III. EVENTS LEADING TO MEMBERSHIP OF ITALY AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY IN THE BRUSSELS TREATY ORGANIZATION, TO MEMBERSHIP OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, AND TO THE RESTORATION OF SOVEREIGNTY TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

A. REACTION TO THE FRENCH REJECTION OF THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY TREATY: FOREIGN SECRETARY EDEN’S TRIP TO BRUSSELS, BONN, PARIS, AND ROME, SEPTEMBER 11–15, 1954; SECRETARY OF STATE DULLES’ TRIP TO BONN AND LONDON, SEPTEMBER 16–17, 1954; DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD EUROPE IN LIGHT OF THE FRENCH REJECTION OF THE EDC TREATY (NSC 5433); AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE NINE-POWER AND FOUR-POWER CONFERENCES

740.5/8-3054: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT WASHINGTON, August 30, 1954—9:11 p. m.

757. For Ambassador from Secretary. Following is text of proposed statement which I propose to issue tomorrow Aug 31 twelve noon EDST. This has been approved in highest quarters subject to observations you may make and which reach me by ten a.m. EDST tomorrow

Verbatim text.

1. The French rejection of the European Defense Community is a grave event. France thus turns away from her own historic proposal to merge the military potential of continental European nations into a single European army and thus basically to change the present European system which has regularly produced wars, the last two of which became world wars.

2. If there is any one area of the world where sovereignty over armament needs to be subordinated, it is Western Continental Europe.

1 Repeated for action to London for the Ambassador and to Bonn for Conant.
2 For documentation concerning the French rejection of the treaty establishing a European Defense Community, see pp. 871 ff.
That was the lofty purpose of the EDC Treaty. It grappled with these basic and stubborn facts:

a. There cannot be an effective defense of Continental Europe without a substantial military contribution from the Germans; yet German rearmament could be dangerous if it occurs in a national form and under a nationalistic German General Staff;

b. Germany cannot be indefinitely neutralized or otherwise discriminated against in terms of her sovereignty, including the inherent right of self-defense. Any limitations on German sovereignty, to be permanently acceptable, must be international in character, shared by others:

c. The prevention of war as between neighboring nations which have a long record of fighting cannot be dependably achieved merely by national promises or threats but only by merging certain functions of government into federal institutions.

3. The French rejection of EDC; without the provision of any alternative means of dealing with the basic ills of Europe, compels the US to reappraise its foreign policies and to adjust them to the resultant situation. The need for such a review can scarcely be questioned since the North Atlantic Council has itself twice declared, with unanimity, that the consummation of EDC was of paramount importance to the European defense it planned. Furthermore, such review is required by conditions which the Congress attached last year and this year to authorizations and appropriations for military contributions to Europe.

4. Four of the six prospective members of EDC had ratified the treaty—Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. A fifth, Italy, seemed on the point of ratifying. The UK and the US had made far-reaching commitments of association. But now France, after three years of negotiation and discussion, has rejected the Treaty. The rejection was accomplished by votes which came from Communist deputies, who wished Europe divided so that Soviet Russia might extend its rule, and from those whose national patriotism blinded them to the fact that not even a nation as great as France can independently be safe in the fire-trap created by rival European armies.

5. US post-war policy had assumed that, given US aid and support, Western Europe would at long last develop a unity which would make it immune from war as between its members and defensible against aggression from without.

That assumption had seemed justified. The imperative need for unity was recognized by the leading statesmen of all the free nations of Europe. Such unity was, indeed, the premise upon which vast US aid was extended and accepted.

As said in 1950 by the then President of France, "Europe must unite herself if she wishes to recover and live, and if she does not want American assistance to be a gesture without future."

The United States, for its part, joined the North Atlantic Treaty defensive alliance with the Western European countries and assisted these countries to recover from the weakening of World War II. Both on the economic and military side we made massive contributions. The US stationed 5 US Divisions in Europe in an effort to implement the European desire for a "forward strategy". We furthermore made our
leading military figures available to assume high positions in the military organization designed to defend Western Europe.

6. During the same period the nations of Europe did, in fact, take significant steps toward unity. They associated themselves cooperatively in many ways, and in 1952 created the European Coal and Steel Community which, in a limited but important area, merged sovereignty and subordinated nationalism. In May 1952 there was signed the Treaty to create the European Defense Community.

7. The US will, of course, remain faithful to the letter and spirit of the North Atlantic Treaty. It should, however, be recalled that that Treaty was made by the US in the conviction that it was the mutual pledges of aid to any victim of aggression that would most powerfully deter aggression.

8. The US owes it to the Federal Republic of Germany to do quickly all that lies within our power to restore full sovereignty to that Republic and to enable it, by reasonable re-armament, to contribute to international peace and security. The present Treaty to restore German sovereignty is, by its terms, contingent upon the coming in force of EDC. Failure to realize that result, through no fault of Germany's, must not be allowed to serve as an excuse for penalizing Germany. The West German Republic should resume its place as a free and equal member of the family of nations. That was the purport of the Resolution which the US Senate adopted unanimously last July.

9. The US should stand ready to consider sympathetically the plight of the many in Western Europe who are left in grave peril and anxiety. There are, in Europe, men of vision and realism and of action. In this fact lies our greatest hope and that is a hope which the US must not dim by any ill-considered action of its own. It is a tragedy that France has seemingly reverted to a pattern of narrow nationalism which the other members of NATO believe to be contrary to the best interests of them all, including France. That tragedy would be compounded if the US were thereby led to conclude that it too must turn to a course of narrow nationalism. It is a matter of elementary prudence that the United States should change its own arrangements to take account of the new situation now created. We are fortunately so situated that we do not need completely to identify our destiny with policies that seem to us to be self-defeating. But it still remains true that we cannot, in isolation, find safety ourselves.

End verbatim text.

Note to London—You may show this to the Foreign Office indicating that textual changes may still be made.

Note to Paris—Please also transmit David Bruce's views.

DULLES

---

*Documentation concerning the European Coal and Steel Community is presented in volume VI.

*For documentation concerning efforts leading up to the signing of the treaty in Paris in May 1952, see pp. 571 ff.

*For the text of Senate Resolution 295 approved on July 30, see the Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 23, 1954, p. 284.

*For Bruce's views on Dulles' draft, see telegram Colied 32 from Paris, Aug. 31, p. 1118.
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 30, 1954.

Participants: The Secretary
General Smith
Mr. Robert Anderson, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Admiral Radford
Mr. Merchant

Mr. Anderson and Admiral Radford called at the Secretary's request to be shown the draft statement which the Secretary proposed to issue in consequence of the French rejection of EDC.1 The Secretary pointed out that it had already been approved by the President but that he felt authorized to make any editorial or language changes. Both the Admiral and Mr. Anderson stated that they considered it a fine statement. Each made several minor suggestions, some of which were incorporated.

Secretary Anderson then raised the question as to how far Defense should go in halting MDAP programs to France2 and the other European countries. He said that he had already called for a review of the European military end item program which would have the effect of slowing down deliveries. The Secretary indicated that he believed, in accordance with the Richards Amendment,3 deliveries should promptly be cut off from France. Secretary Anderson then repeated that he would proceed on the basis of a general review program which would have the effect of an unannounced slow-down but that in the case of France end item deliveries would be stopped. The Secretary indicated agreement (although not explicit it seemed that this discussion referred to military aid to metropolitan France and that the cutoff in deliveries was not intended to include deliveries to Indochina).

There was then a brief exchange concerning the offshore procurement program in France and reference was made to the part which some French industrialists behind the scenes had played in killing the EDC. It was agreed that new contracts in France would be held up but there was no suggestion that existing contracts in France should be canceled.

---

1 The text of Dulles' draft statement is included in telegram 757 to Paris, Aug. 30, supra.
2 Documentation concerning Mutual Defense Assistance Pact programs in France is presented in volume vi.
3 Regarding the Richards amendment, which was designed to curtail aid to countries that did not ratify the EDC Treaty, see the editorial note, p. 973.
CONFIDENTIAL NIAC  PARIS, August 31, 1954—noon.

Coled 32. For Secretary. Re Deptel 757.¹ Have following comments to make on text proposed statement.

Paragraph 4, 5th sentence. Suggest elimination portion of sentence following word “rule.” Comment. It is better to represent yesterday’s Parliamentary action as having been caused by Communist deputies and not involve ex-Gaullists or others in it. Also, there are many who would question whether the majority of votes from those sources other than Communists who opposed EDC were dictated by “national patriotism.” Having made this elimination, would replace language starting “not even” and ending “armies.”

Paragraph 7. Would eliminate entire paragraph. Comment. In my opinion, this vitiates much of the force of the statement, since it might be seized upon as indicating that our reappraisal would result in no major disturbance of our previously expressed policy in regard to NAT commitments. We may wish to make this statement later, but I think it especially inappropriate to do it in this context.

In paragraph 8 eliminate word “full.” Its retention might limit our freedom of maneuver.

These are the only textual changes I would advocate in this excellent and strong paper. However, it seems to me that something else must be added to it in the way of a program of action. Otherwise it will be regarded as merely a reaffirmation of principles already and frequently pronounced by us. Since we have no certitude the Germans will accept a return of sovereignty with the limitations imposed by the Bonn contractuals and by the protocols now under discussion in London, and since the question of German sovereignty and German rearmament are almost inextricably intertwined, I strongly advocate the Secretary’s statement conclude with a demand for the convocation of an emergency meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Council not later than October 1 to review the situation created by yesterday’s French parliamentary action, and further to deliberate upon the German problem.

This leaves unsolved the method by which consultation may be had with the Chancellor. Some appropriate means must be found to do so. In this connection, it is all-important that Mendes not be allowed to talk with us, the British and Germans to the exclusion of our other partners in NATO about this situation. This is what Mendes will undoubtedly count upon in order to fortify himself against the bitter criticism which is now pouring in against him from all parts of Europe. Also, this would be considered by the Benelux countries as a betrayal of them. They are likely to feel that, although we have a

³Dated Aug. 30, p. 1114.
right, as occupying powers, to exclude them from such conversations, their interest is as great as that of France in spite of the differences of population, in assuring the security of Western Europe.

They will undoubtedly think that the French should be faced with all their partners in NATO before any action or program is adopted by the U.S., U.K. and France in regard to the German problem.

Have discussed this with Ambassadors Hughes and Dillon who agree with suggested program for positive action. Hughes asked me to say he concurs in suggestions regarding paragraph 4 and 7, and also would prefer, as I would, a restatement of paragraph 2a. See immediately preceding cable for Spaak’s views re NATO meeting.²

BRUCE

²In telegram Coled 31 from Paris, Aug. 31, Bruce informed the Secretary of State that Spaak came to Paris for an hour that day to request that Bruce urgently send Dulles Spaak’s comments that the French Government had “committed an indecency in democratic parliamentary procedures in shutting off debate,” that this was due to Mendès-France “who has deliberately falsified what took place in Brussels in his determined efforts to kill EDC” and that Spaak had dropped any idea of calling a four-, six-, or seven-nation conference in advance of an emergency NATO meeting. (740.5/8-3154)

740.5/8-3154

The Secretary of State to Foreign Minister Spaak ¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 31, 1954.

MY DEAR FRIEND: The action of the French National Assembly in rejecting, even without full debate, the European Defense Community Treaty is, I know, a bitter disappointment to you as it is to me. David Bruce has relayed your comments to me.² You have done everything that anyone could do to bring about the realization of this bold concept which held such hopeful significance for the future of Europe and our Western Alliance. I want you to know how deeply I and my fellow Americans appreciate your strenuous and imaginative efforts over the years and in particular during these last critical weeks. The qualities of true statesmanship which you have displayed have won the admiration and respect of all of us.

We must, of course continue our common efforts to build a strong, united and hopeful Europe, though under far less auspicious circumstances than we have had in the past. The United States will be faced with the most difficult decisions if our combined efforts in the future do not bring early success. It is, however, reassuring for me to know

¹This message, which was drafted by Merchant and cleared with O’Connor, was transmitted to Brussels in telegram 236, Aug. 31, with instructions that Ambassador Alger deliver it to Spaak.

²See footnote 2, supra.
that dedicated men such as yourself will be devoted to achieving somehow these common goals.

I am leaving now for Manila but will be following most closely developments in Europe in the coming days. I understand that you plan to be in New York for the opening of the United Nations General Assembly and I shall look forward with great pleasure to seeing you again at that time.

With warm regards,

Sincerely yours,

Foster Dulles

Secretary Dulles was leaving Washington for the Manila Conference scheduled for Sept. 6-8; documentation concerning this conference, which laid the groundwork for the signing of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, is presented in volume xii.

In telegram 238 from Brussels, Sept. 2, the Embassy informed the Department of State that Dulles' message was delivered to Spaak on Sept. 1 and that Spaak "was visibly pleased, expressed deep appreciation and said he would send reply shortly". (740.5/9-254)

Statement by the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, August 31, 1954.

The French rejection of the European Defense Community is a saddening event. France thus turns away from her own historic proposal made nearly four years ago. That proposal sought a unification of the military strength of Continental Europe into a single European army so as to end the era of recurrent European wars, the last two of which became world wars.

The French action does not change certain basic and stubborn facts:

(a) the effective defense of Continental Europe calls for a substantial military contribution from the Germans; yet all, including the Germans themselves, would avoid national re-armament in a form which could be misused by resurgent militarism;

(b) Germany cannot be subjected indefinitely to neutrality or otherwise be discriminated against in terms of her sovereignty including the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense. Limitations on German sovereignty to be permanently acceptable must be shared by others as part of a collective international order;

(c) The prevention of war between neighboring nations which have a long record of fighting cannot be dependably achieved merely by national promises or threats, but only by merging certain functions of their government into supranational institutions.

To deal with these facts was the lofty purpose of EDC. Four of the six prospective members of EDC had ratified that treaty—Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. A fifth, Italy, was on the

1 Reprinted from the Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 13, 1954, pp. 363-364. The source text was issued as Department of State press release 486 on Aug. 31.
point of ratifying it. The U.K. and the U.S. had made far-reaching commitments of association with EDC. France thus disassociates herself not only from her own proposal but from her prospective partners who had stood united at the recent Brussels Conference.

The U.S. post-war policies beginning in 1946 were framed on the assumption that Western Europe would at long last develop a unity which would make it immune from war as between its members and defensible against aggression from without. The imperative need for that unity was recognized by the leading statesmen of all the free nations of Europe. The U.S. joined the North Atlantic Treaty defensive alliance with the Western European countries. We assisted these countries to recover from the weakening of World War II. Both on the economic and military side we made massive contributions. We stationed the equivalent of 6 divisions in Europe. We furthermore made our leading military figures available to assume high positions in the military organization designed to defend Western Europe.

The French negative action, without the provision of any alternative, obviously imposes on the United States the obligation to reappraise its foreign policies, particularly those in relation to Europe. The need for such a review can scarcely be questioned since the North Atlantic Council of Ministers has itself twice declared with unanimity that the EDC was of paramount importance to the European defense it planned. Furthermore, such review is required by conditions which the Congress attached this year and last year to authorizations and appropriations for military contributions to Europe.

The Western nations now owe it to the Federal Republic of Germany to do quickly all that lies in their power to restore sovereignty to that Republic and to enable it to contribute to international peace and security. The existing Treaty to restore sovereignty is by its terms contingent upon the coming into force of EDC. It would be unconscionable if the failure to realize EDC through no fault of Germany’s should now be used as an excuse for penalizing Germany. The Federal German Republic should take its place as a free and equal member of the society of nations. That was the purport of the resolution which the United States Senate adopted unanimously last July, and the United States will act accordingly.

The United States stands ready to support the many in Western Europe who despite their valiant efforts are left in grave anxiety. We need not feel that the European idea is dead merely because, in one of the six countries, a present majority seems against one of its manifestations. There is still much on which to build and those foundations should not be shaken by any abrupt or any ill-considered action of our own.
It is a tragedy that in one country nationalism, abetted by Communism, has asserted itself so as to endanger the whole of Europe. That tragedy would be compounded if the United States was thereby led to conclude that it must turn to a course of narrow nationalism. It is a matter of elementary prudence that the United States should review its dispositions and planning in the light of the new situation now created. We are fortunately so situated that we do not need to identify ourselves with what to us seem self-defeating policies. We have flexibility to adjust our own policies to take account of developments elsewhere. In doing so, we shall be governed by the realization that we cannot in isolation find safety for ourselves.

When the NATO Ministerial Council came to adjourn last April to meet next December, I pointed out that if the EDC failed of realization that would create an emergency situation which would call for a special meeting of that Council. That condition has arisen, and the United States believes that there should promptly be a special meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council, as well as early consultations with Chancellor Adenauer. We shall move accordingly.

---

740.5/9-154: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State ¹

SECRET  PRIORITY  

Bonn, September 1, 1954—noon.

636. Dowling had dinner in Baden-Baden with Blankenhorn and Hallstein last night at latter’s request to discuss situation created by French rejection of EDC. He found them troubled re advice which they shld give Chancellor at this juncture.

They said they had no doubt that coalition leaders wld continue—for this stage at least—to endorse whatever policy Chancellor shld put forward at meeting today. Problem was what position Chancellor shld take, as they felt it imperative for the future of Germany that his program this time be assured of success. If he shld again fail to achieve his aims, the inevitable result wld be to throw German leadership into other hands, and as a minimum a weakening of German ties with the West. It soon became evident that they were particularly concerned re danger of Chancellor coming out publicly at this time with demand for full German membership in NATO, which he seemed inclined to do as simplest way out of his dilemma, and were looking for arguments to dissuade him from this course.

¹ Transmitted to the Department of State in two sections and repeated to London and to Paris for Bruce.
Hallstein voiced particular doubts re British policy, saying he feared Churchill and Eden must have given Mendes-France commitment not to move on German question without French consent; and said problem was to find formula which wld avoid French veto of equitable solution. As he saw it, French wld never agree to full and equal German membership in NATO, and he wondered what other arrangement French cl.d be brought to accept. Moreover, he doubted whether British opinion wld support German membership in NATO if France were adamantly opposed. It was therefore, he said, superfluous to point out that Germany and the Chancellor were wholly dependent upon U.S. policy in this problem. Chancellor, he added quickly, was not unhappy at this, as he had long ago recognized realities of world situation and was content to throw in his lot with U.S. His hope was that we cl.d bring Britain to join with U.S. in persuading French to accept necessity of early and reasonable solution of German question.

As to solution, he said Chancellor rightfully felt he shld not abandon goal of European integration in economic and political fields, at least, but he wondered what effect wld be if Adenauer now threw his might behind German national army in NATO. There were elements in Germany (he mentioned Oberlander and Dehler in particular) who wld cheer such a decision, but they wld be first to exploit situation when it became clear that French wld veto full NATO membership or at best wld insist upon discriminatory restrictions unacceptable to Germans. On other hand, he observed, majority of Germans were not keen about national military organization as opposed to European army—but he then himself dismissed this argument by saying that any way Germans wld make good soldiers in national army, perhaps even too good. He went on to say that there might well be limitations on German participation in NATO which Germans cl.d accept, such as, for example, the size of German contingents, since the 12 divisions envisaged under EDC was the maximum defense contribution which Germany cl.d afford at this time. Such limitations wld however, have to be freely accepted by Germany, and not imposed.

Dowling then reminded Hallstein of report given Chancellor re London Study Group's work following Washington talks (Bonn's 125 to Dept 8), whereupon Hallstein pointed out that German Govt

---

*For reports concerning Mendès-France's visit to London on Aug. 23, see the letters from Churchill and Eden to Dulles, both written on Aug. 24, pp. 1077 and 1078.
* A Study Group of officials of the United States and the United Kingdom met in London July 5-12, 1954, to discuss their policies toward Germany; for the text of their report, see p. 997.
* This is a reference to the Eisenhower–Churchill discussions in Washington in June 1954; regarding these talks, see the editorial note, p. 984.
* Not printed; it informed the Department of State on July 13 that Chancellor Adenauer appeared satisfied with the United States-British initiative evident in the Report of the London Study Group. (622A.00/7-1954)
had always maintained connection between Bonn conventions and EDC, and he felt sure Chancellor wld have to take position that 2 were interdependent. If EDC were not to come into being, then new arrangements wld have to be found to take place of Bonn conventions. He argued further that agrmts along lines of Bonn conventions wld be difficult for Germans to accept without simultaneous agrmt on nature of German defense contribution, and that here again problem of French veto arose.

Dowling then inquired whether they thought that Chancellor had to take a position in favor of a specific formula at this time, Blankenhorn referred to conference of EDC powers plus U.S. and U.K. which had been proposed at earlier period, and said that if such a meeting cld be held soon, he was of opinion it wld be preferable for Chancellor not to propose a specific solution now, but rather to confine himself to general proposition that German Govt maintained its support for European integration and maintained its readiness to make its contribution to Western defense on basis of equality and in measure envisaged in EDC. Hallstein readily agreed, saying this wld provide opportunity for other powers to make such proposals as might be found mutually advisable, and might even persuade French that EDC was after all better solution from their point of view than NATO. He added that in any event negots were bound to be difficult, and while Germans were prepared to take on their share of this tough assignment, perhaps it wld be preferable for Germans not to take too much of the initiative.

Discussion between Hallstein and Blankenhorn then turned to consideration of what action, if any, cld be taken to impress upon French vital necessity of concluding agrmt at such a conference. They urged that there must be steps which U.S. and U.K. cld take towards organization of German defense contingent which while of provisional nature, and in anticipation of EDC (or even NATO or some intermediary solution), wld nevertheless convince French that German rearmament was fact which they must face now rather than later. They said openly that once this process began it cld not be halted short of completion, but felt that so long as these preliminary measures were under U.S. and U.K. control French cld not object too strenuously and other European powers might well approve.

Conversation was cut short at this point to permit Dowling to catch train for return to Bonn, but he was left with impression they wld recommend some such course as above to Adenauer, although they were by no means sure he wld accept their recommendations.

*Documentation concerning the Conventions signed at Bonn on May 26, 1952, is presented in volume VII.*
We telephoned Hallstein this morning to give him gist of Deptel 592. He said he was seeing Chancellor prior to coalition mtg today, and wld pass on Dept’s views.

Conant

7 Not printed; it instructed Conant to give Chancellor Adenauer “a broad account” of what the United States and the United Kingdom intended to do for Germany now that the French rejected the EDC in order to encourage him to refrain from publicly announcing a rigid formula that would later deny him flexibility of action. Conant was instructed to do this without specifically mentioning the London Working Group protocols (see footnote 3, infra) which the British felt had to be shown to the French first. (740.5/8-3154)

662A.00/9-154: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn 1

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, September 1, 1954—8:21 p.m.

621.1. Department telegram 566 to Bonn repeated London 1163 Paris 734; British have replied they feel it important give Mendes-France text Protocols immediately and have proposed simultaneous communication to him and to Adenauer. Bonn and Paris in concert with British colleagues should therefore jointly present texts of two London Working Group Protocols on application of contractuals and German defense contribution telegraphed yesterday 5 as joint proposals of US and UK Governments. They should also be given texts of related notes included in report of Anglo-American Study Group 4 with change in second note indicated in Department telegram 1203 to London repeated Bonn 588 Paris 764.

2. For Bonn. In presenting text to Chancellor you should make clear that proposal to place contractuals in effect without solution of armament problem does not represent in any sense lessening interest on our part in obtaining early German contribution to Defense, nor is there any intention of postponing indefinitely German right to rearms. On

3 Drafted by Reinstein and cleared with Cowles, Merchant, Bowie, and Murphy; repeated for action to London and to Paris for Bruce.

5 Not printed; it approved the recommendation that Chancellor Adenauer be approached concerning the protocols (see footnote 3, below) prior to consultation with the French. (740.5/8-2754)

4 This is a reference to two protocols which were transmitted to Bonn in telegrams 595 and 596, Aug. 31 (662A.00/8-3154); the texts of the two protocols were based on a part of Document 3 which was attached to the Report of the London Study Group, July 12, p. 997. These protocols were subsequently referred to as the “London protocols.”

6 The texts of the related notes under reference were also a part of Document 3 which was attached to the Report of the London Study Group (see footnote 3, above).

7 Not printed; it approved the deletion of the words “pending the entry into force of the Treaty establishing the EDC” from the opening sentence of the second exchange of notes the texts of which comprise a part of Document 3 (see footnote 3, above).
contrary Article 3 of Protocol is designed to force solution this problem as soon as possible. You may make clear if necessary that this text is designed to eliminate continued veto by any one country. It is our intention that Federal Republic will participate fully in all considerations of this question and our view that solution must be found which permits German participation on basis of equality and without discrimination.

3. For Paris. You should make clear to Mendes-France that US and UK Governments are seeking Chancellor's reaction to proposal and will wish take it into account in making final decision. You should give him aide-memoire containing following explanation of basic concept of protocols. We do not believe, as stated in Secretary's statement of August 31, that we can continue indefinitely withhold from Germans sovereignty, including right to defend themselves and to contribute to Western defense. Provisions in Article 1 of second protocol for deferment of German rearmament "for the time being" are designed to afford opportunity for further efforts to reach mutually satisfactory solution this problem. However we are confronted with threat serious deterioration of our position in Germany and we could not envisage situation in which one of the Signatory Powers could block solution acceptable to others and create conditions which might cause us loss of Germany to the Western cause. Therefore, the provisions of Article 3, taken in combination with those of Article 1 are construed by us as in no sense permitting any one country to maintain a continuing veto on arrangements for the rearmament of the Federal Republic after the expiration of the 90-day period provided in Article 3.

4. For London. Please inform British of paragraphs 2 and 3 above and urge that they instruct their missions in Bonn and Paris similarly.

5. For Bruce. Believe paragraph 3 takes care of concern regarding French veto expressed in Coled 33."

Addendum (Primarily for Bonn)

Since above telegram drafted British have informed us that Cabinet this afternoon decided joint approach to Adenauer not advisable since it would constitute conspicuous snub of French. We understand British High Commissioner being instructed see Adenauer as soon as possible after former's return Germany.

You consequently instructed to carry out above instructions when you see Chancellor tomorrow. When handing copies of protocols and related notes you should make clear you are acting on behalf of UK and US and that your British colleague will be calling on Adenauer

---

*In telegram Coled 33 from Paris, Sept. 1, Bruce expressed the view that the language of the protocol dealing with a German defense contribution implies that the French have a veto power since nothing will be done by the United States and United Kingdom unless the French agree (740.5/9-154)."
to make similar presentation shortly. For your background purposes, we are transmitting to you copies of British instructions to their High Commissioner which were given us here. Fact that British propose sounding out Adenauer on his views with respect to NATO, which we are not prepared to do, in our opinion makes separate interviews advisable.

We have informed British that we accept their proposition of separate approaches to Chancellor on understanding that (1) British High Commissioner will make it clear to Adenauer that he is not speaking on behalf US when he refers to NATO matter and that (2) démarche on Mendes-France will be joint and will occur on Friday.

We have also informed British with respect to second sentence of numbered paragraph 3 above.

SMITH

---

740.5/9-154

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Butterworth) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)

PERSONAL CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, September 1, 1954.

DEAR LIVIE: You will have seen from my telegram 1069 of August 31 what my basic reaction was to the first draft of the Secretary's lament on the death of EDC. I trust it did some good in helping to remove the tone of bitterness and preserve our position of leadership; the final draft was much improved.

However, I do believe that it does not help the cause of European integration—which we must not think of as dead because EDC has been defeated in a French Assembly that is by no means representative of current French opinion, as the Gaullists full well know—by presenting to the world as one of the three "basic and stubborn facts" what is neither stubborn (sic) nor a fact. The statement to which I take exception is: "The prevention of war between neighboring nations which have a long record of fighting cannot be dependably achieved merely by national promises or threats but only by merging certain functions of government into supranational institutions." The

---

1 Not printed; it informed the Department of State of Butterworth's criticism of the draft statement to be made by Secretary Dulles. Butterworth's general position was the less said until constructive action was planned and underway the better. (740.5/8-3154)
history of Europe is replete with examples which belie this assertion from Scandinavia to Iberia, not to mention the fact that after centuries of strife France and England for the last century and a half have been at peace and have grown to be allies of half century standing.

Looking at the obverse side of this sole-cure patent remedy I seem to remember as a Southerner that the existence of federal institutions is no guarantee against war even within a single nation.

The fact is that statements like this put into the Secretary’s mouth do far more harm in Europe than we generally realize, for they tend to give the impression of an ignorant or at best superficial approach to age-old and intricate human problems.

I trust that our agonizing reappraisal includes self-appraisal, and that despite the outrageous action of the French Assembly yesterday we are prepared to continue to work for the integration of Western Europe even if we have to make haste more slowly and more painstakenly than we would wish. In our present mood should we not recall that whereas it is valid to attribute to France the authorship of EDC it is equally true that it was called into being by the strident demands of the Pentagon for German divisions and, unfortunately, was not so much “framed on the assumption that Western Europe would at long last develop a unity which would make it immune from war as between its members” as precipitously to “make it defensible against aggression from without”. In my view the essential reason for our failure is because we approached this problem with the latter consideration as the catalyst. Incidentally, all this goes back to that “Cottage Club” argument that you and I and Harry had at Phil’s apartment in Paris.

[Here follow personal remarks.]

All the best.

As ever,

Walt

---

662A.00/9-254: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn

SECRET N I A C T  WASHINGTON, September 2, 1954—12:13 a. m.

623. For Conant—to be delivered urgently Thursday morning. We appreciate Chancellor’s reaction to protocols may well be that they

1 Drafted by Reinstein and cleared with Kidd, Lyon, and Merchant; repeated to Paris and London.

2 Sept. 2.
are inadequate and could not get Bundestag approval. You should say that proposal was worked out in anticipation of French rejection of EDC treaty with idea they would be helpful to him. While we recognize there are many provisions of contractuals which Germans would like to have changed and while we appreciate that there may be difficulty with Bundestag, we are inclined to feel that placing contractuals in effect now has advantage of enabling us to end the occupation and would avoid numerous problems in our mutual relations during difficult period ahead. What is more important in our view, it would facilitate more rapid solution of defense problem by giving Federal Republic status of equality as first step and by removing broad area of subjects from discussion and possible disagreement in immediate future. We think that protocols as drafted meet substance of German government declaration and trust that Chancellor will weigh carefully disadvantages of negotiating whole parcel of difficult points de novo compared with immediate advantages provided by contractuals.

It is possible, in light of Government declaration reported in your 643, that Chancellor may indicate Federal Republic is no longer willing to accept contractuals on any basis and that Federal Government now insists upon full sovereignty, i.e., without reserved powers. If he does so, you should point out that contractuals contain provisions to which Allies attach great importance and which they could consider relinquishing only if given equally adequate arrangements, e.g., for security of their forces. Reopening contractuals would certainly involve protracted negotiations and greatly complicate speedy settlement of defense problem.

You might point out, if he refers to reserved powers, that the positions regarding unification of Germany which we have taken vis-à-vis Soviets in full agreement with Federal Republic, including question of Allied agreement on free elections and their supervision, have been based on these powers. To abandon Allied position would risk giving Soviets real basis for asserting that unification can only be achieved by agreement between "sovereign" GDR and Federal Republic. Our

---

*Not printed; it transmitted to the Department of State the text of a German communiqué issued after a meeting of the Cabinet with Adenauer on September 1. The communiqué included a statement concerning the following goals of the German Federal Republic:

1. Continuation of the policy of European unification with all willing countries, in every field, to reach the goal. Consultation on further treatment of military integration with those countries who ratified EDC or were expected to ratify EDC.

2. Restoration of sovereignty.

3. Participation in the defense of Western Europe without discrimination.

4. Juridical regulations, reached by agreement, concerning the stay in West Germany of troops from other countries.

5. Opening of immediate negotiations with the US and Britain." (762A.00/9-154)
rights regarding Berlin are of course essential to maintenance of Western position there.\footnote{Documentation concerning all-German elections, the problem of German unification, and Allied rights in Berlin is presented in volume VII.}

---

662A.00/9-254: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

SECRET NIACT \textbf{WASHINGTON, September 2, 1954—12:25 p. m.}

804. Confirming Merchant’s telephone conversation with Dillon we have informed British here of Dowling’s telephonic report to Merchant to effect that Adenauer’s reaction to Protocols was more violently negative than anticipated and recommending postponement \demarche to Mendes-France. British informed us they are telephoning and cabling London at once as follows:

(1) At our request interview scheduled with Mendes-France this afternoon be postponed until we all have an opportunity know results (a) Conant’s and (b) Hoyer Millar’s interviews with Adenauer.

(2) That we are instructing Amb. Dillon not to accompany Jebb to interview with Mendes-France this evening even if British insist upon going through with it.

We emphasized to British our feeling that purpose Protocol operation was to assist Adenauer and that his views as expressed to Conant indicated that far from being helpful it might prove harmful to him. British underlined to us their fear that if there were not a joint \demarche, element of US–UK solidarity which is so necessary in coming weeks would be lacking. They appreciated however grave risk Protocols leaking to press once they are in French hands.

---

\textsuperscript{1} Drafted by Lyon and cleared with WE, RA, BNA, and EUR; repeated to London and Bonn.

\textsuperscript{2} For a summary of Conant’s conversation with Chancellor Adenauer concerning the protocols, see telegram 663 from Bonn, Sept. 2, p. 1138.

740.5/9-254: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Butterworth) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY \textbf{LONDON, September 2, 1954—3 p. m.}

1120. At his request I called on Permanent Under Secretary this morning who wished to have a general discussion and to bring to the fore for comment by us following two matters.

\textsuperscript{1} Repeated to Paris and Bonn.
(1) If as Scott has reported we do not favor an 8-power meeting it because we regard a NATO ministerial meeting to be held in a month's time as the alternative? HMG's view is that NATO meeting would have grave disadvantage (unless it was a mere pro forma performance to isolate France) of 14 participants many of whom have no direct connection with problem at issue, and above all would not include Germany. I gather that HMG has open mind about its 8-power proposal and the fact that Adenauer reaction to protocols and British discussion of NATO plan is decisive factor. If by any chance 4-power discussions should go well then a jump from 4 to 14 would take on a different complexion. Since Canada is anxious to participate Kirkpatrick has been turning over in his mind as a possible formula the powers having military forces in Western Germany plus EDC powers. At any rate further elucidation of what we have in mind is desired.

(2) Secondly, if the time schedule of study group is to be adhered to Kirkpatrick pointed out that action in matter of Germany's military contribution is to be completed within 90 days after signature of second protocol. Scott having reported Department's reference this general matter to Pentagon Foreign Office wishes to know how soon our considered views will be forthcoming. (Department has already received for comment Study Group document 6 containing British views.)

Incidentally, Kirkpatrick thought it fortuitous that Senator Wiley will accompany Ambassador Conant to Adenauer interview since he anticipates that the former's presence will have a restraining effect. In his experience after suffering serious setbacks Chancellor goes into 3 stages: (1) "Quiet bereavement as for loss of a wife"; (2) bitter and formidable anger; (3) make the best of it and continue pursuing constructive role. He judges Adenauer to be in the midst of (2) and he attaches significance to point 4 of the German Cabinet statement, namely, "judicial regulation of the stationing of troops of other countries in the Federal Republic by the conclusion of treaties". He has some bitter things to say about the example at Brussels which

---

2 This is a reference to Document 6, which is an enclosure to the Report of the London Study Group, July 12, p. 1013; Document 6 is a British paper entitled "Restrictions on German Rearmament Which Might Be Feasible in the Event of German Admission to NATO."

3 In a letter to Senator Alexander Wiley, dated July 27, Dulles asked him to take a trip to Europe in order to study firsthand the European defense situation with particular emphasis on "the use of American assistance, the possibility of coming into force of the European Defense Community, and the question of alternatives in the event of the failure of full ratification of the European Defense Treaty," as well as examining matters relating to the Foreign Service. (033.1100 WI/7-27/54) When Wiley agreed to make the European trip, arrangements were made for him to visit Paris, London, Oslo, Helsinki, Brussels, Bonn, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, London, and Paris. Wiley, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, was accompanied by Carl Marcy, a staff member of the Senate Committee, and their two wives. (CA-843, Aug. 4, 1954; 033.1100 WI/8-46/4) For a summary of the conversation among Conant, Wiley, and Adenauer, see telegram 663 from Bonn, Sept. 2, p. 1118.

4 See footnote 3, p. 1129.

5 For documentation concerning the Brussels Conference, Aug. 19-22, 1954, see pp. 1052 ff.
Mendes-France had set for the Germans if they chose to treat the contractuals as Mendes-France had tried to treat EDC by requesting omission of all disadvantageous provisions.

BUTTERWORTH

740.5/9-254: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

SECRET

PARIS, September 2, 1954—5 p. m.

938. Mendes asked me to come and see him this morning at Marly. When I arrived he said that he was very tired and suggested that we take a walk in the park, which we did for about 45 minutes. He said that he was presently engaged in remaking his Government which he considered to be a necessary waste of valuable time. He said that he intended to replace 33 pro[anti]-EDC ministers, who had resigned, with men who were in favor of EDC and who had voted that way in the Assembly. He was finding this task very difficult as the important pro-EDC figures would not join his government, and those pro-EDC men who were willing to join did not seem to have enough importance or ability to hold ministerial rank.

Regarding the 3 vacancies created by the earlier Gaullist resignations he said it was his present intention to take possibly one of the three ministers who had resigned back into his Government to indicate that there was no enmity between him and the Gaullist Party. In answer to a question he said that he would probably take back Chaban-Delmas but that he definitely would not take back General Koenig.

After this conversation Mendes said that he had been pleased by the Secretary’s statement regarding EDC, as he had feared and expected something much stronger. I told him that he should be under no illusions as to the strength of the feeling on the subject in Washington and he said that he realized how the United States felt and he fully realized what a great disappointment the defeat of EDC had been. He then related at some length his earlier arguments to show that there never had been a majority in favor of EDC. He said that if Monday’s vote had been taken on EDC directly rather than on a procedural question, and if the Government had been allowed to vote as they pleased, there would have been 350 votes against EDC.

I told Mendes it was difficult for us to understand why he had not wished to go back to Brussels for a second try. He replied that he had been willing to do this but that Rene Mayer in his speech had accused

---

1 Transmitted in two sections to the Department of State and repeated to Bonn, London, and Manila, where Dulles was attending the Manila Conference of Sept. 6-8; documentation concerning the Manila Conference is presented in volume xii.

2 For the text of the statement by Dulles on Aug. 31, see p. 1120.
him of sabotaging the Brussels conference and that therefore it made it necessary for him to ask specific approval of his conduct at Brussels which the pro-EDC people were not willing to give. He said he considered that Rene Mayer had broken the agreement which had been reached in the Cabinet earlier regarding his willingness to go back to Brussels.

Mendes then said that he had intended to make a dramatic move immediately after the close of the EDC debate. He had intended to send Adenauer a telegram asking if he could come to Bonn to visit Adenauer to discuss the situation. He said that this telegram had been all drafted and was ready for transmission Monday night when he was informed of the Reynaud petition and the fact that the debate was going to be reopened on Tuesday. This made it impossible for him to send a telegram at that time and then yesterday had come the report of Adenauer's meeting with the public statement indicating that the Germans did not wish to talk further with the French. Mendes said that he could well understand the German position and was not too upset by it as he considered it primarily a question of internal politics. He quoted Tallyrand in this connection, saying "that which I exaggerated is of no importance". Mendes said that nevertheless he would like to go immediately to Bonn to see Adenauer but that he did not know just how to proceed. If he should ask Adenauer if he could come and see him and Adenauer should say "no" Mendes felt that the result on French opinion would be catastrophic coming after the way Adenauer had rebuffed his approaches at Brussels. I asked Mendes if he could not have Francois-Poncet make discreet inquiries and Mendes said that this would not be possible as it could not be kept from the public. He reverted to this subject two or three times during our conversation and finally mentioned it again just as I was leaving. I got the definite impression that he hoped that we would informally contact Adenauer to see if he would be willing to receive Mendes at Bonn. If Mendes were to receive informal assurances from us that Adenauer would be receptive to such a suggestion I am sure that he would proceed immediately to suggest to Adenauer that they hold a meeting at Bonn.

Mendes then said he was not quite clear on what the program was from now on as the Secretary had spoken of a meeting of the NATO Council, which of course was agreeable to him, but at the same time the British had suggested an 8-power meeting. He said that he was inclined to prefer the British suggestion as it foresaw a meeting taking place very promptly and he felt that there was not time to waste.

Mendes said that as far as France was concerned he had committed himself to ratify the Bonn convention subject to a clause postponing

*Aug. 30.
German rearmament. He said there would be initial difficulties with the French assembly but that he was prepared to make this a question of confidence and that he felt that given the full backing of the United States and United Kingdom he would be successful in obtaining the approval of the Bonn convention by a large majority. He said that the Communists would of course oppose the Bonn conventions and that this would please him as it would disassociate the Communists from his majority. He emphasized that the vote on the Bonn conventions must be simple and uncomplicated and something that would be easy for the Assembly to understand. He expressed some concern at the German position that the Bonn conventions were no longer satisfactory. He said that he could fully understand why they wanted something more and personally he was in favor of giving it to them. However that would require a complicated renegotiation and would make the problem with the French Assembly much more difficult. Mendes argumentation along this line was practically identical to that in Deptel 623 to Bonn repeated Paris 802, London 1254. He said that he felt that after the Bonn conventions had been ratified, it would be possible to make steady and rapid progress toward the granting of full sovereignty to Germany, but that what was important was to get a favorable vote on the first step.

Regarding a defense contribution for Germany, he said that he had no very clear-cut ideas but that there should be immediate negotiations and a final agreement should be reached no later than the first of November. The final agreement should be simple and easy and very short. When I asked him if he had any particular thoughts in mind on this subject he said only that the most important thing from the French point of view was to have a close association with the United Kingdom. Therefore he would hope for some sort of a little NATO including the United Kingdom. He repeated almost word for word what he had told me at our last interview regarding his ideas on German rearmament (Embol 747).

Finally Mendes said that a Saar settlement would have to be part of the final arrangements with Germany. I asked him whether this meant that a Saar settlement would be tied to the ratification of the Bonn contractuals, or whether it would only be tied to the settlement of the question of rearmament. Mendes replied he personally would rather it was only tied in with the rearmament problem but that Rene Mayer had during the last week spoken twice in the Foreign Affairs Committee and once in the Assembly to the effect that he would never approve the Bonn conventions until a Saar settlement had been reached. If Rene Mayer proved to have much following on this subject it would be necessary to reach a Saar settlement simultaneously or

---

* Dated Sept. 2, p. 1128.
* Dated Aug. 24, p. 1071.
prior to the ratification of the Bonn accords. Mendes said that he felt he could settle the Saar in two days conversation with Adenauer. He said that he had not studied the question in great detail and did not want to commit himself on the detailed wording of the Teitgen-Adenauer agreement but that he was in full accord with the general outline of that agreement. He said that in his view the fact that the French Assembly had been against supra-national clauses in the EDC did not mean at all that the idea of European unity should be shelved, and that he still foresaw the Saar settlement taking place in the framework of a future European political community.

During the course of our conversation Mendes asked me what the United States and United Kingdom proposals were on the question of giving sovereignty to Germany. I told him that I hoped to be ready to see him tomorrow, Friday, with Jebb to give him our joint proposals but that I was not yet free to do so. I had talked to Jebb just before going to see Mendes and Jebb said he had as yet not received any instructions on this subject from London but he would telephone and clear the matter up during the course of the day.  

---

6 In telegram 942 from Paris, Sept. 2, Dillon informed the Department of State that during his conversation with Mendès-France reported in telegram 938 he had asked Mendès-France what his ideas were concerning possible controls of German rearmament. He replied that he realized there could be no discrimination and that everyone would have to accept any controls that were proposed which meant that the controls would have to be considerably weaker than those provided in the EDC plan. (740.5/9-254)

---

740.5/9-254: Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State 1

SECRET PRIORITY

PARIS, September 2, 1954—8 p. m.


1. As noted ref tel, NATO reps all welcomed enthusiastically, although in most cases personally, initiative taken by US in calling for NATO ministerial meeting.  Discussion implied their understanding ministerial meeting would be called upon to deal with entire complex

1 Transmitted in two sections to the Department of State and repeated to London.

2 Not printed; it reported on a private session of the North Atlantic Council on Sept. 1 during which various Permanent Representatives gave their initial reaction to Secretary Dulles' statement of Aug. 31. (740.5/9-154)

3 In telegram Topol 222 to Paris, Sept. 1, the Department of State instructed Hughes to recommend an emergency meeting of the full NATO Ministerial Council for the general purpose of considering the serious situation created for NATO by the French rejection of the EDC (740.5/9-154).
of problems created in Western alliance by failure of EDC. No distinction was made by any member between political problems that might be resolved by US–UK protocols and problem of arrangements for German military contribution, although of course possible such distinction might have been implicit in their minds. Despite general understanding that NATO ministerial meeting would be seized of totality of problems raised by French action, believe there was general understanding that substantial amount of preparatory work would be necessary for ministerial meeting to be in fact fruitful.

2. In view welcome given Secretary’s statement and in view prevailing atmosphere of anger and uncertainty re future of alliance, believe it essential to keep NATO Council fully informed of all steps being taken to deal with crisis, to consult it as fully as possible about proposed procedures and measures, and to use perm reps to maximum extent feasible in handling necessary work of preparation for ministerial meeting.

3. Believe if this general approach followed consistently, should be no difficulty in securing understanding of necessity, as part of preparatory program linked directly to ministerial meeting, of consultation among more limited groups. For example, occupying powers and Germans would be recognized as in best and legally appropriate position for dealing with contractual question provided it can be divorced from military issues. UK-proposed group of eight, consisting of countries best informed on problems involved in German military contribution, might be equally accepted as necessary to work out plan for that field. We believe these types of preparatory steps are useful and necessary, but wish urge that Council be brought into picture to maximum extent possible at each stage.

4. As example of implementation of policy proposed above, we recommend that if Adenauer accepts protocols, at least as basis for discussion, text be promptly circulated to other NATO countries perhaps day after distribution to EDC countries, and that shortly thereafter discussion of them be held in private NAC session. By same token believe reasons for eight-power talks, if US, UK and others decide to go ahead with them, should be explained to Council, their link to NATO ministerial meeting made clear, and perhaps tacit approval secured in advance final public decision. De Staercke advised me this morning that Spaak felt would be difficult to reject proposal of eight-power meeting, and thought if it took place it should be considered as preparatory meeting to NAC ministerial meeting later. Steel said this afternoon he personally had recommended to Roberts that any invitation issued for conference of eight state that it was preparatory meeting to later NAC.
5. (a) Consistent also with this approach we urge that by early next week we be prepared to propose to NAC limited number alternatives re time and place ministerial meeting and seek their agreement these points. Cooperation in this matter is not assisted by stories appearing in French press with Washington dateline about US Govt intentions prior to our receipt of such info, let alone consultation with NATO countries, as did occur yesterday. This leak makes early formal action important.

(b) On basis informal soundings, our present belief is meeting should be tentatively scheduled for early Oct with understanding preparatory work must proceed satisfactorily to meet this date, and that Council will be kept informed of such progress in order that date may be re-examined if necessary. Nevertheless believe relatively firm date agreed soon will assist in giving sense of urgency to preparatory work.

(c) We believe that psychological factors of substantial importance in selecting location for meeting. For this reason we fairly automatically rule out Paris and have grave doubts about wisdom of any location in US, despite fact may be convenient few ministers attending UN General Assembly to meet in New York. In course contacts we have been able make, have not found any govt which feels this should be considered major factor and number of them believe problem best settled where it is, namely, in Europe. Our own preference is for Rome. Apart from obvious general prestige factors from Italian point of view (important since failure EDC appears to present grave difficulties for Italian foreign policy), choice of Rome would underline fact that NATO countries do not consider Italian delay on EDC ratification puts Italians in same category as French.

(d) These conclusions re time and place represent best we have been able to do checking informally. Many perm reps not in Paris at present. Will cable further tomorrow giving additional reactions as result of further informal talks with reps or dels. Personally would hope that time and place of meeting could be set at NAC meeting Thursday Sept 9 at latest.*

6. While do not believe can be precise about agenda until preparatory work further advanced, consider would be helpful be able clarify soon whether we wish meeting to deal with totality of problem or merely military aspects. We would hope would be possible next week to make some statement on this and try to reach agreement in Council. Whether or not there would need to be affirmative actions re implica-

---

* In telegram Polto 325 from Paris, Sept. 3, Hughes informed the Department of State that while there was little agreement among the Permanent Representatives concerning the location of the next NAC Ministerial meeting, although several voiced strong objections against the possible choice of New York or Paris, the consensus seemed to favor the convening of an NAC Ministerial meeting no later than early October. (740.5/9-354)
tions of failure of EDC for 54 it will presumably depend on solution reached re German defense contribution. There is, however, active interest in this question.

7. Would be most helpful to us if we could receive indication of latest Washington thinking on substantive arrangements to be sought as alternative to EDC. Most recent info we have is copy of draft Departmental position paper dated 27 July, which seems to us outmoded in some important respects.

HUGHES

* The editors were unable to further identify the position paper under reference here.

662A.00/9-254 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT

Bonn, September 2, 1954—9 p. m.

663. Limit distribution. In conformity with instructions from Wash, presented protocols to Hallstein this morning in Baden-Baden and argued for Chanc’s agreement along lines Wash instructions as vigorously as possible. Hallstein from start took very negative position and assured me our protocols were quite unacceptable. Cabinet had in essence realized what might be in the wind in Fr and Brit quarters along this line and had taken unanimous stand in opposition yesterday. I labored point intent US at end ninety day period was to force decision and that we had no intention allowing Fr veto to prevail. He replied that this was not in document and document was what had to be placed before the Bundestag and public. Said he felt Chanc wanted no steps taken about partial sovereignty before whole problem full sovereignty including rearmament was settled.

Immediately following this discussion, met Senator Wiley at airport and drove with him to Buehlerhoche. Chanc had opportunity of reading protocols before our arrival. In few words during preliminary conversation with Senator, he made it plain he was very unfavorably disposed towards document in question. I endeavored get discussion with Chanc of whole subject without bringing in Senator, who I point out had no knowledge of documents. I succeeded for first part of visit, as when Senator was out of room for short time I could speak quickly with Chanc, and on subsequent occasion was able argue

* Repeated to London and to Paris for Bruce.
* Presumably a reference to telegrams 621 and 623 to Bonn, Sept. 1 and 2, respectively, pp. 1125 and 1128.
* For information concerning Senator Wiley’s trip to Europe, see footnote 3, p. 1131.
with him in absence of Senator. But after lunch Chanc insisted on bringing Senator fully into argument and before call ended, Senator was privy to whole subject. Chanc was negative to my arguments as was Hallstein and said it was completely impossible for him present any such document to Bundestag which would unanimously reject it. He said that proposals in this document would be terrible shock to German people and great blow to him worse than blow which he had suffered after vote of French Assembly. He spoke so strongly, that I became convinced it would be impossible to move him and that his apprehension as to consequences of public discussion of this document and knowledge that it had been communicated to French would be very grave. Therefore I left room at 2:20 and telephoned Dowling in Bonn; asking him to relay Wash my urgent recommendation that protocols not be shown to Fr. At that time I believed schedule called for Friday, which was as stated in my tel and which I stated to Chanc. I told Chanc it had not been settled as yet as to whether Fr would see protocols and I was reporting his point view to Wash at once, but made no statement as to my own recommendation.

Senator Wiley was much impressed by Chanc’s argument and shared his apprehension as to consequences of showing this document to Fr.

On my return to Bonn, I found that approach to Fr had been held up. Urgently repeat my previous recommendation that we give up any idea of showing this proposal to Fr, and if Brit insist they do it alone as UK proposal. Brit HICOMer at airport after my interview with Chanc and before his, took attitude that Brit were not going to push protocols, but if Chanc didn’t like them, say they were merely an idea of three months ago. This line of Brit, if it were carried out by HICOMer, puts American position in awkward light since I argued strongly with Hallstein and Chanc for acceptance these protocols.4

I now believe I made serious error in following Wash’s instructions in arguing for acceptance of protocols after Chanc made his first statement to me that they were unacceptable. For as consequence my arguments and presentation this document, Chanc seems now convinced that Wash does not understand present German problem. He said document was put together by bureaucrats who had taken old texts and who had no understanding of political and psychological problems. He even spoke of this document as being step back. At this point I did my best to point out good intentions of both my Govt and Brit, and that if we were in error, it was based only on misunderstanding.

Then talk turned to what should be done. Chanc showed no interest in meeting with occupying powers or with EDC countries plus US and UK until such time as US and Germany had agreed on common

---

4 For a report by the British concerning Hoyer Millar’s conversation with Adenauer that same day, see telegram 1153 from London, Sept. 3, p. 1141.
policy. In this connection an earlier remark of Chanc’s to Senator that he had been lied to by Mendes-France at Brussels seems to me of enormous significance. He said we were only country which could help him in his objective, which was to bring about German rearmament within European defense community framework. On being challenged as to these words by Senator, who asked about NATO, he said yes perhaps NATO, but he really wanted EDC. He believes this can be done if US and Germany can agree on a position.

My own opinion, based on this conversation and certain hints by Hallstein, is that HICOG proposal, although it has never been discussed with any German, would be acceptable to Chanc. But nothing need be done about sovereignty in immediate future.

Chanc spoke of desirability of his sitting down with Secretary. I pointed out difficulties of bilateral talks from political point view and also reminded him Secretary will be in Philippines for some weeks. He then spoke of sending Hallstein to see Secretary, or Hallstein and myself. I succeeded in diverting conversation at this point because it seemed to me fruitless to discuss before Senator and his assistants the next steps in our communications between FedRep and Wash. Needless to say, I am very much opposed to any visit by Hallstein.

Chanc said he would formulate more clearly in few days the exact steps which the Germans had in mind as to what was needed, and would communicate them to us, but did not indicate he wished to communicate with any other nation.

Conant

662A.00/9-354 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State

SECRET    PRIORITY

Bonn, September 3, 1954—2 p.m.

666. Personal for Merchant from Conant. Supplementing my telephone conversation of last night recommend strongly we drop once and for all any further discussion London protocols. Furthermore, venture recommend equally strongly we proceed to disengage completely from the British in our approach German problem. Would remind you that Washington instructions to me based on British FonOff stubbornness prevented my exploring with Chancellor protocols some days ago. British insistence that French must be kept on equal basis very nearly caused major blow-up in delicate situation. We missed by only few hours a most serious diplomatic blunder, the blame for which, if it had occurred, would have been clearly on British.

I have reported by phone to Hallstein that so-called London protocols were not shown to French yesterday. He reported that British HICOMer had told him they were being shown. I said this report, I
believe, to be completely in error. As far as I was concerned the discussion with Chancellor yesterday should be regarded as purely exploratory discussion of possible line of action which U.S. had thought might help Chancellor. The less said about matter in future the better and it was my belief that matter would not be discussed by U.S. with French.

I have appointment to see Chancellor next Thursday when he will have returned from his vacation. He wishes to be left undisturbed over week-end, including Monday.

Situation seems to me so complicated and mistrust between Chancellor and Mendes-France so great that normal diplomatic channels will have difficulty laying basis for fruitful conference whether it be held on EDC or NATO level. It would be highly desirable to have some American visit FonSecys each of EDC countries and London as soon as possible to act as “friend of the court” in preparing ground work for subsequent meeting, preferably on eight-power basis. Would it not be possible for you to make this journey? Would recommend such step most strongly. The absence of Secretary in Far East is one of factors which leads me to this recommendation. Believe public opinion can simmer for few days to week but in this period soundings by an American in seven countries primarily involved might be of great value not only to U.S. but to other countries involved.\(^1\)

\[\text{CONANT}\]

\(^1\) In telegram 651 to Bonn, Sept. 3, the Department of State informed HICOG officials that they should not discuss the matter of the London protocols with the French or other interested countries. Bonn was also informed that the Department concurred with the remarks in the source text concerning the exploratory nature of Conant’s discussion with Hallstein. No action was taken on the suggestion in the final paragraph except to inform the Embassy that it was being given consideration. (662A.00/9-354)

740.5/9-354 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Butterworth) to the Department of State\(^1\)

SECRET \quad NIAC T

LONDON, September 3, 1954—6 p. m.

1153. Frank Roberts called Chipman to Foreign Office this afternoon to give Embassy outline of British HICOMer’s conversation with Adenauer although he assumed that British Missions in Bonn and Washington would give us full account.\(^2\) Briefly, he stressed point that while Adenauer was in less angry mood than was case when he

\(^1\) Repeated to Bonn and to Paris for Bruce and USRO.

\(^2\) A summary of the British High Commissioner’s meeting with Adenauer in Bonn on Sept. 2 was provided by British Embassy officials during a call at the Department of State on Sept. 3 (memoranda of conversation, Sept. 3; 740.5/9-351). For Adenauer’s summary of this meeting, see his Erinnerungen 1953–1955, pp. 305–306.
saw Conant, Chancellor made it clear that events had overtaken protocols and that he would have to have more than they offered. British HICOMer replied, said Roberts, that protocols had been designed to help him and asked what Chancellor had in mind. Chancellor responded that he would have something definite to say next week. Roberts thought that it would be only realistic for UK and US now to regard protocols as inadequate to meet new situation.

In touching on German rearmament, Roberts said British HICOMer made it clear to Adenauer he was speaking only for British Government and outlined in general British preference for some form German participation in NATO to any other solution. Adenauer seemed to understand British position but vaguely suggested that possibly German troops could be placed under SACEUR apparently in order, British assume, to avoid French veto.

Roberts then took up British suggestion of eight-power conference defending it on grounds that Germans would be admitted thereto while in NAC conference, Germans would be excluded or if somehow admitted conference could not risk failure to admit Germans in NATO. Roberts insisted that British consider an eight-power conference as necessary step toward NAC conference and thought that arrangement might be made for Canadian participation.

In conclusion, Roberts touched on matter for which he obviously had called Chipman to Foreign Office, namely, when British could expect to obtain American reaction to document 6 of paper on Anglo-American discussion in London. He felt that UK and US should be prepared by next week to have joint position thereon. In this connection he stressed point that document in question had been approved in two latest British Cabinet meetings. Roberts added that Prime Minister is most restless and "burning to take action on German rearmament" which, however, is reluctant to do prior to reaching agreement with Washington.

Roberts explained that Spaak had sent special message on occasion latest British Cabinet meeting expressing opposition to "small European army" solution and in favor of NATO membership. While British, he continued, were not endeavoring to line up governments in favor of NATO solution, Italian, Norwegian, Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg Ambassadors had expressed to him during past few days during general conversations, preference for German rearmament under NATO to any other solution, now that EDC was dead.

Butterworth

* For a report on Conant's meeting with Adenauer, see telegram 663 from Bonn, Sept. 2, p. 1138.
SECRET


Dear Mr. Dulles: I have received the message which you were so very kind as to send me.2

This comforting message touched me deeply at a time when, I must admit, I feel both disappointed and anxious. I believe that I did all I could during the Brussels Conference and the few days thereafter, to convince the President of the French Council. He proved to be unyielding. It is very difficult for me to say why.

Now the big question is to decide what we are going to do. I have the impression that here in Europe the greatest confusion reigns everywhere to some extent. It is so easy to say “no” to something and so difficult to do something positive.

In my opinion, we must, by definite action, make each one face his responsibilities. It seems clear to me that German rearmament is essential. Without the support of German divisions, Western defense can not be effective. This being the case, we must bring it about, and the simplest way, is to offer Germany her place in the Atlantic Organization.

Perhaps an attempt might be made to limit, at least in the preliminary stage, the number of German divisions that could be organized. I know that this is not consistent with the spirit of the Atlantic Pact, but it is a reservation which can be justified for political reasons. However, I am opposed to the creation of a German national army. Not that I fear that a national army would be guilty of reckless actions, but because I am certain that all the German ultra-nationalist elements would again group themselves around such a national army and the big general staff directing it.

Under these conditions, I should like to make a supreme effort to avoid such an unfortunate solution, and I wonder if, while deciding, now that Germany should begin her rearmament in NATO, we should not at the same time affirm our desire to resume discussion of the EDC treaty in the light of the ideas exchanged at Brussels.

We might fix a three-month period. At the expiration of this period, each of us would then be obliged to make a definitive choice between a defense community and the entry of Germany into the Atlantic Organization.

1 An official translation of the text of this letter from Spaak, a copy of which was presumably given to Embassy officials in English, was transmitted to the Department of State in nact telegram 244 from Brussels, Sept. 3. That same day what the Department described as an “informal translation” of the Spaak letter was forwarded to Dulles in Manila in telegram Tedul 6. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CP 350)

2 Dated Aug. 31, p. 1119.
Such a procedure would avoid the postponement of German rearmament and yet leave a chance to accomplish this rearmament in the right direction.

I know that this proposal is far from perfect, and that it is perhaps already outstripped by events, but I confess that I should like to attempt this last chance.

According to the news I have received from Paris, such an attempt would not necessarily be doomed to failure, for there is hope that on the day when the French Parliament really chooses between these two systems, it will vote for the better of the two.

Actually, the question has never been clearly put to the Parliament. A number of French Deputies, in rejecting EDC, hoped to prevent any German rearmament. When they see that their hope is blighted, perhaps we may trust that they will adopt a formula which, from all evidence, gives France more guarantees.

I am aware that all this rests on hypotheses that are far from being certain, but apart from pure and simple rearmament, I can see nothing else to do.

I thank you again most sincerely for your kindness in sending me your message in these difficult times, and I beg you, dear Mr. Dulles, to accept [etc.]

P. H. Spaak

Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower

TO SECRET

[LONDON, September 3, 1954.]

[MY DEAR FRIEND:] I should like you to see the following message I sent to Dr. Adenauer which I believe had a fairly good reception. I will write again soon in answer to your letter of August 20. Kindest regards.

Message begins. "It seems to me that at this critical juncture a great opportunity has come to Germany to take her position among the leaders of free Europe. By a voluntary act of self-abnegation she could make it clear that in any new arrangement as a substitute for EDC she would not ask for a level of military strength beyond that proposed in the EDC plan or to be agreed with her partners in western defence. This would invest the new Germany with a moral dignity and respect far more worth having than merely claiming the right to create as many divisions as she chose or as anybody else and plunging into an endless legalistic argument on the subject. This might well be expressed in terms in no way derogating from the equal and honourable

1 The source text was delivered to the White House on Sept. 3 by Sir Robert H. Scott; it was then forwarded to the summer White House in Denver for President Eisenhower where it was received on Sept. 5. A copy of the source text was also delivered to the Department of State on Sept. 3 and transmitted to Secretary Dulles in Manila in telegram Tedul 8 the same day. (Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower")

2 Not further identified.
status of the German Federal Republic and would indeed open a new chapter by the very fact that the decision was taken on the initiative of Germany herself. I beg you to think this over as coming from one who after so many years of strife has few stronger wishes than to see the German nation take her true place in the worldwide family of free nations.”

[WINSTON]

740.5/9–354

The President to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

DENVER, September 3, 1954.

DEAR BEDELL: For some days I have been storing up a few matters regarding which I wanted to write to you. I have felt so pushed during the first ten days of my so-called vacation that I have really neglected bringing to your attention one or two points that concern me very much.

The first one is the state of our thinking toward the development of a substitute for EDC. I take it that all of us agree we cannot sit down in black despair and admit defeat.

It seems to me there are two possible approaches—or maybe even three—

(a). Through the revision of the EDC idea by the nations concerned.
(b). Through a meeting of the entire NATO group, with a view of including Germany as an equal partner therein.
(c). Through unilateral agreements with Germany—to which agreements we would, of course, have to get the concurrences of a sizeable number of Western and Atlantic nations.

Please do not have your planners send me a long dissertation; I would merely like to know the direction of attack that appears to them to be the most hopeful and to get the outlines of their thinking.

Another subject is the Rio Conference,¹ and along with this Foster’s suggestion that we send Kemper somewhere else. I have already okayed the latter idea, and I assume that my office has telephoned you today so that Foster’s letter to Jimmy Dunn can be sent at once.

Last evening I went over with Bobby Cutler the Security Council’s recommendations on South American policy, which I accept. In connection with this subject, I should like to have some idea of the approach that we intend taking. I am interested in specific objectives and our calculations as to what will be our greatest difficulty.

¹ Documentation concerning the Rio Conference of November 1954 is presented in volume iv.
Still another subject in which I am tremendously interested is Trieste.\textsuperscript{2} We have been working on it a long time and my impression is that we have been letting Tito block us, perhaps needlessly. Over a period of many weeks I have been told time and again that it looked as though we were just on the point of securing an agreement, after which there has been nothing but silence. I think that whatever we do must be done soon, if for no other reason than to provide some counterbalance for the EDC flop.

I know that all of us are concerned about Italy and I personally know how much our friends there have been counting on the enactment of EDC. They must be very low in their minds and we could suffer an irretrievable disaster if things really went wrong. I know that the group in London has been working on this for a long time and I do not mean to complain. I merely mean that the situation begins to look rather grim, and I would hope that we could get our British friends to push a little harder on Tito. Perhaps we could do it ourselves, providing this would not cross wires with others who are working toward the same ends.

Please do not take your own time to answer my questions and to supply the information I seek. I merely ask that the proper sections of your staff prepare for me very short memoranda on these matters so that my own thinking may have the benefit of some specialized knowledge.

With warm regard,

As ever,

D[WIGHT] E[ISENHOWER]

---

\textsuperscript{2} Documentation concerning Trieste is presented in volume VIII.

740.5/9-254

The Counselor of Embassy in Belgium (Sprouse) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)


Dear Livie: With the failure of the Brussels Conference on EDC and the unfavorable vote in the French National Assembly, there has been some criticism here of the role played by Spaak. Some of it has emanated from within his own party. As you know, the Socialist Party here is not united on foreign policy and the principal opposition to EDC came from Socialist quarters.

We have discussed this criticism briefly in our despatch 189 of September 1\textsuperscript{1} (which you may wish to have brought to your attention) but hesitated to make too much of it in a telegram lest the wrong impression be created in Washington. As we emphasized in our despatch the recent criticisms are not in themselves too significant. What is

\textsuperscript{1} Not printed; it reported on the criticism that Spaak was receiving from within his own Socialist Party. (755.00/9-154)
important, however, is that there is a sizeable number of leading Socialists who do not see eye to eye with Spaak. Some of these are close to the top in the party hierarchy. This opposition is a factor which Spaak must consider in taking public positions on important foreign policy questions. It could possibly give him some trouble in the future.

Spaak’s presentation of his case yesterday before the Chamber Foreign Affairs Commission was, in our opinion, designed chiefly to meet this criticism and to make clear to the Belgians that Belgium had not willy-nilly and without justification lined up with any group of countries against France. He also must have been considerably irritated with Mendes-France over the latter’s apparently blatant misrepresentations of what had happened at Brussels.

I am writing you all this informally as, needless to say, we do not like to spread any impression or criticism about Spaak which might get to his ears through contacts at Paris, and thus render our position impossible. This description of the situation is not intended as a criticism of Spaak but as an explanation of why he has been giving so much publicity to actions taken by him during and after the Brussels Conference. I am sure that we here all feel that he has performed magnificently and has held the line extremely well in the face of great difficulties.

He was most appreciative of the Secretary’s letter, particularly coming as it did when his role was subject to some criticism here. His presentation before the Commission seems to have mollified the Commission at least, if we are to believe opposition newspaper reports.

With all good wishes.

Sincerely yours,

PHIL

---

740.5/9-254: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, September 4, 1954—1:44 p.m.

1330. Following replies to questions raised London’s 1120, September 2.

1. Department unaware basis Scott’s impression we do not favor eight-power meeting but suspects it may derive from conversation with Departmental officer between Brussels and French debate on EDC. At that time we were inclined favor seven-power conference (i.e., without French) but this possibility no longer in our thinking at this stage, and we do not exclude possibility eight-power meeting.

1 Drafted by Joseph Palmer; cleared with Murphy, Lyon, WE, and BNA; and repeated to Paris and Bonn.

2 Ante, p. 1180.
However, Department feels primary requirement in present situation is for NATO Ministerial meeting, agenda for which would be drawn in general terms set forth Topol 222 (repeated London 1282). It would further be our hope that such conference would concern itself with question of alternatives, provided sufficient meeting of minds obtained by that time. We do not think an eight-power conference would be adequate substitute for NATO Ministerial meeting but feel that it might be useful preliminary to such meeting by affording opportunity to explore problem among eight powers primarily interested. You should make foregoing clear Kirkpatrick, emphasizing at same time that we do not wish take final decision until we know more clearly what British have in mind. (In this connection, Department’s only official knowledge of proposal based on paragraph in text UK instructions to Bonn re Contractual protocols given us in confidence by British Embassy on September 1 in which FonOff refers to possibility of eight-power meeting in London, to be followed by NATO Council meeting, to prepare alternative plan to EDC.)

2. You may also inform Kirkpatrick that while we recognize desirability earliest possible US–UK discussion on question German military contribution, it is doubtful that we will be ready before another ten days to two weeks in view necessity relating our study this problem to general reappraisal US European problems referred to by Secretary in his statement of August 31st.

3. Department would be grateful to receive any information which you may obtain as to whether and to what extent British may have revised their thinking on German participation in NATO with certain restrictions as set forth in Document 6 London Working Papers.

4. For your information Joint Chiefs are considering this British proposal in connection with their general study of alternative planning.

5. FYI Canadians have today informed us they feel question German participation Western defense should be considered in NATO and not eight-power forum, even though Canada were added to latter.

6. Italians today stated that their Permanent Representation to NAC instructed Italy has in principle no objection to advanced meeting NAC, but should first see what emerges in next few weeks, especially following developments of UK initiative to call 8 power conference.

---

* Not printed; it recommended an emergency meeting of the full NATO Ministerial Council for the general purpose of considering the serious situation created for NATO by the French rejection of the EDC (740.5/9-154).
* A memorandum of this conversation between officials of the Department of State and the Canadian Embassy is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 375.
* A memorandum of this conversation with Italian Ambassador Tarchiani, including as an enclosure a memorandum from the Italian Government concerning the EDC, is in Department of State file 740.5/9-334.
7. If 8-power meeting develops, inclined to favor formula be found to include Canadians.

8. Understand from UK Embassy Eden thinking of Sept 15 for 8-power meeting, which, if held, would be early for us in terms our projected status preparation, and has difficulty for us that Secretary will not then be available.  

SMITH

*In telegram 1176 from London, Sept. 6, the Embassy informed the Department of State that Prime Minister Churchill in particular and the British Government in general were most anxious to avoid any delay such as outlined in the source text. Accordingly Eden sent a message to Secretary Dulles asking him to return from Manila through London if at all possible. (740.5/9-654) For the text of Eden's message to Dulles, see telegram Dulte 11 from Manila, Sept. 7, p. 1151.

740.5/9-454: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

SECRET

PARIS, September 4, 1954—2 p.m.

983. Re London's 1153 and 1154 to Department. British Embassy this morning received instructions that in view of Adenauer's reaction protocols were no longer adequate to present situation and should definitely not be communicated to French. British Embassy assumes London now considers them definitely dead. British Embassy also instructed to answer any inquiries to effect that United Kingdom is consulting with United States and Adenauer about present situation. Also on instructions Reilly told De Margerie this morning that United Kingdom had never been willing to make binding commitment to maintain forces on continent over long time and would certainly not do so now that French must realize that current situation could not be met by generalities such as agreement in principle on necessity for German rearmament which had been reached years ago.

He like we have found De Margerie and other Foreign Office officials depressed, uncertain and in dark as to Mendes' intentions. We have impressed on British Embassy here, which shares our feeling, that French are taking foreign reaction to defeat of EDC much too lightly and that further action to make clear depth of British as well as United States displeasure would be desirable.

DILLON

1 Repeated to London and Bonn.
2 Dated Sept. 3, p. 1141.
3 Not printed; it informed the Department of State that Mendes-France had casually suggested to the British that they might consider making a binding commitment of long duration to maintain given levels of forces on the continent, joining a European arms pool, and agreeing jointly with the Europeans to common limitations on armament production in zones likely to become involved in fighting in case of hostilities (740.5/9-354).
740.5/9-654 : Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Manila

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, September 6, 1954—12:25 p.m.

Tedul 15. British firmly desire nine-power (six EDC countries plus US, UK and Canada) meeting London September 14 on post-EDC situation. They will not issue invitations until certain our acceptance.

Despite tightness schedule and difficulty our arrival any firm detailed US position by that date, I recommend you authorize me inform British we will accept formal invitation on understanding meeting preliminary to later full NAC meeting. I do not see how I could attend with you still out of country. Murphy may well be Triesting at that time and hence unavailable for London. Accordingly, I recommend designation Bruce to represent US at London meeting and request your approval.

SMITH

1 Drafted by Merchant and cleared with Murphy.

396.1 LO/9-754 : Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT MANILA, September 7, 1954—noon.

Dulte 10. Eyes only Acting Secretary and Merchant from Secretary. Re Tedul 15. I now have personal message from Eden (cabling text separately) expounding his program for nine-power meeting "in London in course of next week" and suggesting I return via Europe to attend this meeting. He also says, "You will know how anxious we would be on all grounds to have you here. Indeed your presence seems essential if results are to be achieved."

I feel September 14 too early for nine-power meeting and that British may be deliberately attempting to rush us in order to put across some plan of their own which we may or may not approve. I feel that probably I personally should attend and both Senators Smith and Mansfield feel Bruce inadequate in view of his long absence from US and inevitable lack of sensitivity to Congressional opinion. However, I think it unwise for me to attend without first talking with President and with State and Defense representatives Washington. Therefore, I propose that we seek delay preferably until Foreign Ministers are in New York for UN meeting.

Believe important from public relations standpoint not to put British in position where they can plausibly blame us for delay. We can, therefore, take position with British that in view of my physical

2 Supra.
3 Infra.
presence here and Eden’s own statement that he considers my presence essential to success of nine-power meeting, there must be delay to enable me to prepare for nine-power meeting and to re-establish contacts with President, Congressional leaders and recent thinking of State and Defense Departments. I could conceivably do this and go to London Thursday night, September 16, getting back on twentieth for UN opening. This would be burdensome but possible if deemed necessary to facilitate participation by Churchill and Adenauer.

For your information tentative planning now to proceed Formosa September 9, Tokyo September 10, and arrive Washington via Denver September 12.

Dulles

396.1 LO/9-754: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NACT

MANILA, September 7, 1954—noon.

Dulles 11. Eyes only Acting Secretary and Merchant from Secretary.

Following text Eden’s message (reference Dulles 10¹).

Verbatim text.

I have been in close touch with the United States Embassy about the situation arising from the rejection of EDC and have no doubt that the State Department have been keeping you informed of our views about the next steps to be taken.

Adenauer will be sending me comments within 24 hours on the ideas which we have expounded to him about German entry into NATO with safeguards and I will of course pass these on to your people at once. The way will then I hope be clear for a conference of the powers principally interested as a preliminary to any ministerial meeting of the Council of NATO. As you know we have been working for such a conference and other European governments are all favourably disposed towards the idea.

Apart from the intrinsic urgency of the matter there is the question of fitting any such conference into the rest of the international timetable. You will know how anxious we would be on all grounds to have you here. Indeed your presence seems essential if results are to be achieved. How would you be placed if we suggested that the conference were to be held in London in the course of next week? I believe you were hoping to visit Japan and Formosa after Manila. If you were to forego these visits you might perhaps be able to return home rather earlier via London and attend the conference. I put this suggestion to you with diffidence knowing the extent of your existing commitments and the amount of travelling which you have already had to do recently. But this is a very grave moment in European history and we shall need your invaluable help in unravelling the tangle. Warmest regards.

End verbatim text.

Dulles

¹ Supra.
SECRET  NIACCT  

Bonn, September 7, 1954—1 p.m.

690. Hallstein tells us Chancellor is seeing Hoyer Millar this morning and will say to him that while German Govt appreciates U.K. initiative he does not favor 8 or 9 power conference as proposed by British. He will justify his position by arguing that he cannot be placed in position of negotiating “safeguards”, which British have still not spelled out for him, at a conference without giving them appearance of discriminatory restrictions imposed on Germany. He feels therefore that such safeguards must be discussed through diplomatic channels and will propose that work begin on this at once.

Hallstein says Chancellor is particularly anxious that onus of blocking 8-power conference not fall wholly on Germans. Chancellor is therefore anxious that U.S. maintain position in favor of early NATO meeting and will communicate with Spaak in hope he will likewise press on this point. Hallstein added that Chancellor attaches great importance to this NATO meeting taking place before Sept 21 and would discuss this further with me during my call on him this afternoon.

CONANT

---

1 Repeated to London and Paris. The Department of State subsequently transmitted the source text to Secretary Dulles in Manila in telegram Tedul 21, Sept. 7.

SECRET  PRIORITY  

Bonn, September 7, 1954—7 p.m.

698. Reference Bonn telegram 690 to Department, repeated London 104, Paris 111.

Chancellor in conversation this afternoon outlined his present position and plans for immediate future. He intends continue discussing with British through British High Commissioner or special representative from London British proposal for German entry NATO with voluntary self-imposed limitations. He has in mind declaration by himself as Chancellor, possibly confirmed by vote confidence Bundestag. Limitation would be on number divisions. He is not thinking of any supra-national feature connection with entry NATO. He, however, assured me and asked me repeat Washington his intention if NATO solution is acceptable French to proceed try once again while

---

1 Repeated to London and Paris.
2 Supra.
German army in process forming to create something equivalent EDC concept. He emphasized same time his intention continue work for general policy European integration, and in discussion of Saar agreed that European solution this problem would be a test for success development of plans for future. He proposes to press for this and other European features his program at same time as attempting find solution rearmament in NATO framework.

I questioned him about sovereignty status. He believes this can be accomplished by declaration three governments that they will not exercise occupational powers insofar as Bundesrepublik is concerned. He believes this would not present legal problem, Berlin would still remain under occupation, but he agreed that legal problems would have to be carefully investigated before this solution could be made final. Convention covering stationing of our forces he would propose cover through something similar to present treaties with other NATO powers. It is quite clear that his present thinking is such that advantages we have in Bonn conventions would largely if not entirely disappear.

He believes all this can be accomplished without action French Chamber if Mendes-France so desires and without action Bundestag except for treaty on stationing of forces.

As indicated reference telegram 690, he dislikes idea nine or ten-power conference and hopes this can be avoided. His objections stem from his fear that German public opinion will feel limitations on German rearmament were imposed on him by conference rather than freely declared by himself. NATO Council meeting would determine nature German contribution and before this occurred he would be ready to state what his self-imposed limitations on this contribution would be. It would then be for French and other NATO countires to accept or reject.

As to date NATO meeting, he would prefer before September 21 but when I pointed out difficulties Secretary's presence he felt even October 1 might not be too late.

He clearly is not entirely optimistic as to possibilities Mendes-France will accept formula which would be worked out with British but feels this test must be made. Further indicated he has hopes Mendes-France Government will not long remain in power. We did not discuss steps which would follow refusal Mendes-France NATO solution acceptable to himself and British. He assumed US would be kept informed his negotiations with British at all points and would be, he hopes, in agreement.

In summary, seems clear that Chancellor is aiming at full and complete sovereignty with equal membership NATO, but he is prepared on behalf his government to give certain assurances as to rearmament and privately intends continue to work for something similar EDC
and above all to go forward solution French-German problems on European basis. These reservations in my opinion, place proposal have national army in NATO in quite different framework than if they came from a government with strong nationalistic bias.

CONANT

740.5/9-854: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Butterworth) to the Department of State

SECRET  PRIORITY  LONDON, September 8, 1954—4 p. m.

1212. At lunch for Senator Wiley today FonSec summarised views he will put to Cabinet for discussion this afternoon briefly as follows:

(a) German admission to NATO is best solution of military problem. (b) This should be supplemented by unilateral undertaking by Adenauer to abide by certain restraints re German rearmament. (c) Brussels Agreement might be revived and revised to make (a) more palatable to France and (d) in this connection UK would increase extent of its military commitment by undertaking to keep certain forces in Germany for specific period of time.

Eden also made the following points:

(1) This was a moment when Europe had to take the initiative to sort this essentially European problem out.

(2) That no solution could be found around a NATO conference table; that the real work had to be done prior to such a meeting.

(3) That holding of NATO meeting in New York about this essentially European problem was impractical regardless of whether or not many of Foreign Ministers were fortuitously there. In this connection he indicated he had received a message from Mike Pearson saying he was prepared to come to Europe. Needless to say I pointed out US had not and was not specifically urging any locus. Eden favored Rome.

Interchanges between Eden and Wiley were most cordial and friendly, as were those of yesterday when Wiley lunched with Churchill.

Senator after stating Communist objectives emphasized time element and danger of failure of London conference without adequate preparation and suggested that what was needed was a “Colonel House” to tour relevant capitols, lay foundations of agreement and particularly find firm basis among majority of French Deputies for agreement that would be approved. It so happens that I had been given to understand confidentially that Eden is contemplating undertaking just such a trip which will probably be discussed at Cabinet meeting this afternoon. Senator’s suggestion was silently but obviously well received by Eden, Makins and Macmillan. Incidentally, Eden indicated that Adenauer had suggested that problem be first discussed on an Anglo-German basis which Eden said he found embarrassing; this will probably clinch trip.
Eden found occasion to tell me how much he appreciated Gen. Smith’s message,\(^1\) Makins leaves Sat. for Washington.

---

\(^1\) Presumably a reference to Dulles’ letter to Eden, dated Sept. 8 (infra), which was sent to London from Washington by the Acting Secretary of State.

---

740.5/9-854

The Secretary of State to Foreign Secretary Eden

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 8, 1954.

[Dear Anthony:] I appreciate your message\(^2\) concerning the problem of what we do next in Europe and fully share your feelings of urgency about situation. I have, however, certain grave doubts about your suggestion for a nine-power meeting in London. I am extremely anxious to avoid repetition of the disharmony of the Brussels meeting.\(^3\) I seriously doubt whether it will be possible to carry out all necessary preliminaries in time to hold a successful formal meeting before the UN Assembly convenes. Before I can usefully discuss these matters, I must return home, reestablish contact with the President and Congressional leaders and inform myself concerning recent thinking within the US Government. Furthermore, I strongly feel that we will need considerable advance diplomatic preparation in order to clarify our objectives and insure success of any formal meeting of Ministers. In particular, I would like to have in hand a meeting of minds between your Government and ours. Also, I understand Adenauer is opposed to an early nine-power meeting. Finally, as you so thoughtfully recognize, I am currently overburdened.

You will realize of course that I want to make every possible contribution to a solution of this grave crisis. I am prepared if it would serve any useful purpose to come to Europe for the weekend of September 18 to 20. However, if I did so, I would think that my time could be more usefully spent in talks with you and Churchill and Adenauer, and perhaps Mendes-France, which will help to create a more solid basis for a conference, than in a nine-power conference itself which, in our present state, we would inevitably enter without the preliminary thinking and exchanges of views necessary to assure that that conference will produce agreement. I suggest we dare not at this juncture risk any further exhibitions of confused division.

---

\(^1\) The source text was transmitted to London in telegram 1371, Sept. 8. An early draft of this letter was sent to Secretary Dulles in Manila in telegram Tedul 25, Sept. 7 (396.1/9-754); his approval of the draft with changes was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Dulte 18, Sept. 8 (396.1 L.O/9-854).

\(^2\) This is a reference to Eden’s message the text of which was sent to the Department of State in telegram Dulte 11, Sept. 7, p. 1151.

\(^3\) For documentation concerning the Brussels Conference, Aug. 19–22, see pp. 1062 ff.
I shall probably have started home by the time you receive this, and plan to get to grips with this European problem as rapidly as possible, and count on closest cooperation with you.

Foster

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 359

Foreign Secretary Eden to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[LONDON, September 8, 1954.]

Please tell Mr. Dulles that I realise the difficulties of timing. It now looks as though the meeting of Foreign Ministers will need a little more time for preparation. I do not think it can take place until a little later in the month. I am quite sure that it must be held in Europe and am more than ever convinced that it is essential that Mr. Dulles should be present. We will do all we can to meet his convenience on timing.

2 The source text bears a notation which reads: "Message from Eden delivered to Secretary in Manila, Sept. 8, 1954". Secretary Dulles summarized the source text in a personal "eyes only" telegram to the Acting Secretary the same day; a copy of Dulles' summary in telegram Dulite 28, Sept. 8, is in Department of State file 396.1 LO/9-854.

740.5/9-854

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of German Affairs (Lyon)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1954.

Subject: Discussion between British High Commissioner and Dr. Hallstein

Participants: Mr. F. J. Leishman, British Embassy
Mr. Cecil B. Lyon, GER

Mr. Leishman called this morning and after having handed me the copies of Mr. Eden’s two messages to the Secretary in Manila,2 which form the subject of a memorandum from Mr. Merchant to the Under Secretary, gave me some information concerning a talk between the British High Commissioner at Bonn and Dr. Hallstein.

Dr. Hallstein indicated that the Chancellor and the German officials were now coming around to the idea of German entry into NATO. However, it would be a fortified NATO with certain agreements which while not discriminatory towards Germany made it clear that Germany would not be able to embark on an unrestricted rearmament. A committee of experts should be appointed to work out the details of what the restrictions would be. As to the procedure to be followed to attain

2 Not attached to the source text. Presumably this is a reference to Eden’s letters of Sept. 7 and 8; for the text of the former, see telegram Dulite 11, Sept. 7, p. 1151, and for the letter of Sept. 8, supra.
this, Dr. Hallstein indicated that this would have to await the Chancellor's views.

The British High Commissioner asked what the Chancellor and Hallstein thought with regard to the restoration of German sovereignty. Dr. Hallstein indicated that the Chancellor, he and the legal authorities were of the opinion that Germany as an independent state possesses sovereignty but that the Occupying Powers enjoyed a special control over that sovereignty, to a certain extent, a sort of mortgage. The three Occupying Powers could restore sovereignty by merely making a unilateral declaration cancelling, so-to-speak, the mortgage. The British High Commissioner indicated that it would be unlikely that the Occupying Powers could make such a declaration unless they were granted certain controls and privileges which the Bonn Conventions embraced. Dr. Hallstein said that Germany would be willing to extend these controls and privileges through a series of fresh instruments to replace the Bonn Conventions and largely based on the Bonn Conventions. However, a group of experts would also have to be appointed to draw up these instruments. It would be sufficient if the Occupying Powers would make a declaration of their intent to restore Germany's sovereignty upon completion of these new instruments.

The British High Commissioner sees the course according to Dr. Hallstein's views somewhat as follows:

(1) The NATO Council would agree to admit Germany as soon as the safeguards drawn up by the experts had been agreed to. A declaration of this intent would be issued shortly.

(2) The three Occupying Powers would issue a declaration of their intent to restore German sovereignty as soon as the experts had agreed to the new instruments to replace the Bonn Conventions.

(3) As soon as the safeguards agreed upon by the experts were approved, Germany would be admitted into NATO, and as soon as the new instruments were agreed to, the three Occupying Powers would issue a declaration restoring Germany’s sovereignty.

740.5/9-854

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs (Palmer)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1954.

Subject: German Defense Problem

Participants: Mr. Adam Watson, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Walworth Barbour, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
Mr. Joseph Palmer 2nd, Deputy Director, RA

Mr. Watson called today to inform the Department about a conversation which the British High Commissioner at Bonn had with
Chancellor Adenauer. Adenauer had begun the conversation with a lecture on the deterioration in the German situation and had emphasized that there was no time to lose in finding an alternative solution. He emphasized that there must be no watered-down EDC and expressed the view that we should work for a NATO solution. He indicated that Germany would be willing to accept safeguards, but that these must be non-discriminatory in character. Moreover, they must be willingly accepted by the German Government and not imposed by the other powers. The Chancellor stated that he felt that the German and other authorities concerned with this problem should begin immediately to work out the necessary arrangements for accomplishing a solution along these lines. He felt it particularly important that this work should be done in the first instance by experts and expressed himself as being chary of entering any discussions at the Ministerial level until this had been accomplished. The Chancellor also expressed concern that if an early solution to these problems were not found, the U.S. reappraisal might result in a decision involving a withdrawal from Europe. Hoyer-Millar confirmed that he thought this concern was legitimate.

Mr. Watson went on to say that he was somewhat confused about the procedural arrangements which would have to precede the NATO Ministerial consideration of the question and asked what the Department’s thinking was on this subject. Mr. Barbour stated that, as the Secretary’s message to Mr. Eden on the 9-power conference had indicated, we were still uncertain as to how the necessary diplomatic preparation could best be handled. Mr. Barbour said that he thought that it would be much wiser if we de-emphasized our concern about the procedural aspects of the problem and concentrated on the substance. Once we had achieved a position, it would be much easier for us to see how the procedural aspects of the problem should be handled. Mr. Watson indicated agreement and said that he presumed that meanwhile there would be no harm in the U.S. and U.K. representatives in Bonn and Paris exploring with Adenauer and Mendes-France their views on the substance of alternative solutions. Mr. Barbour indicated agreement insofar as this indicated normal diplomatic intercourse, but felt that we should be careful to avoid any impression of anxiety to ascertain French views. Mr. Watson indicated agreement and observed parenthetically that he did not believe that the continuation of Mendes-France in office constituted any vital interest of HMG. On the other hand, he thought that the British could be helpful in smoking Mendes-France out, since the latter seemed to place great importance on the necessity of a close tie with the U.K.

1 Dated Sept. 8, p. 1155.
Foreign Secretary Eden to the Secretary of State, at Tokyo

SECRET PRIORITY [LONDON, September 9, 1954.]

[Dear Foster:] I am most grateful to you for your message from Manila. I quite agree that an early conference is now out of the question and you will have heard that I am proposing to do some preparatory work by visiting Brussels, Bonn, Rome and Paris. It would certainly be a mistake to hold any conference until the ground has been thoroughly prepared.

It is very kind of you to suggest coming to Europe for the week-end of September 18–20. I shall look forward to discussing these problems with you. But would it not be better to consider dates and methods of further consultations after I have seen Adenauer on September 12 in Bonn? I will send you a further message from there. I would not wish to expose you to the burden of making two trips to Europe in quick succession. For I still think that since this is a European problem any conference or conferences should for psychological reasons be held in Europe.

[Kindest regards,] ANTHONY

1 The source text was delivered to the Department of State by officials of the British Embassy at 5 p.m. on Sept. 9 and was transmitted to Secretary Dulles in Tokyo in telegram 528 within the hour. Secretary Dulles visited Tokyo on his way back from the Manila Conference.

2 Presumably a reference to Secretary Dulles' message to Eden of Sept. 8, p. 1155.

Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower

TOP SECRET [LONDON, September 9, 1954.]

My Dear Friend: Thank you so much for your message of September 6. Adenauer's response was good and I think his attitude is easier.

2. We are all agreed that an 8-Power Meeting of Allies, plus Canada, would be the right move now and prefer it to the 16 N.A.T.O. Powers proposal, which might well follow it, and we should like very much to have it in London which is a big and well known place and

1 The source text was delivered to the White House by British Embassy officials during the evening of Sept. 9 and an additional copy was delivered to the Department of State at the same time. (Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower")

2 Presumably a reference to President Eisenhower's brief note to Churchill of Sept. 5 which was probably delivered to him on Sept. 6; for the text of Eisenhower's note, see footnote 3, p. 1145.
has stood by the Thames for quite a long time without having a Conference of this kind. Anthony, who knows all the Continental personalities involved from long experience, feels that he could smooth out difficulties, queries and objections, of which there are no lack, better by personal contacts than by the interminable interchange of coded messages and arguments. He is, therefore, at the desire of the Cabinet, proposing to start on a flying circuit of Brussels, Bonn, Rome and Paris to see what he can do. We shall keep you and Foster fully and punctually informed.

3. If he succeeds, it seems to me not improbable that we might reach a considerable measure of agreement and that the N.A.T.O. Meeting would follow as the second stage.

4. Of course it is always my hope that the prospects of an improvement in our affairs, arising out of a London Conference might be so good, or the results in sight become so good, that you might be able to come yourself, at least for the finale, and make that State visit I mentioned to you at the White House. But that of course is not a matter which requires decision now.

5. I have read what has been disclosed to our people in Washington about the Pentagon's views on re-appraisal. This, I am sure, would mean disaster if it actually came to pass. I hope, nonetheless, that if such ideas are shaping themselves in Washington, you will let the French know about them at an early stage. It might help them to do their duty.

Kindest regards,

Winston

---

740.5/9-954 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the President, at the Summer White House, Denver, Colorado

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 10, 1954—10:13 a.m.

Following are brief memoranda on subjects your letter September 3:

EDC. Keeping in mind the principal objectives of the EDC package, we are considering two alternative approaches. The first would bring Germany directly into NATO. The size, composition and disposition of German defense forces would be controlled principally by NATO agreement on non-discriminatory safeguards. The Germans would also undertake certain voluntary commitments unilaterally as

---

1 The first section of the source text dealing with the EDC was drafted in EUR.
2 Ante, p. 1145.
part of the terms of their admission to NATO. We would move concurrently to restore sovereignty to West Germany.

The second alternative would be used if, as is possible, the French prevent the first. This second alternative provides for steps by the US, UK, and Germany (including possibly Benelux and Italy) to proceed without French concurrence with German rearmament under a defense agreement along the lines of the Yugoslav-Greek-Turk Pact. While negotiating this agreement actual training of German cadres could begin in the US and UK Zones. These steps might induce a welcome change in the French position.

We would continue to encourage European integration.

Our tactics and timing would be to reach as wide as possible agreement before a full NATO Ministerial Meeting early in October. At the NATO Meeting we would attempt to secure the preferred first alternative.

[Here follow a second section concerning Latin America and a third section dealing with Trieste; for the text of the paragraphs concerning Trieste, see volume VIII.]

SMITH

---

*Documentation concerning this subject is presented in volume VIII.*

---

740.5/9-254: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 10, 1954—8:33 p. m.

920. Believe views expressed by Mendes-France reported your 938 require some comments on our part. On possibility his meeting with Adenauer, it should be conveyed to him by appropriate means that we have given it serious consideration but we believe that at this juncture the common meeting ground between two situations faced by himself and Adenauer has not been sufficiently clarified and early face-to-face meeting should it fail would have very adverse repercussions. Rather we believe we should all work through diplomatic channels to clarify broad lines of that meeting ground first.

On his general approach to problem expressed ref tel, believe it should also be conveyed to him our view that he misjudges difficulties of Adenauer's situation which we see roughly as follows:

1. Adenauer has suffered defeat his major policy on which he based entire personal prestige.
2. Now three years after Japan's status settled and two years after West intended similarly to settle status of Fed Rep and several months

---

1 Drafted by William D. Fisher and cleared with Kidd and Merchant; repeated to London and Bonn.

2 Dated Sept. 2, p. 1132.
after Soviets have ostensibly done so for propaganda purposes in East Germany.

3. In terms of West Germany's real not juridical situation, parts of Bonn contractuals were already out of date. Adenauer has maintained reasonable and patient attitude among his people with regard contractuals only with difficulty during last two years. With rejection EDC it should not be expected that he would accept contractuals without any determination of that key element sovereignty—right to carry out or participate in one's own defense.

4. In spite of his personal disappointment and his need act in such a way as to carry his people with him, we believe Adenauer will be reasonable if others are in turn reasonable with him. But this requires an appreciation of his position and realization that time and events have changed political facts of life since 1952.

SMITH

740.5/9-1054

The Acting Secretary of State to Prime Minister Churchill

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 10, 1954.

MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER: In talking with the President today, he referred to your last letter and particularly to paragraph 5, regarding which he asked me to send you this personal note.

It can hardly be said that our soldiers have as yet any definite or coordinated views on reappraisal. We do not concede that Britain and we together will, on the diplomatic front, fail to produce a satisfactory solution to the grave problems arising from the rejection by France of EDC. Nevertheless, it would be less than prudent if the Joint Staff did not at this time consider long-range alternatives in the event that an unforeseen failure should take place.

These alternatives would undoubtedly include various forms of strategic regrouping, any of which at best would be a forlorn hope.

The President asked me to assure you that when views on these alternatives become a little more clear on the planning levels, British opposites will be kept informed, and certainly that no final decisions of any importance will be taken without advising you in advance.

My personal opinion, which I will urge, is that when a really serious appraisal of alternatives can be made we should attack it on a joint basis, as in the past.

We are inclined to think here that it will do no harm if the French realize that reappraisals are being made to cover all possible contingencies.

Faithfully,

Bedell

---

1 According to covering memoranda attached to the source text, this letter was drafted by Smith in accordance with telephone instructions which he received from President Eisenhower and was delivered to the British Embassy in Washington on Sept. 10 for transmission by telegram to London.

2 Dated Sept. 9, p. 1159.
TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 10, 1954.

Subject: Alternative to EDC.

Attached at Tab A is a Memorandum for the President which he has already received outlining a program to meet the present European crisis.² At Tab B is a paper which spells out this program in greater detail. At Tab C is a proposed NATO resolution to be approved by a special Council meeting in October.³ At Tab D is a proposal for restoring German sovereignty.

In connection with these papers, I should like to call your attention particularly to the following points:

1. The President should be aware that we have not attempted to deal with the problem of what happens in the event of the unification of Germany. We are continuing to consult the Legal Advisers' Office on this point in an effort to develop a position.

2. In your absence, we have not submitted a copy of these papers to the Department of Defense, although we have kept them generally informed of our thinking. I believe we should transmit copies of the papers to Defense for their comments as soon as you have had a chance to review them. We should also transmit promptly copies to Ambassador Hughes and General Gruenther for their private comments.

3. From the tactical point of view, particularly in negotiating with Adenauer, we should not accept the position that the contractual agreements are dead. There are still some principles in these agreements which are important to us and our bargaining position will be better if we cling as long as possible to the view that they remain in effect.

4. In discussing our position with the British and French we should emphasize that we are not relying only on unilateral German commitments. Many of the provisions in our program which will limit German control over their military establishment are multilateral.

5. In negotiating with the Germans on the status of forces problem, we will probably be driven back on acceptance, at least publicly, of the NATO SOF formula. In order to improve our position vis-à-vis Defense and Congress, we should, however, attempt vigorously to negotiate additional concessions on treatment of troops in a supplementary arrangement such as we have recently reached with Italy.

6. We are agreed that for the practical purpose of putting pressure on the French we must have a veto-proof alternative for German rearmament such as that outlined in paragraph 4 of Tab B. I wish to emphasize, however, my conviction that any alternative requiring us to proceed without French cooperation does not conform to your basic principle that a strong Europe can be built only on Franco-German collaboration. Consequently, any such alternative is not an end itself.

¹ Drafted by Ben T. Moore.
² For text of Tab A, see Acting Secretary of State Smith's unnumbered telegram to President Eisenhower of Sept. 10, p. 1160.
³ Not printed.
but only a bargaining device and we should not become over-committed to it, but should retain essential flexibility.

7. If an opportunity presents itself, I suggest you ask Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford to pull together from the many studies now going on in the Pentagon the essential military comments on the British document outlining their program for German membership in NATO. I am convinced that at some point in our forthcoming negotiations we must have a position on this particular paper.

Tab B

*Paper Prepared by the Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs (Moore)*

*TOP SECRET*  
**[WASHINGTON, September 10, 1954.]**

**U.S. POSITION ON ALTERNATIVE TO EDC**

The major objectives of US security policy toward Western Europe have been:

1. To associate Germany with the West.
2. To foster further progress toward European integration, particularly France-German reconciliation.
3. To obtain a German contribution to Western defense.
4. To restore sovereignty to Germany and end discrimination against her.

French rejection of EDC has blocked that road to attainment of these objectives. If the Europeans can lay out and follow an alternate route promptly and with determination, we should support them because of our vital interest in a strong Europe. The essential elements of an alternative program would be the following:

1. **German Membership in NATO**

   Germany should be invited to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty by agreement among all the signatories in accordance with Article 10. In accepting this invitation, Germany would submit a formal reply emphasizing the defensive character of the forces she expects to contribute and undertaking to follow in her initial contribution the size and composition of forces specified in the EDC Special Military Agreement (this excludes submarines and strategic bombers). She would also undertake to produce equipment needed for the common defense. She would state, however, that she would not produce atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons, military aircraft, etc. (other items in Annex II of Article 107 of EDC Treaty) because of her exposed strategic position except as agreed by NATO.

   Parallel with this step, NATO should reach agreement on a program for more effective military integration. In accepting membership in
NATO, Germany would, of course, be bound by these agreements. This program would have as its objective strengthening the military effectiveness of the forces committed to NATO. It would as a by-product limit autonomy of any forces committed to NATO in Europe which would include all German forces as provided below. It would thus have the advantages of being desirable in its own right and non-discriminatory vis-à-vis Germany. The following points should be covered:

(a) Further integration and internationalization of command.
(b) Strengthening of SACEUR's control over deployment of forces committed to him so that they will be deployed in accordance with NATO plans and can be moved within his area only as a result of his decision. SACEUR would be subject to appropriate political guidance in the exercise of these powers.
(c) Strengthening of Annual Review including formal NAC agreement that changes in previously approved force goals and force commitments to NATO should be made only in accordance with the Annual Review process.
(d) Agreement on integration of supply and logistics including proposal for international depots (Bogart Plan).
(e) Invitation to all NATO members willing to participate but aimed primarily at the Six to form an "Arms Production Pool" going as far as possible in the direction of the EDC provisions. (The US should be ready to indicate a preference for channeling its aid to the Six through such a body rather than directly.)

This program could be agreed and implemented without any modification of the Treaty. It would not, however, be effective unless supplemented by agreement on a new protocol committing signatories not to maintain forces other than those committed to NATO Commanders except for certain specified purposes. Since these would include the right to maintain forces needed to fulfill defense responsibilities in areas other than Europe or outside the NATO area, it should be possible to obtain Senate approval. At the same time this protocol should improve the chances of French and British approval by limiting German forces to those assigned to NATO.

Every effort should be made to reach agreement on this program first with the British and Germans and then with the other EDC countries and Canada in time for a meeting of the North Atlantic Council prior to October 15. At this meeting the Council would approve in principle German membership in NATO. It would also approve a resolution covering very broadly the program outlined above and instruct the Permanent Representatives, working with the military bodies, to draw up detailed documents carrying out the program for approval by the Council at its December meeting. The objective would be to agree in December on a complete program, made as impressive and attractive as possible, for use in securing parliamentary approval of those portions of it for which this is necessary.
2. Restoration of German Sovereignty
   See attached Tab B [D].

3. European Integration
   Every effort should be made to restore impetus to the movement for
   European unity. We should continue to support the European Coal
   and Steel Community and to encourage any other practical steps for
   economic integration. An effort should be made to move toward a
   European political community either by reviving the Charter drawn
   up by the Schuman Plan Assembly last year, or by calling a directly
   elected European Assembly, in accordance with the Declaration of
   May 1954, and assigning it the responsibility for drawing up a
   Charter. France, of course, would be expected to participate in these
   endeavors. At the NATO Council meeting in early October a strong
   resolution along these lines should be approved by the Ministers. We
   should also support a European solution for the Saar along the lines
   agreed between Adenauer and the preceding French Government. 4

4. German Rearmament outside NATO
   If the above fails to obtain French concurrence in German mem-
   bership in NATO, and in the German defense contribution, we should
   be prepared to adopt a new position, the essential feature of which
   should be that it would make it possible to circumvent a French veto.
   We should work out the substance of this position in advance with the
   British, but should not discuss it with the French or other powers un-
   less it becomes necessary because of French obstructionism on NATO
   membership and the defense problem. The French should be informed
   that the door is always open to French concurrence in the German
   NATO membership solution or to a revival of EDC. However, it is
   necessary in the meantime to work out a program for dealing urgently,
   although less satisfactorily, with the German problem.

   The first step in this program would be a joint US-UK request to
   their respective Joint Chiefs of Staff to review together the strategy
   for Western defense on the assumption that French cooperation will
   not be forthcoming. Although a final US position should await the
   results of this study, we should indicate to the British that we are
   thinking along the lines of two main steps:

   (a) Draw up a defense pact among the US, UK and Germany on a
   basis analogous to the Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav pact. This pact would
   be valid only until a change of circumstances makes possible German
   admission to NATO or a revival of EDC.

   (b) Prompt institution of the "interim measures" program for
   actually getting under way the preliminary training of German forces.

4 Documentation concerning European integration, including U.S. policy toward
   the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Political Community,
   is presented in volume vi.
This program should be implemented with the primary objective of putting political pressure on the French since it is highly unsatisfactory from the standpoint of obtaining the objectives listed at the beginning of this paper.

Tab D

Paper Prepared by the Officer in Charge of German Political Affairs (Kidd)

SECRET [WASHINGTON, September 10, 1954.]

GERMAN SOVEREIGNTY

A. German Position

With the rejection of the EDC by the French Assembly, Chancellor Adenauer has given notice that the Germans are no longer interested in the qualified sovereignty they were to have obtained through the Contractual Agreements. In a statement issued on September 1st the Federal Government declared its goal to be "Restoration of sovereignty." The Government gave point to this by adding "Participation in the defense of Western Europe without discrimination" and "juridical regulations, reached by agreement, concerning the stay in West Germany of troops from other countries." Amplifying these points in a radio statement on September 4th, the Chancellor said:

"I want to emphasize this: It goes without saying that in the negotiations on the Federal Republic's sovereignty the obligation of the three Occupation Powers, laid down in the Bonn Conventions, must be maintained to bring about, jointly with the Federal Republic, the reunification of Germany in peace and her integration in the west. . . ." I should like to stress the sentence in the statement made by Secretary of State Dulles in which he said that it was impossible in the long run to withhold from the Federal Republic the right to individual and collective defense. It appears to me that this sentence correctly expresses the cardinal issue of the whole matter."  

In conversation with Ambassador Conant on September 8th [7th], the Chancellor stated that he believed sovereignty could be restored by declaration of the Three Powers lifting the occupation powers. Berlin would remain an exception. He envisaged something like the NATO status of forces agreement instead of the Forces Convention. The latter was the only thing that would require Bundestag action.  

---

* Ellipsis in the source text.
* The text of Adenauer's radio statement was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 692 from Bonn, Sept. 7 (662A.00/9-754).
* For a summary of Conant's meeting with Adenauer on Sept. 7, see telegram 698 from Bonn, Sept. 7, p. 1152.
What the Germans find most unacceptable in the Contractuals are:

(a) Stationing of troops as a reserved (occupation) power rather than on the basis of agreement (Article 2, Convention on Relations).

(b) The reserved power to protect the security of our troops (Article 2) coupled with the emergency clause (Article 5) of the Convention on Relations. Few legal questions were more heatedly discussed in the Weimar and Hitler periods than the emergency clause, Article 48, of the Weimar Constitution, and the thesis of a Nazi jurist that “sovereignty lies in the power to declare an emergency.”

(c) Perhaps the “Except by common consent” clause of Article 7 of the Convention on Relations, limiting the Federal Republic’s treaty-making powers.

(d) Much of the Settlement Convention, as an extension of occupation requirements in another form.

(e) The Forces Convention, as discriminating in comparison with the NATO status of forces agreements.

(f) The Finance Convention, depending upon the modification of the Forces Convention and the form which the German defense contribution will now take.

B. U.S. Position

By the Senate resolution of July 28th [30th] we have declared ourselves in favor of restoring German sovereignty. In his statement of August 31st the Secretary said:

“Germany cannot be subjected indefinitely to neutrality or otherwise be discriminated against in terms of her sovereignty including the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense. Limitations on German sovereignty to be permanently acceptable must be shared by others as part of a collective international order.”

There is thus no policy obstacle to recognition of German sovereignty, by agreement or by executive declaration. To be entirely effective, however, and to avoid abrogation of the Occupation Statute by unilateral action, the Federal Republic’s sovereign status should be recognized in conjunction with the British and French. There are also certain important collateral agreements with the Germans which should be made firm, and accordingly the timing of any formal act of recognition should be made dependent upon mutually satisfactory conclusion of these agreements. These include, in addition to arrangements for the German defense contributions:

(a) Preservation of our rights relating to Berlin (no difficulty anticipated);

(b) Preservation of our rights relating to unification and Germany as a whole (no difficulty anticipated);

* Documentation concerning contractual relations with the Federal Republic of Germany, including negotiations over the various conventions, is presented in volume vii.
* For the text of Senate Resolution 295 approved on July 30, 1954, see the Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 23, 1954, p. 284.
* For the complete text of Dulles’ statement of Aug. 31, see p. 1120.
(c) Satisfactory agreement on stationing of troops (recasting a
reserved right into the form of an agreement);
(d) Provision for security emergencies if not as a reserved right, at
least as a practical arrangement.
(e) Parts of the Settlement Convention which have not been over-
taken by time (e.g. deconcentration) but in fact needed to be "settled"
(e.g. restitution).
(f) The substance of the Forces and Finance Conventions, modified
to provide for the French in addition to the US and UK. In answer
to a German request for a NATO status of forces agreement, a distinc-
tion may be made between the type of situation for which this was
primarily designed (bases) and the situation in Germany, where size-
able armies in the field are maintained.

C. Recommended Course of Action

(1) German sovereignty should be recognized by the US as soon as
the form of the German defense contribution and necessary collateral
agreements have been worked out.

(2) So far as the Germans are concerned, if the NAC invites the
Federal Republic to become in due course a member of NATO (or
invites the NATO members to agree to German membership within a
specified time), this will in itself amount to recognition of Germany's
right to military sovereignty (Wehrhoheit), which will be a great
satisfaction to them. At the same time the Occupation Statute will
remain on the books until the Three Powers take some further, formal
action. The NAC should accordingly invite the Occupying Powers, or
the latter should state their intention, to recognize the Federal Repub-
lie's sovereignty as soon as suitable arrangements have been made for
German defense participation.

(3) With regard to timing, if a period (e.g. 60 days) is allowed for
working out NATO controls, conclusion of necessary collateral agree-
ments by the Occupying Powers, and completion of governmental
action by the respective NATO states to agree to German membership,
the US, UK, and France might time their formal recognition of sov-
ereignty to coincide with their deposit of ratifications. The Depart-
ment has been informed that French recognition of German
sovereignty will probably require Assembly action, and some of the
NATO members, including the US, have reserved the right to obtain
parliamentary approval of new members in NATO.

(4) With regard to the form, recognition of sovereignty could be
accomplished by either a treaty or executive agreement, or by declara-
tion of the respective states. It is believed that there is some advantage
in using declarations, so as to avoid the possibility of further delays
through negotiations and ratifications. Although tripartite agree-
ment is required for abrogation of the Occupation Statute, the US
and UK might be able to hasten French action if they should announce
that so far as their respective Governments were concerned, recogni-
tion of the Federal Republic’s sovereignty would accompany their formal agreement to German membership in NATO. The French can of course withhold either consent to NATO membership or recognition of German sovereignty, but this cuts both ways, since the US and UK can render the Occupation Statute inoperative in their zones by recognition of sovereignty.

PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “S/P Papers, August–October 1954”

Paper Prepared by Leon W. Fuller of the Policy Planning Staff

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 10, 1954.

US POLICY TOWARD EUROPE—POST-EDC

(May I call your attention to my earlier paper, “An Appraisal of US Policy Respecting Europe” of June 10,² written in anticipation of the possible rejection of EDC; most of it, I believe, remains valid.)

I. THE US STAKE IN EUROPE TODAY

Following the presumed demise of EDC the US must reassess its vital interest in Europe in the new situation. To what degree is our national interest engaged here inevitably and irrevocably?

Defeat of EDC in no way diminishes this interest. We have lost a battle, not a war, and this loss points not so much to the need for withdrawal or retreat, much less surrender, as to a change in tactics, possibly in basic strategy. Our recent setback in SE Asia, despite the very partial and problematical recoupment of our fortunes through the SEATO pact, and our still dubious strength in the Near East, make clear how isolated and disastrous our world position would be if Europe were lost. Nor does EDC’s defeat mean that our prime objective of European strength through union is at fault or should be discarded. It does mean that we should weigh possible faults in our strategy. EDC failed, in the last analysis, because in the showdown it represented to many Europeans, particularly French, a US project to force premature federation along military lines involving a high risk of ultimate German predominance in a European union, and with a too apparent concern for realization of EDC as a device for mobilizing German armed forces. This view of our EDC policy was the more

¹In response to instructions from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Robert R. Bowie, Fuller wrote a series of brief memoranda every few days following the French rejection of the EDC in which he attempted to pick up “straws in the wind.” As a result of this assignment, Fuller drafted several papers on post-EDC U.S. policy toward Europe of which this is one. Copies of Fuller’s “Post-EDC European Reactions” of Sept. 3, 9, and 17 are in the PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “L. Fuller chronological”. There is no indication on the source text that Bowie gave this paper further circulation outside the Policy Planning Staff.

pronounced because recent developments seemed to point to (a) the
lessened necessity to secure German ground forces for a prospective
nuclear war, if war should come, and (b) the lessened likelihood, in
view of presumed Soviet calculations of their own interests and world
strategy, that there would be a general war involving Europe.

The US decision on German rearmament was made in 1950 in the
shadow of the Korean outbreak. The decision that must be made in
1954 concerning our next moves on this and related issues must be
made in the light of the four-year evolution of the world situation,
involving the progressing nuclear revolution in the art of war, the
evidences of modified Soviet World strategy, the obvious weakness and
incapacity of France, the startling economic and nationalistic evolu-
tion of West Germany to potential great power status, the continued
aloofness of Britain from the continent, and the growing nationalist
disposition of our recovering European allies to resent US ascendancy
and to work out national policies of their own. These are the realities
which confront us, even through our involvement in Europe and our
stake in maintaining it as a strong anti-Soviet bastion of the free
world remain also as inexorable realities.

II. THE HOT WAR DILEMMA

Earlier NATO and EDC planning was in anticipation of a possibly
imminent hot war in Europe. Strictly military planning, of course,
must continue to envisage this eventuality in realistic fashion. But our
diplomatic and political strategy vis-à-vis Europe can no longer be
guided mainly by consideration of this eventuality, as a point has
been reached where, to Europeans, the outbreak of a hot war could only
mean utter catastrophe, whatever its formal outcome.

Speculation on this theme is hampered by the difficulty in picturing
the “next war” if it comes to Europe. We might assume that the U.S.
and Soviet nuclear capacities would cancel each other out by non-use,
and the war would be fought with conventional forces only. This
would probably mean an early Soviet conquest of Western Europe.
But current JCS strategy would seem to mean that U.S. nuclear ca-
capacies would be used in strikes against (a) major military and indus-
trial objectives within the Soviet orbit, and (b) West European
objectives (as the Ruhr) in event of their take-over by the Soviets so
as to deny additional military capabilities to the enemy. There is the
possibility that the Soviets, on the verge or at the inception of war,
would seek to bribe the Europeans into non-resistance by offering
immunity from air bombardment and even from military occupation.
This, if successful, would seem to reduce a war to a long-distance air-
atomic exchange between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., by-passing or
over-passing Europe. But it seems improbable that in any event,
Europe could remain uninvolved for long. Another conceivable pos-
sibility is that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. would virtually wipe out each other's nuclear capabilities early in the war, and that from then on hostilities would continue mainly with conventional ground forces in Europe. Furthermore, the development of certain new types of nuclear weapons, such as guided missiles, and of new techniques of nuclear defense, seems now unpredictable in its bearing on a war in Europe.

At any event, the expectations of Europeans of the probable consequences to them of an all-out war are horrendous enough, and with justification. This feeling, in conjunction with their prevailing estimate that a Soviet attack is not likely, their sense of relative weakness, inadequacy and vulnerability in the situation, and their suspicion and cynicism concerning U.S. intentions, creates a difficult situation for us, given our assumption which remains valid that only [by] the creation of massive, pooled strength in Western Europe can our vital objectives then be attained.

The U.S., therefore, would probably do well to "sell" its European defense program to its allies mainly on its merits as a deterrent to Soviet aggression. Our own military strategists must, of course, plan for all contingencies, which may include choices of action in event of a hot war extremely unpalatable to our allies if they were publicized (early retreat to the Rhine or farther west, scorched earth policy in evacuated areas, etc.). But our general position should be that we aim to create the strongest possible collective security structure through NATO, including arrangements for maximum effective use of unconventional weapons, in order to set up a successful deterrent to Soviet aggression. The underlying premise would be that, in event of hot war, this collective security complex would be utilized in accordance with the west military and political judgment in the given situation. How it would be used cannot and need not be pre-judged in advance, and the U.S. would do well to avoid excessive legalistic precautions to insure its "rights" regarding military decisions and actions in Europe, particularly respecting the employment of nuclear weapons. An excess of zeal would probably stimulate violently nationalist reactions and undermine rather than strengthen the edifice of collective military strength and political morale.

If we must be more candid with our European allies as to our expectations and plans for a hot war, we might picture it somewhat as follows. However it comes, if it is clearly the "real thing," we would plan maximum air-atomic strikes at once against Soviet military and industrial centers, communications, and all points of vulnerability where the Soviet war potential might be weakened or crippled. We assume the Soviets would reciprocate against the US in like fashion, but would have far greater difficulties than we due to distance of bases, lesser nuclear capabilities, etc., in delivering a knockout punch. Meanwhile, Western Europe might or might not be invaded by the Soviets
(they might be successful in blackmailing our NATO allies into refuse [refusing] cooperation by offering to refrain from atomic bombardment, or even invasion, but in that event we could still deliver massive air strikes against Soviet objectives). In a relatively short phase, characterized by the exchange of atomic blows between the US and USSR, we should be able to do such crippling damage to the Soviet war machine (and its "infrastructure" and sources of supply) that the Soviets either would be in no position to invade Western Europe or to hold it for long if they did (CIA’s view). Thus we could assure our allies of two probabilities: (1) that they would not have to suffer a prolonged Soviet occupation, with subsequent destructive "liberation" by us, and (2) that we would not find it a military necessity to adopt a large scale "scorched earth" policy toward Western Europe as a means of denying it to the Soviets.

This, at least, is one concept of a future hot war that might not be too discouraging to our allies, and might induce them to give us their full cooperation in building up our nuclear strategic capabilities in the area.

III. OUR PRIORITY OBJECTIVES

It would seem futile, on several counts, to make the attainment of absolute European defensibility a priority objective. If ever attainable—which it was not, according to military estimates, even given the full attainment of the Lisbon goals with German forces in being—it seems even less so now as the development of the atomic equation tends to cancel out whatever edge the West has had, due to superiority of atomic armaments. And economic, political and psychological factors all militate against making the attainment of "absolute" defensive capacity in Europe a prime objective.

Therefore the US is driven by logic and reality to place the main emphasis on two cold war objectives (this is on the assumption, pretty well validated today by the best intelligence estimates, both civilian and military, that the Soviets are extremely unlikely to gamble on a hot war at least for the next few years). These are (1) the strengthening of the deterrent effectiveness of the NATO military establishment to a maximum degree (which would also increase its potential effectiveness if war did come), and (2) halting any further trend to the disintegration of the free European community and promoting its economic, political and psychological strength through unity within itself and through closer ties with the extra-continental NATO powers (UK, US, Canada).

There are not, of course, new goals, but nothing in recent developments would appear to invalidate them as basic, short and long range, objectives. Recent failures may throw much light, however, on difficulties, methods and tactics, and help us in shaping future policy. In
general, we require a more pragmatic and flexible approach, less dogmatic reliance on any particular concept or project, a less overtly aggressive sort of leadership in relation to our NATO allies, yet with persisting firmness in pursuing really vital objectives, more patience and self-restraint. Inasmuch as the problem is immediately European we should defer to, and encourage European leadership in the inception and implementation of specific plans. We should seek to influence the evolution of European planning and action only in so far as this is essential to harmonize it with the inexorable, minimal purposes of a global strategy in which we are, by necessity, the prime leader and mover.

IV. SHORT-RUN POLICIES

The above considerations should shape our thinking and planning about Europe and determine our long-range objectives. But we face an emergency and quick decision and action must proceed on a number of aspects of the European situation that cannot wait. The following courses of action are suggested as best fitting the actual situation that now confronts us, with the promise that any course now decided upon must evolve pragmatically in a “trial and error” fashion as we progress upon it, and that no “council of perfection” based on philosophic insights however profound can assure us a fool-proof blue print to guide us in a colossal venture in “social engineering” in which we must deal constantly with unforeseeable complexities and human imponderables.

A. Germany

It is clear that the status question must be resolved at an early date. We must probably scrap the London protocols and move farther toward a grant of sovereignty by three-power action, qualified only by reservations concerning the conditions of German rearmament, and Berlin and all-German questions. This move should not be clogged with legal or bureaucratic verbiage or thinking but should be sweeping and generous, for its psychological impact on the Germans. “Membership in the club” must be established without quibbling reservations.

As to German rearmament—the actual procedure, not the right, which should be established by return of sovereignty—the U.S. should, first of all, avoid the attitude it has displayed for years, that this is of primary urgency in order to strengthen NATO. We might do well to appear somewhat indifferent, merely assuming that it will come to pass eventually, and not giving France or the Germans themselves any opportunity to blackmail us or pry from us excessive concessions as a price for quick results. We should exert a more restrained influence, in the background, deferring to European leadership and thinking as to ways and means. We should indicate that we want a plan generally
acceptable to all our European partners, as the issue is an immediate, life-and-death issue for them.

We might do well to formulate a tentative plan of our own as a background for discussion and negotiation, but not to be set forth with insistence as "our plan." Even this plan should be highly provisional and subject to modification in the developing situation. It could, in general, favor (1) clear establishment of the German right to rearm; (2) German admission to NATO; (3) constructive development of NATO in the direction of a more integrated command structure, logistics system, etc., and possibly the exercise of additional powers respecting the size, nature and disposition of NATO forces on the continent; (4) salvaging of elements of EDC through renegotiated arrangements in the general direction of a European arms pool within NATO and conforming to the latter's requirements; (5) supplementing the above with other moves, somewhat as proposed in the British "Document 6." It could be assumed that French acceptance of "2" will be contingent on agreement on some of the subsequent points.

Regarding the German unity issue, I feel that the Germans will continue allergic to it, the Soviets and German Communists will exploit it to the utmost, and that our policy will remain at all times flexible and open-minded enough to comprehend necessary moves on this front. For instance, West Germany in NATO should not be bound to renounce her unification objective, and the diplomatic door should always be left open to renewed negotiation with the Soviets on this issue. There is not the complete incompatibility between our projected Western policy for Germany and hopes for German reunification that some assume, because it is clear that our only prospect for successful negotiation with the Soviets on this matter lies in so strengthening West Germany and integrating it with the West that we have a strong bargaining base from which to operate, and which we do not now have.

B. France

We face a grave dilemma here. We must, through our diplomacy, avoid being hopelessly hampered in pursuing our minimal vital objectives in Europe by French veto or serious obstruction, while avoiding, likewise, any policy which would really alienate France and could result only in a weakened and fragmented Europe.

The post-EDC phase has already given France a taste of isolation, and her European allies seem as indignant and determined to move ahead on constructive lines regardless of her opposition as we are. We should, not too overtly, support the tendency to effect France's diplomatic isolation, not to push her out of the club, but to compel her to a realistic reappraisal of her position and policies. We should continue to respect her legitimate and reasonable demands, i.e., those clearly
reflecting her unique national interests, but make clear, without threats, that we and the other NATO powers are going to move ahead to necessary decisions without her if she proves irrationally obstructive. We must gamble on the hope that such diplomacy will prove successful and that France, in the last analysis, will not prove recalcitrant to a suicidal and destructive degree.

In this spirit, and with such tactics, we should move forward to realize the program suggested in III-A above. We should avoid threatening France with ultimate or imposing deadlines, yet be prepared, in the last analysis to go ahead without French concurrence if necessary, with our other NATO allies, in taking essential actions.

C. Britain

We should employ our diplomatic resources to induce Britain to work closely with her continental allies in working out plans, and encourage her to exert constructive leadership in the matter (Eden already seems to be moving in this direction).

Feeling that Britain should associate herself more closely and integrally with the continent, we should, nevertheless, avoid "pressuring" her in this respect. Our most effective means here is a demonstration that we, too, recognize the need for closer association on our part and are ready to make certain commitments and sacrifices to this end.

D. European Integration

Underlying all our policies and acts should persist the basic concept of a unified free Europe. But we should have learned from our EDC experience to avoid the limelight. There remains a substantial residuum in Europe, even in France, of desire and readiness to move ahead toward a united Europe. We should defer, but helpfully and constructively, to European leadership, recognizing that only plans for association that are developed indigenously and have time to mature in the minds of Europeans, can be ultimately successful. We should largely divorce the European movement, in our own minds and policies, from procedures for securing a German defense contribution. Possibly these procedures can eventually converge with the integration program, but that must come later.

Finally, we must reassess our own relations to an evolving European community, seeking and considering ways and means to establish the maximum ties with this community, even of an institutional nature, that are in conformity with our constitutional limitations and enlightened public opinion. This may be the crux of our whole European policy, and a great institutional [national] debate and decision may well be precipitated on this issue if things move to a major crisis. The choice, at such a stage, may be between a radical move toward institu-
tional association with free Europe, and renunciation of our major European objectives and programs.

751.00/3-1154: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

SECRET

PARIS, September 11, 1954—2 p. m.

1056. With Parliament adjourned and many deputies away from Paris it is difficult at this juncture to make estimate of political scene in general and of possibility Assembly approving as yet indefinite EDC alternative in particular.

1. Embassy concurs with Deptel 896, September 9 that, whether we like it or not, Mendes is man we will have to deal with on German rearmament issue, on assumption that some alternative plan will be formulated within near future, and believes it unrealistic to hope for resuscitating EDC in substantially old form. Parliament is adjourned until November 3 and no hurdles, apart from German rearmament issue, appear on horizon before appropriations debates in late November and December. Moreover, even though Mendes’ majority is incoherent and his stock declined owing to equivocal position on EDC, he still enjoys considerable credit and cannot be easily brought down. Whether or not his majority, especially socialists, will stick with him will probably depend largely on implementation of his economic and social program.

2. On issue of German defense contribution, parliamentary situation as we see it at present is as follows: (It is assumed that new formula would be package deal again entailing both German sovereignty and rearmament.) Opposition to any foreseeable solution, in addition to that of Communists, will be of three kinds: (1) opposition to German rearmament as such, (2) opposition to Mendes, and (3) opposition to any solution which does not encourage European concept. Different groups are motivated by different combinations of the three. Socialist Party is still in throes of internal dissension. Guy Mollet had hoped quickly to oust main culprits—Moch, Daniel Mayer, LeJeune, et cetera—and get remaining anti-EDC deputies to eat humble pie, but is running into serious difficulties. Under circumstances, socialist elements would be strongly inclined to restore party

* Repeated to London and Bonn.
* Not printed; it stated that regardless of one’s opinion of Mendès-France his strength in the French Assembly did not appear to be greatly diminished and was greater than any other potential premier. While it was recognized that Bidault and Adenauer desired to force Mendès-France out of office, the Department of State believed that working for his downfall seemed destined to destroy the main chance for an early solution to the problem of German rearmament which would involve French cooperation. (751.00/3-754)
unity on basis of policy that would have wide support—namely, opposition to German rearmament in absence of supranational political authority.

MRP are now licking their wounds—leaders such as Tietgen, Bidault and Maurice Schumann all have deepest distrust of Mendes and are threatening to vote against anything he presents. Maurice Schumann is now writing articles warning against revival of German Wehrmacht. They are of course party most devoted to European idea.

Radicals, like UDSR, are split both on Mendes and on German defense contribution. Herriot and Daladier followers can be expected to vote against any plan for German rearmament, and other elements such as Martinaud-Deplat would tend to vote against anything Mendes proposes. Overseas independents would probably go along with Mendes.

Most independents, Peasants and ARS are strongly opposed to Mendes and are prepared to use any issue to bring him down. Majority of Social Republicans would probably accept some formula, if it contains safeguards against unrestricted German rearmament.

3. Assuming his sincerity, which is as yet by no means sure, it is obvious that Mendes is going to have difficult time getting Assembly to approve any alternative plan. Those elements who are opposed to any form of German rearmament without supranational controlling organization and without other guarantees contained in EDC would have to be convinced of merits of new scheme and those who are violently hostile to Mendes would have to be persuaded to put aside suspicions and animosity in view of gravity of international juncture. On this basis possible that independents, peasants, ARS and majority of radicals might be induced to come around. Most difficult to convince will be MRP whose support is necessary and who therefore largely hold key to situation. Any degree of socialist support seems highly questionable.

4. One requirement for success is that not only must Mendes press for rapid Assembly decision but must also give plan his full support including putting question of confidence on issue. Doubtful that possible advantages of his not making it question of confidence, namely to get support from elements hostile to himself, would offset obvious disadvantages. Important therefore that Mendes be given as much role as possible in negotiations for formulating new proposal. Mendes should not be excluded from any international meetings on issue, especially any to which Adenauer invited, as such would only give him easy way out. Mendes should be obliged to take full responsibility for contributing towards formulating feasible plan and for getting Assembly approval as logical sequence to his role on EDC.

Dillon
My Dear Friend: I promised to keep you fully informed of Anthony’s tour.

He had a successful talk yesterday with Benelux Ministers whom he found robust and realistic. They are disturbed at the growth of nationalism in Germany and fear that the dangers which confront us all are not apprehended by Mendes-France or the French Chamber.

They are agreed on German entry into NATO with such safeguards as we can extract in the present German atmosphere. They are also attracted by the suggestion which Anthony laid before them of modifying the Brussels Treaty so as to admit Germany and Italy. We want of course to keep this idea secret until we can put it to the French.

As to procedure they consider that whilst the NATO Council must be brought in, a preliminary 9 power meeting should be held. They hoped this would take place in London as soon as possible after Anthony’s tour, and be followed by a NATO meeting.

Finally they consider that we must proceed rapidly on the lines on which we are all agreed and do what we can to convince the French. But we must be ready to go ahead without France in the last resort (policy of the empty chair presumably) making clear our intentions in Paris in good time.

Kind regards,

Winston

---

1 According to memoranda attached to the source text, this message was delivered to the White House on Sept. 12 with an additional copy delivered to the Department of State the same day.

2 British Embassy officials delivered a copy of the unofficial transcript of the meeting between Eden and the Benelux Foreign Ministers in Brussels on Sept. 11 to the Department of State with instructions that the transcript be held in strict confidence. The transcript was circulated to members of the U.S. Delegation to the Nine-Power Conference as document NPT Special 1 of Sept. 20. A copy of this document is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 303.

The Embassy in Brussels also reported on Eden’s meeting; its summary is in telegram 268 of Sept. 13 (740.5/9-1354).

---

Editorial Note

In telegram Tedul 30 to Manila, September 8, Secretary Dulles was informed of President Eisenhower’s desire that Dulles return from the Manila Conference by way of Hawaii for a short rest, arriving in Denver on Sunday, September 12, for a meeting with the President.
followed by a session of the National Security Council. Members of the NSC were summoned to the summer White House in Denver to discuss the problem of the Chinese offshore islands and future policy in Europe following the failure of the EDC. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 850) At the 214th meeting of the National Security Council on September 12, the Council agreed that there was no objection in principle to exploring an increase in the authority of the NATO Council even though such an increase might apply to such forces as the United States might periodically place under NATO Command. This discussion, which occurred in connection with the possible admission of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO (NSC 160/1), met with the approval of the President (NSC Action No. 1225; S/S—NSC files, lot 66 D 95, "NSC Records of Action—1954"). For the text of NSC 160/1 of August 17, 1953, entitled "U.S. Position With Respect to Germany," see volume VII.

740.5/9-1354: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Butterworth) to the Department of State

SECRET

LONDON, September 13, 1954—8 p. m.

1305. I saw Perm UnderSec re Dept Topol 291, rptd London 1451. In reviewing major points in ref tel with Kirkpatrick, I attempted to minimize seeming contradiction between Dept's sense of urgency in connection with fixing date of ministerial conference and deliberation with which it approaches question of preliminary discussions either in NAC or in 9 power conference—but without success. Kirkpatrick put his finger firmly on these points and went on to emphasize that HMG had now come to view that Adenauer had been right in not favoring a 9 power meeting until effective preliminary exchanges had taken place, and in conversation with Eden he had advocated further exchanges through diplomatic channels after Eden's return to London.

I believe the British are determined to hold a 9 power conference in London if they possibly can and until they are in a position to fix a date for it they will be most reluctant to fix a date for NATO ministerial meeting. Eden plans to attend NAC meeting Sept 15 and

1 Repeated to Paris.

2 Not printed; it expressed the Department of State's disappointment with the failure of the North Atlantic Council to set a target date and place for an emergency ministerial meeting to discuss possible German membership in NATO. The Department emphasized the great urgency for such a meeting but stressed its view that the Council should not concern itself at this point with the substance of the preparatory work involved. (740.5/9-954)
make an abbreviated report on his findings. I urged that this be not allowed to presage general substantive discussion.

Kirkpatrick was pleased with outcome of Brussels talks, PM’s report of which to President was shown me.5 FonOff has to date only received account of 1st meeting between Eden and Adenauer with which they are also most satisfied.

BUTTERWORTH

2 Dated Sept. 12, p. 1179.

740.5/9-1354 : Telegram
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State
SECRET N I A C T
Bonn, September 13, 1954—11 p. m.
755. Limit distribution. Murphy and I had long conversation with Chancellor this afternoon and will see him again tomorrow morning before Murphy departs for Belgrade.4 Chancellor gave us report of his talks with Eden, re which he appeared completely satisfied, but throughout discussion ran thread of his concern re French attitude.2 Murphy began by saying that Department had naturally been giving much thought to German question, but that Secretary had not wished to take final position until he had received Chancellor’s views.

Adenauer replied by reiterating concern re Mendes-France’s motives which he had expresed to me so often in past. He then turned to his talks with Eden, and asked Hallstein to give summary of position in which he and Eden had reached agreement in principle.

Hallstein thereupon gave lengthy exposé, in which Chancellor joined from time to time, pointing out two main aspects of problem were restoration of sovereignty and German defense contribution.

Re sovereignty, he said British agreed with German viewpoint that problem could be settled by simple declaration by each of three occup-

1 In telegram 684 from Bonn, Sept. 4, repeated to Manila as telegram Tedul 9, Conant recommended that Dulles consider returning from the Manila Conference by way of Bonn because Adenauer was disturbed by his feeling that he was isolated from the source of U.S. foreign policy (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, OF 350). The Department of State replied that neither Dulles nor Merchant would be able to travel to Europe in the near future but that Murphy was on his way to Europe primarily in connection with the Trieste negotiations. Since the Department did not want this reason revealed, Murphy would visit Bonn and elsewhere as a cover; the press would be informed that his trip was planned to discuss problems arising from nonratification of the EDC (telegram 872 to Bonn, Sept. 8; 662A.00/9-354). For a summary of his meeting with Mendès-France, see telegram 1254 from Paris, Sept. 24, p. 1236; documentation concerning Murphy’s role in the Trieste negotiations is presented in volume VIII.

2 For a summary of the Eden-Adenauer meeting provided by the British Foreign Office, see telegram 1509 from London, Sept. 14, p. 1188.
ing powers to effect that occupation status had been ended. Hallstein
seemed at first to be arguing that no specific reservation re Berlin and
German reunification would be needed in such declaration, but in
course of discussion admitted that appropriate language to maintain
Western powers' position on these questions vis-à-vis Soviets might
be included in declaration. He said it was further agreed status of
forces convention would be required along lines of NATO model, but
appropriately modified to take account of special situation of troops
in Germany, i.e., special facilities arising from stationing in NATO
forward area, financing of support costs, etc. It was recognized that
negotiation of this convention would take time, and would come into
force only with formal German entry into NATO (see below), hence
Germans were prepared to accept commitment that in meantime and
until Germany membership NATO finalized, allied troops should con-
tinue to enjoy rights and privileges presently available to them, as, for
example, requisitioned housing. He went on to say that Germans felt
declaration and forces convention, taken together, would cover sub-
stance of Bonn conventions which had not already been overtaken by
events, such as decartelization, restitution, etc., but implied that Ger-
man were prepared to be reasonable re allied desires and insisted that
negotiation of this new convention would not be difficult.

Turning then to problem of German rearment, he said there was
agreement on German entry into NATO with self-imposed "safeguards" on nature and character of German rearment which would
reassure Germany's neighbors and at same time preserve as much as
possible of EDC. This would mean that Germany would enter NATO
with the contingents envisaged under EDC, and would undertake not
to change this contribution without the consent of SACEUR, this
control being exercised in fact by NATO Council through annual re-
view procedure. (He was explicit that there could be no French veto
over initial raising and equipment of German contingents.) As to
future questions, he seemed to set great store on power of SACEUR
and assumed he would always be an American. He went on to say that
Germans were likewise prepared to accept a liberalized version of
EDC restrictions on armament production, which would not be dis-
criminatory under "strategic area" concept.

It was also envisaged, Hallstein continued, that mutual guarantee
as contained in EDC Treaty would be preserved. On assumption US
would not, for constitutional reasons, be party to such guarantee, it
could be achieved for six EDC countries and UK by special treaty
within NATO framework.

Turning then to time-table, Hallstein said British had insisted on
nine-power conference. Germans had given in, and agreed therefore
that this meeting should be proposed for end of next week, with NATO meeting to follow in early October. In this connection, he argued that restoration of sovereignty and first practical steps towards rearmament could not await formal approval of German entry into NATO by all Parliaments concerned, as this ratification process would probably take twelve months. Therefore, it was agreed that steps for restoration of sovereignty should be taken immediately after agreement in principle had been reached by NATO conference, and that at this same meeting agreement should be concluded for early commencement on first essential steps of German rearmament such as infrastructure construction, training of cadres both in Germany and abroad, etc.

In conclusion, Hallstein emphasized need for information as given above to be held most closely until Eden had been able to present to Mendes-France proposals which had been agreed in principle by UK and five EDC powers. He said Benelux and Foreign Ministers had already accepted NATO solution as outlined above, and that Chancellor anticipated Eden would have no difficulty in obtaining Italian concurrence.

Murphy thanked Chancellor for opportunity for discussion, which he said would be most helpful to Secretary. Adenauer then said there were three points which he wished to make. First, acceptance of a NATO solution did not mean that he was giving up on European integration. French rejection of a European Army meant that this concept must be postponed but he would be prepared, and indeed would strive, to merge the German contingents under NATO into a European Army at the earliest opportunity. Secondly, he said Eden had told him of Francois-Poncet’s query re Saar this morning (see my 754). He had thereupon assured Eden that he remained prepared to settle Saar problem on European basis as agreed with Teitgen. He continued to feel that European integration achieved to date, notably CSC, must be preserved and that further steps, including political community and ultimately European Army must be pursued without pause. Thirdly, he wished to emphasize again his concern re French attitude. He felt, he said, it would be important for French to realize that US was “in earnest” as concerns our recent statements of policy. Discussions will be continued with Hallstein and Blankenhorn tonight after dinner. It was evident from conversation that Anglo-German discussions had not gone into great detail on many of points enumerated above, and Murphy and I plan to question Hallstein more closely on German thinking re obvious difficulties in solution of these

\[^3\] Not printed; it summarized Conant’s conversation with Eden during which Eden expressed how disturbed he was that François-Poncet should raise the Saar issue as a serious obstacle to any action by the French Assembly on alternatives for the EDC (740.5/9–1354).
problems. Moreover, Chancellor’s reiterated concern regarding French attitude raises question whether he really expects French to accept NATO solution, and we shall therefore endeavor to develop further information on this point.

Conant

740.5/9-254

The Secretary of State to Foreign Minister Spaak

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 13, 1954.

I wish to thank you for your message to me of September 3.\(^2\) As you know, I have for the last several days been absent from Washington and I am sure you understand my pre-occupation with the problems of the Manila Conference.

I share fully your concern over the gravity of the problems we now face as the result of French rejection of the EDC. We are in process of developing urgently our thinking here on the steps which should be taken next, and receiving your views has been most helpful in this connection. I hope that we will in the very near future be in a position to discuss our views with you. We shall of course want to consult fully with you and your Government well in advance of the forthcoming meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

I am looking forward in particular to discussing this problem with you personally at the forthcoming meeting of the General Assembly in New York.

Dulles

\(^1\) This message was transmitted to Brussels in telegram 301, Sept. 13, with instructions that it be delivered to Spaak.

\(^2\) Ante, p. 1143.

Conference files, lot 80 D 627, CF 359

Foreign Secretary Eden to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[LONDON, September 13, 1954.]

[DEAR FOSTER:] I have been much encouraged by meetings in Brussels and Bonn. The Benelux Ministers and the Chancellor warmly welcomed our ideas. They considered that they provided the right basis for solving the double problem of German association with the West and of a German defence contribution.

2. I explained that our thought was to solve the latter problem by bringing Germany into NATO with such safeguards as could be
agreed on a non-discriminatory basis, I found the Chancellor ready to do his best to provide as effective safeguards as possible. Our Benelux friends also have some useful ideas to supplement our own. I think we now have the foundation for a practical plan which our experts in NATO could work out quickly with German participation.

3. I found that the Chancellor agreed with us in attaching even greater importance to the political problem of ensuring German association with the West through the maintenance in another form of the European conception. We have tried to work out a formula which would enable the United Kingdom to participate equally with France and Germany. We hope we have found it in the extension and adaptation of the Brussels Treaty Organisation with its automatic guarantees of assistance and machinery for political consultation to include Germany and Italy. All this should be within NATO and avoid dangerous duplication of our NATO defence system. Adenauer, Spaak, Beven and Bech were delighted with this idea and think it should appeal to the French as well as to the Italians.

4. I also had useful talks with the Chancellor on the best way to restore German sovereignty quickly without leaving a legal vacuum, in regard to the many important issues covered by the Bonn Conventions, while preserving the essential Allied rights over Berlin and all-German questions and ensuring that the vital interests of Allied troops in Germany are met. I made it clear, however, that all this would have to be discussed in a wider circle with you and the French.

5. The upshot was that Adenauer is now fully satisfied that basis exists for a successful conference at an early date preparatory to a NATO ministerial meeting in October. We both thought that the smaller group is essential to discuss the Brussels Treaty idea, but all these questions are so interlocked that we cannot hope to make real progress without you. If all goes well in Rome and Paris, a nine power meeting might be held in London next week—say about Sept. 22nd. The Benelux ministers would I know welcome this and I hope very much that you will also agree. I think it would be very helpful if you could come to London a day or two sooner so that we can clear our own thinking together before going into the wider meeting.

6. While all has so far gone better than I could have hoped, Paris may well prove very difficult, although the Chancellor himself was surprisingly optimistic about probable French reactions. We can make no firm timetable until I have seen Mendes-France and I am sure you will realize the importance of keeping this message within a very small circle until I can send you a further message after seeing Mendes-France. I shall also be seeing the NATO permanent representatives in Paris and will I hope be able to remove any misconception that we are
short-circuiting NATO. I am sure we must proceed with vigour and a sense of urgency and I look to your good counsel and powerful help.

Kindest regards,

Anthony

740.5/9-1454: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State

SECRET

NIACST

Bonn, September 14, 1954.

757. Limit distribution. Regarding my 755.1 In conversation after dinner last night with Hallstein and Blankenhorn, it quickly became evident that Germans did not in fact expect French to accept NATO solution. Hallstein argued, however, that such solution must be tried out, since British had proposed it, most other powers favored it to greater or less degree, and only method by which it could be eliminated as alternative to EDC was through French rejection.

Hallstein then outlined “third solution” which he said he had discussed briefly with Chancellor, but to which latter had not yet given his approval (although he had reason to believe Adenauer had previously been thinking along same lines). On assumption that French would reject NATO solution, or as seemed more likely, attempt to delay decision on German rearmament, he thought only way out was security agreement between Germany and US and UK modeled on Balkan Pact, which would give Germany somewhat the same indirect relation to NATO as that enjoyed by Yugoslavia by reason of its association with Greece and Turkey. French and, of course, Benelux countries would be invited to join, and door would remain open for French participation at any time. Should French not accept to join in such an arrangement, their position would become all the more isolated and this in turn would bring internal changes which might in the end serve the cause of European unity. He added that it would help if the French got wind of the fact that something along this line was brewing.

At same time, Hallstein did not exclude possibility that, faced with decision of US and UK, to proceed without them, French might return to modified EDC as best solution. He quoted Spaak as saying that if the French were faced with a solution involving German membership in NATO they would well be willing to renegotiate EDC. Spaak had in mind at one time, he said, possibility of calling conference for this

1 Dated Sept. 13, p. 1181.
purpose, if NATO solution were rejected by French Assembly, with understanding that agreement must be reached in ninety days, and new solution presented to French Assembly as soon as agreement concluded.

Hallstein expressed opinion that if French reject NATO solution, Benelux countries and Italy would favor arrangement which excluded France if necessary, and added it would be helpful if British "saw it that way." He hopes, in fact, that Eden will give French hint of this possibility. Asked in an aside whether this "third solution" had been raised with British, Blankenhorn said it had been mentioned cautiously; Eden had confined himself to commenting on how terrible predicament would be if French reject NATO solution, but Roberts had intimated British would then be prepared to proceed without French.

Reverting to NATO solution as discussed with Chancellor, Murphy asked if Germans believed French would be willing to end occupation status merely on basis NATO conference agreement in principle. I reminded Hallstein that Mendes-France had given French Assembly commitment to consult it before restoration of German sovereignty. Hallstein admitted this was problematical, but professed to believe that if US and UK were prepared to act, French would come along. He then referred to disappointing election results in Schleswig Holstein, to fact elections in Hesse were scheduled for November, with possibility of further weakening of Chancellor's position, and stressed urgent need for some sort of success for Chancellor. He said early end of occupation status (with Western troops, of course, retaining their present rights until forces convention concluded) was vital. In spite of considerable discussion on this point German proposal remained far from clear to me. Hallstein and Blankenhorn agreed Adenauer's position was safe for some months, possibly six, if there were some encouraging developments in meantime, but both felt that situation was already deteriorating.

I led the conversation into discussion of possibility that Mendes-France's rejection of reasonable NATO scheme might bring about his downfall. Hallstein and Blankenhorn agreed this would be most desirable. As subsequent French Government would undoubtedly take more moderate view German rearmament, but viewed it as improbable. It appears they are not counting on any change of government in France, which seems to be a reversal of Chancellor's implied position of a week ago.

In conclusion Hallstein raised question of US policy in event present British initiative failed owing to intransigence of Mendes-France or
rejection by French Assembly. He argued that it seemed not unlikely French could be brought to take decision only if they were made aware of alternative which faced them by reason of their rejection or postponement of decision and urged that we find some way to let them know what cost would be of further inaction.

Conant

740.5/9-1454: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Butterworth) to the Department of State

SECRET

London, September 14, 1954—1 p. m.

1309. FonOff showed us this morning brief telegram outlining in most general terms Eden’s talk with Adenauer as it touched on contractual relations.2 Adenauer thought easiest way for everybody, including French, was for tripartite powers to renounce in formal declaration their occupation rights. While apparently Adenauer did not specifically say so, he implied that FedRep would issue counter declaration to effect that pending final settlement of forces, finance and other conventions would remain in force.

One thing Adenauer insisted upon was renunciation of emergency clause. Working level FonOff considers this reasonable demand on grounds that with FedRep in NATO all forces would go into action if necessary regardless of any reserved power. Adenauer recognized special position of Berlin.

Germans apparently according FonOff, had not decided how they would prefer to handle agreements revising occupation powers but one thought was that FedRep would declare conventions in force minus certain provisions in each convention. It was agreed that Grew and Bathhurst, respectively German and British legal experts, would engage immediately in informal talks on matter.

FonOff’s impression is that Adenauer is reasonable about contractuals and anticipates no great trouble. In fact, it is from British military that FonOff anticipates real trouble on question of status of forces agreement.

Butterworth

1 Repeated to Bonn and Paris.
2 In telegram 1817 from London, Sept. 14, the Embassy supplemented the information provided in the source text by noting that Adenauer was “very forthcoming on accepting the limitations on German rearmament to be embodied in either Brussels agreement or NATO,” provided they dealt with the following points: Limitations on the size of the force, undertaking to refrain from manufacturing certain types of atomic weapons and guided missiles, and rationalizing war material production. (740.5/9-1454)
THE GERMAN PROBLEM

740.5/9–1454: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

SECRET

PARIS, September 14, 1954—2 p. m.

1078. In talking with Senator Wiley yesterday Mendes-France devoted at least half an hour to defending his course on EDC along now familiar line that previous governments had misled us as to prospects but been unwilling to put treaty to test. He alone had been honest, had been willing to force issue, had known it could pass only if modified in accordance with his Brussels proposals on which no one could help him although they affected only procedure and not substance of EDC.

As to future, he held objectives of EDC could be accomplished by means which would avoid its two basic defects: (1) Lack of British participation and (2) too much supranationality too suddenly. Curing second should help cure first. British participation, even if not complete, was key to French ratification. There must also be some commitment as to maintaining of British troops on continent. He would rather listen to Eden than make proposals himself but he nevertheless had a draft ready. We commented that he had said previous French governments had misled us as to French opinion but now he was predicating future course on British commitments which British Government had consistently refused to give. Had there been recent change in British position?

He stated he understood British reluctance but removal of supranational features of EDC should make great difference and each government must make new effort to achieve EDC objectives. Asked how US might help, he replied that it could pressure Britain at proper time. Asked whether NATO framework could not provide solution he said NATO provided the necessary outer structure but that there must be seven-nations interstructure as well.

Senator Wiley expounded forcefully the effect French rejection of EDC had had in increasing Neo-Isolationist sentiment in Congress and his own conviction that peace and survival of the west depended upon achievement of greater unity.

Last night at Mendes small dinner for Wiley (other guests were Letroquer, Moustier, Parodi and Senator Maroger) again expressed concern at extent to which he was counting on new British commitments. He said he knew they would not come in “all the way” but was confident his views provided basis for negotiation and would not be wholly rejected. Senator Maroger was equally insistent that British participation was key to French approval of any solution on Germany.

Dillon

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

Bonn, September 14, 1954—6 p. m.

771. Limit distribution. Murphy, Dowling and I saw Chanc, Blankenhorn and Hallstein again this morning for nearly an hour. Chanc emphasized gravity of European situation, spoke again about his distrust Mendes-France and difficulties Chanc faced in Germany. He emphasized need for ending occupation status soon as possible.

In this connection we went over again some points yesterday's discussion with Chanc and last night with Blankenhorn and Hallstein. Chanc wishes declaration three occupying powers ending occupation except for (a) Berlin, (b) responsibilities reunification Germany, (c) for time being status of troops, but desires this status be given another name. He agreed that his objective was to dissolve High Commission, have Embassies replace High Commissioners' offices, eliminate veto on constitutional amendments and eliminate Military Security Board. In connection with this Board, he told story of French veto on expansion certain industry which was rescinded after negotiation between German and French concern. I had heard same story some months before and do not doubt there may be basis for his implied charge French were using MSB from time to time to further certain French commercial interests. In addition removing these occupation restraints, Chanc emphasized important psychological effect which could only occur if Allies declared occupation at an end.

Early in discussion Chanc raised frank question what was U.S. prepared do if Mendes-France refused NATO solution and ending occupying status. Discussion turned to Hallstein's outline his third scheme, which he had given us last night as being unofficial. Murphy said without committing Secy or Govt, he could say some of thinking in State Dept had been along similar lines. He felt that this discussion and his knowledge Chanc's views would help Secy reach decision which had not yet been possible because of his absence in Manila. In response to direct question, Chanc and Hallstein said discussion with British of what to do if French refused to accept second alternative, namely membership in NATO, had been very tentative and no details considered. (Preferred scheme, it must be remembered, is EDC, and Chanc repeated his preference for this and belief that after election

---

1 For a summary of this meeting with Adenauer during the afternoon of Sept. 13, see telegram 755 from Bonn, Sept. 13, p. 1181.

2 For a summary of this evening meeting with Blankenhorn and Hallstein, see telegram 757 from Bonn, Sept. 14, p. 1186.
May 1956, France would be prepared for integration German Army into European army, but said France could not hold up defense of Europe that long.)

It was opinion all participants in conversation that significance of a third scheme such as outlined Hallstein last night was in first instance to put pressure on France to accept NATO solution as outlined Eden-Adenauer talks. Chanc seemed to be of opinion that time for U.S. to step in with its pressure would be immediately after Eden-Mendes-France conversation if Mendes-France were obdurate or if he proposed further conditions such as Saar settlement.

My personal opinion in comparing conversations yesterday and today with talks last week with Chanc and Hallstein is as follows:

Germans seem less inclined to hope NATO solution unacceptable Mendes-France would result overthrow his government followed by modified EDC solution, though Chanc still emphasizes importance European idea Schuman Plan and eventual formation European army. Chanc seems more urgent about some dramatic political gesture ending occupation. Clearly wishes this to be accomplished without Bundestag action such as would have been involved had London protocol route been followed. Chanc has retreated from his belief that mere declaration of intent to limit German armament would be sufficient basis of responsible plan to present to French and has come to view of modified NATO Treaty. To meet obvious objection this plan that long delay and much negotiation required, he proposes to get political benefits by end of occupation status in return for agreement on principle by French. It would be my view if Mendes-France at all moved to accept NATO solution prompt action his Assembly should be forced and at same time Chanc should be required to place a status of forces convention before his Bundestag, a modified Bonn convention but with a different name and with the most objectionable feature from his point view removed, namely reserved powers which created a special status for Ambassadors U.S., U.K., and France.

CONANT

740.5/9-1454

President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Churchill

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 14, 1954.

DEAR WINSTON: Your report on the progress of Anthony’s tour is very helpful to me. It is encouraging to know that the Benelux

1 This message was transmitted to London in priority telegram 1485, Sept. 14, with instructions that it be personally delivered to Churchill.

2 This is a reference to Churchill’s letter of Sept. 12, p. 1179.
people are thinking along constructive and realistic lines. We will look forward to the more detailed account of your proposals which Anthony has promised to send Foster at the end of his tour.

In the meantime, we are trying to pull together some useful ideas to contribute with respect to both the plan for German membership in NATO and a course of action in the unhappy event that the French refuse to go along. I feel that you and we should agree on this latter point as soon as possible since I am not certain that anything less drastic will bring the French to their senses.

With kindest regards,        D[wight] D. E[isenhower]

740.5/9-1454
The Secretary of State to Foreign Secretary Eden.1

SECRET        WASHINGTON, September 14, 1954.

DEAR ANTHONY: I appreciate your keeping me informed of developments on your travels.2 I am glad that you feel progress was made at Brussels and Bonn and I agree with you that Paris is where the greatest difficulty is in store.

I gather that the proposal regarding entrance of Germany into NATO which you are putting forward to our friends follows the line of Document 6 of the Study Group which met in London last July. I do not think that our thoughts are far apart on this general approach on the modalities of this matter. I realize that we have not yet given you in any formal or official fashion our comments on this document but I hope to do so soon after taking into account the views of our military.

I do however have certain firm convictions which influence all my thinking on tactics and methods. The first is that we must restore full sovereignty to Germany and do it promptly. I agree with Adenauer that the time is past when the position could be held by placing the contractual agreements in effect. From this it would follow that any secret limitations or conditions on German rearmament which were imposed or gave the appearance of being imposed on Germany would be a dangerous error. A voluntary and public declaration of self-imposed limitations would of course be another matter.

My second conviction is that we can only make Europe a perma-

---

1 The source text was transmitted to Rome in nact telegram 880, Sept. 14, with instructions that it be personally delivered to Eden who was there for talks with the Italian Government; the text was repeated in telegrams to Paris, London, and Bonn.

2 This is a reference to Eden's letter to Dulles of Sept. 13, p. 1184.
nently secure place by merging significant governmental functions, including French and German, into supranational institutions. This was always to me the most important aspect of EDC. I hope we will not lose sight of this purpose and objective in seeking arrangements to restore German sovereignty including her right to participate in her own defense. Any arrangement which fails to move along on this European road I would regard as a makeshift and one which we on this side of the ocean would have to examine very carefully. I know that our Congress feels very strongly about this phase of the matter.

This leads me to another point on which I must confess some puzzle-ment. This is your reference to the Brussels Treaty and its enlarge-ment to bring in Italy and Germany. As traditional treaties go I have always felt Brussels to be a good one but I read nothing in it of a supranational character nor can I see that its enlargement merely in terms of membership would add anything to the North Atlantic Treaty. If on the other hand your thought is to invest it with supra-national features so that it might become in fact a true substitute for EDC, I would be deeply interested in your thoughts on this subject.

Now for your suggestions regarding a Nine Power meeting in London, I have felt, as you know, that it was a mistake to go into any such meeting without adequate spade work in advance. Some of this you are now of course doing. I have also felt and I gather that you agree that such a meeting should be considered as a preliminary to the special meeting of the North Atlantic Council which on August 31 I suggested be convened. The French rejection of EDC has created a situation of gravity for the entire membership of NATO and it is right that we should all meet together. I welcome your suggestion that before any London meeting you and I have the opportunity to spend some time together. I also feel I should see Adenauer since he has indicated to me his desire for such a meeting.

The date you suggest of September 22 for the 9-power meeting in London makes difficulty. I do not feel that I can go into that meeting and adequately represent the US position unless I have first talked with you and with Adenauer and then have an opportunity to digest what I learn and to discuss the resultant position with the President and with our Defense people. Without that I could only play the role of an observer and I gather that you and the others would want something more than that. Also, as you know, the General Assembly opens in NY on September 21 and I feel that there is some embarrassment in staging a major meeting in London which would attract many of the Ministers who would ordinarily take part in the General Assembly general debate.
My suggestion is that I should leave here tomorrow, Wednesday afternoon, for Bonn and spend the afternoon and evening with Adenauer if he is free, then come on to London and spend Friday with you if you are free, coming back Friday night, which would give me a weekend of rest which I need rather badly. Then I could take part in the general debate at the UN and have my talks in Washington with the possibility of returning for the 9-power conference during the succeeding week if you felt it could wait until then.

Please let me know immediately your reaction as this program would require me to leave a few hours after you get this message.

Sincerely yours,

Foster

Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower"

Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower

TOP SECRET

[London, September 14, 1954.]

My Dear Friend: You will have seen the messages which Anthony sent Foster last night on his talks in Bonn. Anthony found Adenauer in fairly good health and as quick as ever, though aged since their last meeting. Adenauer much liked the Brussels Treaty idea which he described as a most happy thought and psychologically valuable as providing a focus for European policies and keeping alive German youth’s faith in the European idea. It was also important he thought to devise means of saving Mendes-France’s plight.

We must now see how the talks in Paris go, but on present form it looks as if there will be plenty to discuss with Foster if, as we hope, he can pay us a visit.

Kind regards,

Winston

1 According to a memorandum attached to the source text, Churchill’s message to President Eisenhower was delivered to the White House on Sept. 14. The White House staff sent a copy of the message to the Department of State the same day.

2 This is a reference to Eden’s letter to Dulles of Sept. 13, p. 1184.

740.5/9-1554 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

SECRET

Paris, September 15, 1954—1 p. m.

1096. Re Emblems 1056 September 11, and 1078 September 14.


2 Both ante, pp. 1177 and 1189, respectively.
Events of immediate future should throw considerable light on Mendes' sincerity. When talking with him on September 13 we had not yet seen report of Eden–Benelux talks and were unaware how far British were prepared to go re Brussels Treaty and were therefore concerned at extent to which Mendes seemed to be putting his eggs in British basket. Our feeling was that if he were sincere in seeking practicable alternative to EDC, certainly British participation would be major element in securing acceptance by French Assembly. It seemed on other hand that if he were insincere, he might well be laying groundwork for another Brussels meeting like his last one, i.e., if Britain would not go as far as French desire in new arrangement with France and Germany, he could again say in effect, “I knew what was essential for Assembly approval and did my best to get it but no one would help me”.

Jebb states Eden had mentioned Brussels Treaty to Massigli just before his departure and Massigli had stated Mendes was thinking along similar lines. So far indications are therefore that he is acting in good faith. If by chance he is not, this should quickly become apparent during his talks with Eden.

Principal question is whether Mendes will accept German membership in NATO as well as in Brussels Treaty. At first view French politicians will undoubtedly consider latter as modification of little NATO concept and will grasp it as alternative rather than supplement to former as Schuman did with EDC. However, events since 1950 and uncertainty as to French and other European policies in future make it more important than ever that Germany be in framework where it is directly linked with US, an advantage which other great advantages of EDC make us willing to forego temporarily but which could hardly be foregone in favor of Brussels Treaty.

In any event French acceptance will depend primarily upon provisions for limitation and control, whether embodied in NATO mechanism, revised Brussels Treaty or elsewhere.

DILLON

110.11 DU/9-1554

The Secretary of State to Prime Minister Mendès-France ¹

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1954.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: This is just a brief note to let you know that I plan to make a quick visit to London and Bonn Thursday and

¹ The source text, drafted by Merchant, was transmitted to the Embassy in Paris in nct act telegram 954 of Sept. 15 with instructions that it be delivered to Mendès-France as a personal message.
Friday. I regret that time is so short because it will not permit me to stop over in Paris to talk with you much as I would like to do so. However I hope that we will have this opportunity very shortly when we meet either in London or in New York at the UN.

Until then, with best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

Foster Dulles

In telegram 1098 from Paris, Sept. 15, Ambassador Dillon informed the Department of State that the message was delivered and that the effect of omitting Paris from the Secretary's itinerary "will be salutary" (110.11 DU/9-1554).

740.5/9-1554: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

SECRET  NIACI  PARIS, September 15, 1954—9 p. m.

1115. For Secretary from Achilles. Re Embtel 1112. Mendes-France just sent for me to say he was deeply hurt by your message and that while he realized he was personally blamed by American opinion for Assembly's rejection on EDC, he felt that any question of "punishment" was less important than future results and that he believed your omitting Paris would harm his and Eden's efforts to work out constructive solution.

I said I would transmit his views to you immediately and that I would not presume to question his estimate of effect on French opinion. At same time I could express personal belief that Washington felt Paris was taking American reaction to rejection of EDC much too complacently and had little conception of lateness of hour with respect to American relations with Europe. Mendes denied any complacency and reiterated he was doing his best to bring about constructive solution but that your failure to come would make his task more difficult. I said that if his talks with Eden went very well, it might be good reason for you to change plans and visit Paris.

Press has of course shown keen interest in subject. Your decision has already had strong effect on Mendes and will no doubt have considerable public effect through tomorrow morning's press. Will send further estimate of situation to Bonn tomorrow.

Dillon

1 Repeated to London and Bonn.
2 See footnote 1, infra.
3 This is a reference to Dulles' letter to Mendès-France, Sept. 15, supra.
SECRET

PARIS, September 15, 1954.

[Dear Foster:] I saw the French Prime Minister this afternoon. Our talks have been interrupted for half an hour and I will send you an account of them later. Meanwhile I think you should know that he said that he was much disturbed that you should contemplate visiting London and Bonn and not Paris.

He said that this would have a bad effect on French opinion which would resent the exclusion of France. French would understand your reasons for wishing to go to the Assembly but would find it difficult to think that the dates were so exact.

[Kindest regards,]

ANTHONY

---

1 This message was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 1112 from Paris, Sept. 15, with Eden’s “apologies for even giving appearance of offering advice”.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 375

FOREIGN SECRETARY EDEN TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

[PARIS, September 15, 1954.]

[Dear Foster:] I received your message just as I was on the point of leaving Rome. I shall be glad to see you in London on whatever day would suit you. The dates September 27 and 28 which you suggest for the preliminary nine power conference should, I think, prove possible. We too had hoped that the E.D.C. would be passed. But every country now agrees that as things are there is no present possibility of reviving the supranational idea. We must encourage other forms of European unity.

[Kindest regards,]

ANTHONY

1 The source text was given to Dulles by British Ambassador Makins during a meeting at noon on Sept. 15. A memorandum of this conversation, prepared by Merchant, is in Department of State file 740.5/9-1554.

2 This is a reference to Dulles’ letter of Sept. 14, p. 1192.

---

110.11 DU/9–1554

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TO PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1954.

Dear Winston: Thank you very much for keeping me posted with

1 The source text was transmitted to the Embassy in London in priority telegram 1514 of Sept. 15 with the instruction that the Ambassador personally deliver the message to Churchill.
reference to the European developments and the talks which Anthony is having. As you probably know by now, Foster is leaving today to have a quick trip where he will talk with Anthony and also with Adenauer. This will help us to make our own plans. Foster will carry to you our latest thinking on these matters.

With warm regard,

IKE

---

\(^2\) This is a reference to Churchill’s letter of Sept. 14, p. 1194.

---

740.5/9-1654: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn

SECRET  NIACIT

PARIS, September 16, 1954—10 p. m.

249. Mendes-France gives us foll summary of his talks with Eden:

German membership in NATO had always been unpopular in France and had come to be regarded as that evil which EDC was designed to avoid. Accordingly he had hoped German membership in Brussels Treaty might provide satis alternative. However, other parties to Brussels Treaty, U.S., Canada and apparently all other NATO countries disagreed and felt German membership in NATO essential. He had accordingly sought with Eden ways and means of making this palatable to French opinion and they had agreed it old best be done thru developing Brussels Treaty.

Brussels Treaty wld be utilized primarily as a substitute for EDC; it wld have two great advantages of Brit membership and that it was not supranational. Some nondiscriminatory controls over armament were essential, voluntary renunciation by Adenauer wld carry little weight in France and NATO was not structurally designed for control. Therefore Brussels Treaty shld be used. It must not be merely paper control or window dressing but must have real substance. It must also offer hope for the development of political integration in Europe and perhaps the development of supranational features in time. There wld be no question of setting up new administrative machinery under the Brussels Treaty; there wld be political discussion and decisions by Brussels Treaty Council but NATO machinery wld be utilized to administer controls. Brussels Treaty must be presented to Assembly as substitute for EDC and as an assurance there wld be no independent Wehrmacht.

This solution wld entail no delay. German membership in NATO wld of course require approval of French Assembly and Brussels Treaty modifications wld take no longer. He and Eden had agreed that

\(^1\) Repeated to London and to the Department of State as telegram 1185, which is the source text.
experts shld be given one month to produce specific document which shld be clear, simple and not comprise more than twenty articles.

In response to question as to how tightly revised Brussels Treaty and German membership in NATO were to be linked to avoid danger of Assembly accepting one and rejecting other, he replied they wld be presented to Assembly in single document and two wld take effect simultaneously.

It had been agreed that Eden wld convoke nine-power mtg in London Sept 27 or 28 and that NAC ministerial mtg shld be held in late Oct or perhaps beginning November and that every effort wld be made to complete parliamentary action by all parliaments concerned before end of year. Mendes expressed hope this wld be satisfactory to us since action shld have been take by time Congress reconvenes.

In response to question whether he considered this solution one for which he cld wholeheartedly seek Assembly approval, he said it definitely was such a solution and that while details must still be worked out, political problems wld be difficult and he did not wish to appear too optimistic, he thought there was reasonable chance of success. He did not wish appear egotistic but felt he had better chance of getting it through than wld someone else. He said he wld need help from all concerned including U.S. He inquired whether there was any change in your plans and was advised that there had not been but that this information wld be communicated to you immed.

Before his departure for airport, Eden had time merely to tell us that he considered outcome as being as good as cld be expected and considerably better than he had anticipated yesterday.

On returning from airport Jebb gave us more detailed account which confirms that given us by Mendes. Additl points were that Eden had emphasized Gruenther's opinion that NATO machinery cld be effectively utilized for operational and logistical control. (Gruenther cabling full account.) Mendes had repeatedly indicated sensitivity to being isolated and alone and it was only late this afternoon that his apprehension as to again being alone at nine-power mtg in London had been assuaged. Eden had agreed to use his influence with other Brussels Treaty and NATO members to bring about solution along above lines. Eden wishes to discuss this personally with you.

Your announced decision to omit Paris had had very satisfactory effect but this unexpected satisfactory outcome of Eden—Mendes talks does, we believe, change situation. In circumstances, we recommend that if possible you plan to come here tomorrow evening, even if you cld only spend an hour or two. Eden and Jebb, while reluctant to offer suggestions, believe it wld be useful if you cld stop here.

Dillon
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn.¹

TOP SECRET NIACT PARIS, September 16, 1954—9 p. m.

248. For Secretary and Conant. Following message from General Gruenther:

"In noon meeting today with Eden at British Embassy, he outlined proposal made during current tour. Brussels treaty to be expanded to include Italy and Western Germany. In this way British satisfy French requirement for more firm British commitment to continent. Also there will be created nucleus of organization which may eventually develop along lines EDC. Simultaneously Germany would be admitted to NATO.

Reception from Benelux Foreign Ministers exceeded expectations. They were all enthusiastic. Adenauer personally delighted. Roberts met with Adenauer's advisors regarding certain safeguards which might be expected of Germans and found them generally in a most cooperative mood. Meeting in Italy was also most satisfactory.

In all places however, Eden found certain lack of confidence in Mendes-France and his sincerity of purpose.

Meeting with Mendes-France has thus far been unsatisfactory. In first session Wednesday afternoon, Mendes-France presented a series of EDC type conditions to Brussels treaty so complicated that months of negotiations would be required. Eden told Mendes-France that they were unacceptable. In after-dinner meeting Wednesday night, he found Mendes-France slightly more receptive. After 11 o'clock Council meeting this morning Mendes-France told Eden that he had considered carefully all that Eden had said in two meetings yesterday. He had slept little last night, and early this morning he summoned his staff to consider matter further. He was now of opinion that it is desirable to consider admission of Germany to NATO. To get this by French Parliament, however, would be difficult matter. He needed Eden's help in strengthening Brussels treaty set-up to present plan in favorable light. Eden was to see Mendes-France again this afternoon to continue discussions.

Eden said he felt SHAPE could make significant contribution safeguard problem. I told him that in controlling operations German forces there was considerable we could do if decision made gives us such responsibility. If manufacture of armaments, there is nothing we could contribute. As example of logistics control we might control jet fuel oil supply through pipeline system. Similarly with respect general supplies there was much we could accomplish if authority given.

I told Eden I doubted Mendes-France has consulted French military leaders on safeguard problem. I discussed matter with Juin last night and found him in liberal frame of mind. Juin thinks controls exercised over Germans need only be modest ones.

¹Secretary Dulles was in Bonn for meetings with Adenauer Sept. 16-17. This telegram was repeated to London for Aldrich and to the Department of State as priority telegram 1134, which is the source text.
Eden said it was clear to him as result of yesterday’s discussions that Mendes-France wants to build up Brussels treaty and soft pedal significance German admission to NATO. If his philosophy in this respect remains unchanged, problem will be difficult one. Eden told Mendes-France that only real control over German forces will come from having Germany in organization with United States. He will press this point further this afternoon.

Several times Eden told Mendes-France his one great fear is peripheral strategy and fortress American concept. At dinner last night Boris told Roberts there was no danger of United States withdrawal.

I asked Eden if decision is taken to hold nine-power meeting at London on September 28, what kind of advance agreement would Eden be able to get from Mendes-France re German admission NATO. Eden replied best he could expect would be Mendes-France would agree to discuss subject. I told him I thought this was not good enough, and I felt conditions Mendes-France would advocate should be thoroughly understood prior to conference. Eden said he thought this was not feasible. Object of conference would be to present such views. I replied I thought staff work had to be more thorough than that or there would be danger of conference failure. He gave impression he was willing take chance on that because he was almost certain of agreement of eight members. If French are again in minority of one, their position would be impossible one.

Eden also stated that in event French refused adopt reasonable point of view, British are willing proceed without them. Eden’s general attitude was pessimistic. Apparently he felt his success at Brussels, Bonn and Rome justified high hopes for Paris meeting and his disappointment was manifest. Several times he stated ‘isn’t it a sad situation that fate of Europe should be based on considerations such as these’.

Dillon

740.5/9-1854: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn ¹

TOP SECRET NIACT PARIS, September 16, 1954—10 p. m.
250. For Secretary and Conant. Foll is second message from Gen. Gruenther:

“During Eden luncheon today De Margerie said he is depressed over present situation with respect to German problem. French PriMin faces almost unsolvable difficulties. Because of bitterness which has developed in French Parliament, no solution has good chance of being approved by Parliament at this time. Because of this complication, Mendes-France considers his best strategy is to lay great emphasis on Brussels Treaty angle. This must be given extensive ‘window dressing’ far out of proportion real merit to secure parliamentary support.

¹ Repeated to London for Aldrich and to the Department of State as priority telegram 1136, which is the source text.
“I asked him what he meant by ‘window-dressing.’ He said there wld have to be certain control organs under Brussels Treaty for insuring safeguards French Parliament considers necessary. One of these wld be control of armaments, very similar to Article 107 of EDC Treaty. He is against duplicating military mechanisms and emphasizes that in final analysis real strength of controls wld lie in NATO.

“I asked De Margerie if PriMin envisaged simultaneous admission to NATO. De Margerie said he could not answer this question definitely but he thought PriMin wld attempt secure admission of Germany to NATO simultaneously with strengthening of Brussels Treaty. He said he thought Mendes-France wld make this a confidence issue, but he personally believed the Parliament wld reject it.

“I asked De Margerie if he thought there was anything to be gained in having a NATO organization exercise certain safeguard functions. He said this wld help but that problem of gaining popular support in Parliament wld still be major one, regardless of safeguards enacted.

“De Margerie said he saw Maurice Schumann recently and Schumann greeted him with, ‘What is this Brussels Treaty nonsense? We are going to shoot you down hard on this point.’ De Margerie answered it was largely window dressing, and Schumann replied, ‘Of course it is, but we are going to shoot you down just the same.’

“De Margerie ended on a very pessimistic note expressing his low opinion of Parliament. He feels there is no solution short of new election.”

Dillon

740.5/9-1654: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn

TOP SECRET NIAC PARIS, September 16, 1954—9 p.m.
151 [251]. For Secretary and Conant. Foll is third and final message from Gen. Gruenther:

“Foreign Min Lange of Norway attended Eden luncheon today. He told me he had 30-minute mtg with Mendes-France this morning in which Mendes outlined his current thinking.

“Mendes desires extension of Brussels Treaty. Lange asked if Norway wld be welcome, and Mendes replied, ‘Certainly, the more the merrier.’

“Under Brussels Treaty organization he envisaged safeguards wld be imposed as follows:

“a. Limitation on size of armed forces of member nations.

“b. Common procurement system for all military supplies.

“c. Limitation on manufacture of arms according to zones.

“Thus there wld be a forward zone in which only very limited manufacturing wld be authorized. Limitations on zones farther to rear wld be less stringent. Much of Article 107 concept was involved.

1 Repeated to London for Aldrich and to the Department of State as priority telegram 1137, which is the source text.
“Lange asked Mendes whether he envisaged admission Western Germany into NATO. Answer was affirmative altho not entirely convincing.

“Lange got impression Mendes sincere in desire for German participation. Mendes emphasized several times it was absolutely essential for future of North Atlantic Alliance that there not be another defeat in French Parliament and that he was bending all his efforts to avoid that unfavorable result.”

Dillon

740.5/9-1654: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department of State

SECRET

Rome, September 16, 1954—10 p. m.

1071. Following is composite report on Eden visit to Rome including substance my talk with Piccioni September 16:

Italian position on post-EDC situation which was agreed on by Scelba and Piccioni September 13 was as follows:

1. Italy faithfully and strongly adhered to principle of European integration which is keystone Italian European policy and it was highly important to find adequate alternative to EDC in integration framework.

2. German rearmament should be brought about with adequate safeguards and controls and this could probably best be handled by German admission to NATO.

3. Concrete means must be found to eliminate fear which French and to lesser extent British, have regarding prospect of being dragged into another world war over German unification question. Italy did not believe French feared German rearmament as such, but linked question with possibility another world war.

4. Italy believed existing European bodies such as CSC OEEC and Council of Europe should be strengthened as part of eventual process leading to political integration.

Eden believes that interested European countries should agree on three substantive and procedural points:

1. Termination of occupation regime but with special provision for Berlin situation and immediate restoration of German sovereignty. Italians expressed full agreement with this point which they believed has great merit.

2. German contribution to Western defense must be provided within framework of such limitations and conditions as Germany might accept along line of those foreseen in EDC treaty. Important that limitations should be freely given by Germany and should not be discriminatory measures.

3. Necessary find formula to remove vacuum created by EDC failure. Eden thought best way would be revive 1948 Brussels Treaty, to provide for entry Germany and Italy, to modify it in such way as to give new direction to a Western European unity and to remove present obvious contradictions. Eden indicated that Benelux countries and

Adenauer had expressed general agreement this idea and considered that Brussels Treaty would provide way toward new undertakings between UK and six former EDC countries. Regarding military aspect Eden thought that NATO offered best means to provide close military association herewith Western Europe and to make possible adequate controls and limitations on German rearmament. Eden said he envisaged simultaneous German entry into Brussels Treaty and NATO, but was evasive in answering Italian questions as to what he meant by simultaneous. Italians consequently wonder whether Brussels Treaty device might in fact lead to long delays in connection with German rearmament. On other hand, Piccioni told me that Italy had accepted idea of Brussels Treaty as uninitiative which “did no harm”.

Eden said that key to situation lay in Paris and he hoped that if Paris would agree with his plan other countries such as Norway and Denmark might give their adherence to Brussels Treaty. Eden indicated he was not as optimistic as Adenauer regarding French attitude since unfortunately French Parliament was too ready to find negative rather than positive majority. In reply to Piccioni’s questions as to what would happen if French did not agree to building up of Brussels Treaty as EDC substitute and providing for German admission into NATO, Eden said that best way perhaps would be for five former EDC countries and UK to proceed on their own but leaving door open for possible future French participation. Eden indicated that Adenauer shared his view.

Eden told Piccioni he was in close touch with Washington and was keeping Secretary Dulles advised of his soundings on this trip. He emphasized that Europe must not make mistake of believing US patience is endless and must not fall into trap of thinking that Europe is indispensable to US. Eden stressed that every effort must be made to avert possible American abandonment of Europe. Eden said he hoped that his talks in Paris would make it possible to call eight or nine power conference in London before end of September. Piccioni made point that it would be serious error to repeat Brussels conference mistake and hoped adequate advance preparations could be made to establish basis for discussions. Eden replied that he hoped French attitude would make conference possible and said he thought such conference would be useful to examine Brussels Treaty modifications and revisions. He emphasized that London conference would be only prelude to important future NAC meeting.

Italians appeared to be particularly impressed by British stress on their intention to participate fully with other Western European nations in any alternatives to EDC. In final communiqué (Embdes 516, September 16 *) British had insisted on use stronger Italian language to emphasize their sharing in European situation.

* Not printed; it relayed to the Department of State the text of the official communiqué following the Eden–Piccioni meeting of Sept. 14 (033.4165/9-1654).
Piccioni asked me what US attitude was regarding present post-EDC situation. I told Piccioni that US position not yet definitive and referred him to Secretary Dulles statement of August 31 as representing basic US position.

Comment:

I believe that the Italians are genuinely pleased by Eden visit to Rome since it is useful public expression of important Italian role in continental developments. Italians are also willing to agree to almost anything which will bring about German contribution to Western defense. They frankly do not believe Eden will get very far in Paris with his plan but certainly wish him well and have authorized him to tell Mendes that British and Italian positions are in effect identical. Privately Italians are suspicious of British moves and one senior Foreign Office official has even gone so far as to suggest British are purposely procrastinating on German rearmament in effort to regain initiative in European politics. It is clear that Italians do not know what Mendes-France wants and they do not see how Brussels Treaty-NATO solution can offer acceptable way out to French. However, Italians have no proposals of their own to offer.

LUCE

S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1, NSC 5433 series

Draft Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 16, 1954.

NSC 5433

IMMEDIATE U.S. POLICY TOWARD EUROPE

SCOPE OF THIS PAPER

1. In view of the French rejection of EDC, the U.S. is faced with a choice between:

   a. Continuing to pursue its present objectives in Europe by means other than EDC; or
   b. On the assumption that continued pursuit of all these objectives is no longer feasible, determining what objectives should then be pursued.

1 According to a covering note by National Security Council Executive Secretary Lay, the source text was prepared by the NSC Planning Board and was circulated to NSC members for consideration by the Council at its meeting on Sept. 24. Attached to the source text and not printed here, in addition to Lay’s note, are a cover sheet, table of contents, and two annexes (extracts from the Brussels Pact of Mar. 17, 1948, and from the North Atlantic Treaty of Apr. 4, 1949).

For a record of the NSC meeting of Sept. 24 at which the source text was considered, see p. 1263. For the text of the amended version of this statement of policy approved at the Council meeting on Sept. 24 and subsequently circulated as NSC 5433/1, see p. 1268.
2. It is recommended that the U.S. for the immediate future make further vigorous efforts to achieve the present objectives set forth below. Accordingly, this paper sets forth a program of action based on par. 1–a above. The paper also sets forth in par. 11 below certain questions the answers to which may assist in making the determination under 1–b above, if that proves necessary.

PRESENT OBJECTIVES

3. Despite French rejection of EDC, the security of the U.S. continues to require the preservation and development of Western Europe (including the UK) as an area of strength allied to the U.S. Accordingly, the U.S. should continue to pursue the following objectives:

a. In the cold war, to prevent further extension of Soviet control in Europe and to retain the major Western European nations as allies.

b. To provide for the effective defense of Western Europe (even though in the event of general war retention of that area may not be indispensable to U.S. survival and ultimate victory), by maintaining and strengthening the NATO security system, inclusive of West Germany, as a deterrent to Soviet aggression designed to provide the most suitable defense of NATO territory.

c. To build the requisite strength and stability in Western Europe on the basis of (1) the combined efforts of the principal nations there and (2) steady progress toward integration on the continent.

d. To assure the orientation of the German Federal Republic (and ultimately a united Germany) to the West by all feasible means, including institutional ties as well as treaty arrangements.

PROGRAM OF ACTION

4. Seek promptly to associate the German Federal Republic with the West by:

a. Restoration to the German Federal Republic of its sovereignty, including the right to participate in the defense of Western Europe without restrictions unacceptable to the Germans as discriminatory or arbitrarily imposed. This step would require agreements regarding allied rights respecting Berlin, the unification of Germany, stationing of allied forces in Germany, and other issues resulting from the war and occupation.

b. Admission of the German Federal Republic to full membership in NATO, without precluding German participation also in the Brussels Pact or other European defense arrangements.

c. Obtaining acceptable safeguards as to German rearmament. Such safeguards might include:

(1) Voluntary acceptance by Germany of limits on its initial build-up of forces;

(2) Regulations or restrictions on the production of certain types of weapons, possibly through designation of "exposed areas" or through a European arms pool;
(3) Agreement among NATO members to commit forces to NATO, under a non-discriminatory formula so designed as to include all German forces (except internal security forces);
(4) Further integration of the NATO command structure and logistics system, by protocol or administrative reform;
(5) Strengthening the authority of SACEUR regarding deployment of forces committed to him;
(6) German assurances against any attempt to modify existing frontiers by force.

d. Continuing to seek eventual German reunification on the basis of freedom and the maximum possibility of association with the West.

5. Seek to reverse divisive trends in Western Europe by developing political and economic strength and cohesion which will enhance the European capacity and will to resist Communist subversion and neutralism. Under present conditions, Soviet military aggression against Western Europe does not appear to be imminent and major Soviet efforts are devoted to dividing and weakening the Western alliance.

6. Foster all practical measures for a greater degree of integration of Western Europe, emphasizing political and economic aspects at this stage and encouraging European initiative and responsibility so far as consistent with U.S. objectives. Specifically, encourage closer ties between France and Germany and the greatest feasible degree of UK association with its continental allies.

7. Continue to seek the strengthening of NATO in a manner which places primary emphasis on its deterrent effect, with due regard for political and economic capabilities and for psychological factors. For this purpose we should seek the full exploitation of developing nuclear capabilities and a generally understood and accepted strategy for forward defense of the NATO area.

8. Be prepared, subject to consultation with legislative leaders of both parties and to appropriate legislative authority, to commit the U.S. to some or all of the following, only if necessary as a quid pro quo for commitments on the part of European nations (including the UK) necessary for the carrying out of the above program of action:

a. Maintain forces in Europe over a substantial period.
b. Accept increased NATO authority over such forces as it assigns to NATO, to the extent necessary to provide acceptable safeguards as to German rearmament.
c. Agree to an extension of the duration of NATO for a reasonable period.
d. Continue to aid NATO countries to improve their forces and share nuclear information with them.
e. [Transfer nuclear weapons to its NATO allies.]*

*Defense and JCS propose deletion. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]
f. Channel its military aid through any European arms pool in order to enhance the pool's authority.

g. Continue efforts to obtain U.S. objectives for the development of a sound, expanding and increasingly integrated European economy through such measures as off-shore procurement, technical assistance, and adaptation of its foreign economic policies with respect to trade, convertibility, payments, etc.

Paragraph 9 has been deleted.

10. Seek to induce France to cooperate in achieving this program of action. For this purpose, attempt to convince France (e.g., by slowing down U.S. aid to France, by letting France become aware of joint U.S.–UK military review of the possibility of alternative strategic groupings excluding France) that her rejection of such a program will present her with alternatives far less attractive to France. As a tactical matter, we should act without French approval or cooperation (leaving to France opportunity later to cooperate) [if such action appears likely]† [because such action is most likely]‡ to induce ultimate French acceptance of the program and not to jeopardize attainment of our objectives. If it appears that French reactions will defeat one or more of our objectives, our policy should be governed by the results of the reappraisal contemplated in par. 11.

REAPPRAISAL OF BASIC OBJECTIVES

State Proposal

11. The Secretary of State should report to the Council not later than October 28, 1954, whether in his opinion the foregoing program of action can be carried through successfully. In the event that the Council at that time believes that the above program of action no longer appears attainable, the Council should then be prepared to determine what objectives the U.S. should pursue in the light of conditions then existing and the answers to the following questions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JCS Proposal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11. If within a reasonable period (approximately 30 days) it becomes evident that the foregoing program of action cannot be carried through successfully, the U.S. should act nevertheless to obtain the following three goals required for U.S. security: German sovereignty, German rearmament, and retention of a West Germany oriented toward the West. If achievement of these goals must be accomplished without the cooperation of France and/or other major allies, due consideration must be given to the following questions in the development of U.S. action:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†Proposed by State. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]
‡Proposed by Defense. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]
a. Assuming our continued purpose to maintain (1) an effective deterrent to Soviet aggression and (2) the means for effective defense of the United States and areas vital to it, could a feasible strategy be devised for the defense of Western Europe:

(a) Without German participation?
(b) Without French participation?
(c) Without the participation of both France and Germany?

What basic changes in U.S. military dispositions and commitment of resources would be required to carry out each strategy?

b. If the U.S., with or without the UK, should proceed with the rearming of Germany over a French veto, what would be the ultimate effect on (1) France, (2) Germany and (3) European stability and vulnerability in the cold war?

c. How would the political and economic integration of Europe be affected by French refusal to participate therein?

d. What is the likely course of UK policy over the next few years with respect to European integration and German rearmament?

e. What would be the political effect in the German Federal Republic and on the future orientation of Germany, if the raising of forces in a sovereign German Federal Republic were postponed for a substantial time with or without German admission to NATO?

f. If Germany were unified and neutralized with restricted armed forces, what would be the probable course of its policy, and the effect on its vulnerability in the cold war and on the stability of Western Europe?

g. To what extent should the U.S. require formal agreements permitting the immediate use of nuclear weapons by the NATO command in the event of aggression? To what extent would pressing for such formal agreements seriously impair allied cooperation or the prospects for successfully carrying out the agreed strategy?

---

Report on the Secretary of State's Conversations With Chancellor Adenauer and Foreign Secretary Eden, September 16–17, 1954

TOP SECRET

Members of Party:

The Secretary of State
Mr. H. Struve Hensel, Assistant Secretary, Department of Defense
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs
Mr. Robert R. Bowie, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Mr. Roderic L. O'Connor, Personal Secretary

1 The source text was drafted by Kidd on instruction by Merchant as a background report for officers in the Department of State who were primarily concerned with the matters to be discussed at the forthcoming Nine-Power Conference in London.
Mr. Ben Moore, Chief, Office of Regional Affairs  
Mr. Coburn Kidd, Officer in Charge of German Political Affairs  
Miss Mildred Asbjornson, Secretary  
Mr. Frank Madden, Security Officer

Schedule:

Departure Washington, 5:30 p.m., September 15  
Arrival Bonn, 2:30 p.m., September 16  
Departure Bonn, 10:15 a.m., September 17  
Arrival London, 12:00 noon, September 17  
Departure London, 8:00 p.m., September 17  
Arrival Watertown, 8:00 a.m., September 18

The purpose of the Secretary’s visit to Bonn and London on September 16th and 17th was to ascertain at first hand, from Chancellor Adenauer and Foreign Minister Eden, the results of the latter’s tour through the European capitals and to obtain an estimate of the possibilities of Mr. Eden’s plan and the prospects for the proposed nine-Power conference on September 28th. The following report represents the impressions received by the Secretary’s party, which may be supplemented by reports received from our Embassies. The Secretary made departure or arrival statements at Washington, Bonn, London, and Watertown, which are appended hereto.²

Bonn

The Secretary was welcomed at Bonn with a cordiality which appeared to indicate that much significance was attached to his visit. Friendly crowds lined the streets to and from the airport. Chancellor Adenauer showed every mark of personal consideration and confidence. His chief advisers eagerly utilized the opportunity for frank and responsive discussions. The Chancellor had in fact excused himself from important parliamentary debates on the John case ³ with the curt remark that his conversations with the Secretary would be of decisive importance for Germany.

In the ensuing talks, which were continued from midafternoon to near midnight without interruption except for a state dinner at Schloss Schaumberg, the Chancellor touched upon general policy towards France, the personality and politics of the French premier, the continued importance to Germany of the integration policy, immediate objectives of sovereignty and German defense participation, revision of the Contractual agreements, utility and shortcomings of the Eden plan for revival of the Brussels Pact, and the importance of interim

² Not printed.
³ Regarding the Otto John case, see footnote 3, p. 1027.
measures to forestall further delays. En route to the airport on Friday morning the Chancellor particularly reverted to the subject of interim measures. The Chancellor was assisted by State Secretary Hallstein, Under Secretary Blankenhorn, his confidential adviser Globke, Blank (head of the German defense agency), Ophuls and Grewe (legal advisers), and von Herwarth, Ambassador Conant and Mr. Dowling participated in the discussions, with Mr. Hensel, Mr. Merchant, and Mr. Bowie.

With regard to general policy toward France, the Chancellor was of opinion that the Secretary had done wisely in omitting Paris from his schedule. He felt that it was a bold move, since Mendes-France would no doubt take it personally; but on the whole he felt it would have a salutary effect. Without indicating any ill-will towards Mendes-France, the Chancellor appeared to regard him with detachment as a man who, either from his own personality or from the exigencies of French politics, was an exponent of an opportunist type of politics which could be dangerous. His dealings with the Soviets, or possible dealings with the Communists, should thus be explained, in the Chancellor's opinion, on the grounds of opportunism rather than any pro-Communist leanings. The Chancellor felt that Mendes-France was primarily interested in economic and financial matters, and could probably be most easily influenced on this side.

The Chancellor said that so much time had passed that it was imperative for the Federal Republic to be given its sovereignty and be allowed to participate in the defense effort in the near future if continued support for the policies he represented were to be expected. He felt that NATO membership was the most suitable answer to the question of defense participation. With regard to sovereignty, he thought that this might be most simply effected by declarations of the respective occupying Powers, ending the occupation status while retaining their rights founded on international agreements with respect to Berlin and matters pertaining to Germany as a whole (unification). He said that he would not wish to go back to the Bundestag for ratification of more than one document, namely an agreement on stationing of forces. He thought that the rest of the provisions in the Contractuals could be taken care of by comparatively minor revisions. Some of the provisions

---

*A 15-page memorandum of conversation of Dulles' afternoon meeting with Adenauer, drafted by Bowie, is in the PPS files, lot 65 D 101, "Chronological 1954". A brief telegraphic account of that meeting is contained in telegram 796 from Bonn, Sept. 17 (662A.00/9-1754). A summary of Dulles' after-dinner conversation with Adenauer on Sept. 16, contained in Dulles' memorandum of conversation on the same date, is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 359. The Department of State summarized the results of Dulles' talks with Adenauer in a telegram 981 to Rome, Sept. 19, which was repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, Brussels, The Hague, and Luxembourg (740.5/9-1954).

*Dulles' memorandum summarizing this conversation with Adenauer en route to the airport on Sept. 17, is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 359.*
were now out of date; these could perhaps simply be dropped. Pending the conclusion of these revisions, the position of our forces would continue under existing arrangements. The Chancellor's legal adviser, Grewe, gave the impression that the revision of the Contractuals would be carried out in a conciliatory and expeditious manner at the technical level. In general we gained the impression that a good deal of the substance of the Contractuals may be retained if the more important issues of sovereignty and defense participation are resolved in the near future. If the latter are not resolved, sniping at the Contractuals may continue to increase.

The Chancellor emphasized that there should be no mistake about the continued importance of the integration policy. So long as he was in office this would remain an integral part of German policy. This suggested one of the shortcomings of Eden's plan. The Brussels Pact solution was being put forward because (a) it avoided any supra-national features, and (b) it would provide for the British association which was so important to France. The combination of these two facts, he pointed out, would result in the speed and level of future integration becoming dependent upon British decision. The Chancellor hoped that means could be found to insure that adoption of the Brussels Pact solution would not preclude future progress toward integration.

A second weakness of the Eden plan was of course that it might be subject to the same fate as the EDC, namely, that after being agreed to by Mendes-France, there would be further delay or refusal on the part of the French parliament to ratify. In order to obviate the disastrous effects of such a result in Germany, the Chancellor felt that it would be of highest importance to undertake certain interim measures. These measures (which have been the subject of a State Department memorandum now being studied by Defense) would include enlarged activity of the Blank Office, German participation in build-up planning with authorization to proceed with certain preliminary measures such as construction of barracks, and recruitment and training on a limited scale (especially air-force training). The Chancellor felt that the US and UK had this leverage in their hands, as well as the power to recognize German sovereignty, and that such interim measures might be necessary in order to obtain a decision from France as distinct from discussion. The Secretary said that we would urge upon the British and French the desirability of interim measures, and that we would be prepared to proceed alone with the British to the extent feasible, if the French declined.

These were the main points covered in the discussions at Bonn. Assistant Secretary Hensel had a good discussion with Blank on the
subject of interim measures, and Mr. Dowling, Mr. Merchant, and Mr. Bowie had more detailed discussions with the Chancellor’s advisers. It was evident from this visit that the Chancellor was at pains to coordinate his policy with that of the U.S., and was relying a great deal upon the common front with the U.S. to obtain the objectives important to the Federal Republic. The Chancellor told the Secretary that he would not attend the nine-Power meeting unless the Secretary did.⁶

London

The discussions at London proceeded in a very different atmosphere from those at Bonn. In the Secretary’s arrival statement, he stressed his admiration for Mr. Eden’s statesmanlike efforts and the fundamental importance of the Anglo-American alliance. The Secretary had lunch at Downing Street with Churchill and Eden. Mr. Eden and the officials of the Foreign Office extended the welcome of old friends. Nevertheless, as the discussions progressed throughout a three-hour session in Mr. Eden’s office, it became apparent that the British were engaged in an uphill climb, seemed tired, and had not got as far as they hoped.⁷

Mr. Eden began with an account of his trip to the various capitals. There had been general apprehension after the breakup of EDC, and they had asked themselves what could be done. They were much against setting up another duplicating military organization under NATO. EDC had appeared tolerable because it had certain advantages, but no other had any attraction for them. They had thus asked themselves what were the possibilities which would not involve some elaborate military organization. One possibility would be to set up a new organization, but there were so many international organizations already. Therefore it had occurred to them to take a new look at the Brussels Pact, which might at least meet part of the political problem. If Germany were admitted into NATO, the Brussels Pact in its present form would be something of an anachronism, and accordingly they thought it might be revised and conformed to meet German membership. They also had Italy in mind. It had not been their intention to use the Brussels Pact except as a political instrument for extending certain guarantees to Germany and assuring the rest of Europe with regard to the EDC type of guarantees.

⁶For Adenauer’s summary of his meeting with Dulles, see his Erinnerungen 1953–1955, pp. 308–312.
⁷In telegram 932 to Rome, Sept. 19, which was repeated to London, Paris, Brussels, The Hague, Luxembourg, and Bonn, the Department of State summarized the results of Dulles’ 3-hour meeting with Eden; for a copy of this summary, see Department of State file 740.5/9–1954.
Mr. Eden said he had proceeded to Brussels with no more of a plan than this in mind. He had been most gratified at the reception. He had feared that the Belgians and Dutch might take the line that the Brussels Pact was designed to be primarily a protection against the Germans, but Spaak and the Dutch were quite receptive. The Dutch had produced the idea that some of the German assurances might more appropriately be given through the Brussels Treaty than through NATO. This idea seemed to him worth examining. The French would like it. He thought that on the whole the Germans would too. In any event he had found support in Bonn and Rome as well as Brussels for this scheme plus German membership in NATO. (Sir Frank Roberts said that the Germans were “enthusiastic”. He had asked twice in order not to be mistaken about the expression.)

At Paris Mr. Eden found the first day depressing. He found that Mendes-France welcomed the Brussels Pact idea with eagerness, as a means of building in a large part of the EDC controls over Germany without any supranational features. It was apparent that this would involve prolonged negotiations and difficulties with respect to the Germans. Mendes-France also thought of the Brussels Pact revision as a preliminary to German membership in NATO. Mr. Eden had replied that this was no good at all. Everyone wanted Germany into NATO, and the French would stand alone. There had been a long argument about this. On the second day Mendes-France said that he recognized German membership in NATO was inescapable, but he would have difficulties with the French Assembly. Mendes-France recalled some bothersome resolution passed by the Assembly in 1952 against German membership. Mendes-France would wish the matter to be so presented that the Brussels Pact would appear to be at least equivalent in importance to NATO. The French position would then be: we have got so much in the Brussels Pact, that we might be willing to accept the Germans into NATO. It was just the opposite for the British. Their primary interest was in NATO. In any event Eden thought that these two matters must take effect simultaneously. He had accepted Mendes-France’s appeal not to represent the results of the Paris discussions as French acceptance of German membership in NATO.

This brought Mr. Eden to the question of safeguards. What would these be? One suggestion of Mendes-France might be worth considering. Mendes-France did not exclude nondiscrimination in theory, but he desired some arrangement on the manufacture of armaments as to who should make what. He also wanted some form of inspections. He would like the UK to join in this. Mr. Eden saw no reason why the British should not take some share of the responsibility. Ismay had
said that his organization could help provide inspectors. That was the sort of thing that the Brussels Treaty could do.

Another suggestion of Mendes-France had been that it was difficult for NATO to provide ceilings. It was a little odd for the same organization to have the tasks both of building up and holding down military preparedness. NATO might set the minimums and Brussels the maximums. These were the main features of Mendes-France's ideas. The French wished to make the Brussels arrangement look as important as possible in order to demonstrate the British commitment.

One disquieting thing that had occurred to Eden was to find the means of finishing up the Occupation Statute. Mendes-France had said that a Saar solution was a precondition. Eden had replied that this was impossible. There had been no more argument—perhaps no agreement either. Eden believed that Mendes-France would do his best to obtain German membership in NATO; but the more we could dress up the Brussels Pact, the better would be his chances. Mendes-France was conscious of the risks of failure; he had no taste for a second Brussels. Eden thought that Mendes-France perceived that to do nothing would be equally fatal. Mendes-France was apprehensive about France again finding herself alone.

Mr. Eden said that the UK would be willing to extend to the Brussels Pact the same assurances they had made for EDC.

In sum, Mr. Eden asked, the question is whether we should take the risk of a nine-Power meeting? The second question was whether there was anything else that could be done by way of preparation? All countries were in favor of German membership in NATO; the French were resigned to it if the Brussels Pact could be sufficiently dressed up; therefore the UK was in favor of a meeting.

With regard to preparations, Mr. Eden thought it would be an excellent idea for Mr. Merchant to go to Paris, as had been suggested.

Mr. Eden had incidentally talked with Lange, of Norway, while he was in Paris. Lange had just seen Mendes-France after Eden's first conversation. Lange had the impression that Mendes-France was sincere, and Eden increasingly felt that Mendes-France was willing to go along.

Sir Frank Roberts mentioned that the French had made one or two references to the US, not in the sense of raising new demands, but with the idea of US participation in controls, e.g. over atomic matters.

Mr. Eden said that Mendes-France was not against ending the occupation regime. One of the advantages of the nine-Power meeting was that it would provide an opportunity to wind this up.

The Secretary said that when he had expressed his admiration for
Mr. Eden's statesmanship in all that he tried to accomplish on his tour, it was no idle compliment but sincerely meant. It would be wrong however to minimize the difficulties confronting the US. The hope of European integration had had great appeal to the American people and Congress. This was reflected in speeches and legislation. Aid to Europe had been tied to consummation of the EDC. The result of the French rejection of EDC was a shock. It would be used by isolationists as justification for moving toward the type of policy they recommended. Several of the Democratic Senators who had been mainstays of the program were now about ready to quit. Many were now in favor of bringing our troops home. There was a problem in trying to sell a substitute policy. The Secretary had not yet received the views of the Joint Chiefs or of the Congress, but he might say in a general way that it was a policy of the Joint Chiefs to concentrate on mobile striking power of sea and air forces, with land forces retained in the strategic reserve at home. Mr. Eden would recall that two divisions had been withdrawn from Korea last spring; four more were being withdrawn. We were looking forward to getting our forces out of Japan. We were not prepared to build up a land power in the SEATO area, where our contribution would be primarily one of sea and air power. The presence of US divisions in Europe was thus an exception to our general policy. Certain members of our Joint Chiefs feel that we should reduce that land commitment. No decision has yet been reached, but there is also a feeling in Congress that our position should be adjusted to that strategic concept. The Secretary felt that it was highly doubtful that Congress would be willing to repeat the commitments it offered for EDC to a new concept. Our traditional policy for over a hundred years had been to avoid commitments on the European continent. The position of the US since World War II had been entirely different from this traditional policy. It was not easy to make such a turn around. Our rationalization of this course was based on the assumption that something new and stronger was being erected in Europe.

The Secretary said that it was the President's desire as well as his own to salvage as much as possible out of the existing situation. However, it could not be taken for granted that they would succeed. Continued participation of the US on the past scale was doubtful. Congress had been sold on the other idea, and it would now be difficult to sell a substitute. The Secretary foresaw that it would involve at least some loss. He hoped that it would not be material or decisive. He merely wished to point out that any plan based on the assumption that the US would go along as in the past would be a fallacy. This did not of course mean that we would pull the rug out from what was going on; it meant merely that we could not put as much into it.
Mr. Eden commented that that was worrying.

"Probably to you," the Secretary replied, "but no one else appears to take it very seriously."

Mr. Eden said that the support of the US was crucial. The British wanted Germany into NATO. They attached almost as much importance to binding Germany to the Western orbit by this means as they did to a German military contribution.

The Secretary said that he did not suggest that there was a better way. At any rate he had not thought of it. As he had remarked to Adenauer, the future policy of the US would be subject to pressures. He could not predict the outcome. He was in no position yet to make commitments. Our position must necessarily remain fluid until the views of the Joint Chiefs, the National Security Council, and the President have been taken into account, in the light of the general political possibilities. It was also necessary to see how the Congressional elections came out. This prevented us from making definitive commitments at the present time.

The Secretary said the general scheme or conception which Mr. Eden had developed seemed the best that could be devised to meet the situation which confronts us. The whole conception had been brilliant and statesmanlike.

The Secretary had a few comments on procedure. He would hope that something could be done in the way of keeping alive the idea of closer integration at least on the Continent. Adenauer had mentioned that one of his worries about the Brussels Pact scheme was that there could be no more rapid development of integration than the UK's pace. Mr. Eden had mentioned the possibility of including something in the preamble suggesting that at least other Powers could be free and should be encouraged to move in that direction. The Secretary saw no harm in this and thought it might do some good. Adenauer had said: "The Brussels Pact is being used because, first, it is not supranational, and secondly, because the UK is in it; the combination of these two factors amounts to a block against future integration."

Mr. Eden exclaimed that the last thing he desired was to stop any movement toward integration. He thought they could do something about this. Norway would like it; he was informed that Yugoslavia would like it too—although he was not quite sure that he wanted the Yugoslavs to like it.

The Secretary said that he had originally had that idea about NATO, but had come to have misgivings about Italy and Norway. NATO had ended up by becoming primarily a military alliance rather than a group of nations with common traditions. This accounted for the failure of Article 2. The Greeks and Turks were another example
of good nations, with a strong people, which did not however have the same traditions and concept as Western Europe. If NATO could have been held to a smaller group, it might have become more effective. If the Brussels Pact could be held to a smaller group with more in common, it might be to the good.

Mr. Eden said that that was exactly their thought. The Brussels Pact did not seem to be Norway's particular place.

The Secretary said that he thought it was a sound concept to have NATO press for more defense, leaving any limitations to be imposed by another organization. He felt that it would be advisable to permit exceptions and departures from the rule to be decided by less than unanimous vote. The Versailles Treaty had been the most thorough instrument for restrictions ever devised, yet it had not worked. Give one country a veto and the results may be negative. For example, Blank was already talking about 24 divisions, 12 in being and 12 in reserve.

Broadly speaking, it seemed to the Secretary that the lines along which Mr. Eden was working were as sound as could be expected under the circumstances. However, it struck him that it was one thing to reach agreement in principle; another thing to reach agreement in writing. Who was going to redraft the Brussels Treaty? Would Adenauer participate? Would the French participate? The US was not a party to this Treaty, but if the Brussels Treaty were to become an adjunct to NATO we should have a very vital interest in it. In the past, one of the best guarantees of a successful conference had been the preparatory working parties. The Secretary felt that it would be a disaster to have the nine-Power meeting fail like Brussels. The possibility of failure would of course constitute a pressure on the conference, which would lead people to try to agree; even so, was there not need for some preliminary exchange of views on specific questions? What would Mendes-France be willing to put up to the Assembly? The Secretary said he could see Mendes’ difficulty about admission of Germany as an equal partner in NATO. French preconditions might exceed what Germany or the US could take. There thus seemed to be advantages in having a working party. It would be a gamble to go into this conference with Mendes-France if we had no guidance as to what Adenauer could accept. How could this be avoided? Is Mendes-France to be left to work all alone?

Mr. Eden said that they had started with mere ideas. They had found easy agreement with Benelux, Bonn, Rome, and the US. The French would no doubt make it difficult. In answer to the question how far one proposed to go at London, he thought perhaps it would suffice to reach agreements in principle, with the working parties to set to
work thereafter. With regard to ending the occupation regime, he saw no reason why a working party of four should not start immediately.

The Secretary agreed that on that phase there was a certain amount of work to be done. He had spoken to Hoyer-Millar and Poncet about it that morning. We wished to save some of the provisions of the Contractuals, for example, with regard to Berlin, sharing of expenses, the status of forces. Working out agreements on this phase could go ahead. The Secretary said that we were of course in the position to agree to restoring German sovereignty. His earlier remarks about commitments had referred to US forces in Europe. It was reasonably certain that the Senate would accept a protocol to the NATO treaty to bring Germany in and to extend the NATO area to Germany.

Mr. Eden reverted to the point that what was worrying was the inability of the US to do for the plan under discussion what had been done for EDC.

The Secretary said that he was informed that the April 16th assurances had been difficult to obtain even for EDC. Mr. Merchant confirmed this. The Secretary added that he did not say they could not be obtained; merely that they could not before Congress reconvened; and the odds were against it.

Mr. Eden said that psychologically people would say that just because the Germans get an army, they would not want the Americans to disappear.

The Secretary said that we were much more likely to stay if there were something like a German army.

Mr. Eden said that they would try a redraft of the Brussels Treaty, omitting anything prejudicial to Germany.

The Secretary asked whether Mendes-France had not thought of adding twenty articles.

Sir Frank Roberts said that this would be a protocol.

Mr. Eden said that it would probably have to be as binding as a treaty. The British would circulate a revised text of the treaty before the meeting. Mendes-France had said that he would send around his suggestions within the next day or so, to all of the NATO countries and also Germany—not his original document, but his proposals on arms manufacture, etc.

The Secretary inquired about the possibility of increasing the powers of SACEUR.

Mr. Eden replied that General Gruenther had said that it was quite possible. With regard to logistics, everything would be operated through NATO rather than Brussels.

The Secretary said that Adenauer considered this important.

Mr. Eden acknowledged that SHAPE could not operate armament
controls. This was something the Brussels Powers would have to do themselves. The principle should be, in other words, that nothing should be taken away from NATO (SACEUR) which it was at present doing.

The Secretary asked whether it was wise to have a meeting until we had seen drafts in advance. He did not think Mendes-France was very flexible.

Sir Frank Roberts said that Mendes-France had had this on his mind and was shy about circulating a paper for that very reason, lest the others jump to the conclusion that he was repeating the Brussels situation. Consequently he intended to send out his general ideas only. His officials said it would be this weekend.

Mr. Eden said that what he had had in mind was that the nine-Power meeting would firm up what he understood to be the results of his swing around the circuit. It would confirm the understanding that Germany be admitted to NATO, sovereignty be restored, etc. On the basis of this, they could try to draft documents. Perhaps they could authorize a redraft of the Brussels Treaty. We might utilize some of our NATO people to work out the details. Eden did not feel sure about Adenauer. The British and the French might wish something more than Adenauer would be prepared to accept. Mendes-France had said that it was hard to get in contact with Adenauer at this time. That had been one of the difficulties at Brussels, the lack of contact between Mendes-France and Adenauer. However, Mr. Eden was convinced that the momentum for a solution could not be sustained without a meeting. He was a little frightened about how Adenauer might react in an exchange of papers. Mr. Eden recalled that the Germans had suggested that a meeting be held as soon as possible; the Italians, “a little later”; Mendes-France, “not too late”.

The Secretary asked whether Mr. Eden intended to come to the UN Assembly. Mr. Eden said he thought not; he would stay and work on this.

“Really I am flummoxed,” Mr. Eden said, “particularly about Franco-German agreement.”

The Secretary asked whether Adenauer had indicated that he would come to the meeting. Mr. Eden said that he had never shown any signs of not coming. Perhaps he had cooled off. Adenauer had a meeting with the Turkish President on October 2nd. There were of course risks in a meeting—but there appeared to be equally as many in not meeting.

The Secretary mentioned Adenauer’s interest in “interim measures”. He supposed that these could also be dealt with on a four-Power basis.
It would be a difficult thing to revamp the Brussels Pact and find an expression of German assurances in a form acceptable to both the Germans and the French.

The British Under Secretary said that he should have thought that a condition precedent for this would be a successful meeting of Mendes-France and Adenauer.

After some further general discussion it was agreed that an effort should be made through the proposal of an agenda for the conference to obtain Mendes-France's agreement to the following program:

1. Further progress towards European unity by expansion of the Brussels Pact so as to admit Germany and Italy;
2. Admission of Germany to NATO.
3. The working out of "accompanying arrangements" by the Federal Republic and the occupying Powers, who should at the same time declare their intentions with regard to restoration of German sovereignty.

A paper to the above effect was drafted by Sir Frank Roberts. After a brief discussion of this and the text of a communiqué, the meeting broke up at 6:30 p.m., when the Secretary's party left for the airport. Before bidding farewell to Mr. Eden, the Secretary again mentioned the importance Adenauer attached to interim measures in case the NATO-Brussels Pact plan miscarried. Mr. Eden assented in general.¹

Conclusions

In the discussions at Bonn and London, supplemented by the reports from Paris, certain things were apparent on the surface:

The urgency of German admission to NATO and restoration of German sovereignty is a contemporary reality acknowledged by almost everyone, the UK, Benelux, the Germans, Italy, Norway, Greece, Canada, and the US. In contrast to this Mendes-France's original plan seemed as outmoded as a superannuated vehicle: increased British assurances to France, with the transfer of EDC restrictions to the Brussels Pact minus supranational features, in a manner so as to hold down German manufacture of armaments and build up French heavy industry. When Roberts remonstrated about this, Mendes' advisers, Boris and Soutout, replied that the point was to satisfy the French Assembly. The Foreign Office's annotation of this passage in the telegram is: "This is it."

Nevertheless the French have a point to which the British and most of the other countries are willing to accede in wishing for certain restrictions upon German rearmament. Adenauer has acknowledged his

¹ For Churchill's summary of Dulles' visit to London, see his letter to Eisenhower, Sept. 17, p. 1225; Dulles summarized his visit to London in a personal letter to Eisenhower on Sept. 18, p. 1227.
willingness to accept the EDC 12-division limitation, NATO controls, and other restrictions on a nondiscriminatory basis (provided that the only restrictions on the initial German rearmament are those voluntarily assumed). This appears to provide an area for negotiation. The British are hopeful that French demands may be reduced to proportions acceptable to Adenauer and the US when confronted by the united stand of eight other nations, and that Adenauer will be amenable to restrictions which appear reasonable to the US and six other nations as well as France.

It is evident that the US has one very powerful means of influence, to which at least the British are sensitive, in the suggestion that we may revise our basic strategy. The British will work hard to avoid this. An additional source of influence, which the British count on, is Mendes-France's obvious desire to avoid a repetition of his experience at Brussels, in which he found himself isolated. The British believe he will work hard to prevent this.

These are the positive elements, out of which, with a little luck, the British hope to sustain the momentum towards a solution, in Mr. Eden's phrase.

The negative elements latent not very far below the surface include the following:

(1) The British appear to have no precise plans for what should be done in case their plan goes amiss. Moreover they are taking the chance, without finding out in advance, of Adenauer and Mendes-France confronting each other at the conference with positions not sufficiently flexible to be modified in the course of negotiations.

(2) The elements in the French Assembly on whom Mendes-France must depend for approval of any plan he presents, are utilizing the situation to bring about his downfall, with the hope of forming a new Government which, when defeated, could call for general elections, which would either improve or restore the inter-party balance of forces to what it was before Mendes-France's advent.

(3) The Germans count upon an astute policy of self-restraint coupled with rigid identification of their position with the US as a means of making the French break if they do not bend.

Confronted with these mixed features in the situation, the Secretary summarized a cautious but not discouraging reaction in the following words in his Watertown statement:

"It is apparent, indeed it has long been apparent, that there is no adequate substitute for the European Defense Community. Nevertheless we must do the best that we can. Many minds are resourcefully studying what next steps are in order. We hope that sufficient preparatory work can be done during the coming week to justify a preliminary meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the countries principally concerned during the week following that."
“It would be a mistake to assume that any acceptable solution has been fully developed. It would be an even greater mistake to adopt a negative approach which would result in the disintegration of what has been built, since the war, out of the sacrifices, the efforts, the aspirations of many.

“The United States is deeply concerned with the maintenance of peace and security on the European continent. European security is intimately connected with our own. We shall, therefore, continue our association with European planning to achieve those ends. There are many European leaders who retain hope of real achievement. They know that we will support them in their creative efforts.”

740.5/9–1754: Telegram

The Ambassador in Norway (Strong) to the Department of State

SECRET    PRIORITY

OSLO, September 17, 1954—2 p. m.

195. 1. British Ambassador queried last night re Foreign Office report of Norwegian interest in possibility joining revised Brussels Pact. London telegram 1317, September 15 to Department. He opined this report based on exploratory conversation at initiative Norwegian Ambassador London some days ago. Since then Norwegian Government had considered possibility joining revised Brussels Pact and related matters at Cabinet meeting September 14. British Ambassador saw Lange late that day and was given résumé Norwegian thinking.

2. Lange told British Ambassador basic premise Norwegian thinking was that new formula for participation German Federal Republic in West European Defense system must be acceptable to France. Norway believes best formula would be admission German Federal Republic to NATO with safeguards on German rearmament. If this impracticable inclusion German Federal Republic in Brussels Pact may be workable alternative, Norway foresees two possibilities here. (a) concomitant German membership in NATO and pact with safeguards on German rearmament provided through pact arrangements and (b) German adherence to pact only as transitional arrangement. In either case Norwegian Government would be willing consider adherence Norway to Brussels Pact if this would contribute to solution of problem. Norway could not however join revised pact if revisions gave it supranational character. Also, Norway would require assurance that revised pact would not alter existing NATO structure providing separate northern European command.

1 Repeated to London, Bonn, and Paris; pouchcd to Copenhagen.

2 Not printed; it informed the Department of State that Norway “surprised and greatly pleased” the British by exhibiting interest in the possibility of joining a revised Brussels Agreement (740.5/9–1454).
3. Lange also told British Ambassador he had been unable consult Danish Government owing latter’s preoccupation with economic difficulties. He thought Danes would follow Norwegian lead in joining pact but if not Norway was prepared act alone.

4. Later last night Skylstad, Secretary-General Norwegian Foreign Office, was queried re Norwegian attitude toward possible resuscitation of Brussels Pact as device for bringing German Federal Republic into west Europe and defense system. It was not disclosed to him that this Embassy already had information from British sources. He on his part did not disclose that this matter had been subject of recent Cabinet consideration. He did review Norwegian position along lines of paragraph 2 above.

5. Skylstad made two further points. As practical matter Norwegian adherence to Brussels Pact could hardly be of great significance as Norway had no military strength to contribute outside its own borders. Importance if any of Norwegian adherence would be psychological in terms of (a) allaying French fears of being associated with Germans in small group of nations and (b) easing German acceptance of limitations on its armaments which could be applied also to Norway and other peripheral countries. Second point was that possibility of Norway joining pact had not been discussed with Storting. Skylstad believes there would be considerable Storting resistance to this move.

STRONG

110.11 DU/9-1754

The Secretary of State to Prime Minister Mendès-France

LONDON, September 17, 1954.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As I leave for home I want to tell you again of my regret that I was unable to come to Paris again on this trip, and resume the talks which we had in Paris when I came there last July.

I believe my meetings with Adenauer and Eden have been useful in developing means of dealing with the problem which confronts all of us of the Atlantic community. Eden gave me a full account of his talks just concluded with you. As a result of this trip I am even more impressed with the need for speedy action and I hope and trust that the projected meeting of nine will mark a definitive step in our progress. I

1 The text of this message was transmitted to the Embassy in Paris in identical telegram 201, Sept. 17, which was repeated to the Department of State as telegram 1391.

2 Documentation concerning Dulles’ visit to Paris, July 13–14, is presented in volume vi; for a record of the meeting on July 13 which dealt with the EDC, see the memorandum of July 13, p. 1018.
am looking forward greatly to seeing you then. All this I hoped to tell you on the telephone, but it proved impossible to establish the connection.

I am asking Murphy my Deputy Under Secretary to ask to see you in Paris on his return from Rome so that you could in this way communicate more intimately than is possible by cable. The President and I hope very much to see you later on in New York and Washington.

Sincerely yours,

Foster Dulles

---

Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower"

SECRET

Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower

[LONDON, September 17, 1954.]

My Dear Friend: Thank you very much for your message of September 15. I am glad I was a good reporter. I made my living as a journalist. I believe you have them in your country too.

2. Foster lunched with me and Anthony today and we had an agreeable and helpful talk. As you know, E.D.C. was very different from the grand alliance theme I opened at Strasbourg in August, 1950. I disliked on military grounds the Pleven European army plan which began with mixing races in companies if not platoons. At that time when I saw you in Paris I was talking of it as "sludgy amalgam". However, when I came to power again I swallowed my prejudices because I was led to believe that it was the only way in which the French could be persuaded to accept the limited German army which was my desire. I do not blame the French for rejecting E.D.C. but only for inventing it. Their harshness to Adenauer in wasting three years of his life and much of his power is a tragedy. Also I accepted the American wish to show all possible patience and not to compromise the chances of E.D.C. by running N.A.T.O. as a confusing rival.

3. All this time I kept one aim above all others in view, namely a German contribution to the defence of an already uniting Europe. This, I felt, was your aim too, and I am sure we both liked the plan better when the intermingling was excluded from all units lower than a division. But it was to get a German army looking eastward in the line with us that commanded my thought, and also I felt yours, with all its military authority. Although the French have rejected E.D.C. I do hope and pray that you and I will still keep the German contribution as our No. 1 target and also to get them on our side instead of on the other.

---

1 *Ante*, p. 1197.
4. When Anthony recently proposed taking the Brussels Treaty of 1948 turned upside down, as a model for preserving the cause of European unity, coupled with a variant of N.A.T.O. to include Germany, I thought it was a first rate plan. I hope earnestly that it will commend itself to you. It may lead on as time passes to United Europe and also gain for us both what we have tried for so hard, namely, the German comradeship. Now Foster tells me that there is a widespread feeling in America that it has not got any, or at least enough, "supra-national" characteristics. I hope this will not prevent you giving it all the help you can. European federation may grow but it cannot be built. It must be a volunteer not a conscript.

5. After all if the realities can be achieved and if Gruenther can form a front including French and German armies by whose side we and you stand, we need not worry too much about the particular theories which are favoured or rebuffed. Above all, we should not lose more time when what we have worked so long and hard to win may now be within our grasp.

6. I have been distressed to hear talk (not from Foster) about the withdrawal of American forces from Europe and even that a German contingent might fill the gap. If the U.S. loses or seems to lose its interest in Europe there might well be a landslide into Communism or into a kow-towing to Soviet influence and infiltration which would reduce the continent to satellite status. I really do not see how we British could stay there by ourselves.

7. Forgive me burdening you with all this, but I feel it a great comfort when I am sure our thoughts are marching along the same roads. You may imagine how pleased I was by your applying the word "perfect" to my message to Adenauer.

Kindest regards,

WINSTON

662A.00/9-1854

The Secretary of State to Chancellor Adenauer

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 18, 1954.

I much appreciated the opportunity of talking to you and the chance to secure your views in detail on Thursday and Friday. I am sure this exchange will prove of great value for purposes of our common objectives in forthcoming international meetings. In frank discussions with Eden yesterday I was struck by his evident desire to find

1 This message was transmitted to Bonn in priority telegram 772 of Sept. 18 with instructions that Conant personally deliver it to Adenauer.
mutually satisfactory solution in near future in spite of difficulties that can be foreseen. I stressed to him importance of careful preparation, which I feel is not yet adequate, in advance of nine-power meeting to insure basis for positive accomplishment consistent with continued progress toward genuine European unity which can alone command unreserved support of your Government and mine. Eden is hopeful that Mendes-France will concur in NATO-Brussels Pact solution acceptable to other governments consulted, but awaits more specific information promised by Mendes-France in next few days, which I understand will also be communicated to all the other interested governments.

With kindest regards,

Foster Dulles

740.5/9-1954

The Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 18, 1954.

[My Dear Mr. President:] I had a very friendly and useful stop in London. I first lunched privately with Churchill and Eden. The Prime Minister was in fine shape and sent you his best. He expressed his relief that the "EDC tomfoolery" was over. He said he had only supported it because you wanted it but had never had faith in it. Now we could get German armies to march by our side instead of having a "sludgy amalgam".

Then we had meeting at Foreign Office first on Europe, then on China.

I was disappointed that Eden has not arrived at anything concrete, even in general principles. It seems that Mendes-France has been most evasive. He may be working out his own project on terms which profess to provide for sovereignty of Germany in NATO but attaching conditions unacceptable to Germany, U.S. and perhaps others. He could present these French terms at prospective London Conference and, if they are not accepted, attempt to pass blame to others. This was his Brussels Conference tactic. I find evidence of a rising tide of concern about Mendes-France's Russian contacts. He has killed EDC at least for now and he may be out to kill German admission to NATO.

I said I would attend London Conference. Eden wants September 28. I set in motion some preliminary planning to try to smoke out Mendes-France and concert UK-US thinking before Conference opens. I am reluctant to go into a major conference where there is so little prepara-

1 This message was sent by telegram to President Eisenhower at the Summer White House in Denver, Colo.
tory work. But Eden thinks it necessary to maintain momentum and avoid vacuum. We are agreed a NATO Ministerial meeting would follow short interval devoted to further preparation in detail.

On the China matter, we met on restricted basis. Eden listened with intense interest but was totally non-committal which was natural. He remarked that US action to defend Formosa was understandable and would have wide approval but that the same was not true of Quemoy and other islands near the mainland. I explained large psychological and lesser material relationship of these islands to Formosa but I fear he was not totally convinced. He will let me know shortly his views re appeal to UN.

I am spending weekend on my island and then shall go to NY for UN opening.

Faithfully yours,

Foster

*Documentation concerning China is presented in volume xiv.*

---

740.5/9-1954 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

SECRET

PARIS, September 19, 1954—1 p. m.

1175. Department pass Defense. Department for Secretary. Noform. From Reinhardt. Following message from General Gruenther:

"I met Mendes-France at Marly for one hour Saturday night, with Parodi present. He stated Eden had informed him Thursday of some of my ideas on controls and he desired develop this subject further. He continued: 'As you may know our approach to subject of German rearmament is somewhat different from our British friends.' He explained that when EDC presented to French public, German admission to NATO was pictured as undesirable solution. French Parliament still considers NATO unacceptable and will be difficult task convert them. That is why so necessary to build up Brussels treaty aspect and stress it constantly in presentation to French.

"He said Brussels organization must have certain important functions but essential there be no duplication in military field. How could SHAPE assist?

"I told him of logistic controls we could execute and explained with chart our possible contribution with respect to pipeline operation. I also showed how we could assist in control of supplies. Mendes said all this important and helpful but that it was in purely military operational role. Problem is mainly political one. He wanted agency to control armament manufacture and conduct inspections to insure that military equipment not being manufactured or stored illegally. He wants NATO Commander to report to Brussels organization in performing this mission. He said French still distrustful of Germans and must be assured that unauthorized German build-up cannot take place.

1 Repeated to Bonn for Conant, Rome for Murphy, and London for Aldrich.
"I told Mendes that I felt we could give no assistance in control of armament production. We might be able help in conducting inspections for material in hands troops if that necessary, but we would be reluctant see such assignment given us. I added it was not clear to me how NATO headquarters would operate under Brussels for tasks such as those he had in mind. However, I said we would study proposal at once.

"I told him I felt he was overstressing inspection aspect; that I considered if Brussels organization was to have satisfactory future, positive aspects had to be emphasized rather than making role one of merely preventing members from violating certain restrictions. He replied he visualized Brussels would also handle common procurement for seven member countries for all military supplies on continent. In reply my query whether British expected conform strictly to this procedure in view Commonwealth relations, he said probably some exception would have to be worked out for British. He said, Brussels would also determine maximum force contributions, while NATO would deal with minimum figures. In addition it might be possible to work out a few supranational functions for Brussels organization.

"I inquired whether or not staff work had been done on French proposal and received reply which convinced me that problem not yet thought through. Mendes expects nine-power conference give instructions to working group of experts on conclusion of meeting starting 28 September. He wants working group to report in 30 days with NAC meeting late October or early November to approve. In that event French Parliament will approve prior to Christmas.

"I came away from meeting with impression that Mendes is obsessed with political difficulties he faces in getting German rearment through Parliament. He considers his most convincing argument will be control and safeguard aspects and that is why he lays such emphasis on British participation in Brussels pact with expanded functions. He will agree somewhat reluctantly to simultaneous admission of Germany to NATO but his heart is not in it. Thursday, De Margerie told me Brussels pact concept is for ‘window dressing’, but I did not get that impression from Mendes, because he appears deadly serious about Brussels role. Once he said, ‘NATO will be superior organization but it will not exercise all functions. Some must be handled by Brussels organization.’ But his ideas on this division were extremely vague.

"It is almost impertinence for me to suggest that preparatory work for nine-power conference be thorough, because no doubt that already in hand. I am nevertheless apprehensive that meeting may convene without thorough understanding of French proposal. Such development could result in disagreement or at least very fuzzy directive to working group. Twice Mendes said, ‘I can get this through French Parliament if our partners will listen to me this time as to kind of proposal which should be adopted. I don’t insist that others have to bow to French opinion but it must be carefully considered’.

"Mendes was in good frame of mind but evident he is very, very tired. He does not expect any rest during next three months. I told him I consider he has too many jobs. He agreed and said he would like get rid of one of them, but he didn’t specify which one.”

London please convey full substance this message to Eden.

Dillon
London, September 20, 1954—5 p. m.

1423. British views on safeguards to accompany German entry into NATO and Brussels pact briefly outlined as follows:

1. General principles. All military arrangements should be in NATO. Even if Brussels powers agree on certain military controls which will apply only to them, these controls should be implemented through NATO so that there will be no duplication of military organization.

2. Safeguards should not be in negative form as French appear to suggest but should be positive operating arrangements which can make useful contribution to common military task.

3. Safeguards should not interfere with military effectiveness of NATO.

Application of above principles to French memorandum contain Mendes-France proposals raise questions regarding principle No. 5 in which French speak of important military arrangements to accompany modified Brussels pact text. British feel strongly these military arrangements should be under NATO.

As regards French proposal on controls and inspections, British believe matter can best be handled by formalizing and extending SACEUR's present inspection system of NATO forces.

Regarding armament zones and distinction between categories (as set forth in Annex 2 of Article 107 of Treaty of Paris) British still believe NATO is better framework than Brussels treaty but they are willing to negotiate this point.

British do not feel they can now state a position until they know what zones French propose in which arms manufacture would be limited. The British agree with the general principle.

Main British question regarding French plan is on proposal to distribute orders for manufacturing armaments on continent of Europe. British are skeptical on grounds of (1) practicability (2) excessively negative approach (3) doubt that it will be feasible unless undesirable supranational element reintroduced (4) belief that production planning at least could be done best on NATO basis even though executive function might have to be carried out under Brussels pact machinery.

On all of these points, however, British are willing to consider French ideas and will go as far as they can to meet them.

---

1 Repeated to Bonn and to Paris, with instructions to pass to Hughes and Reinhardt.

2 Presumably a reference to the French aide-mémoire whose text was transmitted in circular telegram 148 of Sept. 20, infra.
British are enthusiastic over General Gruenther's comments in telegram 1832 [332] September 19.  

ALDRICH

8 Same as telegram 1175 from Paris, Sept. 19, supra.

740.5/9-2054: Circular telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, September 20, 1954—7:20 p.m.

148. Following is translation aide-mémoire handed Merchant by French Chargé September 18:  

"The plan given below is based on the following principles:

1. Nondiscrimination; (2) Limitation of troop strength and armaments; (3) Control (supervision) of troop strength and armaments; (4) Exclusive application of the provisions specified to the armed forces (troops and armaments) placed by the member countries at the disposal of the Supreme Command of NATO; (5) Within this framework, full participation by Great Britain.

I. The Brussels Treaty shall be changed so as to furnish the basis for an organization charged with strengthening security and peace on the European continent. Germany and Italy shall adhere by means of various appropriate modifications of the text now in force.

This text is to be supplemented by important military provisions.

II. With regard to the armed forces, both troops and armaments, placed by each member country, on the continent, at the disposal of the Supreme Command, the Council provided for in Article 7 of the Brussels Treaty will adopt the levels fixed by the Council of NATO upon the recommendations of the Supreme Command.

However, these levels considered by NATO as minima become for the members of the Brussels Treaty maxima which they pledge themselves not to exceed.

Compliance with the maxima thus fixed will be guaranteed by controls and inspections organized throughout the whole of the continental territory covered by agreement.

III. With regard to armaments, it will be necessary to set up two categories:

(a) The arms envisaged in Annex 2 of Article 107 of the Treaty of Paris (subject to possible revision of the list);
(b) Other armaments.

The manufacture of the arms in Category (a) will be prohibited in strategically exposed zones which will be marked off on a map annexed to the agreement. The Council of the Seven will ensure by inspections  


2 A memorandum of this conversation between Merchant and French Embassy officials, with the attached French aide-mémoire, is in Department of State file 740.5/9-1854. The Embassy in Paris also reported on a conversation with Parodi concerning the French proposals in telegram 1173 of Sept. 18 (740.5/9-1854).
and controls that the regulation forbidding manufacture is fully com-
plied with.

As for the arms in category (b), their manufacture on the continent
and their distribution shall be directed and controlled by the Council.
The latter shall especially be charged with: drawing up the manu-
facturing programs and assigning the orders for the various member
countries; distributing arms among the various armed forces; receiv-
ing arms imported free of charge from the United States and dis-
tributing them.

The continental countries undertake not to carry out any manufac-
ture in excess of the orders placed with them. The Council may also
authorize manufactures for export. The manufacture of armaments
intended for equipping forces of the member countries other than those
which are placed at the disposal of the Supreme Command, shall also
be authorized.

The sole purpose of the control provided for armaments category
(a) shall be to establish that no manufacture has taken place, while the
control provided for armaments category (b) shall be qualitative and
quantitative.

In order that the quantitative control to be exercised by the Council
may be effective, it shall also apply to the creation of new armament
installations, industries, or factories. In that connection, authorizations
shall be issued by the Council, which will take decisions on strategic
considerations. The continental area covered by the agreement shall be
contained within a series of zones subject to special regulations, extend-
ing, in decreasing size, from East to West. So that this system may not
be in any way discriminatory and may be just, joint new arms factories
may be established in unexposed zones.

The decisions of the Council shall be taken by a simple majority, a
weighted majority, or unanimously, as the case may be. In the matter
of control, they shall be taken by a simple majority.

IV. Whether it is a matter of troops or of arms, the Council of Seven
shall insofar as possible call upon the NATO services for assistance in
connection with the above-mentioned controls and inspections.”

Chargé described six other arrangements outside revision Brussels
Treaty text which would be necessary. In response request express in
writing Chargé subsequently submitted informal memo of which fol-
lowing is translation.

“1. The Federal Republic shall pledge itself not to raise any other
forces except those which it places at the disposal of the Supreme
Commander.

2. The German forces will form part of the inter-Allied combat
force, in which German and Allied divisions will be placed side by side
in large common units. The arrangements pertaining to this matter
shall be established by agreement between the Council of the Seven
and the Atlantic Council, upon the recommendations of the Standing
Group.

3. The Federal Republic shall pledge itself not to resort to force in
order to settle its territorial problems. The Council of the Seven and
the Atlantic Council shall take note of this commitment.

4. Furthermore, the two Councils shall specify that a violation by
the Federal Republic of the various commitments undertaken by it
would immediately entail the loss of the guarantees which are granted
to it, as well as the loss of all support.

5. Great Britain, participating fully in the military organization of
the Seven, shall maintain a minimum force on the continent. In this
connection it would give to the Brussels Organization assurances that
the strength of the British forces in Germany would not be reduced
below a certain level.

The Government of the United States would make a similar
declaration.

6. The control exercised by the Supreme Commander over the troops
placed at his disposal would be strengthened in such a way as to make
the deployment and utilization of the Central-Europe forces depend-
ent upon a decision by SACEUR."

Chargé commented that (3) pertained to declaration agreed tri-
partitely last winter and that (4) was repetition tripartite declara-
tion of May 1952.

In making démarche Chargé reading from telegram said in Mendes-
France’s view principal objections French Assembly to EDC were
too much supranationality and UK not member. He therefore believes
to make German rearment acceptable to French Assembly Brussels
Treaty must be revised to meet these two objections. If this done he
prepared support it before Assembly with “Full powers of his Gov-
ernment”. His idea is that Nine Power Conference at London should agree
upon certain broad principles and set experts to work, with time limit
of one month, to translate agreements in principle into actual texts.
These would then be submitted NAC and, assuming its approval, he
would immediately thereafter present texts to Assembly. His intention
and purpose would be to secure decision by Assembly before end of
year.

Merchant said he did not want to comment on aide-mémoire until
we had opportunity to study it, however French should not take for
granted it would be automatically possible for US issue same assur-
ances offered in anticipation of EDC. Situation was changed and solu-
tion now proposed quite different. He said he felt Congressional con-
sultation needed before any statement of assurances could be issued
or reaffirmed.

In response Merchant’s query re omission in proposal any mention
German sovereignty and membership NATO Chargé appeared unin-
formed and stated he could only assume Mendes would present package
proposal to French Assembly of which revised Brussels Treaty would
only be one element. In response Merchant’s query re Saar, Chargé
said he knew nothing as to what was planned or thought of in that
connection.

Chargé said Mendes would speak Monday at Council of Europe
outlining proposal in general terms. Merchant expressed hope it would

---

For documentation concerning the negotiations over a tripartite security
declaration, see pp. 688 ff.

For the text of the Tripartite Declaration of May 27, 1952, see p. 686.
be in broadest possible terms to avoid risk being publicly committed and therefore frozen into position from which he might claim it impossible to retreat during course impending negotiations. Chargé said he was sure Mendes intended only very general exposition. He said Mendes was most anxious have our comments as far in advance as possible of London Conference next week.

Merchant informed Chargé briefly on Secretary’s trip Bonn and London, his efforts telephone Mendes and Murphy’s visit Páris.⁵

⁵ For a summary of Murphy’s conversation with Mendes-France in Paris on Sept. 23, see telegram 1254 from Paris, Sept. 24, p. 1256.

3961 LO/9-2054

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick)

CONFIDENTIAL


Participants: Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
Mr. F. J. Leishman, First Secretary, British Embassy
Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary, EUR
C. Burke Elbrick, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR

The Ambassador said that he had been instructed by his Foreign Office to extend a formal invitation to the United States to be represented at the forthcoming Nine Power Meeting in London which is to open on September 28. Mr. Merchant said that he would consult the Acting Secretary and give the Ambassador a formal reply as quickly as possible.¹ He said that the Secretary, anticipating the invitation to the meeting, was tentatively planning to arrive in London on Sunday, September 26. The Ambassador said that his Foreign Office would be pleased to hear this.

The Ambassador then handed Mr. Merchant a statement of position reached by Messrs. Eden and Mendes-France in Paris on September 17 and a copy of the final draft of the United Kingdom–United States understanding of the purpose of the Nine Power Conference (copies of both are attached). It was noted that the latter draft now states that the purpose of the Nine Power Conference is “to agree . . . upon the measures equally for promotion of European unity and for defence of the free world through expansion of the Brussels Treaty to include German Federal Republic and Italy and of NATO so as to include German Federal Republic.”

The Ambassador then referred to Mendes-France’s reply to the

¹ In circular telegram 149, Sept. 20, the Department of State informed the NATO capitals and Bonn that the United States formally accepted the invitation to attend the Nine-Power meeting in London beginning Sept. 28 (3961 LO/9-2054).
² Ellipsis in the source text.
British proposals, saying that the French counter-proposals seemed to differ in emphasis rather than in substance, though they left the question of NATO membership for Germany unanswered. He also mentioned the French memorandum which was communicated to the interested governments on September 18 and said that he believes this memorandum provides a basis for discussion. It is true that the French appear to desire a Brussels organization solution of the German problem rather than a NATO solution, but Sir Roger believed that there was room for maneuver and that the French position is a first position which is subject to some change in negotiation. He said that the British Government is aware of the need for a rapid solution of this problem and he felt that Mendes-France was also aware of the need for haste. Ambassador Jebb in Paris had reported that Mendes-France was anxious to avoid a repetition of the situation at the Brussels Conference where France constituted a minority of one, and the Ambassador thought this seems encouraging.

In speaking of the conditions laid down in the French proposed solution Mr. Merchant said it would be a mistake to assume that the United States can automatically re-issue the assurances given by the President last April when an EDC solution was envisaged. Any proposal to repeat these assurances in a new context would require consultation with Congress. The Ambassador said that he understood this and that he hoped the State Department would adopt a favorable attitude toward this particular proposal. Mr. Merchant said that another aspect of the French proposals which would require careful consideration by this Government is that part which suggests channeling all United States end item aid through the Brussels organization.

Mr. Merchant said that we are very interested in the studies which we understand are now proceeding in London regarding the possible revision of the Brussels Pact and that our Embassy in London had been instructed to keep closely in touch with the drafting group. He expressed the hope to the Ambassador that the British Foreign Office would keep our Embassy fully informed of the progress made.

[Annex 1]

STATEMENT OF POSITION REACHED BY MR. EDEN AND M. MENDES-
FRANCE IN PARIS, SEPTEMBER 17, 1954

SECRET

The Foreign Secretary explained that all the Governments he had visited, as well as Her Majesty's Government themselves, were convinced that the right solution lay in the admission of Germany into

---

2 The text of the French memorandum under reference is included in circular telegram 148 of Sept. 20, supra.
3 For the text of United States assurances concerning the EDC, issued on Apr. 16, see the Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 26, 1954, pp. 619–620.
NATO simultaneously with her entry into the expanded Treaty of Brussels Organisation, subject to the necessary accompanying arrangements.

M. Mendes-France urged that, if this was to be made acceptable to French public opinion, the accompanying arrangements, so far as possible and practicable, should be organised within the framework of the Treaty of Brussels Organisation, it being understood that the execution of any military arrangements should be carried out by the NATO machine.

For their part Her Majesty's Government, and as they believe, the other Five Governments concerned, at present prefer that most of the arrangements referred to should be organised directly by the NATO machine. Her Majesty's Government are, however, prepared to consider how much of the arrangements can in practice be confided to the Treaty of Brussels Organisation and to encourage the other Governments concerned to do likewise.

[Annex 2]

UNITED KINGDOM—UNITED STATES UNDERSTANDING OF THE PURPOSE OF THE 9-POWER CONFERENCE

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 20, 1954.

The purpose of the Nine-Power Conference is to agree, with a view to the forthcoming Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, upon the measures equally for promotion of European unity and for defence of the free world through expansion of the Brussels Treaty to include German Federal Republic and Italy and of NATO so as to include German Federal Republic.

The Conference would discuss how best the accompanying arrangements could be organised within the revised Brussels Treaty and within NATO.

The Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, France and Federal German Republic would also discuss among themselves and inform the Conference of their plans for restoring German sovereignty, which would be an essential pre-requisite to the entry of the Federal German Republic into the Brussels Treaty and into NATO.

740.5/9-2254 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State

SECRET

BONN, September 22, 1954—6 p. m.

830. 1. Coalition leaders and Foreign Office and Defense officials have

1 Repeated to London and Paris.
now had opportunity examine Mendes-France proposals on German rearment. Their mood one of reserve and suspicion. Strauss, Krone, Blank and Dehler commented on absence mention of NATO membership for Federal Republic, some form of which regarded as essential to permit efficient US–UK–FedRep military cooperation and frustrate FR efforts to cripple German armament, and some form NATO membership also considered domestic political necessity.

2. Blank and his military advisor Heusinger specifically criticized fact that FedRep would be only member whose entire armed forces would be subject to limitation and control of Europe defense system as compared to France and others who could declare majority their forces needed for overseas duty. More important, they said, was FR capacity to control size of German forces through FR veto power on NATO Council of which under Mendes-France plan FedRep apparently not a member. They insisted prior agreement on size of German army similar to EDC military protocol necessary before any subsequent system of limitations went into effect. They strongly criticized FR proposal that Brussels Council allocate arms aid received from US.

3. Coalition leaders interpret FR proposal as intentionally unacceptable and aimed at placing blame for breakdown London talks on FedRep or on UK (by introducing requirement of still closer British participation). Blank, Strauss and Krone stressed that London meeting must bring French agreement to effective German armament and not be allowed degenerate into ceaseless discussions on technical level. Blank and Strauss insisted that if London failed, US and UK must act immediately to rearm FedRep under limitations already agreed on. Failure to do this would discredit Adenauer completely, US–UK policy in FedRep, and lead to *de facto* neutralization of FedRep. This view shared by leading FDP deputies.

4. From our estimate political situation here we believe settlement along lines of German position paper reported Bonn tel 835 [839] to Dept London 130, Paris 140 would probably win support of full coalition in Bundestag and of majority German public.

5. SPD has stated Mendes-France proposals present usable basis of discussion, although they will have to be further examined for discriminatory provisions. They are disappointed at omission of unity question.

6. With exception of SPD press and a few papers with neutralist tendencies such as *Frankfurter Allgemeine* and *Sud Deutsche Zeitung* German press criticized Mendes-France proposals as discriminatory and unacceptable unless immediate NATO membership included.

*Conant*

*Not printed.*
The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State

SECRET

PARIS, September 22, 1954—7 p. m.

Polto 475, 1. At NAC restricted meeting today Ismay said some delegations had raised question as to whether there should be NATO observer at London conference. He remarked that his position at Bermuda was difficult one and often he felt that he was really not wanted. Aside from opportunity confer with President Eisenhower and public relations value having NATO observer, he felt his presence there not fruitful.

UK rep said large number of technical questions must be considered at conference, such as return of German sovereignty and status of Allied forces stationed Germany, especially financial issues relating thereto which are of primary interest occupying powers and nations having forces there. These matters will require considerable study in Bonn. He said there is also series of questions re safeguards which will have considerable impact on NATO. In his opinion will be difficult prepare text on these issues by Oct 15 and for that reason NAC ministerial meeting may not be held until end of October. On question having NATO observer he said if NAC so desires he will ask his Govt as host nation whether 8 NATO members and FedRep would agree have observer. He said he did not favor idea NATO having observer and suggested as alternative that conference be requested designate one of members to give oral briefing end each day to Ambassadors or other reps 6 NATO govts not attending conference. Expressing his personal view re length of conference he opined it would probably last not more than 4 days.

2. Canadian rep speaking off record said was not quite correct use analogy of Bermuda meeting which after all was primarily meeting of 3-powers to discuss forthcoming 4-power meeting. It was of interest to NATO but not directly related to NATO or under NATO auspices. However, issues for consideration London conference so closely related to NATO his Govt had hoped conference would be under NATO auspices. He felt very strongly that NATO should send observer since conference may vitally affect future of organization. Portuguese rep said his Govt entirely shares views expressed by Canadian rep. He added question admitting FedRep to NAC is vital issue but matter regarding occupation forces is not by any means main issue as suggested by UK rep. Greek, Danish and Norwegian reps also supported Canadian view.

\[1\] Repeated to all NATO capitals and Bonn.

\[2\] For documentation concerning the Bermuda Conference, Dec. 4–8, 1953, see pp. 1710 ff.
3. US rep said it had always been his understanding that London conference would undertake only preparatory work for later consideration at NAC ministerial meeting. He envisaged that immediately after conference permanent reps would meet here for full discussion and exchange of views. He said he was not opposed to information being made available to NATO govts not attending conference and on contrary thought they should be fully informed on conference developments. However he thought most fruitful exchange of views could take place after conference. (Portuguese rep had earlier suggested might be useful NAC perm reps meet here simultaneously to discuss conference developments.)

4. Dutch rep referring to daily briefing suggested by UK said these would be flat and with little value. He felt most desirable method for govts not attending conference to obtain information would be through close contact between their Embassies and conference delegations. This way they would be posted on conference developments and also obtain good cross section of opinions and views. Belgian rep also favored this procedure pointing out that it was most successful at Brussels conference.

5. After lengthy debate during which Canadian, Norwegian and Portuguese reps, especially latter, gave considerable vent to their feeling over restrictive 9-power conference, it was agreed UK rep would recommend his Govt request conference arrange daily briefing session for reps 6-NATO powers not attending meeting. Method suggested by Dutch rep will also be used.

6. Today's meeting gave further evidence of real concern on part those perm reps whose govts not invited London that they would not be kept fully informed developments conference. Recommend Dept support any UK initiative to ameliorate this situation.

Hughes

740.5/9-2254: Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

Paris, September 22, 1954—10 p. m.

Polto 483. Reftel Topol 325, September 19.²

A. General Considerations

1. Question assigned to USRO in reftel has been discussed with Gruenther, Norstad and Schuyler of SHAPE, Freeman of EUCOM,

¹Transmitted to the Department of State in two sections and repeated to Bonn for Comant and London for Aldrich.

²Not printed; it instructed USRO that it had the major responsibility for coordinating U.S. preparations for the London Conference on those matters relating to German membership in NATO (740.5/9-1954).
Dillon and Achilles of Embassy, Bruce, Wood and Martin in USRO. This telegram and one which follows it on French proposals are largely based on these discussions. It has not been possible in time available to seek concurrence of all parties to specific language of this message. However, most of them have read and commented on it in draft and do not have major objections to broad lines of position taken though they might question individual details or emphasis.

2. It seems hardly fruitful exercise to attempt to forecast with any precision what Mendes will buy, how vigorously, if bought, he will try to sell Parliament, or what French Parliament will buy. Consequently, should relegate to strictly secondary place in development of US position, particularly initial position, nose-counting of French Parliamentarians. While not disregarding saleability in France, primary considerations should be:

a. Clarity and simplicity;
b. Positive contribution to short-term and long-term effectiveness of NATO, particularly in its military aspects;
c. Acceptability to OSR allies, particularly Britain, Germany, Benelux and Italy;
d. Keeping door wide open to and encouraging as rapid development as Europeans can agree to make toward closer unity among them, and in particular toward France-German rapprochement, taking into account set-back caused by failure of France to ratify EDC.

3. Given fact that further sponsorship of EDC is not currently practical, program sketched in broad outline in Polto 35, September 3, and spelled out in documents dated September 10, referred to in Topol 325, seems to us in general to meet most adequately these requirements. Believe should adopt position which can be enthusiastically defended on its own merits and which can appeal to real supporters of Atlantic alliance and what it stands for, rather than to risk failure on behalf of some compromise which few really like. Believe this program has valid selling points if there is will to use them.

B. Procedural

4. Consider it important that US be in position to present at least broad outlines of its proposed solution to countries invited to nine-power meeting as soon as possible, preferably before Foreign Ministers leave for London so can discuss alternatives which will be on table with other Cabinet members. Foresee serious difficulties in securing

---

*Not printed; it contained the views of USRO concerning Document 6 of the London Study Group as it had been reexamined in light of the present situation. (740.5/9-354) For the text of Document 6, which was attached to the Report of the London Study Group, July 12, see p. 1013.

* Presumably this is a reference to an early draft of document NPT D-8 of Sept. 27 entitled “Outline of Actions Required to Accomplish Immediate U.S. Objectives in Europe”; a copy of NPT D-8 is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 363. The drafts of Sept. 10 were not found in Department of State files.
successful conclusion of what is already difficult operation if at least some of this kind of preliminary discussion cannot take place.

5. Permanent representatives of NATO countries not to be represented in London feel strongly importance their countries being informed London developments. Statements this subject made at closed session this morning contained separate message. Recommend that should agree at nine-power meeting to full briefing of Permanent Council immediately at close of meeting. Urge also that comments be invited on programs for working groups and that working groups themselves function in Paris, utilizing services of NATO IS.

C. Substance

6. Remainder this message will comment on position proposed in document of September 10, especially paras 2, 3, and 4 of Appendix C. Assume Bonn handling para 1. Do not suggest that details discussed this message would be acted upon or even discussed formally at forthcoming London meeting. However, believe it important in making final decision as to principles of US position as well as to insure that in negotiations at London there is real understanding of what agreed principles mean in practice. That US know in some detail how each specific proposal could be carried out.

7. See no special problems directly related para 2 of proposed resolution as German membership in NATO can clearly be handled through regular procedure provided in Article 10 of Treaty. However, problem does arise of situation in case of German unification, particularly in light statements made by Western Powers at recent Berlin conference. Separate message will be sent on this point.

8. Specific proposals for carrying out those parts of para 3 which deal with extension of NATO authority over logistics and supply and further integration of NATO forces will be contained in response to Todef [Defto?] 96. Would suggest, however, that should be some help to French in accepting NATO rather than Brussels solution to many of their problems if US prepared to participate on equal basis with Europeans in steps to be taken along these lines in Europe. Believe sufficient possibility exists that we could do so without real damage to US interest that this should receive careful study. Such steps by US would also be welcomed by NATO countries generally as important recognition by US of role as equal partner.

9. Response to Defto 96 will also deal in some detail with strengthening controls over deployment, assignment and level of forces. In general, believe protocol to treaty requiring forces be assigned NATO, with certain exceptions, based on items of UK document 6, is appro-

---

5 This is a reference to telegram Polto 475 from Paris, Sept. 22, supra.
6 The editors were unable to further identify this message.
7 Not found in Department of State files.
priate and essential to effectiveness other measures. Should be sup-
plemented by ministerial resolution providing that cutbacks in
assignments or agreed force goals be made only after opportunity for
formal council discussion of AR character and that proposed increases
in assignments not previously provided by agreed force goals or pro-
posed increases in force goals outside AR procedure be submitted to
council and implemented only if no objections raised. Believe deploy-
ment of forces assigned SACEUR should be made subject to his con-
currence approval, redeployments within his area be made only with
his concurrence, and, if militarily significant, approval of Council.
Such redeployments might bear on possible need for invocation
Articles 4 and 5 of treaty and justify political discussion temporary
redeployment outside his territory, presumably to meet emergency
situations, should be notified to him but because of possible covert
character such operations, reported to and discussed in Council only
at time agreed between NATO military authorities and country con-
cerned. Believe these arrangements would protect US freedom to re-
duce force commitments in Europe or to redeploy temporarily forces
located in Europe without impairing effective control sought by
France over German buildup and use of forces. Moreover they rep-
sent a strengthening of NATO which is desirable per se. (In addition
to above on assigned forces, there is special problem of earmarked
forces.)

10. As indicated earlier, believe actions taken at this time in con-
nection with alternatives to EDC should not be of such character as to
foreclose or hamper early and significant development among Euro-
peans of further supranational institutions along lines designed par-
ticularly to improve France-German relations. Believe essential that
nine-power meeting and NATO ministerial meeting encourage moves
in this direction. However, do not believe US should expect positive
decisions as to specific steps to be agreed immediately as part of gen-
eral arrangements now being worked out. Believe it will take longer
for participating countries to develop and sell steps which would have
real long-range significance and should not delay agreement on other
matters for this purpose. As tactical matter, urge that US maintain
position of supporting European initiative in this field along lines
para 4 of app C but not take lead at London.

11. While see no basic objection to efforts by continent to develop
arms pool idea, and therefore to US support of any initiative they may
wish to take in this connection, consider IL represents exceedingly
difficult negotiating and operational problem, particularly outside
EDC framework, with not much prospect of positive benefits in near
future and some chance of causing serious delay in German ability to
THE GERMAN PROBLEM

initiate arms production for her forces. Therefore would not press for it.

12. As additional point to program in ref document, believe original UK proposal, as we understood it, that Germany and Italy be brought into Brussels Pact and thereby realize benefit of UK automatic guarantee to come to their aid in case of attack, is unobjectionable and may be useful to France as symbol of greater UK participation on continent. Therefore, believe it might be added to program described above.

13. Do not gather that question of extension of NATO to 50 years is particularly lively issue at present.

14. Assume we may wish do something about new US statement on maintenance of forces in Europe, but doubt if anything we can in fact say at this point, with rejection of EDC behind us could have important impact on informed opinion.

15. Have no strong feelings about proposal which understand both British and French endorse for establishment strategic zones in which certain types armaments would not be produced. Consider it somewhat unrealistic from military standpoint and may raise enforcement problems. However, anything Germans could accept we should probably accept. If done would be feasible and would think better from German standpoint to do it in NATO rather than Brussels Pact.

16. There has been much talk recently of need to provide control and inspection mechanisms to insure that decisions provided for in various proposed programs are in fact carried out in detail by individual countries. Believe that analogy drawn to situation in Germany in 20's is essentially false. In terms of arrangement which includes German participation in NATO and integration of German forces into NATO forces with multiplicity of channels for exchange of information, filling out of questionnaires, etc., with the stationing of Allied forces on German soil, with close scrutiny of German economic activities through OEEC and other current mechanisms and with current status of military technology, it seems to us that danger of covert German violation is negligible one. This result, however, only if all German forces are required to be assigned to NATO. No doubt does represent political factor which above explanation cannot fully deal with. Perhaps could be dealt with as political factor by NATO ministerial resolution directing international staff in cooperation with NATO military authorities to take necessary steps to enable it to report to Council on actions being taken by countries in carrying out NATO decisions in these fields. Extent to which this would be implemented by special administrative arrangements would be left for future decision. Particularly important that NATO military not be given inspection functions in production field. Should point out that it now has inspection role in connection with infrastructure, with both inspec-
tion teams visiting construction sites and board of auditors making
detailed review of national infrastructure financial operations.

HUGHES

740.5/9–2854: Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Alger) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET

BRUSSELS, September 23, 1954—6 p.m.

309. In conversation this morning Spaak gave me following as his
current thoughts.

Thing he least able understand is why Mendes-France returned from
Brussels describing self as defeated when he could have claimed suc-
cess, which Spaak believes would have enabled him put through EDC.

Embassy comment: Spaak continues preoccupied with Mendes-
France claim others ganged up in Brussels under Spaak leadership;
also obvious Spaak endeavoring formulate personal estimate Mendes-
France for use as measuring stick in future.

Spaak went on to say he cannot bring self believe Mendes so evil as
to be insincere in protestations devotion to Atlantic pact. Believed
Mendes when he told him is now prepared accept idea of German
admission NATO if adequate safeguards within Brussels pact devised.
Believes Mendes does not plan failure London talks. However, Spaak
believes that Mendes would be in mood adopt neutralism if London
fails, saying he had failed with five in Brussels, then with UK and US
at London, France is thus alone, not understood by friends and allies,
nothing positive left to do.

Spaak remarked that number French parliamentarians agree on
opposing Mendes-France but not on anything positive. Also Mendes-
France is not opposed by French public which is factor which will
make parliamentarians hesitate overthrow him. Pro-EDC French
leaders he observed especially at Strasbourg are discouraged and dis-
organized and at great disadvantage vis-à-vis Mendes-France who
being in power knows all factors some of which they do not. Spaak
described Mendes-France’s Strasbourg speech as veto very clever.

Re possible success London Spaak sees three problems for Germans:
Sovereignty, discriminatory provisions and Saar. For UK there will
be terribly difficult question of new commitments on continent. Spaak
is not sure Adenauer now prepared settle Saar yet this appears con-
tinue condition precedent for France.

Spaak believes simultaneity of following must be achieved: German
sovereignty, German admission NATO and rearranged Brussels pact.

Spaak said Dutch regard French control proposal unfavorably. Presumably all Dutch and Belgian effort would be controlled as well as German, yet France would retain measure freedom.

Spaak sees extremely difficult technical problems arising out of control proposal: UK would be controller, France would be controller and partly controlled, etc. One curiosity is that proposed controls would in effect put maximum limit on number British troops sent continent. Worried that even if agreement reached in principle negotiations will be difficult and plans can fail because of technicalities.

Spaak plans go The Hague September 25, London 27 and hopes sail for New York October 15.

740.3/9-2354: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices

SECRET NIACI WASHINGTON, September 23, 1954—7:07 p. m.

156. Re French request for US views on proposals incorporated Circular 148 September 20 and from all addressees, difficult for us to comment in detail in absence clarification points raised Dept 1039 to Paris repeated London 1642 and Bonn 800. However, believe following general comments should be transmitted to French:

1. We note that French proposals deal primarily with Brussels Treaty arrangements. Question German sovereignty not covered and no statement that French favor German admission NATO, although some form of German association with NATO appears implied in proposed six arrangements outside Brussels context. US view is that Germany must be admitted full NATO membership promptly. Any form of German association with NATO short of full membership out of question in light of political realities in Germany. Also our understanding that apparently unanimous support for principle of German membership in NATO developing among other NATO countries.

2. We fully recognize French Government’s need for some safeguards and controls in order to make German participation NATO acceptable to parliament. US does not in principle oppose making use of Brussels Treaty context as partial means for working out certain of the safeguards required by France. However, we believe such safeguards or conditions as may be necessary to France, irrespective of what context they may be worked out in, must meet certain criteria: (a) They must in the first instance be nondiscriminatory if they are to be acceptable to the Germans. We are pleased to note that French Government has itself recognized this principle in its aide-mémoire.

1 Drafted by Fessenden; cleared with Moore, Merchant, Bowie, and the Department of Defense; and sent to all NATO capitals and Bonn.

2 Ante, p. 1231.

3 Not printed; it provided Murphy with guidance concerning questions he could raise during his pending meeting with Mendès-France on Sept. 23 (740.5/9-2154). For a summary of meeting between Murphy and Mendès-France, see telegram 1254 from Paris, Sept. 24, p. 1235.
(b) They should be capable of prompt adoption. Lateness of hour regarding need for German sovereignty, association with West, and defense contribution make it essential that prolonged and complex negotiations be avoided. (c) Arrangements should be such as not to create new organizational machinery which will duplicate or frustrate existing machinery. In particular, we would hope that no machinery would be established under Brussels which would conflict with existing NATO functions and powers. (d) Generally preferable to meet French need for safeguards through positive measures, such as strengthening powers and functions NATO commanders, rather than through negative measures, such as inspection of forces and armament production. Concept of inspection is contrary to spirit of trust and mutual confidence which characterizes Western alliance.

3. French should be told that it cannot be assumed that US April EDC assurances would be reaffirmed. Much will depend on outcome of London Conference and NAC Meeting.

4. Similarly proposal channel US MDAP aid through Brussels Council is very different proposition from intended use of EDC Commissariat for this purpose and would require careful examination by US.

5. To extent that French proposals meet foregoing objectives and criteria, we believe they represent valuable contribution toward solution of problem and are prepared to consider them sympathetically.

Dulles

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5433 series

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 23, 1954.

Subject: Immediate U.S. Policy Toward Europe

Reference: NSC 5433

At the request of the Secretary of Defense the enclosed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with which the Secretary of Defense agrees, with respect to the reference report on the subject are transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council in connection with its consideration of NSC 5433 at its meeting on Friday, September 24, 1954.

Also enclosed and transmitted herewith at the request of the Secretary of Defense for the information of the Council are the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the related subjects of “Strategic Issues Con-

1 At the same time that the Secretary of Defense sent the three enclosures to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council for distribution, he also sent a letter to Dulles with the same three enclosures attached. In the letter he stated his belief that the views of the two Departments were not “basically very far apart.” (3961 LO/9-2354)

2 Dated Sept. 16, p. 1206.

3 For a memorandum of discussion of this NSC meeting, see p. 1263.
fronting the United States in Europe” and “Preparations for the 9-Power Conference in London”. The Secretary of Defense agrees generally with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in these papers.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

[Enclosure 1]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 22 September 1954.

Subject: Immediate United States Policy Toward Europe—NSC 5433.

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views regarding a draft statement of policy, titled “Immediate U.S. Policy Toward Europe” (NSC 5433), prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Friday, 24 September 1954.

2. The draft paper sets forth a program of action for the immediate future designed to achieve present United States objectives in Europe by means other than the European Defense Community (EDC). It also sets forth certain questions the answers to which may assist in determining the United States objectives to be sought in the event that the pursuit of all present United States objectives is no longer feasible. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in general with this approach and consider that, in view of the uncertain trend in the European situation, the National Security Council should direct the appropriate United States Government agencies to develop now the answers to these questions, in order to permit the timely formulation of any such changes in United States policy towards Europe as events may prove to be necessary.

3. The following comments are addressed to the specific portions of the draft statement of policy:

a. Subparagraph 3b, page 2. Delete the parenthetical phrase.
   
   Reason: The parenthetical phrase is considered to be susceptible of misinterpretation. It tends to downgrade the major importance which the United States attaches to the successful defense of Western Europe and carries a connotation that a resolute defense of Western Europe might not be warranted. It ignores the probability that the loss of this area to the Allies would serve to prolong a general war and render eventual victory more costly.

b. Paragraphs 5 and 6, page 4. Delete the second sentence of paragraph 5.
   
   Reason: This sentence, either separately or as a part of the paragraph, does not prescribe a course of action. Further, as now written
and in the context of paragraphs 5 and 6, the sentence appears to imply that, since Soviet aggression is not now imminent, the political and economic aspects of the European situation should receive major emphasis in the United States short-range program of action. While the recent developments in Western Europe may not have served to increase the imminence of Soviet military aggression, neither have they in any way served to lessen the threat. The Soviet divisive efforts have as an ultimate aim the reduction of Allied military effectiveness as well as the weakening of Allied political cohesion. If this sentence is to be retained, it should be reworded as follows (changes indicated in the usual manner):

"Under present conditions, Soviet military aggression against Western Europe does not appear to be imminent and major Soviet efforts are devoted to dividing and weakening the Western alliance."

c. Paragraph 8, pages 5 and 6.

(1) Until the precise extent and scope of the proposed courses of action have been delineated, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would desire to reserve their final endorsement.

(2) Delete subparagraph e and reletter the following subparagraphs accordingly.

Reason: Until, among other things, the reliability and support of the European Allies have been better demonstrated, it would be injudicious to enter into a commitment with such far-reaching implications. Certainly an offer to transfer nuclear weapons to our NATO Allies should not be used as an inducement for acceptance of the United States short-range program.

d. Paragraph 10, page 7 (Revised). Modify the third sentence as follows (changes indicated in the usual manner):

"As a tactical matter, we should act to implement the program, if necessary and as feasible without French approval or cooperation. (leaving to France opportunity later to cooperate). [If such action appears likely] [because such action is most likely] to induce ultimate French acceptance of the program and not to jeopardize attainment of our objectives."

Reason: To provide for the early initiation of measures designed to test French reactions and which the United States, in any event, should pursue, while avoiding commitment to courses of action which might have to be abandoned or reversed in the face of strong French opposition.

e. Paragraph 11, page 8. Of the alternative proposals, the Joint Chiefs of Staff favor the "JCS Proposal."

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the foregoing views be incorporated in the Department of Defense position in connection with the formulation of an immediate United States policy toward Europe.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

ARTHUR RADFORD
Chairman
THE GERMAN PROBLEM

[Enclosure 2]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 22 September 1954.

Subject: Strategic Issues Confronting the U.S. in Europe

1. In response to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 10 September 1954, subject as above, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the actions required in the three situations outlined in paragraph 5 a, b, and c thereof follow:

   a. Should France abstain from a program for German membership in NATO and controlled rearmament under NATO, but not withdraw from NATO or take active or passive measures of interference to the German defense contribution, no significant adjustment would be required in either NATO or U.S. strategic planning or in military programs.

   b. Should France actively oppose German membership in NATO and controlled rearmament under NATO, and take measures of interference to hinder German rearmament short of withdrawal from NATO, adjustments in strategic planning might be necessary, depending upon the nature and degree of interference. Successful implementation of military programs would be handicapped but would not be prevented.

   c. Should France withdraw from NATO and take all measures of interference with independent rearming of West Germany by the United States and United Kingdom short of open hostility, NATO and U.S. strategic planning for Europe, including North Africa, and military programs would require major adjustments and an immediate reappraisal by the United States of its basic policy toward Western Europe and its NATO commitments would be necessary.

2. With respect to your further request for at least tentative conclusions regarding those aspects of a strategic reappraisal having a significant impact on the development of a new U.S. approach for Europe, the Joint Chiefs of Staff respectfully reiterate their views contained in their statement on alternative EDC planning submitted to the Secretary of Defense on 15 September 1954, as follows:

   a. A German contribution is essential to the defense of Europe and the free world. Therefore, the United States should seek such a German contribution, preferably with the concurrence of the French and British but if this cannot be obtained we should be willing to go as far as making a bilateral agreement with the Germans in order to get their participation and to keep them on the side of the free world.

   b. A really sound defense of Europe depends on an adequate contribution from both Germany and France as well as the smaller nations. Failure to obtain French cooperation for a German contribution at

*Not found in Department of State files.
this time will therefore require a basic change in NATO commitments and structure but this should not deter the United States from working out the best possible arrangement with Western Germany in our own interests as well as the interests of a free Europe.

3. The possibility cannot be discounted that France might not concur in any form of German rearmament and might actively oppose and obstruct Allied German efforts in this direction. French retaliatory measures, under extreme circumstances, might take the form of a withdrawal from NATO and the cancellation of all bilateral military facilities agreements. Any such action would compel a reorientation of United States strategy. On the assumption that the majority of the free nations of Europe still exhibit a resolute intent to stand in unified opposition to Soviet aggression, this would entail our support of a more extensive rearming of Germany, the increased utilization of Spanish and English naval and air bases and the strengthening as feasible, of the remainder of the West European perimeter. Under such circumstances, the rearming of West Germany should proceed without restrictions on the size and composition of forces and on her munitions production, such as contemplated in the Contractual-EDC arrangements. It should be our policy to capitalize on the potential of West Germany to the maximum extent. Her rearmament should be directed toward:

a. Initially, providing her with forces which, with U.S. and Allied support, could maintain an effective defense against an invasion by satellite forces, particularly those of East Germany, and which could compel the Soviets to mount an all-out attack in order to overrun Western Europe; and

b. Eventually, providing West Germany with forces adequate to compensate for the loss to the NATO of the French military commitment and to provide, with U.S. and Allied support, a reasonably effective defense against any external attack.

4. In the event that the support of the NATO nations envisaged in paragraph 3 above is not forthcoming, but these nations do not actively oppose such a course, the United States should nevertheless endeavor to enlist the aid of the United Kingdom in rearming that part of West Germany lying within the United Kingdom and United States zones on the order of that contemplated in the Contractual-EDC arrangement.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue to keep the reappraisal of U.S. long-range policy with respect to Europe under study in the light of developments.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arthur Radford
Chairman
TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 22 September 1954.

Subject: Preparations for the 9-Power Conference in London

1. This memorandum is in response to the memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 21 September 1954, subject as above, which requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the proposals concerning revisions to the Brussels Treaty, contained in a French Aide-Mémoire, and regarding certain reservations which the French propose as preconditions to the adoption of a revised Brussels Treaty.

2. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the general subject of a German contribution to the defense of Western Europe may be summarized, in part, as follows:

   a. From the military point of view, the most desirable method of obtaining a German contribution would be the admission of the Federal Republic as a full-fledged, sovereign partner in the NATO;

   b. Any politically feasible variant of the NATO or EDC formula would be militarily acceptable, provided it would result in a German contribution on the order of that contemplated in the EDC treaty;

   c. It is desirable that maximum use be made of the German industrial potential for the production of munitions for Germany and for the NATO nations, consistent with and in support of the security interests of the United States; however,

   d. If dictated by political consideration, restrictions on the composition of the military forces of West Germany and on her munitions production, approximating the safeguards incorporated in the Contractual-EDC arrangements, would be acceptable from the military standpoint, provided that such restrictions would not serve to impair the effectiveness of the German contribution.

3. As a general observation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned lest the current Allied efforts to achieve a German contribution to Western European defense become so involved, in the inhibitory and negative aspects of the proposed arrangements as to detract seriously from the military effectiveness of any organization which might eventually be evolved. They feel that, since the paramount purpose is to increase the strength and cohesion of the Western alliance, the principal efforts of the organization should be directed toward positive accomplishments, rather than to surveillance of the respective members.

---

5 Not found in Department of State files.
4. The following comments are addressed to certain military aspects of the proposals in the French Aide-Mémoire:

a. Section II. This restriction could be accepted, provided that, in the face of SACEUR's recommendations, the French, through veto or other voting process, would not be in a position to delimit the German contribution substantially below that contemplated in the EDC treaty. With respect to the inspections designed to detect violations of the restrictions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that these should be a function of an agency other than SACEUR—who must not be placed in a position of policing conformance of member nations to the imposed restrictions.

b. Section III. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it desirable to locate arms manufacturing facilities in relatively unexposed positions and of coordinating arms production programs among the Brussels Treaty countries. However, they consider that the French proposal respecting the manufacture and distribution of arms on the continent of Europe is excessively rigid, would fail to take advantage of German production facilities and, in distinction to fostering the development of an adequate mobilization base for the support of the NATO armed forces, would serve to inhibit its growth; consequently it would tend to perpetuate the dependence of these forces on United States arms production. Further, while the United States might find it convenient to avail itself of the proposed machinery for the importation and distribution of arms provided by this country, it would appear inadvisable to bind ourselves to do so. The exclusive use of this channel might serve to deprive us of a potent means to accomplish the aims of our military aid programs.

c. The comments in subparagraph 4a above, regarding controls and inspections by SACEUR apply with equal force with respect to the inspections envisaged in Sections III and IV of the Aide-Mémoire.

5. The following comments are applicable to certain of the provisions of the Informal Memorandum:

a. Paragraph 2. This arrangement would be satisfactory provided it is definitely established that it would not preclude the integration of German units up to the level of a conventional army corps.

b. Paragraph 5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States assurances should not specify minimum forces to be maintained by this country on the European continent. In their opinion, these assurances should conform generally to the United States assurances concerning EDC transmitted by the President to the EDC signatory nations on 15 April 1954.

c. Paragraph 6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff prefer to withhold their concurrence until the terms of reference of SACEUR in this regard are more definitely delineated.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the foregoing views form the basis of the Department of Defense position at the 9-Power

---

* There is a translation of the French aide-mémoire in circular telegram 148 of Sept. 20, p. 1231.

** For text, see Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 26, 1954, pp. 619–620.
Conference with respect to the French proposals concerning the revisions to the Brussels Treaty and with respect to the reservations which the French propose as preconditions to the adoption of that treaty.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

ARTHUR RADFORD
Chairman

740.5/9-2354
Memorandum of Conversation, by Russell Fessenden of the Office of European Regional Affairs

SECRET

[PARIS,] September 23, 1954.

RECORD OF MEETING

HOTEL TALLEYRAND, 3 P M, SEPTEMBER 23, 1954

Participants: Assistant Secretary Merchant
Ambassador Dillon, AmEmbassy, Paris
Mr. Achilles, AmEmbassy, Paris
Ambassador Hughes, USRO
Mr. Martin, USRO
General Wood, USRO
Mr. Page, USRO
General Schuyler, SHAPE
General Cook, USEUCOM
General Freeman, USEUCOM
Mr. Fessenden, Department
[Mr. Bruce]

Mr. Merchant outlined the general situation on the eve of the London Nine-Power Conference. Following the Secretary’s trip of the preceding week to Bonn and London, an NSC paper had been prepared which set forth the basic US position. The NSC paper would be approved by the President before the Secretary left Washington. Underlying the US position was the assumption that it was crucially important to associate Germany in sovereign equality with the West. We agree with Adenauer’s own estimate that he cannot go on much longer maintaining his position unless we take positive action.

At the forthcoming London conference, our general frame of mind will not be one of discouragement or defeatism. We do not believe that the conference is foredoomed to failure. We are also taking the position that primary responsibility rests with the Europeans for developing a proposal. No “made in America” plans will be presented, although we will do what we can to assist.

1 Drafted by Fessenden on Sept. 28.
2 For a summary of Dulles’ trip, see the report of Sept. 20, p. 1209.
3 The paper under reference is NSC 5438/1 of Sept. 25, p. 1268.
Three positions have been presented so far. The German position appears reasonable to us, and the British position is generally close to ours. The French proposal in our view has many serious difficulties. However, we have not rejected it out of hand, but have made certain general comments on it which were incorporated in circular telegram 156. We have also in Washington been giving thought to what should be done if we encounter a fundamental roadblock of obstructionism and cannot reach agreement. We have been giving much thought to the so-called “interim measures” for proceeding without the French, if this becomes necessary. Finally, the cables coming out of the NATO Working Group in Paris have been very helpful in Washington and it is clear that our views and those in Paris have been very close.

Mr. Merchant suggested three general questions on which he would like to have the views of the group: (1) the best guess as to the nature of the package which could be sold to the French Assembly. (It must be borne in mind, of course, that the proposal must also be acceptable to the Bundestag, the British Parliament and Congress.) (2) The nature of the steps to strengthen NATO authority, particularly with respect to SACEUR control in various fields. (3) The feasibility of an arms pool plan. Our feeling in Washington is that an arms pool has many attractions, but that its feasibility in the immediate future is another question.

In replying to the first point, Ambassador Dillon reviewed Mendes-France’s conversation with Mr. Murphy (Paris telegram 1254 to Department). Ambassador Dillon then gave his own evaluation of Mendes-France’s probable position at London. Mendes will probably say he has little basis for negotiation. He will claim that unless he gets what he has asked for from the other Ministers he will not succeed with the Assembly. Ambassador Dillon added that we must remember that NATO membership is poison to the pro-EDC Deputies and that these same Deputies also have great personal animosity for Mendes-France. We must therefore be prepared to face the fact that, even if some sort of agreement is reached in London, it is by no means certain that the Assembly will approve it. It is therefore questionable whether anything acceptable will be worked out. We must therefore be prepared to go ahead with the British in the rearmament of Germany. It would be very important, however, to do this in a way which will not appear to be a threat to France.

The main difficulty with the French proposals is that they would require long and complex negotiations. The situation is very reminiscent of the pre-Brussels situation. Mendes has submitted proposals which he may well claim must be accepted without change if there is to be any prospect of approval by the Assembly. It is very important,

---

4 Dated Sept. 23, p. 1245.
5 Infra.
therefore, that we go to London, not in a spirit of forcing Mendes to agree, but with our attention primarily focused on how our attitude will look after the conference. It is essential that Mendes not succeed in putting the blame on others for any failure. In replying to the second point raised by Mr. Merchant, strengthening NATO controls, General Schuyler described in some detail the practical controls which already exist under SACEUR and which could very easily be further developed. (General Schuyler’s account followed very closely Defto 157.5) General Schuyler reported that General Gruenther had discussed SACEUR controls with Mendes-France during his recent talk with him, and Mendes-France was obviously not interested in NATO controls on the ground that they lack political appeal. It was generally agreed that, if Mendes-France wanted to, he could make effective use of the NATO and SACEUR controls in selling NATO membership and German rearmament to the Assembly. It was felt that his unwillingness to make any important use of NATO controls was a further reflection on his intentions.

General Cook commented that our attention was perhaps being diverted from Mendes’ real purpose in his proposals. The emphasis on arms production controls in the French proposal might well reflect primary French concern over German economic ascendancy, rather than military ascendancy. Ambassador Dillon suggested that there might be considerable basis for General Cook’s interpretation; pointing out that Mendes emphasized in his proposals that only new armaments factories would be subject to licensing. This obviously applied to Germany only.

General Cook raised the question of possible rearmament of Germany without the French. It would be quite possible that France would become “pacifically hostile” and the position of US forces in France and perhaps in Africa would become untenable. Our line of supply to our forces in Germany might then be impossible to maintain. General Schuyler pointed out that the British and US forces in Germany were in a very different position as far as their lines of supply were concerned. We have a long logistical “tail”; the UK has a very short one. Mr. Merchant explained that the primary purpose of the interim measures program for proceeding without Germany was to induce France to go along. He agreed that if our action produced an excessively hostile attitude in France, then we would certainly have to take a long, new look at our entire program to determine whether it made sense militarily. It was also our view that it would make no sense militarily to proceed on the interim measures program without the United Kingdom, and it would certainly be very doubtful whether the Germans would agree to proceeding without British cooperation.

* Not found in Department of State files.
Mr. Bruce made certain general observations on the forthcoming conference. He felt that, in the first place, our general attitude should be that of the nation which has the least direct interest in the conference. Second, he felt the German proposal was certainly the most meaningful of the three. It places full reliance on the NATO contact, and it is certainly to our own great long-term interest to build up NATO. The Brussels Treaty might be used to a limited extent, but only as window dressing. A third point was the grave danger of our making too many concessions and in a futile effort to win votes in the French Assembly when we were not at all sure that we will succeed. On the other hand, we must not be in a position of browbeating the French to the extent that we are made responsible for failure. We should go into the conference without "made in America" proposals and with our position essentially uncrystallized. On the arms pool, for instance, he felt that the US should remain completely aloof and let the others directly involved deal with the French proposal.

The participants generally agreed that the French proposal for a European arms pool was too complex and discriminatory. It was also agreed that full establishment of an arms pool, even if one should be worked out, should certainly not become a condition to German entrance into NATO.

740.5/9-2454: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State 1

SECRET NIACT

PARIS, September 24, 1954—noon.

1254. After two days of effort we received a message at 6:15 last night, 10 minutes before Murphy was leaving for airport, that Mendes-France would see Murphy and me at Marly at 7:15. Murphy postponed his departure for London and we met with Mendes for approximately one hour.

Mendes first apologized for the delay in arranging the appointment and said that he had had a very busy day, and in particular had devoted a great deal of time to the Dides affair which he said was assuming serious proportions (full reports on this strange and highly important affair are being forwarded through other channels 2).

Murphy then expressed the Secretary’s regrets at not being able to come to Paris and said that the Secretary had asked him to stop and see Mendes and tell him how much the Secretary was looking forward


2 Documentation concerning the l'affaire Dides, which involved accusations concerning indiscretions committed by persons acquainted with military secrets relating to Indochina, is presented in volume vi.
to seeing Mendes at London. Mendes immediately expressed surprise that the Secretary had any regrets about coming to Paris and a discussion of the Secretary's last trip thereupon ensued between Murphy and Mendes. Mendes said that the decision to omit Paris was very unfortunate not from the point of view of personal feelings, which should not be considered in matters of this sort, but because it made more difficult the task of reaching an agreement on the European problem. He said that Adenauer had not behaved well in the weeks since the defeat of EDC and had made a number of unfortunate public statements which Mendes had been careful not to answer. According to Mendes, the Secretary's trip to Bonn and his cordial visit with the Chancellor gave him impression that the US supported these extreme statements by the Chancellor which was unfortunate.

The subject then shifted to a discussion of where we go from here. Mendes said, and repeated a number of times, that he was sure that the London conference would succeed as failure would be inadmissible. He expected the meeting to last for three or four days, but he said if there was no agreement at the end of four days, the conference must go on for six days or nine days, or whatever was necessary to reach agreement. The agreement would be in general form to be submitted to experts for final drafting. Final draft should also be relatively simple and not attempt to cover all contingencies. Mendes said that he would propose a time limit of 30 days on the drafting procedure by the experts. Mendes said that his real concern was to obtain an agreement that could be approved in the French Parliament. To do this he would require an agreement that was as close as possible to a simplified EDC treaty without the provisions unifying forces, and with Great Britain as a member. He said that a solution along the lines of the Eden proposals, as he understood them, would have no chance of approval by the French Assembly. He then explained that, as he understood the Eden proposals, they consisted of the admission of Germany to NATO after a number of unilateral renunciations and statements of policy by the German Government. In addition, Germany and Italy would be admitted to the Brussels pact more or less as window dressing for the admission of Germany to NATO. Mendes said that there was great opposition in France to the admission of Germany to NATO and it would never be accepted in this form. This opposition existed, he said, because throughout the years of the EDC debate, admission of Germany to NATO had been held up to the French people as the terrible solution which must be avoided at all costs and it was to avoid this solution that some pro-EDC people were willing to sacrifice a portion of French sovereignty.
On the other hand, Mendes said he felt there was a very good chance that if the London conference accepted the broad outlines of his proposal he could get it accepted by the French Assembly. He said that his proposal essentially meant the expansion and strengthening of the Brussels treaty for the purpose of creating a European organization to take the place of EDC. He said the Eden plan created no European organization and therefore he felt that the US would prefer the French plan, as it represented some progress toward the goal of European unity in which Mendes said he had always believed. The Brussels organization would be charged with setting maximum force limits for each country, with the procurement of all military equipment for the Brussels treaty nations and with the continuous inspection of armament production in all the countries. Finally, it would be charged with the licensing of the creation of all new armament factories in any of the Brussels treaty countries.

Mendes said that at the same time the Brussels Organization went into effect, France would be ready to accord Germany full sovereignty. He said he foresaw legal and negotiating difficulties in reaching an agreement with Germany on the stationing of forces on German territory but that he saw no difficulties in principle, as the French fully agreed in principle on the complete restoration of German sovereignty. In this connection he laid down one absolute condition which was that the negotiations for stationing of troops in Germany would have to be conducted with Germany on a tripartite basis. He said that under no circumstances would France accept separate negotiations between Germany and the three occupying powers individually on this problem. He also said that he had reluctantly agreed that Germany could join NATO at the same time as the Brussels Agreement went into effect. He said this would be difficult to put through the French Assembly, but that he felt it could be done provided the Brussels Organization had been established along the lines of his plan. The whole would be presented to the Assembly in one package.

Regarding the Saar Mendes said, as he had previously told me, that a Saar settlement remained as a pre-condition to any French agreement on German sovereignty or rearmament. He said there should be Franco-German negotiations on this subject concurrently with the meetings of the experts to draft the treaty agreed on at London. He thought that with goodwill the problem could be ironed out in two or three days. He said he recognized that the defeat of EDC created problems for Adenauer in connection with the Europeanization of the Saar, and if it would be helpful to Adenauer he would be willing to have the Saar placed under the Brussels Organization as a step toward its Europeanization.

Regarding the common procurement program Mendes said it could be operated one of two ways; either with a common budget, which he
did not appear to favor, or by giving the Brussels Organization the sole right to place orders for armament production giving it the authority to draw on national budgets for payment. In other words, the national budgets for procurement of military equipment would be made available solely to the Brussels Organization which would place all orders and distribute all equipment. Mendes apparently has not thought out any of the details of this plan regarding how and on what basis the Brussels Organization would reach its decisions. He also apparently does not contemplate preparing any drafts of articles necessary to revise the Brussels Treaty, and his statement that some 20 articles would be required was apparently not based on any work on such articles, but was only put forward as a contrast to the 140 or 150 articles in the EDC treaty.

Regarding limitations of production in strategic zones, Mendes said that such zones should be created and based solely on strategic considerations and this would not have any discriminatory aspects as regards Germany. The production of critical items would be prohibited not only throughout the strategic zone of Germany, but also in the Benelux countries and in parts of Eastern France. On the other hand, there would be no objection to armament production in Germany of more or less standard items. Finally, he would suggest what creation of joint German-French, or possibly Brussels community factories in safe areas. In this connection he mentioned the possibility of airplane factories in Algeria.

It is clear that Mendes does not plan to consult with any political leaders, either among the pro-EDC or the anti-EDC groups prior to the London conference. What he plans to do after London, assuming agreement has been reached there, is not known.

Dillon

740.5/9-2454 : Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

SECRET

PARIS, September 24, 1954—8 p. m.

1269. Views contained in Depciertel 1562 conveyed to Parodi and Margerie. They found them in main encouraging but expressed serious concern over point three. Parodi felt that unless US could give substantially similar assurances there was no point in trying to reach any agreement on Germany. He hoped most important words were "much will depend on outcome". We took occasion to reiterate difference as far as US was concerned between a Europe effectively integrated for defense and a Europe of discordant nationalisms,

2 Dated Sept. 23, p. 1245.
as well as seriousness of reappraisal currently taking place in Washington.

Parodi asked our reaction to Murphy's talks with him and Mendes yesterday. We mentioned feeling that Mendes seemed uninterested in effective, positive measures of mutual control through NATO and overly preoccupied with developing negative, almost Versailles type, controls through Brussels treaty. They felt it inconsistent that US should so strongly support EDC and now question performance of some of its functions through Brussels treaty. We replied that in simplest terms difference was between positive and negative approach. They denied that current French thinking was negative in this respect and stressed importance of giving Brussels really substantive functions rather than mere window-dressing ones.

In subsequent conversation Margerie commented that Mendes' position at London would be very different from his position at Brussels. This time he was going with position approved by Cabinet but which was reasonably flexible, with Parliament in recess rather than breathing down his neck and with program in which he really believed and which he believed could be sold to Assembly. Margerie himself had serious reservations on last point and said that, while he was optimistic that mutually satisfactory agreement could be reached at London, he feared that any agreement would be rejected by Assembly for reasons having little relation to its substance.

DILLON

110.11 DU/9-2554

Prime Minister Mendès-France to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL


Dear Mr. Secretary: I deeply regretted that the shortness of your trip to Europe did not allow you to stop off in Paris. As a matter of fact, during our meeting in July, I appreciated the value of these direct conversations which, in a few hours, enabled us to overcome a lot of difficulties and a lot of misunderstandings.

The problems we have to resolve require constructive efforts from each of members of the Atlantic Alliance in order to find quickly a solution to the problems which we have set our heart on. I deeply hope that your actions will bear fruit promptly and I will be happy to see you again soon in London, before meeting, I hope, President Eisenhower and yourself in the U.S.A.

Please accept, etc. [Mendès-France]

1 This message, translated by Embassy officials in Paris, was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 1277, Sept. 25.

2 Regarding Dulles' visit to Paris July 13-14, see the memorandum of conversation, dated July 18, p. 1015.
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Jones) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 24, 1954.

Subject: The Handling of Mendes-France at London

The 9-Power Conference at London must succeed. The degree of success will be determined largely by the extent to which firm agreement can be reached on a wide variety of fairly detailed arrangements and by the absence of agreements on "broad principles" and on formulas which do not represent true meetings of minds and which would open up possibilities of disagreements among the experts in their work following the conference.

The elements of difficulty, including the lack of detailed preparatory work, are obvious. There are, however, the following encouragingly positive factors: the British willingness to participate in continental arrangements to a greater extent than previously; the generally reasonable German position; and the fact that, in his talks with Eden and his subsequent acceptance of the terms of reference of the conference, Mendes-France has come a remarkably long way toward meeting the ideas of the other members of the Atlantic Alliance.

We must recognize that Mendes-France is in a difficult parliamentary position. Not the least of his difficulties in this respect is the necessity of getting the votes of the MRP and other pro-EDC deputies. The principal task in dealing with him will be to hold him firmly to his commitments and to prevent him from introducing into the agreements factors which can be exploited to produce delays in the subsequent meetings of the experts and in the final accomplishment of our objectives.

We have, since the EDC vote of the Assembly, sought to chasten and to educate Mendes-France and the French by mild shock treatment. Though he contributed to and exaggerated it, the fact is Mendes-France was in a position of relative isolation at Brussels. That he exploited this isolation for political purposes in the EDC debate does not remove the basic fact that he is keenly aware of what he feels is general—and, particularly, an American—distrust in him. There is considerable doubt as to the efficacy of relying exclusively upon the use of the stick in dealing with Mendes-France. We must at London use

¹Drafted by West. According to a cover sheet attached to the source text, this memorandum was circulated as NPT Memo 21 to officers engaged in the forthcoming Nine-Power Conference.
the carrot also and encourage and fully recognize the positive constructive action which, despite his difficult parliamentary position, he has already taken since Brussels and which we hope he will take at London.

Fortunately, we appear to be to some extent in a position to arbitrate between Mendes and the British with respect to their apparently conflicting desires as to which powers go to NATO and which to the Brussels Treaty—subject, of course, to our conviction that there should be no derogation of the military powers of NATO and that, in fact, certain strengthening of those powers is desirable. We can afford, in other words, to side with Mendes on certain issues.

The principal source of our concern and reservations about Mendes-France has been his ambivalent attitude toward the USSR which appears to stem from a different appraisal of the nature, extent and imminence of the Soviet threat. Fortunately, this issue will not arise per se at London. A firm agreement at London will, in fact, limit his capacity to make mischief in this respect.

Our conviction that Mendes-France must receive sympathetic treatment at London rests on two judgments. First, his full cooperation is a requisite to the success of the conference. Secondly, by giving him support at London we will assist him in his task of selling the agreement to the National Assembly. To the extent that we have administered slaps to Mendes, we have, as a corollary, encouraged certain pro-EDC elements hostile to Mendes to seek his downfall. Solidarity at London will render more difficult for the deputies in question a decision to vote against a 9-Power agreement and the subsequent NATO Council endorsement thereof.

Recommendation

While holding Mendes firmly to the road he has committed himself to follow, we should take all appropriate occasions to encourage him by showing sympathetic consideration for his problems and giving him positive support when he seeks arrangements not contrary to our interests. We should also assure him that we will do all we appropriately can to help him in his difficult task of selling to the National Assembly the package agreed upon at London.

110.11 DU/9-2454

The Secretary of State to the President

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 24, 1954.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am back at the Department for a couple of days after stopping off for three days in New York to attend the
United Nations session. ¹ I made my major speech there yesterday and then flew down here. I leave tomorrow, Saturday, for London for the Nine-Power Conference on a substitute for EDC.

[Here follow seven paragraphs dealing with meetings which took place in New York during the United Nations session, meetings with British, Mexican, Australian, and Indian officials.]

I am just about to go to the NSC meeting on Europe and China.² I have the impression that it may be possible to salvage a European military set-up which will bring the Germans in, but that the political foundation for it all will remain wobbly and unstable. However, latest advice from Paris—Murphy saw Mendes-France last night—indicate that Mendes-France is very chary about proposing to the French Parliament the admission of Germany to NATO. I fear he may attach conditions in terms of what Germany, Britain and the United States will do which will be unacceptable to us. No doubt this London Conference will be a grave affair.

Trieste again seems on the verge of settlement, but in view of past experience I must emphasize the word "verge" rather than the word "settlement".³

With best wishes to you and Mamie, I am

Faithfully yours,

Foster

¹ Documentation concerning United Nations affairs is presented in volume III.
² A memorandum of discussion at the NSC meeting of Sept. 24 is printed infra.
³ Documentation concerning Trieste is presented in volume VIII.
Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows a general discussion of world developments affecting United States security.]

2. Immediate U.S. Policy Toward Europe

(NSC 5433; \(^1\) Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated September 23, 1954; \(^2\) NSC Action No. 1225 \(^3\))

With respect to paragraph 8, which indicated possible U.S. commitments as a *quid pro quo* for commitments by the European nations to carry out the program of action, Admiral Radford expressed the opinion that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unable to comment on the various proposed U.S. commitments because the Joint Chiefs did not know what these commitments really involved. He believed, however, that it would be unwise for the United States to make any additional preliminary commitments such as were proposed in this paragraph.

Secretary Wilson said that he felt even more strongly than the Joint Chiefs with respect to this paragraph. If we had to buy the French into supporting the program of action, the deal wouldn't be worth anything. "None of this hit me very good."

Secretary Humphrey asked, apropos of this paragraph, whether everything didn't really depend on how wholeheartedly these Europeans supported a practical defense plan which the United States could approve of. If they came up with something that will really function, we can go quite a long way in helping them to develop their plan. It is not words that count, however, but spirit and deeds.

The Vice President expressed the opinion that the Secretary of State, who would be on the scene and would be entrusted with the negotiation, was in the best position to judge what, if anything, the United States felt it should give to the Europeans in order to get something from the Europeans. He therefore counselled against listing

\(^1\) For the text of NSC 5433 of Sept. 16, see p. 1205.
\(^2\) *Ante*, p. 1246.
\(^3\) NSC Action No. 1225 noted that the Council had no objection in principle to increasing the authority of the NATO Council, in light of the possible admission of Germany into NATO, even though it might apply to increased control over U.S. forces under NATO command. This decision took place at the 214th meeting of the NSC on Sept. 12 during the Council's consideration of NSC 160/1. (S/8–NSC files, file 66–D 95, "NSC Records of Action—1954") The text of NSC 160/1 concerning U.S. policy toward Germany is printed in volume VII.
a rigid set of commitments which would bind the Secretary of State. Instead, he should be permitted discretion and flexibility.

Governor Stassen felt that nevertheless some guidance should be afforded the Secretary of State in view of the difference of opinion between the Planning Board and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Cutler pointed out that the United States might have to pay something in order to obtain support of the program of action outlined in this report, and the United States should therefore realize what it might have to pay.

Secretary Dulles explained that he did not believe at this time the United States was going to “sell any plan”. What we would face at the London meeting was not a U.S. plan but an indigenous plan. Neither France nor Germany nor the U.K. expect at this time to be paid by the United States to take this plan. Nor will they take kindly to any plan “made in America” because of any “payments” we undertake to make.

As a result of his trip last week Secretary Dulles was convinced that the Europeans are much more concerned with a program to replace EDC as a problem of their own rather than as a U.S. problem. What the Europeans will want to know is not whether we will give them a quid pro quo to adopt a program of action devised by us, but rather if they devise a substitute for EDC whether we will pull out our troops next week. Or if they devise a system of controls through increasing the authority of SACEUR, will we pull our forces out of the control of SACEUR. Or if the Europeans devise a control mechanism for procurement purposes, will the U.S. go along with it or break it up.

In sum, the Europeans will say to us, “Assuming we can agree on a substitute for EDC, will the U.S. cooperate with us along the lines that you agreed to cooperate with us with respect to EDC?”

Accordingly, said Secretary Dulles, we should not try to impose a U.S. plan by dangling promises, nor will it be necessary to offer firm commitments as a quid pro quo. In any event, he did not expect to “scatter” U.S. commitments around the Nine-Power conference in London.

Governor Stassen expressed anxiety lest the European powers prove constitutionally incapable of a sound solution to their defense problem. Considering the great stake that the United States has in the defense of Europe, we may well find that we will have to exhibit more by way of U.S. initiative if an acceptable substitute for EDC is to be found. After all, EDC itself was originally an indigenous plan. Its successor may have to be made in America even if it does not appear to have been made there.

The Vice President inquired of Secretary Dulles whether our leader-
ship was now so seriously resented in Europe that any defense plan openly sponsored by the U.S. would be likely to be defeated. Secretary Dulles replied that if such a plan appeared to have been devised by Europeans it would have better chance of success. He went on to point out that France and England, at any rate, have now reached a point of no longer wishing to seem tied to the U.S. coattails. They want to throw their weight around a little. We need not feel too badly about this, since one of our great objectives has been to get the Western European States to stand on their own feet. National pride may do more to assure a successful defense of Europe than U.S. tutelage. It may be wonderful to have strong United States leadership, but Secretary Dulles said that he was more interested in actual results.

Secretary Dulles then proceeded to give the Council his view as to the stakes at the forthcoming meetings in Europe. The heart of the matter was whether or not we should be able to preserve NATO. The Soviets successfully used Mendes-France to kill, or at least to maim, EDC. Will they now try to use him to destroy NATO? If they do that successfully the whole situation falls apart. There is no use talking about the U.S. proceeding unilaterally to rearm Germany. In such a situation Germany may well choose not to rearm. There would certainly be heavy pressure in these circumstances for Germany to accommodate to the Soviet Union. The latter could dangle the possibility of unification of Germany, rectification of the Polish frontier, and economic advantages. In short, there is no good alternative if the French torpedo the NATO solution, and we must not assume that we can go ahead independently to rearm Germany if the French won't agree.

With respect to the means of inducing France to cooperate, as set forth in paragraph 10, Secretary Wilson suggested that unless and until the French start to cooperate, we should make clear to them that we should be compelled to stop any new construction in France or the placing of any new orders in France.

On this same subject, the Vice President again expressed the view that this was primarily a matter of tactics, and discretion should be left to the Secretary of State, who must conduct the negotiation.

Secretary Dulles said that he had talked with Chancellor Adenauer with respect to the flow of U.S. aid to France as part of the problem of how to handle Mendes-France. Adenauer had said that Mendes-France's heart was really in the area of finance and economic reform in France. When Secretary Dulles asked if that meant that we should cut off everything to France, Adenauer had said no, not everything, but to slow down the flow to the point where Mendes-France realizes that the flow is slowing down and whose hand controls the spigot.
Secretary Humphrey thought that perhaps the sensible thing to do was to tell the French, when they came here next week, that we were simply not in a position to do anything until we see what happened in London. Secretary Dulles said that was all right, but don’t say to the French that you will cut off everything at once, as Secretary Wilson suggested.

With respect to the JCS proposal in paragraph 11, Secretary Dulles said the time had not yet arrived to make the decision to go ahead and seek the goals desired by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There was general agreement with this position.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the subject on the basis of the reference report and in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 5433, subject to the following changes:

(1) Paragraph 3-b: Delete the parenthetical phrase.
(2) Paragraph 4-a: Change the word “agreements” to “understandings” in the second sentence.
(3) Paragraph 5: Revise the second sentence to read as follows:

“Under present conditions, major Soviet efforts are devoted to dividing and weakening, and subverting some members of, the western alliance.”

(4) Paragraph 8: Delete, and substitute the following:

“8. If a program of action along the above lines acceptable to the U.S. is developed and genuinely adopted by the European nations (including the UK), be prepared to give U.S. assurances generally similar to those given in support of EDC, in addition to NSC Action No. 1225.”

(5) Paragraph 10: Delete the second and third sentences and substitute therefor:

“Under present circumstances and until the situation has further clarified, slow down U.S. aid to France and make no new financial commitments to France.”

(6) Paragraph 11: Delete the JCS proposal, and in paragraph b change “If the U.S., with or without the UK,” to read “If the U.S. and the UK,”.

c. Agreed that answers to the questions in paragraph 11 should be prepared for the information of the Council not later than October 28, 1954, by the following departments and agencies:

a: Department of Defense

b through f: Director of Central Intelligence (coordinated intelligence estimate)
g: First sentence: Department of Defense
Second sentence: Department of State

Note: NSC 5433 as amended subsequently approved by the President and circulated as NSC 5433/1. The statement of policy contained therein subsequently referred to the Secretary of State to coordinate its implementation. The questions in paragraph 10 thereof subsequently transmitted to the appropriate departments and agencies for the preparation of answers pursuant to c above.

[Here follows a discussion of the Chinese Nationalist offshore islands, United States policy on economic defense, and United States policy toward Iran.]

S. EVERETT GLEASON

*The text of NSC 5433/1 of Sept. 25 is printed infra.*

S/S—NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5433 series

Statement of Policy by the National Security Council

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 25, 1954.

IMMEDIATE U.S. POLICY TOWARD EUROPE

SCOPE OF THIS PAPER

1. In view of the French rejection of EDC, the U.S. is faced with a choice between:
   a. Continuing to pursue its present objectives in Europe by means other than EDC; or
   b. On the assumption that continued pursuit of all these objectives is no longer feasible, determining what objectives should then be pursued.

2. It is recommended that the U.S. for the immediate future make further vigorous efforts to achieve the present objectives set forth below. Accordingly, this paper sets forth a program of action based on par. 1—a above. The paper also sets forth in par. 11 [10] below certain questions the answers to which may assist in making the determination under 1—b above, if that proves necessary.

PRESENT OBJECTIVES

3. Despite French rejection of EDC, the security of the U.S. con-

---

*Attached to the source text, but not printed here, were the following: a cover sheet, a note by Lay, a table of contents, and two annexes (extracts from the Brussels Pact of Mar. 17, 1948 and extracts from the North Atlantic Treaty of Apr. 4, 1949). A memorandum of discussion at the NSC meeting of Sept. 24 at which the source text was adopted by the Council is printed supra.*
continues to require the preservation and development of Western Europe (including the UK) as an area of strength allied to the U.S. Accordingly, the U.S. should continue to pursue the following objectives:

a. In the cold war, to prevent further extension of Soviet control in Europe and to retain the major Western European nations as allies.

b. To provide for the effective defense of Western Europe by maintaining and strengthening the NATO security system, inclusive of West Germany, as a deterrent to Soviet aggression designed to provide the most suitable defense of NATO territory.

c. To build the requisite strength and stability in Western Europe on the basis of (1) the combined efforts of the principal nations there and (2) steady progress toward integration on the continent.

d. To assure the orientation of the German Federal Republic (and ultimately a united Germany) to the West by all feasible means, including institutional ties as well as treaty arrangements.

PROGRAM OF ACTION

4. Seek promptly to associate the German Federal Republic with the West by:

a. Restoration to the German Federal Republic of its sovereignty, including the right to participate in the defense of Western Europe without restrictions unacceptable to the Germans as discriminatory or arbitrarily imposed. This step would require understanding regarding allied rights respecting Berlin, the unification of Germany, stationing of allied forces in Germany, and other issues resulting from the war and occupation.

b. Admission of the German Federal Republic to full membership in NATO, without precluding German participation also in the Brussels Pact or other European defense arrangements.

c. Obtaining acceptable safeguards as to German rearmament. Such safeguards might include:

(1) Voluntary acceptance by Germany of limits on its initial build-up of forces;
(2) Regulations or restrictions on the production of certain types of weapons, possibly through designation of "exposed areas" or through a European arms pool;
(3) Agreement among NATO members to commit forces to NATO, under a non-discriminatory formula so designed as to include all German forces (except internal security forces);
(4) Further integration of the NATO command structure and logistics system, by protocol or administrative reform;
(5) Strengthening the authority of SACEUR regarding deployment of forces committed to him;
(6) German assurances against any attempt to modify existing frontiers by force.

d. Continuing to seek eventual German reunification on the basis of freedom and the maximum possibility of association with the West.
5. Seek to reverse divisive trends in Western Europe by developing political and economic strength and cohesion which will enhance the European capacity and will to resist Communist subversion and neutralism. Under present conditions, major Soviet efforts are devoted to dividing and weakening, and subverting some members of, the Western alliance.

6. Foster all practical measures for a greater degree of integration of Western Europe, emphasizing political and economic aspects at this stage and encouraging European initiative and responsibility so far as consistent with U.S. objectives. Specifically, encourage closer ties between France and Germany and the greatest feasible degree of UK association with its continental allies.

7. Continue to seek the strengthening of NATO in a manner which places primary emphasis on its deterrent effect, with due regard for political and economic capabilities and for psychological factors. For this purpose we should seek the full exploitation of developing nuclear capabilities and a generally understood and accepted strategy for forward defense of the NATO area.

8. If a program of action along the above lines acceptable to the U.S. is developed and genuinely adopted by the European nations (including the UK), be prepared to give U.S. assurances generally similar to those given in support of EDC, in addition to NSC Action No. 1225.2

9. Seek to induce France to cooperate in achieving this program of action. Under present circumstances and until the situation has further clarified, slow down U.S. aid to France and make no new financial commitments to France. If it appears that French reactions will defeat one or more of our objectives, our policy should be governed by the results of the reappraisal contemplated in par. 11 [10].

REAPPRAISAL OF BASIC OBJECTIVES

10. The Secretary of State should report to the Council not later than October 28, 1954, whether in his opinion the foregoing program of action can be carried through successfully.3 In the event that the Council at that time believes that the above program of action no longer appears attainable, the Council should then be prepared to determine what objectives the U.S. should pursue in the light of conditions then existing and the answers to the following questions:

---
2 See footnote 3, supra.
3 At its 220th meeting on Oct. 28, 1954, the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission agreed that, in light of events, the requirement in NSC Action No. 1227-c for answers to the question in paragraph 10 of NSC 5433/1 should be cancelled. (NSC Action No. 1255)
a. Assuming our continued purpose to maintain (1) an effective deterrent to Soviet aggression and (2) the means for effective defense of the United States and areas vital to it, could a feasible strategy be devised for the defense of Western Europe:

(a) Without German participation?
(b) Without French participation?
(c) Without the participation of both France and Germany?

What basic changes in U.S. military dispositions and commitment of resources would be required to carry out each strategy?

b. If the U.S. and the UK should proceed with the rearming of Germany over a French veto, what would be the ultimate effect on (1) France, (2) Germany and (3) European stability and vulnerability in the cold war?

c. How would the political and economic integration of Europe be affected by French refusal to participate therein?

d. What is the likely course of UK policy over the next few years with respect to European integration and German rearmament?

e. What would be the political effect in the German Federal Republic and on the future orientation of Germany, if the raising of forces in a sovereign German Federal Republic were postponed for substantial time with or without German admission to NATO?

f. If Germany were unified and neutralized with restricted armed forces, what would be the probable course of its policy, and the effect on its vulnerability in the cold war and on the stability of Western Europe?

g. To what extent should the U.S. require formal agreements permitting the immediate use of nuclear weapons by the NATO command in the event of aggression? To what extent would pressing for such formal agreements seriously impair allied cooperation or the prospects for successfully carrying out the agreed strategy?

110.11 DU/9-2554

The Secretary of State to Prime Minister Scelba

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, September 25, 1954.

[Dear Mr. Prime Minister:] Your letter of August 26 delivered to me by Ambassador Tarchiani arrived at a particularly difficult moment for me, and therefore its expressions of friendship and cooperation were doubly appreciated. I regret that my long absences from Washington have not permitted an earlier adequate reply.

Italy and the United States now face new and grave tasks. The rejection of EDC by one of the six treaty nations places upon all western governments, which seek solidarity in opposing world

1 This message was transmitted to the Embassy in Rome in telegram 1014, Sept. 25, with instructions that it be delivered as soon as practicable.
2 Not found in Department of State files.
domination by communism, a burden of decision and action which will require the noblest efforts of us all. The forthcoming conferences offer us, however, a renewed opportunity to find solutions to our mutual problems in this field. In these conferences, to know that the Italian Government under your direction seeks the same security, the same defense, the same unity which the Government of the United States seeks, augurs well for the future and will maintain the solid friendship of our two nations.

I look forward to the mutual cooperation that I confidently anticipate between your new Foreign Minister Sig. Martino, and myself at London.

[Sincerely yours,]

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 363

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)¹

SECRET

[LONDON,] September 25, 1954.

Participants: Mr. Herbert Blankenhorn, Under Secretary of the German Foreign Office.
Mr. Oskar Schlitter, Counselor of German Embassy, London.
Mr. Butterworth
Mr. Merchant

I saw Mr. Blankenhorn for nearly an hour at his request. First he said that if the Secretary wanted to see Adenauer before the conference he would be available between 7 and 8 and after dinner on Monday. I gave no indication that the Secretary was planning to see him in advance of the conference.

Blankenhorn then said that he was disturbed by indications from Frank Roberts that it would be impossible to terminate the occupation by declaration until all the accompanying arrangements had been concluded. He said that the Chancellor’s political position was weak and that he was most anxious that there should be a declaration at the conclusion of the London conference restoring sovereignty to Germany. I said I could not see how it would be possible to consider anything beyond a declaration of intent to restore sovereignty prior to agreement on German entrance into NATO and the Brussels Pact and agreement on the treatment of the contractuals. He expressed disappointment.

¹This document was circulated among the U.S. Delegation at the Nine-Power Conference as NPT Memo 27.
Next Blankenhorn said that the Chancellor hoped that certain interim measures could be taken immediately following the London conference. I pointed out that the London conference was really preparatory to the North Atlantic Council meeting and that it was the latter rather than the former which seemed to me to be the crucial meeting, before the holding of which nothing along the lines he suggested seemed to be possible of consideration.

Blankenhorn asked if we were going to insist on according supranational powers to the amended Brussels Treaty. I said he knew the Secretary's views on the importance of organic union on the continent and I said we were most anxious that nothing be done which would impede its development in the future but that we would not take a position insisting on supranational powers in the Brussels Treaty.

I asked him why they had withdrawn the reference to the arms pool which was in the earlier draft of the memorandum. He said that as they understood Mendes-France's proposal it was totally unacceptable and they had finally decided that it would place them in a false position to appear to endorse it. He felt that any arms pool of a satisfactory nature would involve a complicated and extremely prolonged negotiation.

Blankenhorn asked if I knew what the French position was on the Saar as a precondition. I said all indications we had were to the effect that even if the government did not establish it as a precondition, the Assembly would. Blankenhorn first said that any solution of the Saar at this time was impossible and that this was another French effort to block progress. He said Adenauer had made the ultimate sacrifice in his agreement with Teitgen in order (as he thought) to assure the EDC passage. With no supranational community a Saar settlement along these lines amounted to a simple cession of German territory which no German government could defend. He said it was nonsense to contemplate putting the Saar executive under either the Council of Europe or the Brussels Treaty Council. I suggested that a relationship might be worked out with the Coal and Steel Community which was a supranational organism already functioning. He said they could discuss a solution along these lines.

In closing I gave him in outline form our general attitude in approaching the London conference. I agreed with him that our position was very close to that of the British and the Germans. I made the point, however, that care must be taken not to give Mendes-France the impression that he was isolated from the outset. I said, and he agreed, that we must all assume that the French came here with a flexible position and that it was a necessity for the London conference to succeed.
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)  

SECRET

[LONDON,] September 25, 1954.

Participants:  Sir Frank Roberts, British Foreign Office
          Mr. Butterworth
          Mr. Merchant

I saw Sir Frank Roberts for about an hour at my request. At the outset he went over in some detail the conference arrangements and the general British approach to the handling of the substance. I said I agreed with the suggestion that Mr. Eden serve as Permanent Chairman and would so recommend to the Secretary. I responded similarly to his suggestion that the conference avoid selecting any one of the three outstanding memoranda as the basis for discussion but instead deal with a functional agenda.

On the working groups envisaged for post-conference work, he felt strongly that the group on the contractuals should meet in Bonn. He said that the purely formalistic changes in the Brussels Treaty would have to be done in London by the Brussels Pact organization but that this was only an hour's work. He agreed that it would be desirable to establish in Paris, depending on the NATO international staff for administrative support, the working group or groups which would deal with the substantive safeguards to be inserted by protocol or Council action in both treaties. He agreed to my suggestion that the members of NATO not attending the London conference be invited to place representatives on this working group.

We briefly and inconclusively discussed the question of keeping the NATO non-London members informed of the progress at the London conference.

I then asked him what British thinking was on the actions which should be taken in the event that it was impossible to reach agreement on our program with the French or in the event that even after agreement was reached the French were clearly delaying progress. He said he could only speak personally on this. Mr. Eden was asked this same question, he said, at every capital and replied uniformly by saying that in the absence of any Cabinet decision he could not say what the view of the British government was but that to him it was clear under the described circumstances that prompt action would be required and he had no doubt that Britain would take it. Roberts went on to say that their thinking centered around the "empty chair" thought

---

1 This document was circulated among the U.S. Delegation at the Nine-Power Conference as NPT Memo 28.
of the Prime Minister. It would be necessary with us to restore sovereignty to the extent within our power and to move ahead with actions looking to the rearmament of Germany but all on a basis which would leave the door open for the French and encourage them to take it. I said we were thinking along the same lines. I asked him if in terms of action he was thinking of such things as permitting the Germans to start building their barracks, bringing some students to the UK for pilot training and starting the training of cadres. He indicated that it was action such as this that he had in mind. I said that an idea I had had personally was that at some early point (if this conference failed) there might be value in a joint survey of the situation by the British and American Chiefs of Staff. He said he thought this would be an excellent idea and that it might be helpful if the French knew such a study were under way.

Editorial Note

Secretary of State Dulles released a statement for the press upon his departure from Washington on September 25 concerning his hopes for the Nine-Power Conference in London; for the text of this statement, issued as Department of State press release 530, see the Department of State Bulletin, October 4, 1954, page 489. Dulles arrived in London at 5 p.m. on September 26. (Telegram Secto 2 from London, September 26; Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 393)

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CP 370

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie)

TOP SECRET [LONDON,] September 27, 1954.

Participants: The Secretary
Ambassador Aldrich
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Butterworth
Mr. Bowie
Mr. Eden and Mr. Caccia

Subject: Dinner last night ¹ at the Ambassador’s House

After general discussion during first half of dinner, the discussion turned to business and was continued until about an hour after dinner.

Mendes-France’s Intentions.

Mr. Eden said that he was still unclear about the real intentions of Mendes-France. He was aware of the various rumors and hy-

¹ Sunday, Sept. 26.
pothetes but felt that we must proceed for the purpose of this Conference on the assumption that Mendes-France wanted to work out an acceptable solution which he could get through his Parliament. If we act on that basis, then if these are not his purposes, that should become apparent in the course of the Conference and we should then have to decide what to do.

He felt that if the efforts to reach an acceptable solution did not succeed here then the U.S. and Britain would probably have to act without France on a program regarding Germany.

British Participation in Brussels.

Mr. Eden said that he had concluded that the time had come for Britain to go further in its association with the defense of the Continent. He felt that Britain should be prepared to assign specific forces to the Continent which would be subject to the control of the majority vote of the Brussels Conference. This would constitute a kind of an acceptance by Britain of the supranatural [sic] principle and would contribute to the movement toward European unity.

Mr. Eden felt that this should help Mendes-France with his Parliament but he stressed that it would be important to Adenauer and that this was one of the reasons for his willingness to take the step.

Mr. Eden stated that he had talked about this somewhat with the Prime Minister but that it was not yet a Cabinet decision. He emphasized that he had spoken about it only to us and it was important that it be held closely for use by the British when it might do the most good.

The Secretary said that he thought this would be most helpful for Mendes-France in meeting his preoccupation for closer British association and for Adenauer in his desire for his continued movement toward European unity.

Arms Pool.

The question of our attitude to the Arms Pool was discussed. All agreed that the proposals put forward by Mendes-France seemed to include features which could hardly be accepted by Adenauer or by the other countries. After discussion of the possible advantages of a genuine system of common procurement, Mr. Eden expressed the view that this might have real advantages both political and economic. It was generally agreed that it would be undesirable and unwise merely to take a negative attitude towards Mendes-France’s proposals. If this were done it would enable him to return to France and to present the position that his efforts to obtain satisfactory safeguards by this means had merely been arbitrarily rejected by the others. To prevent this, it was thought desirable that a project for a bona fide Arms Pool
should be developed and presented, if possible, by one of the Benelux countries. Mr. Dulles, who was seeing Benelux late on Monday afternoon, agreed to broach the subject with them and see whether they would be interested in putting forward some positive proposal which would be more acceptable both to the Germans and themselves than the present French proposal.

Arrangements.

The Secretary suggested that it would be best to have a permanent chairman rather than to rotate and proposed that Mr. Eden act in that capacity. Mr. Eden was inclined to agree that a permanent chairman would be better but was not particularly anxious to serve because he would not wish to be foreclosed from presenting the British view. After reviewing the other possibility it was concluded that Mr. Eden should serve with the understanding that he would not be prevented from taking an active part in the discussion at the Conference. Mr. Dulles agreed also to suggest this to Mendes-France and the Benelux representatives when he saw them.

It was agreed that in the first day or two it would be desirable to avoid airing the respective positions in the press, especially the French and the German positions, which were likely to be negotiating positions. Any detailed reporting at the start would make it harder to make compromises to accommodate the differing points of view. The best answer seemed to be to have short formal statements from each of the Nine at the start of the Conference which could be released to the papers on the first day.

It was also agreed in the early stages it would be desirable to have a Four-Power Meeting to deal with German sovereignty and to request the High Commissioners to continue their work with the Germans on the revision of the contractuals with a view to reporting any major issues to the Conference before it adjourns, if possible.

U.S.-British Unity.

Mr. Dulles said that he felt that the U.S. should not take the initiative in the early stages of the meeting in putting forward any proposals. His attitude would be that the U.S. was there as a friend and counselor and was deeply interested in the results but looked to the Europeans to put forward proposals. We would probably be consulted by others and would express our views to them but would try to avoid getting out in front. Mr. Eden agreed that this was the wise approach.

Mr. Eden said that he felt that the success of the Conference depended absolutely on joint US–UK cooperation. He thought that at some point we would have to “heave” a solution through.

The Secretary said he was very glad that we were so close together in our thinking on the problems.
Southeast Asia.

In the course of the discussion at the table, Mr. Eden expressed his belief that it was vital that Laos and Cambodia be preserved from Communist control. At one point he seemed to say that he thought the situation in Viet-Nam was hopeless, but later expressed the view that it was important, if possible, to preserve Cochin China.

In pursuing the question of U.S. training missions for Cambodia, Mr. Merchant pressed Mr. Caccia as to why there should be any objection to this in view of the terms of the armistice agreement. Mr. Caccia's somewhat evasive answers tended to confirm the suspicions that the British had given side assurances to the Chinese Communists regarding the U.S. training missions in Laos and Cambodia.

Mr. Eden said that he had sent a long cable to Nehru explaining the Southeast Asia Pact with a view to his pending trip to Peiping. He had also cabled him to express his concern about Laos.

Conference file, lot 60 D 627, CP 389: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at London

WASHINGTON, September 27, 1954—7 p.m.

Tedul 2. Eyes only Secretary. I wish to be sure you read Schwartz's memorandum of September 25 to Bowie reporting Cutler's conversation with the President and the President's approval of NSC 5433 as amended by Friday's NSC meeting. Believe Bowie has full memorandum but pertinent portion follows:

"General Cutler also transmitted the following points made by the President in connection with NSC 5433 and the London meeting:

1. He heartily agrees with the Secretary's view that the Europeans should make the plan and do most of the talking.
2. He believes that we should not threaten the French, but should view their rejection of EDC more in sorrow than anger.
3. He agrees that we should slow down aid to France and make no new financial commitments (as set forth in revised paragraph 19 [9]).
4. In connection with the JCS memorandum (transmitted under cover of Secretary Wilson's letter of September 23 and Mr. Lay's memorandum of September 23), he is of the firm opinion that no bilateral arrangement between the U.S. and Germany will

---

1 A copy of the Schwartz memorandum is in the S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5433 series; virtually the entire text of this memorandum is quoted in the source text.

2 For the text of NSC 5433 of Sept. 16, see p. 1205. NSC 5433 was revised as a result of a meeting of the National Security Council on Sept. 24 and circulated as NSC 5433/1 of Sept. 25; for the text of NSC 5433/1, see p. 1268.

3 This is a reference to Enclosure 2 to the memorandum by Lay of Sept. 23, p. 1249.
work; he considers that we would have to have at least the U.K. and the Low Countries with us.

5. He still believes that an arrangement equivalent to NATO and EDC, which provides for a German contribution, will permit the defense of Europe on the ground."

SMITH

751.5 MSP/9-2754: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET  PRIORITY  WASHINGTON, September 27, 1954—7:02 p. m.

1765. For Secretary and Merchant. Limit distribution. Subsequent Saturday meeting with Secretary, FOA prepared position paper 2 for aid talks with French interpreting Secretary's policy guidance as designed to "slow down flow US aid and other extraordinary dollar payments to France so that total effect which US will endeavor realize is to gradually decrease French gold and dollar reserves rather than continue to increase them which has been effect over past year of such US payments." 3 Paper sets forth for presentation to French US position that we must review in detail specific problems connected aid program and must undertake thorough consultation with Congress before reaching any conclusions. Meantime aid payments will of necessity be delayed but we will endeavor keep delay at minimum. Paper then poses series questions for French to answer.

FOA paper states for US internal use only that in implementation this policy it is anticipated ceiling will be placed on rate of dollar flow to France from OSP and Indochina aid programs in months immediately ahead and until further decision. Also anticipated rate dollar payments to France for NATO infrastructure and US military construction will be kept at minimum until further decision. Not anticipated there should be any slowdown in flow of FOA pipeline commodities to France. Implicit in this policy is that preparations must be made for direct US aid programs to Associated States to commence promptly.

FOA paper gives breakdown $427 million extraordinary French dollar receipts first six months calendar 1954 from FOA paid ship-

---

1 Drafted by Beigel; cleared with Barbour, Robertson, MacArthur, Nolting, and Jones; and repeated to Paris.

2 The position paper under reference was not found in Department of State files; however, a letter from the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, Harold E. Stassen, to the Secretary of Defense, dated Sept. 29, outlines the highlights of the new policy on aid to France. (751.5 MSP/9-2954)

3 The Secretary of State had responsibility for providing further guidelines on the matter of aid to France, based on paragraph 9 of NSC 5433/1 of Sept. 25; for the text of NSC 5433/1, see p. 1288. Further documentation concerning U.S. aid policies toward France is presented in volume vi.
ments, troop pay and construction, NATO infrastructure, OSP and Indochina aid.

Department notes that some portion this amount represents Defense payments to Eximbank for French deliveries under former Lisbon contracts and while reducing outstanding French obligations did not result in current cash accrual to France, and that undetermined portion FOA pipeline payments went to US banks and exporters in those cases where French did not prefinance with their own dollars. Available French Finance Ministry figures show increase in French dollar reserves by $150 million during first seven months calendar 1954 during which period French also paid off some $200 million in long-term and short-term obligations and EPU debts.

Embassy Paris study indicates if US expenditures on troop pay, construction and French OSP deliveries reach proportions predicted by US military services for 1954, French could earn $800 million this calendar year from these US military programs while flow from Indochina program would go entirely into French reserves.

If these estimates correct slowdown in US aid program might retard rate further buildup in French reserves but would not appear likely reverse trend remainder this year. Since French monthly receipts from US military programs and OSP fluctuate widely (23, 14, 24, 12 and 46 million during first five months 1954) French may not readily discover we are slowing down such payments, and desired effect could be lost. What corresponding actions US military services will have to take to slow down payments must also be examined.

On other hand slowdown in Indochina budgetary support program would directly affect internal position French Treasury and could have considerable political impact. Ramifications would appear broadest from slowdown in reimbursements on French procurement contracts for either Indochina or NATO forces.

FOA now preparing details on how implement slowdown US military programs in France and French Morocco and how deal with immediate French requests for reimbursement under Indochina program.

Economic talks with French here now scheduled for Tuesday afternoon.4

Foregoing sent for your information and any comment you may have.5

SMITH

---

4 Documentation concerning these talks in Washington is presented in volume vi.
5 In telegram 361 from Paris to London, not repeated to the Department of State, Achilles noted that this policy "will presumably have major impact here" and that its coincidence with the opening of the London Conference "seems to us unfortunate". Achilles recommended that every effort be made to clearly indicate that this action was "in no sense punitive" (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 372). In a memorandum to Merchant on Sept. 27, Wilson recorded that he had spoken with Achilles on the telephone and had confirmed Achilles' view that they should not make an issue of the stoppage (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 872).
THE GERMAN PROBLEM

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Moore)¹

SECRET

[LONDON,] September 27, 1954.

Participants: The Secretary of State
               Mr. Merchant
               Mr. Bowie
               Mr. Moore
               Ambassador Hughes
               Mr. Hensel
               General Gruenther
               Colonel Richardson
               Colonel Anderson

The Secretary said that he would like to have General Gruenther’s views on the problem raised by the French in their memorandum, namely an armaments pool. He said that our preliminary thinking on this subject suggested that there were two main purposes to be serviced by such a proposal.

One would be the delimitation of certain areas, or zones, in which certain types of production would be prevented or limited, for example atomic weapons. These zones would be drawn in accordance with strategic and military considerations since the German territory would be included in the forward area. The proposal would also serve a political purpose by prohibiting or limiting German production of strategic weapons.

The second main purpose would be a rationalization of arms production within the territories covered, thereby serving an economic, as well as a political, purpose. The thought would be to lower costs of production of certain types of equipment in efficient plants, and at the same time, make it impossible for any one country to provide a balanced arms program independently of its neighbor.

As we analyzed French motives at the conference, they were concerned about two main points; they wished to involve the U.K. as deeply as possible on the Continent and they were concerned to limit German control of an independent military potential. Some form of arms pool would help to meet the second preoccupation, although it was clear that the British attitude was such that it would do little to meet the first. It was probably true also that the French had ulterior motives with a view to getting control over the allocation of arms orders for the benefit of French industry. However, it should be pos-

¹The source text was circulated to members of the U.S. Delegation to the Nine-Power Conference as document NPT Memo 29.
sible to arrange a scheme which would provide safeguards against this
danger.

In reply, General Gruenther recounted his conversation with
Monsieur Mendes-France, in which he pointed out that an arms pool
was not the most satisfactory method of meeting the French desire to
control German military strength. He pointed out to Monsieur Men-
des-France that, in NATO, we had a going concern already set up to
provide certain safeguards for France. He listed these as follows:

1. Through the Infrastructure Program, NATO controlled the
pipelines through which fuel for aircraft must flow in the event of
future war, and without this fuel German forces would have no air-
craft support and thus could not fight independently.
2. Under NATO, a pooling of reserve supplies and stocks was being
worked out, so that no one country would be able to fight for very long
in the absence of control over these reserves.
3. NATO had integrated arrangements for air defense which, for
military reasons, must be operated from one source through an inte-
grated radar network.
4. The International command structure under NATO would pro-
vide a tip-off in the event that any one Member country initiated a
process of pulling out its own forces for aggressive purposes.

He said that to improve and strengthen these controls over inter-
national forces, SHAPE would need to have its powers strengthened and
defined by Council action, but that this should be relatively easy to
provide by international agreement. Monsieur Mendes-France had
replied that a program of the kind outlined by General Gruenther
would be difficult to sell politically in France. German [General]
Gruenther said that SHAPE’s experience in talking with various
groups of Frenchmen suggested that such a program could be sold
if it were properly explained to the average Frenchman. He said
further that the EDC had failed in part because of opposition from
French military officials. These same officials, including General Juin,
would support a proposal of the kind General Gruenther had made. He
said that Mendes-France wanted SHAPE to accept responsibility for
the inspection of German factories. This would be impracticable since
SHAPE had no personnel for this purpose and it would be politically
impossible for them to get into this field.

The Secretary pointed out that, if SHAPE were given increased
authority by Council action, the Council could only remove this au-
thority by a unanimous vote, and that this should help to satisfy
French fears. General Gruenther agreed and pointed out that a

---

2 For a summary of Gruenther’s meeting with Mendès-France on Sept. 16, see
telegrams 248, 250, and 251 from Paris, Sept. 16, pp. 1200, 1201, and 1202,
respectively.
Frenchman, General Juin, would administer these NATO controls insofar as they relate to ground forces in the central sector. The air force commander in this sector is also a Frenchman, General Charpentier.

General Gruenther felt that the best tactic with respect to an arms pool would be to ask the French questions about their plan. The Germans, including Mr. __________, 3 have no knowledge of the details. He said that the SHAPE analysis suggested that the basis of the French proposal was the so-called Lapie Plan, developed in 1951 to deal with the need for greater integration in aircraft procurement. He suggested that this plan provided the germ of a program which would be acceptable and which could be developed by the experts. It was pointed out that any plan would require some formula for making the basic decisions, such as the voting procedure set forth in the EDC Treaty. Perhaps such a formula could be worked out under the Brussels Treaty. The Secretary felt that it was important to develop some set of counter-proposals, possibly by agreement with the Benelux countries, so that the French could not say that there was only destructive criticism of their proposal. It was agreed that we needed to develop promptly the principles of an effective scheme, so that we could use them informally in our discussion with other Delegations.

3 The name was left blank in the source text.

Conference files, lot 69 D 627, CP 370
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) 1

SECRET [LONDON,] September 27, 1954.

Place: Residence of the French Ambassador, London

Participants: The Secretary

M. Mendes-France

Mr. Merchant

The Secretary called at noon today on Premier Mendes-France. The latter greeted the Secretary on the doorstep in the presence of a dozen or more press photographers who appeared out of nowhere.

The Premier escorted the Secretary to the living room and a moment later a dozen or so photographers were ushered in who took five minutes worth of pictures of the Secretary and the Premier engaged in pleasant conversation. In the presence of the photographers M.

1 The source text was circulated to members of the U.S. Delegation to the Nine-Power Conference as document NPT Special 2.
Mendes-France asked the Secretary how long he expected the conference to last. The Secretary said that he assumed it would last through this week. The Premier expressed surprise and said that he thought it should do its work in less time than that, reaching agreement on principles which would provide guidance for experts who would assemble immediately following the conference.

After the photographers had been removed from the room with some difficulty and at the cost of an upset vase of flowers, the Secretary opened the conversation by saying that he had seen Mr. Murphy on Saturday before he left and received a report of the talk he had had with the Premier.² M. Mendes-France said that he had been glad to receive Mr. Murphy and was sorry that his visit was so short. He had seen him at the end of a very difficult day in which he had been concentrating on the scandal in the police and the arrest of Dides. He said that there was a very curious situation of espionage and that he didn’t know where it might lead. He would have wished for another week or so of investigation with no publicity because then they might have had a more successful investigation. In a week or so, however, he hopes to have further information. He said that there was no doubt that secret documents were being passed on (he did not say to whom) and said that one curious aspect was that reports of at least two meetings of the National Defense Council had been passed on but that they were extractions of the proceedings and did not contain the most precise or sensitive subject matter discussed at the meetings. In other words they had been screened before transmission. He could not account for this pattern but “policemen are terrible people” and it was a bad situation. There were a number of them who were spending large sums of money on cars, women and gambling who had no private fortunes of their own and relatively small salaries. They were connected with different circles, including political groups. The Premier indicated that he was going to get to the bottom of it but that he was unable to see the full implications as yet.

M. Mendes-France then said that he was glad of this opportunity to talk to the Secretary and that he would like to do so frankly. In order to deal with the future it was necessary to go back to the past. He remembered their July meeting with pleasure and at that time he had felt that there had been a full, friendly and frank exchange of views even though they were dealing with difficult subjects. He reminded the Secretary that at that time he had made two promises, both of which he had fulfilled. The first was that he would hold the Assembly in Paris and secure an answer on EDC one way or the other before the end of August. The second was that since there was at that time no majority in favor of the EDC in the Assembly (a point on which he

² For a summary of Murphy’s meeting with Mendès-France on Sept. 23, see telegram 1254 from Paris, Sept. 24, p. 1256.
and the Secretary had had an argument) he would attempt to find some modification which would be acceptable to the other five countries and change 60 or so Deputies’ votes to carry the treaty.

M. Mendes-France then recited at some length his experience at Brussels. He emphasized that when he arrived there he found that the other five were opposed to accepting his changes and that Mr. Bruce had told him at Brussels that the United States Government did not like his protocols either. Despite his best efforts he had been unable to secure from his partners what was necessary for him to obtain passage of EDC in the Assembly.

M. Mendes-France then explained at some length why under the French constitution and in light of the division within his Cabinet he had been unable to put the vote on the basis of an issue of confidence. He said he had fought for its passage and that he had made clear to the Assembly that the early return of sovereignty to Germany and the early rearmament of Germany under some alternative arrangement were inevitable if EDC was rejected. Notwithstanding his efforts, the Deputies sustained his earlier estimate of the situation by rejecting the treaty. He then referred in rather bitter terms to the violence of the reaction against France and against him personally in the American press and in the American Government. He indicated clearly that he felt this was unjust and whereas he disclaimed any personal feeling in the matter it was quite plain that he felt a deep and bitter resentment.

The Premier said that he came to London in the belief that it was essential that the conference succeed. He said that up until the close of his talks with Mr. Eden he had been opposed to German entrance into NATO but that he now saw that all others wished it and consequently France could not hold out. He needed, however, “weapons” to win his fight in the Parliament, which would be extremely difficult at best. The two factors about EDC which accounted for its rejection were (1) its supranational character and (2) the absence of the British. By expanding the Brussels Treaty and bringing Germany and Italy into it, it would be possible to meet these two objections. “I am proposing what is really the EDC but without supranationality and with British membership.” (At no time during the conversation did M. Mendes-France mention specifically the armaments pool.)

On the matter of restoring sovereignty to Germany the Premier said that there would be no difficulty but it was essential that it be done on a trilateral basis and not be worked out on the basis of three separate bilateral arrangements with Germany. The French people, he said, were willing to accept the return of sovereignty to Germany and hence it presented no political problems to him although there were a number of very difficult legal complications. In this matter, however, we would find him completely reasonable and cooperative.
The important thing, however, M. Mendes-France said, was to give such powers to the Brussels Treaty Council and incorporate in the treaty such safeguards as would enable him to tell the French Chamber that the French were protecting against the "inconveniences" flowing from German rearmament.

M. Mendes-France said that he felt it was a mistake for the Secretary to have omitted a visit to Paris last week when he went to Bonn and London. "It had done more harm than good." However, we had all come to London to make the conference a success and he was looking forward to working cooperatively toward that end.

The Secretary replied to the Premier (who had spoken without interruption for an hour) at some length. He recalled the long and affectionate relationship between the two countries extending back to the revolution. He reminded the French Premier that since the war it had been the United States who had supported the French materially, monetarily and diplomatically at conferences. He recited a number of post-war incidents when the United States had championed French interests. He said that the defeat of EDC had been a great blow to the American people who had felt, particularly as delay followed on delay, that it had become the symbol not only of the consistency of France but of the entire concept of a European community which the American people were convinced must be developed if we were to avoid a repetition of the history of two world wars starting in Europe.

The Secretary said that we came here with no plan of our own but only the desire to be helpful. We felt that, even though there was indeed no good alternative to the EDC, nevertheless we could find a solution. A solution, however, he felt must meet three criteria. First, it must result in the prompt restoration of sovereignty to Germany; second, it must permit German participation in its own defense and in support of NATO's forward strategy (the Secretary at this point said that notwithstanding the statements of some military men, the President and he had always felt that the supranational aspect of EDC was far, far more important than twelve German divisions. He said that we had no intention of rushing into a massive rearmament of Germany but we did feel that German participation and collective defense was essential); thirdly, the Secretary said that in any solution it was important that it be made clear that the idea of ultimate unity on the continent was not dead. He said that if the American people felt the rejection of EDC meant the rejection of the European movement toward unity then there was a very real chance that the American people would be disillusioned and would withdraw to their own continent feeling another world war would ultimately start in Europe and that we had no wish to be involved in it.
The Secretary then said that there had been press stories to the effect that he and Mendes-France did not get along. He said it was a curious irony that he, who of all American Secretaries of State probably knew France better and loved France better than any other, was regarded by the French with more hostility than any other Secretary (M. Mendes-France protested this statement vehemently). The Secretary said that he had the highest regard for Mendes-France, that he felt their talk in July had established a relationship in which they could work with frankness and intimacy for the same aims. He said he still felt that way but that even if he didn’t he had learned years ago the foolishness of attempting to deal on governmental matters with anyone other than the chosen head of the government. He described Woodrow Wilson’s failure in his effort to go to the people over the heads of Clemenceau and other European leaders at the time of Versailles. He said no one had the influence to achieve results by this measure. (The Premier interjected that President Eisenhower had enormous influence with the people of Europe.) The Secretary assured Mendes-France that he was looking forward to working with him on a basis of close and intimate association at this conference.

In connection with the omission of Paris from his last trip to Europe, the Secretary pointed out that he had made a number of trips in the last year and a half to Paris without necessarily going to many other capitals. He also pointed out that he had had urgent messages from Adenauer of the latter’s desire to see him and similarly had an urgent suggestion from Mr. Eden that he come to London directly from the Manila Conference. He had had no such intimation from Mendes-France of a desire that he come to Paris at that time. He had hoped between Manila and the United Nations to take a week’s vacation but he had reluctantly sacrificed four days of it in order to meet the requests he had had from Adenauer and Eden. There had been no intended slight of France and he was surprised that this interpretation had been placed by some upon his itinerary.

By this time it was nearly 1:30 and as the Secretary rose to leave he asked Mendes-France what he would think of having Eden serve as Permanent Chairman of the Conference. He said he had given thought to other possibilities but that this seemed the best. The Premier indicated full agreement. The Premier then said that Eden had mentioned to him this morning a plan to base the discussion on an extraction of the common points connoted from the French, UK and German memoranda. He felt this was unsatisfactory from his point of view and he suggested that they might open the conference by permitting him to expand and discuss in more detail his proposal. The Secretary said that that was a possibility, particularly if thereafter the British and the Germans were given a chance to expand their proposals, following which an agenda might be developed which would
draw on the common points of all three memoranda, making clear, however, that each Minister reserved his position on any particular point until the outcome of the discussion of all was seen.

Either at this point or earlier Mendes-France assured the Secretary again that if the London conference arrived at an acceptable agreement he would put it to the French Parliament immediately with the full authority of his government behind it. “This time the French Parliament will be the first to act and not the last.”

As they walked to the door Mendes-France said that he needed the Secretary’s help at this conference. The Secretary said of course he would help him. Mendes-France however went on to say that he had to judge what was possible of passage in the French Assembly. He said there was no point in reaching an agreement which would fail to secure Parliamentary approval by the countries concerned. That would be meaningless. Therefore he knew the Secretary would understand that there would be certain points to which he had to stick.

The Premier then saw the Secretary to his car. The parting was cordial and friendly.³

³In a separate memorandum of conversation by Merchant, which was circulated to members of the U.S. Delegation at the Nine-Power Conference as NPT Memo 26 of Sept. 27, Merchant made the following observations:

“At the outset of M. Mendes-France’s talk with the Secretary he seemed tense but as the conversation ran on he became increasingly relaxed. His color was worse than I have ever seen it before and he seemed to me a man suffering from deep fatigue. There was no doubt that he felt or feels a deep resentment over the reaction of the American press against France and particularly against himself as a result of the rejection of EDC. It was equally obvious that he resented the omission of Paris from the itinerary of the Secretary’s trip to Europe last week.”

(Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 363)

---

Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States Acting Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Martin)¹

SECRET  


Participants:  
The Secretary  
General Gruenther  
Ambassador Aldrich  
Mr. Merchant  
Mr. McCordle

Mr. Bowie  
Mr. Martin  
Colonel Silver  
Colonel Richardson  
Mr. O’Connor

Subject:  SACEUR Assistance in Alternative Arrangements to EDC

General Gruenther called attention to the fact that during the morning meeting ² he had not had an opportunity to answer the question asked by the Secretary about the feasibility of establishing a strategic

¹The source text was circulated to members of the U.S. Delegation to the Nine-Power Conference as document NPT Memo 30.

²For a record of this morning meeting, see the memorandum of conversation by Moore, Sept. 27, p. 1281.
zone in which it would be militarily unwise to produce certain types of munitions.

General Gruenther stated that establishment of such a zone was feasible, and his Headquarters would be willing to assist in it. However, they would prefer not to get involved, and he suggested that it might be possible to utilize, at least as a solution for the present, the arrangements in this regard agreed to in connection with the EDC negotiations.

General Gruenther expressed the opinion that the Germans were apparently willing to accept the EDC solution although he doubted the prohibition of the production in Germany of military aircraft could be maintained for long.

---

PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “Chronological 1954”

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie)

TOP SECRET


Participants: Mr. Eden
Mr. Caccia and Denis Allen (British Foreign Officer)
Ambassador Aldrich
Mr. Bowie

1. Ambassador Aldrich showed Mr. Eden the text of the attached cable ¹ and said that Mr. Dulles wanted to be sure that Mr. Edenconcurred in the cable insofar as it concerned him. Mr. Eden said he fully concurred.

2. Mr. Allen handed us a paper ² which he said reflected the legal opinion of Mr. Fitzmorris, supplemented by the views of some of the people in the legal section of the Foreign Office. Mr. Eden said he had not seen the paper and after reading it he expressed some concern lest it give the wrong impression about his attitude. He said he wanted it made quite clear to the Secretary (a) that this was merely a statement of legal views and not a policy statement, and (b) that as far as he was concerned he favored the use of Chapter VI rather than Chapter VII but that he also favored the use of Chapter VII rather than nothing at all.

3. Mr. Eden said he was very pleased with the talk of last night.³ He said that he had talked today with Mendes-France and proposed to him an early meeting of the Four regarding German sovereignty in order to get work on that started. Mendes-France had told him there would be no difficulty on this since he agreed completely on the prin-

¹ Under reference is telegram Dulles 2, Sept. 27; for text, see the compiliation on China in volume xiv.
² Not printed. A copy of this paper entitled “Quemoy”, is in file 794A.5/9-2754.
³ For a record of this Dulles-Eden meeting which occurred on the evening of Sept. 26, see the memorandum of conversation by Bowie, Sept. 27, p. 1275.
principle; there would be merely specific points to be worked out which he was satisfied could be done and could begin promptly.

4. Mendes-France also said he could see no reason for a long conference and thought it could be pushed to reach satisfactory conclusion in a few days. Mr. Eden said he hoped this was right; and, in effect, implied to Mendes-France that it depended on him. He had outlined his idea of the agenda and Mendes-France had not seemed entirely satisfied. The Ambassador told him that in his conversation with the Secretary, Mendes-France had expressed a desire to state his program as a whole rather than piece-meal.

5. Mr. Eden said that Mendes-France wanted Mr. Eden to make some introductory remarks along the lines of the agenda paper which we had agreed with them on the last trip to London. He inquired whether the Secretary was planning on a short statement. The Ambassador told him that he would have a 5-minute statement and thought this was a useful way to keep the press in line. Mr. Eden said he would notify the others of this procedure.

6. Mr. Eden said that on further reflection he was much taken with the ideas regarding the Arms Pool which had been discussed last night. He said he had talked today to Bech about the French proposal which Bech found unacceptable. Mr. Eden had told him that the Americans had some ideas on how this might be modified into a constructive proposal. He said that he thought Bech would be receptive. The Ambassador said that the Secretary planned to raise this with the talks with the Benelux this evening.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 370

Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States Acting Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Martin)


Participants: The Secretary
Mr. Spaak, Belgian Foreign Minister
Mr. Beyen, Netherlands Foreign Minister
Mr. Bech, Luxembourg Foreign Minister
Mr. van Starkenborgh, Netherlands Permanent Representative to NATO
Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Bowie
Mr. Martin

Subject: Prospects for Nine-Power Talks

1. The Secretary suggested that it would be desirable to have Mr. Eden act as Permanent Chairman of the Conference and wondered
if one of the Benelux Foreign Ministers would care to nominate him. They agreed to do so.

2. The Secretary described Mr. Eden's idea of dealing with major items one by one rather than trying to decide which of the three different papers to discuss in toto first. He also described the desire expressed to him by the French Prime Minister of making a statement on the whole of the French paper before any discussion of individual subjects. He also indicated the thought that the opening session might permit any Delegation head who wishes to make a statement of a general character which might be passed to the press. These arrangements were concurred in by the Benelux Ministers.

3. The Secretary indicated that the Foreign Ministers of the three occupying powers might meet early in the Conference with Chancellor Adenauer and ask the three High Commissioners and a representative of the Chancellor to continue the talks begun at Bonn on the papers involved in granting sovereignty to Germany on a basis other than that provided in the contractuals. He indicated our desire to keep the Benelux countries informed on the progress of this work in view of their interest in the matter, and in particular to seek their views before decisions were made by Ministers. The Benelux Foreign Ministers expressed appreciation for this.

4. The Benelux Foreign Ministers all expressed concern over difficulties of solving the Saar problem. They had a definite impression it was a "condition préalable" as far as the French were concerned, but that in the absence of EDC there was no obvious way in which a European solution could be found. There was inconclusive discussion as to whether or not this problem should be dealt with before concessions are made to the French on other issues which would be fruitless if this most difficult issue proved insoluble.

5. Mr. Beyen came to the meeting direct from a talk with Mr. Mendes-France. There was considerable interchange of information about his talk and the Secretary's talk with Mr. Mendes. Mr. Beyen confessed he still did not know what French intentions really were. He also stated that despite some effort on his part, he received no real clarification on the specifics of the French proposals. He thought it clear that the French position was to accept membership in NATO provided all the arrangements under Brussels which Mendes considers necessary were accepted. He believed Mendes attached great importance to Brussels as opposed to NATO, to British participation in Brussels arrangements, and to having Brussels arrangements capable of exercising firm control and inspection of German rearmament. He was not clear that an armaments pool was an essential condition of Mendes' program. In the light of past experience, he and the other two Foreign
Ministers expressed strong suspicions of the French fundamental intentions and of the straightforwardness of their tactics. Mr. Beyen said he had gathered Mendes might submit NATO and Brussels to Parliament separately if arrangements were not entirely to his satisfaction. This would of course be fatal.

6. The Secretary suggested that if the armaments pool proved an essential point, it was desirable not to reject it outright, but rather to make clear that there was an alternative of a reasonable kind which might be acceptable to us. The more this could be made to look like merely a modification of Mendes’ scheme, the more difficult it would be for him to convince his Parliament that he had been unreasonably treated at London. He also felt there were positive advantages of an economic, and possibly political, character to be gained from a good armaments pool scheme which was simple and non-discriminatory. The Benelux representatives, and particularly the Dutch, expressed great hesitancy about indicating approval of any armaments pool scheme. This seemed to stem largely from their disbelief that the French would agree with anything reasonable, anything that did not discriminate against Germany or give preference to French industry. They also felt strongly that an armaments pool arrangement was more acceptable and workable as part of EDC, which was also responsible for logistical supply of forces, than as independent institution with countries retaining logistical responsibility. They believed that negotiation of a fair scheme would be complicated and time consuming. This discussion concluded with tentative agreement to consider the matter further.

7. Mr. Beyen called attention to the fact that Mendes had indicated he would not formally sign any agreement without consulting his Parliament and Parliament leaders. This might affect future time schedule.

8. Mr. Beyen asked if we had seen a more detailed German document. We said we knew nothing of it.

---

398.1 LO/9-2854

The Secretary of State to the President

LONDON, September 28, 1954.

[My Dear Mr. President:] Sunday evening and yesterday were busy times preparatory to conference convening today (Tuesday).

---

1 This message was transmitted to the Acting Secretary of State on an “eyes only” basis in telegram Dulte 3 from London, Sept. 28, with the instruction that it be passed on to the President.
Sunday evening Eden had dinner with me at Embassy. We had very satisfactory exchange of views, and I felt he was dealing with us with greater frankness and sincerity than sometimes has been the case. We dealt primarily with pending conference, but also with reference to China as to which I have reported separately.

The high point yesterday was hour and half conference I had with Mendes-France, beginning and ending with many photographs. He made passionate defense for one hour of his conduct regarding EDC, and seemed personally resentful at criticism and blame which have been placed on him for defeat. Meeting more of a post-mortem than preparatory to conference, although he repeated general indications regarding French position, finally emphasizing, however, the imperative need for solution which would contain features necessary to satisfy French Parliament that it was safe to let Germany into NATO.

I had two useful talks with Gruenther, who made it quite clear that present or possible arrangement of his command could effectively make it impossible for any one of the national forces to go to war alone. I met also with the new Italian Foreign Minister, who seemed happy about the prospects of Trieste settlement.²

Aldrich and I paid courtesy call on Churchill. He was in excellent shape and sent you warmest greetings. He is delighted to have at last a major conference “on the banks of the Thames”.

Then the three Benelux Ministers called on me at Embassy. They are obviously very pessimistic and distrustful of Mendes-France’s intentions.

Most encouraging aspect of situation is fact that it seems that the British may be prepared now to take some firm continental commitments by possibly agreeing that their forces shall remain on continent under control of majority of Brussels Treaty Council. Eden is definitely prepared for this, although he says Cabinet has not yet approved; and yesterday when I saw Churchill he expressed grave concern at possibility of having British troops committed to continent after US forces might have been withdrawn. He repeated several times “we cannot stay there alone without you”. However, my impression is that UK will make this commitment if it will suffice to put settlement through and provided we reaffirm substantially what we said in connection with EDC.

Am about to go now to opening of conference.

Best regards,

Foster

²Documentation concerning Trieste, including the memorandum of conversation under reference here, is presented in volume VIII.
B. NINE-POWER AND FOUR-POWER CONFERENCES AT LONDON, SEPTEMBER 28–OCTOBER 3, 1954

1. PROCEEDINGS OF THE MEETINGS

Editorial Note

The Nine-Power and Four-Power Conferences at London, September 28–October 3, involved a total of 14 plenary sessions of the 9 Foreign Ministers from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States and 5 meetings of the Foreign Ministers from France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, in addition to numerous other informal and formal bilateral and multilateral discussions. The editors have attempted to account for all the meetings which occurred during the conference, even if the subject discussed was exclusively related to non-EDC matters, in which case information is provided concerning where the document is printed if it does not appear in this compilation.

The most useful supplement to the Department of State Central files concerning this conference, especially file 396.1 LO, was the Conference files, lot 60 D 627. It included 14 folders of material relating to the meetings, the preparations, and relevant conference documents. The material is arranged as follows: folder 363—reference and position papers, CF 364–365—conference documents, CF 366–368—verbatim records of the meetings of the Nine-Power and Four-Power sessions, CF 369—the final act and annexes, CF 370–372—telegrams and memoranda of conversation, and CF 373–376—materials relating to the administrative arrangements for the conference. A principal supplementary file, not as complete as the Conference files, is the CFM files, lot M 88, box 169, which also has the preparatory papers, verbatim records, and conference documents.

The main telegram indicator series used at this conference was the Secto–Tosec series, which was utilized by the delegation for conference business between Washington and London; the first telegram in the series began with the departure of the Secretary of State for London. The Dulte–Tedul indicator series was used to transmit personal messages from and to the Secretary of State while at the conference in London.

For personal accounts of this conference by some of the major participants, see the following: Adenauer, Erinnerungen 1953–1955, pages 328–354; Eden, Full Circle, pages 149–169; Macmillan, Tides of Fortune, pages 482–483; and Spaak, The Continuing Battle, pages 181–
186. For President Eisenhower’s account, see Mandate for Change, pages 403–407.

Most of the meetings of both the Nine-Power and Four-Power sessions were attended by the Foreign Ministers of the participating countries, assisted by staffs of experts from the various delegations. Since no records are available indicating which members of the various delegations attended the individual meetings to assist their Foreign Minister, the editors have attempted to list only the principal participants at such meetings. The leading representatives on the delegations of the participating countries were as follows:

**BELGIUM**

Paul-Henri Spaak  
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Andre de Staercke  
Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council

Robert Rothschild  
Chief of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**CANADA**

Lester B. Pearson  
Secretary of State for External Affairs

Norman Robertson  
High Commissioner in London

L. Dana Wilgress  
Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council

**FRANCE**

Pierre Mendès-France  
President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs

Roland de Moustier  
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

André François-Poncet  
High Commissioner for Germany

René Massigli  
Ambassador to the United Kingdom

Roland de Margerie  
Director of Political Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**GERMANY**

Konrad Adenauer  
Chancellor

Theodor Blank  
Member of the Bundestag and Adviser to the Chancellor

Walter Hallstein  
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Herbert Blankenhorn  
Political Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**ITALY**

Gaetano Martino  
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Manlio Brosio  
Ambassador in the United Kingdom

Massimo Magistrati  
Director General for International Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**LUXEMBOURG**

Joseph Bech  
President and Minister of Foreign Affairs

Andrew Clasen  
Minister in the United Kingdom

Nic Hommel  
Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council
Netherlands

Johan W. Beyen
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Dirk Stikker
Ambassador in the United Kingdom

Jonkheer A. W. L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer
Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council

United Kingdom

Sir Anthony Eden
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick
Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office

Sir H. M. Gladwyn Jebb
Ambassador in France

Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar
High Commissioner for Germany

Sir Christopher Steel
Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council

Sir Harold Caccia
Deputy Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Office

Sir Frank Roberts
Deputy Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Office

United States

John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State

Winthrop W. Aldrich
Ambassador in the United Kingdom

Robert R. Bowie
Director of the Policy Planning Staff or the Department of State

David K. E. Bruce
Ambassador to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation

James B. Conant
High Commissioner for Germany

C. Douglas Dillon
Ambassador in France

H. Struve Hensel
Assistant Secretary of Defense

John C. Hughes
Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council

Livingston T. Merchant
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

A complete list of the United States Delegation is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, October 4, 1954, pages 489-490.

FIRST PLENARY MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE,
LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, SEPTEMBER 28, 1954, 11 A. M.

Principal Participants

Belgium
Paul-Henri Spaak

Luxembourg
Joseph Bech

Canada
Lester B. Pearson

Netherlands
Johan W. Beyen
Telegraphic Summary by the United States Delegation

SECRET

LONDON, September 28, 1954—4 p.m.

I. Nine power meeting opened at Lancaster House at 11 this morning. After brief period for photos, following procedural decisions were made:

(A) Eden chosen chairman with understanding will continue speak for UK.
(B) Regular sessions will be held at 11 and 3:30 each day. However today Foreign Ministers of occupying powers will meet with Chancellor at 3 on restoration German sovereignty and session will be at 4:30.
(C) Each delegation will deal with own press but urged limit information to maximum extent possible.
(D) Verbatim transcript three languages available each night.
(E) UK permanent representative to brief daily London Ambassadors six NATO countries not present.

II. Chairman made opening statement in which repeated essential points last UK document. In addition emphasized this meeting was preparatory to NATO meeting and its conclusions provisional until other governments concurred. Congratulated Bonn experts on progress made on restoration sovereignty. Also felt Brussels commission made

1 Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 5, Sept. 28, and repeated to Bonn, Rome, Ottawa, Luxembourg, The Hague, Brussels, and Paris for USRO, CINCEUR, and Reinhardt. A 23-page verbatim record of this meeting, which was circulated as document NPC(54)5, is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 366. The list of principal participants, not provided in the source text, was taken from the verbatim record.

2 The British document under reference is NPC(54)2 of Sept. 24, which is printed on p. 1324.

3 Representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany formed a Working Group in Bonn to consider matters relating to the restoration of German sovereignty and the revision of the contractual agreements. The Working Group, which began meeting on Sept. 21 and continued through Sept. 24, was established to seek quadripartite agreement on these issues and to prepare a report on the results of their work for the Nine-Power Conference. Documentation on the meetings of the Bonn Working Group is in Department of State file 662A.00/9-2354 through 9-2554.
good progress in amending treaty to accomplish addition of Germany and Italy.\footnote{Documentation concerning meetings of the Permanent Commission of the Brussels Treaty Organization, which met in London to consider modifications of the Brussels Treaty and a draft declaration of invitation for Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany, is in Department of State file 740.5.}

Then turned to problem of agenda pointing out have these memos on table. Suggested that rather than have general unguided discussion or attempt selection of memos as basis discussion preferable list subjects on which agreement required and address them one by one. Distributed proposed agenda in accordance this principle (reported separate message\footnote{Telegram Secto 7, Sept. 28, not printed, informed the Department of State concerning the agenda proposed by the British. The agenda items were as follows:

"A. Termination of the occupation regime in Germany and accompanying arrangements.

B. Accession of the Federal Republic German and Italy to the Brussels treaty.

C. Arrangements to accompany German and Italian accession to the Brussels treaty and German accession to NATO.

1. Arrangements to be applied to SACEUR's forces on the continent.

(a) deployment and movement

(b) integration

(c) logistics

(d) inspection

(e) force ceilings

2. Size and character of the German defense contribution.

3. Control of armaments production.

(a) strategically exposed areas

(b) arms pool


5. Possible extension of the duration of the North Atlantic treaty.

6. United Kingdom and United States declarations." (386.1 LO/9-2854)}). Believed working parties could be set up on any subject where they could help.

Mendes-France agreed procedure by subject appropriate but thought any minister who wished should have chance make general statement giving philosophical background of position his government on particular points. French would like, for example, to do so. He also wished to make IC.2 of UK agenda ("size and character of the German defense contribution") the first item under C.1 ("arrangements to be applied to SACEUR forces on the continent"). Believe this derived from desire make sure these arrangements would apply to German contribution.

His points agreed. Chairman emphasized no government committed on any item until all work finished.

III. Chairman then asked each representative if he had anything to say. Only Mendes and Martino spoke. Mendes spoke at length but added nothing new of importance except to conclude with statement
that package which French Government was willing to sell to French Parliament and chance of success included not only their proposals with respect to Brussels treaty and NATO but also solution of Saar problem and adequate guarantees with respect to maintenance US and UK forces on continent. His statement will be reported more fully in separate message.\(^6\)

Martino welcomed restoration of German sovereignty and contribution of German to Western defense as indispensable. Thought NATO most suitable framework. Accepted extension Brussels treaty, but thought any guarantees under Brussels should be applied through NATO with its practical experiences. Wished support further developments Europe institutions and collaboration.

IV. Chairman called on Ambassador Massigli, chairman Brussels treaty permanent council, to report on its work. He indicated no difficulties in principle and agreement of present signatories on procedure for amending preamble and Article 7 and adding new article to cover future arrangements. It was agreed that these proposals should be discussed with Italian and German delegations.

V. Chairman then moved on to IC.1 in agenda, as amended, size and character of German defense contribution. Chancellor Adenauer said that his government and his people were anxious to remove past anxieties about what Germany would do with power to rearm. Wanted to assure group that this power will never be used except in Europe framework.

Stated his government prepared make binding declaration that size of German force would not exceed EDC limits.

Assured conference Germany will submit to any non-discriminatory controls considered necessary.

VI. Chairman suggested that members would wish to consider Chancellor’s statement, and adjourned meeting.

---

\(^6\) Telegram Secto 6, Sept. 28. (396.1 LO/9-2854)

---

FIRST MEETING OF THE FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, SEPTEMBER 28, 1954, 3 P. M.

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>France</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pierre Mendès-France</td>
<td>Anthony Eden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konrad Adenauer</td>
<td>John Foster Dulles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECRET

LONDON, September 29, 1954—2 a. m.

First quadripartite Ministers meeting on restoration German sovereignty held 3 p. m., September 28 under chairmanship Eden.

Eden opened meeting by saying all four governments appeared agreed occupation should be terminated and that necessary arrangements should be made as soon as possible. These should include retention Allied rights re Berlin and Germany as a whole, arrangements for stationing, security, status and support of forces. Bonn discussions had been useful and he proposed that three High Commissioners and representative of Chancellor carry on discussions and recommend to Ministers how this should be worked out. There was need for speed and agreement in principle should be reached in London. However, necessary agreements would have to be made in accord with constitutional procedures of respective governments. Chancellor was entitled to show progress as result of this convention. He suggested this be done by Allies issuing declaration of intent indicating that occupation regime would be terminated as soon as possible. It might also state that meanwhile, three High Commissioners would not exercise powers to be diverted except in agreement with German Federal Government. Eden said he put this forward as suggestion. It needed examination which should be done by experts.

Adenauer said he hoped restoration of sovereignty would not have to wait until all arrangements made and all treaties ratified. He welcomed British suggestion which he said German public opinion would feel meant that conference had resulted in real change and not mere words.

Re restoration German sovereignty, Mendes-France said French delegation would facilitate achievement of this objective to maximum

---

1 Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 9, Sept. 29, and repeated to Bonn, Rome, Ottawa, Luxembourg, The Hague, Brussels, and to Paris for USRO, CINCEUR, and Reinhardt. A 12-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 367. The list of principal participants, not provided in the source text, was taken from the verbatim record.

2 Eden's proposal was circulated as document NPC (54) 6 of Sept. 28, the text of which reads as follows:

"The proposal is to make a declaration of the intent of the three Occupying Powers to take as soon as possible the steps necessary to terminate the Occupation regime.

"Since, however, this process must take a little time, the declaration could include a statement by the three Occupying Powers that they propose to instruct the High Commissioners not to use in the meantime powers of which it is proposed to divest them except in agreement with the German Federal Government." (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 364)
and would be realistic in dealing with it. After Brussels conference,\(^3\) French Government had decided to agree to Anglo-American suggestion to put Bonn treaties in effect. He had publicly stated this and French parliament was aware of it. He said re Eden proposal it would be difficult for French Government to take position without parliamentary approval. Government could give instructions to French High Commissioner but could not enter into agreements which prejudice right of Parliament to pass on substantive issue.

Secretary said US desires German sovereignty be restored as soon as possible and that US prepared in light unanimous vote Senate to act without delay from constitutional standpoint.\(^4\) He felt further exploration of steps needed complete restoration sovereignty. Working groups could press forward on this and report in two or three days areas of agreement and disagreement which Ministers could then consider. He hoped that agreement on steps necessary consummate termination occupation could be worked out in detail at London. These might be dependent on coming into force of other arrangements.

Re Eden proposal, Secretary said it was new idea and he wished to think it through before expressing an opinion. He felt everything possible should be done to assist Chancellor and enable him to indicate to German people that conference had taken action. He wished to think about implications of Eden proposal. While he approached it with sympathy, he thought it needed to be studied to see whether necessary rights would be maintained. He suggested it be considered by working group. Secretary renewed his proposal that High Commissioners and Chancellor's representative make comprehensive report in next two or three days. Mendes-France said problem was complex. He felt that governments probably not far apart on substance, but there was problem of procedure which he felt experts should also explore during conference. He said that French delegation had three or four questions on procedure which he would like to have considered.

Eden suggested that it would be desirable that working group have some agreed principles from Ministers on which to work and distributed paper proposing following principles: \(^5\)

1. Arrangement for terminating occupation should be capable of being made effective in advance or independently of arrangements for German military contribution. Pending entry into force of latter, German rearmament would remain subject of restriction.

\(^3\) For documentation concerning the Brussels Conference of Aug. 19–22, see pp. 1072 ff.

\(^4\) For the text of Senate Resolution 295 approved on July 30, 1954, see the Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 23, 1954, p. 284.

\(^5\) The British paper presenting the principles summarized in the source text has not been further identified.
2. Simplest method would be declaration by three Allies terminating occupation and giving Federal Republic full authority subject certain reservation, e.g. Berlin.

3. Declaration would not come into force until settlement convention, less those parts now out of date, had become effective and arrangements made to cover stationing, status and financing of Allied forces and protection their security.

4. In reviewing extent to which Bonn conventions could now usefully be brought into operation, working group should not attempt to renegotiate documents but restrict themselves to deleting provisions now out of date.⁶

Secretary said for problems immediately at hand only fourth point seemed relevant and that first three could be considered better in light of knowledge what documents would look like. However, he did not object to working group studying these points as well as new Eden proposal. All Ministers agreed to fourth point British paper and remainder of British proposals were referred to working group for study, it being specifically understood that consideration of declaration of intent was without commitment. Eden suggested that if working group felt it needed further instructions it should report to Ministers on following day.

Adenauer designated Grewe as German representative on working group.⁷

⁶ Documentation concerning the negotiation of the Bonn conventions is presented in volume vii.

⁷ Immediately following this Four-Power meeting, the Working Group on German Sovereignty held its first meeting at Lancaster House. As a result of this meeting and another held the following morning at 11 a.m., the Working Group submitted a list of questions to the four Foreign Ministers seeking guidance concerning their tasks and stated that little progress could be made until this guidance was received. The questions submitted to the four Ministers were circulated in document NPC(54)15 of Sept. 29 and were considered at the second Four-Power meeting of Oct. 1; a copy of document NPC(54)15 is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 827, CF 364. A brief summary of the first meeting of this Working Group is contained in telegram Secto 8 from London, Sept. 29 (396.1 LO/9-2954); however, no records of the subsequent meetings of Sept. 30, Oct. 1, and Oct. 2 were found in Department of State files. The U.S. representatives on the Working Group were Conant (head of U.S. Delegation), Reinstein, Hilles, and Wilson. This Working Group is presumably a continuation of the quadripartite Working Group which met in Bonn prior to the beginning of the Nine-Power Conference; for information on the Bonn group, see footnote 3, p. 1297.

SECOND PLENARY MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, SEPTEMBER 28, 1954, 4:30 P.M.

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

BELGIUM
Paul-Henri Spaak

LUXEMBOURG
Joseph Bech

CANADA
Lester B. Pearson

NETHERLANDS
Johan W. Beyen
SECRET

London, September 29, 1954—11 a. m.

At meeting afternoon of September 28 Eden opened by discussing agenda items dealing with German defense contribution to NATO and associated arrangements. He suggested there was no controversy about level of German contribution. It should follow formula agreed in EDC secret annex. Any subsequent necessary changes should be worked out in accordance with agreed NATO procedures. On deployment he suggested agreement to generalize principle included in US and UK assurances of last spring, namely to deploy forces in accordance with agreed NATO strategy and in response to SACEUR’s command. On integration and logistics he proposed asking SACEUR for recommendations, and on inspection he suggested agreement to make annual review procedure more effective. Procedurally he proposed agreement on papers setting forth principles at this meeting. These papers would then be submitted to appropriate NATO bodies for preparation of more detailed documents and results of this work approved by NAC in October.

Only major substantive comment on Eden’s statement was made by Mendes-France. He suggested need for exception to EDC principles to cover overseas forces. French have in mind something along lines French protocol to article 13 of Paris Treaty. On integration he suggested adoption of principle of mixed units below corps level along lines EDC except where declared unfeasible by SACEUR and Brussels Treaty organization for military reasons. He reaffirmed need for limit on size of forces to be worked out under Brussels. He suggested establishment of office of “Inspector General” under Brussels, function of which would be to see that agreed limits were enforced. He emphasized that such office should be separate from SHAPE in view of entirely different function of limiting forces while philosophy of NATO was to increase forces.

Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 10, Sept. 29, and repeated to Bgn, Rome, Ottawa, Luxembourg, The Hague, Brussels, and Paris for USRO, CINCEUR, and Reinhardt. A 26-page verbatim record of this meeting, which was circulated as document NPC (54) 8, is in the Conference files, 1st 69 D 627, CF 306. The list of principal participants, not provided in the source text, was taken from the verbatim record.
Spaak and several others suggested need for more careful study of both Eden's and Mendes-France's statements, and it was agreed to consider this subject at next meeting when verbatim transcripts available.

Turning to agenda item on control of production, Spaak said he had several questions to ask Mendes-France on French proposal on this subject. He said problem of establishing zones for limitation of arms production was easy but pool aspect much more difficult. He wanted to know if pool arrangement applied to all forces of member country. He also wondered what position of French del was on many safeguards included in EDC Treaty but not mentioned in French plan, such as economic clauses, control of pool by Assembly, etc. Mendes-France replied by reiterating many of points already included in French memo and made by him at morning session. Only new point was reference to possibility of establishing list of items to which operations of pool would be limited. Spaak suggestion for additional safeguards of type included in EDC Treaty could be studied.

Beyen made point, which we consider principle [principal] one concerning Dutch, that national governments are responsible for raising and supplying forces under French proposal but have lost control over production of equipment for these forces. This principle of divided responsibility was basic difference between French plan and EDC. Dutch felt strongly that this would create difficulty. He also felt that there was confusion over whether purpose of pool was to be control or increased efficiency. He wanted to know to what extent UK would participate in pool, pointing out that one benefit resulting from failure of EDC was closer association of UK with continental countries. He emphasized need to avoid long complicated negotiations and asked if French could not find some simpler way to meet their objective of control.

Eden closed discussion by pointing out that all could agree on principle of establishing security zones and limited production therein in accordance with principle of Article 107 of EDC Treaty.

---

2 The French proposal under reference is document NPC(54)1 of Sept. 27, which is printed on p. 1332.

---

THIRD PLENARY MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE,
LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, SEPTEMBER 29, 1954, 11:15 A.M.

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

**Belgium**
Paul-Henri Spaak

**Luxembourg**
Joseph Bech

**Canada**
Lester B. Pearson

**Netherlands**
Johan W. Beyen
Telegraphic Summary by the United States Delegation

SECRET

LONDON, September 29, 1954—6 p. m.

1. Plenary session opened at 11:15 this morning. US requested verbatim minutes no longer be taken. Felt inhibited discussion and burden on dels to revise. Suggested any del be free to request verbatim transcript for statement about to make. This was agreed.

2. Secretary stated High Commissioners and German representative dealing with restoration of German sovereignty requested meeting with Foreign Ministers and German Chancellor after afternoon plenary session. This agreed. At close of meeting working party said would not be ready for meeting today but would wish meeting tomorrow.

3. Chairman invited discussion of strengthening NATO and SACEUR powers. Spaak stated on basis verbatim text of Eden statement day before and draft French paper circulated informally, felt very close to agreement.

With respect to character and size German contribution, thought should start at EDC level. What happens next less clear, but suggested Brussels countries agree in Brussels on contribution of each and this be basis for submittal to NATO AR. Would also be agreed among Brussels powers this would be maximum for each of them. Referred to this as carryover of EDC plan (De Staercke later stated implication of Brussels AR not intended). Spaak felt remaining problems matter of detail. Belgium would support strengthening NATO control over forces.

Chairman stated there is new UK draft on these points which would be distributed.

---

1 Transmitted to the Department of State in two sections as telegram Secto 11, Sept. 29, and repeated to Bonn, Rome, Ottawa, Luxembourg, The Hague, Brussels, and Paris for USRO, CINCEUR, and Reinhardt. A 23-page verbatim record of this meeting, which, as noted in the source text, was no longer to be circulated as before and therefore was not given a document designation, is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 366. The list of principal participants, not provided in the source text, was taken from the verbatim record.

2 This is a reference to document NPC(54)11 of Sept. 29, which is printed on p. 1335.
Mendes-France welcomed Spaak statement. Suggested that approach to problem should be along EDC lines and each year Brussels make decision of maximum before NATO acts and then harmonize in NATO Brussels maximum with traditional NATO minimum. Promised circulate French memo. Expressed pleasure there appeared to be no contradictions between Spaak and himself.

German Chancellor agreed that start should be as in EDC with respect size of forces but type had been agreed upon three years ago and may no longer be militarily correct.

It was agreed that reference to types should be omitted.

Chairman asked dels to appoint experts to meet on call of UK to recommend to future plenary session on principles to be adopted by this conference on points covered in C.1 of UK agenda. (Secretary appointed Ambassador Hughes as US representative).

4. Chairman asked for discussion question of strategic areas, C.2[3], a in agenda. Thought there was agreement strategic plants should not be in areas exposed to first thrust of invasion. If this agreed questions arise as to what these areas are and as to what type of armament production and research should be prohibited in them.

Martino stated exposed areas concept not clear on its face. If what s meant is similar to what was discussed in EDC, Italy will have no opposition. Asked Mendes-France to explain his proposal.

Mendes stated prepared to accept EDC plan if others agree. If some think more elaborate solution necessary, would be glad to hear views and might arrive at formula in French text.

Chancellor suggested that question of area and type of weapons should be turned over to experts as too complex for Ministers.

This was agreed, subject possibly to reconsideration in light subsequent Spaak statement (action situation on this point not clear). (From quick checks with dels EDC countries, appear Ministers assumption there was agreed EDC solution to area question appears erroneous.)

5. Spaak expressed fear of giving experts too much to do without adequate guidance. Thought it was difficult to separate question of arms pool from that of strategic zone. Belgium accepted idea of control of armaments production. Though NATO logical, Belgium accepted Brussels as preferable organization politically to handle this problem and noted it would not duplicate anything NATO now doing. Spaak felt proposal to go beyond control arrangements to common production arrangements created great difficulty, raised complex issues which might delay decisions, and seems unnecessary to security. If

---

2 Presumably a reference to the memorandum prepared by the French Delegation, which was circulated as document NPC(54)1 of Sept. 27, printed on p. 1382.
one country produces only those heavy items that its forces need, plus exports and equipment for non-NATO forces authorized by Brussels, and there are adequate controls to enforce this principle, thought it unnecessary to do more.

Beyen said Dutch were thinking along same lines as Spaak.

Mendes-France said France did not envisage production in common but agency to establish common needs, to place orders centrally for heavy equipment to meet these needs, and to distribute equipment as decided in common. In addition, though not immediately essential to their proposal, could envisage common factories owned by community or by several countries of community which seemed to be Spaak’s idea of common production. Felt these arrangements valuable to standardization. Could agree on new weapons and arrange their production in factories at interior locations. Felt larger orders would have financial advantage. Felt this collaboration in arms field important step in further cooperation in economic field. Did not feel agreement these points complex or cause for delay. This conference need only lay down principles for experts to elaborate later. Returning to substance Mendes stated that must study in common both use of existing facilities and building new ones. Principal objectives were efficiency and standardization and would not want to build new factories which duplicated those already in existence in community. Urged careful study French proposals in this field.

German Chancellor asked Mendes if he envisaged that Germany would provide soldiers but have no armaments factories. Suggested that such situation would give “uncanny feeling” to those who are to be soldiers.

Mendes-France said Germany would be expected to contribute units, armaments and arms production. Of course special question arose for exposed areas. But these need not necessarily include all of Germany or include only German territory. This question for experts. Also pointed out that Germany could share in common production in unexposed locations.

Chairman expressed view this whole question was urgent problem for conference. Believed nature of controls to be instituted must be decided in conjunction with other major issues before conference. Seemed general agreement to limit control to important items. Hoped there was agreement that it would be done by majority vote. UK agreed on use of Brussels. Invited Spaak to present paper giving his ideas on control. Spaak agreed.

*The Belgian Delegation presented its paper on the control of armaments at the Fifth Plenary meeting of Sept. 30; for the text of this paper, which was circulated as document NPC (54) 16 of Sept. 29, see p. 1336.*
Chairman suggested that question of armaments pool raised extremely complex issues on which decisions now not clearly essential to general purpose this conference, and which would be difficult resolve in course this conference. Suggested Brussels Council plan to take them up after present round of decisions and actions have been completed.

Mendes-France urged more discussion now on armaments pool idea. Again stated should not be difficult since not new. Ground gone over thoroughly in EDC discussions. Might well secure most of what is needed by lifting provisions from EDC treaty with few or minor modifications. If did not deal with this would fail to deal with most essential point and would omit constructive aspects of French proposals.

Turning to Chancellor Mendes stated that in further response to Chancellor’s question he had never wished to prevent Germany from producing arms as foreseen in EDC. Perhaps even could be more arms production than foreseen in EDC as well as production in jointly owned plants in other sites. Felt this point should raise no difficulty.

Spaak said he felt unclear about some points in Mendes plan, what EDC provisions he would use, et cetera, and invited Mendes to present paper. Mendes agreed. Beyen indicated Dutch would also probably have paper on this subject.

6. Chairman announced that at plenary session at 4:00, would take up items 3, 4, 5 covering security declarations, extension of NATO treaty duration, and US and UK declarations.

DULLES-MENDÈS-FRANCE MEETING, AMBASSADOR’S RESIDENCE
LONDON, SEPTEMBER 29, 1954, 3 P. M.

PARTICIPANTS
M. Mendès-France, French Premier
The Secretary of State
Mr. Merchant

PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “Bonn–London Conference”

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)

SECRET

[LONDON,] September 29, 1954.

The Prime Minister of France called on the Secretary this afternoon at 3 o’clock at the former’s suggestion. He arrived unaccompanied despite the Secretary’s suggestion that he might wish to bring with him one or two of his Delegation. The conversation lasted until approximately 3:50 when it was necessary to depart for the Plenary Session at Lancaster House at 4 p.m.
The Premier opened the conversation by saying that he had felt after the morning conference session that there may have been a slight misunderstanding between the Chancellor and himself which he had attempted to clear up after the session ended. He had felt that Chancellor Adenauer was under the impression that additions to existing plants or increasing existing capacity might be free from his proposed licensing requirement whereas the construction of new armaments plants would be subject to approval by the Brussels Council. He said that he had explained to the Chancellor that both expansion of existing plant and construction of new plant were equally under the same licensing requirement.

The Premier then embarked on what was clearly the primary purpose of his call. He opened by saying that German admission to NATO was extremely unpopular in France. He said that in the light of the clear desire of France's allies in this matter he had agreed to accept German admission into NATO. This, however, represented a major concession on the part of France and in consequence he hoped that the Secretary would understand the necessity for his insisting on obtaining agreement to the French point of view on other elements in the package which he would have to submit to the French Assembly. He said that the essential components of this package were German admission to NATO, strengthening of the Brussels alliance, assurances from the UK and the US concerning the retention of forces on the continent, control of armaments, inspection arrangements and a settlement of the Saar dispute with Germany. He seemed to give certain emphasis to the arms proposal which he said was lifted almost in its entirety from the EDC Treaty. He intimated that he was amazed at the opposition that he had encountered to this proposal in light of the fact that France's five partners in EDC had always professed a confidence in the perfection of the EDC Treaty.

The Secretary said that the Premier must realize that certain suspicions concerning his purposes in putting forward his arms pool ideas were prevalent. There were doubts as to whether he might not have as his intention the prevention of any armament production in Germany and the concentration in France of the armaments industry of the entire community. In light of these suspicions (which the Secretary made clear he did not share personally) the suggestion was made that it would be useful if the Premier could put down on paper with more precision his proposal on an armaments pool. M. Mendes-France said that he was doing so and that it would be circulated shortly.

The Secretary then said that he had discovered somewhat to his surprise only this morning that there had never been an agreement
reached by the signatories of the EDC Treaty as to the description of the exposed area referred to in Article 107 of the Treaty. He said that the Annex described the area within which propellents could not be produced but that there apparently was no agreement as to the more general area in which general production limitations applied. Mendes-France said that there had been no formal agreement but that there had been an agreement reached by the experts of the six countries to the effect that this area would be identical with that which had been described in connection with propellents.

M. Mendes-France then went on to repeat that he was surprised at the opposition into which he had run in putting forward his proposal for an arms pool. He felt that it was almost identical with the provisions of the EDC Treaty. He felt that it would be possible for experts to agree within the next three or four weeks on the general principles which should govern such a pool or agency. The Secretary did not comment on this expression of confidence.

The Secretary then said that he had the impression that the UK was disposed to go just as far as it felt possible in granting assurances on the maintenance of British forces on the Continent. He felt that this would be a most constructive development. The Secretary then went on to explain that if the London conference produced a success it would probably be possible for the United States to repeat in substance the assurances which it had given in this general connection on the assumption that the EDC would come into force. The French Premier expressed surprise approaching consternation, which seemed somewhat feigned, that the US would find it impossible to go beyond the EDC assurances. The Secretary then explained in great detail the constitutional aspects of this matter, on which M. Mendes-France made no further comment.

The Secretary then raised the question of the Saar. The French Premier related at considerable length the history of the establishment of a Saar settlement as a precondition for ratification of the EDC by the French Assembly. He described how his inadvertent omission of this topic in his investiture speech in the early summer of 1953 had brought a storm down upon his head. He made it perfectly clear that even if he were not personally disposed to make a Saar settlement a precondition for an arrangement for German sovereignty and rearmament, the French Assembly would do so beyond the slightest doubt. He then went on to describe his concept of how the matter should be handled. He said he had discussed it glancingly with Chancellor Adenauer in the morning. Mendes-France had no disposition (nor apparently had the Chancellor) to attempt to reach a settlement on the Saar during the course of the London conference. Neither of them
had any appetite for its injection into the discussions of the conference itself.

M. Mendès-France expressed the view that French and German experts working together could probably arrive within three or four weeks at the outline of a settlement which would not necessarily be along the lines of the Adenauer–Teitgen agreement \(^1\) (which Mendès-France said had been severely criticized even by Bidault) and that thereafter he and Adenauer personally would have to settle the final terms of the agreement. He thought that a solution was possible under which the Executive of the Saar would be responsible to the Council of Ministers under the Brussels Treaty. He recognized that some parliamentary superstructure might be required and outlined a rather vague proposal that an Assembly might be established as a parliamentary adjunct to the Brussels Pact which would be composed of the individuals named by the seven countries signature to the Brussels Treaty as their representatives to the Council of Europe.

The Secretary did not comment on this proposal which was vague and ill-formed.

The French Premier then reverted to the question of the retention of US troops on the Continent and indicated that he would like an arrangement under which the aggregate of British, French and American divisions in Europe would bear a fixed relation to German divisions. He explained that only by such a commitment would it be possible to maintain a consistent and varied integration of divisions within the several corps at the disposal of SACEUR.

The Secretary repeated that it was beyond our constitutional competence to give long-term commitments for the maintenance of specified numbers of American military forces to be maintained outside of the United States.

As the time was approaching for the opening of the afternoon Plenary Session, the Secretary and the Premier left for Lancaster House in the Secretary's car.

\(^1\) Regarding this agreement signed May 22, 1954, see the editorial note, p. 967.

---

FOURTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, SEPTEMBER 29, 1954, 4 P. M.

**Principal Participants**

**Belgium**
- Paul-Henri Spaak

**Canada**
- Lester B. Pearson

**France**
- Pierre Mendès-France

**Belgium**
- Luxembourg
- Joseph Bech

**Netherlands**
- Johan W. Beyen

**United Kingdom**
- Anthony Eden
SECRET

LONDON, September 30, 1954—7 p. m.

Fourth plenary, afternoon, September 29. Eden opened meeting for discussion of security declarations.

Adenauer recalled tripartite declaration, Paris, May 27, 1952 regarding Berlin and declarations in Bonn conventions relating common aims three powers and Federal Republic bring about reunification of Germany in peace and freedom and freely negotiated peace treaty. Stressed since conventions not ratified it important declarations should be repeated. Eden replied thought all parties concerned stood by the declaration and that Ministers should consider how best express such agreement in findings of conference.

Discussion extension duration NATO Treaty followed. Eden stated UK in conformity with its declaration last April continued regard it as being of indefinite duration. Suggested it would be reassuring to public opinion for Ministers to say they conceive of no circumstances in which they would wish to denounce it. Spaak suggested protocol Brussels Treaty should state it same duration as NATO. Was agreed that permanent commission of the Brussels Treaty, with Germans and Italians represented, would look into the suggestion at its meeting following day.

Secretary and Eden then discussed US and UK declarations (full text both statements carried Wireless File).

Mendes-France replied those statements saying two declarations were powerful contributions to the realization of the common aim; that Secretary had reminded Ministers of US efforts to help in setting up a peace in Europe which had suffered so much and should take

---

1 Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 14, Sept. 30, and repeated to Bonn, Rome, Ottawa, Luxembourg, The Hague, Brussels, and Paris for USRO, CINCEUR, and Reinhardt. A 26-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 366. The list of principal participants, not provided in the source text, was taken from the verbatim record.

2 For the text of the Tripartite Declaration on Berlin, see volume vii. For the texts of the Bonn Conventions, see ibid.

3 Adenauer's statement requesting these declarations was circulated as document NPC(54)21, a copy of which is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 364.

4 The texts of the statements made by Dulles and Eden were subsequently included in the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference as Annexes II A and B, pp. 1357 and 1361.
back with him the gratitude which the people of Europe feel towards the US. Said that gratitude would be increased by what the US would do for Europe in the future if Europe does what it should. In commenting on Eden statement, said message would play great role in current deliberations and that he rejoiced to hear UK views toward strengthening its military contribution to the security of Western Europe.

Spaak spoke in appreciation Secretary’s statement and expressed the conviction that after a moment of weakness, Europe had started once more on right road. Emphasized the great sacrifice involved in UK declaration.

Adenauer stressed that statements would make deep impressions on Germans on both sides of iron curtain and spoke of realization of obligation to a united Europe. Secretary and Eden agreed to submit edited texts for the record. Martino, Bech, and Beyen also praised two statements.

Pearson commended US and UK Foreign Ministers for statements. Stated Canada accepted the continuing obligations arising out of its membership in NATO and would continue to do its best to discharge them. Said the disappearance of the EDC does not affect those obligations but that an alternative arrangement must include the association of Germany not only with the defense of Europe and the West, but with the development of the Atlantic community. Said the Canadian forces on European Continent is not only measure of military contribution to common defense but an evidence of Canadian belief in the future of North Atlantic Community. Canadians would look forward to growing relationships within the framework of NATO to the Brussels Treaty countries with whom they were bound by such close ties. A short communiqué containing substance of US and UK statements was approved. The meeting adjourned with agreement to reconvene at 11:00 a.m., September 30.

---

5 For the text of Pearson’s statement, see p. 1363.
6 The communiqué, not printed, was circulated as document NPC(54)13 of Sept. 29. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 364)

---

DULLES-THORNEYCROFT MEETING, AMERICAN EMBASSY RESIDENCE, LONDON, SEPTEMBER 29, 1954, 9:30 P. M.

Editorial Note

Sir John E. Thorneycroft and Dulles held a lengthy discussion during the evening of September 29 concerning the possible revision in the embargo list for Communist China. A copy of this memorandum of conversation is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 370.
DULLES-EDEN MEETING, LONDON, SEPTEMBER 29, 1954

Editorial Note

On September 29 Dulles also met with Eden and the Acting New Zealand High Commissioner to discuss the Chinese offshore islands. For a memorandum of their conversation by Bowie, September 29, see the compilation on China in volume XIV.

FIFTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, SEPTEMBER 30, 1954, 11 A.M.

Principal Participants

BELGIUM
Paul-Henri Spaak

CANADA
Lester B. Pearson

FRANCE
Pierre Mendès-France

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Konrad Adenauer

ITALY
Gaetano Martino

LUXEMBOURG
Joseph Bech

NETHERLANDS
Johan W. Beyen

UNITED KINGDOM
Anthony Eden

UNITED STATES
John Foster Dulles

BRUSSELS TREATY PERMANENT COMMISSION
René Massigli

396.1 LO/9-3054

Telegraphic Summary by the United States Delegation.  

SECRET

LONDON, September 30, 1954—5 p.m.

At plenary meeting morning September 30 Ministers agreed that no attempt would be made to adjust Brussels treaty duration provisions to those of NAT. Instead new article will be added to Brussels treaty on cooperation with NATO along lines those included EDC. Secretary suggested establishment of working group to draft final acts of conference and communiqué, which was agreed. In long discussion of Belgian and French memos on control of arms production, no particularly new points were developed although issue between Benelux on one hand and France on other was further clarified. Spaak argued for control over production of arms in territories outside continental Europe, having in mind primarily Africa. Mendès-France argued that such control not necessary since Brussels agency

1 Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 13, Sept. 30, and repeated to Rome, Bonn, Luxembourg, Brussels, The Hague, Ottawa, and Paris for USRO, CINCEUR, and Reinhardt. A 35-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 366. The list of participants, not provided in the source text, was taken from the verbatim record.

2 The Belgian memorandum under reference is document NPC (54) 16 of Sept. 29, which is printed on p. 1336; the French memorandum is document NPC (54) 1 of Sept. 27, which is printed on p. 1332.
would control all imports, including those from African territories. There was inconclusive discussion of problem of which Assembly would receive annual reports of Brussels agency. French argued for consultative assembly of Council of Europe since it included British delegation as well as those of other countries who might adhere to Brussels treaty. Also pointed out that Brussels Council of Ministers should receive reports in first instance.

In response to question by Secretary, Spaak replied that same list mentioned in his memo should be listed in Article 107 of EDC treaty as modified by any agreement reached by experts.

In statement on treatment of end item aid of OSP, Secretary emphasized that US would have to retain right to make final decisions in light of recommendations of SACEUR. Said he was concerned by possible conflict between Brussels recommendations and those of SACEUR. On same subject Pearson said that Canada could accept transfer of recommendations from NATO to Brussels providing role of Canada in decision remains same as at present.

Beyen stated he approved of objectives of French in looking toward standardization of arms and more economical production. However, he felt "we are heading for serious difficulties" if conference tries to settle details of meeting these objectives before adjournment this meeting. He asked Mendes-France to accept agreement on objectives and permit implementation to be worked out by Brussels treaty organization or other means at later date without holding up important decisions now necessary. He said that Dutch Parliament could not be expected to ratify promptly any detailed proposal covering these points.

Agreement was reached to refer Belgian memo to working party with question of disposition of French memo to be discussed further this afternoon.

SIXTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, SEPTEMBER 30, 1954, 3 P. M.

Principal Participants

Belgium
Paul-Henri Spaak

Canada
Lester B. Pearson

France
Pierre Mendès-France

Federal Republic of Germany
Konrad Adenauer

Italy
Gaetano Martino

Luxembourg
Joseph Bech

Netherlands
Johan W. Beyen

United Kingdom
Anthony Eden

United States
John Foster Dulles

Brussels Treaty Permanent Commission
René Massigli
SECRET

London, September 30, 1954—9 p. m.

1. Sixth plenary session opened at 3:00 with discussion formal amendments Brussels treaty. Draft invitation to Germany and Italy to join was agreed. Draft protocol making certain other amendments was referred back for further consideration in the light of future decision which might be made at this conference to increase the powers of the Brussels treaty organization. Spaak in particular wished composition, voting procedure and powers Brussels council to be spelled out further. Secretary State pointed out already appears Brussels council would be more than consultative body, of which account should be taken.

2. Working from report of working group on “German defense contribution and strengthening NATO”, there was long and confused discussion of means for enabling French to say that none of safeguards in EDC over future increase in size of German forces had been lost without unduly complicating NATO procedures for fixing force goals. With major assist from Belgians, French position advanced from one of having NATO goals considered as minima, adopted by Brussels as maxima which Brussels countries would not exceed without unanimous consent, to position that should be separately agreed Brussels maxima, which NATO force goals could not exceed without unanimous Brussels council decision. Chancellor urged that both increase and decrease in force goals require unanimous approval Brussels powers.

Reluctant agreement was finally reached on basis Brussels council to agree separate forces protocol along lines EDC secret protocol, that forces of Brussels powers assigned to SACEUR would not exceed this

---

1 Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 15, Sept. 30, and repeated to Bonn, Rome, Ottawa, Luxembourg, The Hague, Brussels, and Paris for USRO, CINCEUR, and Reinhardt. A 48-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60-D-627, CF 305. The list of principal participants, not provided in the source text, was taken from the verbatim record.

2 The draft declaration inviting Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany to accede to the Brussels Treaty, which was circulated as document NPC(54)20, was eventually made an annex to the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference; for the text of this declaration, see p. 1355.

3 The draft protocol amending the Brussels Treaty, which was circulated as document NPC(54)22, is not printed. The draft protocol, as finally approved by the Conference, became an annex to the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference; for the text of this protocol, see p. 1356.

4 Presumably a reference to the First Report by the Working Party on German Defense Contribution, which was circulated as document NPC(54)23 of Sept. 30; this first report, as well as an earlier draft (document NPC(54)18) and a second report (document NPC(54)26), are in the Conference files, lot 60-D-627, CF 305. For the text of the report by the Working Party, which was circulated as document NPC(54)38 and was adopted by the Conference during the Eighth Plenary meeting of Oct. 1, see p. 1338.
level without unanimous approval Brussels powers, and that this decision by Brussels powers could take place either in Brussels council or through liaison NATO council.

In interest of simplicity, US had urged there was no real necessity for Brussels review of NATO decisions with respect maxima, since NATO operated only by unanimous agreement and each of Brussels powers thereby had veto. There seemed some danger that Brussels would have to set up competing annual review procedure, which was much to be regretted as present one complicated enough. Even in absence of that, requirement of double action seemed hardly in interest of real security for countries concerned. However, if they felt their political considerations were more important, that was primarily up to them. US did think, however, that if separate Brussels action required, should be recognition that, contrary to EDC, all Brussels members were in NATO and appropriate action could be taken either in Brussels council or through NATO.

3. In addition, was agreed with relatively little discussion:
   a. That initial German contribution would be of size and general character agreed upon in EDC;
   b. That all forces of NATO countries on continent of Europe would be assigned to SACEUR except as NATO has recognized, or will recognize, exceptions;
   c. That Brussels treaty organization will fix strength and armament of internal defense and police forces of its members;
   d. That deployment of NATO forces be in accord with NATO strategic plans that SACEUR shall determine deployment after consultation and agreement with countries concerned, and that redeployment on the continent may take place only with the consent of SACEUR subject to appropriate political guidance;
   e. That SACEUR forces should be integrated so far as possible, consistent with military efficiency; 
   f. That SACEUR coordination of logistics be made more close;
   g. That SACEUR should inspect the levels of forces, the armaments, equipment and so forth of forces assigned to him;
   h. That the Brussels countries will seek to arrange for SACEUR to designate a high-ranking officer to provide the Brussels treaty organization with information available in SHAPE on whether or not Brussels members have exceeded the agreed force maxima.

(Should be able send full and exact text tomorrow.)

4. Italian Foreign Minister and Chancellor both made statements of French armaments pool proposals, endorsing their objectives strongly but urging that in interest prompt action, further considera-
tion of them be turned over to Brussels council. Chairman called attention to fact working group had been assigned task study Spaak paper dealing with central procedure but not Mendes paper on which perhaps more ministerial discussion required. Mendes urged that his paper also be considered by working group, but added that at working group meeting, his government would have some proposals to make to experts with respect to task to be undertaken by Brussels council. (While not entirely clear, this was generally felt to be concession in direction of move to postpone consideration here of substance French armaments pool proposals.)

SECOND MEETING OF THE FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, OCTOBER 1, 1954, 10:30 A.M.

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS
FRANCE
Pierre Mendes-France
FEDERAL REPUBLIC
of GERMANY
Konrad Adenauer

UNITED KINGDOM
Anthony Eden
UNITED STATES
John Foster Dulles

395.1 LO/10-154

Telegraphic Summary by the United States Delegation¹

SECRET

LONDON, October 1, 1954—11 p.m.

Ministers devoted two sessions today to question of German sovereignty and related issues raised by list of questions submitted by HICOMers for guidance of working party.² Good atmosphere and constructive discussion. Immediately apparent that only flat issue was between Germans and French with UK and US endeavoring steer toward compromise.

Germans preferred question of sovereignty to be settled independently of question defense contribution, i.e., "before or at same time" rather than "only simultaneously". Preferred tripartite declaration or declaration plus German undertaking instead of convention on

¹Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 18, Oct. 1, and repeated to Bonn, Rome, Berlin, Ottawa, Luxembourg, The Hague, Brussels, and Paris for USRO, CINCEUR, and Reinhardt. The source text also summarizes the proceedings of the third meeting of the Four-Power Conference which took place on Oct. 1. A 23-page verbatim record of the second meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 367. The list of principal participants, not provided in the source text, is taken from the verbatim record.

²The questions from the Working Group on German Sovereignty were circulated in document NPC(54)15 of Sept. 29, a copy of which is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 364. For information concerning the Working Group, see footnote 7, p. 1302.
relations. Preferred such declaration take effect when Bundestag had taken necessary action. If occupation terminated before entry into force of German defense arrangements, preferred demilitarization controls to be sustained by unilateral declaration of Federal Republic or contractual agreement rather than by reserved power of Allies. Asked that controls be applied in such way as to permit German preparatory measures in interim period and applied by Four-Power Commission acting by majority vote.

French explained impossibility committing themselves before Parliament had opportunity pass on all questions. Therefore preferred restoration of sovereignty simultaneously with entry into effect of defense contribution. Preferred implementation of all Bonn conventions as amended by protocol deleting or amending out of date provisions. Preferred declaration on sovereignty or implementation conventions come into effect when all four governments had ratified, not merely Bundestag. Preferred maintenance demilitarization controls as reserved power, with no interim measures, but agreeable to have controls applied by joint Four-Power Commission.

UK and US stressed necessity giving Adenauer something solid that he could take home from conference while not spoiling atmosphere for parliamentary action in UK, France, possibly US. Therefore proposed declaration intent (text given immediately following telegram 4). Asked Adenauer whether he could meet French on implementation contractuals and maintenance demilitarization controls as reserved power, if declaration intent sufficiently positive and satisfactory. Adenauer very pleased with declaration intent and indicated conciliatory attitude on French points provided working party reached agreement by tomorrow on provisions to be deleted or amended in conventions. Secretary stressed that our agreement to declaration intent dependent upon clarification by Germans on how much of Bonn conventions they desired to alter.

US (followed by UK) made important reservation that if nothing accomplished by January 1, might need re-examine position with view proceeding unilaterally so far as US HICOMer and US Zone concerned. Mendes-France hoped for Assembly action by then but could not realistically expect completion Council action before March 15. US and UK qualified reservation to mean that if necessary action proceeding favorably at first of year, that would suffice. Had not intended date as hard and fast time-limit. Question of maintenance

4 Not printed; it transmitted to the Department of State the draft declaration of intent which was subsequently approved and incorporated into the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference. (896.1 LO/10-154) For the text of the declaration of intent, see Part I of the Final Act, p. 1345. The draft declaration, which was circulated as document NPC(54)31, is also in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 365.
demilitarization controls as reserved power and question re interim measures likewise decided in this sense.

Agreed that restoration sovereignty could take place “before or at same time” as entry into force of defense arrangement. Agreed that timing question re restoration sovereignty upon completion Bundesstags action or Four-Power action dependent upon question of form, i.e., whether French proposal accepted for implementation of contractuals, which will be decided after report of working party tomorrow. Agreed that demilitarization controls will be applied by joint Four-Power Commission acting by majority vote.¹

¹Extracts from various statements made during this discussion by Dulles, Mendes-France, and two by Eden, were circulated as documents NPC(54)40, NPC(54)41, and NPC(54)37 and NPC(54)42, respectively, and are in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 365.

SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, OCTOBER 1, 1954, NOON

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

BELGIUM
Paul-Henri Spaak

CANADA
Lester B. Pearson

FRANCE
Pierre Mendès-France

FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY
Konrad Adenauer

ITALY
Gaetano Martino

LUXEMBOURG
Joseph Bech

NETHERLANDS
Johan W. Beyen

UNITED KINGDOM
Anthony Eden

UNITED STATES
John Foster Dulles

Editorial Note

After briefly surveying the tasks that remained before the Conference could be ended, the representatives of the Nine Powers agreed that the general composition of the Final Act of the Conference would be as follows: an introduction, the texts of the documents approved by the Conference, and an indication of future actions. The remainder of the meeting was devoted to a discussion of various amendments to NPC(54)26; for information concerning this report and its various earlier drafts, see footnote 4, page 1316. A 14-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 366; no telegraphic summary of the meeting was found in Department of State files.
THE GERMAN PROBLEM

THIRD MEETING OF THE FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, OCTOBER 1, 1954, 3:30 P. M.

Principal Participants

France
Pierre Mendès-France
Federal Republic
of Germany
Konrad Adenauer

United Kingdom
Anthony Eden

United States
John Foster Dulles

Editorial Note

The telegraphic summary of this meeting was combined with that of the second Four-Power meeting, October 1, page 1318. A 16-page verbatim record of this third meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 365.

EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE,
LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, OCTOBER 1, 1954, 4:45 P. M.

Principal Participants

Belgium
Paul-Henri Spaak

Canada
Lester B. Pearson

France
Pierre Mendès-France

Federal Republic
of Germany
Konrad Adenauer

Italy
Gaetano Martino

Luxembourg
Joseph Bech

Netherlands
Johan W. Beyen

United Kingdom
Anthony Eden

United States
John Foster Dulles

396.1 LO/10-254

Telegraphic Summary by the United States Delegation

SECRET

LONDON, October 2, 1954—5 a. m.

1. Chairman opened eighth plenary session at 1645 Friday afternoon. He noted that a text had been agreed upon between French and Italian delegations concerning strength and armaments on continent

1 Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 20, Oct. 2, and repeated to Bonn, Rome, Ottawa, Luxembourg, The Hague, Brussels, and Paris for USRO, CINCEUR, and Reinhardt. A 27-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 368. The list of principal participants, not provided in the source text, was taken from the verbatim record.
of internal defense forces and of police belonging members Brussels Treaty Organization. 2

2. Chairman then turned to statement made by Adenauer at fourth plenary session September 29 concerning proposed declarations by Federal Government and by western powers. Requested that these assurances be renewed in light changed circumstances. Chairman referred document to experts to agree on appropriate language. 3

3. Chairman then asked for report from working group on control armaments. Chairman of group stated that it had not completed discussion on Spaak paper 4 and had not yet considered paper distributed by Mendes-France on arms pool. 5 Mendes-France immediately stated, that report by chairman working group did not correspond in any way to proposals made by French delegation. He went on to say that he was under impression there had been large measure agreement on control proposals made by French Government seeking establish very strict system limitation and control aimed at reassuring public opinion. On other hand, wide divergence opinion between several delegations existed on question production. He stated that proposals of working group are disappointing concerning control and leave almost nothing of proposals for production made by French delegation.

4. Recess followed after which Canadian Foreign Minister Pearson listed main difficulties before conference in this field: (1) Definition strategic areas; (2) which arms should be prohibited from manufacture in such areas; (3) problem of establishing agency for limitation and control certain other armaments. Suggested that there be agreement in principle that (1) there must be a strategic area; (2) that manufacture certain arms in that area must be prohibited; and (3) that there must be agency for limitation and control armaments. After conference agreed to these principles it should then set up working group which will attempt convert principles into practical detail. Further proposed that during interim period commitments should be

2 The text under reference was contained in document NPC(54)30 of Oct. 1 and concerned a revision of paragraph 2 of document NPC(54)26, the Second Report by the Working Party on German Defense Contribution. Neither of these documents is printed in this compilation but both are in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CP 304–305. For information concerning the reports of this Working Party, see footnote 4, p. 1316.

3 Adenauer’s statement concerning these proposed declarations was circulated as document NPC(54)21, a copy of which is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CP 304.

4 This is a reference to the Belgian memorandum, which was circulated as NPC(54)16 of Sept. 29, printed on p. 1336.

5 Presumably a reference to the French memorandum, which was circulated as NPC(54)1 of Sept. 27, printed on p. 1332.
taken not to manufacture certain armaments in areas where they are
not now being manufactured. Suggested that interim period be defined
pending coming into being Brussels organization. Suggested that
decisions taken by working group should be reached by simple ma-
majority or by two-thirds. Said that if working group failed reach solu-
tion “bets would be of [off]” but said he felt certain this would not
happen in practice.

5. Secretary Dulles then said he had been thinking broadly along
same lines Canadian Foreign Minister. Pointed out all agreed desir-
able establish agency under Brussels Treaty generally controlling and
supervising production arms. Pointed out number factors have to be
dealt with which means that time must elapse before agency can be
established. Secretary then suggested in response to French Parlia-
mentary requirements that Germany undertake not to manufacture
armaments listed in Annex 2, Article 107 of EDC Treaty. Further
said that considerable proportion 12 German divisions would be sup-
plied by United States and that gap remaining complete full equip-
ment could be filled by German production limited to that purpose
only. Suggested period of say two years elapse before Brussels organi-
ization established and that agency should be created on basis of either
majority or two-thirds member countries.

6. Chancellor Adenauer made point that Federal Republic cannot
put divisions into field unless these supplied with best of arms.

7. Netherlands Foreign Minister Beyen then pointed out that no
chance whatever exists that any government or Parliament in Holland
would ever agree to accepting verdict majority vote on such an issue.

8. Adenauer asked that proposal be submitted in writing and re-
pealed his previous statement.

9. Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak expressed difficulty in postpon-
ing solution problem arms control and production for two years and
that such delay would weaken parliamentary position all governmens.
Deplored excessive pessimism on report experts on committee. Em-
phasized degree of agreement already reached and that difficulty due
to fact that yesterday everyone had accepted principle of strategically
exposed zones but could not agree as to definition. Proposed conference
should consider entirely new approach instead of system based on
EDC Treaty text. Suggested that continental members Brussels Pact
Organization should agree not manufacture categories A, B, C unless
authorized by Brussels Treaty Organization. Proposed they should
only manufacture weapons necessary for their own arms and equip-
ment and that means of control which could be devised would be amply
sufficient and water tight.
NINTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, OCTOBER 2, 1954, 11 A.M.

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

Belgium
Paul-Henri Spaak

Luxembourg
Joseph Bech

Canada

Netherlands
Johan W. Beyen

Lester B. Pearson

United Kingdom
Anthony Eden

France

United States
John Foster Dulles

Pierre Mendès-France

Federal Republic

Federal Republic of Germany

Konrad Adenauer

of Germany

Italy

United States

Gaetano Martino

ITALY

396.1 LO/10-354

Telegraphic Summary by the United States Delegation

SECRET

LONDON, October 3, 1954—3 p.m.

Ninth plenary October 2 was confined to discussion of armaments control problem. It was followed by restricted session of Ministers with one adviser each. After a lunch break the restricted session was resumed at three. After lengthy discussion question was referred to expert group which submitted draft to plenary in course 10 p.m. meeting.

Do not believe it useful or necessary report this prolonged debate in detail. Substance of issue was insistence by Mendes prohibition of production all items in Annex 2 to Article 107 of EDC treaty by Germany and securing effective control of level of output in Brussels treaty territory on continent, most items in Annex 1 of Article 107. Initially insisted that changes could be made in future in Annex 2 prohibitions only by unanimous vote of Brussels Council. Chancellor unwilling accept imposition of control on Germany alone on grounds discriminatory from military standpoint. Belgians reluctant to accept strategic zone covering substantial portion their industrial areas. Most other Brussels pact powers very reluctant accept detailed control proposed and none of them like insistence on unanimity with respect to changes in prohibitions on the guided missiles, military aircraft, and warships paragraphs of Annex 2.

1 Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 23, Oct. 3, and repeated to Bonn, Rome, Ottawa, Luxembourg, The Hague, Brussels, and Paris for USRO, CINCEUR, and Reinhardt. The source text summarizes the proceedings of the 9th through the 13th Plenary meetings, some of which were restricted in attendance; information concerning the 10th through the 13th meetings follows this document. An 18-page verbatim record of this 9th meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 697, CP 338.
Issues finally resolved by offer of Chancellor unilateral German declaration to be accepted and enforced by Brussels treaty organization that Germany would not produce atomic, chemical or biological weapons and that she would not produce guided missiles, warships over 3000 tons or strategic bombers without approval by 2/3 vote of Brussels council and recommendation subject by NATO supreme commander concerned. Benelux countries indicated they expected join in German declaration with respect to atomic, chemical and biological weapons. France and Italy refused to do so.

Control will be exercised over items to be selected from Annex 1 by expert working group in Paris (this selection process is apt to be difficult as French wish to include all but hand weapons and Benelux countries wish to include selected items of very heavy equipment). Control will be directed to stocks to insure that they do not exceed amounts justified for NATO forces, non-NATO forces and legitimate exports. Field inspection is authorized in addition to statistical and budgetary checks. Decision of Brussels council on control matters in this field will be by majority vote.

Provision is made for Brussels council to make annual report on its activities in this field to delegations of Brussels countries to Consultative Assembly of Council of Europe, US and Canada have agreed supply information to Brussels treaty organization on military aid programs of Brussels members and to receive Brussels treaty organization comments thereon.

The whole question of positive armaments pool program was turned over to Brussels treaty council for future study in light various proposals which have been or may in future be made by members on this subject including original French proposal. It has been made clear that no one is committed to accept any part of French proposals on this subject.

This somewhat complicated arrangement with number important questions still not worked out clearly is result long and sometimes vigorous clash of opinion on both major and minor points. It is difficult to forecast with any degree of certainty its future practical impact.

TENTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, OCTOBER 2, 1954, 11: 20 A. M.

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

BELGIUM
Paul-Henri Spaak

LUXEMBOURG
Joseph Bech

CANADA
Lester B. Pearson

NETHERLANDS
Johan W. Beyen
At approximately 11:20 a.m. on October 2, the Chairman of the Nine-Power Conference adjourned the Ninth Plenary meeting and called for a restricted meeting of the principal participants with only one adviser in attendance from each of the nine delegations. This Tenth Plenary meeting continued until noon and its proceedings are summarized in the telegraphic summary by the United States Delegation, October 3, page 1324. A 27-page verbatim record of the restricted Tenth Plenary meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 368.

FOURTH MEETING OF THE FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, OCTOBER 2, 1954, NOON

Principal Participants

France
Pierre Mendès-France

Federal Republic of Germany
Konrad Adenauer

United Kingdom
Anthony Eden

United States
John Foster Dulles

Editorial Note

The four Foreign Ministers reviewed a draft report of the Working Group on the Termination of the Occupation and discussed the deletion of the proposed preamble and several other alterations in the text. The draft report under discussion was circulated as NPC(54)45 and is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 365; for the text of the Final Report of the Working Group on the Termination of the Occupation, approved during the 14th Plenary meeting of the Nine-Power Conference and circulated as NPC(54)50, see page 1339. A 16-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 367; no telegraphic summary of this meeting was found in Department of State files.
ELEVENTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, OCTOBER 2, 1954, 3 P. M.

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

BELGIUM
Paul-Henri Spaak

LUXEMBOURG
Joseph Bech

NETHERLANDS
Johan W. Beyen

UNITED KINGDOM
Anthony Eden

UNITED STATES
John Foster Dulles

CANADA
Lester B. Pearson

FRANCE
Pierre Mendès-France

ITALY
Konrad Adenauer

GAETANO MARTINO

Editorial Note

This meeting was a continuation of the restricted session held during the morning of October 2 and involved the same principal participants assisted by one adviser each (see page 1325). A brief summary of the proceedings of this meeting is included in the telegraphic summary by the United States Delegation, October 3, on page 1324; a 19-page verbatim record of this restricted meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 368.

TWELFTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, OCTOBER 2, 1954, 3:45 P. M.

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

BELGIUM
Paul-Henri Spaak

LUXEMBOURG
Joseph Bech

NETHERLANDS
Johan W. Beyen

UNITED KINGDOM
Anthony Eden

UNITED STATES
John Foster Dulles

CANADA
Lester B. Pearson

FRANCE
Pierre Mendès-France

ITALY
Konrad Adenauer

GAETANO MARTINO

Editorial Note

At approximately 3:45 p.m. Chairman Eden called the 12th Plenary meeting to order without restricting attendance at the session by dele-
gations from the nine participating countries. A brief summary of the proceedings of this meeting is included in the telegraphic summary by the United States Delegation, October 3, page 1324; a five-page verbatim record of the meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 368.

THIRTEENTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, OCTOBER 2, 1954, 10 P. M.

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

BELGIUM
Paul-Henri Spaak

CANADA
Lester B. Pearson

FRANCE
Pierre Mendès-France

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Konrad Adenauer

ITALY
Gaetano Martino

LUXEMBOURG
Joseph Bech

NETHERLANDS
Johan W. Beyen

UNITED KINGDOM
Anthony Eden

UNITED STATES
John Foster Dulles

Editorial Note

The proceedings of this evening session, which involved the principal participants and representatives of delegations from the nine countries, are briefly summarized in the telegraphic summary by the United States Delegation, October 3, page 1324; a 19-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 368.

FIFTH MEETING OF THE FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, OCTOBER 3, 1954, 10:30 A. M.¹

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

FRANCE
Pierre Mendès-France

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Konrad Adenauer

UNITED KINGDOM
Anthony Eden

UNITED STATES
John Foster Dulles

WORKING GROUP ON THE TERMINATION OF THE OCCUPATION
Derek Hoyer Millar

¹ This meeting presumably took place at approximately 10:30 a.m., immediately prior to the 14th Plenary meeting of the Nine-Power Conference at 11 a.m., although no time is given in the verbatim record.
Editorial Note

The four Foreign Ministers heard a report from Hoyer Millar that the Working Group was in complete agreement on its final report and that the only outstanding issue concerning finance was settled. The report was then approved and the Foreign Ministers instructed their representatives to begin negotiations in Bonn for the conclusion of a protocol and related documents in accordance with the decisions set out in the report and annex A. They directed them to submit the protocol for approval not later than October 20, 1954. For the text of the Final Report on the Termination of the Occupation, which was circulated as document NPC(54)50 of October 2, see page 1339. A brief three-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 367; no telegraphic summary of this meeting was found in Department of State files, except for its brief mention in the summary, below on this page.

FOURTEENTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, OCTOBER 3, 1954, 11 A. M.

Principal Participants

BELGIUM
Paul-Henri Spaak

LUXEMBOURG
Joseph Bech

CANADA
Lester B. Pearson

NETHERLANDS
Johan W. Beyen

FRANCE
Pierre Mendès-France

UNITED KINGDOM
Anthony Eden

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Konrad Adenauer

UNITED STATES
John Foster Dulles

ITALY
Gaetano Martino

SECRET

London, October 3, 1954—5 p. m.

Final four-power and nine-power sessions held today with agreement reached on all points, final act signed, and general satisfaction over achievements of conference. These include British association and commitment to maintain troops on continent, assurances of US Government's continued support to extent feasible, agreement on German

1 Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 24, Oct. 3, and repeated to Bonn, Rome, Ottawa, Luxembourg, The Hague, Brussels, Berlin, and Paris for USRO, CINCEUR, and Reinhardt. A 24-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 368. The list of principal participants, not provided in the source text, was taken from the verbatim record.
membership in NATO with reasonable limitations, workable Brussels pact organization, and program for rapid liquidation of occupation and restoration German sovereignty.

Off-hand impression: (1) That Britain, Benelux and Federal Republic made impressive concessions to French. (2) Mendes-France did not obtain quite as strong a control organism in Brussels pact as he wished, nor able retain as many vestiges of occupation rights or other discriminations against Germany as he might have wished. (3) With agreed plans for Federal Republic membership in NATO, revision of Bonn conventions, and restoration sovereignty, Adenauer has in effect received a larger promissory note but smaller cash payment than he may have expected from conference. Everyone aware of latent opportunities for upsetting program (particularly by Saar issue, difficulties in working out Brussels armament controls on non-discriminatory basis, and possible Soviet moves) in intervening period between now and March 15 which Mendes-France considered realistic date for completion necessary French Parliamentary action. But all hopeful that with so much solid accomplishment to build on, Mendes-France will fully engage his ingenuity in getting program through Assembly.

Papers approved today include (1) final report of four-power working party on termination of occupation. This amounts to program for revision of Bonn conventions and interim arrangements re disarmament and demilitarization controls. This will not be made public. (2) Final report by working group on control of armaments, which was incorporated in (3) final act of conference. Latter includes (I) declaration of intent on Germany, (II) arrangements for Brussels treaty organization and establishment thereunder of agency for control of armaments, (III) text of US, UK, and Canadian assurances, (IV) NATO arrangements, (V) security declaration by Federal Republic and joint tripartite declaration, (VI) instructions on future procedure, with annexed documents.

---

*For the text of the Final Report of the Working Party on the Termination of the Occupation, which was circulated as NPC(54)50 of Oct. 2, see p. 1339. An earlier draft of this report, circulated as document NPC(54)45, is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 365.
*The text of the Second Report by the Working Group on the Control of Armaments, which was circulated as document NPC(54)51 of Oct. 2, was incorporated into Part II of the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference, which is printed on p. 1346.
*For the text of the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference, see p. 1345.

**SIGNING CEREMONIES OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, OCTOBER 3, 1954, 2:30 P. M.**

*Editorial Note*

The formal signing ceremonies of the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference took place at 2:30 p. m. on Sunday, October 3, 1954, at the
Lancaster House, the site of all the Nine-Power and Four-Power meetings since September 28. Anthony Eden was the first to sign, followed by Paul-Henri Spaak, Lester B. Pearson, Pierre Mendès-France, Konrad Adenauer, Gaetano Martino, Joseph Bech, Johan W. Beyen, and John Foster Dulles, representing the nine participating countries. The text of the Final Act was released to the press at 5:30 that afternoon and was published in full in the New York Times edition of October 4. For the text of Dulles’ statement concerning the results of the London Conference, which he made at Washington National Airport upon his arrival on October 4, see the Department of State Bulletin, October 11, 1954, page 519, or AFP, volume I, page 1492.

DULLES—EDEN—MENDES—FRANCE MEETING, LONDON, OCTOBER 3, 1954

Conference files, lot 66 D 627, CF 370

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

SECRET


Following the Signing of the Final Act, M. Mendes-France took Mr. Eden and me apart and said that there was one matter he wanted to mention to us—that was the Saar. He said that he felt that it was indispensable that the Saar agreement should be completed and part of the final package which would go to his Parliament. He said he had not wanted to discuss this matter here in London, but that we should not forget that it was part of the problem. He said that he had spoken to Adenauer about this, and Adenauer had said that he did not want to agitate [advert] to the Saar matter for a few days until the situation was calm following the discussion of the London Conference. Mendes-France said he understood this viewpoint, but that there could not be long delay.

Mr. Eden said that he understood that the Saar matter should be discussed, but that he could not agree that its completion should be a condition precedent. He doubted very much that it would be possible to complete a Saar agreement with all its details at any early date.

I said that I was inclined to agree with Mr. Eden, that I did not know much about the details of the Saar matter, but I felt it was highly complicated and that probably agreement in principle was all that could be obtained within the next two or three weeks.

Mendes-France reaffirmed with some petulance his position that a completed Saar arrangement must be part of the package that went to the French Parliament.

At this point I spoke privately to Chancellor Adenauer, asking
him when he would be prepared to discuss the Saar with Mendes-
France. He said he would be prepared to do so on October 20.

I then returned to M. Mendes-France and Mr. Eden and reported
what Mr. Adenauer had told me. M. Mendes-France said the 20th
was rather late; that he would have to submit the matter to his Par-
liament about November 1, and he knew that Mr. Adenauer would be
absent during the last week of October.

At this point Mr. Spaak joined our group. He expressed the view
that two days should be sufficient to settle the Saar matter. He thought
in essence it was a problem of substituting the Brussels Organization
for the Council of Europe.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

DULLES-MENDÈS-FRANCE MEETING, LONDON, OCTOBER 3, 1954

Editorial Note

Dulles and Mendès-France held a conversation concerning leadership problems in Indochina on October 3, presumably following the
signing ceremonies for the Nine-Power Conference. Dulles' memo-
randum of this conversation is printed in volume XIII, Part 2, page
2115.

2. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 364

Memorandum Prepared by the French Delegation


[NPC(54)1]

The draft which appears below is based on the following
principles:

(1) Non-discrimination.
(2) Limitation of forces and of armaments.
(3) Control of forces and of armaments.
(4) Conditions laid down for the armed forces (effectives and
armaments) to apply exclusively to those forces placed by the member
countries at the disposal of the Supreme NATO Command.
(5) Full participation of Great Britain within this framework.

I. The Brussels Treaty shall be amended in such a way as to provide
the basis for an organisation entrusted with the consolidation of

According to a cover sheet attached to the source text, this memorandum was
circulated by the French Delegation during the First Plenary meeting on Sept. 28.
security and peace on the Continent of Europe. Germany and Italy shall become members, the necessary amendments being made to the Treaty as now in force.

This text shall be completed by military arrangements on a large scale.

II. As regards the armed forces (effectives and armaments) on the Continent of Europe, placed by each member country at the disposal of the Supreme Command, the Council provided for in Article 7 of the Brussels Treaty shall adopt the levels fixed by the Council of NATO on the proposal of the Supreme Command.

The levels fixed by NATO as minima shall, however, for the members of the Brussels Treaty be treated as maxima which they will undertake not to exceed.

Observance of these maxima shall be guaranteed by control and inspection organised throughout the Continental territory covered by the agreement.

III. So far as armaments are concerned, a distinction shall be made between two categories:

(a) armaments covered by Annex 2 of Article 107 of the Treaty of Paris (allowing for a possible revision of the list);

(b) other armaments.

Manufacture of arms covered by category (a) shall be prohibited in strategically exposed zones to be defined on a map annexed to the agreement. The Council of Seven shall ensure by inspection and control that the rule prohibiting manufacture is observed.

Manufacture on the Continent of arms covered by category (b) and their distribution shall be directed and controlled by the Council, whose special task it will be to:

(i) draw up programmes for manufacture of arms and allot the orders corresponding to these programmes to the different member countries;

(ii) allocate the arms to the different forces;

(iii) receive the arms imported free from the United States and allocate them.

The continental countries undertake not to manufacture any armaments over and above those for which orders have been allocated to them. The Council may also authorise manufacture for export. The manufacture of armaments may also be authorised if intended for the equipment of forces of member countries other than those placed at the disposal of the Supreme Command.

The sole purpose of the control provided for armaments of category (a) shall be to ensure that none have been manufactured, whereas the control provided for armaments of category (b) shall be both qualitative and quantitative.
In order that the quantitative control which the Council is to exercise may be effective, it must also be extended to the setting up of new armaments plants, industries and factories. In such cases authority must be granted by the Council, which shall base its decision on strategic considerations. The Continental area covered by the agreement shall be defined as a series of zones subject to limitations decreasing progressively from east to west. In order to avoid any discrimination under this system and to render it equitable, new armaments factories owned in common could be established in the unexposed zones.

The Council's decision shall be taken, according to circumstances, by a simple majority, a weighted majority, or unanimously. Where armaments control is concerned, they shall be taken by simple majority.

IV. Both as regards the size of the armed forces and of the armaments, the Council of Seven shall, so far as possible, have recourse to the services of NATO for the inspection and control provided for above.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CP 394

Memorandum Prepared by the British Delegation

CONFIDENTIAL

[LONDON,] September 24, 1954.

[NPC(54)2]

GERMAN ASSOCIATION WITH THE WEST AND GERMAN DEFENCE CONTRIBUTION

During his recent tour of European capitals, Mr. Eden proposed a solution under three headings: the termination of the occupation régime, the accession of the Federal German Republic and Italy to the Brussels Treaty, and German membership of NATO with accompanying arrangements of a non-discriminatory character designed to increase the efficiency of Western defence and to determine the character and size of the German defence contribution.

2. These arrangements might cover the following subjects:

(a) agreement on the size and composition of the German Defence Contribution to NATO, based on the totals and types agreed for the E.D.C. Any subsequent variations would be subject to the current NATO procedure;

(b) agreement that the forces placed at the disposal of SACEUR on the Continent shall be:

(i) deployed in accordance with agreed NATO strategy, and shall not be moved within his command area, nor revert to national control for use within that area, without his consent,

1 According to a cover sheet attached to the source text, this memorandum was circulated as document NPC(54)2. It was distributed to the participating delegations prior to the First Plenary meeting of Sept. 28.
(ii) integrated as far as military efficiency requires,
(iii) inspected by SACEUR, this inspection to cover the levels and effectiveness of forces, their armaments, logistics and reserve formations.

(c) agreement that apart from forces placed at the disposal of SACEUR on the Continent, forces will only be maintained for defined purposes (e.g. international missions, forces required to defend other parts of the North Atlantic Treaty area or other parts of the world);
(d) agreement that certain types of armament production and research will not take place, except by consent of the North Atlantic Council, in those parts of the North Atlantic Treaty area classified as strategically exposed areas, such areas to be subject to NATO inspection;
(e) agreement to extend the legal life of the North Atlantic Treaty so as to preclude denunciation before 50 years;
(f) declarations by the United Kingdom and United States reaffirming any of their undertakings to the E.D.C. which remain applicable and are not covered by the agreements mentioned above;
(g) declarations by the German Federal Republic and the Governments of NATO on the subject of European Security.

3. This list is in no sense exhaustive. Another possibility is SHAPE control of logistics; and the French Government's memorandum of September 18 contains further suggestions which are being studied in London.

4. Whilst Her Majesty's Government would prefer that these arrangements should apply to all members of NATO (including the German Federal Republic on her accession to NATO), they recognise that this may not be feasible in every case and they are very ready to consider whether some of the arrangements could be organised within the enlarged Brussels Treaty Organisation. In this connexion Her Majesty's Government would, however, underline the importance of

(a) not duplicating the NATO machinery or command structure, and
(b) ensuring, accordingly, that any arrangements agreed between the members of the enlarged Brussels Treaty Organisation shall operate within the NATO framework and be carried out by NATO machinery.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 564

Working Draft Memorandum Prepared by the British Delegation

CONFIDENTIAL

[NPC(54)11]

[LONDON,] September 29, 1954.
The 9 Governments are agreed:

\(^1\) According to a cover sheet attached to the source text, this document was circulated by the British Delegation during the Third Plenary meeting of Sept. 29.
(1)
(a) that the German Defence Contribution to N.A.T.O. shall be 12 divisions, 1350 aircraft and naval units, of the same types as agreed for the E.D.C.
(b) that these German forces shall be placed under SACEUR
(c) that subsequent variations in the German Defence Contribution will be subject to current N.A.T.O. procedure.

(2)
(a) that their forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent shall be deployed in accordance with N.A.T.O. strategy;
(b) that the location of such forces shall be determined by SACEUR in consultation with the national authorities concerned;
(c) that such forces shall not be moved on the Continent nor used on the Continent without his consent.

(3) that their forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent shall be integrated in the interests of military efficiency.

(4) that the level and effectiveness of their forces on the Continent, and the armaments, equipment, logistics and reserve formations of those forces shall be inspected by SACEUR.

(5) that their representatives, in concert with SACEUR and the Secretary-General of N.A.T.O., will draw up in Paris detailed proposals for approval by the North Atlantic Council, to give effect to the agreements recorded above.

Memorandum Prepared by the Belgian Delegation

SECRET


[NPC(54)16]

MEMORANDUM ON THE CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS

The control of armaments should be regarded as coming under two distinct headings:

1. Prohibition of the manufacture of certain arms in strategically exposed areas.

What arms?
The arms in categories A, B, and C, and possibly in other categories as well, a list of which should be drawn up.

1 According to a cover sheet attached to the source text, this memorandum was circulated by Spaak at the Fifth Plenary meeting of Sept. 30.
What is meant by a strategically exposed area?

Let us take as a provisional working hypothesis the definition of a strategically exposed area as laid down in the Treaty of Paris, that is to say, the combination of Article 107 with the decision of the Council of Ministers at Strasbourg, dated 23rd May, 1952 and further defined by the letter from Chancellor Adenauer dated 27th May, 1952.

Allowance must also be made for civilian needs.

2. Controlled limitation of the manufacture of certain arms to be applied to the continental powers members of the Brussels Treaty Organisation.

What arms?

In principle, these should be heavy armaments, such as aircraft, artillery and tanks.

What criteria should govern limitation?

Principally, the needs of the forces assigned to N.A.T.O., taking into account in addition certain national and overseas military requirements, and the commercial and industrial needs of the countries in question.

How should the requirements of the forces assigned to N.A.T.O. be determined?

A dual criterion should be applied at the outset:

1) The statistical results arising from the annual revision which determines, for at least three years, a schedule of requirements.


External aid should be deducted from the requirements to be met.

How are the needs of the non-N.A.T.O. Forces to be determined?

These needs should be notified by the State concerned to the Agency cited below and approved by the Council of Ministers on the basis of a procedure to be laid down.

Exports and imports of controlled arms should be notified to the Agency, which should approve them and, if necessary, judge of their genuineness.

How is control of armaments to be ensured?

By an Agency of the Brussels Treaty Organisation—an autonomous administrative organ—which would confirm the requirements according to the accepted criteria, and would submit proposals to the Brussels Treaty Council of Ministers. The action and decisions of this organ should be submitted to the Council of Ministers and agreed by majority vote.

It should also be agreed that the Brussels Treaty Agency present an
annual account of its activities to the Common Assembly of the Coal and Steel Community, to which should be added a certain number of British representatives.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 365

Report by the Working Party on a German Defense Contribution and Arrangements To Apply SACEUR’s Forces on the Continent

CONFIDENTIAL

[LONDON,] October 1, 1954.

[NPC(54)38]

The nine Governments represented at the London Conference agree to instruct representatives to draw up in Paris, in concert with the military and civilian agencies of N.A.T.O. through the Secretary General, detailed proposals, for approval by the North Atlantic Council, for a German defence contribution and arrangements to be applied to SACEUR’s forces on the Continent. These detailed proposals shall be based on the following principles agreed between the nine Governments:

1. (a) The seven Brussels Treaty Powers will conclude a special agreement setting out the forces each of them will place under SACEUR on the Continent.
   (b) The German Contribution shall conform in size and general characteristics to the contribution fixed for the E.D.C. brought up to date and adapted as necessary to make it suitable for N.A.T.O.
   (c) The terms of this special agreement will be agreed with the other N.A.T.O. countries.
   (d) If at any time the N.A.T.O. Annual Review recommends an increase above the figures in the Brussels Special Agreement such increase will require the unanimous approval of the Brussels powers expressed in the Brussels Council or in N.A.T.O.
   (e) The Brussels Powers will ask that arrangements be made for SACEUR to designate a high-ranking officer who will be instructed to transmit regularly to the Brussels Treaty Organisation information acquired as indicated in 3(f) below in order to permit that Organisation to establish that the figures agreed among the Brussels Powers are being observed.

2. All forces of N.A.T.O. countries stationed on the Continent of Europe shall be placed under the authority of SACEUR, with the exception of the forces which N.A.T.O. has recognised or will recognise as suitable to remain under national command. The strength and armaments on the Continent of the internal defence forces and of the police belonging to the members of the Brussels Treaty Organisation

---

1 According to a cover sheet attached to the source text, this report, which was circulated as document NPC(54)38, was adopted by the Conference during the Eighth Plenary meeting of Oct. 1.
shall be fixed by agreements made within this Organisation, taking into account the task for which they are intended and on the basis of existing levels and needs.

3. Arrangements to apply to SACEUR's forces:

(a) Forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent shall be deployed in accordance with N.A.T.O. strategy.

(b) The location of such forces shall be determined by SACEUR after consultation and agreement with the national authorities concerned.

(c) Such forces shall not be redeployed on the Continent nor used operationally on the Continent without his consent subject to appropriate political guidance from the North Atlantic Council.

(d) Forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent shall be integrated as far as possible consistent with military efficiency.

(e) Arrangements shall be made for the closer co-ordination of logistics by SACEUR.

(f) The level and effectiveness of forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent and the armaments, equipment, logistics and reserve formations of those forces on the Continent shall be inspected by SACEUR.

---

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 365


CONFIDENTIAL

[NPC(54)50]

I. Introduction

The following procedure is one which can be applied, as may be decided, either before or at the same time as the entry into force of the arrangements for the German Defence Contribution. In this report the expression "the interim period" refers to the period between the termination of the occupation and the entry into force of the arrangements for the German defence contribution, if the two events are not simultaneous.

II. Procedure

It has been agreed that the Four Powers will sign, and if necessary under their respective constitutional procedures, ratify a Protocol which will bring into force all the Bonn Conventions, but which will delete or suitably amend out of date provisions.

---

1 This report was approved during the 14th Plenary meeting of the Nine-Power Conference. An earlier draft of this report, which was circulated as document NPC(54)42, is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 365.

2 Documentation concerning the Bonn Conventions of May 26, 1952, and their subsequent revision is presented in volume vii.
While parts of the Convention on Relations, and of the Settlement Convention as amended (together with subsidiary documents relating or [to] either of them) will continue in force without time limit, the Forces and the Finance Conventions, as amended, and the Tax Agreement (together with subsidiary documents relating to any of them) will apply only during a limited period. The Forces Convention will continue in force until the entry into force of a new agreement based on the N.A.T.O. Status Agreement, supplemented by such provisions as are necessary in view of the special conditions existing in regard to the forces stationed in the Federal Republic. The Finance Convention, as amended, will continue in force until the entry into force of new financial arrangements providing support costs for the allied forces in the Federal Republic. The negotiations for the new agreements on the status of forces and on financial arrangements will begin as soon as the N.A.T.O. Council has accepted in principle the arrangements for a German defence contribution.

III. Detailed Examination of the Conventions

Annex A to this Report sets out a complete list of those parts of the Bonn Conventions which it has been agreed shall be considered for deletion or amendment. Agreement has been reached on a considerable number of points which in the attached list are marked with asterisks. On a number of other points further discussion is required but there is no disagreement on major matters of principle.

In addition to the matters referred to in Annex A, the German Delegation indicated that they would be raising the question of External Assets subsequently, without however suggesting any amendment to the Conventions.

IV. Interim arrangements in respect of disarmament and demilitarisation controls

It has been agreed that, during the interim period, controls over demilitarisation and disarmament shall be maintained by the reservation and the appropriate exercise by the occupation authorities of their existing reserved powers in these fields. The controls are however to be applied by a joint four-power commission which is to act by majority vote. In making this reservation, the protocol is to provide that the four signatories will review the problem at the end of 1954 in the light of the situation then existing with regard to the entry into force of the arrangements for the termination of the occupation. At the same time they will review the exercise of the controls with a view to permitting preparation by the Federal Republic for its future defence contribution.

V. Declaration of Intent

The Declaration of Intent at Annex B is to be issued at the conclusion of the Nine Power Conference.
Annex A

Note: Agreed proposals are indicated by an asterisk *

CONVENTION ON RELATIONS

*Amend operative words of convention to refer to four parties
*Preamble. Delete.
*Article 1. Redraft as follows:

1. On the entry into force of this Treaty the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States will terminate the Occupation régime in the Federal Republic and will revoke the Occupation Statute and abolish the Allied High Commission and the offices of the Land Commissioners in the Federal Republic of Germany.

2. The Federal Republic shall have accordingly the full authority of a sovereign State over its internal and external affairs.

*Article 2(1) (a). The right to station armed forces shall be exercisable fully only during interim period, after consultation or with consent, as the case may be, if military situation permits, thereafter only for exercise of other two reserved rights.

Outside the matters covered by the Forces Convention (which shall apply to Allied Forces stationed in the Federal Republic after it enters into force and until replaced by new agreements), the existing powers for the protection of the security of such forces especially against external threats, will continue only until the Federal Government obtains similar powers under Federal legislation; but the existing powers will only be exercised if the Federal Government has been consulted, in so far as the military situation permits, and has agreed that the circumstances (including the lack of legal powers enabling the Federal Government itself to take the necessary action) require such exercise.

Article 2(2).
*Article 3(4). (Free to have diplomatic relations with such states).
*Article 4(2). See Article 2(1) (a).
Article 4(3).
*Article 4(4). Delete.

*Article 5. Substitute for emergency powers reserved right in respect of security to be exercised only until Federal Government has obtained similar powers for itself and if Federal Government agrees situation involving external threat requires it. (See Article 2(1) (a) above).

Paragraph 7. This paragraph to be replaced by an exchange of notes.
*Article 6(2). Delete second sentence, see Annex A below.
*Article 7(1) and 7(2). Delete reference to Three Powers.
*Article 7(3). Delete.

*Article 8(1). Forces and Finance Conventions limited to period until new arrangements.
*Article 8(2). Redraft without changing the substance.

Article 9. The Three Allied Delegations wish to keep the Tribunal. The German Delegation reserves its position.

Article 9(3). Redraft with reference to Article 5 and query jurisdiction of Tribunal.

*Article 10. Improve review clause.


*Annex A — Issue as separate declaration.

*Annex B — Review Article 11.

**FORCES CONVENTION**

Delete references to E.D.C. and make other consequential amendments.

Article 51 will have to be adjusted since the Convention’s duration is limited to a specified period.

**FINANCE CONVENTION**

*Delete or suitably amend all references to E.D.C.

A list of such deletions and amendments is being prepared.

*Appropriate amendment of dates.

*Article 3 — delete.

*Article 4.

The arrangements with regard to support costs should be as follows:

1. In the period between the termination of the occupation on the basis of the London understandings, and the entry into force of the arrangements for the German defence contribution, the Federal Republic will provide a monthly average contribution of DM 600 million for the support of the armed forces of other Powers stationed in the Federal territory; of this, DM 100 million a month will be earmarked for particular defence measures agreed jointly between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic. Expenditures for the N.A.T.O. Infrastructure Programme are included in this sum. Payment for claims for occupation damages can be included therein. The arrangement set out above will not in any case continue beyond June 30, 1955.

If the arrangements for the German defence contribution have not come into force before 30 June 1955 negotiations will take place between the four governments.

2. *(a)* During the first twelve months after the entry into force of the arrangements on the defence contribution of the Federal Republic, the Federal Government will make available for the support of the non-German forces stationed in the Federal territory a total amount of DM 3,200 millions. This amount shall be made available on the following schedule:

- DM 400 million a month for the first two months
- DM 300 million a month for the next four months
- DM 200 million a month for the last six months
If the arrangements for the defence contribution of the Federal Republic enter into force after the 1st of July 1955, this undertaking shall no longer apply, but negotiations shall take place between the Federal Republic and the Three Powers on the contribution of the Federal Republic to the support of the forces referred to for a period not exceeding 12 months. (b) The Three Powers recognise the right of the Federal German Republic to propose that the above arrangements on support costs be re-examined should it consider that the burden imposed by the build-up of the agreed German forces justifies such re-examination. In this event, the parties concerned will examine all the relevant factors and if found necessary will agree to amend the above arrangements on support costs. (c) In accordance with the spirit of Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty the Federal Government agrees that at the end of the period laid down in subparagraph (a) above they will be prepared to negotiate with other member governments of N.A.T.O. who have forces stationed in the Federal Republic in respect of questions relating to the support (for example goods and services) of those forces having regard to the requirements of the forces of the Federal Republic.

3. In view of its close connexion with support costs the Committee also discussed the question of occupation costs prior to the termination of the occupation regime in the Federal Republic. It has been agreed that the Federal Government will provide for a period of three months from the 1st of October an average monthly sum of DM 600 million for occupation costs and mandatory expenditures. The occupying powers undertake to make a consistent effort to ensure that the present carry over of unspent funds for occupation costs and mandatory expenditures will not increase and shall be substantially reduced as rapidly as possible. To this end the occupying powers will give appropriate instructions to their respective High Commissioners and to their stationed forces. The authorities of the three occupying Powers and the German authorities will cooperate fully for this purpose and will assist each other by exchanging relevant information and in any other appropriate ways. It was agreed that this undertaking should also be applicable in respect of the carryover during the interim period.

The substance of the last part of paragraph 3 of Article 4, and of paragraph 5 of the same Article suitably amended in accordance with subsequent arrangements, should be retained.

*Article 18 (1) delete

Article 19

The German Delegation desire the omission of this Article. The other delegations agree that subparagraph (a) requires review in the light of the changes to be made in Articles 3 and 4, but do not agree with the complete suppression of this Article.

**SETTLEMENT CONVENTION**

*Chapter 2. *Article 1. Delete. This Article to be replaced by a letter.

*Article 2. Delete.

*Article 3. Delete.
Articles 4–9. Delete, and substitute new provisions in Chapter 1 or in a new chapter on transitional provisions, which will ensure that the programme of deconcentration shall be carried out to the end. There shall be no provision against future reconcentration, since this is covered by the Coal and Steel Community Treaty.

Article 10. Delete. German legal opinion to be furnished.

Chapter 3. Article 3 (5) (a) (b) (c). Delete and exchange notes on comparable facilities.

Chapter 7. Article 1 (a) (b) (c). Delete.

Article 3. Delete.

Article 5. Delete.

Chapter 8 and Annex. Delete.

Chapter 10. Article 7. List can be reviewed.

Chapter 11. Delete this chapter. Insert a provision in Chapter 1 or in a new chapter on transitional provisions covering requisitioned property unless otherwise covered under German law. Exchange Notes on some of its subject matter.

Annex B

Declaration of Intent

Recognizing that a great country can no longer be deprived of the rights properly belonging to a free and democratic people, and

Desiring to associate the Federal Republic of Germany on a footing of equality with their efforts for peace and security;

The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America desire to end the Occupation regime as soon as possible.

The fulfilment of this policy calls for the settlement of problems of detail in order to liquidate the past and to prepare for the future, and requires the completion of appropriate Parliamentary procedures.

In the meantime, the Three Governments are instructing their High Commissioners to act forthwith in accordance with the spirit of the above policy. In particular, the High Commissioners will not use the powers which are to be relinquished unless in agreement with the Federal Government, except in the fields of disarmament and demilitarisation and in cases where the Federal Government has not been able for legal reasons to take the action or assume the obligations contemplated in the agreed arrangement.
Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference Held in London Between the Twenty-Eighth of September and the Third of October, Nineteen Hundred and Fifty-Four

The Conference of the Nine Powers, Belgium, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States met in London from Tuesday the Twenty-eighth of September, Nineteen hundred and Fifty-four, to Sunday the Third of October, Nineteen hundred and Fifty-four. It dealt with the most important issues facing the Western world, security and European integration within the framework of a developing Atlantic community dedicated to peace and freedom. In this connexion the Conference considered how to assure the full association of the Federal Republic of Germany with the West and the German Defence contribution.

Belgium was represented by His Excellency Monsieur P.-H. Spaak. Canada was represented by the Honourable L. B. Pearson. France was represented by His Excellency Monsieur P. Mendès-France. The Federal Republic of Germany was represented by His Excellency Dr. K. Adenauer. Italy was represented by His Excellency Professor G. Martino. Luxembourg was represented by His Excellency Monsieur J. Beck. The Netherlands was represented by His Excellency J. W. Beyen. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was represented by the Rt. Hon. A. Eden, M.C., M.P. The United States of America was represented by the Honourable J. F. Dulles.

All the decisions of the Conference formed part of one general settlement which is, directly or indirectly, of concern to all the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Powers, and which will therefore be submitted to the North Atlantic Council for information or decision.

I.—Germany

The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States declare that their policy is to end the Occupation régime in the Federal Republic as soon as possible, to revoke the Occupation Statute and to abolish the Allied High Commission. The Three Governments will continue to discharge certain responsibilities in Germany arising out of the international situation.

---

1 The source text is a certified copy of the Final Act which was transmitted to the Department of State in despatch 1933 from London, Jan. 7, 1955. The French and German texts have been omitted. The Final Act, which was approved at the 14th Plenary meeting of the Nine-Power Conference, was circulated at the Conference as document NPC(54)59. Earlier drafts of the Final Act are in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 365.
It is intended to conclude, and to bring into force as soon as the necessary parliamentary procedures have been completed, the appropriate instruments for these purposes. General agreement has already been reached on the content of these instruments, and representatives of the Four Governments will meet in the very near future to complete the final texts. The agreed arrangements may be put into effect either before or simultaneously with the arrangements for the German defence contribution.

As these arrangements will take a little time to complete, the Three Governments have in the meantime issued the following Declaration of Intent:

"Recognising that this great country can no longer be deprived of the rights properly belonging to a free and democratic people; and
"Desiring to associate the Federal Republic of Germany on a footing of equality with their efforts for peace and security:
"The Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America desire to end the Occupation régime as soon as possible.
"The fulfilment of this policy calls for the settlement of problems of detail in order to liquidate the past and to prepare for the future, and requires the completion of appropriate Parliamentary procedures.
"In the meantime, the Three Governments are instructing their High Commissioners to act forthwith in accordance with the spirit of the above policy. In particular, the High Commissioners will not use the powers which are to be relinquished unless in agreement with the Federal Government, except in the fields of disarmament and demilitarisation and in cases where the Federal Government has not been able for legal reasons to take the action or assume the obligations contemplated in the agreed arrangement."

II.—BRUSSELS TREATY

The Brussels Treaty will be strengthened and extended to make it a more effective focus of European integration.

For this purpose the following arrangements have been agreed upon:

(a) The Federal Republic of Germany and Italy will be invited to accede to the Treaty, suitably modified to emphasise the objective of European unity, and they have declared themselves ready to do so. The system of mutual automatic assistance in case of attack will thus be extended to the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy.

(b) The structure of the Brussels Treaty will be reinforced. In particular the Consultative Council provided in the Treaty will become a Council with powers of decision.

(c) The activities of the Brussels Treaty Organisation will be extended to include further important tasks as follows:

The size and general characteristics of the German defence contribution will conform to the contribution fixed for E.D.C.

The maximum defence contribution to N.A.T.O. of all members of the Brussels Treaty Organisation will be determined by a
special agreement fixing levels which can only be increased by unanimous consent.

The strength and armaments of the internal defence forces and the police on the Continent of the countries members of the Brussels Treaty Organisation will be fixed by agreements within that Organisation, having regard to their proper functions and to existing levels and needs.

The Brussels Treaty Powers agree to set up, as part of the Brussels Treaty Organisation, an Agency for the control of armaments on the Continent of Europe of the continental members of the Brussels Treaty Organisation. The detailed provisions are as follows:—

1. The functions of the Agency shall be:—

   (a) to ensure that the prohibition of the manufacture of certain types of armaments as agreed between the Brussels Powers is being observed;

   (b) to control the level of stocks held by each country on the Continent of the types of armaments mentioned in the following paragraph. This control shall extend to production and imports to the extent required to make the control of stocks effective.

2. The types of armament to be controlled under 1(b) above shall be:—

   (a) weapons in categories I, II and III listed in Annex II to Article 107 of the E.D.C. Treaty;

   (b) weapons in the other categories listed in Annex II to Article 107 of the E.D.C. Treaty;

   (c) a list of major weapons taken from Annex I to the same Article, to be established hereafter by an expert working group.

Measures will be taken to exclude from control materials and products in the above lists for civil use.

3. As regards the weapons referred to under paragraph 2(a) above, when the countries which have not given up the right to produce them have passed the experimental stage and start effective production, the level of stocks that they will be allowed to hold on the Continent shall be decided by the Brussels Treaty Council by a majority vote.

4. The continental members of the Brussels Treaty Organisation agree not to build up stocks nor to produce the armaments mentioned in paragraph 2 (b) and (c) beyond the limits required (a) for the equipment of their forces, taking into account any imports including external aid, and (b) for export.

5. The requirements for their N.A.T.O. forces shall be established on the basis of the results of the Annual Review and the recommendations of the N.A.T.O. military authorities.

6. For forces remaining under national control, the level of stocks must correspond to the size and mission of those forces. That level shall be notified to the Agency.
7. All imports or exports of the controlled arms will be notified to the Agency.

8. The Agency will operate through the collation and examination of statistical and budgetary data. It will undertake test checks and will make such visits and inspections as may be required to fulfil its functions as defined in paragraph 1 above.

9. The basic rules of procedure for the Agency shall be laid down in a Protocol to the Brussels Treaty.

10. If the Agency finds that the prohibitions are not being observed, or that the appropriate level of stocks is being exceeded, it will so inform the Brussels Council.

11. The Agency will report and be responsible to the Brussels Council which will take its decisions by a majority vote on questions submitted by the Agency.

12. The Brussels Council will make an Annual Report on its activities concerning the control of armaments to the Delegates of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

13. The Governments of the United States of America and Canada will notify the Brussels Treaty Organisation of the military aid to be distributed to the continental members of that Organisation. The Organisation may make written observations.

14. The Brussels Council will establish a Working Group in order to study the draft directive presented by the French Government and any other papers which may be submitted on the subject of armaments production and standardisation.

15. The Brussels Treaty Powers have taken note of the following Declaration of the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and record their agreement with it:

The Federal Chancellor declares:

that the Federal Republic undertakes not to manufacture in its territory any atomic weapons, chemical weapons or biological weapons, as detailed in paragraphs I, II and III of the attached list;

that it undertakes further not to manufacture in its territory such weapons as those detailed in paragraphs IV, V and VI of the attached list. Any amendment to or cancellation of the substance of paragraphs IV, V and VI can, on the request of the Federal Republic, be carried out by a resolution of the Brussels Council of Ministers by a two-thirds majority, if in accordance with the needs of the armed forces a request is made by the competent supreme Commander of N.A.T.O.;

that the Federal Republic agrees to supervision by the competent authority of the Brussels Treaty Organisation to ensure that these undertakings are observed.
LIST APPENDED TO THE DECLARATION BY THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR

This list comprises the weapons defined in paragraphs I to VI and the factories earmarked solely for their production. All apparatus, parts, equipment, installations, substances and organisms which are used for civilian purposes or for scientific, medical and industrial research in the fields of pure and applied science shall be excluded from this definition.

I.—Atomic Weapons

(a) An atomic weapon is defined as any weapon which contains, or is designed to contain or utilise, nuclear fuel or radioactive isotopes and which, by explosion or other uncontrolled nuclear transformation of the nuclear fuel, or by radioactivity of the nuclear fuel or radioactive isotopes, is capable of mass destruction, mass injury or mass poisoning.

(b) Furthermore, any part, device, assembly or material especially designed for, or primarily useful in, any weapon as set forth under paragraph (a), shall be deemed to be an atomic weapon.

(c) Nuclear fuel as used in the preceding definition includes plutonium, Uranium 233, Uranium 235 (including Uranium 235 contained in Uranium enriched to over 21 per cent. by weight of Uranium 235) and any other material capable of releasing substantial quantities of atomic energy through nuclear fission or fusion or other nuclear reaction of the material. The foregoing materials are considered to be nuclear fuel regardless of the chemical or physical form in which they exist.

II.—Chemical Weapons

(a) A chemical weapon is defined as any equipment or apparatus expressly designed to use, for military purposes, the asphyxiating, toxic, irritant, paralysant, growth-regulating, anti-lubricating or catalyzing properties of any chemical substance.

(b) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (c), chemical substances, having such properties and capable of being used in the equipment or apparatus referred to in paragraph (a), shall be deemed to be included in this definition.

(c) Such equipment or apparatus and such quantities of the chemical substances as are referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) which do not exceed peaceful civilian requirements shall be deemed to be excluded from this definition.

III.—Biological Weapons

(a) A biological weapon is defined as any equipment or apparatus expressly designed to use, for military purposes, harmful insects or other living or dead organisms, or their toxic products.

(b) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (c), insects, organisms
and their toxic products of such nature and in such amounts as to make them capable of being used in the equipment of apparatus referred to in (a) shall be deemed to be included in this definition.

(c) Such equipment or apparatus and such quantities of the insects, organisms and their toxic products as are referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) which do not exceed peaceful civilian requirements shall be deemed to be excluded from the definition of biological weapons.

IV.—Long-range Missiles, Guided Missiles, and Influence Mines

(a) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (d), long-range missiles and guided missiles are defined as missiles such that the velocity or direction of motion can be influenced after the instant of launch by a device or mechanism inside or outside the missile, including V-type weapons developed in the recent war and subsequent modifications thereof. Combustion is considered as mechanism which may influence the velocity.

(b) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (d), influence mines are defined as naval mines which can be exploded automatically by influences which emanate solely from external sources, including influence mines developed in the recent war and subsequent modifications thereof.

(c) Parts, devices or assemblies specially designed for use in or with the weapons referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) shall be deemed to be included in these definitions.

(d) Proximity fuses, and short-range guided missiles for anti-aircraft defence with the following maximum characteristics, are regarded as excluded from this definition:

- Length, 2 metres;
- Diameter, 30 centimetres;
- Velocity, 660 metres per second;
- Ground range, 32 kilometres;
- Weight of war-head, 22·5 kilogrammes.

V.—Warships, with the Exception of Smaller Ships for Defence Purposes

"Warships, with the exception of smaller ships for defence purposes" are:

(a) Warships of more than 3,000 tons displacement.
(b) Submarines of more than 350 tons displacement.
(c) All warships which are driven by means other than steam, Diesel or petrol engines or by gas turbines or by jet engines.

VI.—Bomber Aircraft for Strategic Purposes

The closest possible co-operation with N.A.T.O. shall be established in all fields.
The United States Secretary of State set forth the willingness of the United States to continue its support for European unity, in accordance with the following statement:

“If, using the Brussels Treaty as a nucleus, it is possible to find in this new pattern a continuing hope of unity among the countries of Europe that are represented here, and if the hopes that were tied into the European Defence Community Treaty can reasonably be transferred into the arrangements which will be the outgrowth of this meeting, then I would certainly be disposed to recommend to the President that he should renew the assurance offered last spring in connection with the European Defence Community Treaty to the effect that the United States will continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany, such units of its armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defence of the North Atlantic area while a threat to the area exists and will continue to deploy such forces in accordance with agreed North Atlantic strategy for the defence of this area.”

The United Kingdom confirmed its active participation in the Brussels Treaty Organisation and gave the following assurance about the maintenance of United Kingdom forces on the continent of Europe:

“The United Kingdom will continue to maintain on the mainland of Europe, including Germany, the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces now assigned to SACEUR, four divisions and the Tactical Air Force, or whatever SACEUR regards as equivalent fighting capacity. The United Kingdom undertakes not to withdraw those forces against the wishes of the majority of the Brussels Treaty Powers, who should take their decision in the knowledge of SACEUR’s views.

“This undertaking would be subject to the understanding that an acute overseas emergency might oblige Her Majesty’s Government to omit this procedure.

“If the maintenance of United Kingdom forces on the mainland of Europe throws at any time too heavy a strain on the external finances of the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom will invite the North Atlantic Council to review the financial conditions on which the formations are maintained.”

Canada reaffirmed in the following statement its resolve to discharge the continuing obligations arising out of its membership in N.A.T.O. and its support of the objective of European unity:

“As far as we are concerned, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation remains the focal point of our participation in collective defence and of our hope for the development of closer co-operation with the other peoples of the Atlantic community. As such, it remains a foundation of Canadian foreign policy. While we emphasise, then, our belief in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, we welcome the proposed extension of the Brussels Treaty. We shall look forward to a growing
relationship, within the framework of N.A.T.O., with the new Brussels Treaty Organisation, composed of countries with whom we are already bound by such close ties."

IV.—NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION

The powers present at the Conference which are members of N.A.T.O. agreed to recommend at the next ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council that the Federal Republic of Germany should forthwith be invited to become a member.

They further agreed to recommend to N.A.T.O. that its machinery be reinforced in the following respects:

(a) All forces of N.A.T.O. countries stationed on the Continent of Europe shall be placed under the authority of SACEUR, with the exception of those which N.A.T.O. has recognised or will recognise as suitable to remain under national command.

(b) Forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent shall be deployed in accordance with N.A.T.O. strategy.

(c) The location of such forces shall be determined by SACEUR after consultation and agreement with the national authorities concerned.

(d) Such forces shall not be redeployed on the Continent nor used operationally on the Continent without his consent, subject to appropriate political guidance from the North Atlantic Council.

(e) Forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent shall be integrated as far as possible consistent with military efficiency.

(f) Arrangements shall be made for the closer co-ordination of logistics by SACEUR.

(g) The level and effectiveness of forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent and the armaments and equipment, logistics, and reserve formations of those forces on the Continent shall be inspected by SACEUR.

The Conference recorded the view of all the governments represented that the North Atlantic Treaty should be regarded as of indefinite duration.

V.—DECLARATION BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY AND JOINT DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF FRANCE, UNITED KINGDOM AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The following declarations were recorded at the Conference by the German Federal Chancellor and by the Foreign Ministers of France, United Kingdom and United States of America:

DECLARATION BY FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

The Federal Republic of Germany has agreed to conduct its policy in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and accepts the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter.

Upon her accession to the North Atlantic Treaty and the Brussels Treaty, the Federal Republic of Germany declares that she will refrain
from any action inconsistent with the strictly defensive character of the two treaties. In particular the Federal Republic of Germany undertakes never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the Federal Republic of Germany, and to resolve by peaceful means any disputes which may arise between the Federal Republic and other States.

DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic,

Being resolved to devote their efforts to the strengthening of peace in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in particular with the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter

(i) to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered;
(ii) to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;
(iii) to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter, and to refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the United Nations take preventive or enforcement action;
(iv) to ensure that States which are not members of the United Nations act in accordance with the principles of the Charter so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Having regard to the purely defensive character of the Atlantic Alliance which is manifest in the North Atlantic Treaty, wherein they reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and undertake to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the principles of the Charter and to refrain, in accordance with those principles, from the threat or use of force in their international relations,

Take note that the Federal Republic of Germany has by a Declaration dated the Third of October, Nineteen hundred and Fifty Four accepted the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and has undertaken never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the Federal Republic of Germany, and to resolve by peaceful means any disputes which may arise between the Federal Republic and other states:
Declare That

1. They consider the Government of the Federal Republic as the only German Government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs.

2. In their relations with the Federal Republic they will follow the principles set out in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter.

3. A peace settlement for the whole of Germany, freely negotiated between Germany and her former enemies, which should lay the foundation of a lasting peace, remains an essential aim of their policy. The final determination of the boundaries of Germany must await such a settlement.

4. The achievement through peaceful means of a fully free and unified Germany remains a fundamental goal of their policy.

5. The security and welfare of Berlin and the maintenance of the position of the Three Powers there are regarded by the Three Powers as essential elements of the peace of the free world in the present international situation. Accordingly they will maintain armed forces within the territory of Berlin as long as their responsibilities require it. They therefore reaffirm that they will treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves.

6. They will regard as a threat to their own peace and safety any recourse to force which in violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter threatens the integrity and unity of the Atlantic alliance or its defensive purposes. In the event of any such action, the three Governments, for their part, will consider the offending government as having forfeited its rights to any guarantee and any military assistance provided for in the North Atlantic Treaty and its protocols. They will act in accordance with Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty with a view to taking other measures which may be appropriate.

7. They will invite the association of other member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation with this Declaration.

VI.—Future Procedure

The Conference agreed that representatives of the governments concerned should work out urgently the texts of detailed agreements to give effect to the principles laid down above. These will be submitted where appropriate, to the North Atlantic Council, and to the four Governments directly concerned with the future status of the Federal Republic. The Conference hoped that it would be possible to hold a ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council on the Twenty-second of October to decide on the arrangements affecting N.A.T.O. This will be preceded by meetings of the four Foreign Ministers on the question of German sovereignty and of the nine Foreign Ministers.
THE GERMAN PROBLEM

These agreements and arrangements constitute a notable contribution to world peace. A Western Europe is now emerging which, resting on the close association of the United Kingdom with the Continent and on the growing friendship between the participating countries, will reinforce the Atlantic community. The system elaborated by the Conference will further the development of European unity and integration.

The following documents are annexed to and form part of the Final Act:—

Draft Declaration and Draft Protocol to the Brussels Treaty.
Full text of statements by Mr. Dulles, Mr. Eden and Mr. Pearson at the Fourth Plenary Meeting on the Twenty-ninth of September.
Conference Paper on "A German Defence contribution and arrangements to apply to SACEUR's forces on the Continent."

In witness whereof the Representatives have signed this Final Act.

Done in London this Third day of October, 1954, in a single copy, in English, French and German, all three texts being equally authoritative. The original texts will be deposited with the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which shall transmit certified copies thereof to each Government represented at the Conference.

For Belgium: P. H. SPAAK
For Canada: L. B. PEARSON
For the Federal Republic of Germany: ADENAUER
For France: P. MENDÈS-FRANCE
For Italy: G. MARTINO
For Luxembourg: JOS. BECH
For the Netherlands: J. W. BEYEN
For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: ANTHONY EDEN
For the United States of America: JOHN FOSTER DULLES

Annex I

Draft Declaration Inviting Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany To Accede to the Brussels Treaty

The Governments of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, parties to the Brussels Treaty of 17th March, 1948, for collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters and for legitimate collective self-defence;

Aware that the principles underlying the association created by the Brussels Treaty are also recognised and applied by the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy;
Noting with satisfaction that their devotion to peace and their allegiance to democratic institutions constitute common bonds between the countries of Western Europe;

Convinced that an association with the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy would represent a new and substantial advance in the direction already indicated by the Treaty;

Decide

In application of Article IX of the Treaty, to invite the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy to accede to the Brussels Treaty, as revised and completed by the Protocol and [list of agreements and documents] of

DRAFT PROTOCOL TO THE BRUSSELS TREATY

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands and Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Parties to the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-defence, signed at Brussels on March 17th, 1948, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, on the one hand,

and the President of the Federal Republic of Germany and the President of the Italian Republic on the other hand,

inspired by a common will to strengthen peace and security,

desirous to this end of promoting the unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe,

convinced that the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Republic to the Treaty will represent a new and substantial advance towards these aims:

Have appointed, &c.  

Have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE I

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Republic hereby accede to the Treaty, as revised and completed by the present Protocol and the [list of agreements and documents.]†

ARTICLE II

(a) The sub-paragraph of the Preamble to the Treaty “to take such

*These agreements and documents will be specified in the final text. [Brackets and footnote in the source text.]

†These agreements and documents will be specified in the final text. [Brackets and footnote in the source text.]

"Omission in source text."
steps as may be held necessary in the event of renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression" shall be modified to read:—

"to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe."

(b) the following new article shall be inserted in the Treaty as Article IV:—

"IV. In execution of the Treaty the High Contracting Parties and any organs established by them under the Treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation."

The present Article IV of the Treaty and the succeeding articles shall be renumbered accordingly.

(c) Article VIII, formerly Article VII, of the Treaty, shall read:—

"For the purpose of consulting together on all questions dealt with in the present Treaty and its Protocol and the agreements and other documents set out in Article I above and of strengthening peace and security and of promoting unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe and closer co-operation between member states and with other European organisations, the High Contracting Parties will create a Council, which shall be so organised as to be able to exercise its functions continuously. The Council shall meet at such times as it shall deem fit.

"At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties, the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit the High Contracting Parties to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or with regard to any situation constituting a danger to economic stability."

**ARTICLE III**

The present Protocol and the agreements set out in Article I above shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Belgian Government. They shall enter into force upon the date of deposit of the last instrument of ratification.

Annex II A

**Extemporaneous Statement by the United States Secretary of State (the Hon. John Foster Dulles) at the Fourth Plenary Meeting**

Mr. Chairman, at the time when we thought that the European Defence Community Treaty would promptly be put to a vote of the French Parliament—that was some time last Spring—the United States indicated that it would be prepared to make a declaration with respect to its intentions as to the maintenance of armed forces in Europe in the event that the European Defence Community Treaty should come into force. The text of that message was communicated to
the six nations that were signatory to the European Defence Community Treaty, and also to the United Kingdom. The essence of that declaration was that the United States would continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany, such units of its armed forces as may be necessary to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defence of the North Atlantic area while the threat to that area exists, and that we would continue to maintain such forces in accordance with the agreed North Atlantic strategy for the defence of this area.

There were other provisions of that Declaration, in fact there were six, one of which related to treating the North Atlantic Treaty as a treaty of indefinite duration, rather than only for a fixed period of years.

I do not need, I think, to read the full text of that Declaration, because it has, as I say, been communicated to all of the Governments who are represented here. You doubtless are already familiar with, and can readily consult, the text which was sent to your at that time.

That Declaration was made, as I say, in anticipation of the coming into force of the European Defence Community Treaty. The Declaration was made after consultation with the leaders of both parties in the Congress of the United States. It would have been as solemn and definitive an obligation as the United States is constitutionally capable of making in this matter.

I should perhaps explain that under our constitutional system the President of the United States is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States, and as such has the right to determine their disposition. That is a right which cannot be impaired by action by the Congress. Also, while Congress has no authority to deprive the President of his right as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces to make such disposition of those forces as he believes to be in the interest of the security of the United States, it is equally the case that one President of the United States is not constitutionally able to bind his successors in this matter. Each President of the United States comes into office enjoying the right to dispose of the armed forces of the United States as he thinks best serves the interests of the United States in accordance with the advice which he gets from his military advisers. Therefore it is not constitutionally possible for the United States by treaty, by law or any other way to make a legally binding, fixed commitment to maintain any predetermined quota of armed forces in any particular part of the world for any particular period of time. It is nevertheless possible for the President to define a policy which in his opinion makes it appropriate to maintain certain elements of the armed forces of the United States in certain areas in pursuance of that policy. And if the policy is a basic and fundamental one it is extremely unlikely that that allocation of forces would be altered.

Now, this Declaration that I refer to was designed to involve an
exercise, to the fullest degree possible under our constitutional system, of the determination of our Government to support the European Defence Community by contributing armed forces which would be subject to integration with its forces, and that declaration was made with the confidence that the policy that it reflected would be pursued because of the very great interest which the United States has in the creation of unity in Europe, and the fact that our nation has historically shown its willingness to make tremendous contributions if, in its opinion, that will aid in the real unification of Europe.

I might recall that the European Recovery Plan—the Marshall Plan as it was called—was made pursuant to a Congressional Act which said that the purpose was to promote the unification of Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty was an engagement which was quite unprecedented for the United States—it was quite unprecedented for the United States to make that kind of long range alliance with other countries. That was directly contrary to our earlier policies which had been pursued for over 100 years. That action was taken only after the European countries themselves had first come together under this Brussels Treaty which we are talking about so much to-day. It was the encouragement which came from that which very largely led to our going on and joining in the commitments of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The first action taken to provide military aid to Europe was under the Military Defence Assistance Act of 1949. The language of it was that it was designed to promote the integration of the defence of Europe. I think that the history of our action, both our positive action and negative action, shows that we respond in many ways like a barometer to the climate which exists in Europe. If the climate is one of unity and cohesion, our assistance and aid of every kind goes out. If the climate is one of dissension, disunity, revival of threats of war, perpetuation of the cycle of recurrent war, then our tendency is to withdraw.

The declaration which we felt able to make in support of the European Defence Community was on the assumption that that was a permanent act which would tie together organically the countries of Europe which in the past have been separate and among whom war has been bred. We felt that it tied them together so permanently, so organically, that we could regard that old chapter as a closed chapter and could hopefully commit our strength to Europe in the confidence that our soldiers over here in Europe would be in a structure which was safe and sound; that we were not putting our troops in the midst of what has historically been the world’s worst fire hazard.

Now a committal of that character is not lightly made, and I would say in all frankness that as the situation stands to-day it would not be possible for the President of the United States to renew that com-
ittal. There has been a great wave of disillusionment which has swept over the United States—and it is particularly manifest in the Congress—a great wave of disillusionment over what has happened, and a feeling that after all the situation in Europe is pretty hopeless and the United States had better not make any long-term committals to be part of it.

That conclusion is so disastrous in my opinion—both for the nations of Europe and for the United States—that I hope most ardently that what is done here will make it possible to come to a different conclusion, and that it will change the atmosphere, the feeling, in the United States to a degree which will permit of a renewal of the pledge by the United States to maintain in Europe such elements of its armed forces as may be necessary or appropriate to contribute our fair share of what is needed for the common defence of this North Atlantic area while the threat to that area exists. I cannot say at this moment that a renewal of that commitment is possible. I can say, and must repeat, that as things stand to-day it is not possible. But if, out of the elements of the situation with which we are dealing, if using the Brussels Treaty as a nucleus, it is possible to find in this new pattern a continuing hope of unity among the countries of Europe that are represented here, and if the hopes that were tied into the European Defence Community Treaty can reasonably be transferred into the arrangements which will be the outgrowth of this meeting, then I would certainly be disposed to recommend to the President that he should renew a pledge comparable to that which was offered in connexion with the European Defence Community Treaty.

Obviously the context of the pledge would have to be changed, because in the form which was given it related distinctively to the European Defence Community Treaty. Just what re-phrasing would be required to give it the “new look” that would be appropriate to the new situation, that is a matter which I have not studied, and which could not usefully be studied until we know whether or not a promise of genuine and durable unity will come out of the deliberations of this gathering and those which may succeed it.

That, Mr. Chairman, is as clear a statement as I can make to-day of the position of my Government in relation to this matter. We are extremely anxious to contribute all that we can from a material and constitutional standpoint to promote the kind of unification which will above all end a situation which has led to recurrent wars which have weakened and drained the Western nations so that our whole Western civilisation is in jeopardy as never before in a thousand years. In reason you can count on us. I think that what we have done since the end of the war in terms of economic contribution, military contributions, the willingness to contribute our best and ablest brains in terms of both military and economic matters, all of that I think is a proof which
cannot be challenged as to what our disposition is in this matter. You can be confident that that disposition will be reflected by genuine support to the extent that is appropriate if there is, on this side, the movement toward unity, if there is a beacon light still ahead, if we do not feel that we have come to a watershed where efforts toward unity finally are ended and we are going down on the other side into the abyss of continued disunity.

I do not think that is going to happen. I know it is within our power here to be sure that it does not happen. If it does not happen, then you can count on the United States acting in support of what the European countries do. I believe that you will find that the American flag, with all it symbolises, will continue to fly alongside of your own here in Europe.

Annex II B

STATEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM SECRETARY OF STATE (THE RIGHT HON. ANTHONY EDEN, M.P.) AT THE FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Gentlemen, I think we all feel that we have just listened to a statement from the United States Secretary of State of very rare quality and much valued frankness. What he has said to us, those of us who are European, is I think all that in present conditions we could possibly expect from the United States.

As we survey these post-war years we, I fear, too readily at times take for granted what this generous brother has done for us in Europe at a time when but for his help all must have collapsed in confusion and, perhaps, into Communism also. On behalf of the country I represent here, I would like to assure him that what the United States has done are not "All good deeds past, forgot as soon as done"—but will be remembered with thankfulness, and not for our own sakes alone. So I would like to tell Mr. Foster Dulles that the words he has said, so far as our Government are concerned, will be examined with gratitude and with understanding, and that we shall do our best—I believe this conference will do its best—to prove worthy of that greater confidence the United States will show as we establish our ability to prove our unity and our strength.

Now in all this I am conscious that my own country has a part to play. I do not want to go back over the full history of past declarations and past undertakings, though there are perhaps one or two that I ought to mention if the setting of what I want to say this afternoon is to be understood. We gave, as the United States Government gave, a series of undertakings to the E.D.C. We gave them by treaty, we gave them by agreement, we gave them by declarations, and as I have already informed my colleagues we stand by those undertakings, and we are ready to reaffirm them. They are not, I think, unimportant,
but some of them are, it is true, inapplicable in the absence of E.D.C. Some of those that have as a result of the disappearance of E.D.C. now disappeared may, and probably will, be covered by the proposals which this conference is now considering. The provision of automatic military assistance, for instance, which was contained in our treaty with E.D.C. will be reproduced, I trust, by the proposed enlargement of the Brussels Treaty. Co-operation between the armed forces, the deployment and integration of those forces, consultation about the level of forces, will all now take place, though perhaps within a different framework.

I am very conscious, and so are my colleagues, that there is one particular plane on which many of you here would wish us to make our position clearer, and where if we were able to do so it might assist the work of this conference. This relates to the maintenance of British forces on the continent of Europe, and in respect of that I have a new proposal to put to my colleagues. The United Kingdom will continue to maintain on the mainland of Europe, including Germany, the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces now assigned to SACEUR—four divisions and the tactical Air Force—or whatever SACEUR regards as equivalent fighting capacity.

The United Kingdom undertakes not to withdraw those forces against the wishes of the majority of the Brussels Treaty Powers, who should take their decision in the knowledge of SACEUR’s views. This undertaking would be subject to the understanding that an acute overseas emergency might oblige Her Majesty’s Government to omit this procedure. If the maintenance of United Kingdom forces on the mainland of Europe throws at any time too heavy a strain on the external finances of the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom will invite the North Atlantic Council to review the financial conditions on which the formations are maintained.

My colleagues will realise that what I have announced is for us a very formidable step to take. You all know that ours is above all an island story. We are still an island people in thought and tradition, whatever the modern facts of weapons and strategy may compel. And it has been not without considerable reflection that the Government which I represent here has decided that this statement could be made to you this afternoon. I want only to add this: we are making it in just the same spirit as Mr. Dulles spoke just now, because we hope that by doing so we shall make a contribution to enable this conference to succeed, and recreate confidence on this European Continent and make it possible for us to show an example of unity to the world. Of course, you will understand that what we have just said, and the undertaking we are prepared to give, does depend on the outcome of our work. If we succeed here then this undertaking stands; if we do not, Her Majesty’s Government could not regard itself as committed to what
I have said this afternoon. That applies to the whole of our work, all the work that we are doing here. So I can only conclude by saying I hope the conference will consider that what we have said will be a contribution to bring us at least a stage nearer the successful conclusion of our labours.

Annex II C

STATEMENT BY THE CANADIAN MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (THE HON. LESTER PEARSON) AT THE FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Mr. Chairman, this item on the agenda, which I apologise for returning to, item 5, is headed “United Kingdom and United States Declarations”. I assume that under it I would be quite in order in expressing great appreciation for the statements which have been made by you and by Mr. Dulles this afternoon, and I hope I would not be ruled out of order if I make a short declaration on behalf of my own country.

Your statement, Mr. Chairman, if I may say so, was one of historic importance. If it is thought, as it sometimes is, that the United Kingdom looks across the Channel more intensely in war than in peacetime, that feeling certainly must have been removed by your statement earlier this afternoon. To me it was all the more impressive because I recognise that the source of the power and the glory of this island has been its vision across the seas.

The statement of Mr. Dulles was also important, not only for the development of European unity, but for that larger Atlantic Community development with which we are all concerned. Indeed, as I see it, European unity cannot be effectively secured unless the lines not only across the Channel but across the Atlantic are strong and unbroken. My country has a part to play in this Atlantic aspect of the problem. Therefore, we accept the continuing obligations arising out of our membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and we are resolved to continue to do our best to discharge them. The disappearance of E.D.C. does not, we think, affect those obligations, because E.D.C.—though we were indeed disappointed in its disappearance—because E.D.C., as we saw it, was a means to an end and not an end in itself. We are here to find an alternative method to accomplish the same purpose. That alternative method, that alternative arrangement, must include the association of Germany not only with the defence of Europe and the West, but—and this is, I am sure, equally important—with the development of the Atlantic Community; an association to be brought about in such a way that the fears that we have inherited from the unhappy past will be replaced by a new and better hope for the future.
So new methods are being discussed this week and new solutions are being sought. As far as we are concerned, however, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation remains the focal point of our participation in collective defence and of our hope for the development of closer cooperation with the other peoples of the Atlantic community. As such, it remains a foundation of Canadian foreign policy. Indeed, enduring and whole-hearted support for N.A.T.O. is for us a policy above polities on which I think our friends can rely.

That support in defence matters is now worked out each year by consultation through the appropriate agencies of our organisation—that is, N.A.T.O. Apart from mutual aid, it now takes the form of naval forces, an infantry brigade group, and an air division of twelve jet fighter squadrons stationed in Europe. We will continue to assist in the common defence through the existing N.A.T.O. procedures until better ones are agreed on. The presence of these Canadian forces on the European continent is not only a measure of our military contribution to the common defence, but an evidence of our belief in the future of the North Atlantic Community.

While we emphasise, then, our belief in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, we welcome the proposed extension of the Brussels Treaty. We shall look forward to a growing relationship within the framework of N.A.T.O. to the Brussels Treaty countries with whom we are bound by such close ties.

We are sure, and I hope our confidence will be realised—I know it will—that these new arrangements through Brussels can be developed without weakening or diminishing N.A.T.O. in any way in its essential functions, because N.A.T.O., with Germany associated with it under agreed arrangements, should, we think, be a stronger force than ever against war, and for the progressive development of the Atlantic Community.

We are also certain, Mr. Chairman, that in this development the United States, which has played such a magnificent, generous and indeed essential part, will continue to be able to do so. Mr. Dulles has given us hope in that regard this afternoon.

We Canadians, being neighbours of the United States, know as well as anybody else, that that country does not fail to accept and to meet, successfully, any great international challenge which faces it. We are certain that in the days ahead it will continue to meet the challenge of assisting in the development of European unity and the Atlantic Community—and the two go together.

The work, then, which we are doing this week must, in order to succeed, make possible the continued contribution of the United States to these great objectives. If that is done, and I know it is going to be
done, it will also, I assure you, make it much easier for my own country
to continue to do its share.

Annex III

CONFERENCE PAPER ON "A GERMAN DEFENCE CONTRIBUTION AND
ARRANGEMENTS TO APPLY TO SACEUR'S FORCES ON THE CONTINENT"

The nine Governments represented at the London Conference agree
to instruct representatives to draw up in Paris, in concert with the
military and civilian agencies of N.A.T.O. through the Secretary
General, detailed proposals, for approval by the North Atlantic Coun-
cil, for a German defence contribution and arrangements to be applied
to SACEUR's forces on the Continent. These detailed proposals shall
be based on the following principles agreed between the nine
Governments:—

1.—(a) The seven Brussels Treaty Powers will conclude a special
agreement setting out the forces each of them will place under
SACEUR on the Continent.
(b) The German contribution shall conform in size and general
characteristics to the contribution fixed for the E.D.C. brought up to
date and adapted as necessary to make it suitable for N.A.T.O.
(c) The terms of this special agreement will be agreed with the
other N.A.T.O. countries.
(d) If at any time the N.A.T.O. Annual Review recommends an
increase above the figures in the Brussels Special Agreement such in-
crease will require the unanimous approval of the Brussels powers ex-
pressed in the Brussels Council or in N.A.T.O.
(e) The Brussels Powers will ask that arrangements be made for
SACEUR to designate a high-ranking officer who will be instructed
to transmit regularly to the Brussels Treaty Organisation information
acquired as indicated in 3(f) below in order to permit that Organisa-
tion to establish that the figures agreed among the Brussels Powers are
being observed.

2. All forces of N.A.T.O. countries stationed on the Continent of
Europe shall be placed under the authority of SACEUR, with the
exception of the forces which N.A.T.O. has recognised or will rec-
ognise as suitable to remain under national command. The strength and
armaments on the Continent of the internal defence forces and of the
police belonging to the members of the Brussels Treaty Organisation
shall be fixed by agreements made within this Organisation, taking
into account the task for which they are intended and on the basis of
existing levels and needs.

3. Arrangements to apply to SACEUR's forces
(a) Forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent shall be de-
ployed in accordance with N.A.T.O. strategy.
(b) The location of such forces shall be determined by SACEUR
after consultation and agreement with the national authorities
concerned.
(c) Such forces shall not be redeployed on the Continent nor used operationally on the Continent without his consent subject to appropriate political guidance from the North Atlantic Council.

(d) Forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent shall be integrated as far as possible consistent with military efficiency.

(e) Arrangements shall be made for the closer co-ordination of logistics by SACEUR.

(f) The level and effectiveness of forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent and the armaments, equipment, logistics and reserve formations of those forces on the Continent shall be inspected by SACEUR.

3. CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE MEETINGS

396.1 LO/9-2954

The Secretary of State to the President

LONDON, September 29, 1954.

[Dear Mr. President:] Have just come from today’s afternoon session of Nine-Power Conference, which was very impressive and moving occasion. The topic was the attitude which the US and UK would take toward the new proposed set-up. I spoke extemporaneously to the general theme of intense US interest in unity in Europe and that we supported it whenever it was a reasonable prospect and turned away when Europe showed signs of disintegration. I said that under present conditions it would be impossible for you to make the declaration which you had made with reference to EDC in terms of intention of continuing US participation in defense of Europe. I concluded by saying, however, that if new and reasonable hopes developed out of the meeting here, then I would recommend your making commitments similar to what had been projected in relation to EDC. Eden followed with appreciation of my statement and of what US had done, and then followed with an expression of willingness, subject satisfactory outcome this conference, definitely to commit for life of Brussels Treaty four British divisions and tactical air force to continental defense unless released by majority vote of Brussels Treaty Council.

This was regarded, and I think rightly, by other countries as an historical decision tying England to the continent in a way which has never been done before. The seven other countries made responses which were expressive of profound appreciation except that the
response of Mendes-France, while formally correct, was somewhat grudging and lacking in the spirit which animated the others. I think he feels that our two statements, and notably the British statement, create a situation which makes it almost impossible for France to reject a reasonable settlement of the conditions which would make possible the admission of Germany to NATO and the creation of European unity with some supranational features on basis of Brussels Treaty.

Earlier today Mendes-France had come to see me privately at my residence, primarily to emphasize that for him to recommend admission of Germany to NATO was a most difficult step in face of his parliament, and that if he was prepared to do this, he must in effect be able to write all other features of arrangement.

We are now at a stage where the experts are preparing various drafts. The most difficult point remains the so-called "arms pool", which many feel is desired by France in order to exclude Ruhr industrialists from participation in arms industry and to concentrate that industry in France.

Spaak, speaking for Belgium, proposed that the Brussels Treaty should be made co-terminus with the North Atlantic Treaty which is a good formula which lets us off the hook of the former proposal that we should make the North Atlantic Treaty co-terminus with the Brussels Treaty or EDC, both of which were for a minimum of fifty years as against a minimum of twenty years for the North Atlantic Treaty.

Last night Winston gave dinner for the nine Foreign Ministers and their Ambassadors. It was an intimate and cordial affair which gave useful opportunity for private exchanges of views and direct talk between Adenauer and Mendes-France. Adenauer was seated at Winston’s right and Mendes-France at his left.

I think it would be both appropriate and helpful if you would send a personal message to Winston expressing appreciation at the contribution which Britain is prepared to make to advance European unity. He has been very reluctant to move without parallel commitment by US. I have explained to him that this was constitutionally impossible, but that I was confident he could count on our not abandoning Europe as long as it was moving toward unity and as long as the British troops were on the continent. If you could say something along these lines and commend him and Eden for their enlightened statesmanship, this would, I think, be desirable.

Best regards.

Foster

\[^1\] For a summary of this afternoon meeting between Dulles and Mendes-France, see the memorandum of conversation by Merchant, dated Sept. 29, p. 1308.
President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Churchill

DENVER, COLORADO, September 30, 1954.

DEAR WINSTON: Foster has kept me informed on the progress of the talks now going forward in the Nine-Power Conference. Both officially and personally I am most deeply appreciative of the contribution that Britain has offered to make to advance European unity.

Of course I understand fully your reluctance to move without parallel commitment by us. However, our constitutional processes do not permit this, but I am certain that so long as Europe is moving toward unified action, you can always be sure of our effective cooperation on the continent. In this statement I know I speak for the tremendous majority of the citizens of our country.

In this often confused world, it is encouraging to witness the enlightened and courageous statesmanship exhibited by you and Anthony. In this instance, as in so many others, I have the greatest admiration for your judgments and actions.

Please give my warm regard to Anthony, and, as always, the best to yourself.

As ever,

Ike

---

1This message was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Lowry 5003, Sept. 30, with instructions from President Eisenhower that it be forwarded to Churchill with a copy furnished the Secretary; the message was sent to London as instructed in telegram Tedul 14, Sept. 30.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 370

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONS WITH SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL

LONDON—SEPTEMBER 27, 28, AND 30

In the course of my three talks with Sir Winston Churchill (my first call on him and then the dinner and luncheon), he repeatedly emphasized the indispensability of capacity for massive retaliation. He said that the Soviets were in a position where, by a sudden sneak attack, they could kill perhaps ten million of our people. However, the Soviets should know that if within four hours they could kill ten million of us, we could kill in the next four hours, twenty million of them. He felt that as long as they knew this that it would probably deter attack, and he did not see any other way. He emphasized that our capacity for retaliation must have many bases, some real, some decoys, so that they could not strike in a sudden way which would knock out all of our capacity to retaliate. Sir Winston felt that much more could be
done than had been done in the way of developing decoy targets which would attract an initial atomic attack and thus divert it from really vital targets.

John Foster Dulles

740.5/10-154

The Secretary of State to the President

LONDON, October 1, 1954.

[Dear Mr. President:] Thank you very much for responding so promptly to my suggestion of a message to Winston. I know he will be greatly pleased.

The last twenty-four hours have not marked any great advance. There is substantial agreement with reference to German rearmament and to giving the Brussels Treaty council power to veto increases above the North Atlantic Treaty quotas and the twelve divisions which were contemplated for Germany under EDC. However, little progress has been made in agreeing on how or when German sovereignty shall be restored or how arms production on the continent is to be controlled. The most that can be said is that the talking which must inevitably precede any decision has largely now been completed. I am hopeful that matters can be brought to a conclusion by Saturday night, but this is by no means certain. The atmosphere on the whole continues good under the impact of Eden's and my Statements of Wednesday.2

Faithfully yours,

Foster

1 This message was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Dulles 17, Oct. 1, with instructions that it be sent to the President; a notation on the source text indicates that it was relayed to the Summer White House at 1:15 p.m. on Oct. 1.

2 This is a reference to the Fourth Plenary meeting of the Nine-Power Conference which took place on Wednesday, Sept. 29; see p. 1311.

740.5/10-354

The Secretary of State to the President

LONDON, October 3, 1954.

[Dear Mr. President:] Have just signed with the eight other Foreign Ministers the agreements reached here. They still have to be perfected in some detail, but an immense amount of work has been accomplished, and I believe that if what was done here is finally realized, we will have saved most of the values inherent in EDC. The Brussels Council will have many supra-national responsibilities, and while the present arrangements do not go as far as EDC in creat-

1 This message was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Dulles 27, Oct. 3, with instructions that it be sent to the President; a notation on the source text indicates that it was relayed to the Summer White House at 3:55 p.m. on Oct. 3.
ing parliamentary controls, this disadvantage is to an extent offset by the British committal to continental Europe. The work has been very exacting, particularly for my advisers and experts, and they have made a tremendous contribution. In the main, I have tried personally to play a background role, believing that it was important that what emerged here should appear to be essentially an agreement among the Europeans themselves and that we should avoid even appearance of a result which reflected US pressures. Of course, our presence here has been in fact the indispensable ingredient without which the whole affair would have fallen apart, and it will be necessary for us to continue our support of the European army.

I suggest that you may think it wise quickly to make indication of your satisfaction of the results so as to prepare the way for an effective follow-up by the American people and the Congress.

The principal fly in the ointment is that Mendes-France has insisted that a Saar settlement is a condition precedent to his proceeding with his Parliament, and in that way he has preserved for himself an "out" if he should find it expedient to reverse his present position.

As you probably know, it is planned to announce a Trieste settlement on next Tuesday, and this will, I think, be an important further contribution to the cause of European unity and solidarity.²

I am about to take the plane at 5 p. m. London time and expect to be back in Washington at 8:30 Monday morning.

Faithfully yours,

Foster

² Documentation concerning the Trieste settlement is presented in volume VIII.

C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE NINE-
POWER CONFERENCE AND THE NEGOTIATION OF A SAAR
AGREEMENT BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, OCTOBER 4–19, 1954

740.5/10–554: Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State ¹

SECRET

PARIS, October 5, 1954—7 p. m.

Polto 563, Cotel.

1. In response letter from Sir Christopher Steel, acting on behalf chairman Nine-Power Conference, perm reps met this morning in restricted session.

2. SecGen welcomed French perm rep Couve de Murville, sitting for first time, and Gen Schuyler, attending on behalf SHAPE. SecGen

¹ Repeated to Bonn and London.
announced that Pearson, Can FM, would meet with Council Wednesday morning to report on Nine-Power Conf.

3. Steel made few general remarks about Nine-Power Conf, particularly emphasizing rigidity of proposed Brussels regime as compared NATO, and necessity operating it to inspire mutual confidence.

Reported that SecGen of NATO had agreed put facilities and Secretariat personnel of NATO at disposal Paris WGs responsible spelling out Nine-Power agreements.

Proposed that NATO reps plus Ger Rep and NATO SecGen, SG and SHAPE reps meet informally as Working Party Nine-Power Conf immediately after this mtg. This was agreed.

4. Reps of Delegations not attending Nine-Power Conf all expressed great appreciation for efforts made keep them informed of its work.

5. Chairman requested members be prepared agree at NAC mtg Wednesday on time and place of ministerial mtg. Understood that Nine-Power mtg proposed October 22 in Paris.

Brief discussion problem attendance at this ministerial mtg indicated most reps expected foreign ministers and defense ministers only. SecGen thought it would be useful have this reported to govts.

6. Italian Rep reported agreement on Trieste and described settlement briefly. Stated documents would be distributed Wednesday. Emphasized heavy sacrifices made by Italy to promote peace. Expressed gratitude to US and UK for their help in reaching settlement.

Most other perm reps congratulated Italy and in some cases Yugoslavia for statesmanship in reaching this agreement.

7. US Rep suggested that problem of release of classified NATO documents to Germans in course work to be done in Paris on Nine-Power decisions be put on agenda for formal NATO meeting Wednesday. This agreed.

Hughes

2 Documentation concerning the Trieste negotiations, including the so-called Memorandum of Understanding signed by representatives of Yugoslavia, Italy, United Kingdom, and the United States, in London on Oct. 5, is presented in volume VIII.

740.5/10-554: Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State ¹

SECRET

PARIS, October 5, 1954—8 p. m.

Polto 566. Cotel.

1. Perm reps from all NATO countries plus German Del, NATO SecGen, SGLO, and SHAPE Rep met at Palais de Chaillot immediately following restricted NAC mtg reported in separate tel.²

On nomination Can Rep, Steel took chair.

¹ Repeated to Bonn and London.

² Supra.
Chairman proposed two Working Parties: First to deal with Brussels Treaty problems, to consist of reps Nine Powers at London plus SGLO and SHAPE. The other to deal with NATO problems, to include in addition to international reps, 14 NATO countries plus Germany.

Suggested that to keep everyone informed, papers of each would be distributed to all countries and that final recommendations would be reviewed by this 15-country steering comite.

Suggested that it be left to WG to decide need for further sub-committees. Proposed that first mtg be held Thurs. As result US suggestions, agreed hold first mtg Wednesday afternoon. After considerable discussion it was agreed to accede French request that for public relations reasons first meeting of Brussels WG be held at Quai d'Orsay with understanding that for practical reasons necessary hold subsequent meetings at Palais de Chaillot but WG could change locale for any meeting as thought necessary.

Nor rep, while not wishing make issue of matter now, thought might wish have observer on Brussels Group. Meanwhile, hoped might be possible make comment on Brussels papers. Chairman stated he was sure chrmn each group would welcome arrangement for participation on points of interest.

2. Chairman emphasized time problem and urged that Working Groups complete work in time for steering comite action by Oct 15. This would give govt's time to study proposals.

3. Chairman proposed that NATO WG set up group to study amendments in NATO SOF agreement to cover new problem of stationing large numbers Allied troops in Germany. Would not expect complete work before ministerial mtg but thought it should be started and preliminary results sent to occupying powers for further discussions with Germans in Bonn. US reserved right discussion substance this suggestion WG meeting Wednesday.

(Amb Hughes will represent US on steering group, Martin on NATO WG, and Page on Brussels Group, with Anderson, Wood and Ernst or their designees as advisers on each of above three bodies.)

Hughes

740.5/10-654: Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

PARIS, October 5, 1954—8 p. m.

Polto 567, Cotel. At NAC meeting today UK distributed draft program of work on follow-up Nine-Power Conference. Included suggestion that NATO Working Party should prepare draft protocol for

1 Repeated to Bonn and London.
entrance of Germany into NATO and draft protocol regarding forces committed to SACEUR. Also suggested that changes in SACEUR’s directive not be worked out before ministerial mtg but be produced by normal NATO procedure.

Unless instructed to contrary, we propose take position at WG mtg tomorrow, Wed afternoon, on basis discussion in del at London, and NPC [NPT] D–8a as follows:

1. It is desirable, though not legally necessary, that German entry into NATO take place through protocol to treaty.
2. That further protocol to treaty involving military matters not be proposed. Do not think it desirable have more documents than necessary which require parliamentary action. Believe these matters are subject to evolution and should not be embedded in treaty; believe council resolution which can only be amended by unanimous vote is adequate.
3. Believe it possible and desirable to have ministerial action at forthcoming meeting on changes in SACEUR’s directive, in accordance para 3 of NPC (54) 38 to come into effect if other parts of package agreed. Does not appear likely that these will present more than one or two major policy problems which have not been resolved at London. Failure to spell out changes in directive would leave us with little or no progress beyond London decisions and in absence spelling out, govs subject to charge that agreements in principle are facade, real impact is open to question.

UK paper also proposes development formula for association other NATO members with declaration made by US, UK and France in reply German declaration renouncing achievement of unification by force. We see no objection this proposal.

Will endeavor keep you promptly advised of all substantive proposals.

Hughes

#396.1 LO/10–654: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Paris, October 6, 1954—1 p.m.

1442. DeCourson informed Embassy Saar situation in wake London conference stands as follows:

(1) Likely Mendes-France who has heretofore given no personal attention to Saar will now turn his mind to this problem.

(2) DeCourson is generally optimistic Saar solution will be found

though had no new slant on problem beyond indicating further talks with Germans would have to take place. No specific moves yet planned by French.

(3) Saar will not embarrass Mendes-France during this week's debate on London agreements (confidence question if posed will cover only general principles agreed at London).

(4) Saar settlement will however, be required before Assembly will give final approval any German rearmament plan after NAC meeting.

(5) Saar problem obviously once more entering active phase.

Dillon

740.5/10-654: Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State ¹

SECRET PRIORITY

Paris, October 6, 1954—8 p. m.


I.—Problem of Associating Western Germany with Defense of West

(a) Discussion of Final Act of Nine-Power Conference

Can Fon Min Pearson, in commenting on London mtg, noted decisions provisional insofar as NATO matters concerned and final decisions would be taken at forthcoming NATO min mtg. Furthermore, conferences propose but national parliaments decide. Principal accomplishments were (1) recommendation FedRep be admitted to NATO forthwith; (2) extension of Brussels Treaty Organization to include Germany—Italy. Latter pushes forward European unity concept and largely fills gap created by disappearance EDC. He underlined strong Can view pointed up in final act that Brussels Pact should be built “within framework of developing Atlantic community” and that “closest possible cooperation with NATO share be established in all fields”.

He welcomed close association of UK with continent which would reinforce Atlantic community, and at same time strengthen Commonwealth. In this connection he paid tribute to Eden’s historic statement and also stressed great importance Sec Dulles’ Sept 29 statement.² Pearson noted arms production issue extremely complicated and referred to future Working Party.

Nor Rep welcomed Pearson’s statement underscoring importance developing Brussels Treaty Organization within NATO framework, and asked whether it was planned move former to Paris. UK Rep

¹ Repeated to Bonn and pouch to all NATO capitals, Wiesbaden, and Heidelberg.

² The texts of the speeches by Eden and Dulles at the Fourth Plenary meeting of the Nine-Power Conference on Sept. 29 were subsequently made Annexes II B and A, respectively, of the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference, pp. 1361 and 1357.
stated no decision reached in London; matter will be discussed in Working Party. Neth and Belg Reps also stressed importance of closest possible links between these two bodies.

Dan Rep referred to London consensus NAT of indefinite duration and asked whether question of ultimate effect on agreement of eventual German unification had been discussed in London; Pearson replied latter point not discussed in any formal mtg. UK Perm Rep reported matter of duration two treaties had been discussed, and agreement reached a clause would go into Brussels Treaty concerning working in close cooperation with NATO.

Pearson also referred para 13 final act and stated his govt's assumption was no change would take place in existing procedure for distributing Can MDAP. The Brussels Treaty Organization may make written observations. US Perm Rep stated his govt's understanding of this para was similar to that of Can Govt.

Item I

(b) Security Arrangements (see sep tel to Wash, Bonn *)

II—Date and Arrangements for Next Min Mtg

All perm reps accepted October 22 as opening date min mtg which might run over onto following day. Altho no perm reps had firm instructions NAC recorded general consensus only for mins and def mins would be expected attend.

[Here follow discussion of participation by non-NATO firms in competitive bidding for infrastructure works, a report by the Infrastructure Committee on the execution of infrastructure projects, and brief comments on several miscellaneous items.]

Hughes

*Not printed; it informed the Department of State concerning a discussion in the North Atlantic Council on Oct. 6 regarding the release of classified NATO information to the Federal Republic of Germany (740.5/10–654).

396.1 LO/10–654

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Barbour)

[WASHINGTON,] October 6, 1954.

Subject: London Nine-Power Conference: Possible Association of Norway with Brussels Treaty

Participants: The Secretary of State

The Norwegian Ambassador

Mr. Barbour, EUR

The Ambassador congratulated the Secretary on the Nine-Power London Conference and his part in it, expressing the view that some

1 Wilhelm Munthe de Morgenstierne.
of the firm statements made by the United States on that occasion appeared to have been most effective in achieving success. The Secretary thanked the Ambassador and noted that he felt he had perhaps been able to dispel doubts in some people's minds as to the seriousness of US intentions to reappraise its policy towards Europe in the event it should be impossible to pick up the pieces left by the failure of EDC.

The Ambassador said he has received a telegram from his Foreign Minister stating that the Foreign Minister will discuss the Nine-Power meeting in the Storting tomorrow and with his Scandinavian colleagues in Copenhagen on Monday, with particular reference to the desirability of Norway joining the Brussels Treaty. The Ambassador asked whether the Secretary would think it a good idea for Norway to join the Brussels Pact.

The Secretary said that frankly he did not believe it would be a good idea. He pointed out that in the concept formulated at London the role of the Brussels Treaty would be principally one of control on European armament, particularly as to the limits of the size of the various military establishments. In the circumstances, he could not see advantage for Norway in joining a pact of this nature. Norway, as a member of NATO, already participated in the most advantageous instrument for defense cooperation. The Ambassador noted that it might be helpful from the standpoint of Norwegian public opinion for Norway also to participate in the control machinery to be provided by the Brussels Pact in relation to Germany. The Secretary, while making clear that he was not in a position to assess Norwegian internal opinion noted that, under the NATO structure, the powers of SACEUR would also be increased, particularly in regard to the disposition of military forces and logistics which, in the opinion of General Gruenther, would themselves constitute the most effective controls against the establishment of a German national army and that, in fact, the Brussels Treaty controls would be of peripheral importance.

The Ambassador referred to the fact that the Secretary has cancelled his proposed radio address on the Nine-Power conference. The Secretary confirmed that cancellation and said that he had done so in the thought that Mendes-France is scheduled to speak in the French Assembly tomorrow and he did not wish to run the risk of saying anything which might disturb Mendes' presentation. The Secretary added that there were considerable difficulties which still might complicate the situation, notably, the status of the Saar problem. He said he had discussed the Saar with Mendes-France and with Adenauer and that it is not clear whether Mendes-France will insist on a solution for the Saar before ratification of the London agreements. He noted that Adenauer and Mendes-Frances seemed to be scheduled to discuss the Saar on October 20 but in view of the contemplated four-power, nine-
power, and NAC meetings from the 21st to the 24th, they would not have much time.

In conclusion, the Secretary emphasized again that he could not presume to comment on or make suggestions as to courses of action for Norway and that the views he had expressed to the Ambassador were extremely informal, not official expressions of the US Government nor anything other than his personal reactions in response to the Ambassador's questions.

Editorial Note

As a result of the special meeting held in Paris on October 5, as described in telegram Polto 566 (page 1371), three working groups were created to continue the work of the Nine-Power and Four-Power Conferences. The Brussels Treaty Working Party, comprised of representatives from the nine powers, SGLO, and SHAPE, held their meetings in Paris beginning on October 6. It was their responsibility to deal with the problems of armament control, the definition of conventional weapons to be controlled, and the drafting of an agreement specifying the maximum defense contributions of Brussels Pact members as well as an agreement in principle regarding forces not committed to SACEUR and police forces. (Telegram Polto 572, October 6; 740.5/10-654)

The second group, the Working Party on NATO Arrangements, was made up of representatives of the 14 NATO members and Germany. The members of this group, which also held its meetings in Paris beginning October 6, were faced with the task of drafting a protocol for the entry of Germany into NATO and a protocol embodying section IV of the Final Act of the London Conference regarding forces committed to SACEUR; they also had responsibility for devising a formula for the association of other states of NATO with the tripartite declaration of the United States, United Kingdom, and France, which was issued in reply to the German declaration renouncing the achievement of unification by force. (Telegram Polto 579, October 7; 740.5/10-754)

A NATO Steering Group, comprised of representatives of the 14 NATO members and Germany, had the overall responsibility for coordinating the work of the two Working Parties and for reviewing their final recommendations. The United States representative on the NATO Steering Group was Hughes, Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council. Documentation concerning the meetings of these three groups is in Department of State file 740.5.
The Permanent Commission of the Brussels Treaty Organization invited representatives from Germany and Italy to join representatives from its member countries to form a Working Group on the Brussels Treaty. The Permanent Commission, comprised of the Ambassadors of the member countries under the chairmanship of René Massigli, also invited W. Walton Butterworth to serve as an observer for the United States. This Working Group, which began its meetings at the headquarters of the Brussels Treaty Organization in London on October 7, had the task of drafting a protocol inviting Germany and Italy to join its organization and resolving problems related to that change in membership. A liaison was also appointed to serve as a contact with the NATO Working Parties in Paris; for information on the NATO Working Parties, see the editorial note, supra. Documentation on the meetings of the Working Group on the Brussels Treaty, which was occasionally referred to as the London Brussels Treaty Working Group, is in Department of State file 740.5.

Memorandum of Discussion at the 216th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, October 6, 1954

TOP SECRET    EYES ONLY    WASHINGTON, October 7, 1954.

Present at the 216th meeting of the Council were the Secretary of State, presiding; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 4); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Admiral Duncan for the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; General Twining for the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the Executive Secretary, NSC; the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC; the Coordinator, NSC Planning Board Assistants.

Following is a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows a discussion of world developments affecting United States security.]
2. The Nine-Power Conference and the London Agreements Relating to Europe (NSC 5433/1; \(^1\) NSC Action No. 1227 \(^2\))

After Mr. Cutler had briefed the Council on the background, he called on Secretary Dulles for his oral report.

Secretary Dulles indicated his opinion that while the conference was not a conclusive success, it had at least avoided the disaster of a neutralized Germany, an isolated France, and Soviet domination of Europe. Thus the conference had succeeded in saving many of the EDC objectives.

Secretary Dulles then stated that while it would take time he thought it would be useful to report to the Council on some fairly technical aspects of the proceedings. Broadly speaking, the work of the conference fell into three phases. First, negotiations between the three occupying powers and West Germany on the restoration of German sovereignty. Second, negotiation among the Brussels Treaty powers and their enlargement to include Germany and Italy. Third, arrangements affecting NATO.

On the first of these three phases, continued Secretary Dulles, agreement was reached to restore sovereignty to Germany with certain reservations affecting the City of Berlin and German unification if it should occur in the future. Adenauer had actively sought reservation of certain allied rights in Berlin. As a result of this phase of the negotiations, the three Western powers had signed a Declaration of Intent which instructed the three High Commissioners to cease exercising certain powers which were presently to be surrendered to a sovereign Germany, unless such powers were exercised by agreement with the Bonn Government. In effect this decision transferred certain powers to the Bonn Government, de facto, at once. Adenauer had said that he needed such a de facto transfer of sovereign powers to take back with him to Bonn as evidence of concrete achievement.

This phase of the negotiations obviously involved certain questions respecting the so-called “Bonn Treaty” which had been negotiated parallel with the EDC treaty. Certain provisions of the so-called Bonn Treaty had now become obsolete and unacceptable to West Germany. Accordingly, said Secretary Dulles, we had gone through the Bonn Treaty paragraph by paragraph, retaining some things, modifying others, and deleting still others. One of the most difficult problems concerned occupation costs. This whole task had been difficult, but the results were pretty specific and would probably prove satisfactory. The end of this phase of the negotiations occurred with an exchange

\(^1\) Dated Sept. 25, p. 1268.
\(^2\) NSC Action No. 1227 summarized the decisions of the National Security Council meeting of Sept. 24 concerning NSC 5433, “Immediate U.S. Policy Toward Europe,” Sept. 16 (p. 1205); for a memorandum of that meeting, including a summary of the decision reached, see p. 1268. A copy of NSC Action No. 1227 is in the S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Records of Action—1954”.
of declarations between the three allied powers and Germany. The latter had agreed not to attempt to use force to secure the reunification of Germany or to modify Germany's present borders. The three allied powers had declared their intention to settle such matters by peaceful means and in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter.

Regarding the second phase of the London conference negotiations—namely, those involving the Brussels Treaty—Secretary Dulles pointed out that these arrangements would, of course, have to be ratified by the various parliaments and, accordingly, could not go into force at once. This immediately raised the question whether the United States should submit its part in the Brussels arrangements to the Senate. While the Executive might not legally be obliged to do this, it might be a good idea to do it anyway, the more so since German admission to NATO would certainly require the approval of the Senate.

The Brussels Treaty arrangements, said Secretary Dulles, were largely designed to replace the defunct EDC machinery, and the conference had agreed to admit Germany and Italy to the Brussels pact. The addition of the UK, predicted Secretary Dulles, would have both advantages and disadvantages. It was obviously an advantage to have Great Britain tied more closely to the Continent. Yet, by virtue of this closer tie, you bring in a country, the UK, which is not as ready to develop the supra-national agencies. This was something of a disadvantage.

Under the new Brussels Treaty the Consultative Council will not actually make decisions by a majority vote. The Brussels Council does not have the same degree of European parliamentary backing that the EDC was to have, but at least the Brussels Council will be required to report annually to the members of the Brussels Treaty Organization, which are members of the European Consultative Assembly.

One of the principal functions of the Brussels Treaty Organization will be to keep force levels under control. The annual NATO review will continue to fix the desired force levels of the NATO powers, whereas the Brussels Council will have authority to see to it that these agreed levels become the maximum levels, not to be exceeded by any Brussels Treaty power.

There had been much discussion, said Secretary Dulles, of additional controls of European armaments, both production and stocks. Indeed, the most critical aspect of the entire conference was the French demand for an armaments pool. The French had devised very tricky definitions designed to exclude Germany almost entirely from armament production to the advantage of French industrialists. There had been an extremely stubborn struggle over this issue, and it had almost disrupted the conference. The first crisis in this area was resolved by a highly statesmanlike proposal from Chancellor Adenauer in the form of a self-denying ordinance—Germany voluntarily undertaking
not to manufacture certain types of weapons—which Secretary Dulles outlined in some detail. This crisis having been overcome, the French then went on to fight for an armaments production pooling, with the objective of locating the armaments industry entirely outside of the German borders. Throughout this phase the motives of Mendes-France were widely distrusted by the others. There was also a feeling that Mendes-France was adopting rather advanced new-deal concepts regarding government control of the arms industry. However, Mendes-France had finally given in, subject to a promise of subsequent consideration of this problem by the Brussels Council.

The conference had recommended German admission to NATO. This, said Secretary Dulles, would of course require unanimous action by all present members of NATO, but no great difficulty need be anticipated in securing such agreement. The conference had also agreed to recommend greater authority for SACEUR regarding integration and deployment of forces under his command. This was the substitute for the European army contemplated in EDC. Despite its shortcomings, General Gruenther had stated his belief that this new system would in fact make it impossible for any single member nation to use its armed forces in Europe for nationalistic adventures. This effectively abolishes the danger, for example, of a revived German General Staff going off on its own. These recommendations respecting NATO would go before the NATO Council when it met on October 21.

The declarations of the United States and the United Kingdom regarding the stationing of forces in Europe certainly provided the most dramatic moment of the conference. While Secretary Dulles said that he had discussed with Eden and Churchill these commitments, he had not known until Eden’s actual announcement the precise and final decision of the UK Government. Eden and Churchill had both been anxious for a parallel U.S. commitment respecting the stationing of forces on the Continent. Secretary Dulles had replied that such a commitment by the United States was not “practical”, but that Churchill and Eden need not fear any hasty or unwarranted withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe. This was the basis for the extemporaneous statement which Secretary Dulles made after Eden “shot the works” regarding the UK commitment. Basically, said Secretary Dulles, his extemporaneous statement confirmed the willingness of the United States to assist the European nations if they would help themselves along the road toward unity. If the European nations made progress along this road, U.S. assistance would increase; if these nations slowed up, so would U.S. assistance. Secretary Dulles had concluded by stating that he would recommend to the President that he take the same attitude respecting U.S. forces in Europe under the new Brussels arrangements as the President had taken with
respect to EDC. There could not be, however, a strict commitment as to the precise duration of the commitment.

Summing up, Secretary Dulles said that in the main the results of London looked hopeful. Much of the value of EDC had been preserved. The great loss was in terms of failure of the new arrangements to establish the same degree of inter-European parliamentary control as had been contemplated by EDC. On the other hand, the extraordinary UK commitment compensates in large measure for this loss. With strict regard for early defensive military strength on the Continent of Europe, said Secretary Dulles, the new Brussels arrangements may even be better than EDC. However, the long-range integration of Europe will be slower. But, said Secretary Dulles, we cannot always force people to do things they don’t want to do, and Adenauer, at least, has great hopes of the French parliamentary elections in 1956.

Regarding the attitudes of the principal governments at the London conference, Secretary Dulles said that he had enjoyed better relations than ever before with the UK and Mr. Eden. The British were thoroughly frightened at what might happen as the result of the collapse of EDC, surrounded as Britain would be by hostile influences. This had induced the British to deal with us more frankly than ever before.

Apart from the historical UK commitment to the Continent, the greatest single contribution in terms of statesmanship was made by Chancellor Adenauer. Secretary Dulles characterized the Chancellor as a “true European who made real sacrifices to European principles.” The contrast between Adenauer and Mendes-France was particularly conspicuous. Mendes-France always had his eye on little things; Adenauer always on big things. Mendes-France played an inscrutable game and a lone hand, even with his own French delegation. His motives remained unclear, and the other Foreign Ministers had distrusted him ever since Brussels. They remained suspicious and hostile at London. Eden had actually become very angry with Mendes-France at many points in the course of the meeting, and particularly because of the lack of magnanimity in the response of Mendes-France to the UK commitment. Curiously, as a result, Mendes-France seemed to feel that he got a more sympathetic reaction from Secretary Dulles than from any other of the ministers present. Mendes-France had also put the Council on notice that a satisfactory Saar settlement might be a condition precedent to French parliamentary agreement to the new arrangements. Such a Saar settlement, said Secretary Dulles, would be much more difficult to obtain in the absence of EDC—in other words, it would be more difficult now to Europeanize the Saar, and Mendes-France can use the Saar as an excuse for scrapping the London program if he wishes to.

Secretary Dulles pointed out that he himself had tried throughout “to play it cagey” from the U.S. viewpoint. He had early taken the
position that what was to be done at London was up to the European powers. If these powers could find a means of salvaging EDC, we would go along. But Secretary Dulles had avoided so far as possible any idea that the new settlement had been "made in the USA". We should know, added Secretary Dulles, pretty quickly whether this new program will work. The French Parliament will have an opportunity this week to give its approval in principle to what Mendes-France has done. Approval or disapproval by the French Chamber of Deputies could be expected before the end of the year. Our own American action probably will not be final until some time in February, but the United States should not ratify the new arrangements until the European powers have ratified them, in order to avoid any stigma that this is a U.S. package, as had been the case when Congress approved the EDC arrangements prior to the European powers. Secretary Dulles concluded by stating the hope that the results of London would really work. If not, the U.S. would face a real and thorough reappraisal of its policy in the face of a neutralized, if not a Soviet-controlled, Continent of Europe.

Mr. Cutler expressed the view that the real danger to the new program would be posed by Soviet action during the interval prior to ratification. Secretary Dulles agreed and, predicted that the Soviets would do all they could to destroy the London program, bringing pressure to bear both on Germany and on France. He pointed out that the Soviets may be willing to pay a very high price to prevent this settlement, and that is why we shall have to move fast on the followup to the London conference.

Secretary Humphrey inquired as to the real difference between having certain decisions made by the Brussels Treaty powers and other decisions by NATO. Secretary Dulles replied that NATO had been primarily designed to build up the armed strength of Western Europe. Accordingly, it should not be assigned the task of putting on the brakes to European armament. The Brussels arrangements can, if necessary, apply the brakes.

Governor Stassen and Dr. Flemming at this point complimented the Secretary of State warmly on his achievements at London, and at the suggestion of Mr. Cutler the entire council agreed that the record of the meeting should express the thanks and esteem of the National Security Council to the Secretary of State.

At the conclusion of the discussion, Mr. Allen Dulles asked if it might not now be possible to postpone or revise the various reports which the intelligence community had been asked to prepare against the contingency of a failure of the Nine-Power Conference. Mr. Cutler, however, suggested that it would be desirable that the proposed reports be completed by the time when they were due—namely, October 28.

The National Security Council:
a. Discussed the subject on the basis of an oral report by the Secretary of State.
b. Expressed the thanks and esteem of the National Security Council to the Secretary of State for his achievements at the Nine-Power Conference.

[Here follows discussion of United States policy in the Far East, Chinese Nationalist offshore islands, United States policy toward Formosa, foreign military assistance, and the redeployment of United States forces in Trieste.]

S. EVERETT GLEASON

396.1 LO/10-854 : Telegram
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

BONN, October 8, 1954—3 p. m.

995. Thursday’s Bundestag debate on London conference dealt mainly general issues; SPD avoided detailed criticism London agreements on sovereignty except for contention they tended establish Federal Republic as separate State, and insinuation that allied agreement to give up emergency and other occupation powers not genuine. Coalition also avoided detailed commentary London agreements, preferring wait until details worked out. Coalition laid main weight its argument on contention that agreements ended link between Federal Republic’s military contribution and restoration of sovereignty contained in former treaties, overcame danger US withdrawal from Europe brought closer British commitment to continent, provided basis toward further development Europe unity and reestablished western commitments on reunifications and security of Berlin. Emphasis of debate gradually drawn away from London talks through SPD concentration on reunification issue. Debate made public what already apparent in private talks, that SPD and coalition analysis international situation differ so widely that foreign policy cooperation out of question for foreseeable future.

Coalition arguments this subject similar those of four-year EDC debate, claiming no progress reunification possible before Federal Republic brought western powers to accept reunification as one of their own major policy aims and Western Europe became strong enough compel Soviet respect. SPD did not attack NATO and Brussels pact solutions as such, as it did EDC, but insisted present best moment for negotiations with USSR on unity in light current relaxation international tension and contention future will bring greater increase in Soviet than in western power.

1 Repeated to London and Paris.
Chancellor in top form, gave possibly his best Bundestag speech. Through adroit maneuvering he forced SPD to discuss in detail its concepts of “allianceless” foreign policy for a united Germany and its membership in a security system with Soviet Union. While informed public aware these SPD views and many intellectuals share them, general public not yet prepared such far-reaching approach and coalition now in position demonstrate absurdity SPD’s thesis (as simplified by Chancellor) that United Germany should be defended by Soviet Union. Chancellor’s success in drawing SPD into position where he could tar them with neutralist sentiments also permitted coalition send SPD motion asking for four-power talks to set up European defense system to committee, thus avoiding situation in which coalition would have had to vote against having talks on unity.

Other points of interest included in debate were Dehler’s complete capitulation and return to coalition fold as loyal member (for moment). Unanimity of Bundestag on Saar also noteworthy—economic concessions yes, political concessions no.

Frequent coalition statements concerning continued interest in progress towards European unity appeared be more than lip-service, especially those of CDU. Coalition clearly showed new confidence and solidarity from restoration momentum in foreign policy matters resulting from London conference.

Conant

Editorial Note

To implement the decisions of the Four-Power Conference in London as they pertained to Germany, the Bonn Working Group on the Termination of the Occupation Regime was appointed comprising representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany. Beginning on October 8 with daily meetings through October 14, the Working Group met in Bonn to draft the text of the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime and its related supporting documents, based on the proposals contained in the Final Report of the Working Party on the Termination of Occupation circulated as document NPC(54)50 of October 2, page 1339. In addition to drafting the text of the Protocol, the Bonn Working Group continued to meet for discussions concerning other matters relating to Germany, such as Allied policy toward the status of Berlin. Documentation concerning the meetings of the Bonn Working Group is in Department of State file 762A.0221. For the text of the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, which was included in the Paris Agreements signed on October 23, see page 1435; for the text of the Report by the Bonn
Working Group on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, see page 1426.

762.022/10–1254 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Bonn, October 12, 1954—7 p.m.

1040. I saw Chanc this afternoon to confirm final arrangements his trip to U.S. He was in excellent spirits and believes vote of confidence for Mendes-France now makes successful outcome of plans initiated at London 95 percent certain.

On Saar he has in mind wide economic concessions which he believes will satisfy Mendes-France, the emphasis being that no final disposition on Saar can be determined except by peace treaty and free election of new chamber of Saar Parl. He was considering possibility of suggesting a three-membered commission to supervise govt but on this point was still uncertain. In answer to direct question he said he had given up all thoughts of European solution of Saar for time being. He felt an agreement with Mendes-France would be readily reached and emphasized that neither France nor Germany could afford new plans shipwrecked on Saar question. I assured him that US public opinion would certainly not understand any such last minute failure on this point and would probably blame both nations equally, to which he readily agreed.

In response to query as to points to be considered in Washington, Chanc replied that if Paris talks successful he would have nothing on his mind to discuss. Nevertheless, I venture to suggest that we would be well advised to be prepared for this raising question of external assets in connection with chapter six of Bonn treaties and Ger assets in US.

Chanc is planning to arrive Paris Tuesday, 19th, for talk with Mendes-France on Saar and understands four-power talks will begin Wed Oct 20, and Nine-Power talks will proceed 21st and 22nd. He will return to Germany before departing for US Tues, Oct 26, arriving Washington Wed, October 27, as scheduled.

CONANT

1 Repeated to London and Paris.
2 For a summary of Adenauer’s talk with Dulles on Oct. 28, see telegram 1177 to Bonn, Oct. 28, p. 1465; further documentation concerning Adenauer’s visit to Washington is presented in volume vii.
3 For information concerning the vote of confidence in France under reference here, see footnote 2, infra.
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

SECRET

PARIS, October 13, 1954—5 p. m.

1558. Mendes-France asked me to come and see him this morning. He said he was happy about the vote and while he did not expect the final vote on ratification to be quite as good he thought that if there were no unexpected difficulties he would not lose more than 30 or 40 votes at the outside. In other words, there would be a minimum of 310 to 320 votes for ratification. He then pointed out that the debate showed very clearly that the French Assembly was preparing to accept German rearmament in a spirit of resignation in order to preserve the Atlantic alliance, and that there was no enthusiasm whatsoever behind the support for the London accords.

Mendes then said that there were two items in the London accords which had been particularly criticised by all shades of opinion in the French Assembly. One was the lack of definite progress towards the arms pool concept, and the second was the provisions for distribution of American military aid. Regarding the first problem, Mendes said he realized that there was nothing that could be done at this time and this was something that would have to be taken up by the Brussels Treaty Council after the new accords had been ratified and had come into being. Regarding the question of American aid, Mendes said he would like to register a most serious plea with the US Govt that we modify the position we took at London and agree to have our military aid distributed by the Brussels Council. Mendes said that if it was not possible for us to go the whole way at this time, he hoped that at the very least we could agree to some sort of compromise solution which would represent a definite modification of the position which we had so firmly taken in London. Mendes pointed out that it was very difficult and in fact impossible for him to explain logically to French Assembly why US was not willing to make an arrangement with the Brussels Organization similar to that which we had been willing to make with EDC Commissariat. I pointed out to him, as I had yesterday to De Moustier, that they were very different organizations and that Brussels Organization was in no sense a supranational body.

Mendes said he could not accept this line of reasoning as it was his desire to give as much supranationality as possible to Brussels Organi-

---

1 Repeated to London and Bonn. Attached to the source text was a memorandum by MacArthur, dated Oct. 14, in which he summarized Dulles' view that since an objective of the Brussels Pact was supposedly greater European unity, then perhaps the Department of State "might be able to link this objective in some way with a statement regarding our policy with respect to our military aid program."

2 On Oct. 12 the government of Mendès-France won a vote of confidence by a margin of 350–118, although Dillon immediately warned against overconfidence on the part of the United States (telegram 1562 from Paris, Oct. 13; 751.00/10–1354). A breakdown of this vote and an analysis of why it happened is provided in telegram 1565 from Paris, Oct. 13, not printed (751.00/10–1354).
zation in order to make it a vehicle with which to work towards Euro-
pean unity. He said he felt that the fact that agreement had been
reached that the Brussels Treaty Organization could act by majority
decision which would be binding on all the governments concerned
gave the organization a real measure of supranationality.

He clearly implied that he would be willing to have any decisions
regarding American military assistance that might be distributed
through the Brussels Organization taken by majority vote.

It is clear both from the results of the debate which Mendes cor-
rectly described, and from my interviews with De Moustier and
Mendes, that Mendes’ major effort in the coming talks will be to obtain
some modification in US position regarding distribution of US mili-
tary aid. It is also clear that any modification giving greater authority
in this matter to the Brussels Organization will be well received by the
French Assembly and will assist Mendes in obtaining ratification.

Hughes and Collins have been kept fully informed on this develop-
ment. I would like to suggest the possibility that this subject which
seems to be of primary interest to France and the US might be profit-
ably discussed, on a bilateral basis with the French prior to the Nine
Power meeting.

Mendes then said there was one other real difficulty facing him
which was the Saar. He repeated what he had told me previously that
a Saar settlement would have to be signed simultaneously with the
signature of the NATO agreements at the end of next week. He said he
“would be fired” if he signed any definite NATO and Brussels Treaty
accords without signing a final agreement on the Saar at the same
time. Mendes said that he was meeting with Adenauer on the 19th and
he hoped they could reach an agreement in principle prior to the open-
ing of the Four Power Conference which would then be signed at the
same time as all the other agreements.

Mendes then said he had been very much concerned by the debate in
the German Bundestag indicating that there should be no settlement
of the Saar at this time and by certain remarks that Adenauer had
made in the Bundestag which indicated that he might be in agreement
with the idea of postponing a final settlement. Mendes said that it had
always been a French prerequisite for agreement that the Saar Agree-
ment be definitive. He recognized that account must be taken of Ger-
man problem regarding their eastern territories and that settlement
must be made technically dependent on the final peace treaty. How-
ever, it must equally be definitely understood that the settlement which
would be arrived at would be the settlement in the eventual treaty of
peace.

Mendes said that he intended to talk to Adenauer also about broad
Franco-German economic relations. He said France wished to find a
larger market in Germany for her surplus wheat and the French were
prepared to open their overseas territories to German trade which would be very valuable concession. Mendes said that if Adenauer should turn out to be adamant against making a definitive Saar settlement at this time he would have to rely on US to convince Adenauer of the necessity of reaching an agreement.

Prior to seeing Mendes I had read Bonn's 1040 to Dept 3 which was very disturbing to me. I fully agree with Mendes that French Parliament will not accept any solution which is not in fact a final one and that if such a solution cannot be reached the London accords will not be ratified. The French will accept any wording which may be suggested to indicate that the final settlement of the Saar depends upon peace treaty arrangements, provided it is very clear that the settlement reached will be the actual settlement placed in the peace treaty.

Dillon

3 Dated Oct. 12, p. 1386.

762.022/10–1454 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State 1

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS, October 14, 1954—7 p. m.

1578. As follow-up Ambassador’s talk with Mendes-France (Embtel 1558 2) Emb officer visited FonOff for discussion details French position Saar. Following was substance FonOff remarks:

1) PriMin is now for first time addressing himself to Saar problem and he has not got into technicalities. However, he is firm on general principles: a) maintenance Franco-Saar economic union; b) political attachment Saar in some form to Brussels Organization; and c) any settlement be given greatest possible air of permanence.

2) Present talks with Hoffman and Saarlanders in Paris primarily devoted to “internal” Franco-Saar economic problems but political questions also being discussed and full agreement expected tonight on position to be presented to Germans.

3) General outlines Van Naters plan 3 as amended in Teitgen-Adenauer agreement 4 still valid insofar as French concerned.

4) Modifications required in earlier understanding caused primarily by disappearance EDC. French now would have Council of Ministers of Brussels Treaty Organization employ an administrator for the Saar. Representatives of these seven nations in Assembly of Council of Europe at Strasbourg would be “democratically chosen


2 Supra.

3 For information concerning the Van der Goes van Naters report, see the editorial note, p. 806.

4 For information concerning the Teitgen-Adenauer Agreement signed in Strasbourg on May 22, see the editorial note, p. 967.
assembly" to which Council of Ministers Brussels Organization would be responsible. This is French negotiating position which we gathered was subject modification depending German views which French believe may favor attachment Saar to CSC.

5) French believe Saarlanders will agree to formula which will be presented Germans permitting increased German imports into Saar without destroying French market or permitting re-export German goods from Saar into France.

6) It is recognized Saar settlement cannot be binding on Germans beyond peace treaty, but it should be possible for French to present it as virtually definitive to Assembly.

7) French expect US to guarantee settlement from time its conclusion to time of German Peace Treaty and to promise our support at peace treaty as previously worked out. UK position now somewhat different because UK member Brussels Organization. Accordingly UK guarantee would cover merely promise of support at time of peace treaty.

Dillon

762A.0221/10–1554

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State ¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] October 15, 1954.


Discussion:

In order to encourage and strengthen Berlin and to improve the relationships between the Allies and the Berlin authorities it is desirable for the Allies to formulate a new Declaration on Berlin. This Declaration would manifest the Allies’ intent to relax their exercise of authority over all matters except those of a military, security or emergency nature.

The old Declaration on Berlin,² signed in May 1952 and intended to come into effect simultaneously with the West German Contractual Agreements, is outmoded. Authorities of both Berlin and the Federal Republic, have indicated a desire for a new Berlin control document. During the Allied negotiations with the Federal Republic concerning

¹ Drafted by Delmar R. Carlson. A handwritten notation in the margin of the source text reads as follows: "See saw and generally approved." The notation, however, does not bear a date. When Merchant’s memorandum was circulated to members of the U.S. Delegation to the Nine-Power Conference as document PMO R–11 of Oct. 16, 1954, the cover sheet indicated that the proposed statement had not been approved by the Secretary. Document PMO R–11 is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 377.

² Documentation relating to the Tripartite Declaration on Berlin, including its text approved at Bonn on May 26, 1952, is presented in volume VII.
implementation of the decisions of the London Conference, the German representatives requested on behalf of Berlin, tripartite assurance that the present document of control for Berlin would be revised and would come into force when the Conventions do. A further request was made that the Berlin authorities be consulted in revising the control document.

The UK and French representatives in Bonn indicated a willingness to have the subject discussed with Berlin authorities but were apparently not in a position to commit their Governments to a decision to revise the present control document. It is believed, however, that if approached at the governmental level the British and French would probably support such a decision, although the French may display some reluctance.

Although the Berlin Government favors Allied retention of supreme authority in the city, a liberalization of Allied–Berlin Government relationships and, where possible, more self-determination is desired. While Berlin authorities realize that a new document of control cannot be negotiated on a contractual basis, they wish to be consulted concerning the formulation and operation of a new document. Attached (as Tab A) is a more detailed discussion of the need for a new Declaration on Berlin and a liberalization of Allied–Berlin relationships.

Recommendation:

That the three Allied Foreign Ministers issue in Paris a joint statement on Berlin which would

1. note their satisfaction with the cooperation between Allied and Berlin authorities,
2. declare their intention to bring about the greatest degree of self-government in Berlin compatible with Berlin's special situation,
3. instruct Allied representatives in Berlin to consult with the city's authorities with a view to implementing jointly and to the fullest degree possible the foregoing principle.

Attached (as Tab B) is a copy of a suggested text of a communiqué on Berlin.

Tab B

Draft Tripartite Statement on Berlin

CONFIDENTIAL

With respect to Berlin, in addition to the reaffirmation of Allied security guarantees for the city as indicated in the London communiqué of October 3, 1954, the Foreign Ministers of France, the United

---

3 The negotiations under reference presumably took place during the meetings of the Bonn Working Group on the Termination of the Occupation. For information concerning the Bonn Working Group, see the editorial note, p. 1885.

4 Not printed.
Kingdom and the United States have noted with deep satisfaction the
close and friendly cooperation between Allied and Berlin authorities.
The Three Powers now declare their firm intention to bring about the
greatest possible degree of self-government in Berlin compatible with
Berlin's special situation. Accordingly, the three governments have
instructed their representatives in Berlin to consult with the authorities
of that city with a view to implementing jointly and to the fullest
degree possible the foregoing principle.

740.5/10-1454: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State\(^1\) to the United States Permanent
Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes), at Paris\(^2\)

CONFIDENTIAL         WASHINGTON, October 16, 1954—1:16 p.m.

Topol 466. Re Polto 652.\(^3\) Our general concept regarding forthcoming
meetings is as follows:

(1) Four Power meetings October 20-21 would settle unagreed
points and reach agreement on text protocol.

(2) Nine Power meeting October 21 (and morning 22 if necessary)
would have primary task resolving unagreed points and reaching
agreement on Brussels Treaty instruments. These would include (a)
declaration on accession of Germany and Italy; (b) protocol No. I
modifying Treaty; (c) protocol No. II on arms control; (d) agree-
ment on force ceilings.

(As extension of London Nine Power conference, this meeting would
theoretically also consider other elements in London Final Act. How-
ever, we believe it preferable confine meeting to Section II problems,
although it may be desirable to use meeting as means obtaining Ger-
man approval NATO arrangements resolution, since Germans will
not attend NATO meetings.)

(3) NATO meeting October 22 (and 23 if necessary) will be re-
ponsible for agreeing on: (a) Protocol on accession Germany to
NATO; (b) NATO arrangements resolution; and (c) resolution for
NATO-wide association with tripartite security declaration.

(4) Ad Hoc 15-Power public meeting would be held October 23 to
perform signing of all documents for which this necessary. Believe this
meeting should be held Palais de Chaillot. This would appear involve:
(a) signing by Four Powers of protocol terminating occupation
regime; (b) signing by present Brussels Treaty Powers of Brussels
Treaty Protocols and agreements; (c) signing by all NATO powers
of protocol on accession Germany. NATO resolutions would not re-
quire signing.

\(^{1}\) Herbert Hoover, Jr., replaced W. Bedell Smith as Under Secretary of State on

\(^{2}\) Drafted by Fessenden and cleared with Moore, Auchincloss, McCordle, and
Elbrick; repeated for action to Bonn and for information to London.

\(^{3}\) Not printed; it informed the Department of State concerning an informal
meeting of representatives of the Four Powers during which arrangements for
the Four-Power meeting of Oct. 20 were discussed (740.5/10-1454).
Re chairmanship, agree that Eden should chair 9-Power Meeting on basis extension London Conference. Would also prefer have Eden chair Four Power meeting, again on basis extension London. However, would not object Mendes chairmanship if French so desire as host country.

Would suggest limiting publicity to absolute minimum during meetings (1), (2), and (3) above. Ministers will have very tight timetable if above schedule to be maintained. Would suggest only short period for pictures at opening conference. Final signing meeting would of course receive fullest publicity treatment.

Re numbered points Polto 652 not covered above, following comments:

1. This has already been partly done by Bonn Working Group. See Bonn's 1079 to Department, repeated Paris 210. Assume Bonn will also do what remains to be done. Believe Four-Power Ministers might report to NATO on agreement reached, but this presumably could not be done until completion Four-Power meeting. See no necessity for NATO action other than to take note of report.

2. and 4. Bonn responsibility.

---

1 Numbered point 1 of telegram Polto 652 (see footnote 3 above) concerned a list of documents and requested what action would be required at the Four-Power, Nine-Power, and NATO meetings, and what type of report on the Four-Power talks should be made to the NATO ministerial meeting.

2 Not printed; it summarized the work of the Bonn Working Group on the Termination of the Occupation Regime and outlined the outstanding issues. (762A.0221/10-1554)

3 Numbered points 2 and 4 of telegram Polto 652 (see footnote 3 above) concerned the provision of ample copies of documents needed at the Four-Power meeting and whether there would be a formal agenda.

751.5/10-1654: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET

PARIS, October 16, 1954—5 p. m.

1615. Eyes only Secretary. I have not commented so far on slow down of dollar transfers to France including complete freeze on military construction because, except for information in Deptl 1765 to London, repeated information Paris 1124. I have never been informed regarding policy decision, reasons for which it was taken or objectives it was meant to achieve.

---

1 Attached to the source text was a memorandum by O'Connor to Merchant, dated Oct. 18, which reads in part: "I think the Secretary's thought is that he would like to be in a position to give in gracefully on this matter to a request from Mendès-France and gain a little credit by so doing."

2 Dated Sept. 27, p. 1279.
It appears to me that irrespective of reasons which led to decision, at least one aspect of this policy should be reconsidered promptly. I refer to the freeze on all new military construction contracts. This freeze as presently applied seems to me to be far more painful to US forces than to French. Its effect on French dollar position is long term and will not be felt in time to have any influence on parliamentary debate on London accords. Effects of freeze on US forces and fact that the longer freeze continues the more it will cost us if and when construction is resumed has been fully reported to Defense by Gruenther.

For my part, I wish to state that under present circumstances, I believe that this rigid freeze on construction which is now fully known to French, is totally ineffective in furthering result which I assume US has in mind, namely, ratification of London accords by French parliament. French Government has so far kept knowledge of this freeze secret presumably because it feels that public knowledge of freeze would substantially increase difficulties of obtaining ratification.

I strongly recommend that this freeze be modified as soon as possible and that CINCEUR be given authority to pursue a flexible policy on new military construction.

DILLON

762.022/10–1654 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

SECRET  NIAC  PARIS, October 16, 1954—6 p. m.

1617. Mendes-France-Adenauer talks on Saar are scheduled begin 19th (probably afternoon) and presumably can continue morning 20th since Four-Power talks will not open until afternoon. Outcome is obviously critical future not only London accords but entire Franco-German relationship.

I realize German situation has changed and Adenauer will take position political detachment no longer realistic possibility in Germany since demise EDC and that accordingly while accepting administration Saar by Brussels Council of Ministers it must be clear Saar remains German territory. I am concerned Mendes-France will feel he cannot sell this formula to Assembly and in fact such task may well be beyond even his large prestige.

Best chance for Mendes persuade Parliament accept some political concessions on Saar would seem be clear statement from British and ourselves we are willing make promise of support for present settle-

---

¹ Repeated to London and Bonn.
ment at peace treaty with additional declaration from US we will
guarantee settlement from now until time of peace treaty (UK guaran-
tee on this point presumably not required since UK is party Brussels
Treaty).

French officials who are handling problem are deeply concerned that
Saar may upset the applecart. Heretofore when German situation was
more malleable we have felt that given goodwill on both sides settle-
ment could be quickly reached. Now although we must postulate good-
will that may not be sufficient. In past US and UK have traditionally
played somewhat secondary role in Saar controversy but time now
seems to have come when we should take whatever action possible that
would assist both sides in reaching settlement. From French side most
helpful step would be in our opinion categoric statement to Mendes-
France of our guarantee of settlement and our promise to support it
at peace treaty. Such action if taken promptly might assist Mendes
in making necessary political concessions to Chancellor on 19th and
20th.

Accordingly I would recommend that Department instruct me to
see Mendes-France, who will return from Radical-Socialist Congress
Marseille over weekend, on Monday evening or Tuesday morning and
inform him US position in sense outlined above, stating that we hope
this will help him to adopt flexible position on political problem be-
cause of present political situation in Germany.

Such action should of course be closely coordinated with British.
Inasmuch as British position no longer entirely parallel to US do
not believe Jebb would need make Démarche at same time as myself.
However it would be essential that British undertake same position as
ourselves re support at time of peace treaty.

I believe such a course would be vastly preferable to letting French
and Germans run into serious trouble—forcing an appeal to US for
help when they already have reached impasse and adopted positions
from which they can only retreat with great difficulty. It might then
be too late and could delay signature London accords since Mendes-
France has indicated he plans sign London agreements only if Saar
settlement signed simultaneously.

I would hope Secretary might be fully briefed on Saar before leav-
ing next week in event his personal mediation should become indis-
pendable. In this connection it seems clear Secretary and Eden would
be only possible persons who might mediate in event French and
Germans unable settle Saar question between themselves.

In view critical importance of Saar problem I would hope we would
do everything possible to help French make political concessions (we
are informed both sides are willing make necessary concessions on
economic problem) which apparently are needed to meet present situation in Germany.

Dillon

762.022/10-1754: Telegram
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY  

BERLIN, October 17, 1954—6 p. m.

260. Re Paris tel to Dept 1558, rptd London 432, Bonn 321.1

I am concerned at Mendes-France’s insistence during his talk with Dillon that any Saar settlement reached with Chancellor be definitive and “would be the settlement in the eventual treaty of peace,” (Ref Paris tel 321), and reports in press he is considering European solution through Brussels Treaty. Question is not merely one of finding formula that would permit French to claim settlement permanent and Gers to say it was provisional. With intensified interest in reunification which has followed failure of EDC, Ger political and popular opinion far more sensitive to implications of Saar settlement for Eastern border question, and leaders of Bundestag parties are unanimous in their rejection of settlement which would prejudice outcome of final peace treaty negotiations. In present state of Bundestag opinion, Chancellor, who is having increasing difficulties with his own party and coalition partners on domestic issues, cannot consider any solution which can be branded as a sham European solution. FDP leaders raised this point with me Friday at lunch. With hopes for a united Europe now so dim, they cannot consider commitment Saar as future European capital and therefore specifically reject Van Naters plan. Maximum Chancellor can achieve, in my opinion, is FedRep agreement to principle that any settlement will remain in force up to peace treaty, when question will again be negotiated.2

Conant

---

1 Repeated to Bonn, Paris, and London.


3 In telegram 1123 from Bonn, Oct. 18, Conant recommended that if the United States and the United Kingdom must give France a guarantee of support at the peace treaty negotiations, such a guarantee must be phrased in terms which would not imperil Adenauer’s “uncertain chances of finding majority on Saar issue in Bundestag.” Conant suggested that any guarantee contain two conditions: 1) no political detachment of the Saar from Germany unless the area became a part of an effective European political community, and 2) the settlement must guarantee political freedoms for the Saar population. (762.022/10-1534)

The same day Dulles informed Dillon, in telegram 1439 to Paris, that “I do not consider it advisable or even feasible to give French guarantee or advance assurance of our support at peace conference” and that, in light of the French rejection of the EDC which offered prospects of a true European framework, “I am not inclined to go as far in statement of support as envisaged last spring.” (762.022/10-1654)
THE GERMAN PROBLEM

762.022/10-1854 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Butterworth) to the Department of State

SECRET NIAC T

LONDON, October 18, 1954—5 p. m.

1942. Embassy shown today Foreign Office instructions on Saar which confirm no British mediation contemplated for present. Indeed British Ambassadors Bonn and Paris not to approach Adenauer or Mendes-France on subject. In Foreign Office view Mendes should concentrate on obtaining economic concessions which Adenauer reportedly ready to grant and avoid attempt obtain political provisions of Strasbourg agreement which Adenauer no longer able to grant.

Foreign Office Representative added in confidence advisability of mediation would have to be restudied after October 19 meeting. Should Saar be linked to Brussels Pact and Franco-German agreement not reached UK as member probably would have to intervene even if US refrained. If impasse still resulted US would probably have to throw its influence into scale.

Butterworth

1 Repeated to Paris and Bonn.
2 For information concerning the Strasbourg Agreement, also referred to as the Teitgen-Adenauer Agreement, signed on May 22, 1954, see the editorial note, p. 967.

396.1 PA/10-1854 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Matthews) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

THE HAGUE, October 18, 1954—6 p. m.

596. I asked Secretary General Van Tuyll today concerning press report from Paris that Benelux countries are about to issue the expected voluntary statement renouncing production ABC weapons similar to Adenauer’s statement at London conference, which report was subsequently denied by Dutch Foreign Office. Van Tuyll said they are running into difficulties. The statement could not be in the same terms as that of Adenauer and latter seemed to prefer that no statement be issued by Benelux if it was not complete as his own since comparisons might hurt him in Germany. On other hand, Dutch and Belgian industry are considerably worried since production possibilities in ABC fields could have dual purpose, that is the output could be both for peaceful uses, but with possibilities for utilization in war. This

production Benelux would not wish to renounce and hence the complications in drafting statement.

He also reported British as being extremely optimistic over outcome of Paris meetings. While Dutch too are optimistic they believe that everything will not be buttoned up in few days this week and that further discussions on detailed implementation of agreements may be necessary thereafter.

Beyen returned to his office today much restored in health.

MATTHEWS

762A.0221/10–1854 : Telegram

The Acting United States High Commissioner for Germany
(Parkman) to the Department of State ¹

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Berlin, October 18, 1954—6 p. m.

263. Both British and French Foreign Mins have now answered Mayor Schreiber’s congratulatory msg (Berlin’s 268 to Bonn rptd to Dept 246 ²).

Brit answered in terms of praise for spirit of Berliners. French reiterated London guarantee and referred vaguely to fulfillment of Berlin’s hopes for the future.

One possibility would be that Secretary express in his reply US desire see development of new status for Berlin resulting from friendly consultation with Berliners and giving them greatest possible measure of self-govt consistent with the special status of city. However, in final analysis we conclude that the parties with whom we will be negotiating re Berlin’s future status will be fundamentally our allies—and particularly French—and not the Berliners. Therefore, it may be unwise to answer Schreiber in terms which wld irritate certainly the French and perhaps to some extent Brit as well, while at same time not achieving sufficient compensating good-will advantages from Berliners. Indeed, not likely this letter will receive major publicity since Berliners have few doubts about sincerity US intentions re Berlin.

In conclusion we, therefore, favor a brief answer re-affirming our admiration for the spirit of the Berliners and giving the assurance that those occupation responsibilities which must be retained in the common interest of the Gers and the Allies will be exercised in a manner which recognizes both this community of interest and the desire and capacity of the Berliners to govern themselves insofar as the unfortunate isolation of their city allows.

1 Repeated to Bonn.
2 Not printed.
CONFI DENTIAL

BERLIN, October 19, 1954—4 p. m.

Unnumbered. In course long private talk between Michael Rose and Knight became apparent that British position with regard change status of Berlin very close to fundamentals our position as agreed between Bonn and Berlin.


In course conversation Michael Rose stated that above position represented his views completely and that he had “every hope” of receiving further instructions from London along these lines in near future, perhaps in time for next Deputies’ meeting, October 20. Since Rose efficient and cautious officer, we can only conclude he would not have gone this far without concrete indication from Foreign Office that he is not out of step therewith. Furthermore, not inconceivable that UK may try seize ball and run with it, especially re prompt issuance declaration of intent with its public relations appeal for Germans.

As result above believe agreement at Paris re issuance Berlin declaration of intent should be not only useful but well in realm of the possible. ²

PARKMAN

² For information concerning the declaration on Berlin, which was issued on Oct. 23, see the editorial note, p. 1461.

740.5/10–1954 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Embassy in France ¹

CONFIDENTIAL

LONDON, October 19, 1954—7 p. m.

287. Paris for Merchant and Reinhardt. ² Eden’s initial predisposition to admit other nations to enlarged Brussels Treaty has been dissipated by Foreign Office opposition and cautious second thoughts on

¹ Repeated to Ankara and the Department of State as telegram 1965, which is the source text.
² Merchant and Reinhardt were members of the U.S. Delegation which accompanied Dulles to Paris for the Nine-Power, Four-Power, and North Atlantic Council ministerial meetings.
part of Norway and diffidence on part of Denmark. At present only Turkey is showing embarrassing signs that it may wish to join, though Greece and Yugoslavia are said to have been keeping door open.

It is to be expected that British will be very careful and gentle in manner in which they discourage Turks and all more so because of part they played initially in opposing Turkey's entrance to NATO, but they will nevertheless, if pressed, refuse.

Dominating reason why HMG has come to this view is no doubt undesirability of possibly weakening NATO and therefore United States participation by creating parallel organization to include most Western European countries now members of NATO.

Aldrich

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 380

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at the Nine-Power Conference, at Paris

CONFIDENTIAL  PRIORITY  WASHINGTON, October 19, 1954—7 p.m.

Tosec 3. British Embassy representative under instruction today informed Department following re atomic energy limitations:

Adenauer told Kirkpatrick at London, in response suggestion nuclear fuel limitation be raised to 1,000 grams, he could not accept specific quantitative limitation because his experts not present but willing agree limit German production nuclear fuel for five years to reasonable amount. British followed this up in Bonn with Hallstein and Germans agreed as result Eden could say in Parliament (today) if questioned Adenauer had agreed limit production nuclear fuel to amount to be worked out by experts not in excess requirements for normal peaceful use.

In view above British intend raise matter Paris with view to agreement that appropriate limitation nuclear fuel production will be worked out by experts at later date. Embassy has received no indication British Government has any particular scheme or framework in mind and believes question open whether limitation to be accomplished in purely German or Brussels organization or some other contexts.

British Embassy Paris instructed similarly inform French.

While we regret emergence this last minute problem recommend Secretary support British general approach to problem and agree to appropriate US participation in experts exercise.

FYI problem is rather more complex than appears from British report and we believe exercise will probably develop into finding

1 Repeated to Bonn and London.
solution problem reporting on and justifying production nuclear fuel as result non-military activities plus problem disposing of quantities nuclear fuel excess to non-weapon needs produced incidental to peaceful atomic activities. US interest these problems is wider than US interest what is done in Germany and it may be possible find means serving our interests continental Europe.

Necessity further study here and difficulty negotiating this problem during crowded Paris schedule make British proposal, in which Germans have apparently concurred, most acceptable presently practicable means agreeing on limitation nuclear fuel production although appreciate French might make firm agreement experts condition precedent to ratification. We believe "appropriate limitation" may turn out to be provisions to deal with problems discussed previous paragraph rather than any quantitative limit.

Defense informed. If they have further comments will send soon as possible.²

[HOOVER]

² In telegram Tosec 14 to Paris, Oct. 21, the Department of State informed the U.S. Delegation that the Department of Defense had reviewed the source text and had no comments. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 380)

762A.0221/10-1554

The Secretary of State to Mayor Walter Schreiber of Berlin

WASHINGTON, October 19, 1954.

DEAR MAYOR SCHREIBER: After a few days away from the Department, I returned to find your generous message ² in the name of all Berliners concerning the outcome of the London Conference and your hopes regarding the future of relationships in Berlin. I can assure you that we retain a strong interest in Berlin's problems and welfare. We expect that future developments will include a growing spirit of partnership and mutual confidence between Berlin and Allied authorities.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

¹ This message was transmitted to Berlin in telegram 195, Oct. 19, with instructions that Parkman should deliver the text to Mayor Schreiber. It was noted on the source text that this message was approved prior to receipt of telegram 263 from Berlin (p. 1398). In telegram 270 from Berlin, Oct. 21, Parkman informed the Department of State that Dulles' letter was delivered on Oct. 21 as instructed and was subsequently released to the press. (762A.0221/10-2154)

A memorandum from Merchant to Dulles, dated Oct. 15, contains the original proposal concerning the drafting of a reply to Mayor Schreiber and it bears a handwritten notation which reads: "See approved." (762A.0221/10-1554)

² Not printed.
SECRET  PRIORITY

PARIS, October 20, 1954—3 p. m.

1655. French and German accounts of yesterday’s Mendes-Adenauer meeting agree that meeting went well, that atmosphere was good and that only major difficulty encountered as with respect to French insistence political agitation in Saar for return to Germany be prohibited. Only difference is as to which side will yield on this point.

Experts of two delegations are working intensively on Saar and overall Franco-German economic relationships and Adenauer has summoned his coalition leaders to meet with him here tomorrow. We understand from Germans that he had planned to summon them in any event.

Following account given us by Soutou. German account being cabled separately:

Soutou states that agreement was reached to use Van Naters’ report as basis with such modification as might be necessary in light of present difficulties in carrying out Europeanization by precise states. He states, and Germans confirm, that agreement was reached on formula that Saar statute could not be changed except by peace treaty. French had agreed there should be referendum on the statute but that thereafter it would, except for peace treaty or action by some future Saar referendum, be definitive. Soutou states French position is due to conviction Saar settlement must make real contribution to Franco-German *rapprochemen* and that continued agitation following referendum for return to Germany would provide constant irritant. French were willing to give up right of prior authorization for political parties but insist their activities be within framework of Saar statute. (In this connection he cited freedom of US parties within framework of US Constitution.)

Soutou said that complete deadlock had been reached on this point and, in answer to question as to what solution he envisaged, he said that he saw none unless Adenauer would yield following consultation with his coalition leaders. Germans on other hand thought Mendes might modify his stand on this point.

With respect to US and UK commitments, Soutou stated French no longer desired commitment to support settlement in peace treaty negotiations but still desired guarantee of agreement until peace treaty.

With respect to administration, French were prepared to accept one commissioner who would be appointed by Brussels Treaty Council with agreement of France, Germany and Saar but not national of any of three. His deputy would be Saarlander. French state Germans had suggested two formulas: (1) single commissioner appointed by Coun-

---

1 Repeated to London and Bonn.
2 *Infra.*
3 *For information concerning the Van der Goes van Naters report, see the editorial note, p. 803.*
cil of Europe or (2) tripartite commission composed of one French, and one German and with neutral chairman. Soutou said that Adenauer preferred first while his delegation preferred second and that there should be no particular difficulty in getting together on single commissioner. French could not accept tripartite commission. Provision would be made for evolution of administration in accordance with progress made toward European integration.

Both sides indicated that agreement on economic questions should be relatively easy.

While each side seems overconfident that other will yield on political parties, it is apparent that each side recognizes absolute indispensability of reaching agreement this week and anticipates it will be reached. Soutou commented that German thinking, including that on relations east and reunification, already considers German NATO membership in the “bank” and we believe Mendes has same feeling about London accords.

DILLON

762.022/10–2054 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

SECRET  PRIORITY

PARIS, October 20, 1954—3 p. m.

1656. Re Embltel 1655.² German accounts of yesterday’s Mendes–Adenauer meeting agree that it went reasonably well. Von Walther, Minister-Counselor of German diplomatic mission, said that although warmth which characterized Adenauer–Schuman meetings was lacking, atmosphere was good. He described it as that of “two bankers discussing detailed matters of business.”

Von Walther said talks opened with French raising practically all “secondary” points at issue between France and Germany with exception war criminals and foreign legionnaires. Asked whether French offered any “concessions” on these points or whether any agreements reached, Von Walther said no that points merely discussed. Talks then proceeded to cultural and economic questions on which French outlined prospects of extensive France-German exchanges and cooperation. On economic side, Von Walther commented that it was obvious French were anxious to dump their surplus wheat and sugar by sales to FedRep.

On Saar Germans confirm French have agreed that peace treaty rather than present settlement will be definitive. Re economic issues, Von Walther said that so far there appeared to be little difficulty but on political side talks had run into snag over Mendes proposal Saar agreement should contain paragraph banning any agitation in Saar

¹ Repeated to London and Bonn.
² Supra.
for return to Germany. He characterized this idea as unacceptable to Chancellor but indicated there was hope French would at least modify it.

Blankenhorn in separate conversation phrased this as French insistence upon some sort of legal guarantee that would preclude any change of Saar status before peace treaty.

Blankenhorn also stated German position was that agreement of French, Saar and German governments was in itself the foremost guarantee which could not be upset by mere talk among the respective populations. In any event he could not support in Bundestag any continued restrictions on political liberties of Saarlanders, including opposition to France-German Saar agreement if that was their feeling. French reported agreeable to plebiscite but Adenauer against it on grounds poisoning of atmosphere and impossibility maintaining any party discipline which could be maintained in free elections for Landtag which would confirm France-German agreement.

Von Walther said French strongly desired attachment Saar to Brussels and that while Chancellor preferred Council of Europe he did not think latter would stick on this point. He added Germans had proposed three-man commission (one German, one French and one “neutral” along lines Mommer Plan) to supervise Saar and report to international body ultimately given responsibility for area.

Blankenhorn reported Chancellor not basically inclined to threeman commission since in his view French and German representatives would be in constant opposition which would tend exaggerate difficulties and could be avoided by single commissioner whose loyalties would tend to gravitate towards Saar.

Dillon

D. NINE-POWER, FOUR-POWER, AND NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL MEETINGS AT PARIS, OCTOBER 20–23, 1954

1. PROCEEDINGS OF THE MEETINGS

Editorial Note

In the four days between October 20 and October 23, the Four-Power Conference held three meetings, the Nine-Power Conference met twice, and the Ministerial Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization held one meeting, all for the purpose of reaching final agreement on the instruments through which the Federal Republic of Germany could be integrated into NATO. In the compilation that follows, the editors have attempted to account for all the meetings mentioned
above, as well as the informal bilateral and multilateral discussions between leading officials of the various participating countries that were held during the conference.

In addition to the Department of State central files, especially file 396.1 PA, two lot files were particularly useful in preparing this compilation. The first was the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, which includes 16 folders of material relating to the meetings. The material is arranged as follows: folder CF 377—preparatory and position papers; CF 378–380, 382–389, and 393—telegrams and memoranda of conversation; CF 381—press releases; CF 390–391—verbatim records of the Nine-Power meetings; and CF 392—documents relating to the North Atlantic Ministerial Council meeting. The other lot file was the CFM files, lot M 88, which largely duplicates the materials listed above except that its holdings of telegraphic correspondence relating to the conference is less extensive.

The main telegram indicator series used during the conference was the Secto–Tosec series, which was utilized by the delegation for conference business between Washington and Paris beginning with the Secretary of State's departure for Paris. The Dulte–Tedul indicator series was used when transmitting personal messages from and to the Secretary of State while at the conference in Paris.

For personal accounts of this conference by some of the major participants, see the following: Adenauer, Erinnerungen 1953–1955, pages 355–383; Eden, Full Circle, pages 169–174; Macmillan, Tides of Fortune, pages 482–493; and Spaak, The Continuing Battle, pages 186–188. See also British Command Paper 9304, Documents agreed on by the Conference of Ministers held in Paris, October 20–23, 1954. For the text of Dulles' statement made on his departure from Washington on October 19, see the Department of State Bulletin, November 1, 1954, pages 638–639.

Since the records are incomplete concerning which members of the various delegations attended the meetings included in this compilation, the editors have attempted to list only the principal participants present at each meeting. The leading representatives on the delegations of the participating countries were as follows:

**Belgium**

- Paul-Henri Spaak
- Antoine Spinon
- Andre de Staercke

- Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Minister of National Defense
- Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council

**Canada**

- Lester B. Pearson
- L. Dana Wilgess

- Secretary of State for External Affairs
- Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council
DENMARK
H. C. Hansen
Rasmus Hansen
Anthon Vestbirk
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Defense
Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council

FRANCE
Pierre Mendès-France
Roland de Moustier
André François-Poncet
René Massigli
Alexandre Parodi
President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
High Commissioner for Germany
Ambassador to the United Kingdom
Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

GERMANY
Konrad Adenauer
Theodor Blank
Walter Hallstein
Herbert Blankenhorn
Chancellor
Member of the Bundestag and Adviser to the Chancellor
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Political Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

GREECE
Stephanos Stephanopoulos
Panayotis Kanellopoulos
Georges Exintaris
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister of National Defense
Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council

ICELAND
Kristinn Gudmundsson
Petur Benediktsson
Hans G. Andersen
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister to France
Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council

ITALY
Gaetano Martino
Paolo Emilio Taviani
Adolfo Alessandrini
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Defense
Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council

LUXEMBOURG
Joseph Bech
André Clasen
Nic Hommel
President of the Government and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister to the United Kingdom
Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council

NETHERLANDS
Johan W. Beyen
Cornelius Staf
Jonkheer A. W. L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Defense
Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council
THE GERMAN PROBLEM

NORWAY

Halvard M. Lange  
Kai Knudsen  
Arne Skaug  
Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Minister of Defense  
Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council

PORTUGAL

Paulo Cunha  
Santos Costa de Tovar  
Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Minister of National Defense  
Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council

TURKEY

Fuad Köprülü  
Nuri Birgi  
Fatin R. Zorlu  
Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council

UNITED KINGDOM

Sir Anthony Eden  
Harold Macmillan  
Sir Gladwyn Jebb  
Sir Christopher Steel  
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs  
Minister of Defense  
Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council

Sir Harold Parker  
Sir Harold Caccia  
Sir Frank Roberts  
Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar  
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense  
Deputy Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office  
Deputy Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office  
High Commissioner for Germany

UNITED STATES

John Foster Dulles  
Robert B. Anderson  
Livingston T. Merchant  
David K. E. Bruce  
James B. Conant  
C. Douglas Dillon  
H. Struve Hensel  
John C. Hughes  
Secretary of State  
Deputy Secretary of Defense  
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs  
Ambassador to the European Coal and Steel Community  
High Commissioner for Germany  
Ambassador in France  
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs  
Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council

For documentation concerning the negotiations between France and the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the Saar, which took place in Paris between October 20 and October 23 and culminated in the signing of a Saar Agreement on October 23, see pages 1458 ff.
FIRST MEETING OF THE FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE, PALAIS DE CHAILLOT, PARIS, OCTOBER 20, 1954, 5:20 P. M.

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

FRANCE
Pierre Mendès-France

UNITED KINGDOM
Anthony Eden

FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY
Konrad Adenauer

UNITED STATES
John Foster Dulles

SECRET

PARIS, October 20, 1954—11 p. m.

At Four-Power meeting of Foreign Ministers to consider report of Bonn Working Group, Eden elected chairman and proposed signing ceremony at 2:45 p.m. Saturday at Quai d’Orsay. Noted agreement reached by Working Party as of today on all subjects except paras 2 and 4 re stationing of troops and additional sentence Germans wished to add to letter from Chancellor re demilitarization controls annex b(1). Agreement reached on review clause (article 10 relations convention) by insertion phrase “being reached with the participation or consent of the states parties to this convention” after words “or an international understanding.”

Re deconcentration (article 10 settlement convention) Adenauer made statement for record to effect that if difficulties arose re disposition of securities which were not solvable within framework present agreement, he would request discussion with the other Foreign Ministers with view to finding solution. Statement noted by UK, US, and French.

Adenauer states willingness forego proposed additional sentence in demilitarization letter annex B(1) stipulating that review at end of year would have effect of excluding civilian research and production from disarmament controls, provided it clearly understood that review would cover this point. Assurances given by UK, US and French and noted in record.

Re stationing troops (articles 2 and 4) Eden and Mendès-France supported allied text in Working Party report on grounds of possible prejudice vis-à-vis Soviets if Allies renounced right as distinct from qualifying exercise of right. Adenauer stressed inconsistency of granting sovereignty while retaining right station troops anywhere in Fed—

1 Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 2 and repeated to Bonn and London. A 35-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CP 375. The list of principal participants, not provided in the source text, was taken from the verbatim record.

eral Republic. Pointed to language of Allied declaration June 5, 1945 which speaks of right to station troops in any or all parts of Germany as showing divisibility of right.

Secretary stated that provided rights re Berlin were covered, as they appeared to be in article 2, US inclined favour German proposal of contractual grant as source of right station troops in Federal Republic rather than retention occupation right. Cited advantages Japanese example of basing rights on grant ratified by Diet and clean break with occupation for purposes disproving communist propaganda that treaty amounted merely to occupation in another form. Adenauer quickly associated himself with Secretary's views, but in face continued UK and French reservation agreed on compromise formula suggested by US.

Compromise formula envisages retention article 2 and article 4(1) as they stand. Allied text of article 4(2) modified to read "forces of same nationality and effective strength as at that time may be stationed" etc. Add new sentence based on German (2) to effect "in view of status accorded to Federal Republic in article 1(2) of relations convention and in view fact that three powers do not desire exercise right station forces in Federal Republic except in full accord with Federal Republic, there will be separate convention dealing with status forces in Federal territory".

Working Group will revise text accordingly tonight and text separate convention (annex D of report) for consideration by Ministers Thursday 3 p.m. Working Group also considering revised draft of emergency letter annex B(a) submitted by US, and draft letter from Three Powers clarifying words "similar powers" in article 5 for consideration tomorrow.


4 In telegram Seco 3, Oct. 21, Dulles informed the Department of State that the four Foreign Ministers tentatively agreed to include contractual agreements relating to the stationing of foreign forces in Germany in a separate convention which was in the process of being drafted. It was proposed that this convention would be signed at the same time as the protocol on the termination of occupation. Dulles requested full powers from the President to sign this convention. Dulles was informed that he was so empowered in telegram Tosec 16, Oct. 22. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 380)

DULLES-EDEN MEETING, AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE, PARIS, OCTOBER 20, 1954

Editorial Note

Immediately after the first meeting of the Four-Power Conference, Dulles and Eden held an informal meeting during which they dis-
discussed the redeployment in Austria of British troops presently stationed in Trieste and the problem of the Chinese offshore islands. Summaries of the discussion of these two topics were transmitted to the Department of State in telegrams Dulles 3 and 6 from Paris, October 21; telegram Dulles 3 is not printed (110.11 DU/10-2154); telegram Dulles 6 is printed in the compilation on China in volume XIV.

**DULLES-MENDÈS-FRANCE MEETING, HOTEL MATIGNON, PARIS, OCTOBER 20, 1954**

**Participants**

**United States**

John Foster Dulles  
Robert B. Anderson  
H. Struve Hensel  
C. Douglas Dillon  
John C. Hughes  
Theodore C. Achilles  
Livingston T. Merchant

**France**

Pierre Mendès-France  
Alexandre Parodi  
Maurice Couve de Murville  
Roland de Moustier  
Georges Boris  
Roland de Margerie  
Jean Soutou

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 379

*Telegraphic Report by Secretary of State Dulles*

**TOP SECRET**

**PARIS, October 21, 1954—3 a.m.**

Dined with Mendès-France at Hotel Matignon this evening in friendly, informal atmosphere. For French, Parodi, De Murville, Moustier, Boris, Margerie and Soutou were present. On our side, Anderson, Hensel, Dillon, Hughes, Achilles and Merchant also present.

Conversation during and after dinner covered wide range, Indochinese aspect of which I have reported separately.

Mendès-France asked me my present estimate Soviet intentions. I replied at length pointing out inherent conflict between Party and State for control foreign policy. I also noted post-Stalin increased attention consumers' goods as reflection need for even despotism to take into account popular pressures, which tendency, however, should not be regarded as basis for immediate optimism but which nevertheless was encouraging sign.

I underlined heavy burden US reluctantly bearing for defense effort and commented on irony criticism certain quarters of our defense effort which was so large an extent responsive to historical arguments that

---

1 Transmitted to the Department of State as telegram Dulles 4, Oct. 21, “eyes only Acting Secretary,” and repeated to London and Moscow as “eyes only Ambassador.”

2 The message under reference is telegram Dulles 5, Oct. 21; it is printed in vol. xiii, Part 2, p. 2147.
first two World Wars might have been avoided had US been militarily strong and had made clear in advance its intention to resist aggression. I then emphasized importance I attach to progress on disarmament front, although I held out no hopes that early progress was possible. Mendes-France, during entire conversation, listened with close attention, and periodically indicated general agreement. I had impression throughout that ears of Boris were flapping.

Conversation then turned to Far East and I took pains to explain at some length dangers inherent in bombardment and harassment offshore Chinese islands in past six weeks. I pointed out they were stepping stones to any invasion Formosa, and said that we had reached no final conclusion as to action which we would take in event Communist effort to subdue them was launched. I said beyond question we would resist with all our force any effort attack Formosa and Pescadores.

In later turn of conversation Mendes-France elaborated at great length his conviction Soviets would make some spectacular move to prevent consummation London Agreement. We discussed various possibilities this direction and difficulties in path effective Soviet effort. He made clear, however, his belief that Molotov's recent effort at East Berlin was not final shot in Soviet locker.

---

4 Documentation concerning the offshore Chinese islands is presented in volume xiv.

5 Presumably a reference to Molotov's speech in Berlin on Oct. 6; for information concerning Molotov's speech, see telegram 582 from Moscow, Oct. 21, p. 1459.

6 During Dulles' meeting with Mendes-France, plans for Mendes-France's visit to Washington in November were also discussed; a summary of this discussion was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Dulle 10, Oct. 21. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, C 379) Documentation concerning this November visit to Washington is presented in the compilation on France in volume vi.

---

FIRST MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, PALAIS DE CHAILLOT, PARIS, OCTOBER 21, 1954, 11:10 A. M.

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

BELGIUM

Paul-Henri Spaak

CANADA

Lester B. Pearson

FRANCE

Pierre Mendès-France

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Konrad Adenauer

ITALY

Gaetano Martino

LUXEMBOURG

Joseph Bech

NETHERLANDS

Johan W. Beyen

UNITED KINGDOM

Anthony Eden

UNITED STATES

John Foster Dulles

NATO OBSERVER

Lord Ismay
Paris, October 21, 1954—10 p. m.

1. First nine-power meeting opened Palais de Chaillot with nomination by Mendes-France of Eden as chairman and invitation of Ismay to attend.

2. Eden reported briefly on four-power meeting yesterday afternoon. He said agreement had been reached in principle on all points. He summarized Bonn convention on right to station forces in Germany and pointed out this would be signed at present meeting by three occupying powers and Federal Republic. However, it would be open for accession by other governments with forces in Germany.

3. Massigli reported results London working group on Brussels treaty listing unagreed points. These were decided as follows:

   a. Title of Council would be “Council of Western European Union”.
   b. At Spaak’s suggestion paragraph 4 of Article 4 of Protocol I will be reworded to provide that where no particular voting procedure is otherwise provided for the Council shall have power to decide whether it will vote by unanimity, qualified majority, or simple majority.
   c. As a result of further suggestion by Spaak Article 5 of Protocol I will be revised to provide that Council shall make annual report to delegations of Brussels treaty powers to Consultative Assembly of Council of Europe on all its activities and in particular control of armaments. Martino suggested that Council should report to CSC Assembly and was supported by Adenauer. However, other Brussels Foreign Ministers opposed this suggestion and it was dropped. Objections mentioned included fact that CSC Assembly did not include UK and was based on principle of supra-nationality while Brussels treaty was association of sovereign states. It was agreed that parliamentary dels of Brussels treaty powers at Strasbourg would constitute separate assembly and not subcommittee of Council of Europe Assembly.
   d. It was agreed to eliminate commission between Brussels Treaty Council and any subordinate bodies including Armaments Control Agency.
   e. It was agreed to establish seven-power working group in London to deal with such problems as could be effectively handled between signing of Brussels documents and their ratification.
   f. It was agreed that expenditures of Brussels Treaty Organization would be met by dividing them into five equal parts—UK, France, Germany, Italy and Benelux.

1 Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 7, Oct. 21, and repeated to London, Bonn, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, Luxembourg, and Ottawa. A 46-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 390. The list of principal participants, not provided in the source text, was taken from the verbatim record.

2 For a telegraphic summary of the first meeting of the Four-Power Conference on Oct. 20, see p. 1408.
g. Secretary pointed out that US had interest in relations between Brussels treaty organization and NATO and proposed addition of following text: "Recognizing the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters." It was agreed to add this language to Article 3 of first protocol.

h. It was agreed that Armaments Control Agency should be located in Paris but that permanent headquarters of Brussels Treaty Organization would continue in London.

Steel then reported results of Paris working group on Brussels, again listing unagreed points. There followed rather intense discussion between Adenauer and Mendes-France of table-listing maximum force levels. Adenauer pointed out that table as submitted by working group resulted in manpower totals for France and Italy [that] were considerably higher than those for Germany. He argued that effective manpower ceilings were more important than ceilings on number of divisions which should be subject to modification as military requirements changed and proposed deleting division ceilings and substituting manpower figures tabled by each country at first meeting of working group which would provide 585,000 for French and 500,000 for Germany. Mendes-France pointed out that problem was to set maximum force limits and not to forecast forces which countries would actually raise. He argued that requirements for flexibility were met better by formula in working group table than by ceiling on manpower. He urged Adenauer to withdraw his proposal in view of very delicate nature of this question. Eden then proposed formula whereby Germany would be limited to forces provided in Paris treaty and other countries would be limited to forces agreed in 54 AR. He then suggested adjournment for lunch to give Ministers time to consider difficult problem.

--

2The document under reference is NPC/Paris-D/2 of Oct. 19, not printed, which contained the drafts of the four protocols to the Brussels Treaty under consideration by the Nine-Power Conference. The first protocol was drafted by the Brussels Treaty Working Group in London, while the last three were written by the Brussels Treaty Working Party in Paris and approved by the Paris Steering Group. Protocol II was circulated separately because of its security classification. The texts of NPC/Paris-D/2, its addendum (Protocol II), and NPC/Paris-D/2 (Final) as approved on Oct. 22 are in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 391. For the final texts of the four protocols, as they were included in the Paris Agreements, see p. 1441.

DULLES-EDEN LUNCHEON MEETING, PARIS, OCTOBER 21, 1954

Editorial Note

During an informal luncheon meeting following the first session of the Nine-Power Conference, Dulles and Eden discussed the possible
stationing of British troops in Austria after their withdrawal from Trieste, United States plans to negotiate a mutual security treaty with Formosa, and the problem of ensuring that the Suez Canal remain open to all traffic. Summaries of the discussion of these three subjects were transmitted to the Department of State in telegrams Dul te 7, 8, and 9, respectively; none are printed here. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 379)

SECOND MEETING OF THE FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE, PALAIS DE CHAILLOT, PARIS, OCTOBER 21, 1954, 3:00 P. M.

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

**FRANCE**
Pierre Mendès-France

**UNITED KINGDOM**
Anthony Eden

**FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY**
Konrad Adenauer

**UNITED STATES**
John Foster Dulles

396.1 PA/10-2154

*Telegraphic Summary by the United States Delegation*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference: Secto 2²

Agreed texts on all outstanding points presented by Working Party to four Foreign Ministers, who gave approval at short meeting 3 p. m. Four Ministers will meet again at 10:45 October 22 to consider text of Allied letter on “similar powers” in article 5 in order give Adenauer opportunity to make statement if this should be necessary. Text of letter and coordination of Four Power texts with Nine Power texts at present under consideration by Working Party.

¹ Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 5 and repeated to Bonn and London. A six-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 378. The list of principal participants, not provided by the source text, was taken from the verbatim record.

² Secto 2 transmitted the summary of the first meeting of the Four-Power Conference, Oct. 20, p. 1408.

SECOND MEETING OF THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE, PALAIS DE CHAILLOT, PARIS, OCTOBER 21, 1954, 4:05 P. M.

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

**BELGIUM**
Paul-Henri Spaak

**LUXEMBOURG**
Joseph Bech

**CANADA**
Lester B. Pearson

**NETHERLANDS**
Johan W. Beyen
THE GERMAN PROBLEM

France
Pierre Mendès-France

Federal Republic
of Germany
Konrad Adenauer

Italy
Gaetano Martino

United Kingdom
Anthony Eden

United States
John Foster Dulles

NATO Observer
Lord Ismay

396.1 PA/19-2254

Telegraphic Summary by the United States Delegation

SECRET
Paris, October 22, 1954—3 p.m.

In final three and one-half hour session, nine power meeting reached agreement on all Brussels treaty protocols. Meeting characterized by French efforts obtain concessions on all points in which they had shown major interest, including long list controlled arms, early consideration arms pool, and channeling United States aid through Brussels organization. French also made new proposal for common schools under Brussels.

One highlight was discussion future ratification plans. Mendes made clear French plan initiate Assembly action November 3, with Assembly approval completed by end year, at latest. Doubled action by Council of Republic possible until January. Spaak hoped complete ratification by end second week January at latest. Martino, however, said impossible complete Italian ratification before end of February at earliest, citing lengthy parliamentary procedures in Italy. Spaak expressed regret Italian timetable and made strong plea for expeditious approval by all.

Below were principal points in substantive discussion:

1. Dispute over force table in Article I Protocol number II finally resolved by stating that air and ground forces which parties would place under SACEUR would not exceed limits specified in EDC

---

1 Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 8, Oct. 22, and repeated to London, Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, Luxembourg, and Ottawa. A 96-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 390. The list of principal participants, not provided in the source text, was taken from the verbatim record.

2 The documents under consideration which dealt with a modification of the Brussels Treaty were the following: Declaration Inviting Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany to Accede to the Brussels Treaty; Protocol I Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty; Protocol II on Forces of Western European Union; Protocol III on the Control of Armaments; and Protocol IV on the Agency of Western European Union for the Control of Armaments. Protocol I was drafted by the Brussels Treaty Working Group in London, while Protocols II through IV were drafted by the Brussels Treaty Working Party in Paris and approved by the Paris Steering Group of NATO. For information concerning these drafting groups, see the editorial notes, pp. 1377 and 1378. For the text of the Declaration and the four Protocols, which were signed in Paris on Oct. 23, see pp. 1440–1457.
special agreement. Special agreement would not be made public, hence avoiding public release force figures for continental Belgian countries. Limits for United Kingdom stated in Article I itself as four divisions and second tactical air force. Problem of planned increase in Italian air force to 1250 needed for interior air defense handled by ministerial understanding that exception be made for Italy to exceed EDC special military agreement figure.

2. Discussion list major weapons subject to control (Protocol III, Article 4), opened with strong pleas by Adenauer, Beyen, and Spaak for keeping list to barest minimum in order insure effective control. Agreement finally reached after item–item consideration. Agree that list would include following: All guided missiles with no exception for smaller anti-aircraft missiles (item 3 on original list), aircraft bombs of more than 1,000 kilograms (item 10), ammunition for weapons described in paragraph 2 of list (item 11) and jet engines, turbopropeller engines and rocket motors (item 11C). Agreed to drop flame throwing equipment (item 3), propellants and explosives (item 12), and machines used only for manufacture of weapons (item 14).

Mendes made special effort retain last item. Other ministers, principally Adenauer, opposed strongly, contending item 14 went beyond London agreement and pointing out great difficulty defining machinery used for weapons production. Mendes finally agreed omission this item, but on understanding question would be discussed by later working group.

2. [sic] Re definition A, B, C, weapons agreed present text Protocol III would not be changed, but that council would be charged with responsibility for more closely defining and up-dating definitions these armaments. No specific agreement on body to undertake this work, but presumably working group intended.

3. Re Protocol IV on agency, French proposed and others accepted new draft Article 10 stating agency “shall direct its attention to production end-items and components listed Annexes 2, 3, and 4 Protocol III, and not to processes. It shall insure that materials and products destined for civilian use are excluded from its operations”. Second sentence Article 7 (1) (A) Protocol IV dropped.

4. Spaak objected to Article 19 Protocol IV as inadequate. Complained Article very important one which had no teeth. Article strengthened to provide: That in case more important infractions, council would invite member concerned to provide necessary explanation. If explanation unsatisfactory, council would take measures it deems necessary in accordance with an agreed procedure. Decision of council under article as revised to be taken by majority vote.

5. Separate cable being sent on discussion United States aid to Western European Union.3

6. Re further consideration arms pool, French introduced new proposal in form of draft resolution citing importance of national organization arms production and calling for conference in Paris December 1 of seven Brussels powers.4 Eden, Spaak and Beyen opposed

---

3 Intra.
4 The text of this resolution, which was tabled by the French Delegation during this meeting and amended as indicated in the source text, was circulated as document NPC/Paris-D/11 (Final) and is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CP 391. The text is printed on p. 1429.
resolution on grounds both procedure and timing. Eden stated his
definite understanding at London that French arms pool proposed
would be studied by expanded Brussels Council after it had been
formed. Beyen concerned over early date, pointing out this would in-
evitably produce wait-and-see attitude among parliamentarians
process ratifying London agreements. After lengthy discussion,
French resolution finally accepted with two changes: (1) Date ad-
vanced to January 17; (2) Only working group to be convened, not
full conference.
7. In discussion NATO resolution implementing Section IV London
act, Mendes introduced new draft protocol providing that Brussels
Council may organize schools and consider other steps for fostering
common doctrine and training. Other ministers had little sympathy
for Mendes explanation that this proposal merely reintroduced EDC
provisions. Other ministers also strongly opposed Mendes resolution
on grounds competition with NATO. Mendes withdrew proposal. 6

6 For the text of the NATO resolution, approved at the Oct. 22 meeting of the
North Atlantic Council, see p. 1431.
6 For two additional reports of this meeting, see the telegraphic summary infra
and the telegraphic report by Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson, p. 1419.

396.1 PA/10-2254

Teleographic Summary by the United States Delegation 1

SECRET PARIS, October 22, 1954—5 p. m.

This is separate cable reporting discussion at final nine-power of
channeling US aid through Brussels. 2

Mendes introduced subject by handing US delegation during meet-
ing proposed revision Article 22 of protocol IV concerning armaments
control agency. Translation French proposal as follows:

"While fully reserving to itself the ultimate right to decide the dis-
tribution of end item aid, the US Government declares that it is ready
to participate with the agency in a procedure for consultation which
would permit an examination on a multilateral basis of the problems
posed by the distribution of that aid. French explained they had in
mind procedure similar to consultation with OEEC re distribution
ERP aid. Secretary pointed out that it would not be possible add much
to what had been said at London. With more time, might be possible
make declaration which would be somewhat more specific than London
remarks and conform more closely to French suggestion."

1 Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 9, Oct. 22, and
2 This is a further report on the discussion which took place during the second
meeting of the Nine-Power Conference on Oct. 21; for two additional reports of
this meeting, see supra and infra.
Secretary then made following points:

(1) US would have to retain right to decide ultimate disposition aid, which appears to be recognized in French suggestion.

(2) US wants to cooperate with new program and see it succeed, we have no desire through our aid program to bring about an armament in excess of that agreed by Brussels powers and no purpose enticing any country into violating its agreements.

(3) At same time, we do not want cumbersome and complicated formal consultative machinery superimposed on what exists. This important practical problem for US from point of view appropriations. Hard enough to get funds obligated before end fiscal year, and if they are not obligated they disappear. Hence essential we not go through unnecessary and time-consuming consultations.

(4) US of course has full desire keep council and through council agency informed so that what we do will be fully taken into account and weighed in relation to total program of armament.

(5) If more complete consultation required, it could be worked out gradually as we go along.

(6) In conclusion, US enthusiastically supporting new project, although we do not want duplication processes already in effect so as to frustrate effort we are making to help build defensive strength Western Europe.

Mendes replied he was fully aware validity of argument that US as distributor aid, must be free to distribute equipment as it wishes. On other hand agency, when it deals with armament problems—which French hope will involve widest scope—will have to take into account equipment which various countries receive from US. Agency cannot make its decisions as to production, standardization, and distribution common orders if it does not take into account what each country receives from US.

Two approaches possible: (1) Agency could itself distribute aid received, which does not appear acceptable to US; or (2) system of coordination and consultation could be established. Although recognizing need to avoid duplication, also clear would not be efficient if there were no close liaison between equipment coming from outside and that being produced on continent. Hence would like to see established procedure comparable to that for OEEC in distribution ERP aid.

Beyen expressed obvious interest of other receiving countries in French proposal and asked that they have better opportunity consider it. Eden raised question whether Article 22 protocol IV, which states only that agency will receive from council information rest aid received from US and Canada, will remain unchanged. Mendes stressed importance which Assembly attaches to Brussels role re US aid and urged again acceptance OEEC-type consultation, if channeling aid not possible.
Adenauer stated that questions raised by Mendes come within framework of functions of arms pool, not within functions control agency. Agreed at London that questions relating arms pool should be discussed within expanded Brussels framework as soon as necessary prerequisites established. Adenauer agreed, however, that every receiving state had interest in knowing what other Brussels states receiving in way of US aid.

Secretary replied that he would not be able to elaborate much further. However, wanted to make clear that it was our eager desire see common agencies develop to maximum extent possible, and to extent we can help in such development, are glad to do so. However, we already have close relationships through MAAGs and through NATO; we do not want to pile machinery on machinery. Once Brussels council and agency get to operating and we see relationship it develops with NATO and member countries, US will certainly be disposed to adapt its processes to that. However, in advance of knowing how Brussels organs will work out, US would prefer letting general statement of our purpose stand. US would be very glad to consider problem further in connection with studies which council is making and to participate in those further studies.

Mendes stressed again importance aid question and of US willingness consider again French proposals after Brussels studies. Eden pointed out that it had been very welcome practice for US and Canada to attend Brussels treaty meetings as observers. Therefore, assumed that US and Canada would continue to participate in observer role when future studies undertaken.

Mendes asked that whole of above discussion be on record because of its importance.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 386

Telegraphic Report by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Anderson)²

CONFIDENTIAL      PARIS, October 22, 1954.

Defto 242. Nine power meeting which Hensel and I attended with Secretary Dulles yesterday was successful and NATO meeting to be held this afternoon should proceed smoothly. State Department has reported details in full.²

During discussion of protocol establishing arms agency Mendes-France approached U.S. delegation with proposal that U.S. agree to distribution of military aid by Brussels Treaty agency, along lines

¹Transmitted to the Department of Defense as telegram Defto 242, Oct. 22, with instructions that it be delivered to Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford; copies were also sent to the Department of State and the Foreign Operations Administration.
²For two telegraphic summaries of this meeting by the U.S. Delegation, see supra and p. 1418.
employed in Marshall Plan. Secretary Dulles ably presented U.S. position, indicating that U.S. Government had to retain full authority over distribution and utilization of end items provided by U.S. taxpayers. In addition he could see no reason for establishment of additional elaborate machinery to be superimposed on existing MAAG structure and NATO relationships. Mendes-France attempted to obtain U.S. acquiescence to future acceptance of French proposal, and Secretary Dulles skillfully rebutted by indicating only that U.S. was, as always, prepared to adapt its processes and procedures for the administration of end item aid, when and if an effective agency was developed and after we saw what its role would be and how it would relate to the existing NATO procedures.

Final text adopted indicates only that the Brussels Council shall transmit to its arms agency “information received from the governments of the U.S. and Canada respecting military aid to be furnished to the forces on the mainland of Europe of members of the Western European Union”. Ambassador Dillon indicated that he felt this statement, which will be made available in the record, represented a sufficient additional expression of U.S. position for Mendes-France’s purposes.

Protocol establishing maximum force levels for Brussels nations was recast to refer to force levels stipulated in EDC protocol. After uneasy discussion between French and Germans as to nature of proposed protocol. Germans desired inclusion of maximum manpower figures whereas French wanted to include figures of maximum numbers of divisions which would show an eighteen dash twelve ratio between France and Germany. Believe end product most satisfactory from all points of view, especially since it obviates security problem which would have been raised by the publication of actual maximum force figures.

On General Collins’ suggestion Secretary Dulles proposed and the Nine Powers agreed to include in the protocol modifying the Brussels treaty a phrase as follows: “Recognizing the undesirability of duplicating the military staff of NATO, the Council and its agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters”.

The French dragged out their arms pool proposal once again and after tough discussion, with Dutch taking the lead, it was agreed that a Working Group would be convened on January 17 to consider the French proposals made in London on this matter. French had originally desired conference to be called on December 1 which, as the Dutch rightly pointed out, would have placed parliamentary action in ratifying the various protocols in the shadow of the action by said conference.

In consideration NATO resolution, which was eventually passed
without difficulty, French proposed establishment common schools and training under the Brussels Council. This proposition was defeated by Secretary Dulles referring to the point earlier agreed for inclusion in the protocol to the Brussels Treaty as reported above and to paragraph 13 of the resolution strengthening NATO, which paragraph had been inserted on the insistence of the French in the Working Group.

Mendes-France indicated that he will commence the ratification process with his parliament on three November with a prospect of completion before the end of the year. Martino, Italian Foreign Minister, stated that even with an ordre d'urgence he could not complete Italian parliamentary action before the end of February. Spaak stated he hoped to complete Belgian process in first half of January.

While NATO meeting remains to be completed, signature of various documents has been scheduled for Saturday afternoon and pending unforeseen and unfortunate circumstances entire package should be concluded by late tomorrow afternoon.

[Anderson]

DULLES–MARTINO MEETING, PARIS, OCTOBER 22, 1954

Editorial Note

On Friday morning, October 22, Dulles held a half-hour meeting with Italian Foreign Minister Martino during which a general discussion took place concerning problems of interest to both Italy and the United States, such as the Trieste settlement, the question of associate membership in the United Nations, and the negotiations over the Saar issue. A summary of this meeting was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Dulte 12, October 22. (110.11 DU/10–2254)

THIRD MEETING OF THE FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE, PALAIS DE CHAILLOT, PARIS, OCTOBER 22, 1954, 3 P. M.

Principal Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>France</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pierre Mendès-France</td>
<td>Anthony Eden</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federal Republic of Germany</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Konrad Adenauer</td>
<td>John Foster Dulles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Editorial Note

The four Foreign Ministers held a brief meeting at which they noted that the remaining unresolved points in the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of
Germany and its five attached schedules had been resolved by a Working Group made up of members of each of the four participating countries' delegations. For the text of the Protocol, see page 1435. A three-page verbatim record of this meeting is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 378; no telegraphic summary was found in Department of State files.

**NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL MEETING, PALAIS DE CHAILLOT, PARIS, OCTOBER 22, 1954, 3:15 P.M.**

**Principal Participants**

*Chairman*

Stephanos Stephanopoulos  
*Vice-Chairman and Secretary General*

Lord Ismay

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Belgium</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Luxembourg</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paul-Henri Spaak</td>
<td></td>
<td>Joseph Bech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antoine Spinon</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nic Hommel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andre de Staercke</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Canada</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lester B. Pearson</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Foulkes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. Dana Wilgress</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Denmark</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H. C. Hansen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. J. C. Qvistgaard</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthon Vestbirk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>France</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pierre Mendès-France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmanuel Temple</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roland de Moustier</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Greece</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Panayotis Kanellopoulos</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georges Exintaris</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Iceland</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kristinn Guðmundsson</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petur Benediktsson</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hans G. Andersen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Italy</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gaetano Martino</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paolo E. Taviani</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adolfo Alessandrini</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Netherlands</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Johan W. Beyen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornelius Staaf</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonkheer A. W. L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Norway</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Halvard M. Lange</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kai Knudsen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arne Skaug</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Portugal</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paulo A. V. Cunha</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santos Costa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comte de Tovar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Turkey</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fuad Köprülü</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuri Birgi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatin R. Zorlu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>United Kingdom</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anthony Eden</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harold Macmillan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christopher Steel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>United States</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John Foster Dulles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Struve Hensel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John C. Hughes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Federal Republic of Germany** | | |
|---------------------------------||
| Konrad Adenauer                | | |
Telegraphic Summary by the United States Delegation

SECRET

PARIS, October 22, 1954—midnight.

At beginning of meeting, Chairman asked whether there would be any objections to Chancellor’s participation as observer. There were no objections. In brief opening statement under item I of agenda (C–A (54) 39 (3rd revise)) chairman emphasized significance Atlantic character of alliance specifically mentioning United States and Canada. In addition, applauded admission of Germany into Western family and settlement of Trieste issue.

Under item II, Eden as Four-Power chairman, reported results Four-Power meeting (C–M(54) 91).

Under item III, Eden as chairman of Nine-Power meeting, reported briefly on its accomplishments, noting that Brussels Treaty Organization had been strengthened particularly through accession of Germany and Italy and would provide focus for European unity. Emphasized new organization was not set up as rival to NATO, would not duplicate NATO machinery, but would maintain closest cooperation with NATO. Expressed hope NAC would permit NATO machinery and staff to cooperate with Western European Union. Eden then suggested NAC adopt resolution signifying its approval of Four-Power arrangements re termination of occupation regime and new arrangements worked out by Brussels Treaty powers. Suggestion was accepted and drafting committee prepared draft resolution which was subsequently approved with minor amendments at end of meeting. Text of resolution will be published tomorrow with other documents.

During course above discussion Lange (Norway) said since Council being asked approve Nine-Power protocols would be necessary circulate EDC special agreement to NATO members since had not been previously circulated and since it was specifically referred to in para 1(A) of article I of protocol II. Was agreed by EDC countries special agreement could be circulated on confidential basis to members NAC.

1 Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 12, Oct. 22, and repeated to all NATO capitals, Wiesbaden, and Heidelberg. A 10-page summary record and a 27-page verbatim record of this 39th meeting of the Council are in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, OF 392. The list of principal participants, not provided in the source text, was taken from the summary record.

2 Not printed. A copy of this revised agenda of Oct. 22 is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, OF 392.

3 Documentation concerning the Trieste settlement is presented in volume viii.

4 Document C–M (54) 91 contains the text of the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany with its five attached schedules along with a covering note by Lord Ismay which indicated that it had been approved by the four Foreign Ministers for signature; a copy of this document is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, OF 392. For the text of the Protocol, see p. 1431.

5 The proposal recommended by Eden is the Resolution on Results of the Four- and Nine-Power Meetings; for the text of this resolution, see p. 1429.
Re Nine-Power resolution concerning study of proposals relative to production and standardization of armaments (C-M(54)89 (revised)). Pearson (Canada) suggested Working Group studying these proposals should ask representative NATO international staff assist them in line with Eden's earlier suggestion re cooperation with NATO. Italian and Greek Foreign Ministers supported Canada's suggestion. Greek also suggested that any proposals Working Group might make should be submitted not only to W.E.U. but to NAC as well. No one objected.

During course discussion item III, Turkish Foreign Minister praised Eden, Secretary, Mendes-France, and Adenauer for results which had flowed from London conference. Noted Turkey had always been attached to idea of European integration. Said "when time comes" Turkey will be ready to occupy place in new organization. (This connection Hughes saw Zorlu this morning. In this afternoon's NAC meeting, Turkish Foreign Minister did not make proposal indicated first para Tosec 12, October 21.)

Re item IV, only comment came from Portuguese Foreign Minister who wanted it placed on record that Portugal was not included in area of Allied Command Europe. Resolution was adopted without change.8

Re item V, eleven other members of NATO associated themselves in brief statements containing varying minor reservations with Three-Power London Declaration re FedRep and draft resolution of association was adopted without change.9

Re item VI, protocol of accession of FedRep to NATO was adopted without change after brief statements by Italian, Danish, Norwegian, and Greek Foreign Ministers.10 Danish Foreign Minister expressed hope German entry in NATO would prove to be forerunner satisfactory solution Danish minority problem in Schleswig-Holstein. Was

---

8 A copy of this draft resolution is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 392; for the text of this resolution, see p. 1490.
9 Not printed; it informed the U.S. Delegation in Paris that the Turkish Embassy had advised the Department of State on Oct. 20 that the Turkish Government desired to accede to the Brussels Treaty and was therefore concerned about the decision that future accessions were dependent upon unanimous consent of all treaty signatories. They intended to propose during the present Council meeting that any NATO member could accede to the Brussels Treaty without unanimous consent. (396.1 PA/10-2154)
10 The item under reference is the Resolution To Implement Section IV of the Final Act of the London Conference Concerning the Powers of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. A draft of this resolution, which was circulated as document C-M(54)85, is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 392; for the approved text of this resolution, see p. 1431.
11 For the approved text of the Resolution of Association with the Tripartite Declaration of Oct. 3, 1954, see p. 1432; the draft of this resolution, which was circulated as document C-M(54)82, is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 392.
12 The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany is printed on p. 1456; earlier drafts of this protocol, which were circulated as documents C-M(54)83 and C-M(54)83(Revised) of Oct. 16 and Oct. 19, respectively, are in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 392.
agreed protocol would be signed in Palais at approximately 4:30 Saturday afternoon.

Re item VII, Chairman noted annual review report and capabilities study would be ready for consideration by Ministers by mid-December and proposed that NAC agree in principle meet about that time. Suggested exact date could be recommended later by permanent reps. This was agreed.

Under item VIII (any other business) Italian Foreign Minister commented briefly on Trieste settlement expressing appreciation for sympathy from France and assistance from U.S. and U.K. Portuguese Foreign Minister invited attention to Goa situation saying might be necessary some day raise matter before Council under article IV of N.A. Treaty. Secretary, Mendes-France and Eden then made statements commenting on significance of developments during past several weeks. (See separate tel reporting their remarks in extenso.)

Meeting then adjourned for thirty minutes since drafting groups on communiqué and resolution suggested by Eden had not finished their work. Meeting then reassembled and adopted resolution suggested by Eden. As drafting group had still not finished communiqué, chairman suggested that meeting consider itself Fifteen-Power conference to enable it to hear remarks from Chancellor. Adenauer then made very brief statement commenting on importance which German people as whole would attach to today's decisions. Meeting then reconstituted itself as NAC and approved communiqué with a few drafting amendments suggested by Secretary and by Eden.

---

11 The editors were unable to identify further the telegram under reference.

---

DULLES-EDEN MEETING, PARIS, OCTOBER 23, 1954

Editorial Note

During the morning of Saturday, October 23, Dulles, accompanied by General Gruenther, spoke with Eden and Macmillan concerning the stationing of their troops in Trieste, and the British gave the impression that these troops would not be sent to Austria but would be brought home. Dulles then spoke with Eden about the British pledge to help finance UNRRA. Summaries of the discussion of these two subjects were transmitted to the Department of State in telegrams Dulle 14 and 15 from Paris, October 23; telegram Dulle 14 is printed in the compilation on Austria in volume VII. Telegram Dulle 15, not printed, is in Department of State file 357.AD/10-254.
SIGNING CEREMONIES FOR THE PARIS AGREEMENTS, PARIS, OCTOBER 23, 1954

Editorial Note

At 2:45 p. m. on Saturday, October 23, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany met in the traditional Clock Room of the French Foreign Ministry to sign the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Tripartite Agreement on the Exercise of Retained Rights in Germany. A photograph of the signing is printed on page 570.

Immediately following this ceremony, the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg gathered in the same room to sign the Declaration Inviting Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany To Accede to the Brussels Treaty and its four Protocols.

At 4:30 p. m. that afternoon, the 14 Foreign Ministers of the NATO countries met at the Palais de Chaillot for a formal signing ceremony for the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany. A photograph of the signing is printed on page 569. For the texts of all the documents noted above, which were subsequently referred to collectively as the Paris Agreements, see pages 1435 ff.

DULLES-EDEN-MENDÈS-FRANCE MEETING, PARIS, OCTOBER 23, 1954

Editorial Note

Following the signing ceremonies, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France held an informal meeting during which they discussed the role of Jules Moch at the United Nations, how they should respond to the Soviet note of October 23, and the situation in Indochina. A summary of the discussion of these three subjects was transmitted to the Department of State in telegrams 1715, 1716, and 1717 from Paris, October 23; telegram 1715 is not printed (396-1 PA/10-2354), telegram 1716 is printed on page 1462, and telegram 1717 is printed in volume XIII, Part 2, page 2165.

2. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 378

*Report by the Bonn Working Group on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany*¹

Bonn, 16 October 1954.

The Committee of representatives of the Governments of the Federal

¹ Attached to the source text, in addition to a cover sheet and list of contents, were five annexes totaling approximately 110 pages. The annexes, not printed
Republic of Germany, the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States established in accordance with the Final Act of the Nine Power Conference, signed in London on the 3rd of October, to complete the final texts of the necessary Instruments for the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany has met in Bonn and submits the following report.

Recommendations

2. There is submitted herewith at Annex 'A' ² and recommended for the consideration of the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers, a draft Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany together with five Schedules annexed to it, setting out amendments to the Agreements between the four Governments signed at Bonn on the 26th of May 1952.

3. There are also submitted at Annex 'B' ³ certain draft Exchanges of Letters which it is recommended should be signed on the occasion of the signing of the Protocol. The Foreign Ministers will note that this Annex includes an Exchange of Letters concerning the affirmation, deletion or amendment, as appropriate, of the various published letters which related to the signing of the Bonn Conventions. The draft Exchange of Letters also includes one relating to certain other documents written at that time but not published.

4. In the preparation of Annex 'B', no action has been taken with regard to the Letters connected with the signature of the Treaty on the Establishment of the European Defence Community, which are set out in the Federal Government's Official Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt) 1954, Part II Number 3 at pages 416 to 418 inclusive, but it was agreed that this did not preclude discussion of their subject matter at some other time.

5. It is recommended that the Foreign Ministers note the agreed comments in Annex 'E'. ³

Request for decision

The Stationing of Forces in the Federal Republic

6. Annex 'C' ² to this Report sets out texts of Articles 2, 4 and 5 of the Relations Convention, with annotations showing the differences of opinion. Annex 'D' ³ sets out a German proposal for the separate Con-

² Not printed. For the text of the final Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime, see p. 1425.
³ Not printed, but see footnote 1 above.
vention referred to in the Note to the German text of paragraph 2 of Article 4 in Annex ‘C’. The essential difference between the various positions is the following. The U.S., U.K. and French Delegations feel that the right to station forces in Germany deriving from the instruments to which their Governments and the Soviet Union are parties relate to Germany as a whole and that this right is indivisible. While they feel that any language casting doubt on the maintenance of this right would weaken the Western position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union with respect to Berlin and in negotiations on the reunification of Germany, they agree that the exercise of the right in the territory of the Federal Republic should be on a contractual basis after the entry into force of the arrangements for the German defence contribution. The German delegation feels that the right to station forces cannot be a reserved right and at the same time be based on a contractual relationship. They consider that it is not indivisible but can be relinquished for the western part of Germany, and that it is not needed vis-à-vis the Soviets, who themselves base the stationing of their forces in Eastern Germany on the contractual consent of the G.D.R. The other three delegations do not agree that the Soviet Declaration on Relations with the G.D.R. places the Soviet forces in the East Zone on a contractual basis. This difference of opinion is submitted to Ministers for decision.

Note

The following action will be required when Ministers have agreed the texts of Articles 2, 4 and 5 of the Relations Convention:

(i) Insert the agreed texts of those Articles in Schedule I to the Protocol.
(ii) Amend the references in Article 9(3) of the Relations Convention.
(iii) Amend the reference to Article 2(1) (c) of the Relations Convention in Letter No. 2 in Bundesgesetzeblatt 1954, Teil II, Nr. 3, page 244, by completing the Schedule to Letter (h) in Annex ‘B’ to take account of the change of numbering of the provision relevant to Letter No. 2.

 Tripartite Statement on Berlin by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France ¹

PARIS, October 23, 1954.

With respect to Berlin, in addition to the Allied security guarantees for the city in the London communiqué of October 3, 1954, the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States have noted with deep satisfaction the close and friendly cooperation between

¹ Reprinted from the Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 15, 1954, p. 732. For information concerning the issuance of this statement, see the editorial note, p. 1461.
the Allied and Berlin authorities. The Three Powers are determined to ensure the greatest possible degree of self-government in Berlin compatible with Berlin's special situation. Accordingly, the three Governments have instructed their representatives in Berlin to consult with the authorities of that city with a view to implementing jointly and to the fullest degree possible the foregoing principles.

Resolution on Production and Standardization of Armaments

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS, 22 October, 1954.

The Governments of the Kingdom of Belgium, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

Anxious to increase the effectiveness of their common Defence forces to the maximum,

Desirous of ensuring the best possible use of their available armament credits by means of the rational organization of production,

Noting the importance in this connection of standardising weapons and weapon components,

Desirous of facilitating any agreements to this end between all or certain of the Seven Powers:

(1) Recall the decision taken at the London Conference to set up a Working Party to study the draft directives submitted by the French Government on 1st October 1954 and such other documents as might subsequently be submitted on the problem of the production and standardisation of armaments.

(2) Agree to convene a Working Group in Paris on the 17th January 1955 of the Representatives of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, to study the draft directives and other documents referred to in the foregoing paragraph, with a view to submitting proposals to the Council of Western European Union when it comes into being.

Resolution on Results of the Four- and Nine-Power Meetings

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS, 22 October, 1954.

The North Atlantic Council:

Recognising that all the arrangements arising out of the London

---

1 This resolution, which was circulated as document NPC/Paris-D/11(Final), was approved by the Nine-Power Conference during its second meeting on Oct. 21; see p. 1414.

---

1 This resolution, which was circulated as document C-M(54)88(Final), was approved by the North Atlantic Council during its meeting on Oct. 22; for a record of that meeting, see p. 1422.
Conference form part of one general settlement which is directly or indirectly of concern to all the NATO Powers and has therefore been submitted to the Council for information or decision;

Have learnt with satisfaction of the arrangements agreed between the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and of the Federal Republic of Germany for the termination of the occupation régime in the Federal Republic as set forth in the Protocol communicated to the Council;

Welcome the decision of the Brussels Treaty Powers to invite the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy to accede to the Brussels Treaty as modified and completed by the Protocols and other documents communicated to the Council, and hereby record their agreement with the provisions of those Protocols and documents insofar as they concern action by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;

Welcome the extension of the Brussels Treaty as an important step toward the achievement of European unity; and express confidence that there will be the closest co-operation between the Western European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which remains the foundation of the security and progress of the Atlantic Community.

Take note with satisfaction of the statements made on 29th September 1954 in London by the United States Secretary of State and the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, and of the declaration by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom concerning the maintenance of United Kingdom forces on the continent of Europe;

Finally,

Record their deep satisfaction at the happy conclusion of all the above arrangements which together constitute a decisive step in fortifying the North Atlantic Alliance and uniting the Free World.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CP 392

Resolution Concerning a Study of Proposals Relative to Production and Standardization of Armaments

CONFIDENTIAL

The Governments of [Signatories of Protocol No. 1],

1 This resolution, which was circulated as document C-M (54) 89 (Revised) along with a covering note by Secretary-General Ismay, was discussed by the North Atlantic Council during its meeting on Oct. 22; for a record of that meeting, see p. 1422.

2 The signatories of Protocol I (modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty) are Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom. Brackets in the source text.
Anxious to increase the effectiveness of their common defence forces to the maximum,

Desirous of ensuring the best possible use of their available armament budgets by means of a rational organization of production,

Noting the importance in this connection of standardising weapons and weapon components,

Desirous of facilitating any agreements to this end between all or certain of the Seven Powers:

(1) Recall the decision taken at the London Conference to set up a working Party to study the draft directives submitted by the French Government on 1st October, 1954 and such other documents as might subsequently be submitted on the problem of the production and standardisation of armaments.

(2) Agree to convene a Working Group in Paris on 17th January, 1955 of the Representatives of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom to study the draft directives and other documents referred to in the foregoing paragraph, with a view to submitting proposals to the Council of Western European Union when it comes into being.

CONFIDENTIAL


The North Atlantic Council:

1. Recognising the necessity of strengthening the structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of reinforcing the machinery for the collective defence of Europe, and desirous of specifying the conditions governing joint examination of the defence effort of member countries,

2. Recalls that:

(a) the resources which member nations intend to devote to their defence effort as well as the level, composition and quality of the forces which the member nations are contributing to the defence of the North Atlantic area are each year subject to collective examination in the NATO Annual Review for the purpose of reaching agreement on force goals, taking into account expected mutual aid;

(b) the defence expenditures incurred by the member nations and the extent to which the recommendations emerging from the Annual

1 This draft resolution, which was circulated as document C-M(54)85 along with a covering note by Secretary General Ismay, was approved without change by the North Atlantic Council during its meeting on Oct. 22; for a record of that meeting, see p. 1422.
Review have been carried out are the subject of periodical review during the year.

3. Agrees with the terms of the Agreement on Forces of Western European Union; and that with respect to the forces which the members of Western European Union will place under NATO Command on the mainland of Europe and for which maximum figures have been established in that Agreement, if at any time during the NATO Annual Review recommendations are put forward, the effect of which would be to increase the level of forces above the limits established in this Agreement, the acceptance by the country concerned of such recommended increases shall be subject to unanimous approval by the members of Western European Union, expressed either in the Council of Western European Union or in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

4. Decides that all forces of member nations stationed in the area of the Allied Command Europe shall be placed under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe or other appropriate NATO Command and under the direction of the NATO military authorities with the exception of those forces intended for the defence of overseas territories and other forces which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has recognised or will recognise as suitable to remain under national command.

5. Invites member nations to make an initial report for consideration and recognition by the Council on those forces which they plan to maintain within the area of Allied Command Europe for the common defence, but not to place under the authority of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, taking into account the provisions of relevant NATO directives bearing on that subject; the initial report will include a broad statement of the reason for which the above forces are not so placed. Thereafter, if any changes are proposed, the North Atlantic Council action on the NATO Annual Review will constitute recognition as to the suitability and size of forces to be placed under the authority of the appropriate NATO Command and those to be retained under national command.

6. Notes that the agreements concluded within the framework of the Organization of Western European Union on the internal defence and police forces which the members of that Organization will maintain on the mainland shall be notified to the North Atlantic Council.

7. Agrees, in the interest of most effective collective defence, that in respect of combat forces in the area of Allied Command Europe and under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe;

(a) all deployments shall be in accordance with NATO strategy;
(b) the location of forces in accordance with NATO operational plans shall be determined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe after consultation and agreement with the national authorities concerned;

(c) forces under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and within the area of Allied Command Europe shall not be redeployed or used operationally within that area without the consent of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, subject to political guidance furnished by the North Atlantic Council, when appropriate, through normal channels.

8. Decides that:

(a) integration of forces at Army Group and Tactical Air Force level shall be maintained;

(b) in view of the powerful combat support units and logistic support organization at Army level, integration at that level and associated Air Force level will be the rule, wherever formations of several nationalities are operating in the same area and on a common task, provided there are no overriding objections from the point of view of military effectiveness;

(c) wherever military efficiency permits, in light of the size, location and logistic support of forces, integration at lower levels, both in the land and air forces, shall be achieved to the maximum extent possible;

(d) proposals to the North Atlantic Council, indicating any increases in commonly financed items of expenditure, such as infrastructure which might be entailed by the adoption of such measures, should be submitted by the NATO military authorities.

9. Agrees that, in order to improve the capability of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe to discharge his responsibilities in the defence of Allied Command Europe, his responsibilities and powers for the logistic support of the forces placed under his authority shall be extended.

10. Considers that these increased responsibilities and powers should include authority:

(a) to establish, in consultation with the national authorities concerned, requirements for the provision of logistic resources;*

(b) to determine, in agreement with the national authorities concerned, their geographic distribution;

(c) to establish, in consultation with these authorities, logistic priorities for the raising, equipping and maintenance of units;

(d) to direct the utilisation, for meeting his requirements, of those portions of the logistic support systems made available to him by the appropriate authorities;

(e) to co-ordinate and supervise the use, for logistical purposes, of

*By logistic resources should be understood all the matériel, supplies, installations and parts thereof necessary for the prolonged conduct of combat operations. [Footnote in the source text.]
NATO common infrastructure facilities and of those national facilities made available to him by the national authorities.

11. Agrees that in order to ensure that adequate information is obtained and made available to the appropriate authorities about the forces placed under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe including reserve formations and their logistic support within the area of Allied Command Europe, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe shall be granted increased authority to call for reports regarding the level and effectiveness of such forces and their armaments, equipment and supplies as well as the organization and location of their logistic arrangements. He shall also make field inspections within that area as necessary.

12. Invites nations to submit to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe such reports to this end as he may call for from time to time; and to assist inspection within the area of Allied Command Europe by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe of these forces and their logistic support arrangements as necessary.

13. Confirms that the powers exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe in peacetime extend not only to the organization into an effective integrated force of the forces placed under him but also to their training; that in this field, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe has direct control over the higher training of all national forces assigned to his command in peacetime; and that he should receive facilities from member nations to inspect the training of those cadre and other forces within the area of Allied Command Europe earmarked for that Command.

14. Directs the NATO military authorities to arrange for the designation by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe of a high-ranking officer of his Command who will be authorised to transmit regularly to the Council of Western European Union information relating to the forces of the members of Western European Union on the mainland of Europe acquired as a result of the reports and inspections mentioned in paragraphs 11 and 12 in order to enable that Council to establish that the limits laid down in the special agreement mentioned in paragraph 3 above are being observed.

15. Agrees that the expression “the area of Allied Command Europe” as used throughout this resolution shall not include North Africa; and that this Resolution does not alter the present status of the United Kingdom and United States forces in the Mediterranean.

16. Directs the NATO Military Committee to initiate the necessary changes in the directives to give effect to the above policies and objectives of the North Atlantic Council.
CONFIDENTIAL

Draft Resolution of Association

PARIS, October 16, 1954.

The North Atlantic Council,

Welcoming the declaration made in London by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on 3rd October, 1954 (Annex A), and the related declaration made on the same occasion by the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic (Annex B),

Notes with satisfaction that the representatives of the other Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty have, on behalf of their Governments today associated themselves with the aforesaid declaration of the Three Powers.

1 This draft resolution, which was circulated as document C-M(54)82 along with a covering note by Secretary General Ismay, was approved without change by the North Atlantic Council during its meeting on Oct. 22; for a record of that meeting, see p. 1422.


Editorial Note

The following documents, which were signed in Paris on October 23 by representatives of the Four-Power Conference, the Nine-Power Conference, and the North Atlantic Ministerial Council, were commonly referred to as the “Paris Agreements”: Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany, Tripartite Agreement on the Exercise of Retained Rights in Germany, Declaration Inviting Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany To Accede to the Brussels Treaty, Protocols to the Brussels Treaty, and Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany. Information concerning the drafting, approval, and signature of these documents is given in the annotation provided with each text.

CONFIDENTIAL

Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany

PARIS, October 21, 1954.

The United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Brit-
ain and Northern Ireland, the French Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany agree as follows:

**Article 1**

The Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, the Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Finance Convention, the Convention on the Settlement of Matters arising out of the War and the Occupation, signed at Bonn on 26 May 1952, the Protocol signed at Bonn on 27 June 1952 to correct certain textual errors in the aforementioned Conventions, and the Agreement on the Tax Treatment of the Forces and their Members signed at Bonn on 26 May 1952, as amended by the Protocol signed at Bonn on 26 July 1952, shall be amended in accordance with the five Schedules to the present Protocol and as so amended shall enter into force (together with subsidiary documents agreed by the Signatory States relating to any of the aforementioned instruments) simultaneously with it.

**Article 2**

Pending the entry into force of the arrangements for the German Defence Contribution, the following provisions shall apply:

(1) The rights heretofore held or exercised by the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic relating to the fields of disarmament and demilitarisation shall be retained and exercised by them, and nothing in any of the instruments mentioned in Article 1 of the present Protocol shall authorise the enactment, amendment, repeal or deprivation of effect of legislation or, subject to the provisions of paragraph (2) of this Article, executive action in those fields by any other authority.

(2) On the entry into force of the present Protocol, the Military Security Board shall be abolished (without prejudice to the validity of any action or decisions taken by it) and the controls in the fields of disarmament and demilitarisation shall thereafter be applied by a Joint Four-Power Organization to which each of the Signatory States

---

1 Documentation concerning these Conventions and Protocols signed at Bonn on May 23, is presented in volume vii.
2 The five Schedules attached to the source text, not printed, are as follows: Schedule I—Amendments to the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany; Schedule II—Amendments to the Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany; Schedule III—Amendments to the Finance Convention; Schedule IV—Amendments to the Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation; and Schedule V—Amendments to the Agreement on the Tax Treatment of the Forces and their Members. The texts of these Schedules are printed in 6 UST (pt. 4) 4117.
shall appoint one representative and which shall take its decisions by majority vote of the four members.

(3) The Governments of the Signatory States will conclude an administrative agreement which shall provide, in conformity with the provisions of this Article, for the establishment of the Joint Four-Power Commission and its staff and for the organization of its work.

ARTICLE 3

(1) The present Protocol shall be ratified or approved by the Signatory States in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. The Instruments of Ratification or Approval shall be deposited by the Signatory States with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

(2) The present Protocol and subsidiary documents relating to it agreed between the Signatory States shall enter into force upon the deposit by all the Signatory States of the Instruments of Ratification of Approval as provided in paragraph 1 of this Article.

(3) The present Protocol shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, which will furnish each Signatory State with certified copies thereof and notify each State of the date of entry into force of the present Protocol.

In faith whereof the undersigned Representatives duly authorized thereto have signed the present Protocol.4

DONE at Paris this ——— day of October, 1954, in three texts, in the English, French and German languages, all being equally authentic.

4 During the ceremonies in Paris on Oct. 23, the source text was signed by John Foster Dulles, Anthony Eden, Pierre Mendès-France, and Konrad Adenauer.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 892

Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS, October 22, 1954.

In view of the present international situation and the need to ensure the defence of the free world which require the continuing presence of foreign forces in the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the French Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany agree as follows:

1 The source text was circulated as document C-M(54)92 along with a covering note by Secretary General Ismay.
ARTICLE 1

1. From the entry into force of the arrangements for the German Defence Contribution, forces of the same nationality and effective strength as at that time may be stationed in the Federal Republic.

2. The effective strength of the forces stationed in the Federal Republic pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article may at any time be increased with the consent of the Government of the Federal Republic.

3. Additional forces of the States parties to the present Convention may enter and remain in the Federal territory with the consent of the Government of the Federal Republic for training purposes in accordance with the procedures applicable to forces assigned to the Supreme Allied Command, Europe, provided that such forces do not remain there for more than 30 days at any one time.

4. The Federal Republic grants to the French, the United Kingdom and the United States forces the right to enter, pass through, and depart from the territory of the Federal Republic in transit to or from Austria (so long as their forces continue to be stationed there) or any country Member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, on the same basis as is usual between Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty or as may be agreed with effect for all Member States by the North Atlantic Council.

ARTICLE 2

The present Convention shall be open to accession by any State not a Signatory, which had forces stationed in the Federal territory on the date of the signature of the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany at Paris on October 1954. Any such State, desiring to accede to the present Convention, may deposit with the Government of the Federal Republic an Instrument of Accession.

ARTICLE 3

1. The present Convention shall expire with the conclusion of a German peace settlement or, if, at an earlier time the Signatory States agree that the development of the international situation justifies new arrangements.

2. The Signatory States will review the terms of the present Convention at the same time and subject to the same conditions as provided for in Article 10 of the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany.

ARTICLE 4

The present Convention shall be ratified or approved by the Signatory States and Instruments of Ratification or Approval shall be
deposited by them with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. It shall enter into force when all the Signatory States have made such deposit and the Instrument of Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty has been deposited with the Government of the United States of America.

It shall also enter into force on that date as to any acceding State which has previously deposited an Instrument of Accession in accordance with Article 2 of the present Convention and, as to any other acceding State, on the date of the deposit by it of such an Instrument.

The present Convention shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, which will furnish each State party to the present Convention with certified copies thereof and of the Instruments of Accession deposited in accordance with Article 2 and will notify each State of the date of the entry into force of the present Convention and the date of the deposit of any Instrument of Accession.

In faith whereof the undersigned Representatives duly authorised there have signed the present Convention.

Done at Paris this ———— day of October, 1954, in three texts, in the English, French and German languages, all being equally authentic.²

²During the ceremonies in Paris on Oct. 23, the source text was signed by John Foster Dulles, Anthony Eden, Pierre Mendès-France, and Konrad Adenauer.

Tripartite Agreement on the Exercise of Retained Rights in Germany ¹

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic agree as follows:

1. The rights retained by the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic after the entry into force of the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, which are referred to in the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany as amended by the said Protocol, will be exercised by their respective Chiefs of Mission accredited to the Federal Republic of Germany.

2. The Chiefs of Mission will act jointly in the exercise of those rights in the Federal Republic of Germany in matters the Three Powers consider of common concern under the said Protocol and the instruments mentioned in Article 1 thereof.

3. Those rights which relate to Berlin will continue to be exercised in Berlin pursuant to existing procedures, subject to any future modification which may be agreed.

¹ Reprinted from United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (UST), vol. 6 (pt. 5), pp. 5703-5704.
4. This agreement shall enter into force upon the entry into force of the said Protocol.

Done at Paris on the twenty third day of October, Nineteen hundred and fifty-four in two texts, in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

ANTHONY EDEN

For the Government of the French Republic:

MENDÈS-FRANCE

---

Confidential

Paris, October 20, 1954.

The Governments of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, Parties to the Brussels Treaty of March the 17th, 1948, for collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters and for legitimate collective self-defence;

Aware that the principles underlying the association created by the Brussels Treaty are also recognised and applied by the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy;

Noting with satisfaction that their devotion to peace and their allegiance to democratic institutions constitute common bonds between the countries of Western Europe;

Convinced that an association with the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy would represent a new and substantial advance in the direction already indicated by the Treaty;

Decide,

in application of Article IX of the Treaty, to invite the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy to accede to this Treaty, as modified and completed in accordance with the decisions of the Conference held in London from September the 28th to October the 3rd 1954, which are recorded in its Final Act.

---

1 This draft declaration, which was circulated as document C-M(54)90 along with a covering note by Secretary General Ismay, was approved by the Nine-Power Conference during its meetings on Oct. 21; once approved, it was placed on the agenda of the North Atlantic Council meeting on Oct. 22 for information.
PROTOCOL [No. I] MODIFYING AND COMPLETING THE BRUSSELS TREATY

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands and Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Parties to the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, signed at Brussels on March the 17th, 1948, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, on the one hand,

and the President of the Federal Republic of Germany and the President of the Italian Republic on the other hand,

Inspired by a common will to strengthen peace and security;

Desirous to this end of promoting the unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe;

Convinced that the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Republic to the Treaty will represent a new and substantial advance towards these aims;

Having taken into consideration the decisions of the London Conference as set out in the Final Act of October the 3rd, 1954 and its Annexes;

Have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries: ——

Who, having exhibited their full powers found in good and due form,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Republic hereby accede to the Treaty as modified and completed by the present Protocol.

The High Contracting Parties to the present Protocol consider the Protocol on Forces of Western European Union (hereinafter referred

1The source text, which was circulated as document C-M(54)84(Revised) along with a covering note by Secretary General Ismay, was approved by the Nine-Power Conference during its second meeting on Oct. 21. Each of the four Protocols was signed during the ceremonies at Paris on Oct. 23 by Paul-Henri Spaak, Pierre Mendès-France, Konrad Adenauer, Gaetano Martino, Joseph Bech, Johan W. Beyen, and Anthony Eden. For a record of the second meeting of the Nine-Power Conference, see p. 1-14. During the Nine-Power Conference, the source text was circulated as document NPC/Paris-D/2(Final); earlier drafts of the Protocols to the Brussels Treaty are in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 391.
to as Protocol No. II), the Protocol on the Control of Armaments and
its Annexes (hereinafter referred to as Protocol No. III), and the
Protocol on the Agency of Western European Union for the Control
of Armaments (hereinafter referred to as Protocol No. IV) to be an
integral part of the present Protocol.

**Article II**

The sub-paragraph of the Preamble to the Treaty: "to take such
steps as may be held necessary in the event of renewal by Germany of
a policy of aggression" shall be modified to read: "to promote the
unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe".

The opening words of the 2nd paragraph of Article I shall read:
"The co-operation provided for in the preceding paragraph, which
will be effected through the Council referred to in Article VIII . . .".

**Article III**

The following new Article shall be inserted in the Treaty as Article
IV: "In the execution of the Treaty the High Contracting Parties and
any organs established by Them under the Treaty shall work in close
co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization".

Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the Military Staffs of
NATO, the Council and its agency will rely on the appropriate Mili-
tary Authorities of NATO for information and advice on military
matters.

Articles IV, V, VI and VII of the Treaty will become respectively
Articles V, VI, VII and VIII.

**Article IV**

Article VIII of the Treaty (formerly Article VII) shall be modified
to read as follows:

"1. For the purposes of strengthening peace and security and of
promoting unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of
Europe and closer co-operation between Them and with other Euro-
pean organizations, the High Contracting Parties to the Brussels
Treaty shall create a Council to consider matters concerning the execu-
tion of this Treaty and of its Protocols and their Annexes.

"2. This Council shall be known as the ‘Council of Western Euro-
pean Union’; it shall be so organized as to be able to exercise its func-
tions continuously; it shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be
considered necessary: in particular it shall establish immediately an
Agency for the Control of Armaments whose functions are defined in
Protocol No. IV.

"3. At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties the Coun-
cil shall be immediately convened in order to permit Them to consult
with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace,
in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic
stability."
"4. The Council shall decide by unanimous vote questions for which no other voting procedure has been or may be agreed. In the cases provided for in Protocols II, III and IV it will follow the various voting procedures, unanimity, two-thirds majority, simple majority, laid down therein. It will decide by simple majority questions submitted to it by the Agency for the Control of Armaments."

**Article V**

A new Article shall be inserted in the Treaty as Article IX: "The Council of Western European Union shall make an Annual Report on its activities and in particular concerning the control of armaments to an Assembly composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe."

The Articles VIII, IX and X of the Treaty shall become respectively Articles X, XI and XII.

**Article VI**

The present Protocol and the other Protocols listed in Article I above shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Belgian Government.

They shall enter into force when all instruments of ratification of the present Protocol have been deposited with the Belgian Government and the instrument of accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty has been deposited with the Government of the United States of America.

The Belgian Government shall inform the governments of the other High Contracting Parties and the Government of the United States of America of the deposit of each instrument of ratification.

In witness whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Paris this ______ day of October 1954 in two texts, in the English and French languages, each text being equally authoritative in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Belgian Government and of which certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to each of the other Signatories.

**Protocol No. II on Forces of Western European Union**

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, the President of the Italian Republic, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, and Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other
Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Signatories of
the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty,
Having consulted the North Atlantic Council,
Have appointed ————,
Have agreed as follows:

**Article 1**

1. The land and air forces which each of the High Contracting Parties to the present Protocol shall place under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe in peacetime on the mainland of Europe shall not exceed in total strength and number of formations:

   (a) for Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, the maxima laid down for peacetime in the Special Agreement annexed to the Treaty on the Establishment of a European Defence Community signed at Paris, on 27th May, 1952; and

   (b) for the United Kingdom, four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force;

   (c) for Luxembourg, one regimental combat team.

2. The number of formations mentioned in paragraph 1 may be brought up to date and adapted as necessary to make them suitable for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, provided that the equivalent fighting capacity and total strengths are not exceeded.

3. The statement of these maxima does not commit any of the High Contracting Parties to build up or maintain forces at these levels, but maintains their right to do so if required.

**Article 2**

As regards naval forces, the contribution to NATO Commands of each of the High Contracting Parties to the present Protocol shall be determined each year in the course of the Annual Review (which takes into account the recommendations of the NATO military authorities). The naval forces of the Federal Republic of Germany shall consist of the vessels and formations necessary for the defensive missions assigned to it by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization within the limits laid down in the Special Agreement mentioned in Article 1, or equivalent fighting capacity.

**Article 3**

If at any time during the Annual Review recommendations are put forward, the effect of which would be to increase the level of forces above the limits specified in Articles 1 and 2, the acceptance by the country concerned of such recommended increases shall be subject to the unanimous approval of the High Contracting Parties to the pres-
ent Protocol expressed either in the Council of Western European Union or in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

ARTICLE 4

In order that it may establish that the limits specified in Articles 1 and 2 are being observed, the Council of Western European Union will regularly receive information acquired as a result of inspections carried out by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Such information will be transmitted by a high-ranking officer designated for the purpose by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

ARTICLE 5

The strength and armaments of the internal defence and police forces on the mainland of Europe of the High Contracting Parties to the present Protocol shall be fixed by agreements within the Organization of Western European Union, having regard to their proper functions and needs and to their existing levels.

ARTICLE 6

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland will continue to maintain on the mainland of Europe, including Germany, the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces which are now assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, that is to say four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force, or such other forces as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe regards as having equivalent fighting capacity. She undertakes not to withdraw these forces against the wishes of the majority of the High Contracting Parties who should take their decision in the knowledge of the views of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. This undertaking shall not, however, bind her in the event of an acute overseas emergency. If the maintenance of the United Kingdom forces on the mainland of Europe throws at any time too great a strain on the external finances of the United Kingdom, she will, through Her Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, invite the North Atlantic Council to review the financial conditions on which the United Kingdom formations are maintained.

In witness whereof, the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol, being one of the Protocols listed in Article I of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Treaty, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Paris this ——— day of October, 1954, in two texts, in the English and French languages, each text being equally authoritative, in a single copy, which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Belgian Government and of which certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to each of the other Signatories.
PROTOCOL NO. III ON THE CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, the President of the Italian Republic, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Signatories of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty,

Have appointed

Have agreed as follows:

PART I—ARMAMENTS NOT TO BE MANUFACTURED

ARTICLE 1

The High Contracting Parties, members of Western European Union, take note of and record their agreement with the Declaration of the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (made in London on 3rd October, 1954, and annexed hereto as Annex I) in which the Federal Republic of Germany undertook not to manufacture in its territory atomic, biological and chemical weapons. The types of armaments referred to in this Article are defined in Annex II. These armaments shall be more closely defined and the definitions brought up to date by the Council of Western European Union.

ARTICLE 2

The High Contracting Parties, members of Western European Union, also take note of and record their agreement with the undertaking given by the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in the same Declaration that certain further types of armaments will not be manufactured in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, except that if in accordance with the needs of the armed forces a recommendation for an amendment to, or cancellation of, the content of the list of these armaments is made by the competent Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and if the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany submits a request accordingly, such an amendment or cancellation may be made by a resolution of the Council of Western European Union passed by a two-thirds majority. The types of armaments referred to in this Article are listed in Annex III.

PART II—ARMAMENTS TO BE CONTROLLED

ARTICLE 3

When the development of atomic, biological and chemical weapons in the territory on the mainland of Europe of the High Contracting
Parties who have not given up the right to produce them has passed the experimental stage and effective production of them has started there, the level of stocks that the High Contracting Parties concerned will be allowed to hold on the mainland of Europe shall be decided by a majority vote of the Council of Western European Union.

**Article 4**

Without prejudice to the foregoing Articles, the types of armaments listed in Annex IV will be controlled to the extent and in the manner laid down in Protocol No. IV.

**Article 5**

The Council of Western European Union may vary the list in Annex IV by unanimous decision.

*In witness* whereof, the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol, being one of the Protocols listed in Article I of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Treaty, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in Paris on the _____ day of October 1954, in two texts, in the English and French languages, each text being equally authoritative, in a single copy, which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Belgian Government and of which certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to each of the other signatories.

**Annex I**

*The Federal Chancellor declares:*

that the Federal Republic undertakes not to manufacture in its territory any atomic weapons, chemical weapons or biological weapons, as detailed in paragraphs I, II and III of the attached list;*

that it undertakes further not to manufacture in its territory such weapons as those detailed in paragraphs IV, V and VI of the attached list.† Any amendment to or cancellation of the substance of paragraphs IV, V and VI† can, on the request of the Federal Republic, be carried out by a resolution of the Brussels Council of Ministers by a two-thirds majority, if in accordance with the needs of the armed forces a request is made by the competent Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;

that the Federal Republic agrees to supervision by the competent authority of the Brussels Treaty Organization to ensure that these undertakings are observed.

---

* Reproduced in Annex II. [Footnote in the source text.]
† Reproduced in Annex III. [Footnote in the source text.]
Annex II

This list comprises the weapons defined in paragraphs I to III and the factories earmarked solely for their production. All apparatus, parts, equipment, installations, substances and organisms, which are used for civilian purposes or for scientific, medical and industrial research in the fields of pure and applied science shall be excluded from this definition.

I. Atomic Weapons

(a) An atomic weapon is defined as any weapon which contains, or is designed to contain or utilise, nuclear fuel or radioactive isotopes and which, by explosion or other uncontrolled nuclear transformation of the nuclear fuel, or by radioactivity of the nuclear fuel or radioactive isotopes, is capable of mass destruction, mass injury or mass poisoning.

(b) Furthermore, any part, device, assembly or material especially designed for, or primarily useful in, any weapon as set forth under paragraph (a), shall be deemed to be an atomic weapon.

(c) Nuclear fuel as used in the preceding definition includes plutonium, Uranium 233, Uranium 235 (including Uranium 235 contained in Uranium enriched to over 2.1 per cent by weight of Uranium 235) and any other material capable of releasing substantial quantities of atomic energy through nuclear fission or fusion or other nuclear reaction of the material. The foregoing materials shall be considered to be nuclear fuel regardless of the chemical or physical form in which they exist.

II. Chemical Weapons

(a) A chemical weapon is defined as any equipment or apparatus expressly designed to use, for military purposes, the asphyxiating, toxic, irritant, paralysant, growth-regulating, anti-lubricating or catalysing properties of any chemical substance.

(b) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (c), chemical substances, having such properties and capable of being used in the equipment or apparatus referred to in paragraph (a), shall be deemed to be included in this definition.

(c) Such apparatus and such quantities of the chemical substances as are referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) which do not exceed peaceful civilian requirements shall be deemed to be excluded from this definition.

III. Biological Weapons

(a) A biological weapon is defined as any equipment or apparatus
expressly designed to use, for military purposes, harmful insects or
other living or dead organisms, or their toxic products.

(b) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (c), insects, organisms
and their toxic products of such nature and in such amounts as to
make them capable of being used in the equipment or apparatus re-
ferred to in (a) shall be deemed to be included in this definition.

(c) Such equipment or apparatus and such quantities of the in-
sects, organisms and their toxic products as are referred to in
paragraphs (a) and (b) which do not exceed peaceful civilian
requirements shall be deemed to be excluded from the definition of
biological weapons.

Annex III

This list comprises the weapons defined in paragraphs IV to VI and
the factories earmarked solely for their production. All apparatus,
parts, equipment, installations, substances and organisms, which are
used for civilian purposes or for scientific, medical and industrial
research in the fields of pure and applied science shall be excluded
from this definition.

IV. Long-range Missiles, Guided Missiles and Influence Mines

(a) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (d), long-range missiles
and guided missiles are defined as missiles such that the speed or
direction of motion can be influenced after the instant of launching by
a device or mechanism inside or outside the missile, including V-type
weapons developed in the recent war and subsequent modifications
thereof. Combustion is considered as a mechanism which may influence
the speed.

(b) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (d), influence mines
are defined as naval mines which can be exploded automatically by
influences which emanate solely from external sources, including in-
fluence mines developed in the recent war and subsequent modifications
thereof.

(c) Parts, devices or assemblies specially designed for use in or
with the weapons referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) shall be
deemed to be included in this definition.

(d) Proximity fuses, and short-range guided missiles for anti-air-
craft defence with the following maximum characteristics are regarded
as excluded from this definition:

Length, 2 metres;
Diameter, 0.30 centimetres;
Speed, 660 metres per second;
Ground range, 32 kilometres;
Weight of war-head, 22.5 kilogrammes.
V. Warships, with the exception of smaller ships for defence purposes

"Warships, with the exception of smaller ships for defence purposes are:

(a) Warships of more than 3,000 tons displacement;
(b) Submarines of more than 350 tons displacement;
(c) All warships which are driven by means other than steam, Diesel or petrol engines or by gas turbines or by jet engines."

VI. Bomber aircraft for strategic purposes

Annex IV

LIST OF TYPES OF ARMAMENTS TO BE CONTROLLED

1. (a) Atomic
   (b) biological, and
   (c) chemical weapons.
   In accordance with definitions to be approved by the Council of Western European Union as indicated in Article I of the present Protocol.

2. All guns, howitzers and mortars of any types and of any rôles of more than 90 mm. calibre including the following components for these weapons, viz., the elevating mass.

3. All guided missiles.

Definition: Guided missiles are such that the speed or direction or motion can be influenced after the instant of launching by a device or mechanism inside or outside the missile; these include V-type weapons developed in the recent war and modifications thereto. Combustion is considered as a mechanism which may influence the speed.

4. Other self-propelled missiles of a weight exceeding 15 kilogrammes in working order.

5. Mines of all types except anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.

6. Tanks, including the following component parts for these tanks, viz:

   (a) the elevating mass;
   (b) turret castings and/or plate assembly.

7. Other armoured fighting vehicles of an overall weight of more than 10 metric tons.

8. (a) Warships over 1,500 tons displacement;
   (b) submarines;
   (c) all warships powered by means other than steam, diesel or petrol engines or gas turbines;
   (d) small craft capable of a speed of over 30 knots, equipped with offensive armament.
9. Aircraft bombs of more than 1,000 kilogrammes.
10. Ammunition for the weapons described in paragraph 2 above.
11. (a) Complete military aircraft other than:
   (i) all training aircraft except operational types used for training purposes;
   (ii) military transport and communication aircraft;
   (iii) helicopters;

   (b) air frames, specifically and exclusively designed for military aircraft except those at (i), (ii) and (iii) above;
   (c) jet engines, turbo-propeller engines and rocket motors, when these are the principal motive power.

Protocol No. IV on the Agency of Western European Union for the Control of Armaments

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, the President of the Italian Republic, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Signatories of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty,

Having agreed in accordance with Article IV of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Treaty, to establish an Agency for the Control of Armaments,

Have appointed ————,

Have agreed as follows:

Part I—Constitution

Article 1

The Agency for the Control of Armaments (hereinafter referred to as “the Agency”) shall be responsible to the Council of Western European Union (hereinafter referred to as “the Council”). It shall consist of a Director assisted by a Deputy Director, and supported by a staff drawn equitably from nationals of the High Contracting Parties, Members of Western European Union.

Article 2

The Director and his staff, including any officials who may be put at the disposal of the Agency by States Members, shall be subject to the general administrative control of the Secretary General of Western European Union.
ARTICLE 3

The Director shall be appointed by unanimous decision of the Council for a period of five years and shall not be eligible for re-appointment. He shall be responsible for the selection of his staff in accordance with the principle mentioned in Article 1 and in consultation with the individual States Members concerned. Before filling the posts of Deputy Director and of the Heads of Departments of the Agency, the Director shall obtain from the Council approval of the persons to be appointed.

ARTICLE 4

1. The Director shall submit to the Council, through the Secretary General, a plan for the organization of the Agency. The organization should provide for departments dealing respectively with:

(a) the examination of statistical and budgetary information to be obtained from the members of Western European Union and from the appropriate NATO authorities;
(b) inspections, test checks and visits;
(c) administration.

2. The organization may be modified by decision of the Council.

ARTICLE 5

The costs of maintaining the Agency shall appear in the budget of Western European Union. The Director shall submit, through the Secretary General, to the Council an annual estimate of these costs.

ARTICLE 6

Officials of the Agency shall be bound by the full NATO code of security. They shall in no circumstances reveal information obtained in connexion with the execution of their official tasks except and only in the performance of their duties towards the Agency.

PART II—FUNCTIONS

ARTICLE 7

1. The tasks of the Agency shall be:

(a) to satisfy itself that the undertakings set out in Protocol No. III not to manufacture certain types of armaments mentioned in Annexes II and III to that Protocol are being observed;
(b) to control, in accordance with Part III of the present Protocol, the level of stocks of armaments of the types mentioned in Annex IV to Protocol No. III held by each member of Western European Union on the mainland of Europe. This control shall extend to production
and imports to the extent required to make the control of stocks effective.

2. For the purposes mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article, the Agency shall:

(a) scrutinise statistical and budgetary information supplied by members of Western European Union and by the NATO authorities; 
(b) undertake on the mainland of Europe test checks, visits and inspections at production plants, depots and forces (other than depots or forces under NATO authority); 
(c) report to the Council.

ARTICLE 8

With respect to forces and depots under NATO authority, test checks, visits and inspections shall be undertaken by the appropriate authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In the case of the forces and depots under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the Agency shall receive notification of the information supplied to the Council through the medium of the high-ranking officer to be designated by him.

ARTICLE 9

The operations of the Agency shall be confined to the mainland of Europe.

ARTICLE 10

The Agency shall direct its attention to the production of end-items and components listed in Annexes II, III and IV of Protocol No. III, and not to processes. It shall ensure that materials and products destined for civilian use are excluded from its operations.

ARTICLE 11

Inspections by the Agency shall not be of a routine character, but shall be in the nature of tests carried out at irregular intervals. Such inspections shall be conducted in a spirit of harmony and co-operation. The Director shall propose to the Council detailed regulations for the conduct of the inspections providing, inter alia, for due process of law in respect of private interests.

ARTICLE 12

For their test checks, visits and inspections the members of the Agency shall be accorded free access on demand to plants and depots, and the relevant accounts and documents shall be made available to them. The Agency and national authorities shall co-operate in such checks and inspections, and in particular national authorities may, at their own request, take part in them.
ARTICLE 13

1. Each member of Western European Union shall, in respect of its forces under NATO authority stationed on the mainland of Europe, furnish annually to the Agency statements of:

(a) the total quantities of armaments of the types mentioned in Annex IV to Protocol No. III required in relation to its forces;
(b) the quantities of such armaments currently held at the beginning of the control years;
(c) the programmes for attaining the total quantities mentioned in (a) by:

(i) manufacture in its own territory;
(ii) purchase from another country;
(iii) end-item aid from another country.

2. Such statements shall also be furnished by each member of Western European Union in respect of its internal defence and police forces and its other forces under national control stationed on the mainland of Europe including a statement of stocks held there for its forces stationed overseas.

3. The statements shall be correlated with the relevant submissions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

ARTICLE 14

As regards the forces under NATO authority, the Agency shall verify in consultation with the appropriate NATO authorities that the total quantities stated under Article 13 are consistent with the quantities recognised as required by the units of the members concerned under NATO authority, and with the conclusions and data recorded in the documents approved by the North Atlantic Council in connexion with the NATO Annual Review.

ARTICLE 15

As regards internal defence and police forces, the total quantities of their armaments to be accepted as appropriate by the Agency shall be those notified by the members, provided that they remain within the limits laid down in the further agreements to be concluded by the members of Western European Union on the strength and armaments of the internal defence and police forces on the mainland of Europe.

ARTICLE 16

As regards other forces remaining under national control, the total quantities of their armaments to be accepted as appropriate by the Agency shall be those notified to the Agency by the members.
THE GERMAN PROBLEM

ARTICLE 17

The figures furnished by members for the total quantities of armaments under Articles 15 and 16 shall correspond to the size and mission of the forces concerned.

ARTICLE 18

The provisions of Articles 14 and 17 shall not apply to the High Contracting Parties and to the categories of weapons covered in Article 3 of Protocol No. III. Stocks of the weapons in question shall be determined in conformity with the procedure laid down in that Article and shall be notified to the Agency by the Council of the Western European Union.

ARTICLE 19

The figures obtained by the Agency under Articles 14, 15, 16 and 18 shall be reported to the Council as appropriate levels for the current control year for the members of Western European Union. Any discrepancies between the figures stated under Article 13, paragraph 1, and the quantities recognised under Article 14 will also be reported.

ARTICLE 20

1. The Agency shall immediately report to the Council if inspection, or information from other sources, reveals:

(a) the manufacture of armaments of a type which the member concerned has undertaken not to manufacture;

(b) the existence of stocks of armaments in excess of the figures and quantities ascertained in accordance with Articles 18 and 21. 2

2. If the Council is satisfied that the infraction reported by the Agency is not of major importance and can be remedied by prompt local action, it will so inform the Agency and the member concerned, who will take the necessary steps.

3. In the case of other infractions, the Council will invite the member concerned to provide the necessary explanation within a period to be determined by the Council; if this explanation is considered unsatisfactory, the Council will take the measures which it deems necessary in accordance with a procedure to be determined.

4. Decisions of the Council under this Article will be taken by majority vote.

ARTICLE 21

Each member shall notify to the Agency the names and locations of the depots on the mainland of Europe containing armaments

2 According to corrigendum to document C-M(54)84(Revised), the words “Articles 19 and 22” should replace “Articles 18 and 21” at this point in the source text. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 382)
subject to control and of the plants on the mainland of Europe manufacturing such armaments, or, even though not in operation, specifically intended for the manufacture of such armaments.

**Article 22**

Each member of Western European Union shall keep the Agency informed of the quantities of armaments of the types mentioned in Annex IV to Protocol No. III, which are to be exported from its territory on the mainland of Europe. The Agency shall be entitled to satisfy itself that the armaments concerned are in fact exported. If the level of stocks of any item subject to control appears abnormal, the Agency shall further be entitled to enquire into the orders for export.

**Article 23**

The Council shall transmit to the Agency information received from the Governments of the United States of America and Canada respecting military aid to be furnished to the forces on the mainland of Europe of members of Western European Union.

*In witness* whereof, the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol, being one of the Protocols listed in Article I of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Treaty, and have affixed thereto their seals.

*Done at Paris this __________ day of October 1954, in two texts, in the English and French languages, each text being equally authoritative, in a single copy, which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Belgian Government and of which certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to each of the other Signatories.*

---

**Draft Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**PARIS, October 19, 1954.**

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty signed at Washington on 4th April, 1949,

**Being satisfied** that the security of the North Atlantic area will be

---

1 This draft protocol, which was circulated as document C-M (54) 83 (Revised) along with a covering note by Secretary General Ismay, was approved without change by the North Atlantic Council during its meeting on Oct. 22; for a record of that meeting, see p. 1422. The approved text was signed during the ceremonies at Paris on Oct. 23 by Paul-Henri Spaak, Lester B. Pearson, H. C. Hansen, Pierre Mendès-France, Stephanos Stephanopoulos, Kristinn Gudmundsson, Gaetano Martino, Joseph Bech, Johan W. Beven, Halvard Lange, Paulo Cunha, Fad Kuprulk, Anthony Eden, and John Foster Dulles.
enhanced by the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to that Treaty, and

Having noted that the Federal Republic of Germany has by a declaration dated 3rd October, 1954, accepted the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and has undertaken upon its accession to the North Atlantic Treaty to refrain from any action inconsistent with the strictly defensive character of that Treaty, and

Having further noted that all member governments have associated themselves with the declaration also made on 3rd October, 1954, by the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic in connection with the aforesaid declaration of the Federal Republic of Germany,

Agree as follows:

**ARTICLE I**

Upon the entry into force of the present Protocol, the Government of the United States of America shall on behalf of all the Parties communicate to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. Thereafter the Federal Republic of Germany shall become a Party to that Treaty on the date when it deposits its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty.

**ARTICLE II**

The present Protocol shall enter into force when each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified to the Government of the United States of America its acceptance thereof, and when all instruments of ratification of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty have been deposited with the Belgian Government. The Government of the United States of America shall inform the other Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of the receipt of each notification of acceptance of the present Protocol and of the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol.

**ARTICLE III**

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

In witness whereof, the undersigned Representatives, duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present Protocol.

Signed at Paris the _____ day of ______.
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, October 21, 1954—4 p.m.

1680. Decourson summarized status Saar negotiations as of noon today as follows:

1) French request Saar agreement contain specific ban on subsidization Saar political parties from outside was apparently causing Germans serious trouble. Final German position would not be known until after Adenauer’s consultations with German parliamentary leaders. French willing legalize pro-German parties only if stipulation to prevent German parties from subsidizing their Saar counterparts accepted.

2) While French had abandoned insistence on definitive settlement, they now proposed language to effect settlement irrevocable until peace treaty. German reaction to this language unknown but there seemed to be hope Germans could accept it since French had abandoned word “definitive” even for period prior peace treaty.

3) French still strongly favored Council of Foreign Ministers of Brussels organization as umbrella over Saar while Germans favor Council of Ministers of Council of Europe. French think Germans oppose putting Saar under Brussels organization because it would mean Saar adherence to one more international body (Saar is already in Council of Europe). Decourson said however French would probably yield on this if necessary. Both sides agree use representatives of seven Brussels Powers at Council of Europe Assembly as “popularly chosen body” to which Ministers would report.

4) French consider idea of three-man commission (one French, one German and one neutral) for Saar utterly unacceptable, but Chancellor has said he doesn’t favor it either though his advisors do. French consider Germans have in effect dropped commission idea in favor single commissioner to be neither French, German nor Saarlander.

5) While many economic details settled, common Franco-German market idea for Saar taken from Van Naters plan still being stressed by Germans. While this might be accepted if French were ready for single Franco-German common market, otherwise this idea was unacceptable. French had proposed specific annual increase in German exports to Saar from 2½ to 5 billion francs instead and hoped this would be accepted.

1 Repeated to London, Bonn, and Strasbourg.
6) Soutou and Blankenhorn are meeting again on Saar this evening and it was hoped something would come out of this.  
7) In spite of difficulties French remain optimistic because Mendes-France absolutely determined reach agreement and French realize failure reach Saar agreement would be catastrophic since Mendes position that signature London Accords cannot precede such settlement remains firm.

Dillon

396.1/10-2154: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State 1

SECRET

Moscow, October 21, 1954—9 p.m.

582. Soviet press treatment of London agreements and subsequent developments continues to be relatively restrained in standard opposition to any form of German rearmament. 2 As previously indicated (Embtl 520 [550], October 15 and 551, October 16 3), there has been tendency to present certain parts of Molotov's Berlin speech as constituting official "proposals" of Soviet Government. This impression is strengthened by following paragraph in Ratiani article published in Pravda today:

"There are proposals of Soviet Government to governments of US, England and France, to reach agreement concerning withdrawal of occupation forces in territory of East and West Germany and to decided this question right now without any delay. Acceptance of this proposal would create favorable conditions for rapprochement between West and East Germany and thereby for unification of Germany. There is also the possibility for the achievement of agreement between the powers on question of free all-German elections if the premise is accepted that chief task is the unification of Germany on peace-loving and democratic bases. Soviet Government has expressed its readiness to examine not only proposals made earlier by the participation of the Berlin Conference of the four powers but also any proposals on the question of free all-German elections."

Since Soviet Government can hardly believe that statements in Molotov's speech could be accepted as formal official proposals either

---

1 Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.
2 In telegram 1688 from Paris, Oct. 21, the Embassy gave a similar description of the "half-hearted manner" in which the Communist press was attacking the London Accords (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 386).
3 Neither printed; both telegrams 550 and 551 concerned Molotov's speech in Berlin on Oct. 6 and suggested that it contained counterproposals to the tripartite Western note of Sept. 10 (see footnote 4 below) concerning Germany (396.1/10-1554 and 396.1/10-1654, respectively).
by Western Governments or non-Commie public opinion, the reasons for this presentation must be sought elsewhere. Soviet Government might prefer to await developments on London agreements before committing itself to a definite set of positions as would inevitably be involved in formal reply to September 10 note. By treating Molotov’s speech, without so stating, as at least interim reply and attempting to create impression that bull is now in Western court, Soviet Government may hope to gloss over awkward fact that it has not replied to Western note. In addition to element of timing, hesitancy in this respect may result from realization by Soviet Government that given limits of its policy towards Germany it has nothing new or tempting to offer and that mere reiteration of old Berlin proposals would be detrimental to Soviet efforts to bloc implementation of London agreements. In circumstances it may have been concluded hence that the holding out of vague hopes, as represented by Molotov’s speech, is the best posture for the Soviet Government to adopt at this particular juncture.

While in dictatorships of this character radical changes of policy can never be completely dismissed, substantive Soviet policy towards Germany still appears to be rooted in a determination to safeguard to all costs control over Eastern Germany. Their diplomacy and even propaganda are still operating within limits imposed by this dominant consideration. Judging from press reports the East German elections of October 17 were a standard Commie-type fraud with no element of choice whatsoever given to population which is hardly preparation for any substantive change in direction of free elections for all Germany.

It is difficult of course to judge from here to what extent pressures for 4-power conference generated by Commie and front organizations abroad have or will become a factor in eventual ratification of London agreements. But if this becomes a real difficulty, rigidity and lack of maneuver in basic Soviet policy towards Germany might be turned to advantage in offsetting any such trend, Soviet attempt to depict Molotov speech as official proposals could afford opportunity for three Western powers to issue statement pointing out that no reply had been received to September 10 note and calling on Soviet Government to state clearly in official form its so-called proposals on Germany. This might force Soviets to show their true position on Germany and de-

* Under reference here is the tripartite Western note of Sept. 10, which accepted the Soviet invitation to a Four-Power Foreign Ministers meeting on Germany and European security provided the Soviets signed the Austrian Treaty on the basis of the previously agreed text and agreed to free elections in Germany. For the text of this note and the Soviet proposals to which it was a response, see Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 20, 1954, pp. 397-402.
prive them of present advantage of hiding behind vague hints of possible future concessions. If no reply is received, that in itself is good propaganda material.  

Bohlen

---

5 In telegram 1762 from Paris, Oct. 22, the Embassy agreed with the analysis in the source text but recommended that the United States "refrain from needling Soviets over their failure thus far to reply to September 10 note" (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 386).

---

Editorial Note

According to telegram Secto 4 from Paris, October 20, Dulles discussed separately with Eden and Mendès-France on Wednesday, October 20, the value of a tripartite statement on Berlin. Both reacted favorably and told Dulles that they would give an answer by the following day. Telegram Secto 6 from Paris, October 21, briefly notes that Dulles, Eden, and Mendès-France, after consultation with Adenauer, agreed to the text of a tripartite statement which would be issued on the same day as the final communiqué at the end of the conference. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 380) For the text of the statement on Berlin, which was subsequently issued on October 23, see page 1428.

---

762.022/10–2254: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State 1

SECRET PRIORITY

PARIS, October 22, 1954—1 a. m.

1891. At Mendes's request, Parodi has just given British Embassy and ourselves following account of state of Saar negotiations:

Despite apparently conciliatory German attitude on Tuesday, Adenauer's position following his talk with political leaders yesterday morning hardened all along the line, principally on three points. The first was that he was no longer prepared to speak of Saar "statute" but only of "reglement", a much weaker word denoting temporary arrangement subject to change at any time. Second, was German insistence on Landtag elections as substitute for referendum. Third, was German rejection of French proposals for increased German-Saar trade and insistence on measures to expedite German participation in management of mines, banks, and insurance companies with view to developing German-Saar relationship approximating present French-Saar relationship. He concluded that Adenauer this morning indicated reluctance even to discuss the Saar further.

1 Repeated to London and Bonn.
We are seeking German version.² French Cabinet is meeting at noon on Saar. Eden is lunching with Mendes and is having Mendes and Adenauer for dinner this evening.

Dillon

² In telegram 1696 from Paris, Oct. 22, Dillon informed the Department of State that Blankenhorst generally confirmed the account given by Parodi. Dillon noted that while Adenauer did not attach too much importance to the Saar Agreement being reached immediately, Mendès-France told the French press that he would sign nothing unless the Saar accord was reached. (762.022/10-2254)

740.5/10-2354 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris ¹

TOP SECRET NIAC T  WASHINGTON, October 23, 1954—11 : 56 a. m.

Tedul 17. Eyes only for Secretary and Merchant. News of receipt by Bohlen of Soviet note today ² poses question of our official reaction and we will probably be under some pressure from press for statement. Although we have not received text note or a summary from Bohlen would assume it is obvious attempt to confuse opinion and detract from success of Paris meetings. We feel that any attempt to comment on note prior to your arrival Washington and your report on Paris meetings would be premature and would reduce impact of Paris agreements. In any event we feel no comment should be made until after adequate consultation with British and French whose preliminary reaction you may be able to get in Paris. If French and/or UK comment is sound we would see some advantage in having their reaction announced prior to ours.

If you agree with this view we shall act accordingly.

HOOVER

¹ Drafted by Elbrick.
² For the text of the Soviet note of Oct. 23, which called for a Four-Power conference in November to consider the reestablishment of German unity, the withdrawal of the occupation forces, and the question of calling an all-European security conference, see Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 13, 1954, p. 902.

396.1 LO/10-2354 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State ¹

SECRET NIAC T PARIS, October 23, 1954—10 p. m.

1716. Limit distribution. During conversation which Secretary had with Mendez-France and Eden after signing ceremonies, it was agreed

¹ Repeated to Moscow eyes only for Bohlen.
that nothing should be said to press concerning Soviet note. It was agreed to say merely that conversation of the three had been of a general nature in accordance with their past practice of having a go-around before separating after conferences. It would be admitted to press, however, that we had discussed Far Eastern in addition to European questions but no reference would be made to Soviet note.

Mendes stated that the Russian reply would have a strong impact in France where the possibility of East-West talks had impressed a lot of people who were not necessarily Leftist. He referred specifically to recent declarations in the Assembly by Gaullists and Radicals on the subject. He felt that the stronger we got the more proposals of this sort we were bound to receive from the Russians. The Secretary called attention to the fact that Soviet moves in sending and replying to notes were now settling into a fixed mould, being timed to minimize the effects of anything constructive the West accomplished as in the present instant.

Dillon

Confidential files, lot 60 D 627, CF 379

The Secretary of State to the President¹

PARIS, October 23, 1954.

[Dear Mr. President:] We are waiting here Saturday morning not knowing whether or not documents in relation to German sovereignty, Brussels Treaty and NATO will or will not be signed this afternoon. Everything hinges on Saar matter, which Adenauer and Mendes-France discussed last night until nearly three. They are apparently in agreement on political issues, but certain economic issues remain unsolved. They meet again at 11:30 Paris time. It seems to me incredible that the margin of difference now remaining should wreck this whole affair, but it is possible because Adenauer has gone close to the tolerable political limit and Mendes-France can be very stubborn.

Everything else has gone extremely well, and the NATO atmosphere is one of strengthened fellowship.

Faithfully yours,

Foster

¹This message was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Duite 17, Oct. 23, with instructions that it be sent to the President.

Editorial Note

Mendès-France and Adenauer engaged in discussions on the Saar following dinner on October 22, discussions that lasted until
3 a.m. the following morning, Telegram 1711 from Paris, October 23, briefly noted that "agreement had been practically reached on political points with only one or two economic problems (coal mines and steel works) outstanding" (762.022/10-2354). They met again at 11:30 a.m. on October 23 and completed their negotiations on the Saar by reaching an agreement. No records of the meetings on October 22 and 23 were found in the Department of State files which would provide information concerning the details of these negotiations. For the text of the Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the French Republic on the Saar Statute, Paris, October 23, 1954, see Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1954, pages 116–118. For the accompanying exchange of letters, see Notes et Etudes Documentaires No. 1951, 23 Novembre 1954.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 379

The Secretary of State to the President


[Dear Mr. President:] I am happy to inform you that every-thing including Saar has now been signed sealed and delivered. I know you will rejoice with me that the unity and freedom of Europe to which you contributed so indispensably seems likely now to be preserved.

Faithfully yours,

Foster

1 This message was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Dulte 20, Oct. 23, with instructions that it be sent to the President.

E. EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE RATIFICATION OF THE PARIS AGREEMENTS AND THE SAAR AGREEMENT, OCTOBER 24–DECEMBER 31, 1954

Editorial Note

On the evening of October 25, shortly after his return from Paris, Secretary of State Dulles presented a report on the outcome of the Four-Power, Nine-Power, and North Atlantic Council meetings to President Eisenhower and the Cabinet. This was the first open session of the Cabinet during the Eisenhower Administration in which national press, radio, and television coverage was allowed. For information concerning this Cabinet meeting, see the Department of State Bulletin, November 8, 1954, page 677; the text of Dulles’ remarks and the question period that followed is in Department of State file 396.1 GE/3–2354.
The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, October 28, 1954—7:59 p. m.

1177. Secretary and Department officials including Dr. Conant had meeting with Adenauer and advisers this morning. In addition subjects covered in press statement issued by Chancellor and President following points discussed.

Saar Agreement. Chancellor stated he attached great importance to issuance US statement of willingness guarantee Saar settlement. This would imply France and Federal Republic should conduct their affairs in accordance Saar Agreement until conclusion peace treaty. Guarantee should include undertaking to make representations if free expression wishes Saar population were prohibited.

Secretary replied it would not be practical make statement this subject while Chancellor in Washington and that guarantee involves constitutional difficulty in US. Matter was left that, if Chancellor considered statement US interest would be helpful in course Bundestag debate ratification, he would notify US so that appropriate language could be agreed upon at that time.

US Relation to Western European Union. Chancellor stated many questions to be considered in Western European Union would affect US security and NATO. Arms control arrangements are example of this. He hoped US could establish official mission to Western European Union as soon as possible, which might be same as US Mission to CSC. Secretary replied US would be disposed accept invitation, if one were extended, to establish Mission accredited to Council to keep in touch so far as Council desired it.

DULLES

1 Drafted by Auchincloss, cleared with Lyon, and repeated to London, Paris, and Berlin.

2 Chancellor Adenauer arrived in Washington on Oct. 27 for several days of consultation with the President and Secretary of State; further documentation concerning these talks is presented in volume VIII.

3 For the text of the joint statement issued by Adenauer and Eisenhowe on Oct. 28, see the Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 8, 1954, pp. 680-681.

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State

SECRET

PARIS, October 30, 1954—3 p. m.

Polto 782. Ismay has sent personal memorandum to PermReps on question associating Germany with NATO work pending her accession

1 Repeated to London and Bonn.
to NATO which he raised orally at NAC meeting October 27 (see Polto 753 rptd Bonn Polto 124 *). Stated purpose of memorandum is set out certain relevant considerations and to suggest some possible courses of action, but Ismay notes that he is not himself wedded to anything suggested therein and that political considerations may outweigh what otherwise desirable and practicable. Memorandum then continues

"2. I think it would be well to recall the following facts which bear on this problem:

(a) An interim commission of the EDC sat for some two years to enable the Germans and their potential colleagues to collaborate in advance of ratification;

(b) This created a mechanism through which SHAPE was authorized to give military advice to the Germans and to release to them certain classified information;

(c) Ministers have agreed that an interim Seven-Power Working Group should operate in London with the Germans as a member, pending accession of Germany and Italy to the Western European Union.

3. The following possible courses of action which might be taken to associate Germany with the work of NATO are put forward as a basis of discussion. The putting into operation of certain of these would, of course, depend on a satisfactory outcome of the inspection of German security which the Council has in mind to institute.

(a) Continuation of the work of the special civil defence committee, which is in existence, and which was in no way related to the interim commission of the EDC;

(b) The release of classified NATO information, particularly insofar as military advice from SHAPE is concerned, under the procedure agreed with the Germans for the handling of NATO information through the Paris steering group series of documents;

(c) Association of German representatives with such planning work as will obviously have repercussions beyond the first quarter of 1955, e.g. the preparation of the questionnaires for the 1955 annual review;

(d) The establishment of a Fifteen-Power ad hoc committee, to include the Germans, with appropriate Fifteen-Power ad hoc subordinate committees."

First three Ismay proposals above seem acceptable, but we are not entirely clear as to what he has in mind in proposing Fifteen-Power ad hoc committee. Next NAC meeting should provide opportunity obtain amplification his thinking. We know Ismay is concerned about possibility that interim Seven-Power Working Group to be established

---

*Not printed; it informed the Department of State that Ismay intended to raise this subject at the next meeting of the North Atlantic Council (740.5/10-2754).
London will begin to nose into areas appropriately reserved to NATO unless similar body established by NATO in which Germans formerly participated. During discussions which we have had this week with delegations in Paris, general feeling (in which we share) is that we should not act precipitously in attempting formalize relations with FedRep at this early stage, but should retain flexibility to deal with specific problems requiring liaison as they arise. At time of December ministerial meetings, when ratification situation should be clearer, we can consider whether more formal modes of association are desirable. Ismay's concern about encroachments by London Working Group is generally considered exaggerated.  

Hughes

---

3 In telegram Topol 541 to Paris, Nov. 2, the Department of State noted its general agreement with the views expressed in the source text (740.5/10-3054).

---

740.5/11-254: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, November 2, 1954—6 p. m.

2175. Re Deptel 2402 1 and para three Embtel 2123. 2 Brussels Treaty Working Group to the post Paris meetings of which we have not been asked to attend is proceeding slowly with plans for new organizational setup after ratification of protocols. Present tentative thinking is that member countries should employ same representation in London after ratification as now, namely, Chiefs of Mission serving as permanent reps. If new functions cause substantial increase in work-load, thinking is that additional official, rank of Minister-Counselor or possibly Counselor, shld be appointed to London Missions of member states for work exclusively on Brussels Treaty. If new Brussels Treaty functions bring on still more work, Working Group believes it may be necessary at some stage to establish permanent Brussels Treaty delegations separate from dipl Missions. This, however, is regarded as very much last step and will not be taken unless work-load becomes exceedingly heavy. In this framework, appointment of Amer Mission as suggested by Adenauer in reftel is at very least premature.

---

1 Same as telegram 1177 to Bonn, Oct. 28, p. 1465.

2 Not printed; in it Aldrich reported a conversation with Eden on Oct. 28 during which Eden expressed the view that U.S. representation to the Western European Union should be in London. Aldrich also stated that he did not think that the Department of State should adopt a policy of representation that would parallel that of the U.S. Mission to the Coal and Steel Community. (611.41/10-2954)
Working Group has considered question of Amer and Canadian association with Council and tentative thought is that US and Canada shld be invited to send observers on *ad hoc* basis when topics of direct concern to them are to be considered, particularly mil aid, but according to FonOff no decision has been reached pending receipt by FonOff of US views as to form its association might take.

Reason given by FonOff for proposing limited association for Canada and US is in order avoid precedent which eld give Turks further excuse to request close association with WEU Council. Real reason which FonOff gave to Canadian High Commissioner, is that not a few members of Working Group were reluctant include a permanent US observer because they felt that members of US observer team to European defense [community] under somewhat similar circumstances, failed to restrict themselves to role of observers, particularly in connection with efforts to bring about adoption of EDC.

I believe *ad hoc* observer status wld prove to be insufficient. Addition of new functions may make Council deliberations of interest to US in many fields beyond those which might be said to be of direct concern. Council is also supervising body for arms control agency and will have responsibilities for Saar under new agreement. When military aid problems are discussed, observer will have to take active part and shld, on those occasions, be considered non-voting participant. Therefore, I recommend that permanent observer from Embassy, either myself or appropriate member of my staff (depending on level of meeting) be proposed, such observer to take active part as non-voting participant in connection with discussion of military aid problems.

I wld appreciate Dept's views soonest so that they may be fully considered in Brussels Working Group decision on question. 

ALDRICH

---

*In telegram Polto 820 from Paris, Nov. 5, Hughes presented “strong reasons” for bringing primary responsibility for representation with the WEU under USRO control. His position was that the United States should seek a role in WEU broadly analogous to that of its present representation to the European Coal and Steel Community in Luxembourg (740.5/11-554). The Embassy in London responded, in telegram 2269 of Nov. 9, that the WEU is an essentially European enterprise which does not cross vital lines of U.S. policy and which would not benefit from an excess of U.S. presence. Its position was that U.S. representation should be informal, flexible, and unobtrusive, without the appointment of a mission to the Brussels Treaty Organization (740.5/11-554). In telegram 2861 to London, Nov. 28, the Department of State informed the Embassy that final decisions regarding U.S. relations with WEU could not be made until the future character of the WEU was more clearly discernible. In the meanwhile, Ambassador Aldrich should serve as observer whenever U.S. interests were involved in discussions at meetings of the WEU. USRO would have responsibility for liaison with the Arms Control Agency in Paris. (740.5/1-254)*
Bonn, November 9, 1954—2 p. m.

1373. In conversation 8 November, State Secretary Globke stated that plan now drawn up for ratification Paris agreements, Foreign policy debate scheduled for Thursday will be postponed, Cabinet will approve treaty laws in special session Friday (there will be four separate bills for NATO, sovereignty, Brussels pact, and Saar agreement.) Laws will then be submitted to Bundesrat, which has period of three weeks to consider them. Following Bundesrat session beginning December, probably December 3, treaty laws will be submitted to Bundestag for first reading. Foreign policy debate and first reading tentatively scheduled for 16–17 December but might take place week earlier. Following first reading, laws will be sent to committee. Second and third readings will take place in January. Final Bundesrat reading will probably follow at end of January or beginning of February.

Regarding Saar dispute in coalition, Globke said working party including Blankenhorn and Ophuels and two or three deputies from each coalition party now going over text of treaty in detail. Globke implied this scrutiny was intended take sharp edge off FDP and BHE criticism of Saar. He said Chancellor intended negotiate with French on those subjects already agreed on with French, i.e., economic agreements, but indicated that Chancellor would not push hard to reopen discussion on questions of principle. Globke said government was launching large-scale propaganda campaign this week to emphasize advantages of Paris Saar agreement over 1945 situation and over status quo. He felt BHE only opposing Saar agreement because of pending Landtag elections and would come around afterward. This was important reason postponement foreign policy debate. Most internal differences with BHE settled, he said, and Chancellor will discuss election law with BHE, FDP and DP Wednesday’s meeting on coalition problems. Chancellor plans to guarantee smaller parties that election law will not damage their interests, and draft law should be ready in December. Globke said it improbable that whole FDP could be brought around on Saar issue, but predicted party would split three ways in vote with one group opposing treaty, one abstaining and one voting for it. He said possibility of constitutional court case on Saar could not be excluded, but hoped Hesse Landtag elections would dissolve only SPD Land Government which might bring constitutional suit.

Conant

1 Repeated to Paris and London.
The Secretary of State to the President

WASHINGTON, November 12, 1954.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I have the honor to submit to you, with a view to transmission to the Senate for its advice and consent to the ratification thereof, ² (1) a Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954, to which are annexed five schedules; and (2) a Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty providing for the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954.³

II

The protocols above referred to are a part of a series of interconnecting arrangements designed to solidify the security structure of Western Europe. Because of such interdependence, I also submit herewith the other arrangements, although they do not themselves require Senate action. I recommend that these documents, which are listed in the annexed schedule, be submitted to the Senate for its information.

III

The foregoing arrangements, when they become operative, will, in combination, establish basically new conditions in Western Europe. They will realize a result for which the United States has long hoped.

The two world wars of this century have made it evident that western civilization, with its dedication to human liberty, cannot survive if the members of the western world continue to make war on each other. Already they have so expended their blood and treasure in fighting that they have gravely depleted their strength, and they have brought upon themselves the moral condemnation of all humanity because of their failure to establish, even as between themselves, a peaceful order.

Realization of the foregoing brought the Western European nations to seek such a measure of unification, particularly in terms of military establishments, as would make it hereafter both militarily impractical and politically unlikely that their military forces would be used against each other, or indeed against anyone else for other than clearly defensive purposes.

² For the text of President Eisenhower's message of transmittal addressed to the U.S. Senate on Nov. 15, see ibid., pp. 847–849.
³ The two protocols under reference are part of the Paris Agreements; for texts, see pp. 1435 and 1456.
The need for this coincides with new dangers born out of the expansionist policies of Soviet Russia, inspired by the worldwide ambitions of Soviet communism and backed by a vast Red military establishment. This creates for Western Europe a threat which can only be effectively deterred by the achievement of a large degree of practical unity among the European nations themselves, including the Federal Republic of Germany, and, we hope, a unified Germany.

It was originally sought to achieve these objectives by the establishment of a European Defense Community, consisting of six continental countries—Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. They would have created an international organization having supranational powers in defense matters. This would have constituted a hard and dependable core at the critical center of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

This plan had been proposed on October 24, 1950, by Mr. Pleven, the then French Minister of Defense. After about a year and a half of negotiation, it was embodied in two interconnected treaties—the Bonn Convention on Relations with the Federal Republic of Germany of May 26, 1952, designed to restore sovereignty to the Federal Republic, and the Paris Treaty of May 27, 1952, designed to establish the European Defense Community.

The Bonn convention was signed by the United States, and on July 1, 1952, the United States Senate advised and consented to its ratification. The Senate at the same time consented to an extension of the North Atlantic Treaty area to include that of the European Defense Community, the significant addition being Western Germany. However, the Bonn convention and the related Paris Treaty never became effective because they were not ratified by all the signatories.

This failure to realize the European Defense Community and to restore sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany created a highly dangerous situation. It seemed that Europe might be doomed to continue divisions which would be disastrous both because such divisions would perpetuate the cycle of recurrent war as between the Western European countries themselves, and because a divided Europe would automatically be dominated by Soviet despotic power.

IV

I desire at this point to refer to the action which the United States Senate took on July 30, 1954. It was then predictable that the French Chamber of Deputies might fail to ratify the Bonn and Paris Treaties, above referred to, and the consequences of that failure could measur-

---

4 For the text of the Bonn Convention on Relations, see volume VII.
5 For the text of the Paris Treaty, see APP, vol. I, pp. 1107–1150; for documentation concerning the attitude of the United States toward the establishment of a European Defense Community, see pp. 571 ff.
ably be foreseen. In anticipation of that situation there occurred consultations between the Executive and the Senate, as a result of which the Senate, by a vote of 88 to 0, adopted a resolution which asked you in your discretion and within the limits of your constitutional powers to seek—

to restore sovereignty to Germany and to enable her to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.

This act of cooperation between the Executive and the Senate, and the unanimous bipartisan action of the Senate itself, had a steadying and sobering effect at a time when there was much confusion and division of counsel. The Senate action enabled me, as your representative, to speak with authority in the subsequent negotiations which I conducted on your behalf.

The forward-looking "advice" thus given by the Senate in pursuance of its constitutional prerogative has in fact been successfully transmuted into Executive action. The first protocol referred to in I above will "restore sovereignty to Germany" and the second protocol referred to in I above will "enable her to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security."

V

The Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany is not linked to the entry into force of the arrangements for a German defense contribution, as was the case of the original Convention on Relations with the Federal Republic. It could come into force before it becomes possible to bring the arrangements for the German defense contribution into force. If there is an intervening period, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States will retain their existing powers in the field of disarmament and demilitarization in the Federal Republic. These powers will be exercised through a Joint Commission, consisting of representatives of the three powers and the Federal Republic, who will function by majority vote. These arrangements will be reviewed at the end of 1954 in light of the situation then existing with regard to the entry into force of the protocol and, at the same time, the four Governments will review the exercise of the controls with a view to permitting preparation by the Federal Republic for its future defense contribution.

In addition to the differences above mentioned, several changes of substance have been made in the Convention on Relations with the Federal Republic, as concluded in 1952. However, these changes neither increase the obligations of nor diminish the benefits to the United States as against those reflected in the Bonn convention which was approved by the Senate on July 1, 1952. The changes, which are
significant primarily from the standpoint of the Federal Republic of Germany, may be summarized as follows:

(1) In article 2 of the convention as originally concluded, the three powers retained their rights relating to the stationing of armed forces in Germany and the protection of their security, to Berlin, and to Germany as a whole, including the unification of Germany and a peace settlement. These powers were to be held in reserve for special use, related to the Soviet position in Eastern Germany, and were not intended for exercise in ordinary German affairs, either domestic or foreign. It seemed preferable, therefore, that insofar as the territory of the Federal Republic was concerned, the arrangements for the stationing of foreign forces should be put on a contractual basis. Accordingly, the forces in the Federal Republic after the entry into force of the arrangements for the German defense contribution will be governed by a separate convention under the terms of which the Federal Republic agrees to the stationing of forces of the same nationality and effective strength as may be stationed in the Federal Republic at that time. Any increase in the effective strength of these forces may be made only with the consent of the Government of the Federal Republic.

The German representatives recognized that the three powers should preserve their rights to protect the security forces stationed in the Federal Republic until the Federal Government itself were able to take the necessary measures. This depends on the Federal Government obtaining new legislative powers. The termination of the general right of the three powers in this field will not affect the right of a military commander, if his forces are imminently menaced, to take such immediate action (including the use of armed force) as may be appropriate for their protection and as is requisite to remove the danger.

(2) A second change in the Convention on Relations relates to the Arbitration Tribunal to be established for the settlement of disputes arising between any one of the three powers and the Federal Government. Under the Charter of the Arbitration Tribunal as originally concluded, the Tribunal was given power to take action directly on legislative and administrative measures or judicial decisions applicable within the Federal Republic. These powers, which are not normal to a body created to arbitrate disputes between sovereign states, have been eliminated from the charter.

(3) A third change in the Convention on Relations relates to the situation which will arise on the reunification of Germany. The Convention on Relations as concluded in 1952 provided for its review in the event of reunification (art. 10). The new protocol provides for review of the convention and the related conventions not only in the event of actual reunification of Germany, but also in case an international understanding is reached with the participation and consent of the four Governments parties to the conventions on steps toward bringing about the reunification of Germany. The Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in Germany will also be subject to review in these circumstances. There must, of course, be agreement by all the signatory governments to any changes made in the conventions.

(4) Changes have also been made in the related conventions. These changes for the most part involve bringing the conventions up to date by eliminating clauses referring to the EDC Treaty, by taking into
account the lapse of time since the conventions were concluded, and by taking into account progress made toward the completion of certain Allied programs in Germany. They also alter certain clauses in the conventions which were not felt to be in harmony with the status of equality being accorded the Federal Republic. Finally, the arrangements for the financial support of foreign forces stationed in Germany have been brought into harmony with more recent agreements with the Federal Republic in this field.

The related conventions were executive agreements implementing the Convention on Relations. For these, Senate action was unnecessary and, furthermore, recognized by the Committee on Foreign Relations to be undesirable, inasmuch as it was foreseen that they might require technical revision from time to time to meet changing conditions. The report of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate (Ex. Rept. No. 16, 82d Cong., 2d sess.), stated:

Some of the technical provisions in the [related] conventions are temporary in nature and as the situation in Germany changes, it may be necessary to make modifications in them from time to time. Under such circumstances it would seem impractical to require resubmission of the conventions to the Senate before each such modification could go into effect.

The ratification of the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany will not change the nature of those related conventions.

VI

The arrangements for the termination of the occupation regime in the Federal Republic do not affect the status of Berlin. In a declaration made by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France at the London Nine Power Conference of September 28–October 3, 1954, they reaffirmed the declaration made by them in Paris on May 27, 1952, that they would maintain armed forces in Berlin as long as their responsibilities required and that they would treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves. In addition, the three powers issued a statement in Paris on October 23, 1954, in which they affirmed their determination to insure the greatest possible degree of self-government in Berlin compatible with Berlin's special situation and stated that they had instructed their representatives in Berlin to consult with the German authorities in the city with a view to implementing these principles jointly and to the fullest degree possible.

* Brackets in the source text.
* For the text of the Tripartite Statement, see p. 1428.
VII

The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty Providing for the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany, referred to in I above, has no precise counterpart in the documents which were submitted to the Senate in 1952, although, as mentioned, there was then a protocol, approved by the Senate, which extended the treaty area to include that of the EDC. It was, however, not then contemplated that the Federal Republic of Germany would itself become a party to the North Atlantic Treaty. The German defense contribution would have been made solely through the European Defense Community. Under the arrangements now contemplated, it is essential that the Federal Republic of Germany should become a party to the North Atlantic Treaty and participate in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). A protocol to that effect was signed in Paris on October 23, 1954, by the representatives of the 14 nations now parties to that treaty, and is one of the two documents referred to in section I hereof which it is recommended should be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. The protocol is framed so that its entry into force is tied to that of the other arrangements relating to German participation in the common defense.

VIII

One of the documents above referred to in section II hereof, is a resolution concerning the powers of the supreme allied commander, Europe (SACEUR) approved by the North Atlantic Council on October 22, 1954.8 The general effect of this resolution is to strengthen the role of SACEUR over the forces under his authority. One result of these changes will be to enhance the effectiveness of the NATO forces in Europe, with consequent benefits to the entire NATO effort. Increasing the authority of SACEUR will also mean that the national forces assigned to SACEUR will become integrated and interdependent to an extent that will minimize the possibility of individual nations exercising an independent military initiative in Europe.

IX

Another of the resolutions of the North Atlantic Council suggested to be submitted to the Senate for its information is that of October 22, 1954, which took note of an exchange of declarations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France on October 3, 1954, in London and

---

8 For the text of the Resolution To Implement Section IV of the Final Act of the London Conference Concerning the Powers of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, see p. 1431.
associated all members of the North Atlantic Treaty with the tripartite declaration issued by the three Governments last named.\textsuperscript{9}

In its declaration, the Government of the Federal Republic declares that it has agreed to conduct its policy in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and accepts the obligations set forth in article 2 of the charter. The Federal Republic also declares that, upon its accession to the North Atlantic and Brussels Treaties, it will refrain from any action inconsistent with the strictly defensive character of the treaties. In particular the German Federal Republic undertakes never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the German Federal Republic.

In the tripartite declaration, the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, and France respond appropriately to this declaration, reaffirming in relation to this situation the principles of article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, condemning the use of force as between nations.

X

A major element in the new arrangements signed at Paris on October 23, 1954, are the four protocols designed to modify the Brussels Treaty.\textsuperscript{10} This treaty, signed on March 17, 1948, by France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, was the first major step toward the military integration of postwar Europe, antedating the North Atlantic Treaty by more than a year. Under the terms of the Brussels Treaty all countries were pledged to give full and immediate military assistance to any party against which aggression might occur. The treaty also provided for consultative machinery for the development of common defense plans. With the advent and growth of NATO, the organizational machinery under the Brussels Treaty became relatively inactive, but the treaty remained in full force and has now afforded a basis for realizing certain major political and security objectives.

The first of the protocols will bring about several important changes in the Brussels Treaty. First, it provides for the accession of Germany and Italy to the Brussels Treaty so that the membership will correspond to that of the proposed European Defense Community, plus the United Kingdom. Second, the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty will be transformed into a new “Council of Western European Union”\textsuperscript{20} for the purposes of strengthening peace and security and promoting unity and encouraging the progressive integration of Western Europe and closer cooperation between them and with other European

\textsuperscript{9} For the text of the Resolution of Association with the Tripartite Declaration of Oct. 3, 1954, see p. 1435.
\textsuperscript{10} For the texts of the four Protocols, see p. 1441.
organizations. Special provision is made for votes by two-thirds majority or simple majority on specific questions. Provision is made for close cooperation between the Brussels Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. There is a clause stating the undesirability of duplicating the work of the military staffs of NATO and stipulating that the Council and its Agency for the Control of Armaments will rely on the military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.

The second protocol is concerned with the size of the forces of Western European Union. It provides that the total strength and number of formations of the land and air forces of Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands placed under SACEUR shall not exceed those laid down in the special agreement annexed to the European Defense Community Treaty. The forces of the United Kingdom under SACEUR shall not exceed those presently under SACEUR command, and Luxembourg's forces shall be set at one regimental combat team. Naval forces are to be set by the NATO annual review process. Any increase in the agreed maximum forces will be subject to the unanimous approval of all parties to the Brussels Treaty.

An important feature of this protocol is the commitment by the United Kingdom to maintain on the mainland of Europe the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces now assigned to SACEUR, i.e., four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force or such other forces as SACEUR regards as having equivalent fighting capacity. The United Kingdom undertakes not to withdraw these forces against the wishes of a majority of the Brussels Treaty Powers. The protocol provides that this undertaking does not bind the United Kingdom in case of an acute overseas emergency. It further provides that if maintenance of forces on the Continent at any time places too great a strain on the external finances of the United Kingdom, the Government of the United Kingdom will invite the North Atlantic Council to review the financial conditions under which the United Kingdom forces are maintained.

This commitment is in addition to the commitment implicit in the United Kingdom's membership in the new Council of Western European Union.

The third protocol relates to the control of armaments. It is concerned both with armaments which are not to be manufactured in the Federal Republic and those which are to be controlled within the Brussels Treaty countries on the mainland. The prohibited arms, which the Federal Republic of Germany has renounced the right to produce, are atomic, biological, and chemical weapons and guided missiles, larger naval vessels, and strategic bombing aircraft. Unanimous vote of the Council of Western European Union is required to give Germany the
right to produce atomic, biological, and chemical weapons. A two-thirds majority of the Council can give Germany the right to produce guided missiles, larger naval vessels, and strategic aircraft, provided that SACEUR recommends that Germany be given this right.

The armaments subject to control throughout the territory of the six Continental countries include both the weapons which are prohibited and a number of other major weapons. These include mines, tanks, large artillery and ammunition therefor, aircraft bombs and most types of military aircraft.

A fourth protocol creates an Agency for the Control of Armaments. With respect to controlled items, the Agency is to exercise its control over stocks of armaments rather than over production. It will also ensure that prohibited items are not produced in Germany.

The United States will give the Council of Western European Union information with respect to military aid to be furnished to the forces of the Brussels Treaty countries on the mainland of Europe. This information will be transmitted to the Agency for Armaments Control by the Council. The United States retains full authority to determine the allocation of United States military assistance.

The Agency does not have responsibilities with respect to the production and procurement of armaments or with the allocation of military equipment. However, the Brussels Treaty countries did agree in a resolution approved at Paris October 21, 1954, that they would convene a Working Group in Paris January 17, 1955, to consider proposals for development of rationalized production programs.

XI

The arrangements which I have discussed impose no treaty engagements and obligations upon the United States other than those incident to restoring to the Federal Republic of Germany sovereign powers which the Allies had assumed after the defeat of the Nazi Government; and the acceptance of the Federal Republic as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty. Nevertheless, the prospective attitude of the United States toward the whole arrangement is a matter of profound, even decisive, significance.

In this connection, I made a statement at the London Conference at its meeting of September 29, 1954, the full text of which is reproduced in an annex to the final act of the London Conference, transmitted herewith.\(^{11}\) By that statement I sought to make clear the desire of our Nation to encourage and support measures which unify and strengthen Western Europe, whereas we would be disposed to draw away from a Europe which persisted in divisions and weakness. In this connection I said that if new arrangements were made by the Western European

\(^{11}\) The text of Dulles' statement was made Annex II A of the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference, p. 1357.
countries, which, in replacement of the European Defense Community, provided unity and strength, so that the hopes which we had placed in EDC could reasonably be transferred to these new arrangements, then I would recommend to you, Mr. President, that you should make a declaration of policy comparable to that which you offered, after consultation with congressional leaders, in connection with the prospective European Defense Community Treaty, including an expression of intention by the United States—to maintain in Europe such elements of its armed forces as may be necessary or appropriate to contribute our fair share of what is needed for the common defense of this North Atlantic area while the threat to that area exists.

I was careful to point out that such a declaration would constitute no more than a policy declaration and that it would not be a legally binding commitment. I pointed out:

under our constitutional system, the President of the United States is Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States and, as such, has the right to determine their disposition. One President of the United States is not constitutionally able to bind his successor in this matter. Each President of the United States comes into office enjoying the right to dispose of the Armed Forces of the United States as he thinks best serves the interests of the United States in accordance with the advice he gets from his military advisers.

I nevertheless pointed out that basic and fundamental policies were, as a practical matter, not likely to be altered and that our policy to cooperate with a Western Europe which was itself acting effectively to make itself united and strong was, I felt, basic and fundamental United States policy, as both the Executive and the Congress had clearly made manifest.

In pursuance of the statement which I made in London, I expect, Mr. President, to make a recommendation to you as thus indicated, if the arrangements which were entered into at Paris have been, or appear likely to be, realized. I understand that you would be disposed to act favorably on such a recommendation.

XII

It is evident that the foregoing agreements, if they come into force and are implemented, will have far reaching and benign consequences.

They will fulfill the aspirations of the people of the Federal Republic of Germany for a position of equality in the family of free nations.

They will increase substantially the defensive potential of the Atlantic alliance.

At the same time, they will afford protection against excessive militarism as a tool of aggressive nationalism. This protection will go not only to the members of the Atlantic alliance, but to all.
They will offer strong assurances against a renewal of fratricidal strife among the free nations of Europe and will afford a framework of practical cooperation which should encourage further advances toward political and economic unity among the Western European states.

Because of the importance to this Nation of achieving these results, I recommend, Mr. President, that you request early consideration by the Senate of this matter, and, in particular, the advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of the two documents of treaty status which the United States has signed, namely, the protocol which will restore sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany and the protocol which will admit the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Respectfully submitted,

John Foster Dulles

Schedule

(1) The Final Act of the Nine Power Conference held at London, September 28–October 3, 1954, with annexes; (2) three resolutions adopted by the North Atlantic Council on October 22, 1954; (3) four protocols to the Brussels Treaty of March 17, 1948, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954, together with the text of treaty itself; (4) a declaration dated October 28, 1954, of the states signatory to the Brussels Treaty inviting Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany to accede to the treaty; (5) a resolution on the production and standardization of armaments adopted by the Nine Power Conference at Paris on October 21, 1954; (6) the Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954; (7) the Tripartite Agreement on the Exercise of Retained Rights in Germany, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954; (8) certain letters relating to the termination of the occupation regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, dated October 23, 1954, together with the texts of letters exchanged in 1952 referred to therein; and 

An agreement on the Saar was also signed at Paris by the French Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany on October 23, 1954. When an authentic English translation of this agreement is obtained, it will be made available to the Senate for its information.

---

12 All the documents listed in this schedule are printed in this compilation except for the letters enumerated as (8). For the text of (1), the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference, see p. 1345; for the texts of (2) through (7), which were collectively known as the Paris Agreements, see pp. 1435 ff.; and for the text of (9), the Tripartite Statement on Berlin, see p. 1428.

13 For information concerning the Saar Agreement, see the editorial note, p. 1463.
United States Minutes of the Opening Meeting With French Prime Minister Mendès-France at the White House, Thursday, November 18, 1954, Noon

SECRET

Participants: United States France
The President Premier Mendès-France
The Secretary Ambassador Bonnet
Ambassador Dillon M. Seydoux
Mr. Merchant M. Soutou

The meeting began with the exposé by M. Mendès-France of the ratification prospects for the Paris accords. M. Mendès-France said that the treaties had been submitted to the National Assembly and that the Foreign Affairs Committee had appointed as rapporteur General Billotte, who was favorable to ratification. M. Mendès-France said that he had set a deadline for Assembly ratification before the end of the year, although he could not guarantee the exact date on which it would take place. He emphasized that action by the Assembly would in effect be final action, as the Assembly has the final authority in France. M. Mendès-France said that the French Senate would take the treaties up immediately after the Christmas vacation and would vote on them before the 15th of February. He said there would be a large favorable vote in the Senate. In the Assembly he said that the debate would be difficult and there would be active opposition but there would be no doubt on the result. He estimated that he would lose not more than 40 votes, compared to the preliminary vote in October when there were 360 favorable votes. M. Mendès-France said he was sure that he would receive an absolute majority, which would be in the neighborhood of 320 to 325 votes in favor of the treaties. The maximum of the vote against the treaties would be 260 provided the MRP voted against the treaties. If they merely abstained, the vote against the treaties would of course be much smaller.

The President asked why the MRP were opposed to the treaties, and M. Mendès-France answered that their opposition was primarily based on internal political reasons, namely their opposition to his government, but that it was also based to a lesser extent on their great attachment to the EDC.

The Secretary then asked for M. Mendès-France's views about the
ratification situation in Germany. M. Mendes-France replied that he thought the situation in Germany would be satisfactory. He said that Adenauer was having some trouble on the Saar but that that had been expected. M. Mendes-France said that the French were trying to help Adenauer and in the recent talks between Blankenhorn and Soutou they had given the Germans a number of things which they had requested. For instance, they had agreed to international supervision of the referendum by a commission composed of all the representatives of the Western European Union treaty, except France and Germany. Mendes-France said it was impossible to change the basic Saar agreement but that they were doing everything they could to help Adenauer on procedural questions connected with the implementation of the agreement.

The Secretary then commented that he had observed a better atmosphere of Franco-German understanding at the London and Paris conferences than he had seen in the past. M. Mendes-France said it was necessary not only to have a complete Franco-German reconciliation but that it was also necessary to have close Franco-German cooperation in all fields, particularly the economic. In this connection, Franco-German economic negotiations would start on November 23.

The President then stated his belief in Western Europe and said that it should be the third great force in the world. All that was necessary was close cooperation between the various countries of Western Europe. He said that the US was related by culture and blood to countries of Western Europe and in this sense was a product of Western Europe. For this reason we favor a strong Western Europe.

The President then said that within Western Europe the one major problem has been the age-old Franco-German problem. He said that he was all for Franco-German rapprochement and had been very pleased at the London and Paris accords. He said that he applauded them and particularly the fact that Great Britain had thrown in her lot with the Continent.

M. Mendes-France then said that he would like to mention two items concerning the Saar. First, the Saar agreement with Germany provided that the two countries would jointly ask the US and the UK to guarantee the agreement up to the peace treaty. The Prime Minister said he realized that there were some Constitutional problems involved but he understood that a wording somewhat along the following lines might be possible: “Any violation of this agreement would be a grave threat to the peace and we would have to consider the situation arising from such a violation”. The Secretary said he thought it would be possible to work something out along this line. The Prime Minister then emphasized that it was not only a question of aggression against

*For information concerning the Saar Agreement signed in Paris on Oct. 23, see the editorial note, p. 1463.*
the Saar but would cover the whole of the treaty. The President then said he saw no reason why something satisfactory could not be worked out by the experts. Mendes-France said that this was satisfactory to him.

M. Mendes-France then took up the second Saar problem and said that France would like the US to agree to support the present Saar settlement at the peace treaty. He said that the US and the UK had agreed on such a course in the past and in particular he cited statements by Dean Acheson on January 18, 1950, and by Ambassador Dillon on June 8, 1954. The Prime Minister said he would like these to be confirmed by the US. The President asked what the Prime Minister's idea of a time limit would be on this commitment and Mendes-France replied that the commitment might last 100 years or so. He said that he had no idea how long it would last and it would have to be regarded as indeterminate. However he pointed out that it was most important that the US take such a commitment, as otherwise the French Assembly would feel that the Saar settlement was precarious and fragile instead of a permanent settlement. He admitted that such a pledge by the US might be difficult for Germany, but he said that the Germans knew that France intended to make this request. He then pointed out that the settlement at the peace treaty would be subject to agreement by the population of the Saar in a referendum and stated that this provision meant that we would not be forcing a solution on the Saar population if we agreed to the French request.

The President said that this raised a real Constitutional problem, as he could not make a commitment of this nature which was not approved by the Senate and which would be binding on his successors. The Prime Minister said that he had never heard before that there was a Constitutional problem involved here, and he read the statement made by Dean Acheson on January 24, 1950. The Secretary then pointed out that Dean Acheson's statement was the reason why a Constitutional issue had been raised. He pointed out that Dean Acheson's statement was not binding on the present Administration, that was presumably why the French wanted a new statement, but any new statement that we would make would not be binding on future Administrations. The Prime Minister then reiterated the importance of this matter and said that it would be raised certainly in the French Parliament during the course of the ratification debate. M. Mendes-France then read from a Memorandum of Conversation between Ambassador Dillon and Maurice Schumann covering a conversation held on June 8, 1954 3 in which, according to Mr. Schumann, Ambassador Dillon had given assurances that the US would support the Saar agreement at the peace treaty, provided the EDC came into being. M. Mendes-France also pointed out that such an agreement to support the

---

3 Regarding this conversation, see telegram 4764 from Paris, June 9, p. 968.
settlement at the peace treaty was a basic part of the Van Naters report on the Saar, which had greatly influenced the present Saar agreement.

The Secretary then pointed out that the situation was different at that time under the EDC. The Germans and the French then both wanted the Saar to be permanently fitted into the European framework. The present settlement, he stated, was good but not as good, and the present agreement asked only for a US and UK guarantee up to the time of the peace treaty. M. Mendes-France interrupted to say that the French have always and still do want a definite settlement. He pointed out that their original position had been a flat one that the settlement would have to be definite and final and that they had only modified this position to accommodate the Germans so as not to prejudice the consideration of the German frontiers in the East at the peace treaty. However the French attach great importance to the present settlement being definite.

The President then said that while he felt the French certainly had the right to take our past statements at face value he thought it was most important that we do not make Adenauer’s task more difficult. M. Mendes-France said that he agreed that we must make things as easy as possible for Germany, but on the other hand he felt it was vital that the Saar be permanently removed as a bone of contention between France and Germany. The Saar must be a finished subject that would not rise up again to plague Franco-German relations.

The President closed the discussion by saying that he agreed in general that it was better to tidy things up and settle them but that in this case we must look out for Adenauer’s interests and must try to be helpful to both sides.4

4 For a record of Dulles’ meeting with Mendès-France on Nov. 19, during which the Saar was again discussed, see the memorandum of conversation by Merchant, Nov. 19, infra.

762.022/11–1954

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] November 19, 1954.

Subject: Saar

Participants: Premier Mendes-France
Ambassador Bonnet
The Secretary
Livingston T. Merchant

The Secretary told M. Mendes-France that since the talk at the White House4 we had given this matter further consideration and that

4 For a record of Mendès-France’s meeting with President Eisenhower on Nov. 18, see the U.S. Minutes, supra.
he felt the Premier was entitled to know that our preliminary thinking was to the effect that it would not be possible to give a fresh committal to support the Saar settlement in the Peace Treaty except under the unlikely circumstances that the Germans as well as the French ask for such a committal. He mentioned the fact that provision had been made in the Teitgen-Adenauer agreement last spring for the French to approach us and the British on this subject. Mendes-France pointed out that this had been merely a reservation by the French Delegation of its right to request such a guarantee.

Mendes-France spoke of the delicacy of this matter and the importance of a satisfactory response by us to the ratification by France.

The Secretary replied that the scales were so delicately balanced in the matter of the Saar as between France and Germany that we were not disposed to take any action which might be disturbing.

Mendes-France argued that there should be no difficulty for us if we made our committal subject to our support conforming to the wishes of the Saar population as expressed at the time of the peace conference. He also expressed the hope that we might be able to do something after ratification if not before.

The Secretary said that we had not of course fully explored the matter yet but he didn’t want the Premier to be in any doubt as to our thinking. He added that apart from legal and constitutional questions, the controlling consideration in his mind would be the avoidance of any risk of an action on our part being responsible for failure of ratification of the complex of Paris agreements by all the countries.

---

740.5/11—1954: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

LONDON, November 19, 1954—7 p. m.

2439. In full-dress, two-day debate, Commons, as anticipated, passed government motion approving UK policy toward Western Europe expressed in London-Paris Agreements by large margin.

Following Eden’s comprehensive and persuasive introduction, debate centered mostly around questions such as whether new agreements will contribute to European military unity and to holding successful talks with USSR on German unification and how effective new limitations on German military forces will prove. There was little discussion of value German military contributions to NATO (except by Defense Minister Macmillan), of US European policies and reactions to agree-

---

ments, or of merits of maintaining UK troops on Continent (which were largely taken for granted). Few tears were shed for EDC and many speakers, including Julian Amery and Sir Robert Boothby, stated preference for new arrangements in which UK could participate. There was no expectation that Brussels Treaty would afford basis for supra-national structure and speakers praised it largely as successful device for permitting participation of both France and Germany in Western European defense. Interesting development, however, is that Morrison advocated acceptance of French plan for arms pool, apparently as added restriction on Germans.

Regarding cost of UK forces on Continent, Gaitskell suggested burden-sharing under common NATO budget as possible means of relieving UK of entire cost after cessation of German support, but Macmillan replied NATO annual review would suffice to achieve equitable burden-sharing. Strong possibility exists that Labor Party will continue to press for some cost-sharing formula which will shift part of burden of maintaining UK troops on Continent to other nations.

Labor Party opponents of agreements, only handful of whom spoke in debate, offered no new arguments, but Bevan made emotional appeal by stating UK would require more US aid if it had to support troops on Continent and by posing question of German Army with Nazi officers in possession of A-bomb. After calling treaties “most ignominious surrender” in modern British diplomacy, he asked only that government meet with USSR before German divisions all in field. Bevan arguments, skillfully answered by Eden, did not create deep impression.

Official Labor opposition accepted agreements and Parliamentary Labor Party voted in first instance to vote with government. Large majority of Labor speakers favored agreement and excellent speeches were delivered by Orrion, Gaitskell, Attlee and Healey supporting government. However, Bevanites, pacifists, Crypto-Communists and cranks on party fringe, as well as pressure from constituencies caused party leadership to back down and members were directed to abstain but not to vote against agreements. Nevertheless, six Labor members, including Silverman and Emrys Hughes, did oppose in final vote, even after threat of strong party disciplinary action.

Although government would certainly have preferred Labor to vote for agreements, Parliamentary consensus was clearly in their favor. Government is expected to proceed with ratification when remaining procedural formalities are completed and when notice has been received from Federal Republic concerning their reservations to acceptance of World Court jurisdiction under Brussels Treaty.

Copies of debate will be pouchd soonest.
Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of German Political Affairs (Kidd) to the Director of the Office of German Affairs (Lyon)\(^1\)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] December 9, 1954.

Subject: Some Thoughts on Rising Public Resistance to Rearmament in Germany and the Practical Effects that may be expected therefrom.

Summary and Conclusions

Recent reports from Germany indicate the presence there of strong and possibly growing sentiments against rearmament. GPA believes this to be the result of a combination of Communist pressures, tactical maneuvers of the Socialist opposition to Adenauer and general doubt and disillusion over the substitution of a German national army for the integrated German-Allied forces foreseen under EDC arrangements. The effectiveness of each of these forces is increased by various historical, psychological factors which affect German public opinion deeply.

To offset these things, there are other substantial forces, including the fully committed and firmly entrenched Adenauer Government, the leadership of the booming community of German industry and commerce, the bulk of the middle, upper-middle and professional classes, the veterans organizations, the refugee and expellee organizations, etc.

Given the paternalistic nature of a German society and its reaction to the voice of authority, it seems most unlikely that the scattered sources of opposition to rearmament will coalesce in any way that will pose a threat to the carrying out of Federal Republic commitments under the London and Paris Agreements. GPA expects that there will be some difficulty, possibly even including rioting on a minor scale in the early stages of bringing German manpower under arms. The degree of such difficulty will depend a good deal on whether the government shows ineptitude in handling the problems that arise or whether it will be able to act smoothly and quickly to take care of smaller troubles before they become larger.

We have recently observed a marked increase of agitation in Germany over the subject of rearmament. In July at the SPD convention in Berlin an overwhelming majority of delegates gave enthusiastic support to anti-rearmament and “negotiation first” policies. In October the Trade Union convention adopted a strongly worded resolution against taking up arms with only three or four dissenting voices. The state election campaigns in Hesse and Bavaria, coming not long after the completion of the London and Paris Agreements, were regarded as a first test of German public reaction to the new arrangements

\(^1\) Drafted by Elwood Williams.
designed to replace the defunct EDC. Not only was there much talk during these campaigns of the folly of rearming without talking first to the Russians (a straight SPD line), but even more remarkable, there were a number of youth demonstrations against rearming and against military service, culminating in a fracas in Augsburg where Herr Blank, the Minister in charge of defense arrangements for the Adenauer Government, was first shouted down and then physically injured. This last incident served greatly to enlarge the already substantial German press comment on the entire subject and there appears now to be doubt in some quarters whether the Federal Republic Government can draft and train troops and establish an army without considerable difficulty.

In the GPA view, there is probably some difficulty to be expected, but it should not be “considerable.” In the area of physical violence, we think that the most to be expected would be draft rioting on a sporadic basis and demonstrations, Marchings, or hecklings at the speeches or appearances of prominent government figures. We would expect such physical disturbances to occur usually on the initiative of Communists or crypto-Communists who would use local disaffected elements, especially draft-reluctant youth, to add mass and weight to the effort. We think any chain reaction of such incidents, starting in one community and spreading from town to town across any large part of the country, an extremely remote possibility.

We would also expect that on paper the opposition to arming would look a good deal stronger and the dissension seem much greater than will actually be the case. The SPD can be expected to use the subject to underline its demands for negotiations with the USSR and, for purely German reasons, the whole matter of rearmament is one which provides excellent copy for the German newspaper and magazine world.

It must be understood that the problem of German rearmament, as seen by the Germans, is a very complex and difficult one. There are wrapped up in it any number of lesser subjects which have, at one time or another, played a real and agonizing part in German life and opinion and which continue to affect them. In listing a few, one might include: the Socialist doctrines of internationalism and pacifism beaten down in 1914, but later reappearing at many times and places; the long dynamic force of Prussian militarism beaten down in 1918, revived and then smashed in 1945; the militaristic trappings and adventures of National Socialism so disastrously discredited in the most recent war; the sincere efforts of the post-war period to outlaw the military idea by provisions in the Basic Law (constitution), and, when it became necessary to amend that, to arrange for rearmament only under the safeguards of a European Defense Community. The attitudes engendered among several generations of Germans by these thoughts are
a real part of their total make-up and can be played upon with some effect. We have seen how, when German rearmament became a real subject in 1950 and 1951, a wave of "ohne mich" feeling swept widely through the country. Now, to play on these attitudes, there are several substantial forces.

The first is the Communist Party, its front organizations and its hidden followers. By definition, the party and every instrument it can command or influence will use every means available to stir up anti-armament and anti-enlistment feeling. Because of the almost total distrust of the Germans for the Communists, the antidote for these efforts is obviously exposure. This is a task the Federal Government and the various Laender Governments are well equipped to do. The Verfassungsschutz organizations are well organized and have effectively penetrated the Communist Party and its affiliated organizations.

The second is the Socialist Party (SPD) which does not oppose rearmament as such, according to its latest (July) official platform, but which does hold as axioms of policy that the reunification of Germany must be the first aim of the Federal Republic, that rearmament will stiffen Russian resistance to reunification, and that, consequently, rearmament should be delayed until the matter of reunification has been re-explored in international conference negotiation with the Russians. In feeding fuel to the fire of this argument, the SPD has, and will, make use of a good many others. There is, for example, no doubt in the light of the elections of September 1953 that a large majority of the German population had accepted the idea of rearmament within EDC. To arm within an international framework with automatic checks established against a revival of German militarism old-style was a cardinal point in the successful appeal of Chancellor Adenauer's CDU/CSU. Again and again before August of 1954, the Chancellor and his party specifically rejected the idea of a German national army as a solution to the German problem. The collapse of EDC was a severe shock to the Germans. The amazing recovery of the situation by Western statesmen, using the devices of NATO and WEU, did much to offset this shock, but the fact that the new scheme called for a German national army, left many Germans doubtful and upset. There is an evident fear in many that the forces of German militarism, Prussianism, and political influence by a military cast will be more than the democratic forces or the Federal Republic can keep under control. The SPD is fully cognizant of the depth and extent of this feeling and is not failing to make use of it in political speeches, even though SPD parliamentarians are participating in Bundestag committee activities designed to keep civilian and democratic control of the armed forces which are to be established.

Thirdly, one must reckon with the German Trades Union Group (DGB) which, in its policies and pronouncements, parallels the SPD.
in large measure, but which has several specific reasons for looking on rearmament with a dubious eye. The DGB has a number of influential members who are old Socialists of the pacifist stripe. It has a vast number of others who hold tightly to Marxist-Socialist doctrines of worker exploitation by the capitalist class and fear the capitalists who produce munitions and weapons above all others. The DGB also includes a substantial element of younger workers, who are pleased to have good jobs in an expanding economy and have an understandable reluctance to spend 18 months or two years away from their families working with a gun instead of a lathe. This group has the further concern that their places will be filled from the ranks of the unemployed or even by labor imported from Italy, thus increasing the competition they will face when they leave military service.

As a fourth factor, one must consider the subject of neutralism. Besides being promoted by the Communists as something useful to them, neutralism has two sources of strength that have nothing to do with Communism. The first is Protestant pacifism. The second is a sort of psychological retreat from reality which rationalizes its position by concluding that Germany is indefensible from Russian assault or that the secret plans of the Allies (especially the French) call for using West German territory only as the foreground of a defense in depth strategy which will make no serious effort to fight east of the Rhine. The pacifist group of neutralists is very small, but the impact of its arguments is much greater than its size would suggest, particularly because many of them are spread by prominent Protestant clergymen and lay leaders. Gustav Heinemann is the most prominent political figure in this group. The other group of neutralists is too scattered to have any coherence at all. It includes writers, professors, some ex-military figures, etc., who do not act together, but who do have an effect because their better argued points achieve wide circulation in the German community and frequently appear in the arguments of organized groups who actually oppose rearmament on other grounds.

This rather long exposition of the forces opposed to rearmament suggests immediately why they can be expected not to succeed. If they were a coherent, unified, well directed force, it would be possible to describe the opposition much more briefly. However, it must not be forgotten that these forces, though often shadowy, are real, and that if they should manage to coalesce under some leadership, the trouble they could cause would be very great indeed.

The job of seeing that they do not coalesce, falls to the forces favoring rearmament in general and the carrying out of the London and Paris Agreements in particular. These forces are powerful, well organized, capable of integrated action, and already, under the leader-
ship of Chancellor Adenauer, have political leadership of Western Germany by a wide margin. The principal elements in these forces are:

1. The Federal Government with its two-thirds majority in the Bundestag. Overwhelmingly successful in the 1953 national elections, it has lost some prestige through the events of 1954, including the failure of EDC and a diminished vote in local elections, but it still has firm control of the internal political situation and shows no sign of losing it.

2. The almost unanimous support of the business community, industrial and commercial. West German business is firm in its support of Adenauer and in its opposition to all things Communist or even Socialist. It also includes large numbers of German community leaders who lean toward the traditional attitudes of respect for the military idea and a belief in the virtues of military strength.

3. The professional and upper middle classes, including the widespread and immensely powerful Civil Service. Here again is a tradition-bearing element of German society firmly convinced that its future lies in a position of German strength, aligned with the West.

4. A variety of influential organizations, including veterans groups and associations of refugees and expellees who are animated as much by a profound hatred (and even fear) of Russia, as by any attachment to the glories of militarism.

The German disposition to respect the voices of those in positions of leadership and authority is well known. It may have been diminished by the events of this century, but it is still a major factor in German social structure. With Adenauer himself and the overwhelming proportion of German upper and middle class leadership lined up in favor of rearmament, there is little doubt that opposition will prove futile, unless some radical change of international circumstance intervenes. This does not, however, exclude the possibility that through poor handling of potentially troublesome situations, the progress of rearmament may be made noisier and somewhat more difficult than it need be.

---

740.5/12-1054: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS, December 10, 1954—7 p. m.

2486. Reference Embassy telegram 2475. Narrow margin by which Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee approved favorable Billette report on German rearmament and membership in NATO is now revealed. Official tabulation 16 votes for included 8 Socialists, 2 ARS, 2 Independents, 2 Peasants, 1 Radical, 2 Independent Peasants and 1 Peasant. Socialists voting for included Mayer and Moch, both of

---

1 Repeated to London and Bonn.
2 Not printed; it reported that the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly approved three favorable reports on the Paris Agreements, which meant that the “first hazard on parliamentary road to ratification [had] been successfully overcome” (740.5/12-1054).
whom have heretofore been opposed to EDC and German rearmament in any form. They are said to have informed committee that their group had voted unanimously in favor of treaty in committee but they reserved their position on final vote on floor. In this connection, it is recalled that last Socialist Congress decided that group should vote unanimously for ratification and that any dissenting members will be subjected to party discipline.

Votes against included 6 Communists, 5 Gaullists, 1 Progressist, 2 Independents and 1 Radical. 11 abstaining included MRP.

Of 2 Independents voting for, Delbez and Paternot, latter later attempted to switch his vote to an abstention but he was overruled on basis final vote had already been recorded. If switch had been accepted, whole process of passing bill from committees to Assembly floor in time to meet December 20 opening date for debate might have been jeopardized.

Bouhey (Socialist) spoke on behalf those voting for to effect favorable vote had been granted on understanding that "parallel negotiations" with Soviets would proceed. Also expressed concern over "Adenauer’s declarations on Saar" and indicated that he and some of colleagues might find reason vote differently on floor than they had in committee if their conditions for parallel negotiations and accepted Saar Agreement were not satisfied. Rosenblatt (Communist) speaking for opposition explained hostility on well-worn Communist ground of objection to German rearmament in any form.

Dillon

762.022/12-1354 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State

SECRET      NIAC

BONN, December 13, 1954—1 p. m.

1713. I called on Chancellor this morning eleven o'clock. He had just received from Blankenhorn copy German translation Mendes-France’s proposed explanation Saar Treaty, scheduled for printing and distribution members National Assembly Tuesday morning. Chancellor glanced through it for first time in my presence and was incensed at number statements contained in document. On several points he declared Mendes-France’s statement contrary to agreements reached between them in Paris. He stated publication this document would make his position impossible in forthcoming debate first reading Wednesday and Thursday Bundestag. He would be obliged to make public denial of number of points in this declaration. Consequence of

1 Repeated to Paris and London.
2 A summary of the salient features of the French Exposé des Motifs, which was to be printed and distributed along with copies of the draft law authorizing the President to sign the Saar Agreement, is in telegram 2509 from Paris, Dec. 13 (762.022/12-1354).
public dispute between Mendes-France and Adenauer on interpretation their agreement in Paris would wreck possibility ratification in Paris and Bonn. I have telephoned Dillon to alert him to this danger. Immediate objective must be avoidance publication this document, but beyond this before French debate opens some degree reconciliation between Mendes-France's explanation and Chanc's position must be reached.

Chancellor did not intend in his statement Wednesday to stress Saar issue. On contrary, he intended to treat it as lightly as possible, he said to me that unfortunately Mendes-France seemed intent on focusing attention on Saar issue and forcing him to do same.

Chancellor cannot help entertaining suspicion that Mendes-France wishes have treaties fail because of German intransigence on Saar issue and this is reason for his desiring publish his explanation before Bundestag debate and many days before his own debate.

In particular, reference to U.S. and U.K. in this statement made Chancellor feel he must ask officially for statement from Washington. Therefore I am officially requesting from Department answer to question which he raises, namely is following statement which Mendes-France proposes to make correct or not:

"We have before us international pact which gives European status to Saar and there is no doubt that French Govt during negotiations for peace treaty (which will finally fix boundaries Germany and which, in so far as it affects Saar, will be submitted to Saar population for approval) will demand that this status be confirmed. During negotiations the French Govt will ask for support of British and American Govts in accordance with express assurances which French Govt received from these two govts as early as April 10, 1947, and which have meanwhile been reaffirmed."

Please instruct urgently.

CONANT

762.022/12-1354 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

SECRET NIAC

PARIS, December 13, 1954—8 p.m.

2526. Reference Embassy telegram 2519. Parodi sent for me urgently late this evening at direct request of Mendes to talk about the Saar. He said that Berard had had an interview with Blankenhorn today in which Blankenhorn had protested violently against the French Exposé des Motifs on the Saar and in particular against the paragraph discussing possible attitude of the U.S. and Great Britain at a future peace conference. Berard had replied outlining the French

1 Repeated to London and Bonn.

2 Not printed; it discussed the release of the French Exposé des Motifs to all members of the French National Assembly and the fact that no French newspapers had published it as yet, although that would soon happen (762.022/12-1354).
position, which was French Government at first introduced Saar bill as a simple annex to Paris Treaty so as not to require any Exposé des Motifs and had only been forced to change their tactics upon publication of the German Exposé des Motifs, which they had found most misleading and which had caused an uproar in the French Assembly. Blankenhorn told Berard that German Exposé des Motifs was regrettable and had been dictated by electoral considerations. He then said that the question was what should be done now. Blankenhorn told Berard that the Chancellor considered that it might not be possible for him to go through with presentation of Paris accords and Saar agreement to Bundestag on 15th, and that he was considering instead appealing to U.S. and Great Britain asking that a 4-Power conference (U.S., U.K., France and Federal Republic) be convened immediately to discuss the Saar.

Parodi’s instructions from Mendes were to tell me clearly and firmly that under no circumstances would the French Government attend such a 4-Power conference on the Saar, the only purpose of which could be an attempt by the Germans to renegotiate the agreements signed at Paris. Parodi pointed out that Blankenhorn had suggested this 4-Power conference while in London on his recent visit. French feel that Germans are blowing incident up out of all proportion and are using it as excuse to try and get the Saar agreement re-opened before a 4-Power conference.

Parodi said that French Exposé des Motifs, while firm, was not at all violent, and that several paragraphs desired by Grandval had been omitted completely. From brief reading, I feel this is fair characterization of French presentation. Parodi also said that French Govt was making every effort to keep subject out of the newspapers, but could not guarantee success, as document was now in hands of all deputies, including Communists.

As I left Parodi’s office, I found Jebb in outer office, and he told me that he also had been sent for urgently, presumably to receive the same message.

DILLON

762.022/12-1354 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, December 13, 1954—8:24 p.m.
8194. Re Bonn’s 1718 (rptd Paris 396 London 406) and telephone conversation Dillon to effect French have already distributed explana-

1 Drafted by Merchant and Dulles, cleared with Phleger. Lyon, and John W. Jones, and repeated for action to Paris as nia ct telegram 2190 and to Bonn as nia ct telegram 1638.

2 Dated Dec. 13, p. 1462.
tion Saar Treaty I believe we should reply to Adenauer’s question along following lines:

"Questions have recently arisen regarding the position which the United States would take at a German peace conference with reference to the status of the Saar. The United States has long had a deep and abiding interest in a just and permanent settlement of the Saar problem. Such a settlement, in its view, should rest upon willing acceptance by the people of the Saar and of the Governments concerned. In 1947, and again in 1950, the United States Government indicated the position which, in the light of the then circumstances, it would be prepared to take at the peace conference. Since that time, the situation has materially altered, notably by the opening of direct negotiations on this subject by France and Germany. In June 1954, in relation to a prospective Franco-German agreement of a permanent character, the United States indicated that, on the assumption that such an agreement was concluded and commended itself to the people of the Saar, the United States would support that agreed settlement in the Peace Conference. That agreement failed of conclusion. On October 28, 1954, the Governments of France and Germany finally reached an agreement with reference to the Saar, which the United States understands is designed to endure ‘until the conclusion of peace treaty’. It further appears that the provisions of the peace treaty affecting the Saar will require the approval of the Saar population by a referendum. The Government of the United States does not feel that in the absence of agreement by the parties on the permanence of this agreement, it can consider giving a commitment running beyond that contemplated in Article 8 of that agreement. It does, however, believe that it can reasonably be assumed that when the question of the Saar is raised at a Peace Conference, the United States will be disposed to support a permanent solution of this matter which rests upon the willing acceptance of the people of the Saar and the Governments concerned."

London should urgently seek UK views on foregoing and intentions regarding British issuance similar statement. Hope US statement can be given Adenauer by close of business Dec. 14, i.e. prior Bundestag debate. Upon receipt UK views and on assumption they agree with us, we intend instruct Conant inform Adenauer and Dillon inform Mendes-France.

DULLES

762.022/12-1454

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant), at Paris ¹

CONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY BAD GODESBERG, December 14, 1954.

Dear Livie: I am taking advantage of Reinstein’s going to Paris tonight to send you a few lines about the present status of the mix-up

¹ Merchant was in Paris as part of the U.S. Delegation to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting scheduled for Dec. 17-18; for documentation, see pp. 549 ff.
on the Saar. As of this writing (6:00 p.m. Tuesday evening), it looks as though tomorrow in the Bundestag would be relatively quiet. The excitement may come on Thursday. A great deal depends on how much of the French “explanation” is published in the press tomorrow (Wednesday morning) and Thursday morning, and whether or not the opposition speakers get hold of the full document.

As I understand it, the Chancellor will make very little of the whole Saar problem and say, in effect, that the “justification” now in the hands of the French Assembly does not agree with his own views on several points and the subject will have to be further discussed. Whether he can get away with this simple statement or not remains to be seen; and you will know by the time you see this letter whether what he says and what other Germans say tomorrow or Thursday will have upset the French so that their time-schedule is altered.

On the subject of the U.S. and British position, it is our view here now that almost certainly there will be no need for the Chancellor to volunteer any statement about U.S. intentions; but if he is challenged because of a “leak” of the French “justification,” then he may be in a very difficult position on Thursday if he cannot reply. Therefore I am still of the opinion that if possible the Chancellor should be given a statement on behalf of the U.S. and the British. I understand the British High Commission is of a somewhat different opinion.

I hardly need point out that one of the basic troubles is that from the start the German and French “explanations” of what was agreed have differed markedly. In a few words, the Chancellor has always maintained the solution was not a European solution, but was a provisional one, whereas the French seem to insist that it is a European one and is not provisional!

As to who was to blame for forcing this issue by printing “explanations” and distributing them, I am not prepared to argue at this time. Clearly the French are blaming the Germans and the Germans the French. But knowing the difficulty the Chancellor is having here, it does seem that his point is well taken; namely that if the French “explanations” were to be adopted as official by the Germans, he could not get the Saar Treaty through the Bundestag. Beyond that statement, I would not care to make any predictions or forecasts at this moment. If it would be of any assistance to you or The Secretary for me to come to Paris, of course I should be glad to do so, but I hope that this Saar problem will not come up to bother you further at this time.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely,

Jim
Memorandum for the President by the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, [undated].

SECRET

Subject: Assurances to French on Maintenance of U.S. Troops in Europe

Mendes-France has sent me word that he would like to have the assurances on the above subject, to which I referred in my statement at the London conference, in time for his use in the French Assembly debate on the Paris Agreements, which begins December 20. I intend to attempt to persuade Mendes-France that the text of my London statement itself, together with the statement in my letter to you of November 12, transmitting the Paris Agreements, that you would be disposed to act favorably on a recommendation from me regarding assurances, should be sufficient for his purpose.

I suggest, however, that you mention this matter in your briefing of the Congressional leaders on Tuesday. You might call their attention to the text of my London statement and point out that as the Europeans appear to be proceeding in good faith to ratify the Paris Agreements, it will be necessary for us to proceed along the lines I indicated in London. We will, of course, consult with them on the content of any statement which you may make prior to its release as we did in the case of the EDC.

I attach copies (a) of my statement in London and (b) the passage in my letter transmitting to you the Paris Agreements.

---

1 A handwritten notation on the source text reads as follows: "Discussed with the President at lunch 12/14/54". Merchant recommended the position taken in the source text in a memorandum which he sent Dulles on Dec. 11 (740.5/12-1154).

2 This is a reference to Dulles' statement made during the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the Nine-Power Conference on Sept. 29; for the text of this statement, which is included as Annex II A to the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference, see p. 1357.

3 Ante, p. 1470.

4 Neither printed here, but see footnotes 2 and 3, above.

---

396.1/12-145: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 14, 1954—2:53 p.m.

2194. Eyes only Ambassador from Secretary. Just lunched with President reviewing problems which may arise in Paris in relation to London-Paris Accords. We both have impression that US is being subjected to undue pressuring. Yesterday we were told that we must
go down the line with the French on the Moroccan issue at the UN and we did so, even voting against a resolution to postpone debate. This has cost us heavily in Arab relations.

Today Bonnet reports SOS message from Mendes-France that he must have in hand the actual declaration of the President which in London I promised would be forthcoming if appropriate agreements were adopted to retain the basic advantages of EDC:

We anticipate there will be similar demands in relation to Saar and perhaps in relation to Indochina.

The disposition of the President, in which I concur, is not to give in to these demands and to insist that the French must rely upon us in good faith to carry out whatever we have promised, but that we do not have to anticipate these promises and make new ones in order to induce the French to take action which presumably is primarily in their own interest rather than ours. If the French do not believe that the London-Paris Accords with all the protections they carry are in the French interest, then we doubt that any marginal assurances we can give will be successful. On the other hand, it would be most embarrassing politically and indeed humiliating if for a second time we go through the process of giving the French all the assurances that they want and then have them reject the program. We feel that this time the French should place some trust in us and not require us to make advanced delivery.

This is sent so that you can be thinking about the general policy prior to my arrival tomorrow.2

DULLES

2 Documentation concerning French North Africa is presented in volume XI.
3 Dulles was going to Paris to attend the NAC Ministerial meeting scheduled for Dec. 17-18; for documentation, see pp. 549 ff.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 422

President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Churchill

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 14, 1954.

DEAR WINSTON: You have given a flawless exposition of Red China's relative weakness if we have under consideration only the possibility that she might launch aggressive war against either of our two countries. However, it is clear that our vital interests can be seriously damaged by operations that she is capable of carrying out against weaker areas lying along the boundaries of her territory. We saw what she tried to do in Korea and was foiled only by the intervention of strong Allied Forces, and we likewise saw what gains she made in the

1 This message was transmitted to the Embassy in London in telegram 3225, Dec. 14, with instructions that the Ambassador deliver it to Churchill.
2 The editors were unable to further identify the “flawless exposition” to which President Eisenhower refers in this sentence.
Indo-China region due to the political and military weakness of one of our allies. She can pay any price in manpower, with complete indifference to the amount. Consequently, she is a distinct threat to the peace of the world as long as she may be sufficiently irresponsible to launch an attack against peoples and areas of tremendous importance to us. This imposes on us the burden of supporting native forces in the region and of supplementing these with some of our own units.

Here I shall not outline the importance to the western world of Japan and the island chain extending on to the southward, as well as the bits of mainland on the Pacific that still remain in the possession of the free world. The moral, political and military consequences that could follow upon the loss of important parts of this great chain are obvious to both of us and to the staffs that work for us in the military, economic and diplomatic fields.

So I think it dangerous to dismiss too complacently the risks that the bad faith, bad deportment and greed of Red China pose to our world. Some of our citizens are particularly sensitive to this threat and openly argue that it would be a mistake to allow this threat to endure and extend until the day comes when Red China may actually achieve the capacity to endanger us directly. I know that neither of us is blind to this possibility, even though we consider that such a development is somewhat doubtful and in any event its attainment would involve such a long time that world conditions and balances of power could well have been radically changed in the meantime. But, of course, I agree with you that our attention and watchfulness should be directed mainly to Moscow.

Incidentally, I was interested in your renewed suggestion of a top-level meeting with the regime in Russia. I have always felt, as you know, that it would be a mistake for you and me to participate in a meeting which was either essentially social or exploratory. A social meeting would merely give a false impression of accord which, in our free countries, would probably make it more difficult to get parliamentary support for needed defense appropriations. Within the captive world it would give the impression that we condone the present state of affairs. And if these are to be exploratory talks, should they not be carried out by our Foreign Ministers, so that heads of government would come in only if some really worthwhile agreement is in likely prospect?

The latter, I fear, is not an early possibility. There are still several months to go before we shall know where we are on the London and Paris Accords and all the indications are that if they go through, the Russians will probably "play tough", at least for some little time. Therefore, I do not see the likelihood of our Foreign Ministers usefully meeting for some considerable period. So, I am bound to say that, while I would like to be more optimistic, I cannot see that a top-
level meeting is anything which I can inscribe on my schedule for any predictable date. I regret this the more because if a top-level meeting were to take place, and if it led to a personal visit to London, I would indeed be very happy.

I hope you will find some way of letting the Queen know how deeply I appreciate her gracious reference to the possibility of such a visit.

Foster and I have just had luncheon together^ and now he starts immediately for the NATO meeting. We discussed a number of matters, including a series of urgent requests that in our view practically amount to demands received from Mendes-France. He wants us to make public pronouncements supporting his statements affecting the Saar, Morocco and commitments of American troops to Europe. Important as French cooperation is to the great NATO plan, Mendes-France seems to forget that the safety, security and welfare of France are far more directly and intimately involved in the projects now under discussion than is the future of this country or of yours. One of the virtues of EDC was that it contained an acceptable solution of the Saar problem and it was French desertion of that plan that insured its defeat.

I see no good reason for this government to re-state its intentions about the stationing of American troops in Europe or take a position as to the Saar arrangement at least until the French Parliament has by some positive action shown itself capable of making decisions in keeping with the responsibilities of a great European power. I have asked Foster to confer with Anthony on these matters. Likewise, I have asked him to avoid any rigid position of refusal in considering the seemingly unreasonable requests of Mendes-France, but I am determined that we shall begin to realize some dividends on the constant pledges and pronouncements that seem to be expected of us.

I like your phrase "tyrannical weakness". It sharply defines the situation.

As you know, I occasionally flatter myself by attempting to paint likenesses of friends. I would be tremendously intrigued by the effort to paint one of you. Would it be an intolerable burden on you to allow an artist friend of mine to visit you long enough to take a few photographs and draw a few hasty color sketches that I could use in such an attempt? The final result would, of course, not be good, but also it might not be so bad as to be unendurable. If you feel this would not make an unjustified demand upon your time, I could send my artist friend over soon after the first of the year. I should think that something about thirty minutes to an hour would be sufficient for what I would need from him.

^For a summary of the discussion which occurred at the Eisenhower-Dulles luncheon meeting on Dec. 14, see telegram 2194 to Paris, Dec. 14, supra.
This is just an idea and I shall not be at all offended by your inability to entertain it.

With warm personal regard,

As ever,

IKE

762.022/12-1354: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Embassy in France

SECRET  PRIORITY

BONN, December 15, 1954—11 a.m.

407. For Secretary 2 from Conant. Your message (Dept to Bonn 1643 rptd Paris 2195 3) transmitted to Chanc through Blankenhorn on receipt 11 p.m. last night. By this time Chanc had formulated his reply to opposition for today’s debate and met with Cabinet. It was clearly too late for him to make drastic change in his presentation. That he was correct in his premise as to opposition’s argument is clear from opposition speaker’s statement this morning in Bundestag at 9:00 a.m., which pointed out serious discrepancy of justification for Saar Treaty presented officially by Ger Govt and presented officially by French Govt to members of French Assembly and published in morning papers. Chanc, in brief reply this morning in Bundestag debate committed himself to later discussion during debate of difference of opinion. Blankenhorn, in reporting Chanc’s reaction to your message and Brit proposals along similar lines, stated that it was impossible for Chanc to change his proposed declaration at this late hour and that most he could do to accommodate our viewpoint was to adopt Eden’s suggestion to effect that if exploratory talks with Mendes-France did not lead to agreement he would suggest to Mendes-France that approach be made to US and UK govts with view to obtaining their good offices (you will recall that in original text contained in our 1732 4 he had said that he would approach American and Brit govts directly.)

It is our view in Bonn that discrepancies between Ger and French published justifications are so serious that it would be impossible for Chanc to keep even his own party in line unless he undertakes some clarification of these basic differences with Mendes-France. Therefore,

---

1 Repeated to London as telegram 414 and to the Department of State as telegram 1749, which is the source text.
2 Dulles was in Paris to attend the NAC Ministerial meeting scheduled for Dec. 17–18; for documentation, see pp. 549 ff.
3 Not printed; it contained Dulles’ instruction that Adenauer be urgently informed that Dulles believed he should at all costs avoid creating a situation where further agreement must be reached on the interpretation of the Saar agreement prior to French and German ratification of the present text (762.022/12-1454).
4 Not printed; it transmitted to the Department of State a translation of the text of Adenauer’s proposed statement to the Bundestag concerning the Saar Agreement (762.022/12-1454).
I believe Chanc is not being stubborn or unreasonable in insisting that there must be clarification on a few vital points before he can proceed with comite discussion of Saar Treaty. We assume debate will be terminated tomorrow afternoon with treaties being sent to comite and matter will not be discussed again in Bundestag until sometime in January.

CONANT

762.022/12-1554 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, December 15, 1954—1 p. m.
2550. Following is summary note which Jebb is delivering to Mendes-France this afternoon on Saar:

Reference is made to Jebb-Parodi talk on December 13 regarding French Exposé des Motifs on Saar and to information received from UK HICOM Bonn re Adenauer's planned statement asking for Four-Power talk on Saar if direct talks with Mendes-France failed.

British note then states UK HICOM Bonn was instructed inform Adenauer of unfortunate effect such statement would have. Note adds that Adenauer was told if he feels bound to say something he should limit himself to saying that as first step he would wish discuss possibility and timing of Four-Power talks with Mendes-France. British note then says HICOM reported Blankenhorn reacted favorably and thought Chancellor might recast his statement.

British note makes further point that Eden somewhat embarrassed by fact UK not consulted about passage in French Exposé des Motifs concerning UK assurances, and concludes this is incorrect statement their position since UK not committed beyond period up to German Peace Treaty and Eden not prepared enter into commitment beyond this period.

DILLON

1 Repeated to Bonn and London.

762.022/12-1654 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, December 16, 1954—7 p. m.
2576. Four developments yesterday seemed make position Mendes-France Government more difficult.

First was tenor of Bundestag debate Paris agreements with particular reference to Saar, which is giving rise to some uncertainty here. Since it is certain French will not implement Paris Agreements sep-

1 Repeated to Bonn and London.
arately from Saar Accord (Embtel 2547) and since ratification Saar settlement in Germany appears doubtful some French are beginning to wonder whether there may not be unforeseen delays in getting operation under way. On assumption Assembly will ratify next week, Franco-German talks on Saar could take place thereafter but before Council of Republic action and second reading Bundestag. Nevertheless progress German debate thus far not helpful to Mendes-France in that spotlight is thrown on fact his European policy as exemplified by Paris Agreements may be in some danger.

Second, Assembly coordinating committee for Indochina yesterday advised Le Troquer of Committee's desire for full-scale debate on Indochina end this week when civil budget for associated states which has already been rejected by finance committee is scheduled for discussion. It is reported Mendes-France will pose question of confidence this issue, as authorized by Cabinet, before debate on ratification Paris Agreements. Consensus seems to be that if steering committee proposes tomorrow Indochina debate be held before ratification debate, opposition may attempt stave off proposal on technical grounds. We believe opposition would prefer face government with difficult and possibly fatal Indochina debate after ratification accomplished and Mendes-France identified with it, rather than before.

Third, bombing attacks against nationalist elements Tunisia have been unfortunate anti-climax to successful Fellagah amnesty campaign and will, as its unknown authors undoubtedly intended, largely nullify good effect this bold effort. Furthermore questions are beginning to be asked as to whether any progress Tunisian negotiations can be expected soon, and rightwing elements continue harass government heavily on this issue. Members of Mendes-France entourage have even alleged to us Gaullist and independent elements are supporting terrorism in Tunisia to create atmosphere where government can no longer negotiate.

Finally, Bidaud-Mitterand feud which has been smoldering for months burst into public view yesterday when Mitterand took step of proposing "jury of honor" examine accusations made against Minister of Interior by Bidaud when latter made his deposition on "leaks case". While if all dirty linen were washed in public, opposition might well be just as embarrassed as Government, effect Mitterand's step at this time will be to start up political gossip again on major scale and incumbent regime presumably always suffers more from such public scandal than the "outs".

None of above elements is decisive but their occurrence all one day cannot but further add to Mendes-France discouragement. Postponement Indochina debate would be ominous for life of government in

---

*Not printed: it reported that as a result of Adenauer's presentation of the Saar Agreement to the Bundestag on Dec. 15, Mendes-France now considered it essential that the French National Assembly make ratification of the Paris Agreements and the Saar Agreement "one package" (762.022/12-1554).

*Documentation concerning Indochina is presented in volume xiii.

*For further documentation on this subject, see volume vi.
sense it would add further difficult debate to already dangerous budgetary debates, though it would remove one hurdle between now and ratification debate.

DILLON

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 423

The Secretary of State to Prime Minister Mendès-France

PARIS, December 16, 1954.

[My Dear Mr. Prime Minister:] When I was in London I made a statement (September 29, 1954) which was annexed to the Final Act of the London Conference, in which, among other things, I made the following statement:

“If, out of the elements of the situation with which we are dealing—if, using the Brussels Treaty as a nucleus, it is possible to find in this new pattern a continuing hope of unity among the countries of Europe that are represented here, and if the hopes that were tied into the European Defense Community can reasonably be transferred into the arrangements which will be the outgrowth of this meeting, then I would certainly be disposed to recommend to the President that he should renew a pledge comparable to that which was offered in connection with the European Defense Community Treaty.”

I am glad to advise you that I have in fact made to the President the recommendation referred to, and the President has indicated that he is disposed to act favorably on that recommendation, if action to ratify the London–Paris Accords promises realization of the assumptions above stated. The President has communicated his position in this respect to the United States Senate for its information in connection with seeking the consent of the Senate to the ratification by the United States of the protocol amending the Bonn contractual agreement and the protocol admitting the Federal Republic of Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty.

As I stated on September 29 in the passage above quoted, the President’s declaration would be “comparable to that offered in connection with the European Defense Community Treaty” the text of which declaration was issued on April 16, 1954 on the condition and assumption that the European Defense Community Treaty would be ratified

1 The U.S. Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting in Paris transmitted the text of this message to the Department of State for information in telegram Secto 3, Dec. 16, and noted that it was delivered to Mendès-France by Dulles during the afternoon of Dec. 16. The telegram also informed the Department that the text of the message was cleared with Anderson and Radford, with copies distributed to the Foreign Ministers of Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, and to Lord Ismay.

2 Full text of this statement is included as Annex II A, p. 1057.
and come into force. I also pointed out that my statement of September 29 would have to have certain changes in language. Thus, it would be appropriate to reflect the fact that it was made in relation to the Paris Accords rather than the European Defense Treaty. Certain other minor changes would be required to take account of intervening developments.

I am transmitting a copy of this communication to all present and prospective members of the Brussels Treaty and to the North Atlantic Treaty Council.

[Sincerely yours,]

Foster Dulles

---

*According to telegram Secto 22 from Paris, Dec. 18, the wording of this sentence was changed before delivery to Mendès-France to read as follows: "I also pointed out in my statement of September 29 that the declaration would have to have certain changes in language" (740.5/12-1854).

---

740.5/12-1654

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)¹

TOP SECRET

Participants: France
Pierre Mendes-France
Alexandre Parodi
Maurice Couve de Murville
Jean Soutou
Roland de Moustier

United Kingdom
Anthony Eden
Harold Macmillan
Gladwyn Jebb
Christopher Steel
Harold Caccia
R. R. Powell
Anthony Rumbold

United States
John Foster Dulles
Robert B. Anderson
John C. Hughes
C. Douglas Dillon
Livingston T. Merchant

PARIS, December 16, 1954.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

Second Saar Period

Mendès-France then referred to the second Saar period (support at the Peace Conference) and said he had promised to return to it. He

---

¹A summary of this conversation was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 9, Dec. 17 (740.5/12-1754).
stated he was told in Washington that the U.S. wanted “to go back” on statement of Ambassador Dillon in June. The Secretary then reviewed the past on this point and stated his belief that this present arrangement was not a permanent solution nor do both the Germans and the French want US–UK support for it at the Peace Conference. (Mendes-France read to the meeting a French memorandum of Ambassador Dillon’s remarks last June.) He said he hoped that after looking at this 1954 statement the Secretary would change his mind. He then read the Marshall 1947 statement and said he would accept a private assurance to support him at the Peace Treaty Conference.

The Secretary said he was not saying he wouldn’t support him. Adenauer last spring in connection with his agreement with Tietgen had accepted the principle of our guaranty. This is now an acute problem in Germany and there is no change in the U.S. basic position sympathetic toward France in his matter. The Secretary went on to say that it is one thing to have an attitude but another thing to give formal understanding, but it was probable that we will support the French position at the Peace Treaty conference.

Mendes-France remarked that that “won’t help a lot!” and went on to say that all France got from the war was the Saar. The Secretary asked if Mendes-France realized that to give the guaranty and publicize this might wreck the entire WEU project. Mendes-France suggested that the Committee Chairman could be told privately. Sir Anthony then went over the record of the Saar problem up to 1950 and said that the attitude was unchanged but they could not give any formal undertaking.

Mendes-France then mentioned a tripartite letter of August 3 [2], 1951 to Chancellor Adenauer reiterating the US–UK position.3

The Secretary remarked that the U.S. attitude toward France was well-known but that he himself couldn’t bind his successors. What will bind them is past history and our fundamental attitude toward France. He went on to say that to give assurances publicly would be disastrous, and to do it privately, dishonorable. He stated he saw no chance of our being able to change our position on this matter.

Mendes-France suggested that this perhaps might be possible in the future—and after ratification. He went on to say that this would be raised in the Assembly. The Secretary said that if the US is formally asked

---

2 Presumably a reference to Dillon’s meeting with Schumann on June 8 concerning a joint United States–United Kingdom statement on a Saar agreement; Dillon informed the Department of State concerning this meeting in telegram 4764 from Paris, June 9, p. 968.
3 For the text of the tripartite letter, which was circulated as document AGSEC(51)1274 of Aug. 2, see Documents on the Saar, p. 304.
for their position, they will give it but that he advised Mendes-France not to ask.

Mendes-France suggested that he refer to former commitments and say he has no reason to believe the position has changed. The Secretary stated he would not be agreeable to this since it would give the impression that the U.S. had committed itself. Mendes-France said he wouldn’t object if the Secretary wanted to think it over for a few days. The Secretary said he felt he should not give a final answer here and now but stated it would be in general along the lines of what he had said.

Letter of Troop Assurances

Mendes-France inquired when the President would make his declaration and the Secretary replied that this would come when the ratification process had advanced to a point where the program was substantially assured. Mendes-France said he assumed this meant after the debates in the French Assembly but before deposits of instruments of ratification. The Secretary stated that it might be before all 14 nations had ratified but after essential action had been taken by the French and Germans. Mendes-France asked if it could come before signature and deposit by France of the ratification instrument. The Secretary said this would probably be all right and quite possibly it would be before the formal French deposit of instruments of ratification. The Secretary suggested that they recess. Mendes-France thought they should meet again and it was agreed to meet on Saturday afternoon if there was no NATO meeting.

Conference files, lot 60 D 027, CF 419

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)

SECRET

[PARIS,] December 16, 1954.

Subject: Saar

Participants: The Secretary
Sir Anthony Eden
Sir Harold Caccia
Mr. Merchant

Following dinner the Secretary and Mr. Eden briefly discussed the Saar in the light of the meeting with Mendes-France that afternoon. They were each agreed that it would not be possible to give Mendes-France a renewed commitment to support at the peace conference the
detachment of the Saar from Germany. They both desired to explore, however, the possibility of giving him some statement which in limited degree might satisfy him and which might not do damage to Adenauer. Sir Harold Caccia was asked to draft something overnight and confer the next morning with Mr. Merchant. Mr. Merchant was instructed to prepare a draft for Caccia’s consideration at the same time of a letter of intent which could be sent to Mendes-France before the Secretary and Mr. Eden left Paris on the subject of US–UK support of the Franco-German Saar Agreement of October 23, 1954.

LIVINGSTON T. MERCHANT

740.5/12–1754 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Bonn, December 17, 1954—7 p. m.

1789. Bundestag foreign policy debate on first reading Paris Treaty produced few new arguments or surprises. Debate can perhaps best be characterized by cartoon in “Welt” which showed Chanc and Ollenhauer entering Bundeshaus, each concealing large phonograph records. As is customary in first readings, argumentation remained general. Most observers feel neither coalition nor opposition gained ground as result debate. Good showing by Chanc and Kiesinger on first day of debate against uninspired Ollenhauer cancelled out by Chanc’s poor handling of SPD attacks on Saar and rearmament cost yesterday, when Chanc seemed fatigued and dispirited.

SPD attack deliberately avoided discussion of content of treaties, except Saar (there was very little criticism of other treaties from any side during course of debate). SPD speakers concentrated on Saar, reunification, high rearmament cost, resistance of youth to military service and doubt as to ability of NATO, even if augmented by German divisions to prevent Sovs from overrunning FedRep in event all-out attack. SPD arguments on Four-Power necessity for conf before ratification had no effect on Bundestag. Party’s theories on Sov willingness to permit reunification of united Germany without Western alliances were rejected by all coalition speakers who seemed even less impressed by alleged changes in Sov policy than during October foreign policy debate.

Mende (FDP) and Schneider (DP) asked for release remaining war criminals held by Western powers, but their arguments were fa-

1 Repeated to London and Paris.
miliar and aroused no real interest in house. Mende recommended large increase in Grenzschutz.

Noteworthy that no coalition speaker defended Saar agreement as such. Merkatz said DP could not support treaty in present form; Dehler and Becker (FDP) and Seibold (BHE) rejected treaty in name of their factions. Even Chanc failed make any effort defend substance of treaty, limited self to explaining necessity of agreement with France on Saar, his displeasure at official French interpretation of treaty was clear in his sharp rejection of it and demand for meeting with US and UK to clarify disputed points. We feel he may have created exaggerated expectations in coalition as to extent of clarifications he will be willing get from France. FDP and BHE speakers followed Chanc's request to exercise moderation in discussing Saar in light coming French debate. They generally followed main SPD argument that treaty should not be supported because signatories could not agree what they meant. Freedom for political parties to campaign for eventual return to Germany while respecting statute and agreement that second plebiscite shall contain opportunity for Saar population vote for return to Germany and that plebiscite results shall determine final disposition of Saar were main points in criticism. On basis their conduct in debate, it believed majority of both BHE and FDP will vote against treaty unless major changes made. It still appears Chanc would have small majority for treaty.

SPD capitalized on Chanc's inability give overall estimate of cost of military build-up, claimed rearmament would cost up to 100 billion DM. Rasner (CDU) said FedRep defense costs would be kept within nine billion DM annual limit or military build-up would have to take place over longer period. Chanc also unable answer persistent SPD questions on extent and quality of armaments to be supplied by US.

There was long discussion by Rasner, Mende and Manteuffel of democratic control of army, each of them asked govt take steps establish personnel selection committee for officers.

Chanc, Kiesinger, Merkatz, Jaeger (CSU) Haasler (BHE) gave strong support with strong CDU applause, to necessity for continuation of attempts to unify Europe (CDU speakers said govt would be willing integrate FedRep army EDC-style at any time.) Dehler and Becker (FDP) on other and expressed strong doubts about possibility or value of supranational integration, commended national self-interest as most lasting and natural element in international politics.

Chanc omitted most refs to settlement with Sovs contained in first draft his speech.

Conant
SECRET

PRIORITY

Moscow, December 17, 1954—8 p. m.

146. Limited distribution. For the Secretary. Since my return I have carefully examined all material affecting present Soviet attitude,\(^2\) initiated by Soviet note of November 13,\(^3\) concerning the question of Paris and London agreements. Everything I have read and heard since I have been back has more than confirmed view I expressed to you in Washington that Soviet Government takes the entry into force of these agreements with great seriousness and their present attitude and warnings should not be dismissed as propaganda only. While obviously the intensive campaign of pressure directed primarily at France is to large extent based on Soviet hope of defeating ratification, I am inclined to believe that Soviet Government itself regards this hope as somewhat forlorn and campaign is at least equally if not primarily motivated by desire to prepare ground and justify Soviet “counter measures” in event that these agreements are ratified. Soviet Government has committed its prestige so deeply in this respect that it could not without great loss of face, and particularly with Satellites, merely do nothing when and if ratification occurs. In effect, Soviet Government is now face to face with dilemma which has been inherent in its German policy since the end of the war. Having been unwilling for reasons which have been frequently reported from here to make the necessary concessions in regard to East Germany which might have, by permitting unification through free elections, frustrated West German rearmament and military association with West, Soviet Government has in past month embarked on policy of threat and intimidation in regard to consequences of final adoption London and Paris agreements.

There is no sign that we can detect here that they are contemplating direct military action in event of ratification Paris and London agreements and key question of full extent of measures they may take in military preparation field is not yet clear. Soviet Government, however,

\(^1\) Repeated to the Department of State in telegram 986, which is the source text. In telegram Dulte 7, Dec. 17, the Secretary instructed the Acting Secretary of State to hold the source text closely and to restrict distribution “as leakage might be distorted into alarm in France” (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 422).

\(^2\) For background concerning the drafting of this telegram, see Bohlen, Witness to History, p. 366.

\(^3\) For the text of the Soviet note of Nov. 13, which invited 23 European nations and the United States to a conference on Nov. 29 to discuss the creation of a system of collective security in Europe, see Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 13, 1954, p. 905.
appears committed rather definitely to following minimum measures in reaction to ratification London and Paris agreements:

1. Consolidation of Eastern European military system with open creation of some form of centralized staff and command, probably along lines NATO organization. In addition, inside general framework this system, probably an inner group composed of Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany, which would involve creation of East German Army. If Soviet measures are confined to purely organizational matters, involving consolidation of Soviet military bloc, only possibly serious feature would be creation of East German Army with its possible effect on position Western sectors Berlin. To this should be added abrogation of Franco-Soviet treaty threatened in yesterday's note and probably for sake consistency similar action re Anglo-Soviet treaty at later date.4

2. Soviets appear committed to some increase in bloc military expenditures but extent of such increase will be decisive factor. They have stated definitely both publicly and privately that entry into force of Paris and London agreements will accelerate “arms race” and they are virtually committed to some measures in this field. It is by no means clear, however, whether or not this increase would be pro forma and in the shape of a gesture primarily related to organization measures indicated above or to a serious increase in existing military programs and expenditures. Any real increase in this field in Soviet Union and Satellites would inevitably affect and possibly reverse economic trends inaugurated since Stalin's death. If these are to be abandoned or radically modified, this could affect entire political situation including principle of collective leadership in Soviet Union. As I have previously indicated, time to look for substantive disagreement or split in top leadership would be when confronted with issues, either foreign or domestic, of such dimensions as to bring about genuine and deep-seated difference of opinion. I have already reported my belief (Embtels 740 * and 912 *) that the German rearmament question might be just such an issue. While entire leadership is undoubtedly united in their desire to defeat these agreements, differences and even division might well develop around degree of increased military build-up which should be undertaken when these agreements are formally adopted. This is a question which only the future can answer and I merely indicate it here as a possibility and a factor which must be present in minds of present Soviet leadership.

* The Soviet Union on numerous occasions issued warnings to the West about the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany, including threats to annul the Franco-Russian and Anglo-Russian treaties of 1944 and 1942 respectively if the Paris Agreements were ratified. Documentation concerning the policies of the Soviet Union to counter German rearmament is presented in volume VIII.

* Not printed; it informed the Department of State about a meeting between French Ambassador Jouze and Soviet leaders in Moscow on Dec. 13 during which the Soviets emphasized the seriousness with which they viewed the entry into force of the Paris Agreements (651.61/12-1554).

* Not printed; in it Bohlen informed the Department of State about a meeting between French Ambassador Jouze and Khrushchev on Nov. 9 during which Khrushchev told Jouze that "the Soviet government would not take lying down the entry into force of Paris agreements but would 'react vigorously'" (651.61/11-1054).
It should be emphasized here that theme of danger of German militarism is one which strikes responsive chord with Soviet people who remember World War II experiences and we have been impressed by degree to which Soviet Government has been stressing this danger as inevitable consequence of entry into force Paris and London agreements throughout Soviet central and provincial press. There are other signs which appear to reflect a certain degree of domestic mobilization in anticipation of measures which Soviet Government may undertake following ratification including particularly involvement of orthodox church in support of Soviet position on Paris and London agreements and consequences which might flow therefrom expressed in declaration by Patriarch and three other leading orthodox clerics followed by reception Patriarch by Malenkov. To this factor might be related Khrushchev statement published November 11, calling on party workers to abstain from anti-religious excesses against believers. It is not characteristic of Soviet regime to play up to church unless its services are needed in order to help persuade population to certain sacrifices. Real danger of present Soviet attitude if translated into action, as observed from here, is not that Soviet Government will undertake any immediate military or even risky actions in foreign field but that in order to justify military build-up to which it is at least on paper committed it will be forced in order to obtain popular support to adopt and stress the theme of imminent war danger as a domestic political necessity with consequent increase international tension.

While understandable as a public position to reassure Western European opinion, I do not believe that we should seriously count on any prospect of Soviets accepting four-power negotiations for some time following ratification of agreements. While Soviet Government never fully closes door to negotiation, nevertheless at present juncture they have committed themselves so definitely to thesis that negotiations on Germany and Austria following ratification would be “pointless” that for reasons of prestige alone they would probably reject any such proposal as that outlined by Mendes-France at UN conference next spring. In face of Soviet pressures and threats it is more than ever necessary to go through as expeditiously as possible with ratification of London and Paris agreements, but I think we should recognize that we will probably be entering phase of greater international tension with real possibility of reversals of many trends both foreign and domestic, which have been inaugurated and pursued by Stalin’s successors.

It may be sometime after ratification before full significance of Soviet counter measures and their corresponding relationship to our
policies and purposes can be fully assessed. We will of course follow
developments with closest attention here.

Department repeat if desired.

Bohlen

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 419 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Minis-
terial Meeting to the Office of the United States High Commissioner
for Germany, at Bonn. ¹

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

PARIS, December 18, 1954—2:30 p. m.

Polto 181. At tripartite Ministers meeting afternoon 16th,² Mendes-
France pressed hard on Saar issue. He insisted upon receiving text
US-UK statement of support for October agreement that evening or
morning of 17th. Secretary told Mendes that while we would work on
it, doubtful whether would be ready before end of next week. Eden
and Secretary agreed could say they were in principle prepared give
assurances if requested and agreement executed.

Following tentative text such letter of intent drafted for simultane-
ous presentation Mendes and Chancellor:

"I am happy to inform you that if the agreement of October 23, 1954
between the Republic of France and the Federal Republic of Germany
with respect to the Saar comes into force and if thereafter the United
States Government is requested by the Governments of the Federal
Republic of Germany and of France in accordance with the terms of
Article 8 of the agreement to give assurances of support pending the
conclusion of a peace treaty, the United States Government is prepared
in principle in accord with the Government of the United Kingdom to
give an appropriate indication of its support."

Bonn should be prepared show text message to Adenauer when
notified Paris showing text to Mendes. Signed letter will be pounced
Bonn for later forwarding.³

Mendes also pressed for reaffirmation old pledges support at peace
conference. Secretary supported by Eden, resisted firmly. Told Mendes

¹ Repeated to the Department of State as telegram Secto 19 and to London as
telegram Polto 302.
² For a record of this meeting, see the memorandum of conversation by Mer-
chant, Dec. 16, p. 1505.
³ In telegram Polto 182 to Bonn, Dec. 18, repeated as Secto 20 to the Depart-
ment of State, HICOG was authorized to show Adenauer the text of this letter of
intent in concert with the British (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 419). HICOG
informed the U.S. Delegation in Paris that Adenauer was shown the text as in-
structed and had expressed satisfaction (telegram 417 to Paris from Bonn,
Dec. 18, repeated to the Department of State as telegram 1794. Conference files,
lot 60 D 627, CF 419). The U.S. Delegation in Paris informed the Department of
State in telegram Secto 25, Dec. 19, repeated to Bonn, that Mendes-France was
also shown the text of the letter of intent on Dec. 18 and had agreed with its
text except for a few minor word changes (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 423).
that while he would give it more thought, in event French formally made request, response would be in general context his remarks.

In event we are pressed further re our peace treaty position, we may make statement along following lines:

"Questions have arisen concerning the position the United States Government will take regarding the status of the Saar at a future peace conference with Germany.

"The United States Government has long had a deep and abiding interest in a just and permanent settlement of the Saar question. Therefore, it believes that it can reasonably be assumed that when the question of the Saar is raised at a peace conference, the United States will be disposed to support a solution which rests upon the willing acceptance of the people of the Saar and of the governments concerned. In this way, the United States Government would hope that the Saar question could be permanently removed as a possible obstacle to continuing European amity and confidence."

Eden has sent this text to FonOff for comments. Would appreciate views Bonne re effect such statement would have Germany.4

4 In telegram 1795 from Bonn, Dec. 19, Conant advised the U.S. Delegation in Paris that his staff could see no objection to the text of the draft statement on the Saar as far as the Germans were concerned (762.022/12-1954).

740.5/12-1954: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

SECRET

PARIS, December 19, 1954—5 p. m.

Secto 26. Blankenhorn called on Secretary this morning and delivered letter from Adenauer stating he hoped second and third readings of Paris Agreements would take place at end January and early February and that he had no doubt Bundestag would then also pronounce favorably on Saar agreement, especially if it should be possible in the meantime to clarify certain implementing provisions of agreement with regard to referendum, to the commissioner and to arbitration. Adenauer stated it was particularly encouraging that debate had clearly demonstrated considered opinion of overwhelming majority of Bundestag that Franco-German relations should be placed on new and good-neighbourly basis and that there was no differences of view on this point between government and opposition.

Blankenhorn elaborated that critical point concerning implementation related to freedom of political expression in connection with referendum at time of peace treaty. Germans had definitely accepted that

1 Repeated to Bonn and London.
2 Not printed. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 419)
no Saar parties could question statute itself and, while agreement was silent on political expression in connection with referendum, it was most important to Chancellor to be able to state that such freedom would exist. Secretary feared this might provide constant source of irritation during coming years and asked whether such freedom of expression might not be limited to period peace treaty actively under negotiation. Blankenhorn felt this would not help Chancellor, that there would not be agitation for return to Germany unless it were understood to be forbidden. He did not elaborate point on commissioner but said Germans hope arbitral authority would be centered in WEU rather than ICJ.

Blankenhorn stated he and Soutou had just agreed Mendes would meet Adenauer to discuss these points enroute back to Paris from Rome about January 14 if still in power. Soutou states that although meeting should not be considered definite until after French debate, it would in all probability be arranged. Both express hope this meeting could be kept secret for time being and particularly until after French debate.

Letter to Adenauer given in Secto 19

\[\text{Dulles}\]

\[\text{Same as telegram Polto 181, supra. The text of the letter of intent was slightly altered before it was sent to Adenauer (see footnote 3, supra). A copy of the letter sent to Adenauer on Dec. 19 is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, OF 419.}\]

740.5/12-2354: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACZ

PARIS, December 23, 1954—noon.

2666. Limit distribution. Mendes telephoned me last night at quarter past twelve, immediately after the end of the night session. He said that things were not going well in the debate and he sounded discouraged. He said that he wanted my frank personal advice on the possibilities of obtaining additional assistance from the US. What he had specifically in mind was the distribution of US military aid and he wondered if, in view of his parliamentary difficulties, it would not be possible for us to go further than we already had and agree to give our aid to the Arms Agency of the WEU for distribution.

I told him that there were serious difficulties of substance and procedure which I was afraid would prevent us from acceding to his

\[1\text{Reports concerning the first 2 days of the ratification debates in the French National Assembly, debates which began on Dec. 21, are in telegrams 2648 and 2663, Dec. 21 and 22, respectively (740.5/12-2154 and 740.5/12-2254).}\]
request. I explained to him as gently as possible that rightly or wrongly the US Government had considered that the EDC was a supranational organization with its own army and that under the EDC, national armies no longer existed. Therefore, we had been forced to agree to give our aid direct to the EDC commissariat for further distribution, not to member states, but to the EDC’s own troops. That situation no longer existed under the Paris Accords, and I told Mendes that it was inconceivable to me that Congress would agree to allow a foreign organization, in this case the Arms Agency of the WEU, to decide how US aid should be distributed. I then told Mendes that the procedural difficulty was, to my mind, even more serious and would make any action impossible, even if we were disposed to take it. The difficulty was, as I told Mendes, that the Secretary could not make any such commitment affecting the future distribution of US aid without first clearing the matter with the responsible committee heads in Congress. These men were not now available in Washington and in any case clearance with them would be a protracted process.

Mendes understood and acknowledged the procedural difficulty and said that in such an event, he thought it was probably better for me not to bother Washington at all about this matter. He would proceed and do his best with what he had. He said the reason he had raised this subject was that many of the speeches in the Assembly bore on this problem. In particular, he said that Maurice Faure, who had spoken previously and indicated he would vote for ratification, had told him during the evening session that he now intended to propose a reservation to the effect that the treaties would not take effect until the US negotiated an agreement to deliver their military aid through the WEU. Mendes said that he had talked Maurice Faure out of submitting this amendment last night but that it might come up again today, and that it would be a very difficult matter for him to combat. He said he realized that such an approach would be utterly unacceptable to the US and therefore he would never accept it himself.

I then asked Mendes if the last paragraph of the letter which the Secretary had given him on the subject would not be of considerable help. Mendes acknowledged that this letter represented real progress, but said that it was not sensational and what was needed now in the present temper of the Assembly was some new sensational fact that could change the tone of the Assembly.

Mendes said that he planned to make his speech this afternoon and would wait and see how it was received before deciding on further tactics. He said there were two possibilities. He was sure that a vote of confidence would be necessary to prevent dangerous amendments to the ratification law, and the question was whether he could force things
tonight and have the vote take place late Friday night and early Saturday morning, or whether he should allow the vote to be put off till Monday morning. He said he saw dangers in both courses. On Friday night many deputies would be absent and would be voting by proxy. These proxies were inflexible and as a general rule proxies were apt to be unfavorable to the government. On the other hand, if he waited until Monday, deputies would be exposed to extreme pressure in their constituencies over the weekend, which might be dangerous and also further time would be allowed for additional moves by the Soviets. I naturally could not be much help to him in this problem of internal political tactics and our telephone conversation ended on this note.

Comment: Mendes has reason to be disturbed by the course of events in the Chamber. The debate so far shows clearly that there is no one in the Assembly enthusiastically in favor of the Paris Accords. This lack of enthusiasm will probably be translated into massive abstentions which might even approximate the number of favorable votes. Consensus of French political reporters now is 240 votes for, 170 against, and approximately 220 abstentions or absences. Such a vote would be a real defeat for Mendes personally, and would be extremely upsetting to him in view of the thesis that he has continually upheld, that the question of German rearmament must be solved by a massive national majority. Such a vote will also make more critical the next two months prior to the vote in the Council of the Republic, and it will give added importance to that vote when it takes place. I regret that I can’t think of any action on our part that would be helpful at this late date.

Dillon

740.5/12-2854: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State

SECRET

Moscow, December 23, 1954—8 p. m.

969. Since Soviet Government has committed itself to take certain actions, i.e., under Moscow declaration of December 12 and notes to British and French concerning abrogation treaties when Paris Agreements are ratified,² there is considerable speculation as to exactly when Soviet Government for purpose of undertaking these actions would consider that agreements had, in effect, been ratified. At press confer-

¹ Repeated to London and Paris.
² Documentation concerning these Soviet notes threatening to abrogate the Franco-Russian and Anglo-Russian treaties of 1944 and 1942, respectively, is presented in volume VIII.
ence on December 20, following delivery of note to British Ambassador here, chief of press section Foreign Office received several inquiries on this point. His answer while not entirely clear seemed to indicate that by "act of ratification" used in British and French notes, Soviet Government had in mind final completion of process of ratification in either country and that therefore it did not choose to consider approval of British Parliament as representing such act which still presumably requires some formal action by Queen. Stories to this effect I am informed by correspondents were passed without objection by censor.

If this version is correct it would mean that Soviet Government is not committed to take any of the provisional actions which it has threatened in immediate future as result of action French Assembly but at some later date when in either France or England act of ratification is signed or otherwise executed by head of state, which according to information available here in case of France might not be until middle of February. This would give Soviet Government an additional six weeks in which to continue its campaign of threat and intimidation without being called upon to put into effect the threatened countermeasures.

Since campaigns of the type which Soviet Government has been carrying on since its November 13 note are difficult to maintain on a steady basis over a protracted period, assuming favorable vote in French Assembly in next few days, manner in which this campaign is handled by Soviet Government during period before final act of ratification will be important evidence as to nature and magnitude of Soviet countermeasures. Iliychev reply of course on this point is not conclusive and there is nothing to prevent Soviet Government, if it so desires, from regarding adoption by French Assembly as point of departure for at least interim implementation of some of the measures forecast by Moscow declaration; but at least this interpretation of what constitutes "ratification" gives Soviet Government additional period of time to determine exact courses of action to be followed.

Bohlen

a Regarding this note, see footnote 3, p. 1510.

Editorial Note

On December 23, the Italian Chamber approved the law ratifying the Paris Agreements by a vote of 335 to 215, making a total of 550 deputies out of 590 participating in the vote. Information on the Italian vote of ratification was transmitted to the Department of State
in telegram 2836 from Rome, December 23, and despatch 1314 from Rome, December 30 (765.00/12–2354 and 765.00/12–3054, respectively).

740.5/12–2454: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACST PARIS, December 24, 1954—noon.

2687. For Secretary from Dillon. Assembly's unfavorable vote last night on key section of Brussels Treaty poses very serious but not insurmountable problem. General consensus is that vote represented a miscalculation by MRP and other former backers of EDC who, in trying to hold government to narrowest possible majority, overdid the thing. They took this action in knowledge that there would be a second chance on Monday when question of confidence would be posed. However, effect of vote on public opinion over week end may be very serious and could cause further Socialist defections on Monday so that favorable result on Monday, although possible, is by no means assured. Consensus of French political commentators is that U.S. and U.K. reaction will be so severe as to bring Parliament to their senses. It is clear that Parliament expects some such reaction from both U.S. and U.K. In view of the seriousness of the situation I recommend that the President and Churchill make similar statements today prior to ten o'clock this evening Paris time so as to get full coverage in French morning press Saturday.

These statements should cover following points: (1) emphasize seriousness of situation for Western allies; (2) state clearly that if treaty is rejected by French Assembly France can in future expect no further concessions; (3) state that result of rejection will be immediate unilateral rearmament of West Germany by U.K. and U.S.; (4) state that without ratification there is no possibility of Four-Power conference with Soviets. During debate yesterday Mendes-France made point regarding unilateral rearmament of Germany and no Four-Power conference if ratification failed. Assembly reaction was clearly to doubt his statement regarding German rearmament. U.S. and U.K. statements could therefore be pegged to Mendes-France's own statements before the Assembly.

I have conferred with Jebb and his views are identical and he is making same recommendation to London. We both feel that action of French Assembly requires reaction by U.S. and U.K. at highest level and that to be effective such reaction must be prompt and clear-cut. To

1 Repeated to London and Bonn.
2 A summary of the first 4 days of debates concerning ratification of the Paris Agreements is contained in telegram 2692 from Paris, Dec. 24 (740.5/12–2454).
have political effect reaction must appear in French press tomorrow morning and so must take place on time schedule indicated.\(^3\)

---

\(^3\) Five hours later, Dillon informed the Department in telegram 2689 from Paris, Dec. 24, that British Ambassador Jebb had just phoned the Embassy to report that Eden had an unfavorable reaction to the recommendation in the source text (740.5/12-2454).

At 6:45 p.m. Dillon and Jebb went to see Mendès-France at the Prime Minister's request. Mendès-France told them that they should not lose courage and that he hoped their governments would limit any statements on the subject to the minimum. When reporting this conversation to the Department in telegram 2683 from Paris, Dec. 24, Dillon withdrew his previous recommendation concerning a need for a statement, a decision Jebb concurred in. (740.5/12-2454)

Just before the Department of State received telegram 2683 from Paris, which withdrew Dillon's recommendation, it informed the Embassy in Paris that it was inadvisable for the President to make a formal statement and that any appearance of external pressure would be counterproductive (telegram 2321 to Paris, Dec. 24; 740.5/12-2454).

---

Eisenhower Library, James C. Hagerty papers

**Diary Entry by the President's Press Secretary (Hagerty)**

**Augusta, December 24, 1954.**

**Friday, December 24, 1954**

I told the President about the vote at 8:15 in his office.\(^1\) His immediate reaction was, "Those damn French! What do they think they're trying to do? This could really upset the apple cart in Europe."

The President asked me to call Foster Dulles and have the Secretary call him back with a full report on the situation. This I did from the President's office at about quarter of 9. Dulles called back at eleven o'clock to tell me that he had just received reports from Ambassador Dillon in Paris. Dillon reported to Dulles that the situation was very serious and that he and the British Ambassador to Paris thought that drastic action was necessary to impress upon the French Deputies over the weekend, and the French people themselves, how concerned America and the United Kingdom were over the adverse vote. Dulles said that Dillon also proposed—although he, Dulles, did not agree, that a formal statement be issued jointly by the President and Churchill which would say in effect that despite French ratification or not, the United States and Britain were going ahead with the rearmament of Germany.

Dulles said that he did not think that was necessary but that he did believe that both the President and himself should issue statements expressing their grave concern about the matter.

Dulles also said that the British Ambassador to the United States, Sir Roger Makins, was coming to his house for a conference at noon, and he thought he should talk to the President prior to the arrival of

---

\(^1\) Regarding this vote, see telegram 2687, supra.
Sir Roger. I told him I would have the President call back within fifteen minutes and went out to the Club to get him.

The President was on the ninth green, practicing putting with Ed Dudley. When I came over, he said to Ed, "Excuse me, Ed, but I've got to go to work. The French have not only disturbed the whole free world but they're cutting in on my lessons."

As the President and I were walking to the office, I told him of Dulles' conversation, of the British suggestion of a joint statement and Foster's opposition to it. He said that he did not believe that a strong formal joint statement was in order. I told him about the British Ambassador calling on Dulles and recommended that if Dulles would approve, it would be a good thing for me to announce from here. He said to remind him to ask Dulles that when he got on the phone.

When the Dulles call came through, the President and I were alone in his office. He opened the conversation with, "Well, Foster, they surely have gotten things in an awful mess, haven't they?" The President agreed with Foster that we should not issue a joint statement and gave Foster the task of relaying that to Churchill through Makins.

Dulles gave the President the Dillon report and filled him in with other details. The President told the Secretary that he should get the State Department busy on putting out some information and we would do the same thing down here. "What is needed here I think, Foster, is a stern expression of the seriousness of the situation, but I think we must leave the door open to the French, and particularly to Mendes-France so that he can operate over the weekend and get a majority vote on Monday or Tuesday. We must let them know that we don't like this one bit but we must also tell them in effect that we are sure they will vote right on Monday."

Dulles then apparently told the President that he was meeting with the British Ambassador, and the President told the Secretary that he would talk to him on the phone anytime Dulles returned the call.

When the President got off the phone, I talked with Dulles and agreed that I would say first that this was viewed as a very serious thing; that the Secretary of State was conferring with the British Ambassador; and that the Secretary would call the President later on and report back to him. Dulles particularly emphasized the necessity for getting something out today because the French have no Sunday papers and the deadline for making the French Saturday papers was four o'clock this afternoon.

When the phone call was concluded, the President briefly discussed this situation and said, "You know, here this plan like EDC was devised to protect all of Europe, the French included. They are really endangering the whole safety of Europe by such votes, but you see, I honestly believe what they are trying to do is this: They know we are going to have to keep bases and troops on the continent of Europe for a
long time. They know we must work somehow or other to get a strong alliance of free nations of Europe. Now, what the French would like would be to act in that concert of nations in Europe very much like we do and like the British do. We are not a member of the European union and neither are the British. The French would like to be part of it without having the responsibility of being in it. It's the old French game of diplomatic doodling to see how much they can get out for themselves and never mind the rest of the world."

I left the President’s office at quarter till twelve and had a press conference at twelve o'clock. I deliberately made it as somber as I could and told the newsmen to stand by for the afternoon.

Dulles called back shortly before one and I took the call at the office at the Bon Air Hotel. He told me that the British had put out a really rough statement which said in effect that the question of arming Germany had been agreed on in Paris and that if the French didn’t want to go along, Germany would be armed nevertheless. Dulles said he did not think we should join with that statement and that it was a good idea anyway for them to make a strong official protest since they were nearer the French than we were and since they would, in case of war, be subject to attack just as fast as France.

I told the Secretary that the President could get to the phone within five minutes and I called Ann Whitman to tell her that the Secretary wanted to talk to the President again. Then I drove out to the Club and arrived there just as the President took the call from Dulles.

Dulles reported that the British Government had issued the strong note and was still requesting that we join them. The President firmly disagreed with that step, and we agreed then and there to the language of the statement that I would put out. It read as follows:

The Paris agreements are still in the process of debate in the French Chamber of Deputies. The President regards the adverse vote of yesterday as one of utmost seriousness. However, we cannot believe that this represents the final French decision in this matter.

I then returned to the Bon Air Hotel and had another press conference at about 1:45.

The British are a determined people and about ten o’clock that night Dulles called the President again. Churchill had sent a message to the President urging him to join personally with Churchill in a joint declaration. The President told Dulles that he had his authority to get in touch with the Prime Minister and tell him what we would put out and that was as far as we were going to go.

Dulles had also called me at 4:30 and said that he had just talked to Dillon by long distance phone. Dillon had had a private meeting with Mendes-France and Mendes-France had strongly urged the Presi-

---

*The text of Churchill’s message and the annexed British statement are printed on p. 1524.
dent not to go into any formal statement with Churchill on this situation. Mendes-France, who wants pressure from the United States and Great Britain put on the French over the weekend, said that a formal statement from the President and Churchill along the lines of the tough British attitude would do more harm than good. Dulles said he did not want to talk to the President on this but merely asked me to give him the report and I told him I would, that I was seeing the President at six o'clock when we were going out with the newsmen and photographers to get the usual Christmas pictures.

740.5/12-254: Telegram
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT
BONN, December 24, 1954—1 p.m.

1846. I saw Chancellor 10:45 this morning at his request. He was much upset by new Paris developments but agreed that nothing should be said until matter was finally settled. He had done what he could to have the German press take a quiet attitude and was making no comment. I believe through his own channels he will try to persuade MRP to sustain Mendes-France on vote of confidence Monday but he was by no means confident of what would happen.

Chancellor proposes to call a Cabinet meeting for Wednesday morning if Mendes-France should fall Monday evening. He wishes me to impress on Washington the seriousness of the situation which would result in Germany if the treaties are not rescued in Paris by vote of confidence on Monday. He believes unless prompt action were taken along line of the theory of the empty chair, public opinion in Germany would move rapidly into a completely neutralist attitude and perhaps shortly to one desiring negotiations with Russia on neutralist basis.

Above all, the Chancellor expressed the view that failure of this attempt to settle German-French relations would end possibility of good French-German relations for some time to come and would kill any idea of European integration.

If matters should go badly in Paris on Monday, I propose to see the Chancellor again on Tuesday and could deliver any message the Dept wishes to transmit to him at that time.

In view of stories in press about Chancellor's health and his difficulties in the debate last Thursday, can report his health seems good although he plans vacation after the new year. He seems perfectly able to handle any crisis that may arise. Though his anxiety is great, his spirits are good.

CONANT

1 Repeated to Paris.
2694. Limit distribution. During talk with Jebb and me, Mendes after delivering message in Embtel 2693\(^1\) philosophized on general situation, he said that France today was clearly the main battlefront of the cold war and that US and UK had not given his government enough support. Crucial moment according to Mendes was failure of either US or UK to support his arms pool proposal at London against attacks by Beyen. He felt that if arms pool had been accepted, it would have meant at least fifty additional votes. Finally he said that neither US or UK had given him vitally needed help on Saar last week or on distribution of US military aid.

He then said that he had not called us in to give us such a speech as bygones were bygones and all that mattered was the present but that he could not help letting us personally know his feelings. He said that he was not asking us to report this part of his conversation to our governments. He mentioned that he had already talked to Secretary along these lines.

Mendes then said that his right wing opponents were ashamed of their nights work. He said that in a fit of anger he had told Reynaud as session broke up that Reynaud had put in a good night's work for Moscow and that Reynaud instead of getting angry had accepted the rebuke rather shamefacedly. Mendes said that personally he was not going to make any further public statements but was going to confine his work to lobbying with individual deputies which he described as dirty business. His weekly broadcast will take place tonight and will be a Christmas message with no mention of Paris Accords or other political matters.

Dillon

\(^1\) Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 1520.

Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, "Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower"

Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower\(^1\)


My Dear Friend: Anthony and I felt it right to make the attached statement through a spokesman of the Foreign Office, with which we

\(^1\) The source text was delivered to the White House on Dec. 24 by Ambassador Makins, with a copy sent to the Department of State at the same time, according to a covering memorandum.
feel sure you will agree. Can you do anything of this sort to help? It is always a good thing when you and we are seen to be in full accord.

Christmas greetings to all.

W.

[Annex]

TEXT OF A STATEMENT ISSUED THROUGH A SPOKESMAN OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE ON DECEMBER 24TH, 1954

The Paris treaties are still under discussion in the French Chamber, and there is to be a further vote on Monday. It is clear that what is at stake is the unity of the Western Allies.

2. The rejection of the Paris agreements would not mean that German rearmament would not take place.

The issue is not whether the German Federal Republic will rearm, but how.

3. The United Kingdom commitment, offered at the London conference, to maintain British forces on the Continent of Europe depends on the ratification of the Paris agreements by all the parties.

7410.5/12-2754

Foreign Secretary Eden to the Secretary of State

SECRET


[DEAR Foster:] If French vote goes wrong, we shall have to act great speed if we are to hold position not only in Germany but also in other WE countries. You may like to have my preliminary thoughts now.

It seems to me that immediate meeting will be necessary. In addition to us two and Dr. Adenauer participants should be representatives of Benelux, Italy and Canada. In view Dr. Adenauer’s age and health I think meeting should be held Europe. I should be happy to hold it London. Failing that, the Hague, Rome or Brussels, but not Bonn, are possibilities.

I suggest that agenda should be:

(a) Termination of occupation of FedRep;
(b) German association with West and a German defence contribution;
(c) Part to be played in new situation by NATO and WE Union.

As at London Conference, Item (a) would be for restricted UK/US/Ger discussion running parallel with Eight Power discussion of other items.

1 This message was delivered to Dulles by Ambassador Makins on Dec. 27. It was transmitted to London for the information of the Ambassador in telegram S878, Dec. 27, which is the source text.
I think there would be great advantage in preliminary meeting between you and me immediately before main conference opens.

[Kindest regards,]

Anthony]

740.5/12-2754
The Secretary of State to Foreign Secretary Eden

SECRET
WASHINGTON, December 27, 1954.

[Dear Anthony:] Thanks for your message.¹ I have been thinking along the same lines. It looks at the moment I dictate this as though the treaties would squeak through, but I suppose we shall not know definitely for a couple of days. In the meantime, we should be ready. The President is in Augusta and would immediately return here if the vote goes wrong. I have talked with him by phone and he agrees in principle that there must be quick action. I would be prepared, as you suggest, to come to Europe, and in general my ideas harmonize with yours. While I would enjoy seeing you again, I hope it will not be necessary on this occasion.

Foster Dulles

¹This message was transmitted to the Embassy in London in telegram 3377, Dec. 27, with the request that the Ambassador personally deliver it to Eden.
²Supra.

740.5/12-2754
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)

SECRET
BAD GODESBERG, December 27, 1954.

Dear Livie: I am writing to you rather than to Cecil Lyon because I would like to have this letter highly restricted in its distribution. Indeed, if when it arrives the French Assembly have approved the Paris Treaties, it will be unnecessary for you to read it and you might well destroy it; for I am writing it in contemplation of the really desperate possibility that Mendes-France will not succeed in gaining the necessary votes today or tomorrow and therefore by the end of the week France may be without a government and the Assembly have rejected the essential part of the Paris agreements.

You will already have known how upset the Chancellor was the day before Christmas at such a possibility. As to his suggested remedy, namely that we should proceed at once along the lines of the "empty chair" philosophy, I have grave doubts. I think that some careful "readings" should be taken on the German situation before any precipitate action along these lines is set in motion, for unless our obser-
vations are all wrong here, the German mood is far less satisfactory than it was even last September. This the Chancellor is well aware of, for in my conversation with him on Thursday last when the prospects in Paris seemed good, he was worried lest Mendes-France should delay the depositing of the treaties and start bargaining with the Russians. He said that as soon as the treaties were ratified by the parliaments concerned, we should proceed at once with providing arms for the German troops so there would be no delay in getting underway with the rearmament. In his conversation with me the day before Christmas when we were all so upset about the news from Paris, he emphasized the danger of German sentiment shifting to neutralism followed by a naive expectation of the outcome of negotiations with Russia.

On the other hand, I think the Chancellor quite naturally fails to realize the extent to which his own prestige and policy have been shaken by the events of the last few months and about how far the damage would have gone if Paris once again fails to take proper action. I am very worried lest the Chancellor's prestige and that of his party will have suffered so serious a blow that we can no longer count with certainty on his effective leadership. In this connection a conversation I had a few weeks ago with the new Minister President of Hamburg, Sieveking, is of considerable significance. Sieveking is a newcomer on the German political scene, but a man of great experience and ability. Indeed, from what I have heard of him and what I have seen of him, he would be one of my leading candidates to succeed the Chancellor,—though whether he has as yet acquired sufficient standing among the politicians among his own party (CDU), I do not know. At all events, he said to me that there could be no question of the rearmament of Germany without full cooperation of the SPD. And remember that this was from a man who had successfully beaten in a recent and rather bitter campaign an outstanding SPD man, namely Max Brauer.

A dispatch in Saturday's Herald Tribune from Gaston Coblenz I think very well sums up the situation here in Germany. If we are going to keep the Germans on our side, I feel we must be very careful not to do anything precipitously about rearmament. For the Social Democrats and some members of other parties might be quick to attack us and the Chancellor in a variety of ways. And when I say us, I mean both the United States and Great Britain. Of course, there would be a group of Germans who might be anxious to go down the road of a rearmament policy backed only by the U.S. and U.K., at once, but I

1 Opposite this sentence in the source text there is a handwritten marginal notation, presumably by Conant, which reads as follows: "Not that the Chancellor would be overthrown but merely that he would no longer get enthusiastic response to his proposals; the opposition would drag its heels and make difficulties at every turn including the passage of various bills necessary if an army is to come into being."
doubt if they represent the forces in Germany with whom we can cooperate for the long pull.

The strange thing about the present situation is that we are no longer concerned primarily with taking off the Allied ban against rearmament. We are concerned with the best way we can get the German people to cooperate with Great Britain and the United States in rearming.

The return of essential sovereignty is quite apart from this question of getting forward precipitously with rearmament. On this point I believe we would have the support of almost all the parties if the United States and United Kingdom were to find some method of putting the Paris Protocol into effect at once and simply walking out on the French insofar as the occupation was concerned. I should be inclined, then, to see if we could not get the SPD in some way committed to whatever policy of rearmament seemed appropriate in the altered circumstances (remembering how vulnerable we are with our establishments in the French Zone, not to mention our lines of communication in France itself). It will be difficult for us to make contact officially with the SPD without deserting the Chancellor, yet I feel strongly that if we are in a terrible second crisis, some sort of dealings with the leaders of all the parties in the Bundestag will be required. I am not prepared to make a definite recommendation on this point—certainly not at this time when the terrible prospects I am considering are purely hypothetical. The purpose is to try to tell you, and through you The Secretary, some of the complications in the German picture and some of the ways in which the situation seems to me to have become worse since the crisis in September.

I never wrote a letter which I hoped would be so much out of date when it was received. If the news from Paris has been good, I hope you will never have read as far as these few lines.

Sincerely,

JIM

740.5/12-2854: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

SECRET

PARIS, December 28, 1954—noon.

2712. For Secretary from Dillon. Last night's favorable vote should practically assure ratification by Assembly late Wednesday night. Difficulties in Foreign Affairs Committee were to have been expected as committee membership has always been more opposed to German

---

1 Repeated to London and Bonn.
2 A summary of the National Assembly debate on ratification of the Paris Agreements which began on the night of Dec. 27 and continued through until the early morning of Dec. 28 is contained in telegram 2711 from Paris, Dec. 28 (740.5/12-2854).
rearmament than has Assembly itself. Important thing is that procedural difficulties have been surmounted and way has been cleared for final vote. It is most important that US make no statements of any sort today that could affect tomorrow’s vote.

If as expected tomorrow’s vote is favorable, we must realize that although toughest hurdle will have been passed, there still remains the Council of the Republic which will not act until late February or early March. We must talk and act during coming two months in a way that will make it as easy as possible for Council of Republic to take favorable action.

Reaction here since Friday and in particular, bitterness of comments regarding British statement make it clear that large majority of French opinion, even MRP circles which oppose Paris accords, is thoroughly ashamed of last Thursday night’s performance and wishes to forget it as soon as possible.

Though I realize that this is a mighty tall order, best policy for US will be to minimize antics of National Assembly once it has voted ratification. The Council of the Republic is equally or possibly more sensitive to foreign criticism than the Assembly. Criticisms of French institutions and French people in next two months will only make job harder in Council of Republic. I am sure there will be strong tendency in Council of Republic to act in dignified manner so as to offset shameful impression made by National Assembly. Seriousness of matter is well known here and does not need to be reemphasized for Council of Republic. I fully realize how hard it will be for US to react in this way immediately after last week’s performance, but I feel it is most important and is worth a great and concerted effort on our part.

Dillon

740.5/12–2854: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Connan) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

Bonn, December 28, 1954—6 p. m.

1861. We saw Blankenhorn this morning who told us that the Chancellor would call a Cabinet meeting immediately after an unfavorable vote in the French Assembly. While Blankenhorn was cautiously optimistic over Mendes-France’s chances tomorrow, he was nevertheless apprehensive over the next step to be taken in the event of an adverse vote. He reiterated what he considered were the necessary steps to be taken in the event of failure; namely (1) a joint US–UK declaration regarding German sovereignty, (2) a joint US–UK guarantee of Fed-Rep territory, (3) provision for maintenance of US–UK troops

1 Repeated to Paris and London.
on Fed-Rep soil as defense forces, (4) the necessity to go ahead with the Western European Treaty arrangement, leaving an empty chair.

He stressed the danger for Adenauer in terms of his domestic situation which would result from a second failure of Adenauer's foreign policy. On the other hand, he believed that whatever gesture was made by Adenauer or the German Government as a result of the French Assembly's adverse decision should not be directed against France and that every effort should be made to keep a conciliatory atmosphere.

Blankenhorn also raised the question of how the Chancellor could get together with US and the British in the event of bad news. We suggested the possibility of talks with the Secretary and Eden. Blankenhorn said that he had thought of such an idea and that the Benelux countries might be included in such talks. On balance, however, he favored talks with Mr. Dulles and Eden and would leave it to US as to how best to proceed when and if it was decided to hold such a meeting.

Conant

740.5/12-2954: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACt

BONN, December 29, 1954—1 p.m.

1870. For Secretary from Conant. Saw Chancellor at his house this morning. He and Blankenhorn relatively optimistic about outcome Paris vote. He spent some time combatting any idea that if vote is satisfactory, nevertheless French have proved themselves so unreliable there will be difficulties in future. He feels this point view wrong and believes once present hurdle is overcome development Western European Union will proceed satisfactorily. In this connection he foresees no difficulty with treaties either in his committees or in Bundestag. This optimism of Chancellor was premised on assumption that all goes well in Paris tonight.

If vote is negative, situation will be completely altered here in Germany. Under these conditions, as Chancellor pointed out, mood of Germans will be one of great disillusionment and his own position extremely difficult. In discussion of what dramatic moves might be made at once if negative vote in Paris, idea developed that if Chancellor, you and Eden could meet in London Monday, the announcement of this meeting would have highly salutary effect on German public and Parliamentary opinion. Decision to hold such 3-Power meeting should come within twelve hours of bad news from Paris. Chancellor under these conditions would not call Cabinet meeting until after

1 Repeated niact to London and to Paris for Reinhardt and Wallner.
London meeting Monday, which presumably would be followed by larger meeting Western European Union countries and U.S. Idea would be to have no statements made by British, U.S. or German Governments prior to 3-Power meeting. The more we talked about this idea, the more it appealed to Chancellor and it seems to me it has many merits from psychological point view here in Germany. From my point view, if result in Paris is negative it is essential to do something at once to strengthen position Chancellor. Having him meet on equal basis with you and Eden and no others would be clear sign to Germany of your recognition Chancellor’s equal status.

In separate telegram, I am reporting some of ideas Chancellor would present at such meeting if it occurs.²

CONANT

²Presumably a reference to telegram 1872 from Bonn, Dec. 29, not printed, in which Conant reported Adenauer’s idea of strengthening the federal border police; according to Adenauer, some immediate strengthening of the military situation was necessary in order to prevent inhabitants of the East Zone from losing heart and to keep people in West Germany from rapidly moving to a neutralist position (740.5/12-2954).

740.5/12-2954

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of German Affairs (Lyon)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 29, 1954.

Subject: Plans for US–UK action in the event of failure by French to approve Paris pacts.

Participants: Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
The Secretary of State
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant—EUR
Mr. F. J. Leishman, First Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. Cecil B. Lyon—GER

Sir Roger opened the conversation by indicating that he had received a report from the British Embassy at Paris that a M. Brusse, a political prognosticator (“sort of a French Mr. Gallup”, Sir Roger thought), had said that the vote in the French Assembly today on the Paris Agreements would be favorable by a margin of between 15 and 25.

The Secretary said that in spite of this it was necessary for us, however, to be prepared for an adverse vote. Were this to occur, the President planned to return immediately to Washington. He had asked the Secretary and other Government officials concerned to be prepared to confer with him on Friday.

The Secretary said that the President had also approved in the first instance the plans for the Secretary’s going to London to confer with
Dr. Adenauer and Sir Anthony Eden. The Secretary then explained Adenauer's proposal for a tripartite meeting in London on Monday (as set forth in Bonn's 1878 [1870], December 29 to Department 1). The Secretary continued that he thought such a meeting should be followed by a larger meeting but that it would be wiser not to schedule this meeting until we knew more exactly what course we should take. The Secretary also questioned whether having the meeting in London on Monday was not rushing it a bit. He said that he didn't think it would be possible to delay as long as had been the case following the French defeat of EDC when Sir Anthony traveled about Europe discussing ways and means of saving the situation, and the first formal meetings between the Secretary and Sir Anthony were only held several weeks after the action of the French Assembly.

The Secretary remarked that a good deal of thinking had already been given to the matter of what we should do, and he referred to the Churchill-Eisenhower memorandum of June 27, 1954 2 and the proposals of the London Working Group of July 5-12, 1954.3

The Secretary also said that he had been giving some thought as to whether a possible solution might not be to alter the Protocol amending the Brussels Pact so that the Pact could be put into effect upon the deposit of ratifications by six instead of seven countries.

The Secretary likewise said that he had asked the Legal Adviser to give him a legal opinion as to whether the fact that France was in Germany due to the US and UK having invited her in, so to speak, might not constitute a legal basis for the US and the UK restoring sovereignty to Germany without French consent. In other words, we were guardians of German sovereignty as a result of our conquest (unconditional surrender) and occupation of Germany. We, so to speak, gave a share of this to France. Could we not give back to Germany the whole which had originally been ours, irrespective of French views? (The Legal Adviser has now indicated that there is no sound legal basis for this proposition. The British have been so informed.)

The British Ambassador suggested that if France did not ratify the agreements it might be better to tackle the problem de novo without France.

It was also suggested that it might be better to defer any decisions as to what the next steps were to be until the tripartite meeting in London in order that Adenauer's views might be ascertained in the light of the existing situation.

The Secretary indicated that the London meeting would undoubtedly indicate what the next move should be, whether it should be a con-

---

1 Supra.
2 This is a reference to the U.S.–U.K. secret minute agreed to by Churchill and Eisenhower; for the text of this secret minute, see p. 988.
3 For the Report of the London Study Group, July 12, see p. 907.
ference with the Benelux countries, a NATO meeting or which course of action, and he reiterated his feeling that it would be unwise to meet with these countries until we have a course fairly well charted.

Mr. Merchant stressed the importance of avoiding giving the NATO nations the feeling that they were being left out of the planning—i.e. that the US and UK were deciding what to do and then would present them with a fait accompli.

Sir Roger then raised the question of a possible statement by the President in the event of French approval. He indicated that the Foreign Office wondered whether it was not rather "overdoing it" to have the Chief of State make a declaration since probably the agreements, if approved by the French Assembly, will only just pass by a slight margin. His Government also felt that there were more hurdles to come. In fact there were reports from Paris that the Council of State would probably insist on many changes in the treaties and the whole matter would have to be taken up again in the Assembly in February. Sir Roger said that his Government had instructed him to point this out to the Secretary.

The Secretary replied by indicating that both the President and the British had made statements at the time of the unfavorable vote in the French Assembly a few days ago, that the President was under great pressure from the Press at Augusta and that the President wanted to make a statement. The Secretary then said that the fact that the President was in Augusta made it difficult for the Secretary to talk things over with him as easily as if he were here and consequently he thought it inadvisable to attempt to alter the plan for the President to make this statement.

Sir Roger indicated that his Government was quite prepared to accept this. The Secretary explained that the two statements, one unilateral by the President, and a joint Anglo-American statement, were not mutually exclusive. After the Secretary had communicated with Mr. Hagerty by telephone, the text of a joint statement was agreed upon.

It was decided that copies of this text would be transmitted to the British and the US High Commissioners in Bonn, who would be instructed to show it to Adenauer and to explain to him that it was impossible to make no statement, as Adenauer had suggested.4

It was also agreed that as far as the United States was concerned, the President would issue his statement in Augusta before coming north, and upon his arrival at the airport in Washington he would issue the US portion of the joint statement.

A new fourth paragraph for the President's statement was drafted. Copies of both statements are attached.

---

4 The text of the joint statement was sent to Bonn in telegram 1767, Dec. 29, repeated to London and Paris for information (806.1/12-2954).
CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] December 28, 1954.

It is a matter for grave concern that the French Assembly has rejected the arrangements agreed to in Paris last October for the entrance of the German Federal Republic into Western defense arrangements. The result sought was a strengthening of the collective defense of Western Europe with effective safeguards against excessive armament by any single nation.

The French action does not, however, relieve the United States of its responsibilities in the matter. We are in Germany as one of the occupying powers and we are a member of NATO. We shall discharge our responsibilities despite the difficulties created by the French rejection.

Last July, the United States Senate, without dissent, passed a resolution requesting me to take such steps as I deemed appropriate to bring about the restoration of German sovereignty and to permit the Federal Republic to contribute to international peace and security. That resolution had at the time my full approval, and I shall strive to carry out its recommendation.

I expect shortly after my arrival at Washington to be able to indicate the initial procedures which the US will plan to follow.

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON, December 29, 1954.]

The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom will promptly enter into consultation with the Government of the German Federal Republic and with the Governments of other countries prepared to cooperate with a view to concerting action to enable the people of the Federal Republic to assume their proper role as a free and equal partner in the Western Community and to play their part in filling a vital gap in the defensive strategy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

As an initial step toward the solution of these problems, the Secretary of State is proceeding to London to confer there Monday with Sir Anthony Eden. They will be joined by Chancellor Adenauer. Later there will be meetings with the representatives of other interested Governments.

We shall insofar as practicable, seek arrangements which would permit the eventual participation of the French Government. We do
not believe that the French Nation will indefinitely disassociate itself from constructive measures to assure the security and increasing well being of Western Europe.

740.5/12-3054: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL  NIACT  PARIS, December 30, 1954—11 a. m.

2742. As reported Embtel 2741 vote on article I Billotte report now embodied in new draft law postponed until 5 p. m. today. In last night's vote on "project as a whole", Government won 287-256, or seven less than 38-vote majority on identical issue Monday. Increase of five in hostile votes due primarily to four opposing MRP votes shifted from abstentions. Otherwise vote virtually carbon copy Monday's results in spite impassioned oratory on both sides. Breakdown shows gain on one ARS vote, and loss of one each in radical, MRP and uninscription groups. In addition to four more opposing MRP votes, there were two more Social Republicans and one additional Socialist voting against, while one less Radical and one less UDSR voted against.

Following vote last night, before session closed several deputies notably Triboulet (Social Republican) expressed fervent hope France would not be subjected to further humiliation in eyes of world by spectacle of Assembly wrangling over procedural matters and refusing to face up to its responsibilities. Before vote Mendes-France had stated no Frenchman would permit these delays if he had to read reactions in foreign press to sorry figure Assembly was cutting. This latest delay in final vote is clearly due to Communist filibustering and Assembly as whole seems fed up with debate by this time.

Assembly will meet on budget this morning and from 3 p. m. to 5 p. m. at which time Letroque[r] intends to open voting immediately. However Communists will try every possible delaying tactic and may succeed in forcing new explanations of vote first on grounds yesterday's lengthy explanations of vote were directed to double vote of confidence and not to this single issue.

As result Mendes-France outburst mentioned Embtel 2741, general fatigue and continued intrigue on part opposition, atmosphere in

1 Repeated to Bonn and London.
2 Not printed; it informed the Department of State that parliamentary proceedings had forced a postponement on article I of the Billotte report (740.5/12-2954).
3 Telegram 2741 (see footnote 2, above) reported that Mendes-France "who is obviously near breaking point" was the object of an insulting attack by Claudius-Petit of the UDSR who questioned Mendes-France's good faith and honesty on the Paris Agreements. In reply, Mendes-France indulged in sharp polemics with Claudius-Petit which detracted from the government's presentation in the Embassy's opinion.
Assembly is heavy. Barring some new disaster, predictions here are to
effect Mendes-France will get less votes for article I than in last night’s
vote but will scrape through. Parliamentary correspondents give him
from eight to twenty-vote majority.

Letroquer also announced last night that immediately after vote on
article I three resolutions pertaining to Paris Agreements will be
discussed. These are:

1) Loustaunau-Lacau (Peasant) resolution along lines his amend-
ment which was withdrawn as result pressure from government. It
calls for “strict application” Paris Agreements. Meaning is unclear
to everyone and since author is a crackpot, it is unlikely we will ever
know exactly what he wants.

2) Maurice Faure (Radical Socialist) resolution on arms control
agency. Faure feels strongly on this subject and did not introduce
formal amendment in debate only because of his feeling agreements
must be ratified at once. His resolution may well be passed.

3) Resolution introduced by Pierre Courant (Independent) which
we have not seen but we understand relates to Four-Power talks.

Talk on these resolutions may take some time although Letroquer
optimistically hopes to get back to budget debate by tonight. Passage
these resolutions probably not too serious in sense they have no bind-
ing force on government and merely express desire of Assembly.
Maurice Faure resolution is of course potentially most troublesome and
relates to issue on which considerable feeling has been shown by ele-
ments which have supported Mendes-France during debate and which
government can use later if it wishes.

Dillon

740.5/12-3054

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of German Affairs
(Lyon) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
(Merchant)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 30, 1954.

Mr. Leishman has just visited me on a matter which we both hope
is now academic.

The British Embassy here has received an urgent telegram from
London which indicates that Sir Anthony Eden does not agree to the
Secretary’s proposal for an immediate meeting between himself, the
Secretary and Adenauer in the event of failure by the French Parlia-
ment to approve the Paris Agreements. In the message from London,
Sir Anthony refers to his personal message to Mr. Dulles in which he
proposed “in addition to Adenauer I suggest that representatives of

1 The Secretary’s proposal was contained in his letter to Eden of Dec. 27, p. 1526.
other interested countries participate" or words to that effect. The instruction to the British Embassy makes it clear that what Sir Anthony Eden had in mind was a meeting between him and the Secretary followed "a day or two after" by an S-Power meeting either in London or some other European capital. He also indicates that he had hoped such a meeting would have taken place with the greatest of urgency.

Sir Anthony adds that if Mr. Dulles concurs in his views in this matter certain textual changes would be required in the various proposed statements and in this event he would have no objection to having Adenauer shown the proposed joint US–UK declaration.

The British telegram made it apparent that the Foreign Office had not as yet paralleled to Hoyer-Millar our instructions to Dr. Conant.

---

This is a reference to Eden’s letter to Dulles of Dec. 27, p. 1525.

---

Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, “Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower”

**Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower**

[LONDON, December 30, 1954.]

[My Dear Friend:] I am very glad you are intervening personally in this major issue. But Anthony and I both feel the terms of your suggested message might be given a less sanguine emphasis. I therefore venture to suggest a modified version (appended) in which I have followed your language but endeavored to preserve the feeling that France has more to do, and that quickly, before she is in line with her allies. Perhaps you would consider this? I should be quite ready to sign it with you, or alternatively we could issue an official statement that we were in full accord with this message.

[Winston]

---

**[Annex]**

**Draft British Statement**

[LONDON, December 30, 1954.]

Text of alternative Joint Statement to be made by the President and Prime Minister referred to in the Prime Minister’s Message:

If the series of actions taken by the French Assembly is the prelude to the speedy ratification of the new treaties signed in London and

---

1 This message was delivered to the White House on Dec. 30 by British Ambassador Makins, according to covering memoranda attached to the source text; the White House staff sent a copy to the Department of State the same day.

2 Presumably a reference to the joint U.S.–U.K. statement which is attachment 2 to the memorandum of conversation by Lyon, Dec. 29, p. 1534.
Paris last October, it would be a matter of great gratification not only to the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, but to the entire free world. We earnestly trust that this hope will be fulfilled without undue delay. The restoration of sovereignty to the Federal Republic and German participation in N.A.T.O. will add to the defensive strength and solidarity in Western Europe. This progress will reinforce the vote on ratification taken last week by the Italian Assembly which approved Western defence plans by an overwhelming and splendid majority. When decisive cooperation supplants age-old antagonism the prospects for a general and lasting peace will be definitely improved, and a measure of encouragement may therefore even now be felt by all who are earnestly striving to maintain and improve the unity and harmony of the free world.

751.13/12-3054

President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Mendès-France

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1954.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister: My hearty personal congratulations on the result of the hard fought battle for the ratification by the French Assembly of the Paris Agreements. You and those who voted for ratification have won a victory for French security and for the advance in unison of the nations of the Western world.

I know that this victory could not have been achieved without your own valiant efforts, in the face of arduous difficulties and exhausting strains.

I would like you to know that I have been conscious of the momentous character of the decision which the French Assembly has taken.

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

This message was transmitted to Paris at 1:15 p.m. in niact telegram 2368, Dec. 30, with instructions for the Ambassador to deliver it as soon as ratification was official. It was requested that this not be made public.

751.13/12-3054

The Secretary of State to Prime Minister Mendès-France

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1954.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I extend to you my warmest congratulations on the successful struggle you have led. I think I can appreciate how arduous the task has been. I followed every phase with intense interest and if we here said little it was because we felt that silence was the best contribution we could make. I am sure, however, that you

This message was transmitted to Paris at 3 p.m. in niact telegram 2304, Dec. 30, with instructions for the Ambassador to communicate it to Mendès-France.
and others in France must have realized the intensity of our concern. With best wishes to you and your wife for the New Year, I am
Sincerely yours,

Foster Dulles

In telegram 2767 from Paris, Dec. 31, Dillon reported that he had received a telephone call from Mendès-France that morning thanking him for the letters from President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles. Mendès-France then said that the restraint exercised by the United States during the past week had been of the utmost help and he was appreciative of the U.S. Government’s silence. (751.13/12–3154)

740.5/12–3154: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL  PRIORITY  PARIS, December 31, 1954—1 p. m.

2769. Final vote on article I (Embtel 2760) gave government slightly larger majority than expected. Before result announced after vote deputies with whom we talked generally predicted 10 to 20 vote majority. Shortly before result known, figure of 18 was being circulated and somewhat later 20. There was little unusual delay in announcing outcome though it is understood efforts were made to verify absentee ballots by telephone where possible. Also some uncertainty existed until the end as to final disposition some 70 absentee ballots which could of course have turned tide. However final outcome shows absentee ballots played little role. Widely distributed rumors that considerable number deputies would never commit last action permitting German rearmament likewise proved false and final result of 287–268 very similar to Wednesday night’s 287–256 score. Only two changes were noted in those voting for with one additional Radical voting for government and one less Social Republican. Total of three more Social Republicans voted against government as well as one more Radical and one more ARS and one less MRP. Robert Schuman who abstained in vote last Friday when government was defeated and voted for on Monday and Wednesday of this week abstained yesterday as result agreement with Bidault who also abstained. MRP total of 16 for government remained intact as Ivory Coast Deputy who had previously abstained voted in favor yesterday. Full analysis voting records follows by despatch (Deptel 2361).

1 Repeated to London and Bonn.
2 Not printed; it informed the Department of State that the French National Assembly voted 287–268 in favor of a resolution giving the government a vote of confidence on article I of the Billette report. This vote completed Assembly action on the Paris Agreements (740.5/12–3054).
3 Presumably a reference to despatch 1410 from Paris, Jan. 11, 1955, which analyzed the voting records of the French Deputies during the ratification debates (740.5/1–1155).
4 Not printed; It requested the names of the French Deputies in the National Assembly who switched votes (740.5/12–3054).
Responsible pro-American deputies such as Rene Mayer, Bourges-Maunoury and Maurice Faure believe that favorable vote by narrow margin following such extensive bitter oratory is not enough and Maurice Faure and Pierre Courant (Independent) have combined their resolutions (number 2 and number 3 in Embtel 2742) and altered it somewhat to make net effect a resounding reaffirmation of France's solidarity with West and Atlantic Alliance. However, Loustau-Lacau has maintained his resolution (now in partnership with Palewski) and Cayeux (MRP) has put in another on Four-Power talks. As result Daniel Mayer reported to Assembly last night Foreign Affairs Committee had decided by 22-11 vote to postpone discussion of resolutions because of their number, variety and complexity. Something along lines Faure Resolution which still includes mention of WEU arms distribution agency but is more slanted towards Western solidarity generally may come later but grand scheme of strongest supporters of Atlantic Alliance who favored Paris Accords to push through resolution last night beame impossible.

Weary Assembly will continue budget discussions today after having already begun examination national defense budget last night. Budget debates are late as result prolongation debate Paris agreements.

Press reports Council of Republic has already appointed four rapporteurs for Paris Accords:

1) Michel Debre (RPF) for WEU.
2) Marius Mouter (Socialist) for cessation occupation statute.
3) Rene Pinton (Radical Socialist) for Saar.
4) Jacques Maupeou (Independent) for military aspects protocols and conventions.

Press adds these rapporteurs are all favorable and that Senate situation looks bright though Embassy will commence checking this with its Council of Republic contacts next week. Press finally predicts Council may begin its action in late January or early February though we think anything more than guess on this not possible at this early date.

Other principal development as backwash Assembly debate is announcement today that sanctions previously envisaged after EDC debate but suspended have now been taken against seventeen Socialist Deputies who voted consistently against agreements in all four votes. These include Naegelen and Max Lejeune (complete list will follow). Sanctions mean these deputies cannot represent party on assembly committees or party delegations.

*Not printed; It reported inter alia on three resolutions pertaining to the Paris Agreements which would be discussed in the Assembly after the vote on article 1 of the Billotte report. (740.5/12–8054)
Atmosphere following debate is one of relief and considerable resignation and sobriety rather than elation. It is too early to tell overall effect on position Mendes-France. Preliminary guess judging from corridor consultation with many deputies would be his stock has not risen and result debate has if anything increased personal bitterness towards him. Parliamentary correspondents were predicting yesterday his fall during last week January but this is probably hasty guess and certainly requires careful analysis.

DILLON

Editorial Note

During the evening of December 30, Secretary Dulles issued the following statement:

"The news from France is good. The French Assembly voted to ratify the treaties which will carry into effect the accords reached last October in London and Paris. The vote indicates that of all the parties only the Communist bloc of about 100 deputies voted mechanically against all constructive measures. In the other parties there were differences, but they were differences of opinion as to how best to proceed to achieve Western European unity under conditions which would assure increased strength to protect national and individual freedom. It is understandable that these differences should have existed. The issues were both complicated and momentous. Now that the French Assembly has spoken, we can justifiably hope that the remaining ratification procedures in France and elsewhere will soon be concluded.

"A special tribute is due to those in France who saw that patriotism required the burying of age-old hostilities. That this could happen is a good augury for the years ahead." (Press release 737; Department of State Bulletin, January 10, 1955, page 43)

President Eisenhower also issued a statement on December 30 which reads as follows:

"The recent series of actions taken by the French Assembly is a matter of great gratification, not only to the United States but to the entire free world.

"There are, of course, further steps to be taken, both in France and elsewhere, before a satisfactory foundation for Western defense has been achieved. But of particular importance is the fact that the French Deputies, after initial hesitations against bringing Germany into Western defense arrangements, have now voted to ratify the new treaties signed at Paris last October.

"The French action is all the more significant since it follows the vote on ratification taken last week by the Italian Assembly, which approved Western defense plans by a decisive majority.

"Once sovereignty is restored to the Federal Republic, with German participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, there will be added defensive strength and general solidarity in Western Europe. As decisive cooperation supplants age-old antagonisms, the prospects for a general and lasting peace will be definitely improved, and a meas-
ure of encouragement may therefore even now be felt by all who are earnestly striving to maintain and improve the unity and harmony of the free world." (White House press release; Department of State Bulletin, January 17, 1955, page 80)