The Soviet Union

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION

1. Editorial Note

On January 3, 1955, the Department of State announced that the United States Government had extended existing travel regulations "for Soviet citizens stationed in the United States to include all Soviet citizens in possession of valid Soviet passports other than Soviet citizen officers and employees of the U.N. Secretariat while their conduct is a responsibility of the Secretary-General of the United Nations." The regulations established closed areas in the United States comparable to those closed to travel by Americans and other foreigners in the Soviet Union. For texts of the announcement and the note presented on January 3 to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, along with five enclosures specifying the areas closed to Soviet citizens, see Department of State Bulletin, January 31, 1955, pages 193–197.

On January 19, the Department of State announced the institution of regulations governing photography and sketching in the United States by Soviet citizens, which the Department said were comparable to those the Soviet Union instituted on February 11, 1954, regarding photography and sketching by foreign citizens in the Soviet Union. For texts of this announcement, and the note presented that day by the Department to the Soviet Embassy, see ibid., pages 198–199.


[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

At the beginning of the meeting of the National Security Council, Mr. Cutler passed out copies of an analysis indicating the greatly increased number of meetings of the NSC and of actions taken by the Council in the Eisenhower Administration as compared to its predecessor. Mr. Cutler observed that this was an indication that "the workman is worthy of his hire" and was proof of how hard the Council had worked for President Eisenhower. He said, however, that the Secretary of State had commented on this analysis by stating that a quantitative study of the National Security Council threw no light on the quality of its membership and their actions. Amidst laughter, the President turned to Secretary Dulles and said, what you mean is that this analysis merely shows that we are now more verbose. (More laughter.)

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

The Director of Central Intelligence first pointed out to the Council stresses and strains which had recently become visible in the Moscow scene. There was now occurring the largest call-back of Soviet Ambassadors abroad to Moscow since the death of Stalin. This would indicate quite a diplomatic pow-wow. To judge from their identities, the Ambassadors would probably concentrate their discussion on the London-Paris pacts and West German rearmament. They might also discuss the situation with respect to Formosa and the Pacific, but they had been summoned to Moscow prior to the issuance of the President's statement to the Congress respecting Formosa.

Another significant fact regarding developments in the Soviet Union was the summoning into session of the Supreme Soviet early in February, a full month ahead of the normal time when that body convened. Significance might be attached to this fact despite the rubber-stamp quality of the Supreme Soviet.

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3 For text of this message, transmitted by the President on January 24, see Department of State Bulletin, February 7, 1955, pp. 211–213.
In addition, continued Mr. Dulles, there still was considerable publicity in Pravda and Izvestia regarding the degree of emphasis to be placed by the Soviet Government on increasing the production of consumers goods, as opposed to emphasis on heavy industry.

Discussing the content of some of this publicity, Mr. Dulles pointed out that Pravda had been plugging heavy industry, whereas until recently Izvestia had championed greater production of consumers goods. This had now ceased, and the Pravda line had apparently won out. In connection with this victory it was possible to attach some significance to the removal of Mikoyan as Minister of Internal Trade of the USSR. While there were no indications that Mikoyan had been purged or otherwise disgraced, his removal from his trade post could be an indication that the role of heavy industry was again coming to the fore in the Soviet Union to the disadvantage of the recent emphasis on the production of consumers goods.

A final straw in the wind was the restoration to grace of Andreyev, an old Bolshevik who had been in discard for some considerable time. It was possible to interpret his reappearance in authority as a sop to Malenkov and a slap at Khrushchev. In any case, concluded Mr. Dulles, all these indications may point to a return by the Soviet Union to a harsher line, as opposed to the recent stress on co-existence and a “soft” policy.

[Here follow discussion of the political situation in Iran, relations between Burma and mainland China, and the situation regarding the Chinese offshore islands, and a briefing by Admiral Radford on recent United States military moves in the Formosa area.]

2. Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities (NSC 5505; Annex to NSC 5505; NSC 5501, par. 26-c; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 26, 1955) 6

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council at very great length and in very great detail with respect to the reference report, reading verbatim

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4 Mikoyan’s resignation as Soviet Minister of Trade was announced on January 25. He retained his position as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers.
5 A.A. Andreyev had been deposed from the Politburo in 1952.
6 NSC 5505, “Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities,” January 18, is not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5505 Series) NSC 5505 is essentially the same, with some minor revisions, as NSC 5505/1, Document 4.
NSC 5501, “Basic National Security Policy,” dated Jan. 6, 1955, is scheduled for publication in volume XIX.
Lay’s memorandum of January 26 transmitted to the Council a copy of Radford’s memorandum of January 25 to the Secretary of Defense containing the views of the Joint Chiefs on NSC 5505. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Soviet Vulnerabilities)
many of the key paragraphs and referring explicitly to the dissents in the present draft as well as to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

At the conclusion of his briefing, certain minor splits in the text were discussed and dealt with by the Council. Mr. Cutler then invited attention to paragraph 4–c, which read as follows:

"c. Thereby convincing the Communist rulers that aggression will not serve their interests, that it will not pay. So long as the Soviets are uncertain of their ability to neutralize the U.S. nuclear-air retaliatory power, there is little reason to expect them to initiate general war or actions which they believe would carry appreciable risk of general war, and thereby endanger the regime and the security of the USSR."

For reasons, said Mr. Cutler, that he could not understand, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to delete paragraph 4–c. While Mr. Cutler believed that this paragraph was not vital to the understanding of the proposed political warfare strategy set forth in NSC 5505, he would have imagined that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would have desired to include this paragraph, the more so since its thought was integral to subparagraphs 4–a and –b which preceded it. He accordingly asked Admiral Radford if he would explain the position taken by the Chiefs.

Admiral Radford said that personally he didn’t care at all whether paragraph 4–c was or was not included. Indeed, he had not himself taken part in the discussion of this paper with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Beyond that, he added that he was altogether confused by all these wordy papers regarding the exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities, indicating the view that such papers as these were of very doubtful value to the National Security Council.

Mr. Cutler explained to Admiral Radford that NSC 5505 and its ancillary reports had been intended to provide guidance in the precise field of exploiting Soviet vulnerabilities, a field in which the need of guidance had been felt for a number of years. Thereafter Mr. Cutler went on to explain what the Planning Board recommended as a suitable Council action on NSC 5505. (This proposed action is set forth in the "Note by the Executive Secretary" at the beginning of NSC 5505.) In the course of summarizing the Planning Board recommendation for Council action, Mr. Cutler said that he wished to propose a slight modification in the recommended Council action, which change had resulted from a conversation he had had the previous evening with Mr. Nelson Rockefeller and Director Hughes of the Bureau of the Budget. (The slight modification suggested by Mr. Cutler amounted to assigning coordination of the

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7 Not printed.
implementation of NSC 5505 to a new committee headed by Mr. Rockefeller, rather than to a subcommittee of the Operations Coordinating Board.)

Mr. Hughes pointed out that, working independently of Mr. Cutler, both he and Mr. Rockefeller had come to the same conclusions as Mr. Cutler respecting the best means of effectually implementing this political warfare strategy. Mr. Allen Dulles indicated that the revised proposal was a "perfectly feasible" way of proceeding, while Mr. Hughes said that his long-awaited report on a mechanism for coordinating within the Executive Branch economic, psychological, and political warfare and foreign information, was almost ready for consideration by the National Security Council.  

Mr. Cutler then asked the Secretary of State for any comment he wished to make on NSC 5505.

Secretary Dulles said that he found it difficult to deal confidently with the vast number of abstractions which inevitably arose in such a report as this. Even if he didn't really understand the abstractions, and particularly the splits in abstractions, he said he was prepared to admit that these abstractions could be very important. Accordingly, he said he would "pass" at this point in the game.

Mr. Cutler attempted once again to explain the heart of the political warfare strategy proposed in this paper, and indicated that the "heart" of it was to be found in subparagraphs 3–c and 3–d, which he insisted expressed a really significant idea, and which subparagraphs he read again to the Council. . . . Secretary Dulles conceded that at least he could understand this concrete manifestation of the theoretical strategy.

Dr. Flemming said that he tended to share the feeling expressed by the Secretary of State on NSC 5505. While he would be willing to vote for approval of the report, he would not be sure exactly what he was proposing to recommend. He would therefore suggest clarifying language for insertion between subparagraphs c–(1) and c–(2) of the Note by the Executive Secretary. After reading his proposed new language, Dr. Flemming said it would provide the Council with a much clearer idea of the direction in which this political strategy was moving, by giving the Council a chance to look at specific illustrative measures and programs.

Mr. Cutler indicated a lack of sympathy with Dr. Flemming's proposal, and again apologized to the Council for his apparent inability to explain the contents of NSC 5505 more clearly. He tried once again by suggesting that the heart of this paper consisted of a

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8Reference is to Hughes' report to the President on March 3 and the establishment by the President on March 10 of a Planning Coordination Group (PCG) headed by Nelson Rockefeller.
set of guiding principles for the exploitation of Soviet and satellite vulnerabilities, laid down for the guidance of Mr. Rockefeller's committee in its task of formulating programs and seeing that these programs were carried out. . . . Finally, said Mr. Cutler, it was plain to him that we did not want a lot more paper work to come out of Mr. Rockefeller's committee. Once in their hands, NSC 5505 would promptly enter the area of operations.

The President said that discussion of this paper was taking place in the context of the cold war. While of course we needed paper programs, we could not keep on planning indefinitely for the future. We must have prompt action. He personally could see nothing particularly wrong with NSC 5505. It was in general following the right line. The United States was not in a position to state that it would promote revolution in the Soviet Union. What we must try to do is win "these guys" over. Accordingly, he believed it was right to give this paper to the Rockefeller group and have them report to the Council from time to time by way of informing the Council of what the Special Committee had been doing. The progress reports should by all means be specific, and the President was sure that Mr. Rockefeller was precisely the right man to chair this committee to implement NSC 5505.

The Vice President said . . . . Was he therefore correct in supposing that the strategy set forth in NSC 5505 would not necessarily rule out resort to revolutionary methods if they seemed likely to be successful? Mr. Cutler answered that such methods would not necessarily be ruled out if they were likely to achieve success.

The President then went on to say that if the Council did approve the present report it should not expect the new Special Committee merely to carry out this policy slavishly, but to report to the Council on other unforeseen possibilities, as well as proposed measures that had turned out wrong. In response to the President, Mr. Cutler pointed out that NSC 5505 called for a continuous review of the strategy which it proposed. He added that he would get together with Dr. Flemming in order to agree on a wording for his proposed change in the Council action on NSC 5505. Governor Stassen pointed out with emphasis that the established pattern of progress reports by the Operations Coordinating Board covered exactly what Dr. Flemming had in mind in suggesting this change.

Secretary Dulles and Mr. Allen Dulles both stated that they did not wish the guidance provided by NSC 5505, on the exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities along evolutionary rather than revolutionary lines, to destroy all possibility of seizing opportunities for exploiting a different type of strategy if such opportunities clearly presented
themselves. Mr. Cutler replied that this possibility was not excluded in NSC 5505.

Secretary Wilson then added that he had a few notes on this paper, from which he would like to speak to the Council. He said that he was "thoroughly sold" on having the implementation of NSC 5505 placed in the hands of this small group headed by Mr. Rockefeller; but he hoped that they would use their best judgment in meeting various specific situations. In general, he had found NSC 5505 "a little too wordy and verbose". As he saw it, there were several differing situations to be observed throughout the world: the situation in the USSR, in the European satellites, in Communist China, in the satellites of Communist China, and among "weak allies" of the U.S. elsewhere. If he were carrying out this task he would operate quite differently in these different areas. Obviously the USSR and Communist China represented "touchy ground". Before carrying out any operations in these areas we should do our best to realize the probable reaction. Other areas were less sensitive.

Secretary Wilson also believed, he said, that no additional reports along the lines of NSC 5505 were really necessary, except a list of concrete courses of action which the U.S. could follow in these various areas.

The President said that he shared much of Secretary Wilson's view, which agreed with his that some one person must constantly follow and be responsible for the actions designed to carry out the strategy set down in the present report. The President then added that it was his view that paragraph 4-c should not be deleted. Admiral Radford repeated the view that he couldn't see that inclusion or deletion of the paragraph made any significant difference. Governor Stassen complained that the last sentence of paragraph 4-c seemed to him a little overconfident in tone. Secretary Dulles agreed with Governor Stassen, and said he was particularly inclined to question the accuracy of the view that the Soviets would not initiate general war or actions risking general war, in view of the Chinese Communist reaction toward the President's statement to the Congress respecting U.S. policy in the Formosa area.

The President said he believed that the Soviets were undoubtedly doing all they could to involve the United States in Asia and in a general war with Communist China. Secretary Dulles added that this was why he was so inclined to doubt the validity of the last sentence in paragraph 4-c.

With considerable emphasis, Admiral Radford said he wished to point out to the Council that he had been involved for many months in all the major studies and plans which had been formulated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Never, however, in all this long time, had the Joint Chiefs of Staff planned a U.S. land offensive on the
mainland of Communist China. For the life of him, he could not understand why, in the event of a general war between the United States and Communist China, all the worst difficulties would not be on the Chinese rather than on the U.S. side. The great problem of the Chinese in such a war was to "get at us if we don't choose to be got at." The only direction in which the Chinese Communists could mount an aggressive offensive on land would be toward the south or in Korea. Accordingly, the general theory that a war with Communist China would involve the United States militarily to very great depths was simply incomprehensible to him.

Secretary Humphrey said that this was all very well, but would Admiral Radford explain to him how, if we got into a war with Communist China, you would end it. Admiral Radford replied that he failed to see how the Russians could be anything else but losers if the United States got into a general war with Communist China. The Chinese Communists would have very little offensive capability against us which we could not counter with the exercise of comparatively little military power. It would, accordingly, be a mistake, really, for the Russians to try to involve the U.S. in war with Communist China.

With regard to Admiral Radford's view as to such a mistake by the Russians, Secretary Dulles said that the Admiral's analysis did not take account adequately of the political advantages which the Soviets might well gain in Europe if we should get into a war with Communist China. Admiral Radford quickly admitted that he was speaking from a military point of view and had not taken these other factors into account. Secretary Dulles went on to enlarge on the very great difficulties that Sir Anthony Eden was facing in the British Parliament in his efforts to back up the new U.S. policy regarding the offshore islands, in the face of the combined opposition of Messrs. Attlee and Bevan. This showed, said Secretary Dulles, that the big danger resulting from a war between the U.S. and Communist China was not to be found in the realm of military action, where he agreed with Admiral Radford's analysis. The great danger of such a war was the possibility that it would alienate the allies of the United States and might indeed block all our best-laid plans for Western Europe.

Admiral Radford went on to say that his own analysis of the situation induced him to believe that Russia and China were bluffing, and that we would succeed in calling their bluff if we proceeded along the lines of the recent decision respecting the defense of Formosa and certain of the offshore islands. The Russians are perfectly well aware that operations of the kind that could occur in carrying out this new policy might give rise to a situation in which the Russians themselves could become involved in a general war.
Since he believed that the Russians did not wish to become so involved, he believed that they were bluffing.

Secretary Wilson said that he, on the other hand, was inclined to look at the situation much as Secretary Dulles did. While he approved the recent move by the President regarding Formosa and the offshore islands, we might presently find out in fact whether the Soviets and Chinese were really bluffing. On the other side of the picture, continued Secretary Wilson, if he had the job of killing a rattlesnake he would try to cut off his head rather than his rattles. There was another aspect of this cold war situation, said Secretary Wilson, that also continually bothered him. He believed that in many of the underdeveloped areas of the world the ordinary run of people were likely to make more progress under a Communist regime than under the traditional types of dictatorships. This was a troublesome fact, but he nevertheless believed that the common people of China were getting along just as well under the present regime as ever they had under the war lords of the old days.

Apropos of the exchange between Admiral Radford and Secretary Dulles, the President said he himself doubted whether the Russians would permit themselves at this time to become involved in a general war. He also doubted if any such general war could be ended in a week or ten days. Perhaps the Russians felt the same way as he did. Nevertheless, if they continued apparently to egg on the Chinese Communists, there must be some good reason for it.

Governor Stassen said that his explanation as to why the Soviets were apparently egging on the Chinese Communists was as follows: The Soviets may fear that if the Chinese Communists permit themselves to be involved in friendlier relations with the Western world, the Soviets may not be able to control the Chinese so effectively. If this were so, the most desirable course of action for the United States was to try to separate the Chinese and the Russians.

Admiral Radford observed that while it was true that the Russians had had ups and downs in their policy toward Europe since 1945, they had made steady progress since that year in their program to subjugate the Far East. The only way to put an end to this steady progress and to secure peace and stability in Asia, was to carry out faithfully the policy which the President had announced to the Congress last week.

Governor Stassen expressed great skepticism as to the likelihood that the Chinese Communists would make serious attacks on Formosa or on the offshore islands which the United States would assist in defending. If this proved to be the case, and after a certain amount of noise the Chinese Communists subsided and took to peaceful ways, this was the moment for the United States to try to broaden our trade with Communist China and to explore other possibilities of opening
up contact with them designed to wean them away from their alliance with the Soviets.

The Vice President, speaking of paragraph 4–c which had given rise to this discussion, said that perhaps the concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with this paragraph was that it was too confident in its assumption that the Communist rulers would act like normal people. Communists simply do not react normally. Accordingly, said the Vice President, he was skeptical of the possibility of inducing evolutionary change in the Soviet Union or in the satellites if we believed that the strategy set forth in the present report would ever change the minds and the hearts of the Communist rulers.

Mr. Cutler suggested that paragraph 4–c be deleted as not being necessary to the sense of the paper as a whole.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the subject on the basis of the statement of policy contained in the reference report (NSC 5505) in the light of the Annex to NSC 5505 and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum.

b. Noted the “Report on the Exploitation of Soviet Vulnerabilities” (Annex to NSC 5505), dated November 30, 1954, prepared by a Special Committee appointed by the Chairman of the NSC Planning Board, in agreement with the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, and the “Summary” therefor, prepared by the NSC Planning Board, contained in NSC 5505.

c. Adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 5505, subject to the following changes:

(1) **Paragraph 3–f:** Include the bracketed phrase, revised to read as follows: “in so far as this can be done prior to such change without impairing the carrying out of these principles.”; and delete the footnote relating thereto.

(2) **Paragraph 3–h:** Delete, including the footnote relating thereto.

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9 Paragraphs a–e constitute NSC Action No. 1314, approved by the President on January 27, 1955. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 148)

10 Paragraphs 3–f and 3–h of NSC 5505 read as follows:

"f. Because substantial change in basic conditions in the USSR or the Satellites (including the imminent threat or initiation of general war) might render these principles inappropriate, they should be continuously reviewed. In order to be prepared to meet any such substantial change, the U.S. should continue to develop and maintain capabilities which would be required in the event of such change, [in so far as this can be done without impairing the carrying out of these principles.]"

"[h. Application of the principles set forth in subparagraphs a through e above does not preclude experimentation with such overt anti-regime measures as might be applicable to substantially changed circumstances. The U.S. can take apparently contradictory lines of action, provided it avoids solidifying the conviction that the U.S. is determined to overthrow the whole system by direct intervention.]"

The following footnote was inserted in the source text after the two bracketed portions: “The Defense member and the JCS Adviser propose deletion.”
(3) Paragraph 4: Insert an additional third sentence, to read as follows: "It is to be emphasized that no political warfare strategy can in any sense substitute for adequate military, political, and economic programs designed to strengthen the Free World."

(4) Paragraph 4–c: Delete.

d. Recommended that the President designate, as the coordinating agency for the statement of policy in NSC 5505, a Special Committee chaired by the Special Assistant to the President, Mr. Nelson A. Rockefeller, and composed of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence (who may be represented in day-to-day operations by deputies appointed by them), and with the participation as appropriate of representatives of the Department of Justice, the Foreign Operations Administration, the U.S. Information Agency, and other interested departments and agencies, for the purpose of:

(1) Reviewing current programs and developing new programs to carry out the statement of policy contained in NSC 5505, and ensuring coordination of actions taken thereunder.

(2) Making periodic progress reports to the National Security Council; including evaluations of the adequacy of the policy in relation to existing or anticipated conditions, and the need for any modifications in the policy, together with illustrative examples of current and projected programs.

e. Referred the "Report" in the Annex to NSC 5505, and the "Summary" in NSC 5505, noted in b above, to the Special Committee referred to in d above, to use as background material relevant to carrying out its assignment.

Note: NSC 5505, as amended, approved by the President as a basic guide to all appropriate executive departments and agencies in exploiting discontents and other problems in the USSR and the European satellites, in conformity with paragraph 26–c of NSC 5501, which paragraph states one element of the general strategy contained in NSC 5501. NSC 5505, as amended and approved, subsequently circulated as NSC 5505/1 and transmitted to the Special Committee referred to in d above as the coordinating agency, together with the Annex to NSC 5505 pursuant to the action in e above.

[Here follow items 3–4.]

S. Everett Gleason

NSC 5502/1  

STATEMENT OF POLICY ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD RUSSIAN ANTI-SOVIEI POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

General Considerations

Composition and History of the Emigration

1. Within the free world today exists a considerable emigration of former Soviet or Russian citizens, numbering over 1 million, widely dispersed individuals, varying greatly in age and experience. These émigrés represent wide divergences in political, social and national backgrounds. The overwhelming majority, although to varying degrees interested in Russian problems, are not politically active and are more concerned with the difficult problems they face in adjusting themselves to the foreign environment of exile. A minority, sometimes referred to as “the political emigration”, is passionately interested and dedicated to the general proposition of the overthrow of the Bolshevik regime.

2. The existence of a large Russian emigration living abroad in exile is not a new phenomenon. In particular, the 19th century witnessed a large and fluid emigration centered particularly in western Europe, whose members were either forced or voluntary exiles from Czarist Russia. Scattered among the larger cities of Europe, and even to a certain extent in the United States, these émigrés pursued their mission of overthrowing czarist autocracy in the atmosphere of idealism and intrigue, theoretical speculation and frustration, violent activity and apathetic despair which is characteristic of the environment of exile. But from this 19th century emigration sprang many of the divergent political parties, ideals and leaders, which played important and often tragic roles in the 20th century revolutions and civil war which eventually ended with Bolshevik seizure of power throughout Russia.

3. The present emigration resembles in many ways its 19th century predecessor as well as other Russian emigrations even further removed in history. Generally, however, it dates its existence from the Bolshevik revolution and the subsequent civil war. As a result, within its ranks it has collected a great variety of conflicting

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1 Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Soviet Vulnerabilities. Top Secret. Circulated to the members of the Council as an enclosure to a note from Lay, dated January 31, which noted that its implementation would be coordinated by the Special Committee established pursuant to NSC Action No. 1314–d, i.e., the Planning Coordination Group chaired by Rockefeller.
political tendencies ranging from a few remaining older monarchists to survivors of the various Russian "White" armies, Social-Democratic and Social-Revolutionary exiles who opposed both former groupings, down through subsequent political movements newly formed and reformed in exile without ever having had a root in the political life of Russia. The emigration itself, since 1917, has been periodically injected with new blood through the continuous addition of exiles who have fled ever since the establishment of the Soviet regime. In the latter category, the most important recent addition is a very large group of refugees representing former German-held Soviet prisoners and forced labor who did not wish to return to Russia following the war, together with former members of the Russian Vlasov army which fought on the German side in the final stages of World War II.

4. For purposes of this paper the Soviet emigration is understood to be limited to persons coming from the area included within the 1939 boundaries of the Soviet Union. Specifically, this definition excludes émigrés from the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), which are in a separate category by virtue of the fact that the United States Government has never recognized their incorporation into the Soviet Union and continues to receive their diplomatic representatives. Relations with the Baltic emigrations therefore come within the purview of the Free Europe Committee, not the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism.

5. The political history of the emigration since 1917 has not been a happy one. In the aggregate it has been characterized by failure. Cut off from the actual experience of Soviet life, deprived of adequate means of communication or the material ability to affect Russian life, the various attempts of different disunited émigré groupings to bring about either by revolution or other means the overthrow of the Soviet government, or accurately to predict the course of events within the Soviet Union, have met with failure. If the small politically active parties and organizations of the émigrés could themselves unite, or if they could succeed in uniting the mass of the emigration itself behind them, it is obvious that their influence and usefulness in the free world struggle with Soviet communism would be enhanced. The emigration's capability to achieve its final objectives—liberation in various forms—would not be significantly changed, however. The future of the peoples of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet regime itself, depends on factors and forces outside the control of the emigration. This fact is realized by most of the emigration, and they in turn envisage liberation as usually coming about as the result of a war between the Soviet Union and the West. Some would frankly wish to hasten this event; all wish to position themselves in a manner favorable to the successful pursuit
of their particular political objectives in the event of such a conflict. As a result, the emigration represents in a real sense a present-day cold war ally of some value, but many deficiencies, and a potential ally in the event of war of greater, but equally indeterminate, value.

6. At the present time no particular unity or cohesion characterizes either the mass of the emigration or the small and fragmentary politically active groups which try to speak in its name. Although such cohesion and unity is desirable, and periodic attempts are made in this direction, it is improbable that much success will be achieved in the foreseeable future in this respect. It would appear that not only are the real divisions of ideology and interest too great among the émigrés but that the very environment of exile in itself renders such unity impossible, to judge from past history.

The Nationalities Problem

7. Within the present emigration are apparent two generally opposed broad groupings: one composed of political parties which claim to speak in the name of the non-Russian nationalities, the other composed of organizations purporting to speak for the Russian nationality, although at the same time frequently claiming to reflect the views of the peoples of the Soviet Union as a whole. Each of these two divisions is itself divided and fragmented into smaller groups representing divergent and conflicting political traditions and beliefs, ranging from extreme rightist concepts to Social-Democratic and other leftist philosophies. The overriding issue, however, which divides the emigration into these two fairly distinct camps is the question concerning the manner in which the nationality problem will be solved within the borders of the present Soviet Union, following liberation. Although both Russian and nationality groups adhere to various principles and formulas of self-determination for all the peoples of the Soviet Union they are in fact sorely divided on this question and may be expected to remain so for the foreseeable future. In essence, the non-Russian nationalities’ representatives favor, and desire U.S. support for, the independent existence as national states of the various national groups within the USSR, although occasionally envisaging some type of loose federation. There is a significant number of non-Russians, however, who do not identify themselves with such “separatist” ambitions. In general, political groups representing Russian, as distinguished from other nationalities, question both the desirability of, and the will for, separate national existences on the part of the non-Russians within the Soviet Union, although envisaging some form of autonomy as probably necessary and desirable for the nationalities.
8. Most elements within each of the two broad groupings are eager and anxious to aid in liberation whether by means of propaganda directed toward the peoples of the Soviet Union or other more activist means. They are equally anxious to gain official U.S. support, material and moral, for their particular solution to the problem of the future organization and government of the Soviet Union. To further their ends, they have frequently attempted to inject their views into domestic United States politics, with some success, both in the sense of urging greater efforts on the part of the U.S. Government to support émigré undertakings for revolution in general, and to support one or the other side of the two opposing camps—Russians and Nationalities in particular. To oversimplify, the nationality émigrés would desire U.S. support now for the concept of independent, separate national states for the Nationalities, including diplomatic recognition for their governments in exile along with practical measures in propaganda and other means to further this objective. The Russian émigrés warn, on the other hand, that the United States would thus incur the enmity of the Russian people and solidify support for the Soviet regime either in time of peace or war, thus strengthening rather than weakening Soviet communism.

Relation between U.S. Objectives toward the Emigration and toward the USSR

9. The United States has traditionally upheld the principles of freedom and self-determination for all peoples to establish governments and other institutions of their own choosing as soon as they are prepared to manage their affairs in an orderly, peaceful and stable manner. These fundamental political ideas are the expression of the American belief that the security and welfare of individuals, as well as states within an international society, are best preserved by such systems of government. In a limited sense, therefore, the United States does indeed regard sympathetically the concept of "liberation" of the peoples of the Soviet Union from the present despotic system of government—if by force of circumstances this becomes feasible in terms of U.S. and free world security interests. But in the light of present-day U.S. security interests, it is neither feasible nor desirable that the U.S. either consider, or run the risk of, initiating war to support such an objective.

10. It is widely held within the emigration that the Soviet regime carries within it the seeds of its own decay and destruction. Tensions, strains and vulnerabilities may lead, particularly if exploited by the free world, either to the violent overthrow, or radical change by other means, of the Soviet regime. It is important to realize that while the emigration furnishes both a means for studying and influencing these vulnerabilities, the more dispassionate
study and experimentation which has thus far been undertaken by the United States Government in this direction does not as yet indicate enough evidence to support the overly optimistic hopes and ambitions of the émigrés in this respect. Some of the beliefs and assertions of the nationality émigrés regarding support for independent States among nationality minorities within the Soviet Union are a case in point. The best evidence to date indicates that there are in fact considerable minority discontents within the Soviet Union. Some, perhaps a majority, of these discontents are no different in kind or quality than the general dissatisfactions felt by Russians as well concerning life under the Soviet regime. Of a different nature are discontents among the nationalities directed against the Russians. These feelings are complex and not subject to finite evaluation. Careful study indicates, however, that such sentiments do not find a significant expression in a desire for independent national existences. Often the desire is simply for better relations of equality with the Russians. Thus, those real discontents within the minorities of the Soviet Union, which the U.S. should indeed exploit, differ greatly in motivation and content from the discontents which nationality émigrés out of contact with their homeland are apt to attribute to groups living under the Soviet regime. This does not mean that the United States must either neglect the continuous investigation, or positive experimentation with appropriate courses of action in this direction, but suggests rather the caution with which such activities must be pursued until better evidence is available on which to base U.S. supported activities.

11. During the next five years it is unlikely that short of war the stability or effective authority of the Soviet regime can be either overthrown or seriously threatened by the action of forces outside the leadership or by a struggle for power within the ruling hierarchy. The regime will probably be able to maintain the largely invulnerable omnipotence of the State with the concomitant ability to control public opinion and render popular discontent impotent. Accordingly, cold war operations of the type which may be promoted by the U.S. and undertaken by émigrés, aimed to create disaffection or opposition within either the broad strata of the Soviet population or specific groups, cannot be expected to influence these characteristics to the point of stimulating major change. Such activities, the most important of which are sponsored by the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism, are, however, of major importance. Although evaluation of their effectiveness is difficult, they already appear to have achieved results of significance. In the long term, the ideas and information thus transmitted to the peoples of the Soviet Union aids in preconditioning them to alternative forms of political and social life more in their own interest, and in
ours. Stated another way, the objective of such anti-Soviet political activities is to create support for alternative forms of Soviet governmental structure and behavior which would both better satisfy the natural aspirations of the Soviet peoples as well as the interests of U.S. and free world security. In the short term, such activities may have significant results in fostering defection and in creating doubt in...the minds of Soviet leaders concerning the loyalty of both individuals and groups within Soviet society. . . .

12. . . . A real alternative which must be kept open for development and exploitation is that gradual change in Soviet behavior and belief which may be brought about more by the growing strength and cohesion of the free world and its ability successfully to resist and deter Soviet aggression than by any other means. Some anti-Soviet activities, either by émigrés, or supported . . . by the U.S., might within the context of growing free world strength help such a process, although it must be noted that the attainment of such objectives would by and large not be consistent with the objectives of the emigration. On the other hand, the indiscriminate fomenting of unrest within the Soviet Union on a broad scale might have the opposite effect and be a contributing factor to an increase in Soviet intransigence and the risk of a general war launched by the Soviet Union.

U.S. Posture toward the Emigration

13. In the balance, therefore, it may be said that it is in the interest of the United States . . . to give limited aid during the present period of the cold war to émigré or other related anti-Soviet activities within the context here described, and provided sufficient U.S. control can be exercised in order that there be no conflict with other U.S. policies and objectives. . . .

14. It is not desirable that the United States, in an official and overt manner, formulate at the present time its objectives towards the future of either a “liberated” or defeated Russia. It is neither in our interest, due to our objective of bringing about a change in Soviet behavior favorable to U.S. and free world security, nor within our capabilities, due to the inconclusive nature of present evidence concerning basic political factors within the Soviet Union. The nationalities problem is again a case in point. In the event of general war, a rapid and successful conclusion of hostilities might, under certain circumstances, be furthered by U.S. promises of support of independence for the nationalities. On the other hand, it is certain that such a U.S. position would influence unfavorably important groups both within and without the Soviet leadership who otherwise might take actions in the U.S. interest. Furthermore, it is even less
clear whether in a nebulous post-war world the minority nationalities would be capable of maintaining separate national States, and whether such a dismemberment of Russia would be in the U.S. interest. . . . In this respect, cooperation with, assistance to, and education of the emigration in American political ideals and methods, will be useful undertakings. . . .

15. The emigration also provides a valuable means at the present time of carrying forward those studies necessary for investigation of the problems of a future non-Soviet Russia, and an organization such as the American Committee presents a useful place for the conduct of some of the necessary U.S. study of these problems. In the event of general war and the possible defeat and removal of the Soviet regime, it may be neither desirable nor feasible for the United States to assume a large degree of responsibility in readjusting the inevitable political, economic and social dislocations resulting from the war; but it is nevertheless probable that in such an event any number of U.S. actions and inactions with regard to the Russian scene will play an important, and perhaps decisive, role in determining the future forms of society and government which might arise there. Should this be the case, the number of choices and decisions which would confront the United States would be myriad and complex, necessitating clarity and effectiveness in U.S. policies in order to influence individuals and events in a manner favorable to U.S. and free world security.

Policy Conclusions

16. The United States should pursue, to the extent deemed feasible under evolving military and political conditions, a policy of non-predetermination and self-determination with respect to the future forms of government, territorial arrangements and status of nationalities or minorities within the present Soviet Union, while avoiding specific U.S. commitments or the assumption of responsibility as to the detailed means by which this policy might be carried out.

17. Consistent with this policy, the United States should support, . . . anti-Soviet émigré groups from the Soviet Union and other similar activities, in order to further the following objectives:

a. To exploit demonstrable or potential present-day Soviet vulnerabilities in order to bring about a change in governmental behavior which will further U.S. security and preservation of peace. Such exploitation should be accomplished primarily by (1) promoting the elimination of those totalitarian-aggressive Soviet practices and policies which now threaten the security of free peoples and which violate the fundamental rights of the Soviet peoples, and (2) furthering the development by the peoples of the Soviet Union of govern-
ment institutions and practices which, in the conduct of domestic and foreign relations, will protect fundamental human rights of all citizens and permit Russia to become again a peaceful member of the international community.

b. To provide human resources and experience which can be utilized in reducing Soviet power, or otherwise influencing and changing Soviet behavior, in the event of general war.

c. To create and maintain, where feasible, doubt in the minds of the Soviet leadership concerning the reliability of the Soviet peoples, including minority nationalities, in the event of general war.

d. To develop capabilities for producing a change in the Soviet state structure, or behavior, during or following a period of general war, along lines of development which would contribute to the attainment of U.S. security objectives while satisfying the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of the USSR.

e. To demonstrate the traditional American belief that the fundamental aspirations and interests of all peoples are best secured through a free union of self-governing nations within the world community.

Courses of Action

18. Continue . . . to support . . . anti-Soviet émigré organizations and activities as appear capable of contributing to present and possible future U.S. purposes in both cold and hot war conditions.

19. Continue comprehensive study of the various alternative situations which might exist within the Soviet Union following either radical change or general war, and the corresponding policies and courses of action which it might be in the U.S. interest to follow.

20. As appropriate, attempt to secure non-partisan Congressional understanding and support for the present U.S. policy of non-predetermination and self-determination.

NSC 5505/1


EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET AND EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES

1. NSC 5501, "Basic National Security Policy", outlines the following general strategy:

"26. . . . U.S. policies must be designed to affect the conduct of the Communist regimes, especially that of the USSR, in ways that further U.S. security interests and to encourage tendencies that lead them to abandon expansionist policies. In pursuing this general strategy, our effort should be directed to:

"a. Deterring further Communist aggression, and preventing the occurrence of total war so far as compatible with U.S. security.
"b. Maintaining and developing in the free world the mutuality of interest and common purpose, and the necessary will, strength and stability, to face the Soviet-Communist threat and to provide constructive and attractive alternatives to Communism, which sustain the hope and confidence of free peoples.
"c. Supplementing a and b above by other actions designed to foster changes in the character and policies of the Soviet-Communist bloc regimes:

"(1) By influencing them and their peoples toward the choice of those alternative lines of action which, while in their national interests, do not conflict with the security interests of the U.S.; and
"(2) By exploiting differences between such regimes, and their other vulnerabilities, in ways consistent with this general strategy."

"27. To carry out effectively this general strategy will require a flexible combination of military, political, economic, propaganda, and covert actions which enables the full exercise of U.S. initiative.

1 Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5505 Series. Top Secret. Circulated to the Council under cover of a note from Lay dated January 31, which noted that the President had designated the Special Committee chaired by Rockefeller as the coordinating agency, which was to make periodic progress reports to the Council, "including evaluations of the adequacy of the policy in relation to existing or anticipated conditions, and the need for any modifications in the policy, together with illustrative examples of current and projected programs." In addition to the Statement of Policy, NSC 5505/1 included a Summary of the Report by the Special Committee on Soviet Vulnerabilities, dated November 30, 1954, and a copy of a memorandum from John K. Gerhardt, the JCS Adviser, to the NSC Planning Board, dated January 6, 1955, giving his views on the Summary of the Special Committee's Report. Neither the Summary of the Report nor Gerhardt's memorandum is printed.

2 See footnote 6, Document 2.

3 Ellipsis in the source text.
These actions must be so coordinated as to reinforce one another. Programs for the general strategy between now and the time when the USSR has greatly increased nuclear power should be developed as a matter of urgency."

2. a. This paper prescribes the principles to be applied, in conformity with paragraph 26-c quoted above, in exploiting discontents and other problems in the USSR and the European Satellites, such as tensions inherent in the police state, low standards of living, opposition to collectivization, cultural and intellectual regimentation, interference with religion, dissatisfaction of minorities, nationality problems, the governmental structure of the USSR, ideological weaknesses of the Soviet system, and disaffection in the Satellites.

b. Such discontents and other problems can be usefully exploited only if the U.S. (1) has or can develop a capability for such exploitation and (2) will thereby advance a specific objective within this capability.

3. In exploiting such discontents and other problems, the following principles should apply:

a. Measures for exploitation should be mutually consistent and should be directed toward specific U.S. objectives which are within existing or potential U.S. capabilities.

b. Seek to create and increase popular and bureaucratic pressures on the Soviet regime through the exploitation of discontents and other problems to promote evolutionary changes in Soviet policies and conduct which will be in U.S. interest and tend to lessen the chance of Soviet attack upon the U.S. As appropriate, seek (1) to cause the regime to occupy itself increasingly with internal problems and (2) to pose difficult decisions tending to create uncertainty or divisions within the regime.

c. Continue basic opposition to the Soviet system and continue to state its evils; but stress evolutionary rather than revolutionary change. At the same time make clear that while the U.S. is determined to protect its vital security interests by force if necessary, it does not seek to impose its ideas of government on the USSR by force.

d. Generally depict the causes of the discontents and other problems which are to be exploited not as inherent conditions reparable only by revolution but as conditions susceptible to correction by the regime if it should choose to take the necessary action.

e. Apply these principles to the European Satellites, taking advantage as appropriate of the special opportunities existing in these countries to exert greater pressures, and to weaken the ties which bind the Satellites to the USSR.

f. Because substantial change in basic conditions in the USSR or the Satellites (including the imminent threat or initiation of general war) might render these principles inappropriate, they should be continuously reviewed. In order to be prepared to meet any such substantial change, the U.S. should continue to develop and maintain capabilities which would be required in the event of such change, in
so far as this can be done prior to such change without impairing
the carrying out of these principles.

4. Exploitation of vulnerabilities in accordance with the above
principles can be expected to modify the policies of the USSR and
the European Satellites along lines more compatible with U.S. securi-
ty interests only if further Communist expansion is prevented. The
USSR and the European Satellites are not likely to experiment with
alternatives more consistent with U.S. interest as long as the accu-
tommed Communist techniques of military and political pressure on
and in the free world show signs of achieving success. It is to be
emphasized that no political warfare strategy can in any sense
substitute for adequate military, political, and economic programs
designed to strengthen the Free World. Therefore, success in carrying
out the above principles will depend upon:

a. Maintenance by the U.S. and its allies, for an indefinite
period, of military forces with sufficient strength, flexibility and
mobility to enable them to deal swiftly and severely with Commu-
nist overt aggression in its various forms and to cope successfully
with general war should it develop; and united determination to use
military force against such aggression.
b. Building the strength and cohesion of the free world and
taking adequate actions for the purpose of (1) creating cohesion
within and among all the free nations, remedying their weaknesses,
and steadily improving the relative position of the free world and (2)
destroying the effectiveness of the Communist apparatus in the free
world.

5. Diary Entry by the President’s Press Secretary (Hagerty) ¹


[Here follows an unrelated paragraph.]
The big story from Russia broke early this morning. I received a
call at 7:30 at my house from Bob Clark of INS reporting that
Malenkov had been replaced as Russian Premier and issued a
statement ² in typical Russian fashion claiming that he lacked experi-

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers.
² Malenkov’s statement, read by someone else before the Supreme Soviet with
Malenkov in attendance, was discussed in telegram 1263 from Moscow, February 8.
ence to handle the agricultural program of his country. I called Foster Dulles as soon as I got to the office. He was at home, and the shocking thing was that no one in the State Department had called him despite the fact that the story had been out for several hours.

(Dulles later raised all sort of hell in his department, and I don’t believe such a thing will happen again.)

Dulles told me that while he had not anticipated these exact changes (it was later announced that Bulganin would succeed Malenkov) we had got wind of the fact that some big changes were coming up in Russia about a week ago. He said that, of course, this was indicative of dissatisfaction within Russia and recommended that we have no official statement on it at this time. I passed this on to the President with Andy Goodpaster, and the President agreed.

The stories came thick and fast out of Russia after the Malenkov resignation. Bulganin was “elected” Premier. Then Molotov made a saber-rattling speech accusing the United States of aggression and saying that the Soviets had developed the hydrogen bomb to a degree where the United States was far behind them. This reversed Malenkov’s statement of several months ago when he said that any nuclear war would result in the destruction of civilization. Molotov said it would not but only result in the destruction of the civilization of the decadent west.

Throughout the day the President was informed of these reports by Goodpaster but neither the White House or the State Department had any official comment. Actually, the President told me when he was in his office with Goodpaster that he believed the following:

1. That the Russian hierarchy has been having considerable trouble prior to Stalin’s death. As Stalin was becoming weaker in health, the in-fighting and double dealing for power had started. Actually, when Malenkov was named as his successor, it was in effect a compromise and the fighting still continued. This was, of course, evident when Beria was done away with and is more evident now with Malenkov in this post. The President also told me that this was just another reason why he had been resisting the British plea for a four-power conference. “It took an awful long time to get the British to realize that with the trouble going on inside of Russia, it would not be to the advantage of the free world for Churchill and myself and whoever the French man would be to sit down publicly with any given leader of Russia. If we did that, it would serve notice, not only throughout the world but also within Russia that we were recognizing Malenkov or Bulganin or whoever else it might

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(Department of State, Central Files, 761.13/2–855) Bohlen’s views on the significance of Malenkov’s resignation are presented in greater detail in Bohlen, Witness to History, pp. 368–372.

3 Molotov’s speech of February 8 is analyzed in Soviet Affairs, March 1955, pp. 4–6. (Department of State, INR Files)

4 Malenkov made this statement on March 12, 1954.
be as the leader. That would give him a great advantage within Russia and would tend to minimize the struggles for power that are going on within Russia. We certainly don't want to do that and that's why I have never wanted to meet with the Russian leader—at least for the time being.”

2. I asked the President if he thought that Bulganin's appointment would mean that Russia was moving toward war. He said that he did not think so; that as a matter of fact, if the Army had more influence in Russia, it would probably be a conservative influence. “You know, if you're in the military and you know about these terrible destructive weapons, it tends to make you more pacifistic than you normally have been. In most countries the influence of the military is more conservative, and so while I do not know for sure, I would not be surprised if the Army influence would be just that within the Soviet Union. They're not ready for war and they know it. They also know if they go to war, they're going to end up losing everything they have. That also tends to make people conservative.”

Later in the day Molotov made a speech in Moscow when he really rattled the sword, saying that Russia was way ahead of the United States in the production of the H-bomb and also said if Russia were attacked, it would destroy western civilization. I called Lewis Strauss on the H-bomb charge and he told me that we have no evidence at all that the Russians are as far advanced as we are on the H-bomb although of course we know they have it and have exploded thermonuclear weapons on testing grounds within their country. Strauss said that he was sure this was merely a propaganda speech by the Russians. I told him to send me a memo to this effect so I could show it to the President and he did the next morning.

[Here follows the remainder of the diary entry.]

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5 Hagerty is apparently recapitulating what he said above about Molotov's speech and is not referring to another speech by Molotov that day.
6 Not found at the Eisenhower Library or in Department of State files.
6. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles), Washington, February 8, 1955, 10:15 a.m.  

AWD said he thinks we should get together to see how we can capitalize on developments in Russia. He talked with Rockefeller—maybe he could get his teeth into it. AWD wondered what Radio Free Europe should say—what line we should take. The Sec. said he thinks the approach should be it is obvious the constant changes of personnel etc. indicate that things are not going well. AWD mentioned his admitting guilt and lack of experience. This should be played up through unofficial channels. They could lunch here said the Sec. and agreed to ask Rockefeller, Cutler, Streibert and AWD will join about 1:30.  

They decided not to invite Defense, but Rockefeller’s office called and suggested under NSC 5505 they should be invited. AWD in the Sec.’s absence said o.k.

1 Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Prepared by Phyllis D. Bernau in the Office of the Secretary of State.  
2 No record of this meeting has been found.  
3 Presumably a reference to NSC 5505/1, Document 4.


[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and discussion of items 1 and 2.]

3. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security  

The Director of Central Intelligence said that he would devote most of his time to an “appreciation” of the situation in Moscow. For over a year now there had been signs that Malenkov was losing power. However, the actual secret of his “resignation” had been very carefully kept. There had been good reason to believe that the summoning of the Supreme Soviet a month ahead of time would

have dramatic repercussions, the more so since this coincided with the summoning back to Moscow of a significant number of Soviet Ambassadors abroad.

Mr. Dulles then said that he did not believe that Malenkov’s fall from power was to be ascribed to any of the assertions of guilt made in his statement. For one thing, he had been less responsible for the failures in Soviet agriculture than Khrushchev himself, and he had had certainly as wide administrative experience as Bulganin. The real point seemed to be that Malenkov had lost the second round of a great power struggle. Accordingly, this may be the beginning of the end of the period of collective leadership in the USSR.

Mr. Dulles then gave a brief comparison of the decline and fall of Beria and Malenkov, noting that a possible reason for the fact that thus far Malenkov had escaped Beria’s fate was that Beria had actually been caught in a plot to seize power.

Khrushchev, continued Mr. Dulles, was now clearly in the dominant position in the Soviet hierarchy. Moreover, the influence of the military was now at an all-time high in the Soviet Union—this despite the fact that Marshal Bulganin was in truth an “old Bolshevik” rather than a genuine military man. He had had no battle experience, and was usually known as “General Rabbit” by the real soldiers in the Soviet Army. According to the statements of a high-level defector, the Soviet Army now gained for itself the power and prestige in the Soviet Government which had once been held by the MVD.

In the view of CIA, said Mr. Dulles, the committee form of government cannot endure in the USSR. He predicted that the struggle for supreme power would continue, with Khrushchev playing the cagy Stalin game of slowly consolidating his power against his rivals. He had deliberately refused the first job (of Prime Minister) in order to consolidate his rivals against himself.

The difficult question was how and why this crisis had come to a head at this particular time. Obviously the economic issues had played an important part, with Malenkov cast in the role of goat. Foreign policy had also played a considerable part. There was a widespread feeling that Malenkov’s so-called “soft” line had not been notably successful, especially in Europe.

The President interrupted to comment that this judgment showed how different the picture looked to the Russians than to ourselves, who had been so greatly concerned about the apparent success of the Soviets with the soft line of foreign policy.

Beria’s arrest was announced on July 10, 1953.
Mr. Dulles went on to point out that Molotov does not seem to have shared Malenkov's views on the line to be followed in foreign policy. Molotov preferred the tougher line, and we could certainly expect tougher words on that subject from now on out. It was too early to say whether the actual foreign policy would change along with the words, but very possibly it would not.

Neither economic nor foreign policy, continued Mr. Dulles, sufficiently explains what had happened in Moscow. It was "a truly Russian affair", with Malenkov obliged to sit and listen while his statement of shortcomings was read before all. It was quite likely that Malenkov would gradually disappear from view.

Mr. Dulles described the appointment of Zhukov as "very interesting". The defectors to whom he had referred earlier had insisted that Zhukov was much too popular in the Soviet Union ever to be appointed to the Ministry of Defense.

The President interrupted to say that Zhukov was, despite everything, "a likable cuss", and had on more than one occasion manifested to the President a certain independence of his political associates. Mr. Dulles said this might prove to be a matter of the carrot-and-the-stick policy, Zhukov being the carrot and Khrushchev the stick. The President agreed, but pointed out that the increase in Army influence symbolized by the elevation of Zhukov did not necessarily portend a tougher and more dangerous Soviet policy. The Army, said the President, tended to be a conservative force.

[Here follow the remainder of the briefing and discussion of items 4–6.]

S. Everett Gleason

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3 Zhukov was named Minister of Defense on February 9.
8. Intelligence Report Prepared by the Office of Intelligence Research

No. 6839


KHRUSHCHEV REACHES TOP AFTER LONG, STEADY RISE

Abstract

The resignation of G.M. Malenkov from the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers on February 8 cleared the way for Nikita S. Khrushchev to assume the position of number one authority in the Soviet Union. The course of Khrushchev’s career has now brought him to the stage where, operating from Stalin’s old vantage point as Party First Secretary, he has outdistanced all his colleagues in the accumulation of power.

Khrushchev was born in 1894, the son of a miner. He received little or no education, worked for a period in the coal fields, and joined the Party only in 1918, after the Revolution. The Party educated him and advanced him through the ranks to the important post of Moscow secretary in the mid-1930’s. Stalin accepted him in the Politburo in 1938, and sent him to the Ukraine as Moscow’s viceroy. During the first part of the war he was at Stalingrad and Voronezh. Returning to Kiev in 1943, he ruled the Ukraine with an iron hand for the next four years. Then, following an apparent set back, he returned to Moscow in 1949 to become the spokesman for the government’s kolkhoz amalgamation and resettlement program. After peasant resistance developed to some features of this, Khrushchev was publicly rebuked in early 1951 and transferred to other Party work.

Immediately after Stalin’s death in March 1953, Khrushchev occupied a position publicly subordinate to the top three leaders—Malenkov, Beriya, and Molotov. He played his hand well, however, and quickly replaced Malenkov as first-ranking Party secretary. Khrushchev’s discernible rise began after the fall of Beriya in June 1953. He assumed direction of the government’s new farm program and began to tinker with foreign affairs. During 1954 his activities and publicity in domestic and foreign fields overshadowed those of his Kremlin colleagues. He paid visits to the three most important countries in the Soviet orbit—Communist China, Czechoslovakia,

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1 Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 70, USSR. Secret. A note on the source text indicates that the report was prepared in collaboration with the Division of Biographic Information and was based on information available through February 8, 1955. The 15-page body of the report and the 6-page chronology of Khrushchev’s activities since Stalin’s death are not printed.
and Poland. Although lacking an important bureaucratic position, he acted as though he occupied one and participated increasingly in governmental affairs.

In his political views, Khrushchev has been careful to reflect doctrinaire positions. This is particularly true of his statements of foreign affairs. Toward the West he is outspoken in his hostility, and repeats the dialectical stereotypes with seeming conviction. In internal affairs he follows closely the standard Party line with its traditional emphases.

Khrushchev's personality is forceful, dogmatic, and blunt. He is essentially a simple type with few inhibitions and little sophistication. He seems to owe his present position to a combination of dogged perseverance, ruthlessness, and native shrewdness. Unlike most Bolsheviks he is reputed to have a sense of humor. On occasions, especially when he has had too much to drink, he has been heard making indiscreet statements. Khrushchev is married, has a large family and, contrary to rumor, is not Malenkov's brother-in-law.

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9. Editorial Note

According to the memorandum of discussion at the 239th meeting of the National Security Council on March 3, the following discussion took place during the briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on significant world developments affecting United States national security:

"Mr. Dulles then turned to the internal situation in the Soviet Union. There had been so many changes in the government in recent days that it was proving very difficult to appraise the significance of the changes beyond stating that they indicated a picture of dissatisfaction with the status quo, especially in the realm of agriculture. When Mr. Dulles noted that Zhukov was not among those who had recently been promoted, Secretary Hoover commented that he thought this significant, and the President said with a smile that perhaps the failure to promote Zhukov was the result of our saying too many nice things about him here in the United States.

"Noting that the Soviet Military Attachés in the European satellite states had been called home to Moscow for consultation, Mr. Dulles suggested that this might be the precursor of a Soviet effort to create in Eastern Europe military defense arrangements similar to those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File)
A report by the Office of Intelligence Research on the leadership changes announced February 28, entitled "Some Soviet Leadership Questions Clarified" (Intelligence Brief No. 1750), concluded that the changes, including those raising to First Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers Mikoyan, M.G. Pervukhin, and M.Z. Saburov, indicated a further reduction in Malenkov's position in both the party and the government. (Department of State, SOV Files: Lot 66 D 70, USSR) Bohlen's appraisal of the leadership changes and how they affected Malenkov's position were transmitted in telegram 1464 from Moscow, March 5. (Ibid., Central Files, 761.00/3-555)

Apropos of Dulles' remarks about the possible establishment of an Eastern European defense arrangement similar to NATO, the Soviet Union and seven Eastern European countries signed a treaty of "friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance" at Warsaw on May 14, 1955.

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10. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Acting Special Assistant for Intelligence (Howe) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)


SUBJECT

Intelligence Note: Position of The Military in The Soviet Ruling Group

Soviet military leaders undoubtedly have gained in prestige since Stalin's death. There is no indication, however, that the power position of the Military within the ruling group has been notably strengthened or that the Soviet armed forces are playing a more independent role than in the past.

In allowing the military increased public prominence, the present regime was probably motivated by a desire to take advantage of the popularity of the armed forces among the population. Thus, there occurred such developments as the assignment of a leading role to army generals in the Beriya trial; the appointment of Marshal Zhukov, the USSR's leading war hero, as Minister of Defense; Zhukov's interview with the Hearst delegation and his letter to

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/5-555. Confidential.
President Eisenhower; and the recent promotion of ten generals to the rank of marshal.

These actions have not impinged on the supremacy of the Party. Zhukov, for example, is a member of the Party Central Committee and is not the first military careerist to serve as Minister of Defense. His lack of top-level influence is clearly implied in the failure to include him among the new deputies to Prime Minister Bulganin. Certain of the actions, such as the recent promotions, may indicate the growing concern of the regime with problems of national defense. Nevertheless, there is no professional military leader in either the Presidium of the Party or the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. The Party safeguards itself against possible rivals through the maintenance of units in all institutions. Recently there have been indications that such units within lower military echelons have been strengthened, and Molotov stated in February that 77 percent of all Soviet soldiers are either Party or Komsomol members.

Under these circumstances there appears to be little likelihood that the army can supplant the Party as the center of power; nor is there reason to believe that the Party has been impelled to enter into a concordat with the military in order to continue the dictatorship. It is probable, however, that relations between the army and the Party are somewhat more amicable than under Stalin.

A similar memorandum has been addressed to the Secretary.²

Fisher Howe

² Not found in Department of State files.

11. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and His Special Assistant for Intelligence (Armstrong), Washington, May 19, 1955, 2:50 p.m.¹

TELEPHONE CALL TO MR. ARMSTRONG

The Sec. asked what is the present status of the Cominform. A. said it has never officially been liquidated but it has been pretty dormant for 3–4 years. It puts out a periodical from he believes

Budapest and has carried on a propaganda function, but there have been no meetings for its members. The Sec. asked what is it that runs the Communist Parties all over the world. The mechanism, said A., by which direction gets out is varied—sometimes the line is given by Pravda or Izvestia—sometimes in the journal or by courier and word of mouth. A. said the question of whether the Soviets might now close it out is one they have been speculating on as a gesture they could make without any cost to themselves. The Sec. asked what can they do with cost in relation to International Communism. A. said not very much because they maintain connections clandestinely. The Sec. asked re our never getting proof from Guatemala of any contact. A. said nothing conclusive. The Cominform was not used as a channel of guidance though it may have been partially. A. said he could bring someone up to talk about it, but the Sec. said he hadn’t the time now. The Sec. said we have to put our heads together with CIA and figure what it is we want to ask for. The Litvinof Agreement applies to us and is full of holes. It is hard to think of something that is not full of holes. To merely ask for the dissolution of the Cominform would be worse than nothing because it would not cost anything. A. will try to get something up.

2 Regarding the conditions in the notes exchanged on November 16, 1933, between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim M. Litvinov, by which the two countries agreed to enter into diplomatic relations, see Foreign Relations. The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, pp. 28–37.

3 No communication on this subject from Armstrong to Dulles has been found, but see Document 42.

12. Editorial Note

At the invitation of Nelson A. Rockefeller a group of 11 experts in Soviet-American relations met in Quantico, Virginia, June 5–10 to explore methods for exploiting Communist bloc vulnerabilities. The group, known as the Quantico Panel, was composed of the following members: Dr. Frederick Dunn, Director of the Center of International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; C.D. Jackson of Time-Life; Drs. Ellis A. Johnson, Paul Linebarger, and George Pettee of Johns Hopkins University; Dr. Max Millikan of the Center of International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Dr. Philip Mosely, Director of the Russian Institute, Columbia Universi-
ty; Dr. Stefan Possony of the Department of the Air Force; Dr. Speier of the Rand Corporation; Dr. Charles A.H. Thomson of the Brookings Institution; and W.W. Rostow of the Center of International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who was designated the panel chairman.

The Quantico Panel Report was submitted to Rockefeller under cover of a memorandum of June 10, 1955, from Rostow. The report consisted of five chapters and four appendices, plus ten papers prepared by individual panel members. In his covering memorandum, Rostow wrote that the one impression that stood out in his mind was "the unanimous belief of the Panel members that the U.S. now enjoys a significant but transitory period of over-all strength vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc." He noted further that the "next two or three years afford the United States the opportunity to negotiate from a strong position for genuine concessions by the enemy without sacrifice of essential positions of strength" and that this kind of negotiation, "along with a vigorous and urgent development of potential Free World strength, could create the conditions for victory in the cold war." Rostow's covering memorandum and a summary of the recommendations by the panel are printed in volume V, page 216.

13. Editorial Note

From July 18 to 23, President Eisenhower, British Prime Minister Eden, French Premier Faure, and Soviet Premier Bulganin met in Geneva to discuss disarmament, the German question, and the expansion of East-West contacts. Documentation on the meeting is in volume V, page 361.

A memorandum of a conversation between Vice President Nixon and Secretary Dulles on July 30, records Dulles as making the following remarks about a possible followup to the Geneva Summit Conference:

"I expressed the opinion that it would be of doubtful wisdom for the Vice President to seek to make a trip to the Soviet Union at this time. In any event, I felt that high level exchange should await the outcome of the second round at Geneva. I mentioned the activities of the Soviets in insisting upon the retention in Vienna of two of the major front organizations of international Communism and said this action was a striking contrast to what Bulganin and Khrushchev had told the President and me at Geneva. I thought we
ought to be a bit cautious about the Geneva outcome until there had been further testing and not seem to be going overboard as Eden was.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Vice President Nixon)

In a memorandum of August 8 to the Secretary of State Rockefeller discussed the factors bearing on a possible visit of Soviet leaders to the United States as follows:

“1. If the top Soviet leaders were to be invited to this country, it would seem that perhaps the best time for such a visit would be during November or December of this year for the following reasons:

   “a. Because if the Soviet leaders were here while Congress was in session, the question of appearing before a joint session of Congress might arise, and this could lead to some rather delicate situations.

   “b. If they were here during the 1956 elections, their visit might become involved in the domestic political situation.

   “c. A visit prior to the Big Four Ministers meeting in October would obviously be inadvisable; however, the possibility of an invitation to come following the meeting might have definite advantages in its effect on their delegation at the conference.

   “2. One objection to the visit has been that the President might be embarrassed by a reciprocal invitation. This could be satisfactorily taken care of should Vice President Nixon represent the President. This possibility has already been suggested by a number of Senators.” (Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/8–955)

In a memorandum to Rockefeller, August 18, Deputy Under Secretary of State Murphy replied that an invitation by the President to Soviet leaders to visit the United States would be “premature.” He explained that “we are in the midst of a probing operation designed to throw light on the actual intentions of the Soviet leadership vis-à-vis the United States” and that it would be better to wait until after the meeting of the Four Foreign Ministers in Geneva in October and November to consider the question of a possible visit. (ibid.)

14. Editorial Note

The Department of State was asked on June 28 to cooperate in the first major United States balloon intelligence operation directed at the Soviet bloc, eventually codenamed “Genetrix.” The United
States Air Force had been developing the concept of plastic balloon reconnaissance since 1946. After studying the use of plastic balloons as carriers of photographic and electronic reconnaissance equipment since 1948, by 1953 the Air Force was experimenting and testing the balloons for such purposes. By the middle of 1954, the Air Force had launched over 500 reconnaissance balloons in test project “Moby Dick” and had, by the fall of that year, drawn up a basic operational concept for all future important reconnaissance programs. On March 23, 1955, Air Force headquarters assigned the Strategic Air Command to undertake a pioneer reconnaissance of Soviet territory. (Memorandum of a conversation by Robert F. Packard, July 22; Department of State, INR Files: Lot 61 D 67, Genetrix; John T. Bohn, “History of the First Air Division,” unpublished paper done in SAC History Division, Office of Information, Headquarters, SAC, November 1956, volume 1, pages 2–3)

Project Genetrix was conceived and designed by the Rand Corporation for the United States Air Force as a means of overcoming the lack of photographic and meteorological intelligence on the Soviet bloc land mass. SAC was charged with operational responsibility for Genetrix. The plans initially called for free flight of balloons from west to east across the Soviet land mass from launching sites in Europe.

15. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions


CA–3790. Subject: Balloon Reconnaissance Operation—Project Genetrix. For principal officer only. The United States Air Force has made plans for a balloon reconnaissance operation to be conducted during the period 1 December 1955 and 1 May 1956. The code name for this project is Genetrix and is classified Confidential. The plan provides for the launching of approximately 2700 plastic, gondola-carrying balloons . . . . Of the 2700 balloons launched, 2500 will be photographic systems and 200 will be electronic intercept systems. Subsequent to launching, it is expected that the balloons will drift for

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5411/11–1455. Top Secret. Drafted by Furnas and cleared with Bennett, Barbour, and Major Conradi of the Air Force. Sent to 41 missions in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, as well as to Ottawa.
several days at various altitudes between 40,000 ft. and 80,000 ft. eastward over Communist-controlled territory. The greatest concentration of balloons will probably emerge from the Communist-controlled eastern coast of Asia into a planned recovery area in the Western Pacific between 10 degrees and 70 degrees north latitude. Elements of the First Air Division, Strategic Air Command, will be responsible for recovery of balloons in the planned recovery area.

Based on the best available information at this time, some of the reconnaissance balloons may be expected to land outside of the planned recovery area in some cases, and possibly in the area of your responsibility. It is requested that you render all possible and appropriate assistance to Air Force representatives in your area in connection with this project.

The United States Air Force will forward to all major air commands and air attachés concerned all details regarding Project Genetrix. Air attachés will have primary action responsibility in the recovery of the reconnaissance gondolas. Attachés or Air Force representatives will be instructed to brief thoroughly Chiefs of Mission and Principal Officers on pertinent details of the project to include the project's cover story which may be used when authorized to inform local government officials or members of the press.

The Department is now considering, with the Air Force, whether and in what form press releases should be made in Washington either when the project is initiated or when information concerning it is picked up here or abroad. Press releases or answers to questions in the field should be carefully coordinated with action in Washington. Accordingly, no action to publicize or to inform local officials should be taken by addressees or Air Force representatives prior to further communication from Department.

Communications to the Department on this subject should be by personal letter to W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant, Intelligence, or by telegram, or despatch marked “For Roger”.

Hoover
16. **Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

*Moscow, November 30, 1955—1 p.m.*

1235. For R. Air Attaché has received no recent or detailed information referred to in third paragraph CA–3790 Nov 14,² nor any indication of cover story. I assume that information which it is hoped warrant possible political repercussion, but hope very warrant possible political repercussion, but hope very much that Dept has anticipated use Soviets might make of this operation when, as would appear inevitable, it becomes known through balloons landing on Soviet territory and opportunity for damaging propaganda exploitation which this might afford. While Soviets might prefer to ignore operation in view of extreme sensitivity on balloon question, believe we should be prepared for every type Soviet political and propaganda reaction, possibly including raising matter UN. Anticipation of possible reaction is particularly important since in this instance there can be no question of disguising direct US Govt responsibility.

In view imminent inauguration project believe important that Air attaché here should be given soonest cover story.

**Bohlen**

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¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5411/11–3055. Top Secret.

² Supra.
17. Paper Prepared by the Division of Research for USSR and Eastern Europe, Office of Intelligence Research


THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP SITUATION AND THE CIA PAPER OF 12/30/55 ENTITLED "SPECULATIONS ON SOVIET LEADERSHIP SITUATION" 2

Most recent evidence supports the view that Khrushchev is the dominant figure in the Soviet hierarchy. He has become the most important spokesman of the Soviet regime on both domestic and foreign questions. It is likely that the hand of Khrushchev is behind a number of the shifts of local Party officials which have occurred since the July announcement of the forthcoming Party Congress, but not all officials affected can be directly linked to him. It is possible that these local changes are designed to achieve two related objectives: (1) they may serve to strengthen Khrushchev's influence throughout the system of territorial Party organs and effect a "packing" of delegations to the congress with his adherents, and (2) the shifts also raise a number of Party officials to positions where they would be logical nominees for membership in the Central Committee or other bodies to be elected at the congress. The rise of Khrushchevism influence does not mean, however, that "collective leadership" has lost all significance. "Collective leadership" never involved, and of course does not now involve, the equal sharing of power at the top level. Appreciation of Khrushchev's superior position should not lead, therefore, to the conclusion that he has secured, or is about to secure, a Stalin-type prominence.

1. The CIA paper Speculations on the Soviet Leadership Situation presents arguments for a series of three hypotheses. The first, the approaching impregnability of Khrushchev, is the most convincing of the three, but appears, nevertheless, to be overdrawn. The other two, positing a coalescence of anti-Khrushchev forces or arguing for a continued effectiveness of collective leadership, are weakly supported; in the case of the latter, over-weakly.

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/1-156. Secret. Attached to the source text was a brief memorandum of transmittal from Klessen to Howe, January 11.

2 A copy of the paper, sent to Klessen under cover of a memorandum of January 5 from Howe requesting his division's comments, is ibid. In the memorandum Howe noted that the CIA paper seemed "to present three different hypotheses and marshalls the arguments behind each without making a selection." Attached to the CIA paper was a note dated December 30 from Amory to Howe, in which Amory said he was "sticking with the third hypothesis for the time being."
2. The conclusion that Khrushchev's position "will become practically impregnable" after the 20th Party Congress (February 1956) is supported by some dubious arguments. Leadership changes are not as uniformly indicative of Khrushchev's sway as the paper implies. The authors seem to have overlooked the appointment to the Party's Presidium last July of Suslov, whose ties to Khrushchev are very tenuous. Likewise, Khrushchev's influence is not too evident in the appointment in 1955 of new deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers. Two of the new deputy chairmen cannot be directly linked with Khrushchev, nor can Mikoyan, Pervukhin, and Saburov, who were elevated to First Deputy Chairman. Even some of the recently-appointed Secretaries of the CPSU, Khrushchev's immediate lieutenants, cannot be classified in any definite way as Khrushchev protégés. The fact that Malenkov still holds a position in the government and that there was a long delay in the appointment of Matskevich as Minister of Agriculture could also be interpreted as indicating resistance to Khrushchev's influence.

Much of the argumentation on this topic is based on very capricious speculation. Thus, the authors describe Yegorov and Konstantinov as Malenkov men, although the evidence for the proposition is most inconclusive. Molotov is hastily dismissed as a deviationist. The formulation used by Molotov for which he was forced to admit his error was an incidental reference buried in a full dress foreign affairs speech. If it was considered at all serious ideologically it seems that some attempt would have been made before October to correct it, yet the speech was still being published in pamphlet form in minority languages as late as September. The main reasons for the rebuff to Molotov seems to be suggested by the timing of the letter just prior to the Geneva Foreign Minister's Conference. It appears that Khrushchev and Bulganin wished to emphasize their final authority in the field of foreign policy. Soviet comment at the time suggested that the censure was also related to the rapprochement with Yugoslavia, which Molotov reportedly opposed.

3. Reasoning and evidence buttressing the second and third hypotheses are extremely weak. The proposition on anti-Khrushchev moves is introduced by three most doubtful points: the so-called Malenkov promotion to First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the so-called Pravda-Izvestiya conflict over the corn program, and the appointment of a "Malenkov man," i.e. Konstantinov,

3 The party journal Kommunist on October 8, 1955, published a letter of September 16 from Molotov, in which he recanted comments he had made in his February 8, 1955, report to the Supreme Soviet about the foundations of a socialist society having already been built in the Soviet Union.
as agit-prop chief. The paper refers to five possibly dissatisfied groups in the population. There is very little evidence of this dissatisfaction, and in some cases even of the group’s existence. The argument for dissatisfaction within the army element seems to oppose the argument given earlier suggesting that the army will be faithful to Khrushchev.

The arguments presented to support the collective leadership hypothesis, the third, do not stand up very well and in some cases might be used to prove the opposite point. What is called “the best ammunition” is Khrushchev’s and Bulganin’s willingness to travel abroad for five weeks. Their willingness to travel abroad so long could also be interpreted as reflecting Khrushchev’s complete confidence in the security of his position. The contention that Mikoyan and Bulganin are friends or “cronies” of Khrushchev does not necessarily have anything to do with the existence of collective leadership.

4. The authors show a certain naivete and amateurishness in their handling of evidence on the leadership question. This is exemplified in the reference to Kaganovich speaking “as one fully in accord with current policies” at the October anniversary celebration, to Mikoyan acting “as if he fully approves the current state of affairs,” to Bulganin as “content to play a supporting role,” and to Zhukov as “prominently associated with policies of the regime.” These postures and declarations are perfectly standard and prove nothing about leadership struggles or harmony.

The treatment of the military in the first part seems to be an especially bad example of misuse of fact. The contention is made that the officer corps is probably in a better position under Khrushchev and Bulganin than it was under Malenkov. Apparently this is based on the elevation of a number of general officers and marshals to higher ranks in 1955. The authors seem to forget that there were a number of promotions when Malenkov was Chairman of the Council of Ministers; that the call-up and discharge procedure was put on a more regular basis in 1953; and that other privileges were granted and efforts made to raise the prestige of the military before Malenkov was ousted. It should be recalled, also, that Marshal Zhukov was promoted to a top military position and subsequently elected to the Party Central Committee in the period of Malenkov ascendancy. The purported satisfaction of the military in 1955 over their budget is unconvincing. Although the publicly-announced amount increased in 1955 over 1954, there is great uncertainty as to the actual total.
18. Diary Entry by the President’s Press Secretary (Hagerty) ¹

Washington, January 24, 1956.

At 12:15 Shanley came into my office to tell me that he had just received a call from the Secretary of State ² informing him that the State Department, through Livingston Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, had received a call from the Russian Embassy requesting an appointment for the Russian Ambassador, Georgi M. Zaroubin, to see the President to deliver a personal message from Premier Bulganin. ³

Shanley said that Dulles, in talking to him, had asked him to check with me to see how I felt about such a request before we talked to the President. Dulles had explained to Shanley that usually under diplomatic protocol, whenever an Ambassador of any kind requested an appointment with the President to present a message from his Head of State, it was granted. Shanley and I both agreed that we would tell the President of the request and also about Foster’s recommendation that the President see him. We discussed briefly the time of the appointment, and both of us agreed that we should not put it on the President’s schedule before the press conference, which was scheduled for 10:30 A.M. tomorrow. We agreed on suggesting to him the hour of 11:30.

I asked Shanley if the State Department had told him what it was about, and he said that they had not and that the Embassy had not given Mr. Merchant any indication of the contents of the message.

When the President came back from lunch at 2 o’clock, we went in to see him and inform him of the request. He agreed with Dulles’ recommendation and said that he would see the Russian Ambassador either at 3:30 that afternoon or at 11:30 the next morning—“or any other time that Foster recommends.” He asked us if we knew what the Russian Ambassador wanted to see him about, and we told him the State Department said they didn’t know. He asked us to recheck with Dulles on the time of the appointment. As we were leaving the room, he called me back and said, “Jim, see what information you can get.”

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers.
² A memorandum of this telephone conversation, which took place at 12:14 p.m., prepared by Phyllis D. Bernau, is in Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations.
³ According to Beam’s memorandum of January 24 through Merchant to Secretary Dulles, it was Beam, not Merchant, who had been called by the Soviet Embassy. (Department of State, EUR Files: Lot 59 D 233, Memos 1956–7)
Shanley and I put in a joint call to Dulles from Shanley’s office. We told him that the President had agreed to see the Russian Ambassador and had offered either 3:30 that afternoon or 11:30 the next morning. Foster agreed with us that it should not be before the press conference because that would probably open up the press conference to a lot of questions. I asked Dulles if he had any idea what it was about, and he said he had but he could not discuss it with me on the telephone. He asked me to come over to his office immediately because there were some matters he wanted to discuss with me to be relayed to the President before the appointment was definitely set.

I immediately got a staff car and went over to the Secretary’s office, going into the building through the basement entrance and up to his office by the private elevator. Dulles and Herbert Hoover, Jr. were waiting for me, and we had a meeting, which lasted about 20 minutes, on the subject.

Dulles started off the conversation by telling me that the call had come in earlier that morning from the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires to Livingston Merchant. Zaroubin was out of town in New York. The Chargé d’Affaires, requesting the appointment in the name of the Ambassador, said that the Ambassador had a personal message from Bulganin to be delivered to the President. Merchant asked the Chargé if he could tell him what the message was, and the Chargé repeated quite bluntly that it was a “personal” message from Bulganin. Livingston then asked if it dealt with disarmament and the Chargé said that it did not. That was as far as Merchant could go. He had to drop the conversation.

Dulles then said that the message could be any number of things but that he and Herbert Hoover, Jr. thought they had a good idea of what it was. They said that they were sure this sudden Soviet move, with the request that the Ambassador personally deliver the message (the first time that the Soviets have requested an appointment since we have been in office—or as a matter of fact, some time prior to that) was undoubtedly in line with some new Soviet propaganda program. Dulles stressed the point that the Chargé d’Affaires’ answer that it did not deal with disarmament would in Dulles’ opinion eliminate a possibility that it might deal with some aspects of the President’s “Open Sky” proposal.

Dulles said that what he thought it was was a very strong Soviet protest on our secret “Weather Balloons”. This program was

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4 A memorandum of this conversation, which took place at 2 p.m., prepared by Bernau, is in Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations. Secretary Dulles also called Radford at 12:09, and Allen Dulles at 1:05 about the Soviet Embassy’s request and its possible significance. (Department of State, EUR Files: Lot 59 D 233, Memos 1956-7)
started in full swing three weeks ago, and at the time it was started we expected that it would take the Soviets about three weeks to catch up with it. We know that some of these balloons were shot down by Soviet aircraft and anti-aircraft fire. Dulles said that he expected the protest, if that is what it was, to be coupled with another attack against the President’s “Open Sky” recommendation. He said that he expected that the protest would cite the “weather balloons” as another instance of the United States attempting to get military information over Soviet territory and that the “Open Sky” recommendations were merely another step in that direction.

The Air Force publicly announced the “weather balloons” in connection with the National Geophysical Year but that the announcement had not received much attention. He (Dulles) said it was extremely lucky that there had been news stories of late about the weather balloons in Tokyo which had been floated over the Pacific Ocean and which were presently floating around the skies of Texas and Oklahoma.

If this protest followed along these lines, we would, of course, deny it and say that we were participating, as we had already long since announced, in research for the Geophysical Year and that such research would be made available to all countries.

I asked Dulles if the Ambassador himself would call on the President, and after checking with Livingston Merchant, he said that the appointment itself would be made with Zaroubin. Dulles and Hoover also thought that if they were right in their guess, the Russians would put out a copy of the letter from Moscow at about the time Zaroubin was seeing the President. That would launch a world-wide propaganda campaign against the United States, picking up the old charges of war mongering and all the rest.

I told Dulles that normally I announce the President’s schedule at four o’clock for the next day and that if the appointment with Zaroubin were set for 11:30, I would, of course, have to announce it at four. He agreed that this was the way to do it to make it as routine as possible although we both realized that the Russian Ambassador visiting the President was in itself a news story. Dulles said he thought I should say in my announcement that protocol had been observed, that the call had come in to Livingston Merchant and had been relayed to the Appointment Secretary at the White House. He also said that he thought I should say that the Ambassador was going to deliver a personal message from Bulganin so that this would show the world that this was handling the call on a strictly diplomatic routine basis.

Dulles also wanted me to tell the President that the reason he was urging this so strongly was that if the President saw Zaroubin to deliver a message from Bulganin, he would think that the Kremlin
would have a difficult job in the future of declining to see Ambassador Bohlen with messages from the President that we wanted to get into the Kremlin. In the past the Russians have insisted that Bohlen present messages from the President to the Russian Foreign Minister, Molotov, instead of Bulganin. We have always felt that it would be much better if our Ambassador could deliver personal messages from the President directly to Bulganin without having to go through Molotov.

Dulles asked me to go back and get to the President with this information as soon as I could and then let him know of the President’s final decision. He said the Russian Embassy had been calling Merchant’s office every hour on the hour to see if the State Department had an answer and that he wanted to give the answer to them as soon as possible. I told Foster that I would do so and left his office, returning immediately to the White House. ⁵

When I got back, Dillon Anderson was with the President briefing him on National Security Council matters, but I sent in a note through Shanley saying that Dulles had asked me to come to his office and that he had some confidential information which he wanted me to tell the President as soon as possible. Shanley brought the note in and came out to tell me that the President would see me in ten minutes just as soon as he finished with Dillon Anderson. When Anderson came out, I went in to see the President and told him of my talk with Dulles. He readily agreed that he should not see the Russian Ambassador before the press conference and then said, “Foster may be right on his guess. I haven’t thought too much of this balloon thing and I don’t blame the Russians at all. I’ve always thought it was sort of a dirty trick. But that was the gamble we took when we made the decision and they ought to have a good answer ready for me if I have to use it when I see the Ambassador. You call Foster and tell him that I want his suggestions for that answer over in my office in a sealed envelope no later than 9:30 tomorrow morning. Also tell Foster that I want him here with me when the Ambassador comes in.

⁵ After Hagerty left, Dulles called Merchant at 2:23 p.m. to verify that it was the Soviet Ambassador and not the Chargé who wished to see the President. The Secretary also called Howe at 2:29 to ask who made the original announcement, and Howe indicated that it was the Air Force in California. Howe subsequently called back and transmitted the message through Bernau that there had been a simultaneous release to the Associated Press ticker in Washington and at the launching site in Vernalis, California. Howe said that the announcement had not been picked up particularly by American newspapers, but it had been by the foreign press, including British and French newspapers. He noted also that subsequent releases conforming to the original release had been made in Tokyo, Hawaii, Alaska, and Germany, and the Air Force believed that a release was made in Norway as well. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)
I also told the President that I would have to announce this at four o’clock, saying that Zaroubin was coming to see him and he asked me why I had to do that and why I could not postpone it until tomorrow. “If you announce it today, you’ll have a whole flock of cameramen and reporters outside.” I told the President that this would be so but that Foster and I agreed that it should be put on the schedule and handled as routinely as possible. I said that we both felt that the Russian Embassy would leak the appointment and that this would cause more confusion and more mystery than a straightforward announcement of it from the White House. He thought that over for a minute and then said, “Yes, I guess that’s right. O.K. You announce it at four.”

The President also said that he was quite sure that this was undoubtedly part of a Soviet propaganda move timed deliberately to break just before his meeting with Prime Minister Eden. 6 “That’s the way they do things, and we will have to handle it as carefully and delicately as we can.” The President, however, warned that we must not at anytime close the door on such messages as this coming through and would have to receive them and give them study no matter whether we might be convinced in advance that they were merely propaganda steps. 7

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7 Hagerty and Shanley passed on the President’s wishes to Dulles in a telephone call at 3:11 p.m. (Memorandum of telephone conversation by Bernau; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)

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19. Diary Entry by the President’s Press Secretary (Hagerty) 1


In at 8:00. Went in to see the President after the press conference staff meeting. I told him that I had been thinking about what the message might contain and that while I thought Foster probably might be right, I had also thought overnight of several other things it could be. Among these were: (1) A request by Bulganin and Khrushchev to visit this country following their visit to England; (2) A seeming acceptance of some phases of the President’s “Open Sky” program with a lot of strings attached; (3) A statement to the

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1 Source: Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers.
President that the Russians would agree with the United States to call off all thermo-nuclear tests.

The President said that he thought that those could also be considered as possibilities and then he smiled calmly and said, "Well, we'll know the answer in a few hours." He told me to call Dulles and tell him to be on hand in his office before the Soviet Ambassador arrived at the White House.

When we returned from the press conference, the President had an appointment with Clare Booth Luce and Dulles arrived in Shapley's office about 11:20. Zaroubin arrived at the White House at 11:25 and pushed his way through a horde of photographers and reporters at the main entrance of the Executive offices without any comment. He was accompanied by John Simmons who escorted him to the conference room. I met him there and told him the President would be with him in a few minutes. He said he was glad to see me and that he had not seen me since Geneva. I replied that I was glad to see him. We were in the conference room with Alexander Logofet, the State Department interpreter. Clare Booth Luce came out in a few minutes, and Dulles went into the President's office.

Promptly at 11:30 Zaroubin was brought in with John Simmons to the President's office, the interpreter accompanying them. Simmons then left the office, and the President and Dulles conferred with Zaroubin.

(See memorandum of conversation supplied by the State Department.)

[Here follows the remainder of the entry.]

\(^2\text{Infra.}\)
20. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, January 25, 1956, 11:30 a.m. ¹

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Soviet Ambassador Zaroubin
Secretary of State Dulles
Mr. Logofet (interpreter)

After the Soviet Ambassador had made a statement from an aide-mémoire (attached), ² the President spoke as follows:

1. His remarks were necessarily of a very preliminary character.
2. He was absolutely and most completely sincere in his conviction of the need for better relations between our countries.
3. He had been concerned with the deterioration in those relations since the meeting of last July.
4. He shared the view that the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States wanted peace.
5. He would give serious study to the proposal now made by Chairman Bulganin and in due course make a written reply.

The President then asked whether it was the view of the Soviet Government that the proposal should be kept confidential, at least for the time being. The President expressed the view that the matter could be developed more productively if it were treated as confidential, but that we would of course acquiesce in whatever the views of the Soviet Government were in this respect.

The Soviet Ambassador stated that he had no instructions from his Government on this point, but would immediately communicate with his Government, and in the meantime would not disclose the nature of the communication. He expressed his personal agreement with the point of view on this matter expressed by President Eisenhower.

I then indicated that perhaps the Soviet Ambassador had better follow the usual practice, which is that after talking with the President, visitors make no statement of their own, but leave it to the White House to make such statement as it deemed appropriate. The Ambassador said he would follow this practice.

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Confidential; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles. A summary record of the meeting prepared by Alexander Logofet is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

² Not printed. Zaroubin also presented to the President a letter from Bulganin dated January 23, which proposed a treaty of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States, to which was attached a draft of such a treaty. Both Bulganin's letter and the Soviet draft treaty are printed in Department of State Bulletin, February 6, 1956, pp. 193–195.
Thereupon the President and I sought to formulate the statement which the White House would issue and it was agreed that Mr. Hagerty would put out a statement which would say in substance that there had been a friendly communication from Chairman Bulganin to the President which was another one of the communications which they had exchanged since becoming acquainted at the Summit Conference.

The Soviet Ambassador expressed his accord with a statement of this general character. Thereupon the Soviet Ambassador and the interpreter retired.

The President and I then discussed the situation briefly. I said that I felt it probable that this was essentially a propaganda move, but that, of course, we should not jump to that conclusion. I said I saw significance in the fact that this proposal was made as a bilateral proposal to the United States, apparently without corresponding the proposal to the UK and France, although this might come later.

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21. Diary Entry by the President’s Press Secretary (Hagerty) ¹


[Here follows the beginning of the entry.]

Zaroubin was in the President’s office for fifteen minutes and left at 11:45. He declined any comment at all to the reporters in the lobby other than to say that he thought the President was looking fine. This was in accordance with the President’s wishes and the agreement that Zaroubin had made in the President’s office. When the Ambassador left, the President called for me and I went into his office through Ann Whitman’s office. Dulles was alone with him. As I walked in, the President said, “Well, Jim, it wasn’t what we thought. There is no mention of the balloons.”

Dulles said that he was quite surprised that it had not been balloons but then laughed and said, “Maybe that’s what you get for having somewhat of a guilty conscience.” The President replied that he was sure that the Russians knew about the balloons and that they might bring it up at some later date. The President then told me that he had agreed that there would be no publication now of

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers.
the letter but that he had also told the Soviet Ambassador that I would make a short statement. He then said, "Why don't you say something like this: "Intermittently since the Geneva Conference the President and Premier Bulganin have been exchanging correspondence. The Soviet Ambassador brought in a letter containing certain ideas which the Premier has asked the President to study."

Dulles interrupted to say that he thought the letter should be described as "friendly" and the President said yes, I should put that in. He then told me that he thought I should add that the Premier had asked the President to study the ideas further in the interest of promoting world peace. The President agreed to this and I revised my statement accordingly.

I then asked the President and the Secretary if they thought there was any danger of the message breaking from Moscow. The President said he did not think so, at least at this time, since he had raised that point with Zaroubin and said that it probably should be released at a later date. Zaroubin said that he would check with his government and let Dulles know.

I held my press conference on the statement and declined to answer other questions. Speculation throughout the day was on almost every subject conceivable, ranging from a story by the New York Daily News that Khrushchev and Bulganin had invited themselves to this country to others more near the mark on the renewal of the "Spirit of Geneva."

I talked to Dulles later in the day, and we both agreed that it was a very clever letter which the Soviets would undoubtedly use for propaganda purposes. The idea of a 20-year Treaty of Friendship with the United States, Dulles told me, was not a new one. Molotov had discussed it with him at Geneva. There is nothing proposed in the Treaty which cannot be done through the machinery of the United Nations to which both the United States and the USSR have pledged themselves.

Dulles said that his guess is that the Russians have realized since Geneva that they have given the impression to the free world, and to much of the neutral world, that they have broken agreements which they made at Geneva and are desperately trying to get back into the "big smile and friendly neighbor" attitude. At any rate, the proposal for a treaty will be sure to touch off a very lengthy debate in this country, and Dulles believes that we should turn it down politely, pointing out that we want deeds not words.

Later in the day I got a query from the British press as to whether we were going to wireless a copy of the letter to Eden on board the Queen Elizabeth and I called Dulles again and told him of my query and he said I had better duck that one, that we could not
officially send anything like that to the British without including the French and possibly the Italians and Germans.

I received a copy of the translation of the letter, the memorandum of conversation in the President’s office and the proposed text of the Treaty at my home at 8:30. I wanted it in case the news broke from Moscow or leaked from Washington. Radio Moscow played it perfectly straight that evening and merely said that the message from Bulganin had been delivered to the President and that the American press showed great interest in it.

I had only one call during the evening, that from Bob Clark of INS, checking on the Daily News story of a Bulganin–Khrushchev visit to this country. I told Bob that I could not comment but if I were in his place, I would advise the INS not to pick it up.

22. Diary Entry by the President’s Press Secretary (Hagerty) ¹


I went in to see the President early in the morning to tell him that I had been thinking about the message overnight, that I thought it was very cleverly phrased and that I thought we should get it out publicly as soon as possible. He told me that he thought that was right but that we would have to wait until we heard back from Zaroubin since he had requested Zaroubin to check with his government. He laughingly told me that he was somewhat relieved at the proposals made in the message because—“I had another idea what it was that I didn’t tell anyone. I thought that it was an invitation from Bulganin for me to visit Russia. That would have been something to give us a lot of thought.” I asked the President if he would have accepted. He merely laughed in reply and said, “Well, we didn’t get the invitation.”

Turning back to our original subject of release of the letter, the President asked me to discuss it with Dulles. I saw Dulles before the NSC meeting and told him my feeling that we should get it out. He said he agreed with me and the longer we held it, the more the Russian propaganda machine would be able to build it up as a great new proposal which in effect was merely a repetition of all the previous Russian proposals rolled into one. He said that he was going to ask the President to discuss it with just the members of the

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers.
Security Council in his office after the meeting. This the President did.  

Later before Dulles left the White House we had another discussion and he asked me personally to discuss it with the President to see if we could get authority from the President to ask Chip Bohlen to get an agreement to release the correspondence. I said I thought there would probably have to be a White House statement in connection with the release, and he agreed. Dulles said that he thought it should be clearly pointed out that there were no new proposals and that it should not be considered too seriously. What they are trying to do by this maneuver is to try to sell us a Treaty of Friendship and then go around and put pressure on all the smaller countries to do the same. The UN Charter provides for everything they propose, particularly the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means and it would simply break up the United Nations and put a lot of pressure on all the other countries of the world. "I'm against it, and it should be rejected, although I suppose we must say that we are studying it." I told the Secretary I would talk to the President when he came back from lunch.

When the President returned from lunch, I told him of my conversation with Dulles and the President said that if Foster thought we were aiding the Communists by holding it up, we should release it, but he insisted that we should not do it on our own but we should get Russian agreement. I told Dulles of this conversation and when he went in to see the President on the Eden visit, the President discussed it with Dulles and also gave him authority to wireless a synopsis of the letter to Eden on board the Queen Elizabeth. (This was the first time such authority was given, and it was strange that earlier in the day, a short UP story from the Queen Elizabeth said that Aldrich and Eden were conferring together on the contents of the letter. Until the President gave authority, no such message had been sent to either Aldrich or Eden on board the ship and the story was probably either a complete dope story by a reporter or fed out by a British member of the party to give the impression that Eden had been cut in on it.) The wireless went off about three o'clock.  

Later in the evening I received press calls, particularly from Bill Lawrence of The New York Times who came awful close to the actual

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2 No record of this discussion has been found.
3 A copy of the message dated January 26 from the President to Eden was attached to a brief covering memorandum from Robert G. Barnes to Goodpaster, also dated January 26, in which Barnes said the message was handed to the British Embassy at 2 p.m. that day and that he understood the message had been cleared with the President by telephone. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)
facts. Lawrence personally called me to tell me that the Times tomorrow morning was going to print a story which said that the new part of the proposal was a non-aggression pact between the United States and the USSR. He said that the Times had received this information from an informer.

I again called Dulles and urged speedy action in getting agreement to release the letter, and he promised that he would do so, getting off a cable tonight to Chip Bohlen requesting such permission. He said that he hoped we could get it out by tomorrow.

At six o'clock Zaroubin called at the Department of State to see Livingston Merchant and informed Merchant that he had now received instructions from his government. They were to the effect that the Russians did not plan to release it "for some time". This is what we expected and is completely in line with the Soviet propaganda campaign which they are now obviously waging on the message. When Zaroubin left, Merchant went to Dulles' office and they dispatched a cable to Bohlen telling him to tell Molotov that because of the widespread speculation on the message in this country we wanted him to know that we would release it soon, either Friday or Saturday.

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4 A memorandum of Merchant's conversation with Zaroubin is in Department of State, Central File 611.61/1–2656.

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23. Diary Entry by the President's Press Secretary (Hagerty) 1


I had a rough night last night on this whole matter. The New York Times was first in print with the story that Russia was offering us a bilateral Treaty of Friendship or non-aggression pact and I received quite a few calls starting at 10:30 P.M. and running through until about 3:00 A.M. To all of them I replied I had no further comment other than what I had said the first day on the message, and that was that.

When I called Dulles at nine this morning, I said to him, "Good morning, Mr. Secretary, this is your midnight correspondent." He laughed and asked if I had many queries last night and I told him I had. He was not attending the Cabinet meeting because he was

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1 Source: Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers.
working with his people on a draft report turning down the Russian proposal. He thought it was particularly important to have a reply by the President included in any publication of the Bulganin message, and I agreed.

I saw the Secretary at 2:25 just before he went in to see the President on the Eden visit, and he said he had been working all day on the reply and that he expected to have a draft over for the President’s study by 3:30. I told him that I had been queried by some of the newspaper people as to whether or not the United States or the Administration would fill in in a bi-partisan way the leadership of Congress before any action was taken on this publicly. He said we probably should do that and that the leaders on both sides should know in advance that we were going to turn it down.

Carl McCardle called me later at three o’clock to tell me that he had an idea where the Times got their story. I believe that the State Department has been playing this one close to its vest and I personally do not think that the leaks came from there. . . .

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24. Editorial Note

On Saturday, January 28, the United States Government released the text of Bulganin’s letter of January 23 to the President, along with a reply dated January 28 by the President. In his reply, the President noted that a number of provisions in the proposed treaty of friendship and cooperation were already contained in the United Nations Charter, to which both countries were signatories, and he wondered “whether again going through a treaty-making procedure, and this time on a bilateral basis only, might indeed work against the cause of peace by creating the illusion that a stroke of a pen had achieved a result which in fact can be achieved only by a change of spirit.” The President reiterated the United States Government’s dedication to achieving progress on the three issues discussed at the Geneva Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers meetings the previous year—namely, European security and Germany, disarmament, and East-West contacts—and said he was looking forward to receiving a further expression of Bulganin’s views. For the full text of Eisenhower’s reply, see Department of State Bulletin, February 6, 1956, pages 191–193.

In his response of February 1, which was delivered by Ambassador Zarubin the following day and released at that time by the
United States Government, Bulganin emphasized the Soviet Government's belief in the usefulness of a Soviet-American treaty, especially in that such a treaty would make it easier to resolve the issues discussed in Geneva. The text of Bulganin's letter of February 1 to Eisenhower is in Department of State Bulletin, March 26, 1955, pages 515–518.

According to a memorandum of a telephone conversation between Secretary Dulles and W. Park Armstrong, on February 3, the following exchange took place:

"A. is watching Genetrix, and has some people in his office on it now. The Sec. is anxious to keep close watch on the extent to which they are coming through and be alert to any evidence there is of diminishing returns. The Sec. wants to stop it if it gets to that basis. A. said they are talking of the Air Force desire to raise the daily launching rate to 40 per day—only 11 went up yesterday. A few are coming through now and some have begun to transmit but have not reached the area of cutdown. A. will come up after he finishes with the people there. The Sec. said he and the Pres. are nervous about it. If it is not producing substantial returns, he does not want to go on about it. We found out what can be done and probably discovered some bugs in the thing. They agreed the time for protest is near. (Memorandum of telephone conversation by Phyllis D. Bernau; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

On February 4, the Soviet Government delivered a note to the American Embassy in Moscow protesting and demanding the immediate cessation of United States reconnaissance balloon flights over the Soviet Union, as well as an end to propaganda balloon flights to which it had protested before. The note indicated that some of the reconnaissance balloons, with "automatically operated photo cameras for aerial survey, radio transmitters, radio receivers and other things," had been captured. For text of the Soviet note, see Department of State, Bulletin, February 20, 1956, page 295.

According to the Secretary's memorandum of his conversation with the President at 10:15 a.m. on February 6, the following discussion took place:

"We discussed the matter of the Soviet protest about the meteorological balloons. The President recalled that both he and I had been rather allergic to this project and doubted whether the results would justify the inconvenience involved. The President said he thought the operation should now be suspended. I agreed, but said I thought we should handle it so it would not look as though we had been caught with jam on our fingers. I said we would prepare and promptly dispatch an appropriate note." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

In a memorandum of February 7 to Macomber, Beam wrote that the draft United States reply had been cleared with the Air Force
and in the Department of State, with three changes included at the suggestion of the Department’s Legal Office. (Department of State, EUR Files: Lot 59 D 233, Memos 1956–7)

On February 8, Ambassador Bohlen delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry a reply to the Soviet note of February 4. It reaffirmed that the United States Government “is not directly or indirectly participating in any project to dispatch propaganda balloons over the Soviet Union.” The note also explained that the other balloons were meteorological balloons, the launching of which had been announced publicly on January 8, and gave the following description of the project:

“The balloons are equipped with instruments to measure and record meteorological phenomena such as air jet streams, and with photographic apparatus to provide pictures of cloud formations which bear on air movements at various velocities. Much valuable scientific information is being accumulated. It is hoped that this method of meteorological research will contribute substantially to the forthcoming International Geophysical Year programs.

“The declared purpose of the project is made clear by the fact that the equipment itself contains instructions in several languages, including Russian, for its recovery and delivery to the authorities charged with the evaluation of the data obtained. In the interest of scientific research, it would be much appreciated if the Soviet Government would return the instruments which have come into its possession.

“Similar surveys have been conducted for some time through the launching of some thousands of meteorological balloons over the United States. These have been equipped with safety devices and have constituted no hazard even to dense civilian air traffic. As explained in the announcement, the balloons observed by the Soviet Government are equipped with the same safety devices.

“The United States Government would be happy to explain further to the Soviet Government the safety measures incorporated in the project. Provisionally, however, in order to avoid misunderstandings, and in view of the Soviet Government’s objection, the United States Government will seek to avoid the launching of additional balloons which, on the basis of known data might transit the USSR.”

Appended to the note was a copy of the Department of Defense press release of January 8 announcing the project. For text of the United States note of February 8 and the Department of Defense press release of January 8, see Department of State Bulletin, February 20, 1956, pages 293–295.
25. Policy Information Statement for the United States
Information Agency

EUR-243

Washington, February 8, 1956.

20TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU

The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
is scheduled to meet in Moscow, February 14, 1956. Under the
Soviet system the Party is the directing and controlling force in the
Soviet state, and the Party Congress is theoretically the supreme
Party forum. The Party itself has been alternately subjected to the
control of a few persons, or of one person, i.e., Stalin, who became
the unquestioned master of both Party and state.

Six Party Congresses were held before the October Revolution,
in various countries. From 1918 to 1925, Congresses were held
annually. The 15th Congress was held in 1927, and the 16th, 17th
and 18th in 1930, 1934 and 1939, respectively. At the 17th Congress
in 1934, it was decided that Party Congresses would be held every
three years. This rule was not observed. It was not until October
1952 that the 19th Congress was held.

At the 19th Congress many changes were made in Party rules.
The word “bolshevik” was dropped from the name of the Party,
which became the “Communist Party of the Soviet Union.” The
Politburo was replaced by a larger Presidium, and the Central
Committee was enlarged. After the death of Stalin, the Presidium
was reduced in size, so that it was again numerically comparable to
the old Politburo.

The convening of the 20th Party Congress was announced by
the Soviet press on July 14, 1955. The decision was made a few days
previously by the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU,
which published the following agenda:

1. Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU by Secretary
   of the Central Committee, N.S. Khrushchev.
2. Report of the Central Auditing Commission of the CPSU by
   Chairman of the Auditing Commission, P.U. Moskhatov.
3. Directives of the 20th Congress of the CPSU for the Sixth
   Five-Year Plan for the development of the national economy of the
   USSR in 1956–60, by Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers,
   N.A. Bulganin.
4. Election of the central organs of the Party.

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 511.00/2–856. Confidential. Drafted
by Collins and cleared with EE, P, and EUR. This statement was sent to 115
diplomatic and consular posts as an enclosure to instruction CA–6001, February 8.
Delegates to the 20th Party Congress have been and are being selected by oblast, krai and republic Party Congresses. These meetings have been accompanied by announcement of certain changes in the positions of state and Party leaders. These changes give some reason to believe that the Congress itself may reveal certain other adjustments in the top Party leadership. There has been speculation that Party First Secretary Khrushchev is strengthening his position as top man of the Party hierarchy. For the present, however, it seems unlikely that he will yet assume the position once occupied by Stalin.

The draft directives of the Sixth Five-Year Plan will no doubt be adopted in approximately their present form.

It is also possible that the Congress may receive a report from the special committee created in 1952 to revise the Party Program. There have been no published revisions of the Program of the Party adopted in 1919. The special committee was headed by Stalin, and included Beria, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Molotov and several others. Since Stalin and Beria are dead and Malenkov has been demoted, the special committee has presumably been reorganized in the meantime.

The 20th Party Congress will probably not bring any surprises on policy issues. The post-Stalin leadership has been rather voluble in the discussion of Party lines and purposes. Nevertheless, the proceedings of the 20th Congress will be followed with considerable interest, particularly from the standpoint of any possible personnel shifts within the Party hierarchy, and tightening up of Party ideology.

Public Position:

It is not in our interest to give the 20th Party Congress undue public attention. The proceedings should be reported factually and objectively without any great amount of commentary on the news emanating from the Congress itself. If the Congress should develop news of a sensational character, further guidance will be given.

The meeting of the 20th Party Congress offers a good opportunity to illustrate the great contrast between the Soviet one-party dictatorship and our democratic system of parties and government. The fact that this is an election year in the United States underlines the appropriateness of comment along these lines.

The subserviency of national Communist parties to the Soviet Party and to Soviet policy can be underlined by appropriate noting of attendance at the Moscow sessions by representatives of these parties.

The following themes could be used to emphasize the nature of the Communist Party dictatorship in the Soviet Union:
1. Article 126 of the Soviet Constitution establishes the Communist Party as the only legal party.
2. The Party makes all the important decisions in the Soviet system, not the legislative or executive bodies.
3. The Party itself is controlled and directed by an elite group at the top. The Congress is a rubber-stamp for decisions made by this small group.
4. Any changes in leadership or organizational forms do not alter the autocratic and dictatorial nature of the regime.

Caution:

Speculation on moves toward a Stalinist-type, one-man control should be avoided.

26. Editorial Note

The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union opened in the Great Kremlin Palace in Moscow on February 14, 1956. In attendance were the delegates to the Congress and representatives from 55 foreign Communist parties. A selection of speeches at the Congress, the Report of the Central Committee given by Khrushchev on February 15, Bulganin's Report on the Sixth Five-Year Plan published in Pravda on February 22, the resolutions and directives adopted by the Congress, and a list of the officials elected at the Congress are printed in Gruliow, Current Soviet Policies—II, pages 8–202. The fact that Khrushchev gave a speech before a closed session on the concluding day of the Congress, February 25, was not known in the West until the middle of March (see Document 33). Telegrams from the Embassy in Moscow to the Department of State reporting and commenting on the proceedings of the Congress are in Department of State, Central File 761.00. Bohlen's recollections of the Congress are in Witness to History, pages 393–396.
[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

The Director of Central Intelligence said that he would like to comment at some little length on developments at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party which was concluding today at Moscow. The composition of the new Presidium (Politburo) had not yet been announced, but it seemed unlikely that there would be significant changes in the top personnel. 60% of the new Presidium consisted of members who had been re-elected; 40% were newly elected. Of the latter group, Khrushchev had obtained a large number of his own supporters. Mr. Dulles commented that it would be interesting to see whether Molotov would continue in the roster of the eleven full members of the Presidium. That he would was likely, although his position was weakening and he might disappear from power in a year’s time.

At this point the President interrupted to ask who would be Molotov’s successor if he did disappear, and would this successor be even more anti-Western than Molotov. Mr. Dulles replied to the President by stating that a successor to Molotov would be more in line with the Soviet “new-look”. He added that Molotov’s speech before the Party Congress had been one of the briefest and most colorless of the many addresses. It was actually possible to deduce the rating of high Soviet officials by the length of the speeches they had made.

Mr. Dulles then held up to view copies of the full texts of all the speeches made at the Party Congress. He observed that Mikoyan’s speech was among the most interesting; in short, Mikoyan charged that the United States was setting up an Iron Curtain. Mr.

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2 The Congress concluded on February 25. Dulles may have been referring to the plenary session of the Communist Party Central Committee held on February 27.
3 Molotov’s speech, published in Pravda on February 20, was analyzed in telegram 1871 from Moscow, February 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/2-2056) An English translation is in Gruliov, Current Soviet Policies—II, pp. 98-103.
4 Mikoyan’s speech of February 16, published in Pravda on February 18 was analyzed in telegram 1861 from Moscow, February 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/2-1856) An English translation is in Gruliov, Current Soviet Policies—II, pp. 80-89.
Dulles then indicated that the CIA was preparing complete texts of all the speeches. These would prove, he believed, very significant guides to Soviet intentions. We had somewhat neglected these speeches in the past, just as we had unfortunately neglected Hitler’s Mein Kampf. There was no intention now to repeat this error. The President asked Mr. Dulles to brief down these speeches and send copies of the briefs to all interested members of the National Security Council. 5

Secretary Dulles agreed with Mr. Allen Dulles on the importance of trying to find out what the Soviets were actually circulating as guides for the conduct of members of the Communist Party. We must pay close attention to what they are teaching to their subordinate party members. It was this kind of information which would provide real indications of possible changes in the Soviet Union. Such indications were far more significant than what the Soviet leaders said to the outside world.

Mr. Allen Dulles then went on to sum up the significance of the Party Congress. In the first place, the present collective leadership of the Soviet Union is accomplishing a peaceful evolution to replace Stalinist control. They were dropping the idea of absolute dictatorship; they were minimizing the threat of military power to accomplish their ends; and they seemed to be abandoning the dogma of the inevitability of war with the imperialist powers. Three main anti-Stalinist ideas had been spelled out at the Party Congress. First, the idea of collective leadership; second, stress on peaceful coexistence rather than on the inevitability of war; and third, peaceful transition to socialism through parliamentary mechanism. This latter point seemed to indicate a strong Soviet drive in the direction of establishing popular front governments in other countries.

Mr. Dulles predicted that many old-line Communists outside the USSR would find it extremely difficult to accept the new doctrines set forth at the Party Congress. There will be widespread dangers of Titoism. Indeed, Tito believes that the Soviet Union has bought his doctrines lock, stock and barrel. 6

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5 Not found in Department of State files.
6 According to a memorandum of the discussion at the 278th meeting of the National Security Council on March 1, the following comments were made:

“Turning to the final situation in the new Soviet Politburo, Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that there had been no change respecting the full regular members of this group. Marshal Zhukov, however, had been elected a candidate member of the Politburo and, so far as Mr. Dulles could recall, Zhukov was the first Army officer ever to attain this height in Soviet history. Secretary Dulles turned to the President and said that Marshal Zhukov had the President to thank for his honor (laughter).” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)
The process of drafting a response to Bulganin’s letter of February 1 to President Eisenhower reiterating the Soviet proposal for a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the United States (see Document 24) extended through the month of February. Draft replies dated February 9, 12, and 23 are in Department of State, EUR Files: Lot 59 D 233, Bulganin.

One view of the significance of the Soviet proposal was that the Soviet Government feared the imminent outbreak of hostilities between the United States and Communist China and it desired a Soviet-American treaty as a hedge against China’s invoking the Sino-Soviet mutual assistance pact and involving the Soviet Union in war with the United States. This view was advanced by Galen L. Stone, Second Secretary of the Embassy in France, in a letter of February 8 to Robert Kranich in the Office of European Regional Affairs. According to a memorandum from Armstrong to Allan Evans in the Office of Intelligence Research, dated February 16, Stone’s letter and the hypothesis it contained were discussed with “considerable interest” at the Secretary of State’s Staff meeting the previous day and Armstrong had been requested to prepare an analysis of the hypothesis. Evans sent his comments on the hypothesis to Armstrong in a memorandum dated February 23, in which he concluded that “although the suggestion is a novel one, we consider it to be without validity insofar as available information can be a guide,” evidence that pointed to “the closest collaboration between the USSR and Communist China, particularly since the Khrushchev-Bulganin-Mikoyan visit to Peiping in 1954.” Armstrong passed on Evans’ comments in somewhat abbreviated form in a memorandum of February 27 to Merchant. All these documents are ibid., Central File 611.61/2-2756.

It was apparently the February 23 draft reply that was discussed by Secretary Dulles in a telephone conversation with Robert Bowie on February 24. Bowie said that the United States would be helping the Soviet leaders if it made a “full-dress” reply to Bulganin’s letter. He suggested merely adding something about the Soviet proposal to
a letter on the subject of disarmament that was also being drafted for the President to send to Bulganin. In an apparent reference to the speeches at the 20th Party Congress, Bowie noted that the Soviet leaders "have said in effect we made a lot of blunders under Stalin, but we are not like him." The full-dress reply, according to Bowie, made it possible for the Soviet leaders "to say we are raking up old stuff etc." Dulles said he would like to give the President a choice of which way to respond. (Memorandum of telephone conversation by Phyllis D. Bernau, February 24, 6:44 p.m.; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

On February 25, Dulles sent to the President a draft full-dress reply No. 5, dated February 25, and a covering memorandum explaining the two options and expressing his belief that any middle course would be unsatisfactory. On February 27, Eisenhower returned the draft full-dress reply to Dulles with the comment that he had no objection to either course, provided that the full-dress reply was modified so as to include "both our negative bill of particulars as well as a positive program that we believe adequate." This correspondence is ibid., Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series. According to a February 28 memorandum from Barnes to Elbrick, Dulles and Eisenhower discussed the matter the previous day and the President accepted Dulles' suggestion that they merely add a brief paragraph to the disarmament letter. (Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)

On March 1, the President sent a letter to Premier Bulganin responding to Bulganin's letter of September 19, 1955, regarding disarmament. The final paragraph of the President's letter reads:

"I also wish to take this opportunity to acknowledge receipt of your letter of February first which replied to mine of January twenty-eighth. My view remains generally as expressed in that letter. But I shall continue to study the problem with a view to seeing whether it seems that any useful new steps can be taken as between us. I may communicate again with you later on this matter."

This letter was delivered by Ambassador Bohlen on March 5 and the text released in Washington the following day. For the full text of the letter, see Department of State Bulletin, March 14, 1956, pages 514-515.
THE TWENTIETH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
OF THE SOVIET UNION

Abstract

The first public criticism of Stalin by his successors stands out as the highlight and main innovation of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (February 14 to 25). Otherwise, the conclave served largely as an authoritative occasion for the Soviet rulers to confirm and formalize their current policies.

Criticism of Stalin. In the nearly three years since his death, Stalin's stature has been progressively reduced. The new regime shrank the symbol of Stalin largely by withholding adulation from him and concentrating it entirely on Lenin. The Congress has now marked a further distinctive step as the rulers took to open attack. Their criticism centered chiefly on the ill-effects of one-man rule, with its glorification of an all-wise leader. Beyond this, however, while they neither completely buried Stalin nor brought into question his basic state policies, they ranged critically over many fields, including economic development, ideology, law and foreign affairs.

The Soviet rulers are rewriting history and rehabilitating some of Stalin's victims; how much further they will go remains to be seen. Clearly to find clay feet on the infallible demi-god whose rule for three decades encompassed all facets of Soviet life will have widespread effects—but effects whose manifestations will depend upon a whole complex of related factors.

Collective Rule. The attack on one-man rule served to underscore the virtue claimed for collective leadership which, formally enshrined as a guiding principle, has thus become an obstacle to concentration of overwhelming power in the hands of one individual. That the present ruling group is stable appears from the absence of changes among full members of the Party Presidium. New and younger blood has been brought to the top circle by the candidate members, expanded to six.

1 Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 487, USSR. Confidential. Attached to the source text was a memorandum of transmittal from Armstrong to the Acting Secretary of State, March 14, in which Armstrong wrote that the 49-page report, "while fairly long, is interesting reading and covers many points of significance to US policy makers." A note on the source text indicates that the report was based on information available through March 5.
Inclusion in the latter group of Marshal Zhukov, the first professional military chief to reach Presidium level, appears to represent both recognition of him personally and appreciation of the military ingredient in policy-making rather than an indication that the armed forces are growing to be a distinct political force.

Khrushchev received no special build-up at the Congress, but his leadership within the ruling group was strengthened by the number of new Presidium candidate members and new members of the Central Committee who have had past links with him.

Foreign Affairs. In foreign affairs the Soviet rulers claimed major successes for their current policy and announced they would pursue it with greater vigor. They set forth as the underlying basis of their policy the thesis that peaceful coexistence is "the only alternative" to nuclear war, and they indicated that the USSR will energetically champion coexistence as an activist program aimed at undermining Western defense efforts. They called for the development of friendly relations throughout the world, and especially with the underdeveloped countries. Although this policy was to apply also to the major Western powers, it was not meant to imply concessions on major East-West issues. Their goal was evidently to remove apprehensions of a Soviet threat and instead to imbue the USSR with an air of respectability, normalcy, and tolerance.

To further this impression, the Soviet rulers readjusted their ideological stance: they stressed the preventability rather than the inevitability of war and, without renouncing violence, they sanctioned for foreign Communists a "non-violent" acquisition of power by parliamentary means. They sought both to assure non-Communists that the USSR is not wedded to violence and to reassure Communists that a period of coexistence would not undercut their struggle for the promised ultimate victory of Communism nor jeopardize the prospect of winning it.

Any improvement in state-to-state relations between Communists and non-Communists would involve no ideological reconciliation. The speakers confidently predicted the inevitable world triumph of Communism on the grounds that Soviet military power would protect the Soviet base; that continuing Soviet economic successes would inspire others to take the Communist path; and that a majority of mankind, although representing different views, was already joining together in "one mighty stream" that would wash out the underpinnings of historically-doomed capitalism.

Domestic Innovations. Traditional emphasis on enforced industrialization and on the maintenance of high level armaments continued at the Congress. It approved the Sixth Five-Year Plan, announced in January, adding a provision for shortening the work-week to 40-41 hours before 1960. A breakdown of investment figures for 1956-60
showed a marked similarity, with some deviation in favor of agriculture, to the pattern implemented in 1951–55.

The leaders showed some concern over living standards and promised to bring up the level of the lowest-paid workers and pensioners while retaining the present policy of a sharply differentiated income structure. Another innovation was the proposal to establish fee-charging boarding schools. Although justified in part as a way of meeting the problem of children who lack adequate parental supervision, these schools will probably be select elite-training institutions.

The importance of these developments on the internal scene was less than the implications of the attack on Stalin, which opens the way to a re-evaluation of all sectors of Soviet life. In this sense the Congress could turn out to be, in Mikoyan’s words, “the most important Congress” in Soviet Communist Party history since Lenin’s time.

30. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, March 7, 1956—2 p.m.

1993. Yesterday evening at Bulganin’s reception I had a series of extremely interesting conversations with virtually all top leaders. In all my experience in this country I have never seen them so relaxed or forthcoming on variety of subjects. They answered individually, with apparent frankness, almost any questions that I asked them.

I shall deal with these questions in separate telegrams since they are in varying degrees of confidentiality. In general, however, since it is now apparent that Soviet leaders in private conversation are disposed to talk very much more frankly than in the past with foreign representatives here, I urge Dept to make every effort to avoid leaks which could only impair real possibilities of useful developments in this field.

All Soviet leaders with whom I talked, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Molotov, Malenkov and Mikoyan, expressed great satisfaction at

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/3–756. Secret; Limited Distribution.
2 See infra and Document 32.
President’s decision to run again, and repeatedly expressed their high regard for him and their belief in his genuine desire to work toward conditions of tranquility and peace throughout the world. I told them that while of course I had no direct information on subject, I was personally convinced that an important element in his decision was the feeling that the job of restoring some stability and tranquility to the world was still to be done and was a sign of his deep and genuine interest in working towards that end.

Bulganin and Khrushchev both said they had been favorably impressed by President’s message on disarmament and that while our views are still far apart they welcomed indication of movement in this field. I shall deal in separate message with views on this subject and other foreign policy matters which Khrushchev expressed to me last night.

Bohlen

3 The President announced this decision on February 29.
4 See Document 28.

31. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, March 7, 1956—9 p.m.

2006. Eyes only for Acting Secretary. Yesterday evening Bulganin told me with reference to previous conversation we had had in past re lack of informal contact with Soviet leaders, that any time that I wished to have an informal and, as he put it, “heart-to-heart” talk with him he could arrange it in such way as to avoid publicity. He said I could either see him alone or together with Khrushchev at his dacha or any other convenient place. He also said if I liked we could bring along Molotov. I thanked him for this suggestion and said that I did not wish to waste his time in idle talk, but that if occasion arose in future I would be glad avail myself his offer.

Later on in evening he returned to subject and said that he had been completely serious and hoped that I would take advantage of this possibility, repeating that he would see me alone or with any

1 Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Top Secret. No copy of this telegram has been found in Department of State files.
2 Not further identified.
other members of the Soviet leadership I would wish to have included. He said he thought it was most important at this juncture that there should be means informal discussion “without commitment”. Throughout evening Bulganin made great effort to impress upon me the importance of US/Soviet relations and of the desire of Soviet Government to see some genuine improvement in this field. I told him of course the US had friends and allies and I could not go in for bilateral deals, to which he replied that he had not in mind any deals behind backs of or at expense of associates.

I am very anxious to safeguard the secrecy of this suggestion which at some time in future [might] come in very useful. Obviously, in part at least, it might be an attempt to sow suspicion with our allies, but I am inclined more to believe that Bulganin recognizes need for some method of communication rather than by official notes or highly publicized communications. I shall of course never on my own initiative take up his suggestion, and would only do so under explicit instructions from Department. In addition, if any use is to be made of this offer I would have to be much more fully aware than I am at present of our thinking on outstanding questions.

I think it might be useful, if you agree, to bring this message to the attention of the President as I believe almost for the first time since I have been here possibilities of diplomatic action are really opening up. ³

Bohlen

³ On March 12, Hoover informed Bohlen that his telegram had been shown to the President, who had read it with great interest. (Department of State, Central Files, 110.12-HO/3-1256)
32. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, March 7, 1956—9 p.m.

2007. Following are chief points interest which emerged from my conversations with Soviet leaders last night (Embtel 1993). I will in each case identify source of information.

Internal party matters. Originally Molotov, in reply to my question, and subsequently independently Khrushchev, gave me following information as to operation of high party organs.

1. Presidium decisions are in general taken without vote but in event disagreement vote is taken with recording in the protocol of minority or even individual views. Both were emphatic on this subject and Khrushchev said in event of disagreement which cannot be ironed out in discussion a vote is “obligatory.”

2. The Secretariat is subordinate to Presidium during periods between meetings of Central Committee and has no independent status of its own. Khrushchev was again emphatic on this point and used the word “unconditionally”.

3. The RSFSR Bureau is also completely subordinate to Presidium and, according to Khrushchev, was set up for administrative reasons in order to render more orderly the conduct of party business in the RSFSR where, as he said, there were “large party organs” in Moscow, Leningrad and other areas. He said past practice had shown that the previous mechanism was inadequate to assure continuity and administration over these “big” party organizations. In this sense the position of the RSFSR in the party structure tends to approximate, although some difference still remains, that of the Union Republic.

4. Candidates to the Presidium have right to attend regular sessions of Presidium but do not do so in all cases. They have right of participation in discussion but no vote.

Taking advantage of the nature of conversation and in order to see his reaction, I told Khrushchev that there had been some press comment that he was on the way to becoming another “great leader.” His reaction was immediate and definite, although he did not appear bothered by the question. He said that this was “absolute nonsense” and “could not be” under present conditions. He said that the objective circumstances of the Soviet Union rendered this impos-

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/3–756. Secret; Limited Distribution. A handwritten note on the source text indicates that this telegram was pouch to Tokyo on March 30 and to Budapest, Bucharest, and Belgrade on April 5.

2 Document 30.
sible. I received subsequently from Mikoyan a statement along these same lines.

I was in a discussion with Khrushchev and Malenkov together when the subject of reasons for the latter’s resignation came up. On this subject the party line was rather closely adhered to since Malenkov said that having been designated to head the group at time of Stalin’s death it was found that he did not have enough “experience.” In reply to my question on economic policy, Khrushchev admitted that certain adjustments had been necessary. In part, he said, that this was because they came to realize that disarmament was not an immediate prospect (although he did not say so I think he had German rearmament in mind), but both denied with vigor that there had been any “quarrel” between them on economic policy. Khrushchev said “Why, Georgi Malenkov is one of my closest friends”. Of all the topics discussed I felt this one was the least frank.

Subsequent to these discussions Mikoyan gave me a brief description of how business was conducted under Stalin, particularly in later years. He described these as “difficult times” and said that Stalin made decisions on his own frequently without any consultation “with any of us.” Mikoyan said this situation could not be repeated after his death and that therefore the collective principle was reinstated in the party. He said that by this procedure Stalin had abolished the principle of voting in party organs and in effect had destroyed their vitality and usefulness. On question of rewriting history, Mikoyan said “under present circumstances” it is essential that the history of Soviet Union should be rewritten in order to conform with reality, and intimated that the process might be quite far-reaching. He told me in all probability that Lenin’s testament would be public and in reply to my question he admitted the existence of a letter from Lenin to Stalin breaking off all personal relations on the Georgian question referred to by Trotsky in his biography of Stalin.

As a sidelight on attitude towards Khrushchev, at one point in conversation with Bulganin and Molotov I mentioned that I had just seen at the Indian Embassy a documentary film of the Indian trip and said that there was one very interesting picture of Khrushchev getting on an elephant, to which Molotov said “Yes, an elephant getting on an elephant.”

At another time to both my wife and myself Khrushchev said “You will understand why after the death of Stalin we had to get rid of Beria.”

In general, whenever subject was mentioned all leaders I talked with emphasized that under present conditions in Soviet Union collective leadership was the only form of rule possible but did not
do so with the appearance of voicing a line concerted in advance, since in most cases they were in response to specific questions from me on one of the other aspects treated above.

I believe the foregoing will be of interest to Department, not because remarks in themselves are of such great importance, but as an illustration of the greater frankness with which these people are now talking to foreigners.

Foreign Affairs. Khrushchev spoke to me at some length on problem of disarmament, stating as already reported he felt President's message had "certain positive elements" in it. I told him I thought disarmament question seemed to be in something of a chicken and an egg stage, since I am sure he realized that the US and other Western nations could not accept any agreement on disarmament until we were certain that workable and effective method of inspection and control had been developed; to do otherwise would be to take an unacceptable risk for national security. Khrushchev said that he favored control, but he thought their proposal of inspection airfields, ports, railheads, etc. would provide safeguard against surprise armed attack based on his experiences in the war. I told him that development of modern weapons had changed the picture since last war and, as President indicated, combination President's open skies proposal and Soviet plan for inspection airfields, ports, etc. could form basis for an adequate inspection and control system. He reminded me of his observations to the President at Geneva and said in their view this could be culminating point of disarmament structure but that present state of mistrust in world affairs did not render it feasible. He admitted, in reply to my question, that what chiefly concerned him was possibility that aerial inspection in itself would not lead to disarmament and that when adequate photographs had been taken it might be abandoned, and repeating his Geneva observation said it was primarily an intelligence operation.

I told him I thought his fears were groundless, since that was not its intention and indeed as President stated the very institution of aerial photography would be probably the most effective means of dispelling distrust and fear of surprise attack. He repeated several times, as did subsequently Molotov and Bulganin, that the Soviet Union was deadly serious in regard to disarmament and that they felt that with genuine effort some common basis for agreement could be found. He did not repeat in this conversation the usual charges that "certain circles" in the US were blocking progress in

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3 See Document 28.
4 For documentation on the Geneva Heads of Government meeting, July 18–23, see vol. v, pp. 119 ff.
this field, but seemed to show a realization of the complexities and difficulties of the problem.

Germany. Khrushchev and Molotov asked me if I had read recent TASS declaration on Germany, and I said that I had and that I did not find it [at] all surprising in view of the position they had taken at both Geneva conferences. Khrushchev then said he hoped that the West understood very clearly that they were "not in a position" to make any deal behind the backs and at the expense of the DDR, and that they could not and would not go along that path. Khrushchev said that the West German Government did not seem to realize this fact which had been the reason for the TASS announcement, and he expressed the view that Von Brentano was largely responsible since he had found Adenauer "more realistic" during their Moscow visit. Both repeated that the only road to unification was by direct dealings between the two Germanys.

I said I thought this provided no solution whatsoever and would merely legalize and perpetuate division of Germany, and until German unity was achieved in accordance with the freely expressed wish of the German people there could be no real tranquility or security in Europe. Neither disagreed with this statement but merely repeated that they would not sell out East German regime for any consideration and that this fact must be faced.

I gained the distinct impression that the Soviet leaders themselves had no clear policy for the future in regard to German unification and had gotten themselves into position where they had very little room for maneuver, and their problem of DDR set-up was chief obstacle. In fact, Khrushchev at one point said strategically Soviet Union had little interest in, what he rather contemptuously described as, 17 million Germans but that matter of DDR was a "political" question.

Bulganin made to me last evening what I regard as one of the best expressions of Russian Bolshevik mentality when in discussing Soviet American relations he said "You cannot escape Russian friendship." 

As indicated in my previous message on this subject, while

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5 Not further identified.
6 A similar view was expressed to the first U.S. Minister to Russia, John Quincy Adams, in 1810 by Russian Chancellor Nikolai P. Rumiantsev, who said, "Our attachment to the United States, I assure you is obstinate—more obstinate than you are aware of." (Quoted in Adams' despatch of October 12, 1810; The United States and Russia: The Beginning of Relations, 1765–1815 (Washington, 1980), p. 704.)
7 Document 30.
none of foregoing is new or of vital importance I hope it will be possible to keep it confidential.

Bohlen

33. Editorial Note

On February 25, at the final session of the 20th Party Congress, which was closed to all except party delegates, Nikita S. Khrushchev delivered a long speech denouncing Stalin for having executed without cause during the purges of the 1930’s thousands of military and political figures. For Khrushchev’s recollections of the origin of this secret speech, see Khrushchev Remembers, pages 346–350.

Ambassador Bohlen first heard of the speech on March 10 at a reception at the French Embassy and reported this in telegram 2045 from Moscow, March 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/3–1256) Bohlen’s recollections of his efforts to confirm the rumors about the speech are in Bohlen, Witness to History, pages 397–398. In telegram 2091 from Moscow, March 16, Bohlen reported that he was informed by a Western correspondent in Moscow that an unidentified Russian source indicated that the Soviet Government sent Tito a detailed summary of Khrushchev’s secret speech, which was apparently hand carried by the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow to Tito. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/3–1656)

Regarding the release of this speech, see footnote 3, Document 50.

34. Memorandum of Discussion at the 280th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 22, 1956

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and item 1, “Report by the Secretary of State”.

2. Significant World Developments Affecting U. S. Security

The Director of Central Intelligence explained that he would like first to discuss the dramatic news from Moscow. The plain attempt to blast Stalin to pieces had raised a number of interesting problems. Someone had suggested, indeed, that Joseph Stalin had now become "the Trojan corpse" which was to be introduced inside the defenses of the free world.

Mr. Dulles then went on to describe the alleged now famous final meeting at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. Foreign Delegates had been excluded from this meeting at which Khrushchev so violently criticized Stalin. Mr. Dulles believed that Khrushchev's purpose at this meeting was to provide guidance to the Soviet delegates present on how to deal henceforth with the Stalin myth or saga. No one knew precisely what had transpired at this meeting, but Mr. Dulles said that the following was his own guess. It seemed quite likely that as Khrushchev was proceeding to read the directives downgrading Stalin, questions were put to him from the floor which he had undertaken to answer extemporaneously. While this might account for some of the drama, it was also apparent that Khrushchev had deliberately undertaken in his speech to destroy Stalin, because he had cited chapter and verse on all of Stalin's crimes. Mr. Dulles then proceeded to summarize the alleged contents of Khrushchev's speech. Thereafter he noted that while nothing had yet appeared in the Soviet press with respect to this now famous occasion, a great many newspaper people in the Soviet Union had managed to pick up bits and pieces of what had happened. The fact that there had been no official denial of these newspaper stories, and the fact that the USSR was permitting these stories to get by the censors, would seem to indicate the basic truth of the allegation that the attack on Stalin had taken place.

As in the case of what had occurred at this meeting, so likewise with the repercussions in Georgia. It was hard to distinguish between fact and rumor. Mr. Dulles then gave a general account of the student riots in Tiflis. It seemed particularly significant to him that the uprising in Tiflis went so far that the Soviet Government

\[2\text{The anniversary of Stalin's death, March 5, passed unnoticed in the Soviet Union. On March 7, student demonstrations, whose purpose was unknown, took place in Tiflis, the capital of the Georgian Republic. There were unconfirmed reports that Soviet troops or police fired on the demonstrators on March 8. A brief chronology of the developments in Georgia was attached to a memorandum of March 19 from Beam through Murphy to the Acting Secretary, in which Beam concluded that there was "no information to indicate that the reported demonstrations in Georgia are serious or that the situation is not fully under control." (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/3–1956)}\]
had been obliged to relax some of its major anti-Stalinist measures in Georgia.

Mr. Dulles next directed attention to the question as to why the rulers of the Soviet Union had decided to attack Stalin's reputation in this particular way and at this particular time. This was a puzzling problem. One explanation, of course, was the Communist penchant for self-criticism. Another explanation perhaps lay in the hope of the Soviet leaders to gain respectability abroad by virtue of a complete break with the past. Mr. Dulles expressed skepticism as to whether this latter objective would be attained, although he admitted that it might have some effect on the Socialist parties throughout the world. Another possibility was that the Soviet leaders had permitted themselves to be pushed further than they had initially intended to go, thanks to Khrushchev's exuberant personality. There was always the possibility, of course, that Khrushchev had been drunk. Nevertheless, it was significant that there was as yet no visible tendency to reverse the trend in the direction of destroying Stalin's influence.

Mr. Dulles then commented that these events afforded the United States a great opportunity, both covertly and overtly, to exploit the situation to its advantage. Stalin had been the chief theoretician of the Soviet Union. He had been its great war hero in addition to his more familiar role as Dictator of the Soviet Union for twenty-five years. What would the Soviets now do with all the vast accumulation of Stalin's printed works? It would take years to rid libraries and individuals of these volumes. There was also the problem occasioned by the fact that Stalin's detractors had all worked closely with him over a long period of years. It would obviously be very difficult to create a new tradition. There was the problem of Stalin's policies which, if any of these, would now be repudiated. Finally, what would the leadership in the satellite states now do? These men were almost all the creatures of Stalin.

In conclusion, Mr. Dulles suggested that all of these problems had important policy implications for the United States. Accordingly, they should be most carefully considered. In Mr. Dulles' opinion, Khrushchev and the other leaders had been guilty of a most serious mistake.

The President expressed agreement with Mr. Dulles' judgment. He gave it as his personal belief that when the Soviet leaders decided to adopt the new tactics and approach with which we are now familiar, they had felt themselves obliged to repudiate Stalin. After all, said the President, the Soviets could not make people like Nehru believe, at one and the same time, in the sincerity of the new Soviet tactics and in the validity of the Stalinist line and tactics.

Secretary Dulles pointed out that Communism could not be held together without a doctrine. In this belief Stalin was correct. While
the present Soviet leaders could rid themselves of Stalin’s books and Stalin’s doctrine, they would have to find a substitute. Both the President and Mr. Allen Dulles suggested that the substitute was already at hand in the writings of Lenin. Secretary Dulles agreed, but pointed out that there was no handbook of Leninism. Lenin’s writings encompassed ten large volumes. It was going to be very difficult to decide what to pick out of these volumes and summarize in a handbook.

Secretary Wilson said that he had one question to put. Was there any likelihood that what had happened in the Soviet Union would turn out favorably for the United States? The President and Secretary Dulles answered that they thought that these events would be definitely advantageous for the United States.

[Here follows the remainder of the memorandum.]

S. Everett Gleason

35. Intelligence Brief Prepared by the Office of Intelligence Research

No. 1902


THE DESECRATION OF STALIN

The public desecration of Stalin by his successors constitutes a major psychological jolt whose ultimate repercussions on the Soviet population and Communists abroad cannot yet be foreseen.

Initial reports from both inside and outside the Soviet Union reveal that the attack on Stalin has produced disbelief, uncertainty, confusion, embarrassment, and anger.

Hazards Ahead. The Soviet rulers certainly realized that by publicly attacking Stalin they would create for themselves certain risks. Because they would hardly attempt political suicide, they presumably calculated that they could successfully cope with these hazards, which they may have unduly discounted.

The main risk was an intangible one: the psychological effect on Party members at home and abroad. For years millions within the USSR and abroad have been encouraged to believe in the wisdom of

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1 Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 487, USSR. Confidential. A printed note on the source text reads: "This is an Intelligence Report and not a statement of Departmental policy."
a demi-god and the consequent correctness of all Soviet methods and policies. About half of the present Soviet population has been born since 1929 when the cult of Stalin-worship began. Communist parties abroad attained their largest growth during the post-war period when Stalin-worship reached its all-time high.

The sudden effort to eradicate a quarter century of indoctrination that Communist loyalties should be directed toward the symbol of Stalin would require many Communists to make a deep personal readjustment. For years they had either uncritically accepted all things Stalin or disciplined themselves to suppress private doubts that Moscow has now publicly expressed. The Soviet rulers presumably count on intensive indoctrination, and the habit of compliance to lubricate the process of readjustment, but the speed with which the Communist rank-and-file can reorient itself after such a psychological jolt remains to be seen.

The Soviet rulers will need to set up guideposts to clarify the new path for the Party line. Pressures to resist the line and pressures to exceed it will have to be checked at all levels. The license to criticize Stalin cannot be allowed to become a permit to question basic Soviet policies, or the legitimacy of the current rulers, or their role in aiding Stalin’s rise and his mistakes. The rewriting of 36 years of Soviet history and the actual rehabilitation of some of Stalin’s victims will have to be controlled by countless decisions that may ultimately touch on all facets of Soviet life.

Evidently the Soviet rulers are willing to accept the consequences of a period of confusion and uncertainty. They presumably calculate that their machinery for persuasion and coercion will enable them to keep within limits the negative repercussions and in time will ensure support for the new line. The very act of initiating criticism of Stalin appears to indicate that the Soviet ruling group views its own position with confidence. The absence of various Soviet rulers from the USSR during the reported demonstrations in Georgia, apparently touched off by the attack on Stalin, further points toward assuredness among the ruling group.

Moving with Caution. Meanwhile, they appear to be unfolding their campaign against Stalin with some degree of caution.

The present leadership had begun to shrink Stalin’s symbol almost immediately after his death by withholding adulation from him and concentrating it instead on Lenin. This treatment of Stalin during the three years leading up to the Party Congress suggests that at least a substantial portion within the ruling group, if not all, agreed that he should be cut down in size.

Whether this shrinking process was also part of a premeditated program leading up to an open attack on him at the Congress is open to question. The treatment of Stalin fluctuated during this
period. Although reduced in stature, he remained a positive symbol. His birthday anniversary in December received unusual attention and as late as January he was accorded favorable treatment. Had the Soviet rulers been pursuing a fully agreed program, it is possible that they would have sought to condition the Party and the population for the shock of public criticism of Stalin. The suddenness of the switch from passively withholding praise of Stalin to actively assailing him and the variations in the treatment of this issue by various speakers at the Congress suggest that the ruling group may have been divided on how far to go and may have reached a decision only shortly before the Congress.

Even at the Congress, they moved with care. In the published speeches they avoided criticizing Stalin by name, except once, although he was the unmistakable target for their attack. The detailed indictment was reserved for Khrushchev’s speech at a closed session on the last day of the Congress.

It is understandable why the Soviet rulers preferred to reserve their main attack for a closed meeting. Yet the possibility cannot be completely excluded that they had not intended to go beyond the charges made publicly, but that in view of the mixed reactions to these charges they felt it necessary to justify their attack by revealing a more detailed indictment.

Since the Congress they have continued to move gradually. A month after Khrushchev’s secret speech the Soviet press had yet even to mention the fact of its delivery. Soviet censors had allowed foreign correspondents to refer to it since March 17, but criticism of Stalin by foreign Communists has been deleted from reports of their speeches in the Soviet press.

For the first month after the Congress the indoctrination of the Party rank-and-file and apparently some non-Party persons has been confined to an oral basis. Party leaders and agitators have addressed meetings throughout the Soviet Union, presumably revealing the contents of Khrushchev’s secret speech or a reported secret circular from the Central Committee based on the speech. A British Communist correspondent in Moscow estimates 30 million Soviet citizens will have attended these meetings. Given the rapidity of rumors within the Soviet Union, a large share of the population can now be assumed to have heard of Khrushchev’s indictment of Stalin.

While the oral indoctrination continues, the Soviet press broke its silence on March 28 when Pravda published a commentary denouncing some of the evils of Stalin’s rule. Kommunist, the Party’s theoretical journal, and Red Star, Army organ, followed with critical articles. The Pravda piece centered on the point that it was absurd, even superstitious, to imagine that Soviet successes are the work of
only one man. Rather it is the people, led by the Party, who make history.

The commentary appeared to be only a partial paraphrase of Khrushchev's reported speech. It did not go as far as the charges already revealed in the published speeches of the Congress and it ignored various charges made by satellite leaders, who would be unlikely to exceed Soviet instructions on so delicate a topic. Pravda did confirm that a large-scale "explanatory campaign" was under way and would purposely avoid a rapid pace because of the vastness and difficulty of the task at hand.

Meanwhile, the regime has indicated the new attitude toward Stalin by removing some, not all, pictures and statues of him from various public places. The Soviet radio is said to have stopped broadcasting the lyrics of the national anthem, which includes a favorable reference to Stalin. The name of the large Stalin Automobile Works in Moscow is reported to have been changed to Moscow Automobile Works. New history books are said to be in preparation. At least one prominent victim of Stalin's purges has been seen in Moscow after nearly 20 years in prison, and others are reported to have been rehabilitated. There are rumors that petitions are being circulated demanding the removal of Stalin's body from the Red Square mausoleum. How far the regime intends to go in displacing public symbols of Stalin is yet to be revealed. It should be noted that Stalin peace prizes were awarded to foreigners in mid-March.

Charges Against Stalin. Since the text of Khrushchev's speech is not yet available, it is impossible to compile a complete set of the approved Soviet charges against Stalin. However, the allegations made in public at the Party Congress, the Pravda commentary of March 28, and the similarities in statements by foreign Communist leaders, suggesting that they were working from a common text, indicates the general nature of the charges. The most detailed set of charges appeared in the Yugoslav newspaper Borba on March 20, and these were described as still incomplete.

Apparently Stalin's activities generally before 1934 are to be favorably regarded. He was hailed by Pravda for his role in the Soviet civil war, for opposing Trotsky, his role in building socialism. Foreign Communists also praised him for undertaking the collectivization of agriculture and for launching the program of forced industrialization. One line common to foreign Communists is to hail the "great victories" achieved during Stalin's time, but to admit that "they may have cost more than was necessary."

After the early 'thirties he is said to have "gradually" placed himself above Party and state and instituted one-man rule during which he made a number of errors and committed various excesses. In particular, his methods are said to have resulted in:
(1) Stultification of the Party apparatus and administrative overcentralization
(2) Illegal use of the police and resultant excesses, including unjustified repression even of fellow Communists
(3) Self-adulation, fabrication and distortion of Soviet history and unjust maligning of veteran Communists
(4) Theoretical errors, especially in regard to the growth of capitalism and nationality policies
(5) Failure to prepare the USSR for the Nazi attack and errors in the conduct of hostilities
(6) Unjustly liquidating a large number of Soviet military officers
(7) Inflexibility in foreign policy, including mishandling the Yugoslav issue
(8) Incorrect emphasis in agriculture
(9) Stagnation in arts and literature.

The Borba article spelled out these charges in greater details. It alleged that Khrushchev accused a “morbidly suspicious” Stalin of conducting a reign of terror over his associates as well as the population at large, ordering the death of Voznesensky, instituting the “doctors’ plot,” and committing other crimes. Pending clarification from Soviet sources, there is no way to judge the accuracy of these press reports.

Although the Soviet rulers have indicated that they do not intend to repudiate Stalin completely, they may find it difficult to preserve Stalin’s earlier merits once his reported excesses become widely known.

Motives for the Attack. The apparent effects of the attack on Stalin, apart from the psychological disturbances, probably throw light on the motives of the Soviet rulers. These effects included:

(1) One-man rule besmirched. Stalin’s mistakes and excesses were invariably traced to the fact that he had managed to place himself above state and party. The criticism of the evils of one-man rule thus served as a contrasting backdrop for the praises of the virtue of collective leadership and as a condemnation in advance of any future attempt of a single individual to acquire a monopoly of power.

(2) Identity of present ruling group established. The public burial of the cult of Stalin-worship appears designed to give the impression of a break with the excesses of the Stalinist past and to portray the present rulers as a more reasonable regime.

(3) Position of “Stalinists” undercut. The dethronement of Stalin also serves to dilute the authority of those who have referred to Stalin as an authority to justify their positions.

(4) Stalin’s reputation smeared. Assuming the correctness of Khrushchev’s reported description of the terrors of life under Stalin, his former associates doubtless shared an emotional interest in publicly smearing him. In addition, they undoubtedly believed that their action would find approval among certain groups of the population.
While these effects doubtless reflect varying factors in the Soviet decision, they do not seem in themselves to provide a satisfactory explanation for the Soviet rulers’ action. Much the same effect could have been achieved by simply letting Stalin be increasingly ignored. The conclusion seems inescapable, therefore, that the Soviet rulers deliberately wanted to make a spectacular impact such as the public denunciation of Stalin would produce. (Togliatti is reported to have said that the Soviet rulers told him that the Soviet party needed a severe and sudden shock.)

Did the Soviet rulers feel compelled to go to this extreme, or did they elect the action of their own free will? There is little evidence that they considered themselves under any immediate compulsion. Certainly the current international situation contained no pressure for them to dissociate themselves publicly from Stalin’s methods. The domestic situation is obviously less well known, but present evidence does not indicate that any internal pressures compelled them to defame Stalin. Suggestions that the Soviet military had forced them to attack Stalin accords the armed forces an independent political role in no way supported by available evidence.

Clearly the Soviet rulers face various domestic problems, but they have given no indication of weakness in their will to cope with them. Indeed in the critical field of agriculture, they demonstrated increased confidence in the stability of their rule by initiating, after the Party Congress, renewed pressure against the peasants.

Increasingly during their three years of rule, the new rulers have demonstrated their own approach to some of these problems. They have brought about a general relaxation in the atmosphere of tension that clouded Stalin’s last years. They have shown an awareness of the need of Soviet elite groups for a feeling of greater personal security: to be able to carry out their work without the threat of police terror. They have succeeded in ending one-man control of the police and thus reducing the threat of capricious coercion. They have sought to decentralize certain governmental and economic functions, distributing greater responsibility to the lower levels and to units outside of Moscow. At the same time, however, they have maintained an undiluted monopoly of political power, reserving to themselves the prerogative of final decision.

In essence, they have attempted to operate a totalitarian state without a single dictator and to reduce the paralyzing sanctions of Stalin’s rule.

If less reliance is to be placed on coercion, threatened and real, then other means of inducing the population to perform satisfactorily rise in importance. In a system where coercion plays a strong role,
those below are expected simply to obey; they have little positive feeling of participation and are fearful of accepting responsibility.

During Stalin’s era the regime sought to persuade as well as to coerce, and repeatedly called for measures to raise “inner-Party democracy,” increase the activity and initiative of the Party rank-and-file, abolish a formalistic execution of decisions. Malenkov at the Nineteenth Party Congress especially emphasized the need for self-criticism and criticism from below, but revealed the ineffectiveness of such appeals when he admitted that some who had taken this course had suffered persecution and reprisals. Exhortations to greater effort apparently could not overcome the stagnation produced by fear and apathy.

The post-Stalin regime has similarly sought to revitalize the Party and to attract a more positive response from both elite groups and the population at large. The acceptance of responsibility and the exercise of initiative does not, however, come easy after years of experience in the penalties for failure, real and alleged. If the post-Stalin regime was to avoid a return to a greater reliance on coercion, it would have to convince the lower ranks of its seriousness in encouraging greater activity at their level and reassure them that such activity would not lead necessarily to personal jeopardy.

In such a context, the attack on Stalin can be viewed as a deliberate effort to stimulate the Party and the population by shock-treatment. Denunciation of terrorism would be expected to be received by the population, especially the elite, as a reassurance and to be answered by them with a more creative and enthusiastic approach to their work.

The regime might have been able to produce such a response by focusing the Soviet economic effort on raising the standard of living. Under the Sixth Five Year Plan, however, the Soviet worker is again being called upon to raise the productive capacity of the USSR. The goal of catching up with and surpassing the US economic output refers to heavy rather than light industry and thus offers little prospect for an early substantial rise in the Soviet general standard of living. Unwilling to divert resources for increased consumers’ goods as a stimulant to the Soviet worker, the regime has apparently sought to spur him on with psychological inducements.

What response will be finally forthcoming from the Soviet population can only be surmised at this time. Although the Soviet regime appears to be urging the removal of certain inhibitions, its followers can be expected to move cautiously in testing any new ground.

The defamation of Stalin can also be regarded as a logical extension of current Soviet foreign policy efforts to appear respectable and to win support abroad. At the national level, local Commu-
nist parties will have to surmount their embarrassment, but in time may find themselves in a stronger position to claim that they are independent and to appeal to other leftist groups to establish popular fronts. It has been suggested that the attack on Stalin cannot but have an effect on the relationship between Moscow and parties within and outside the Communist bloc. The bloc parties face the same general problems on this subject as in the Soviet Union itself. In some cases, doubt may be thrown on the status of Communist leaders who have long been identified with Stalin or who occupy Stalin-like positions. Outside the bloc Communist Party members have raised publicly questions about the permissibility of criticizing the Soviet Union and of relying more heavily on their own evaluations particularly of local situations. How far Moscow will permit such questioning and to what extent it will insist on a common international Communist line remains to be seen.

36. **Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

*Moscow, April 1, 1956—9 p.m.*

2232. Vienna for Ambassador Bohlen. Embassy is making tentative comments re statement proposed in Deptel 1112 but subject to Ambassador’s views if he can be reached.

Presumably would be best if we are able to defer official comments until Soviet actions provide surer guide to meaning of 20th Party Congress and of de-Stalinization movement, but presume comment unavoidable if press raises issue. Objective then would presumably be to have best impact on those areas at moment most critical to our interests, as we do not believe it feasible to formulate comments which would have universally favorable impact.

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/4–156. Confidential; Niat. Repeated to Vienna. Bohlen left Moscow on March 19 to take leave in Vienna and to return to Washington for consultations. He returned to Moscow and resumed charge of the Embassy on April 24.

2 Telegram 1112, March 31, contained a draft statement on the anti-Stalin campaign for use by the Secretary at his April 3 press conference and requested the Embassy’s comments on the statement. (Ibid., 761.00/3–3156) For text of the statement as released by Dulles at his news conference on April 3, see Department of State Bulletin, April 16, 1956, pp. 637–638. A transcript of the news conference, during which several questions were asked regarding the Soviet Union and Khrushchev’s speech, is ibid., pp. 638–643.
It is also desirable comments provide minimum opportunity to Soviets for distortion as counter-propaganda.

In Asia and Middle East there appears willingness even anxiety to believe that the new Moscow lines indicate a basic reorientation of Soviet policy having as objective a lessening of tensions which will make it easier for newly sovereign populations to pursue development of their economies in peace. These peoples must also recognize that Soviet offers of assistance give them the opportunity to bargain. Probably the Yugoslav interpretation of events is similar although much deeper since it evidently stems from a conviction the principles that Tito has been enunciating are vindicated by Soviet emulation. Therefore, if it is Asians (and Yugoslavs) whom we particularly want to impress at this time, we would suggest that the statement give particular emphasis to what might be called "promising" elements in the current developments. We also believe that "denouncing Stalin" is of secondary importance; such denouncement seems to have been necessary (although the reasons may be obscure) in order to give emphasis and meaning to the line that has been developing for some time of so-called revolutionary legality.

In sum, we would hesitate to give the impression to the Asians that we rebuff without waiting to test the sincerity of the Soviet leadership in their offers of cooperation, negotiation and aid which have certainly impressed the Indians, Burmese and Arabs.

If it is considered desirable to retain the enumeration of deeds which the Soviets could perform as proof it would seem important to include disarmament in the third paragraph. We are somewhat dubious, however, about the desirability of including the Japanese since it is quite conceivable that the Soviets, having set up inflated bargaining positions, may be preparing in the relatively near future to make some "concessions" which the Japanese would find difficult to turn down at the price of normalization of relations. Also, although from our point of view Soviet activity in the Middle East is increasing tensions, we wonder whether our referring to the matter, at least until after Hammarskjold has completed proposed mission, would have a useful effect on the Arabs.

If we wish to concentrate on Europeans it should be useful to point out that although Soviet leadership may be responding in part to the aspirations of Soviet citizens long submerged by the repression characteristic of the Stalin style of government, nevertheless what that leadership now gives, it does so unilaterally and in no way surrenders the right to take away again although baring major domestic or foreign crisis, it would appear difficult for them to return overnight to Stalinist methods. The prerogatives Stalin monopolized have been somewhat dispersed, but not dissipated, among the new governors; and if there is at present a closer identification
between the interests of the regime and the aspirations of Soviet citizens, with consequent effect upon the method with which the regime operates, there has been no renunciation of objectives. What seems to have happened is that the regime’s conviction that communism will ultimately prevail by operation of historical forces, barring nuclear warfare, has grown deeper and its greater self-assurance permits it a more relaxed method of rule and allows it to concede greater self-determination to satellites and Communist parties abroad.

Although the new posture may in the short run cause waverers in Western Europe to waver more and permit intellectuals etc. who found it difficult to stomach Stalin to satisfy their nostalgia for Lenin and therefore to regard the Soviet Union with additional sympathy, we concur fully with draft statement to effect that these and possibly other foreign repercussions have, in the light of circumstantial evidence so far available, played secondary part in the formulation by Soviet leaders of the present line. As statement implies, internal developments, e.g. the system although beset by serious, although not critical problems, has held together and operated successfully without the all powerful hand of Stalin; vested interests, professional and economic, have contributed to regime’s stability.

Soviet people have long frustrated aspirations, seem to have been decisive in bringing the regime to its present conclusions and postures [sic]. Cutting across all of this is sobering effect of honest estimate of the nuclear equation (difficult for Stalin to reconcile with principles of infallibility and vulnerability).

In sum we would heartily agree that none more than the United States would welcome such changes provided they have cumulative favorable effect upon Soviet conduct of its relations with other countries.

Walmsley
Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Beam) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) ¹


SUBJECT

OCB Ad Hoc Committee on Anti-Stalin Campaign

The OCB Ad Hoc Committee has drawn up two papers—an intelligence round-up on the anti-Stalin campaign and general US policy paper ²—which have been circulated to the OCB Board Assistants. The Committee is now meeting daily and will currently submit brief papers covering (1) latest developments (2) comments thereon (3) agreed courses of action and recommendations.

The first such paper is submitted herewith.

New Developments

Kommunist, Party theoretical journal, has an editorial (text unavailable) criticizing stagnating effects of Stalin’s role on party organs. Red Star, Army organ, has accused Stalin of underestimating Lenin’s military genius. Reports still conflict on whether violence took place in Georgia, but confirm that demonstrations did occur.

The attack on cult of personality apparently produced criticism of Ulbricht, but he appears to have weathered the storm. Party leadership elsewhere in the orbit does not seem to be affected.

In Yugoslavia, the text of the Borba article of March 20 has just been received and appears to be the most complete, and probably authoritative statement, of Soviet charges against Stalin. (Tab A). ³

General Comments

While the Pravda March 28 editorial significantly did not mention Khrushchev’s speech, it apparently sought to curb extreme interpretations of that speech. By dividing the Stalin era into good and bad periods it tried to create as smooth a possible transition to

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¹ Source: Department of State, EUR Files: Lot 59 D 233, Stalin I. Secret. Copies were sent to Sohm, Comstock, and Stoessel for William Jackson. Attached to the source text was a brief note from Beam to Murphy, also dated April 3, in which Beam wrote that this memorandum was the result of two meetings of the committee and explained that the “budget is rather meager since we only include recommendations which have been agreed upon between all of us.”

² One of these references is presumably to Document 35, since there is a previous draft of this paper dated March 27 and headed “Intelligence Paper prepared for OCB Working Group.” Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Soviet and Related Problems. The general U.S. policy paper referred to has not been further identified.

³ Not printed.
the new approach and to placate those communists both within and outside Russia who may have been shocked by Khrushchev's harsh denunciation.

The Borba editorial fails to credit Stalin with any "good period". It refers to Bulganin, Khrushchev and Mikoyan as the leaders of the Soviet communist party, perhaps indicating they are the ones the Yugoslavs primarily look to as against other leaders who may hold different views.

There has been a different tempo of acceptance of the new line by the communist parties outside of Russia. This has occurred faster in the parties in Poland and East Germany.

**Agreed Courses of Action**

For the time being US overt propaganda should continue to be pitched on a minor key. The anti-Stalin campaign is following its own course, very much to our advantage. If the communists could show that the US was gloating over their present embarrassment, they might be able to close ranks and also discredit the US with some Socialist elements who would dislike a sensational "capitalist" victory.

While continuing to promote the destruction of communist credibility, as provided in general guidance, US media should endeavor to delay as long as possible the closing of the gap between the new communist line and the old.

US media can point out the inconsistency between the Pravda and Borba editorials, emphasizing the former did not tell the whole story.

Doubt and criticism can also be stimulated by asking hypothetical questions of a kind probably in the minds of many communists.

Opportunities for creating confusion within foreign communist parties, and particularly in France and Italy, should be exploited by indirect means, as is now being done, rather than by direct US intervention, which would be counter-productive.
Guidance has been furnished to USIA on the Secretary's press statement of April 3 (Tab B).  

4 See footnote 2, supra.

According to the preliminary notes prepared by Richards on the OCB meeting of April 4, the following occurred:

"The work of the working group on the Anti-Stalin campaign was discussed at some length. It was generally agreed that the working group was serving a useful purpose and it was agreed to accept the following recommendations as to the handling of the reports:

"(1) That the OCB Working Group continue to meet to appraise new developments and to advise the policy officers of State;
"(2) That the Chairman of the Working Group (Mr. Beam) be charged with the responsibility of seeing that working group papers are brought to the attention of top policy officers in the Department; and,
"(3) That after the Working Group paper has been acted upon at the policy level in State, appropriate guidance immediately be sent through normal channels to USIA." (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, OCB Preliminary Notes)

38. Editorial Note

At the 281st meeting of the National Security Council on April 5, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles made the following comments during his briefing on significant world developments affecting United States security:

"The Director of Central Intelligence said he would comment first on the campaign to downgrade Stalin, which he said was continuing briskly. He referred to editorials published in Pravda, in the publications of the Soviet armed forces, and in Kommunist. Mr. Dulles speculated that, thanks to the play in the foreign press, the anti-Stalin campaign was receiving more impetus than its instigators had originally intended it to have.

"Mr. Dulles said that only yesterday had the Chinese Communists finally made known their views on the anti-Stalin campaign, in the shape of a long statement which had reached us last night. It was evident from this statement that the Chinese Communists were in some difficulty because they do not fully accept the new Soviet insistence on collective leadership. Incidentally, said Mr. Dulles, he personally believed that the Soviet leaders had their tongues in their cheeks when they professed to believe in the practice of collective leadership.

"At this point Mr. Dulles went on to comment on the various satellite reactions to the downgrading of Stalin, to the wholesale rehabilitation of individuals who had been purged, and finally to point out that in some of the satellites political difficulties were bound to emerge from this campaign."
"In concluding his remarks concerning the downgrading of Stalin, Mr. Dulles reported the comments of the British Ambassador in Moscow, Sir William Hayter. The Ambassador believed that the anti-Stalin campaign was basically directed toward internal Soviet objectives rather than to foreign relations." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

The views of the Chinese Communist Government on the anti-Stalin campaign, as expressed in an article in the official party newspaper Peoples Daily of April 5, were transmitted to the Department and analyzed in telegram 1969 from Hong Kong, April 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/4–656)

39. **Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

*Moscow, April 9, 1956—7 p.m.*

2300. This telegram and following message (which will contain reference to present one) are companion pieces designed as of possible use during Ambassador’s consultation. Present message seeks to present general picture of post-20th Congress period, while next one will deal more specifically with most important element of so-called campaign against personality cult and will also endeavor to identify some of new problems which present solutions of old problems may produce.

I. Where Stalin is himself criticized in current line, it is because of specific errors attributed to him, errors which it is implied party, had it been able, would not have permitted. These errors were serious primarily in sense they diverted or slowed progress of Soviet Union or increased risks to it. Stalin’s “constructive” achievements, i.e. whenever he consulted leadership, are still separated and preserved. It is more plausible, therefore, to consider campaign anti-Stalinism rather than anti-Stalin.

II. Destruction of myth of Stalinist infallibility and invulnerability transfers to party legality, morality and omniscience. This, as reported before, provides ideological underpinning for party necessary as backdrop and to justify party decisions and actions of government responsive thereto.

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/4–956. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, Berlin, and Bonn and pouches to posts in Eastern Europe.

2 Telegram 2316, infra.
It is as necessary to these people as to other societies that policy be based upon some standard of morality, ethics or faith; it is constitutional foundation which even most arbitrary of governments seem to need to justify itself.

III. Unified field theory of Soviet action seems to be borne out by developments. While needs of internal situation and of purposes of party seem to have immediately preponderant role in shaping new postures, external effects are not absent.

A. As to internal side, motives while in most instances still obscure seem to be divided into two categories.

1. Internal compulsions. These would include such problems as agricultural yields, productivity of industrial labor, and very importantly, the loosened relationships within Presidium inherent in collective leadership. Well-being of Soviet citizens which for a large percentage fall short of their aspirations and which during Stalinist forced draft were pretty much ignored, must also be present as consideration. It can be moreover imagined that professional military pride which had been deeply injured by purges and by Stalin’s assumption of credit for winning war has been a factor taken into account at least by leaders in weighing effects of present movement. Also, fact that system has held together despite demise of the autocrat suggests that party, bureaucratic and professional classes (especially those advanced rapidly into vacancies created by purges) have developed vested interest in privileges and positions attained in regime, contributing to its stability, and have some means to make their voice heard. It might also be expected that intellectual curiosity unsatisfied by strictly controlled availability of scholastic and technical material has created restiveness in growing numbers of students and younger professional people.

2. Internal purposes. At same time, thanks to proven stability of regime and demonstrated workability of collective leadership (crisis of succession in any case has been weathered), leadership has found itself sufficiently strong to take certain measures of its own will to counter-act and overcome its inherited shortcomings. While ends may be unclear to outsiders, it is unlikely that they differ greatly from what they were under Stalin, but progress towards these ends under Stalinist system was often slowed, arrested or reversed. One of important effects of Stalinism was lethargy and mediocrity engendered in state and party bureaucracy and discouragement of initiative and spontaneity in arts, professions and technology. Undoubtedly present moves are designed to encourage initiative and provide incentives in order to increase material and intellectual output.

B. External factors. Realization that course Stalin had been pursuing would only increase risk of war, and honest appraisal of nuclear equation that was incompatible with principle of infallibility and invulnerability necessary to Stalin must have had important influence on present leadership. These people are sensitive to foreign reactions to estimates of their own intentions and are able, where
Stalin was not, to behave in manner designed for favorable foreign impact. It cannot very well have escaped them that Stalin’s rigidity, suspicions and brutality were mainly responsible for fear abroad of Soviet Union, and for military and political counter measures taken abroad. If this fear can be dispelled more auspicious atmosphere might be built for historic developments which as Marxist leaders of Soviet Union feel must in time take place. Realistic strategic concepts that Soviet Government now gives signs of accepting indicate that modern war, i.e. destruction of Soviet resources and base of power, would advance neither their national interests nor Marxism.

IV. As to loosened relationship within Presidium (referred to above) its effects must be felt down lines of command; in Soviet relationships with Chinese Communists and satellites, and in those with countries of rest of world. This is less a calculated effect than psychological one, but even so it is extremely important one to recognize since it does not in any way represent lessened hostility toward United States and “reactionary” societies. Conviction of leadership here in “rightness”, strength and stability of system and in Marxist theory of history is no weaker, and is probably stronger. Willingness to “compete” in so-called peaceful co-existence starts from borders outward, never inward, of expanded empire inherited from Stalin. There is no sign of intent to move back from these borders. Competition they envisage is either in uncommitted areas or among populations of our allies, under new and, it must be admitted, more sensible set of ground rules. Undoubtedly Soviets have also in mind, without factor being controlling one, appeal to so-called progressive elements in West who were unable to stomach Stalinist brutalities, of mystique of daring reform movement credited to Lenin.

V. Cumulative documentation of the new line indicates that leadership has taken account of problems to arise from shift away from measures of repression toward incentives and indoctrination. Present movement is cautious, each step seems to be tested by measuring its contribution to envisaged ends against new problems it generates. When they speak of democratic centralism involving two antagonistic concepts, they are speaking of relative emphasis rather than of clear cut principle.

(These inbuilt problems were manifest at Writers’ Congress and more recent Architects’ Congress, and crack few days ago at provincial press for lack of originality; exhortations to creativeness coupled with warnings against departures from lines laid down from the top or violations of discipline.)
In sum, the place is in motion, but there is no evidence as yet that problem of stimulating initiative has been reconciled with necessity of preserving discipline.

Walmsley

40. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, April 11, 1956—7 p.m.

2316. This is companion to Embtel 2300, and is specific appraisal current treatment of Stalin based on latest authoritative Soviet statements (editorial current issue Kommunist and Pravda article April 5—Embel 2278).

While yet impracticable here to try answer many questions on this development (e.g. precisely when and under what circumstances decision taken to launch frontal attack on Stalin), seems reasonably clear that party leaders pursuing three broad goals:

1. Leadership undoubtedly calculated campaign would facilitate restoration "Leninist norms party life," infusing new vigor into party structure which (particularly on intermediate and lower levels) had withered under Stalin. In words Kommunist, "ignoring by Stalin of norms party life, collective leadership led to violations internal party democracy, lowering of activity of Communists, their initiative, independence, retarded development criticism and self criticism". In sense, move is shock treatment, reaching new heights in post Stalin efforts to revitalize party. Purpose made clear by Kommunist: "Internal party democracy is not end in itself, but means for developing energy, activity of Communists, for mobilizing them for fulfillment economic and cultural plans".

2. By disassociating themselves from and condemning arbitrary acts of Stalin, party leaders probably hope to win wider active support from key groups in Soviet population (e.g. cultural, managerial, scientific, military). They seek to convince both these groups and ordinary citizen that "democratic" party rule has replaced one man dictatorship forever. Move has further advantage of helping establish present collective leadership as proper, legitimate successor Lenin.

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/4-1156. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Berlin, and Bonn and pouch to posts in Eastern Europe.
2 Supra.
3 Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/4-556)
3. Finally, by repudiating certain aspects of Stalinism and presenting themselves as Leninist "democrats", they may hope simultaneously to remove onus which brutalities Stalinism placed on party of world opinion and to narrow gap between Western social democracy (Titoism) and Soviet Communism.

Party leadership can reasonably be expected to achieve some success toward these goals. Its effect on certain segments of population non-Communist world, coupled with flexible foreign policy and deft manipulation propaganda symbols, should help USSR in its world diplomacy. Within Soviet Union, campaign should appeal among key groups mentioned above, not only because Stalin deflated but (perhaps more important) because it makes more convincing assertions Soviet leaders that police terror as it existed under Stalin is thing of past. Additionally, campaign will probably create atmosphere conducive to more realistic discussion of internal economic and social problems and may stimulate—as intended—greater local initiative. Finally, psychological-ideological barrier to reestablishment personal dictatorship raised by campaign must be regarded as one of its most significant substantive results.

On other hand, campaign poses certain real and potential problems for regime, though it is impracticable at this time to assess precisely their impact and this aspect must be approached with great caution. Nonetheless, following items deserve mention (subject to overall reservations in conclusion this message):

Party leadership runs risk of encouraging freedom thought, expression beyond intended limits, of creating or reinforcing doubts concerning party as infallible. Pravda editorial April 5 (tone of which somewhat defensive) makes clear that under "guise of condemning personality cult", at least few party members have already given vent to "anti-party statements", while others have taken "liberal attitude" towards these offenders. Pravda wailing may dampen further public expression "anti party statements" among party rank and file, but will it provide convincing answer to questions and doubts underlying such statements? This connection intelligent Russian contact of Western diplomat here recently asserted that campaign has shaken "faith" average Soviet in party and its leadership (has there been some miscalculation of impact?).

2. Senior members of Presidium in shaping course also place selves in exposed position. Abroad it is easy to point to hypocrisy these people and foreign Communists, but internal impact can be far more important. It is recalled in speeches at 20th Congress (which by nature is form for agreed policy presentation) Voroshilov only member of party Presidium (except Kirichenko) who failed to criticize personality cult, while Molotov [garble] relatively weak in their condemnation. At least seven members party Presidium cannot escape fact they were Stalin's creatures and tools during many of actions now criticized. This thought must come to minds of many Soviet citizens. And if repudiation of Stalin carried far enough,
implication of these henchmen could be used in future by rising generation in party.

3. Process of repudiating certain methods or institutions of Stalin renders more difficult their future utilization by present leadership, in event this deemed necessary in time of stress.

Above is summary certain real gains and losses involved for party dictatorship. Without prejudging sum result this much can be said, there is no reason to believe that losses will have any significant immediate effect on Soviet political and social structure; they were apparent to leaders; anti-Stalin consistent with current Soviet internal, external policies and latest sign of confidence on party leadership (unconfirmed report is effect leadership considered initiating campaign as early as 1954 but concluded move premature) no evidence yet course completed, but that it logical in series of efforts since Stalin’s death to rationalize party dictatorship but also introduces new, dynamic element with possible far reaching consequences.

Walmsley

41. Memorandum From Richard H. Davis of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Staff (Bowie) 

Washington, April 11, 1956.

SUBJECT

Mr. Bohlen on Soviet Developments

At the EE staff meeting last Tuesday Mr. Bohlen exposed himself to a wide variety of questions concerning developments in the Soviet Union and its policies. Mr. Savage has suggested that a list of the principal points made by Mr. Bohlen might be useful to you before the S/P meeting on Friday with Mr. Bohlen.

1 Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 487, USSR. Confidential.
2 Apparently April 3.
3 No record has been found of this meeting. An unsigned memorandum, dated April 12, of the meeting on April 10 between the Ad Hoc Working Group on Stalinism and Ambassador Bohlen, is in Department of State, EUR Files: Lot 59 D 233, Stalin Committee. In a telephone call to Dulles on April 18, Sherman Adams asked whether the Cabinet would like to hear Bohlen. Dulles replied that the Cabinet members might enjoy it, but he would rather that Bohlen not speak. Dulles said that “it would build him up too much—he is not working with us.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)
The EE staff meeting covered a wide variety of subjects and Mr. Bohlen's responses were as usual made in his own inimitable style and language. I, therefore, do not feel able to do more than list principal subjects and points made by Mr. Bohlen in the discussion.

1. Denigration of Stalin

**Reasons:**

a. Assurance against another Stalin or one-man dictatorship.

b. Fundamental need for establishing new basis for operation of collective leadership—necessity revise all history, philosophy, etc. All facets of Soviet life intertwined with cult of Stalin which had to be placed in perspective.

**Timing:**

Not a last-minute decision. Natural that new Soviet leaders should await Party Congress before defining position on Stalin.

**Effects:**

a. In Russia certain bewilderment and shock among uneducated masses who never had "inside track" on methods Stalin's rule. On the other hand, bureaucrats, intellectuals and Army welcome assurance that Stalin-type rule less likely to reoccur.

b. In satellites Mr. Bohlen pleaded ignorance of latest developments, but advanced opinion that while this attack on Stalin would provide temporary difficulties, it would contribute in long run to readjustments Moscow groping for in its control-relationships.

c. In free world countries foreign Communist parties would experience considerable difficulties. Socialist parties were less likely to be taken in by appeal to united front; whereas, bourgeois parties were more susceptible to Soviet blandishments.

2. Internal Developments

a. No struggle for power. Collective leadership most important fact and source of Soviet policy changes.

b. Collective leadership is in process "institutionalizing" its rule. Under Stalin all Soviet institutions were subject to his arbitrary and often brutal rule. New leadership seeks to revitalize institutions of Soviet state led by Communist party. This applies to army and there is no evidence army has assumed separate rule.

c. Ideological reformulations at 20th Congress striking evidence that ideology, except in its basic sense, such as the public ownership of all means of production, is servant of the Soviet regime in power.

d. If possible, we will soon witness "honorable" retirements from Presidium to make way for new, younger blood at pinnacle; for
example, Voroshilov out to pasture with Molotov assuming chief of state role.

e. Problem of discipline vs. initiative and responsibility. Soviet leaders may have opened up "Pandora's Box" but unlikely serious difficulties will arise.

3. Foreign Aspects

a. Western world, particularly US, attune to fighting past Soviet threats of (1) military nature, (2) subversion. Soviets have now moved to classic methods of diplomacy.

b. Immediate aim is assault on Western defense systems with concentration on weakest links such as Baghdad Pact. Nevertheless, NATO members object of Soviet attentions, particularly flanks: Scandinavian countries, Greece and Turkey.

c. Yugoslavia: Contrary to widely held Western opinion, journey to Belgrade 4 was not a pilgrimage or "Canossa". It was a carefully calculated move with eye toward Soviet relations with other countries, particularly Egypt, India, etc. Moreover, it is part of long-term readjustment in control-relationships with satellites where Stalin-type control no longer feasible in long run.

d. Ideological reformulations and move to diplomatic offensive suggest foreign Communist parties no longer as necessary as in past to Soviet Union.

4 Reference is to the visit of a Soviet delegation, including Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan to Belgrade, May 26–June 2, 1955.

42. Editorial Note

On April 18, a statement was published in Pravda (Moscow) in the name of the members of the Cominform announcing the dissolution of the organization and the discontinuance of its journal, For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy. An English translation of the statement is in Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1956, pages 377–378.

At the 282d meeting of the National Security Council on April 26, Allen Dulles, as part of his briefing on significant world developments affecting United States security, briefly commented on the dissolution of the Cominform. According to the memorandum of discussion at this meeting, "Mr. Dulles expressed the judgment that this event had no practical significance, but could have important
propaganda value and would certainly be pleasing to Marshal Tito.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

The Division of Research for USSR and Eastern Europe, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, analyzed in detail the decision to dissolve the Cominform in the May issue of Soviet Affairs and concluded that it "marked one more gesture in Moscow's campaign to prove its respectability and lack of hostile intentions toward the outside world. The announcement of the move, which Italian Communist leader Togliatti said was decided at the Soviet Party Congress in February, appeared timed with the arrival in Britain of Khrushchev and Bulganin and was a logical culmination of the Soviet effort to woo Tito and evolve new means to attract support from Socialist and neutral groups.” (Department of State, INR/Files, Soviet Affairs)

43. Memorandum From the Deputy Director (Plans) of Central Intelligence (Wisner) to the Director (Dulles) ¹


SUBJECT

Views of a Leading Expert ² on Soviet Affairs Regarding Causes and Significance of the Downgrading of Stalin

1. It is believed that you and certain other Agency officials will be interested in the hypothesis, set forth below, of one of the most outstanding American experts on Soviet affairs, which I have just received. For the reasons which I have expressed orally to you, I do not deem it advisable to identify this expert in this memorandum. . . . It is my hope that a certain amount of additional research, keyed to the various points that are advanced in support of this hypothesis, will be productive of material tending to support or disprove at least some portions of the analysis, thereby affording to us a somewhat clearer view of the matter. I would recommend against the dissemination of this document outside the Agency until such time as it has been subjected to further research and analysis.

2. The expert takes exception to the view which has been expressed in certain quarters that the present Soviet leadership is a

¹ Source: Department of State, EUR Files: Lot 59 D 233, Memos 1956–7. Secret.
² George F. Kennan.
group of amiable and mutually cordial persons, welded together by
their long apprenticeship under Stalin who have found a workable
and enduring solution to the inherent difficulties of collective leader-
ship. In particular this expert is skeptical of the view that the recent
wave of anti-Stalin revelations in Russia represents only the imple-
mentation of a plan conceived long in advance, and quite harmoni-
ously, by the entire group at the top. [The foregoing is perhaps an
over-simplification of the line of thought to which exception is
taken—but it is set up in this manner by the expert to provide a
clear point of departure for his analysis. Actually I am not aware
that any of the respectable experts consider that there is complete
harmony within the top leadership, since most of those who are
inclined to the view that barring unforeseen crises we can expect a
substantial period of mutual accommodation as between the leaders
have qualified their statements in various ways and in varying
degrees.] 3

3. The hypothesis which appears to this expert the most plausi-
ble and most worthy of attention with respect to these recent
happenings in Russia is simply this:

"That the members of the present leading group either killed
Stalin, in 1953, or brought about his death as a side-effect of an
effort to remove him from power;

"That they did not wish to admit this at the time for fear of
causing 'panic and disarray';

"That they have been aware from the start that some day and
in some way the truth must come out;

"That this has been the basic reason for the entire action, since
Stalin's death, to reduce his stature in the public eye; that these men
have been concerned, in other words, to reveal—gradually and
discretely—the true frightfulness of Stalin's personality in order that
when the truth does come out their action may appear as a justifi-
able step to save the movement from possible destruction at the
hands of a semi-mad villain rather than as an act of treachery and
jealousy;

"That the secret thus shared by these men is indeed in some
respects a bond of unity among them, but at the same time a very
touchy and delicate factor in their relations and one that can easily
be or become, the source of violent suspicions and disagreements;

"That there has not by any means been full agreement to date
as to:

"(a) The point at which the complete revelation should be
made, or—accordingly—

"(b) The rate of speed at which Stalin's image should be
deflated;

3 Brackets in the source text.
"That the vacillating and erratic quality of their recent behavior with respect to the treatment of Stalin (the increased use of his name at the close of 1955, followed by the complete rejection of it toward the end of January) reflects these disagreements; and

"That there is considerable likelihood that these recent developments involve not just a theoretical argument about how fast the debunking of Stalin ought, in the interests of the movement, to be permitted to proceed but threats or insistence, from some quarter, that the revelation of what occurred in 1953 may—or should—take place in the near future."

The expert adds that if his hypothesis is generally accurate, then there would be every reason to suppose that the killing of Beria (who would not—in this expert’s opinion—be accepted as a party to the action against Stalin) had something to do with knowledge on Beria’s part of what had occurred and of the fact that he could not be depended on—not sharing the guilt—to observe the same rules and to have the same sense of responsibility in this respect, as the others.

This expert also doubts very much that Molotov was a party to any of this, which would explain his estrangement from the ruling group; but his cautious temperament plus perhaps the fact that he has no actual proof, might be considered sufficient guarantee, in contrast to Beria, that he will make no trouble. Malenkov, too, cannot have been a full-fledged participant in the action against Stalin, a circumstance that would explain much in the development of his position since Stalin’s death, and may be very important for his political future as well.

4. This expert emphasizes that the foregoing is only a hypothesis, but states that he has been encouraged to give it to us by what seems to him to be some general confirmation, in subsequent events of the interpretation of Soviet internal happenings which he gave to us shortly after the death of Stalin.

Note: This analysis and hypothesis is quite similar in certain respects to that which appeared in the 16 April issue of the New Leader, in an article by Vishniak, entitled “Was Stalin Murdered?” The Vishniak article contains references to other authors said to hold similar views (e.g., Nicolaevsky, Borkenua, Crankshaw, Joseph Newman, Gouzenko). It may well develop that the processes of normal research will not produce any very clear-cut results, by way of affirming or disproving the thesis. ... The fact that a serious and knowledgeable expert can arrive at such an hypothesis suggests that it may be a very credible one . . . .

Frank C. Wisner

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4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
44. Report by the Operations Coordinating Board's Special Working Group on Stalinism


Part I

SUMMARY OF U.S. POLICY GUIDANCE AND ACTIONS TAKEN TO EXPLOIT THE CAMPAIGN

A. U.S. Objectives To Be Served by Exploitation of the Anti-Stalin Campaign.

In the Soviet Union.

1. Expansion of the official criticism of Stalin into pressure by the people of the USSR for the diversion of effort away from military production and expansion of communism abroad toward a higher standard of living and more representative government at home.

2. Extension of Soviet admission that one-man rule was undesirable into an eventual admission that one-party rule carries the seeds of dictatorship.

In the Satellites.

3. A loosening of the ties binding the satellites to Moscow and creation of conditions which will permit the satellites to evolve toward independence of Moscow.

In the Free World.

4. Exposure of communist claims to infallibility and utopian pretensions.

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1 Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Soviet and Related Problems. Secret.

According to a memorandum from Stevens to Beam, dated May 23:

"At the OCB meeting on May 23 Mr. Hoover called attention to points C-12-d and e on pages 2 and 3 of the status report dated May 17. He said he felt these were important considerations which would permit the undermining and discrediting of current Soviet propaganda lines and suggested that they should receive major emphasis in media output. There were no other comments on the status report. Mr. Hoover suggested that the report should receive broader circulation than is normally given status reports and it was agreed that copies would be circulated for information to members of the NSC and to other selected recipients.

"In the briefing session this morning, the question of the future status of the Special Working Group was discussed. Mr. Hoover expressed the opinion that it was important that a high level group continue active in this field and suggested that the present Special Working Group be continued and that the members of the NSC-174 Working Group be designated as their deputies and continue their normal work. Mr. Hoover repeated this suggestion in the form of a proposal at the Board meeting today and the Board concurred in the proposal." (ibid., Central Files, 761.00/5-2356)
5. Prevention of the use of the denigration of Stalin by communist parties to come to power through parliaments in free countries where they are now represented.

General.

6. Extension of Soviet admission of Stalin’s mistakes at home into an admission of Stalin’s mistakes abroad.

B. General Approach.

7. A distinction is being made between the U.S. official line and other U.S. means to exploit the campaign.

8. Publicly, U.S. media are adopting a note of cautious skepticism, calling upon the Soviet leaders to demonstrate their professed attachment to reform by correcting still outstanding major abuses in domestic and foreign politics. For the time being, an attitude of jubilation over communist embarrassment is being avoided in order to obviate a counter-productive reaction which might cause the communists to close their ranks. In order to stimulate and maintain the momentum of the effects of the campaign without directly involving the U.S., overt media are helping to keep in circulation the flow of material and comment, wherever generated, damaging to the communist cause.

9. In the non-attributable field the U.S. is employing its resources to sow confusion and doubt in the communist world, to undermine the objectives of the campaign through ridicule and questioning and to expose the attempt of the present leaders to dissociate themselves from unpopular communist tenets.

10. It is appreciated that an excellent opportunity is presented to exploit the contradictions of communism and this is being done wherever possible by direct statement, by implication or suggestion as appropriate to each particular form of media.

C. Guidance Issued.

11. Statements by U.S. officials. Agencies concerned are basing their official comment and line of questioning principally upon Secretary Dulles’ press statements of April 3 and April 24, his speech of April 23, and on pertinent portions of the President’s speech of April 21. 

2Extracts from these statements by the President and the Secretary of State were attached to the source text, but are not printed. Regarding the Secretary’s press conference on April 3, see footnote 2, Document 36. The transcript of his press conference of April 24 is in Department of State Bulletin, May 7, 1956, pp. 747–753. For text of Dulles’ address before the annual luncheon of the Associated Press in New York City on April 23, see ibid., April 30, 1956, pp. 706–710. President Eisenhower’s speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, broadcast over radio and television, is ibid., pp. 699–706.
12. *Use of non-official comment.* Agencies concerned have been advised to use foreign and U.S. non-official opinion and report local communist confusion to achieve our immediate goals rather than to give evidences of a major U.S. propaganda campaign. Such attributed non-official material is emphasizing the following main points.

a. Stalinism is the antithesis of democracy.
b. Stalin’s men are still ruling the country and Stalin’s policies, reiterated at the recent Party Congress, are still being pursued—collectivization, police state, domination of the satellites and Baltic States, control of foreign communist parties, etc.
c. Only a few of Stalin’s victims have been rehabilitated to date.
d. The Soviet Government has confirmed Western accusations of many years standing.
e. Communist claims to infallible leaders and doctrine have been shattered.
f. Communist leaders have admitted that Soviet policies under Stalin involved “excessive costs.”
g. On the basis of past experience and in view of continued Soviet emphasis on heavy industry and armaments, we are urging the Free World to remain on guard against a new turnabout by confronting the Soviet Union with the firm determination of a cohesive Free World to resist aggression.

13. *Maximum reliance on indigenous sources.* Wherever and whenever possible we are using local opinion and reaction, and confusion among communist parties, to achieve our objectives without publicly injecting widespread U.S. output.

14. *Regional emphasis.* Agencies are tailoring output to fit target areas, to wit:

a. *The Soviet Union.* The Soviet population is being encouraged to take advantage of the anti-Stalin campaign to obtain greater political relaxation and a higher standard of living.
b. *The satellites.* Hope for greater freedom is being strengthened, and pressure toward this goal is being encouraged. Intra-party dissension and differences with the Moscow line are being exploited.
c. *The Free World.* The continuity of basic Soviet policies from Lenin to the present is being emphasized. Agencies are seeking to counter trends toward the relaxation of vigilance, striving to prevent the assumption of respectability by the Soviet leaders, discrediting and promoting dissension among the local communist parties. Stress is given to the servile attitude of foreign communist parties and their leaders toward the USSR. Yugoslavia is being encouraged to remain independent, physically and ideologically.
d. *The Far East.* Questions are being raised whether “collective leadership” is to be the new fashion for Asia and it is being pointed out that the Far Eastern communist leaders are no more infallible than Stalin.
D. Implementation of Agreed Points of Guidance.

15. Open Media.

a. Radio. The U.S. International Broadcasting Service has emphasized the actual news of the denigration of Stalin with commentary based on various Free World editorial viewpoints. The output has been designed to raise questions in the minds of listeners. In the Bloc the need for actions to demonstrate the sincerity of recent communist pronouncements has been publicized. In the Free World the statements of foreign socialists, particularly those made at the British Trade Union meeting at Margate,\(^3\) have been used to warn against the Popular Front.

b. Press. The International Press Service has paralleled the line taken by the USIBS. It has also despatched cartoon roundups and comic strips using the guidance themes.

c. Film. USIA is providing some film for a film biography of Stalin being prepared by the American Broadcasting Company.

d. Research. All research agencies are examining old files for information on Stalin and also for information on Bulganin and Khrushchev for possible future use in the event the ban against attacking the present leaders is lifted.

16. Unattributable Propaganda. Appropriate agencies, in close coordination with the Department of State, are engaged in unattributable propaganda in direct support of U.S. objectives as outlined in Section I above.

E. Coordination With the British and French.

17. The British and French have been informed regarding our approaches to the anti-Stalin campaign and suggestions have been solicited from them. As a result of cooperative arrangements, the French organization “Peace and Liberty” will shortly issue a new satirical poster series dealing with the anti-Stalin campaign.

Part II

MOTIVATIONS OF THE CURRENT ANTI-STALIN CAMPAIGN

18. It was agreed that the Soviet leaders have probably not felt compelled by foreign developments to take the step of jettisoning the symbol of Stalin. Possible motivations include the following:

a. The desire of the present Soviet leaders to confirm their own position by a dramatic break with the past, thereby gaining popularity at home and respectability abroad.

b. The desire to gain greater freedom of action to pursue current emphasis on coexistence by eliminating a contradiction between the Stalinist symbols of the USSR and its present avowed intentions.

\(^3\)Not further identified.
c. The desire of the current rulers to forestall the rise of a future Stalin (both in the Soviet and other orbit parties) by denouncing the "cult of personality."

d. The desire to stimulate the lower administrative ranks to assume more initiative and responsibility instead of merely awaiting orders from above—by informing them that this is expected of them and by removing the source of fear of responsibility.

e. The aim of strengthening the role of the Soviet Party both at home and in its leadership of foreign communist parties, in order to make good the loss of Stalin's dominating influence.

45. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, May 17, 1956—4 p.m.

2582. Have now had opportunity to study document referred to in Embtel 2558 (which was being photostated for extra copies for French). Document is not actual speech but notes taken during one hour possession member French Embassy Warsaw. Assuming notes to be full summary of original text it is still not possible to ascertain with any degree of accuracy whether original was authentic text of Khrushchev's speech or not.

There is nothing in summary which contradicts reports and rumors current here in mid-March and subsequently concerning text of speech. On the other hand, there are certain important omissions; for example, no reference is made to Stalin's executions of Soviet marshals and officers which was most substantiated of initial reports. Furthermore, there are a few errors of fact which it is doubtful Khrushchev would have made.

According to document Khrushchev made copious reference to unpublished Lenin documents, including testament and other notes and letters directed against Stalin. These bear a suspicious resem-

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/5-1756. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London and Paris.

2 In telegram 2558, May 14, Bohlen reported that the Counselor of the French Embassy in Moscow had loaned him a copy of a despatch from the French Embassy in Warsaw, which was purported to be a summary of the text of Khrushchev's secret speech on Stalin. Bohlen indicated that he had not yet studied the document, but that at first glance it appeared "highly plausible" and the French Embassy was "apparently convinced of its authenticity." (Ibid., 761.00/5-1456) Bohlen transmitted to the Department of State a photostat copy of the summary as an enclosure to despatch 503, May 18. (Ibid., 761.00/5-1856)
blance to Trotsky's writings on subject in his biography Stalin. This
in itself of course is not disproof, and merely may indicate accuracy
Trotsky's memory but, on the other hand, could equally well have
been compiled by someone on basis Trotsky's works.

In general, document adds very little to previous information
concerning nature Khrushchev's speech, except on few minor points.
Photostat copy is being forwarded to Department by next
pouch.

Bohlen

46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy
in the Soviet Union

Washington, May 18, 1956—4:54 p.m.

1286. CAS Headquarters has procured purported copy Khru-
shchev speech of February 25. Since document may be same as one
on which notes taken . . . appreciate your spelling out errors men-
tioned Embtel 2582 to assist analysis here.

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/5–1756. Secret; Limited
Distribution. Drafted by Klosson and cleared with EE and Armstrong, who signed for
Dulles.

2 Supra.
Owing sensitivity source, document being treated no form until further notice. Copy being sent you for comment soonest.  

Dulles

3 In telegram 1300 to Moscow, May 21, the Department indicated it was forwarding by air pouch the document procured by the CIA and compared its contents to the contents of the document obtained by Bohlen. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/5-1956)

In his memoirs, Ray Cline, who was then the CIA’s expert on Sino-Soviet relations, recalled that the agency obtained a copy of the speech in April “through non-American intermediaries, at a very handsome price.” Cline, who was asked to read the document to vouch for its authenticity, argued that it was authentic and that it should be made public as an aid to students and scholars interested in the Soviet Union. Cline said that he had also pointed out that it was a rare opportunity to have all the critical things that “we had said for years about the Soviet dictatorship confirmed by the principal leader of the Soviet Politburo.” But, according to Cline, Wisner and James Angleton, Chief of Counterintelligence and Counterespionage, opposed publication of the speech and wanted to “exploit” it by “feeding selected bits of the text to specific audiences on which they wanted to have an impact.” (Cline, Secrets, Spies, and Scholars, pp. 163–164) In a public statement on November 29, 1976, Angleton said the CIA did not pay for the copy of Khruşchev’s speech, but instead obtained it from a European Communist whose motive was considered ideological. (New York Times, November 30, 1976)

47. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, May 28, 1956, 11 a.m.  

OTHERS PRESENT

Under Secretary Hoover
Mr. Allen Dulles
Admiral Radford
General Twining
Colonel Goodpaster

The President indicated he had wanted to have this meeting in order to see just what we are doing, and how we are handling the matter of special reconnaissance flights. He referred to a recent protest by the USSR. 2 He said he wanted to give the Soviets every chance to move in peaceful directions and to put our relations on a better basis—and to see how far they will go. For this reason, during this period, it is particularly desirable to be wise and careful in what


2 The text of the Soviet note, May 14, was transmitted to the Embassy in Moscow in telegram 1273, May 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/5-1456)
we do. Mr. Hoover read the draft text of a reply to the Soviets. The President thought a passage might be added to the effect that our Government had instructed its aviation services to be especially careful in this regard (possibility of navigational error in Arctic regions).

Turning then to a discussion of the Soviet invitation to General Twining, the President said he had wondered why they picked out one Chief, rather than the JCS as a whole, since they function as a body—specifically he wondered whether they did so for personal reasons or with some other purpose in mind. General Twining said that the invitation was for Soviet Aviation Day, and that they were inviting air officers of many other countries. Admiral Radford recalled that at Geneva Khrushchev had said laughingly that the Soviets might send their chiefs over to look at U.S. war plans, and that he had said that might be all right if it were fifty-fifty. He added that the JCS had considered the matter and were disposed to accept an invitation if extended, indicating that they would want to look seriously at what the Soviets have.

The President said that if General Twining wanted to go, he saw no reason why he should not. He would not foresee that the visit would be of any particular intelligence value, however. General Twining said there was a good possibility that he might go in the Boeing 707, flying non-stop from the United States to Moscow. The President (and the others present) thought this was a splendid idea if it could be worked. The President said that General Twining could say while he was there that if the Soviets want to trade military visits, and go around and really see what the other country has in a military sense, they might invite our Chiefs, who would be prepared to visit the Soviet Union providing the Soviets were willing to have their chiefs visit us.

The President next discussed certain other reconnaissance efforts.

He then returned to the subject of the invitation to General Twining and indicated he thought it should not have come directly to the Air Force, but should have come through diplomatic channels, inasmuch as the Soviet Embassy is accredited to the President. He indicated that he thought an answer ought to go to the Soviets through the American Ambassador to the effect that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force is authorized to attend, and that he will

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3The draft has not been found, but on May 29 the Department of State presented to the Soviet Embassy a note explaining that navigational difficulties in the Arctic region may have caused unintentional violations of Soviet air space, which, if they in fact had occurred, the Department regretted. The text of the note was transmitted in telegram 1332 to Moscow, May 29. *(Ibid.)*

4See Document 105.
provide his own transport. All things considered, he felt it was best for General Twining to go.

The President repeated that he is very anxious to see how far the Soviets are ready to go in making offers and working for better relationships. General Twining said the operation protested has been stopped. All actions were completed. It was set up last February and conducted in recent weeks.

G
Colonel, CE, US Army

48. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, May 31, 1956—12:42 p.m.

1339. For Ambassador. On basis extensive additional analysis and checking here, by most knowledgeable governmental experts and consultants, we strongly incline view that document Deptels 1286 and 13002 our possession is authentic copy of version Khrushchev secret speech prepared for use and guidance Communist leaders of satellite country where document procured. All experts call attention to obvious omissions and distortions in text which prepared for external use, and in addition mention likelihood omissions from original speech of certain most sensitive and potentially embarrassing portions full story Stalin era.

Question of whether, and if so, how to release document in relatively near future is now raised in view partial leakage contents of some similar versions, most notably France Soir 28 May issue, and probability of further leakages of incomplete or distorted versions. One important concern this connection is possibility that versions so leaked by others will present speech in light unduly favorable to present regime and will gain a measure of currency and acceptance which would tender difficult this being overtaken by more balanced version which we have.

Medium for release currently being most favorably considered here is that entire document would be released by Committee for

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/5-3156. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Armstrong and cleared with Murphy and Beam, who signed for Hoover.
2 See Document 46 and footnote 3 thereto.
Free Europe, which method would at least partially obviate appearance of official governmental sponsorship and exploitation document.

Of special interest here would be your views on impact of indicated type of release and exploitation and general desirability handling matter in manner proposed, i.e., assuming that no official responsibility for action or document is taken. ³

CAS has just received additional collection of documentary material running to some 30 pages which appears to have been issued as supplement to version of speech our possession. This material includes purported texts of letters and other documents similar to, but not contained in, text of speech. CAS advises that these documents likewise appear authentic and that some are believed entirely new material, i.e., hitherto unknown to us.

Hoover

³For Bohlen’s response, see Document 51.

49. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State ¹

Moscow, June 2, 1956—4 p.m.

2712. Announcement this morning change in Foreign Minister carried in all papers. (Embtel 2707 ²).

As entire world is aware, Molotov’s resignation from Foreign Minister position has been rumored for well over year when became apparent that Bulganin and Khrushchev had taken out his hands direction Soviet Foreign Affairs (in part at least because his known opposition to Yugoslav rapprochement). It not necessary here review clear evidence his loss authority in this field nor oblique criticisms his direction Soviet foreign relations at 20th Party Congress.

Shepilov as his replacement has also been rumored, although there have been counterrumors in favor of Gromyko. Shepilov’s

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.13/6–256. Confidential. Received June 2, 11:32 a.m. Repeated to Belgrade.

²Telegram 2707, June 2, contained the announcement by the Soviet press that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on June 1 complied with Molotov’s request that he be relieved of his duties as Foreign Minister and had appointed Dmitrii T. Shepilov to replace him. (Ibid.)
elevation to candidate member Presidium gives him requisite party standing.

While decision eventually remove Molotov appears have been germinating for over year, timing is obviously in connection with Tito visit, and in order remove Molotov as one co-signatories of Stalin of excommunication messages of 1948 from direct participation Tito talks.

Announcement gives no indication of transfer to any other specific job but makes clear that Molotov retains position as First Deputy Prime Minister.  

Bohlen

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3 Tito visited the Soviet Union June 1-23.
4 A more detailed analysis by OIR of Molotov’s removal as Foreign Minister is in Soviet Affairs, July 1956, pp. 11-12. (Department of State, INR Files, Soviet Affairs)

50. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions

Washington, June 2, 1956—3:50 p.m.

843. Department recently obtained from confidential source copy of document which purports to be version of Khrushchev’s secret Feb 25 speech as prepared for confidential info and guidance of leadership of a Communist party outside USSR. Study furnishes

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/6-256. Confidential. Drafted by Beam, cleared with Murphy, and signed by Beam for Hoover. Sent to Moscow, Prague, Vienna, Warsaw, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Budapest.
2 In a memorandum of June 1 to Acting Secretary Hoover, Armstrong wrote that he was attaching a revised translation of Khrushchev’s secret speech, which should be substituted for the earlier translation sent to Hoover on May 18. Armstrong noted that Wisner made the following comments in transmitting the revised translation to the Department:

“All the evidence we have been able to collect to date tends to confirm our earlier belief that this document contains the substance of N.S. Khrushchev’s secret speech of 25 February 1956 at the XXth Communist Party Congress, as prepared for the confidential use and guidance of the leaders of the Communist Party in one of the European Satellite countries. In the time that has passed since my first letter, we have had this document examined by a number of experts on Soviet Communism and checked as to factual accuracy in many ways.

“We continue to feel that the original speech probably contained additional revelations that were omitted or altered in the version released for Satellite consumption.

“The speech as here presented adds a great deal to our knowledge of the
grounds for confidence its authenticity but Department does not propose to vouch for it.

Local correspondents aware Department's possession of document and pressing for release. Accordingly Department will probably make document public some time Monday afternoon Washington time.

Document lengthy and will be air pouched to addressees soonest.

In releasing document Department will simply let it speak for itself and will offer no commentary. 3

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implications of the degradation of Stalin. It makes clear that the present Soviet leaders lived in mortal terror for their own lives in the last days of Stalin's rule." (Ibid., 761.00/6-156)

3 In telegram 1353 to Moscow, June 2, not sent to the other Eastern European posts, the Department of State said that since the Washington press was aware of the Department's possession of a copy of the speech, it was no longer feasible to use the method of release indicated in Document 48. In publishing the document the Department did not plan to provide background or comment, but would let the text speak for itself. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/6-256)

The origins of the decision by the U.S. Government to publish the speech are not clear. In his memoirs, Ray Cline recalled that he was alone with Allen Dulles on June 2 working on the drafting of a speech, and Dulles mentioned that he had heard that Cline was in favor of releasing the Khrushchev speech. After Cline explained his reasons for this position, Dulles said that he too favored release. According to Cline, the Director first called Wisner and then Foster Dulles and obtained their concurrences to releasing the speech. (Cline, Secrets, Spies, and Scholars, p. 164) However, in a statement in Washington on November 29, 1976, James Angleton, who was head of CIA's special operations and counterintelligence division in 1956, disputed Cline's version. According to Angleton, the decision to publish the speech "was made by Eisenhower, Allen Dulles and John Foster Dulles. They decided its significance should take precedence over political action, and therefore, with the President's consent, the text and footnotes prepared by the CIA were given over to the New York Times."

Eisenhower was at his Gettysburg farm from the afternoon of Friday, June 1, to the morning of Monday, June 4. Foster Dulles was on vacation in Watertown, New York, from May 25 through June 5. No record has been found of telephone conversations they may have had during June 1-4 regarding the publication of Khrushchev's speech.

The speech was published in the New York Times on June 4 and reprinted in Grullow, Current Soviet Policies—II, pp. 172-188.
51. **Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

*Moscow, June 2, 1956—4 p.m.*

2718. Deptel 1339. Having had opportunity of careful study of document I agree with conclusion that this is in all probability authentic copy version Khrushchev’s speech, at least as sent to satellites.

Certain errors of fact which had been noted in French document, e.g. date of deportations and Eikhe arrest, are corrected in this document. From comparison two documents it is apparent French version was based on same source, but since text from which notes were taken by French in Warsaw was in Russian two documents were apparently not identical. In view of complete secrecy surrounding event it is possible that Eikhe’s execution in 1940 is authentic, although as observed (Embtel 2603) end of 1938 was generally regarded as bringing to a halt excesses great purge and I still for this reason find puzzling reference to Stalin’s enciphered telegram concerning use physical torture as late as January 1939.

In addition, I have had from entirely independent source confirmation of certain specific details in document which tend to confirm its credibility, as well as possibility that document may be actual speech itself and not merely version prepared for Communist leaders in satellite countries. These details come from French journalist, Michael Gordey, at present in Moscow and he obtained this information from an old Menshevik friend whom he had known well in Paris and who had returned to Soviet Union in 1950. Gordey is of Russian parents, speaks perfect Russian and is extremely knowledgeable about Soviet Union. He of course has no knowledge whatsoever of existence document in question but had seen French version in French Embassy. His informant had not actually seen text of Khrushchev’s speech himself, but had received second-hand account from old Bolshevik friend who I believe had actually been present or in any event had seen stenographic account of speech. Version of speech given Gordey followed very closely that outlined in document and included certain specific details which were not in French version, namely reference to Khrushchev’s telephone call to Vasilevsky on Kharkov battle and his conversation on same subject with

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/6-256. Secret. Limited Distribution. Received June 2, 5:43 p.m.

2 Document 48.

3 Telegram 2603, May 19, contained Bohlen’s listing of the errors he perceived in the version of the speech obtained by the French. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/5-1956)
Malenkov when Stalin refused to come to telephone. Informant also
gave in much greater detail than in French version Eikhe, Kedrov,
Rudzut and, particularly, Kirov cases.

In addition, Swedish Ambassador told me that Bulgarian Ambas-
sador here, who claims to have seen text of speech, had given
him outline without details and order of subjects and construction of
speech from source followed very closely order of subjects and
general organization of documents.

While nothing can be conclusive in a matter of this kind, I
believe these independent confirmations here in Moscow from per-
sons stated above who have no knowledge of our possession of
document certainly tend to add to its credibility.

In regard to publicity I am of two minds. In general I believe
that documents such as this concerning Soviet policies which are
believed to be genuine are worthwhile publishing in that they help
clarify public opinion and explain what is actually going on in this
country, and this document would be invaluable to students of
Soviet affairs who would normally not have access to it. However, I
would seriously doubt if publication would be valuable to our side
from propaganda point of view. Speech is extremely serious and
convincing and goes far to providing real evidence that current
Soviet leadership determined to persist in present mere “liberals”
course and do away with certain abuses of Stalin period. Theme
throughout speech, particularly on page 12, that there must be no
repetition of Stalin’s crimes will, I am sure, be regarded as strong
evidence in many quarters that current leadership has indeed in
certain respects “reformed”. Very fact that text given in this docu-
ment is more balanced than previous speculations and leaks will, I
feel, not only tend to enhance its credibility but will give more
credit than discredit to present leadership. Fact that document when
published will undoubtedly be denounced as spurious by Commu-
nists will not, in my opinion, offset reaction more favorable than not
to present regime.

Therefore, I would conclude if primary purpose of publication is
to place current rulers in unfavorable light, I would be inclined not
to publish. On the other hand, if main purpose is merely to get out
an interesting and important document concerning political develop-
ments in Soviet Union, publication would be useful, particularly as
leaks are almost certain. In this connection I note (Paris 5677 to
Department repeated info Moscow 212)⁴ that entire French version

⁴Telegram 5677, May 31, indicated that the U.S. Embassy in Paris obtained from
the French Foreign Ministry a 19-page typewritten copy of Khrushchev’s speech that
was presumed to be the same as the one Bohlen obtained from the French. The
French Foreign Ministry had shown copies of the document to certain journalists,
including Americans, and had given them permission to use the document without
has been given to correspondent by Quai d’Orsay so that substance of speech has already been made public. If Department’s decision is to publish believe Committee Free Europe is as good a channel as any in order to avoid appearance US Government involvement.

I have strictly observed noform classification; however, I do feel certain obligation toward French Embassy which made available to us other version, but will do nothing pending further instructions from Department.  

Bohlen

attribution. It was also pointed out that France Soir on May 29 had printed under a Vienna dateline excerpts patently taken from the same version. (Ibid., 761.00/5-3156)

5 In his memoirs, Bohlen wrote that his advice “was rejected.” (Bohlen, Witness to History, p. 399) It is clear, however, that the decision to publish the speech had already been made by the time Bohlen’s advice was received in the Department. A typewritten notation on the source text reads: “Mr. Furnas (R) notified 7:15 p.m., 6/3”. A handwritten notation reads: “No further action.”

52. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 1

Moscow, June 16, 1956—3 p.m.

2837. At last night’s reception I had short talk with Khrushchev and following points emerged. He seemed to be considerably more subdued than usual and mentioned fact that he was very tired after his trip with Tito. 2 I took advantage this reference to tell him that American and other Western correspondents who had been along on trip with Tito were very much displeased at discriminatory treatment they had received during trip, and told him of complaints I had had in this regard from US correspondents. Khrushchev said that he had been unaware of this on trip although he said Tito had mentioned it to him, and brushed matter aside by stating that there were still some bureaucrats in Soviet system who could not easily adjust to new conditions.

Khrushchev then in mild but definite terms said that he simply did not understand attitude of US, and particularly that of Mr.

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/6-1656. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Repeated to London and Paris.

2 During Tito’s visit to the Soviet Union, June 1-23. Khrushchev accompanied him to Stalingrad, Rostov, and Novorossisk, June 10-13.
Dulles, and felt that recent speeches and statements were difficult to reconcile with views that had been expressed at Geneva Conference. I told Khrushchev that I felt that he simply did not understand operation of American system with its free expression of opinion and, in particular, the institution of press conferences where leading government officials were subjected to free and untrammeled questioning by correspondents on any subject.

He said he felt that while Soviet relations were improving with other countries, with the US it was going very slowly indeed. Given this opportunity I told him I thought words were insufficient in matters of this kind and he surely realized special responsibility of the US to which he agreed. I told him that as long as the major questions such as Germany, disarmament and others which were the chief causes tension remain unsolved that mere words on desirability of improved relations, etc. were not going to change situation. I gave him my personal opinion that Soviet leaders seemed believe they could have everything their own way and that the constant assault in their own statements and their propaganda against measures such as, for example, NATO, which US and its associates felt to be vital to security seemed to me to be incompatible with the constantly reiterated thesis of desire for co-existence and normal relations. I told him that constant attacks on so-called policy of "positions of strength" led me to believe the Soviet Union desired we should operate from position of weakness while they maintained their strength intact. Khrushchev countered by saying that at Geneva Soviet Union had indicated its willingness to accept as an international fact NATO and had proposed renunciation of force agreement between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. I told him I thought that additional pieces of paper of this nature were unnecessary in view of the Charter of the UN and besides any such question brought US squarely up against the problem of the division of Germany. Khrushchev did not argue point but returned to his original thesis and said he felt the US did not understand the depth and significance of changes which were taking place in Soviet Union.

I told him I did my best to keep my government informed but despite certain improvements the area of secrecy was so great in this country that it was very difficult for an Ambassador to obtain a clear picture of what was going on. I mentioned in this connection fact that middle of March the whole world knew that he had made very important speech to a closed session of Congress but no reliable information on this subject had been available in Moscow. (I did this in hope that Khrushchev would make some remark on subject of

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3For documentation on the Geneva Heads of Government meeting, July 18–23, see vol. v, pp. 119 ff.
version published by Department.) Khrushchev at first attempted to
deny that there had been any special speech, but finding this
untenable he said versions had been circulated which did not corre-
spond to truth but denied (incidentally this is party line since similar
statements were made to me last night by Malenkov and Molotov
with big smiles on their faces) that he had read the version recently
published on grounds that it required "a big work of translation."

Khrushchev then referred to Twining visit ¹ and said he hoped
that this would be step which would lead to better understanding of
Soviet Union, to which I replied that would depend in no small
measure to degree of frankness which General Twining was dealt
with during his visit here.

Khrushchev throughout the conversation spoke in unusually
quiet and restrained terms and seemed to have very much on his
mind the problem of relations with the US. He inquired after
President’s health and expressed satisfaction when I told him that
his condition was excellent and from all accounts he had undergone
the operation without any difficulty. ²

Bohlen

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¹ Twining visited the Soviet Union June 23–July 1; see Document 105.
² President Eisenhower had an operation for ileitis on June 9.

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53. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special
Assistant for Intelligence (Armstrong) to the Secretary of
State

Washington, June 18, 1956.

SUBJECT

Documentary Material Supplemental to Khrushchev’s Speech

In connection with your San Francisco speech, you should
know that the Department and CIA have each separately obtained
copies of the so-called "Unpublished Documents" that were sup-
posed to have been distributed among the delegates to the XXth

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¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/6–1956. Secret.
² For text of Dulles’ address before the 41st annual convention of Kiwanis
International at San Francisco on June 21, a speech entitled "The Contest Between
CPSU Congress. . . . A translation into English runs to 34 double-spaced, legal length pages. There are 17 documents involved, including Lenin's "testament," Lenin's note regarding the treatment of nationalities, and other notes by Lenin regarding domestic policy.

We and CIA have been examining the documents to ascertain their authenticity and value in the event of publication. The tentative consensus is that, while a small part of the material has not been previously published, most of it has appeared in one form or another in the West. On balance there seems to be little additional propaganda or political advantage to the United States in publication, but the documents would be of some interest to students of Soviet history and would tend to some degree to keep alive interest in the Khrushchev speech. We have reason to believe that both the British and French have also by now obtained these documents, although they have not indicated any plans for publication.

The view of EUR, P and ourselves is that the documents would probably better serve US interests if released by the British, but in any case, at a date to follow your speech in San Francisco. EUR is exploring the possibility of the British doing so. Alternatively, the documents could be released as a routine matter here, at such time and in such fashion as to encourage their tie-in with and focus upon the Khrushchev speech, following your speech in San Francisco. When the choice between these alternatives is clearer, a recommendation will be made to you through Mr. Murphy.³

If you care to see a copy of the documents prior to departing for San Francisco, I have them available.

³In a memorandum of June 19 to Murphy, Armstrong summarized the origin of the documents, which he said numbered 18, not 17, and how they were obtained and repeated as recommendations to the two alternatives mentioned in this memorandum, apparently leaving it to Murphy as to how the documents were to be published. There is no indication on this memorandum of the decision Murphy reached. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/6-1956) But on June 30, the Department announced that it recently obtained through a confidential source copies of certain documents it believed were distributed to the delegates at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February. These 18 documents were published in the Department of State Bulletin of July 23, 1956, with an explanation that the Department decided to make the documents available in the interests of scholarship and historical perspective and in light of the fact that on June 30 the CPSU made public a segment of the documents in the group. (Ibid., pp. 153-161)
54. Notes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, June 25, 1956, 9:15 a.m. ¹

[Here follows discussion of items 1–9.]

10. Khrushchev’s Speech and Conflicts in Communist Parties—Mr. Bowie said there had been a “suspicious similarity” between statements made by western communist parties regarding Khrushchev’s speech. He thought there was something here to be exploited among the satellites.

Referring further to the speech, those present agreed that it had offered good material for use by the informational agencies. The Secretary said there should be policy guidance on what line to take. This should be carefully thought through. He added “that we have an opportunity the like of which might not occur again for many years. Now is the chance to fragmentize the wall of granite of the International Communist Party.” Mr. Henderson made two points: One, that we should not ignore the Baltic States and, another, that while Khrushchev had been jabbing at Stalin’s brutality to Communists, he had not mentioned the cruelty to the Koreans, Poles, Persians, Afghans, and many others. Mr. Murphy asked if the OCB would not do something about this problem. Mr. Phleger, insisting that we should exploit this break, asked if Khrushchev’s speech had been “circulated physically” abroad. The Secretary reiterated that it should be translated and printed in foreign languages, e.g., one-half million copies to Indonesia.

Continuing on the same subject, the Secretary said he would speak about it at his press conference on Tuesday. ² He would make the point (1) that despotism can only hold together under brutality and iron discipline and (2) this discipline was accepted only in an atmosphere of constant victories. There had been no such recent victories. Mr. Bowie asked if the President could make a speech on July 4. The Secretary said that a speech was not likely but a statement or television film might be possible.

Action: To sum up, Mr. Hoover proposed, with general concurrence, that (1) there should be a meeting before the next OCB session, with the Directors of CIA and USIA, to discuss further exploitation of this issue and (2) Mr. Beam’s committee (in OCB),

¹Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meeting; Lot 63 D 75. Secret. Drafted by Murat W. Williams. According to an attached attendance sheet, the participants at this meeting included Dulles, Hoover, Murphy, Bowie, MacArthur, Henderson, Armstrong, McCordle, and Elbrick.

²For text of the transcript of the Secretary’s press conference of June 27 dealing with the Khrushchev speech, see Department of State Bulletin, July 9, 1956, pp. 47–49.
which had been analyzing the speech, should attempt to set an official and unofficial line on exploitation.
[Here follows the remainder of these notes.]

55. Memorandum of Discussion at the 289th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 28, 1956

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

The Director of Central Intelligence said that he would like to comment first on the reaction outside the Soviet bloc to the publication of Khrushchev’s secret speech at the Twentieth Party Congress and the subsequent developments relating thereto. There had been rather dramatic speeches by Togliatti and Nenni in Rome, followed by statements in behalf of the Communist Parties of France, the United States, the United Kingdom, and others. In addition, Pravda in Moscow has published the statement by Dennis, head of the Communist Party, USA, as reported in the N.Y. Daily Worker of June 18, 1956. Mr. Dulles thought it remarkable that the Kremlin leaders should have selected the U.S. Communist Party criticism as the springboard for their first public reaction to the publication of the Khrushchev speech. He predicted that the Pravda statement would presently be followed by other significant statements on this subject from official Kremlin sources. All the above-mentioned reports had contained criticism of the current leadership of the Soviet Union. The chief question posed in all these statements was this: How did such gross inequities creep into the Soviet system of government when all the present Soviet leaders surrounded Stalin at this very time? To illustrate his point Mr. Dulles cited several instances in which this question had been posed, particularly the manner in which it had been posed by the Dennis statement in the Daily Worker. Mr. Dulles emphasized that while these statements were all critical in some degree of the present Soviet leaders, an attempt was generally made in these statements to maintain the link between the

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local Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as distinct from the current Soviet leadership.

In further elaboration of his general point, Mr. Dulles stated that Nenni was having a "field day" at the expense of the Kremlin. His objective appeared to be to formulate an agreement for the creation of a popular front government in Italy or at least to bring about the so-called "opening to the left". This objective has alarmed Togliatti.

The basic question which emerges from all this current confusion is the question as to what the Kremlin is actually driving at. Are these developments simply the result of confusion in the Kremlin, or are they the result of a deliberate design? Mr. Dulles said this was a difficult question to answer, but he believed that the men in the Kremlin certainly never intended that Khrushchev's speech should produce such far-reaching results as it had in fact produced. On the other hand, we must take into account the possibility that the speech was deliberately designed to confer a semblance of respectability and independence on the Communist Parties in countries outside the Soviet bloc, with the ultimate objective of producing popular front governments in these countries. Even if this proves to be the case, Mr. Dulles pointed out the serious implications of any attack on a dictatorship and its leaders. Whatever the ultimate purpose of the Kremlin, what has actually happened may well impair the Soviet leadership in the end.

Mr. Allen Dulles then asked Secretary Dulles whether he perceived any objection to his reading a summary of a cable from Ambassador Bohlen describing the conduct of Khrushchev at the reception in the Kremlin given to General Twining and the leaders of other Air Force delegations. Secretary Dulles replied that he was only concerned that the fact that this information had come from Ambassador Bohlen be kept within the walls of the room. Accordingly, Mr. Allen proceeded to describe the ineptness, discourtesy, and general misconduct of Khrushchev at this reception, emphasizing in particular the obvious disgust of the other Soviet leaders with Khrushchev's behavior. This, said Mr. Dulles, at least indicated that the present leaders of the Soviet Union were not very happy, and that they had a lot of serious problems on their hands. It might well be possible for the United States to exploit these problems to its own advantage.

When Mr. Allen Dulles had concluded his observations, Secretary Dulles stated his belief that Khrushchev was the most dangerous person to lead the Soviet Union since the October Revolution.

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2 Telegram 2915 from Moscow, June 25. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5861/6-2556)
He was not a coldly calculating person, but rather one who reacted emotionally. He was obviously intoxicated much of the time, and could be expected to commit irrational acts. The previous Soviet leaders had been for the most part the chess-playing type. Khrushchev was the first top authority in the USSR who was essentially emotional and perfectly capable of acting without a calculation of the consequences of his action. Stalin always calculated the results of a proposed action. Bad as he was, you at least knew what you were up against in dealing with him. In fact, Stalin’s only serious blunder was the Korean war, and this could readily be forgiven him in view of the fact that the U.S. Administration at the time had given every possible indication that the United States was indifferent to what happened in Korea. All in all, said Secretary Dulles, he would be glad indeed to see Khrushchev go, and there was evidently considerable feeling in the governing circles in the USSR that he ought to be fired. Unhappily there was no easy means to get rid of him. Death or violence were about the only recourse.

Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that a special meeting of the Supreme Soviet had been called in Moscow for the middle of July. It was possible that something would happen at this meeting along the lines Secretary Dulles had been talking about.

Secretary Dulles said that in addition to the cable from Ambassador Bohlen just summarized by the Director of Central Intelligence, a later cable from the Ambassador had arrived in the State Department. It described the reception at the Kremlin given for the Shah of Iran. Notable were reflections by Marshal Zhukov on the behavior of Khrushchev at the previously mentioned reception for the Air Force delegations. Of great interest also was Zhukov’s statement that U.S. estimates of the production of Soviet aircraft and submarines were much too high.

The Vice President inquired as to what line the United States should take with respect to the apparently growing independence of the Communist Parties in countries outside the Soviet bloc. Are we to regard this phenomenon as a calculated effort to confer respectability on these national Communist Parties, or are we to take it as evidence of confusion and weakness in the Soviet leadership and in their control of national Communist Parties? Mr. Allen Dulles replied that it was impossible to give a clear answer to the Vice President’s question as yet. The issue was still the subject of vigorous argument. Nevertheless, one line that we seemed safe in playing up was that there was obvious confusion in the USSR.

Governor Stassen commented that in his opinion there was a good possibility that all these statements critical of the current

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3 Telegram 2920 from Moscow, June 26. *(Ibid., 700.5861/6-2656)*
Soviet leadership were part of a central plan devised by Moscow. If this was indeed the case, the Soviet objective would be to position themselves more effectively for the newly developing phase of economic, political and psychological warfare against the free world. It seemed quite possible to Governor Stassen that Khrushchev sometimes pretended to be drunk and that his indiscretions might well be deliberate. At the same time, Governor Stassen emphasized that the Soviet leaders are unleashing forces that no one, not even these leaders themselves, could be sure would not get out of control. In any event, both possibilities deserved careful study, for the United States must not permit itself to be caught flat-footed, whichever possibility proved to be the fact.

Mr. Allen Dulles replied that there was still about a 50-50 division of opinion among the CIA experts as to which of these two possibilities was correct. Mr. Dulles added that he himself personally inclined to believe that the Soviet leaders were in fact now engaged in making the best of a bad situation.

Secretary Dulles said that he agreed with Mr. Allen Dulles' opinion. He warned, however, that this did not mean that the Soviet leaders could not ultimately snatch a victory from their current difficulties. Secretary Dulles then paid a warm tribute to the success of the Director of Central Intelligence in obtaining a copy of Khrushchev's secret speech and having the contents of it published. Secretary Dulles described this as the greatest feat by American Intelligence in a number of years.

Secretary Dulles went on to say that the problem posed by these developments in the Soviet Union could be described as follows: The Kremlin leaders, being generally recognized as evil men, had in past years generally been ostracized by civilized people. Since we agree that these leaders are evil men, should our objective be to try to maintain them in a state of ostracism; or, alternatively, ought we try to induce them to shed their evil ways, even though we realize that in doing so they will gradually cease to be ostracized?

Citing his statements in his press conference yesterday, Secretary Dulles said that he preferred the course of action of trying to induce the rulers of the Soviet Union to shed their wicked ways.

As for what had happened as a consequence of the Khrushchev speech, Secretary Dulles said he was quite sure that the Soviet leaders had never planned to have events happen as they did. On the other hand, since developments had followed the course that we have seen, the Soviet leaders are now trying to make the best of it. Certainly we do not want to assist them in this endeavor. On the

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4 A transcript of the Secretary’s news conference on June 27 is printed in Department of State Bulletin, July 9, 1956, pp. 47-53.
other hand, the United States certainly cannot take the position that
developments since the Khrushchev speech are meaningless, that
nothing whatsoever has happened in the Kremlin, and that no
changes are taking place in the USSR. As a matter of fact, the allies
of the United States go much further than we do in accepting the
reality of the changes which are occurring in the USSR. The United
States will be in real danger of isolation from its allies if it refuses to
accept the possibility of some real changes in Soviet practices.

Basic to the whole situation in the USSR, Secretary Dulles
insisted that it was impossible to run a dictatorship like the Soviet
dictatorship without having recourse to terrorism and iron discipline
such as Stalin had consistently employed. Stalin was no mere sadist;
he employed terror methods simply because he realized that it was
essential to instill terror in order to rule the people of the USSR.
Nevertheless, continued Secretary Dulles, the people of a dictator-
ship will not go on accepting terrorism unless it is accompanied by a
series of victories for the government which employs the terror. If
you go for a period of five years without a significant victory, as
was now the case in the USSR, the people will simply no longer
endure to be governed by terrorism. This is a lesson that history
teaches about all dictatorships, and history is the best guide as to
what is now occurring in the Soviet Union. Hitler illustrated the
same phenomenon in his own career.

Secretary Dulles warned that all this did not mean that the
United States would not now have to face up to another very grave
problem—namely, the problem of preventing the creation of popular
fronts, including the Communist and Socialist Parties, in many
countries of the world. Happily, even this danger was not at present
as great as it had been, for instance, six months ago. The recent
disillusioning visit of the French Socialists to Moscow, 5 and the
reaction of the Labour Party leaders to the visit of Bulganin and
Khrushchev to London, 6 had marked distinct setbacks to the Soviet
objective of winning over the Socialists to cooperation with the
Communist Parties. There was, after all, a basic cleavage between
the Communist and the Socialist Parties, and that cleavage had
become increasingly apparent since the contacts of the last six
months between Socialist and Communist leaders. Accordingly, the
likelihood of a rapprochement between these two parties was now
less than it was six months ago, although, of course, the Soviets
would keep on trying.

5 A 12-member French Socialist Party delegation visited the Soviet Union April
28–May 14.
6 On April 23, a group of British Laborites submitted to Khrushchev and
Bulganin an inquiry about Socialists imprisoned in Communist countries.
Secretary Dulles then pointed out that we were too inclined generally to believe that nothing ever happened with respect to Soviet policy and action except as the infallible result of carefully laid Soviet plans. To ascribe such infallibility to the Kremlin was an error. Indeed, part of what had happened in recent months in the Soviet Union had happened because we ourselves in the U.S. Government had planned it that way.

Governor Stassen then turned to Secretary Dulles and said that his earlier remarks should not be taken as an indication of a belief that no significant changes had occurred in the Soviet Union and that the policies of the Secretary of State and the President had not likewise had a great deal to do with the effecting of these changes. In his earlier remarks, said Governor Stassen, he had only wished to suggest the possibility that the events transpiring in the Soviet Union may be the result of a general policy directive agreed upon in advance by the Kremlin leaders.

Mr. Allen Dulles said he had one last thought to inject into the discussion—namely, that Marshal Tito may have played a role in what had been happening since the Khrushchev speech. He reminded the Council that Togliatti had paid a visit to Tito just before the latter had started on his trip to Moscow. It was quite possible that on this occasion Tito may have urged upon Togliatti a greater and more independent role for the national Communist Parties, both in the satellites and in the free world.

[Here follows the remainder of the memorandum.]

S. Everett Gleason
Memorandum Prepared in the Office of the Special Assistant for Intelligence


SOVIET RESOLUTION ON CULT OF PERSONALITY

1. The Central Committee resolution appears as an effort to keep under control further critical discussions of Stalin and prevent such discussions from becoming an inquiry into the characteristics of the Soviet system and the past actions of current Soviet leaders. In response to the recent questioning of Togliatti and others, it advances an explanation of how Stalin managed to gain control and why he was not removed. Moscow presumably expects foreign Communists to accept this explanation and terminate their discussions, since the resolution stresses that Stalin is a thing of the past and in effect warns that critical discussions of the Stalin situation parallel efforts of the imperialists to distract the working class from future tasks.

2. Compared to the depth of analysis of Togliatti's questioning, the resolution is superficial, transparent, and hackneyed. Its defensive tone, lack of frankness, and incompleteness point up how difficult it is for Moscow to provide a serious explanation so long as the Soviet rulers refuse to permit discussion of the Soviet system and their own relations with Stalin.

3. The only foreign Communist reaction as of Wednesday appeared in the New York Daily Worker which equivocally concluded that some would be satisfied and some would want to probe deeper.

4. The explanation of how the cult of personality developed provides no new thoughts, simply repeating what has been previously suggested by various foreign Communists. Moscow does go beyond its previous position, however, of ascribing everything to Stalin's vanity and argues that historical conditions, chiefly capitalist encirclement, also operated as a cause.

5. The explanation of why Stalin was not removed omits some points mentioned in Khrushchev's secret speech and provides some new points, but these raise more questions than they answer. The resolution denies that no counteraction was taken against Stalin and,

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/7-356. The source text was attached to a brief covering memorandum dated July 3 from Armstrong to Howe, indicating that the memorandum was material for the Secretary's briefing book.


3 Apparently June 27.
without elaboration, asserts that Party and military figures restricted his activity during the war. It also for the first time alleges that a "Leninist nucleus" existed in the Central Committee and, immediately after the death of Stalin, began the struggle against the cult of personality. These two new elements raise the possibility that within the Soviet ruling circle an effort is under way to build a case designed to absolve at least some of the current rulers from corresponsibility for Stalin's excesses and even to claim that these excesses had been opposed within the limitations of Stalin's rule.

6. As for guarantees against a repetition of Stalin, the resolution simply asserts that such excesses will not be allowed in the future, but does not state how they would be prevented.

7. The resolution completely ignores the remarks of Togliatti and others regarding new relations among Communist parties, including greater autonomy and mutual criticism.

57. Memorandum From the Deputy Director (Plans) of Central Intelligence (Wisner) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) ¹


SUBJECT

Views of a leading expert on the Soviet Union, concerning exploitation of the Soviet de-Stalinization program

1. This memorandum is submitted pursuant to your request for a somewhat fuller statement, in writing, of the current views of a leading American expert on Soviet affairs (hereinafter referred to as "the expert"). ² [This information is submitted for your confidential use, since the expert has repeatedly expressed himself to me as being most anxious to avoid the creation of any impression that he is

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/7-456. Secret; Eyes Only.
² According to a covering memorandum of July 5 from Murphy to the Secretary of State, the CIA was in continuous contact with George Kennan on matters relating to the Soviet Union. Murphy referred to the analysis of Khrushchev's secret speech made by Kennan, who had stated his opposition to publication of the speech (see Document 43). Murphy noted that the attached memorandum indicated that "Mr. Kennan was agreeably surprised over the heavy percentage of favorable and useful reaction, and that the first phase was more successful than he would have predicted."
seeking to intrude or in any way impose his views upon government
officials having the responsibility for policy formulation, and I
have undertaken to respect his requests in this regard.)

2. It will be recalled that the expert expressed the view, prior to
the publication on June 4 by the State Department of a version of
the Khrushchev secret speech, that it might be wiser and more
effective in the long run if more “indirect means” could be found
for releasing the document and exploiting its contents to our advan
tage. About two weeks after the publication of the document, the
expert told me that he had been most agreeably surprised to find
such a heavy percentage of favorable and useful reaction in the
foreign press (extracts of which I have been furnishing to him on a
continuing basis). He said that in his opinion this enterprise had
come through the first phase more successfully than he would have
predicted, and that on the whole things are rolling along very well.
He felt certain that the impact upon the Free World Communist
parties had been almost shattering and that they were filled with
confusion and dismay. He commented particularly upon the “con
spicuous malaise and bitterness of Togliatti”, whom he regards as a
most significant bellwether of Free World Communist leadership. He
also commented in this same conversation upon the obvious difficul
ties of the satellite Communist leadership, and repeated his continu
ing view that the Kremlin leadership itself appears to be on the
defensive and to have opened up a Pandora’s Box for themselves. He
was, however, quite strongly inclined to the view that now the
campaign has been successfully launched, the more we can get
others to say for us and the less our own top leaders have to say
themselves, the better the results will be.

3. In a conversation which I had with the expert yesterday, for
the purpose of requesting him to study and give us the benefit of
his reactions and interpretations regarding the so-called “Resolution
of the Central Committee of the CPSU” which was published on or
about 1 July, the expert offered the following additional observa
tions and refinements:

a. The Resolution, especially the use which is made of the
Poznan riots to blame all of their problems on “subversive imperial
ist intervention”, is a typically Stalinist reaction; after all the Krem
lin leadership were Stalin’s own pupils, especially in so far as the
non-Communist world is concerned. It appears more and more
clearly that the differences between the present leadership and Stalin
are mainly tactical as regards their handling of the outside world and
in the conduct of foreign affairs generally. They seemed to feel that
Stalin had missed a lot of good bets; viz., had made enemies

3 All brackets in this document are in the source text.
4 See footnote 2, supra.
unnecessarily and in so doing had united the Free World against him—and also Stalin had failed to cash in on many opportunities which should have been easily exploitable to the advantage of the Soviet Union.

b. The effort to justify the dictatorship in the 1920’s and early 1930’s in terms of capitalist encirclement is a Stalinist explanation and one which was entirely unwarranted by the factual situation. No one was planning to attack the Soviet Union during that period. They no doubt did have need of a tightening-up of the reins of authority when the threat of Nazi Germany became real, slow as Stalin was to open his eyes to the true nature of that menace.

c. The tone and content of the Resolution indicate that the Kremlin is very worried and their dragging in of the references to the Poznan revolt underscores this worry. It is of the greatest importance that they not be allowed to get away with this new lie. The expert said that whereas he welcomed the State Department’s flat denial of our involvement or responsibility, he wanted to underscore in particular the importance of the avoidance on our part of any statements or actions which would be susceptible of the interpretation that we were involved—i.e., “let the lady not protest too loudly”.

d. . . . [The expert continues to feel that there are many evidences of a continuing power struggle within the top leadership, and that they are still very far away from resolving all of the difficulties which are inherent in the attempt to convert from a one-man dictatorship to a truly collective leadership.]

Frank G. Wisner

P.S. You may want to show this to Jake Beam and Franny Stevens.

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58. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Gettysburg, July 13, 1956

[Here follow several paragraphs regarding the President’s trip to Panama.]

(2) We discussed Khrushchev’s speech and the controversy between the various Communist Parties which had resulted. I indicated that I felt that important forces were at work and that the Soviet Communists were in a dilemma of either allowing liberal

1 Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Personal and Private.
forces to grow and obtain recognition, or else revert to Stalinist type of repression, in which case they would lose the ground they had been trying to gain with the free nations as having become more civilized and liberal.

The President referred to a letter he had received criticizing my having spoken publicly about this matter. He said he merely sent this to me for information and not because he accepted that viewpoint.

I said this problem like many others could be dealt with more readily if only part of the problem were considered. Our difficulty in the State Department was that we had to weigh all angles. In this case, it was very important from the standpoint of the Mutual Security legislation to portray our past policies as successful and to have some reason such as their success for continuing these policies. Furthermore, all that I said and did in this matter was very carefully weighed not only in the Department of State but also with Mr. Allen Dulles. The President indicated his complete understanding of the matter and approval of what I had done.

[Here follows the remainder of the memorandum.]

2 Not further identified.

59. Paper Prepared by the Senior Research Staff on International Communism in the Central Intelligence Agency

CIA/SRS–2

WASHINGTON, JULY 15, 1956.

THE PRESENT COMMUNIST CONTROVERSY: ITS RAMIFICATIONS AND POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS

1. The publication of Khrushchev's "secret" speech of 25 February created a strain, bearing certain appearances of a crisis, in the

1 Source: Department of State, P/PG Files: Lot 60 D 661, Soviet and Related Problems (Beam File). Confidential.

A note on the title page reads: "This is a speculative study which has been discussed with US Government intelligence officers but has not been formally coordinated. It is based on information available to SRS as of 15 July 1956."
relationship of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) with the Communist parties of Europe and the United States. It accentuated prevailing tensions in at least some of the East European satellites. However, it does not seem to have affected Communist developments in Asia and Africa, judging from the few cautious reactions noted so far.

2. In the West, the controversy came into the open with questioning statements by the French CP, strong denunciations by Togliatti and Nenni, and somewhat milder criticism by the British and American CPs, all between 18 and 24 June. Some of the smaller European parties joined in the fray. Soviet failure to provide for publication of the speech by Communist organs, and the subsequent lack of an immediate explanatory follow-up unquestionably disconcerted Western CP leaders and caused confusion among the rank and file of Party members and fellow travelers. Nevertheless, the Western scoop only brought to a head the restlessness which had vexed the parties ever since the 20th Congress of the CPSU and created a need to vent pent-up feelings.

3. In the satellite orbit, East German Party chief Ulbricht’s criticism was the first to be heard. Subsequent press comments, while chiming in with Ulbricht, made it clear, however, that criticism was to remain within bounds. The Polish press published most of Togliatti’s interview, without comment. A direct connection of the Poznan uprisings with the present Communist crisis probably cannot be established. Rather, the uprisings may have been the result of more liberal policies promised after the 20th Congress, just as the East German uprisings of 17 June 1953 followed the introduction of Malenkov’s “new course”. The Hungarian press quoted a few lines of the Togliatti statement. During the post 20th Congress period, ferment increased, more among the intelligentsia of Hungary than among the workers, who stood on the side lines and seemed inclined to let the Party leaders fight the issues among themselves. However, the Petőfi circle of young intellectuals is promoting critical discussions and, at least by implication, demanding that Nagy replace Rakosi. As far as is known, no other satellite government permitted publication of the Western Party criticism, even though leaders occasionally referred to it.

4. The Chinese Communist Party which reacted slowly to the theses of the 20th CPSU Congress and finally came out with a statement of restrained endorsement, has apparently not participated in the subsequent controversy. It merely printed parts of the Togliatti interview alongside the 30 June Resolution, without comment. The Japanese CP, too, has been reluctant to take sides. That Party’s leadership is probably preoccupied by factional fights which have been going on for some time and have not as yet been resolved. The
cautious and reluctant reaction of the Indonesian CP, which is trying
to keep its peace with both Stalin and Khrushchev, is perhaps
symptomatic of the state of mind of the Communist leadership in
the uncommitted areas. Similarly, the Indian CP did not criticize
Khrushchev severely, merely indicating that Stalin’s merits should
not be altogether forgotten and that further explanations should be
provided. The Resolution will probably furnish sufficient clarifica-
tion, from the point of view of the Indian CP leadership, which is
cconcerned lest the masses become even more confused than they
already are. In general, Communist parties in the uncommitted areas
may be so impressed with Soviet activities, profitable to them, that
they will submerge the controversy over the “secret” speech and at
least pretend to be content with the Resolution. We believe that the
course charted by the 20th Congress will prove more appealing to
the Communists in these areas than was rigid Stalinism. As more
Party “autonomy” is stressed, native nationalism may gradually lose
its fear of the USSR as a new source of potential foreign domination.

5. The principal points of criticism by the Western parties were
the following:

a. The CPSU leaders have mishandled the publication of Khrush-
chev’s “secret” speech of 25 February by permitting the bourgeois
press to scoop the Communists and have compounded this error by
not issuing an immediate explanation;
b. The CPSU leaders cannot be absolved of all responsibility for
Stalin’s crimes; not having stopped him, they must share his guilt;
c. Past violations of “socialist legality” and the harm done to
the International Communist Movement by the “cult of personality”
cannot simply be accepted ex-post-facto; there must be guarantees
that they will not occur again.

6. The principal inferences or conclusions drawn by Western
Communist leaders in their criticism were:

a. The structure of World Communism may have changed;
b. The USSR has served as a model for building Socialist
society, but the areas in which Communist rule is now established
are so vast and varied that the Soviet model can no longer be
mandatory.
c. In non-Communist parts of the world, there are countries
where Socialism might be achieved by drawing together various
socialist movements which have not yet reached a mutual under-
standing or agreement. This means that freedom of action is required
by the national CPs to work out their problems in accordance with
prevailing conditions.

Criticism and inferences were similar everywhere, and no real
independence of thought was displayed.
7. The Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU of 30 June, 2 published by Pravda on 2 July, was issued to provide an answer to the Communist critics. Although the document was signed by the Central Committee, there is no evidence that a plenary meeting of the Committee actually took place. The document appears to have been hastily drafted; it is repetitive and apologetic. In the endeavor to exculpate themselves, the Soviet leaders modified their previous statements regarding Stalin’s behavior during World War II. They now claimed that they had succeeded in “sharply restricting” the dictator during this period but they admitted that afterwards they were unable to do so. Being psychologically cornered, the Soviet leaders aggressively revealed their revolutionary intentions more bluntly than in the 20th Congress statements, and their interpretation of the Party line is anything but mellow. The Resolution does not answer many pertinent questions raised by the criticism, nor does it deal sternly with the “rebels”. It slightly slaps Togliatti’s wrist but on the other hand quotes his positive statements, along with similar quotations from the CPs of China, France and the US, purporting to show that the fraternal parties throughout the world have approved of the new Soviet policies.

8. In order to dispel any impression among the Free World parties that the Soviet system had changed fundamentally, the CPSU emphasized again and again that the underlying principle of Communist strategy is and remains Marxism-Leninism. The paraphernalia of this ideology are unchanged: the Leninist principle of Party leadership (i.e. the dictatorship of the Party); the reinvigoration of “socialist democracy” (i.e. “democratic centralism”, internally and externally); the use of cadres for the attainment of special targets (i.e. undercover activities); the continued interest in proletarian solidarity (i.e. central control of Communism in one form or another); and a more flexible method to achieve and maintain such solidarity (i.e. a tendency, for the time being, to retain control without rigid organization such as the Comintern). The Resolution (which falsely ascribes Stalin’s thesis of building “socialism in one country” to Lenin) caters to former Stalinists as well as to those of Titoist leanings. It officially restates its undying enmity toward the imperialist West in general and the US in particular. It clearly disposes of any hope concerning changes which might decrease the Communist threat. Rather it confirms the 20th Congress proclamation of a Communist Renaissance following the Stalinist Dark Age.

9. Such a Renaissance, in the view of the Soviet leaders, can only be achieved by recognizing that previous tactics have become obsolete and that new conditions and circumstances require new

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2 See footnote 2, Document 56.
policies and methods. Among these circumstances the Soviet leaders include the following:

a. There is a nuclear stalemate, making resort to general war unprofitable;
b. There appears to be a chance that the polarization of power around the US and the USSR will give way to a variety of power combinations, and if this is the case, the Sino-Soviet bloc will in time acquire superiority over the Western camp without having to resort to violence;
c. A new “polycentric” concept, i.e. a modified application of Leninist “democratic centralism” to International Communist organization, will promote world-wide United Fronts and lead to Socialist-Communist combinations, such as Tito has suggested.

10. It is unlikely that the CPSU can and will change its position for some time to come. It will permit the development of Party “independence” outside the orbit, well aware of the risks involved but almost certainly confident of its ability to maintain its predominance in World Communism. It should be understood that “autonomy” will be limited to local interpretations of Soviet policies. Even prior to the 20th Congress, the visit to Belgrade implicitly sanctioned greater freedom in the conduct of CP affairs. So far as the satellites are concerned, the Soviet leaders probably felt that Party autonomy could be confined to external manifestations without touching the substance of control, thereby preventing the emergence of genuine Titoism. They probably reasoned that, doctrinally, the People’s Democracies have already chosen their road to socialism. Moreover, the political and economic dependence of the satellites upon the USSR, which is about to be further strengthened by impending economic integration into the Soviet Bloc, guarantees, by and large, the loyalties of the leadership. Having an overriding vested interest in the continuation of a Soviet-Satellite union, and controlling their armed forces and the police, the Satellite Communist leaders can be expected to prevent anti-regime resistance from creating more than occasional rioting. Serious tendencies toward Titoism could, if necessary, be curbed by Soviet armed forces. SRS believes that the Eastern Bloc is politically, economically, and militarily now so tightly knit that major deviations could and would not be tolerated by Soviet leaders. Occasional flareups of local independence, such as the Hungarian radio outburst of 3 July following Suslov’s visit, will be treated as vents for national self-assertion but they will have little real meaning. In other words, there is no reason to believe that the satellites will not remain satellites.

11. The Soviet leaders probably foresaw difficulties with the Western powers when they launched the anti-Stalin campaign. But they may have looked upon Western Communist outbursts as tempests in the samovar which in time would calm themselves without harming the cause. They must have concluded that minor “revolts” of Western parties need not impede Soviet advance into the political vacuum of the uncommitted areas seething with powerful nationalist aspirations. There are indications that Asia and Africa are now the prime targets of Communism, taking precedence over stalemated Western Europe for the present.

12. The CPSU, with the help of the Central Committee’s Resolution, will try to tighten the Party Line which had become somewhat diffused in the aftermath of the denunciation of Stalin. The CPSU leaders have embarked on a grand-scale tactical maneuver to overcome the obstacles in their way and to hasten the advent of a socialist society. In its bold conception, this tactic transcends that of Lenin’s New Economic Policy (NEP). Basically, it uses the technique of decentralizing International Communism. The former Stalinist crime of “nationalist deviation” has now been declared a Leninist virtue.

13. In this connection there is evidence that Tito is still thinking of a world-wide Socialist-Communist combination, a “Fifth International”, as it has been called. His interest in closer relations with Socialists has been developing ever since his break with the Cominform, and the theses of the 20th Congress probably have given new impetus to an old idea. Tito may have discussed this idea with Togliatti in Belgrade and with the Soviet leaders during his visit to the USSR. It is conceivable that the Kremlin, far from objecting, in fact encouraged him to go ahead. It may have believed that such a combination would greatly stimulate United Front developments and would impress many “advanced” socialists in the uncommitted areas. However, this new “International” would differ from its predecessors, at least for the time being, in avoiding formal organization. Tito appears to envisage it as a loose association of leftists. Presumably he still is averse to becoming a member of a more formal organization, the control of which could pass into the hands of the USSR. Thus it may be assumed that, at the outset, the new “International” would center around Socialist and Communist groups of the Free World, notably from uncommitted areas, and that the USSR would not insist upon active participation or leadership. While the Soviet leaders may not be entirely happy about such a development, they probably believe that for the advancement of World Communism, Titoism is preferable to “reformist” socialism. Moreover, the Soviet

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4 Tito visited the Soviet Union June 1–23.
leaders probably expect that Socialists, by affiliating themselves with the new "International" would be more likely to break away from the influence of the Second International in general and the European Social Democrats in particular, which still is considerable.

14. The idea of the new "International" is not to be confounded with attempts on the part of Tito, which appear to be supported by the USSR, to create a neutralist "zone of peace". The implementation of this objective would greatly assist the USSR in its efforts to detach the Afro-Asian nations from Western influence and to substitute that of the USSR through political and economic manipulations. Evidently, both the creation of a neutralist combination of states and the establishment of a new Socialist-Communist "International" are viewed as supplementing each other. For the implementation of both plans, Tito may have been accorded a leading role as a mediator between the radical and moderate political groups, as a man who has demonstrated how to remain neutral even against heavy odds. But while the formal establishment of a neutralist bloc probably would meet with resistance on the part of leaders who seek to remain unattached to any type of political alignment, an informal "Fifth International" might win the sympathy of many leftists who desire a political position halfway between social democracy and Communism.

15. Although these developments may raise hopes that the deterioration of Communism is imminent, SRS does not believe that such hopes are justified. On the contrary, we feel that in the long run the danger of Communist encroachment is likely to increase rather than decrease. A determined, gradualist, and purposefully flexible Communist policy, not always recognizable as such, is difficult to combat with means at the disposal of a democratic country. In SRS–1 we speculated that:

"The post-Stalinist concept of Communist victory is the achievement of 'socialism' in individual countries in a manner suited to national conditions, followed by the joining of such countries in a loose community of 'socialist' states. At first, these states would retain their national identities but as time goes by they would gradually merge into a World-Communist community which would rule itself according to ideologically motivated universal laws, having discarded national governments as we know them today." (Para. 12).

Doctrinally, Communism will now differentiate "between that which is universally valid in Marxism and that which is particularly applicable to one or another country". (Eugene Dennis in Political Affairs, June 1956, p. 3.) This approach would tend to avoid the narrow dogmatism of Stalin's era and might even go beyond Lenin's

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5 Not further identified.
democratic centralism toward Tito’s “polycentrism”. Such a decentralization of World Communism would provide for a flexibility of maneuvering that could not easily be matched by the more cumbersome parliamentary machineries of the West. Barring vigorous and novel Western countermeasures, the Titoist gamble of the Soviet leaders appears to have good chances of success. We may find Communism greatly expanding and possibly confronting the West with an unfriendly world combination of Socialists and Communists. Such a combination might flourish in an atmosphere which the USSR deliberately kept free of international tension.

16. Nevertheless, there are risks for the Communists. Their long-range tactic of decentralization might lead to a loosening of discipline and to fractionalization, especially in Europe. Without monolithic isolation, Communism could lose its spell, and might even be infected by evolutionary socialism. However, in our opinion, such a development is not likely to occur, unless the US and the West act vigorously to exploit prevailing Communist confusion, to counter the Soviet economic offensive effectively, and to undertake a more aggressive program for the conquest of man’s mind. There is still considerable wishful thinking on the Western side. European and US newspapers have sensationalized Communist Party criticism; they have played down indications that the USSR still is the base of World Communism and that Communist Parties remain dependent upon Soviet ideological guidance, financial help, and organizational leadership.

17. We conclude that the present crisis, if in fact it is one, is not a grave danger for World Communism. We see no convincing reason to assume that the USSR has lost its ability to control the Communist movement. We believe that the CPSU leaders, when they launched the campaign against Stalin, probably expected manifestations of discontent. Nevertheless, they were willing to relax their absolute control of the Western parties, at least temporarily, in the belief that they could re-establish Soviet hegemony at will. We further believe that the Resolution will suffice as an “explanation”, even though many questions remained unanswered, as the CPUSA and Togliatti have already pointed out. The Western Communist leaders will probably not press for further elaboration. As parish priests, they will interpret the Soviet encyclicals in accordance with their own needs, without resorting to the Moscow high priests. The line for such additional interpretation probably has been communicated to those European leaders (all members of the Cominform) who reportedly congregated in Moscow at the time the Resolution was published. We believe that the USSR’s main concern will be the exploitation of Communism in Asia and Africa. In this area, it probably will proceed cautiously, dealing with national governments
rather than with Party officials, in pursuit of its economic offensive. Overtly, it will be circumspect, avoiding "interference in the internal affairs" of other countries. Covertly, it will press toward the formation of United Fronts and other Socialist-Communist combinations. Where their parties are outlawed, Communists will join socialist groups, thereby gaining and maintaining Communist influence in any new political combinations. If intra-Communist squabbles should continue or increase, it is possible that a tougher Party line may be adopted. The CPSU Resolution and current Pravda interpretations provide the theoretical tools for such a toughening within the framework of Khrushchev's "new course".

60. Editorial Note

According to the memorandum of discussion at the 291st meeting of the National Security Council on July 19, Allen Dulles made the following remarks as part of his briefing on significant world developments affecting United States security:

"The Director of Central Intelligence said that the USSR was caught in a dilemma. The Soviets wish to continue their de-Stalinization program and at the same time cut off the debate that is now going on regarding de-Stalinization and the question of freedom. They wish to foster the impression that there is no change in their policy of "liberalization", but also wish to close ranks and adopt a "harder" line, particularly toward the West. They wish to hold the loyalty of the Communist leaders generally in non-Communist countries, and also disavow certain of those leaders. They wish to modify conditions in the satellites, but at the same time "keep the lid on" and prevent additional riots such as those which recently occurred in Poland.

"Mr. Dulles then noted that a recent cable from Ambassador Bohlen had expressed the view that Pervukhin appeared to be gaining increasing influence in the Soviet governing hierarchy. This view was based on information regarding the seating arrangements at recent high-level Soviet meetings." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)
61. **Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State**

*London, September 24, 1956—1 p.m.*

1622. The well-known writer and Soviet expert Louis Fischer who just arrived here following twenty-four day visit to Moscow gave following information to EmbOff today relating to Voice of America broadcasts to Soviet Union. Information based mainly on conversations he had with about twenty close friends he had known in pre-war days.

1. Voice broadcasts can be heard easily outside Moscow and with special devices even in Moscow.
2. Russians prefer BBC broadcasts and listen to it eagerly. Writers at House of Creation gather daily at 5 pm to listen to BBC.
3. Voice programs are strongly disliked because "they reflect dislike of Russian people and country" and "reek with propaganda". Russians are fed up with their own propaganda and like even less to listen to American.
4. American jazz of course is delight of Russian youth. Russians who made these remarks to Fischer hoped Voice would improve and give them straight news, facts and viewpoints of US without irritating Russian patriot feelings. One friend remarked "no matter what we think of regime, we are patriots".

Other information follows which was told in strict confidence. He was struck by freedom with which ordinary people talked as compared with Stalinist era and relative absence of fear of police. He also noted persons asked questions that would never have been put forward in pre-war days and which indicated people are beginning to think of themselves. For instance, one student asked him what he thought of Marxism in such a way as to indicate it was not gospel. Writers felt freer and paid less attention to "directives" in publication.

Everybody with whom he talked had read secret Khrushchev speech to which they referred as a "letter". Depth of revelation had shocked them. In talking with Mikoyan latter made remark he (Fischer) had some bad things in his books about Soviet Union. Fischer replied they were not worse than "facts revealed by Khrushchev speech and asked why it could not be published in Soviet Union. Mikoyan said "still too early to do this". Mikoyan revealed towards end of Stalinist regime he was "facing destruction" and he otherwise let Fischer know he was violent anti-Stalinist.

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/9-2456. Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Moscow.
Fischer found great respect for Malenkov among his old friends who thought he was “not finished as a top leader”. Malenkov was greatly respected for his competence, culture and breeding.

Russian friends greeted Fischer with open arms and saw him several times without in any way showing fear of police. One friend saw him five times. Thanks to Mikoyan visa was extended from eight to twenty days.

Fischer requested especially in using above information it not be attributed to him for fear it possibly endanger friends whom he saw.

Aldrich

62. Telephone From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, October 16, 1956—4 p.m.

837. Yesterday at Afghan reception in reply to my direct question Khrushchev confirmed that Central Committee meeting had been “postponed” until end of November or beginning December, probably latter. He gave explanation preoccupation leading party workers with harvest, state visits scheduled for October and November 6 holiday.

On domestic matters Khrushchev expressed himself as extremely “pleased” with record harvest and said that agricultural results this year had been outstanding in all fields, including corn. He denounced as nonsense reports in foreign press of any major domestic problems, and said “Our affairs here are going very well (po maslu)”. Khrushchev said it seems difficult for foreigners to understand that with restoration “democracy” in party individuals had right to express their own view and that frequently these views differ but did not represent real divisions in leadership.

Comment: While Khrushchev’s remarks absence serious dissension could not in themselves be taken at face value, they were made naturally and not defensively. While these men are of course excellent actors, there was nothing in appearance either Khrushchev, Bulganin, Mikoyan or Zhukov, who were present, to indicate any

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/10-1656. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, and Belgrade.
element of strain. On the contrary, they all appeared relaxed and at ease.

In reply to my question if all members leadership had taken their vacation, Khrushchev replied to the negative saying Malenkov and Pervukhin were going on their holiday now and that Molotov and Voroshilov "whom we insist take two months", were still in the Crimea.

Bohlen

63. **Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

*Moscow, November 23, 1956—11 p.m.*

1299. Following announcement Molotov appointment Minister State Control (reported Embtel 1283), \(^2\) *Central Press* today in routine chronicle item reported appointment V.G. Zhavoronkov, former Minister State Control, as Deputy Minister. Following are Embassy’s initial comments on appointments.

Appointment Molotov raises several questions regarding motivations behind move and possible policy implications which impossible answer intelligently on basis present information; however, whatever may be specific reasons for appointment, it does not seem to indicate or presage measurable increase, if any, un [of?] Molotov’s standing in Soviet leadership. Regarding rumor circulating here last week that Malenkov and Molotov to be appointed Chairman Council Ministers and Party First Secretary respectively, Molotov’s new assignment would appear to lay to rest speculation that he might be elevated to top party spot. Should also be noted that Minister State Control as presently constituted is relatively minor post (previous incumbent Zhavoronkov merely candidate member party Central Committee), although as considered below possibility not excluded that job could become more important under Molotov.

On other hand, appointment announcement specifies Molotov retains post First Deputy Chairman Council Ministers and no reason

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.13/11-2356. Confidential. Repeated to London and Paris.

2 Telegram 1283, November 21, reported that Soviet radio announced Molotov’s appointment as Minister of State Control and that the Embassy would comment the following day. (ibid., 761.13/11-2156)
assume his position as member party Presidium affected. Thus, appointment cannot be interpreted as signifying radical downgrading Molotov.

Within these limits, there are several possible interpretations of reasons for and significance move. (1) This could be basically trouble-shooting assignment. Molotov has had previous experience this field. Khrushchev in Central Committee Report to 20th Congress 3 criticized Operations Ministry and called for “radical reorganization its work (although press since then has given little attention to subject). (2) New appointment may be time-filling spot designed to charge Molotov with operational duties as far removed from foreign policy field as possible. Well known that Molotov’s differences with present dominant party leadership over foreign policy (particularly rapprochement with Yugoslavia) led to his loss of major influence on foreign policy in 1955 and relinquishment 1956 post Foreign Minister. In this case, present difficulties satellite relations could explain timing of move. However, this would appear unnecessary in view Soviet-Polish declaration and Pravda article today stressing as official policy “different roads to socialism” concept which Molotov supposedly opposed.

Foregoing reasoning would also appear less cogent if Molotov were to retain responsibilities in cultural field which he has held sometime since he stepped down as Foreign Minister. As previously reported, Molotov in conversation with me few weeks ago confirmed earlier rumors that he was responsible for overseeing cultural activities. As late as November 20 Soviet Culture printed account meeting held by Ministry Culture on pictorial arts at which Molotov given top billing and delivered address. (3) Appointment could possibly foreshadow shift economic policy with possible attendant personnel changes. Switch to greater emphasis on consumer goods production could produce economic problems requiring strengthening watch-dog functions this Ministry.

One clue to significance Molotov’s appointment is question future functions and responsibilities Ministry on State Control. If Ministry’s responsibilities remain roughly at level of past few years this could indicate appointment Molotov in effect demotion. On other hand, if his appointment signifies radical increase in role this Ministry it could represent promotion. Evidence on this point may be forthcoming shortly.

As to wider implications, forthcoming plenum party Central Committee, which according to private statements in October by party leaders still scheduled for early December, may give answer.

In conclusion might add that among diplomatic corps and foreign correspondents here there is no consensus opinion as to significance this appointment.

Bohlen

64. Editorial Note

According to the memorandum of discussion at the 305th meeting of the National Security Council on November 30, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles made the following statement in his briefing on significant world developments affecting United States security:

"Mr. Dulles said that reports from both the American Embassy and other sources in Moscow were giving us fairly hard evidence of unrest in the Soviet Union itself. So far this unrest was mostly confined to youth and student groups. Such groups were expressing open sympathy for Hungary and calling for the creation of more than one political party in the Soviet Union. After citing certain specific instances of such student activity, Mr. Dulles pointed out that while these were small indications, they seemed to be signs of real discontent. There were even some signs of unrest in the field of labor. Other rumors concerning dissension in the high command in Moscow so far lacked confirmation, though it was certainly likely that there had been real attacks on Khrushchev's policies. In this connection Mr. Dulles pointed out that as long as the Soviet Union remained under such fire as it now was, it was very likely that the top Soviet leadership would try to hold together. The Central Committee was scheduled to meet before the end of the current year. If any changes are to occur in Soviet leadership, the meeting of this Committee might be the occasion of the announcement. While there was no doubt that Khrushchev's policy was under fire, it remained difficult to see who could successfully replace him. It was the general opinion of the intelligence community that Molotov's new position did not constitute a promotion." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)
Memorandum for the Record, by the President's Staff Secretary (Goodpaster)  

Washington, December 18, 1956.

On the President's direction, I conveyed to Secretary Wilson, Admiral Radford, and Mr. Allen Dulles individually and personally today between noon and 1 P.M. the President's instructions that, effective immediately, there are to be no flights by U. S. reconnaissance aircraft over "Iron Curtain" countries. Each of them confirmed that he understood what the President intended.

A. J. Goodpaster  
Colonel, CE US Army


Editorial Note

According to the memorandum of discussion at the 329th meeting of the National Security Council on July 3, the following remarks were made by Director of Central Intelligence Dulles during his briefing on significant world developments affecting United States security:

"The Director of Central Intelligence stated that a dramatic announcement could be expected some time today from Moscow. He pointed out that he had earlier informed the National Security Council of an unusual occurrence in the USSR—namely, the cancellation of the annual Air Show. This had been followed by an abrupt postponement of a visit by the Soviet leaders to Czechoslovakia. Today Pravda had published an editorial giving clear indication of the existence of disagreements in the highest ranks of the Soviet leadership. There were now unconfirmed press rumors that a purge was about to occur which would remove four top leaders accused of deviation. Included, according to these rumors, were Molotov, Molotov, Mlenkova, and Kaganovich.

"The President commented that the more trouble the Soviet leaders got into, the better for us all." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

Later that day, the Soviet Government announced that, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU from June 22 to 29, it was decided to remove 5 of the 11 members of the Party
Presidium. Three of these—Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich—were accused of collusion against party policy and expelled also from the Central Committee. The other two full members ousted from the Presidium were Pervukhin and Saburov. Former Foreign Minister Shepilov was said to have joined the three “anti-party” members and was dropped from his posts as Party Secretary and candidate member of the Presidium and expelled from the Central Committee. The new Presidium consisted of 15 members, including 5 promoted from the ranks of candidate members. Among these were Zhukov, Brezhnev, Furtseva, Shvernik, and Kozlov.

The initial appraisal of these developments by the Embassy in Moscow was transmitted in telegrams 14 and 22, July 3, and telegram 23, July 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/7-357 and 761.00/7-457) The text of a statement regarding these events, released by the Department of State press officer on July 3, was transmitted to Moscow in telegram 14, July 3. (Ibid., 761.00/7-357)

According to the notes of the Secretary’s Staff meeting on July 5, there was considerable discussion of the announced changes in the CPSU Presidium. Acting Secretary of State Herter said that the President was considering sending a message to Zhukov “appropriate to the latter’s appointment to the Presidium.” (Ibid., Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75) In a memorandum of July 5 to Herter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs John Wesley Jones submitted a formal recommendation that the President not communicate with Zhukov at this time, because Zhukov’s new position was within the party, not the government. He concluded that “it would seem more appropriate, and perhaps more effective, to exploit this enhancement in Zhukov’s position and prestige within the party hierarchy at a later date in connection with some substantive issue, perhaps related to disarmament.” (Ibid., Central Files, 761.13/7-557)

For Khrushchev’s brief reminiscence on the removal of the “anti-party” group, see Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, page 14. A more detailed account of these events is in the diary entries for July 3–6 of the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow, Veljko Mićunović, including his account of a lengthy conversation with Khrushchev on July 5, which Mićunović reported to Tito. (Mićunović, Moscow Diary, pages 258–275)
Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions

Washington, July 5, 1957—5:21 p.m.

12. Following are Department's preliminary views concerning some possible policy implications for USSR of dismissal top CP leaders.

1) Khrushchev has emerged more powerful than ever through elimination of leaders who have clearly spearheaded opposition to current "20th Congress" policy lines championed by him. Impact of development on continuance "collective leadership" principle not yet clear. There are no indications as yet Khrushchev turning to police in way Stalin did to eliminate potential opposition or that he has embarked on all-out effort obtain supreme power of Stalin.

Most other strong personalities of regime in political and prestige sense have of course now been removed and newly constituted Presidium can be expected share Khrushchev's policy objectives.

2) Current Soviet policies will probably remain unchanged but ability Soviet Government to pursue them may be enhanced by elimination of opposition. (Mikoyan made flat statement along these lines to Davis at July 4 reception. 2)

3) Elimination opposition, particularly Molotov, may facilitate closer cooperation between Poland and Yugoslavia and Soviet Union. Position of Stalinist elements in Eastern European satellites may be weakened with more emphasis on 20th Congress policy lines (satellite developments subject separate message). 3

4) There are no clear signs of any effects on such important foreign policies as those with regard to disarmament and German reunification. Domestically USSR is likely to press forward with current Khrushchev programs in industry (reorganization of management) and agriculture (livestock campaign, etc.) with less effective opposition from bureaucratic and other elements who undoubtedly now aware that they no longer have spokesmen in top Party circles.

Addressees selected because of special interest in Soviet affairs. Your early comments requested.

Herter

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/7-557. Confidential. Drafted by Stefan and Nathaniel Davis (EUR/EE) and cleared with Swank (OIR/DRS), Freers (EUR/EE), and Knox (EUR/RA). Sent to Paris, London, Bonn, Rome, Belgrade, Frankfurt for SRD, Munich for PRU, Manila, Saigon, Vienna, Warsaw, Prague, Bucharest, and Budapest and repeated to Paris for USRO and Moscow.

2 Davis' discussion with Mikoyan was described in telegram 24 from Moscow, July 4. (Ibid., 761.00/7-457)

3 Not further identified.
68. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 6, 1957—3 p.m.

44. Department pass Defense. In unusual procedure Soldatov called me personally to Foreign Office July 6 to inform me clearance had been granted for Ambassador Thompson’s plane fly Moscow July 10 and return July 12.

He then said purpose of calling me was to refer once again to his statement at time Ambassador Bohlen’s plane last cleared, i.e., if Soviet Government desired to send a Soviet plane to US on similar occasion, request would meet with “positive” response from US Government. (Embel 2343, April 15.)

I asked Soldatov whether Soviets had in mind plane for use Soviet Ambassador exclusively and whether he had at this time specific request to make. He replied Soviet Government was only now “studying” question; it had no specific request to make at moment; Soviet plane might be for use Soviet Ambassador or for important delegations such as Soviet Delegation to UN. In reply my direct question he said he did not expect specific reply this matter now but merely desired “express hope” that if specific request made in future it would meet with US agreement.

Obvious from manner in which this question has been raised twice in succession that Soviets are seriously considering request to send Soviet plane to US for official purposes at least in next few months. Question of what type of plane they would or could use and alternative routes are technical questions which Department may wish to discuss with Air Force. When I referred in conversation with Soldatov to fact that during war Soviet planes had flown to US via Alaska and inquired whether they had any particular route in mind, he confined his reply to restating they were only studying matter.

We suggest that this matter be given thorough study and that Department be prepared to answer specific Soviet request at any time in near future. Soviet practice with regard use Ambassador’s plane here is to require at least ten days prior notice.

Tying request for agreement in principle to flights to Moscow of Ambassador’s special aircraft, Soviets have made it perfectly plain that refusal would result automatically in immediate cessation of privilege we have long enjoyed. Aside from Air Force considerations, result would be loss of this means to bring in classified material not

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/7-657. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.

2 Not printed. (Ibid., 761.5411/4-1557)
physically suitable for transmission by pouch, inconvenience to Ambassador and loss of highly desirable logistic support for Embassy to say nothing of unfavorable publicity in view number of years we have exercised this privilege.

Davis

69. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles), Washington, July 8, 1957, 12:16 p.m.  

TELEPHONE CALL TO ALLEN DULLES

AWD returned the call and they discussed things in Russia—they are afraid of Khrushchev as he is not the chess-playing type of Russian as Stalin and Molotov. AWD said K is not entirely free because the Army is coming up—may be working toward a military dictatorship. They agreed it is another step in the winning of long-range battle. The Sec said we have to calculate more closely. They agreed we should have had more dope on it. AWD said they are reviewing it and wants to talk with the Sec about it. AWD does not think we did well. They talked about seeing each other tonight (the Sec and Mrs D will dine at AWD’s).


70. Memorandum of Discussion at the 330th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 11, 1957  

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants and items 1 and 2.]

3. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

Mr. Cutler indicated that the Director of Central Intelligence would confine his briefing to the recent changes in leadership of the Soviet Union, a subject which the Council would doubtless find of absorbing interest.

Mr. Allen Dulles displayed a chart entitled "USSR Party and Government Organization". With this chart as background information, he went on to describe the recent developments in the USSR as the most dramatic which had occurred in recent years, not even excepting the death of Stalin. He described the collective dictatorship in the Soviet Union as finished. Khrushchev had achieved clear-cut control of the Party apparatus. His only potential rival might be Marshal Zhukov. The Central Committee of the Communist Party had exercised real power against the Presidium, the old Politburo, for the first time in years. Mr. Dulles followed this with the listing of the major policy issues which had been the subject of debate.

Mr. Dulles then pointed out that the majority of the new Presidium were second-level figures, and that five very well-known members had been eliminated. This left Zhukov and Mikoyan as the only two personalities of real note who remained on as members of the new Presidium. Mikoyan appeared from the record not to be a genuine seeker after power.

Mr. Dulles followed these comments with a brief narrative and analysis of the events which had occurred in the Soviet Union, from the departure of Khrushchev and Bulganin to Finland, ² up to the present time. This was followed by a recital of the official charges against "the rebels". Mr. Dulles stated his inclination to believe that in this extended contest Zhukov's intervention on the side of Khrushchev had been decisive. Bulganin's role, on the other hand, appeared uncertain. Perhaps in the early stages of the debate he had voted with the rebels against Khrushchev. In any event, Khrushchev would probably deem it advisable to keep Bulganin around for a while. This would tend to soften the blow that a disgrace of Bulganin would cause in countries like India, which Bulganin and Khrushchev had recently visited. ³ After a while, however, Bulganin might be allowed to retire quietly and be replaced by Zhukov. If this happened, Marshal Konev would be the logical candidate to succeed Zhukov in the Ministry of Defense.

Mr. Dulles indicated his doubts that show trials of the rebels were likely to be staged. Banishment or some kind of house arrest was more likely than show trials.

² Khrushchev and Bulganin visited Finland June 6–13.
³ Bulganin and Khrushchev visited India as part of a South Asian tour in November and December 1955.
Mr. Dulles followed with what he described as the tentative conclusions of the CIA as to the meaning of these events, pointing out that as yet these conclusions had not been coordinated within the intelligence community as a whole. Firstly, Khrushchev as a dictator would be dangerous and impulsive, though he may be restrained by Zhukov. Throughout his career, Khrushchev had shown himself to be a shrewd opportunist. He favors co-existence, different roads to socialism, reconciliation with Yugoslavia, and increased contacts with other countries. Khrushchev was likely to continue to follow these policies in the future if not prevented by events beyond his control.

Secondly, the future policy of Khrushchev and Zhukov with regard to the Soviet satellites was hard to analyze. Mr. Dulles stated the belief of CIA that these two individuals had primarily been responsible for the job that had been done in Hungary. On the other hand, Khrushchev’s recent statements would raise hopes in the satellites for a softer Moscow line. This might raise such serious problems in the satellites that Khrushchev will not dare to relax Moscow’s strict control.

Thirdly, Mr. Dulles thought it unlikely that these recent events would produce much of a change in the Soviet position on disarmament at London. It was conceivable, however, that Khrushchev might make some concessions in order to exhibit a victory for himself.

Finally, Mr. Dulles indicated that Khrushchev would be facing very severe internal problems, particularly with respect to industrial decentralization and agriculture. If these problems were not solved, the consequences for Khrushchev could be very serious. De-Stalinization is going on apace. The steam has gone out of the fanatic ideological Communism of the past.

In conclusion, Mr. Dulles said that he would like to emphasize three vitally important questions: First, can Party careerists really make the new industrial system work? Second, if the Party careerists fail, can Khrushchev save himself by adopting wholly new policies? Third, is the next great step military dictatorship?

(A copy of Mr. Dulles’ briefing is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to the recent changes in the top levels of the Communist Party and the government organization of the USSR.
[Here follows the remainder of the memorandum.]

S. Everett Gleason

71. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Deputy Special Assistant for Intelligence (Arneson) to the Secretary of State

Washington, July 12, 1957.

SUBJECT

Possible Impact on Soviet Military Posture of the Kremlin Shake-up

While the Soviet leadership changes could portend the emergence of Khrushchev as a dictator in the image of Stalin, there is no present evidence that the secret police or the military are subordinate to him personally; or that Bulganin, Mikoyan, and Zhukov are ciphers within the Party. Counterbalancing forces to one-man rule will probably be operative into the foreseeable future despite the greater freedom which Khrushchev may enjoy in executing policy. The dangers inherent in such rule of a miscalculation leading to hostilities thus do not appear more pressing than heretofore.

The changes could also mean considerable enhancement of the power of the military. In the absence of evidence that the military in fact seek an independent power position, we interpret Zhukov’s elevation to the Party Presidium as a recognition of influence he has exerted for some time over policy formation rather than as a harbinger of vastly increased powers. The military are nevertheless likely to serve as an important deterrent to a resurgence of Stalinist-type rule; professionally they are also likely to press for a continued preferential allocation of resources to military and related industrial investment.

The changes could likewise affect internal stability and bloc solidarity, both central to Soviet readiness and capability to initiate hostilities. They now appear unlikely, however, to produce a decisive impact in either respect. In the USSR the regime has not felt obliged to take unusual security precautions, and any discontent in Party circles has been muted by a massive propaganda campaign.

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/7-1257. Confidential. Drafted by E.C. Swank (OIR/DRS).
Much will depend on whether Khrushchev ultimately abstains from the temptation to widen the purge and whether he successfully implements the apparently popular agricultural and housing policies with which he is identified. As regards Soviet policy toward the bloc, the optimistic Polish interpretation of events must yet be proved accurate. We believe that the USSR will continue to find it virtually impossible to achieve a stable satellite policy through a mixture of liberal and repressive measures. As a corollary, Eastern Europe seems likely to remain a dubious Soviet asset in the event of widespread hostilities.

In light of these considerations and Moscow’s current stress on continuity of policy rather than dramatic change, Khrushchev’s elevation is unlikely to entail any substantial modification of existing estimates as to the likelihood of a Soviet resort to force.

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2 The view of Polish officials that the changes in the CPSU would be the harbinger of improved East-West relations were described in telegram 32 from Warsaw, July 4. (Ibid., 761.00/7-457)

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72. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, July 15, 1957—7 p.m.

107. Department repeat as desired. Following are Embassy’s further comments (Embtel 23) on impact of June plenum on collective leadership as institution.

1. Collective leadership established after Stalin’s death (more accurately after Beria expulsion in June 1953) was ad hoc working relationship among members of Presidium based on agreement that policy decisions would be reached by majority vote within Presidium, disagreements among Presidium members were permitted and expected, disagreements would be resolved within Presidium and above all not by means of arrest, and “chairman of board” of Presidium would have authority to lead but not to dictate and would not have power of life and death over his colleagues. Under this arrangement, Presidium has been center of political power and Party

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/7-1557. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.

2 See Document 66.
Central Committee basically rubber stamp of authority for Presidium decisions, neither initiating policies nor vetoing Presidium decisions.

2. This working relationship (but not necessarily the institution of collective leadership) has now broken down with expulsion of five of original nine members of Presidium (excluding Beria). This creates fluid political situation in Soviet Union with three likely possibilities: (1) Establishment of absolute one-man rule by Khrushchev, (2) Continuance of previous collective rule by Presidium with Khrushchev pre-eminence as “first among equals” strengthened, (3) Solution along lines of (2) but with Central Committee achieving greater political power, particularly as court of last resort in case of major policy disputes in Presidium. If Khrushchev were to seek one-man rule, presence of following three factors would be important for his success: breakdown of practice in Presidium of reaching decisions by majority vote, establishment of personal control over secret police, and ambition and will to become personal dictator.

3. June plenum had some results which point in direction of establishment of one-man rule, and some signs have appeared since plenum of build-up Khrushchev for this position:

a) Plenum was triumph for Khrushchev over opposition attempting to unseat him from leading position in Presidium. It was public reaffirmation of and strengthened commitment to policies carried out under Khrushchev’s leadership, in particular certain policies which were apparently introduced on his own initiative. These circumstances undoubtedly greatly increase Khrushchev’s authority.

b) Khrushchev’s most persistent opponents have been expelled from party leadership, including his most influential and dangerous rivals, Malenkov and Molotov. Presidium staffed with nine new members and presumably many of them have been thus rewarded for their personal loyalty to Khrushchev. Although entire question of personal loyalty among Soviet leaders is very obscure and frequently misleading (Shepilov good example), this factor cannot be dismissed as being without significance for immediate future at least. For example, six members of Presidium (four of them new members) are Central Committee Secretaries and directly subordinate to Khrushchev in his capacity as First Secretary. Thus, Khrushchev undoubtedly enjoys freer hand than ever before within Presidium.

c) Khrushchev has received extraordinary praise and honorifics on number of occasions since June plenum. Bulganin has twice singled him out for praise. In Leningrad he credited Khrushchev with “initiative” in proposing meat and dairy products program and in Prague asserted that Khrushchev “deserves great credit in unmasking and crushing anti-party group.” Soviet press coverage of Khrushchev-Bulganin visit has been almost exclusively devoted to Khrushchev’s activities and Bulganin has been placed very much in background. (New York Times correspondent reports Moscow censor

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3 Khrushchev and Bulganin visited Czechoslovakia July 9-16.
passed story asserting Khrushchev receiving “top billing” on Prague visit. In past any such comment has always been deleted by censor.) Several provincial party organizations have singled Khrushchev out for particular praise. New height reached at July 3 meeting Uzbek party Aktiv which credited Khrushchev with rendering “great aid” in development Uzbek cotton and livestock industry, noted “great attention which Khrushchev has given to creative activities Soviet writers,” and adopted resolution expressing confidence in new party Presidium “headed by First Secretary Khrushchev.”

On other hand, certain build-up of Khrushchev is understandable in view of events and outcome of June plenum. Fact that Khrushchev singled out in Soviet press for particular attention and praise is only significant if it is part of concerted campaign inspired by him to build self up as one-man ruler. Neither quality nor volume of public praise so far indicates that a campaign with this objective has been launched.

4. Following is case against establishment of one-man rule.

a) If Embassy analysis of June plenum is correct (Embtel 61 4), Khrushchev did not take initiative in Stalinist tradition to eliminate his opponents but instead it was latter who were trying to depose him.

b) Present party leadership based its whole position at plenum on 20th Congress decisions, on “correction of mistakes and shortcomings caused by personality cult.” It has strongly pledged itself to continue these policies and accuses opposition of trying to reverse them and “return party to incorrect methods of leadership condemned by 20th Party Congress.” There is undoubtedly some truth to these accusations. According to Mukhitdinov (Pravda Vostoka July 5), opposition charged that industrial reorganization and decentralization measures in field of government meant “weakening of dictatorship of proletariat,” that is, would mean in final analysis weakening of party’s political controls. Their stand was apparently in favor of greater centralization political control, whereas Khrushchev group has rejected these “outdated forms of leadership” in favor of less centralization and rule based more on persuasion than whip. Establishment one-man rule with its consequences would run entirely counter to current general line.

June plenum decree contained no specific reaffirmation of principle of collective leadership but referred only to “restoration of Leninist norms of party life.” However, several editorials and articles have appeared since plenum on subject “collectivity highest principle of party leadership” which condemn “violations of collective leadership” under Stalin and praise Central Committee’s “undeviating realization of principle of collective leadership.”

c) Khrushchev would have to gain direct control of secret police in order to become absolute dictator. There is little doubt that elements in party, intellectuals as a whole and army above all would be opposed to acquisition of this power by one man; in particular to attempts by Khrushchev to use police measures against party members in order to eliminate opposition to him. All of these groups

4 Dated July 9, (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/7-957)
suffered heavily from Stalin's form of rule based on control of police
and could be expected to be against any return to this.

That is why fate of Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov is of
considerable importance. Any police measures against them would
probably symbolize to many in top party and army circles return to
Stalinism. There must be powerful opposition to such action on this
ground alone. Present events (decrease in press treatment of subject
since July 10 and Radio Moscow's July 10 foreign broadcast that the
three will be given jobs and not brought to trial) indicate that
Khrushchev will not seek this solution at least in immediate future.

d) Role of Zhukov in Presidium struggle and at CC plenum not
clarified by subsequent information and hence remains subject of
speculation. We agree with remark (Manila's 99 \(^5\)) that Zhukov
would be unlikely support return to Stalinist one-man rule. But
there is no evidence as yet pointing to active and early intervention
of Zhukov in political struggle or ambition or determination to
enhance his own or army's power outside military field.

e) Objective economic conditions, social forces in Soviet Union
today and Khrushchev's present policies are not those which call for
return to autocratic one-man dictatorship but gradual relaxation of
Stalin heritage. Circumstances of Soviet Union in 1930's and Stalin's
policies probably required Stalin's iron fist to keep Communists in
power. Return to these methods today would not only arouse strong
opposition among certain influential Soviet groups but also run
contrary to entire trend of Soviet social and economic development.
These social conditions do not have immediate political impact but
in long-run would operate against Stalinist-type dictatorship.

f) Finally, all evidence indicates that it was Central Committee
which decided issue and brought about expulsion of opposition
group. Thus Central Committee by reversing Presidium decision
exercised its formal authority as highest executive organ of party for
first time since 1920's.

5. Above is summary of pros and cons regarding continuance
collective leadership. To draw firm and final conclusion on this
complex question is not possible at present: Information is fragmen-
tary and not all pieces of political structure have fallen into place
since disruption at plenum. Following should be regarded as tenta-
tive conclusions:

a) It is unlikely that Khrushchev has become or will emerge in
near future at least as one-man dictator, especially on Stalin model.

b) It is likely that collective leadership by party Presidium will
continue, but with Khrushchev having much freer hand within
Presidium.

c) It is possible that Central Committee will in time tend to
become more effective seat of power, with Presidium accountable to
it at least on major policy issues. One act of will is not sufficient to
bring this about, but expression of power is habit forming. This
development is at best still great distance away and such develop-

\(^5\) Dated July 9 and addressed from Bohlen to Under Secretary Herter, it contained
Bohlen's preliminary analysis of the changes in the party. (Ibid.)
ment would be far cry from inner-party "democracy" to say nothing of state democracy. But it would nonetheless be important development, as it would permit freer expression of competitive social and political forces.

6. Given Khrushchev's personality it appears likely that he will be conspicuously in driver's seat, with Central Committee in immediate future closely watching outcome of his policies. Failure of any of his major policies (particularly if failure should come before major successes in other fields evident) or premature greed for sole power might result in action by Central Committee to remove him from party leadership.

Thompson

73. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Intelligence (Cumming) to the Secretary of State

Washington, August 27, 1957.

SUBJECT

Soviet Claim of Successful Testing of an ICBM.

The Soviet announcement is clearly made in a political context: The statement refers to the many years' discussion in the United Nations without result of the problem of disarmament, including a ban of atomic and hydrogen weapons, and on the other hand reiterates the Soviet claim that they have more than once submitted concrete proposals for reductions in armed forces and armaments and the prohibition of nuclear weapons as well as cessation of tests. The West is charged not only with not taking any practical steps in the field of disarmament, but also the creation of all kinds of obstacles.

The TASS statement categorically asserts that the United States and its partners not only reject the prohibition of nuclear weapons, "but in fact do not want agreement on the unconditional and immediate cessation of tests of nuclear weapons while staging large

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.5612/8–2757.
2 In telegram 407 from Moscow, August 27, Thompson reported that all Soviet papers carried an announcement that the Soviet Union had successfully launched an ICBM and claimed that alleged Western resistance to disarmament had justified Soviet concentration on weapons development. (Ibid., 330.13/8–2757)
series of tests with these weapons.” The statement continues that because of this negative attitude on the part of the Western powers, “primarily the USA,” the Soviet Government has been compelled to take all necessary measures with the object of safeguarding the security of the Soviet state. The statement concludes by asserting that the Soviet Government will nevertheless continue persistently to press for agreement on cessation of tests, prohibition of nuclear weapons, and the problem of disarmament as a whole.

We believe that the TASS statement was apparently aimed at heightening the effect of the Soviet demand for immediate cessation of or suspension of nuclear tests. It probably was timed to set the stage for a major Soviet propaganda offensive on the test issue in the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly, where Moscow hopes to score major propaganda gains. A Soviet move for an early recess in the London disarmament talks and a transfer of discussions of the disarmament problems to the General Assembly is therefore not to be excluded.

In your Press Conference we suggest that you may wish to emphasize the political context of the Soviet announcement, perhaps against the following background:

Speaking at Bangalore on November 27, 1955, Khrushchev said that because the West does not want to ban nuclear weapons the Soviets found themselves obliged to manufacture atomic weapons as well as ballistic missiles.

On December 9, 1955, Bulganin in addressing the Supreme Soviet said the Soviet Union desired an agreement outlawing nuclear weapons, including rocket missiles which had been developed over the previous few years and which “we can say are becoming intercontinental weapons” (the clear implication is that the Soviet Union was then developing intercontinental missiles).

In the November 5, 1956, message to Prime Minister Eden Bulganin posed the question: Suppose England were attacked by a more powerful state possessing all types of modern weapons of destruction?—“Such countries instead of sending naval or air forces to the shores of Britain could use other means as for instance rocket equipment” (quotation not precise).

January 23, 1957, Pravda in an article suggested that probably the United States was lacking in missile development. There was an implication in the article that by contrast the Soviet Union was ahead in such development.

In an article in the Soviet Army newspaper Red Star dated 16 August 1957, Soviet Deputy Defense Minister Marshal Vasilevski attacked an article which had recently been published by Admiral Burke on the subject of naval power. Marshal Vasilevski stressed developments in the field of ultra long-range missiles and said that Navies were not now as important as Admiral Burke thought.

Confidential: I agree with General Cabell that you may very well get a question at the Press Conference regarding the US intelligence
estimate of the Soviet Statement and also some question asking what American intelligence has been up to. We suggest that you make no specific reply on the point of a US estimate of the accuracy of the Soviet claim but say something along the lines that regular intelligence reports and estimates of Soviet military preparations and developments are constantly being made. We have known for a long time about the Soviet activity in missile development.³

³For the Secretary’s comments about the Soviet ICBM launching at his press conference on August 27, see Department of State Bulletin, September 16, 1957, pp. 457–462.

74. Editorial Note

On Friday, October 4, TASS announced that the Soviet Union had successfully launched an earth satellite. On October 7, in circular telegram 319 to 20 United States missions around the world, the Department of State requested for receipt not later than 3 p.m., October 9, any information that could be obtained concerning the local government’s reaction to the Soviet satellite launching, along with the mission’s appraisal of the probable political effects in the short run and in the longer term. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.56301/10–757) In circular telegram 324 to 46 other United States missions, October 8, the Department requested similar information to be received in Washington no later than October 20. Responses to these circular telegrams are also ibid., 761.56301.
Letter From the Ambassador in the Philippines (Bohlen) to the Deputy Director (Plans) of Central Intelligence (Wisner) ¹

Manila, October 7, 1957.

Dear Frank: I was more than pleased to get your letter of August 30 giving Isaiah’s thoughts on recent Moscow developments. As always I find them most stimulating and he has the facility of bringing out new facets in any subject.

I give you below such comments as I can make from here. There is a vast difference, as I have again learned, from being in daily touch with the Soviet situation and attempting to work out some consecutive thoughts when the information is intermittent and fragmentary.

While I certainly did not anticipate any such spectacular developments, or at least not so soon, I have not found anything in the June events in Moscow to change any of my basic thinking on Soviet developments. On the contrary, I believe the manner in which this occurred demonstrated possibly more than anything else that collective leadership was indeed a reality and not a fiction. Had, as many people thought, Khrushchev been building his power position to a point of absolute mastery there would have been no need for a two-week fight including an eight-day Central Committee meeting for him to put down the opposition. From all indications I got here, the argument in the Presidium was real and not pro forma and I have yet to receive any information which would indicate that police or other armed force was used or threatened to bring about the final result. It seems to have been a question of who had the majority where and when. It would of course be folly to predict anything for the future, but I am by no means certain that the expulsion of Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich and, in a lesser level, Shepilov marks the end of a collective leadership and a return to one-man rule. It might even mark a trend in the opposite direction since apparently K had to bring the CC into the act which, so far as I am aware, is the first time that it has been made the final arbiter of a dispute of this nature in the Presidium. It could therefore mean that in the future the circle of power will be broadened from the Presidium to include 133-odd voting members of the CC. Conse-

¹ Source: Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 79 D 379, Research Notes 1957, Secret; Eyes Only. Small sections of this letter are printed in Bohlen, Witness to History, pp. 453-456.

² Not printed. (Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 79 D 379, Research Notes 1957) Reference is to Isaiah Berlin and to Wisner’s quoting of Berlin’s private comments made in London on August 9.
quently whoever is top dog will have to in the last analysis obtain and retain the support of more people than in the post-Stalin period. With reference to the specific passages you cite, I am not sure that Isaiah is right in presenting Malenkov vs K as a personal power struggle pure and simple. This is of course possible, but I don’t think in the post-Stalin Soviet set-up that this factor plays as great a part as it did in the past. It would seem to be based on the assumption that there is one position, i.e. First Secretary of the CC, which has so much power that it is worth in itself struggling for and, as indicated above, the very fact that this group could hope to succeed against K would seem to indicate the position does not have any such power in itself. I would therefore be inclined to put Malenkov (although in a different context) in the policy fight. At a certain point policy disputes, as in all governments and particularly dictatorships, eventually end in a power struggle among the disputants. I agree that you cannot organically list Malenkov among the “Old Guard” and therefore his disagreements with K’s policies were probably of a somewhat different nature than Molotov’s and Kaganovich’s. I am inclined to believe that all three for different reasons saw in K’s domestic policies a real danger of loss of the collective political power of the top leadership and being Marxists feared that economic decentralization if pushed forward with the vigor which K usually throws into these matters would inevitably lead to some form of loss of control at the top. By that I do not mean revolution or violent overthrow but real problems of maintaining a political monopoly in a few hands with a certain degree of loss of control in economic matters. I’ll admit I’m influenced by Mikoyan’s ready and apparently favorable agreement the last day I was in Moscow with my observation that economic decentralization in Marxist terms must lead to political decentralization. This may be one of the reasons why Mikoyan is still there and the others are out.

Following along the same line I would be inclined to believe that neither side planned this thing very carefully before the actual conflict. I cannot believe that Khrushchev and Bulganin accompanied by Serov would have spent a week in Finland just prior to the event if he had planned a coup of this dimension. Conversely, given the experience in conspiracy and general dirty work that all three of the opposition leaders had it seems to me unlikely that they would have done such a clumsy job if this had been a carefully planned coup timed to coincide with Khrushchev and Bulganin’s absence. I am of course operating on very little evidence, but it seems to me that there was a confluence of those who disagreed with K’s policies for

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3 Bohlen’s conversation with Mikoyan is described in telegram 2374 from Moscow, April 17. (Ibid., Central Files, 661.00/4–1757)
different reasons along about this time over some question due to come up in the Presidium. Some of the opposition to K's policy, particularly on the part of Molotov and to a somewhat less publicized degree Kaganovich, have been known for some time. Malenkov's exact role remains unclear but given the age factor it is probable (and here Isaiah is right) that he was destined to take the top slot if the opposition movement had been a success. There were obviously many other factors besides economic decentralization involved and I would be inclined to give some weight to a rather frivolous one, namely that these three men who are rather serious and on the whole sober individuals were really concerned at K's freewheeling tendency to make off the cuff remarks and probably even commit the group by snap decisions, especially in the field of foreign policy.

With reference to the sentence you quote in sub-paragraph (g) on Hungary I am in full agreement. I feel that those who feel differently are talking about a different matter. It is true that for the short run Russian ability to crush ruthlessly revolt in the face of Western inaction may have given them some prestige among Communist regimes in EE, but I am sure even the Russians do not consider that such a naked use of force in the long run is a "victory". Shooting people down has never been in history a final solution and certainly the Hungarian events did not solve any of the problems which the Russians face and will continue to face in my opinion in maintaining these regimes in Eastern Europe.

With reference to the military, again pleading lack of knowledge, I have seen nothing which would indicate that K's victory was due to the military as an independent cohesive force. It stands to reason if Zhukov had been against him he would have had great difficulty in eliminating the others. It does not follow that he is in any sense a prisoner of the military. On the contrary, I agree with Isaiah that Zhukov on the whole being somewhat of a pragmatist probably agrees with most of K's policies. I also agree that a military dictatorship would be probable only in the event of an emergency so

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4 Subparagraph (g) of the August 9 memorandum of conversation with Berlin was quoted by Wisner as follows:

"He does not believe the Soviets will provoke the Poles if it can possibly be avoided and is convinced that Khrushchev cannot afford another Hungary which, in Berlin's view, was a disaster for the Russians. This continues to be my own view and most of the current Washington thinking is likewise generally in accord. However, there is an important difference of opinion as to the nature and extent of the 'disaster' for the Russians, some feeling that on balance Hungary has turned out to be a 'victory' for the Russians simply because in crushing the revolt they demonstrated their willingness and ability to do so and the ineffectuality of the West--both as applied to Hungary and to similar situations elsewhere." The bracketed note is Wisner's.
great, either domestic or foreign, i.e. war, which would threaten the regime. I cannot see any reason why the Army as such, even assuming that distinct Army point of view is possible, would wish to take over the direction of all Soviet affairs except in the case of extreme necessity to preserve the system.

With reference to your (d), ⁵ while there obviously was quite a struggle, I do not believe that K has committed himself to any one faction but rather, as indicated above, to the CC as a whole and then only in the sense that he will be forced to keep his majority intact in that body. K’s position, therefore, in my mind should not be compared to Stalin’s but in very different circumstances more to Lenin’s and I believe that his future depends in large measure on the success of his policies, primarily internal, and to a lesser degree in the foreign field.

On your (e) ⁶ I still believe that the Party by the nature of things will gradually lose out if the decentralization program is carried forward seriously and I do not see in the June developments a victory for the Party over the bureaucracy. As I may have mentioned during the briefing at your place, the provincial levels of the Party are considerably less impressive than the top leaders and are presumably so regarded by the factory managers and economic powers there than in Moscow. In other words, the bureaucrats, if such is the right word, will have the real operational power in the economic regional set-up and will probably be less disposed to listen to Party hacks at that level than the Ministers were to the Presidium. It must be recalled in this connection that the division between the Party apparachi and the real technocrats is greater at the provincial level than at the center where more often the top Ministers are also members of the Presidium.

On your (f) ⁷ the role of ideology is such a slippery one in Soviet affairs that it would take quite a dissertation to run down all of its ramifications. I believe, however, that ideology played a part in

⁵ In point (d) Wisner wrote that, according to George Kennan, “it must have been quite a struggle and that Khrushchev won out at great cost, probably committing himself on several issues to the military and perhaps to others, possibly to the Central Committee as a body.”

⁶ In point (e), Wisner asked the following question: “Recalling your statement that the Party would probably lose importance with the implementation of the decentralization program, would you feel that Khrushchev’s stress on the role of the party is more leading from weakness than an assertion of strength. The bureaucrats may be dispersed by the new program, but does this really break their power?”

⁷ In point (f), Wisner made the following comments:

“Certainly the ideology is not a matter of deep concern, but apparently they have to go through the motion of elections, parades, agitprop sessions, etc., to keep the society functioning. ‘Carrots’ may be necessary, but is not at least the semblance of faith also needed? What would happen if the current apathy toward all this turned into disgust and revulsion?”
the recent developments, particularly the “different roads to socialism” concept, not on grounds of ideological purity but on practical grounds of the consequence of pursuing one or the other courses of action which in Bolshevik history frequently are depicted in ideological terms. Ideology has shown itself to be so flexible that without serious loss of power at the top I would not believe for the foreseeable future that Soviet leaders will have too much difficulty in finding the proper ideological formula to deal with whatever policy they are pursuing and for that reason will never run out of carrots. However, if disarray sets in at the top and the process of spreading the power which, though it has not gone very far has been a continuing factor since the death of Stalin, gets to the point where the monolithic character of the regime is impaired, the lack of convincing ideology could become extremely important.

I realize the foregoing is very brief and I don’t know that there is much point of my trying to look into a crystal ball from this distance. However, going deeper into the matter I am inclined to regard what has happened in the Soviet Union in June as a further manifestation of its basic contradiction of which I have spoken before and that is the contradiction between the social and economic changes in the Soviet Union brought on by the process of industrialization and the antiquated forms of political rule which were devised and perfected in quite different circumstances. The story is not over and I think we will see further developments, not necessarily in the near future, as a result of this basic contradiction.

[Here follow brief personal comments and a passing reference to the national elections scheduled in the Philippines.]

Yours,  

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The source text is not signed.

76. Memorandum of Discussion at the 339th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 10, 1957

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1 Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on October 11. The discussion of item 1 is also printed in vol. xi, pp. 757–764. The text printed here includes material not previously released for publication in volume xi.
1. Implications of the Soviet Earth Satellite for U.S. Security (NSC 5520; NSC Actions Nos. 1656 and 1713) ²

Mr. Cutler explained the order in which the various aspects of this item of the agenda would be presented to the members of the Council. He then called on the Director of Central Intelligence for a briefing on the Soviet earth satellite.

Mr. Allen Dulles stated that at 1930 hours on October 4 the Soviets had fired their earth satellite from the Tyura Tam range. Its initial path followed the range, crossing approximately over the range’s other end at Klyuchi. Two hours after the successful orbiting of the earth satellite and after the second circuit of the earth by the satellite, the Soviets announced their achievement. This delay in the announcement was in line with the previous statements of the Soviet Union that they would not announce an attempt to orbit their satellite until they had been assured that the orbiting had been successful. Moreover, all the indications available to the intelligence community prior to the actual launching of the satellite pointed to the fact that the Soviets were preparing to launch either an earth satellite or an intercontinental ballistic missile.

Mr. Dulles then stated that the actual launching of the earth satellite had not come as a surprise. Indeed as early as last November the intelligence community had estimated that the Soviets would be capable of launching an earth satellite any time after November 1957.

Information on the earth satellite itself remains rather sparse, but it is believed to weigh between 165 and 185 pounds.

The President interrupted to state that the Vice President of the Soviet Scientific Academy had informed Dr. Bronk that someone here had got a decimal point out of place. (There seemed to be no inclination in the Council to question the estimated weight as given by Mr. Dulles.)

Mr. Dulles continued by pointing out that the Soviets had joined together their ICBM and earth satellite programs, which fact helps to explain the speed of the Soviet launching of its earth satellite. We do not as yet know if the satellite is sending out encoded messages. Furthermore, we must expect additional launchings of Soviet earth satellites during the International Geophysical Year. The Soviets have said that they would launch between six and 13 such satellites.

Mr. Dulles then turned to the world reaction to the Soviet achievement. He first pointed out that Khrushchev had moved all

² NSC 5520 is printed ibid., p. 723. For texts of NSC Action Nos. 1656 and 1713, see ibid., footnote 8, p. 747, and footnote 6, p. 753, respectively.
his propaganda guns into place. The launching of an earth satellite was one of a trilogy of propaganda moves, the other two being the announcement of the successful testing of an ICBM and the recent test of a large-scale hydrogen bomb at Novaya Zemlya.3 Incidentally, added Mr. Dulles, . . . . Moreover, there had been another Soviet test late last night, also at Novaya Zemlya, . . . .

Larded in with Khrushchev's propaganda statements had been a number of interesting remarks, such as the one in which Khrushchev consigned military aircraft to museums in the future. With respect to this remark, Mr. Dulles pointed out that U.S. intelligence had not observed as many Soviet heavy bombers on airfields as had been expected. This raised the question as to whether the Soviets are in the process of de-emphasizing the role of the heavy bomber. There had been no clear verdict yet by the intelligence community on this question.

Mr. Dulles thought that there was no doubt that in gearing up all this propaganda of recent days and weeks, the Soviets had had an eye to the situation in the Middle East, and wished to exert the maximum influence they could summon on that situation. Much of the Soviet propaganda comment is following closely the original Soviet boast relating their scientific accomplishments to the effectiveness of the Communist social system. The target for this particular thrust, thought Mr. Dulles, was evidently the underdeveloped nations in the world. He informed members of the Council that he had copies of an FBIS summary of Soviet comment,4 which were available to any who wished to have them.

The Chinese Communist reaction was to declare quickly that the launching of the earth satellite was proof of Soviet military and scientific supremacy over the United States. Maximum play on this theme was being provided in all the Soviet satellites.

Thereafter, Mr. Dulles touched on the reactions in Western Europe, in Asia, and in Africa. He concluded his remarks by emphasizing that the Soviet Union was making a major propaganda effort which was exerting a very wide and deep impact.

[Here follow comments by Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles and others on the United States earth satellite program; for text, see volume XI, page 758.]

Mr. Cutler then called on Secretary Herter for an appraisal of the foreign policy implications for U.S. security of the successful launching of the Soviet satellite. Secretary Herter initially stated that

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3 See Document 73. On September 24, the Soviet Government announced that nuclear tests were being conducted in connection with army and navy combat training.

4 Not further identified.
it was extremely difficult to make such an assessment because there was such a mass of information pouring into the Department of State. While there had been insufficient time to analyze this intake, there were already some indications of the serious effects of the Soviet success which we hope to be able to counteract.

Thereafter, Secretary Herter read selected quotations to illustrate his point, with particular reference to Turkey, Morocco, and the Philippines. He also pointed out the probable repercussions of the Soviet success in the United Nations. The United States may now encounter much greater difficulty in defending its disarmament position.

By and large, continued Secretary Herter, the reaction of our allies had been pretty firm and good, though even the best of them require assurance that we have not been surpassed scientifically and militarily by the USSR. The neutralist countries are chiefly engaged in patting themselves on the back and insisting that the Soviet feat proves the value and the wisdom of the neutralism which these countries have adopted.

Summing up, Secretary Herter described the first foreign policy reactions as "pretty somber". The United States will have to do a great deal to counteract them and, particularly, to confirm the existence of our own real military and scientific strength.

Governor Stassen enlarged somewhat on the repercussions in the United Nations. He believed it was yet too soon to measure these repercussions with any assurance, but already the first surprise was settling down and the diplomats in the UN have begun to realize that the fundamentals of the world situation have not been changed—namely, that the capability for mutual annihilation still exists. Governor Stassen doubted whether there would be any quick shifts among UN members.

Mr. Cutler then called on Mr. Larson, who said that he was hesitant to say what he was going to say because he was not sure that he really believed it. He then went on to say that while we could not permit ourselves to be panicked by the Soviet achievement, he did wonder whether our U.S. plans were now adequate with regard to the next great break-through. If we lose repeatedly to the Russians as we have lost with the earth satellite, the accumulated damage would be tremendous. We should accordingly plan, ourselves, to accomplish some of the next great break-throughs first—for example, the achievement of a manned satellite, or getting to the moon. Do we have any such plans, asked Mr. Larson. If not, our people should begin to think about them.

The President replied to Mr. Larson by stating that while he could hardly quarrel with Mr. Larson's conclusions if the Soviets were to win every time, the fact remained that the United States
couldn’t possibly set up a whole vast scientific program of basic research in areas about which we don’t know anything, and then attempt to outdo the Russians in each aspect of such a program. We must, above all, still seek a military posture that the Russians will respect.

The Vice President inquired of Mr. Allen Dulles whether it was possible to provide estimates of the amounts of money allocated to basic research by the United States in comparison with the USSR. [Name deleted] answering for Mr. Dulles, could not give a clear response, though he could not say that the Russians had put in more resources than we have. Mr. Dulles said that at least the Soviets have concentrated more heavily on the guided missiles field than we have, ever since 1945. The President, agreeing with Mr. Dulles, pointed out that the United States had not made any all-out effort in the field of ballistic missiles until after the Killian Committee had submitted its report to the National Security Council. 5 He added that of course the Soviets were bound to be ahead of the United States in certain fields and in certain discoveries.

The Vice President warned the Council that we must be prepared for the fact that Congress would insist on examining in great detail what we have been doing in the missiles field. In the course of such an examination they are certain to ask the question which he had just put—as to the relative amounts which the United States and the USSR had allocated to their respective missiles programs. Accordingly, we must be prepared to answer such a question.

After Mr. Larson had reiterated his plea for planning for a U.S. win in the next great break-through, Dr. Bronk commented that, in line with Mr. Larson’s views, the United States could, if it chose, give much greater emphasis to the spectacular achievements that we have made in the scientific field—for example, we could stress our vast achievements in the field of cancer research. Regrettably, it was hard to get the press to take an interest in these achievements. Mr. Cutler suggested that we might perhaps have announced the successful launching of a U.S. missile with a range of 3500 miles. Secretary Quarles pointed out that the Operations Coordinating Board was presently engaged in examining our public relations policies with respect to our missiles programs. General Twining cautioned that we should not permit ourselves to become hysterical about the Soviet achievement.

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5 Reference is to the Killian report of February 14, 1955.
The National Security Council: 6

a. Discussed the subject in the light of:

(1) An intelligence briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the Soviet earth satellite, its relation to the Soviet ballistic missiles program, and world reaction to the Soviet earth satellite.

(2) A briefing by the Department of Defense on the information regarding the Soviet earth satellite obtained by scientific tracking, and on the status of the U.S. scientific satellite program under NSC 5520.

(3) Comments by the Director, National Science Foundation, and the President, National Academy of Sciences, on the scientific implications of the Soviet earth satellite.


(5) An appraisal by the Department of State of the foreign policy implications for U.S. security of the Soviet earth satellite.

b. Noted the statement by the President on the subject issued at his press conference on October 9, 1957, 7 and the President’s statement at this meeting of the importance of adhering to the U.S. scientific satellite program under NSC 5520 as being well-reasoned and deliberately planned.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated for information and guidance to all holders of NSC 5520.

[Here follows discussion of “Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) Programs”, “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security”, and “Status of National Security Programs on June 30, 1957”.

S. Everett Gleason

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6 Paragraphs a–b constitute NSC Action No. 1799. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 148)

7 For text of the President’s comments at his press conference on October 9, as well as text of the statement issued by the President at the time on the U.S. space exploration program, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958, pp. 719–735.
77. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Missions

Washington, October 10, 1957—8:11 p.m.

339. In view propaganda being made by Communists in relation to launching of satellite and their effort to stir up somewhat panicky reactions, we think it useful give you for background our estimate of situation.

Soviet satellite is of military importance only in sense that advancement of science in long run contributes to military technology. While Soviet satellite does not meet all of the scientific objectives, its values are scientific rather than military. Efforts to capitalize on Soviet satellite for cold war purposes should be discounted. Our own satellite program has, from start, been directed toward scientific purposes. You will have noted the President’s statement October 9 that he “considers our country’s satellite program well designed and properly scheduled to achieve the scientific purposes for which it was initiated”.

Soviets exploited the German assets, human and material, which they removed after World War II from Pennemunde, Germany and appear to have given this line of development both in its ballistic missile and satellite applications the highest priority of their military work over past twelve years. In vital air/atomic area we believe that Soviet Union now is, and for some time will continue to be, in a position of relative inferiority. From Mr. Khrushchev’s recent speeches as quoted in press, and particularly his statement that “fighter and bomber planes can be put in museums”, it would appear that he is trying to cover up on a relatively weak long-range bomber position. By attempting to jump long-range bomber stage he would avoid bearing at same time expense of a large bomber and missile development. It is unlikely however that he will have for some time an atomic delivery capability in the very long-range missiles which would be an adequate counterpart for the large number of bombers capable of reaching Soviet Union now in possession of United States.

We believe Soviet propaganda is in large measure designed to cover up this period of relative weakness which may exist for several years. Even if Soviet claims about long-range missiles are

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.56301/10—1057. Official Use Only; Priority. Drafted by Dulles and Quarles, cleared with Allen Dulles and various bureaus and offices in the Department of State, and signed by Murphy on behalf of Acting Secretary Herter. Secretary Dulles left Washington at 1:40 p.m. for a vacation at Watertown, New York; he returned to Washington on October 14.

2 See footnote 7, supra.
fully substantiated we believe that time difference between their operational capability in this area and our own will be minor and that at least in meantime we will have a distinct superiority with our long-range bomber force.

You should not feel or allow anyone to feel that United States is in a position of relative weakness. It is quite the contrary. Our foreign policy should reflect the basic sense of confidence which we feel in the military posture of our country.

It should be noted that proposals of the four Western Powers regarding control of sending objects through outer space as part of a disarmament agreement were introduced in London in August. These proposals thus antedate announcement of Soviet earth satellite and are not a response to it.

Your attention is also invited to statement by the President October 9 providing a summary of important facts in development by United States of an earth satellite. This is being communicated to all posts through USIA channels.

(Following paragraph should be added to this message for European and Middle East posts only.)

“It should be quite clear that in respect of European and Middle East apprehensions regarding Soviet attack by intermediate range ballistic missiles this would not occur without immediate overall reaction by United States. Such an attack would be completely unproductive unless US striking power was destroyed simultaneously.”

Each Chief of Mission is authorized to use substance foregoing locally in his discretion in a manner designed to best serve the US interest.

Herter
78. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, October 11, 1957.

SUBJECT

Information on Soviet Earth Satellite

Calculations based on a weight of 184 pounds for the satellite proper suggest that the final stage (satellite and housing, both orbiting) might have an empty weight of a little more than 400 pounds. It would be possible to orbit a mass of this size with the rockets currently estimated for the Soviet 700-mile missile. It would not be necessary to have higher thrust rockets, such as those used in an ICBM, but the USSR could have used such rockets. A feasible design for Sputnik could be directly adapted to a surface-to-surface missile capable of sending a sizeable warhead 3,000-3,500 miles.

Subsequent Soviet earth satellites are expected to be heavier and more instrumental. In March 1957, the IAC estimated that a satellite vehicle possessing substantial reconnaissance capabilities of military value probably could be orbited by the USSR in the period 1963-1965. There has not yet been any change in this estimate in the intelligence community, but I venture to say that if a second Sputnik is orbited in the near future, this date might well be 1960.

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/10-1157. Secret.

79. Editorial Note

On October 26, TASS announced that Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov had been replaced as Minister of Defense by Marshal Rodion Ya. Malinovsky. The announcement provided no other details.

The initial appraisal by the Central Intelligence Agency of Zhukov’s removal was in a memorandum from the Assistant Director of the Office of Current Intelligence to the Deputy Director for Intelligence, dated October 26, in which he concluded that Zhukov’s removal was likely intended to allow him to concentrate more on political matters, that his political stature had not been reduced, and
that he probably would continue as a leading member of the Soviet hierarchy. The memorandum concluded, however, that "the possibility cannot be excluded at this time that Zhukov was removed because of policy differences with Khrushchev or that Khrushchev moved against the marshal to eliminate his most obvious contender for supreme power." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File—USSR 1956–1957)

For Khrushchev's recollection of the decision to remove Zhukov, see Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, pages 11–18.

80. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State  

Moscow, October 28, 1957—6 p.m.

850. Pass Defense. Although as stated in Embtel 844 2 evidence still inconclusive on reasons for replacement of Zhukov as Defense Minister or significance of change for his personal standing in top party and governmental echelons, recent emphasis in military press on role of party as leader and organizer of Soviet Armed Forces may reflect one of issues over which there was disagreement in top Soviet circles. Beginning with Red Star editorial on October 16 which contended that "in leadership of Communist Party is main source of strength of our armed forces" and claimed that Soviet Army and Navy were "indebted" for World War II victories to Communist Party, military press has repeatedly referred to guidance and supervision of party over military (Weeka 42 and 43). On October 25 and 26 subject was treated especially heavily; Soviet Fleet editorial 25th entitled "In Leadership of Party is Source of Power of Soviet Army and Fleet," Red Star editorial 26 dealt with same subject as did Soviet Aviation article on same day. Pravda editorial today (only newspaper published on Monday) which entitled "Indivisible Unity of Party and People" repeats theme that "because of leadership of Communist Party and its Central Committee Soviet people and their Armed Forces won . . . 3 victory in fatherland war."

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2 Telegram 844, October 27, contained Thompson's speculation on the significance of Zhukov's ouster, with the caveat that there was little information yet available on which to base an interpretation. (Ibid., 761.13/10–2757)

3 All ellipses are in the source text.
Theme of party supervision of military, of course, is not new. However, quantity of [garble] subject since mid-October has been stepped up impressively and apparently is not due solely to propaganda preparations for forthcoming celebration. This evident from recent treatment in military press of subject of improving “party-political work” in armed forces, particularly in Soviet Fleet editorial of 26th. Attributing to party leadership “chief source” of might of Soviet Armed Forces, editorial stated that in solving problems facing Soviet Armed Forces “important role belongs to military councils, political organs and party organizations along with one-man commanders.” Editorial then stated that “instructions” to party organizations in armed forces (which Party Central Committee issued last April although they first mentioned in press in May) “obliged political organs and party organizations . . . to delve actively into all sides of military preparation, military discipline and indoctrination of personnel, to uncover on basis of criticism and self-criticism all shortcomings in instruction and indoctrination of troops, to assist commanders to adopt in time measures for eliminating defects hindering improvement of military preparedness of units, ships and subunits.” Nevertheless, this editorial and one in Soviet Aviation on 25th stipulated that “orders and instructions of commanders” were not to be criticized, which had been made clear last May when military press first discussed Central Committee’s “instructions.” That there were differences in views, however, over scope of responsibility of political workers in Armed Forces was apparent in remarks of Soviet Fleet editorial that some party organizations were “weakly” studying problems affecting military training and discipline of troops because of “harmful” opinion that political workers should “not deal with questions of military preparation.” This was also apparent in editorial’s remarks that “there still are individual Communists who evaluate criticism of defects in instruction and indoctrination of troops as undermining their authority, interference in service functions of commander. This is mistaken, Philistine understanding of criticism.”

From above it would appear that there has been considerable difference of opinion over extent of supervision political organs and party organizations would exercise over activities of military commanders and their troops. Obviously line cannot be sharply drawn between criticism of orders of commanders and criticism of training and indoctrination of troops.

Presumably military commanders would be inclined to interpret latter criticism as criticism of their “orders” while party officials would tend to interpret criticism of commanders’ orders as criticism of troop training. Thus while principle of one-man command presumably basis for organizing structure of Soviet military system, it
in great danger of being vitiated by party interference. This could have been one of principal issues over which there were differences.

One paragraph in Soviet Fleet editorial of 26th may have been pointedly directed at Zhukov. It emphasized how a Communist must be “modest”, must not “exalt personal self,” and must not only teach masses but must be able to learn from them. Paragraph then asserted “Each member and candidate member of party, no matter what post he occupies, must have these valuable qualities”. This is remindful of Pravda July 3 assertion immediately prior to announce-ment of action against “anti-party group” that there is no one in party, regardless of how high his post, who is above party criticism.

In respect to Zhukov, of interest American correspondents report original TASS announcement night of 26th said he was met by “high Defense Ministry and Foreign Ministry officials.” However, this fact was omitted from simple, inconspicuous statement of his return published on last or next-to-last page of all principal Moscow newspapers, including military ones. This obvious effort to play down return of Zhukov in marked contrast to Pravda first page announcement today that Aristov and Supreme Soviet Delegation had returned from visit to China and northern Vietnam. (Embassy officer who observed arrival of Aristov delegation yesterday at Vnukovo noted unusual amount of security personnel guarding reception party headed by Mikoyan.)

Also of interest that American correspondents on 27th were permitted to send out stories speculating that Zhukov has been downgraded, although day before censors cut out all references to possibility his replacement as Defense Minister indicated decline in his personal standing.

Thompson

81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines

Washington, October 29, 1957—5:23 p.m.

1376. For Bohlen from Cumming. Fully realize your absorption Philippine elections and physical remoteness Soviet scene. Many

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/10-2957. Secret; Priority. Roger Channel. Drafted by Cumming and cleared in substance with Herter.
here would be grateful however receive your interpretation current internal Soviet crisis. May well be even prior your receipt this message Soviets will have made authoritative release which would provide most useful material for interpretation which at present difficult even with all the sources available Washington. Following summary available facts may be of interest to you even if you have not time to give us your reactions no matter how tentative:

1. Zhukov returned 26 October from three-week trip Yugoslavia and Albania. That morning TASS gave him full title Minister of Defense; in afternoon TASS dropped Minister of Defense title in reporting his departure from Albania. Announcement release from Defense post made by TASS evening hours Moscow that day.

2. At midday arrival Moscow Zhukov received by military, press and Foreign Office personnel as well as Albanian and Yugoslav diplomatic representative. No top Party members present.

3. Khrushchev, Bulganin and Mikoyan arrived one hour late at Iranian reception early evening same day.

4. Indications are Central Committee in session since about 28 Oct.

5. Foreign communist correspondents Moscow indicated in despatches that idea Zhukov promotion (namely release from Defense duties for broader political duties) should be discarded and that feeling perplexity prevailed Moscow. Boffa, Uniia correspondent Moscow advised no reliable briefing available.

6. Evening 28 October CBS correspondent Schorr suggested through Soviet censorship that issue broader than merely struggle between Khrushchev and Zhukov; conflict concerned internal rather than foreign issues; that most Western speculation was wide of mark; that outcome would have extremely farreaching implications; and that tipoff would come in appearance of portraits of Soviet Presidium members in preparation for Fortieth Anniversary "whoever they may be at that time." (These have not yet appeared.)

7. One factor current situation may be old issue Army-Party relationship military and party press recent months indicate see-saw battle this issue.

8. Pravda editorial 28th and other Soviet press items emphasize Party supremacy in all matters; Party leadership to victory World War II. Red Star stresses Party control and cites fable of officer Velikii Luki whose head turned by overpraise, considered himself above reproach and led by conceit to severe Party punishment.

9. Reliable ... source reports news seriously shocked and disturbed members Soviet Officer corps. Other reliable ... info reports replacement of Shtemenko who had been Chief GRU since some time in summer 1956 by Shalin who was previous GRU chief.
Thus, seems possible decision remove Zhukov, reassign Rokossovsky and remove Shtemenko all made 22 Oct.


11. AP and UP despatches datelined Moscow have just arrived reporting Khrushchev, Bulganin and Mikoyan with other unnamed Presidium members unexpectedly showed up at Turkish Embassy reception tonight. Khrushchev told reporters Zhukov would be given a new position "according to his experience and qualifications" but no decision yet made. Khrushchev said reports that Central Committee in Session were made up by correspondents. Also said his presence at Turkish party could be interpreted as peace gesture.

12. If you care to make any comments they should be sent through Roger channel.

Dulles

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82. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State

Manila, October 30, 1957—7 p.m.

1631. For Cumming from Bohlen. Reference: Deptel 1376.  As you know, I have refrained since I have been here from commenting in most cases on Soviet developments, in part because I profoundly believe that our people in Moscow on the spot are in the best position to do so without views being submitted from all quarters of the globe. In addition, while I have not lost my interest I have lost touch with Soviet developments on a day-to-day basis. However, in this particular case I am very glad to give you my comments, primarily because, particularly after Geneva, I had considerable opportunities for informal talks with Zhukov and formed, insofar as it is possible with any Soviet official, some rather definite conclusions as to his character and cast of mind.

I shall, therefore, start with this aspect of the matter which will help to explain my subsequent remarks. Zhukov in my opinion

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/10–3057. Secret; Priority. Roger Channel.
2Supra.
above all is a Soviet patriot. He is a Bolshevik and as Hungary showed he is capable of ruthless and even brutal action if he feels the interests of the Soviet Union are involved. Ideologically, while not questioning the general premises of Marxism and Leninism, I would say his interest in this field, and hence in communism in other countries, is distinctly subordinate to his preoccupation with the security of the Soviet Union and by analogy of the whole Communist bloc.

On military matters from several conversations I am convinced that he is extremely sober and realistic in his evaluation of modern warfare and I would imagine has an extremely accurate comprehension of the correlation of forces between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Although primarily and principally a military man, he is at the same time a party member and has been since 1918. I am reasonably certain that he has no personal political ambitions and seriously doubt if he ever had any intention of making Soviet Armed Forces supreme as against the party. For these reasons I cannot see him engaged in the intrigues of power struggle for his own advancement. However, given his preoccupation of the effectiveness of the Soviet armed forces he would in my opinion fearlessly and bluntly resist any attempt to re-establish political commissar system in the form that existed under Stalin. He would probably be prepared to work closely with the political sections of the Red Army in the indoctrination of troops in ideology and in support of current Soviet policies, but would oppose the reinstitution of a system of Party spies and informers in the officer corps of the armed forces. His chief reason I would imagine would certainly not be any basic hostility to the party as such but rather his conviction based on past experience that any such system would be demoralizing to the officer corps and would reduce the military efficiency of the forces. It is entirely possible, therefore, that his dismissal arose from his opposition to attempts by Khrushchev and party people to re-introduce a full blown political commissar system in the Soviet Armed Forces. However, given the timing of this crisis I am inclined to believe that other elements, possibly more important to us, may have entered the picture. If it had been a purely internal matter in the traditional party/military jockeying on the subject of political commissars, it would hardly seem wise for either side to press it to a crisis at a time when international tension in the Middle East and U.S./USSR confrontation is probably more acute than at any time since Korea. If this crisis should explode into war dismissal of the most respected and competent military leader who in addition enjoys great personal popularity would be an act of unparalleled folly by Khrushchev and company. Even if Soviet intention is to score a diplomatic triumph in the Middle East it would certainly have been
wiser for the same reason to have awaited the end of this particular crisis.

Accordingly, I am inclined to the view that a difference of opinion as to Soviet foreign military policy is likewise involved. Given Zhukov’s temperament and realism I believe it a safe bet that he views with concern, if not with real alarm, Khrushchev’s reckless threats and saber rattling. With a more professional understanding of the present correlation of military forces in the world he may have been constantly opposed Khrushchev in the development of his Middle East policy and the risks that it most certainly involves. In my opinion, therefore, the latter consideration, possibly in conjunction with a latent dispute between party control and military efficiency, is a most likely explanation of the present crisis.

I entirely agree that the idea of Zhukov’s promotion is untenable and have thought so from the moment his release from Defense duty was announced. If promotion had been in the cards standard Soviet practice would have been to announce his promotion and his departure from Defense as a consequence.

If information concerning a CC meeting is accurate (although according to the evening press here Khrushchev denied it at Turkish reception), this would appear to indicate Khrushchev and his supporters have encountered real opposition to the demotion and possible elimination of Marshal Zhukov. Khrushchev’s remark that Zhukov would receive a new position according to his experience and qualifications is of course meaningless as to the nature of any new job he may have. It, however, may be an indication that because of opposition in the Army and even within the party Zhukov cannot just be dismissed out of hand and he may have to be given some face-saving job.

There is yet no indication that I have seen as to whether Zhukov is to be likewise removed from the Presidium which is of course a key point. If present crisis, however, results in total elimination of Marshal Zhukov from high Soviet councils I think it is a most disturbing development as I can see no one in the immediate entourage of Khrushchev who would be either in a position or have sufficient courage to act as a sober restraining factor on Khrushchev’s tendency to gamble.

If you see no objection I would appreciate this being repeated to Moscow for Tommy. ³

Bohlen

³ Sent to the Embassy in the Soviet Union as telegram 500, October 30. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/10-3077)
83. Memorandum of Discussion at the 342d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 31, 1957

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and item 1, "CIA Annual Report".]

2. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

The Director of Central Intelligence sketched the background and developments preceding the replacement of Marshal Zhukov as Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union. Just before his journey to Yugoslavia, Zhukov had seen Khrushchev in the Crimea, and apparently all had gone smoothly at this meeting. Zhukov was nine days in Yugoslavia and eight days in Albania. These facts raised certain questions. If there is as much danger of war as Khrushchev has lately been implying, why was Zhukov permitted to be away from Moscow for a period of three weeks? Were plots against Zhukov being hatched during this time? Was Marshal Rokossovsky sent to a provincial military command in order to get him out of Moscow when Zhukov was removed from his job?

Apparently when Zhukov returned to Moscow on October 26, he had no expectation that anything would happen to him. He immediately went into a series of meetings the outcome of which is even yet not known. Then came Khrushchev’s announcement of Zhukov’s relief from the Defense Ministry.

A meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party has evidently been going on for several days. We do not know what has occurred in this meeting. Perhaps Khrushchev may originally have offered Zhukov some other high-level job, but one remote from the Army, where Khrushchev feared the power of Zhukov. Apparently Zhukov did not react calmly to this proposal. What has actually happened to him physically since that time, we again do not know.

Undoubtedly Khrushchev would have preferred to settle this matter quietly and without fuss. It appears that Zhukov’s dismissal has been instrumental in causing Marshal Tito to decline to go to Moscow for the November 7 celebrations. Meanwhile, the press of the Soviet Union is emphasizing the superiority of the Communist Party over the Army. Zhukov may not have sufficiently realized this point, so that Khrushchev felt the time had come to put the military in its place of subordination. In any event, Zhukov has been an outspoken advocate of the right of military commanders to control

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their troops, and to this end has reduced the power of the political commissars in the Soviet armed forces.

We have been hearing that Zhukov is to get another job, but the censorship has been stricter than ever in recent hours, and we do not know anything further about this job. It would seem, however, that the last die has not been cast. Will the Soviet Army take Zhukov’s dismissal lying down? It is too early to predict an answer to this question. We may get the decision today as to what Khrushchev will finally do. In the meantime, it is unwise to make further prophecies.

The National Security Council:

Noted an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to Marshal Zhukov.


S. Everett Gleason

84. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, November 3, 1957—2 p.m.

895. Having secured the domination of the police by the liquidation of Beria, of the government bureaucracy by the elimination of the “anti-party group,” and now of the armed forces by the disgrace of Zhukov, the Communist Party under the strong hand of Khrushchev has clearly established its supremacy over all the other elements of power in the Soviet system. This victory has not been achieved without cost. The morale of the armed forces will certainly suffer although how much will depend upon whether other military

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2On November 2, the Central Committee of the CPSU announced a resolution ousting Zhukov from the Party Presidium and the Central Committee. Publication of the resolution in Pravda on November 3 was accompanied by a long editorial by Deputy Defense Minister Konev disparaging Zhukov’s abilities as a military theorist and strategist. Within a few days, virtually all top marshals, with the notable exception of Vasilevsky, were identified as supporting the Central Committee action.
leaders are involved and the extent to which party intervention in military affairs will offend and discourage the professional officer corps. The roster of top military officers who lined up to kick the fallen hero appears to be virtually complete but many of them cannot escape responsibility if only by virtue of their silence in the face of Zhukov's alleged misdeeds and we would expect further changes in the military leadership to be quietly made in due course. The respect and esteem in which Zhukov was held by the public at large will add to the doubts and uneasiness of the public in general and while this may not be able effectively to express itself, it will make more difficult Khrushchev's efforts to increase the efficiency of the Soviet system by evoking enthusiasm and belief of the people in the system. The extent to which the leadership and propaganda apparatus has been employed in stating the regime's case indicates the seriousness with which the question of public opinion is regarded. This was also apparent in the charge the CC resolution made that Zhukov's role in World War II was being exaggerated and in Konev's Pravda article which minimized Zhukov's wartime exploits and pointed up his shortcomings. At the same time Konev supplied support for the claim that a personality cult was being developed around Zhukov, citing as one of the facts the painting of him on a white charger overlooking the burning Reichstag which was hung at his order in the Museum of the Soviet Army. This and the quotation in the Pravda editorial from Zhukov's recantation accepting the Party's charges as just are intended to undermine the basis of Zhukov's appeal to the masses and to reduce the area of latent opposition the anti-Zhukov move may engender.

Perhaps the most striking point in the decree of the Central Committee is the statement that Zhukov "showed himself an unsound political figure, inclined to adventurism, both in his understanding of the most important tasks of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union as well as in the direction of the Ministry of Defense." This lends credence to the view that Zhukov opposed Khrushchev in the field of Foreign Affairs. The Syrian problem would certainly seem to be the most likely issue despite the strong statements made on this subject by Zhukov in Albania. There are of course other possibilities. For example, his prolonged stay in Albania may have been accounted for by his taking a hand in the Yugoslav-Albania problem. We have also been disturbed by the possibility that recent developments in Berlin and the recognition of East Germany by Yugoslavia may presage a more aggressive Soviet policy in that area. The Syrian policy seems a more likely issue, however, since from his many statements on this question we know that Khru-

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3 Yugoslavia established diplomatic relations with East Germany on October 15.
shchev was personally involved in building up the crisis and it is in this area that the Soviet armed forces would be most handicapped in conducting limited military operations should the issue be forced. Whatever the immediate incident that may have precipitated a showdown, however, the basic factor was clearly the Party’s concern that its control over the military was not secure. This rivalry between the party and the armed forces as institutions rather than a personal fear on the part of Khrushchev that his leadership of the Party was threatened by Zhukov was, in my opinion, the issue.

The removal of Zhukov leaves no strong figure in the Presidium, with the possible exception of the ubiquitous Mikoyan, who could be expected to exert a strong restraining influence on Khrushchev’s impetuousness. This development can only be deplored from our point of view. For the time being however, Khrushchev’s sensitivity to public opinion and the knowledge that by moving so quickly on so many fronts he has created a formidable latent opposition, may have a sobering influence. The charge against Zhukov of developing a cult of personality may for the time being act as a check on a similar build-up of Khrushchev, the logic of the Soviet system and his own personality, however, appear to be pushing Khrushchev toward one-man dictatorship but whether he can successfully carry out this role remains to be seen.

Thompson

85. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) to the Secretary of State


SUBJECT

Intelligence Note: Significance of Zhukov Ouster

The ouster of Marshal Zhukov is in all probability the Party’s rebuff of efforts on the part of Zhukov and perhaps other professional military leaders to reduce the influence of the Party apparatus in the armed forces. In April 1956, Zhukov publicly criticized the quality of political indoctrination in the armed forces and asserted the pre-eminent role of the military commander. Opposition to political interference has been long-

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/11-457. Official Use Only.
standing among both career officers and men of the Soviet armed forces.

Evidence is lacking that Zhukov posed any present threat to Khrushchev’s position of dominance in the Party Presidium. Zhukov is not known to have harbored ambitions beyond the military sphere. Even the announcement of his ouster carried no suggestion that he aspired to greater political power. Unlike Beriya and the leaders expelled last June, Zhukov was not charged with an attempt to seize power. He was charged, however, with fostering, largely within the military, a Zhukov “cult of personality.” There is already the apparent beginning of a campaign, kicked off by First Deputy Minister of Defense Konev, to disparage Zhukov’s abilities as a military strategist and theorist.

The insinuation that Zhukov favored an “adventurist” foreign policy is unsupported by any known facts. This vague charge has so far not been further developed in Soviet propaganda. If Zhukov represented an “adventurist” force in Middle Eastern policy, he might have been expected to remain in Moscow during the height of the crisis instead of visiting the Balkans. The slackening of Soviet alarmist talk on the Middle East, though coincidental with the Zhukov ouster, has been gradual and can be better explained by factors other than the Zhukov ouster.

Although related primarily to internal affairs, the ouster is not likely to produce any significant domestic innovations. The Party apparatus has now followed its demonstrations of supremacy over the secret police and the economic bureaucracy with an act designed to underline a similar primacy over the military. The ouster from the top leadership of so popular a figure as Zhukov may produce some resentment in both military and civilian ranks, but this should cause the regime no serious problem. The elimination of Zhukov, whose prestige exceeded his real power, is not likely to enhance materially Khrushchev’s already well-established position of dominance.

While it is questionable that Zhukov ever played a determining role in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy, Moscow may nevertheless now consider it expedient to counter foreign inferences that Zhukov’s removal portends a further stiffening in Soviet attitudes and a greater willingness to court war. Recent Soviet achievements in the rocket and guided missile fields and evidence of an increasingly aroused Western response to recent Soviet challenges could in any case evoke a reinvigorated “coexistence” drive by Moscow. The desire to undercut Western expectations of a more bellicose Soviet posture could now be an important additional motive for accentuating Soviet appeals for a détente.

The timing of the move against Zhukov remains puzzling, in the absence of evidence that the army-Party issue had grown so acute as to
require immediate resolution. His absence in the Balkans apparently served as a convenient occasion to organize the case against him.

86. Editorial Note

On November 6, the Supreme Soviet held a “Jubilee” session in honor of the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. Khrushchev delivered the major address—a long review of Soviet economic and political history, a recapitulation of Soviet accomplishments and goals, and a restatement of Soviet positions on various international issues. In the course of the speech, Khrushchev urged that there be further high-level negotiations between Communist and Western officials. A two-page analysis of the speech was sent to the Secretary of State as an enclosure to a memorandum from Cumming, November 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.11/11-857)

On November 7, Secretary Dulles, in a statement at National Airport in Washington, said that he did not interpret Khrushchev’s remarks “as necessarily meaning a summit meeting.” Dulles’ comments at the airport, as well as the statement regarding Khrushchev’s speech made by the Department of State press officer at the press briefing on November 7, were quoted in telegram 536 to Moscow, November 8. (Ibid., 611.61/11-857) In telegram 917 from Moscow, November 8, Ambassador Thompson reported that he was inclined to believe that Khrushchev had proposed a summit meeting and that “this proposal is being seriously put forward and is not merely a propaganda gambit although I doubt that Khrushchev expects an early acceptance.” Thompson also discussed what he thought the Soviet Government hoped to achieve by such a meeting and his belief that the United States Government’s reply should be “along the line that we are prepared to participate in high level discussions at any time when there is prospect of success.” (Ibid.) One view of what was anticipated at the Jubilee session is in a paper prepared by the CIA’s Senior Research Staff on International Communism entitled “Speculation on the Program of the 40th Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution,” October 29, which was sent to Under Secretary Herter as an attachment to a memorandum of November 4 from F.M. Dearborn, Special Assistant to the President. (Ibid., 761.00/11-457)
In recognition of the anniversary, it was decided that President Eisenhower would send Voroshilov a message of greeting, and Murphy, Elbrick, and Buchanan would attend a reception at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. (Notes on the Secretary's Staff meeting, November 5, 1957; *ibid.*, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)


87. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research (Arneson) to the Secretary of State

Washington, November 14, 1957.

SUBJECT

Impact and Implications of Soviet Earth Satellites

In view of your interest in the impact and implications of the Soviet earth satellites, you may wish to note the following summary of our recent estimate on this subject brought up to date to include Sputnik II.

1. Following its announcement of Sputnik I on October 14 [4], Soviet propaganda emphasized the satellite’s scientific aspects but relied for the most part on free world sources to bring home its military implications. The rest of the Bloc elaborated both themes in volume. The second launching produced a smaller volume of propaganda along similar lines.

2. Outside the Bloc, Sputnik I tended to remove misconceptions about Soviet technological capabilities and to confirm its temporary ICBM lead. The resulting widespread concern was deepened by Sputnik II, which caused many to believe that the gap between the US and the USSR was wider than first realized. Although these views were tempered by the general belief that the US will match the USSR achievement in reasonable time, Sputnik II raised at least some doubts as to US ability to catch up quickly.

3. The USSR’s prestige has risen substantially and the US has suffered a serious, although not decisive, setback. World opinion tends to hold that the sputniks per se have not altered the strategic balance of forces in the short run, since Soviet ICBMs are not yet thought to be in mass production. Nevertheless, some new weight

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/11-1457. Secret.
has been lent to Soviet foreign policy pronouncements and increased credibility may attach to Soviet claims in other fields.

4. Observers throughout the world agree that beyond the immediate future US ability to match the Soviet advance is crucial and that a significant lag would have far-reaching effects. In Western Europe, particularly, this has led to the conviction that NATO efforts must be strengthened, collaboration increased, and US leadership revitalized. In addition, in Europe and leading countries elsewhere, the sputniks gave new urgency to problems of strategy and military planning arising from the advent of ballistic missiles.

5. The USSR will make further intensive propaganda efforts to exploit the situation but probably does not believe that it is justified in radically altering its foreign policy for the present. Nevertheless, the Kremlin will experience some gain in confidence, may expect to seize political opportunities at less risk, and will exploit any sign of US failure to meet the challenge.

6. Free world opinion will be influenced by the Soviet achievement for some time to come. In Europe, pressure for increased US, US–UK and NATO effort and collaboration will continue. At the same time, further stimulus will have been given to development of European advanced weapon capability, partly because of continuing anxiety that the US may gradually withdraw once it has an operational ICBM. Fear that the US will enter bilateral negotiations with the USSR will also continue to be felt. Elsewhere in the world no major realignments seem probable in the short run, although attitudes will be influenced by progress in the weapons race. The status of US bases is for the present not likely to be affected.

7. Delayed or insufficient demonstration of United States success in the ballistic field would produce political and psychological effects of substantially more serious nature—for example, on attitudes toward neutralism and on the cohesion of alliances.

A similar memorandum has been addressed to the Under Secretary.
88. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State ¹

Moscow, November 16, 1957—3 p.m.

953. Depcirtel 428, Nov. 5. Embassy suggests addition sections on impact Sputnik within USSR and bloc.

Embassy believes Sputnik undoubtedly source pride to all elements Soviet society particularly intelligentsia. Regime attempt to equate communism and progress enhanced and its prestige probably raised, while disquiet certain professional and intellectual groups perhaps somewhat mollified. Although military angles not focus of principal stress, national sense of security also probably increased. However, Embassy contacts, though limited, indicate ordinary citizens remain more interested in bread and butter measures. Moreover, Zhukov ouster and way it was handled probably vitiated in short run some psychological advantages of Sputnik and pointed up gap between arbitrary and antiquated political system and ultra-modern technological achievements.

Finally Sputnik not unalloyed gain for intelligentsia, since though already high status of science boosted further, there are indications regime may seek use Sputnik success to demand greater exertions for comparable triumphs in other fields. In bloc, Soviets are obviously using Sputnik as symbol of growth Soviet power which should be proof to peoples of bloc that communism is irreversible. Hopes for liberation which already dimmed by passage of time in general and by Hungary in particular presumably will be further reduced. Repeated demands by Khrushchev (who will now seem to be leading from own “position of strength”) that West recognize status quo in Europe will have some effect even if West maintains silence or gives verbal refusal.

On basis apparent Soviet analysis of new international opportunities now open to USSR, Embassy believes Dept estimate fails give sufficiently high rating to impact, especially in uncommitted areas, of present situation. This is one in which the USSR, after giving general impression of parity with US in nuclear field, has gone on dramatically to take stance of world leader in vitally important and imagination-catching field of future like rocketry, leaving US in position of catching up in science and technology which hitherto assumed US strong point. Embassy agrees that US launching satellite and ICBM might lessen impact, but there is no reason expect USSR rest on present laurels and meanwhile USSR has gone long way to

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.56301/11-1657. Secret.
² Not printed.
establish picture of itself (which it is assiduously promoting) as world power on par with and conceivably superior to US. In this connection, Sputniks have given much greater retroactive impact to ICBM announcement, a fact acknowledged but also underplayed in estimate.

Immediate consequences appear to be Soviet effort to inflate pressure for big power talks, and possibly increased Soviet belief that US and West ready or can be forced discuss disarmament on Soviet terms, admit Soviet role in Near East, and accept postwar Communist conquests in Eastern Europe and Far East. Moreover, since USSR is combining its greatly increased prestige and enhanced political stature with continued foreign assistance program in key uncommitted areas, it can be expected that tendency to accept Soviet help and expanded trade (with all possibilities of penetration thus implied) will grow as target nations feel need accommodation with Soviets, as well as real domestic pressures for industrialization—especially if US programs should become inadequate. With regard to section roman numeral IV B 7 and 8, it is true that Sputnik—ICBM does not increase danger of devastation threatening US friends which already huge, but its importance still great since for first time it brings into question US superiority or even certain parity vis-à-vis Soviet power on which these nations had been relying as shield.

Thompson

89. Editorial Note

From November 14 to 16, a meeting was held in Moscow of representatives from Albania, Hungary, North Vietnam, East Germany, Communist China, North Korea, Outer Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union. On November 21, a declaration signed by representatives from all the countries except Yugoslavia was published. It reaffirmed the revolutionary nature of the international Communist movement and Moscow's direction of the movement. For text of the declaration, see Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1957, pages 527–539. For an analysis of the significance of the meeting and the declaration, see Soviet Affairs, December 1957, pages 6–8. (Department of State, INR Files, Soviet Affairs)
According to the memorandum of discussion at the 346th meeting of the National Security Council on November 22, Director of Central Intelligence Dulles made the following remarks during his briefing on significant world developments affecting United States security:

"Mr. Allen Dulles first referred to the recent meeting in Moscow on November 14 to November 16. The fact that the communique had only been issued yesterday (November 21) indicated that there had been difficulties encountered at the meeting. After summarizing the contents of the communique, Mr. Dulles pointed out that it was neither very ringing nor very important. It was significant that the Yugoslavs had not joined in the communique and that there was to be apparently no new Cominform." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

90. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 10, 1957

SUBJECT
The Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS
Secretary Dulles
Senator Fulbright
Mr. Macomber

The Secretary alluded to the discussion he had with Senator Fulbright the previous Tuesday at the bipartisan meeting and said that he would like to explain his views regarding the Soviet Union in somewhat greater detail. The Secretary said he did not believe he would convert the Senator to his thinking but he hoped that as a result the Senator would have a better understanding of his viewpoint.

The Secretary said he thought we had a three-fold task in connection with meeting the threat of the Soviet Union. The Secretary did not for a minute underestimate the military strength of the Soviet Union. The first requirement was to have a military capability which would deter the Soviet Union from initiating a hot war. The

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1 Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199, December 1957. Drafted by Macomber. A note on the source text indicates that copies were sent to Herter and Smith (S/P).
2 No record of this meeting, December 3, has been found.
second task was to be able to counter probing or "nibbling" operations by the Soviet Union in the form of small-scale aggressions around the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc. The third task was to insure the economic progress of the underdeveloped areas in order to prevent the Soviets from taking over these areas by subversion.

The Secretary pointed out that the second and third tasks were heavily dependent on the Mutual Security Program.

The Secretary said that if we could succeed in these three objectives he believed that there eventually would be a change in the Soviet Union which would transform it into the kind of nation with whom we could have good relations in normal international society. He said he was not speaking of a revolution but of evolution. The Secretary said that it had been the experience of history that totalitarian regimes which existed on repressive measures in regard to its own people could only survive as long as they continued to achieve victories abroad. If they were denied such victories they were inevitably forced to release these repressive measures, become less authoritarian, and yield to the internal wishes of their people. The Secretary pointed out that when Khrushchev was asked why it took so long for the Soviets to do anything about the evils of Stalinism, the reply had been that it was impossible to do anything as long as Stalin was achieving great successes abroad. The Secretary thought that Khrushchev today needed these victories as much as Stalin had in the past. The Secretary pointed out that Khrushchev had many troubles at home. He alluded to the unrest in the satellites, the abandonment of the five-year plan, and the turnover in leadership. He thought the evolutionary process was even now beginning, pointing out that Russia was no longer ruled by one man or even by the Presidium but rather the locus of power appeared to be now in the larger Central Committee. (At this point Senator Fulbright interjected to say that it looked to him as though the power had descended for a time to the Central Committee but was rapidly ascending again to one man.)

The Secretary stressed that he could not determine whether the change he predicted in the Soviet Union would be in five, twenty-five or fifty years but he was convinced that if the Soviets could be denied external victories that the change would inevitably come.

Senator Fulbright said that he was less optimistic than the Secretary in his appraisal of the future course of the Soviet Union. He said that this evolutionary process might take place some day but he did not think it was enough of a certainty for us to base our policy upon it. He was, in fact, very discouraged about the possibilities of dislodging the Communist leadership from power in any foreseeable period of time. They had control of all the political,
military, economic, and the police resources and he did not see how they could be pried loose from these.

Senator Fulbright said that he had been enormously impressed by the implication of recent Soviet accomplishments and attached much greater significance to them than did the Secretary. He said he thought he was more "scared" of the present hot war potential of the Soviet Union than the Secretary was.

Senator Fulbright asked the Secretary what the effect of the Sputnik was abroad. The Secretary said the Sputnik had less effect abroad than it had in the United States. The Senator asked about its effect in the neutral areas. The Secretary replied that he had not seen recent reports but it was his impression that in some ways it helped the neutral areas in that the Soviets were considered the chief war makers in the world rather than the United States. The Secretary asked Mr. Macomber whether he had seen any reports regarding the Sputnik abroad. The latter said it was his impression that the preliminary reports indicated a growing hesitancy on the part of the neutral areas who had tended to lean toward the West to commit themselves in our direction. They seemed more anxious than before to wait a little longer to see whether the West or the Soviet Union would come out on top. On the other hand, Sputnik had tended to draw the Western European nations closer together and to the United States.

Reverting to his earlier theme, the Secretary stressed the importance of having a policy which envisioned a successful conclusion to our efforts. He said that the only logical and sound policy, if we accepted the Senator's reasoning, would be preventive war. The Senator's comment on this point was that regardless of logic a country like the United States with democratic institutions was incapable of initiating a preventive war.

[Here follows discussion of the Mutual Security Program.]
Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) to the Secretary of State


SUBJECT

Intelligence Note: Foreign Policy Speeches by Khrushchev and Gromyko

In today’s (December 21) concluding session of the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev and Gromyko delivered speeches on foreign policy, discussing, in particular, the disarmament question. In addition, the Supreme Soviet adopted a decree on foreign policy.

The main points in these three pronouncements, full texts of which are not yet available, were as follows:

1. Gromyko in effect rejected the idea of a Foreign Ministers Conference as an attempt to make Soviet representatives sit down . . . with the same men with whom the USSR negotiated . . . fruitlessly . . . over many years.” He said the proposal for talks “could neither satisfy the Soviet Union nor be accepted.”

2. Gromyko proposed a special UN session or a disarmament conference of unspecified composition. Both these proposals, or variants thereof, have been advanced periodically by the USSR during the past four years.

3. Khrushchev repeated recent Soviet calls for a top-level East-West conference to solve international problems. He apparently continued to be vague as to participants, but Gromyko indicated that Moscow would press for Chinese communist participation in such a meeting as well as in talks on disarmament alone.

4. Both Khrushchev and the Supreme Soviet Decree took note of the NATO statement that the West would not use force unless attacked and, ostensibly in consideration of this statement, the Supreme Soviet instructed the Soviet Government to consider further unilateral reductions in Soviet military forces. Since 1955, the USSR has announced two major unilateral troop reductions totaling 1,840,000 men. These reductions appear to have been carried out to a substantial degree, although full confirmation is lacking. No reductions are thought to have occurred in 1957. Announcement of a new cut in response to the NATO conference had been considered likely by the Intelligence Community. Khrushchev also stated that pending agreement on disarmament the USSR would continue to develop modern weapons although within “reasonable limits” so as not to overburden the Soviet economy, an almost unique statement for a Soviet leader.

5. Both speakers took favorable note of Norwegian and Danish statements at NATO while being especially critical of Turkey, Italy, and the UK. Gromyko questioned Bonn’s sincerity on the issue of

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¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/12–2157. Confidential.
²All ellipses are in the source text.
missile bases and indicated that in the case of Germany, Moscow would continue pressing for exclusion of all nuclear weapons.

6. Khrushchev, like the CPSU Central Committee Decree of December 17, stressed the importance of the recent international Communist party conferences in consolidating the Communist movement in the face of “reactionary” efforts to split it. He regretted Yugoslavia’s failure to sign the 12-Party declaration as showing that ideological and political differences continued to exist. On the other hand, he stressed the “joint front” existing on many important issues and promised efforts to remove remaining differences.

7. There were no new substantive proposals in the three pronouncements; they recapitulated the suggestions contained in the recent Bulganin letters, stressing in particular the need to recognize the status quo, to set up an “atom-free” zone, and to sign a non-aggression agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

In general, the statements struck a note similar to that in Bulganin’s letters. They indicated no particular haste to enter negotiations, but rather reflected a belief that at the present juncture, the USSR can afford to hold out for talks more nearly on its own terms, (especially with respect to participants), than on previous occasions. Moscow seems intent on fostering inclinations in the West toward negotiation and toward going slow on new military decisions by striking a favorable attitude toward Norway and Denmark as well as Canada, by such unilateral concessions as the announcement of another troop reduction, and by Khrushchev’s unusual inference that Soviet military development will be limited so as not to curtail the needs of other sectors of the economy. The statements make clear again that if negotiations should eventuate, a priority Soviet goal will be to obtain explicit Western recognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe.

A similar memorandum has been sent to the Under Secretary.