was with him as a prisoner. Certainly you have taken away from demagogues one of their chief arguments against you. . . . To conclude—I hope that Lord Salisbury comes back into the fold." (Ibid., Eisenhower to Macmillan Correspondence 1957–1958, Vol. I)
241. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom**

*Washington, April 16, 1957 — 4:10 p.m.*

7312. In view heavy Turk pressure (Ankara’s 2324 and others) to obtain more definitive US–UK views on future Cyprus, suggest London consult with HMG and indicate that we have given GOT preliminary reply (Deptl 2353 to Ankara), and that we plan to have Amb. Warren discuss matter further upon his return Ankara April 22. We feel, despite excitement being generated, GOT’s Aide-Mémoire (Ankara’s 2290) provides useful basis for further discussion by way of follow up to Deptl 2220 to Ankara. Unless HMG has serious objections, we plan present following views to GOT orally stating at that time that we have also discussed with HMG without indicating HMG’s reaction to Turks. For the present we do not plan similar approach to GOG. We would, however, plan keep both Ismay and Spaak informed generally. Until we have first exchanged views with HMG, we would prefer hold matter closely between our two Governments.

This proposed approach to GOT will be designed primarily to indicate that US now seriously doubts whether either enosis or partition would prove to be peaceful or practical solutions and that US now believes that either independence within the Commonwealth or independence outside Commonwealth coupled in either case with a treaty preventing enosis are worthy serious consideration. Within context Deptl 2220 we have in mind developing these further views along following lines:

Any change in status Cyprus must be accomplished gradually if there is to be a peaceful solution. It would not appear practical in present tense situation and in view Cypriots’ relative inexperience in

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4–957. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Jones and Wood. Also sent to Athens, Ankara, Paris, Topol, and Nicosia.

2 In telegram 2324, April 9, the Embassy reported that the failure of the United States to respond to the recent Turkish démarche on Cyprus ‘could be misinterpreted by Turks as evidencing some degree USG acquiescence in whatever tactics Turkey may decide employ in Cyprus issue’. (Ibid.) The démarche was made on April 8 by Birgi to Frederick B. Lyon, at Ankara. According to Lyon, Birgi noted that there was ‘increased tension’ among the Turkish people over Cyprus and that the government might not be able to prevent ‘disturbances’. Birgi also indicated that his government felt compelled to issue a statement concerning Greek ‘insincerity and unfairness’. (Telegram 2308, from Ankara, April 8; ibid., 747C.00/4–837)

3 See Document 238.

4 Warren was in the United States for consultation.

5 See Document 238.

6 Ibid.
governing themselves, to pass directly to some form self-determination without providing for predetermined period of self-government, such a period would afford Cypriots opportunity to assume increased measure of responsibility for their own affairs and might also permit present tensions to cool.

Because self-government would appear best prelude to any final solution, it follows that representatives of Island’s communities should negotiate with HMG on mutually acceptable form self-government, since responsibility for achieving successful self-government will rest largely with Cypriots. The choice of these representatives should be left to members of Cypriot communities.

It seems unlikely Cypriots will agree on self-government as interim solution unless they have fairly clear conception eventual status Island. Concurrently, therefore, with these negotiations between HMG and representatives Cypriot communities, future status Cyprus might appropriately be explored within NATO framework. These explorations might possibly lead to a treaty whereby within a fixed term of years there would be a plebiscite to determine future status Cyprus. NATO negotiations should be secret and insofar as possible, seriatim.

Obviously eventual status Cyprus can only be finally settled by agreement between parties directly concerned. However, reestablishment good relations between GOT and GOG is matter of primary concern not only to both Governments, but to all Free World. At the present time, either enosis or partition would appear to be counterproductive to reestablishment good relations. Enosis would in the foreseeable future seriously exacerbate Turk-Greek relations. Partition would appear do the same. It would also pose grave and perhaps permanent political and economic problems on Cyprus. Both Turk and Greek communities are fairly evenly distributed throughout Island. It would seem almost impossible divide Cyprus equitably, would certainly require major population transfer and would leave in its wake bitterness and resentment among entire Cypriot population.

A solution promising more hope for improved Turk-Greek relations might be that of offering Cypriots, after fixed period self-government, choice between independence within British Commonwealth and independence outside Commonwealth. In either case there would be a treaty signed by interested and friendly nations, as well as Government of Cyprus as then constituted, whereby Cyprus would be independent and would not become part of any other nation without full consent of the parties most intimately concerned. (FYI UK, Greece, Turkey and Cypriots. End FYI)

Any solution should recognize British sovereignty over bases on Cyprus needed for Free World defense.
GOT would be informed that foregoing views are advanced within context of frequently stated desire of both GOT and USG to have frank exchange of views. The further views of GOT would be welcomed.

After soliciting HMG’s views on foregoing approach, Embassy London should also suggest HMG seriously consider bringing Cypriot leaders to London for negotiations on self-government. Release of Makarios was certainly difficult step. If he now remains too long in Athens, situation may become increasingly rigid and opportunity provided by his release may be lost.

Athens: Ambassador Allen may wish urge on Makarios that having been released, he should indicate willingness promptly go to London for negotiations.

Comment addressee posts requested soonest without consultation except in London (and Athens only as stated in preceding paragraph).

Herter

242. Editorial Note

In telegram 5734 from London, April 18, the Embassy informed the Department that the British Foreign Office had no objection to Ambassador Warren presenting to the Turkish Government the views contained in telegram 7312, supra. The Foreign Office added, however, that instead of telling Turkey that the United States had “discussed” these views with the United Kingdom, that the Turks be told that the United States had “informed” the British about them. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4-1857)

On April 18, the Embassy at Athens informed the Department that it fully agreed with the line presented in telegram 7312. The Embassy added that a distinction should be made between the “eventual status of Cyprus” and “self-determination”. (Telegram 3502 from Athens, April 18; ibid.)

In telegram 2424 from Ankara, April 20, the Embassy, in its interim reply to telegram 7312 to London, noted that “unless there is some drastic change in political atmosphere, it is no more possible that Turks would sit down at same negotiation table with Makarios than that Pope should sit with devil.” (Ibid., 747C.00/4-2057)
On April 18, the Office of the United States Permanent Representative to NATO informed the Department that it agreed with the Department's position as outlined in telegram 7312 to London, repeated as Topol 1960. The Office added, however, that it was important to recognize Turkish concern for the protection of the rights of the Turkish minority, especially during any period of independence. (Polto 2511 from Paris, April 18; ibid., 747C.00/4-1857)

In telegram 399 from Nicosia, April 18, the Consulate noted that both the solution and the procedure described in telegram 7312 to London were contrary to what seemed to be some of the basic tenets of the Greeks and the Turks. Although the Consulate noted that renunciation of enosis by the Greek Cypriots was unlikely, it was not impossible that Cypriot acceptance could not be obtained, "provided, of course, leads from Athens and Ankara did not prevent" it. (Ibid.)

243. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, April 24, 1957—3 p.m.

2445. Re Istanbul telegram 910 to Department. I saw Prime Minister Menderes, Birgi and Esenbel together evening April 23 for almost hour and half conversation. I conveyed orally precisely sense Deptels 2416 and 2469. I stressed that my remarks were not a USG proposal or plan but rather observations for study and future consultation with idea they might lead finally solution Cyprus problem.

The Prime Minister remarked when I finished that his government would study my presentation (of which they made minute,
careful notes) point by point and he would give me Turkish observations very soon.

My presentation was received completely dead-pan.

When I reached point about independence, Birgi completed two sentences for me before I could do so. First instance, he anticipated word "independence". Second time he supplied "within British Commonwealth". This makes me think my remarks were not surprise for them.

I tried lay groundwork for later consultations and appeals, repeating Department's idea Turks statesmanship, restraint, and need for calm atmosphere to work out solution. Prime Minister then emphasized there limit on restraint beyond which cannot go. That limit has been reached. He stated Greeks are making categorical, dogmatic claims publicly which are freezing Greek position, satisfying Greek public opinion. Prime Minister said must now face up political requirements here in Turkey.

On conclusion my remarks, Prime Minister asked me how much of my remarks he could pass on to parliamentary groups and how much use in parliamentary debate. I replied I had not foreseen his query and so did not have the answer. I ventured the opinion, however, that Washington would not want its ideas disclosed to parliamentary groups or used in Assembly debate.

I said I felt that would violate very purpose USA efforts and prevent USA and Turkey make headway this problem.

Prime Minister then stressed he has delayed for fifteen days answering parliamentary inquiry, that his preliminary remarks will no longer hold situation, that he must make suitable reply Assembly. In his reply he must clarify the views, intentions and policy his government order to protect Turkish position in light Greek buildup.

I believe Prime Minister doubtless will discuss my presentation with his confidants in government but discussions with parliamentary groups and parliamentary debate are still of great importance to USG.

Will Department inform Embassy urgently what can be said to Prime Minister regarding use of my remarks in Assembly and in parliamentary group discussions?

Warren
244. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey ¹

Washington, April 25, 1957—4:48 p.m.

2509. In response to Menderes' request (Ankara 2445 ²) you may inform him orally and confidentially that we feel whatever merit our proposals may have would probably be jeopardized by public discussions at this time. We are motivated by strong desire make progress promptly in Cyprus explorations and continue believe best hope is through quiet diplomacy. You should emphasize that in present situation we had not intended to inform GOG until there had been time for discussion with GOT. We can understand situation Menderes faces vis-à-vis Turkish public interest this question, but hope he will agree that main consideration at this juncture is to move towards solution of question.

FYI Ankara. . . . If in your considered judgment there is likelihood that GOT will in any event, reveal publicly that US has made substantive suggestions, you should inform Athens immediately. End FYI.

FYI Athens. We would prefer not inform Greeks of contents Deptl 3730 ³ to Athens until Turk response has been received. If however Ankara indicates may divulge substance US views and if in Embassy's opinion situation would then require that GOG be informed, you may take action on basis Deptl 3730. End FYI.

Dulles

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¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4–2457. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Holmes and Wood. Also sent to Athens; repeated to London, Paris Topol, and Nicosia; and pouch to Rome, Ottawa, Bonn, and Valetta.
² Supra.
³ Printed as telegram 7312, Document 241.
245. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

* Athens, April 26, 1957—5 p.m. *

3596. Paris for USRO. Rome for McSweeney. Reference: Deptel 3836. During meeting at my home this morning Makarios proposed that U.S. assume UN-sponsored trusteeship over Cyprus during interim period prior to self-determination. I immediately pointed out that this would not be feasible for several reasons. We would be shouldering responsibilities which those directly concerned should carry. Moreover, U.S. is already accused of speaking against colonialism because U.S. wishes to supplant existing imperialist overlords. He said if people of Cyprus requested US trusteeship, no one could accuse U.S. of imperialism. On contrary, this would be first time any great power had assumed governmental responsibilities at request of population and would consequently be opposite of imperialism. I asked if he had any evidence that Turkish as well as Greek Cypriots would like it. He said he thought they would. He added that our recently assumed responsibilities in Middle East made it imperative for us to take bold steps to help solve Cyprus problem.

I asked how British Government could justify recalling all its officials from Cyprus and seeing them replaced by Americans. He acknowledged the difficulties but pointed out that British had shifted its responsibilities to U.S. elsewhere, including the shift in Greece itself in 1947. Since U.S. had to support free-world, he thought we should exercise our responsibilities directly.

Comment: It is difficult to believe that Makarios advanced this proposal with serious belief it might be accepted. I am inclined to regard it as tactic designed to show he has come forth with something, however far-fetched, and that ball is now in our or someone else’s court.

Other subjects discussed will be reported in separate telegrams.

Allen

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4-2657. Secret. Repeated to London, Rome, and Paris Topol.
2 See footnote 2, infra.
3 See infra. In telegram 3597 from Athens, April 26, Allen noted that his meeting with Makarios had been arranged by Averoff, who suggested that the conversation take place at his house. Allen added that rather than give the meeting a "conspiratorial aspect", he suggested that the meeting take place at his home. The Ambassador reported that he and the Archbishop had agreed to try to keep the meeting from becoming public. If it did become known, Allen concluded, he was prepared to say that "several sources" had suggested that the meeting might be a useful one and that he had agreed in order to obtain a better understanding of the Cyprus problem. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4-2657)
246. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State

*Athens, April 26, 1957—5 p.m.*

3595. Paris for USRO; Rome for McSweeney. Department’s 3836. During talk with Makarios I did not mention subject of his return to Cyprus and he did not bring it up. I did press him earnestly, however, to bring about end of terrorist threat on island as most important next step towards solution. I pointed out that neither British nor Turks would be ready to negotiate as long as he had armed organization in being which could be called into action at any time. I thought he could justify taking bold measures against terrorism on the grounds that his release from exile was beginning of new phase of Cyprus question, and urged him to present himself to world as man of peace, which befitted his clerical garb.

Makarios seemed impressed. He agreed that from international aspect, he should do so. Intense emotion of Greeks in Cyprus and Greece presented difficulties for him internally but he declared he would do everything he could.

I asked whether Grivas could be persuaded to leave Cyprus. He said Grivas would not leave while many of his followers were in prison under long sentences. I said British would probably grant amnesty in natural course of events when they were convinced by experience that return to terrorism was unlikely. He agreed, but said he would not persuade Grivas to leave unless Grivas had fairly definite assurance regarding amnesty, since otherwise his followers would feel betrayed. I said I would try to find out whether there were any possibilities regarding amnesty.

*Comment:* Makarios did not add condition which Averoff had mentioned, regarding his own return to Cyprus. If British are able to

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2 In telegram 3836, April 25, the Department of State noted that the United States should not take steps to facilitate the return of Makarios to Cyprus in view of “extreme Turk sensibilities.” The Department added that it believed that the Archbishop would arrive in Cyprus via London soon enough, and meanwhile the Turks “needed time to cool”. The Department instructed the Embassy that when it was appropriate it might wish to indicate to Makarios that he should travel to London to “establish contact there.” The Department added, for the information of the Embassy, that the U.S. position was that both partition and enosis seemed impractical. *(Ibid., 747C.00/4-2457)*
say anything re amnesty which would give Makarios basis for acting, I believe he would try to persuade Grivas to leave.3

Allen

3 On May 3, in reply to this telegram, the Department informed the Embassy that it agreed with Allen’s suggestion that Makarios should present himself as a “man of peace”. The Department added that it believed that a renunciation of violence was an “essential prerequisite” to further progress on the Cyprus issue. The Department suggested to the Embassy that it might wish to inform the Greek Government that prospects for progress on self-government for Cyprus might depend on Grivas’ departure from the island. (Telegram 3941 to Athens, May 3; ibid., 747C.00/4–2657)

247. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State ¹

*Athens, April 26, 1957—5 p.m.*

3594. Rome for McSweeney. During talk with Makarios today I urged him to make statement favorable towards Turks of Cyprus. He said Turkish Cypriots had been almost as violent as Turks in Ankara in condemning Greece for welcoming him to Athens. Nevertheless, he asserted he would try his best to placate Turks of Cyprus. I expressed view that best way to defeat partition would be for Cypriot Turks to show they were opposed. He expressed confidence they would do so after period of self-government. I asked if he planned to make counter proposals to Radcliffe constitution. He said he had plans which he would bring forward at appropriate moment.

When I urged him to visit London, he said he planned to go but not at present because under existing atmosphere he would be castigated in London as terrorist. I said he could remove this danger by convincing evidence that he is man of peace.

*Comment:* I doubt he can be persuaded to visit London as long as he is being strongly attacked in Turkish and some British circles. He is aware that his visit might incite further adverse Turkish reaction.

Allen

248. Editorial Note

On April 27, Ambassador Warren reported that Foreign Office Secretary General Esenbel had presented him with a long aïde-mémoire on Cyprus. The Ambassador noted that he was more concerned about the Cyprus situation now than at any time since his arrival in Ankara. (Telegram 2487, April 29; Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/4–2957) The full text of the aïde-mémoire was transmitted in despatch 678, April 29. (Ibid.)

249. Telegram From the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, May 3, 1957—10 a.m.

Secto 12. Paris for USRO. Following afternoon NAC session Averoff visited me for half an hour to discuss Cyprus.

He said Greek Government is now contemplating two possible solutions of Cyprus problem. First would be creation of independent state and he expressed his deep conviction that Greece would accept guaranteed independence. He also said Greece would hold elections, placing issue squarely up to electorate which would leave no doubt as to Greek willingness to go through with such solution. Second solution he cited was possible creation of trusteeship. He referred to Makarios proposal to Allen re United States trusteeship. He realized this not feasible and suggested that some NATO country such as Norway might be asked to accept it. He said United Kingdom would be in position to keep its bases on Cyprus and could call on United Nations to arrange such trusteeship.

Commenting on second solution Secretary said Greek Government should turn such a proposal over to someone like Spaak to present and not present it as a Greek proposal. Secretary said heretofore trusteeships have been established with view to eventual self-government and independence and presumably trusteeship over Cyprus would have to be established on different basis. Averoff said that Greek Government could never agree to permanent trusteeship and could not exclude forever right of Cypriots to determine their

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–BO/5–357. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Athens, London, Nicosia, and Paris Topol. Dulles was in Bonn to attend the Ministerial meeting of the NAC held May 2 and 3.
future. He thought it might be possible to express trusteeship in terms of a minimum period of 20 years or so. Averoff said in any case he preferred first solution, i.e., independence and was obviously seeking United States support for this solution. Secretary remarked Turks are opposed to independence because they fear it will lead to ultimate enosis. Secretary did not commit himself to either solution but suggested Averoff pursue question of trusteeship through third party. Secretary felt that any solution acceptable to Greece and Turkey would also be acceptable to United Kingdom. Averoff asked that his views re solution Cyprus be closely held since, he said, only Prime Minister and King in Greece have knowledge of these views.

Dulles

250. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the British Ambassador (Caccia) and Secretary of State Dulles, Department of State, Washington, July 25, 1957 ¹

SUBJECT

Cyprus

The Ambassador called to leave with the Secretary the attached "oral communication" concerning a United Kingdom plan on the Cyprus problem. ² . . .

In leaving this document, the Ambassador made the following supplemental remarks. The Cyprus problem had now entered a critical stage and it was of the utmost importance that efforts be undertaken speedily to arrive at a compromise solution. The present United Kingdom approach was prompted by the belief that it was necessary first to arrive at an agreement on the ultimate status of the island; within that framework the internal problems of self-rule

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7–2557. Secret. Drafted by Jones.

² The "oral communication," dated July 24, not printed, proposed a plan in which Great Britain would invite representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments to a conference in London in September. According to the plan, the United States and Secretary General Spaak would be invited as observers. The conference would have no fixed agenda and might discuss "without prejudice every solution so far mooted." The "only fixed requirement[s]" the British plan proposed, on which any solution must be based, were: essential military facilities under British control; protection of the island from Communist infiltration; and ensuring peace of the island. (Ibid., 747C.00/7–2457)
could then be negotiated with the Cypriots. In the past, the problem of self-rule had been approached first; these efforts had failed, in part because of Greek Government support of the Greek Cypriots; there was, therefore, more hope for effective self-rule negotiations with the Cypriots if the Greek Government first became a party to an agreement on the ultimate status. The Ambassador emphasized the importance of United States influence and expressed the hope that we would use this not only to get the parties together for the proposed meeting but to have them approach the meeting with a reasonable spirit of compromise. This was particularly important in the case of the Greeks, who undoubtedly would not attend without United States encouragement. No public announcement concerning the meeting was intended and the proposed discussions with the Greek and the Turkish Governments would be on a confidential basis. It was the United Kingdom’s hope that the time between now and the meeting in September could be used to consider carefully with the United States the various possible solutions. In that connection he expressed the hope that these discussions might be held in London. He also pointed out that after the Suez experience the “essential military facilities” mentioned in the document would now be quite small and should present no problem.

The Secretary said the United Kingdom plan would be studied by the Department. He asked if there was any reason to hope that the Greeks would attend, recalled the past Greek attitude toward such a meeting, and observed that it probably would be very difficult for the United States to prevail upon Greece to participate without assurances of support that we were not in a position to give because of the interests of our Turkish ally in this same problem. The Secretary also noted the importance of there being no public announcement about this plan and took under advisement the suggestion that the proposed United States—United Kingdom discussions be held in London.
251. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom ¹

Washington, July 30, 1957—1:24 p.m.

Tosec 7. Re Secto 2 ² and Deptel 856 to London. ³


2. British plan in principle is consistent with U.S. desire see parties primarily interested take initiative in arriving at compromise solution. While we should join with others in influencing Greeks and Turks to attend, we do not think U.S. should participate as observer. It would involve us too deeply in Cyprus dispute and might serve to detract from role we would like Spaak to play in bringing parties together. Interim discussions before meeting should afford us long needed opportunity for frank discussions with UK concerning their intentions with respect to Cyprus.

3. Spaak should be encouraged support meeting and participate as observer. Might also be useful for him participate in interim U.S.-UK discussions, thus making London logical place such talks.

4. UK intentions with respect to meeting and to Cyprus problems generally require clarification.

(a) If meeting is largely tactical move in connection with next UNGA, UK may soon feel impelled either to leak or publicly announce meeting prematurely. This would prejudice chances of acceptance and/or success.

(b) Nature UK commitments, if any, to Turkey may influence meeting. UK freedom of action on Cyprus issue has been limited by her apparent commitment to Turkey on partition made at time of parliamentary debate on Radcliffe proposal. It would be useful to know if in approaching conference "with entirely open mind" UK will be uncommitted to Turkey.

(c) British Ambassador's assertion essential military facilities under British sovereignty will be small and present no problem suggests sharp curtailment UK military expenditures on Cyprus. Such eventuality requires assessment in terms of future base facilities to West and of impact on viability island's economy.

(d) We need to know UK intentions with respect to self-rule and whether, under any type of ultimate status, UK willing to

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7-3057. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Jones. Also sent to Paris, Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia and pouched to USUN. Dulles was in London to attend a meeting of the U.N. Disarmament Commission on August 2.

² Secto 2, July 29, requested a background briefing memorandum for possible side talks with British officials regarding Cyprus. (Ibid., 747C.00/7-2957)

³ Telegram 856, July 27, transmitted the full text of a British proposal for a conference on Cyprus; see footnote 2, supra.
assume financial burden and political risks of transitional period of self-government under UK rule.

5. Turks will probably accept invitation to London meeting. They have encouraged UK to call such meeting and presumably believe that UK views will be more in harmony with Turk than Greek views. Because of forthcoming Turkish elections, it is doubtful if Turkish Government will be able to recede at meeting from its present uncompromising position favoring partition. Turks may therefore attempt impose conditions for acceptance.

6. Greeks will undoubtedly reject invitation unless strong influences are brought to bear.

(a) They will regard this as tactical UK move to forestall UNGA discussion or at least keep it in low key. Greeks regard UNGA as one of their most important levers on this issue and may resort to various tactics to assure full airing Cyprus problem at UNGA. These tactics may include imposing conditions for acceptance and/or leaking UK plan to press in order marshal opinion to their side.

(b) They had bad time at London tripartite conference 1955 and have repeatedly said they would not participate in another meeting where they are outvoted two to one. While success of meeting will depend on willingness all parties to compromise rather than on voting alignment, Greeks deeply distrust UK and aware fact Turk elections limit Turk Government’s capacity for compromise.

(c) Proposed meeting will put Greek Government in very difficult position vis-à-vis Makarios. Doubtful if Greek Government could participate effectively without support of and active consultations with Makarios during course of meeting. This may also lead Greeks to impose conditions for acceptance.

(d) U.S. participation as observer would undoubtedly make it easier for Greeks to accept.

7. Within context of foregoing, Department is now considering following course of action with respect UK note:

(a) Support idea of meeting attended by UK, Greece, and Turkey with Spaak as observer.

(b) Inform UK we believe we can exert influence more effectively by not participating as observer and that we are prepared to work closely with them before and during meeting.

FYI only. Should it become clear that sine qua non of holding conference is attendance of U.S. as observer, we may wish reconsider this point. End FYI.

(c) Undertake to use our influence together with that of Spaak to get Greece and Turkey to attend without prior commitments. Join with Spaak in pointing out to Greece dangers Soviet bloc involvement in Cyprus through UNGA and in urging Greece to play Cyprus in low key at next UNGA.

(d) Welcome frank discussions in London with UK (in which Spaak might also participate). Attempt to get clearer picture of UK ultimate intentions with respect to Cyprus and of UK relationships with Turks.
(e) Urge upon all parties importance of avoiding premature leaks and of minimizing publicity.

8. Comments of addressee posts desired by August 2.
9. Secretary's attention invited particularly to paragraphs 2 and 7(b).

Herter

252. Editorial Note

The Embassy in London replied to Tosec 7 (supra) in telegram 886, August 2. Regarding parts a, b, c, and d of paragraph 4 of Tosec 7, the Embassy: 1) noted that the British proposal was a tactical maneuver connected with the General Assembly; 2) noted that Macmillan and Lloyd had assured Dulles that the British would not "tint" the conference with a commitment to Turkey; 3) reported that the British regarded military facilities on Cyprus as a way to protect the right flank of NATO, coordinate with Baghdad Pact planning, stabilize the area, and keep Cyprus in the free world; and 4) noted that, regarding British intentions, the Foreign Office indicated that it would approach the conference with an "open but not empty mind". Regarding the question of United States participation in the conference, the Embassy reported that the Foreign Office would be pleased if the United States were to attend, but that it appreciated United States reluctance. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8-257)

In Polto 314 from Paris, August 2, the Office of the United States Permanent Representative to NATO noted that it would ideally like to see the conference postponed as it would "almost certainly" aggravate an already bad situation. Instead it suggested that the British, with assistance from the United States and Spaak, should continue to press forward with secret bilateral talks with the Greeks and the Turks. (Ibid.)

In telegram 283 from Ankara, August 1, the Embassy noted, regarding paragraph 6 (a) of Tosec 7, that it believed the advantages to be gained from United States attendance at the proposed conference as an observer outweighed the disadvantages. (Ibid., 747C.00/8-157)

In telegram 350 from Athens, July 31, the Embassy noted that the United States should not commit itself so firmly at this stage to
support the British proposal for a tripartite meeting that “we will be obliged either to press Greeks to point where our potential effectiveness vis-à-vis GOG is seriously prejudiced or on the other hand to back away from our support and thus lead British to accuse us of letting them down.” (Ibid., 747C.00/7-3157)

In telegram 24 from Nicosia, August 1, the Consulate General commented that the United States should participate in the conference with Spaak as an observer. (Ibid., 747.00/8-157)

253. Memorandum of Discussion at the 333d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 1, 1957

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1-7.]

8. U.S. Policy toward Settlement of the Cyprus Dispute (Supplement to NSC 5718)

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the background of the statement of policy toward settlement of the Cyprus dispute (Supplement to NSC 5718). (A copy of Mr. Cutler’s briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, together with part of his note on Greece.)

Mr. Cutler noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in the Supplement to NSC 5718.

The President asked whether this was not an unusual type of paper for the National Security Council to consider. It appeared to him that the courses of action in the Cyprus Supplement consisted mostly of things the Department of State should do. Mr. Cutler said the Cyprus Supplement had been prepared primarily for the information of the Council. The Planning Board had felt it was difficult to talk about Greece without any mention of Cyprus.

Mr. Cutler then pointed out that there was a difference of opinion in the Planning Board on paragraph 12 of the Supplement, relating to U.S. participation in arrangements guaranteeing the interim or eventual status of Cyprus. Secretary Bowie said that it was conceivable that a guarantee arrangement might be concluded some time in the future, especially if the United States would participate.


2Document 256. NSC 5718 is not printed, but see Document 307.
State was not asking that the NSC now approve U.S. participation in a guarantee, but had suggested paragraph 12 of the Supplement in order to alert the Council to the problem. He said State would be prepared to amend the wording of the paragraph so that the phrase "be prepared to give serious consideration to participating" would replace the phrase "be prepared to participate".

The National Security Council: ³

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in the Supplement to NSC 5718, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as reported at the meeting.
b. Noted the suggestion by the Department of State that the last sentence of paragraph 12 of the Supplement to NSC 5718 be amended by revising the phrase "be prepared to participate" to read "be prepared to give serious consideration to participating".
c. Noted the President's statement that the statement of policy contained in the Supplement to NSC 5718, as amended above, should be referred to the Secretary of State for his use in the conduct of future U.S. foreign relations with respect to the Cyprus dispute.

Note: The Supplement to NSC 5718, as amended by b above, subsequently referred to the Secretary of State pursuant to the President's action in c above.

[Here follow items 9–10.]

S. Everett Gleason

³Paragraphs a–c constitute NSC Action No. 1763. (Department of State, NSC Records of Action: Lot 66 D 95)

254. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State ¹

London, August 1, 1957—7 p.m.

867. Following is excerpt pertaining Cyprus from memorandum of conversation prepared by Secretary of meeting with Prime Minister, Selwyn Lloyd and Ambassador evening July 31.

"Cyprus. Lloyd referred to his plan for a conference of UK-Greece-Turkey with Spaak and the US as observers. I said I did not

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–157. Secret; Niact. Limited Distribution.
see how we could wisely act as observers. We had no status, no responsibility and no authority. This was different from Spaak, who as Secretary General of NATO had a responsibility to deal with quarrels between NATO countries. I said we might urge the Greeks to attend but only if we were absolutely convinced that there was no side deal between the UK and the Turks and no private understanding expressed or implied. Both Macmillan and Lloyd assured me with the greatest solemnity that they would go into the conference with a completely open mind and without a commitment of any sort to the Turks. I said under these circumstances we would probably indicate to the Greeks our view that they ought to attend particularly if Spaak was going to be there as apparently he would be. Lloyd asked whether they could tell the Greeks that we had been invited. I said if he thought that served their purpose I saw no objection to it. I said that as Lloyd had suggested earlier in the day we might be willing to have present at the Embassy someone who is particularly familiar with Cyprus matters so that the Embassy would be in a position to take an intelligent interest in what was going on, and there could possibly be consultations outside of the conference if this seemed appropriate.

“Macmillan and Lloyd expressed regret but without any evidence of surprise that we would not actually be in the conference and said they would appreciate our help otherwise. I expressed skepticism of the possibility under the best of circumstances of getting the Greeks to attend. Lloyd reaffirmed that their only purpose was really to get a solution and they had an open mind as to any solution.”

Today Selwyn Lloyd sent note to Secretary urgently raising following problem: UK plans formally to propose conference to Greece and Turkey as soon as possible not later than afternoon August 2 or morning August 3, since longer delay increases risk news may reach Greek government from other quarter and Athens may reject proposal out of hand. Selwyn Lloyd stated that if this representation is to succeed, “it is vital that the United States Ambassador in Athens should be able to indicate to the Greeks, without delay, that the United States Government are in favor of the British proposal . . .” He added that an indication US planning make arrangements keep closely informed of proceedings of conference would also be helpful. He concluded with pleas that such instructions be sent American Ambassador on August 2 if practicable. In view tenor of conversation quoted above and in line sug-

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2 According to Dulles’ appointment calendar, the Secretary met with Lloyd at the Foreign Office at 10:30 a.m. No record of that conversation has been found in Department of State files.

3 Lloyd’s note to Dulles, dated August 1, was attached to a note from Robert A. McKinnon of the Executive Secretariat to Montague Stearns of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, on August 5. A notation on the note by Wood indicates that notice of receipt was given orally to Charles Wiggin of the British Embassy. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8-557)

4 Ellipsis in the source text.
gested course of action para 7(a) Deptel Tosec 7, Embassy recommends that Department instruct US Ambassadors Athens Ankara to state our general support proposed conference, say proposal appears be serious attempt by UK reach settlement problem, recommend careful consideration proposal and emphasize need for secrecy.

Embassy suggests final decision whether US participate in conference be meanwhile deferred, presumably pending Secretary's return.

Secretary has seen this telegram and agrees to above recommendations.

Please repeat this message as desired.

Whitney

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5 Document 251.
6 During an August 6 meeting among Dulles, Rountree, and Minister of the British Embassy Couelson, the Secretary noted that he doubted whether it would be useful or advisable for the United States to attend the proposed conference. Dulles added that his reservations stemmed from the fact that the United States had no authority or responsibility and no new ideas to propose on the Cyprus matter. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–657)

Dulles later instructed the Embassies at Athens, Ankara, and London to inform the governments concerned that if all the parties agreed, the United States would send an observer “without prior commitment for or against any particular proposal.” (Telegram 465 to Athens, August 7; ibid., 747C.00/8–757)

In an August 10 message to Dulles, Lloyd expressed his appreciation to the Secretary for this decision. The text of Lloyd's message was transmitted in circular telegram 129, August 12. (Ibid., 747C.00/8–1257)

255. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece

Washington, August 2, 1957—6:24 p.m.

415. Re Deptel 856 to London, Tosec 7, London 867. For Athens and Ankara: Inform soonest government to which you are accredited:

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–257. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Jones, Wood, and Timmons. Also sent to Ankara and Paris Topol and repeated to London and Nicosia.
3 Document 251.
4 Supra.
1. USG has been informed by UK of proposed meeting to be attended by UK, Greece and Turkey with Spaak as observer to discuss Cyprus problem. UK has stated intention enter such discussion on basis open mind and without fixed agenda.

2. We regard this as desirable move towards arriving at compromise solution of this problem.

3. US hopes government to which you accredited will consider favorably UK proposal and accept invitation without prior conditions.

4. We believe best hope for solution Cyprus problem lies in quiet diplomacy and consequently urge that all parties impose strictest secrecy on their actions with respect this meeting, including fact meeting is being held.

If asked, you should explain that although especially as NATO members we are deeply concerned by Cyprus question, we do not now see how we can appropriately act as observer in question in which we are not a party. It seems to us advantageous that Spaak, who as SYG of NATO has a responsibility to deal with problems between NATO countries, will participate.

FYI Before making above approach we suggest you verify with your British colleague that British approach has been made and is substantially similar to “oral communication” made to us (Deptel 856 to London). Further instructions will follow based on response you receive from GOG or GOT. End FYI.

For USRO: As soon as Athens and Ankara confirm foregoing approach has been made, you may inform Spaak privately of terms of approach. 5

Herter

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5 In telegram 394, August 3, Allen informed the Department that he had conveyed to Averoff the pertinent sections of this telegram adding appropriate comment and emphasizing his opinion that the British proposal provided an excellent opportunity for Greece to achieve a clarification of Turkey's position and a Greek refusal would place Greece in a defensive position before world opinion. Among his comments, Averoff noted that Karamanlis agreed in general with this position, but the Foreign Minister cautioned that these were preliminary reactions. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8-357) The same day Warren responded in telegram 299 that he had conveyed the points contained in this telegram and that the Turkish Foreign Office promised to transmit the substance to the Prime Minister. (Ibid.)

Supplement to NSC 5718

Washington, August 5, 1957.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 333rd Council meeting on August 1, 1957 (NSC Action No. 1763):

[Here follows NSC Action No. 1763; for text, see footnote 3, Document 253.]

The President has this date approved the above actions. Accordingly, the enclosed revised page 2 of the Supplement to NSC 5718, incorporating the amendment referred to in b above, is transmitted herewith for insertion in all copies, with the request that the superseded page be destroyed by burning, in accordance with security regulations.

In accordance with c above, the Supplement to NSC 5718 is being referred to the Secretary of State for his use in the conduct of future U.S. foreign relations with respect to the Cyprus dispute.

S. Everett Gleason
Acting Executive Secretary

[Enclosure]

SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS DISPUTE

Objectives

1. Support concept of the attainment by the Cypriots of a government of their own choice in a manner that will protect the legitimate interests of our allies and of all groups on the island.

2. Pursue policies designed to preserve NATO unity.

3. Support efforts to retain continued access to NATO members and continued denial to the Soviet Bloc of the strategically important bases on Cyprus.

4. Avoid involving the United States in a settlement that will require significant U.S. economic or military support.

\(^1\) Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5718 Memoranda. Secret. NSC 5718 is not printed, but see Document 307.
Policy Guidance

5. Keep the primary responsibility for working out a peaceful solution in the hands of the Cypriots and the three countries primarily concerned. Be prepared to support a peaceful and practical compromise solution acceptable to all interested parties.

6. Support NATO efforts to resolve the problem. Be prepared to use our influence in support of a reasonable solution developed within the framework of NATO good offices.

7. Encourage some form of direct negotiations among the British, Greek, and Turkish Governments.

8. Encourage direct negotiations between the United Kingdom and representatives of the Cypriot communities toward self-government.

9. Encourage interested parties to enlist the support of the Cyprus and Greek Orthodox Churches to any mutually acceptable settlement.

10. Encourage interested parties to attempt to solve the problem through quiet diplomacy rather than in the UN forums.

11. Encourage the British to remain as ruling power pending agreement on the ultimate status of the island.

12. Preserve U.S. Government maneuverability by not freezing our position for the present in favor of any specific formula. If necessary to bring about a solution acceptable to the interested parties, on terms which will strengthen NATO interests in the Mediterranean, be prepared to give serious consideration to participating in arrangements guaranteeing the interim or eventual status of Cyprus.
257. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece

Washington, August 29, 1957—6:16 p.m.

748. Re Athens Embtel 420; Ankara Embtel 341. We concur with Athens and Ankara that GOG and GOT should be encouraged to negotiate directly. If our advice sought we suggest that quiet Turk-Greek diplomatic negotiations and not Karamanlis-Menderes meeting be encouraged at this time.

FYI. Our present thinking question of high level meeting is colored by fact that in view possible London Conference and imminent Turkish elections quiet diplomatic negotiations between two countries likely at present be more fruitful than meeting at PM level. If such diplomatic negotiations (which could be expected to take up a number of weeks at minimum) were to show an area of common Greek-Turk agreement regarding Cyprus solution then a Karamanlis-Menderes meeting to put finishing touches on such an understanding and commence new era Greek-Turkish relations might well pay off. On other hand if Menderes and Karamanlis face each other without adequate advance preparations and feel constrained take firm public position at this point primarily for domestic reasons, meeting might be seriously counterproductive.

Dulles

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8-657. Secret; Limit Distribution. Also sent to Ankara, repeated to London and Paris, and pouch to Nicosia.

2 Telegram 420 from Athens, August 6, transmitted the highlights of a meeting between Allen and Averoff that morning. According to the Ambassador, the Greek Foreign Minister noted that Greece was prepared to make a “bold new approach” to the Turks—including the prospect of a trip to Ankara by Karamanlis and Averoff. (Ibid.)

3 On August 8, the Embassy at Ankara informed the Department that a Karamanlis-Averoff visit to Ankara would have a “salutary” effect even if no substantive progress resulted on the Cyprus problem. (Telegram 341 from Ankara, August 8; ibid., 747C.00/8-857)
258. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, August 29, 1957—7:19 p.m.

1707. Deptel 1379; 2 London tel 1247. 3 Secretary has approved idea informal secret talks with UK re Cyprus on following basis and British Embassy here so informed:

A. We welcome invitation to exchange further views on Cyprus question on an informal and secret basis.

B. We regard such discussions as exploratory only and a continuation of regular diplomatic exchanges we and British have conducted on this problem.

C. We hope there will be no suggestion that talks procedurally constitute a development sufficiently formal as to raise apprehensions, should their secrecy be violated, that we and British are undertaking to reach a substantive solution to exclusion of Greeks and Turks on a matter involving their interests.

D. That Barbour will attend for United States, assisted as appropriate by a Departmental officer cognizant latest Dept. views.

You authorized inform Foreign Office Barbour prepared participate in talks within context foregoing. 4 Ascertained time British wish start talks and information on British representation.

Instructions follow for Barbour’s use in talks.

Dulles

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–1957. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Wood. Also sent to Paris Topol and repeated to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia.

2 In telegram 1379 to London, August 17, the Department informed the Embassy that Wiggins had informed the Department that Great Britain was interested in beginning secret talks with the United States on Cyprus whether or not the Greeks agreed to attend the proposed London Conference. (Ibid., 747C.00/8–1757)

3 In telegram 1247 from London, August 19, the Embassy reported, that the latest British move to begin secret talks with the United States represented determination to advance a solution on Cyprus. The Embassy added that the United States should welcome an opportunity for discussion but that discussions should be viewed as a continuation of regular diplomatic discussions rather than constituting any new procedure. (Ibid., 747C.00/8–1957)

4 On August 30, Caccia delivered the following message from Macmillan to Dulles:

“I am very glad to hear that you have agreed to informal, secret and exploratory talks with us about Cyprus. You know how much I believe that we must try to work together on this as on other matters and talk with frankness and confidence.

“But this is, of course, a matter of the greatest delicacy for us. I know that you understand that secrecy is vital, but I should be grateful if you would ensure that knowledge of our conversations is kept to the smallest possible circle as it will be on our side.” (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan to Dulles Correspondence 1955–1959)
259. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, September 5, 1957—5:17 p.m.


I. Background

Latest Greek reply to UK (Deptel 1743 London) and continued uncertainty over date Turkish elections (Ankara 395 and 562) make holding London tripartite meeting doubtful. Its being held in immediate future or prior to UNGA now virtually out of question. London US–UK talks may, therefore, be in somewhat different context from that originally anticipated and UK may now emphasize problem of UNGA tactics. We nonetheless welcome these talks in hope that they will establish more adequate exchanges with British on Cyprus problem. In our desire to establish such communications, we should however avoid in fact or in appearance substantive understandings to exclusion of Greeks and Turks on matter involving their interests. These talks must therefore be kept on strictly informal and secret basis.

II. Probable British Objectives at Talks

A. Ascertain nature of current US thinking on Cyprus.

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–3157. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Jones. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, Paris Topol, and Nicosia.

2 Telegram 1556, August 31, reported that bilateral talks with the British would begin, if the United States agreed, toward the end of the week. Permanent Under Secretary Hoyer Millar or Deputy Under Secretary Hayter would probably represent the British. (Ibid.)

3 Supra.

4 Telegram 1743, August 30, transmitted the summary of a Greek aide-mémoire presented to the British Ambassador in Athens by Averoff on August 27. Among other things, the aide-mémoire rejected Britain's proposals for a conference to discuss Cyprus. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/8–2957)

5 Telegram 395, August 16, reported that Esenbel had informed Warren that Turkey could not send representatives to a conference on Cyprus until after the Turkish national elections scheduled for October 15. (Ibid., 747C.00/8–1657)

6 Telegram 562, August 30, reported that despite the intention of the Prime Minister to hold elections around mid-October, Democratic Party leaders might have, for one reason or another, decided to hold elections at the normal time in May 1958, or even in 1959. (Ibid., 762.00/8–3057)
B. Test out on US current trend of British thinking, including defense plans and ideas on three-power condominium (Depcirtctel 1297).

C. Seek understanding with US on tactics at UNGA.

III. US Tactics at Talks

Within context of the broad criteria set forth in Deptel 1707, you should be governed by following considerations:

A. Endeavor to ascertain British intentions with respect to Cyprus. This should include defense plans (including type of installations, location of enclaves, and projected rate of military expenditures), plans for retention or divestment of governing responsibility, timing of such divestment if intended, and interim plans pending formal and final divestment. You should establish assumption that any divestment will be an orderly one and associated with an understanding among interested parties concerning interim arrangement for or ultimate status of Cyprus.

B. Explore question of interim arrangements versus ultimate status. Tempered of interested parties leave serious doubt that agreement on ultimate status now possible. Moreover, dispute has assumed such character that any interim arrangements, including self-government, may have to be settled in international forum. In view UK difficulties in providing forum at proposed London tripartite meeting, it may be desirable to emphasize again role that Spaak can plan in this direction. Arrangements might be made whereby techniques used in settlement Trieste dispute might be brought to Spaak’s attention.

C. US not prepared to espouse any particular solution either as to interim arrangements or ultimate status, but believes it useful to consider criteria against which any proposed solution should be tested. Those provided in HMG oral communication (Depctel 856 London8) provide useful point of departure: i.e., (a) retention of essential military facilities under British sovereignty; (b) protection of island from Communist infiltration; (c) establishment peace and tranquillity in island as a whole. We believe that: (1) these criteria might be further explored and refined in course of talks; (2) compro-

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7 Circular telegram 129, August 12, sent to London, Athens, Ankara, Paris, and Nicosia, transmitted the text of a memorandum from Lloyd to Dulles and a proposed British reply to the Greek Government regarding the latter’s reply to the British proposal for a conference on Cyprus. Lloyd’s memorandum to the Secretary expressed Britain’s appreciation for the prospects of a U.S. observer at the proposed conference, speculated on Greece’s motives in rejecting Britain’s proposals, expressed regret at Greek conditions for attending the conference, indicated the possibilities of some compromise on Cyprus, and noted the importance of bringing Greece to the conference table. (Ibid., 747C.00/8–1257)

8 See footnote 3, Document 251.
mise assuring preservation of NATO unity should be another criterion; (3) account should be taken of viability of Cypriot economy under any future set up and desirability of avoiding international financial burden; (4) means should be considered for enlisting support and cooperation of orthodox churches in arriving at solution.

D. While we are interested in UK thinking, we feel that it is still premature to define UNGA tactics and also feel that any negotiation concerning either our tactics or position at UNGA should be avoided. We continue to believe solution of the Cyprus problem is to be found through quiet diplomacy rather than through public forums and that our UNGA tactics should be directed to those ends. This will require US to maintain maximum tactical flexibility. Generally speaking we should endeavor to avoid discussions and forestall resolution that would prejudice prospect for future negotiations or provide basis for increased Soviet Bloc or Afro-Asian bloc involvement in Cyprus. In view absence any significant progress toward solution since last UNGA resolution, we recognize it may be difficult to forestall resolution calling for specific solution either in direction of interim arrangements or ultimate status.

IV. Liaison with Spaak

You should suggest that UK and USG both undertake to inform Spaak of talks and to keep him currently informed. After British agreement obtained, Perkins should see Spaak and so inform him. You should of course mention in appropriate terms need for secrecy. Perkins may also inform Spaak of Barbour's terms of reference (Deptel 1707 to London) and substance of parts I and III of this cable.

V. Reporting and Guidance

Detailed guidance will be provided as required, on basis full reports which should be made of each session. You may find it useful to refer to Cyprus supplement to NSC 5718/1 9 which contains major policy guidance on Cyprus problem generally. Dep Director GTI 10 arriving London September 8.

Dulles

9 Printed as an Enclosure to Document 256.
10 Murat Williams arrived on September 8 to assist in the secret bilateral talks on Cyprus.
260. Editorial Note

Between September 10 and 18, representatives of the United States, led by Walworth Barbour, and representatives of the United Kingdom, led by Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar, held secret and informal discussions in London on the Cyprus problem. British officials expressed their willingness to withdraw from Cyprus provided that Britain maintain sovereignty over certain military facilities on the island. Various proposals were also examined for both an interim and a long-term solution to the problem of the status of Cyprus. Both a NATO trusteeship and guaranteed independence were given serious consideration. The British representatives believed, however, that the best solution to the problem might be a condominium in which the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey would share responsibility for that part of the island not retained for British military installations. According to the tentative plan, Cyprus would be administered by a governor selected by the three governments concerned. Self-government would be based on a constitution. The United States representatives, on instructions from the Department of State, agreed that the British proposal had merit and was worth pursuing. British and American representatives agreed that as a next step the British might suggest their proposal to NATO Secretary General Spaak. (The agreed minute of the discussions was transmitted in telegram 1969 from London, September 19; Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–1957) A brief summary of the conversations is also in a memorandum from Jones to Rountree, September 16; *ibid.*, 747C.00/9–1657)

261. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

*Washington, September 16, 1957—6:57 p.m.*

2154. London 1778, 1812, 1846, 1856.² For Barbour. Your prompt and full reports on London talks appreciated. Ideas of

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¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–1357. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, Paris Topol, and Nicosia.

²Telegram 1778, September 11, transmitted the highlights of the first session of talks on Cyprus between the United States and the United Kingdom. (*ibid.*, 747C.00/9–1157) Telegram 1812, September 12, conveyed the results of the second session of
condominium and alternative NATO roles particularly interesting. We agree on desirability concluding bilateral talks before UNGA opens and suggest this be done along following lines.

A. Inform British we find condominium concept an interesting one and we would like see this idea developed more fully. If this concept should be pursued we agree with Barbour’s suggestion Spaak might better put it to Greeks and Turks as his own idea. We would inform Spaak British discussed idea with us, that we found it of interest as another approach to a possible solution to Cyprus problem that is worthy further development, that we have asked to be kept informed as it is developed, and that we would be particularly interested learning Spaak’s reaction to it.

B. Endeavor develop further British thinking on details of condominium: (1) At first sight condominium appears to be interim arrangement. Do British in fact envisage its continuing indefinitely? How will time element be defined to Greeks and Turks? (2) Are British aware Turks have mentioned condominium off and on over past several years and might not apparent British adoption Turk idea militate against its acceptance by Greeks? FYI. It appears likely British have in fact already discussed this with Turks. End FYI. In any event we would hope for time being British would discourage Turks from publicly supporting condominium. (3) How would condominium’s sponsor reassure Greeks they would not be outvoted by UK and Turks within condominium. FYI. In event UK Labor Party comes into power condominium might offer more opportunities for ultimate solution favorable to Greece. Greeks might not therefore reject condominium out of hand. End FYI. (4) Ascertain more precisely NATO role and relationship in establishing condominium, adjudicating disputes, and providing for military defense. Believe suggestion that differences between co-domini be settled by arrangement involving NATO countries other than UK, Greece, and Turkey requires early study particularly as to organizational framework within NATO for handling such disputes. (5) How would condominium be negotiated? It occurs to us Spaak might take lead in negotiations of Trieste-type. 3 Account should be taken of role Cypriot groups would play in negotiations and how, if at all, church and/or ethnarchy might be identified with agreement in order fore-

talks. (Ibid., 747C.00/9–1257) Telegrams 1846 and 1856, September 13, transmitted the highlights of the third and fourth sessions of the talks. (Ibid., 747C.00/9–1357)

3 Presumably a reference to the secret talks held in London by the American negotiator Llewellyn Thompson, and the British negotiator, Geoffrey Harrison, first with Yugoslav representatives, February–May 1954, and then with Italian representatives, June–August 1954. The talks led to a resolution of the Trieste dispute in October 1954. For documentation on these talks, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. viii, pages 365 ff. and 439 ff.
stall continuation enosis campaign and consequent continued exacerbation Greek-Turkish community relations.

C. Follow up on Barbour's expression of "interest in exploring some other kind NATO relationship to Cyprus" (para 2 London 1812).

D. In any further discussions of independence, take into account USG reservations on this solution reflected in NSC supplement on Cyprus and fact that since arrival in US, Makarios has publicly coupled independence and enosis as acceptable solution Cyprus problem. Enosis and independence as ultimate solutions likely to be equally unacceptable to Turks, for present at least. Condominium or some other type of interim arrangement (also perhaps involving NATO) might provide useful cooling off period that would enable Greeks and Turks to get together in time on ultimate status that might include a Greek quid pro quo acceptable to Turks in return for ultimate enosis. While not ruling out independence, we believe enosis on this basis offers more hope for long term area stability than independence. We doubt Cypriots equipped for immediate independence, guaranteed or otherwise, and fear chaos would result. Immediate independence under some sort of tutelage partakes character of self-government and might better be considered in that context.

E. Indicate to British we would like "details to be provided and forwarded" (para 5 London 1778) on future UK base requirements to include comparative figures showing present and future estimates of British military expenditures in Cyprus and how British believe gap could be met without reduction of present standard of living on island. We would welcome any British staff studies supporting their thinking on future viability of island and possible lines for sharing financial and other responsibilities among co-domini.

F. Endeavor obtain a fuller British estimate Communist capabilities and present Communist tactics on Cyprus.

G. Inform British our UNGA position under active study here and we in contact with their delegation in New York.

H. Obtain agreement with British on separate approaches to Spaak following conclusion meeting. Williams authorized proceed Paris to assist Perkins in connection such talks with Spaak as might be agreed. Instructions will follow for Perkins.

4 Document 256.
5 On September 12, Makarios arrived in the United States to campaign for the independence of Cyprus and to collaborate with the Greek Delegation to the Twelfth Session of the U.N. General Assembly, which opened on September 17. Makarios was received in New York City by both Mayor Robert Wagner and Governor Harriman. The Archbishop appeared on NBC’s “Meet the Press” and addressed the National Press Club in Washington. Makarios left the United States in December.
Express gratification over this opportunity to have had such useful exchange views with British and leave door open to resumption as occasion warrants at later date.

Murphy

262. Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State\(^1\)

Washington, September 14, 1957.

THE QUESTION OF CYPRUS

The Problem

On July 12, 1957, Greece submitted for the fourth time "Question of Cyprus" for inclusion in the provisional agenda of the 12th session of the General Assembly. The Greek item has two parts: (a) "Application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination in the case of the population of the island of Cyprus" (the same formulation as in the Greek proposals in 1954, 1955 and 1956); and (b) "Violation of human rights and atrocities by the British colonial administration against the Cypriots".

United States Position

1. To the extent feasible in light of other considerations influencing the order of items in the Political Committee, the United States should support and encourage efforts seeking to ensure that the Cyprus item will not be considered before the Turkish elections scheduled for October 27.

2. (a) The United States should emphasize its conviction that the only way to solve the Cyprus question is through quiet diplomacy among those parties concerned—Greece, the UK and Turkey. It should state its belief that there are various possible solutions which would protect the interests of the parties and peoples involved.

(b) The United States should seek to exercise a moderating influence on the parties involved. In particular, it should urge the parties not to press any resolution which would prejudge the future

\(^1\)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9-1457. Secret. Drafted by Shaw, Sisco, and Brown and attached to a brief covering memorandum from Wilcox to Dulles.
status of Cyprus or which would in other ways make more difficult the renewal of negotiations and undermine the prospects for peaceful settlement. The United States may also encourage others, such as India, to exercise a moderating influence on the parties.

(c) The United States should not take the lead on this item, except where such action may be necessary to insure the success of a compromise resolution acceptable to the parties directly concerned and consequently to the United States.

3. In keeping with the above and subject to review by the Department of any specific proposal, the United States should:

(a) In general, support any resolution acceptable to all of the parties (Greece, the UK, Turkey).

(b) In particular, support a resolution along the line of the one adopted at the 11th General Assembly on the grounds that it would give the parties maximum latitude for arranging direct negotiations but would not prejudice the ultimate solution of the Cyprus problem.

(c) Oppose resolutions of the type noted in paragraph 3(b) above, e.g., a resolution condemning the UK administration of Cyprus or a resolution condemning the Greeks for inciting terrorism on Cyprus, on the grounds that a solution can only be reached through an agreement between the parties involved and that such resolutions would only make an agreement more difficult to attain.

(d) Oppose any resolution providing for establishment of a good offices committee or a similar body to deal directly with the problem of Cyprus.

(e) Consult the Department concerning the position to be taken on other resolutions which might be presented.

Comment

In 1954 the General Assembly, by a vote of 49 (US, Greece, UK, Turkey)–0–11, adopted a resolution according to which it decided not to consider the item further. In 1955 the Assembly refused to inscribe the Greek item on Cyprus by a vote of 28–22–10, the US opposing inscription. This action reflected the conviction that “quiet diplomacy” offered a better prospect for the successful conclusion of the then current negotiations between the UK and Greece than General Assembly discussion. In 1956 both the United Kingdom and Greece submitted items on Cyprus, and both were included in the agenda without objection or formal vote. The Greek proposal called for self-determination for Cyprus and the British proposal was entitled “Support from Greece for terrorism in Cyprus”. On February 27, 1957, the General Assembly adopted an Indian compromise resolution which “expressed the earnest desire that a peaceful,
democratic and just solution will be found, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the hope that negotiations will be resumed and continued to this end. The United States supported this resolution.

While the situation on Cyprus and Anglo-Greek relations have improved somewhat, there have been no further direct negotiations. Greece took the position that the 11th GA resolution required negotiations between the British and the Cypriots, while the United Kingdom contended that the resolution was intended to cover not only such negotiations but also negotiations among the three governments concerned, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

However, some progress has been made. The British Government has released Archbishop Makarios from his exile in the Seychelles Islands, and violence on Cyprus has largely subsided. The Secretary General of NATO, Paul Henri Spaak, offered his good offices to the three governments concerned but has so far been unsuccessful in bringing about a resumption of negotiations under the aegis of NATO.

Meantime there has been a helpful modification of the British position. The United Kingdom has expressed a willingness to surrender its sovereignty over Cyprus if a mutually acceptable solution can be reached and has reduced its minimum conditions to (1) essential military facilities to remain under British sovereignty, (2) protection of Cyprus from Communist infiltration, and (3) establishment of peace and tranquillity on the island as a whole. Greece now appears willing to consider "guaranteed independence" or dominion status for Cyprus. Turkey continues to favor partition but might shift its position in the absence of British support.

In August the United Kingdom through diplomatic channels proposed a tripartite conference including the three governments, with the United States and M. Spaak to attend in the capacity of observers. The British proposal contemplates a conference on the ultimate status of the island. There would be no fixed agenda. Spaak immediately agreed to attend as an observer, and later the United States reluctantly concurred. Turkey reacted favorably but indicated it could not attend the conference until after the Turkish elections which are scheduled for October 27. Greece rejected the British proposal but qualified its answer in such a way as to permit reconsideration of its position. Moreover, at British initiative arrangements have been made for secret informal talks in London between the United Kingdom and the United States.

The United States continues to believe that the best prospect for a satisfactory solution lies in quiet diplomacy involving direct negotiations among the parties. Debate of the item in the General Assembly would probably not be helpful and could exacerbate the
existing situation. Consequently, the United States should seek to exercise a moderating influence on any debate in the General Assembly in the hope of facilitating a return to direct negotiations and should encourage others, such as India, to do likewise. It is clear that Greece is determined to press the question of Cyprus in the General Assembly in the hope that discussion there will strengthen its own position in any future negotiations.

Discussion of the Cyprus question prior to or concurrently with the Turkish elections would only serve to make the Turkish position at the Assembly more inflexible and to inflame popular passions in Turkey. It would therefore be desirable to delay substantive discussion of the issue until after the Turkish elections.

263. Editorial Note

On September 13, 5 days before the opening of the Twelfth General Assembly, Greece noted, in an explanatory memorandum, that no progress had been made on the Cyprus issue since February 26, 1957, the date of the last Assembly resolution on the subject.

On September 13, in a discussion among Ambassador Caccia, Rountree, and Harold Beeley of the British Embassy, Secretary Dulles acknowledged that it would be helpful to avoid the language of the Greek item for inscription and added that he would consider the matter to see what the United States might do under the circumstances. (Memorandum of conversation by Rountree, September 13, 1957; Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–1357)

On September 17 at 10:25 a.m., Eisenhower telephoned Dulles. According to the transcript of the conversation, the following exchange regarding Cyprus occurred:

"The Sec. said the Greek-Turkey thing is in a mess. The Pres. said the Greeks are demanding unless we take their side, they will be tough. The Sec. said we probably won't favor putting it on the UN Agenda because if it comes up, it will be a shambles, but we need more definite commitments from the British. They dragged the Turks in and got them excited so the issue is considered to be Greek-Turkish and not Greek-British. The Pres. said Cyprus never belonged to Greece." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)

On September 18, at 10:15 a.m. Dulles called Lloyd. According to the transcript of the conversation:
"The Secretary said we had to give an answer on Cyprus. He said the Norwegians were prepared to consolidate this Greek proposal into an innocuous single item and wondered if this was OK with Selwyn Lloyd. The Norwegians had checked with us to be sure that we were all lined up together.

"Selwyn Lloyd apparently inquired about lunch and they agreed the Secretary would come to Mr. Lloyd's suite at 1:30 today." (ibid., Telephone Conversations—General)

In Delga 13, September 18, the United States Delegation at the United Nations informed the Department of State:

"This morning we informed Norwegians and UK we could support move by former to revise title to read: 'The Cyprus question'. Just before general committee meeting Lodge informed Averoff (Greece) who said he was 'disappointed but not surprised'. We also informed other members General Committee we could support this move. After item changed by vote 11–0–4 (UK, USSR, Czech, France), Lloyd (UK) expressed satisfaction to Lodge at ease with which this accomplished." (Department of State, Central Files, 320.5747C/9–1857)

On September 20, the General Assembly decided to place the Cyprus issue on its agenda and referred it to the First Committee.

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264. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, September 17, 1957—5 p.m.

Secto 1. In conversation with Secretary, Averoff spoke hopefully of clarification in Cyprus situation (without specifically citing guaranteed independence), but impaired danger of communal violence on Cyprus if no progress at UN. Said he wished postpone debate until after Turk elections.

Secretary strongly urged that GOG change its item as proposed July 12 since it appeared unduly provocative and might arouse passions making solution more difficult. He pointed out this was not

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–1757. Confidential. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, London, Paris Topol, and Nicosia. Dulles was in New York to attend the opening of the Twelfth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.
time to attack British who we convinced, were anxious to settle reasonably.

Rountree pointed out GOG item as now constituted would probably produce counter item from British and cause bitter debate.

Dulles

265. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, October 7, 1957—8:38 p.m.

2592. Embtel 2180. Embassy may inform HMG along following lines that after considering our talks with them in London and after further consideration of condominium proposal, we feel it would be unwise seek persuade Spaak to advocate a particular solution before exploratory talks on his part.

Firstly, we are not sufficiently convinced of the merits of any of them to do so. We believe that condominium plan as outlined to us presents serious problems of which the greatest would be question of where ultimate authority lies in event dispute between co-domini or crisis on Island. Even assuming that Governor had unusual ability, he would need either strong support from co-domini or general acceptance by both Greek and Turkish Cypriots of his administration. Former would be unlikely since it should be assumed Greece and Turkey, as co-domini, likely be in disagreement; latter would take time and great skill. Our London talks have shown other suggested solutions also present difficulties.

We do not wish to rule out these solutions and are mindful HMG's comments on them but believe that there is a greater

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10-157. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Wood and signed by Dulles. Repeated Paris Topol, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia and pouched to USUN.

2 In telegram 2180, October 1, the Embassy informed the Department that the British had decided to postpone their approach to Spaak regarding the condominium plan until the United States had further time to study the proposal. The Embassy expressed the hope that the Department could facilitate study of the plan and requested any ideas that the Department might have about "interim information", which might be conveyed to Spaak. (Ibid.)
likelihood of progress if we concentrate more attention on devising an acceptable procedure for the transmission of views between the parties.

This leads to our second reason for not wishing urge a particular solution on Spaak. We continue believe Spaak can play useful mediatory role as NATO SYG. However, Spaak has already attempted persuade parties of merits of a particular solution (guaranteed independence) without success. Also, most solutions thus far proposed are considered as having originated with one of parties and thus less likely be acceptable to others. Acceptable solution more likely be blend of present proposals. We believe Spaak might more usefully adopt general method of collecting views of U.K., Greece, and Turkey in separate talks without championing any particular solution and seek gradually find basis for common understanding on an interim arrangement. This would take time but we believe time is necessary element any progress this question. We would like to speak to Spaak about the London talks if no serious objection is perceived as soon as possible and also give our views along the foregoing lines. We would, of course, fully inform HMG of this discussion.

We think this would be more in line with HMG's idea of negotiations without agenda and hence less apt to frighten off Greeks or Turks. However, we are frankly not sanguine about the possible success of a London meeting of the three powers which could not avoid publicity and are thus more inclined favor secret separate talks in Paris, where all three countries well represented.

We intend explore this promptly with Spaak because we would hope that after careful preparation such talks could be started soon.

In general we believe Cyprus question less tense than last year but that nevertheless on international plane agreement on a final solution unlikely now. We feel it more realistic expect that months of serious effort will be needed to reach international understanding on some interim arrangement. For this reason we urge HMG consider taking series small but concrete steps on Cyprus itself to give Cypriots greater participation their own affairs. Preferably there should be no advance publicity or discussions which usually bring automatic critical response. This would help relieve local tensions on Island while secret international talks in progress. These might include some elements Radcliffe proposals but without so designating them.

FYI Embassy may also wish reexamine Jernegan letter to Foster of March 15, 1955 with view to raising points therein with HMG if

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3 Not found in Department of State files.
Embassy considers useful. Extra copies being furnished all addres-
eses. End FYI.

Dulles

266. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 22, 1957

SUBJECT

Cyprus Problem

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, British Foreign Secretary
Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador to the United States
Lord Samuel Hood, British Minister
Mr. Roger Jackling, Head of Chancery
Mr. Denis Laskey, Private Secretary to the British Foreign Secretary
Mr. W. Morris, First Secretary of Embassy
Mr. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Mr. John Hay Whitney, Ambassador to Great Britain
Mr. Lane Timmons, Director, European Regional Affairs
Mr. William N. Dale, Officer in Charge, United Kingdom and Ireland Affairs

Mr. Lloyd noted that General Harding’s resignation as Governor of Cyprus has been announced and then pointed out that the Greeks have become more obdurate since the Cyprus resolution adopted by the Labor Party Conference. Mr. Lloyd did not think that much could be done now until after the Turkish elections. He said that the British had hoped that, if they could get the parties concerned around a table, eventually they would come to agree on some compromise which everyone could accept. In this context they had developed the tridominium concept, not expecting that it would be accepted to begin with but that it might be useful as an eventual

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1 Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Dale.
2 Macmillan was in Washington for 3 days of discussions with U.S. officials.
3 On October 4, the Labour Party Conference expressed its intent to resolve the Cyprus problem by granting the island self-determination. The Colonial Office announced on October 22 that Sir Hugh Foot would succeed Harding.
4 Turkish elections were held on October 27. Menderes' Democratic Party won 421 seats in the Grand National Assembly; the Republican People's Party won 173 seats; the Freedom Party, 4 seats; and the Republican National Party, 4 seats.
compromise. He noted that at first the US officials appeared to like the idea but that now we seemed to feel it has disadvantages.

The Secretary replied that we were not so much concerned over the disadvantages of the plan as with its practicability. He did not think that the Greeks could accept it because it would give the Turks a legal status on Cyprus.

The Foreign Secretary said that the British would be in a state of suspended animation regarding the Cyprus problem until after the Turkish elections. He noted that there would be a thirty-day gap between these elections and the date when the Cyprus item is scheduled for UN debate in December, during which time he hoped fruitful discussions might take place. He believed that the Greeks will probably start a campaign about November first to get Britain's friends to bring pressure to bear on the UK in preparation for the UN debate. Mr. Lloyd observed that the present situation on the island is precarious and that terrorism could start again at any moment. He stated that the British could no longer, in terms of money or manpower, afford to keep the same number of troops on Cyprus as Harding had had to suppress terrorism and that a reduction will take place phased over the next three to four years.

Mr. Elbrick said that Mr. Spaak will probably have something to say on the Cyprus question when he comes later this week.

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267. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey

Washington, November 25, 1957—9:51 p.m.

1727. Forthcoming debate on Cyprus in UNGA, urgent British desire to lessen burdens of Cyprus status quo and expected interest in Cyprus during Paris NATO ministerial meeting, all underline importance of continuing our attempt in quiet diplomacy to assist parties concerned in their efforts to get together and solve controversy.

In frequent discussions during past year, British and Greeks have shown flexibility in respective positions. UK has privately expressed willingness under reasonable conditions to accept even

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9-1957. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Williams and approved by Howe. Also sent to London and repeated to Ankara, Paris Topol, and Nicosia.
solution which will mean end of UK sovereignty of island outside modest base area (London 1969\textsuperscript{2}). Both GOG Foreign Minister and Cyprus Ethnarch have repeatedly indicated they can accept solution short of enosis (London 3106\textsuperscript{3} and Athens 1050\textsuperscript{4}).

For many reasons including especially Turkish elections, there have been relatively few discussions in recent months with leaders of Turkish Government on Cyprus problem. All public statements reveal Turkey holding rigidly to partition of island between Greece and Turkey as only acceptable alternative (other than Turkish annexation) to status quo.

It is clear to Department that Turkey considers its readiness to accept partition as evidence of its willingness to make concessions. Yet it is equally clear that outright partition as solution presents such difficulties (Deptel 2416\textsuperscript{5}) that those who sincerely desire solution must carefully study variants thereof or other possibilities. In light of mutual desire for free world harmony and NATO solidarity, we believe Turkish Government will recognize need for Turkish concessions as well as concessions by all other interested parties to achieve lasting solution to this problem and thus contribute to peace in eastern Mediterranean.

Accordingly Department desires Embassy Ankara to take advantage of appropriate opportunities to impress upon Turkish Government at high level importance which we attach to solution of Cyprus question. With prospects poor for either enosis or outright partition and with need great for some solution, those who wish to solve problem must consider seriously other interim or long-term solutions in spirit that recognizes overriding importance of NATO solidarity. Most careful examination of problem bilaterally and multilaterally is called for and we trust that Turks will welcome opportunity to exchange views with those concerned and those who for sake of common interests are seeking to assist in solutions.

In approach to Turks Embassy should also say US Government particularly welcomes Spaak's interest in problem and reports of direct Turk-Greek talks. While not necessarily associating ourselves with any specific proposals that Spaak or the Greeks may make, we welcome and encourage any bilateral or multilateral exchange of views of this type that might lead to compromise proposal. NATO summit meeting in Paris\textsuperscript{6} will doubtless offer opportunity for private talks between high level Greeks and Turks.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{2} Dated September 19. \textit{(Ibid.)}
\item \textsuperscript{3} Dated November 15. \textit{(Ibid.)}
\item \textsuperscript{4} Dated October 8. \textit{(Ibid.)}
\item \textsuperscript{5} Printed as telegram 7312 to London, Document 241.
\item \textsuperscript{6} Reference is to the Heads of Government Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at Paris, December 16–19.
\end{itemize}
If you deem it appropriate you may remark that Greek interpretation of British Labor Party resolution has had profound effect in Greece, where there is growing conviction that GOG may accept nothing short of enosis since Greeks believe Labor Party victory in 1960 or before will mean enosis. Department will appreciate Ankaras estimate of impact if any of Labor Party's resolution in Turkey. Specifically may Turks be led to accept compromise (other than outright partition which they consider to be such) in anticipation of eventual change in UK policy favorable to Greece?

FYI. In your discussions with Turks we recognize that any direct attack on Turkish advocacy of partition might not be useful. However, you should bear in mind that Department has grave misgivings regarding both partition and enosis. If you have reason to believe Turks may suspect our approach motivated by Pesmazoglou (Ankara 1444) you should emphasize timing of these instructions determined by other impelling factors, e.g., end of Turkish electoral campaign, Spaak's activities and NATO Ministerial meeting. End FYI.

London: Inform Foreign Office that we are instructing Embassy Ankara to make this approach to Turkish Government, and express gratification UK resuming Cyprus discussion with Turks (London 3235).

Dulles

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2 Reference is to the statement adopted by the Labour Party at its 56th annual conference at Brighton, September 30-October 4. The part of the statement dealing with Cyprus reads:

"Cyprus should be given the right of self-determination and after a set period may opt for Greece: but it is fully possible that the Cypriots, once the right of self-determination has been conceded, may decide to stay within the Commonwealth." (Transmitted in telegram 2328 from London, October 9; Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10-957)

4 Telegram 1444, November 19, reported the substance of a conversation between the Greek Ambassador to Turkey, Pesmazolu, and Warren during which the Greek Ambassador stressed his determination to find a solution to the Cyprus dispute. (Ibid., 747C.00/11-1957)

9 Throughout October and November, Spaak continued his discussions with the Greeks and the British in an effort to find a framework for a Cyprus settlement that might prove acceptable to the Turks. Among Spaak's proposals were a formula for a settlement that guaranteed independence for Cyprus; a NATO base on the island occupied by British forces; and an international statute preserving the rights of minorities. (Polto 1333 from Paris, November 18; Ibid., 747C.00/11-1857)

10 Telegram 3235, November 21, transmitted a summary of instructions being sent to the British Ambassador in Ankara with respect to exploring the Cyprus situation with the Turks. (Ibid., 747C.00/11-2157)

On December 2, Warren informed the Department that he had conveyed the substance of this telegram to President Bayar. Commenting on the conversation, the Ambassador noted that it seemed that the Turks were pressing forward with their ideas on partition and could not retreat. (Ibid., 747C.00/12-257)
Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 2, 1957

SUBJECT
Cyprus: Greek Plans for UNGA

PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Evangelos Averoff, Greek Foreign Minister
Mr. George V. Melas, Greek Ambassador
The Secretary
Mr. William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary, NEA
Mr. Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary, IO
Mr. Murat W. Williams, Deputy Director, GTI

The Greek Foreign Minister opened his discussion with the Secretary today by extensive remarks on the Middle East designed apparently to show that the Greeks were good allies in a crisis, . . . .

Mr. Averoff then turned to the one subject upon which, he said, all others depend—Cyprus. He felt the situation in recent months was both better and worse. It was better because the British attitude had clearly improved and the British had now shown themselves ready to accept a “quite logical solution to the problem”. The situation was worse because there seemed to be a new “intransigence” on the part of Turkey and there were prospects of a resumption of fighting in Cyprus itself.

Mr. Averoff emphasized that the Greek people now realized that not the United Kingdom but Turkey stood in the way of a solution of the Cyprus problem. He remarked that the British Ambassador in Athens had even said that he, the Ambassador, had started to become popular. Averoff said that there had been a period of calm on Cyprus which had developed particularly “because we have fed the people with hopes”. Now, with hopes still unrealized, the Cypriots might become discouraged. Moreover, the Turks on Cyprus were armed. “If fighting starts”, he said, “between Greeks and and Turkish Cypriots, I must forecast that Greek-Turkish relations will be broken. I will not do it myself. I will resign first, but the street will do it.”

The Foreign Minister added that the Greek Government had mobilized “all our imaginations to find a solution”. Tension goes on, where will it lead? What can we do?

Turning to the UNGA, the Foreign Minister remarked that he had made a proposal to the British. While he was under strong

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1 Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of a Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Williams.
pressure to push for a resolution in favor of self-determination, he 
would try to break the least possible number of windows. He had 
suggested, therefore, that the British make a declaration at the 
UNGA (1) indicating that they would cancel the deportation of 
Makarios, (2) saying that the Government of Cyprus would start 
negotiations with the representatives of the people of Cyprus—both 
Greeks and Turks—regarding the future of the island. If the British 
would make such a declaration he would agree to a resolution which 
took note of the substance of this and would not press for his own 
resolution on self-determination. (Note: In a later talk with Mr. 
Rountree, 2 Mr. Averoff made it plain that the resolution itself need 
include only the second portion of the proposed declaration.) 

The Foreign Minister reported that the British in New York 
appeared sympathetic towards this proposal and had referred it to 
London. He was hopeful that this might lead to a satisfactory 
arrangement at the General Assembly.

In concluding his presentation, he said that be wished to request 
of the Secretary that the United States agree not to block his 
resolution on self-determination if the United Kingdom did not 
accept his compromise proposal. He added that he was convinced 
that one day the British Government would apply self-determination 
to Cyprus—if not under the Conservative Party, certainly under the 
Labor Party. “How,” he asked, “can other countries impede what the 
British will one day apply?”

In response to the Foreign Minister, the Secretary started to 
comment first on what Mr. Averoff had to say about the Middle 
East. Averoff stopped him, saying he was more interested in what 
the Secretary would say about Cyprus. The Secretary then referred 
to the British Labor Party’s statement on Cyprus to which Averoff 
had alluded. The Secretary noted that one must not base one’s hopes 
too much upon what a party out of power might say, since parties 
are known to change their minds when they assume power and 
responsibility. He then observed that Mr. Averoff had omitted any 
mention of Mr. Spaak’s name in his talk. Mr. Averoff replied that he 
would, of course, be glad to talk of Mr. Spaak if the Secretary 
wished. The Secretary then mentioned the overriding importance of 
a solution from the NATO standpoint, and said that he hoped that a 
solution could be reached in quiet diplomacy such as Mr. Spaak had 
undertaken. Accordingly we would not wish to see anything happen 
in the UN which might hurt the efforts in quiet diplomacy. The

2 A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., Central File 747.C.00/12–257.
Secretary added that we did not think a United Nations resolution would resolve the problem. In respect to Mr. Averoff’s specific question as to whether we would support a resolution on self-determination, he said that we could not commit ourselves in advance to support a resolution which we have not seen. However, it seemed that the most desirable result would be for the Greeks to work out something with the British. Meanwhile, we would have to reserve our position. The Secretary further noted that Averoff had told him, when they last met in September, \(^3\) that the Greeks would do nothing to generate animosity in Cyprus. The Greek Foreign Minister took leave of the Secretary saying that he would continue his discussion in greater detail with Mr. Rountree. \(^4\)

\(^3\) See Document 264.

\(^4\) Rountree’s discussion with Averoff on December 2 is recorded in a memorandum of conversation drafted by Williams. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12-257)

In Gadel 100 to New York, December 3, the Department instructed its delegation to “encourage UK to work out something directly with Greeks”, but noted that it did not wish to take the lead on this matter. (Ibid., 747C.00/11-2857)

269. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, December 9, 1957—9 p.m.

Delga 571. Re Cyprus. Averoff approached Lodge after Committee I adjourned. He urged in strongest terms that US remain neutral and abstain from voting on Greek self-determination resolution. \(^2\) . . .

When Lodge asked whether there was any possibility of Greeks and British agreeing on resolution, Averoff replied affirmatively, but emphasized Greece could never accept any resolution stipulating parties to dispute since this would give Turkey veto power over any solution.

Recommendation: On basis of what Averoff told me and what I know of situation, I strongly recommend I be authorized to take neutral position on Greek resolution should it be pressed to

\(^1\) Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12-957. Secret; Priority.

\(^2\) The Greek draft resolution stipulated that the General Assembly would express the desire that the people of Cyprus be given an opportunity to determine their own future.
vote. . . . Of course recognize that it would be preferable if Greek resolution never came to vote, and compromise resolution acceptable all three emerged. Given Greek state of mind this year, this seems unlikely.  

3 In telegram 1683, December 10, Penfield reported that Karamanlis had expressed great concern that the U.S. position on the Greek resolution would be “unfavorable”. Penfield strongly urged the Department to avoid a U.S. vote against Greece. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12-1057)

Lodge

270. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State 1

Washington, December 9, 1957.

SUBJECT

Field Marshal Montgomery’s Letter to the President About Cyprus

Field Marshal Montgomery has written a personal letter (Tab A 2) to the President expressing concern over the danger to the Free World of a continuation of the Cyprus dispute and urging the President to “bang together the heads of Karamanlis and Menderes” in order to effect a compromise solution.

Discussion:

There is a striking similarity between Field Marshal Montgomer y’s letter and Field Marshal Sir John Harding’s final assessment of the problem in Cyprus. The British Embassy has informed us that Harding has concluded that someone must turn to the Greeks and Turks and “bang their heads together.” Harding, like Montgomery, stated that the United States must do this. (Tab B 3)

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12-957. Secret. Drafted by Williams, Jones, and Lingen.

2 Not found attached. A copy of Montgomery’s letter to Eisenhower, dated November 1957, is in Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memos.

3 Tab B, which according to a notation on the source text was an extract from Williams’ memorandum of conversation with Wiggins, dated November 27, was not found attached. A copy of the memorandum of conversation is in Department of State, Central File 747C.00/11-2757.
Field Marshal Montgomery speaks of the need for concessions on both sides, including Greek recognition of Turkish interests and Turkish recognition of the principle that Cyprus must be a "single state" with majority rule subject to safeguards. Montgomery thus apparently shares Harding's views that Cyprus must not be partitioned. Our own view has also been to discourage partition. We have also discouraged the Greek desire for enosis. We have not espoused any of the various compromise solutions that have been put forward.

We believe that the best way to bring Greece and Turkey closer together on the Cyprus problem is through the efforts of Mr. Spaak. The December NATO Meeting in Paris provides an excellent opportunity to urge Karamanlis and Menderes to undertake a frank exchange of views. Spaak will seek to do this. We should also do all we can to help effect bilateral exchanges on the Cyprus dispute at Paris, between the parties concerned and between each of them and ourselves.

The British are unlikely to undertake any new departure in Cyprus until after Sir Hugh Foot, the new Governor, has had a chance to review the problem in Cyprus and make recommendations. This will probably take at least six weeks. As soon as this is done, we would hope that we may resume the secret informal talks with the British which Mr. Barbour conducted in London in September and try to agree on possible lines of action by which we could further assist Mr. Spaak in his efforts and encourage the Greeks and Turks to make necessary concessions.

Recommendations:

That you suggest to the President that he tell Field Marshal Montgomery:

1. That we have already, as Montgomery suggests, urged the Greek Government to use all its influence to keep EOKA from further violence at this time. We have also made representations to Averoff on the need for moderation in the UNGA debate on Cyprus.

2. That we are now concentrating our efforts regarding the Cyprus problem on appropriate support to Mr. Spaak's activities.

3. That at the NATO Meeting in Paris we will encourage Greeks and Turks to begin to talk to each other to try to narrow their differences. When the President sees Menderes and Karamanlis in Paris individually, he may wish to encourage such talks.

4. That after the new British Governor has made his report, we would like to go over with the British possible lines of action with a view to seeing in what ways we can further support Mr. Spaak's efforts and encourage the Greeks and Turks to make concessions.
We are prepared to draft a suggested reply to Montgomery along the above lines.  

4 There is no indication on the source text that Dulles approved the memorandum.

271. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey

Washington, December 10, 1957—7:11 p.m.

1891. Your 1600, 2 Athens 1661 3 and Nicosia 142. 4 US policy on Cyprus has not changed and you should go ahead with representation to GOT as set forth Deptel 1727. 5 As stated in these instructions we welcome and encourage any bilateral or multilateral exchange of views that might lead to compromise proposal. We trust that Turks will welcome opportunity to exchange views with those concerned and those who for sake of common interests are seeking to assist in finding solution.

Re paras A, B and C ref tel, 6 US is not supporting any of various compromise solutions which have been put forward. We are carefully preserving our freedom of action in manner which will

2 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12-1057. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Williams, Laingen, and Jones. Repeated to London, Paris, Athens, and Nicosia.

3 In telegram 1600, December 6, the Embassy informed the Department that it was concerned that the United States position on the Cyprus question was shifting. The Embassy was particularly disturbed by the possibility that the United States was becoming too closely involved in the problem and too closely identified with a particular position. (Ibid., 747C.00/12-687)

5 In telegram 1661, December 7, Penfield noted that a solution to the Cyprus problem had to be found as soon as possible. He concluded: “Should excessive demonstrations of these three dangerous national characteristics happen to occur simultaneously or as chain reaction it is hard to see how we could avoid disastrous results to NATO and our ME position.” (Ibid., 747C.00/12-757)

4 In telegram 142, December 9, the U.S. Consul at Nicosia, commenting on the telegrams cited in footnotes 2 and 3 above, noted: “...I have tended disregard more extreme statements Greek Cypriot politicians and others who claim they have nothing lose but chains in bringing on 'heroic holocaust' heralded by recent EOKA leaflets and private statements that 10,000 lives not too high price for freedom. But it seems perilous ignore statements ethnarchy and EOKA indicating unwillingness accept further delay.” (Ibid., 747C.00/12-957)

6 Reference is to three paragraphs of telegram 1600, which contained references to three telegrams that included various proposals for resolving the Cyprus problem. One of these was telegram 1727, ibid.
permit us to exert our influence most effectively on all interested parties of Cyprus dispute.

In event Zorlu asserts "USG too active in Cyprus matter" you should say that as member NATO and close friend of parties involved, US is deeply concerned over continued failure parties to recognize larger issues at stake and to make compromises essential to solution of Cyprus controversy. US has been urging and will continue to urge interested parties to get together and arrive at compromise solution. There is too much at stake for us to do otherwise.

We generally agree with various points made by Embassy in ref tel except following:

A. Now that elections are over we fail to see why GOT feels it must go "full steam ahead on partition." If Greece does likewise in pursuit its aims we see only gravest consequences ahead. Only hope lies in gradual retreat by both Greek and Turks from intransigent positions they have taken.

B. We do not agree "that status Cyprus can remain unchanged if no solution found." If we are to avoid further deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations and in NATO defenses in area it is imperative that some early interim or permanent arrangements be found that will take us out of present impasse. Events of last 18 months clearly indicate how untenable is status quo. British themselves recognize this.

We trust you will be able to make representations to Menderes and Zorlu along lines Deptel 1727 before their departure for Paris.  

Dulles


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272. Letter From President Eisenhower to Field Marshal Montgomery  


Your recent letter on Cyprus  was very much appreciated here. Foster and I share your concern about the bad effect this controversy

1 Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Confidential Files. Secret.

2 See Document 270.
is having on the North Atlantic Alliance. I agree that some way has to be found to bring the Greeks and Turks closer together.

I have already tried to persuade both the Greeks and the Turks to restrain themselves in the debates of the United Nations General Assembly because, as you say, bitter debate there would make a solution more difficult and could further interfere with the working of our Alliance. I also have urged the Greek Government to keep E.O.K.A. from further violence.

You probably know that the United States is supporting Mr. Spaak’s efforts to find some common ground between the Turkish and Greek positions in the hope that these efforts may contribute to some solution. During the NATO Meeting in Paris we will encourage the Greeks and the Turks to talk to each other directly.

After the new Governor has had a chance to look over conditions on the Island and make his report to London, I think it might be worthwhile for us to go over with the British Government possible lines of action to see if there are ways in which we can further support Mr. Spaak’s effort and encourage the Greeks and Turks to make the sort of concessions of which you speak.

As I am sure you know I am ready to do whatever is right to do to bring an end to this quarrel.

I look forward to seeing you in a few days.

With warm regard,

3 The source text is not signed. On December 15, Montgomery responded to Eisenhower’s letter:

“I have just got your letter in answer to mine about Cyprus. I am so very glad to know that you agree.

“I shall not see you again while you are in Paris; I have to go over to England tomorrow afternoon for certain commitments in connection with Christmas charities. I must be content with the glimpse of you at the airport yesterday; it was good to shake your hand again.”

The source text is handwritten. (Eisenhower Library, White House Confidential Files)

273. Editorial Note

On December 12, during discussion at the Secretary’s Staff meeting, the subject of the Cyprus issue at the United Nations was raised. According to the notes of the meeting:

“Mr. Walmsley reported that Ambassador Lodge last night moved for adjournment of the vote on the Cyprus resolution, which
had been expected to pass in Committee by a small majority. Certain amendments were expected and there was also the alternative of introducing a new resolution which would eliminate the reference to self-determination and which would indicate that some progress had been made since the last resolution. Mr. Walmsley expected the Greek resolution would be amended before it was adopted. If it came to a vote in its present form, the US would have to abstain. (Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

Later that day by a vote of 33 to 20 with 25 abstentions, among them the United States, the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution on Cyprus. (U.N. Doc. A/3794) The approved text of the resolution, which noted the importance of having the principle of self-determination applied in the case of Cyprus, was based on a Greek subamendment to a four-power amendment to the operative part of the original Greek draft resolution. The operative part of the amended resolution reads:

“Expresses its earnest hope that further negotiations and discussions will be undertaken in spirit cooperation with view have right self-determination applied in case of people of Cyprus.”

Two days later, however, at the plenary session of the Assembly, the amended resolution failed to attain the two-thirds majority required for final approval. The vote was 31 for, 24 against, with 24 abstentions, among them the United States.
Memorandum of a Conversation, Ambassador’s Residence, Paris, December 18, 1957, 9:30 a.m.¹

USDel/MC/22

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Mr. Constantin Karamanlis, Prime Minister of Greece
Mr. Averoff-Tossitsa, Foreign Minister of Greece
Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell

SUBJECT

Cyprus

Mr. Karamanlis said that he wanted to invite the President’s attention to the problem of Cyprus. It was having very unfortunate repercussions in the Balkan Pact and in NATO. The solution was simple—Cyprus should either be independent or Greek. In either circumstance, it would be with the United Nations and a member of NATO; Greece was prepared to give guarantees concerning the Turkish minority.

The President commented that all problems become difficult when emotions are involved. He knew that Cyprus was not an easy problem for Greece. Mr. Karamanlis declared that Greece had a moral obligation to support the Greeks on Cyprus.

The President said he thought the UK was now more flexible on this problem and would support any arrangement that Greece and Turkey agreed on. Mr. Averoff wondered whether the UK was sincere in this and the President stated his strong conviction, based on his long friendship with Prime Minister Macmillan, that the UK was indeed sincere.

The President said he would be very happy to see Mr. Karamanlis and Mr. Menderes get together on Cyprus, to see if within an atmosphere of flexibility they could agree on something.

Mr. Karamanlis said that for 2½ years he had endured a series of provocations connected with Cyprus. He referred to the riots in Istanbul and Izmir and to “unfriendly” British moves. An anti-Western feeling was being built up in Greece because of Cyprus. Whereas only 10 per cent of the Greek population is Communist, a Popular Front had now been established. Mr. Karamanlis said that despite all this, he continued to steer a pro-West policy but he was constantly being attacked because the West was against Greece on

¹ Source: Department of State, President’s Memoranda Conversation: Lot 66 D 149, 56–59. Drafted by Rockwell. Eisenhower was in Paris to attend the NATO Heads of Government meeting, December 16–19.
Cyprus. "You all vote against us in the United Nations," he said.

The President asked whether Turkey or Greece couldn't sit down with a third, neutral, person to work out an agreement. Mr. Karamanlis reiterated that the solution was a simple one. He added that if a neutral person became involved, it should be the President.

Mr. Averoff, in discussing the Turkish minority, said that Greece had in mind that a committee of neutrals would fix the status of the minority. This status would then be put under the guarantee of the United Nations, which would have a Commissioner on Cyprus for this purpose.

The President inquired whether Cyprus, if independent, could survive economically. Mr. Averoff said it could.

The President asked whether the Greeks had proposed their solution directly to the Turks. Mr. Karamanlis said there had been no direct contact but that the Turks were aware of the Greek position. Turkey is opposed to the union of Cyprus with Greece, he added. A UN guarantee against this should prevent such union.

The President commented that the geography of the situation worries the Turks. Mr. Karamanlis replied that there would be no security problem if Cyprus were independent or controlled by Greece, a small power. Cyprus under UK control was more dangerous to Turkey because the UK is a big power and some day might not be friendly to Turkey.

The President stressed his concern over the damage being done to NATO by the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus. He thought Cyprus should not be allowed to prevent Greece and Turkey from being allies in NATO. He noted that Cyprus had even caused the destruction of the American Library in Athens, despite our vote in the UN, which we understood had pleased the Greeks. Mr. Karamanlis said he was sorry about this. He believed the Communists might have done it.

The President said that the Turkish Prime Minister was coming to see him shortly and that he would suggest to Mr. Menderes that Turkey should be as flexible as possible and that Greece and Turkey might meet to discuss Cyprus.

Mr. Karamanlis said that Turkey desired partition of Cyprus but that this was not a logical or practical idea, since 82 per cent of the population is Greek. The Turks are too intransigent, he thought.

The President said that he would be willing to do personally anything he thought would help. Mr. Averoff said that the US is the only country that can persuade Turkey to be "reasonable". The
President made clear that we had not espoused any particular Cyprus solution. We did not believe we should use pressure on either side. We would urge flexibility and the possible use of a neutral party. Mr. Karamanlis said that he was grateful that the US had made clear that it is not against Greece.

The President said that the US was trying to keep strong the alliance against Communism. We are trying to promote agreements among the many friends we have in cases where these friends are in dispute. We often think it is better to abstain in votes on these problems and thus maintain our influence and ability to play a useful role.

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275. Memorandum of a Conversation, Hotel Bristol, Paris, December 19, 1957, 3:15 p.m.¹

USDel/MC/34

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The Secretary
Mr. Rockwell

Greece
Prime Minister Constantin Karamanlis
Foreign Minister Evanghelos Averoff-Tossitza
Mr. George Melas, Greek Ambassador in Washington

SUBJECT

Cyprus

Prime Minister Karamanlis said that something had to be done to solve the Cyprus problem. Because of it Greece was in conflict with its allies and because of it it was hard for the Greek Government to oppose the Communists at home. The US must intervene decisively. The Greek solution would meet the interests of Greece, Turkey, the UK and the Cypriot population. Greece was willing to give guarantees regarding the latter.

The Secretary inquired whether Greece was working with Mr. Spaak. Mr. Karamanlis said that he had talked with Mr. Spaak

¹ Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 953. Secret.
yesterday and that Mr. Spaak agreed that partition was no solution. He favored a solution on the basis of independence. . . .

Mr. Averoff said that the US was the only power which could bring about a solution. Mr. Spaak had said that the UK was willing to accept independence for Cyprus, but not Turkey. That was why Greece was asking for US help in connection with the problem of the Turkish attitude.

Mr. Karamanlis was sure that next year a majority of the UN would vote for independence for Cyprus. He said that he was in severe trouble at home over Cyprus, facing eight opposition parties, the Communists, Makarios, and the Cypriots. . . .

The Secretary said he could understand why Greece felt it had to bring the Cyprus matter before the UN. We did not think the UN could solve it, and it was for this reason that we were not sympathetic to the UN approach, not because of our views on the merits of the Greek position. Emotional forces made a solution difficult. The Secretary told Mr. Karamanlis that he admired how he had conducted himself in the face of domestic political pressures. We recognized him as a real friend of the US, and we were trying to be a real friend of Greece. This did not mean, however, that we would do what we thought was wrong—to coerce another friendly country. We did not use our aid programs in this way. Furthermore, we had no mandate to settle the Cyprus problem, not that we were asking for one. We would like to help, but we could only do so through appeal to reason on both sides. The Secretary thought that if all the parties would put down what they wanted and why they wanted it, the “whys” could be reconciled.

The Secretary said that Mr. Spaak had a mandate of sorts to reconcile differences between NATO members. We were prepared to encourage him.

Ambassador Melas stated that just a display of interest with Turkey would be helpful. The Secretary replied that the President spoke with Prime Minister Menderes yesterday about Cyprus and that he, the Secretary, was going to see Mr. Menderes that very afternoon after his appointment with Mr. Karamanlis.

The Prime Minister said that Cyprus was the last part of Europe under colonial rule. This was intolerable.

Mr. Averoff said the Secretary should tell Mr. Menderes that partition is something rejected by everybody but Turkey. He should be made to be less sticky on this. Greece, for example, had proposed three or four possible approaches. Greece badly wanted the re-establishment of good relations with Turkey in order to be able better to withstand the pressure of the Slavs on the East Mediterranean.