THE PERIOD OF THE NORTH KOREAN OFFENSIVE, JULY 1–SEPTEMBER 15, 1950: BRITISH AND INDIAN EFFORTS AT MEDIATION; UNITED NATIONS ACTIVITIES CONCERNING KOREA; THE PROBLEM OF THE 38TH PARALLEL

Editorial Note

At 6:53 a.m. (EDT) on July 1 a teletype conference was held with HQ, FEC in Tokyo by military officials in Washington along with representatives of the Department of State and other agencies (DA TT-3445). G-2 in Tokyo reported that the North Koreans threatened Suwon and that the members of the disorganized ROK Government had moved to Taejon. (Korean Conflict)

795.00/7-150: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East
(MacArthur)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1950—11:28 a.m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

JCS 84808. 1. In keeping with the United Nations Security Council's request for support to the Republic of Korea in repelling the Northern Korean invaders and restoring peace in Korea the President announced that he had ordered a Naval blockade of the entire Korean coast.

2. To implement this order you are authorized to use such means and forces as are available to you to deny unauthorized ingress to and egress from the Korean coast. The primary purpose is to suppress seaborne traffic to and from North Korea and to prevent movement by sea of forces and supplies for use in operations against South Korea. Care should be taken to keep well clear of the coastal waters of Manchuria and USSR.

3. Appropriate governmental notification and notice to Mariners will be issued from Washington.2 Advise date measures will be effective.

1 In a circular telegram transmitted at 7 p.m. on July 3, not printed, the Department of State instructed all diplomatic officers to notify the government to which they were accredited that the naval blockade of the Korean coast was effective immediately (795B.5/7-350).
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1950.

Subject: Korean Speech for President Truman

I understand that there has been some suggestion that in the speech which is being prepared for President Truman to make on the Korean situation\(^1\) there should be included a statement to the effect that United States forces and presumably South Korean forces will only attempt to drive the North Koreans back to the 38th parallel and will not go any farther. I most strongly urge that no such statement be included in the speech. In my opinion it would be fatal to what may be left of South Korean morale if such a statement were made. It would also appear to me to be most unrealistic in the present situation. I believe there is ample justification in the last part of the second Resolution of the Security Council\(^2\) for any action which may be deemed appropriate at the time which will contribute to the permanent restoration of peace and stability in that area. I am convinced that there will be no permanent peace and stability in Korea as long as the artificial division at the 38th parallel continues. I believe the time has come when we must be bold and willing to take even more risks than we have already and, while I certainly would not advocate saying in the speech that we would proceed beyond the 38th parallel, nevertheless we should not commit ourselves at this time not to do so.

I personally feel that if we can, and I am not at all certain we can, we should continue right on up to the Manchurian and Siberian border, and, having done so, call for a UN-supervised election for all of Korea. Any action on our part now which would inhibit such action in the future would, I think, be most unwise.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Reference is to the address made by President Truman on July 19; see editorial note, p. 480.

\(^2\) June 27.

\(^3\) Manuscript note in the source text reads: “Agree D[ean] R[usk]”.

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The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TAEJON, July 1, 1950—11 p. m.

PRIORITY

[Received July 1—2:21 p. m.]

1. Contrary to predictions most observers, ROK forces held their ground well on Han River and other fronts last night and today.
Enemy today reportedly strengthened ground forces in bridgehead area to about battalion strength. No enemy tanks appear to have crossed river but ROK Intelligence reports indicate enemy tanks massed near pedestrian bridge on which repairs going forward and in Mapo area to west where new bridge reportedly under construction. Inchon port remains in ROK hands while there apparently little change in Kimpo area. If ROK Intelligence reports have any basis, enemy may be expected push tanks across river under cover darkness and misty weather obtaining tonight.

ADCOM, on basis conflicting alarming reports and ROK Chief of Staff's inability to assume being able to hold Suwon air strip till next morning decided about 9 p.m. [to evacuate?] and was completed by early morning July 2 when headquarters reestablished Taejon about 110 [miles] southeast Seoul. All military personnel including KMAG officers near front lines were withdrawn thus leaving no US advisers at Korean Army headquarters or forward toward front. State personnel headed by Drumright and several correspondents were obliged to evacuate with military personnel. All arrived safely at Taejon where remaining Embassy personnel now concentrated excepting Noble and Prendergast who went to South Cholla today to keep contact with Rhee. Latter left Taejon about daylight today but Prime Minister states Rhee decided return Taejon, due arrive 10 tonight. Some KMAG personnel returning front areas tonight. It appears USAF air attacks have slowed enemy advance and have at same time put some heart in ROK soldiers. Word is now getting about about commitment US ground forces and this is having definitely steadying effects. It is earnestly hoped US ground forces can be transported North in time contain enemy at Han River. If this can be accomplished task of eliminating aggressors should be greatly facilitated.

I earnestly pleaded National Assemblymen congregating Taejon area return home districts and pacify people. Many left Taejon today to Lothab [apparent garble]. I also appealed Cabinet, Governors and public leaders to remain Taejon and carry on business as normal. Refugees streaming from Seoul–Suwon area constitute growing problem which government appears to be doing little to solve. Though people have lost considerable confidence in ROK Army, they appear willing continue support ROK Government. There has been remarkably little sabotage or guerrilla activity since start hostilities. However North Koreans crossing over in ROK uniforms and carrying ROK weapons create some difficulties. Near-panic Suwon yesterday started by two jeep-loads men in ROK MP uniforms rushing down highway shouting, "Tanks coming", undoubtedly Communist. I have been mak-

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ing supreme effort all week to fortify wavering determination of Ko-
reans to continue resistance. With arrival US ground forces there
no question of ROK determination to carry on.

Stewart is making full use of remaining USIS centers to bring news
of conflict to ill-informed Korean masses whose knowledge of affair is
based very largely on rumors.

Muccio

795.00/6-2850: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1950—3 p. m.
US URGENT

3. Pls arrange see Zafrullah ¹ earliest to express US Govt grati-
fication GOP attitude re Korean situation (urtsels 614, 623 Jun 28,
30 ²), and at same time to indicate our reaction to Egypt position in
SC yesterday, particularly re contention that “The conflict under
consideration is in fact but a new phase of the deep-rooted diversions
between the Western and Eastern blocs, diversions which threaten
world peace and security.”

Fol is for your guidance and use in informal and oral approach
(You may tell Zafrullah Dept officer is informally speaking along
same lines to PM Liaquat Ali Khan before his departure from NY
today):

I. US Govt notes with satisfaction prompt support which GOP
is giving to UNSC action re Communist aggression against ROK. US
Govt is employing sea air and land forces Korean theater in response
to UNSC resolution in firm belief that maintenance of peace and pre-
vention of aggression must be met effectively and swiftly by UN. It is
therefore gratifying to know that GOP has without hesitation asso-
ciated itself with action UNSC.

II. On other hand US Govt has received with deepest regret news
of decision of Egypt Govt to abstain in UNSC voting. US Govt feels
sure that GOP will agree that issue involved is one of worldwide
scope in which all freedom-loving nations have vital stake. US believes
issue is full support and use of UN by its members to maintain peace
and oppose aggression. It is not matter of special interest to this or
that nation.

III. While US Govt believes individual members UN shld be free
to determine for themselves course of action they will pursue in UN,
US also believes that effectiveness of UN will be seriously impaired
by failure of any UN member to support UN efforts to prevent aggression
and maintain international peace.

IV. US Govt noted with appreciation that Acting Prime Min and
FonMin of GOP have informed Amer Amb Karachi that GOP will

¹ Mohamed Zafrullah Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan.
² Neither printed.
give moral support to UNSC action. It is hope of US Govt that GOP will make known its views on this matter to other states in Near and Middle East and South Asia.

Conclusion:

For your info Dept has reason believe that there are differences of opinion among leaders of Arab states as to wisdom and propriety of course followed by Egypt Govt. We believe that timely advice and influence GOP with particular relation to Arab States other than Egypt who are members of UN might forestall development of neutrality among all Arab States. Such a development wld be harmful to interests of free world.

In addition while US deeply regrets Egypt position it does not at this time wish adopt attitude publicly or privately which wld have effect of further stiffening Egypt attitude. If anything we wish play down Egypt position in hope that there will be change in attitude and other NE states will not rejt not feel forced stand by Egypt.

Finally shld GOP wish use influence other states including NE ME and SOA States we wld of course wish that it be done in its own name and in support of UN action as a whole, and no ref shld be made our approach.⁸

ACHESON

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⁸In telegram 12, July 3, from Karachi, not printed, Ambassador Warren reported that Zafrullah indicated he would be quite willing to approach the Arab states on the question of support for the U.N. action on Korea (785.00/7-350).

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 1, 1950—2 p. m.
[Received July 1—4:10 p. m.]

1. 1. At request Bajpai SYG MEA I saw him at noon today. He said he had noticed press reports to effect Chiang Kai Shek was offering place armored division at disposal UN for action in Korea. GOI sincerely hoped UN would not permit use Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea. Participation these troops would place GOI in difficult position since many Indians and other Asian nationalists who thus far had approved UN action and GOI support thereof would be shocked and repelled and might join already appreciable opposition to stand taken by India against aggression. I told Bajpai I appreciated fully force of his statements and would pass them along to my Government.

2. Bajpai said GOI had today replied to circular from SYG UN informing SYG it was not in position furnish troops, material, or funds for fighting in Korea. It was not easy when India was unable to
contribute for it suggest contribution be not accepted from Nationalist China. Suggestion was made however because of wide unfavorable repercussion which would follow appearance of Nationalist China forces in conflict.  

HENDERSON

1 In telegram 3, July 2, to New Delhi, not printed, the Department informed Ambassador Henderson of the Secretary of State’s aide-mémoire to the Chinese Ambassador, July 1, below, and authorized him to tell Bajpai in confidence that the recommendations of the Indian Government were taken into fullest consideration in the formulation of the U.S. position on the question of use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea (795.00/7-250).

330/6-2850: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1950—5 p.m.

4. Dept expects provide full reply questions raised Para 5(a) ur 554 Jun 28 soonest possible. Meanwhile fol present gen views Dept may be helpful.

Action to prevent attack on Formosa and to prevent Natl Govt air and sea operations against mainland taken as immediate security measure to preserve peace in Pacific and without prejudice to pol questions affecting Chi Govt. No change anticipated in relations between US Govt and Chi Govt.

Dept believes Amb Gross expressed this very well in his conversation with Lie (ur 569 June 30 1) when he pointed out US move respecting Formosa of mil significance only and believes USUN shld continue adhere this explanation.

ACHESON

2 Not printed.

795B.5/6-2850

The Secretary of State to the Chinese Ambassador (Koo) 1

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In response to the request contained in the Chinese Embassy’s Aide-Mémoire of June 29, 1950, 2 the appropriate authorities of the Govern-

1 A manuscript note in the source text by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) indicated that this note was approved in substance by Secretary of Defense Johnson and directly by General Bradley for the JCS, incorporating changes Bradley suggested, after which it was initialed by Mr. Acheson at 5:50 p.m.

2 See the memorandum by Mr. Merchant, June 29, p. 239, and also the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Freeman, June 30, with the annexed aide-mémoire from the Chinese Embassy, p. 262.
ment of the United States have given consideration to the expression of willingness on the part of the Government of the Republic of China to furnish ground forces for service in Korea in support of the United Nations.

The Secretary of State desires to inform His Excellency the Ambassador of the Republic of China of the deep appreciation of the United States Government for this prompt and substantial demonstration of support for the United Nations on the part of the Government of the Republic of China. In light, however, of the threat of invasion of Taiwan by Communist forces from the mainland, a threat repeated in the last day or so by spokesmen for the Chinese Communist regime in Peiping, it is the view of the Government of the United States of America that it would be desirable for representatives of General MacArthur’s Headquarters to hold discussions with the Chinese military authorities on Taiwan concerning the plans for the defense of the island against invasion prior to any final decision on the wisdom of reducing the defense forces on Taiwan by transfer of troops to Korea. It is understood that General MacArthur’s Headquarters will be in communication with the appropriate Chinese military authorities on Taiwan with a view to the dispatch from Toyo of representatives of General MacArthur’s Headquarters for this purpose.3

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1950.

3For related documentation, see vol. vi, pp. 256 ff.

736.00/7-150: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirb) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

Moscow, July 1, 1950—11 p. m.

NIACGT

[Received July 1—6:29 p. m.]

7. Eyes only for Secretary of State, Department circular 30 June, 5 p. m.1 has certain disturbing connotations particularly as regards military situation South Korea. We have assessed Politburo attitude as of yesterday (Embte 1778, June 30) as poised to jump either way: i.e., if NK invasion stopped hurled back and full power western world (meaning chiefly that of US) manifested in prompt decisive defeat to Communist inspired attack in ROK, then Kremlin in nice position to remain aloof and disclaim any responsibility for what would doubtless

1Not printed; it provided background on President Truman’s decision to authorize use of U.S. ground forces in Korea on the basis of General MacArthur’s report that the ROK forces were not prepared to fight the kind of force thrown at them, had lost or abandoned supplies and heavy equipment, had not fought seriously, lacked leadership, and were discouraged and losing their willingness to fight (736.00/6-30560).
be described as regrettable "civil war"; but on other hand should military success favor attackers from NK or should struggle become protracted with issue uncertain, despite whatever strength western powers are able and willing to commit, it is then conceivable Soviets would commence to throw their weight more and more into scales on side of NK forces, either openly or by subterfuge, following pattern Spanish civil war. Just what might be course of military events from thence onward is difficult to foresee, although unmistakeably clear that we would suffer to some considerable degree in loss of prestige.

Essence of situation, it seems to me, lies in earliest military success our arms in SK. The issue has been put to the test of battle and entire world is watching and waiting for results this test. I am sure Politburo will be governed by such results which will constitute the kind of cold facts upon which their realistic attitude will be based completely unconditioned by any emotional or altruistic sentiments.

Consequently, I can only record my fullest concurrence with whatever action we and our allies can take to inflict at the earliest moment the most complete and crushing defeat upon NK invading forces. Every day of delay in stopping advance of NK troops increases our problem, and will shortly operate to reduce our prestige in all Asia as well in friendly western world. While I am impressed and encouraged by expressions approval, etc., as reported in Department's infotels and otherwise, yet I am anxious now to see resounding military success achieved by demonstrably overwhelming power.

We cannot afford a military reverse in Korea.

Dept pass London, Paris; repeated info London 5, eyes only Ambassador Douglas; Paris 4, eyes only Ambassador Bruce.

Kirk

357.AD.7–150

The Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebold)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1950—7 p. m.

6. Info OAFE. While fully realizing difficulties involved, Dept recommends that if at all possible you communicate to Muccio or Drumright desirability Rhee and other ROK leaders be prevailed upon to endorse and sign statement to UN SYG along following lines for use in propaganda especially to SEA and SOA. Lack comment from ROK, due harsh necessity, has been serious propaganda handicap, which shld be remedied if at all possible.¹

¹ Under date of July 4, the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea (Limb) communicated to Secretary-General Lie a message substantially similar to that quoted in this telegram except as indicated in footnotes 2 and 3 below; the Korean message was circulated as U.N. document S/1571.
Beginning text: “The Govt and the people of Korea are deeply grateful for the resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations calling upon its members to assist the Govt of the Rep of Korea to repel a brutal and unwarranted aggression against it and to restore the situation existing prior to the aggression.3

The Govt and the people of the Rep of Korea are likewise deeply moved by the promptness and vigor with which members of the United Nations, in honorable fulfillment of their obligations under the Charter, have acted to repel the aggression and to restore peace in Korea.

As the constitutionally chosen representatives of the people of Korea, freely acting in accordance with the democratic principles and processes embodied in the Constitution of the ROK, which was set up with the approval and sponsorship of the United Nations, we, the undersigned, solemnly declare that we shall unflinchingly carry on the struggle with all the resources at our command until the situation hitherto existing has been restored.3

We are deeply conscious of the harsh trials through which the people of Korea are now passing, but we share with them the conviction that, in this trial, we are fighting not for ourselves alone but for the great principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. Only if these principles survive and flourish in the world can free nations and peoples, especially those newly arrived at national independence, hope to survive in freedom, dignity and peace. The knowledge that our struggle is filled with significance for millions of other peoples and many new nations buoy us up our courage and stimulates our efforts. We call upon the people of Korea to renew their resistance to the aggressor with stout heart and furious purpose.

Confident of the ultimate success of the effort to repel aggression, we shall disdain negotiations with the aggressor for any purpose other than the restoration of the situation existing prior to the aggression. No support will be given by the people of Korea to any illegal negotiations with the aggressor undertaken ostensibly in their name, and no recognition will be tendered to any such negotiations that may be purported to have been made.

Recognizing the solemn obligations of our Constitutional position and filled with confident hope for the future, regardless of present trials, we hereto set our names and, with our signatures, pledge to the peaceful future of Korea our supreme efforts and our unstinted sacrifice to the cause in which, with a goodly company of nations devoted to freedom, we are involved.”

ACHESON

2 The Korean message contained no mention of restoration of the situation existing prior to the aggression.
3 In the Korean message, the word “removed” was used rather than “restored,” at this point.
SECRET

BELGRADE, July 1, 1950—10 p. m.

[Received July 1—8:24 p. m.]

6. Tonight at Canadian reception Kardelj made point seeking out Reams, Mates, Prica, and Admiral Manola were in group. Kardelj began conversation by expressing hope that US would understand Yugoslavia’s position in SC on Korea. He continued that he wanted US to know that Yugoslavs fully understood and approved US action. He added conviction that US intervention would quickly restore situation in Korea and stated that the result would be greatest possible “blow for peace”. Kardelj went on to say that we should realize extent of prestige loss to Russians made it likely that Russians would attempt recoup elsewhere. He did not believe Russians were prepared to accept challenge in Korea.

Reams expressed appreciation for Kardelj’s statement of understanding and support. Department pass Moscow niact, repeated info Moscow 1.

ALLEN

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1 Edward Kardelj, Yugoslav Foreign Minister.
2 R. Borden Reams, Counselor of Embassy in Yugoslavia.
3 Leo Mates, Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister.
4 Rear Adm. Srečko Manola, Chief of Staff, Naval Section of the Yugoslav General Staff.
5 Telegram 2, July 3, to Belgrade, not printed, expressed gratification at the Yugoslav indications of understanding and approval of the U.S. action on Korea and concluded: “We believe we shall be satisfied at this stage with benevolent neutrality on part Yugo and not press Yugo Govt for open manifestations of support.” (795.00/7-150)

795.00/7-250 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, July 2, 1950—1 p. m.

[PRIORITY

[Received July 2—8:09 a. m.]

9. In accordance instructions from GOI Indian Ambassador Radhakrishnan called on Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin July 1 to make démarche Korea. Indian counselor Kapur informed Embassy officer that his Ambassador took a “stiffer line” than had either US or UK Governments and that Zorin “was taken aback when Radhakrishnan countered former’s reference to Soviet Government reply to Trygve Lie on legal aspects SC action with blunt accusation that Soviets had violated Article 28 UN Charter in walking out
SC (Kapur observed this connection that US should also emphasize Soviet violation Article 28 in its publicity on Far East situation).

Kapur added that GOI cable requesting Indian Ambassador take this action indicated that British had suggested such step to GOI. Presumably GOI also instructed Indian Embassy consult with British Embassy in matter, for British Embassy informs me that Kapur called at British Embassy morning July 1 with proposed draft démarche asking Soviets use their influence persuade North Korean authorities obey cease-fire order UN, withdraw troops north 38th parallel, and adding that breach of peace was “your fault”. At British Embassy Kapur was advised words “your fault” seemed possibly gratuitous and likely to place Soviets in undesirable position, but that otherwise démarche was welcomed, applauded and encouraged. British Ambassador states Indian Ambassador did omit on his own responsibility expression “your fault” from his prepared statement.


Kirk

795.00/7-250: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur) to the Department of the Army

TOP SECRET

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

Tokyo, 3 July 1950—12:43 a.m.¹

CX 57097. Reference DA (JCS) nr W 84808 2nd July.² Consider that if effective Naval blockade of the entire Korean coast is to be maintained, the following principal port areas should be patrolled. Najin, Chongjin, Wonsan, Inchon, Chinnampo, Anju and Sonchon plus any South Korean port which may fall to North Koreans.

In order to keep well clear of coastal waters of Manchuria and USSR do not plan to blockade Najin, Chongjin and Sonchon. Plan to patrol on East Coast latitude 41 degrees North and West Coast to 39–30 degrees North.

With units already committed to WESTPAC no need for additional forces other than carrier CVE Task Group to provide air cover for forces operating and to increase range of surveillance. Blockade forces can be deployed as of 4th July within limitations of existing Naval Forces Far East but present patrol cannot be extended effectively until reinforcement combatant ships arrive.

¹The time of transmission is given in the source text as corresponding to 10:43 a.m. on July 2 (EDT).
²Transmitted on July 1 at 11:28 a.m., p. 271.
SECRET

PRIORITY

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

[TAEJON,] July 2, 1950—10 p. m.

[Received July 2—4:55 p. m.]

5. Late reports from Korean sources suggest enemy forces estimated to exceed 2000 in number and transported in 90 trucks had by 6 p. m. today penetrated to vicinity Kimyanggang, about 10 miles east Suwon. This column appears to have crossed Han River in vicinity Kwangjangni. Another much smaller column which apparently crossed at same place appears to have turned south through Kwangju and to have reached vicinity Yangin, about 4 miles northeast Suwon by dusk. Han River front south of Seoul appears to have held all day and situation in Kimpo area reported unchanged. Inchon still in ROK hands. 17th regiment which successfully evacuated from Ongjin peninsula now moving north from Taejon area in attempt to contain enemy threat east of Suwon.

UNCOCK preparing establish headquarters Taejon and start functioning. For this purpose Kondapi of India and Brionval France now at Pusan being asked proceed Taejon and other absent members in Japan being requested proceed Taejon. However, when Brionval and Kondapi arrive Taejon quorum will be achieved and UNCOCK will start functioning. Embassy facilitating UNCOCK in every way possible.

Department pass CINCFE.

Muccio

Editorial Note

For purposes of Korean aid, Secretary of State Acheson on July 3 transferred $10,568,500 of funds authorized in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 from Title II (Greece, Turkey) to Title III (Korea, Philippines, Iran). (795B.5 MAP/7–350)

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Miss Barbara Evans, Personal Assistant to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] July 3, 1950.

Participants: Secretary of Defense Johnson
Secretary Acheson

The Secretary telephoned Secretary Johnson to find out whether his Department had any comments on the draft of the suggested Presi-
dential Message to Congress and the Joint Resolution on the Korean statement. Secretary Acheson pointed out that he thought it would be possible to get a resolution through if it were confined solely to Korea, without mention of Formosa or Indochina. He felt that such a resolution would be helpful during the time ahead. Secretary Johnson said that the question was in Secretary Acheson's field and he would follow whatever course Secretary Acheson wished.

Secretary Acheson suggested that, if Secretary Johnson agreed, a recommendation from the two Departments should be gotten up by late afternoon, and that the President might be requested to meet this afternoon with State and Defense people, and any other advisers he wished, in order to decide what he wanted to do about the statement and resolution.

The Secretary suggested that he send over a copy of the latest draft so that General Burns and Secretary Finletter and others might go over it. Secretary Johnson indicated that he would be glad to have such a draft sent over, but that it should go from Mr. Matthews to General Burns. Secretary Acheson said he would so send it, and Secretary Johnson said he would see that General Burns received a memorandum on the subject from the Service Secretaries to Secretary Johnson.  

1 Neither the draft Presidential Message nor the draft Joint Message is printed; the "Korean statement" is a reference to President Truman's statement of June 27, p. 202.

2 For further discussion of the draft Presidential Message and the draft Joint Resolution, see the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Jessup of the meeting at Blair House on July 3 at 4 p.m., p. 286.

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**Editorial Note**

On July 3, the Department of State released a memorandum directed to the authority of the President to order the Armed Forces of the United States to repel the aggressive attack on the Republic of Korea; excerpts from the memorandum are printed in the Department of State Bulletin, July 31, 1950, pages 173–177, and a list of historical precedents is printed *ibid.*, pages 177–178.

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795.00/7–350: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 3, 1950—7 p.m.

[Received July 3—2:34 p.m.]

16. 1. During talk July 3 with Bajpai, SYG MEA, he emphasized that, in opinion GOI, it was extremely important for maintenance
world peace that Russia and Communist Chinese take seats soon as possible in SC. At this moment SC should be functioning with all 11 members since there was possibility, even though perhaps faint, that discussions could convince Russians and Communist Chinese that it was mistake to resort to armed force. GOI felt so keenly in this matter that it had instructed Radhakrishnan, its Ambassador to Moscow, to endeavor persuade Soviet Government to take its place in SC, informing it at same time of India’s efforts favoring admittance Communist China. Indian Ambassador had also been instructed undertake persuade Soviet Government use its influence prevail on North Korea cease fighting and withdraw troops from ROK, suggesting at same time that India would be glad participate if desired in discussions on this subject with US and Russia.

2. Indian Ambassador had talked to Zorin, Deputy FonMin, who had received him somewhat coldly. Zorin insisted Russia could not return to SC except in company with Communist China. Zorin also said that Russia could not intervene in Korea, particularly at time when US armed forces were killing Asians. He added significantly that Russia would be at disadvantage in conference with US and India since there would be two against one. Bajpai said, judging from Radhakrishnan’s report, latter had not displayed strong attitude GOI had hoped. He had not, for instance, pointed out that North Koreans began killing of Asians and were still killing them; that it could be no comfort to Asians who were being killed and wounded that their attackers were Asians.

3. I asked Bajpai what, in general, was Radhakrishnan’s attitude toward recent GOI decisions. (He had told me previously that Radhakrishnan frequently displayed certain amount of “wooliness” and “naiveté” in his dealing with Russians.)

4. Bajpai said Radhakrishnan had not thus far given GOI his personal views on subject. He imagined, however, that logic of situation was so clear that Radhakrishnan must believe that GOI decisions were correct. It is possible, although in my opinion not probable, that Radhakrishnan might have sent telegrams re Korean situation to Nehru which were not seen by Bajpai.

Department pass Moscow, repeated info Moscow unnumbered.

HENDERSON

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1 At 5 p.m. on July 3, the Department of State sent the following message to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations as telegram 9:

"In view Korean situation Dept considers it wld be undesirable for Chi representation question be raised SC at this time. In event you receive evidence that question may be raised, you shld express this view other UN Delegations. In addition, you may as appropriate indicate that during Korean crisis we wld be even more disinclined see change Chi representation." (310.2/7-350)
Confidential

[WASHINGTON,] July 3, 1950 [—3:05 p.m.] 1

Subject: Chinese Offer of Ground Forces for Employment in Korea

Participants: Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador
Mr. Dean Rusk, FE
Mr. Fulton Freeman, CA

Ambassador Koo called this afternoon at his request and opened the conversation by expressing the complete agreement of his Government with the substance of the Department’s aide-mémoire of July 1, 1950, in reply to the offer of the Chinese Government to despatch ground forces to South Korea. He stated that his Government concurred in the desirability of discussing this question with representatives of General MacArthur’s headquarters and that the arrival of General MacArthur’s representatives in Formosa would be eagerly awaited. 2

I pointed out that the grand strategy of the Communists in the Far East was still unclear and indicated that they might be planning additional moves in that area. I also stated that if there had been some question a few months ago whether the forces on Formosa were in fact able to defend the island against an all-out Communist attack, then it would perhaps be unwise to spare troops at this time. I stated, in this regard, that a proper defense of the island would, in my opinion, require the coordinated action of the Chinese army, air force and navy together with the U.S. 7th Fleet, and pointed out that General MacArthur would undoubtedly wish to weigh the Chinese offer of assistance to Korea in this light.

Ambassador Koo acknowledged that the sending of 33,000 troops to Korea might in fact weaken the island’s defense, particularly if they were given the best equipment available on Formosa.

In response to my inquiry whether the Ambassador had received any reports of Chinese Communist military movements or building-up operations on the mainland, the Ambassador replied in the positive. He stated, however, that the reports which he had received had been confined to military movements in three specific areas, namely Manchuria, Hongkong and the Indochina border area. He made no specific mention of any military movements in the so-called invasion area on the coast opposite Formosa.

The Ambassador then inquired whether any conclusion had been reached with respect to the question of the close in-shore islands

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1 The time is that given in Korean Conflict.
2 On July 3, the Chinese Government formally sent to Secretary-General Lie its offer of three divisions of troops for use in Korea (U.N. document S/1562).
which he had mentioned to Mr. Merchant in their conversation of June 29. I replied that this matter was being discussed with the Defense establishment and with General MacArthur’s headquarters and it was hoped that we would be in a position to give him an answer within a short time.3

Ambassador Koo then mentioned again the desirability of establishing satisfactory liaison between the U.S. 7th Fleet and the Chinese authorities on Formosa as soon as possible. I informed him that we had already communicated with General MacArthur with respect to the urgent need for such liaison, and I assured him that I would endeavor to ascertain the present status of the arrangements. I stated that I understood that, for the time being, the senior assistant naval attaché was acting as principal liaison officer.

Ambassador Koo then inquired whether we had received reports of any unusual movements of Soviet forces in other parts of the world, such as the Iranian, Turkish or Yugoslav border areas, that might indicate the planning of offensive actions similar to that in Korea. I stated in response that our reports from the areas he mentioned, while indicating normal troop movements, showed nothing unusual. I added that we frequently received reports of troop activity in these peripheral areas, but that we had received nothing which would clearly indicate that an early offensive action was being planned.

* For related documentation, see vol. vi, pp. 256 ff.

795.00/7-350

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 3, 1950—4 p. m.

Subject: Meeting at Blair House

Participants: The President
Secretary Acheson
Secretary Johnson
Secretary Snyder
Secretary Brannan ¹
Postmaster General Donaldson
Senator Lucas
Secretary Pace
Secretary Matthews
Secretary Finletter
General Bradley
Mr. Harriman

Mr. Jessup and Mr. Rusk accompanied the Secretary of State

¹ Secretary of Agriculture Charles Brannan.
The President asked Mr. Acheson to lead off.

Mr. Acheson said the purpose of the meeting was to lay before the President and his advisors a recommendation by the Department of State that the President go before Congress some time in the near future to make a full report to a Joint Session of the Congress on the Korean situation. It was proposed that this report to the Congress would be followed by the introduction of a Joint Resolution expressing approval of the action taken in Korea. It was not proposed that the President should ask for such a resolution but that the initiative for this should come from the members of Congress. He said that Mr. McFall and others had talked to various Senators and Congressmen and that his exploration revealed a general desire for a Presidential message of this kind. This was partly due to the fact that they felt that so far only the leaders had been told what was going on. The Secretary then distributed copies of the draft resolution and read it aloud. He explained that in drafting it he had tried to avoid anything which would give rise to debate by concentrating on points on which there seemed to be general agreement. For example, the resolution proposes that the Congress commend the action by the United States rather than the action by the President.

The President said that is right.

Mr. Acheson said they had also eliminated from the draft resolution any reference to Formosa or Indochina. There the action was preliminary; no American boys were getting shot and the action was clearly within the Presidential powers. The Secretary then distributed copies of the draft message and read it aloud.

The President asked Senator Lucas what was his reaction to this suggestion. He indicated that Congress would not reassemble until a week from today but that he wanted to consider whether he should deliver such a message when Congress reassembled.

Senator Lucas said it was hard for him to give an opinion without consulting his colleagues.

The President said that all he was asking for was his personal opinion.

Senator Lucas said that he frankly questioned the desirability of this. He said that things were now going along well and he questioned especially the paragraph on the top of page 14 which suggests that the President may come up with further recommendations. He said that one could draw whatever conclusions he pleased as to what such Presidential recommendations might contain. He said that the President had very properly done what he had to without consulting the Congress. He said the resolution itself was satisfactory and that

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*Neither the draft Presidential Message nor the draft Joint Resolution is printed.*
it could pass. He suggested as an alternative that the President might deliver this message as a fireside chat with the people of the country.

The President said he had reached no decision on this point. He had merely discussed it with Secretary Johnson and Secretary Acheson and wanted this round-table discussion on it.

Senator Lucas said that most of the members of Congress were sick of the attitude taken by Senators Taft and Wherry.

The President said he thought Wherry had been a little better after the consultation the other day. 8

Senator Lucas said that he thought this was not the case in view of the statements which Wherry later made. 4

Secretary Johnson thought that Senator Wherry’s statement was not so bad.

Senator Lucas said that to go up and give such a message to Congress might sound as if the President were asking for a declaration of war.

The President said this was exactly the point. He said that he had not been acting as President but as Commander-in-Chief of our forces in the Far East.

Senator Lucas reported that the President would be practically asking for a declaration of war if he came up to the Congress like this. On the other hand a fireside chat with the people would be good. He said the document itself was wonderful. He would merely leave out the paragraph on the top of page 14.

The President then asked Secretary Snyder for his opinion pointing out this was a suggestion from the Department of State and that the Secretary of Defense agreed with Senator Lucas.

Secretary Snyder said that it would be a fine thing for the people to know what was in this message and to hear this statement from the President himself. He said Senator Lucas had made a good point but that the substance of the message was excellent. He agreed it was debatable whether this should take the form of a message to the Congress or a fireside chat. His first reaction was in favor of having the President make this statement in some form.

The President said that it was necessary to be very careful that he would not appear to be trying to get around Congress and use extra-Constitutional powers.

Secretary Johnson said there were some difficulties in the text that he would question; he had noted that Senator Lucas marked up his copy where it referred to Communist China, for example. He thought this was not the time for a message to the Congress but that this was a political decision.

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8 Presumably this is a reference to the meeting at 11 a. m. on June 30; see the editorial note, p. 267.

4 See Congressional Record, June 30, 1950, pp. 9537 ff.
The President said he didn’t want to call Congress back for this purpose.

Secretary Johnson said things were going very well and there was nothing in the message that was not already in the press. He suggested that the President wait until there were things which the public does not know and which could then be told to them.

Secretary Brannan said he thought the President could not go to the people without going to the Congress. He said that perhaps the talks with the leaders had filled the need for reporting to Congress but the real question was whether the President should now send a message to the full Congress. Such a message of course went to the people also. He questioned including in the last few pages the discussion of the diplomatic exchange with the USSR. This seemed to him to be at variance with the policy of not putting the Soviets on the spot. The less said about their machinations the better. He thought we should stick to the North Koreans and action under the UN.

The Postmaster General said that he had carefully listened to Senator Wherry’s remarks at the recent meeting. Wherry felt there should be a report to Congress and had raised the question of the President’s authority. If the President made a report like this he might be called back again and again in further explanations to the Congress. He felt the President should not go unless he had some new information or wished to make a request for some legislative action.

Senator Lucas stated that Senator Wherry was complaining because the President didn’t go to Congress before he acted. Regarding the resolution he said he was just thinking out loud but it occurred to him that if the President should call the same group together we might get their reaction and then would have no trouble in getting it through. He thought they would be unanimous.

The President said that it was up to Congress whether such a resolution should be introduced, that he would not suggest it. He said it was not necessary to make the decision today and that he too was just thinking out loud.

Secretary Pace said the legislative branch has a strong desire for participation at some time.

Secretary Snyder said that we were going along a new road and making a historical record. He thought the President should make this record clear. On this point he disagreed with Secretary Brannan. He thought the President could not wait too long for a summation. He thought the public support should be kept steady as it is today.

Secretary Matthews thought it was essential to say something to the people and not to by-pass the Congress. He was not sure as to the timing.

Senator Lucas said that he felt he knew the reactions of Congress. He thought that only Senator Wherry had voiced the view that Con-
gress should be consulted. Many members of Congress had suggested to him that the President should keep away from Congress and avoid debate. He thought a debate on the resolution might last at least a week.

Secretary Johnson said that everybody in Congress wanted to pose as an expert on Constitutional law.

Secretary Finletter agreed with Secretary Snyder that we were treading new ground. If such a message were sent by the President people would feel a sense of participation. The report should stress that his one cardinal purpose is to maintain peace.

Mr. Harriman commented on the European reaction and stressed the need for close relation between the President and Congress under Presidential leadership. While things are going well now there may be trouble ahead. Regarding the paragraph on the top of page 14 which had been considered he thought people were wondering about this and that some statement should be made. He did not know that Congress would not reassemble until next Monday.\(^6\)

The President said we should not call them back before they planned to return.

Secretary Acheson said no one thought of doing that.

Mr. Rusk said that clear Congressional support would help abroad. Comments by Senator Taft and Wherry are reported abroad and may raise a question of our solidarity.

Mr. Jessup stressed the importance particularly for opinion abroad having the President reiterate the facts in the situation. The statement by the President would in itself be news.

General Bradley said that he thought some report at some time was a very good idea but he wished to avoid a long debate in Congress on matters which now seemed to be taken for granted.

The President said he certainly must make a report some time but he did not want to call Congress back now. He said it was always difficult to keep 541 men informed even about legislative business. Even though he did explain matters to the leaders there were many in Congress who did not know and eventually he must report. He said his judgement was to hold up his decision for the rest of this week. He would have further consultations with the Big Four next Monday. He said he was still just thinking out loud and if there were any better suggestion he would be glad to listen to it.

Senator Lucas commented that Senator Taft was merely following his same old line. Senator Jenner's statement in Indiana was unbeliev-

\(^6\) July 10.
able. Senator Lucas said if there should be a row in Congress that
would not help abroad. He did not think that Congress was going to
stir things up.

The President said this depends on events in Korea. He said that
if this view met with the approval of those present he would wait
until he had his talks with the leaders next Monday.

This was agreed. 6

6 President Truman did not deliver his message to Congress until July 19;
see editorial note, p. 430. No action was taken on the draft Joint Resolution.

350/7-350: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the
United Nations

SECRET Washington, July 3, 1950—4 p.m.

8. Fol is draft text of res which Wainhouse 1 telephoned to Noyes
for USUN comment:

The SC

Having determined that the armed attack upon the ROK by forces
from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,

Having recommended that Members of the UN furnish such assist-
ance to the ROK as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and
to restore internat peace and security in the area,

(1) Welcomes the prompt and vigorous support which Govrs and
peoples of the UN have given to its resolutions of 25 and 27 June 1950
to assist the ROK in defending itself against aggression and to re-
store peace and security in the area;

(2) Notes that Members of the UN have transmitted to the UN
offers of assistance for the ROK;

(3) Recommends that all Members providing mil forces pursuant
to the SC resolutions to assist Korea place such forces under a unified
command;

(4) Requests the US to designate the Commander of such forces;

(5) Requests the US to provide the SC with periodic reports on the
course of action taken under the unified command.

(6) Establishes a SC Comite composed of five reps of the Members
of the Council to be appointed by the Pres:

a) To receive offers of assistance for the ROK transmitted to
the UN and to inform the ROK of all such offers.

b) To receive the periodic reports requested in Para 5, above.

c) To advise the SC concerning action taken by Members in
support of its resolutions.

ACHESON

1 David W. Wainhouse, Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations
Political and Security Affairs, Department of State.
Memorandum of Conversations, by Mr. Charles P. Noyes, Adviser on Security Council Affairs, United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET

[N. Y.], July 3, 1950.

Subject: Korea

Conversations separately:

Participants:
Mr. Joseph Nisot, Belgian Delegation
Mr. Bredo Stabell, Norwegian Delegation
Dr. Jose A. Correa, Ecuadorian Delegation
Mr. David Wainhouse, UNP, Dept. of State
Mr. C. P. Noyes, United States Mission

Nisot asked whether the rumor that there would be a Special Session of the General Assembly on Korea, in the near future, had any basis in fact so far as we knew. I told Nisot that I heard the suggestion at various times during the last several days but that so far as we knew, no one was taking it seriously at the present time. If the situation changes for the worse, of course, that would be a different matter. Nisot indicated he felt there was nothing to be gained at the present time in calling a Special Session. He simply wanted to check on our feeling.

Stabell wanted to get our advice as to when the next meeting of the Security Council could be held. He said that they were in a very difficult position to judge since while they knew there were some conversations going on, they did not know the substance of these conversations. He asked what we thought about holding a meeting on Wednesday and that if that were to be done the decision should be made this afternoon.

I told Stabell I was in a difficult position. We had as yet received no instructions but hoped to receive them tonight or tomorrow. Ambassador Austin plans to see the British and French on Wednesday morning. I indicated that we were not in a position to initiate action. If a proposal were put forward, it would come from some other Delegation. While we would have our instructions by Wednesday, we did not know whether any other Delegations would have their instructions by that time and whether any resolution should be tabled on Wednesday.

Stabell indicated that under these circumstances his advice to Sunde would be that they should not call a meeting this afternoon for Wednesday afternoon and should contemplate that the meeting should

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1 The source text is a copy of a document in the IO Files, Department of State, bearing the designation US/8/1273 and the date July 3, 1950.
2 July 5.
3 Arne Sunde of Norway was the President of the U.N. Security Council during the month of July.
probably not be held until Thursday morning or afternoon. This would give more time for private consultations and would perhaps enable the Security Council in a single meeting to have a resolution introduced and passed. I said that personally I thought that was a good approach. I did not think we felt any urgency about a Wednesday meeting. In case of real necessity, a meeting could of course be called on short notice.

Stabell made a plea that we should keep the President in close touch with the situation. I told him I would do my very best to let them know just as soon as we received our instructions. This might, however, have to await Ambassador Austin’s return on Wednesday morning.

Mr. Wainhouse. After speaking with Ambassador Gross, Mr. Ross and Ambassador Austin, I telephoned the Mission’s comments to Mr. Wainhouse in the Department, as follows: [Re Resolution shown Dept’s 8, July 3.]

The Mission thinks that the latest draft resolution is excellent and fully supports it. We hope the Department will give us the broadest possible discretion to negotiate on the basis of this resolution with other Delegations. We understand that we shall attempt to get some other Delegation to introduce a resolution along these lines. We should like to make the following comments:

Paragraph 5. It might be advisable, if possible, to find some language which does not pin the responsibility on the United States to make Reports. Wainhouse commented on this point to the effect that it was essential to have a single channel for Reports so as to avoid confusion. I indicated this was not a matter of any importance with the Mission.

Paragraph 6. The Mission agreed that the Committee should be composed of Five Representatives. However, we felt we needed considerable latitude here to change this if necessary in the light of the comments of other Delegations.

The main thing that concerned us with the resolution was that the Terms of Reference of the Committee seemed too limited. We doubted that we could sell such a limited Committee and we saw no reason why the United States should not support somewhat broader Terms of Reference. We were wholeheartedly in agreement with the Department, and were quite sure other Delegations would be, also, that we must stick to the principle that the Committee should have no jurisdiction whatever to deal with problems of the strategic direction or command of the joint forces.

As to a, we felt that the Department should consider giving the Committee power to coordinate the offers of assistance so that it would not be doing simply a secretarial function.

* Brackets appear in the source text.
As to c, we suggest that the Committee should have the power to give advice to the Security Council concerning matters relating to the implementation of the Council's resolution. The Committee should, of course not have any authority to give advice directly to Members on such questions. In this connection, we thought it might be possible for the Committee to make useful recommendations to the Security Council on economic problems; that in any case it should have this authority.

The Mission also felt that it might be advisable to invite the participation of Members of the United Nations who were contributing forces or other assistance when questions involving their interests were being considered, and, in particular, that some reference should be made to the effect that the Republic of Korea might be invited to sit.

The Mission also believes it would be desirable that in some way authority should be given to the combined forces to fly the United Nations Flag. Wainhouse indicated that the Department had now cleared its policy along these lines.

I emphasized that these were minor comments and that our basic position was that we should be delighted to get instructions as soon as possible authorizing us to negotiate on the basis of this resolution with as wide authority as possible.

Dr. Correa called and wanted to know where we stood. I told him we hoped to have instructions by Wednesday morning; that I would call him. I thought that on either Wednesday or Thursday it might be possible for the Council to take some affirmative action.

795.00/6-2950 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Moscow

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1950—7 p. m.

7. Embtel 1768 June 29. Development close relations Kapur Ind Emb highly commendable. Dept has found recent Embtels reporting his views extremely interesting. FYI although Dept gave Amb Pandit advance notice Pres statement of June 27, successful discussions with Indians on Korea culminating GOI acceptance SC Res June 27 conducted entirely New Delhi by Amb Henderson. Although ref tel not reed until after GOI acceptance, in point fact, content, tone, and method Henderson's representations to Nehru Bajpai very similar Kapur's proposals. No special appeals such as msg from Pres or Secy utilized. No action being taken however along lines Kapur's idea of SYG appealing Nehru. Dept agrees Kapur's brief might be useful in future approaches GOI leaders.

Acheson
WASHINGTON, July 3, 1950—7 p.m.

10. Fol are Dept’s preliminary comments on some items in check list forwarded to Dept in urtel 554, June 28.

Re Para 1 (a and c) of urtel
Fol is Dept’s analysis of Charter basis of SC resolutions of June 25 and 27.

Security Council Resolution of June 25, 1950
SC Res of June 25, 1950 contains explicit determination under Art 39 of Charter that action by forces from North Korea constitutes breach of the peace.

Para 1 contains cease-fire order and order to the forces to withdraw to the 38th parallel. These orders binding upon members.

These orders are enforceable against non-members under principle contained in Art 2 para 6 of the Charter.

In para 2 SC requests UNCOOK to communicate its recommendations on situation, observe withdrawal of North Korean forces and keep SC informed.

In the third para SC, acting under Art 39, applies general principle of Art 2 para 5 of Charter to Korean situation.

In this para SC calls upon all members to render every assistance to UN in execution of Res. This requires members to facilitate execution of Res i.e., cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of the armed forces to the 38th parallel. The means of accomplishing this are not specified (“render every assistance”) and presumably would be within discretion of members.

In second part of this para the SC calls on members to refrain from giving assistance to North Korean authorities, using language of Art 2 (5).

Action taken by the US on the basis of this Res prior to the adoption of the Res of June 27 was taken in response to the call for assistance in execution of the cease-fire order and withdrawal orders.

The SC Resolution of June 27
In this Res SC noted that its orders of cease-fire and troop withdrawal had been disregarded by authorities in North Korea. It concluded that urgent military measures were required to restore peace. As a result, the Council decided to recommend to members to furnish such assistance as may be necessary to repel armed attack and restore
international peace and security in area. This is a recommendation under Art 39.

The Charter envisaged the fol enforcement procedure:

1. Under Art. 39 the SC, having made an explicit or implied determination of threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression can make recommendations to members or can decide on measures in the nature of sanctions to be taken under Arts. 41 and 42 for purpose of maintaining or restoring peace.

2. The measures ordered by SC may be either of non-military character under Art. 41 or they may be of a military nature under Art. 42. The SC may take action under Art. 42 by air, sea and land forces which are made available to it by the Members of the UN under special agreements mentioned in Art. 43.

3. Pending the coming into force of such special agreements, under Art. 106 the 5 permanent members are to consult with views to joint action for maintenance of international peace.

No special agreements have thus far been concluded which would place armed forces at the disposal of the SC. The Soviet Union made it abundantly clear that it would not consult in a body in which the National Govt. represents China.

In the absence of the armed forces placed at disposal of SC the Council chose other alternative provided by Art. 39:—to recommend to members that they act on behalf of UN rather than to order action under Art 42. SC as organ holding primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under Art. 24 had power to do so. US and other Members have acted in accord with SC recommendations.

As result Members acting in response to recommendation of SC are under obligation to SC to ensure that their action is in fact designed to repel armed attack and to restore international peace. US Commander in charge of the military action in area is responsible only to US Govt. which in turn answers to SC.

Scope of continued US action in support of the Govt of the Republic of Korea is fully within both resolutions.

We believe that there is no room for any doubt as to legality of US action and any effort to present detailed public justification might be seized upon and misused for propaganda purposes as indication that we ourselves are not certain of legality of our actions.

Re para. 2 of urtel on Coordination of Assistance

"Assistance" covers economic as well as military assistance to ROK. "Assistance" also covers "sanctions" against North Korea as indicated in the above legal analysis of SC Res. of June 25. As you know US has already imposed embargo on exports to North Korea.
Re para. 3 of urtel asking whether SC action should be taken to Establish Soviet Complicity.

For the moment Dept thinks it undesirable to bring formally to attention of SC our direct approach to the USSR and the Soviet reply thereto. For time being Dept intends to continue careful course of avoiding formal charges against the USSR in the SC.

Re para. 4 of urtel regarding Special Session of the GA

Dept does not consider desirable to call a special session of the GA at this time. The SC has primary responsibility under Charter in matters relating to international peace and security such as armed attack against the Government of the Republic of Korea. Council action appears adequate at this time and we see no necessity for the submission of the Korean question to the GA now.

Para. 1 (b) on linking SC action and US action, part of Para. 2 dealing with coordination military assistance, Para. 5 on China and Formosa under consideration in Dept. See Deptel 4 to N.Y., however.¹

ACHESON

¹ Transmitted on July 1 at 5 p. m., p. 276.

795.00/7-450

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] July 4, 1950.

Subject: Memorandum of Conversation between Mr. Livingston T. Merchant and Mr. H. A. Graves, Counselor of the British Embassy.

Participants: Mr. Merchant and Mr. Graves

Mr. Graves came in to see me this morning at his request. At the outset he said that he was under urgent instruction from the Ambassador and Tedder, acting on a telegram from London, to obtain a general statement of the United States Government’s ultimate intentions with respect to Korea. He said that he realized that this was difficult but that the Cabinet was most anxious to give full support from the very outset to the central theme of U.S. policy with respect to Korea and that the Cabinet was meeting tomorrow morning to decide what Mr. Attlee should say on the debate in the Commons tomorrow afternoon on Korea. Mr. Graves emphasized that they did not wish to pry into military matters but were anxious to secure the broad picture including, I gathered, such points as our attitude on unification of North and South Korea as opposed to mere restoration of the status quo ante. I
told Mr. Graves that we were naturally anxious to give them the benefit of our thinking and that I would take the matter up urgently with Mr. Rusk. (Immediately thereafter I spoke to Mr. Rusk and Mr. Jessup who agreed that the best and promptest method was to ask Sir Oliver Franks to come in today and discuss the subject with Mr. Rusk. Failing to get in touch with Mr. Satterthwaite or Mr. Jackson this was arranged for noon when the British Ambassador called on Mr. Rusk.)

Secondly, Mr. Graves inquired what our views were regarding the technical implications of the President's orders to blockade North Korea. Again, he said he was acting under instructions from London who for historical reasons were sensitive to the classic legal problems of a blockade. He asked specifically what our position was with respect to the granting of belligerent rights, whether a state of war was thereby considered to have been established, the status of prize courts, whether or not a contraband list would be issued and the question of effectiveness. I asked him what the UK views were on this matter and he indicated he was not yet in receipt of them. I told him that I thought this was a matter that lawyers would be arguing about for years, that the President's action was taken in clear conformity to the Security Council resolution of June 25 and that I would see that our views on these and related aspects were collected and conveyed to him. (In a separate memorandum I have asked Mr. Johnson of NA to consult with L with a view to formulating our views on the blockade and communicating them to Mr. Graves.)

In the above connection Mr. Graves pointed out that the status of their relations with Peking coupled with the presumable participation of British naval units in the enforcement of the blockade posed certain problems which while now hypothetical might materialize into a difficult situation. I asked Mr. Graves what news they had from Peking which might indicate the effect on the Chinese communists in the matter of recognition of the events of the last ten days. He said to their surprise they have been getting no information at all out of their people in Peking.

I then asked Mr. Graves what reply if any he had had from London concerning our request that the British Government ask Shell to suspend all shipments of petroleum products to communist China. I said in this connection we had received with satisfaction a message from Rankin to the effect that a Shell tanker en route to Tientsin had been recalled by radio to Hong Kong. Mr. Graves said that the Embassy had

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1 Livingston Lord Satterthwaite, Deputy Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs.
2 Wayne G. Jackson, Officer in Charge of United Kingdom and Ireland Affairs.
3 No record of the meeting between Ambassador Franks and Mr. Rusk has been found.
4 Not printed.
5 Karl L. Rankin, Consul General at Hong Kong.
had a reply from London which pointed out the minimal quantities of oil going through Shell to China. He added that the telegram neither said that London did or did not ask Shell to suspend the current shipments. The specific figures which he quoted (which incidentally emphasized that no aviation gas had gone to communist China) Mr. Graves stated would be given in detail to Mr. Freeman of CA.¹ I told Mr. Graves that both Caltex and Stanvac had immediately and completely acceded to our request. I further asked him to emphasize strongly to London that it seemed the height of foolishness to permit any oil supplies to move into Mainland China during this period of uncertainty as to the Chinese communists’ reaction to the Korean situation. I said that, however insignificant the quantities involved, he could imagine for himself the effect on American public opinion and relations with the UK if Chinese communist troops appeared in battle against American troops in Korea and it could be said that they rode into battle on oil supplied by a British company. Mr. Graves did not attempt to reply but said he would emphasize this to London.

¹ The figures given by Mr. Graves indicated that in the period January 1—May 31, 1950, the Shell Oil Company exported 25,000 tons of petroleum products to mainland China; for further documentation, see vol. vi, pp. 619 ff.

330/7-450: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, July 4, 1950—4 p. m.

14. 1. Dept is submitting in the next fol tel revision of proposed SC draft Res in connection with the Korean problem. The text takes into consideration some of the suggestions which Noyes discussed with Wainhouse yesterday,² as well as those which the SYG included in his memo to USUN ² as reported by Noyes.

2. Since this proposed Res recommends that all Members providing mil forces and other assistance make such forces and assistance available to a unified command under the US, and further requests the US to designate the commander of such forces, it would be desirable for some other friendly member of the Council to introduce the Res. It is suggested that you consult prior to the meeting with all friendly members of the Council and seek to have an agreed text.

3. Dept wil much prefer to have the Res include the draft text through numbered paragraph 6. If, however, strong pressure develops for the estab of a SC Comite, you may submit paras 7 and 8 to meet that pressure and stave off less desirable proposals.

² See the memorandum of conversations by Mr. Noyes, July 3, p. 292.

4. Dept is not wedded to the method proposed in its draft Res of selecting the SC Comité. It wld be disposed to have the SC itself name the 5 Reps. However, we do not agree with the composition of the Comité suggested by the SYG. As we understand his slate, it is US, UK, France, India and Norway. We believe there ought to be a Latin American State on it, and wld wish to see Cuba or Ecuador, preferably Cuba on the Comité in lieu of Norway.

5. Dept has no objection to your accepting the suggestion of the SYG that he be designated as Rapporteur of any Comité that may be estab. This wld be in accordance with Rule 23 of SC Provisional Rules of Procedure.

6. If the SC shld meet to consider the draft Res we suggest Wed. or Thurs, preferably Thurs to provide more time for consultation and instructions from Govts.

7. We have no objection to ROK being invited to participate in Comité discussions. We do not believe, however, that it is necessary to provide specifically for such participation in the SC Res since the Comité itself wld have authority to take such action. We believe that if the question of participation of the ROK is raised, many other states, both Members and non-Members on the SC, will likewise wish to have the SC invite them to participate in the discussions. This might tend to confuse the situation and impede the passage of the Res.

8. Dept. of Defense has informally cleared text of draft Res. You will be advised as soon as we obtain its formal clearance. Pending this formal clearance, your consultations with other Dels will have to be on a tentative basis indicating lines of our thought without final commitments.

ACHESON

*In a memorandum of July 4, not printed, to General Burns, Mr. Hickerson explained that this suggestion was intended to eliminate Mr. Zinchenko, the Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Security Council Affairs, from the administrative handling of this aspect of the matter in the proposed Security Council Committee (330/7-450).

*July 5 and 6.

330/7-450: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, July 4, 1950—4 p.m.

15. Fol is revision of proposed SC draft res in connection with the Korean problem:

The SC

Having determined that the armed attack upon the ROK by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,
Having recommended that Members of the UN furnish such assistance to the ROK as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore internat'l peace and security in the area.

1. Welcomes the prompt and vigorous support which Govts and peoples of the UN have given to its ress of 25 and 27 June 1950 to assist the ROK in defending itself against armed attack and to restore peace and security in the area;
2. Notes that Members of the UN have transmitted to the UN offers of assistance for the ROK;
3. Recommends that all Members providing mil forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid SC ress make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the US;
4. Requests the US to designate the Commander of such forces;
5. Authorizes the unified command and the armed forces of Member States under it to use the UN flag in addition to their own;
6. Requests the US to provide the SC with periodic reports on the course of action taken under the unified command;
7. Establishes a SC Comite composed of Reps of —— Members of the Council to be appointed by the Pres:

   a. To receive offers of assistance for the ROK transmitted to the UN, to communicate these to the unified command, and to inform the ROK.
   b. To receive the periodic reports requested in Para (6) above.
   c. To advise the SC concerning action taken by Members in support of its ress.

8. Requests the SYG to act as Rapporteur of the Comite.

ACHESON

795.00/7-350: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

[TAEJON,] July 3, 1950—11 p. m.
[Received July 4—4:14 p. m.]

10. Mytel 7, July 3.¹ Enemy thrusts through Yongen and Songjong-ni do not appear to have made much progress today. Enemy believed to have pushed considerable number troops and equipment across Han River below Seoul with air opposition seemingly light. New threat has developed to east, this time in Yoju and Wonju areas which reportedly in enemy hands and with enemy advancing rapidly southeast. This enemy thrust evidently came from Chunchon direction and represents break through 6th division defenses.

Rhee arrived in Pusan yesterday by sea from Mokpo and is evincing strong desire return Taegon. About 105 assemblymen have registered with Assembly secretariat and others are known to have gone

¹Not printed.
to constituencies in south. Cabinet had inaugurated informal meetings, though there little evidence of government offices being set up in Taejon. People more calm here today than any time since outbreak hostilities. Commodity prices have risen somewhat Taejon where influx of refugees relatively great, but little elsewhere.

Department pass CINCFE.

795.00/7-550: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, July 5, 1950—3 p.m.

[Received July 5—1:46 p.m.]

42. Indian Ambassador Radhakrishnan told Embassy officer at July 4 reception that he had not yet received any reply from Soviets to his July 1 démarche re Korea. Asked whether he intended “to return to the charge”, he replied, “Goodness, no” (Delhi’s 16, July 3 to Department). He anxiously inquired whether US would permit use Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea and appeared relieved when told that published US reply to Chinese offer indicated negative attitude on our part.

Radhakrishnan also asked whether “we intended stop at 38th parallel” and speculated about political future of Korea after cessation hostilities. While saying that perhaps all that could be expected would be restoration of status quo line, he thought that military defeat of North Korean forces might create possibility holding all-Korea elections under UN auspices as basis for Korean unification under some kind of UN guarantee. He doubted UNOK could accomplish this objective and considered appointment either smaller UN group or single “UN Commissioner” preferable instrument. From long-term viewpoint he wondered whether we could expect Koreans not to be influenced in their political orientation by their proximity to USSR and Communist China, adding, however, that with Stalin’s demise, he thought Mao ¹ would cut his apron-strings which now tie him to Kremlin.

At end conversation Radhakrishnan referred to earlier remarks he had made to effect that “when chips are down, India would be with US” and said that GOI stand on Korea was confirmation this prediction.

While Embassy agrees that there is some justification for Bajpai’s remarks on Radhakrishnan’s “wooliness” (Delhi’s 16) all evidence

¹ Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central People’s Government Council of the People’s Republic of China.
here points to fact that on Korean issue at least he has taken firm stand along with US and other UN members. This connection Indian Counselor Kapur recently told Embassy officer that latter should not be deceived by his Ambassador’s apparent naïveté and vagueness and that he himself had learned that behind facade was very observant and realistic mind.

Department pass New Delhi, USUN. Repeated information New Delhi 4, USUN 6.

Kirk

795.00/7-550

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 5, 1950.

Subject: Check List on Decisions in Korea Crisis

Attached are two copies of a check list on decisions made in connection with the Korean crisis. You may wish to hand one copy informally to Mr. Harriman. The purpose of the list is to draw together the more important questions which require decision or action arising out of the Korean situation and applies to the responsibilities of both the Department of State and Department of Defense.

Two main points need emphasis. First, we must be unequivocally clear that we shall press the Korean issue through to a successful conclusion, subject to a reexamination of general strategy if the Soviet Union enters the fighting. Unless we have clearly in mind this basic determination, many day-to-day decisions become impossible to make and the American posture is one of timidity and uncertainty and not one of vigorous leadership.

Second, even though our policy may clearly be to see the Korean matter through to a successful conclusion, that policy cannot be acted upon with assurance by the Secretary of State unless all necessary military and economic action is being taken in support thereof. Our relations with other governments on a large number of details will be directly affected. Further, unless we act resolutely, the political effect upon the Soviet Union will not be what we hoped to produce in the opening days of the Korean conflict.

The attached list is not exhaustive, but if we get clear governmental answers to the questions raised, we shall be considerably ahead of where we are now.

FE will work closely with Mr. Matthews to get the answers which turn upon Department of State action, and Mr. Matthews will work

2 Not printed.
with General Burns to attempt to get many of the military questions answered—although we recognize some of the difficulties in that channel.

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Editorial Note

At 3:30 p.m. on July 5, Secretary of State Acheson held a news conference at which he made a statement in refutation of allegations of aggression by the Republic of Korea, likening such charges to Nazi claims in 1939 that Poland had started hostilities by attacking Nazi Germany. For the text of the statement, see Department of State Bulletin, July 17, 1950, page 87.

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791.00/7-550: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 5, 1950—7 p.m.

[Received July 5—3:34 p.m.]

22. 1. Bajpai, SYG MEA, has informed me today by telephone that GOI had received one telegram from Mme. Pandit and another from B. N. Rau reporting that New York Times has leading article to effect that I persuaded GOI take decision in favor resolution of SC and that one reason for India acceptance resolutions was US announcement that it would send aid to Indochina.¹ Bajpai pointed out such stories were harmful to our common cause since they strengthen Communist propaganda that GOI had become tool of USA. They could also cause GOI embarrassment internally.

2. He said instructions were being issued to Pandit and Rau authorizing them deny truth story and to point out that my visit Nehru on day GOI decision was coincidence since I had obtained appointment prior any knowledge second SC resolution. Instructions also were to effect that GOI decision was based on logic of events and was not made as result influence any foreign power.

3. Bajpai said this is second time during recent months that NYT had given credit to American Ambassadors in SOA for decisions taken by SOA Governments. He recalled that Sulzberger in an article sent from Karachi about two months ago had indicated that Indian-Pakistan pact had been brought about as result efforts on part American Ambassadors to Pakistan and India.² This story had caused much

embarrassment and harm. Latest story could be even more harmful.

4. I told Bajpai that I realized harm that story this kind could do to all of us; that I was deeply distressed that article appeared in so authoritative a newspaper as NYT; and that I was sure my government realized GOI decisions were based on merits and logic of events. I said that I was somewhat at loss as to what should be done; that I hoped some way could be found for my government to put matter in its proper perspective; but that denials in situations this kind sometimes did more harm than good. Bajpai replied that he had no suggestions to make but that tendency American press give US credit for everything that was done anywhere was exasperating for govern-
ments dealing with US.

5. Bajpai was deeply irritated and I am sure Nehru is furious. Publica-
tion such story will seriously injure my relations at least tempo-
rarily with Nehru at most unfortunate time. He will be annoyed both with US Government and with me even though he may realize neither was responsible for publication. Appearance this story will, of course, also be effective ammunition for those groups in India and elsewhere in Asia who are already charging that GOI has fallen under domi-
nation "Anglo-American imperialism."

6. I do not know whether Department can find some way of denying NYT story without giving it undue emphasis. I do not believe however we can remain silent in face of storm which is sure to rise in India. Perhaps Department can create occasion make statement along following lines:

Reports that US Government had attempted in Washington, Lake Success or New Delhi to exert pressure on India in matter of SC resolutions on Korea of June 26 and 27 are without foundation. US Government was of opinion that what had happened in Korea was so clear that events should be much more convincing than anything which it or any of its representatives could say.

It was entirely accidental that American Ambassador to India visited PM on June 29, the date GOI made decision to support resolu-
tion of June 27. Ambassador had requested appointment before he had any knowledge of this resolution in order explain considerations which had prompted US Government to take certain actions re Korea. Representative of India in SC had already supported SC resolution of June 26 [25]. It should therefore be clear that no representations from US were required to prevail upon GOI to support resolution of June 27 which was natural corollary to that of preceding day. US Government had no reason to believe that GOI decision re resolution of June 27 was influenced by Ambassador and PM. Its understanding is that decision was taken after Cabinet meeting had carefully re-
viewed all pertinent facts.

7. I would appreciate it if Department would inform me if it would have any objection to my issuance of statement similar to that out-
lined in paragraph 6 in response to inquiries certain to be received from press.

HENDERSON

330.1/7-550: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

New York, July 5, 1950—3:51 p. m.
[Received July 5—4:56 p. m.]

16. I met with Chauvel and Jebb at former's office at eleven this morning to discuss proposals for SC action at next meeting on Korea. Lacoste, Ordonneau, Shone, Cole, Gross and Ross present.

We gave colleagues copies alternative texts draft resolution first alternative consisting of draft contained Deptel No. 15, July 4 through numbered paragraph 6, and second alternative consisting entire text set forth this ref tel. I explained numbered paragraphs 7 and 8 reflected our present line of thinking should there be strong pressure to establish committee at this time. I pointed out difficulties involved in establishment committee at this time and particularly re composition, and question whether colleagues foresaw any embarrassment, particularly to commander designated by US pursuant paragraph 4, in postponing action on committee now but possibly taking up question of committee at later date should this seem necessary or desirable. I mentioned as wholly personal thought possibility at some stage committee consisting of president SC, president GA, and SYG in order to maintain maximum universality UN approach to Korean conflict.

Jebb said he sure UK Government would prefer short form of resolution (through numbered paragraph 6) and that in view of difficulties particularly re composition concerning committee would prefer to postpone question of committee time being. He read from instructions indicating his government view SC itself could meet as often as necessary to consider offers from member governments or further measures to be taken. In this way SC would demonstrate its active and continuing interest in Korean conflict. Meanwhile it should be possible unofficially and informally outside of SC to guard against undesirable resolutions or measures which might embarrass commander designated by US. Jebb said his government had suggested that ROK might be requested to report nominally to SC thus avoiding any embarrassment if such there be in requesting US directly to make such reports.

Chauvel indicated desire his government also to avoid embarrassment US commander. He said important question was to avoid going
back again to SC (attitude India, Egypt, Yugoslavia, possibly others) in event conflict spreads (Formosa, Indochina). Therefore Chauvel said important that resolution not be too precise. He had prepared personally draft resolution (sent separately as USUN 15)\(^1\) which was very much along lines our short draft. He said he thought most essential point was asking us to designate commander. Neither we nor British reacted very favorably to Chauvel’s idea of committee composed of Norway, US, UK, France and SYG. Chauvel stressed principal concept he had in mind was set forth in numbered paragraph 2 his draft resolution, namely that Sunde as individual might be named as rapporteur to continue in this role after expiration his presidency. Principal purpose Chauvel saw in committee was “negative” in sense blocking off SYG and preventing his trying to do “everything”.

Neither Jebb nor Chauvel reacted very favorably to getting GA or Romulo\(^2\) involved.

Both Jebb and Chauvel said they would have to get instructions concerning the use of UN flag (our No. 5).\(^3\) Neither voiced strong objection this point nor enthusiasm.

Gross pointed out Department opposed putting non-members of SC on a SC committee on ground this would open field for effort various governments get on committee and that Department proposed naming Government of Korea to sit in on committee since committee itself would of course have ample power to request representative Government Korea to attend meetings. Jebb asked re paragraph 3 US draft whether we had intentionally omitted reference to Korean forces being placed under MacArthur command and I explained this had been intentional since Korea not member UN but forces UN members being unified in support of Korea. Neither Jebb nor Chauvel dissented from this point; both however considered point important.

Jebb and Chauvel appeared to agree it would be appropriate for their two delegations to introduce draft resolution.

It was agreed tentatively that we were not ready yet to decide on the committee and that we should proceed with consultations on basis short draft (through numbered paragraph 6). We agreed Jebb would inform Sunde our consultation, that the three delegations would meet with Dune [Sunde?]) tomorrow afternoon, and that we would ask him to call a meeting of SC for Friday morning.\(^4\)

\(^{1}\) Not printed.
\(^{2}\) Carlos P. Romulo, Philippines Representative at the United Nations, was President of the U.N. General Assembly.
\(^{3}\) See paragraph 5 of telegram 15 to New York, July 4, 4 p. m., p. 301.
\(^{4}\) July 7.
CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1950--8 p. m.

PRIORITY

16. Dept has been in consultation with Ind Emb re Crock [Krock] art. First Secy states probable that no formal statement will be issued in US altho he has not consulted Amb or Rau. Press queries will be answered in sense Ind decision based on independent Fon policy, devotion to world peace and opposition to aggression and was in no way related to IC.

At Dept press conference tomorrow (urtel 22, July 5) press officer will respond to planted question in sense (1) Ind decision inherent in Ind Fon policy and position in UN since independence; (2) in light that policy and position, US Govt considered that facts Korean situation would speak for themselves to GOI and that no representations from outside source were required to convince GOI of rightness of decision it took; and (3) ur role was normal one of consultation with GOI in order that GOI might be currently informed of US views on developing situation and Dept aware of Ind opinion. If queried re IC aspect reply will be in sense that Dept has no reason believe GOI was influenced by anything other than facts in Korean situation.

You may in ur discretion make statement or reply to press queries along foregoing lines adding such other comment as may seem useful locally.

ACHESON

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* See footnote 1 to telegram 22, July 5, from New Delhi, p. 304.

* On July 6, a Department press spokesman did deny that the United States had exerted pressure on the Indian Government to support the June 27 Security Council resolution; see the New York Times, July 7, 1950.

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SECRET

New York, July 5, 1950--8:37 p. m.

PRIORITY

[Received July 5—9:12 p. m.]

22. Gross and Ross lunched with Sunde and Stabell this noon to bring them up to date on USUN and Department thinking on proposed resolution for action at next SC meeting. Gross and Ross gave them copy full text of resolution transmitted Department's 15, July 4, explaining that our present thinking with which UK and French delegates seem to agree was to drop paragraph 7 and 8 for time being and concentrate on short form of resolution through numbered para-
graph 6. Sunde indicated support for short form, and said he did not feel it necessary or desirable at this stage to get involved in complicated question of setting up committee. He said he was unaware of pressure from any quarter to set up a committee at this stage. He said he had talked with Lie on telephone this a.m. and that Lie was not pressing for committee.

Re sponsorship of resolution, Sunde although without instruction clearly indicated he favored Norway as sole sponsor. (Stabell told Ross privately he was personally opposed to Norwegian sponsorship since his government would not have full opportunity and time to consider many implications of action). Sunde recognized that French and possibly British also might wish to participate in sponsorship. He thought there should be maximum of free sponsors.

Question Chinese representation came up by Norwegian reference current activities Rau. Gross and Ross took line indicated Department’s No. 9, July 3.¹

Sunde indicated he thought if question should arise in SC, in light his government’s position, he would probably have to vote for seating Communists; he agreed, however, it would be undesirable for question to come up during Korean crisis.

In context Chinese representation question and Russian absence, Sunde observed (referring to Hoover’s speech)² that he thought whole function and structure of UN should be studied with view to charter revision in event continued absence Russians. He agreed, however, would be better not to give Russians excuse for charging free nations had broken up UN, but rather that we should continue on present basis, leaving seat open for Russians.

AUSTIN

¹ See footnote 1 to telegram 16, July 3, from New Delhi, p. 284.

705.00/7–650: Circular telegram
The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices ¹

SECRET
WASHINGTON, July 6, 1950—4 a.m.

Reporting NK advance to Pyongtaek, 20 miles south Suwon, Hq Tokyo states NK forces displaying resourcefulness and tactical skill. One NK division said to have 15 Sov advisers while Sov personnel manning NK tanks north Seoul were identified by ROK general. B–3

¹ This message was sent to all diplomatic missions except Colombo and to the Office of the Acting Political Adviser in Japan, and to the Consulates General in Hong Kong and Singapore.
report states 200,000 Chi Commie troops massing Antung on Chi-Korea border. US Far East Air Force reports NK planes avoiding combat.

Jap officials wholeheartedly behind US action Korea according USPolAd, who has received confidential msgs from Emperor expressing gratitude. Indications are Jap Govt wld like, within limits imposed by occupied status, offer support SC res.

In reply charge by Trotskyite MP that Ceylon is tied US and UK imperialism, Ceylon cabinet min stated that, faced by necessity choosing between US and USSR, his govt will follow US and its democratic principles.

Re Chi Govt offer send 33 thousand troops Korea, Chi Amb Wash has conveyed his govt's complete agreement our reply suggesting consultation with MacArthur whether Formosa defense wld thereby be weakened, which Chi Amb believed might well be case. In response question by Chi Amb, Dept stated no info recd clearly indicating USSR planning early offensive action other parts world.

Indians advise against dismissing lightly Chi Commie allegations US action re Formosa is aggression against Chi and cite reports of rising feeling in Commie Chi that US is using Korea as pretext to strengthen its armed forces in region for eventual support Chi Natists. Indians note possibility Peiping making such claims as basis for possible future request for Sov assistance under Sino-Sov treaty. While aware US conviction that USSR and Chi Commies wld if participating UN merely denounce as invalid all actions taken behalf Korea, Indians feel it important both countries take seats SC near future believing way might then be opened for negots on Korea and Formosa and for preventing decline UN into group nations revolving around US and West.

Port FonMin holds principal Sov objective remains Mediterranean and that Sov moves other areas may be flank operations preparatory to central drive somewhere between Adriatic and Afghanistan.

UK, Fr, and Nor delegs UN in agreement US draft res establishing unified command Korea under US with omission provision for UN Comite.

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*The text of a statement to this effect was communicated to Secretary-General Lie by Chou En-lai on July 6; see U.N. document S/1583.
*Reference is to the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, February 14, 1950; for related documentation, see vol. vi, pp. 256 ff.
*A meeting with President Truman on July 6, Secretary of State Acheson secured the President's approval for the U.S. draft resolution as contained in telegram 15, July 4, to New York, p. 300, through numbered paragraph 6 (795.00/7-650). Concerning JCS opposition to the concept of a U.N. Committee, see Schnabel, Policy and Directions, p. 101.
Austral PriMin informed AmAmb Canberra he wld like spend week Wash on return from London end July in order discuss with Pres questions Pacific and world defense and Austral contribution thereto. Inform Dept if in view expense transmission and limitation your code facilities you believe circular tels Korea shld be discontinued to your post.

ACHESON

795.00/7-650

Memorandum of Teletype Conference, Prepared in the Department of the Army

[Extract]

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1950—6:52 a.m.
Nr: DA TT 3467

Tokyo: FEC Item 10
Reur DA-5, DA TT 3462 051029Z July 50:

Official

The U.S. and the U.N. are committed in Korea to the extent that withdrawal is completely unacceptable from a political viewpoint. There are no known diplomatic steps which would deter the Chinese Communist Government. Should Chinese combat forces become involved in active opposition to U.N. forces in Korea, sufficient power must be added to U.N. forces to insure fulfillment of currently assigned missions. The first military steps should be to destroy the communication facilities into and through North Korea. The assistance of SAC would be required for this task. An announcement by the President that the U.S. would back up the U.N. decision with the Strategic Air Force if necessary might be a psychological deterrent to the Chinese people, including those in the military forces. (End Item 10)

1 The text of the referenced document reads as follows:

"Washington: DA-5
G3 also desires your opinion as to the following:
Should Chinese Communist combat forces become involved in active opposition to UN forces in Korea, what would be your recommendation as to US reaction from the political-military viewpoint? (End DA-5)."

Editorial Note

On July 6, the National Security Council met to discuss Korea. A memorandum for the files, in Department of State top secret file
795.00/7–650, which covered Mr. Acheson's discussions with his principal Department of State advisers prior to the meeting, was not declassified by the National Security Council in time for inclusion in this volume. The memorandum dealt chiefly with the blockade of North Korea. At the NSC meeting, the Secretaries of State and Defense agreed that the two Departments should clarify the extent and meaning of the blockade of North Korea (NSC Files: NSC Action No. 3105).

A published account of the NSC meeting, covering topics other than the blockade, is printed in Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, pages 344–345.

Also at the July 6 NSC meeting, the President instructed the members that all proposals for presidential action in the current Korean crisis were to be forwarded to him through the NSC machinery; no unilateral proposals for his action were to be sent to him directly. (Harry S. Truman Library: Files of Charles S. Murphy, Box 22, Folder "Korea"; Elsey to Murphy, July 7, 1950)

795.00/7–650: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACI

Moscow, July 6, 1950—8 p. m. [Received July 6—2:58 p. m.]

54. For the Secretary, Gromyko asked British Ambassador to call at two today, July 6. He asked Ambassador if he adhered to statement he had made to Pavlov on June 29 (Embtel 2; July 1). The Ambassador said yes and repeated that he had urged that the Soviet Government cooperate in effecting a peaceful settlement of the Korean dispute. Gromyko asked if Ambassador still adhered to this position in spite of what had happened since and of American actions. The Ambassador confirmed that he did.

Gromyko then stated Soviet Government wished for a peaceful settlement and asked if Ambassador had any specific proposals to make. Ambassador said since [sense?] his instructions were that British hoped Soviet Government would use its influence with North Korean Government to stop bloodshed. Pressed to be more specific Ambassador said British obviously desired to restore status quo. A UN commission had been working in South Korea to promote peaceful union of two halves and British wished to return to status quo and to stop war. Gromyko nodded assent.

Ambassador inquired whether he could report Gromyko as meaning that, despite his recent statement (Embtl 32, July 4) to effect that

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1 See footnote 3 to telegram 1767, from Moscow, received at 1:02 p. m. on June 29, p. 290.
2 Not printed.
Soviet policy was one of noninterference, Soviet Government would be willing to act if it found suitable means. Gromyko said that Ambassador knew position of Soviet Government from documents which have been published but that Soviet Government wished for a peaceful settlement and therefore he had advised Ambassador if latter had any proposals. Ambassador said that all British asked was for the use of Soviet influence with the North Korean Government, that he would report at once what Gromyko had said and that he would ask to see Gromyko again if he received a further communication for him.

On theory that, since reply to British will not be made public, press correspondents will determine that reply given him must be different from that given us (Embretel 1767, June 29) Ambassador Kelly has, to avoid undesirable speculation, informed correspondents off-the-record that Gromyko asked him for "elucidation of his request for Soviet cooperation".

Kirk

THE BRITISH EMBASSY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRET

EXTRACT FROM TELEGRAM FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE TO THE BRITISH EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, DATED JULY 6TH, 1950

I think that you should at once communicate the text of Kelly's report 1 to Mr. Acheson personally and speak to him from me in the following sense.

2. He will remember that we decided to make a parallel approach to the Soviet Government after the United States had approached them. This Soviet response clearly needs the most careful consideration, and we shall not make any further move in Moscow without discussion with the United States Government. Meanwhile it would be very helpful to us to know what Mr. Acheson's reaction is.

3. Have in mind that the public here in the main believe that the Russians themselves recognise that they have overstepped the mark in Korea. They will therefore expect the most serious consideration to be given to any move which might lead to peace, and the Government for their part are bound to be careful not to act in any way which might lose them the unanimous support of the country which was demonstrated in yesterday's debate in Parliament.

1 The text of Ambassador Kelly's telegram to the Foreign Office, July 6, on his meeting with Gromyko, which was transmitted to the Department of State along with this note from the British Embassy, is not printed; the substance of Ambassador Kelly's message is contained in telegram 54, from Moscow, supra, and is also summarized in Prime Minister Attlee's statement before the House of Commons on July 20, 1950, printed in British Cmd. 8078, Korea No. 1 (1950) : Summary of Events Relating to Korea, 1950, p. 27.
4. Please impress on Mr. Acheson that it is of the utmost importance that details of Kelly's conversation with Gromyko should not be allowed to leak to the press. We are refusing to enlarge on what Kelly has already given out to the press in Moscow.

5. In my immediately following telegram I am transmitting a message from the Prime Minister to the President regarding the military and political implications of the Korea situation. I am anxious that Mr. Acheson should see this message at the same time as he sees Kelly's report. The Prime Minister's message will indicate to the United States that we think that nothing should be left to chance. But I do not think that the proposals in the Prime Minister's message should detract from the importance of weighing carefully what reply we should give to Gromyko's approach.

*Infra.*

795.00/7-650

The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman

TOP SECRET

MESSAGE FROM MR. ATTLEE TO THE PRESIDENT

I have been giving much thought to the problems which are likely to face us as the situation in Korea develops. These problems are of course primarily military but they are likely to have increasingly wide political implications.

2. The implications will concern not only the way in which we should like to see the situation in Korea develop but also the reactions of the Russians as it develops. Russian reactions may be expected not only in the Far East; we have been giving some thought to other parts of the world where the Soviet Government may cause trouble for us.

3. A particular aspect of the situation in Korea which is causing us concern is that the Russians have involved the Western Powers in a heavy commitment without themselves playing an overt part, and there are other areas in the Far East where the same tactics are open to them. You have already made known your concern with Indo-China and Formosa. There is some reason to think that Communist-inspired activities in Malaya have already been stepped up in tune with the Korean affair. And we can not ignore the possibility of a Chinese attack on Hongkong.

4. But further, we can not be sure that these activities on the part of Russia will be confined to East Asia. I understand your Military Advisers have already expressed the view that Persia may again become a danger spot. We should consider whether the opportunity may not be taken of relighting the fire in Greece. And there may be other areas of potential trouble.
5. No-one can attempt to provide precisely in advance for every eventuality. But I hope you will agree with me that we should look ahead as far as we can and reach some agreement as to our common policy in these areas in the event of further outbreaks.

6. I would like to propose to you therefore that representatives of our two Governments should meet to consider what courses of action are most likely to be adopted by the Soviet Government and should have an exploratory discussion of the plans we should adopt to meet them. Plans have already been concerted between us over a wide field but I think that the time may have come for extending the area to which our detailed plans should apply. Other Governments, in particular the French, may be concerned but it will suffice if they are informed as and when the situation demands.

7. I would therefore like to suggest to you that you should authorise the appropriate United States authorities to discuss these problems with Lord Tedder in Washington. If you approve this suggestion, I should propose to send a representative of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff to advise Lord Tedder on our thinking here.

8. It seems to me that such talks cannot ignore the political implications. I should therefore be glad to hear whether you would propose that the Department of State should be associated with these talks. If so, I should of course arrange for Lord Tedder also to be supplied with appropriate political advice.

9. My colleagues and I attach very great importance to reaching the closest possible understanding with the United States Government so that we can both plan in full confidence that we understand each other's approach to these weighty problems. I therefore deeply hope that you will be able to give me an early and favourable reply to this suggestion.

10. I am sure you will agree that there should be no publicity about the proposed talks either before or while they take place.


795.00/7–650: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

MOSCOW, July 6, 1950—9 p.m. [Received July 6—3:44 p.m.]

For the Secretary. Re my immediately preceding telegram Korea.² Without overlooking possibility that Russian move is solely designed as trap in effort to slacken pressure on Korea by endeavoring drive wedge in unanimity free world, our first reaction is that approach is genuine to the extent that it reflects Soviet view that, in

² See telegram 54, from Moscow, received at 2:58 p.m. on July 6, p. 312.
light of developments, outcome in Korea cannot be envisaged as favorable to the Soviets, that as of now at least they are not disposed to enlarge the conflict into a general Asian or world conflagration, that they wish to localize the affair, and that they are seeking means to salvage as much prestige as possible. Should their representations develop into a peaceful solution, they probably feel they could capitalize on their initiative as demonstrative of their peaceful pretensions. Even if nothing comes of it they may foresee advantageous exploitation of their step in terms of publicity in connection with their peace campaign. British Ambassador is of same view.

In any event it seems to us that Gromyko’s request for “specific proposals” is one which cannot be let drop. We do not at this point have any specific ideas as to the most desirable UN action towards the unification of Korea following the re-establishment of the 38 parallel line. Presumably the obvious reply to Gromyko is to make fully clear that a prerequisite to a peaceful solution is complete compliance by the North Koreans with the SC order that they withdraw beyond the 38 parallel and cease fire. It seems to us that there might be added to such a statement a request for assurances that the Soviet Union would cooperate and participate in a subsequent UN supervised all-Korean election, should the other members of the UN determine such an election to be desirable, and, having left no doubt in the Soviet mind that such agreement on their part and on the part of the North Koreans are essential pre-conditions, inquiry might then be made whether the Soviet Government has anything specific in mind itself.

It will be noted Gromyko’s remarks were confined to Korea. 

KIRK

705.00/7-650

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1950.

Subject: Air Force Reconnaissance Flights

            Dean Rusk—Assistant Secretary of State

General Hamilton came in this afternoon at his request and showed me a telegram from the Commanding General of Far East Air

1 Brig. Gen. Pierpont Hamilton, Chief of the Policy Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Department of the Air Force.
2 Not printed.
Forces to Headquarters Air Forces, Washington, asking for permission to conduct high level (30,000 feet) reconnaissance flights over Dairen, Port Arthur, Vladivostok, Karafute, and the Kuril Islands. General Hamilton said that there had been some difference in the Air Force as to how this telegram should be handled. He said there were certain officers who felt that the Far East Air Force should simply go ahead and conduct such reconnaissance flights without raising any questions, particularly since they considered it most unlikely that such flights would be discovered. General Hamilton said others considered that very important political questions were involved and that political clearance would be required.

I told General Hamilton that such an operation at this time would raise political questions of the gravest importance, that such flights would be clearly contrary to the President’s specific directives on the subject of Manchuria and Siberia, and that I could not under any circumstances give consent or clearance to such an operation. I told him that I felt certain that the President would have to consider this question after careful advice from the Secretaries of State and Defense and that I had no doubt but that the Secretary of State would strongly oppose such an operation under existing circumstances.

I suggested to General Hamilton that the matter was one which should be taken up with Secretary of Air Finletter, who had been present in all of the top-side meetings at which our recent basic decisions were made.

General Hamilton confirmed that he understood clearly that the Department of State was not giving any clearance to any such operation and that he would recommend to his own superiors that the question be taken up with Secretary Finletter.

Subsequently, I informed the top policy group of this item and suggested that Mr. Matthews (G) mention the matter to Secretary Finletter in order that the latter might get his own hand on the situation as soon as possible. Mr. Matthews has informed me that he spoke to Secretary Finletter and that Finletter took a serious view of the matter and would move in on it at once.

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* The proposal for the reconnaissance flights was disapproved by President Truman; see Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 346–347.
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse)

CONFIDENTIAL  [WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1950.

Subject: Draft Resolution on Unified Command
Participants: USUN—Ambassador Gross
UNP—Mr. Wainhouse

Ambassador Gross called me at 4:55 to report the following. The Norwegian representative has heard from his Government and reports that his Government does not seem prepared to sponsor the resolution. The Norwegian representative, however, has asked his government to reconsider and expects an answer around 5:30 this afternoon.²

The Norwegian representative wanted to know whether we would be prepared to add at the end of paragraph (3) of the draft resolution the following words “as agent for the United Nations”. Ambassador Gross stated that USUN is opposed to such an amendment. The Norwegian representative did not appear disposed to press the point.

The representatives of the UK and France are prepared to sponsor the resolution but they have a special problem relating to the flag and would like to submit the following language which although not expressed as a condition to sponsorship would make it more palatable for them to do so. The language for paragraph (5) as they gave it to Ambassador Gross is as follows:

“Authorizes the unified command to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations involved.”

(I raised the question regarding the use of the word “involved” and suggested that a better word would be “participating”.)

Ambassador Gross stated that India will probably vote for the resolution. It, however, would like to allay its fears regarding paragraph (1), that the phrase “to restore peace and security in the area” means only in the Korean area. Accordingly, the Indian representative suggests the use of the word “thus” in paragraph (1) before the phrase “to restore peace and security in the area.”

¹ See the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Wainhouse on his talk with Mr. Hyde at 6:45 p. m. on July 6, p. 320.
² See telegram 15, to New York, July 4, 4 p. m., p. 300.
Ambassador Gross asked if Norway, UK and France dropped out, how strongly do we feel about having a resolution at all.

The Security Council meeting tomorrow has been postponed from 11:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. at the request of the British.

795.60/7-650: Telegram
The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State
SECRET
PRIORITY
Belgrade, July 6, 1950—10 a.m.
[Received July 6—4:58 p.m.]

22. Kardelj confirmed to me at Bled last night remarks he made to Reams in Belgrade (Embassy’s 6, July 1). He repeated that equivocal position Yugoslav Government had taken on Korean case had been due primarily to considerations of Yugoslavia’s own immediate security. Yugoslav Government did not wish to give Soviets any color of reason for creating “second Korea here”. He added that Yugoslavia, as Communist country, faced some awkwardness in aligning itself with US now because certain American newspapers and statesmen were calling for “crusade against Communism”. He said if action by North Korean troops were characterized as aggression by “Soviet type Communism”, Yugoslavia would find much less difficulty in aligning itself clearly on our side. However, he said that despite these and other considerations Yugoslavia nevertheless recognized overwhelming fact that North Koreans were aggressors and that supreme necessity for Yugoslavia was for aggression to be banished. Consequently Yugoslavia was glad SC had taken action it did, which Yugoslavia accepted as fully legal. Refusal by North Korea to accept this decision had freed Yugoslavia’s hand.

I replied that many people in US regarded Communism, like Fascism and other dictatorships by one group or class, as synonymous with aggression and that only way Yugoslavia could convince these persons that Yugoslav Communism was different would be for Yugoslav Government to come out publicly and categorically in opposition to aggression of North Korea and in support of UN action to stop it. I pointed out that if occasion ever arose for US to ask SC to take action in support of Yugoslavia, it would be difficult to arouse enthusiasm among American people if Yugoslavia maintained neutral position in Korean case.

Kardelj, who was clearly making point of informing me of firm decision taken by Yugoslav Politbureau, said Yugoslav Government
would seek early appropriate occasion to "get off the fence" and make declaration in support of SC resolution. He said recent troop movements in Bulgaria made Yugoslav situation delicate for the moment but they thought appropriate occasion for Yugoslav declaration might be when fighting returned to 38th parallel if not before.

While I have taken consistently strong line with Yugoslav Government since beginning of Korean case, urging open support of our position in UN, I recognize that valid arguments may be adduced that neutral position of Yugoslavia is advantageous to us for time being, and I would welcome any instruction or thoughts Department may have on subject. Otherwise I shall continue to press for early and categoric declaration. It seems to me that in present case desirability of clear Yugoslav position against aggression outweighs all other considerations, however persuasive contrary considerations may be.¹

Department pass Moscow priority; repeated info London 1, Paris 1, Moscow 6. (Delayed in transmission from Bled July 4.)

Allen

¹The Department of State sent the following message to Belgrade in telegram 6, July 7, 5 p.m.:

"Conversation with Kardelj reported Ur 22, July 6 undoubtedly made before receipt Deptel 2, July 3 [see footnote 5 to telegram 6, from Belgrade, received at 8:24 p.m. on July 1, p. 280], which after due consideration here was believed best course for US in present circumstances to follow in dealing with Yugo over Korean issue. In light that tel you shld defer pressing for Yugo declaration." (795.00/7-650)

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1950.

Subject: Draft Resolution on Unified Command

Participants: USUN—Mr. James Hyde

UNP—Mr. Wainhouse

Mr. Hyde telephoned at 6:45 tonight to say that the Norwegian representative has reported that he cannot sponsor the resolution. Mr. Hyde stated that the decision of the Norwegian representative is about 100% certain.¹

¹At 5:56 p.m., the Department of State had received telegram 22, July 6, from Oslo (not printed), wherein Ambassador Bay reported on a conversation held that afternoon with Foreign Minister Lange. Mr. Bay indicated that Lange's reluctance to accept sponsorship for the resolution was based on the grounds that it was a more appropriate matter for one of the larger powers to sponsor the resolution and that Norway had not participated in the preliminary drafting of the resolution (757.00/7-650).
Ambassador Chauvel cannot sponsor the resolution alone because he is without a Government, but felt he could go along in the joint sponsorship with the UK.

330/7-650: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

New York, July 6, 1950—11:09 p. m.
[Received July 6—11:37 p. m.]

29. Tsiang 1 at his urgent request in my absence and that of Gross this afternoon called on Ross as follows:

1. He said that if at some point a committee were to be established China would wish to be member of such committee.

2. He said he felt we were under grave disadvantage Soviet propaganda attacks that Korean effort a "manifestation of American imperialism". Stressing he felt this propaganda having strong effect in Asia he proposed for urgent consideration USG including in pending SC resolution or in separate resolution at early date SC pronouncement that action in Korea limited to purposes already indicated (repelling North Korean attack) and that no country contributing aid to ROK should derive any political, economic or territorial advantage from participation in UN effort and that any final solution of Korean situation should be consistent with the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of ROK. Tsiang added each government offering aid to ROK should subscribe in entirety to foregoing SC statement. Tsiang felt this approach would go far to enlist support of India for UN effort.

3. Tsiang said he had advised his government that they should not be concerned too much about providing forces for effort in Korea but that they should make very clear that they would not be able to provide necessary transport and supply but only initial equipment for any Chinese forces. At same time Tsiang felt that from political viewpoint UN effort in Korea taking on much too much of western European complexion (he mentioned in this connection Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, UK) with no Asian forces so far offered. He said it was very important in his view that Asian forces participate in effort and he mentioned the possibility of Philippine and Pakistan forces with a question mark on possibility getting some contribution of forces from Thailand. India he felt was unlikely to contribute forces.

Tsiang was informed his views would be communicated immediately to Department 2 and reactions transmitted as soon as possible; mechanical difficulties of including SC pronouncement along lines his suggestion paragraph (2) above in time for tomorrow's meeting were pointed out and understood by him.

AUSTIN

2 See the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Wells, July 11, p. 362.
28. Reports from USUN re Korea: The following telegram reports conversations by USUN officers with other delegations July 6:

**Views of SC members:**

Bebler (Yugoslavia) told Sunde (Norway) that Yugoslavia would “make no difficulty” at SC meeting July 7, Sunde informed Gross. From Bebler’s comments, Sunde believed Yugoslavia was “coming around”.

Sunde also said he had talked separately with Bebler and Rau (India), who reportedly agreed that it would “not be opportune” to raise issue of Chinese representation during Korean crisis. Sunde apparently had given them substance of Gross’ comments to him along lines of Deptel 9 of July 3¹ without attributing source of these comments.

In separate telephone conversations, Ross gave substance of six numbered points of pending draft SC resolution on Korea to Rau, Fawzi (Egypt) and Tsiang (China). Rau expressed thanks but made no comments. Tsiang offered no comment but in response to request for observations, Tsiang thought a resolution along lines indicated “seemed like a reasonable proposition”.

Fawzi said he did not think the US could appropriately sponsor such a resolution, nor would he like China to do so. Upon Ross’ inquiry, Fawzi suggested Norway as sponsor would be fine but that other possibilities should be considered in case Norway could not do so. UK and France would be all right, Fawzi agreed.

Asked if he cared to make comment either of personal nature or on behalf of his government, Fawzi said he thought Egypt’s position would be “in line with what has taken place”. He thought he detected some “straightening out of the line”. He was not discouraged and was “not giving up”.

Fawzi added opinion that the less discussion on resolution at SC meeting the better. He said he had been urging upon himself and others the view that legalistic points should not be subjected to a magnifying glass, and that after all we were trying to do a job in spirit of charter.

¹See footnote 1 to telegram 16, from New Delhi, received at 2:34 p.m. on July 3, p. 284.
Latin-American caucus:

The LA caucus July 6 discussed Korean problem particularly with reference to coordination of offers of aid, Muniz (Brazil) indicated to Noyes. Muniz had argued strongly against Latin Americans attempting to make concrete offers of supplies now. He thought all offers might not be accepted and refusal of coffee, rice, et cetera would have bad effect on people involved. He believed it wiser to await information from combined command. He said Alvarez (Cuba) reported that Austin thought this course was wisest and that seemed to be consensus of meeting.

A LA source reported to Corrigan that results of LA caucus were: 1) Unanimous decision to support US action in SC July 7; 2) agreed Korean question should not be referred to IC; 3) decided to give further study to Lie’s message re contributions to UN effort in Korea. General atmosphere of meeting was reportedly harmonious and optimistic.

Other members’ comments:

In conversation with J. Hyde, Carter (Canada) said his Ambassador had underlined great importance to Canada of having it clear that this was UN operation. He commented on two points of US draft: 1) Matter of UN flag, which he understood leaves a measure of discretion to unified command; and 2) reports from US to SC on actions of unified command. On latter point, he indicated Canada might prefer unified commander be requested to make reports to SC but he realized there were reasons why US chain of command must be respected. Carter seemed quite content that resolution contained no reference to SC committee.

Von Balluseck (Netherlands) expressed concern to Hyde about press reports indicating strong difference between British and French as to kind of administrative machinery for handling armed forces under MacArthur’s command. He said the Netherlands, having recognized Communist China, wanted to be certain that its offer of a destroyer if accepted did not lead it into conflict with Communist China. When shown copy of draft resolution which represented joint thinking, Von Balluseck felt it met his problem. He added that UK, which also had recognized Chinese Communists, would be thinking of same problem as Netherlands.

Kyrour (Greece) called at his request on Austin to describe talk he had just had with the Jam Sahab of Nawangar, whom he considered to have considerable influence in Indian Government affairs. Jam Sahab apparently reported that if the resolution providing for unified command under MacArthur restricted the commander’s activity
to area of Korea, he felt confident India would send forces. If however, there was no such limitation and possibility existed of fighting spreading to Formosa, Indo-China or elsewhere in Asia, he was equally sure India would not contribute forces. When Austin read pertinent passages from working paper on Korea, Kyrou agreed this draft limited action to Korea as much as could be reasonably expected.

AUSTIN

330/7–750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT

NEW DELHI, July 7, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received July 7—7:14 a. m.]

35. 1. I discussed with Bajpai Secretary General MEA at 11 a. m. July 7 draft of SC resolution re commander of UN forces in Korea contained in Depcritel July 6, 1 a.m.¹

2. He thanked me for copy which I handed him and said he had received last night similar draft from B. N. Rau. Since GOI was contributing no armed forces to Korea campaign it was of opinion that it would be preferable for it not to vote on this resolution. Rau had therefore been instructed that he should not “participate” in voting, stating that he was taking this position because Indian armed forces were not involved. Bajpai hoped US would understand failure India cast vote on this question did not mean that it had any reservation about resolution or that it was “back-sliding” in giving full support to UN in its struggle against aggression. GOI believed that it was logical that an American should be commander of UN forces and that that American should be General MacArthur. Although he had not mentioned matter in instructions to Rau, he personally thought that it would have been preferable from India’s point of view if resolution had provided that commander should report direct to SC rather than through US to SC. This point was, however, not of great importance and perhaps technical reasons had prompted decision to make report through US.

3. Continuing in personal vein, Bajpai said that although logic of situation called for US commander of UN forces and for that commander to be chief US armed forces officer in Far East, nevertheless there were certain complications so far as India was concerned. For instance, if Chinese Commies should move against Formosa order for UN armed forces to resist such attack would undoubtedly emanate from person who was in command of UN armed forces. Again he did not wish to labor this point. There was probably no way of separating

¹ Not printed; the draft resolution referred is in telegram 15, July 4, to New York, through numbered paragraph 6, p. 300.
functions American UN commander from those of US commander in Far East without weakening effectiveness of UN forces engaged in battle in Korea.

4. Nehru, he said, would probably at press conference today make it clear that although GOI was giving full support to SC resolution of June 26 [25] and 27 it had not associated itself with President Truman’s statements re Formosa and Southeast Asia. It was Nehru’s intention, however, in making this statement not to display either approval or disapproval for those US decisions announced by President.

HENDERSON

795.00/7-750

Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen 1 to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 7, 1950.

Subject: Indications of Soviet willingness to seek settlement of Korean fighting.

The handling of the indication of a Soviet desire to find some manner of terminating the hostilities in Korea, whether through the intermediary of the British or possibly directly with the Soviet Government, must be done with the greatest possible care. While subsequent evidence, i.e. Soviet press handling of this matter, continues to confirm our original impression that the Soviets are serious in this matter and wish to find some means of terminating a situation which obviously has taken a turn unanticipated by them, we must however remember that there is no reason to believe that this Soviet desire is unlimited. It looks to me as if Stalin, looking into the future, had foreseen a situation which would present him alternative choices, neither of which he would by preference like to make. It is doubtful if he believes that despite temporary reverses the U.S. will not in a comparatively short time bring sufficient power to bear on the North Koreans as to bring about victory on the spot. Then, as U.S. forces approach the 38th Parallel, he would be confronted with the following choices:

(1) To do nothing and permit American power to come up to the Soviet frontier right next door to Vladivostok and within easy bombing distance of their chief military headquarters in the Far East Khabarovsky, a situation which he might well find intolerable; or

(2) Prior to our reaching the 38th Parallel, to re-occupy Northern Korea with Soviet forces.

This he would undoubtedly prefer not to do since it would immeasurably increase the risk of an open conflict between U.S. and Soviet

1 Mr. Bohlen, Minister at the American Embassy in Paris, was at this time in Washington for consultations.
forces and from the political point of view would be most undesirable for its psychological effect throughout Asia. He therefore, probably in anticipation of the development outlined above, is casting around for some means to prevent its occurrence.

This does not, however, mean that we could expect a complete Soviet surrender, i.e. withdrawal of North Korean forces and accepting the continued presence of important U.S. forces in South Korea. It is more likely that he is willing to accept a backdown but only a partial one and that the Soviet proposition might well be the restoration of the status quo ante in Korea in accordance with the terms of the June 25 resolution of the Security Council. This would mean the withdrawal of North Korean forces behind the 38th Parallel and the end of the fighting in Korea but on that basis would also involve the withdrawal of U.S. forces. This would clearly be unacceptable to us and I believe to the other members of the U.N. But we should not forget it is a position which might have important propaganda value to the Soviet Union. Considerable point could be made of the thesis that the Russians had offered to bring about the end of the fighting in Korea but that the U.S. had insisted on keeping its troops in that country and hence the peace effort had failed. We must therefore be very prudent in any discussions directly or indirectly with the Soviet Union to avoid (a) being caught in a position which might imply a willingness on our part to withdraw the troops, or (b) on the other hand getting caught in an awkward propaganda position, which the Soviets could exploit to advantage before world opinion, in rightly refusing to accept any such proposal.

We must, therefore, give a great deal of attention to this point and establish immediately the justification for our insistence on leaving U.N. forces in Southern Korea which will both be a position in any negotiations and will stand up in public.

There is another and perhaps even more important element which could bring about a change in the Soviet attitude at the present time. That is the development of the military situation in South Korea. I am quite certain that Stalin cannot conceive that the U.S. will for any appreciable time continue to suffer reverses in the field and he is therefore ignoring the initial difficulties we are encountering in the expectation that massive American forces will soon be brought to bear on the spot. Should it most unfortunately become apparent that the U.S. will not be able to bring this force to bear for a considerable period of time and that we have a steady series of reverses extending for several weeks, we should logically anticipate a considerable hardening of the Soviet attitude. Not, I should add, in the direction of Soviet involvement but in a much tougher line completely excluding any willingness on their part to contemplate terminating the hostilities in South Korea. It would seem, therefore, of vital importance to charting our political
course that we should obtain from the Defense Establishment the most realistic possible estimate of the probable course of military developments. It is not necessary to emphasize what the consequences might be, not only in Korea but in other parts of the world, of a sudden Soviet realization that the U.S. is not militarily in a position to win a relatively quick victory in Southern Korea, if this should prove to be the case. Therefore, if our best military estimate is that we are in for a considerable period of military reverses there is only one way, quite apart from the obvious necessity of broadening our military base, of preventing the Russians from attempting to exploit dangerously such reverses. It would be to have the U.S. Government adopt some measure which would indicate a mobilization of our power to correct this situation. I honestly believe that in that case the reverses on the spot would be offset by the evidence of a seriously aroused America.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

796.00/7-750: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, July 7, 1950—12 noon.

83. Eyes only for the Ambassador. Please see Bevin ¹ or Younger ² immediately and present following US views on Gromyko approach of July 6 to Brit Amb Moscow:

(1) Although it is impossible to be certain that this is not an attempt to confuse issue and weaken our common resolve, we are inclined to regard this as serious approach designed to find way to end Korean affray without undue prestige loss to USSR but presumably for price as yet undisclosed.

(2) We agree that any move which might lead to peace should have the most serious consideration. However, we believe it important not to appear over-anxious and we are not willing to bargain away positions in exchange for termination of aggression against SK.

(3) We believe there would be advantage in Brit Amb Moscow playing matter out somewhat further without involving US or other govs in order to get clearer picture of what Soviets have in mind.

(4) We believe it of greatest importance that further responses to Gromyko should be wholly within framework UNSC Korea Resolutions of June 25 and 27 and should not become involved in other issues on which Soviets might attempt to extort concessions (e.g. Chinese representation in UN or Formosa).

(5) Foregoing for confidential info HMG only. Following three paras contain substance suggested approach to Gromyko.

(6) We believe Brit Amb might see Gromyko and reiterate three specific points in UNSC res of June 25, i.e., immediate cessation of

¹ Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
² Kenneth Younger, U.K. Minister of State.
hostilities, immediate withdrawal of NK forces behind 38th parallel, UNCOCK observation of withdrawal NK forces, and call Gromyko’s attention to fact that forces are now in SK in response to UNSC resolutions of June 25 and 27. Brit Amb might say UK believes details of arrangements for withdrawal NK forces and restoration status quo ante (but see para (7) below) could be worked out if USSR willing to use its influence NK forces to obtain acceptance three specific points of June 25 res. Time and circumstances of withdrawal of forces from SK which are acting on behalf UN would have to be considered by UNSC in light situation and speed with which peace and security can be restored.

(7) Above is related to immediate restoration peace in Korea and is without prejudice to UN view re ultimate settlement that UNCOCK should be permitted to carry out program in Korea as recommended by UNGA.

(8) If Brit Amb is asked whether he is representing views of US, it is suggested he make clear that he is speaking for his own govt but if Gromyko has any comments or views which he wishes to have transmitted to other members of SC, his govt would be glad to assist.

ACHESON

795.00/7-750

Memorandum by Mr. John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary of State, to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 7, 1950.

Mr. Hickerson has shown me the draft of proposed Security Council resolution 1 requesting U.S. and other members to make forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States and requesting the United States to designate the commander of such forces.

I assume that General MacArthur would be designated.

In view of the extreme delicacy of the present situation; the importance of preventing the Korean fighting from developing into a world war; the importance of maintaining the confidence of the other members of the Security Council that their resolutions will be scrupulously complied with; and in view of the factors which you and I discussed with the President, I suggest that the President might want to emphasize by personal message to General MacArthur the delicate nature of the responsibilities which he will now be carrying, not only on behalf of the United States but on behalf of the United Nations, and the importance of instructing his staff to comply scrupulously with political and military limitations and instructions which may be sent, the reasons for which may not always be immediately apparent but which will often have behind them political considerations of gravity.

1 The text of the resolution is printed, infra.
Resolution Adopted by the United Nations Security Council, July 7, 1950

The Security Council

Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,

Having recommended that Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area,

1. Welcomes the prompt and vigorous support which governments and people of the United Nations have given to its Resolutions of 25 and 27 June 1950 to assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed attack and thus to restore international peace and security in the area;

2. Notes that Members of the United Nations have transmitted to the United Nations offers of assistance for the Republic of Korea;

3. Recommends that all Members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States;

4. Requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces;

5. Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating;

6. Requests the United States to provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command.

1 U.N. document S/1588. This resolution was adopted at the 476th meeting of the Security Council which met from 8 to 4:45 p.m. on July 7. It was introduced by the Representatives of France and the U.K. and was approved by a vote of 7 (including the U.S.) to 0, with 3 abstentions (Egypt, India, Yugoslavia), and 1 member absent (U.S.S.R.). For the record of the meeting, see U.N. document S/PR.476.

795.00/7-750

The British Embassy to the Department of State

TOP SECRET

MESSAGE FROM MR. BEVIN TO SIR OLIVER FRANKS
DATED 7TH JULY 1950

If the Soviet Government genuinely desire a peaceful settlement, it is possible that they in fact would agree to use their influence in the manner suggested. I cannot foresee precisely how they would extricate

1 This message was handed to Mr. Acheson by the British Ambassador at 3 p.m. on July 8; see telegram 177 to London, July 11, 8 p.m., p. 365.
themselves from the difficult position in which they have placed themselves, but Soviet ingenuity could no doubt find some face-saving device.

We must expect however that if the Soviet Government do show a readiness to co-operate in re-establishing the status quo in Korea, they will almost certainly raise the question of Formosa, having regard to the situation which the President's declaration of 27th June creates. It also seems to us, that the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations would be raised and become acute, the Russians arguing that they could not play their part in the Security Council with China not represented.

I think that Mr. Acheson and the United States Government should appreciate, and I put it to them very frankly, the way I see the situation which is as follows.

The United States have the whole-hearted backing of world opinion in the courageous initiative they took to deal with the aggression in Korea. I do not believe they could rely on the same support for their declared policy in connexion with Formosa. Not only would many powers, particularly Asian powers, dislike the prospect of an extension of the dispute which might follow if the Central People's Government were to attempt an attack on Formosa, but some undoubtedly feel that, now that the Central People's Government are in control of all Chinese territory, it would not be justifiable, in view of the pledge under the Cairo declaration, to take steps which might prejudice the ultimate handing over of the territory to China. India especially, as Mr. Acheson will have heard from the United States Ambassador at Delhi, is very sensitive on this aspect of United States policy. In general I think that the United States Government would be wise in their public statements to concentrate on the Korean issue and play down the other parts of the President's statement of 27th June, otherwise there may be a risk of a breach in the international solidarity happily achieved over Korea.

Thus the latest Soviet move has forced us to ask ourselves the question what the attitude of the United States would be if the Russians agreed to help in restoring the status quo in Korea in return for United States readiness to reconsider their present declared attitude in regard to Formosa.

Finally I want Mr. Acheson to know that I am keenly alive to the possibility, and even likelihood, that this Soviet move has a sinister significance. For example, the Russians, knowing there is a divergence of policy between Great Britain and the United States in regard to China, may well calculate that their move may increase the divergence. We must both be on our guard against this. Moreover the move may be no more than a manoeuvre in the Soviet peace campaign, launched

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"Foreign Relations. The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 448."
with the object of courting a refusal, though personally I am inclined to doubt this. Finally we must bear in mind that a restoration of the status quo in Korea may merely result, in the long run, in a development similar to that in Czechoslovakia. Clearly there can meanwhile be no relaxation of the military effort.

Mr. Acheson will understand my feeling that this is a time for us to be frank with each other. I know he will answer me with equal frankness.

330/7–850: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, July 8, 1950—2 p. m.
[Received July 8—9:50 a. m.]

156. Eyes only for the Secretary.

1. I called at Foreign Office this morning reDeptel 831 and had preliminary conversation with Younger and later with Prime Minister who called at Foreign Office. As British had full text of Reftel detailed repetition of contents was unnecessary. Prime Minister stated that British thinking was consistent with ours; that they would despatch a holding telegram to Kelley at once informing him that instructions would follow; that instructions would be along lines of following paragraph; that text would be furnished you in Washington and to me here and that Kelley would be told not to take action for 48 hours to give you time to comment.

2. Kelley would be instructed to confine himself to general terms and to the resolutions of SC. He would be told to endeavor to draw Gromyko out in order to determine insofar as possible the Soviet's position and what they are prepared to do. Kelley will make it clear that UK is acting wholly within the framework of UN resolutions and that UK as a member of SC would be glad to listen to any proposals Soviets may have in mind.

3. Speaking entirely off the record and personally I suggested to Prime Minister that very probably one of the prices which Soviets would demand for using their influence to cause withdrawal North Korean forces would be agreement that Communist China be seated in SC. If Communist China became member SC its claim to Formosa would be difficult to refute and the US position would be made extremely difficult. Thus price of Communist representative in SC might result in a real estate swap of South Korea for Formosa. Prime Minister replied that British had been thinking along this same line and that the position of HMG would be that the question of Korea and admittance of Communist China to SC were wholly separate.

1 Transmitted at 12 noon on July 7, p. 327.
Department pass Moscow; repeated info Moscow 9 eyes only for the Ambassador.

705.00/7-850: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

Moscow, July 8, 1950—8 p. m.

[Received July 8—1:55 p. m.]

77. Eyes only for the Secretary. While proposed instructions to Kelly (London’s 156, July 8), are generally along line Deptel 83, July 7, I am apprehensive that they may not go far enough and may put us in the bargaining position we wish to avoid as foreseen in paragraph two of Deptel 83. If Kelly confines himself to terms SC resolutions and then directly asks Gromyko for proposals, it seems to us almost certain Gromyko will respond with some sort of price, as a minimum the seating of Commie China (paragraph 3 London’s 156). If we are all correct in assuming that Soviets are trying to bail maximum prestige out of a bad situation with minimum losses, we ourselves should be the ones to obtain concessions from them.

I feel it important, therefore, that Kelly should include condition that Soviets give assurances they will support effective implementation UNGA recommendations re work of UNCOOK after cessation of hostilities, before he asks Gromyko’s views. This seems to have been in the Department’s mind (Deptel 83) as it was in ours (Embtel 56, July 6) and the groundwork has already been laid by Kelly in his references to UNCOOK in his first meeting.

Repeated info London eyes only for the Ambassador niact 27.

Kirk

611.95422/7-850

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 8, 1950.

Subject: Korean Blockade

Participants: Mr. Matthews—Secretary of the Navy
Admiral McCormick—Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
Mr. Matthews (G)
Mr. Jessup—S/A
Mr. Dean Rusk—FE
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson—NA

In reply to our queries Mr. Matthews stated that in the event a Russian merchant vessel attempted to enter a blockaded port in Korea
the vessel would be stopped and, if necessary, fired upon in order to enforce the orders of the blockading vessel. In the event a Russian naval vessel attempted to enter a blockaded port it would, in accord with normal international practice in such cases, be permitted to proceed as well as to leave the port. In the event a Russian merchant vessel, escorted by a Russian naval vessel, attempted to enter a blockaded port the merchant vessel would be stopped but the naval vessel would be permitted to proceed. If the Russian naval vessel attempted to interfere with any measures taken to stop the merchant vessel and fired upon the blockading vessel, the blockading vessel would return the fire as a matter of self-defense.

The question of the President proclaiming a blockade in conventional terms defining the presently patrolled area and other legal aspects were briefly discussed without decision. Sec. Matthews instructed Admiral McCormick to obtain more information from Admiral Joy concerning the background of the decision to confine the patrolled area to 41 degrees on the east coast, 39 degrees, 30 minutes on the west coast.

Sec. Matthews indicated his tentative and informal agreement with Mr. Rusk’s suggestion that consideration be given to having the Commander of UN Forces, designated by the United States in accordance with the Security Council resolution of July 7, to proclaim the blockade.

It was agreed that State would work out some formula for consideration by the Navy and that Mr. Fisher (L) and Mr. Johnson would confer with Admiral McCormick on the matter.

1 Vice Adm. C. T. Joy, Commander of Naval Forces, Far East.

315.3/7-850

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 8, 1950.

I refer to General Bradley’s telephone call to you today about that part of the President’s statement directing General MacArthur, pursuant to the Security Council resolution, to use the United Nations flag.

1 The statement, issued by President Truman on July 8, designated General MacArthur as Commanding General of the U.N. military forces in Korea; for the text, see Department of State Bulletin, July 17, 1950, p. 83. General MacArthur formally established the U.N. Command with Headquarters in Tokyo and assumed the role of Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) in an order issued on July 25; see U.N. document 8/1629.
The Security Council resolution which was passed yesterday (copy of which is attached) was cleared by me through General Burns’ office, with the Department of Defense, including the JCS and Secretary Johnson. You will recall that the resolution recommended that Members providing forces and assistance make these available to a unified command under the United States; requested the United States to designate the commander of such forces; and authorized the unified command (that is, the United States) at its discretion to use the UN flag.

The UN Secretariat yesterday afternoon urged upon us action by the President as early as possible today designating a commander and carrying out the terms of the resolution.

My associates in UNA and I drafted the press statement you took to the President this morning, a copy of which is attached for ready reference. I regarded this press statement as a completely routine announcement to give effect to a fully agreed resolution. As soon as it came off the typewriter I telephoned General Burns’ office and read it to Captain Murdaugh who had a stenographer take it down. I told Murdaugh that I didn’t think it required Defense clearance, and he said he was inclined to agree but that he would give it to Under Secretary Early and the JCS for information. A little later, while you were still at the White House, Captain Murdaugh telephoned me and said that Under Secretary Early “thought the statement was fine” and that he had sent the statement in to a JCS meeting and had heard nothing adverse from them. He said Secretary Johnson was in West Virginia and that he would not telephone him about the statement since he was sure Secretary Johnson would be in accord.

About the same time General Bradley called me on the telephone and said that he thought the President’s statement should “authorize” rather than “direct” General MacArthur. I replied that the Security Council resolution authorized the U.S. Government to use the UN flag in these operations and in my opinion the President should direct General MacArthur to do this. I added that this was a press release and not military instructions to General MacArthur and that we assumed that the Defense Department would send General MacArthur military instructions giving him such discretionary authority in the application of this directive as they considered advisable from the military standpoint. When General Bradley seemed doubtful about this I suggested he call the White House and give his views about the statement to the President.

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\(^{2}\textit{Ante}, \text{p. 329.}\)

\(^{3}\) Stephen T. Early, Deputy Secretary of Defense.

\(^{4}\) The President’s statement directed General MacArthur, pursuant to the Security Council resolution, to use the U.N. flag concurrently with the flags of the various participating nations.
I emphasized the fact that we drafted a press release announcing the President's acceptance of an agreed resolution of the Security Council. This press release should not in any way be a substitute for the required military instructions to General MacArthur, nor should it limit the form or scope of such instructions.

I am sorry General Bradley was unhappy about this. For the reasons stated in this memorandum I do not think there were grounds for his unhappiness, nor do I think our procedure in this matter was incorrect. If, however, our procedure was in any way incorrect I was, of course, entirely responsible for this and no one in the Department other than I should be blamed.

795.00/7-850: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, July 8, 1950—7 p. m.

121. For the Amb. The Pres requests that the fol msg from him to the PriMin be delivered as early as convenient Mon:

"To PriMin Attlee from the Pres. I, too, have been giving a great deal of thought to the problems which may arise as the situation in Korea develops, and agree with your suggestion that these problems be explored between us."

I note that you propose to send a representative of the UK Chiefs of Staff to advise Lord Tedder. I agree entirely that the political implications of the situation are of the greatest importance, in fact in some respects they are preeminent. For this reason I have asked the SecState to designate Amb Jessup to be associated with General Bradley in conducting the talks on our side. I understand that you are agreeable in this event to associate a representative of the FonOff with Lord Tedder.

I am in entire agreement with your thought that these talks shld be conducted in the greatest secrecy and note your observation that it will suffice if the Fr and other interested Govts are informed as and when the situation demands. It seems to me that we will have to make arrangements to bring in or consult other Govts when subjects of direct interest to them are under discussion; for example, Fr in the case of Indochina. I suggest we leave this point open for a joint consideration at the opening of our talks."

The Msg. from Attlee to the Pres to which above is reply is as follows and was handed to Secy by Franks on evening of July 6:

[Here follows the text of the Attlee message.]

ACHESON

1See Prime Minister Attlee's message to President, July 6, p. 314.
SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

CX 57481. The situation in Korea is critical. We are endeavoring by all means now avail here to build up the force nec to hold the enemy, but to date our efforts against his armor and mechanized forces have been ineffective. His armored equip is of the best and the service thereof, as reported by qualified veteran observers, as good as any seen at any time in the last war. They further state that the enemy’s inf is of thoroughly first class quality.

This force more and more assumes the aspect of a combination of Soviet leadership and technical guidance with Chinese Communist ground elements. While it serves under the flag of North Korea, it can no longer be considered as an indigenous North Korean mil effort.

Our own troops are fulfilling expectations and are fighting with valor against overwhelming odds of more than ten to one. To build up, under these circumstances, sufficiently to hold the southern tip of Korea is becoming increasingly problematical.

I strongly urge that in add to those forces already requisitioned, an army of at least four divisions, with all its component services, be dispatched to this area without delay and by every means of transportation available.

The situation has developed into a major operation.²

¹ A manuscript notation on the source text indicated that Secretary Acheson saw this message.
² On July 7, General MacArthur had informed the JCS of his intent, once the North Korean advance had been halted, “to exploit our air and sea control, and, by amphibious maneuver, strike him [—the enemy—] behind his mass of ground force.” (See Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 118.)

795.00/7–950 : Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

SEOUL, July 9, 1950—10 p. m.

33. Rhee, who has been impatiently waiting in Pusan several days for signal to return Taegon, left Pusan this morning at eight by rail for Taegon. Ambassador thereupon discussed matter with General Dean.¹ It was agreed in view continued fluid situation around Chonan,

Rhee should delay arrival Taegu. His train was intercepted at Taegu and he was requested to remain there for time being. Ambassador left Taegon by plane at six this evening for Taegu where he will see Rhee and bring him up-to-date on military and international situation. Ambassador plans to suggest to Rhee that he remain Taegu for time being and summon all Ministers there except following: Prime Minister, Defense Minister, Home Minister and Transportation Minister. View unsatisfactory performance Home Minister Paek, Ambassador will probably recommend his replacement. Ambassador expects return Taegon tenth.

Military situation has taken turn for better today. Enemy thrusts diminishing in strength and appear halted in most areas. ROK troops have won two small scale victories in past two days and their morale is rapidly returning.

Department pass CINCFE.

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337. AD/7-950: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACI LONDON, July 9, 1950—6 p. m. [Received July 9—2:37 p.m.]

167. Eyes only for Secretary. We have received text of instruction to Kelly which British Embassy will show you today. Kelly has been instructed not to act until final instruction after receipt your comments.

Instruction to Kelly is in line with our conversation Prime Minister yesterday and is, we believe, the correct first step. Gromyko said Soviets want peaceful settlement; they can stop fighting by calling off North Koreans. Position being taken that British are acting as member of and within framework of UN precludes risk of jeopardizing position under UNGA resolutions re work of UNCO (Moscow’s niact 77 to Department).

If question of UNCOK supervision of North Korea withdrawal raised too early Soviets will no doubt call for immediate withdrawal US forces. This, of course, is matter for SC and is covered by paragraph 5 of British draft telegram to Kelly.

Department pass Moscow; Moscow niact 11, eyes only for Ambassador.

Holmes

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1 Infra.

2 Received on July 8 at 1:55 p. m., p. 332.
The British Embassy to the Department of State

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

The attached message gives the line of an oral reply which Sir David Kelly will make to Mr. Gromyko. This is intended as a first step, which, if the Soviet Union are now genuinely anxious to find a way out of the Korean conflict, may encourage them to show their hand a little further.

WASHINGTON, 9th July, 1950.

[Annex]

MESSAGE FROM MR. BEVIN TO SIR DAVID KELLY,
MOSCOW, 9TH JULY, 1950

SECRET

Following is the line I wish you to take with Mr. Gromyko:—

I am much interested in the attitude taken up by Mr. Gromyko at your last conversation and I am glad to note his statement that the Soviet Government wish for a peaceful settlement. That is also the earnest desire of His Majesty’s Government.

As regards his question whether we have any specific proposals to make, I am well aware of the precise and concrete sense attached by the Soviet Government to the word proposals. (The Russians read into the word proposals far more than we do and are apt to regard them as something by which the proposer is irrevocably bound, just as they regard a “basis of discussion” as something which is firmly agreed. Hence my use of the phrase “preliminary suggestion” in this telegram.) It would be difficult for His Majesty’s Government as a member of the United Nations, to come forward with proposals in this sense. We could not properly do so unless we had assured ourselves that what we proposed carried with it the assent of the other members of the United Nations chiefly concerned. In view of our collective responsibility as a member of the United Nations, we could not, as an individual government, run so far ahead as this. We therefore think it best to make a preliminary suggestion. The Soviet Government may well make the comment that they see nothing new in the preliminary step which we propose. But any step is tremendously important if it leads to a cessation of hostilities and the clearing up of difficulties among members of the United Nations. It therefore seems to us that the influences making for peace ought to join together in order to bring about a cessation of hostilities, without concerning themselves for the moment with other causes of difference which have
arisen in the more distant or more recent past in connexion with the Korean question.

I want you therefore to emphasise to Mr. Gromyko that, irrespective of any other consideration, the plain fact is that the hostilities in Korea have arisen from the movement over the 38th parallel by the forces of North Korea. It follows that the best suggestion which His Majesty's Government, as a member of the United Nations, are in a position to put forward is to urge the Soviet Government—who His Majesty's Government are glad to note have expressed their desire for a peaceful settlement—to add their efforts to those of other members of the United Nations by using their influence as a member of the United Nations with the North Korean authorities to bring them to cease hostilities and to withdraw their forces to the 38th parallel.

If, as is possible, Mr. Gromyko tries to get you to say how you would see matters developing if the Soviet Government were willing to use their influence with North Korea and produce the desired result, you will have to say that the working out of these matters would fall to be dealt with by the Security Council. What you are now concerned to do is to suggest a step whereby, in the view of his Majesty's government, the way might be paved for an ultimate solution. If Mr. Gromyko, for his part, has any suggestions to make, you should of course say that you would be very glad to convey them to me.

Mr. Gromyko may also raise other questions such as Chinese representation on the United Nations or Formosa. I suspect that he may also be angling for an opening to suggest a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers. This would have the advantage for him, since it would arise out of a Far Eastern issue, of opening the way for the Soviet Government to bring the question of the Japanese Peace Treaty into this forum, which they have (unjustifiably in our view) always wanted to do. You will have to avoid such traps. Your best line would, I think, be to say that, without prejudice to other questions which remain to be settled, the cause of peace is of such over-riding importance that we feel entitled to call upon the Soviet government to lend their assistance. What do they think? Have they any suggestion to make? They and we have an equal interest in bringing hostilities to a close. You are not speaking for any other Government or organisation but for His Majesty's Government who feel deeply about the dangers of the present situation and make an earnest appeal to the Soviet Government to join their efforts to those of other members of the United Nations and to use their influence in the interest of peace. I want you to drive home the thought that it is essential to stop the fighting in Korea, to get back to methods of peaceful settlement and to promote the restoration of peace.

WASHINGTON, 9 July, 1950.
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET  PRIORITY  WASHINGTON, July 9, 1950—7 p. m.
NIACGT

123. Eyes only for the Ambassador. I have fol comments on Kelly’s instructions which in general seem satisfactory providing fol points are safeguarded.

1. While we certainly wish to explore every possibility of restoring peace, it is most important not to convey to Gromyko any impression of slackening in our determination to carry out UN decisions on Korea. Such impression would be contrary to fact and would be particularly dangerous while mil position remains in present difficult phase.

2. Soviets should not be permitted to lead discussions into framework of dealing with a dispute in which both parties are blameworthy. Kelly should leave no doubt of UK conviction that SC findings and decisions, supported by 46 members of UN, describe the situation as it exists in fact.

3. It also seems important to me that each ref to cessation hostilities by North Koreans should be followed with ref to requirement of withdrawal behind 38th parallel.

4. Discussion restoration of status quo or former situation should not carry any implication obligation of UN forces thereupon to be withdrawn from SK nor any diminution in responsibilities UNCOK.

Foregoing appear to be among traps to be avoided which I believe should be further emphasized or amplified to Kelly.

AGHESON

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2 At 5 p. m. on July 9, the Department of State had transmitted telegram 122 to London requesting the Ambassador to see to it that Kelly withhold his approach to Gromyko until the Department’s comments on Kelly’s instructions could be conveyed (795.00/7-950).

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET  NIACGT  Moscow, July 10, 1950—8 a. m.

[Received July 9—9: 37 p. m.]

33. Eyes only for Secretary. Indian Counselor Kapur called on me this afternoon to deliver following “secret and personal” letter from his ambassador dated July 9:

“I have been thinking a great deal about Korean situation. I know that anything we do should not appear as matter of appeasement. What do you think of settlement on these lines: (1) that America support the admission of People’s Republic of China into SC and UN; (2) and that SC with China and USSR on it support immediate cease fire in Korea and withdrawal of North Korean troops to 38th parallel and mediation by UN for creation of united, independent Korea.
Postscript: if we are able bring main disputants into SC to consider outstanding questions it may well be beginning of new chapter.

Kapur said he would appreciate my conveying contents letter to Washington and making reply thereto in due course. I told him that his Ambassador's request would receive every consideration and that I would inform my Government, at same time pointing out present attitude US Government re China and Formosa along lines Department circular telegram July 1, 3 a.m.

Shortly after delivering letter to me Kapur made personal call on Thurston, who had in meantime been informed of contents and asked by me to sound out whether his Ambassador's letter represented personal gesture or was written pursuant to GOI instructions. When Thurston queried Kapur along this line, latter expounded as follows:

1. Radhakrishnan's letter was delivered to me pursuant GOI instructions.

2. GOI has not been empowered by UN act as mediator in present Far Eastern crisis but is seeking resolve impasse by "informal mediation"; hence the "personal" tone of the message.

3. Moscow chosen as venue for this informal mediation effort because of danger of premature leaks if discussions took place New Delhi or Washington; furthermore Radhakrishnan is in touch with Soviets, who have been given same formula; and, lastly, because nature of GOI mediation effort shaped in large measure on recommendations of Indian Embassy Moscow. Kapur added: "I am sure our Washington Embassy is not acquainted with our mediation effort, and I don't believe any approach has been made to your Embassy New Delhi".

4. Kapur explained that R's first point is meant to be implemented by US only if point two accepted by Soviets.

5. Radhakrishnan has presented same formula to Soviets, who "have made it clear that they will not agree to second point, hence US has nothing to lose by accepting both points".

6. Indian Ambassador Peking has presented same formula to Chinese Communists "who have agreed to both points".

7. GOI views divergence between Soviet and Chinese Communists on proposed settlement as most significant and believes that US acceptance would bring about split between Kremlin and Peking "which is one important objective of GOI in its present effort".

8. Other important objective GOI is to eliminate present UN impasse over Chinese representation question and put spotlight on Soviet unwillingness to cooperate with UN in peaceful settlement Korean issue, that is, to put onus on Soviets if they refuse abide by SC majority. "If UN in present form is to break up, it is much better for all of us that this occur over Soviet veto of UN action directed against clear-cut aggression in Korea rather than on debatable Chinese representation question."

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5 For text, see vol. vi, p. 367. The telegram indicated that the action taken regarding Formosa in President Truman's statement of June 27 was intended as an immediate security measure without prejudice to political questions affecting the Government of the Republic of China (794A.00/7-150).

2 Ray L. Thurston, Counselor of the American Embassy in Moscow.
9. When pressed as to whether positive US support Chinese Communist membership considered essential, Kapur said that “abstention coupled with friendly word to Ecuador and Cuba would probably do just as well”.

10. Asked whether Indian formula might not create doubts as to legitimacy previous UNGA action re Korea, not to mention SC resolutions June 25 and 27 re Korea, Kapur said, “Not at all; new resolutions could incorporate appropriate references to previous action and thus not give rise such doubts”. Present UN effort in Korea would continue.

11. Asked what GOI thinking was reference timing, especially in view impact GOI plan at time when North Korean forces have not yet suffered serious military set-back, Kapur said he did not consider this important consideration “since Soviets were sure to turn down point two”. He added: “We have in mind publishing replies of governments concerned (he clearly means US and Soviets but also may have had Peking regime in mind) as soon as possible but before publication we’ll check with you in order that wording Ambassador’s letter may be amended to remedy omission about conditional relationship between points one and two.”

12. Toward close conversation Kapur mentioned that it was the Formosa question which had started his Government thinking along lines proposed formula. He indicated that linking of Korean and Formosa questions were creating difficulties for GOI in its sincere desire back UN effort Korea whole-heartedly.

13. Kapur said that Radhakrishnan was personally very upset at news of “young American boys dying in Korea” and of “lack of vigorous resistance by South Koreans”.


15. Kapur made point of asking that nothing be said to British about Indian mediation effort.

KIRK

793.00/7-1050 : Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

NIAC

Moscow, July 10, 1950—3 a.m.
[Received July 9—11:20 p.m.]

84. Eyes only for Secretary. I hesitate to attempt any categoric assessment of the Indian démarche reported Embtal 83.1 I see no reason to doubt Nehru’s or Radhakrishnan’s good faith, that they are sincerely endeavoring to reach a solution which would satisfy basic free world interests, nor that they firmly believe that an important step can be taken along this line to weaken the Kremlin’s hold on Mao. However, the implications and ramifications not only of the proposal but even of the manner of its presentation are obviously portentous.

1 Supra.
As I see it, regardless of the merits of the proposal as an ultimate solution, there is an overriding danger that its pursuit at this time, parallel with the anticipated further British soundings of the Soviets, will materially assist the Soviets to confuse the issues of the situation with a view to damaging free world unanimity. On the other hand, the Indian attitude cannot be dismissed lightly.

In the circumstances, we believe it essential some means be found to get British and Indians together before things go any further. Delicacy of matter is that Indians have specifically requested British not be informed and, as British apparently have not informed Indians, it is difficult to see how it can be accomplished without betraying confidences. On the other hand, we note that Indians talked with British before first, and so far as we can ascertain the only Indian conversation with Soviets on July 1 and possibility cannot be excluded that British and Indians are cognizant each others negotiations which are nevertheless being presented to us here as independent. In any event, considering all aspects of matter we feel British should be consulted in strictest confidence and their agreement obtained that, with a view to achieving tripartite understanding as to future moves, Indians be (1) informed of prior Soviet overture to British and (2) strongly urged to postpone further action along their line until possibilities of British conversations are further developed.

Kirk

706.00/7-1050: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, July 10, 1950—1 p. m.

PRIORITY

[Received July 10—10:30 a.m.]

176. For the Secretary. Please inform the President that his message to the Prime Minister contained Deptel 121 July 8 was delivered by me this morning. Prime Minister indicated he received this message from Embassy in Washington and expressed complete satisfaction with its suggestions. A representative Foreign Office will be chosen to participate in the conversations. Prime Minister was not able to say at moment who it would be but will let me know soon as selection has been made. He indicated, however, that he was anxious that the talks commence soon as possible.

Have you any dates in mind?  

Douglas

2 Telegram 299, July 14, from London, not printed, reported that M. E. Dening, Assistant Under Secretary of State, had been chosen to represent the Foreign Office in the conversations which were to begin in Washington on July 19 (706.00/7-1450). The talks actually began on July 20; see the agreed memorandum on p. 462, and footnote 1 thereto.
CONFIDENTIAL

[TAEJON,] July 10, 1950—11 p. m.
[Received July 10—12:08 p. m.]

34. Pass CINCFE. When in Taegu today I had long conference with Rhee. I found him well, cheerful, composed and resolute. After bringing him up to date on war developments and international situation I discussed with him Cabinet and other problems. It was agreed he would remain in Taegu for time being and all Ministers except Acting Prime Minister (concurrently Defense Minister), Home Minister and Transportation Minister would shuttle between Taejon and Taegu. Rhee strongly felt there should be no formal move of Ministers from Taejon and no publicity will be given to shuttling of Ministers. I agreed this wise move. It also agreed Director of Office of Supply would set up in Pusan, port of entry for ECA supplies. Rhee likewise agreed prevail upon National Assembly Emergency Council to congregate in Taegu. I urged replacement of Home Minister and although Rhee sought my ideas re replacement I made no recommendation. Cabinet members who have been meeting informally Taejon last week and accomplishing virtually nothing should do better in Taegu where they will be less affected by battle developments.

In Military field US air power aided by good weather is taking tremendous toll of enemy and definitely checking his thrusting power. Meantime US manpower and equipment continue to pour in ever growing quantities and it should not be long before some offensive operations on ground may be within capability air [our?] forces.

Muccio

795.00/7-1050 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACI LONDON, July 10, 1950—5 p. m.
[Received July 10—12:50 p. m.]

184. Eyes only for the Secretary. Re Embtel 175 repeated Moscow 12,1 saw Younger instead of Strang 2 this afternoon who said that your

1 Infra.
2 Sir William Strang, Permanent Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office.
comments (Deptel 123) would be incorporated one way or another in a follow-up message being sent to Kelly. This message would also give Kelly green light to go ahead. Hope to be able to cable you text this message later today.

Repeated Moscow 14, eyes only for Ambassador; Department pass Moscow.

HOLMES

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Transmitted on July 9 at 7 p.m., p. 340.

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795.00/7-1050 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, July 10, 1950—1 p.m.

[Received July 10—2:03 p.m.]

175. Eyes only for the Secretary. Re Deptel 123, July 9. Discussed with Prime Minister four points suggested in refelt. He indicated complete approval but asked that matter be discussed detail with Strang who at that time had been sent out to see Bevin at the hospital.

Will see Strang soon as he returns.¹

Department pass Moscow. Repeated information Moscow 12, eyes only for Ambassador.

DOUGLAS

¹ See supra.

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796.00/7-1030 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

NIAC\*

LONDON, July 10, 1950—8 p.m.

[Received July 10—3:26 p.m.]

209. Eyes only for Secretary. Re Embtel 184 (repeated Moscow 14).¹

My immediately following telegram contains text revised instructions to Kelly.² Underlined portions indicate changes made to incorporate your comments. This appears satisfactory.

Department pass Moscow. Moscow eyes only for Ambassador 17.

DOUGLAS

¹ Received on July 10 at 12:50 p.m., p. 344.
² See telegram 210, from London, received on July 10 at 5:52 p.m., p. 352.
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1950.

Subject: U.S. Courses of Action in the Event Soviet Forces Enter Korean Hostilities

1. In accordance with your memorandum dated 30 June 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their recommendations as to the course of action to be adopted by the United States in the event that Soviet forces enter Korean hostilities.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion [that] the USSR armed forces should be considered to have entered Korean hostilities when major Soviet combat units engage or clearly indicate their intention of engaging in hostilities against U.S. and/or friendly forces in the Korean hostilities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned, however, lest political considerations demand excessive commitments of United States military forces and resources in those areas of operations which would not be decisive. In the event the USSR should decide to undertake global war, that nation would be in a position to exploit such United States deployments and commitments and could thus render more effective Soviet over-all war strategy.

3. Preliminary to, or in the initial stages of a global war, it would be militarily unsound for the United States to commit large forces against the USSR in an area of slight strategic importance, as well as one of Soviet choice. Therefore, if major USSR combat units should at any time during military operations in the Korea area of hostilities engage or clearly indicate their intention of engaging in hostilities against U.S. and/or friendly forces the U.S. should prepare to minimize its commitment in Korea and prepare to execute war plans. These preparations should include initiation of full-scale mobilization.

4. In connection with the preceding paragraphs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would advise that, by their direction, the matters set forth therein are being kept under continuing study with a view to timely submission in accordance with development of suitable recommendations.²

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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² Not printed.
³ This memorandum was forwarded to the Executive Secretary of the NSC (Lay) by Secretary of Defense Johnson with a statement of his concurrence. Mr. Lay submitted it to the NSC as NSC 76, under date of July 21, for consideration at the 62nd NSC meeting scheduled for July 27 (NSC files). For the comments of the Department of State on NSC 76, see the enclosure to NSC 76/1 under date of July 25, p. 475.
735.00/T-1050: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1950—5 p. m.

NIAC

132. Eyes only for the Ambassador. Request you deliver fol message to Mr. Bevin from the Sec:

"I was glad to receive through Sir Oliver Franks your views on the possible relationship of Formosa to the Korean matter and appreciate the frankness with which you presented them. I believe it will contribute to a full understanding between us if I am equally frank.

I consider it vital before dealing with the specific points raised in your message that we clearly understand certain fundamental aspects of the US position in this matter which to us are completely controlling:

1. We have faced squarely a calculated act of aggression and in so doing we are profoundly convinced that we are acting for the protection of the entire free world. The future peace of the world in our view hangs directly upon the success we expect to achieve in defeating this first overt act of aggression since the end of the war.

2. I must tell you that we have no intention of retreating from the position taken by the Pree in his statement of June 27. We are convinced that any sign of retreat from those positions would have disastrous consequences that might easily place in jeopardy the entire venture of resistance to aggression. We believe the tragic history of the 30's demonstrates beyond any doubt that the sole hope of preserving the peace of the world is to halt before they spread initial acts of aggression of this character. We believe that the overwhelming support from the free nations of the world is precisely due to their recognition that the whole future of the free world is at stake. We value this support very greatly indeed and particularly appreciate the support which Great Britain is giving both in the battle and in the debate, but we think you should understand that while we will make every effort on our part to safeguard and preserve this world-wide support, the objective of all must be to do what has to be done to defeat the present aggression in Korea and to forestall its possible outbreak elsewhere in the Far East.

We recognize that the Soviets have placed themselves in a difficult position by their provocative and uncompromising public declarations but believe that, nevertheless, if over-riding factors dictate, they will find means of extricating themselves. Experience has shown that they can make sharp reversals even when publicly committed and we feel they have been careful in the present instance to leave the door open for such reversal. UN firmness and unity are most conducive to such a reversal, whereas any indication that we are prepared to pay a substantial price for termination of Soviet aggression in Korea might well encourage the Soviets to drag out the Korean war or even start similar ventures elsewhere.
There is no question but that a well-planned and unprovoked aggression is now in progress against the Rep of Korea. The deep resentment of the Amer people toward this cynical attack is multiplied because of the cruel strains upon our resources imposed by our attempt to meet it. Neither of us has any doubt but that this aggression was ordered by the Kremlin and is being actively directed by key Sov personnel in increasingly large numbers in Korea. Further, there is some evidence which shows Chi Communists may be participating in the fighting not only in Korea but in other parts of Asia, with obvious and serious implications for the special positions of the UK in Hong Kong and Malaya. We shall do what we can to prevent an extension of the Korean conflict, but as the fiction of no Sov or Chi involvement wears thin, questions will be raised of the gravest importance to us all.

If we are to prevent the recurrence of such conduct on the part of the Sov Union, it seems imperative that (a) the aggressor not be militarily successful and (b) the Soviets not be paid any price whatever for calling off an attack which they should never have started. The effect on the free world, on the UN and on the Soviets themselves would be disastrous if the Sov Union can now establish the proposition that aggression can be a profitable transaction. I am certain that neither the US nor the UK wish to contribute in any way to such a result.

For the above reasons it seems to us that the Korean matter must be dealt with by the UN and its Members on principle as a case of aggression and that if the UN should permit the aggressor to inject other issues and extort concessions for desisting from unlawful conduct, the ability of the UN and the free world to prevent aggression would be totally lost.

For similar reasons, we do not believe it possible to accede to the Sov view that in some way the UN itself and the US in particular have made it impossible for the Sov Union to participate in the UN. This is sheer unadulterated blackmail on their part which has no support in the Charter or in reason or conscience. I am certain we both agree that we cannot repeatedly pay appeasement prices to get the Sov Union to take their seat in the UN nor permit them to establish by indirection a veto in organs of the UN where no veto was ever intended. You will recall that I spoke strongly about this point of coercion at our last meeting. I did so and do so now because I am deeply convinced that the UN would suffer a severe reverse if it should bow to such tactics. There might be some temporary satisfaction in having all the seats filled again, but if at the price of submission, the

\footnote{Reference is to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, in London, May 11–14, documentation on which is scheduled for publication in volume III.}
satisfaction would be more than offset by the wrecking tactics of the Sov Union in the UN during the present crisis and by the disillusionment and contempt the peoples of the free world, certainly the people of the US, would feel toward the UN and those responsible for the surrender. The UN could not improve its position if it brought back the Russians on terms which would lose for it the support of the US.

The question of Chi representation is affected by the considerations suggested above and is greatly complicated by the gap between our respective policies toward Chi. In all frankness, I do not see any likelihood of harmonizing our policies toward Chi by any significant change in the basic attitudes on which US policy is founded. We have not recognized Peiping because (1) there was little indication that Peiping genuinely desired the establishment of normal relations with others, (2) the Peiping regime singled out US citizens and Amer interests for specially hostile treatment, (3) it has made no pretense of accepting and carrying out the international obligations of Chi, (4) it has recognized Ho Chih Minh and is actively interfering in the situation in Indo-China, (5) it is lending encouragement and support to Communist insurgents in the Philippines, Malaya, Burma and elsewhere, (6) it is cooperating with a degree of Sov penetration of Chi which can only lead to de facto dismemberment in violation of the territorial integrity and political independence of Chi, respect for which has been recently reaffirmed by the UNGA, (7) its support by and control over Chi is still incomplete, and (8) now, the Peiping regime is openly defying the UN with respect to Korea, is mobilizing political support in Asia on behalf of the aggressors, and is apparently furnishing manpower for aggression in Asia.

For these reasons we have also opposed seating Chi Communists in the UN. This latter question in our view must be considered against the background of general policy and the situation in the Far East. There can be little doubt but that Communism, with Chi as one spearhead, has now embarked upon an assault against Asia with immediate objectives in Korea, Indo-China, Burma, the Philippines and Malaya and with medium-range objectives in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Siam, India and Japan. We doubt that they will be deflected from their purpose by temporary accommodation, particularly if this accommodation is obtained by them at a time when their own conduct is aggressive and in violation of the Charter.

We do not believe that the question of the Chi UN seat should be dealt with until the aggression against Korea is resolved. We do not have a closed mind on the question of Chi representation in the UN, but we do feel strongly that the question should be taken up by the UN on its merits and dealt with as the UN decides it should deal with the question of competing claimant Govts for a UN seat. We do not
believe the UN can deal with the matter on its merits under the coercion of (a) Communist aggression against Korea or (b) Russian absence, with Peiping seating as the price of return. If the coercion were removed, the UN could set about the matter of seating in a normal fashion, perhaps seating no Chi representative pending full consideration of the unprecedented problem of competing claimant Govts.

In regard to Formosa, there is a short-range mil problem and a longer-range political problem. On June 25–26 it became apparent that the attack in Korea was an all-out act of aggression against the Rep of Korea, set in motion by the Sov Union. It was not and still is not possible to say with certainty what Sov mil intentions are in the Far East and elsewhere. Mr. Attlee and the Pres have agreed on the need for further talks between us on this broader question raised by the events in Korea. We felt that it was essential from both a political and mil point of view to try to stabilize the situation with respect to the Far East until we could get a clearer picture of the drastically new situation created by Sov aggression in Korea and learn what other orders it had given to its lackeys in the area. As a simple matter of mil prudence, we took the mil precaution of trying to eliminate or reduce the risk of hostilities between Formosa and the mainland and the risk of Communist occupation and mil exploitation of this strategically located island. The step taken by the Pres on June 27 was mil in character and did not purport to deal with the many complicated political questions involved.

I believe it important that we consult with each other and with certain other Govts as soon as practicable about the political aspects of the Formosa problem. So far as our attitude is concerned, it is essentially very simple and clear. It has been made plain that a carefully planned aggression has occurred in the Far East, that it has been well mounted and most capably led. We cannot accept that forces which are hostile, aggressive and capable should seize Formosa and exploit it as an air and naval base against us. Further, in the present situation in the Far East we do not wish to see hostilities erupt between Formosa and the mainland as a major disturbane to the peace of the Pacific. We have, therefore, taken mil measures to neutralize Formosa.

We are aware of the commitments of Cairo and Potsdam concerning Formosa but existing conditions were clearly not envisaged at the time they were made. Commitments made by the Sov Union in connection with Cairo and Potsdam (e.g. independence of Korea and support of the National Govt of Chi) have been flouted. We think it

one thing to turn Formosa over to the then Rep of Chi and quite another to turn it over either to the Sov Union or to a Peiping regime which at the least is encouraging aggression against its neighbors in open cooperation with Moscow.

I believe it fair to summarize our view by stating that we have not taken our recent action with any intention of taking possession of Formosa, we believe the ultimate fate of Formosa should be settled by peaceful means either in connection with a Jap peace settlement or by the UN, but we are not willing to see it go involuntarily to Peiping in the present state of affairs in Asia.

These are grave matters which I have discussed in the frankest terms because of their importance not only to our own relations but to the position of the free world as a whole in dealing with the vital issues thrown at us by the fact of aggression. I recognize the many difficulties of your position and have tried to set forth some of ours.

If I should close with an indication of the steps ahead as we see them it would be (1) as early and complete a liquidation of the Korean aggression as is militarily possible and in any case without concessions which would whet Sov appetites and bring on other aggressions elsewhere, (2) consideration by the UN of the Chi seating problem on its merits and out from under the duress and blackmail now being employed, and (3) a peaceful disposition of the Formosa problem in the Jap peace settlement or the UN without the employment of force or the outbreak of hostilities disturbing to the peace of the Pacific.

I should be glad to have your further views at your earliest convenience."

ACHESON

705,00/7-1050 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1950—5 p.m.

NIACCT

133. Personal. Eyes only for Douglas from Secretary. I am sending you by separate telegram¹ message sent me from Bevin² and my reply.³ I hope you will emphasize to Bevin that this reply which has been approved here at highest levels represents both my own strong personal views and has fullest concurrence of all official quarters here. I think you might well remind Bevin orally of grave doubts he himself expressed to me in private conversation in London⁴ as to

¹ Not printed.
² See the note from the British Embassy, July 7, p. 329.
³ Supra.
⁴ See footnote 1 to telegram 132 to London, p. 348.
wisdom of Britain's own China policy and ask him frankly what possible practical advantages he sees in trying to get Communist China into SC and return to SC of USSR in present situation. Fact that SC was able to take such prompt and effective action, subsequently endorsed by 46 nations, was due solely to absence of the Soviet and we can be certain that their return to SC at this time would be utilized solely to sow confusion and delay or hinder the primary objective of both of us—namely, to show that armed aggression does not pay. We have of course no wish to see USSR leave UN and are well aware of effect of such a permanent move on character of UN, but that is quite different matter from paying a price to obtain their return to Lake Success in an obstructionist role at this critical time.

I want you to leave him in no doubt of seriousness with which I view implications of his message and their possible effect on our whole future relationship.

Acheson

795.00/7-1050: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET N I A C T

LONDON, July 10, 1950—8 p.m. [Received July 10—5:52 p.m.]

210. Eyes only for Secretary.

"Communication to Sir David Kelly."

"I am glad to note Mr. Gromyko's statement at your last conversation that the Soviet Government wish for a peaceful settlement. That is also the earnest desire of HMG.

"As regards his question whether we have any specific proposals to make, I am well aware of the precise and concrete sense attached by the Soviet Government to the word 'proposals'. (The Russians read into the word 'proposals' far more than we do and are apt to regard them as something by which the proposer is irrevocably bound just as they regard 'a basis of discussion' as something which is firmly agreed. Hence my use of the phrase 'preliminary suggestion' in this telegram). The Soviet Government will understand that HMG can only take action in this matter in the light of their position as a member of the UN. The SC made certain recommendations in connection with Korea which have since received the overwhelming support of the members of the UN as a whole. HMG therefore could not come forward with any 'proposals' as such. We could not properly do so unless we had assured ourselves that what we proposed carried with it the assent of

1 See telegram 209, from London, received on July 10 at 3:26 p.m., p. 345.
the other members of the UN chiefly concerned. In view of our collective responsibility as a member of the UN we could not as an individual government run so far ahead as this. We therefore think it best to make a preliminary suggestion. The Soviet Government may well make the comment that they see nothing new in the preliminary step which we propose, but this step is tremendously important if it leads to a cessation of hostilities and the clearing up of difficulties among members of the UN. It therefore seems to us that the influences making for peace ought to join together in order to bring about a cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal by the North Korean forces beyond the 38th parallel, without concerning themselves for the moment with other causes of difference which have arisen in the more distant or more recent past in connection with the Korean question.

"We, as a member of the UN are anxious to use our good offices to promote peace. Mr. Gromyko has stated that the Soviet Government wish for a peaceful solution. Therefore there is common ground between us. But Mr. Gromyko should be quite clear in his mind that there is nothing in the action being taken by HMG which will justify the assumption that there is any weakening in the determination to carry out the UN's recommendations regarding Korea.

"I want you therefore to emphasize to Mr. Gromyko that irrespective of any other consideration the plain fact is that the hostilities in Korea have arisen from the movement over the 38th parallel by the forces of North Korea. It follows that the best suggestion which HMG as a member of the UN are in a position to put forward is to urge that the Soviet Government—who, HMG are glad to note, have expressed their desire for a peaceful settlement—to add their efforts to those of other members of the UN by using their influence as a member of the UN with the North Korean authorities to bring them to cease hostilities and to withdraw their forces to the 38th parallel. Mr. Gromyko will appreciate that the aggression of the North Korean forces was a challenge to the UN who are handling the resultant situation. We feel sure therefore even if it can be arranged that the North Korean forces should withdraw to the 38th parallel that the UN would not entertain any proposal that the UN forces in Korea should thereupon be withdrawn from Korea and will insist that there shall be no diminution of the responsibilities of the UN Commission on Korea.

"If, as is possible, Mr. Gromyko tries to get you to say how you would see matters developing if the Soviet Government were willing to use their influence with North Korea and to produce the desired result, you will have to say that the working out of these matters would fall to be dealt with by the SC. What you are now concerned to do is to suggest a step whereby, in the view of HMG, the way might
be paved for an ultimate solution. If Mr. Gromyko for his part, has any suggestions to make, you should of course say that you would be very glad to convey them to me. But as said above it is the aggression of the North Koreans which is blameworthy and no suggestion which failed to take account of that fact could bear fruit.

"Mr. Gromyko may also raise other questions such as Chinese representation on the UN or Formosa. I suspect that he may also be angling for an opening to suggest a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the four powers. This would have the advantage for him, since it would arise out of a free issue, of opening the way for the Soviet Government to bring the question of the Japanese peace treaty into this forum, which they have (unjustifiably in our view) always wanted to do. You will have to avoid such traps. Your best line would, I think, be to say that, without prejudice to other questions which remain to be settled, the cause of peace is of such overriding importance that we feel entitled to call upon the Soviet Government to lend their assistance. What do they think? Have they any suggestion to make? They and we have an equal interest in bringing hostilities to a close. You are not speaking for any other government or organization but for HMG who feel deeply about the dangers of the present situation and make an earnest appeal to the Soviet Government to join their efforts to those of other members of the UN and to use their influence in the interest of peace. I want you to drive home the thought that it is essential to stop the fighting in Korea, get the North Korean forces to withdraw beyond the 38th parallel and to get back the methods of peaceful settlement and to promote the restoration of peace."

Department pass niact Moscow 18, eyes only for Ambassador.

Douglas

795.00/7-1050: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

39. Immediately after meeting with Lie on offers of assistance re Korea, separately reported next following telegram (USUN 40), Korean Ambassador Chang took me aside as follows:

He said that 38th parallel was meaningless and that liberation and unification of all of Korea was essential, after which there should be UN supervised elections for whole country. He said that the UN should

infra.
not stop short of this objective. If they did, Chang went on, we would be confronted indefinitely with necessity defending 38th parallel, North Korean Reds continuously being aided and abetted by Manchurians.

Chang expressed earnest hope therefore that airborne force should be landed behind North Korean lines (38th parallel) and North Korean Reds crushed (slaughtered) in pincers beyond hope recovery.

I told Chang I would transmit his views to Department.  

AUSTIN

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2 On the following day, Ambassador Chang expressed his views to Messrs. Rusk and Allison in a conversation at the State Department, indicating his great concern at press reports that the British Government was attempting to achieve a settlement of the Korean problem through negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Mr. Rusk stated that the actions of all concerned nations were being governed by the Security Council resolutions, that it was impossible to tell what the final outcome of the situation would be, and that there was no indication that the British or any other government intended to take action contrary to the Security Council resolutions. (795.00/7-1150)

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830/7-1050: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

New York, July 10, 1950—6:54 p.m.

[Received July 10—7:57 p.m.]

40. Accompanied by Gross and Ross at 11 this morning, I attended meeting called by SYG Lie with SC president Sunde and Korean Ambassador Chang to discuss coordination offers of assistance for Korea. Cordier, Stabell, and secretary of Chang’s Embassy present.

Lie initiated discussion by reference to his responsibilities as SYG, indicating, however, that we had now reached stage where US had taken over responsibilities to act for UN. He said reason for calling meeting was that many delegates have been coming to him for advice about possible offers of assistance. He stressed importance maintaining UN aspect of whole operation. He said at this stage he was interested not only in votes but in tangible evidence of support of action in order to show aggressors that UN is behind ROK. He said delegates want to give to the UN not to the US nor to the ROK. He said he did not want to get UN secretariat involved in administration of anything; that he realized US must decide with ROK how to handle offers of assistance.

Lie stressed particularly two aspects of matter. First, current sufferings of Korean people and their need for short-term relief and long-term rehabilitation; second, the moral and political aspects of support in contrast with military aspects.
Lie ended his introductory statement by saying he wanted “help” to do a good job.

I told Lie we thought he was doing a fine job and emphasized that I thought present discussions must be exploratory until we know what is needed. I said we were dealing with essentially a military matter and that we must know what the unified command finds necessary. I said I thought we had not quite yet reached the time for decisions in this matter. Meanwhile, we felt the SYG should carry on as he has been as the chief administrative officer of the UN and representative, therefore, of the entire membership of UN. I said the machinery for dealing with the problem was being established in Washington and that I thought our present most important job was to provide smooth transmission through USUN.

I emphasized importance of security in dealing with strategic requirements.

Chang indicated general agreement with what I had said and added that he thought not only the commanding general but also the Korean Government should participate in determining needs. He said he was sure commanding general was in closest contact his government; he thought that he might, through his own channels, however, be helpful in determining Korean needs.

Appearing to agree generally with what I had said, Lie said he took a political view of the matter. He said the other side was very clever with their propaganda (e.g., international brigades from Iron Curtain countries) and that we must meet this propaganda politically. Emphasizing importance, as he saw it, of maintaining broad UN character of operation in defense of Korea, he said whole world must know that UN is behind suffering country.

He referred in passing to American political situation, saying that we must not lay ourselves open to charges that US is providing all the men and all the money to carry on Korean operation.

He said he thought we must get something definite and specific from others, at least on paper. He referred, for example, to availability of Norwegian and Swedish shipping paid for by those governments. He said that through material participation by other governments we would get and keep public of other countries on our side. In other words, he concluded, we must keep the snowball rolling and building up.

Sunde agreed with what I had said to the effect that our first task was to find out what was needed. He observed that, while he thought MacArthur would certainly know what he needs for military operations, “Washington” would know better what is available and from what sources, et cetera.
Cordier said he thought most important consideration was timing of requests. He agreed that first requirements were those of military urgency. At same time he felt we should not lose too much time in meeting ROK requests. He referred in this connection to his understanding that ROK already had a serious refugee problem. He said he thought we must at least begin to get supplies lined up and transport arranged to meet these needs as quickly as possible.

Chang agreed with what Cordier had said. He said he was very happy to learn of Thailand offer of rice. He said he would not hesitate a moment in accepting this offer, since military operations have come at worst time of year from viewpoint of Korean food supply. Medicines, he thought, were also urgently needed.

Chang said he thought there were three phases of requirements: first, strategic; second, relief; third, reconstruction. He said he thought first two should be dealt with in parallel.

Referring to propaganda problem, Chang said that, since his government had lost Seoul radio, it now had remaining only two very small transmitters. He said that facilities were urgently needed to give his people courage and hoped that more could be done very promptly in this regard.

No conclusions were reached at this discussion, there being general agreement that exchange of views had been helpful and that elements of problem were understood.

In course of meeting, Lie, Cordier, and Chang all spoke about weakness of UNCOOK and necessity of strengthening it. Chang said that weakness of UNCOOK was unfortunately well known to his people. Cordier pointed out that none of UNCOOK members have had UN experience; that the commission seems to be virtually paralyzed and wholly lacking in leadership. He had just received indications that Salvadoran and Philippine representatives were going back home for instructions. The Australian (Jamieson) was described as a nice young man but inexperienced. Cordier said he thought that someone like Hasluck\(^1\) would be ideal to represent Australia. He thought that Col. Hodgson\(^2\) might be useful. Cordier has talked to Australians here and to Romulo about this problem. Lie expressed hope we could find some means of helping get commission strengthened. Lie, Cordier, and Chang all attached large importance to moral and political importance of UNCOOK.

Lie expressed pleasure at report from Katzin of full cooperation by MacArthur headquarters.

\(^1\)Paul Hasluck, Member of the Australian Parliament, had formerly been on the Australian Mission at the United Nations.

\(^2\)William Roy Hodgson, Head of the Australian Mission in Japan.
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, July 11, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received July 11—10:06 a. m.]

214. Eyes only for the Secretary from Douglas re Deptels 131,1 132 and 133, July 10. In response to question Deptel 133, what possible advantage can Bevin see in the return of USSR to its chair in UN and to seating of Chinese Communists under critical international situation and before:

(a) Soviets have learned that aggression does not pay,
(b) The Security of the Pacific has been restored, and
(c) The forces that have invaded Republic of Korea have withdrawn to 38th parallel, he probably will reply that India is the only country, which can exert real influence on the attitude of the vast populations of the Far East; and that India is important in maintaining common view among the members of the Commonwealth. India does not approve of US action in regard to Formosa, and our attitude toward the seating of the Chinese Communists in the Security Council and toward the People’s Republic of China. Accordingly, the US should modify its view and its position.

In reply I should like to be able to ask Bevin if he will not join and support us in attempting to explain our policy and point of view and position clearly and adequately to the GOI. I might ask HMG to take the line which we believe to be true and which was so clearly presented in your message, that complete change in international environment from that which existed at Cairo and Potsdam, the repudiation of Soviet commitments to support the Chinese Nationalist Government, the clear and identifiable efforts of the Soviets to use communism as an instrument of aggression in China, Indonesia-China, Malay, Burma, Tibet, the Philippines, and Korea present situation of great danger to India herself. To seat Chinese communists in Security Council, to recognize the Communist regime in China, et cetera, all under Soviet coercion would aggravate immeasurably the very great threat to independent states in the Orient, to the freedom of India, indeed to peace of world. In President’s statement of June 27 in regard to Formosa, US was moved only by very serious desire to prevent area of warfare from including Formosa and to restore security of Pacific so that the status of Formosa can be determined either under provisions of Japanese peace settlement or by decision of UN. We might ask HMG to emphasize that unless Communist aggression in Asia is stopped, there can be no security whatsoever for India.

1 Not printed; it transmitted the text of the message from Mr. Bevin to Sir Oliver Franks conveyed to the Department of State in the note from the British Embassy dated July 7, p. 329.
In other words, may I not say to Mr. Bevin that we agree that India's leadership is important among the teeming millions of the Far East. It is because her leadership is so important that we ask HMG to join us in pointing out grave danger in view presently held by GOI. It will not restore the security of the world for us to yield to the Indian position when it is our clear conviction that it will produce nothing but further acts of aggression. It is far preferable that India be persuaded that our line is the only line which can restore security, that India's influence therefore be exercised among peoples of the Orient in the only direction which can insure peace than for us to yield to India's views for the purely nebulous gain of temporarily aligning ourselves with her leadership in the Orient and thereby to produce situation out of which only further and possibly vaster extension of the area of warfare will emerge.

I will telephone you. You can give me the answer yes or no. If yes I will follow the line indicated in this cable. If no, I will refrain.²

Douglas

²A manuscript note on the source text by Dean Rusk indicated that the Secretary replied "yes".

795.00/7-1050: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 11, 1950—12 noon.

PRIORITY

NIACCT

28. Eyes only for the Ambassador. Dept desires give friendly answer Indians in view desirability maintaining their support Korea action (re Embtels 88 and 84 July 10) and agrees necessity respect Indian confidence. Dept considers it extremely important, however, Brit be informed activities Indian Amb in order to avoid muddying water Kelly-Gromyko conversations.

You are accordingly instructed immediately to inform Indian Amb orally along following lines:

1. You have transmitted his letter of July 9 to USGovt which has given careful attention Indian suggestions. Although US appreciates Indian concern to end aggression in Korea, Indian proposal presents fundamental difficulty. This basic difficulty involves UN as well as US and we believe it most improbable that UN or US would agree to settlement situation produced by unprovoked attack on Korea on any basis whatever which directly or indirectly meant payment or reward to aggressor or diluted requirements UNSC resolutions June 25 and 27 or left Korea after cessation hostilities exposed and defenseless situation.

2. You and ur Govt have adhered his counsellor's request that we not inform Brit of this approach. US believes, however, that in light
UK membership on SC and its important role in Korean situation, Indians shld immediately and fully take Brit into their confidence. US will keep in close touch with GOI as fellow SC member on Korean problem and will continue to keep US Amb New Delhi fully informed at all times for that purpose.

3. You shld add personal comment that in light Sov rejection Indian approach as reported by his counsellor, you assume Indian effort secure prompt liquidation Korean aggression already foreclosed.

ACHESON

795.00/7-1150: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACI Moscow, July 11, 1950—8 p. m.
[Received July 11—2:26 p. m.]

99. Eyes only for the Secretary. Kelly saw Gromyko this afternoon (London telegram 210, July 10). His report of conversation, copy of which will not be available to us until tomorrow morning, is being repeated immediately to British Embassy Washington. Kelly states that speaking from notes he presented to Gromyko the substance of his instructions in considerable detail. Gromyko heard him out and then after some clarification of the translation remarked on only three points. First, he took issue with Kelly’s statement concerning the North Korean attack, reiterating the Soviet contention that the attack was “provoked” by ROK. Second, he inquired why the British specifically sought Soviet influence with the North Koreans. Third, he mentioned the British reference to “running so far ahead”. Kelly refuted Gromyko’s charge of ROK provocation along the obvious line, said that Soviet influence with the North Koreans was being invoked because Soviet relations with that government were known to be close and repeated that he could not “run ahead” with any “proposals” as such, since the British were acting as a member of the UN and consequently could not properly make “proposals”.

Gromyko concluded that the matter would be referred to the Soviet Government. No mention was made by Gromyko or Kelly either of China or Formosa.

Department pass London; repeated info London niacI 33, eyes only for the Ambassador from Moscow.

Kirk

On the following day, Mr. H. A. Graves, Counselor of the British Embassy, met with Livingston T. Merchant and read him the text of the telegram (not printed) which Ambassador Kelly had sent to the Foreign Office (895.00/7-1290).
725.00/7-1150: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, July 11, 1950—8 p. m.
[Received July 11—4:08 p. m.]

241. Eyes only for Secretary. I saw Bevin at hospital this afternoon and delivered your message contained in Deptel 132.\(^1\) There follows a brief summary of the points which emerged from a long and somewhat rambling discussion.

1. There is no deviation from the instructions sent to Kelly; that in his conversation with Gromyko or others he is to stick strictly to the UK's position as a member of and within the framework of the UN. I pointed out that in my conversation on Saturday with the PriMin the latter had said that the position of HMG was that the Korean problem and the question of seating the Chinese Communists in the UN, Formosa and other matters were unrelated (see Embtel 156).\(^2\) This Bevin confirmed.

2. Bevin seemed somewhat surprised and a little taken aback at the vigor of your response. He was rather defensive in explaining the motive which had prompted him to send his message to you saying that although Kelly's instructions confined any discussions the latter might have strictly to Korea, he felt that it was well to explore in advance what the position of the US would be in the event that the Soviets should respond with proposals which on the surface might appear to be honest and inviting. He said that he wanted to provoke the question in order that we might have consultations in anticipation of a Soviet question or proposal. He was indefinite and did not give a direct answer to my frank question as to what possible practical advantages he sees in trying to get Communist China into Security Council and return to Security Council of USSR in present situation. He said he would have to consider the matter carefully. In passing he said that he had never doubted the wisdom or justice of Britain's decision to recognize Communist China but had expressed doubts to us in London as to a satisfactory outcome. I had the impression that Bevin had not quite appreciated the significance of his message to you and it may well be some of his subordinates with less fortitude than he persuaded him to despatch his telegram to you without explaining its implications.

3. Bevin said that he wished to enter a caveat that UK's position with respect to Korea is not to be construed as a commitment that the same position is taken with regard to Formosa as that of the US. UK is willing to consult with US, the Commonwealths—especially

\(^1\) Transmitted on July 10 at 5 p. m., p. 347.
\(^2\) Received at 9:50 a. m. on July 8, p. 331.
India—and others with respect to Formosa but that great care must be taken not to weaken UK–Commonwealth relations particularly with India and Pakistan. Moreover, India was an important influence in the Orient.

(4) I then raised the question of India and made the suggestion contained in Embtel 214. Bevin seemed to be impressed by this proposal and suggested that Washington might be an appropriate place for discussions with Indians. When it was pointed out that the Indian representative would be Madam Pandit, he immediately withdrew the suggestion but stated that in no event should talks be held in London. I then suggested the possibility of New Delhi and Bevin said that he would study my suggestion concerning India and let me know in the course of a few days.

(5) Bevin said that he could make no final comment on your message to him as it would require careful study by HMG; that it would receive immediate and careful attention and that he hoped to communicate with me again in a few days time.

(6) Please give me date and hour of Bevin’s message to you so that I can determine whether it was sent before or after my meeting with Attlee on Saturday morning June [July] 8. This might reveal whether Bevin himself initiated message or whether it was some subordinate’s handiwork—probably Strang’s. It has marks of Strang’s spoor.  

DOUGLAS

8 Received at 10:06 a.m. on July 11, p. 358.
4 See telegram 177, to London, transmitted on July 11 at 8 p.m., p. 365.

:330/7–650

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. H. B. Wells of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, of a Meeting Held on July 11, 1950

SECRET

[WASHINGTON], July 17, 1950.

[Subject:] Tsiang Proposal Set Forth In US [UN] Telegram 29 of July 6

Participants: UNP: Mr. Wainhouse NA: Mr. Emmons
               Mr. Wells
USUN: Mr. Ross
SOA: Mr. Mathews
      Mr. Sparks

1 Elbert G. Mathews, Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs.
2 Joseph S. Sparks, Officer in Charge of India–Nepal Affairs, Office of South Asian Affairs.
3 Arthur B. Emmons, Officer of Northeast Asian Affairs.
4 Wallace W. Stuart, Office of Chinese Affairs.
5 Ward F. Allen, Bureau of European Affairs.
At a meeting here on July 11 Mr. Ross indicated the belief of USUN that it was necessary for us to see to it that steps be taken by the Security Council with respect to Korea which would have the effect of averting a severe hangover among the nations indicating their support of SC action on Korea, once the first fine enthusiasm should have worn off. There was need for continuing SC application to the various phases of the problem. One of the things that must be done was to consider measures which would help to line up the middle powers (the Middle Eastern states and the Asiatic) in continuing support of the SC resolutions, and which would maintain the solidarity of the whole democratic bloc in the United Nations, including the Latin American and Western European states as well. Something was necessary both to offset the Soviet propaganda advantage, derived by the Communist states from the ease with which they have been able to claim that the conflict in Korea is a war where white men are shooting Asians, and to prevent this propaganda advantage from spreading. It was also important to proceed with vigor and acumen in this case, since it might in so many respects serve as a precedent for the future.

In the foregoing setting, the Tsiang proposal appealed to USUN.

Mr. Ross further proposed that it would be desirable that frequent meetings of the SC be held; that reports from the Unified Command be kept flowing to the Council—there should certainly be one report to the Council this week; and that the Specialized Agencies be called upon to consider what they might do to assist the UN's cause in Korea.

The consensus of those present at the meeting was to the effect that the Tsiang proposal had merit, and that the main difficulty with it was the question of how it should be sponsored. This question was left to the discretion of USUN, in view of the mission's acquaintanceship with the personalities involved. It seemed that there was some likelihood Tsiang might find an opportunity of bringing this proposal to the attention of the Egyptian representative with a view to the latter's making it his own and then discussing it with the Indians.

Mr. Mathews regarded the Tsiang proposal, in its present form, as a mere self-denying ordinance, as being too negative. He considered that it should preferably take the form of a statement of the objectives which the UN seeks to accomplish in the present struggle.

It appeared to be agreed that while the objectives had already received preliminary definition in the SC's resolution of June 25 and 27, provisions of this character might perhaps be embodied in an eventual draft resolution designed to accomplish our purpose, and that such language might be used concurrently with the Tsiang "self-denying ordinance" language. It was agreed that what the resolution should contain was a matter which could not be passed upon finally
until after further conversations in New York with delegation of other states represented on the SC.

Mr. Ross agreed that he would talk to Dr. Tsiang further and inform us of the outcome of his conversation.

330/7-1150: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET  PRIORITY

NEW DELHI, July 11, 1950—5 p. m.

[Received July 11—6:17 p.m.]

66. Following are texts (a) of telegram of July 10, 1950 of Indian Ambassador in Peking to his government, and (b) of GOI reply thereto of July 11, 1950 as furnished me by Bajpai, Secretary-General of MEA (see Embtel 65 of July 11, 1950) :

[Here follows the message from the Indian Ambassador in Peking transmitting an unofficial note of conversation handed him by Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Chang Han-fu expressing the Chinese Government's agreement with the Indian position that the PRC should be represented in the United Nations and setting forth emphatically the view that the Korean problem and the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations should be considered separately. Panikkar's message went on to say that the Indian Government, however, did not agree with the Chinese contention that the June 27 Security Council resolution was invalid in view of Soviet and PRC nonparticipation.

The Indian Government's reply stated that it was continuing to press the United Kingdom Government for early admission of China to the Security Council and continuing to urge the United States not to stand in the way. The text of the Chinese note would be conveyed to London by the Indian Government for the attention of Mr. Attlee. The message concluded by saying that if China were admitted to the Security Council and the Soviet Union returned to that body the Indian Government hoped that all governments would work for a speedy settlement in Korea, although it understood that Peking could not speak for Moscow.]

HENDERSON

*Received at 8:43 p.m. on July 11, p. 365.
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

WASHINGTON, July 11, 1950—8 p.m.

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

177. Eyes only for the Ambassador from Rusk. Oliver Franks handed me ref message (urtel 241)1 at Brit Emb at 3 p.m. Sat., July 8. When handing it to me Franks stated he had received it the day before but had just received a short message from London to go ahead and deliver it. Text of message handed me was in fact dated July 7. I got impression from Franks that FonOf wished us to be thinking about Bevin’s message pending receipt text instruction to Kelly which arrived July 9.2 On basis above, it is clear Bevin’s message was sent at least one day before your meeting with Attlee on Sat. morning. [Rusk.]

ACHESON

1 Received on July 11 at 4:08 p.m., p. 361.
2 See the note from the British Embassy, July 9, p. 333.

330/7—1150: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PRIORITY

NEW DELHI, July 11, 1950—4 p.m.

[Received July 11—8:43 p.m.]

65. 1. I saw Bajpai, SG MEA, this morning at his request. He showed me copy of telegram dated July 10 from Pannikar, Indian Ambassador to China, setting forth substance of conversation between Pannikar and Chinese Communist Vice MFA and copy of GOI reply thereto of July 11, and suggested US Government might be interested in contents these two messages. I said I would be glad telegraph Department but must admit I always disliked relying on my memory in conveying to my government with accuracy contents of important documents which I had not had opportunity carefully to study. He promised to send copies to Embassy as soon as they could be made. Copies have been received and texts are set forth in subsequent telegram No. 66 of July 11.1

1 Received at 6:17 p.m. on July 11, p. 364.
2. After I had read two documents, Bajpai again argued with great earnestness importance of early admittance of Chinese into SC. He said he saw little hope of resolving Korean conflict or of preventing its spread unless China and USSR could begin participating in proceedings of SC. Statements made by Peiping Vice Minister seemed to him to be encouraging. He was relieved to note desire Chinese Communists to keep problem of admission to UN separate from that of Korea. GOI was not inclined to ascribe particular importance to insistence of Chinese Communists that all major decisions of UN organizations in absence of representatives of USSR and Chinese Communists were illegal or to Chinese Communists' reference to US invasion of Taiwan, et cetera. GOI hoped that when once Communist China was seated in UN organizations, it would assume more reasonable attitude towards developments. First step in direction of replacing use of violence in Korea with conversations would appear to be admission of Communist China. In opinion GOI such admission should be unconditional. He had learned from conversation yesterday with Roberts, acting HICOM of UK, that during recent conversation between UK Ambassador in Moscow and Gromyko, former had obtained impression that Russia might be willing to make some concessions re Korea in return for admission Communist China. GOI considered that attempts to attach strings to admission Communist China would lead to nothing; that atmosphere for achieving solution of problem of Korean aggression would be much better if Communist China could be admitted immediately and unconditionally.

3. I told Bajpai that I wished I could share his optimism; that it seemed to be [me?] international communism was now seeking admission of Communist China into UN as a reward for having committed aggression in Korea; that, if and when Russia and Communist China would be participating in SC, they would endeavor use that organization as forum for attacks on US and those forces which have been endeavoring combat aggression and to prevent SC from functioning effectively in its efforts to stop aggression. I was inclined to agree with him that it would be useless to try to lay down conditions for admittance Communist China. In my opinion, Russia would not agree to imposition of conditions and, if it should for some unexpected reason agree to conditions, it would probably not live up to them. It seemed to me that by hinting at its readiness to consider peaceful mediation after its admission to SC, Communist China was already beginning to divert attention from fact that aggression had been and was still being committed to other problems.

4. In view of Bajpai's earnestness and his evident keen desire that US Government be apprised of GOI views re urgency of admission
Communist China, I did not consider it advisable argue with him at length at this time. I told him, however, it would be impossible for US in view of both international and internal situation to vote for admission Communist China into any UN organization.

5. Bajpai said he appreciated this fact, but was still hoping that US would not take such hard attitude with regard admission Communist China, that other members SC would refuse to vote for such admission in order not to offend US. Egypt, for instance, at present took position that, after having failed to vote for recent SC resolutions, it did not wish further to offend US by voting for admission Communist China. Ecuador and Cuba, in his opinion, also would not vote for Communist China unless they had reason to believe that US reaction would not be too unfavorable.

6. I told Bajpai that US was not carrying on campaign against admission Communist China; that it would not, however, in my opinion, vote for admission of Communist China; and that I continued to believe that admission of Communist China at this time would not be likely to strengthen cause world peace. Nevertheless, I would endeavor to present fairly to my government GOI views re this matter.

HENDERSON

320/7-1150: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 11, 1950—11 p. m. [Received July 12—5:27 a. m.]

PRiORITY

67. 1. I am somewhat concerned lest I find myself becoming gradually involved in a GOI effort of intermediation (see Embtel 65). I have impressed on Bajpai that my comments to him were based on such background as I have and should not be considered as official answers to Chinese Communists statements to Pannikar or to his statements to me. Our conversations have been of an extremely personal character and should be considered as such. It might interfere with future conversations if what he says should be quoted to other Indian officials and should find their way perhaps in garbled manner back to MEA. I have outlined in utmost confidence portion of our talk to Canadian HICOM who is deeply interested and whom Bajpai has also approached re his government’s attitude towards admission Communist China and plan also to discuss matter briefly with Roberts, acting UK HICOM. It seems advisable for us to keep in close friendly touch with these two missions.

1 Supra.
2 Warwick F. Chipman.
2. I hope Department will indicate at once if it does not approve what I have done so far. If it believes that it would be wiser in future for me to pass on further approaches by GOI without so much comment, I would be grateful if it would so inform me. One reason for my frankness in talking with Bajpai has been my belief that by doing so without committing my Government I am keeping open certain channels of information which might be useful to US.  

HENDERSON

* A note on the source text indicated that a reply to this message was drafted but was superseded by Prime Minister Nehru's communication to Mr. Acheson, July 13; see memorandum by Assistant Secretary McGhee, July 13, p. 372.

330/7-1250: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL  

WASHINGTON, July 12, 1950—10 p.m.

27. Confirming telephone conversation with Ambassador Gross, the following procedure in regard to contributions by Members of the United Nations to the military effort in Korea has been approved by the Departments of State and Defense:

(1) Ambassador Austin will see SYG immediately to suggest that he make a further communication to the Members that have replied favorably on the Security Council resolutions, along the following lines:

(a) That the replies received have been communicated to the unified command (US) recommended in the Security Council resolution of July 7;

(b) That he (SYG) has been informed that the unified command will communicate with individual governments regarding their offers of assistance;

(c) That the individual countries consider without delay what they can contribute in the way of effective assistance, including wherever possible combat forces, particularly ground forces.

(2) Immediately following SYG's circular a bilateral approach will be initiated with the countries that we consider in a position to offer effective economic or military assistance, particularly combat forces.

Mr. Lie should be informed of this proposed bilateral action on our part.

Although it is recognized that from a military point of view most Members of the UN cannot give effective assistance, there are com-
pelling political and psychological reasons for stimulating offers of assistance, particularly combat troops.1

ACHESON

1 See the circular telegram transmitted at 8 a. m. on July 14, p. 377.

795.00/7-1350: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices 1

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1950—2 a. m.

Fol summary re Korea:

Despite heavy US air attacks Tokyo Hqrs reports NK forces continuing strong frontal assaults on US troops. Phil Scout Veteran Asn reportedly offering 31,000 Scouts for duty with US army in FE. US taking position in Consultative Group on export controls that complete embargo on NK shld not be instituted by group but wld be welcome if instituted by individual nations in response SC recalling on UN members refrain from aiding NK. Yugo UN rep states he has changed mind on invasion ROK since obvious US not only had no intention use force but had inadequate troops Japan for Korea defense. Believes this will influence many who previously suspected US intentions Japan and FE. Turk officials and press minimizing possibility immed Sov threat against Turk but concerned possibility Sov inspired moves Balkans and Iran. Dept’s Iran desk estimates that while USSR militarily capable invade Iran any time, main threat is internal aggression which Iran security forces able handle providing econ deterioration halted and Commie Party held in check. Amemb Delhi learned Chi Commies have informed India they approve India’s efforts obtain their admission UN, maintaining issue shld be separated from Korea and that only after they and Sov are in attendance can SC “mediate” Korea and stop “US aggression” Formosa. UK doubts Chi Commies will invade Burma, believing they unready risk repercussions in Asia from assault on free state unconnected “imperialist” powers. Fr intelligence has no evidence Chi Commie buildup for invasion Indochina or for increased aid to Ho Chi-minh. ConGen Hong Kong cites reports Chi Commie troops moving into Canton and out toward North, possibly either to coast opposite Formosa or to north China.

ACHESON

1 This telegram was also sent to the missions in Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Colombo, Damascus, Jidda, Monrovia, Tangier, and Tel Aviv; and was repeated by airgram to the missions in Addis Ababa, Kabul, Rangoon, Tripoli, and Tunis.
The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY

TAEBJON, July 13, 1950.

[Received July 13—10:55 a.m.]

1. Deptel 1 of July 12.  
Foreign correspondents presently devoting entire time to American-held front because of greater news interest also closer proximity to headquarters here. Will try improve their coverage Korean fighting but correspondents not likely accept our suggestions. Suggest use OFL communiqués there to emphasize Korean resistance which still considerable.

While morale ROK Army varies with units, in general ROK still has army in field of over 50,000 men fighting delaying actions stubbornly and some success. Morale lower among Cabinet Ministers who have not risen to the crisis. Believe this situation will improve when Cabinet assembles with President in Taegu. Will try again there to arrange regular ROK press releases detailing government activities. Meanwhile Provincial Government leaders have done remarkable job maintaining public order. Also activities Railway Administration have been outstanding.

1 The text of this message read as follows:
"Press here takes view ROK Govt and Army have collapsed entirely and latter offering little resistance leaving US to fight alone. CINCFE sitreps indicate ROK Army showing good resistance. Wld have most salutary effects if press reports emanating there play up ROK Army activities. Request ur comments attitudes and morale both Army and Govt." (795.00/7-1250)

Drumright

795.00/7-1350: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

Moscow, July 13, 1950—3 p.m.

[Received July 13—11:32 a.m.]

111. Department pass New Delhi, London; repeated info New Delhi 10, London 41. In friendly conversation late afternoon 12 July at Indian Embassy our position, on matters contained mytels 83 and 84 July 10, as detailed in Deptel 28, July 11 was explained to Radhakrishnan who reacted along following line: (a) his endeavors would now cease as they were his own idea although approved by Nehru; (b) his sole approach to Foreign Minister had been on 1 July when he saw Zorin; (c) he responded favorably to my suggestion that British be informed of his efforts and without hesitation said he would undertake to advise British Ambassador promptly; (d) while accepting my views as conclusive for the present yet he expressed hope we would eventually recognize Communist China.
Our talk ranged over many aspects current situation in Far East and UN and I was able to hold him to point that North Korean aggression must first be stopped and without appeasement but he still insists we should recognize Peking Government saying this would open way to break between Mao and Kremlin. Throughout conversation I emphasized that we were not going to pay a "price" for the unprovoked North Korean aggression.

I feel he is very uneasy over Formosa and while realizing general nature threat Communist action in SEA and even wider including his own country, yet an idealistic streak pervades his thinking when urgent immediate problems arise. He takes considerable pride in his own recommendations to Nehru on 26 June which he feels contributed greatly to GOI action in SC. But I believe that we must face up to probability that GOI will not support us in matters concerning Formosa.

Radhakrishnan is currently informed on Pannikar's reporting from Peking which is discounted somewhat by my colleague here. Still he feels there is serious risk Chinese will go all out against Formosa and is persuaded Soviets must honor assurances to Mao of military support.

Kirk

791.09/7-1350: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 13, 1950—6 p. m.

[Received July 13—12:39 p. m.]

79. 1. I have read with deep interest Deptel 52, July 12, 5 p. m.,¹ and my present impression is that Indian diplomacy at this juncture is somewhat confused and is working at cross purposes. It would appear to me that (a) Nehru is carrying on secret correspondence with Radhakrishnan unknown to Bajpai or (b) Radhakrishnan either personally or under influence Kapur is engaging in venture on his own without keeping his government fully informed of his activities.

2. I am confident that when Bajpai talked to me on July 11, he did not know that Indian Ambassador at Moscow was making proposal of character contained in latter's letter of July 9 to Ambassador Kirk. It will be recalled that Bajpai gave me to understand on July 11 that British Ambassador at Moscow had received impression that agreement along lines suggested in that letter might not be disagreeable to Russia but that he, Bajpai, thought it would be unwise to attempt to

¹ Not printed; it transmitted the texts of telegrams 83 and 84, July 10, from Moscow, received in the Department on July 9, at 9:37 p. m. and 11:29 p. m., pp. 340 and 342.
achieve such agreement. I am quite sure that Bajpai, in spite of his statements that our conversations are on personal basis, outlines them to Nehru. It would be rather surprising that person with Nehru’s experience should permit Bajpai to adopt one attitude in talking with me while authorizing his Ambassador at Moscow to follow another line in discussions with Soviet Government and with our Ambassador at Moscow.

3. I have for time being lost contact with office UK High Commissioner. I understood from Bajpai that Roberts, acting UK High Commissioner discussed with him on July 10 recent conversation between UK Ambassador at Moscow and Gromyko. I have not pressed Roberts re this conversation since I have had feeling that he might be under instructions not to divulge character his latest instructions from London to other than GOI and I have not wished to embarrass him. It seems to me that British and Indian diplomacy is becoming entangled and that resulting confusion cannot be too unpleasant to the Russians.


HENDERSON

330/7–1350
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 13, 1950.

Subject: Personal Message from Prime Minister Nehru of India

At a meeting arranged at her request this afternoon, the Indian Ambassador, Madame Pandit, handed me the attached note including the text of a message to you from the Prime Minister of India appealing to you to exert your authority and influence for the maintenance of peace and the preservation of the solidarity of the United Nations by localizing the present Korean conflict and facilitating its early peaceful settlement:

“By breaking present deadlock in Security Council so that representatives of People’s Government of China can take seat in Council, the U.S.S.R. can return to it, and, whether within or through informal contacts outside Council, U.S.A., U.S.S.R. and China, with

1 In a separate memorandum of conversation, not printed, on his talk with Madame Pandit, Mr. McGhee related that Madame Pandit told him she had received the message from Prime Minister Nehru after having arranged for her appointment with Mr. McGhee (795.00/7–1350).

2 Not printed.

3 The substance of Mr. Nehru’s message is given in this memorandum; the full text is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, July 31, 1950, p. 170.
help and cooperation of other peace-loving nations, can find basis for terminating conflict and for permanent solution of Korean problem."

FE, UNA and NEA will cooperate in the preparation of a suggested reply to Prime Minister Nehru but I thought you might wish to see the message immediately.¹

¹ A manuscript note in the source text read: "Sec[retary] saw".

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 13, 1950.

Subject: CBS Broadcast on Korea.

During the CBS "World News Round-Up" at 8 o'clock this morning, the CBS correspondent in New York told of a statement by President Rhee to the effect that the action of the North Korean forces had obliterated the 38th parallel and that no peace and order could be maintained in Korea as long as the division at the 38th parallel remained. The broadcaster then went on to say that an American Army spokesman (it was not clear whether in Tokyo or Korea) had publicly stated that American troops were only in the fighting to drive the North Koreans back to the 38th parallel and would stop there and use force if necessary to prevent South Korean troops from advancing beyond the 38th parallel.

I think both of the above statements should never have been made. President Rhee's statement is understandable and it would be difficult to persuade him not to make such statements, but perhaps Ambassador Muccio could caution him about premature statements of final aims. I most strongly recommend that representations be made to the Department of Defense at once with a view to having prompt orders sent to Tokyo to the effect that commanders in the field and Army spokesmen should make no statements about what the policy of the United States Government will be in the future. If I were a South Korean soldier and had heard of the announcement by the American Army spokesman I would be strongly tempted to lay down my arms and go back to the farm. It is realized that there are many complicated problems connected with whether we do or do not proceed beyond the 38th parallel, but any statement by us at this time that we will not do so is, I believe, folly.¹

¹ A copy of this memorandum was sent to Mr. Dulles, who, in a separate memorandum of July 13, expressed to Mr. Rusk his agreement with Mr. Allison's observation that no present commitments should be made with regard to the 38th parallel (795.00/7-1350).
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET


Subject: Secretary’s Message to Bevin

Participants: Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador;
Secretary of State Acheson;
and Mr. George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary.

Sir Oliver stated that Mr. Bevin had received my message through Lew Douglas and was appreciative of the full and frank exposition of our views. He said they will study the message and will reply later. In connection with this Sir Oliver stated that apparently Mr. Bevin had been disturbed about the phrase “serious consequences” which Ambassador Douglas had used in the supplementary presentation of my message. I assured Sir Oliver that what we intended to convey was that we regarded most seriously the possibilities of our policies drifting apart, and that there was no other meaning intended. Sir Oliver said he was sure of this, but that he wanted to reassure Mr. Bevin who was apparently disturbed.

Sir Oliver handed me a copy of the message from Sir David Kelly to Mr. Bevin reporting on his conversation of July 11 with Mr. Gromyko (copy attached).

DEAN ACHESON

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1 See telegram 132, July 10, 5 p. m., to London, p. 347.
2 See telegram 133, July 10, 5 p. m., to London, p. 351.
3 Not printed; for a summary of the contents, see telegram 99, from Moscow, received at 2:26 p. m. on July 11, p. 360, and also British Cnd. 8078, p. 28.

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)

CONFIDENTIAL


Subject: Korean Blockade

Participants: Mr. Ford, British Embassy
Mr. Johnson, Department of State, NA.

Yesterday I called Mr. Graves of the British Embassy and told him that I would like to discuss with him, or anyone else in the Embassy that he might designate in the absence of Mr. Fossett who is in New York, the subject of the Korean blockade. He stated that he would have Mr. Ford see me. This morning Mr. Ford called and said that in

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1 Joseph F. Ford, First Secretary, British Embassy.
the meanwhile they had received a communication from the Foreign Office, and arranged to see me at 11:30.

Mr. Ford handed me the attached memorandum. After a hurried reading, I informed him, that without presuming to speak on all of the technical legal aspects, it appeared that the general approach of the Foreign Office was very closely allied to ours and that I could see no points of major disagreement in the first two pages. With regard to page 3 which contains the suggestion that General MacArthur, in his new capacity, formally should declare the existence of a blockade, I informed Mr. Ford that we, ourselves, had given careful consideration to this idea but had rejected it as we felt that there was ample justification under the Security Council Resolutions of June 25 and 27 for the President's declaration. Therefore, we did not feel it necessary to take any additional action which might even imply that there was not a sound legal basis for the President's declaration.

I then informed Mr. Ford of our plan to include in our first report to the Security Council, under paragraph 6 of the Security Council Resolution of July 7, our action to prevent aid being given to the North Korean authorities including the prevention of ingress to and egress from Korean ports. I said that we hoped that like-minded members of the United Nations would take any necessary action themselves to prevent their nationals or ships giving aid to the North Koreans. In reply to his query, I informed Mr. Ford that the United States had already taken administrative action to prevent any shipments from the United States to North Korea. Mr. Ford stated that while as a practical matter it was his understanding that no British shipments were being made to North Korea it would probably require legislative action to actually embargo such shipments.

I then informed Mr. Ford, in absolute confidence, of the limits of patrol of the Korean coast and the instructions to the patrolling vessels with regard to Soviet vessels. I stated that in the view of the limited patrol of the coast, it was our view that the only possible legal question that could arise with regard to the blockade would be its effectiveness, and that, at the worst, we could possibly lose a lawsuit. In the meanwhile supplies were being kept from North Korea.

In reply to Mr. Ford's query concerning the possible establishment of prize courts in Japan, I said that we have not gone into this subject but preliminarily it would appear highly doubtful whether this could be done, and it was my understanding that it would be necessary for any prizes captured by American vessels to be brought into the juris-

2 Not printed.
3 The text of the first report from General MacArthur was released and read on July 28, at the 47th Security Council meeting; see U.N. document S/PV.477.
diction of a Federal District Court for adjudication. Mr. Ford said that it was his tentative understanding that under British law prize courts were a matter for the Admiralty and that he thought there was a possibility that prizes could be adjudicated without necessity of their being brought within British territorial jurisdiction.

I told Mr. Ford that I would refer the memorandum from the Foreign Office to the Legal Section of the Department and would inform him as soon as possible of their comments. Mr. Ford stated that he would immediately refer our views on the blockade to the Foreign Office and inform us as soon as a reply has been received. I assured Mr. Ford of our desire to confer freely with them on these questions as they arose and to keep them informed of our views.  

*For the text of the reply by the Department of State on August 2 to the British note of July 13, see p. 516.

611.90/7-1350: Telegram

_The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State_

**TOP SECRET**

**NEW DELHI, July 13, 1950—5 p. m.**

[Received July 13—4:36 p. m.]

78. 1. I am grateful to Department for its thoughtfulness in making available to me information contained in top secret telegrams NR 40 of July 10. These telegrams² represent, in my opinion, one of greatest and most inspiring documents which I have seen during my years of service.

2. In view of faltering way in which GOI is following up its decision to support basic SC resolutions on Korea, of tendency of Nehru and his foreign advisers to seek for means of liquidating the struggle which has opened in Korea through mediation even though such mediation might involve appeasement, and of confused state of mind of formulaters of GOI policies, I believe it would be helpful for President or Secretary of State to send personal message to Nehru, setting forth in considerable detail our policies and explaining reasons for them and for actions taken in pursuance of them. I would hope that in tone and content this message would resemble document under reference wording and stress would, of course however, be altered in places in order to make stronger appeal to Nehru. Such message could be drafted in Department and submitted to us for comment and suggested deletions or additions before presentation to President or Sec-

²A note in the source text indicated that the plural “telegrams” was in the wording of this message as received, although only telegram 40 is specifically referred to; the language of the remainder of this message appears to indicate that only telegram 40 is under reference. Telegram 40 to New Delhi, July 10, repeated the text of telegram 132 to London, July 10, 5 p. m., p. 347.
Secretary in final form, or if preferred by Department, could be prepared here in draft form and sent to Washington for completion.

3. Such message in our opinion should set forth in considerable detail our attitude here Formosa and also Indochina and reason therefor. We believe preferable message should not request Prime Minister’s support or approval. It should merely aim to clarify your policy, set forth reasons for our actions, and contain our views re present international situation.

4. Message this kind might disturb Nehru because he would learn from it that some of his ideas about mediation are not likely bear fruit. On other hand, it seems to us that he is entitled to learn from highest quarter more about our position and what our intentions are than he apparently knows at present. Message if sent should, of course, be top secret since leak could be disastrous. To attain maximum effect it should be as soon as possible, since Prime Minister is constantly meeting in Congress Party and elsewhere critics of his line of action and he should not have any misconceptions during his various conferences as to where we stand.

Department pass London and Moscow, repeated information London 2, Moscow 2.

HENDERSON

330/7-1450: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices ¹

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, July 14, 1950—8 a.m.

UN SC July 7 Res recommends that all UN Members providing mil forces and other assistance ROK pursuant SC Res June 25 and 27 “make such forces and other assistance available to unified command under US”. ²

Dept desires clarify for urinfo and benefit Govt to which accredited procedure which it envisages re channeling and publicizing specific offers of assistance. Such procedure must necessarily be flexible in order balance consideration operational mil security against importance maximizing UN role through publicity, Lake Success datelines, etc. Actual decision as to extent specific offers are publicized will, of course, rest with contributing country.

¹This message was sent for action to 46 embassies and 4 legations and was sent for information to the missions in Belgrade, Bucharest, Budapest, Cairo, Moscow, and Warsaw.

²On July 14, the U.N. Secretary-General despatched communications to the 52 member governments which had supported either the Security Council resolution of June 25 or that of June 27, urging that they consider the possibility of providing assistance, particularly ground combat forces, for the U.N. effort in Korea (see U.N. document 8/1019).
In general Dept's thinking is that in order to maximize UN effort nations making offers shld do so through UNSYG. Dept believes that nation contributing wld naturally want to give the maximum publicity to secure appropriate credit. However, in case of nations making offers of mil forces or strategic material it wld be undesirable for obvious mil security reasons to disclose the precise nature or details of such offers through UNSYG. In these cases Dept feels that contributing country shld communicate offer in general, nonspecific terms to UNSYG (for transmittal through USUN to USG) and in doing so indicate that details will be worked out directly with unified command. Details of such offers in terms numbers, types, characteristics, etc. wld thus be revealed only by direct communication to US and mil security thereby protected.

With respect to assistance such as food stuffs, medicine, etc. such offers in first instance and unless otherwise directed shld be made to SYG for transmittal to unified command and have full publicity.

Unified Command (USG) wld consider offers and inform countries of decision through UNSYG. US in addition wld discuss directly with offering Govts arrangements necessary.

You shld use best judgment with full regard to any special local conditions in determining whether to communicate this thinking to Govt to which accredited or whether utilize in these terms mutatis mutandis if approached for advice.

ACHESON

795.00/7-1420: Telegram

_LThe Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State_

TOP SECRET

Moscow, July 14, 1950—2 p. m.
PRIORITY

[Received July 14—9:31 a. m.]

124. After allowing time for Indian Ambassador to advise British Ambassador (as Radhakrishnan said he would do in item (c) opening paragraph mytel 111, July 13 to Department, repeated New Delhi as 10) of his own approaches to me on ways of solving Korean question and my un receptive reaction to this plan, I saw Kelly 6 p. m. yesterday and in course of talk asked if he had seen Radhakrishnan recently. Not since Saturday (8 July) said Kelly but I had a note from him last night (12th), in which Radhakrishnan deplored unhappy situation in Korea, no appeasement possible but could not something be done to restore authority UNSC, such as Chinese Communist representation and return USSR to meeting; and ending with expressions sorrow over bloodshed and hope something could be arranged. Kelly says he wrote in reply that in general he shared sentiments of concern
over situation and bloodshed but of course HMG was in close touch with Indian High Commissioner in London as well as through British High Commissioner in New Delhi, with GOI. (Kelly did not show me notes nor had he made any report this exchange).

I then summarized my two talks: That of 7 July (Embtel 76, July 8)¹ which Kelly said Radhakrishnan had mentioned on 8 July visit to British Embassy; and that of 12 July (Embtel 111). British Ambassador was surprised at Indian Ambassador’s lack of frankness with him but said in view Radhakrishnan’s assurances to me (as per (a) in mytel 111 that suggestion was abandoned), it was perhaps just as well Radhakrishnan had sent his note since personal visit just then might have made difficult avoid reference to recent talks British Ambassador with Gromyko.

I left the matter there with understanding that fuller briefing for background could be given Kelly whenever desirable. We did agree Radhakrishnan was vague and starry-eyed, rather professorial in manner, and gave impression of not always paying close attention to what was being told him. However both Kelly and I are of opinion Radhakrishnan inclines to exaggerate his powers although to Nehru he may have private pipeline.

Indian Embassy press release (Embtel 123, July 14²) is hard to reconcile with statements made to me on Wednesday ³ at 5 p.m. except on assumption Radhakrishnan received further instructions.

Department pass London, Delhi; repeated info London 46, Delhi 13.

KIRK

¹Not printed; it dealt mainly with Indian concern over the reaction of the People’s Republic of China to the recent U.S. course of action respecting Formosa (794A.00/7-850).
²Not printed; it transmitted the press release dealing with the Indian Ambassador’s visit to Mr. Gromyko at 4 p.m. on July 13, to deliver an urgent personal message from Prime Minister Nehru for Generalissimo Stalin (601.9161/7-1450). The message was similar to that sent to Mr. Acheson (see the memorandum by Mr. McGhee, July 13, p. 372.
³July 12; see telegram 111, from Moscow, July 13, p. 370.

601.9161/7-1450: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Moscow, July 14, 1950—5 p.m.

[Received July 14—12:17 p.m.]

125. On July 13 about hour before he and Ambassador Radhakrishnan called on Gromyko to deliver message from Nehru to Stalin (Embtel 123, July 14)¹ Kapur paid hurried visit this Embassy. He said that his Ambassador had asked him see Barbour and Thurston

¹ See footnote 2 to telegram 124 from Moscow, supra.
with the thought they would pass on to me the following resume of
Radhakrishnan's views FE crisis:

"1. It is our anxiety to make UN effective organ. US is deeply
interested in it. So should vote for admission of China.
2. Russia's boycott of UN organizations is wrong but that not
justification for our non-recognition of China.
3. President Truman's instructions to Chiang Kai-shek to leave
Chinese mainland alone is an implicit recognition of sovereignty of
People's China in the Chinese continent.
4. A great nation like America can afford to be generous. Mag-
nanimity may pay and China with whom America's relations have
been fairly long and friendly may be moved to behave reasonably.
5. It will not be regarded as an act of appeasement for the with-
drawal of the North Korean forces to 38th parallel would be required.
6. UN mediation may take all steps necessary for giving protection
to South Korea until final settlement.
7. Soothing declaration by US on Formosa would be helpful."

Kapur performed his errand in pro forma manner clearly indicat-
ing that he was doing so to please his Ambassador and that he had
no hope that presentation these Indian arguments would make any
difference in US attitude. He did not reveal that approach to Soviets
was imminent nor has he since been in touch with Embassy.

Department pass Delhi, London; repeated info New Delhi 14,
London 47.

Kirk

795.00/7–1450: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary
of State

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

[Received July 14—12:56 p. m.]

291. Eyes only for the Secretary from Douglas. For the purpose of
following up my meeting with Bevin July 11 and of having a survey
of the international situation in general and the position in Far East
in particular, I arranged a lunch with Younger, Strang, Dening and
Holmes. The following major lines of thought clearly emerged.

(1) Bevin was very much surprised at the vigor of your response
to his message and was hurt if not offended by the seriousness with
which you view the implications of his message and their possible
effect on the future relationship between the two countries. Strang
inquired when your message had been written, whether before or after
the amplifications of the instructions to Kelly had been received by
you. I told him that I could not say when your message had been
written but that I suspected that you were directing your message at
Mr. Bevin's request for a candid exchange of views in regard to the situation in the Orient and especially the question which Mr. Bevin had put in regard to what would be the attitude of the US should the Russians agree to help in restoring the status quo in Korea in return for US readiness to be considered [reconsider?] their present declared attitude in regard to Formosa.

Strang then asked whether we had thought that Bevin's inquiry implied a disposition on the part of Bevin and His Majesty's Government to accept such a trade. I told him that I could not say what the view in Washington had been but that when I read it, quite candidly, I thought the whole tenor of the note and the precise language justified the inference that His Majesty's Government was at least flirting with the idea of an agreement of that sort.

I said that it was because we interpreted the message to carry such an implication that I suspected you had replied so vigorously and so clearly and that personally it seemed to me that only good could come out of a very frank and candid expression of views which Mr. Bevin himself had specifically and we were assured quite sincerely, invited.

Strang gave me to understand that Mr. Bevin had no disposition to advocate an agreement along the lines implied in his message or to view such an agreement as something which was good. Mr. Bevin, Strang said (both Younger and Dening echoed this view) put forward his question based on a hypothetical state of affairs purely for the purpose of exploring with us in advance the situation as it might in the future develop.

(2) Notwithstanding the disavowals of any predilections or intentions in regard to a settlement of the Korean affair, the subsequent conversation made it very clear that all British present were extremely worried and anxious, if in fact they did not lean strongly toward an arrangement, if not identical with, at least similar to, the possible settlement which Bevin referred to in his message.

The unified world opinion and particularly the unity of thought and support among the free Asiatic nations of which the significant leader is India which we now enjoy because of our prompt action in Korea and determination to resist aggression, is essential to the Western world. While Korea was the binding and cementing influence, the action in regard to Formosa was disturbing and was viewed with grave alarm by the entire Oriental free world.

Viewed through Asiatic eyes, Formosa belongs to China, quite irrespective of what sort of government China may or may not have. Under the pronouncement of Cairo, confirmed by the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, Formosa is legitimately part of the area over which the Chinese Government, howsoever composed and of what-
soever political complexion should lawfully exercise jurisdiction. Asiatic powers had recognized the Chinese People's Democratic Republic. This was in their view the established and lawful Government of China. Any efforts undertaken by this lawful government to exercise its sovereignty over an area, in this case Formosa to which it was legitimately entitled, would not be an act of aggression but merely a normal, natural and legal measure. They could not therefore understand why the US should intervene by stationing its fleet in a certain position to prevent a lawfully established and recognized government from performing its normal functions over the Island of Formosa and its inhabitants.

Nor do they recognize that a settlement which contemplated withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel (the status quo thereby being restored) in return for the seating of the Chinese Commmies in the Security Council and in the UN generally, the recognition of the Chinese regime and the inclusion of the island of Formosa within the territory of the People’s Republic to be an extorted blackmail price. The free Asiatic nations, of which India is the principal spokesmen, believe these three steps should have been taken long ago. Were they to be taken now at the same time the Korean affairs were resolved, it would be purely a matter of accident and coincidence and not extortion.

Moreover, the position of the US Government as expressed in the President's statement of June 27 constitutes a great change from the statement of January 5.¹ The free Asiatic peoples and those who constitute their governments believe this change to have been induced by purely strategic considerations on the part of the US and by the dislike which the US has for the Chinese People's Republic combined with the desire to maintain another outpost of the Western world from which the Orient could be dominated by the West.

(4) His Majesty's Government is strongly of the view that the Soviet would like nothing better than to have China and the US become entangled in armed conflict. This would punctuate and reinforce the Soviets blaring propaganda that the US and the Western world were anti-Asiatic and opposed to the yellow man and his independence and is intent upon a design of distant if not close imperialistic control. An armed conflict between China and the US, His Majesty's Government felt, would promptly and for an interminable period throw the whole of Asia into the USSR camp.

¹Reference is to the statement issued by President Truman on that date wherein he announced that the United States would not provide military aid or advice to the Chinese forces on Formosa and would not pursue a course which would lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. For the text, see Department of State Bulletin, January 16, 1950, p. 79; for related documentation, see vol. vi, pp. 250 ff.
(5) I replied that these views which had been tentatively and personally advanced tended to confirm the urgency of the US and UK finding some common platform in regard to Formosa and China from which we could attempt to persuade the Asiatic peoples and especially India of the rectitude of our position and to dissuade them from some of their deep-seated misunderstandings.

Merely because the British had recognized the People’s Chinese Republic and the US had not was no reason, it seemed to me, for us necessarily to diverge in regard to Formosa. The international situation which we had forecast at Cairo and Potsdam and the cooperation of the Soviet in establishing peace which we had then expected and on which we rested so many of the arrangements including the statement about Formosa had not materialized. Quite a contrary international climate existed produced by a whole series of violations or commitments by the USSR in the Far East and elsewhere. Moreover, it was clear that the Soviets were using Communism as an instrument of expansion and of imperialism of the most violent and ruthless sort. May [They?] want confusion and disorder not peace.

Even though declarations in regard to the intention of the US and UK toward the return of Formosa to China had been made at Cairo and even though these declarations of intentions had been confirmed by the Potsdam pronouncements with which the USSR was associated, the fact was that the title to Formosa had not passed to China. I myself seriously doubted the legal authority of two or three powers to convey title for Formosa to China and that actually China could not be vested with the title to Formosa except by the terms of an international agreement or peace settlement with Japan or alternatively in accordance with and pursuant to a lawfully made decision of the UN.

The US was not seeking any territorial position in the Orient. We had no ambition to establish a Western outpost from which the yellow man could be dominated. We were trying to preserve the present international status of Formosa in order that in a peaceful international environment unmenaced by wars or threats of wars, undisturbed by acts of coercion, uninfluenced by duress, the disposition of Formosa could be wisely and dispassionately determined by one of the only two methods that were lawful and valid.

An extension of the area of warfare we felt would seriously jeopardize the achievement of this objective and might precipitate us into a world war. With this purpose solely in mind, we had ordered the Seventh Fleet to take its position to prevent an act of aggression by the Chinese Commies against the Island of Formosa on which there was established from our point of view, the only Chinese Government we recognized. In addition we had used our good influences and per-
suasions so far successfully to terminate the Chinese Nationalist air attacks upon the mainland and other interferences with the mainland.

(6) The British replied that this statement of the case had never been made to them. They had looked favorably upon the President’s statement of January 5. The statement of June 27 was quite a different one. It did not make any reference to the legal position of Formosa. It, so the British viewed the matter, placed our case squarely on the grounds of the strategic significance of the Island. This was the motive too that most of the Asiatic world, the British thought, believed was behind our action. The British did not know what sort of a reply would be made to your message. They were now considering the matter from all these various angles and from all points of vantage. It was possible, they thought, that we could arrive at a common platform from which we could attempt to persuade the Asiatic countries, particularly India, of the propriety and the correctness of our position. This, however, was a purely personal view expressed on their part. The legal case they thought a good one.

They wondered, however, if there was time to go through the arduous process of persuading the Asiatic countries, and again, especially India. They wondered whether this suggestion did not really beg the question. Reinterpretation of their information led them to suspect that the Chinese Communists were massing their forces, their air and amphibious equipment, their ground and armored troops for an attack upon Formosa. (This may reflect Indian influence.) They thought that the invasion might be launched at almost anytime. Should it occur we would find the world divided with practically all of the Asiatic countries siding with the Chinese Communists and indeed some of the Western European countries.

(7) I cannot say that my statement of the legal position in regard to Formosa was even approximately correct but it is true that it has not been put to the public nor indeed has it been put to either the British Government or any Asiatic government. If there is a reasonable colour of validity to my statement of the case it might be wise to consider, but not necessarily to take any action until after Bevin’s note has been received, an amplification by the President of his statement of June 27, this amplification to include an explanation of the legal position in regard to Formosa and an elaboration of our reasons for taking the action which we took including emphasis on cessation Nationalist operations against mainland. He might even give a solemn undertaking that when peace is restored and the North Koreans withdraw to the 38th parallel, et cetera et cetera, we would not attempt to exert any undue influence in the negotiation of the final disposition of Formosa either under the terms of a peace settlement with Japan or by the UN. Any statement, however, it seems to me on the subject elaborating what was necessarily the short statement of June 27 should
make it clear that it implies no slackening of our efforts in Korea and
no compromise of our fundamental reasons for taking the measures
re Formosa.

DOUGLAS

795.00/7-1450: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 14, 1950—5 p. m.
[Received July 14—1:25 p.m.]

86. 1. Bajpai, SYG MEA, showed me today copy of telegram
July 12, to Mme. Pandit containing message from Nehru to Secretary
State. He also showed me copy of telegram to Indian Ambassador
Moscow containing appeal to Stalin and another telegram to Indian
High Commissioner London asking him inform UK of these two
messages. He said that Prime Minister had felt so strongly gravity
international situation that he considered it his duty to do what he
could to prevent further developments in direction world war. I
deemed it inappropriate to make any comments other than express
appreciation to Bajpai for letting me see messages.

2. Message to Stalin was as brief as that to Secretary State. As I
recall it Nehru expressed hope that if Communist China should be
admitted into UN organization Soviet Union would take attitude
which would lead to quick solution Korean problem.

3. Bajpai told me that he was rather disturbed that despite his
statements to me of July 11 and instructions contained in his telegram
of same date to Indian Ambassador to China (copy of which he had
given me) there still seemed to be impression in certain circles in
Washington that GOI was suggesting some kind of bargain between
US and Soviet Union under which Soviet Union would prevail upon
North Korea to withdraw its troops from ROK and US would support
admittance Communist China into UN Organizations. I assured him
that I had not given my Government any such impression. He said
that he had just received telegrams from Indian Ambassador to Mos-
cow outlining conversation which latter had had with Ambassador
Kirk and that it would appear from this telegram that Ambassador
Kirk seemed to believe that GOI was advocating an agreement of this
character.

4. During discussion which ensued I became fully convinced that
GOI not only had not authorized its Ambassador to Moscow to make
suggestions of kind contained Ambassador’s recent letter to Ambassa-
dor Kirk but was still ignorant of fact that such suggestion had been
made. I gained impression that Radhakrishnan had been authorized to
send out certain feelers but that latter had gone much further than
his government had expected him to go and had not reported in detail
his activities to New Delhi. Examination of Prime Minister’s letter to Secretary State makes doubly clear that GOI has not been supporting a quid pro quo arrangement.

5. I was not aware of Nehru’s message to Secretary State when I sent suggestions yesterday contained in Embtel 79 of July 13.1 This message apparently calls for basic statements of our policies and time element will of course prevent its examination by this mission before dispatch.

HENDERSON

1 Presumably the reference here should be to telegram 78, July 13, from New Delhi, received at 4:30 p.m. on July 13, p. 376.

795.00/7-1450

Memorandum by Mr. John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary of State, to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitte)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 14, 1950.

Since I understand thought is being given in the Policy Planning Staff to the desirability of a present public commitment on the part of the U.S. to permit the North Koreans anytime they wish to retreat in good order and re-form behind the 38th Parallel,2 I give you briefly my views as follows:

1. The 38th Parallel was never intended to be, and never ought to be, a political line. The United Nations, has, from the beginning, insisted that equity and justice require a united Korea. The 38th Parallel, if perpetuated as a political line and as providing asylum to the aggressor, is bound to perpetuate friction and ever-present danger of new war. If we have the opportunity to obliterate the line as a political division, certainly we should do so in the interest of “peace and security in the area”. (U.N. Resolution)

2. I would think that, from a national standpoint, it would be folly to allow the North Korean army to retire in good order with its armor and equipment and re-form behind the 38th Parallel from whence it could attack again the now ravaged and weakened Republic of Korea. To permit that would mean either the exposure of the Republic of Korea to greater peril than preceded the June 25th attack or the maintenance by the United States of a large military establishment to contain the North Korean Army at the 38th Parallel. The North Korean Army should be destroyed, if we have the power to destroy it, even if this requires pursuit beyond the 38th Parallel. That is the only way to remove the menace.

1 See the memorandum by Mr. Allison to Mr. Rusk, July 15, p. 393.
3. Neither equity nor good sense dictates that an unprovoked act of aggression should occur without risk of loss to the aggressor. If there can be armed aggression under conditions such that failure involves no permanent loss, then that puts a premium on aggression. There must be a penalty to such wrong-doing unless we want to encourage its repetition.

4. I do not suggest that we should at this time make any public declaration of intention. Perhaps expediency would make it wise to stop at the 38th Parallel. But I believe strongly that we should not now tie our hands by a public statement precluding the possibility of our forces, if victorious, being used to forge a new Korea which would include at least most of the area north of the 38th Parallel.

We should preserve our freedom to act in the way that seems best at the time when a decision is practically needed. That may be months hence and no one can now know the then surrounding circumstances.

5. I would not suppose that a united Korea would necessarily include the North Kankyo [North Hamgyong] Province, which runs up to the neighborhood of Vladivostok or the North Heian [North Pyongan] Province, which borders on the Yalu River. But most of Korea could be, and should be, united without this involving any territorial threat to the Soviet Union. Also, any reuniting should involve U.N. auspices, not merely U.S. unilateral action.

705.00/7-1456: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 14, 1950—5 p. m.

16. Press report June [July] 13 quotes Pres Rhee as voicing determination ROK not to stop at 38th parallel in repelling invaders. Same report quotes US Army spokesman, presumably in Korea, as stating US forces will not only stop 38th parallel but will use force if necessary to prevent ROK troops from advancing beyond that line.

In order not prejudice US position this important and explosive question, Dept feels every effort shld be made to avoid official statements or other public discussion of course of action to be taken at such time as northern forces expelled from South Korea. This particularly true of any statements, such as that cited above, which cld be taken by Koreans as prejudging US attitude toward 38th parallel.

Foregoing views being conveyed also to Defense.  

ACHESON

1 At his news conference on July 13, in answer to a question on whether the "police action" in Korea would be carried north of the 38th parallel, President Truman replied: "I will make that decision when it becomes necessary to do it." (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950, p. 523)
6. All ROK Cabinet officers except acting Prime Minister and Foreign Minister left Taejon yesterday for Taegu where seat government being established. Both remaining here temporarily. On advice provincial governor civilians evacuating Taejon and most shops closing. With 8th Army headquarters established Taegu, administration here dissolved and KMAG moving headquarters to Taegu. Headquarters General Dean remain Taejon. At suggestion General Walker ¹ Korean Army headquarters moving Taegu tonight or tomorrow.²

There was little appreciable change in military picture past 24 hours. US forces consolidated along south bank Kum River. Korean forces effected slight withdrawals in Chongju and Chungju areas. Main enemy forces and threat remain in area north of Taejon with possibility enemy may concentrate numerically superior ground forces for attempted drive on the Taejon somewhere between Chochiwon and Chongju. Morale and spirit ROK forces and populace remains good despite hardships and continued withdrawals. Loss of Taejon would be serious psychological blow, however. From military viewpoint loss Taejon would be even more serious since it links north-south railway network and since it would endanger Cholla provinces which rich in food resources and manpower.

Drumright

¹ Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, Commander of the U.S. Eighth Army, had assumed command of all U.S. Army forces in Korea on July 13.
² On July 15, President Rhee assigned to General MacArthur command of the Republic of Korea’s armed forces (see U.N. doc. S/1627).

795.00/7-1550: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

Moscow, July 15, 1950—2 p. m.

138. British Ambassador informs me that Indian Ambassador stated last night at French national reception that communication he delivered to Gromyko for Stalin (Embtl 123, July 14) ¹ was a sealed message from Nehru but that he knew its contents and it contained no specific proposals. He added that Gromyko remarked that the first requisite to a solution of the Korean situation is the

¹ See footnote 2 to telegram 124, July 14, from Moscow, p. 379.
withdrawal of American troops and that he had replied to Gromyko that such action is obviously impossible. He further stated that North Korean forces are making a desert of Korea to which Gromyko made no response. It appears, judging by timing of pouch arrivals, et cetera that Indian Ambassador in all probability received his instructions and message from Nehru Thursday July 13, i.e. after his talk with me on 12th (Embtext 124, July 14).

Department pass London, New Delhi, repeated information London 49, New Delhi 15.

Kirk

795.00/7-1050: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

TAEGU, July 14, 1950—10 a. m.

[Received July 15—9:29 a.m.]

39. ReEmbtext 34, July 10. Immediately after arrival Taegu yesterday called on President, urged immediate appointment strong, vigorous, courageous Home Minister capable cooperation military authorities, inspire police confidence. Rhee said would dismiss Home Minister Paek but first must talk with him; has since received Paek’s resignation but continuing him in office till successor appointed. Has summoned Chough Byung Ok and Kim Tae Sun as possible successors; would probably appoint Chough but must discuss with him before appointment in order secure certain guarantees re his conduct. Previously President had told Noble preferred appointment Kim Tae Sun since latter possessed current knowledge police situation; considered Chough involved police manipulations opposition DNP. Following my instructions Noble urged [neither?] although Kim was much lesser stature than Chough; President indicated willingness appoint Chough.¹

About 50,000 police now South Korea, well organized and led; can be used both assist our troops combat areas, spot infiltrates and fight as small combat units against guerrillas relieving both US Army and Korean army this responsibility. Former activity being performed now behind our lines. Have discussed with General Dean and deputy chief staff 8th Army importance this function, necessity arming each police unit with some grenades and machine guns enable offset guerrilla superiority weapons, inspire police self-confidence. Both agree but emphasize necessity in shipment such weapons earmarked for police.

Pass CINCFE.

Muccio

¹ See telegram 43 from Taegu, received at 4:17 a.m. on July 16, p. 399.
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 15, 1950—6 p. m. [Received July 15—1:35 p. m.]

330. Eyes only for the Secretary. In order to keep in close touch with working level Foreign Office, I arranged another luncheon today with Younger, Strang, Dening and Holmes.

Strang delivered me copy of Bevin’s reply to your most recent message setting forth British position in general. He also gave me another document which will be subject my immediately following telegram.

The conversation was frank and personal and there follows a summary of the principal points developed. There are three basic questions affecting US and UK positions and the present situation in the FE. They are (1) the seating of the Chinese Communists in the SC (2) recognition by the US of the Chinese Communists regime, and (3) the problem of Formosa.

As to (1) there appears to be no likelihood that in present circumstances a majority could be produced in the SC in favor of seating the Chinese Communists and therefore this question is not one of immediate concern and we are both agreed that it must not be related to the specific problem of Korea.

As to (2) there is no chance whatever that the US will recognize Peiping regime, British are fully aware of this and problem does not immediately trouble us. The question to be resolved is the one of Formosa and our respective positions with regard thereto. The British officials agreed that in spite of our divergence of views with respect to Chinese Communists, it ought to be possible for us to reconcile our positions with respect to Formosa and establish a common platform which would permit us to act in closer association. They agreed that a statement by the US along the lines recommended in paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of Embtel 291, July 14 would constitute a substantial contribution to a common position.

It is my opinion that should we make such a statement the British will be prepared to argue our case and indeed they assure us they have been doing so in response to numerous inquiries. They consider to be of extreme importance assurances by us that once an atmosphere of peace and calm is reestablished in the FE, we will not use undue influence in determining the ultimate disposition of Formosa.

1 See the annex to the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Perkins, July 15, p.396.
The British expressed the hope in which I concur, that we shall be able to see to it that there is on contribution of Armed Forces by Nationalist China to Lie's recent appeal.

Douglas

795.00/7-1550: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, July 15, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received July 15—1:39 p. m.]

331. Eyes only for the Secretary. After luncheon meeting today (see my tel 330)¹ Strang handed me text of Nehru’s message to Stalin transmitted in my immediately following telegram.² It was pointed out to Strang that text did not include details of India’s proposal and he was asked whether British had substance of discussions between Indian Ambassador Moscow and Soviet Foreign Office. Reply was in negative. This answer leads us to believe that Indians have not wholly confided in UK. Strang made great point that it was highly exceptional for UK to give us text of communication between Prime Ministers within Commonwealth and also that our possession this text should not be disclosed to anyone.

Department pass Moscow; repeated info Moscow 27.

Douglas

¹ Supra.
² Telegram 332 not printed; Prime Minister Nehru's message to Generalissimo Stalin was virtually identical with his message to Mr. Acheson; see the memorandum by Mr. McGhee to Mr. Acheson, July 13, p. 372.

795.00/7-1550: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 15, 1950—3 p. m.
[Received July 15—2:41 p. m.]

95. 1. At request of Bajpai, Secretary General MEA, I called upon him at noon today. He told me Nehru had yesterday received through acting UK HICOM reply to Nehru’s message to UK Government of July 12.¹ Reply was to effect that UK Government could not support seating Communist China in UN organization until Communist China had agreed it would not move against Formosa; until North Koreans

¹ See telegram 86, from New Delhi, received at 1:25 p. m. on July 14, p. 385.
had withdrawn from ROK; and until Russians had resumed their seat in SC.

2. Bajpai said GOI deeply disappointed at negative character UK reply and Nehru had immediately sent another appeal to UK Government. Bajpai outlined general character of this new appeal. According my recollection it was to effect that:

(a) There is threat of world war unless present deadlock in SC can be broken and way opened for solution of problems of Korea and Formosa.

(b) If one party attempts lay down conditions for seating of Communist China and for opening conversations for solving Korean and Formosa questions, other party may be prompted to do likewise. For instance, Russia may well insist that resolutions of SC re Korea be cancelled before it will re-enter SC or participate in activities SC.

(c) Assuming one party takes position that “face” is involved, other party may also ascribe more importance to “face” and no progress can be made.

(d) What is needed is a dispassionate and independent settlement of problem of Chinese representation in SC.

(e) UK and US would be serving cause of peace and of survival of mankind if, without any surrender of vital interests of prestige, they would agree to seating Communist China.

(f) If Russia and Communist China after admission would use veto to block efforts SC to solve problems before it, world would hold these two powers guilty of endangering world peace.

(g) Communist China certainly, and Russia probably, are anxious to avoid world war and admission Communist China at this time may help avoid such a war.

3. I assume UK has furnished Department with copy GOI’s new appeal and can check from it accuracy my memory as to its contents.

4. Bajpai again expressed disappointment at UK attitude. He said UK apparently has gone backward rather than forward. Only recently it was prepared to vote to admittance Communist China. It seemed now, however, to be laying down conditions, some of which were not pertinent to merits of case.

5. I made no comments other than to thank Bajpai for giving me this information and promised to convey it at once to Washington.

Department pass London; repeated information London 7.

HENDERSON
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 15, 1950.

Subject: United States Objectives in Korea with Particular Reference to Problem of 38th Parallel

Considerable thought is being given in the Policy Planning Staff and probably elsewhere in the Department to the desirability of issuing a public statement on our objectives in Korea which would make clear that we do not intend to allow our own troops or Republic of Korea troops to proceed beyond the 38th parallel. I have noted Mr. Feis's memorandum of July 14 urging that this government "positively and publicly disassociate itself" from President Rhee's statement that action of the North Koreans had obliterated the 38th parallel. I have also been asked to comment upon S/P document dated July 5 recommending that General MacArthur announce that he will order forces under his command not to conduct "close pursuit" should North Korean forces offer to withdraw and that he should further undertake to prevent his troops and those of the Republic of Korea "crossing into North Korean territory in force". The reason given for these suggestions is, in the case of Mr. Feis, that the attitude of our Allies will be adversely affected and Chinese Communist and Russian governments will be encouraged to put their own troops into the fight in Korea if we don't disavow President Rhee, while in the latter case it is stated such action will "aid in blocking Soviet charges of United States aggression in Korea ...".

I wish to express my most emphatic disagreement not only with the above suggestions themselves but with the reasoning back of them. In my opinion any such action as that recommended by Mr. Feis or in the S/P document in question will go far toward making impossible a successful carrying out of the terms of the June 27 Resolution of the Security Council which stated in conclusion:

"RECOMMENDS that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area." (Underlining added)

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1 Not printed. Herbert Feis was a member of the Policy Planning Staff.
2 Not printed.
3 Mr. Feis' memorandum concluded by saying that he did not believe that the Russian Government would possibly allow substantial American armed units to reach the Soviet frontier (795.00/10-550).
Obviously in determining what our course in Korea should be we must take into consideration the effect of our action both among the members of the United Nations now associated with us and also among the Korean people themselves. Any action taken in Korea with a view to keeping our UN Allies on our side will be of no avail unless it also keeps the Korean people on our side.

If any one thing seems certain as a result of our experience in Korea over the past five years it is that a perpetuation of the division of that country at the 38th parallel will make it impossible “to restore international peace and security in the area.”

From the beginning the 38th parallel was meant to be a temporary line delineating areas in which to take the surrender of the Japanese. That it has become a permanent division of the country into two states has not been the fault of either the people of South Korea or of the United States. It is solely due to the intransigent attitude of the USSR and its lackeys in North Korea. This has been recognized by an overwhelming majority of the United Nations. It is North Korea and the Soviet Union that have restricted the movements of the UN Commission in Korea—not the South Koreans or the United States. Any solution of the problem which ignores the past and in effect says “If you stop fighting and withdraw to your original positions all will be forgiven and we will start over again attempting to reach a solution” disregards realities and would be a compromise with justice which would, and in my opinion rightly, cause the people of South Korea, to lose all confidence and faith in the moral position of the United States.

Conversations among officers in NA and representatives of Embassies of our United Nations allies, has, in the majority of cases, indicated a definite agreement that it would be utterly unrealistic to expect to return to the status quo ante bellum. It is believed that a positive program of persuasion conducted through the diplomatic channel, Voice of America and USIS would obviate most of whatever opposition there may be to taking advantage of this opportunity to carry out the pledges of Cairo and bring about a truly independent, unified Korea.

A determination that the aggressors should not go unpunished and vigorous, courageous United States leadership to that end should have a salutary effect upon other areas of tension in the world. Notice would be served on the aggressor elsewhere, who is the same as the covert aggressor in Korea, that he cannot embark upon acts of aggression with the assurance that he takes only a limited risk—that of being driven back only to the line from which the attack commenced.

At the very least we should destroy the North Korean Army, through force if necessary, or by disarmament under UN auspices as
a result of an offer of peace. We should then insist upon the full implementation in North Korea of the procedures laid down by the General Assembly resolutions of November 14, 1947 and December 12, 1948, including the holding of elections under the observation of the UN Commission on Korea. In view of our desire to bring about permanent peace and order in the area and a removal of psychological as well as geographic barriers between North and South Korea, it is believed it might be desirable to be generous in such matters as reparations, war crimes and related problems.

I do not advocate a public statement at this juncture of our intentions with regard to Korea but I most strongly urge that no statement be made which in any way commits this government not to proceed beyond the 38th parallel or implies that we will agree to any settlement which merely restores the status quo ante bellum.

I also strongly recommend that an early determination be made of just what our policy toward a Korea settlement should be, at least in broad outlines. One of the reasons for the difficulties we now face in Korea is that we failed to realize that political forces would be more compelling than military and hence did not insist upon our military establishment being prepared to implement the political decision we made when the test came. I hope we will realize that political necessity will compel us to act in such a way as to bring about a real restoration "of international peace and security" in Korea, and that we will be adequately prepared. The risks are admittedly great—the risks in accepting a partial solution or in compromise are, in my opinion, infinitely greater.

793.00/7-1550

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 15, 1950.

Subject: Communication from Mr. Bevin to the Secretary

Participants: Sir Oliver Franks, the British Ambassador
Mr. George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary

Sir Oliver left the attached communication from Mr. Bevin to the Secretary. It is in answer to the Secretary's communication to Mr. Bevin delivered by Mr. Douglas on July 11.

He said he had been asked to point out that the other members of the Commonwealth, they believed, took much the same attitude as that indicated in this communication. However, they wanted to make it perfectly clear that they had not consulted the Commonwealth in connection with this communication and that this communication represented U.K. views.

GEORGE W. PERKINS
I am very glad to have the detailed and frank exposition of the U.S. view on the Korean situation and the implications arising from it which were communicated to me in your Ambassador's letter of the 11th July. I have already sent you a message to this effect through Oliver Franks.

I should also like you to know that we fully realise here how onerous is the duty which the United States have so readily assumed in Korea. We are all indeed indebted to the U.S. for their prompt action in coming to the assistance of the Korean Republic and recognise how heavy an additional burden has been added to the world-wide responsibilities of the U.S. Government.

I should like first of all to remove any misapprehension about the purpose of the message which I sent to you on the 7th July through Oliver Franks, and to which Mr. Douglas conveyed your answer on the 11th July. It was never in my mind, when I asked what the U.S. view would be in the event of the Soviet Union asking a price in return for using their influence with the North Koreans, to suggest that a bargain was desirable. We are just as determined not to submit to Soviet blackmail as you are. I want to make it quite clear that we could not agree with you more wholeheartedly when you say that you have faced squarely a calculated act of aggression. We ourselves, and I think the whole right-thinking world, appreciate to the full the stand which the U.S. Government have taken in Korea on behalf of us all. I think it essential to remove any misunderstanding before we discuss, as I hope we can dispassionately, the two questions of Formosa and our attitude towards China where clearly there has been a difference in our thinking.

I know that I can explain without troubling our relationship exactly why we have been very seriously worried here about the implications of the President's declaration about Formosa. I am sorry that it was not possible for you, no doubt owing to the speed of events, to consult us in advance on a step which is of such close concern to us, particularly in view of the undertakings we exchanged when you and I met in Washington last September and again in London in May to consult on matters affecting China. We are, as you know in a very vulnerable position in Hong Kong, and we have vast Chinese communities in Malaya where we have a long drawn campaign on our hands. You know our views on China and that our aim remains that

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1 For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. ix, pp. 1 ff.
China should not go irrevocably into the Soviet camp and be lost permanently to the Western world. The President’s declaration on Formosa evidently has an impact on all these situations, and it therefore cannot be said to affect the U.S. alone.

As I see it the possibilities of the Formosa situation are as follows. If the Central Peoples’ Government take heed of the President’s declaration and abandon any attempt to invade Formosa and thus avoid an armed clash with the United States Forces, no very serious consequences may ensue. But the Central Peoples’ Government have addressed a communication to the Security Council stating their intention to “liberate” Formosa whatever the United States may do, and though this may only be bravado, it may be unwise to assume that no attempt to stage an invasion will be made. If an attempt is made we must, in view of the position taken by the President in his statement of the 27th June, expect hostilities between the Forces of the United States and those of the Central Peoples’ Government. We consider that the consequences of such a clash would be very grave. They might lead to an extension of the conflict. Even if that does not happen it is not improbable that Russia would appeal to the Security Council and accuse the United States of aggression. While no doubt you have considered this, and would have a good case I am concerned lest the solidarity of the support you now have should not be maintained in these circumstances. The Russians will of course, be out to make mischief.

I recognize that you attach great strategic importance to Formosa. What I am anxious to avoid is that we should give the Russians a chance to divide Asia from the West on an Asian problem. I really think there has been some misinterpretation of what the President said about Formosa and of course the Russians are doing their best to encourage this. Maybe the President in his own inimitable way could say something to remove any misapprehension by making it clear that the final disposal of Formosa is an open question which should be settled on its merits when the time comes, and that nothing which has been said or done implied any decision to go back on the position as set out in the Cairo declaration. I realise the delicacy of this matter.

Your communication to me deals in some detail with the question of Chinese (and Russian) representation in the United Nations. As already explained, I only raised this question in my message to you because of the likelihood that the Russians would put it forward as part of a bargain, and I am in entire agreement with you that we cannot bargain on the Korean issue. We should refuse to discuss with the Soviet Union the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations as part of the Korean problem. In other words, Russia must come back and take her place in the United Nations and, in order to
give a sense of security to the world, must renounce the practice by which one nation can claim to prevent the United Nations from working. The question of Chinese representation does not therefore seem to me to arise at this present stage, though I shall be very glad in due course to give you our views on the questions which you put.

You have elaborated to me at length the attitude of the U.S. Government towards China, and their reasons for that attitude. I do not think that we should necessarily find ourselves in full agreement with all your statements, but that is not the point which I want to make. You know our policy towards China, and I think it is the right policy. On the question of recognition you and we have differed, but I did think that, as a result of the official talks in London in May, we were agreed that we did not want to see China irrevocably alienated from the West. What I am afraid of is that the present situation will, if we are not careful, push China further and further in the direction of the Soviet Union. On our information China, though reacting violently to your declaration on Formosa, has committed herself no more than Russia has over Korea, and I should doubt if she wishes to become involved in that conflict. I should also doubt whether, for the present, she would embark on adventures further afield apart from Formosa, although we cannot afford to disregard that possibility. But I think we must be careful not to accuse China of what she has not yet done, or to give her the impression that she is already so much beyond the pale that she has no hope of re-establishing her position with the West. Once she becomes convinced that the Western Powers will have nothing to do with her, she will turn even more to the Soviet Union, who will be out to exploit such a tendency to our detriment and we may find that we have aligned against us a Power whose influence in Asia, for good or evil, is bound to have a profound effect upon the course of events. This is a question of vital concern to us because of our position in Hongkong and Malaya. It is also of vital concern to all Asian countries, who are very conscious of it.

Therefore I say that we must be very careful not to add China to our enemies by any actions or attitudes of ours. If China eventually demonstrates by practical evidence that she will in no circumstances co-operate with the free world; if she takes her seat in the United Nations and behaves in precisely the same way as the Soviet Union has in the past, then at any rate it will be clear to Asian as well as to other Nations what she is and where she stands. I do think it is important that we should not put ourselves in a position where it can be alleged that, but for some action of ours, China would not have gone irrevocably into the Soviet Communist camp. I will now try to summarise my views.
I think that the governing factor in our politico-strategic policy should be to localise the Korean conflict and attempt to prevent it from spreading. I think that this objective would be helped by some public clarification regarding Formosa and by the adoption of policy towards China which would not press her to the point where still closer association with the Soviet Union would appear to her to be her only course.

If you agree with this I should hope that we could find common ground on the following points.

The first is that the aggression in Korea must be repelled and North Korean Troops must go back to the 38th parallel.

The second is that there can be no submitting to Soviet blackmail, but that Russia's right course is, as said above, to come back and take her place in the United Nations, having renounced the practice of holding up the work of the United Nations by the action of one Nation.

Thirdly the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations should be considered in the United Nations and not in relation to any possible Soviet blackmail connected with Korea. In any case as a matter of practice I cannot believe that the necessary majority for the changeover at the United Nations could be secured so long as the Korean conflict lasts, even if any Power were to attempt to push it at the United Nations.

I hope that this exchange of correspondence will help to clarify the position and that we may continue our exchanges through our respective Ambassadors in an endeavour to remedy any weakness in the common front against Soviet expansion. My hope is that in the end we may arrive at an agreed policy. If our policies are somewhat divergent in the meanwhile, I think it very important that the United States and Britain should do their best not to take opposing lines in any statements we have to make to third Powers or publicly, and that we should make sure that these divergencies do not prejudice the future. The forthcoming talks in Washington will, I hope, help to clear our minds in certain important respects, but I should like to think that this will not be an isolated event but that we shall get ever closer together on Far Eastern questions.

795.00/7-1530: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TAEGU, July 15, 1950.

PRIORITY

[Received July 16—4:17 a.m.]

43. ROK Government establishing Taegu. Following now here: President, Foreign Minister, Home Minister, Finance Minister, Edu-
cational Minister, Communications Minister, Commerce Minister, Agricultural Minister, Transportation Minister, Social Affairs Minister, Public Health and Welfare Minister, Directors Bureaus Administration, Public Information. Prime Minister-Defense Minister expected here today but possibly returning Taejon. Except Finance Minister who established at Bank Chosun, all ministers established Provincial Government building; hoping persuade disperse office enable conduct more normal government business instead congregating together devoting attention war news.

Home Minister Paek Sung Ok replaced today by Chough Pyung Ok, former chief national police USAMGIK. Chough’s ability, energy courage expected have excellent effect leading police, including antiguerilla operations, this crisis. Paek proved utterly incapable. Director Public Information Clarence Ryee being given “sick leave” sent Pusan owing incompetence; Foreign Minister Ben Limb unofficially being given additional duty Director Public Information, will work closely with Stewart, who informally recommended his designation.

Ever since Embassy persuaded President leave Taejon, President has been insisting on returning, both to head government and show self to people near front for morale purposes. President was stopped Taegu July 9 by my advice but strongly against his will; since then has been most insistent upon returning Taejon. Today General Walker persuaded President his presence, activities Taegu more helpful war effort than return Taejon; President appears accept this advice.

Chief Staff Chung Il Kwan promoted Major General, easing his command position relative other major generals, especially “Flk” Chaf [“Fat” Chae?] 1 who has shown reluctance accept Chung’s orders. Chung probably will maintain headquarters Taegu near General Walker’s headquarters, but for morale purposes of Korean army likely spend most time advance headquarters at Kumchon, or forward. ROK considerable concern lest psychological support Korean people be undermined by appearance retreat Korean Army command and government, causing either popular indifference or resurgence guerilla warfare and subversion.

Repeated information Tokyo unnumbered.

Muccio

1 Presumably the reference is to Gen. Chae Byong Duk, whom Chung had replaced as Chief of Staff of the ROK Army.
330/7-1650: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 16, 1950—10 a.m.

[Received July 16—6:14 a.m.]

97. 1. At request Bajpai, Secretary General, Ministry External Affairs, I called on him this morning. He said he had just received copy Stalin’s reply and was repeating it to Mme. Pandit with instructions that she discuss it with Department.

2. He showed me draft telegram to Mme. Pandit enclosing reply and containing instructions.

3. As I recall it, reply was in effect somewhat as follows: Stalin expressed appreciation of India’s suggestions. He agreed that participation all five great powers in SC was prerequisite to settlement Korean question and, that in order for that question properly to be considered by SC, it should “hear representatives of the Korean people”

4. Instructions to Mme. Pandit were brief. They told her, as I recall it, to convey further appeal from Nehru to Secretary of State and also through Secretary of State to President for favorable consideration of admittance Chinese Communists into SC. It was pointed out that continued opposition on part of Western Powers to such admittance at this time might make them vulnerable to Communist propaganda, that they were standing in way of possible solution of Korean problem. It was true that admission Chinese Communists would be “act of faith” but in view of importance of issues involved, in opinion of Government of India there should be act of faith.

5. I was unable in glancing briefly through documents to make any notes or to commit all points to memory. Bajpai assured me however, that document itself and appeal would be conveyed to US Government within few hours. My description therefore of telegram to Mme. Pandit is not entirely accurate. Nevertheless I believe it fairly represents substance of Stalin’s reply and of Government of India instructions.

6. I took advantage to convey to Bajpai information contained in telegram 68, July 15. I made no comment with regard to Nehru’s

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1 Transmitted to the Secretary of State by Madame Pandit on July 17, p. 407.

2 The text of this telegram read as follows:

“For the Ambassador. Press reports emanating from Washington, misinterpreting statements by Dept spokesman do not reflect our answer to Nehru’s message. Pls indicate to Bajpai we expect to have an early reply and our attitude should not be anticipated from erroneous press accounts.” (791.00/7-1550)
appeals and answers thereto other than to state that I was confident that regardless of nature our reply my government fully appreciated constructive motives behind Prime Minister's various messages. Bajpai replied that he hoped we would appreciate motives, but he hoped still more that our answer would be favorable.

HENDERSON

795.00/7-1650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 16, 1950—9 p. m.

[Received July 16—2:22 p. m.]

99. 1. Immediately following this telegram is another containing a hastily prepared draft of message to Nehru as suggested in Deptel 63, July 14, 8 p. m. which we received only this morning.¹

2. We are not satisfied with this draft which we believe is too long and perhaps too closely reasoned. Nevertheless, we hope some of the points contained in it will be useful to Department.

3. I wish it were possible immediately after delivery of reply, which in our opinion should be devoted primarily to matters emphasized in Nehru’s message, for another message to be transmitted to Nehru setting forth in considerable detail our general policies re Korean problem, aggression, Far East, et cetera. This message might give him better understanding of our determination not to turn back or be diverted, the reasons therefor and the dangers of any appearance of vacillation. Unfortunately time has thus far prevented us from working on such a document.

HENDERSON

¹The text of telegram 63 read as follows: “Eyes only for the Ambassador. Dept now working on draft message to Nehru and will submit for your comments. Sec would appreciate your own suggestions about our approach and hopes you will send them over weekend.” (123 Henderson, Loy)

795.00/7-1650 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 16, 1950—9 p. m.

[Received July 16—6:32 p. m.]

100. Following is draft referred to in Embtel 99:¹

I am deeply appreciative of the high motives which prompted Your Excellency in sending the message which I received on July 13. Both the President and I have been strongly moved by your appeal for the

¹Supra.
US to exert such authority and influence as it may have for the maintenance of peace and for the preservation of the solidarity of the UN. One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the US is to assist in maintaining world peace, and the Government of the US is firmly of the opinion that the UN is the most effective instrument yet devised for preventing the outbreak of war. The Government of the US is therefore eager to do all that is proper and possible to strengthen and preserve the UN.

We have been giving careful thought to the suggestion contained in your message since we are determined not to fail to take any step which might conceivably be in the direction of terminating the conflict in Korea on a basis which would be likely to promote world peace. It is our considered opinion however that support by us under present conditions of the admission of the so-called Peoples Government of China into the SC or into any other organization of the UN would not serve the cause of peace and would not strengthen the UN.

We do not believe that merely because an armed group has been able by force to take possession of a major portion of the territory of a country which is a member of the UN and to set up what it calls a government, the regime so established should be permitted to take a seat in the various organizations of the UN until it has made it clear by word and deed its intentions to adhere to the principles of the Charter of the UN.

In our opinion the Peiping regime has not thus far given indication by word or deed of its intention to live up to the principles of the Charter. On the contrary, by its announced policies and its acts, it has shown that its objectives are not in accord with those of the UN.

A qualified candidate for a seat in the UN, intending to abide by the principles laid down by Charter, would, we believe, indicate a desire to establish normal relations with other nations. Peiping has thus far not shown such desire. A regime qualified to hold seats in the UN does not engage in activities calculated to promote hatred between other nations and other peoples or to instigate, or to give support to armed uprisings in other countries. Peiping is actively endeavoring to promote hatreds between nations and between continents and to stir up and to encourage insurrectionary movements among other members of the UN. It is, for instance, trying to promote hatred and friction between the peoples of Asia and those of other continents. It is attempting to set one nation in Asia against another and nations of Asia against those of Europe and America. It is lending encouragement and support to Communists and other armed insurrectionaries in the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, Indochina and elsewhere. A regime qualified to occupy seats in the UN should not support aggression. In spite of the fact that the SC has found that the invaders of
the ROK are guilty of breach of peace, the Peiping regime is openly defying the UN and is seeking to mobilize international and internal political support in favor of the aggressors. Furthermore, in spite of the fact that the General Assembly of the UN has only recently declared itself in favor of the territorial integrity and political independence of China, the Peiping regime is cooperating with another power in the latter’s efforts to penetrate China, to bring about the de facto dismemberment of China, and to violate territorial integrity and political independence of China.

Until the Peiping regime shows that it intends to conduct itself like a member of the UN in good standing, we do not see how the Government of the US can support its admission into organizations of the UN. We do not believe that merely because China is a permanent member of the SC, any group which happens by force to obtain control of extensive Chinese territories must ipso facto, regardless of the principles to which it may adhere or of the objectives which it may be pursuing, take a seat in that body. It is our view that the problem of Chinese representation in the UN in itself is distinct from that of aggression in Korea. Each of these problems must be considered on its own merits. Aggression which is at the present time being perpetrated in Korea has not affected the attitude of the Government of the US with respect to the problem of Chinese representation in the UN. The attitude of the Peiping regime towards the aggressors, however, has furnished additional evidence that the regime has not at present the qualifications which a member of the UN must have.

We are inclined to believe that it would be improper, if not immoral, for us to support the admission of the Peiping regime into the organizations of the UN so long as we are convinced that that regime is not qualified to be a member of the UN and that the presence of that regime in the UN would render the organizations of that body less, rather than more, effective in their efforts to preserve the world peace.

The Government of the US regrets the decision of the Soviet Government not to send representatives to fill the seats to which they are entitled. It would welcome the return of such representatives.

The Government of the US does not believe, however, that it would be strengthening or increasing the effectiveness of the UN by lending its support to the admission of representatives of the Peiping regime into the UN merely because the Soviet Union has indicated that it will not send its representatives back to organizations of the UN unless the Peiping regime is also represented. The Government of the US has no reason to think that in existing circumstances the presence of representatives of the Soviet Union and of the Peiping regime in the SC would contribute to the solution of the Korean problem. We encountered a negative attitude when we endeavored in a friendly
spirit to prevail upon the Soviet Government to exert its influence on the aggressors to withdraw from the ROK. Both Moscow and Peiping are engaging through direct and indirect propaganda and by the use of diplomatic channels to rally support for the aggressors and to immobilize world opinion which the acts of aggression have aroused. There can be no doubt that if the representatives of the Soviet Union and of Peiping take seats in the SC they will concentrate their efforts not on endeavoring to effect the withdrawal from the ROK of the aggressors but on stultifying the endeavors of the SC to combat the aggression and on attempting to obscure the issue which is now so clear. That issue arises from the facts that an armed attack was made upon the ROK obviously in pursuance of detailed plans prepared long in advance; that the SC passed resolutions describing this attack as a breach of peace, called upon the attackers to withdraw from the territory of the Republic and called upon members of the UN to furnish to the Republic assistance in repelling the attack and in restoring international peace and security; and that the attackers instead of heeding the call of the SC have not withdrawn from the ROK but have continued their warfare, apparently with the purpose of occupying all of the territory of that Republic. The attack has been made so openly that it is difficult to understand how any member of the UN can regard it as other than aggression. The overwhelming majority of the members have so regarded it and have pledged their support to the actions taken by the SC. The issue is whether the UN will or will not stop this aggression and force the aggressor to leave the territory which he has invaded.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union and certain other members of the UN as well as the Peiping regime are endeavoring to divert the attention of world opinion from this issue. They are endeavoring to exploit at this time such differences of opinion with regard to various international problems which exist between members of the UN opposed to aggression. It is their hope to dissipate the energies of the nations opposed to aggression by inveigling these nations into considering problems other than the main issue. The Government of the US is confident that they will not succeed in so doing.

It is not unusual for those engaging in or supporting aggression to attempt to cloud the issue by indicating that if certain concessions are made to their views, an atmosphere might be created conducive to settlement of basic problems, the solution of which is necessary for the preservation of peace. The Government of the US has learned

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3 Subsequently, in telegram 101, July 17, from New Delhi, Ambassador Henderson suggested changing the wording of this passage, in order to avoid any misunderstanding on the part of the Government of India, as follows: "Unfortunately the Soviet Union, the Peiping regime, and other governments under the influence of Moscow are endeavoring, etc." (795.00/7-1750)
through experience that concessions made to aggressors or supporters of aggression do not create an atmosphere in which basic problems are solved but merely lead to a weakening of the forces opposed to aggression and to fresh demands and further aggressive actions.

In the opinion of the Government of the US there is for the present only one solution to the problem of Korea, and that is for the North Koreans to withdraw from the ROK and if they do not withdraw for them to be driven out by the combined forces of loyal members of the UN.

HENDERSON

210/7-1650: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 16, 1950—midnight.

NIAC/T

71. For the Ambassador from Rusk. Urteil 100\(^1\) received here late Sunday night. Ind Amb sees Sec Monday morning,\(^2\) probably to inform us of Stalin's reply. Since Nehru's message to Acheson was very short, we have considered replying very briefly in event early publication of exchange becomes necessary and to follow our short reply with long personal and confidential message from Pres or Sec giving full background and flavor our views present world situation. Urteil 100 contains excellent material for longer message but we have doubts about using it for formal reply. If public reply should contain much argumentation, Nehru might feel compelled to continue public debate on points of disagreement in order not to let silence give consent or let "points" stand against him.

We have in mind following short formal reply and would greatly appreciate your judgment soonest as to (1) whether we are right in replying so briefly for public record and (2) whether you consider our text would be helpful.

Text follows:

"My dear Mr. PM: I am deeply appreciative of the high purpose which prompted ur Excellency in sending the message which I received on July 13, 1950 through ur distinguished Amb in Wash. Both the Pres and I have given the most searching consideration to ur appeal for the US to exert such influence and authority as it may have for the maintenance of peace and for the preservation of the solidarity of the UN.

"One of the most fundamental objectives of the foreign policy of the US is to assist in maintaining world peace and the Govt of the US is firmly of the opinion that the UN is the most effective instrument

\(^1\)Supra.
\(^2\)July 17.
yet devised for preventing the outbreak of war. The US is, therefore, eager to do all that is proper and possible to preserve and strengthen the UN.

"The purpose of the US Govt and of the Amer people with respect to Korea is to support by all means at our disposal the determination of the UN to repel the armed attack upon Korea and to restore international peace and security in the area. We desire not only to prevent the spread of aggression beyond Korea but to end it—as required by the SC of the UN.

"We are deeply convinced that law-abiding Govts and peoples throughout the world have a vital stake in the issues involved in this aggression and in the success of the United Nations in dealing with it. It is painful to realize that there could have long since been a restoration of peace and the saving of the lives of those fighting on behalf of the United Nations had not certain Members of the United Nations failed to meet their obligations under the Charter and refused to use their authority and influence to prevent or stop the hostilities.

"We do not believe that the termination of the Korean aggression can be contingent in any way upon the determination of other questions which are currently before the United Nations. A breach of the peace or an act of aggression is the most serious matter with which the SC can be confronted. It has shown that it is both competent and willing to act vigorously for the maintenance of peace. There has not been at any time any obstacle to the full participation by the Soviet Union in the work of the United Nations except the decision of the Soviet Union itself.

"In our opinion, the decision between competing claimant governments for China’s seat in the UN is one which must be taken by the UN on its merits. It is a question on which there is at present a wide diversity of views among the membership of the UN. I know you will agree that the decision should not be dictated by an unlawful aggression or by any other conduct which would subject the UN to coercion and duress.

"I wish to assure your Excellency of our earnest desire to see an early restoration of peace in Korea and elsewhere and of our eagerness to work with you and your great country to establish in the UN a means by which the fear of aggression can be permanently lifted from the peoples of the earth."

[Rusk]

ACHESON

330/7-1750

_The Indian Ambassador (Pandit) to the Secretary of State_

WASHINGTON, July 17, 1950.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: I have the honour to enclose text of a message for you from the Prime Minister of India. Also enclosed is the text of Marshal Stalin’s message to the Prime Minister and his reply thereto.

With [etc.]  

VIJAYA LAKSHMI PANDIT
[Enclosure 1]

TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA TO HON’BLE DEAN
ACHESON, SECRETARY OF STATE, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

I consider Marshal Stalin's reply most encouraging. I have already explained why, in my opinion, the apprehension that the entry of China into the Security Council and return of Soviets may possibly lead to obstruction of proceedings should not be allowed to stand in the way of restoring to the Council its full representative character. Insistence on prior fulfilment by Moscow or Peiping of conditions such as return of North Korean forces to 38th parallel may be pleaded by both as evidence of lack of desire of the Western Powers for a peaceful settlement. On the other hand, if Soviets and China prove unreasonable after entry into the Council, world opinion will hold them responsible for consequences. My honest belief is that Moscow is seeking a way out of the present entanglement without loss of prestige and that there is a real chance of solving the Korean problem peacefully by enabling the Peiping Government to enter and Soviet Union to resume its place in the Security Council without insistence on conditions. This may be an act of faith but the gravity of alternatives seems to justify it. In view of urgency of the matter I shall be grateful for earliest possible answer.

With [etc.]

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

[Enclosure 2]

TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM MARSHAL STALIN TO PRIME MINISTER
OF INDIA

I welcome your peace initiative. I fully share your point of view as to the expediency of a peaceful settlement of the Korean question through the Security Council, the participation of the representatives of the Five Great Powers including the People's Government of China being indispensable. I believe that to reach an early settlement of the Korean question it would be expedient in the Security Council to hear representatives of the Korean people.

With respects,

J. STALIN
Prime Minister of Soviet Union

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2 Enclosure 2, below.
3 This message was received by the Government of India on July 16 (see telegram 97, July 16, from New Delhi, p. 401) in response to Mr. Nehru's communication of July 13 (see footnote 2 to telegram 124, July 14, from Moscow, p. 379).
TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA TO MARSHAL STALIN *

I am most grateful for Your Excellency’s prompt and encouraging response. I am communicating immediately with the other governments concerned and hope to be able to approach Your Excellency again soon.

With respects,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

* Communicated to the Soviet Government on July 16, in response to Generalissimo Stalin’s message printed in Enclosure 2, above.

330/7-1750: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 17, 1950—2 p. m.

[Received July 17—12:25 p. m.]

110. 1. During my conversation with Bajpai, SYG MEA, this morning he asked if I had as yet any indication as to when reply to Nehru’s message re Chinese Commie representation in UN. I replied in negative but said I had impression several additional days may lapse before its receipt. I know that we are giving careful consideration to message.

2. Bajpai asked if I could hazard any guess as to content of reply. I said I did not have slightest idea in that regard; to be frank, however, I was of personal opinion it would be extremely difficult for US just now, when American blood was being shed in a UN effort to halt aggression, to give its support to admission into SC of representative of regime which had thus far shown peculiar sense irresponsibility in conduct foreign relations and which was lauding aggressor.

3. Bajpai said GOI did not really expect US to go so far as to give support admission Commie Chinese. It hoped, however, US would indicate it would have no serious objection thereto so other members of SC which were refraining from voting for admission because they did not desire offend US would feel free to vote as they pleased.

4. This remark of Bajpai might be useful to officials of Department charged with drafting reply. If we have not changed our policy on Commie Chinese seating despite recent developments, Department may wish, after presenting with full force US reasons for voting against entry Peiping regime, insert paragraph to effect that while US cannot but be opposed seating delegates that regime it is not and

* See enclosure 1 to the note from Madame Pandit to Mr. Acheson, supra.
has not been carrying on systematic campaign this regard among other members SC; that every member SC is, of course, entitled to its own views; and that US is prepared accept vote of necessary majority and not make use its veto power.

HENDERSON

700.001/7–1750 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 17, 1950—3 p. m.

PRIORITY

[Received July 17—3:37 p.m.]

111. 1. Leak of contents Stalin’s reply to Nehru re representation China in SC has appeared in several Delhi newspapers including Times of India, News Chronicle and Statesman. General effect these stories is to build up Stalin as favorable to peace move and create impression that all that was now needed was for US to acquiesce in admission Communist China into SC.

2. Bajpai told mē this morning that GOI distressed at leak which apparently was result of deliberate maneuver on part Soviet Embassy in New Delhi. He said GOI regretted that this maneuver was furnishing ammunition for pro-Soviet propaganda.

3. Indian journalist who has proved to be reliable source in past informed me this morning that yesterday Soviet Embassy called in four Indian journalists known to be on its payroll, showed them Stalin’s reply, and outlined stories to be based on it.

HENDERSON

See enclosure 2 to the note from Madame Pandit to Mr. Acheson, July 17, p. 408.

785.00/7–1750

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 17, 1950.

Subject: Future United States Policy With Respect to North Korea

The President has requested the National Security Council to prepare for his consideration a report on the subject, covering the policy which should be pursued by the United States after the North Korean forces have been driven back to the 38th parallel.

Accordingly, this project is being referred to the NSC Staff for the preparation of a report for Council consideration.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Washington, July 17, 1950—6 p. m.

102. Info: OAFE pls discuss at once with Gen MacArthur possibility of his inviting Romulo, as Pres of UNGA, to visit hdqrs in Korea of UN forces resisting aggression. Dept believes such visit will be of material aid in continuing effort to emphasize UN character of Korean action. It is suggested Romulo might make broadcasts from Korea over VOA which will have considerable propaganda value as well as bolstering morale of Koreans. Defense informed.

ACHESON

Moscow, July 17, 1950—midnight.

[Received July 17—6:17 p.m.]

155. Eyes only for the Secretary. British Ambassador informs that report his conversation Gromyko this evening is being repeated British Embassy Washington which will make available Department

(reference Embtel 99, July 11).

In substance he says that Gromyko stated Soviet Government desires peaceful solution Korean affair, believes Security Council should take appropriate measures that end, and Communist China should be represented in SC deliberations which should permit Korean people to decide fate.

Gromyko gave Kelly written statement Soviet position and declined comment on Kelly’s inquiry as to Soviet’s views North Korea’s continued hostilities against united will of 53 nations.

Department pass London. Repeated info London 54, eyes only Douglas.

Kirk

1 See the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Perkins, July 18, p. 419.
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, July 17, 1950—7 p. m.

303. Dept appreciates measure of agreement indicated in last para Embtel 264, July 12, relative legal basis of action in Korea. Dept shares FonOff desire for full understanding in this matter in order meet Communist allegations of illegality with a common UK-US position.

It is of course clear that even without any SC action US would have been justified under general principles of international law, which are recognized in Art 51 of Charter, in coming to assistance of Republic of Korea. However, US position is that initial action prior to June 27 also was in accord with SC Res of June 25. In justifying action, US position is that no differentiation should be made between period before and after June 27 since President’s action seeks to accomplish objectives of both Resolutions.

Dept suggests Embassy in its discretion inform FonOff of above views which parallel line taken in discussions between US and UK Dels New York.

ACHESON

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1 Telegram 264 not printed; the paragraph referred to indicated that the United States and the United Kingdom were in agreement that the action at present being taken in Korea under the Security Council resolution of June 27 was in pursuance of Article 39 of the U.N. Charter (795.00/7-1250).

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795.00/7-1750: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 17, 1950—8 p. m.

NIACFT

77. There fols text msg from Sec to Nehru approved by Pres which you shld deliver earliest opportunity:

“My dear Mr. Prime Minister: I am deeply appreciative of the high purpose which prompted ur Excellency in sending the msg which I rec’d on July 13, 1950 through ur distinguished Amb in Wash. and ur subsequent msg of the 17th transmitting Prime Min Stalin’s reply to ur similar ltr to him of July 13. Both the Pres and I have given the most thoughtful consideration to these communications.

“One of the most fundamental objectives of the fon policy of the US is to assist in maintaining world peace, and the Govt of the US is firmly of the opinion that the UN is the most effective instrument yet devised for maintaining and restoring internatl peace and security. The US is, therefore, eager to do all that is proper and possible to preserve and strengthen the United Nations.

1 Repeated for information to Moscow as 52, London as 307 and to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations as 44.
"The purpose of the US Govt and of the Amer people with respect to Korea is to support by all means at our disposal the determination of the United Nations to repel the armed attack upon Korea and to restore internatl peace and security in the area. We desire both to prevent the spread of aggression beyond Korea and to end it there—as required by the SC of the United Nations.

"We are deeply conscious of the fact that law-abiding Govts and peoples throughout the world have a vital stake in the issues involved in this aggression and in the success of the United Nations in dealing with it. It is painful to realize that there cld have long since been a restoration of peace and the saving of the lives of those fighting on behalf of the United Nations had not a small minority of the United Nations failed to meet their obligations under the Charter and refused to use their auth and influence to prevent or stop the hostilities. The acceptance of their obligations and the exercise of their auth and influence in accordance with those obligations wld restore peace tomorrow.

"A breach of the peace or an act of aggression is the most serious matter with which the United Nations can be confronted. We do not believe that the termination of the aggression from northern Korea can be contingent in any way upon the determination of other questions which are currently before the United Nations.

"There has not been at any time any obstacle to the full participation by the Soviet Union in the work of the United Nations except the decision of the Soviet Government itself. The Security Council has shown that it is both competent and willing to act vigorously for the maintenance of peace.

"In our opinion, the decision between competing claimant governments for China's seat in the United Nations is one which must be reached by the United Nations on its merits. It is a question on which there is at present a wide diversity of views among the membership of the United Nations. I know you will agree that the decision should not be dictated by an unlawful aggression or by any other conduct which would subject the United Nations to coercion and duress.

"I know that your Excellency shares our earnest desire to see an early restoration of peace in Korea in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council and I assure you of our eagerness to work with you and your great country to establish in the United Nations a means by which the fear of aggression can be permanently lifted from the peoples of the earth."

Since Stalin's reply has been made public, we believe we must shortly make public our reply to Mr. Nehru. Pls ascertain whether he has objection to publication his ltr July 13 at same time.

Inform Dept urgently when msg will be delivered New Delhi in order that copy may be provided Ind Amb here at about same time.*

ACHESON

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*Telegram 135, July 18, from New Delhi, informed the Department that the message would be handed to Bajpai at 9:30 p. m. local time on July 18 (230/7-1850). See telegram 137 from New Delhi received at 4:27 p. m. on July 18, p. 417.
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 17, 1950—11 p.m.
[Received July 17—8:08 p.m.]

113. 1. In view wide publicity given to Nehru's approaches and deliberate leak Soviet reply, we agree that documents exchanged must eventually be made public and that therefore our reply should be brief and contain minimum argumentation. (Deptel 71 July 16).

2. We consider text helpful, but have some concern lest Nehru will be offended at our failure to let him know our present attitude re Chinese representation. He may consider our silence this regard evasive and indicative lack of proper respect for his approach on which he has staked so much before whole world.

3. We venture, therefore, suggest that something along following lines be substituted for last sentence of penultimate paragraph your draft:

"Our views in this regard are already known to you. There have been no recent developments which, in our considered opinion, would justify a change in them. We believe that in the interest of the UN and of world peace, such decision as the UN may make should not be influenced by threats or acts of aggression or by any other conduct which would subject the UN to coercion and duress."

4. Nehru has made so much of this diplomatic venture that he is sure to be annoyed at negative reply from US no matter how gentle and disarming our language may be. We probably shall be widely denounced for several days by Indian press and certain sections public for blocking "peace move." Nevertheless we are hopeful that the more sober although not so voluble elements among Indian leaders who are beginning to have a true appreciation of world situation and who quietly wield considerable influence will prevent Nehru and his more irresponsible advisors from giving expression to their irritation in manner which can do permanent damage.

5. I suggest that in delivery of message recipient be informed that it is short and devoid of argumentation because in view of wide publicity already given to Nehru's messages and Soviet reply, it is evident that eventually the whole correspondence must be published and we are of opinion that publication of detailed argumentation may exacerbate rather than relieve international tension.¹

HENDERSO

¹Telegram 78, July 17, 11 p.m., to New Delhi, authorized Ambassador Henderson to use the substance of paragraphs 3 and 5 of telegram 113 orally if he so desired (330/7-1750).
SECRET NYACT

NEW DELHI, July 18, 1950—1 p.m.  
[Received July 18—8:31 a.m.]

132. Bajpai SYG MEA called me noon today to say Soviet Government Moscow had published texts of recent exchange of notes with GOI without securing consent of latter. Bajpai added that he hoped US government would not release either message until after agreement between the two governments for simultaneously release in Washington and Delhi. He referred to press report to effect US planned release messages at time delivery and said he thought this report must be inaccurate.

Henderson

795.00/7-1850: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 18, 1950—8 a.m.  
[Received July 18—11:18 a.m.]

129. 1. Last sentence of text Stalin’s reply 1 as allegedly given out by Soviet Embassy and published in Indian News Chronicle read as follows: I suppose that for a quicker settlement of the Korean problem, it would be necessary to hear Representatives of the Korean people. Text telegraphed by Radhakrishnan read as follows: I believe that to reach an early settlement of the Korean question it would be expedient in the SC to hear Representatives of the Korean people. Bajpai, SyG MEA yesterday pointed out that Soviet translation text used word “necessary” whereas Radhakrishnan’s word was “expedient”. He took it for granted that Soviet Embassy had meddled with text.

2. It has occurred to me that text may have been received by Indian Embassy in Moscow in Russian language and that in making translation Embassy had toned down message somewhat by translating Russian word as “expedient” rather than “necessary” in order to make reply more palatable.

Department pass Moscow; repeated info Moscow 5.

Henderson

1 See enclosure 2 to the note from Madame Pandit to Mr. Acheson, July 17, p. 408.
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. James N. Hyde of the United States Mission at the United Nations

[Extract]

SECRET

July 18, 1950.

Subject: 1. Korea
2. Appointment of a Secretary-General
3. General Assembly

Participants: Mr. John W. Holmes, Canadian Delegation
Mr. Pierre Ordonneau, French Delegation
Mr. John C. Ross, United States Mission
Mr. James N. Hyde, United States Mission

Holmes and Ordonneau had lunch with us at our request and we covered the following topics:

1. Korea: They were both concerned and unhappy about the Secretary-General’s recent circular on military and other assistance. They had not been consulted about it in advance. Holmes stated that the first word his Office of External Affairs had was when correspondents came asking comments. Ordonneau shared this view and added that it would prove an even greater mistake if there is not widespread response. He added that it was a source of embarrassment to many governments, including his own, to know how to answer and that a good many governments might adopt the policy of no answer at all. He thought that this represented Lie taking a very serious and unwise step on his own responsibility. So far as troops are concerned, he said that any French troops would have to come from Indochina, which would simply weaken things there. The Benelux countries will meet to consider this question on July 20th.

As further evidence of Lie’s questionable initiative, both men were critical of him sending Colonel Katzin as his personal representative. They wondered what the significance of this was and were doubtful of this personal diplomacy. Ross stated that he saw the mission of Colonel Katzin as simply strengthening the Secretariat support for the Commission at a critical time. Holmes wondered what use the military observers would be in Korea now, adding that there were two Canadian observers at Lake Success. There was some agreement that these

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1 The source text is a copy of a document in the IO Files, Department of State, bearing the designations US/S/1331 and US/A/2351, and the date July 10, 1950.
observers in Korea might perform the function of military advisers to the Commission, especially in the preparation of its report.

Ross thought that the next meeting of the Security Council might well be for the purpose of receiving the report of the Unified Command, and his suggestion that atrocities in Korea might be considered seemed acceptable.

J. N. Hyde

330/7-1850: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 18, 1950—11 p. m.

[Received July 18—4:27 p. m.]

137. 1. I delivered Bajpai 9:30 this evening message contained in Deptel 77, July 17. After he had read message, I communicated orally substance paragraphs 3 and 5 Embtel 113 as authorized in Deptel 78, July 17.1

2. Sir Girja said he would bring message immediately to attention PriMin and it would be discussed tomorrow at committee of cabinet which had already been called for that purpose.

3. I told Bajpai that in view wide speculation and of rumors which are certain to circulate, Department would like to arrange for simultaneous release of exchange as soon as convenient. Bajpai replied that he also would discuss this with PriMin and arrangements would probably be made for release of messages sometime tomorrow evening Delhi time which would mean morning July 19 in Washington. I said I would like at least six or seven hours notice.

4. Bajpai added it was his own personal belief that PriMin’s message of seventeenth should not be published since its contents obviously were not for publication. He would discuss this point however with PriMin before making definite statement with regard to it.

5. Bajpai was obviously disappointed although he did not so express himself.

HENDERSON

1 See footnote 1 to telegram 113, from New Delhi, received at 8:08 p. m. on July 17, p. 414.
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Mathews)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 18, 1950.

Subject: Delivery to the Indian Ambassador of a copy of the Secretary’s Reply to Prime Minister Nehru

Participants: Mrs. Pandit, Ambassador of India
Mr. Kaul, First Secretary, Embassy of India
Mr. McGhee, Assistant Secretary
Mr. Mathews, Director, SOA

Before handing to the Indian Ambassador a copy of the Secretary’s reply to Prime Minister Nehru’s messages of July 13 and 17, Mr. McGhee explained that we had given the most careful consideration to the questions raised by the Prime Minister and that our reply had been discussed with and approved by the President. Mrs. Pandit read the reply and said quite frankly that she was disappointed.

She asked in some agitation how the drift to war could be stopped if steps were not taken to bring the principal world powers together in the Security Council or elsewhere. She said that people everywhere were deeply fearful of the possibility of a new world war; the United States was losing friends all over the world because many people believed that our attitude toward the seating of Chinese Communist representatives in UN organs was contributing to the deterioration in the world situation. Mrs. Pandit said emphatically that she personally and her Government fully realized that the United States was sincere in its approach to the problems of maintaining world peace but she insisted that our policies could be and were widely misinterpreted.

Mr. McGhee stressed that in our view it was necessary to give primary attention to the most pressing problem which was the putting down of aggression where it had occurred, namely in Korea. Our people were just as concerned as people everywhere in the world at the grim possibility of a new global war and were determined to avoid it if at all possible. Unfortunately, the decision which might precipitate in a world war would be made in the Kremlin. It seemed essential to us therefore to make it clear to the Kremlin that aggression would be resisted. With reference to the problem of the seating of Communist China in the UN, Mr. McGhee observed that we considered this a separate issue which should not be allowed to divert the world’s attention from the immediate problem of stopping aggression in Korea. He was aware that our position on this and other matters was being misinterpreted, but he feared that this was the price we had to pay for the role of world leadership which had been thrust upon us.

1 See telegram 77, July 17, p. 412.
Mrs. Pandit expressed appreciation of the Department’s cooperation in providing her so promptly with a copy of the Secretary’s reply to the Prime Minister.

Memorandum of Conversations, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 18, 1950.

Participants: Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador; and Mr. George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State.

Sir Oliver handed me copies of the report Ambassador Kelly had made on his last talk with Gromyko (copies attached).

He then gave me the following message for the Secretary: He said Mr. Bevin had inquired whether or not it would be possible to see the Secretary in Washington during the UN and had appreciated the Secretary’s statement that he would probably be in New York for a considerable period of time and that, therefore, he was quite ready to agree that he should see the Secretary in New York and not in Washington.

Sir Oliver had a news dispatch indicating that London had released their action concerning oil in Hong Kong. He asked that this action be explained to our Congressional leaders as soon as it was made public (This has been done).

Sir Oliver then repeated the question he had asked the Secretary on Sunday as to whether or not he could have any information as to the President’s message to forward to London so that Mr. Attlee might be informed in the event of questions in the House of Commons as soon as the message was released (This was done at 10:00 p.m., July 18).

In response to a question which I put to Sir Oliver as to the Formosa situation, he indicated that he thought that the thing that was most troublesome about the original statement of the President was the implication that we would never agree that Formosa would go to China so long as there was a Communist Government in China.

1 The British Admiralty had requisitioned all oil stocks in Hong Kong for military requirements. The effect of this measure, since there were no direct deliveries to North Korea, was to prevent shipments from Hong Kong to Communist China, whence the oil might be transhipped to North Korea. For related documentation, see vol. vi. pp. 619 ff.

2 July 16.

3 Reference is to President Truman’s message to Congress on July 19, concerning which, along with his radio address to the nation on the same day, see editorial note, p. 450.
Later in the evening Sir Oliver telephoned that he had received a message from London saying that they were now considering what reply if any should be made to Gromyko's statement to Ambassador Kelly and that they would consult with us on the reply before making it.

GEORGE W. PERKINS

[Enclosure]

The British Embassy to the Department of State

17 JULY 1950.

Mr. Gromyko asked me to call at 9:30 p. m. Moscow time and informed me of substance of a Russian text which he then handed me. Literal translation follows in my immediately following telegram."

2. He began by briefly summarizing my communication of July 11th and then stated that in opinion of Soviet Government Security Council should be convened with "indispensable" (he emphasized the word) participation of Chinese Peoples Government. "And that" (Russian text has "so that") representatives of Korean people should be heard, and that Security Council should then solve the Korean question.

3. I said our general attitude to representation of Chinese Peoples Government was known but that this was separate from actual situation which was that forces representing 53 United Nations were being attacked in South Korea. Did he mean this was to be referred to Security Council with Chinese Government in it and that, meanwhile hostilities should continue?

4. Mr. Gromyko at first evaded direct answer but on being strongly pressed finally said that it was for Security Council to "solve the broad Korean question" including the cessation of hostilities.

5. By coincidence I had three journalists dining with me this evening and was therefore obliged to explain to them my reasons for leaving. I authorised them to report on my return that I had seen Gromyko at his request in continuation of earlier conversations on the subject of Korea.

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

On July 11th M. l'Ambassadeur, you informed me for communication to the Soviet Government that the British Government being bound by the latest decisions of the Security Council, cannot at the present time put forward definite proposals for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question and that the British Government considers the putting forward of such proposals to be running ahead. At

*Printed in this document under the subheading "Aide-Mémoire", below.
the same time, so you stated, *M. l'Amabassadeur*, the British Government considers it necessary, by way of a preliminary proposal, that the hostilities in Korea should be terminated and the North Korean troops withdrawn behind the 38th parallel. I am authorised to state to you that the Soviet Government considers the best means for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question to be the convening of the Security Council with the indispensable participation of representatives of the Peoples Government of China so that representatives of the Korean people should be heard during the deciding of the Korean question.

With reference to the preliminary proposal of the British Government, the Soviet Government considers that, to avoid running ahead, this, and also any other proposals should be submitted for the consideration of the Security Council.

[Document, although in form of letter, has no superscription or signature.]*

17.7.50

*Brackets appear in the source text.*

795.00/7-1850: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET LONDON, July 18, 1950—7 p. m. [Received July 18—7:44 p. m.]

399. Eyes only for the Secretary. Foreign Office states that copies of Kelly's reports on conversation with Gromyko sent Franks as well as copies of correspondence between Prime Minister and Nehru* and that these documents will be shown to you.

Decision not yet taken as to next move in Gromyko-Kelly conversations. We are assured, however, that no further instruction in this connection will be sent Kelly until full consultation with you. Thinking on official level Foreign Office inclined to belief that Kelly should hand written statement to Gromyko, drafted with eye to future publication with special emphasis on fact that Gromyko stated in first interview that Soviet Government desired peaceful settlement in Korea and that UK suggestion that Security Council resolution be carried out and North Korean troops withdrawn north of 38th parallel was wholly ignored in Gromyko's last communication. Foreign Office officials are not optimistic that Soviets would agree to use influence on North Koreans to withdraw but feel that Gromyko's most recent statement should not be left as a last word.

*The Attlee-Nehru correspondence is not printed; see the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Acheson on his talk with Ambassador Franks, July 19, p. 431.
There is a general feeling here of complete disapproval of Nehru's intervention and a belief that it has done considerable harm.

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330/7-1850: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

TOP SECRET

URGENT

NIAC T

WASHINGTON, July 18, 1950—8 p. m.

88. Urtei 137 July 18. We urgently desire release messages 9:30 July 19 Washington time or not later than 10:30. Later release would conflict important presidential statement. Inform Bajpai and cable urgently time of release.

Re. para 4, Dept does not intend release Nehru message rec’d here July 17.

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357.AD/7-1850: Telegram

The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[Received July 18—8:23 p.m.]

Unnumbered. For OAFE and State Department. Re State Department message 180106Z (sent Tokyo as 102).¹ I have discussed matter with General MacArthur who in effect states as follows:

"General MacArthur holds Secretary Romulo in highest esteem and personal regard, but the military situation in Korea does not permit this type of activity at this time. A further objection is the fact that he is the Foreign Minister of the Philippine Islands Republic and has no connection with the UN Commission on Korea. It is believed that his presence would tend to create friction and misunderstanding which at this time would certainly be most undesirable. If his services are to be employed in the Korean situation it should manifestly be from his UN Headquarters rather than Korea. If any opportunity presents itself in the future to utilize his services here, it will be reported at once."

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¹ Transmitted on July 17 at 6 p.m., p. 411.
330/7—1850: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIAC T

PARIS, July 18, 1950—8 p. m. [Received July 18—9:23 p.m.]

332. Repeated info London 95. Embtel 331. Following is text Schuman aide-mémoire:

[The aide-mémoire, not printed, began by reiterating French support for United Nations opposition to the North Korean aggression and expressed appreciation for United States contributions toward this end. The French note went on to point out that events in Korea after 3 weeks pointed to a protracted conflict rather than a rapid United Nations victory. In this light, and in view of the danger of extension of the fighting, the French Government felt that no opportunity to enter into conversations with the Soviet Union should be neglected, although a North Korean withdrawal to the 38th parallel must remain the fundamental condition of any basis for understanding.

In view of the dangerous situation in the Far East, the French Government called for as close contact as possible with the American and British Governments in the form of consultations aimed at warding off in advance any new perils which might arise and depriving the aggressors of the profit of the initiative. Questions meriting particular attention were the problem of armed intervention by Communist China, United States action in regard to Formosa, Chinese representation in the United Nations, Berlin, the Soviet threat against Yugoslavia, and the Near East situation.

The French note concluded by pointing out that military developments in Korea showed the relative weakness of the Western powers and the need for increased efforts to meet the threat of Communist armed aggression. Tripartite military talks, in addition to the suggested diplomatic discussions involving France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, should be held to discuss the challenge, perhaps in connection with the impending meeting of the Deputies of the North Atlantic Council in London, or within the context of the Standing Group, composed of representatives of the Three Powers,

1 Not printed; it reported the receipt of the message transmitted in telegram 332, from French Foreign Minister Schuman, who stressed the great importance and seriousness attached to it by the French Government (330/7—1850).
which served in a subordinate capacity to the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Council.¹

BRUCE

² The tripartite discussions suggested by the French Government took place on August 3 and 4 in Paris; they were held on the political level and did not involve military talks. For the minutes of the meeting of August 3, see p. 519.

380/7-1950 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 19, 1950—2 p. m.
[Received July 19—8:12 a.m.]

147. 1. Bajpai informs me not possible effect release messages so early as 9:30 July 19 Washington time because Nehru wishes his reply to Secretary's message to be delivered by Mme. Pandit today to be incorporated in release. Furthermore Moscow must be informed.

2. GOI is anxious that messages be published in New Delhi papers July 20 and therefore is informing both Washington and Moscow its intention issue release its exchanges with Washington and Moscow not including Nehru's message of July 17, July 20, 3 a. m. Delhi time. I assume this permits sufficient time to elapse after statement contemplated by President (Deptel 88, July 18).

3. Fearing that there may be some delay in receipt reply by Mme. Pandit, Bajpai gave me copy to transmit direct Department. If Mme. Pandit's text not received before time scheduled for release Department might arrange with her approval publication text given me which is contained in Embtel 148.¹

HENDERSON

¹Received at 9:27 a.m. on July 19, p. 425. The Department of State released the texts of the Nehru-Acheson exchanges on July 19 at 3:30 p. m. (EDT); for texts, see the Department of State Bulletin, July 19, 1950, p. 170.

795.00/7-1950 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

Moscow, July 19, 1950—1 p. m.
[Received July 19—8:45 a.m.]

165. Russian text Stalin's reply to Nehru as published Soviet press confirms accuracy English translation transmitted GOI by Radhakrishnan. Key word is "tseleseobrazno" which can be translated "expedient" or "suitable". Bajpai's assumption Soviet Embassy Delhi meddled with text therefore appears correct.

Reur thought Indian Embassy here may have deliberately toned down Stalin's message in order make it appear more palatable, I feel
you may possibly have gained impression from Bajpai that diver-
gencies between GOI and Radhakrishnan (urtsls 3, July 13\(^1\) and
8 July 14\(^2\)) on Korean issue reflect tendency of latter take “softer”
line with Soviets than desired by GOI. We do not have complete
picture here of course but as stated mytel 10, July 13\(^3\) Radhakrishnan
seemed to be genuinely proud of role he played in influencing GOI
to support SC resolution of June 27 and his informal mediatory ap-
proach to me on July 9 smacked less of appeasement than Nehru’s
present mediation efforts.

In fact from recent conversation with Indian Embassy officer it
seems Indian Embassy has received message from GOI rapping it over
knuckles for way it handled informal mediation effort with this
Embassy and implying arguments used by Indian Embassy that
connection (which appear to have become known to MEA) raise ques-
tion Radhakrishnan’s good faith and impartiality and possibly com-
promise his position vis-à-vis Soviets. It appears therefore that
whatever indiscretions Indian Embassy may have committed (and
Indian Embassy source continues maintain that his Ambassador’s
approach to me was based on GOI instructions) stem from its allegedly
uneutral, i.e., pro-US attitude on certain vital aspects Korean issue.

Incompleteness of our information here on what Radhakrishnan
told Soviet DepFonMins Zorin and Gromyko in his conversations
with them on July 1 and 13 respectively precludes my reaching
100% firm conclusions re Radhakrishnan’s position in this affair but
for reasons given foregoing paragraphs I am inclined to believe his
approach to me although unrealistic was conceived in friendly pro-US
spirit.

Dept. pass Delhi, sent Delhi priority 16.

Kirk

\(^1\) See telegram 79 from New Delhi, received on July 13 at 12:39 p. m., p. 371.
\(^2\) See telegram 86 from New Delhi, received on July 14 at 1:25 p. m., p. 385.
\(^3\) See telegram 111 from Moscow, received on July 13 at 11:32 a. m., p. 370.

330/7–1950: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NEW DELHI, July 19, 1950—1 p. m.

NIACST [Received July 19—9:27 a. m.]

148. Following is text Nehru’s reply to be delivered today by
Madame Pandit (Embtel 147).\(^3\)

“My dear Mr. Secretary of State: I thank you for your letter which
your Ambassador conveyed to me last night.

\(^3\) Received on July 19 at 8:12 a. m., p. 424.
I am grateful to President Truman and to you for the consideration that you have given to my message of the 13th July and to the subsequent communication forwarding Marshal Stalin’s reply to my message to him of the same date. I recognize that one of the most fundamental objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is to assist in maintaining world peace, and that the Government of the United States is firmly of the opinion that the United Nations is one of the most effective instruments yet devised for maintaining and restoring international peace and security. As Your Excellency must be aware, the maintenance of peace and support of the United Nations has consistently been the policy of the Government of India. My suggestion for breaking the present deadlock in the Security Council, so that representatives of the Peoples Government of China can take their seat in the Council and the USSR can return to it, was designed to fulfill this policy, not to weaken it. In voting for the resolutions on Korea adopted by the Security Council, on the 25th and 27th June, it was our purpose to strengthen the United Nations in resisting aggression. Since the Government of India recognized the Peoples Government of China on 30th December, 1949, it has been our endeavour to bring about the admission of its representatives to the various organs and agencies of the United Nations. Our present proposal was a renewal of this effort. It was made on its merits and also in the hope that it would create a suitable atmosphere for the peaceful solution of the Korean problem. I do not think that the admission of China now would be an encouragement of aggression.

I am requesting our Ambassador in Moscow to communicate the text of Your Excellency’s letter to me, and of my reply, to Marshal Stalin. Arrangements are also being made to release at 3 a.m. tomorrow (20 July, Indian standard time), copies of these two letters, of my messages to Your Excellency and to Marshal Stalin dated 30th [13th] July, and of the messages exchanged between Marshal Stalin and me on the 15th and 16th July, respectively.

Please accept the assurance of my highest consideration.”

HENDERSON

705.00/7—1950: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

Moscow, July 19, 1950—2 p.m.

[Received July 19—9:20 a.m.]

166. Published exchange letters Nehru Stalin obviously contribute nothing to peaceful solution Korean crisis. On contrary Nehru’s July 13 appeal omitted any reference to Security Council resolutions as framework solution. Stalin was thus given excellent opportunity confuse issue by concentrating on question seating Chinese Commies which he has done. Similarly Nehru’s acknowledgement of July 16, in characterizing Stalin’s reply as “encouraging” tends to play Stalin’s game.
Embassy welcomes Secretary's reply to Nehru (Deptel 52, July 17) and believes this exposition of US attitude re Korea and Chinese Commie admission UN is clear and should go far to demonstrate spuriousness Soviet maneuver.

Nehru's attitude towards prior compliance with SC resolutions as set forth Deptel 51, July 17 and his consequent omission any mention thereof in messages to Stalin seems clearly to have raised important doubt as to India's firmness of resolve in adhering to position it originally took. Soviets can manifestly obtain considerable comfort therefrom. Accordingly it is to be hoped that Nehru will restore India's stature by some firm reiteration India's support SC stand possibly in subsequent message he says he intends address Stalin.

Assuming that Nehru's appeals to Stalin and the Secretary were prompted by a sincere desire to assist in reaching a solution of Korean situation (and not by determination of a leading Asian power to take advantage of the situation to seat another Asian power in UN). Embassy feels that thus far appeal has led nowhere, Stalin has neatly seized initiative to exploit it by focussing attention on Chinese Commie seating, and India has given damaging impression of a change in her attitude of support of UNSC action.

Department pass Delhi, London. Repeated info Delhi 17, London 56.

KIRK

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1 See telegram 77, p. 412.
2 Not printed; it transmitted the texts of the three messages printed as enclosures to the note from Madame Pandit to Mr. Acheson, July 17, p. 497.

611.91/7-1950

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] July 19, 1950.

Subject: Presentation by Madame Pandit of Prime Minister Nehru's Personal Message of July 19, 1950

Participants: Her Excellency, Madame Vijayalakshmi Pandit, Ambassador of India.
Mr. T. N. Kaul, First Secretary, Embassy of India.
The Honorable, Dean Acheson, Secretary of State.
Mr. Joseph S. Sparks, SOA

Madame Pandit handed me a note as she came in, saying that she did not wish to detain me long. I thanked her and read the note which was a reply from Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to my message

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1 The text of Mr. Nehru's message is in telegram 148 from New Delhi, received on July 19 at 9:27 a.m., p. 425.
of July 18, 1950. I told Madame Pandit that I very much appreciated her having brought the message to me and assured her that we would continue to give every serious consideration to the problems with which her brother is so actively concerned. I said that there were many grave issues in the world today but that I was confident that they could be resolved by the continued cooperation and determination of like-minded constructive nations such as India and the United States.

725.00/7-1950

The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to President Truman

RESTRICTED

[TAEGU,] July 19, 1950.

Dear Mr. President: I can not find words to express, for myself and for all the people and Government of Korea, our profound gratitude for your prompt and continued actions in bringing aid to Korea in these desperate days. While we deeply appreciate the support of so many free nations, through the United Nations, to the cause of Korea, which also is the cause of freedom, we know full well that without your courageous leadership in a time of bewildering crisis there would have been no support and no aid.

I am deeply moved as I learn of increasing American battle casualties here. It is a tragic thing that so many men should have had to give their lives for liberty in this land so far from their own. It is easier for me to accept word of our own battle casualties than of yours, cruel as ours have been, since our forces are fighting in and for their native land. I wish I could convey to every mother and father and wife and child, and sister and brother of an American soldier killed or wounded here in Korea even some slight comfort through the knowledge that no Korean can ever forget the courage and sacrifice of these men who in the great traditions of the United States of America have come to the defense of the weak against the cruel aggressor, and have fought and given their life's blood that liberty and freedom should not perish from the earth. These soldiers of your great country, Mr. President, have lived and died as Americans, but they have given their lives even beyond love of country as citizens of the world, knowing that to permit the further destruction of the independence of free nations by the Comminazis is to clear the way to assault upon every nation, even the United States itself.

1 The source text is the original of this letter as transmitted by Ambassador Muccio to Mr. Acheson under a covering note, not printed, on July 19; a copy of the text was also sent in telegram 60 from Taegu (not printed), July 19, which, however, was delayed in transmission and not received in the Department of State until July 23.
As you know, the Korean people were divided against their will as a result of military decisions in 1945 regarding the 38th Parallel, to which no Korean was a party. This division permitted the development in the north, under Soviet direction and leadership, of a communist regime wholly alien to Korean traditions and feelings. With absolute control of the military, police and fiscal powers in that region of Korea, the communists, with Soviet direction, were able to create the formidable force which has caused such cruel damage not only to Korea but also to the United States and most members of the United Nations. When the Soviet sponsored regime in North Korea simultaneously attacked the defense forces of the Republic of Korea in the early morning of June 25, they ended any possible claim to the maintenance of the 38th Parallel as a political or military dividing line between free and slave Korea.

It would be utter folly to attempt to restore the status quo ante, and then to await the enemy's pleasure for further attack when he had had time to regroup, retrain and reequip. The time has come to cut out once and for all the cancer of imperialist aggression, the malignant growth artificially grown within the bosom of our country by the world communists.

The people of North Korea are the same as the people of South Korea. All are loyal to the land of their birth with the very few minor exceptions of foreign trained and foreign directed communists. This war is not a conflict between North and South; it is a conflict between the few who are communists, who by an accident got control of half of our country, and the overwhelming mass of the citizens of Korea, wherever they may live.

The Government and the people of the Republic of Korea consider this is the time to unify Korea, and for anything less than unification to come out of these great sacrifices of Koreans and their powerful allies would be unthinkable. I am sure, Mr. President, that you have come to the same conclusion yourself, but I wish to make clear to you the position of this Government. The Korean Government would consider as without binding effect any future agreement or understanding made regarding Korea by other states or groups of states without the consent and approval of the Government of the Republic of Korea. From statements which you have made recently I believe that this also is the position of the Government of the United States.

Daily I pray for the joint success of our arms, for clear skies so that the planes of the United States Airforce may search out and destroy the enemy, and for the earliest possible arrival of sufficient men and material so that we can turn to the offensive, break through the hard
crust of enemy forces and start the victorious march north. I have no slightest doubt in the ultimate victory of our cause; I know that both right and might are on our side. ²

With ever continued warm personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

SYNGMAN RHEE

² For President Truman's reply, see telegram 68 to Taegu, August 10, p. 553.

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Editorial Note

On July 19, President Truman sent to the Congress a special message on the situation in Korea in which he set forth his views on the significance for the United States and the world of the events taking place there, and laid before Congress certain recommendations for legislative action. The text of the message is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950, page 527. In his message, the President made the following statement on Formosa:

"In order that there may be no doubt in any quarter about our intentions regarding Formosa, I wish to state that the United States has no territorial ambitions whatever concerning that island, nor do we seek for ourselves any special position or privilege on Formosa. The present military neutralization of Formosa is without prejudice to political questions affecting that island. Our desire is that Formosa not become embroiled in hostilities disturbing to the peace of the Pacific and that all questions affecting Formosa be settled by peaceful means as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations. . . ."

At 10:30 p. m. on the same evening, Mr. Truman delivered a radio and television address to the nation on Korea; text ibid., page 537. In the course of his talk, he quoted from a message recently received from General MacArthur wherein the latter stated: "Our hold upon the southern part of Korea represents a secure base . . . Our strength will continually increase while that of the enemy will relatively decrease. His supply line is insecure. He has had his great chance and failed to exploit it. We are now in Korea in force, and with God's help we are there to stay until the constitutional authority of the Republic of Korea is fully restored." The full text of General MacArthur's message is printed ibid., page 542.
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 19, 1950.

Participants: Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador;
Secretary of State Acheson;
Assistant Secretary of State, George W. Perkins.

I asked Sir Oliver what he thought the reaction would be to the President’s message to Congress. He stated that he thought it would be taken the way we would like it to be taken. He also indicated that he sensed a growing feeling of realism in the messages that were coming through from London although there was nothing tangible to support this and attributed it partly to the return of General Slim to London from his trip to the East.

Sir Oliver stated that he felt that the statement on Formosa should be of assistance. He said he was not sure as to the effect of leaving out all numbers in connection with the calling up of additional personnel. He also stated that he thought the letter to Nehru which we had just forwarded would be well received.

Sir Oliver then showed me, without leaving copies, Stalin’s communication to Nehru, Nehru’s message to London on the Stalin message, and Attlee’s message to Nehru in reply, together with the comments of the U.K. High Commissioner in India on the situation. I told Sir Oliver that I thought Mr. Attlee’s message was admirable and most helpful.

Sir Oliver then said he had been asked to make the following remarks: The U.K. felt that an awkward situation had been created no matter how good the motives involved were. They had tried to make clear to Mr. Nehru the dangers arising from his course of action. There were other dangers which they wished to point out. India does not consider what they are suggesting as a bargain. Perhaps we must allow for this attitude on the part of the Indians as there is great danger in a cleavage between the East and West on the issue of seating Communist China in the UN and this could be disastrous. They were trying particularly hard to avoid direct collision between the U.S. and India. They felt that it would be best if nothing happened as a result of these communications, but they were not sure

1 See supra.
2 Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, had recently returned from an extensive trip during June and July to the Near East, Southeast Asia, and Australasia, for defense discussions with Commonwealth Defense Ministers and Service Chiefs.
3 See telegram 77, July 17, 8 p.m., to New Delhi, p. 412.
4 See endosure 2 to the note from Madame Pandit to Mr. Acheson, July 17, p. 408.
that that would be the outcome and felt that we should keep in close contact on the problem.

I indicated that I agreed and said that I thought it would be most unfortunate if it came up in the Security Council. If it had to come up at all it would be much better to have it come up in the General Assembly where the matter would be considered on a more leisurely basis, and a direct head-on collision would perhaps thereby be avoided.

I then asked Sir Oliver if he had heard of the French suggestions for consultations. He said that he had not heard of this from London but had been informed by Washington.

I told him that I thought the proposals were in good spirit and that we must, of course, be careful in setting up such consultations; we must always bear in mind the problems of communications.

I raised with him the question of how the U.S. could best approach the problem with the U.K. of the build-up of U.K. forces, always assuming that there was an established plan towards which we were working. There was not time to go deeply into this subject, and it was agreed that Sir Oliver would be kept in touch and informed.

DEAN ACHESON

* See telegram 332 from Paris, received at 9:28 p.m. on July 18, p. 423.

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET


Subject: Aid from UN Members in Support of the Operation in Korea.

The Department is operating on the policy of seeking to encourage in all possible ways the maximum direct participation by all UN members in support of the UN effort in Korea. An offer of direct assistance, in military or non-military form, should be considered more valuable than an expression of moral support.

Our stated position is that in the area of military assistance we welcome all offers of naval, air and ground units, particularly the latter. As a practical matter it is recognized that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur have to determine what particular military units offered by other UN members can in fact be integrated into the military effort in Korea without creating problems greater than their military contribution.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reached tentative decisions as to the acceptability from a military point of view of contributions of ground
units from particular countries. They also are in process of reaching a decision with respect to certain other countries. (See Tab "A" attached).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in reaching a negative decision on a particular country, presumably base the decision on one of two grounds. Either the army of a particular country is already committed under other defense arrangements which they deem it unwise to weaken, or the quality of the troops or difficulties related to logistic support, standardization of weapons, language barrier, etc., would render particular national units unsuitable or a positive hindrance.

We are operating on the assumption that in the case of countries in units from which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed a positive interest, the Department should by all means at its disposal urge, through diplomatic channels, the government in question to make a specific offer of ground forces. We are doing so in the case of Pakistan and the UK.

In the event that countries, ground units of which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have specifically decided could not be used, offer through UN to contribute ground units, the procedure established is to publicly welcome the offer and then for the appropriate officials in the Department of Defense to discuss with the military representatives of the offering country the terms of the offer in detail and in protraction, with a view not to turning down the offer but temporizing on a basis which will not affront the offering government.

It should be noted at this point that a case or cases may arise where the political importance of having even a token detachment accepted and landed in Korea will override the military disadvantages on which the Joint Chiefs have reached their decision. The procedure in such cases would be for the Secretary to write the Secretary of Defense, pointing out the political considerations which it is believed should control and requesting the Secretary of Defense to ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reconsider in the light of such considerations.

In general, it is not believed that the Department should actively press another government to offer ground or other units when it is known in advance that on the military basis an offer would be unacceptable, unless it has been determined in advance that political considerations should control.

Non-Military Assistance

Tab "B" attached, shows by types of commodities and services offers of non-military assistance already made or discussed with us by other governments. Most of these fall into the area of civilian relief rather

1 See Annex 1.
2 See Annex 2.
than military supplies or services. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have given a preliminary indication that they are interested in offers of merchant shipping and in offers of harbor and airport facilities even though the latter may not be in the Korean area and may, in fact, never be availed of. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are considering what, if any, commodities (including medicines) would possess for them a military interest. The answer is expected to be completely negative. The Joint Chiefs have also been asked to decide what interest, if any, they would have in offers of transport, aircraft and hospital units. The problem presumably, in the case of commodities and medicines, becomes one of integrating such offers into a civilian relief program. This requires coordination with ECA, whose Korean staff has been placed under General MacArthur, to provide all possible economic support of the military operation.

Procedures

A general procedure for channeling and dealing with offers of assistance on both a military and non-military basis to the UN has been worked out with the Secretary-General of the UN and the Department of Defense (see Circular Telegram of July 14, 7:00 p.m. [8 a.m.], Control 4174, attached as Tab "C"). The basic procedure for integrating offers of food, medicine, etc. for civilian relief into the ECA program is in process of final agreement, the comments of General MacArthur, Ambassador Muccio and ECA Chief in Korea Bunece having already been sought on a preliminary proposal.

Decision to be Made

1. In the case of what, if any, countries whose ground units the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not welcome on military grounds does the Department wish to press for acceptance?

[Annex 1]

Preliminary Views of Joint Chiefs of Staff re Ground Force Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Want</th>
<th>Considering</th>
<th>Don't Want</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>India†</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Argentina†</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia*</td>
<td>Benelux</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Ante, p. 377.

† MacArthur prefers to keep BCOF in Australia [Japan] to fill gaps caused by transfer USA ground forces to Korea. [Footnote in the source text.]

† Probably will want. [Footnote in the source text.]
NORTH KOREAN OFFENSIVE, JULY 1—SEPTEMBER 15

[Annex 2]

OFFERS OF NON-MILITARY ASSISTANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Country</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merchant shipping</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copra, etc.</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper, etc.</td>
<td>Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TENTATIVE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Port facilities</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance units</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport aircraft</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

795.00/7-2050: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

PLAIN

Moscow, July 20, 1950.

[Received July 20—7:28 a.m.]

168. Following translation item today’s press entitled “In Ministry Foreign Affairs USSR”.

On 11 July Ambassador Great Britain Moscow, Mr. Kelly, informed Deputy Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko, concerning Korean question, that English Government being bound by recent decisions Security Council, cannot at present time put forward definite proposals for peaceful settlement Korean question, that English Government considers as premature the putting forth of such proposals. Together with this Ambassador stated that English Government considers essential that as preliminary proposition military operations in Korea should cease and the North Korean troops should be withdrawn behind 38th parallel.

On 17 July Deputy Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko stated to Mr. Kelly that the Soviet Government considers as a best means of a peaceful settlement of Korean question a convening of Security Council with the essential participation of representatives of Peoples Government of China, and also that the representatives of the Korean people should be heard for solution of Korea question. Regarding the preliminary conditions of English Government, A. A. Gromyko stated to Ambassador that in order to avoid premature action it should follow that the preliminary proposal, as well as other proposals, be transmitted for the consideration of Security Council. Mr. Kelly replied that he would bring contents of statement of Soviet Government to attention English Government.

795.00/7–2050

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, July 20, 1950—2 p. m.
[Received July 20—9:59 a. m.]

428. For Secretary, Rusk or Perkins. British yesterday cabled British Embassy, Washington, to consult you concerning instructions to Kelly to hand Gromyko written memo restating British position so as not to leave Gromyko's last statement to him as final word. There has not been time for you to comment on this message. We have examined it and British have accepted suggestion that it be made perfectly clear that in the first move in this exchange made by Gromyko he stated that Soviet Government desired a peaceful solution of the Korean situation. It would also be made clear that this is not the first time that HMG has urged Soviets to use their influence with North Koreans for withdrawal.

In the light of the incomplete and slanted version of Kelly-Gromyko conversations released by Tass at early hour this morning, Cabinet decided this morning to take following steps:

(1) Instruction to Kelly as described above will be immediately despatched;

(2) At 3:30 p. m. London daylight time in response to question from Eden, Prime Minister will make a full statement tracing entire history of Gromyko-Kelly talks. He will conclude by saying that Kelly has been instructed again to make position of HMG entirely clear to Soviets.

There will probably be no time for you to make useful comments concerning instructions to Kelly; however, should you have any suggestions concerning Prime Minister's statement, please telephone Holmes by 2:30 p. m. London daylight time. It is doubtful that this short time schedule will permit any alteration and we believe that both instructions to Kelly and statement of Prime Minister will be found

\[1\] A copy of a message from Mr. Bevin to Sir Oliver Franks containing suggestions for a memorandum to be handed to Gromyko by Sir David Kelly was transmitted to the Department of State by the British Embassy on July 19; not printed (795.00/7–1950).

\[2\] See supra.

\[3\] See the note from the British Embassy, July 20, p. 437.

\[4\] See Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 477, col. 2450; also reprinted in British Cmd. 5078, p. 27.
satisfactory. In any event these next moves are in the lap of the Gods and the conscience of the British people.

DOUGLAS

795.00/7-2050: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 20, 1950—1 p.m.


ACHESON

1 Telegram 25 transmitted the text of the following UP dispatch of July 19, datelined “Somewhere in Korea”:

“A US Government official said today that when the United Nations forces push northward in Korea it would be most unrealistic from the military standpoint, if not actually impossible, to halt at the 38th Parallel.

“He contended that from the political standpoint it would be ‘unthinkable’ for the Americans and South Koreans to stop fighting at the boundary.

“The official, who worked and studied in Korea for years, said a return to the way things were before the war here would negate everything the Allies hoped to accomplish in fighting against the attempt to communize all Korea.

“That would make similar clashes in the future virtually inescapable, he said.” (795.00/7-2050)

795.00/7-2050

The British Embassy to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE FROM MR. BEVIN TO SIR DAVID KELLY
DATED 20TH JULY, 1950

Following is text of Aide-Mémoire.

His Majesty’s Government observing that the Soviet Government have issued a version of the recent talks between Mr. Gromyko, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, and His Majesty’s Ambassador in Moscow on the Korean question, wish to restate their views so that the Soviet Government may be under no misunderstanding regarding their attitude.

1 A manuscript note in the source text indicated that this document was handed to Mr. Rusk at 3 p.m. on July 20.

2 A previous telegram from Mr. Bevin to Sir David Kelly, a copy of which (not printed) was transmitted by the British Embassy to the Department of State, had instructed Sir David to deliver this aide-mémoire to the Soviet Government at the earliest possible opportunity (795.00/7-2050).
2. His Majesty's Government have noted the views of the Soviet Government on the question of the participation of representatives of the Chinese People's Government in the Security Council. On this point His Majesty's Government have already made known their policy, namely, that it is a question which must be decided on its own merits by a majority.

3. The immediate issue, however, is that of stopping hostilities in Korea, in regard to which His Majesty's Government wish to reaffirm their support for the resolutions of the Security Council. In the view of His Majesty's Government the restoration of peace in Korea cannot be made conditional on the settlement of other issues.

4. Noting the expressed desire of the Soviet Government for a peaceful settlement, His Majesty's Government wish to reiterate the hope already expressed by His Majesty's Ambassador that the Soviet Government will use their influence with the North Koreans to bring about an immediate end of hostilities and the withdrawal of North Korean forces to the northward of the 38th parallel.

WASHINGTON, [July 20, 1950.]

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330/7-1850: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 20, 1950—6 p. m.

359. Pls deliver fol reply to Schuman's Aide-Mémoire (Embtel 332 of July 18):

The American Govt has been gratified by the full and prompt support of the French Govt in connection with its action in the Korean crisis both as an ally and as a fellow member of the UN. In this connection it has noted with particular gratification the decision of the French Govt to dispatch a naval unit to the Korean theatre.

In a crisis of this nature this Govt is in full accord with the suggestion that the closest contact be established and maintained between the Govts of France, Great Britain and the United States. The French proposal is being given urgent study and our comments on the best means of carrying out the necessary consultations will be advanced as soon as possible.

Sent Paris as Deptel 359; Repeated London for info as Deptel 365.

Acheson

1In telegram 398 to Paris, July 21, not printed, the Department suggested that tripartite talks might begin in Paris in early August by which time Mr. Bohlen would probably have returned to the Embassy there (330/7-1850).
SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 20, 1950—11 p. m.
[Received July 21—6:53 a. m.]

159. 1. At Rajagopalachari’s suggestion (new Minister without Portfolio) I had long talk with him early July 19 re Korean situation. He said he wished to talk to me before meeting of special Cabinet Committee on Foreign Affairs called by Nehru to consider replies to Prime Minister’s message to Stalin and Secretary of State.

2. Rajagopalachari initiated our substantive conversation by saying he supposed US Government and perhaps I were personally annoyed at approaches by Prime Minister at this time to Moscow and Washington, particularly at injection of Chinese representation SC into problem of Korean aggression. I replied “not at all”. I understood and I was confident my government understood motives which had prompted Nehru to send his messages to Washington and Moscow. We appreciated international and domestic position of Prime Minister and could see he must convince Indians and other nations looking to him for leadership that he was leaving no stone unturned in bringing about termination hostilities in Korea without weakening effectiveness of UN. It was unfortunate that Stalin, instead of responding to Nehru in like spirit of sincerity, had with some success, given twist to exchange of messages which had served purpose Soviet and Communist propaganda. We could not blame Nehru for Stalin’s trickiness.

3. At Rajagopalachari’s request I explained to him at length developments in Korea and Far East and our attitude with respect thereto as I understood them. While I was pointing out to him necessity of our sending armed assistance to ROK even before SC had passed second resolution, he interrupted and said it was not necessary for me to enlarge on that point. It was clear that if US had failed to give immediate armed assistance to ROK, some free countries and many persons throughout world who were now making critical remarks re US policies would have been among first to criticize US for talking much and doing little. They would have said that although US for years had been stating its determination to resist aggression and that it was only power with forces close at hand sufficiently strong to stand up against the aggression, it had shown indecisiveness and hesitation until it was too late to be of any real assistance. There could be no question in his mind that US had no choice other than to send armed
forces to Korea just as soon as SC had resolved that breach of peace had taken place. What concerned him was US attitude re Chinese representation in SC. Nehru claimed that if US had not prevented Communist China from being admitted into UN, aggression in Korea would not have taken place.

4. I said I was frankly astonished at advancement such theory. I did not believe that it could be supported by evidence or logic. I could see no connection between Chinese representation in SC and attack on Korea, unless I should try to argue that Russia deliberately encouraged Communist China to conduct itself so that it would be refused admittance to SC thus giving Russia excuse not to be in SC at time aggression was being launched. I would not try, however, to support this thesis because I could not prove it. Aggression in Korea, however, not well planned and undoubtedly was merely one manifestation of aggressive designs on part international Communists which point in many directions. It seemed to me unfair to attempt to place blame for aggression on US because its attitude re Chinese representation instead of where it belongs—on international Communists. I added that although it must be clear to every intelligent, informed person that Korean aggression had been planned and directed by Russia with cooperation Communist China, we thus gain our desire not to put Russia and Communist China into position from which they could not well retreat had not [we?] publicly accused them of connection with this aggression.

5. Rajagopalachari asked if we had evidence that Russian or Chinese nationals were engaged in actual fighting. I replied that I could not answer this question but there was no doubt that strategy was being planned by Russian officers and that many of those engaged in fighting had been trained in the Soviet Union as well as in North Korea by Russian instructors. Planes, tanks, ammunition, et cetera, had been furnished by Russia. We on our part had refused to supply heavy tanks, et cetera, to ROK in pursuance our general policy not to supply other countries with weapons which might be considered to be of aggressive character. Result this policy had, of course, been disastrous to ROK but we still believed that policy was right because results had made it clear that while we had refrained from giving ROK equipment which would permit it to engage in aggression, Russia had been preparing Northern Korea for aggression.

6. Rajagopalachari said that it seemed to him that main difference of opinion between US and India at present related to Chinese representation. I said it was difficult for me understand how anyone could seriously believe that at time when American lives were being sacrificed in supporting UN opposition to aggression, US Government
would be expected to reverse position which it had taken in past and support admission into SC of regime that was lauding aggressor and condemning US and UN for opposing aggression. How could US change its attitude in such circumstances particularly when Peiping regime continued demonstrate all those qualities which had contributed to original US decision not to vote for its admission into SC? Rajagopalachari said he could well understand US attitude and appreciated my frankness in discussing matter with him. He hoped to keep in close touch with me during days to come.

HENDERSON

795.00/7-2150: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 21, 1950—8 a. m.

Although Taejon lost, Tokyo Hqtrs reports local successes in center and on east coast where Allied naval strikes punishing enemy. In Hamchang-Andong area enemy flanking movements are complete failure. Several points retaken. Enemy force of undetermined size moving south on west coast plain and advance elements reported 60 miles southwest Taejon. No friendly forces this sector. ROK naval base Kunsan lost. Enemy growing more sensitive US air attacks, now reluctant to enter into action in daylight and taking steps conserve dwindling transport by elaborate camouflage. Enemy estimated lost half armor in 4 weeks action, 156 of estimated 260-412 armored vehicles knocked out. Our air action especially carrier strikes have reduced enemy air capabilities to only 75 sorties a day.

Re SyG Lie’s circ request aid for Korea, top Canad officials endorse UN US stand but not convinced of gravity situation. Canad dispatched a long-range air transport sqdrn and may send more destroyers but probably not troops since Canad Army has only one operational brigade. NZ consulting other Commonwealth countries, waiting to see what they do. Unlikely NZ ground troops be sent due long training needed. Swed finds it impossible modify position and provide troops but willing supply field hospitals. Cannot supply ambulances since Swed Army has none spare. Ital cannot supply material aid at least for present. East Pak Army has urged Pak Govt send troops. SyG Indian Fonoff thinks Nehru unlikely assign even token force just now. Ceylon Primin stated if Korea shld develop into “struggle between Communism and democracy” no doubt which side Ceylon wd fight. According Pak Dipl in Jidda there some hope for change in

1 Sent to 38 diplomatic missions and to the Consulates General in Hong Kong and Singapore.
Egypt attitude near future. Turk UN rep said any hesitation part Turk on offering troops due to fear of direct attack on Turk. Amemb Athens hopes Greek Govt offer of six C-47s will not be accepted by UN due technical problems. Little chance Iran will offer troops or other aid. Phil Fommin Romulo repeated offer 25,000 Phil Scouts to be outfitted by US. Pres Quirino stated Phil Army needed in anti-Huk campaign at home. Thai Fommin reported in press to have offered 4,000 best combat troops ready within month.

PolAd Tokyo notes current Jap anti-Commie drive taking edge off Jap Commie Party activities. Party line newspapers are closed as soon as they open. Commie line concentrating on appeal that US will bring renewed suffering not peace. Numerical strength Party reduced and labor unions culling rolls. Jap Primin explains to Diet that move expand police reserves taken to provide against emergency of possible Commie infringement on Jap territory and disturbance internal law and order.

Emb Paris and Leg Dublin note that Commies capitalizing on sensational emotional type stories on "stumbling, sobbing GIs" such as those filed by Homer Bigart and Marguerite Higgins from Korea. Such stories have helped make Europeans seriously doubt effectiveness US mil support in event Sov aggression Europe.

Replying recent Schuman aide-mémoire calling for reassessment western strategy in light Korean developments, we state that US in full accord with Fr suggestion that closest contact be maintained between US, UK and Fr. We particularly gratified at Fr decision send naval unit to Korean area.

Yugo UN rep Bebler said he becoming personally more concerned possibilities aggression against Yugo. He referred to mounting campaigns in USSR and satellites alleging that Yugo prepares for war on neighbors with US connivance. He intends invite member Amer Progressive Party such as Henry Wallace to inspect Yugo first hand to determine whether Yugo permits for powers to have milit bases on Yugo soil.

Bebler also commented that it unfortunate Nehru in message to Stalin had given latter opportunity to place Chi UN representation question in front of the aggression in Korea.

US Chargé in Taipei reports that most Amers there believe Commies having little success among civilians, particularly Formosans. However, ample discontent present in armed forces for Commies to work on.

Acheson
NORTH KOREAN OFFENSIVE, JULY 1–SEPTEMBER 15

795.00/7-2150: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 21, 1950—9 a. m.

Fol summary re Korea:

Re SYG's circ re material aid and troops Nor govt unable furnish ground troops. Swed unable provide troops but cld supply field hospitals. Requested clarification procedures envisaged in circ as did reps Fr, NZ, Canad, Braz, Bol, Mex, Urug, Arg, Neth states practically impossible send Dutch troops. Previous reports Peron planning offer Arg troops unfounded. Emb Tehran believes little chance Iran will offer mil support and cld hardly offer other aid in view internal situation. Indian FonOff doubtful Nehru wld feel he cld send token troops just now. Benelux powers to meet discuss question. Nic only country make UN firm offer troops. Iraqi Chargé privately assured us under instrs his govt that Iraq not neutral but lined up solidly with West. Peru placing embargo on trade with NK. We considering direct appeal for UK troops.

Hung first satellite openly suggest aid NK. All Hungs asked by "natl peace council" contribute money for field hospital. Turk FonMin wld deplore "Korean compromise" if quid pro quo were UN admission Commie Chi. Ceylon official said Ceylon not neutral and wld have supported SC res if UN member. In event Korean conflict shld become struggle between commies and democracy no doubt on which side Ceylon wld fight. While bulk Israel's population continues support govt decision back SC, commies and left-wing Mapam taking Cominform line. UK auths Hong Kong Singapore now have effective controls on exports I-A list to Chi, NK.

Korea situation reflected in planned Fr offensive against Ho Chi Minh, in our Mil Survey Mission recommendations that cuts in our mil aid program for Phils be restored and additional aid be provided soon, and in first MDAP shipments going Indo.

ACHESON

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711.5/7-2150: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, July 21, 1950—6 p. m.

[Received July 21—5:41 p. m.]

183. Needless to say President's address to nation on 19 July is inspiring and already gives great encouragement. It is particularly
gratifying to note that the word “Communist” has been used to name the aggressor, and the avoidance of referring directly to Soviets.

In this connection, we and all the world know what government has inspired this attack in Korea, but it is currently advisable to employ the term “Communist” to stigmatize the aggressor. Restraint for the moment will let the door stay partly open, at least, and give time for other events to produce their effect.

I continue to feel it is prudent to keep from engaging directly personal prestige of Stalin as well as of Politburo and Soviet Government, for there still is no evidence available here to show Soviets intend precipitate full scale world war. What moves Kremlin may be planning are not yet discernible, but it does seem their position remains sufficiently flexible to allow retreat under some formula which they might themselves devise. I would incline towards expectation of period of détente until military position develops further.

Of course the speedier the action taken by the Congress, and otherwise, to implement the President’s program, the greater will be the effect not only upon the Politburo but also upon waverers elsewhere.

Reply to Nehru by Secretary State ¹ likewise brings clearly into focus primary source of threat to peace in Korea, while at same time dissipating misty proposition concerning China seat in UN. We already see how well British Government has come forward to make it’s position known to world on these issues.


Kirk

¹ See telegram 77, July 17, 8 p. m., to New Delhi, p. 412.

357.AD/7–2150: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 21, 1950—7 p. m.

127. For MacArthur eyes only from Dulles, I have just looked over the exchange of views between the Dept and yourself re Romulo.² I can quite appreciate that Romulo’s presence at Korean headquarters wld be an embarrassing diversion in a tense situation requiring concentration on military matters. However, I feel that there are moral and psychological objectives of great importance which wld be served by bringing Romulo in some way onto the scene in his capacity as President of the United Nations General Assembly.

² See telegram 102, July 17, to Tokyo, and the unnumbered telegram from Tokyo, July 18, pp. 411 and 422.
This wld have immediate significance because of his UN position and because he is an Asiatic. Also it wld have longer range importance because of his probable presence and large influence at the Sept meeting of the Assembly which will undoubtedly debate the Korean matter. I know that you will fully grasp these implications. Wld it be feasible without excessive personal strain on you, for you to invite Romulo to come to Tokyo at a time you pick for a brief talk with you as the Supreme Commander for the United Nations forces? He might then make a broadcast from Tokyo and promptly return to Manila. If at that moment it seemed practical for him to set foot on Korean soil without disturbance to the GHQ there, that cld be determined by you at the time, but wld not be any part of a prearranged program.

Best wishes and we are all proud of the magnificent effort you are directing. [Dulles.]

ACHESON

795/69/7-2250 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, July 22, 1950—2 p. m.
[Received July 22—8:54 a.m.]

189. AP correspondent reports that he attempted transmit news story along line that only solution Korean issue lay in seating Chinese Communists UN and that Soviets would accept no other formula. Censors expunged all phraseology which indicated that Soviets view seating Chinese Communists as only path to peaceful settlement. Correspondent then took different tack and wrote newstony to effect that "way to peacefully settling Korean question not completely closed", that door remains open, etc., and this was passed by Soviet censors.

While attitude censors obviously not conclusive evidence Soviet policy, foregoing would appear be further evidence that Soviets carefully keeping their position sufficiently flexible to allow retreat (mytel 183, July 21).


Kirk

337/AD/7-2250 : Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

Tokyo, July 22, 1950—7:11 p.m.
[Received July 22—10:29 a.m.]

6310. Personal for Honorable John Foster Dulles.

"Reference your message No. 127, July 21. I understand fully the
psychological and moral factors involved in giving the greatest possible prominence to the United Nations Korea effort. I also fully understand the value of the use of an Oriental for such purpose. I do not believe, however, that Romulo is an acceptable agent in this particular area. He is immensely unpopular among the Japanese because of the bitter and unrelenting stand he has taken with reference to their recovery in any form. They understand fully how he has opposed, in the most implacable and unrelenting way, practically every United States effort with reference to Japanese recovery or an equitable and just Japanese peace. His completely selfish and nationalistic attitude on reparations has aroused hatred and resentment on the part of all Japanese of whatever party or affiliation. In the Far Eastern Commission, his stand has been perhaps the most obstructive and destructive of any of the members except that of the Soviet. His general attitude was only recently given particular emphasis in his tart and offensive reply to Ambassador Grew’s appeal for support for the campaign to raise funds for the projected International Christian University in Japan. His presence here could not fail to arouse the greatest possible Japanese resentment, just at the moment when I am seeking the greatest possible Japanese cordiality. He is also completely unacceptable to the Koreans, as he is held responsible by them for canceling the invitation which President Quirino was understood to have given to the Korean Foreign Service at the time of the Southeast Asia meeting in Baguio some months ago. The mortification and humiliation felt by Koreans at this incident has left a permanent scar. A similar feeling exists towards him in Nationalist China circles where he is credited with having not only blocked the presence of the Chinese Nationalists at the Southeast Asia meeting, but also to have completely vitiated its original purpose, which was to oppose the advance of Communist influences in Southeast Asia.

As you know, he is an old comrade of mine and I hold him personally in the greatest possible esteem, but in my opinion, a most fundamental and irreparable error would result from trying to inject him into the local situation.

Everyone here joins me in heartiest regards. MacArthur.”

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1 See footnote 1 to the letter from Mr. Muerdo to Mr. Rusk, May 25, p. 88.
2 The following reply to this message was sent by the Department of State in telegram 188, July 24, 7 p.m., to Tokyo:

“Personal for General MacArthur from Dulles. Thanks for your message. Number 6310, DOTG2210112. I appreciate your going to the trouble to explain so fully the complications. I had known there were irritations, but had not sensed that they were big enough to offset the advantage of bringing onto the scene the President of the Assembly who is also an Asian. Your message puts the matter in a new light and I fear we must regrettfully forego the project, at least for the present. With sincere good wishes.” (320/7-2450)
795B.551/7-2250

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET  LONDON, July 22, 1950—1 p. m.  [Received July 22—11:21 a.m.]

NIACI  485. ReDeptel 401, July 21. Strongly suggest that you permit me have personal talk with Attlee on subject of British plans and possible contribution ground forces in Korea before taking any further steps. I will not put anything formally to him but can sound him out as to British intentions.

It seems to me there are two issues here. First, the extent of British contribution of ground forces in Korean affair and secondly, whether British will follow our pattern of semi-mobilization. Reason I make this recommendation so strongly is that I believe it would be far better if British were to make offer on their own initiative instead of as result of aide-mémoire from us.

An aide-mémoire could probably not be withheld from Commons and feeling might begin develop in certain quarters of Labor Party that we were pressing issue.  

Douglas

Not printed; it stated the Department’s strong feeling that the United Kingdom should make a commitment of ground forces to Korea as soon as possible and questioned Ambassador Douglas on the desirability of the Department’s transmitting an aide-mémoire on this subject to the British Ambassador in Washington (795B.5/7-2150).

Department telegram 416, July 22, 2 p. m., to London, not printed, expressed agreement with the line of action suggested by Ambassador Douglas in telegram 485 (795B.551/7-2250).

795.00/7-2250: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

TOP SECRET  WASHINGTON, July 22, 1950—4 p. m.

PRIORITY  NIACI

106. Eyes only for Henderson. Dept now considering possible further msg from Sec to Nehru along lines fol text. Highly important that existence and content any such msg and any ensuing correspondence be kept secret. Dept requests your soonest advice such msg, particularly with regard to (1) content (2) whether we shld send another msg now or allow Nehru time to cool off and think things over and (3) whether it desirable to raise fresh series of exchanges on matters on which we disagree. Text follows:

“My dear Mr. Prime Minister: As my message of July 18 1 was to be released to the press, I did not for obvious reasons specifically

1 See telegram 77, July 17, 8 p. m., to New Delhi, p. 412.
address myself therein to the points raised in the communication delivered to me by your Ambassador on July 17. I should now like, on a strictly personal and confidential basis, to give you my thoughts on those points.

"It may well be that Moscow is seeking a way out of its present entanglement without loss of prestige. Our experience with the Kremlin leads us to believe, however, that it will make every effort to find an exit which will also provide positive gain in terms of an increase of Soviet influence throughout the world. One such gain would be the seating of representatives of the Peiping regime in the Security Council in circumstances which would create the impression in many parts of the world that the US had made a deal with the USSR to buy off Communist aggression in Korea.

"It seems to me that the four sentences beginning 'Since the Govt of India' in your message of July 19 put well and succinctly the Indian position with respect to the Peiping regime. I shall try to state as briefly our position.

"We have not recognized Peiping for reasons which you and I discussed while you were in the US last autumn —reasons which we believe are still valid. We have consistently opposed the seating of Peiping representatives in UN organs, at the same time making it clear that we would accept the decision of a constitutional majority in any organ. Our position has not changed and in our view has been reinforced by Peiping's rejection of the findings of the UNCOK and the SC in the Korean situation and its open support of the North Korean aggressor.

"Your request that the US exert its authority and influence to bring about the seating of Peiping representatives in the SC put us in a very difficult position. It was, as you point out, consistent with India's past policy for you to make the request, but it would have been wholly inconsistent with our past policy for us to accept your proposal. We had hoped that in the present critical phase of the development of the UN as an effective mechanism to prevent aggression it would be possible for those nations sharing the common objective of stopping aggression in Korea to avoid becoming involved in difficulties over other questions such as Chinese representation in the UN. I am confident that this will still be possible between India and the US.

"You expressed in your message of July 17 the honest belief that there is a real chance of a peaceful settlement in Korea if Peiping representatives enter and the USSR returns to the SC. You also said that if Peiping and Moscow thereafter proved unreasonable, world opinion would hold them responsible for the consequences. I have given much thought to these two statements which I conceive to be very much at the heart of your position.

"I greatly doubt on the basis of our experience with the USSR that the presence of Moscow and Peiping in the SC would be conducive to a peaceful settlement in Korea. In any event, there has been no intimation from Moscow that they would comply with SC resolutions and stop the aggression in Korea. This is admittedly a matter of

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2 See telegram 148, from New Delhi, received on July 19 at 9:27 a.m., p. 425.
3 Related documentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1949, volume vi.
judgment, but if they were to come into the SC and your estimate of
the effect of their presence proved wrong, a real disaster might result.
One consequence might be a development which our two governments
have been striving to prevent—namely, the permanent splitting away
from the UN of the USSR and its satellites. If Moscow and Peiping
were unreasonable and world opinion were to mobilize against them
as you foresee, the issue might be so sharply drawn between the free
world and the Soviet bloc that no reconciliation within the UN system
would be possible. It seems to us that the risks inherent in your pro-
aposal are even greater than those we face in the current situation.

"I know that you have been deeply concerned about Formosa as
one facet of the Chinese problem. I hope that the President's message
to Congress 4 removed any doubts that you may have had about our
intentions with respect to that island.

(To Henderson: Here you could orally summarize this section
message to Congress and furnish text excerpt, if you desire)

"I understand that yours is the only non-Communist government
which has effective diplomatic relations with the Peiping regime. I
hope you will find it possible to apprise your Ambassador in Peiping
of our position with respect to Formosa and make every effort to
persuade Peiping that its own interests require that it avoid inter-
vention in the Korean situation or an attack upon Formosa.

"Although our recent communications unhappily highlighted our
divergent views on the Peiping regime, they did reveal a gratifying
unity of purpose to strengthen the UN in resisting aggression. I
believe our agreement with respect to Korea is of greater importance
than our disagreement over China."

ACHESON

4 See the editorial note under date of July 19, p. 430.

Draft Memorandum Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, July 22, 1950.]

Problem:
To decide upon U.S. policy regarding the advance beyond the 38th
parallel of U.S. forces now engaged in Korea as a part of the U.N.
forces.

Analysis:

1. As U.N. forces drive back North Korean forces and approach
the 38th parallel, the decisions and actions taken by the United States
and other U.N. members which are supporting the Security Council

1 The source text bore the notation that it was drafted on July 22, by George
H. Butler of the Policy Planning Staff; an attached chit by Philip H. Watts of
the Policy Planning Staff, dated July 23, 9:45 a.m., indicated that this was the
latest draft of "the 38th parallel paper".
Resolutions, and those taken by the Kremlin, will determine whether hostilities can be confined to Korea or will spread so that the danger of a third world war is greatly increased.

2. In its Resolution of June 28, 1950, the United Nations Security Council noted "with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea," determined "that this action constitutes a breach of the peace," called for "the immediate cessation of hostilities," called upon "all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities."

3. In its Resolution of June 27, 1950, the Security Council noted "from the report of the United Nations Commission for Korea that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security"; noted "the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security"; and recommended "that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."

4. In a third Resolution of July 7, the Security Council requested the United States to designate a Commander for all the forces of the members of the United Nations in the Korean operation, and authorized that these forces fly the U.N. flag. In response to this Resolution, General MacArthur has been designated as Commander of these forces. The Republic of Korea also has placed its forces under General MacArthur's command.

5. In his message to the Congress on July 19, President Truman stated that he thought it important that the nature of our military action in Korea be understood; that it should be made perfectly clear that the action was undertaken as a matter of basic moral principle; that the United States was going to the aid of a nation established and supported by the United Nations and unjustifiably attacked by an aggressor force.

6. The primary purpose of the present military action in Korea is to bring about the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the 38th parallel. This action is being carried out under the provisions of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which deals with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.

7. The General Assembly Resolutions of November 14, 1947, December 12, 1948 and October 21, 1949 are a part of the U.N. effort which is strongly supported by the United States, to bring about the
complete independence and unity of Korea. This effort is based upon provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter, dealing with pacific settlement of disputes.

8. There are, therefore, two major parts of the Korean problem: (a) the long-term effort to bring about unity and independence, and (b) the present enforcement action to repel North Korean aggression. This paper is addressed to the latter phase of the problem.

9. The following contingencies are envisaged as the U.N. enforcement action develops, provided North Korean forces are not reinforced by USSR or Communist Chinese troops; (a) voluntary withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel before U.N. forces have begun a counter-offensive; (b) a withdrawal in good order of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel at a time when they are being driven northward to a point approaching the 38th parallel; (c) a major defeat and disintegration of North Korean forces during the period when they are being driven back toward the 38th parallel; (d) continued resistance by North Korean forces after U.N. forces have reached the 38th parallel. Another contingency is the occupation of North Korea to the 38th parallel by Soviet or Communist Chinese forces before the U.N. forces reach the 38th parallel, or active support of the North Korean forces south of the 38th parallel by Chinese Communist or Soviet forces.

10. A need for important decisions will arise with a reversal of the military situation in Korea and the approach of U.N. forces toward the 38th parallel. It is probable that at the time when it becomes apparent that the North Korean aggression cannot succeed and that eventually North Korean forces will be driven back north of the 38th parallel the Kremlin will take a decision (if it has not already done so) regarding a course of action in the new situation.

11. There is ample evidence of the strategic importance to Russia of the Korean peninsula. It is extremely unlikely that the Kremlin would accept the establishment in North Korea of a regime which it could not dominate and control.

When it becomes apparent that the North Korean aggression will be defeated, there might be some agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the North Korean regime which would mean in substance that U.N. military action north of the 38th parallel would result in conflict with the U.S.S.R. or Communist China.

While fighting is in progress south of the 38th parallel, the Kremlin might bring about the occupation of North Korea either with its own or with Chinese communist forces.

The Kremlin might initiate some move toward a negotiated settlement while hostilities still are in progress south of the 38th parallel. It is possible that the basis would be the withdrawal in good order of
North Korean forces and the continued division of the country along the 38th parallel. The situation at the time of such a possible proposal might make its acceptance desirable; but we should guard against terms that would leave the aggressor in an advantageous position, that would invite a repetition of aggression, and that would undermine the authority and strength of the United Nations.

12. Since the United States is participating in a U.N. action, the attitude of its U.N. allies are important.

If North Korean forces withdraw or are driven back to the 38th parallel, it is doubtful that there would be majority support in the United Nations for continued military action by the U.N. forces for the purpose of imposing a settlement that would result in a unified and independent Korea.

There probably would be reluctance and opposition to multilateral use of force as a part of the United Nations effort, initiated under the provisions for pacific settlement, to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea. This is particularly true as concerns many of the countries of Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia.

13. The future of the Korean people is an important consideration. The United States has supported the U.N. effort to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea. The United States is concerned about the safety and well-being of the Republic of Korea and the Korean people.

Having been the victim of armed attack from North Korea, the Republic of Korea naturally will want a settlement that gives a maximum guarantee against the danger of similar future attacks. Consequently, if the North Korean forces are driven back to the 38th parallel, the Republic of Korea may well urge the continued pursuit of those forces until they are destroyed.

14. Likewise, public and Congressional opinion in the United States might be dissatisfied with any conclusion falling short of what it would consider a “final” settlement of the problem. Hence, a sentiment might arise favoring a continuation of military action north of the 38th parallel. The development of such a sentiment might create serious problems for the execution of United States policy.

15. The disadvantages of a failure to attain the complete independence and unity of Korea after the North Korean forces have been driven back to the 38th parallel must be weighed against the risk of a major conflict with the U.S.S.R. or Communist China that such a settlement might well involve. Furthermore, if the North Korean forces are decisively defeated and if North Korea suffers heavy material damage from air attack, those forces are not likely to attack again soon. By that time the United States and other U.N. members should be in a much stronger position to take effective action. It seems
likely, also, that a satisfactory permanent solution of the Korean problem can be hoped for only when and if a substantial accommodation is reached between the U.S.S.R. and the non-communist world.

Conclusions:

16. If U.N. forces were to continue military ground action north of the 38th parallel except to the extent essential for tactical requirements as fighting approaches that line, the danger of conflict with Chinese communist or Soviet forces would be greatly increased.

17. From the point of view of U.S. military commitments and strength, we should make every effort to restrict military ground action to the area south of the 38th parallel, to bring about a cessation of hostilities on acceptable terms as rapidly as possible, and to work for a situation that will minimize the requirements for U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea.

18. U.N. military action north of the 38th parallel, except to the extent essential for tactical requirements as fighting approaches that line, would require a new Security Council resolution. Such new resolution might be difficult to obtain. U.S. action without U.N. support should be avoided unless absolutely required by considerations of national security.

19. The risks of bringing on a major conflict with the U.S.S.R. or Communist China, if U.N. military action north of the 38th parallel is employed in an effort to reach a “final” settlement in Korea, appear to outweigh the political advantages that might be gained from such further military action.

20. In the unlikely event that there is a complete disintegration of North Korean forces together with a failure of the Kremlin and Communist China to take any action whatever to exert influence in North Korea, U.N. forces, acting in pursuance of an additional Security Council resolution, might move into North Korea in order to assist in the establishment of a united and independent Korea.

21. Efforts to secure the unity and independence of Korea should be vigorously pressed if the North Koreans show a disposition to sue for armistice terms, or by means of the pacific settlement procedures of the United Nations after the North Korean forces have been driven back or withdrawn to the 38th parallel and hostilities have ceased.

Recommendations:

22. It should be kept constantly before world opinion that U.S. forces in Korea are acting as a part of U.N. forces in response to Security Council resolutions; that they are acting in support of the moral principle of repelling aggression; that their immediate purpose is to bring about the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the 38th parallel; and that other measures in
regard to Korea which might be necessary or desirable, once the
aggression has been brought to an end, would be a subject for U.N.
consideration.

23. The Department of State should keep developments in Korea
under close and constant study, in order that decisions regarding our
action can be taken rapidly whenever they are required by new
situations.

24. Copies of this paper should be sent to the U.S. Delegation at the
United Nations and to General MacArthur for information and
guidance.

330/7-2350: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 23, 1950—11 p.m.

[Received July 28—6:36 p.m.]


1. It is somewhat difficult decide whether or not we should engage in
further correspondence on this subject. Among factors this end are:

(a) Nehru and Bajpai who in effect is FonMin appear to be
considerably irritated at our reply. Bajpai particularly seems to have
taken reply as personal affront and has made number of sarcastically
critical remarks to other chiefs of mission. For instance, immediately
following receipt our reply British Chargé asked him if Indian press
might not start campaign against US. Bajpai’s answer was “They
won’t like the American reply any better than I”. To another diplo-
matic he said “The US has made its decision and the worse for US”.
To another he said US had completely failed understand spirit in
which approach was made. Bajpai’s anger due in part personal pique.
Although idea of sending messages was it seems first suggested by
Krishna Menon HC to UK most effective foe of US among Nehru’s
trusted inner circle, Bajpai assumed role master strategist. He per-
sonally drafted messages after presenting arguments to me re im-
portance seating of Peiping in SC, after working on British, etc. With
his supersensitive mind he apparently has interpreted second para-
graph our reply in which we state our policies re maintenance peace
and of strengthening UN as veiled insinuations that our policies this
respect were in contrast those of India. He apparently failed note that
this paragraph had been inspired by mention these points in Nehru’s
original message to us. This misconception Bajpai’s part responsible
for third paragraph Nehru’s second published note. Neither Nehru
nor Bajpai has made move discuss exchange with me subsequent receipt
our reply. I have considered it wise not to approach them on subject
for present. Bajpai has taken occasion twice to tell me over telephone

1 See telegram 148, from New Delhi, received on July 19 at 9:27 a.m., p. 425.
Reference is to the third and fourth sentences of Mr. Nehru’s message.
that GOI considers correspondence on this subject as “terminated” and both times I have indicated my belief US Government has similar views.

(b) Indian press in general has denounced what it considers as thwarting by US of Nehru’s efforts for peace. Nehru by this move has won back favor of those sections Indian press which most enthusiastically support India’s policy of “non-alignment with either power bloc.” Nehru and Bajpai are undoubtedly encouraging to some extent criticism in Indian press our response to Nehru’s approach.

(c) There is no indication our reply has irritated such Indian political leaders as Patel and Rajagopalachari who seem to understand our position.

(d) Nehru and Bajpai are further annoyed by leak in Washington of Nehru’s second message. Bajpai telephoned me about NY Times article expressing surprise Nehru and self and complaining same time re NY Times unfortunate editorial on Kashmir.

2. I am inclined believe that in spite Bajpai’s intimations GOI would prefer correspondence closed we should send immediately another note along lines suggested. Following my reasons:

(a) By outlining with such frankness our reasons for turning down Nehru approach to us we would indicate that we consider his cooperation important and desire take him into our confidence.

(b) Delivery of note would furnish Nehru and Bajpai self-satisfying opportunity give vent to their resentment arising from injured pride. It would also give me chance to point out their misinterpretation spirit of our formal reply.

(c) Note contains convincing exposition our position which must have certain effect on Nehru and much more so on other members his new Cabinet Committee on Korea—Patel, Rajagopalachari, Ayyangar.

(d) Delivery should be soon in order prevent resentment Nehru and Bajpai from hardening and to influence them to curtail their critical comments of us to Indian leaders and press and foreign diplomats and from taking other steps which might be injurious.

3. Following represent certain suggestions re Department’s draft:

(a) First sentence fourth paragraph. It might be helpful instead merely of referring to reasons given Nehru orally last autumn for our failure to recognize Peiping, to list most cogent reasons as we did in recent message to Bevin (Deptl 40, July 10 * section 2 first seven numbered points). Foreign Relations Committee Cabinet might thus be in better position understand our policy toward Peiping.

(b) Change next last sentence paragraph 5 to read:

“We are hoping that in the present critical phase of the development of the UN as an effective mechanism to prevent aggression

* Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Vallabhai Patel.
* See enclosure 1 to the note from Madame Pandit to Mr. Acheson, July 17, p. 408.
* See telegram 132, July 10, 5 p. m. to London, p. 347, repeated to New Delhi as 40.
those nations sharing the common objective of stopping aggression in Korea will not permit differences of opinion over such questions as Chinese representation to divert their attention and energies from the attainment of this objective."

(e) Second sentence penultimate paragraph. Substitute words “continue to endeavor” for “make every effort”.

4. Any leak Washington this message after previous leaks would be most unfortunate. It is difficult us believe leaks have been US sources. We are wondering whether member some foreign diplomatic mission in Washington might not have been indiscreet.

HENDERSON

795.00/7-2150: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TAEGU, July 21, 1950.

[Received July 24—12:49 a.m.]

72. ReDeptels 25 and 26, July 20 on UP despatch. Check reveals quoted despatch is paraphrase of much longer despatch on general subject filed by Ralph Teatsorth on July 19. Teatsorth filed despatch after long, private, off record, informal talk with FSR Noble who assures me he was not speaking on subject for publication.

I have again strictly instructed staff to refrain from any discussion whatsoever this issue. On receipt Deptel 16, July 14, I invited members my staff and also Army’s attention to its content since US Government official, in that case, proved to be acting PIO. Every effort will be made by all US Government agencies here to abide by Department directives.

MUCIO

1 See footnote 1 to telegram 26 to Taegu, July 20, 1 p.m., p. 437.

330/7-2450: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 24, 1950—10 a.m.

[Received July 24—4:52 a.m.]

182. Embtel 180, July 23.

1. I suggest further minor alteration to draft message to Nehru.1 Last clause, first sentence, final paragraph be changed to read “they

1 See telegram 106, to New Delhi, July 22, 4 p.m., p. 447.
also served to emphasize our unity of purpose to strengthen the UN in resisting aggression."

2. In order further to smooth ruffled feelings I suggest that passage similar to following be inserted in Department's draft immediately before last paragraph: "I particularly regret that we were unable to respond in what you might have considered a generous manner to your message of July 17. We fully appreciate your earnest desire that hostilities in Korea be terminated before they spread to other countries. We are convinced, however, that they can be terminated without encouragement to the aggressor and to potential aggressors only after the unconditional withdrawal of aggressor from the ROK. We also understand your deep interest in China and your evident desire for the maintenance of friendly relations with your neighbors, the people of China. We too are most anxious that the traditional friendship between the peoples of the US and those of China should not be allowed to languish. We look forward to the time when the contacts between the American and Chinese people, broken through no desire or acts on our part, can be resumed; and when there cannot be reasonable doubt on the part of the free nations that such persons as represent China in the UN are true spokesmen for a free and independent China. From our own knowledge of the Chinese peoples we can have no doubt that a free and independent China will fully associate itself with the great purposes of the UN."

HENDERSON

795B.5/7-2450 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to All Missions

CONFIDENTIAL        WASHINGTON, July 24, 1950—5 a.m.

Ltr dated Jul 24 from Sec to Sec Def Johnson summarizing policy Re UN aid for Korea is quoted below for ur use and guidance in discussions this matter with Reps Govt to which you are accredited. If Sec Def reply modifies this policy you will be promptly informed.¹

"I am outlining in this ltr the gen policies under which it is intended that the Dept of State and its Reps abroad shld conduct conversations with other Govts on the subj of contributions by members of the UN to the UN effort in Korea. I wld appreciate confirmation from you that this is in accordance with our several conversations on the gen subject in the light of the expressed wishes of the Pres. There is no doubt in my mind that the gen attitude described below has the support of Congressional leaders.

"The US Govt is anxious to encourage the maximum direct participation by all members of the UN in support of the UN effort in Korea. All offers of direct assistance, mil or non-mil in form, shld be

¹No formal reply from the Secretary of Defense was received until September 25, see p. 774.
welcomed. Obviously mil assistance, and in particular the offer of
ground forces is most important.

“All offers shld be made to the UN which will immed communicate
them to the US Govt for consideration by the Unified Command.
When Reps of other Govts discuss directly with US Reps intended or
possible contributions, they shld be encouraged and thanked but re-
mined that the formal offer shld be communicated to the UN.

“Once an offer has been made to the UN and communicated to the
Dept of State by the US Mission to the UN, arrangements will be
made by the Dept for Reps in Wash of the offering Govt to discuss
the specific details and eventual integration of the offer into the UN
effort in Korea with appropriate Reps of the Office of the Sec of Def.

“As a practical matter, the JCS and the Unified Command will
have to determine what particular mil units, or other types of assist-
ance offered by other UN members, can in fact be integrated into the
mil effort in Korea. It is the intention of the US Govt to accept all
offers notwithstanding the fact that thorough examination in bilateral
discussions between reps of the Dept of Def and Reps of the offering
Govt may ultimately reveal that it will be impossible, as a practical
matter, to use what is offered. In such cases, a modification of the
actual offer into usable form may result or agreement may be reached
that, while the offer stands as accepted, it may never be called forward
unless circumstances change.

“In order not to mislead other UN members, the US Govt does not
intend, through either mil or dipl channels, unilaterally to urge in-
dividual UN members to offer mil units except in cases on which the
US Govt is agreed that for mil or other controlling reasons it is in-
tended to employ such units in the combat area. In cases where such
agreement is reached we will of course make every effort to secure
commitments to provide mil forces.

“Since I am anxious promptly to confirm instrs in the above sense to
our missions abroad, I wld appreciate it if you wld let me know as soon
as may be convenient if you are in agreement with the views which I
have expressed above.”

You will be promptly informed if country to which you accredited
is one which US Govt desires directly to ask for ground forces and of
any action taken this regard here.

 Achenson

795.00/7-2450

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs
(Allison) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitzse)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 24, 1950.

Subject: Policy Planning Staff Paper 1 on Problem of U.S. Policy
Regarding Advance Beyond the 38th Parallel by U.S. Forces Now
Engaged in Korea as part of the UN Forces

I have read and studied carefully the Policy Planning Staff paper
on the above subject, and I regret to state that I must enter an

1 See the draft memorandum dated July 22, p. 449.
emphatic dissent from its philosophy and conclusions. As I understand it, the paper proposes in effect that we make known at once to General MacArthur and the US Delegation to the UN the fact that US objectives in Korea are limited to repelling the aggression of the North Koreans and bringing about the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the attacking forces to the 38th parallel, after which a final solution of the Korean problem would be a matter for UN consideration. In other words we would go back to the status quo ante bellum and then ask the UN to start all over again doing what has been its attempt at three General Assemblies since 1947. The aggressor would apparently be consulted on equal or nearly equal terms and the real aggressor, the Soviet Union, would presumably go unpunished in any way whatsoever. The aggressor would be informed that all he had to fear from aggression was being compelled to start over again. There are given below my comments on specific parts of the paper in question and my further reasons for opposing the adoption of recommendations of this paper. There is also given my conception of what is the proper attitude for the United States to take.

The whole tone of the present paper implies that the North Korean regime has a legal status and that the area north of the 38th parallel is, in fact, a separate nation. This has no foundation in fact or morality. The North Korean regime is a creature of the Soviet Union set up in defiance of the will of the majority of the Korean people, and in deliberate violation of three Resolutions passed in the General Assembly.

The paper makes a false division between what it terms (a) the long term effort to bring about unity and independence in Korea and (b) the present enforcement action to repel North Korean aggression. It assumes the latter phase of the problem can be solved without regard for the former. This is a fundamental error. If a correct solution of the immediate problem is not reached, a correct long term solution will be impossible.

There is in the paper no recognition of the fact that in supporting the action of the North Korean regime the Soviet Union is acting in direct defiance of Paragraph 5 of Article 2 of the UN Charter which requires that:

“All members shall give the UN every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the UN is taking preventive or enforcement action.”

While the paper rightly stresses the importance of the attitude of our UN Allies toward what is done in Korea, it gives only cursory attention to the attitude of the 20 million people of South Korea who have been wantonly attacked, and the more than 2 million Koreans who
fled from Soviet oppression in the North and sought refuge in the South. There can be no sound solution which does not take fully into account the hopes of these millions. Any action which implied that the aggressors would suffer but mildly if at all and that the artificial division of Korea was to be perpetuated would cause the people and army of South Korea to lose what little morale they have left and would run the grave danger of turning them actively against American forces now in Korea. And let us not comfort ourselves with the belief that we could adopt the recommendations and philosophy of this present paper and not have the Korean Government and people find it out. They would. And I should hate to have on my conscience the responsibility for what would follow. The Korean people and Government are already insisting that the 38th parallel division must go and that the present opportunity to unify the country must be seized. American diplomats in Korea have expressed agreement. If this is not done the people of Korea will lose all faith in the courage, intelligence and morality of the United States. And I, for one, would not blame them.

The nub of the problem confronting the United States is correctly stated in the paper—namely whether the disadvantages of a failure to attain complete independence and unity for Korea outweigh the risk of a major conflict with the USSR or Communist China that such a settlement might involve. But the answer given or at least implied is, in my opinion, the wrong one.

While rightly pointing out the strategic importance of Korea to the USSR, one of the main reasons for this importance, that possession of Korea makes easier the ultimate conquest of Japan—the real prize in Asia as is neither Korea nor even China—is ignored. And while accepting the fact that the USSR would not permit a regime hostile to it to exist in North Korea, there is no apparent realization of the fact that Japan is of critical importance to the United States and that we cannot afford to allow a regime hostile to American interests in Japan to dominate Korea.

The paper assumes we can buy more time by a policy of appeasement—for that is what this paper recommends—a timid, half-hearted policy designed not to provoke the Soviets to war. We should recognize that there is grave danger of conflict with the USSR and the Chinese Communists whatever we do from now on—but I fail to see what advantage we gain by a compromise with clear moral principles and a shirking of our duty to make clear once and for all that aggression
does not pay—that he who violates the decent opinions of mankind must take the consequences and that he who takes the sword will perish by the sword.

That this may mean war on a global scale is true—the American people should be told and told why and what it will mean to them. When all legal and moral right is on our side why should we hesitate?

We should determine now that we will accept in Korea no solution which does not:

1. Eliminate the North Korean Army, either by force or disarmament under UN auspices.

2. Provide for the full implementation in North Korea of the UN Resolutions of November 14, 1947, and December 12, 1948, including the holding of elections under the auspices of the UN Commission on Korea. These elections to be held after the return to their homes in North Korea of the more than 2 million refugees who had fled from Communist oppression.

3. Provide for a UN police force to maintain order until such time as a unified Korea can provide security forces of its own.

4. Provide for the admission of the unified Korea to the UN with its consequent assumption of the obligations of the Charter to refrain from the threat or use of force in its international relations against the Soviet Union as well as all other members of the UN.

5. Provide that the members of the UN, upon the advice of a UN Commission in Korea, will give such political and economic aid to the Korean Government as may be necessary to get it fairly started on the road toward becoming a stable, peaceful member of the United Nations.

Having determined on the above course, we should make known our policy to all the world after having discussed it with our friends in the U.N. It is one of which no man need be ashamed. Its announcement would inspire the people of South Korea to greater efforts in their own behalf. It is in accord and the only solution which is truly in accord with the UN Resolution of June 27th which requires the restoration of “international peace and security in the area”. Any member of the United Nations which did not support us would do so in the knowledge that its action was dictated by fear and not by doubt of the rightness of what we were doing. The free world cannot any longer live under constant fear. The issue is clear—we should now decide to stand up to what our President has called “raw aggression”, or we should admit that Soviet Communism has won and be prepared to take the consequences.
Agreed Memorandum, Summary of United States-United Kingdom Discussions on the Present World Situation, July 20–24, 1950, Washington, D.C.¹

[Excerpts]

TOP SECRET

1. Following is a summary of discussions held in Washington between July 20 and July 24, between General Omar N. Bradley and Ambassador Philip C. Jessup, representing the United States, and Sir Oliver Franks and Lord Tedder representing the United Kingdom. Mr. Charles W. Yost,² Colonel L. K. Ladue,³ Mr. M. E. Dening,⁴ Major General Redman ⁵ and Captain R. D. Coleridge, R.N.⁶ were also present.

Terms of Reference

2. The conversations were purely exploratory and involved no commitments by governments. It was understood that there would be no definitive or detailed discussion of areas in which third parties have a primary interest.

FAR EAST

3. The U.K. representatives emphasized the importance which their government attached to avoiding any further major involvement of Western forces on the Asiatic mainland.⁷ They therefore expressed the hope that any new conflicts which might break out in the Far East might be localized and not be allowed to develop into general war, either with the Soviet Union or with Communist China. The U.S. representatives agreed as to the desirability of this objective but pointed out certain possible cases of aggression, as noted below, which it might be difficult or even impossible to localize.

Chinese Communists

4. The U.K. representatives particularly stressed the advantages of localizing any possible conflict between the U.S. or the U.K. on the

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¹ Four meetings were held on July 20, 21, 22, and 24. This memorandum was prepared and agreed upon at the conclusion of the talks, following a comparison of the informal summary notes kept by each side. Herein are printed the parts of this memorandum dealing with the Far East; complete coverage of the talks is scheduled for publication in volume III.

² Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs.
³ Deputy Secretary, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.
⁴ Assistant Under-Secretary of State, United Kingdom.
⁵ Director of Military Operations, U.K. War Office.
⁶ Secretary, British Joint Services Mission.
⁷ Paragraph 29 of this memorandum, not herein printed, indicated the view of the U.K. Representatives that a threat to Berlin should be placed at the top of the list of danger points.
one hand and the Chinese communists on the other; first, for the reason set forth in the preceding paragraph and, second, in order that a possible gradual drift of the Chinese communist regime away from Moscow might not be interrupted.

5. It was agreed that further study should be given by the U.S. and the U.K. to the question whether an overt large-scale involvement of the Chinese communists in Korea or a large-scale Chinese communist attack on any other state or territory should, as being indicative of a Soviet intention to force the issue, be considered as raising the immediate question of general war.

Korea

6. The U.S. representatives stressed the political and military importance of the contribution of ground forces to the campaign in Korea by as large a number of nations as possible. They pointed out, on the military side, that the campaign would presumably last for some months and that it was important that, when the counteroffensive was undertaken, it be carried out with very strong forces in order that the North Korean army could be destroyed to the maximum extent possible before our forces reach the 38th parallel. The U.K. representatives declared that they had not hitherto considered that any forces which they might be able to contribute could reach the theatre of operations in time to be used. In light, however, of the statement by the U.S. representatives that the campaign would be long and that very considerable land forces would be needed, they would represent to London the points made by the U.S. representatives.

7. The U.S. representatives expressed the view that careful study should be given to the question of the eventual solution of the Korean problem, particularly what will happen when UN forces reach the 38th parallel and what forces will remain in Korea after the end of hostilities. They indicated that this would be a question for consideration by the UN.

8. It appeared to be the view of both U.S. and U.K. representatives, as an exception to the general proposition stated above, that, if Soviet forces should interfere overtly on a large scale in Korea, this action would raise the immediate question of general war. The U.S. representative made it clear that they had no intention of fighting a major war in Korea. Should war occur, it was their intention to fight in accordance with our agreed over-all strategy.

9. It was agreed that further study should be given to the question of whether or not overt intervention of the Chinese communists in Korea should also raise the immediate question of general war. The U.K. representatives were inclined to consider such an intervention by the Chinese communists unlikely since the Chinese would not act
solely at Soviet direction unless they gained some material advantage to themselves. The U.S. representatives, however, believing that Peiping is at the present time under very strong Kremlin influence and that the Kremlin might wish to involve the Chinese communists in hostilities with the West, considered such a possible involvement less unlikely.

Formosa

10. The British representatives expressed a strong hope that any hostilities arising from a Chinese communist attack on Formosa would be localized. The U.S. representatives replied that it is their desire and intention that any such hostilities be localized. In view of the character of the President's statement of 27 June, there was reason to believe that there would be no invasion of the mainland in connection with a Communist attack on Formosa. The U.K. representatives stated they were in full agreement with this intention to localize any such hostilities.

Hong Kong

11. The British representatives stated that their forces in Hong Kong are adequate to resist internal disturbances or a small-scale attack from without, but they are not adequate to hold off a full-scale attack by the Chinese communists. Should such an attack occur, it would presumably lead to an appeal to the UN, but nevertheless the U.K. representatives would hope that the hostilities might be localized.

Macao

12. It was considered that action could not be taken to assist the Portuguese in case Macao were attacked. The U.K. representatives stated that they had already intimated to the Portuguese that the U.K. would not be able to assist in these circumstances.

Philippines

13. The U.S. representatives pointed out the fact that the U.S. occupied naval and air bases in the islands. Elsewhere in the discussions it was brought out that the Philippines constitute the southern end of the U.S. Japan-Okinawa-Philippine stopline.

Indochina

14. It was understood that the U.S. and U.K. would assist the French to the extent of their abilities in case of a Chinese communist attack, but the probability would be great that neither could provide
forces for this purpose. There was no further discussion of the Indochina problem in the absence of the French, though further tripartite discussions were considered to be necessary.

Burma

15. It was understood that neither the U.S. nor the U.K. could provide forces to Burma in case of attack and that it is unlikely, though not impossible, that India or Pakistan would do so. In regard to action to be taken it was understood that the U.K. would take the initiative.

Malaya

16. The U.K. representatives said that they did not expect to be able to reduce their forces in Malaya during the next twelve months, but hoped to do so after that time. It was generally agreed that an early and favorable resolution of the Korean situation would have a salutary effect on the Malayan problem.

Siam

17. It was generally agreed that Siam would bend with the wind.

Japan

18. Interest was expressed by both parties in proceeding with joint preliminary political discussions of the Japanese peace treaty at a relatively early date.

Afghanistan

19. It was agreed that Afghanistan could not be effectively assisted in case of invasion by the Soviets.

Actions To Be Recommended

1. A comprehensive study of the effects of overt large-scale Chinese communist intervention in Korea or attack upon any other state or territory, particularly with a view to determining whether or not such intervention or attack could be localized or would lead to general war.

2. An examination, within the UN framework, of the eventual disposition of the Korean problem, including the maintenance of UN forces in South Korea, possible reoccupation of North Korea by the Soviets, and the problem of ultimate unification of the country.
115. Text msg for delivery Nehru folks. As indicated Deptel 106 Jul 22 highly important existence and content this msg and any ensuing correspondence be kept secret. We wish avoid further public exchange with Nehru. As press keenly interested suggest you deliver msg to Bajpai thus avoiding attracting attn by appt with PM.

"My dear Mr. Prime Min; I did not in my msg of July 18 specifically address myself to the points raised in the communication delivered to me by your Amb on July 17 as I wished to give you my thoughts on those points on a strictly personal and confidential basis.

"It may well be, as you say, that Moscow is seeking a way out of its present entanglement without loss of prestige. Our experience with the Kremlin leads us to believe, however, that it will in such case make every effort to find an exit which will also provide positive gain in terms of an increase of Sov influence throughout the world. One such gain will be the seating of reps of the Peiping regime in the Security Council in circumstances which will create the impression in many parts of the world that the US had made a deal with the USSR to buy off Communist aggression in Korea.

"It seems to me that the four sentences beginning ‘Since the Govt of India’ in your msg of July 19 put well and succinctly the Indian position with respect to the Peiping regime. I shall try to state as briefly our position.

"We have not recognized Peiping for reasons which you and I discussed while you were in the US last autumn—reasons which we believe are still valid. We have consistently opposed the seating of Peiping reps in UN organs, at the same time making it clear that we will accept the decision of a constitutional majority in any organ. Our position has not changed and in our view has been reinforced by Peiping’s rejection of the findings of the UNCOOK and the Security Council in the Korean situation and its open support of the North Korean aggressors.

"The considerations influencing our position are of a most serious character. I shld like to restate some of them because of the weight which we attach to them.

1. Peiping has shown little indication of a genuine desire to estab normal relations with other states.
2. It has singled out Amer citizens and interests as special objects of its hostility.
3. It has made no pretense of accepting and carrying out the internatl obligations of China.
4. There is still room for doubt that it exercises effective control throughout the mainland of China or is supported by the Chinese people.
5. It is lending support to Communist insurgents in the Philippines, Malaya, Burma and elsewhere, has recognized Ho Chi Minh
and is actively interfering with efforts to transfer polit power in Indochina by peaceful processes.

6. It is cooperating with a degree of Sov penetration of China which can only lead to China’s dismemberment.

7. Its recent defiance of the United Nations in connection with the Korean situation is, of course, a new and grave factor.

"Your request that the US exert its authority and influence to bring about the seating of Peiping reps in the Security Council put us in a very difficult position. It was, as you point out, consistent with India’s past policy for you to make the request, but it wld have been wholly inconsistent with our past policy for us to accept your proposal.

"You expressed in your msg of July 17 the honest belief that there is a real chance of a peaceful settlement in Korea if Peiping reps enter and the USSR returns to the Security Council. You also said that if Peiping and Moscow thereafter proved unreasonable, world opinion wld hold them responsible for the consequences. I have given much thought to these two statements which I conceive to be very much at the heart of your position.

"There has been no intimation from Moscow that it wld comply with the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and 27 and stop the aggression in Korea even if reps of the Peiping regime were seated in the Security Council. In view of the Kremlin’s silence on this point and our gen experience with the USSR, I greatly doubt that the presence of Moscow and Peiping in the Security Council wld be conducive to a peaceful settlement in Korea. This is admittedly a matter of judgment, but it seems to us that the risks inherent in your proposal are so great that we cannot disregard our own appraisal of the situation. If Moscow and Peiping were to come into the Security Council and proved unreasonable, the UN effort to restore peace in Korea might be blocked. This wld be a very grave consequence indeed, and its effect on world opinion of the United Nations and the value of continued Sov participation therein would be difficult to predict.

"We hope that in the present critical phase of the development of the UN as an effective mechanism to prevent aggression those nations sharing the common objective of stopping aggression in Korea will not permit differences of opinion over such questions as Chinese representation to divert their attm and energies from the attainment of this objective.

"I know that you have been deeply concerned about Formosa as one facet of the Chinese problem. I hope that the President’s msg to Congress removed any doubts that you may have had about our intentions with respect to that island. We understand your deep interest in maintaining friendly relations with your neighbors, the people of China. We too are most anxious that the traditional friendship between the Amer and Chinese peoples shall continue and be fostered. We look forward to the time when the present barriers to the full expression of that friendship, which barriers have come into being through no desire on our part, may be lifted.

"I understand that yours is the only Govt outside the Soviet bloc which has effective dipl relations with the Peiping regime. Wld it be possible for you to apprise your Amb in Peiping of the President’s statement with respect to Formosa and continue to endeavor to per-
suade the Peiping authorities that their own interests require that they avoid intervention in the Korean situation or an attack upon Formosa.

"Although our recent communications unhappily highlighted our divergent views on the Peiping regime, they did serve to emphasize our unity of purpose to strengthen the United Nations in resisting aggression. We share your earnest desire that hostilities in Korea be terminated before they spread to other countries. I believe our agreement with respect to Korea is of greater importance than our disagreement over China."

ACHESON

Editorial Note


795B.551/7-2550 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, July 25, 1950—7 p. m.
[Received July 25—4:04 p. m.]

548. Personal for the Secretary's eyes only. Supplementing Embedel 544,1 Prime Minister informed me of details of decision to send ground forces to Korea. They will consist of a brigade group, three battalions of infantry, an armored regiment and supporting artillery. It will be a self-contained unit.

Forces will be sent from UK. It may take them some time to collect them since they are not now in existence in this particular form. Two months may elapse before the movement can commence.

These details may not be announced in House of Commons tomorrow but you doubtless will get them through Franks.2

DOUGLAS

1 Although transmitted from London at 6 p. m. on July 25, this telegram was not received until 11:25 p. m. on that date. The text read as follows: "Personal for Secretary eyes only. Matter of sending British ground troops to Korea satisfactory and voluntary. Announcement will be made in House of Commons tomorrow. Please guard with great discretion until that time." (795B.551/7-2550)

2 Ambassador Franks transmitted the information on the U.K. contribution of ground forces to Mr. Jessup on the afternoon of July 25; Ambassador Jessup then passed it along to Mr. Acheson in a memorandum of that date, not printed (795B.5/7-2550).
Draft Memorandum Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON, July 25, 1950.]

Problem:

To decide upon U.S. policy regarding the advance beyond the 38th parallel of U.S. forces now engaged in Korea as a part of the U.N. forces.

Analysis:

1. As U.N. forces drive back North Korean forces and approach the 38th parallel, the decisions and actions taken by the United States and other U.N. members which are supporting the Security Council Resolutions, and those taken by the Kremlin, will determine whether hostilities can be confined to Korea or will spread so that the danger of a third world war is greatly increased.

2. In its Resolution of June 25, 1950, the United Nations Security Council (a) noted "with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea"; (b) determined that this action constitutes a breach of the peace; (c) called for the immediate cessation of hostilities; (d) called upon "the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel"; and (e) called upon "all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities."

3. In its Resolution of June 27, 1950, the Security Council (a) noted "from the report of the United Nations Commission for Korea that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security"; (b) noted "the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security"; and (c) recommended "that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."

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1 The source text bore the notation that it was drafted on July 25 by George H. Butler of the Policy Planning Staff; it was forwarded to Max W. Bishop, Department of State representative on the NSC staff, by Philip Watts under cover of a memorandum dated July 26, not printed, which indicated that the document was now ready to go to the NSC staff for appropriate processing. Mr. Watts' memorandum also noted that the document had been prepared by the Policy Planning Staff in consultation with Messrs. Jessup and Bishop along with representatives of the Bureaus of Far Eastern and United Nations Affairs.
4. In a third Resolution of July 7, the Security Council requested the United States to designate a Commander for all the forces of the members of the United Nations in the Korean operation, and authorized these forces to fly the U.N. flag. In response to this Resolution, General MacArthur was designated as Commander of these forces. The Republic of Korea also has placed its forces under General MacArthur’s command.

5. In his message to the Congress on July 19, President Truman stated that he thought it important that the nature of our military action in Korea be understood; that it should be made perfectly clear that the action was undertaken as a matter of basic moral principle; that the United States was going to the aid of a nation established and supported by the United Nations and unjustifiably attacked by an aggressor force.

6. The present military action in Korea responds to the Security Council resolutions which come within the scope of provisions of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter dealing with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.

7. The General Assembly Resolutions of November 14, 1947, December 12, 1948, and October 21, 1949 are a part of the U.N. effort which is strongly supported by the United States, to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea. This effort is based upon provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter, dealing with pacific settlement of disputes.

8. There are, therefore, two phases of the Korean problem: (a) the long-term effort to bring about unity and independence, and (b) the present enforcement action to repel North Korean aggression. This paper is addressed primarily to the latter phase of the problem.

9. The following contingencies are envisaged as the U.N. enforcement action develops, provided North Korean forces are not reinforced by U.S.S.R. or Communist Chinese troops; (a) voluntary withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel before U.N. forces have begun a counter-offensive; (b) a withdrawal in good order of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel at a time when they are being driven northward to a point approaching the 38th parallel; (c) a major defeat and disintegration of North Korean forces during the period when they are being driven back toward the 38th parallel; (d) continued resistance by North Korean forces after U.N. forces have reached the 38th parallel. Another contingency is the occupation of North Korea to the 38th parallel by Soviet or Communist Chinese forces before the U.N. forces reach the 38th parallel, or active support of the North Korean forces south of the 38th parallel by Chinese Communist or Soviet forces.
10. A need for important decisions will arise with a reversal of the military situation in Korea and the approach of U.N. forces toward the 38th parallel. It is probable that at the time when it becomes apparent that the North Korean aggression cannot succeed and that eventually North Korean forces will be driven back north of the 38th parallel the Kremlin will take a decision (if it has not already done so) regarding a course of action in the new situation.

11. There is ample evidence of the strategic importance to Russia of the Korean peninsula. It is unlikely that the Kremlin at present would accept the establishment in North Korea of a regime which it could not dominate and control.

When it becomes apparent that the North Korean aggression will be defeated, there might be some agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the North Korean regime which would mean in substance that U.N. military action north of the 38th parallel would result in conflict with the U.S.S.R. or Communist China.

While fighting is in progress south of the 38th parallel the Kremlin might bring about the occupation of North Korea either with its own or with Chinese communist forces.

The Kremlin might initiate some move toward a negotiated settlement while hostilities still are in progress south of the 38th parallel. We should guard against terms that would leave the aggressor in an advantageous position, that would invite a repetition of aggression, and that would undermine the authority and strength of the United Nations.

12. If North Korean forces withdraw or are driven back to the 38th parallel, continued military action by the U.N. forces for the purpose of imposing a settlement with a view to a unified and independent Korea would depend upon majority support in the U.N.

13. There probably would be reluctance and opposition to multilateral use of force as a part of the United Nations effort, initiated under the provisions for pacific settlement, to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea. Conversely, there probably would be gratification and acclaim were extraordinary efforts to be made to avoid such use of force. The above would be true particularly in many of the countries of Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia.

14. It will be desirable to bear in mind both the eventual advisability of securing, through intensive diplomatic preparation, support on the part of the majority of United Nations Members for any action that might be taken beyond the 38th parallel, and the possible advantages of assuming a position which will clearly show that every effort has been exhausted to avoid carrying the military struggle into a new phase by a land offensive beyond the 38th parallel.
15. The future of the Korean people is an important consideration. The United States has supported the U.N. effort to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea. However, the United States has not had and does not now have any commitment to use military force to bring about that independence and unity.

Having been the victim of armed attack from North Korea, the Republic of Korea naturally will want a settlement that gives a maximum guarantee against the danger of similar future attacks. The Korean people and Government already are insisting that the 38th parallel division must go and that the present opportunity to unify the country must be seized.

16. Likewise, public and Congressional opinion in the United States might be dissatisfied with any conclusion falling short of what it would consider a "final" settlement of the problem. Hence, a sentiment might arise favoring a continuation of military action north of the 38th parallel.

17. The advantages of an effort involving the use of military force to attain the complete independence and unity of Korea after the North Korean forces have been driven back to the 38th parallel must be weighed against the disadvantages of such a course. If the North Korean forces are decisively defeated and if North Korea suffers heavy material damage from air attack, those forces are not likely to attack again soon. The United States and other U.N. members should be in a much stronger position to take effective action as present efforts have time to take effect. It seems likely, also, that a satisfactory permanent solution of the Korean problem can be hoped for only when and if a substantial accommodation is reached between the U.S.S.R. and the non-communist world.

Conclusions:

18. It is U.S. policy to help bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea. That policy has a sound basis of right and principle. U.S. action to carry out the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council regarding North Korean aggression are in accord with our policy of strong support of the United Nations; but we have no commitment to use armed force in the effort to bring about Korean independence and unity.

19. The Korean problem must be dealt with in the wider framework of the conflict between the communist and non-communist countries. The necessity to maintain a realistic balance between our military strength on the one hand and commitments and risks on the other
hand, together with the need for additional information which depends upon political and military developments in the near future, make it impossible to take decisions now regarding our future course of action in Korea. It seems clear that our national security and interest will be best served at present by maintaining the greatest possible degree of flexibility and freedom of action.

Recommendations:

20. The present vigorous U.S. action in support of the United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding North Korean aggression should be continued.

21. Decisions regarding our course of action when the U.N. forces approach the 38th parallel should be deferred until military and political developments provide the additional information necessary to enable us: (a) to base our decisions on the situation in Korea and in other parts of the world at that time; (b) to consult with other U.N. members who are supporting the Security Council resolutions in regard to measures which might be necessary or desirable once the aggression has been brought to an end; and (c) to keep our military capabilities and commitments in safe balance.

735.00/T-2850

The Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Foreign Military Affairs and Assistance (Burns)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 25, 1950.

MY DEAR GENERAL BURNS: I refer to the Secretary of State’s letter of July 24, 1950 1 to the Secretary of Defense on the subject of general policy on offers of military assistance by members of the United Nations in support of the operation in Korea. On the basis of preliminary indications from the Department of Defense in the case of particular countries, the Department has already taken steps actively to encourage commitments to provide such assistance by certain governments, such as the United Kingdom, Pakistan, Australia, and New Zealand. In order to extend these efforts, it is necessary to have an indication from the Department of Defense of those countries on whose governments we should concentrate our efforts. Without

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1 See the circular telegram, July 24, 5 a.m., p. 457.
prejudice to suggesting future additions, I would appreciate it if you could secure for me from the Department of Defense its views on our proposed approach to the governments of the countries listed below for the purpose of securing from them a promise to provide ground forces:

- United Kingdom
- Thailand
- Canada
- Philippines
- Australia
- Brazil
- New Zealand
- Belgium
- Pakistan
- Netherlands
- India
- Turkey
- Argentina
- Greece
- France
- Union of South Africa

Parenthetically, it should be noted that Thailand has already made a specific offer of 4,000 infantry subject to confirmation by its King.

It would also be helpful if in your reply you could inform the Department of the minimum requirements as, for example, to size of unit and arrangements for self-supply in order that we might put our request upon the proper basis. In this connection, it would also be helpful if you could indicate in the case of countries such as France which have defense obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty, what would be the maximum force which the Department of Defense feels could be detached for service in Korea without seriously weakening defense arrangements elsewhere with which this government is concerned.

Finally, I would appreciate it if the Department of Defense would give urgent consideration to the possibility of enlisting Philippine nationals with combat experience in the United States Army. As you know, the Philippine Government has stated that former Philippine scouts to the number of 26,000 are available to volunteer for service with the United Nations in Korea. The Department is replying to the Philippine Government’s offer that the United States welcomes all offers of military aid and assumes in the case of this offer that such Philippine forces would be paid by the Philippine Government and would serve under the Philippine flag. Notwithstanding this possibility, the Department is most anxious to have the alternative of their enlistment in the United States Army explored.

Sincerely yours,

H. Freeman Matthews
Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 25, 1950.

NSC 76/1

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON U.S. COURSES OF ACTION IN THE EVENT SOVIET FORCES ENTER KOREAN HOSTILITIES

References: NSC Action No. 308-c

The enclosed comments on NSC 76, prepared by the Department of State and the National Security Resources Board Consultants, respectively, are submitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council in connection with its consideration of NSC 76 as Item 2 on the Agenda of the Meeting scheduled for Thursday, July 27, 1950.

The National Security Council Consultants recommend that after discussion by the Council, NSC 76 together with the enclosures be referred to the Consultants for preparation of a report on the subject in the light of the discussion by the Council.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

[Enclosure]

STATE DEPARTMENT CONSULTANT'S COMMENTS WITH RESPECT TO NSC 76

1. The State Department agrees completely that full-scale mobilization should be initiated immediately it is determined that major Soviet combat units have entered Korean hostilities or have indicated their intention of engaging. The further decisions set forth in NSC 76 relate to the most basic national policies and should not be taken except at the highest level in the light of all relevant circumstances at the time.

1 The text of the record of action, taken at the 58th NSC meeting on June 28, read as follows: "Agreed that the Council should prepare for consideration by the President recommendations as to the courses of action to be followed in the event that Soviet forces enter Korean hostilities." (NSC files) See also footnote 1 to the note from Auchincloss to Johnson, June 28, p. 217.

2 See footnote 2 to the memorandum, July 10, from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, p. 346.

3 The comments of the NSRB Consultant are not printed.
2. The determination whether major Soviet combat units have entered Korean hostilities or have clearly indicated their intention of engaging in hostilities, and the decision to initiate the actions contemplated by NSC 76 should be made only by the President. It is difficult at this time to foresee clearly the various possible ways in which the engagement of Soviet combat units might be indicated or occur. It would be of the utmost importance that a course of action not be touched off by an incorrect evaluation of the actual situation which had arisen.4

3. The phrases "prepare to minimize its commitment in Korea" and "prepare to execute war plans" appear to require clarification. The State Department assumes that the phrase "prepare to minimize its commitment" means that the evacuation of Korea would be prepared and undertaken. The State Department is not clear as to what, in addition to the initiation of full-scale mobilization, is contemplated by the phrase "prepare to execute war plans". In any event, it is the opinion of the State Department that the actual decision should be made by the President in the light of all the circumstances at the time. It is the State Department's opinion that, prior to the actual execution of war plans, careful consideration should be given to the following points, among others:


b. The effect on our relations with our principal allies. The Atlantic Pact does not by its terms cover hostilities breaking out in Korea.

c. The advisability of the immediate execution of war plans under the particular state of facts which had occurred. In this connection it would be important to determine:

(1) Whether the nature of the commitment of Soviet forces had been such as to secure the clear support of world opinion for the execution of war plans by us.

(2) What would be the effect upon our allies, in particular our European allies, of an immediate generalization of hostilities.

(3) Whether the country was sufficiently mobilized to carry out its war plans with maximum effectiveness in the light not

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4 At its 62nd meeting on July 27, the NSC recorded the following decision taken as Action No. 324 (b):

"Agreed with the recommendation by the Secretary of State that, in order to establish the fact of support to the North Koreans by the USSR or the Chinese Communists, aerial reconnaissance over all Korean territory, including Korean coastal waters, up to the Yalu River on the west and up to but short of the Korean-Soviet International boundary on the east should be authorized, subject to the understanding that such operations will be conducted from as far south of the frontiers of Manchuria or the Soviet Union as practicable, and that in no case will these frontiers be overflown.

"Note: The action in b above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate action." (NSC files)

Appropriate instructions were sent out by the JCS to General MacArthur in telegram JCS 88051, August 5, for text, see vol. vi, p. 424.
only of the immediate military situation but also of the total campaign to be waged, or whether additional time for mobilization would improve the prospects of ultimate victory.

d. The type of action to be taken by the Congress before the initiation of war plans. A decision as to what action the Congress should take would have to be made by the President.  

5 According to Action No. 328 taken at the 62nd meeting of the NSC on July 27, the NSC “noted and discussed the reference reports [NSC 76 and 76/1] and referred them to the NSC Consultants and Staff for the preparation of recommendations for Council action thereon”. (NSC files) Subsequently, this action was cancelled in the light of action taken on NSC 73/4 of August 25, scheduled for publication in volume 1, and NSC 81/1, September 9, post, p. 712.

795.00/7–2651 : Circular telegram
The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices

SECRET
WASHINGTON, July 26, 1950—11 a. m.

Reporting 2 NK divisions tentatively identified pushing E from SW Korea in direction Pusan, 3 or 4 NK divisions pressing against elements 2 US divisions in central front Yongdong (50 miles NW of Taegu), and 3 fresh NK divisions, including veteran First Division, pushing ROK forces back near Hamchang (50 miles NW of Taegu), Tokyo Hqrs states NK engaged in classical double envelopment on theatre basis with 2 or possibly 3 corps of 3 or 4 divisions each. Tokyo Hqrs reports that unless center line can be held against envelopment, forward elements must be retracted toward more continuous perimeter for final defense Pusan. Continuous advance NK forces regardless heavy losses and setbacks caused by US air attack indicates NK war footing and armament had been underestimated.

ACHESON

1 Sent to 40 diplomatic and consular offices.

795B.551/7–2650 : Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
LONDON, July 26, 1950—11 a. m.
[Received July 26—7:39 p. m.]

554. Personal eyes only for the Secretary. Further supplementing Embtel 544 1 and 548, July 25, failed to mention HM’s offer will be to

2 See footnote 1 to telegram 548, July 25, p. 468.
the United Nations in response to Trygve Lie’s call. US Government and Joint Chiefs of Staff can arrange for such details as have not already in advance of the notification to Trygve Lie been arranged.

I hope that when the announcement of the British contribution is made there will be a full explanation of the first-rate war the British have been fighting in Malaya against the Communist for some two years, of the position they are in at Hong Kong and the need for forces not only for the defence of the colony against attack from without but also for the security of the Colony against the widespread subversive elements that there are within. I hope too that an explanation will be made of the requirements for British troops to guard and defend the lifeline—the Middle East, and, finally, of the need for forces on this island which is so vulnerable to attack and so important in general strategic plan.

I suggest it might be helpful also if it were made very clear that, notwithstanding all these world-wide demands on their military resources, British had contributed in initial stages greater naval forces, prior to the arrival of the Boxer, than we ourselves had in the Korean affair and that notwithstanding the exposed position of this island to hostile air attacks, she had made available a carrier.

DOUGLAS

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2 The text of the message from the U.K. Government to the Secretary General is contained in U.N. document S/1633; it indicated that a “self-contained force” would be sent to reinforce the troops serving under the U.N. Command in Korea.

611.94A/7-2750: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

NEW DELHI, July 27, 1950—7 p. m.

[Received July 27—4:17 a. m.]

210. 1. On evening of July 26, I handed Bajpai, SYG MEA, message from you to Nehru contained in Dept 115, July 25.

2. Bajpai, whose ruffled feelings I had smoothed down during friendly chat at my house on preceding evening, received message graciously, read it carefully and said he thought that it would be helpful. Referring to suggestion re forwarding statement of President on Formosa to Peiping, Bajpai said that passage from President’s speech on this subject had already been telegraphed to Panikkar. Panikkar had not been instructed to bring it to attention Peiping Government but Bajpai thought it likely Nehru would authorize instruction to be issued. I asked if President’s statement had been useful in clarifying US policy and intentions re island. Bajpai said it had been extremely useful; it had been telegraphed to New Delhi by
Madame Pandit who claimed credit for its issuance. I said that I hoped Madame Pandit would be given credit. Some of her suggestions in Washington had been deeply appreciated.

3. Bajpai said that he hoped we would not obtain impression that Prime Minister was resentful because US could not accept his suggestion re Chinese representative in SC. Prime Minister had been disappointed but he had no ill will against US because our attitude. Prime Minister was concerned, however, at what situation would be when GA opened in autumn without Russia and Russian satellites. UN without Communist countries would not be truly representative of present world and might well deteriorate in manner League of Nations. It was to be hoped that US did not prefer permanent absence of Russia and her satellites from GA and organs of UN.

4. I said my understanding was that US deplored absence Russia but considered that such absence was voluntary and that it would be fatal endeavor induce Russia return by making concessions which would weaken UN or which would be at expense of nations or peoples who looked to UN for support in maintenance their independence and integrity. There was doubt, however, on part US Government that presence Russia at this time in SC would contribute to solution of Korean problem in its present phase.

HENDERSON

330/7-2750: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

New York, July 27, 1950—12:38 p.m. [Received July 27—1:18 p.m.]

140. Confirmation of telecon with Popper, UNA, following his text of UN draft resolution on emergency relief, assistance, and medical aid in Korea as received from Cordier:

"The SC, concerned by the destruction and suffering caused to the people of Korea as a result of the invasion by the NK forces,

"Desirous of providing for immediate and effective relief to aid the people of Korea,

"Recalling the provisions of its resolutions of June 25 and June 27, 1950 relating to assistance to the ROK,

"Request all governments as a matter of grave urgency to furnish such assistance as is within their means for the relief of suffering in Korea,

"Authorizes the Secretary General and the unified command, established under the resolution of July 7, to provide in consultation the necessary administrative procedures and organization for the mobili-"
zation and distribution of relief supplies and for the employment and
direction of relief personnel;

"Requests the Secretary General to make available such personnel
as is necessary to assist in the conduct of the relief operation in Korea
and to make reports to the SC and to the ECOSOC on the progress of
the relief effort,

"Requests the ECOSOC:

"a. To urge the specialized agencies, the UNICEF, and other ap-
propriate organizations to assist the relief effort in Korea in every way
possible.

"b. To receive and consider reports by the Secretary General on the
progress of the relief effort, and

"c. To consider plans for longer term economic assistance to the
people of Korea."

PARTMENT

795.00/7-2750

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs
(Allison) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs (Rush)

TOP SECRET


Subject: Policy Planning Staff Paper on Korea ¹ to be Discussed at
Under Secretary's Meeting, July 28.²

As I mentioned to you yesterday, the present Policy Planning Staff
paper on the problem of what US policy should be regarding advance
beyond the 38th parallel is much better than previous drafts and I
believe can be supported by FE with only minor changes. These
changes which I suggest are in the Analysis part of the paper rather
than in the Conclusions and Recommendations.

I believe that paragraph 13 on page 5, as it now stands, gives a
slanted view of the situation and I suggest that the first three words
of the first sentence of this paragraph be eliminated and that the fol-
lowing words be substituted: "The possibility cannot be ignored that
there might . . . ."

It is suggested that in paragraph 14 the word "reasonable" be
inserted in the third line from the bottom of page 5 after the word
"every".

The following changes are suggested in paragraph 16 in order to
bring it into line with what I believe to be the true situation. In the
second line of paragraph 16, cross out the words "might be" and insert

¹ See the draft memorandum dated July 25, p. 469.
² Post, p. 486.
instead "is already beginning to show" and then change the next word from "dissatisfied" to "dissatisfaction". In the second sentence of paragraph 16, cross out the fourth word, "might", and substitute "may well".

I believe the Conclusions and Recommendations are all right and, while they do not go as far as I personally would like, nevertheless I believe they do go as far as we can reasonably expect at the present time.

The present paper does not, in my opinion, entirely comply with the President's request, which was that the National Security Council should prepare for his consideration a report on the "Future United States Policy with Respect to North Korea". While it is true that special attention was called to the policy to be pursued after the North Korean forces had been driven back to the 38th parallel, there is much more to the problem than just that. It is suggested that you point out at the Under Secretary's Meeting that, while FE goes along with the present paper, it nevertheless feels that continued studies should be made on the whole question of future US policy toward Korea and that on this broader question you understand that FE will continue to have action responsibility in accordance with the memorandum you sent out last Monday to the various Offices concerned.3

3Reference is to a memorandum by Mr. Rusk dated July 22 (Saturday), not printed, wherein Mr. Allison was designated as the responsible officer to act as steering member for the Department of State's studies on future U.S. policy with respect to North Korea (795.00/7-2250).

795.00/7-2750

The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Foreign Military Affairs and Assistance (Burns) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

SECRET


My Dear Mr. Matthews: I refer to your letter of July 25 concerning military assistance by members of the United Nations in support of the operation in Korea. The Department of Defense has under study the general questions of criteria of useful military assistance and countries from which, from a military point of view, and in light of general strategic considerations, such assistance might be afforded. These views will be transmitted to the Department of State in due course.
I can, perhaps, clarify to you the position of the Department of Defense with regard to some of the questions raised in your letter. By letter of 7 July,¹ the Department of State was informed that ground forces from Pakistan were desired. By telephone conversation between our respective Secretaries on 14 July and in discussions between members of our offices, you were informed of the Joint Chiefs of Staff opinion that useful aid, particularly in the form of ground units, could be provided from the United Kingdom, Australia, Pakistan, New Zealand and Canada, but that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that no aid be requested from the Philippines, Italy, Turkey or Saudi Arabia, since the latter countries may have urgent need for their own use of all the forces which are available to them.

With regard to minimum requirements, as for example size of units and arrangements for self-supply, I refer you to our letter of 26 July concerning New Zealand, Lebanese and French offers, which should furnish some guidance pending completion of the more general study previously referred to.²

Concerning the enlistment of Filipino nationals with combat experience in the U.S. Army, I am advised that present laws, subject perhaps to a few very minor exceptions, would not permit this to be done. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not, at this time, recommend new legislation to permit acceptance of alien volunteers in the U.S. armed forces.

Sincerely yours,

J. H. Burns

¹Not printed.
²In the letter of July 26, not printed, Secretary of Defense Johnson forwarded the views of the JCS, with which he concurred, on acceptance of the French offer of a warship for use in Korean waters and the Lebanese offer of use of ports and airfields. The letter also advised acceptance of offers from New Zealand and Lebanon to furnish ground force units for operations in Korea. In regard to the latter offer, the following views of the JCS were transmitted for general guidance:

"... In order to permit ready integration of such units into the over-all military effort, it is considered that in accepting the offers of these countries it should be pointed out that it is desirable that the forces contributed by each should consist of one infantry battalion augmented by appropriate combat and service support, with a total strength of approximately 1,000. The forces so furnished should be fully equipped and should arrive in the field of operations with a sixty days level of supplies, on transportation provided either by the parent nation or by contributing U.N. nations. Parent nations should be responsible for full logistic support on a continuing basis utilizing shipping either available to them or as provided under an integrated shipping program. However, in the event such full support is not practicable, the units should be integrated into the U.S. supply program, to the extent that common supply items are usable by them. The cost of such items should be repaid to the U.S. Government. Items of supply peculiar to the forces furnished must be provided by the parent nations.

"It is desirable that sufficient personnel of the units speak English in order that language barriers will not unduly hamper operations." (795B.3/7-2650)
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

Moscow, July 27, 1950—7 p.m.

[Received July 27—7:03 p.m.]

215. 1. Prospect of protracted UN/US military campaign Korea involving so much concentration on the fluctuations in our military fortunes, suggests importance continuing to clarify and delimit our political objectives in Korea. It would seem particularly important that our policy be currently adjusted so as to keep Korea in proper correlation to those other worldwide problems we face, in containing Soviet expansionism by building up “situations of strength” in the free world. Key political issue insofar as Korea is concerned would seem to be whether we should now, or in near future, commit ourselves to a policy of using armed force under UN auspices to eliminate Soviet influence and power from that part of Korea lying north of 38th Parallel, as essential step forward establishment unified and democratic Korea.

2. As understood here, present position this respect is that UN is by virtue UNGA recommendations still committed to achievement Korean unity by peaceful UNCOUK mediation, whereas under recent SC decisions UN is now also committed to expulsion by force of NK troops from ROK territory (unless they withdraw voluntarily). Presumably under article 12 (1) of UN charter facts that SC now seized of Korean issue precludes further UNGA recommendations unless requested by SC. It would appear therefore that if UN is to make any further political recommendations re-Korea, SC must itself take action or authorize forthcoming UNGA to do so.

3. To date neither in Soviet press nor in official statements has Politburo foreshadowed reaction to situation which will arise when tide of battle turns against NK troops and latter are retreating, or are about to do so. Cautious avoidance of any formal involvement of Soviet prestige in fortunes NK regime has been noteworthy (Embtel 183, July 21), and has effect leaving Soviets with freedom of action for time being. Embassy believes on basis: (1) its own estimate of Soviet intentions re all out war (Embdesp 514, April 25); (2) reasonable flexibility which Soviets have shown in past in withdrawing after tentative jabs beyond post war Iron Curtain frontiers (Iran, Greece, Berlin) have resulted in burnt fingers; and (3) Soviet attitude since Korean fighting began June 25, that at critical phase for

\[1\] See footnote 3 to telegram 1726, from Moscow, received at 9:59 a.m. on June 25, p. 139.
NK régime as above envisaged, Soviets will not throw their own forces into South Korea or any other forces possibly at their disposal (Chinese Communist troops). Rather they are more likely, first, to attempt to arrange some kind of cease fire and truce on basis military status quo, and if this is unsuccessful, then to order NK troops to withdraw to 38th Parallel, announcing to world that KPDR has been persuaded by Soviets to bring to halt their punitive measures to deal with ROK aggressors; that this is evidence Soviet love for peace (thus salvaging some face); and, lastly, possibly proclaiming in one form or another inviolability of 38th Parallel (perhaps by signing treaty of friendship and mutual defense with KPDR at this juncture).

Possibility cannot be excluded that Soviets may make declaration re inviolability 38th Parallel well prior to period of NK military reverses with view deterring UN from adopting any resolution calling for action to unify Korea with assistance UN forces and or to punish NK aggression through military occupation north of 38th Parallel. Soviets would then be counting on intimidating some UN members on basis that to take action in face such warning would precipitate WW III.

4. On other hand, Soviets may feel that for them to commit themselves definitely to defense NK, particularly if UN had earlier indicated its determination take all steps within its power to bring about establishment unified and democratic Korea after restoration peace and security in the area, would involve risk all out war, which Embassy believes Soviets still wish to avoid. We should obviously be prepared to take quick advantage of any such temporary military vacuum, such as political unification moves under UN auspices, using such UN and ROK military units as may be necessary for maintenance internal law and order.

5. Positive advantages which would derive from an early proclamation by UN of its determination to assist the Koreans by all possible means to achievement their freedom in an independent, unified and democratic state, are manifest. Such forthright enunciation would give heart to all non-Communist Koreans in their time of travail and would be particularly useful as a morale stimulant to those Koreans, both civilian and military, who are actively cooperating with US and UN forces. Proclamation by UN that objective UN effort is establishment unified and independent Asian state would also tend help our cause with vacillating non-Communist Asian opinion, which to considerable degree appears view present conflict struggle between two power blocs, without involving any fundamental principles of right or wrong.

6. From several points of view, therefore, it seems desirable UN formulate and declare its purposes regarding political future of Korea. No doubt we are sufficiently in touch with sympathetic fellow UN
members to take sounding with view crystallizing the nature and timing of such declaration. This connection Embassy believes that while an affirmation by SC, that UN will persist in its efforts towards Korean unity, might well be made now or in near future, it would be decidedly premature to make any move which would definitely commit us to use our forces north of 38th Parallel regardless of military situation in NK at time NK troops in South Korea near defeat. Our enormous responsibilities in Western Europe, not to mention peripheral sore spots in SEA and NE, preclude any commitments to extend our Korean effort beyond present objectives until we are in better position evaluate degree to which Soviets are willing to risk showdown in Korean peninsula which, it must be recognized, does constitute favorable military terrain for Soviets and their Asian puppets.

7. In essence Soviet inspired NK aggression left us with but one choice: to demonstrate unmistakably before eyes free world that we would not permit extension Soviet power by armed aggression beyond present limits Soviet sphere. Our firm stand and willingness to undertake risks and sacrifices for that end have made a deep impression not only on non-Communist world but, I am sure, on Soviet leaders too. We should seek to achieve a basic solution of the Korean political problem at the same time as we inflict a decisive defeat on the NK aggressors, and it is possible that the latter event will open the path to a solution. At present time, however, it should be recognized that we are not in a position to make a realistic appraisal of the obstacles, military and otherwise, that will face us even after NK troops in South Korea have been defeated; and elementary prudence dictates that we not take on now an obligation, the fulfillment of which may require a US military effort out of proportion to political and strategic importance of Korea.


Kirk

330/7-2850: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT

NEW DELHI, July 28, 1950—1 p. m.

[Received July 28—7:40 a.m.]

219. 1. GOI apparently somewhat embarrassed at unexpected Soviet decision return SC even though Communist China has not been admitted.1 This embarrassment arises from fact that GOI has been

1 On July 27, the Soviet Representative at the United Nations (Malik) communicated to Secretary-General Lie his intention to assume the presidency of the Security Council during the month of August and to call a meeting of the Council for August 1 (see U.N. document S/1643).
basing its approaches to other governments re importance admittance Communist China on assumption that such admittance is condition precedent to return Russia.

2. Bajpai, SYG, MEA, told me this morning GOI taken completely by surprise at Soviet decision. Journalist had asked him whether Soviet decision had been influenced by Nehru’s recent approaches and Bajpai had answered categorically that there could be no connection. GOI had not been working merely to get Russia back into SC.

3. I also obtained impression from conversation with Bajpai that GOI is somewhat concerned lest Russia take course of action in SC which will deepen rift in UN.

HENDERSON

Files of the Under Secretary of State: UM M-225

Memorandum for the Files on a Meeting Held in the Office of the Under Secretary of State (Webb)¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 28, 1950—10 a. m.

Advance Beyond the 38th Parallel (UM D-109)²

1. Mr. Nitze explained that the substance of the recommendations in this paper was that we should wait until the time comes when our troops approach the 38th parallel before deciding whether to cross it or not. Mr. Dulles concurred with these conclusions emphasizing that the important thing was to remain flexible. Mr. McGhee pointed out that this conclusion was necessary in view of the possibility that Russian troops might reoccupy North Korea, in which case a U.S. decision to go beyond the 38th parallel would then involve us in fighting Russian troops.

2. It was recognized that other States will want to know now what our intentions are. Mr. McGhee also pointed out that it would be desirable for the UN to have a policy on how to punish an aggressor. The North Koreans should not be left in exactly the same position they were in before they started.

3. Mr. Tate ³ stated that the General Assembly actions of 1947, 1948 and 1949 on Korea had been taken under Article 14 of the Charter rather than under Chapter 6 as indicated in the paper. Mr. Tate also suggested that we should speak of the North Korean “attack” rather than of their “aggression”, because the later word might imply the existence of a North Korean State.

¹The meeting, one of a regular series, was chaired by Mr. Webb and attended by 25 Department of State officials.
²See the draft memorandum prepared by the Policy Planning Staff, July 25, p. 469.
³Jack B. Tate, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State.
4. Mr. Nitze will see that the section dealing with UN support for an advance beyond the 38th parallel is rewritten to take account of the views expressed by Messrs. McGhee, Miller, and Sandifer. These agreed that it might be possible to get UN support for such a move and, as Mr. Rusk stated, that the important factor would be the position taken by those countries whose troops were doing the fighting.

5. It was recognized that the conclusions of this paper would make it difficult to conduct an effective public information campaign. It was felt, however, that P could emphasize the UN actions and continuing efforts for Korean independence and unity. Mr. Dulles stressed the importance to the Koreans of national unity. He said he believed the kind of government under which they would be united was of secondary importance to most Koreans. He recognized therefore, that our propaganda may have to go further than the political position we are willing to take at the moment. The danger was also pointed out that if we should be pushed out of Korea, other States, particularly India, might be inclined to approve the fait accompli which had united Korea. This would be especially likely if the U.S. had not promised unity.

6. Mr. Rusk will take the initiative to have a section added dealing with our attitude toward a possible Soviet suggestion for an early voluntary withdrawal by the North Koreans.

7. Paragraph 16 will be modified to indicate that U.S. public and Congressional opinion would not now be satisfied with a restoration of the status quo ante, but on the other hand that they would probably not desire to make elimination of the 38th parallel a U.S. war objective.

*Durward V. Sandifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs.*

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761.00/7–2850: Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

PARIS, July 28, 1950—2 p. m.

[Received July 28—10:45 a. m.]

511. High Interior Ministry official in charge political intelligence has informed Embassy officer that according his best information Soviet objective now is to press China into war with US so as to keep US immobilized in Far East for long time to come. While recognizing potential Soviet threats to Western Europe, he largely discounts possibility Soviet aggression in Europe for time being. This opinion is shared by chief French counter-intelligence who also foresees Soviet policy turned primarily toward Asia in period immediately ahead. Latter appraises Soviet strategy as seeking encompass ultimate con-
quest West by initial exploitation weakened Western positions in so-called colonial areas. While envisaging no slackening meanwhile of Communist efforts to soften up Western Europe from within, he sees Soviets now seeking rapid acceleration this process through incitement to colonial insurrection. Accordingly, he anticipates out-break series limited "civil wars" or "wars of national liberation" principally in Asian theater and patterned on Korean model without risk direct engagement Soviet prestige or armed forces. Stalin in his opinion proposes maintain fixed abscess in Far East, draining of which will cost him nothing while requiring such immense US budgetary costs and dispersion of efforts as to invite serious economic crises and internal disorders in West upon which Soviets will continue to rely for final dislocation Western world.


BRUCE

Editorial Note

For the text of the Agreement between the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Korea regarding expenditures by forces under the command of the Commanding General, Armed Forces of the Member States of the United Nations, July 28, 1950, see TIAS No. 2135; 1 UST 705.

798.00/7-2550: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

LONDON, July 28, 1950—6 p. m. [Received July 28—3:25 p. m.]

622. Foreign Office has shown Embassy Office text of telegram dated July 25 from Peiping reading substantially as follows:

1. During long tête-à-tête on July 21, Chou En-lai ¹ made it quite clear to Panikkar that Chinese had every intention of avoiding implication in present hostilities unless forced on them.²

¹ Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China.
² At 9:25 a. m. on July 28, the Department of State had received the following message in telegram 218 from New Delhi:

"Acting British High Commissioner Roberts states he has received telegram from British Chargé Peiping which reported Chargé had been told by Panikkar that Chou En-lai during course of dinner with him stated frankly that Peiping had no desire to see hostilities in Korea extended beyond their present scope." (798B.00/7-2550)
2. Chou injected in conversation a tentative suggestion that India, Pakistan, Burma and Indonesia might make some sort of joint statement perhaps along with China that they, as recently established political entities primarily concerned in consolidation of internal social and economic structure, desired preventing if possible spread of hostilities, particularly into territories under their control.

3. Panikkar, in informing Hutchison* of above, stated he responded to Chou by pointing out nations mentioned had already made their views quite clear. He does not anticipate that the suggestion, tentatively mooted by Chou, will be pursued.

DOUGLAS

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795.00/7-2850

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 28, 1950.

Subject: Aid to Korea

Participants: The President;
Prime Minister Robert Menzies of Australia;
Secretary Acheson

The President received Mr. Menzies at 3:30 p.m. The interview, including the photographs, lasted approximately one hour.

The discussion opened with general conversation on non-business subjects.

The Prime Minister then raised the question of Australian defense and the sending of Australian ground forces to Korea. He said that Australia was wholeheartedly behind American policy and wished to play its full part in the defense of the free world. To do so Australia would have to increase its defense forces substantially. This required legislative changes. Australia also wished to send ground forces to support the United Nations in Korea. At present, however, it had no forces available. Out of the 2,000 troops in Japan only about 500 were combat troops and these had been enlisted only for service in Japan. The Prime Minister expected promptly upon his return to attack the whole broad subject. He did not think it advisable to confuse the broader issue by attacking first of all the problem of forces for Korea. He wished to get through a universal service bill and to remove restrictions upon the place of service since it was highly likely that in the event of general war Australian troops might be needed in the Near East and in the Far East beyond areas where service was now permissible. He had made his announcement that Australia would make ground forces available in Korea in order to commit his Govern-
ment to that objective, but it would not be immediately possible to provide the forces.

The President expressed the hope that the Prime Minister could make rapid progress both in regard to forces for Korea and the general expansion of the defense program.¹

¹In a separate memorandum of conversation dated July 28, not printed, Ambassador at Large Jessup reported on a conversation held on the previous evening at the Australian Embassy by Messrs. Acheson, Harriman, Dulles, and Jessup with Prime Minister Menzies and Australian Ambassador Norman J. O. Makin. Mr. Jessup’s memorandum contained the following excerpt: “Mr. Menzies raised the question of the seriousness of the damage caused by Nehru’s peace effort. The Secretary said that he thought the damage was serious but the consequences could not yet be determined.” (795B.00/7-2850)

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The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

WASHINGTON, July 28, 1950—7 p. m.

73. Dept wishes USUN to seek passage by SC of Res on relief and non-military assistance to Korea before Aug 1. Fol text is approved in Dept and shld be used in consultation with other Dels:

“The SC

“Recognizing the hardships and privations to which the people of ROK are being subjected as a result of the continued prosecution by the NK forces of their unlawful attack; and

“Appreciating the spontaneous offers of assistance to the Korean people which have been made by govs, specialized agencies, and non-governmental organizations,

“Requests the Unified Command (USG) to exercise responsibility for determining the requirements for the relief and support of the civilian population of Korea, and for establishing in the field the procedures for providing such relief and support;

“Requests the Economic and Social Council and the specialized agencies to provide such assistance as the Unified Command (USG) may request in the relief and support of the civilian population of Korea, and, as appropriate, in the implementation of the resolutions adopted by the SC on June 25, June 27 and July 7, 1950; and to that end directs the SyG, in consultation with the rep of ——, as rep of the SC [Alternative Form: in consultation with a comite of the SC consisting of reps of ——] to coordinate the nonmilitary assistance offered by govs, specialized agencies, and non-governmental organizations in fulfillment of the requirements set forth by the Unified Command (USG).”

Depts intention has been to produce simplified and flexible res whose passage wld place “UN umbrella” over civilian relief for Korea without interfering with responsibility of Unified Command (USG) in the field.
Ref in 4th para to implementation of SC Res is intended to cover such activities as UNESCO info program and ICAO air navigation assistance.

Re alternative language contained in para 4, Dept prefers single SC rep to participation SC comite. In Dept view centralization of coordinating functions in SYG is desirable as least cumbersome administrative arrangement. Moreover creation of SC comite here may stimulate request for SC Comite to handle military assistance. Nevertheless, in view of sentiment reported among SC Dels against leaving matter in hands of SYG, USUN may in its discretion agree to SC Comite despite Dept reluctance to see one established.

Dept regards Secretariat draft (ur tel 140 July 27) as unsatisfactory because it divides responsibility which shld be centralized in unified command.

ACHESON:

1 In this regard, Ambassador Austin had made the following observation in his telegram 109, July 24, not printed:

"... [There is a] very widespread and strong feeling here, by no means limited SC members, but definitely including most of them, that Secretariat has already exceeded its authority in number of respects. It is felt that hopeless confusion and ineffectiveness will result in total UN effort re Korea if Secretariat and other organs UN such as ECOSOC go riding off madly in all directions on own initiative without prior consideration and authorization by SC. I disagree with opinion that SYG has exceeded his responsibility under Charter. Opinions reported above are probably result of manner in which business has been transacted. However, feelings described above are held so strongly, particularly by Chauvel but also by others, as to constitute important political factor. ..." (340/7-2450)

Telegraph

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, July 29, 1950—4 p.m.

78. Fol is text of draft SC Res communicated to USUN by phone this afternoon. You are authorized to confer with friendly delegations on this draft. While we desire as large a measure of support as possible for this draft, we do not want to see it watered down nor do we want our hands tied in the event we shld want to introduce it unilaterally.

The condemnation clause in the draft is indispensable.

We believe that the Res provides a basis around which USUN can build its statement in SC.

We have not determined when it wld be best to introduce Res. We wld welcome your views on this subject.

The Security Council,

Condemns the North Korean authorities for their continued defiance of the United Nations;
Calls Upon all States to use their influence to prevail upon the authorities of North Korea to cease this defiance;
Calls Upon all States to prevent the spread to other areas of the conflict in Korea; and
Calls Upon all States to refrain from action which might endanger international peace and security in other areas.

ACHESON

330/7–2950 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

Moscow, July 29, 1950—8 p.m.
PRIORITY

[Received July 29—4:49 p.m.]

237. Embassy views prospective Soviet return to SC as Soviet tactical retreat dictated by over-all course world developments since inception Korean fighting and believes that Soviets have utilized the coincidental circumstances of their alphabetical succession to SC presidency as convenient face-saving cover for their decision to return. Embassy bases this opinion on its estimate of long-term prospects which have been confronting Kremlin in past few weeks, and perhaps one tangible corroborative piece of evidence is the curiously indirect manner in which Soviet public has been informed of this development (Embtel 232, July 29).

One prospect facing the Soviets is that the UN is “marching away” from the minority Soviet bloc, taking with it the Charter, the UN flag, and the SYG. The free world, united as it never has been before on any important issue, is achieving a moral and physical cohesion through the UN which bodes ill for the Kremlin's long term ambitions to remake the world in its image.

As Embassy has stated in previous cables, while Soviets attach considerable importance to advantages which they derive from UN membership, at such time as they felt UN would hamper the attainment of important Soviet objectives, they would not hesitate to leave UN in a fashion calculated to disrupt the organization. The fact that the Soviet boycott of UN during its consideration of Korean issue has not achieved such disruption but, on the contrary, has led to

1 The text of this telegram read as follows:

"Following complete text of Soviet announcement via New York Tass item dated July 28 their intention participate SC meeting August 1.

"[Members of SC again assembling July 28 [see U.N. document S/PV. 478], during prolonged period discussion report submitted by Austin. Speakers limited selves to short remarks in which they obligingly approved Austin's report. After statements representatives of France, England, Cuba, India and Ecuador, President Sunde closed meeting and set new meeting for July 31. This decision of Sunde provides delegates of Anglo-American bloc with opportunity to continue hurried behind-scenes negotiations and hold new meeting before representative of USSR Malik occupies post of presidency of SC on August 1 when turn of representative of Soviet Union to preside in SC begins." (330/7–2950)"
greater free world unity within UN, must have made deep impression
on Soviet leaders (Soviet public was never permitted to glimpse
factual picture of concerted UN effort re Korea).

Related to first prospect, but of even greater import to Kremlin is
the stimulus which their Korean military adventure has given to
building up of the military strength of the free world, and in par-
ticular that of the US and UK. If Embassy estimate that Soviets not
now prepared to invite consequences of global conflict with west
(Embdes 514, April 25) is correct even under present circumstances
(which at least afford Soviets excellent opportunities for initial mili-
tary victories in Europe and Asia) with what serious concern must
Kremlin view march of events which threatens to give west much
stronger relative military position within next year or two.

Impelled by considerations of foregoing nature to make tactical
retreat from position so long and stubbornly maintained on Chinese
representation issue, Soviets will no doubt exploit to the full the pos-
sibilities for maneuver which their new position affords. Their return
to the UN opens up following avenues of approach which were at least
partially closed to them during their willful boycott:

(1) They regain UN forum for use as world sounding board for
all their views and propaganda;

(2) More particularly, they can once again project into UN their
phony “peace movement”, including “Stockholm appeal”, and perhaps
even a more attractively packaged version of their UNGA “peace
pact”.

(3) They will certainly take full advantage of their return to
resume familiar disruptionist and obstructive tactics and to encourage
maximum dissension among free world governments represented on
SC. Use of veto one of several methods open to them this connection.

(4) They may feel that given the tough free world attitude that
prompted their return and the serious dangers, military and otherwise,
which confront them in that regard, the first three avenues will not
suffice and that, making a virtue of necessity, the time has come to
make concrete appeasement moves (e.g., on Korea) which would tend
to relax marshalling of free world strength which has been under
way since onset Korean affair. Their return to SC per se might be
conceived as step in this direction.

Having indicated that they will return to SC without prior decision
their favor re Chinese Communist representation, question arises as to
what action Soviet representative will now take to press that issue.
Unless Soviets have made advance deals assuring favorable vote for
seating Chinese Communists (which seems unlikely from information
available here), precipitating a vote on this matter would place Soviets
in awkward position, particularly if Embassy analysis of underlying

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2 See Footnote 3 to telegram 1726 from Moscow, received at 9:59 a.m. on
June 25, p. 139.
reason for Soviet return to SC essentially valid. It is believed, therefore, that Soviets may follow path already marked for them in Nehru-Stalin correspondence of linking peaceful settlement in Korea with question proper composition SC, thus opening up general discussion with vote delayed for time being. Fact that spotlight has shifted from Chinese representation matter to Korea may, in fact, have been important reason why Soviets may have deemed it possible to get back in SC without too much loss of prestige.

From Soviet point of view this is propitious time make “peace” moves re Korea. NK regime is now in control most of South Korea, and though NK troops may still make some advances, it would appear that point of temporary military stabilization being reached with only Pusan beachhead and perimeter under control UN/US forces. To call for truce and armistice now would certainly meet Soviet requirements, though unlikely Soviets would consider that any such proposal by itself would receive SC support. More probable that Soviets would submit proposals based on idea that Koreans must settle their own political future, “foreign” troops should get out, and elections be held, perhaps under UN observation. If Soviets intend make real appeasement move, they may (refEmbC 215, July 27) use this opportunity pull back NK troops to 38th Parallel to avoid defeat of latter and make maximum political capital as peacemakers on assumption that their continued participation in SC with veto power would be adequate weapon to forestall movement UN forces into North Korea, and that ROK troops would be too weak to attempt this alone. In appraising possible Soviet moves looking toward “peaceful” political solution Korean problem through cessation of fighting followed by elections (even if NK troops withdrawn), it cannot be overlooked that public opinion in South Korea may be very vulnerable to appeals based on “anti-foreign” aspect of UN intervention (including destruction wrought by UN forces), and outcome elections might be favorable Korean Communists.

Soviets may attempt by various means to make Formosa an issue, seeking to exploit unilateral US commitment and failure to date of SC to support US position. This might be considered by Soviets as good tactics to cover up their failure “stick it out” on Chinese Communist question, for Soviets would appear to be fighting for Chinese Communist interests within UN. If Chinese Communists should attempt invade Formosa and US naval units take defensive action, Soviets would, of course, in addition to any other reaction, exploit this issue for all it is worth in SC.

It is, of course, possible to view Soviet return to SC as presaging further overtly aggressive moves by international Communism (Indochina, Burma, Iran, Yugoslavia) on assumption that Soviets would
now be in position to block effective UN counter-action through veto
and other obstructionist methods. If, as Embassy strongly believes,
Soviets have their eyes on the major issues outlined at outset this
message, it is doubtful that Soviet return was motivated by this
somewhat legalistic motive. Further aggression in the near future,
even though of a local character, would certainly intensify more than
ever the strengthening moves now begun in the west and would reveal
a Soviet recklessness out of keeping with Embassy observations and
estimates of long standing.

Department pass USUN, London, Paris. Repeated information
USUN 31, London 75, Paris 64.

Kirk

785.00/7-2950: Telegram

The United States Acting Representative at the United Nations
(Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

New York, July 29, 1950—4:31 p. m.
[Received July 29—4:51 p. m.]

163. Re draft resolution including condemnation of North Korean
authorities telephoned by Wainhouse, we have following comments
and questions:

1. It is our feeling that the third paragraph of the resolution would
be interpreted by other members of the SC as committing them in
advance to use their armed forces to prevent spread of conflict to areas
other than Korea, and particularly to Formosa, and therefore would
be quite unacceptable to them. If this meaning is not intended by
Department, we feel third and fourth paragraphs are essentially du-
plications of the same thought. Either the third should be dropped
completely or it should be merged in fourth paragraph. We suggest the
following:

"Calls upon all states to refrain from action which might lead to
the spreading of the Korean conflict to other areas and thereby further
endanger international peace and security."

2. We should like to clarify the meaning of the words "calls upon". If
this is intended as an order, it will make it extremely difficult in
our view to obtain support. From the point of view of India and UK,
for example, if they support an order to the Communist Chinese to
refrain from attacking Formosa, they will then be morally committed
to support a decision of the SC to take military action in case of such
an attack. We doubt very much that many members of the SC will
be prepared to commit themselves to this step at the present time. On

1 See telegram 78, July 29, 4 p. m., to New York, p. 491.
the other hand, it might well be possible to gain support for these paragraphs if we make it clear that the words "calls upon" should be considered recommendations rather than orders.

3. Department does not state whether it desires that this resolution be approved at Monday's meeting. In our view this would be most difficult to accomplish in view of the short time available and in view of the other irons we have in the fire for Monday's meeting. In any case, it is our opinion that it would be preferable not to approve a resolution along these lines at Monday's meeting but to save it until the Russians return to the Council. A debate on a resolution of this nature in which the Russians are forced to take part will give us a fine opportunity to put the Russians on the spot.

A veto by them of a resolution along these lines would be enormously valuable and would place upon the Russians full responsibility for the continuation of the conflict.

Our suggestion would be that the resolution might be tabled late Monday so that it would have priority of consideration over any substantive proposal which Malik introduces and would enable us to hold the initiative, rather than being forced on the defensive by a Russian proposal.

Please advise urgently.

Gross

*July 31.

230/7-2950: Telegram

The United States Acting Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

NEW YORK, July 29, 1950—7:30 p.m.

[Received July 29—10:13 p.m.]

167. Deptel 73 of July 28 and telecon between Hickerson and Gross resulted in agreement on following draft resolution which USUN has handed to members of SC delegations with a view to its adoption in SC meeting on Monday, July 31:

"The Security Council,

"Recognizing the hardships and privations to which the people of Korea are being subjected as a result of the continued prosecution by the North Korean forces of their unlawful attack; and

"Appreciating the spontaneous offers of assistance to the Korean people which have been made by governments, specialized agencies, and non-governmental organizations;"
"Requests the Unified Command to exercise responsibility for determining the requirements for the relief and support of the civilian population of Korea, and for establishing in the field the procedures for providing such relief and support;

"Requests the Secretary General to transmit all offers of assistance for relief and support to the Unified Command;

"Requests the Unified Command to provide the Security Council with reports, as appropriate, on its relief activities;

"Requests the Secretary General, the Economic and Social Council in accordance with Article 65 of the Charter, other appropriate United Nations principal and subsidiary organs, the specialized agencies in accordance with the terms of their respective agreements with the United Nations, and appropriate non-governmental organizations to provide such assistance as the Unified Command may request for the relief and support of the civilian population of Korea, and as appropriate in connection with the responsibilities being carried out by the Unified Command on behalf of the Security Council." End of draft.

At meeting with UNSYG, Sunde of Norway, Jebb of UK and Lacoste of France, secretariat draft resolution (mytel 140) was on the table.

Gross stated that without discussing this or any other resolution in detail Department felt that question of relief should be dealt with by SC before August 1 and purpose of any resolution would be (a) to underline responsibility of Unified Command which may have very extensive and responsible relief program. Also for domestic purposes and to utilize ECA it is useful from the US point of view to indicate this responsibility. (b) It is important to give ECOSOC the needed authority pursuant to Article 65 to concern itself in Korean relief and coordinate other agencies. This is also important to functions of UNESCO in disseminating information. He further mentioned that a resolution might provide that SYG, ECOSOC and other specialized agencies and NGO's should be asked to provide assistance as suggested by Unified Command.

SYG stated that his concern is sound relief program to avoid allowing Korea to be soil for Communism in wake of military action. He thought it important to adopt resolution before August 1, because he would expect USSR veto. He and his staff are anxious to assist within framework recognizing responsibility of Unified Command which he stressed.

Jebb saw general outline put forward by Gross and agreed by SYG as quite acceptable to FonOff but would like opportunity for consideration of draft. He mentioned importance that UN be associated with Unified Command in carrying out its responsibilities.

^ Received on July 27 at 1:18 p. m., p. 479.
Lacoste hoped that any draft resolution would emphasize that this operation so far as UN angles are concerned is subject to the SC.

While there was general agreement with Lie’s view that it would be desirable to have the resolution unanimously adopted, Gross pointed out that probably the Yugoslavs could not vote for any resolution mentioning the Unified Command. However, it was felt that if by avoiding specific reference to SC resolutions on Korea Egypt’s vote could be obtained, it was desirable to avoid such reference in order to get this support.

Gross agreed before end of the day to submit a draft to all SC delegations except USSR, and this has been done. He also agreed to request text be forwarded to US Embassies in SC members’ capitals.2

Department please relay to London as USUN 3; Paris USUN 3; Oslo USUN 3; New Delhi USUN 3; Cairo USUN 2; Taipei USUN 2; Habana USUN 3; Quito USUN 1; Belgrade USUN 2; Moscow USUN 2.

GROSS

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2 In telegram 82, July 30, not printed, to New York, the Department of State authorized the U.S. Mission at the United Nations to introduce the draft resolution contained in telegram 167.

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230/7-3950: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, July 30, 1950—4 p. m.

[Received July 30—12:39 p. m.]

243. In absence details Department’s thinking underlying contemplated resolution for SC meeting August 2 (Depcertel July 29, 3 a. m.);2 I have serious misgivings as to its desirability. Aside from probability that USSR action at intervening meeting on August 1 will introduce elements materially bearing on its aptness, it seems to me that SC actions to date have established sound position acceptable to free world and proposed resolution does not appear to augment basic platform on which we now stand. From point of view of embarrassing Soviets further it seems to me effort so transparent as to weaken chances its support by present friends. Also, I feel Soviets could put reverse English on last clause for purposes their propaganda and make capital of our action in Indo-

2 Not printed; it transmitted the text of the draft resolution contained in telegram 78, July 29, 4 p. m., to New York, p. 491.
china, Formosa, Philippines etc. as "action which might endanger international peace and security".


Kirk

330/7-2950: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET Washington, July 30, 1950—1 p.m.
PRIORITY

80. Reur 163 July 29. Dept is of the view that strong Res at this juncture of the Korean crisis is called for and with that view in mind it desires that you impress upon your friendly colleagues the importance of strong SC action. In the context of this view Dept interprets the word[s] "Calls upon" as an order.

Dept perceives no objection to your merger of paras 3 and 4 which as revised wld read as follows: "Calls upon all States to refrain from action which might lead to the spread of the Korean conflict to other areas and thereby further endanger international peace and security".

Dept perceives no objection to your tabling this Res late Monday (July 31) for SC meeting on Tuesday to secure priority of consideration over any substantive proposal which Malik might introduce. We shld maintain and hold the initiative. If USUN believes it more desirable or advantageous to table Res at SC meeting Monday afternoon (July 31) it may do so.

Acheson

795.00/7-3050

The Prime Minister of India (Nehru) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [NEW DELHI, July 30, 1950.1]

My Dear Mr. Secretary of State, Very many thanks for your letter which was conveyed to me on the 26th July by your Ambassador in New Delhi.2

2. It was indeed good of you to have found time, in the midst of your urgent and anxious preoccupations to write to me so fully. I

1 Transmitted to the Secretary of State by the Indian Ambassador (Pandit) under cover of a note, not printed, dated July 30.
2 See telegram 210 from New Delhi, received at 4:17 a.m. on July 27, p. 478.
am also happy that you have written frankly, because it is only on this basis that we can understand each other; even though we may not always agree.

3. There are only two points, arising out of your letter, on which I think it desirable to dwell in some detail, and I shall do so, to quote your own words “on a strictly personal and confidential basis.”

4. The first relates to the People’s Government of China. You have referred to our conversations last year on the subject of the recognition of this Government. I explained to you then our point of view, and I think it worth while to recapitulate what I said.

Our recognition is not based either on approval of Communism or all the policies of the Peiping Government; it conforms to our views of the facts of authority over Continental China, which is far the greater part of China, and to our appraisal of the psychology of the majority of the peoples of Southeast Asia. A process of revolution is at work in most of these countries; Indonesia, Indo-China, Malaya and Burma offer abundant proof of this. It is both political and economical. In broad terms the political conflict is one between the urge of nationalism and Colonial rule. Communists have found an ally in nationalism especially in those countries where the resistance of Colonialism to nationalist aspirations has proved obdurate. The political evil of Communist totalitarianism has not proved an obstacle to this alliance so far nor is it likely to prove so in future as long as a people’s natural longing for freedom from foreign domination is not satisfied. Moreover since all the countries that I have mentioned have a predominantly agricultural economy and land reform is their crying need, any regime which carries out such reforms successfully is bound to make a sympathetic appeal. We felt withholding of recognition from the People’s Government of China would be to ignore these highly important considerations and to create a gulf not only between ourselves and China with whom we have a historical, almost immemorial, friendship but also misunderstanding between India and the peoples of Southeast Asia who are now struggling for their freedom. For us, situated as we are, and where we are, the recognition of the New China was not only inevitable but urgent. Our latest effort to seat China in the Security Council, an effort which, as I have already explained to you has been consistent and spreading over the last six months or so was prompted by the honest conviction that such a step was necessary to preserve the United Nations as a representative organisation and to maintain world peace. I think you will agree that so long as a nation of 450 million people remains outside the organisation, the organisation cannot be regarded as fully representative.
This view has nothing to do with the condonation of aggression whether by China or by any other country. Were China to resort to acts which in our opinion constitute aggression we should not hesitate to adopt the same attitude towards China as we have towards North Korea. The reports that we have received from our Ambassador in Peiping have led me to the conclusion that given the chance the New China will take a line of its own and work for peace so vital to its economic and social reconstruction rather than try the hazards of war, of its own will or at someone else's behest. But that chance can scarcely come if she is for whatever reasons kept out of the Community of Nations. I do not presume to challenge your sources of information but quite naturally have to be guided by my own.

5. My second point deals with your request to apprise our Ambassador in Peiping of the President's statement with respect to Formosa and to continue our endeavour to persuade authorities there that they avoid intervention in the Korean situation or an attack on Formosa. The President's statement about Formosa was repeated to our Ambassador in Peiping as soon as we received it from our Ambassador in Washington. Mr. Panikkar was advised in the first few days after the conflict in Korea started to impress upon the People's Government of China the necessity in the interests of world peace of avoiding action that might extend the area of armed conflict. You may rest assured that we shall persist in this endeavour.

6. In conclusion I should like you to know that the divergence of our views on the Peiping regime detracts in no way from our desire for cooperation between our two countries to terminate the hostilities in Korea and to ensure for the world lasting peace.3

With [etc.]

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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* On July 31, Mr. Acheson saw President Truman and made the following brief record of the conversation relating to Mr. Nehru's message: "I reported to the President on Nehru's last note to me which he thought showed development of Nehru's views in the right direction." (795.00/7-3150)

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*Editorial Note*

On July 31 at 3 p.m., the United Nations Security Council held its 479th meeting; for the record of the meeting, see U.N. document S/P.V.479. The representatives of France, Norway, and the United Kingdom submitted the resolution on Korean relief, the text of which was identical with that contained in telegram 167, July 29, from New York, page 406. This resolution (U.N. document S/1657) was approved by a vote of 9 in favor (including the United States), to 0
opposed, with 1 member abstaining (Yugoslavia), and 1 member absent (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

At this meeting, the United States Representative (Austin) also introduced for discussion at the next Security Council meeting scheduled for August 1, the following draft resolution (S/1653):

"The Security Council

"Condemns the North Korean authorities for their continued defiance of the United Nations;

"Calls upon all States to use their influence to prevail upon the authorities of North Korea to cease this defiance;

"Calls upon all States to refrain from assisting or encouraging the North Korean authorities and to refrain from action which might lead to the spread of the Korean conflict to other areas and thereby further endanger international peace and security."

795.00/7-3150

Draft Memorandum Prepared in the Department of Defense

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 31, 1950.

U.S. COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

I. THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the implications of military and political actions which might be taken in areas north of the 38th parallel.

2. To determine the courses of action the United States should adopt which would contribute to the restoration of international peace and security to Korea.

II. MILITARY FACTORS

Estimate of the Situation:

3. The present military objective of the unified command is to repel the armed attack by North Korean forces and to restore international peace and security in the area. The Security Council resolution of 27 June noted that the authorities in North Korea had not withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel. No action of the Security Council has yet specifically limited military ground operations of the unified command to the area south of the 38th parallel.

4. From the point of view of military operations against North Korean forces as now constituted, the 38th parallel has no more significance than any other meridian. North Korean forces can be engaged and defeated wherever found, by whatever means are necessary, in the same fashion that air and naval power now are used to destroy military targets anywhere in Korea.
5. The only opposition to military operations north of the 38th parallel would be the entry of major Chinese Communist or Soviet forces in action in order to oppose further advances by the ground forces of the unified command. The movement of such hostile forces might be delayed, however, by destructions along the lines of communication into Korea. Furthermore, skillful coordination and timing of military and political operations in North Korea might forestall Soviet or Chinese Communist movements.

6. On the basis of available intelligence, the North Korean forces will not be reinforced by any large numbers of Chinese Communist troops, Soviet ground forces, or Soviet air forces as long as the ground fighting is confined to the area south of the 38th parallel.

7. The minimum offensive effort by the unified command in Korea might be to carry out the 25 and 27 June resolutions of the Security Council, and no more. The unified command could thus employ its troops only as far as the 38th parallel, and when the remaining North Korean forces had retreated north above the 38th parallel, hostilities would cease. The United Nations would be back where it was on 24 June 1950; the former military instability would again obtain. The USSR could re-arm a new striking force for a second attempt. Thus, a return to the status quo ante bellum would not promise security. It would not provide the unification which all Koreans so desperately desire, and it would still require a very great outlay of funds to reconstruct and secure South Korea. On the other hand, a cessation of hostilities by the forces of the unified command on their arrival at the 38th parallel would be least likely to provoke the Kremlin and might lay the basis for a negotiated settlement.

8. As an intermediate objective, the unified command could occupy P'yongyang and vicinity, in addition to important communications points in the center and east of Korea between 40° and 39° latitudes. An unoccupied, demilitarized zone might then be set up in depth along the Chinese and Soviet frontiers to allay their suspicions. But Korea would still not be united, and the security problem would be as great, if not greater, than in the case of a minimum effort.

9. A maximum effort would include the pacification and occupation of all Korea by the unified command, which would take any and all appropriate measures within Korea to accomplish its mission. The United Nations could then arrange elections to establish a government for all Korea. The future military frontier would coincide with the international boundary sanctioned by law, custom, and treaty, and perhaps guaranteed by UN authority and force.

Military Assumptions:

10. Any consideration of US courses of action in support of UN action in Korea must assume that the United States will mobilize and
use sufficient resources to gain the military objectives in Korea, while strengthening its military position in areas of strategic importance.

11. Secondly, the courses of action considered in this report would be taken only on the assumption that the Soviet government will not directly enter the hostilities in Korea, and will not initiate general hostilities. Should the Soviet government enter directly into the hostilities in Korea, the courses of action in NSC 76 would apply.¹

III. POLITICAL FACTORS

Korean Unity:

12. For centuries Korea has been a cross-roads of conflict. In modern times foreign exploitation and suppression have stunted Korea’s growth as a nation. A ruthless Japanese rule erased Korea as a nation, and a post-war irreconcilable split divided Korea. Even today some governments view the fighting in Korea solely as another clash of great powers, and not as the measure of United Nations responsibility and initiative in restoring international peace and security to Korea.

13. The urge for union is irrepressible and fundamental among all Koreans. During 40 years under the Japanese, their deepest dream was independence; today it is unification and independence. Five years of bisection culminating in a bitter, destructive civil war will probably intensify their desire for union.

14. The 38th parallel is a geographical artificiality violating the natural integrity of a singularly homogeneous nation. It began as a temporary military convenience; it became the eastern outpost of the iron curtain. As a result, the political economy of Korea has temporarily branched off in two completely different forms. One of the serious problems of reconstruction will involve the integration of the different political and economic institutions now established in the south and the north. However, after the cessation of hostilities, the intrinsic unity of Korean economic and human resources will help recast a divided Korea into one mold, provided political conditions permit.

15. The United States proposed the 38th parallel, but never intended it as a rigid frontier. In the Cairo Declaration of 1943, the United States spoke out for Korean freedom. During 1945–1947 the United States made repeated efforts to find agreement with Soviet authorities in order to unite Korea. The Moscow Decision of 1945, the sessions of the Joint US–USSR Commission in 1946 and 1947, the Hodge-Chistiakov exchanges in 1946–1947, and the Marshall-Molotov

¹ See the memorandum by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, July 10, p. 346.
exchanges of 1947 are familiar landmarks of our persistent but unsuccessful effort to persuade the USSR to join in unifying the two occupation zones under a single provisional government.

16. Attempts at unification continued under the aegis of the United Nations but with no more success. By its resolution of 14 November 1947 the General Assembly sought the objectives of freedom and national independence for all Korea, and set out a program for its attainment. The United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK), established by subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly, has been, and still is, charged with seeking Korea's unification by pacific settlement. On 21 October 1949 the General Assembly reaffirmed these objectives and the mission of UNCOK, and called upon the member States "to refrain from any acts derogatory to the purposes of the present resolution". While the General Assembly for three years has sought to unify Korea by peaceful means, it has never formally considered nor explicitly approved the unification of Korea as a consequence of military operations taken to defeat aggression against the Republic of Korea.

17. Yet, the United Nations did succeed in establishing a government in South Korea. Its existence has considerable significance. It is a sovereign government recognized by 32 nations. It is the legal authority in South Korea. The General Assembly resolution of 12 December 1948 declared that there has been established "a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea), having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea."

18. The Government of the Republic of Korea, despite many weaknesses, demonstrated a growing capacity to govern prior to hostilities. As UNCOK pointed out in its report of 26 June 1950 to the Secretary General, "there have been distinct signs of improvement in recent months in both economic and political stability of the country". Recent elections for the National Assembly gave significant gains to moderate elements. However, the most conservative elements have exercised power in the Government of Syngman Rhee, usually in a harsh and
authoritarian manner. Syngman Rhee has not been popular. In North Korea communist propaganda undoubtedly has aroused considerable hostility among Koreans to the South Korean administration. Political reconstruction in Korea will present a complex challenge.

19. In view of the establishment of a Soviet-style police state in North Korea, it is difficult to weigh the degree of popular support for or opposition to the regime there. The relatively large number of refugees who have fled south during the past five years indicates the possibility of considerable discontent. The ravages of war may create in North Korea a population hostile to the Communists authorities. They will, in any event, attempt to unite occupied South Korea to North Korea by so-called national elections.

IV. POLITICO-MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

20. By a quick and crushing victory in South Korea, the USSR would have gained its long-standing goal of the complete absorption of Korea into its orbit. Furthermore, the building of a "cordon soviétique" from the Soviet borders of Sinkiang to the southern shores of Korea would have neared completion. Only Japan, at the edge of the orbit, and Southeast Asia to the South would have still remained outside. Yet, the aggression in South Korea may result in the opposite effect—the failure to complete the cordon.

21. In this light, the situation in Korea now provides the United States and the free world with the first opportunity to displace part of the Soviet orbit. If the basic policy of the United States is to reduce the preponderant power of the USSR in Asia and elsewhere, then UN-operations in Korea can set the stage for the non-communist penetration into an area of Soviet influence.

22. Penetration of the Soviet orbit, short of all-out war, would disturb the strategic complex which the USSR is organizing between its own Far Eastern territories and the contiguous areas. Manchuria, the pivot of this complex outside the USSR, would lose its captive status, for a free and strong Korea could provide an outlet for Manchuria's resources and could also provide non-communist contact with the people there and in North China.

23. The significance in Asia of the unification of Korea under UN auspices would be incalculable. The Japanese would see demonstrated a check on Soviet expansion. Elements in the Chinese Communist regime, and particularly important segments of the Chinese population, might be inclined to question their exclusive dependence on the Kremlin. Skillfully manipulated, the Chinese Communists might prefer different arrangements and a new orientation. Throughout Asia, those who foresee only inevitable Soviet conquest would take hope.
24. For the above reasons, it is probable that the danger of a free, united Korea will lead the Kremlin to try to prevent its total loss. When North Korean forces appear to be losing, or even before, the Kremlin may launch a vigorous attempt to mediate the dispute, or may employ Chinese or Soviet forces to hold part or all of North Korea. However, it is possible that, notwithstanding its considerable military strength located in the Far East, the Kremlin will not jeopardize its uncompleted strategic position in the Far East to risk a general war to prevent a full-fledged, rapid, and determined UN effort to unite Korea.

V. U.S. INTERESTS AND OBLIGATIONS

25. In subscribing to the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, the US pledged its support to Korean independence. Our word has been measured in our diplomatic support, military aid, and economic assistance. Our obligation to the United Nations, to block a breach of the peace, is fixed.

26. The broad objectives of the United States were stated in NSC 8/2, approved by the President on 23 March 1949, as follows:

"a. To establish a united, self-governing, and sovereign Korea as soon as possible, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the UN.

"b. To ensure that the government so established shall be fully representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people.

"c. To assist the Korean people in establishing a sound economy and educational system as essential bases of an independent and democratic state. A more immediate objective is the withdrawal of remaining U.S. occupation forces from Korea as early as practicable consistent with the foregoing objectives."

27. The political value to the United States of establishing a free, united, and stable Korea and of carrying out the resolve of the United Nations justifies the cost in military forces, as long as the assumptions in paragraphs 10 and 11 hold true.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

28. The following conclusions may be derived from the preceding analysis:

A. The unification of Korea squares with historical necessity, Korean aspirations, U.S. obligations and policies, and the objectives of the United Nations.

B. The establishment of a free and united Korea and the elimination of the North Korean Communist regime, following brutal mili-

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*For the complete text, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. vii, Part 2, p. 969.
tary aggression, would be a step in reversing the dangerous strategic
trend in the Far East of the past twelve months.

C. The 38th parallel, in and of itself, has no military significance.

D. The chief potential limitation on the objective of unifying Korea
will be Soviet military countermeasures on a local scale, or Soviet
diplomatic and political actions in the UN.

E. Consequently, the timing and speed of U.S. politico-military
operations are crucial, and call for especially close working
relationships.

F. In the long run, a maximum UN effort will be needed in securing
peace in Korea and in meeting the acute problems of political and
economic reconstruction.

G. The continued functioning of the Republic of Korea, as the
only sovereign government in Korea, is indispensable to the re-estab-
lishment of the rule of law in Korea and the fulfilment of U.S.
objectives.

H. Long-range policies in support of independence for Korea con-
form to the general objectives of the United States in Asia.

29. In consonance with the above conclusion[s] and in pursuit of its
basic long-range objectives with respect to Korea, the U.S. should take
measures to effect:

A. The unification of Korea under a united, sovereign, and repre-
sentative government independent of foreign control and eligible for
membership in the UN.

B. The security of Korea against foreign aggression and internal
subversion.

C. The reconstruction of Korea in political, economic, and social
fields to develop a stable, self-sustaining, and advancing state.

30. As the basis for realizing these objectives, the United States
should take the following series of actions:

A. Statement of Aims:

(1) At an appropriate time, the President should proclaim that our
peace aim is a united, free, and independent Korea, as envisaged by
the UN. Such a statement should be supported by a Joint Resolution
of Congress.

(2) Again at an appropriate time, the U.S. should seek to translate
this aim into UN objectives. In view of the possibility that uncoordi-
nated measures would provoke Soviet counter-action, either in the
military or diplomatic field or both, the United States should seek UN
action in two stages: First, at the 1950 meeting of the General Assem-
bly, the United Nations should immediately endorse the resolutions
of 25 and 27 June and 7 July, of the Security Council and seek maxi-
mum support for the unified command; second, at a later date, at the
moment when the unified command has taken the offensive, the United
Nations should re-affirm the basic UN aims in Korea along the lines of
the General Assembly Resolution of 14 November 1947.
(3) No statement of US general objectives should be made until the unified command has launched offensive military measures to carry out the military objectives listed below. Until such time, great caution and discretion should be taken in public discussion of the 38th parallel.

(4) In the meantime, the U.S. should use all its diplomatic means to forestall any Soviet effort to mediate the conflict on any terms short of the unification of all Korea on a free and representative basis under UN auspices.

B. Military Objectives:

(1) The unified command should seek to occupy Korea and to defeat North Korean armed forces wherever located north or south of the 38th parallel.

(2) To achieve this objective, the Commanding General of the unified command should be directed to take necessary military action in Korea, without regard to the 38th parallel.

C. Occupation Problems:

(1) As an interim measure the U.S. should encourage the UN to strengthen UNCOOK to render it more effective in maintaining liaison with the government of the Republic, and with other political elements in Korea, in observing the course of hostilities, and in supervising the care of refugees and the civil organization of reoccupied areas.

(2) At or about the time of surrender or the cessation of hostilities, the U.S. should encourage the UN to create a new UN organization, incorporating UNCOOK. This organization would be responsible for the long-term reconstruction and security of Korea. It should include (a) a UN administrator for relief and reconstructions; (b) a commission to supervise national elections and the reformation of the national government of the Republic of Korea to include all of Korea; and (c) a border commission to observe the integrity of the Korean frontier and it should use the international security forces provided by the UN to police this frontier.

(3) The United States should be prepared to provide its share of forces required to police the Korean frontier until such time as Korean forces are trained and equipped to take over that responsibility. Likewise, the U.S. should seek firm commitments from UN members to retain in Korea their individual contingents until the mission of the UN is accomplished.

D. Politico-Military Measures:

(1) The United States should make a maximum effort to support and strengthen the governing bodies of the Republic of Korea. The quality of administrative personnel should be improved, the National Assembly restored to full working order, and civilian teams selected and trained to take over reoccupied areas to provide effective follow-up of military operations.

(2) Psychological warfare should be intensified to discredit the Communist regime and improve Korean morale.
(3) An ad hoc committee of departmental representatives should be established immediately to develop detailed reconstruction plans to include recommendations for military, economic, and political assistance.

(4) The UN, and perhaps the U.S., should not be deflected from its present course of action or stated objectives in Korea by any proposals by the USSR or minority groups in the UN which fall short of complete achievement of the present UN objectives.

330/7–2950: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, July 31, 1950—8 p.m.

91. Reurtel 164 July 29 1 Dept considers rep North Korea cannot be accepted for fol reasons:

(1) GA has already established in UNCOOK an instrumentality whereby North Koreans may be heard. They are at liberty make use UNCOOK facilities any time. GA before NK attack decline seat reps that regime on ground UNCOOK not availed of; now, after attack, SC will be the more unwilling override GA provisions this regard.

(2) North Korean regime is defying SC decisions and is carrying on armed hostilities against forces acting, pursuant to SC authority, to enforce these decisions and therefore its rep may not be seated at Council table.

(3) Malik most likely, in light past USSR conduct, to call for hearing NK as “state” under Art 32. Our position that GA, in conferring status upon ROK, had denied status to NK, and that SC shld avoid adopting a contrary formula, was set forth in SC debate on Korean membership applications. SC did not refer NK application to committee on membership, thus presumably persuaded NK not a state. 2 Since Dept feels confident SC will not wish receive NK personages as reps of state, there is no likelihood that Art’s auth to lay down conditions need be invoked.

(4) Conceivable some SC Rep may suggest invitation be issued under Rule 39. We shld in that case point out in addition (1) above that SC requires no communication from “other persons” to supply it with info or to give other assistance in examining matters so plain as propriety adopting, and insisting upon execution, its resolutions June 25 and 27.

ACHESON

1 The text of this message read as follows:

“Chanvel reports ‘brain wave’ that we should consider carefully and agree on action we will take in event Malik asks SC to accept representative North Korea at council table. Chanvel asks our views. Please instruct.” (330/7–2950)

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW DELHI, July 31, 1950—4 p. m.
[PRIORITY Received July 31—8:56 p. m.]

254. 1. Bajpai, SYG MEA told me today he hoped US would not be disappointed at size and composition GOI “token force” for Korea. It was contemplated that medical unit would comprise between 200 and 300 persons carefully selected from defense forces who would serve as military contingent in uniform. Among them would be some of best surgeons in India. It was regretted that GOI had no combat units available at present, but hoped medical unit could be of help.

2. I told Bajpai that I was sure GOI contribution would be appreciated. I had some experience with Indian military doctors and considered that they stood extremely high in their profession.

3. It would be helpful if indication could be made through appropriate channel to GOI of US appreciation of this aid. I regard this contribution as only beginning. Meager as it is, announcement has given rise considerable criticism from Indian press. Decision represents in present atmosphere courageous act on part GOI.

HENDERSON

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The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET TAEGU, August 1, 1950.
[Priority Received August 1—5:07 a.m.]

98. Question has been raised informally re authority US equipment and support for Korean Army beyond 65,000. Considering importance Koreans themselves making largest possible contribution manpower to military effort as means both defeating Communists and saving American lives and probability that after end major operations North Korean Guerrillas will continue fight mountain areas considerable time for whose suppression Korean Troops should be used to greatest possible extent, I recommend US or United Nations arming largest possible number able-bodied Korean soldiers who can be trained and who considered necessary by General MacArthur without regard to prewar 65,000 limitation.

General Walker concurs.
Repeate information Tokyo unnumbered.

Muccio
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, August 1, 1950—12 a.m.

[Received August 1—10:19 a.m.]

254. When on July 30 Embassy officer delivered to Indian Ambassador message re UNESCO contained Deptel 87 July 28,1 Radhakrishnan took occasion to discuss significance Malik's projected return SC, saying he thought it was sign Soviets disturbed by repercussions Korean affair and that they had decided to make move to stop rearmament of west. He feared that if Soviet return did not lead to some kind of settlement, UN would break up and Soviets would start war before west becomes stronger. Indian Ambassador was sure that democracies would in that event win military victory, but what would happen to democracies in course hostilities? Would they achieve moral victory?

It was clear that Radhakrishnan seemed to fear impact Malik's propaganda appeal in SC. He asked why we wouldn't cut Gordian knot by allowing Peking to take SC seat in return for Soviet undertaking to withdraw NK troops and to agree to UN mediation in Korea? He was sure that Soviets and Peking would agree not to vote against (i.e., they would agree to abstain) constructive Korean resolutions in SC, thus giving future SC action full "moral weight" of "800,000,000 additional people."

Indian Ambassador does not think Soviets are returning to SC with any assurance, based on secret deals, that Peking would be seated and expressed view that vote would continue be adverse at this stage unless US took positive action. Indian Ambassador Peking certain that Peking not yet solidly tied to Kremlin. Indian effort is to detach China from Moscow. Magnanimous gesture by US might help do the trick. China not yet "communized" except for agrarian reform; it is not as "socialistic" as Britain.

When Embassy officer emphasized "blackmail" aspect any change US position on China this time, Indian Ambassador said he feared that our stand very much "which comes first, chicken or egg" proposition, and that net result our standing on prestige would be war. After Embassy officer sketched course Soviet post-war imperialism in Europe and Asia since 1945 which underlies US disillusionment with possibilities negotiated settlements with Soviets, Indian Ambassador agreed that Soviets had been faithless and asked whether we then consider

1Not printed; the message related to the calling of a meeting of the Executive Board of UNESCO to discuss UNESCO's position on Korea (398.43 UNESCO/7-2850).
situation “hopeless.” Embassy officer replied that “solidarity of non-Communist world” was answer to problem whereupon Radhakrishnan said we must take into account cross-currents in Asian part non-Communist world. Not difficult to convince many Asians that Korean affair staged or at least seized upon by west as pretext for re-introduction western military forces into Asia to reconstitute old nineteenth century imperialism. GOI in difficult position if its foreign policy appears consist of support for French in Indochina, British in Malaya, Americans in Formosa, etc.

Indian Ambassador then referred his call on Stalin last January, which appears to have left deep impression, and said he personally counted great deal on fact that Stalin an old man who would not wish do anything which might result in destruction Soviet “house” which he had constructed and that Stalin is proud of difference between himself and Hitler. Whereas latter impetuous and adventurous, Stalin considers that he is cool, detached, cautious and calculating. Radhakrishnan thinks we should take advantage this fact.

In review Stalin—Nehru correspondence, Indian Ambassador clearly implies he was not happy with way matter had been handled by GOI, particularly failure GOI pin Soviets down on details peaceful settlement in Korea. Added that if he had received “green light” instead of “flat no” as result this informal mediatory approach this Embassy, Nehru would have taken different tack.

Indian Ambassador indicated several times during talk that GOI stood by its position re NK aggression and withdrawal NK troops after which mediation should take place. Like many genuine idealists, he was naive enough to suggest that something might come of direct approach to Malik by US or one of its friends to effect, “My dear fellow, what are you chaps up to? You know you can’t blackmail us, so let’s get down to business.” Nurtured in the atmosphere of British power in India, which was flexible and compromising, he fails almost completely to understand the implacable and fanatical persistence of Soviet Communist power.

Department pass New Delhi; repeated information New Delhi 23.

Kirk

793B.551/7—2850: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 1, 1950—12 noon.

561. For the Amb. Considerations outlined Embtel 554.¹ are important and I agree that public shd be made fully aware of them.

¹ Received at 7:39 p. m. on July 28, p. 477.
However, we are disappointed with length of time which will elapse before forces are dispatched. Brit have already consumed month in reaching decision with net result that ground troops will not be available for action until at least three months after aggression started.

While welcoming commitment and ack all considerations you enumerate, we feel Brit shd be informed we hope forces will be en-route much sooner than now indicated.

Acheson

795.00/8-150

Memorandum by Mr. John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary of State, to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitzze)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 1, 1950.

With reference to the paper on “Advance Beyond the 38th Parallel” (UM D-109), I want to make it clear that while I accept the conclusion that we should not make any commitment one way or another now, I did not agree with much of the body of the paper.

In my opinion, there is every reason to go beyond the 38th Parallel except possibly one, and that is our incapacity to do so and the fact that the attempt might involve us much more deeply in a struggle on the Asiatic mainland with Soviet and Chinese Communist manpower because of the strategic bearing that the northern part of Korea has toward Port Arthur and Vladivostok.

I think, however, we should allow the government of the Republic of Korea to advocate the unity of Korea as this is the one great popular issue and if the North Koreans advocate unity and the Republic of Korea seems to advocate a return to disunity, then it will forfeit all popular support throughout Korea.

1 See the draft memorandum prepared by the Policy Planning Staff, July 25, p. 469.

795.00/8-150

Memorandum by Mr. George H. Butler of the Policy Planning Staff to the Department of State Representative on the NSC Staff (Bishop)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 1, 1950.

With reference to your memorandum of July 21, 1950 to Mr. Watts regarding future U.S. policy with respect to Korea, there are attached three copies of revisions of some of the paragraphs.

1 Not printed.

2 References in the annexed document are to the paragraphs of the draft memorandum by the Policy Planning Staff of July 25, p. 469, as it had gone forward to the NSC Staff, bearing the date July 27 and with no changes in the text but with the paragraphs renumbered.
These revisions are based upon comment made at the Under Secretary’s Meeting of July 28. They also reflect comment made by Mr. Jessup.

Messrs. Allison, Sandifer, and Wells and I agreed that work on this paper should go ahead but that another paper would be necessary to complete the study. This point is covered in the final paragraph of the revision.

GEORGE H. BUTLER

[Annex]

FUTURE U.S. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO KOREA

THE PROBLEM

1. To report upon the policy that the United States should pursue after the Korean communist forces have been driven back to the 38th parallel.

ANALYSIS

8. (The last sentence of this paragraph should be deleted.)
9. (The last sentence should read as follows): This paper is addressed primarily to the latter phase of the problem, for the reasons set forth in the following paragraph:
13. If North Korean forces withdraw or are driven back to the 38th parallel, continued military action by the U.N. forces for the purpose of imposing a settlement with a view to a unified and independent Korea would depend upon majority support in the United Nations. Account would have to be taken of possible reluctance regarding the multilateral use of force as a part of the U.N. effort to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea.
14. (This entire paragraph should be deleted.)
15. (Renumber as paragraph 14.)
16. (Renumber as paragraph 15.)
17. (Renumber as paragraph 16 and revise as follows):

Likewise present public and Congressional opinion in the United States would be dissatisfied with any conclusion falling short of what it would consider a “final” settlement of the problem. A sentiment favoring a continuation of military action north of the 38th parallel already is arising. On the other hand, there may well develop a contrasting sentiment against using U.S. military forces to help establish an independent Korea.

18. (Renumber as paragraph 17.)

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*See paragraph 7 of the draft memorandum by the Policy Planning Staff, July 25, p. 470.
*See paragraph 8, *ibid*.
*See paragraph 12, p. 471.
*See paragraph 13, *ibid*.
CONCLUSIONS

19. (Renumber as paragraph 18.)
20. (Renumber as paragraph 19.)

RECOMMENDATIONS

21. (Renumber as paragraph 20.)
22. (Renumber as paragraph 21 and revise as follows):

Decisions regarding the course of action when the U.N. forces approach the 38th parallel should be deferred until military and political developments provide the additional information necessary to enable us: (a) to base our decisions on the situation in Korea and in other parts of the world at that time; (b) to consult with other U.N. members; and (c) to keep our military capabilities and commitments in safe balance.

[Add new paragraph 22.] 7 Measures which might be necessary or desirable once the aggression has been brought to an end, either by defeat of the Korean communist aggressors or as the result of a possible Soviet suggestion for an early voluntary withdrawal by the Korean communists, should be the subject of immediate study and early report by the Department of State in cooperation with the Department of Defense.

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7 Brackets appear in the source text.

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Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council met from 3 to 6:15 p.m. on August 1; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.480. The discussion related principally to the efforts of the President of the Council, Mr. Malik, to raise the question of the seating of a representative of the People's Republic of China on the Security Council in place of the representative of the Republic of China.

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795B.5/7–1350

The Department of State to the British Embassy

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

The British Embassy's memorandum of July 13, 1950 2 set forth certain tentative views of the Foreign Office with respect to legal

2 Not printed; but see the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Johnson, July 13, p. 374.
problems arising out of the Korean hostilities and requesting the comments of the Department thereon.

The Department has not so far found it necessary to make any overall determination as to the legal nature of the Korean conflict, i.e. whether it is a civil war or an international war. It has certainly been the intention of the United Nations and of the United States that all of Korea should constitute one state with one government and no change in this as an ultimate aim has been made nor has the United States ever admitted the division of Korea into two independent states. Nevertheless, it is difficult to fit the Korean conflict into traditional concepts of either civil or international war and the Department feels that it is unnecessary for present purposes to do so.

Whatever the nature of the Korean conflict the United States is in agreement with the Foreign Office that the international police action taken by the United States and other members of the United Nations under its authority entitle[s] them to the exercise of all of the rights to which a normal belligerent is entitled under international law.

The United States is also in agreement with the Foreign Office that so long as the armed forces of Northern Korea observe the laws and customs of war they are entitled to the humane practices provided by international law for combatants, but that Northern Korea cannot be recognized as a lawful belligerent and hence is not entitled to the rights accorded to belligerents under international law, for instance, the belligerent right to interfere with neutral commerce. As the Foreign office is aware, General MacArthur has publicly proclaimed the intention to treat captured North Koreans in accordance with international practice in cases of armed conflict.

While the Department appreciates the informal suggestion regarding the declaration of a blockade by the Commanding General of the forces operating pursuant to the Security Council resolutions, it had reached the conclusion prior to the receipt of the Embassy's memorandum that such an action was neither necessary nor desirable. The blockade announced by the President and put into effect by General MacArthur pursuant to Security Council resolutions of June 25 and June 27 rests on the authority of those resolutions and subsequent measures taken by the Commanding General to maintain the blockade will no doubt be supported by all of the forces under his command. The blockade having been legally proclaimed by the Commander-in-Chief of the only forces in the field at the time, no need is seen for a further proclamation because of the augmentation of those forces with those of other members of the United Nations or the designation of
the General in command of those forces as the Commanding General of the augmented forces.

The above are the purely informal and tentative views of the Department on the matters covered.

WASHINGTON, August 2, 1950.

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Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council met on August 2 from 3 to 6:15 p.m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.481. No action was taken during the meeting, which dealt mainly with Korea, as the Council was deadlocked on the procedural question of the adoption of an agenda.

795B.551/3-250 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State.

TOP SECRET

LONDON, August 2, 1950—11 a.m.
[Received August 2—3:15 p.m.]

695. For the Secretary from Douglas. ReDeptel 561, August 1. We are all here disappointed at the interlude between now and the departure of British self-contained unit to Korea. I have already expressed our anxiety that they embark at earliest possible date and surprise at length of interlude.

The fact is, however unpleasant, that British do not have forces presently organized in the necessary infantry battalions, armored regiment, and other supporting troops, such as engineers and service of supply forces, to despatch on a mission of this sort. Because of this deplorable state of affairs it will necessarily take them some time to sift out the new selectees, those that have six to eight months training or more, and to rearrange the regulars that are now disbursed through every battalion, in order to assemble the self-contained unit which British are sending.

I am confident from conversation with responsible and high British military that British will make every effort to expedite the commencement of the movement and its completion.

The significant fact emerging from all this is the lamentable state of the ground forces in Britain.

DOUGLAS
Minutes of a Meeting Held by Representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, in Paris on August 3, 1950

[Extract]

TOP SECRET

PARTICIPANTS

France: M. Alexandre Parodi, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
M. Roland Jacquin de Margerie, Assistant Political Director.
M. James Baeyens, Director for Asia.
M. Jacques de Bourbon Busset
M. Bernard de Menthon
M. Jacques de Folin
M. Jean Laloy
M. Sauvagnargues
M. Pignon, High Commissioner for Indochina (Part of 2nd Session).

U.K.: Mr. Maberly E. Dening, Assistant Under-Secretary of State.
Mr. William Hayter, Chargé d'Affaires a.i., Paris.
Mr. Anthony Montague-Brown, Third Secretary.

U.S.A.: Ambassador Bruce
Mr. Bohlen, Minister
Mr. Woodruff Wallner, First Secretary
Mr. William A. Crawford, Second Secretary.

M. Parodi opened the talks by referring to the French aide-mémoire of July 18, 1950 noting the dangers of the current world situation resulting from the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. He expressed the hope that the present conversations would offer the opportunity for a profitable study of the political lessons to be derived from the Korean aggression and for a reassessment and coordination of the positions of the three countries with respect to Korea and other danger points throughout the world. He preferred that the talks be kept on an informal basis and that their purpose be that of exchanging information rather than of arriving at specific commitments.

Ambassador Bruce expressed his agreement with M. Parodi's statement of the character and purpose of the talks and said that Mr. Boh-
len, who had just returned from Washington, would make the United States presentation.

Mr. Hayter likewise expressed his agreement with M. Parodi’s summation.

M. Parodi said that he would prefer to place the topics relating to Asia at the head of the agenda because Mr. Dening might not be able to remain for the full duration of the talks. There was general agreement on this suggestion.

Mr. Bohlen presented the United States position on Korea. He said that any attempt to analyze Soviet intentions in initiating the attack on Korea was pure guess-work. Our best guess as to the primary reason is perhaps the most obvious—that the Soviet Union desires to control South Korea because of the strategic importance of that area to the Soviet positions in North Asia, such as Port Arthur, Manchuria and Vladivostok. The fact that the Soviets had concluded no military agreements with North Korea such as they had with all their other satellites (except Albania) would indicate that they regarded North Korea as unfinished business which was to be completed by armed action with which the Soviet Union did not wish to be directly and juridically connected.

Mr. Bohlen stated that our entry into the Korean conflict was a political action based on the premise that aggression cannot be tolerated. From a purely military standpoint such action was undesirable because Korea from a strategic point of view was not vital to the United States defense position in Asia. For this reason there had been no American plan for a military action in Korea. The Soviet Union was doubtless fully aware of United States military thinking, which had been publicly stated, and had acted accordingly. We believe that for these reasons the United States and United Nations reactions to the North Korean attack came as a surprise to the Soviet Union. Further support for this belief lies in the fact that the Soviet propaganda machine was caught off guard and did not react immediately. Since the outbreak of the conflict, the Soviet Union has kept a free hand politically and militarily and has carefully avoided the impression that there is any special connection between itself and the North Koreans.

Mr. Bohlen reaffirmed that the United States action was a political action aimed at resisting aggression. He noted that it is based on the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and 27. He said that we cannot at this juncture predict the course of action that we should take if and when we reach the 38th parallel. That action will presumably depend on a Security Council decision when the time comes. As for the present military situation, it is critical but with luck we can hold.
Of outstanding importance are the long-term results of the aggression as evidenced in our mobilization and rearmament now under way. These actions should place the United States in a much stronger overall military posture within a reasonably short period. The President has already asked Congress for additional military appropriations of 10 billion dollars for ourselves and of 4 billion dollars for foreign military aid of which about 3.5 billion dollars will be for Europe.

Mr. Bohlen emphasized that whereas the purpose of the resolution recently submitted by Mr. Austin to the United Nations is to localize the Korean action, there is a real danger that the present hostilities may be extended. The greatest danger of this arises from the possible entry of Communist China into the conflict. So far no Chinese troops have been identified among the North Koreans. As for the North Koreans themselves, we have been much impressed by their fighting skill and believe that many of them had previous military experience in the Chinese civil war and possibly in Soviet Armies during World War II.

Turning to the possibility of direct Soviet involvement in the Korean conflict, Mr. Bohlen said that we consider such an eventuality unlikely so long as the fighting is confined to South Korea. Should the front be stabilized and the fighting turn again toward the North, we might expect a shift in the Soviet attitude. As the situation is today, we see no possibility that the Soviet Union would be prepared to settle the Korean question in a manner acceptable to the United Nations. There is no reason for the U.S.S.R. to adopt a conciliatory attitude so long as everything is going in its favor. If a real opportunity for an acceptable peaceful settlement (that was not merely a propaganda gesture) presented itself, we would certainly not reject it. However, we must remember that we are fighting for a political principle that aggression cannot be permitted to pay, and that this principle cannot be compromised.

Mr. Denning expressed general agreement with what Mr. Bohlen had to say. In the British view the Soviets were employing the technique of aggression by proxy in a new form. Moreover they were seeking to exploit an initial success before the Republic of Korea could be armed to resist aggression. Unquestionably they had been surprised by the United States and United Nations actions. The United Kingdom–Soviet diplomatic exchanges in Moscow showed that the Soviets had nothing to propose by way of settlement in consonance with the Security Council resolutions. Nevertheless the Soviet replies have not closed the door to negotiations. The United Kingdom shares the United States view that so long as the North Koreans continue to be militarily successful the Soviet Union will be disposed to make
no acceptable offer. In short, the North Koreans must be forced by
military action back to the 38th parallel. Doubtless the United Na-
tions will then seek to unify all Korea. Unification, however, will be
impossible without United Nations forces to support it. Although
there is no question that the ultimate solution must be a United Na-
tions solution, it is premature at this time to discuss the methods by
which it may be achieved.

With regard to the possibility of Chinese Communist involvement
in the Korean conflict, Mr. Denning expressed the view that this was
unlikely unless the Peking Government considered that very material
advantage would accrue therefrom. Nevertheless he did not exclude
the possibility that the Peking Government might be compelled by
Soviet pressure to take military action against its better judgment.
So far as the Soviet Union is concerned, he believed that it desires
above all to avoid involvement in total war and that should things
go badly in Korea it will have no compunction in sacrificing its
North Korean satellite in the hope of taking it over by political
means at a later date. Meanwhile it will exploit the situation.

Mr. Bohlen said that United States public opinion has been
aroused by the Korean action to a fuller understanding of the extent
of the Soviet menace and is facing up admirably to the realities of the
situation. He noted that whereas the technique of Soviet aggression
by proxy is not new, this is the first occasion of an un concealed aggres-
sion by proxy. This would seem to denote that the Soviet Union is
prepared to take greater risks today than a year or so ago and that the
Soviet rearmament program has doubtless progressed to a point per-
mitting of greater risks. We are forced to conclude that only by
rearming in turn can we deter the Soviets from continuing to take
risks of an increasingly graver nature.

M. Parodi expressed general agreement with what had been said.
In his view the Soviet Union had eschewed simulated aggression, such
as a civil war might have offered, in favor of brutal and open aggres-
sion. He assumed that although the Soviet Union had believed there
would be no armed aid to South Korea and had counted on United
States non-intervention, it had nevertheless prepared for the worst.
The lesson of the Korean aggression, he said, is that it is provoking
the rearmament of the West. He expressed concern that the Soviet
Union might be tempted to seize the opportunity of Western weakness
in the months immediately ahead to start a general war. He said that
we are now in a more dangerous phase than at the beginning of the
Korean conflict and noted that the United States military cover on
which Western Europe must depend is dispersed and largely tied down
in Asia.
Mr. Bohlen spoke to this point. He said that we are fully aware of the danger of war in the period immediately ahead. We are, as M. Parodi indicated, entering a new phase of large scale rearmament. While this may entail the risk of war, it is a risk we must take because to do nothing would leave us in a weakened state in the event of aggression. In the past, Stalin's actions have not been based on the military factor alone. By nature he is very prudent, and he is not accustomed to launching wars where the odds are not overwhelmingly in his favor. These are deterrents to aggressive action which we must constantly bear in mind. Moreover, there are other deterrents, the first of which, from a military point of view, is our atomic arm. In the second place, Stalin must keep in mind the lesson of the defection of Soviet troops in 1941. Furthermore, he cannot feel entirely secure in his European satellites. By launching an intensive rearmament program, we may be taking a risk, but because we are living in a dangerous world where self-defense is a paramount necessity, the risk must be taken, and we cannot let our actions be dictated by fear of Soviet reactions.

M. Parodi remarked that it would be logical for Stalin to foresee that within three years the United States would be in a much stronger position than it is now and that this consideration might induce him to take preventive action against us at this juncture. He agreed that we must take the risk and expressed the hope that we can gain time now. He then referred to the inroads which Communist "peace" propaganda has made on public opinion in Europe and commented that the Russians had spoken so much of peace that many had begun to believe them. He concluded that while recognizing that United States intervention in Korea was indispensable and is fully supported by France, we must use every proper means to achieve a peaceful settlement.

Mr. Denning expressed agreement with Mr. Bohlen that while there is danger in rearmament there is even greater danger in not rearming. He said that while the United Kingdom would like to buy time, as M. Parodi had suggested, we must preserve a firm attitude.

Mr. Bohlen recognized that by drawing our forces into Korea our position from the standpoint of offering effective military cover elsewhere has been temporarily weakened. At the same time Stalin must realize that the net result of our present effort will be increased strength for us in the near future. Stalin has often said that what he particularly respects is productive capacity and that by underestimating the role of production in modern war and the productive capacity of the United States, Hitler had made his greatest mistake. There is no question that he continues to maintain a healthy respect for our productive potential. He can only conclude that from our standpoint
the adverse effect of our initial reverses in Korea must soon be offset many times by the cumulative results to be derived from mobilizing our industrial capacities for war.

M. Parodi asked Mr. Bohlen if we had envisaged the possibility of a Soviet proposal for elections in Korea.

Mr. Bohlen replied that it would be difficult to envisage such elections without the presence of United Nations troops throughout the country. Moreover, the Soviets are generally afraid of internationally conducted elections. In any case, as long as they hoped to get all Korea by military action, they would have no reason to favor general elections. A United Nations electoral commission in any case would not be enough, and United Nations troops would be required to guarantee security.

Mr. Bohlen said that contrary to the popular conception, the South Koreans have held together politically. There is no important guerrilla activity on the part of the South Koreans behind our lines. Not only have they fought well but after the initial defeat some four South Korean divisions have been regrouped and are continuing to make an effective contribution. It should be noted moreover that 700,000 South Korean refugees have preferred to flee behind our lines rather than to remain in Communist occupied territory.

M. Parodi expressed great interest in these facts and said that it would be desirable if they were more widely known in France.

M. Parodi then turned to the question of Formosa and expressed the view that perhaps the greatest present danger lay in the possibility of the Peking Government entering the conflict over this issue.2

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2 At this point, Mr. Bohlen set forth the U.S. position on Formosa; for documentation, see vol. vi, pp. 407 ff. On the question of Chinese Communist entry into the Korean conflict, the minutes of the meeting of August 4 attributed to Mr. Bohlen the observation that "as regards Korea, the Chinese Communists have no special interest in Korea and if left to their own free will, would probably hesitate to take any aggressive action."

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330/8-350: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PRIORITY

New York, August 3, 1950—1:18 p.m.
[Received August 3.]

198. Rau on afternoon of August 2 on his own initiative raised with Gross problems he said GOI was facing in connection with motion for localization of conflict in Korea.1 Saying he had not received

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1 See the editorial note under date of July 31, p. 501.
instructions as to how to vote on motion, Rau said he had been requested to take up several questions with US. Referring to condemnation paragraph in resolution, Rau asked if we had considered likelihood Soviet veto. If Soviet representative did veto, asked Rau, “Would that mean that SC did not condemn North Korean authorities?” Gross replied that it would mean no such thing, but would merely signify Soviet unwillingness for Council to condemn North Korean authorities. Rau, obviously cool to the condemnation clause and indeed to the resolution as a whole, did not argue the point but seemed unconvinced.

Rau also asked, what importance we attached to condemning the North Korean authorities, inasmuch as the SC “has already taken action much beyond the point of mere condemnation”. Gross replied we attached importance to giving all members of the Council, including the Soviet representative, opportunity to express their true views concerning continued contempt by North Korean authorities of SC orders.

Throughout discussion Rau clearly indicated GOI reluctance go along with resolution and unhappiness concerning “hard line” being followed by US in SC during past few days.

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**Editorial Note**

The United Nations Security Council met on August 3 from 3 to 6:40 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.482. The debate continued to revolve around the procedural question of the adoption of the agenda. A Soviet proposal to include the question of representation of the People’s Republic of China failed by a vote of 5 in favor (India, Norway, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Yugoslavia) to 5 opposed (China, Cuba, Ecuador, France, and the United States), with 1 abstention (Egypt). Another Soviet proposal to place on the agenda an item entitled “Peaceful Settlement of the Korean Question” was defeated by a vote of 3 in favor (Egypt, India, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) to 7 opposed (including the United States), with 1 abstention (Yugoslavia). Thus, the agenda adopted contained one item, as moved by the United States Representative, “Complaint of Aggression Upon the Republic of Korea”. The vote on this motion was 8 in favor (including the United States) to 1 opposed (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), with 2 abstentions (India and Yugoslavia).
611.91/3-350: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 3, 1950—6 p.m.

169. Text msg from Secy for delivery Nehru thru Bajpai fols:

"My dear Mr. PriMin: Thank you very much for ur gracious ltr, delivered to me by ur Amb on July 30. I am grateful to you for discussing so fully and frankly ur views on current developments in China, and I am confident that as a result of our exchange of ideas we now have a better understanding of each other’s views.

"I very much appreciate ur kindness in forwarding to ur Amb in Peiping the Pres’s statement re Formosa. I am likewise grateful for ur efforts to impress upon the auths in Peiping the desirability, in the interest of world peace, of avoiding action that might extend the area of hostilities.

"I was informed July 31 of India’s offer of a medical unit for the UN effort in Korea. I shld like to express my personal gratification that ur Govt found it possible to take this step which further evidences India’s solidarity with those members of the UN who oppose aggression.

"With warm personal regards. Sincerely yours."

You may wish to remark to Bajpai that the Secy and other top officials of Dept were gratified by the frank and friendly tone of Nehru’s note and found it very helpful in clarifying our understanding of India’s position. Such expressions of opinion are bound to increase mutual understanding between our two Govts.

ACHESON

795B.5/8-150: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 4, 1950—2 p.m.

60. Reurtel 98 1 Dept understands from Dept Defense that emergency auth given Gen MacArthur immed fol outbreak hostilities permitting him, as operational expedient, fulfill, without limitation, all KMAG’s requests for material on behalf ROK. It further understood MacArthur utilizing this auth to meet current requirements Korean forces.

For your further info Dept informing NSC its opinion that NSC 8/2 2 which imposed limitation of 65,000 troops, now obsolete.

ACHESON

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1 Received on August 1 at 5:07 a.m., p. 511.
Editorial Note

At 3 p.m. on August 4, the United Nations Security Council met for its 483rd session. At the outset, the Soviet Representative introduced the following draft resolution (S/1668):

"The Security Council,

Decides,

(a) To consider it necessary, in the course of the discussion of the Korean question, to invite the representative of the People's Republic of China and also to hear representatives of the Korean people;
(b) To put an end to the hostilities in Korea and at the same time to withdraw foreign troops from Korea."

Most of the debate then centered on the question of Korean representation at the Security Council, but no vote was taken on the Soviet draft resolution. For the record, see U.N. document S/PV.483.

Editorial Note

At the request of President Truman, his Special Assistant, W. Averell Harriman, made a trip to the Far East in early August. He held discussions with General MacArthur in Tokyo on August 6 and 8, and with Ambassador Muccio in Korea on August 7. Mr. Harriman's notes on his conversations in Tokyo are printed under date of August 8, page 542; concerning his talk with Ambassador Muccio on August 7, see infra.

795.00/8-750

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President

[Extract]

TOP SECRET

[TAEGU, August 7, 1950.]

I saw Muccio at General Walker's Headquarters. I asked him whether he wanted me to give the President any message, having in mind that there might be something that Muccio might want. He answered, "Tell him what great admiration I have for the stand that he has taken". There was nothing he wanted. He explained the strong support the South Koreans had given us. Their armies had fought well, even during the first attack when they were over-run by tanks and overwhelmed by heavy artillery. No ROK unit had surrendered, even down to company. The morale of the Army was good, and they were
fighting well. The morale of the Government was better, but Syngman Rhee was erratic, had his ups and down with the pulse of battle. The South Korean people were giving us full support, loading our ships, running the railroads, and South Korean police were maintaining order. No acts of major sabotage, in spite of Communist infiltration from the North, had occurred, and there were reports of cheering in Seoul whenever our planes came over. A million Koreans had come back with our troops. If there was victory, everyone would jump on the bandwagon. No doubt was in his mind as to the non-Communist outcome of an election. Some of the ROK police which had stayed behind were doing guerrilla work behind the enemy lines. Muccio sends texts for leaflets to Tokyo and data for radio. There has been some good work done, but not enough. The best thing of all would be good war news. Our radio is weak in Pusan, whereas the North Koreans have all the strong radios. He is now asking for a better radio in Pusan. Muccio has a staff of about 10, all of whom are good and their health is good . . .
nificance than any other meridian. There are no restrictions to preclude engaging and defeating North Korean land forces wherever found, by whatever means are necessary, in the same fashion that air and naval power now are used to destroy military targets anywhere in Korea.

5. The principal deterrent to military operations north of the 38th parallel other than North Korean armed forces, would be the entry of major Chinese Communist or Soviet forces in action in order to oppose further advances by the ground forces of the unified command. The movement of Chinese Communist or Soviet forces might be delayed, however, by destructions along the lines of communication external to Korea. Furthermore, skillful coordination and timing of military and political operations in North Korea might deter Soviet or Chinese Communist movements.

6. On the basis of available intelligence, it is not expected that the North Korean forces will be augmented by organized bodies of Chinese Communist troops, Soviet ground forces, or Soviet air forces as long as the ground fighting is confined to the area south of the 38th parallel.

7. Each of the following courses of action could be interpreted as in consonance with the UN Security Council resolutions of 25 and 27 June, 1950:

a. The minimum offensive effort by the unified command in Korea might be to carry out "repel the armed attack" provision of the 27 June UN resolution in seeking only a limited military offensive by forcing the North Korean armed forces to withdraw to positions north of the 38th parallel. The unified command would thus employ its troops only as far as the 38th parallel, and if the remaining North Korean forces had retreated north of the 38th parallel, hostilities might cease. The United Nations would be back where it was on 24 June 1950; the former military instability would again obtain. The USSR could use this force in being as a striking force for a second attempt to gain control of Korea. Thus, a return to the status quo ante bellum would not insure security. It would not provide the unification which all Koreans so desperately desire, and it would still require a very great outlay of funds to reconstruct and secure South Korea. On the other hand, a cessation of hostilities by the forces of the unified command on their arrival at the 38th parallel would be less likely to incite the Kremlin to military action and might lay the basis for a negotiated settlement.

b. As an alternative objective, the unified command could occupy Pyongyang and vicinity, in addition to key communications points in the center and east of Korea between 40° and 39° latitudes. An unoccupied, demilitarized zone might then be set up in depth along the Chinese and Soviet frontiers to allay their suspicions. But Korea would still not be united, and the security problem would be as great, if not greater, than in the case of a minimum effort.
c. A maximum effort would include the pacification and occupation of all Korea by the unified command, which would take any and all appropriate measures within Korea to accomplish its mission. The United Nations could then arrange elections to establish a government for all Korea. The future military frontier would coincide with the international boundary sanctioned by law, custom, and treaty, and perhaps guaranteed by UN authority and force.

8. Any consideration of US courses of action in support of UN action in Korea must assume that the United States will mobilize and use sufficient resources to gain its military objectives in Korea, while strengthening its military capabilities for execution of emergency war plans.

9. The courses of action considered in this report are based also on the assumption that the Soviet or Chinese Communist governments will not overtly enter the hostilities in Korea, and will not initiate general hostilities. Should the Soviet or Chinese Communist government enter overtly into the hostilities in Korea, the courses of action in NSC 73/1 and NSC 76 would apply.

Political Factors

10. For centuries Korea has been a cross-road of conflict. In modern times foreign occupation and exploitation have stunted Korea's growth as a nation. A ruthless Japanese rule erased Korea as a nation, and a post-war irreconcilable split divided Korea. Even today some governments view the fighting in Korea solely as another clash of great powers, and not as the measures taken by the United Nations in its responsibility to restore peace and security in Korea.

11. The urge for union is irrepressible and fundamental among all Koreans. During 40 years under the Japanese, their fondest hope was independence; today it is unification and independence. Five years of bisection culminating in a bitter, destructive civil war will probably intensify their desire for union.

12. The 38th parallel is a geographical artificiality violating the natural integrity of a singularly homogeneous nation. It began as a temporary military convenience; it became the eastern outpost of the iron curtain. As a result, the political economy of Korea has temporarily branched off in two completely different forms. One of the serious problems of reconstruction will involve the integration of the different political and economic institutions now established in the south and the north. However, after the cessation of hostilities, the intrinsic unity of Korean economic and human resources will help recast a divided Korea into one mold, provided political conditions permit.

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1 Related documentation is scheduled for publication in volume I.
2 See footnote 2 to the memorandum by the JCS, July 10, p. 346.
13. The United States proposed the 38th parallel as the dividing line for the acceptance of Japanese surrender, but never intended it as a rigid frontier. During 1945–1947 the United States made repeated efforts to find agreement with Soviet authorities in order to unite Korea. The Moscow Decision of 1945, the sessions of the Joint US-USSR Commission in 1946 and 1947, the Hodge-Chistiakov exchanges in 1946–1947, and the Marshall-Molotov exchanges of 1947 are familiar landmarks of our persistent but unsuccessful effort to persuade the USSR to join in unifying the two occupation zones under a single provisional government.

14. Attempts at unification continued under the aegis of the United Nations but with no more success. By its resolution of 14 November 1947 the General Assembly sought the objectives of freedom and national independence for all Korea, and set out a program for its attainment. The United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK), established by subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly, has been, and still is, charged with seeking Korea’s unification by peaceful settlement. On 21 October 1949 the General Assembly reaffirmed these objectives and the mission of UNCOK, and called upon the member States “to refrain from any acts derogatory to the purposes of the present resolution”. While the General Assembly for three years has sought to unify Korea by peaceful means, it has never formally considered nor explicitly approved the unification of Korea through military means.

15. Yet, the United Nations did succeed in establishing in South Korea a sovereign government recognized by 32 nations. The General Assembly resolution of 12 December 1948 declared that there has been established “a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea), having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea.”

16. The Government of the Republic of Korea, despite many weaknesses, demonstrated a growing capacity to govern prior to hostilities. As UNCOK pointed out in its report of 26 June 1950 to the Secretary General, “there have been distinct signs of improvement in recent months in both economic and political stability of the country”. Recent elections for the National Assembly gave significant gains to moderate elements. However, the more conservative elements have exercised power in the Government of Syngman Rhee, usually in a harsh and authoritarian manner. Syngman Rhee has not been popular. In North
Korea communist propaganda undoubtedly has aroused considerable hostility among Koreans to the South Korean administration. Political reconstruction in Korea will present a complex challenge.

17. In view of the establishment of a Soviet-style police state in North Korea, it is difficult to weigh the degree of popular support for or opposition to the regime there. The relatively large number of refugees who have fled south during the past five years indicates the possibility of considerable discontent. The ravages of war may create in North Korea a population hostile to the Communist authorities. They will, in any event, attempt to unite occupied South Korea to North Korea by so-called national elections.

Politic-Military Considerations

18. By a quick and crushing victory of the North Korean military forces in South Korea, the USSR would have gained its long-standing goal of the complete absorption of Korea into its orbit. Furthermore, the building of a "cordon soviétai" from the Soviet borders of Sinkiang to the southern shores of Korea would have neared completion. Only Japan and the Philippines at the edge of the orbit, and Southeast Asia to the South, would have still remained outside. Yet, the aggression in South Korea may result in the opposite effect—the failure to complete the cordon.

19. In this light, the situation in Korea now provides the United States and the free world with the first opportunity to regain territory from the Soviet bloc. Since a basic policy of the United States is to check and reduce the preponderant power of the USSR in Asia and elsewhere, then UN operations in Korea can set the stage for the non-communist penetration into an area under Soviet control.

20. Penetration of the Soviet orbit, short of all-out war, would disturb the political, economic and military structure which the USSR is organizing between its own Far Eastern territories and the contiguous areas. The bonds of Manchuria, pivot of this complex outside the USSR, would be weakened, for a free and strong Korea could provide an outlet for Manchuria's resources and could also provide non-communist contact with the people there and in North China.

21. The significance in Asia of the unification of Korea under UN auspices would be incalculable. The Japanese would see demonstrated a check on Soviet expansion. Elements in the Chinese Communist regime, and particularly important segments of the Chinese population, might be inclined to question their exclusive dependence on the Kremlin. Skillful manipulation might drive a wedge between the Chinese Communists and the Kremlin. Throughout Asia, those who foresee only inevitable Soviet conquest would take hope.
22. For the above reasons, it is probable that the danger of a free, united Korea will lead the Kremlin to try to prevent its total loss. When North Korean forces appear to be losing, or even before, the Kremlin may launch a vigorous attempt to mediate the dispute, or may employ Chinese or Soviet military forces to hold part or all North Korea. However, it is possible that, notwithstanding its considerable military strength located in the Far East, the Kremlin will not jeopardize its uncompleted strategic arrangements in the Far East to risk a general war to prevent a full-fledged, rapid, and determined UN effort to unite Korea.

U.S. Interests and Obligations

23. In subscribing to the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, the U.S. pledged its support to Korean independence. Our intentions have been measured in our diplomatic support, military aid, and economic assistance. Our obligation to the United Nations to block a breach of the peace, is fixed.

24. The broad objectives of the United States were stated in NSC 8/2, approved by the President on 23 March 1949, as follows:

"a. To establish a united, self-governing, and sovereign Korea as soon as possible, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the UN.

"b. To ensure that the government so established shall be fully representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people.

"c. To assist the Korean people in establishing a sound economy and educational system as essential bases of an independent and democratic state. A more immediate objective is the withdrawal of remaining U.S. occupation forces from Korea as early as practicable consistent with the foregoing objectives."

25. The political value to the United States of establishing a free, united, and stable Korea and of carrying out the resolve of the United Nations justifies our current military effort in behalf of South Korea.

CONCLUSIONS

26. The following principles form the basis for consideration of U.S. actions:


b. The establishment of a free and united Korea and the elimination of the North Korea Communist regime, following unprovoked military aggression, would be a step in reversing the dangerous strategic trend in the Far East of the past twelve months.

c. The 38th parallel, in and of itself, has no military significance other than such an artificial barrier as would limit if not prevent a military victory.

*For the complete text, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. vii, Part 2, p. 969.
The chief potential limitation on the objective of unifying Korea will be Soviet military countermeasures including the use of Chinese Communist troops, or Soviet diplomatic and political actions in the UN.

Consequently, the timing and speed of U.S. politico-military operations are crucial, and call for especially close working relationships.

In the long run, a maximum UN effort will be needed in securing peace in Korea and in meeting the acute problems of political and economic reconstruction.

The continued functioning of the Republic of Korea, as the only sovereign government in Korea, is indispensable to the re-establishment of the rule of law in Korea and is necessary to the fulfilment of U.S. objectives.

Long-range policies in support of independence for Korea conform to the general objectives of the United States in Asia.

In consonance with the above principles and in pursuit of its basic long-range objectives with respect to Korea, the U.S. should take measures to effect:

- The establishment of a free, independent and stable Korea oriented toward the U.S.
- The security of Korea against foreign aggression and internal subversion.
- The reconstruction of Korea in political, economic, and social fields to develop a stable, self-sustaining, and advancing state.

As the basis for realizing these objectives, the United States should take the following series of actions:

- **Statement of Aims:**
  
  (1) At an appropriate time, the President should proclaim that our peace aim is a united, free, and independent Korea, as envisaged by the UN. Such a statement should be supported by a Joint Resolution of Congress.

  (2) Again at an appropriate time, the U.S. should seek to translate this aim into UN objectives. In view of the possibility that uncoordinated measures would provoke Soviet counter-action, either in the military or diplomatic field or both, the United States should seek UN action in two stages: first, at the 1950 meeting of the General Assembly, the United Nations should immediately endorse the resolutions of 25 and 27 June and 7 July, of the Security Council and seek maximum support for the unified command; second, at a later date, at the moment when the unified command has taken the offensive, the United Nations should re-affirm the basic UN aims in Korea along the lines of the General Assembly Resolution of 14 November 1947.

  (3) No statement of U.S. general objectives should be made until the unified command has launched offensive military measures to carry out the military objectives listed below. Until such time, great caution and discretion should be taken in public discussion of the 38th parallel.
(4) In the meantime, the U.S. should use all its diplomatic means to forestall any Soviet effort to mediate the conflict on any terms short of the unification of all Korea on a free and representative basis under UN auspices.

b. Military Objectives:

(1) The unified command should seek to occupy Korea and to defeat North Korean armed forces wherever located north or south of the 38th parallel.
(2) To achieve this objective, the Commanding General of the unified command should pursue military operations in Korea without regard to the 38th parallel.

c. Occupation Problems:

(1) As an interim measure the U.S. should encourage the UN to strengthen UNCOOK to render it more effective in maintaining liaison with the government of the Republic, and with other political elements in Korea, in observing the course of hostilities, and in supervising the care of refugees and the civil organization of reoccupied areas.
(2) At or about the time of surrender or the cessation of hostilities, the U.S. should encourage the UN to create a new UN organization, incorporating UNCOOK. This organization would be responsible for the long-term reconstruction and security of Korea. It should include (a) a UN administrator for relief and reconstructions; (b) a commission to supervise national elections and the reformation of the national government of the Republic of Korea to include all of Korea; and (c) a border commission to observe the integrity of the Korean frontier and it should use the international security forces provided by the UN to police this frontier.
(3) The United States should be prepared to provide its share of forces required to police the Korean frontier until such time as Korean forces are trained and equipped to take over that responsibility. Likewise, the U.S. should seek firm commitments from UN members to furnish military forces for occupation purposes until the mission of the UN is accomplished.

d. Politico-Military Measures:

(1) The United States should make a maximum effort to support and strengthen the governing bodies of the Republic of Korea. The quality of administrative personnel should be improved, the National Assembly restored to full working order, and civilian teams selected and trained to take over reoccupied areas to provide effective follow-up of military operations.
(2) Psychological warfare should be intensified to discredit the Communist regime and improve Korean morale.
(3) An ad hoc committee of departmental representatives should be established immediately to develop detailed reconstruction plans to include recommendations for military, economic, and political assistance.
(4) The UN, and perforce the U.S., should not be deflected from its present course of action or stated objectives in Korea by any proposals by the USSR or minority groups in the UN which fall short of complete achievement of the present U.S. and UN objectives.
CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, August 7, 1950—5 p. m.

120. Dept’s analysis present parliamentary situation SC re invitation reps of North and South Kor authorities folks:

1. At June 25 meeting rep of Repub of Kor was duly invited participate “during consideration of this case” by unanimous Council decision. At same meeting by vote of 1 in favor, 6 against, and 3 abstentions res inviting Gov of North Kor to state its case before SC failed to carry. At all subsequent meetings during June and July which considered agenda item “Complaint of Aggression Upon the Repub of Korea” rep of Repub of Kor was invited participate. Subsequent invitations were not separate decisions by SC but merely continuance of June 25 decision carried forward by Pres without objection by any member. Similarly, during these meetings in June and July no further motion was made to invite North Korean reps.

2. SC decision to invite reps of Repub of Kor was and is decision with continuing force and effect and remains operative, in words of original motion, “during consideration of this case”; the words “this case” referring generally to Korean situation and specifically to agenda item before Council on June 25, namely, Complaint of Aggression Upon the Repub of Kor. Decision therefore to invite reps of Repub remains in full force and effect at every subsequent meeting of Council at which that agenda item is under discussion. Decision could of course be reversed by subsequent SC decision taken by procedural majority of any 7 votes. Had objection been raised to issuance of automatic invitation by Pres during June or July, it wld have been duty of Pres put question of reversing prior decision to vote. No objection raised during this period so issue did not arise.

3. Sov del at Aug 4 meeting has now raised objection to automatic invitation pursuant to continuing decision of June 25. It is therefore privilege of Sov to move that June 25 decision shld be reversed. Unless such motion is made it is duty of Pres to issue invitation to Repub rep. To reverse June 25 decision requires direct action by SC taken by 7 vote majority.

4. As to priority of voting, it is clear that because of continuing nature of invitation to Repub reps under June 25 decision, a vote to reverse this decision shld be taken first. Once decision to invite a rep is made, practice of SC has always been at commencement of each subsequent meeting to invite participants immediately after adoption of agenda and prior commencement discussion of question. Agenda was adopted at conclusion of meeting Aug 3; therefore seating of Repub rep not called for until commencement meeting Aug 4. After vote on invitation to Repub rep it wld be appropriate for Pres submit question of invitation to North Kor reps and if he desires, participation without vote of Chi Commie under Rule 39.

Foregoing analysis sets forth what in our view is appropriate parliamentary action to be taken by any Pres of Council conforming to SC
Rules of Procedure and practice. Set forth below are various hypotheses which Sov Pres may foil and suggested methods of dealing with them:

a. If Pres puts question of invitation to Repub reps in such way as to require 7 votes to confirm decision of June 25 Pres ruling shld be challenged under point of order pursuant to Rule 30 on grounds set forth above that June 25 decision is legal continuing decision until reversed by subsequent SC vote.

b. If Pres rules that June 25 decision was illegal because of absence of Sov and Chi reps that ruling itself is subject to challenge under Rule 30.

c. If Pres rules that question must be put in way requiring 7 affirmative votes to invite Repub rep because question is subject to veto, that ruling must also be challenged on ground that San Francisco Four Power Statement\(^1\) provides expressly to contrary (Part I, Para 2) and on ground of previous SC precedents where decision to invite participants under both Art 32 of Charter and Rule 30 of Rules were taken despite negative votes of permanent members (See Czech case, S/PV 266, page 62, S/PV 272, page 11; Indonesian case, S/PV 181, page 111.)

d. If Pres rules that Part (a) of Sov draft res must be voted on prior to vote on question of reversing June 25 decision, that ruling shld also be challenged.

e. Dept does not anticipate that in light San Francisco Statement Sov will attempt exercise double veto. However, if Pres makes any ruling to effect that decision of Council is not to invite Repub rep, that ruling shld be challenged and over-ruled. In such event US rep shld state that Sov rep in his capacity as Pres is not following decisions of Council and it is therefore duty of Council to instruct SYG to provide place for rep of Repub of Korea at table and to invite him to participate in Council discussions on present agenda item.

ACHESON

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\(^{1}\) Text in Department of State Bulletin, June 10, 1945, p. 1047; for related documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1945, volume I.

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230/3-750: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

New York, August 7, 1950—8:53 p. m.

PRIORITY

[Received August 7—10:09 p. m.]

227. Jebb (UK) convened meeting with Sunde (Norway), Ordonneau (France) and Gross to consider procedural tactics for Tuesday’s\(^2\) SC meeting.

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\(^{2}\) August 8.
At beginning of meeting Gross outlined the procedural situation at end of Friday’s meeting with Chinese point of order that SC had decided on June 25 to seat representative of ROK as the previous question. He therefore suggested that on Tuesday first business is this point of order which should be put to a vote immediately under rule 30. Therefore, Tsiang (China) or someone else should insist on Tuesday that President rule on point of order that President is bound by SC decision of June 25 to invite representative of ROK to the table. Under rule 30 he would request immediate ruling on this point.

It was suggested that other members of SC would thereupon remain silent until the President rules. If he refused to rule on the pending point of order we would suspend or adjourn to a day certain to consult on the ground that serious constitutional crisis created and SC cannot continue so long as President refuses to act. Gross then outlined other alternatives that might occur:

1. The President might rule that the Council made no decision on this question on June 25. In that event his ruling would be challenged and overruled.

2. He might rule that the Soviet proposal be put to the vote first. Here again his ruling would be challenged and overruled.

3. He might attempt adjournment for lack of speakers. Objection would be made on the ground Council should not adjourn without hearing President’s ruling as rule 30 provides. If he adjourned the meeting in spite of objection and left the chamber other members of Council would remain.

4. Gross pointed out that in a variety of circumstances the President might claim that on a ruling after he has ruled as President and it is challenged, his vote as USSR representative in sustaining the ruling, and opposing a challenge constitutes a veto. That would raise the question of overruling the decision that a negative vote of a permanent member on a challenge constitutes a veto. Gross observed that this tactic is more a successive veto operation than the usual double veto problem.

The meeting indicated a general reluctance to be firm on the issue of seating the ROK representative if this involves anything resembling a double veto fight and the necessity for overriding a purported Soviet veto. Ordonneau, who will be sitting on Tuesday since Chauvel and Lacoste remain away, indicated that he would not be allowed to challenge a Soviet veto and added that even as to decisions stated to be procedural in GA resolution or part I of San Francisco statement, he would still feel bound by part II of San Francisco statement. The UK and Norwegians reflected to a lesser degree the same view. Jebb stated that although his FonOff did not like the idea he had suggested going ahead without ROK representative at the table to avoid this

*See the editorial note under date of August 4, p. 527.
entire subject. Gross pointed out that this would be a serious propaganda victory for USSR and appeasement to them on an important charter principle. If we avoided the issue this time we would undoubtedly have to face it later. Stabell (Norway) suggested that rather than be involved in a double veto fight we should point out that the decision of Malik is illegal, not a binding precedent and go on the ground that nothing could be done.

Gross pointed out that if we adjourn should the President refuse to rule, it would be possible to save the principle and consider a number of remedies, such as the amendment of the rules of the SC or a special session of the GA.

Jebb suggested that we might not insist on applying the rules of procedure but simply have a general debate on the subject of Korea in general without regard for the rules. Gross again stressed that this was giving in to dictatorial and illegal acts by the President and would lead to inch by inch capitulation. The major objection pressed by the UK and Norwegians was that Malik will refuse to rule on whether the ROK representative is entitled to sit and will simply say that he will put that question to the Council as previous Presidents have put question of substance or procedure to the Council. That would lead directly into the feared double veto fight.

Jebb suggested that it might be simpler for Malik to rule as requested that ROK should be seated if first we voted on paragraph a of Soviet proposal which provides that representatives of Korean people and Chinese Communists be seated. This would be defeated for lack of seven votes and then we would go ahead and insist on a ruling on the pending point of order. Gross pointed out that the major objection to this is that we would then have gone far toward abandoning our strong position that the Council has already decided on seating ROK representative and that force of that decision would have been put in doubt.

At the end of the meeting Ordonneau and Jebb came back to the point that it was unlikely Malik would insist on a veto but would take his medicine as he has on previous August votes. It was therefore agreed that subject to instructions and reflection the same group will meet Tuesday before SC meeting and that (1) Tsiang should raise a new point of order stating that the previous question is that the President is bound by the SC decision of June 25 to invite representative of ROK to table; (2) other SC members will not speak on this issue; (3) reasonable efforts will be made to get Malik to rule and his insistence that his resolution or some other motion be considered will be treated as a ruling against Tsiang's point; (4) if Malik as USSR representative casting a negative vote takes the position this
is a veto, SC will adjourn; (5) if he attempts adjournment without consent for lack of speakers and leaves the chamber, Council will continue in session without him; (6) it was agreed that we would at least consider the suggestion that in the light of rule 39 upon the adoption of the agenda Chang of Korea by agreement of all except the USSR privately reached should sit at the table so that the burden of removing him will be up to Malik; (7) it was agreed that we would oppose the seating of the North Korean representative. Ordonneau stated he would oppose it “for the moment”. Jebb pointed out that there may be a movement by India to set down certain conditions precedent on which the NK representatives would be invited. This would include return of NK forces to 38th parallel. He added that Pearson of Canada had been thinking along this line and that Jebb’s FonOff feels that the time will come when SC should hear North Koreans. Gross warned of the danger of weakening now about what might be done in the future and questioned whether the SC is the right body in the foreseeable future for hearing NK representatives in light of UNCOK and GA consideration of this case.

AUSTIN

795.00/8-550

Memorandum of Conversation, by Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration, United States Army

TOP SECRET

Tokyo, August 8, 1950—10:30 a.m. to 12:55 p.m.

Conferees: Gen. MacArthur
Mr. Harriman
Gens. Norstad
Ridgway
Almond

1. In a brilliant 2½ hour presentation, made with utmost earnestness, supported by every logical military argument of his rich experience, and delivered with all of his dramatic eloquence, General MacArthur stated his compelling need for additional combat ground forces by the following dead-lines:

15 Sept—3d Infantry Division (U.S.)
Rest of 1st Marine Division (U.S.)
15 Oct—2d Marine Division (U.S.)

1 Lt. Gen. Lauris Norstad, Acting Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force. Mr. Harriman on his visit to the Far East traveled in the company of Generals Ridgway and Norstad who were on a special mission. They returned to the United States after the discussions in Tokyo.
2. Conclusions:

a. Time works against us in the Korean situation.

b. Early military victory is essential.

c. Delay in achieving it increases the chance of direct military participation Chinese Communist or Soviet forces, or both.

d. A maximum co-ordinated offensive effort of U.S. forces should be made at the earliest possible date that offers reasonable chance of decisive success.

e. This effort should have as its objective the destruction of the main North Korean armed forces South Korea before the onset of next winter.

f. The forces now scheduled to be operationally available in FECOM by 25 September are inadequate for the successful accomplishment of this mission.

g. Decisive success—destruction of hostile main forces in South Korea—is reasonably attainable by early winter, if the offensive is launched by about 25 September, and if the forces now in or enroute to FECOM are augmented by the approximate equivalent of two U.S. infantry divisions and one U.S. airborne RCT.

h. The diversion of these forces to this mission will still further seriously impair our mobilization base, and therefore entail acceptance of a substantial additional risk which the JCS must evaluate and proper authority decide.

i. Once launched, this operation must be given every chance of success.

j. To insure success, it must have reasonably adequate forces at the outset.

k. The alternatives to furnishing the additional forces required, involve the certainty of a more difficult and costly operation later, of an incalculable loss of military prestige world-wide and consequently of political advantage, and the probability of greater non-battle casualties during a Korean winter, than of battle losses in the operation as planned.

l. Present best intelligence estimates are that the Soviet will not intervene with armed forces during the next few months.

m. The forces should be furnished by the dates indicated and the operation ordered executed as planned.

n. Every effort should be made to secure the maximum of United Nations combat ground forces, particularly British, Canadian, Pakistani, Australian, Turkish, and perhaps French, and at the earliest possible date.

3. Concurrences:

Mr. Harriman [initialed] W.A.H.


[The following note in longhand:] Delivered to Mr. Harriman about 091145 Aug and returned by him to me by hand in Sec Louis Johnson's office about noon same date. M.B.R.²

²The following information is taken from Korean Conflict, based upon conversations held with Mr. Harriman by Messrs. Noble and Dougall of the Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, on March 2, 1951 and by Mr. Dougall on March 5, 1951:

"Immediately after his return to Washington, on August 9, Harriman reported to the President upon his conferences in Tokyo. The President requested the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to give immediate consideration to General MacArthur's proposals for a military offensive, and later in the morning Harriman conferred with Johnson, the Joint Secretaries, and the Joint Chiefs. . . . The Joint Chiefs of Staff met at once to consider the military recommendations proposed by MacArthur as transmitted and concurred in by Ridgway, Norstad, and Harriman, and within twenty-four hours approval had been given to the plan discussed for an offensive in Korea."

795.00/8-850

Extracts of Memorandum of Conversations, by Mr. W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President, With General MacArthur in Tokyo on August 6 and 8, 1950 ¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 20, 1950.

. . . . . ²

The reaction among the Japanese to our action in Korea was one of relief, as they interpreted it to mean that we would vigorously defend them against Russian invasion. They were not disturbed by our temporary difficulties, since they understood the military difficulties caused by the surprise attack. Their pride had been aroused by "his" confidence in them, shown by the withdrawal of most of the American troops. He could withdraw them all without danger of disorder in Japan.

. . . . . ²

I had a 2½ hour talk with MacArthur in the morning; ³ lunch with him and Mrs. MacArthur for the entire party, and then a further 2-hour talk from 5:30 to 7:30 in the afternoon.

¹ The source text in the Department of States files, an unsigned typewritten document, bore the heading "Notes Dictated by Mr. Harriman on August 20 Concerning His Conversations With General MacArthur [Extracts]". At the conclusion of the document, the following note was typed: ["Note: This copy (no carbons) was made from rough, largely unedited notes dictated by Mr. Harriman. Some liberties have consequently been taken with the format and the spelling of the original. The wording, however, is not changed, except that a few queries of clarifications have been inserted in brackets."]

² A fuller version of Mr. Harriman's memorandum is printed in Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 349-353.

³ Ellipsis indicated in the source text.

² Of August 6.
On Tuesday morning, after my return from Korea, we had a further four-hour talk before my departure.

The first 2½ hours included a military discussion at which Generals Ridgway and Norstad participated. General Almond also was present.

I will not attempt to divide the conversations chronologically, but largely by subjects.

Military (Korea). Our first talk on Sunday morning covered the military situation as he saw it.

I explained to him that the President had asked me to tell him that he wanted to know what MacArthur wanted, and was prepared to support him as fully as possible. I asked MacArthur whether he had any doubts about the wisdom of the Korean decision. He replied, “absolutely none”. The President’s statement was magnificent. It was an historic decision which would save the world from Communist domination, and would be so recorded in history. The commitment of our ground forces was essential, and victory must be attained rapidly.

MacArthur described his firm conviction that the North Korean forces must be destroyed as early as possible and could not wait for a slow build-up. He emphasized the political and military dangers of such a course; the discouragement that would come among the United Nations including the U.S.; the effect on Oriental peoples as well as on the Chinese Communists and the Russians. He feared that Russia and the Chinese Communists would be able to greatly strengthen the North Korean forces and that time was of the essence, or grave difficulties, if not disaster, were ahead.

(His military appraisal is dealt with in a separate memorandum, including the statement to the Joint Chiefs prepared by Ridgway, and signed by him, Norstad and myself.)

He did not believe that the Russians had any present intention of intervening directly, or becoming involved in a general war. He believed the same was true of the Chinese Communists. The Russians had organized and equipped the North Koreans, and had supplied some of the trained personnel from racial Koreans of the Soviet Union who had fought in the Red Army forces. The Chinese Communists had cooperated in the transfer of soldiers who had fought with the Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria. These had not come over as units, but had been released in Manchuria, and reorganized into North Korean forces after they had been transported to North Korea. Their leadership was vigorous. A number of Russian

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4 August 8.
5 See supra.
officers were acting as observers but undoubtedly giving direction. Their tactics had been skillful, and they were as capable and tough as any army in his military experience.

MacArthur wants maximum UN ground forces possible, as many as 30 or 40,000. He will take battalions (1,000 men) just as fast as they can come, with only their small arms. Actually, heavier artillery would be welcome, but the need is so great that he would take them with their small arms only. He feels the British should send a brigade from Hong Kong or Malaya, thinks it could be replaced from the United Kingdom. The French could send some forces from Indochina; a brigade from Pakistan and Turkey would be most welcome. Canada should send some troops. He was going to work on Menzies when he arrived the following week. He didn't have a good word to say about the Siamese, although he recognized the value of Eastern troops. He wasn't sure the Philippines could spare anything just now.

He has no doubts of the political outcome, once there is victory. Victory is a strong magnet in the East, and the Koreans want their freedom. When Syngman Rhee's Government is reestablished in Seoul, the UN-supervised election can be held within two months, and he has no doubt of an overwhelming victory for the non-Communist parties. The North Koreans will also vote for a non-Communist Government when they are sure of no Russian or Communist intervention. He said there was no need to change the Constitution, which now provides for 100 seats for the North. Korea can become a strong influence in stabilizing the non-Communist movement in the East.

[Here follows discussion of China and Formosa printed in volume VI, page 256.]

* Ellipsis indicated in the source text.

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Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)\(^1\)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 8, 1950.

I am putting down in outline form below a qualitative estimate of progress and prospects for UN military aid offers.

\(^1\) A manuscript note in the source text indicated that Mr. Acheson saw this memorandum.
I. The following countries have provided military combat units already integrated into the Korean operation:

- UK (naval and carrier)
- Australia (naval and air force)
- New Zealand (naval)
- Netherlands (naval)
- France (naval)
- Canada (naval, military air transport)

II. The following countries have offered military aid in one form or another; the offer has been officially welcomed by the US and discussions have started or been arranged for between their representatives and The Pentagon:

- Union of South Africa (fighter squadron)
- Australia (combat troops)
- New Zealand (combat troops)
- India (army hospital unit)
- Thailand (4,000 combat troops)
- Turkey (4,500 combat troops)

(The Joint Chiefs of Staff have not yet decided whether or not they will be able or wish to utilize the Thai and Turk offers)

- UK (Combat troops)
- Greece (air transport)
- China (combat troops—refused by Unified Command for military reasons)
- Belgium (air transport—accepted)

III. With some hope of success, we are actively encouraging ground troop offers from the following countries:

- France
- Philippines
- Pakistan

IV. There appears no prospect of any troop offers from the Arab League.

V. There appears no prospect of troop offers from the Scandinavian countries, with the possible exception of Norway. Norway, however, has offered merchant tonnage and Sweden a self-contained hospital unit, both of which offers have been accepted and are in process of being integrated into the needs of the Unified Command. Denmark is considering offering a hospital ship.

VI. There appears no immediate prospect of troop offers from any of the Latin American Republics. We are encouraging offers from

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*On August 10, Secretary of Defense Johnson informed Mr. Acheson of the views of the JCS, with which he concurred, that the Thai and Turkish offers be accepted (7953.5/8-1050).*
Brazil, Mexico and Argentina which ARA considers the only countries in this group which conceivably could offer national units which would meet the minimum requirements of the Unified Command. An alternative would be to organize, equip and train mixed divisions or larger units from individual volunteers from Latin American countries. ARA has prepared a NSC paper at my suggestion on this general subject, which paper is now in the process of Departmental consideration.  

VII. There appears no prospect for the present of additional troop offers from any Asian countries.

VIII. The following countries may offer troops or other military aid which would be welcomed but would have to be considered for actual employment.

- Italy (small naval vessel)
- Belgium (token troop unit)
- Netherlands (token troop unit)
- Norway (token troop unit)

IX. Volunteers have been offered by certain governments, such as the Philippines, Costa Rica and Panama, and on an individual basis in many countries. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, have decided that they do not wish to incorporate alien volunteers, including Filipinos, in US forces at this time. The Secretary General of the United Nations and UNA in the Department are urgently studying the possibility of recruiting, arming and training a United Nations Legion. This proposal is expected to come up for discussion at the General Assembly next month.

*Related documentation is scheduled for publication in volume 1.*

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**Editorial Note**

The United Nations Security Council met on August 8 from 3 p.m. until 7:40 p.m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.484. The debate continued on the question of Korean representation, and Mr. Malik, as President, refused to make a ruling on the validity of the June 25 Security Council decision to invite the representative of the Republic of Korea to sit in on the meetings. Before the Council adjourned until August 10, Mr. Malik introduced the following resolution (S/1679), on which no vote was taken:

"Proposal Concerning the Inhuman, Barbarous Bombing by the United States Air Force of the Peaceful Population, Towns and Populated Areas in Korea"

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the protest of the Government of the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea against the inhuman, barbarous bomb-
ing of the peaceful population and of peaceful towns and populated areas which is being carried out by the United States Air Force in Korea,

"Recognising that the bombing by the United States armed forces of Korean towns and villages, involving the destruction and mass annihilation of the peaceful civilian population, is a gross violation of the universally accepted rules of international law,

"Decides

"To call upon the Government of the United States of America to cease and not permit in future the bombing by the Air Force or by other means of towns and populated areas and also the shooting up from the air of the peaceful population of Korea;

"To instruct the Secretary-General of the United Nations to bring this decision of the Security Council to the very urgent notice of the Government of the United States of America."

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795B.5/8-950 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TAEGU, August 9, 1950.

[Received August 9—5:55 a.m.]

113. From Eighth Army advanced to SecState Wash DC. Repeated info Tokyo unnumbered. In hour's conversation General Walker pointed up his command greatly handicapped this critical period by inability make use available Korean manpower, both partially trained, such as police and recruits, and very considerable number would be volunteers, owing lack weapons for either training or combat. Reinforcement ROK army greatly delayed for same reason at time ROK army steadily depleted by combat losses. Currently over 20,000 Korean soldiers under training of whom 5,000 capable entering combat immediately if Walker were able arm them.

No stocks weapons held in Korea; depots in Japan largely depleted. It seems imperative ZI arsenals should be required earliest supply infantry weapons for air lift Korea: rifles, carbines, light machine-guns, mortars vitally needed here quickest possible time.

I urge Department take whatever measures possible emphasize to DA critical need for earliest possible action this regard. Advice on necessity for this action coincides with my own observations as well as urgent requests of ROK.¹

Muccio

¹The Department of State sent the following reply in telegram 70, August 11, to the Embassy in Korea:

"Your urgent interest and that of Gen Walker in obtaining additional arms for ROK forces (urget 113 Aug 9) has been discussed with Defense, which assures that everything possible being done get additional weapons to Koreans quickly as possible." (795B.5/8-950)
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

New York, August 9, 1950—2:35 p.m.

[Received August 9—2:58 p.m.]

240. We have carefully considered following alternatives for dealing with SC for remainder August beginning Thursday afternoon, August 10.

1. Do nothing but reply to Malik's attacks.
2. Continue drive for procedural decisions having objective to clear agenda for S/1653 (US resolution localization conflict). This involves "sweating out" August on procedural rows interspersed with substantive statements.
3. Establishment committee of whole under rule 28 to consider and recommend on complaint of aggression upon ROK. Such committee would elect own chairman and report to SC September 1.
4. Adjournment for remainder of month of August.
5. Amendment rule 18 in order eject Malik from chair and elect new chairman.
6. Special session GA.

We strongly favor number 3. Number 2 is bad alternative for following reasons:

a. Continuation through month August of proceedings last ten days would play into hands Russians who, despite daily victories we may have won, have achieved objectives (1) paralyzing and demeaning Council; (2) using Council as effective sounding board, particularly in Asia.

b. Continuation of present procedure but in addition using every opportunity available to us and to our friends to make substantive statement would (1) increase paralysis SC; (2) improve Malik's propaganda position; (3) increase difficulty maintaining solidarity our friends; (4) impair our moral position which is one of our strongest assets; (5) give victory in fact to Malik on not seating ROK representative; (6) involve protracted and embarrassing discussion seating North Koreans, Chinese Communists; (7) prevent progress towards vote on Korea; (8) involve great damage SC machinery and prestige by demonstrating ability Russians to tie it up; (9) enlist public support here and abroad for Hoover proposal as irritation increases.

We strongly favor number three for following reasons:

a. It would extricate us from procedural morass we are now in which is very advantageous to Malik and disadvantageous to us.

1 See the editorial note under date of July 31, p. 501.
b. It would provide us with opportunity to regain by legal means substantive initiative we effectively seized July 31 by introduction our localization resolution (S/1653) but which we lost to Malik during last ten days; under this procedure he would be forced to take position on localization resolution.

c. Re-assert the authority and competence of SC.

d. Give us opportunity to reply legally to Malik’s propaganda speeches.

e. By acting within rules do least violation of established procedure of Council, having regard to disorderly precedents now being established which Soviet will exploit in months to come.

We recognize effort to establish rule 28 committee might involve us in double veto; we feel, however, that there is no reason to be afraid of this.

Foregoing, of course, is subject to consultations. We would contemplate, if possible, getting nine or ten sponsors motion to establish committee. We have in mind possibility giving Malik “last clear chance” by renewing, this time sponsored by ten members Council, point of order that President is requested by decision SC of June 25 to invite representative of ROK to table prior to transaction any other business. If Malik still dodges issue by refusing to give rule or otherwise seat them, contemplate introduction motion to establish committee.

Meeting with other delegates 4:30 p.m. today.

Austin

330/S-950: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

secret

Washington, August 9, 1950—6 p.m.

niact

123. Dept has considered alternatives set forth your niact 240, Aug 9 and is in agreement with you that alternatives 1, 4, 5 and 6 are unsatisfactory and shld not be followed.

As to alternative 3 to establish comite under Rule 28, Dept does not believe this wld be satisfactory solution. In first place, to propose comite and to bring proposal to vote might require another 2 or 3 days procedural wrangling if Sov in his capacity as Chairman chose. This procedural wrangle wld simply compound parliamentary quagmire re invitation to South Koreans. Secondly, establishment comite is much less clearly procedural decision than an invitation to participate. Indeed, under Para 4, San Francisco Statement an argument with color of legal validity can be made that establishment of such
comite constitutes investigation (see experience Czech case). Dept doubts therefore desirability of overriding double veto on that decision when Council is unwilling override double veto on invitation to a party to dispute which is clearly and expressly set forth paras 2 and 3 SF Statement as procedural decisions.

Dept continues believe alternative 2 is best procedure follow and there is set forth below Dept's philosophy underlying that view. Dept believes however it is important as matter principle not to give up position that SC decision of Jun 25 is valid and continuing decision SC which Pres has duty put into effect. It might be possible if agreeable to reps South Kor to achieve in practical effect what Malik seeks prevent by having US rep or another SC member read to SC any statement or statements South Korean reps wld make had they been not prevented from participation by illegal presidential action.

In Dept's view, best procedure for dealing with situation in SC during remainder Aug is to take advantage of unique opportunity which attention that SC meeting now getting throughout world provides. Our statements in SC shld set forth our own natl policy in intensive effort to solidify unity of UN Members supporting Korean action and to win over peoples of Asia and Far East. Our speeches in SC shld stress the substantive themes which wld be stressed if orderly debate on Korean question was now in process. We shld not be diverted by Sov tactics of reducing SC discussion to procedural wrangle. As practical matter it is easy for us and any other member to say in SC what we wish to say under the agenda item as adopted no matter what parliamentary ruling the Pres may make as to precise question under debate. We can support frequent meetings of SC during remainder August at which there can be developed by us and by other SC Members the theme presented to Council in questions which Amb Austin put to meeting Aug. 8. We can embellish and enlarge at length the nature of Communism in Asia; we can stress the contrast between Communism and real nationalism, real independence and real freedom; we can stress the imperialism of Communism in contrast to our own espousal of freedom and independence for Asiatic peoples; we can set forth our views as to the ultimate destiny of Korea and the Korean people. In short, we can stress all themes which we have in common with the Asiatic peoples and de-emphasize by proper clarification collateral questions on which we differ with them such as the seating of Chi Commies which has little bearing on real issue of freedom or Soviet imperialism in Asia. We shld not hesitate to make long speeches if they wld carry an effective appeal to the Asiatic people. Nor shld we be afraid of departing from any parliamentary limitations set by SC Pres.
USUN has already statement supporting our substantive Res on localizing conflict. Dept is setting up working parties to provide further material for further statements to be delivered in Council to carry forward the propaganda war.

Suggest you discuss this approach as matter of urgency with other SC Members and if agreeable to them put this program into operation at Meeting Aug. 10.

Acheson

330/8-850 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW YORK, August 9, 1950—8:37 p.m.
PRIORITY

[Received August 9—9:26 p.m.]

247. Preceded by half-hour exchange views US, UK, France, 2 hour meeting Jebb’s office 4:30 today all SC members, except Beblor and Malik, reached following conclusions:

1. General agreement proper course to follow SC Thursday afternoon meeting and perhaps at least day or two following would be along lines paragraph 2, USUN’s 240, August 9. Fawzi objected but all other members with possible exception Rau agreed to interspersing drive for procedural decisions with substantive statements.

2. Brief discussion idea committee of whole under rule 28, (paragraph 3, USUN’s 240) brought out some objections and it was agreed to postpone consideration this possibility for at least day or two pending outcome generally preferred course.

3. Majority favored opening proceedings Thursday afternoon with renewal of point of order that June 25 resolution stand and President required thereby to invite representatives ROK to table. There was also, however, considerable interest in procedural alternative suggested by Rau, namely, to request President to rule on manner in which question should be put; that is, whether question should be put as stated by Malik Tuesday’s meeting: “Who is in favor of the permission that was extended to the representative of the Southern Korean authorities to attend the SC being considered as being still validly in force today”? or whether question should be put other way around to reverse June 25 decision of SC. Possibility also discussed of leading off with original Tsiang form point of order and falling back later in meeting to Rau idea as second string to bow. Agreed to consider these possibilities overnight and reach decision at meeting same group eleven tomorrow.

4. There was no support for “drastic action” such as amendment rule 18 in order eject Malik from chair nor in favor adjournment or other possible alternatives.

5. There was considerable interest in idea put forward by Rau “referring to substance of matter” that it might be desirable to prepare and publish our own general proposals for peaceful settlement.
He had in mind specifically establishing commission nonpermanent members to study all proposals for peaceful settlement of Korean problem; during this commission’s study consideration of other resolutions would be deferred by SC. Rau added commission’s terms of reference would, of course, be based on (a) cease-fire, (b) withdrawal to 38th parallel, and (c) basic conditions for peaceful settlement. It was agreed this idea merited very careful consideration and that meanwhile it should be held very closely without publicity.

6. On Quevedo’s proposal there was general agreement that Malik should be invited to informal, private consultation with entire SC membership prior SC meeting tomorrow afternoon. Sunde, tapped for this chore, telephoned Malik who agreed in principle to such informal, private consultation at 2 p.m. at Lake Success. Malik said he would let Sunde know tomorrow morning if he had any different thought.

At opening of meeting today Jebb explained Bebber had first agreed to attend but had subsequently telephoned and in effect said he thought it would not be consistent with his position of neutrality to do so.

Jebb also informed group he had called on Lie in connection Lie’s desire to attend meeting and had offered to transmit Lie’s views and advice to group. Lie felt (a) nothing drastic should be done such as forcing Russians out; (b) that we should go on with procedural course we are following; and (c) in event this leads to wholly intolerable situation SC should adjourn or walk out on Malik if he refuses to adjourn.

During course of discussion Rau referred at least three times mysteriously to probable development during week which would make it very undesirable for him to move any point of order or participate any action which would lay him open to Russian charge he was engaging in any way in conspiracy against them.

Austin

1 Antonio Quevedo, Ecuadoran Representative on the U.N. Security Council.

795B.5/8-450

The Department of State to the British Embassy

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State refers to the memorandum of the British Embassy transmitting Mr. Bevin’s message of August 3, 1950, to Sir Oliver Franks with regard to the issuance of a general warning towardships of powers not engaged in the conflict to avoid the Korean area.¹

¹ Mr. Bevin’s message, not printed, requested reconsideration on the U.S. Navy Department’s decision not to issue such a warning (795B.5/8-450).
On July 27, 1950, the United States Chief of Naval Operations instructed the Commander, Naval Forces, Far East, to the effect that unidentified submarines may be attacked and driven off only in self-defense or when offensive action against our forces is indicated. The instructions further stated that the continued submergence of an unidentified submarine in position to attack our forces is considered to indicate offensive action against our forces.

It is the view of the United States Government that the foregoing instructions are entirely justified by the inherent right of self-defense and sufficiently explicit to minimize the risk of sinking a Russian submarine on a peaceful mission.

It is also the view of the United States Government that the issuance of a general warning to all warships of powers not engaged in the conflict to avoid the necessarily broad area related to the operations in Korea would be an undesirable restriction on the use of the high seas by warships of those powers, and would not have any legal effect in addition to that given by the inherent right of self-defense.

WASHINGTON, August 10, 1950.

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Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council held its 485th meeting on August 10 from 3 to 5:50 p.m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.485. Ambassador Austin made a lengthy statement reviewing the political history of Korea in the postwar period, but no substantive action took place in the light of the continuing procedural deadlock caused by the refusal of the President (Malik) to rule on the point of order raised by the representative of the Republic of China at the previous meeting on the matter of the President’s obligation to honor the June 25 Security Council decision to invite the representative of the Republic of Korea to sit at the Council table.

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611.95R/8-1050: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Korea (Muccio)

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, August 10, 1950—7 p.m.

68. Fol is text of Pres Truman’s reply to Pres Rhee’s ltr to him of July 19:

“My dear Mr. President: I wish to acknowledge your kind letter of July nineteenth and, on behalf of the Amer people and myself, to convey to you our deep appreciation for the heartfelt sentiments which you have voiced. Free people everywhere share the concern
which you have expressed both for the brave soldiers fighting for the
UN and for their families who must endure suffering and sorrow.
This is clearly demonstrated by the response to the resolutions of the
SC regarding the aggression against the Republic of Korea.

As the might of the free world gathers momentum, it is my earnest
hope that the Govt of Korea, the Korean people and all the forces
engaged in the present effort will take courage and comfort in the
knowledge that the overwhelming majority of the UN stands with
you in this hour of trial. The sacrifices being made today will, I am
certain, have their reward in ultimate victory.

It has always been the expressed policy of the US to support the
independence and unity of Korea. It is the belief of this Govt that
any permanent solution of the problem of the unification of Korea
shld be reached within the framework of the several resolutions of
the UN designed to accomplish this purpose. The US considers that
the future of Korea is not to be underwritten by any one great power,
but holds, with the SC and with the GA, that it is a matter for deter-
mination by the UN and the Korean people. However, the first task
to be accomplished is to repel the aggression which continues against
the Govt and people of Korea. The US will therefore continue its
present vigorous action in support of the UN SC resolutions regarding
North Korean aggression.

Pls convey to the people of Korea my admiration for their stead-
fastness in the face of great adversity, my sympathy for their suffer-
ing and my assurance that the people and Govt of the US will not relax
their endeavors on behalf of the Republic of Korea until peace and
security are established in full accordance with the resolutions of
the UN.

With assurances of my highest regard and personal good wishes,
Very sincerely yours, (Sgd) Harry S. Truman”.

Original this ltr being airpouched for delivery Pres Rhee.¹ Dept
suggests no publicity be given this exchange of ltrrs at this time.

ACHESON

¹The text of President Truman's letter, bearing the date August 8, was sent
to Korea under cover of Instruction No. 5, August 16, with instructions for its
delivery to President Rhee (611.95B/8-1050).

330/8-1150: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, August 11, 1950—11 a.m.
PRIORITY

[Received August 11—10:23 a.m.]

344. 1. In conversation with me yesterday Bajpai Secretary General
MEA referred to Ambassador Austin's statements Security Council
indicating that Council members would consult to determine what
steps to take to assert authority Security Council in case Malik con-
tinued obstructive tactics. He asked if I had any ideas to what "steps"
US had in mind. When I replied in negative he said he hoped US
would not complicate matters by endeavoring set up shadow Security Council or some kind committee without Russia to handle Security Council affairs. Only three weeks left of Malik’s presidency and in GOI’s opinion it would be preferable, unless any new aggression should develop, for Security Council struggle along even with handicap of Russian obstructionism until September 1. Malik had now made it clear that USSR had returned not for purposes of promoting world peace but to use Security Council as platform for disseminating propaganda and to prevent Security Council from taking any constructive action. Nevertheless GOI believed that any endeavor to circumvent Security Council or to replace it during presidency Malik would give Russians further opportunity to claim that UN had become nothing more than instrument of western imperialism.

2. Bajpai referred to Soviet resolution condemning inhumane actions of American Armed Forces in Korea. He said instructions had been sent Rau to vote against resolution pointing out in doing so that it was part of duties of Security Council to make sure that warfare was being conducted in as humane manner as possible. He hoped US Government and public opinion would not misconstrue such statement by Rau. GOI was of opinion that in rejecting USSR resolution it should indicate that it was not opposed to Security Council taking interest in manner in which war was being conducted.

HENDERSON

795.00/8–1150

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. James N. Hyde of the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] August 11, 1950.

Subject: The Settlement of the Korean Question

Participants: Dr. Tsiang, SC Representative of China
Dr. Alvarez, SC Representative of Cuba
Dr. Quevedo, SC Representative of Ecuador
Fawzi Bey, SC Representative of Egypt
Mr. Chauvel, SC Representative of France
Sir B. N. Rau, SC Representative of India
Mr. Sunde, SC Representative of Norway
Sir G. Jebb, SC Representative of the U.K.
Ambassador Gross, United States Mission
Mr. James N. Hyde, United States Mission

In the informal consultations among the Security Council members there has been some sentiment for stating now the basis on which the

1 The source text is a copy of a document in the IO Files, Department of State, bearing the designation US/S/1390 and the date August 11, 1950.
Korean case can be settled. This is on the theory that it is not enough to oppose the Russian peace plan by condemning the Soviet Union. Specifically, at the consultation on August 9 Sir Benegal N. Rau read from a recent issue of the London Times its leading article. The substance of it was that the major powers could with advantage prepare and publish the proposition upon which they are agreed for Korean independence after a cease-fire and the withdrawal of troops beyond the 38th parallel. Rau commented that this article had inspired him to suggest the consideration of this problem. He thought it could best be undertaken by a SC commission for the peaceful and honorable settlement of the Korean question. The commission would be made up of all the non-permanent members of the SC, and during its deliberations looking toward a formula the consideration of all other resolutions would be deferred. Rau commented that of course the proposals would be based upon the premise that North Korean troops must withdraw beyond the 38th parallel and that there be a cease-fire. Quevedo wanted to consider this idea further at a subsequent meeting.

It was agreed that this proposal be put aside for further consideration and that there be no discussion of it in the press.

At the end of the consultation with the nine SC members on August 10, Jebb detained Gross and read a paragraph or two of the speech he had prepared to be made in the Council on August 11. He stated that the speech had several “purple passages” condemnatory of Soviet tactics and policy, and he added that the Foreign Office had directed him to balance these passages with some constructive language. This language suggested that the time would come for a political settlement of this problem when the North Koreans had returned “whence they had come” and after a cease-fire. Gross commented that he was somewhat concerned about mention of a cease-fire at this stage. This had military implications because it might be that we would want to advance well beyond the 38th parallel and not have our hands tied in any way by a commitment made at such an early stage. In the light of this comment Jebb stated that he would at once call London and suggest that no mention of a cease-fire be made. Gross read the last paragraph of our instructions contained in the Department’s No. 95 of August 1, Control 1812, and pointed out that we were using more general language.²

J. N. HYDE

²Telegram 95 not printed; the pertinent portion of the paragraph under reference read in part as follows: “. . . progress can be made toward a settlement of this problem only if the North Koreans should cease aggression and immediately evacuate the territory which they have seized in defiance of the UN. It is only thereafter that future steps can be taken to restore and maintain International peace and security in the area.” (795B.5/8–150)
Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council met on August 11 from 3 to 6:25 p.m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.486. The procedural stalemate prevented any action being taken by vote and most of the session was taken up with lengthy statements by Sir Gladwyn Jebb and Mr. Malik, ventilating their opposing views of the conflict in Korea.


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386. Despite the Korean conflict, plethora of subsequent rumors and an obvious increase in intensity of the war of nerves, none of the developments since April of this year seems to us to alter the Embassy’s basic opinion that, although they are prepared to assume grave risks in the pursuit of their objectives, the Soviet leaders do not desire to engage themselves in global conflict in the near future. Their actions appear to indicate that they hope to make most effective use of their existing strength through championing world peace movements on the one hand and inflating a war scare on the other with a view to establishing a revolutionary situation on a world scale in which the military might of the USSR and its satellites could be either the critical element in a violent clash (war between the imperialist and anti-imperialist camps), or the power behind the throne for a grand coup d’état.

For victory by either method this dual policy of blandishment and threat must increase in intensity in order to achieve its purpose of isolating the US as much as possible from other capitalist governments and of isolating those capitalist governments that do cooperate with the US from their people. This process reached a certain crescendo with the outbreak of hostilities in Korea and the spurt in concentration on the Stockholm appeal signature campaign which accompanied it. Korea fits on what might be termed the left hand of this policy—demonstration of strength. The Berlin blockade, the Soviet walkout of UN, Soviet actions in the Baltic, the Soviet attitude on the Austrian treaty, and the Whitsunday demonstration are all part of this picture. These previous steps all created much tension and apprehension with-
out entailing for the Soviets direct risk of military reaction such as might have developed over an attempt to seize Berlin forcibly or dispose of Tito through overt military action. Korea was only a short step forward. It was a place where Soviet might could be impressively demonstrated and where the Soviet rulers had good reason to suppose that no effective military counteraction would be taken. At little risk they were playing for tremendous stakes in power-conscious Asia and in apprehensive Europe. Even so its repercussions were felt in India, Egypt and other sensitive spots that entertain doubts about the strength and unity of the western world vis-à-vis the USSR. Looking back it might have paid the Soviets to have made a greater expenditure to assist the Chinese in taking Formosa. This would have impressed Asia and have struck a heavy blow at the unity of the free world. This project cannot be undertaken now without large risk of involving themselves as well as China in a war with the US.

It is clear that the Soviets were prepared to follow up a quick complete victory in Korea with either another attack where there were adequate prospects for localizing the conflict or for a great display of saber rattling at sensitive points. Even though the latter can be conducted chiefly through the circulation of alarmist rumors, some shifting of troops along frontiers is helpful for both purposes. A decision as to whether to attack or rattle the saber indeed need not have been made until world reaction to the developments in Korea became known.

It is unlikely the Soviets expected their action in Korea to meet with the united condemnation of 53 UN member states or to provoke a sharp speeding up of defense preparations on a scale calculated to cope with a major crisis rather than with the Korean situation alone. Thus instead of enjoying an increase in its relative politico-military position through this step the USSR has precipitated a reverse trend which will result in time working against it for the next few years. It must certainly now make some fresh calculations. The following appear prominent among the possible alternatives:

1. To undertake an immediate speed up in their own military mobilization and launch a broad attack in Europe in order to reap maximum advantage of their present military position. Aside from rumors circulating throughout the world and reported to us there is nothing discernible here to indicate they have taken this decision. Soviet propaganda continues to stress the defense aspect of the USSR's military might to the Soviet people and what military dispositions are known are largely of a defensive character. No urgent cause has been developed to pull the people into full support of an offensive move, which even such a dictatorship as this must consider essential. It is interesting that anger over Korea was allowed to subside in favor of work harder for defense. Major changes are taking place in the organization of agricultural production which may be sources of future strength, but are causing some weakness and un-
certainty at present. The same is true of the shake-ups in the fields of scientific theorization and research.

2. To touch off an outbreak of hostilities through a satellite on another scene, China or the Balkans, which might be localized, for a time at least, and cause a drain on the free world’s resources and increase the strain on its solidarity. This course would entail great risk of Soviet involvement at a tempo unfavorable to the USSR. It would seem that slow but direct progress to a major clash which would allow the west to marshall preponderant military economic strength and guarantee security of all western Europe as now occurring temporarily, would be highly detrimental to attainment of long-term Soviet objectives.

3. To play down the military aspect of this policy and while continuing to champion the North Koreans and to clamor for peace, allow a settlement to work itself out in Korea over their protests perhaps and an atmosphere of relaxation to set in giving the huge military preparations in the west no place to go. This would offer the possibility of a return by the west to the uncertain position of quandary between expenditure of effort for defense or for economic progress while the USSR continues a steady growth of industrial military potential. This is a hard choice to make because it means an immediate if perhaps temporary loss of prestige among the people who respect power and success. However, this policy would permit the Soviets to consolidate their present empire further and to utilize their rather effective political and social weapons abroad even though they could not count on major political victories where power played the dominating role.

4. To continue to exploit the mystery of Soviet strength and keep the west heavily and uneconomically mobilized in the hopes that the economic burden will cause disaffection among the masses and make them defeatist and more receptive to Soviet peace blandishments. All economic and political controls in the direction of increasing western defense preparedness would be labelled as suppressive Fascist measures and as deterioration of individual welfare grew the appeal of Communism as well as peace would increase. Continuance of or intensification of the war of nerves as well as the peace movement, along with continuous experimentation with organizational methods for controlling the attitudes of the masses would be features of such a program. The magnitude of defense allocations made since the end of June as compared with that of Marshall Plan aid could lead the Soviet rulers to the belief that this course has promise.


Kirk

753B.551/8-1150: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET Washington, August 11, 1950—8 p. m.

PRIORITY 787. Malik’s statements in UN and present Sov propaganda make it clear that one of main Sov objectives is to obscure UN character
of Korean action by placing emphasis on fact that burden of fighting is being undertaken by US forces virtually alone. Immed and decisive action is called for to place UN decision in true light of joint effort to meet aggression. While we appreciate support for UN already given by other govts we consider it essential that all those nations whose mil capabilities are adequate for the purpose shld increase their contribution by the sending of ground troops as a matter of urgency. In addition to political desirability, this step support of Brit ground forces would be of real military value.

Brit timetable for sending ground forces to Korea is much too slow under circumstances of situation. London's Week of Aug 4 reports plans that UK brigade of about seven thousand will depart UK about end Oct meaning they cannot be engaged until Dec at earliest. US considers it of utmost urgency that some Brit ground troops be available Korea much earlier.

Pls see Attlee urgently and express above views as held most seriously by US and urge immediate reexamination of Brit capabilities as to increasing tempo forwarding Brit troops to Korea at once. Stress US view of extreme urgency of need for prompt and effective action.

Similar approaches being made other countries including France. *

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1 The following message was sent to London and Paris in telegrams 788 and 770, August 11, 8 p.m.:

"Eyes only for Ambassador.

"In addition to reasons set forth Deptl 787, Aug. 10[1] re ground troops for Korea you will appreciate that there is another extremely important factor, namely rapidly increasing public and congressional opinion that in spite of their vocal support our allies are sitting back and allowing us to bear the full brunt of the Korean fighting. This is due to fact that casualties have been born in overwhelming proportion by ground troops and no amount of naval or air support, however welcome, will successfully counter this sentiment.

"You will readily appreciate possible effect of this growing opinion on our current plans for invigorating NATO and voting funds to assist our allies to build up their defensive strength." (795.B.531/8–1150)

2 Not printed.

* Telegram 771, August 11, 8 p.m. to Paris, not printed. Similar messages were sent on August 11 to the Embassies in Ottawa, Paris, The Hague, and Wellington, as well as to the Acting Political Adviser in Tokyo for use during the visit there of Australian Prime Minister Menzies. In addition, the Ambassadors in Bangkok and Manila were requested to expedite the despatch of Thai and Philippine forces to Korea, and the Ambassador in Stockholm to speed the sending of the promised Swedish Medical Unit to the United Nations Command in Korea. The Minister in Jordan was informed of U.S. interest in the idea of a contribution of a ground forces unit by the Government of Jordan, although no formal approach was to be made pending U.S. talks with the U.K. Government, and the Ambassador in Pakistan was instructed, at his discretion, to attempt to obtain an immediate offer of ground forces from the Government of Pakistan for use in Korea (795.B.5/8–1150; 795.00/8–1150; 357.AD/8–1150).

Subsequently, Department telegram 1149, August 31, to London informed the Embassy that the Department of State was inclined to believe that States not members of the United Nations should not be pressed to supply troops for Korea, but that, if Jordan decided to offer troops, the offer would be carefully considered by the United Nations Command (795.B.5/8–3150).

Neither Pakistan nor Jordan provided ground forces to the U.N. Command in Korea.
You shld explore with Attlee the possibility of transfer of Brit forces from Malaya or Hongkong for immediate use Korea, replacing them later with troops from UK. It appears to us that Brit themselves shld come to conclusion that situation warrants risk of withdrawing forces from Malaya or possibly Hongkong for immediate use Korea.

Acheson

795.00/8-1150: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, August 11, 1950—9:20 p. m.

PRIORITY

[Received August 11—10:08 p. m.]

265. For Hickerson. Pursuant to our phone conversation this morning, I talked with Rau on a purely personal and exploratory basis concerning a possible statement of position on peace aims in Korea. I said that it seemed to me important to keep clearly in mind the avoidance of any implied military commitments of a sort which might prevent UN forces from taking action which may prove necessary in order to effectuate SC decisions to repel aggression and restore international peace and security in the area. For this reason, it seemed to me important to avoid the use of general and undefined terms such as “cessation of hostilities” or “withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel”. Instead, I believed that it would be preferable to use a formula such as “immediate cessation of aggression including withdrawal of armed forces” and “measures necessary to assure the ROK against renewed aggression and to restore international peace and security in the area”. Rau agreed generally that the distinction was an important one.

With respect to “peace aims”, I outlined (stressing the purely personal and unofficial nature of my thinking) the following as possible points for consideration:

1. Reaffirmation of GA policy for establishment of independent and unified Korea.
2. Reaffirmative GA policy of establishment of a government in a unified Korea through free popular elections under UN supervision.
3. Statement of UN interest in creation of conditions in Korea essential to maintenance of free institutions.
4. Statement of intention on part of UN to give all appropriate assistance to people of Korea in the achievement of these conditions.
5. Guarantee by UN of frontiers of an independent unified Korea.
6. UN guarantee of neutrality of a de-militarized Korea.
7. Establishment of UN advisory council, appropriately composed and preferably with India as chairman. Function of such council
would be to render all assistance in accomplishment of UN objectives in Korea, involving steps leading to the establishment of democratic government for a re-unified Korea and assistance to such government, when established, to set up a stable democratic regime.

8. Admission of a re-unified Korea to the UN.

Rau, while withholding specific comment, generally felt this outline might form basis for a UN policy.

However, Rau expressed belief that it would not be advantageous for USG to make such proposals. He felt they would be attacked by USSR if only because they were proposed by USG. Instead, Rau repeated his interest in seeing the SC establish a committee composed of non-permanent members, prime purpose of which would be to formulate a “peace plan”. Rau volunteered the thought that it should be quite simple for such a committee to formulate, in a fairly short time, policy recommendations somewhat along the lines I had suggested. He thought that such recommendations, coming from a committee composed of non-permanent SC members might have a better chance of acceptance by USSR.

Rau said he was planning this week-end to communicate with Malik and discuss his proposal with him. Rau did not know whether Malik would wish to talk with him but said that he wanted to be in a position to tell Malik that the idea of establishing a committee was Rau’s own idea, and that he did not know what the reaction of the USG would be. Rau therefore asked me to refrain from comment.

However, I said that without commenting upon the merits or demerits of the proposal, it seemed clear to me that it would be deplorable if any device were put forward which might be seized upon by USSR as an excuse for dilatory tactics. Rau replied this might be taken care of by making clear in putting forward such a proposal that the committee would be expected to report within a fixed short period and that in any event a minimum essential condition would be withdrawal of North Korean forces and compliance with SC resolutions. I also pointed out the danger of cushioning USSR from strong world pressures by diverting attention from necessity for compliance with SC decisions. I pointed out such diversions might occur by a protracted debate in SC concerning the desirability of establishing a SC committee, settling its composition and terms of reference, etc. Rau agreed that such danger should be avoided.
I concluded by saying that I wanted him to understand that we might consider it essential to make a statement and that I did not wish him to feel that if we concluded it weren’t necessary or desirable to so do, we had in mind “stealing a march on him”. He said he appreciated my frankness and certainly did not consider that he was “engaged in a race with us” to table his proposal before we stated what we considered would be appropriate aims. However, I said that before we did so, I was sure my Government would wish to consult with GOI in line with our customary friendly frankness, so as to secure as close a meeting of the minds as possible. He expressed gratitude for this assurance.

Rau said he would communicate with me as soon as he had talked with Malik and transmitted the results of his conversation.

Department may wish to repeat to New Delhi.

Gross

793.00/8–1150: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, August 11, 1950—8 p. m.
[Received August 11—10:46 p. m.]

883. Following based on what can be recalled from hurried reading of message received in War Office from UK MA China; evaluation B–2:

1. Tating coal output being shipped in entirety to USSR even though dearth of fuel in North China.
2. Substantial part Fourth Army under Lin Piao garrisoned along Korean frontier.
4. North of Shanhaikwan all station names removed and replaced by numbers.
5. Russian advisers stationed to south of Nanyuan Airfield, Peiping have left presumably for north.
6. According Mongolian travelers an entire area within 30 miles radius of a mountain (unfortunately not identified in Outer-Mongolia) had been evacuated of its population.

Douglas
266. Following tentative views of UNCOOK were given us tonight by Cordier, UN, in strictest confidence with request for US reactions:

"A series of informal meetings have been held and on 5 August 1950 a number of recommendations were informally agreed upon as a basis for formal discussion at a later date after members have consulted their governments. (The member for El Salvador was not present at the discussions on 5 August.) These recommendations might be included in the report to the GA. It must be emphasized that these tentative recommendations should not be made known. However, you might consider communicating the text to certain delegations with the request that they expedite their instructions to their respective members on the Commission. Text of recommendations follows:

4 August 1950.

1. The Commission's recommendations should include the following objectives:

I. Restoration and maintenance of peace and security in the area;

II. Unification of Korea in accordance with the will of the people so as to constitute one independent democratic state; and pending the establishment of constitutional authorities for unified Korea,

(a) To ensure that North Korea is not left in a position to renew its aggression at a later date, and

(b) Respect the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea as recognized by the GA and in defense of which the UN have taken action against the aggressor

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1 Telegram 269, August 12, from New York forwarded the following message in elaboration of the communication contained in telegram 266:

"Text quoted mytel 266 was from Renborg, principal secretary, UNCOOK. It was enclosed in following letter from Cordier (UN) to Austin:

The SYG has asked that I transmit a copy of the communication I have received from Mr. Renborg, principal secretary, UNCOOK.

You will notice from the communication that the Commission contemplates one inclusion of a series of recommendations in its report to the GA. The SYG and I agree that the policy of the UN with regard to the future of Korea is obviously in such a fluid state that it would be unwise to engage in precise recommendations with regard to it at this time. Furthermore, this question is of top importance to the membership of the UN and it is for that reason that we felt it advisable to transmit this communication to you.

We should be glad for an informal expression of your views on the matter at your convenience." (357.AD/8-1250)
2. To secure these objectives:

(a) Korea as a whole will be internationally guaranteed from aggression both from within and from without by a UN security force stationed within Korea until a duly constituted government for the whole of Korea has been established or for such longer period as the SC may deem necessary;

(b) A Government and national assembly for a unified Korea shall be established after general elections organized and conducted by the UN have been held throughout Korea;

(c) The elections will take place when a free and democratic atmosphere allowing the free expression of the will of the people has been created, and not less than 12 months after the cessation of hostilities;

(d) Upon the cessation of hostilities the government of ROK will resume its functions in the whole of the territory of South Korea;

(e) The commander of the UN security force assisted by a UN advisory commission appointed by the GA will,

(1) Assume full responsibility for the administration of North Korea;

(2) Consult with the ROK on problems common to the whole of Korea; assist and advise the ROK in maintaining internal security in promoting general harmony among the people and in ensuring a free and democratic atmosphere for the general elections;

(3) In particular be charged with the duty of ensuring that no arbitrary punitive measures in connection with acts committed prior to the cessation of hostilities are resorted to in Korea.

(f) An international tribunal shall be set up to try acts committed in violation of the Nuremberg principles affirmed by the GA;

(g) The functions and responsibilities specified in clauses (d) and (e) above will terminate when the government and national assembly of unified Korea assume their function;

(h) In order to assist the government of unified Korea in maintaining order and achieving economic and social stability the UN will maintain a commission of experts in Korea for the purpose of organizing and coordinating such technical assistance as may be required.

*The Department of State sent the following reply in telegram 168, August 19, 2 p.m., to New York:

"Reurtel 266 Aug 11 you may inform Cordier our appreciation his furnishing text quoted and state that Dept has warmly welcomed opportunity examine it. However, in interest GA's receiving wholly independent expression UNCOK Judgment Dept prefers reserve comment at this time." (357.AD/8-1150)
TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 12, 1950.

After talking with General Norstad about another matter this morning, I told him that we in the State Department were disturbed at reports that American B-29s had bombed the port of Rashin. I said that, as he knew, the Russians were very touchy about any military activity in the neighborhood of their frontiers. I reminded him that the directive which had been sent to CINCFE had specified that our Air Force in its bombing missions north of the 38th parallel was to stay "well clear" of the Manchurian and Soviet frontiers. I said that 17 miles from the frontier did not seem to us to come within this definition. I asked him what was the importance of bombing Rashin. He replied that the Air Force had given the strictest instructions that B-29s were not to bomb Rashin except under the most favorable weather conditions when there could be no possibility of bombing Soviet or Manchurian territory through error.\(^1\) He said he was sure that in this case the mission had not flown over or bombed Soviet or Manchurian territory. As to the importance of the mission, he said Rashin was very important for fuel supplies and as a rail and shipping center.

To make our views known through appropriate channels, I telephoned General Burns this afternoon. Being unable to reach him or Captain Murdaugh,\(^2\) I delivered the following message to Mr. Kenneth Young:\(^3\)

The State Department was deeply concerned over the bombing of Rashin and did not feel that this was consistent with the general directive approved by the President that all American bombing missions should stay "well clear" of the Soviet and Manchurian frontiers. I said I was communicating this as the official State Department view and asked that he communicate it to the proper quarters. I emphasized the sensitivity of Soviet authorities to any military activity in the neighborhood of their territory and the dangers involved, particularly in view of their presumed state of tenseness and irritation. Mr. Young

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\(^1\) At 7:56 a.m. on August 12, the Department of the Army held a teletype conference with officials of the Far East Command in Tokyo, headed by General Willoughby, G-2, who made the following report: "FEAF Bomber Comd B-29's today dropped 550 tons of bombs on the important seaport and rail center of Rashin. 17 mi SW of Korea's NE boundary. Bad weather necessitated radar bombing against the target area; results unobserved..." (DA TR-3650; Korean Conflict).

\(^2\) Capt. Albert C. Murdaugh, U.S.N., Acting Director, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense.

\(^3\) Mr. Young was Captain Murdaugh's Assistant.
expressed the personal view that he shared our anxiety on this score and said he would immediately communicate this message to any available members of the Joint Staff and that he would pass it on to General Burns and Secretary Johnson on Monday.4

H. Freeman Matthews

August 14.

705.00/8-1250

Draft Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison)

TOP SECRET


U.S. Courses of Action in Korea

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine what measures would be necessary and/or desirable in order to contribute to the restoration of international peace and security in the Korean area, either by defeat of the Korean Communists or as the result of a Soviet suggestion for an early voluntary withdrawal of the aggressor forces back to the 38th parallel.

ANALYSIS

Military Factors

2. The present military objective of the U.N. Command is to “repel the armed attack” of the Korean Communists and restore international peace and security in the area. The Security Council Resolutions in pursuance of which action is being taken call for the withdrawal of the aggressor forces beyond the 38th parallel but do not specifically limit military ground operations of the U.N. Command to the area south of the 38th parallel.

3. The strategic importance of Korea to the Soviet Union is of such a high degree that it is unlikely that it would permit the establishment of a regime in North Korea which it could not dominate or control.

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4 The date is the drafting date given on the source text. This draft memorandum was forwarded for comment under date of August 14 to Messrs. Butler, Sandifer, Reinhardt, Jessup, and Rusk with an accompanying note from Mr. Allison which read in part as follows:

“Herewith is a draft NSC paper on the Korean problem. I am afraid you will find that it is not by any means a perfect presentation of the problem but it is the best I have been able to think up over the weekend. Certain of the paragraphs on this paper have been lifted bodily from a paper prepared by the Defense Department on the same problem. These paragraphs are 8, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, part of 23 and paragraph 24(a) (b) (c) (g). . . .” See the draft memoranda from the Defense Department dated July 31 and August 7, pp. 502 and 628.
4. Hence, the Soviet Union will probably take whatever action it deems necessary to prevent such a consummation of the present Korean hostilities. Such action might take the form of committing Soviet or Chinese Communist troops to action in Korea or at least occupying Korea north of the 38th parallel by such troops.

5. However, it is believed that when the tide of battle begins to turn, the Soviet Union will not wait for U.N. forces to reach the 38th parallel before taking action. When U.N. forces begin to have military successes then will be the time to look for new Soviet action—entry of Soviet forces, entry of Chinese Communist forces, a new effort at U.N. settlement, or all these together.

6. From a strategic point of view the Korean peninsula is not of such importance to the U.S. that it would be desirable to have large U.S. forces committed there. In fact in case of a global conflict, it would be a serious disadvantage to have U.S. forces so committed.

Political Factors

7. After 45 years of either colonialism or division, the people of Korea have an irrepressible urge for the unification of their country and its recognition as an equal and respected member of the family of nations.

8. The division of Korea at the 38th parallel is an entirely artificial barrier violating the natural integrity of the nation. This division was never meant to be permanent and for five years the U.S. has endeavored to eliminate it by all possible peaceful measures, first through bilateral negotiation with the Soviets and later through initiating action through the United Nations machinery.

9. Since November 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations has passed, by overwhelming majorities, three Resolutions looking toward achieving the objective of a free, independent and unified Korea. A U.N. Commission on Korea was established and has been and still is charged with seeking Korea's unification by pacific settlement. In its Resolution of October 21, 1949, the General Assembly reaffirmed its aims in Korea and called upon all member states "to refrain from any acts derogatory to the purposes of the present resolution." While the General Assembly for three years has sought to unify Korea by peaceful means, it has never formally considered nor explicitly approved the unification of Korea through military means.

10. The Government of the Republic of Korea has been established in accordance with the Resolutions of the General Assembly, has been declared by the U.N. to be the only lawful government in Korea and has been recognized by 32 nations.

11. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities the Government of the Republic of Korea demonstrated, despite many weaknesses, a growing
capacity to govern. In its report of June 26, 1950, UNCOOK pointed out that “there have been distinct signs of improvement in recent months in both economic and political stability of the country.” Recent elections for the National Assembly gave significant gains to moderate and non-Government elements, thus confusing those critics who had raised the cry of “police state.”

12. The leaders of the Republic of Korea have stressed that the aggression from the North provides the opportunity to abolish the 38th parallel and unify all of Korea under United Nations auspices. President Rhee has insisted on the special position of his government and has formally notified the President of the U.S. that the Republic of Korea will not recognize the validity of any decision reached about the future of Korea in the making of which the Republic of Korea has not participated.

13. There is a growing sentiment in the United States favoring a “final” settlement of the Korean problem and disapproving of any settlement which smacks of compromise or a “deal”.

14. On the other hand there are significant groups who believe further efforts should be made to find a peaceful solution. Should a peace offer be made or the aggressor retire or be forced back to the 38th parallel there would doubtless be strong efforts made by large sections of the public and the Congress to stop the fighting and return to a peace basis.

15. There is evidence that the UNCOOK which is operating in the field will make recommendations of a far reaching character designed to bring about the unification of Korea under U.N. auspices. (See USUN’s 266, Aug. 11. Copy attached.) The U.S. will have to take a stand on these recommendations.

Politico-Military Considerations

16. By a quick and crushing victory of the North Korean military forces in South Korea, the USSR would have gained its long-standing goal of the complete absorption of Korea into its orbit. Furthermore, the building of a “cordon sovietaire” from the Soviet borders of Sinkiang to the southern shores of Korea would have neared completion. Only Japan and the Philippines at the edge of the orbit, and Southeast Asia to the South, would have still remained outside. Yet, the aggression in South Korea may result in the opposite effect—the failure to complete the cordon.

17. In this light, the situation in Korea now provides the United States and the free world with the first opportunity to regain territory from the Soviet bloc. Since a basic policy of the United States is to check and reduce the preponderant power of the USSR in Asia and

* Ante, p. 564.
elsewhere, then UN operations in Korea can set the stage for the non-communist penetration into an area under Soviet control.

18. Penetration of the Soviet orbit, short of all-out war, would disturb the political, economic and military structure which the USSR is organizing between its own Far Eastern territories and the contiguous areas. The bonds of Manchuria, the pivot of this complex outside the USSR, would be weakened, for a free and strong Korea could provide an outlet for Manchuria’s resources and could also provide non-communist contact with the people there and in North China.

19. The significance in Asia of the unification of Korea under UN auspices would be incalculable. The Japanese would see demonstrated a check on Soviet expansion. Elements in the Chinese Communist regime, and particularly important segments of the Chinese population, might be inclined to question their exclusive dependence on the Kremlin. Skillful manipulation might drive a wedge between the Chinese Communists and the Kremlin. Throughout Asia, those who foresee only inevitable Soviet conquest would take hope.

20. The above reasons, in addition to the strategic factor mentioned in paragraph [3], make it even more probable that the Soviet Union will not be willing to see settlement resulting in a Korean Government which it cannot control. However, it is possible that, notwithstanding its considerable military strength located in the Far East, the Soviet Union is not yet ready to risk a general war to prevent a determined and rapid effort by the U.N. to create a unified Korea. This possibility might be increased if the U.N. should adopt a large majority a program recommended by UNCOK and if some means can be devised of assuring the Soviet Union that a U.N. settlement would not be only a U.S. settlement and that it would not be directed against legitimate Soviet interests.

U.S. Interests and Obligations

21. In subscribing to the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, the U.S. pledged its support to Korean independence. Our intentions have been measured in our diplomatic support, military aid, and economic assistance. Our obligation to the United Nations to block a breach of the peace, is fixed.

22. The broad objectives of the United States were stated in NSC 8/2,3 approved by the President on 23 March 1949, as follows:

"a. To establish a united, self-governing, and sovereign Korea as soon as possible, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the UN.

"b. To ensure that the government so established shall be fully representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people.

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“c. To assist the Korean people in establishing a sound economy and educational system as essential basis of an independent and democratic state. A more immediate objective is the withdrawal of remaining U.S. occupation forces from Korea as early as practicable consistent with the foregoing objectives.”

23. The political value to the United States of showing to the world that it is determined that aggression shall be repelled, and that the expressed will of the United Nations shall be respected, justifies our current military effort in Korea.

Conclusions

24. The following principles form the basis for consideration of U.S. actions:


b. The permanent unification of Korea can only be fairly and correctly resolved with the participation of representatives of the Korean people chosen as the result of free elections on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot held under the authority and observation of the U.N.

c. The Government of the Republic of Korea should continue to be recognized as the only lawful government in Korea and should be consulted with respect to any long-term solution of the Korean problem.

d. The problem of Korea is manifestly a United Nations problem and the final solution of that problem must be one which is consistent with the principles of the U.N. Charter.

e. The tremendous problem of an economic, social and political nature attendant upon the establishment of a unified Korea are of such a magnitude as to require the assistance of the United Nations. Korea is an Asiatic state and it is therefore appropriate that the Asiatic members of the United Nations should have a major voice and should play a prominent role in the assistance that the United Nations can give.

f. The establishment of a free and united Korea and the elimination of the North Korean Communist regime, following unprovoked military aggression, would be a step in reversing the dangerous strategic trend in the Far East of the past twelve months.

g. The 38th parallel, in and of itself, has no military significance other than such an artificial barrier as would limit if not prevent a military victory.

25. The following limiting factors on action which should be recommended by the United States must be kept in mind:

a. The probability that any attempt either by force or through U.N. action to establish a unified Korea would cause the Soviet Union to commit either its own forces or those of Communist China or both with the consequent danger of global war.

b. The fact that as stated in paragraph 3 of NSC 73/1, "The United States is not now capable of conducting immediately a general military
offensive against the USSR because our forces are either not appropriately positioned or are so inadequate as to be incapable of effective action?"

c. Possible reluctance of other members of the United Nations to agree to action necessary to effect the unification of Korea if it appears it would lead to the outbreak of a general conflict with the USSR or the breaking up of the United Nations.

26. In consonance with the above principles and having in mind the above limiting factors, the United States should take the following steps:

a. Continue its efforts in cooperation with the other members of the United Nations to repel the aggressors and restore the integrity of the Republic of Korea, taking such military action north and south of the 38th parallel as is necessary.

b. Take such action through the diplomatic channel as necessary to assure the greatest possible support of United States action by United Nations members.

c. Announce in the United Nations its determination to seek a solution of the Korean problem within the general framework of previous United Nations Resolutions and in a manner consistent with the United Nations Charter.

d. To the above end, recommend or urge others to recommend, the creation of an appropriate United Nations body which would study and make recommendations to the General Assembly on the future of Korea in accordance with principles enumerated above. It might be appropriate for the representative of India to act as chairman of such a body.

e. Recommend to the United Nations that, after the successful repulsion of the aggression in Korea and the unification of the country in accordance with recommendations of the above named United Nations body, Korea be demilitarized, the United Nations body in question to recommend the methods by which this could be done, together with recommendations as to the size and character of internal security forces needed by the Republic of Korea.

f. Announce its belief that for as long as the 38th parallel divides Korea or until a stable unified Korea is established, a United Nations military force should be retained in Korea to prevent renewed aggression or internal strife during the natural period of readjustment, and that such forces should consist primarily of contingents from Asiatic countries. The United States might recommend that such of its forces as are included in the United Nations force be stationed south of the 38th parallel.

g. Recommend that the members of the United Nations, upon the advice of the United Nations body mentioned above, give such political and economic aid to the Korean Government as may be necessary after the conclusion of hostilities.

h. Should the United Nations Commission on Korea make recommendations along the lines indicated in paragraph 15, the United States should strongly support the general character of those recommendations reserving the right to suggest changes in detail as may appear desirable.
i. To the extent feasible take measures to speed up and intensify military and industrial preparations with a view to eliminating as early as possible the factors mentioned in paragraph 25b.

27. Should the USSR make clear that it intended to commit its own troops or those of Communist China into action in Korea with a view to making impossible the action contemplated above, the United States should undertake the action recommended in NSC 76, at the same time making clear that it did not renounce in any way its ultimate objective of contributing to the creation of a free, independent and unified Korea in accordance with the announced objectives of the United Nations.

\(^4\) See footnote 2, p. 346.

795.00/8-1350: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 13, 1950—7 p. m.

237. For Henderson from Hickerson. You will observe from several USUN tells repeated to you that we are stepping up as much as possible informal consultation between USUN and Rau on Korean and other UN matters. We are doing this deliberately and think it will pay good dividends.

Apropos of Rau's mysterious statement last Wednesday,\(^1\) Rau yesterday told Gross that what he had in mind was that he had received instructions to support US position on all matters likely to come to a vote in connection with Korea in the near future and that on that account he did not want to get out in front with statements or initiatives in SC. [Hickerson.]

ACHESON

\(^1\) See telegraph 247 from New York, received at 9:28 p. m. on August 9, p. 551.

795.00/8-1450

Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 14, 1950.

I telephoned General Burns at 10:30 this morning and referred to my conversation with Mr. Young on Saturday.\(^1\) I said I was calling to emphasize the very grave danger which the State Department felt

\(^1\) August 12; see memorandum by Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews, p. 566.
was involved in the bombing of Rashin and our belief that such bombing is contrary to the directive to stay “well clear” of the Manchurian and Soviet frontiers. I called his attention to the article by Talbert in this morning’s Herald Tribune indicating that the real purpose of the mission was to hinder possible Soviet submarine operations out of the ice-free port of Rashin. I said that in view of what must be presumed to be the present state of mind of the Soviet authorities and their extreme sensitivity to any operations in that area, the State Department felt strongly that any repetition of the bombing of Rashin might entail the gravest consequences. I said that I understood that both the Defense Establishment and the State Department feel very strongly that we do not want active Soviet participation in the Korean war or the commencement of worldwide hostilities this year. We believed that if the Soviet authorities are undecided or are hesitating as to whether to move on a wider basis now the bombing of Rashin or similar moves might well prove an important deciding factor. I asked General Burns to convey this view immediately to the appropriate Defense authorities. He promised to do so and made no comment other than to say that he thought in view of the present Air Force precision there probably was no likelihood that the B–29s had flown over Soviet or Manchurian territory.

H. Freeman Matthews

*In a memorandum of conversation, not printed, Ambassador Jessup recorded his discussion of this same subject on the morning of August 14 with Secretary of the Air Force Finletter. Mr. Jessup registered the State Department’s grave concern with the bombing and reported that Mr. Finletter urged that the State Department communicate formally with the Defense Department on the matter. Mr. Finletter also said that he would look into the question personally. (795.00/8–1450)*

795.00/8–1450

Memorandum by the Counselor (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 14, 1950.

This memorandum is supplementary to my memorandum of August 8 containing a round-up of the present pattern of Soviet intentions.1

You will recall that attention was drawn in paragraph five of that memo to the concern which the Soviet leaders must feel over the proximity of the operations in Korea to their own frontiers and over the direct damage which could conceivably be done to their military interests by an extension of the area of hostilities.

1 Text is scheduled for publication in volume I.
In paragraph 7(c) of that memo it was also pointed out that any further direct detriment to the Soviet military establishment in the Far East resulting from hostilities in South Korea might be expected to hasten a re-entry of the Red Army into North Korea.

According to releases from General MacArthur's Headquarters of August 13, attacks were made August 12 by three sweeps of B–29 bombers on military (including naval) targets at Najin (Rashin), a North Korean port described in one communiqué as only 17 miles from the Soviet border. The attacks were made, one communiqué states, through heavy cloud cover, by radar guidance, and 500 tons of high explosives were dropped.

There has now come to my attention a front page story in today's New York Herald Tribune by Ansel E. Talbert, despatched from Tokyo on August 13. This story states (a) that Rashin is "of tremendous future importance to the Soviet Union"; (b) that the Soviet Navy has been using it as a submarine base; (c) that it is particularly important to them in this respect because Vladivostok and other Soviet Far Eastern ports are ice-bound part of the year, whereas Port Arthur and Dairen are poorly situated as submarine bases; and (d) that although "officially" the attack was designed to interdict the flow of supplies to the front in Korea, actually most such supplies "are believed to have passed through Najin before the fighting began", and reconnaissance flights conducted the same day between Wonsan and Seishin "disclosed not a single supply train or any other rail traffic moving along the entire stretch ..." (Despite requests of several days' standing we have been unable to get any information out of General MacArthur's Headquarters for the Department about such reconnaissance flights and their results.)

Given the speed at which these planes operate, and the fact that they were bombing through an overcast, it is obvious how easily they could not only have overflown the Soviet frontier but actually have inflicted damage on the Soviet side of it. Aside from this, we must remember that this point is less than 100 miles from the entrance to the roadstead of Vladivostock and that the Soviet authorities are pathologically sensitive even to any reconnaissance activities, let alone actual bombings, in that vicinity. On top of this, we have the story apparently passed by General MacArthur's Headquarters three or four days after the announcement that censorship had been imposed, making it entirely plain that the relationship of Rashin to the hostilities in South Korea was only a pretext for our bombing and that the real reason for it was the desire to injure the Soviet strategic position in the Far East.

It is my belief that this drastically heightens the importance and actuality of the passages in my analysis of August 8, cited above. In
the light of this conduct on our part, which can only appear to the Soviet authorities as evidence of a deliberate decision to exploit the South Korean hostilities for the purpose of reducing Soviet strategic capabilities in the area, we must be prepared at any time for extreme Soviet reactions going considerably beyond, and therefore not fully in accordance with, the analysis I gave on August 8. In the light of this situation, it is entirely possible that a Soviet military re-entry into North Korea might occur at any time; or the Soviet Government might take other local measures, such as putting strategic bombing planes nominally at North Korean disposal, and beginning operations with them against our forces and our bases in Japan. We also cannot exclude the possibility that this evidence, as it must appear to them, of a United States intent to damage their strategic interests under cover of the Korean war, even at the price of greater heightened danger of serious complications, will naturally affect their estimate of the possibility of avoiding major hostilities, of the likely timing of such hostilities, and of the relative advantages of a Soviet initiation of such hostilities as opposed to a waiting policy based on the continued hope of avoiding them altogether.2

GEORGE F. KENNAN

2 A copy of this document was transmitted on August 15 to General Burns by Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews under cover of a note which drew General Burns' attention particularly to the last paragraph of Mr. Kennan's memorandum (795.00/8-1550).

795.00/8-1450

The Under Secretary of State (Webb) to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)1

WASHINGTON, August 14, 1950.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Department of State is very much concerned with the possibly serious results of the bombing by the American Air Force of the North Korean city of Najin. We believe that the Department of Defense should give urgent consideration to the relation between this bombing mission and the President's directive that bombing operations north of the 38th Parallel should stay well clear of the Manchurian and Siberian frontiers.

A further concern arises from the type of publicity which this mission is likely to get. For example, in today's edition of the New York

1 On August 14, Mr. Webb met with President Truman and indicated to him the intent of the Department of State to take up vigorously with the Defense Department the matter of the bombing of Rashin. Mr. Webb informed the President that he was not suggesting that Mr. Truman take any action, but merely wanted him to know that this step was being taken by the State Department (795.00/8-1450).
Herald Tribune there appears a story by Mr. Ansel E. Talbert from Tokyo which left the strong implication that Air Force sources in Japan considered this raid as one directed against the Soviet Union and its submarine capabilities and not as a raid militarily essential to the successful prosecution of the Korean war. I am sure you will agree that stories of this sort, which seem to reflect official American thinking, could have very grave consequences in our efforts to localize the Korean fight and to prevent the outbreak of general hostilities. We believe it would be important for the Department of Defense to arrange for official statements relating the bombing of this port directly to the war in Korea and to deny flatly that it had any other purpose or implication.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES E. WEBB

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Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council held its 487th meeting on August 14 from 3 to 6:30 p.m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.487. Debate continued on the Korean question and procedural matters relating thereto, but no action was taken. The Indian Representative (Rau) made an informal proposal for the establishment of a committee, to be composed of the six nonpermanent members of the Security Council, which would study all draft resolutions or proposals that had been or might be presented under the title “A Peaceful Settlement in Korea.” See infra.

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795.00/8-1450

Memorandum of Conversations, by Mr. Charles P. Noyes, Adviser on Security Council Affairs, United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET


Subject: Korea

Participants: As shown below. Conversations, separately, with Mr. C. P. Noyes, United States Mission

During the meeting, I asked ORDONEAU for an explanation of the sentence in their speech relating to Rau’s proposal, indicating that

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1 The source text is a copy of a document in the IO files, Department of State, bearing the designation US/S/1405 and the date August 15, 1950.

2 See the editorial note, supra.
this was a confidential proposal which it was agreed would not be discussed publicly. Ordonneau indicated that Rau was going to make this proposal public in his speech and that the French Delegation had instructions to support it. I indicated I was very much surprised and that we had had no advance warning that the proposal was going to be made. I showed concern that this would result in splitting the solidarity of the Members of the Security Council who supported the Council's decisions. I doubted that we should admit that this was a parallel of the Berlin Case. Ordonneau shrugged his shoulders and indicated it was too late for them to do anything about it.

I called Menon out of the meeting to ask him what was the proposal they intended to make. I referred him to the text of the French draft speech which had already been given to the Press. He indicated the nature of the proposal to me and pretended surprise that I did not already know about the proposal which had been discussed with Ambassador Gross. I indicated we knew they were thinking of something of this sort but did not know they were planning to make it, or its details. Menon came around later to advise Ambassador Gross that Rau had seen Malik about the matter on Saturday; that Malik's reaction had been rather cool. Menon was obviously somewhat embarrassed about the whole matter.

Hans Engen (Norway) asked me what our reactions were to the Rau proposal. I said we hadn't any yet. He indicated that the Indians had not really discussed the matter with them before the meeting; that they had not been told the details of the Indian proposal or consulted about it. His personal view was that it was rather naive.

Ambassador Sundé refused to comment to the Press on the Rau proposal and implied to me, afterwards, that he did not like it much.

Corrier was upset by the way the Indians had introduced this proposal—in particular, the mean way in which it had referred to the United States.

C. P. Noyes

735B.551/8-1450: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, August 14, 1950—3 p.m.

[Received August 14—3:52 p.m.]

910. ReDeptel 787 August 11.

1. Talked with Attlee and Bevin again regarding expediting the embarkation of troops for Korea or moving troops from Hong Kong or Malaya or some other spot such as the Middle East immediately and
making substitution of troops from the UK for those sent at once to Korea.

2. As to movement of troops from Malaya to Korea, both Attlee and Bevin made the argument that not only would they run the risk of being seriously repulsed in Malaya, but also, which they considered to be of great importance, the withdrawal of British troops from the battle in Malaya would have very adverse effect upon the battle in Siam and might even mean the loss of that part of Asia.

3. As to Hong Kong, they said the troops for Hong Kong were inadequate to meet the situation that might develop.

4. They realize of course the importance of refuting the Soviet propaganda aimed at concealing the fact that the Korean affair is a United Nations engagement and making it an exclusively US venture, but they would review the matter and would do everything they could to expedite the movement of troops to Korea and would let me know.¹

DOUGLAS

¹ On August 21, the U.K. Government informed the U.N. Secretary-General that an infantry force would be dispatched immediately from Hong Kong to Korea (U.N. document 8/1702). Subsequently, Ambassador Douglas reported to the Department of State in telegram 1119, August 22, that the British were speeding up the movement of ground forces from the United Kingdom to Korea and that the target date for sailing had been advanced from November 1 to October 1 (795B.551/8-2250).

795.00/8-1450: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State SECRET

NEW DELHI, August 14, 1950—11 p.m. [Received August 15—8:56 a.m.]

393. 1. In view remarks made to me by Bajpai, Secretary General MEA on August 12 re GOI thinking in matter of peace moves (Embtel 376, August 12, paragraph 3¹) I took liberty of outlining to him during conversation August 14 eight numbered points made by Gross in his conversation on August 11 with Rau (Deptel 285, August 12²). I explained background of conversation of Gross with Rau and told him that without instructions I was reporting these

² Paragraph 3 of telegram 376 (not printed) read as follows:

"Although GOI policies re peace moves not formulated GOI thinking at present along following lines: ceasefire with understanding North Korean troops be withdrawn from ROK. In view unpopularity Rhee in ROK it might be better for Government ROK to be taken over by UN and eventually UN take over government all Korea in order for nationwide plebiscite. GOI would not be happy at idea of merely status quo being restored. Efforts should be made to set up for all Korea kind of government agreeable to Korean people." (795.00/8-1250)

¹ Not printed; but see telegram 265 from New York, received at 10:08 p.m. on August 11, p. 561.
points to him because I thought it might be useful for him to know how some of our officials in Lake Success were thinking. I emphasized that I was not undertaking give fixed views of Department.

2. Bajpai said information was helpful. He would make no secret that India was still looking for possible avenues in direction of peace as was also UK. Acting UK High Commissioner had appointment with him in few minutes to exchange views re possible solution Korean problem.

3. Bajpai said he wished put question which was bothering GOI. Suppose it should become evident that UN Forces would either be driven out of Korea or be tied down in small sector for many months while US and other countries were preparing forces to invade country on appropriate scale. Would it be advantageous for cause of peace during this period of strain for SC to refuse to have any conversation or negotiations with North Koreans unless North Koreans would withdraw or agree unconditionally to withdraw? GOI considered that unfortunate unconditional surrender formula in World War II was partially responsible for present condition of world. Might it not be mistake for SC to adopt similar inflexible attitude at this time? He did not wish to be misunderstood; GOI was not planning to rush in with some suggestion which would embarrass those members UN opposing aggression. It had not as yet been able to determine what might or could be done. Nevertheless, it hoped that a formula would not be adopted at this time which would firmly close the door to discussion; with North Koreans to remain in undisturbed possession of Korea from six to eight months while forces were being mobilized to oust them might be more disastrous for cause of peace than for talks to take place. During those months Communists could eliminate all persons and groups who might have ability and energy to oppose them. If talks should take place they should, of course, be in certain framework in order that impression might not be obtained that determination UN was weakening in face military adverses [reverses?]. There could, of course, be no peace except on condition that North Korean forces be withdrawn and steps taken to ascertain real desires Korean people. He was merely thinking aloud.

4. I told Bajpai, although I appreciated his sharing of thoughts with me I could not reciprocate because my thinking had not as yet gone so far. We might pursue this matter again later.

5. Bajpai read excerpts from telegram which he had received over week-end from Rau. Latter reported that he had told Malik that he would vote against resolution inviting North Koreans to appear before SC. Malik had expressed regret at decision which seemed to him unfair and partial. Rau added he was in somewhat difficult posi-
tion. Both groups were clearly anxious for India’s moral support and were treating him with so much courtesy and consideration that he sometimes found it unpleasant to take sides.

HENDON

798.00/3-1550

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 15, 1950.

Cabinet Meeting, Tuesday, August 15, 1950

The Cabinet meeting was quiet and nothing of concern to the Department was raised.

However, before the meeting of the Cabinet, Secretary Johnson took from his papers my letter regarding the bombing of Rashin, dated August 14, 1950. He stated that we should not be disturbed about the action taken; that it had been approved in advance by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President; that there was a large chemical plant there in which munitions of war were being made for use in fighting, and that in the judgment of the Joint Chiefs it was essential to destroy it.¹

I told him that our experts on Russia took a most serious view of this; that the Russians were undoubtedly now in the process of making important decisions; and that we were very concerned that such an action might precipitate the reoccupation of Korea down to the 38th Parallel or the introduction of the Chinese Communists into the war; that if that is the case, results of such action could not be overlooked. Secretary Johnson was adamant in his position and stated that, regardless of our view, it was essential to destroy this plant, and that they would go back time after time to destroy it. He seemed to think that as long as planes did not cross the Russian border the exact location of targets was of little significance. I explained to him that this was not the view of those who had had the most experience in dealing with the Russians, and I again expressed the hope that he would re-examine this whole matter and give more attention to the concern of the Department of State about the consequences of such actions in the proximity of the Russian border.

When I discussed this matter with the President yesterday he indicated some concern about it himself, but did not state that he had

¹ The Department of Defense has supplied information indicating that Secretary Johnson was in error regarding the nature of the target at Rashin, having apparently confused it with another location on the approved target list. See Secretary Johnson’s letter to the Secretary of State, August 21, 1950 (post, p. 613), in which he correctly identified the target as a petroleum storage plant.
approved the action. I frankly doubt that he approved the action in advance, and therefore believe we should address another, and stronger, formal communication to the Secretary of Defense, stating in more detail the reasons for our concern and particularly requesting that consultations be held with the proper officials of the Department of State prior to making exceptions to the orders which have been issued by the President specifically directing that actions in the proximity of the Russian border be avoided.

James E. Webb

705.00/8-1550
Memorandum by Mr. George H. Butler of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 15, 1950.

The papers on Korea now are so numerous that it is difficult to fit all of the pieces together. According to the July 17 memorandum from the Executive Secretary, NSC: “The President requested the NSC to prepare for his consideration a report on the subject, covering the policy which should be pursued by the United States after the North Korean forces have been driven back to the 38th parallel.”

Papers now in draft form, none of which has been agreed to or approved, include:

1. NSC 73/1 (now being considered by the senior staff of NSC);
2. NSC 76 and 76/1 (being considered by the NSC consultants and staff);
3. A paper agreed to in the State Department and circulated by NSC under date of July 27 for NSC staff consideration only;
4. A Defense draft paper dated August 7 and circulated for NSC consideration only; and
5. The draft paper attached to your memorandum of August 14, 1950.¹

The following comment on this paper is made in an effort to relate it to other papers on this subject and to keep duplication and possible contradiction to a minimum.

The Problem

To determine what policies the United States should pursue in order to contribute to the restoration of international peace and security in the Korean area once the aggression has been brought to an end, either by the defeat of the Korean communists or as the result of an early voluntary withdrawal of the aggressor forces to territory north of the 38th parallel.

¹ Mr. Allison’s memorandum is printed under date of August 12, p. 567.
Analysis

(This paragraph would be inserted as the first paragraph of the Analysis.) Aspects of the Korean problem relating to the present U.N. enforcement action and other military operations are dealt with in NSC 73/1, NSC 76 and NSC 76/1, NSC staff draft (State Department) of July 27, and NSC staff draft (Defense Department) of August 7. This paper therefore deals primarily with the phase of the problem following the termination of the aggression.

Paragraph 6. The following sentence might be added to this paragraph: "However, a Kremlin-dominated Korean peninsula would be a threat to U.S. security interests in Japan."

Paragraph 9. The following sentence might be added to this paragraph: "Neither has the United States taken the decision to include the use of military force among the means by which it would seek to bring about the establishment of a unified and independent Korea."

Paragraph 16. The final sentence might be revised as follows: "The aggression in South Korea, if defeated in pursuance of the Security Council resolutions, may result in the opposite effect—the failure to complete the cordon."

Paragraph 20. The first sentence might read as follows: "The above reasons, in addition to the strategic importance of Korea to the U.S.S.R., make it even more probable that the U.S.S.R. will not be willing to see a settlement resulting in a Korean government which it cannot control."

Paragraph 21. The first sentence might read: "The United States has pledged its support of a unified and independent Korea."

Paragraph 24a. This paragraph might read: "The independence and unification of Korea conform with Korean aspirations, United States objectives, and the expressed objectives of the United Nations."

Paragraph 24d. This paragraph might read as follows: "Although the United States national interests are involved in the Korean situation, the problem of Korea is primarily a U.N. problem and its final solution must be one which is consistent with the principles of the U.N. Charter."

Paragraph 24e. The last sentence might read as follows: "Since Korea is an Asiatic state, it is appropriate that the Asiatic members of the United Nations should play a prominent role in the assistance that the United Nations can give, and that their views regarding a solution of the problem should be given sympathetic consideration."

Paragraph 24g. It is suggested that this paragraph be eliminated, since it refers to military operations which are dealt with in other papers.

Paragraph 25a. Insert the words "and independent" after the word "unified" in the second line.
Paragraph 25b. This paragraph might read as follows: "The fact that the military strength of the United States now is inadequate to assure the attainment of the objectives fixed by our national interests."

Paragraph 26. This paragraph might read as follows: "In consonance with the above principles and having in mind the above limiting factors, the United States should take the following steps once the aggression has been brought to an end."

Paragraph 26a. This paragraph could be eliminated since it deals with military phases covered in other papers.

Paragraph 26b. Might read: "Take action through diplomatic channels to assure the greatest possible support for the attainment of United Nations and United States objectives regarding Korea."

Paragraph 26c. This paragraph might read: "At a time when the United Nations forces in Korea are achieving substantial victories over the Korean communists forces, or when any proposals may be made for the withdrawal from the Republic of Korea of the Korean communists forces, announcement should be made in the U.N. of the determination of the United States to seek a solution of the Korean problem within the general framework of previous U.N. resolutions and in a manner consistent with the U.N. Charter."

Paragraph 26d. "When such an announcement is made, the United States should recommend, or urge others to recommend, the creation of an appropriate U.N. body which would study and make recommendations to the General Assembly on the future of Korea in accordance with the principles enumerated above. It might be desirable to support the Representative of India as Chairman of such a body."

Paragraph 26e. This paragraph might start as follows: "At the time of the announcement, recommended to the U.N. that, after the unification of the country in accordance with recommendations of the above-named U.N. body; . . . ."

Paragraph 26f. This paragraph might read as follows: "In its announcement to the United Nations, the United States should express its view that for as long as the 38th parallel divides Korea, or until a stable, unified, and independent Korea is established, a U.N. military force should be retained in Korea to prevent renewed aggression or internal strife during the natural period of adjustment, and that such force should include substantial contingents from Asiatic countries. The United States would make it clear that its forces would be available to participate in enforcing a U.N. guarantee against unprovoked aggression; but would recommend that its contingents in the U.N. force referred to should be stationed south of the 38th parallel."

Paragraph 26h. "Should the U.N. Commission on Korea make recommendations along the lines set forth in USUN telegram 266 of August 11, the United States should strongly support the general
character of those recommendations, reserving the right to suggest such changes in detail as may appear desirable."

Paragraph 26. This might read: "Press forward urgently with measures to build up the military, political and economic strength of the United States and other non-communist nations."

Paragraph 27. This paragraph might be deleted since it deals with military phases covered in other papers.

GEORGE H. BUTLER

330/5-1550: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
NEW YORK, August 15, 1950—1:52 p. m.
PRIORITY
[Received August 15—4:06 p. m.]

283. For Hickerson, UNA.
1. Immediately following our telephone conversation, and before my staff had brought in the dispatch which I have promised to send you, I confirm the telephone statement to this effect:

I am not in favor of assenting to a resolution which would buy cessation of debate in the SC for the remainder of August at the price of turning over to a special committee under Article 28, consisting of non-permanent members of SC, responsibility of the SC regarding "complaint of aggression upon the ROK".

I favor attempting to guide our colleagues on the SC by informal consultations toward a SC resolution establishing principles for a peaceful solution without any committee. This is a UN effort (not the allegation by India that it is a US effort).

I favor a constructive effort at pacific methods through the UN to achieve:

1. Liberation of the Korean people from captivity;
2. Restoration of freedom and opportunity to govern themselves, and enjoy security, throughout the whole peninsula;
3. Arrest of aggression anywhere and everywhere (this being regarded as an aggression upon the UN and upon the world).

Details, such as you mention, could also be talked out informally:

1. Entire peninsula;
2. Democratic government guaranteed by UN;
3. Demobilization;
4. High-powered UN Commission;
5. Election.

Please refer mytel 265, August 11, page 2, for possible points for consideration.
2. Staff thinks this statement supplements my personal previous statement I agree.

1. We feel that Rau's proposal, including the method of its introduction, is very damaging to our interests and that we should make certain that it is not adopted.

2. We are most anxious that the United States should avoid responsibility before the world for killing an Indian initiative identified with peace in Korea.

3. It seems unlikely that the Russian delegate will accept this proposal. We doubt that the other delegations will be enthusiastic in support of it.

4. Our suggested tactic, therefore, for the immediate future would be to avoid taking a definitely negative attitude toward Rau's suggestion. Instead, we would propose to speak privately with the various delegations about the substance of what our peace aims in Korea should be and the importance of maintaining a solidarity among those members who are fighting together in Korea. We would hope to engender in the Security Council a substantive debate of these affirmative principles on the theory that the terms of reference of such a committee could not possibly be framed except in the light of consideration of these important principles. We would expect that by the time a number of friendly delegates had spelled out their own peace aims in public speeches in the SC, the uselessness and impracticability of Rau's suggestion would become apparent to all.

AUSTIN

330/8-1550 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the
United Nations

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 15, 1950—7 p.m.

147. Re Rau proposal made in SC yesterday. US will give sympathetic consideration to any proposal made in Council which is likely bring about compliance of North Koreans with resolutions heretofore adopted by Council.

We cannot of course give support to Indian proposal until we learn purpose which Rau has in mind and precise terms of reference of proposed comite.

Accordingly, you shld approach Rau and make clear to him our concern with ref to fol:

1. Korean case is not conflict between US and USSR but UN against North Korean aggression and any who give support to it.

2. Principal function of Comite shld be to assist SC in formulating proposals for Korea on basis of cessation of hostilities and full compliance by North Koreans with SC resolutions. It shld not have any mediatory functions.
3. SC maintains and does not surrender any part of its responsibility for action in relation to Korea. SC in carrying out this responsibility is acting on behalf of all UN Members to achieve:

a. Cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of NK forces,
b. By example of UN action in this case to deter and prevent aggression anywhere, and
c. Establishment of free unified and independent Korea so that its people may govern themselves in manner recommended in prior GA resolutions.

4. That although Comite may of course consider resolutions now before SC, just as it may consider entire SC debate, those resolutions, particularly US res, are before SC and shld be put to vote as soon as Pres willing carry out his obligations as Pres. There is no reason why SC needs sub-comite consideration of these res before vote can be taken.

5. We feel strongly that North Korean reps shld not be heard by Comite until they cease their defiance of UN and that there is no occasion or justification for hearing Chi Commies.

6. If Com. established, its work should end by Sept. 15 to clear the deck for any GA rec. on Korea.

FYI our present thought as regards para 5 action is that it wld be better not to make issue of this point in formulating res but to rely on efforts US and UK and other friendly dels to persuade comite members individually of dangerously harmful results of such a course on continued public support in US of UN action in Korea.

You shld discuss also foregoing conception of nature and function of comite with other SC members with view obtaining their concurrence.¹

ACHESON

¹The text of this telegram was sent to New Delhi in telegram 248, August 15, with the added instruction to Ambassador Henderson that at his discretion he discuss its substance with Bajpai (330/8-1550).

795B.5/8-1550: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 15, 1950—7 p. m.

148. Confirming telecon Ludlow to Hyde re MacArthur’s Second Report to SC: MacArthur agrees to following wording penultimate paragraph report:

“The international character of the operations in Korea has received important emphasis since the preparation of the last report in the offers of combat forces made by a number of Members of the United Nations. But, it is my sincere hope that the Member Nations of the
United Nations will without delay build up the strength of our ground forces. To bring the conflict to a successful conclusion quickly, it is essential for the Member nations to act speedily. The material utility of each contribution is directly related to the rapidity with which it is despatched. Urgent attention therefore should be given to the arrival of organizations now in being. 1

By agreement yesterday State Defense following paragraph has been deleted:

"There is increasing evidence that much of the equipment and supplies of the North Korean forces is of Soviet origin."

Report as revised may now be transmitted to UN. 2

ACHESON

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1 The text of this paragraph, as submitted to Mr. Acheson by Secretary of Defense Johnson on August 11, had read as follows:

"The international character of the operations in Korea has received important emphasis since the preparation of the last report in the offers of combat forces made by a number of members of the United Nations. But, it is my sincere hope that the member nations of the United Nations will without further delay build up the strength of our ground forces. Speed in this matter is of the essence. Contributions should not be token but of real strength and come immediately. They are needed now, not indefinitely later. Organizations now in being must be dispatched if they are to be of material utility. It is necessary that they come now in order materially to shorten the operation and bring it quickly to a successful conclusion." (755B.5/8-1150)

2 The text of the report was transmitted to the Security Council by Mr. Austin on August 16; see U.N. document 8/1694.

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755.00/8-1650

The Under Secretary of State (Webb) to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1950.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am much concerned by the situation which we discussed before Cabinet meeting yesterday as outlined in my letter of August 14 on the bombing of Najin. You indicated to me that the action in question had been taken after prior approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and yourself, and that the State Department should not be disturbed about the possible reactions.

As you will recall, the pertinent directive to General MacArthur was worked out in its final form at a meeting at the White House by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the State Department and this final text was thereupon approved by the President, Secretary Acheson and yourself. 1 That directive contained the clear statement

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1 See p. 240.
that while bombing operations against specified military targets in Korea north of the 38th parallel were authorized, our planes engaged in the operations should stay "well clear" of the Manchurian and Soviet frontiers. Najin is just 17 miles south of the Soviet and Manchurian frontiers and its bombing does not, in the opinion of this Department, conform to the terms of the aforesaid directive.

We have a deep concern in this matter which in the view of this Department vitally affects the national security of the United States and our basic foreign policy objective to prevent the outbreak of a general war. I therefore feel that any modification of the above directive should be jointly considered with this Department for recommendation to or decision by the President.

The injunction to stay "well clear" of the Manchurian and Soviet frontiers in bombing operations in North Korea stemmed in our view from the extreme sensitivity of the Kremlin to any military action in this area which they consider to be of vital military importance to them and from the common State and Defense objective to avoid if possible direct Soviet participation in the conflict in Korea or elsewhere. It is the view of those in this Department most familiar with the Soviet Union and its policies that the bombing of Najin can only appear to the Soviet authorities as evidence of a deliberate decision to exploit the South Korean hostilities for the purpose of reducing Soviet strategic capabilities in the area. This belief on their part can only be strengthened by the article by Mr. Ansel Talbert in the New York Herald Tribune mentioned in my letter of August 14 and by similar statements appearing in the column of Mr. Hanson W. Baldwin in this morning's New York Times. In our opinion, this action greatly increases the possibility of a Soviet military reentry into North Korea, and the possibility of placing strategic bombing planes nominally at North Korean disposal for operations against our forces or our bases in Japan. We also cannot exclude the possibility that this evidence, as it must appear to them, of a United States intent to damage their strategic interests under cover of the Korean war, even at the price of greater danger of serious complications, will affect their estimate of the possibility of avoiding major hostilities, of the likely timing of such hostilities, and of the relative advantages of a Soviet initiation of such hostilities as opposed to a waiting policy based on the continued hope of avoiding them altogether.

In the light of the foregoing, I consider it to be highly important that the Department of State be consulted in advance of any repetition of the bombing of Najin or any other place equally close to the Soviet or Manchurian frontiers.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES E. WEBB
The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
Taegu, August 16, 1950—9 p.m.
[Received August 16—1:33 p.m.]

129. For Department's information only. On July 28 General Walker suggested it would appear in order for ROK Government to remove from Taegu to safer area in rear. I demurred, pointing out morale and psychological factors involved and requesting transfer of Government be delayed if military situation permitted at least until after August 15. As Department is aware enemy has for past two weeks been within 10 to 15 miles of Taegu at several points and has reportedly continued to build up strength. While General Walker has expressed confidence UN forces will be able to hold Taegu, he has during past two days renewed request that ROK Government remove to safer area saying General MacArthur is concerned as well. He pointed out realistic appraisal of situation dictated such a move and in this I concurred.

I accordingly broached move to Rhee and his War Cabinet this afternoon. All Rhee's Ministers concurred removal of Government desirable but should be accompanied by clear-cut explanation. Rhee professed reluctance leave Taegu, asserting at one point he preferred to resign Presidency and remain Taegu to fight enemy at head volunteers. However, in end he agreed War Cabinet should draw up plan for removal of government—probably to Pusan.

Removal of seat of government from Taegu will of course have deleterious effect on morale of Korean people and will require clear explanation. Explanation will probably be removal based on recommendations UN military commander and on consideration civil administration can better be handled in area more removed from hostilities. Department will be informed if and when removal plans crystallize.

Muccio

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
New York, August 16, 1950—5:45 p.m.
[Received August 16—7:17 p.m.]

298. After dinner last night at his apartment, Rau (India) told USUN officer he hoped both US and USSR could find it possible to say very little about his proposal for a committee, and perhaps to
abstain on the vote setting it up. He realized, he said, that if either the US or the USSR supported the proposal vigorously the other would be forced to vote against it. He did not ask what US reaction to committee was.

Queried on wire service story from Lake Success to effect that committee would not insist on fulfillment of 25 and 27 June resolution as prerequisite of settlement, Rau said story was incorrect. He said the fulfillment of those resolutions was obvious prerequisite to peaceful settlement, adding that five members of proposed committee had already voted in favor of resolution[s] and would therefore of course insist on their fulfillment. This may have been intended as indirect means of telling us not to be worried if reference to earlier resolution was not included in committee resolution; Rau implied that leaving out specific reference to earlier resolutions might make it possible for Soviet Union to abstain on committee resolution instead of vetoing it.

Queried on statement that committee might hear representatives of other governments, Rau said North Koreans would have to be heard at some time but that he had deliberately inserted phrase in his speech “at an appropriate time” so as to make sure that NK’s would not be heard until they had complied with earlier resolution. He suggested possibility that withdrawal to 38th parallel, if agreed to by committee as prerequisite and also agreed to by NK’s, might be carried out in stages. Queried on whether Chinese Communists might be heard by committee he said he was anxious to avoid details at this stage keeping resolution as general as possible so as to increase chances of its being accepted.

He asked what State Department views were on peace aims. Told that Department was giving matter careful consideration, he commented that he thought it essential to formulate the general terms of peace plan soon, indicating why UN is fighting in Korea. Malik’s propaganda speeches, he said, were doubtless doing great damage in Asia, where even knowledge of fact that NK’s committed aggression tends to be obscured by fact that Americans are fighting Koreans, and where determination to resist aggression also tends to be overlayed by emotional reaction against bombing of civilians and industry. He thought even presence of Turkish and Thailand troops would do little to offset Asian reaction against “colonial forces” fighting in Korea since Turkey was far away and Thailand was regarded in Asia as artificial creation designed as buffer between French and British territories, and therefore as atypical Asian state. Only way to meet Malik’s propaganda, he thought, aside from reiteration of facts, was formulation of peace plan even if drawn in very general terms in order to avoid binding commitment or possible prejudice to future military operations.
The basis of a peace plan, he said, must be unification of Korea and establishment of free independent government through UN supervised election in entire country. Asked whether he thought UN troops should unify country by force if necessary, he replied that NK’s were likely to agree to some such proposal when they saw they could not win war. On this point, he thought it important to make peace early and if possible before fighting our way back to north, both in order to localize fighting and to prevent further destruction which would increase number of Communist votes.

He said Malik had not liked the plan when he broached it to him over the weekend, but added “if you can show me the advantages, I may change my mind”. Rau said he told Malik committee would of course base any proposal on NK’s withdrawing. He said Malik replied quickly, “Would the foreign troops also withdraw”. Rau said he was unable to reply to this. Malik said he would consult his government.

Rau said he had not been sure on Monday 1 that he would make his proposal until he was shown advance text of Chauvel (France) speech in which proposal was welcomed, at which point Rau decided he would speak. He said his only prior consultations with other delegates had been in secret meeting last week when he suggested plan. Since making speech he had received favorable personal reactions from Egypt, Ecuador, Yugoslavia and Norway, all of whom had told him they would consult their governments. He guessed chief reason for French enthusiasm was French concern about US troops being tied down in Asia when they might soon be needed on French border.

Rau advanced suggestion that ROK representative in council should write letter to SYG stating he would not sit so long as President was clearly opposed to it. We replied that a gentleman might leave the company where one member did not wish his presence, but that a government representative could hardly do so. Rau said this government representative would undoubtedly do so if the US Government suggested it to him. We replied we could not conceive that the US Government would entertain such a thought. Rau returned to point indirectly several times stating that council delegates were perhaps too much impressed by proper procedure and observance of correct forms, whereas people outside were not impressed, did not understand importance of procedure, and wished council to make progress somehow toward settlement in Korea.

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1 August 14.
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 17, 1950

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, THURSDAY, AUGUST 17, 1950

BOMBING OF RASHIN

I showed the President a number of excerpts from Mr. Kennan's reports of August 8 and 14 with respect to the present pattern of Soviet intentions, and also the attached letter under date of August 16 to Secretary Johnson, with respect to the Rashin bombing. The President's first reaction was that he thought we would have to take whatever risks were necessary to destroy the points from which supplies were flowing, but when I made the point that departures from agreed instructions should not be made without thorough consultation with the State Department on the political implications, the President agreed.

I later had a brief conversation with Secretary Johnson on this matter and he also agreed that we should have such prior consultation.

JAMES E. WEBB

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1 See ante, p. 574 and footnote 1.

Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON, August 17, 1950.]

Telegram No. 95 of August 1st to USUN gives the text of a statement which Senator Austin should make in the Security Council in case Malik proposed the withdrawal of the UN forces concurrent with the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the 38th Parallel. At the time this seemed to me a good statement, and it was cleared by a considerable number including Mr. Kennan and Mr. Butler for S/P. On rereading it in the light of the events which have transpired since

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1 Not printed.
and the present appreciation of the situation, it seems to me that we should consider a modification of it. 2

It is true that the response stated in the telegram is not wholly negative in the sense that it poses three questions to the Soviet Union including acceptance of the General Assembly’s resolutions, free access of UNCOK to North Korea, and supervised elections. It seems to me as a result of various conversations around the Department recently that we should be ready to suggest a willingness to withdraw American troops provided a UN force composed of other contingents remained in Korea to assist the Korean Government to re-establish itself in the south and to assist UNCOK in conducting free elections. The withdrawal of American forces would be staged to coincide with their replacement by an adequate number of other forces. It is at least possible that for that kind of a mission Indian and Pakistani troops would be available. Obviously there are many complications, such as the command factor. What I suggest at this point is that the telegram of August 1st should be re-examined with a view to giving it somewhat more of an affirmative note than we gave it when it was written.

Not only with relation to the above situation but in general it seems to me of very pressing importance that the Department should arrive at a decision concerning the formulation of our program for the future of Korea. That matter will be discussed next week by the Senior Staff of the NSC, and it is important for the Department’s representative to have guidance. It seems to me it is also important that we should

3 The thrust of the proposed statement for Ambassador Austin was contained in the following excerpts from telegram 95:

“. . . Our experience has . . . been broadened by the events of the past few weeks, and I submit that the [Soviet] proposal is a dishonest one. We know now that the North Korean regime is a murderous automaton. The representative of the USSR must know it too. He knows, too, that it has with every appearance of satisfaction launched a concerted, planned attack upon a nation and a people who are certified by a UN Commission to this Council as having offered no provocation save that of their weakness and their lack of preparation. Merely to replace this conscienceless instrument in its original position, ready for another run, is not a solution. It is not a basis on which the people of the Republic of Korea can be deprived of the shelter which they receive through the presence in their territory of UN forces.

“Accordingly, Mr. President, my Govt cannot accept the proposal made by the representative of the USSR. If we are to reach agreement here, something far more radical and stable will be required. The essential point in which 53 Members of the UN have agreed is that progress can be made toward a settlement of this problem only if the North Koreans should cease aggression and immediately evacuate the territory which they have seized in defiance of the UN. The future steps can then be taken to restore and maintain international peace and security in the area.

“As for these future steps, in contrast to the govt of the USSR my Govt considers that the future of Korea is not to be underwritten by one great power, but holds, with the SC and with the GA, that it is a matter for determination by the UN in consultation with the Korean people. My Govt considers that an essential element of any plan which may be adopted by the UN to determine Korea’s future shld be the elimination of the threat of renewed attack upon Koreans or upon the forces of the Members of the UN which are in the country pursuant to the action of this Council.” (7955.3/8-150)
be able as soon as possible to make public our program for the future of Korea. It seems clear that we do not wish to remain in occupation. We do not wish on the other hand to have the Soviets in occupation or practical occupation even of the northern half. We wish to see the country united.

Could the following be taken as the core of our program?

1. A united, independent Korea.
2. This united Korea to remain at least for a time under United Nations auspices.
4. A United Nations force to remain within Korea for a brief period of time to assist in the establishment and maintenance of internal peace.
5. The United States will contribute troops to this United Nations force if requested by the Security Council or will gladly withdraw all of its troops and have the United Nations force constituted by troops of other countries.

I assume that a fundamental idea underlying our position is that we would be glad to extricate ourselves militarily from the Korean situation and that Korea does not have the strategic importance of, say Formosa, and therefore is free from the considerations which flow from those strategic considerations.

Philip C. Jessup

735B.00/8-1750: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TAEGU, August 17, 1950—11 p. m.

PRIORITY

[Received August 17—1:50 p. m.]

131. For Department’s info only. Embtel 129, August 16. Rhee was reconciled this morning to withdrawal seat government from Taegu. At his request I arranged air travel to Pusan where he said he wished to go on urgent business. Late in afternoon he returned Taegu. After picking up Mrs. Rhee and personal entourage he flew to Chinhae where he plans to rest for two or three days. Later he will probably proceed to Pusan.

Korean Cabinet agreed this morning most of civil government should be removed to Pusan and that move should be accomplished during next three days, with announcement of move to be made at noon of 18th.

However General Walker called me late this afternoon to inform me enemy had launched strong drive on Korean sector north of Wae-gu-nan at noon today. He said enemy push was of such intensity he felt it advisable for Korean civil authorities, Diplomatic Corps and UN
officials to leave without delay. At my suggestion Walker called in ROK Acting Prime Minister and chief of staff, outlined situation and repeated advice to leave. Later after I had conferred with Prime Minister and Home Minister it was agreed latter would take steps to issue official announcement tonight and ready government employees and National Assemblymen to leave Taegu tomorrow. Arrangements are being made for special trains for this purpose.

Foreign Minister called on Diplomatic Corps tonight and orally informed them of intention ROK Government move most of civil departments to Pusan. At same time he advised them leave Taegu soon as convenient. It is understood Diplomatic Corps and UN officials plan to leave Taegu tomorrow. All members Embassy with possible exception Drumright and myself and possibly one or two others will probably leave tomorrow morning for Pusan where Embassy will be reestablished.

General Walker informed me there good possibility Taegu will still be held, but he does not wish assume responsibility for civilians remaining here. He stated he expects retain 8th Army Headquarters here unless and until military situation becomes precarious.

Mucho

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council held its 488th Meeting on August 17 at 3 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.488. The debate on Korea continued, but no action was taken to break the procedural deadlock which prevented voting on any substantive proposals.

Ambassador Austin made a statement setting forth the three great objectives to which the United Nations was committed in Korea: to end the breach of the peace; to provide a demonstration of United Nations achievement which would deter any future aggression; and to aid the establishment by the Korean people of a free, unified, and independent nation.

330/8–1750: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

NEW YORK, August 17, 1950—6:21 p. m. [Received August 17—7:45 p. m.]

303. Following is account of informal meeting SC members 2 p. m. today, called by Malik through intermediary Rau to continue in-
formal exchange of views on deadlock in SC. Malik opened meeting with expression "heartfelt thanks" to Rau for cooperating in arranging today's exchange of views.

Malik then mentioned that in discussion with Rau way of liquidating situation in SC had been discussed, particularly question of inviting two parties (South and North Koreans) to SC. He proposed deadlock should be liquidated as follows: both should be invited. Position Soviet Union boils down as follows, he said; in effect, Soviet Union, without changing its view as to validity June 25 resolution, was willing to leave aside question validity that resolution and agree to invite South Korean representative and simultaneously decide to invite representative North Korea.

In response Malik request for expression views, Jebb said if he understood correctly Malik's proposal boiled down to invitation to both representatives simultaneously. Jebb asked how this would change existing situation. Or would Malik have in mind first inviting representatives ROK and then discussion question inviting North Korean representative. Malik replied in affirmative to Jebb's statement that he was proposing both representatives be invited simultaneously. Malik went on to say his proposal alters substance of matter without altering position Soviet Union regarding validity June 25 resolution (or discussion further question validity since this question has already been fully discussed). Malik said "complications" indicate representative South Korea should be invited but that simultaneously representative North Korea should be invited. In other words, Malik said the two decisions must be covered in one. After decision had been taken to invite both simultaneously consideration could be given to the form in which this decision would be executed in formal meeting SC, that is, manner in which implemented.

After providing opportunity, which not taken, for further expression of views, Malik went on to say Soviet delegation feels without participation both parties at SC no peaceful solution Korean question can be achieved.

In response to request for clarification by Fawzi as to how Malik would propose putting decision he sought before formal meeting SC, Malik replied as follows:

Representative of Egypt was referring to second stage of matter which would be academic to discuss before decision had been reached on first stage (agreement to seat both simultaneously). Repeating his view no necessity going back over ground of validity of June 25 resolution (referred to by Fawzi) which had been sufficiently discussed, Malik said should not be difficult reach agreement on formal presentation in SC if agreement could first be reached privately on his proposal.
In further effort to clarify matter for Fawzi, Malik went on to say he had already made clear that when he refers to representative of Korean people he means representatives from South and North Korea. Substance of matter is that there are two governmental authorities in Korea which have clashed in armed conflict. In order deal with question of Korea SC must have representatives of both authorities available.

Malik then said that even assuming (as some members of SC say) question is really one of North Korea being on one side and UN on other side, equity and principles of charter require SC to hear North Korea which stands accused before UN. SC cannot ignore equity or indulge in petty vengeance or discriminatory measures.

Tsiang intervened to following effect: If authorities of North Korea had a grievance they could have brought complaint to SC which could have considered complaint as a dispute and SC might then have heard both parties. NK had, however, resorted to war and article 32 did not apply. It was open to NK to turn war back into a dispute by withdrawing to 38th parallel. Article 32 might then apply and SC might then hear NK; otherwise Chinese delegation would adhere to decision June 25.

Malik made no comment on Tsiang’s remarks.

Sunde intervened that he could not understand how Malik’s proposal today was any different from proposal he had previously made in SC.

Malik said he would make further endeavor to clarify matter as follows: He had made proposal in SC to hear representatives of Korean people. He had further clarified that this meant representatives of North and South Korea. Series of members had objected because of June 25 decision. The Soviet-Union representative had objected and stated his views and as result of difference of views SC found itself unable to go on with substance of its work re Korea.

Malik said Soviet Union strongly stands on its position that both parties should be invited. He said again it would be impossible to achieve peaceful settlement Korean question unless both were invited. He said he wished to repeat and emphasize this point, which he did.

It then being past three o’clock, Malik inquired if it were desired to continue private exchange of views at specified later time.

Rau, speaking for first time, said first that in order to avoid any misunderstanding he wished to make clear to his colleagues that he had merely agreed to convey Malik’s desire to hold meeting to have informal exchange of views.

Ran then went on to say he had submitted proposal at last Monday’s meeting and that he had indicated he would submit resolution if there
were sufficient support for proposal. Many delegates had indicated they would like to see text of resolution. This, he said, would take time to prepare. Meanwhile, purpose of his proposal would be defeated if SC were to continue its discussion of substance of Korean matter. He therefore wished to ask indulgence of his colleagues for adjournment SC until Monday or Tuesday.

Malik suggested, and no objection being raised, it was agreed (a) there would be another informal exchange of views Monday afternoon, and (b) bearing in mind Rau's request, next official meeting of SC after today would be next Tuesday.1

It was also agreed without objection that Malik would state at opening SC meeting as follows: "An informal exchange of views took place between members of the SC on questions which arose during the course of meetings of the SC. It was recognized that it would be appropriate to continue the informal exchange of views on the question touched upon."

AUSTIN

1 August 22.

795.00/8–1850

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1950.

CABINET MEETING, FRIDAY, AUGUST 18, 1950

KOREA

While General Bradley was briefing the Cabinet with respect to the military situation in Korea, Mr. Harriman stated that he was answering the criticism about the attack by American forces in the Southwestern area by saying that it had a real military objective and was not dictated from Washington. He asked General Bradley if this was true, and General Bradley indicated that it was, that the decision had been left to the commander in the field, as were all other decisions in that area. Secretary Johnson then stated that Ambassador Jessup had telephoned the Pentagon this morning lodging a protest by the British against bombing military targets in North Korea, and left the impression that perhaps some of the targets the British did not wish bombed might even be owned by the British. He stated that these matters had been left to the commander in the field, and that neither he nor the Joint Chiefs expected to change instructions with regard to bombing or interfere with the discretion of the commander in the field. General Bradley then stated that this was generally true, that
they had sent out information obtained from Mr. Pauley and other sources with respect to military targets in North Korea which might be bombed to prevent their utilization in the military effort. General Bradley also stated that he had had a talk with Air Marshal Tedder this morning and believed that the concern of the British was due to a misunderstanding relayed from Tokyo by the British man there, and that he and Tedder both understood that the targets to be bombed were really military targets, such as marshalling yards, warehouses, industrial plants, etc. At this point I intervened to say that the British had lodged a protest last night based on an assumption that our dropping of evacuation warning leaflets over cities in North Korea indicated that we were preparing to engage in mass bombing of those cities, and that this, if carried out, would produce a feeling in Asia and elsewhere that would be harmful to the West. I stated I was sure this protest was not intended to influence the decision to bomb particular military targets.

The President stated that he understood my point, but then turned to General Bradley and said, in effect, that he was to go after any targets which were being used to furnish supplies to the North Korean troops fighting the UN forces.

JAMES E. WEBB

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1 Edwin W. Pauley had been Personal Representative of President Truman on reparations. Concerning his trip to North Korea, May 29–June 3, 1946, see Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 320–322, and Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. VIII, p. 706.

795.00/8–1350

Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 18, 1950.

Subject: Factors Affecting the Desirability of a UN Military Conquest of All of Korea

Conclusions

Although an invasion of North Korea by UN forces could, if successful, bring several important advantages to the US, it appears at present that grave risks would be involved in such a course of action. The military success of the operation is by no means assured because the US cannot count on the cooperation of all the non-Communist UN members and might also become involved in hostilities with Chinese Communist and Soviet troops. Under such circumstances there would, moreover, be grave risk of general war.

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1 The source text indicated that this was the date on which this document was received in the NSC.
Discussion

A successful invasion of North Korea by UN armed forces could bring several important advantages:

1. The conquest of North Korea by UN forces would represent a major diplomatic defeat for the USSR. It would have a profound effect on the entire non-Communist world and would give renewed hope to anti-Communists in both the European and the Asian Satellite states. The recovery of a Satellite from Soviet domination, regardless of its geographical position or political importance, would be a decisive victory for the Western world.

2. The military victory achieved by the UN forces would greatly increase the prestige of the UN and particularly would bring prestige to the US as the chief participant in the UN forces. The countries of Western Europe and the Near East would place greater reliance in the UN as a practical force for world peace and in the determination and ability of the US to stem Communist aggression.

3. UN military conquest of Korea would not only deny the USSR a strategic outpost from which to threaten Japan, but it would provide the Western Powers with a buffer area and a wedge into Communist-held territory . . .

4. The elimination of the arbitrary division of Korea at the 38th parallel and the expulsion of the North Korean regime would appear to provide an opportunity to bring about the economic and political unification of the country. Korean unity would be in accord with the wishes of the Korean people, the announced policy of the US, and the recommendations of the UN.

In addition to these advantages, however, an invasion of North Korea would involve certain grave risks for the US:

1. It is doubtful whether the US could secure the support of its allies and of other non-Soviet nations in the UN for such a course of action. Many non-Communist members of the UN would almost certainly be opposed to any action which would involve the risk of strong counteraction by the USSR. The nations participating with the US in Korea do not wish to become deeply involved in Korea or to take action which might bring them nearer to a general war. They would probably take the position that the UN forces are not committed to the liberation of North Korea and that the SC’s resolutions do not provide an adequate legal basis for the conquest. Consequently, US action would provide the USSR with a strong wedge for attempting to separate the US from its Western European allies. It would also have serious repercussions among Asian nations, particularly India, which is habitually distrustful of Western motives, and might convince many Asians that the US is, after all, an aggressive nation pursuing a policy of self-interest in Asia.

2. The invading forces might become involved in hostilities with the Chinese Communists. As it became apparent that the North Koreans were being defeated in South Korea, the Chinese might well take up defensive positions north of the 38th parallel. The USSR, which might welcome the outbreak of hostilities between the US and
China, would thus have an additional opportunity of driving the wedge more deeply between the US and its allies. The USSR might use Chinese Communist troops at any stage in the fighting, but their participation would be especially useful at the 38th parallel where UN members could legally discontinue their support of the US policy.

3. Inasmuch as the USSR would regard the invasion of North Korea as a strategic threat to the security of the Soviet Far East, the invading forces might become involved, either directly or indirectly, in hostilities with Soviet forces. The USSR is now in a high state of readiness for general hostilities, and the Kremlin might well calculate that, with US mobilization set in motion, the USSR is better prepared now than it would be later for a full-fledged test of strength with the US. It could therefore place Soviet forces on the 38th parallel and oblige the US to initiate hostilities against Soviet forces under conditions which would alienate most of Asia from the US—UN cause in Korea, permit full exploitation of the propaganda theme that the South Koreans under US guidance opened the aggression against the North Koreans and other peace-loving peoples, and enable the USSR to neutralize and conquer most of Europe and the Near East before the impact of US industrial mobilization could be felt upon the defensive capability of those areas.

Even if the USSR should not choose to utilize a UN attempt to conquer North Korea as a pretext for the inauguration of general hostilities against the west, it is probable that the Kremlin would be prepared by one method or another to prevent UN occupation of North Korea. Along with exploiting fully its veto power in the UN and the opportunity for charging the US with aggressive action, the USSR might well provide sufficient ground, air, or naval assistance to interdict UN communications, halt the ground advance, and neutralize UN air and naval superiority. Concurrent with such action, the USSR might well inaugurate new limited aggressions elsewhere in order to offset the advantages which might be gained by an advance into North Korea and to strain further UN military capabilities. There is no assurance that the USSR is unprepared to assume such risks.

4. The conquest of North Korea would not provide assurance of peace throughout the country or of true unification. The Soviet high command would almost certainly attempt to withdraw into Manchuria or into the USSR a large portion of the North Korean forces. From these areas the USSR might continue to threaten aggression and infiltration and thus produce such instability as to require the continuing presence of large numbers of US or UN forces. Moreover, Syngman Rhee and his regime are unpopular among many—if not a majority—of non-Communist Koreans. To re-establish his regime and extend its authority and its base of popular support to all of Korea would be difficult, if not impossible. Even if this could be done, the regime would be so unstable as to require continuing US or UN military and economic support. If, as one alternative, a new government should be formed consequent to a UN-supervised free election, there is no assurance that the Communists would not win either control of or a powerful voice in such a government. If, as another alternative, a prolonged trusteeship under UN control and with US participation were established, instability would nevertheless continue, with probably even
the non-Communist Koreans reacting against the substitution of outside control for independence. Furthermore, Korea once more would become the cat's paw of international politics, and its ultimate status would be dependent upon the comparative strength and ambitions of the countries whose representatives supervised the trust administration.

330/8-1850: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, August 18, 1950—11 a.m.

PRIORITY
[Received August 18—10:19 a.m.]

415. 1. I discussed with Bajpai Secretary General MEA August 17 substance message contained Doptel 248, August 16 [16].

2. He listened to various points as outlined by me rather listlessly. When I asked if he would like to have notes made of them he replied in negative. If he had notes he would feel compelled to discuss them with Prime Minister and he did not believe matter was worth pursuing to that extent. He had in fact already telegraphed Rau asking him not to present this suggestion to UN in form of resolution. From outset GOI had not been enthusiastic of committee composed of non-permanent members of SC. It doubted that such committee would have any influence or great capacity. August 16 Roberts UK acting High Commissioner had informed him his government had misgivings re Rau's suggestions. GOI had no detailed knowledge of what Rau had in mind until it obtained from Roberts transcript of Rau's speech. For instance, he had learned only from Roberts that Rau had suggested proposed committee should "hear any person they please".

3. Bajpai added he was wondering whether, if committee were to be appointed, it should be limited to members SC. States which were not members SC might be able furnish statesmen more qualified to work out principles of peace than statesmen representing non-permanent members SC. What contribution, for instance, could be expected of Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt and Yugoslavia.

4. I asked Bajpai what states in his opinion might be able provide capable statesmen. After some hesitation he said that as examples Canada might furnish Pearson and Netherlands Van Royen [Roinjen]. When I asked if he thought Malik would agree to committee composed of such countries as Netherlands and Canada he admitted some doubt. Perhaps some statesmen could be found also from among countries behind iron curtain. I said such "statesmen" could be nothing more or less than spokesmen for Russia so that committee would in fact

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1 See footnote 1 to telegram 147 to New York, August 15, 7 p.m., p. 587.
have in it representative of one of great powers. Bajpai acknowledged there would be problems connected with setting up of any kind committee but said efforts should not be halted merely because of difficulties.

5. Bajpai said for some time he had been wishing to make suggestion which he hoped would not be interpreted as lack of confidence in judgment of Rau. He had impression that America, British and other western colleagues of Rau in UN, in desire not to hurt Rau’s feelings or to appear obstructive, were not sufficiently frank with him. There seemed to Bajpai to be tendency when Rau made tentative suggestions for his western colleagues, instead of telling him frankly why in their opinion they were impracticable, to act as though they deserved consideration. Too often his colleagues treated his suggestions sympathetically and as worth submitting to their governments. Rau was simple, straightforward man inclined to believe that sympathetic attitude towards his suggestions indicated belief they were sound. He was, therefore, sometimes misled into pushing forward projects which should have been discouraged at their very initiation. It was difficult for GOI to order Rau not to go ahead with some of his ideas when in submitting them to Delhi he indicated they had been greeted with at least tentative sympathy by his western colleagues.

6. I told Bajpai I would pass his suggestions along. I was sure they would not be misunderstood. I wanted again to assure him of the high respect and esteem in which Rau was held by US delegation at Lake Success.

HENDERSON

795.00/8-1850: Telegram

The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

TAEGU, August 18, 1950—9 p. m.  
[Received August 18—12:30 p. m.]

1. Rhee returned from Chinhae to Taegu this morning just before noon. Ambassador Muccio conferred with him at his request. Apart from showing displeasure at manner in which removal of civil officials was being conducted Rhee appears to have come here solely to show he had not run out on Taegu populace. He accepted Ambassador’s invitation to accompany latter on NA plane to Chinhae and Pusan which left here about 2 p. m. Stewart, Prendergast, Berry, Wilson, Harris, Lorence, Naval Attaché Sifert and Marine guard Edwards left today either by rail or highway for Pusan where Embassy’s main office being established. FSR Noble went by road to Chinhae where he will maintain contact with President and Mrs. Rhee pending their going to Pusan.
Contrary to 8th Army expectations and desires, provincial governor this morning distributed handbill ordering Taegu civilians to evacuate to selected areas to southeast. Following strenuous protest by army some steps were taken to rectify this mistake which by noon resulted in mass exodus and closing of great majority shops. By evening, however, as result radio and other public exhortations by Prime Minister and Home Ministers and better turn in military situation many evacuees were returning to homes in city.

Many ROK civil employees left today by highway for Pusan. About 500 others including Assembly, are expected to leave by train tomorrow. UN liaison group less military observers left this morning for Pusan as did members Chinese Embassy and British Legation. Following Embassy staff remains here: Military Attaché Edwards, Fatigati, Scherbacher, Jacoby, Floyd, Marine guard Goff.

DRUMRIGHT

330/8-1850 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, August 18, 1950—1:58 p.m.

PRIORITY

[Received August 18—2:44 p.m.]

309. Department may find useful up-to-minute (noon, 18 August) roundup on developments past 48 hours re Rau proposal for SC subcommittee on Korean question.

1. On evening 16 August, Gross outlined to Rau points made Deptel 147, August 15. After expressing view that we would give sympathetic consideration to any proposal likely to lead to compliance with outstanding SC resolutions, Gross said we were anxious to receive more specifics from Rau concerning objective and terms of reference of subcommittee. Rau replied he had not yet prepared a resolution; he would be glad to show it to us when he had drafted one.

Rau denied any assumption his part that Korean problem was a US-USSR matter. He said that his reference in his SC speech to UNCQK report simply designed to bring out fact that it was inability of US and USSR to reach agreement regarding Korea which lead to necessity for GA action and that all he intended to say was that the genesis of problem lay in US USSR inability to agree upon a solution. Gross pointed out that even in pre-GA phase US approach was not "unilateral" but reflected policies of Charter whereas USSR approach was designed to obstruct unification and free choice of democratic government.
Rau agreed subcommittee should not have any mediatory functions nor did he contemplate SC would surrender any of its responsibilities to subcommittee but that, on contrary, latter would aid SC in carrying out its responsibilities.

With regard to point that there was no need for subcommittee consideration of US resolution, which we felt should be put to vote in SC as soon as Parliamentary situation permitted Rau with some vehemence disagreed, saying that a great advantage of his subcommittee idea was that it could take up US resolution as well as others before the Council.

At this point Rau said that while he appreciated our “openmindedness” in not rejecting his proposal out of hand, he was equally convinced that it would be a good thing if we did not publicly support his resolution. He thought our support would inevitably bring a Soviet veto. Gross had impression Rau was pleased with our lukewarm reception of his idea, and that our reaction to some degree seemed to him to clothe his proposal with even greater virtue.

Rau insisted that this proposal could not contain explicit reference to earlier SC resolutions since this would also compel a Soviet veto, but on other hand Rau said he felt there should be no doubt in our minds that it was not his intention that subcommittee take any action which was not in furtherance of those resolutions. Rau indicated his clear intention to proceed with his proposal.

2. At SC meeting 17 August, Yugoslav delegate made public statement supporting Rau suggestion “in principle”.

3. During Council meeting Jebb showed us telegram from New Delhi reporting that Bajpai had sent Rau a message that Nehru considered this was not most opportune time in which to submit Rau proposal but that GOI did not wish to instruct Rau to refrain from doing so because of lack of knowledge in New Delhi concerning line-up of other delegates at Lake Success.

4. USUN has just learned of subsequent developments as follows:

5. Following SC meeting Jebb talked with Rau and ascertained Rau had received message from Bajpai referred to in paragraph (3) above. Rau nevertheless advised Jebb he intended to proceed to discuss his proposal with other members SC with view to possibly tabling a resolution at SC meeting Tuesday August 22.

6. Chauvel learned from Rau that resolution has been drafted and is in simplest possible form. Substance resolution, which has not yet been made available to USUN, merely provides for establishment of committee composed of six non-permanent members, requests committee to discuss all proposals put forward on Korean question, and instructs committee to report to SC.
Rau explained to Chauvel he wished to omit reference to prior SC resolutions in order to avoid a Soviet veto. Rau said he understood Washington and London had a "reserved point of view" and would probably abstain in a vote. Rau thought Malik might abstain if the resolution were vague enough and avoided reference to earlier SC resolutions.

7. Chauvel believes Tsiang is strongly in opposition and may vote against, thereby raising veto question. In talks with us up to this moment Tsiang has indicated he has not yet received final instructions from his government.

8. Rau has called a meeting of non-permanent members today. USUN will report results thereof as soon as possible. We are following matter very closely and will have further talks with Chauvel and Jebb during course of day.

AUSTIN

230/8-1850 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, August 18, 1950—7 p. m.

PRIORITY

[Received August 18—3:48 p. m.]

419. 1. Bajpai SYG MEA asked to see me urgently this afternoon. He referred to conversation reported in Embtel 415, August 18 and said that GOI had received telegram this morning from Rau asking that he be permitted to explore his plan further; that reception was not entirely negative; that US and UK were merely abstaining; and that certain elements American press including "influential columnist Lippmann" were supporting him. Bajpai after discussing matter with Nehru had sent instructions to Rau along following lines:

(a) No plan for restoration of peace could make progress with [without?] active support great powers. Negative attitude indicated his plan could not succeed.

(b) It was suggested he discuss with great powers alternative plan for setting up "advisory committee" of nations including not only members SC but also those of UN and possibly some outside UN. One difficulty of committee chosen for SC was that India only Asian power. Wider choice would give opportunity to include such countries as Burma, Indonesia, Turkey, etc.

(c) If attitude great powers should not be receptive plan should not be pushed since their cooperation necessary.

(d) Advisory committee could have two-fold task: that of preparing an immediate plan for bringing about cessation of fighting and that of working out plan for future of Korea including ascertainment of desires of Korean people.
2. I said that I assumed that GOI desired Indonesia to be member advisory committee. He replied that in his opinion Indonesia might be extremely useful in work this kind.

3. Baijai asked me what in my opinion was real attitude US re Rau’s original proposals. I stated I had no information other than that which I had given him during our conversation on August 17. I assumed that US had taken attitude of abstention partially because it did not wish to assume position which might indicate lack of confidence in non-permanent members of SC.

4. He asked me what in my opinion US attitude might be towards alternative scheme which he had just outlined. I replied there were too many factors involved for me to hazard an opinion at this distance from Washington. I was inclined believe, however, that my government would not be enthusiastic about any scheme which might permit conversations to take place between representatives of SC and North Koreans while latter were continuing to ignore resolution of SC or which would give North Koreans status of government while they continued to commit aggression in defiance of SC.

5. Baijai said that matters this character were details which would necessarily be decided in Lake Success. In Delhi GOI must limit itself to suggesting framework possible peace plans. He hoped particularly that in conversation with Rau US representatives would say nothing which would give him impression that his government did not have full confidence in him or was going over his head direct to US Government.

Henderson

330/8–1550: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

New York, August 18, 1950—3:36 p. m.
PRIORITY

[Received August 18—3:48 p. m.]

310. Supplementing our 309, August 18, re developments Rau proposal, USUN has now learned Rau circulated to non-permanent members at meeting this morning copy of draft resolution. No commitments were sought other delegations present or given.

Shortly after conclusion of meeting Rau advised other conferees by telephone that he had received new instructions from India which would require him reconsider resolutions. Rau did not reveal nature of instructions and it was not clear whether he would redraft his resolution or hold up action on it or any similar one.
Norwegian delegation requested our views which were outlined to them by Gross basis Deptel 147, August 15.

Austin

330/8-1850: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

New York, August 18, 1950—8:14 p.m.

PRIORITY

[Received August 18—9:40 p.m.]

325. At Rau’s request he called on me this afternoon to discuss his proposal concerning Korean subcommittee. Rau said he had been giving further thought to his proposal and wished to ascertain whether we “had mental reservations” about his proposal since he felt that our attitude should be largely decisive in determination on his part whether to proceed further with his proposal. He commented that since USG was playing major role in Korea and bearing heaviest burden, he had grave doubts whether he should proceed if we felt that a subcommittee of sort he had suggested would hinder rather than help our effort in Korea. I replied that I could not characterize our attitude in terms of “mental reservations” but that I would repeat to him views expressed by Department of which I had told him two days ago as reported in USUN’s 309, August 18. I then outlined Deptel 147, August 15, stressing opening paragraph and summarizing our main points of concern. I attempted to make clear that we were concerned lest his proposal might, because of inadequate terms of reference, be construed as derogating from force of earlier SC resolutions and that we thought it of decisive importance that any procedure should clearly be designed to bring about earliest possible compliance with those resolutions. I also stressed importance we attached to avoiding an unprofitable and diversionary debate in SC concerning subcommittee, which debate would open up opportunity for dilatory tactics and deflect from important matter of obtaining compliance with SC resolutions. Finally I stressed importance attached by Department to adhering to fact that there was no reason in logic or in sound policy why US pending resolution required subcommittee consideration but that, on contrary, it should be put to a vote as soon as Parliamentary situation in SC permitted.

I said I was sure it would assist Department in considering whole matter if I could transmit text of draft resolution which Rau earlier said “had been hammered out” in his meeting with other non-permanent members this morning. However, Rau was clearly un-
willing to give me copy and I did not wish to embarrass him by pressing him for it. Department will recall substance of draft as transmitted earlier today in USUN 309.

With respect to Rau's comments concerning special interest of US in matter, I emphatically denied that we had any greater or smaller interest than any other member of UN in obtaining compliance with SC resolutions. I said that while we appreciated Rau's motive and friendship in requesting our views, we would not wish to assume to ourselves any special role or responsibility in leading him to a decision concerning his future actions. I said that I was sure Department would be interested in reaction of Soviet Union to his proposal and that I hoped Malik would be as forthcoming in expressing his views concerning proposal as we were. In addition, I expressed certainty that Department would also be affected by views of our other colleagues on SC and added that in informal discussions we had derived impression that a substantial number of SC members felt same concerns about his proposal which I expressed to Rau.

Rau then said that shortly after a meeting which he held with other non-permanent members of council earlier today, he had received new instructions from his government. He said that in view of heavy responsibility which would fall upon non-permanent members, particularly India if his subcommittee proposal were adopted, his government felt that it was of great importance to have affirmative support of permanent members of council rather than their mere acquiescence or abstention. He said it was for this reason that he had asked whether we had mental reservations.

I reminded Rau that this introduced a wholly new factor since up to this point he had advised us of his feeling that it would be best for us to abstain on theory that announced support of his proposal by US would compel a Soviet veto. I also reminded him that he had up to this point left us with impression that while our viewpoint was not irrelevant, he would prefer to proceed on basis of his own independent judgment. I attempted to convey foregoing comments in as tactful manner as possible and he readily admitted that a "wholly new factor" had been introduced by his present instructions from his government. I said that I would advise Department of introduction of this new factor.

Rau then adverted to discussion we had held on 11 August, reported in USUN's 265. He referred to mention I had made of possibility of a UN advisory council. Saying that he had understood that I had mentioned this in a tentative manner and that as he recalled I was referring to a council which might be established after cessation of hostilities, he said he wished to explore our views concerning possibility of SC establishing an advisory committee at present time. He envisaged a committee which would include at least two Asiatic powers mention-
ing India and Burma as illustrations. He had no views about other members of committee except that its composition would not be limited to SC members. Although he was somewhat vague about terms of reference, he pictures it as an advisory group which "would have no formal functions" and which would make no recommendation to SC. Apparently it would be a group which would be available for consultation to any members of SC desiring to consult with it and its primary purpose would be to assist in formulation of what Rau described as "war aims". I pressed Rau for an elaboration of his idea, which was clearly amorphous. He mentioned thought that such a committee or group might formulate post-hostilities aims, including a formula for establishment of a UN advisory council, but would not formalize them in any way and would not report to anybody.

I said I would transmit this suggestion to Department but felt I should point out immediately reaction that it would seem preferable to leave to GA task of forming a subcommittee or advisory group. Rau said he had not considered question of GA action on matter but thought that an advisory committee of sort he was now suggesting might in some way be of assistance to SC.

Comment: My impression during whole of our conversation was that Rau had been instructed to go slow pushing his proposal and that he was endeavoring to find an exit through which he could walk gracefully. I do not believe he himself attaches much importance to his advisory committee idea. Inasmuch as our tactics up to this point in not committing a frontal assault upon his subcommittee proposal have preserved his good will and at same time have not led to establishment of a subcommittee, I think that pursuit of same tactics with respect to his new proposal would also be a wise course.

It is not likely that he will obtain much if any support for this new proposal from other members of council, and I doubt that upon further reflection he will adhere to it himself. However, I promised that I would communicate with him Monday\(^1\) morning and give him definitive Department reactions both to his request for our point of view concerning his subcommittee proposal and also concerning his newer advisory committee proposal. It will therefore be important to have instructions Monday mid-morning.

In light of foregoing and in view of fact that Department is now crystallizing its views re Korea in GA and contemplates initiating consultations with British and French on this subject next week, we feel it would be advisable and would help maintain good relations with Rau by among other things helping him get off hook, if we could be authorized to discuss in preliminary form our thinking re Korea in GA.

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\(^1\) August 21.

468-806—76—40
330/8-1950: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

New York, August 19, 1950—6:49 p.m.

[Received August 19—7:05 p.m.]

334. Remytel 325, August 18. Following is text of letter from Rau to me and text of draft resolution enclosed, upon which we hope to have Department’s comments by mid-morning Monday, August 21:

“I enclose herewith the draft of the resolution relating to my recent proposal as settled at a discussion between the non-permanent members of the SC. I shall be glad if you will kindly favour me with the views of your delegate as to whether you will support the resolution or oppose it or abstain from voting if it is presented to the Council. I hope you will be able to let me have the information by Monday, the 21st August 1950”.

Draft resolution:

“The SC hereby appoints a committee consisting of its non-permanent members, namely, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Norway, and Yugoslavia—

“(a) To study

“(1) All proposals that have been or may be presented for the restoration of peace in Korea in accordance with principles of the UN,

“(2) All proposals for the future of Korea after the restoration of peace;

“(b) To submit its recommendations to the Council before——.

“The committee shall determine its own procedure and may at the appropriate stage invite any person, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give it other assistance in examining matters within its competence”.

Austin

735.00/8-2150

Memorandum by the Counselor (Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 21, 1950.

With reference to your memorandum of August 17 about the Rashin bombing, I note that the President feels that we must take “whatever risks were necessary to destroy the points from which supplies were flowing.”
Should you have any further discussions with the President of this matter; it might be useful for you to know that Park Armstrong and I have been unable to get from our military intelligence authorities any confirmation that supplies are flowing to the Korean battlefield in any significant quantities from that area. We have not even been able to learn from them what are the main arteries of supplies for the North Korean forces; and they have not indicated that they have any particular interest, from the standpoint of their own responsibilities, as distinct from requests we may make of them, in the state of transportation facilities along the North Korean border or the use being made of those facilities.

GEORGE F. KENNAN

The Secretary of Defense (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, August 21, 1950.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have Mr. Webb’s letter of August 16 on the bombing of Najin. The bombing of Najin was directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with their military responsibilities for the conduct of war operations. Najin is one of a number of highly important military targets in North Korea, all of which must be rendered incapable, as far as our forces are able, of providing logistic support to North Korean forces, if the success of our Korean operations is not to be seriously jeopardized. Your earlier objection to the attack which had already been made upon Najin was discussed with the President and the attack met with his approval.

Najin, being seventeen miles south of the North Korean frontier, is, of course, well clear of that frontier and its bombing is, accordingly, within the terms of the Presidential directive mentioned by you with respect to keeping bombing operations north of the 38th parallel “well clear” of the frontier. Also, the bombing of Najin is definitely within the terms of that same directive which authorized the extension of air operations “into Northern Korea against air bases, depots, tank farms, troop columns and other such purely military targets, if and when, in your judgment, this becomes essential for the performance of your missions . . . . or to avoid unnecessary casualties to our forces.” In connection with the foregoing, I must make plain, further, that the “well clear” restriction is, in my opinion, intended only to guard against the possibility of frontier violation and not to provide for political determination as to which military objectives within the area of North Korea may or may not be bombed.

The primary target at Najin is a petroleum storage plant. This petroleum storage plant is obviously a military asset to the opera-
tions of North Korean forces and, therefore, important to our own forces as a military target which must, in the interests of successful conduct of our own operations, be attacked until destroyed.

I cannot agree with the implication that the opinions of columnists, to the effect that our actual Nadj objectives are the reduction of Soviet strategic capabilities or their submarine capabilities in the area, can properly be regarded as factual. Further, I cannot agree that the possibility of Soviet conclusion that our purpose is to reduce their strategic capabilities should logically have special weight in the matter. Otherwise, it would follow that our entire Korean campaign is, or may be, so regarded by the Soviets, thus placing in question practically all military features of our Korean operations.

While I share your concern as to the over-all implications of possible eventual Korean developments and, in fact, as to the entire international situation, I am convinced that there must be no weakening exception to our military effort within Korean territory if we are to permit responsible military authorities to perform their required missions and if we are to avoid unnecessary casualties to our own forces, particularly in the light of the precarious situation now existing in Korea.

I firmly believe in the importance of political considerations in politico-military decisions. However, I also believe that the conduct of military operations, once we are committed to such operations, are not subject to question in detail as long as they are conducted within the terms of the over-all decision and as long as our military commanders are held responsible for their successful conclusion.

In short, once war operations are undertaken, it seems to me that they must be conducted to win. To any extent that external appearances are permitted to conflict with or hamper military judgment in actual combat decision, the effectiveness of our forces will be jeopardized and the question of responsibility may well be raised.

I repeat that we interpret the spirit of the expression “well clear” to be that our planes must not violate Soviet or Manchurian frontiers. We are carefully complying with this spirit not only in our planning, but also in our instructions to General MacArthur.1

Sincerely yours,

LOUIS JOHNSON

1 According to a memorandum dated August 28 by the Director of the Executive Secretariat (McWilliams), Under Secretary Webb suggested to Mr. Acheson that no action be taken in regard to this letter, since no good would be served by continuing the correspondence. Mr. Acheson’s staff as a whole felt that the letter showed a lack of understanding of the important issues involved and a lack of willingness to integrate military and political policies. It was agreed that the Department of State should take no action which could be interpreted as interference in the conduct of military operations. (756.00/8-2850)
Memorandum by the Counselor (Kennan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 21, 1950.

I approve generally of the considerations set forth in Mr. Jessup's memorandum of August 17 about our position with respect to an eventual proposal for withdrawal of United Nations forces concurrent with the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the 38th Parallel.

I am not sure that we will have to insist on United Nations supervision of elections "throughout Korea". I think it may be necessary to return to the divided status, leaving South Korea as a sort of U.N. trusteeship, protected by forces of other U.N. nations, under U.N. control.

GEORGE F. KENNAN

Draft Memorandum Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 21, 1950.¹

PROPOSED TERMS FOR A SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN CONFLICT PRIOR TO THE ASSUMPTION OF THE OFFENSIVE BY UN FORCES

The following terms are devised to meet only one particular contingency: an indication from the Soviet side, before the tide of battle has turned, that Moscow and/or Peiping are prepared to negotiate a settlement involving the withdrawal of the North Koreans to the 38 parallel.

1. The invading forces would obey a Security Council order for a cease-fire.

2. An UNCOK, revised to meet its new responsibilities, should forthwith dispatch by air teams to key positions along the 38 parallel to observe the North Korean withdrawal to positions determined by

¹ A covering note, dated August 22, from Philip Watts of the Policy Planning Staff to Assistant Secretary of State Hickerson, indicated that this document was the second draft of a memorandum which had been discussed at a meeting on August 21 involving Messrs. Rusk, Hickerson, Bonbright, and, presumably, Nitze and Davies of the Policy Planning Staff.
UNCOK, to inhibit removal of South Korean persons and property and to report twice daily to UNCOK on the withdrawal.

3. UN Forces, other than ROK, should remain south of the 36 parallel.

4. ROK forces should follow the North Korean withdrawal up to but not beyond 38 parallel. The ROK Government would, of course, return to the capital and resume governing authority over the ROK.

5. When ROK forces take up positions on the 38 parallel, UNCOK teams should proceed into North Korea to prepare the groundwork for forthcoming UN action, set forth below.

6. The North Korean forces should be demobilized and their arms placed under the custody of UNCOK pending the completion of the elections discussed in the following paragraph, at which time UNCOK would turn over the weapons to the new national government. Meanwhile the North Korean civil authorities should be held responsible for the maintenance of law and order.

7. UNCOK should supervise an election in North Korea which would provide for representation from that half of the country in the Government of the Republic. As requested by UNCOK, ROK constabulary units should enter North Korea to assist in conducting the elections and to assume, under the control of UNCOK, responsibility for the maintenance of order.

8. Meanwhile, having no disposition to retain armed forces on Korean soil, the United States would welcome the replacement of its troops south of the 36 parallel by units of other UN member nations which have supported the United Nations resolutions on Korea, particularly Asian members.

9. With the establishment of an all-Korean Government UN forces should promptly be withdrawn, unless the Korean Government requests and the UN agrees that they should be retained.²

²On August 22, Mr. Emmerson sent the following memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State Rusk with regard to this draft memorandum by the Policy Planning Staff:

"John Davies suggests—and I agree—that this be telegraphed to Loy Henderson with the suggestion that it be conveyed in confidence to Bajpai. Having this reach Peling's ears would irritate the Russians, promote the cleavage, and might possibly intrigue the Chinese Communists. What do you think?" (795.00/8-2250)

For Mr. Rusk's reply, see his memorandum dated September 8, p. 708.
Draft Memorandum by Messrs. John M. Allison and John K. Emmerson of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 21, 1950.

U.S. COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine what policies the United States should pursue in order to contribute to the restoration of international peace and security in the Korean area once the aggression has been brought to an end, either by the defeat of the Korean Communists or as the result of an early voluntary withdrawal of the aggressor forces to territory north of the 38th parallel.

ANALYSIS

Military Factors

2. The present military objective of the U.N. Command is to “repel the armed attack” of the Korean Communists and restore international peace and security in the area. The Security Council Resolutions in pursuance of which action is being taken, call for the withdrawal of the aggressor forces beyond the 38th parallel but do not specifically limit military ground operations of the U.N. Command to the area south of the 38th parallel.

3. The strategic importance of Korea to the Soviet Union is of such a high degree that the USSR would probably take extreme measures—excepting possibly those it deemed likely to bring on general war—to prevent the establishment of a regime in North Korea which it did not believe it could ultimately dominate or control.

4. Such Soviet measures might take the form of committing Soviet or Chinese Communist troops to action in Korea or at least occupying Korea north of the 38th parallel by such troops.

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1This memorandum was forwarded on August 22 to Ambassador Jessup with a covering note from Mr. Emmerson indicating that it represented a revised version of the earlier draft paper by Mr. Allison dated August 12 (p. 567), revisions having been made on the basis of comments received from recipients of the earlier draft.

The memorandum was then forwarded without change on August 23 to the NSC for NSC Staff Consideration Only as a Department of State Draft Paper on “U.S. Courses of Action in Korea”. 

5. However, it is believed that when the tide of battle begins to turn, the Soviet Union will not wait for U.N. Forces to reach the 38th Parallel before taking action. Such action may be expected when U.N. forces begin to have military successes and may consist of entry of Soviet forces, entry of Chinese Communist forces, a new effort at U.N. settlement, or a combination of these.

6. The strategic importance of the Korean peninsula to the U.S. is not such as to make desirable the commitment of large U.S. forces there. In fact in case of a global conflict, it would be a serious disadvantage to have U.S. forces so committed. However, a Kremlin-dominated Korean peninsula would be a threat to U.S. security interests in Japan.

*Political Factors*

7. After 45 years of either colonialism or division, the people of Korea have an irrepressible urge for the unification of their country and its recognition as an equal and respected member of the family of nations.

8. The division of Korea at the 38th parallel is an entirely artificial barrier violating the natural integrity of the nation. This division was never meant to be permanent and for five years the U.S. has endeavored to eliminate it by all possible peaceful measures, first through bilateral negotiation with the Soviets and later through initiating action through the United Nations machinery.

9. Since November 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations has by overwhelming majorities passed three Resolutions looking toward achieving the objective of a free, independent and unified Korea. A U.N. Commission on Korea was established and has been and still is charged with seeking Korea’s unification by pacific settlement. In its Resolution of October 21, 1949, the General Assembly reaffirmed its aims in Korea and called upon all member states “to refrain from any acts derogatory to the purposes of the present resolution.” While the General Assembly for three years has sought to unify Korea by peaceful means, it has never formally considered nor explicitly approved the unification of Korea through military means. Neither has the United States taken the specific decision to include the use of military force among the means by which it would seek to bring about the establishment of a unified and independent Korea.

10. The Government of the Republic of Korea has been established in accordance with the Resolutions of the General Assembly, has been declared by the U.N. to be the only lawful government in Korea and has been recognized by 32 nations.

11. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities the Government of the Republic of Korea demonstrated, despite many weaknesses, a growing capacity to govern. In its report of June 26, 1950, UNCOK pointed
out that "there have been distinct signs of improvement in recent months in both economic and political stability of the country." Recent elections for the National Assembly gave significant gains to moderate and non-Government elements thus confusing those critics who had raised the cry of "police state."

12. The leaders of the Republic of Korea have stressed that the aggression from the North provides the opportunity to abolish the 38th parallel and unify all of Korea under United Nations auspices. President Rhee has insisted on the special position of his government and has formally notified the President of the U.S. that the Republic of Korea will not recognize the validity of any decision reached about the future of Korea in the making of which the Republic of Korea has not participated.

13. There is a growing sentiment in the United States favoring a "final" settlement of the Korean problem as opposed to any settlement which smacks of compromise or a "deal", although this sentiment has not taken the explicit form of using United States forces to bring about Korean unification after the North Koreans have been driven back.

14. On the other hand there are significant groups who believe further efforts should be made to find a peaceful solution. Should a peace offer be made or the aggressor retire or be forced back to the 38th parallel there would doubtless be strong efforts made by large sections of the public and the Congress to stop the fighting and return to a peace basis.

15. There is evidence that the UNCOK which is operating in the field will make recommendations of a far-reaching character designed to bring about the unification of Korea under U.N. auspices. (See USUN's 266, Aug. 11. Copy attached.) The U.S. will have to take a stand on these recommendations.

16. Soviet domination of North Korea has brought with it the pattern of police and propaganda control well known throughout the Soviet world. Since the existence and stability of a unified Korea must in the long run depend largely upon the Korean people themselves, the tasks of the United Nations will include the reorientation of the North Korean people toward the outlook of free peoples who accept the standards of international behavior set forth in the United Nations Charter.

17. A quick and crushing North Korean victory over South Korea would have gained for the USSR its long-standing goal of the complete absorption of Korea into its orbit. Furthermore, the building of a "cordon sovietaire" from the Soviet borders of Sinkiang to the southern shores of Korea would have neared completion. Only Japan

2 Ante, p. 564.
and the Philippines at the edge of the orbit, and Southeast Asia to the South, would have still remained outside. The aggression in South Korea, if defeated in pursuance of the Security Council resolutions, may result in the opposite effect—the failure to complete the cordon.

18. In this light, the situation in Korea now provides the United States and the free world with the first opportunity to regain territory from the Soviet bloc. Since a basic policy of the United States is to check and reduce the preponderant power of the USSR in Asia and elsewhere, UN operations in Korea can set the stage for the non-Communist penetration into an area under Soviet control.

19. Penetration of the Soviet orbit, short of all-out war, would disturb the political, economic and military structure which the USSR is organizing between its own Far Eastern territories and the contiguous areas. The bonds of Manchuria, the pivot of this complex outside the USSR, would be weakened, for a free and strong Korea could provide an outlet for Manchuria’s resources and could also provide non-Communist contact with the people there and in North China.

20. The significance in Asia of the unification of Korea under UN auspices would be incalculable. The Japanese would see demonstrated a check on Soviet expansion. Elements in the Chinese Communist regime, and particularly important segments of the Chinese population, might be inclined to question their exclusive dependence on the Kremlin. Skillful manipulation might drive a wedge between the Chinese Communists and the Kremlin. Throughout Asia, those who foresee only inevitable Soviet conquest would take hope.

21. The above reasons, in addition to the strategic importance of Korea to the USSR, make it even more probable that the Soviet Union will exert vigorous efforts to block any settlement resulting in a Korean Government which it cannot control. However, notwithstanding its considerable military strength located in the Far East, the Soviet Union may not yet be ready to risk general war in order to prevent a determined and rapid effort by the U.N. to create a unified Korea. This possibility might be increased if the U.N. should adopt by a large majority a program recommended by UNCOOK or by some other United Nations body and if it could be demonstrated to the Soviet Union that the proposed settlement was truly a U.N. and not a U.S. settlement and that it would not be directed against legitimate Soviet interests.

U.S. Interests and Obligations

22. The U.S. has pledged its support of a unified and independent Korea. Our intentions have been measured in our diplomatic support, military aid, and economic assistance. Our obligation to the United Nations to carry forward Security Council decisions to block a breach
of the peace is fixed. We have a moral obligation as well to support previous General Assembly recommendations on Korea.

23. The broad objectives of the United States were stated in NSC 8/2, approved by the President on 23 March 1949, as follows:

"a. To establish a united, self-governing, and sovereign Korea as soon as possible, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the UN.

"b. To ensure that the government so established shall be fully representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people.

"c. To assist the Korean people in establishing a sound economy and educational system as essential bases of an independent and democratic state. A more immediate objective is the withdrawal of remaining U.S. occupation forces from Korea as early as practicable consistent with the foregoing objectives."

24. The political value for the United States and to the United Nations of showing to the world the determination that aggression shall be repelled, and that the expressed will of the United Nations shall be respected, justifies our current military effort in Korea.

CONCLUSIONS

25. The following principles form the basis for consideration of U.S. actions:

a. Although the United States national interests are involved in the Korean situation, the problem of Korea is primarily a United Nations problem and its final solution must be one which is carried out under the authority of the United Nations and is consistent with the principles of the U.N. Charter.

b. The permanent unification of Korea can only be fairly and correctly resolved with the participation of representatives of the Korean people chosen as the result of free elections throughout Korea on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot held under the authority and observation of the U.N.

c. The Government of the Republic of Korea should continue to be recognized as the only lawful government in Korea and should be consulted with respect to any long-term solution of the Korean problem.

d. The independence and unification of Korea conform with Korean aspirations, United States objectives, and the expressed objectives of the United Nations.

e. The tremendous problems of an economic, social and political nature attendant upon the establishment of a unified Korea are of such a magnitude as to require the assistance of the United Nations. Korea is an Asiatic State and the United States should therefore urge that the Asiatic members of the United Nations should play a prominent role in the assistance that the United Nations can give, and that their views regarding a solution of the problem should be given sympathetic consideration.

f. The establishment of a free and united Korea and the elimination of the North Korean Communist regime, following unprovoked military aggression, would be a step in reversing the dangerous strategic trend in the Far East of the past twelve months.
26. In order to effect the reorientation of the North Korean people, to cause defection of enemy troops in the field, and to train North Korean personnel to participate in activities looking to unification of the country, the following steps should be taken:

   a. Establish the principle that the treatment of POW’s, after their transfer to places of internment, shall be directed toward their exploitation, training and use for psychological warfare purposes, and for the tasks specified above.

   b. Set up immediately on a pilot-plant scale an interrogation, indoctrination and training center for those POW’s now in our hands in Korea. Personnel in charge of this project must be selected with the greatest care, taking into consideration Korean or Far Eastern experience, language qualifications, and temperamental aptitude. Full advantage should be taken of World War II experience in the indoctrination of German and Japanese prisoners of war and of recent experience with Soviet escapes.

27. The following limiting factors on action which should be recommended by the United States must be kept in mind:

   a. The fact that up until the present the Security Council has not expressly authorized the use of force to effect the unification of Korea once the aggression has been repulsed.
   b. The probability that any attempt either by force or through U.N. action to establish a unified and independent Korea would cause the Soviet Union to commit either its own forces or those of Communist China or both with the consequent danger of global war.
   c. The fact that the military strength of the United States now is inadequate to assure the attainment of the objectives fixed by our national interests.
   d. Possible reluctance of other members of the United Nations to agree to action necessary to effect the unification of Korea if it appears it would lead to the outbreak of a general conflict with the USSR or the breaking up of the United Nations.

28. In consonance with the above principles and having in mind the above limiting factors, the United States should take the following steps once the aggression has been brought to an end:

   a. Take vigorous action through diplomatic channels and in the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly to assure and solidify United Nation support of necessary action in Korea.
   b. Be prepared to announce in the United Nations its determination to seek a solution of the Korean problem within the general framework of previous United Nations Resolutions and in a manner consistent with the United Nations Charter and the general aims and principles which the United States believes should underlie such a solution.
   c. When such an announcement is made, the United States should recommend or urge others to recommend, the creation of an appropriate United Nations body which would study and make recommendations to the General Assembly on the future of Korea in accord-
nance with the principles enumerated above. It might be appropriate for the representative of India to act as chairman of such a body.

d. Recommend to the United Nations that, after the successful repulsion of the aggression in Korea and the unification of the country in accordance with recommendations of the above named United Nations body, that body should advise as to the size and character of military forces and of internal security forces needed by the Republic of Korea.

e. The United States should express its view that for as long as the 38th parallel divides Korea, or until a stable, unified, and independent Korea is established, a U.N. military force should be retained in Korea to prevent renewed aggression or internal strife during the natural period of adjustment, and that such force should include substantial contingents from Asiatic countries. The United States would make it clear that its forces would be available to participate in enforcing a U.N. guarantee against unprovoked aggression; but would recommend that its contingents in the U.N. force referred to should be stationed south of the 38th parallel.

f. Recommend that the members of the United Nations, upon the advice of the United Nations body mentioned above give such political and economic aid to the Korean Government as may be necessary after the conclusion of hostilities.

795.00/8–2150

Memorandum by the Counselor (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 21, 1950.

Mr. Dulles recently asked me to give him a formal answer as to whether I approved of his latest draft of the Japanese peace treaty. I have given him certain conditional answers, which avoid the larger question of our attitude toward the Japanese Peace Treaty as part of our whole Far Eastern policy. But his inquiry reminded me that I have never really set forth to you my feelings about Far Eastern policy in general, and has made me feel that perhaps I ought to try to summarize them for you, if only for purpose of clarification, before I leave the Department.

An unsigned manuscript note on the source text indicated that the Secretary of State requested that no distribution be made of this memorandum.

For related documentation, see vol. v, pp. 1109 ff.

Mr. Kennan left the Department of State at the end of August.
I would therefore like to say the following:

1. The course upon which we are today moving is one, as I see it, so little promising and so fraught with danger that I could not honestly urge you to continue to take responsibility for it. These are the main reasons why I feel this way:

a. We have not achieved a clear and realistic and generally accepted view of our objectives in Korea and sectors of our public opinion and of our official establishment are indulging themselves in emotional, moralistic attitudes toward Korea which, unless corrected, can easily carry us toward real conflict with the Russians and inhibit us from making a realistic agreement about that area.

b. By permitting General MacArthur to retain the wide and relatively uncontrolled latitude he has enjoyed in determining our policy in the north Asian and western Pacific areas, we are tolerating a state of affairs in which we do not really have full control over the statements that are being made—and actions taken—in our name.

c. Our policy toward the rival Chinese regimes is one almost sure to run us into serious conflict with other Asian countries and with England and the Commonwealth and to strengthen Peiping-Moscow solidarity rather than weaken it.

d. In Indo-China we are getting ourselves into the position of guaranteeing the French in an undertaking which neither they nor we, nor both of us together, can win.

e. By our intention to leave U.S. forces in Japan with full freedom of movement there, and with their presence sanctioned by the Japanese Peace Treaty, we are undermining our future political relations with the Japanese people and creating a situation which will obscure for them a correct view of their own national interest; in addition to this, we are thereby making an agreement with the Russians over Korea far more difficult than it would otherwise be.

2. In the light of this situation, what course of action would be dictated by considerations of pure national interest, leaving aside for the moment our domestic political inhibitions?

First of all, we should make it an objective of policy to terminate our involvements on the mainland of Asia as rapidly as possible and on the best terms we can get.

With respect to Indo-China, we should let Schuman know at the coming meeting of the Foreign Ministers that the closer view we have had of the problems of this area, in the course of our efforts of the past few months to support the French position there, has convinced us that that position is basically hopeless. Stressing that this has been, and continues to be, their own responsibility, we should say that we will do everything in our power to avoid embarrassing the French in their problems and to support them in any reasonable course they would like to adopt looking to its liquidation; but that we cannot

4 Documentation on the tripartite meeting of Foreign Ministers in New York, September 12-14 and 18-19, is scheduled for publication in volume III.
honestly agree with them that there is any real hope of remaining successful in Indo-China, and we feel that rather than have their weakness demonstrated by a continued costly and unsuccessful effort to assert their will by force of arms, it would be preferable to permit the turbulent political currents of that country to find their own level, unimpeded by foreign troops or pressures, even at the probable cost of an eventual deal between Viet-Nam and Viet-Minh, and the spreading over the whole country of Viet-Minh authority, possibly in a somewhat modified form. We might suggest that the most promising line of withdrawal, from the standpoint of their prestige, would be to make the problem one of some Asian regional responsibility, in which the French exodus could be conveniently obscured.

So far as Korea is concerned, my thoughts are not based on any regret for the basic determination to enter the Korean war, which was unquestionably the correct one; but I think we will be on very dangerous terrain if we fail to recognize the following subtle but wholly valid and vital distinction:

It was not tolerable to us that communist control should be extended to South Korea in the way in which this was attempted on June 24, since the psychological radiations from an acquiescence in this development on our part would have been wholly disruptive of our prestige in Asia;

Nevertheless, it is not essential to us to see an anti-Soviet Korean regime extended to all of Korea for all time; we could even eventually tolerate for a certain period of time a Korea nominally independent but actually amenable to Soviet influence, provided this state of affairs were to be brought about gradually and not too conspicuously, and were accompanied by a stable and secure situation in Japan and a quieting down of the existing tensions and fears in that general area.

My reasons for considering this distinction a valid one are these: It is beyond our capabilities to keep Korea permanently out of the Soviet orbit. The Koreans cannot really maintain their own independence in the face of both Russian and Japanese pressures. From the standpoint of our own interests it is preferable that Japan should dominate Korea than that Russia should do so.* But Japan, at the moment, is too weak to compete. We must hope that with the revival of her normal strength and prestige, Japan will regain her influence there. But the interval will probably be too long to be bridged over successfully by any of the expedients we have employed in the past or now have in contemplation. A period of Russian domination, while

*In his book on "Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War" Tyler Dennett described Roosevelt's policy toward Korea in 1905 as follows: "To Japanese ascendency in the peninsula the American Government has no objections. Japanese control was to be preferred to Korean misgovernment, Chinese interference, or Russian bureaucracy." [Footnote in the source text.]
undesirable, is preferable to continued U.S. involvement in that unhappy area, as long as the means chosen to assert Soviet influence are not, as was the case with those resorted to in June of this year, ones calculated to throw panic and terror into other Asian peoples and thus to achieve for the Kremlin important successes going far beyond the Korean area. But it is important that the nominal independence of Korea be preserved, for it provides a flexible vehicle through which Japanese influence may someday gradually replace Soviet influence without creating undue international repercussions.

As for Japan, we have here the most important single factor in Asia. We cannot, in the long run, continue successfully to keep Japan resistant to Soviet pressures by using our own strength as the main instrument in this effort. The only adequate “main instrument” for this, in the long run, will be enlightened self interest of the Japanese people, as translated into action by a Japanese Government. If we insist on keeping troops in Japan, their presence there will inevitably be a bone of political contention, and the communists will vigorously make capital of it. Precisely because we have forces there, we will not be able to establish a healthy diplomatic relationship to the Japanese, which could develop and enlist their sense of self-interest. Our commander and his position will constantly tend to stand in the way of such a trend of events. This is particularly cogent in its implication because of our seeming inability to keep large bodies of troops abroad without burdening local peoples physically and flaunting before them the visible evidences of a vastly higher standard of material comfort. Furthermore, the marked predilection of the American people for taking the side of any United States garrison commander abroad against the Government (and particularly the State Department) in Washington, will mean that we will not really have effective policy control over him. A military commander in a foreign territory is never a suitable vehicle of political policy. In addition to this, if the commander has a quasi-international status, as is now the plan, he will exploit this as a means of evading policy directives from this Government which do not coincide with his own predilections. Finally, if the Japanese agreement to the presence of such forces is anchored in a treaty of peace, which in turn reflects a duress implicit in military defeat and unconditional surrender, it will never have full legitimacy in Japanese eyes. This element of duress will always rise to plague us in all our future relations to the Japanese, and to divert Japanese attention to the problem of “how to get United States troops out” rather than “how to meet Soviet pressures against Japan.”

In the event of war, I take it we would not try to maintain and supply an armed establishment in Japan anyway, if it were faced, as I think it would be, with active opposition and attack from Soviet
forces on the mainland. I assume, therefore, that the presence of our forces there is not necessary for this contingency.

Our best bet, therefore, at the present time would be to establish real diplomatic contact with the Russians (this means contact along the lines of the Malik-Jessup talks of last year) *aiming at the achievement of something like the following state of affairs: we would consent to the neutralization and demilitarization of Japan (except for strong internal police forces) whereas the Russians would agree to a termination of the Korean war involving withdrawal of the North Korean forces and of our forces and a period of effective United Nations control over Korea for at least a year or two, the U.N. utilizing for this purpose the nationals and forces only of other Asian countries.

Such an arrangement would have to have as its concomitants certain decisions of unilateral United States policy: to wit:

(a) A readiness on our part to get ourselves out of the line of fire on the question of Chinese admission to the United Nations, by a policy of abstention from voting on this subject or of the exertion of pressure on others;

(b) The adoption of a military policy in this country whereby we would maintain in being and in a state of readiness at all times a mixed combat force, commanded and operated as a unit, capable of dealing a sharp blow on a limited front almost anywhere in the world on short notice, along the lines of my recommendations to the Defense Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in 1947 (copy attached); *

(c) A determination on our part to see to it that the Japanese would be adequately equipped to look after their own internal security, even in the face of the worst that their own communists could do; and

(d) An approach to the Formosan question based on a U.N.-conducted plebiscite, again without U.S. participation, and complete subsequent demilitarization of Formosa under whatever regime might be established, the U.N. acting as permanent supervisor.

It should be noted that this does not imply any written agreement with the Russians. In fact, to try to negotiate anything of that sort would probably be disastrous. It implies only a general meeting of the minds, the sanction for which would lie in the readiness of either side to proceed with its part of the arrangement. Thus channels should be left open so that further Russian tactlessness in Korea could be followed by an immediate re-introduction of U.S. forces into Japan. If, on the other hand, we were to re-occupy Japan without provocation, the Russians could consider all bets off with respect to Korea.


Such an arrangement, it should be noted, would involve the resumption of real diplomatic contact with Japan, as well as with the Soviet Union. This means contact not with the present Japanese Government but with the really influential circles which are now lurking in the political background. This cannot be done by General MacArthur or by anyone in his headquarters. It would take a real diplomatic envoy, backed by Presidential authority but instructed to operate quietly, patiently and inconspicuously.

3. So much for national interest in the abstract. There remains the fact that United States public opinion, aroused by the Korean aggression, and confused by the partisan attacks on the administration, is not prepared for this sort of a policy. I realize that an attempt to proceed along these lines would encounter, as things stand today, violent and outraged opposition both within sectors of the Executive branch and in the Congress. In particular, it would mean pouring oil on the fires already kindled by the Republican opposition in the charge that our Far Eastern policy has been over-lenient to Communism and therefore neglectful of our national security. Nevertheless, I think there is a clear problem of responsibility here involved, which begs for clarification. This is not really my competence, and I do not think I should discuss it in this paper. But I would be glad to give you my views orally, before I leave, if they would be of any interest.

GEORGE F. KENNAN

330/8-1950: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 21, 1950—1 p. m.

170. Reurtel 234 August 19 our position continues to be that set forth in Deptel 147 Aug 15 and Rau res text does not in itself suffice to meet points we have raised. As we understand GOI trying to kill Rau proposal, we believe we should do nothing to prop it up.

In discussion with Rau you may present fol views:

Fighting in Korea may be halted through accomplishment objectives SC resolutions June 25 and 27. Leading members UN such as India and US should be giving careful thought to problems arising for UN thereafter.

UN faces long-range problem of great difficulty after fighting ceases. It is incumbent upon these members to consider how the UN can carry out its political, security, and rehabilitation responsibilities.

Accordingly Dept suggests we, Rau, and others give attention to defining those problems, exploring alternative answers, and then considering procedures best adopted to arriving at reasonable and accept-
able UN answers; i.e. that we should make procedure the servant of substance and not vice versa.

Reurtel 325 Aug 18 advisory committee suggested. We will seek to encourage broadest possible debate and action in GA regarding the problem of Korea's future, and accordingly believe that any Committee including reps of countries not on SC might preferably await GA consideration.

ACHESON

310-2/8-2150: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

NEW YORK, August 21, 1950—6:30 p. m.

[Received August 21—7:23 p. m.]

339. At consultation of SC members called by Malik at Lake Success, he opened by stating that the Soviet Union without changing its attitude toward the 25 June resolution felt that it was possible for the SC to agree on the simultaneous seating of the SK and NK authorities. He recalled consultation of August 17 when other delegates had spoken on the timing but not on the substance of the Soviet proposal. Hence, he had called for this informal exchange of views to receive any comments on substance. In the discussion that followed Sunde (Norway) was only member to speak except for one brief comment by Quevedo (Ecuador). After an exchange of about 40 minutes Malik suggested the following communiqué:

"An informal exchange of views of SC members took place on August 21 on the question of hearing in the SC, representatives of NK and SK. No agreement was reached on this question."

To summarize discussion, Sunde opened by recalling last consultation in which USSR maintained its position but asked all the others to concede. He thought it was clear why SC could not ask NK's to sit. During the police action the SC could properly hear only from the victim but during the final stage the question of seating the NK's would be a different one. Malik again spoke of the Soviet position based on the real fact that without both parties the case cannot be settled either now or in the future. He therefore restated his proposal that without further discussion of the 25 June resolution we invite the representative of SK and since both are needed for the peaceful settlement of the case we also make a decision on an invitation to the NK's. He referred to Sunde's comment that only during the pendency of the police action were the NK's not to be asked. There were no precedents in the charter for hearing only the victim and he referred to the practice of the Palestine and Kashmir cases. He stressed that
at all stages both parties are needed and concluded that if Sunde reflected the majority of the Council without prejudice to the rights of the NK’s it seemed to him there was no purpose in continuing the exchange.

Sunde replied that a great number of SC members had debated this and these members had given authoritative interpretation to the 25 June resolution to the effect that a standing invitation has been issued to the representative of SK. Two presidents of the SC have acted on this invitation by stating that they invited the SK representative to the table and not using the phrase “unless there is objection”. Sunde reminded Malik that he was asking the Council to reverse this decision. He felt that on this substantive question nine members of the SC endorsed the action of the two presidents. Malik attempted to draw out Sunde asking for clarification as to whether those nine members while insisting on an invitation to the SK’s would take a decision on seating the NK authorities since, as he put it, “any lack of clear understanding would harm our business.” When the other members remained silent Malik then noted the facts that Sunde did not deem it possible to take a decision on seating the NK’s and therefore the exchange of views was complete. There was then discussion of the communiqué set out above and Sunde added in conclusion that he thought ten members of the SC were agreed on the formal point that the SK representative had been invited to the table.

AUSTIN

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council met on August 22 from 3 to 6:50 p.m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV. 489. No substantive action took place, the entire meeting being devoted to a lengthy statement by the Soviet Representative accusing the United States of aggression in Korea, to which responses were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States. The Council then adjourned until August 25.

795B.00/3–2250 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, August 22, 1950—5 p.m.

89. There is growing tendency among correspondents and others to talk of short-comings Rhee Govt thus falling unconsciously for commie line that ROK is reactionary govt not representative of people which
has done nothing about land reform, locked up polit opposition, etc.

Dept thinks ROK record far better than its reputation. Greater
effort required counteract this growing tendency with factual info
about govt achievements. Handling serious refugee problem wd make
excellent story this regard. Also excellent resistance ROK troops stress-
ing large casualties, training ROK troop replacements, etc. Cld more
be done with ideas ROK is after all legitimate govt confronted by
great handicaps, gradually becoming stabilized, encouraging public
education, responsive popular will evidenced by two elections in which
people expressed free will, as results show? How about more effort
publicize national assembly as representative, responsive body?

Suggest giving background briefing Amer fon correspondents such
achievement, use every opportunity stress ROK activities. Dept real-
izes correspondents mostly interested actual war coverage but more
serious ones shld be willing note polit factors too.

ACHESON

795.00/8-2359

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United
Nations Affairs (Sandifer) to the Director of the Office of North-
east Asian Affairs (Allison)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 23, 1950.

Subject: Revised Draft Paper on “U.S. Courses of Action in Korea”

The comments which follow relate to the revised draft, dated
August 21, of the paper on “U.S. Courses of Action in Korea”.

We appreciate the extent to which the Comments contained in my
memorandum of August 13 have been taken into account in the
preparation of the revised draft. However, there are a couple of points
to which we attach very great importance which are not satisfactorily
covered by the revised draft.

1. Paragraph 23.—In the introductory sentence to Paragraph 28
(which was previously 26), we note that the following phrase has been
added: “once the aggression has been brought to an end”. We are
certain to be confronted with the necessity of developing our position
and stating it publicly on the question of the future of Korea before
the aggression has been brought to an end. It is quite clear from recent
developments in the Security Council that there will be continued
pressure for the development by the Security Council and even by
the General Assembly of a program for the future settlement in Korea.
It is essential that we be in a position to influence the development
of plans for the future of Korea. For this reason it would be fatal to
limit the statement of policy here by including the time element of

1 Not printed.
having it done after the aggression has been brought to an end. We cannot delay longer than the consideration of the Korean question in the General Assembly a public announcement of our general policy with respect to the future of Korea. Accordingly, we urge most strongly that this phrase be dropped. Otherwise the value of the paper is to a very considerable extent nullified.

2. Paragraph 28 (d).—The recommendation in the earlier paragraph that Korea be demilitarized has been eliminated and it is now provided that the United Nations body referred to shall “advise as to the size and character of military forces and of internal security forces needed by the Republic of Korea.” We consider that an important element of the Korean settlement is the demilitarization of Korea. It is only on the basis of a mutual agreement between the contending parties to eliminate Korea as a source of military contention that there is any hope of obtaining a settlement which will establish peace and security in the area. This might possibly bring about Russian acquiescence in a settlement resulting in the unification of Korea. It seems to us that we should not envisage a settlement which would involve maintenance by the United States of strong military forces in Korea on a continuing basis. Demilitarization of course means that Korea must be assured of adequate protection by the United Nations.

In addition the following minor changes are suggested:

1. Paragraph 8.—“... and later by initiating action through the United Nations machinery.”

2. Paragraph 11.—“... thus confusing those critics who had raised the cry of ‘police state.’” Alternatively this clause might be omitted entirely.

3. Paragraph 13.—“... although this sentiment has not taken the explicit form of advocating use of United States forces...” etc.

4. As paragraph 25 (a) now contains a reference to “the problem of Korea”, paragraph 25 (b) may now begin simply, “The problem can only be fairly and correctly resolved” etc., instead of with the present awkward and somewhat misleading formula.

DURWARD V. SANDIFER

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON], August 23, 1950.


Problem:

In the event a “North Korean” submarine makes an overt attack upon a UN vessel the Navy proposes that a declaration immediately be issued by the Commanding General of the Unified Forces to the
effect that all submarines passing through the area outlined in blue on the attached map would be subject to immediate attack by UN forces unless proceeding on the surface under escort.

Discussion:

At present, instructions to the UN Naval Forces provide that they may attack unidentified, submerged submarines only if they remain in position to attack a UN vessel. Recently the US Commander, Naval Forces, Far East, and the British proposed the establishment of a "belligerent area" in the waters around Korea into which "neutral" warships would be warned not to enter. Neither the Department nor the Navy Department concurred in this proposal as it was considered to be an unjustified interference with the rights of neutral vessels on the high seas and as not having any legal effect beyond the exercise of the right of self-defense already contained in the orders under which the Navy was operating.

It must be recognized that the present lines of Naval communication with Korea are very vulnerable to submarine attack and if such an attack were made by "North Korean" submarines it would be important that the UN Naval Forces be able to take prompt countermeasures and not wait until a submarine came into position to deliver an attack as required by present instructions. However, the proposed area is so broad that unless the Soviets chose to comply with the conditions established for the passage of submarines through the area they would have no means of moving submarines from such places as Dairen and Vladivostok except by keeping within Chinese or Russian territorial waters for long distances.

Therefore, it is suggested that we propose to the Navy that:

(a) The area be reduced approximately to the limits shown in red on the attached map. This area would include only the waters immediately adjacent to Korea and the supporting supply lines for the UN Forces. It will give the USSR access to Dairen and Vladivostok without the necessity of their complying with the required procedures.

(b) To avoid incidents involving UN Forces and to protect UN Forces, full and ample notification be made to all Governments prior to initiating attacks on submarines in the area. The proclamation of the area should be by the Commanding General of the UN Forces at least 48 hours prior to initiating attacks in the area and should be immediately communicated through the UN to all Governments. During this 48-hour period the self-defense measures now in effect would operate.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that you approve the communication to the Navy of the foregoing counter-proposal.

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1 Not printed.
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 23, 1950.

Subject: Declaration Concerning Action Against Submarines in Event of "North Korean" Submarine Attack.

In accordance with your instructions, I called on Capt. Orem at the Navy this afternoon to discuss the above subject. I informed him that the Department was entirely sympathetic to the Navy’s problem and was confident that a mutually satisfactory solution could be reached. I also informed Capt. Orem that it was the view of the Secretary of State that, regardless of the forum in which the final decision was reached, the President should be informed thereof. Specifically, I informed him that it was the view of the Department that:

1. The proposed area should be limited to the maximum possible degree to the waters immediately adjacent to Korea and the shipping lanes between Japan and Korea so as to permit USSR vessels reasonable freedom of movement from Dairen and Vladivostok if they did not choose to submit to the required procedures.
2. Full notification of the action should be made by all means available, including formal notification to all governments through the UN.
3. Not less than 48 hours should elapse between the public declaration and the initiation of the proposed attacks, during which period the present self-defense measures would operate.
4. Consideration be given to making the declaration at this time rather than awaiting an overt attack.

Capt. Orem was personally receptive to a further limitation of the area and we discussed various alternatives without reaching any final decision.

He indicated the Navy concurred on the proposals relating to notification including the 48 hours period of warning.

Capt. Orem was inclined to the belief that initiation and announcement of this action prior to an overt attack was not necessary or desirable, it being his personal view that an attack was more likely to be made by Chinese Communist forces against our vessels operating off Formosa, and that it would be desirable not to have any more differentiation than essential between the action permitted our forces operating in the Formosa area and that in the Korea area.

It was agreed no further action by the Department was necessary at this time, and that the Navy would again initiate action taking into consideration our views on the return of Admiral Sherman to Washington.

1 Capt. Howard E. Orem, Director, International Affairs, Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations.
Draft Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State for National Security Council Staff Consideration Only

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 23, 1950.

FUTURE U.S. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO KOREA

THE PROBLEM

1. To report upon the policy that the United States should pursue after the Korean communist forces have been driven back to the 38th parallel.

ANALYSIS

2. As U.N. forces drive back North Korean forces and approach the 38th parallel, the decisions and actions taken by the United States and other U.N. members which are supporting the Security Council Resolutions, and those taken by the Kremlin, will determine whether hostilities can be confined to Korea or will spread so that the danger of a third world war is greatly increased.

3. In its Resolution of June 25, 1950, the United Nations Security Council (a) noted “with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea”; (b) determined “that this action constitutes a breach of the peace”; (c) called for “the immediate cessation of hostilities”; (d) called upon the authorities of North Korea “to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel”; and (e) called upon “all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.”

4. In its Resolution of June 27, 1950, the Security Council (a) noted “from the report of the United Nations Commission for Korea that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security”; (b) noted “the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security”; and (c) recommended “that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area”.

5. In a third Resolution of July 7, the Security Council requested the United States to designate a Commander for all the forces of the members of the United Nations in the Korean operation, and authorized these forces to fly the U.N. flag. In response to this Resolution,
General MacArthur was designated as Commander of these forces. The Republic of Korea also has placed its forces under General MacArthur's command.

6. In his message to the Congress of July 19, President Truman stated that he thought it important that the nature of our military action in Korea be understood; that it should be made perfectly clear that the action was undertaken as a matter of basic moral principle; that the United States was going to the aid of a nation established and supported by the United Nations and unjustifiably attacked by an aggressor force.

7. The present military action in Korea responds to the Security Council resolutions which come within the scope of provisions of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter dealing with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.

8. The General Assembly Resolutions of November 14, 1947, December 12, 1948, and October 21, 1949 are a part of the U.N. effort which is strongly supported by the United States, to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea.

9. There are, therefore, two phases of the Korean problem: (a) the long-term effort to bring about unity and independence, and (b) the present enforcement action to repel North Korean aggression. This paper is addressed primarily to the latter phase of the problem, for the reasons set forth in the following paragraph.

10. The following contingencies are envisaged as the U.N. enforcement action develops, provided North Korean forces are not reinforced by U.S.S.R. or Communist Chinese troops; (a) voluntary withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel before UN forces have begun a counter-offensive; (b) a withdrawal in good order of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel at a time when they are being driven northward to a point approaching the 38th parallel; (c) a major defeat and disintegration of North Korean forces during the period when they are being driven back toward the 38th parallel; (d) continued resistance by North Korean forces after UN forces have reached the 38th parallel. Another contingency is the occupation of North Korea to the 38th parallel by Soviet or Communist Chinese forces before the UN forces reach the 38th parallel, or active support of the North Korean forces south of the 38th parallel by Chinese Communist or Soviet forces.

11. A need for important decisions will arise with a reversal of the military situation in Korea and the approach of UN forces toward the 38th parallel. It is probable that at the time when it becomes apparent that the North Korean aggression cannot succeed and that eventually North Korean forces will be driven back north of the 38th parallel the Kremlin will take a decision (if it has not already done so) regarding a course of action in the new situation.
12. There is ample evidence of the strategic importance to Russia of the Korean peninsula. It is unlikely that the Kremlin at present would accept the establishment in North Korea of a regime which it could not dominate and control.

When it becomes apparent that the North Korean aggression will be defeated, there might be some agreement between the USSR and the North Korean regime which would mean in substance that UN military action north of the 38th parallel would result in conflict with the USSR or Communist China.

While fighting is in progress south of the 38th parallel the Kremlin might bring about the occupation of North Korea either with its own or with Chinese communist forces.

The Kremlin might initiate some move toward a negotiated settlement while hostilities still are in progress south of the 38th parallel. We should guard against terms that would leave the aggressor in an advantageous position, that would invite a repetition of aggression, and that would undermine the authority and strength of the United Nations.

13. If North Korean forces withdraw or are driven back to the 38th parallel, continued military action by the U.S. forces for the purpose of imposing a settlement with a view to a unified and independent Korea would depend upon majority support in the United Nations. Account would have to be taken of possible reluctance regarding the multilateral use of force as part of the U.S. effort to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea.

14. It will be desirable to bear in mind both the eventual advisability of securing, through intensive diplomatic preparation, support on the part of the majority of United Nations Members for any action that might be taken beyond the 38th parallel, and the possible advantages of assuming a position which will clearly show that every effort has been exhausted to avoid carrying the military struggle into a new phase by a land offensive beyond the 38th parallel.

15. The future of the Korean people is an important consideration. The United States has supported the UN effort to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea. However, the United States has not had and does not now have any commitment to use military force to bring about that independence and unity.

Having been the victim of armed attack from North Korea, the Republic of Korea naturally will want a settlement that gives a maximum guarantee against the danger of similar future attacks. The Korean people and Government already are insisting that the 38th
parallel division must go and that the present opportunity to unify the country must be seized.

16. Likewise, present public and Congressional opinion in the United States would be dissatisfied with any conclusion falling short of what it would consider a "final" settlement of the problem. A sentiment favoring a continuation of military action north of the 38th parallel already is arising. On the other hand, there may well develop a contrasting sentiment against using U.S. military forces to help establish an independent Korea.

17. The advantages of an effort involving the use of military force to attain the complete independence and unity of Korea after the North Korean forces have been driven back to the 38th parallel must be weighed against the disadvantages of such a course. If the North Korean forces are decisively defeated and if North Korea suffer heavy material damage from air attack, those forces are not likely to attack again soon. The United States and other UN members should be in a much stronger position to take effective action as present efforts have time to take effect. It seems likely, also, that a satisfactory permanent solution of the Korean problem can be hoped for only when and if a substantial accommodation is reached between the USSR and the non-communist world.

CONCLUSIONS

18. It is U.S. policy to help bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea. That policy has a sound basis of right and principle. U.S. action to carry out the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council regarding North Korean aggression are in accord with our policy of strong support of the United Nations; but we have no commitment to use armed force in the effort to bring about Korean independence and unity.

19. The Korean problem must be dealt with in the wider framework of the conflict between the communist and non-communist countries. The necessity to maintain a realistic balance between our military strength on the one hand and commitments and risks on the other hand, together with the need for additional information which depends upon political and military developments in the near future, make it impossible to take decisions now regarding our future course of action in Korea. It seems clear that our national security and interest will be best served at present by maintaining the greatest possible degree of flexibility and freedom of action.
RECOMMENDATIONS

20. The present vigorous U.S. action in support of the United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding North Korean aggression should be continued.

21. Decisions regarding the course of action when the United Nations forces approach the 38th parallel should be deferred until military and political developments provide the additional information necessary to enable us: (a) to base our decisions on the situation in Korea and in other parts of the world at that time; (b) to consult with other United Nations members; and (c) to keep our military capabilities and commitments in safe balance.

22. Measures which might be necessary or desirable once the aggression has been brought to an end, either by defeat of the Korean Communist aggressors or as the result of a possible Soviet suggestion for an early voluntary withdrawal by the Korean Communists, should be the subject of immediate study and early report by the Department of State in cooperation with the Department of Defense.

330/8-2350: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PRIORITY

New York, August 23, 1950—6:06 p.m.
[Received August 23—7:38 p.m.]

358. Gross and Ross called on Rau this noon at latter’s request. Rau said he wanted to inform us that according to Malik Soviet Government attitude toward Rau’s proposal of committee of non-permanent members was “unfavorable”. Malik told Rau that while Soviet Government appreciated motives of Rau in putting his proposal forward, it considered it would be better to leave in SC matters Rau proposed to deal with in subcommittee.

Rau said it was not clear to him whether Malik would veto or merely abstain on resolution establishing subcommittee, if tabled.

Rau said he interpreted Soviet reaction as indicating Russians are really not sincere in their desire for peaceful settlement of Korean matter, but have returned to SC merely to take advantage of it as sounding board.

Rau said that under his present instructions, he of course, would not push forward with his proposal unless US and UK supported it. In other words, he said in effect that he would not wish to push for it
unless US and UK had "faith in us". He assumed we shared Indian objective of bringing conflict in Korea to an end as soon as possible "consistent with obligations of charter".

Rau said that he did not want to be Machiavellian, but it appeared to him that Russian unfavorable reaction to his proposal might provide us an opportunity (by supporting his proposal) to strengthen our propaganda position.

Gross, after thanking Rau for conveying information to us, said that we would not, of course, hide behind the Russian position regarding Rau’s proposal. He said he would transmit information to Department, which had always been interested in views of other SC members re Rau proposal.

Referring to earlier conversation (USUN 325, August 18) concerning possibility establishing a UN advisory council, Gross asked if Rau had received any further clarification from GOI. Gross indicated our tentative reaction that GA would probably be considering problem of future of Korea and that GA itself might wish to consider establishing an advisory council.

Rau had not yet received any further clarification from his Government.

Gross indicated our primary concern that any consideration of war aims or peace aims should be based upon prior compliance with SC resolutions. Rau re-emphasized GOI absolutely firm on compliance. Rau referred to phrase in paragraph (a) (1) of his draft resolution (USUN’s 334, August 19) reading “in accordance with the principles of the UN”, indicating his belief that this formula protected SC resolutions on book. He referred to difficulty in drafting formula acceptable to Egyptian and Yugoslav delegations.

Comment: Information regarding Soviet position makes it even more important in our view to maintain non-committal position. We have now made clear to Rau Department views expressed Deptel 170, August 21. I have stressed to Rau importance we attach to maintaining close and frank consultation with Indian delegation here, particularly in the days ahead. It does not seem to us wise to give Rau opportunity, for which he may indeed be angling, to say that in effect US had made his decision for him regarding his subcommittee proposal. Accordingly, recommend we be authorized maintain line set forth Deptel 170, citing to Rau as additional factor that in view Soviet unfavorable reaction it is not likely his subcommittee would be effective instrument to expedite compliance SC decisions.

New subject: Rau told Gross he had received message from Nehru in which latter stated that because of domestic problems he was facing in India he did not think it would be possible for him to attend GA.

AUSTIN
Memorandum by Mr. Max W. Bishop to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)\(^1\)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 24, 1950.
Subject: State Department Drafts on Korea Policy and the 38th Parallel.\(^2\)

Jimmy Lay said this morning that he was somewhat surprised at the last State Department's drafts on the above subjects. He pointed out that the President had asked for policy recommendations on what we do when we reach the 38th Parallel. Jimmy said that he could hardly understand how, in the light of the President's specific request, we could reply to the President merely stating that we have no policy recommendations at this time.

I told Jimmy that these were working drafts and that they would, of course, be changed in the process of staff consideration. I pointed out that the response to the President's request might have to be negative but that nevertheless if that were the case, the reasons would be clearly set forth in the paper in the final draft which would be entirely responsive to the original request. I said that I hoped that the Staff Assistants could have a free exchange of substantive ideas this morning and that on the basis of that exchange, the Department of State would attempt to consolidate all of the agreed ideas into one or two drafts.

I hope to prepare for you today an analysis of the many papers on the Korean matter and some suggestions as to how we can best get forward.

M. W. B[ishop]

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\(^{1}\) Mr. Bishop, a member of Ambassador Jessup's staff, was the Department of State Representative on the NSC Staff Assistants, while Mr. Jessup was the Department's Representative on the NSC Senior Staff.

\(^{2}\) See the draft memorandum by Messrs. Allison and Emmerson on "U.S. Courses of Action in Korea", dated August 21, p. 617, and the Department of State draft memorandum on "Future U.S. Policy With Respect to Korea", dated August 23, p. 633.

Memorandum by Mr. Walter P. McConaughy to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)\(^1\)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 24, 1950.
Subject: NSC Staff Assistant's Meeting of August 24 on State and Defense Drafts on Korea Policy and the 38th Parallel.

The Armed Services representatives were strongly of the view that the two State Department drafts on long-term and short-term policies

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\(^{1}\) Mr. McConaughy was a member of Ambassador Jessup's staff.
in Korea should be combined into one. They felt that the matter of military action when the 38th Parallel is reached is so closely interwoven with future U.S. policy in Korea that the two cannot logically be separated. It was suggested that one paper be drafted to cover the entire subject with separate conclusions and recommendations for the immediate military question and the long range policy issue. Mr. Butler of S/P saw no objection to this.

The representatives of the other Departments apparently had no objection to the State Department's short-term draft except that it was inconclusive and recommended a postponement of the urgent decision as to whether 38° should be crossed. They felt that the State and Defense drafts could readily be reconciled if the State Department were willing to participate in making the essential decision now.

The Armed Services representatives pointed out that postponement would delay the military build-up which would be necessary in case of an affirmative decision. They stressed that it would take a long time to prepare for airborne or amphibious operations north of 38°, and that if there was any likelihood that such operations might be called for, an immediate decision was needed.

Mr. Butler felt that it should be decided whether planning should be based on a narrow interpretation of the UN Resolution on Korea (not specifically authorizing ground operations north of 38°), or a broad interpretation of the resolution, under which any military action required to “restore peace and security in the area” could be taken.

The consensus seemed to be that ground operations north of 38° subsequent to the withdrawal of North Korean forces from South Korea would probably lead to the direct involvement of the Soviet Union and Communist China, or both, in hostilities, which might well become generalized.

The question was raised as to whether there might not be some intermediate line north of 38°, but short of the Manchurian and Siberian borders, to which the UN forces might push without grave danger of provoking the Soviet Union to open hostilities. It was generally conceded that the occupation of North Korean points within easy striking distance of Vladivostok and other strategic centers would be more provocative than a limited occupation which stopped short of such points.

It was agreed to request the Senior Staff to pass on the following

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2 Reference is to the draft memorandum of August 23, p. 635.
3 The Department of Defense draft memoranda are dated July 31 and August 7, pp. 502 and 528.
question taken from paragraph 28, subsection B, "Military Objectives" of the Defense draft:

1. "Should the unified command seek to occupy Korea and to defeat North Korean armed forces wherever located north or south of the 38th parallel?"

2. "Should the unified command be instructed to pursue military operations in Korea without regard to the 38th parallel?"

WALTER P. McCONAUGHEY

357.AD/8–2450: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

New York, August 24, 1950—1 p. m. [Received August 24—1:17 p. m.]

357. Re tentative statement of UNCOK views on political settlement in Korea, our 266 of August 11, and Department's view in its 168 of August 19 ¹ that we reserve comment in order to get wholly independent expression from Commission.

Preliminary US–UK conversations reported in our 342 of August 21 ² indicate French desire that no such far reaching conclusions be put forward now, and we understand this view is shared by UK. In light of this fact and considering that France is a member of UNCOK, our recommendation is that we indicate to SYG concurrence with view that conclusions should not be formulated now. This would be without prejudice to UNCOK presenting these conclusions or others during course of GA, perhaps as supplement to report, or perhaps in response to GA request as suggested by Chauvel.

We agree with SYG that situation is fluid and that it is undesirable to freeze any plan by reducing it officially to writing, as Cordier's letter suggests (our 269, August 12 ³). Suggested position would give us free hand to consider these tentative suggestions in light of Indian Advisory Council idea. This would also have some advantage for India as member of UNCOK. Since UNCOK is an instructed commission we feel it difficult to play a more complete hands off role than suggested above.

AUSTIN

¹ See footnote 2 to telegram 266 from New York, August 11, p. 565.
² Not printed.
³ See footnote 1 to telegram 266 from New York, August 11, p. 564.
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

New Delhi, August 24, 1950—7 p.m.

[Received August 24—7:15 p.m.]

461. 1. At request Bajpai I saw him morning August 24. Referring to our conversation August 18 (Embtel 419, August 18) he said several telegrams had been received from Rau asking that he be permitted present resolution to SC calling for establishing committee to endeavor bring about cessation fighting Korea and to work out plan for future that country. In one telegram Rau had stated that sentiment among members SC as well as of American public appeared favorable. Probably Russia and US would abstain. Such abstention would have advantages because if either these powers should support resolution, other might become suspicious and oppose it. Rau failed indicate attitude UK. GOI, however, had been firm in insisting that no resolution be presented unless it could be ascertained in advance that all great powers would be favorable.

2. Bajpai asked if I had any information as to what US attitude toward plan was. When I replied in negative he said he did not wish complain, but it seemed to him US could be little more helpful in letting India know how it felt. Neither Madame Pandit nor Rau seemed know how US regarded proposed resolution and apparently American Ambassador Delhi also was uninformed. GOI was conscientiously trying find formula which might lead termination conflict or at least prevent spread hostilities. It could not carry burden alone. It did not expect too much from Soviet Union which was noted for its reticence, but it had hoped for certain degree cooperation from US. Rau had reported US delegation had been somewhat concerned lest attempt be made include Peiping in committee in case resolution should provide for members not belonging to UN. Rau had therefore been instructed abandon idea of including in committee nations not in UN.

3. I said I was confident only reason my Government had not made its views known was that it was not sufficiently acquainted with purpose committee to have any fixed views. I knew my Government desired keep even closer in touch with GOI in future than in past. It was difficult, however, for it to state its views re proposals which had not been clearly formulated.

4. Bajpai said Rau had inquired for more details re purposes committee and GOI had replied that purposes could be more clearly defined after it had become clear that great powers in principle were not disagreeable to setting up such committee. I again emphasized it must
be difficult for my Government to indicate that it agreed in principle to setting up committee purposes of which were not clear to it. Undoubtedly informal talks, even if not reported were taking place between our delegation and his. My Government probably had not given me instructions to discuss matter here because conversations on matter like this at two places might lead to confusion.

5. Bajpai said he also hoped there could be closer consultation between our two Governments. Present situation was not wholly satisfactory. He and I were able to have certain amount useful talks, but GOI knew little about conversations which might have taken place between Rau and members US delegation and Madame Pandit seemed rarely to have conversations of any importance. In fact maintenance Madame Pandit in Washington seemed almost to be waste Government funds.

HENDERSON

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350/3—2450 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW YORK, August 24, 1950—8:47 p.m.  
[Received August 24—9:16 p.m.]

363. At meeting with Gross requested by Jebb this p.m. Jebb asked for our ideas re first SC meeting to be held under his presidency in September.

Jebb agreed with Gross re desirability hold meeting September 1. Following tentative thoughts concerning procedure at meeting outlined by Gross as follows: (Department’s reactions would be appreciated.)

1. Upon adoption agenda Jebb would forthwith invite ROK representative to come to SC table. Malik, if present, might either object on point of order or table motion for reconsideration of June 25 invitation. If Malik chooses first course Jebb will rule against Malik’s point of order and upon Malik’s challenge would poll SC. If Malik argues his vote to overrule Jebb’s ruling has effect of a “veto” of ruling, Jebb will state his disagreement with Malik on ground that a ruling by President is inherently a procedural matter. Jebb will then proceed to next order of business. If on other hand Malik tables a motion for reconsideration, Jebb will put this to a vote after permitting ROK representative (who will be sitting at table) to make a statement opposing motion for reconsideration.

2. In lieu of customary presidential encomium of his predecessor Jebb will make a few well chosen remarks in opposite sense. Gross suggested Jebb might wish to make a statement to effect that he wished
record of President for August had permitted him to say nice things, but that he is sure he speaks for SC when he says that record for August bears eloquent testimony gross abuses Presidential powers during month of August. Jebb might then read a prepared bill of particulars from August record showing Malik's misbehavior. Jebb said he would consider latter suggestion.

3. Jebb would then state that regular order is pending US motion tabled 31 July and call upon ROK representative first speaker. SC would thereafter proceed to vote upon US resolution, as rapidly as possible, consistent with right of SC members to speak to motion.

AUSTIN

785.00/8-2550

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. James W. Barco, Special Assistant to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)


Subject: United States Courses of Action in Korea

Participants: G—Mr. Matthews          UNA—Mr. Hickerson
FE—Mr. Rusk                        Mr. Sandifer
Mr. Merchant                       S/P—Mr. Butler
Mr. Emmerson                       S/A—Mr. Jessup

At a meeting this morning to consider the Department’s position on courses of action in Korea for guidance in NSC discussions the following questions were considered and recommendations agreed upon:

1. **Limitation on Military Action**—The question was raised whether any restrictions should be placed on the unified command on ground operations north of the 38th parallel.

It was agreed that under present directives General MacArthur has authority to make operational amphibious landings behind the North Korean lines, north of the 38th parallel. It was also agreed that if there was any doubt of this authority we would have no objection to such landings being made, our concern being that the UN forces should keep well clear of the Russian frontier. In this connection, it was recalled that the Defense Department has not regarded bombings within seventeen miles of the Russian frontier as being too close. On the East Coast it was agreed that UN forces might occupy the neck reaching into the mountain area up to the 39th parallel if it were strategically desirable in order to insure operational control of the area but that ground operations should not go beyond the neck into the mountain area at the 39th parallel.
2. Should operational plans, including amphibious landings north of the 38th parallel, be executed if Chinese Communists or Soviet forces have entered the war. A paper approved as a working paper for NSC 73 takes the position that if Chinese Communist forces have entered the fighting we continue our operations as if we were still fighting North Koreans and it was agreed that under these circumstances amphibious landings north of the 38th parallel in the eastern neck could be undertaken. The Joint Chiefs have taken the position in NSC 76 that if major Soviet units are engaged the US should minimize its commitments and execute war plans. To go beyond the 38th parallel would be to maximize our commitments, and it was agreed that we would approve the JCS position.

3. If UN forces are successful in pushing North Korean troops back to the 38th parallel should UN forces stop at that point. It was agreed that in the absence of Chinese Communist or Soviet participation we should not stop. It was recognized that it might be desirable for South Korean troops to pursue North Korean troops beyond the 38th parallel but that American unit participation should be minimized. In other words it would be politically desirable, if militarily feasible, for the South Korean forces to follow-up, and it was agreed that this might be indicated to General MacArthur, but that a blood bath by South Koreans against North Koreans should be guarded against. It was agreed that our desire should be to put brakes on full military occupation of North Korea by US troops without putting any limitation on the total destruction of North Korean troops. It was also agreed that it would be desirable to begin consultation at an appropriate time with countries contributing forces to the UN Army to insure that they would continue under General MacArthur's orders if and when UN forces have reached the 38th parallel, and that this became practical as other countries began active participation. The British should be the first to be consulted. It was also agreed that, while not an NSC matter, consideration of a deputy for General MacArthur should be taken up with the Defense Department.

4. If Russian troops are observed to be Moving into North Korea could UN forces bomb them north of the 38th parallel? It was agreed that in the absence of an announcement by Russia of its intentions of moving into North Korea we would bomb Russian troops as if they were North Korean troops. If the Soviet Union announces its intention to re-occupy North Korea we should take the case immediately to the Security Council as a matter for all of the Security Council to consider. It was agreed that we could not make a war issue with Russia out of their announced intention to re-occupy North Korea, but that
we should continue to destroy North Korean troops south of the 38th parallel and demand assurances that they would be disarmed north of the 38th parallel. Our course of action would be based on the assumption that Russia would undertake to withdraw North Korean forces to the 38th parallel and that Russia could not, by its action, place an umbrella over the supply lines to North Koreans fighting south of the 38th parallel.

5. What should our course of action be for the ultimate solution of the Korean problem?

(a) The first draft of the NSC paper on Korea has taken the position that questions of ultimate solution should not be decided until the military situation has cleared up. The British and French apparently adopt this view. It was agreed that we should announce at an appropriate time that we have no unilateral desire to occupy Korea but that we will contribute as far as we are able what the UN feels necessary. We have no desire for permanent military occupation and are willing to withdraw but will not weaken in our support of UN measures. We should also announce that being willing to contribute our fair share, we would be happy to see US forces replaced by the troops of other countries.

(b) Should we favor demilitarization and neutralization of a united Korea? It was agreed that we should favor neutralization but that demilitarization presented certain dangers, the principal danger being that we would in effect be in the position of guaranteeing demilitarization without having indigenous forces to assist in action against aggression. It was agreed that we should favor neutralization of a united Korea with political undertakings by the Koreans and others not to engage in aggression, with Korea being free to have the necessary forces to protect its territory. It was suggested that a UN resolution in this sense might be adopted with provision for Korea and its neighbors, plus the United States and the United Kingdom as signatories.

6. Further steps to be taken for liquidation of the war. It was agreed that while leaving open the question of our war aims we should announce what we wish ultimately to accomplish. This would include provision for UNCOK to have free access to North Korea for supervising the demobilization of the North Koreans and the supervision of elections. Paragraph 28 of the NSC working paper on Korea should be amended to strike out the phrase “once aggression is brought to an end”. It was agreed that we should not defer the announcement of our program for Korea.

1 See the memorandum dated August 21, by Messrs. Allison and Emmerson, p. 617, and footnote 1 thereto.
Memorandum by Mr. Walter P. McConaughy, of the Staff of the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

TOP SECRET


ROUGH NOTES ON NSC SENIOR STAFF MEETING ON KOREA,
AUGUST 25, 1950

Mr. Jessup observed that as to the operational problem there were two aspects, namely, operations behind the lines, presumably amphibious or airborne; and straight ground operations involving occupation. There were many different contingents which would have to be considered under each heading.

Mr. Jessup inquired whether any limitation should be placed on the freedom of the UN Commander to carry on ground operations north of 38 degrees.

Mr. Finletter felt that the group should adopt tentatively the view that there was no essential differentiation to be made between air, sea, and ground operations north of 38 degrees.

Mr. Jessup felt that as to ground operations a caveat should be observed:—The UN Commander should be instructed to keep well clear of the border of USSR and China. Land operations should not come as close to the borders as sea and air operations. Land operations around the narrow bottleneck area between 38 and 39 would seem permissible.

Mr. Jessup suggested that in principle no limitation be placed on operations which are an essential part of the strategy of defeating the North Koreans. It was agreed that UN consultations on this point would be required, also possible direct diplomatic discussions with the interested countries to preclude the possibility of other UN contingents from being called back by their governments when the 38th parallel is reached.

Admiral Wooldridge wanted a statement of what our eventual intentions in Korea were. He said that there was a very pessimistic CIA estimate dated August 18, regarding the dangerous consequences of any UN attempt at the military conquest of all of Korea. The Joint Chiefs would want to know the probable consequences of operations north of 38.

1 Rear Adm. E. T. Wooldridge was the Senior NSC Staff member nominated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2 Ante, p. 600.
Mr. Jessup brought up the question of what the US–UN position would be should Soviet–Chinese Communist forces enter the conflict. It was mentioned that if Soviet forces came in, the recommendations contained in NSC 76\(^3\) would apply. If Chinese Communist forces came in, the recommendations in NSC 73/4 would apply.\(^4\) It was agreed that if the participation of Soviet or Chinese Communist forces should not be announced by their governments, such forces should be treated as if they were North Korean and might be fired upon without restriction. It was agreed that if the entry of such forces into the fighting was formally announced, “that would be something else again”. All agreed that the Korean incident should not be permitted to lead to war with the USSR or Chinese Communists.

There was general concurrence that the UN Commander should be allowed to go in with ground troops north of 38 degrees, but he should keep clear of the borders. It was further agreed that this general authorization should be limited as follows: “If intelligence indicates that important organized USSR or Chinese Communists opposition is pending, the UN Commander should not go in without reference of the matter to Washington”.

Mr. Jessup suggested that if the UN troops should be in hot pursuit of the North Koreans when 38 was reached, the UN troops should proceed, insofar as possible minimizing US participation and maximizing the participation of the troops of South Korea and other contingents. There should be no firm restriction on US participation, but the principle of minimizing the US role seemed desirable. Any suggestion of US occupation of all of Korea should be avoided.

Admiral Wooldridge wanted to know if UN forces would be in the front of any advance into North Korea.

Mr. Jessup thought that we would want to have diplomatic conversations with a few selected countries about that point. Various

\(^3\) Dated July 10, p. 346.

\(^4\) At its 66th meeting on August 24, with the President presiding, the National Security Council and the Secretary of the Treasury adopted NSC 73/4 as a working guide, with the understanding that final recommendations to the President regarding U.S. actions in the event of any of the contingencies envisaged would be deferred until it was established that the event was certain to occur (NSC files). Documentation relating to NSC 73 is scheduled for publication in volume I.

The paragraph of NSC 73/4, relating to Chinese Communist intervention in Korea, read as follows:

“In the event of the overt use of organized Chinese Communist forces in Korea:

1. The United States should not permit itself a general war with Communist China.

2. As long as action by UN military forces now committed or planned for commitment in Korea offers a reasonable chance of successful resistance, such action should be continued and extended to include authority to take appropriate air and naval action outside Korea against Communist China. The latter action should be continued pending a review of U.S. military commitments in the light of conditions then existing to determine further U.S. courses of action.”
members suggested the following principles which did not meet any objections:

(1) Roll-back operations would be approved so long as the UN forces keep well clear of the border.
(2) It would be desirable for the North Korean troops to be destroyed south of 38 so far as possible.
(3) UN adherence to the principle of unification of all Korea strengthens the case for operations north of 38 degrees.
(4) The US has no desire to occupy Korea, but the Republic of Korea will need some help. We would be delighted to withdraw our forces altogether and let units of other UN members replace them. But we are not going to welsh on our UN commitment.
(5) It would be desirable for the UN to re-affirm its position on unification, get UNCOOK to assist the Republic of Korea and provide UNCOOK with UN forces.
(6) The permanent neutrality of Korea should be affirmed by the Republic of Korea and by multilateral declarations of all other states. But this does not call for the complete de-militarization of Korea.

Mr. Finletter wanted to know how soon after the end of hostilities elections would probably be held. He asked if one year would be a reasonable guess.

Mr. Jessup thought the time would probably be shorter—perhaps six months. Mr. Finletter wanted to know if UN forces would protect the government of Korea until elections were held and whether the UN forces could withdraw immediately after elections and the installation of the government of Korea.

Mr. Jessup mentioned that the State Department draft on Korea had something to say on this point.

Mr. Finletter feared that this would mean indefinite occupation of Korea, by UN forces. He suggested that if UN forces had to stay in Korea a “thin line” of such troops be kept near the frontier as a token force if requested by the government of Korea. The Soviets could not call such a token force a military threat to them. At the same time it would give us authoritative information on any border violations and make any communist aggression against the border a direct offense against the UN.

Mr. Finletter felt that US troops should get out of Korea as soon as possible with a clear indication that we have no obligation to return to defend Korea.

He thought we might give some thought to what we would do with our troops in Korea in case the going became very tough with increasing though covert support of the North Koreans by the USSR and Chinese Communist.

Mr. Jessup mentioned the possibility of North Korean guerrilla operations in the hills after formal hostilities have stopped. He in-
quired if the UN would have to mop up the guerrillas. The consensus was that the Republic of Korea would have primary responsibility for the job and that any necessary UN help should be provided by affiliated members so far as possible. The theme was repeated that we should pull the US out of major responsibility as fast as practicable.

It was agreed that if USSR forces should enter Korea, we should take it to the UN urgently. If our forces should be south of 38 degrees at the time, and if Soviet forces did not cross 38, it was surmised that the UN would probably do nothing. If our forces were north of 38 at the time and made contact with the Soviet troops, the evidence of Soviet aggression would be conclusive and the case for UN action would be stronger.

It was agreed that in case of Soviet occupation of either North Korea or all of Korea, the issue would be thrown into the UN and we would see what came out in debate. We didn't want to precipitate war on the issue of Soviet occupation of Korea.

If the USSR forces enter south Korea, we might have to fight at least a rear guard action in order to evacuate our troops.

Mr. Finletter believed that we could agree on these general principles in advance:

(1) Do not suddenly stop the UN offensive at 38.
(2) Avoid aggravating sentiment of the people in North Korea against the UN and the US.
(3) Refer any Soviet or Chinese Communist interference to the UN.
(4) In case of complications requiring UN action, "defend, localize, and stabilize" until further moves are decided in Lake Success and Washington.

W[ALTER] P. M[cCONAUGHY]

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Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council met on Friday, August 25, from 3 to 6:25 p.m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.490. In the course of the meeting, Mr. Malik referred to and later had read into the record the text of a communication from Chou En-lai, dated August 24, accusing the United States of aggression against the People's Republic of China by its virtual occupation of Formosa (U.N. document S/1715). Ambassador Gross read the text of a letter from Mr. Austin (S/1716) responding to this charge. For documentation on this subject, see volume VI, pages 256 ff.
Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 28, 1950.

SFM D-7/3a

SEPTEMBER FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETINGS

KOREA

The attached document has been cleared within the Department of State for use in the preliminary tripartite talks.

The document recommends that the U.S. seek support by the United Nations of the following position:

1. As UN forces approach the 38th parallel:

   a. Constant assessment of the situation and continued consultations with UN members should be maintained.

   b. The unified command should be authorized to conduct military operations without regard to the 38th parallel and should continue the advance northward in order to stabilize and unify as much of the country as is feasible, unless

      (1) Soviet forces occupy North Korea to the 38th parallel.

      (2) Major Soviet or Chinese Communist units engage or indicate their intention of engaging in hostilities against UN forces.

   In these cases further UN decisions should be sought. In any event ground operations should be kept away from Manchurian and USSR frontiers.

2. With regard to restoration of international peace and security in the Korean area:

   a. UN support of the final solution of the Korean problem must be assured and solidified.

   b. Consideration and support should be given to the reports and recommendations of UNCOOK.

   c. An appropriate UN body should be created to study and make recommendations to the GA on the future of Korea.

   d. Following the repulsion of aggression, this UN body should advise as to immediate post-war steps.

   e. The UN should retain in Korea forces consisting substantially of Asiatic contingents until a stable, unified and independent Korea is established. U.S. forces should be available for protection from unprovoked aggression but would be recommended to be stationed south of the 38th parallel.

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1 This document was prepared as a U.S. position paper by the Department of State Working Group for the preliminary tripartite conversations in Washington, August 29–September 1, in preparation for the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in New York, September 12–14 and 18–19. Documentation on these meetings is scheduled for publication in volume III.
f. UN members, upon advice of the UN body mentioned above, should give political and economic aid to the Korean Government as necessary.

g. These policies should be announced in the UN at an appropriate time.

[Annex]

DRAFT POSITION PAPER FOR MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS IN SEPTEMBER

KOREA

Problem:

To determine (1) the course of action to be recommended to the United Nations for pursuance when United Nations forces approach the 38th parallel, and (2) the policies to be recommended to the United Nations in order to contribute to the restoration of international peace and security in the Korean area once the aggression has been brought to an end, either by the defeat of the Korean Communists or as the result of an early voluntary withdrawal of the aggressor forces to territory north of the 38th parallel.

Background:

- United Nations responsibility in Korea has been affirmed by the General Assembly resolutions of November 14, 1947, December 12, 1948, and October 21, 1949. These form part of the United Nations effort, strongly supported by the United States, to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea. The present military action in Korea responds to the Security Council resolutions which come within the scope of provisions of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter dealing with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.

The United Nations Security Council in its resolution of June 25, 1950 determined that the armed attack by North Korean forces constituted a breach of peace, called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel, and called upon members of the United Nations to render assistance in the execution of the resolution and to refrain from aid to the North Korean authorities. In its resolution of June 27, 1950, the Security Council noted that its resolution of June 25 had not been complied with by North Korean authorities, that urgent military measures were required, and further recommended that U.N. members furnish assistance not only to repel the armed attack but also to “restore international peace and security in the area”.

Action by the United Nations therefore divides itself into two phases: (a) the present enforcement action to repel North Korean
aggression, and (b) the long-term effort to bring about unity, independence, and the establishment of peace and security in the area.

Reversal of the military situation in Korea, with assumption of the offensive by U.N. military forces, will undoubtedly impel the Kremlin to take a decision as to its future course of action. The strategic importance of Korea to the Soviet Union is such that the U.S.S.R. would probably take extreme measures—excepting possibly those it deemed likely to bring on general war—to prevent the establishment of a regime in North Korea which it did not believe it could control. Furthermore it seems likely that the Soviet Union would not wait until U.N. forces reached the 38th parallel to take action. Such action might be expected when U.N. forces begin to have military successes and might consist of the entry of Soviet forces, the entry of Chinese Communist forces, a new effort toward a United Nations settlement, or a combination of these. While fighting is in progress south of the 38th parallel, the Kremlin might bring about the occupation of North Korea either with its own or with Chinese Communist forces.

Should the U.S.S.R. announce the reoccupation of North Korea to the 38th parallel by Soviet troops, it is unlikely that there would be sentiment among U.N. members for taking action which would precipitate a direct clash with Russian forces.

While U.N. military forces are now engaged in air and naval action north of the 38th parallel, the use has not yet been made of amphibious landings and ground operations in North Korea. Such operations may be highly desirable as part of the strategy to defeat North Korean forces. The necessity for advance planning and preparation for such operations emphasizes the importance of decisions authorizing them or restricting their location for political reasons. For example, in order not to provoke unnecessarily the USSR and Communist China, the unified command might be instructed to refrain from amphibious and ground operations within a specified area adjoining the Manchurian and Soviet borders.

When North Korean forces withdraw or are driven back to the 38th parallel, continued military action to bring about the unification and independence of Korea will depend upon prior decision by the United Nations. Having been the victim of armed attack from North Korea, the Republic of Korea naturally will want a settlement that gives a maximum guarantee against the danger of similar future attacks. The Korean people and Government are already insisting that the aggression from the north provides the opportunity to abolish the 38th parallel and unify all of Korea under United Nations auspices. Certainly the decisive defeat of the North Korean aggression and the successful unification of Korea would represent a victory of the United
States and of the participating non-Communist nations of incalculable importance in Asia and throughout the world. The Japanese would be keenly impressed by the demonstrated check on Soviet expansion and any latent or active differences between Peiping and Moscow would be considerably stimulated. Soviet satellites in Europe would not be immune to the effect of such an event.

These considerations, in addition to the strategic importance of Korea to the USSR, make it even more probable that the Soviet Union will exert vigorous efforts to block any settlement resulting in a Korean Government which it cannot control. However, notwithstanding its considerable military strength located in the Far East, the Soviet Union may not yet be ready to risk general war in order to prevent a determined and rapid effort by the U.N. to create a unified Korea. This possibility might be increased if the U.N. should adopt by a large majority a program recommended by UNCOOK or by some other United Nations body and if it could be demonstrated to the Soviet Union that the proposed settlement was truly a U.N. and not a U.S. settlement and that it would not be directed against legitimate Soviet interests. At any rate, the existence of the possibility justifies a plan of action by the United Nations to achieve a unified Korea.

United Nations support for any program for action in Korea is essential. Therefore it will be necessary to reach general agreement with the British and French Governments and with the other members of the United Nations, to the future course of action to be taken in the Security Council and in the General Assembly.

Recommendations:

That discussion of the Korean problem with the British and French Foreign Ministers proceed on the basis of the considerations set forth above and that an effort be made to seek support by the U.N. for the general position outlined below:

1. Course of action to be pursued as United Nations forces approach the 38th parallel:

   a. Constant assessment of the situation should be made and continued consultation held with U.N. members to seek general agreement to the course of operations.
   b. Should Soviet forces occupy North Korea to the 38th parallel, U.N. forces should not proceed north of the 38th parallel unless so ordered by decision of the United Nations.
   c. Should major Soviet or Chinese Communist combat units engage or clearly indicate their intention of engaging in hostilities against U.N. forces, the question of further U.N. action should be immediately referred to the Security Council.
   d. Excepting in the situations envisaged in b and c above, the unified command should be authorized to conduct military opera-
tions, including amphibious landings and ground operations, without regard to the 38th parallel. However, ground operations should be kept well away from the Manchurian and USSR frontiers, and should not be conducted in the mountainous areas north of the 39th parallel except by special U.N. authorization.

e. Excepting in the situations envisaged in d and e above and unless the U.N. should have taken a prior decision to the contrary, U.N. forces, having arrived at the 38th parallel, should continue their advance northward in order to stabilize and unify as much of the country as is feasible. The extent of their advance and occupation would depend upon U.N. decision. Republic of Korea forces should make up the large percentage of such forces with U.S. participation minimized.

2. Policies directed towards the restoration of international peace and security in the Korean area:

a. The final solution of the Korean problem must be carried out under the authority of the United Nations and must be consistent with the principles of the U.N. Charter. Therefore United Nations support of action in Korea must be assured and solidified.

b. Due consideration and support should be given in the United Nations to the reports and recommendations of the United Nations Commission on Korea.

c. There should be created an appropriate United Nations body, with substantial Asian participation and preferably under the chairmanship of the representative of India, to study and make recommendations to the General Assembly on the future of Korea. Such recommendations should be in accordance with the following principles:

(1) The permanent unification of Korea can only be fairly and correctly resolved with the participation of representatives of the Korean people chosen as the result of free elections throughout Korea on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot held under the authority and observation of the U.N.

(2) The Government of the Republic of Korea should continue to be recognized as the only lawful government in Korea and should be consulted with respect to any long-term solution of the Korean problem.

(3) The independence and unification of Korea conform with Korean aspirations and the expressed objectives of the United Nations.

(4) The tremendous problems of an economic, social and political nature attendant upon the establishment of a unified Korea are of such a magnitude as to require the assistance of the United Nations. Korea is an Asiatic State and the Asiatic members of the United Nations should play a prominent role in the assistance that the United Nations can give, and their views regarding a solution of the problem should be given sympathetic consideration.
d. The United Nations body referred to above, following the successful repulsion of the aggression in Korea, should advise as to steps to be taken to liquidate the effects of the war, and to neutralize the country, and should recommend as to the size and character of such military and internal security forces as may be needed by the Republic of Korea.

e. The United Nations should retain in Korea, for as long as the 38th parallel divides Korea, or until a stable, unified, and independent Korea is established, a military force to prevent renewed aggression or internal strife during the natural period of adjustment. Such force should include substantial contingents from Asiatic countries. United States forces would be available to participate in enforcing a UN guarantee against unprovoked aggression but the United States would recommend that its contingents be stationed south of the 38th parallel.

f. Members of the United Nations, upon the advice of the United Nations body mentioned above, should give such political and economic aid to the Korean Government as may be necessary after the conclusion of hostilities.

g. The policies outlined herein should be announced in the United Nations at an appropriate time and support sought for a determined effort to seek a solution of the Korean problem.

795B.5/8-2960 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Paris, August 29, 1950—7 p.m.

[Received August 29—10:04 p.m.]

1035. MAAG has received a communication from General Raguget to effect that French battalion for Korea will embark on October 1 at Cherbourg and will consist of 1,000 men plus 500 for maintenance with a 500-man depot to be set up in France for replacements. The communication states that battalion will have only light arms and proposes that all medical supplies are to be furnished by US Government against MDAP FY '50 program.

MAAG is sending detailed account direct to Defense and is informing General Raguget that this communication has been sent to Washington where it presumably will be discussed between Defense and French military there.

If it is desired we make any reply here, please instruct.1

Bruce

1 Department telegram 1120, September 2, to Paris, not printed, informed the Ambassador that no reply was necessary (795B.5/8-2960).
795.00/8-3050

Memorandum of a Teletype Conference, Prepared by the Department of the Army

[Extract]

TOP SECRET

(WASHINGTON,) August 30, 1950—6:50 a.m.

Nr: DA TT 3708.

Subject: Far East Situation

**PRESENT WASHINGTON**

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<tr>
<td>Maj Gen A R Bolling</td>
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<td>Col R W Hayward</td>
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<td>Col Mark Devine</td>
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<td>Col A G Stone</td>
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<td>Mr Fisher Howe</td>
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<td>Lt Col M F Gilchrist</td>
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<td>Cdr S L Smith</td>
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**PRESENT TOKYO**

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<td>Maj Gen C A Willoughby</td>
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<td>Col E H F Svensson</td>
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<td>Lt Col W A Hampton</td>
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<td>Lt Col R C Cassibry</td>
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<td>Lt Col J A Berry Jr</td>
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<td>Maj R H Anderson</td>
<td>G4</td>
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<td>Maj R E Freeze</td>
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<td>Lt (USN) J L Wohler</td>
<td>AFIO NAVFE</td>
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Chinese Communist reinforcements: ²

Over a considerable pd info from Fru[?], Formosa, and FEC covert sources have reported troop movements from Central China to Manchuria for sometime, which suggest movements preliminary to entering the Korean theatre. As regards troop str, the physical potential of Chinese Communist reinf is evident. Total Communist regular forces, at present in Manchuria, are est to be aprx 246,000 comprising nine armies of 37 divs (aggregate str 6,000 each.) 80,000 have been variously reported in the vic of Antung, in varying stages of assembly. Many Koreans have served in these Manchurian units. Prior to the invasion, ethnic Koreans were combed out of Chinese Communist forces and released to the North Korean Govt in nbrs varying from 40,000–80,000. Further reinf through that channel are therefore not

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¹ The source text is taken from a copy in Korean Conflict.

² The portion of the document herein printed represents a response from Tokyo to a question from Washington on the enemy situation in Korea.
to be discounted. On the other hand, this action probably would precipitate further Russian participation directly or indirectly. Consequently, it is believed that infiltration might take place but no organized participation with div or corps units. Air technical personnel in small nbrs have been described as Chinese and have been picked up in Seoul and Kunsan, and there is a possibility that air reinf may be flown in, since the Formosan invasion appears to be postponed and some Chinese air contingents, with Russian equip, could be employed elsewhere. After all, the precedent of furnishing grd and air support to South Korea by the US has been established and there is no legalistic obstacle for Manchuria to assist its neighbor, the North Koreans. In this connection, the recent broadcast from Mukden accusing American planes of violating the Manchurian border conceivably can be the legalistic basis for air intervention. Finally, the recent preparation of revetments of fwd flds, below the 38th Parallel, on which 43 revetments have been constructed, indicates the expected fwd movement of acft in spite of the depletion of the present NK Air Forces.

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*For documentation on this subject, see vol. vi, pp. 256 ff.*

795.00/8-3050

*Draft Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State for National Security Council Staff Consideration Only*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 30, 1950.

U.S. COURSE OF ACTION AS TO KOREA

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine what United States course of action as to Korea would be best calculated to restore international peace and security.

DISCUSSION

2. The present United States responsibility in Korea stems from the UN resolution of June 27, 1950 which noted that North Korean authorities had not complied with the UN resolution of June 25 calling for immediate cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the 38th parallel; that urgent military measures were required; and recommended that UN members furnish assistance not only to repel the armed attack but also to “restore international peace and security in the area”. Earlier General Assembly resolutions on Korea which also have a bearing on U.S. re-
responsibility in Korea are referred to in Appendix I. Under the UN resolutions, the United States as a UN member, along with other UN members is obligated to: (1.) continue the present enforcement action to repel the North Korean aggression and (2.) participate in an effort to establish peace and security in Korea and bring about the unity and independence of the country under a representative government chosen by the Korean people in a free election.

3. Assuming that a UN offensive will be launched in South Korea within the fairly near future, both the United States and the USSR will be obliged to take critical decisions as to the course of action they will pursue in Korea. The USSR would not be likely to accept passively a situation where all or most of Korea would be under the control of forces not subject to its influence. Action by the Soviet Union to forestall such an eventuality might begin either before or after the UN forces reached the 38th parallel and might take the form of the entry into the conflict of satellite armed forces from Communist China, or Soviet forces. Such Soviet or Chinese Communist forces might be organized elements of the regular Soviet or Chinese Communist armies fighting under their own banners, or they might masquerade as North Korean forces fighting as an integral part of the North Korean Army. The former contingency would create a more serious issue for the United Nations than the latter. If Soviet or Chinese Communist forces should openly enter the fray, occupation by Soviet or Chinese Communist forces of all that portion of Korea between the battle lines and the Manchurian-Siberian borders could reasonably be anticipated.

4. Should the USSR announce its intention to occupy part or all of the Korean peninsula, or openly take part in hostilities with its organized armed forces, the UN members resisting the aggression in Korea would be placed in a precarious position and the prospects would be reduced that a united front could be maintained against the aggression. Notwithstanding the risks, it is highly desirable that the UN Commander in Korea have the maximum degree of latitude of strategic and tactical decision in order that he may carry out his mission at minimum cost and in minimum time. Military considerations might dictate the desirability of amphibious or airbourne landings or ground operations in North Korea, either after or (more likely) before the main body of UN forces has crossed the 38th parallel. Such operations might cut the supply lines and the avenue of retreat of the North Korean forces and materially hasten the end of the hostilities. The UN Commander should not be denied the au-

\[1\] Not printed; the resolutions referred to are listed in paragraph 8 of the Draft Memorandum Prepared by the Department of State for NSC Staff Consideration Only dated August 23, p. 655.
thority to carry out such operations in his discretion without conclusive reasons for such denial. It should be decided immediately whether the Commander has authority to carry on operations north of 38 so that in the event of an affirmative decision there will be sufficient time for the considerable advanced planning and preparation required.

5. Clearly any operations which might be undertaken north of 38 should not needlessly risk drawing Soviet or Chinese Communist forces into either general or local conflict with forces supporting the UN. The objective should be to obtain the maximum strategic and political benefits from operations north of 38 with a minimum of provocation to the Soviet Union and Communist China.

6. Distinct from, but related to the issue of landings north of 38 while fighting is still in progress south of 38, is the question whether a straight roll-back of the main North Korean forces should be continued beyond 38 when the principal battleground reaches that parallel. It is unlikely that the North Korean forces can be entirely disarmed and dissolved south of 38. Hence a continuing threat to the UN forces would exist if those forces halted at 38. The important military advantages of momentum and initiative would be lost. There would be an imminent threat of a renewal of the offensive by rearmed and reinforced North Korean troops, regrouped and reconditioned under cover of the immunity afforded by the 38th parallel. The pacification and unification of Korea in accordance with the UN mandate could not be effected.

7. Thus a halt at this point would not make political or military sense unless the risk that it would provoke a major clash with the Soviet Union or Communist China were so great as to override all other considerations. The Korean Government would not be satisfied with a cease fire decision at the 38th parallel. Such action might be plausibly construed as a betrayal of the Korean people and a negation of the UN resolutions on Korea. The moral effect of a victory in South Korea would be largely dissipated by a refusal to press on, while a decision to continue the pursuit beyond the artificial dividing line would have world-wide psychological repercussions favorable to the United Nations and adverse to the Soviet Union.

8. The arguments for endeavoring to wipe out the arbitrary partition of Korea as a part of the UN military operation is bolstered by the fact that the Soviet Union may well have already made a decision to wage its counter campaign only on the political and propaganda fronts without risking general hostilities at this time, unless the strategic areas contiguous to key population and military centers in the Maritime Provinces and Manchuria should be occupied by the forces of a Great Power. Strong endorsement of and participa-
tion in a positive UN course in Korea by Asiatic and other more or less “neutral” members of the UN might have a deterrent effect on the Soviet Union. Certainly, bold action could not safely be participated in by United States without strong UN sanction enjoying the support of the great majority of the membership. The action would have to be a cooperative effort not identified solely with the interest of the great western powers. It should be crystal clear that any action taken will not pose a military threat to the Soviet Union and will not be aimed against any legitimate Soviet or Chinese Communist interest.

CONCLUSIONS

A. Operational

9. The risk of provoking a clash of the Soviet forces with the UN forces will be inversely proportional to the distance between the front line UN forces and the Siberian-Manchurian borders. The UN forces should, therefore, refrain from any ground activity, either combat or occupational, in areas close to the international borders of Korea, or in any more distant areas the occupation of which might reasonably by construed as greatly increasing the military vulnerability of Vladivostok or any other strategic center in Siberia or Manchuria.

10. The UN Commander should be informed: (a) that the foregoing is the sole restriction on his freedom to carry out operations north of 38 degrees as part of the strategy to accomplish the mission assigned to him by the UN; (b) that behind-the-line operations in the narrow neck of the peninsula [near?] the 39th parallel would be less provocative than operations farther north; and (c) that it is desirable that he confine any amphibious or airborne operations to that area unless compelling military considerations dictate otherwise.

11. The UN Commander should also be authorized to conduct continuous roll-back operations against North Korean forces well into the northern part of the peninsula if such operations are necessary to the dissolution of the North Korean armed resistance. In this connection, the UN Commander should be directed: (a) to seek new instructions before pushing on after North Korean organized resistance has been terminated; (b) in no eventuality to approach the international borders of Korea; (c) increasingly, as militarily expedient, to designate South Korean troops, and (secondarily) UN forces other than the United States contingent, to spearhead the advance north of 38 degrees; (d) in consultation with South Korean Government, assign to it a large measure of responsibility for determining the timing and the method of subjecting occupied territory north of 38 degrees to its jurisdiction; (e) to take due precautions against the indulgence of South Korean troops in unwarranted reprisals against the forces, officials, and populace of North Korea.
12. In order to insure that participating forces of other UN members will not be recalled by their governments when the UN forces reach the 38th parallel, the United States should seek an explicit prior understanding on this score through the framework of the UN or through direct negotiation, as desirable.

13. In the event of the overt use of organized Chinese Communist forces in Korea:

"(1) The United States should not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China.

"(2) As long as action by UN military forces now committed or planned for commitment in Korea offers a reasonable chance of successful resistance, such action should be continued and extended to include authority to take appropriate air and naval action outside Korea against Communist China. The latter action should be continued pending a review of U.S. military commitments in the light of conditions then existing to determine further US courses of action." (cf. NSC 73/4, paragraph 406)

14. If major USSR combat units should at any time during military operations in the Korean area of hostilities engage or clearly indicate their intention of engaging in hostilities against U.S. and/or friendly forces the U.S. "should prepare to minimize its commitment in Korea and prepare to execute war plans. These preparations should include initiation of full scale mobilization." (cf. NSC 76—July 21, 1950)²

15. If unidentified and unannounced Soviet or Chinese Communist forces should enter the fighting under the North Korean banner, they should not be distinguished from North Korean forces.

16. Notwithstanding the authorizations contained in the preceding paragraphs, if the intelligence available to the UN Commander should indicate that there will be important organized USSR or Chinese Communist resistance, he should not advance farther without specific authorization and should immediately refer the matter to the United Nations.

17. If the Soviet Union should announce an intention to re-occupy North Korea, the United States should take the issue immediately to the Security Council as a matter clearly within the competence of that organization. United Nations forces should not risk open conflict with the Soviet Union while this issue is before the Security Council, but the UN forces should not cease their efforts to destroy North Korean forces south of 38. If the UN should be unable to prevent Soviet reoccupation of North Korea, the United States should seek UN action designed to extract assurances from the Soviet Union that North Korean forces would be disarmed and dispersed when they retreated north of the 38th parallel.

² See the memorandum by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, dated July 10, p. 346 and footnote 2.
18. The United States should, in so far as possible, reduce the scope of United States participation in UN responsibilities for Korea after the organized armed resistance of the North Koreans has ended, without any intimation that the United States would not fulfill its UN commitments. After North Korean organized armed resistance is substantially liquidated, the forces of the Republic of Korea, assisted by the UN Commission on Korea should take the lead in disarming North Korean troops and enforcing the terms of their capitulation. Guerrilla activity should be dealt with primarily by the forces of the Republic of Korea with minimum participation by UN contingents, unless the Korean forces alone should prove unable to cope with the guerrilla activities.

19. After UN forces have crossed the 38th parallel, their general posture should be one of conciliation rather than retaliation. An effort should be made to encourage the gradual voluntary adherence of even larger areas of North Korea to the Republic of Korea through civil procedures. UN forces should constitute a stabilizing influence during the transition period and should endeavor to reassure both of Korea's neighbors as to the non-aggressive and temporary nature of the UN occupation.

B. Political Objectives

20. The political objective of the United States in Korea is to carry out the UN mandate of establishing under the auspices of the United Nations a unified and independent Korea without provoking a general war with the Soviet Union thereby. The United States should act in Korea only with UN sanction and should consent to the commitment of United States armed forces to the fighting in Korea only so long as employment of these armed forces does not lead to grave risks of a frontal clash with the USSR. The United States should continue to urge support of the United Nations position as to the establishment of a unified and independent Korea but should not unilaterally take action beyond that which is effectively supported by a preponderant majority of the UN membership.

21. The United States should recognize that the USSR and Communist China will make the strongest possible effort to aid the Korean Communists to infiltrate Korea and to seize control of the government by indirect aggression, if their effort to seize all of Korea by civil war is thwarted and that accordingly the legitimate government will be impelled to take strong counter measures for which it may require moral and political support from the United States.

22. The United States should make every effort, utilizing all information media, to turn the inevitable bitterness and resentment of the war-victimized Korean people away from the United States and direct it toward the Korean Communists, toward the USSR and,
depending upon the role they play, toward the Chinese Communists, as
the instigators of the destructive conflict. These efforts should be in-
creased immediately and special assistance should be given the field
Commander and the U.S. Embassy in Korea to augment their present
propaganda and information programs. The Government of the Re-
public of Korea should be encouraged to carry this message to the
Korean people and should also be given material assistance such as
portable radios, sound trucks and printing presses and leaflet materials
to facilitate their efforts.

23. The United States should press for UN designation of the
United Nations Commission on Korea or some other UN body to
make recommendations to the General Assembly as to the future of
Korea. The United States should urge that this United Nations body
be guided by the following principles:

(1) The permanent unification of Korea should come about through
the participation of representatives of all the Korean people chosen
in free country-wide secret-ballot elections on the basis of universal
adult suffrage, the elections to be held under the authority and super-
vision of the United Nations.

(2) The Government of the Republic of Korea should continue to
be recognized as the only lawful government in Korea and should be
consulted with respect to any long-term solution of the Korean prob-
lem. Its independence and stability conforms with Korean aspirations
and the expressed objectives of the United Nations.

(3) An obligation rests upon the members of the United Nations
to contribute to the solution of the tremendous economic, social and
political problems certain to confront a unified and independent Korea.
Asiatic members of the United Nations should make a substantial con-
tribution to the requisite United Nations assistance in view of the
special regional interest they have in Korea. Their views regarding
a solution of the problems of Korea should be given weighty con-
consideration.

24. The United States should also urge that this United Nations
body be charged with continuing consideration of Korean problems
and instructed to make recommendations as to the size and character
of the military and internal security forces needed by the Republic
of Korea and as to steps which might be necessary or desirable to
insure that all countries will recognize and respect the neutrality of
Korea.

25. If the United Nations should recommend the retention in Korea
of a UN military force until a stable, unified, and independent govern-
ment is firmly established, United States forces should be made avail-
able as a component unit in the UN forces for the purpose of assisting
in the prevention of renewed aggression or disruptive internal strife.
United States forces should however be minimized and should prefer-
ably serve only in conjunction with contingents of Asiatic and other
UN members.
United States Delegation Minutes: SFM Pre 4

TOP SECRET

PRELIMINARY CONVERSATIONS FOR SEPTEMBER
FOREIGN MINISTERS’ MEETING
AUGUST 30, 1950—3:30 P.M.

Delegations: British: Graves, Burrows, Greenhill
French: Daridan, de Margerie, Millet, Fequant
U.S.: Yost, Emmerson, Bancroft, Raynor, Jackson, Emmons, O'Shaugnessy, Hackler, Bacon, Ranney (recorder)

Subject: Korea

In opening the discussion on Korea, Mr. Emmerson said that the U.S. position was still tentative and we wished to hear the views of the other Powers regarding the future courses of action. It was unnecessary to detail the events which had led up to the present position. U.N. responsibility for Korea had existed for some time and present action in the country was clearly based upon the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and 27, 1950. As the U.S. saw it, the problem might be divided into two phases, (1) the question of present enforcement action and, (2) long-term objectives for Korea. Both matters, in the U.S. view, required urgent consideration. Reversal of the North Korean fortunes would compel a decision by the Soviet Union regarding its own course of action and the danger existed that the USSR might take extreme measures, either of open intervention or of large scale military assistance to the North Koreans. These questions would become particularly acute when the North Korean forces were driven back to the 38th Parallel, and the U.S. believed that continued military action would depend upon prior decision by the U.N. It was clearly desirable that efforts for the unification and independence of Korea be carried through to a successful conclusion. The U.S. stated, however, that it believed no step should be taken which might provoke a general war.

1 A cover sheet, not printed, indicated that at this fourth session of the preliminary tripartite conversations for the September Foreign Ministers meetings the subjects discussed were Korea and Formosa; for minutes of the meeting dealing with Formosa, see vol. VII, p. 500.
2 Hubert A. Graves, B. A. B. Burrows, Counselors, and Denis A. Greenhill, First Secretary, British Embassy in Washington.
3 Jean Daridan, Minister Counselor, Christian de Margerie and Pierre Millet, Counselors, and Albert Fequant, Second Secretary, French Embassy in Washington.
The U.S. proposed the following course of action as U.N. forces approach the 38th Parallel:

(1) Constant assessment of the situation should be made and continued consultation held with U.N. members to seek general agreement to the course of operations;
(2) If Soviet forces occupy North Korea to the 38th Parallel, U.N. forces should not cross the Parallel unless ordered by the U.N.;
(3) If major Soviet or Chinese Communist combat units engage or clearly indicate their intention of engaging in hostilities, the question of further action should be referred to the Security Council.

The U.S. put forward the following proposals with regard to restoration of peace and security in Korea:

(1) The final solution must be consistent with the principles of the U.N. Charter and U.N. support of action in Korea must be assured and solidified.
(2) Consideration should be given to the reports and recommendations of UNCOOK.
(3) An appropriate U.N. body should be created to study and make recommendations to the GA on the future of Korea. Such recommendations should be based upon (a) permanent unification of Korea requires free elections in Korea under the observation of the U.N.; (b) the Government of the Republic of Korea should continue to be recognized as the only lawful Government and should be consulted on long-term solutions; (c) any solution must conform with Korean aspirations and U.N. objectives; (d) continuing U.N. support will be necessary.

The U.S. also expressed the view that it would probably be necessary to retain a U.N. force in Korea for some time after the cessation of hostilities. Such a force should include substantial contingents from Asian countries. U.S. forces would be available for this purpose, but the U.S. would recommend that its contingents be stationed South of the 38th Parallel. The U.S. also believed that members of the U.N. should give such political and economic aid to the Korean Government as might be necessary after the conclusion of hostilities.

The French representative began by mentioning that the Korean problem was at present under discussion in New York between the various delegations to the U.N. Without prejudice to the course of these discussions he could state the following general elements in the French position:

(1) Until the Security Council has passed a further resolution on the subject, U.N. forces should not cross the 38th Parallel, as this would create a new situation and might bring in the USSR and China;
(2) U.N. forces must remain in South Korea after the liberation of the country;
(3) It would be inconsistent with the high principles which have guided U.N. action in Korea for the U.N. merely to undertake a resto-
ration of the Rhee Government, which has revealed its internal weaknesses and corruption. Elections shortly before the invasion clearly demonstrated that a large majority of the people were dissatisfied with that Government. Moreover, re-establishment of the present regime might provoke a widespread terror in the country. France believed that new situations called for new formulas. Whatever formula is adopted, its application should be step by step, to gain time, allow passions to cool, and permit a period of guidance of Korean affairs by the U.N. In response to a question by the U.S. representative, the French admitted that any apparent effort to keep Korea in a state of tutelage might be resented by other Asian powers, but he said that the decision would be a U.N. one so that the Western powers alone could not be blamed for slowness in implementing a solution. It was obvious, in any case, that the U.N. could not stay in Korea "for only a few days."

The British stated that because of the nature of Korean operations their remarks at this meeting could be speculative and exploratory only. They were largely in agreement with the U.S. position as outlined, although there were some different points of emphasis. The British attached great importance to the remarkable array of unanimity in support of U.N. action in Korea and believed that every new phase of action should be designed to command widest support, especially in Asia. The U.N. therefore should endeavor to make just and reasonable arrangements for Korea, even if these arrangements in practice were difficult of attainment.

Some early statement should be made of broad U.N. objectives for the country. The British agreed with the French that something more than the mere restoration of authority of the present Korean Government was necessary. A limited objective of this kind would satisfy no one. The United Kingdom holds that the Government of the Republic of Korea has no title to sovereignty to those parts of the country where free elections have not been held. Rhee's pretensions that all Korea is under his Government are accordingly unacceptable and any solution for Korea based upon these pretensions would split the democratic powers.

The British suggested that one way of clarifying U.N. objectives might be a resolution of the GA that as soon as the situation permits, all previous U.N. resolutions with respect to Korea should be implemented and that free elections be held at the earliest date. Such a resolution need not commit us to the view that the 38th Parallel should be crossed—this decision could be made at a later date—but it would emphasize our desire to unify Korea on a democratic basis. In the British view, the GA was the most appropriate body for the consideration of broad objectives with regard to Korea.

The British doubted whether crossing of the 38th Parallel could be justified under the resolution of June 27, 1950, as this resolution
was aimed at repelling attack. Crossing the Parallel or establishing a permanent occupation of North Korea would be another matter requiring further decision by the Security Council. In any event, it was essential that a general statement of objectives be made prior to any extension of military activities beyond the 38th Parallel. Future circumstances would necessarily affect the decision as to the wisdom of committing U.N. forces north of the 38th Parallel, particularly the state of the North Korean forces at that time. The British shared the view that fighting North of the 38th Parallel would increase the risks of Soviet intervention. They believed the USSR did not wish to provoke a major war, but the Soviets might dispatch a volunteer force or large military supplies which would create a situation full of explosive possibilities. It was, of course, possible that the USSR might in any case occupy the country up to the 38th Parallel or take other action alleged to be in the interest of restoring peace. The Soviets might also revive previous proposals for a four-power trusteeship of Korea, although we could solve this problem by exposing Soviet motives and saying that the Koreans have demonstrated their ability to govern themselves. The British agreed that U.N. forces should be retained in Korea during the period of readjustment following cessation of hostilities to prevent renewed aggression and maintain order. In their view, permanent occupation of North Korea by U.N. forces should not be contemplated.

The British believed that UNCK as now constituted was not an entirely suitable body for handling Korean affairs involving the establishment of the new state. A new Commission should be formed, composed largely of Asian representatives to make recommendations to the U.N. on problems relating to establishment of an independent and unified Korea. The Commission would also inform the Koreans of the intention to hold elections and if possible would arrange for U.N. forces to enter North Korea to supervise the elections. The Commission would be charged with preventing retaliation by the South Koreans. In the British view, such a Commission should be as strong as possible, composed of members who would carry considerable weight. It might remain in Korea for about a year, or whatever period was necessary for secure establishment of the new Government. The British were of the opinion that elections should be held in whatever part of Korea may be liberated by U.N. forces, whether or not it is possible to hold them North of the 38th Parallel. They had no definite instructions on this point, however.

The U.K. shared the view of the other Powers that the new Korean state would need continued military and diplomatic support because of the ravages of the present conflict and the danger of subversion which the Korean Government would have to face.
In reply to the views put forward by the British and French representatives, the U.S. representative stated that we appeared to be in general agreement, the chief point of difference being our attitude to the present Korean Government. The U.S. favored continued recognition of the Republic of Korea as the only lawful Government in the country, which should be consulted with respect to any long-term solution of the Korean problem. The U.S. pointed out the importance of maintaining the prestige and continuity of the Republic of Korea, a nation sponsored by the U.N. and cited the democratic aspects of that Government in spite of its immaturity and inexperience. If Rhee is, in fact, not supported by the Korean people it will be up to them to change the Government by democratic processes.

The British and French representatives continued to express their dissatisfaction with the Rhee Government, although the French representative agreed that Korean pride should not be diminished and that this matter needed careful consideration. The U.S. stated that its position was to continue to recognize the jurisdiction of the Government of the Republic of Korea in the exact terms of resolutions which have been passed by the GA. The jurisdiction of the Republic might progressively be extended as free elections were held.

Draft Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 31, 1950.

UNITED STATES COURSES OF ACTION AS TO KOREA

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine what United States course of action as to Korea would be best calculated to advance the national interest of the United States.

DISCUSSION

2. The present United Nations' action in Korea is being taken in pursuance of the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and June 27, 1950. The Resolution of June 25 called for "the immediate cessation of hostilities," called upon "the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel," and called upon all U.N. members "to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities." The Resolution of June 27 noted the failure of the North Korean authorities to comply with the
resolution of June 25 and recommended that “the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.”

3. In a third resolution (July 7, 1950), the Security Council requested the United States to designate a Commander for all the forces of the members of the United Nations in the Korean operation, and authorized that these forces fly the U.N. flag. In response to this resolution, General MacArthur has been designated Commander of the U.N. forces in Korea. The Republic of Korea has also placed its forces under General MacArthur’s command.

4. The political objective of the United Nations in Korea is to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions of November 14, 1947, December 12, 1948, and October 21, 1949.

5. The United States has strongly supported this political objective. If the present United Nations’ action in Korea can accomplish this political objective without substantial risk of general war with the Soviet Union or Communist China, it would be in our interest to advocate the pressing of the United Nations’ action to this conclusion. It would not be in our national interest, however, nor presumably would other friendly members of the United Nations regard it as being in their interest to take action in Korea which would involve a substantial risk of general war. Furthermore, it would not be in our national interest to take action in Korea which did not have the support of the great majority of the United Nations, even if, in our judgment, such action did not involve a substantial risk of general war.

6. As U.N. forces succeed in stabilizing the front, driving back the North Korean forces, and approaching the 38th parallel, the decisions and actions taken by the United States and other U.N. members which are supporting the Security Council resolutions, and those taken by the Kremlin, will determine whether hostilities are confined to Korea or spread so that the danger of a third world war is greatly increased.

7. It is unlikely that the Soviet Union will passively accept the emergence of a situation in which all or most of Korea would pass from its control, provided it believes that it can take action which would prevent this and which would not involve a substantial risk of general war. The Soviet Union may decide that it can risk reoccupying Northern Korea before United Nations’ forces have reached the 38th parallel, or the conclusion of an arrangement with the North Korean regime under which Soviet forces would be pledged to the defense of the territory of the People’s Republic of Northern Korea. Alternatively, the Soviet Union might initiate some move toward a negotiated settlement while hostilities are still in progress south of the 38th parallel.
In view of the importance of avoiding general war, we should be prepared to negotiate a settlement while refusing terms that would leave the aggressor in an advantageous position, that would invite a repetition of the aggression, and that would undermine the authority and strength of the United Nations.

8. Although it does not appear likely that Chinese Communist forces would be used to occupy North Korea (because the Soviet Union probably regards Korea as being in its own direct sphere of interest), this contingency cannot be excluded. It also seems unlikely that Soviet or Chinese Communist forces will be openly employed in major units in the fighting in the southern part of the peninsula, for it is believed that neither the Soviet Union nor the Chinese Communists are ready to engage in general war at this time for this objective. It is possible that the Soviet Union may endeavor to persuade the Chinese Communists to enter the Korean campaign with the purpose of avoiding the defeat of the North Korean forces and also of fomenting war between the United States and the Chinese Communists should we react strongly.

9. It is possible, but not probable, that no action will be taken by the Soviet Union or by the Chinese Communists to reoccupy Northern Korea or to indicate in any other way an intention to prevent the occupation of Northern Korean by United Nations' forces before the latter have reached the 38th parallel. In this unlikely contingency it would seem probable that the Soviet Union had decided to follow a hands-off policy, even at the expense of the loss of control of Northern Korea. Only in this contingency could the U.N. forces undertake ground operations north of the 38th parallel without a substantial risk of general war. It is difficult to appraise this risk at this time, and our action in crossing the 38th parallel would create a situation to which the Soviet Union would be almost certain to react in some manner. While the risk of Soviet or Chinese communist intervention might not be lessened if only the ROK forces conducted the operation north of the 38th parallel, the risk of general hostilities as a result of such intervention would be reduced. In no circumstances should other U.N. forces be used in the northeastern province bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border.

10. It will be desirable to bear in mind in the contingency stated in paragraph 9 both the importance of securing support of the majority of U.N. members for any action that might be taken north of the 38th parallel and the advantage of establishing a record that will clearly show that every reasonable effort has been made to avoid carrying the military struggle into a new phase by a land offensive beyond the 38th parallel. At some point after the U.N. forces begin to take the initiative and to drive back and destroy the North Korean forces, terms of
surrender should be offered. The question of the acceptance of such terms by the North Koreans would of course be determined by the U.S.S.R. in the light of its appraisal of its interests under all the circumstances then existing.

11. The U.N. forces are clearly committed by the Security Council resolutions to compel the withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind the 38th parallel and there is a clear legal basis for taking such military actions north of the 38th parallel as are necessary in accomplishing this mission.

12. Military actions north of the 38th parallel which go beyond the accomplishment of this mission as, for example to accomplish the political objective of unifying Korea under the Republic of Korea are not clearly authorized by existing Security Council resolutions. Accordingly, United Nations approval for such further military actions is a prerequisite to their initiation.

13. Soviet domination of North Korea has brought with it the pattern of police and propaganda control well known throughout the Soviet world. Since the existence and stability of a unified Korea must in the long run depend largely upon the Korean people themselves, the tasks of the United Nations will include the reorientation of the North Korean people toward the outlook of free peoples who accept the standards of international behavior set forth in the United Nations Charter.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

14. It is evident from the above discussion that final decisions cannot be made at this time concerning the future course of action in Korea, since the course of action which will best advance the national interest of the United States must be determined in light of the action or inaction of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists and in consultation and agreement with friendly members of the United Nations. Pending final decisions, the United Nations’ commander should make plans to cover the contingency that the United Nations’ forces, or at least the R.O.K. forces, will be called upon to occupy Northern Korea, provided a substantial risk of general war is not thereby incurred.

15. The United Nations’ forces have a legal basis for conducting operations north of the 38th parallel for the purpose of compelling the withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind this line or of defeating these forces. The United Nations’ forces should be developed so that operations to compel the withdrawal, to inflict maximum losses in the process, and, if possible and desirable, to occupy Northern Korea are within their capabilities. Plans for such operations should be perfected but major actions to carry out the occupation of northern Korea
should not be undertaken north of the 38th parallel by the United Nations’ commander without prior authorization. Such authorization should be granted only with the explicit approval of the President, and would require consultation with, and the approval of, the U.N. members supporting the Security Council resolutions.

16. The United Nations’ commander should undertake no ground operations north of the 38th parallel in the event of the occupation of North Korea by Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, but should reoccupy Korea up to the 38th parallel. Bombing operations north of the 38th parallel should not be discontinued merely because the presence of Soviet or Chinese Communists troops are detected in a target area. However, if the Soviet Union should announce in advance its intention to reoccupy North Korea, either explicitly or impliedly giving warning that its forces should not be attacked, the matter should be immediately referred to the Security Council. Military action against North Korean troops south of the 38th parallel would continue. Under the general policy considerations applicable to engaging in full-scale hostilities with the Soviet Union in Korea, forces of the Unified Command would seek to minimize conflict with the Russian forces.

17. In the event of the open employment of major Soviet units south of the 38th parallel, the U.N. Commander should break off the action as rapidly as possible consistent with the orderly withdrawal of his forces. U.S. action in this event should conform with that outlined in paragraphs 35 to 36d of NSC 73/4.¹

18. In the event of the open employment of major Chinese communist units south of the 38th parallel, the United States should not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China; but as long as action by U.N. military forces offers a reasonable chance of successful resistance, the U.N. Commander should continue such action and be authorized to take appropriate air and naval action outside Korea against Communist China. The latter action should be continued pending a review of U.S. military commitments in the light of conditions then existing to determine further U.S. courses of action.

19. In the event of an attempt to employ major Soviet or Chinese Communist units covertly south of the 38th parallel, the United Nations’ Commander should continue the action as long as he believes his forces were capable of successful resistance.

20. Instructions as to the course of action in the event of the overt employment of major Soviet or Chinese Communist units north of the 38th parallel should be issued to the Commander simultaneously with

¹ Text scheduled for publication in volume I. These paragraphs dealt with U.S. response in the event of overt Soviet attack or Soviet-inspired aggression in various quarters of the world.

468–806—76—44
any authorization to undertake major ground actions north of the 38th parallel.

21. Instructions as to the terms of surrender to be offered in the event of a sudden collapse and rout of North Korean forces shall be transmitted to the U.N. Commander as soon as they are formulated under the procedure outlined in paragraph 27. Pending the preparation of such instructions, the Commander should be given interim instructions that in such event he should offer terms requiring at a minimum the cessation of hostilities and the laying down of arms. If the terms offered should not be accepted, the U.N. Commander should continue his efforts to destroy as many of the enemy as possible before they retreat across the 38th parallel. He should request new instructions before continuing operations north of the 38th parallel with major forces for the purposes of occupying North Korea. He should not in any circumstances permit the use of U.N. forces other than R.O.K. contingents in the northeast province or along the Manchurian border.

22. If operations are undertaken to occupy northern Korea, the United Nations’ Commander should, in consultation with the Government of the R.O.K., determine the timing and method of subjecting occupied territory north of the 38th parallel to its jurisdiction. He should forbid, as commander of the U.N. forces, reprisals against the forces, officials, and populace of North Korea except in accordance with international law and take such measures as are within his power to secure compliance with this directive.

23. In the event of Soviet reoccupation of North Korea or announcement of an intention to prevent U.N. occupation of North Korea (or in the unlikely event of such action by the Chinese Communists), the United States should take the matter to the Security Council, with the stated purpose of securing the cooperation of the Soviet Union (or the Chinese Communists) in U.N. action to achieve the unity and independence of Korea. Since such cooperation would not be forthcoming, an attempt would then be made in the General Assembly to secure the condemnation of the Soviet Union (or the Chinese Communists) for flouting the will of the U.N. majority. U.N. forces would be maintained at or near the 38th parallel to safeguard the security of the R.O.K.

24. In the event of the open employment of major Soviet units south of the 38th parallel, the matter should be taken to the Security Council with the purpose of explaining the breaking off of action by the United Nations’ forces and of developing a basis for united action by as many members of the U.N. as possible at such time as the United States believed that action against the Soviet Union would be advantageous. U.S. action in this event should conform with that outlined in paragraphs 35 to 36d. of NSC 73/4.
25. In the event of the open employment of major Chinese Communist units south of the 38th parallel, the matter should be taken to the Security Council with the purpose of condemning the Chinese Communists as aggressors. Other U.S. action should be as outlined in paragraph 18.

26. In the event of the attempted covert employment of major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces south of the 38th parallel, the United States should anticipate the probable forced withdrawal of United Nations' forces from Korea and should take the matter to the Security Council with the purpose indicated in paragraphs 24 or 25.

27. In preparation for the possible eventual retreat of North Korean forces, the United States should immediately discuss with certain friendly members of the United Nations the terms to be offered the North Korean forces. This will serve to develop support for action north of the 38th parallel to accomplish the political objective of the United Nations in Korea in the event that the terms are rejected and there is no evidence of a substantial risk of a clash with Soviet or Chinese Communist forces.

28. When organized armed resistance by the North Korean forces has been brought substantially to an end, the United States should attempt to reduce its share of the U.N. responsibilities for Korea, and announce its desire to do so, without, however, implying any unwillingness to fulfill its U.N. commitments. The R.O.K. forces, operating under principles established by the U.N. Commission for Korea, or such body as may be established to take its place, should take the lead in disarming remaining North Korean units and enforcing the terms of surrender. Guerrilla activity should be dealt with primarily by the forces of the Republic of Korea with minimum participation by U.N. contingents, unless the Korean forces alone should prove unable to cope with the guerrilla activities.

29. In performing their mission beyond the 38th parallel, the general posture of the United Nations' forces should be one of liberation rather than retaliation. An effort should be made to encourage the voluntary adherence of ever larger areas of North Korea to the R.O.K. The United Nations' forces should attempt to exert a stabilizing influence during the transition period. They should endeavor to conduct themselves in such a way as to emphasize the non-aggressive and temporary nature of the U.N. occupation.

30. The United States should recognize that the Government of the R.O.K. will have to take strong measures against Communist efforts to cause trouble in Korea and that it may require support in these measures from the United States. At the same time, the United States should recognize that social and economic reforms will be necessary in order to reduce the Communist menace to manageable proportions.
31. The United States should make an intensive effort, using all information media, to turn the inevitable bitterness and resentment of the war-victimized Korean people away from the United States and to direct it toward the Korean communists, the Soviet Union, and, depending on the role they play, the Chinese Communists, as the parties responsible for the destructive conflict. These efforts should be increased immediately and special assistance should be given to the field commander and the U.S. Embassy in Korea to augment their present propaganda and information programs. The Government of the R.O.K. should be encouraged to increase its propaganda output and should be given material assistance in this effort.

32. In order to effect the reorientation of the North Korean people, to cause defection of enemy troops in the field, and to train North Korean personnel to participate in activities looking to unification of the country, the following steps should be taken:

(a) Establish the principle that the treatment of POW's, after their transfer to places of internment, shall be directed toward their exploitation, training and use for psychological warfare purposes, and for the tasks specified above.

(b) Set up immediately on a pilot-plant scale an interrogation, indoctrination and training center for those POW's now in our hands in Korea. Personnel in charge of this project must be selected with the greatest care, taking into consideration Korean or Far Eastern experience, language qualifications, and temperamental aptitude. Full advantage should be taken of World War II experience in the indoctrination of German and Japanese prisoners of war and of recent experience with Soviet escapees.

33. The United States should advocate in the United Nations the adoption of the following principles to govern the action of the United Nations in Korea in the post-hostilities period:

(a) the unification of Korea should be arranged by representatives of the Korean people chosen in free secret-ballot elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage, the elections to be held under the auspices of the United Nations,

(b) the Government of the R.O.K. should be recognized as the only lawful government in Korea and should be consulted on problems arising in connection with the unification of Korea.

(c) An obligation rests upon the members of the United Nations to contribute to the solution of the tremendous economic, social and political problems certain to confront a unified and independent Korea. Asiatic members of the United Nations should be urged to make a substantial contribution to the assistance program in view of their special regional interest in Korea.

34. In consonance with the above principles, the United States should take the following steps:

(a) Take vigorous action through diplomatic channels and in the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly to assure and solidify United Nations support of necessary action in Korea.
(b) Be prepared to announce in the United Nations its determination to seek a solution of the Korean problem within the general framework of previous United Nations Resolutions and in a manner consistent with the United Nations Charter and the general aims and principles which the United States believes should underlie such a solution.

(c) When such an announcement is made, the United States should recommend or urge others to recommend, the creation of an appropriate United Nations body which would study and make recommendations to the General Assembly on the future of Korea in accordance with the principles enumerated above. It might be appropriate for the representative of India to act as chairman of such a body.

35. The United States should urge that the U.N. Commission on Korea or such body as may be established to take its place be charged with continuing consideration of Korean problems and instructed to make recommendations as to the size and character of the military and internal security forces needed by the R.O.K. The U.S. should recommend that the U.N. Commission should consider the desirability of permanent neutralization of Korea accompanied by political undertakings by the R.O.K. and by other states separately to refrain from any aggression. The question of U.N. guarantee should be studied but no U.S. commitment on this point should be made at this stage.

36. The United States should urge that U.N. forces be retained in Korea until a stable, unified, and independent state has been firmly established and should be prepared to make available United States forces as a contingent of the U.N. forces for the purpose of deterring renewed aggression or internal strife. The number of our forces should be reduced so far as possible, however, and should serve only in conjunction with other U.N. contingents, preferably including some Asiatic contingents.

795.00/8-3159

Draft Paper Prepared for the Preliminary Tripartite Conversations of the September Foreign Ministers Meeting

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 31, 1950.

COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

A. AREAS OF AGREEMENT

1. Every effort should be made to maintain the impressive degree of unanimity achieved to date among U.N. members on the Korean question.

1This paper, bearing the designation Document 5 [D-6/1], was prepared following the meeting on August 30 (p. 667) for consideration by the meeting of Ambassadors on September 1, infra, in the preliminary tripartite conversations.
2. United Nations forces should not be committed to proceed north of the 38th parallel without prior United Nations direction. Future circumstances would necessarily affect this decision, particularly the state of the North Korean forces at the time.

3. United Nations forces should not proceed north of the 38th parallel, if Soviet or Chinese Communist forces have occupied North Korea to the 38th parallel, or if major Soviet or Chinese Communist combat units have engaged or clearly indicated their intention of engaging in hostilities against U.N. forces.

4. A resolution formulating the broad objectives and intentions of the U.N. in Korea should be adopted in the General Assembly at an early date. Such resolution should emphasize the necessity of implementing previous U.N. resolutions directed to the achievement of the independence and unification of Korea.

5. A commission of representatives of senior rank, with a high percentage of Asian members, should be formed to make recommendations to the U.N. on problems relating to the establishment of an independent and unified Korea, including holding of elections.

6. U.N. forces, which should include strong Asian participation, should be retained in Korea during the period of readjustment following cessation of hostilities to prevent renewed aggression and maintain law and order. In the British view permanent occupation of North Korea by U.N. forces should not be contemplated.

7. Continued political and economic assistance to the Korean Government by the U.N. will be necessary.

B. QUESTIONS REQUIRING MINISTERIAL CONSIDERATION

There was a difference of opinion on the attitude to be maintained toward the government of the Republic of Korea after the cessation of hostilities. The U.S. position was stated to be continued recognition of the Republic of Korea as the only lawful government in Korea, which should be consulted with respect to any long-term solution of the Korean problem. The U.S. representatives pointed out the importance of maintaining the prestige and continuity of the Republic of Korea, a U.N. sponsored nation, and pointed to the democratic aspects of its government in spite of its immaturity and inexperience. The French representatives felt that the Rhee government did not enjoy the confidence of a large majority of the South Korean people and that an attempt simply to reconstitute and re-establish that government over Korea would not meet with wide approval inside and outside Korea. The British representative emphasized that Rhee's contention that his government held title to sovereignty over all of Korea could not be accepted. Therefore both delegations felt that a new situation would demand a new government and that elections on a national scale should be required.
The French representative favored a step-by-step approach to the Korean political problem, with a slow, deliberate application of formulae to allow passions to cool and to gain time for a settlement under the aegis of the U.N.

795.00/9-150

United States Delegation Minutes: SFM Pre 5

[Extracts] ¹

SECRET

PRELIMINARY CONVERSATIONS FOR SEPTEMBER
FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETINGS
SEPTEMBER 1, 1950, 10:30 A.M. TO 12:45 P.M.

DELEGATIONS

BRITISH  FRENCH  U.S.

Sir Derick Hoyer  Ambassador Bonnet ²  Ambassador Jessup
Millar ²  Mr. Daridan  Mr. Perkins
Mr. Burrows  Mr. de Margerie  Mr. Yost
Mr. Graves  Mr. Millet  Mr. Raynor
Mr. Burns  Mr. Jackson
Mr. Watson  Mr. O'Shaughnessy
Mr. Marten  Mr. McSweeney
Earl Jellicoe  (Recorder)

Ambassador Jessup welcomed the British and French delegations. He stated that the work done in preceding conversations had been very satisfactory. There are a number of points which cannot be dealt with at this moment. The function of these meetings should be to develop the points as much as possible, sharpening the documents so that they will contain the most important points for the Foreign Ministers. It was agreed that today's meeting would attempt to cover all the documents, leaving Tuesday ⁴ available for another meeting if necessary.

Document 5 (D-6)—Korea ⁵

The UK delegation suggested that the phrase “Similarly without UN direction . . .” be added at the beginning of A.3.

Ambassador Jessup pointed out that in the matter of military action north of the 38th parallel, we are not talking about military actions,
such as bombing attacks which may be carried out for strategic or tactical purposes in the course of the present action, but rather of the use of UN forces, presently in Korea to prevent aggression, to bring about unification of Korea.

Ambassador Jessup raised the question of the meaning of "permanent occupation" in Paragraph 6, page 2, and stated that he assumed that this would not exclude the use of UN forces in the period of pacification of the area. The British delegation stated it felt the phrase meant something like "unduly prolonged occupation" but that the phrase was taken from Foreign Office instructions.

Memorandum Prepared in the Preliminary Tripartite Conversations for the Consideration of the Foreign Ministers

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 1, 1950.
Document 12 [D-6/1a]

COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

A. AREAS OF AGREEMENT

1. Every effort should be made to maintain the impressive degree of unanimity achieved to date among United Nations members on the Korean question.

2. U.N. forces should not be committed to proceed north of the 38th parallel without prior U.N. direction. This would not preclude tactical operations north of the 38th parallel incident to action south of the parallel. Future circumstances would necessarily affect this decision, particularly the state of the North Korean forces at the time.

3. Without U.N. direction, U.N. forces should not proceed north of the 38th parallel, if Soviet or Chinese Communist forces have occupied North Korea to the 38th parallel, or if major Soviet or Chinese Communist combat units have engaged or clearly indicated their intention of engaging in hostilities against U.N. forces.

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The French representative favored a step-by-step approach to the Korean political problem, with a slow, deliberate application of formulae to allow passions to cool and to gain time for a settlement under the aegis of the U.N.

Executive Secretariat Files: NSC 80

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 1, 1950.

NSC 80

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON PEACE OFFENSIVE CONCERNING KOREA

On the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and with the concurrence of the President, the enclosed memorandum by the Joint
Secretaries on the subject is circulated herewith for the information of the National Security Council and the Secretary of the Treasury and referred to the NSC Staff for use in the preparation of a report for Council consideration.

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Enclosure]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, August 24, 1950.

Subject: Peace Offensives Concerning Korea

Statement

1. The past few weeks have produced the outline of the pressures for compromises in Korea. The Soviets have plunged into an avalanche of words on peace, U.S. aggression, and civil war. India, and other UN members, are seeking ways to end hostilities as soon as possible. Unless skillfully managed, these and other efforts plus growing casualty lists may build up into an uncontrollable demand for a settlement that would nullify the heroic resistance of American and South Korean troops and injure U.S. interests.

2. In a few weeks, barring large-scale entry of Chinese Communist or Soviet forces into Korea, a military stalemate may develop. This stalemate possibly could last several months. It is a bleak prospect for our troops, the American people, and the UN cause. In anticipation of this possibility, vigorous action on the psychological and diplomatic front, based on well-considered policy directives, should be undertaken by the United States almost immediately.

Recommendation

We strongly urge that you request the National Security Council staff to prepare a report on the courses of action to be taken to offset the psychological and diplomatic effects of a stalemate in Korea. Such actions would be taken, on the President's approval, with a view to bridging the gap until sufficient military force is available to launch a successful offensive in Korea.¹

Frank Pace, Jr.
Secretary of the Army

Dan A. Kimball
Acting Secretary of the Navy

Thomas K. Finletter
Secretary of the Air Force

¹At its 69th meeting on October 12, 1950, the National Security Council, on the recommendation of the NSC Senior Staff, agreed to cancel this project (NSC Action No. 369e).
TOP SECRET
NSC 81

[WASHINGTON,] September 1, 1950.

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON UNITED STATES COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO KOREA

References:
A. NSC Action No. 338 ¹
B. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Future United States Policy with Respect to Korea", dated July 17 ² and August 30, 1950 ³

Pursuant to the President's request the enclosed report on the subject, prepared by the NSC Staff, is submitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council and the Secretary of the Treasury at the next regularly scheduled Council meeting on Thursday, September 7, 1950.

It is recommended that, if this report is adopted, it be submitted to the President for consideration with the recommendation that he approve the Conclusions contained therein and direct their implementation by all executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

[Enclosure]

DRAFT REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON UNITED STATES COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO KOREA

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine what United States course of action with respect to Korea would be best calculated to advance the national interests of the United States.

ANALYSIS

2. The present United Nations action in Korea is being taken in pursuance of the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and June 27,

¹ Taken at the 64th meeting of the National Security Council on August 10, it expressed agreement that the NSC Staff should expedite work on the preparation of the requested report on Future U.S. Policy With Respect to North Korea.
² Ante, p. 410.
³ Not printed; it forwarded a memorandum dated August 29 from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in which the President concurred, requesting the NSC Staff to expedite work on its report so that it could be considered at the NSC meeting on September 7, 1950. (NSC files)
1950. The Resolution of June 25 called for "the immediate cessation of hostilities", called upon "the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel", and called upon all U.N. members "to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities." The Resolution of June 27 noted the failure of the North Korean authorities to comply with the resolution of June 25 and recommended that "the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."

3. In a third resolution (July 7, 1950), the Security Council requested the United Nations [States] to designate a Commander for all the forces of the members of the United Nations in the Korean operation, and authorized that these forces fly the U.N. flag. In response to this resolution, General MacArthur has been designated Commander of the U.N. forces in Korea. The Republic of Korea has also placed its forces under General MacArthur's command.

4. The political objective of the United Nations in Korea is to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions of November 14, 1947, December 12, 1948, and October 21, 1949.

5. The United States has strongly supported this political objective. If the present United Nations action in Korea can accomplish this political objective without substantial risk of general war with the Soviet Union or Communist China, it would be in our interest to advocate the pressing of the United Nations action to this conclusion. It would not be in our national interest, however, nor presumably would other friendly members of the United Nations regard it as being in their interest, to take action in Korea which would involve a substantial risk of general war. Furthermore, it would not be in our national interest to take action in Korea which did not have the support of the great majority of the United Nations, even if, in our judgment, such action did not involve a substantial risk of general war.

6. As U.N. forces succeed in stabilizing the front, driving back the North Korean forces, and approaching the 38th parallel, the decisions and actions taken by the United States and other U.N. members which are supporting the Security Council resolutions, and those taken by the Kremlin, will determine whether hostilities are confined to Korea or spread so that the danger of a third world war is greatly increased.

7. It is unlikely that the Soviet Union will passively accept the emergence of a situation in which all or most of Korea would pass
from its control, provided it believes that it can take action which would prevent this and which would not involve a substantial risk of general war. The Soviet Union may decide that it can risk re-occupying Northern Korea before United Nations forces have reached the 38th parallel, or the conclusion of an arrangement with the North Korean regime under which Soviet forces would be pledged to the defense of the territory of the “People’s Republic of Northern Korea”. Alternatively, the Soviet Union might initiate some move toward a negotiated settlement while hostilities are still in progress south of the 38th parallel. In view of the importance of avoiding general war, we should be prepared to negotiate a settlement while refusing terms that would leave the aggressor in an advantageous position, that would invite a repetition of the aggression, and that would undermine the authority and strength of the United Nations.

8. Although it does not appear likely that Chinese Communist forces would be used to occupy North Korea (because the Soviet Union probably regards Korea as being in its own direct sphere of interest), this contingency cannot be excluded. It also seems unlikely that Soviet or Chinese Communist forces will be openly employed in major units in the fighting in the southern part of the peninsula, for it is believed that neither the Soviet Union nor the Chinese Communists are ready to engage in general war at this time for this objective. It is possible that the Soviet Union may endeavor to persuade the Chinese Communists to enter the Korean campaign with the purpose of avoiding the defeat of the North Korean forces and also of fomenting war between the United States and the Chinese Communists should we react strongly.

9. It is possible, but not probable, that no action will be taken by the Soviet Union or by the Chinese Communists to reoccupy Northern Korea or to indicate in any other way an intention to prevent the occupation of Northern Korea by United Nations forces before the latter have reached the 38th parallel. In this unlikely contingency it would seem probable that the Soviet Union had decided to follow a hands-off policy, even at the expense of the loss of control of Northern Korea. Only in this contingency could the U.N. forces undertake ground operations north of the 38th parallel without a substantial risk of general war. It is difficult to appraise this risk at this time, and our action in crossing the 38th parallel would create a situation to which the Soviet Union would be almost certain to react in some manner. While the risk of Soviet or Chinese communist intervention might not be lessened if only the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) forces conducted the operation north of the 38th parallel, the risk of general hostilities as a result of such intervention would be reduced. In no
c ircumstances should other U.N. forces be used in the north-eastern province bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border.

10. It will be desirable to bear in mind in the contingency stated in paragraph 9 both the importance of securing support of the majority of U.N. members for any action that might be taken north of the 38th parallel and the advantage of establishing a record that will clearly show that every reasonable effort has been made to avoid carrying the military struggle into a new phase by a land offensive beyond the 38th parallel. At some point after the U.N. forces begin to take the initiative and to drive back and destroy the North Korean forces, terms of surrender should be offered. The question of the acceptance of such terms by the North Koreans would of course be determined by the U.S.S.R. in the light of its appraisal of its interests under all the circumstances then existing.

11. The U.N. forces are clearly committed by the Security Council resolutions to compel the withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind the 38th parallel and there is a clear legal basis for taking such military actions north of the 38th parallel as are necessary in accomplishing this mission.

12. Military actions north of the 38th parallel which go beyond the accomplishment of this mission as, for example, to accomplish the political objective of unifying Korea under the Republic of Korea, are not clearly authorized by existing Security Council resolutions. Accordingly, United Nations approval for such further military actions is a prerequisite to their initiation. Should such approval not be forthcoming, accomplishment of this political objective would not be feasible. It would have to be recognized that a stalemate freezing the U.N. forces indefinitely in Korea or returning to the status quo ante June 25, would be undesirable.

13. Soviet domination of North Korea has brought with it the pattern of police and propaganda control well known throughout the Soviet world. Since the existence and stability of a unified Korea must in the long run depend largely upon the Korean people themselves, the tasks of the United Nations will include the reorientation of the North Korean people toward the outlook of free peoples who accept the standards of international behavior set forth in the United Nations Charter.

CONCLUSIONS

14. Final decisions cannot be made at this time concerning the future course of action in Korea, since the course of action which will best advance the national interest of the United States must be determined in the light of: the action of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists, consultation and agreement with friendly members of the United Nations, and appraisal of the risk of general war.
15. The United Nations forces have a legal basis for conducting operations north of the 38th parallel to compel the withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind this line or to defeat these forces. The U.N. Commander should be authorized to conduct military operations, including amphibious and airborne landings or ground operations in pursuance of a roll-back, north of the 38th parallel for the purpose of destroying the North Korean forces, provided that at the time of such operations there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North Korea. U.N. operations should not be permitted to extend into areas close to the Manchurian and U.S.S.R. borders of Korea.

16. Concurrently U.N. forces should be developed and plans should be perfected with a view to the possible occupation of North Korea. However, the execution of such plans should take place only with the explicit approval of the President, and would be dependent upon prior consultation with and the approval of the U.N. members.

17. The United Nations Commander should undertake no ground operations north of the 38th parallel in the event of the occupation of North Korea by Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, but should reoccupy Korea up to the 38th parallel. Bombing operations north of the 38th parallel should not be discontinued merely because the presence of Soviet or Chinese Communist troops is detected in a target area. However, if the Soviet Union should announce in advance its intention to reoccupy North Korea, either explicitly or implicitly giving warning that its forces should not be attacked, the matter should be immediately referred to the Security Council with the stated purpose of securing the cooperation of the Soviet Union (or the Chinese Communists) in U.N. action to achieve the unity and independence of Korea. Since such cooperation would not be forthcoming, an attempt should then be made in the General Assembly to secure the condemnation of the Soviet Union (or the Chinese Communists) for flouting the will of the U.N. majority. Military action against North Korean troops south of 38 would continue, but action north of 38 should not be initiated or continued and if any U.N. forces are already north of 38 they should prepare to withdraw pending further directives from Washington.

18. In the event of the open employment of major Soviet units south of the 38th parallel, the U.N. Commander should defend his forces, make no move to aggravate the situation, and report to Washington. The same action should be taken in the event that U.N. forces are operating north of the 38th parallel and major Soviet units are openly employed. In either of these events the United States in common prudence would have to proceed on the assumption that global
war is probably imminent. Accordingly, the United States should immediately:

a. Make every effort in the light of the circumstances to localize the action, to stop the aggression by political measures and to ensure the unity of the free world if war nevertheless follows. These measures should include direct diplomatic action and resort to the United Nations with the objectives of:

(1) Making clear to the world United States preference for a peaceful settlement and the conditions upon which the United States would, in concert with other members of the United Nations, accept such a settlement.

(2) Consulting with members of the United Nations regarding their willingness to join with the United States in military opposition, if necessary, to the aggression.

b. Give consideration to the possibility of a direct approach to the highest Soviet leaders.

c. Consult with selected allies to perfect coordination of plans.

d. Place itself in the best possible position to meet the eventuality of global war, and therefore prepare to execute emergency war plans; but should, in so far as it has any choice, enter into full-scale hostilities only at the moment and in the manner most favorable to it in the light of the situation then existing.

e. While minimizing United States military commitments in areas of little strategic significance, take action with reference to the aggression to the extent and in the manner best contributing to the implementation of United States national war plans.

19. In the event of the open employment of major Chinese Communist units south of the 38th parallel:

a. The United States should not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China.

b. As long as action by U.N. military forces offers a reasonable chance of successful resistance, the U.N. Commander should continue such action and be authorized to take appropriate air and naval action outside Korea against Communist China. The latter action should be continued pending a review of U.S. military commitments in the light of conditions then existing to determine further U.S. courses of action.

c. The United States should take the matter to the Security Council with the purpose of condemning the Chinese Communists as aggressors.

20. In the event of an attempt to employ Soviet or Chinese Communist units covertly south of 38, the United Nations Commander should continue the action as long as he believes his forces capable of successful resistance.

21. The United States should immediately make an intensive effort, using all information media, to turn the inevitable bitterness and resentment of the war-victimized Korean people away from the United
States and to direct it toward the Korean Communists, the Soviet Union, and, depending on the role they play, the Chinese Communists, as the parties responsible for the destructive conflict. Special assistance should be given to the field commander and the U.S. Embassy in Korea to augment their present propaganda and information programs. The Government of the R.O.K. should be encouraged to increase its propaganda output and should be given material assistance in this effort.

22. In order to effect the reorientation of the North Korean people, to cause defection of enemy troops in the field, and to train North Korean personnel to participate in activities looking to unification of the country, the following steps should be taken:

   a. Establish the principle that the treatment of POWs, after their transfer to places of internment, shall be directed toward their exploitation, training and use for psychological warfare purposes, and for the tasks specified above.

   b. Set up immediately on a pilot-plant scale an interrogation, indoctrination and training center for those POWs now in our hands in Korea. Personnel in charge of this project must be selected with the greatest care, taking into consideration Korean or Far Eastern experience, language qualifications, and temperamental aptitude. Full advantage should be taken of World War II experience in the indoctrination of German and Japanese prisoners of war, of experiences in Greece, and of recent experience with Soviet escapees.

23. In preparation for the possible eventual retreat or sudden collapse of North Korean forces, the United States should immediately discuss with certain friendly members of the United Nations the terms to be offered the North Korean forces. This will serve to develop support for action north of the 38th parallel to accomplish the political objective of the United Nations in Korea in the event that the terms are rejected and there is no evidence of a substantial risk of a clash with Soviet or Chinese Communist forces. If the terms offered are not accepted, the U.N. Commander should continue his efforts to destroy as many of the enemy as possible before they retreat across the 38th parallel. He should request new instructions before continuing operations north of the 38th parallel with major forces for the purpose of occupying North Korea. He should not in any circumstances permit the use of U.N. forces other than R.O.K. contingents in the northeast province or along the Manchurian border.

24. If operations are undertaken to occupy northern Korea, the United Nations Commander should, in consultation with the Government of the R.O.K., determine the timing and method of subjecting occupied territory north of the 38th parallel to its jurisdiction. He should forbid, as commander of the U.N. forces, reprisals against the
forces, officials, and populace of North Korea, except in accordance
with international law, and take such measures as are within his
power to secure compliance with this directive.

25. In performing their mission beyond the 38th parallel, the general
posture of the United Nations forces should be one of liberation rather
than retaliation. An effort should be made to encourage the voluntary
adherence of ever larger areas of North Korea to the R.O.K. The
United Nations forces should attempt to exert a stabilizing influence
during the transition period. They should endeavor to conduct them-
selves in such a way as to emphasize the nonaggressive and temporary
nature of the U.N. occupation.

26. When organized armed resistance by the North Korean forces
has been brought substantially to an end, the United States should
attempt to reduce its share of the U.N. responsibilities for Korea, and
announce its desire to do so, without, however, implying any unwillingness to fulfill its U.N. commitments. The R.O.K. forces, operating
under principles established by the U.N. Commission for Korea, or
such body as may be established to take its place, should take the lead
in disarming remaining North Korean units and enforcing the terms
of surrender. Guerrilla activity should be dealt with primarily by the
forces of the Republic of Korea with minimum participation by U.N.
contingents, unless the Korean forces alone should prove unable to
cope with the guerrilla activities.

27. The United States should recognize that the Government of
the R.O.K. will have to take strong measures against Communist
efforts to cause trouble in Korea and that it may require support in
these measures from the United States. At the same time, the United
States should recognize that social and economic reforms will be nec-
essary in order to reduce the Communist menace to manageable
proportions.

28. The United States should advocate in the United Nations the
adoption of the following principles to govern the action of the United
Nations in Korea in the post-hostilities period:

a. The unification of Korea should be arranged by representatives
of the Korean people chosen in free secret-ballot elections on the basis
of universal adult suffrage, the elections to be held under the auspices
of the United Nations.

b. The Government of the R.O.K. should be recognized as the only
lawful government in Korea and should be consulted on problems
arising in connection with the unification of Korea.

c. An obligation rests upon the members of the United Nations
to contribute to the solution of the tremendous economic, social and
political problems certain to confront a unified and independent Korea.
Asiatic members of the United Nations should be urged to make a
substantial contribution to the assistance program in view of their
special regional interest in Korea.
29. In consonance with the above principles, the United States should take the following steps:

a. Take vigorous action through diplomatic channels and in the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly to assure and solidify United Nations support of necessary action in Korea.

b. Be prepared to announce in the United Nations its determination to seek a solution of the Korean problem within the general framework of previous United Nations Resolutions and in a manner consistent with the United Nations Charter and the general aims and principles which the United States believes should underlie such a solution.

c. When such an announcement is made, the United States should recommend or urge others to recommend the creation of an appropriate United Nations body which would study and make recommendations to the General Assembly on the future of Korea in accordance with the principles enumerated above. It might be appropriate for the representative of India to act as chairman of such a body.

30. The United States should urge that the U.N. Commission on Korea or such body as may be established to take its place be charged with continuing consideration of Korean problems and instructed to make recommendations as to the size and character of the military and internal security forces needed by the R.O.K. The U.S. should recommend that the U.N. Commission should consider the desirability of permanent neutralization of Korea accompanied by political undertakings by the R.O.K. and by other states separately to refrain from any aggression. The question of U.N. guarantee should be studied but no U.S. commitment on this point should be made at this stage.

31. The United States should urge that U.N. forces be retained in Korea until a stable, unified, and independent state has been firmly established and should be prepared to make available United States forces as a contingent of the U.N. forces for the purpose of deterring renewed aggression or internal strife. The number of our forces should be reduced so far as possible, however, and should serve only in conjunction with other U.N. contingents, preferably including some Asiatic contingents.

Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council held its 494th meeting on September 1 from 3 to 7:10 p. m., with Sir Gladwyn Jebb of the United Kingdom replacing Yakov Malik of the Soviet Union as President. Mr. Malik objected to the President's ruling to seat the representative of the Republic of Korea, but Sir Gladwyn's ruling was upheld by a vote of 9 (including the United States) in favor to 1 (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) against, with 1 (United Kingdom)
abstention. A Soviet draft resolution (U.N. document S/1751) to seat both Korean regimes then failed by a vote of 2 (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Yugoslavia) in favor to 8 (including the United States) opposed, with 1 member (Egypt) not participating in the voting. For the record, see U.N. document S/PV.494.

At 10 p.m. on September 1, President Truman delivered a radio and television address to the American people on the situation in Korea; for the text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950, page 609. Mr. Truman set forth an eight-point program on United States policy in the Far East and stated that there would be neither appeasement nor preventive war. He declared that the Korean conflict would not spread except by action of the Communist countries. He indicated that the United States would mobilize 3 million or more men for the present crisis. The United States, he said, had no territorial aspirations in Formosa.

795B.00/9-250

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

PUSAN, September 2, 1950.
[Unnumbered]

Subject: Transmittal of Memorandum of Conversation of the Ambassador, President Rhee, and Dr. Noble

The Embassy transmits a memorandum of conversation of the Ambassador, President Rhee, and Dr. Noble, which took place September 1, 1950.

Although the Ambassador had conveyed substantially the same ideas to the President and other officials repeatedly since the Government had been established at Taejon, the immediate purpose of this conversation was to impress the President with reasonable handling of a conflict with the National Assembly which had just come to a head by adoption, by overwhelming vote, by the National Assembly of a Resolution calling upon the President to discharge the Prime Minister—Defense Minister, Captain Shin Sung Mo, and the Home Minister, Dr. Chough Pyung Ok. The Ambassador had also sent Mr. Noble to discuss this question with the Chairman of the National Assembly, Shin Ik Hi, and the senior Vice-Chairman, Chang Taik San. Mr. Noble had presented views similar to those described in the conversation and the two National Assembly officers had agreed that for the time being they would use their influence to stop any public legislature-executive conflict.
Following the conversation described above, the President decided to go, and did go, before the National Assembly and addressed them, for about an hour in a friendly and conciliatory manner, while at the same time explaining why he found it impossible to accede to their request to discharge the two ministers. He also announced the appointment of four members of the National Assembly as part of the Korean Delegation to the Fifth General Assembly of the UN, which was taken by the Assemblymen as a conciliatory gesture. Unfortunately, in the question and answer period following his speech the President lost his temper and made some harsh statements about the Assembly which partially undid the good effect of his previous speech. Under the leadership of Shin Ik Hi and Chang Taik San, however, the Assembly proceeded to pass the budget and suppress the controversy for the present.

[Enclosure]

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Korea (Muccio)

CONFIDENTIAL

PUSAN, September 1, 1950.

Participants: Ambassador
President Rhee
Dr. Noble

Location: President Rhee’s Office

I told President Rhee how disappointed I was upon arrival at Pusan to find men—both in and outside the Government—who pride themselves in being leaders, “knifing” men in responsible positions. I considered particularly deplorable attempts to inject selfish political bickerings into the army and police at a time when the very life of the state was at stake.

I reminded Rhee that this jarred me officially and personally, as twice in the past two years I had had the opportunity of throwing my weight against continuance of U.S. aid to Korea. Since the blow of June 25, there were at least two times before military aid arrived that the U.S. could have run out plausibly and left the peninsula to its fate. It would have been easy to have done that at Suwon and, a few days later, at Taejon. I am delighted that we hung on at that time. I am proud that President Truman made his bold, forthright decision to send air and sea support and two days later ground support to stop the aggression. At the same time, I feel a tremendous responsibility to the American people for the lives and effort being expended and cannot but expect all Koreans to work together and do their best expressing confidence they could and would thereby be justifying the support received.
I then mentioned that the UN Commission on Korea in its first two reports had done well by Korea and by what was being done here. I understood that the third report had just been signed and that it was even more favorable to Korea. I continued that I was thrilled that 53 member states have endorsed what Korea, supported by the United States, had done. Many of these states were not only giving their moral support, but were coming now with material and military. The reports of the United Nations Commission on Korea had played a vital role in mobilizing world opinion on the side of Korea. I know that the delegates also hope that the Korean politicos will not nullify the confidence they have expressed in Korea.

Naturally, people throughout the world who are sending their loved ones to fight here are going to be eager to know why they are here and what the Koreans are doing. The eyes of the people of the world, friendly and unfriendly, are on Korea. He, all the members of his cabinet, the National Assembly, and civic leaders—both in and outside of the Government—must be aware that they are living in a goldfish bowl. Some may feel that they can continue their sinister manipulating and get away with it. They had better be aware that even though they think they can get away with it, they cannot.

This general outline was used in conversations that I and members of my Staff have had with Koreans, both in and out of the Government.

J. J. M[uccio]

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4 The third report of UNCOF, covering the period from December 13, 1949 to September 4, 1950, was forwarded to the Secretary General of the United Nations on the latter date; see U.N. document A/1350.

795.00/9-450: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PUSAN, September 4, 1950.
[Received September 4—7:56 p.m.]

159. For background purposes only, I have had increasing difficulty in dissuading President Rhee from making harmful public statements and actions; following are two illustrations:

a. On August 6, I outlined to President and later to war cabinet American proposal to include 100 Korean recruits directly into each American military unit. President said war cabinet were enthusiastic that Koreans were to be intermingled with Americans. Recruiting for Korean forces at rate of 1,000 a day was continued and additional accelerated recruitment for Americans was highly satisfactory to UN Commander Korea both as regards numbers and quality.
In Pusan the military and Youth Corps later resorted to impressment. Strong inducement tactics were probably used elsewhere. Without consulting cabinet, President issued order stopping all conscription. This delayed recruitment. I called on President and pointed out that I also was against forceful impressment but could not understand why Youth Corps, particularly its Youth Guard component and Student Defense League, were not tapped to furnish the requirements of Korean Army and UN forces. These two organizations appeared to be using their “goon” squads to impress other youth and were not furnishing any of their own members. He brushed the query aside with “You do not understand the Youth Corps”. I countered that the Youth Corps, especially the Youth Guard which had received six weeks’ intensive military training last summer, and members of the Student Defense League should be called forward, inasmuch as everyone said that they were burning with patriotic fervor and only needed arms to defend the country. That President Rhee has not changed his mind in keeping Youth Corps as sort of “citizens’ army” was reflected in his statement implementing conscription law that members Youth Guard Corps and Student Defense League are to register but are not to be drafted.

b. For about a month now President has been champing to issue statement “condemning negotiations behind his back”. About two weeks ago President drafted message to the 53 nations supporting Korean case which he proposed issuing simultaneously to press, to effect that Korea would recognize no settlement in negotiations of which he had not participated, that Korean forces would not stop at 38th parallel, etc. Noble cautioned against such action. Some days later his new director of OPI called and showed me text similar to original message. His FonMin called with another message to India that its position was hurting Korea. I cautioned in strongest terms possible any message, particularly messages as drafted, which publicly questioned motives of President Truman and other leaders spearheading fight against aggression as giving aid and comfort to enemy. I suggested that if President insisted on making his position clear, to do so by instructing his ambassador in Washington to do this informally with authorities there, FonMin accepted suggestion. Several days later director of OPI issued greatly watered down statement to non-Korean correspondents, text of which is being cabled separately.¹

Sent Department 159, repeated information CINCFE for General MacArthur only.

Muccio

¹ Not printed.
SECRET

TAEGU, September 4, 1950—6 p. m.
[Received September 5—10:42 a. m.]

5. General Walker today issued orders that all but skeleton staff UN military headquarters Taegue shall remove to Pusan. Movement now in progress. Move was dictated by serious enemy encroachment in Kyongju-Yongchon area during past two days where ROK forces have shown little capability to hold enemy thrusts. General Walker intends remain Taegu to head up skeleton staff. He has advised ROK Prime Minister to move ROK military headquarters to Pusan and this probably will be done tomorrow. Prime Minister plans to shuttle between Taegu and Pusan. Home Ministry plans remain Taegu. Pending further developments Taegu Embassy offices will remain Taegu.

DRUMRIGHT

SECRET

HONG KONG, September 5, 1950—4 p. m.
[Received September 5—3:06 p. m.]

508. Letter from Ch’en Yi, Shanghai journalist known to Sabin Chase1 (ConGen despatch 275, August 23, 19502) brought ConGen today by Ch’en’s friend. Letter reports following statements made recent Peking conference by Chou En-lai, repeated him by friend who attended conference. When asked position of China should North Korean troops be pushed back to Manchurian border, Chou replied China would fight enemy outside China’s border and not wait until enemy came in. He added that it would require at least 30 divisions for US to accomplish anything in Korea and at least 300 if enemy wants to try anything in China. Every day China is getting better prepared and has already had more than a year’s preparations in Manchuria, Chou declared. In meantime, Government policy is to nourish existing economic structure and not disturb it further. Important center still Europe, Chou concluded.

WILKINSON

1Chief of the China Branch, Division of Research for the Far East, Department of State.
2Not printed.
Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council met on September 5 from 3 to 7 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.495. At the meeting the United States Representative drew the Council’s attention to a communication from the United States Government (S/1758) dated September 5 relating to the shooting down of a bomber, bearing a red star insignia, which had attacked a United Nations fighter patrol off the west coast of Korea. The body of one crew member of the bomber had been recovered and identified as a member of the Soviet armed forces. Mr. Austin stated that the incident illustrated the desirability of adopting the United States draft resolution (S/1653) on localization of the fighting in Korea. In this connection, Mr. Austin also expressed United States concern at reports received of increased rail and road traffic in the area of North Korea adjacent to the Manchurian border.

761.5622/9-650: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

Moscow, September 6, 1950—4 p.m.

[Received September 6—11:16 a.m.]

622. Eyes only for Secretary. At his request I called on Vishinsky at 1 p.m. (Moscow time) today. He opened by referring to statement made by US Representative Security Council September 5 on Soviet plane incident off Korea September 4, describing it as incorrect.

He then read me via interpreter Soviet note to US Government, in substance alleging Soviet plane unarmed training mission 140 kilometers distant Korean coastline. Presentation followed in reverse our note April 18 Baltic plane, demanded investigation indemnification punishment those responsible.

I replied as follows:

“The information at my disposal indicates that the question to which you refer pertains to defensive action by United Nations Forces operating in the Korean area in accordance with resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and that it has, in fact, been brought to the attention of the Security Council for appropriate consideration. I am therefore not in a position to accept on behalf of the United States Government the communication of the Soviet Government on this subject. It would appear to be appropriate for any representations on this question to be presented to the United Nations Security Council.”

1 See the editorial note, supra.
2 Text quoted in telegram 825, scheduled for publication in volume iv.
During further half hour Vishinsky attempted persuade me accept note using various arguments. I consistently adhered position subject matter under UN competence in Security Council where Soviets should make their representations. Details later.

KIRK

761.5622/9-650: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, September 6, 1950—5 p.m.

PRIORITY

[Received September 6—1:58 p.m.]

623. As recounted mytel 622, September 6 after Vishinsky read note I said to him that the information at my disposal indicates that the question to which you refer pertains to defensive action by United Nations Forces operating in the Korean area in accordance with resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and that it has, in fact, been brought to the attention of the Security Council for appropriate consideration. I am therefore not in a position to accept on behalf of the United States Government the communication of the Soviet Government on this subject. It would appear to be appropriate for any representations on this question to be presented to the United Nations Security Council.

VISHINSKY. We are in possession of data, as I read in the note, and as confirmed by Soviet Government that this incident was not a defensive action but was an attack by eleven American planes on a Soviet plane making, as I said, a training flight between Port Arthur and Haiyan-Dao Island. Since it was a training flight the plane had neither bombing nor torpedo devices which testifies to the fact that the crew did not have any hostile intentions. Furthermore, the resolution of the SC of June 25 because of the absence of two permanent members has no legitimate force. The question as to whether the matter is a subject for SC is special question and cannot be subject for our discussion. As to your statement that it is not possible accept on part of your government any communication this subject, this is contrary to generally recognized rules of diplomatic courtesy. There were occasions when notes which were not in our opinion within competence of Soviet Government were accepted by us in accordance with rules of courtesy. Again I ask you to accept note to facilitate course of settlement of this matter.

AMBASSADOR. Armed forces referred to are operating under command of UN under a commanding officer responsible to UN. Soviet Government has representative at UN and therefore has every opportunity to raise question there. This is not question between US and USSR and therefore I cannot accept the note.
VISHINSKY. This is exactly a matter connected with the relations between US and USSR because no matter how it is represented about subordination of these forces to UN fact is that forces are American, under command American national who receives instructions from American Government. There is no headquarters UN in that vicinity. I cannot understand attitude Ambassador wishes to display towards Soviet Government. It is contrary to norms of diplomatic courtesy. For third time I beg Mr. Ambassador to accept note and convey it to those to whom addressed. Moreover this note contains appeal to US Government regarding an investigation and one can hardly try to avoid such duty.

AMBASSADOR. Mr. Minister, in UN 53 nations have agreed to condemn aggression against South Korea. These 53 support UN action there with their moral and physical resources. US is but one of these and is acting under mandate of UN which is doing its best resist this aggression. Your problem is to deal with UN, not US, on this matter.

VISHINSKY. In my opinion there is misunderstanding on this matter. Incident took place 140 kilometers from Korea which has nothing in common with operation taking place in Korea. It is generally known we have nothing to do with Korean events. Were planes active in the vicinity of Korea then point of view of Ambassador would be correct. This not case. As said in note, plane was making training flight in region of Port Arthur and Haiyan-Dao Island in zone of Port Arthur naval base which according to treaty well known to US Government temporarily belongs to Soviet Union. All this could be understood if incident had any connection with Korean events. It is strange that American Government does not want investigation action of forces acting under its instructions.

AMBASSADOR. Your Government has a correct way of pursuing this problem through UN. It is question between USSR and SC. I do not see profitability of continuing conversation on this matter.

VISHINSKY. This is not correct. This is not question between USSR and UN but between our countries for reasons I had honor to state to you, Mr. Ambassador. It is question of relations between our two countries. I cannot understand how such a position as taken by Ambassador was caused—one which excludes any other estimate but the one I have given (sic). It is contrary to the norms of diplomatic relations and practices of the diplomatic corps. But it is up to the Ambassador to act as he wishes.

AMBASSADOR. I am sure you know I intend no lack of courtesy to you personally. I only wish stress point of view that this is not question of direct relations US and USSR, but between USSR and UN, and should be conducted through proper channels.
Vishinsky. This is not question dealing with person of Foreign Minister, USSR, but one which deals with relations between our countries. I would like to ask Mr. Ambassador if matter is put this way what military action was effected by American destroyer in vicinity 140 kilometers from Korea and 18 kilometers from Haiyan-Dao Island which is in limits of Soviet naval base? What kind of military actions? If not, if no military actions then it was just an American destroyer. Just because there are military actions by UN—just because an American destroyer shoots at Soviet crew, does it mean no other relations can exist between the two Forces? So as I pointed out there is no other connection between this action and military events in Korea.

Ambassador. US Government has already expressed its willingness to facilitate the conduct of investigation into incident in Manchuria. My Government is never against investigation of facts. It will welcome an investigation of this incident but this is a matter for the UN.

Vishinsky. I must state Ambassador gave no answer my question. How we are to act in UN concerns only us, just as this question concerns only USA and USSR. I beg you to accept this note—not you personally but through you to US Government. In my opinion you are obliged as Ambassador to accept communication addressed your government.

Ambassador. For reasons stated I cannot accept this note.

Brief conversation then ensued concerning Vishinsky's departure for Lake Success, I wished him bon voyage and departed at 1345.

Kirk

761.5622/9-650 : Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
SECRET

Moscow, September 6, 1950—5 p. m.

PRIORITY

[Received September 6—3:23 p. m.]

624. Subsequent to Embtel 622 and 623 re my conversation with Vishinsky, Foreign Office delivered by messenger Soviet note I declined to accept during interview. At 1630 Moscow time this note was returned to Foreign Office under covering following note:

"I am returning herewith your note No. 52 of this date which has been sent to this Embassy subsequent to our conversation at 1300 today.

"As I stated to you during that conversation, the information at my disposal indicates that the question to which you refer pertains to defensive action by United Nation Forces operating in the Korean area in accordance with resolutions of the UNSC and that it has, in
fact, been brought to the attention of the SC for appropriate consideration. I am therefore not in a position to accept on behalf of the US Government the communication of the Soviet Government on this subject. It would appear to be appropriate for any representations on this question to be presented to the UNSC.

"Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my most distinguished consideration."

For Department's information translation of Soviet note No. 52, September 6, reads as follows:

"Government USSR considers necessary on basis verified data declare following to Government US.

"September 4 at 1244 local time two motored air plane of Air Forces USSR possessing neither bombing nor torpedo devices, carrying out training flight in region of Haiyan-Dao Island, projecting into limits Port Arthur naval base and situated 140 kilometers from the coasts of Korea, was without any basis or excuse attacked and fired upon by 11 fighters of the Air Forces USA. As result of attack Soviet plane was shot down and fell burning into sea 8 kilometers south Haiyan-Dao Island. Witnesses this attack of American fighters on plane Soviet Air Forces were two other Soviet planes carrying out training flight alongside plane that perished, and also Soviet post of observation and communication service on Haiyan-Dao Island.

"In order camouflage this unjustified attack on Soviet plane representative USA in UN circulated false version that Soviet plane allegedly flew over vessel carrying out screening operation and headed with clearly hostile purpose towards center UN unit and allegedly opened fire on American fighters.

"In reality Soviet plane not only did not fly over American vessel but did not come close to it being at a distance of more than 10 kilometers from it and was carrying out, as already stated above, training flight and did not at all open fire on American fighters but was shot down as a result of [gratuitous] attack of 11 American fighters on it.

"Soviet Government categorically rejects American version and declares a decisive protest to Government USA against crime committed by American military aviation.

"Soviet Government places on Government USA all responsibility for criminal actions American military authorities sullying themselves with this crying violation generally accepted norms international law and insists on strict investigation and punishment of persons responsible for attack mentioned and also on compensation for loss caused by perishing of crew consisting three flyers and destruction Soviet plane.

"Soviet Government considers also necessary draw attention Government USA to serious consequences which such actions on part American military authorities can have."

Kirk

1The Department of State sent the following message to Moscow in telegram 175, September 6, 8 p.m.: "Dept commends you prompt and able handling subject matter urt 624 and previous. FYI identical note delivered Dept this afternoon was promptly returned to Sov Emb." (761.5622/9-650)
Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council met on September 6 from 3 to 6:30 p. m.; for the record, see U.N. document S/PV.496. The Soviet Representative had the text of his Government’s note to the United States Government on the shooting down of the Soviet plane (see supra) read aloud to the Security Council (U.N. document S/1766), but indicated that it was not his intent to have this inter-governmental matter debated in the Security Council.

Subsequently, the Soviet Union vetoed the United States draft resolution condemning North Korean defiance of the United Nations (S/1653; for the text, see the editorial note on the 479th meeting on July 31, page 501). The vote was 9 (including the United States) in favor to 1 (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) opposed, with 1 (Yugoslavia) abstention. The Security Council then rejected the Soviet draft resolution calling for withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and extension of invitations to the Security Council to representatives from North Korea and People’s Republic of China (S/1668; for the text, see the editorial note on the 483rd meeting on August 4, page 527). The vote was 1 (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in favor, to 8 (including the United States) opposed, with 2 abstentions (Egypt and Yugoslavia).

795.00/9-850

Memorandum Agreed Upon by the French, United Kingdom, and United States Delegations to the United Nations

SECRET

NEW YORK, September 6, 1950.

PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS RAISED IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONSIDERATION OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM

In discussions with the UK, French, and U.S. Delegations in New York on August 28 the points stated below were agreed upon. The substantive aspects of the Korean problem are considered separately in document No. 5 (D-6/1). There are no questions under the above heading which require decision by the Foreign Ministers.

Points of Agreement.

1) The procedural problem of concurrent consideration of Korea by the SC and the GA arises because Article 12 of the Charter provides

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1 A cover sheet (not printed) to the source text, bearing the date September 11, indicated that this was a document prepared for the records of the Foreign Ministers Conference; it bore the designation “Document 19 [D-1/2].”

2 Dated August 31, p. 679; see also Document 12 [D-6/1a], dated September 1, p. 682.
that while the SC is exercising its functions regarding a dispute the
GA shall not make any recommendations with respect to it unless
the SC so requests. A decision of the SC to remove an item from its
agenda is not subject to the veto.

2) During the GA the SC should continue to remain seized of the
specific item of "complaint of aggression against the Republic of
Korea" and it should not request the GA to make recommendations
regarding this matter. This position is subject to review should it
prove necessary for the UN to take further affirmative action regard-
ing the aggression or military operations and a Soviet veto in the
SC appears likely.

3) Since the GA will have before it the problem of "the independ-
ence of Korea" and the report of UNCOOK the GA will have wide
latitude in discussing and making recommendations regarding the
future of Korea.

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Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council held its 497th meeting on
September 7 from 11 a.m. to 6:50 p.m.; see U.N. document S/PV.497.
The Council rejected the Soviet draft resolution condemning United
States bombing in Korea (S/1679; for the text, see the editorial note on
the 484th Security Council meeting of August 8, page 546). The vote
was 1 (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in favor to 9 (including
the United States) opposed, with 1 (Yugoslavia) abstention.

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795.00/9-750

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[Extracts]

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 7, 1950.

NSC MEETING

1. Action at the NSC on the Korean paper.2 The paper has been
approved, subject to the senior staff members from State and Defense
going together, principally on Paragraphs 15 and 17.

General Bradley's comments seemed to be that the paper contem-
plated a stabilization at the 38th Parallel, whereas, if General Mac-
Arthur could destroy the North Korean forces, then President Rhee
might proclaim an election and police the whole country north of the
38th Parallel with Korean forces. He had not had time to study the
paper closely but felt that it would preclude this.

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1 The 67th meeting of the National Security Council was held on September 7.
2 Reference is to NSC 81, September 1, p. 685.
I said that it had no such effect, and that Paragraph 15 should be rewritten to make it clear that if there was to be an actual invasion north of the 38th Parallel with fighting forces—American, etc.,—that decision had to be made in Washington.

I also explained the trouble with Paragraph 17. The President, Secretary Johnson and General Bradley agreed and thought there would be no problem about the paper. I am attaching General Bradley’s memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, copy of which he gave me.

4. After the meeting General Bradley and Secretary Johnson raised with the President another bombing of Rashin. They said that one-quarter of the oil supplies of North Korea were at this point, and Secretary Johnson thought that it was the point through which most of the tanks came.

They wanted to bomb the installations and marshalling yards. They said they would do this, if the President approved, in daylight so as to be certain of not violating the border.

The President asked my opinion.

I said that I was not so much worried about violating the border as I was about bombing so close to the Soviet border and in so sensitive a spot; that it might provoke attack on the bombing expedition or Soviet reaction in the direction of occupying some or all of North Korea. If these eventualities occurred, or either of them, we would lose far more than we would gain by knocking out the gasoline.

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*Under cover of a memorandum dated September 7, not printed, to Mr. Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State, Rusk forwarded the following proposed revisions in Paragraph 15 of NSC 81:

1. **Paragraph 15, 2nd sentence.**
   - Delete the first four words, and substitute the phrase indicated:
     - "It would be expected that the UN Commander would be authorized to conduct..."

2. **Paragraph 15, bottom of page 6.**
   - Insert the following additional sentence after the 2nd sentence of paragraph 15, bottom of page 6:
     - "Since such operations would involve a risk of major war with the Soviet Union and would directly involve the interests of other friendly governments, the UN Commander, should prior to putting any such plan into execution, obtain the approval of the President in order that he may give consideration at the time to the various elements involved." (NSC Files)

4. **Paragraph 17, last sentence at bottom of page 7.**
   - Delete this sentence and substitute the indicated sentence:
     - "It is assumed that Soviet occupation down to the 38th parallel would be accompanied by the withdrawal of North Korean forces behind the 38th parallel. Otherwise new decisions would have to be made as to the nature of U.N. military operations in the area." (Ibid.)

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"Infra."
I also spoke about the danger of another action on our part in a sensitive area so soon after the episode of the plane.

General Bradley asked whether some postponement of the operation would be useful.

The President expressed considerable worry about the matter and asked the JCS to review the situation, asked me to review it, and asked that Defense and State get together and discuss the matter before laying it before him.

I would like Mr. Matthews to take charge of this and have a word with me at the 9:30 meeting tomorrow.

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Executive Secretariat Files: NSC 80 Series

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 7, 1950.

Subject: U.S. Courses of Action With Respect to Korea.

With reference to your memorandum of 1 September 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered NSC 81 and are of the opinion that the approach to the basic problem as outlined in this paper is unrealistic since that approach envisages the stabilization of a front on the 38th parallel.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after consultation by two of its members with General MacArthur, agree with his concept that the initial objective to be attained is the destruction of North Korean forces. We believe, after the strength of the North Korean forces has been broken, which it is anticipated will occur south of 38th degrees North, that subsequently operations must take place both north and south of the 38th parallel. Such operations on the ground should be conducted by South Korean forces since it is assumed that the actions will probably be of a guerrilla character. General MacArthur has plans for increasing the strength of the South Korean forces so that they should be adequate at the time to cope with this situation.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur agree that the occupation of Korea by U.N. forces subsequent to the cessation of actual hostilities should be limited to the principal cities south of the 38th parallel and that any occupation by U.N. forces should be terminated as early as possible. In this connection it is considered that all United States forces should be removed from Korea as early as practicable. Such action will be of great importance to our position with respect to all of Asia.

1 This memorandum was circulated to the NSC on September 8 by the Executive Secretary (Lay).
It is our understanding that General MacArthur, in consultation with Syngman Rhee, has agreed that the government of the Republic of Korea, the only government recognized by the United Nations, should be re-established in Seoul as early as practicable. General MacArthur states that he has reached an understanding with Mr. Rhee that he, Mr. Rhee, upon re-entry into Seoul will immediately grant a general amnesty to all except war criminals and that he will call for a general election to fill the 100 vacant seats in the Korean Parliament, and thereafter set up a single government for all Korea.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest that NSC 81 be redrafted to reflect the foregoing principles and that the redraft, in lieu of NSC 81, be considered by the National Security Council.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
OMAR N. BRADLEY

795.00/8-2250

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Planning Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Emmerson)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1950.

Subject: New Démarche to Bajpai: Proposed Terms for Settlement of Korean Conflict

Reference: Your memorandum August 22, 1950

It is believed that the reference project should not be undertaken for the following reasons:

(1) The conflict in Korea is primarily a concern for, first, the UNSC, and, second, the 53 members of the United Nations supporting the UN resolution of June 25 and June 27;
(2) Such a démarche coming from the United States alone would therefore be inappropriate and would cause some wonder in the mind of Bajpai as to, not only its propriety, its bona fides;
(3) The démarche as such would in fact commit us to a position which we have as yet neither cleared as a Government position nor cleared with other friendly Powers, and would therefore tend to create for us certain possible future complications;
(4) In view of the existing military situation in Korea and the position of both Moscow and Peiping, consideration of the matter outside the UNSC would appear in any event to be premature;
(5) The discussions with Bajpai are proceeding satisfactorily on the present basis and had perhaps better not be complicated by the interjection of a new controversial matter such as the present.

1 See footnote 2 to the draft memorandum by the Policy Planning Staff on Proposed Terms for a Settlement of the Korean Conflict Prior to the Assumption of the Offensive by UN Forces, dated August 21, p. 616.
The proposed procedure for a settlement of the Korean conflict prior to the assumption of the offensive by UN forces, judged on its merits, has much to recommend it. It is suggested that it be kept on ice for possible future use.

795.00/9-850

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1950.

Subject: Problems Relating to Korea.

Participants: Dr. John M. Chang, Korean Ambassador.
Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary.
Mr. Arthur B. Emmons, Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs.

Ambassador Chang of the Korean Embassy called on Mr. Rusk at three o'clock this afternoon at his own request. The Ambassador mentioned that he had heard that the forthcoming meeting of the Foreign Ministers might discuss the Korean problem and felt that it was important that the point of view of the Korean Government be made known. He added that he is being frequently approached by members of the press and others on what the Republic of Korea position is with respect to the question of the 38th Parallel and to the future solution of the Korean problem. He remarked that he was often forced into the position of having to make some reply to such questions and that in these replies he had taken the position that the Republic of Korea no longer recognized the existence of the 38th Parallel and that the future solution to the question of Korean unification and independence must be based on the United Nations resolutions in this respect.

The Ambassador stated that his Government would not be satisfied with any solution which did not envisage the complete subduing of the Communist military forces and the removal of the North Korean regime. He added that there was now much talk about the holding of new elections throughout Korea; his Government felt that its authority should be extended over North Korea following a cessation of hostilities, and that the integrity of the present National Assembly, elected last May, should not be prejudiced by further special elections in South Korea under the United Nations.

Mr. Rusk pointed out that the United States could not now assume a definite position upon the problem of the 38th Parallel and, at this stage, would not support any predetermined line of action in relation to it, since the problem was one for decision by the United Nations.
at the proper time. He therefore hoped that, in any public statements which the Ambassador might make, no position would be taken with respect to future policy towards Korea which would necessitate an open commitment on this problem by the United States at this time, inasmuch as we are not in a position fully to support the apparent attitude of the Republic of Korea on the question of the 38th Parallel under present circumstances.

In reply to the Ambassador's question concerning the Foreign Minister's meeting, Mr. Rusk stated that the general question of Korea would undoubtedly be discussed and that such discussion would probably revolve around what further long range action the respective governments could take in seeking a solution to the Korean problem through the medium of the United Nations. He added that he did not think that the specific matter of the 38th Parallel would necessarily be discussed.

Ambassador Chang suggested that his mission prepare, for the use of the Department, a memorandum on the position of the Republic of Korea Government with regard to the future of Korea. Mr. Rusk agreed that this would be a good idea but asked that the memorandum be phrased in such a way that no reply from the Department would be called for at this time. The Ambassador agreed.

The Ambassador then referred to the question of the formation of a Korean relief society, stating that he understood meetings were now being held in New York concerning this matter, at which Mr. Kim of his Embassy was present. He hoped that an early decision would be reached concerning the establishment of such a society.

The Ambassador raised the question of the supply of M-1 rifles to South Korean civilians corps in aid of the war effort, pointing out the importance which his Government placed on the early delivery of such arms. Mr. Rusk replied that, according to his latest information, supplies of such arms were being expedited and that this program appeared to be well under way.

The Ambassador next raised the matter of Paul M. Ro (Ki Nam Ro) the Korean Catholic Bishop of Seoul who was now in Tokyo. He stated that Bishop Ro's Cathedral in Seoul, together with his residence and a seminary, had recently been destroyed by American bombers. The Bishop was very anxious to get a visa for the United States, in order to collect funds for the restoration of his Cathedral, and the Ambassador said the Maryknoll Society and several of the American Catholic Archbishops, including Cardinal Spellman, had offered to assist him. He added that the Bishop did not speak much English but that he had a priest in the United States who could help him in this regard. He wished to lend the support of his Embassy to the Bishop's request for a visa.
Mr. Rusk asked the Ambassador's opinion concerning the possibility that the Chinese Communists might intervene militarily in Korea. The Ambassador did not think that the Peiping regime would do so on the grounds that the Chinese Communists would not want to make open war against the United Nations. He felt any such intervention as might be made would be limited to the covert supplying of "volunteers" to the North Korean forces.

The Ambassador stated that Louise Yim and Mr. Cynn, both currently members of the Korean National Assembly and now in the United States, would appreciate an opportunity to call upon the Secretary to pay their respects. He added that Miss Yim, who was shortly to return to Korea, also would like to see the President if this could be arranged. Mr. Rusk made no commitment on this.

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396.1–NE/9–850: Telegram

*The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

NEW YORK, September 8, 1950—6:05 p.m.  
[Received September 8—7:46 p.m.]

488. Jebb (UK) feels we should be prepared for action if Chinese Communists take military action in Korea. He made suggestion in which we concur that this topic should be on agenda for FM meetings.¹

Gross

¹ The Department of State's reply, in telegram 243, September 12, read as follows: "Korea on agenda FM mtgs reurts 488, Sept 8, and aspect question to which Jebb refers can readily be raised as part of genl Korean discussion." (396.1–NE/9–850)

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795B.00/9–850: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL  

PUSAN, September 8, 1950.  
[Received September 9—1:15 a.m.]

169. National Assembly voted overwhelmingly September 6 request President dismiss Prime Minister-Defense Minister Sihn Sung Mo and Home Minister Chough Pyung Ok. President expected refuse.

Attack on Chough due to his arrest Assemblyman Kim Choon Tae (Embtl 124, August 15 ¹) at Taegu, charged with undercover Communist activity while Assembly in session and subsequent refusal release him. Assembly leaders claim concerned with constitutional

¹ Not printed.
immunities, not protection Communist, while Chough, President maintain dangerous release Communist agent while ROK fighting Communists, regardless immunities.

Assembly feeling against Sihn stronger than against Chough. Causes complex, partly from Sihn's alleged unbending foreign ways, more important desire group including Lee Bum Suk, Yun Chi Yung, Louise Yim, General Kim Suk Won get power and probably Speaker Shin Ik Hi ambition become premier. Assembly hostility general for Sihn's alleged failure warn them before he left Seoul and permitting General Chai prematurely blow Han bridge. Most recently Sihn's relief Generals Kim Hong Il and Kim Suk Won, for cause, by order General Walker being made political issue in Assembly where facts generally unknown and relieved generals are lobbying.

Embassy considers both Sihn, Chough doing outstanding jobs; also domestic quarrel this time possibly have serious external effects; has privately so indicated to Assembly leaders who appear impressed but whether they will take necessary measures stop movement from developing into open acrimonious legislative-executive battle unknown.

Muccio

Executive Secretariat Files: NSC 81/1

Report by the National Security Council to the President

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON, September 9, 1950.]

UNITED STATES COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO KOREA

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine what United States course of action with respect to Korea would be best calculated to advance the national interests of the United States.

ANALYSIS

2. The present United Nations action in Korea is being taken in pursuance of the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and June 27, 1950. The Resolution of June 25 called for "the immediate cessation of hostilities", called upon "the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel", and called upon all U.N. members "to render every assistance to the United

1 A memorandum dated September 11 by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council read as follows: "The President has this date approved the Conclusions contained in the reference report on the subject and directed their implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government." This memorandum was annexed to the source text. (NSC files)
Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.” The Resolution of June 27 noted the failure of the North Korean authorities to comply with the resolution of June 25 and recommended that “the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.”

3. In a third resolution (July 7, 1950), the Security Council requested the United Nations [States] to designate a Commander for all the forces of the members of the United Nations in the Korean operation, and authorized that these forces fly the U.N. flag. In response to this resolution, General MacArthur has been designated Commander of the U.N. forces in Korea. The Republic of Korea has also placed its forces under General MacArthur’s command.

4. The political objective of the United Nations in Korea is to bring about the complete independence and unity of Korea in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions of November 14, 1947, December 12, 1948, and October 21, 1949.

5. The United States has strongly supported this political objective. If the present United Nations action in Korea can accomplish this political objective without substantially increasing the risk of general war with the Soviet Union or Communist China, it would be in our interest to advocate the pressing of the United Nations action to this conclusion. It would not be in our national interest, however, nor presumably would other friendly members of the United Nations regard it as being in their interest, to take action in Korea which would involve a substantial risk of general war. Furthermore, it would not be in our national interest to take action in Korea which did not have the support of the great majority of the United Nations, even if, in our judgment, such action did not involve a substantial risk of general war.

6. As U.N. forces succeed in stabilizing the front, driving back the North Korean forces, and approaching the 38th parallel, the decisions and actions taken by the United States and other U.N. members which are supporting the Security Council resolutions, and those taken by the Kremlin, will determine whether hostilities are confined to operations against the North Koreans or spread so that the danger of a third world war is greatly increased.

7. It is unlikely that the Soviet Union will passively accept the emergence of a situation in which all or most of Korea would pass from its control, unless it believes that it can take action which would prevent this and which would not involve a substantial risk of general war or unless it is now prepared to accept such risk. The Soviet Union may decide that it can risk reoccupying Northern Korea before
United Nations forces have reached the 38th parallel, or the conclusion of an arrangement with the North Korean regime under which Soviet forces would be pledged to the defense of the territory of the “People’s Republic of Northern Korea”. Alternatively, the Soviet Union might initiate some move toward a negotiated settlement while hostilities are still in progress south of the 38th parallel. In view of the importance of avoiding general war, we should be prepared to negotiate a settlement favorable to us. Such a settlement should not leave the aggressor in an advantageous position that would invite a repetition of the aggression and that would undermine the authority and strength of the United Nations.

8. Although politically unlikely, it is possible that Chinese Communist forces might be used to occupy North Korea, even though the Soviet Union probably regards Korea as being in its own direct sphere of interest. Similarly, it is also a possibility that Soviet or Chinese Communist forces may be openly employed in major units in the fighting in the southern part of the peninsula. Soviet decision in this regard would depend on whether the USSR or the Chinese Communists or both are ready to engage in general war at this time for this objective. It is possible that the Soviet Union, although this would increase the chance of general war, may endeavor to persuade the Chinese Communists to enter the Korean campaign with the purpose of avoiding the defeat of the North Korean forces and also of fomenting war between the United States and the Chinese Communists should we react strongly.

9. It is possible, but politically improbable, that no action will be taken by the Soviet Union or by the Chinese Communists to re-occupy Northern Korea or to indicate in any other way an intention to prevent the occupation of Northern Korea by United Nations forces before the latter have reached the 38th parallel. In this unlikely contingency there would be some reason to believe that the Soviet Union had decided to follow a hands-off policy, even at the expense of the loss of control of Northern Korea. Only in this contingency could the U.N. ground forces undertake to operate in or to occupy Northern Korea without greatly increasing the risk of general war. It is difficult to appraise this risk at this time, and our action in moving major forces north of the 38th parallel would create a situation to which the Soviet Union would be almost certain to react in some manner. If only the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) forces operate in or occupy Korea north of the 38th parallel, the risk of general hostilities would be reduced, although the possibility of Soviet or Chinese Communist intervention would not be precluded. U.N. operations should not be permitted to extend across the Manchurian or USSR borders of Korea. It should be the policy not to include any non-Korean units in any U.N. ground forces which may be used in the north-eastern province
bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border.

10. It will be desirable to bear in mind in the contingency stated in paragraph 9 both the importance of securing support of the majority of U.N. members for any action that might be taken north of the 38th parallel and the advantage of establishing a record that will clearly show that every reasonable effort has been made to avoid carrying the military struggle into a new phase by a land offensive beyond the 38th parallel. Therefore, at some point after the U.N. forces begin to take the initiative and to drive back and destroy the North Korean forces, terms of surrender should be offered. The question of the acceptance of such terms by the North Koreans would of course be determined by the USSR in the light of its appraisal of its interests under all the circumstances then existing.

11. The U.N. forces are clearly committed by the Security Council resolutions to compel the withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind the 38th parallel and there is a clear legal basis for taking such military actions north of the 38th parallel as are necessary in accomplishing this mission.

12. Military actions north of the 38th parallel which go beyond the accomplishment of this mission as, for example, to accomplish the political objective of unifying Korea under the Republic of Korea, are not clearly authorized by existing Security Council resolutions. Accordingly, United Nations approval for military actions in furtherance of this political objective is a prerequisite to their initiation. Should such approval not be forthcoming, or should the USSR announce its intention, or take military action, to prevent the accomplishment of this political objective, its accomplishment would not be feasible. It would have to be recognized that a stalemate freezing the U.N. forces indefinitely in Korea or returning to the status quo ante June 25, would be undesirable.

13. Soviet domination of North Korea has brought within it the pattern of police and propaganda control well known throughout the Soviet world. Since the existence and stability of a unified Korea must in the long run depend largely upon the Korean people themselves, the tasks of the United Nations will include the reorientation of the North Korean people toward the outlook of free peoples who accept the standards of international behavior set forth in the United Nations Charter.

CONCLUSIONS

14. Final decisions cannot be made at this time concerning the future course of action in Korea, since the course of action which will best

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2 The substance of the conclusions was transmitted to General MacArthur by the Department of the Army on September 15; see Hearings, p. 718.
advance the national interest of the United States must be determined in the light of: the action of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists, consultation and agreement with friendly members of the United Nations, and appraisal of the risk of general war.

15. The United Nations forces have a legal basis for conducting operations north of the 38th parallel to compel the withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind this line or to defeat these forces. It would be expected that the U.N. Commander would receive authorization to conduct military operations, including amphibious and airborne landings or ground operations in pursuance of a roll-back in Korea north of the 38th parallel, for the purpose of destroying the North Korean forces, provided that at the time of such operations there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North Korea. Since such operations would involve a risk of major war with the Soviet Union and would directly involve the interests of other friendly governments, the U.N. Commander should, prior to putting any such plan into execution, obtain the approval of the President in order that he may give consideration at the time to the various elements involved. U.N. operations should not be permitted to extend across the Manchurian or USSR borders of Korea. It should be the policy not to include any non-Korean units in any U.N. ground forces which may be used in the north-eastern province bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Man-churian border.

16. Concurrently the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be authorized to direct the Commander of the U.N. forces in Korea to make plans for the possible occupation of North Korea. However, the execution of such plans should take place only with the explicit approval of the President of the United States, and would be dependent upon prior consultation with and the approval of members of the U.N.

17. The United Nations Commander should undertake no ground operations north of the 38th parallel in the event of the occupation of North Korea by Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, but should reoccupy Korea up to the 38th parallel. Air and naval operations north of the 38th parallel should not be discontinued merely because the presence of Soviet or Chinese Communist troops is detected in a target area. If the Soviet Union or the Chinese Communists should announce in advance their intention to reoccupy North Korea and give warning, either explicitly or implicitly, that their forces should not be attacked, the matter should be immediately referred to the Security Council with the stated purpose of securing the cooperation of the Soviet Union (or the Chinese Communists) in U.N. action to achieve the unity and independence of Korea. Since such cooperation would not be forth-
coming, an attempt should then be made in the General Assembly to secure the condemnation of the Soviet Union (or the Chinese Communists) for flouting the will of the U.N. majority. Action north of the 38th parallel should not be initiated or continued, and if any U.N. forces are already north of the 38th parallel they should prepare to withdraw pending further directives from Washington. It is assumed that Soviet occupation down to the 38th parallel would be accompanied by the withdrawal of North Korean forces behind the 38th parallel. Otherwise new decisions would have to be made as to the nature of U.N. military operations in the area.

18. In the event of the open or covert employment of major Soviet units south of the 38th parallel, the U.N. Commander will assume the defense, make no move to aggravate the situation, and report to Washington. The same action should be taken in the event that U.N. forces are operating north of the 38th parallel and major Soviet units are openly employed. In either of these events the United States in common prudence would have to proceed on the assumption that global war is probably imminent. The United States should then take steps immediately to:

- Make every effort in the light of the circumstances to localize the action, to stop the aggression by political measures and to ensure the unity of the free world if war nevertheless follows, such measures to include direct diplomatic action and resort to the United Nations with the objectives of:

  1. Making clear to the world United States preference for a peaceful settlement and the conditions upon which the United States would, in concert with other members of the United Nations, accept such a settlement.

  2. Consulting with members of the United Nations regarding their willingness to join with the United States in military opposition, if necessary, to the aggression.

- Give consideration to the possibility of a direct approach to the highest Soviet leaders.

- Consult with selected allies to perfect coordination of plans.

- Place itself in the best possible position to meet the eventuality of global war, and therefore prepare to execute emergency war plans; but should, in so far as it has any choice, enter into full-scale hostilities only at the moment and in the manner most favorable to it in the light of the situation then existing.

- While minimizing United States military commitments in areas of little strategic significance, take action with reference to the aggression to the extent and in the manner best contributing to the implementation of United States national war plans.

19. In the event of the open or covert employment of major Chinese Communist units south of the 38th parallel:

- The United States should not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China.
b. As long as action by U.N. military forces offers a reasonable chance of successful resistance, the U.N. Commander should continue such action and be authorized to take appropriate air and naval action outside Korea against Communist China. The latter action should be continued pending a review of U.S. military commitments in the light of conditions then existing to determine further U.S. courses of action.

c. The United States should take the matter to the Security Council with the purpose of condemning the Chinese Communists as aggressors.

20. In the event of an attempt to employ small Soviet or Chinese Communist units covertly south of the 38th parallel, the United Nations Commander should continue the action.

21. The United States should immediately make an intensive effort, using all information media, to turn the inevitable bitterness and resentment of the war-victimized Korean people away from the United States and to direct it toward the Korean Communists, the Soviet Union, and, depending on the role they play, the Chinese Communists, as the parties responsible for the destructive conflict. Special assistance should be given to the field commander and the U.S. Embassy in Korea to augment their present propaganda and information programs. The Government of the R.O.K. should be encouraged to increase its propaganda output and should be given material assistance in this effort.

22. In order to effect the reorientation of the North Korean people, to cause defection of enemy troops in the field, and to train North Korean personnel to participate in activities looking to unification of the country, the following steps would be appropriate:

a. Establish the principle that the treatment of POW’s, after their transfer to places of internment, shall be directed toward their exploitation, training and use for psychological warfare purposes, and for the tasks specified above.

b. Set up immediately on a pilot-plant scale an interrogation, indoctrination and training center for those POW’s now in our hands in Korea. Personnel in charge of this project must be selected with the greatest care, taking into consideration Korean or Far Eastern experience, language qualifications, and temperamental aptitude. Full advantage should be taken of World War II experience in the indoctrination of German and Japanese prisoners of war, of experiences in Greece, and of recent experience with escaped Soviet detainees.

23. In preparation for the possible eventual retreat or sudden collapse of North Korean forces, the United States should immediately discuss with certain friendly members of the United Nations the terms to be offered the North Korean forces. This will serve to develop support for action north of the 38th parallel to accomplish the political objective of the United Nations in Korea in the event that the terms are rejected and there is no evidence of a substantial risk of a clash
with Soviet or Chinese Communist forces. If the terms offered are not accepted, the U.N. Commander should continue his efforts to destroy as many of the enemy as possible before they retreat across the 38th parallel and only if so directed should continue operations north of the 38th parallel with major forces for the purpose of occupying North Korea.

24. If operations are undertaken to occupy northern Korea, the United Nations Commander should, in consultation with the Government of the R.O.K., determine the timing and method of subjecting occupied territory north of the 38th parallel to its jurisdiction. He should forbid, as commander of the U.N. forces, reprisals against the forces, officials, and populace of North Korea, except in accordance with international law, and take such measures as are within his power to secure compliance with this directive.

25. In performing their mission beyond the 38th parallel, the general posture of the United Nations forces should be one of liberation rather than retaliation. An effort should be made to encourage the voluntary adherence of ever larger areas of North Korea to the R.O.K. The United Nations forces should attempt to exert a stabilizing influence during the transition period. They should endeavor to conduct themselves in such a way as to emphasize the non-aggressive and temporary nature of the U.N. occupation in any part of Korea, and non-Korean forces should be removed as soon as practicable.

26. When organized armed resistance by the North Korean forces has been brought substantially to an end, the United States should attempt to reduce its share of the U.N. responsibilities for Korea, including withdrawal of its own forces as soon as practicable, and announce its desire to do so, without, however, implying any unwillingness to fulfill its U.N. commitments. The R.O.K. forces, operating under principles established by the U.N. Commission for Korea, or such body as may be established to take its place, should take the lead in disarming remaining North Korean units and enforcing the terms of surrender. Guerrilla activity should be dealt with primarily by the forces of the Republic of Korea with minimum participation by U.N. contingents, unless the Korean forces alone should prove unable to cope with the guerrilla activities.

27. The United States should recognize that the Government of the R.O.K. will have to take strong measures against Communist efforts to cause trouble in Korea and that it may require support in these measures from the United States. At the same time, the United States should recognize that social and economic reforms will be necessary in order to reduce the Communist menace to manageable proportions.
28. The United States should advocate in the United Nations the adoption of the following principles to govern the action of the United Nations in Korea in the post-hostilities period:

a. The unification of Korea should be arranged by representatives of the Korean people chosen in free secret-ballot elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage, the elections to be held under the auspices of the United Nations.

b. The Government of the R.O.K. should be re-established in Seoul and recognized as the only lawful government in Korea and should be consulted on problems arising in connection with the unification of Korea. That Government should be expected to exercise its powers with full regard to the desirability of eliminating the spirit of vengeance.

c. An obligation rests upon the members of the United Nations to contribute to the solution of the tremendous economic, social and political problems certain to confront a unified and independent Korea. Asiatic members of the United Nations should be urged to make a substantial contribution to the assistance program in view of their special regional interest in Korea.

29. In consonance with the above principles, the United States should take the following steps:

a. Take vigorous action through diplomatic channels and in the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly to assure and solidify United Nations support of necessary action in Korea.

b. Be prepared to announce in the United Nations its determination to seek a solution of the Korean problem within the general framework of previous United Nations Resolutions and in a manner consistent with the United Nations Charter and the general aims and principles which the United States believes should underlie such a solution.

c. When such an announcement is made, the United States should recommend or urge others to recommend the creation of an appropriate United Nations body which would study and make recommendations to the General Assembly on the future of Korea in accordance with the principles enumerated above. It might be appropriate for the representative of India to act as chairman of such a body.

30. The United States should urge that the U.N. Commission on Korea or such body as may be established to take its place be charged with continuing consideration of Korean problems and instructed to make recommendations as to the size and character of the military and internal security forces needed by the R.O.K. The U.S. should recommend that the U.N. Commission should consider the desirability of permanent neutralization of Korea accompanied by political undertakings by the R.O.K. and by other states separately, including the USSR, to refrain from any aggression. The question of U.N. guarantee should be studied but no U.S. commitment on this point should be made at this stage.
31. The United States should urge that U.N. forces be retained in Korea until and only until a unified and independent state has been firmly established and should be prepared to make available United States forces as a contingent of the U.N. forces for the purpose of deterring renewed aggression or internal strife. These forces should be removed from Korea as early as practicable. Meanwhile, and in any event, the number of our forces should be reduced so far as possible, and they should serve only in conjunction with other U.N. contingents, preferably including some Asiatic contingents.

795.60/9-1150

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET  WASHINGTON, September 11, 1950.

Subject: Considerations Surrounding Proposed Bombing of Rashin (Najin)

It is our understanding that the present policy of the United States, both military and political, is directed toward a localization of the conflict in Korea and the avoidance of any unnecessary extension of hostilities or the outbreak of a general war. If there is any lack of agreement on this point, it should be clarified without delay. It is obviously not the intention of the Department of State in any way to inhibit the progress of military operations, but at the same time it is the duty of the Department to attempt to assess the political risks and possible consequences of proposed military actions as they might affect this policy.

The proposal to again bomb Rashin, a town but seventeen miles from Soviet territory, is an operation which in the opinion of the Department entails serious risks. The directive to General MacArthur, approved by the President, which authorizes bombing operations against specified military targets in Korea north of the 38th parallel contains a stipulation that planes engaged in such operations should stay “well clear” of the Soviet and Manchurian frontiers. This injunction to stay “well clear” of the Soviet frontier is by its terms more than an injunction simply to avoid a violation of those frontiers, or it would have been so stated.

The Kremlin has an intensive and almost pathological sensitivity regarding Soviet frontier areas. This has always been true with respect to the Far Eastern area and especially the immediate surroundings of Vladivostok. The latter is an area which Soviet authorities consider of vital importance to the security of the Soviet Union. Military operations of any character in that vicinity cannot but give them deepest concern and keep them in a state of constant alert. A specific risk involved in the proposed operation, by no means lessened by the
high speeds and high altitudes at which modern air warfare is conducted, is that either a violation or merely a Soviet conviction that a violation of the frontier was possible would induce the local Soviet commanders to endeavor to intercept our planes. This could well produce an incident with incalculable consequences. To say the least it would have most serious repercussions in both the United States and the Soviet Union given the present inflamed state of opinion. It would enjoy additional impact following so closely on the alleged violation of the Manchurian frontier by our planes and the recent episode involving the shooting down of the Soviet plane in the Yellow Sea.

Yet even in the absence of an incident and given this extreme Soviet sensitivity towards their frontiers, operations of the character proposed might well convince the Kremlin of the need to take protective measures against their possible violations and injury and thus lead to a reoccupation of North Korea by Soviet armed forces. In this connection, one cannot exclude the possibility that they might place Soviet strategic bombing planes at the disposition of North Korean forces for attacks against UN forces in Korea and even our bases in Japan.

In short, the bombing of Rashin or of any other place of equal proximity to the Soviet or Manchurian frontier runs the pressing danger of causing the Soviet Union to react in the very way we wish to avoid. It is therefore the Department's opinion that before a decision is made, the specific military advantages which might be expected to accrue from the proposed attack on Rashin should be carefully weighed against the risk of the grave political and military consequences outlined above. The Department of Defense has indicated that Rashin is believed to afford storage for about 28% of the petroleum supplies for North Korea, but the significance of this is not clear in view of the distance which separates Rashin from the fighting front and the town's proximity to Soviet territory which itself must offer extensive facilities for storage and stockpiling.1

DEAN ACHESON

1 Mr. Acheson saw President Truman on September 11, left this memorandum with him, and subsequently dictated the following memorandum of their conversation:

"I left with the President this memorandum, and briefly discussed it with him. He is inclined strongly toward our point of view and believes that General Bradley is pretty much of that mind. I said that a copy of the memorandum had been sent to the Defense Department so that they could have it in mind in making their report to the President." (735.00/9-1150)

The Department of Defense has supplied information to the effect that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already informed MacArthur on September 8 that they wished no further attacks to be made against Rashin for the present. On September 26, the Joint Chiefs of Staff terminated the bombing program entirely by rescinding the basic target directive. (See Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 346.)
TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 11, 1950—5 p.m.

117. UP desp Sep 10, reporting joint press conference of Pres Rhee and Gen Church quotes Rhee to effect UN advance imminent and "must not stop until Reds driven entirely out of Kor".

Dept fully appreciates difficulty limiting expression Rhee's views on advance beyond 38 and relation this subj to Kor morale. However, important that all Amer personnel dealing with Rhee and other senior ROK Govt personnel carefully avoid expressing views on this subj that cld in any way be interpreted as expression of US policy. This complex question is being considered at highest levels US Govt in light many changing factors including vital importance of maintaining high degree of UN support for whatever policies are adopted. You will be informed of decisions when reached, and, any communication thereof to Govt ROK can be made only by you as Amer Amb.

For ur info in reply to question on television interview on Sep 10 1 See replied that he shld like to underline that whether or not "we stop at the 38th parallel" is a UN decision. He went on to state that "The UN have set up the goal of a united and free Kor. That was in their resolution in the GA in '47 and '48. Now, how this UN operation is conducted is for the UN to decide. And, . . . , the UN cannot decide that until it is clear as to how and under what circumstances its forces reach the 38th Parallel".

ACHESON

1 For the text of this interview, see the Department of State Bulletin, September 18, 1950, p. 460.

CONFIDENTIAL

THE HAGUE, September 12, 1950—8 p.m.

[Received September 12—1:18 p.m.]

397. Pass Defense. Chinese desk officer of Netherlands FonOff informs Embassy of following reports received from its Consuls Hong Kong and Canton and Chargé Peking:

(1) From Hong Kong and Canton reports continue be received about Chinese Communist troop movements from south to north and vice versa. FonOff officials say these reports not reliable and originate from Nationalist sources Taipei and Hong Kong and are
so conflicting and confusing as lead them (FonOff) conclusion that they have been “planted” for US consumption. As example their conflicting natures said 200,000 troops reported moving northward and over 50,000 moving south in direction Indochina border.

Absolutely no reports from Peking Chargé confirming these reported troop movements toward Manchurian-Korean border.

(2) Peking Chargé reports recent meeting there representatives CPG and private Chinese export interests wherein concluded that except for export certain strategic materials exports will be placed in hand private enterprise. FonOff comments that this may be purely temporary measure.

Apparently Chargé on friendly terms with Indian Ambassador Panikkar. Latter has informed him of recent talks with Chou En-lai who says CPG willing moderate attacks regarding Korean conflict on following conditions: (a) that Chiang regime make no moves regain former position of power and; (b) that outcome forthcoming UN session prove successful, i.e. that CPG be admitted. Panikkar, Netherlands Chargé and Netherlands FonOff all view future darkly if CPG not admitted UN, arguing USSR will capitalize on its championship Chinese people and their government while USA refusing even recognize “representative” Chinese Government. No mention made Panikkar’s previously reported anti-western attitude. No mention of any kind appeared in controlled Peking press about indirect invitation from Madame Sun Yat Sen¹ to Nehru to come Peking for visit (which was declined).

CHAPIN

¹ Vice Chairman of the Central People's Government Council of the People's Republic of China.

661.93/9-1250: Telegram

The Consul General at Hong Kong (Wilkinson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Hong Kong, September 12, 1950—noon.
[Received September 12—1: 44 p. m.]

556. Chinese American source believed reliable with whom Consulate General has been in contact for some time obtained following information from Chang Yen-ching, former Minister Foreign Affairs in Manchukuo Government (Chang gave as reference Ambassador Stuart and Colonel Barrett ¹ who may be useful in evaluating information). Chang

¹ J. Leighton Stuart and Col. David D. Barrett, Ambassador and Assistant Military Attaché, respectively, American Embassy in the Republic of China at Nanking (closed).
asserts old-time friend now high Communist official Szechuan few weeks ago returned to post from Peking via Hong Kong and told him following conclusions reached in high-level conference Peking.

(1) China cannot be neutral either with respect to Korea or third world war because of Mutual Aid Pact with USSR.
(2) China will provide 250,000 troops to aid North Korea. They will go into battle in North Korean uniforms. Li Li-san’s trip to Korea was for purpose signing agreement for this step.
(3) If world war breaks out, Communists will win initial battles but will eventually lose because of material superiority of West.
(4) In event world war, Chinese Communists will abandon coast line, which they consider indefensible against Western naval and air strength and withdraw to Northwest.

Consulate General arranging interview with Chang in order better evaluate above information and if possible learn identity original source.

Sent Department 556; repeated info Taipei 54.

WILKINSON

*Li Li-san, Minister of Labor in the People’s Republic of China, was a member of a delegation headed by Kuo Mo-jo, Vice Premier, State Administration Council, People’s Republic of China, which visited North Korea beginning August 11, 1950 to help observe the fifth anniversary of Korean liberation from Japanese rule.

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 12, 1950—5 p. m.

121. Dept has been endeavoring wherever possible to meet increasingly critical attitude toward ROK Govt for its alleged polit and other shortcomings. With increasing influence of UN in future solution of Korean problem, ROK is being weighed in balance by member govt’s and public opinion. Dept therefore particularly disturbed over dissenion and polit maneuvering within ranks of Korean leaders described urtelt 169 Sep 8 at time when unity so critically vital to war effort and to future of Korea. Effect of this on world opinion under present circumstances cld be disastrous to ROK Govt. While Dept feels US must avoid appearance undue intervention in Korean internal affairs, suggest you consider discreet discussion along foregoing lines with Rhee and other ROK polit leaders, emphasizing grave danger inherent any demonstration lack of unity at this time.

WEBB
SECRET

New York, September 13, 1950—5:16 p.m.

[Received September 13—5:50 p.m.]

523. Cordier has given USUN in strictest confidence copy of following cable from Katzin to SYG, dated September 8, raising question regarding the role of UNCOOK in investigating evidence of external assistance to North Korean forces. Cordier hopes to discuss with us in a few days the policy questions raised therein. We would appreciate Department's comments soonest.

"Recently the Commission agreed to include among the functions of military observers matters relating to external assistance to North Koreans, from whatsoever source or of any kind. As this is outside its terms of reference, commission in doubt without specific instructions from GA or SC whether it is competent report generally on this subject although they proceeded immediately request commander-in-chief UN forces furnish them with information upon which to reply to SYG's request in specific case queried. Delegates consider in absence of over-all request from SC or GA they would require to receive specific instructions from their governments in order regularize their position. At request of meeting this morning, have undertaken convey above to you. Above agreed chairman."

Specific SYG query mentioned above refers to SYG's request for any information UNCOOK might have re Soviet plane incident. Copies of cables from Katzin on this and other matters, also given us in confidence by Cordier, follow by despatch.¹

Austin

¹ Not printed.

795.00/9–1450

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 14, 1950.

SFM D–7/3a Revised

SEPTEMBER FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETINGS

SUMMARY FOR BRIEFING OF THE SECRETARY ON KOREA

The attached brief has been revised² to include a statement of the U.S. position as established in NSC 81/1.²

¹ For the text of document SFM D–7/3a, dated August 28, see p. 653.
² Dated September 9, p. 712.
NORTH KOREAN OFFENSIVE, JULY 1—SEPTEMBER 15

[Annex]

SUMMARY FOR BRIEFING OF THE SECRETARY ON KOREA

During the preliminary tripartite discussions general agreement was reached on the following main points:

1. Every effort should be made to maintain the present impressive degree of unanimity in the UN on the Korean question.
2. UN forces should not be committed to proceed north of the 38th Parallel without prior UN direction. This would not preclude tactical operations incident to actions south of the 38th Parallel.
3. UN forces should not proceed north of the 38th Parallel if Soviet or Chinese Communist forces have occupied North Korea to the 38th Parallel or if major Soviet or Chinese Communist combat units have engaged or clearly intend to engage in hostilities against UN forces.
4. The GA should formulate its broad objectives and intentions with respect to Korea at an early date, emphasizing the necessity of implementing previous UN resolutions directed to the achievement of the independence and unification of Korea.
5. A commission of representatives of senior rank with a high percentage of Asian members should be formed to make recommendations to the UN on problems relating to the establishment of an independent and unified Korea, including the holding of elections.
6. UN forces with strong Asian participation should be retained in Korea during the period of readjustment following the cessation of hostilities.
7. Continued UN political and economic assistance to the Korean Government will be necessary.

Agreement with the British and French should be sought as to the future authority and competence of the present Government of the Republic of Korea in the following sense:

(a) The continuity and sovereignty of the ROK should continue to be recognized over Korea south of the 38th Parallel.
(b) The validity of the elections previously held by the ROK under UN supervision should not be challenged.
(c) Elections under UN supervision should be held when opportunity offers, in Korea north of the 38th Parallel for the ultimate extension of the authority of the ROK in that area.

With reference to paragraph 2 above, the U.S. position as established in NSC 81/1 may be summarized as follows:

Operations north of the 38th Parallel for the purpose of the occupation of North Korea would be undertaken only after consultation with and approval of United Nations members. The UN forces now have a legal basis for conducting operations north of the 38th Parallel to compel the withdrawal of the North Korean forces behind this line or to defeat these forces. However, the UN Commander, before undertaking such operations, including amphibious and airborne landings or ground operations in pursuance of a rollback, would, in view of the risks involved, obtain further authorization from Washington.
United States Delegation Minutes: SFM Min-4

[Extracts] 1

SECRET

CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, AND FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTERS
NEW YORK, SEPTEMBER 1950

MINUTES OF THE FOURTH MEETING HELD IN THE WALDORF-ASTORIA
3:00 P.M. SEPTEMBER 14, 1950

MEMBERS
Mr. Acheson (US)
Mr. Schuman (FR)
Mr. Bevin (UK)

PRESENT
United States
Philip C. Jessup
George W. Perkins
Dean Rusk
France
Henri Bonnet
Jean Chauvel
M. de Latournelle
Roland de Margerie
United Kingdom
M. E. Dening
Sir Pierson Dixon
Sir Oliver Franks
Sir Gladwyn Jebb

Korea

Mr. Acheson noted that the UN delegations of the three countries had been in constant consultation on the Korean question and were agreed upon the course to be followed in the U.N. 2 Unless there were questions to be raised, it seemed unnecessary to discuss the issue further.

Mr. Bevin said that at a later time the United Kingdom wished to discuss the attitude to be taken toward the Syngman Rhee government, but there was no need to raise the issue now. 3

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1 The complete text of these minutes is scheduled for publication in volume III.
2 See the memorandum agreed upon by the three U.N. delegations dated September 6, p. 704.
3 The U.S. Delegation Summary Minutes of this portion of the meeting read as follows:

"Mr. Acheson noted that the Delegations of the three governments to the United Nations had had a full exchange of views on the subject of Korea and were fully agreed upon the course to be followed in the United Nations with respect to that problem.

"The Ministers approved the understanding reached by their Delegations in this matter." (Summary Minutes 4: 795.00/9-1450)
Editorial Note

In the early morning of September 15 (Korean time), forces of the United Nations Command successfully launched an amphibious assault against the North Korean-held port of Inchon. This was the first phase of a United Nations offensive to drive the North Korean forces out of the Republic of Korea. For details and references to other sources, see Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, pages 488 ff.

357.AD/9–1850: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

SECRET
WASHINGTON, September 15, 1950—2 p.m.

269. Reurtel 523 Sep 13. Dept considers UNCOCK may correctly interpret its terms of reference to cover observation of matters relating to external assistance to North Koreans, from whatever source or of any kind. Paragraph 1 (a) of GA res Oct 17, 1949 provides that Commission shall “observe and report any developments which might lead to or otherwise involve military conflict in Korea.” It is our recollection that “or otherwise involve” was addition suggested by Australians to obviate possibility of interpretation that, with outbreak military conflict, observation mandate of Commission would terminate. We understood it to mean that Commission had on contrary clear GA mandate, while military conflict should continue, to observe and report on any feature relating to such conflict.

WEBB

793B.00/9–1850: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PUSAN, September 15, 1950.
[Received September 15—8:17 p.m.]

180. Deptel 121, September 12. Embassy has consistently done everything within its capabilities to make Rhee, civic and National Assembly leaders fully aware of dangerous effect on UN support appearance Korean internal disunity and factionalism. Mytel 169 1 was sent only after it became evident that Assembly was preparing conduct public political battle between executive and legislature nominally over question dismissal ministers Defense and Home Affairs and Rhee was preparing accept public challenge.

1 September 8, p. 711.
After private Embassy conversations National Assembly leaders Shin Ik Hi and Chang Taik San agreed to suppress controversy for present while Rhee appeared before Assembly making generally conciliatory speech while refusing dismiss ministers, and appointed four members National Assembly UNGA delegates.

Embassy will continue discreetly tender such advice as necessary. Appears for present key figures persuaded necessity presenting appearance unity. Two most disturbing influences, Yun Tchi Yun and Chang Taik San, will be removed shortly with their departure on missions abroad.

Muccio