East-West Exchanges

UNITED STATES POLICY IN ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM OF EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND PERSONS WITH THE SOVIET BLOC

92. Memorandum From the Attorney General (Brownell) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler) ¹


This has reference to your memorandum of March 9, 1955, ² relative to the admission to the United States of certain European non-official temporary visitors excludable under existing law.

Pursuant to your request, I am enclosing a one-page memorandum which I believe adequately summarizes the considerations and actions which have taken place in this matter. You will note that a suggestion is included therein for substituting certain language in NSC Document 5508, February 8, 1955. ³

I am also attaching a copy of a more detailed report on this subject, ⁴ which was prepared for my use, in the event that you might have need for further background information.

I will be glad to keep your office informed of any further developments. I see no reason why this matter should not be the subject of consideration by the National Security Council on March 24.

Herbert Brownell, Jr. ⁵

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Admission to the U.S. of European Soviet Bloc Nationals. Secret. Transmitted to the NSC under cover of a memorandum from Lay, dated March 22, indicating that it reported an agreement between the Departments of State and Justice pursuant to NSC Action No. 1336–b, and was to be considered by the Council at its meeting on March 24.

² Not printed. (Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5508 Series)

³ Not printed, but see NSC 5508/1, Document 94.

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Memorandum Prepared in the Department of Justice


The Secretary of State recommended to the Attorney General, in the national interest, the admission of eleven Soviet student and youth newspaper editors for a three week visit "to acquaint themselves with the life of students and youth in the United States." The Attorney General, under a discretionary authority contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act, did authorize admission of this group under the sponsorship of the Institute of International Education.

The Institute of International Education, in accepting this responsibility, agreed to certain controls and requirements of the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice, the Agency of Government primarily responsible for all alien visitors in the United States. It should be made clear, however, that these conditions are not such that will detract from the purpose of the visit.

The general question of admitting to the United States various groups of visitors from Russia, such as Russian farmers, athletes, etc., is the subject of a paper recently considered by the National Security Council. The President directed that the paper be referred to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General for consultation and decision. As a result of such consultation, it has been agreed that as to all future applications for admission of visitors from Russia, this plan will be followed:

The Secretary of State will informally advise the Attorney General or the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the group that desires to come to the United States. The Immigration and Naturalization Service will then develop, in consultation with the State Department, the necessary plans and controls which should be put into effect, including the selection of a non-Governmental organization to make arrangements for and to monitor the visitors while in the United States in cases where such action is

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6 Secret.

7 For text of the Department of State press release of March 10, announcing this decision, see Department of State Bulletin, March 21, 1955, p. 487. On April 16, however, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the 11 editors decided not to visit the United States because they were unwilling to comply with the legal requirements for the issuance of nonofficial visitors' visas, including fingerprinting. For a Department of State press release of April 16 responding to this announcement, see ibid., April 25, 1955, p. 695.
appropriate. When such plans are complete, the Secretary of State will be advised, at which time the necessary formal actions will be taken to authorize admission.

(It is suggested that the language in the paragraph immediately preceding be substituted for paragraphs 12, 13, and 14 in NSC Document 5508, February 8, 1955. 8)

Agreement has also been reached in principle as to authorizing the admission of the Soviet farmers 9 through this same mechanism and under the same controls.

Following the visit of the eleven Soviet student and youth newspaper editors, and following the receipt of information as to the results of that experiment, a detailed report will be made.

8 Not printed. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Admission to the U.S. of European Soviet Bloc Nationals)

9 On March 10, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered a note to the American Embassy expressing the view that an exchange of agricultural delegations, as suggested by the Des Moines Register, could be advantageous and asked for the U.S. Government's view on such an exchange. The text of the note has not been found in Department of State files.

93. Memorandum of Discussion at the 242d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 24, 1955 1

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and item 1.]

1 Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Item 2 was prepared by Coyne; the remaining items were prepared by Gleason, on March 25.
2. Admission to the U.S. of Certain European Non-Official Temporary Visitors Excludable Under Existing Law (NSC 5427; NSC 5508; Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 16, 1955; NSC Action No. 1366; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 22, 1955)\(^2\)

Mr. Cutler summarized earlier developments with respect to the subject, noting that at the Council meeting of February 17, 1955, the NSC considered recommendations by the Planning Board to admit a limited increase in the number of non-official temporary visitors otherwise excludable under the McCarran Act for the purpose of countering foreign talk that it is the United States, rather than the USSR, that is maintaining an “iron curtain”. He noted that at its February 17 meeting the Council was favorably disposed toward paragraphs 10 and 11 of NSC 5508, but that it found the provisions of paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 of that report unacceptable. Accordingly, the Council referred NSC 5508 to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General for further consideration in the light of the Council discussion on February 17, and for subsequent report to the Council.

Mr. Cutler stated that on March 22 the Attorney General submitted memoranda\(^3\) summarizing the considerations and action taken pursuant to the Council’s discussion at its meeting of February 17. He mentioned that the memoranda reflected that harmony had prevailed between the Departments of State and Justice since this subject was last considered, and commented that the Planning Board, by its consideration of NSC 5508, served in the capacity of midwife to the Departments of State and Justice in helping to resolve the problem.

Mr. Cutler indicated that the March 22 memoranda before the Council for consideration today included a paragraph, agreed to by the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, to be substituted in NSC 5508 for paragraphs 12, 13 and 14.

To refresh the Council’s recollection, Mr. Cutler summarized paragraphs 10 and 11 of the “Policy Guidance” statement contained in NSC 5508. He then read the paragraph which the Departments of

\(^2\) Regarding NSC 5427, “Restricting Diplomatic and Official Representatives of Soviet Bloc Countries in the United States in Connection With Strategic Intelligence,” July 19, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. viii, footnote 9, p. 1246. NSC 5508 is not printed, but see NSC 5508/1, infra. Gleason’s memorandum of February 16 to the Council was a covering memorandum transmitting a memorandum from Radford to the Secretary of Defense, dated February 15, giving the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on NSC 5508. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Admission to the U.S. of European Soviet Bloc Nationals) Regarding NSC Action No. 1366 and Lay’s memorandum to the Council of March 22, see footnote 1, supra.

\(^3\) See supra.
State and Justice recommended for insertion in the "Policy Guidance" statement in lieu of paragraphs 12, 13 and 14.

Mr. Cutler indicated that the Departments of State and Justice had been proceeding along the lines indicated in the proposed paragraph; that they had followed these recommended procedures in the case of the proposed admission of the Soviet student and youth newspaper editors, and in the case of the Soviet "agriculturists" who had been recommended for admission to the United States. He mentioned, with respect to the former group, that some of the "youths" designated for admission were forty years of age or more.

Mr. Cutler next directed attention to the third paragraph of the Attorney General's summary report dated March 22, which indicated that as a result of consultation between the Departments of State and Justice, it had been agreed that the plan outlined in the substitute paragraph mentioned above would be followed "as to all future applications for admission of visitors from Russia." He said that it was his understanding that the Policy Guidance contained in NSC 5508 was not intended to be limited in its application to Russian nationals, but that it was also to be applied to certain nationals of other European countries, both Soviet bloc and non-Soviet bloc, who were excludable under applicable sections of the McCarran Act. The Attorney General confirmed Mr. Cutler's understanding that the substitute paragraph was not intended to be limited to Russian nationals. Mr. Cutler suggested, accordingly, that a phrase be included in the proposed substitute paragraph to indicate that it applied to those categories of persons falling within paragraphs 10 or 11 of NSC 5508. The Attorney General concurred in Mr. Cutler's proposal.

Mr. Cutler then raised a question as to whether the word "religious" should be included in paragraphs 10–d and 11–c of NSC 5508, in view of Secretary Dulles' comments with respect to this aspect of the subject at the February 17 meeting of the Council. The Secretary of State indicated that he would like to see the word "religious" added in both instances.

Secretary Wilson raised a question as to the application of the term "scientific" in paragraphs 10 and 11 of NSC 5508, wherein those paragraphs refer to the admission of otherwise excludable aliens for participation in scientific, cultural, educational, or other types of meetings. He thought that we should be sure how far we intended to go with respect to the admission of such individuals for scientific purposes. He referred to a recent instance in Japan where Soviet technologists were granted entry and it later turned out that their real purpose in entering Japan was to examine Japanese plants engaged in manufacturing munitions for the United States. Secretary Wilson thought it would be a good idea to insert the word "religion"
igious” in paragraphs 10 and 11, and to drop the word “scientific” from those paragraphs.

Secretary Humphrey inquired whether the granting of admission permitted these aliens to go anywhere they liked in the United States. The Attorney General responded in the negative, stating that their travels were to be very carefully supervised and controlled.

The Attorney General stated that the Department of Justice was receiving very “bitter” mail critical of the United States for permitting these people to enter the country. In response to the President’s inquiry as to the source of these criticisms, the Attorney General said the mail emanated from patriotic organizations and individuals.

The Attorney General then asked Mr. Allen Dulles if he was going to make a report on what those people who had been permitted entry previous to this time actually said and did when they returned to their home lands. Mr. Dulles replied in the affirmative, and Mr. Cutler thereupon read the highlights of a report 4 which he had received from the Director of Central Intelligence, outlining highly critical and false propaganda charges which some of these visitors had made. Mr. Cutler noted that among other things some of the representatives from iron curtain countries who attended the recent Evanston Assembly of the World Council of Churches made the following accusations or complaints when they went back behind the iron curtain: (a) They were put under surveillance by U.S. secret police; (b) they—and even the Archbishop of Canterbury—were fingerprinted in the same manner as Chicago gangsters; (c) there was a crime wave in Chicago; (d) Bishop Peter 5 referred to an Evanston memorial to World War II dead which bears the inscription “December 7, 1941—blank”, and charged that the failure of local officials to insert the second date was proof that the war had not ended so far as the United States was concerned. Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out in this connection that in some instances the governments of these people probably compelled them to make such charges when they returned home.

In reference to the foregoing, Mr. Cutler made a comment about the happiness expressed by the Secretary of State at the February 17 meeting over the fact that these religious people were permitted entry to this country. The Secretary said that he wanted to correct any misunderstanding on that score. He said he was happy that such a great organization as the World Council of Churches wasn’t driven away, for he thought it would have been scandalous if the World Council had been forced by our policies to hold its meeting outside the United States.

4 Not further identified.
5 Bishop Janos Peter of the Reformed Church of Hungary.
The Attorney General indicated that the only reason these people were being let in was to help the national interests of the United States. He thought, accordingly, that the Director of Central Intelligence should continue to keep a close check on what such people did and said when they returned to their respective homelands, for the purpose of determining whether we were achieving the desired results in granting them entry to the United States.

Mr. Rockefeller thought that the Director of Central Intelligence should report on the general psychological attitude being evinced around the world regarding the restrictive policies of our immigration laws, and Mr. Cutler replied that this subject was already covered in the basic paper.

Secretary Dulles, speaking of other psychological aspects of the cold war, mentioned that he had seen an item on TV from New York last night describing the interview which was held with one of the two Americans who had been thoroughly brain-washed by the Chinese Communists and who had returned to the United States by air yesterday. He thought the manner in which this individual “carried on” before the press and cameras was shocking; that he was vitriolic in his criticism of the United States to the point that it would make one’s blood run cold to witness such a demonstration on the part of any American.

Secretary Wilson said that in the case of the American prisoners of war who were captured by the Chinese Communists and brain-washed, the military tried to take care of that situation by keeping them in camps for a while after they were brought back to the United States.

Secretary Humphrey said that while he had not seen the TV broadcast referred to by Secretary Dulles, he had heard about it, and that the general impression of those who reported it to him was along the lines that a terrible thing had been done to the returnee by the Chinese Communists in that he had obviously become deranged mentally.

Mr. Allen Dulles thought that it might be a good idea to put such individuals on slow boats rather than fly them back to the United States immediately after their release by the Chinese Communists.

The President commented that some of the newspaper people, by their ballyhooing of a situation of this sort, were only trying to stir up controversy, and he cited, as an example, the effort on the part of the people at his press conference yesterday to try and point
up differences between the Secretary of State and Senator George on certain foreign policy questions.  

Secretary Wilson, referring to the fact that Soviet “agricultur-ists” would be coming in in the near future, said that it was in one respect a good thing, in that it indicated to him, from a military point of view, that the food situation in the Soviet Union was bad. On the other hand, he said he didn’t want to help that particular situation by enabling their agricultural experts, through visits to the United States, to learn ways and means of bettering the agricultural situation in the Soviet Union. To this the President said that he did not believe that permitting a few Soviet farmers to visit this country would improve the situation one-half of one per cent. The President pointed out that the Russians got all of our literature and pamphlets on subjects. Furthermore, the President said, when U.S. farmers visited the Soviet Union they would be in a position to talk about how superior their agricultural attainments were to those of the USSR. In addition, the President said that this program was designed to help individuals as well as governments to get together. Considering these and related psychological factors, the President said, he did not feel too concerned about the point raised by Secretary Wilson.

Mr. Cutler indicated that NSC 5508 would be revised in line with the proposal contained in the Attorney General’s memorandum of March 22 and in the light of the discussion at today’s Council meeting.

*The National Security Council:*  

a. Noted and discussed the memorandum on the subject by the Attorney General, transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 22, and concurred in by the Secretary of State.

b. Adopted the statement of policy contained in the reference report (NSC 5508) subject to the following changes:

3. Paragraphs 12, 13 and 14: Delete, and substitute in the following therefor, renumbering the final paragraph accordingly:

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7 Paragraphs a-b and subparagraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1357. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)
"12. The Secretary of State will informally advise the Attorney General or the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service of any individual or group falling within paragraphs 10 or 11 above, that desires to come to the United States. The Immigration and Naturalization Service will then develop, in consultation with the Department of State, the necessary plans and controls which should be put into effect, including the selection of a non-Governmental organization to make arrangements for and to monitor the visitor or visitors while in the United States in cases where such action is appropriate. When such plans are complete, the Secretary of State will be advised, at which time the necessary formal actions will be taken to authorize admission.

Note: NSC 5508, as amended and adopted, approved by the President; circulated as NSC 5508/1, and referred to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General for the policy guidance contained in paragraphs 10 and 11 thereof and for appropriate action pursuant to paragraphs 12 and 13 thereof.

S. Everett Gleason

\[8\] \textit{Infra.}

94. National Security Council Report \(^1\)

NSC 5508/1

\textit{Washington, March 26, 1955.}

\textbf{STATEMENT OF POLICY ON ADMISSION TO THE U.S. OF CERTAIN EUROPEAN NON-OFFICIAL TEMPORARY VISITORS EXCLUDABLE UNDER EXISTING LAW}

\textbf{General Considerations}

1. \textit{Introduction}. As a part of its "coexistence" campaign since the death of Stalin, the USSR has eased restrictions on travel to and from the Soviet orbit. Under the new Soviet policy, 101 U.S. private

\(^1\) Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5508 Series. Confidential. NSC 5508/1 was circulated to the members of the Council under cover of a memorandum of March 26 from Lay, in which he noted the discussion and action taken at the Council's 242d meeting on March 24 and stated that the President had approved on March 26 the statement of policy as set forth in NSC 5508/1. In addition to the statement of policy, NSC 5508/1 included a table of contents, annexes, and maps, none printed, that were identical to those included in NSC 5508.
citizens were admitted to the USSR during 1953 and 1954. The United States, on the other hand, for practical, security and political reasons arising from an enhanced awareness of the Communist threat, has been reluctant to admit European Soviet Bloc private citizens. As a result, the U.S. is placed in a paradoxical position, which is being exploited by Communist propaganda. Despite its traditional policy favoring freedom of travel and its record of having favored a liberal exchange of persons with the USSR in the post-war period, the U.S. is being accused of maintaining an "Iron Curtain"; and these accusations are being made not only by representatives of international Communism but also by otherwise friendly persons in the free world. This situation is causing damage, and may cause further damage, to U.S. prestige and the U.S. reputation for liberal world leadership.

2. Present Law and Policy. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, non-official alien visitors who are communists and subversives are excludable from admission to the U.S. Such of these aliens who there is reason to believe would enter to engage, even incidentally, in activities prejudicial to the national security, or who would probably engage in subversion or participate in the activities of a subversive organization, are admissible under no circumstances. The Act does permit the Attorney General, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State, to exercise discretion to admit temporarily communists and other potential subversives not included in the above categories. Under the present statute, the Attorney General has exercised his discretion in favor of admitting 33 Soviet Union private citizens during 1953 and 1954.

3. Restrictions on Travel in the U.S. and USSR (see maps at end of paper).

a. Restrictions on Travel by Foreigners in USSR. The present Soviet regulations which restrict the travel in the Soviet Union by foreigners went into effect June 22, 1953. Whereas the previous regulations, effective January 15, 1952, closed nearly 50% of Soviet territory, the present Soviet regulations permit travel to all but about 30% of the Soviet land area. Americans and other foreigners may visit over 70% of large Soviet cities (of over 100,000 population) and may travel in such densely populated and heavily industrialized areas as European Russia. Inasmuch as the majority of places that hold interest for visiting foreigners are open, Intourist, the government agency which

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2 An additional limited number of U.S. commercial travelers may also have been admitted to the USSR without their presence being made known to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Figures on the number of U.S. private citizens admitted to the European Satellites are not available. [Footnote in the source text.]

3 In addition, the Attorney General admitted 25 private citizens from the European Satellites during 1953 and 1954. This paper does not cover European Soviet Bloc nationals entering the U.S. in official capacities (including residence or attendance at the United Nations or specialized agencies) or as more or less permanent residents. [Footnote in the source text.]
arranges, coordinates and supervises the travel of temporary foreign visitors, can usually keep such visitors from entering off-limits areas or cities without their becoming aware of the existence of restrictions. Occasionally, American or other foreign visitors are permitted access to a closed area or city for some specific purpose. The present regulations also permit rail or air transit through closed areas en route to open areas. Because of this transit privilege, foreigners may traverse the entire breadth of the Soviet Union via the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

b. Restrictions on Travel by Soviet Citizens in the U.S. All Soviet citizens in possession of valid Soviet passports other than Soviet employees of the United Nations Secretariat are subject to travel restrictions during their stay in this country similar to the restrictions imposed by the Soviet Government on the travel of U.S. citizens and other foreigners in the USSR. A previous requirement that certain Soviet officials in this country, not including the Soviet delegation to the UN, give advance notification of travel outside the Washington, D.C. area, was extended on January 3, 1955 \(^4\) to include the broader category of Soviet citizens as defined above. The new regulations also closed 27\% of the U.S. to travel by those persons. They may still visit approximately 70\% of large American cities and may transit closed areas by air, rail and, in certain specified cases, by automobile along designated routes. In order to permit greater flexibility in handling temporary Soviet visitors as opposed to Soviet officials stationed in the U.S., the new regulations contain a provision whereby, at the discretion of the Department of State, they may be permitted access to closed cities or areas if their presence in such cities or areas is germane to the purpose of the visit for which they were admitted.

4. Advantages of a Modest Broadening of U.S. Admissions Policy. U.S. admission of a larger but still modest number of European Soviet Bloc nationals (in categories falling within the discretionary power of the Attorney General on recommendation of the Secretary of State) would tend to maintain the reputation of the U.S. as a mature leader and as a believer in freedom. Such admission would thus counter Communist propaganda and tend to strengthen free world cooperation with the U.S. It would have the following additional advantages:

a. Admission of European Soviet Bloc travelers may lead to admission of more U.S. travelers into the Bloc, . . . .

b. Some European Soviet Bloc travelers to the U.S. could not but be privately impressed by the American scene and American technological accomplishments. Some of these would report to at least limited local audiences a reasonably accurate picture of the U.S.

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\(^4\) See Document 1.
c. There is a possibility that some travelers from the European Soviet Bloc countries might defect.

d. . . . The present restrictions have discouraged in advance the holding of some scientific and cultural conventions in the U.S. Under a broadened policy, such gatherings would probably bring to the U.S. important (and unquestionably admissible) non-Bloc visitors as well.

5. Disadvantages of Broadening U.S. Admissions Policy. It must be assumed that any European Soviet Bloc visitors would be selected on an official basis, and carefully screened and supervised for security; and that their visits would be designed to obtain maximum advantage for the Bloc. In particular:

a. Any group of European Soviet Bloc travelers admitted would probably include some intelligence agents.

b. Any group of European Soviet Bloc travelers would probably be able to gather, if only by observation, some strategic information on the U.S.

c. There is a risk that returning visitors might be exploited for propaganda purposes since the fact that they had been in the U.S. might lend personal authenticity to any distortions concerning the U.S. (However, in the past this risk has not proved serious.)

d. The selection by the European Soviet Bloc countries of disciplined groups who would distinguish themselves by superior performance might enhance the general prestige of the Bloc countries.

e. A relaxation of U.S. vigilance toward the Soviet peril might be fostered.

In addition, there is a risk that local public feeling in the U.S. might react against travel in the U.S. of Soviet Bloc nationals, leading to "incidents".

6. Net Evaluation. On balance, provided (a) appropriate internal security safeguards are established, and (b) prompt decisions are made on requests for visas, the advantages to the U.S. of a broadened admission policy outweigh the disadvantages. Such disadvantages will be more than counterbalanced by upholding the U.S. reputation for adherence to the principles of cultural exchange and freedom of movement, and by the other advantages cited above.

7. Administrative Questions.

a. Appropriate internal security safeguards must be established when European Soviet Bloc nationals are admitted to the U.S. The Attorney General has responsibility for approving the security provisions made in each instance. In most cases contemplated under this paper, total surveillance will not be necessary, but responsible private or governmental agencies may be entrusted with the burden of keeping account of the Bloc nationals' activities and of informing the Department of Justice (FBI and the Immigration and Naturalization Service) where its responsibility may be involved. It is recognized that any increase in the number of admissions, while entailing an
increased burden on some agencies for administrative arrangements and, in some cases, on the Department of Justice from an internal security point of view, is not likely to require additional personnel.

b. The travel restrictions on European Soviet Bloc nationals admitted under a broadened admissions policy should conform to NSC 5427, except where specific cases make a specific departure therefrom desirable.

8. Possibility of a Radically Broadened U.S. Admissions Policy. Consideration has been given to broadening the exchange of visitors between the Soviet Bloc and the United States to proportions greater than the limited program contemplated in this paper. While it appears that a considerable intelligence advantage would be gained by large-scale visits of U.S. citizens to the Soviet Bloc nations, and while a broader program would give this nation more freedom in seizing the initiative in the propaganda warfare over the "Iron Curtain" allegedly erected by the United States, it does not appear that such a program is feasible within the framework of present law or national security policies. It must be recognized that waiver of inadmissibility is an exception and that the policy written into the terms of the Immigration and Nationality Act itself is a policy of exclusion. Exercise of the Attorney General's discretion to waive inadmissibility in any great number of cases would convert the exception into a rule, and a legal basis for any such program would probably require an amendment of the existing provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act. It must further be recognized that the admission of any great number of Soviet Bloc nationals would increase the internal security problems attendant upon any such program, with a consequent increase in the administrative burden imposed on the responsible agencies.

9. Related Problem of Excludable Non-Soviet Bloc Nationals. Note must be taken of the fact that the exclusion provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act applicable to Soviet Bloc nationals apply equally to Communists, Communist sympathizers and other potential subversives from non-Soviet Bloc countries. A policy which admits excludable Soviet Bloc nationals and at the same time denies admission to excludable non-Bloc visa applicants is open to a challenge of inconsistency. Such persons, of course, are more apt to be Communists by conviction than many visitors from the Bloc countries. They are more likely to be effective propagandists. Their admission leads to no reciprocal travel advantages. They are not subject to travel restrictions applicable to USSR citizens. On the other hand, exclusion of such persons may be detrimental to the U.S. reputation among foreign free world nations. Their admission might permit the

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5 See footnote 2, supra.
holding of many world-wide scientific and cultural meetings in the
U.S. Adequate security safeguards might be provided, and as a
condition of entry, some travel restrictions could be imposed. It
seems desirable, therefore, that where such persons have important
cultural or professional contributions to make to the U.S. by tem-
porary visits to the U.S. for specific engagements or for participating in
meetings held in this country, they should be considered for ad-
mission in the light of the same factors applicable to European Soviet
Bloc visitors, under adequate security safeguards.

Policy Guidance

10. It would be in the national interest for the U.S. to admit
European Soviet Bloc nationals to the U.S., provided:
   a. They are admissible under U.S. law.
   b. Their visits are of short duration.
   c. Admission is based on general reciprocity as to the numbers
      and categories of U.S. nationals admitted to the European Soviet
      Bloc.
   d. Admission is for the purpose of participation in specific and
      bona fide cultural, educational, religious, scientific, professional or
      athletic activities.
   e. Appropriate internal security safeguards are established.

11. A limited number of non-Soviet Bloc nationals excludable
    only under Section 212(a) (28) of the Immigration and Nationality
    Act (1952) should be admitted to the U.S. provided:
    a. They have an important cultural or professional contribution
       to make to the U.S.
    b. Their visits are of short duration.
    c. Admission is for the purpose of participation in specific and
       bona fide cultural, educational, religious, scientific or professional
       meetings or engagements.
    d. Adequate internal security safeguards are provided.

12. The Secretary of State will informally advise the Attorney
    General or the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization
    Service of any individual or group, falling within paragraphs 10 or
    11 above, that desires to come to the United States. The Immigration
    and Naturalization Service will then develop, in consultation with
    the Department of State, the necessary plans and controls which
    should be put into effect, including the selection of a non-Govern-
    mental organization to make arrangements for and to monitor the
    visitor or visitors while in the United States in cases where such
    action is appropriate. When such plans are complete, the Secretary
    of State will be advised, at which time the necessary formal actions
    will be taken to authorize admission.
13. The Executive Branch should endeavor to enlist support for the above policy from influential leaders in the Congress, and to promote understanding of it among the American people.

95. Report Prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board


DISTRIBUTION THROUGH THE U.S. MAILS OF CERTAIN IMPORTED COMMunist PERIODICALS

1. Purpose. To review existing arrangements relating to the distribution through the U.S. mails of imported Communist periodicals which are published primarily for consumption in Soviet bloc countries rather than for the purpose of being disseminated as "political propaganda" in the United States.

2. Basis For This Review. Recent press criticisms alleging that postal regulations have made it difficult for some individuals and organizations to receive Izvestia and Pravda through the U.S. mails.

3. Facts Bearing on This Problem:

a. With certain exceptions, including first class mail, it is the general practice of the Treasury Department (Customs) to screen with special intensity mail imports from Soviet bloc countries. These imports are examined to ascertain (1) their dutiable status, and (2) their admissibility under various U.S. laws and regulations, including those dealing with "political propaganda" within the meaning of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, which defines "political propaganda" as:

"any oral, visual, graphic, written, pictorial, or other communication or expression by any person which is reasonably adapted to, or which the person disseminating the same believes will, or which he intends to, prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce, or in any other way influence a recipient or any section of the public within the United States with reference to the

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1 Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Planning Board Member Files. Confidential. Circulated to the members of the NSC and other officials under cover of a memorandum of March 29 from Lay, in which he stated that the report was prepared by the Planning Board with the assistance of representatives of the Departments of Justice, the Post Office, and Commerce, the U.S. Information Agency, and the White House Press Secretary. Hagerty’s diary account of the discussion of this issue at an OCB meeting on March 24 is in Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers.
political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party or with reference to the foreign policies of the United States or promote in the United States racial, religious, or social dissensions. The term 'disseminating' includes transmitting or causing to be transmitted in the United States mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce or offering or causing to be offered in the United States mails."

b. Even though the material so screened contains "political propaganda" it is promptly released for delivery through the U.S. mails, provided it is destined for (1) any individual or organization complying with the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act; (2) Governmental agencies; (3) certain bona fide individuals and groups of a non-Governmental character, in the absence of evidence indicating that the material, if delivered, would be disseminated further for propaganda purposes (included in this non-Governmental category are libraries, news establishments, educational institutions, scientific and other private research groups).

c. If the material so screened contains "political propaganda" but is not destined for individuals or organizations in the categories outlined above, it may be, and if detected is, barred from the mails by the Post Office Department pursuant to its understanding of (1) interpretations by the Department of Justice of the Foreign Agents Registration Act and other statutes relating to the non-mailability of printed matter, and (2) NSC Action No. 1114-b, dated May 13, 1954.

(1) In essence the interpretations of the Department of Justice authorize the Post Office Department to exclude from the mails "political propaganda" introduced from abroad by agents not registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act for the purpose of effecting dissemination within the United States.

(2) NSC Action No. 1114-b follows:

"Agreed that, in lieu of legislation on the subject [Importation of Communist Propaganda], the responsible departments and agencies should remain alert to this problem and should do everything possible within the means now available to defeat the Communist objectives in importing propaganda into the United States."

(It is to be noted that the subject of this review is limited to but one aspect of the broad study on which NSC Action No. 1114-b was based.)

d. Inquiry indicates that: (1) approximately 1000 copies of Izvestia and 1000 copies of Pravda are sent to the United States daily; (2) they arrive by air freight, air mail and ordinary mail; (3) about 550 copies of each publication are promptly released for delivery to recipients listed in paragraph 3-b, above; (4) the balance are exclud-
ed from the mails because the processing agencies (a) construe them to be non-mailable "political propaganda" within the meaning of the Foreign Agents Registration Act as that Act has been interpreted by the Department of Justice; (b) are unaware of their intended use; (c) do not know whether they have been requested by the addressees.


a. In the implementation of NSC Action No. 1114–b, it appears that the national security would not be adversely affected by permitting, in addition to the deliveries permitted under 3–b, above, delivery through the U.S. mails of imported Communist periodicals which are published primarily for consumption in Soviet bloc countries, provided they are not introduced into the United States for the purpose of being disseminated as "political propaganda".

b. The Departments of the Treasury, Justice and the Post Office, in appropriate consultation with the Department of State and the U.S. Information Agency, should be governed by the preceding paragraph in resolving problems arising in the implementation of NSC Action No. 1114–b and the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

96. Memorandum of Discussion at the 243d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 31, 1955

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Importation of Communist Periodicals (Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Importation of Communist Propaganda", dated April 19, May 4 and 12, 1954; NSC Action No. 1114; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 29, 1955 4)

Mr. Cutler advised the Council that during the last several weeks there had been a "rash" of press stories and letters to editors, alleging that the Post Office Department was obstructing the receipt of copies of Pravda and Izvestia sent through the mails to recipients in the United States. Based on these allegations the Planning Board, supplemented by representatives of the Departments of Justice, the

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1 Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Item 1 was prepared by Coyne on April 1.
2 None printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Planning Board Member Files)
3 NSC Action No. 1114–b is quoted in paragraph 3– C–(2), supra.
4 See footnote 1, supra.
Post Office, and Commerce, and by the White House Press Secretary, prepared the reference report of March 29 which was scheduled on today's Council agenda. He said that the report focused upon only one particular aspect of the much broader subject of "Importation of Communist Propaganda". He noted that at its May 13, 1954, meeting the Council considered that broader subject and agreed that in lieu of seeking legislation with respect thereto, the responsible agencies should remain alert to the problem and do everything possible within the means now available to defeat Communist objectives in importing propaganda.

Mr. Cutler then summarized the March 29 report of the Planning Board, which dealt with the more limited subject of "Importation of Communist Periodicals". He then read to the Council paragraph 4 of the report, which paragraph was submitted for action by the Planning Board.

The Postmaster General said his Department would have no objection to paragraph 4; that it could see no great danger in releasing the 450 copies of Pravda and the 450 copies of Izvestia which were currently being withheld from the mails. He said, however, that in the case of certain other foreign Communist publications, the Post Office Department had some question as to whether they should be permitted to pass through our postal system, inasmuch as they contained political propaganda. He added that he did not think this question was a major one, and expressed the view that if problems did arise with respect to other publications, the Post Office Department would get together with the agencies concerned, as outlined in paragraph 4-b of the reference memorandum on the subject. He said that his Department would prefer to see the language in paragraph 4 qualified by including a provision that only a limited number of such periodicals would be permitted to pass through our postal system to their ultimate addressees. Mr. Cutler pointed out that if the numbers of such periodicals increased greatly, and if they were construed to contain propaganda, they would be kept out under paragraph 4 as presently written. The Postmaster General responded that there would be no necessity for amending the paragraph along the lines suggested by him so long as the interpretation expressed by Mr. Cutler was understood by all parties concerned.

The President concluded the Council discussion on this subject with the statement that he was astonished that the Post Office Department couldn't lose these things and not say anything about it.

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5 A memorandum of the discussion at this meeting is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.
6 Arthur E. Summerfield.
The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the subject on the basis of the reference memorandum of March 29, 1955.

b. Agreed that:

(1) In the implementation of NSC Action No. 1114–b, the national security would not be adversely affected by permitting, in addition to the deliveries permitted under paragraph 3–b of the enclosure to the reference memorandum of March 29, delivery through the U.S. mails of imported Communist periodicals which are published primarily for consumption in Soviet bloc countries, provided they are not introduced into the United States for the purpose of being disseminated as “political propaganda” as defined in the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

(2) The Departments of the Treasury, Justice and the Post Office, in appropriate consultation with the Department of State and the U.S. Information Agency, should be governed by the action in (1) above in resolving problems arising in the implementation of NSC Action No. 1114–b and the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General and the Postmaster General for implementation, and to the Secretary of State and the Director, USIA, for information.

[Here follows the remainder of the memorandum.]

S. Everett Gleason

97. Editorial Note

From July 18 to 23, President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Eden, Premier Faure, and Premier Bulganin met in Geneva. Their discussions centered on disarmament and the German question, but there was some discussion of the desirability of expanding the exchange of people and information between East and West. Texts of four statements by President Eisenhower at the meeting, including one on July 22 on East-West contacts, are in Department of State Bulletin, August 1, 1955, pages 171–176. Further documentation on the formal sessions of the meeting, as well as delegation meetings and informal conversations between the Heads of Government, is in volume V, pages 361 ff.

On July 23, the Heads of Government issued a directive to their respective Foreign Ministers requesting that they continue discussion
of the issues raised at a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers scheduled at Geneva in the fall. (Department of State Bulletin, August 1, 1955, page 176)

On July 25, in a radio and television report to the American people on the results of the Geneva meeting, President Eisenhower made the following remarks about the issue of East-West contacts:

"In the matter of increasing contacts, many items were discussed. We talked about a freer flow of news across the Curtains of all kinds. We talked about the circulation of books, and particularly we talked about peaceful trade. But the subject that took most of our attention in this regard was the possibility of increased visits by the citizens of one country into the territory of another, doing this in such a way as to give each the fullest possible opportunity to learn about the people of the other nation. In this particular subject there was the greatest possible degree of agreement. As a matter of fact, it was agreement often repeated and enthusiastically supported by the words of the members of each side.

"As a matter of fact, each side assured the other earnestly and often that it intended to pursue a new spirit of conciliation and cooperation in its contacts with the other. Now, of course, we are profoundly hopeful that these assurances will be faithfully carried out." (Ibid., August 8, 1955, page 217)

98. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, September 20, 1955

SUBJECT
Views of Secretary Dulles on East-West Contacts

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Mr. Jackson
Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Stoessel

After expressing his deep appreciation to Mr. Jackson for agreeing to accept the difficult job of coordinating the United States position on East-West contacts for the Geneva Conference, the

1 Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential. Drafted by Stoessel.

2 For text of the Department of State press release of September 19 announcing William H. Jackson's appointment, effective that date, as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State "to coordinate within the U.S. Government the development of U.S. positions for phases of the Foreign Ministers meeting at Geneva pertaining to East-
Secretary said that he felt this whole subject was an extremely complicated one. He had the feeling that everyone wants to penetrate the Soviet Union, but no one wants the Soviet Union to penetrate us.

The Secretary said that we should keep very much in mind problems of reciprocity in connection with East-West contacts. For example, he noted that one of the proposals which had been advanced was to establish a USIA center in Moscow. This might be a fine idea in itself, but it would obviously cause the Soviets to request the establishment of a Soviet information center in the United States. The Secretary anticipated that we would have a very hard time with Congressional representatives and a large segment of the American people if we consented to the establishment of a Soviet propaganda mill in the U.S.

Furthermore, the Secretary observed that we are currently doing certain things with regard to the Soviets which might be difficult to alter. The Post Office stops Soviet publications from coming in and has warehouses full of such material. To reverse this practice might be difficult.

Mr. Stoessel mentioned, with regard to controls over Communist literature, that there are two bookstores in New York which act as agents for Soviet publications. These bookstores receive Soviet publications without hindrance and have available for distribution in this country some 500 Soviet newspapers and periodicals. The Secretary said he was interested to hear this and that it should be taken into account in our work on East-West contacts.

The Secretary said that some people talk about “eliminating the Soviet iron curtain” in a physical sense, i.e., to remove the actual barriers of barbed wire, watch towers, and so on. Again, this idea sounds appealing but might cause us some trouble. The Secretary recalled that he had talked recently with General Swing, of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, who had described in some detail our system of barbed wire barriers along the United States-Mexican border. In addition to these barriers, it appears that U.S. patrols send out bloodhounds to track down persons attempting to cross this border. The Secretary understood the Communists have made a movie about these American border controls and that we might have this situation thrown back at us if we raise a question about removal of Soviet border patrols.

The Secretary believed that we should concentrate on items in East-West contacts on which we are in a position to reciprocate. He

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West contacts and exchanges,” see Department of State Bulletin, October 3, 1955, p. 529.

*No record of this conversation has been found.*
thought that radio communications and circulation of newspapers fitted into this category. We do not jam Soviet radio broadcasts to this country and we give full publicity in our newspapers to all speeches made by Soviet leaders. It might be possible to accomplish something in this field, so that the peoples of both countries will know what the leaders of both countries are saying. In the present situation, there is a blackout in the Soviet Union of true news about the United States. The Soviet communications media distort the American position on major issues and the Soviet people have little choice but to believe these distortions. This is a dangerous situation which we should try to improve.

The Secretary recognized that there would be difficulties in discussing this subject with the Soviets. For one thing, the Soviets have a controlled press and we have an uncontrolled press. No doubt, our press prints many things about the Soviet Union which are distortions of the truth and which are unpalatable to the Soviet leaders. The Soviets could point to this fact and ask us to take steps to correct this situation in the U.S. This would have to be rejected of course, since the press in the U.S. is free to print what it wishes.

The Secretary said that one of the chief difficulties we are faced with is that information the Soviets wish to disseminate in this country is known to all in the United States. On the other hand, what we try to get across to the Soviet Union is known to very few people there. Even though we may think that we are reaching a considerable number of people in the Soviet Union through radio or other means, there is no way of proving this. The Secretary recalled that when he was in Moscow in 1947 he had been told that copies of the Russian language magazine Amerika were very rare and were sold at bootleg prices. This was because, the Secretary understood, the Soviet Government was buying up all copies of Amerika and very few copies were actually getting out to the people. This simply pointed up to him the task we have in insuring dissemination of our ideas in the Soviet Union.

On the subject of fingerprinting, the Secretary remarked that this was a question for action by Congress and that obviously we could not make any commitments one way or the other on it at Geneva. He thought we should look into the matter carefully and weigh the pros and cons of asking Congress to rescind the fingerprinting provision. For himself, he was not very sympathetic to changing the law. Many people here had objected to fingerprinting when it was first introduced but now they had grown used to it.

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4 Dulles was a member of the U.S. Delegation to the Fourth Session of the Council of Ministers held at Moscow, March 10-April 24, 1947.
In answer to Mr. Jackson’s question as to how the East-West contacts item had come up in discussions between the four powers, the Secretary said that at the opening session of the Heads of Government Conference in Geneva, each speaker had referred to the desirability of increased contacts and this subject was subsequently placed on the agenda for discussion. As it turned out, only President Eisenhower and Mr. Faure had made statements on East-West contacts. Mr. Eden and Mr. Bulganin had submitted statements which had not been read at the meeting. The Secretary’s impression was that the Soviets had emphasized trade and tourism in their opening remarks on the subject,⁵ but that there had been no discussion which went very deep into the whole question of East-West contacts.

With regard to handling of the East-West contacts item at the October meeting in Geneva, the Secretary thought that it would be best to have a sub-committee of experts designated to go to work on this item at the start of the meeting. They could prepare positions on this subject which could then be considered by the Foreign Ministers. The Secretary thought he might suggest this to Mr. Molotov when he saw him in New York.⁶ He believed that the directive of the Heads of State meeting provided for such a method of handling the question at Geneva.

In preparing our position, the Secretary felt it was important to coordinate with the British and French and not let them feel that they were being left out of any arrangements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. He recognized, however, that many of the specific projects which the U.S. wished to propose would be of a bilateral nature with the Soviet Union. The Secretary indicated agreement with Mr. MacArthur’s suggestion that the East-West contacts item be handled in a very general way with the Tripartite working group now meeting in Washington and that detailed discussion of it should be postponed until the working group meets in Paris immediately before the October conference.

⁵ See supra.
⁶ Dulles met with Molotov, Foreign Secretary Macmillan, and Foreign Minister Pinay in New York on September 27.
99. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State


SUBJECT

U.S. Views on East-West Contacts post-Geneva

Discussion:

Embassy London's telegram 2205 of November 29 (Tab A) reported United Kingdom thinking (as expressed by Paul Grey, Assistant Undersecretary in the Foreign Office and the British expert at Geneva on East-West contacts) with regard to follow-up action on East-West contacts during the post-Geneva period. The U.K. presently feels it would be well to let any follow-up "lie fallow" for a time in order to see what the Soviets may do during this pause. Mr. Grey thought, however, that the U.S. might wish to take bilateral action on specific items of interest to it. He asked for our thinking concerning East-West contacts.

The attached telegram (Tab B) (to be sent by pouch) for your approval replies to London's cable and states that we feel it would be advisable for the U.S. to initiate action with the Soviets on a bilateral basis regarding certain points included in the 17-point Western memorandum on East-West contacts submitted at Geneva on October 31 (Tab C). This would demonstrate that we were sincere in espousing these proposals and were not merely seeking propaganda effect. Our telegram would also go to Paris so that the views expressed therein could be discussed with the French.

Most of the points on which we recommend action would seem to be non-controversial and of advantage to the U.S. (book and publications exchanges, films, exhibits, reciprocal reduction in travel restrictions). A decision to move ahead on these is required, however. Certain policy questions arise in connection with exchanges of expert groups which should be decided before we proceed with the course of action outlined in the attached cable. These questions

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 511.60/12-2155. Secret. Drafted by Stoessel and concurred in by Stelle, MacKnight, Howe, MacArthur, and Hoover. A note on the source text reads: "I oppose this policy in the absence of a document from Intelligence agencies which clearly asserts U.S. advantage in proposed policy—SMcLeod". Another notation indicates that an undated letter from Cabell (Tab E) pertained to McLeod's dissent. Cabell's letter was not found attached to the source text.

2 Not found attached to the source text. (Ibid., 511.60/11-2955)

3 Not found.

4 Not found attached. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, November 14, 1955, pp. 778-779.
involve propaganda, intelligence and public relations issues. These issues must be dealt with whether we like it or not. They are being dealt with now on a piece-meal, ad hoc basis with all of the attendant risks of such an approach. This is not a satisfactory way to develop national policy.

As stated therein, we have already approached the Soviet Foreign Office with a suggestion that talks be instituted in Washington between representatives of the Department and of the Soviet Embassy to make plans for exchanges for a one-year period in various fields—for example, in agriculture and medicine. (Tab D reports Embassy Moscow’s approach on this subject.) 5 No answer has been received from the Soviets to this approach, and it may be that, as it appeared at Geneva, they will attempt to evade commitments for the careful planning of exchanges in advance on a basis of mutual advantage, but will try to conduct exchanges in the future on the present ad hoc basis.

It may be noted that the Soviets have already accepted our proposal on Amerika magazine and have taken the initiative recently in proposing student and professor exchanges, despite the lack of a positive Soviet stand on these points at Geneva. They have also made several new proposals for technical exchanges.

We believe exchanges will continue between the U.S. and the USSR. The latter wants to obtain technical know-how and propaganda benefits from exchanges. Many individuals in the United States are anxious to promote or take part in exchanges with the USSR. The latter group includes those who look hopefully at any sign of “peace”, those who believe in a sort of non-political “people’s diplomacy”, those who feel we will undermine the regime by exposing the people to Free World influences, and those, such as many scientists, who feel it essential that we have “contacts” in order to get to other specialists and show them the Free World is both unafraid and positively interested in mutual sharing of information. There are also those Americans interested in business dealings—both legitimate commercial enterprises and the promoter type. It would not appear advisable for us to attempt to bar further exchanges, since this would be incompatible with our stand favoring increased East-West contacts and would cut us off from obtaining intelligence benefits ourselves from exchanges. Also, we think more contact with the West will give Soviet officials a better understanding of Western realities and may help promote evolutionary trends in the USSR in the long run.

5 Telegram 1115 from Moscow, November 12, was not found attached. (Department of State, Central Files, 032/11-1255)
If exchanges are to continue, and they will whether we like it or not since passport controls are off and the Soviets are interested in sponsoring visits, it is important that we take the initiative in suggesting exchanges we want to see carried out, and in preparing careful plans for such projects. Therefore, we would propose to press the Soviets to accept our ideas on exchanges in the fields of agriculture and medicine, even if they do not seem inclined to respond to our initial approach. Moreover, we would wish to propose during the coming year a few additional exchanges in areas of high intelligence priority (for example, petroleum, transport, plastics). Groups would be small in size and publicity would be held to a minimum. The fingerprinting problem would not be a difficulty in such exchange, since incoming Soviet groups would be professional and capable of classification as official.

Action of this kind presupposes policy agreement on the following points:

1. The U.S. is interested in actively promoting a limited number of officially organized reciprocal exchanges of professional and technical groups with the USSR.  
2. Sufficient funds will be allocated to cover expenses of such exchanges. (We estimate roughly that at least $50,000 would be required during FY 1957 to cover expenses of translators, tour guides and incidentals if professional exchanges of the type we wish to propose to the Soviets are carried through. For expenses between now and July 1, 1956, we would continue to draw on the Department's confidential funds and on other agencies. The Soviets would pay basic travel and subsistence expenses of their groups, and U.S. groups would pay their own way.)
3. A special office will be established in the P area of the Department to handle East-West contacts. (EUR/EE has been dealing with exchanges to date, but is unable to cope with the growing workload involved while continuing to perform its regular functions. The question of a new office to handle contacts and the problem of providing funds for its operation is now before Mr. Henderson for consideration.)
4. The Department will support in the NSC a revised policy statement favoring a positive program of East-West exchanges.

Recommendation:

That you approve in principle the policy outlined above on East-West contacts, including the numbered points in the preceding paragraph, and that you sign the telegram (Tab B) giving our views on the program to be followed on East-West contacts in the future.  

6 There is no indication on the source text that the Secretary of State approved or disapproved the recommendation.
Memorandum From Robert Cutler to the Secretary of State


I am writing this memorandum to you in my capacity as a private citizen (though with perhaps a residue tinge of N.S.C.).

The Dean of Harvard University, McGeorge Bundy, spoke to me toward the end of January of a proposal which had been made to Professor Malia, while on a purchasing mission in the USSR, by a representative of the Soviet Ministry of Higher Education, for an exchange of a small number of scholars and students.

This proposal is well set forth in Dean Bundy’s memorandum and in the attached copy of a more full letter by Professor Malia.

The attitude of Harvard University is as follows. In the first place, it wishes to be guided by the policy of the United States in making any reply to the above mentioned proposal. Second, if the policy would permit acceptance, an acceptance which Harvard would be glad to explore, Harvard would agree to the exchange only if bona fide scholars were involved, but would limit its exchange to Harvard personnel of professorial or post-graduate grade (not undergraduate students).

In discussing this matter with . . . Dillon Anderson, it seems to me that the issue raised is covered by an existing NSC policy (I do not mention its number so as to avoid classifying this memorandum). Bob Bowie could easily bring the policy paper to your attention. The question at issue is whether the Department of State is willing to move under that policy, getting the necessary clearance from the Attorney General.

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 511.613/2-1056.
2 Cutler resigned on April 1, 1955, as the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.
3 Neither Bundy’s memorandum, which was enclosed with his brief letter of January 25 to Cutler, nor Professor Martin Malia’s letter of January 30, is printed.
4 Presumably a reference to NSC 5506/1, Document 94.
I have ventured to write you this personal memorandum because I find that my opinion, which is favorable to accept this proposal, is shared by Allen and Dillon. If the President had been available when I was here last Friday, I would have mentioned it to him, but I do not think in view of what I have written above that it is necessary to bother him. I feel sure that he would agree with the point of view which is just expressed.

In my opinion the U.S. has much more to gain from such an exchange than the USSR. Of course proper safeguards would necessarily be taken in accordance with usual practice. Therefore, I hope that you will find a moment to consider and give some determinative action on this matter.

The reason for taking such determinative action is that Harvard should make a reply one way or the other without more time intervening. The attached story from the January 25 issue of the *New York Herald Tribune* shows the unfavorable publicity attending too long delay in answering such USSR proposals.

Bobby

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5 February 3.
6 Attached to the source text was a memorandum of February 24 from Bowie to Hanes, to which Bowie had attached his memorandum of the previous day to Hoover expressing his view that student and professor exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union would be to the overall advantage of the United States. Also attached to the source text was the following memorandum for the files prepared by Robert G. Barnes and dated March 1:

"The Secretary expressed the view that in his opinion there are many factors both for and against proposals such as the one covered in the attached file. At the present time he indicated that he was against this proposal but this did not mean he would necessarily be against it in one, three or six months.

"Mr. Hanes has conveyed this information to both Mr. Beam and Mr. Stoessel with the request that Mr. Stoessel appropriately inform S/P. Mr. Hanes has also telephoned General Cutler to give him a summary of the Secretary's views. "In view of the equivocal nature of the decision it is suggested that this not be further disseminated."

7 Not printed.
101. **Paper Prepared in the Department of State** ¹

*Washington, June 6, 1956.*

**EAST-WEST EXCHANGES**

*General Considerations*

1. The basic strategy of the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc is:

   (1) To promote within Soviet Russia evolution toward a regime which will abandon predatory policies, which will seek to promote the aspirations of the Russian people rather than the global ambitions of International Communism and which will increasingly rest upon the consent of the governed rather than upon despotic police power.

   (2) As regards the European satellites we seek their evolution toward independence of Moscow.

2. For the first time since the end of World War II there are visible signs of progress along the lines we desire.

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¹ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, East-West Exchanges. Confidential. This paper was transmitted to NSC Executive Secretary Lay under cover of a memorandum of June 6 from Secretary of State Dulles, in which Dulles noted that since East-West exchanges were essentially a foreign policy program, “it is my belief that primary responsibility for it should be within the Department of State although it is obviously desirable that the views of other departments should be obtained.” Dulles’ memorandum and the attached Department of State paper were then distributed to the members of the National Security Council by Lay under cover of his memorandum of June 6. Lay indicated that the Department of State paper was being referred to the NSC Planning Board for study and recommendation prior to the Council’s consideration of it.

This paper superseded a previous Department of State paper on the subject, which Murphy had submitted to Dulles on April 10. The June 6 paper was an outgrowth of, and closely resembled, a draft paper prepared by Secretary of State Dulles on May 12, which he prefaced with the remark that he had read the previous papers on the subject and had gained the impression that “we are thinking too much in terms of detail and not enough in terms of broad policy and scope for the execution of that policy.” When the June 6 paper was presented to the NSC Planning Board for its consideration on June 7, Dillon Anderson stated that there was a “complicated history” of Operations Coordinating Board consideration of the subject of East-West exchanges, that “they had been working on a paper, but the members of the OCB who had been present at a recent meeting all agreed that it was desirable not to continue the OCB assignment when it became known that the Secretary of State himself had been thinking intensively on this subject for the past few weeks and that there had been prepared a document reflecting his thinking to be circulated to the Council.” (Notes on the Planning Board Discussion, June 7; ibid.)

The Secretary of State’s draft paper was also sent to President Eisenhower, for in a memorandum of May 30 to Under Secretary of State Hoover, Eisenhower said, “I have read the Secretary’s memorandum labelled ‘East-West Exchanges.’ I agree with him. I should like to see some start made by the interested agencies toward the implementation of the ideas suggested.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)
3. Within the Soviet Union there is increasing education and consequent demand for greater freedom of thought and expression; there is increasing demand for greater personal security than existed under Stalin’s police state and there is increasing demand for more consumer’s goods and better living conditions for the masses of people. The demands referred to must be considerable because the Soviet rulers judge it necessary to take drastic and hazardous measures to seem to meet them.

4. Within the satellite countries there has occurred a considerable demotion of those who were dedicated to the Stalin doctrine of iron discipline of Communists everywhere, with the Soviet Communist Party acting as the general staff of the world proletariat. The fact that “Titoism” is now regarded as respectable by the Soviet rulers, and that it is profitable to Tito, encourages those within the satellite countries, such as Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary to seek a greater degree of nationalism and independence of Moscow.

5. There has thus come about a condition which should lead the United States intensively to seek projects which would have impact within the Soviet bloc and encourage the liberal tendencies referred to.

6. At the Geneva meeting of Foreign Ministers, the three Western Powers submitted a well-rounded 17-point proposal which reflected the above thinking. This was rejected by the Soviet Union which, however, indicated that it might be prepared to develop East-West exchanges along the indicated lines on the basis of bilateral talks.

7. The problem of East-West exchanges should be considered in the foregoing context.

Policy Conclusions

8. Our foreign policies are necessarily defensive, so far as the use of force is concerned. But they can be offensive in terms of promoting a desire for greater freedom, well-being and security within the Soviet Union, and greater independence within the satellites. In other words, East-West exchanges should be an implementation of positive United States foreign policy.

9. The exchanges should in large part be initiated by the United States itself, and we should not be content with the negative or neutral position incident to passing upon Soviet initiatives, or the initiatives of private groups within the United States. Of course, Soviet initiatives should be accepted, and the private United States initiatives should be welcomed, whenever they advance United States policy or seem to be an acceptable and necessary price for
what will advance United States policy. But the Government should be thinking and planning imaginatively in this field.

10. One aspect of this matter which requires particular consideration is the impact of what we do upon third countries. In many cases, the United States can tolerate a type of exchange which to other countries would be poisonous. It is suggested that consideration should be given to explaining to third countries, on a confidential basis, the scope and purpose of our program and the precautions we would take, so that they will not misconstrue what we do as evidence that we believe that Soviet purposes have now become benign. This could be done, for example, as regards the American Republics at a meeting of the Ambassadors, such as we have had with increasing frequency in recent months. There could be similar expositions made on a selective basis with friendly countries of Africa and Asia. In this way, it could be made clear that what we do is a part of our policy designed to weaken International Communism, and that it is not either an acquiescence in Soviet policy or a recognition that Soviet motives have so changed that they are no longer to be feared.

Objectives

11. To increase the knowledge of the Soviet people as to the outer world so that their judgments will be based upon fact and not upon Communist fiction.

12. To encourage freedom of thought by bringing to the Soviet peoples challenging ideas and demonstrating to Soviet intellectuals the scope of intellectual freedom which is encouraged within the United States.

13. To stimulate the demand of Soviet citizens for greater personal security by bringing home to them the degree of personal security which is afforded by our constitutional and legal systems.

14. To stimulate their desire for more consumer's goods by bringing them to realize how rich are the fruits of free labor and how much they themselves could gain from a government which primarily sought their well-being and not conquest.

15. To stimulate nationalism within the satellite countries by reviving the historic traditions of these peoples and by suggesting the great benefits which can be derived from a courageous policy of defiance of Moscow such as Tito exhibited.

Courses of Action

16. The U.S. should employ as a program guide the 17-point proposal submitted at the Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting. (At-
Each proposal should be judged on its merits as contributing to the agreed objectives.

17. The U.S. should make clear as appropriate to third countries the scope and purpose of our programs.

2 See footnote 4, Document 99.

102. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the Members of the Council


SUBJECT

East-West Exchanges

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5427
B. NSC 5508/1
C. NSC 5602/1
D. NSC Action No. 1522-g
E. Statement of policy transmitted by Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 6, 1956

1. The NSC Planning Board (with the assistance of representatives of the Department of Justice, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security), after study of the statement of policy submitted by the Secretary of State as the Department of State position on the subject

1 Source: Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, East West Exchanges. Confidential. Copies were also sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

2 Regarding NSC 5427, “Restricting Diplomatic and Official Representatives of Soviet Bloc Countries in the United States in Connection With Strategic Intelligence,” July 19, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. VIII, footnote 9, p. 1246. NSC 5508/1 is printed as Document 94. NSC 5602/1, “Basic National Security Policy”, dated March 15, 1956, is not printed. NSC Action 1522–g requested the OCB and the Department of Justice to prepare a study of the factors involved in implementing paragraph 36 of NSC 5602/1. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95) Executive Secretary Lay’s memorandum to the Council of June 6 is not printed, but see footnote 1, supra.
(Reference E), concurs in the policy set forth therein and recommends:

a. That for clarification the statement of policy be amended as follows:

Para. 8. In the second sentence, insert "individual" between "greater" and "freedom".
Para. 10. Delete the words "It is suggested that" at the beginning of the third sentence.
Paras. 11, 12 and 13. Insert the words "and satellite" after the word "Soviet" wherever the latter appears in these paragraphs.
Para. 16. Revise to read as follows:

"16. The U.S. should take the initiative in East-West exchanges as a positive instrument of U.S. foreign policy, employing as a general guide the 17-point proposal (attached) as submitted at the Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting. Each proposal should be judged on its merits as contributing to the agreed objectives."

b. That the Council adopt the above-mentioned statement of policy, as amended, and submit it to the President with the recommendation that he approve it and (1) refer it to the Secretary of State for implementation in consultation with the Department of Justice and other departments, agencies and boards [as] appropriate; (2) direct that the Secretary of State and the Attorney General continue to cooperate in developing and applying appropriate internal security safeguards with respect to the admission of Soviet and satellite nationals to the United States.

2. The President has recommended to the Congress that the Immigration and Nationality Act be amended to permit the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to waive the requirement of fingerprinting of non-immigrants applying for visas to enter the United States temporarily. The Planning Board notes, as indicated in the attached letter from the Attorney General to the Secretary of State, that the failure of the Congress to approve such legislation at this session would materially impede the implementation in the months ahead of the above-mentioned statement of policy as it applies to exchanges of persons.

3. In addition to the above recommendations unanimously agreed upon by the Planning Board, the following proposed amendments of the above-mentioned statement of policy are submitted by individual Planning Board representatives:

a. The ODM Member with the concurrence of the Justice Observer recommends insertion of the following before the final

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3 See footnote 4, Document 99.
4 Dated June 13, not printed.
sentence of para. 9: "Administration of each proposed exchange program must therefore take into account the advantages sought against the acknowledged political dangers (abroad and at home) so as to secure a total net advantage to the United States from such contacts."

b. The ODM Member recommends insertion of the following as a new para. 11: "It is at least as important as the proper explanation of the meaning of this policy to third countries, to give a clear understanding of the way the American public could and should help to carry it out. There must be appropriate guidance as to the difference between the projected program of an American initiative in selected exchanges and in broader cultural contacts, on the one hand, and over-zealous friendliness to visitors who may in many cases be hostile agents."

c. The Defense Member with the concurrence of the ODM Member and the JCS Adviser recommends the following as a substitute for para. 10:

"10. One aspect of this matter which requires particular consideration is the impact of what we do upon third countries as well as upon military, political and economic cooperation among the countries of the free world. In many cases, the United States can tolerate a type of exchange which to other countries would be poisonous. Also, it is recognized that our embarking upon this policy may have a serious impact upon our capacity to maintain present military alliances and trade controls and involves taking a calculated risk of enhancing the spread of neutralism. To mitigate these effects as much as possible, we must exert constant and strenuous effort to convince third countries that our program is not to be construed as evidence that we believe that Soviet purposes have now become benign by:

(1) Explaining, on a confidential basis, the scope and purpose of our program and the precautions we would take. This should be done, for example, as regards the American Republics at a meeting of the Ambassadors, such as we have had with increasing frequency in recent months. It also should be particularly emphasized with the countries aligned with us in military alliances. There should be similar expositions made to friendly countries of Africa and Asia, and

(2) Constant public reiteration by top-level government spokesmen of the extent and nature of the substantive divisions that remain between the respective aims and objectives of ourselves and the Soviet Union and of the need for retaining maximum collective safeguards.

It must be made clear that what we do is a part of our policy designed to weaken International Communism, and that it is not either an acquiescence in Soviet policy or a recognition that Soviet motives have so changed that they are no longer to be feared."
4. The above-mentioned statement of policy, in the form in which it is finally adopted and approved, is intended to supersede NSC 5508/1. At a later date the Planning Board, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1522–g, will review NSC 5427, “Restricting Diplomatic and Official Representatives of Soviet Bloc Countries in the United States in Connection with Strategic Intelligence”.

James S. Lay, Jr. 

5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

103. Memorandum of Discussion at the 289th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 28, 1956

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and item 1, “Significant World Developments Affecting United States Security.”]

2. East-West Exchanges (NSC 5427; NSC 5508/1; NSC 5602/1; NSC Action No. 1522–g; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 6 and 19, 1956; Memo for All Holders of June 19 Memorandum, dated June 22, 1956) 

Mr. Anderson briefed the National Security Council on the contents of the draft statement of policy on the subject, and pointed out that, in addition to the usual membership, the Secretary of Commerce and Messrs. J. Edgar Hoover and J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman of the Council's internal security committees, had been invited to attend this Council meeting. (Copy of Mr. Anderson's brief filed in the minutes of the meeting.) At the conclusion of his briefing, Mr. Anderson suggested that the Secretary of State explain the philosophy behind the policy report.

Secretary Dulles said that this paper, as Mr. Anderson had pointed out, had come to the National Security Council by a somewhat unusual route. He himself had personally drafted the statement of policy, for the reason that the situation with regard to East-West exchanges had seemed to be hopelessly bogged down.


2 Lay's memorandum of June 22 has not been found. Regarding the other documents under reference, see supra and footnote 2 thereto.
The President had grown impatient, and had asked the Secretary of State to draft a new policy position on this subject.

The basic theory behind the new policy statement was that as this Government had hitherto been proceeding in the area of East-West exchanges its attitude had proved too passive and inert. All initiative in developing East-West contacts had been left either in the hands of the Soviets or in the hands of private American groups. This situation Secretary Dulles believed to be wrong, and he took the position that the U.S. Government should be thinking about what it wanted to do as a government, and not simply continue to act as a screen for private U.S. or Soviet proposals for increased East-West contacts. The President had evinced a very great interest in this matter at the Summit Conference at Geneva, and had maintained his interest ever since that time. Indeed, Mr. William Jackson had made a most thorough study of the problem of East-West contacts prior to the Summit meeting, and Mr. Jackson was of course present at the meeting today. As a result of Mr. Jackson’s studies, a program for U.S. initiatives in the area of East-West contacts had been presented to the Soviets at the Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting. The Soviets, however, had turned down the U.S. program because, they said, it promoted the kind of exchanges which would be valuable to the United States but not the kind of exchanges desired by the Soviet Union. While this had been the Soviet attitude at Geneva, there were now indications that their views were changing.

Secretary Dulles then pointed out that the 17-point program elaborated by Mr. Jackson was a very good illustration of the kind of exchanges which the United States felt would be advantageous. As for the Soviet view of East-West exchanges, they had two main objectives in mind—first, through these exchanges to gain technical information which would prove of value, and secondly, to set precedents with respect to exchanges which they could make valid for third countries and thus gain political advantages which they could not hope to gain from exchanges with the United States. There were many types of exchanges which might prove advantageous or tolerable to the United States which would be bad for third countries not sufficiently strong or sufficiently shrewd to resist Soviet machinations. In concluding his statement on the general philosophy of the new policy statement, Secretary Dulles said that it reflected his belief that the United States could and should assume the offensive in the area of East-West exchanges. If we did this we could present the Soviet Union with hard choices and sharp dilemmas that the Soviets will not like, rather than, as in the past, permitting the Soviets to confront the United States with such choices and dilemmas. While the United States would never take the
military offensive against the USSR, it should certainly be prepared to take the offensive in the area of East-West contacts.

As to the dangers to third countries of the U.S. example of encouraging exchanges with the Soviet Union, alluded to by Mr. Anderson and noted in the present policy paper, Secretary Dulles agreed that the United States would have to proceed here with very great care. As a basic precaution against a misunderstanding of U.S. motives and objectives in encouraging East-West contacts, Secretary Dulles said that he had suggested confidential explanations by the U.S. Government to other governments which might be pressured by the Soviets for exchanges which would not be to their advantage. For example, in explaining our policy to the other American Republics, we could quite easily make use of the vehicle of the Organization of American States (OAS). Conversations in this body would certainly minimize the risks of the weaker American Republics inviting exchanges with the Soviet Union and citing the example of the United States as a guide. With the countries of Asia and Africa, which might well prove to be the target of Soviet initiatives, we could explain our policy on exchanges with the Russians by means of bilateral conversations. Secretary Dulles admitted, however, that private conversations, whether bilateral or otherwise, would probably not wholly eliminate the risks that third countries might misunderstand our policy and as a result themselves become involved in unfortunate exchanges with the USSR. This was a risk which we should have to run. The theoretical test of the proposed exchanges between the U.S. and the USSR was whether or not, on balance, they proved advantageous to the United States. They might well do so by at long last providing the people of the Soviet Union with accurate knowledge of the kind of opportunities that existed in the United States for the ordinary run of citizens. Such knowledge might well stimulate pressures on the Soviet Government to confer on its people rights and advantages similar to those enjoyed by U.S. citizens. Such pressures generated in the Soviet Union would certainly begin to absorb the thoughts, plans and resources of the Soviet Government and, accordingly, minimize the amount of energy and resources which the Soviet Government could devote to its attack against the free world on other fronts.

Secretary Dulles emphasized that no policy directive in and by itself would provide a certain answer as to the advantages and disadvantages of each exchange proposal. Each such proposal should be weighed on its own merits, though, of course, we might be obliged to accept a specific disadvantage and pay a specific price in certain instances in order to secure an over-all net advantage for the United States in the exchange program. Success or failure of the program would depend on operations carried out under this new
policy paper. After all, no policy can do more than indicate broad
general principles, and Secretary Dulles believed that the present
report goes about as far as one could usefully go in setting forth the
criteria to govern East-West exchanges. Accordingly, it was now
time to “get going” on the new program. The United States was
already far behind the rest of the procession. Adoption of the new
policy paper would get us into the way of dealing with this problem
more intelligently and more expeditiously. If the policy did not
work, it could be changed in due course. Case law may in time
modify statute law, as it were.

At the conclusion of Secretary Dulles’ statement, Mr. Anderson
pointed out that the Council had not received the formal written
views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the proposed new policy, and
asked Admiral Radford if he would give orally the views of the Joint
Chiefs.

Admiral Radford then handed Mr. Anderson a copy of the
written views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He pointed out that
these written views were in agreement with the position on this
paper taken by the JCS Adviser on the NSC Planning Board when
the policy had been considered by the latter group. Furthermore,
the Joint Chiefs recommended that the Department of Defense be
represented along with the Departments of State and Justice in
responsibility for coordinating the implementation of the policy.
Apart from these matters, Admiral Radford indicated that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff were very worried indeed about the impact of this
new policy on our alliances unless we made crystal-clear to our allies
the objectives that we sought in taking this new initiative toward
expanding East-West contacts. Explanation by the U.S. Government
to other friendly governments was not in itself enough, because
these other governments would have to explain to their people why
it was perfectly safe for the United States to indulge in contacts with
the Soviet Union, whereas it might be dangerous for the country in
question to follow the U.S. example. Accordingly, Admiral Radford
believed that the Council should give careful consideration as to
how far we could go in coming out with a public explanation of the
basis for this new U.S. policy. If the 17-point program drawn up by
Mr. Jackson and set forth in the present paper as a guide was to be

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3 The views of the Joint Chiefs were contained in a memorandum of June 26 from
Radford to the Secretary of Defense, in which the revisions made by the NSC
Planning Board as noted in Lay’s memorandum of June 19 to the Council were
accepted, with the further revision proposed that the phrase, “Department of De-
fense” be inserted after the word “Justice” on page 2, subparagraph 1-b, fifth line of
Lay’s memorandum. A copy of Radford’s memorandum was distributed to the
members of the Council as an enclosure to Lay’s covering memorandum of June 28.
(Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, East-West Exchanges)

4 See footnote 1, Document 101.
applied as a package, that was one thing. If the 17-point program was to be applied separately, it was quite another thing. The Council should remember that the groups sent to the United States by the Soviet Union would all be hand-picked. The cards would be stacked against the United States because individual U.S. citizens would be free to visit the Soviet Union, although when they got there they would see only what the Soviet Union wanted them to see. Lastly, the U.S. Communist Party could be expected to encourage all kinds of American leftists to visit the Soviet Union. These people would come back, as had the scientific group lately, with reports all highly favorable to the Soviet Union. In conclusion, said Admiral Radford, the Joint Chiefs are prepared to admit the validity of the new policy proposed by the Secretary of State, but they were very worried as to the safeguards with which it would be carried out.

Mr. Anderson then called on Secretary of Commerce Weeks for his views on the policy. Secretary Weeks said he would address himself solely to those exchanges of personnel in which the Department of Commerce had a special interest. Thus, said Secretary Weeks, in exchanges of businessmen and industrialists the Department of Commerce was of the opinion that it should be given a formal role to play in the carrying out of the new policy. For example, the Department of Commerce should be consulted in advance as to the makeup of the teams of U.S. industrialists who were going to be sent on exchanges to the Soviet Union. The Department of Commerce was in a position to give good advice as to the membership of such teams, as well as advice as to what they should look for in the Soviet Union and what, in exchange, the Russians should see in the United States. Up to now, at any rate, the Department of Commerce had had no say in any of these matters.

Secretary Weeks then went on to comment on the impact of the export control legislation. The export control legislation circumscribed closely what it was legal for us to allow visiting Russians to see. For example, since our export control legislation forbade us to export radio tubes to the Soviet Union, it was obvious that it was contrary to the spirit of the legislation to permit visiting Russians to see radio tubes in the United States.

In conclusion, Secretary Weeks said he had a couple of specific recommendations to make in behalf of the Department of Commerce. First, if Russian teams were going to come to the United States, the United States should get a quid pro quo out of the visit. Admittedly the over-all policy on East-West exchanges was a responsibility of the Department of State, which developed our foreign policy. On the other hand, the substantive content of the exchanges was not in itself a foreign policy matter, and therefore Secretary Weeks hoped that whatever department was best able to give good
advice should have an opportunity to provide such advice. Certainly the Department of Commerce should be tied in more closely in all matters relating to what the Soviets were doing in the industrial field.

Mr. Anderson pointed out that the coordination of the implementation of U.S. policy with respect to East-West exchanges had in the past been confined to the Departments of State and Justice. Currently, however, and with respect to the new policy, the Planning Board was recommending to the Council not only that the Departments of State and Justice continue to be responsible for implementation, but had also added other departments, agencies and boards, as appropriate. Secretary Dulles said that he entirely concurred in the views just expressed by the Secretary of Commerce, and he believed that the Department of Commerce should be brought right in on the ground floor with respect to any exchanges of industrialists or other exchanges in which the views of the Commerce Department would be useful. Mr. Anderson went on to say that if the Council so desired, the Planning Board language could be amended to add specifically the Departments of Defense and Commerce to the implementing machinery if the more general language suggested by the Planning Board—namely, "other departments, agencies and boards, as appropriate"—was not deemed sufficient to cover the matter.

Secretary Dulles said he was inclined to doubt the wisdom of specifying any other department than the Department of Justice (and State) as constituting the coordinating group. After all, the Department of Justice, for obvious reasons, would be involved in each and every exchange between the U.S. and the USSR. Other departments and agencies of the Government would be brought in only when a given exchange proposal involved the specific responsibilities of that department or agency. The implementation of the proposed new policy would continue to be bogged down if the Council insisted on putting in as coordinating authorities every department of the Government which might conceivably have any interest in the exchange. Accordingly, the Secretary of State thought that the general language on implementation proposed by the Planning Board was quite acceptable. Proposals for adding other departments by name would probably have the result of stalling any offensive on the part of the United States to increase East-West exchanges. Secretary Dulles insisted that he did not look on the proposed new policy as forming the basis for a stalling operation but, rather, to permit us to assume the initiative.

The Acting Secretary of Defense asked permission to state his general philosophy with respect to the proposed new policy. Secretary Robertson then said that the recommendations of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, as earlier reported by Admiral Radford, had the hearty endorsement not only of the Service Secretaries, but of the Department of Defense as a whole, particularly with respect to the need to stress the effect on weaker third countries of initiative by the United States in the direction of increased East-West contacts. While he stated himself to be strongly in favor of taking the offensive in the field of East-West contacts, Secretary Robertson said he was very worried about the possible effects of the proposed new policy on such alliances as NATO and SEATO. Accordingly, he strongly recommended that the Council agree to accept the substitute paragraph 10 proposed by the Department of Defense. This Defense version of paragraph 10 simply made explicit and firm the possible danger to our military alliances and to the political and economic cooperation in the free world of the adoption of an increased program of East-West contacts by the United States. Moreover, while the Department of Defense did not wish to have a hand in setting up all the different exchanges which might be contemplated between the U.S. and the USSR, it did wish to have its voice heard in any exchange which involved the responsibilities of the Department of Defense.

Speaking sharply, the Secretary of State informed Secretary Robertson that the Department of State was, after all, charged with the responsibility for conducting the relations of the United States with its allies—NATO, SEATO, and all the others. Quite possibly the State Department conducted these relations badly, but it was nevertheless the fixed duty and responsibility of the State Department. Secretary Dulles assumed that the Department of Defense did not aspire to take over these duties of the Department of State. Secretary Robertson replied that the Defense Department certainly did not wish to take over any of the responsibilities of the State Department. Nevertheless the Defense Department had a very real interest, for example, in the relations between the United States and those foreign countries in which the United States had military bases.

The Vice President said that he thought the language which directed implementation of the policy was suitable and OK, and that Secretary Dulles, having heard the discussion at the present meeting, would certainly bear the different points of view in mind and would be certain to bring in the Department of Defense and the Department of Commerce when such a course of action was clearly indicated with reference to a specific exchange proposal. On the other hand, if, instead of the Departments of State and Justice, a

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5 See subparagraph 3–c, Document 102.
whole large board of officials was assigned the task of implementing the new policy, very little would ever get done under it.

Admiral Radford suggested certain new language which would indicate that the Department of Defense should be kept informed of all impending exchange proposals in order that the Department of Defense could be in a position to state its interest and concern over any given proposal. If it were not kept informed of all current and impending exchange proposals, the Department of Defense might never know when its interests were involved in any specific exchange proposal.

Secretary Dulles replied that this was certainly fair enough, and a very good suggestion. Indeed, all interested departments and agencies should be kept informed of impending exchange proposals so that they could assert their right to a voice in the matter. On the other hand, he could not approve of a large board made up of representatives of all the conceivably interested departments, where every one of these individuals would have to be heard on every single proposal, whether his department had any specific interest or responsibility for the proposal or not. Such a large implementing board would serve to diffuse responsibility to a point which would assure that nothing would happen under the new policy.

Secretary Weeks said he had one additional suggestion to make. These other departments should not merely be kept informed, but kept informed in such a way that they would be given an opportunity to provide advice to the Departments of State and Justice before a decision on any given exchange proposal had been made.

Secretary Dulles said he had no objection to this suggestion either, but he assumed that Secretary Weeks would not be particularly interested in a proposal for an exchange of musicians between the U.S. and the USSR. Secretary Weeks replied that he would have none whatsoever.

The Vice President commented that the discussion had certainly brought out what the Council wished to have done by way of a coordinating group. Mr. Anderson said that he would circulate appropriate language to indicate the Council’s wishes in this matter.

Mr. Anderson then invited the Council’s attention to the problems raised for the implementation of the proposed new policy on East-West exchanges by existing statutes, and most notably by the requirement that foreign nationals visiting the United States unofficially must be fingerprinted. He invited the comments of the Attorney General on these impediments.

The Attorney General first inquired whether the implementation mechanism just agreed to by the Council was designed to cover exchanges under all the seventeen points listed in the annex to the proposed new policy. He said he wished to be sure that this was the
case, and Secretary Dulles replied in the affirmative. The Attorney
General then went on to emphasize the two special concerns of the
Department of Justice with respect to the proposed new policy—
first, the problem of internal security posed by the admission of
more Soviet and satellite citizens; and secondly, the requirement in
the Immigration and Nationality Act for the fingerprinting of non-
immigrants applying for visas to enter the United States temporarily.
These two conditions, said the Attorney General, would pose prob-
lems in carrying out an expanded program of East-West contacts.
The fingerprinting problem would be particularly difficult, and the
Congress was unlikely to change the law requiring fingerprinting,
even though this move had been recommended by the President. 6
Accordingly, the Attorney General said that we would presently find
ourselves back in the familiar position of requiring the fingerprinting
of all non-official visitors to the United States.

Secretary Dulles explained that he had long been sympathetic
with the suggestion that the fingerprinting requirement be dropped
from existing law. His position, he said, did not derive from Soviet
criticism of the fingerprinting requirement, but from the complaints
of nations friendly to the United States. He also agreed that it was
extremely difficult to draw any real line between official and non-
official Soviet visitors. For the time being, our only recourse was to
try to persuade the Soviets to accept the fingerprinting requirement.

As for the internal security problem, which would be increased
under the proposed new policy, the Attorney General said the most
difficult aspect was the provision of effective monitoring of the
Soviet visitors under an exchange program. Obviously the Soviet
Government did use these delegations for its own particular pur-
poses—espionage and the like. Therefore it was essential that we
keep track of these people. The previous practice of selecting moni-
tors from outside the Government had not been successful. Many of
the monitors provided by private U.S. agencies failed on the job. In
the future, therefore, monitors of a given exchange must be chosen
from within the ranks of the Government. This was one reason why
the Department of Justice would have to have a hand in carrying
out the proposed new policy.

The Vice President then inquired whether the expansion of
East-West exchanges, as proposed in this policy statement, would
require additional funds for the Department of Justice to carry out
its responsibilities. The Attorney General said that additional funds

6 This was one of several proposals Eisenhower made in his annual message to
Congress, January 5; see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D.
Eisenhower, 1956, pp. 1–27.
would be required if there were any notable increase in Soviet and satellite visitors to the United States.

Mr. Anderson inquired whether Mr. J. Edgar Hoover wished to add anything to the statement just made by the Attorney General. Mr. Hoover said that he agreed with and, indeed, would like to emphasize what the Attorney General had said, and particularly his expression of concern about the internal security aspects of adopting this proposed new policy. He proceeded to cite a number of instances in which Soviet visitors to the United States had engaged in espionage activities in the course of the last six months. Mr. Hoover also stressed his belief that each proposed exchange should be scrutinized and judged on its merits. On the other hand, he agreed with the foreign policy objectives set forth by the Secretary of State as underlying the proposed new policy.

Referring to the Vice President's question about the need for additional funds for the Department of Justice, Director Brundage inquired of the Secretary of State how large a number of Soviet and satellite visitors could be expected when the proposed new policy began to be implemented. Would the increase in numbers be so large as to involve budgetary implications? Secretary Dulles replied that he doubted whether the number would be so large as to have severe budgetary implications. He certainly neither expected the United States to be flooded with Russian visitors nor the USSR with American visitors.

Mr. Anderson then asked Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, whether he wished to add anything. Mr. Yeagley expressed agreement with the views set forth previously by the Attorney General and the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference. He informed the Council that the internal security committees were now engaged in working out criteria for the successful implementation of the proposed new policy from the point of view of internal security. He did not believe that these new criteria would impair the effectiveness of the new policy.

Mr. Anderson then explained the editorial changes in the draft statement of policy unanimously recommended by the NSC Planning Board in the memorandum of June 19, 1956, to the National Security Council. The Council promptly agreed to accept these clarifications.

Mr. Anderson went on to deal with recommendations proposed by individual members of the Planning Board dealing with more substantive matters. He first described a proposal by the ODM member of the Planning Board, concurred in by the Justice observer, for the insertion of a new sentence at the end of paragraph 9, reading as follows:
"Administration of each proposed exchange program must therefore take into account the advantages sought against the acknowledged political dangers (abroad and at home) so as to secure a total net advantage to the United States from such contacts."

Mr. Anderson suggested that this language represented a somewhat more restricted approach to East-West exchanges, and that the ODM member strongly believed that each proposed exchange should be judged on its individual merit. Secretary Dulles wondered if this language was really necessary, in view of similar language in paragraph 16 of the present paper. The Attorney General also thought the proposed new language too restricted, even though his representative on the Planning Board had concurred in it. Mr. Cooley, representing the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, stated his willingness to drop the proposed amendment and to go along with the views of the Secretary of State.

Mr. Anderson then pointed out the next proposed amendment, proposed by the ODM member of the Planning Board as a new paragraph 11. The objective of this amendment was to call attention to the importance of a clear understanding of the new policy by the American public as well as by the peoples of third countries. There was included a warning against overzealous friendliness by U.S. citizens to visitors who might in many cases be hostile agents. Mr. Cooley explained that the ODM member of the Planning Board had in mind the need for guidance to U.S. hosts to Soviet visitors, especially visitors to important U.S. industrial plants.

The Vice President said he perfectly well understood the need to indoctrinate the American people as to the elements of danger in these exchanges, but he did not believe that it was necessary to include this matter in the statement of policy. Secretary Dulles said he also agreed strongly with the thought behind this proposed new paragraph, but concurred in the view of the Vice President that it was unnecessary to put such a warning in a policy paper. In general, it had not been the practice of the National Security Council to include implementation tactics in a policy statement. Accordingly, the proposal for a new paragraph 11 was rejected.

Mr. Anderson then invited the Council's attention to the important proposal by the Defense member of the Planning Board—concurred in by the ODM member and the JCS adviser—for a new version of the existing paragraph, designed to emphasize the dangers inherent in the new policy with respect to third countries and with respect to the military, political and economic cooperation of the countries of the free world. The proposed Defense paragraph 10 read as follows:

"10. One aspect of this matter which requires particular consideration is the impact of what we do upon third countries as well as
upon military, political and economic cooperation among the countries of the free world. In many cases, the United States can tolerate a type of exchange which to other countries would be poisonous. Also, it is recognized that our embarking upon this policy may have a serious impact upon our capacity to maintain present military alliances and trade controls and involves taking a calculated risk of enhancing the spread of neutralism. To mitigate these effects as much as possible, we must exert constant and strenuous effort to convince third countries that our program is not to be construed as evidence that we believe that Soviet purposes have now become benign by:

"(1) Explaining, on a confidential basis, the scope and purpose of our program and the precautions we would take. This should be done, for example, as regards the American Republics at a meeting of the Ambassadors, such as we have had with increasing frequency in recent months. It also should be particularly emphasized with the countries aligned with us in military alliances. There should be similar expositions made to friendly countries of Africa and Asia, and

"(2) Constant public reiteration by top-level government spokesmen of the extent and nature of the substantive divisions that remain between the respective aims and objectives of ourselves and the Soviet Union and of the need for retaining maximum collective safeguards.

"It must be made clear that what we do is a part of our policy designed to weaken International Communism, and that it is not either an acquiescence in Soviet policy or a recognition that Soviet motives have so changed that they are no longer to be feared."

After Mr. Anderson had read in its entirety the proposed substitute paragraph 10, Secretary Humphrey said that it sounded to him as though we were sending out a salesman and telling him every single word that he was to say to his prospective customers. If we cannot trust our salesman, we had better not send him out at all.

Secretary Dulles insisted that all that was really essential in the proposed new paragraph had been included in the original paragraph 10. He could see no need to include in this statement all the anxieties which we might have in adopting this new policy; nor was there any need to set forth in a policy paper an analysis of all the motives which underlay the new policy. If one was going to repeat, as the Department of Defense proposed, all the reasons against adopting a new policy, then it made equally good sense to set forth all the reasons in favor of adopting a new policy, the more so since it seemed to the Secretary of State that the National Security Council had virtually decided to adopt the proposed new policy.

Secretary Robertson pointed out that while the proposed new paragraph 10 seemed quite long when it had been read, actually there were only one or two sentences in addition to what had been stated in the original paragraph 10. Nevertheless, Secretary Robertson
thought these additional sentences were of very great significance. It
might be true that the Secretary of State and other members of the
Council would heed the warnings of the dangers in this new policy,
but at the working levels at which the policy would actually be
carried out, it was necessary to avoid a tendency to “soften up”. The
inclusion of the stronger warning language proposed by the Depart-
ment of Defense would serve to check any softening-up process.
Accordingly, Secretary Robertson stated his belief that the substitute
paragraph 10 proposed by the Defense Department was a distinct
improvement over the original paragraph 10.

Admiral Radford supported the views of Secretary Robertson,
and again emphasized his conviction of the need for a clear public
explanation of our objectives in adopting this new policy, as op-
posed to mere private conversations designed to explain our objec-
tives to third countries.

Secretary Humphrey said that it seemed to him that in this
matter the Council was trying to ride two horses. We all know that
there is a risk in the adoption of this proposed program for increas-
ing exchanges and contacts between the U.S. and the USSR. We had
known this at least since the time of the Geneva Summit Confer-
ence. Accordingly, we have simply got to weigh the advantages of
the new proposal as against its disadvantages, and make a clear
choice. He personally favored taking the risks which were inherent
in the new proposal. Admiral Radford invited Secretary Humphrey
to remember that the groups of people which the USSR would be
sending to the United States under the new policy, would be in
every sense controlled by the Soviet Government. Secretary Hum-
phrey said he was quite aware of that, but that nevertheless we were
still obliged to run the risk. There was certainly a chance that these
increased exchanges would have a real effect on the people of the
Soviet Union, and might play a real part in convincing the Soviets of
the errors of their system.

Admiral Radford said that all the same, adoption of this new
policy constituted a very great gamble for the United States. He then
went on to point out that if the U.S. Government restricted itself to
explaining to governments of third countries, on a strictly confiden-
tial basis, the true objectives of the United States in adopting a
policy of increased exchanges with the Soviet Union, the govern-
ments of these third countries would be unable to explain to their
citizens the true motives of the United States. As a result, there
would be a clamor in these third countries to admit Soviet visitors, with citations of the example set by the United States itself.

Secretary Dulles pointed out to Admiral Radford that confidential conversations with other governments was not the only possible avenue by which we could explain the objectives of this increased exchange program to the governments of third countries. . . . the State Department would make public statements explaining the new policy wherever it appropriately could.

Secretary Robertson stated that the objective of the Department of Defense in its substitute paragraph 10 was simply to state publicly that despite the increased contacts between the U.S. and the USSR, there remained major unresolved issues between the United States and the USSR. This was a useful warning to the free world and to our own people.

The Vice President commented that Defense and ODM, in supporting the new paragraph 10, were in effect simply seeking some public indoctrination as to the objectives of the new policy. As of the present time, we might all agree with the type of indoctrination proposed in paragraph 10. On the other hand, what we may wish to say publicly about these objectives would certainly be susceptible to change from time to time in the future. Moreover, continued the Vice President, those who are likely to make public statements about the objectives of this policy are, of course, the people who are gathered around the Council table this morning. If a clear understanding exists among these top spokesmen as to the risks and dangers of increased U.S.-USSR contacts, this was about all that we needed or could ask for. Secretary Dulles had certainly stressed these dangers in his speech at the Kiwanis convention. 7 It would be extremely difficult to set forth in this policy paper the precise line of indoctrination for the people of the United States and the free world.

Mr. William Jackson commented that if, in proposing its new paragraph 10, the Department of Defense was not really trying to change the proposed new policy but merely calling for a heightened public understanding of the policy, he could see no reason for not putting in a reference to educating the people of the United States into the present paragraph 17.

7 For text of Dulles’ address before the 41st annual convention of Kiwanis International in San Francisco on June 21, see Department of State Bulletin, July 2, 1956, pp. 3–7.
Admiral Radford professed himself still greatly worried about the probable inability of the governments of third countries effectively to explain to their people why the United States was showing a marked increase in its willingness to receive Soviet visitors and to send U.S. citizens to the Soviet Union. With some asperity, the Secretary of State informed Admiral Radford that the problem to which he had just referred was part and parcel of the daily routine of the Department of State. The problem of explanation of policy to the other governments was the responsibility each day of State Department officials. The State Department did not make a practice of telling the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Defense Department what kind of bombers, missiles or submarines to make. Accordingly, Secretary Dulles said he would appreciate it if the Department of Defense would trust the Department of State to exercise appropriately its functions and duties.

Secretary Humphrey expressed his agreement with the view just stated by Secretary Dulles, and again pointed out that we cannot avoid a certain risk if we adopt this policy. If the Council was not willing to take the risk, it should simply not adopt the new statement of policy.

Admiral Radford went on to express further concern as to the effect of adopting the proposed new policy, this time because of its possibly serious effect on our military alliances. Speaking with firmness, Admiral Radford expressed the opinion that the recent adoption by the National Security Council of a more liberal point of view with respect to the problem of East-West trade had been a mistake. Sir Anthony Eden had gone back to England and was playing fast and loose with the understanding he had reached with us in the matter of British trade with the Soviet bloc.

Secretary Dulles replied heatedly that if the National Security Council had made a mistake in its recent decisions in the matter of East-West trade, it was a mistake made not only by the Council but by the President of the United States. Secretary Dulles did not believe that it was appropriate to criticize the President.

At this point Mr. William Jackson again undertook briefly to summarize the basic philosophy upon which the proposed new policy rested. Secretary Humphrey pointed out that in effect the proposed new program of increased East-West exchanges marked a point of departure for a quite new U.S. policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The real question was whether we were going to go to war with the Soviet Union or whether we were going to live with them. Up to now we have been trying to do a little of both at one and the

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8 Reference is to a decision taken at the 282d meeting of the National Security Council on April 26.
same time. We can no longer do so, and are now called upon to make our choice. We cannot have our cake and eat it too.

Secretary Robertson pointed out that the Defense Department was in agreement that we must take the risks inherent in the adoption of this new policy. Nevertheless he stressed again that we should not leave out the necessity for a clear public statement or statements as to our objectives. He then asked whether the Council would be willing at least to accept the first three sentences of the Department of Defense version of paragraph 10 as designed to stress the nature of the risk we were taking.

The Vice President inquired whether there was objection to Secretary Robertson's request. Secretary Dulles commented that if embarking upon this new policy involved the risks which Defense wished to emphasize, it was equally true that refusal by the U.S. to embark on this policy might have very serious repercussions in the realm of foreign policy. The Vice President remarked that Secretary Robertson, so it seemed to him, merely wanted to add a *caveat* against going overboard with the new policy. He could at any rate see no objection to the inclusion of the first sentence of the Defense Department version of paragraph 10. Secretary Dulles said that he had no objection to the inclusion of this first sentence.

The Vice President observed that he shared personally much of the concern shown by the Department of Defense over the impact of this policy on our alliances and on political and economic cooperation among the countries of the free world. In fact, however, the Council was really beyond the point of arguing. The President had already indicated strongly his views in favor of taking the risk. Discussion by the Council this morning had been of value in informing those whose task it would be in the future to implement the new policy. It furthermore seemed to the Vice President that the inclusion of the first sentence of the Defense Department version of paragraph 10, combined with the Council discussion, provided adequate guidance to the Secretary of State in carrying out this policy.

The Secretary of State again said he had no objection to the inclusion of this sentence, and the Vice President asked Secretary Robertson if this satisfied the Defense Department. The Vice President went on to say that he sensed a basic disagreement between the Department of State and the Department of Defense. This disagreement had been thoroughly aired and discussed, and the Vice President believed that the Council could go no further. If it did, the paper would have to go to the President with a split view, and the President would almost certainly accept the language for paragraph 10 as set forth in the original version.

Secretary Robertson made one more effort to explain the Defense position. Secretary Humphrey likewise again pointed out that
the fact of the matter was that this Government was directly and significantly changing its policies toward the Soviet bloc, and that we should frankly recognize this important fact.

Secretary Dulles agreed with Secretary Humphrey, and said that the actual change in our policy had been made at Geneva in accordance with the President’s own decision. Under the Constitution of the United States we therefore had no other choice than to follow the President’s decision. If in point of fact the new policy on exchanges works badly, there will be ample opportunity to change it. We have by no means frozen our course. If the Department of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought at some future time that the new policy operated to our disadvantage, they should come and tell us so frankly, and we can work it out. There was always a forum for an appeal, and nothing catastrophic was going to happen as a result of the adoption of this new policy.

The National Security Council: 9

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject, submitted as the Department of State position and transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 6; the recommendations thereon by the NSC Planning Board, transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 19; and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as reported by the Chairman, JCS, at the meeting.

b. Adopted the draft statement of policy contained in the enclosure to the reference memorandum of June 6, subject to the following amendments:

(1) Paragraph 8, 2nd sentence: Insert the word “individual” between the words “greater” and “freedom”.

(2) Paragraph 10, 1st sentence: Revise to read as follows: “One aspect of this matter which requires particular consideration is the impact of what we do upon third countries as well as upon military, political and economic cooperation among the countries of the free world.”

(3) Paragraph 10, beginning of 3rd sentence: Delete the words “It is suggested that”.

(4) Paragraphs 11, 12 and 13: Insert the words “and satellite” after the word “Soviet” wherever the latter appears in these paragraphs.

(5) Paragraph 16: Revise to read as follows:

“16. The United States should take the initiative in East-West exchanges as a positive instrument of U.S. foreign policy, employing as a general guide the 17-point proposal (attached) as submitted at the Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting. Each proposal should be judged on its merits as contributing to the agreed objectives.”

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9 Paragraphs a–c constitute NSC Action No. 1577, as approved by the President on June 29. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)
c. Recommended that the President approve the draft statement of policy as amended by b above, and:

(1) Refer it to the Secretary of State for implementation in consultation with the Department of Justice and other departments, agencies and boards as appropriate; keeping the Departments of Defense and Commerce and, as appropriate, other interested departments, agencies and boards informed in advance of proposed East-West exchanges.

(2) Direct the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to continue to cooperate in developing and applying appropriate internal security safeguards with respect to the admission of Soviet and satellite nationals to the United States.

Note: The above-mentioned statement of policy, as amended and adopted and subsequently approved by the President, circulated as NSC 5607 for implementation in accordance with c above.

[Here follow items 3, “United States Civil Aviation Policy Toward the USSR and Its Satellites” and 4, “United States Objectives and Policies With Respect to the Near East.”]

S. Everett Gleason


NSC 5607

Washington, June 29, 1956.

STATEMENT OF POLICY ON EAST-WEST EXCHANGES

General Considerations

1. The basic strategy of the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc is:

a. To promote within Soviet Russia evolution toward a regime which will abandon predatory policies, which will seek to promote the aspirations of the Russian people rather than the global ambitions of International Communism, and which will increasingly rest upon the consent of the governed rather than upon despotic police power.

b. As regards the European satellites, we seek their evolution toward independence of Moscow.

1 Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, East-West Exchanges. Confidential. Circulated to the members of the Council as an enclosure to Lay’s memorandum of June 29, in which he noted the discussion and action taken at the 289th meeting of the Council on June 28; see supra.
2. For the first time since the end of World War II there are visible signs of progress along the lines we desire.

3. Within the Soviet Union there is increasing education and consequent demand for greater freedom of thought and expression; there is increasing demand for greater personal security than existed under Stalin’s police state, and there is increasing demand for more consumer’s goods and better living conditions for the masses of people. The demands referred to must be considerable because the Soviet rulers judge it necessary to take drastic and hazardous measures to seem to meet them.

4. Within the satellite countries there has occurred a considerable demotion of those who were dedicated to the Stalin doctrine of iron discipline of Communists everywhere, with the Soviet Communist Party acting as the general staff of the world proletariat. The fact that “Titoism” is now regarded as respectable by the Soviet rulers, and that it is profitable to Tito, encourages those within the satellite countries, such as Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, to seek a greater degree of nationalism and independence of Moscow.

5. There has thus come about a condition which should lead the United States intensively to seek projects which would have impact within the Soviet bloc and encourage the liberal tendencies referred to.

6. At the Geneva meeting of Foreign Ministers, the three Western Powers submitted a well-rounded 17-point proposal which reflected the above thinking. This was rejected by the Soviet Union which, however, indicated that it might be prepared to develop East-West exchanges along the indicated lines on the basis of bilateral talks.

7. The problem of East-West exchanges should be considered in the foregoing context.

Policy Conclusions

8. Our foreign policies are necessarily defensive, so far as the use of force is concerned. But they can be offensive in terms of promoting a desire for greater individual freedom, well-being and security within the Soviet Union, and greater independence within the satellites. In other words, East-West exchanges should be an implementation of positive United States foreign policy.

9. The exchanges should in large part be initiated by the United States itself, and we should not be content with the negative or neutral position incident to passing upon Soviet initiatives, or the initiatives of private groups within the United States. Of course, Soviet initiatives should be accepted, and the private U.S. initiatives should be welcomed, whenever they advance U.S. policy or seem to
be an acceptable and necessary price for what will advance U.S. policy. But the Government should be thinking and planning imaginatively in this field.

10. One aspect of this matter which requires particular consideration is the impact of what we do upon third countries as well as upon military, political and economic cooperation among the countries of the free world. In many cases, the United States can tolerate a type of exchange which to other countries would be poisonous. Consideration should be given to explaining to third countries, on a confidential basis, the scope and purpose of our program and the precautions we would take, so that they will not misconstrue what we do as evidence that we believe that Soviet purposes have now become benign. This could be done, for example, as regards the American Republics at a meeting of the Ambassadors, such as we have had with increasing frequency in recent months. There could be similar expositions made on a selective basis with friendly countries of Africa and Asia. In this way, it could be made clear that what we do is a part of our policy designed to weaken International Communism, and that it is not either an acquiescence in Soviet policy or a recognition that Soviet motives have so changed that they are no longer to be feared.

Objectives

11. To increase the knowledge of the Soviet and satellite people as to the outer world so that their judgments will be based upon fact and not upon Communist fiction.

12. To encourage freedom of thought by bringing to the Soviet and satellite peoples challenging ideas and demonstrating to Soviet and satellite intellectuals the scope of intellectual freedom which is encouraged within the United States.

13. To stimulate the demand of Soviet and satellite citizens for greater personal security by bringing home to them the degree of personal security which is afforded by our constitutional and legal systems.

14. To stimulate their desire for more consumer’s goods by bringing them to realize how rich are the fruits of free labor and how much they themselves could gain from a government which primarily sought their well-being and not conquest.

15. To stimulate nationalism within the satellite countries by reviving the historic traditions of these peoples and by suggesting the great benefits which can be derived from a courageous policy of defiance of Moscow such as Tito exhibited.
Courses of Action

16. The United States should take the initiative in East-West exchanges as a positive instrument of U.S. foreign policy, employing as a general guide the 17-point proposal (attached) as submitted at the Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting. Each proposal should be judged on its merits as contributing to the agreed objectives.

17. The United States should make clear as appropriate to third countries the scope and purpose of our programs.

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2 See footnote 4, Document 99.

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105. Report From the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force (Twining) to the President


SUBJECT

Visit of the U.S. Air delegation to the U.S.S.R., 23 June–1 July 1956

Purposes of the Visit

Our general purpose in going to the Soviet Union was to find out how far the Soviets were willing to go in exposing the equipment and activities of their Air Force and of their supporting establishments.

We also had in mind these four specific purposes:

1. To attempt to measure their current and potential air strength and degree of readiness for global war, to the extent that the

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1 Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series. Secret. Twining was 1 of 28 foreign military representatives invited to the Soviet annual air show. The invitation was apparently first made through the Soviet Military Attaché in Washington on or about May 25. At the Secretary of State's Staff meeting that day, Dulles said that he was “on the whole” in favor of Twining's accepting the invitation, since it could be part of the U.S. offensive to reach “our hidden allies” in the Soviet Union, those forces in the Soviet Union which, he said, “are going in the same direction as ourselves.” (Department of State, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75) President Eisenhower gave his approval to Twining's acceptance of the invitation in a conversation with Twining and others on May 28; see Document 47. Documentation on the planning for Twining's visit to the Soviet Union and the composition of the U.S. Delegation is ibid., Central File 711.5861.

2 A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "submitted to the President in meeting 5 July 56."
conditions imposed by our hosts would allow and against the background of our existing assessments.

2. To report on Soviet intentions concerning further visits of military personnel between the United States and the U.S.S.R., as well as the motives behind this particular invitation.

3. To appraise the reactions of other air delegations invited at the same time.

4. To make recommendations as to the advisability of future exchange visits of military representatives of the two countries, and also to consider the possible frame of reference within which such exchanges might be made.

Summary of Results and Conclusions

It was apparent that in showing us what they chose to show, the Soviet leaders felt that they were being fairly open-handed. Certainly by contrast with their previous habits of secrecy, they did let down the bars somewhat. In point of fact, however, they gave us much less information than is openly available to them about our own air force and defense preparations. Though cordial, their air force leaders were invariably unresponsive whenever we attempted to converse with them on serious professional lines. Neither I nor other members of my party succeeded in promoting a forthright exchange of views with anyone.

Such exposure of operational aircraft and prototypes as they elected to make was done under conditions that permitted us only cursory observation. (The aircraft and equipment that we saw are discussed in the attached tab. 3) The Soviets permitted close-up inspection only of those equipment items about which they had reason to suppose we already possessed rather complete information, or which had no important relationship to modern air combat capability; for example, their version of the Nene jet engine and one of their air transport plants, which is producing the IL–14.

With regard, therefore, to our first specific purpose—to measure at first hand their current and potential air strength and their degree of readiness for global war—we obtained no new information of significance. In fact, in the critical areas of long-range bomber production, defensive and offensive guided missile systems, and military applications of nuclear energy as well as the size, composition and location of operational forces and modern industrial installations, we encountered a blank wall. Nevertheless, the inspection of their aircraft and equipment, limited as it was, will enable us to refine some of our estimates of the quality and performance of Soviet air weapons. In this respect our trip was profitable. Further, the contacts with key Soviet military personalities permitted the

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3 The attachment, a 17-page "Preliminary Report" on the visit of the U.S. Delegation, is not printed.
members of the group to form some opinion as to their professional competence.

As to the Soviet air potential in the years ahead, our visit substantially strengthened previous assessments that the U.S.S.R. can reduce and is, in fact, progressively reducing the technological lead of the West generally and the United States in particular.

The factors supporting this judgment include (a) their emphasis on a thorough technical training of a large number of carefully selected personnel; (b) the variety of aircraft under development; (c) their ability to squeeze the maximum potential from a jet engine of Western origin and at the same time to develop powerful new engines on their own; and (d) the rapid rate of progress they have shown during the last few years in the research and development field.

Furthermore, given the heavy emphasis which they are placing upon the creation of a new technical generation, beginning with primary education and carrying through basic research and engineering development, we must reckon on the possibility of their achieving a scientific breakthrough and consequent technological surprise in new weapons.

Concerning our second specific purpose—to gauge Soviet intentions in the matter of future military visits, as well as their motives in our particular instance—these three points can be made:

1. Soviet officials at all levels repeatedly voiced the hope that our visit would be the first of a series of encounters leading to wider exchange of information. They plainly desire an early invitation to visit the United States.

2. The nature of the Soviet overtures definitely indicates a desire to establish a pattern for the exchange of military information on their terms as a counter to the U.S. proposal for aerial inspection, which they continue to reject.

3. Judging from the political and propaganda treatment given our visit, from the studied emphasis on defensive weapons displayed, and from statements made to us, the motives behind this first invitation were to further the general Soviet foreign policy line of reduction of armaments, and the lessening of international tensions, with the ultimate purpose of weakening the Free World’s alliance system.

Concerning our third specific purpose—to appraise the reaction of other delegations—the representatives of countries in the Soviet orbit, so far as we were in a position to judge, associated themselves with the general Soviet line. With regard to our allies, the representatives of the NATO nations appeared to look to the United States for leadership. Their outward attitude was, in effect, “You show us the way. We’ll follow.” The British delegation acted somewhat more
independently. We believe, however, that in general the members of the RAF delegation are in accord with our views.

Recommendation

I am not prepared, of course, to render advice concerning the numerous political factors that must be taken into account in measuring the desirability of future reciprocal military visits. From a military viewpoint, however, my judgment is that the Soviets would undoubtedly gain from visits to the United States useful knowledge of air techniques and equipment, while we on our side would gain only to the extent that they can be persuaded to raise the curtain around their military establishment on subsequent visits by us.

If, therefore, it should be the decision of the United States Government to adopt a policy of reciprocal military visits, I recommend that such visits be under the following conditions:

1. That they be started with a clear understanding that they will be on a trial basis, subject to a more convincing show of forthrightness on the part of the Soviet Union.
2. That their visits to the United States be under appropriate military supervision.
3. That such visits be carefully controlled with a view toward bringing our knowledge of the Soviet air position up to a level corresponding to their knowledge of ours.
4. That consideration be given to the advisability of widening any invitations that the U.S. might extend to include nations of our alliance system as well as Soviet satellites, rather than confining this to a bilateral arrangement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

(A more detailed narrative of the visit is attached.)

N.F. Twining
106. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Director of the East-West Contacts Staff (Merrill) and Adlai E. Stevenson, Washington, September 18, 1956, 9:30 a.m. 

SUBJECT

Invitation to Soviet Bloc to U.S. Election Campaign

I called by appointment on Governor Adlai E. Stevenson this morning at 9:30 in his suite at the Sheraton Park Hotel to give him a secret letter from Ambassador Lacy. This letter was for the purpose of informing him of the Department's proposal to invite two or three representatives of the Soviet bloc countries to come to the United States for a fifteen-day period in order to familiarize themselves with the two-party electoral process whereby the Chief Executive and members of Congress are chosen. No one else was present. Governor Stevenson read the letter with great care. I explained the advantages we consider can be derived from these invitations, whether accepted or not. He then became interested in the whole exchange program and asked me to describe the workings of the Immigration law and the part the fingerprinting requirement plays. This I did, and pointed out, inter alia, that the Soviet Government's refusal to permit their nationals to be fingerprinted was being used by them as a means to control the travel of their citizens to the United States. However, our Government had granted a number of special visas to those documented as officials, in instances wherein the visit was in our interest, and thus some sixty or so Soviet

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 511.603/9-1856. Secret. Drafted by Merrill. Copies were sent to various offices and bureaus in the Department of State, to Moscow, Warsaw, Prague, Paris, London, Bucharest, Budapest, and to the White House in care of Francis Williamson.

2 According to a memorandum of a telephone conversation between Secretary Dulles and President Eisenhower on August 29:

"The Sec. referred to East-West exchanges—there is an idea to invite the Soviet Satellite Governments to send representatives to witness our elections and see how a free election is conducted. If they do it we would have the right to send some there and contrast their elections. Everyone concerned is for it—but the reason the Sec. is clearing the matter with the Pres. is we may think it important to clear it with the Democrats. It will be done through the Heritage Foundation. The Pres. does not see how they can make a political football of it. He would not mind taking it up with Sam [Rayburn] and [Walter] George and he mentioned one other. We would have to approve, they agreed, their having visas. The Sec. mentioned he could mention it to George when he sees him this p.m." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations)

Eisenhower and Dulles also discussed this subject in a telephone conversation the morning of August 30. According to the memorandum of their conversation:

"The Sec. asked if he mentioned the project to George—the Pres. said yes, and G. thought it a good idea. The Sec. said he is intrigued with it—it will be good propaganda for us if they turn it down, as he expects them to. The Sec. thinks he will go ahead." (Ibid.)
citizens had actually come here this year to international congresses and as a result of exchange visits.

Governor Stevenson then asked me what were the negative aspects of the proposal. I said there seemed to be only two. One involved the possibility of demonstrations, particularly by citizens of Eastern European extraction, and the other the presumption that upon return home the visitors would report unfavorably on our electoral processes. I explained that the first objection could be avoided by careful planning of the itinerary. In the case of the second, our media outlets would be able to counter such reports, perhaps by playing back actual quotes made while here. In any case, it was hardly likely that the captive peoples, particularly in the satellites, would believe critical reports, which incidentally they would be getting from their own media anyway. He warned that in the closing stages of the campaign there might be a spate of extreme anti-communist statements by various candidates, which might be considered insulting by the guests. To my expression of belief that this campaign would not find communism a major issue, he replied Vice President Nixon was forcing it on him and that he was not too sanguine it would not become one. He added he himself had no intention of exacerbating the issue of communists in government. (These remarks were obviously prompted by the press conference he had held yesterday.)

I told Governor Stevenson that naturally Secretary Dulles and President Eisenhower had knowledge of and approved the idea of inviting the Soviet bloc representatives, and that as a matter of course it was thought desirable he also be apprised of it. In order that there might be no misunderstanding as to why, I said that the possibility had been considered that the arrival of Soviet bloc representatives in this country could become a partisan issue in the campaign. He said he did not think it would, and it was quite clear from the way he expressed himself that he for one would not criticize the administration in this respect. He did add, however, that certain local candidates with minority constituents might indulge themselves. Governor Stevenson then offered the opinion that the invitation was a "good idea", particularly as it gave both the opportunity to the communists to view free elections and also to us to ask for reciprocity. He said he would be very glad to receive the visiting delegations, but hoped it could be limited to one occasion in view of the great pressures he would be under at the closing stages of the campaign.

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3 Not found.
I said I would be in touch with Mr. Blair as regards the itinerary and arrangements for receiving the bloc visitors. I explained that an experienced tour director, possibly a retired Foreign Service Officer, would be in charge of the group and that travel and other arrangements would probably be made by the Government Affairs Institute which handles such matters for leadership grantees from other countries here for elections. Governor Stevenson appeared well satisfied and put the letter aside for safekeeping. The conversation ended at ten o'clock.

I am certain that he has approved the objectives under which we are tendering the invitations and will not seek partisan advantage therefrom.

4 William McCormick Blair, Jr., a member of Stevenson's staff.

107. Editorial Note

On September 28, the Department of State announced that it had recently issued invitations through its missions abroad to the Governments of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Romania to send representatives to the United States in October “to view at first hand the free electoral processes in this country.” The Department indicated that it assumed, on the basis of reciprocity, that Americans would be invited to view elections in their countries on the next appropriate occasion. For text of the announcement, as well as that of the formal invitation issued to these governments, see Department of State Bulletin, October 8, 1956, page 550.

In a note delivered to the United States Embassy in Moscow on September 29, the Soviet Government accepted the invitation and invited American representatives to visit the Soviet Union during the election of the Supreme Soviet. (Ibid., October 15, 1956, page 582) On October 20, the Department of State announced that, in addition to the Soviet Union, Romania had also accepted the invitation, but that Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary had declined. The Department also announced the composition of the Soviet Delegation, which was to arrive in New York on October 22, and the arrangements for its itinerary through October 27. (Ibid., October 29, 1956, pages 665–666) On October 24, the Department announced the composition of the Romanian delegation and its itinerary, beginning
with its arrival in New York that day and extending through October 27. *(Ibid., November 5, 1956, page 728)*

On November 6 President Eisenhower won reelection to a second term, defeating Adlai E. Stevenson in the electoral vote 457–74 and in the popular vote by more than 9 million votes.

According to a report prepared in the Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, the Soviet observers, in reporting their experiences after their return home following the election, "confined themselves strictly to Soviet propaganda stereotypes, although on departing they had praised the exchange as of value." The Romanian observers reported upon their return home that the things they had found in America had "strengthened our conviction in the superiority of our socialist democracy over bourgeois democracy." *(Department of State, INR Files, Soviet Affairs, December 1956)*

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108. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union**

*Washington, November 13, 1956—7:55 p.m.*

588. After consultation with the President, Dept has decided continuation of officially approved exchanges with USSR inappropriate in light of Sov behavior in Hungary and has therefore ordered immediate suspension. In accordance with President’s wishes, decision is not to be publicized since publicity may jeopardize President’s channel to Bulganin and may also scare off satellites, particularly Poland, with whom Dept hopes be able step up exchanges.

Dept plans following lines of action in implementing decision. On exchanges while continuing internal preparation for technical exchanges scheduled next year, Dept will make no approaches to Sovs while suspension in effect and will rebuff any Sovs initiatives.

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 511.60/11-1356. Confidential. Drafted by Toon; cleared with Freers, Blake, and Murphy; and approved for transmission by Lacy, who initialed it for Hoover. Repeated to London, Paris, Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, and Bucharest.

2 In the wake of the Soviet Union’s armed intervention in Hungary on November 5, President Eisenhower, in a meeting with Vice President Nixon and Under Secretary of State Hoover later that day declared that the United States should suspend the East-West exchange program and U.S. attendance at trade fairs and that U.S. officials should not attend the November 7 celebration in Moscow of the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. *(Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)*
On conference attendance, with exceptions conferences scheduled immediate future, Dept will advise sponsors of suspension of official exchanges and leave decision as to Sov participation to sponsors. Impresarios will be left decision on invitations to Sov cultural figures. On queries re private travel to USSR, Dept will refrain from counsel and simply advise no ban on such travel.

Dept has taken following specific action:

1. Suspended visit US mass feeding delegation to USSR scheduled Nov 15–30 and plan so inform SovEmb.
2. Informed SovEmb Dept unable arrange for attendance Sov specialists Automation Exhibition NYC Nov 26 (Embeltel 1126 Nov 8\(^3\)). Emb should return passports to FonOff with this explanation.

Only other conference scheduled for near future to which Sovs invited is ASME Conference NYC Nov 25–30. To be consistent with action on Automation Conf, Dept will advise sponsors of current attitude toward reciprocal exchanges with Sovs and urge they withdraw invitations. Other sponsors who may seek Dept’s advice on Sov attendance at future conferences will be simply informed of Dept’s policy on exchanges but will be told decision to invite is theirs.

FYI, Dept felt obliged authorize visas for Sov observers Seattle Fisheries Conference (Deptel 560 Nov 8\(^4\)) because of international nature conference and previous commitment to SovEmb to permit attendance.

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\(^3\) Telegram 1126 transmitted the Foreign Ministry's urgent request for visas to be issued to the Soviet specialists. (Department of State, Central Files, 511.60/11–856)

\(^4\) Telegram 560 briefly discussed the kinds of visas to be issued to the Soviet observers to the Fisheries Conference. (Ibid.)

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109. Editorial Note

At the Secretary of State’s Staff meeting on December 3, Secretary Dulles questioned whether the press should be informed of the suspension of the exchange program with the Soviet Union “because it carries the implication that our past decisions to have exchanges were taken in [the] Soviet interest.” He had no doubt that the exchanges should be suspended, since he felt that recent events had shown the United States probably had less to gain from them. Under
Secretary Hoover replied that the decision to suspend the exchanges had been made in discussion with the President following the Hungarian crisis and that it was to be a "temporary suspension pending clarification and a new evaluation of the situation." It was decided that in any discussion with the press on this subject, it should be emphasized that the suspension was temporary and "the inference should be avoided that our past policy of exchanges has been dictated by any desire to help the USSR at the expense of the U.S." (Department of State, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

Later that day, the following responses were given by a Department of State spokesman to questions raised about the possible suspension of East-West exchanges at the Department’s press briefing:

"Q. Have we suspended our exchange program with the Russians?

"A. Well, in view of recent developments, proposed Governmental exchanges with the Soviet Union have been suspended during a reappraisal of the program. This reappraisal is continuing.

"Q. When was the decision made?

"A. I don’t have any specific date. It has been some weeks.

"Q. How about the satellite countries?

"A. This does not apply to any other country in Eastern Europe.

"Q. Is the State Department doing anything to discourage private exchanges?

"A. Not to my knowledge.

"Q. You say it is due to recent developments. Do you mean particularly the Soviet intervention in Hungary?

"A. I think you could draw that conclusion.

"Q. The decision (to reappraise the policy) came after the Hungarian attack, didn’t it?

"A. Yes.

"Q. You are talking about proposed exchanges having been suspended.

"A. This applies to what is commonly known as ‘East-West Exchanges’ and this refers—as I have made clear—specifically to US-USSR exchanges.

"Q. Have we told the Soviet Governmental authorities to whom we have been proposing these exchanges, about our decision to suspend this program?

"A. That I do not know.

"Q. We have now decided not to participate in the (Moscow Trade) Fair, is that correct?

"A. That is right."

This exchange was quoted in telegram 675 to Moscow, December 4, in which the Department of State also noted that it planned to continue the East-West Contacts division. (Ibid., Central Files, 511.613/12-456)
110. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 28, 1957

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen
Ambassador William S.B. Lacy
EE—Messrs. Freers and Blake
P:EWC—Messrs. Merrill and Toon

Ambassador Bohlen was informed that the British Foreign Office favored a gradual and unobtrusive resumption of exchanges with the Soviet Union but wished its action be coordinated with that of the Department. While the Department had been considering for some time a lifting of the suspension, the matter had been brought to a head by the Soviet Embassy’s undated Aide-Mémoire handed to Mr. Beam January 24, 1957, in which the Department had been queried on its intentions with regard to several technical exchanges under discussion last fall. EE and EWC share the British view that exchanges with the U.S.S.R. should be resumed on a gradual basis; there remains the question of the method and timing of resumption.

Ambassador Bohlen was informed that American public opinion, (as reflected by recent polls), most editorial comment, and the views of American intellectual and scientific circles were in favor of resumption. It was the Ambassador’s view that if the American public would support exchanges with the Soviet Union, as appeared to be the case, then he would favor resumption as in the national interest. If there is general agreement to resume, the Ambassador felt no useful purpose would be served by linking resumption to Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe or to current Soviet attacks on the United States in the General Assembly. While it is desirable on appropriate occasions to combat the Soviet standard line on East-West exchanges by stressing our belief that exchanges can fruitfully take place only in a favorable political environment and cannot as the Soviets contend create such an atmosphere, the issue now is whether we should resume exchanges or not. If it is agreed that it is

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 511.613/1–2457. Confidential. Drafted by Toon on March 7. A typewritten notation on the source text reads: “Approved in substance by Ambassador Bohlen.”

2 Bohlen left Moscow on February 21 to return to the United States for consultation.

3 The British Foreign Office’s views on this matter were communicated to Merrill and Toon by the Counselor of the British Embassy in Washington, William Barker, on February 20. A memorandum of their conversation is in Department of State, Central File 541.613/2–2057.

4 Not found.
in the national interest to do so, we should not attempt to make resumption conditional on certain changes in Soviet behavior, notwithstanding the propaganda opportunities inherent in such an approach. He would recommend that no formal reply be made to the Soviet Aide-Mémoire; that, instead, the Soviet Embassy be permitted to deduce from the Department’s actions that the suspension was lifted. He would agree that a suitable first step would be for the Department to inform the Soviet Embassy that the American mass feeding delegation was now ready to return the visit of the Soviet group last fall.

The Ambassador was careful to point out that the policy should not be one of full scale resumption without qualification. He felt we should proceed cautiously in order not to find ourselves confronted with the necessity of a further suspension in the event, as is very possible, that Soviet behavior in Poland or increased anti-United States campaign would require such action. In short, he believed we should start very slowly and be guided in the development of a program for exchanges by future Soviet behavior and the state of our relations with the Soviet Union.

Ambassador Bohlen felt that although American cultural performances in the U.S.S.R. are useful in combating the Soviet charge that the U.S. is a cultural desert and personal contacts between scholars and scientists have merit, exchanges of technical delegations are the most beneficial to the United States. . . . Tourism he felt had little impact on Soviet society, and while he had no objection to controlled student exchanges he did not share the British estimate of potential gain in this field. Although there had been signs of recent student unrest in the Soviet Union, he was convinced that disaffection had not and would not reach such proportions as to represent a real threat to the Soviet social order. He did not feel that the Soviet regime would have to resort to coercive measures to cope with this problem. Because of the hunger of Soviet youth for education and its awareness that only through education could their status in Soviet society be improved, the threat of expulsion for non-conformism would be adequate.

As to cultural exchanges, the Ambassador felt the American position should rest not only on Soviet unwillingness to comply with the fingerprinting requirement but also on the hostility of American public opinion to the Soviet Union at the present time. By mentioning the latter, we would prepare the ground for official discouragement (for security or other reasons) of a large-scale Soviet cultural invasion in the event the fingerprinting requirement should be lifted at the current session of Congress.
111. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President

Washington, March 27, 1957.

SUBJECT

Resumption of US-USSR Exchanges

You will recall that officially sponsored exchanges of delegations between the United States and the USSR were discontinued last November. No initiative has been taken in that respect since that time, although the objectives of NSC 5607\(^2\) regarding exchanges with the USSR are now as pertinent as ever before. . . .

We have accordingly been giving consideration to a resumption of exchanges with the USSR some time this spring. We believe it would be natural and unobtrusive to resume exchanges with the Russians by claiming from them their reciprocal obligations to receive American mass feeding experts in the USSR this spring. Russian mass feeding experts (concerned with Army feeding techniques, disaster relief feeding, large institutional provisioning) visited the United States last fall; the reciprocal visit of the US experts to Russia was cancelled by our suspension of exchanges with the USSR.\(^3\)

During the coming seven or eight months, we propose to effect exchanges with the USSR in the fields of iron and steel technology, coal mining, peat mining, and public health. The British are also very much interested in resuming their exchange program with the USSR, for reasons similar to ours. You will recollect that this was discussed with Selwyn Lloyd at Bermuda.\(^4\)

On January 24 the Soviet Embassy handed us an Aide-Mémoire\(^5\) inquiring as to our plans regarding the exchanges under discussion with the Embassy last October. Subject to your approval, we would reply orally to the Soviet Aide-Mémoire to the effect that the United States is now prepared to send a mass feeding delegation to visit the Soviet Union.

I recommend that you authorize the Department of State, in the national interest, to resume gradually and carefully the series of

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\(^2\) Document 104.

\(^3\) Not further identified.

\(^4\) Reference is to a meeting between U.S. and U.K. officials at Bermuda on March 22 at 10:30 a.m.

\(^5\) See footnote 4, supra.
offically sponsored exchanges with the USSR in pursuance of the objectives of NSC 5607 and our intelligence needs.\(^6\)

\(^6\) The following notation in President Eisenhower's hand is in the margin of the source text; "O.K. provided we have bi-partisan info. DE"

In telegram 1079 to Moscow, April 4, and repeated to certain posts in Eastern Europe as well as London, Paris, Rome, Bonn, and Tokyo, the Department indicated it planned an "unobtrusive resumption" of exchanges of technical delegations with the Soviet Union and that it would orally notify the Soviet Embassy that it was ready to send the delegation of mass feeding experts to the Soviet Union. The Department indicated further that it was prepared to discuss details of other proposed exchanges, particularly those in the fields of public health administration and steel. It noted that permission had already been given for Soviet participation in several international conferences to be held in the United States during the spring, including the visit of six nuclear physicists to a conference in Rochester, New York, in April. (Department of State, Central Files, 511.60/4–457)

112. Report by the Operations Coordinating Board's Special Committee on Soviet and Related Problems\(^1\)

Washington, October 14, 1957.

REPORT ON PROPOSED GOVERNMENT PROGRAM FOR STUDENT EXCHANGE WITH SOVIET UNION AND OTHER COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE

Background:

1. Possible student exchange with the Soviet Union and other East European countries has been under active consideration ever since the Geneva Conference. One of the 17 proposals put forward by the three Western Foreign Ministers at Geneva on October 31, 1955, specifically called for exchange of students.\(^2\) And on June 29, 1956, the President approved the recommendation of the National Security Council that the U.S. should seek exchanges with the countries of Eastern Europe, including the USSR,\(^3\) along the lines of the 17-point proposal at Geneva.

\(^1\) Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, East-West Exchanges. Secret. Circulated to the members of the Board under cover of a memorandum of the same date from Staats, in which he noted that the report was to be considered by the Board at its October 16 meeting.

\(^2\) See footnote 4, Document 99.

\(^3\) Document 104.
2. Khrushchev "challenged" the U.S. to student exchange, mentioning a figure of 200, in talking to a group of U.S. tourists this summer.4 Also, the Soviet Foreign Office has taken the initiative in suggesting exchange of students as a topic for negotiations in the overall discussions on exchanges scheduled for late October.

3. U.S. fingerprinting requirements, which had previously frustrated any student exchanges with the Soviet bloc, have now been amended by Congress to permit waiver of these requirements for visits of less than 12 months, and the necessary implementing action has already been taken by the Secretary of State and the Attorney General.5 Favorable action is also expected on a policy paper now circulating in the State Department6 which would recommend to the Attorney General that he waive inadmissibility for Soviet bloc exchangees who are members of the Communist Party or affiliated organizations, since it is anticipated that the majority of the bloc exchangees will be members of such organizations.

4. Thus, at the present time there are at last indications that a modest student exchange program might be successfully arranged with the Soviet Union and other East European governments.

5. Two concrete projects to comprise a government-financed student exchange program with the Soviet Union and other East European countries have been submitted to the Special Committee on Soviet and Related Problems in order to achieve full interagency understanding of, and support for, the program. The two projects, both of which would be sponsored by the Department of State, are complementary, though somewhat different in scope.

6. The first project has been drawn up by the International Educational Exchange Service of the Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State, in conjunction with the East-West Contacts Staff. This project calls for an extension to Eastern Europe of the rather extensive program of educational exchange with friendly and neutral countries which has been underway for some years under the terms of Public Law 402.7 At present, the IES program for exchanges with friendly and neutral countries involves about 6,300

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4 Not further identified.
5 On October 10 the Department of State announced that the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, acting under authority conferred upon them by Section 8 of P.L. 316 of September 11, 1957, were authorizing the publication of regulations waiving the fingerprinting requirement in the case of most nonimmigrant aliens. For texts of the announcement and the new regulations, also dated October 10, see Department of State Bulletin, October 28, 1957, p. 682.
6 Not further identified.
7 Apparently an error in the source text, since no P.L. 402 enacted between 1945 and 1957 dealt with educational exchange. Presumably reference was to P.L. 584 amending the Surplus Property Act of 1944, otherwise known as the Fulbright Act, signed into law on August 1, 1946. (60 Stat. 754)
exchanges annually at a cost to the U.S. of around $26,000,000. Except for a small program recently launched with Yugoslavia, all IES exchanges have been with non-Communist countries.

7. Here is a brief summary of the IES project as submitted to the Special Committee. It is apparent that the plan calls for a pilot operation only. Moreover, details of the plan are quite tentative, and its administration must be quite flexible.

a. The total number of exchanges would be 114, including 44 students, 44 leaders and specialists in the field of education, 17 research scholars, and nine teachers. An effort will be made in administering the program to see that there is adequate representation of various fields of interest among the exchangees.

b. Twenty exchangees will come to the U.S. from the Soviet Union, 34 from Poland, 9 from Czechoslovakia, and 5 from Rumania. An equal number of Americans will go to each country, except that only 12 Americans are slated to go to Poland. The 20 Soviet exchangees would include 10 students, two research scholars, and eight leaders.

c. For Soviets coming to this country the U.S. would pay all expenses in the U.S. but not international travel expenses. For other foreigners, it is contemplated to pay international travel costs as well as expenses in the U.S.

d. It is contemplated that the U.S. will pay only international travel costs for Americans going to the Soviet Union, but all costs for Americans going to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania.

e. Students, teachers, and research scholars would be exchanged for a full academic year; leaders and specialists would visit for several months only.

f. Total cost of the 114 exchanges is estimated at $554,000. IES plans to ask Congress for a supplemental appropriation of this amount to be expended in FY 1958 and FY 1959, and hopes that a decision can be reached by April 1958, so that student, teacher, and research scholar exchanges can begin with the opening of the academic year in September 1958, and leader exchanges even earlier.

8. The United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange, in a recent report to the Secretary of State, has approved the IES project in principle. The Commission recognizes the program as a "modest one" but a "beginning." The Commission stresses the need for caution and flexibility, and "accepts the assurance of the Department that exchanges will be carried out only as it is determined that this can be done on the basis of reciprocity, as Congress intended, and with adequate provisions for sufficient freedom of movement and protection of the educational content of such exchanges as to warrant a reasonable expectation that the goals prescribed by Congress for these programs can be achieved."

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8 Not further identified.
9. Here is a brief summary of the second project, submitted by
the East-West Contacts Staff, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department
of State. The various aspects of this project, too, are quite tentative
at the present time.

a. This project differs from the IES project in that it involves
only students and only two countries, U.S. and USSR. Also, the
number of students to be exchanged is considerably greater and the
length of the visits much shorter.

b. During the summer of 1958, for a period of about six weeks,
100 American students would visit the Soviet Union and 100 Soviet
students would visit the United States.

c. It is contemplated that the travel costs of American students
to and from the Soviet Union would be paid for by the U.S.
Government, and that the expenses of the American students in the
Soviet Union would be borne by the Soviet Government.

d. [d.] To keep down the costs to the U.S. Government (and at
the same time to simplify the task of selecting Americans to visit the
Soviet Union) it is proposed that each American exchangee con-tribute
a sum in dollars which would defray the expenses of a Soviet
student during his stay in this country. (The contributions required
of the American students might be raised for some of them by
foundations, scholarship funds, church groups, labor unions, etc.)
The travel expenses of the Soviet students to and from the U.S.
would be paid for by the Soviet Government.

e. Travel costs to and from the Soviet Union for 100 Americans
are estimated at $100,000. A supplemental appropriation of this
amount would be requested from Congress in conjunction with the
IES request.

f. The Soviet visitors would probably go in groups of 20 to five
different universities which have, or would organize, appropriate
summer seminars.

g. In view of the nature of the project and the number of
persons involved, present security requirements for Soviet bloc visi-
tors, which put too much of a burden on the American hosts, would
have to be revised. Obviously, it would not be possible or desirable
to require individual surveillance over each Soviet student. It is
anticipated that most of the visitors would be handled in groups and
would be under constant observation of faculty advisers and the
student organizers of the project. The security dangers would appear
to be minimum. However, responsibility for security should rest
solely with the FBI.

Pros and Cons of the Proposed Projects

10. Disadvantages of launching any program of student exchanges
with Communist countries might include:

a. Soviet bloc students in this country might engage in espio-
nage or subversive activities. (However, it is more likely that the
bloc governments involved would prefer to put their best foot
forward and avoid the possibility of a display of bad faith. Further-
more, it is questionable that bloc governments would find use of
exchangees for these purposes worthwhile. It is expected that any such activities could be controlled by our security organs.)

b. The bloc governments might seek to subvert American students abroad. Also, American students, because they are often less mature politically and in other ways than many foreign students, might, through their immaturity, reflect adversely upon the U.S. (It is contemplated that the selection process would ensure that the U.S. participants be representative of the best of American youth and thus would reduce these risks to a minimum.)

c. In addition, there will be some public opposition to the exchanges in this country as unwarranted burdens on the taxpayers or as an unnecessary display of willingness to cooperate with, and lend prestige to, Communist regimes. (On the other hand, broad public support for the principle of student exchange with Communist countries has already been manifest. The current intellectual ferment and interest in new ideas among Soviet bloc students is fairly well known to the American public, and it is clear that student exchange is one of the few steps which the U.S. can take to further directly its program of promoting peaceful change in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries.)

d. There may be opposition to the proposed projects from some quarters on the grounds that they are too modest, too small-scale, to meet the needs of the times. (Both projects are in the nature of pilot operations for the first year, and could be expanded considerably if this should prove desirable on the basis of actual experience.)

e. Another disadvantage might be that other countries more susceptible to Communist penetration than the U.S. would be influenced by the U.S. example and initiate or increase their own exchange programs with bloc countries, to the overall detriment of the Free World cause. (It is true, however, that extensive exchanges are already underway in many countries, and it is hoped that the example set by the U.S. of careful organization of exchange programs and careful selection of exchangees will have a beneficial effect.)

11. **The advantages** of the proposed projects would include:

   a. Exposure for even six weeks to American life could be expected to widen the intellectual horizon of Soviet bloc students, at least to some extent, and to suggest new ways of thinking, which Communist education has sedulously withheld from them.

   b. The returning Soviet bloc students could be expected to share, to a degree consistent with personal security, their experience in the U.S. with many fellow students who have had no contact with the U.S. and thereby help to correct misconceptions about this country which their governments encourage.

   c. The returning Soviet bloc students could be expected to act as a leaven in their society, working in the direction of a decrease in tension between the Soviet bloc and the West. Thus, as a more immediate result, they could be expected to increase pressure within their society for wider contacts outside the Sino-Soviet bloc, and in the long run to encourage evolutionary change in the Soviet system.

   d. The American students in the Soviet bloc could be expected to help spread among the people a first-hand knowledge of the
outside world, particularly of the U.S. A good example of this process at work was seen in the impact of foreign visitors on Soviet young people at the recent Moscow youth festival. 9

e. Their experience would encourage many to pursue studies of the Russian language, of Communism and of the USSR and perhaps to increase ultimately the pool of U.S. specialists in those areas of knowledge.

f. The returning American students could be expected in themselves and through their influence among other Americans to increase popular American recognition of problems of American foreign relations, particularly with the Soviet bloc.

g. Soviet acceptance of the proposal would make it possible to achieve the advantages described above. Soviet rejection would bring with it a loss of prestige among the peoples of the world, including those within the Soviet bloc and in the "uncommitted areas" of the world.

Recommendation:

12. The Special Committee on Soviet and Related Problems finds that the program for student and educational exchanges with the USSR and other countries of Eastern Europe set forth in the two projects proposed by the International Exchange Service and the East-West Contacts Staff of the Department of State, and outlined in paragraphs 7 and 9 above, is a logical, timely, and highly desirable first step in the right direction and recommends that the OCB concur in this finding.

9 The Sixth World Festival of Youth and Students held in Moscow, July 28–August 11, the results of which are analyzed in Soviet Affairs, September 1957, pp. 11–13. (Department of State, INR Files, Soviet Affairs)
113. Notes on the Meeting of the Operations Coordinating Board, October 16, 1957


Report on Proposed Government Program for Student Exchange with Soviet Union and Other Countries of Eastern Europe

Mr. Lacy (S/EWC), Mr. Kendrick (EE), Mr. Merrill (P/EWC) and Mr. Wyman (P/IES) were present for the discussion.

In his briefing for the Board Mr. Lacy stated that talks with the USSR were now scheduled to begin in Washington on October 28. He summarized U.S.-USSR exchanges for the past few years and noted several of the disadvantages arising from legislative and Department of Justice requirements. It was pointed out that NSC 5607 charges the Department with its implementation in conjunction with the Department of Justice, and that both Departments were directed to develop and apply internal security safeguards. Mr. Lacy stated the present system, which requires that the Department secure sponsors for Soviet bloc visitors, has been burdensome and disliked by American schools and individuals who have undertaken to act in this capacity.

The exchange proposals were presented to the Board. In one, the U.S. and USSR would exchange 100 students for a period of six weeks in the summer of 1958 or later at a cost of about $100,000. The second proposal was for a U.S.-Soviet European bloc exchange of 114 persons, students and teachers for one year, leaders and specialists for six months. The latter program would cost about $550,000. It was generally agreed that the objectives of both programs accord with NSC policy. Mr. Larson stated his conviction that a six-week program is much too short to be effective and suggested that anything less than a year is inadequate.

Under Secretary Herter pointed out that NSC policy requires the U.S. to take the initiative in such exchanges as a positive instrument of U.S. foreign policy. Since the U.S. negotiators in the coming talks must know the boundaries of their authority, particularly with regard to internal security requirements, he said that the present State and Justice positions would be discussed at the Cabinet meeting next week.

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1 Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, East-West Exchanges. Secret. The source text was taken from Richards' memorandum of October 16 to Lacy, in which he made the following prefatory remark: "For your information there is quoted below an excerpt from my preliminary and informal notes on the OCB meeting of October 16, 1957."

2 Supra.

3 Document 104.
During the discussion of the financing of such programs, it was agreed that no attempt should be made to seek funds or supplemental appropriation for FY '58. Without excluding the possibility of some funds being found within the FY '58 exchange program, it was thought best that East-West programs should be presented as part of FY '59. Mr. Macy of the Budget Bureau said that he expects that in the coming election year there will be quicker Congressional action on budget requests.

Mr. John Reilly (Justice) said that he was under instructions from the Attorney General to say that the FBI could not take on the job of surveillance. He also said that it was the view in Justice that there were provisions in the Immigration and Naturalization Act which might preclude group or category waivers.

It was agreed that any East-West program should begin modestly; that the exchanges should embrace not only the USSR but the European Soviet bloc; and that flexibility in approach should be maintained.

Later, the Under Secretary said that some formal action would be required by agreement between the Secretary and the Attorney General or, failing this, a determination by the President, as regards the surveillance and waiver aspects of the exchanges. The Under Secretary asked that Mr. Lacy study this matter to determine precisely the position which should be adopted by the Secretary at the coming Cabinet meeting; also, that Mr. Lacy should set up a briefing of the Secretary on this subject. The advice of L should be sought as regards the interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act, especially with reference to the proposed approval of group or category waivers.

*Cutler prepared a memorandum for the record regarding this discussion at the OCB meeting and sent it to Secretary Dulles as an attachment to a letter dated October 16. In the memorandum Cutler stated that the President apparently had forgotten that the security regulations governing exchanges had been discussed by the National Security Council the previous year, and that Cutler believed that it was preferable to continue discussion of the issue, if the Secretary of State and the Attorney General could not reach agreement, at the NSC rather than the Cabinet level. In a covering letter, Cutler wrote that the Attorney General had indicated there had been no discussion with the Secretary of State since the previous year about the regulations. Cutler suggested that Dulles and Brownell meet to work out revisions in the regulations and only if they were unsuccessful would Cutler schedule the issue for discussion at the NSC meeting of October 24. (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, East-West Exchanges) No record of further discussion of this issue by Brownell and Dulles has been found, but they presumably were able to agree on revisions in the legislation since the subject was not scheduled for discussion at the October 24 meeting of the NSC or any subsequent meetings during 1957.*
114. Editorial Note

On October 28, the first meeting was held in Washington between a Soviet Delegation, headed by Ambassador Georgi N. Zaroubin, and a United States Delegation, headed by Ambassador William S.B. Lacy, on the question of technical, scientific, and cultural exchanges. The opening statements made by Lacy and Zaroubin at this meeting are printed in Department of State Bulletin, November 18, 1957, pages 880–883. The proceedings of the meeting and the proposals submitted by the two sides were summarized in telegram 491 to Moscow, October 28. (Department of State, Central Files, 511.603/10–2857)

Subsequent meetings were held on November 4, 8, 12, 14, and 21. The proceedings at these meetings were summarized in telegrams 526, 537, 547, 551, and 574, respectively, to Moscow, all of which are ibid., Central File 511.603.

The negotiations were discussed at the Secretary of State’s Staff meeting on November 26, at which Under Secretary of State Dillon presided. According to the notes of the meeting:

“In reply to the Under Secretary’s comment on the rapid progress of the exchange negotiations with the Soviets, Mr. Lacy stated that a slowdown of the negotiations was planned. He indicated that the Soviets were eager to obtain the rights for a direct flight over the Pole to the US, whereas we were desirous of obtaining a satisfactory agreement on radio-TV exchanges. Despite the considerable area of agreement there was some doubt in Mr. Lacy’s mind as to how faithfully these agreements would be carried out. He felt that we held an unusual advantage in these negotiations since we agreed in principle ad referendum to the appropriate American industry or association which would bear the final responsibility for the support of these exchanges. In response to a query from the Under Secretary, Mr. Lacy said that the negotiations on security regulations were going well and he assured the Under Secretary that he was fully aware of the necessity to refer this matter to the Department of Justice for its concurrence.” (Ibid., Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

Another meeting was held on December 4, which was described in telegram 612 to Moscow, December 4. (Ibid., Central Files, 511.603/12–457) According to the notes of the Secretary of State’s Staff meeting of December 10, Ambassador Lacy reported that the talks “had slowed down to a crawl in order that they could be protracted. Fifty separate exchanges have been discussed, half introduced by the Russians and half by us. About twenty-five have been agreed, generally in the ratio of one to one. The outstanding item the Russians want is the right for direct airlifts to the US while the outstanding item we want is the right to present American TV
and radio shows to the Russian people. Mr. Lacy believes that the Russians will accept part of our radio and TV offer in the hope that we will agree to discuss direct airflights. It appears that it may be possible to negotiate an improvement concerning the free admissibility of films to the Soviet Union and improved circulation methods for the magazines *Amerika* and *USSR*. Mr. Lacy noted that there was certain subterranean propaganda from the Soviet side about the progress of the talks. In some instances the Russians had indicated that the talks were progressing satisfactorily, while in other cases they were reported as being dissatisfied with the progress being made.” (Ibid., Secretary Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)