SOUTH ASIA

GENERAL UNITED STATES POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO SOUTH ASIA

S/S Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 98 Series

Note by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 22, 1951.

NSC 98/1

THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO SOUTH ASIA

References: A. NSC Action No. 421
B. NSC 98
C. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 17, 1951.

The enclosed draft statement of policy on the subject, a revision of NSC 98 prepared by the NSC Staff pursuant to NSC Action No. 421, is submitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on January 24, 1951.

It is recommended that, if the enclosed statement of policy is adopted, it be forwarded to the President for consideration with the recommendation that he approve it and direct its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Secretary of State.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

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3 For previous documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1382 ff.
4 NSC Action No. 421, taken by the National Security Council at its 80th meeting on January 17, with the President presiding, recorded consideration of NSC 98, a draft paper of January 5 which like the later NSC 98/1 was entitled "The Position of the United States With Respect to South Asia." Discussed at the meeting were the views and comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to NSC 98, as set forth in a memorandum of January 16 to the Secretary of Defense, which in turn had been conveyed to the NSC under cover of a memorandum of January 17 by the Executive Secretary (Lay), neither printed. NSC 98 and the views and comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were referred to the NSC Staff for revision in the light of the discussion at the meeting. (S/S Files, Lot 62 D 1, NSC Actions)
5 NSC 98/1 was adopted by the NSC and the Secretary of the Treasury in NSC Action No. 425, taken at the 81st NSC meeting on January 24, with the President presiding, and was approved by the President on the following day; it was to be implemented by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Secretary of State (S/S Files, Lot 62 D 1, NSC Actions; Lot 66 D 95, NSC Files; Policies of the Government of the United States of America Relating to the National Security, 1951).
DRAFT STATEMENT OF POLICY PROPOSED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON SOUTH ASIA
(India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Ceylon and Nepal)

1. The United States objective with respect to South Asia is to improve the security position of the United States. In this connection, India and Pakistan are the key nations of the area.

2. The loss of India to the Communist orbit would mean that for all practical purposes all of Asia will have been lost; this would constitute a serious threat to the security position of the United States. The loss of China, the immediate threat to Indochina and the balance of Southeast Asia, the invasion of Tibet, and the reverses in Korea have greatly increased the significance to the United States of the political strategic manpower and resource potential of the countries of South Asia and made it more important that this potential be marshalled on the side of the United States. India, especially, and Pakistan as well, possess leaders having great prestige throughout the whole of Asia; the future support of these countries diplomatically and in the United Nations is of great importance; India in particular has certain strategic materials of importance to our national defense; all these considerations emphasize the necessity for continuation of free and friendly non-Communist governments in South Asia, especially in India and Pakistan, and of improved stability in the area.

3. Accordingly, the situation in Asia is now so critical that the following inter-related objectives with regard to South Asia should be achieved for the purpose of improving the security position of the United States:

a. Development of sound enduring friendly relations between the United States and the various countries of the region.

b. Continuance in power of non-Communist governments in the countries of South Asia and the strengthening of their individual and collective ability and determination to resist communist imperialism in Asia, and their association with the United States and like-minded countries in opposition to communism.

c. Increased South Asian participation in, responsibility for, and contribution to the solution of problems arising in Asia.

d. Development of an attitude in South Asia which would assist the United States and its allies to obtain the facilities desired in time of peace or required in the event of war, and which would prevent the USSR from obtaining military support or assistance from these nations, either directly or indirectly.

e. Access by the United States and friendly countries to the resources and markets of the region and the creation of conditions which would lead the governments of South Asia to deny their resources to the Soviet bloc.

4. Accordingly, the United States, while continuing talks with the
British on the ways and means by which US–UK policies and actions with respect to South Asia can be better coordinated toward achieving mutual objectives, should:

a. Undertake in the first instance with India and Pakistan and at later stages with other South Asian countries more intimate consultation and encourage those governments to consult more frankly with us.

b. Support the adherence on the part of South Asian countries to United Nations organizations and give friendly aid to their achieving their rightful place in such organizations.

c. If a desire for a regional association of non-communist countries arises in South Asia and a basis for its success exists, be sympathetic with the efforts of the leaders and consider to what extent the United States should encourage or associate itself with the movement.

d. Expand United States information and education programs for South Asia, (giving priority to the program in India and Pakistan) in order to assist in integrating the political, the manpower and the material resources of that area with those of the non-communist world.

e. While avoiding assumption of responsibility for economic welfare and development, continue to encourage the creation of an atmosphere favorable to economic development in South Asia and to the expansion of trade along multilateral non-discriminatory lines consistent with U.S. security interests, with a view to promoting economic conditions that will contribute to political stability.

f. Provide economic assistance which will contribute to stability of the area generally, and particularly to the economic progress of India and Pakistan, but for which internal and external public and private investment may not be adequate, having in mind the political urgency of reversing the trend towards economic deterioration and of improving the western orientation of India in particular, and the strategic interest to the United States of greater facilitation on the part of South Asian governments of the transfer to the United States of materials needed for stockpiling or other purposes related to national security.

g. Provide, as far as practicable in the light of other demands of higher priority, the requirements especially of India and Pakistan and generally of the other South Asian countries for military supplies, equipment and services not available from other sources and required for internal security, legitimate needs for self-defense, or participation in the defense of the area.

h. Seek to obtain such military rights in South Asia as the U.S. Government may determine to be essential.

i. Take all possible action consistent with U.S. security interests to prevent the USSR, its European satellites and communist areas in Asia from obtaining through or from South Asian countries supplies of strategic materials and equipment currently being denied them by the United States, placing special emphasis on India.

j. Continue efforts to improve Indo-Pakistan and Afghan-Pakistan relations.\footnote{For documentation, see pp. 1689 ff.}  
\footnote{For documentation, see pp. 1922 ff.}
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John Frick Root, Second Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET

[LONDON,] February 14, 1951.

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMAL US–UK DISCUSSIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE VISIT TO LONDON OF MR. DONALD D. KENNEDY, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

Tuesday Afternoon, February 6

Topic for Discussion: Items I–IV on the Agenda. Review of the current international position of the South Asia countries; Review of United States and United Kingdom objectives with respect to South Asia; Possible United States and/or United Kingdom action; Possible United States and/or United Kingdom action with respect to peripheral South Asian problems: Afghan-Pakistan dispute, Nepal, Tibet, French and Portuguese possessions on the subcontinent and Indian minorities in Ceylon.

Participants:

Foreign Office
R. H. Scott, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs
J. D. Murray, Head, South-East Asia Department
F. S. Tomlinson, Assistant Head, Far Eastern Department
P. H. Scott, South-East Asia Department

Commonwealth Relations Office
J. J. S. Garner, Deputy Under-Secretary of State
N. Pritchard, Assistant Under-Secretary of State
G. E. Crombie, Head, Western and United Nations Department
E. G. Norris, South Asian Department

U.S.A.
Donald D. Kennedy, Department of State
Joseph Palmer 2nd
John Frick Root American Embassy, London

1 Mr. Kennedy met in London on February 6 through 10 with officials of the British Foreign Office, Commonwealth Relations Office, Treasury, and Ministry of Defense. The topics of discussion in addition to those covered by this memorandum included U.S. and U.K. policies with respect to economic and military assistance to South Asia; the desirability of a regional association in Asia including South Asian countries; the Kashmir dispute; the Afghan-Pakistan dispute; and the Indian request for U.S. wheat. The memoranda of these conversations were enclosures to despatch No. 3829 from London, February 15 (890.00/2–1551).
Mr. Kennedy said he believed that during Mr. McGhee’s talks \( ^2 \) in London it had been accepted that the UK and the Commonwealth should continue to have the major responsibility for seeking a solution to problems on the Indian subcontinent. It was Mr. Kennedy’s belief that the UK still recognized this major responsibility. The British representatives confirmed that this was so.

Mr. Kennedy said he would also like to be clear on a further point. The US assessment of the present situation in the area was that it called for positive action now. Did the UK also feel that the time had come for action? The British representatives replied in the affirmative.

Mr. Garner then referred to the observations on India he had made during the talks with Mr. McGhee last September in which he had stated his belief that Nehru \( ^3 \) and the Indian Government were gradually moving toward the side of the West. He believed this process had, in general, been continuing. Nehru had taken a leading role at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meeting in January and it was significant that he had subscribed to the declaration \( ^4 \) at the conclusion of the conference including the references to rearmament and the individual responsibility of each country in meeting aggression. Nehru had gone out of his way to seek the assessment of the British Chiefs of Staff on the military position in Europe and Korea.

Within India, said Mr. Garner, Nehru seemed to be in a somewhat stronger position without Patel.\( ^5 \) Whether he would be more or less cautious in his policy, as Mr. Kennedy had asked, was anybody’s guess. Mr. Garner said he would have thought that Nehru would feel freer in his actions.

The British representatives agreed with Mr. Kennedy that the posture of India on main issues of the hour was very much the key to the position of all countries in South Asia. They also indicated agreement when Mr. Kennedy stated his belief that India’s posture was largely determined by its attitude toward four major factors: (1) anti-colonialism and anti-westernism; (2) nationalism; (3) the

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\( ^2 \) Mr. George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, had held talks with British officials in London in September 1950.

\( ^3 \) Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations.


\( ^5 \) Sardar Vallabhai Patel, Indian Deputy Prime Minister, died on December 15, 1950.
problem of social and economic progress; and (4) the Sino-Russian Communist threat.

Mr. Scott said that at the Commonwealth Conference Nehru had produced the theory that the key to security in South Asia lay in weakness, that is, in disarmament rather than rearmament. Later Bajpai\(^6\) had told the British that “many of us” do not share these views and that he had reminded the Prime Minister there was such a thing as tempting Providence. Mr. Garner said that Nehru felt strongly that we must be most careful in our own actions to avoid provoking a war. This was his feeling toward the dangers of rearmament in Europe and Japan. Mr. Scott went on to explain that Mr. Nehru’s actual position on Japan, however, was that he objected to any defense provisions in a peace treaty. He personally preferred the disarmament of Japan as the wiser policy, but made it clear that he would have no objection to Japan, as a free and equal nation, making what defense arrangements it liked; the prerequisite was that its independence be established beforehand.

The Foreign Office had had conflicting reports on Nehru’s talks with the French. While Ambassador Harvey\(^7\) in Paris had said that they were not successful; the British Embassy in New Delhi had reported that they were very satisfactory. Mr. Kennedy said that we had so far heard only from Paris, which had likewise given us the indication that the talks had been disappointing. Mr. Kennedy said that we had emphasized to the Indians both in Washington and New Delhi the degree to which the French had gone in granting independence to Indo-China. The British officials said they agreed with the US view, as expressed by Mr. Kennedy, that the French had indeed gone quite a way in this respect and about as far as could at the moment be expected. The real difficulty was that the French had failed to give adequate publicity to the measure of freedom which they had in fact advanced.

The consensus of the British officials was that India had become increasingly aware of the dangers, and indeed the direct threats, of international communism. Likewise, the other countries of the area were learning the peril of remaining to be picked off one by one. The UK felt, nevertheless, that we must exercise patience and moderation and that any attempt to force the process might land us in disaster. In connection with Mr. Kennedy’s reference to anti-westernism in India, Mr. Garner cited, as an illustration of the danger of this

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\(^6\) Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, Secretary General, Indian Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations.

\(^7\) Sir Oliver Charles Harvey, British Ambassador in France.
development, the way in which President Truman’s statement on the atomic bomb* had swept through Asia like wildfire.

Mr. Scott believed that Nehru was now looking on Communist China as communist first of all and had an increasing appreciation of the aggressive nature of international communism. What Nehru always emphasized was that he must live with China. At the Commonwealth Conference he had cited India’s 2,000 miles of frontier with China as the major factor with which India must reckon and he also put his view plainly on Burma by pointing out that no outside power could defend it. (Mr. Scott said he did not think, however, that this would be the view of the Indian army staff, which probably would consider the frontiers of Burma as the frontiers of India). Mr. Scott called attention to the fact that certain steps in Asia which we might view as favorable to our cause were sometimes viewed in India and other countries in the area as a return of undesirable Western or colonial influence and that this reaction worked against the development of the realization that Communist China was a threat to the whole of Asia. In answer to Mr. Kennedy’s question as to what India would do if there were Communist aggression against Burma, either through invasion or subversion, Mr. Scott replied that if this development happened soon, he would not expect India to intervene, but that if it happened at some later time, India might definitely move to prevent it. Time was an important factor in the building of strength and a sense of realism in the non-Communist countries of Asia. The Indonesian Ambassador* touched this key in a recent remark when he said that what was required for his country was a “breathing space.”

On China itself, Mr. Scott thought that Britain and America were agreed in their basic analysis of China as an expansionist power and as a menace to Asia. Where there were points of difference between us was on tactics. Mr. Kennedy asked whether the British had any practical suggestions for fostering a closer alignment of South Asian countries with the West. Mr. Scott said that in the British view, it was, above all, imperative that the Kashmir dispute and other difficulties between India and Pakistan be settled. There was, in addition, the opportunity of encouraging cooperation on the economic

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*Reference is to a remark by President Truman at his press conference of November 30, 1950, where in the course of discussion on the Korean crisis the President indicated that consideration of steps necessary to meet the present military situation included the use of the atomic bomb. For the complete text of the press conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 724–728. For additional documentation relating to the President’s statement, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. 1, pp. 1 ff. and ibid., volume vii.

* Dr. Subandrio, Indonesian Ambassador in the United Kingdom.
level. The UK attached great importance to the Colombo Plan as a means of stimulating, on the economic level, the sort of voluntary cooperation which would provide the surest foundation for regional strength. The UK considered it important in whatever we did that we avoid obvious dictation or interference and that we treat the countries in the area as equals.

Mr. Garner concurred with Mr. Scott’s remarks but thought it well to realize that an objective settlement of Kashmir might in itself represent a set-back to India’s relations with the West. (That is, India would hardly be pleased if most of Kashmir went to Pakistan).

Mr. Kennedy asked whether the British officials thought it would be helpful at this time to make a clear and perhaps more positive statement than any hitherto on the US and UK policy toward Asia. Could we, by such a statement, help to allay Asian suspicions over such issues as colonialism, the fear that a new type of imperialism was being fostered through economic aid, developments in Indo-China and US efforts with respect to Formosa? Neither Mr. Scott nor Mr. Garner thought this was an opportune time for any such statement. They felt that the currency of statements had become depreciated and that it would not be wise to manufacture any statement; rather, let it flow in time from the course of events.

Mr. Kennedy then asked whether a statement on our attitude towards agrarian reform had any place now. We realize, he said, that the Communists had a strong psychological weapon in the way they dealt with this issue and also that our aid to the area, without social and economic reform, might bring little benefit to those who really needed it. Until now we have, on the whole, remained silent about agrarian reform. Mr. Scott said that there would appear to be few subjects more important for us to consider. Mr. Murray suggested that the Colombo Plan might lead to some improvement in this respect. He noted, however, the difficulties in the way of reform. On the one hand, local customs were often a great hindrance; on the other, if we brought too much pressure to bear we ran the risk of being criticized for interference in internal matters. Mr. Olver also pointed out an additional problem in the case of countries where state and local governments might to a considerable extent depend for support on precisely those interests which would be hurt most by reform.

The remaining conversation about how we could deal with agrarian reform was largely inconclusive, but all agreed that it was of vital interest. Mr. Kennedy said that he had raised his question in the con-

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10 The Colombo Plan was a report published on November 23, 1950, by the British Commonwealth Consultative Committee on South and Southeast Asia calling for the economic development of the area. At a meeting of the Consultative Committee held in Colombo on February 12–20, the United States was represented by Mr. Kennedy. Documentation on U.S. cooperation with the Colombo Plan is in Department of State file 890.00.
text of his concern about what more we might be doing in the field of psychological warfare to meet the Communist threat.

Turning to Pakistan, the British officials pointed out that this country stood ready to cooperate and that it was particularly interested in the Middle East, whose defense it looked on as a matter of acute concern. At the time of the Commonwealth Conference, Liaquat had taken part in the talks on Middle East defense and while, to be sure, he had mostly listened and made no commitments, it was clear he was very much absorbed in the matter. (Mr. Garner said, however, in reply to Mr. Palmer’s question, that Pakistan would not participate in the talks among some of the Commonwealth countries in March on Middle East defense). The main barrier to gaining Pakistan’s cooperation was Kashmir. Until this question was out of the way, little more could be done to bring Pakistan into the Western alliance but, given a Kashmir settlement, Mr. Scott and Mr. Garner believed there was a real chance of obtaining a defense agreement with Pakistan. (This, of course, would then raise difficulties over the supply of arms Pakistan would undoubtedly want). They believed that the Commonwealth talks had had a beneficial effect on Pakistan’s attitude and discounted the importance of the incidents surrounding the delay in Liaquat’s departure from Karachi which, they said, largely revolved around the mechanics of consulting the other Commonwealth Prime Ministers about Liaquat’s desire to have Kashmir discussed in London.

The British officials did not think that the Afghan-Pakistan dispute by itself would be a serious obstacle to Pakistan’s participation in Middle East defense; without Indian support they believed the Afghan case would largely fall apart.

Mr. Garner next commented on the UK’s defense discussions with Ceylon. Basic agreement with Ceylon has been reached and only points of detail remain. The position of the Ceylon Government is that it is glad and even anxious for the UK to retain bases and the Ceylonese have already publicly stated that they would be on the Western side in the event of war. The defense agreement of 1947 in itself established a firm alliance with the United Kingdom. The point now under debate is how Ceylon is to fulfill its obligation to purchase bases for United Kingdom use. At present the UK is occupying bases in Ceylon through leases from private owners and is continuing to pay rent for these bases. The UK is now trying to persuade Ceylon to go ahead with the purchase of these bases and present them to the UK for use without charge. As could be expected, Ceylon is asking the highest

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11 Documentation on the possible entry of Pakistan into defense arrangements for the Middle East is scheduled for publication in volume v.
12 Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan.
13 The text of this agreement, dated November 11, 1947, is in Mansergh, Documents, vol. II, p. 749.
price for agreeing to this arrangement. What it wants is UK assistance in the development of Ceylonese armed forces; more specifically, it wants the UK to furnish necessary military equipment without cost. At the moment, the UK is unwilling to pay the price asked by Ceylon and therefore the issue is still open. Meanwhile, so long as no agreement can be reached, the UK still has the use of the bases but will have to go on paying rent for them.

Mr. Kennedy said that the US, at Ceylon’s request, had supplied it with information on certain small naval vessels and training aircraft which might be available for purchase. We had as yet received no reply from Ceylon indicating whether it intended to make the purchases. The prices of the US equipment were high and this factor may have discouraged further interest.

ITEM II. REVIEW OF UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM OBJECTIVES WITH RESPECT TO SOUTH ASIA

In opening the discussion under Item II on the agenda, Mr. Kennedy outlined the general US objectives in South Asia. These were:

1. To encourage strong, enduring and friendly relations with the governments in the area;
2. To encourage the continuance in power of non-Communist governments;
3. To encourage among the countries of the area the development, individually and collectively, of strength capable of opposing communist expansion;
4. To encourage countries in the area to assume greater responsibility for the solution of Asian problems;
5. To encourage in the area the development of an attitude which would assist us and other friendly countries to obtain facilities we might desire and, by the same token, ensure that facilities are denied to the Soviet bloc; and
6. To encourage close economic ties which would ensure that we and other friendly countries have access to resources and markets in the area and that they are denied to the Soviet bloc.

Mr. Scott confirmed that the UN shared these general objectives. He thought, however, that the UK’s approach to the problem might be somewhat different from ours. The UK centered its attention on the achievement, first of all, of an improvement in Indo-Pakistani relations. It then looked forward to the building up of cooperation on a regional basis in South and Southeast Asia and was presently hoping to stimulate this sort of cooperation on the economic level. In this connection, efforts exerted by Asian countries under the Colombo Plan and other regional economic exercises were fully as important as the results. The development of cooperation was a process requiring time and the education that would stick best with the people
in the area was self-education. We in the West might prod them a little, but we should be careful not to go too far. The UK realized that in tackling the problem of regional cooperation from the economic angle first, it was following an apparently illogical pattern. It might seem to make more sense to start with defense first, build up a stable political situation next and then concentrate last of all on economic improvements. But circumstances in South and South-East Asia made the only practical approach at the present time an effort to get some degree of harmony in the economic sphere and to hope that from it political advantages would eventually flow. The UK appreciated that time might work against us, but there seemed no alternative.

Mr. Garner thought we should make clear that the objectives Mr. Kennedy had outlined were our ultimate, long-range aims. Mr. Kennedy agreed; they could be termed the desiderata of the situation. Mr. Kennedy thought that the UK might tend to emphasize stability per se more than we, but Mr. Scott said that what the UK meant was the stability of non-Communist governments established through popular support.

III. POSSIBLE UNITED STATES AND/OR UNITED KINGDOM ACTION

Mr. Kennedy then went on to note that the status of India–Pakistan relations was becoming an increasing source of embarrassment for the US Government domestically and that it would be difficult to answer questions Congress might raise on this matter. Congress might ask why the US should spend money in an area which gave so little heed to impending destruction and doom. Officials in the Department of State themselves were increasingly concerned about what to do in the event that hostilities did break out between India and Pakistan or the Communists advanced into South-East Asia. This concern perhaps explained why the US seemed somewhat more inclined than the UK to press ahead.

Mr. Garner said that all evidence available to the UK suggested that India and Pakistan were not in fact on the verge of war and that the general situation in this respect was much better than last year at the time of the communal troubles. Relations between the armed forces lined up in Kashmir seemed to be good and it was certainly significant that they had remained in position for nearly three years without significant incident. There was now no indication of any aggressive moves. Mr. Kennedy found this assessment interesting; he said we would have been inclined to say that the situation in the subcontinent now was at a lower ebb than at any time since last March. Mr. Garner admitted that there might indeed have been some deterioration since the relieved situation following the settlement of the refugee issue;
but he repeated that the UK saw no signs suggesting that an outbreak was in any sense imminent.

In response to Mr. Kennedy's inquiry whether some advantage might be realized in lumping together the various disputes between India and Pakistan and treating them as a single problem, Mr. Garner said he felt this would only complicate the problem. The UK had tended to concentrate on one problem at a time and believed this was still the most feasible approach. Our greatest handicap, of course, was that the will to reach a settlement was not there. Mr. Scott agreed and speculated on the various solutions which might suggest themselves. Theoretically, a little bloodshed might throw such a fight into the two governments that they would quickly come to terms, but this resort was so fraught with danger that we had no choice but to rule it out. Another possibility was arbitration, but here it was necessary to offer some inducement to the parties to submit to arbitration and there was little we could offer India, which already has pretty much what it wants.

Mr. Scott said that Nehru appeared to be shaken at the time of the Commonwealth Conference when Mr. Bevin took the opportunity to describe to him the danger of a pincer movement from Communist Russia on the West and from Communist China on the East aimed directly at India. Mr. Garner added that the paradox of Nehru, however, was that while he appeared to appreciate the significance of the Communist threat in Asia, it seemed to have little effect in the way of producing in him a sense of realism on Kashmir. (Mr. Scott remarked to Mr. Kennedy that Mr. Bevin's personal notes showed that Nehru appeared "flummoxed" when Mr. Bevin pointed out to him the inconsistency of his stand on aggression in Korea and in Kashmir). Mr. Kennedy affirmed that the US wished to pursue a settlement of Kashmir as rapidly and effectually as possible and Mr. Garner said this was certainly also the UK position.

IV. POSSIBLE UNITED STATES AND/OR UNITED KINGDOM ACTION WITH RESPECT TO PERIPHERAL SOUTH ASIAN PROBLEMS: AFGHAN-PAKISTAN DISPUTE, NEPAL, TIBET, FRENCH AND PORTUGUESE POSSESSIONS ON THE SUBCONTINENT AND INDIAN MINORITIES IN CEYLON

Mr. Kennedy then explained the latest developments in connection with our proposal for talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghanistan had accepted, but we were still awaiting a definite reply

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14 Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
15 For documentation concerning the proposals made by the United States to the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan on November 6, 1960, see Foreign Relations, 1960, vol. v, pp. 1446 ff.
from Karachi. The Pakistanis wanted us to give them an assurance in advance that we accepted the Durand line as the valid international frontier of Pakistan. The Pakistanis had said that they would be satisfied with a private assurance, but we had made perfectly clear that we could not state our position in advance as this would vitiate the whole basis on which we were suggesting talks without prior conditions and for which we were offering to lend our good offices. We thought our position with respect to the Durand line implicit in our recognition of Pakistan at the time of partition, but it was impossible for us to make this explicit now. We had also told the Pakistanis that if the talks failed we would then consider whether we could make some statement making specific our stand on the Durand Line. Mr. Garner said that the Pakistanis had also raised with the UK the question of the US position on the Durand Line and the UK had undertaken to inquire of the Department of State about this issue. A reply from Washington was now awaited. The British officials suggested that, in light of what Mr. Kennedy had just explained about our position, perhaps it would be helpful for the UK to send a message to Karachi which, without in any way committing the US, would reassure the Pakistanis that our position on the Durand Line was in fact favorable and remove Pakistani suspicions of the motives behind the US proposal for talks which, to the UK officials, seemed to be the only obstacle delaying Pakistani acceptance. The UK agreed to draft a message of this nature and to show it to Mr. Kennedy.

Nepal

Mr. Kennedy said we had in mind sending a small diplomatic mission to Katmandu consisting perhaps only of a Chargé and possibly one other official. For the present at least, our Ambassador in New Delhi 16 would continue to be accredited also to the Nepal Government. Mr. Scott said that UK experience had been that it was usually unsatisfactory to have one envoy accredited to two countries. He thought it might at least be helpful in this case for our Chargé in Katmandu to be able to explain to the Nepal Government that he was free to report directly to the State Department.

Both the UK and US representatives agreed that our exchange of views at the time of the recent Nepal crisis had been very useful. The UK officials felt that it was a little too early to be overly optimistic about the situation in Nepal, but Mr. Garner pointed out that the problem would diminish as, inevitably, Nepal was brought more and more within the Indian sphere.

16 Loy W. Henderson.
Tibet

On Tibet, Mr. Kennedy said that the US still had in mind the Tibetan appeal to the UN against Chinese aggression. We would probably go along with any major support in the UN for consideration of this appeal, but we did not intend to take any initiative ourselves in the matter. The UK officials said that the British position was substantially the same and that the UK believed the issue was mainly one for determination by India, as the UK had in fact already made clear to the Indian Government.

While it was generally recognized by the group that there would be little in the way of practical result from UN consideration of the appeal, Mr. Kennedy pointed out that we were concerned about the moral aspect of overlooking aggression anywhere in the world. Mr. Scott agreed that this was a valid concern and he thought it might also be useful to point out to India the moral issues involved.

French and Portuguese Possessions

Mr. Kennedy said that the US preferred to have as little to do as possible with the problem of French and Portuguese possessions in India. The UK thought that India was probably in no great hurry at the moment to press the holding of referendums. India was probably somewhat fearful of an adverse result. Among other factors which might work against a vote favoring India, the local inhabitants of the French possessions were now enjoying profitable trade in smuggling into India. The UK believed that Nehru was convinced of the sincerity of top level French officials in their willingness to have the future of the possessions determined through referendum. The sincerity of local French officials might be somewhat more suspect.

A settlement over the Portuguese possessions was still farther away. It was clear that Portugal would oppose a referendum since it considered its Indian possessions part of the Portuguese Crown territories. Mr. Garner said that, however it was explained, the fact seemed to be that the heat had for the moment gone out of this whole problem of the French and Portuguese possessions.

India–Ceylon Relations

The UK said that, generally speaking, there was no serious current problem over Indians in Ceylon. This issue was, of course, potentially difficult and Ceylon always had in the back of its mind the fear of some positive Indian action of one sort or another. In reply to Mr. Kennedy’s question, the British officials saw no attempt in Ceylon to freeze out the Indian inhabitants from Ceylonese citizenship; to the contrary, the Ceylonese had made it possible for Indians to acquire citizenship after a reasonable period of residence.
Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 20, 1951.

Subject: South Asian Regional Conference, Ceylon

The South Asian Regional Conference of United States Diplomatic and Consular Officers, which was held in Nuwara Eliya, Ceylon from February 26 to March 2, 1951 under the chairmanship of Assistant Secretary McGhee, was attended by officials of our missions and consular establishments in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Ceylon. Representatives from Foreign Service posts in Iran, Burma, Indo-China, Thailand, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom were also present, as well as representatives from the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, and Defense, CIA and ECA.

The meeting concerned itself with the problems confronting the United States in its political, military, economic, cultural, and labor relations with the countries of South Asia. Among its most significant conclusions were (1) recognition of the importance of technical assistance and economic grant aid as means of implementing United States policy and combating anti-Westernism in the conference area; and (2) recognition of the potential military importance of Pakistan with respect to the defense of South Asia and the Middle East.

The agreed conclusions and recommendations of the conference are attached herewith for your information (Tab A).¹

Mr. McGhee will summarize the results of the conference at the Under Secretary's meeting after his return.

[Annex]

SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL CONFERENCE OF UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR OFFICERS
NUWARA ELIYA, CEYLON
FEBRUARY 26–MARCH 2, 1951

AGREED CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PARTICIPANTS

From the Department of State:

Hon. George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, Chairman.

¹ Annex below. A more detailed record of the proceedings of the Nuwara Eliya Conference, including summaries of discussion and the texts of working papers prepared in advance by officers in Washington and in the field, will be found in Department of State file 120.4346E.
Donald D. Kennedy, Deputy Director, Office of South Asian Affairs. Philip L. Kelser, Officer in Charge, Economic Affairs, Office of South Asian Affairs.
S. Shepard Jones, Officer in Charge, Public Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs.

From Foreign Service Establishments:
Hon. Loy W. Henderson, American Ambassador, New Delhi.
Clifford C. Taylor, Counselor
Henry L. Deimel, Counselor
Fraser Wilkins, First Secretary
Henry Sokolov, Attaché
Clare H. Timberlake, Public Affairs Officer
Myron L. Black, Economic Officer
Theodore L. Elliot Jr., Administrative Officer
Ellis V. Glyn, Administrative Assistant
Argus Tresider, Public Affairs Officer
Henry W. Spielman, Second Secretary
Hugh Crumpler, Acting Information Officer
Hon. George R. Merrell, Ambassador Designate, Kabul.
Fred W. Jandrey, First Secretary
Joseph Leeming, Public Affairs Officer
Prescott Childs, Consul General, Bombay.
J. G. Evans, Economic Officer
G. Edward Clark, Public Affairs Officer
L. A. Squires, Consul
Evan M. Wilson, Consul General, Calcutta.
Wilson E. Sweeney, Consul
George Mann, Public Affairs Officer
Robert Rossow, Jr., Vice Consul, Madras.
Robert A. Christopher, Vice Consul
Stanley R. Chartrand, Public Affairs Officer
Austin R. Preston, Consul General, Lahore.
Charles D. Withers, Consul, Dacca.

Arthur Richards, Counselor, American Embassy, Tehran.
Joseph Palmer, First Secretary, American Embassy, London.
Edwin W. Martin, Second Secretary, American Embassy, Rangoon.
Norman B. Hannah, Third Secretary, American Embassy, Bangkok.
Edmund A. Gullion, Counselor, American Embassy, Saigon.
Vinton Chapin, Counselor, American Embassy, Manila.

From other Departments and Agencies:
Captain Ernest M. Eller, USN, Commander, Middle East Forces.
Stanley Andrews, Director, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture.
Carleton Wood, Director, Far East Division, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce.
Waldo H. Dubberstein, Intelligence Specialist, Central Intelligence Agency.
Shannon McCune, Deputy Director, Far East Program, ECA.

I. UNITED STATES STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN SOUTH ASIA

A. Conclusions

1. The most effective military defense of South Asia would require strong flanks. Turkey, Iran and Pakistan are of primary importance on the west and Indochina on the east.

2. Pakistan could provide important ground forces now, for use in South Asia or on the western flank. It would, therefore, be useful to the United States and the United Kingdom to bring about an early build-up of Pakistani ground forces assisted by the provision of military equipment to Pakistan.

3. India also could provide important ground forces. However, unless its foreign policy changes, India will not give the free world military assistance in war. In the event of war, initially India will probably attempt to maintain a posture of neutrality. If its policy should change prior to war, it would be useful to provide military aid to India on terms similar to those reached with Pakistan. Indeed, offer of such aid to India, and acceptance of similar aid by Pakistan, might spark a change in Indian policy and provide a stimulus which in the long term would bring great benefits to the free world from India’s military potential, raw materials, industrial output, manpower, and communications facilities.

4. The potentialities of Pakistan and India as sources of ground troops could be realized only after an easing of Indo-Pakistan tension through a settlement of the Kashmir issue or by other means, or through assurances adequate to both countries against attack by the other.

5. India might be utilized to produce military supplies for the West during the cold war. Initiation on our part of action to bring this about might be one of the best means of securing India’s ultimate alignment with the West.

6. Ceylon and Pakistan contain a number of bases, particularly air and naval bases, which could make an important contribution to the military operations of the free world from the outset of war.

7. Raw materials and products from India and other South Asian countries may be severely restricted or eventually cut off during the course of war.

8. Although Afghanistan is weak militarily, it occupies a position of strategic importance; in the event of war, it would be to our advantage to have Afghanistan neutral initially but determined to resist Soviet invasion.
9. In addition to whatever military grant aid may be furnished, the Conference endorses the existing policy of providing non-grant military assistance to South Asian countries under Section 408E of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act.\textsuperscript{2}

10. If the United States Government considers that its policies in Indochina and the Far East in general promote our national security, we should not be swayed from carrying out these policies by criticism on the part of the South Asian countries.

B. Recommendations

1. We should take every feasible military and political step to build up the strength of the western and eastern flanks of the South Asian area. For the short term, this can best be effected by increasing military strength in Pakistan, Iran and Turkey on the west, and in Indochina on the east.

2. The United States military authorities should consider on an urgent basis the desirability of the United States entering into an early understanding with Pakistan, which would provide for equipping and building up Pakistan's military forces and insure the availability of Pakistani ground forces on the western flank at the outset of war.

3. A similar understanding should be offered India if the latter is willing to accept the same commitments with regard to the utilization of its forces on the western flank or elsewhere.

4. If a Middle Eastern\textsuperscript{*} pact should be developed which includes Iran, Pakistan should be offered membership. Such action, however, should not delay the understanding with Pakistan proposed in recommendation number 2 above.

5. Consultation should be undertaken with the United Kingdom with respect to recommendations 2, 3, and 4 before entering into consultations with Pakistan or India.

6. For both political and military reasons, we should promptly initiate, if feasible, steps to develop India and Pakistan as sources of military supplies.

7. The United Kingdom should be urged to bring the air and naval bases and communications facilities in Ceylon to a higher state of readiness for war operations, and to accelerate development of Ceylon's military forces.

8. We should seek to obtain increased amounts of raw materials from South Asia in light of the fact that South Asian sources of supply may be cut off in time of war.


\textsuperscript{*}The term “Middle East” as employed herein refers to the area comprising Greece, Turkey, Iran, the Arab states, and Israel. [Footnote in the source text.]
9. Should Afghanistan request military aid, we should consider offering assistance similar to that given to other South Asian countries, limiting any aid to those items required for internal security.

10. We should consider India as a worthwhile long-term risk from a military standpoint, and endeavor through non-pressure methods to insure its friendship and ultimate support.

II. APPRAISAL OF THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES

A. Conclusions

1. The foreign policies of the South Asian countries are concentrated upon the problems arising from regional tensions to the exclusion of an active realization of threatening world catastrophe.

2. The foreign policy of India dominates the area. An important aspect of that policy is India's diminishing interest in supporting the maintenance of peace by collective action, despite the fact that India is presently incapable of defending itself against determined communist aggression. India shuts its eyes to the imminence of communist danger.

3. The position of Afghanistan as a buffer state against direct Soviet aggression from the north can be strengthened appreciably by removal of the Pushutunistan issue.

4. Pakistan is willing to make a significant contribution to the defense of the Middle East provided its fear of Indian attack can be removed.

B. Recommendations

1. We should make stronger efforts to minimize the importance of regional differences in South Asia by stressing the national and international threat of Soviet imperialism.

2. In view of India's foreign policy, which seeks to build a neutral third force both by attacking the West, in which it partially follows the Cominform line, and by placating the Soviet Union and Communist China, the United States should maintain a policy of patience built on firmness in its relations with the Government of India. However, whenever Indian Government policy has the effect of undermining maintenance of peace through collective security, the United States should challenge it vigorously, both at home and abroad through the press, radio, and other media, but always avoiding the appearance of moral or political expediency.

3. In view of India's ambitions for political hegemony, its advocacy of a doctrine of appeasement, and its tendencies toward abandoning support of the principle of collective security, the United States should not at this time encourage the formation of a South Asian
regional bloc, since such an organization might come under India’s domination.

4. In view of Pakistan’s conviction that it is not able to come to the defense of the Middle East in the event of communist aggression, unless Pakistan has been guaranteed against attack from India, the United States and the United Kingdom, as the two powers most immediately responsible for the defense of the Middle East, should discuss urgently the possibility of giving Pakistan assurances with respect to such an attack by India.

5. In the light of Pakistan’s present orientation to the West and its active cooperation with the countries of the Middle East, the United States should encourage Pakistan’s participation in problems common to the Middle East, and its orientation toward Turkey. In addition, the United States should consult more intimately with the Government of Pakistan on questions of common interest in the Middle East.

6. Consultations between the United States, and the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan should be developed further, subject to the judgment of the Chiefs of Mission, to bring about a closer cooperation between the United States and the two Governments, and a more realistic appreciation on the part of India of the danger which confronts it from communism.

7. We should suggest to Governments associated with us in the North Atlantic Pact and the Hemisphere Defense Pact that they instruct their diplomatic and consular representatives in South Asia and elsewhere, and their representatives to the United Nations, to point out on every appropriate occasion to the officials of the Governments of Middle Eastern and Asian countries the fallacious basis of the present foreign policies of India, and the dangers to Asia and to world peace inherent in those policies. These representatives should also be instructed, in their discussions with officials anywhere throughout the world, to attempt to win them over to the point of view that aggression by international communism wherever it occurs must be opposed.

8. A diplomatic office should be established in Nepal, and a Chargé should be appointed to provide the United States with first-hand information on the Nepalese situation, thereby removing our present dependence on British and Indian observers. Such an office might have unexpected usefulness in the event of war, provided India and Nepal were not participants therein.

9. Economic assistance to the countries of South Asia offers the best means presently available of achieving or strengthening their orientation toward the West, since it demonstrates that the Western powers are not imperialistic.
A. Conclusions

1. The conclusion of the trade agreement between India and Pakistan, including acceptance by India of the present value of the Pakistan rupee, should lessen materially the degree of tension between the two countries.

2. Kashmir remains the central and most acute issue between India and Pakistan.

3. The Security Council should remain seized of the Kashmir issue. The United States should not take the lead either within or without the Security Council in attempting to settle the Kashmir problem.

B. Recommendations

1. The United States should maintain the position that the United Kingdom continue to take the lead in pressing for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

2. The United States and United Kingdom jointly should press to a vote the present Kashmir resolution before the Security Council, even though one or both parties state they will not accept it and will not cooperate in its implementation. If, during discussion in the Security Council, it becomes evident that modification of the resolution will make it more acceptable to both parties without material loss of the resolution's strength, such modification should be accepted by the United States if it is also accepted by the United Kingdom, but the sponsors should guard against being placed in a negotiating position with the parties.

3. If the United Nations representative provided for under the resolution should report failure, and one or both of the parties refuse to accept arbitration, the United States should look to the United Kingdom for leadership as to the next step which should be taken in connection with the dispute.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan dispute

A. Conclusions

1. The present condition of political unrest along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, and the propaganda campaign and mutual distrust between the two Governments contribute to the instability of South Asia and increase the vulnerability of that area to penetration by international communism.

2. The dispute is not, however, of such a character as to warrant that the United States take the lead in insisting on its prompt settlement.

3. Settlement of the Pushtunistan issue will only flow from mutual agreement between the parties, and it is doubtful that the attitudes of the two Governments are such as to lead to the belief that such mutual agreement is possible at an early date.

4. If Pakistan should fail to reply favorably to the United States' proffer of good offices, the United States should not consider itself obligated to take further action in the matter for the time being, although it might find it advantageous to discuss with the United Kingdom and India further steps which might be taken to end the dispute, including the feasibility of efforts by the United Kingdom to persuade Pakistan to submit the question of the status of the Durand Line to an international tribunal.

B. Recommendations

1. The United States should press Pakistan once more for a definitive reply to its proffer of good offices made on November 6, 1950. Pakistan should be informed that the United States cannot remain indefinitely in the position of extending its good offices, and that therefore failure on Pakistan's part to make a definitive reply by April 1 will be construed by the United States as a rejection of its offer. The United States would in this circumstance immediately after April 1 make a public announcement that its offer of good offices is being withdrawn. The United States should make no further explanations or approaches on this matter.

2. The United States should not make any explicit statements, either now or later, with regard to the validity of the Durand Line, or give any secret assurances thereon. If Pakistan should fail to give an affirmative answer to the present proposals of the United States looking towards settlement of the dispute, the latter should not feel compelled to take any further steps in the matter with the parties in the near future.

3. If, after examination of the Afghan brief on the subject of the Durand Line, it should appear useful to do so, the United States should approach India with respect to its interpretation of the Afghanistan-United Kingdom treaty of 1921 and Afghanistan's obligations thereunder. If such an approach should provide a favorable opportunity, the United States should endeavor to approach Afghanistan to obtain terminations of its propagandizing for Pushtunistan and its attacks on Pakistan on that subject.
A. Conclusions

1. Virulent and widespread anti-Westernism is found in South Asia primarily in India and should be systematically attacked. However, only limited success can be achieved in combatting color and race prejudice, important elements in anti-Westernism. Envy of Western accomplishments and resources is another aspect of anti-Westernism which cannot easily be removed. In addition, lack of interest in India on the part of Western nations has offended the Indians and has thereby encouraged anti-Westernism in India.

2. American support of the activities of the Western powers in Asia, and specifically our present support of French policy in Indo-China, has been bitterly attacked by some countries in South Asia, and this support has lent substance to the charge throughout South Asia that the United States favors imperialism, colonialism, and racialism, all elements of anti-Westernism.

3. Technical assistance and grant aid programs can serve as effective means of combatting anti-Westernism.

B. Recommendations

1. Those aspects of anti-Westernism springing from color and race prejudice should be combatted by maintaining the present volume of counter-propaganda through an information and cultural approach which admits the existence of a color problem in the United States but points out clearly that we are doing something about it. It was further recommended that American official establishments abroad, particularly in South Asia, should, with the concurrence of the principal officer, have on their staffs a few additional American negroes, as recommended by the South Asian Regional Foreign Service Conference held in New Delhi in April, 1949.

2. The prevailing feelings of envy over Western accomplishments and resources common among Asian nationals should not be aggravated by tactless presentation of our more fortunate position.

3. Active steps should be taken to counter charges of a lack of interest on the part of the United States in the countries of South Asia, particularly India, by fostering in the United States an understanding of South Asian life and problems through such media as art exhibits, cultural societies, and the press.

4. Charges of United States support for imperialism and colonialism in Asia should be attacked through a carefully formulated public relations program. This program should include a systematic and well-planned stepping up of friendly discussions with influential individuals and groups in South Asia, such as labor organizations, as well as with the “grass roots”. Discussions of this character should
be carried out by all members of the Foreign Service establishments, and by qualified members of the American community. Moreover, private institutions, i.e., the Rockefeller Foundation and American schools and colleges, should be encouraged to undertake educational and humanitarian activities of a nature which could usefully supplement, or, under certain political conditions, supersede those of United States official agencies.

5. A determined and better-documented effort should be made, through diplomatic and informational channels, to convince the peoples and Governments of the South Asian countries that the French have passed the "point of no return" in Indo-China; that the inhabitants thereof are achieving independence as did those of the subcontinent; but that the Indo-Chinese must unfortunately contend with communist-led aggression sustained by a neighboring communist power. In this connection, it should be made clear to the South Asian states that the United States would not be supporting Franco-Vietnamese policies in Indo-China if it thought such support meant a survival of colonialism in Asia. To this end, the Department and the United States missions in Indo-China should furnish timely material to our missions in South Asia.

6. The Western allies, particularly the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Canada, should avoid both overt and covert attempts to discredit one another locally in Asia.

7. Since technical assistance and grant aid programs constitute effective means of demonstrating that the Western powers are not imperialistic, such programs should be instituted. Care must be exercised, however, in carrying out such programs so as to avoid antagonizing the recipient countries.

8. In the preparatory work on our policies in the Far East and in Southeast Asia, and in the implementation thereof, the United States Government should carefully consider the impact of such policies on South Asia. This consideration, however, should not deter us from pursuing policies which are in our vital interest.

V. EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNAL COMMUNISM IN SOUTH ASIA ON THE ACHIEVEMENT OF UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES

A. Conclusions

1. Local communists in various countries of South Asia, particularly in India, represent a dangerous threat to the security of that region. Since the communists in India in particular, although relatively not numerous, are well organized in many communities, and are able to attract much non-communist support, they should therefore be considered an active threat to the security of India.
2. International communism, including communist recruits in the countries of South Asia, is meeting with considerable success in its efforts to prevent the realization of United States policies in South Asia. The influence of international communism is gradually increasing, especially in India, particularly among intellectuals and those classes or groups whose social and economic position is undergoing change or whose habits and outlook are being altered as a result of the profound political, economic, and social developments which are taking place in the country.

3. The United States is handicapped in its struggle with international communism in South Asia because the campaign of the United States is carried out for the most part through governmental agencies, the activities of which must necessarily be circumscribed. On the other hand, the campaign of international communism is carried on by nationals of the countries of South Asia, acting either individually or through organizations, and therefore the campaign is not limited in scope as is that of a government.

4. Among the allies of international communism in South Asia are the prejudices of the South Asian peoples against the Western world, based on their belief that the latter is colonialistic and imperialistic, and on their jealousies of the West, which arise from color differences and from the fact that the West is superior in wealth, power, and technology. After discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the possible issuance of a statement by the President or some other high official of the American Government setting forth the position of the United States with regard to colonialism or imperialism, the conferees concluded that such action would be unwise at the present time. However, it was concluded that we should continue, as heretofore, on every appropriate occasion at lower levels to explain the United States position with regard to colonialism and imperialism.

B. Recommendations

1. All American officials and employees in South Asia should continue to improve their knowledge of the ideological aspects of the struggle with international communism and of the aggressive tactics and intentions of particular communist governments, and should continue to make contacts with nationals of the countries in which they are stationed for the purpose of obtaining a better understanding of, and wider support for, the objectives and policies of the United States.

2. Foreign Service establishments of the United States in South Asia should continue in their efforts to achieve a better understanding among representative American nationals in South Asia of the policies of the United States, and to enlist the aid of such nationals in explain-
ing these policies and obtaining support therefore among the South Asian peoples.

3. The activities of the USIE should be broadened and strengthened in the South Asian countries. Among its specific activities which should be enlarged is the practice of sending for brief visits to the South Asian countries outstanding leaders in various walks of American life who are believed to have both an understanding of the area and the tact to influence South Asian leaders and groups, particularly in India, in favor of the policies of the United States.

4. To supplement the overt activities carried on through USIE and other sections of American Foreign Service establishments in South Asia, covert steps should be taken to assist individual nationals and groups within South Asian countries to expose the duplicity, hypocrisy, and aggressiveness of international communism, and to support United States efforts to discourage communist aggression.

5. Programs of economic aid, both through Point Four and through grant assistance, constitute the one approach most likely to succeed in convincing the Governments and people of South Asia that the United States is genuinely interested in their welfare, and thereby in bringing them closer to the West and drawing them away from communist influence.

VI. THE ATTITUDES OF SOUTH ASIAN AND PERIPHERAL COUNTRIES TOWARD NEGOTIATION OF A PEACE TREATY WITH JAPAN

A. Conclusions

1. Philippines: Emphasis was laid upon Philippine determination to recover reparations, which the Philippines estimate at 8 billion pesos (US$4 million), for losses and destruction suffered during the Japanese occupation. Mr. Dulles’ efforts to dissuade the Philippines from pressing for these unrealistic claims have had only a moderating effect upon Philippine official and public determination to press for that compensation which they consider their just due. However, since the United States can count on Philippine support on important matters of international policy, and since President Quirino has expressed his private view that the reparations question can be resolved in overall economic agreements, this question is not a vital issue, and the United States can expect basic support for its policy toward Japan.

2. Indonesia: Indonesia appears to favor a peace treaty which would restore Japanese sovereignty. Despite the Japanese occupation, the Indonesians feel a certain community of Asian interest with Japan. Moreover, they are interested in profitable trade relations with Japan, and recently concluded a trade treaty therewith. An official Indonesian spokesman has urged close relations with Japan, stating that once a peace treaty was concluded, it might be expected that
Japan should be permitted armed forces necessary for its defense. However, while advocating a peace treaty, Indonesia appears concerned about the conditions which the United States might demand in the way of bases, occupation forces, etc., and particularly about continuance of United States military interest in Japan, in the sense of making it a bastion against Communist China, which they believe might provoke a Far Eastern conflict. They are believed to favor a discussion of all Japanese treaty issues initially by a conference of the major powers, including Communist China.

3. Indo-China: The Indo-Chinese desire to develop closer relations with the Japanese in order to offset French influence, and the French accordingly fear direct trade relations between Indo-China and Japan. However, both Vietnam and the French would probably support United States proposals for a Japanese peace treaty.

4. Thailand: Thailand would probably endorse whole-heartedly the United States position on a Japanese peace treaty.

5. Burma: Although Burma has thus far failed to make its views known, it would probably feel that it must participate in whatever kind of peace settlement is decided upon. For political reasons, Burma would probably also request reparations.

6. Pakistan: On the Japanese treaty question, Pakistan defers to India, because prior to partition, the Government of India handled this subject for what is now India and Pakistan. However, Pakistan is believed to favor the United States position on a Japanese peace treaty. At present it is enjoying profitable trade relations with Japan, and there is a Japanese trade mission now in Karachi.

7. Ceylon: Ceylon is believed to support the United States position on a Japanese peace treaty, but would like to participate in such a treaty. Ceylon has particularly friendly feelings towards Japan, and is anxious to purchase as much as possible from Japan.

8. Afghanistan: Although Afghanistan has not yet made its policy clear, its attitude will probably be influenced by its proximity to the Soviet Union and Communist China.

9. India: India's attitude toward the United States position with respect to Japan is neither balanced nor objective. It appears motivated primarily by India's opposition to colonialism, its antipathy for Western imperialism, its recognition of the so-called facts of Far Eastern life, and its belief in the non-aggressive character of international communism. Evidence of these motivating influences may be found in India's reply to the seven-point memorandum on tentative United States policy of November 24, 1950.4 First, India wishes to include Communist China among the treaty participants. Second, it

desires Formosa and the Pescadores to be turned over to Communist China immediately, without awaiting a peace treaty. Third, disposition of South Sakhalin and the Kuriles was decided at Yalta, they are now occupied by the Soviet Union, and the matter should not be reopened. Fourth, India acquiesces in a United States trusteeship for the Ryukyus and the Bonins but believes the question of their return to Japan should be considered by the peace conference. Fifth, Japan should be demilitarized and its security guaranteed by the United Nations; however, India would support a small Japanese force for internal security purposes. Sixth, India agrees in general with the United States regarding United Nations membership for Japan, and on questions of trade and reparations, although it has raised some questions regarding external assets.

Prime Minister Nehru recently informed our Ambassador of his views along the following lines. There can be no general Far Eastern settlement without a solution of the Japanese problem. If the United States should undertake to restore Japan’s military power, both the Soviet Union and Communist China would be convinced that Japan was being prepared as a base of operations against them. Therefore the rearming of Japan would be likely to provoke war rather than to contribute to a peaceful atmosphere, and the best solution would be for the United Nations to guarantee Japan against aggression. Although it might be advisable to permit Japan to have sufficient arms to defend itself until the United Nations had time to come to its assistance in case it should be the victim of aggression, neither Russia nor Communist China would attack Japan if the latter were protected by a United Nations guarantee, since neither country desired war. Nehru reiterated his conviction that Russia and Communist China would not risk a world war by deliberately upsetting a Far Eastern settlement calling for an unarmed, neutralized Japan.

10. Since negotiations are in process for final determination of a definitive treaty with Japan, and since they are being considered at the highest policy level, it was decided that the competence of the Conference to make conclusions or recommendations did not go beyond recording the foregoing views.

VII. UNITED NATIONS PROBLEMS

A. Conclusions

1. The conduct and policies of the South Asian countries in the United Nations generally reflect their respective views and estimates of world politics and of the causes of world tension. India attempts to steer an aloof course between what it conceives to be two power blocs. Pakistan and Afghanistan side more frequently with the Western group of nations than does India, but they increasingly believe that the United Nations is paralyzed by great power antagonisms.
2. While India considers the United Nations a useful platform from which to advance its views, it does not appear to regard it as an effective instrument for collective security or for settlement of disputes among major powers, nor does it appear to desire it to be such an instrument. India considers the United Nations as dominated and controlled by the United States in the interest of promoting American policies. There is little present opportunity for the United States to alter these conceptions in advance of fundamental changes in Indian foreign policy or leadership.

3. Participation of South Asian countries, especially India and Pakistan, in the various organs of the United Nations is extensive, active, and generally responsible. The contacts which South Asian leaders make with opinions and leaders of the Western world at Lake Success sometimes generate a current of opinion among them in advance of that of the countries they represent, and more favorable to our policies. Both the domestic and foreign attitudes of the South Asian countries are sometimes influenced because of their participation in the United Nations.

4. We cannot at this time expect India or Afghanistan to make any significant contribution to the United Nations effort in Korea, and they will probably make only a nominal contribution, eventually, to relief and rehabilitation.

5. Pakistan would probably contribute troops for Korea in the event of the removal of tensions centering on the Kashmir dispute.

6. Settlement of the Kashmir dispute in the United Nations without some fundamental alteration in the positions of the opposing parties is virtually impossible.

7. In view of the opposition of the Soviet bloc, there appears to be no possibility at present that Ceylon or Nepal can be admitted into the United Nations.

B. Recommendations

1. In conformity with our overall relations with India, our policy toward India in the United Nations should continue to be firm and friendly, and, in our approach to specific problems, consideration of the personal sensitivities of Prime Minister Nehru should be subordinated. We should also suggest to governments who maintain friendly association with us that they inform their diplomatic representatives at Lake Success of the fallacious basis of the present foreign policies of India, and of the dangers to South Asia and to world peace inherent in those policies.

2. Every effort should be made to guard against the division of the United Nations into opposing Asian and Western blocs. Specifically, we should be more active in opposing Nehru’s efforts to create a neutral bloc among the Asian and Arab states.
3. We should lose no opportunity afforded by the United Nations organization and proceedings to demonstrate to India, and, to a lesser extent, to other South Asian countries, that:

(a) The United Nations is the keystone of our policies, and should be the keystone of their policies, in the struggle against aggression, which is their own struggle as it is that of free people everywhere;
(b) With their help, the United Nations can function more effectively as an instrument for collective security and not, as some South Asian states are inclined to consider it, as an arena for two contending power blocs.

4. Whether or not the Kashmir dispute is settled, we should keep alive the question of Pakistan sending a contingent of troops to Korea. In this connection, we should keep before the Pakistani people and Government the example of Turkey and the enhanced position in world opinion produced by its participation in the collective effort in Korea.

5. At such time as the Kashmir dispute appears susceptible of solution, whether or not as a result of direct United States or British intercession with the parties, the United States, in conjunction with and under the leadership of the United Kingdom, should promote a formula whereby the solution will be consummated through the United Nations.

6. We should continue to hold prior consultation with the South Asian countries whenever possible on matters before the United Nations.

7. While India’s leadership and policies continue along the present lines, and unless we stand to gain advantages of overriding importance, we should refrain from action in the United Nations which would assist in promoting a regional organization in South Asia, which would probably come under Indian domination.

VIII. THE NEED FOR AND POSSIBILITIES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH ASIA

Economic aid

A. Conclusions

1. Grant aid programs, which would include integrated technical assistance and would be related to present and possible future loans, would be of great benefit in South Asia for political purposes. They would vitiate existing hostility and resentment against the United States, which is accused of lack of interest and concern with the area. They would also increase the stability of deteriorating economies which now provide fertile ground for communist pressures.

2. Aid to date has been in the form of foodgrains and technical assistance under the Point Four program. The proposed foodgrain program for India, including the generation of counterpart in sub-
sstantial amounts, would be of great value in assisting economic development.

B. Recommendations

1. In view of the magnitude of the economic problems of South Asia, and the limitations on the availability of material and technical aid from the United States, the focus of grant aid programs should be upon internal stimulation of economic development, as a means of giving hope to the peoples of South Asia.

2. United States grant aid programs should be instituted in each South Asian country which desires grant aid; should be organized on a bilateral rather than a multilateral basis; and should vary in scope and character in accordance with the needs of each individual country. Operation of the programs must take into account the sensitivities and weaknesses of the governments of the area. In view of the latters' limitations, operations on a joint basis where possible may be most effective.

3. In the case of countries in a strong financial position, where grants are made for political reasons only, technical assistance projects should constitute a large proportion of the aid. Moreover, a country which has the ability to repay should attempt to satisfy its needs to the maximum extent possible through international loans before seeking any more grant aid than the United States regards as necessary for political purposes.

4. Aid programs should integrate economic grant aid with technical assistance to the maximum extent feasible through a single mission in each country under the general supervision of the Ambassador.

5. At the earliest appropriate time, consultations should be held with the recipient governments concerning our contemplated aid programs.

6. In the execution of aid programs, special attention should be paid to increasing the production of materials needed by the United States, and to facilitating the purchase of such materials by the United States. Assistance to the countries concerned in obtaining priorities for any equipment necessary to such production should be extended.

7. Bilateral aid programs should be coordinated with other assistance programs such as those of the United Nations and the Commonwealth, and such coordination can be most effectively carried out on a country basis. The United States should remain a member of the Consultative Committee for the Economic Development of South and Southeast Asia on the basis that this Committee confines its activities to those of a discussion and advisory group.

8. Political benefits would result from publicizing the interrelationship of American aid programs with those from other sources.

9. Aid program budgets which are released to the public should be
consolidated to the extent possible into a general Asian program, to minimize unfavorable comparisons between countries.

Technical assistance programs

A. Conclusions

1. It is important that technical assistance programs be continued and be merged with future economic programs. This result would be achieved if the United States Government should decide to assign to a single agency responsibility for both economic aid and technical assistance.

2. It is important that any change in agency responsibility for technical assistance should not interfere with the carrying out of commitments already undertaken, and that no impetus be lost while existing Point Four programs are being adapted for integration with aid programs.

B. Recommendations

1. Technical assistance programs on a bilateral basis should be continued and merged with economic development programs when they come into existence.

2. In the event of organizational changes in Washington, existing commitments should be carried out and every effort should be made to maintain accumulated momentum. In the meantime, delays in processing technical experts under Point Four should be overcome.

3. The execution and supervision of technical assistance and economic aid programs should be carried on by a single mission in each country under the general supervision of the Ambassador.

4. In view of impending economic aid programs, the appointment of additional technical cooperation officers should be suspended, and our embassies should continue to carry out their present responsibility for screening Point Four requests. The economic sections of the embassies should be strengthened immediately.

5. The United States should continue to contribute to and support United Nations technical assistance activities.

6. The present liaison relationship with the Colombo Plan Council for Technical Cooperation should be continued.

IX. PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

A. Conclusions

1. During the emergency period, the primary aim of trade promotion activities must be to increase the production and export of materials needed for the defense efforts of the United States, including assistance in the field of marketing.

2. Continued collection of information on economic conditions in South Asia is essential not only for defense planning in the United
States, but also for private traders, who need current information on changing trade conditions.

3. A favorable attitude is evident in South Asian countries toward increasing the supply of raw materials to Japan, particularly in exchange for capital equipment needed to produce and transport such materials. In some cases Japan and the United States are competitors for scarce materials from the South Asian area.

4. While South Asian countries may seek to follow barter tactics in the allocation of their exports, it is in the interest of the United States to refuse to enter into barter deals, and instead to stress the principle that each side do its utmost to supply materials needed by the other. In the event that South Asian countries refuse to cooperate, the United States Government will be forced to regard South Asian requests less favorably.

5. South Asian Governments need considerable assistance in programming their requirements, and careful screening of their requirements statements by United States Foreign Service posts is essential. However, the present staffing at key posts in the area is inadequate to meet the additional burdens being placed upon them.

6. South Asian countries are cooperating to a certain extent with United States security export controls, but they do not cooperate fully because their foreign policies, particularly with regard to China, differ from our own. However, the trade of South Asian countries with the Soviet bloc is not considered at present to prejudice the overall national security of the United States in such manner as to warrant drastic action on our part at this time. Close attention, however, should continue to be given to this subject.

7. Except for Pakistan, the South Asian countries have generally shown a disposition to participate in the work of the international commodities groups set up to handle the allocation of scarce materials. India has shown no interest in being included in the central organization, and it may become desirable to arouse Indian interest in such participation if the central organization is expanded to include a Latin American member.

8. In planning their production programs for materials needed by the United States, it would be useful for governments in the South Asian area to be provided with target figures for their areas based upon the overall requirements of the United States. In order that such target figures may be realistic, however, it is essential that they be worked out in consultation with the Foreign Service posts concerned.

B. Recommendations

1. Consideration should be given to sending from the United States to the South Asian area experts in the collection, grading, and shipment of specific strategic commodities required by the United States.
2. Efforts should be made to encourage the production in, and export from, the South Asian area of materials needed by Japan, if consistent with the United States overall defense program.

3. The United States policy on the supply of essential materials needed by South Asian countries, and required by the United States from South Asian countries, should be on the basis that each side will meet the needs of the other to the best of its ability in the light of mutual sacrifices and the needs of all free nations; that bargaining for specific commodity exchanges be avoided; and that, if necessary, South Asian Governments be so informed.

4. United States Foreign Service staffs in the South Asian area should be increased to take care of the many additional duties resulting from the defense effort in the fields of foreign requirements, export controls, and procurement of materials.

5. Vigilance should be continued to detect transshipment or re-export of United States strategic materials, and advantage should be taken of suitable occasions to press the governments of the South Asian countries for export controls of strategic commodities more in line with our own.

6. The United States should not at present press for the inclusion of a South Asian country in the Central International Allocating Committee, but should reconsider this question if requested to do so by a South Asian country or if the Committee is expanded.

7. Import requirement targets should be established by the United States for strategic commodities from the South Asian area, and these targets should be communicated when appropriate to the governments of the area.

X. PROBLEMS OF AGRARIAN REFORM

A. Conclusions

1. Since at least 85 percent of the population in South Asia derives its income directly or indirectly from agriculture, political stability depends to a considerable extent upon the economic and social well-being of this group and in general upon the ownership of land by the tiller.

2. Since a large proportion of cultivators are tenants, owners of uneconomic holdings and landless laborers whose living standards are among the lowest in the world, they are as a group vulnerable to communist slogans and propaganda.

3. While a beginning has been made in land tenure reform, in the application of modern science and technology, in cooperative and regulated marketing, and in the improvement of credit facilities, these and other agricultural institutions and techniques remain, for the most part, primitive or only slightly developed.
4. Since the United States and the United Nations have established the policy of encouraging agrarian reform in underdeveloped countries as a means of improving the standard of living and thereby creating conditions for political stability, aid programs may appropriately be used in furthering this policy.

5. Since large landowners should be compensated for their lands when the latter are transferred to cultivators, it would be desirable for local governments, in such cases, to provide for the profitable investment of these funds in the economic development programs of their countries.

B. Recommendations

1. Measures taken by South Asian governments to enable tillers to become owners of the land should, where appropriate, be given sympathetic encouragement in cases where adequate compensation is guaranteed to those whose land is expropriated and where the governments can provide such compensation without endangering their own financial stability.

2. Governmental and cooperative efforts to effect consolidation of fragmented farms into more economic units should be encouraged by all appropriate means.

3. In granting economic development assistance, particular consideration should be given to the encouragement of agricultural extension through demonstration projects and their use as training centers.

4. Aid should be given to governmental efforts in improving rural credit and marketing facilities; in increasing agricultural water resources; and in soil conservation and reforestation.

5. Assistance programs should include encouragement of studies relating to agrarian reform, farm management, village industries, and other aspects of rural welfare.

6. Aid funds should not be used for direct compensation to landowners for expropriated land.

7. Our informational activities should include descriptive contrasts between the commendable type of land reform which is being undertaken with due regard to property rights, and those types which have deluded the rural people of Soviet-dominated areas.

XI. LABOR PROBLEMS, WITH REFERENCE TO UNITED STATES POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

A. Conclusions

1. The Conference concluded that labor is of major and increasing political importance in most of the countries of South Asia. The worldwide cleavage between the free world and the communist world
has its counterpart in India, Ceylon, and Pakistan, where both the World Federation of Trade Unions and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions are represented by powerful adherents. In many of these countries, trade unions are closely tied to political parties, giving them their main if not their only mass basis of support.

2. The Conference reviewed with satisfaction the progress made by the ICFTU during the past year, and was particularly impressed by the fact that, unlike previous international trade union movements, the ICFTU had deliberately and effectively sought to gain the support of trade unions in the South Asian area, notably in the decision of the ICFTU to establish an Asian Labor College in Ceylon, and by the establishment of a regional office in Singapore. In these developments, the role of American labor both within and without the ICFTU has been of the highest importance.

3. Despite the recommendations of the Foreign Service Conference in New Delhi in 1949 that the United States Government facilitate the exchange of labor leaders and specialists, and provide technical assistance in trade union organizations and workers’ education, and despite the obvious importance of labor in South Asia, the total impact of the United States Government in this field has been only a slight one. The conferees concluded that the recommendations made at New Delhi were in general still valid and should be implemented.

B. Recommendations

1. The exchange-of-persons program should be stepped up in the labor field. In execution of the program, there should be a departure from traditional procedures which will take into account the political realities of the labor movement in South Asia, the need for special handling of trade union leaders, and the special knowledge of the labor attaché.

2. There should be frequent meetings, on a country or regional basis, of Foreign Service personnel engaged in labor activities.

3. All Foreign Service personnel should be indoctrinated on the delicacy of their relations with the ICFTU and the American federations. While there should be close cooperation between our missions and these organizations, the freedom of action of the latter should be carefully preserved and any impression that they are under the tuteledge of the United States government should be avoided.

4. A program should also be developed which would be directed at both native and American management, in order to develop better labor relations. In particular, the labor practices and attitudes of Western corporations are a matter of significance.

5. In addition to urging the American labor federations to assign personnel to the area on a more or less permanent basis, it is urged
that the AFL and the CIO send high-ranking officials on brief tours of perhaps one or two months, particularly to India. However, care should be taken to avoid conflict or competition with ICFTU activities in South Asia.

6. The United States labor information program should be expanded, although a typical American propaganda program would be inappropriate in the labor field because of the political and ideological tensions which exist in South Asia. The substance and development of a labor information program should be made the joint responsibility of the labor attachés, or labor reporting officers where no labor attachés exist, and the appropriate USIE officers.

7. Full consideration should be given to labor and social problems in the execution of economic and technical assistance programs.

XII. INFORMATION AND EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS

A. Conclusions

1. The task of the USIE is to advance the foreign policy of the United States, giving particular attention to the psychological impact of a given policy on the government and the people of the area concerned, both in the presentation and the implementation of such policy.

2. The immediate primary objective of the program in South Asia is to orient the governments and people of the area toward the United States and the free world and away from the Soviet Union and international communism.

3. More specifically, our objectives should be:

   (a) To develop confidence among the leaders and people of the area in our motives and intentions;
   (b) To demonstrate the importance and effectiveness of democratic values and methods in the achievement of the social, economic, and cultural goals desired by the people of the area;
   (c) To create a genuine understanding among the people of the area that communist imperialism and materialism constitute a serious menace to the achievement of their own aims.

4. The advantages of maintaining the information and educational program in the Department of State outweigh the advantages that may be expected from placing the program in a separate agency, in view of the difficulties of maintaining adequate departmental coordination and of the need for the United States Government to speak with one voice in foreign countries.

*General documentation on this subject is scheduled for publication in volume 1.
B. Recommendations

1. In the light of present world conditions, acceleration of the activities and tempo of the USIE program is of high importance to the successful conduct of United States foreign policy in South Asia.

2. While emphasis placed upon target groups varies from country to country in South Asia, in general the primary groups whom we should try to reach are the policy-makers and opinion-molders. The literate public and the masses in the cities and in the villages, although of lesser priority, should be reached to the degree feasible.

3. In developing our informational approach, the USIE should stress the mutual interests of South Asian countries and the United States in the following:

(a) Maintenance of national freedom;
(b) Maintenance of characteristic indigenous cultures;
(c) Maintenance of peace, security, and freedom from external aggression;
(d) The development of social and economic progress;
(e) The development of democracy.

4. American economic programs such as Point Four aid and food-grain relief should be skillfully exploited by USIE to convince South Asians of the interest of the United States in the welfare of the people of this area.

5. The USIE program should be strengthened by a close coordination between USIE staffs and other American officials engaged in the implementation of foreign policy, particularly in such fields as labor, agriculture, Point Four, economic assistance, and social welfare.

6. The success of the program requires greater collaboration by USIE staffs with indigenous groups and individuals who can assist in the campaign of truth. This is particularly true in the present situation because public opinion and basic attitudes make difficult the carrying out of effective propaganda by Americans alone.

7. Greater emphasis should be given to production and adaptation of information materials in the field to insure their local appeal.

8. Effective propaganda in the South Asian area requires diverse types of products, some of which should be directed toward sophisticated individuals and others, in very simple and graphic form, should be aimed at persons of lesser understanding. Appropriate use of emotional appeals should be made.

9. USIE products should avoid ostentation, a patronizing tone, boastfulness, and undue emphasis on material prosperity which creates envy.
10. In developing the campaign of truth in South Asia, full consideration should be given by the Bombay USIE Conference to elaboration of practical programs such as:

(a) More effective utilization of local personnel to broaden contacts with indigenous groups;
(b) The increased use of local writers and artists, particularly in the production of pamphlets, posters, radio, and films, to make a better appeal to the local population;
(c) A greatly stepped-up use of mobile film units and distribution of films and other materials through other channels, including central and local governments and the military;
(d) The rapid establishment of branch information centers, especially in India and Pakistan;
(e) A rapid extension of library book circulation by mail, and the increased use of mobile libraries.

11. The USIE Conference at Bombay should explore the desirability of a regional production center in South Asia; alternative ways of handling local production and its coordination with the Department; and the relation of the South Asian needs to the Manila production center.

12. Efforts should be made by the Department to secure the rights to republish in English appropriate American books for sale or distribution in South Asia.

13. Specially tailored Voice of America radio programs in English, Hindi, Urdu, the Dravidian languages, and Bengali should be inaugurated at the earliest possible moment for South Asia, utilizing the Ceylon relay.

14. The educational exchange program should be carefully coordinated by the Public Affairs Officers with the informational program. An increase in the leader-specialist type of program can contribute greatly to short-run USIE objectives.

15. An increased flow of information to the American public concerning the peoples and culture of the South Asian countries should be stimulated.

16. The recommendations embodied in other sections of the Conference report which relate to informational and cultural problems should be related to the foregoing and implemented as suggested.

XIII. ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS

[Here follows a brief series of recommendations on administrative matters.]
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John Frick Root, Second Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom


MEMORANDUM OF INFORMAL US–UK DISCUSSIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE VISIT TO LONDON OF THE HONORABLE GEORGE C. MCGHEE

TUESDAY AFTERNOON, APRIL 3, 1951

Topic for Discussion: South Asia

Participants:

Foreign Office
R. H. Scott, Assistant Under-Secretary of State
J. D. Murray, Head, South-East Asia Department

Commonwealth Relations Office
N. Pritchard, Assistant Under-Secretary of State

USA
George C. McGhee, Department of State
John Frick Root

Pakistan Contribution to Near East Defense

In a discussion of how Pakistan’s support in the defense of the Near East could be obtained, Mr. McGhee said that it had occurred to him that it might be possible for the US and UK to satisfy Pakistan’s apprehensions about India by giving an assurance that we would not recognize a fait accompli in Kashmir brought about by the unilateral action of India. Mr. McGhee said that he believed it unlikely that India would actually invade Pakistan and that Pakistan’s real fear was that India would take advantage of any international turmoil to fasten its grip on Kashmir. For this reason, Pakistan felt that it had to keep the bulk of its armed forces available as protection against such eventuality. We might be able to obtain Pakistan support in the Near East with some such assurance and we must remember that the contribution Pakistan could make was probably the only hope of holding the area. Both Mr. McGhee and Mr. Scott recognized that India would be unwilling to make any contribution to Near East defense, Mr. McGhee observing that Delhi was inclined to put the US down as imperialists in the Near East in pursuit of oil.

* Mr. McGhee met in London with British Government officials on April 2 and 3. The subjects of discussion other than those covered by this memorandum included Iran, Arab Refugees, Near East Defense, and “Egypt, Libya, and Neutralism in the Near East.” The memoranda of these conversations were enclosures to despatch No. 4882, April 10, from London (788.00/4-1051).
Mr. Scott said he agreed entirely on the role that we should try to get Pakistan to play in the Near East. He thought any assurances to Pakistan, however, should not be directed too obviously against India. Perhaps they might be provided under some sort of blanket assurance to countries of the Near East generally. It might be wise to go to both India and Pakistan and ask them what help they might be able to provide toward the problem of Near East defense. The Indians could of course be expected to turn down any suggestion that they should participate. It might then be possible to arrange for some regional association in which Pakistan would enter and which would provide the satisfaction with respect to any threat from India which it might desire. Mr. McGhee said that it seemed clear that Pakistan was anxious to play a leading part in the Near East, doubtless in part at least in order to ensure the support of the Moslem world for Pakistan in its difficulties with India. Furthermore, he thought that public opinion in Pakistan would almost demand some sort of intervention in the event of a Russian invasion of Iran. Mr. Scott said that the suggestion for an assurance to Pakistan made by Mr. McGhee was well worth exploring in view of the vital importance of obtaining its association in Near Eastern defense.

Neutralism

Mr. McGhee said that he had given particular attention to the problem of neutralism in the Near East and South Asian countries he had visited. We were increasingly concerned about the position Nehru had been taking and were interested in learning what substance there was to the support he had obtained from the Near East and Asian countries. Mr. McGhee said that as a result of his conversations with Government leaders in the countries he had visited he was convinced that Nehru was not expressing a consensus of opinion but rather represented an extreme point of view and that among other countries there was no philosophical attachment to a neutralist policy. He thought Government leaders in most of the area were quite realistic about the struggle between communism and the free world and only held back from taking a more open stand because they were conscious of the internal weaknesses and insecurity of their countries. Mr. McGhee said that he had a talk in Cairo on this subject with Sir Esler Dening and that Sir Esler had been convinced that the countries of South East Asia were not under Nehru’s influence and were only lying low in the East-West struggle until they were able to build up their own internal strength. Sir Esler believed that Nehru would end up isolated. Mr. McGhee said that it appeared to him that Nehru was the

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*Sir Maberly Esler Dening of the United Kingdom Foreign Office, appointed to special duties in the Far East with the rank of Ambassador.*
only one putting out neutralism as a philosophy. He was unrealistically obstinate in refusing to recognize that we were in the midst of a power struggle, in which India was helpless without food, petroleum and the other vital supplies it could only obtain from outside its borders.

Mr. Scott and Mr. Pritchard commented on the characteristic interest of the Indians in political to the neglect of economic issues and thought that Nehru's position was an outward expression of something deep within the Hindu character. He was rationalizing the negativism and passivism which found its roots in Hindu emotion and philosophy. It was noted, moreover, that Nehru was probably misled by the reports he got from his representatives abroad, who fed his ego and encouraged him to believe that he was the only one sincerely working for peace.

Pakistan Conspiracy

When asked what he thought was the explanation for the recent conspiracy in Pakistan, Mr. McGhee said that it probably lay largely in the personality of Gen. Akbar Khan, whose ego had been played upon. Mr. Scott said he had wondered whether disorders in such parts of the Moslem world as Morocco, Iran, Pakistan and Indonesia, might not have some links with international communism. Mr. McGhee felt there was no evidence that troubles in these areas resulted from some master plan. In Iran, for example, the recent crisis seemed to have sprung mainly from the internal situation. Communist or Communist sympathizers were no doubt to some extent involved in Pakistan.

Afghan-Pakistani Dispute

Mr. McGhee then described conversations he had had in Karachi in an effort to obtain Pakistan's acceptance of the US proposals for joint Afghan-Pak talks. He had assured Pakistan that we would try to prevent the Afghans from attempting to derive any advantage from the fact that discussions were to take place. He had reiterated to the Pakistanis our position on the Durand Line and the reasons why we felt we could not amplify it at this time and he believed that Liaquat saw the logic of our position. In fact there seemed to be little margin any longer for Pakistani objection to proceeding on the basis of our proposals. Liaquat seemed to be ready to call off propaganda, to exchange Ambassadors and to talk with the new Afghan Ambassador about any subject he wished save Pushtoonistan. Mr. McGhee

*The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, had on March 9 announced the discovery of a "conspiracy hatched by the enemies of Pakistan." Among those arrested as leaders of the conspiracy was Maj. Gen. Akbar Khan, Chief of the General Staff. The text of the Prime Minister's statement is printed in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 11336.
thought it might be possible to work out some basis for agreement under which Ambassadors would be exchanged with talks to follow say some two months thereafter. Pakistan has now asked for an extension to April 15 for giving its reply to our offer and he was encouraged to believe that some arrangements on the basis of our proposals would be possible.

Colombo Plan

Mr. McGhee explained the US position on giving aid to Asian countries and the relationship of this position to the Colombo Plan. He said that we were willing to continue our membership on the Consultative Committee. The British said they found nothing in our position incompatible with the British concept of the Colombo Plan. Mr. Scott emphasized, however, the British desire to keep aid within some regional framework so that economic development in the area would be seen as a cooperative enterprise. The virtue of the Colombo scheme was that it was designed to focus attention on economic and social problems.

Kashmir

With regard to Kashmir the desirability of standing by the Security Council resolution was recognized. The British mentioned that US–UK efforts to find a representative under the terms of the resolution and said that they understood consideration was now being given to Dr. Frank Graham as a candidate for the position.

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S/S Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 98 Series

Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 10, 1951.

Subject: First Progress Report on NSC 98/1, “The Position of the United States With Respect to South Asia.”

NSC 98/1 was approved as Governmental policy on January 25, 1951. It is requested that this Progress Report as of April 25, 1951, be circulated to the members of the Council for their information.

Representatives of the Department of State and the Embassy in London discussed United States and United Kingdom objectives and policies with respect to South Asia with officials of the British Foreign Office and Commonwealth Relations Office on February 6–10, 1951. The United States spokesman based their presentation on NSC

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1 This progress report was noted by the National Security Council in NSC Action No. 483, taken at its 92nd meeting on May 23 (S/S Files, Lot 62D1, NSC Actions).
98/1. These talks disclosed general agreement between the two govern-
ments on broad objectives in South Asia, and led to closer coordina-
tion of policy with respect to such matters as the Kashmir dispute, the Afghan-Pakistan dispute and the supply of military materiel to the South Asian countries.

The United States Government participated as a full member in the meeting of the Consultative Committee for Economic Develop-
ment in South and Southeast Asia held at Colombo, Ceylon, from February 12 to 20, 1951. This meeting provided an excellent forum for making known the sympathetic interest of the United States in economic development in South Asia, although no commitments as to the nature or extent of possible United States assistance were given.

From January 25 to April 25 the number of USIE personnel, United States and local, in South Asia increased from about 360 to some 450. Priority in the USIE program has been given to India and Pakistan, personnel in India on March 31 being 344 and in Paki-
stan, 80. The total USIE program for South Asia is being reviewed in order to increase its effectiveness in reaching key target groups.

On February 12, 1951, the President recommended to the Congress that it authorize a grant of two million tons of food grains to India to assist that country to meet a food crisis arising from an extraor-
dinary series of droughts, floods and other natural disasters which had seriously reduced domestic food production. Representatives of the Department of State, the Department of Agriculture and the Eco-
nomic Cooperation Administration strongly supported this proposal in hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Feb-
uary 21 and 22, and before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in executive session on April 16–18. A rule for a House bill authorizing a loan to India for the purchase of two million tons of grain was issued by the Rules Committee on April 25. A Senate bill authorizing the supply of two million tons of grain, one-half as a grant and one-
half on credit terms, was approved by the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee on April 20. Further Congressional action was pending on April 25.

On March 16 the Indian Government entered into an agreement, embodied in an exchange of notes, under Section 408(E) of the Mu-
tual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, thus becoming eligi-
gle for military procurement assistance on a reimbursable basis. The Government of Pakistan had entered into a similar agreement on December 15, 1950. In addition to testing samples made available to both countries, Pakistan has received 70 medium tanks with two years maintenance spares, and India spare parts for light tanks under these agreements. Both countries have purchased other types of military equipment in open market, including such items as remanufactured
training aircraft. Negotiations with respect to additional matériel for both countries were in progress on April 25.

On April 19, as a consequence of representations by the United States Ambassador in New Delhi, the Government of India prohibited the export of tires and tubes. Although the ban was imposed on all destinations, its principal intent was to stop the flow of tires and tubes to Communist China.

With respect to the dispute between India and Pakistan over the future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the President on February 16, 1951, assured the Prime Minister of Pakistan that the United States Government would endeavor to provide a United States citizen to represent the United Nations in the next phase of the United Nations effort to settle the dispute. On February 21 the United States and the United Kingdom jointly introduced in the United Nations Security Council a resolution providing for the appointment of a United Nations Representative charged with effecting the demilitarization of the disputed state and preparing the way for a plebiscite to determine whether the people of Kashmir wished to be affiliated with India or Pakistan. The resolution further provided that matters on which the United Nations Representative was unable to achieve agreement between the parties should be referred to arbitration. This resolution, with minor amendments, was adopted by the Security Council on March 21 [30]. The Government of India indicated that the resolution was unacceptable to it. The Government of Pakistan accepted the resolution. Dr. Frank Porter Graham has agreed, with the President's approval, to serve as the United Nations Representative provided for in the resolution and it is anticipated that he will be so designated by the Security Council on April 30.

On February 25, 1951, the Governments of India and Pakistan signed a trade agreement valid until June 30, 1952. This agreement ended a trade impasse which had existed from September 1949 when India devalued its rupee and Pakistan did not. The United States Government had no part in the negotiation of the agreement, but the Department of State had in the immediately preceding months repeatedly urged both the Indians and the Pakistanis to find some formula which would permit a resumption of trade between their complementary economies.

During the period under review the Department of State continued its efforts to persuade the Pakistan Government to accept the United States proposal of November 6, 1950, made to Afghanistan and Pakistan, for the resumption of more normal relations and, thereafter a conference between the two governments. The Afghan Government had informally indicated its willingness to accept this proposal shortly after it was put forward. The Pakistan Government on
April 14 stated that it was prepared to accept those portions of the United States proposal looking toward the resumption of more normal relations, but that before agreeing to participate in a conference, it wished to have the utility of such a conference explored through bilateral diplomatic channels. In the meantime and without apparent reference to the United States proposal, the two governments had in mid-April embarked on informal, exploratory talks at the official level. On April 23 the Secretary of State informed the Afghan Prime Minister,² in this country on an unofficial visit, of the substance of the Pakistan reply to the United States proposal. Efforts to bring the two governments together were still in progress on April 25.

There were no developments to April 25, 1951 which require a revision of the policies approved in NSC 98/1 on January 25.

H. Freeman Matthews

² Shah Mahmud Khan.

S/S Files: Lot 68D851: NSC 98 Series

Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 13, 1951.

Subject: Second Progress Report on NSC 98/1, “The Position of the United States with Respect to South Asia.”¹

NSC 98/1 was approved as Governmental policy on January 25, 1951. It is requested that this progress report as of November 2, 1951 be circulated to the members of the Council for their information.

On June 15 the President signed the Emergency Food Aid Act ² providing a loan to India of $190,000,000 for the purchase of food grains in the US. By November 2 approximately 97 vessels, carrying some 845,500 tons of grain purchased under the loan had left US ports for India. In mid-July a representative of ECA joined the Embassy staff in New Delhi to observe grain distribution and to implement provisions of the Act. While it is too early to evaluate accurately the full effect of the grain loan, it is evident that it has averted famine in India; and there is good reason to believe it is contributing to economic stability, and indirectly to political stability. When the Emergency Food Aid Act was passed the Government of India announced restoration of a substantial cut in grain rations. There is reason to believe the grain loan has increased good will toward the US in India.

¹ The National Security Council, in NSC Action No. 584, noted this progress report at its 107th meeting on November 28 (S/S Files, Lot 62 D 1, NSC Actions).
With reference to the strategic materials clause of the Food Aid Act, it should be noted that in June and early July a special mission headed by Ambassador Pawley visited India to discuss with high Indian officials the question of increased shipments of strategic minerals—particularly beryl, manganese, mica, and kyanite—and initial shipments, heretofore prohibited, of monazite. In September a Government of India representative visited Washington to continue negotiations. A contract has now been drawn up to cover shipment from India of 500 tons of monazite concentrate. During the period under review, India has informed the US that it does not intend to ship strategic or military items to China.

Dr. Frank Graham, UN Representative appointed under the Security Council’s Resolution of March 30, 1951, presented his report to the Security Council on October 18 after two and a half months in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent where he endeavored to effect demilitarization of Kashmir on the basis of agreements reached between India and Pakistan incorporated in the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan Resolution of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949. While Dr. Graham has not succeeded in effecting demilitarization, the US Representative on the Security Council has been instructed to support a Resolution continuing Dr. Graham’s mediatory efforts. If an equitable solution is not found during the next few months, incidents leading to general hostilities between India and Pakistan, and widespread communal warfare, may well occur. Resulting chaos could in effect deny South Asia and its resources to the free world and, by opening the way to possible Communist control of the subcontinent, threaten a crisis of greater proportions in relation to US national security than the current crises in Egypt and Iran.

Greatly increased tension in India and Pakistan—growing out of delay in the settlement of the Kashmir dispute and the plan of the Kashmir National Conference to hold elections to a so-called constituent assembly to decide the future affiliation of the state, and culminating in the forward movement of Indian and Pakistan troops to their common borders—impelled the Department of State on July 25 to instruct our Ambassadors in New Delhi and Karachi to express grave concern to both governments. Informal approaches were made in Karachi and New Delhi on July 26. Following a hull in September, there are signs that tension may again increase—principally over the Kashmir dispute. The assassination of the Prime

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8 William D. Pawley, Consultant to the Secretary of State; formerly Ambassador to Peru (June 1945–April 1946) and Ambassador to Brazil (April 1946–March 1948).
5 U.N. document S/396.
Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, on October 16 represented a blow to stability in the subcontinent. While Liaquat Ali’s successor, Khwaja Nazimuddin, is expected to follow Liaquat Ali’s policies of moderation, it remains to be seen whether he will be able to control indefinitely popular feeling in Pakistan against India’s actions in Kashmir.

On July 17 the National Security Council formally excepted India from the provisions of the Kem Amendment. This permitted continuation of the operation of the loan agreement with India as well as Point IV agreements. Nepal executed the required certification under the amendment. Pakistan was formally excepted from the provisions of the Kem Amendment on September 19. No formal action was taken regarding an exception for Ceylon under the Kem Amendment. The fact that Ceylon shipped rubber to Communist China October 2 raises a question as to whether Ceylon may be granted an exception under the Battle Act.

During the period since April 25 the number of US Information and Educational Program (USIE) personnel in South Asia or enroute to this area has increased from 63 US and 462 local employees to 87 US and 520 local employees. The total USIE program for South Asia is now under review. Owing to Congressional cuts in funds requested, expansion of the program will not reach the level contemplated by the Department.

South Asia is included under Title III of the Mutual Security Program enacted into law on October 8. Funds which may be made available for this program will be devoted to economic development and technical assistance projects. On November 1 it was announced that programs in India and Pakistan would be directed by Technical Cooperation Administration in the Department of State. No military financial aid is provided for or contemplated at this time, but procurement assistance on a reimbursable basis is available to India and Pakistan under Section 408(e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended.

Late in October the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan were informed that the US was discontinuing its efforts to bring about acceptance by these two governments of its informal proposal of November 6, 1950 for the resumption of more cooperative relations.

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7 The Kem Amendment, Section 1302 of P.L. 45, Third Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1951, approved June 2, 1951 (65 Stat. 52), so-named after Senator James P. Kem of Missouri, provided for a ban on economic assistance to countries exporting strategic materials to Communist-bloc countries.

8 The Kem Amendment was superseded by the Battle Act (The Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, P.L. 213, 82d Cong., approved October 26, 1951, 65 Stat. 644), so-named after Representative Laurie C. Battle of Alabama, which likewise provided for the suspension of economic aid to nations supplying specified strategic commodities to the Soviet bloc. Rubber was one commodity included in Title II of that Act.
between the two countries. The Department will continue informally to encourage bilateral negotiations but, for the present, does not contemplate making further proposals. Until such time as the Afghan Government decides to discontinue its anti-Pakistan agitation over the status of the Pakistan tribal areas, it is not likely that substantial progress will be made.

During the period under review the Point IV program for South Asia, which is administered on a country rather than a regional basis, has been accelerated. Thirteen US technicians are now in India; 7 are about to leave for that country; and 44 awards have been granted to Indians for training in the US. There are 6 US experts in Pakistan and 4 scheduled to leave soon, while 90 awards have been granted to Pakistanis to train in the US. Three US experts have arrived in Afghanistan and 5 Afghan trainees have been selected to come to the US. Five Ceylonese were awarded training grants in FY 1951, but further US technical assistance to Ceylon has been suspended pending a decision as to Ceylon’s status vis-à-vis the Battle Act.

There were no developments to November 2, 1951 which required a revision of the policies approved in NSC 98/1.

H. Freeman Matthews
EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE DISPUTE BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN OVER KASHMIR

Editorial Note

Proposals for a new effort by the United Nations Security Council to resolve the Kashmir dispute under the joint sponsorship of the United Kingdom and the United States had been under informal discussion in London and Washington since the fall of 1950. An impetus to these discussions was the report to the Security Council on September 15, 1950, by Sir Owen Dixon of Australia, United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, that no agreement had been reached between India and Pakistan for the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir or on other preparations for the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite, and requesting the formal termination of his position (U.N. document S/1791).

Sir Owen had been appointed U.N. Representative by the Security Council on April 12, 1950, in accordance with a resolution of March 14, 1950 (S/1461). This resolution took note of the following earlier United Nations efforts to resolve the Kashmir dispute:

(a) The Security Council Resolutions of January 20, 1948 (S/654) and April 21, 1948 (S/726), which established the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), of which the United States was a member.

(b) The UNCIP Resolutions of August 13, 1948 (S/995), and January 5, 1949 (S/1196), both endorsed by the Security Council. The former resolution provided inter alia for a cease-fire, a truce agreement, and an unfettered plebiscite. The latter resolution set down the conditions and basic principles of the proposed plebiscite.

(c) The nomination by the U.N. Secretary General on March 21, 1949 of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, U.S.N., as Plebiscite Administrator for Kashmir in accordance with the UNCIP Resolution of January 5, 1949. As of early 1951 Admiral Nimitz had not taken up his functions, pending agreement between India and Pakistan with respect to conditions for demilitarization and a plebiscite.

(d) The efforts of General A.G.L. McNaughton of Canada, President of the Security Council for December 1949, who negotiated informally with representatives of India and Pakistan. His final report to the Council (S/1453, February 3, 1950), which included a plan for demilitarization, was accepted by Pakistan but rejected by India (S/PV. 463–466, February 7–10, 1950).

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

London, January 2, 1951—7 p.m.

3701. According Olver,¹ UK's latest message from Karachi, sent yesterday, reports Liaquat ² still refuses depart from [for] Commonwealth conference ³ without assurance Kashmir will be discussed by Prime Ministers. UK's proposal to Liaquat referred to in Embtel 3558, December 20 ⁴ was that, while there could be no question placing Kashmir on formal agenda, UK would do what it could persuade other Prime Ministers agree consider Kashmir as a group in informal discussions and hoped on basis UK promise its efforts to this end Liaquat would agree attend conference. Purport Karachi's latest message, however, is that Liaquat will not come London until he knows other Prime Ministers have agreed have Kashmir discussed.

Outcome this contretemps must therefore await UK's approach to other Prime Ministers, last of whom should be here by tomorrow latest. According Olver, Menzies ⁵ already sold on Kashmir discussions and Olver thinks Holland ⁶ will follow his lead. Olver also confident Canada will agree to discussions if others do, but indicated Canadian answer still unknown. Big question mark is Nehru,⁷ now en route London.

Olver said Nehru's response original UK proposal for India-Pakistan talks with UK in mediatary role was favorable (Embtl 3558, December 20) and UK has had message similar Delhi's 1593, January 1 ⁸ reporting Nehru willing talk privately London re Kashmir. Olver says this does not, however, appear answer question whether Nehru will be willing have issue placed before Prime Ministers as informal round-table. Press here has made big play over Liaquat's alleged insistence that Kashmir be placed on agenda, but, according Olver, this immaterial since UK sure Liaquat will be satisfied with round-table consideration outside agenda. Olver also says it is probably unimportant whether Ceylon and South Africa take part in discussions.

Olver thinks that Liaquat genuinely believes if he attended Com-

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¹ S. J. L. Olver, Officer for India, Pakistan, French and Portuguese India, and Ceylon in the South-East Asia Department of the British Foreign Office.
² Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan.
³ The Conference of British Commonwealth Prime Ministers was to open in London on January 4 under the chairmanship of the British Prime Minister, Clement R. Attlee.
⁵ Robert Gordon Menzies, Australian Prime Minister.
⁶ Sidney George Holland, Prime Minister of New Zealand.
⁷ Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations.
⁸ Not printed.
monwealth conference and came back empty-handed on Kashmir question his government would probably fall. UK and CRO disturbed by mounting opposition to Liaquat in Pakistan. Olver personally thinks that if Liaquat does not attend Commonwealth conference, then early action on Kashmir in UN will become necessary.

Virtually all articles in wide press coverage here on Commonwealth conference play up India-Pakistan rift over Kashmir and shadow it threatens throw over Commonwealth meeting.

Comment: Foreign Office has recently revealed growing UK anxiety over Pakistan domestic situation which appears contrast appreciably with previous assessment reported Embtel 3558. We think increased UK concern probably results largely from somber tone most recent reports from UK HC Karachi describing worsening situation and from obvious implications in Liaquat's adamant stand on consideration Kashmir by Commonwealth conference. At time Foreign Office commented on Department's proposals for SC action, it would probably not have denied seriousness Pakistan situation, but hopes which UK had then just invested in major decision mediate India-Pakistan talks time Commonwealth meeting led it to fear lest SC or any other action undermine this effort and by same token Foreign Office probably read most favorable meanings into developments then occurring in Pakistan. Latest events have unquestionably had sobering effect.

Repeated information Karachi 41, Delhi 98.

Gifford

* On this point telegram 3558, from London, reported that the British Foreign Office and Office of Commonwealth Relations did not consider public unrest in Pakistan to be in any sense at the point of crisis. They discounted talk of holy war, and speculated that the leaders of Pakistan might be stimulating agitation in order to gain a better bargaining position in negotiations.

* Sir Laurence Graffey-Smith, United Kingdom High Commissioner in Pakistan.

* See the editorial note, supra.

690D.91/1-551

Memorandum by Mr. Howard Meyers¹ to the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Bancroft)

CONFIDENTIAL


Subject: Kashmir Dispute: Possible UK-US Courses of Action.

I discussed the present status of the Kashmir question at some length with Frank Collins, SOA, with particular attention to what we might do if Prime Minister Liaquat of Pakistan does not attend the Common-

wealth Prime Ministers Conference in London. We agreed tentatively on the following points:

1. We should do nothing for the next few days, while awaiting a final decision by Liaquat whether to attend the Commonwealth Conference. We should not urge the UK to place the Kashmir issue on the formal agenda of the Conference, since it is obvious from the most recent telegrams that the British are doing everything in their power to have an informal round-table discussion of the dispute by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, without placing the Kashmir issue on the formal agenda. London’s 3701, January 2, said the Foreign Office believes the Prime Ministers of Australia, New Zealand and Canada \(^2\) will agree to this procedure; that Canada’s answer is still unknown; that it remains to be seen whether Nehru will concur. The Foreign Office believes this informal round-table meeting will satisfy Liaquat.

2. If Liaquat does not attend the Conference and the GOP presses the US for an early SC meeting, we should suggest to the GOP that it is highly advisable to have UK support for any SC action; that the UK has indicated its desire to await the end of the Commonwealth Conference; that the US is willing to have an SC meeting at any time. Therefore, we should suggest that it is advisable that Pakistan settle this particular problem with the UK, indicating that we will reiterate to the British our interest in an early SC meeting.

3. Both Frank Collins and I believe that to do more than this will involve the US taking the initiative in the Kashmir dispute, contrary to our agreement that the British should assume and maintain this initiative. We do not believe that our assumption of initiative is indicated by the present situation. Liaquat’s intransigence appears initially, at least, to have strengthened his position at home and that of his government. If the present Western-oriented government of Pakistan should be threatened with dismissal from power because of SC failure to consider the Kashmir question and to advance somewhat toward a reasonable solution, then we think the Department should review the situation to decide whether the US should assume the initiative from the UK in attempting to aid the parties to reach a solution. The Pakistan desk in SOA has recommended that the US in fact assume this initiative, but I do not believe that Bert Mathews \(^3\) favors this proposal.

4. As soon as possible, most probably when we know the outcome of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in regard to Kashmir, we should try to obtain UK agreement on the draft UKDel-US resolution \(^4\) which Robert Fowler \(^5\) telegraphed London on

\(^2\) Louis Stephen St. Laurent, Canadian Prime Minister.

\(^3\) Elbert G. Mathews, Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs.

\(^4\) A copy of this draft U.K.-U.S. Security Council resolution on Kashmir was contained in telegram 573 to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations, December 8, 1950, not printed (357.AB/12-850). A later version of the draft resolution (Security Council document S/2017) was submitted by U.K. and U.S. representatives at the 532nd meeting of the Council on February 21 and was discussed through March 9 (S/PV. 532-533). On March 21, a revised joint draft resolution (S/2017/Rev. 1; see text, p. 1758) was introduced and adopted on March 30 (S/PV. 537-539).

\(^5\) Robert Fowler, member of the U.K. Delegation at the United Nations.
December 9. We still do not know the specific British objections to this draft but believe the only important one was that there should be two resolutions, one dealing with the action of the Kashmir National Conference, and that the UK did not wish to sponsor this resolution for fear of Indian ire. If the UK still refuses to sponsor or co-sponsor a resolution of this nature, we should attempt to secure other co-sponsorship in the SC with the US as one of the sponsors. The UK, presumably, will still co-sponsor a resolution appointing a special representative to interpret the parties commitments and report what has been done in implementation of these commitments. Both Frank and I believe that it is important that the SC go on record as refusing to accept any blatant unilateral attempt to settle the Kashmir dispute, such as the action of the Indian-controlled Kashmir National Conference. We have had some indication recently from New Delhi that the Indians might back down somewhat in regard to this action, if a strong stand is taken by the UN.

The above conclusions represent our working-level ideas only, and are being submitted to you and to Bert Mathews for your comments.

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8 On October 27, 1950 the General Council of the All-Jammu and Kashmir National Conference adopted a resolution recommending that a Constituent Assembly be convened to determine the “future shape and affiliations of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.” The area from which this Constituent Assembly was to be elected was only a part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In a letter of December 14, 1950 (5/1952) addressed to the President of the U.N. Security Council, Sir Mohammed Zafrulla Khan, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations of Pakistan called attention to Indian press reports that Prime Minister Nehru had welcomed the proposed Constituent Assembly and had declared that it would “ratify the formal accession of the State to India.” Further press reports indicated that a formal proclamation to hold elections was about to be promulgated by the government of Maharaja Hari Singh. Zafrulla charged that this move sought to nullify the international agreement between India and Pakistan embodied in the UNCIP Resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949. He called for urgent consideration of the Kashmir question by the Security Council and requested the Council to call upon India to refrain from proceeding with the proposed Constituent Assembly and from taking any other action which might prejudice the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite.

337.AB/1-551: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, January 5, 1951—7 p.m.

3285. Advise FonOff immed fol Dept views re Kashmir.

(1) In event Liaquat fails respond further Attlee appeal to attend Commonwealth PriMins mtg, as appears likely (Embtel 3471 [3/5/51] Jan 4), we believe prompt action SC essential and that best approach lies in UK-DeL-US draft res. We note that Pak internal pressures (Deptel 3168 Dec 27) continue and although Liaquat position temporarily strengthened by stand re Commonwealth meeting we believe

\[1\] Not printed.

that unless prompt action by SC is taken opposition groups will gain further momentum making position present Govt precarious.

(2) We consider it most highly advisable UK and US both sponsor res re Kashmir Nat'l Conference action and appointment SC special Rep, in order to give full force and effect to such res and advance toward solution of this dispute. We reiterate our belief single res preferable, as outlined Deptel 3077 to London, Dec 15, and strongly urge UK join US in sponsoring such single res. We believe joint UK-US sponsorship wld counteract mounting anti UK-US feeling in Pak.

(3) Although we have continued to press UK for their views, we still do not know specific UK objections draft UKDel-US res. We wish details of possible UK objections so that we may reach agreement and be ready for immed SC MTG. What is earliest date UK envisages SC mtg re Kashmir?

ACHESON

*Not printed.*

357.AB/1-651: Telegram

_The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State_

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY LONDON, January 6, 1951—2 p. m.

3776. Embassy officer this a. m. discussed Kashmir with Murray and Lloyd, SEA Department, in accordance Deptel 3285 January 5. Murray noted Department's views premised on Liaquat's failure attend Commonwealth Prime Minister meeting and confirmed this a. m.'s press reports that Liaquat has agreed attend conference and will depart Karachi by plane this evening. We expressed pleasure at this news and hope that during course conference it would prove possible arrive some solution this problem. We went on to say, however, that we were sure His Majesty's Government would agree that in event it were not possible reach understanding here, disappointment in Pakistan would be sharply intensified and Liaquat's position made increasingly difficult. Under these circumstances we thought that we should still prepare urgently for SC action in event failure here in order provide quick alternative action to absorb shock in Pakistan.

Murray agreed completely with foregoing. While he was not in position give us detailed answer to point 2, Department reftel at this time, he said His Majesty's Government would consider matter urgently and indicated reply might depend largely on way matter progressed here.

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1 J. D. Murray, Head of the South-East Asia Department, British Foreign Office.
2 J. O. Lloyd, Assistant, South-East Asia Department, British Foreign Office.
Meanwhile, he would keep us currently informed of developments this question when considered by Prime Ministers.

Re paragraph 3, Department reftel, he confirmed His Majesty’s Government’s objections to US–UK draft resolution had been basically those reported paragraph 2, Embtel 3509 December 18. While first (i.e. desire not sponsor resolution containing implied condemnation India before opening Prime Minister’s meeting) no longer applicable, nevertheless His Majesty’s Government has continued attach importance second (i.e. that it would be better separate two issues since implied condemnation India might prejudice GOI’s acceptance eminent jurist provision).

Following additional points in response Embassy Officer’s questions made by Murray:

1. Prime Ministers will not consider Kashmir formally as part of agenda. Murray described procedure to be followed as one of “interested friends sitting around table to attempt solve differences pertaining between two of them.” He read us excerpt of message in which Liaquat indicated he had decided attend meeting. Message emphasized Liaquat had hoped that matter would be considered by all Commonwealth Prime Ministers and not merely those “interested” in problem in order that there might be Commonwealth judgment passed on problem. Liaquat went on to say, however, that he appreciated that even on formal agenda items (which he appeared to accept Kashmir should not be), Prime Ministers were free to attend or not as they saw fit, but he hoped as many as possible would participate.

2. Prime Ministers of UK, Austria, New Zealand and Canada (in addition India and Pakistan) will participate in talks. Representatives of South Africa and South Rhodesia will definitely not attend. Ceylon Prime Minister still doubtful but will probably absent himself.

3. UK feels best tactics are to try to pick up where Dixon left off and to obtain agreement partition plus plebiscite, going on from there to try decide on division line and plebiscite conditions. If Pakistan refuses consider partition plus plebiscite, and continues insist on overall plebiscite, tactics may be shifted to try to obtain agreement on plebiscite conditions, not, however, going as far as Dixon in replacing Abdullah administration. If necessary, UK has in mind suggesting arbitration of plebiscite condition question.

We found Murray and Lloyd on whole fairly optimistic re prospects of success here. Bevin has reported Nehru to be in eminently favorable frame of mind with respect to conference items in general and to be so preoccupied with question of world peace as to lead Bevin

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*Not printed.

*Reference is presumably to the suggestion which had arisen in discussions with the British in the fall of 1950 that the proposed U.K.-U.S. Security Council resolution provide for the appointment of a prominent judicial figure to report on the Kashmir dispute.

Mohammad Abdullah, Prime Minister of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
to believe that he might be willing find way settling this question. Murray mentioned in passing that Nehru has expressed himself as feeling that he can make his best effort in attempting to promote world peace by not aligning himself either with USSR or US but by continuing to cooperate with Commonwealth.

Embassy will continue keep Department currently informed developments here on this question and meanwhile would appreciate Department's reaction to line we took opening paragraph which went beyond our instructions.\footnote{In telegram 3314, to London, January 9, not printed, the Department of State concurred in this approach by the Embassy to the British Foreign Office (357.AB/1-651).}

Repeated information Karachi 45, New Delhi 106, USUN 58.

GIFFORD

841.022/1-1751: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

LONDON, January 17, 1951—6 p.m.

3966. Garner,\footnote{J. J. S. Garner, Deputy High Commissioner of the United Kingdom in India.} in conversation with Embassy officer today, made it clear Kashmir conversations here made no progress towards solution of problem. While cautious in his language, he left no doubt re his feeling that failure primarily result Nehru's intransigence, although he balanced this to some extent stating that unfortunate public agitation in Pakistan and uncertainty re Liaquat's attendance had created unfavorable atmosphere for conversations. He did not, however, blame Liaquat for this agitation which he felt was a genuine expression public concern and dissatisfaction over impasse.

Altogether three informal meetings held on Kashmir. At first two, Prime Ministers of UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Ceylon present while at final meeting at Chequers only Attlee and Menzies present in addition Liaquat and Nehru. At first meeting atmosphere was friendly and UK was optimistic re possibility agreement. Second meeting was still encouraging and it was not until third that it became apparent there was no possibility any agreement.

Garner went on observe that it was difficult give us full details re proceedings since they were confined Prime Ministers with no other officials present. Memorandums which were prepared by Attlee himself, only reached officials yesterday and were not very full. In general, however, Garner understood Nehru had not been willing accept any
suggestion put forward while Liaquat prepared accept all. (In this connection, Garner observed Nehru appears have followed same course as during Dixon efforts by turning down proposals before Liaquat had chance speak, which may have facilitated Liaquat's acceptance).

Following specific proposals put forward on demilitarization during course conversations:

1. Outside force to assist in demilitarization and policing during plebiscite period. UK, Australia, New Zealand and Canada all indicated willingness contribute to force, which, however, was not intended necessarily be exclusive and, if established under UN aegis, would have contained other contingents as well if UN members had felt that would be desirable.

2. Joint Indian-Pakistani force.

3. Force recruited from local inhabitants of Kashmir by plebiscite administrator, with officers chosen from outside. All foregoing proposals were accepted by Liaquat and rejected by Nehru. In case of first suggestion, Nehru turned it down on grounds that it would be interpreted by Indian public as return to old imperial days and might be provocative to Russians.

Garner said Nehru's main point during conversations was that India's association with Kashmir was matter of right while Pakistan's was that of aggressor. He could not, therefore, tolerate positions of two countries in dispute being equated. Government of Kashmir is legal and duly constituted and he insisted Pakistan must therefore withdraw from its territory.

Garner said that although bulk of consideration given to problem was on demilitarization, there had also been some inconclusive discussion of ways in which plebiscite might be conducted. He understood that there had been no great pressure on part due Pakistan for over-all plebiscite and little effective discussion of possibility partition plus plebiscite. There was some general and inconclusive discussion of possibility simultaneous plebiscites in different areas. Question of conditions for holding plebiscite also briefly considered with Nehru taking position he could not commit himself on this point due to his inability to speak for Government of Kashmir.

Garner said SC action is clearly next step and Pakistanis have indicated desire for earliest possible action. In this connection, Garner understood Zafrullah holding himself in readiness to go Lake Success shortly after Liaquat's return to Karachi, while Mohammed Ali is understood be proceeding directly from London within next few days. Garner said Pakistanis have told HMG that they do not think that eminent jurist proposal goes far enough and mentioned possibility SC resolution instructing plebiscite administrator to proceed with implementing SC's recommendations.

*Secretary General, Government of Pakistan.
Garner said CRO and Foreign Office now considering nature of steps which should be taken in SC and hope be in position talk to us in near future. While they regard matter as one of urgency in light current Pakistani public opinion, they nevertheless feel it is important give matter fullest possible consideration in order assure that best possible line of action is taken. Garner said Pakistanis concur this latter viewpoint.

Garner emphasized UK carefully watching reaction in Pakistan to latest failure here and is fully alive to danger inherent in situation. He expressed particular concern at anti-Commonwealth turn which Pakistani resentment had taken prior Liaquat’s departure for London. He said Liaquat felt that rather complete expose of conversations which he had given in press conference yesterday (Embtel 3962, January 17) would help in convincing Pakistan public that Commonwealth had in fact given fullest possible consideration to this problem and had tried in every way find equitable solution to it.

Garner paid generous tribute to Menzies, who, he said, had worked hardest of all Prime Ministers (except Attlee) to find solution to this problem and who was fully aware of disruptive influence which continuance of dispute is having in present world crisis and, more specifically, on Commonwealth solidarity.

When I saw Menzies yesterday, he expressed very grave concern at failure reach agreement, placing blame squarely on Nehru. Menzies spoke of his efforts contribute to solution by offering Australian troops for proposal No. 1 above, which he took initiative putting forward, but which Nehru rejected for reasons of doubtful validity. Menzies most apprehensive continuance of impasse will lead resumption communal strife and perhaps war between two dominions.

Repeated information priority Karachi 60, New Delhi 123.

Gifford

357.AB/1–1851: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

London, January 18, 1951—6 p. m.

3992. Fowler (CRO representative UK UN delegate now on consultation London) told us today Mohammed Ali has urged on UK Pakistan viewpoint that SC should now adopt resolution (a) instructing Nimitz carry out duties as plebiscite administrator basic previous SC resolutions and (b) including specific reference offer neutral troops police Kashmir. While all UK views still tentative, FonOff–CRO officials apparently ready agree that more positive SC action than

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*Not printed.*
simply that contemplated “eminent jurist” proposal now necessary. Working levels giving close attention merits Pakistan suggestion. Repeated information Karachi 62, New Delhi 125.

GIFFORD

690D.91/1-2051: Telegram

The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

KARACHI, January 20, 1951—2 p.m.

654. In my conversation with Zafrulla this morning he confirmed that Mohammed Ali has urged on UK and will urge on US the Pakistan viewpoint that the SC take more positive action on Kashmir issue than had previously been contemplated. Reference London’s 3992 January 18 to the Department. Zafrulla added that inasmuch as Mohammed Ali represents the PM’s conscience and the PM relies strongly on his judgement he hoped that Department officers in Washington will keep this in mind when discussing the Kashmir problem with him in the early days of the coming week before Zafrulla arrives in New York. He added it is a most important consideration to bear in mind at this time.

Repeated information London 37.

WARREN

357. AB/1-2251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Pakistan-Afghanistan Affairs (Gatewood)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 22, 1951.

Subject: Kashmir

Participants: Mr. Mohamad [Mohammed] Ali, Secretary-General, Government of Pakistan
Mr. M. A. O. Baig, Minister, Embassy of Pakistan
SOA—Mr. Mathews
Mr. Gatewood

Problem: To make further progress towards solution of Kashmir dispute.

Action Required: To consider Pakistan views concerning action by the Security Council.

Action Assigned to: SOA

Mr. Mohamad Ali called by appointment and, in the course of a two hour conversation, reported on developments at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference as follows:

1. The Commonwealth Prime Ministers (excluding the South African representative) met twice and the Prime Ministers of the
UK, Australia, India, and Pakistan met once to discuss Kashmir and the outstanding issues were found to be, (a) demilitarization (without which it was agreed no impartial plebiscite could be conducted), and (b) arrangements for a plebiscite. Liaquat recognized that, should certain non-Muslim districts (such as those south of the Chenab) find themselves included in Pakistan as a result of the plebiscite, a serious refugee problem would be created; therefore, he was willing to consider the possibility of having the plebiscite conducted by regions, especially as each of the three principal regions of Kashmir (Jammu and Pooneh, The Vale, and the northern areas with Ladakh) were mostly populated by Muslims. Nehru felt that more emphasis should be placed on ethnic and linguistic affinities and maintained his opposition to the “two-nation theory,” but he did not object strenuously to the idea of three regional plebiscites. It was pointed out to him that ethnic and linguistic ties of the population in the Ladakh area were stronger with Tibet and China than with India or Pakistan.

In regard to demilitarization, Nehru insisted that he was responsible for the security of Kashmir, that he feared further Pakistan aggression, and that India’s legal position was sound. Attlee pointed out that legal considerations should not impede the settlement of a de facto situation.

2. Menzies (Australia) put forward the first suggestion for effective demilitarization: Commonwealth troops might be stationed in Kashmir at Commonwealth expense after the withdrawal of both Indian and Pakistan forces. After considering this proposal for a day, Nehru rejected it on the grounds that the USSR would be offended by it, alleging that Kashmir had been turned into an Anglo-American base of operations against Russia and the Indian public would object to this indication that Dominion troops were beginning to re-occupy the subcontinent. Mr. Mohamad Ali was clearly attracted to this suggestion and pointed out that Nehru’s arguments were very weak as only one brigade, lightly armed, would be needed throughout Kashmir and these troops would not be numerous enough to arouse suspicions of imperialism or intended aggression.

3. Attlee then suggested that joint Indo-Pakistan forces might be stationed in Kashmir after the withdrawal of the present troops. Nehru flatly opposed this, stating that this would give Pakistan the same status as India and therefore would be equivalent to condoning Pakistan aggression.

4. It was then suggested that the UN Plebiscite Administrator might raise local troops which would be commanded by officers of UN countries other than India and Pakistan. After considering this, Nehru said he was only responsible for the defense and foreign affairs of Kashmir; that this proposal affected the internal administration of the State; and that he would have to consider Sheikh Abdullah in the matter. (Menzies remarked that this would imply that Nehru thought his colleagues were fools, knowing nothing of his control over Abdullah.) Liaquat pointed out that only a question of principle was involved: after both Indian and Pakistan troops were withdrawn, the Plebiscite Administrator must have some military support to ensure the impartiality of the plebiscite. Nehru said that, from this point of view, he would have to refuse the proposal and vaguely indicated
that, after consulting Sheikh Abdullah, he might talk about it further with Liaquat when they next meet in Karachi. Mr. Mohamad Ali indicated such a meeting might possibly take place in mid-February but he had no hopes that it would produce any substantive results. He also believed the delay in recruiting local troops, estimated at 6–9 months, would not be very acceptable to his Government, even though Liaquat had agreed to the proposal in London.

5. The UK communiqué and Nehru’s press conference on Kashmir left the impression that there were still several points to be discussed. Liaquat’s press conference was designed to set the record straight, to inform the Pakistan public of a course of discussions and to show that the Commonwealth Prime Ministers had really made a sincere attempt to move forward. Liaquat made it quite clear that Pakistan would be unable to contribute anything to the defense of the Middle East or Asia until the Kashmir question was solved.

6. In talks with Attlee and Bevin before leaving London, Liaquat pointed out that there was a wave of anti-Commonwealth and anti-UN feeling in Pakistan and that the position of the Muslim League (the source of Liaquat’s political power) might be gravely prejudiced if this party were unable to obtain a good majority in the Punjab local elections, now scheduled for March. Accordingly, he urged SC action before the end of January along lines stronger than those put forward in the “ eminent jurist” resolution. Attlee agreed with both these suggestions. Liaquat went on to say that he hoped some SC resolution might be worked out along the following lines: a) The activities of the Kashmir National Conference (concerning which Zafrulla has already presented a letter to the SC) must not be allowed to prejudice a fair plebiscite; b) Nimitz should be appointed both UN Representative (exercising the powers of the former UNCP to supervise troop withdrawals) and Plebiscite Administrator (with powers to complete arrangements for a plebiscite); and, c) the new SC resolution should take account of the offer of Commonwealth troops. Liaquat made it plain that the powers of the Plebiscite Administrator should be sufficient to prevent the local Kashmir governments, on either side of the cease-fire line, from taking any action that would prejudice an impartial plebiscite. The British agreed to give this suggestion most careful and urgent consideration.

Mr. Mohamad Ali pointed out that the “formal authority” of the Plebiscite Administrator is to be derived from the State of Kashmir, in accordance with terms of the UN Resolution of January 5, 1949; that the Indians had insisted, in 1948–49, that this was a mere formality; and that he thought the Indians would induce Sheikh Abdullah to grant proper authority to the Plebiscite Administrator if the SC were to pass a resolution such as Liaquat suggested. He also said he had seen the President of the SC (Quevedo) briefly in New York and had obtained his agreement that SC action on Kashmir should consist of something further than a mere acknowledgment of Zafrulla’s letter regarding the Kashmir National Conference.

In closing this summary of developments in London, Mr. Mohamad Ali expressed the hope that the US would support SC action along the lines suggested by the Pakistan Prime Minister.
Mr. Mathews thanked Mr. Mohamad Ali for informing us of the London discussions and said that the Department agreed that, a) the "eminent jurist plan" was no longer adequate, and b) that the SC must act promptly. He pointed out that we were not yet informed of specific British views in this matter and that our own thinking was in a formative stage. Meanwhile, he raised some questions, on a personal and speculative basis, eliciting the following replies:

a) The Plebiscite Administrator should be allowed discretion to request outside military forces for duty in Kashmir from UN members so as to avoid the possibility of having the USSR offer some troops for this purpose, (this would be distasteful to Pakistan, which was quite ready to accept Swiss or Swedish or Commonwealth or locally raised troops).

b) In the view of Pakistan military authorities, only one brigade (3 battalions) would be necessary for the use of the Plebiscite Administrator in the whole of Kashmir. It was to be understood that the existing strength of local police forces was not to be increased and that all types of Indian and Pakistan troops (including local State forces and the Maharajah's guards) were to be withdrawn.

c) Pakistan could not consider making a unilateral gesture by withdrawing its troops shortly after the passage of a SC resolution such as Liaquat proposed; public opinion would accuse the GOP of leaving Azad Kashmir at the mercy of the Indians. Pakistan forces, however, could be withdrawn as soon as UN contingents arrived in Kashmir.

d) It might be possible for Pakistan to agree that the plebiscite should be conducted by districts (tehsils) rather than by regions, provided India accepted conditions for a "reasonable" conduct of the voting.

Mr. Mohamad Ali attached great importance to the appointment of Admiral Nimitz as both UN Representative and Plebiscite Administrator at the earliest possible moment, pointing out that the Admiral had been accepted by both parties, that he was internationally eminent, and that any delay in his appointment would postpone a plebiscite until the summer of 1952, whereas Pakistan wishes the earliest possible action.

Mr. Mohamad Ali said his government would have no difficulty controlling any possible tribal incursions into Kashmir, provided definite action were taken to set in motion the procedures for a fair plebiscite.

It was agreed that the Foreign Minister (Ziafrulla), who is arriving in New York about January 25, and Mr. Mohamad Ali would be available for conference in Washington, if necessary, and that the Department would inform the Pakistan Embassy if further discussions with Mohamad Ali were required. Mr. Mathews said we would give most urgent and careful consideration to GOP views in this matter.
690D.91/1–2251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Pakistan–Afghanistan Affairs (Gatewood)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 22, 1951.

Subject: Afghan-Pakistan Dispute; Pakistan Position Re Communist China; Pakistan Proposal for SC Action Re Kashmir

Participants: Mr. Mohamad Ali, Secretary-General, Government of Pakistan
Mr. M. A. H. Ispahani, Ambassador of Pakistan
NEA—Mr. McGhee ¹
SOA—Mr. Gatewood

[Here follow introductory remarks and discussion of two subjects: the Afghan-Pakistan border dispute and the attitude of Pakistan toward Communist China. The portion relating to the Afghan-Pakistan dispute is printed on page 1934.]

Kashmir:

Mr. Mohamad Ali then briefly reviewed developments arising from the London Conference of Prime Ministers, emphasizing that Nehru’s desire to keep troops in Kashmir had prevented any progress in London; that his Government hoped the US would support speedy action in the SC along the lines suggested by the Pakistan Prime Minister (as indicated in the earlier conversation with Mr. Mathews) ²; that the Kashmir question was a matter of world importance, as Pakistan would be unable to contribute anything to the defense of the Middle East or Asia until this issue were settled and that there was a strong feeling in Pakistan that the Government’s support of the Commonwealth and the UN had failed to produce any favorable results. In passing, Mr. Mohamad Ali remarked that his Government could probably work out arrangements with Iran to reinforce Middle Eastern defenses, provided Pakistan could be relieved of the military pressures generated by the Kashmir case. He also pointed out that the Pakistan public wondered why powerful nations like the US and the UK should not find it possible to make their power effective in a just cause and should continue to pay court to India, which had not honored its international obligations.

In answer to questions by Mr. McGhee, Mr. Mohamad Ali said that Nehru had offered no suggestions of his own in London, and that, although the stability of the present Pakistan Government would not immediately be affected by lack of progress in the Kashmir case, it

¹ George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.
² Supra.
was important that the Muslim League obtain a good majority in the elections for the provincial Punjab legislature (scheduled for March) as failure to do so might mean the decline of this government party in other provinces and, eventually, in the Central Legislature.

Mr. McGhee said he well understood Pakistan’s interest in Middle Eastern questions (which was one reason for Ambassador Warren’s attending the forthcoming Regional Conference at Istanbul); that neither the US nor the UN could solve problems without cooperation on the part of other nations; that Pakistan’s cooperation had been evident and that Liaquat appeared to have scored several points over Nehru in London; that the US press has been favorable to Pakistan, especially in recent weeks; and that the Department would give earnest consideration to Pakistan’s views in moving towards early action in the SC.

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*The Second Regional Conference of the Chiefs of Mission in the Near East, held in Istanbul from February 14 through 21, of which Mr. McGhee served as Chairman.

357.AB/1-1951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, January 23, 1951—5 p.m.

3457. We regard it imperative have SC mtg re Kashmir soonest, preferably before end Jan, in view Liaquat–Nehru press statements about Commonwealth Conference negots and failure achieve progress in case, with attendant impact GOP internal stability.

We note UK statements Paks do not believe eminent jurist proposal enough and suggest possibility SC res instructing PlebAd proceed implement previous SC ress. (Embs 3966, 3992, Jan 17–18). However, 5 Jan 49 UNCP res, accepted by GOI–GOP, provides PlebAd’s activities depend on previous truce and demilitarization, which have not been achieved. Still necessary SC officially recognize reasons for failure demilitarization and plebiscite, which can be done by adopting report of eminent jurist or by other means. To save time and press issue, we suggest utilizing other means, including fol, each of which wld occur after (1) SC discussion 28 Oct Kashmir Natl Conference res on basis GOP ltr Dec 14, (2) SC discussion Dixon report and Commonwealth negots:

(a) Res appointing SC sub-comite or individual to draft detailed plans for state-wide and local plebiscites, and meet with parties to report which plan seems most feasible or make other recommendations for solution dispute.

(b) Res requesting Commonwealth provide UN force to assist parties in demilitarization and policing Kashmir area preparatory to
PlebAd conducting plebiscite as agreed to by parties in 5 Jan 49 UNCIP res. PlebAd to report in 3 months if presence Commonwealth troops has created order sufficient enable arrangements for plebiscite to be carried out, and make recommendations if plebiscite appears not feasible or conditions for fair plebiscite not present.

(c) Res dispatching PlebAd to Kashmir to report whether or not conditions precedent for plebiscite exist, and if exist, to proceed hold plebiscite. This approach founded on possible GOI claims 28 Oct Kashmir Natl Conference res implementation established basis for fair plebiscite.

We contemplate result discussion item (1) wld be res in language contained present UKDel-US draft based on 17 Nov plan. This may be in separate res or part of single res dealing also with one or combination of concepts (a)–(e) above. (a) and (b) singly or jointly believed most productive. It is still not clear from Emibetel 3776, Jan 6, whether UK will co-sponsor with US res re Kashmir Natl Conference action. We regard UK–US co-sponsorship this type res extremely important, irrespective whether contained separate res or combined single res with other elements.

Mohammed Ali conversations with Dept officials Jan 22 urged SC action for end Jan and indicated preference res calling for Commonwealth troop participation and despatch PlebAd to area.

Advise Dept soonest UK reaction above proposals.

ACHESON

741.022/1-2451

The Australian Prime Minister (Menzies) to the Secretary of State *

TOP SECRET

[LONDON, undated.]

Before I leave for a week’s rest insisted on by my doctor, would like to pass on to you something which I think it is important for you to know on two of the matters which were discussed here by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers earlier this month.

Kashmir. Our talks on this subject have brought me regretfully to the conclusion that Nehru does not want to settle the Kashmir argument and hopes that lengthy delays may strengthen the prospect of Kashmir acceding to India. I have great sympathy with the position

* Transmitted to the Department by the Australian Ambassador, Mr. Norman Makin, under cover of a note to Secretary Acheson dated January 24, 1951 (741.022/1-2451).
of Liaquat Ali Khan, who is facing a difficult political situation in his
country. I formed a high opinion of his co-operative spirit. He is very
appreciative of the efforts we made in London. It seems to me of the
greatest possible importance to get a decision on this matter which is
so seriously dividing India and Pakistan. I hope that the Security
Council will be able to act speedily when it reaches the Kashmir
problem.

Declaration by Commonwealth Prime Ministers.

There are in our declaration, subscribed to by all the Prime Min-
isters, references to the United States which, as you will not have
failed to realise, are of particular significance in view of earlier atti-
tudes towards the United States by Nehru. I myself felt very
strongly, and most of my colleagues were of similar mind, that the
meeting of Prime Ministers must not end without some statement
setting out our beliefs and referring with the greatest clarity to our
bonds with the United States. We piloted our draft declaration
through the rocks and obtained for all to see Nehru’s subscription to
its sentiments towards the United States.

You will no doubt hear various versions of what took place at the
London meetings. To me, and I know to others, these two things
stand out—the light we have thrown on the Kashmir issue, and the
ground we have won from Nehru on the question of closest co-
operation between the Commonwealth and the United States.²

With warmest regards,

R. G. MENZIES

²This message was acknowledged by Secretary Acheson on January 25 in a
note to Prime Minister Menzies sent by way of Ambassador Makin (357.AB/-
1-2551).

357.AB/2-351: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET New DELHI, February 3, 1951—10 a. m.

1942. For McGhee.

1. We wish again with all earnestness, suggest that Department
take steps relieve Nimitz his present responsibilities re Kashmir and
make sure he not replaced by another American national. In our
opinion it would be unfair distinguished American officer like Nimitz
who has had such honorable and outstanding career to be called upon
to submit to ordeals to which he would be subjected if he should under-
take carry out duties plebiscite administrator or function of similar
character.

2. On various occasions GOI officials have informally hinted that
in their opinion he not man for job. These hints contained no reflec-
tion on his character or general ability. It clear, however, that GOI does not want ex-officer American armed forces serve as plebiscite administrator and if Nimitz does come to south Asia in connection Kashmir, he likely not only not receive GOI cooperation but be target venomous Indian press attack which would charge US has in mind its own special interests in Kashmir and which would seriously affect success his mission. We hope Nimitz can be replaced by outstanding person chosen from Commonwealth or from some small country which would not be vulnerable to charge of having selfish interests in settlement.

Henderson

357.AB/2-351: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, February 3, 1951—11 a.m.

1943. 1. During our conversation yesterday Bajpai asked if I had any information as to what next step of UN re Kashmir might be. I replied I had nothing sufficiently definite nature be of value, but I had thought it likely that Kashmir case would be active again in near future since further postponement might give impression lack UN interest in settling dispute before it.

2. Bajpai said he did not wish attempt unduly influence US policy this matter, but speaking personally he hoped US would not just at this time take lead in action which might be construed as bringing pressure on India re Kashmir. If US should initiate or play leading role in such action it would be difficult convince Indian press and people that US not “getting back” at India for position latter had assumed re Korea and Far East. GOI, of course, aware that US Government would not permit itself be influenced in consideration of question such as Kashmir by differences of opinion between it and GOI re Far East. There was grave danger, however, that Indian public would feel differently.

3. I expressed Bajpai appreciation for his frankness and said I could understand and did share his concern. US Government was, of course, extremely anxious have good will and friendship of Indian press and people and did consider this important factor in making foreign political decisions just as it was compelled to take also into consideration other factors such as what was best for preservation world peace.

Henderson

1 Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, Secretary General, Indian Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations.
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Frank D. Collins of the Office of South Asian Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] February 6, 1951.

Subject: 1. Unavailability of Admiral Nimitz for Kashmir Negotiations: US suggestion for Dr. Ralph Bunche
2. India's Request for Wheat

Participants: Mr. C. E. Steel, Minister, British Embassy
Mr. Michael Walker, First Secretary, British Embassy
NEA—Mr. George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary
UNA—Mr. John Hickerson, Assistant Secretary
SOA—Mr. Frank D. Collins
UNP—Mr. Howard Meyers

After welcoming the opportunity to confer with the UK representatives, Mr. McGhee stated he wished to discuss two matters: (1) Kashmir and (2) India's request for wheat.

Kashmir:

The appointment by the President of Admiral Nimitz as Chairman of the President's Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights was of such importance that we would be unable to make his services available for the duties proposed in the UK draft resolution. There was a great deal of feeling in this country with respect to the need for such a Presidential Commission and as the UK was aware Admiral Nimitz had held himself in readiness for almost two years to depart for the sub-continent and take up his Kashmir duties.

We have always regarded the Kashmir problem as a matter of primary Commonwealth concern and were appreciative of the efforts made at the recent Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference at London as well as the previous efforts of Commonwealth representatives such as General McNaughton of Canada and Sir Owen Dixon of Australia in attempting to solve the Kashmir issue. We wish to stress, however, that we are not withdrawing our great interest in the settlement of this issue and we wish to continue to be of as much help as possible. If the UK is agreeable we would be glad to approach another distinguished American, Dr. Ralph Bunche and press him to take on the proposed Kashmir negotiations. We would appreciate it if the UK would keep in confidence this information pending their reply to our suggestion at which time we will inform the Pakistan Ambassador of this development. Mr. Hickerson stated we would have

1Ralph J. Bunche, Top-Ranking Director, Department of Trusteeship and Information for Non-Self-Governing Territories, U.N. Secretariat.
2Mr. Hickerson was Assistant Secretary of State for U.N. Affairs.
3President Truman had appointed Admiral Nimitz to this post on January 22.
to ask for the release of Dr. Bunche's services from Secretary General Trygve Lie who would probably be reluctant to give him up but would, we think, agree if a time limit were set in the proposed resolution.

Mr. Steel remarked that the UK would regret the loss of Admiral Nimitz's services but that his government appreciated the continued willingness of the US to be of help. He personally believed Bunche might be very effective. He would, however, have to refer the matter to London. He wondered whether Bunche would agree to take on such a task. Mr. Hickerson indicated that he believed, if pressed by the UK and the US, Bunche would reluctantly agree to serve. Mr. Collins remarked that in the event Bunche might not be available we believed there were a number of Commonwealth candidates who might be considered, including Dixon.

Mr. Walker was of the opinion that Dixon would be very much disliked by Pakistan and Mr. Steel concurred. Mr. Hickerson indicated that he believed from conversations he had with Dixon that the latter would be extremely reluctant to serve. Mr. Steel stated that he would inform the Department of London's reaction to our suggestion with respect to Dr. Bunche as soon as possible. It was agreed in the meantime that the UK and the US would move ahead to work out the existing minor differences in the UK draft resolution. (At this point Messrs. Hickerson and Meyers left the meeting.)

[Here follows a brief discussion of India's request for foodgrains from the United States; for documentation, see pages 2085 ff.]

857.AB/2-1051: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW DELHI, February 10, 1951—2 p.m.

2035. According to New Delhi press today UK and US will jointly sponsor resolution in SC next week with aim solving Kashmir problem. Basis Anglo-American scheme would be to hold plebiscite in Vale and to provide some form UN supervision. Since failure to find solution at Commonwealth PM meeting UK and US have been exchanging views in joint attempt find way out present deadlock.

When I saw Bajpai February 8 he again asked me if I had anything to tell him about US thinking re Kashmir and whether we were contemplating some kind of resolution in UN. He said various rumors had reached him. I replied situation seemed to me to be fluid and I did not know exactly what my government intended to do. I understood, however, US Government believe UN could not afford neglect Kashmir problem much longer. Kashmir dispute was of considerable importance, not only because of principle involved but
also because settlement seemed to be one of prerequisites for restoration normal political and economic conditions in SA.

HENDERSON

357.AB/2-1251

Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 12, 1951.

Subject: Appeals From the UK and Pakistan for Admiral Nimitz’s Services in Kashmir

Background:

On January 30 Mr. McGhee and Mr. Hickerson forwarded a memorandum 1 to you requesting that you urge the President to make available Admiral Nimitz’s services to carry on UN negotiations in the Kashmir case. When it was decided that this would not be advisable, 2 another joint memorandum was forwarded to you calling attention to a possible appeal from the UK and Pakistan and recommending that you forward a personal message to Mr. Bevin pointing out that, while Admiral Nimitz was not available at this time, we would be glad if the UK concurred to approach another distinguished American, Dr. Ralph Bunche and to press him to undertake the proposed Kashmir negotiations. 3 It was decided that a preferable approach would be to have Mr. McGhee discuss this matter with the British Embassy, which he did on February 6 in a conversation with Mr. Steel, Minister Counselor of the British Embassy. 4 On February 8, Ambassador Austin in New York informed the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Sir Zafrulla Khan, that Admiral Nimitz’s services were unavailable and that the US had suggested to the UK another distinguished American without identifying the person by name. Mr. McGhee similarly on this date informed the Pakistan Ambassador here. Both the UK and Pakistan representatives expressed disappointment upon hearing of Admiral Nimitz’s unavailability and Sir Zafrulla has requested a meeting with the President at which time we anticipate that he will ask us to reconsider our decision on Admiral Nimitz.

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1 Not printed.

2 According to a memorandum of February 5 by Mr. Matthews to Mr. McGhee, the “Secretary on February 2 decided that it would be inadvisable to approach the President requesting Admiral Nimitz’s services he made available for the Kashmir negotiations proposed in the UK draft resolution.” (McGhee Files, Lot 53D468)

3 Memorandum by Assistant Secretaries McGhee and Hickerson to the Secretary of State, February 2, 1951, not printed (357.AB/2-251).

4 See the memorandum of conversation of February 6, p. 1718.
On February 10 the British Embassy approached the Department and requested that the views of Mr. Bevin be transmitted to you. The UK inquired (Tab A)\(^6\) if the President could not make Admiral Nimitz’s services available for an immediate three-month assignment as provided in the revised UK Kashmir resolution.

A complicating factor is that we have just informally learned that both the White House and Admiral Nimitz are of the opinion that his services might be made immediately available for UN Kashmir negotiations. We believe we should now inform both the UK and Pakistan that we favor Admiral Nimitz retaining his status as UN Plebiscite-Administrator-Designate for future services in Kashmir; that he will not be available for UN duties at this time, in view of his current appointment as Chairman of the President’s Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights; and that we believe another outstanding American can be sent out to take on the immediate task of demilitarization and to suggest plans for the plebiscite. We should stress to the British that we strongly favor Dr. Bunch because of his extensive UN experience in difficult negotiations (Tab B)\(^6\). We are not in a position to inform the Pakistan Foreign Minister of the name of our alternate choice, as we believe it highly important that the name of the person designated by the UN not be submitted to the parties for their approval, a view shared by the Pakistanis.

**Recommendation:**

1. That you sign the attached telegram (Tab B) to Mr. Bevin;
2. That you approve the attached memorandum to the President (Tab C)\(^7\);
3. That you arrange to have Admiral Nimitz informed of the above developments.

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[Annex]

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President*

[WASHINGTON,] February 11, 1951.

Subject: Your Appointment With the Pakistan Foreign Minister

Sir Zafrulla Khan, the Pakistan Foreign Minister, will call on you on February 13 or 14 and put forward an earnest request that

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\(^6\) Extract of memorandum of conversation of February 10, not printed, in which the following participated: Mr. Michael Walker of the British Embassy and Messrs. Elbert G. Mathews and Frank D. Collins of the Department of State (357. AB/2-1051). A portion of this conversation is paraphrased in telegram 3765 to London, February 12, infra.

\(^7\) Ibid.

\(\) Annex below. The covering memorandum bears the following notation in the Secretary of State’s hand: “I gave the memo to the President who will see Sir Zafrulla at 12:15 Wed. [February 14.] I have signed the telegram. D[ean] A[cheson]."
you make available the services of Admiral Nimitz in connection with the Kashmir case, which will be considered by the United Nations Security Council this week.

On the assumption that Admiral Nimitz would not be immediately available for a United Nations assignment, because of his recent appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights, the Department has recently informed the British and Sir Zafrulla that another prominent American was being considered for the post of United Nations Representative in the Kashmir dispute. We have also suggested to the United Kingdom (but not to Pakistan) that we believe Mr. Ralph Bunche would provide the most suitable alternate for Admiral Nimitz. Under a new United Nations resolution, which we expect the British and other members of the Security Council to co-sponsor with us, a United Nations Representative would be authorized to effect the demilitarization of Kashmir and to suggest detailed plans for a plebiscite. The functions of Plebiscite-Administrator-Designate, from which Admiral Nimitz is on leave without pay, would be exercised at a later stage. Mr. Bevin has inquired if you could not make the Admiral available immediately for three months’ service with the United Nations and I have informed him that, as this would not be possible, we favor the alternative procedure prescribed above.

I believe you will wish to express to Sir Zafrulla your regret that the services of Admiral Nimitz are not now available in connection with the Kashmir case and to say that we have great hopes that another distinguished American will be able to carry out the immediate duties which may be assigned to a United Nations Representative by the Security Council. You may also wish to state that Admiral Nimitz is still the Plebiscite-Administrator-Designate and that you will give every consideration to the possibility of making his services available in that capacity at the appropriate time.

Should Sir Zafrulla inquire as to the name of the American being considered for an immediate United Nations assignment regarding the Kashmir case, you may desire to point out that, in our view, the United Nations Representative should be appointed directly by the Security Council without reference, as heretofore, to either party to the dispute (a position originally put forward by the Pakistan Government).

It is possible that Sir Zafrulla will mention the pending Indian food request and express the hope that the effects of United States generosity will not prove detrimental to Pakistan. In this case, you may find it appropriate to remind him that the Pakistan Ambassador has been informed of our humanitarian motives in this matter, and has
been assured that we do not intend our action to be in any way detrimental to Pakistan’s interests.\(^8\)

\(^8\) The President and the Secretary of State met with Sir Zafrulla and the Ambassador of Pakistan on February 14; see the memorandum of conversation of that date by Secretary Acheson, p. 1726.

357.AB/2–1251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom.\(^1\)

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, February 12, 1951—7 p. m.

3765. On Feb 10 Brit Emb approached Dept requesting substance tele from Bevin be transmitted to Secy containing fol major pts:

1. UK is very seriously concerned over prospect of losing services Admiral Nimitz. They appreciate from US pt of view, importance attached his new duties Chairman Pres Comm Internal Security and Individual Rights. However, UK wishes inquire if Pres eld not make Nimitz available for three-month assignment as provided most recent UK draft res.

2. UK believes prospect finding person similar caliber remote and calls attention acceptance by parties of Nimitz. They attach great importance his symbolic value and believe unavailability Nimitz will give Indians further opportunity to hold up progress.

Convey orally to Bevin or to FonOff for Bevin substance fol comments by Secy:

While we are cognizant importance UK attaches services Admiral Nimitz we regret we are unable to make his services available Kashmir negots at this time.

The internal security problems of this country and their relation to individual liberties is of such importance we believe Nimitz’ duties Chairman Pres Comm take precedence over other demands his services. However, we are prepared to give fullest consideration making his services available at later date in order that he may fulfill, if called upon, the duties UN PlebAd.

We are prepared urge UN Secy-Gen to make available services another distinguished and outstanding Amer, Dr. Ralph Bunche, for UN mission proposed UK–US draft res. We believe Bunche has, because his extensive UN experience difficult negots, qualifications which wld make him particularly effective in proposed UN task. Although we recognize it is unlikely that candidate equally acceptable to both parties can be found, we do believe Bunche wld encounter less resistance dealing with Indians on this problem than wld Nimitz. If UK is favorably disposed toward this US suggestion which was initially made to Brit Emb on Feb 6, we are prepared to approach,

\(^1\) Repeated as telegram 1270 to the Embassy in New Delhi and as telegram 494 to the Embassy in Karachi.
through the UN Secy-Gen, Dr. Bunche and urge him accept this assignment. In event Bunche mission successful, the way will be opened for PlebAd Designate, Admiral Nimitz, to exercise the functions previously assigned to him by SC.

ACHESON

790D.13/2-1951

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 13, 1951.

Subject: Pakistan Objections to Part of Proposed UN Resolution
Re Kashmir; Unavailability of Admiral Nimitz for UN Duties in Kashmir; Pakistan Attitude Toward US Approach of November 6 Re Proposed Afghan-Pakistan Conversations

Participants: Sir Mohammed Zafarulla Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan
The Secretary
Mr. M. A. H. Ispahani, Ambassador of Pakistan
Mr. Mohamad Ali, Secretary-General, Government of Pakistan
SOA—Mr. Mathews
Mr. Gatewood

Sir Zafarulla called, at his urgent request, and stayed for 35 minutes. The Foreign Minister said he had learned (through Mr. Fowler of the UK Delegation to the UN) that the proposed UN Resolution concerning Kashmir contained a paragraph 1 referring to the possibility that certain regions might be ceded to the party having a minority of the total votes in any State-wide plebiscite, provided the majority of voters in such regions were in favor of association with the losing party in the overall plebiscite. He wished to express his concern over this provision of the Resolution, as any public reference to the possibility of the partition of Kashmir would have most unfavorable repercussions in Pakistan at this time and would put India in the position of being assured of obtaining at least a part of the State, before any agreement had been reached with India as to the terms of demilitarization or the conditions for a plebiscite. He pointed out that, under these circumstances, India would be extremely unlikely to agree to any arrangements that would assure an impartial voting procedures, especially as such arrangements would have to be much more strictly supervised in the case of regional voting than if a State-wide plebiscite were contemplated (i.e., a difference of 10,000 votes in an overall plebiscite would have little effect, whereas a dif-

1This was paragraph B-4-iii of a U.K. draft resolution on Kashmir, an abbreviated text of which appears in telegram 4127 from London, January 25, not printed (357.AB/1-2551).
ference of 2,000 votes in a given region would result in the acquisition of that region by India). Sir Zafrulla said that the past record of the Kashmir case had shown that Pakistan had always been ready to agree to reasonable suggestions by impartial conciliators, whereas India had constantly refused such agreement and was very likely to continue these tactics in view of their past success. He also stated that, if the course of the forthcoming debate in the SC should indicate that India were greatly concerned with the refugee problem that would arise if all of Kashmir went to Pakistan, his Government would probably have no objection to leaving this matter open for further discussions at a later stage, when India had agreed on measures both for demilitarization and a plebiscite.

I said I wished to be quite sure of understanding Sir Zafrulla's remarks, which seemed to me to contain two main ideas: that the possibility of partition should not be specifically mentioned in public at this time and that, if it were, India would gain by it without making any concessions on other points. I asked whether the possibility of partition of Kashmir were not already publicly known, as it had been mentioned in reports of Sir Owen Dixon.

Mr. Mohamad Ali pointed out that, though the Dixon report had alluded to partition, such a reference had little force as compared with a formal reference to this subject by the SC itself, which would support the view that the future of Kashmir would eventually be decided by partition—a view hitherto strongly opposed by Pakistan, which had agreed with India (under the terms of the UNCIP Resolution of January 5, 1949) that the claims to Kashmir should be decided by a State-wide plebiscite. He reiterated that Pakistan's interests would suffer if the UN Resolution now proposed should refer to partition before India had been brought to agree to demilitarization and to the conditions for any type of plebiscite. Sir Zafrulla endorsed this view and said that, in such an event, Pakistan's acceptance of the proposed Resolution would give India "a quid without any quo". I indicated that I now perceived the nature of the difficulties they anticipated.

Sir Zafrulla expressed regret over the unavailability of Admiral Nimitz in the Kashmir case, but said he would not trouble me with this problem, which he intended to take up tomorrow, in his interview with the President, on the basis of a personal appeal from the Pakistan Prime Minister. He said that, as Admiral Nimitz had taken the oath of office yesterday as Chairman of the new Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights, he could see that it would require an "uphill effort" to obtain Admiral Nimitz's services.

[Here follows a brief discussion of the border dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan which is printed on page 1943.]
SECRET

NEW DELHI, February 13, 1951—noon.

1. In spite probably unfavorable Pakistani reaction we still hope Nimitz can be relieved his responsibilities re Kashmir. He, or almost any other US citizen prominence and integrity not known be opposed to present US foreign policies would be greatly handicapped.

2. Bunch might be exception, since general impression prevails among Indians he not likely have sympathy for Moslem point view and because India's consistent campaign against racial discrimination somewhat pro-Indian.

3. Members UK HICOM here agree privately with paragraph 1 above.

Repeated Karachi 69.

HENDERSON

Secretary's Memoranda : Lot 53D444

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] February 14, 1951.

Participants: The President
Sir Zafrulla Khan
Ambassador Ispahani
Ambassador Mohammed Ali, Secretary General of the Pakistan Foreign Office
Mr. Acheson

The President received Sir Zafrulla Khan at the latter's request. Those attending the meeting are noted above.

Ambassador Ispahani opened the discussion by presenting the President with a letter from the Prime Minister of Pakistan. This letter referred to the delays and difficulties which had been created by India in the settlement of the Kashmir dispute and to the fact that the matter was about to come again before the Security Council. The purpose of the letter was to request the President to make the services of Admiral Nimitz available to the United Nations in carrying out any resolution by the Security Council.

After the President had read the letter, Sir Zafrulla Khan supported the request of the Prime Minister. He pointed out the great importance from an international point of view of the settlement of this controversy. This came both from the geographical location of Kashmir and the disastrous consequences of any continuance of the tension between India and Pakistan. He said that to the people of Pakistan the name of Admiral Nimitz was synonymous with holding
of the plebiscite and the peaceful settlement of this controversy. He had become an important symbol of the United Nations and of American interests in the settlement of the dispute.

The President then referred to the long period of time in which Admiral Nimitz had been waiting to perform his duties and the urgent necessity which had arisen to perform the services for the United States in connection with the Loyalty Commission. He said that he could not see his way clear to releasing him at this time. However, he would remain available to conduct the plebiscite and that he hoped that after the Admiral had completed the organizational work and the Commission had got started, preparations for the plebiscite would be sufficiently advanced so that Admiral Nimitz could then conduct it. The President added that if it were desired to have another American carry out any instructions of the Security Council regarding demilitarization, the President hoped to be able to select an outstanding person who would be satisfactory to both parties to the dispute. The President said that they would be consulted in this.

Sir Zafrulla Khan stated that while he was disappointed, the President was obviously the person best qualified to decide where the Admiral’s services were most needed. He thought that it was most important in selecting any other person to do the demilitarization task, that he should be a military officer, not only because the task would have predominantly military aspects but also because he thought it most undesirable that the idea of mediation should again be prominent. He hoped that the Security Council would reach decisions and that the man selected would be directed to carry them out. It was for this reason that he preferred a military officer to a civilian, although he did not say that no civilian would be equal to this task.

The President ended the interview by stressing the importance which he attached to the solution of the dispute and his understanding of the necessity of making plans strong and continuing United States interest in this solution.

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President

SECRET

WASHINGTON, February 14, 1951.

Subject: Pakistan–Afghanistan

Participants: M. A. H. Ispahani, Ambassador E. and P. (Pakistan)
Sir Zafrulla Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan
Mohammed Ali, Secretary General of the Pakistan Cabinet
Mr. Elbert G. Mathews, Director of South Asian Affairs Division of Department of State
Mr. W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President

Sir Zafrulla opened the conversation by summarizing his discussion with the President earlier today. He said that he had made a strong plea to the President that Admiral Nimitz be made available for the Kashmir case at this time. The President had indicated that unfortunately it would not be possible to do this but that Admiral Nimitz might be made available later to fulfill his role as plebiscite administrator. Sir Zafrulla said that he must, of course, abide by the President’s decision but that he did greatly hope that any American who might be substituted for Admiral Nimitz at this stage of the Kashmir dispute would be of outstanding ability and of a military background.

Sir Zafrulla then referred to his Government’s concern at the possibility that the Security Council might make some reference in its next resolution to a regional plebiscite in Kashmir. He said that Pakistan did not object to this concept in principle but that its introduction by the Security Council at this time would encourage the Indians to believe they could obtain even more concessions by being entrenched. I said that I believed that the Secretary of State fully understood the Foreign Minister’s point on this matter.

[Here follows a brief discussion of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan which is printed on page 1944.]

I asked Sir Zafrulla what he thought would happen to Burma. He replied that Burma was in a very shaky internal state and deeply fearful of China. He thought, however, that China would turn its attention first to Indo-China and then to Malaya before exerting greater pressure on the Burmese. This would give time to strengthen the Burmese. I asked the Foreign Minister what he had in mind in the latter connection. He said that economic aid and even military aid would be very helpful. I commented that we were now giving the Burmese some economic assistance, but that they had been rather hesitant in requesting it. Sir Zafrulla remarked that this was only another indication of the Burmese fear of China.

I said to Sir Zafrulla in conclusion that I believed the Russians were strongly of the opinion that the free world could not hold together; that in a sense this was an advantage since the Russians had the idea that if they waited long enough the free world would fall apart and their road would be much easier; and that I did not believe this would happen, although the free world clearly had many problems among its members urgently requiring solution.

I also referred to President Roosevelt’s conviction that the Moslem world offered a great opportunity for economic development and
improvement. I myself had much the same feeling as the President. Unfortunately the unhappy events in the Near East and also in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent had greatly impeded necessary measures in the economic field. We hoped that these political issues could be put at rest and that emphasis could be shifted to the economic field. Sir Zafrulla expressed his agreement and said that, as regards India and Pakistan, their disputes had made them liabilities to the free world when in happier circumstances they could be substantial assets.

Mohammed Ali told Mr. Mathews that in view of the President's decision his Government definitely desired that any representative who might be appointed by the Security Council at this phase of the Kashmir case should not be given the functions of plebiscite adminis-
trator, that Pakistan desired that Admiral Nimitz continue to retain that capacity.

W. A. Harriman

6990.91/2-1451: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, February 14, 1951—5 p. m.

2090. 1. Bajpai asked see me this morning. Said he wanted a talk re Kashmir. GOI knew US and UK planning some kind move UN and had been somewhat surprised parties most interested not included in conversations since those parties might be able make useful contributions. He had not asked see me, however, to endeavor find out what US and UK were planning nor to complain. Main object had been to discuss Pakistani tendencies resort to threats of holy war in case Kashmir problem not solved to Pakistan's liking in immediate future. He hoped UK and US could use influence on Pakistan stop this type talk since it merely served inflame passions and did not promote atmosphere conducive to friendly and conciliatory negotiations nor for making arrangements for plebiscite. Particularly difficult plan for right kind plebiscite when one party "beating war drums".

2. I told Bajpai I not aware all going on in Washington and Lon-
don re Kashmir. Nevertheless sure my government had no intention working out any move re Kashmir behind India's back. Naturally, however, it must give thought to this important problem. I would assume that after Pakistan had presented its case to SC and GOI had given reply US would then make final decisions as to what course action in its opinion SC should take. I thought it likely that at that stage if not before, my government would indicate in Lake Success or in Delhi how it was thinking. I had reason believe my government also deplored any kind war talk in South Asia and was doing what it properly could to discourage it. Nevertheless GOI should bear in
mind since it was in possession Valley Kashmir India was likely to be more placid re delays in solution Kashmir problem than Pakistan. Repeated Karachi 71.

HENDERSON

357.AB/2-1551: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY WASHINGTON, February 15, 1951—6 p.m.

1291. Embls 2090, Feb 14, 2035, Feb 10. You may convey Bajpai fol US views Kashmir:

1. US attaches great importance early settlement Kashmir issue. Last Mar when SC instructed Dixon proceed subcontinent we were hopeful his efforts wld result progress toward settlement this long-standing issue. Altho Sir Owens submitted his report Sep 15 SC has not, as you know, resumed hearings Kashmir case. US believes SC must address itself immed future Kashmir problem and point out to parties method making progress toward prompt solution this issue. We believe Council may wish bear in mind fol points difference between parties as outlined Dixon's report: a) procedure for and extent demilitarization State preparatory holding plebiscite; b) degree of control over exercise functions govt in State necessary ensure free and fair plebiscite.

2. We believe further SC must address itself Kashmir Natl Conf Oct 1950 res.

3. US has discussed with UK various proposals SC action. We do not believe it advisable discuss in advance substance these proposals with parties but will be fully prepared present our views when SC meets. We sincerely hope India and Pak will give fullest consideration proposals put forth SC and both countries will cooperate fully working toward prompt solution this issue.

FYI only we propose co-sponsor with UK res providing appt UN rep who wld: 1) After consulting parties, effect demilitarization; 2) present detailed plans carrying out plebiscite. We favor Bunche UN rep (Embls 2063, Feb 13) and are awaiting UK concurrence before approaching Syg and Bunche (Depts 1270, Feb 12).1 We believe possibility utilization Nimitz PlebAd shld be left open because great difficulties opening question incumbency PlebAd wld entail this stage, and fact parties have agreed his selection. We do not underestimate Indian opposition Nimitz but believe Pak has right be assured every effort will be made by US carry out original commitment given re his services as PlebAd.2

ACHESON

1 Same as telegram 3765, to London, February 12, p. 1723.
2 Ambassador Henderson replied in telegram 2156, from New Delhi, February 17, that he had conveyed to Bajpai the U.S. views on Kashmir outlined in the Department's telegram 1291 of February 15 (357.AB/2-1751).
Memorandum by Mr. Howard Meyers of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs and Mr. Frank D. Collins of the Office of South Asian Affairs

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 28, 1951.

Subject: U.S. Policy in the Kashmir Dispute.

1. From New York's 1189, February 23, reporting a conversation of Zafirullah and Mohammad Ali with Ambassador Gross, it appears fairly certain that the draft UK-US resolution introduced in the Security Council February 21 is generally acceptable to the Government of Pakistan. The Pakistan press has indicated some dislike for the border adjustment clause and the provision suggesting that there might be a varying degree of supervision of the government for different areas during the plebiscite, but the objections of the Pakistan Foreign Minister and Secretary General of the Cabinet were concerned principally with drafting rather than substantive matters.

2. The reaction of the Government of India undoubtedly, will be quite adverse, judging from the response of the Indian press to the resolution and supporting speeches. In general, Indian newspapers single out for objection the references to Dixon's demilitarization proposals, the use of foreign troops to police the plebiscite area, and the proposal to refer unresolved issues to arbitration. The Hindustan Times, which is regarded as usually reflecting the Government's position, takes the line that the whole resolution should be rejected without effort to amend it and remedy its defects. Accordingly, there is a good possibility that the GOI will take the position of refusing to accept the resolution in toto, thus raising the question—what should be the policy of the United States in this event.

3. It should be noted that the Indian Government has objected to considerable portions of previous Security Council resolutions adopted during the course of the India-Pakistan question hearings: particularly the 21 April 1948 and 14 March 1950 resolutions. Despite these objections, the GOI cooperated with the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) and with the United Nations Representative who succeeded the Commission, Sir Owen Dixon. Admittedly the GOI did not object to every provision of these past resolutions, but objected to such substantial portions that it is a reasonable assumption that the GOI will similarly be willing to enter into negotiations with the new United Nations Representative even though refusing to accept the resolution.

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1 Addressed to the Director of the Office of U.N. Political and Security Affairs (Bancroft) and the Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Mathews).
2 Not printed.
3 Ernest A. Gross, Deputy U.S. Representative at the United Nations.
4. Mr. Fowler of the United Kingdom Delegation on 27 February said that he believed the United Kingdom would be willing to consider an Article 37 approach to the Kashmir problem, by which the Security Council would recommend specific terms of settlement for the dispute, rather than machinery to aid the parties to reach a solution, as in the past. This position was based upon a possible GOI refusal to accept the major elements of the resolution, particularly the provision for arbitration of unresolved issues, so that the United Nations Representative would only be retracing the ground covered by Sir Owen Dixon in his unsuccessful mission, if the Indian Government was willing to engage in negotiations with the United Nations Representative although not willing to accept the terms of the resolution.

This indication of a possible United Kingdom position poses a difficult problem. It seems probably that the Indian representative in the Security Council will either refuse categorically to accept the arbitration provision, or will say that, while his Government agrees to arbitration in principle, they cannot commit themselves to arbitration on unresolved issues before they know what are the specific matters to be the subject of such arbitration. This would be in line with Nehru’s statements in his exchange of correspondence with Liaquat. Assuming that this will be the Indian line, two possible U.S. positions appear logical:

a) To defer for the present taking issue with the Indian refusal to accept the terms of the resolution, trusting that the negotiations of the United Nations Representative may coincide with other factors sufficient to induce the Indian Government to exhibit a reasonable attitude toward suggestions for solving the dispute, so that the UN Representative’s mission will result in a net gain in Security Council action in this dispute.

If this policy is adopted, we should point out that, as was said in our supporting speech on February 21, the resolution does not criticize either of the parties and does not attempt to sit in judgment upon them; that the resolution is predicated on the theory that the area of disagreement between the parties has been narrowed and that the Security Council can best exercise its functions to narrow further this area of disagreement by effecting demilitarization of Kashmir as a prerequisite to conducting a plebiscite. We should take the line that we think the resolution is a practical attempt to capitalize on the often-reiterated willingness of both sides to settle the issue peacefully on the basis of a fair and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices. We might refer to Nehru’s speeches reaffirming the plebiscite method of settlement and say that we assume that it is still the foundation of GOI policy; that the resolution is directed toward this goal and we, consequently, assume that the Government

of India will cooperate to the utmost in aiding the UN Representative to effect demilitarization and to work out detailed plans for such a plebiscite. We can suggest that the United Nations Representative will be able, through his investigations and negotiations, to report back to the Security Council what he has been able to accomplish, so that the Council and the world in general will have a clearer picture of the situation in Kashmir.

In other words, we should ignore the Indian refusal to accept specific terms of the resolution; assure them that we recognize their willingness to settle the issue peacefully by means of state-wide plebiscite, pressing them to meet their previous commitments in regard to the plebiscite; and hint broadly that failure to work with the United Nations Representative will result in a report to the United Nations, which, adequately publicized will further indicate Indian failure to practice the reasonable approach to international issues which they advocate so strongly in other matters.

On the basis of previous Indian action in the Kashmir dispute, the GOI will probably meet with the United Nations Representative to see what possibilities might adduce to their benefit through these negotiations. If the Indians are willing to, in fact, negotiate with the United Nations Representative on the basis of the terms of the resolution which establishes his terms of reference, even though refusing to accept those terms of reference, they have in effect accepted the terms. Moreover, the resolution is predicated upon acquiescence between the parties rather than affirmative acceptance. Under these circumstances, the policy outlined above would seem adequate for the immediate circumstances.

b) If the United Kingdom openly proposes an Article 37 approach (instead of only suggesting the possibility), then in deference to the agreement that the United Kingdom should take the initiative in this matter we might support such initiative, and help draft a resolution by which the Security Council would recommend the specific terms of settlement considered appropriate, on the basis that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. If this policy is adopted, it will require careful presentation of the history of this dispute and the continued refusal by the GOI to accept reasonable proposals for solving the two major issues of demilitarization and the plebiscite, in such way as to demonstrate that the Council has been led inexorably to the next step in the process of peaceful settlement of the dispute under Chapter 6; recommending specific terms of settlement. The new resolution, whatever its details, should be supported by pointing out: (i) the parties have failed to settle the dispute by means of their own choice, (ii) the Council and its representatives have failed to persuade the Indian Government to accept proposals worked out through machinery established by the Council, (iii) the Council must take a more radical step because of the deterioration of the situation in Kashmir and the threat the Kashmir dispute presents to the maintenance of international peace and security in South Asia. For this reason, the United States believes that it is necessary to take a step.

which goes beyond that envisaged in the original UK-US resolution presented to the Security Council on Feb. 21. This step is proposed without intending to criticize or judge either one of the parties. However, it is a necessary evolution of this case to which the Security Council has been led by the logic of the situation, in which repeated attempts to reach a solution of the case have foundered upon objections which appear to have no direct relationship to the expressed willingness of both parties to settle the future of Kashmir by a fair and impartial plebiscite under UN auspices. Under these circumstances, the Security Council has no other alternative except that of recommending in detail the steps which should be taken by the parties to bring about demilitarization and a fair and impartial plebiscite under UN auspices.

Recommendations

Despite irritation with the GOI attitude, alternative (a) above is recommended as the better policy as of this moment. It is possible that it may result in nothing more than a fruitless negotiation of the same nature as Sir Owen Dixon's. Nevertheless, it does offer the possibility that a combination of the negotiator's efforts plus other factors in the international and Indian domestic scenes may cause the GOI to be willing to cooperate in demilitarization and accepting a reasonable plebiscite plan. It is reasonable to say that a major factor in United States policy in the Kashmir dispute, to date, has been to attempt to provide various devices for keeping the parties in a negotiating position so that (i) their positions would not become frozen; (ii) the combination of varying factors might cause the Indians to adhere to a reasonable solution. If this, in fact, has been the immediate limited objective of our policy in the United Nations, alternative (a) offers the opportunity of carrying out this policy while still enabling us to resort to a strong stand, as suggested by alternative (b), if the United Nations Representative’s negotiations actually are fruitless. In other words, employing alternative (a) does not rule out alternative (b), whereas the use of an Article 37 approach at this time would automatically eliminate alternative (a). Assuming that Pakistan will be satisfied and their public assured by Security Council action along the lines of the present UK-US resolution, this resolution should be put forward despite apparent Indian refusal to accept its terms, since the GOI will probably engage in negotiations with the United Nations Representative.

The proposal to present detailed recommendations under Article 37, in addition to eliminating a more flexible approach as outlined above, raises the serious problem of the succeeding step if the Indians, as is probable, reject the detailed recommendations under Article 37. It is true that a recommendation under Article 37 is not binding upon the parties (see Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 79th Congress, pp. 272–288). However, a detailed recommenda-
tion of this sort does involve the prestige of the Security Council to a greater degree than previous suggestions by the Council, which have had for their goal establishing machinery to aid the parties to reach a settlement of the dispute. A probable Indian rejection of such detailed recommendation would appear to have a more adverse reaction upon Security Council prestige than non-acceptance by the GOI of the type of proposals envisaged by the present UK–US resolution coupled with probable Indian willingness to negotiate with the United Nations Representative. Moreover, Indian refusal of detailed recommendations under Article 37 might logically lead the Security Council to consider whether the situation constitutes a threat to the peace, and face the Council with the unhappy task of deciding if enforcement measures under Chapter 7 are required. There has been no case before the Security Council to the present in which this question of enforcement measures has been considered when the dispute before the Council did not involve actual hostilities. Thus, it is somewhat difficult to see how the Council can determine that a threat to the peace exists when conditions in the Kashmir area are the same as they have been since the summer of 1949, and the Council has not yet declared that this situation constitutes a threat to the peace. Nonetheless, an Indian rejection of an Article 37 recommendation might well lead Pakistan to conclude that a show of force on the part of the Azad Kashmir forces or Muslim tribesmen would, given the Indian recalcitrance towards the Council, materially aid the Pakistan cause. In this situation, the Security Council would be faced with a situation which might be termed a threat to the peace, and probably would have to decide if enforcement measures were necessary to support the Council’s detailed recommendations under Article 37.

A final argument supporting this recommendation that alternative (a) be adopted is that since any lasting settlement of this dispute must rest on Indian as well as Pakistan acceptance, it is difficult to conceive what can be gained by dropping the present UK–US resolution, which is unacceptable to the GOI, and then put forward a recommendation which is sure to be even less acceptable to the Indians. The present resolution, at least, offers the possibility that the UN Representative’s negotiations may result in Indian acceptance of a reasonable solution of the dispute, while enabling establishment of more evidence which would be necessary if the Security Council must proceed to a detailed plan for settling the issues. Assuming that the Pakistanis will be satisfied by Security Council adoption of this resolution, as appears quite probable, it does not seem appropriate to drop this resolution and proceed to an Article 37 approach at this time.

SECRET PRIORITY

New York, February 28, 1951—1:51 p.m.

1207. Re Kashmir. Following SC dinner last night, Jebb \(^1\) agreed to my suggestion that we both approach Rau \(^2\) for an informal discussion of GOI reactions to Kashmir draft resolution. Although Rau appeared quite ready and willing to discuss matter, Jebb left me alone with Rau almost at once after conversation had begun. However, before Jebb left, following two points were brought up by Rau: (1) His statement that we need not be concerned by the proposed action of the Kashmir national conference (which Rau subsequently in conversation explained in fuller detail, as set forth below); and (2) his comment that the GOI felt matter should have been left to the settlement between the two parties. As to first point, Jebb expressed gratification, and as to second point, he commented merely that this was, after all, what Sir Owen Dixon himself had suggested.

I then continued conversation alone with Rau. Rau said it would be no secret to us that his government had reacted most unfavorably to the resolution. Nehru was “upset, very upset” not only about the substance of the resolution, but by the fact that matter had not been discussed with GOI in advance of tabling the resolution. GOI had made repeated efforts to ascertain in advance what was planned, but approaches to UK both in London and here had been rebuffed.

Throughout our talk, Rau’s criticism seemed directed against UK rather than against US. In fact, when I pointed out that our sole interest was to see a fair end to a dispute which was giving increasing concern to our Congress and people who were sincerely friendly toward the people of India, Rau readily expressed understanding of our motive and attitude. I said that we quite naturally felt that the Kashmir dispute was primarily an issue within the British Commonwealth nations, that we wished to be as helpful as possible in bringing the parties to agreement on a mutually satisfactory basis, and we understood that the draft resolution, which we had co-sponsored, reflected the best judgment of the Commonwealth Ministers who had participated in the London discussions of the matter.

Turning to the resolution itself, I said we shared anxiety of the British concerning the proposed action of the Kashmir national conference. It seemed to us that action taken by the conference which might prejudice and prejudice the plebiscite would be grossly arbitrary and utterly inconsistent both with the prior agreement of the parties

\(^1\) Sir Gladwyn Jebb, U.K. Representative to the United Nations.

\(^2\) Sir Benegal Narsing Rau, Permanent Indian Representative to the United Nations.
and the interest and jurisdiction of the SC. Rau replied that we need have no concern about the actions of the conference. He said the conference would limit itself to preparing a constitution and that for this purpose it was appropriate and necessary to establish a Constituent Assembly. However, the question of accession of the state would not arise. As to this, Rau emphasized, the matter was one to be handled subject to the SC.

I then raised the question of demilitarization, requesting Rau’s views on the resolution in this respect. Here I found him most critical of the resolution, which, he insisted, was built upon the “errors” of Sir Owen Dixon. Rau insisted Dixon had turned the clock back by reopening a question which had actually been previously settled by agreement of the parties. When I pressed Rau for further comment on this he said he was referring particularly to fact that the parties had agreed prior to Sir Owen’s advent that demilitarization of the state of Jammu-Kashmir would be effected and that this meant withdrawal of all Pakistani forces and of all Indian forces except for a small, if not negligible, number essential for security purposes. Rau complained that Sir Owen had reopened this question and had made it appear that Pakistan was not under an obligation to withdraw its forces from the large areas of which it was in occupation. Rau asserted that GOI was in process of withdrawing Indian forces, and in fact had already withdrawn 20 to 25 percent. Rau, therefore, objected to the provision in the draft resolution instructing the UN representative to effect demilitarization on the basis of Sir Owen Dixon’s proposal with such modifications as the UN representative deems necessary.

I replied that we were interested solely from the point of view of assuring that conditions would be established in which a free and fair plebiscite could be held. It seemed clear to us, as we had been advised by the British and by General McNaughton as well as Sir Owen Dixon, that demilitarization was an essential prerequisite. I said I assumed GOI was still willing to adhere to its agreement that a disposition of the state would be decided by a plebiscite. I asked Rau whether he could hazard an opinion as to when he thought a plebiscite could be held at the earliest practicable time under conditions assuring that such a plebiscite would be free. I found Rau very evasive on the whole subject of a plebiscite and I consequently prodded him from different directions. This elicited a rather discursive lecture on the impossibility of anyone (I was certain he was referring primarily to the British) understanding the problems of Kashmir who was not thoroughly familiar with the local situation. Rau said he himself had been Prime Minister of the State for over a year and he was personally well aware of the many difficulties and complexities of the situation. He thought Abdullah was genuinely attempting to bring
about reforms within the State and that conditions were improving all the time. This, Rau maintained, was why it was possible for the GOI to withdraw a substantial portion of its forces there. In addition, the Pakistanis had acted in a most unreasonable manner. Rau illustrated his comment by saying that he believed the dispute could have been settled last year if Ibrahim, former President of Azad Kashmir, had been allowed to follow through on his plan to confer at Lake Success with Abdullah. Rau said a lunch had actually been arranged by Ibrahim and Abdullah, but that the day prior to the luncheon, the Government of Pakistan had requested Ibrahim to leave New York.

I said that we did not wish to reopen settled questions nor become involved in a fruitless debate over past history. We were interested in the future and in the prompt and fair settlement of the dispute. Therefore, I hoped that Rau in his statement to the SC could find it possible to avoid bitterness, rancor or destructive criticism. I ventured to suggest to him that his approach might be to point out the manner in which the GOI felt the dispute could be settled, the steps by which his government believed demilitarization could be accomplished and the method and the time for holding a plebiscite. In other words, it seemed to me that if GOI pointed the way toward a solution, it would be most reassuring to our government and public, which were becoming increasingly anxious over the indefinite postponement of solution. Rau did not comment himself but listened attentively, and I do not know what his ultimate course will be. He reverted to his earlier comment that it was most unfortunate that the resolution had been tabled without prior discussion with his government. He repeated Nehru's deep disappointment and dissatisfaction and said it was quite possible that it was too late now to undo the harm that had been done. He felt that we should have taken into account the necessity for parties to reach an agreement on their own, and pointed to the recent trade agreement between India and Pakistan, which he said had been successfully concluded in spite of great difficulties in the way. He said we must remember that GOI is not a dictatorship and that the public reaction as well as the reaction in the Indian Parliament, has been violently opposed to the draft resolution. All this, Rau repeated, might have been avoided if his government had been consulted prior to the publication of our resolution.

The tone of our conversation, which was rather lengthy, was most friendly throughout and Rau seemed anxious to appear reasonable without concealing at any point his strong feeling that it had been a mistake to table the resolution without previous consultation with GOI.

GROSS
The Chargé in India (Steere) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY New Delhi, February 28, 1951—5 p. m.

2272. Munshi invited me call, ostensibly show me text Parliament statement he making today re efforts secure Russian wheat. Real purpose however was voice concern about likely results SC consideration Kashmir resolution sponsorship US–UK. Munshi said rightly or wrongly most Indians felt US sponsorship was retaliation for Indian attitude re Korea and to placate Pakistan. If matter came before SC Indian attitude at mildest would be SC could take whatever action it desired but India would refuse cooperate. It was even conceivable course debate might be such as induce India withdraw UNO. India in either event would be forced psychologically toward side Soviet and Communist China, latter of which, he said, was endeavoring placate India by reaching an accommodating agreement with Tibet. Soviets, he thought would play India’s side in SC and probably use veto (see Embtel 2231, February 24). In his view whole outlook was dismal and threatening, more so since US–UK did not seem be aware intensity Indian feeling.

By way of background Munshi mentioned Indian feeling it had been let down by British in Commonwealth Conference London, in GA action labeling Communist China aggressor and now (for first time in Kashmir dispute) in resolution strongly favoring Pakistan. His implication, though he avoided saying so, was Britain had yielded to or was influenced by US in each case.

I told Munshi could not believe GOI would take in SC almost suicidal course he had suggested, it was complete misreading US motives to regard sponsorship SC resolution as in any way related Indian action Korea. US concern about Kashmir dispute, involvement in which we had long sought avoid, was it constituted serious threat to peace and danger spot for Communist infiltration in South Asia. We had hoped India and Pakistan could themselves resolve problem but they had made no progress and situation now seemed threatening deteriorate as result Kashmir National Confederation activities. As member UN and SC with responsibilities for leadership we felt duty bound use UN machinery endeavor prevent situation becoming more dangerous.

1Kanialal Maneklal Munshi, Indian Minister of Food and Agriculture.
2Telegram 2231 from New Delhi, February 24, not printed, conveyed a report received by the Embassy that Sir B. N. Rau would make a statement at Lake Success on the U.K. U.S. draft Kashmir resolution that would be the “shortest and most insulting” ever made in the U.N. (357.AB./2–2451).
3Resolution 498 (V), adopted by the General Assembly at its 327th Plenary Meeting on February 1.
Munshi said he himself did not doubt US sincerity but many others did and he was frankly alarmed about attitude developing this country and wondered whether something could not be done avoid matter's coming to crisis. Was it not possible for SC debate be avoided at present time which most unpropitious. He suggested delay of say two months. If that impossible he thought friendly high level approach US-UK to parties concerned with indication readiness find solution outside UN would be best way avoid thoroughly bad situation now threatening. He said such approach was best way to deal with Nehru.

Munshi intimated that GOI would still accept solution giving Jammu to India through partition and providing acceptable means for conducting plebiscite in vale. Striking point was that India could not accept plebiscite proposal for vale which left military forces of Pakistan, the aggressor, where they are and required India, the injured party, to withdraw its army. No way to meet Indian sensibilities this point had yet been proposed.

My impressions of above are that Munshi: (a) Chiefly concerned lest debate Kashmir resolution might interfere favorable action US food grant legislation and (b) Might have been put up to making this approach by Cabinet colleagues. He was given no intimation that conversation would be reported.

STEERE

330/3–251: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY WASHINGTON, March 2, 1951—7 p. m.

1396. In event GOI officials approach Emb re SC Kashmir res, fol Dept views may be of use.

US deeply disappointed GOI reaction present SC efforts further solution Kashmir issue. Res tabled Feb 21 represents what we believe to be best method by which SC can assist parties reach fair agreement. Although we understand GOI concern at not being consulted before hand with respect res, we were dissuaded from discussing res before tabling with either India or Pakistan because of previous difficulties encountered when efforts were made along these lines.

US notes Rau statement in SC to effect Constituent Assembly under Kashmir national conference res is not intended prejudice issues before SC, or come in way of SC. We assume Rau spoke for Sheikh Abdullah

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1 Repeated as telegram 4010, to London, 540 to Karachi, and 756 to New York.
2 For the text of remarks made before the Security Council by the Indian Representative concerning the draft resolution of February 21, see Security Council document S/PV. 533.
Govt and that in this connection GOI authority re Kashmir is not limited to advisory role mentioned later in Rau speech.

In absence concrete GOI suggestions re future course US unimpressed by Rau intimation SC could do worse than follow Dixon advice to return initiative to parties in dispute. History Kashmir dispute since ceasefire has revealed apparent inability parties make any constructive proposal.

We believe GOI shld offer SC specific detailed suggestions for demilitarization and conduct plebiscite with specific dates for completion both. It is not in our opinion enough for GOI state it willing rest on its commitments contained Aug 48 and Jan 49 res. Such attitude overlooks unsuccessful efforts implement broad principles set forth these two UNCIP res. These efforts since Jan 49 have been made by UNCIP, McNaughton, Dixon, and Commonwealth PriMins. GOI position appears dispose of two years experience attempting resolve issues posed by implementation UNCIP resolutions. At minimum, SC shld know what GOI considers details necessary implement these res.

US hopes GOI will give every consideration to SC efforts bring about settlement this issue. We emphasize our suggestions motivated by sincere desire help both parties reach mutually acceptable settlement dispute.

WEBB

357.AB/3-351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

LONDON, March 3, 1951—2 p. m.

4755. According Olver, UK position on choice UN representative for Kashmir has now received Prime Minister's approval and will be conveyed in telegram British Embassy Washington today for discussion earliest with Department. Embassy gathers UK will say it less hopeful than we Bunche will be acceptable to Pakistanis but that after careful review other possibilities, there is no suitable candidate UK prepared suggest as alternative. UK does feel, however, Department should take preliminary soundings on likelihood Bunche acceptable to Pakistanis and if their reaction violent, position should be reviewed. With this in mind, UK would be willing for Department ascertain whether Bunche might be available.

CRO officials downcast by Rau's attack on UN resolution but there are certain individuals within CRO and Foreign Office with personal experience Indian temperament who say Indian reaction no more than might have been expected and similar intransigent stand certain occasions previous history UN consideration Kashmir dispute. These
individuals believe SC should continue with deliberation resolution as planned and try to get UN representative to Kashmir as soon as possible.

Department pass USUN. Repeated info New Delhi 148, Karachi 81, USUN 76.

Gifford

357.AB/3-551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, March 5, 1951—11 a.m.

1611. Deptel 542 February 28.1 Silence of Soviet press to date on SC meeting February 21 and US–UK resolution on Kashmir not surprising view past failure Soviets take active part in SC proceedings re Kashmir and relatively limited comment on subject in Soviet press since issue arose in 1947. Such articles as have appeared in Soviet periodicals and other media have invariably depicted Kashmir dispute as stemming from machinations of Anglo-American “imperialists” who while both interested in utilizing Kashmir as military base against USSR are at same time vying with each other for supremacy over the area. Soviet has thus deliberately soft-pedaled purely Indo-Pakistan character of dispute and attempted create impression that Anglo-American interests are encouraging continuance Indo-Pakistan struggle over Kashmir with view keeping two countries under imperialist yoke.

Kashmir developments from February 21 to date (formal US–UK initiative in SC, provisions of resolution re possible introduction UN forces into Kashmir and reported GOI rejection of resolution on grounds India cannot permit entry foreign troops) certainly afford Soviets excellent opportunity for further propaganda along foregoing lines. Failure Soviet press thus far utilize these developments may arise from fact that world peace council sessions Berlin, which also began February 21, have been dominant Soviet press topic during past week.

Reticence Soviet press this subject also reflection of basic early decision by Soviets not to alienate either Indians or Pakistanis by taking any concrete position on future status Kashmir and to let onus fall on US and UK for almost inevitably unpopular character in one

country or another of a given territorial decision. Wisdom of such policy must have been confirmed in Soviet minds by fact that Kashmir problem has indeed become major irritant in US-UK relations with both Karachi and New Delhi (Soviet policy re Palestine in past two years obviously formulated on same premises and with similar consequences).

Embassy inclined view that in future meetings SC on Kashmir Soviets will continue take backseat and let US and UK “hang themselves” over this explosive issue. If Soviets should contrary to this prediction decide take active part in dispute at this stage, they would almost certainly adopt pro-GOI position though for reasons given Delhi’s 103, January 23 (1950), they would probably prefer weak, independent Kashmir to either partition or accession of entire state to India or Pakistan. A pro-Indian position would be calculated encourage GOI neutralism on world scene and at same time embitter GOP relations with US and UK by making it even more difficult for latter “to deliver the goods” on Kashmir. Soviets must be aware that Pakistan public opinion so intense on Kashmir that failure GOP achieve favorable settlement may undermine present Karachi regime and thus create better prospects for eventual Commie revolution in Pakistan. Soviets may feel too that while solution favorable to GOI would not appreciably bolster internal GOI stability (since Kashmir not widespread popular issue in India), nevertheless Indian Commies and associated elements would be able capitalize on friendly support by Soviets of this aspect Nehru’s foreign policy. Within Kashmir itself opportunities for Commie penetration would be better under GOI-supported Sheikh Abdullah regime than control by present GOP.

On other hand, pro-GOI stand would have immediate, though perhaps short-lived unfavorable repercussions for Soviets in Pakistan and would also entail losses in Moslem Near East at time when Soviet influence on upgrade in that strategic region.

Whatever tactics Soviets choose follow, we may be sure they will not encourage or support constructive proposals aimed at a solution acceptable to both parties and conducive to greater stability in SOA. Advantages to Soviets of indefinite prolongation of tension between GOI and GOP must be presumed dominate any Kremlin approach to Kashmir problem.

Repeated info USUN 250, Delhi 54, Karachi 20, London 287.

Kirk

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*Telegram 103 from New Delhi, January 23, 1950, contained an analysis of an article which appeared in the January 6, 1950 issue of the Indian communist organ Crossroads, entitled “Imperialist Aggression in Kashmir.” The Embassy believed that the article was prepared on the basis of instruction from Moscow and that it would therefore assist in understanding the objectives of the Soviet Union in the forthcoming Security Council discussion of Kashmir. (357.AB/1-2350)
The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations 1

CONFIDENTIAL  PRIORITY  WASHINGTON, March 5, 1951—1 p. m.

760. Brit Emb informed Dept Mar 3 UK prepared accept Bunche provided US able prevail upon Pak agree his selection. Although we wld have preferred avoid seeking reaction parties selection candidate we believe interest moving ahead preferable accept UK suggestion. We suggest Gross approach Bunche informal basis and ascertain his availability, pointing out: (1) great importance UK, US attach early settlement Kashmir dispute which is retarding econ social progress both countries and preventing estab stable conditions important area Asia and world; (2) Pres had Bunche in mind (on Secy's recommendation) when he informed Pak FonMin Feb 14 US wld offer one of its most distinguished cits for role UN repr; (3) Dept believes Bunche has qualifications which make him eminently suited this difficult task and chances successful negts wld be greatly enhanced by his taking on this role; (4) Despite initial Indian reaction UK-US Res we hope further SC consideration will lead to situation in which appt UN repr of person such outstanding qualifications as Bunche would offer hope of progress.

WEBB

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1 Repeated for information to Karachi as telegram 550, to New Delhi as 1405, and to London as 4018.

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The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL  PRIORITY  NEW YORK, March 8, 1951—6:08 p. m.

1248. Re Kashmir. At Muniz's 1 (Brazil) request a talk was arranged in his office this morning to discuss amended draft he has tentatively drawn up as consequence of conversations he had yesterday with Rau and Zafrullah. (See immediately following telegram for text).  2  Meyers (UNP), Collins (SOA) and Maffitt 3 (USUN) accompanied me. Muniz had Ouro-Preto 4 and Araujo Castro 5 with him.

Muniz said Rau had sought him out in delegates' lounge yesterday and had indicated India's preoccupation over its partition problems

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1 João Carlos Muniz, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations.
2 Telegram 1246 from New York, March 8, not printed. Details of discussions on amendments to the U.S.-U.K. draft resolution are in file 357.AB.
4 C. S. de Ouro-Preto, Adviser, Brazilian Delegation to the United Nations.
5 J. A. de Araujo Castro, Adviser, Brazilian Delegation to the United Nations.
and its desire to get Kashmir question off its mind. Muniz said Rau had appeared worried, had given impression that GOI was feeling weight of adverse opinion on its Kashmir stand and was also feeling weight of Pakistani military strength along cease-fire line. Rau had almost seemed “as if he were putting himself in my hands”, Muniz said. In view of Rau’s demeanor, Muniz rather thought that time might be propitious for action at long last to resolve Kashmir problem.

Rau’s main point with Muniz had been that if India and Pakistan were left alone to settle dispute, India felt sure agreement would be reached. During his conversation with Rau, Muniz said he had brought up point of constituent assembly. Rau had reacted against any mention being made of it in resolution, as offensive to India. His remarks at table March 1st had been sufficient assurance on that score. Muniz then had idea of proposing to Rau that if certain features unacceptable to India were struck from resolution, Nehru might make statement to effect India would negotiate with another UNRep. Rau had not rejected this. Question of whether arbitration would be left in resolution had not been mentioned.

Muniz said that after council meeting Zafrullah had sought him out to discuss Kashmir and had appeared receptive to his general ideas for amending resolution, which were developing from Rau talk. Muniz told Zafrullah Rau had shown anxiety over situation created by dispute, with India “bleeding” from partition and emotions running high. Muniz felt Rau had a point there.

Muniz seemed to us very interested in possibility of his getting something done with this new lead and was optimistic over prospects. While encouraging him and commending his statesmanship in taking this initiative, we sought to point out some of gopher holes ahead of him. Commenting on his tentative draft, I said two main points seem to emerge in connection with it: Constituent assembly and arbitration. I said that Pakistanis had asked SC take action to prevent establishment of constituent assembly and that to date Rau’s assurances that assembly would not deal with accession were not clear. Much depended, of course, on what Rau would say Friday on this score, but in any case something had to go into record through resolution showing council’s feelings on subject. As for arbitration, this was one of principal points in resolution that constituted an advance over previous three years negotiations and should remain, as Brazilian draft contemplated. We pointed out year and half ago when India rejected President Truman’s and Prime Minister Attlee’s arbitration suggestion, it had said that disarming and disbanding of Azad forces was matter not for arbitration but had to be settled as prior condition and that India, while subscribing to principle of arbitration which was in charter, could not agree to step without knowing in advance what points would be arbitrated. In this connection, we said India’s
position on Azads was based on their thesis that accession had been completed and Kashmir was part of India. We said US does not subscribe to this, but feels that accession to either party will not be completed until fair and impartial plebiscite carried out. We cautioned that Muniz bear this in mind when talking again to Rau on subject.

We also said that statement from Nehru simply that GOI would negotiate with UNRep would not be sufficient for Pakistanis, since it would permit Indians to adopt same position on arbitration as it had in 1949. We felt that another exercise of mediation without this further step provided for would be little more than a fourth round of activity which had three times failed.

As an indication of what the Brazilians were thinking, Ouro-Preto, in an aside, said that it was "as plain as nose on your face" that India knew plebiscite would give state to Pakistan and therefore had sabotaged all efforts to implement over-all commitment.

In summing up I added that members of SC should keep in close touch and try to work out constructive proposal, but that it would seem unwise to get into negotiations here with parties. This should be task of UNRep on the spot.

I further said that question of Communism entered into the matter, since Russians had indicated they were thinking of independence as solution and since Yugoslavs who were friendly to India had their own interest in matter and were thinking of making some suggestions for SC mediation in NY. I said UK had strong Commonwealth interest in case and was taking lead in present round. We were naturally endeavoring to assist them and Commonwealth and were keeping in mind that this could to some degree become Commonwealth-Communist issue.

Muniz indicated he would be talking further with two parties and would keep us informed of results.

GROSS

891.2811/3-1051

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Pakistan-Afghanistan Affairs (Gatewood)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] March 10, 1951.

Subject: Possible Unfavorable Effects of US Provision of Wheat to India.¹

Participants: Mr. Mohamad Ali, Secretary-General, Government of Pakistan

SOA—Mr. Mathews

Mr. Gatewood

¹ For documentation on the provision of wheat to India, see pp. 2085 ff.
In the course of today's conversation concerning the proposed UN resolution on Kashmir, Mr. Mohamad Ali referred to the considerable drain on the Indian economy resulting from the maintenance of troops in Kashmir and pointed out that this drain particularly affected the Indian transportation system, the volume of petroleum and automotive imports, and the Indian budget. He said he did not intend to suggest that the US fail to provide the wheat requested by India (either on a gift or loan basis) and that he understood it might be considered "heartless" to attach any political conditions to this transaction, such as the settlement of the Kashmir issue; however, he emphasized that the continued existence of the dispute was forcing Pakistan to maintain a high level of defense expenditure and he expressed the hope that the US would utilize its influence to impress on India the need for devoting its resources to constructive purposes which would bring about peace and prosperity on the subcontinent as a whole.

Mr. Mathews said that the Department had been aware of this need ever since partition and, after complimenting Mr. Mohamad Ali on the effectiveness of Pakistan propaganda in the US directed against the proposed US gift of wheat to India, reminded him that some of these Pakistan arguments might later be used in Congress to oppose the fulfilment of "other desires" of this type that might be expressed by South Asian countries.

Mr. Baig pointed out that his Government had expressed no wish for US aid economic aid and the conversation turned to other matters.

357.AB/3–1251: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

New York, March 12, 1951—7:29 p. m.

1264. Re Kashmir. Zafrullah and Mohamed Ali called this morning at former's request to discuss substance and procedure of SC action now that both parties have been heard from. Their main points were the constituent assembly called for by the Kashmir national conference, and the problem of implementing the details of UNCIP resolutions.

Re constituent assembly, Zafrullah said he hoped SC would make clear that assembly should not be called. He feared that GOI would claim afterward that it was freely elected, UN not having objected to its creation, and that therefore nothing further regarding a plebiscite was necessary to enable people to express will regarding accession. I remarked that undesirability of such development was quite obvious. Mohamed Ali thought constituent assembly would, if necessary, later claim right to pass on accession. I said this point could be
taken up in re-framing of resolution, which action we believe will be necessary. The thing was to determine whether this point was among items of "irreducible minimum" beyond which present draft resolution could not be cut. I pointed out, however, that I had had no time to talk with Jebb and I expressed hope Zafrullah would understand. I could say nothing further at this time regarding possible future action on this point.

Zafrullah's principal argument with regard to implementation problems was that the points in disagreement were political, or technical, not legal. GOP therefore felt that outstanding figure as UN representative would furnish more effective pressure in interpreting how resolutions should be carried out than would judicial person or tribunal. Mohamed Ali said that if questions were of legal character ICJ would carry much greater weight, but since they were of political nature, pronouncement of eminent figure such as Nimitz would have more weight than court or other legal body. I pointed out that Nimitz is not available for UN representative job and further that interpretation of contract is traditionally left to courts. Nimitz being unavailable, I said there might be difficulty in getting man with all qualifications required and it might be better to have tribunal as second string if US representative failed.

Zafrullah said that remedy is needed for what has become "clear GOI pattern of obstruction" of details of implementation and that US representative must have arbitration or interpretation powers, otherwise he would be back in June or July with no result, as in the past UNCIP Dixon returned to report failure. If this happened Zafrullah said, he did not know what else GOP could say to its people to justify lack of solution of Kashmir problem.

Emphasizing that I was merely discussing and not advocating any view at this time, I asked whether there was any advantage in treating UN representative as SC executive and reserving judicial role to some sort of tribunal. Wouldn't ICJ under the circumstance have more authority than UN representative under Pakistan's suggestion? Zafrullah admitted that in some cases perhaps this would be true, but returned to argument that questions over Kashmir being political, UN representative would be in better position to make interpretation. Furthermore, since Indian agreement was called for in resolutions, progress would be stymied at once, whereas if UN representative might interpret points at issue we would at least get to show-down without delay necessitated by his going through exercise of seeking agreement. Mohamed Ali added that while this process would delay UN action, matters would nonetheless be marching (Kashmir constituent assembly, Pakistan restiveness, et cetera) and anyway final court decision might be so lengthy and intricate as to confuse clear issue of Indian obstructionism.
I inquired whether Pakistanis agreed to deletion of details, which I did not specify, up to irreducible minimum. Mohamed Ali replied in affirmative.

Zafrullah then asked what our over-all timetable or procedure was. We replied UK and we are not thinking of negotiations with parties or rapporteur, but rather of proceeding with resolution, suitably amended. We thought that if we agreed with British today or tomorrow on amendments, we could seek usual member's support thereafter and possibly present amendments Thursday.1 However, since other members seem to have ideas, we did not know whether such tentative deadline could be made or who might be putting in amendments. We were only speaking for ourselves and for what we knew of British position. Zafrullah indicated satisfaction with this and counselled care in proceeding to presentation of amendments. If more time was needed in order to work out greater support and best resolution, Pakistanis would not mind few more days delay after so many years.

GROSS

1 March 15.

357.AB/3–2151 : Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY NEW YORK, March 21, 1951—3:15 p. m.

1311. Re UN Representation—Kashmir. Pursuant to Deptel No. 760, Mar 5, I approached Bunche Mar 20 (upon his return to town) on informal basis to ascertain his availability, making points outlined in ref tel. I also discussed with him frankly questions he raised concerning probable attitude of parties toward him, our estimate of likelihood of success or of progress, etc. Bunche says he is willing to serve if we think he can be useful.

Subsequently I obtained SYG Lie's approval and at my request Lie talked to Bunche.

The matter is now clear from this end and Dept can feel free to act on basis that Bunche has accepted with Lie’s approval.

GROSS

357.AB/3–2251 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NEW YORK, March 22, 1951—7:33 p. m.

1321. Re Kashmir: Zafrullah and Mohammed Ali, Jebb and Fowler, and Maffitt and Gross met in UKDel office this morning to discuss
Bunche. Zafrullah outlined three reasons why Bunche is unacceptable to his country: (a) he is thought to be too devoted to Nehru, as champion of colored races, (b) his mediation efforts in Palestine were designed to result in establishment of Israel as state, and (c) as a UN figure he has less prestige in this matter than if he were outstanding in American national life.

Zafrullah pointed out these objections have been on record with Dept for a year. He referred to talk he had with McGhee in 1950 shortly prior to appointment of Dixon and to his recent talk with President and Secretary. On latter occasion he had felt President had Bunche in mind, although no name was mentioned, and had attempted, without openly alluding to him, to make clear Pakistanis' deep objection to him. He also recalled that on same occasion President had indicated list would be prepared from which suitable candidate could be chosen. Despite this commitment, we had pressed on with Bunche in face of known Pakistan position, and it appeared to Zafrullah that we may have given thought to no one else. We assured him that this was not the case, but that Bunche's qualifications were so high and he seemed so uniquely suitable that we had selected him. It was now obvious that we had not accurately gauged the depth of the Pakistan feeling re him; in fact, from Zafrullah's demeanor on March 19 Gross and Jebb had concluded Paks would accept him. Zafrullah agreed that there had been a misunderstanding and he hoped he had not contributed to it in his conversation on March 19.

In discussing our reasons for preferring Bunche, Gross stressed that the British and we are not insisting on pushing any particular person, but simply want to get the best man for the job. He pointed out that the decision ultimately is up to the Security Council, and other members will have to be consulted and make up their minds. He said that in our effort to produce a suitable candidate we had two possible methods to choose from: to depend on the assent of both parties, or to confine consultations to Council members and proceed to a selection without giving the parties a voice in it. We had tried to take a middle course, avoiding arbitrariness but at the same time not leaving ourselves open to a veto from one of the parties.

Regarding Bunche's qualifications, Gross said it was precisely his UN status that gave us confidence he would enter case with strong bias in favor of making plebiscite possible. His UN training would see to that. We could not know that same would be true of a person without Bunche's background. Dixon, for example, had given up overall plebiscite idea and had proposed compromise. Gross also thought that Zafrullah in his objections might be confusing deep seated mental

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3 Mr. Bunche had formerly served as U.N. Acting Mediator on Palestine, 1948-1949.
reservations with initial reaction on announcement of Bunche’s appointment. Perhaps Bunche would have the greater success at end for having begun under the initial handicap pointed out by Zafrullah. Gross was sure Bunche’s honesty and loyalty to UN would vindicate Council’s judgment if it chose him. Furthermore, there was great advantage in having India cordial to a UN rep who, for our part, we were certain would be scrupulously fair.

Jebb inquired whether Pakistan would still oppose Bunche if India indicated it would accept the resolution so long as Bunche was UN rep. Zafrullah’s first reaction was that this hypothetical attitude by India would indicate that India felt Bunche would favor it. In that case, perhaps, Pakistan would endeavor to dispense with intermediate three months exercise and try for immediate arbitration. Later Zafrullah betrayed the suspicion that Jebb’s question denoted deal whereby we would try to force Bunche on him by dangling bait of Indian acceptance of res. We attempted to disabuse him of this suspicion. Gross wondered what importance India’s knowing of our preference for Bunche would have if Bunche not chosen. Mohammad Ali thought it would be of little importance since last year when Bunche’s name also was prominently mentioned, Indians had accepted Dixon.

Zafrullah seemed to feel that we were inconsistent in bowing to India’s veto of Nimitz last year while attempting to force on Pakistan a man against whom Pakistan had registered opposition fully year ago. He finally summed up his position by saying that he had been hoping to see acceptable UN rep named, had once again stated his govt’s views, and would continue to entertain hope for suitable rep.

Jebb and Gross said more thought must be given to the matter.

Before meeting broke up there was discussion of Pakistan reaction to high ranking military adviser if Bunche named. Zafrullah seemed to assume such adviser would be Gen. Courtney Hodges and to our surprise said Lie yesterday had told him Bunche was going out with Hodges as his adviser. We manifested further astonishment. Gross finally summed up our position saying question is whether Bunche is a good man for job or not; if he is good, SC problem is to weigh his qualifications against objections cited by Pakistan and endeavor to decide on his suitability. Jebb concurred. Mohammed Ali felt the problem was not to debate merits of an individual, but to select an individual who will fit the bill.

After Pakistanis left, there was discussion with Jebb in which he wondered whether we might turn to other American. He read from

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*U.S. Army, retired; former Commanding General, First Army, 1944–1949.*
list including such men as Vannevar Bush, Gen. Clay, Sumner Wells, Norman Armour, Harold Stassen. Gross and Maffitt countered with suggestion that some outstanding Commonwealth man be picked such as Alexander Cadogan. Jebb said he would report developments to his FO and include this suggestion, but he understood that UK policy was not to have Commonwealth member. Gross pointed out that up to now two Commonwealth men had been utilized and had done well.

If Zafrullah cares to lobby against Bunche among members he will do it well and we might not be able to put him over. It may be that he is play acting lest Indians think Pakistan wants Bunche. Also, he may not have given sufficient thought to consequences if we lose UN rep who very probably has cordial GOI sympathy. However USUN is inclined to feel that he is sincere in his perturbation and has thought matter through. He seems to lay great store by President’s oral assurance that several Americans will be suggested for job, and if, as Mohammed Ali alleges, President also put this in writing to Liaquat, we frankly see no way to honor our commitment, if Zafrullah insists, except by producing someone else. The best we can do at this moment would seem to be to arrange, if possible, for the SC members to try to convince Pakistanis appointment of Bunche is to Pakistanis’ own interest. If this fails, or if we conclude that circumstances cited by Zafrullah outweigh Bunche’s qualifications, we seem committed to looking elsewhere, in the US.

AUSTIN

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857.AB/3-2951: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 23, 1951—7 p. m.

PRIORITY NIAC

601. USUN advised Dept Zafrullah, Mar 21, expressed strong opposition Bunche UN Rep Kashmir when told now possible designate

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1Repeated for information to London as telegram 4328, to New Delhi as 1540, and to New York as 808.
him per agreement with Syg and Bunche. In view USUN and UKDel understanding evening Mar 19 Bunche not entirely unacceptable to GOP, Dept surprised strength Zafrullah reaction. You are requested make immediate inquiry and report basis this reaction pointing out fol:

1. Probability press leak re Bunche appointment impelled USDel inform Indians re proposed designation same time Zafrullah advised. Consistent with Pres’s promise to Liaquat, we wld if necessary submit another American for nomination. However, in view unexpected strength GOP reaction, we wld have to give very careful consideration next person so named. This, obviously, might cause delay appointment UN Rep and GOP has said time of essence in dealing with dispute.

2. Moreover, we desire remind GOP it was Pak principle neither party have veto over selection UN Rep. However, in view Zafrullah’s objection Bunche, we believe we must consider GOI as well as GOP reactions when we tell parties our next preferred UN Rep nominee. This may also result additional delay.

3. US believes Bunche best possible choice and has gone considerable lengths persuade him accept post. We believe strongly Bunche’s objectivity; feel suspicion possible anti-Moslem or pro-Indian prejudice unfounded. US prepared inform Bunche GOP has objected to him as UN Rep, believing that then Bunche wld wish withdraw his name. Before speaking to Bunche, we wish GOP know our intent and desire obtain their reaction. We wish point out that if GOP continues desire withdrawal Bunche’s name, we will approach him with greatest reluctance and with belief his withdrawal is profound mistake, not in Pak’s best interest.

4. If GOP case re Kashmir as good as claimed, GOP shld be prepared press case with designated UN Rep of established qualifications. In our opinion, GOP reaction Bunche may prejudice their case, particularly because GOI will surmise withdrawal Bunche’s name result GOP objection.

USDel instructed make somewhat similar approach Zafrullah.2

ACHESON

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2 Telegram 879, from Karachi, March 25, reported that the substance of telegram 601 had been given to Mohammad Ikrarnullah, Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Government of Pakistan, who in turn communicated it to Prime Minister Liaquat. In response, the Prime Minister reiterated that Mr. Bunche was not acceptable to the Government of Pakistan under any circumstances. The Embassy reported its belief that Liaquat’s position was based above all on his estimate of probable public reaction should Bunche be named U.N. Representative. (357.AB/3-2551)
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] March 27, 1951.

Subject: Availability of Frank P. Graham\(^1\) as UN Representative for Kashmir Dispute

1. Because the President had appointed Admiral Nimitz to be Chairman of the U.S. Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights, on February 15, 1951 the President replied to a letter from the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, stating that we would suggest Americans other than Admiral Nimitz as nominees for the position of United Nations Representative in the Kashmir dispute (Tab A).\(^2\) Pakistan had pressed the President to make available Admiral Nimitz for the position envisaged in the draft resolution (Tab B) jointly presented to the Security Council by the United Kingdom and the United States, and revised March 21, 1951.\(^3\) The UN Representative, under the terms of this resolution will be responsible for effecting demilitarization of Kashmir preliminary to a plebiscite, or of obtaining the parties’ agreement to a demilitarization plan, within three months from the date he arrives on the subcontinent.

2. Pursuant to this understanding we had proposed Ralph J. Bunche as the best American candidate for this position of UN Representative. The United Kingdom agreed to Dr. Bunche, provided that he was acceptable to the Government of Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan flatly rejected Dr. Bunche on March 24, because of his association with the Palestine dispute and because the Pakistanis regarded him as too friendly to Prime Minister Nehru of India. Since the President promised to suggest “certain names” to act in Admiral Nimitz’ stead, we must present other American candidates.

3. It is our belief that Dr. Frank P. Graham is the outstanding candidate, in the light of his standing and particularly his contribution to the solution of the Indonesian question. Since Dr. Graham has just recently received an important assignment in the Department of Labor, we believe that he would be reluctant to consider the position of UN Representative unless released by the President. In view of your relationship with Dr. Graham and the urgent importance of the

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\(^2\) Not printed.

\(^3\) For the text of /2017/Rev. 1, as adopted by the Security Council on March 30, see p. 1758.
Kashmir problem to the peace of the Indian subcontinent, we request that, if you approve, the matter be taken up with the President at an early opportunity, to the end that Dr. Graham may be available for this vital post for a period of approximately 3 or 4 months.

Recommendations:
1. That the matter be taken up with the President at the first opportunity.
2. If the President is agreeable, that Dr. Graham be approached and urged to accept this assignment.

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Howard Meyers of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL
US/S/1718

[NEW YORK,] March 28, 1951.

Subject: Kashmir

Participants: Mr. B. L. Sharma, Indian Delegation
Frank D. Collins—SOA
Howard Meyers—UNP

We saw Mr. Sharma at New India House. We opened the conversation by stating we wished to continue our informal discussions on Kashmir, as suggested by Mr. Sharma when we last met.

Mr. Sharma referred very bitterly to Sir Gladwyn Jebb’s remarks during the March 21 Security Council meeting, saying that he had cast aspersions on India’s intentions in permitting convocation of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly. We remarked that we had noted Prime Minister Nehru’s recent statement at Agra, when he had declared that India’s position had either been misunderstood or deliberately misrepresented by the United Kingdom and the United States Representatives to the Security Council. We said we thought it was unfortunate that Mr. Nehru had expressed himself so strongly when it had not been UK or US intention to challenge India’s motives, but, on the contrary, to point out that the actions of the Kashmir National Conference—when taken in conjunction with various statements about their legal position vis-à-vis India—presented a confusing picture which we thought should be clarified by a definite Indian statement that the Government of India would not permit the Kashmir Constituent Assembly to take action which would prejudice the issue before the Security Council.

When Mr. Sharma insisted that the Government of India could not prevent the people of Kashmir from expressing their opinion about the question of accession, Mr. Meyers suggested that there were two
good legal analogies which indicated that the Government of India might well prevent the Constituent Assembly from expressing an opinion on the question of accession and, at least, should lead India to declare that it would not permit action by the Kashmir State Government which would interfere with the issue before the Security Council. The first analogy was that of a jury, which, before the trial began, could not declare its opinion in regard to the issue concerning which it was the trier of fact, since this would prejudice the jury’s decision. The second analogy was that in which the title to property is in dispute and an injunction is issued forbidding action which might interfere with the ultimate determination of title. Obviously, if the Kashmiris, acting through the Constituent Assembly, expressed their “opinion” about accession, this expression could well influence them when the time came to vote in the plebiscite. Mr. Sharma seemed to admit some validity in these analogies, but insisted that Sir Benegal Rau’s statements concerning the inability of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly to issue more than an “opinion” on the subject of accession were sufficient guarantees of the Government of India’s good intent in this situation. He also said that, while India viewed the plebiscite question as whether Kashmir should remove itself from India (accession having already occurred), India’s international commitment under the UNCIP resolutions was in terms of settling accession to either India or Pakistan by a free and impartial plebiscite under UN auspices. Consequently, Sir Benegal Rau had not meant to suggest that the question put to the people of Kashmir during the plebiscite be phrased other than “do you wish to accede to India or Pakistan?” Theoretically, the question could be asked if Kashmir should be independent, but the Government of India would undoubtedly not like this.

Mr. Collins pressed strongly for an Indian statement of willingness to accept the amended resolution. Mr. Sharma replied that India could not support the entire resolution. He added that the Delegation had just received their instructions, as follows:

a) The Government of India could not accept the paragraphs in the Preamble which referred to the Kashmir Constituent Assembly; nor could they accept the operative section clause calling upon the parties to arbitrate unresolved issues as formulated and reported by the UN Representative.

b) The Government of India would accept that part of the resolution directing the UN Representative to proceed to the sub-continent, and would, of course, cooperate fully with the UN Representative.

We urged Mr. Sharma to see if it were not possible for the Indian Government to acquiesce in the arbitration proposal, pointing out that it was no more than a logical step in the development of this case. While it was true that it went beyond the two UNCIP resolu-
tions, it was a proper step forward if the Kashmir dispute were to reach a speedy and reasonable settlement. Mr. Sharma argued this point strongly, saying that India did not object to arbitration in principle, but simply could not agree to be bound in advance to arbitrate all issues remaining unresolved at the end of three months of negotiations by the UN Representative. He suggested it would be better to provide that the UN Representative report to the Security Council those matters which the Representative regarded as fit subjects for arbitration; that the Security Council should consider this report and determine which of these issues were proper subjects for arbitration; that the Council should then recommend to the parties that these issues be arbitrated.

Mr. Collins remarked that the development of the case indicated quite clearly now what issues would most probably remain unresolved and thus be the subject of arbitration. Consequently, he strongly suggested the advisability of Indian acceptance of the arbitration provision in the amended resolution. However, Mr. Sharma replied that the Indian Delegation's instructions left no room for compromise on this point. He hoped that the UN Representative, whoever the Representative might be, could be successful, and pointed out that the present Security Council discussions on the Kashmir dispute had at least served the valuable purpose of clearing the air of misapprehensions and of returning to the August 1948 and January 1949 UNCIP resolutions.

Mr. Meyers took the opportunity to inform Mr. Sharma that Ralph Bunche had withdrawn his name as a candidate for the position of UN Representative and said that we were considering other possibilities, but had not reached any final conclusions. Mr. Sharma indicated no reaction to this news.

We also told Mr. Sharma that we anticipated there were sufficient votes to pass the resolution; that we expected three or four Council members, other than the United Kingdom and the United States, to speak about the resolution at tomorrow's Security Council meeting. Mr. Sharma thanked us for the information, and said that the Indian Delegation had always been most appreciative of the good relations existing between them and the US Delegation.

Before leaving, we returned to the question of the nature of the forthcoming Indian statement in the Security Council, urging that, if possible, Sir Benegal Rau adopt a moderate tone. Mr. Sharma again indicated that the Indian Delegation's discretion was circumscribed by the instructions it had received from New Delhi. He spoke most strongly against the statement made by Sir Gladwyn Jebb and said that New Delhi had sent the Delegation much information indicating British duplicity in the Kashmir dispute, but that the Delegation could not use the information because so much of it related to the
January meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, and was of a confidential nature which could not be disclosed. He said that India was conscious of the good intentions and fair-mindedness of the US, but it was most unfortunate that the US had associated itself with the UK in sponsoring this resolution, since the US would thereby be associated with the UK's statements and objectives.

We closed our discussion on a cordial note, expressing our appreciation for the frankness with which Mr. Sharma had spoken.

Howard Meyers

Secretary's Memoranda: Lot 53 D 444

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] March 28, 1951.

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, WEDNESDAY, MARCH 28, 1951,
3:15 P. M.

[Re:] Availability of Frank P. Graham as UN Representative for Kashmir Dispute

The President indicated that he thought Dr. Frank Graham would be an excellent choice to handle the Kashmir matter mentioned in the attached memorandum,¹ and authorized us to discuss this with Secretary Tobin.²

When we left Secretary Tobin was waiting outside and I mentioned this matter briefly to him. He appeared quite reluctant to release Dr. Graham, and I left the matter on the basis that we would contact him to discuss the importance of the Kashmir assignment so that he could judge whether or not he could release Dr. Graham for this purpose.

James E. Webb

¹Not printed.
²Maurice J. Tobin, Secretary of Labor.

Resolution Adopted by the United Nations Security Council¹

[NEW YORK,] March 30, 1951.

Having received and noted the report of Sir Owen Dixon, the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, on his mission initiated by the Security Council resolution of 14 March 1950;

¹U.N. document S/2017/Rev. 1, approved at the 539th meeting of the Security Council, March 30, by 8 votes to none, with India, the USSR, and Yugoslavia abstaining. For the record of the meeting, see U.N. document S/PV. 559.
Observing that the Governments of India and Pakistan have accepted the provisions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 and have re-affirmed their desire that the future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations;

Observing that on 27 October 1950 the General Council of the "All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference" adopted a resolution recommending the convening of a Constituent Assembly for the purpose of determining the "future shape and affiliations of the State of Jammu and Kashmir"; observing further from statements of responsible authorities that action is proposed to convene such a Constituent Assembly and that the area from which such a Constituent Assembly would be elected is only a part of the whole territory of Jammu and Kashmir;

Reminding the Governments and Authorities concerned of the principle embodied in the Security Council resolutions of 21 April 1948, 3 June 1948 and 14 March 1950 and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, that the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations;

Affirming that the convening of a Constituent Assembly as recommended by the General Council of the "All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference", and any action that Assembly might attempt to take to determine the future shape and affiliation of the entire State or any part thereof would not constitute a disposition of the State in accordance with the above principle;

Declaring its belief that it is the duty of the Security Council in carrying out its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security to aid the parties to reach an amicable solution of the Kashmir dispute and that a prompt settlement of this dispute is of vital importance to the maintenance of international peace and security;

Observing from Sir Owen Dixon's report that the main points of difference preventing agreement between the parties were:

(a) The procedure for and the extent of demilitarization of the State preparatory to the holding of a plebiscite, and
(b) The degree of control over the exercise of the functions of government in the State necessary to ensure a free and fair plebiscite;

*U.N. document S/819.*
The Security Council,

1. Accepts, in compliance with his request, Sir Owen Dixon’s resignation and expresses its gratitude to Sir Owen for the great ability and devotion with which he carried out his mission;

2. Decides to appoint a United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan in succession to Sir Owen Dixon;

3. Instructs the United Nations Representative to proceed to the sub-continent and, after consultation with the Governments of India and Pakistan, to effect the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949;

4. Calls upon the parties to co-operate with the United Nations Representative to the fullest degree in effecting the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir;

5. Instructs the United Nations Representative to report to the Security Council within three months from the date of his arrival on the sub-continent. If, at the time of this report, he has not effected demilitarization in accordance with paragraph 3 above, or obtained the agreement of the parties to a plan for effecting such demilitarization, the United Nations Representative shall report to the Security Council those points of difference between the parties in regard to the interpretation and execution of the agreed resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 which he considers must be resolved to enable such demilitarization to be carried out;

6. Calls upon the parties, in the event of their discussions with the United Nations Representative failing in his opinion to result in full agreement, to accept arbitration upon all outstanding points of difference reported by the United Nations Representative in accordance with paragraph 5 above; such arbitration to be carried out by an Arbitrator, or a panel of Arbitrators, to be appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice after consultation with the parties;

7. Decides that the Military Observer group shall continue to supervise the cease-fire in the State;

8. Requests the Governments of India and Pakistan to ensure that their agreement regarding the cease-fire shall continue to be faithfully observed and calls upon them to take all possible measures to ensure the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations and to refrain from any action likely to prejudice a just and peaceful settlement;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan with such services and facilities as may be necessary in carrying out the terms of this resolution.
KASHMIR DISPUTE

357.AB/3-3051: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

NEW DELHI, March 30, 1951—5 p. m.

2626. 1. We assume GOI opposition to Kashmir resolutions presented SC no surprise to Department since Embassy has repeatedly reported during last two years GOI not likely agree arbitration on any important phase Kashmir dispute. Thus far GOI has been less violent than we had expected against US and UK for supporting resolutions this kind. It is likely as our support continues denunciations will increase in shrillness and violence.

2. We believe GOI will continue register objections to any resolution looking toward demilitarization and plebiscite. Noteworthy that neither Nehru nor other GOI spokesmen have thus far undertaken discuss either draft resolution objectively. They have preferred resort to generalities and employ such broad arguments as Kashmir juridically and politically integral part India. In our opinion GOI convinced that if it entrusts outcome dispute to SC it wld eventually lose parts Kashmir now held by India. It therefore hopes SC will drop dispute and present temporary partition will gradually be accepted as permanent. We also believe GOI fears lack determination on its part resulting in weakening position India and Kashmir wld lower prestige Nehru in India and render Congress Party more vulnerable during electoral campaign of next autumn.

3. It seems to us that for US and UK to retreat in face Indian denunciations from position assumed after careful deliberation and after having foreseen Indian attitude wld indicate indecision and lack conviction. Retreat wld not increase respect for US, UK or UN in South Asia and wld render it more difficult for UN play any effective role re Kashmir in immediate future.

4. There is possibility that if present resolution shld pass SC despite GOI opposition GOI might receive mediator and might cooperate in other ways in execution of resolution but wld refuse accept part relating arbitration. We thus far refuse take seriously rumors obviously inspired GOI may withdraw UN if pressed too far.

5. Assume Dept also troubled re steps to take in case GOI eventually refuses accept recommendation or recommendations contained in resolution passed by SC. We regret we have no constructive suggestion offer this respect at this time. That bridge one to be crossed later. Nevertheless we believe that it wld be unfortunate for US fail support resolution which it considers offers fair solution merely because one or more parties to dispute may refuse live up to suggestions contained therein.

HENDERSON
Memorandum by Mr. Howard Meyers of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs.\(^1\)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**WASHINGTON, April 3, 1951.**

Subject: Kashmir: Future Policy

1. Sir B. N. Rau's recent statements in the Security Council during discussions on the resolution adopted by the Council March 30, coupled with statements by Prime Minister Nehru, indicate quite clearly that India's minimum goal in Kashmir is to make the present cease-fire line a political boundary. It may be surmised that the GOI's median policy is to keep alive the Kashmir issue, as a means of weakening the position of the Government of Pakistan and threatening Pakistan's security; that India's maximum objective might be to use the Kashmir issue, among other disputes, as an excuse for an attempt to bring Pakistan territory within a Greater India. If this analysis is correct, the United Nations Representative, to be appointed by the March 30 Resolution, will be unsuccessful in accomplishing his task of effecting demilitarization or, at least, securing the parties' agreement to a demilitarization program within three months from the time he arrives on the subcontinent. The problem, then, is what should be our action after the UN Representative reports the failure of his mission.

2. The UK Delegation believes that the Security Council, at this stage, should develop a detailed statement of the exact way in which the Council believes demilitarization and a plebiscite should be carried out. The device which might be employed to work out this detailed statement was not suggested. Following adoption of the statement, the Council would cease suggesting other solutions or methods for arriving at a solution, on the basis that a detailed declaration of such Security Council ideas would provide maximum pressure on the Government of India to take a more temperate line and explore reasonable solutions. (See my conversation with Robert Fowler, US/S/1706, 20 March 1951).\(^2\)

3. To my mind, implicit in this British suggestion is the possibility that the UK will be able, following such detailed statement, to turn to Pakistan and say that the UK has carried out its maximum responsibility as Senior Commonwealth Member to provide aid and guidance in attempts at settlement of the Kashmir dispute. The UK will also be able to give up its role of initiator in attempting to find

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\(^1\) Addressed to the Director of the Office of U.N. Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse) and the Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Mathews).

\(^2\) Not printed.
solutions for the Kashmir dispute in the United Nations. The dispute will continue; relations between India and Pakistan will worsen; and the United States will then be faced with the problem of deciding whether to adopt a different policy than the present one, including as a possibility the assumption of initiative hitherto exercised, however reluctantly, by the United Kingdom.

4. From the viewpoint of our national interest, as opposed to our international obligations, the Kashmir dispute is only one element in the greater problem of our relationship with India and Pakistan. In many ways, it provides the point at which our obligations as a Member of the United Nations, plus our honest evaluation of just solutions, affect most adversely our relations with India. I do not believe that we should abjure our international obligations in order to bring about better diplomatic relations with India. Moreover, bowing to Indian intransigence would materially harm our relations with Pakistan and with the Moslem world. In the long run, we must hope that the overwhelming Security Council support of UN Charter principles as the bases for solving the Kashmir dispute will cause India to realize that her actions in Kashmir are a short-term gain but a long-disability, in the light of loss of moral standing, continued Pakistan hostility, and diverting of attention from India's basic internal and external problems.

5. In the light of the analysis in the previous paragraph, I believe that we should accept in general the UK Delegation concept of the proper Security Council action at the next stage of the Kashmir dispute. However, I do not believe the Council should wash its hands of the dispute, after having presented in detail to the parties the Council’s concept of the manner in which demilitarization and a plebiscite should be carried out. I think that we should provide some form of continuing mediatory machinery to take advantage of any weakening in India’s adamant intransigence, and to be available for use by the parties in case either or both wishes to approach the other through UN means. This machinery could take the form of a United Nations Representative, with an indefinite term of office, who would report progress or lack of progress to the Security Council at specified periods. The very existence of such a representative of the Security Council would provide additional pressure upon the Government of India.

I do not believe that the United States should assume in the UN the initiative in proposing future action in this dispute. We have received very definite political benefits through the fact that the UK, ostensibly, is exercising the lead in the Security Council, and I think that we should exert as much pressure as possible to induce the United
Kingdom to retain this initiative. For the immediate future, once the
Security Council has adopted the detailed statement envisaged and
once the general mediatory machinery has been set up, there is not
much initiative which would be exercised by either the United King-
dom or ourselves, except the initiative of patience.

690D.01/4-551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, April 5, 1951—3 p. m.

2691. 1. Problem Kashmir arose during talk yesterday with Bajpai.
I asked if he had further info re what India’s attitude wld be towards
those portions UN res to which it had no objection. He said far as
he knew no decision yet taken this regard.

2. I remarked PrmIn’s utterances re res seemed rather bitter. Some
them questioned motives US and UK. I sincerely hoped for good both
US and India and in interest world peace Nehru wld not permit
irritation at US attitude re Kashmir adversely affect gen attitude
toward US. I knew my govt disliked take position re Kashmir not
pleasing to India. It was convinced, however, that if it did not no
hope for solution Kashmir problem foreseeable future and consequent
deterioration polit and econ situation SOA. No Asian country with
which my govt more anxious have close and friendly relations than
India. If my govt playing power politics it wld have given India
full support in Kashmir dispute. It was, however, approaching prob-
lem with sincere desire support principles UN and find settlement
fair to all parties concerned incl people Kashmir. My govt anxious
that differences between it and India arising over Kashmir not spread
other aspects US-Ind relations. During recent years many differences
between US and UK yet both govs thru wise leadership successful
preventing these differences from coloring their gen relations.

3. Bajpai said he shared my hope but as I cld understand he cld
not predict precisely what PrmIn might do. Kashmir problem
fraught with emotion.

4. Bajpai said he wished again mention matter he had discussed
with me previously. Our gen relations were constantly receiving set
backs because tendency US not to consult with India re contemplated
actions of great importance to Asia. For instance, US had recently
submitted to UK proposed draft for treaty with Japan which UK
had passed along to India for comment. GOI wld prefer discussing
matters this kind direct with US rather than through UK. Although
India member Commonwealth it was not UK dependency.
5. I told Bajpai I did not know precisely why draft this agreement submitted India thru UK. It was possible that arrangement made whereby UK wld discuss draft with members Commonwealth and US wld discuss various other countries. If so I was sure arrangement merely for purposes of convenience and not with idea members Commonwealth in UK sphere of influence.

Henderson

357.AB/4–651: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

SECRET
WASHINGTON, April 6, 1951—7 p. m.

We anticipated (your para 1) GOI wld strongly object to arbitration provision SC res and that this wld probably result GOI rejection res. However in view long history mediation efforts and delaying tactics GOI, we as well as majority SC members, of opinion arbitration provision as French Rep pointed out in his speech Mar 30 represents “the core of the draft.” It is significant that eight SC members in speeches announcing vote for res stressed need for arbitration in event mediation efforts again failed.

We believe chance success UN Rep greatly limited if GOI continues, as we expect (para 2), maintain present rigid position. UN Rep may, however, perform useful service defining clearly issues separating parties. Possibility remains, however remote, GOI may, if UN pressure sustained, revert to partition proposal made by Dixon and agree essential guarantees necessary free plebiscite in Vale.

Rau (para 4) stated his SC speech India wld confer UN Rep. However, Indian del member indicated India may request clarification of UN Reps reference terms by writing letter SC Pres.

In event UN Rep reports failure (para 5) his mission and attributes failure GOI attitude, next possible step might be that SC wld establish machinery work out detailed specific recommendations for solution, and then adopt res containing such recommendations. We are prepared to support such res provided terms are objective and fair even though it were clear India wld not accept res.

Dept concurs with and gratified by your comments Bajpai re Kashmir (Embtel 2691 Apr 5)

Dept proposes downgrade Embtel 2626 Mar 30 to Secret unless Emb objects.

Acheson

1 Repeated as telegram 831, to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations.
SECRET  PRIORITY

NEW DELHI, April 27, 1951—1 p.m.

2991. 1. During talk with Bajpai Apr 26 I remarked reports in press Trigve Lie might visit India near future and asked if they had foundation. Bajpai replied GOI knew nothing such visit. He personally hoped Lie wld not come. No good purpose wld be served. Lie had been singularly inept during visits other countries and now no time for bull in Indian Chi shop. Few Indians respected Lie and difficult them understand why he elected for second term. (Depintels Apr 25, 1 a.m. and 2 a.m.)

2. I replied I thought I had explained to him some months ago why US had supported Lie re-election. We thought he had done creditable job and it wld be impossible obtain agreement upon successor. Bajpai admitted if Lie had not been re-elected UN might be without SecGen.

3. Altho Bajpai’s comments may not precisely reflect attitude GOI towards Lie visit I doubt he wld have made them if he had not thought that to extent at least they represented approximate views Nehru. I am therefore inclined believe preferable Lie not come India now.²

HENDERSON

¹ Neither printed.
² In telegram 473, to Tel Aviv, April 27, not printed, the Department instructed the Embassy to ascertain the plans of Secretary General Lie, who was then in the course of his trip to Europe and the Middle East. If he indicated that he intended to visit India, the Embassy was to inform him that the Department had obtained information that he might receive a cool reception there. The Embassy was also to suggest that he might wish to consider whether this would be an opportune time for such a visit. (357.A/B/4-2751)

357.AB/5-951

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Howard Meyers of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON] May 9, 1951.

Subject: Kashmir

Participants: Dr. Frank P. Graham, UN Representative for India and Pakistan
Frank D. Collins, SOA
Howard Meyers, UNP

On Monday, 7 May, Frank Collins and I spent three hours with Dr. Graham. At this time, we handed him the list of unclassified documents noted in the appendix to this memorandum,¹ and promised to furnish additional classified materials as soon as we could get it ready.

¹ List of documents, mostly published by the United Nations, not printed.
I had previously ascertained from Dr. Graham’s secretary, and confirmed it with Dr. Graham, that he would prefer to read the basic documents in the case before coming over to the Department for briefing. We indicated which of the documents we believed were of primary and immediate interest.

[Here follows a discussion of possible appointments to the staff of the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan.]

The UN Representative was most curious about the personality of Prime Minister Nehru, remarking that Nehru appeared to be the single most important factor in any negotiations on the Kashmir Dispute. We attempted to describe as objectively as possible the Prime Minister’s background in general and its specific application to the Kashmir Dispute, pointing out that the emotional overtones of his attachment to Kashmir were complemented by the power-politic realism of various elements within India who saw the Kashmir Dispute as useful for a variety of purposes. We suggested that some of the more important of these purposes, which we did not believe were inconsistent one with the other, might be outlined as the following: (i) through various devices, to avoid implementing the Indian commitment to settle the accession question by a fair and impartial plebiscite, with the objective of making the cease-fire line a real political boundary and integrating Kashmir more closely into the Indian Union; (ii) avoiding settlement of the Kashmir Dispute, as a means of weakening the position of the Government of Pakistan and disrupting Pakistan’s internal stability; (iii) keeping alive the Kashmir Dispute, as one of a number of devices directed at eventual reintegration of Pakistan in a Greater India.

Despite these possible objectives of the Government of India, we said that the Department believed that overcoming Nehru’s objections to fair suggestions was the single greatest problem for a reasonable settlement of the Kashmir Dispute, since there are members of his cabinet and groups in India who we believe really desire a reasonable settlement of the Kashmir Dispute. We added that Nehru, himself, continued to declare publicly that a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir Dispute was possible and desirable.

At Dr. Graham’s request, we described at some length the various shifts in Indian tactics by which they had gone from the state-wide plebiscite concept of the two UNCIP resolutions, to the Bajpai suggestion of partition with a plebiscite in the Vale of Kashmir, to the return at the recent Security Council meetings to an emphasis on the state-wide plebiscite under the August 1948 and January 1949 UNCIP resolutions. Dr. Graham remarked that this maneuvering reminded him very strongly of the Dutch attitude during the Indonesian Dispute, and added that a solution of the Indonesian problem had been reached finally despite the maneuvering of the Dutch trying to pre-
vent a fair solution. He hoped that something of the same nature could occur in the Kashmir Dispute, although he was cognizant of the difficulties and of the fact that he did not possess any similar means of bringing pressure to bear which would be nearly as effective as those which had been used on the Dutch. He said he found that it had been most difficult for the Dutch to talk their way around very specific and detailed proposals which had been supported by the Security Council, and indicated that this might be the logical development of the Kashmir Dispute. We took this opportunity to say that the minimum benefit we could obtain from Dr. Graham’s mission would be a report in which, under his terms of reference, he would sum up the unresolved issues between the parties which he believed had to be solved in order for them to implement their commitments under the two UNCCIP resolutions. This might possibly be used as the basis for working out detailed proposals of the nature of those which Dr. Graham had referred to in connection with the Indonesian Dispute.

We ended the discussion by explaining to Dr. Graham that we wanted to make clear that the Department would support him as best it could. We pointed out that his position was not that of the United States Representative on a Commission but the UN Representative for the Kashmir Dispute. Actually, by acting in the most objective fashion, Dr. Graham could not help but advance UN interests and US interests. Both India and Pakistan are our friends. The United States sincerely desires a solution which will be mutually acceptable to both parties, and Ambassador Gross had said in the recent Security Council meetings concerned with the Kashmir Dispute that there could be no lasting solution of the dispute which was not acceptable to both parties.

690D.91/6-151: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW DELHI, JUNE 1, 1951—6 p. m.

3452. Bajpai requested Steere call yesterday and made following statement re Kashmir. Bajpai explained he was acting on PriMin instructions that no one shld be left in doubt attitude GOI on questions constituent assembly and Doctor Graham’s visit.

GOI reps UN had made repeated statement on GOI attitude on question CA, yet various UN reps including US rep continued make statements showing failure recognize Ind position which GOI cld

3 Reference is to the Kashmir Constituent Assembly, a proclamation for the convocation of which had been issued by the Yuvaraja of Jammu and Kashmir on April 30. For further information, see footnote 2, p. 1770.
not understand. Kashmir under Ind constitution had right to formulate own constitution and elect legislature. GOI had no right interfere; in fact, considered it right and proper that Kashmir shld proceed with these steps.

Steere asked whether Bajpai meant that GOI cld not restrain Kashmir authorities from convening assembly. Bajpai replied he was not constitutional lawyer and cld not assert positively GOI had no legal right restrain Kashmir officials, but that regardless of whether or not it had such rights CA was to be convened with full approval GOI.

CA also wld have right voice opinion (which GOI cld not forbid) on question accession. Such opinion was in no way binding upon GOI or UN and GOI therefore did not consider such action cld be regarded as prejudicial to res of issues by SC.

Steere asked whether his statement was based legalistic view or whether he meant that convening of CA wld not affect atmosphere and that passage of res on accession question wld not prejudice carrying out of plebiscite. Bajpai replied GOI opinion was "that convening of assembly and passage by it of accession res would not prejudice action by SC". Bajpai said this with air finality implying that GOI insisted on this opinion in defiance views others.

Bajpai went on to say with some show of heat that it was completely unreasonable accuse Ind of prejudicial actions when Pak authorities and press were allowed engage in most violent agitation including open talk of "jehad" without criticism or reproof from any side. He then added US Govt might well consider public reproof or advice to Pak on this score; he has followed matter closely and had not once seen statement by US spokesman in UN or elsewhere showing any recognition excesses of Paks.

GOI attitude re visit of Graham was he shld be received with due courtesy as distinguished foreigner and rep of UN and that it wld be prepared talk with him; but GOI cld not receive him in capacity official engaged in implementation UN res against which GOI had voted.

HENDERSON

330/6-551 : Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW YORK, June 5, 1951—7:17 p. m.

1611. Re convening of Kashmir Constituent Assembly. Bokhari \(^1\) (Pakistan) called at his request this noon under instruction from his

\(^1\) Ahmed S. Bokhari, Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations.
govt to ask us to convey to our govt with reference to SC President's letter concerning convening of Constituent Assembly that his govt was "thoroughly dissatisfied and considered it a retrograde step". Bokhari said the attitude of his govt was based on expression in letter of satisfaction with assurances given by rep of India. Bokhari said that these assurances were not assurances at all, that they were almost a verbatim repetition of "assurances" Rau had given in March which had in effect been repudiated at that time in the council by Jebb.

Point was that convening of Assembly and expression of opinion by Assembly would, in fact, be prejudicial to carrying out of SC intent.

I pointed out and emphasized that SC letter went on to point out sense of SC that reports under review would involve procedures in conflict with commitments of parties to determine accession by plebiscite. I also emphasized I had stated at last meeting of SC that if GOI permitted convening of Constituent Assembly at this time it would not be adhering fully to spirit of its commitment. I indicated I did not believe council would be prepared to enjoin, in effect, convening of Constituent Assembly.

Bokhari expressed appreciation comparative strength my statement in SC. He referred to present very difficult position his govt vis-à-vis Pakistan public opinion mentioning, in this connection, widespread charges that "SC was doing nothing and, from left-wing sources, that Anglo-American bloc was creating muddle in Kashmir".

Bokhari expressed great concern that Graham had not yet left, two months having passed since his appointment. He said that Pakistanis did not expect in March, and did not now expect that Graham’s mission would be successful. He expressed strong hope that Graham could be persuaded to leave for sub-continent immediately and that he would report to SC as soon as he found that agreement of parties was not possible. This would pave way to order by SC to both parties to withdraw their forces from Kashmir.

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8 On May 29, the Security Council approved (S/PV. 548) the text of a letter (S/2181) to be sent by the President of the Council to India and Pakistan. The letter noted with satisfaction the assurances of the Indian representative that the constituent assembly was not intended to prejudice the issues before the Council. On the other hand, it said, reports concerning the constituent assembly contained in two recent communications from Pakistan to the Council (letter of May 4, S/2119; and May 8, S/2145), if correct, would conflict with the commitments of the parties to determine the future accession of Jammu and Kashmir by a fair and impartial plebiscite under U.N. auspices. The Council reminded the governments of India and Pakistan of the provisions of its resolution of March 30, 1951, and trusted that they would do everything in their power to ensure that the authorities in Kashmir did not disregard the Council.

3 The last meeting of the Security Council was held on May 29; see U.N. document S/PV. 548.
We told Bokhari that we would of course report views he had expressed to Dept.4

Gross

4 In telegram 975, to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations, June 3, the Department of State approved the comments made by Ambassador Gross to Mr. Bokhari, and stated that further action in the matter was unnecessary (330/6-551).

690D.91/6-151: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India1

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1951—2 p. m.

2090. Dept requests Emb approach Bajpai soonest asking fol be imparted GOI as US Govt’s attitude responding GOI views contained urtel 3452, June 1:

1. As GOI aware, US has from beginning Kashmir dispute been interested in fair settlement acceptable both parties. On Feb 21, US Rep SC stated there can be no real and lasting settlement Kashmir dispute which is not acceptable both parties. He rptd this statement May 29 adding “Any attempt to decide the issue without consent of both parties wld only leave a constant and explosive irritant in relations between these two govts, an irritant which wld effectively prevent the bringing about of peace and security in South Asia.” This policy has been, as GOI aware, basis US efforts over past 3½ years assists in bringing about settlement this issue.

2. In view this basic attitude it shld not be surprising to GOI that US views with deep concern Yuvaraj proclamation May 1 convoking Kashmir Constituent Assembly and provocative statements Sheikh Abdullah Feb 25, May 3, June 2 to effect Constituent Assembly will decide accession question. This concern is further deepened by remarks Bajpai that Constituent Assembly to be convened with full GOI approval and Assembly wld have right voice opinion on question accession. US views on this pt have been fully explained US Rep SC. US, however, desires pt out again its views as expressed by US Amb Gross to SC May 29, “It wld appear to my Govt that, if the GOI permits the convening of this Constituent Assembly at this time, it wld not be adhering fully to spirit of its commitment as accepted in res 13 Aug 1948 so firmly proclaimed as a foundation of India’s position by Sir Benegal Rau at the SC mtgs on this matter, and again reaffirmed by Rep of India at the mtg today.”

1 Repeated to Karachi as telegram 845, to London as 6698, and to New York as 973.
3. The US wishes to reassure GOI it deplores irresponsible appeals to force to settle Kashmir issue, and has publicly stated its views SC on Mar 21 this pt as fol: “The GOP and the GOI have both condemned appeals to force to settle Kashmir dispute which have been made by irresponsible and intemperate elements. Contd efforts by the parties to discourage such appeals to force will help ensure and maintain an atmosphere which is favorable to promoting further negot and to refrain from action likely to prejudice a peaceful settlement.”

US believes it pertinent pt out, however, that convoking Constituent Assembly is not type action which will restrain irresponsible statements on part Pak natls.

4. US believes India and Pak have continuing responsibility to work wholeheartedly with UN in effort to arrive at fair settlement this issue acceptable to both. We do not believe partial rejection GOI Mar 30 SC res absolves GOI from its responsibilities to work for fair and mutually acceptable settlement Kashmir dispute.

Re GOI attitude toward visit new UN Rep (para 7, refetl): Dr. Graham is distinguished and outstanding Amer cit made available to serve UN and parties by US Govt. As a rep of UN charged with a mission which is of vital importance to India and Pak, this Govt and US people wld find it difficult understand if GOI were not to accord Dr. Graham recognition due Rep UN.

ACHESON

690D.91/6-951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, June 9, 1951—6 p. m.

3561. I imparted to Bajpai today info of US view re Kashmir set forth Deplt 2090, June 7. Bajpai listened courteously and made point-by-point replies which most part mere repetition of statement made to us on previous occasion. Substance his reply as fols:

1. Not only US Govt but every well-intentioned govt including GOI wld like “fair settlement acceptable both parties”. Unfortunately prospect such settlement not bright just now. Strict adherence this formula overlooks fact GOI and GOP not in same position re Kashmir. GOP’s present position Kashmir based on aggression fruits of which it wld like expand.

2. GOI cannot accept US view that if it permits Constituent Assembly it wld not be adhering fully to spirit its commitments to UN. Convening Constituent Assembly and action taken by that assembly can in no way affect GOI pledge re holding plebiscite terms of which
agreeable to India and Pak in order determine future Kashmir. Kashmir at present integral part India. GOI therefore cannot discriminate against people Kashmir by refusing allow them elect their own Constituent Assembly which can determine form their govt. If subsequently agreement can be reached between India and Pak with regard to plebiscite, plebiscite can be held regardless what Constituent Assembly may meantime have decided or recommended. People Kashmir have had no constitutional form govt for 3½ years. It wld not be fair deprive them of constitutional govt in future merely because Pak will not agree to plebiscite on terms acceptable to India.

3. GOI not happy re statement made by US re in SC on March 21, to effect that efforts by both GOP and GOI to discourage appeals to force in settlement Kashmir dispute will help insure atmosphere favorable to peaceful settlement. GOI believes this statement bracketing GOP and GOI infers that there is equal amount warmongering on both countries. There are practically no threats of resort to violence in Ind press except in response to threats being made in Pak where as not only Pak press but also polit leaders continually threatening to use force.

Furthermore GOI believe that fact it is in Kashmir stirs Pak press and nationals to talk of jehad rather than acts such asconvoking Constituent Assembly. So long as GOI in Kashmir, GOP likely complain re every important action taken either by GOI or by Abdullah’s govt.

4. GOI still willing work for fair mutually acceptable settlement Kashmir dispute but it cannot accept res March 30. It will receive Dr. Graham courteously as distinguished US citizen and UN rep. It prepared discuss with him its views re Kashmir but not deal with him in manner which wld indicate that it accepts this resolution.

Rptd Karachi unnumbered.

Henderson

357 Declare 6-21: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, June 21, 1951—7 p. m.

908. Embtel 1212, June 18. Emb instr take suitable opportunity in course conversation to make fol observation: 1) US notes increasing frequency provocative statements by leaders of both countries re Kashmir; 2) Dept concerned GOP may lose present advantage they have in world opinion if its leaders continue indulge intemperate speeches and propaganda, which may also adversely affect Pak case in eyes Graham mission.

\(^2\) Repeated to London as telegram 6035.

\(^2\) Telegram 1212, from the Embassy in Karachi, June 18, stated that an informal approach to the Government of Pakistan cautioning against provocative statements on Kashmir might be useful, provided it was made in general terms and without specific reference to statements made recently or in the past by either side (357 AB/6-1851).
Prior to making approach Emb shld consult UK HICOM (Lontel 6703, rptd Kar 97, June 20) but avoid giving impression joint action.

For Lon only: Emb instr inform FonOff and ask it to instr HICOM Karachi in accordance ref tel above.

ACHESON

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*Telegram 6703, from the Embassy in London, June 20, reported in part that if the United States made an informal approach to the Government of Pakistan, the British Foreign Office would be willing to instruct the U.K. High Commissioner in Pakistan to make an informal follow-up (857.AB/6-2051).*

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690D.91/7-1451 : Telegram

**The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan**

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 14, 1951—4 p. m.

44. Dept exploring prospects preventing violent Pak outbreaks against India before end Graham mission October 1 or thereafter, assuming KNC not convened before that date.

Dept believes GOP presently exerting successful manoeuvres (by curbing provocative official and press statements re Kashmir) to restrain frustrated Pak public from resorting violence, as Govt fears loss favorable world opinion and does not wish jeopardize its chances for SC seat next year. These efforts will continue successful if US, UK and UN can offer occasional tangible evidence basic appreciation for Pak interests and problems; however GOP probably unwilling restrain public indignation if it threatens overturn present Govt, in which case Govt might abandon adherence UN principles and take lead in aggressive moves.

Dept further believes: 1) GOP will be able prevent any violence against India or incursions Kashmir during course Graham mission; 2) Provided SC able rapidly take promising steps fol Graham report, GOP will maintain similar controls next fall; 3) If Graham report produces no workable plan for progress, GOP controls will remain effective provided UN can produce such plans; 4) In case all efforts fail offer hope softening Indian position, GOP late in 1951 or early 1952 will be unwilling and unable to prevent outbreak hostilities with India.

Recent events Iran and Turkey indicate deterioration UK prestige Near East with probably similar results in PAK and consequent lessened effectiveness US–UK collaboration re Kashmir.

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\(^1\) Sent also to London as telegram 305, to New Delhi as 111, and to New York as 31.

\(^2\) For documentation on Iran, see vol. v, pp. 445 ff.
FYI only Brit FonOff believed well aware above problems but not yet ready propose solutions.
Emb’s comments urgently requested.

ACHESON

690D.91/7-1651: Telegram

The Chargé in India (Steere) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 16, 1951—5 p. m.

229. RefEmbtel 215 July 15\textsuperscript{1} rptd info Karachi, London 7. Dutt acting Fon Secy was asked this morning whether he wld comment upon press reports Liaquat Ali had declared Karachi yesterday that 90 percent Ind army concentrated easy striking distance Pak borders and that he had sent tel to Nehru asking him in interest peace to remove threat thus created, etc.

Dutt replied he was unable make official statement but wld comment personally. Substance his remarks was as fol:

Without knowing all details he cld generally confirm that large share Ind army forces had been moved into positions general area Ind borders with east and west Pak. GOI decision do so had resulted from belligerent statements recent weeks by Pak press and many Pak leaders from highest level down. Dutt particularly mentioned that high Pak officials had declared Pak wld not permit Kashmir plans for convening Constituent Assembly to be carried out. GOI had expressed its support of Kashmir intentions to proceed with its constitutional rights to convene assembly for purpose preparing new constitution and India had no intention backing down in face Pak threat to intervene in this matter. In view character of statements responsible Pak leaders GOI felt it cld not run risk being taken by surprise and must make troop movements and dispositions necessary from defensive point view. Dutt emphasized Ind measures were purely defensive.

Dutt recalled PriMin Nehru’s offer to conclude joint declaration with Pak PriMin foregoing war as means of settlement disputes between two countries, which Pak PriMin had refused GOI cld not but regard Liaquat attitude as implying that Pak unwilling rule out possibility of war with India in certain circumstances. Dutt further declared his opinion that if hostilities shld break out and all-out war with Pak on all fronts wld be involved. To my inquiry about position in that event 40,000,000 Moslems in [India?], Dutt drew long face

\textsuperscript{1} Telegram 215 from New Delhi, July 15, not printed, contained information concerning the movement of Indian troops toward the Pakistan borders (690D.91/7-1551).
and said there wld probably be resumption of communal strife on
great scale.

In touching upon CA question Dutt particularly emphasized that
GOI was supporting convening of Assembly for strictly constitu-
tional purpose; namely, drafting of constitution and other aspects
of local govt, and reiterated GOI wld not be bound by any views about
accession which CA might voice. He seemed to be at pains to dis-
tinguish between actions of constitutional right which India felt it
must support, and other actions which GOI might not support.

Dutt concluded by stating he assumed PriMin who returns Delhi
July 17 wld regard it necessary make public reply Liaquat Ali.

STEERE

690D.01/7-1751: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, July 17, 1951—6:17 p. m.

100. Re: India–Pakistan: UKDel has received request from London
for views re possible SC action to get UN observers into Kashmir
and Punjab areas where build-up of GOI forces is known to exist.
Reply was sent off this morning in following sense:

No procedural difficulty exists in having SC consider situation
under Kashmir item since technical title of item is India–Pakistan.
Also recommendation could be adopted for group of observers to be
sent to areas in question, but some objections to council meeting on
this subject as were found sufficient in constituent assembly instance
apply in this case also. Such meeting would drag in whole Kashmir-
debate and destroy chances of Graham mission succeeding. Why could
Graham not take this matter up with India and also discuss with
Karachi rumors of Pakistan build-up in Kashmir, since both states
complained that the other is reinforcing its forces in Kashmir?
Reduction of forces is integral part of Graham mission to effect
demilitarization. Suggestion made therefore that Syg order one of co-
sponsors privately bring this suggestion to Graham’s attention,
keeping matter confidential and at all costs out of SC. If Graham
wanted, US and UK might consider diplomatic back stopping.

Our reaction to this suggestion is unfavorable. We think Graham
is old enough to know facts of life and needs no advice. He would
probably resent such advice. Furthermore, diplomatic backstopping
would probably be resented by India since it feels already US and
UK biased toward Pakistan and reluctant take Pakistan to task for
jihad and other inflammatory talk. In addition such diplomatic action.
would make Graham appear to be simply stooge of Anglo-Saxons and would prejudice his status, if not ruin it.

Our suggestion would be that US and/or UK reps in New Delhi or Karachi on suitable occasion mention to Graham our anxiety over troops build-up, especially in Kashmir, but also in Punjab because of contribution it makes to Indo-Pakistan tension and consequent increase in difficulty of bringing two countries to agreement on Kashmir.

If Dept instruct soonest we shall try to convince British neither FO proposal (which we dislike as much as UKDel does) nor UKDel suggestion is wise.

AUSTIN

690D.91/7-1751: Telegram
The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

SECRET  PRIORITY

KARACHI, July 17, 1951—10 p.m.

50. Emb agrees events likely to fol Dept’s estimated para 2 and 3 Dept’s 44, July 14. If there is communal rioting risk of hostilities is immed.

Spontaneous rally of Pak public opinion, including polit opposition, to Liaquat’s statement given July 15 strengthens his hand in dealing with India. Emb believes he is alert to risks and danger presented by present sitn. He will restrain and discipline his people unless extremists in West Bengal utilize tension arising from troop dispositions to incite communal rioting.

As of today position of Hindu minorities in East Bengal is not cause for immed concern. While daily movement of minorities between East and West Bengal has been accelerated during past 45 days, still there has been a small net inflow of 824 Hindus into East Bengal during this period. However fact that daily movement is numerous cld have immed and dangerous results shld communal rioting break out and large number of Hindus now in East Bengal become terror stricken.

It is Emb’s opinion that any communal disturbances caused by anxieties and tensions growing out of troop dispositions wld be uncontrollable and might extend rapidly across India thru united and central provinces as far as Bombay.

The impact of communal rioting on any considerable scale upon Pak public opinion is unpredictable.

Emb believes both GOI and GOP shld be reminded immed of dangers inherent in this sitn where 12 million Hindus in East Bengal and 40 million Muslims in Ind Union are at mercy of extremists who may be expected take advantage of tensions arising from current mil postures. Whatever the dangers inherent in maneuvers may be with respect to mil coercion directed against Graham Mission and SC’s
efforts for peaceful solution, the risks of widespread massacres in communal rioting are far greater in Emb’s opinion.

As safeguard against possibility of rapid deterioration Emb recommends US take initiative in warning 2 Govts of risks they are running. Rptd USUN umn, Delhi 11.

WARREN

357.AB/7-1851

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Deputy Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Weil)

SECRET


Subject: Indo-Pakistan Tension: Extraordinary Troop Movements

Participants: R. H. Belcher, First Secretary, British Embassy
T. E. Weil, Acting Deputy Director, SOA

Mr. Belcher called at my office at 3:00 p.m. and read excerpts from a telegram reporting a conversation between the Acting UK High Commissioner in Delhi, Mr. Garner, and the Acting Secretary for External Affairs, Mr. Dutt, on July 17. Mr. Belcher indicated that the conversation really produced nothing new but revealed that the decision to move Indian troops to forward positions had apparently been taken by the Indian Cabinet. It appears that Mr. Dutt reviewed the arguments already given to the public, to the effect that India was compelled to move the troops in the face of war talk in Pakistan, but that in response to Mr. Garner’s request for information regarding the disposition of troops Mr. Dutt said he would have to consult with Mr. Nehru who was due to return to Delhi from Bangalore on July 18.

Mr. Belcher also read from a telegram which he stated had been sent by the UKUN Delegation to London setting forth points summarized in USUN’s telegram 100, July 17. In this message the UK Delegation suggested that if the Security Council took up the question of sending UN military observers to India and Pakistan, the whole Kashmir debate would be renewed and Dr. Graham’s chances of succeeding in his mission would be destroyed. The UK Delegation therefore suggested that Dr. Graham take up the question of troop movements with GOI and GOP as part of the Kashmir problem and that one of the co-sponsors of the resolution under which Dr. Graham is working bring this suggestion to Dr. Graham’s attention without bringing the question into the Security Council.

Speaking informally, Mr. Weil suggested to Mr. Belcher that while it was obvious that the current tension over troop movements in India and Pakistan would affect Dr. Graham’s chances of succeeding in his demilitarization project, it might be borne in mind that if Dr. Graham were asked to desert his present task in order to attempt mediation between India and Pakistan he might not be in a position to com-
plete his demilitarization assignment within the allotted time. Mr. Weil remarked that if some other means could be found to resolve the current tension and Dr. Graham could be allowed to proceed with his current assignment, there would be obvious advantages in Dr. Graham’s being fully prepared to go ahead with his demilitarization proposal after the tension had died down in India and Pakistan. Mr. Weil further suggested that since GOI had not accepted the UN resolution under which Dr. Graham was working, it seemed doubtful that the Indians would accept him as a qualified mediator unless he were given new terms of reference by the Security Council; and that this would probably precipitate the very sort of debate in the Security Council which the UKUN Delegation apparently wished to avoid. Mr. Belcher, also speaking informally, agreed that these points were valid.

Mr. Weil told Mr. Belcher that we wished to continue (see memorandum for the files dated July 17, 1951) consultation with the UK and were looking forward to learning the results of the expected Cabinet consideration of the problem. He also told Mr. Belcher that we were consulting with our missions in London, Delhi and at the UN as to the desirability of expressing concern over developments at an early date to GOI and GOP through our Embassies.

Mr. Belcher said that by the morning of the twentieth he hoped to have a report on action taken by the Cabinet.

2 Not printed.

600D.91/7-1951 : Telegraph

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, July 18, 1951—5 p. m.


1. During past few days EmbOff has consulted frequently with FonOff and CRO re India-Pak difficulties and is convinced UKG, although acutely aware of seriousness of situation, completely devoid of ideas as to possible solution. Last week FonOff and CRO jointly prepared paper on subject bringing up this or that idea including condominium for Kashmir, joint control of waterways, etc., but discarding them all as impractical until or unless there is notable relaxation of tension. Only constructive thought UKUN has been asked to explore feasibility (also mechanics involved) of having UN observers Kashmir extend their activities to Amritsar frontier area, but even this wld appear impractical as it assumably wld require SC action. It is general consensus any effort appeal to Nehru from moral stand-
point wld be useless (he seems to assume moral attitudes only in connection with problems outside India) and any move bring pressure to bear wld tend alienate him at expense of Commonwealth as a whole. UKG also acutely conscious delicacy Graham mission and aware any vigorous action now may prejudice its success.

2. Re Deptel 289 July 13,¹ for present UK wld prefer say nothing more either to Rau in New York or to GOI in New Delhi. FonOff notes Rau has stated GOI has no intent have any positive action taken in SC. FonOff wld therefore prefer action, if any, be in form of polite acknowledgment by Pres SC, referring perhaps to reported statement by Nimmo ² on July 13 in Rawalpindi that recent incidents merely part of a series which had been magnified propagandewise out of proportion to their military significance.

3. FonOff reiterates if general build-up of India-Pak crisis continues some drastic step may be necessary. Nye, UKHC New Delhi returned London yesterday. Action will be delayed, at least until UKHC has had opportunity mull over results these conversations. Rptd info Delhi 8, Karachi 11.

GIFFORD

¹ Telegram 289 to London, July 18, not printed, included an inquiry as to the attitude of the British Foreign Office toward an approach to the Government of India (690D.91/7-1851).

357.AB/7-1851: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, July 18, 1951—6:10 p.m.

102. Re Indian troop movements. At close of long and very cordial conversation with Rau at lunch today he read to Gross and Ross ¹ from top secret telegram he had just received from his FonOff on question of Indian troop movements. Referring to Nehru’s Bangalore speech, telegram stressed that reasons for Indian troop movements exactly as described by Nehru. Flat statement was made in telegram that India did not want war nor did it want to take any measures which might lead to war. Reference was made to broad, nationwide elections as important factor indicating India does not want war.

After referring to reduction of some fifty-two thousand in total Indian armed forces, telegram went on to refer, apparently in some detail, to Pakistan propaganda for jihad against India, to strengthening of Pakistan forces, to border incidents about Kashmir, to vio-

¹ John C. Ross, Deputy U.S. Representative to the Security Council.
ience and incitement, to disorder within Kashmir, all directly traceable, according to telegram, to Pakistan sources.

Evidence was also cited to effect that British officers were conversing with and even assisting in carrying out Pakistani policies in regard to such incidents. Specific reference was made to activities in this regard apparently in both east and west Pakistan, of Gracie and Auchinleck. Telegram emphasized defensive character Indian troop movements in light of factors recited.

Rau emphasized top secret character of info he was giving us, pledging us to strictest confidence with particular reference to comments concerning activities of Gracie and Auchinleck.

After reading from this telegram Rau expressed half-jokingly hope we would not find it necessary to follow UK lead too closely.

Rau said Graham had made excellent impression on Nehru who found Graham very serious and sincere man; Nehru has issued orders that Graham is to be shown every courtesy.

AUSTIN

3 Field Marshal Sir Claude John Eyre Auchinleck, Supreme Commander in India and Pakistan, 1947.

690D.91/7-1951

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 19, 1951.

Subject: Tension Between India and Pakistan: Extraordinary Troop Movements

During the last two weeks tension between India and Pakistan has been seriously aggravated by the movement of substantial numbers of Indian troops toward the Pakistan border and by similar forward movements of Pakistan forces. Liaquat Ali Khan has publicly appealed to Mr. Nehru to cooperate in reducing tension and has filed a copy of his message to Mr. Nehru with the Security Council. On July 17 Mr. Nehru, in a reply to Liaquat Ali's message, declared India's intentions were peaceful but that war talk in Pakistan had compelled India to move troops to forward positions.3

1 The texts of messages exchanged between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan during the summer of 1951 are contained in two publications of their respective governments: India, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indo-Pakistan Relations (Correspondence Between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan from 15 July to 9 August 1951) (New Delhi, 1951); Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, India's Threat to Pakistan: Correspondence Between the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India, July 15–August 11, 1951 (Karachi, n.d.).
According to the British Embassy the British Cabinet is to decide on a course of action today. The Foreign Office has been considering the possibility of recommending to the Security Council that UN military observers be sent to the areas concerned, but in view of certain practical difficulties surrounding such an operation there are indications that the first step may take the form of a personal message from Mr. Attlee to the Indian and Pakistan Prime Ministers. The British Embassy expects to have a report on Cabinet action tomorrow morning.

The Australian Prime Minister has sent a message to Liaquat Ali and Mr. Nehru expressing his Government's concern and tendering his Government's good offices. The text of Mr. Menzies' message is quoted in Mr. Spender's letter to you of July 17 (attached).²

To date the Department has taken the position that the British should take the lead in this Commonwealth problem and that action by the United States should be coordinated with British action. Our missions in London, Karachi and Delhi have been instructed to consult fully with UK officials and have been asked for their views on the desirability of immediate expression of our concern to the Indian and Pakistan Governments. We have also, in conjunction with UNA, studied possible approaches to a solution and have reached the tentative conclusion that the most effective action might comprise a request by the Security Council for explanations from the Governments of India and Pakistan followed by a resolution expressing the hope that both Governments will create an atmosphere favorable to settlement of the current dispute. The Australians might then be encouraged to repeat their offer of good offices which, if accepted, could be used to propose utilization of the POC or of UN military observers to reduce the existing tension and to bring about eventual withdrawal of troops. We believe Dr. Graham should be informally apprised of all pertinent developments but do not favor, as certain British officials have suggested, taking him away from his present assignment in Kashmir to undertake mediation of the current critical tension in India and Pakistan.

While there is no evidence that either Government wants war, we believe there is a grave danger that an incident could lead to hostilities and to communal war throughout the subcontinent. The immediate problem therefore is to decide, in consultation with the British, ways and means of preventing an outbreak of hostilities.

² Not printed. The note from Prime Minister Menzies to Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan, quoted in the note of July 17 from the Australian Ambassador to President Truman and Secretary Acheson, indicated that the Australian government was greatly disturbed by reports of troop concentrations and possible frontier disturbances, and expressed the hope that differences between India and Pakistan might be settled peacefully. The note further stated that if the Prime Ministers believed the Australian government could help in removing causes of difference, its good offices were freely available. (690D.91/7-1751)
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

SECRET

WASHINGTON,] July 19, 1951.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT

Item 5. India-Pakistan Tension

I went over this with the President along the lines of the briefing paper \(^1\) in my book, stressing particularly that it was not our intention to take the initiative in making proposals. We thought that since this was a Commonwealth matter, the Commonwealth nations should take the initiative and we hoped to be able to support the line upon which they could agree. The President expressed his concern over the trend of affairs in India and he agreed to the position which I had outlined.

The President mentioned a communication which he had received from the Australian Ambassador and asked whether he should reply to it and, if so, how. I agreed that the Department would very promptly make a recommendation to him on this.\(^2\)

D[EAN] A[CHESON]

\(^1\) Reference is presumably to Mr. McGhee’s memorandum to the Secretary of State of July 19.

\(^2\) In a memorandum to President Truman of July 27, not printed, Secretary Acheson wrote that he was conveying thanks on behalf of both himself and the President for the Australian Ambassador’s similar note to each of July 17, and recommended that the President therefore need not write a separate acknowledgment (690D.91/7-1751). In his reply to the Australian Ambassador, also July 27, Secretary Acheson wrote in part as follows:

“I share fully Mr. Menzies’ concern over the trend of affairs in India and Pakistan and hope means can be found without delay to create an atmosphere favorable to negotiation of outstanding disputes. Officers of the Department of State are following developments closely and are looking forward to discussing the problem with your Embassy.

“I am gratified to know that your Government stands ready to take an active part in efforts to prevent further deterioration of relations between India and Pakistan.” (690D.91/7-1751)

490D.91/7-1951: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, July 19, 1951—8 p. m.

44. Re Kashmir: recent troop movements.

I. Urgently request USUN and London consult with UKDel and FonOff, seeking views on fol contemplated action which Dept believes preferable:

\(^3\) Sent also to London as telegram 458; repeated for information to New Delhi as 169, to Karachi as 66, and to Canberra as 23.
1. While Ind troop movements might be treated as giving rise separate cause of action, we believe preferable consider them part “India—Pakistan Question”, which is GOP approach in ltr SC indicated by numbered para 2 and 3 USUN’s 88, July 16 (rptd, July 17 to London, 348; Delhi 55; Karachi 132). We propose UK-US and other dels request SC mtg near future re troop movements. General line mtg might be as fol:

   a. Members refer recent reports large-scale troop movements both Ind Pak as indicating dangerous situation in area, and ask explanation from parties re nature, extent, reasons such movements. State reason for request primary responsibility SC for maintenance internat peace and security, and bearing troop movements appear have on Graham mission.

   b. After explanations, we believe shld seek res with limited objective, touching on fol among other points:

   (1) recalling parties commitment under 13 Aug 1948 UNCP res to assist in creating and maintaining atmosphere favorable promotion further negots;

   (2) recalling various SC reses had called on parties take all possible measures ensure creation and maintenance such atmosphere and to refrain from any action likely prejudice just and lasting settlement Kashmir dispute;

   (3) pointing out troop movements and belligerent atmosphere both countries appeared hinder possibility Graham cld help parties under mission on which sent by SC;

   (4) hoping parties wld so act as ensure creation and maintenance atmosphere favorable promotion further negots in India Pakistan Question.

2. Simultaneously with SC mtg or prior thereto, US–UK shld urge parties accept Austral offer good offices made by Menzie. We suggest FonOff CRO and Dept at once see Austral HICOM and Amb, expressing desire aid Menzie offer and inquiring what Austral have in mind. We think advisable ask if Menzie has considered specific approaches, such as suggesting that parties might wish avail selves of such UN devices as observers under Peace Observation Commission, or an expanded Kashmir Mil Observer Group. In both cases, observers cld observe and report on situation, and their presence might serve reduce tension while helping protect each party against actions by the other. Such suggestions to Austral based on our belief that, if Menzie cld get parties accept UN observers, this might materially diminish chance general hostilities. We wld, of course, advise Austral clsd on our contemplated SC action.

3. UKDel–USUN shld informally suggest UN SYG ask Chief Kashmir Milob report any recent troop build-up in Kashmir. This

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*Telegram 88 from the U.S. Mission at the United Nations, July 16, not printed, quoted the text of a communication from Ahmed S. Bokhari, Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, to Secretary-General Trygve Lie. The communication was issued as U.N. document S/2245. Numbered paragraphs 2 and 3 referred to here were quotations from a letter to Nehru from Liaquat Ali Khan of July 15. (6901.91/7–1651)

*E. J. Harrison, Australian High Commissioner in the United Kingdom.
KASHMIR DISPUTE

wld give necessary info and, since limited to area Milob operations, can be done without formal SC action. In view UK assumption initiative Kashmir dispute, we have not yet instructed USUN take such step and hope UK will at once instruct UK Del join with USUN in making suggestion.

4. Advantages we see in above approaches fol:

a. SC Mtg deals with immed cause of tension—troop movements—but does not bring SC into complicated problems involved in troop withdrawals. These problems left to parties and possibly Menzies. SC only calls on parties live up to present commitments, thus diminishing prestige questions which wld be involved in any request parties withdraw troops.

b. Airing troop movement question and asking explanation in SC may have restraining effect on parties.

c. New cause of action not created, but only further consideration present case.

d. Menzies good offices, directed to troop movements issue, performed outside UN forum, thus giving flexibility in approaching problem and not in any way conflicting with Graham’s mission. Menzies’ efforts, if necessary keyed to SC action, shld give maximum effect in helping diminish tension in area.

e. Graham mission not made more difficult by giving him other duties re troop movements, and he will be aided if tension subsides.

f. If UN observers desirable in helping prevent outburst, probably wld be more acceptable have Menzies first make this suggestion privately outside SC, where parties’ prestige not so involved. In this connection, using POC for first time or greatly expanding Kashmir Milob Group might require some time. Might need large nr observers (525 used in Palestine). However, assume cld send in some observers on improvised basis fairly quickly.

g. SC Mtg shld be adequate indication to Pak genuine UK-US concern, while not overly antagonizing Inds.

II. 1. New Delhi and Karachi requested at once inform Graham, on most confidential basis, nature action contemplated. Explain Dept wishes keep him informed and urgently desires his comments before taking action.

2. Comments all Embs requested.

III. Dept agrees with FonOff views on taking notice GOI complaints on cease-fire violations [London’s 358, July 18, para 2, rptd Delhi 128, Karachi 54, USUN 35; USUN’s 106, July 18].

ACHESON

NEW DELHI, July 20, 1951—6 p.m.

283. Ref Dept 141, July 18 to Delhi, sent London 384, USUN 37, rptd info Karachi 58.\(^1\) Emb convinced GOI has taken firm decision stand its ground on Kashmir. Inds appear believe Kashmir will be theirs without further action their part and they can successfully defy any effort by Pak or even UN to take from Ind parts Kashmir which they now occupy. Recrudescence inflammatory retribution both countries (but particularly Pak) appear to have developed rapidly among Inds including armed forces, officials and public state of mind no longer shrinks from all-out war accompanied by horrors of communal strife—if, as Inds say, it is forced upon them by Pak. This attitude is more one of calm determination or resignation than anger but seems none-the-less dangerous if dangerous incidents of violence should occur.

Emb believes nevertheless that something might be achieved bringing Inds leaders to greater awareness of the sense of responsibility for dangerous situation to which country has now been brought. We doubt that UNSC or Graham mission in present frame of mind Ind can bring about such change. We believe that only US and Brit Govts have sufficient prestige and influence. We accordingly suggest that it wld be useful to check dangerous drift toward war if US in consultation with UK were immed to express to GOI and GOP its concern about most recent developments incident to Kashmir dispute.

Emb ventures further make certain suggestions re an approach to GOI which it believes might be effective.

(1) We might begin by expression our grave apprehension: Over sudden development extremely dangerous relations between two countries which has resulted in movement substantial portion their armed forces to respective common borders; over development mutual recriminations by countries leaders and press which we believe if continued cannot but inflame population toward readiness for war; over signs of Communal uneasiness which by single incident might suddenly spread and envelop the country in a wave of bloodshed.

(2) We have no doubt sincere desire both countries maintain peace and avoid war but wld respectfully remind them that all history shows situations such as that now existing are prelude to war. Ind is by far larger of two countries and with forty million Moslems residing within its boundaries bears a grave responsibility for avoidance of

\(^1\) Telegram 141, July 18, to New Delhi, repeated to London as telegram 384 and to New York as 37, not printed, stated that although the Department believed the United Kingdom should take the lead in approaches to the Governments of India and Pakistan, it would welcome the views of the Embassies in New Delhi and London and the Mission at the U.N. as soon as possible on the usefulness of an immediate expression to the two governments of the U.S. Government's concern (857.AB/7-1851).
communal strife. Its very existence as newly independent country might be jeopardized and economic life of country perhaps shattered if war shld break out.

(3) Furthermore if Ind now fails take action, world wld not understand why it was that Ind which so strongly supports peaceful solutions in international councils was apparently unable achieve peaceful solutions with its own neighbors. Kashmir problem has defied solution for almost four years. Ind and Pak leaders must now make utmost effort avoid drift toward war and communal holocaust and find solution basic problem.

(4) In addition to above suggestion Emb also believes: UNSYG might consider requesting UN mil observers in Kashmir for interim report with respect recent mil developments there. Circulation interim report to SC members shld be effective means impressing Pak and Ind with seriousness situation and possibly deterring them from further mil moves which wld certainly result in SC consideration.

(5) US and UK dels UN meanwhile might informal discuss with certain other SC members possibility SC meeting on basis Pak letter re constituent assembly and Ind letters re cease-fire violations as basis for immed SC consideration during which Liaquat charge re Ind mil movement and Nehru reply wld certainly arise for discussion. At such meeting pres SC might be authorized address further letter to Ind and Pak calling upon them (1) to check drift toward war and perhaps suggesting (2) formal negots between Ind and Pak PriMins to settle Kashmir matter with Graham functioning in good offices capacity.

(6) Emb fully concurs in Amb Warren’s conclusions re effect communal disturbances in Ind and Pak and believes this aspect shld be stressed strongly (Embtel 50 July 17 from Karachi). Contel 50 July 18 from Calcutta graphically describes press agitation and growing influx refugees from East Pak. During recent discussion re Kashmir, high MEA official indicated to Steere that GOI was not worried re possibility communal disturbances which suggests urgent reason for approach to GOI outlined above.

Rptd info London 14, Karachi 17.

HENDERSON:

Not printed.

690D.91/7-2151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

KARACHI, July 21, 1951—1 p. m.

68. Re Deptel 66, July 19. The suggestions for a course of action contained in ref tel appear to proceed from the assumption of great danger of outbreak of gen hostilities between Ind and Pak, and that this is principal danger in present situation. It seems to Emb that greatest immed danger lies in possibility of outbreak of communal rioting (Embtel 50, July 17), and that a debate in SC at this time with inevitable hardening of position on both sides and consequent
newspaper polemics and heightened public emotion, wld increase the risk that communal disorders wld take place.

Restraining pressure shld be brought to bear on two PM’s, but it shld be exercised privately and not in public. I recommend that US and UK take appropriate action independently and not jointly and I suggest US take initiative in addressing both PM’s.

I communicated substance ref tel to Graham last night, but because of pressure of his engagements then and today he has not yet had sufficient time to give consideration to subj.

Rptd info London 10, New Delhi 12, Canberra 1.

WARREN

SECRET PRIORITY

NEW DELHI, July 23, 1951—6 p. m.

320. Re Deptel 169 July 19 info to Delhi sent NY 44 London 458 info Karachi 66 in which Dept requests Emb comments:

1. Emb preliminary views on how deal with critical turn Indo-Pak relations incident to recent troop movements were set out in Embtel 283, July 20 which crossed ref tel.

2. Our comments on various points ref tel are:

(a) We recognize close link between crisis which has just risen and Kashmir problem and possible future need treat together or as parts of one problem.

(b) For present however we regard present crisis as problem likely become serious in Bengal and various parts India rather than or before in Kashmir and as one requiring immed action. We believe we fully agreed with Karachi this point.

(c) We see fol definite disadvantages linking two problems now in manner which wld result full scale discussion in SC:

1. Difficulties from mixing short and longer term problems.

2. SC wld be greatly handicapped in dealing with crisis urgent nature because low prestige UN and SC in India re Kashmir.

3. Also fact that Nehru as recently as July 13 announced “final” rejection SC Mar 30 res.

4. SC debate cld easily contribute to increase in Indo-Pak bitterness which it vital shld subside.

5. We believe line approach by SC suggested in article 1 section 1a and b particularly B (regardless its full validity) wld meet with cool reception India as “just another res” and wld not make much impression on PriMin, GOI or public.

(d) We assume Dept suggestion re urging parties accept Menzies offer good offices overtaken by Nehru decline. We understand Nehru has personal aversion to Menzies particularly since last Common-wealth conf London and believe this offer has no usefulness.
(e) We agree expanded UNMOK wld be desirable particularly if observations cld be extended to Punjab borders. We assume UNMOK might be expanded without SC action if GOI and GOP were to agree. We believe Graham in best position to ascertain informally from PriMins whether they wld agree, and that such inquiry his part wld be facilitated by prior high level approach to PriMins such as suggested Embtel 283.

(f) We agree suggestion (article I section 3) re UNSYG request for special UNMOK report and believe shld be expedited.

(g) Emb has been daily consultation with Acting HC Garner. Both he and Emb are apprehensive about effects India of full dress SC debate over troop movements at this time. Wld it be feasible restrict SC debate by device of presenting for SC consideration draft ltr by SC pres along lines suggested numbered para 5 Embtel 283?

(h) We believe that approach to Nehru, to succeed, must not be one that obviously involves retreat for India or Nehru vis-à-vis SC re Kashmir problem. If attack on troop movement aspect cld be from new angle and be one in which Nehru himself figures prominently we believe chances success wld be enhanced. There is even some reason believe Nehru may have personal gesture in mind (as last year) when he deems moment propitious.

3. Emb assumes Karachi has informed Graham and asked his comments. Graham arriving Delhi 1330 hours today.
Rptd info Karachi 20, London 18, Kabul 3.

HENDERSON

090D.91/7-2851: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PRIORITY

NEW DELHI, July 23, 1951—8 p. m.

321. Gen Devers \(^1\) called this afternoon and said Graham had asked him handle contacts with Embs while he is endeavoring maintain utmost impartiality.

Devers said Graham was grateful with progress made Karachi, and remarked that mission wld be successful if it cld secure from Nehru anything like commitments secured, in writing, from Liaquat. He did not particularize.

General impression gained by Devers in visit to border areas both sides in Kashmir was that neither side wanted any war.

According to Devers, Dr. Graham does not want to take on any duties in addition to those which he came here to do. He feels that to do so would jeopardize his mission. He wld particularly dislike becoming involved in any efforts deal with recent troop movement or anything necessitating going back to SC.

Rptd info London 19, Karachi 21.

HENDERSON

\(^1\) Gen. Jacob J. Devers, Military Adviser to the U.N. Representative for India and Pakistan.

248-231—77—21
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

NEW YORK, July 23, 1951—8:05 p. m.

183. Re India-Pakistan: We have following comments re Deptel 44, July 19:

(1) Decision whether to risk SC action this time on troop concentrations obviously will be basically determined by evaluation of immediacy of danger of war or communal violence. We are not in position make this evaluation although repeated reports to us from Karachi, New Delhi, and Calcutta and information from UKDel here would seem indicate (1) war not immediately threatened; (2) communal disorders not taking place although chance spark could set them off.

(2) We feel that if war not immediately threatened, risks attendant upon SC debate at this time are so great as to warrant effort being made to accomplish our objective by other means. We understand our objective to be that army build-up and troop concentrations both sides be stopped and trend reversed.

(3) As we see them, principal risks we would run in SC debate being held are:

(a) Each side at table would have to justify actions by making charges against other. This would tend further to exacerbate relations and might increase rather than diminish possibility of communal outbreak.

(b) Would not such exchanges by parties tend to harden positions and lessen Graham’s chances of achieving success?

(c) Would SC action on troop concentrations, for which GOI is receiving most of blame by occidental public and press, tend to confirm any feeling GOI may have that we and UK are biased in GOP’s favor? (We did not call meeting to consider GOI reports of frontier incidents but we did when GOP made charge about GOI, etc.)

(d) Limited-objective res as summarized in ref tel has so little substance as to imply SC leading from weakness.

Assuming that war or communal violence is not imminent, probably the most effective work toward our objective, with least risk, could be done privately by UK and US, rather than by public discussions in SC. Menzies’ reported offer of good offices said, in Canberra’s 31 of July 23,¹ to have been declined by Nehru, might serve as useful purpose, and might still occur if he would become particularly interested in pressing it, and if parties should welcome it. Thereupon, his good offices, combined with above private talks with GOI and GOP, might have less resistance than would efforts in SC, and accomplish

¹ Not printed.
reversal of trend to build up arms and troop concentrations on both sides. These controversial issues would not fall upon Dr. Graham.

AUSTIN

357. AB/7-2151 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in New Delhi

SECRET  PRIORITY  WASHINGTON, July 24, 1951—8 p. m.

199. Ref New Delhi tels 288 July 20 and 298 July 21. Dept desires Embs New Delhi and Karachi proceed make simultaneous démarches Indian and Pak govt's as fols:

1. Express to two PriMins our deep concern along lines numbered paras 1 and 2 ref tel. New Delhi shld also comment along lines numbered para 3 ref tel. Second and third sentences para 2 apply only India while last sentence para 3 may be used by both Delhi and Karachi.

2. You may inform UK HICOMs of this action, preferably prior to approaches to GOI and GOP. USUN inform UKDel and Emb London inform FonOff.

ACHÉSON

1 Sent also to Karachi as telegram 88, to London as 569, and to the U.S. Representative at the United Nations as 51.

2 Telegram 298, July 21, made several minor changes in the text of telegram 288. These changes have been incorporated in the text of telegram 288 as herein printed.

690D.91/7-2351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET  PRIORITY  LONDON, July 25, 1951—6 p. m.


1. FonOff informed this morning along lines indicated para 2 ref tel.

2. No reply as yet to Emb's request of FonOff-CRO for views on contemplated action outlined Deptel 44 July 19 to USUN, rptd London 458, New Delhi 169, Karachi 6, Canberra 23. Gordon Walker and Attlee discussed problem at length this morning. Results as yet not communicated FonOff. EmbOff advised reply when forthcoming will doubtless indicate decision by UK make similar approach to GOI and Pak next few days.

Rptd info New Delhi 15, Karachi 16, USUN (?).

GIFFORD

1 Patrick C. Gordon Walker, British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.
The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

KARACHI, July 26, 1951—3 p. m.

96. Immed on receipt of Deptel 88, June [July] 24, 8 p. m., I requested interview with PriMin. His secy last night gave me 11:45 today and appointment was notified to Delhi early this a.m.¹

After I had expressed to PM msg indicated by Deptel under ref, he asked (1) what shld he do, and (2) what does US propose to do. Then I countered by asking for his estimate of GOI mil position and intent. He replied according to my recollection that he believes GOIs basic intent is to place sufficient mil power adjacent to Pak frontiers and well in advance of projected Kashmir Constituent Assembly election so that Pak has two alternatives; (1) accept election as a fait accompli which wld mean the end of the Kashmir dispute, or (2) fight. If Pak were to fight then GOI wld denounce them as aggressors. He believes reason for placing Ind Army adjacent to west Punjab now rather than after monsoon was done not on account of monsoon floods but rather to embarrass Graham mission and to face Graham with argument that India must re-militarize rather than demilitarize on account of increased number of border incidents at Kashmir cease-fire line and alleged belligerency of Pak polit leaders.

He added in opinion GOP now is not the time for Pak to advance publicly estimate of GOI intentions because (1) it wld complicate any possible success of Graham mission and (2) Pak does not want to reopen Kashmir question before SC while Graham is trying to secure some Indian acquiescence for carrying out his commission.

He added that before Graham left Karachi on 23rd for Delhi, the Paks had agreed to all of his proposals. PM himself had expressed to Graham the hope that if his present visit in Delhi was fruitless that he, Graham, wld consider desirability of reporting back immel to SC the position taken by the two govt's, and not stay on indefinitely in subcontinent and thus become a party to what Liaquat considers to be Nehru's plan as indicated above. In event that Graham shld decide his present visit Delhi gives no hope of success his demilitarization plans and returns to SC, then GOP intends denounce to SC and possibly special mtg of Gen Assembly GOIs present mil position adjacent both Pak borders as threat to peace as well as an intimidation to force Pak acquiescence in projected Kashmir Constituent Assembly election.

¹This notification was given in telegram 367, from New Delhi to Washington, which was repeated as telegram 24, to Karachi (357.AB/7–2651).
Liaquat concluded by saying he is prepared to move promptly on any simultaneous withdrawal of troops adjacent to two borders if it can be arranged and this without respect to implications that may arise with respect to Kashmir elections. If troop withdrawals can be brought about he is ready to participate in UN discussions on the elections because in no case will he agree to the elections taking place.

WARREN

857.AB/7-2651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW DELHI, July 26, 1951—10 p. m.

370. Ref Deptel 199, sent Karachi 88, London 569, USUN 51. Statement closely following numbered paras 1, 2, 3 of Embtel 283, July 20 and 298, July 21 was made to PriMin at 1800 hrs. Allusion was made at end to PriMin’s successful personal intervention in communal crisis last year.

PriMin responded with what seemed expression of genuine appreciation of Secretary’s message. PriMin said he could well understand our concern about sudden intensification Kashmir difficulty at time when so many other difficulties existed in other parts of world. He asked that Secretary be assured that he would do his utmost to resolve present crisis in peaceful way. He said that his personal conviction was there wld be no war and went on to add that he thought GOI action in moving troops fortnight ago toward Pak borders was principal reason why war wld not come.

PriMin explained movement of troops as resulting from mounting evidence in several weeks immed prior thereto that GOP was taking mil measures in both East and West Pak which GOI wld not but regard as carrying possible threat to India. As responsible head of Ind Govt he had felt he cld not possibly disregard these mil measures and had taken steps which he wished to assure US had no aggressive intent toward Pak. He went on to say that Pak leaders and press had long been fulminating against India with much talk of jehad; that GOI had largely disregarded these actions as propagandistic but that when these were followed by what, he insisted, were measures of mil character of seemingly threatening intent he cld no longer continue to ignore possible danger.

PriMin’s explanation was couched in calm and measured language without any suggestion of bellicosity.

PriMin picked up only one thought in statement made to him—that referring to difficulty for world to understand any failure GOI
find peaceful solution of crisis with neighboring govt in light of its
counsels of peace in UN. He understood that world might be mysti-
fi ed at what might seem like Indian inconsistency and launched
into lengthy explanation of what had led to this situation. Tribal
invasion of Kashmir 1 had taken Inds completely by surprise and un-
prepared. He described heart-searching conferences of Ind leaders in-
cluding Gandhi 2 before decision taken to send troops to Kashmir to
resist what they thought was an incursion of tribal marauders num-
bering only few thousands. It was some time before they found them-
selves up against Pak troops. When it was realized that Pak was
actively involved, mil advisors had urged attacks upon the real bases
of Pak operation but Ind Govt from then until present day had
carefully refrained from any action that wld bring on full-scale war.
India, he said, still believed in peaceful methods and was engaged
in Kashmir in what was essentially a defensive operation which Pak
by propaganda had apparently convinced world was something of
another character.

He went on to explain at length that India had been at pains to
adopt the attitude it had in Kashmir because Kashmir exemplified
the larger problem of India—a great nation of many diverse peoples.
The conflict within Kashmir was more between the reactionary and
progressive elements of the Muslim population than between Muslims
and Hindus. The progressives were enlightened people desirous of
living in peace with their Indian neighbors. India cld not abandon
all these people to their fate.

The PriMin finally concluded his remarks by statement that he had
great difficulty in visualizing any practical solution to this extraor-
dinarily difficult problem but reiterated intention do his utmost solve
it.

He also stated that next Sunday 3 it was his intention make several
speeches in different parts New Delhi to city populace in which he
wld call upon them to maintain calm and to avoid doing anything
that might give rise to communal feelings.

PriMin was informed that reps in similar sense being made by
Emb in Karachi.


HENDERSON

1 Reference is to tribal movements into Kashmir from the North-West Frontier
Province of Pakistan in October 1947.
2 Mohandas K. Gandhi (1869-1948), Indian nationalist leader, formerly Presi-
dent of the Indian National Congress.
3 July 29.
KASHMIR DISPUTE

The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

KARACHI, July 27, 1951—1 p. m.

99. PriMin Liaquat yesterday sent Nehru a tel, the third in his present exchange of msgs with Ind PriMin, which fills three columns in this morning's papers. Liaquat rejects, with considerable protestation, Nehru's claim Ind armed forces have been reduced in past year; with quotes from speeches and statements of Ind leaders, asserts it is India and not Pak which is guilty of warmongering; says Nehru's "claim that Kashmir is part of Ind territory is wholly wrong and untenable", and occupation of Kashmir by Ind armed forces "under cover of a wholly invalid instrument of accession . . . was an act of aggression against Pak and against people of Kashmir"; says Nehru is attempting to bolster false claim "thru a puppet assembly . . . under shadow of Ind bayonets" and present world with fait accompli; argues that when Pak says they will not allow India "grab Kashmir by force" they are not warmongering but merely reflecting fact that continued Ind occupation of Kashmir wld be driving not only Pak, but all peace-loving people throughout world to despair"; "asserts categorically Pak has no intention of attacking Ind territory"; presents five-point proposal reported in Embtel 97, July 27; and concludes with "cordial" invitation to Nehru, if he wishes discuss proposal, to visit Karachi "as soon as first essential step . . . namely withdrawal of concentration of forces, has been carried out."

As Liaquat's plan, aside from provision for withdrawal of forces, is essentially a repetition of proposals of arbitration which Nehru has repeatedly rejected, we believe it is advanced for the record only and not with any idea it will be accepted.

WARREN

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1 Not printed, but see the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Acheson, July 30, p. 1798.

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

LONDON, July 27, 1951—7 p. m.

565. Embtel 500 July 25 to Dept rptd New Delhi 15 Karachi 16 USUN 4, CRO was just about to instruct New Delhi and Karachi make representations to GOI and Pak along lines similar to those of US when report received of Liaquat's invitation to Nehru. Instructions have now been withdrawn for restudy.
President CRO thinking in view of rebuff to Menzies, apparently polite but unresponsive reaction to US move, and probable refusal by Nehru of Liaquat’s invitation, is to suggest to both leaders that a meeting be arranged, perhaps on neutral ground and without conditions of any kind. If Attlee approves, such a line may now be adopted.

Rptd priority info New Delhi 17, Karachi 17 USUN.

GIFFORD

690D.91/7-2751: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 27, 1951—6 p. m.

383. General Devers' called today and was shown copies Emblt 370, July 26 rptd Karachi 25, London 21; also Karachi’s 14, July 26.*

Devers commented very briefly and guardedly upon Graham’s talks with PriMin Nehru and GOI as fol: PriMin has thus far been very frank, friendly and cooperative and he (Devers) was inclined to feel optimistic about possibilities of making progress even though nothing positive had yet developed. He thought that further conference this afternoon might reveal how matters wld go. Impression had been gained that PriMin was under such pressure from internal problems, particularly within Cong Party that he might be inclined to be willing to find satisfactory formula for solution Kashmir problem.

General Devers discussed conversations he had had with several GOI officials including Iengar, Secy Home Ministry responsible for internal security. Iengar gave him picture of disturbing internal security situation. General felt it was of such gravity as to influence govt toward desire for settlement Kashmir. General remarked he had given Iengar his frank opinion that if Graham mission was not successful there was grave danger war between Pak and India. His opinion based mainly upon inflamed state of mind Pakistani public (to be distinguished from armed forces at border) and the likelihood that tension wld increase and possibly get out of hand unless relations with India cld be improved.

Devers likewise had impression that Bajpai was endeavoring to be helpful to Graham mission although he noted Bajpai deferred entirely to PriMin for statement of Ind views whenever PriMin was participant in conversation.


HENDERSON

*Gen. Jacob L. Devers, Chief Military Adviser, UN Mission to India and Pakistan.

* Same as telegram 96 from Karachi, p. 1792.
690D.01/7-2851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

LONDON, July 28, 1951—4 p. m.

578. Embtel 565, July 27, rptd New Delhi 17, Karachi 17. Attlee has just approved instructions to UKHCs New Delhi and Karachi directing them make strong oral statements to govt to which accredited (a) emphasizing seriousness of situation, (b) stating UK relies on pronouncements PMs both govt they have no intention resort to war, (c) saying placement of troops both govt are such as might lead to war and (d) recommending to both govt they institute immned withdrawal such forces. UKHC New Delhi informed these instructions carefully drafted before Liaquat's offer, and if he sees any way of exploiting Liaquat's approach he authorized proceed without ref London.

Rptd info New Delhi priority 18, Karachi priority 18.

Gifford

690D.01/7-2851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 28, 1951—8 p. m.

402. Ref Embtel 383 July 27, rptd Karachi 26 London 22. Gen Devers states noon today fourth talk (fifth for Graham) with PriMin had concluded current Delhi visit with rather encouraging results. Nehru had agreed that GOI wld submit to Graham early next week plan containing its idea of steps necessary for demilitarization of Kashmir as whole. Both parties had agreed proceed that basis.

Gen said he cld not be sure what Ind plan wld contain, but he thought progress had been made in receiving Nehru assent at point when Baijpi seemed inclined go slow. Receipt of GOI plan wld enable mission endeavor to mesh with Pak plan already in its hands, and then resume discussions.

Devers again emphasized Nehru's coop attitude, but said mission recognized its problem lay in Delhi more than Karachi.

Mission departs for Srinagar morning July 29 for approx week; anticipated will then return Delhi.


Henderson
SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 28, 1951—9 p. m.

403. Ref London’s 565 July 27 to Dept, rptd New Delhi 17 Karachi 17. Interpretation Nehru reaction US move as “unresponsive” seems not entirely accurate. Emb believes Nehru was about as responsive as could have been expected in the circumstances.

Bulk of 45-minute interview consisted of essentially defensive explanation by PriMin of how India was drawn into Kashmir military operations repugnant to govt and people nurtured for 30 years on philosophy of nonviolence—in which they still believed. He appeared sensitive about invidious position which threatened India in world-opinion—and genuinely desirous, but rather despairing, of finding honorable solution acceptable both parties.

PriMin’s desire on July 27 was certainly to give impression of being receptive and cooperative. Promises to do utmost which he gave must, of course, be taken with all reservations, and their value judged by future events.

HENDERSON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] July 30, 1951.

Subject: Pakistan Government Views on Recent Indian Troop Movements

Participants: Mr. M. A. H. Isphahani, Ambassador of Pakistan

The Secretary

SOA—Mr. Gatewood

The Ambassador called at his request to report his government’s grave apprehension over recent Indian troops movements and stayed for twenty minutes.

He said that almost all India’s fighting forces had now been concentrated near the borders of Pakistan and that his government (which had been forced to take defensive measures of its own) attaches the greatest importance to the earliest withdrawal of Indian troops. He pointed out that the Pakistan Prime Minister, in his recent five-point proposal to ensure peace between the two countries, had made it clear that the troops on both sides should be withdrawn simultaneously, but that no reply had yet been received from the Indian Prime Minister to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan’s invitation to visit Karachi to discuss these Peace proposals. Accordingly, the Ambassador expressed the hope that the Secretary could use “his good offices” to the best advantage in
KASHMIR DISPUTE

reducing the extreme tension now prevailing between India and Pakistan, so as to avoid the imminent risk of a war which might result from almost any untoward incident on either side.

I said that we had expressed our serious concern over the existing situation to both governments and indicated that I was familiar with the Pakistan Prime Minister's reply to our approach, which stated that he would favor simultaneous withdrawal of troops. I said that it had seemed hopeful that both Prime Ministers were in communication with each other and that I had thought a meeting between them might be arranged that would lead to a mutually satisfactory solution of the present serious tensions between the two countries. I inquired whether we had yet received any reply from the Indian Prime Minister. Mr. Gatewood informed me that we had not. I then asked the Ambassador to outline the five points of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's proposal to Mr. Nehru.

The Ambassador said that the five points were: 1) withdrawal of troops (which could be negotiated, in the Ambassador's opinion, without great difficulty); 2) renunciation by both governments of the use of force in settling any of their disputes, together with an agreement to refer such disputes to arbitration if they were not resolved by negotiation or mediation; 3) reaffirmation that the governments would not permit propaganda in either country to be directed against territorial integrity of the other; 4) reaffirmation that the question of Kashmir would be decided by the United Nations; and 5) a declaration by both governments that they would never attack each other. The Ambassador said that, at the moment, he was unaware of any official Indian reply to this proposal though there had been rumors in the American press that it would be refused. These rumors, the Ambassador thought, might derive some substance from Mr. Nehru's recent speech at a Congress Party rally, at which he boldly stated that the Indian position both on the Kashmir issue and all other Indo-Pakistan matters had always been correct, whereas Pakistan had always been wrong.

The Ambassador pointed out that, regardless of what Mr. Nehru might say, it was Pakistan that most feared an outbreak of war, as it was the weaker party, and that Pakistan Prime Minister's five-point proposal had been intended to make it amply clear that his country wished to carry out its obligations as a loyal member of the United Nations.

I said that Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's proposal appeared reasonable and statesmanlike and that we would continue to follow with particular care all developments that might arise.

As the conversation ended, I asked the Ambassador to convey my regards to Sir Zafrulla Khan and inquired whether I might expect to
see the Pakistan Foreign Minister at San Francisco (for the signature of the Japanese Peace treaty). The Ambassador replied he thought Sir Zafrulla would probably come to San Francisco, provided the course of Indo-Pakistan relations did not take a turn for the worse.

GOOD.91/7-3051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, July 30, 1951—3 p. m.

590. Deptel 44, July 19 to New York, rptd London 458, New Delhi 169, Karachi 66, Canberra 23. Following is abbreviated text FonOff letter July 28 commenting on proposals contained refel. It should be noted this letter drafted prior despatch instructions to UKHC’s New Delhi and Karachi described Embtel 578, July 28 to Dept, rptd New Delhi 18, Karachi 18.

1. UK has grave doubts re Dept’s first proposal. Neither GOI nor Pak has asked for SC action, and we know that Pak is positively not in favor. UK fears therefore that debate this stage wld only serve as forum for protest and counterprotest by both sides. However, limited objective of resolution which might eventually be tabled, it is almost foregone conclusion that GOI wld reject it. We wld thus have achieved nothing constructive and wld have attracted further undesirable attention to SC’s lack of success in solving Kashmir dispute. Moreover, an inconclusive res now wld lessen effect of any SC action that might be contemplated when Graham has completed his mission. A further argument against SC debate at this stage is that GOI wld be almost certain in course of it justify their troop movement on ground of alleged “war-mongering” in Pak. Paks in turn wld point to Kashmir Constituent Assembly, and discussion on those lines wld lead to fundamentals of problem. Thus whole history of dispute wld be undesirably raked up again while Graham mission still in field. These objections wld apply equally to any action this stage through peace observation commission, since to bring commission into problem wld also involve debate in SC or GA.

2. Re proposal GOI and Pak accept Austral offer of good offices, although Paks have welcomed offer, Nehru reported to have rejected it already. While therefore UK wld be willing in principle join with US in discussing with Australs specific approaches to both sides, UK feels no useful purpose wld be served by any further Austral initiative at this stage.

3. UK agrees with Dept’s third proposal—to arrange informally with SYG for report on any recent troop buildup in Kashmir. Never-
theless UK informed that chief UN military observer in Kashmir, reporting on recent incidents on cease-fire line there, saw nothing unusual in their occurrence and did not remark on any special troop buildup. However UK willing instruct UKUN join with USUN in acting on Dept’s proposal.

4. UK actively considering what useful action might be taken at present juncture and is in close touch with other members of Commonwealth. UK also realizes importance of maintaining close touch with US and will certainly keep it fully informed on any action which UK may take. Generally speaking, however, UK thinks there is something to be said in favor action being taken by US independently rather than jointly with UK. UK notes US Ambs New Delhi and Karachi have in fact already made urgent approaches to GOI and Pak about present tension. UK is considering similar representations which it is hoped wld further emphasize to the 2 govts the seriousness of the situation.

Dept pls inform USUN.
Rptd info New Delhi 10, Karachi [19?].

Gifford

690D.91/7-3051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 30, 1951—7 p. m.

418. Garner (UKHC) who has been kept fully informed re developments reported Embtel 370, July 26 (rptd Karachi 25, London 21) and Embtel 383, July 27 (rptd Karachi 26, London 22) called today and showed Steere statement he making this afternoon under instrs to PriMin.

Garner explained statement was “at official levels”; that HMG thought best withhold intervention by PriMin Attlee for possible need later date.

Statement opened by expressing grave concern HMG at signs growing tension between Ind/Pak. HMG did not wish attribute motives but was disturbed at movement of troops to common borders. PriMin Nehru statement peaceful intentions had been noted but HMG wished to point out danger of incidents when troops face each other across borders.

HMG had noted GOP statement peaceful intentions and hoped 2 govts may by consultation find way to relieve tensions. HMG respectfully suggested limited withdrawal troops from borders as effective method preventing incidents.

HMG hoped both govts wld take all possible steps to relieve tension, hoped both wld consider what cld be done. HMG offered cooperation if cld be helpful.
Garner pointed out that instrs approved before desp Liaquat last msg to Nehru. Garner’s instrs are to encourage GOI receptivity to Liaquat msg—to extent deemed advisable. He is also to sound GOI to ascertain receptivity to extension UNMOK activities to Punjab.
Rptd info London 24, Karachi 81.

HENDERSON

690D.91/7-3151: Telegram
The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

KARACHI, July 31, 1951—11 a. m.

109. Burmese Amb ¹ told me Sat midnight his govt approaching simultaneously Prime Ministers Indonesia, ² India and Pak with proposal the Prime Ministers of Indonesia and Burma ³ make joint visit to Delhi and Karachi and offer their good offices to Nehru and Liaquat to ease tension between the two countries which Burmese view with increasing alarm particularly about their own future. He said he was approaching Liaquat, that Burmese FonMin ⁴ then visiting Delhi was talking to Nehru, and Burmese Prime Minister had communicated direct with Prime Minister of Indonesia. Proposal was being kept quiet and asked me to wait a day before saying anything about it.

Last night at a dinner given by the Prime Minister for the GovGen ⁵ Burmese Amb told me proposal was all off. He said Liaquat was favorably inclined, the Prime Minister of Indonesia was also disposed to make the visit in company of Burmese Prime Minister, but Nehru had told the Burmese FonMin he wld not go along.

WARREN

¹ U Pe Kin, Burmese Ambassador in Pakistan.
² Sukiman Wirjosoanjojo.
³ Thakin Nu.
⁴ Sao Hkun Hkio.
⁵ Khwaja Nazimuddin, Governor-General of Pakistan.

690D.91/7-3151: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India ¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 31, 1951—9 p. m.

262. Embs’ views requested on desirability Liaquat’s visiting Delhi or mtg Nehru at some other place such as a point on Indo-Pak border. Dept realizes Liaquat’s acceptance Nehru invitation for Nehru’s failure consider Liaquat’s invitation, along with fact that Liaquat traveled to Delhi last year, might provoke strong reaction in Pak. Dept also realizes if Liaquat were encouraged go Delhi and re-

¹ Sent also to the Embassy in Pakistan as telegram 119.
turned empty-handed Pak reaction against those who had encouraged acceptance Nehru’s invitation wd be unfortunate. Do Embs believe Liaquat might decide acceptance Nehru’s invitation wd demonstrate to rest of world GOP’s sincere desire for peace? Wld this possible advantage be outweighed by popular reaction in Pak against Delhi visit and by possibility India wd regard it as sign weakness?

What are Embs estimates practical progress which might be made if PriMins met?

ACHESON

690D.91/8–151: Telegram

The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

KARACHI, August 1, 1951—1 p. m.

114. UK acting HICOM  discussed with me yesterday his call on Zafrulla under inrs from London re Deptel 19, July 30  and Fon-Min’s comments.

He said both FonMin and FonSecy appeared relaxed in their attitude to Indo-Pak relations, the only good sign he sees in present sitn. FonSecy confirmed that Mohd Ali has been responsible for drafting of Liaquat’s notes to Nehru in past two weeks. Burnett feels Mohd Ali is so bitter against India because of his own personal losses resulting from partition that his attitude colors Liaquat’s correspondence with Nehru. I feel same way and expressed myself guardedly to Finance Min and FonSecy to effect that Liaquat’s peace proposals as addressed to Nehru might have been more effective had they not been packaged in extraneous and bitter preamble.

Acting UK HICOM is depressed and apprehensive over the outlook and said yesterday he was informing his govt to that effect. My own feeling is that the press campaign is inflammatory and invitations to the provincial populations and frontier tribesmen to express their adherence to Liaquat’s govt by mass demonstrations is dangerous. In my opinion two areas of most acute friction are tribal areas and Azad Kashmir in West Pak and villages Pak adjacent to Bengal. Provincial Governor Noon’s appeal in Dacca to East Pak population to rally behind Pak might easily be utilized by extremist elements to provoke communal disturbances in that area. Shld this occur there is almost certain risk of war.

I visited the frontier tribal area bordering on Azad Kashmir two weeks ago immed before the announcement of Ind troop concentrations and found the population there preoccupied with campaign for

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1 R. R. Burnett.
2 Reference is presumably to London’s telegram 19 to Karachi, same as London’s 590 to Washington, July 30, p. 1500.
December elections in the frontier province and expressing little concern over the Kashmir question at that time. But with campaigns now under way to arouse public feeling I feel that attitudes may change almost over night.

With Amb Henderson’s approval I have sent Metcalf, Polit Secy, to consult with Emb staff in Delhi and Consul Gen in Calcutta en route to a week’s observation in East Pak. If the tension eases I propose to make another visit to the northern frontier the last week in Aug to observe attitudes, not only with respect to Kashmir, but also with respect to Afghan ref Kabul’s 68 to Dept.4

Shld Nehru be successful in delaying Graham’s work through Aug by vague proposal on Kashmir demilitarization, I feel boiling point may be reached in Indo-Pak relations no later than mid-Sept. In view of this depressing outlook I recommend that US and UK suggest to their SC reps the desirability of having SC informally ask Graham for an interim report not later than mid-Aug, provided he has not already submitted his views on the probable success of his task, in order that thought may be given in the latter part of the month to an SC reminder to both govts that present tensions if not curbed are a threat to the peace.

WARREN

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3 Lee El. Metcalf, Second Secretary and Vice Consul of the Embassy in Pakistan.
4 Telegram 68, from Kabul, July 27, suggested that there was a close connection between the Kashmir issue and the dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan with respect to jurisdiction over the North-West Frontier Province and Tribal Areas. For text, see p. 1987.

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690D.91/S–151: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, August 1, 1951—6 p. m.

660. Embtel 578 July 28 to Dept rptd New Delhi 18 Karachi 18.

1. Emb Off has seen replies from UKHC’s New Delhi and Karachi describing reaction Zafrullah and Bajpai to representations briefly outlined Reftel. Both Zafrullah and Bajpai made polite but somewhat equivocal remarks general tenor of which was their own positions unassailable and concessions shld be made by other side.

2. New Delhi, Garner reported he suggested as on own personal initiative UN observers might be sent Punjab frontier. Bajpai reported to have replied this an entirely new suggestion and GOI had not considered such a possibility. He promised think it over.

3. In response to similar approach at Karachi Zafrullah said his govt had thought of this possibility but was reluctant at present
stage ask SC take any kind of action, although Pakistan might later appeal to SC if situation did not improve.

Gifford

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 2, 1951.

Subject: Tension between India and Pakistan.

Background:

Among the many and complex difficulties between India and Pakistan two issues stand out at the moment:

1. The urgent problem occasioned by recent troop concentrations, particularly in the Punjab where 90,000 Indians face 46,000 Pakistanis (See Tab A), and
2. The closely related, but longer standing, question of the disposition of Kashmir.

Although it is believed that neither party desires war, an incident might lead to open hostilities at any time. India is not likely to initiate action since she now holds most of Kashmir. There is increasing danger that public opinion in Pakistan will force the government to resort to war to prevent a fait accompli in Kashmir. Since elections to be held in Kashmir in the fall could result in a showdown on this issue, Indian troops were brought in, according to Mr. Nehru, as a defensive measure. Indian concentrations were completed on July 14, and Pakistan movements in reaction were completed on July 18.

Dr. Graham, who has gone out in behalf of the U.N. to help resolve the Kashmir problem, has wisely, we think, resisted becoming involved in the question of troop concentrations. In the meantime Dr. Graham continues his efforts to bring the parties to agreement on the demilitarization of Kashmir. We have been told that Liaquat Ali has given Dr. Graham “favorable commitments” and that Nehru has promised proposals in writing this week. We are not optimistic that Dr. Graham will be successful.

Action by outside countries on this crisis so far taken includes:

1. UK discussions with India and Pakistan when troop movements first became known;
2. Australian offer of “good offices” which Liaquat Ali Khan accepted and Nehru rejected;

1 Annex entitled “Order of Battle—Kashmir and Indo-Pakistan Borders” not printed.
(3) U.S. expression of deep concern;
(4) Démarche by U.K. urging troop withdrawal and indicating availability of British “good offices”;
(5) Expressions of interest by both the Burmese and Indonesians in the easing of tensions. (The Burmese Ambassador in Karachi told Ambassador Warren that a tentative proposal by the Burmese Foreign Minister that the Burmese and Indonesian Prime Ministers jointly visit both capitals was “killed” by Nehru.)

The exchange of messages between Nehru and Liaquat Ali has continued. Liaquat Ali on July 26 asked Nehru to come to Karachi provided there had been prior withdrawal of troops, and Nehru replied on July 29 with an invitation to Liaquat Ali to come to New Delhi without any preconditions.

Discussion:

(A) Troop concentrations: It is believed that the immediate crisis caused by troop concentrations should be kept out of the Security Council, at least for the present. We are consulting daily with the U.K. and are in touch with other Commonwealth countries, in an effort to effect troop withdrawals. We should, in this connection, be prepared to send personal messages to Nehru and Liaquat Ali from the President, if the situation worsens and no alternative appears. Continuing consideration is being given to the use of U.N. observers between the two lines, using either the present U.N. military observers in Kashmir or the U.N. Peace Observation Commission. In case of hostilities immediate Security Council action on a cease-fire resolution should be taken.

(B) Kashmir: We may hope that Dr. Graham will succeed in effecting demilitarization of Kashmir through agreement between the two parties, but must anticipate failure. Alternate lines of action in that unfortunate event might be:

(1) Resolutions either in the Security Council or the General Assembly embodying the Graham recommendations or some variant of them.
(2) Action toward solving the problem by other Asian countries to be taken outside the U.N. (Indonesia, Burma).
(3) Attempt by the U.S. and U.K. acting jointly to seek an entirely new approach to the problem. Indian and Pakistan consent might be sought to deferring for a period of time, such as ten years, the determination of the accession of Kashmir, under conditions involving a combination of some of the following elements in Kashmir:

(a) Partial partition of Kashmir;
(b) Establishing an Indian-Pakistan condominium over all or part;
(c) Establishing a U.N. trusteeship over all or part;
(d) Obtaining political agreement between India and Pakistan as to propaganda, military forces, and local government;
(e) Establishing a joint Indian-Pakistan or U.N. Development Authority to provide for economic development, particularly through use of water resources;
(f) Establishing a joint Indian-Pakistan Water Commission to resolve broader differences relative to water rights both in Kashmir and the Punjab as recently suggested by Mr. Lilienthal.2

Recommendations:
That we continue action along the above lines but that we be prepared as follows:

(1) In the event of a worsening arising out of troop concentrations to be prepared for a personal appeal from the President to Mr. Nehru and Liaquat Ali;
(2) Planning be undertaken for a suggestion along the lines of that proposed in (3) above with respect to Kashmir, which would only be considered for execution in the event of a failure of Dr. Graham’s present efforts.


Memorandum by Mr. Howard Meyers of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs of a Conversation Held on August 2, 1951

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 17, 1951.
Subject: Tension Between India and Pakistan (Kashmir)
Participants: The Secretary
              G—Mr. Matthews
              NEA—Mr. McGhee
              Mr. Kennedy
              UNA—Mr. Hickerson
              Mr. Meyers

1. On August 2, a meeting was held in the Secretary’s office, to discuss the recent troop concentrations on both sides of the Indo-Pakistan borders and possible action concerned with the Kashmir Dispute. Mr. McGhee and Mr. Kennedy briefed the Secretary on recent developments.

2. It was generally agreed that the troop concentration aspect of the problem should be kept out of the Security Council for the present. We should be prepared to send personal messages from the President, to Prime Ministers Nehru and Liaquat Ali, if the situation
worsens. We should continue to explore with the United Kingdom the possibility of using United Nations observers between the opposing forces, employing either an expanded Kashmir military observer group or observers under the United Nations Peace Observation Commission. We should be prepared for immediate Security Council action on a cease-fire resolution in case of hostilities.

3. The Secretary concluded that further study should be given to action concerning the Kashmir Dispute, and stated that all possibilities should be explored, [and that] a "shot-gun" approach might be necessary. It might be well to have General Assembly consideration of the dispute, after Dr. Graham returns and if, as seems likely, he is unsuccessful in his present mission. However, it was agreed we could not assume that General Assembly opinion adverse to the Indian position would exert sufficient pressure to cause Nehru to adopt a more reasonable attitude in examining solutions for the dispute. Consequently, immediate and continuous attention should be directed toward developing all possible courses of action.

690D.91/8-251: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, August 2, 1951—7 p.m.

67. Re Kashmir (urteil 173, July 31): Dept believes wld be better not fol line suggested by UKDel, by which joint UKDel-USUN approach wld be made to UN Secretariat requesting Secretariat have Nimmo include observations on troop build-up in Kashmir in regular bi-monthly report on cease-fire line, this report to be made public.

Making public any possible violations of Kashmir cease-fire line at this time might well add fuel to already tense situation in subcontinent. Moreover, when we proposed UK-US shld suggest SYG might ask Chief Milob to report any build-up in Kashmir (para 3, Deptel 44 to USUN, July 19), we thought we might gain valuable info, either on confidential or public basis. Now, however, our info indicates no real troop increment in that area, so principal purpose of this instruction has been obviated by events.

Ask UKDel if agree with this reasoning and FonOff reaction.

ACHESON

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1 Repeated for information to London as telegram 772, to New Delhi as 282, to Karachi as 127, and to Canberra as 35.
2 Not printed.
3 Telegram 718 from London, August 3, reported that the Foreign Office was agreeable, subject to the concurrence of the Commonwealth Relations Office, to refrain from having General Nimmo include in his reports observations of Kashmir troop movements (690D.91/8-251).
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

NEW DELHI, August 3, 1951—7 p.m.

478. Ref Deptel 262, July 31 to Karachi 119.

1. Emb believes that two PriMins have taken such firm and uncompromising positions particularly in recent exchanges notes that meeting between them as result of one side giving way would be unfruitful at either Delhi, Karachi or border point and, therefore, undesirable at present time. Emb Delhi does not see basis for recommending that Liaquat be urged come Delhi now and believes possible disadvantages considerably outweigh advantages.

2. Emb doubts that much if any, practical progress wld be made if PriMins met based upon its beliefs recent Pak and Indian actions and countermoves have taken place (1) because India is determined take no action which wld result loss Kashmir to India; (2) because India wished be prepared for and to forestall possible Pak intervention and to guarantee holding consenably; and (3) because arrival Graham as UN rep had crystallized Kashmir issue and both India and Pak considered it necessary demonstrate their views re Kashmir by action and statement. Neither invitation, in Emb's opinion was put forward in belief other wld accept as neither is as yet prepared compromise on fundamental points.

3. Emb believes, however, despite foregoing, present state relations India and Pak provides situation into which third party cd take step with proposal Nehru and Liaquat meet at neutral spot (New Delhi and Karachi alternately) for discussion interim solution present crisis. Proposal wld need have great authority behind it, embody elements of new approach, be practical and useful in present circumstances, and be consistent or reconcilable with current UN activities Kashmir. Emb considers courageous step necessary to halt dangerous deterioration in situation and believes suggestions meeting above criteria cd be devised which might be dramatic or forceful enough to break vicious cirlce now being trod in Liaquat–Nehru correspondence.

4. We shall endeavor put forward tomorrow certain thought which occurs to us from vantage point Delhi.

Sent Dept 478; rptd info Karachi.

HENDERTON

¹ Constituent Assembly.
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, August 4, 1951—7 p.m.

495. Ref Embtel 478, Aug 3, rptd Karachi 35. Emb ventures suggest that specific points to be contained in new approach might include following:

1. Immed withdrawal to old positions by both countries of troops recently moved forward;
2. Agreement to use full authority and influence of govts to put end to press and other attacks on each other;
3. Partition of Jammu/Kashmir, except for valley of Kashmir, along line to be agreed;
4. Postponement elections and holding Constituent Assembly until after plebiscite has been taken in valley;
5. Agreement to hold plebiscite 9 to 12 months;
6. Agreement on demilitarization of valley and acceptance of UN police force recruited from small countries for use in valley during brief plebiscite period.

Emb believes new approach might have greater chance success if put forward by third party other than US or UK. Ideally, it shld be put forward by Graham, but for him to do so might prejudice his present mission re demilitarization. New developments in situation since SC res Mar 30 adopted may however make desirable Graham widen his approach even at risk charge exceeding his instructions. Emb envisages that such third party approach shld, following public announcement, be quickly endorsed by US, UK, and UN officials (Graham, of course, might be unwilling take such action unless he recd some private encouragement). If Graham nevertheless remained unwilling, some third country such as Canada, Indonesia, or possibly Iran, in view its reported Aug 3 approach to GOI, might be suitable alternative candidate.

Sent Dept 495; rptd info Karachi 37.

Henderson

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 6, 1951—8 p.m.


1. Dept agrees with FonOff objections to SC mtg at present as proposed Para 1 Dept ref tel (London’s 590, July 30).

1 Repeated to London as telegram 823 and for information to New Delhi as telegram 303, to Karachi as 144, and to Canberra as 38.
2. Proposal contained para 2 ref tel of course no longer feasible in view Nehru’s rejection Menzie’s good offices. However, we hope FonOff will follow up eventual possibility personal appeal by PriMin Attlee and also offer UK’s good offices made by Garner (Delhi’s 418, July 30, rptd London 24, Karachi 31). We wld be prepared support an appeal and encourage parties accept U.K. offer good offices if FonOff deems advisable.

3. (For para 3 ref tel see Deptel 67 to USUN, Aug 2, rptd London 772, Delhi 282, Karachi 127, Canberra 35.)

4. We think there may still be advantages in using observers under POC or expanded Milob group (para 2 ref tel) invited by both parties in border areas. However, we continue doubt advisability Graham becoming involved with troop moves in addition present task, and note Graham also reluctant (Delhi’s 321, July 23; London’s 470,7 July 24). Re possible use observers, old FonOff estimate probable number needed on borders in danger areas, on basis Brit experience in subcontinent.

5. We believe wld be very helpful if Nehru and Liaquat brought together. Does UN have any suggestions? Perhaps offer good offices shld now be directed toward obtaining mtg PMs for specific purpose effecting withdrawal troops to old positions and cessation propaganda.

6. Dept greatly appreciates comments and suggestions all Emb.

ACHERSON

*Telegram 470 from London, July 24, not printed, reported in part that, as a result of a conversation between the U.K. High Commissioner in Karachi and Graham, the British were now well aware of Graham’s reluctance to become involved in the troop movements dispute (690D.91/7-2451).

690D.91/8-851: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, August 8, 1951—3 p. m.

760. Deptel 76, Aug 6 to USUN, rptd London 823, New Delhi 303, Karachi 144, Canberra 38. At FonOff yesterday Emb Off reviewed Kashmir question with desk officer immed concerned along lines ref tel.

Fol are his preliminary reactions:

Re para 2 ref tel. FonOff and CRO have very much in mind personal appeal by Attlee to good sense of Nehru and Liaquat, but feel this appeal shld be held in reserve for present. UKG concurs, however, Attlee appeal shld not be delayed if it appears events moving toward crisis. Dept of course aware Attlee in Norway.
Re para 3: FonOff has now recd from UKUN expression Dept's views as expressed Deptel 76 to USUN. Tentative reaction in FonOff-CRO remains as reported Embtel 718, Aug 3 to Dept.

Re para 4: FonOff thinking in accord with that of Dept. FonOff-CRO have discarded any idea of attempting involve Graham in troop movements. Re possible use of observers, UKG has recd no further comment from New Delhi or Karachi to "personal suggestions" by UKHCs that UN observers be sent to Punjab frontier (Embel 660, Aug 1, rptd New Delhi 21, Karachi 21). FonOff will ask CRO for estimate for observers needed on borders in danger areas; if CRO unable supply estimate it will consult UKHCs New Delhi and Karachi.

Re para 5: FonOff concurs as short term objective desirability bring Liaquat and Nehru together in order effect cessation propaganda and withdrawal of troops, but wld prefer await result present exchange communications between two PriMins. FonOff points out, however, Garner did not actually extend offer of good offices (New Delhi's 418, July 30); he merely said it might be good idea if PriMins got together and mentioned as his own view his govt support such a move. This being the case it might prove difficult fol up such a tentative and informal suggestion.

FonOff desk officer thought it might now be possible fol up suggestion re use of observers but it wld of course be necessary consult CRO.

EmbOff will renew discussion question at first opportunity and will report any developments.

Dept may wish inform USUN and Canberra.

Sent Deptel 760, rptd info New Delhi 25, Karachi 24.

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2 Telegram 718 from London, August 3, not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 1808.
3 Not printed.

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The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 10, 1951—4 p.m.

157. Dept doubts feasibility Graham making informal interim report mid-Aug (last para Embtel 114, Aug 1) because 1) his obvious unwillingness devote himself to present crisis (Delhi tel 321 rptd Kar 21, Aug [July] 23) 2) such report not essential to permit SC action if necessary and 3) it wld undoubtedly prejudice successful conclusion Graham present work by possibly prematurely showing his hand.
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, August 10, 1951—7 p.m.

826. Embtel 760, August 8, rptd Delhi 25 Karachi 24.

1. Pak HC London has informed CRO his govt concurs in "personal suggestion" by UKHC Karachi that UN observers be sent Punjab frontier (Embtel 660, Aug 1). Problem now before CRO is how to reopen subject with GOI. Desk level thinking is that UKHC New Delhi wld say he had reported conversation to his govt which had approved his initiative and had authorized him ask whether GOI had given consideration to possible use observers. Only if GOI reaction contd negative wld UKHC mention observers agreeable to Pak.

2. CRO now giving consideration to possibility, in event Graham reports he unable carry out his mission, of recommending that Pak troops garrisoning Kashmir be gradually replaced by UN forces and that, perhaps coincidentally, GOI troops in Kashmir be gradually withdrawn, thus paving way for polit settlement in less strained atmosphere. That this plan has pitfalls is obvious, but at least it is refreshing indication constructive thinking here.


Holmes

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2 Habib Ibrahim Rahimtoola, High Commissioner of Pakistan in the United Kingdom.

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, August 11, 1951—5 p.m.

164. Second Secy Fr Emb informed Dept Aug 10 that Pakistan Amb recently requested Fr FonOff express concern to Indian Govt over recent Indo-Pakistan developments; that Amb was told Fr had already on several occasions (unspecified) told Indian Govt of great importance they attach to peace in South Asia; that Fr Govt considering possibility joint approach by US, UK and France to both India and Pak supporting conclusions reached by Graham Mission and urging both countries implement Graham recommendations; that Brit FonOff similarly advised; and that Fr FonOff desired US and UK informal reactions to proposed joint approach.

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2 Repeated to New Delhi as telegram 356, to London as 927, and to Paris as 941.

3 Albert Pequart.
Dept reps pointed out that Graham report might not be available before end Sep; that three Govts concerned might then find it possible agree support Graham recommendations; and that in this event joint or other approaches to India and Pak, either through UN delegations or at Karachi and New Delhi, might be considered helpful.

Second Secy informed Secy Acheson's answer to questions Aug 8 press conference (plain tel follows) re US expression concern over mounting tension and (confidentially) that UK had also approached both Govts to express hope improvement Indo-Pak relations. He thought Fr might wish make similar approaches and inquired re exact suggestions already put forward by US and UK. He received no details US or UK approaches but was told Dept wld welcome consultation with Fr Govt if latter decided make similar démarche.

FYI only. Dept believes such Fr démarche may be resented by India. Emb Paris its discretion shld not encourage idea if consulted. Request London report Brit reaction re joint approach.4

AICHESON

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357.AB/8–1351: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

NEW DELHI, August 13, 1951—7 p. m.

597. Dept 358 Aug 11. Graham informed Emb today he does not believe there is any possibility at this time that GOI wld consider any action to secure postponement Kashmir Constituent Assem or commitment that Assembly wld not vote on accession question.

Graham added that he is in particularly delicate phase his discussions and wld not himself wish at this time to sound out attitude GOI toward Assembly questions.

HENDERSON

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1 Telegram 358 to New Delhi, August 11, read as follows: “Dept aware delicacy Graham's position (especially at this time) in attempting negotiate basis Kashmir demilitarization. Nevertheless, Dept wld appreciate Graham commenting, if he wishes, re possibility postponement Kashmir Constituent Assembly or GOI commitment this Assembly will not vote on accession question. Advise Dept promptly results.” (357.AB/8–1151)
SECRET

NEW DELHI, August 13, 1951—7 p. m.

598. Dr. Graham who returned Delhi yesterday saw Nehru this afternoon and had very gen discussion. He is having dinner alone with Nehru Aug 15 at which time he hopes obtain definite indication PriMin attitude toward question upon which his mission has set itself to find solution.

Our discussions with both Graham and Devers indicate they are now somewhat disillusioned about possibility success their mission. Their pessimism seems largely to stem from pessimism high Pak auths about Nehru attitude. They expressed themselves as convinced that Pak auths were prepared consider nearly any measure necessary to solve Kashmir question subject only to non-jeopardy Pak security. GOI suggestions for demilitarization recd fol last mission visit New Delhi had afforded, in Devers judgment, some basis for joint Indo-Pak discussions demilitarization and Devers indicated mission's firm intention bring Nehru and Liaquat together discuss demilitarization before they wld be ready admit failure mission. Mission members not at all sanguine Nehru readiness agree in final analysis to demilitarization plan. Dr. Graham is hopeful, however, that Wednesday evening with Nehru will give opportunity in favorable atmosphere discussion with PriMin of Kashmir problem as major element in preservation world peace and as affording India, particularly of course PriMin, opportunity for setting example entire world, and from which India cld emerge as leader of entirely new effort toward peace and disarmament. Dr. Graham explained that he is not making starry-eyed approach but one which he thought, after careful study Nehru character, there might be bare chance of selling to Nehru, the idealist. If successful he thought this might lead India definitely over to side of western world.

Emb impression is that Graham conception is that time has arrived, if his mission is to succeed, he must persuade Nehru on broad general grounds of importance for India that it take lead for a definite solution of Kashmir dilemma.


HENDERSON
357.AB/8–451: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 15, 1951—6 p. m.

378. Re Kashmir (Embtl 495, Aug 4): Dept greatly appreciates refelt's suggestions. We have fol comments:

a. For present at least we think advisable so far as possible separate troop movement and Kashmir dispute aspects Ind-Pak tensions. Linking both aspects as part single approach wld undoubtedly hamper Graham's efforts effect demilitarization. Thus, we believe shld await Graham report before considering action along lines pts (3)–(6) refelt since these suggestions all concern matters bearing directly on Graham's mission.

b. Pts (1) and (2) refelt seem good basis for action re more immediate cause tension; the troop movements. (See para 5 Deptel 76 to USUN Aug 6 (rptd London 823, Delhi 303, Karachi 144)).

c. Pt (5) refelt describes one solution we hoped cld be effected by previous UN Rep Dixon. It remains possibility under certain conditions.

d. Pt (4) refelt wld be excellent immediate objective for any proposals dealing with Ind-Pak tensions. We are considering this, but have doubts Nehru wld be willing or cld afford call off Constituent Assembly, in view GOI and his personal stand to contrary. We note Embtl 478 Aug 4 [3] paragraphs 1 and 2 (2) indicate doubts re suggestion pt (4) refelt.

e. Pts (5) and (6) refelt are really matters for Graham under present terms reference.

We agree with Emb that new approach might have greater chance success if made by party other than US–UK. We are considering possibilities including Indo and Can.

WEBB

690D.91/8–1651: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1951—2 p. m.

391. Deptel 927, Aug 11. Fr Emb now states Fr wld like "associate themselves" with US in any future approaches, before conclusion Graham mission, re present crisis Indo-Pak relations and wishes know substance previous US action. Most likely Fr have been in touch with Brit on this question.

Fr Emb informed Aug 15¹ that US Amb's had informally expressed deep US concern to both PriMins over recent troop movements, mu-

¹ Memorandum of conversation with M. Albert Frequent, Second Secretary of the French Embassy, by Mr. Richard D. Gatewood, August 15, not printed (690D.91/8–1551).
tual recriminations by polit leaders and press both countries, and
signs of communal uneasiness, urging utmost efforts be made avoid
drift toward war and find solution for basic Kashmir problem; also
that Fr interest this matter welcomed and that further advice wil
de forthcoming.

Emb shld report Brit views. Assoc of Fr with any further expres-
sions US and UK concern might be helpful if such expressions become
necessary, but Dept does not want take position now.

FYI only: Background Fr interest appears be reported talks last
week between Fr reps at Karachi (with Auchinleck) and Calcutta
(with Cariappa) 2 indicating Auchinleck’s conviction that war will
start in Oct, despite its disastrous consequences for Pak, and Cari-
appa’s opinion that Pak is bluffing.

WEBB

2 Gen. K. M. Cariappa, Chief of Staff and Commander in Chief, Indian Army.

UNP Files: Lot 89D237

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Secretary
of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 21, 1951.

Subject: India–Pakistan Relations—Kashmir, for Review at the
NSC.

The following is for use in a review of the Kashmir problem for the
NSC:

During August there has been no relief of India–Pakistan tension.
This tension became acute when, with Indian approval, plans were
announced to form a constituent assembly in Indian-held Kashmir
to determine the future “shape and affiliation” of the state, and cul-
minated in mid-July with the concentration in the Punjab of 90,000
Indian combat troops separated by ten to twenty miles from 46,000
Pakistan combat troops. (This is in addition to Pakistan–Azad and
Indian troops facing each other along the cease-fire line in Kashmir
and on the borders between East and West Bengal.) Contrary to state-
ments by Mr. Nehru, our military intelligence reports that India has
reinforced its strength in Kashmir. Although both Prime Ministers
have said they will not launch an attack on the other country, their

1 At the 100th meeting of the National Security Council on August 22, with
President Truman presiding, the NSC discussed the subject of relations between
India and Pakistan in the light of an oral report by the Secretary of State. No
policy decision was made as a result of the discussion. (NSC Action No. 529,
S/S–NSC (miscellaneous) files, lot 66D95)
recent speeches have been more bellicose than before, and both have pledged never to give up Kashmir.

Although we doubt that either country desires war, under this tense situation it is possible that some untoward incident might lead to hostilities. India now occupies the most desirable part of Kashmir and is confident of its strength; the Government of Pakistan is aware of its comparative military disadvantage but is under pressure to resort to war to prevent a *fait accompli* in Kashmir. Elections for the constituent assembly will be completed by the end of September. These elections will probably precede somewhat Dr. Graham’s report to the Security Council on the results of his current efforts to help solve the Kashmir impasse. It is likely therefore that a crisis in India–Pakistan relations will come in mid-September.

We are considering means whereby the probability of armed conflict may be reduced, including the use of either the present military observers in Kashmir or the machinery of the UN Peace Observation Commission to observe the military situation in the Punjab and the sending of Presidential messages to Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan if the situation worsens and no alternative arises. We believe Security Council action is unnecessary at the moment because a Council meeting at this time might hamper Dr. Graham’s possible success through a further hardening of attitudes by the participants and because action already taken by outside countries (Tab A) might have had some restraining effect.

In case of hostilities we would urge an immediate cease-fire resolution by the Security Council.

We are not sanguine that Dr. Graham will succeed in effecting a demilitarization of Kashmir through agreement between India and Pakistan, but his report may contain recommendations which offer hope that some progress toward a settlement can be made. We are inclined to believe that if, by the end of September, Pakistan has hope of progress toward a settlement with UN support, Liaquat Ali will be able to resist those in Pakistan who favor gambling all on a military adventure.

Continuing effort is being devoted to consideration of future steps, including in particular what should be done if Dr. Graham does not succeed in obtaining agreement on demilitarization. No decision has been reached as yet on this. We continue to desire the UK to “take the lead”. (Tab B lists certain possibilities.)

We do not contemplate additional UN action with regard to India–Pakistan relations while Dr. Graham is on the scene as the agent of the Security Council and so long as it appears that both governments remain disposed to avoid open conflict.
Tab A

ACTION RECENTLY TAKEN BY OUTSIDE COUNTRIES WITH RESPECT TO KASHMIR

1. UK discussion with India and Pakistan when the troop movements become known in mid-July.
2. An offer by Menzies of Australia of good offices which was accepted by Liaquat and rejected by Nehru.
3. An expression to both governments of our deep concern.
4. A further approach by the UK urging a withdrawal of troops in the Punjab and intimating the availability of British good offices.
5. Expressions of interest by both the Burmese and the Indonesians in an easing of tension. (Quashed by Mr. Nehru)
6. A Canadian expression of concern to Nehru on August 10.
7. A proposal by France that it associate itself with US-UK in future efforts to relieve tension.
8. Expressions to us by Canada, Australia, and New Zealand of their concern and their wish to help in removing the threat of war.
9. A reported Iranian approach to India and Pakistan.

Tab B

POSSIBLE FUTURE LINES OF ACTION—KASHMIR

1. A resolution by the Security Council embodying the recommendations which Dr. Graham may make or a variant of them.
2. General Assembly consideration and expression of opinion in regard to the approaches previously taken by the Security Council and the General Assembly's attitude on the assumptions and attitudes of both parties. We cannot assume, however, that General Assembly opinion adverse to the Indian position would, of itself, exert sufficient pressure to cause Nehru to adopt a more reasonable attitude. Consequently, it may be advisable to couple this with other action.
3. A request to the International Court of Justice to render an opinion regarding the legality of the act of the Maharaja of Kashmir in acceding his state to India. We are doubtful of the wisdom of this step since considerable time would elapse before a decision would be made, other action might be blocked pending a decision, and despite tentative opinions of our own legal experts and those of the UK, a decision adverse to our purpose might be rendered. However, we may find it advisable to follow this step as a last resort.
4. Action toward solving the Kashmir dispute through the intercession of other Asian nations outside the United Nations.
5. An attempt by the United States and the United Kingdom to seek an entirely new approach to the problem. The two countries might be asked to defer for a period such as ten years, the determination of the accession of Kashmir, under conditions involving a combination of some of the following elements:

(a) A partition of Kashmir by religious majority areas leaving the Vale under UN administration.
(b) An India-Pakistan condominium over all or part of the state.
(c) A United Nations trusteeship over all or part of the state.
(d) An India-Pakistan or United Nations Development Authority to provide for economic development particularly through the use of water resources.
(e) A joint India-Pakistan water commission to administer plans for the best joint use of water both in the Punjab and in Kashmir.

Memorandum by Mr. William L. S. Williams of the Office of South Asian Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 22, 1951.

[Subject:] French Interest in the Kashmir Issue

Discussion

The French Foreign Minister¹ may raise the question of the association of France with U.S.-U.K. efforts to improve Indo-Pakistan relations and to help in reaching a settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Growing French interest in this matter became evident in mid-August when the French Foreign Office expressed a wish to associate itself with the U.S. and U.K. It may be recalled that the French supported the most recent Security Council Resolution on Kashmir, which was generally favorable to Pakistan. It is possible that the basic motives for increased French interest are a wish to assert France's position as a great power and to enhance French prestige in Muslim countries by a display of friendly concern with the problems of Pakistan, the largest and most populous of Muslim states.

French-Indian relations are adversely affected by the existence on the coast of India of four French establishments, the remnants of French colonies in India, and by India's refusal to recognize the Associated States of Indochina. It is believed that the French attach relatively little importance to the retention of their tiny possessions

¹ Robert Schuman, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, was to attend the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in Washington from September 10 through 14.
in India provided a fair plebiscite, required by the French Constitution, indicates the desire of the inhabitants to become Indian citizens. We believe it is undesirable to encourage the French to enter into the same relationship with us on Indo-Pakistan affairs as that we now have with the British. We question the usefulness of support for our policies and close association with us in actions to further our policies in India and Pakistan by France, which is generally considered by Asians as devoted to unprogressive colonialism. On the other hand, we wish to maintain French support in the UN for our policies in the Kashmir issue.

Recommendation

If the French Foreign Minister should raise this subject, a reply along the following lines is suggested:

1. We welcome French interest in this difficult question and trust that France will find itself able to lend maximum support in the Security Council to any feasible recommendations that Dr. Graham may make for the solution of the Kashmir dispute.

2. If the U.S. makes any high level approaches to India and Pakistan we shall keep the French informed and advise them if they so desire of our views as to their possible contribution.

3. For the present, barring further heightening of the tension, it may be desirable to avoid giving the Indians the impression that the Western powers are "ganging up" on them.

357.AB/8–2351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, August 23, 1951–2 p. m.

707. Emb appreciates logic Dept comments Deptel 378, August 15 particularly re separation troop movements and Kashmir dispute in order not prejudice Graham efforts demilitarization.

To obviate any possible misunderstanding its suggestions para 3 Embtel 478, August 3 and Embtel 495, August 4, Emb wishes make clear:

(1) They were intended for use as a whole;
(2) But only in event (a) current (troop movement) tension shld take critical turn threatening war and break down Graham efforts, or (b) Graham efforts shld themselves break down. In either event, we believe situation wld have to be regarded of such seriousness as to require new effort or approach to avoid possible disaster.

At time ref cables it seemed possible Nehru–Liaquat exchanges might degenerate into real crisis. This immed prospect passed but tension persists and possibility explosion being touched off remains
(note Lahore 13 August 17 to Karachi, passed Delhi as Deptel 418, August 21), as well as likelihood renewal tension Sept incident to carrying out Const Assembly plans Kashmir before Graham mission reports back.

Emb believes new approach shld be ready for use in event seriously critical situation does develop. It is our impression Graham, if his mission shld fail or seem certain do so, wld himself be willing consider new approach, and we believe that it wld be preferable, from many points view, that he—rather than some third nation—shld handle. It is Emb’s belief Graham is building great personal prestige which wld be of high value in event critical turn.

HENDerson

Not printed.

McGhee Files: Lot 53D468

Paper Prepared in the Office of South Asian Affairs and the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs


KASHMIR DISPUTE: FUTURE ACTION

PROBLEM

The problem is to determine, to the extent possible prior to Dr. Graham’s report, what future steps should be taken with respect to the Kashmir dispute. It is assumed that the current crisis arising out of the July concentrations of practically all Indian and Pakistan combat troops along common borders and the September “elections” of the Kashmir constituent assembly will not result in immediate hostilities; also that Dr. Graham will be unable to effect demilitarization of Kashmir.

DISCUSSION

1. Immediately following Dr. Graham’s report to the Security Council, the Council should discuss the report. If the report contains recommendations which appear to offer reasonable hope of advancing the dispute toward a mutually acceptable settlement, the United Kingdom, United States and other members might introduce a resolution embodying those recommendations deemed feasible.

2. If Dr. Graham’s report does not provide basis for making substantial progress toward a settlement of the dispute, immediately following its presentation to the Security Council, the Council should

1 Drafted by the Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Kennedy) and Messrs. Howard Meyers and Eric Stein of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs.
discuss the report and adopt a resolution requesting the General Assembly to consider the Kashmir dispute, making recommendations in regard to the approaches previously taken by the Security Council and any possible solutions. Other provisions of the resolution would be determined by any recommendations made by Dr. Graham as well as by the outcome of the consultations and the discussions in the Council. If the Security Council is prevented by a veto from adopting such a resolution, the question should be placed on the General Assembly agenda for the Assembly’s consideration and expression of opinion, which is technically feasible but not as preferable as its recommendations would be. The Security Council would remain seized of the problem during the Assembly consideration. The action in the Assembly should be directed towards:

a) increasing the pressure upon the parties to accept peaceful solutions by focusing world opinion on the dispute, and,

b) exploring any new possible approaches which may be suggested either in Dr. Graham’s report or which may come from other quarters. A thought might be given to retaining the services of Dr. Graham in his present or some other capacity.

3. At the time of the Assembly consideration, Asian countries should be discreetly stimulated to make independent and apparently spontaneous approaches to the parties. It would be best for them not to base their respective approaches on any previous action or proposal but rather to endeavor to take a fresh look at what might bring about agreement between the parties.

4. The United States and the United Kingdom should agree as soon as possible on an entirely new approach to be put forward jointly or independently, as decided upon later. At some stage, to be determined subsequently, presumably United Nations action would be required. The elements of such an approach might be:

a) Immediate partition of Jammu and Kashmir except for the Vale on a basis mutually acceptable to both parties, insofar as possible utilizing the principles employed in the partition of British India.

b) A United Nations administration for the Vale for a specified period (five to ten years). Indian and Pakistan forces to be completely withdrawn from the Vale. In this connection, a proposal might be made that United Nations forces (non-United States) replace the Indian and Pakistan troops.

c) An agreement between India and Pakistan which would specify that:

(1) A plebiscite in the Vale would be held at the end of a specified period (five to ten years) under United Nations auspices.

(2) The parties would refrain from all propaganda activities directed against each other during this period.
(3) The two countries would guarantee to maintain law and order in the portions of Jammu and Kashmir given them and would not threaten in any way the Vale.

(4) The two countries would agree to accomplish a substantial reduction of any of their forces remaining in that part of Jammu and Kashmir transferred to their sovereignty, and would consult with the United Nations representative in implementing this undertaking.

d) A United Nations Development Authority for the Vale which would provide for its economic development and improve living conditions for the people, and which might in consultation with the parties be extended to other parts of Jammu and Kashmir.

e) An Indo-Pakistan Water Authority which would undertake the joint development of the water resources shared by the two countries. Funds for this program could come from either the Mutual Security Program or the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

5. If there is no indication that the parties may be receptive to the plan envisaged in the new approach, the new approach should not be put forward until it appears that the lines of the action contained in paragraphs 1–3 are not likely to lead to any constructive results. If there is an indication that the parties may be receptive to this plan, it may be raised in connection with the proceedings of the General Assembly or in any negotiations which may arise as a result of the Asian initiative contemplated in paragraph 3 above. Some of the elements mentioned in paragraph 4 may be included in Dr. Graham’s recommendations and in a subsequent resolution of the General Assembly.

6. If the new approach also is not acceptable, a group of countries including the Commonwealth nations and the United Kingdom, the United States, Near Eastern and Asian countries might jointly make representations in the hope that the parties would choose the line they were willing to accept, or put forward a mutually agreed line of their own.

7. Further action may be required in the Security Council. The Council might well consider providing some form of continuing mediatory machinery to take advantage of any changes in the situation, and to be available for use by the parties in case either or both wishes to approach the other through United Nations means. This machinery could take the form of an SC representative, with an indefinite term of office, who would report progress or lack of progress to the Security Council at specific periods.

8. At some time in the course of our efforts, we might consider asking the Security Council to request the International Court of Justice to render an advisory opinion regarding the legality of the
act of the Maharaja of Kashmir in signing an instrument of accession to India. If the ICJ finds the accession was invalid, this would knock out one of the principal Indian arguments supporting their occupation of Kashmir. On the other hand, this submission of this question to the Court would be hazardous, since considerable time would elapse before a decision would be made, other action might be blocked pending a decision, and despite the tentative opinions of the United Kingdom Foreign Office and our legal Adviser a decision supporting India’s claims could conceivably be rendered. This eventuality would weaken Pakistan’s position.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That the above plan be discussed with the United Kingdom as soon as possible in Washington.

CFM Files: Lot M-88: WFM British and French Talks

Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 28, 1951.

ALIGNMENT OF US–UK POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

KASHMIR

The Problem

The absence of recent progress with respect to Kashmir and the concentration by both India and Pakistan of practically all their combat troops along common borders presents a situation of gravest concern. Dr. Graham may achieve some success but this is not anticipated.

US Objectives

Our long-run objective is a lasting settlement of the Kashmir dispute which would eliminate this problem as a cause of tension. We desire that armed conflict be avoided and some progress towards solution be made.

Probable Position of the UK

The UK is fully aware of the seriousness of the situation and is urgently looking for ways to ameliorate it, but has not yet given any clear indication of new measures which it believes would be helpful.

1 Prepared as a briefing paper for the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, to be held in Washington, September 10 through 14. In the records of the meetings the paper was designated as document WFM B–2/35. The Kashmir dispute was considered at the meeting of September 10; see the extract from the minutes of that date, p. 1887.
The UK is willing, but perhaps reluctantly, to retain the lead, but desires, as we do, continued close consultations with us and coordinated action. We may find it necessary to detail our views on particular issues between India and Pakistan and on certain aspects of the Kashmir dispute, such as the question of troop withdrawals or the nature of UN supervision during a plebiscite. The British may not be disposed to do this because of their wish not to risk offending India and thereby increasing Indian sentiment for withdrawing from the Commonwealth. It is probable that the British Foreign Minister will concur in our view that inaction or weak action now could result in the necessity of our taking strong action later under even worse conditions.

It is likely, however, that the British will be inclined toward some procedure which would result in their not risking the responsibility for steps which might not have the desired effect. The British Government seems willing to stimulate additional steps such as offers of help by third countries or further UN action, but may be expected to be very cautious as regards open intervention by itself, on a unilateral basis. It is fully aware that any reasonable proposal designed to bring about progress in the settlement of the Kashmir dispute along the lines laid down by the United Nations will be resisted and resented by India.

**Position To Be Presented**

1. It is hoped that close US–UK coordination will continue, with the UK in the lead. We believe that the present situation is so dangerous that we cannot acquiesce in inaction or weak action if hostilities are to be averted and if British and/or US prestige is to be preserved in India and Pakistan. We believe that the alternative to forceful action by the British and ourselves would have consequences so grave that by comparison Indian displeasure would be the lesser evil.

2. We know the UK has considered a personal plea by Attlee and would appreciate knowing its status, including its timing and character. We also have in mind an appeal by the President to be made if hostilities appear imminent.

3. We would like to know the Foreign Minister’s appraisal of the likelihood of an outbreak of hostilities and when it might occur. We believe that the election of the constituent assembly in Kashmir is the danger point but that barring incidents Pakistan will be unlikely to resort to force if some hope of progress toward a settlement exists. We should like to know the opinion of the Foreign Minister as to what would be acceptable to Pakistan as constituting hope of progress. Specifically, would a US–UK promise of further action in the Security Council or General Assembly be enough?
4. We are studying certain broad alternatives with respect to future steps:
   a. Continued action through the UN;
   b. US–UK separate or joint action outside the UN;
   c. Intervention by Asian countries (i.e., Burma, Indonesia; possibly Turkey and Iran) in spontaneous pleas and offers of assistance;
   d. Postponement of the disposition of Kashmir for an extended period (such as 10 years) and provision for third party direction of the affairs of the state (such as UN trusteeship) combined with UN or US assistance in providing for economic development during this period; and
   e. Combinations of these alternatives.

The Foreign Minister's thoughts as to the best general line of action would be appreciated. Specifically, would it be better to depend on UN action, to try some line outside the UN, or a combination of both?

**Discussion**

Mr. Black, president of the IBRD, is thinking seriously of addressing letters to both Prime Ministers offering "good offices" in connection with furthering consideration of the Lilienthal proposal for a joint Indo-Pakistan water authority. Mr. Black is considering suggesting that, if the two Governments desire to approach the development of the Indus water resources along the proposed lines, he would be happy to recommend that the Bank give appropriate assistance, including making available qualified members of his staff and considering any related financial proposals. Officers of the Department have informally indicated their interest in Mr. Black's suggestion, but have said that they believed it would be wise for the US to remain dissociated therewith, in order that it would be apparent that this development had occurred spontaneously with Mr. Black.

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**[Annex]**

SECRET
WFM B-2/3b
(Supplement)

**Views of the Embassy in London on Probable British Attitudes on Subjects to Be Discussed in the Washington Foreign Ministers' Meetings**

**KASHMIR**

The Foreign Office regards the situation as extremely dangerous, and Morrison will probably propose that we endeavor to get the Security Council to refer the matter to the Assembly thus putting the matter into a wider forum where the veto does not apply.
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State

CONFFDENTIAL  

[WASHINGTON,] August 29, 1951.

Subject: Kashmir—Current Situation.

During August there have been no significant changes in the Kashmir situation. Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan have ended their exchange of telegrams, but both Governments have now issued "White Papers", India charging Pakistan with aggressive intentions, and Pakistan charging India with not having accepted the partition of British India. There have been minor changes in troop dispositions in Kashmir and the Punjab border. Contrary to Indian statements Pakistan intelligence reports that Indian Army strength in Kashmir has been increased during the past three months by eight battalions (about 6500 men). It also appears that the bulk of the Pakistan Army units in Kashmir are now deployed within Pakistan. Orders have been issued on both sides that patrols be held back in order to avoid the possibility of an incident.

Dr. Graham saw Nehru on August 26, and it is likely that they discussed demilitarization details. He flew to Karachi on August 27. We are not in direct touch with him and do not know what he is proposing.

Elections in India-held Kashmir to form a constituent assembly, with the support of the Government of India, and Pakistan opposition to this plan were the immediate causes of rising tension which recently reached an acute stage. The elections are to be held September 10-30. Abdullah's Government has publicly stated that these elections "shall be the only and final plebiscite". On August 25 the Indian Deputy Foreign Minister reportedly denied that there had been any Security Council advice against the constituent assembly. The Security Council Resolution of March 21, 1951, stated that "any action that the Assembly might attempt to take to determine the future shape and affiliation of the entire state or any part thereof would not constitute a disposition" of the state in accordance with the method agreed to by the two parties.

The United Kingdom High Commissioner approached Bajpai with a suggestion that military observers be posted along the Punjab border, and Bajpai's reception of the suggestion was not favorable. It is likely that a new crisis will come at about the time the elections in Kashmir are completed and Dr. Graham submits his report to the Security Council.
KASHMIR DISPUTE

SECRET

LONDON, August 30, 1951—6 p. m.

1153. At FonOff it has been learned of a suggestion apparently made by desk officers in the Dept that UK and US officials have preliminary discussion in Wash on working level on Kashmir problem prior to formal meeting of Fon Mins. FonOff plans to indicate next day or so thru Brit Emb this suggestion quite agreeable.

Such indication being held up temporarily pending final clearance briefing for Fon Secy. Any such talks wld of course be purely exploratory and any conclusions reached wld be subj clearance in London. It is thought in FonOff that developments immediate future, such as projected visit of Graham to US early Sept and Sov participation San Francisco,¹ will likely have considerable bearing on Indian-Pak relations, but in any case working level discussions wld certainly be useful exercise.

HOLMES

¹Reference is to the Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Peace Treaty With Japan, held in San Francisco, September 4–8. For documentation on this subject, see pp. 777 ff.

SECRET

NEW DELHI, September 1, 1951—8 p. m.

821. Ref Deptel 495, Aug 31.¹ No foundation whatsoever Graham planning depart for NY Sept 4. He told Steere and me today he determined show utmost patience and not allow self be hurried. He might even find it advisable ask extension term of mission. He maintained he not discouraged although he could not report any concrete steps forward. He believed, however, he was gaining confidence Nehru and hoped make use his position to obtain concessions both sides which might eventually break deadlock.

His tactics apparently are to start with broad approach of type which might appeal both sides and then gradually narrow discussions until he comes to specific issues.

¹Telegram 495, to New Delhi, August 31, read as follows:

"UK Del just informed USUN UK HICOM Delhi says reservations were made for Graham departing Delhi Sept 4 en route NY. Confirm and query Graham meaning departure now. Does this imply mission total failure? Explain Dept anxious extend all possible aid and wld greatly appreciate knowing general outline his thoughts and possible recommendations, in order consider next steps in S.C." (357.AB/8-3151)
Departure story probably relates three or four junior members of mission who leaving soon; majority remaining.

HENDERSON

357.AB/9-551: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, September 5, 1951—noon.

1220. Deptel 495, August 31 to New Delhi rptd London 1284.¹ Fact that Graham planned return to US has been known to FonOff for past week (Emtel 1153 August 30).

Acting head, Southeast Asia Dept told EmbOff yesterday, in strict conf, Pak Govt source of info Graham now ready write his report embodying fol: 12 point plan for neutralization Kashmir both sides agreeing in advance to withdraw to predetermined line at an agreed time. Neutral forces (Comwlth or other UN) would garrison step by step areas from which Pak and Azad forces would withdraw; no garrisoning by neutral forces of areas from [which] Indian forces would withdraw.

Above plan said to have support GOP and qualified support GOI.

HOLMES

¹ See footnote 1, supra.

357.AB/9-551

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

NEW DELHI, September 5, 1951—2 p. m.

862. 1. Graham told Steere and myself this morning in utmost confidence that after long talk with Nehru yesterday he has almost come to conclusion that it useless for his mission remain longer in South Asia. He might make definite decision this regard in matter hours. If he should arrive such conclusion he would probably prepare leave South Asia soon because he believes it would be harmful interests his mission in UN for it stay after it had become clear it could accomplish nothing more. Prestige mission with GOI and GOP still high but would fall rapidly if it should begin frittering time in India. He had found both GOI and GOP willing talk generalities and agree to general principles but when he offered concrete suggestions he made absolutely no headway, particularly with Nehru.

2. He had decided before leaving South Asia present his mission’s plan for demilitarization to both India and Pakistan. Nehru might not like the proffering by him of suggestions nevertheless he thought it would be only fair to UN for him make some concrete suggestions.
He would keep proposals and answers thereto secret until his report to SC would be made public.

3. For some time number of Graham’s assistants have been impatient with him for staying on in South Asia. He has refused, however, consider leaving as long as there was even glimmer of hope. He now regretfully appears be nearing decision no further hope exists. We agree that it would be advisable for him leave when he once becomes convinced there is nothing more to be accomplished.

HENDERSON

357.AB/9–551: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, September 6, 1951—11 a.m.
524. Re Kashmir (urteil 852, Sept 5):
Dept agrees your comment will be advisable for Graham leave when he once becomes convinced there is nothing more to be accomplished in subcontinent. However, in view Ind–Pak comments Dixon left before exhausting all possibilities, we consider advisable Graham not depart until sure adequate time has elapsed without hopeful responses after submission his proposals to GOI–GOP. If Graham asks your opinion this regard, you shld express this view while making clear US not attempting influence him re decision.2

WEBB

1 Repeated as telegram 266 to Karachi and 124 to New York.
2 The following comment was added in telegram 538, to New Delhi, September 6, repeated as telegram 270, to Karachi:
“Further urteil 852, Sep 5, we believe that report Graham contemplates filing might be ‘interim’ in nature to prevent further freezing of situation. You might discreetly convey this thought to him.”
“FYI we are desirous that Graham consult in NY before making report to SC.” (357.AB/9–551)

357.AB/9–651: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT NEW DELHI, September 6, 1951—6 p.m.
871. Embtel 852 Sept 5.
1. Graham told me complete confidence following today:

(a) Commission decided not present complete plan demilitarization for consideration GOI and GOP but give to each govt simultaneously and in writing identical documents containing several numbered points or suggestions re demilitarization with request for views re each. Approval of all these points or suggestions will in effect represent approval of complete outline of plan for demilitarization. Commission feared that if integral detailed plan presented to each govt and if one govt shld accept and other reject govt which accepted might
feel itself entitled become militant because it had UN behind it and that danger of outbreak of hostilities which seemed to have declined during recent weeks might revive. If each govt wld accept commision’s invitation give its written views on each point or suggestion replies which shld clearly show issues and differences involved wld be included in Graham’s report to SC.

(b) Graham plans have documents containing points or suggestions delivered within next 48 hours. He expects take final departure from New Delhi morning Sept 8 proceed Karachi to bid farewell GOP officials, then continue Geneva to prepare report. He will leave member mission behind to receive and carry replies to Geneva.

2. Our impression Graham and his assistants have thus far acted with wisdom, tact and restraint. We believe their decision to submit number points and suggestions rather than integral plan sound. We do not know contents document at present under preparation but are sure it being drafted with great care, in close accord with terms reference and with desire demonstrate complete fairness to parties concerned.

HENDERSON

357.AB/9–751: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY NEW DELHI, September 7, 1951—10 a.m.

874. Took occasion this morning express view Graham as suggested last para Deptel 524 Sept 6. He replied he had given matter careful consideration. Fact was however he had already recd informally from both govt’s replies to points and suggestions contained in document to be presented to them today. He did not believe therefore it wld serve any useful purpose him stay on merely in order receive formal document setting forth what had already been given him informally. He convinced time has come for him leave SOA and is therefore going on with plans set forth Embtel 871 Sept 6.

Rptd info Karachi 57.

HENDERSON

690D.91/9–751: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, September 7, 1951—3:19 p.m.

317. Re Kashmir: This confirms my telecon with Sandifer\(^1\) suggesting supplementary telegram to Henderson recommending Graham sus-

\(^1\) Durward V. Sandifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs.
pend decision whether to file final or interim report until his arrival in NY. This suggestion is based on ideas we think should be put before Graham on his arrival.

a. Kashmir case is entering on dangerous phase with Graham unable to effect demilitarization, constituent assembly elections in prospect and troops concentrated on India-Pakistan borders. To meet this situation we put forward following suggestions, all of which to be discussed with Graham for his reactions.

1. Graham at the earliest possible moment would make an interim report to the SC. This report would not imply any failure of his mission and might contain part, but not necessarily all, of his factual material and conclusions. He would also be requested to appear in SC to present his interim report, preferably within the next week or ten days.

2. After brief general debate, SC would adopt a resolution broadening his powers so that he could act as general mediator of over-all differences between India and Pakistan. Resolution would also extend his term indefinitely.

3. At about the same time, or perhaps delayed to blanket activities of Kashmiri constituent assembly, SC would adopt a second resolution requesting POC to set up the necessary machinery to observe and report on the situation along the cease-fire line in Kashmir and also along the India-Pakistan frontiers both east and west.

4. Graham would have an opportunity for consultation with UN members here. We would expect during these consultations to urge on Graham the importance of his continuing with the case as he did in Indonesia and we would then put before him possible courses of action or elements of a general plan (discussed below) which, subject to his best opinion, might move this dispute along by giving India and Pakistan something to think about in terms of a more secure future.

b. Starting the POC in motion to get observers into the area would allay tension caused by troop concentrations and would blanket publicity given any decision by Constituent Assembly on question of accession of Kashmir. POC action would help calm Pakistan’s fears of fait accompli. We would think it desirable to have observers in Pakistan even if India did not accept them. India would know that the UN would get unbiased reports of any military incidents and Pakistan would have cogent reasons for restraining the tribesmen. This would also minimize the chances of India goading Pakistan into a first act of aggression.

An additional proposal which merits discussion with Graham is that of placing UN (non-US) forces in the area on either or both sides of cease-fire line.

We think SC should retain case rather than pass it to GA unless SC should be frustrated by Soviet veto. GA cannot contribute to substantive solution and India may well have written off moral opinion of world community on Kashmir as it did in Hyderabad case in 1948. Also, presentation of case in GA would risk several splits in free world majority and might complicate handling of Korean case in 6th GA.
It seems to us important to keep Graham as effective contact and spokesman for a solution of Kashmir dispute which might include various elements mentioned below. Thus we would have him installed in that role and engaged in preliminary discussions before his final report is published. This would avoid freezing Kashmir dispute to status quo which might boil up into hostilities later, and would avoid embarrassing consequences of possible SC futility in light of India’s refusal to accept arbitration.

c. Consultations with Graham about how he would proceed under broader terms of reference would include methods of developing new approach to problem. One new element (which we think may be found necessary) is proposal for joint control and development of Kashmir water resources through some form of India—Pakistan corporation or authority along lines of Lilienthal proposal. Focusing parties’ attention on this might start them cooperating on a mutually advantageous enterprise and at the same time remove real Pakistani fear of water shortage caused by Indian control of headwaters.

We also suggest discussion with Graham of possibilities of partition of Kashmir as well as UN admin of vale. Partition might or might not include plebiscite in the vale. Since India now occupies the entire vale, a retreat might have to be made to total partition.

Graham might feel that even such a drastic proposal as partition of vale might be less undesirable than a proposal for interim UN administration and deferring to some future date a plebiscite, since latter would merely postpone the evil day even in the unlikely event that both parties agreed to such a course of action. Moreover, such a delay would exacerbate India—Pakistan relations by continual intrigue for votes.

d. The need for vigorous exploration with Graham of all practical possibilities arises from fact that Kashmir dispute may be key to other economic and political controversies between Pak and India. It is likely that present plan of statewide plebiscite and arbitration of issues not agreed has been carried about as far as practicable, although this is of course a question to be thoroughly explored with Graham. Neither India or Pak feels obliged to surrender what it now holds of Kashmir because of any moral or legal considerations or because of threat of force. While we would keep separate consideration of constituent assembly and troop concentration, they are companion sources of tension which might lead either govt to mutual disaster. US and UN effectiveness in this controversy would become small should hostilities commence, because UN political or economic sanctions would have little restraining effect and military sanctions seem outside the realm of practical possibility. Also, military conflict would afford to USSR choice of volunteering to assist India in a movement to secure Asia for the Asiatics or could support Pak, thereby rallying loyalty of Muslim world.

For these reasons we have suggested tactic for keeping Graham in the case, for keeping movement toward long term political settlement and for provisional measures to lessen present tension. We see danger in temporing by general SC discussion of a final Graham report
with no further action taken or by dilatory tactics such as establishment interim UN administration.²

²The suggestions contained in this telegram were summarized in an unnumbered information telegram from the Department of State to the Embassies in New Delhi and Karachi, September 10, not printed (New Delhi Embassy Files, Lot 59 F 117, Box 69). Ambassador Warren reported in telegram 272, from Karachi, September 12, that he had delivered the contents of the information telegram to Dr. Graham, with whom he had dined privately on the night of September 11. Ambassador Warren further reported that Dr. Graham had by coincidence explored lines of thought almost identical with the suggestions of Ambassador Gross. (690D.81/9-1251)

357.AB/9-851: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY NEW DELHI, September 8, 1951—noon.

897. 1. Had talk with Graham this morning at airport when he was departing. I said Dept apparently anxious have opportunity consult with him in New York before he makes report to SC. He said he wld like have such consultation and indicated that in meantime report wld be prepared in Geneva. I said Dept also understood his report to SC wld be of “interim” nature in order that situation may not be completely frozen. He said every effort wld be made see that report was of such character as not “freeze” situation. Nevertheless his report in that sense wld be official account of mission and not merely preliminary to another report (Deptel 538, Sept. 6).¹

2. If FonOff had report over week ago that Graham planned return US this report was without foundation. Graham did not make decision return US until after his talk Sept 4 with Nehru (Deptel 540, Sept 6).² As reported Graham had in mind prepare concrete integrated plan. Number points in it not specified. During recent days he has changed his mind and instead submitted doc containing Nr of points which he invited each govt discuss point by point. He has not told us Nr or content these points. We are inclined believe GOP did not know until yesterday contents of doc prepared by Graham and that any info which it has passed onto London was based on supposition rather than on knowledge.

¹Telegram 538, to New Delhi, not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1581.
²Telegram 540, to New Delhi, repeated as telegram 273, to Karachi, transmitted the text of telegram 1220 from London, September 5 (p. 1580), and inquired whether the Embassy had any information concerning Graham’s reported twelve-point plan.
3. Graham told me Nehru has neither promised nor refused to comment on various points contained in doc. He told Graham however doc wld require careful study and cld not be immediately answered. Graham told him he was leaving behind member party at least until Sept 12 to receive reply.

Rptd info Karachi 59.

HENDERSON

357.AB/9–551: Telegram.

The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

KARACHI, September 8, 1951—1 p. m.

256. Ref Deptel 273, Sept 6.¹ Mohd Ali, before taken ill this week, showed in strictest confidence to acting UK HICOM Graham's Twelve Point proposal for demilitarization Ind-held Kashmir and Jammu and Azad Kashmir.

Twelve Points covered particularly in clauses seven and ten, number troops necessary for internal security to remain on both sides. Pak's suggestion was proportion shld be two to one, that militia on both sides be disbanded, and that Ind forces be reduced to four or five battalions, in which case Pak forces wld be reduced to two battalions.

Gurmani, commenting generally on discussions without mentioning existence of Twelve Point proposals, told me C-in-C Pak Army recommends from a mil point of view a minimum of three battalions in Azad Kashmir, but Prime Minister and Gurmani were willing stretch a point and reduce to two, provided Ind wld agree to hold her forces to four or five.

Mohd Ali also told Burnett Paks felt there shld be 13th proposal covering arbitration in event of disagreement of demilitarization. Graham is said to have replied that India in no case wld accept arbitration and then produced a draft of a 13th arbitration clause for Pak consideration. Burnett told me that he had given an undertaking to Mohd Ali, he wld hold this in strictest confidence and I gathered he was not reporting it. My understanding with him was that I wld not do anything about it until given signal.

Graham, who came to see me just before he returned to Delhi last week, expressed keen regret that he could not discuss in detail his conversations with Liaquat and Nehru, but he did express hope that Nehru wld agree to progressive demilitarization down to minimum requirements for internal security. He said he was pleased with Pak attitude on demilitarization of Azad Kashmir.

WARREN

¹ Not printed, but see footnote 2, supra.
WASHINGTON, September 10, 1951—3:30 p.m.

Present: U.S. Mr. Acheson
       Mr. Harriman
       Mr. Gifford
       Mr. Jessup

       U.K. Mr. Morrison
       Sir Oliver Franks
       Sir Pierson Dixon

[c] Kashmir

39. Mr. Acheson said that events were moving very rapidly toward a collision in this area. The question is whether to put forward any plan at this time. It appeared that the Pakistanis would be willing to do anything to which India would agree to solve the problem. It was first necessary that the U.S. and U.K. should act together. In the UN it would be possible to muster an impressive vote against India. Outside of the UN attempts should be made to have the Asians take the initiative in intervening, especially such countries as Burma, Indonesia and Ceylon. Another possibility would be to postpone the disposition of Kashmir for an extended period such as ten years and make provision for UN administration of the area. The attempt should be made to remove the dispute from the political sphere and to concentrate on its technical aspects. If progress were made on water development, the whole economic basis for the dispute would disappear.

40. Mr. Morrison said that the more we could delay, the better the chances would be for a peaceful settlement. Perhaps this was wrong but at least there was no use to use force at this time. Both countries were in the British Commonwealth and the U.K. was trying to be impartial, but it made clear in the UN that the Indians were wrong. It was impossible for the U.K. or UN to intervene by force. Perhaps at the right time the British Commonwealth could collectively intervene. The Asian intervention which Mr. Acheson mentioned might be a strong influence. India was sensitive to any U.K. or U.S. inter-

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1 Complete text of the minutes of this meeting is scheduled for publication in volume iii.

2 Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large.

3 Herbert Morrison, British Foreign Secretary.

4 British Ambassador to the United States.

5 Deputy Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office.

ference with regard to Pakistan. Whether the UN would be a suasive
force was not sure. Even though this was no time for bullying Nehru,
a stalemate should be avoided. If the U.S. agreed to this general line
details could be worked out by the respective UN delegations.

41. Mr. Acheson said that while Mr. Scott was here he would like
to have the appropriate officials in the Department meet with him on
this matter. Regarding taking this question up in the Security Coun-
cil and especially in the General Assembly, it should be raised “more
in sorrow than in anger”. Meanwhile, it would be most helpful to try
to make progress on the Punjab development scheme which would
help to remove the dispute from the political field.

357.AB/9-1151: Telegram

The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY KARACHI, September 11, 1951—1 p. m.

267. In two conversations with Graham one last night when Prime
Minister gave him dinner and other this a. m. when he came say good-
bye to me it was made clear he had not submitted to either government
specific proposals that might invite rejection. In his final conversa-
tion with Liaquat yesterday Prime Minister’s discussions were general.
He and Prime Minister agreed that recommendations submitted in
Graham report to SC should receive immediate consideration and
decision of SC arising from report should receive closest attention
from Committee to promote early and peaceful solution of Kashmir
problem.

I understand that twelve-point memo prepared by Graham left
blanks for inclusion of specific info and therefore was not presented
by him as formal proposal which might invite rejection by either
side.

The Prime Minister in long conversation with me last night said in
his opinion next step to be taken by SC following receipt and dis-
cussion of Graham report is to move under Art 37 of Charter and
call on two powers to proceed forthwith in inviting plebiscite admin-
istrator to proceed with discharge of his responsibilities. He assumed
Graham’s report would make specific recommendations on demili-
tarization stages including number of armed forces on both sides to
maintain internat'l security until after plebiscite vote had been taken.

Liaquat said he saw no virtue in arbitration recommendation which
had already been rejected by GOI. He said also he is opposed to SC
turning Kashmir question over to General Assembly because “it wld
be shirking the responsibility which the Council shared with him and
Nehru for the lives of millions which might otherwise be sacrificed in
senseless and disastrous war”.
Liaquat said in his conversation yesterday he had expressed confidence in Dr. Graham’s awareness of his own responsibility as UN representative for safeguarding the peace of subcontinent and he hoped the Graham report to SC would reflect gravity of situation which has deteriorated in past year.

Liaquat concluded by telling me he feels US and UK as two most powerful members of SC must move for early decision; otherwise his own position in Pakistan will be untenable. The pressure on him is increasingly heavy and he can only withstand it if he can have his people believe that action by the SC will not be delayed.

WARREN

357.AB/9–1151: Telegram

The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY KARACHI, September 11, 1951—2 p. m.

268. Dr. Graham in farewell conversation with me this a. m. said he considered it fruitless to raise any additional specific questions with GOP prior to his departure because that wld necessitate further trip to Delhi to discuss same matters with GOI and such action would in his opinion not alter situation.

He is preparing his report in Geneva because he said it is physically impossible to write it in India or Pakistan and it wld be difficult to write it in NY without interruptions. He said that immediately on arrival in New York he wld consult with our delegate before submitting report.

Dept pass USUN.

WARREN

McGhee Files: Lot 53D468

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Weil) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 12, 1951.

Subject: Kashmir: India–Pakistan Relations: Your Talk with Mr. Scott.1

Discussion:

On Monday, September 10, the Secretary discussed Kashmir with Mr. Morrison—presumably along the lines of WFM B–2/35 2 (Tab

1 Robert Heattie Scott, Assistant Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office.
A). On the same day officers of the Department discussed with Mr. Fowler of the UK delegation to the UN and Mr. Belcher, First Secretary of the British Embassy future action with regard to Kashmir. The paper “Kashmir Dispute: Future Action” was used as a basis for discussion (Tab B). At this working level conference there seemed to be general agreement that on balance there was greater advantage in getting the Kashmir case before the General Assembly than in restricting UN treatments of the case to the Security Council. The British representatives agreed with points 1 and 2 of this paper, said that it was a firm UK decision not to take the initiative in stimulating Asian approaches (point 3). Regarding points 4 through 8 in general, the British representatives believed that danger would lie in indicating to the Government of India at too early a stage our willingness to go ahead on a basis other than the agreed UNCIP resolutions. They thought we should not now commit ourselves to action so far in advance and that the whole situation should be re-examined if the approaches suggested in points 1 through 3 failed. They intend to send the gist of the paper to London for HMG’s comment.

In the record of the afternoon meeting of the Secretary and Mr. Morrison on September 10, it is stated that the Secretary told Mr. Morrison that “the Pakistanis would be willing to do anything to which India would agree to solve the problem”. We doubt that this statement accurately reflects the Secretary’s comments, because it differs with our appreciation of the attitude of the Government of Pakistan. As you are aware, the Pakistan and Indian positions have been unchanged for more than two years.

In connection with the possibility of approaches to the two Governments by certain Asian countries mentioned under numbered paragraph 4 of Tab A, and mentioned also in the record of the talk between the Secretary and Mr. Morrison, it should be noted that SOA has not contemplated that Ceylon’s intervention would be useful. The question of stimulating or encouraging Asian Governments to offer assistance is so delicate that we are convinced action along this line, if attempted, must be most adroitly executed lest India and Pakistan learn that such Asian approaches are the result of United States stimulation.

With reference to the discussion of a joint Indo-Pakistan Water Authority in Tab A, SOA believes it is not possible to remove Kashmir from the political sphere by concentrating on technical aspects of Indo-Pakistan problems.

SOA had hoped that Mr. Morrison’s remarks might have been somewhat more responsive to the position outlined in Tab A. It is hoped

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*Paper of August 27, 1952.*
in your talks with Mr. Scott that you elicit rather more precise views than were forthcoming from the Foreign Secretary.

Recommendation:

1. That you discuss Kashmir and India–Pakistan relations along the lines suggested in Tab A.

2. That you ask Mr. Scott whether he has any comment on the ideas contained in Tab B (working paper).

**Memorandum of Conversations, by Mr. Howard Meyers of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs**

SECRET  

[WASHINGTON,] September 12, 1951.

Subject: Kashmir Dispute: Future Action

Participants: Mr. R. H. Scott, UK Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs  
Mr. Ronald Belcher, First Secretary, UK Embassy  
Mr. Robert Fowler, UK Delegation to the United Nations  
Mr. John D. Hickerson, UNA  
Mr. Joseph Palmer, First Secretary, US Embassy, London  
Mr. T. E. Weil; SOA  
Mr. W. Witman, SOA  
Mr. R. D. Gatewood, SOA  
Mr. D. W. Wainhouse, UNP  
Mr. H. Meyers, UNP

Mr. Scott wondered whether Dr. Graham would be apt to put in a report showing complete failure for his mission, or rather would leave a door open for further progress.

Mr. Hickerson believed that Dr. Graham would do the latter; that he, of all men, could pull off a miracle in this dispute.

Mr. Scott then inquired whether this description of Graham’s nature did not indicate that, if Graham could not successfully conclude his mission, there was not much sense in making further approaches of a similar nature.

Mr. Hickerson said that we were somewhat inclined to agree, although we had not come to a definite conclusion and wished to stress the necessity for examining carefully Dr. Graham’s report to see whether that report might offer possibilities of advancing the dispute.

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1 T. Eliot Weil, Deputy Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs.
in the Security Council. However, we had given thought to referring
the dispute to the General Assembly, in an effort to bring about pres-
sure upon the Government of India. He personally was inclined to
doubt that such pressure would be successful without being coupled to
other approaches. He invited Mr. Scott’s comments.

Mr. Scott referred to Secretary Acheson’s comments regarding the
possibility of further efforts by the Indonesians and Burmese. He
thought that the best forum for such efforts was the General Assembly,
where these Asian countries might take an active part in the discussion.

Mr. Hickerson then read to Mr. Scott the draft SOA–UNP paper,
He cautioned that the United States proposals with regard to the
Development Authority in the Vale and the Indo-Pakistan Water
Authority were only tentative and involved difficult problems of
financing and staffing. Mr. Hickerson further cautioned that our whole
paper was tentative and that we earnestly desired the United King-
dom’s comments.

Mr. Scott said that this was such a baffling problem that any con-
structive approach was valuable. Recapitulating the situation for a
moment, Pakistan was pressing for a state-wide plebiscite but was
willing to accept arbitration on the unresolved differences with India
in regard to this plebiscite. Moreover, there was serious danger of
internal difficulties in Pakistan if there were no progress on the Kash-
mir dispute. Consequently, the United Kingdom was afraid that any-
thing less than an emphasis upon arbitration would seriously weaken
the position of the Liaquat Government. Regarding the new approach
outlined under point 4 of the United States paper, the United States
proposals depended upon mutual acceptance by both parties. Could
we believe that the Government of India would agree to such proposals
as partition of Kashmir, the Development Authority or the Water-
Right Authority? In other words, what would India obtain which
would be better than what it has now?

Mr. Fowler pointed out that both the Development Authority and
the Water-Right Authority would really require some surrender of
GOI control in the Vale and elsewhere in Kashmir. The only benefit
the GOI would derive would be financial assistance and economic
development, and it was a most moot question whether enough money
would be available for these projects to induce India to go along with
these proposals. However, this might be a possibility if the induce-
ment could be made good enough, although in his personal opinion
this was not a very good possibility.

Mr. Scott pointed out that other factors, such as a world crisis,
might cause India to go along with these proposals. This, on the other
hand, would involve a most dangerous situation in India and
elsewhere.
Mr. Fowler stated that it appeared from the joint UK-US discussions the previous day, that all favored examining this new approach to see if this might be a valuable course of action to have in reserve. He thought that if cautious soundings showed that India might accept this line, then the proposals might be put to Pakistan. To do otherwise would alarm Pakistan, since the GOP might believe that the United Kingdom and the United States were abandoning them by a departure from the present insistence upon the agreed UNCIP resolutions.

Mr. Wainhouse urged that we should not think of going to the General Assembly until we had exhausted the possibilities of action in the Security Council which might appear when we examined the Graham report. He pointed out that we really could not make any definite decision until we saw this report.

Mr. Witman referred to the Indian elections in January 1952, and inquired whether it might not be wise to drag out negotiations in the Security Council past this time, in order to see if the negotiating atmosphere within the GOI would be better. As he understood it, the General Assembly would still be in session at this time, should it prove advisable or necessary to refer the dispute to the Assembly.

Mr. Fowler said that the United Kingdom was afraid of reaction in Pakistan following the Graham report, and thus the United Kingdom thought that immediate United Nations consideration and action was needed.

Mr. Witman said that he believed we all agreed we must wait and see Dr. Graham's report, which it appeared would probably be phrased in such a way as to enable further United Nations consideration and discussion of possibilities. He thought that Pakistan would be satisfied by immediate Security Council consideration of the problem.

Mr. Fowler said that if the dispute were referred to the General Assembly he would hope that a General Assembly resolution would favor arbitration. If India refused such a recommendation, then the General Assembly might appoint a negotiating committee and use Dr. Graham's services in conjunction with this committee. This would provide continuing pressure on India, pressure which would be maintained even after the Indian elections in January. This might cause a change of heart on the part of Nehru, particularly if the January elections strengthened his domestic political position.

Mr. Gatewood inquired what the Security Council could do before referring the dispute to the General Assembly.

Mr. Wainhouse replied that this depended upon Dr. Graham's proposals. The Security Council might well consider proposals, whether through Dr. Graham or through other machinery, including the Coun-
cil itself. He favored using Dr. Graham’s services to advance the possibilities which might be contained in Graham’s own report.

690D.91/9-1251: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

New York, September 12, 1951—8:45 p.m.

337. Kashmir—Graham’s 12-point plan. Re Deptel 540, Sept. 6, to New Delhi, and Karachi’s No. 256, Sept 8. Malania (secretariat) has given us personally and in strictest confidence following text of Graham’s draft agreement, including 13th arbitration clause referred to para 4 Karachi’s 256:

"The Govt of India and Pakistan:

(1) Reaffirm their will not to resort to force and to adhere to peaceful procedures with regard to question of state of Jammu and Kashmir;
(2) Agree to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favorable to promotion of friendly relations between the two countries and to appeal to their respective peoples to cooperate to this end;
(3) Reaffirm their will observe cease-fire of Jan 1, 1949 and Karachi agreement July 27, 1949;
(4) Reaffirm their acceptance of principle that question of accession of state Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through democratic method free and impartial plebiscite under auspices UN;
(5) Agree that demilitarization of state Jammu and Kashmir contemplated UNCIP res August 13, 1948 and Jan 5, 1949 shall be effected in single continuous process;

This text of Graham’s draft agreement was repeated to New Delhi as telegram 606, to Karachi as telegram 299, and to London as telegram 1485. Each Embassy was at the same time informed that the Department of State had discussed the text in strictest confidence with representatives of the British Embassy in Washington and the United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations (690D.91/9-1251).

See footnote 2, p. 1835.

Leo Malania, Special Assistant to the Executive Assistant to the U.N. Secretary-General.

The Governments of India and Pakistan had ordered the forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir to cease fire at 11:59 p.m., January 1, 1949 (S/1196, Annex VI), after accepting the proposals for the conditions of the plebiscite proposed by the U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan, successively embodied in the UNCIP Resolution of January 5, 1949 (S/1196).

At a meeting of military representatives of India and Pakistan held in Karachi under the auspices of a Truce Sub-committee of UNCIP, an agreement was signed on July 27 by which a cease-fire line was established as a complement to the suspension of hostilities in the State of Jammu and Kashmir (S/1340/ Add. 1—Annex 26).
(6) Agree that this process demilitarization shall take place during period of ninety days;

(7) Agree that demilitarization referred to above shall be carried out in such a way that at end of period of ninety days forces on Pakistan side cease-fire line will consist of blank and India side of cease-fire line will consist of blank;

(8) Agree that disposition forces each side cease-fire line during and after ninety day period referred to above shall be so arranged as to involve no threat cease-fire agreement;

(9) Agree that India and Pakistan commanders-in-chief, under auspices of UN, will establish a programme of demilitarization in accordance with provisions of paras 5, 6, 7 and 8 above;

(10) Agree that Indian Govt will cause plebiscite administrator to be formally appointed to office on blank day of ninety day period referred to in para 6 above;

(11) Agree that completion of programme referred to in para 9 above will be without prejudice to functions and responsibilities of UN rep and plebiscite administrator as set forth in para 4 a and b of Jan 5, 1949 res;

(12) Agree that any difference of interpretation regarding programme of demilitarization will be referred to the military adviser, and if disagreement continues, to UN rep, whose decision should be final.

(13) Agree that any disagreement regarding interpretation of provisions this agreement will be settled by final decision of UN rep.”

AUSTIN

694.00/9-1351

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of
Pakistan-Afghanistan Affairs (Gatewood)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] September 13, 1951.

Subject: San Francisco Conference and Kashmir

Participants: Mr. M. A. H. Ispahani, Ambassador of Pakistan
Sir Zafrulla Khan, Pakistan Foreign Minister
Mr. McGhee—NEA
Mr. Weil—SOA
Mr. Gatewood—SOA

Problem:

To elicit Pakistan views on possible progress on the Kashmir case.

Action Required:

To express continued US concern with the Kashmir issue.

Action Assigned to: NEA

[Here follows a brief discussion of Pakistan’s representation at the
San Francisco Conference.]

Sir Zafrulla then turned to the Kashmir issue, pointing out that
public feeling was intensely aroused over Kashmir and the recent
troop movements by India, and stating that prompt action in the Security Council on Dr. Graham’s report must be taken to ease the pressure of the Pakistan public on the Government. Such action, he said, would best be taken before the meeting of the General Assembly in November; otherwise, the Pakistan public would believe the SC had failed to live up to its responsibilities, and further delays would be intorduced into the Kashmir case because the General Assembly would overshadow the activity of the Council.

Mr. McGhee assured Sir Zafrulla that we had no intention of recognizing, as in any way binding, such action as the so-called “constituent assembly” in Indian-held Kashmir might take regarding the question of accession. Sir Zafrulla said he expected the Indian Government might not follow up the nominations of candidates for the so-called “constituent assembly” with any voting procedures, as these would be expensive and as 43 out of 45 candidates were, apparently, unopposed. He went on to compare the cordial and cooperative treatment Dr. Graham had received in Pakistan with the originally hospitable, but later evasive, reception accorded him by Nehru, and he quoted Dr. Graham to this effect. As to Dr. Graham’s suggestions for demilitarization and plebiscite, Sir Zafrulla indicated that these were designed to establish a single continuous process, in contrast to Dixon’s proposals, and he referred to the recent public statement of the GOP that Dr. Graham’s suggestions had been “accepted.” Mr. McGhee remarked that this indicated a familiar pattern: Pakistan accepting, and, possibly, India refusing to consider measures of conciliation.

Sir Zafrulla made it clear that, in his opinion, it was not yet necessary to proceed in the Security Council to take action under Chapter VIII of the Charter (“Threats to Peace”), but that it was most desirable for the Council to “recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate” under Chapter VI, Article 37. Mr. McGhee pointed out that there were general limitations on the effectiveness of UN action which had to be carefully considered, and Sir Zafrulla agreed, stating that his Government “cannot ask for the moon,” but that some progress must be made and the Kashmir dispute was becoming a “weariness of the spirit” for the Security Council and all concerned.

Mr. Weil inquired whether the greatest pressure on the GOP was coming from the general public, the tribes in the Northwest, or possibly the dangers of communal disturbances in East Pakistan. Sir Zafrulla said that General Devers had held talks with quite a number of tribal leaders along the northwest frontier, and had been assured by them that so long as the UN was taking some action leading to a fair plebiscite in Kashmir, they could restrain their tribes.
[Here follows a brief discussion of shipments of cotton from Pakistan to Communist China.]

After mentioning his great regret over the recent illness of Mr. Ghulam Mohammed, Pakistan Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, Mr. McGhee asked Sir Zafrulla if it would be convenient for him to see Mr. Harriman (as informally suggested by Mr. McGhee) late this afternoon at Mr. Harriman’s home, to give him a brief review of the military situation on the subcontinent. Sir Zafrulla concurred and also accepted Mr. McGhee’s invitation to a private dinner with him tomorrow evening. He was also informed that the Secretary would see him tomorrow afternoon.

257.AB/9-1451

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Howard Meyers of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, and Mr. Frank D. Collins of the Office of South Asian Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON,] September 14, 1951.

Participants: Mr. Robert Fowler, UK Delegation to the UN;
Mr. Ronald Belcher, First Secretary of British Embassy;
Mr. James Hyde—US Delegation to the UN;
UNP—Mr. Eric Stein; Mr. Howard Meyers;
SOA—Mr. William Witman; Mr. F. D. Collins

The UK representatives were given in confidence the thirteen point proposal which Dr. Graham has submitted to both India and Pakistan. It was explained that the US believed that this approach was different from anything which had been attempted before in that it appeared designed to draw out the parties’ attitudes, on the basic elements of the dispute. It would be difficult for either party to disagree completely with all the points. Thus, this may provide a useful means to narrow differences between the parties on particular points. The UK Representatives, after reading the various points outlined by Dr. Graham, were of the opinion that they afforded room for moving ahead in the Security Council discussions, and that it may be possible to negotiate between the parties on this basis. In the event this line of approach proved unfruitful, the Security Council could then consider other approaches, such as a reference to the General Assembly.

Mr. Hyde recommended that Dr. Graham’s terms of reference be broadened so that he might negotiate not only on Kashmir but on other problems such as the water rights issue, etc., and that consideration be given to having the Security Council send the Peace Observation
Committee to the area and also to stationing POC observers along the East-West Indo-Pakistan borders. Mr. Hyde explained that it was USUN's opinion that such action would partially offset the action of the Constituent Assembly and would lessen the tension caused by recent troop concentrations.

It was agreed that certain advantages would accrue from having Dr. Graham continue with negotiations, and that it might be advisable at a future date to request that the POC be dispatched to the area. The UK Representatives thought that the POC should be used only if there was renewed tension on the borders. Mr. Fowler remarked that unless some signs of progress could be detected, it might not prove fruitful to have him continue indefinitely negotiations with the parties. The preferable line might be to continue to apply pressure against India through a reference of the issue to the General Assembly, if Graham's further negotiations showed after a couple months that he could not make adequate progress.

Secretary's Memoranda: Lot 53D444

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 14, 1951.

Subject: Kashmir: Future UN Action

Participants: Sir Zafrullah Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan
              Mr. M. A. H. Ispahani, Ambassador of Pakistan
              The Secretary
              Mr. McGhee, Assistant Secretary
              Mr. Weil, SOA

Sir Zafrullah called on me at 6:00 p.m. He said he was disturbed by reports that consideration was being given to referring the Kashmir case to the General Assembly after Dr. Graham had submitted his report. Sir Zafrullah said he believed the Security Council should continue its efforts to settle the case; that it was still the SC’s duty within the purview of Chapter VI, Article 37 of the Charter to make further efforts; and that he did not see how the GA, with some sixty nations represented, could successfully tackle the problem.

Sir Zafrullah said he believed the SC should take up the question immediately following submission of the Graham report and pass an appropriate resolution. He asked me (1) whether the Department would discreetly ascertain from Dr. Graham the estimated date on which his report would be submitted, and (2) whether the US Delegation would take up the Kashmir question in the SC immediately
following submission of the report. He said there should not be any
difficulty in persuading the SC to resume consideration of the case
since the membership was the same as when the last resolution on
Kashmir was adopted in the spring of this year; and added that his
Government had reason to believe that the report would be a clear
statement of the problem.

I told Sir Zafrullah that I considered his statement a very orderly
presentation of his Government's position and asked Mr. McGhee for
comments. Mr. McGhee asked Sir Zafrullah whether he did not believe
that consideration of the case by both the SC and the General As-
sembly would be more effective than consideration by the SC alone.
Sir Zafrullah said he thought not. Mr. McGhee asked whether con-
sideration by the General Assembly would not give the recommenda-
tions a broader base. Sir Zafrullah said he did not think so—that it
would probably take three months to explain the case to the GA.
Mr. McGhee remarked that it was our object to use UN machinery
to a maximum extent. I suggested that if the SC acted and India
refused to accept its recommendations, then there would be reason
for referring the case to the General Assembly. Sir Zafrullah added
that likewise if the USSR vetoed SC action then there would be
justification for adopting the new procedure and referring the case to
the GA. He added, however, that referring the case to the GA would
be "too complicated" and would result in delay.

Sir Zafrullah said that earlier in the afternoon he had discussed
with Sir Percy Spender the question of the Korean cease-fire nego-
tiations. He said he had come to the conclusion that there might be
some possibility of a resumption of negotiations if the UN followed
"a middle course". He said if the Communist allegations were not
completely brushed aside, the UN would have an opportunity to test
the Communists and to find out whether they wanted a cease fire. I
agreed that perhaps the UN would have such an opportunity now that
it had been admitted that an UN plane had strafed the Kaesong area.
I said I would have a look at this.

Following mutual congratulations on our speeches at the San Fran-
cisco Conference, I said to Sir Zafrullah that I would like to tell him
in confidence that the US would support Pakistan's candidacy for a
seat on the Security Council. Sir Zafrullah said jokingly that we
needn't worry because there were virtually no other competitors for
this seat. Mr. McGhee assured Sir Zafrullah that this was not the rea-
son for our supporting Pakistan.

Vice President of the Japanese Peace Treaty Conference at San Francisco;
Australian Ambassador to the United States.
Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency

SECRET
NIE-41

[WASHINGTON,] 14 September 1951.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE KASHMIR DISPUTE TO THE END OF 1951

THE PROBLEM

To estimate probable developments in the Kashmir dispute during 1951, with particular reference to the possible use of armed force, and to indicate the consequences for US security interests of war between India and Pakistan.

CONCLUSIONS

1. India and Pakistan have once again reached a critical state of tension over Kashmir. The military forces of both countries are deployed opposite each other on the frontiers, and few additional measures would be required for either to initiate hostilities.

2. The Indian Government (GOI) is unlikely to precipitate war deliberately, but is prepared to accept war and is unlikely to act to reduce the tension.

3. The Pakistan Government (GOP) is unlikely to precipitate war deliberately so long as the UN appears to GOP leaders to offer hope of effective action. However, there is a possibility that the GOP would deliberately launch or sponsor local action in Kashmir, especially between 15 September and 1 November.

4. The Kashmir issue has generated high military, political, and religious pressures one or more of which might well lead to hostilities.

5. In the event of war, there will almost certainly be fighting not only in Kashmir, but also in the Punjab and probably East Pakistan (Bengal). It is unlikely that the UN could effect a cease-fire, if either side had gained a material advantage from the fighting.

6. In any extended conflict India would probably be victorious, but its victory would not be quick or easy.

7. The most important consequence of war would be internal deterioration in both countries, which might open the way for a Communist seizure of power in parts or all of India. In addition, war would have a serious adverse effect on US relations with both coun-

*The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 10 September. [Footnote in the source text.]
tries, and would probably deprive the US of potential air bases in Pakistan and of important raw materials from India.

DISCUSSION

The Current Situation

8. Troop movements by both India and Pakistan since May have greatly increased the tension between the two countries and the possibility of major hostilities. Almost 90 percent of India’s and 70 percent of Pakistan’s ground combat forces are now deployed opposite each other in Kashmir itself, and on the Punjab and East Pakistan (Bengal) frontiers.

9. Pursuant to a Security Council resolution of 30 March 1951, Dr. Frank Graham is now in the subcontinent seeking to achieve agreement on demilitarization of Kashmir as a prelude to an impartial plebiscite to determine its permanent affiliation. Graham is due to report to the Council by 29 September, though he may seek a delay.

10. The chief focus of dispute at the present time is the projected election of a Constituent Assembly in the area of Kashmir controlled by Indian forces under the 1949 UN cease-fire and containing about three quarters of the population. These elections are scheduled for 10–30 September, under the auspices of the pro-Indian Government of Kashmir, headed by Sheikh Abdullah, for the declared purpose of establishing a constitutional government for all of Kashmir.

11. The Constituent Assembly elections are bitterly opposed by Pakistan, and Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan has threatened war to prevent them. Although the UN has written a letter to India stating that the elections are contrary to the spirit of the March 30 resolution, Abdullah and the Indian Government have reiterated their intention to proceed with the plan.

Basic Objectives of the Parties in Kashmir

12. The dominant motivating force of both India and Pakistan on the Kashmir issue is nationalism tinged with religion. The issue focuses the deepest passions of both countries, and since 1947 public opinion, particularly in Pakistan, has made it one of national prestige. To Pakistan, founded on the principle of a Moslem nation, it seems intolerable that the largest of the subcontinent’s princely states, containing a predominantly (78 percent) Moslem population, should be handed over to India. To the Indians, who have waged a vigorous campaign to take over the princely states left uncommitted by partition, it appears all but unthinkable to give up a state whose ruler formally acceded to India in 1947. Nehru’s feelings about Kashmir are intensified by his long association with Sheikh Abdullah, by the fact that he himself is of Kashmiri descent, and by his strong belief in the concept of a secular state embracing both Moslems and Hindus.
13. Strategically, the Pakistanis view Kashmir as an important military gateway that would enable India to threaten Pakistan's principal military base area at Rawalpindi and also major agricultural areas. Indian strategic interest is less marked; a Pakistani Kashmir would outflank much of the East Punjab, but the border terrain is difficult.

14. Economically, Kashmir's trade is with Pakistan rather than India. Possession of Kashmir would slightly improve Pakistan's control over the vital water supply obtained from the four major tributaries of the Indus River, though it would not prevent India from carrying out a present threat to impair the flow of two of these tributaries that cross Indian territory before entering Pakistan.

15. Eventually, both India and Pakistan might be satisfied with less than the whole of Kashmir. However, both are adamant in demanding control of the Vale area, the heart of the state, which has a Moslem majority but is on the Indian side of the cease-fire line.

Political Prospects in the Absence of War

16. India's trump card is its present control of the Vale. A plebiscite conducted under impartial auspices in the near future would probably produce a majority in the Vale for accession to Pakistan. However, Indian control, with the inevitable intimidation and ban on pro-Pakistan religious campaigning, would presumably produce a result favorable to India in any Constituent Assembly elections.

17. Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that India will postpone or cancel the elections. There is no indication of any further UN action to block the elections and almost no chance that India would heed the UN if it did take such action.

18. If the elections are held, the resulting Constituent Assembly will undoubtedly pass some form of resolution in favor of final affiliation with India. Although Indian spokesmen have conceded that such a resolution would not be binding on the UN, India will certainly make maximum propaganda use of it and may later reverse its position. Moreover, the creation of a constitutional "independent" government (in contrast to the "puppet" Azad Government of the Pakistan-occupied part of Kashmir) may enlist growing loyalty and support among the Kashmiris. In this way the Indians undoubtedly hope eventually to present the world with a fait accompli, at least as to the areas now under Indian control.

19. Confronted by this sequence of events, Pakistan—if it did not go to war—would certainly seek further UN action. Because of its willingness to accept an impartial plebiscite, Pakistan undoubtedly believes that it has a superior moral case at this stage of the dispute and that further UN resolutions will be favorable to it. At the very least it can count on firm political support from Arab and Moslem
nations and to a large extent from the British Commonwealth nations. Present reports indicate that Dr. Graham has little chance of obtaining an agreed solution. He may propose the appointment of an arbitrator (already rejected by India) or perhaps formulate his own plan for demilitarization, and these recommendations would go to the Security Council. At the same time Pakistan would almost certainly propose a new resolution specifically denouncing and refusing to recognize the Constituent Assembly elections. Reference to the General Assembly in November is also a possibility (and need not mean withdrawal of Security Council jurisdiction); Pakistan might welcome this move as a more effective means of bringing the pressure of world opinion to bear on India.

Indian and Pakistani Military Capabilities†

20. The recent Indian troop movements have brought India's strength in Kashmir itself to an estimated 68,000 men. In the East Punjab, India has a striking force of 75,000, including an armored division and an independent armored brigade. Close to the borders of East Pakistan in Bengal, India has 25,000 to 28,000 men.

21. In Kashmir itself, Pakistani and Azad Kashmir troops number about 18,000. In the Lahore-Wazirabad area of the Punjab, Pakistan has 57,000 men. Another 15,000 are in reserve at Peshawar, and could be moved rapidly to either front. Elsewhere in West Pakistan, about 20,000 men are deployed on internal security. In East Pakistan, Pakistan's forces total an estimated 10,000.

22. The Indian Air Force and Navy, though small, are superior to Pakistan's and India has far greater trained reserves and manpower resources. Moreover, India has some industrial capacity for arms production, while Pakistan has virtually none and would be heavily dependent on outside supplies. Another major Pakistan weakness is the fact that its transportation and communications network in West Pakistan parallels the Indian frontier and is extremely vulnerable to attack.

23. In an all-out war with Pakistan, India probably would be victorious provided Pakistan received no substantial outside help. Initially, probably neither country would gain a decisive victory, and in the first stages Pakistan might even win some battles. But in time the balance would be tipped in India's favor by its over-all advantages. The Indian Navy could blockade Karachi, West Pakistan's only major port, and the Indian Air Force could neutralize the Pakistani Air Force, though its own offensive capabilities are meager.

†Full details on the comparative strengths of the Indian and Pakistani armed forces are given in an Appendix attached to this estimate. [Footnote in the source text.]
24. In a limited action designed by either country solely to take all or part of Kashmir, India would probably also be victorious, but its success would not be quick or easy. India’s present troop superiority in the area would be partially offset by the mountainous terrain and by the difficulty of bringing up supplies and reinforcements over the single road between India and Kashmir. Pakistan’s communications into the area are, on the other hand, relatively good. There are better roads, easier passes, and lower grades.

25. Important elements in any conflict between the two countries would be the attitude of Afghanistan and of the Pathan tribesmen of the North West Frontier Province. Afghanistan itself, which has been diligently courted by India, would probably make border raids on Pakistan; past raids have already resulted in the deployment of elements of two Pakistani divisions near the Afghan frontier. On the other hand, in spite of continuing Afghan propaganda, some of the Pathan tribesmen would probably fight again on the Pakistani side, as in 1947, and if so their warlike qualities would substantially augment initial Pakistani strength in Kashmir.

26. Weather conditions would seriously hamper military operations in Kashmir and the Punjab until after the Southwest monsoon ends, generally about 15 September. For a short time thereafter, major rivers in the Punjab area would be deep and unfordable, and it has been reported that flood conditions now exist in the Lahore area and will prevent operations there until at least 1 October. Thereafter, fighting conditions should be most favorable in Kashmir to the end of November and in the Punjab until next April, although winter conditions would not preclude operations in Kashmir. In Bengal, the monsoon ends later, and the most favorable period would be December and January.

**Likelihood of War to the End of 1951**

**Deliberate War by India**

27. In general, Indian forces are now deployed so that they could either conduct defensive operations or launch strong attacks in the Punjab and against most of the important centers of East Pakistan. No other movement of troops would be necessary for India to make war on all fronts, and it is believed that the Indian forces have sufficient supplies to carry out at least a major initial attack.

28. We estimate that, despite its troop dispositions, the Indian Government (GOI) is unlikely to precipitate a war deliberately during this period. Its reasons against war are formidable: (a) India already controls the disputed area; (b) war would disrupt the Constituent Assembly elections and subsequent plans; (c) time is all on India’s side—even if the elections were postponed, its possession of most of the disputed areas would still leave it in a strong position...
gradually to win over the Kashmiris; and (d) any extended war would be a serious threat to Indian economic and political stability and would almost certainly lead to widespread communal rioting between Hindus and Moslems. The only contrary arguments of any possible weight are that: (a) a war that led to quick victories in the West Punjab and East Pakistan would help the government’s wavering prestige; (b) most of India, including Nehru, opposed partition and would welcome an opportunity to reintegrate Pakistan. However, Nehru is almost certainly too well aware of the risks to be swayed by the first of these considerations, and anti-partition sentiment does not generally go to the length of seeking war.

29. Indian actions are consistent with this view of Indian intentions. Its recent troop movements were probably designed to forestall Pakistani interference with the Constituent Assembly elections while further deterring Pakistan by the threat of a Punjab counterattack.

30. Nonetheless, India is clearly willing to accept war and is extremely unlikely on its own initiative to withdraw its forces in such a way as to relax the tension. In the event of war, India would be unlikely to permit hostilities to be confined to Kashmir, but would probably take advantage of its superiority on the Punjab front and perhaps in Bengal.

**Deliberate War by Pakistan**

31. Pakistan’s troops are deployed defensively, but are in positions in the Lahore-Wazirabad area from which they could attack either the Jammu City area of Indian-controlled Kashmir or the East Punjab. In the latter case, however, an attack could not be in more than division strength unless forward movements were first made from the Wazirabad area. The Pakistani forces in Kashmir itself could not launch more than a very limited attack at this time without substantial reinforcements, which would require major troop movements from other areas.

32. The Pakistan Government (GOP) appears unlikely to precipitate war deliberately. It is possible, however, that the GOP would deliberately launch or sponsor local action in Kashmir, as it did in 1947. This possibility will be greatest during and immediately after the Constituent Assembly elections (roughly 15 September to 1 November).

33. There are strong reasons that should deter Pakistan from resorting to war. In a long war Pakistan would almost certainly lose East Pakistan (containing 60 percent of its population) and major Punjab areas, and its economic and political stability—even its very existence—would be threatened. However, the extreme statements of Liaquat and other Pakistani leaders indicate that they may be reaching a dangerous mood of frustration in which these considerations
would be outweighed by the desire to thwart the Constituent Assembly elections. Moreover, the Pakistani leaders, some of whom tend to be contemptuous of Indian fighting qualities, may believe that their forces could make quick gains in Kashmir (even to capturing Srinagar) and conduct a holding action in the Punjab (possibly aided by the reported floods), after which Pakistan would appeal for a new UN cease-fire. Pakistani statements have used every possible argument to put India in the wrong and encourage support for a contention in the UN that military action in Kashmir is justified because of Indian obduracy and the illegality of the Constituent Assembly elections. There is some possibility that Pakistan might encourage both the tribemen and the Azad Kashmir forces (aided by Pakistan regulars “on leave”) to attack in Kashmir and then disclaim responsibility. GOP leaders might believe that, at the very least, hostilities in Kashmir would bring about immediate UN action favorable to Pakistan.

34. If the Constituent Assembly is elected and convenes, the GOP’s course of action will depend on whether the UN offers real hope of a solution that would offset the effect of the elections and permit an impartial plebiscite. The actions of the Constituent Assembly, plus Indian “crowing,” will undoubtedly tend to increase army and popular pressure for war, and if the Security Council failed to take even the steps of denunciation and arbitration, the GOP might give way to this pressure and start a war deliberately. However, so long as the UN appears to GOP leaders to offer any hope of effective action, the GOP will probably not resort to war deliberately.

Unpremeditated War

35. Apart from the possibility of deliberate war, we estimate that there is some chance that war will be brought on during this period by a chain reaction of explosive factors. These include:

a. Unauthorized military action by elements of the Pakistan Army. For some time a militant group in Pakistan has agitated for aggressive action. An anti-government plot from this source was nipped in the bud by the GOP in the spring of 1951. While a recurrence of actual revolt appears improbable, members of this group might succeed in turning a border incident into a large-scale conflict at any time.

b. Popular feeling in Pakistan. The GOP has exercised effective control over the press and radio to date, and US Embassy Karachi believes the GOP can continue to suppress inflammatory statements if it so desires. Nevertheless, the possibility of a dangerous surge of feeling exists.

c. Renewal of the widespread communal rioting that took place in Bengal in the spring of 1951. This would further arouse feeling in both countries.
d. Indian internal politics. Popular sentiment in India is no less intense but notably calmer than in Pakistan, and Nehru appears to enjoy virtually unanimous support on the Kashmir issue. However, some elements of the right wing of the Congress Party are sympathetic to the strongly anti-Moslem and anti-Pakistan Hindu Mahasabha, and there is a possibility of inflammatory statements for political advantage.

36. The chance of unpremeditated war arising from the above factors is likely to diminish only if there is a substantial relaxation of tension. Neither side is likely to relax the tension by withdrawing troops, but there is a bare possibility that Nehru might make some conciliatory statement or that he and Liaquat might temper the situation by meeting to settle subsidiary issues, such as the water dispute. So long as India pursues the Constituent Assembly plan, the only real chance for relaxation appears to lie in UN action that would offer hope, not only to the leaders of the Pakistan Government but also to the army and people of Pakistan, that the effects of the Constituent Assembly plan would be offset.

Consequences of War for US Security Interests

37. It is unlikely that a war between India and Pakistan could be confined to Kashmir. At the very outset of hostilities, the UN might be able to achieve a cease-fire, though India probably would not accept one that left Pakistani forces in control of the Vale. Once hostilities were fully under way, a cease-fire would be unlikely so long as either side had hope of major immediate gains. War on a broad scale would have a serious effect on US security interest.

38. In the first place, war would increase general world tension and uncertainty. Diplomatically, its immediate effect would be to subject the US to heavy pressures for support from both sides. Whether or not the US took an active role in attempting to settle the conflict, war would increase the risk that US policy might alienate one or both of the parties and adversely affect their positions in the East-West conflict.

39. Militarily, war would almost certainly remove any early prospect of Pakistan’s joining in plans for defense of the Middle East against a Communist attack. US security interests would also be affected directly through the denial, by an immobilized or neutralist Pakistan, of potentially important air base sites that could be used for bomber strikes against any part of the USSR.

40. From an economic standpoint, if hostilities spread to Bengal, the shipment of important raw materials from Calcutta, including mica, Kyanite, and jute, would be impeded or halted. General disorder in India might also cause interruption of shipments of manganese, which would have serious effects on US industry since over 30 percent
of the US supply currently comes from India. While replacements for these supplies could almost certainly be found in the long-run, there would be some serious short-run procurement problems.

41. By far the most important probable development, however, would be internal deterioration in India and Pakistan. Although the outbreak of hostilities might initially strengthen the respective government’s control, any extended fighting would so weaken both countries as to make the maintenance of orderly government a matter of question. There would almost certainly be vast communal disturbances and a resulting increase in the severity of the refugee problem. Such conditions might permit the Indian Communist Party to take over various local areas, and there is a possibility that it would be able, with Chinese help, to assume control of the government.† Outright Communist control is extremely unlikely in Pakistan, but a state of internal chaos and immobilization would be probable.

### Appendix

**Comparative Strengths of Indian and Pakistani Armed Forces**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actives strength</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized National Guard</td>
<td>$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major tactical units:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>6 Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Armd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 LofC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent brigades</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent infantry battalions</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashmiri battalions**</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Guard battalions in service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†The consequences of Communist control of India to US security interest vis-à-vis the USSR, especially in Southeast Asia and the Near East, are considered in NIE-23, “Position of India in the East-West Conflict.” [Footnote in the source text. For text of NIE-23, of September 4, see p. 2174.]

§ India has been organizing a Territorial Army. Its ultimate size is programmed for 150,000, but thus far India has had only limited success in recruiting men for this force. The mission of the Territorial Army is to serve, not as a combat force, but as an internal police force in time of war. [Footnote in the source text.]

||Pakistan has a part-time National Guard, unarmed, with a personnel strength of about 47,000. (Seven battalions, totalling about 6,700 men, were recently called to active duty.) [Footnote in the source text.]

According to their respective tables of organization, Indian divisions consist of about 21,500 men and Pakistani divisions of about 18,000 men. Brigades of both countries consist of about 3,000 men. However, Indian units are very elastic and are often considerably over strength. [Footnote in the source text.]

**Kashmiri battalions in the Indian Army are believed to be at full strength, i.e. 1,000 men per unit, but they are probably inferior in quality to the regular Indian units. Although the Kashmiri battalions in the Pakistani Army contain only about 650 men each, they are nearly as good in quality as the regular Pakistani units. [Footnote in the source text.]**
KASHMIR DISPUTE

II. Navy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Light cruisers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large minesweepers</td>
<td>6 (3 inactive)</td>
<td>4 (3 inactive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesser types and auxiliaries</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III. Air Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jet Fighters</td>
<td>42 Vampires</td>
<td>4 Vickers Attackers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional Fighters</td>
<td>91 Tempests</td>
<td>68 Hawker Furies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Bombers</td>
<td>27 B–24’s</td>
<td>6 Halifaxs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transports, 2-engine</td>
<td>68 C–47’s</td>
<td>36 C–47’s, Bristols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 Doves</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

357.AB/9-1851

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ward P. Allen of the Bureau of European Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] September 18, 1951.

Subject: 1) Kashmir
          2) San Francisco Conference

Participants: Sir Mohammed Zafarullah Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan
              Mr. Ward P. Allen—EUR

Kashmir. During the course of a lengthy conversation on this subject, Sir Zafarullah made the following major points:

1. He strongly hopes that Dr. Graham’s report will be submitted as soon as possible—in any event no later than the end of this month, and he suggested (as he had to the Secretary on September 14) that the US seek to induce Dr. Graham, if possible, to advance the date of submission. I stated that Dr. Graham is, in fact as well as in name, the UN and not the US representative and, without directly suggesting that Zafarullah do so, asked whether he had yet discussed the problem of timing of his report with the Secretariat. Sir Zafarullah replied that he had intended to do so on September 20th.

2. He thinks it vital that as soon as the report is received it be considered immediately by the Security Council and stated he made this point with the Secretary as well as with Messrs. Morrison and
Schuman. It is essential that SC consideration be well under way and the general lines of the Council's action substantially defined by the time the Council moves to Paris in late October. If that is done the Council will be able to continue its consideration in Paris and push it through. If that is not done, then Sir Zafrullah is convinced from past experience, no real action will be taken until after the Sixth GA. I assured Sir Zafrullah that we desired to have the SC act with dispatch and we would certainly share his hope that active consideration would not be postponed until after the GA Session.

3. Pakistan intends to urge that the SC not resort to the appointment of another mediator but itself now make recommendations under Article 37 of the Charter with respect to the demilitarization phase of the dispute. He recounted the mediatatory efforts of UNCP, General McNaughton, Sir Owen Dixon, and now Dr. Graham, and pointed out there must obviously be an end to this procedure and that the Council itself deal with the substance of the issues. He stated that both Sir Gladwyn Jebb and Mr. Gross in the SC meetings leading up to Dr. Graham's appointment expressed the view that this would be the last mediatory effort of this nature. He believes that this is likewise Dr. Graham's view.

4. In response to my question, Sir Zafrullah expressed his high respect for Dr. Graham and stated that he is "an impeccably honest, sincere and scrupulous man". He used the same terms in describing General Devers, Dr. Graham's military adviser.

5. He is strongly opposed to any reference of the case to the GA and stated that he made this clear to the Secretary as well as to Morrison. His reasons are that the case is so complex that it would require a minimum of three months for it to be properly layed before and understood by the GA, and the members of the Assembly would undoubtedly go through the same lengthy processes and procedures as the SC and its mediators had over a period of three years. He foresees therefore that the net effect of GA consideration would be chaos, confusion and delay. He sees no merit in the argument that the judgment of the Assembly representing the international community would carry greater weight than actions of the SC, so long as the latter are backed by the US and the UK. He fears that if the case is given to the GA, even if the SC remains technically seized of it, the impression would be created (fostered by India) that the SC as the UN action body had given it up and that from now on UN consideration will be reduced to the realm of discussion and talk in the organ which has no power to act.

Sir Zafrullah stated that when this matter was discussed with the Secretary Mr. McGhee had indicated that one reason we were thinking of GA consideration is to avoid Soviet veto, but that Zafrullah had pointed out the unlikelihood of this in view of the past record of the USSR in the Kashmir case. He stated that the Secretary agreed with him and indicated his preference for returning the case to the Council. If the Council is then blocked by Soviet veto that is the proper time for us to consider taking the case to the GA under the Uniting for Peace Resolution.

[Here follows a discussion of the San Francisco Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Peace Treaty with Japan.]
SECRET  PRIORITY  New York, September 19, 1951—8:47 p. m.

355. Re Kashmir. On Bokhari’s invitation Ross and I lunchee with Zafrullah Khan today. I gave Zafrullah sympathetic lead on possibility of transferring Kashmir case to the Assembly. For a number and variety of reasons, he expressed strong opposition. Among reasons for opposition were: (a) loss of momentum and position gained over long period of time in SC; (b) risk of misinterpretation that SC was merely passing the buck to GA; (c) necessity of explaining intricacies of problem to great majority of members of Assembly and getting involved in all sorts of new and fancy suggestions and (d) risk that Indians (needing only one-third vote) could block any constructive res.

On possibility of action under Art 37 Bokhari in effect let cat out of bag, anticipating by implication that Art 37 action at this time might later lead to Chapter VII action. Zafrullah discounted this but only in sense that there would be no early contemplation of Chapter VII action. I indicated strong belief that realistically council would not be willing to contemplate Chapter VII action. Zafrullah made what he considered and we agreed an important distinction in the sense that in thinking about Art 37 action was not so much thinking of recommendations for solution of Kashmir problem so much as recommendations with view to breaking present deadlock. In this connection, I very tentatively opened question of relationship between Kashmir problem and others in relations between Pakistan and India. Although we cannot be sure that Zafrullah got the point, in any event, he gave no sign of being unreceptive to a broader approach.

On the whole it was our impression that Zafrullah was much more calm and relaxed than he has appeared to be on previous occasions. This was true in particular for example with regard to present military and political situation.

Zafrullah was considerably interested in the schedule for SC consideration of Graham’s report. He was concerned lest report be taken up in November during Tsiang’s presidency of SC and during the Assembly. He made very clear this did not reflect in any sense on Tsiang or the position of Tsiang’s Govt; it was, on the contrary, a concern that the Russians might create confusion in the SC during Tsiang’s presidency and that this confusion would be compounded by the fact that the Assembly would be in session. I informed Zafrullah

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1 Tingfu F. Tsiang, Representative of China at the United Nations.
in confidence that we had heard Graham expected to return to this country on the 27th or 28th of September. Zafrullah was very hopeful that Graham might return a day or two earlier, that his report might be issued on the 27th or 28th and that the Council might commence consideration of the Kashmir case early in the first week of October with a view to completing action on this phase before the 22nd. We indicated general support of this objective.

GROSS

690D.91/9-1251 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in London

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 22, 1951—3 p. m.

1624. 1. Working level mtgs held Dept Sep 10-14 with Fowler of UKUN and Belcher Brit Emb. Scott of FonOff also had gen conversations with McGhee and Hickerson fol Acheson-Morrison talks which dealt briefly and inconclusively Kashmir.

2. Talks explored all aspects Kashmir case and gen very helpful. No essential disagreement developed the Brit admittedly rather sterile of ideas. Since it was realized nature Graham report might alter any contemplated approach, no effort made reach definite agreement policy beyond immed SC consideration report.

3. USUN tel 337 Sep 12 rptd 9/14, London 1485 Delhi 606, Karachi 299 arrived in time last talk. Apparent Graham endeavored forestall rejection anything which at this stage cld be called a plan but rather utilized device carefully phrased questionnaire pts to be ans separately, thus permitting essential tabulation of individual pts of difference on which Graham or SC cld suggest compromises. Some reason believe Graham only included questions on which he had recd previous assurances helpful ans.

4. Working level mtgs discussed at some length question ref case to GA. UK appeared favor ref to GA by SC fol submission Graham report. Dept has been inclined favor such action if it definitely appeared unlikely SC cld act effectively, on ground that res by GA wld have broader base, increase pressure on India and possibly open new avenues of solution. However, Dept now inclined favor SC action rather than GA in view GOP attitude expressed by Liaquat to Warren and by Zafrullah to Dept and USUN (NY’s 245, Sept 19, rptd London, Karachi, Delhi). Dept also notes possibility some effective SC action may be enhanced by fact that Graham’s draft agreement does not entirely freeze situation. If USSR were to veto SC res or GOI were to finally reject, further consideration wld of course be given to ref

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1 Sent also to New Delhi as telegram 669, to Karachi as 326, and to New York as 151.
case to GA. Immed problem is convince GOP that UN making max-
imum effort toward early settlement. Now apparent ref to GA wld
not serve this purpose. London discuss with FonOff, USUN with
UKDel, Delhi, Karachi with UKHC's. Cable comment soonest.

WEBB

690D.01/9-2451

Memorandum by Mr. William D. Pawley,2 Consultant to the Secretary
of State, to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South
Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 24, 1951.

Subject: The Kashmir Problem

During my recent visit to India to explore the possibilities of obtain-
ing additional quantities of strategic materials,2 I had an opportunity,
purely by accident, to ascertain some facts which may offer a possible
solution of the Kashmir problem.

During the negotiations with various Indian Government officials,
references were made upon several occasions to mineral resources
recently found in Kashmir. While I was calling on Dr. S. S. Bhat-
nagar, Secretary of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Scientific
Research of the Government of India, I was shown samples of high-
grade sulphur, of which he stated that scientists of his Ministry had
found a 400,000 ton deposit in Kashmir. He also showed me samples
of numerous other valuable minerals found in Kashmir and told me
that in addition they had found deposits of copper, gold, and silver,
which he thought might turn out to be extremely valuable. During
this visit with Dr. Bhatnagar, the idea occurred to me that possibly
he, more than anyone else, was influencing the Prime Minister to hold
on to Kashmir at all costs, even to the extent of risking armed conflict.

A few days prior to this meeting, the Prime Minister had told me
that the future of India is greatly dependent upon scientific develop-
ment and the use of its mineral resources. In a brief talk with
Dr. Graham a few days later, I told him that I thought that although
the Kashmir problem had many well known political implications, the
discovery of potential mineral resources might very likely turn out
to be one of the main reasons why Prime Minister Nehru was unwilling
to risk a plebiscite.

1 Formerly Ambassador to Peru (June 1945–April 1946) and Ambassador to
Brazil (April 1946–March 1948).
2 Mr. Pawley’s mission dealt with U.S. assistance programs and with acquisition
of materials for use in the U.S. atomic energy program; documentation is sched-
uled for publication in volume 1; and see pp. 2085 ff., herein.
As you know, Dr. Bhatnagar is now in the United States and I have had several conversations with him. While he was visiting at my home the weekend of September 15, I took the occasion to press him regarding the importance that he and the Prime Minister place on the mineral discoveries, the hydroelectric power potential, and the other economic assets of Kashmir. He admitted that he, the Prime Minister and other members of the Indian Government look upon the wealth of Kashmir as being far more important to India than any political considerations. He told me more of the sulphur discovery and said a road was being built to facilitate its transportation to a railroad.

Thinking that possibly an economic solution might be the key to the problem, I asked Dr. Bhatnagar if he thought the Prime Minister would be interested in a proposition in which the United States and England would participate with India and Pakistan in a corporation for the development of mineral resources, hydroelectric power and the other economic assets of Kashmir. Such a corporation could be financed initially by the World Bank and the four countries involved but could be organized on a self-liquidating basis so that all foreign advances would be repaid at the end of ten, or so, years, during which the area would be under a trusteeship arrangement of the four countries with both India’s and Pakistan’s troops withdrawn. Dr. Bhatnagar said he thought this would offer the Prime Minister a solution, especially as it would enable India to cut down on her now high military budget, now being devoted exclusively to Kashmir.

I know that many suggestions for the solution of this pressing problem have been submitted, but I am convinced that an economic solution must be found. I think it is significant, moreover, that Dr. Bhatnagar feels that Prime Minister Nehru would very likely welcome a proposal such as I have outlined above.

I shall be glad to discuss this further with you or with anyone to whom you may wish to pass on this memorandum.

6900.D.81/9-2551: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, September 25, 1951—4 p. m.

1503. 1. Extended conversation at FonOff yesterday revealed fact UK thinking closely in accord with that described para four Deptel 1624, Sept 22 to London rptd Delhi, Karachi, USUN.

2. Main UK objective is play for time but, in order avoid exacerbation Pakistan, aim shld be initiate some action in SC before it moves to Paris next month. Clearly, firm decision cannot be reached until
Graham report received and studied and reactions India and Pakistan obtained.

3. UK prefers delay in reference to GA in order (a) meet Pakistan’s present objection ref to GA and (b) enable UK-US choose most favorable moment in light India’s reaction to discussions.

4. There appears to be chance Graham’s report may leave opening for further useful action in SC. If so, such course wld be advantageous for fol reasons: (a) it wld avoid appearance of deliberately ignoring Pakistan’s views; (b) it wld leave ref to GA as a reserve tactical maneuver; (e) it wld avoid or postpone damaging effect on prestige of SC in case of admitted failure solve disputes; and (c) it might serve as means of keeping negotiations alive until after Indian elections in December.

5. In any further SC action it is essential there be no risk such action wld lead to deadlock. This wld not only further exacerbate Pakistan but also wld make such a ref to GA transparent avoidance of problem by SC.

6. Folr are comments on suggested courses of action in SC as brought up in recent Washington discussions:

a. Resolution under Article 37, recommending parties take certain specific action, open to foll serious objections: (i) it wld likely lead to deadlock in SC; (ii) it wld tend to put India “in dock” and wld thus undermine remaining chance agreed settlements; and (iii) rather than reference to GA providing opportunity for new ideas to emerge, this hoped for development wld be made more difficult if issues had already been narrowed down by terms of an Article 37 resolution.

b. Extension of SC activities to include potentially valuable industrial basic proposal undesirable, as to link it with political settlement of Kashmir question wld be best method of killing it.

c. Reappointment of Graham with further negotiating powers has attractive features, particularly opportunity it affords of keeping discussion open. Further SC action might well be based on this idea but under fol essential conditions: (i) it wld be folly reappoint Graham in face hostile reception by either party to Graham report; (ii) Graham’s terms of reference shld continue to be based on provisions agreed UNCIP resolutions; (iii) Graham’s functions shld be limited to political aspects Kashmir dispute and shld not be broadened to include such other problems as canal waters or evacuee property; and (iv) altho, in order preserve momentum Graham’s activities he cld be given wider terms of reference than under present resolution, they shld be phrased so as not to weaken Pakistan’s position. Even though Graham cannot be reappointed he might continue in other ways to be associated with further action.

7. Proposal for immediate partition Kashmir, with vale question shelved for period of four years, under consideration.
8. Spontaneous pressure from Asian states shld prove valuable but in order avoid suspicion US or UK had inspired such activity we shld make no move this direction.

Understood above views being communicated by FonOff and CRO to British Missions Washington, Karachi and Delhi for their comments and for further discussion with their US colleagues.

Dept please inform USUN.

Sent Dept 1508, rptd info Karachi 41, New Delhi 38.

HOLMES

690D.91/9-2651: Telegram

The Chargé in India (Steere) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, September 26, 1951—1 a.m.

1123. Deptel 669, Sept 22¹ and related telegrams discussed with UK HC (Nye)² today. He read me exchange telegrams with London in which he urged that British attitude toward UN handling Kashmir question be kept flexible until Graham report available and situation resulting from it became clear. He had said that Graham had made excellent impression upon Nehru and Indians generally, as he had also in Pakistan.

From what was known of Graham questions to two govt's it was clear he had been at pains to keep situation open if possible. Nye understood Pakistani replies had been favorable, and from remarks by Bajpai he judged that GOI had given most careful consideration to its reply. Nye also thought approaching adjournment Parliament and coming elections India were beginning to have influence on GOI and Parliament in the direction of avoiding a showdown with UN and delaying Kashmir settlement efforts until after elections.

Nye said he was inclined (assuming Graham report kept Kashmir question open) to urge that effort be made use Graham demonstrated skill and high prestige for further negotiations, and possibly to widen scope his powers.

If, on other hand, Graham report showed no possibility further progress under existing resolution, Nye was inclined favor reference Kashmir question to GA, since he believed that action under Article 37 wld lead to hardening of Indian attitude and that this wld be prejudicial to efforts by GA to resolve dilemma. Reference to GA also wld have merit of gaining time at unpropitious moment. Nye intimated he thought new govt after elections wld be more ready to negotiate than present GOI.

¹ Same as telegram 1624 to London, September 22, p. 1862.
² Sir Archibald Nye, High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in India.
Embassy in agreement with Nye views regarding Graham and his possible future usefulness this problem. We are also inclined believe GOI, while most reluctant if not unwilling reach agreement on Kashmir before elections over, will be in better position to undertake settlement, for better or worse after elections.

Embassy struck by apparent interest of Zafrullah (Deptel 667, Sept 21 rptd Karachi 325)\(^2\) in action under Article 37 to break present deadlock as distinct from final solution of Kashmir problem, as well as certain other possible indications that Pakistan may be relaxing pressure toward early final solution. Pakistan HC in New Delhi recently remarked to me that last thing Pakistan wished was see Nehru lose power in India. A possible interpretation of such remark by Pakistani officials is that Pakistan may be beginning to see some virtue in not pressing the Kashmir issue to a showdown in months just ahead.

It wld be helpful to Embassy for possible future use to know steps which wld ordinarily fol Article 37 action.

Repeated info London 46, Karachi 67, USUN unnumbered.

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\(^2\)Telegram 667 to New Delhi, September 21, repeated as telegram 325 to Karachi, transmitted the text of telegram 355 from New York, September 19, p. 1861.

690D.91/9-2851: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 28, 1951—7 p. m.

1567. FonOff learns from UKUN Graham returning today and consideration being given to-informal talk between Graham and US and UK dels before report published. Although FonOff view not yet firm this question, preliminary thinking is UK del shld not participate for fear of getting into bad graces of Nehru who, it will be recalled, on publication Dixon report accused US–UK of having influenced Dixon in preparation thereof.

UK hesitation this respect, however, based on reasons not necessarily applicable to US. Important points to bear in mind from UK viewpoint are (1) report shld leave door open for further negotiation (if practicable by Graham himself) on any unsettled issues and therefore (2) action under Art 36\(^1\) wld be preferable to action under Art 37.

Gifford

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 1, 1951—7 p. m.

167. Re Kashmir (urtels 389, 390 Sep 28) :

1. Re timing SC mtg; SC Kashmir discussions Oct complicated by: (a) SC consideration Iran problem; (b) Graham's views (reported USUN's 390) wld file report around Oct 8 and did not contemplate SC action prior Paris; (c) changed UK attitude preferring action near end Oct (USUN's 389, London's 1537, Sep 27, rptd Karachi 42, Delhi 38).

2. Accordingly, any timetable tentative but Dept still believes advisable SC mtg New York before Oct 19 adjournment for move to Paris because: (a) necessity forestall increased tensions, particularly Pak; (b) Dept and UKDel statements to Zafrullah re early mtg fol submission report (USUN's 369, Sep 24, Sep 26 London 1679, Delhi 691, Karachi 336). Dept questions realism attempting set specific date introducing res, but believe parties might be able speak before Paris move. Such plan wld not necessitate UK or US speaking until resumption discussions Paris.

3. In discussing SC timetable with Graham (Urtel 390) suggest you indicate Dept favors, unless he perceives overriding objections, early consideration case and we wld like discuss future courses action after careful study his report expressing hope he will continue make available his services future use.

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1 Repeated as telegram 1763 to London, 355 to Karachi, and 723 to New Delhi.
2 In telegram 389, from New York, September 28, not printed, Ambassador Gross reported the substance of a conversation with Mr. Robert Fowler of the U.K. Delegation at the U.N. concerning consideration by the Security Council of the Kashmir question (690D.91/9-2851).
3 In telegram 390, from New York, September 28, not printed, Ambassador Gross reported that Dr. Graham had arrived in New York that morning, that the preparation of his report would require another ten days, and that Graham did not contemplate action by the Security Council prior to its move to Paris (690D.91/9-2851).
4 Telegram 1537, from London, September 28, not printed, reported in part that the British Foreign Office believed the last week in October to be the best time for Security Council consideration of the Graham report (690D.91/9-2651).
5 In telegram 369, from New York, September 24, not printed, Ambassador Austin reported that Pakistan Foreign Minister Zafrulla had stressed to the U.K. Delegation at the U.N. the importance of bringing Graham's report before the Security Council at once. Zafrulla favored a resolution under Article 37 of the U.N. Charter that would pinpoint the differences between India and Pakistan, set forth what each party should do about these differences, and lay the foundation for action by the General Assembly in case of Indian disregard of the resolution (690D.91/9-2451).
The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)

TOP SECRET

[NEW YORK,] October 2, 1951.

Dear Jack: On Frank Graham's invitation I spent last evening with him for a completely personal confidential talk on Kashmir. He is extremely anxious that his views be confided to the narrowest possible group and I told him that I agreed to take the following matters up only with you and George McGhee, to whom I am sending a copy of this letter.

Graham feels he was well received by Nehru and believes that although Nehru had originally intended to deal with Graham on a purely ceremonial basis, Graham was able to make a dent upon him in terms of appealing to his ego and sense of destiny. Graham spent three or four hours alone with Nehru, playing this theme and implanting in Nehru the germ of the idea that Nehru's potential leadership position in Asia and the world would be thwarted so long as the Kashmir dispute remained unresolved.

Graham thinks that the time for a Security Council decision is at hand. He is willing (I should say even anxious) to remain in the picture but on a basis which he considers sound.

The plan that he unfolded which I outline below has been built up inductively and is to be regarded as an integrated whole. Graham and his immediate advisers (notably General Devers) made a painstaking survey of the history of the dispute, extracting every substantial point as to which questions have been raised or objections made by either party and their plan is deliberately drawn from the standpoint of meeting all of these objections. Therefore, at least so far as its method of preparation and concept is concerned, it seems to me that the plan is entitled to great respect. Graham has pretty well made up his mind and I would venture the guess that it would take the most cogent arguments to shake him. The only person other than myself in whom he has confided is Trygve Lie and Lie has apparently indicated his agreement. Graham is most anxious that it not be known that he has discussed the plan with me and feels, rightly or wrongly, that any leak would fatally injure his chances of success. He did not show me the report but outlined it orally. (I had the impression he wanted to be able to say in the future that he had not shown his report to anyone in advance of submitting it to the Security Council.) In view of the fact that he recited orally, I am not in a position to give you a text. The following is a summary I have prepared on the basis of my own recollection immediately after I got home last night. The points are not necessarily in order but I believe I have all of them.
The Security Council would adopt a resolution, on the basis of recommendations in Graham’s report, which resolution would make substantive recommendations in the following sense:

1. Both governments would, as part of the plan, agree to a “no war” declaration.
2. Both governments would instruct their officials not to make warlike or inflammatory statements and would request all media of public information to refrain from such statements.
3. Each government would pledge not to permit its armies or irregular forces to make incursions, raids or warlike demonstrations or activities.
4. Both governments would reaffirm the cease-fire agreement.
5. Additional observers would be placed at strategic points throughout the state.
6. Both governments would reaffirm their determination to have a free and impartial plebiscite.
7. Both governments would agree that demilitarization will be a single, interdependent and continuous process.
8. Demilitarization would take place in such a way as not to endanger the cease-fire line.
9. At the end of demilitarization period there would be left on the Pakistan side 4,000 civil police and on the Indian side 8,000 troops, militia and state forces.
10. 4,000 U.N. troops would be stationed in Azad Kashmir within a period such as three months (or whatever period would be required for the recruitment or deployment of such troops).
11. Representatives of both governments would meet to draw up practical details of demilitarization.
12. At the end of the demilitarization period (to be completed in some fixed time, perhaps ninety days), the Government of India will cause a plebiscite administrator to be inducted into office.
13. Nothing in the agreement would be deemed to impair functions or authority of the U.N. Representative or the plebiscite administrator.
14. Any disagreements between the parties concerning implementation of the foregoing would be referred to the U.N. Representative, whose decision would be final.

Graham thinks it is of great importance to have the Security Council itself make these recommendations. I explored with him the possible alternative of having the Security Council adopt a resolution in broad form extending his term and enlarging his authority so that he might himself subsequently make specific suggestions, but he appears to be firmly convinced that the Council should itself make substantive recommendations at this stage. He thinks this would add greater force to them and strengthen his hand. He believes it would be very difficult for either government to reject these proposals since, as I have said above, they are based upon and reflect a distillation of points which have been raised in the past and which these proposals are designed to meet.
You will note certain key points, which I have underscored. Graham is particularly taken with the idea of stationing U.N. troops in Azad Kashmir. Such a device, while meeting the Indian objections to "stationing foreign troops" on Indian soil would also deprive Nehru of the argument that India fears hostile action from across the frontier either by Pakistan regulars or tribesmen. He thinks that it should be acceptable from the Pakistan viewpoint because it would guarantee Pakistan against attacks by Indian forces of whom there were now upwards of 60,000 deployed in Kashmir. I made clear my feeling that the U.S. Government would not consent to U.S. contingents serving in such a force. Graham agrees.

You will note that the plan envisages the reduction of forces on the Indian side to 8,000, including troops, militia and state forces. This number would be balanced on the Azad side by adding to the 4,000 U.N. troops in Azad Kashmir, 4,000 civil police. These would be recruited by the Commander of the U.N. forces, in consultation with the Pakistan Government. The resolution might also provide for consultation by the U.N. Commander with the Indian Government, although in any case the recruitment of civil police would be by the U.N. Commander subject only to prior consultation but not clearance.

Graham realizes that Nehru might argue against stationing U.N. forces in Azad Kashmir on the theory of "sovereignty" of the Indian state over the Azad area. However, this would be such a patently sham and arbitrary position that Graham doubts that even Nehru would stoop to it.

Graham attaches importance to the other point I have underscored which would require the Government of India to take action necessary to install the plebiscite administrator. He feels the earlier agreement is weak in that it requires Sheik Abdullah's voluntary action prior to the installation of the plebiscite administrator, thus leaving the way open for the Sheik and for the Government of India to play around the rosy. Graham's suggestion would result in the Security Council pinning the rose on Nehru. Moreover, he thinks it important that the Security Council explicitly provide that such action would be taken at the end of the demilitarization period, which might be fixed in the resolution. Otherwise, he feels Nehru would simply not get around to taking this decisive step.

I sought Graham's opinion concerning the significance and possible consequences of the convening of the Constituent Assembly and actions which the Assembly might take. Somewhat to my surprise, he tended to minimize both the significance and potentially dangerous consequences of the election as well as of the Constituent Assembly. He

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1 Printed in italics.
believes the election was so patently a farce that it has fooled no one and possibly has even to some extent discredited Sheik Abdullah. In many areas of the state no rival candidates came forward and the elections were apparently not taken seriously by large and important elements of the population. The most potentially dangerous consequences of the Constituent Assembly reporting to reaffirm accession to India or otherwise passing upon the question of accession would, Graham seems to believe, be met by those points in his plan which would call upon both governments to reaffirm their determination to have a free and impartial plebiscite. I got the impression this is probably the chief importance of paragraph 6 in the outline.

I asked Graham what his attitude is toward the arbitration provision of the March 30 resolution. He does not believe that there is any hope, at the present time at least, of the Indians agreeing to arbitration. He believes, however, that this might be kept alive as a concept in a new resolution for possible ultimate use.

In general, his analysis is that there are two broad alternatives open to him and to the Council. One is for him to carry out the literal provisions of the resolution of March 30 and to report remaining differences of opinion so that arbitration could be invoked. The other course is the one he preferred and which is outlined in this letter. As I say, he has pretty much made up his mind that the latter course is the one which hold promise.

Now, as to timing: Knowing Frank as well as you and I do, you will not be surprised to know that he is intent upon working out his report meticulously and with the correct phrase. Now that he has made up his mind, he wants to allow himself time in which to shape up his thinking and he also wants his report to give a great deal of the history and background of the problem. He told me that accordingly he would not be ready for another ten or twelve days. This led us into a discussion of the situation in the Council because of the Iranian case. You will recall the Council decided yesterday to meet again on October 11 when Mossadegh may be here. I think we must assume that October 11 and 12 will be taken up very actively with the Iranian question. Moreover, I think that it would be a mistake for Graham to file his report on the very day on which the Council is debating Iran since his report would be completely overshadowed and the basic importance of the Kashmir question would be minimized. Therefore, I discussed with him the possibility of his filing his report on Monday the 8th or Monday the 15th. He said he would definitely not be ready by Monday the 8th and we left it on the wholly tentative basis that he would file his report on Monday the 15th. He said this was no commitment and I expressed understanding, but I did urge him not to delay beyond that date.
I suggested to him, and he agreed, that if he were indeed ready on October 15 the Council might meet and he would make an oral presentation to the Council. There would be no need, therefore, to wait until the report is translated and processed which would probably require five or six days. His oral presentation on the 15th would start the ball rolling and meet the essential point in Deptel 167, October 1, in which the Department expresses the view that it would be advisable to have a Security Council meeting in New York before October 19 adjournment. I explained the adjournment problem to Graham and he agrees. There might even be a second meeting of the Council prior to October 19 in which the parties might state their preliminary reactions to his report. However, this can be left open for later determination.

I don't suppose I need say it, but it will do no harm to reassure the Department that I undertook no commitment of any kind. On the contrary, I told Graham I was without authority and said that I would communicate with you and George McGhee and then get in touch with Graham again. He expects me to do so.

I think it only remains to say that Graham has returned from the subcontinent with the strongest feeling that this dispute will, if unsettled much longer, lead to war. My impression is that he feels that if his recommendations are adopted by the Security Council, it would open the road to a peaceful solution and that he would go back to the subcontinent with restrained optimism and deep faith in his mission.

Sincerely yours,

Ernest A. Gross
Ambassador

690D.91/9-2851: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 2, 1951—7 p. m.

171. Re: Kashmir (urtels 389, 390, Sept 28) : ¹
Re pos course of action: Dept strongly supports USUN belief UK-US cld draft res based on both Arts 36 and 37 without citing them. Dept believes continued ref these arts has been somewhat confusing. While must await Graham report and private discussions with him, Dept considering fol course:

Expand Graham’s powers enable him endeavor induce parties carry out his 13 point program previously submitted to parties. Dept favorably disposed USUN belief res shld both hold parties Uncip com-

mits and enable Graham explore mutually acceptable settlements

¹ See footnotes 2 and 3, p. 1868.
along lines Dixon’s powers. Phrasing can probably be found to avoid implication SC abandoning UNCIP agreements while seeking solution mutually acceptable both parties.

WEBB

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The Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 5, 1951.

Dear Ernie: Your letter of October 2, concerning your confidential talk with Frank Graham, was reassuring to both NEA and ourselves. We were all very much heartened by both the disclosure of Dr. Graham’s ideas on future action in this perplexing dispute and, particularly, by the indication of his willingness to continue in the picture. The fact that as perceptive a person as Frank Graham is willing to continue to act as the United Nations Representative gives me hope that there is still some possibility of arriving at a reasonable settlement of the Kashmir problem.

When you get in touch with Dr. Graham, as you have said he expects you to do, please let him know that we generally favor his preferred course outlined in your letter, and that we are delighted he appears willing to continue to be of service to the United Nations in attempting to advance the Kashmir dispute along the lines he has suggested. We are deeply impressed by the amicable relationship he established with Nehru, particularly because his personal relations with the Indian Prime Minister are clearly a factor in making any progress towards solving the Kashmir problem.

We are interested in an explanation of two points in Dr. Graham’s program:

a. Does the 90-day period for completing demilitarization include the drafting of the demilitarization plan by the Representatives of both governments, or does Dr. Graham want an indefinite period during which the Indian and Pakistan Representatives would draft the demilitarization plan—with the 90-day period assigned to the carrying out of this demilitarization plan?

b. If the Indian and Pakistan Representatives are unable to work out the practical details of demilitarization, does Dr. Graham’s plan envisage that the United Nations Representative would settle any disagreements on these details or himself work out a demilitarization plan on the basis of the UNCIP resolutions?

Incidentally, I note that the whole Graham plan continues to drive hard toward a state-wide plebiscite, and I cannot help but wonder what is in Dr. Graham’s mind concerning the next step if his present approach outlined in your letter does not work.
Both NEA and ourselves greatly appreciate your efforts to convince Dr. Graham he should present his report to the Security Council in New York not later than October 15, even though the report might not be translated and he would have to make an oral presentation. We do think it most important that there be a Security Council meeting on Kashmir as soon as feasible, and this belief is buttressed by Dr. Graham's own estimate of the situation reflected in his strong feeling that the dispute will, if unsettled much longer, lead to war in the subcontinent.

Karachi's telegram 364 of October 4 reporting Liaquat Ali Khan's concern over the effect in Pakistan of delay in presentation of the report points up the urgency of the earliest possible action.

Sincerely yours,

John D. Hickerson

1 Not printed.

357.AB/10-551: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, October 5, 1951—8:42 p.m.

Unmis 64. For Hickerson from Gross. Re: Kashmir. Yesterday Graham telephoned and asked if on thinking it over I had developed some thoughts in reaction to the line of action he had outlined to me Monday, which I embodied in my letter of Oct. 2 to you. I said that I had not yet heard from you and McGhee but that I personally was having increasing doubts whether SC should go ahead on your idea without knowing whether it was jumping off cliff or five-foot fence. I wondered what would happen if SC shot its bolt and missed. Probably war.

Just now Graham called again and said that while he is still firmly wedded to his idea he is beginning to feel it should be presented differently, to minimize risk rejection by parties. He is now thinking of following:

Instead of SC, without warning, confronting parties with idea containing elements not put up to them on sub-continent, he would limit report to background and facts including his 12 points and statement of areas of agreement and disagreement thereon. After submission of report he could try out new elements (neutral force, etc.) on the parties in private consultations. He would probably choose Paris for these consultations in order be near SC and able, if parties agreed to proposal or for internal political reasons wished weight of SC pronouncement, to have immediate SC action.

1 October 1.
Graham thinks this mediation would be better than frontal attack of doubtful outcome. He realizes new procedure will take some punch out of report but said better to be wise than “punchful.”

GROSS

357.AB/10–651: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, October 6, 1951—2:10 p.m.

Unmis 65. For Hickerson from Gross. Re: Kashmir.

Graham called me just now and brought me up to date on his thinking since last night. You will of course realize that his thoughts are going through evolutionary process as he thinks problem through here in New York. But I stress his basic thinking, as set forth in my letter of Oct 2 to you, remains constant and he is concerned principally with tactics connected with his report, SC action, and his private negotiations with the parties. Your guidance on these questions, in the light of the Kashmir problem and Graham’s approach to it, will be highly important to him and to me as we exchange ideas and work this problem out. My next talk with him, when he wishes to discuss the following ideas on approach, will probably be at lunch Monday, Oct 8. He is anxious for constructive suggestions.

You will recall that in my letter of Oct 2 I reported that I had suggested to Graham possibility that SC might adopt res extending his term and in broad form enlarge his authority to deal with Kashmir case. Graham is now turning over in his mind this possibility. He wonders whether he might submit a report which would give factual background, including twelve points previously discussed with parties and parties’ reactions thereto, and add to his report recommendation that SC enlarge his mediatory authority. He would not in his report make reference to the “new points” discussed in my letter, nor would he want the SC to do so. Instead, acting upon the basis of a res which in broad and general terms widened his mediatory authority, he would present informally to the parties these new points and endeavor to persuade them to accept.

The advantage he sees in such a course would be that he would thus not be bound to the specifics of the points but might, for example, find some method of “international policing” other than the introduction of UN forces. Moreover, the parties would not be in a position to anticipate his informal discussions with them by taking a public position regarding his new points. This he feels the parties might do if his report were to refer to them.
He stressed, and I of course agreed, the decisive importance of making clear that the UNCIP res of Aug 13 and Jan 5 remain intact and are in no way abrogated.

Gross

257.AB/10–651: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

TOP SECRET  PRIORITY  WASHINGTON, October 8, 1951—8:13 p.m.

Misun 70. For Gross from Hickerson. Re Kashmir (Unmis 64 and 65, Oct 5):

Until the receipt of your messages, UNA and NEA had been reluctant to express fully our views regarding Graham’s approach, because we did not wish to give him cause to believe we were attempting to pressure him. It now appears clear that Dr. Graham really wants our views in order to help resolve the issues which have been troubling him and the Department. Consequently I will spell out our views in some detail, in the hope that these remarks will help Graham to decide what future course of action he should recommend.

Our thinking is conditioned by two basic concepts: There must be UN activity of such nature as (a) to help prevent the parties’ attitudes becoming frozen and adamant, (b) to give Pakistan sufficient hope of a reasonable settlement so that it will not in desperation resort to armed force. This means it is generally advisable that the SC avoid presenting either party with a recommended course of action which at the time would probably be publicly rejected so strongly as to cut off the possibility of immediate and continuing negotiations. It would be better to give the UN representative continuing authority enabling him to deal with the parties.

Consequently, while recognizing the possible value of the forthright approach outlined in your letter of October 2, we have had some doubts regarding Graham’s orginal desire that the SC resolution recommend the detailed course of action he outlined. While the Department would have been willing generally to follow that course of action, there was the exceedingly difficult question of the next step if India refused categorically to accept the recommendation. Moreover, the United Kingdom, in part because of the October 25 general elections, had clearly indicated its desire to avoid a resolution which might not provide room for future negotiations. Finally, there was USUN’s doubt concerning the course of action if possibilities in the council had been exhausted—and I believe an Indian rejection of Graham’s detailed plan at this stage would severely limit if not exhaust the SC’s possibilities.
With this as background, I believe that it would be wiser for Graham to submit at the earliest possibility, and no later than October 15, a report giving the factual background, including the points previously discussed with the parties, and a recommendation that the council continue his mediatory authority. The parties should be able to make introductory statements, at least, prior to the council's adjourning to Paris. In November, the UK, US and other sponsors could introduce a resolution which would continue Graham's mediatory authority, clearly referring to the UNCIP resolutions as the basic authority. Graham could then present new points, such as those described in your October 2 letter, informally to the parties. It probably would be advisable to provide in the resolution that Graham file a progress report concerning his negotiations, and it would be helpful to know Graham's views on the time-limits for such reports.

If these efforts fail, the SC might well consider passing a resolution broadening Graham's powers to enable him to explore possible solutions outside his present terms of reference.

Please impress on Graham our pleasure at his willingness to continue his efforts, which everyone agrees is the best factor for success.

[Hickerson.]

ACHESON

357.AB/10-951: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY New York, October 9, 1951—6:56 p.m.

Unmis 69. For Hickerson (UNA) from Gross. Re Kashmir: At his invitation, I lunched with Graham today in his hotel room. We discussed the complications in timing of the submission of the report and ways of obtaining maximum impact despite publicity of Iranian case. I urged Graham to submit his report by Saturday, the 13th, and at the latest by the 15th. He thought he might not be able to submit it by the 13th but possibly could on the 14th. We thought report could be released to press by Secretariat upon submission but we would look into SC schedule in order to avoid blanketing by meeting on Iran.

I outlined the concepts of Misun 70, all of which we both felt were consistent with Graham's plan. He is thinking in terms of broad mediatory authority such as Dixon had and feels SC action is necessary to broaden his present powers since he does not believe March 30 resolution broad enough to give him Dixon's full authority.

Re Question A in your letter of October 5, Graham envisages that period for completing demilitarization (which need not necessarily
be for exactly 90 days and could possibly be a range) would follow drafting of demilitarization plan. He has in mind no time limit for such drafting. His theory is that if there is a will for settlement on both sides, agreement will be reached quickly. If there is not, there will be no agreement. Graham’s problem is to instill such will in both parties.

Re Question B, Graham intends to submit his own plan in event parties fail to agree. He has such plan already mostly worked out and has shown parts of it to the parties. Naturally new points have arisen [concerning?] which he has not had an opportunity to talk with the parties.

I told Graham that in thinking things over further, it seemed to me Graham might offer UN troops to both sides not Pakistan alone. He said he would think this over, offering advantage that Pakistan might accept even if India did not, the former thus accumulating virtue.

Graham had no new ideas on tactics since my Misun 65, October 6.

Gross

330/10–1051: Telegram

The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

KARACHI, October 10, 1951—11 a. m.

379. Prime Min sent for me last night to express his disappointment at delay in presentation of Graham report to SC. He said Graham had told Paks before leaving Karachi his report wld be available for Lie by 1 Oct but said Prime Min “he saw Lie on 29 Sept and nothing has been heard of the report since.”

I told him posit of US had been clear in desiring presentation of report and discussion by SC in Oct before Council departed for Paris. He said Zafrulla had confirmed such an understanding but he now feels there has been a double-cross somewhere.

He said “the Amers may not be responsible for it but they will be blamed for it. We Paks are convinced that where Amer interest is engaged action fols shortly after.”

I then mentioned urgency of Iran issue in which Pak as well as US has a polit as well as a commodity interest. He agreed that sitn as presented in NY by presence of Mosadeq ¹ is of prime urgency but expressed belief that some solution must be reached within next few days. He thought it wld be mistake from everybody’s point of view except the Soviets to have Iran question aired in SC. Immed thereafter he said Paks hope that SC will be able to take up Graham report

¹ Mohammad Mossadeq, Iranian Prime Minister.
not later than 15th this month in order have debate on what are “no more than procedural recommendations” before recessing to France.

Dept pass USUN.

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WARREN

230/10-1151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

KARACHI, October 11, 1951—noon.

384. Ref Embtel 379 10th Oct 11 a.m. Fol my conversation with PM, Assoc Press Pak yesterday carried govt-sponsored note that people of Pak disappointed failure SC discuss Kashmir issue since return of Graham to NY end last month.

Today English-language press carries protest by several named leaders Muslim League, single party supporting govt, protesting failure Pak Govt’s “wait and see foron policy”. Press also carried today note all student bodies in Karachi colleges and univs held mtgs yesterday to organize campaign for action on Kashmir. Civil and Military Gazette, in leading editorial (ref Embtel en clair 383 Oct 11), advocates popular demonstrations as most effective means to attract internatl attn to problem and cites its effectiveness in Iran and Egypt. If Pak Govt promotes or even permits renaissance of popular emotion to attract internatl attn to Kashmir issue at this time I believe it invites an uncalculated risk of war. At the same time there is justification for impatience shld SC fail to take up Graham report without further delay. I urge strongly that US and UK support hearing on Graham report within the next week and so forestall the extension to Paks [of] a chain reaction against UK that might easily affect dissident elements in this country.

Dept pass USUN.

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WARREN

1 Not printed.

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837.AB/10-1251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 12, 1951—7:09 p.m.

200. Re Kashmir:

On Oct 8, Dept raised possibility 2-step procedure re Graham’s future terms of reference:

(1) In next res SC wld continue his mediatory authority under Mar 30, 1951 res. Under this authority he wld informally present new points outlined in your 2 Oct communication and file progress reports;
(2) If Graham’s efforts under step 1 above failed, SC might pass further res broadening his powers and enabling him explore possible solutions other than state-wide plebiscite.

In your 9 Oct communication, Graham did not comment upon this 2-step procedure, and Dept wld be interested in his views on this point.

Dept sees advantage in 2-step approach above primarily because postpones SC indication approval solutions other than state-wide plebiscite. Res under step 1 might appeal Paks as showing full SC support for state-wide plebiscite while strengthening Graham’s hand in pursuing UNCIP res objectives. Second step res broadening terms of reference cld then be tailored to needs of occasion. Re step 1 above, ask Graham if he believes he wld have sufficient authority discuss with parties new points in 14-point plan by res merely continuing his mediatory authority under Mar 30 res. If not, what language does he think necessary? It follows from above that use Dixon’s terms of reference at this time might be risky as indicating implied approval solutions other than state-wide plebiscite.

Acheson

357. AB/19–1251: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY New York, October 12, 1951—7:38 p.m.

466. Re Kashmir: Gross told Graham this afternoon of Embassy Karachi’s tel 379 of Oct 10 and said that we were increasingly worried lest we get entire blame for delay in submission Graham’s report. He emphasized Liaquat sarcastic remark that Pakistanis are convinced that action happens in short order where American interest is engaged.

Graham said he was impressed by this and felt he should change his plans. He had been working on big historical survey of case for inclusion in his report, which was what was delaying it, but would omit this and submit shorter report reviewing areas of agreement and disagreement and make recommendation that he be given broader mediatory powers. He would present this to SYG Monday ¹ and later on would add historical section. He would be prepared to speak in Council later on next week. He thought there should be early renewal of Kashmir discussion upon arrival of SC in Paris. He had in mind date as early as Oct 25. Gross said we would do our best to support Graham’s wishes but foresaw the problem of a number of delegations not arriving in Paris until Nov. He thought we would know more about this factor before adjourning for Paris.

¹ October 15.
FYI at meeting this morning with Jebb and SC President Muniz, Gross brought up Kashmir question and emphasized urgency of having SC meeting on it before adjourning to Paris. Saying that he did not know when Graham report would be submitted, he asked whether Muniz could fit in meeting on Kashmir next week notwithstanding debate on Iran, if report presented. Jebb offered no objection, remarking meeting probably would be for sole purpose of hearing Graham on report. Muniz said he would fit in meeting next week on Kashmir if report appeared in time and no objection from SC members.

AUSTIN

357.AB/10-1351: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to
the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

NEW YORK, October 15, 1951.

471. From Gross to Hickerson. Re Kashmir. Graham and I had long and I hope definitive discussion Sunday evening regarding his report. I had refrained up to this point from pressing him in any direction but rather had acceded to his obvious desire that I be a sounding board for his ideas as well as a confidant. Yesterday I felt time was ripe for me to stress latter role and accordingly I told him frankly that whereas up to now I had been attempting to give him a balanced, somewhat neutral reaction to his evolving ideas, I was prepared if he desired to make affirmative recommendations.

He expressed eagerness for me to do so and accordingly I emphasized advantages in his not requesting widening of his authority at present time, expanding Dept ideas set forth in Deptel 200, October 12. After lengthy discussion he agreed.

He stressed advantages of retaining flexibility in his own future informal approaches to both parties. He plans to give his report to UN Secretariat today, asking Secretariat to hold it in confidence until he has had opportunity to give it to both parties prior to its public release. He also agreed to SC meeting this week at which he would outline history of his efforts on subcontinent.

He will go to Paris and expects to have informal discussion with Zafrullah and Rau at which time he will place before them his new points. He will determine his future actions and recommendations on basis of their reactions to his informal proposals.

1 October 14.

2 For the text of Dr. Graham’s report to the Security Council, dated October 15, 1951, see U.N. document S/2375.
We discussed possible alternative future courses. I expressed the view that he possesses sufficient authority under March 30 res to make suggestions to parties of sort he has in mind and although he has some doubt he appears satisfied.

We agreed that if either party raised questions of his competence to make new suggestions he could at any time request SC for requisite additional authority since he will be in Paris and SC could be quickly convened.

Re problem of period for which his authority would be extended, I suggested SC might fix six weeks for submission further report, without setting time limit on his mission. [Gross.]

AUSTIN

791.13/10-1751: Telegram

The Chargé in India (Steere) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW DELHI, October 17, 1951—7 p. m.

1382. Assassination Liaquat Ali ¹ discussed informally today with Bajpai who said news had shocked and saddened GOI leaders many whom knew him well and deeply respected him as man and leader Pakistan. Bajpai thought tenor official condolences from India and Indian press reaction clearly reflected India’s sense loss, and said, in his opinion, this event wld have sobering effect India-Pakistan relations.

Bajpai who had just heard Nazimuddin’s resignation as Dir Gen and designation as PriMin and Defense Min, characterized him as man of moderation and great experience whom he thought had good chance maintaining control situation in Pakistan. Bajpai thought Nazimuddin even more opposed than Liaquat to policy of adventure or war over Kashmir; Nazimuddin likely as Bengali to link East and West Pakistan more closely.

Rptd info Karachi 78.

STEERE

¹ The Prime Minister was assassinated on October 16 in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. For related documentation, see pp. 2203 ff.

690D.91/10-1851: Telegram

The Chargé in India (Steere) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, October 18, 1951—6 p. m.

1395. During call Bajpai today his request I commented on editorials critical Graham report Indian News Chronicle and Hindustan
Standard (both Delhi). Bajpai replied two editorials no way reflected GOI views or influence. He had taken occasion inform editors two major papers (Hindustan Times and Statesman) that MEA regarded present time inauspicious for any criticism Graham report and that he hoped both papers might refrain from such comment.

Bajpai added, for my info he thought chances successful negot Ind-Pak agreement Kashmir now boiled down to “how many troops should remain on either side cease-fire line”. He had insisted that GOI must back up statement readiness hold plebiscite with evidence of readiness such plebiscite take place free from any possible duress from presence Ind troops. GOI prepared reduce peak nr. troops Kashmir by approx 80 percent to 16 battalions totaling 10,800 men and to concentrate these forces at strategic border points where possibility infiltration hostile forces must be guarded against. Eventually, GOI prepared further reduce forces to—say—12 battalions. These, GOI convinced mil experts would agree absolute minimum necessary guard against possible re-incursions Kashmir. GOI also convinced that with provisions for UN supervision plebiscite, above measures would eliminate any reasonable doubt undue influence presence troops on voters during plebiscite.

Bajpai again commented on Graham’s patience, understanding and integrity and his satisfaction at Graham’s indication his belief negotiated understanding might still be achieved.

Steere

690.91/10-1851: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

New York, October 18, 1951—6:50 p.m.

496. Re Kashmir. Fowler (UK) after SC mtg today told us preliminary Foreign Office reaction to Graham’s report is that suggested period of six weeks within which he would file further report would be most unfortunate. They anticipate SC action about mid-Nov on new res. Six weeks from then would land Graham’s new report in middle of Indian elections. They would prefer longer period.

Fowler said Foreign Office and UKDel had not had time to think about report and did not expect to have instructions or even preliminary views prior to UKDel’s sailing for Paris on Oct 23. He suggested we consult on next steps and draft res when we meet in Paris.

Dept please relay to GADel, Paris.

Austin
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET  PRIORITY  NEW YORK, October 19, 1951—6:47 p.m.

507. Re Kashmir. Liaquat's assassination, we believe, emphasizes need for consideration of action on Graham report when SC reconvenes in Paris, on October 29. Graham plans to be in Paris October 28. Parties will presumably speak at October 29 mtg and SC can meet later in week to consider res. Thus beginning of SC debate would precede convening constituent assembly and would take place while constituent assembly is in session. SC members can make clear that any decisions by constituent assembly will have no effect on disposition of state.

As to res, while it is obviously premature to predict its most suitable form, two practical alternatives should be discussed with Graham. One is based on his recommendations. The other is outlined below. His views would be major factor in decision. If he agrees, he or we might propose course to UK, which would if agreeable consult key council members and parties in effort to work out draft res which could command widespread support now and also lay foundation for whatever future action becomes necessary.

Alternative res might include following elements:

1. Note Graham's report.
2. Recall GOI and GOP acceptance of UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949.
3. Note with approval assurances of two govt on Graham's first four points, listing them; call upon govt along lines of Graham's first recommendation; and declare SC will not recognize constituent assembly action.
4. Observe, on basis of Graham's report, that area of disagreement between parties in regard to demilitarization has been narrowed to specific points, which could be listed along with areas of agreement.
5. Instruct Graham to continue his efforts to effect demilitarization (possibly adding: and to place before GOI and GOP suggestions likely to contribute to enduring solution of this problem.)
6. Instruct Graham to report to SC as he may consider necessary, submitting conclusions and any recommendations.

We see following advantages in res along these lines:

(a) It holds parties to UNCIP commitments, mtg Pakistan public opinion problem.
(b) It lists areas of disagreement and agreement on demilitarization, giving Graham solid foundation on which to proceed while at same time not calling on parties to carry out his plan in detail; which we agree would risk an outright rejection and consequent freezing of situation.
(c) Paras 2 and 3, together with timing of meeting, help blanket expected action by constituent assembly.

(d) Bracketed suggestion in para 5 specifically adds substance of Dixon's powers to Graham's present terms of reference so that he can, if he considers it desirable, enlarge discussion with parties beyond narrow issue of demilitarization. We realize problem of anticipated Pakistani reaction against this. However, we think it may be more productive in long run to give Graham this added flexibility now instead of in subsequent res if he feels it would be useful. It seems to us that possible disadvantage of two-step res procedure suggested in Deptel 200 is that it might be construed as public registration of failure of demilitarization effort. Moreover, we think addition of this phrase does not necessarily indicate SC approval of conditions other than state-wide plebiscite, especially since proposed res specifically reaffirms plebiscite principle.

(e) It gives Graham free hand in determining his own pace of work and desirability or otherwise of interim reports, thus taking advantage of considerations that GOI position may be more flexible after Indian elections at end of year and that Graham can probably work better away from glare of SC debates, whether in Paris or on sub-continent. Changed circumstances since Liaquat's death, we think, may provide adequate reason for SC to give Graham slightly different terms than those he suggested in report written before assassination.

We would be glad to have Dept's views on above suggestion. The key to the problem is of course Graham's own reactions.

Dept please relay GADel Paris.

AUSTIN

690D.91/10-1951: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, October 19, 1951—8:17 p.m.

510. Re Kashmir. Graham appeared at office this afternoon and had talk with Gross. Maffitt was present.

1. Re possible swing through subcontinent before next SC Kashmir meeting, Graham opposed, unless invited by GOI and GOP. He did not want to appear to be pushing himself, he thought it suicidal to place himself in position of appearing to seek delay in SC action, and he would cause damage if he returned with nothing to show from trip, whether of base-touching or substantive nature, which could not have failed to arouse considerable speculation at its outset, he would rather have early action by SC which would explicitly extend his term of office and perhaps suggestion he return to capitals if this would serve useful purpose. He had no doubt personally of his authority to talk with parties now, but in view of Rau and Bokhari
hesitation when in presence SC President Muniiz yesterday he asked
them how matters could now be advanced through his efforts, he
wanted for political reasons that SC extend his term.

2. On basis his not making subcontinent swing, Graham thought
he would go Washington Oct 22, thereafter attend to certain family
affairs at home, and then fly to Paris in time to be there by evening
Oct 28. He agreed that there might be SC meeting possibly to hear
parties on 29th and another meeting Nov 1 or 2 in order Council make
clear its position re Kashmir constituent assembly, already set forth
in preamble to March 30 resolution. Graham felt it most important
that Pakistan “get headlines” immediately after constituent assembly
in order pacify restive spirits. Graham felt greatest danger spot for
World War III today is subcontinent. He apparently believes that
Pakistanis are near end of patience and moderate influences in Paki-
stan must be strengthened by all means, including speedy SC attention
to case and above-mentioned headlines on constituent assembly.

3. In Graham’s opinion solution of Kashmir problem requires settle-
ment of but three more points:

(a) Number of troops on Indian side of line (GOI has officially
agreed to 16,000 and privately has reduced this to 14,000 including
Indian as well militia and state troops; Graham believes number must
not exceed 6,000;

(b) Period for completion of demilitarization (Pakistan will reluc-
tantly take 120 days, but shorter time preferable);

(c) Date of formal appointment of plebiscite administrator, whose
broad powers will be tower of strength in carrying out final settlement
through plebiscite.

Regarding (a) Graham discussed his closely held secret, use of UN
forces, saying he had observed Pakistanis concern over number of
Indian troops on Indian side of line was more on ground of their po-
tential ability to intimidate plebiscite voters than of fear of aggression
from Indian side. He had endeavored to reassure them on this point.

4. Regarding six-week period recommended in Graham’s report, he
defended use of specific time on ground that failure to fix time limit
might cause disastrous explosion in already impatient Pakistan. SC
might prefer period extending beyond Indian elections.

5. Graham said with his report issued he no longer feels need of
publicly maintaining aloofness from all governmental contact. He
planned to call at Dept Monday.¹

Dept pass GADel Paris.

¹ October 22.
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, October 22, 1951—6:39 p. m.

515. Re Kashmir. Coulson ¹ (UK) requested interview with Gross today to express UKDel's reservations about scheduled Paris Security Council meeting on October 29. He said they would like delay so as to allow time for consultations and advance agreement if possible on new res. Fowler (UK) had talked to Bokhari (Pakistan) this morning and had found no particular sense of urgency for meeting that soon. Bokhari suggested early part of next week could usefully be spent in Paris consultations. Coulson said UK had no present intention of consulting with Indians but might raise question of timing of Security Council action in New Delhi. He assumed Indians would not be anxious to meet.

Gross said we had thought early mtg necessary from Pakistanis' point of view; if they did not want it we of course would not press. He said Graham planned to be in Paris 28th and wondered whether he should put him off. Coulson said it would be useful if Graham could be there for consultations with Fowler, Ross, Hyde ² and possibly parties. Jebb and Coulson could go to Paris on 29th or whenever thereafter need arose. Security Council might begin discussion later in week.

UKDel still feels it would be preferable if res could be agreed before parties spoke so as to avoid freezing their position. Gross pointed out Indians would presumably attempt to appear conciliatory at this time in any case. We agreed this question might be left for decision after consultation between US and parties. To our suggestion about need for blanketing Constituent Assembly, Coulson said UK saw little profit in denouncing it without taking other action at same time. He thought position of Security Council was clear and further agitation might simply irritate Indians without producing further results.

On Graham's suggestion that UN rep be instructed to report back to Security Council in six weeks, Coulson said they did not feel six

¹ John Eltringham Coulson, Deputy U.K. Representative to the United Nations.
weeks was sufficient time to complete job, and repeated Fowler’s pre-
vious remark that six weeks would be unfortunate time in any case
since it would bring report back to Security Council just before
Indian elections.

Gross explained Graham’s view that definite time period should be
stated so as to show Pakistanis’ Council was not letting matter slide.
He also explained Graham would plan to continue if task was not
completed within this time, and that Graham had selected six weeks
period arbitrarily and would probably accept longer period if
Security Council desired.

We suggested UK might want to talk to Graham through Embassy
in Washington. Coulson said he would suggest this possibility but if
Graham was to be in Paris 28th and meeting was postponed from 29th
there would seem to be sufficient time for talks there.

He assumed Foreign Office and State Dept would beconcerting
policy while dels were at sea.

After Gross left for appointment, Bolte ² inquired what were UK
views on new res. Coulson said he was without instructions but
assumed res should extend Graham’s term of office, commend sub-
stance of Graham’s proposals to parties (as requested by Bokhari) and
urge him to continue efforts to achieve demilitarization along these
lines. Bolte raised on personal basis suggestion that in changed circum-
stances since Liaquat’s assassination, and considering that Graham had
apparently won confidence of parties to considerable degree, now
might be time for Security Council to broaden his terms of reference
along lines of authorizing him to place before parties suggestions
likely to contribute to enduring solution of problem. He said res should
reiterate principle of over-all plebiscite and demilitarization as first
step, but broader terms of reference would give Graham opportunity
if he saw fit to go beyond bounds of narrow demilitarization functions
in effort to reach agreement. Coulson said this might be fruitful ap-
proach so long as Graham did not attempt to get into settlement of
all outstanding problems between India and Pakistan. He said he
would think and talk with his colleagues about this idea.

Department please relay GADel, Paris.

AUSTIN

²Charles G. Bolte, Adviser, U.S. Mission to the United Nations; Member of
Memorandum by Mr. Vincent Baker of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, of a Conversation Held on October 23, 1951

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 26, 1951.

Subject: Kashmir

Participants: UN Representative for India and Pakistan: Dr. Frank Graham
UNA: Mr. Hickerson
SOA: Mr. Weil, Mr. Collins
UNP: Mr. Stein, Mr. Meyers, Mr. Ludlow, Mr. Baker

Introductory Remarks

Dr. Graham opened the discussion by emphasizing the need for playing up the importance of a Kashmir settlement. He considered it especially necessary to do so for the effect such an emphasis would have in Pakistan. He had considered filing a dramatic report to achieve this effect but decided such a report would end his mediation efforts, and that sometimes more boldness was required to proceed slowly and wisely than to file an apparently bold report. He decided that his report could not please the Pakistanis unless it said they were lily white and it could not please the Indians unless it called the Pakistanis aggressors. He thought his report as submitted would probably displease the Pakistanis by its avoidance of any condemnation of India, but that they would be pleased that he did not recommend partition. He believed that if the agreements under the UNCIP resolutions were thrown aside, India would merely assert its sovereignty and the possibility of peaceful settlement would be ended. The Pakistanis would be quite alarmed if the broader powers granted to Sir Owen Dixon were given to him at this time.

Estimate of Nehru’s Attitude

To Mr. Weil’s inquiry as to the apparent sincerity of Nehru’s arguments against demilitarization proposals, Dr. Graham replied that at one stage it appeared that Mr. Nehru genuinely wanted a settlement, but after a visit of Nehru to Kashmir and conferences with Abdullah there the Indian attitude seemed to stiffen a bit. At one point, Graham had come to Nehru’s home for dinner as the guest of the family, and for three hours after dinner he had conferred with Nehru alone. Graham did not mention terms of settlement or specific issues on this occasion but confined his remarks to a purely personal appeal during

1 James M. Ludlow, Foreign Affairs Officer, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs.
which Graham poured out his heart to Nehru on India’s opportunities for Asian and world leadership. Graham later confirmed his statements with a private paper to Nehru to avoid any subsequent misunderstandings. The remarks and paper were such that Graham would not object to their publication in Times Square or Pakistan. In all official negotiations on terms of settlement the Indians and Pakistanis had been equally represented.

**Effect of Indian Elections**

Mr. Weil raised the question of the effect of the coming Indian elections and Mr. Stein pointed out that a six weeks mediation period beginning November 1 would end in the midst of the campaign. Dr. Graham replied that some believed no progress could be achieved until after the election, but remarked that if Nehru should win on the basis of promises to hold Kashmir it was doubtful he could change his course of action afterward. Mr. Stein suggested India might be firmer after the elections. Dr. Graham said Nehru might then say he had made a promise to the people.

**Effect of Assassination**

Mr. Collins asked for Dr. Graham’s estimate of the effect of Liaquat’s assassination on the situation. Dr. Graham replied that he had thought it might be considerable until it was found that the Kashmir issue was not the cause of the assassination. He believes Nazimuddin will follow policies similar to those of Liaquat. His main concern now was that immediate differences between India and Pakistan could connect with centuries old differences and touch off a conflagration. Mr. Meyers inquired what procedures seemed most feasible in the near future in view of this danger. Dr. Graham said it seemed reasonable to try further negotiation and mediation followed by a report and recommendations. Returning to the subcontinent would be dramatic but dangerous.

**Publicity**

Mr. Stein asked what aid the United States could give to Dr. Graham at this stage. Dr. Graham replied that he wanted the help from the United States to be undirected by the UN Representative. He had disabused the parties of the idea that he was a US–UK stooge and did not want to give them grounds for thinking otherwise. One form of action undertaken informally, however, would be of the greatest value. Editorials in leading newspapers should precede the opening meeting of the Security Council in Paris and should comment favorably on the personal part of Dr. Graham’s report bearing down on the potentialities that a peaceful settlement hold for India and the world. Such editorial comment would be printed all over India. When
a mediator presents a report he inevitably disappoints some people; Dr. Graham accordingly considers that he needs new strength in the form of such support if he is to continue his efforts successfully. The editorials should appeal for an approach based not on 19th century sovereignty and nationalism but on 20th century statesmanship. Such editorial support should be broadly representative without a party focus. The following papers might specifically be included: New York Times, New York Herald Tribune, Christian Science Monitor, St. Louis Post Dispatch, Norfolk Pilot, Richmond Times Dispatch, Portland Oregonian, Louisville Courier Journal, Atlanta Constitution, Atlanta Journal, Chicago Daily News, New York Evening Post, Washington Post, Manchester Guardian, and papers in Minneapolis, Des Moines, Baltimore etc. . . . Commentators and columnists such as Stokes, Childs and Kaltenborn might likewise point up the importance of the issue and the value of a settlement.

Mr. Collins asked if the United States could take any action to produce an atmosphere conducive to Dr. Graham’s success in Paris, raising the possibility of representations by the Secretary of State to the parties. Dr. Graham replied that independence was a source of his strength. If word reached one of the parties that an idea put forward by the Council or the United States came from Graham and he were asked about it, he could not deny it. He repeated that a wider realization of the importance of the issue would be helpful; that a war between India and Pakistan could in his opinion create a power vacuum that would enable Russia to take over all of Asia and involve the United States in World War III. Further, people in Asia think we push the case aside as unimportant because it does not involve the West, that in our opinion just 400,000,000 colored people make no difference, and that the UN is concerned primarily with problems of interest to the West. The Kashmir is far more important than the Iranian case but has received less attention because it is not so dramatic.

Status of Graham’s Twelve Proposals

Dr. Graham added that it might be useful if the United States could get any information from Minister Steere in New Delhi as to how far the Government of India could go in compromising on demilitarization. Dr. Graham had been privately informed that India could accept a limitation of troops on the Indian side of the cease fire line to 14,000. The latest figure publicly announced was 16,000. Dr. Graham does not believe the Pakistanis would accept the figure of 14,000 and thinks India should reduce the figure further. He believes, however, Pakistan would be making a mistake to stand for equality of troops if such a stand would delay the appointment of
the plebiscite administrator. With the arrival of the administrator
the situation would be completely changed because of the broad powers
granted to him. If the Pakistanis quibble and fail to get an adminis-
trator they will fail to get Kashmir.

Dr. Graham emphasized that he considered the pinning of re-
sponsibility directly upon India in the appointment of the adminis-
trator to be the key point of his proposals. The language that India
should “cause the plebiscite Administrator to be formally appointed
to office” was carefully planned.

Dr. Graham remarked that he was convinced his twelve points rep-
resented a sound basis for negotiation and that each was aimed at a
target. That Pakistan should make a no-war declaration would satisfy
an Indian allegation of danger of an attack by the Government of
Pakistan. Pakistan would accept it in the context of a broader agree-
ment, but like a no-strike declaration in a labor dispute it would have
to be accompanied by certain other agreements. The ban on war propa-
ganda was likewise aimed at satisfying an Indian complaint. The re-
affirmation of the plebiscite was designed to satisfy Pakistan’s
apprehensions concerning the Constituent Assembly. Similarly, the
other points were not created in a vacuum.

Dr. Graham mentioned that he had a private paper from Bajpai
transmitted through Marin saying the points that India had not com-
mented upon were acceptable. Dr. Graham noted that the Government
of India had not commented on the arbitration point in his proposal.

At present agreement was lacking on only two more points: (1) the
number of troops and (2) the fixing of the date on which India would
cause the plebiscite administrator to be inducted.

UN Troops Proposal

Dr. Graham had in mind another proposal that he had withheld
from the parties thus far lest it be attacked on procedural grounds.
He would like to see 4,000 United Nations troops stationed in Azad
Kashmir. Tribesmen could not get by them; the Pakistan army would
no longer constitute a threat to India in that area; the Azad forces
would not be a threat. India’s three main arguments would be under-
cut. Pakistan might say the proposal was not fair and that UN troops
should be placed on the Indian side as well, but India had already
rejected an offer of troops and claims sovereignty in the area. Graham
could answer that India does not have de facto sovereignty in Azad
Kashmir at present if India should object to troops on the Pakistan
side of the cease fire line. Dr. Graham said Gross had suggested that
UN troops be offered to both sides simultaneously in the interest of
fairness and because rejection by India and acceptance by Pakistan
could only redound to the credit of the latter. Dr. Graham thought
well of the suggestion but preferred to try to induce India to accept the troops on condition that Pakistan did so, and then to get Pakistan acceptance.

A bold proposal of that sort could not be advanced by the mediator, however, unless it had the support of the world. This bold proposal might be timely since Liaquat’s last comment to Graham was “Your mission is the last—I have held my people in check three years and can do so no longer if you are unsuccessful.” The mission did make progress largely because it took the considerable risk of not getting mixed up in the three issues of constituent assembly, cease fire violations, and troop movements which threatened war even while the mission was on the subcontinent. Graham reached the decision that war would not actually break out while the mission was present, and that to give the parties an opportunity to blow off steam a while on these side issues might make them more ready to talk seriously on demilitarization issues.

New Resolution

Mr. Collins asked Dr. Graham if he needed a Security Council resolution or whether the prestige of a resolution should be held in reserve. Dr. Graham replied that he needed a definite expression. Mr. Hickerson remarked that sometimes a letter from the President of the Security Council had served the purpose of a resolution. Dr. Graham stated that a new resolution would not have to abrogate the March 30 resolution and that the Council could if necessary come back to the arbitration clause in that resolution. Further, a new resolution should not give him any broader terms of reference. The Council must make it clear that acts of the constituent assembly would have no effect.

It was asked whether a resolution mentioning the constituent assembly now might weaken the effect of a later resolution. Dr. Graham said the resolution could be softened to terms that would take note of the promises of India that the assembly action would have no effect.

Mr. Meyers asked what step might follow the six weeks period of negotiation and the writing of the report and recommendations to the Security Council. Mr. Collins asked if it would strengthen Graham’s hand in the negotiations if he were able to say in advance that if agreement was not reached by the parties he would be backed by the Security Council in specific recommendations as to terms of settlement. Dr. Graham remarked that it was a good point but that under those conditions the Pakistanis might just sit and wait during the negotiations. Moreover, the Indians might say that they had rejected arbitration and now Graham was setting himself up as an arbitrator. A decision as to the step that would follow would depend on cir-
cumstances. He did not put a recommendation of the use of UN armed forces in his recommendations this time because of procedural objections that could be raised. It had been his experience that when people cannot meet a proposal on its merits they attack its procedural aspects, and on those grounds he thought he would have been wide open to attack. A mediator cannot spring new proposals on the parties.

Mr. Collins then asked if it would be helpful for him to be able to say that if agreement was not reached he would feel impelled to recommend that the Security Council pass a resolution embodying his proposals. Dr. Graham replied that it would be better for the Council to ask the UN Representative to make recommendations, and incorporate these recommendations in a subsequent resolution. If handled this way Dr. Graham thought his recommendations as mediator would not be subject to criticism as having the character of an arbitral award because they would not be binding on either the Council or the parties.

Mr. Meyers asked whether it would be useful to have a resolution saying that the UN Representative should make a report and recommendations. Dr. Graham said such a resolution would give him great strength, and that it might say something to the effect that at the end of two months the UN Representative should report to the Security Council with recommendations. He mentioned that he had just done that under his present terms of reference.

Return to Subcontinent

Mr. Hickerson raised the question of Dr. Graham’s return to the subcontinent. Dr. Graham stated that President Truman had asked him to accept another post but that, on the basis of Dr. Graham’s estimate of the importance of following through the Kashmir case, the President had said it seemed more desirable at present for him to continue work on that problem. Dr. Graham accordingly would be available to return if necessary, but thought it would be a mistake to do so unless he received word in Paris that there was some likelihood of achieving a substantial effect. He could say no more to Nehru than he had already said in the paper confirming the personal appeal, and to retrace steps without progress would appear to close the issue and increase the danger of war.

Mr. Weil asked for Dr. Graham’s reaction to the proposal that he touch base in the subcontinent en route to the Paris meetings of the Security Council. Dr. Graham stated his belief that it would be a mistake to go back without formal Security Council action.

Mr. Weil interpreted the consensus as being that Dr. Graham should wait until all possibilities had been exhausted in Paris and he had a package to place in Nehru’s hands or an indication from the Government of India that his presence would be useful.
Dr. Graham said to return without such a new indication would be dramatic but might merely dramatize failure. There was dynamite as well as drama in running back to the subcontinent.

Mr. Meyers added comments on the difficulty of getting Nehru's attention during his seven weeks' election tour except under the conditions mentioned.

**Schedule of Action**

The question of the scheduling of a Security Council meeting was raised. Dr. Graham emphasized that he did not want to be a party to any delaying action, but had no objection to a postponement of a few days in the Paris meeting if the parties were themselves in agreement as to its advisability.

**Reaction to Report**

Dr. Graham raised the question of the reactions to his report and personal statement to the Security Council saying Rau had thanked him and said it was a magnificent statement and that one Pakistan delegate had told him it was the greatest statement ever made to the Security Council. Dr. Graham thought that it had been as well received as could be expected but that the filing of any report causes disappointments. Accordingly he felt the need of assistance in the form of newspaper support to restore his strength before undertaking new negotiations.

357.AB/10–2451 : Telegram

**The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State**

**TOP SECRET**

KARACHI, October 24, 1951—8 p. m.

435. After two conversations today with Zafrullah and one between him and Mohammed Ali I have reason to believe Pak's favor second alternative res on Kashmir ref Intel October 22. Their feeling wld be that second alternative includes in points one and two recommendations in Graham's report and that point three goes beyond it in a way satis to Pak. Shld point four be included in a SC resolution Zafrullah wld be obliged to review the history of the dispute already so well documented in Graham's report, but advance the contention that from Pak point of view, India has not moved beyond its post of March 1949. Shld Zafrullah take such an attitude it might well close the door that has been left ajar by Graham negots. For that reason I recommend that the inclusion of point four will serve no useful purpose.

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1The unnumbered information telegram referred to here, sent to both New Delhi and Karachi, on October 22, contained a summary of telegram 507 from New York, October 19, p. 1885 (copy in New Delhi Embassy Files, Lot 58 F 95, Box 50).
The Paks wld also accept point five but without the time limit suggested by Graham in his third recommendation. They favor his continuance of mediation but I believe wld prefer speedy and continuous action to reach an agreement on demilitarization to a specific time limit. They certainly wld be in favor of giving Graham a free hand in determining his pace work and to take advantage of the possibility of India's position becoming more flexible.

This presentation which represents only Zafrullah's and Mohammed Ali's thinking, but which I consider authoritative, for other members of Cabinet who have not been consulted wld be expected to go along, does not mean that Paks will acquiesce in a postponed consideration of the Graham report. They wld like to see the earliest possible SC action, but I believe wld accept a SC res along the lines of this discussion.

Warren

357.AB/10-2351

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] October 26, 1951.

Subject: Kashmir: Possible Discussions During General Assembly Meeting in Paris

Discussion

On October 15 Dr. Frank P. Graham, the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan submitted to the Security Council a report on the progress of his negotiations as provided for under his terms of reference contained in the Security Council Resolution of March 30, 1951. Dr. Graham's efforts were directed toward achieving a demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In his report Dr. Graham outlined twelve proposals concerning demilitarization which he submitted to the Governments of India and Pakistan as well as the replies to both Governments. As a result of his negotiations with the parties and the replies which they gave to his proposals Dr. Graham concludes that "the possibility of arriving at a basis of agreement by the two Governments is not excluded". He further recommended that "if the Security Council decides that a renewed effort to obtain an agreement should be made . . . such negotiations should be carried out at the seat of the Security Council and the Council should instruct the United Nations Representative to report
to the Council within six weeks".* After Dr. Graham's presentation to the Security Council on October 18 of his oral views the Council decided to resume hearings on the Kashmir case following its reconvening in Paris.

The assassination of the Pakistan Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, in Rawalpindi on October 16, the day after Dr. Graham submitted his report to the Security Council has created profound shock in both countries with Prime Minister Nehru calling for renewed effort to plan Indo-Pakistan relations on a new basis. Immediate reaction to the Graham Report in Pakistan has been somewhat unfavorable in view of the feeling on the part of the Pakistanis that some censure should have been leveled against India for what Pakistan considers to be its intransigence. In addition the death of Liaquat Ali Khan in the minds of many Pakistanis is linked in the delay in the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Reaction in India has been confined mostly to objective reporting of the proposals outlined by Dr. Graham with some slight criticisms. The Government of India has discouraged criticism of the Graham Report by the Indian press on the grounds that the time was inauspicious. On balance, it might be said that Indian reaction was as good as could be expected.

It should be mentioned that Dr. Graham has not assessed blame to either side for delays in the settlement of this issue but has seized upon the areas of agreement which exist and has attempted to bridge the existing differences between the parties. We believe the report is an excellent one and that if the Security Council, as we hope, requests Dr. Graham to continue his mediation in Paris there is some prospect of agreement. We are convinced that the best approach is for Dr. Graham to continue his efforts. Dr. Graham has made a good impression on both Indian and Pakistani officials and in particular appears to be persona grata with Prime Minister Nehru.

There is a danger that with attention drawn on so many subjects of concern to the General Assembly, not sufficient attention will be given to the Security Council and Dr. Graham's efforts with respect to the Kashmir case. A position paper outlining the Department's views will be forwarded to Paris for the guidance of the US Representative on the Security Council.

Recommendation

It is recommended that Dr. Graham be fully supported in his efforts at Paris to bring about an agreement between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute.

Concurrence: UNA

320/10–2551: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1951—7:12 p.m.

Gadel 7. Re Kashmir. Dept after considering views Embs Delhi Karachi London and USUN (NY 507 Oct 19) favors at present res consisting following elements:

1. Note Graham report and his personal statement.
2. Note Indian assurance re Consembly and reaffirm previous SC position.
4. Direct UN Rep submit report to SC containing specific recommendations as to future action, not later than 2 months from date res and earlier at his convenience.

WEBB

690D.91/11–551: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, November 5, 1951—6:35 p.m.

947. AP desp New Delhi Nov 3 qtes Nehru as welcoming further exploration by Graham demilitarization Kashmir and stating Graham "went a long way toward success" on question demilitarization. "We stand by our commitments to SC. Let us have a plebiscite and be done with it."

Does Emb believe: a) Above represents GOI shift Kashmir policy to COOP with UN efforts; b) Graham’s efforts further mediation might be more productive on subcontinent than Paris; c) Nehru now of opinion plebiscite wld result Indian victory?

WEBB

1 Repeated to Paris as Gadel 65 and Karachi as 446.
CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON, NOVEMBER 6, 1951.]

NEGOTIATING PAPER FOR STEERING GROUP FOR POSSIBLE US–UK TALKS IN NOVEMBER

PROBLEM

Continued coordination of US–UK efforts in the United Nations to bring about a settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

US OBJECTIVE

The US objective is the solution of this dispute in order to increase prospects for stability in the area. In the achievement of this objective the US will continue to support UK initiative.

PROBABLE POSITIONS OF OTHER COUNTRIES

Members of the Security Council, with the exception of the USSR, have thus far fully supported the resolutions sponsored by US and UK in the case and eight members spoke in favor of the resolution of March 30, 1951 under which Dr. Graham has worked. There are indications of increasing interest and concern among the Commonwealth countries. Foreign Minister Casey of Australia indicated late in October that he had discussed the Kashmir question in both Karachi and New Delhi on his visit to those capitals. During the summer Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, as did the US and the UK, issued appeals to the governments of India and Pakistan at the high point of tension caused by troop movements along the borders. Governments of Asian countries, including Indonesia, Burma, and Iran, have manifested interest in the Kashmir case, and have indicated their recognition of the dangers inherent in the continuation of the dispute.

POSITION TO BE PRESENTED

The UK has in the past exercised leadership with close UK–US cooperation and a joint sponsorship of resolutions. It has been agreed

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1 A covering memorandum by Mr. George Denney, Secretary of the Steering Group on Possible U.S.–U.K. Talks in November, indicated that this paper was drafted by Mr. Frank D. Collins of the Office of South Asian Affairs, and was approved at the working level in the Departments of State and Defense. The Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France met in Paris and Rome, November 2–30, but there is no record that the Kashmir dispute was formally discussed. In the records of the meetings the paper was designated as document NOV D–5/1b.
that there be similar co-sponsorship of a resolution to be submitted to the Security Council at an early date instructing Dr. Graham to continue mediatory efforts and to report his views to the Security Council within a fixed period.

The following points should be raised:

a) Does the Conservative Government contemplate any change in the UK approach to the Kashmir problem?

b) Are the UK and Commonwealth countries prepared to use pressures or inducements through or in aid of the United Nations in its efforts to secure Indian cooperation?

c) It is too early to formulate a definitive position on lines of action to be adopted in the event that Dr. Graham's mediatory efforts fail. However, UK-US discussions of this problem have been held at the working level during recent months, and the Department believes it essential that these discussions continue. Are the British prepared to continue these discussions?

DISCUSSION

Pakistan has been pressing for a Security Council Resolution which would at a minimum recommend a solution to the parties based on the Graham proposals. We may anticipate considerable pressure from Pakistan along these lines. If India should refuse the Security Council’s recommendations the danger of hostilities would undoubtedly increase and a crisis of serious proportions might well result. On the other hand, unless the Council takes forthright action to recommend a settlement Pakistan may abandon hope of a settlement through the efforts of the United Nations and may take the matter into its own hands. Continuing negotiations by another United Nations Representative would likely be unacceptable to Pakistan. Viewed from the standpoint of the United Nations a comparable dilemma is presented. If the Council makes decisive recommendations as to terms of settlement unsupported by enforcement action, their rejection by India may reduce the Council’s prestige and future effectiveness in the dispute. If, on the other hand, the Council by indecisive action leads the parties to lose confidence in its capabilities, the blow to its prestige and effectiveness may be equally damaging.

In considering possible lines of SC action following Dr. Graham’s next report, the US and the UK will, of course, wish to take into account the contents of this report as well as political factors prevailing at the time of the submission of the report.
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET  PRIORITY

Paris, November 6, 1951—11 p. m.

Delga 78. Subject Kashmir. Further Delga 69,\(^1\) Gross showed draft res to Graham who expressed unqualified approval of it. He felt draft had been worked out on the basis of the views of the parties with particular care for Pakistani sensibilities and this he felt was the proper approach. He stressed that view of two govts should be embodied into draft and also suggested that parties shld have 48 hours notice of its contents before SC mtg. He agreed with Gross that this shld be more a matter of courtesy than to open the door to drafting changes.

Graham had seen Nehru's statement referred to in Gadel 69\(^2\) and agrees with Dept's view that last clause in para 3\(^3\) of draft res is sufficient re Constituent Assembly in light of that statement. He was reserved on what its true significance may be.

In Graham's opinion under para 6 he can express his views fully and will do so at once if he saw breakdown of negots and issue of war. He understands that the report referred to in para 6 might or might not be a financial one.

On basis of Graham’s views and restiveness of parties for early SC mtg, Gross recommends Dept clearance so draft can be given parties during course of Wed 7 Nov with SC mtg not later than Sat 10 Nov.

ACHESON

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\(^1\) Delga 69, from Paris, November 6, not printed, transmitted a draft resolution virtually identical to that approved on November 10, with the exception of the last paragraph (numbered paragraph 6), which in Delga 69 read “The SC . . . instructs the UNRep to make a report to the SC not later than six weeks after this res comes into effect.” (357.AB/11–651) This paragraph was replaced by numbered paragraph 4 in the final resolution, which added a clause allowing Graham to include in his report “his views concerning the problems confided to him.” Details concerning this change, which the Department saw as a means of giving Graham authority to recommend a future course of action, which in turn would give him bargaining power during continued mediation, are in telegram Gadel 99, to Paris, November 7, not printed.

\(^2\) Gadel 69, to Paris, November 5, referred to the reported statement on the subject of Kashmir by Prime Minister Nehru at a press conference of November 3, in which he welcomed Graham’s continuing mediation efforts. The telegram stated that the Department was therefore prepared to omit mention of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly in the Security Council resolution, provided the United Kingdom and the United States made brief references in their speeches reiterating the earlier Security Council position. (367.AB/11–551) A transcript of Nehru's remarks of November 3 is contained in Despatch 981 from New Delhi, November 5 (6909.91/11–551). In telegram 1641, from New Delhi, November 6, Ambassador Bowles viewed Nehru's remarks as conciliatory and helpful and as affording a definite basis for a further attempt by Dr. Graham to achieve demilitarization and ultimate settlement of the Kashmir issue (791.13/11–654).

\(^3\) Same as numbered paragraph 1 of the Security Council resolution approved November 10, p. 1904.
CONFIDENTIAL

NEW DELHI, November 7, 1951—6 p.m.

1660. Deptel 947 Nov 6 crossed Embtel 1641, Nov 6 ² in which Emb expressed view Nehru's remarks re Kashmir were conciliatory, helpful and afford basis for further Graham effort to achieve demilitarization and ultimate settlement.

For are Emb views re questions propounded Depreftel:

(a) We feel Nehru's remarks do not necessarily reflect shift GOI pol but rather some evolution that pol. Nehru wld be first to deny GOI uncooperative with US or blocking settlement. We interpret Nehru's remarks to mean he desires early settlement and is willing continue explore means either through SC (with further effort being made by Graham) or through direct discussions with Pak, though he made it clear any direct negotiations cld not overlap with impending SC meeting. But as we interpret Nehru's remarks, he still insists all Pak troops and most, if not all, local forces wld have to be withdrawn from Kashmir or disbanded as case may be before demilitarization cld be accomplished. If foregoing steps were taken and in GOI and Kashmir Govt cld be assured there wld be no further invasion, Nehru intimated GOI might be prepared withdraw all Ind troops. However, Nehru made it clear demilitarization only one step in reaching final settlement, declaring after that "first major step" settled, "others cld be tackled". Thus as we read his remarks, Nehru is encouraging further exploration Kashmir issue, either through Graham or directly. We do not perceive he has receded substantially from his original position but rather that he is now prepared move ahead at some points where GOI has held back.

(b) Nehru stated plainly, in reply to a question, he wld give Graham all help possible in exploration further possibilities settlement. We have no reason doubt bona fides this statement. As we view sitn from here, we believe any resolution empowering Graham continue efforts shld be so broadly drawn as to permit his return sub-continent; further, we consider Graham shld not be restricted by inclusion definite time limit, since climate here in Jan may be more conducive settlement than now.

(c) Nehru is clearly of view plebiscite, as he envisages it, wld go as Ind desires, indeed, he stated this plainly in course remarks to Press Nov. 3. This confidence probably predicated on GOI feeling Abdullah's consolidation or power, popularity, and ability to control electorate now such as to insure vote in favor of Ind.

Rptd info Paris 16 for GAdel, Karachi 89.

Bowles

¹ Chester Bowles was appointed Ambassador to India and Nepal on October 10.

² Not printed.
Resolution Adopted by the United Nations Security Council

The Security Council

Having received and noted the report of Dr. Frank Graham, the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, on his mission initiated by the Security Council resolution of 30 March 1951, and having heard Dr. Graham’s address to the Council on 18 October,

Noting with approval the basis for a programme of demilitarization which could be carried out in conformity with the previous undertakings of the parties, put forward by the United Nations Representative in his communication of 7 September 1951 to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan,

1. Notes with gratification the declared agreement of the two parties to those parts of Dr. Graham’s proposals which reaffirm their determination to work for a peaceful settlement, their will to observe the cease-fire agreement and their acceptance of the principle that the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be determined by a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations;

2. Instructs the United Nations Representative to continue his efforts to obtain agreement of the parties on a plan for effecting the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir;

3. Calls upon the parties to co-operate with the United Nations Representative to the fullest degree in his efforts to resolve the outstanding points of difference between them;

4. Instructs the United Nations Representative to report to the Security Council on his efforts, together with his views concerning the problems confided to him, not later than six weeks after this resolution comes into effect.

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1 U.N. document S/2390 was approved at the 566th meeting of the Security Council, November 10, 1951, by 9 votes to none, with India and the USSR abstaining. For the record of the meeting, see U.N. document S/PV. 539.

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690D.91/11-1651: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW DELHI, November 16, 1951—7 p. m.

1770. Have just completed calls on all Chiefs of Mission, and in the course of each conversation I asked for an opinion on who wld win honest and uninfluenced plebiscite in Kashmir. Each without exception stated that India wld win; margins varied from three to two to four to one. Many of these mission chiefs or their staffs visited
Kashmir recently. Amer press here, several of whom have recently visited Kashmir, also agree with this analysis.

Emb estimates are more modest as to margin but no disagreement over likelihood that India wld win under conditions likely to prevail.

Much of India's improved position undoubtedly due to Sheik Abdullah's land and tax reforms which have won much support among peasants.

Bowles

Secretary's Memoranda: Lot 59D444

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

CONFIDENTIAL

Paris, November 20, 1951.

Subject: Kashmir

Participants: Dr. Frank Graham

The Secretary

Dr. Graham spoke to the Secretary at the close of the Committee I session this morning and suggested to him the desirability that he get hold of Sir B. N. Rau now and ask Sir B. N. to give consideration to two points:

(1) With respect to the 16 Indian battalions, what guarantees would the Indian Government require in order to reduce that number?

(2) Would the Indian Government agree to set a date when a plebiscite administrator could take over?

I understand the Secretary expressed no definite opinion to Dr. Graham in regard to the desirability of this matter.

(I consulted Ambassador Gross and Mr. Hyde both of whom expressed the following views. This approach to the Secretary is at variance with Dr. Graham's general position which has been that he did not want to be in such close touch with the U.S. Delegation that the Indians would feel he was acting under U.S. Government instructions. If the Secretary spoke to Sir B. N. Rau now about these two points which are the main points over which Graham is struggling, Sir B. N. would undoubtedly think that the Secretary was acting on Graham's behalf. The outcome would not be helpful to Graham or to the position of the United States.)

(On being informed of these views, the Secretary expressed his concurrence and said he would not attempt to see Sir B. N. Rau.)

Philip C. Jessup
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Weil)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON], November 27, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

Subject: Proposed Corporation for Development of Kashmir’s Economic Resources.

Reference is made to Mr. Pawley’s memorandum of September 24, 1951, in which was discussed the possibility of forming a corporation through which the US, the UK, India, Pakistan, and the World Bank would cooperate in an effort to develop the mineral resources, hydroelectric power and other economic assets of Kashmir with a view to reducing tension between India and Pakistan and paving the way for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

SOA continues to believe that as long as there is any prospect of a political settlement of the Kashmir dispute through the efforts of the UN, our Government and that of the UK should concentrate their energies officially on supporting the UN and on doing everything possible through diplomatic channels to establish a basis for settlement. Thus the plan for economic development of Kashmir under UN auspices formulated in SOA in June is being held in reserve as a possible last resort in the event of Dr. Graham’s failure in his current effort at mediation. Both SOA officers, including the author, and UK officials, with whom this plan has been discussed informally, have serious doubts as to whether such a plan would work—even though it would combine economic development and the presence in Kashmir of a UN observer whose job it would be to protect the interests of India and Pakistan in Kashmir during a “cooling-off period.”

We have approved on an informal basis Mr. Eugene Black’s efforts to sound out Mr. Nehru and the late Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, on the subject of an Indus Valley Authority organized along the lines proposed by Mr. Lilienthal some months ago. If the World Bank can interest the two governments in such a project, a step in the direction of Indo-Pakistan cooperation may be achieved, but there is still no evidence to support the theory that this would take the place of a political settlement. The present government in Pakistan may well stand or fall on the success of the UN in holding a plebiscite in Kashmir; and the dispute has become a major issue in Indian politics.

Nevertheless, the time limit placed on Dr. Graham’s mediation by the Security Council’s resolution of November 10 necessitates reconsideration of plans which might be proposed in the unhappy event
that Dr. Graham fails to bring about agreement on demilitarization in preparation for a plebiscite. In the light of current developments I offer the following comment on the reference memorandum:

1. If mineral resources exist in the Indian-occupied portion of Kashmir which are capable of exploitation, and the presence of these resources influences Mr. Nehru to hold on to the Indian-occupied area at any cost, is it likely that the Indian Government would be willing to share profits of such exploitation with the US, the UK, and Pakistan?

In view of the fact that the state is disputed territory, India and Pakistan would presumably be entitled to share equally the proceeds of exploitation in either the Indian-controlled or Pakistan-controlled portion of the state. So long as the political status of the territory remains unsettled, it is difficult to see how either the Indian or the Pakistan Government could justify to its people payment to the other government of proceeds from exploitation of lands fought for and held by its troops.

2. Would it be politically feasible for the Pakistan and Indian Governments to commit funds for the development of the state as a whole?

Since each government accuses the other of being the aggressor in Kashmir, it is difficult to believe that either would dare appropriate funds part of which, at least, would presumably be used for the benefit of areas occupied by troops of the other country.

3. Would the governments of India or Pakistan, or the people of Kashmir, welcome an Anglo-American plan to exploit such resources as Kashmir may possess?

In view of widespread fear of “American economic imperialism,” and of “Anglo-American” perfidy in general—effectively encouraged by Communist propaganda—the question arises as to whether the benefits of the project under reference would outweigh the disadvantages deriving from suspicion and fear which would be created, and stimulated by both Communist and nationalist elements. Virtually the only effective means of countering such fears would be to demonstrate almost immediately that the scheme was raising the standard of living in Kashmir, and that the profits were not all flowing into the pockets of US and British bankers. It is not likely that the mining of sulphur which Dr. D. N. Wadia\(^1\) has said would “cost its weight in gold” by the time it reached India, or the construction of hydroelectric units, would have any immediate effect on the living standards of the poverty-stricken Kashmiris; and both the Indian and Pakistan Governments would probably be widely accused of having turned the resources of Kashmir over to Wall Street and London capitalists.

4. Would a corporation formed by the World Bank with the participation of Indian and Pakistan capital, but not of US or UK capital, be able to create conditions which would make India and Pakistan forget their political and military struggle for control of Kashmir?

While such an arrangement might reduce suspicions of Anglo-American “economic imperialism,” it would probably face the ob-

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\(^1\) Mineral Adviser, Government of India.
stables referred to in (1) and (2) above; and if the World Bank were willing to finance the program wholly, without the direct participation of the Indian or Pakistan Governments, the question still arises as to how the operation of mines or the construction of hydroelectric plants in Kashmir would benefit either the people of India or the people of Pakistan sufficiently to remove the political passions which the dispute has generated. On the contrary, if a corporation financed by the World Bank succeeded in exploiting resources in the Indian-held portion of Kashmir, Pakistan’s insistence on an equitable settlement of the dispute would probably be intensified, and India’s determination to hold the territory it now occupies would be proportionately increased. By the same token, successful exploitation in the Pakistan-held area would whet India’s appetite for annexing the whole state, and concurrently strengthen Pakistan’s determination to hold the territory it now controls.

In view of the fact that NEA has been working on possible solutions of the Kashmir dispute for four years, and the fact that other governments and the UN have tried without success to find the answer, I wish I could summon more optimism regarding the practical possibilities of the plan discussed in the reference memorandum. One of our chief concerns regarding the plan drawn up in SOA in June (UNDOAK) has been the question of financing economic development in Kashmir during a “cooling-off period” (to which we believe it would be difficult to obtain agreement). The suggestion of World Bank financing of economic development in Kashmir is one which may be kept in mind, and may prove useful if we reach the conclusion that all possibilities for a political settlement have been exhausted. On the other hand, Indian representatives in the World Bank might object to the use of World Bank funds on the ground that portions of the funds would be used in the Pakistan-occupied part of the state, and Pakistan representatives might object on the ground that they would be used in Indian-occupied territory.

SOA is currently re-examining its various plans for future action in Kashmir and expects to renew informal discussions with the British within ten days.

600D.91/11-2951: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, November 29, 1951—7 p. m.

1911. Although Emb realizes Graham demil talks with Ind and Pak in Paris will not terminate for another 3 weeks, Emb wld appreciate indication how Dept anticipates Kashmir question will be handled thereafter.
As Emb now sees it, Ind will probably be unable make final commitment re Kashmir until conclusions Ind's gen elections in Jan because of effect decision may have on vote. Meanwhile however, Emb believes Ind will continue fol more conciliatory line re Indo-Pak relations which developed fol Liaquat's death. Even in Kashmir there has been little provocative action by Consemby. Latter recently adjourned, possibly until next spring. Foregoing seems add up to more amenable Ind attitude re Kashmir.

If foregoing sit continues prevail and providing Graham talks have favorable result Emb hopes way will be found continue present method negot, at least until after Ind elections.

Informal discussion with UKHC officials indicate they have similar views.


Bowles

690D.01/11-3051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

KARACHI, November 30, 1951—3 p. m.

575. Emb desires comment as fols on Delhi tel 1911, Nov 29, 1951 to Dept rptd info Karachi 95:

a. We concur in statement that India can do nothing constructive until elections are over. This mainly for polit reasons.

b. We question India’s sincerity in implying publicly that its attitude toward Pak will be more conciliatory. We agree that India sincerely wishes a settlement which involves no armed conflict.

c. With exception Sheikh Abdullah’s speech on occasion of opening of the Kashmir Consemby, we agree that there has been little provocative action by the CA. The adjournment of CA until next spring can be taken as indication that India does not want CA to be provocative body during next few months.

d. The GOP realizes that India will resist taking positive action toward settlement of Kashmir controversy until after their pending elections. Pak has gone along with six weeks extension Dr. Graham’s efforts, but its patience probably will not extend to delays beyond that time, while awaiting India’s pleasure. In this event, we believe Pak may make strong appeals to SC, or failing that, take some more direct action. Even though GOP realizes that elections in India will be factor, pressure of public opinion may force GOP to refuse accept any further procrastination.


Warren
The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, December 1, 1951—6 p. m.

1940. Bajpai volunteered info to Steere yesterday that GOI, in response to indication from Graham that he thought India shld make reduction in forces 28,000 men (including armor) which India considered necessary be kept in Kashmir, had instructed Rau to indicate GOI wld give up armored support and reduce forces to 21,000. GOI hoped this wld enable further progress Paris discussions and be accepted as evidence India’s desire facilitate agreement. He then referred PriMin’s recent indication that complete withdrawal Indian armed forces was possible once conditions permitted. He mentioned “90 days” rather vaguely in this connection with implication it depended upon Pak attitude.

Bajpai said he cld not venture forecast whether Graham wld succeed in time allotted him but he thought it not impossible. Said plebiscite questions shld offer no great difficulty once demilitarization agreed. He referred to difficulty carrying on such discussion in Paris when decisions by govts all had to be taken this end.

Rptd info Paris Gadel 40.

Bowles

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1951—6:11 p. m.

1113. Re Kashmir. Dept appreciates views expressed Embtel 1911 Nov 29. (Rptd Karachi as 95, Paris Gadel as 37, London as 62). In event Graham has not succeeded by Dec 22—due date his report—we believe if parties either tacitly or openly indicate a willingness for him continue and SC does not specifically terminate his services he cld continue his negوتs. Dept plans at working level confer immed future with UK re possible courses action in event Graham’s present efforts unsuccessful.

Webb

1 Repeated to Karachi as telegram 520, to Paris as Gadel 336, and to London as 2778.

KASHMIR DISPUTE

690D.91/12-551: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, December 6, 1951—2 p. m.


Current FonOff thinking is in accord with that expressed ref tel. Nevertheless if Graham reports Dec 22 he has not succeeded in his mission, even though there is acquiescence by both sides in continuance of his present capacity, it will be incumbent on US-UK have ready any res (1) placing onus for failure on India but so carefully worded as not to force its open defiance SC, and (2) sufficiently strongly worded as to encourage Pak to agree to continuance of Graham in his permanent capacity until after Indian elections.

FonOff problem is to sell this idea to CRO which "has to live with India".

Emb hopes report more fully this subj next few days.

Rptd info New Delhi 56, Karachi 49, Paris 1209.

Gifford

320/12-1051: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

PARIS, December 10, 1951—10 p. m.

Delga 601. Re Kashmir. Graham called at his request on Gross with Hyde present to discuss substance of his report and tactics in presenting it. He has got the issue narrowed down to the question of the number of troops to remain at the end of the demilitarization period and the date of appointment of plebiscite administrator, but he finds little tendency on the part of Indians to agree to any reasonable proposition. He has asked Rau if India wld accept 600 or 800 UN observers and alternatively whether India wld accept UN forces in Kashmir. (He has not suggested they might be used in Azad-Kashmir area.) If neither of these suggestions is agreeable he has asked Rau to make a counter-suggestion. The current Indian figures on troops as he gets them from Rau are 28,000 men, including state forces, and 6,000 militia.

In addition to this Devers has had exploratory conversations on the military level with Indian generals and has suggested a series of stages, the first of which is more favorable to India than the basic resolutions wld provide. However, the Indians have not been encouraging on this. Graham and Devers are waiting for concrete answers to
their suggestions and figures on the number of troops which they expect to have this week.

Rau's general approach is that the Indian elections make a final settlement difficult at this time. Ayub\(^1\) feels that Pakistan needs a simple formula or some encouragement in the report from Graham to avoid a blow up. Pakistan feels that this is a bad time for a showdown with India, especially since the UK wld not get tough on the eve of Indian elections and, therefore, Graham feels that Pakistan wld agree to some simple formula that wld keep the door open until after elections.

In the light of the above analysis and the expectation of Graham that he will get nothing helpful from the Indians on the question of the number of troops they insist on keeping in the state, and considering that the Pakistanis need something for domestic political purposes on or about the due date of his report, Graham is thinking of tactics along the fol lines:

He wld draft a report that contains a long analysis of the background of the case that will not recite the suggestions that have been made and refused by India. Then, on the theory that the report shld contain something positive, he wld state simply (1) that in his opinion the forces remaining after demilitarization shld be as small as possible and (2) the plebiscite administrator shld be appointed not later than at the end of the demilitarization period. He wld add that on this point his opinion is contrary to the Indian view.

His theory is that this report wld let the operation suspend for a month during the Indian elections, wld give the Pakistanis something to hold public opinion and while it wld not satisfy them they wld swallow it. Graham feels that he shld not make concrete recommendations now and Gross agreed that the case shld not be permitted to crystallize at this stage. The effect of the report wld be to give the SC time to get by the Indian elections and late in Jan mediation operations again commence. Graham wants to hold the case in a negotiating situation, but he feels he must meet the deadline of Dec 22 and the Pakistanis wld object to any appreciable delay in his report. Also, he is sensitive to causing such delay on a second occasion. Graham added that this was the result of much earnest consideration by him. Ayub has told him that any delay in his report wld give great comfort to extremists in Pakistan and at the same time wld be just what the Indians want.

If these tactics were followed Gross suggested that Graham after the elections wld probably want to go again to the subcontinent although Graham stated that the Indians had not suggested this. It was agreed that there is no point in his doing so until after the elections. While a report along the lines projected might weaken Graham's position to some extent, it wld be a natural consequence of it for him to return to the subcontinent.

\(^1\) Mohammad Ayub, Ambassador of Pakistan in France.
Graham then suggested possibility of including in his report or in some covering statement an appeal to the parties to move this case along as a concrete way of showing by deeds that they believe in dis- armament. He also suggested pointing to the relationship of any Korean settlement to the Kashmir case as showing that two pending security issues can be settled by UN processes.

Gross felt that these broad questions shld be kept for later on and not used in a report which Graham intends as a holding operation.

Gross commented that it seemed clear that Pakistan wld not request or agree to any substantial delay in his report and that therefore it shld be filed as planned.

AUSTIN

357 AB/12-1251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Kennedy)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 12, 1951.

Subject: Kashmir

Participants: Mr. Richard G. Casey, Australian Minister for External Affairs
Mr. C. T. Moodie, Counselor, Australian Embassy
Mr. Shullaw—BNA
Mr. Kennedy—SOA

Mr. Casey, Minister for External Affairs, Australia, came to my office to discuss Kashmir in accordance with an appointment made by the Australian Embassy. In the course of a general discussion the following points emerged.

1. Mr. Casey said that Prime Minister Nehru had told him that the January elections in India would prevent him from making any concessions on Kashmir at the present time. Anything he did to "appease" Pakistan would undoubtedly lose him dozens of seats in Parliament. Mr. Casey had asked Prime Minister Nazimuddin of Pakistan what the Pakistan reaction would be if there were further delay because of the Indian elections and the latter replied that the world would have to be prepared for a lot of "shouting" about this, but in the end that Pakistan would take the delay.

2. In response to my query, Mr. Casey said he thought the UK would be prepared to take a strong line on future steps to resolve the Kashmir dispute. It had been his observation that Mountbatten was the only one left in London who favored India.

3. Mr. Casey said that he had asked Churchill if the latter had any new ideas as to settlement of the Kashmir dispute and that the

1 J. Harold Shullaw of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs.
2 Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister, First Lord of the Treasury, and Minister of National Defence.
latter had replied that he did not. Mr. Casey had then suggested that
there be a high-level approach to the parties, meaning by this that
there should be personal appeals by Prime Minister Churchill and
President Truman. Churchill replied that this was worth considering
and that he would talk to the President about it when he came to
America. Mr. Casey said that on the occasion of his appointment with
the President during his current stay in Washington, he had men-
tioned this and the President had replied that he would be glad to
discuss Kashmir with Churchill.

4. Mr. Casey expressed no disagreement with Graham's continuing
his efforts to reach agreement re demilitarization but expressed some
surprise that Graham seemingly was not going to go to the sub-
continent before making his report on December 22. Although he did
not specifically say so, it was evident that Mr. Casey did not have
much optimism as to the prospects for success arising out of Graham's
efforts.

5. Mountbatten had said in a private conversation with Mr. Casey
that the latter's suggestion that Churchill and the President intervene
was the worst possible one to make. Nehru personally disliked the
President and had no love for Churchill.

6. Mr. Casey did not express any particular interest in providing
UN troops to replace those presently in Kashmir. This seemed to be
merely one way of attempting a solution. I indicated our concern that
such a proposal might interfere in some respect with the broadest
possible UN support in Korea.

7. In a long conversation with Nazimuddin the latter told Mr. Casey
that Pakistan had a lot of troops that would be available for assistance
in the defense of the area once the Kashmir dispute was settled; until
that time not a corporal would be provided.

2 Lord Mountbatten had been Viceroy of India, March-August 1947 and Gover-
nor General of the Dominion of India, August 1947-June 1948. Since 1950 he
was Lord Commissioner of the British Admiralty, Fourth Sea Lord, and Chief
of Supplies and Transport.

320/12-1351: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at
the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET PRIORITY SAVAN MU, 12, 1951—7 p. m.

Gadel 432. Subject Kashmir. Re Delga 601 December 10; 436 No-
ember 30 and London's 2624 repeated Paris as 1209 December 6.

1. Following are Department's views re future action Kashmir
question which should be conveyed to Dr. Graham for comment. Until

1 Delga 436, from Paris, November 30, reported in part that Graham had
informed the U.S. Delegation to the General Assembly that his talks with repre-
sentatives of India and Pakistan in Paris were progressing slowly on two points:
1) the number of troops to remain in Kashmir at the end of the demilitarization
period and 2) the date on which India was to assure the appointment of the
Plebiscite Administrator. Graham considered Indian demands for the number of
troops to be left in Kashmir to be excessively high. (320/11-3051)
Department has been advised his views, Department suggests USDel and London not discuss with British colleagues. (a) In event Dr. Graham unable obtain agreement by end 6 weeks period Department strongly believes he must continue negotiations probably on sub-continent; (b) In view GOP attitude indicated Delga 601 Department believes Dr. Graham should make written report to SC by December 22 deadline. Department doubts advisability lengthy report as such might encourage parties make intemperate statements and precipitate SC debate. Therefore, suggests brief factual account his current efforts including possibly points one and two mentioned paragraph 5 Delga 601 together with statement his view further negotiations will reduce two points of difference. How, when and extent of indicating his intentions return subcontinent up to Dr. Graham; (c) SC action on December 22 report should be avoided as merely likely harden Indian position with concurrent lessening possibility of further effective negotiations by Dr. Graham. Accordingly, Department presumes Dr. Graham will wish have understanding with Zafirullah this point through assurance he will have further views to indicate per paragraph 4 November 10 resolution after conclusion negotiations on subcontinent which we believe should be short duration; (d) either prior to going subcontinent or upon arrival Dr. Graham might suggest both parties that withdrawal token forces from area during month January would be indication their good faith and possible easing tension. Dr. Graham and General Devers should go to subcontinent early part January for talks with Nazimuddin, and with Nehru either before or immediately after Indian elections, in manifested hope gaining necessary approval demilitarization plans. In this connection final polling in Indian elections occurs January 23.

2. Re Graham's suggestion that 6 to 800 military observers be sent to Kashmir as alternative to neutral troops, Department believes this figure probably unobtainable particularly on short notice. However, if General Devers indicates his belief Pentagon ought attempt produce necessary U.S. contingents, Department will press for such, providing Dr. Graham still believes it desirable. Only present limiting consideration from U.S. is statutory ceiling of 1000 placed on U.S. military personnel assignable to U.N. Department believes further discussions should be discouraged re possibility making U.N. forces available for service in Kashmir. No U.N. troops are available or will be available from Korea and U.N. members are presently being pressed for additional troops for Korea.

3. If Dr. Graham decides return to subcontinent and desires services Aycock, Department will press University North Carolina release him for month January.

*William B. Aycock, Professor of Law, University of North Carolina; Personal Assistant to the U.N. Representative for India and Pakistan.*
4. Re current Indian figure 28,000 Indian troops plus 6,000 militia (see paragraph 1 Delga 601) Department notes Bajpai informed Steere on December 1 (New Delhi’s 1940 repeated Paris as Gadel 40 December 1) Government of India had instructed Rau indicate it would give up armored support and reduce forces to 21,000.

WEBB

357.AB/12-1351: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

LONDON, December 13, 1951—7 p.m.

2730. Subject Kashmir. In meeting Dec 12, CRO concurred FonOff view that until elections over in India it will be impossible get any substantial concessions from GOI. Therefore some way must be found bridge gap between Graham’s report and end of January when elections over. Impossible in circumstances avoid SC res which critical of India and which contains recommendations for concrete action.

UK wld favor res containing recommendations to both parties and asking them consider fully and thereafter report back to SC, perhaps within given time limit. This view of course dependent on whether Graham report lends itself to such treatment; it shld not, for example, be too condemnatory of India.

Tel along above lines will probably be sent Paris tomorrow.

Rptd info priority Paris 1266, New Delhi 57, Karachi 50.

GIFFORD

691.90D/12-1451

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 14, 1951.

Subject: Call of Australian Foreign Minister, Mr. Richard G. Casey, on the President, December 11, 1951

During the course of his call on the President, the Australian Foreign Minister, Mr. Casey, stated that he had told Mr. Churchill during his visit to London that if Dr. Graham’s efforts failed to produce a solution to the Kashmir question, joint action by Mr. Churchill and the President might offer the only prospect of resolving this problem. The President said that he would be pleased to discuss the matter with Mr. Churchill.

Mr. Casey also referred briefly to Australian concern with respect to Indonesian claims to Netherlands New Guinea.
The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, December 16, 1951—4 p.m.

Delga 697. Re Kashmir: In light of Gadel 432 of Dec 12, Gross had conversation with Graham and Devers, Hyde present. In course of two hours fol conclusions were reached:

1. Graham will not now commit himself to return to subcontinent and reiterated that this shoild be “matter of depending on future developments”. He wld not at this time commit himself to continue in case but on Gross insistence agreed to keep open mind. Graham feels his future usefulness depends on attitude of parties toward him after filing of report.

Devers stated his personal commitments make return to subcontinent impossible; he feels he has done his part and if military man is needed wld suggest Gen Malony 1 whom he wld be willing to accompany to subcontinent, introducing him to Ayub and Cariappa. While Graham stated he felt his duty ends with filing report, Gross pointed out that Nov 10 resolution can properly be construed as continuing his services and Graham agreed to take no final decision.

2. On suggestion of token withdrawal of forces, Graham and Devers will put their heads together and consider this possibility. Devers was doubtful Indians wld agree, since Pak troops cld be returned in matter of hours but Indians in matter of days. However, Graham will consider raising this with Zafrullah entirely apart from his report.

3. Graham agreed that no res or other action by SC shoild be taken at this time.

4. Graham and Devers stated that idea of large number of observers was put forward partly as a tactical move and it is not now under active consideration.

5. Idea of neutral troops has been rejected by India in a communication received by Graham on Dec 14. He and Devers feel that Pak wld probably reject idea of troops there without increasing neutral contingents in India. Therefore, this idea no longer is current.

6. As things stand now, Graham intends to insert in report two opinions stated in para five of Delga 601 and in addition as third point he plans to suggest July 15 as date of appointment PlebAd. As for the point and developing idea of small number of troops, he will suggest that part two of Aug 13, 1948, UNCIP res and para 4(a) and (b) of Jan 5, 1949 res are inter-related. He will also state that at every stage in demilitarization which is to be completed by July 15 there shoild be a fair proportion of Indian and Pak troops in relation to each other and that proportion might well be arrived at by using figures at time of cease-fire.

Devers has worked out demilitarization plan in stages with precise number of troops at each stage and an over-all figure at end of demilitarization and upon appointment of PlebAd who, as Devers

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understands his powers, can decrease or increase number of troops remaining throughout the state.

Indian statement which was recd on Dec 14 was consistent with Bajpai statement to Steere (New Delhi’s 1940 to Dept of Dec 1) and referred to informal paper on numbers of troops which Devers had prepared for Indian military men. In the light of this fact, Devers plan on demilitarization, which is complete in every detail, leading to appointment of PlebAd on July 15 will be annexed to Graham report. Gross commented that this wld be most important document and Graham stated that this paper contains solution of case on theory of a plebiscite if it is at all possible to solve it.

7. Re SC tactics, Graham and Devers agreed with Gross that Graham might orally present his report in substance at SC mtg on or about Dec 19 without submitting it first for UN documentation. This might prevent leaks and report cld later be documented and circulated. This wld meet problem of Paks for some SC consideration before Xmas recess, but it was recognized this shld be discussed with UK in light of London’s 2750 to Dept of Dec 13.

In discussing above points Graham felt he had completed his best efforts and that Devers’ demilitarization plan is the key to any solution on our present theory.

Devers was very frank in urging that Nehru is key to problem; that Indian milit men wld agree with him on settlement if they were permitted to do so. He doubted that Graham cld do anything further with Nehru and while he personally cld not return to subcontinent, was skeptical of usefulness of Graham doing so. While Indians have reduced their figures on troops, they still deny the Paks the right to have any on their side. He feels appointment of PlebAd wld be creation of agent who might deal effectively with Nehru. However, he thinks Nehru does not desire plebiscite, because on analysis the powers of the PlebAd are so great that it wld infringe on sovereignty of state and be bitterly opposed by Abdullah. He has found Indian milit men most sympathetic and feels he cld have settled case with them if they were permitted to do so.

Graham’s analysis is that Indian statements about desiring a plebiscite are conditioned on what he and Devers consider unreasonable fear that the withdrawal of troops if agreed in advance, not just for one stage but as part of an entire plan, might lead to communal rioting and slaughter. Therefore, the Indians have insisted on agreeing upon not more than one stage of demilitarization at a time. It is understandable with four years experience with Indian vagueness, feel this means nothing. Graham feels Rau is sincere in arguing this point of view but agrees with Devers that milit forces under Devers plan wld be sufficient to prevent serious communal disorders at every state. Devers added that Paks wld have same problem of refugees and security and yet Indians wld allow them no troops other than police force to cope with them.
We left discussion with understanding that, subj to views of Dept, we wd aim at SC mtg next week and we feel it likely UK will agree in light of Pak desire for some SC consideration before holidays.

In discussing recent statements of Zafrullah in GA with personal and official hostility to US position, Devers feels this reflects uncertainties in positions of Pak Govt and understands Zafrullah is most anxious to return to Karachi for consultations on Dec 21. Altho Indians have now agreed to eight of Graham's twelve points, Graham concluded that essence of disagreement remains.

Roosevelt

320/12-1751: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, December 17, 1951—6:39 p.m.

Gadel 488. Re Kashmir, re Delga 697, Dec 16. Dept believes SC mtg on or about Dec 19 undesirable unless Dr. Graham has determined not to return to sub-continent and to indicate in his Dec 22 report he believes his utility now ended. Even assuming Dr. Graham did not introduce six weeks report at mtg, effect of holding meeting this week is to assure prompt consideration Kashmir very early in Jan. Prospect continuation debate on Kashmir early Jan wd, in Dept's opinion, preclude Dr. Graham's returning to sub-continent. GOI wd not be likely to accede to Dr. Graham's suggestions early in Jan even if he went to sub-continent, and further SC debate pursuant Dec 19 mtg cld not be put off through time in Jan Dr. Graham was on sub-continent. Dept therefore urges USGadel indicate no SC meeting shld be held prior to Christmas vacation unless UK and GOP insistent. Dept's further comments re Delga 697 to follow.

Acheson

320/12-1851: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, December 18, 1951—6:52 p.m.

Gadel 502. Re Kashmir. Further to Gadel 488. While Dept appreciates content Dec 22 report ¹ must be determined by Graham and

¹ Graham's second report to the Security Council was actually presented on December 18 (S/2448). In the report he indicated that while some progress had been made toward enlarging the area of agreement between India and Pakistan, two principal points of difference remained: (1) the size of forces to be left on either side of the cease-fire line at the end of the demilitarization period and (2) the day on which the Government of India would agree to the formal appointment to office of the Plebiscite Administrator. With the approval of the Security Council given him on January 31, 1952, Graham returned to the subcontinent for a third series of negotiations in March.
based his estimate his further utility, believes US Del shld indicate to him Dept's hope he wld consider importance not presenting a report that wld force GOI into position of having comment publicly before elections on demilitarization plan which he and Devers have worked out. One way accomplish this is avoid SC action until after Xmas recess perhaps by indicating in Dec 22 report supplementary report likely in two or three weeks on recommendations per para 4 Nov 10 res Graham intends to make. Basis info available India cannot be expected depart from present public attitude on Kashmir until after elections if at all, and GOP recognizing this prepared put up with this situation.

If Graham eventually makes recommendations re demilitarization plan and SC adopts in form res, Dept presently of opinion Graham’s further service might be needed to counsel parties re their acceptance.

ACHESON

320/12-1951: Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

SECRET  PRIORITY

PARIS, December 19, 1951—1 p. m.

Delga 728. Re Kashmir.

1. Gadel 488 of Dec 17. Plan of SC meeting has been abandoned in light (a) of UK opposition, (b) fact Ayub is not pressing and (c) Graham has his report in Secretariat hands today. According to Devers, Graham plans to stay in Fr from Christmas (report is silent on Graham’s future status).

2. Further Delga 697 and Delga 692, 1 Ayub and Bokhari have urged that Zafrullah’s attacks are not personal but substantive differences of opinion on Moroccan case. Ayub quotes Zafrullah as feeling that four years of cooperation with US and UK have been “wasted”. However, all junior members of Pak del are trying to pass incident off as difference of opinion without elements of personal attack.

Devers, Dept please protect source, got from Ayub fact Zafrullah feels US as friend of submerged people may be veering toward UK and Fr colonial policy. Zafrullah is quoted as sensing this from conversation with Secretary re Morocco, and US GA plenary speech on Morocco brought these feelings to surface. Ayub has asked appointment for Zafrullah to see Gross before former’s departure Karachi on 19 Dec.

1 Delga 692, December 15, not printed, contained the partial text of a statement by Zafrulla Khan on the Moroccan case in the General Assembly on December 15 (320/12-1951).
3. Re substance of Kashmir case, Ayub feels essential to have res to SC before Paris session ends. However, he feels UK view of no debate until after Indian election involves too long postponement. He added Zafrullah is generally upset and not willing to consider tactical details.

Roosevelt

220/12–2051: Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

SECRET  PRIORITY

PARIS, December 20, 1951—2 p. m.

Delga 749. Re talk with Sir Zafrulla Khan. On initiative Zafrulla Khan, Gross had long conversation with him Dec 19 just prior to Zafrulla's departure for Pak. Zafrulla, in a deeply emotional vein, expressed regret that anything he had said in GA debate clld have been construed as personal attack upon Gross. In most contrite tone he said that far from having any such intention, the incident had "increased his affection" for Gross and he expounded at great length his respect, friendship, et cetera.

He then went at great length into matters, which will have to be reported separately, relating to his own personal position in the present Pak Govt arising particularly out of the frustration of Pak aspirations re Kashmir. In this connection he discussed in frankest terms Pak dissatisfaction with attitude and actions of Brit Govt.

[Here follows a discussion concerning Morocco.]

Our conversation concluded with renewed protestations by Zafrulla of his friendship, his last comment being, "If there is anything I have done which hurt you or which was wrong, tell me what penance I must make".

With mutual expressions of friendship and respect, he departed for home to face new difficulties.

Roosevelt

357.AB/12–2151: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 21, 1951—3: 57 p. m.

Gadel 528. Re Kashmir. Amb Warren, now Wash consultation, reports Pak PriMin told him in strict confidence GOP realized GOI clld not until after elections change attitude on nrs troops in Kashmir at end of demilitarization. GOP wld be willing agree to res which wld extend Graham's mediation "two or three months". PriMin said GOP hopes Nehru will be returned power, but doubtful he will have
overwhelming majority. In such situation elements India wishing settlement Kashmir wld have greater weight, and possibility for settlement then somewhat improved. GOP did not wish harass GOI during elections and believed Kashmir shld be soft pedaled until after they completed. (Incidentally Warren thinks Graham shld not return subcontinent before elections but continue his efforts Paris.)

Ghulam Mohammed, Gov Gen, later told Warren GOP might be prepared “make deal” involving partition of Kashmir with plebiscite certain areas, but that suggestion wld have come from GOI since otherwise Pak public wld believe GOP given up hope. Gov Gen said Deshmuk and Rajagopalachari among those who might be able exert their influence after elections favor of broad settlement Indo-Pak issues.

Gadel pass substance foregoing to Graham, and ur discretion to appropriate Brit. Dept convinced however that recurrence any talk by parties, US, UK, or other dels or by Dr. Graham re partition this time wld doubtless undo much if not all Graham’s efforts re demilitarization. Therefore, GOP’s position indicated above must be very closely held.

ACHESON

320/12-1951: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, December 22, 1951—2:06 p. m.

Gadel 540. Re Kashmir. Re Delga 728. As result discussion Dec 20 with Brit Emb based on UK FonOff tel Dec 17 to Brit Emb containing new views re handling case, Dept suggests fol as course of action handling Kashmir. If GOP insistent and cannot be dissuaded particularly by UKDel, SC meeting cld be held about Jan 15. Purpose of meeting wld be to hear oral statement Dr. Graham only. We wld hope understanding could be reached with GOP and GOI dels no statements from them at that meeting. Next meeting of SC might be arranged for about Jan 25 at which meeting parties wld make statements but resolution would not be tabled. At third meeting possibly week later, UK and US wld table resolution and speak. Tentatively Dept’s views nature of resolution subject of course to substance of Graham’s recommendations (not yet known to Dept are as fol:

1. Wld endorse agreed points of demilitarization program;
2. Wld note three remaining points of difference of demilitarization program. If Graham report makes recommendations concerning settlement of three remaining points SC might endorse recommendations and urge parties to accept and put demilitarization program into effect.
3. SC might urge parties, if they wished to take some other course of action leading to demilitarization, to enter into direct negoti- mmediately for that purpose. Deadline for report on such negoti might be indicated.

Dept suggested Brit Emb obtain views UKFonOff re Dr. Graham making quick trip subcontinent immediately after Indian elections, which over Jan 23, with view making last appeal to Nehru agree to his proposals. Success or failure of last minute appeal wld influence nature and strength SC res. Dept hopes Graham may agree idea making quick trip make appeal Nehru soon as wise after Ind elections. Believes no new res necessary for trip since our view Graham fully empowered under Mar 30 and Nov 10 res pursue efforts time and place he sees fit.

Acheson

320/12-2451 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Jessup) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, December 23, 1951—6 p. m.

Delga 802. Re Kashmir

1. Graham had decided not to annex Devers plan when approached in light of Gadel 502. He did not see his way to indicating his report as an interim one. However, he will be available for SC mtgs in Paris.

2. Issue has been raised by Ayub that ref in Indian reply to Devers plan which Indians claim to have accepted in large part renders it necessary that Devers plan itself be on the record and not a classified document. Fowler (UK) feels that Paks are entitled to have this and that they need UK-US assistance on point. He suggests Graham might be asked to reconsider his reported decision not to make statement in SC and in connection with statement or questions make public Devers report. Hyde expressed personal view to Fowler that Devers report shd be public because of Indian references to it.

3. Ayub urges early SC consideration of case in Jan even before Zafrullah's expected return sixth or seventh. In addition to stressing need for publication Devers report, he urged: (a) Graham shd be urged to make statement Jan 4. Comment: It wld be difficult to have SC dels consider merits so early after adjournment; (b) Paks wld like substantive res tabled about 15 Jan which wld call on parties to accept Graham plan; (c) Before Zafrullah speaks Paks want firm assurance re US–UK line so that they take position consistent with it; (d) They expect US and UK diplomatic pressure on Delhi; (e) They stress desirability of whole operation complete two weeks before SC
ends Paris sessions so that parties consent obtained and no action needed in New York.

4. Fowler reports UK position now firming up much along lines para three and he feels action cannot be delayed until Indian elections now not to be completed until 5 February. In gen UK feels Graham report contains principles which SC shld call on parties to accept, and then give two govs three months to work out details in bilateral talks (see London 2730 of Dec 13 to Dept). Fowler feels SC prestige and UK-US diplomatic reps shld be staked on this plan. Fowler is pressing for early SC mtg at least to hear Graham on Jan 3. We did not comment on substantive position but felt decision by Dept on it must be basis for decisions on all tactical and timetable questions.

5. Views of Dept requested on what position shld now be re release of Devers report and timetable for January.

Jessup

690D.91/12-2351: Telegram

The Chargé in Pakistan (Perkins) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

KARACHI, December 23, 1951—9 p. m.

644. In conversation with me today re second Graham report, FonMin Zafrulla gave it as his “personal opinion, without commitment” that Graham’s recommendations on the wording of the four of his twelve proposals on which India and Pak had not agreed, wld in gen be acceptable to Pak provided number of armed forces to remain on each side of cease-fire line was specified not as “the lowest possible number” but as some definite total. He did not have authoritative figures on the number of troops on each side of the line on Jan 1, 1949, but he had been given estimates of about three Ind to two Pak, and if this were the approx proportion Pak wld not object to Graham’s formula.

He thought Ind wld accept Jul 15, 1952 as date for complete demilitarization, but whether it wld agree to appoint a plebiscite administrator by that date was another question. Pak regards naming of admin on or before that date as absolutely vital.

Zafrulla said he did not think any useful purpose wld be served by again prolonging Graham’s mediatory effort. He thought a point had now been reached from which further progress cld be made only if SC were to adopt a demilitarization program of its own and call upon the parties to implement it with the assistance of a UN rep.

With respect to the schedule for SC consideration of Graham’s report. Zafrulla was noncommittal. He said he had discussed the subj in Paris with Gross and Eden, and had told latter that substance of any draft res which UK prepared wld be more important to Pak than
the speed with which it was handled. My impression is that while Pak may continue for the record to press for quick action, it will have no real objection to postponement of discussion until Ind elections are out of the way.

Zafrulla is leaving tomorrow for Lahore to see his family but will come back to Karachi before returning to Paris in early Jan. He has discussed Kashmir with the PriMin but there has as yet been no formal cab consideration of the question in the light of Graham's latest report.

Rptd information New Delhi 64, London 40, Paris 4 for USUN.

PERKINS

630D.91/12-2851: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, December 26, 1951—4 p. m.

2224. Bajpai asked me see him 4 p. m. Dec 24; subj was Kashmir. He said it wld be serious mistake start discussion and debate in UN on Kashmir question as bitter statements wld inevitably be made and solution wld become more difficult. He stated his govt felt Graham had done far better job than previous negotiators and that he shld be given additional time secure agreement. I asked him specifically what he wld like have happen in UN as result of Graham's report.

Bajpai answered:

(1) Extend Graham’s term to Mar 31. He stated time limit is essential as otherwise Pak may feel issue being deliberately stalled. However, Bajpai pointed out very little cld be accomplished until after elections which will tie Ind leaders up more or less completely during Jan, but that with sincere effort on part both sides (which sounded like a commitment as far as GOI concerned) it shld be possible iron out remaining points of difference by Mar 31.

(2) Extend Graham’s term of reference as far as possible and specify he shld return to subcontinent where he can be in personal contact with Pak and Ind leaders.

(3) Tell Graham privately and confidentially he shld himself at proper time ask PriMins of India and Pak to meet with him for discussion of remaining differences. Bajpai said it was of course possible for two govt to deal directly but he thought this wld be looked upon as UN failure and that he and PriMin were extremely anxious that if agreement can be reached it be reached through efforts UN thereby giving new strength and prestige to this organization.

Sent Karachi 106, Paris 46.

Bowles
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 26, 1951—8:03 p.m.

Gadel 553. Re Kashmir. As outlined Gadel 540 Dec 22, Dept has had in mind that substantive SC res when adopted wld in view failure get agreement through mediation, contain recommendations re demilitarization and urge parties put them into effect. Such recommendations in Dept’s view might embrace Graham 12 “proposals” including those four on which still no agreement plus Dever’s demilitarization “plan” (which Dept has not seen) which we presume to be detailed development those Graham proposals which deal specifically with troop withdrawals. There might be some objection SC expressing views on all aspects of plan on grounds some too technical and shld be left to direct negs two parties, but thought has been SC res shld be rather detailed.

With this in mind, Dept believes desirable avoid placing GOI in position in which during electoral campaign it cld not avoid making public statements re Dever’s plan from which it wld be subsequently difficult withdraw. There appears to be agreement all sides including UK that new decisions by GOI highly unlikely until main campaign effort ended and most votes cast. This connection refer Gadel 528 Dec 21 and Karachi Tel 644 to Dept repeated Paris 4 to USUN reporting views Nazimuthd and Zafrullah.

Ayub’s urgings appear therefore not entirely consistent highest level GOP attitudes which according our info reveal greater concern substance SC res than with very early SC action. If Dever’s plan placed before SC at early date we inclined believe likelihood GOI acceptance wld be reduced since it wld be more difficult GOI leaders publicly reject it for election purposes and then shortly thereafter accept it if incorporated in SC res. Dept in summary doubtful that agreement Ayub’s timetable wld accrue Pak principal interest which we conceive is GOI agreement to plan of demilitarization which will bring eventual plebiscite much nearer. Dept wonders whether Ayub attaches any importance this analysis.

Re Fowler’s comments we believe pressure for SC meeting by Pak not so strong that one shld be held Jan 3, and continue prefer handling outlined Gadel 540 Dec 22. Apparent discrepancy between Fowler’s position and UK position outlined Gadel 540 Dec 22 mentioned to Belcher of Brit Emb Wash, who was frankly puzzled and promised query London.

ACHESON
KASHMIR DISPUTE

320/12-2851 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 28, 1951—8 p. m.

Gadel 559. Re Kashmir. Brit Emb has referred Pak interest publication Devers plan (re Delga 802) and reported word from Fowler that Pak Del wld be satisfied if Graham at early mtg SC wld discuss plan. Brit Emb has also mentioned that according info reed from Paris Sir B N Rau has said he interested in knowing why Graham abandoned a plan which GOI had all but accepted and that he might raise question in SC (which wld have effect opening up discussion Devers plan).

As pointed out Gadel 502 and Gadel 553 Dept has considered it undesirable stimulate open discussion Devers plan at such early date. Dept interested US Del’s views re motives Pak and India in seeking bring plan into open.

ACHEISON

690D.91/12-2851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, December 29, 1951—5 p. m.

2273. For Acheson. Ref Embtel 2224, rptd Paris 46, Karachi 108. Bajpai called me his office this morning to ask me if I had any info on US stand in re SC action on Kashmir. I told him I had none and that in my opinion the willingness of my govt to agree continue Graham mission until March 31 depended on likelihood of success.

I asked Bajpai if he had anything further to say which might give us indication of possibility of agreement between now and Mar 31 if US agreed to go along. He said he cld not speak at all specifically or officially but in his opinion there shld be no difficulty about agreeing to setting up the plebiscite admin by July 15 provided Pak took reasonable attitude on other points.

He told me very confidentially that India was faced with certain political problems in dealing with Sheikh Abdullah’s Kashmir govt and implied Kashmir Govt was sometimes inclined be unreasonable and stubborn. He said the military problem wld obviously be the most difficult to solve but intimated that if India were not asked compromise too large number of troops they might agree allow plebiscite admin to have final decision on placing these troops so that no one cld remotely claim they in any way influenced the election.

1 December 26, p. 1925.
I again asked Bajpai if the resolution was agreed to wld he have any objection to flat statement that this was Graham's final effort. He said he would have no objection and that this fact in itself indicated his belief that agreement cld be reached. Bajpai again emphasized that any solution which criticized and pressured India cld only end in an impasse which wld make problems of his govt much more difficult here in India and be regarded as another defeat for UN.

I pointed out my govt was under pressure from Pak and asked if he had any knowledge as to how firm Pak position was likely be. He said he believed they wld talk very firmly but that he thought they wld be in very poor position if after all these months of negots they refused agree to final 90-day extension of time.

Bajpai impressed me as being entirely sincere and personally anxious to get this problem solved. Although I believe he speaking for Nehru and govt I cannot of course be sure of this. In any event I do not see how we can lose by accepting his suggestions.

May I caution that our reps exercise utmost discretion in any follow-up or use they might make of above info. I must protect Bajpai or my source info may dry up. I wld appreciate any views or comments which might help in pursuing this matter with him.²


Bowles

²In telegram 1295, to the Embassy in New Delhi, December 31, the Department of State acknowledged the Embassy's telegrams 2224 and 2273 and promised an early expression of its views on Bajpai's suggestions. The Department's preliminary view was to doubt that these suggestions would provide a basis for an acceptable settlement. (690D.91/12-2651)
THE PUSHTUNISTAN DISPUTE: INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN PRESERVING PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN WITH RESPECT TO JURISDICTION OVER THE NORTHWEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

Editorial Note

The United States had on November 6, 1950, simultaneously approached the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan with an expression of concern over the tension between the two, which it felt was impeding economic and social progress and creating a situation favorable to Soviet intrigue. The United States offered to serve as an informal “go-between” in seeking agreement by the two governments to the following four points:

1. To cease attacks upon one another by officials or through official channels and to use their best efforts to prevent such attacks in the press or from other non-official sources.

2. To use their influence to prevent incidents among the tribes which were likely to affect good relations between the two governments. The two governments would further agree that if, despite their efforts, incidents did occur, they would consult together through diplomatic channels and avoid public statements on such incidents.

3. To exchange ambassadors within two months.

4. To designate representatives to meet within three months for informal, exploratory discussions of their differences without a previously agreed agenda or stated preconditions. The two governments would further agree that there should be no publicity concerning these discussions without prior agreement between them.

In instructing the Embassies at Kabul and Karachi to make the above approach, the Department of State asked that care be taken to avoid giving the impression that the United States would act as a mediator. The United States role was to be limited to bringing the parties together. If a third party to the discussions proved essential, a small neutral state or outstanding individual should be sought.

The Department's instructions concerning this approach were made in telegram 117, to Kabul, November 2, 1950, repeated to Karachi as telegram 228; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1950, volume V, page 1455.

For previous documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1446 ff. For related material herein, see documentation on pp. 1650 ff.; pp. 1699 ff.; and pp. 2004 ff.
The four points were accepted with minor alterations by the government of Afghanistan on November 13, 1950, but a response had not yet been received from the government of Pakistan as of the beginning of the year 1951.

689.90D/1-551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

KARACHI, January 5, 1951—2 p. m.

597. During conversation last night with Mohammad Ali, Secretary General GOP on another subject he gave me to understand GOP plans no further action on our proposal of November 6 re discussions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. GOP regards McGhee's conversations of November 16 with Zafrullah and November 27 with Ispahani as having closed matter so far as it is concerned.

Warren

1 See the editorial note, supra.
2 George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.
3 Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Government of Pakistan. The conversation of November 16, 1950, was among Zafrullah, Mohammad Ali, and McGhee. This conversation, as well as a further conversation of November 17, in which they were joined by Secretary Acheson, is summarized in telegram 280, to Karachi, November 28, 1950, printed in Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. v, p. 1457.
4 M. A. H. Ispahani, Ambassador of Pakistan in the United States. The conversation of November 27, 1950, is likewise summarized in telegram 280, to Karachi, ibid.

689.90D/1-551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan.

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, January 9, 1951—7 p. m.

375. Pls inform FonMin Dept was of opinion conversations Nov 16 and 27 (Emtbel 597 Jan 5) were inconclusive, and wonders if Ali's remarks indicate final position GOP.

If it appears GOP means to refuse our approach you might ur discretion pt out that Dept will no doubt have to answer press inquiries re such refusal and hopes this will not result in unfavorable propaganda position GOP (Deptel to Karachi No 317 Dec 12).

1 Repeated to London as telegram 3326 and to Kabul by air.
2 Telegram 317 to Karachi, December 12, 1950, not printed, was sent also to Kabul as telegram 149, to London as 3001, and to Paris by air. It requested in part that the Embassy inform the Pakistani government that the Department was attempting to prevent an adverse reaction by Afghanistan to press reports that the Pakistani Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, did not regard the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier as a subject for discussion. (689.90D/12-1250)
Also, Dept still believes improved Afghan-Pak relations might well result from informal talks.

Urtel No 597 Jan 5 rptd Lon for Info FonOff.

FYI only Dept believes statement similar to that reported Kabul desp 211, Dec 26 ⁴ (with implication US proposed Pashtoon issue be discussed) may shortly be issued by Afghan Embs here and in Lon despite informal advice given Afghan Chargé Jan 3 (Deptel 362 Jan 4). ⁴

ACHESON

⁴ Despatch No. 211 from Kabul, December 26, 1950, not printed, transmitted an Afghan press report concerning U.S. efforts to bring about Afghan-Pakistan discussions which implied that the real object of the approach was a discussion of the Pashtoonistan question. The Embassy feared that the Pakistan government might use the article as a further argument against holding discussions of any kind. (689.90D/12-2650)

⁴ Telegram 362 to Karachi, January 4, not printed, summarized a conversation of January 3 with the Afghan Chargé in Washington, Abdul Hamid Aziz, who had sought the Department’s advice as to whether he should publicly refute the impression that Afghanistan was not favorable to the U.S. approach of November 6. He was told that the Department saw no objection to his issuing a restrained statement to the press that Afghanistan had replied to the U.S. proposal shortly after it was made with a statement of Afghan willingness to consider discussions with Pakistan. It was suggested that he avoid any direct mention of the Pushtun question. (689.90D/1-451)

689.90D/1-1051: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY LONDON, January 10, 1951—6 p.m.

3834. Current status US efforts promote informal Afghan-Pakistan conversations communicated Murray ¹ today along lines Deptels 3325 ² and 3326 January 9. ³

Murray expressed Foreign Office’s appreciation for information which he said was particularly timely since Foreign Office has had in mind possibility endeavoring persuade Liaquat accept US proposals if suitable opportunity presents itself. Murray told us that when Bevin ⁴ briefed on this subject, latter had suggested possibility UK suggesting to Liaquat that he sit down at table with UK, Afghan and US representatives here in London to explore possibility of holding such conversations. Murray said he had pointed out to Bevin that

¹ J. D. Murray, Head of South-East Asia Department, British Foreign Office.
² Telegram 3325, to London, January 9, not printed, instructed the Embassy to inform the British Foreign Office of the substance of telegram 597, from Karachi, January 5, and of telegram 375, to Karachi, January 9 (689.90D/1-951).
³ See footnote 1, supra.
⁴ Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Afghans had already indicated willingness to consider proposals and no good purpose would seem to be served by their participation. Bevin agreed, but still has in mind possibility suggested procedure for undertaking talks be explored by Liaquat with UK and US representatives here. Murray stressed Bevin may not even make this latter suggestion, but if he does so, there would be sufficient opportunity for us to obtain instructions from Department. We would appreciate Department’s reaction.\(^5\)

Repeated Karachi 48, Kabul 11.

\(^5\) In telegram 3358, to London, January 11, not printed, the Department requested the Embassy to inform the British Foreign Office of its belief that it was premature to initiate quadripartite or tripartite talks with respect to possible Afghan-Pakistan discussions. Provided the Pakistanis or the British Foreign Office took the initiative, the Department saw no objection to the Embassy talking with the Pakistanis with respect to the general position of Pakistan vis-à-vis the U.S. approach. (689.90D/1-1051)

689.90D/1-1151: Telegram

The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

KARACHI, January 11, 1951—4 p.m.

623. Yesterday in a general conversation with Zafrulla, we discussed the present status of Pakistan-Afghan relations. I had asked for his comment on the statement made by the Afghan Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs\(^1\) to our Chargé at Kabul,\(^2\) alleging Pakistan has budgeted 500,000 RS to be spent in stirring up the tribes of the Afghan side of the border. Zafrulla pointed out that the only money spent by Pakistan is the continuance of the annual subsidy paid Pakistan tribesmen as a responsibility inherited from the British. He then referred to his conversation of November 16 (reDeptel 375, 9th) and gave me the impression that while not refusing the Department’s overture he still expects a statement from the Department on the legitimacy of the Durand Line\(^3\) similar to the British attitude as a prior condition to entering into discussions with the Afghans.

Repeated information Kabul 26.

\(^1\) Abdul Samad Khan.

\(^2\) Fred W. Jandrey.

\(^3\) The boundary line between British India and Afghanistan drawn up by a British mission under Sir Henry Mortimer Durand and agreed to by Amir Abdur Rahman, Khan of Afghanistan, on November 12, 1893. For the text of the agreement, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 95, 1901–1902, p. 1049; or India, Foreign and Political Department, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries (Calcutta, Government of India Central Publication Branch, 1933), vol. xiii, p. 256. The Pakistani representatives had in their conversations at the Department of State with Assistant Secretary McGhee and Secretary Acheson on November 17 and 27 pressed for
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

LONDON, January 12, 1951—8 p.m.

3886. Dept 3358, January 11. Embassy today informed Murray of Department’s views re tripartite talks. Murray said FonOff would bear in mind in connection any conversations between Bevin and Liaquat this subject. So far as he knew, no discussion this problem had yet taken place between two PM’s although at yesterday’s PM meeting, matter received passing attention in connection survey of Asian problems. Bevin referred to Afghan–Pakistan dispute as one on which Commonwealth should draw together. Liaquat followed this by expressing concurrence and indicating indirectly that India had been somewhat less than helpful in matter. Problem was inconclusively left at that. Murray said FonOff still hopeful Bevin will tackle Liaquat alone in effort persuade him adopt favorable approach US proposals.³

Repeated information Kabul 12, Karachi 54, Delhi 117.

Gifford

a statement that the United States would support the Durand Line as the valid international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan; see telegram 280 to Karachi, November 28, 1950, in Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. v, p. 1457.

An aide-mémoire sent to Ambassador Isphani on November 29 at his request following the conversation of November 27 with McGhee contained the following four points:

“(1) The United States Government believes that it would be inappropriate for it to make an explicit statement regarding the validity of the Durand Line at this time, before the beginning of any informal talks between the Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan (as suggested by the United States approach of November 6, 1950).

“(2) If the United States is to maintain its posture of impartiality it cannot at this stage give commitments to either Pakistan or Afghanistan with respect to the talks it has proposed between them.

“(3) As regards the Durand Line, the United States considers that its position is implicit in the prompt recognition accorded the Government of Pakistan in 1947 and in the attitude which the United States Government has adopted toward the Afghan–Pakistan dispute since its inception.

“(4) In the unhappy event that the Afghan–Pakistan talks proposed by this Government should break down over the issue of the validity of the Durand Line, the United States would then give consideration to making its position explicit.”

(689.90/D3/11-2950)

¹ Telegram 3358 to London not printed, but see footnote 5, p. 1932.
² The annual Conference of British Commonwealth Prime Ministers had been in progress in London since January 4.
³ Telegram 3898, from London, January 18, not printed, reported that Liaquat had delayed his return to Karachi until January 19, that he would have a private conversation with Bevin on January 18, and that the South-East Asia Department of the British Foreign Office had recommended that Bevin take the opportunity to urge him to accept the U.S. proposals for Afghan–Pakistan conversations (689.90/D/1-1851).
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL  

LONDON, January 19, 1951—6 p. m.  

4009. Lloyd,1 SEA Department, informs us Bevin yesterday made unsuccessful attempt persuade Liaquat accept US proposals re Afghan-Pakistani conversations. (Emtcl 3889, January 18).2 Liaquat stated he was unable accept so long as US refuses affirm validity Durand Line.3  

Repeated info Kabul 14, Karachi 63.  

Gifford

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1 J. O. Lloyd, Assistant, South-East Asia Department, British Foreign Office.  
2 Not printed, but see footnote 3, supra.  
3 In telegram 656, from Karachi, January 20, Ambassador Warren reported as follows: “Zafrulla confirmed to me this morning that Bevin and Liaquat have discussed Pakistani-Afghan relations in the course of their general review of political matters. He said that he would ask the Prime Minister to give me an answer. I think it would be a mistake should the Afghan Chargé issue a press statement before the Department has a statement of Liaquat’s position.” (689.90D/1-2051)

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Pakistan-Afghanistan Affairs (Gatewood)

SECRET  

[WASHINGTON,] January 22, 1951.  

Subject: Afghan-Pakistan Dispute; Pakistan Position Re Communist China; Pakistan Proposal for SC Action Re Kashmir.  

Participants: Mr. Mohamad Ali, Secretary-General, Government of Pakistan  
Mr. M. A. H. Isphahani, Ambassador of Pakistan  
NEA—Mr. McGhee  
SOA—Mr. Gatewood

Problem:  

To clarify Pakistan views of US approach re informal talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan; to obtain an indication of how Pakistan will vote on the US resolution to condemn Red China as an aggressor; Kashmir case.

Action Required:  

To obtain an answer from Pakistan to the US approach of November 6; to influence Pakistan’s attitude towards Red China; and to make some progress toward solution of the Kashmir issue.
Action Assigned to:

NEA: SOA

Mr. Mohamad Ali called, at his request, for a one-half hour appointment, which was extended to one hour.

Afghan-Pakistan Dispute:

Mr. Mohamad Ali said Mr. Kelser had informed him in London that Mr. McGhee would shortly be visiting Pakistan. Mr. McGhee said that he was looking forward to his trip, which would also include Kabul, and that he was disappointed that the GOP (as reported by Ambassador Warren following his conversation of January 4 with Mr. Mohamad Ali) believed that no further action need be taken with regard to the U.S. approach of November 6 unless the Department were prepared to make a statement as to the validity of the Durand Line similar to that issued by the British.

Mr. Mohamad Ali said that, as he had told Mr. Mathews earlier, he had not meant the Ambassador to understand that his Government was refusing to accept the US approach; that he had personally hoped Mr. McGhee might convince his colleagues in the Department that there was no harm in making a statement as to the Durand Line, since this was only a question of fact; that to express US views on this subject to the Afghans did not, in his opinion, constitute favoritism to one side or the other; and that if the US were not to make such a statement the proposed conference would almost certainly fail, as "those blackmailers" would insist on raising the question of an independent Pushtoonistan and the GOP could not admit any discussion that might imply willingness to surrender any part of Pakistan territory. Mr. Mohamad Ali repeated the arguments he had used in his earlier conversation with Mr. Mathews and referred, as a fact, to Indian financial support for Afghanistan's activities in the tribal areas.

Mr. McGhee pointed out that the Department was not an international court; that the validity of the Durand Line was implicitly affirmed by the US recognition of Pakistan in 1947; that (as Sir Zafrulla had been informed in November) the Afghans had accepted the US proposals in principle; and that we still had hopes that the talks would produce some favorable results. He expressed regret that the GOP did not share our view that the timing of such a statement

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1 Mr. McGhee visited a number of countries in South Asia and the Near East in connection with two diplomatic conferences of which he served as chairman: the Second Regional Conference of U.S. Chiefs of Mission in the Near East, held in Istanbul, February 14–21; and the South Asian Regional Conference of U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Officers, held at Nuwara Eliya, Ceylon, February 26–March 3.

2 Ellbert G. Mathews, Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs.
would cause the Afghans to doubt our good faith, in view of our
careful attempt to avoid introducing into our proposal any pre-
conditions that would bind either country. He asked whether he was
to understand that Pakistan would refuse our approach.

Mr. Mohamad Ali replied that his Government had not yet refused;
that he had seen a draft reply to the US aide-mémoire; and that he
would cable the Prime Minister on this subject. He said that, if only
the Durand Line were recognized by both countries as the official
boundary, he thought they could reach a settlement regarding the
control and welfare of the tribes on either side of the border.

Mr. McGhee said he sincerely hoped that the Afghans would not
be in a position to make unfavorable propaganda for Pakistan by
playing up Pakistan’s unwillingness to hold general, informal talks
with its neighbors.

[Here follows discussion of the attitude of Pakistan toward Com-
munist China and the Kashmir dispute. For the portion relating to the
Kashmir dispute, see page 1713.]

689.90D/1-2251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of
Pakistan-Afghanistan Affairs (Gatewood)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 22, 1951.
Participants: Mr. Mohamad Ali, Secretary-General of the Govern-
ment of Pakistan
Mr. M. O. A. Baig, Minister, Embassy of Pakistan
SOA—Mr. Mathews, Mr. Gatewood

Problem:

To ascertain the answer of the Government of Pakistan to the US
approach of November 6.

Action Required:

To clarify the Pakistan position.

Action Assigned to:

SOA

In the course of Mr. Mohamad Ali’s call at the Department, Mr.
Mathews took occasion to express his disappointment that (as reported
by Ambassador Warren after his conversation of January 4 with
Mr. Mohamad Ali) the Government of Pakistan wished to take no
further action on the US approach of November 6 unless the US
should make explicit its view that the Durand Line constituted the
international boundary of Pakistan.
Mr. Mohamad Ali said he had not wished to give the Ambassador the impression his Government would flatly refuse the US approach unless the US position were altered and that he had personally hoped that we would be willing to change our views, possibly during the next week or so before the Pakistan Prime Minister returned from his political tour of the Punjab.

The Pakistan Secretary-General presented the following arguments for a change in the US position:

(1) The Durand Line was a question of fact only and did not involve a policy decision; therefore, there was no reason why the Afghans should not be told that the US accepted it. This would not be an unfriendly act, as the US could make it clear that such a statement had been requested by Pakistan.

(2) The proposed informal talks would almost certainly break down on this issue, as the GOP would not even discuss the possibility of giving up any territory to the east of the Durand Line and it appeared that the Afghans were absolutely determined to raise this issue; therefore, unless the Afghans clearly understood that the boundary could not be called in question, “those blackmailers” would do everything possible to obtain a propaganda victory such as Pakistan had once before refused them, when Shah Ali had requested that the administered areas of the NWFP be renamed “Pushtoonistan”.

(3) If Afghanistan raised the question of Pushtoon independence, the GOP might well reply that the majority of Pathans (on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line) were anxious to liberate their brethren from the inept and undemocratic Government of the Mohammed Zias, with the result that Afghan–Pakistan relations would deteriorate still further.

Mr. Mohamad Ali said that the British had been surprised at the US attitude concerning the Durand Line (Mr. Mathews immediately assured him that there was no cause for this, as the British should have well understood our views); that the GOP now had proof that India was subsidizing Afghanistan to promote unrest in the tribal areas, as well as allowing a good deal of agitation for Pushtoonistan within India; and that, if the Kashmir question were settled, Afghanistan would immediately abandon its sponsorship of Pushtoonistan.

Mr. Mathews said he found it difficult to understand the Pakistan viewpoint: It seemed clear that, at this stage, we could hardly make a pronouncement concerning the Durand Line just because Pakistan requested it, as the Afghans would then doubt our good faith. Our approach of November 6 had been specifically designed to promote general, informal talks without attempting to suggest an agenda, because we thought some improvement in Afghan–Pakistan relations would emerge from these talks, even though some issues remained unresolved. Mr. Mathews further pointed out that the Afghans had
"a pretty good idea" of our views concerning the Durand Line; that there was no question that our recognition of Pakistan in 1947 implied our acceptance of the Line; but that we still believed that we should not make an explicit statement on this point at this time.

Mr. Mohamad Ali said that, of course, the Department had not bothered about details like an agenda, but that he expected the Afghans would press for some encroachment on Pakistan territory; that "those blackmailers" would try to maintain the despotism of the Afghan royal family, which had done nothing for the Afghan people in its twenty years of rule; and that perhaps the Department considered the present Afghan regime more high-minded and liberal than it really was.

Mr. Mathews replied that we did not take quite so dark a view of the Afghan situation; that we also wished to encourage democratic elements in Afghanistan; that if Pakistan refused the US approach, this action might strengthen the hands of the extremists and prevent moderate influences from making themselves felt so as to allow improved relations with Pakistan. He said he did not think the Department would change its stand against making a statement as to the Durand Line in the present situation.

Mr. Mohamad Ali said that, however good US intentions might be, he thought the US initiative in this matter might unhappily result in further unsteadiness in the Frontier area. He said his government "would try to meet" the Department on this point and that he would cable the Prime Minister about it, so that a definite reply might be given to Ambassador Warren when Liaquat returned from his Punjab tour.

Kabul Embassy Files

The Chargé in Afghanistan (Jandrey) to the Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Mathews)

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

Kabul, January 23, 1951.

Dear Bert: From the flow of telegrams which has been received here, and especially the last one from London ¹ giving what appears to be the Pakistan Prime Minister's final decision on our proposals, it is obvious that these proposals are not acceptable to the Government of Pakistan and that conversations will not take place. Unless we make an unequivocal statement that we consider the Durand Line to be the international boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan,

¹Reference is presumably to telegram 4009 from London, January 19, p. 1934.
the Government of Pakistan will not agree to negotiate; if we make such a statement, you can be sure that the Afghan Government will retract its acceptance. The question with which we are now faced is whether or not there is anything more we can or should do to attempt to bring about a solution to this Pashtoonistan problem.

The fact that the Pakistan Government has insisted on our support for their thesis of the validity of the Durand Line has doubtless made you wonder if such a declaration on our part may not some time have to be made. I assume, however, that this would not be done until the Department has had an opportunity of reviewing the legal arguments of the Afghan Government. It is of interest in this connection to note that the day before his departure the Ambassador was given a French copy of a brief drawn up supposedly by a French international lawyer and possibly, if the Foreign Minister's statement is correct, by a British lawyer as well. The Ambassador has promised to translate this brief while en route to Paris, where he should be about February 7.

Any unequivocal statement we may feel obliged to make concerning the Durand Line would certainly have the following effects:

(1) The Afghans would feel that they had been tricked by the United States as our original proposals emphasized that no conditions should be placed on the negotiations. Accordingly, we would be accused of bad faith by coming out in favor of the thesis back of the very condition which Afghanistan, rightly or wrongly, has always found unacceptable.

(2) Obviously, the relations between the Embassy and the Afghan Foreign Office, which are at present very cordial, would suffer. I don't mind taking the rap here, which I should certainly have to do. The Ambassador was very careful not to argue against the Afghan point of view and the Afghans very definitely feel that he has been working in their interest. That is not, however, the unequivocal feeling about me or perhaps other members of the Embassy staff who have upon occasion questioned the validity of the arguments of Afghan government officials and our Afghan friends. I know, therefore, that any declaration on our part would result in strong criticism of me as being pro-Pakistan and anti-Afghan. Nevertheless, the Department must decide whether it has to make a statement, and if so, what timing will be most advantageous and what concessions, if any, Pakistan would be prepared to make for this support. In any case, I can't believe that it would be to our advantage to have such a statement follow too closely on the heels of a breakdown in our attempts to bring about bilateral negotiations. Possibly Mr. McGhee, when he visits Kabul

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*Not printed. Reference is presumably to a brief entitled “Consultation for the Government of Afghanistan Regarding the Juridical Situation of the North West Frontier Province and Particularly Concerning the Free Tribes,” prepared by Mr. Georges Scelle, which is discussed in a memorandum, also not printed, by Mr. John Maktos, Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, to the Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Mathews), March 20, 1951 (689.90D/3-2051).*
early in March, may find a convenient opportunity of indicating our official opinion and implying that sooner or later we might feel compelled to take a definite stand on this point. (As stated above, he might first want to review the Afghan legal position.) I think the Afghans should have ample warning and not have our opinion come as a surprise.

(3) Any announcement regarding the Durand Line would doubtless cause general criticism of Americans and would make it hard for the American teachers at Habibia, as well as for the teachers coming out for the Afghan Institute of Technology. What would probably be even more serious would be the loss of prestige by American educated Afghans who would doubtless personally feel the resentment of their superiors. The German and French stock would rise correspondingly.

The over-all decisions are of course up to the Department which must view this dispute on a global basis and decide how best to settle it and what value Afghanistan is to us under any circumstances. Moreover, the Department will doubtless consider carefully whether there is anything further that we can do on our own to bring about a settlement so long as the bigger issue of Kashmir remains unresolved. Meanwhile, I merely did want to get a note off to you in this pouch to record briefly my first thoughts on the effect of giving in to Pakistan’s insistence that we declare ourselves on the Durand Line.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK JANDREY

689.80D/1-2451: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, January 24, 1951—6 p.m.

4093. Olver,1 SEA Department, today told us that Younger2 (in Bevin’s absence because of illness) yesterday made effort persuade Zafrullah, who is here en route Lake Success, to accept US proposals for Afghan-Pakistani conversations. Zafrullah took same line as Liaquat (Embell 4009, January 19), indicating main stumbling block is lack US assurance re Durand line. According Olver, Zafrullah made it clear that all he desired was private and confident assurance on this point.

In commenting on Pakistan motivation for insisting on this point, Olver said he had clear impression Pakistanis do not desire statement for any propaganda purposes now and would not use it as such. He

1 S. J. L. Olver, Officer for India, Pakistan, French and Portuguese India, and Ceylon in the South-East Asia Department of the British Foreign Office.
2 Kenneth Younger, British Minister of State.
thought, however, they desired to have confidential statement (probably in writing) up their sleeve in event talks broke down on Durand line issue and would like then be in position to cite "neutral" opinion re validity of line to buttress "interested" UK statements on subject. We pointed out we had already informed Pakistanis that if talks broke down on this issue, we would give consideration at that time to making US position clear to Afghans. (Deptel 2804, November 24 [28]). Olver thought Pakistanis probably wanted matter more tightly sewed up.

Repeated information Karachi 65, Kabul 15.

Gifford


659.90D/1–5051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

KARACHI, January 30, 1951—2 p. m.

685. For McGhee. Ikramullah ¹ showed me this morning Bevin’s top secret letter of December 4, 1950 to the Pakistan High Commissioner in London ² defining the UK position on the Durand line. While I cannot quote from memory, the substance of the communication is that His Majesty’s Government in the UK considers that Pakistan at the time of the formation of its government became the inheritor of the Durand Line as the boundary with Afghanistan. In the view of the UK Government, Afghanistan’s expressed willingness to enter into direct negotiations with Pakistan on the problems of mutual concern without including Pashtoonistan specifically in the conversations shows a more conciliatory attitude. It is the hope of the UK Government that Pakistan for the reason cited above may find it possible to accept the good offices of the US Government and enter into direct conversations with Afghanistan.

I urgently recommend you present to the Secretary from the point of view of timing and effect the desirability that he give assurances similar to Bevin’s to the Pakistan Ambassador in Washington. The Pakistanis are prepared to go ahead immediately and have already drafted, and Ikramullah tells me, have cabled approval for the notes inviting the Afghans to enter into conversations.

Warren

¹ Mohammad Ikramullah, Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Government of Pakistan.
² Habib Ibrahim Rahimtoola.
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 1, 1951.

Subject: Pakistan Request for Explicit US Statement as to Validity of Durand Line.

Discussion:

The Government of Pakistan has approached Ambassador Warren once more in an effort to obtain a US assurance that we accept the Durand Line as a valid international frontier. As you informed the Pakistan Foreign Minister on November 17, we do not believe that we should make explicit our position as to the Durand Line at this time, while Pakistan has not yet accepted our proposals of November 6 to engage in general and informal discussions with Afghanistan regarding their differences. Even if such a statement were made privately to Pakistan, it would constitute a change in the US position governing our proposals.

Ambassador Warren would like to convey your present views on this question to the Pakistan Foreign Office (Tab A)\(^1\) and we believe that, once the Pakistanis learn that your opinion has not changed, they may be amenable to initiating the talks on the basis we have suggested.

Recommendation:

That you authorize transmittal of the attached telegram to Karachi (Tab B).\(^2\)

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\(^1\)Telegram 685 from Karachi, January 30, *supra*.

\(^2\)Secretary Acheson signed the telegram, which was sent as 462, to Karachi, February 2, *infra*.

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689.90D/2-251: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan*\(^1\)

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, February 2, 1951—11 p. m. 462. From McGhee. Secy has again considered US position (Embtel 685 Jan 30) and believes it shld remain same as indicated in his Nov 17 talk with Zafrulla and US aide-mémoire Nov 30.

We have never questioned validity Durand Line but believe we cannot explicitly state our position at this time without completely

\(^1\)Repeated by air to London, New Delhi, and Kabul.
altering basis Nov 6 approach. We wld reconsider this position if talks break down.

You may convey above to FonOff. Pak Emb here not informed. [McGhee.]

ACHESON

689.90D/2-951: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, February 9, 1951—1 p.m.

4349. For Mathews, SOA, from Kennedy.¹ Foreign Office prepared give Pakistan High Commission aide-mémoire re November 6 proposal for Afghan-Pakistan talks. Substance key paragraph follows:

"It is UK belief that the State Department does not question the validity of the Durand line as the international frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan. They have not made any public statement this subject because they have not regarded US as directly concerned; they consider, however, that their attitude has always been implicitly clear."

British understand that Department not involved this action and that we are not prepared go any further than in our aide-mémoire of November 28 to Pakistan Ambassador.² [Kennedy.]

GIFFORD

¹ Donald D. Kennedy, Deputy Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs, met in London February 6 through 10 for discussions with British government officials. For a summary of the discussion concerning Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, see memorandum dated February 14, p. 1653.

² For the provisions of this aide-mémoire, which was drafted on November 28 and sent on November 29, see footnote 3, p. 1882.

790D.13/2-1351

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 13, 1951.

Subject: Pakistan Objections to Part of Proposed UN Resolution Re Kashmir; Unavailability of Admiral Nimitz¹ for UN Duties in Kashmir; Pakistan Attitude Toward US Approach of November 6 Re Proposed Afghan-Pakistan Conversations

Participants: Sir Mohammed Zafrulla Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan
The Secretary
Mr. M. A. H. Isphahani, Ambassador of Pakistan

¹ Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, U.S.N.
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 14, 1951.

Subject: Pakistan-Afghanistan

Participants: M. A. H. Ispahani, Ambassador E. and P. (Pakistan)
Sir Zafrulla Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan
Mohammed Ali, Secretary General of the Pakistan Cabinet
Mr. Elbert G. Mathews, Director of South Asian Affairs Division of Department of State
Mr. W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President

[Here follows a discussion of the Kashmir dispute; for text, see page 1727.]

The Foreign Minister turned finally to the question of the United States' attitude to the Durand Line in connection with the Afghanistan-Pakistan dispute over the tribal areas. He said that his Government had hoped very much that the U.S. could see its way clear to inform both the Afghanistan and Pakistan governments that it recognized the Durand Line as a valid international frontier. I said that it was my impression that we did not question the Durand Line, and Mr. Mathews confirmed that this was the State Department position. Mr. Mathews went on to say that the real difficulty was that the United States did not feel, after having made certain proposals to
Afghanistan and Pakistan looking toward a resolution of their differences, that it should make any change in its declared position on the Durand Line. Mr. Mathews commented also that another point of difference between the U.S. and Pakistan in this connection was that the U.S. had much greater hope that discussions between Afghanistan and Pakistan would lead to a good result.

[Here follows a discussion of other matters.]

W. A. Harriman

689.60D/2-2351

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Pakistan–Afghanistan Affairs (Gatewood)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 23, 1951.

Subject: Afghan–Pakistan Dispute; Health of Afghan Prime Minister

Participants: Abdul Hamid Aziz, Minister Counselor, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, Embassy of Afghanistan

SOA—Mr. Mathews

Mr. Gatewood

Minister Aziz called at his request to inquire concerning developments relating to the Pakistan attitude toward our November approach. Mr. Mathews informed him that, since their conversation of February 13 the Pakistan Prime Minister had returned briefly to Karachi, but was now in the Punjab again; that we had been informed that the Pakistan reply to our approach would have to be decided by the full Cabinet and not by Liaquat alone; that it was unlikely that the Pakistan Cabinet could meet much before March 1; and that we therefore believed the Pakistan reply could not now be expected before early March.¹ Mr. Mathews also told the Minister that we deplored this delay as much as he did; that we had informed Pakistan officials here of our regret in this matter; and that it appeared the Pakistan Government attached considerable importance to their reply, which would have to be considered by the full Cabinet.

The Minister said he would cable this news to his Government, and inquired whether we had any indication as to the reasons for this additional delay, i.e., either Pakistan’s dissatisfaction with the original proposals, inability to reach a decision, or preoccupation with other matters, such as Kashmir. Mr. Mathews said he personally thought that all three factors might be involved. The Minister then asked whether Mr. Mathews was in a position to tell him, on a purely personal basis, why the Pakistan Government had been unable so far to

¹This information had been conveyed to the Department in telegram 749, February 17, from Karachi, not printed (600D.91/2-1751).
accept the eminently reasonable US proposal, and he was informed
that, in all probability, it appeared that Pakistan feared that the
extremists in Afghanistan would take an unyielding position on the
Pushtoonistan question during the proposed talks.

The Minister pointed out that he would be much embarrassed to
report such an opinion to his Government and Mr. Mathews agreed;
reminding him that he had merely answered the Minister's question.
Mr. Aziz then suggested that it might be possible, should the Pakistan
reply be favorable, for this opinion to be expressed by the Secretary
of State to the Afghan Prime Minister, at the time when the latter
would visit Washington. He said that he made this suggestion on a
purely personal and informal basis and would not communicate it to
his Government. Mr. Mathews agreed that this possibility might well
be kept in mind as a possible contribution to the favorable outcome
of the proposed talks.

In later conversation with Mr. Gatewood, Mr. Aziz inquired some-
what querulously why the British had not been of any assistance in
persuading Pakistan to accept the US approach, and he was informed
that the British Foreign Office had, in fact, attempted to exert some
favorable influence on the Pakistan Government in this regard.

[Here follows a brief discussion of the health of the Afghan Prime
Minister.]

389.90D/3–551 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan

SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1951—6 p. m.

553. For McGhee. Embtel 795 Mar 2. In forthcoming talks with
Ikramullah or Liaquat you may wish state:

(1) US disappointed failure GOP respond efforts alleviate Afghan-
Pak tensions. GOA early acceptance suggests willingness consider US
proposals constructive and of mutual benefit both GOA and GOP
but concern over GOP delay tends reduce GOA confidence usefulness
proposed negotts. At present impossible for US fundamentally alter
orig concept Afghan-Pak talks by yielding to GOP efforts obtain
further definition our position Durand Line. (FYI latest effort this
direction by Pak addressed UK auths, who indicated to GOP under-
standing and concurrence US firmness this pt.) US hopes GOP will
not overlook positive benefits foreseen from Nov 6 approach which

1 Repeated for inforation to Kabul as telegram 217, and by air to London.
2 Telegram 795, from Karachi, March 2, not printed, reported that Ikramullah
had stated that the U.S. approach of November 6 was not discussed at the Paki-
istani cabinet meeting of February 28. Ikramullah had recommended to the Prime
Minister that a decision be deferred until he (Ikramullah) could discuss the
subject with McGhee when the latter arrived in Karachi. (389.90D/3–251)
provides for immed improvement Afghan-Pak relations through agreement to (a) stop propaganda, (b) prevent or at least minimize disruptive possibilities border incidents and (c) exchange ambs.

(2) Despite previous GOP objections Dept convinced US approach contains effective means rendering major infection more amenable to remedial treatment by removing many present sources irritation and suspicion. Dept concerned as to outcome GOP foresees if tensions allowed ferment indefinitely.

(3) Dept’s interest in settlement Afghan-Pak differences reflects gen US policy contribute maintenance peaceful world. It wld be shocked to think that GOP does not believe either party has major self-interest and responsibility for relieving tensions affecting whole SOA area. US therefore assumes GOP is considering its own responsibility, shld it reject US approach, to put forward some alternative.

(4) If GOP believes itself unable reply our approach by end Mar, Dept sees no alternative but to withdraw our proposals.

If you concur last point you may wish to inform GOP and point out such withdrawal will inevitably involve some statement to press both in Wash and Karachi.

WEBB

659.90D/3–1051: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan

SECRET  PRIORITY  WASHINGTON, March 10, 1951—4 p. m.

229. For McGhee. Afghans undoubtedly attach great significance present visit, perhaps overestimating importance Dept gives Pushtoonistan issue and overoptimistic re US sympathy for Afghan position. While believed undesirable strengthen such impressions you may wish bring out fol pts in ur Kabul talks:

(1) Afghan acceptance Nov 6 proposal welcome evidence willingness discuss differences and Afghan awareness heavy responsibility Asian nations keep own houses in order in face world situation.

(2) To forestall Afghan efforts learn future US line you might indicate our concern limited to gen interest in peace this area as elsewhere and to hope we can assist two govt friendly to US in communicating to each other constructive views that wld facilitate discharge their own responsibilities as neighbors solve local problem.

(3) Although we wld be concerned failure either party recognize and assume responsibility bilateral settlement we will not be drawn in as mediator and believe we shld not take any position on those legal questions that might be considered suitable for ref internatl bodies. (Afghans will probably assert applicability Kashmir plebiscite principles in Pushtoonistan but we believe best not argue this pt.)

(4) Re inevitable questions Pak delay responding Nov 6 proposal best explanations appear be preoccupation Kashmir problem and Punjab elections pointing out we still have hopes favorable reply.
(5) If queried re Dept position, in event Pak rejection (or break-
down talks if held) we wld have to review situation in light of cir-
cumstances then prevailing.
(6) Consistent with US view that numerous problems other than
Pushtoonistan may profitably be discussed between parties it may be
useful press Afghans for statement other chief issues preventing
resumption good relations Pak and for views priority they attach solu-
tion these issues.

You may also wish review Amb Jessup’s “Notes on conversations
in Kabul, Mar 5 1950” 1 especially concluding paras conversation with
PriMin.

FYI FonMin gave Amb Dreyfus 2 personally and confidentially Fr
legal brief which Dept now studying in conjunction opinion requested
some weeks ago from Legal Adviser re legal aspects Pushtoonistan
issue. Adviser’s opinion expected early Apr.

WEBB

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1 Reference is to a memorandum by the Ambassador at Large, Philip C. Jessup,
not printed (611.59/3-550).
2 Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr., Ambassador to Afghanistan, 1949-1950.

689.96D/3–1251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chargé in Afghanistan
(Jandrey)

CONFIDENTIAL

[KABUL,] March 12, 1951.
Participants: Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs
and
Mr. McGhee
Mr. Ludin
Mr. Jandrey

The Foreign Minister began the conversation with the statement
that Afghanistan had always been interested in the problem of the
tribal peoples and had always sought a peaceful solution thereof. He
mentioned that in 1942 the question had been raised by him with the
British Ambassador at Kabul 1 who told him that the time was not
then ripe to seek a solution. Subsequently the issue was again raised
at the time the Cripps mission 2 came to India and again the same
answer was given to the Foreign Minister by the British Ambassador.
When partition took place, Afghanistan was not consulted about the
tribal area although the Afghan presumption was that this would

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1 Sir F. V. Wylie.
2 Mission to India in 1942 of Sir Stafford Cripps, Lord Privy Seal.
be done. When subsequently a referendum was held in the North West Frontier Province, the Afghan Government advised the Pakistani that under no circumstances would it accept the outcome of the referendum as a fair means of resolving this problem. Later, when the question of sending a special Afghan envoy to Karachi arose, the invitation was accepted on the condition that the status of the tribal area would be discussed. Still later, when the exchange of ambassadors was proposed, the Afghans once more inserted a clause relating to the negotiation of differences over the Pathan tribes, and finally the Foreign Minister said that he had made an offer to discuss this vital matter to the Pakistan Ambassador but that no reply was ever received.

In the light of the above evidences of interest, Afghanistan was naturally pleased to accept our proposal of November 6 for the initiation of bilateral talks. The Foreign Minister said that he saw no reason why Pakistan should refuse to discuss this matter as it involved the question of the desire of the Pathan people to decide their destiny for themselves. He said that he could see no reason why they should not be allowed to choose whether they wished to be independent or to be Pakistani. Moreover, the Foreign Minister himself had assured the Pakistani that Afghanistan would not use the willingness of Pakistan to negotiate as an argument against Pakistan in case the Pushtoonistan issue was discussed in the UN or became the subject of arbitration or mediation. He expressed the conviction that if something is not done, serious trouble might result and that the beneficiary would be Soviet Russia. It was, in his opinion, in the interest of both Afghanistan and Pakistan, who need each other, to reach a final settlement. He did not, however, envision negotiations which would resolve all problems at one time.

Mr. McGhee stated that he appreciated the interest of Afghanistan in the Pathan tribes but that this problem, as all others, must be considered in the light of the expansionist policy of Soviet Russia which had no hesitancy in taking advantage of the power vacuums in Asia as well as Europe. There was no question about Soviet aggression, of which we have recently had several clear examples. The United States wished to help all countries to protect themselves from Communism and we have already given evidence of that interest to Afghanistan. He assured the Foreign Minister that our objective in connection with the Pushtoonistan issue was simply to see the matter settled by bringing the two parties together. It is the belief of the United States Government that this is the only way of settling an affair of this kind and we do not wish to antagonize either Pakistan.
or Afghanistan, with whom we are both friends, by taking any definite side.

Mr. McGhee then explained that he wished to express several personal observations based on world-wide strategic factors but that he would not make any statement to Pakistan of what he personally thought Afghanistan might wish to consider in forming its policy. He first asked the Foreign Minister whether the Afghan approach to Pushtoonistan was based on legal arguments or on the principle of self-determination. The Foreign Minister replied categorically that it was based on the right of self-determination. Mr. McGhee then pointed out that the principle of self-determination was one enunciated by President Wilson but that this principle was not applicable in the present world. There was in fact, ample evidence that today the trend is all the other way. He cited the example of the unification of Europe where countries were even demonstrating a willingness to drop from the essential elements of sovereignty in the interest of collective security, with which the United States was in full accord. He also mentioned the Arab states which are at present seeking some basis for united action. With particular reference to Pushtoonistan, Mr. McGhee then made the following points:

1. That the area called Pushtoonistan was not economically viable.
2. That the area was not politically viable. He indicated that Pushtoonistan would have no informed or experienced leaders to handle its relations with its neighbors.
3. The internal political situation in Pakistan was such that Liaquat Ali Khan could not maintain his position were he to make any considerable concessions on the tribal area.
4. The timing of the present sponsorship of Pushtoonistan is important. We are trying to prepare as rapidly as possible for a united effort in contesting Soviet aggression.

During this period there is a serious question whether keeping the Pushtoonistan issue alive would not harm Afghanistan by creating conditions leading to Soviet intervention. Regardless of the position which Afghanistan might wish to take in the future, it may be better at this time to come to a modus vivendi.

Mr. McGhee then reverted to the question of our proposal for negotiations, saying that Pakistan had not yet reached a decision but that they were on the point of doing so. He said that the point which bothered Pakistan was that of sovereignty over the tribal area and suggested that if agreement on this issue could not be reached at the first meeting, some good would come out of discussions on other points of difference which would eventually lead back to the primary issue. He pointed out that economic problems cannot be separated from
political problems and the question of the welfare of the tribes, which is certainly Afghanistan’s major interest, would again touch on the margin of the central issue.

The Foreign Minister then mentioned in confidence that Faiz Mohammed\(^4\) had recently gone to Karachi for the Islamic Conference and while there Colonel Shah,\(^4\) the Minister for the Pakistan Tribal Area, had made two amazing statements:

1. That he was not aware of any approach which Afghanistan had made to Pakistan offering to discuss tribal affairs.
2. That they should get together themselves informally in order to discuss the matter. Faiz Mohammed replied that he was not authorized to discuss the problem by his Government but that he would be glad to take the matter up when he returned to Karachi.

The Foreign Minister said that subsequently Faiz Mohammed had telegraphed to Colonel Shah suggesting that he come to Jalalabad where the discussions might take place, but the only word received thus far was that Colonel Shah was not in Karachi.

When Mr. McGhee asked the Foreign Minister directly whether he thought any good would come from continuing to explore solutions to problems short of the sovereignty issue, the Foreign Minister said he could not say but he hoped so. Finally, at Mr. McGhee’s urging, the Foreign Minister said he saw no reason why Mr. McGhee should not mention to Liaquat that Afghanistan was hopeful that good would come out of the meeting even if agreement was not immediately reached on the big issue. The Foreign Minister also said that he would give the British Ambassador assurance (which was doubtless passed on to the Government of Pakistan) that Pakistan’s willingness to negotiate would never be raised to the disadvantage of Pakistan in case of efforts for settlement by some other means. This fact also Mr. McGhee might pass to Liaquat Ali Khan.

Mr. Ludin then reviewed briefly some of the historical aspects of the Pashtoonistan issue, stressing particularly that the area occupied by the Pathans had been severed from Afghanistan. His point seemed to be a justification for the existence of a Pashtoonistan issue and the desirability of Pakistan’s recognizing that a problem in fact does exist. It was my impression toward the end of the conversation that the Foreign Minister admitted the desire of Afghanistan to see this issue solved and that over a period of time the Afghan Government during the course of negotiation would be willing to listen to Pakistan’s suggestions and attempt to arrive at some compromise position.

\(^4\) Former Afghan Minister of Education.
\(^4\) Col. A. S. B. Shah, Secretary of the Pakistan Ministry of States and Frontier Affairs.
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren)

CONFIDENTIAL

KARACHI, March 16, 1951—8:30 P. m.

Participants: The Prime Minister
Mr. McGhee
Ambassador Warren

After Mr. McGhee had outlined, with the Prime Minister’s consent, his conversation the previous day with Mr. Ikramullah, and especially had brought out the three points made by the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, the Prime Minister said that he is agreeable to calling off immediately the propaganda campaign against Afghanistan provided the Afghans will take the same action.

He is agreeable also to naming an Ambassador to Afghanistan and expected the Afghans on their part to name and send an ambassador to Karachi. After the accreditation of the ambassadors in their respective capitals, he is prepared to receive in Karachi any representations on differences that might arise between the two countries as part of the normal intercourse between countries on the ambassadorial level. In the event that problems may arise that might not be settled in this manner, he is prepared to work out with the Afghan Government through the two ambassadors the organization of a special joint conference that would take cognisance of outstanding tensions and frictions.

Mr. McGhee said that it is his understanding that the Prime Minister in substance accepted the points in the American offer of good offices to which the Prime Minister agreed. It was then suggested that at the beginning of the week Ambassador Warren should get in touch with Mr. Ikramullah to work out language that might be mutually satisfactory and so inform Washington officially of the results of the conversation.

Avra M. Warren

1 Transmitted as enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 1745 from Karachi, May 28.

689.90D/4-451: Telegram

The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

KARACHI, April 4, 1951—1 P. m.

915. FonSecy told me this a. m. of report he had yesterday from the Pak Chargé Kabul 1 detailing a conv with Saudi Arabia Min

1 Abdur Rahman Khan.
there. The Russian Amb at Kabul in conv with Saudi Arabian Min said the Sov views sympathetically Afghan’s aspirations for Pushtoonistan on the ground of racial affinity of the tribal population.

The Saudi Arabian then pointed out that Pak is known throughout the Muslim world for its opposition to imperialism and colonialism and that Sov must understand that any attitude taken by Russia against Pak on an issue such as Pushtoonistan will arouse a strong resentment in every Muslim country. He added that many of the Muslim states have tried to prevail on Afghans to withdraw the Pushtoonistan issue in order promote Islamic solidarity.

The Sov Amb according to the report said he wld present the Saudi Arabian’s point of view to Moscow.

The FonSecy is communicating this info today to the UK HICOM also. He said the Saudi Arabian Min is a responsible source of info and the report for that reason has weight.

Ikramullah said this is the first time the Sov has indicated interest in Pushtoonistan and raises several speculative assumptions; (1) If Sov expansionism continues to operate on the principle of limited objectives then the Hindu Kush wld no longer be considered as a probable limit of Sov influence. Instead the Indus, including the port of Karachi must now be assumed to be the new frontier of expansionist thinking, (2) in the event India shld withdraw its sympathetic attitude toward Pushtoonistan the Sov is ready to take its place if for no other reason than insure the continuance of friction between Afghans and Paks.

Repeated info Kabul 44.

WARREN

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* Fuad Pasha Alkhateeb.
* The Soviet diplomatic representative in Afghanistan was A. Fedorov, who carried the rank of Minister.
* Sir Laurence Graffney-Smith.

699.9O83/4-651: Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 6, 1951—8:25 a. m.

Reference is made to Recommendation No. 2 under Item III ("Afghan-Pakistan Dispute") considered at the South Asia Regional Conference, which reads as follows:

"The US should not make any explicit statements, either now or later, with regard to the validity of the Durand Line, or give any

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1 Sent to the Embassies in Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, and Ceylon.
2 For the full text of the agreed conclusions and recommendations of the Conference, see p. 1664.
secret assurances thereon. If Pakistan should fail to give an affirmative answer to the present proposals of the US looking toward settlement of the dispute, the latter should not feel compelled to take any further steps in the matter with the parties in the near future.” (Underlining inserted.)

It would appear that the Department might find it suitable and feasible at some future time to make some explicit statement concerning the validity of the Durand Line under certain circumstances (such as intensification of Afghan propaganda regarding the Pushtoonistan question, a particularly serious border incident, or a determined Afghan effort to bring the dispute before an international body, possibly the SC or the ICJ). It would therefore be appreciated if the Embassies, perhaps after mutual consultation, would inform the Department whether or not the consensus of opinion at the South Asia Regional Conference was definitely opposed to either a formal or informal expression of the Department’s opinion concerning the validity of the Durand Line in the indeterminate future. If this question is answered affirmatively, the Department would likewise appreciate a careful review of the reasons supporting this conclusion.

ACHESON

653.90D/4-451: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY WASHINGTON, April 6, 1951—8 p. m.

632. From McGhee. Pls make fol pts to Liaquat in reaching clear understanding re timing and nature of talks proposed by US approach and position prospective Afghan Amb relation to such talks:

1. In terms our Nov 6 approach talks wld follow exchange Ambs. Liaquat’s suggested procedure (allowing Amb to raise Pushtoon question and giving negative reply) wld be compatible with terms of our approach and wld constitute Pak acceptance only if new Afghan Amb wld be only Afghan Rep with which substance talks is to be discussed. Dept wld be glad consult Kabul on this pt if necessary, however, since it seems certain Afghans wld wish to have several high-level reps for these talks it is hoped original suggestion can be accepted.

2. Under other circumstances (such as conversations between Afghan Amb and Liaquat concerning agenda for subsequent talks in which Afghan Amb might be one of several Afghan Reps) it seems clear that Liaquat’s procedure wld in fact establish a “pre-condition” for talks. Therefore we can only regretfully conclude that his suggestion deviates from our approach and does not constitute Pak acceptance. We might be prepared transmit Liaquat suggestion as counter proposal although we frankly doubt Afghans wld accept it.

1 Repeated for information to Kabul as telegram 250, and to London and New Delhi by air.
3. The essential pt is that Afghans must feel free to raise Pushtoon question in course of the “informal exploratory talks” we have proposed. If Liaquat agrees to this US obligations as “go-between” can soon be discharged and substance talks left to be developed by both parties. In this case Dept wld have no further concern in its capacity as “go-between” with substance Pak reply on any matter to be discussed with Afghans. In its capacity as friend of both parties, however, Dept wld naturally be concerned re best possible outcome for talks and may later make suggestions in this regard.

4. Pls urge Liaquat accept US approach in generous fashion consistent with faith in US good will pointing out that (a) Dept always assumed talks wld not prejudice previous existing positions either Govt on disputed matters; (b) our approach specifically limited publicity re talks except by mutual consent both parties; (c) Dept will use best efforts insure Afghans take no future tactical advantage re talks (although ample safeguards appear provided by (a) and (b) above; (d) McGhee personally convinced that Afghans are now hopeful some good will come of proposed talks even though agreement cannot be reached re Pushtoon issue; (e) USSR only beneficiary continued Afghan-Pak friction (Karachi's 915 Apr 4).

Zafrullah and Mohd Ali remaining New York until informed nomination new UN representative re Kashmir and McGhee intends speak Mohd Ali along above lines. [McGhee.]

ACHESON

689.96D/4-951: Telegram

The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY KARACHI, APRIL 9, 1951—7 P. M.

933. For McGhee.

(1) In a long discussion with FonSecy this p. m. (your 632 of the 6th) it was agreed he wld bring its 4 points to attention of Prime Minister tonight and request appointment for me tomorrow to have Liaquat's answer.

(2) Ikramullah said the cabinet had sent on April 7 to Zafrullah at Lake Success a draft of Paks reply to the US démarche of Nov 6 and hoped to have his comments by tomorrow so the Prime Minister may discuss that also. He intimated the Paks wld accept 3 points of the US démarche but on the 4th point wld impose a precondition that Pushtoonistan could not be included in any discussion with the Afghans under point 4 of our approach.

(3) Perhaps I may be able to persuade Liaquat to accept your thinking on para 3 of your tel under reference when I see him especially in view of the fact that Col. Shah now secy of the Pak Ministry of States and Frontier Affairs, and as I reported 6 months ago the probable Amb designate to Afghan, has accepted an invitation from Faiz Mohd to meet in Jalalabad this week and resume last years
confs on problems of common interest to Pak and Afghan. Ikramullah said Col. Shah leaves Karachi tomorrow en route to this meeting and added this is evidence the 2 govts are in contact at a high level in discussing current frictions and pressures.

Department pass London, repeated info Kabul 45, London 57.

WARREN

689.90D/4-1251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL       PRIORITY     KARACHI, April 12, 1951—4 p. m.

942. For McGhee. Prime Minister ¹ asked me last night to see him in presence Ikramullah for discussion of Pak-Afghan relations ref Deptel 632 Apr 6, 8 p. m. my 933 Apr 9 and Kabul’s 312, 5 p. m., April 12 [9] to Dept. ²

1. PM asked why there was confusion concerning his attitude on US démarche of Nov 6 as he expressed in his conversation with McGhee and then reiterated that his attitude is unchanged. He said “he is prepared (a) cease attacks on Afghan provide they do same, (b) name an Amb provided they do likewise and (c) place no restriction on Afghan Amb’s freedom of discussion on points of difference between two countries, but with prior understanding of US that if Afghan Amb raises subj of Pushtoonistan, the Paks will not discuss it with him nor with any other Afghan rep or reps because Liaquat and his govt consider the Durand line the frontier and tribal admin on the Pak side a matter of exclusively domestic concern”.

2. I replied that Mr. McGhee in his tele exchanges on Pushtoonistan since his conversation with the PM has raised the question why Pak considers it necessary to impose a prior condition eliminating Pushtoonistan from any discussion when the language of our démarche did not mention issue nor have Afghans mentioned it in their indication of its acceptance. The PM said he desired to make position of his country unequivocally clear to US because Pushtoonistan is only real issue between the two countries and then added “this is my personal attitude. It may well be that in our reply to your démarche, which I hope to give you Friday 13th after receiving Zafrullah’s comments on suggested language of reply sent him last Saturday ³ at Lake Success, there will probably be no ref to Pushtoonistan”.

¹ Liaquat Ali Khan.
² Telegram 312, from Kabul, April 9, not printed, described a discussion of April 4 in Kabul among Kennedy, Jandrey, and the Acting Prime Minister, Ali Mohammed. The latter, with reference to the third point of the U.S. approach of November 6, which called for an exchange of ambassadors, stated that he considered such an exchange inadvisable unless exploratory discussions of designated representatives had proceeded favorably. He stated that he desired to avoid the embarrassment which would result from withdrawing the Afghan Ambassador again if the talks were unsuccessful, implying that such withdrawal would be necessary if the Government of Pakistan refused to discuss the Pushtun question. (689.90D/4-951)
³ April 7.
3. I then referred to forthcoming convs at Jalalabad this weekend between Col. Shah as rep of the Paks and Faiz Mohd an unofficial rep of the Afghans and inquired if PM could tell me what instrs he had given Col. Shah. He said Col. Shah had no auth make any commitments, but is instructed to engage in informal and exploratory convs with Faiz Mohd, whereupon I observed that although the PM has expressed his inability to accept the language of point 4 of our démarche, he has in fact, not only accepted, but implemented the point 4 undertaking in almost identical instrs to his rep at weekend convs. He replied that my observation required his further thinking and that he wld take it under consideration in framing of his promised reply on Friday to our Nov 6 démarche. He then instructed Ikramullah to take note of this point and they both said it wld be considered by their govt.

4. When I inquired how long the conversation at Jalalabad might last, the PM said Col Shah, who left Karachi by train for Afghan the night before, wld probably meet Faiz Mohd on 13th. He added that as both men are naturally cautious, he expected convs wld last several days. He said there wld be no publicity about them and intimated he hopes that US, whatever its attitude, may be on Pak reply to our démarche wld not give any immed publicity because of its possible harmful effect on progress of convs. I recommend to Dept that we abstain from any immed publicity even if we consider Pak reply not entirely acceptable.

5. My gen impression as the result of an hour’s conv with PM and Ikramullah is that they are seeking language in their reply that will be acceptable to us and at same time will not involve Pak in any interpretation of acquiescence in any future international discussion of Pashtoonistan. Their basic fear appears to be that Afghan, in the event the current efforts to reach a settlement between the two countries shld fail, may try to capitalize on US démarche in possible future reference of Pashtoonistan issue to UN.

Dept pass London; sent Dept 942, rptd info Kabul 46, London 59.

WARREN

663.90D3/4-1351

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations (Gatewood)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] April 13, 1951:

Subject: Terms of Pakistan’s Reply to United States Approach of November 6 Re Afghan-Pakistan Differences

Participants: Mr. Mohammad Ali, Secretary General to the Pakistan Government

Mr. M. O. A. Baig, Pakistan Chargé d’Affaires

Mr. McGhee—NEA

Mr. Gatewood—SOA

Problem:

To persuade the Pakistan Government to reply favorably to our November 6 approach.
Action required:

To obtain a text of the Pakistan reply that conforms to our original proposals.

Action assigned:

NEA: SOA

Mr. Mohammad Ali called at Mr. McGhee's request to discuss the terms of the Pakistan reply to our November 6 approach.

Referring to the urgent Pakistan desire for a settlement of the Kashmir issue (see a separate memorandum of conversation on this subject of today's date), Mr. McGhee remarked that Pakistan had an excellent opportunity of demonstrating its willingness to reach reasonable solutions to vexing international problems by accepting our November 6 approach. After pointing out that the Pushtoonistan issue was a mere offshoot of the Kashmir problem, Mr. Mohammad Ali said that a Pakistan reply would soon be forthcoming which would attempt to meet the United States approach on all points, indicating that the reply would request a clear understanding that Afghan propaganda for Pushtoonistan should cease and would propose, following an exchange of Ambassadors, that the Government of Pakistan might hold a conference with the Government of Afghanistan to discuss matters of mutual interest, provided such a conference appeared to offer some hope of success.

Mr. McGhee pointed out that our approach had specified that all types of propaganda should cease and said that he did not think the Government of Pakistan was now unwilling to accept the substance of our approach, despite some confusion of thought over the exact functions of the new Afghan Ambassador (i.e., who might be the sole Afghan representative for "informal exploratory discussions" or who might be authorized to discuss the agenda of a future Afghan-Pakistan conference). Mr. McGhee urged Mr. Mohammad Ali to consider that Afghan suspicions would be disarmed if only the Pakistan reply were phrased in the exact terms of our original approach.

Mr. Mohammad Ali promised to cable his government immediately, endorsing Mr. McGhee's suggestion. He explained that the Government of Pakistan wished to agree on some procedure that would result in improved Afghan-Pakistan relations; that it was fearful of building up public confidence in results that might never be achieved; and that, though still doubtful of Afghan willingness to recede from their present stand on Pushtoonistan, he would accept Mr. McGhee's estimate of the conciliatory Afghan attitude.

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2 Not printed.
Mr. McGhee replied that he might be wrong in his estimate of Afghan intentions, but he had conveyed to the Pakistan Prime Minister the remarks of the Afghan Foreign Minister indicating the hope that beneficial results might be obtained from informal discussions, even though all issues were not resolved. He said that time appeared to have worked for Pakistan and, as only the USSR could benefit from continued Afghan–Pakistan differences, he was hopeful that the two governments could reach some measure of agreement.

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**Editorial Note**

On April 14, Pakistani Foreign Secretary Ikramullah sent Ambassador Warren a memorandum containing a three-point reply by his government to the United States approach of November 6, 1950. It stated that (1) the Government of Pakistan agreed to the first two United States proposals of November 6, on the condition that the Government of Afghanistan also agreed to them and ceased its propaganda and other actions in favor of Pushtunistan which constituted attacks on Pakistan’s territorial integrity; (2) if Afghanistan accepted and implemented these proposals, Pakistan would be ready to exchange Ambassadors in two months; (3) Pakistan would be prepared for discussion with the Afghan Ambassador on matters of mutual concern, provided Afghanistan continued to cease propaganda and prevent incidents, and Pakistan would be prepared to hold a conference between the two governments if this discussion indicated a conference would be successful.

In a letter to Warren transmitting this memorandum, Ikramullah also commented on the visit to Jalalabad of Colonel A. S. B. Shah, Secretary of the Pakistani Ministry of States and Frontier Affairs, for informal discussions with Faiz Mohammed Khan, former Afghan Minister of Education. Ikramullah recalled that Faiz Mohammed Khan had discussed Afghanistan–Pakistan relations with Colonel Shah while in Karachi in February 1951. Colonel Shah replied that Pakistan was ready to have friendly relations with Afghanistan, provided the latter ceased its Pushtunistan activities. Faiz Mohammed Khan proposed further talks; the Government of Pakistan considered the invitation and, in the interest of promoting friendly relations with Afghanistan, authorized Colonel Shah to meet Faiz Mohammed Khan at Jalalabad. Colonel Shah was expected to reach Jalalabad on April 14, Ikramullah stated, and was instructed by the Government of Pakistan to discuss all matters of mutual concern with the exception of the Pushtunistan question. (Telegram 960 from Karachi, April 14; 689.90D/4-1451)
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, April 16, 1951—7 p. m.

3819. Deptel 627, April 5, based Karachi’s tel to Dept 915, April 4.1 From scanty info available to us here we would surmise that Sov short-term intentions re Afghanistan are somewhat less carefully defined and perhaps more pragmatic than is case with Sov ME policy generally. Lacking strategic position and oil resources Iran, and not having revolutionary potentialities inherent in more industrially-developed ME nations. Afghanistan as such hardly seems to occupy major place in list Kremlin’s immediate objectives in ME.

It is of course obvious that Sovs are always prepared to take fullest advantage of any and all opportunities to embarrass Pakistan, country which Sovs regard as Brit-created monstrosity. However, despite theoretical advantages to Kremlin of pushing Pooshtoonistan issue, official Sov silence up to now suggests hesitancy to disregard reactions in other Muslim countries. In this sense approach of Sov Amb Kabul to Saudi Mins may be attempt to probe attitude Islamic nations, and SA Min’s prompt reaction in defense Pak thesis may cause Sovs to avoid taking sides at present juncture.

Clue to Sov thinking on Pooshtoonistan issue may be found in art published in Questions of History in 1949 2 (Emb despatch 746, Dec 2, 1949).3 In bald terms this suggested territorial aggrandizement Afghanistan at expense Pak tribal area, but at same time “return” to USSR of Afghan areas inhabited by Tadjiks, Uzbeks and other peoples majority of whom encompassed USSR. We have not seen this line of thought developed elsewhere, but no doubt it constitutes theoretical Sov position re frontier problems this area. That any such boundary rectification would probably seriously impair continued existence Pak naturally would not constitute obstacle in eyes of Sov planners.

Based on foregoing, we are inclined to believe that “speculative assumptions” Pak Sec Gen, while they may be perfectly correct, are not warranted by slim info now at hand. We doubt whether it is right to postulate that Sov expansionism up to now has been based on limited objective extending to Hindu Kush, any more than that Indus with Karachi now is new frontier Sov expansionist thinking. As indicated first para this tel, we conceive Sov tactics this area to be

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1 Telegram 627, to Moscow, April 5, repeated the text of telegram 915 from Karachi, April 4 (p. 1952), adding the phrase “please comment” (659.900D/4-451).
2 I. Reisner, “K voprosu o skladyvanii afganskoi natsii” [On the question of the formation of the Afghan nation], Voprosy istorii [Questions of history], No. 7 (July) 1949, p. 66.
3 Not printed.
pragmatic at present time, and we believe they must be considered within framework “sof” [soft?] policy outlined Emb despatch 294, Dec 11, 1950.4

However, fact that Pak Fon Secy has taken alarm at new Sov interest in Pooshtoonistan issue possibly may be turned to our advantage. If we can bring both Paks and Afghans to realize potential Sov exploitation issue, possibilities greater degree of caution both sides and mutual willingness to reach some form modus vivendi may result. We assume Dept already has thought of utilizing this opportunity for informally pressing our views to both parties to dispute.


Kirk

4 Despatch 294, from Moscow, December 11, 1950, not printed, reported that there had been in the past several months an apparently sustained effort on the part of the Soviet Government to avoid sharp criticism of Near Eastern Governments, picturing them instead as victims of Western imperialism (761.00/12-1150).

659.90D/4-1851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

KARACHI, April 18, 1951—1 p. m.

972. I talked with Col. Shah 1 last night immed after his return from the Jalalabad convs with Faiz Mohd ref my 942 Apr 12 to Dept rptd info Kabul 46 and London 59 and Kabul's 312 Apr 9 and 3 to London. 2 He said they did not get anywhere. The Afghans will not name an Amb nor will they call off Pooshtoonistan campaign. He rejected their suggestion that Pak agree to discuss Pooshtoonistan as condition prior to designation of Amb. He said he is now, as he has been in past, opposed to soft policy of the PM with respect to Afghan. On the other hand he believes it wld be mistake for Paks to attempt to overthrow regime in Kabul because it wld play into hands of Russians. He said Liaquat does not appreciate that most Afghans south of Hindu Kush are fanatical Sunnis and that tribal leaders are more interested in outcome of Kashmir sitn than they are in maintenance of present Kabul regime. His prescription for sitn as between Afghan and Pak is Paks shld buy off Kabul at estimated expense of approximately one crore rupees year and that US shld

1 This telegram was corrected by telegram 963, from Karachi, April 25, which read as follows: “Person with whom I talked April 17 was Sardar Bahadur Khan, GOP Min of Communications and not Col. Shah as reported Emblel 972, Apr 18. Bahadur Khan remarks to me based on preliminary report from Shah to GOP.” (659.90D/4-2851)

2 Telegram 312, from Kabul, repeated as 3 to London, April 9, not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1956.
support arrangement by affirmative declaration on Durand line. He added that Kabul support if subsidized could not be depended upon now any more than in the past when the Brit used it between Wars, but that it is in his opinion the best immediate compromise of problem as it stands. He said as Pathan he could speak with some authority because many of his tribe are now living in Aljian and this same tribe was utilized by Brit in overthrowing Amamullah regime and established present dynasty. In response to question he said he is not interested in appointment as Amb to Kabul where his cousin is Chargé.


689.90D/4–1451: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 13, 1951—6 p.m.

PRIORITY NIAC

661. Embtel 960 Apr 14.² Dept notes Pak reply Nov 6 approach formulated prior receipt report conversation Mohd Ali and McGhee Apr 13 which might have influence GOP phrase its reply more consistently with US proposal.

Dept forced, after careful evaluation, regretfully conclude present reply does not constitute acceptance broad terms Nov 6 approach for fol reasons:

1) Para one restates effect implicit in pts one and two Nov 6 approach in terms unnecessarily offensive Afghan Govt.

2) Para two Dept believes Afghan Govt would view as unacceptable challenge its sincerity new GOP precondition that exch Ambs be postponed until after lapse arbitrary two months “good behavior” period. Dept considers exch Ambs anytime within two mos as permanent constructive step creating climate conducive further negotiations.

3) Para three GOP proposal connects exch Ambs with substantive discussions to point where they arrange agenda. This conflicts our proposal which specified discussions without agenda or preconditions, exch Ambs being procedural, psychological factor and preceding substantive talks.

It appears GOP may either:

(a) Rephrase reply in light Mohd Ali–McGhee talks.

(b) Accept unconditionally first three pts US approach (as GOP apparently ready to do in March) in which case Pak concept re talks (to be carried on through diplomatic channels after exch Ambs) would constitute counter-proposal to US fourth point which Dept

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¹ Repeated for information to Kabul as telegram 258, to London as 4760, and to New Delhi by air.
² Not printed, but see the editorial note, p. 1950.
would be willing submit Afghans though most doubtful their acceptance.
(c) If present reply GOP last word Dept must withdraw approach and end attempts act as informal go-between.

Afghan PriMin together with Najibullah Khan, Amb to India, will talk with Secy Apr 23 and Dept considers desirable that final Pak reply be available by then so Afghans can be informed. ACHESON

689.60D/4-2151: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, April 21, 1951—11 a. m.

2913. Ciragam April 6, 8:25 a.m and Karachi tel 964 to Dept Apr 16. 1 Altho dispute over Durand Line primarily between Pak and Afghan, GOI considers itself to have interest on historical grounds and because kind and method settlement of, prolongation of, dispute might have deep effect upon situation through all SOA. As Dept aware GOI gen position is Durand Line not necessarily frontier between Afghan and Pak and question frontier shld be settled amicably by discussion between Pak and Afghan. From this vantage point it seems to us status Durand Line shld be regarded by US as more of judicial than polit dispute and that unless some distinctly constructive purpose can be achieved it wld be preferable in absence judgment by some internatl tribunal for US Govt which has no historical connection with dispute not to issue statement recognizing Durand Line as border. Embs Kabul and Karachi better position than we to judge what effects such statement wld have on Afghan and Pak. We have however, no info here which wld cause us believe such statement wld induce Afghan cease agitation. In fact we concerned lest statement cause Afghan to act even more irresponsibly since it might no longer be subject our present restraining influence. In India such statement wld probably be regarded as another example “US power politics” in SOA.

2. If info Dept’s disposal now or at later date shld indicate such statement by US wld be helpful in relieving tension over Durand Line its issuance wld of course serve constructive purpose and wld seem advisable regardless of probably unfavorable reception in India.


HENDERSON

1Telegram 964, from Karachi, April 16, not printed, asked the Department, in connection with its circular airgram of April 6, p. 1953, to suggest the time and place for consultation with a representative of the Embassy concerning the future possibility of a U.S. statement on the Durand Line (689.60D/4-1561).
The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NACT

Karachi, April 21, 1951—2 p. m.

988. For McGhee. Re Embs 960, Apr 14.\(^1\) PriMin in conversation this p. m. hoped his reply ref Deptel 661, Apr 18 wd be considered as an acceptance of the US Nov 6 démarche and regretted its unfavorable reception. After lengthy discussion based largely on his recollection of conversation with McGhee and an exposition of the points in Deptel under ref, the PriMin authorized me to say his govt accepts para 3 (b) of Dept’s proposal, i.e. Pak accepts unconditionally first three points of US approach of Nov 6 and reaffirms its attitude on point four of the Nov 6 approach as expressed in its memo of Apr 14.

Shld the Dept still consider this reaffirmation a counterproposal he nevertheless wd be pleased to have the Dept submit it to the Afghans and wd welcome the Dept’s indication of their reaction to it.

Warren

\(^1\) Not printed, but see the editorial note, p. 1959.

788.13/4-2351

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] April 23, 1951.

Subject: Call by the Prime Minister of Afghanistan, His Royal Highness Sardar Shah Mahmud Khan, on April 24, 1951

The Prime Minister previously called upon you on August 8, 1947. Then and subsequently Afghanistan has sought US aid in efforts toward social and economic progress. US-Afghan relations have been increasingly cordial and the US raised its diplomatic mission in Kabul from a Legation to an Embassy in 1948.\(^1\) Numerous American educators and technical experts and some private firms have worked in Afghanistan and the number of Afghan students in the US has increased. An Export-Import Bank credit of $21 million has been advanced to supplement equivalent and earlier Afghan outlays for the construction of roads, dams and irrigation projects. The American firm of Morrison-Knudson is currently engaged in developing the resources of the Helmand River in southwest Afghanistan.

Throughout the Prime Minister’s tenure of office, the government has been stable and has resisted Communist influence, notwithstanding the country’s vulnerable geographic and economic position. There have been indications recently of unrest in Afghanistan which might

\(^1\) For documentation on the raising of the U.S. Legation in Afghanistan to the status of Embassy, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. v, Part 1, p. 488.
cause some Cabinet shifts, possibly affecting the Prime Minister; but we do not expect this to result in any diminished stability of the government.

Afghanistan has contributed to our objective of promoting stable conditions in South Asia by cooperating with an international technical commission established through US good offices to study a 75-year old boundary-water dispute with Iran. Our efforts to promote amicable bilateral negotiations with respect to differences concerning the tribes along the Afghan-Pakistan border, a local issue which could endanger regional security, have not been successful. We still hope, however, to encourage moderate Afghan elements, of whom the Prime Minister is a representative, to bring about a settlement of this serious issue.

The Prime Minister may express Afghanistan’s interest in obtaining US technical, economic and military aid. While you may wish to indicate the limitations of the ability of the US to furnish military assistance, it appears suitable for you to stress our continuing reliance on the UN and its individual members to promote collective security and to state that, following the successful utilization of present financial and technical aid, we should be able to give sympathetic consideration to further Afghan needs of this kind.

The Prime Minister will be accompanied by the Minister Chargé d’Affaires of Afghanistan, Abdul Hamid Aziz.

The Prime Minister may be addressed as Mr. Prime Minister or as Your Royal Highness.

DEAN ACHESON

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2 See the editorial note on the interest of the United States in resolving the dispute between Afghanistan and Iran regarding distribution of the waters of the Helmand River, Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. v, p. 1459.

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759.13/4-2351

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] April 23, 1951.

Subject: Interview with Afghan Prime Minister

Participants: Sardar Shah Mahmud Khan—Prime Minister of Afghanistan
Abdul Hamid Aziz—Chargé d’Affaires, Embassy of Afghanistan
The Secretary
Mr. McGhee—Assistant Secretary
Mr. Mathews—Director, Office of South Asian Affairs

After appropriate remarks of courtesy, the Prime Minister referred to this Government’s proposal of November 6, 1950 to the Govern-
ments of Afghanistan and Pakistan looking toward an improvement of relations between them. He pointed out that his Government was deeply grateful for the interest which the United States had shown and had accepted our proposal promptly. There has, unhappily, been no reply from Pakistan. I said that we had just received Pakistan’s answer. The Government of Pakistan accepted the first three points of our proposal relating to the prevention of propaganda, the prevention of incidents among the tribes, and the exchange of Ambassadors. With respect to the fourth point, which proposed a meeting of representatives of the two governments without an agenda or preconditions, Pakistan had indicated that it would be prepared to participate in such a meeting if prior discussions through the newly appointed Ambassadors showed that the meeting would be fruitful. Mr. McGeorge commented that as this departed to some extent from our original proposal, we could not consider the Pakistan reply an acceptance of our proposal unless the Afghan Government were disposed to accept the Pakistan counter-suggestion.

The Prime Minister remarked that his Government had exchanged Ambassadors with Pakistan before but that discussions through these regular diplomatic channels had been without avail. He feared, therefore, that the Pakistan counter-proposal would lead to the same unsatisfactory situation with the result that the Ambassadors would have to be withdrawn and that there would be no lasting improvement in Afghan–Pakistan relations. He stated that although he was Prime Minister, he could not by himself indicate whether his Government would or would not find the Pakistan counter-proposal acceptable. It would have to be carefully considered by the Afghan Cabinet. I said that the Department was transmitting the Pakistan reply to Kabul in order that our Embassy might transmit it to his Government.

Mr. McGeorge urged that the Afghan Government give very careful consideration to the Pakistan counter-proposal. It was not too far removed from our original suggestion and since both governments were in agreement as to the first three points of that suggestion, it would be unfortunate if this measure of progress were lost. The Prime Minister indicated that he would pass these comments on to his colleague, the Acting Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, and remarked that we might now be embarking upon a period of bargaining between Kabul and Karachi which could be time-consuming.

In more general discussion of the Pashtoonistan issue, the Prime Minister emphasized that he was speaking not only for himself and his government, but for all the people of Afghanistan. They felt very strongly that their 4 to 4½ million Pathan brethren in Pakistan should have the right to determine their own future. He warned me that
Pakistan could never be strong as long as these unwilling people were kept within its borders. On the other hand, if there were a free Push- toonistan the peoples of that nation and of Afghanistan would be a solid bulwark against the threat from the north. He urged that I think on these things and I said that I would do so.

The Prime Minister expressed the gratitude of his Government and his people for the loan extended to Afghanistan by the Export-Import Bank. He went on to say that Afghanistan looked to the United States as a stronger and richer brother which would help his poor country along the road to self-reliance. The Afghan people were strong and his country had many resources, but it needed outside help to develop itself. He hoped that the United States would provide the necessary assistance; if it did, it could rely upon the loyal support of Afghanistan. I assured the Prime Minister that we were interested in the progress of his country.

Reference is to a recent loan of $21,000,000.

689.90D/4-2351: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan

CONFIDENTIAL Washington, April 23, 1951—7 p.m.

676. Embtel 988 Apr 21. Secy informed Afghan PriMin Apr 23 re Pak counter-proposal. PriMin made no commitment and was told Dept wld transmit Pak suggestions to Kabul. As exact wording para 3 Pak memo Apr 14 is believed likely offend Afghans Dept suggests fol text: "GOP prepared accept unconditionally first three points US approach Nov 6. GOP also ready discuss through dipl channels after exchange ambs all matters of common concern. If these discussions indicate conference between two govts wld be fruitful, GOP prepared to hold such conference."

FYI Pak memo appears assume Karachi will be seat discussions, although there wld be new Pak amb to Kabul who might also assist in exchange of views.

Pls inform FonOff although Dept still considers Pak attitude toward fourth point US approach constitutes counter-proposal, it is hoped GOP can promptly agree above phrasing so GOA may be informed. When clearance obtained from FonOff inform Dept and Kabul. Latter shld immed transmit agreed text to GOA.

FYI Najibullah did not call on any Brit or US officials in London although issued statement to Press Trust India there (Embtel 985

1 Repeated for information to Kabul, London, and New Delhi.
Apr 21). He is expected talk with McGhee this week and was not present PriMin talk with Secy.

ACHESON

2 Not printed.

689.90D/4–2151: Telegram

The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

KARACHI, April 25, 1951—8 p. m.

1000. In two conversations today with Ikramullah and one with Dr. Mahmud Husain, Min of States and Frontier Regions who is acting for Prime Minister, it was agreed that text of GOP’s reply to our approach as contained in Deptel 676, Apr 23 shld be telegraphed to Prime Minister now in Peshwar this week. Mahmud Husain is recommending to Prime Minister acceptance of textual language. As soon as reply has been reed Ikramullah promises to inform me immed.

WARREN

689.90D/5–651: Telegram

The Chargé in Afghanistan (Jandrey) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

KABUL, May 6, 1951—3 p. m.

339. Col Shah returning Karachi shortly as personal talks with Faiz Mohd now require consultation with GOP re extent willingness accept Afghan viewpoint especially necessity discuss tribal area.

Shah said Afghan viewpoint as follows: NWFP and tribal area taken by force Brit arms; Afghans always vitally interested this area with its people of Afghan blood and apparent acceptance Durand Line was matter duress; Afghan Govt deeply resents unfulfilled Brit promised discuss tribes at time partition and unwilling accept GOP contention Pathans freely chose to be part new Pak.

Shah said Pak viewpoint was: Backbone formation Pak was brotherhood Islamic peoples who were consulted before creation Pak; sovereignty issue therefore cannot arise. Shah alleges regret inability convince Afghans necessity cease all propaganda and appoint Ambs but he sees fol accomplishments: (1) Creation favorable atmosphere for talks, (2) release accumulated tension and suppressed ideas, (3) better understanding viewpoints, (4) door definitely remains open.

Despite desire both sides reach settlement they are convinced re loss prestige internally. If GOP concedes point by discussing tribal affairs, formula must be devised giving nominal recognition to Afghan Govt interest such affairs without real change status.
Karachi can evaluate impression Shah tried leave with me of reasonableness and desire convince GOP agreement not beyond hope, especially if he can bring Liaquat and Shah Mahmud together.

Sent Dept 339, rptd info Karachi 32.

JANDREY

689.90D/5-1051: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, May 10, 1951—7 p. m.

276. Since Apr 30 Brit Emb has several times inquired whether Dept willing encourage Afghan PriMin return promptly Kabul as this seemed desirable connection Acting PriMin talks with Colonel Shah and internal polit situation. Move appeared originate either Brit Emb Kabul or Brit FonOff or both and possibly result GOP suggestion.

PriMin’s announced plans (fol his talks with Najibullah) provide departure US not earlier than June 15 by ship via UK and Pak arriving Kabul possibly early Aug.

Dept responded negatively Brit suggestion on fol grounds: (1) Somewhat tactless intervene known Afghan plans; (2) PriMin un-able reach Kabul in time affect results Shah conversations; (3) without Pak reply suggested revision its counterproposal no clear line Dept cld suggest PriMin pursue if returning immned; (4) urging return might produce unwarranted assumption by Afghans Dept moving toward support Afghan position.

F Y I PriMin’s views internal situation probably already registered since this purpose Najibullah visit.

Dept undertook reconsider above position in event subsequent developements might clearly indicate desirability PriMin’s return.

Brit inquired if Dept willing press Afghans in event GOP showed willingness talk with GOA re control welfare tribes in return for Afghan admission Durand Line valid boundary Pak and were informed premature now attempt assess this hypothetical situation.

Brit also informed that Dept might be forced cease exercise good offices in case GOP response tantamount to rejection Nov 6 approach or if containing terms not acceptable GOA.

F Y I GOA possibly deliberately delaying PriMin’s return as re-serve factor for use future contingency. Pls comment re foregoing without direct efforts ascertain Brit motives.  

ACHESON

1 Repeated for information to Karachi as 724 and to London as 5156.
2 In telegram 349, from Kabul, May 14, not printed, the Embassy in Afghanistan replied that it fully agreed with the Department's position as outlined in the above telegram (689.90D/5-1451).
The Chargé in Afghanistan (Jandrey) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

KABUL, May 15, 1951—noon.

353. Pass CSGID. Under Secretary Fon Off ¹ called Brit, Indian, Sov and Amer Embassies today to inform them that 5,000 regular Pak troops composed of army and militia are being brought up to Baqi post area on Baluchistan border with tanks, guns and ammunition. Under Secretary did not indicate that Pak troops had as yet attacked Afghans. Press has reported capture of 25 more Pak troops in border area four or five days ago.

Comment: Emb believes Afghan Govt’s intention is to publicize threatened aggression in order win support in case of border disturbance.

JANDREY

¹ Abdul Samad Khan, First Undersecretary of the Royal Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Editorial Note

On May 16, Foreign Secretary Ikramullah handed Ambassador Warren a memorandum dated May 15 in which the Government of Pakistan stated that it accepted the first three points of the United States approach of November 6, 1950; that it was ready to discuss matters of common concern with the Afghan Ambassador; and that it would be ready to hold a conference if the discussions indicated that a conference would be productive. In a covering letter, also dated May 15, Ikramullah referred to interviews between Warren and the Prime Minister on April 23 (no meeting of that date was reported to the Department of State by Warren; the reference was presumably to the meeting of April 21, as reported in telegram 988 from Karachi, page 1964) and between Warren and Ikramullah on April 25 (see telegram 1000 from Karachi, page 1968). The Foreign Secretary requested Warren to confirm the latter’s statements in those interviews (a) that it was unnecessary for Pakistan specifically to refer to the cessation of pro-Pushtunistan propaganda and activities because these were covered by the first two points of the United States approach of November 6, and (b) that the United States would regard as a breach of agreement any continued pro-Pushtunistan propaganda and activity on the part of the Afghan Government. On the strength of these assurances, Ikramullah stated, the Pakistani Prime Minister had agreed to accept the first three points of the United States approach of November 6; with respect to the fourth point, Pakistan’s reply had been changed in accordance with Warren’s suggestions of April 25. The
texts of the Pakistani memorandum and covering letter of May 15 were
sent to the Department of State in telegram 1077 from Karachi, May 16
(689.90D/5-1651).

689.90D/5-1551: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, May 18, 1951—7 p. m.

755. Emb Karachi shld inform FonOff re first para its May 15 letter
that Dept wld be seriously concerned over any offensive propaganda
or activities originating in either country fol acceptance first two-
points Nov 6 approach as this wld be inconsistent with bona fide im-
plementation these points; however, Dept cld not agree with inter-
pretation as spelled out Ikramullah letter since by implication this
wld constitute Dept arbiter agreement between GOP and GOA and
result continuing role as judge possible violations. This obviously
outside US role go-between.

Dept still believes Pak memo May 15 represents counterproposal
to Nov 6 approach and anticipates GOA rejection, particularly in
view apparent Pak insistence that differences be discussed only with
new Afghan Amb Karachi and not by new Pak Amb Kabul. In con-
voying substance foregoing to FonOff Emb may state that, if GOP
desires memo transmitted GOA without further change, Emb will
so inform Emb Kabul.

ACHESON

1 Repeated to Kabul as telegram 282 and to London by air.

689.90D/5-1951: Telegram

The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

SECRET  NIAC T

KARACHI, May 19, 1951—1 p. m.

1094. FonMin called me last evening and on arrival said he had
also asked UK HICOM to be present for estimate of Afghan-Pak
border sitn in vicinity Chaman and Kandahar that is rapidly be-
coming inflammatory ref my 1086 May 18 1 and Kabul's 357 May 16
to Dept.2

1 Telegram 1086, from Karachi, May 18, not printed, contained in part a report
from the Pakistan Ministry of Defense that, with reference to Afghan allega-
tions that 5,000 regular Pakistan troops were now based on the Baluchistan
border with tanks, guns, and ammunition, the actual fact was that the Ministry
had ordered one troop of seven armored cars to Chaman to safeguard villages
against further raids. (689.90D/5-1651)

2 Telegram 357, from Kabul, May 16, not printed, reported in part that Afghan
allegations of substantial troop reinforcements on the Baluchistan border were
unconfirmed and that such reports were motivated by the desire of Afghanistan
to win support abroad for its case regarding Pushtunistan (689.90D/5-1651).
A week of relative quiet followed the Afghan raids May 5. Now Pak MilAtt at Kabul reported on May 14 the Afghan–Kandahar garrison reinforced by three brigades including artillery and some aircraft and at same time reserves were alerted from Kabul to extent of three brigades. Machine guns, automatic rifles and other weapons from Kabul ordnance depot have been released to equip them. Pak vice consul Kandahar yesterday was made object of public anti-Pak demonstration. With prospect that Daud may proceed from Kabul to Kandahar this weekend Pak feel sitn may get out of hand.

FonMin said Paks as measure of defense have moved from Quetta towards Chaman a reinforced brigade which is the total of regular armed forces stationed in Baluchistan. Yesterday they flew a squadron (12) Furies to Quetta. Troops are instructed not to cross border nor fire into Afghan territory.

In opinion FonMin these concentrations along immed border between the two countries, not in so-called Pooshtoonistan area where there is a buffer of tribal territory, has no obvious explanation. He said it may be a bid for power by Daud, or it may be that Kabul, having been informed that Pak accepts the provisions of US démarch of Nov 6 in its first three phases, realizes the Pooshtoonistan issue is dead unless border incidents between the two countries become sufficiently significant to invite UN cognizance of sitn ref Kabul’s 353 to Dept, in which case the Pooshtoonistan issue could be introduced as an element of irritation between the two countries. This thinking was not advanced by Zafrullah but was subj of triangular discussion between three of us.

Zafrullah said his purpose in seeing us was (1) to acquaint us with facts as they appear from Pak side and with Pak defense measures; (2) to invite US and UK to send their senior MilAtt to Chaman outpost on border where they could readily determine what defensive measures Pak has taken as well as attitudes of villages that have been subj to raids in the last month.

After I had remarked that adjacent concentrations on the Kandahar plain were dangerous and shld be dissipated soonest, Grafftey-Smith offered the proposal, to which I subscribe, that Zafrullah ask PM in his capacity as Defense Min (1) to tell us Pak prepared inform Afghan that it considers sitn has element of danger to peace between two countries and (2) Pak is prepared withdraw immed ground troops it has moved into area as measure of defense if Afghans take similar measures with ref their concentration in Kandahar.

Zafrullah concurred with suggestion. Said he wld take up with PM and ask for cab mtg and if approved wld let us know immed.

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8 Mohammad Daud Khan, Commander in Chief of the Afghan Central Forces and Military Schools.
In event PM accepts our suggestions I recommend to Dept a further step; Paks wld welcome presence of US and UK senior MilAtts to verify facts of withdrawal of its forces at threatened point on border and wld be glad if Kabul could make similar arrangements with US and UK MilAtts in Afghan who wld determine facts of withdrawal of Afghan forces on their side.


Warren

689.90/D/5—2051: Telegram

The Chargé in Afghanistan (Horner) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

KABUL, May 20, 1951—5 p.m.

367. Fully concur with proposal made (Karachi tel to Dept 1094 May 19) to effect that Paks and Afghans should agree to withdraw ground troops on either side Kandahar-Baluchi border, and that US and UK MilAtts Karachi and Kabul shld make survey both sides frontier. However, we wish point out possibility that Afghans may be disinclined to accept UK MA’s as impartial witnesses on ground UK has been directly responsible for Pak’s alleged aggressive policy. We shld anticipate possible Afghan counter-proposal to broaden observer group, and shld not be caught unawares by possible inclusion Sov MA’s (obviously Afghan Govt bringing Sovs into picture wld be highly undesirable). We further agree, as indicated Embtel 357 May 16, that continuance present inflamed situation constitutes real danger to peace of area, and that energetic measures our part are called for. In this regard, we note no diminution strongly-worded Afghan press and radio campaign directed not only against Pak but incidentally accusing UK of pro-Pak attitude and actions. This has reached point where “spontaneous demonstration” are being held in schools, obviously wholly engineered and inspired by regime. Consequently, time has perhaps come when we shld be prepared to deliver firm warning to GOA that this type irresponsible agitation can only be regarded by US as indicating Afghan failure to comprehend real issues at stake and attendant dangers armed conflict. In sum, we feel “neutral” position we hitherto have taken on so-called “Pushtoon” issue may have to give way to stand perhaps more in keeping with current trend developments.


Horner

1 See footnote 2, supra.
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan

SECRET PRIORITY
WASHINGTON, May 21, 1951—7 p. m.

766. Karachi’s tel 1097 May 20.² Embs Karachi and Kabul instructed provided UK reps have received similar insts to express serious concern with present inflammatory sit and to request FonOff, as evidence GOP (Afghan) desire for peaceful solution, to adjust troop disposition to that prior May 1, provided GOA (Pak) agrees to simultaneous dispersal its troop concentration in adjoining border areas.

FYI Karachi: GOP note to GOA appears inconsistent with FonMin insts to GOP Chargé at Kabul to offer (Embtel 1096, May 20)³ withdrawal all GOP forces beyond normal limits of garrison at Chaman. Why did Paks make no ref to Afghan reported willingness (London’s tel 6031, May 19) to withdraw if GOP withdrew their forces from frontier?⁴

ACHESON

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¹Repeated priority to Kabul as 284 and to London as 5364.
²Telegram 1097, from Karachi, May 20, not printed, contained the undated text of a note sent by the Pakistani Government to the Afghan Government concerning the situation on their common border. It also contained the recommendation of Ambassador Warren that the Department consult with the United Kingdom and that the United States and United Kingdom direct their representatives in Karachi to ask the Pakistanis, as evidence of their desire for a peaceful solution to an inflammatory situation, to adjust their troop disposition to that prior to May 1, provided the Afghan Government agreed simultaneously to the dispersal of the Kandahar reserve brigade. Similar instructions would be sent to Kabul. (689.90D/5-2051)
³Telegram 1096, from Karachi, May 20, not printed, reported in part that Zafarulla had instructed the Pakistan Chargé at Kabul to inform the Afghan Government that the Government of Pakistan considered the troop concentration in the Chaman–Kandahar area to be potentially dangerous and offering to withdraw the forces of Pakistan provided Afghanistan would do the same (689.90D/5-2051).
⁴Telegram 6031, from London, May 19, not printed, in part related a report to this effect received in the British Foreign Office from the British representative in Karachi (689.90D/5-1951).

The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

KARACHI, May 23, 1951—noon.

1109. I conveyed to FonMin yesterday afternoon Dept’s position re para 1 Ikramullah ltr, May 15, Deptel 753, May 18. Zafarulla said it was not in his opinion intention GOP to project US as arbiter of agreement but only to satisfy itself as to Dept attitude shld GOA persist in
its pro-Pushtoonistan propaganda. I reiterated sense of first sentence ref Deptel and Zafrulla said he wld clarify matter with PM.

Re memo May 15 Zafrulla said it was not his understanding that GOP intended to preclude Pak Amb at Kabul from discussing matters of common concern and that he wld also clarify this understanding with PM.

Zafrulla then expressed hope that we wld now come to final agreement on text of Pak acceptance and suggested that that shld be the case assuming PM confirms his (Zafrulla's) understanding of GOP intent as expressed above.

I recommend to Dept that if PM approves Zafrulla's statement of intent and understanding on both points raised ref Deptel that we tell GOP that their May 15 memo will be transmitted to GOA as constituting Pak acceptance our démarche.

Dept pass London; sent Dept 1109, rptd info Kabul 60, London 78.

WARREN

689.90DS/5-2451: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY WASHINGTON, May 24, 1951—7 p. m.

785. Dept believes impossible delay longer informing Afghan Govt re Pak position Nov 16 [6] approach and proposes two alternatives: (a) Transmit Pak memo May 15 (first para Emb 1077 May 16) informing GOA this in our view a counter proposal or (b) inform GOA that GOP has not found it possible accept by this date Nov 16 [6] proposal and therefore our suggestion is hereby withdrawn. GOP wld be informed at same time this withdrawal.

Dept desires Pak indication which alternative it prefers by May 29 but believes it will be necessary to proceed in accordance with (b) if no reply received by that date.

Position of US in offering its Good Offices inconsistent with proposed exchange of letters involving any agreement or understanding on part of US and therefore unable accept Pak letter of May 15 even with clarifications.

Dept believes it wld be helpful if it could inform if memo transmitted GOA that GOP by language its memo did not intend preclude Pak Amb Kabul discussing matters of common concern.

Inform Dept soonest. Kabul to be instructed by Dept.

ACHESON

1 Repeated for information to Kabul as 290 priority, and to London by air.
SECRET  PRIORITY  WASHINGTON, May 26, 1951—5 p. m.

792. In light present info Dept unable understand fol (1) Def Secy view (Embtel 1086, May 18)\(^2\) that border raids have no special significance and FonMin report (Embtel 1094, May 19) that sit becoming inflammatory; (2) GOP declaration of maintaining normal defense positions about Chaman border while it describes concentrations composed of armored squadron from Kohat and planes from Rawalpindi; (3) GOP ref (Embtel 1097, May 20) to maintaining its “normal mil strength stationed in these areas in previous years” and recent decisions after careful consideration to revert to the sound “defense arrangements in Shelabagh-Chaman area before partition”; (4) GOP FonMin concurred your suggestion for simultaneous withdrawal GOP-GOA border forces (Embtel 1096, May 20) but GOP note requested only GOA withdrawal; and (5) Pak charge Kabul had recd no instrs at all re troop withdrawals by evening May 24 (Kabul’s tel 373).\(^3\)

GOP actions seem to indicate (1) GOP has lost faith in utility any bilateral negot before demonstrating its own mil strength to GOA and its firm intention stopping Afghan border raids; (2) GOP believes US and UK can take no action to prevent Pak make such demonstration and will not take strong line in view US-UK desire for Pak support on larger issues; and (3) GOP taking up position to overturn present GOA if any mil move in Kashmir becomes nec (re Ikramullah-Kennedy conversation last Apr). Last conjecture may be supported if Emb can ascertain whether new Pak defense policy applies to whole frontier and whether additional troop movements have taken place in Lahore, Rawalpindi, and Peshawar areas.

Emb comments desired soonest re above and re (1) reason for GOP additional implementation at this time (by forward troop movements) of decision that prepartition defense positions were sound; and (2) indications possible relation troop movement and GOP attitude to Nov 6 approach.

\(^1\) Repeated to Kabul for information as 293 and to London as 5503.

\(^2\) Telegram 1086, from Karachi, May 18, not printed, but see footnote 1 to telegram 1094 from Karachi, May 19, p. 1971.

\(^3\) Telegram 373, from Kabul, May 24, not printed, reported in part that even before the Pakistani Chargé in Kabul had delivered a note to the Afghan Government on the border situation, the Afghan Government had put forth a proposal for joint and simultaneous troop withdrawals. Since the Pakistani Chargé in Kabul had received no instructions on troop withdrawals by May 24, the Embassy recommended in telegram 373 that the Government of Pakistan be prevailed upon to undertake negotiations promptly with Afghanistan. (689.90D/5-2451)
Dept presumes GOP has been further urged accept simultaneous withdrawal per Kabul’s 373, May 24, but if not suggests this be done after consultation UK HICOM.

ACHESON

689.90D3/5-2551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1951—7 p. m.

798. Apparently some misconception re US position Nov 6 approach (Embtd 1126 May 25). Position repeatedly stated Dept unwilling at this stage do more than bring govs together. GOP seemingly unwilling accept this fact as evidenced by efforts achieve GOP-US understanding by letter despite US statement that very basis its proffer of Good Offices is absence any preconditions. GOA has accepted in good faith Nov 6 proposal and all Dept can do is inform GOA of GOP position. Since evident GOP will not accept original US approach, remaining alternatives are rejection or counterproposal (Deptel 785 May 24). Dept has been interested in clarifying GOP proposal and minimizing possible irritation to GOA but has always believed that it was counterproposal and said wld so state to GOA. New tension GOA–GOP relations because of recent troop movements probably makes urgent action reply Nov 6 proposal less desirable at this time.

Emb instructed (1) inform GOP soonest, if not already done, Dept of opinion GOP putting forward counterproposal which wld have to be transmitted to GOA as such; (2) at same time advise GOP Dept. wld of course continue have obvious interest in status Afghan–Pakistan relations as in past. In this connection Emb note original proposal (Deptel 228 Nov 2) which stated US position that Afghan–Pak differences cld and shld be settled by direct negotiation govs involved and that US role limited to bringing parties together. US position does not now include any responsibility for proper observance of agreement.

In its discretion as to time, Emb shld present alternatives to GOP as contained Deptel 785 May 24 with short deadline thereafter for reply. Dept wld then instruct Kabul.

1 Repeated for information to Kabul as telegram 295 and to London as 5528.
2 Telegram 1126, from Karachi, May 25, not printed, included the text of a memorandum from the Government of Pakistan which had been transmitted to the Embassy under cover of a personal note from the Foreign Minister dated May 25. The memorandum in part sought assurances that the U.S. Government would have a “continuing interest in the proper observance” of the proposed agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which would be based mainly on the U.S. approach of November 6. (689.90D3/5-2551)
3 Telegram 228, to Karachi, November 2, 1950, is the same as telegram 117, to Kabul, printed in Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. v, p. 1455.
Dept of opinion any counterproposal useless if Pak’s do not agree on withdrawal of troops (Deptel 766 May 21); wld therefore proceed withdrawal Nov 6 proposal.

ACHESON

689.90D3/6-151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

KARACHI, June 1, 1951—10 a. m.

1151. 1. It is evident now, in view of revealed Pak decision taken on May 9 to adopt defensive positions (Emb tel 1107, May 22),¹ that Defense Secy gave me different interpretation of the then developing sitn of which border raids were only a factor, than that which GOP actually entertained. Similarly MiAtt recd incomplete picture from Pak mil authorities while defense deployment was being carried out. Significantly it was only after deployment was completed that Fon-Min called UK HICOM and myself to present estimate of sitn, and likewise MiAtt was freely given order and timing Pak troop movements after they were completed.

2. It is further evident that despite Pak allegations and ambiguities actual recent additions to strength in areas in question are squadron of eight planes from Peshawar, one infantry battalion from Rawalpindi and about 12 armored cars. Pak motives for lack of forthrightness in describing troop movements and reason therefore are not clear. Motive for secretiveness is made less clear since additional strength moved into affected area is not substantial, units are deployed defensively and Paks have nothing to fear from Afghan mil machine. Dept perhaps correct in conjecture that GOP has lost faith in usefulness bilateral negotiations with Afghans and decided instead to “rattle the sabre” for effect it may have on stopping border raids as well as on making Daud think twice before taking precipitant action.

It may be giving Paks too much credit for global thinking in connection this particular sitn to project considerations probable attitude US and UK. But if such considerations were undertaken it is likely that GOP cld conclude along lines suggested in Dept’s second conjecture.

Third conjecture seems unlikely. Defense Secy informed MiAtt today that no troop movements have taken place in Lahore, Rawalpindi or Peshawar.

Emb has recd no clue in conversations with PriMin, FonMin, and others of a relationship between troop movements and GOP attitude toward Nov 6 approach. Fact is, however, that Pak’s reluctance to

¹Telegram 1107, from Karachi, May 22, not printed, contained information on Pakistani troop movements (689.90D3/3-2251).
accept unconditionally our Nov offer is now matched by parallel refusal to accept GOP offer simultaneous withdrawal troops without imposing unilateral conditions.

3. Discrepancy between FonMin’s statement to me that GOP wld offer simultaneous withdrawal (Embtel 1096, May 20)² and actual offer probably based on my misunderstanding Zafrullah’s precise meaning. Paks did not then nor do they now consider their recent troop dispersal in Chaman area to be abnormal in strength, whereas they regard Afghan concentration around Kandahar as “dangerous”. Hence Pak request for unilateral withdrawal.

It is opinion of Emb, supported by MilAtt, that pattern troop deployment in Baluchistan at present date is one of defense only and that Paks have no offensive designs.


WARREN


SECRET  PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1951—6 p.m.

300. McGhee told PM in NY May 30 that Dept seriously concerned re troop movements approx same size (5,000 men) on either side border; that GOA had proposed to GOP simultaneous withdrawal troops, which US-UK reps (independently of GOA) had urged upon GOP; that despite moderating influence Acting PM several anti-Pak demonstrations had occurred Kabul; that apparently Daud unwilling control these disorders, which might well be followed by additional border incidents; that Daud had told Emb Afghanistan might be forced call USSR its aid; and text GOP reply to Nov 6 approach not yet reed. McGhee expressed hope PM might be able return Kabul sooner than intended perhaps arriving during Ramazan.

PM agreed he wld return Kabul soonest by sea as he cld only travel short distances by air. He said we shld not be concerned with Daud’s reference to USSR (which presented threat all Afghans understood) and that Daud not of nature assume responsibility for polit maneuvers we feared (seizure of power and aggravation border incidents).

Dept informed Afghan Chargé May 31 substance this talk except for PM’s last comment re Daud’s polit ambitions.

ACHESON

¹ Repeated for information to Karachi and London as telegrams 820 and 5595, respectively.
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Pakistan–Afghanistan Affairs (Gatewood)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] June 8, 1951.

Subject: Pushtoonistan

Participants: H.R.H. Shah Mahmud,
Prime Minister of Afghanistan
Abdul Hamid Aziz, Minister Counselor, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, Afghan Embassy
Mr. McGhee—NEA
Mr. Mathews—SOA
Mr. Gatewood—SOA

Problem:
Explore means of improving Afghan–Pakistan relations.

Action Required:
To convince the Afghan Prime Minister that it is not in Afghani-
stan's best interest to press the Pushtoonistan issue at this time.

Action Assigned to:
NEA.

On the occasion of the Prime Minister’s visit to Mr. McGhee’s
Virginia farm, the Prime Minister was requested to review the Pushto-
noonistan question. There ensued a 3-hour discussion, throughout
which Mr. Aziz acted as interpreter for the Prime Minister, who made
the following initial points:

(1) After describing in some detail the location and nomenclature
of the tribes on both sides of the Durand Line and their relationship
to each other, the Prime Minister pointed out that tribes to the east
of the line had never been directly administered by the British who
had done nothing to improve their condition except to build a few
military roads and some forts.

(2) Afghanistan wishes no additional territory but is seriously
concerned with obtaining self-government and improved living stan-
dards for the Pushtoon people. (He admitted that more than half of
the Pushtoon-speaking people live outside Afghanistan.)

(3) The Durand Line is an artificial boundary, largely drawn across
the crests of mountains, and the 1921 treaty 1 establishing this bound-
ary was only agreed to initially by Afghanistan with great reluctance,
and is not worthy of much consideration (implying that Pakistan did

1 Treaty between Great Britain and Afghanistan establishing Friendly and
Commercial Relations, signed at Kabul, November 22, 1921; text in British and
not inherit any rights or obligations from the British under this treaty, which the Afghans have, nevertheless, failed to denounce, as they might).

Mr. McGhee reiterated two points he had made during his visit to Kabul: (a) that the principle of self-determination, though popular after World War I, had proved most difficult of application in the last 20 years; and (b) that the area called "Pushtoonistan" was not economically viable. He also pointed out that the tribes in this area had been associated for many years with British India, perhaps more closely than with Afghanistan.

The Prime Minister replied that: (a) these tribes had, in fact, very close associations with various Afghan Governments during the War of Independence (against the British), the reign of King Amanullah, and the establishment of the present (Mohammedzai) dynasty in 1929; (b) furthermore, they were most intelligent and ingenious, as shown by their remarkable ability in reproducing European types of rifles, and could make rapid progress if they received outside assistance, particularly if such aid were to develop their untouched mineral resources; and (c) though it might be true that the principle of self-determination had led to difficult political situations, nevertheless, it formed the basis for the establishment of small states such as Trans-Jordan and Israel.

Mr. McGhee said that the Prime Minister had unhappily picked poor examples to illustrate his last argument, as Trans-Jordan had been established because of British strategic interests in the Middle East, and Israel was being upheld by large amounts of American aid. He went on to say that, as for Pushtoonistan, Afghanistan could not support it, Pakistan would not countenance it, and the United States had too many commitments to be able to give it any assistance; it seemed to him, therefore, that, without any possibility of outside aid, without a seaport, and with only sparse resources, the inhabitants of "Pushtoonistan" would have a dim future, unless they chose to join their efforts with those of West Pakistan, which is a progressive and democratic state. On this last point Mr. McGhee alluded to the fact that the Pakistan constitution, though not yet completed, contemplated representation for the inhabitants of the tribal areas and that Pakistan had begun to execute certain important development projects that should provide opportunities for improving the condition of the tribes.

*King of Afghanistan, 1919–1929.
The Prime Minister summed up the principal reasons for Afghan support of the Pashtoon-speaking tribes as follows:

(1) The close bonds of blood relationships and mutual political influence between these people and the Afghans;
(2) The demands of the whole Afghan people (not of the Afghan Government only) for Pashtoon independence;
(3) The verdict of history, with which future generations would praise or condemn present Afghan leaders in proportion to the effort put forth to protect and aid the Pashtoons; and
(4) The consciousness that there should be justice done to the Pashtoons for their long-standing efforts to preserve their independence.

The Prime Minister emphasized that Afghanistan would pursue these aims only by peaceful means and that, if the Pashtoons were abandoned by the GOA, the present Afghan rulers might be overthrown by a popular revolution.

Mr. McGhee said that, without further disputing the cogency of the Prime Minister’s arguments, it seemed to him that the persistence of Afghan–Pakistan differences over Pashtoonistan might provide a spark to a world conflagration; that all the countries of the free world, including Afghanistan, were struggling to preserve the peace and build up their strength as quickly as possible; and that the free nations would, in one or two years, acquire such combined power as to deter the USSR from further aggression. Under these circumstances, he urged the Prime Minister to believe that these were not times in which to persist in pressing the Pashtoonistan issue.

The Prime Minister replied that he agreed entirely with Mr. McGhee’s opinion but felt he must point out that, by the will of God, the Afghans had been able to retain their freedom by fighting for it (implying that the Pashtoons might feel impelled to follow this example), and that he hoped Mr. McGhee would carry his point with the Pakistanis also (indicating that Pakistan’s stubbornness was a great stumbling block to the GOA).

Mr. McGhee replied that we had indeed pressed Pakistan to consider the consequences of its actions and we would continue to do so. He said he wished to make it quite clear that it was only “Pashtoonistan” that we felt we could not assist and that we had every hope of continuing to help Afghanistan. The Prime Minister inquired whether, as Pakistan was buying arms in the United States, some aid might not be extended to allow Afghanistan to do this also. Mr. McGhee said that Pakistan arms purchases here had been of little significance, to which the Prime Minister replied good-naturedly that something was better than nothing.
The Chargé in Afghanistan (Horner) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

KABUL, June 11, 1951—6 p.m.

410. Deptel 304, June 5. I called on First Under Secy MFA this morning to inform him of Pak reply to US démarche Nov 6, 1950. I had previously sought interview with acting PM, who however, stated he was overwhelmed with work and asked me to see Abdul Samad instead.

In discussion I urged upon Abdul Samad view that whereas Pak reply did not represent full acceptance our démarche still it did go long way and if it cld be accepted by GOA atmosphere more conducive to calm discussion wld result. Abdul Samad mentioned but without heat that GOA had rejected proposal from Colonel Shah which “went further” than present Pak counter to our original para 4. However, he said he wd discuss Pak answer with Acting PM first thing tomorrow (I left him aide-mémoire) and wd keep me advised result. He threw in gratuitous observation that Ali Mohamed had deep desire to see detente between these two Islamic countries and that GOA in consequence wld go as far as it cld in direction of free discussion. Key point in Abdul Samad’s mind was whether Pak counterproposal was intended to preclude discussion “Pushtun question”. I cld only point to plain language Pak message to effect “GOP will also be prepared to discuss with Afghan Amb all matters of common concern”, and suggested this shld be accepted in most generous spirit by GOA.

Whether or not due to Ramazan lethargy, I found Abdul Samad in much more accommodating state of mind than I have seen him before. Instead of wild threats of summary Afghan defeat Paks, he likened this country to sparrow which being faced with throat cutting places pathetic little paws upon knife blade.


Horner

1 Telegram 304, to Kabul, June 6, not printed, repeated the text of telegram 1173, from Karachi, June 5, also not printed, which in part transmitted the text of a brief memorandum from Zafrulla which reiterated the reply of the Pakistan Government to the U.S. approach of November 6 (as stated in the Pakistan memorandum of May 15, summarized in the editorial note, p. 1970; together with the memorandum enclosed with the Foreign Minister’s letter of May 25, as summarized in footnote 2, p. 1977). The present memorandum further stated that the reply of the Pakistan Government might be transmitted to the Afghan Government. (689.90D/6-551)
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan

CONFIDENTIAL  PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1951—2 p.m.

8. UK HICOM Karachi reported Brit Emb here Afghan PriMin declined Pak GovGen invitation July 2 on grounds health but with hint that last prominent Afghan visitor Karachi (presumably Shah Wali) 2 not too pleased with reception. As Afghan-Pak relations again deteriorating after border incident (Embtels 9 and 14 July 2 and 3) 4 Dept wld welcome Emb suggestions re action improve sit.

In its discretion Emb shld query FonOff re intention reply Pak counterproposal (Emtne 410 June 11) and Pak suggestion re conference prevention border raids (London tel 22 May 29). 4 If FonOff vague Emb might point out delay gives Pak chance to claim Afghans unwilling negotiate and ascertain whether replies are being postponed until return PriMin.

FYI GOA does not seem wish make any move now toward settlement differences possibly because govt can use Pushtoon issue to rally popular support and divert attn from domestic difficulties and because delays (with renewed intensity Kashmir problem) may enable GOA exact higher price for better relations. Emb may find other reasons also.

Emb Karachi comments requested.

ACHESON

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1 Repeated for information to Karachi as telegram 11, and to London and Paris by air.
2 Prince Shah Wali Khan was Afghan Ambassador to the United Kingdom. Actually, the prominent visitor mentioned here was Hashim Khan, who had been Prime Minister of Afghanistan, 1929–1947. The Department made the correction in telegram 25, to Kabul, July 14, the text of which is printed on p. 1986.
3 Telegrams 9 and 14, from Kabul, July 2 and 3, neither printed, dealt with reports of renewed tribal raids and Afghan–Pakistan fighting in the border area (689.90D/7–251 and 7–351).
4 Same as telegram 6257, from London to Washington, May 29, not printed, repeated for information to Kabul as 22 and to Karachi as 91. It described a discussion of the current Afghan–Pakistan situation with the British Foreign Office. (689.90D/5–2951)

The Ambassador in Afghanistan (Merrell) 3 to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

KABUL, July 11, 1951—1 p.m.

26. ReDeptel 8, July 6. In reply to my inquiry yesterday Acting PriMin said answer to Pak counterproposal wld be sent me in few days. Meanwhile he wld tell me it could not be accepted in view of

3 George R. Merrell had been appointed Ambassador to Afghanistan on April 19.
fact that fourth point was merely "beating around bush," that Afghan Govt must satisfy "the people," that Pushtunistan wld be discussed and that it cld not have new Amb to Karachi placed in position of being told it was a domestic matter.

Regarding recent incidents he said that if neutral commission were to be sent to border it cld be proved that incidents were instigated by Paks.

Only suggestions which occur to me at present for improving sit are: (1) Possibility of convincing Afghans of fact stated to me by Saudi Arabian Min here who is much venerated in Afghanistan as a protector of Mecca that all Muslims in world except Afghans are opposed to creation of Pushtunistan. Min informs me he has already endeavored to dissuade King and officials of govt; (2) Dept might consider offering neutral ground at Washington for discussions between reps of both govt's encouraged by Dept's friendly assistance and removed from emotional tensions and national sensitivities of area.

Further unfavorable fact is govt notice that Sept 2 has been named Pushtunistan Day and will probably be used to intensify feelings and worsen sit. Perhaps one favorable aspect of question, however, is that King's speech at recent Eid celebration made only barest ref to Pushtuns and Acting PriMin's reply thereto made no mention of issue.


MERRELL

689.90D/7-1151: Telegram

The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

KARACHI, July 11, 1951—2 p. m.

33. Re Deptel 11, July 6.¹ Pakistanis say there was nothing wrong with their reception of Shah Wali, but that he refused all offers hospitality including invitation to stay with Gov Gen,² and insisted on haranguing protocol officer who met him on Pushtoonistan.

Emb feels many of reported border incidents are not important in themselves and that their chief significance lies in exaggerated publicity given to them by each side as evidence of hostility and bad faith of the other. In our opinion a conf to discuss prevention border raids such as has been suggested by Pakistanis wld probably result in nothing more than an exchange of recriminations. What is needed is not a method of preventing raids, but the will to stop them and to stop talking about them.

¹ Same as telegram 8, to Kabul, July 6, p. 1954.
² Khwaja Nazimuddin, Governor General of Pakistan.
Consequently, even if Afghans reject a Pakistan counterproposal it
seems to us useful to call upon both govts to accept principle of point
2 our Nov 6 approach, namely to work toward preventing tribal in-
cidents and avoiding publicity on those that do occur.
Dept pass London; sent Dept 33. Rptd info London 3, Kabul
unnumbered.

WARREN

689.90D/7-1151 : Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY WASHINGTON, July 14, 1951—5 p. m.
25. Amb might his discretion seek informal interview Acting
PriMin (Embtel 26 July 11) to express concern over recent deteriora-
tion Afghan-Pak relations and make fol pts:

1) If GOA refuses Pak counter-proposal Dept will transmit msg
to GOP but believes Pak will let matter drop. This will mean US
no longer in position exercise its good offices (ReDeptel 117 Nov 2)\(^1\)
as go-between.
FYI Dept believes GOA reasons rejecting Pak counter-proposal
not entirely valid as a) GOA already agreed no agenda on talks when
accepting Nov 6 approach hence questionable GOA cld tell people
“Pushtoonistan” to be discussed and b) GOA understood publicity
re talks was to be mutually agreed upon and doubtful Pak wld con-
cur with public statements wholly satis GOA.
2) If GOA turns down Pak counter-proposal without suggesting
measures improve relations it wld appear lack willingness for any
rapprochement. Even if GOA rejects however might consider suggest-
ing GOP that some agreement cld be reached on steps to cease propa-
ganda and to use best efforts both govts to prevent border incidents
and to consult in case they occurred. Both govts appear already agreed
in principle on these points. (Karachi tel 33 July 11)

FYI Dept does not favor neutral comm to fix blame past incidents.
Emb suggestions under consideration for possible use at later date.
Suggestion Wash site talks might imply US mediation which Dept
still wishes to avoid. Correct Deptel 8, July 6 to read Hashim Khan for
Shah Wali.\(^2\)

ACHESON

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\(^2\) Ambassador Merrell reported in telegram 47, from Kabul, July 19, not printed,
that he had conveyed to the Acting Prime Minister the substance of points
1 and 2 of telegram 25 to Kabul, July 14. All Mohammad seemed to appreciate
the Department’s position but said he did not see how the Afghan Government
could accept a Pakistani counterproposal or suggest a means of improving
relations until Pakistan had agreed to discuss Pushtunistan. (689.90D/7-1951)
689.90/7-2851: Telegram

The Ambassador in Afghanistan (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Kabul, July 27, 1951—11 a.m.

68. It is not necessary to admit validity of GOP charge that GOI is financially and morally behind pro-Pashtunistan propaganda to see close inter-connection between Kashmir and Pashtun issues. Without any doubt outbreak actual hostilities over Kashmir wld present GOA with challenge. Expressed differently, there wld exist strong temptation to join GOI in hope (or possibly as result prior agreement) of obtaining NWFP and Baluchistan. This potential opportunity to secure for Afghan exit to sea and considerable accretion territory wld be held in check by fear of internal troubles, for it is seriously open to doubt whether regime cld carry with it Pashtun tribesmen in war at side infidel Hindus and Sikhs.

As Dept aware, present govt is made up of such diverse elements, and yields such tenuous auth, that it is impossible to predict how it will react in face given situation. However Acting PM in discussion yesterday admitted that outbreak Indian-Pak hostilities wld impose severe strain on GOA to extent that he personally wld be unable to gauge consequences internally. Other observers believe without question that tribesmen wld be irresistibly drawn to side of Pak, and that if GOA attempted take pro-Indian stand it wld be overthrown in quick order. In consequence an attempt at neutrality, at least in early stages, wld seem obvious policy govt. As against this clear course of wisdom (which, however, might fail shld tribesmen move on Kashmir as they did in 1947), voices are heard inland advocating prompt move thru Khyber and Chaman. Whereas we consider Af mil capacities to be extremely limited, it is sad commentary that many Afghans tend to be guided by their emotions rather than minds.


Merrell

Kabul Embassy Files

The Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Ambassador in Afghanistan (Merrell)

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

WASHINGTON, August 14, 1951.

Dear George: Since your arrival last month in Kabul, I have intended to write you about a number of outstanding problems affecting Afghanistan. Your reports are most helpful and indicate that we are
witnessing a new phase in the internal political situation there. We have been particularly interested in your summaries of significant events showing that the people of Afghanistan are acquiring greater political consciousness and are comparing their own depressed living standards with those of their more prosperous neighbors. The so-called liberal elements, though lacking in leadership at present, seem to offer opportunities for the exercise of tactful and beneficial United States influence. Without identifying ourselves too closely with them, we may be able to influence them sufficiently so as to prevent their capture by Communist infiltration.

Pushtoonistan is always with us and is likely to be for some time. I think you will agree that a minimum requirement of our policy is to discourage Afghan agitation of this issue, reduce tension as much as possible, and hope that time and wiser counsels on both sides will prevail. Economic development of the country may help to eliminate some of the emotional bases for “Pushtoonistan.” That is not to say, however, that we should not continually strive to settle the issue bilaterally or through other appropriate means. Incidentally, I doubt that my remarks to the Afghan Prime Minister on June 8 ever filtered down to the Afghan Foreign Office; perhaps it will be useful for you to find an occasion to repeat these points to Ali Mohammed, as we suggested in our telegram No. 36 of July 20.

It will be interesting to learn what the Prime Minister’s position is when he returns. I believe it would be very unfortunate from our point of view for him to retire. He has many ideals similar to those of the West and seems to be respected by the Pakistanis as well as the Afghans. His visit here was successful, I think, in making him a better friend to the United States, but it is now clear that we were unable to prevail upon him to make an early return to Afghanistan. This may reflect a desire among certain elements in Afghanistan to keep him away at this particular time or the possibility that he is holding himself in reserve for a real crisis in either internal or external affairs.

1 Telegram 36 to Kabul, July 20, not printed, in part requested Ambassador Merrell, should the Afghan reply to the Pakistani counterproposal be a flat refusal, to remind the Acting Prime Minister of the substance of McGhee’s March 12 conversations in Kabul and of his June 8 talk with the Prime Minister. He was to emphasize the following points: (1) Pushtoonistan is not an economically or politically viable state; (2) the insistence of the Government of Afghanistan in pressing the Pushtun issue under present world conditions is not believed to be in the best interests of Afghanistan or of world peace, a view with which the Prime Minister indicated agreement; and (3) the principles of self-determination have proved difficult in practice during the last 20 years. (689.80D/7-1151)

Telegram 72 to Kabul, August 17, not printed, instructed the Embassy to transmit the formal Afghan reply, when received, to the Department for forwarding to the Government of Pakistan. If the Afghan reply was a flat refusal, the Embassy was to make the representations indicated in telegram 36 to Kabul of July 20. (689.80D/8-861)
The MKA oil situation may be a matter of concern for some time and we intend to lend appropriate assistance while following the general line you recently recommended, i.e. to make the Afghans shoulder some responsibility for negotiating with the GOP, at least on the technical level. I believe the record shows that the GOP has done pretty well by us and MKA and you might find this useful sometimes in countering the perennial Afghan contention that Pakistan is constantly trying to strangle their economy. On the other hand, I quite agree with your recent telegram indicating that, if Indo-Pakistan tensions increase, Afghanistan will be in a very tight spot both politically and economically.

I have noted with great interest your reports of increasing USSR activity in Kabul, and I know you will keep us alert to any hints of a change in their objectives or plains, which might lead to some internal coup.

The application of the Kem Amendment \(^\text{2}\) to Afghanistan is another matter of some concern at this time. We hope that Afghanistan, like India, may be granted exemption and that US aid, though small, may stimulate the Afghan development program and indirectly ease the Pashtoonistan issue. Meanwhile, it is gratifying to know that the two dams being financed by the Export-Import loan may cost only $16 million, so that the $5 million balance might possibly be used for land utilization.

In the administrative field, we are fully aware of the need for expanding the Embassy staff and arranging for additional housing. Fritz Larkin \(^\text{3}\) has promised to visit Kabul some time this year. We are doing everything possible to get you more personnel, though I am sure you realize that a good deal of time is needed to select suitable people. I think it is particularly necessary to continue utilizing the USIE program so as to reach more Afghans, especially those who are just now beginning to become more sophisticated politically. We are also trying to persuade the Air Force to let you make the maximum use of the Air Attaché’s plane.

I still recall with great pleasure my visit with you in Addis and hope that some time I may have occasion to see you also in Kabul. With warm personal regards and best wishes to the members of your staff, I am

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE C. MCGHEE

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\(^{2}\) The Kem Amendment, Section 1302 of P.L. 45, Third Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1951, approved June 2, 1951 (65 Stat. 52), so-named after Senator James P. Kem of Missouri, provided for a ban on economic assistance to countries exporting strategic materials to Communist-bloc countries.

\(^{3}\) Frederick Larkin, Chief, Division of Foreign Buildings Operations.
Editorial Note

In an aide-mémoire of September 6 sent by the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Embassy at Kabul, the Afghan Government reiterated its view that the dispute between the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan centered on the unresolved political and legal position of the trans-Afghan Pashtuns whose natural ties were with the Pashtuns of Afghanistan. Afghanistan and Pakistan should seek a formula to determine the political and legal status of the Pashtuns and thereby promote peace in the area. The Afghan Government noted that it had prepared two formulas which were transmitted earlier in the year to Pakistan through Colonel Shah, and that it was still prepared to enter into discussions on the basis of either formula. Under the first formula, Afghanistan and Pakistan would agree that the question of the trans-Afghan Pashtuns should be determined through diplomatic channels at the earliest opportunity. Under the second formula, the same course would be followed but the two governments would in addition seek to fulfill the aspirations of the Pashtuns and consider means of establishing peace and improving economic, cultural, and administrative conditions in the Pashtun homeland. Under both formulas, the two parties would also agree to cease propaganda against the other and to exchange ambassadors as soon as possible.

Ambassador Merrell reported to the Department that whereas this Afghan reply was not very helpful, it did not constitute a “flat refusal,” and he was therefore not carrying out the instructions contained in the Department’s telegram 72 of August 24 (see footnote 1, page 1988), pending further instructions. (Telegram 139 from Kabul, September 10; 689.90D/9–1051)

689.90D/9–1051: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, September 27, 1951—2 p. m.

119. Re Embtel 139, Sep 10. Assuming Aide-Mémoire official GOA position re Pak counterproposal Emb in its discretion shld point out to FonOff:

1. It wld appear from Aide-Mémoire that US Nov 6 proposal can no longer usefully serve as basis for improving Afghan Pak relations as both govts concerned have found it impossible agree on all four points US approach.

1 Not printed, but see editorial note, supra.
2. Both govts however appear have reached agreement on first three points Nov 6 approach thus encouraging US hope that they may pursue further bilateral negotiations (such as Shah talks) leading to better understanding between them.

3. As it appears Shah talks thoroughly explored possibility of agreement on terms of Nov 6 approach, it wld seem unnecessary for US Govt transmit any further communication from GOA to GOP this regard.

4. Consequently US Govt considers further discussion Nov 6 approach wld serve no useful purpose and considers this approach at an end.

5. At same time US sincerely hopes both govts will be able take bilaterally effective measures lessen existing tensions.

Report GOA reactions soonest.

Acheson

689.90D/10–851

The Ambassador in Afghanistan (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

Confidential

Kabul, October 8, 1951—6 p.m.

178. Minister Foreign Affairs did not react very vividly to contents of Deptel 119, Sept 27, which I conveyed to him yesterday altho he indicated that he might send reply in writing. He did take exception, however, to phraseology “govts concerned have found it impossible agree on all four points US approach,” pointing out that GOA did accept all four points and that GOP alone had rejected fourth point. I told him that we thoroughly realized and appreciated this and that expression merely meant that agreement cld not be reached.

In course of conversation when I remarked that we had hope that expression “GOP will also be prepared to discuss with GOA all matters of common concern” in Pakistani counterproposal was meant to include question of Pashtuns, he said that this possibility had been ruled out (confirming their previous view) only a few days ago when the Pakistani Charge had asked what they wanted besides recognition of Pashtun problem, that “they wld give them anything else.” To this Minister Foreign Affairs replied to Chargé that they were not “bargaining,” that they felt other problems cld be solved after relations were improved.

Pakistani Chargé confirmed to Horner today that he had suggested willingness his govt to make important concessions in economic field, with strong implication this wld constitute return for GOA relinquishment Pashtun issue. Chargé went on to say that response Ali Mohd was emphatic negative.


Merrell
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, October 10, 1951.

384. View inability both govt’s agree all points Nov 6 approach, wld appear this suggestion no longer basis improving relations two govt’s. You shld inform GOP therefore US Govt considers Nov 6 approach at an end. You shld also express sincere hopes US Govt both govt’s may pursue further bilateral negotts (such as Shah talks) leading to a better understanding between them, and that both govt’s will be able take bilaterally effective measures lessen existing tensions. Cable GOP reactions soonest.²

ACHESON

¹ Repeated for information to Kabul as telegram 135, to London as 1939, and to New Delhi as 795.
² In telegram 396 from Karachi, October 12, not printed, Ambassador Warren informed the Department that he had delivered the message contained in telegram 384 to Karachi, October 10. The Prime Minister stated that Abdul Majid, the former Afghan Minister of National Economy, was arriving in Karachi from Kabul within the next few days and would stop over for a 2-day visit. Arrangements had already been made for him to resume his conversations with Colonel Shah during his stay. (690D.91/10-1251)

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, October 15, 1951—6:12 p. m.

138. While for purposes past negotts Dept has been willing give GOA benefit of doubt re GOAs initial acceptance Nov 6 approach (Embtel 167 Nov 13, 1950)¹ is now apparent GOA has had mental reservations in addition to suggestions listed in refet. Dept therefore hopes Emb will not encourage GOA (Embtel 178 Oct 8, 1951) believe USG now considers GOAs acceptance was unqualified. GOAs original mental reservations evidenced by subsequent efforts introduce Pashtoonistan issue.

Dept also hopes Emb will not make further ref to Pashtoon problem in context of second para Embtel 178 Oct 8. Dept has studiously avoided volunteering to GOA or Afghan Emb officials any interpretation GOP position vis-à-vis demarche. Informing GOA that US had hoped discussions wld include Pashtoon question might be maliciously interpreted to GOP by GOA as US support for “Pashtoonistan” campaign which aims at dismemberment Pak. Emb will recall that in his initial comment on US approach (Embtel 159 Nov 6,

1950s, the Government of India (GOI) was careful to remind Emb Afghans held tribal areas to be "independent".

Depr. wld appreciate Emb's estimate current activity GOI in support GOA Pashtoonistan campaign.

ACHESON

*Not printed.

682.90D/10-1751: Telegram

The Ambassador in Afghanistan (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

KABUL, October 17, 1951—3 p. m.

194. We wish to offer fol comments seriatim on points raised Deptel 188, Oct 15:

(1) We have all along considered it self-evident that GOA interpreted our Nov 6 proposal as offering basis for discussion Pashtun issue. Further, it seems obvious from GOP delay in acceptance, and its reframing of point 4 thereof, that GOP also realized that proposal as originally worded offered opportunity for GOA to bring up Pashtun question. Further, as we have reported, GOA consistently has made it clear that Pashtun issue only matter it is interested in discussing with GOP and that it wld not be prepared to go into what it considered secondary subjects in dispute (Emb 178, Oct 8) unless this first and primary matter was settled to its satisfaction. In this sense we feel employment term "mental reservations" as misconception facts of case.

(2) It has been our belief that main intent of Nov 6 approach was to bring about end to newspaper and radio war over Pashtun issue, and to substitute calm and reasoned talks between two parties on mutually acceptable basis. It was just as inevitable that GOA wld interpret term "without a previously agreed agenda or stated preconditions" in point 4 Nov 6 approach as permitting discussion Pashtunistan as that GOP wld see to substitute other wording ostensibly covering same ground but in fact circumscribing right GOA to introduce matters deemed by GOP of purely internal import. It was in terms basic need to bring two parties together that expression "GOP will also be prepared to discuss with GOA all matters of common concern" was (Emb 178, Oct 8) mentioned to Min Fon Affairs as possibly affording means of discussing "question of Pashtuns" (which obviously is not the same thing as Pashtunistan state as such). Further, far from encouraging GOA to believe US supports Pashtunistan concept, we have consistently made plain our belief that such state wld be non-viable, and that support for it on part Pashtuns on other side of Durand Line (or for that matter in Afghan itself) is highly ques-
tonable. We have no doubt that GOA harbors no misapprehensions on
this score, and in fact we have been given many indications that GOA
regards attitude this mission on Pashtun question as distinctly frigid.

(3) Our views on entire Pashtunistan question are set forth in con-
siderable detail in Embdes 131, Oct 12, which shld reach Dept shortly. 1
In summary, we feel prospects new and successful effort to end Pak-
Afghan imbroglio must await propitious conditions.

(4) We consider it strong probability that Afghans are receiving
financial (in addition to obvious moral) support from India. Clearly
Pashtun question intimately linked with Kashmir problem, which pro-
vides main Indian motivation. We cannot adduce any concrete proof
of Indian financial aid, which undoubtedly is indirect. However,
Afghan exparliamentarian Habib, now operating under auspices in
Peshawar, has told reliable source that Indian import duties on
Afghan goods are collected and retained by Afghan customs authori-
ties at Chamen, and earmarked for Pashtunistan propaganda. There
is probable substance in this charge. Other means support takes such
form as punitive subsidization Pashtun-propaganda organs published
in India.

MERRELL

1 This 16-page despatch, not printed, contained a summary of the question which
recapitulated most of the points documented in the present compilation and that
for the year 1950 (689.90D/10-1251).

689.90D/10-2051: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices  

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 20, 1951—3: 57 p. m.

377. Afghan Chargé handed Dept Oct 18 translated communiqué
from Kabul for local press, stating in summary if GOP identification
Liaquat’s assassin 2 Seyed Akhbar as Afghan national correct, it was
clear Akhbar had no connection Afghanistan for reasons that Akhbar
and brother involved in unsuccessful insurrection against GOA 1944
southern province fol which they interned India. Communiqué indi-
cated GOA revulsion assassination.

Approval expressed restrained tone Afghan disclaimer and hoped
sympathetic dispassionate attitude wld continue so as avoid aggravat-
ing relations two countries during difficult period while facts motiva-
tion still not clearly established.

1 Sent to the Ambassador in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, the United King-
dom, and the Soviet Union.

2 The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, was assassinated on
October 18 in Rawalpindi, Pakistan.
Emb Kabul shld seek occasion soonest convey substance above remarks to FonOff. While Dept recognizes necessity Afghan pronouncement in answer implications press reports, believes best interest both countries served by limiting public discussion. Request earliest transmission fullest info and Emb comments re alleged 1944 insurrection and possibility Commie instigation assassination.

ACHERSON

659.90D/10-2351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Afghanistan (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

KABUL, October 23, 1951—5 p. m.

204. I saw FonMin this morning and conveyed to him substance of para 2 Depirtel 377 Oct 20. He said that he had been shocked to learn of assassination of Liaquat, for whom he had great admiration, and had been much upset by Pak radio charge that GOA was involved. He emphasized that return of consul from Peshawar on day of assassination was mere coincidence; that leaving his family there he had come to Kabul for purpose of discussing matter mentioned in Oct 18 communiqué on orders issued by FonMin 10 days previously and that he wld return shortly.

"Alleged 1944 insurrection" was one of series of tribal outbreaks which have plagued country from time immemorial.

It seems established that Seyed Akbar was one of minor leaders of this rebellion, which was led by his elder brother. Some of rebels, including Seyed Akbar, held out until Jan 1947, when they fled to Brit India and were given asylum. However at least one brother has since returned to Afghan and is mental case in Kabul. FonMin who has no idea of who instigated murder nor of motive and says similar assassination cld occur here any day, knows that elder brother of assassin recently visited Afghan republican group in Karachi.

During Brit rule it was custom of GOI to grant asylum to unsuccessful Afghan rebels and to afford them small pensions. Thus grandfather present King lived in exile in United Provinces of India and his sons, including present PriMin, were born and brought up there.

Records UK Emb here indicate Seyed Akbar did receive regular pension from the GOI, which probably was continued by GOP.

PriMin, in conversation with my Brit colleague ¹ on Oct 20 (it had been arranged sometime before murder) expressed considerable apprehension over effects Liaquat murder. Brit Amb remarked that if some were disposed to depict GOA instigator this was but natural result of exacerbated relations between two countries for which GOA must

¹ The British Ambassador in Afghanistan was Alfred John Gardener.
bear its share of blame. Shah Mahmoud stated emphatically that GOA had nothing whatever to do with assassination. We are inclined to believe such is the case, while not overruling possibility that certain Afghan elements may have had a hand in affair.

On the face of it assassination Liaquat wld hardly seem to further Afghan interests and on contrary seems calculated to harm them. However, as we have commented before, Afghans do not always act from what we wld consider rational motives.

We think it highly improbable that Commies were behind assassination and have seen no suggestion to that effect. While assassination might, by further worsening Pak-Af relations, generally be to advantage USSR, on basis facts available to us we wld dismiss Sov implication as unlikely. FonMin, who says he is not very familiar with Commie activities in Pak, also feels they were not involved.²

Dept pass Karachi sent Dept 24 rptd info Karachi 31, pouched New Delhi unnumbered, Moscow unnumbered, London unnumbered.

MERRELL

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²Telegram 429 from Karachi, October 23, not printed, reported that, in accordance with the request of the Pakistani Government, the Pakistani press had since October 16 refrained from referring to the Afghan connection of the assassin. The Government had not released to the public the information that the assassin was in contact with the Afghan Consul at Peshawar. The telegram further reported that the Pakistani Government had no information indicating any Communist connection with the assassination. (689.90D/10-2351)

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689.90D/11-351: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, November 3, 1951—3:29 p.m.

154. Amb's¹ remarks conversation with McGhee 31st re Pak relations included fol:

1. Expression GOA disappointment termination Nov 6 approach.
2. Breakdown due GOP unwillingness accept formula in language permitting possibility discussion status Pashtoons.
3. GOA like US keenly aware chief danger USSR, hence greatly concerned prevent additional Asian crisis.
4. Notwithstanding UK-GOP assertions no discontent border area we shld not overlook fact this crisis developing daily. Symptoms anti-Pak feeling which Afghans unable ignore include tribal dels to Kabul, "weekly" border clashes, presence Chitral refugee Kabul as fugitive from "intolerable pressures" (Karachi desp 443 Oct 11),² and assassination Liaquat.
5. Continued bilateral negts futile; only hope settlement is continuation US efforts.

¹Sardar Mohammed Naim, Afghan Ambassador.
²Not printed.
McGhee referred long-standing efforts this Govt, his conversations GOA and GOP PriMins in search workable formula implement Nov 6 approach. However in absence complete acceptance terms both sides US had no alternative but withdraw this particular procedure. Although US still interested supporting other possibilities (perhaps along lines Col Shah talks), parties shld exercise own responsibility for area stability and obligation other free nations and not rely primarily upon US arrange settlement.

Emphasized (1) overriding seriousness world sitn must be main preoccupation small as well as large free nations; (2) although US recognized as natural, local and national aspirations, short-term stability more important than immediate fulfillment; (3) hence our hope Afg wld be able hold local problem in abeyance next few years as contribution to success in dealing with world menace; (4) commented favorably restraint both GOA and GOP press re possible implications Afg origin Liaquat assassin and urged continuation restraint all aspects Afg Pak relations with confidence elimination world tensions next few years wld permit solution local issues. Naim made no suggestions possibility referring problem to internatl body.

Naim continued conversation with reference Afg interest mil equipment from US (Embdesp 100 Sep 6) and expressed keen desire GOA learn US reactions. McGhee said Dept giving serious study Afg note. Asked if he wld press matter, Asst Secy said within limitations our many commitments it wld receive all possible consideration earliest.

In view indications PriMin not currently inclined emphasize "Push-toonistan" issue (Embte 208 Oct 25), does Emb believe Naim's remarks may indicate genuine desire find face-saving formula for receding from present position?  

*Not printed.

689.90D/11-551: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Afghanistan (Merrell) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

KABUL, November 8, 1951—5 a.m.

231. In hour and quarter conversation with PriMin this morning during which he frequently referred to US as Afghan's best friend and incidentally indicated our request for dipl exchange rate seemed perfectly reasonable (Cabinet wld take it up Monday) and said "of course" we cld send occasional and extremely urgent messages by your own radio if we kept the matter secret (Embdes 70, August 11) he

1 November 12.
2 Despatch 70, August 11, not printed, concerned the transmission of Embassy messages by radio (116.1/8-1151).
endeavored to appeal to my vanity by saying I cld make a great name for myself if I cld solve the outstanding dispute between Afghan and Pak. When he replied in negative as to whether he had any new ideas how this cld be done or how Afghan cld cooperate I emphasized my opinion that cessation of provocative and useless propaganda by both sides wld help a great deal. To this he replied quite categorically that if US wld give an undertaking to see that the question of Pashtuns were brought before UN “in three or four years when world was calmer” he wld be willing to abolish all propaganda. When asked if that meant question of Pashtunistan wld be dropped he said yes. He explained that such an undertaking wld have to be a written document so that he wld have something to show “the young men of Afghan” and some of the tribal leaders.

Whether this furnishes the possibility of a solution or not, it certainly seems to verify Afghan’s keen desire for face-saving formula (last para Deptel 154, November 3).^3

Dept pass Karachi. Sent Dept 231; rptd info Karachi 36.

Merrell

^3 In telegram 165, to Kabul, November 15, the Department replied as follows: “Dept inclined agree PriMins remarks (Embtel 231 Nov 8) may reflect desire find face saving formula, but for time being Dept believes it has exhausted all possibilities. Dept assumes Emb agrees consideration PriMins proposal re UN out of question. We shld continue urge Afghan officials to talk directly with Paks re their common problems.” (689.90D/11-851)

689.90D/11-1551: Telegram

The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

KARACHI, November 15, 1951—10 p. m.

524. Acting FonMin Mahmud Hussain informed me tonight in conversation called at his request that Paks had recd info over past two-three weeks that Afghan auths had recently surreptitiously released from incarceration over 120 known killers with orders infiltrate Pak and eliminate Pak public men. At first Paks did not believe but Hussain states that info has now reached Paks causing them consider reports beyond doubt. He wld not reveal sources of latter info beyond admitting that some came from Pak Emb Kabul, but with most from many other sources. Added that if other public men assassinated by suspected Afghan nationals, govt will be unable hold people in check.

Dept pass Kabul; sent Dept 524, rptd info Kabul 43.

Warren
The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

KARACHI, November 15, 1951—10 p.m.

525. In conversation tonight Mahmud Hussain Acting Fon Min stated that when Abdul Majid in Karachi on way to US he called on PriMin and on Hussain. Majid stated to Hussain Afghan had to make friends with Paks otherwise Afghan wld be “taken over by Soviets”. Hussain replied Paks willing go all out on their side improve Pak-Afghan relations on mutual basis economically and politically, exchanging Amb, ceasing propaganda and even discussing Pushtoon question without publicity. Majid stated Afghan Govt wld have let people know question being discussed owing popular feeling. Hussain stated Paks cld not have publicity due loss face with Pak public. He emphasized to Majid this not concession on Pak’s part. Agreement reached between two that propaganda wld gradually decrease over period three months at end of which Amb wld exchange and at that stage discussions on Pushtoon and other issues wld begin. Majid was to write to Afghan Fon Min not then in Kabul and answer wld be channeled thru Colonel Shah to Hussain. No reply yet rec’d by Pak.

Dept pass Kabul ; sent Dept 525, rptd info Kabul 44.

[Warren]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 24, 1951—1:06 p.m.

495. Dept willing believe there may be growing Afghan realization dangerous potentialities continuation Pushtoonistan campaign, and increasing GOA inclination reach solution. In view fact Pushtoonistan propaganda situation orig created by GOA, Dept does not believe incumbent Pak make concessions as such, but it wld be highly desirable if GOP cld react conciliatory manner toward any GOA proposals promising relieve tension and approach solution. Karachi tel 525 Nov 15 (44 to Kabul) suggests GOP willingness to go along with GOA on phased program, but it is possible to deduce from Hussain’s remarks (Karakari 524 Nov 15, 43 to Kabul) GOP may be preparing to renew strong anti-Afghan propaganda campaign.

Dept requests Emb Karachi’s views without outside discussion re fol:

1) Actg GOP FonMin purpose informing you along lines urtel 524.
2) Importance GOP may attach to talks with Majid.
3) Possibility Pak Govt willingness scale down propaganda and exchange Ambs (urtel 525) leaving matters of agenda and publicity for later settlement.
4) Info Emb may have re Majid’s possible reaction new prospects agreement on basis his talks with Hussain.

Emb Kabul only:

Re 1 above: comment on substance Karachi tel 524.
Re 2: any indication extent Majid authorized or instructed approach GOP this line.
Re 3: Estimate GOA willingness go along with phased program.

Info re Majid’s itinerary.

Webb

689.90D/11-2451: Telegram

The Ambassador in Afghanistan (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

KABUL, November 24, 1951—4 p. m.

251. My Brit colleague, who is leaving Kabul shortly on reassignment, recently called on ex-PriMin Hashim Khan (brother of present PriMin and uncle of King Zahir) to say farewell. He found Hashim with his nephew, ex-War Min Daud. In course conversation, Gardener gathered firm impression both men were extremely worried about imputations assassination Liaquat was agent GOA. Moreover, they seemed to have reached realization that Afghan–Pashtun propaganda has misfired. Gardener, who had many years’ experience this general area feels that present atmosphere is more propitious for some form of settlement Pak–Afghan rift than at any time since his tenure began over two years ago.

Gardener is of opinion, which I share, that reported release of 120 killers with orders infiltrate Pakistan and eliminate Pak public men (Karachi tel to Dept 524 Nov 15) seems incredible. We both consider that present GOA leaders are far too intelligent to adopt any such course of action, and we both believe it unlikely that any subordinate official wld dare to open prison gates without explicit authorization from above.

Dept pass Karachi. Sent Dept 251; rptd info Karachi 42. London unnn.

Merrell

689.90D/11-2451: Telegram

The Ambassador in Afghanistan (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

KABUL, November 24, 1951—5 p. m.

250. While I fully agree we shld continue to urge GOA to talk directly with GOP re their common problems (Deptel 165, November 15), I am not so sure we shld not give further consideration PriMin’s offer (Embtel 231, Nov 8). It occurs to me that GOP itself
might be prepared to envisage a US undertaking (in which it was made clear that support of Afghan cause not included) that Afghan-Pashtun case be given a hearing a few years from now, since by so doing GOP would remove immediate annoyance which no doubt has bearing on its dispute over Kashmir. In any case, I believe it wd strengthen PriMin’s hand in his evident attempts to chart a more moderate course if we cld give him some encouragement and at the same time bolster our primary thesis that, whatever may be the merits of Afghan-Pashtun case, at the present time we shld all present a united front against Commie aggression.


MERRILL

489.90D/11-2951: Telegram

The Ambassador in Afghanistan (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

KABUL, November 29, 1951—noon.

260. Dept pass DeptAr G-2. Pak Chargé wishing discuss “Hussain-Majid agreement” (Embtel to Dept 254, Nov 26)¹ called on Horner yesterday. Horner attempted impress upon Abdur Rahman advantages of positive GOP response to GOA’s evident desire to achieve face-saving compromise to Pash question. Abdur Rahman said he wd call on AF Amb to London Shah Wali (who has been visiting Kabul, and is brother PriMin and uncle of King) with object inciting him to travel back via Karachi (Emb had understood previously that Shah Wali wished to go thru Pak, but was uncertain of his reception). He also said, if response was favorable, he wd ask GOP to extend formal invitation and to urge warm reception calculated to improve polit atmosphere.

Abdur Rahman agreed that essential feature of any agreement is face-saving formula. In that regard, Horner indicated Emb’s strong belief that gradual cessation propaganda on both sides was crux of situation without which no agreement was possible. Horner also suggested that during period in which propaganda being diminished it wd be most helpful if GOP cld make some unsolicited offer to improve transit Afghan goods, even to point of suggesting possibility of free port arrangement and extension of rail line from Chaman into

¹Telegram 254, from Kabul, November 26, not printed, reported that the Hussain-Majid “agreement” outlined in Karachi’s telegram 44 to Kabul, November 15 (same as telegram 525 to Washington, p. 1009) had been reposing in the Prime Minister’s desk and that the Minister of Foreign Affairs had been summoned from vacation to Kabul to consider it. The acting Minister of Foreign Affairs had stated that while the agreement might not lead to a solution it was “encouraging.” (489.90D/11-2951)
Kandahar. Chargé promised bring these views to attention GOP with positive recommendation.

As previously indicated, Emb considers that atmosphere conducive to satisfactory settlement Pak-Af dispute, if on no more than temporary basis, is being rapidly generated. Emb feels this result, in large measure, PriMin’s own earnest wish for opportunity for peaceful development Afghan industry and economy. Emb therefore believes it wld be important if face-saving formula (largely intended to strengthen PriMin’s hand against more nationalistic elements) could be accompanied by economic advantages to GOA. These wld not be essentially bribe, but rather wld be intended rationalize Afghan’s land locked position, and to replace archaic Brit system of refundable customs duties, which has led to great delays in Afghan imports and exports, and very considerable increase in costs thereof. Emb hopes that ultimately GOA can be offered free port arrangement in Karachi, and that rail line shld be extended into Kandahar, thereby making possible exemption Afghan goods from customs examination and duty within Pak. At same time, Emb wld like to envisage substantial improvement Kabul-Kandahar road (partially paid for by US grant aid).

These improvements in communications not only wld bolster Afghan econ, but wld be of ultimate military value in event Sov aggression in this area. For that reason, if for no other, Emb wld recommend strong support by Dept and Emb Karachi along those lines. Army Attaché concurs.


Merrell

659.80D/12-1851: Telegram

The Chargé in Afghanistan (Horner) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

KABUL, December 18, 1951—1 p. m.

290. We wish to reiterate our belief that progress can be made in settling Afghan–Pak differences if we take advantage now of evident Afghan desire find face-saving formula. Vital point in Embtel 250 is achievement one or more year’s moratorium on all Pashtun propaganda or vituperative press and radio exchanges; we believe that Pashtun campaign, once buried, wld be difficult if not impossible to dig up again (PriMin is far too astute not to have realized this when he made his suggestion reported in Embtel 231 of Nov 8). Since Dept expresses reluctance to have US give written assurance that Pashtun case will be given hearing when world tension ceases we suggest possibility GOP wld be willing give such written assurance which, how-
ever, wld have to bear endorsement of US, UN or some third party in whom Afghans have confidence.

We wld appreciate Dept's comments.

Dept pass Karachi. Sent Dept 290; rptd info Karachi 47.

HORNER

689.90D/11-2951; Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1951—7:33 p.m.

206. Dept in accord desirability certain econ objectives and their relationship Pak-Afghan relations advanced Embtel 260 Nov 29. However Dept questions whether GOP wld be inclined actively to cooperate in improvement Afghan econ position in absence demonstration good faith GOA. Such demonstration not yet forthcoming except decrease local press propaganda which not as significant as radio propaganda that reaches Pak audience.

FYI re para 2 your memo conversation des 187 Dec 3 there are no funds available this FY for grant aid to Kabul Kandahar highway project and Dept cannot now predict level MSP appropriation FY 1953. Hence in conversations with GOA Emb shld carefully avoid statements that may lead Afghans expect more than Dept can offer.

ACHESON