

# CONFLICT IN KOREA



UNITED NATIONS  
ADVANCE



COMMUNIST  
ADVANCE

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100  
STATUTE MILES

MANCHURIA

CHONGJIN

RIVER

HYESANJIN

YALU

MANPO

NORTH

November 1950  
Line of greatest U.N. advance

KOREA

SEA  
OF  
JAPAN

HAMHUNG

HUANGNAM

SINANJU

PYONGYANG

WONSAN

TRUCE LINE  
Agreed upon by both sides  
July 26, 1953

PANMUNJOM

38th PARALLEL

SEOUL

SUWON

WONJU

SOUTH  
KOREA

KANGNUNG

TAEJON

September 1950  
Line of greatest  
Communist penetration

YELLOW  
SEA

KUNSAN

POHANG

TAEJU

PUSAN

EVENTS PRIOR TO THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES,  
JANUARY 1-JUNE 24, 1950<sup>1</sup>

611.95/1-1450

*Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large, Philip C. Jessup<sup>2</sup>*

CONFIDENTIAL

SEOUL, January 14, 1950.

*President Rhee*

I had several conversations with President Rhee,<sup>3</sup> first when we called to pay our respects on the afternoon of our arrival, second after we dined with him that same evening, third when we called on him officially in his office the next morning, and finally when we called to say goodbye the evening before our departure. The following notes cover the general views which he expressed.

His primary emphasis was upon the communist menace in Korea and in the world. So far as the Korean situation is concerned, he pointed out over and over again as do many of the other Koreans the fact that they are fighting the guerrilla bands throughout South Korea as well as meeting border forays along the 38th Parallel. Several times he made the statement that they were prepared to fight to the death. With obvious reference to his pleas for further military aid and probably in defense of his domestic security measures, he kept stressing the fact that the infiltrating communists were killing large numbers of people in the area all of the time. He says that he keeps telling the Koreans in the north what their attitude is toward resistance. In one of the first talks he explained that they would have a much better strategic defense line if their forces moved into North Korea and he expressed confidence that they could defeat northern opposition. Subsequently, he was careful to add that they were not planning to embark on any conquest. The general tone of his statements, however, lends credence to the belief that he has not objected when the Southern Korean forces along the 38th Parallel have from time to time taken the initiative. In regard to the military assistance they desire, he stressed the familiar pleas for planes, ships and tanks. My conversation with

<sup>1</sup> For previous documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 940 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Jessup visited the Republic of Korea from January 11 to January 14 as part of a 3-month fact-finding trip to the Far East on behalf of Secretary of State Dean Acheson. For further information on Mr. Jessup's visit to Korea, see despatch no. 103, January 28, from Seoul, p. 18.

<sup>3</sup> Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea.



General Roberts<sup>4</sup> and with other officers of KMAG as well as with the Korean Minister of Defense<sup>5</sup> and Korean officers all make out a good case for the need for at least a few aircraft and antiaircraft guns. General Roberts said that, while he would like very much to have a few light tanks, these were low on his priority list.

President Rhee branched out into a consideration of the world menace of communism and spoke very strongly about the British policy of recognizing the Chinese communist government.<sup>6</sup> He can not understand how they could make such a decision and thinks they will be unsuccessful in getting any advantage from it. I explained to him that, whether one considered it wise or not, one must take into consideration as a political fact the attitude not only of the British but of many other governments which do not regard recognition as related to approval and who do not see the same significance in recognition that the President sees in it. The President went on to argue the necessity of the United States defending the free world. He expressed great appreciation for American help to Korea and his especially warm feelings toward Ambassador Muccio. It seems to me clear that the relations between the Ambassador and the President are excellent. The Ambassador talks with him very frankly and the President takes it in very good part. I tried to stress in all my talks with the President the need for his close cooperation with the Ambassador and the ECA staff. It was interesting that on the occasion of our first call on the President, Mrs. Rhee immediately began a political conversation with special emphasis on the need for developing Korean trade. She is evidently well informed. She discussed the possibilities of their developing their exports in tobacco and such specialties as glassware of the Czech type. She said that they had had some recent inquiries about the possibility of their taking up the former Czech glass markets, but the Korean plants are not now adequate and lack the capital for development.

When we called on the President in his office in the morning (January 13) I began by referring to the problem of inflation as one of the most vital ones which Korea needed to solve. The Ambassador added certain specific points. The President was obviously on the defensive on this point and merely stated that he would bring it under control. When we called on him to say goodbye (January 14) I said that I hoped that by the time I returned to Washington we would have reports from Ambassador Muccio that in cooperation with his Mission all of the major problems confronting Korea would have moved for-

<sup>4</sup> Brig. Gen. William L. Roberts, Chief of the U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea.

<sup>5</sup> Sihn Sung Mo.

<sup>6</sup> The U.K. Government extended recognition to the Government of the People's Republic of China on January 6, 1950.

ward to a solution. The President immediately mentioned the question of inflation and said that he was going to take active steps to control it. In the same connection, he said that he had discussed this matter and other financial questions with his Cabinet that day. He told them that some of the banks must be sold since it was unsatisfactory to force Koreans always to turn to the Government when they needed capital. He spoke also of orders which he had issued for the sale of rice from Government stores. Without explaining why the Government had held its large stores of rice for so long, he noted that private speculators had been hoarding and that this had resulted in an increase in the rice price. This he would meet by putting Government rice on the market. The profiteers would be unable to meet this Government competition.

At our morning session (January 13) with the President, he spoke also of his desire that a Pacific Pact should be concluded.<sup>7</sup> He referred to his conversations with Chiang Kai-shek<sup>8</sup> and said they had both agreed that the initiative should be left to Quirino.<sup>9</sup> He felt that Australia and New Zealand would be interested, but that the leadership must be taken by the United States. I reminded him that we had made clear our position of sympathetic interest in any development of a regional arrangement but noted that all successful regional arrangements such as those in the Americas, in Western Europe and in the North Atlantic community developed in response to a local regional sense of solidarity. This could not be imposed from outside. With this the President agreed. However, during my last conversation with him (January 14) he again stressed his hope that the Pacific Pact could be concluded.

He talked a good deal about their relations with Japan. He is much interested in increasing trade relations. He and Mr. Sebald<sup>10</sup> exchanged views on this question. He asked me to tell President Truman how much they needed a Naval and Air Mission here. He expressed the greatest admiration and gratitude for Mr. Hoffman's<sup>11</sup> interest and asked me to convey this message to him.

My general impression is that there is no question about the dominance of the President in the whole picture. Ambassador Muccio re-

<sup>7</sup> For documentation concerning the proposed Pacific Pact, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 1115 ff.; *ibid.*, 1950, vol. VI, pp. 1 ff.

<sup>8</sup> For the text of a joint statement issued by President Rhee and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, former President of the Republic of China, at the conclusion of their talks on August 8, 1949, see *ibid.*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1184.

<sup>9</sup> President Elpidio Quirino of the Republic of the Philippines had met with Chiang Kai-shek in July 1949 prior to the latter's meeting with President Rhee; for related documentation, see *ibid.*, pp. 1151 ff.

<sup>10</sup> William J. Sebald, Acting U.S. Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Japan, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, accompanied Mr. Jessup to Korea.

<sup>11</sup> Paul G. Hoffman, Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration.

ports that there is really no one who really dares stand up against him, although Mr. Shin Ik Hi, Chairman of the National Assembly, has shown a good deal of independence. This independence was illustrated by a conversation I had with him at dinner on Friday night<sup>12</sup> in which he told Dr. Bunce<sup>13</sup> and me that under no circumstances could they allow the elections to be postponed, that they must be held in May as scheduled since this was the whole basis for democratic development.

*Prime Minister*<sup>14</sup>

When Ambassador Muccio, Mr. Sebald and I called on the Prime Minister Thursday morning,<sup>15</sup> he began his conversation by a speech about Formosa which both Mr. Sebald and I thought was very significant. It is of course clear that all of the Koreans were disturbed by the President's recent statement on Formosa<sup>16</sup> and still hope that we may do something to help the Nationalists there. One of the most frequent questions asked me was whether I was still planning to go to Taiwan.<sup>17</sup> The Prime Minister then went on to say that their two greatest problems are inflation and control of the guerrillas. Ambassador Muccio interposed that they were doing quite well in their campaign against the guerrillas but not so well on inflation. Both from General Lin,<sup>18</sup> as a military man, and from other Korean officials and our own KMAG, I got quite a complete picture of the operations against the guerrillas. Some of these still infiltrate across the 38th Parallel, many along the very rugged terrain in the eastern part of the country. However, our officers think that their road blocks and controls have largely cut down this avenue of infiltration. This is driving the communists to intensify their efforts to smuggle in men and arms by sea. The Korean lack of coast guard patrol craft makes it very difficult to control this. They have however captured a sufficient number of smugglers and smuggling vessels including plans and instructions to give them a clear picture of the pattern. Small groups of trained communists are sent through the country to organize guerrilla bands

<sup>12</sup> January 13.

<sup>13</sup> Arthur C. Bunce, chief of the ECA Mission in Korea.

<sup>14</sup> Lee Bum Suk.

<sup>15</sup> January 12.

<sup>16</sup> In the statement under reference, issued on January 5, 1950, President Truman had said that the United States would not provide military aid or advice to the Chinese forces on Formosa; for the text, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents* (Department of State publication 6446), vol. II, p. 2448.

<sup>17</sup> Mr. Jessup proceeded to Taiwan on January 15 following a visit to Okinawa after his departure from Korea; for documentation on his talks with officials of the Republic of China, see vol. VI, pp. 256 ff.

<sup>18</sup> A marginal notation in the source text indicated that the reference to General "Lin" may have been incorrect.

which begin operating when they number anywhere from 20 to a couple hundred men. The operations against these bands have been very successful and many of the bands have been completely exterminated. This is accomplished, however, only by devoting to the campaigns overwhelming superiority. This means tying up considerable numbers of troops in this work. General Roberts is now organizing some of the national police in units which will operate as constabulary and relieve the demands on the regular army. I gather that the Koreans are adequately trained and equipped for this type of operation.

In our visit to the 38th Parallel in the Uijongbu area, one was impressed with the smartness of the Korean troops in drill. We noted particularly the crews training in handling anti-tank guns (of which they have only six) also rifle squads and their few batteries. The northern artillery is heavier than theirs and outranges them by at least a thousand yards. General Roberts stressed the fact that five or ten bombers could come over and be absolutely unopposed and probably disrupt South Korea by the panic which would result from a raid on Seoul. Up at the line, the officers stressed the need for more anti-tank guns since the North has a good many light tanks. They have anti-personnel land mines in the South and their combat engineers are well trained in demolition of bridges, etc., in case of an enemy attack. Both observation and all reports would indicate that the morale of the Southern Korean troops is high. I was interested in talking, however, with some of the Korean officers to find that they had no tendency to play down their fellow countrymen to the north pointing out that they were not only in greater strength and armed with superior weapons but were equally good fighters. They did agree that their own morale was better. The defensive positions laid out near the 38th Parallel have been arranged in collaboration with KMAG but the extensive trenches which were dug by civilian Korean labor are considered by our people to be quite useless. The day we were there they were sharply outlined by strips of snow and would seem to afford admirable targets to the enemy. At the most advanced post about a thousand yards from the Parallel they produced for our benefit a boy 24 years old who was said to have been captured after he came in. They said he had been trained in a special school in the North to assassinate the Southern Korean governmental leaders. He was one of a group being sent in for this purpose. The Minister of Defense and other Korean officers interrogated him in our presence, but the translation seemed to cover very little of what was said in Korean. It was hard to tell whether the whole affair was a plant or was genuine.

There seems to me a general realization in Korean government circles of the necessity of solving some of their principal economic problems. The impression of our mission which was borne out by conversations with the Koreans is that they are quite ready to make decisions in principle and to agree to proposals which we make, but action to implement the decisions simply is not taken. For instance, the adoption of the further legislation on the land reform was carried through successfully but the implementation has been held up.<sup>19</sup> Ambassador Muccio told me that this was clearly due to the opposition of the landlord group while the Koreans, especially the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, insisted that it was due merely to the difficulties in setting up the administrative machinery. As another example, they planned boldly for the building of new cement plants while they are not operating any where near capacity the plants they already have. This industry, incidentally, is of particular importance because of its relation to the program for construction of dams to increase their hydro-electric power. The rice crop has been a bumper one for two years and the farmers are quite prosperous. The only exception has been the area around Seoul where this year they have been suffering from drought. The briefings by the members of the mission give more details on some of these points.

Riding on the train to and from the 38th Parallel, I talked at some length with Mr. Chang Kyung Keun, Vice Minister of Home Affairs. His English is not very good and when he found it convenient he was unable to understand what I said. I discussed with him the national security law which is the basis of much of the criticism of the "police state" aspects of the Korean Government.<sup>20</sup> He told me that the President had suspended the enforcement of the law pending the adoption of certain amendments particularly in regard to eliminating the ex post facto feature. Ambassador Muccio had told me that the President had not vetoed the law but had allowed it to take effect without his signature. The picture I got even from the Deputy Minister's statements was one in which any one could be arrested on the ground that he was pro-communist. He is tried by a special court composed of four judges but there is no appeal from the decision of this court.

<sup>19</sup> Concerning this question, see the memorandum, dated December 16, 1949, from Assistant Secretary of State Butterworth to Secretary of State Acheson in *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1110; and also U.N. document A/1881, p. 49.

<sup>20</sup> For the views of the United Nations Commission on Korea concerning the application of the National Security Act during this period, see U.N. document A/1350, p. 25.



If he should argue that the security law under which he is being tried was unconstitutional, this question could go up to the Supreme Court only if the judges themselves decided to refer it. The accused is allowed to have counsel and, if he is unable to get counsel, the court will designate someone. In discussing with him the arrest of the 15 members of the National Assembly, he was very evasive.<sup>21</sup> He told me there were only 7 instead of the actual 14 or 15 who were arrested. He claimed that they would not be convicted unless it were proved that they were acting under orders of a foreign power. He endeavored to maintain the thesis that no one would be prosecuted because he merely held views in opposition to the government. Ambassador Muccio doubts very much if they could prove the foreign instructions and pointed out to me that when Rhee arrested this group of National Assemblymen he wrote a letter indicating that he had perhaps 20 more on his list whom he would not arrest at this time. It was a clear threat over the heads of the Assembly. The Deputy Minister also insisted, in response to my questions, that newspaper editors were perfectly free to sponsor views hostile to the government just so long as they were not under the orders of a foreign power or the communist party. He was unable to explain why in some of these cases the advocacy of the withdrawal of the American forces seemed to him such clear proof of communist orders since this opinion concided with the action decided upon by the United States Government. On the question of police administration, he insisted that centralization of authority was necessary until they succeeded in licking the problem of communist guerrillas. He was unable to explain, however, why even the local police charged with traffic control and the ordinary petty crimes needed to be under national rather than local authority. Although he argued that some of the police were under the authority of the provincial governments, he admitted they were actually responsible to the central national police administration. He was quite ready to agree with my little lecture on the vital necessity of reconciling provisions for the freedom of the individual with provisions for the protection of the national safety, but it was quite apparent that their thinking is dominated by the idea of centralized authority which they now justify on the ground that they are engaged in such active operations against the communist guerrillas. He insisted, however, that legally the peacetime rather than wartime system of justice operated.

<sup>21</sup> For information on the arrest of the members of the National Assembly in 1949 and their trial in 1950, see U.N. document A/1350, p. 22.



895.00R/1-1850

*The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 57

SEOUL, January 18, 1950.

Ref: Depins 90, December 30, 1949<sup>1</sup>Subject: Control of Inflation in Korea<sup>2</sup>

As instructed in the reference cited above, I called on President Rhee Syngman at his office by appointment at 2:00 o'clock p.m. on Sunday, January 15, 1950, in the company of Dr. Arthur C. Bunce, Chief, Economic Cooperation Administration, Mission to Korea. The following is a summary of the ensuing conversation, in course of which I presented to the President certain documents referred to in the text below. Copies of these documents are attached as enclosures herewith.

I expressed regrets at having to call on a Sunday. I recalled that I had mentioned in the course of my recent visit with Dr. Jessup that I had received firm instructions to present a note to him expressing my Government's grave concern over the mounting inflation and recommending a drastic plan of control. I explained that I had discussed this instruction with Dr. Jessup, who left Saturday, and intended originally to present the note and plan for control on Monday. With the near rice panic in Seoul, I had decided to come to see him immediately.

I mentioned that the Economic Cooperation Administrator and the Secretary of State could not understand why President Rhee did not take a more serious view of the mounting inflation. If he appreciated its seriousness he would and could keep it under control. I had been instructed by my Government to present the note and the plan for con-

<sup>1</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1112.

<sup>2</sup> In despatch no. 68, January 21, from Seoul, not printed, the Ambassador reported on a meeting he had had on January 5 with President Rhee concerning the state of the Korean economy. Mr. Muccio explained that he had not reported on this meeting at the time in anticipation of the receipt of instruction no. 90 from the Department. Ambassador Muccio concluded despatch no. 68 with the following observations:

"It will be noted that the Mission's efforts to correct and improve the critical economic situation frequently have not found response in the President and that the latter's attitude has not reflected the gravity of the situation. Obviously, the President's proposed remedies are often not related to either the magnitude of the overall problem or to the specific considerations which are essential to improve Korea's economic plight. This condition is illustrated by his views on the sale of vested properties and by his lack of deep concern over the delay in concluding the sale of rice to Japan." (895.00R/1-2150)

trol, which were thereupon handed to him (Enclosure 1).<sup>3</sup> I cited that Korea seemed to be in the same position as China in 1947-1948; that the Chinese officials also continuously stated that they could put a stop to inflation at any time. They never faced the situation realistically; inflation got out of hand and contributed even more than the military inertia to bringing about the Nationalist downfall.

President Rhee went into a long dissertation on his difficulties. It was almost impossible for him to get his cabinet members to carry out his policy and his orders. He did not like to change ministers. He would have to remove them. He had the resignations of Agriculture and Forestry, of Commerce and Industry, and of Home Affairs. He would change others but he just could not find competent men to take the jobs. After listening to this harangue, I pointedly expressed my opinion that the difficulty would not be solved by a mere change of ministers. I considered most of his ministers quite competent. I admitted that there was a great deal of bureaucracy, particularly in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, where Bureau chiefs were thwarting the good intentions of the Minister in order to perpetuate their respective empires.

However, I did not consider that the main impediment to effective government. I considered the main impediment the repeated instances where: first, he and the State Council adopted a policy, then plans were drawn up by the competent ministry in discussion with ECA officials, and finally, when recommendations were sent to him, there was an inordinate delay. Time and again when inquiry was made by Americans as to the delay in getting going, the reply was that the matter was still pending in the President's office and, in many instances, that the matter lay on Mr. Lady's desk.<sup>4</sup> I cited two glaring instances, reading to him from the memoranda dated January 15, 1950 (copy of which

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. The plan for control called for firm action by the Republic of Korea in the following fields:

I. Control of Government expenditures and establishment of budgetary accounting controls; II. Control over extension of bank credit and creation of Government debt; III. Elimination of subsidies in prices and rates of Government-produced goods and services; IV. Increase of the counterpart deposit rate, increases in the prices of aid supplies and restriction of credit in sales of aid supplies; V. Improvement of tax assessments, enforcement of tax collection, and elimination of the "voluntary contribution" system; VI. Expansion of extraordinary and non-recurring Government revenues; VII. Implementation of Land Reform Law; VIII. Expansion of exports and facilitation of approved imports; IX. Measures to facilitate the development and establishment of unitary rate of foreign exchange; X. Termination of the rice purchase program.

<sup>4</sup> Harold Lady, an American, was an adviser to President Rhee.

was also left with the President, see Enclosures 2 and 3),<sup>5</sup> of bungling: the rice export program and the food program culminating in the current rice price crisis.<sup>6</sup>

I reminded him that we had in ECA some two hundred Americans, that these men had been most carefully selected in the course of the past year. Some of them were outstanding experts in their respective fields. They were brought here at great effort and expense to the United States specifically to advise and make available to the Korean Government the best technical and professional talent obtainable in the United States. If he felt that men available to him were better qualified on food matters, there was no point in having men like Mr. Dawson, who is probably the world's best authority on agriculture in the Far East, Mr. Beck and others waste their time here. If he felt that the President of the Bank of Korea knew all there was to know about banking and finance there was no need to have Messrs. Loren, Bloomfield, Jensen or Smith here.

President Rhee countered that he had several times asked me to have an American placed in each ministry and that I had failed to do so. I reminded him that every member of the American Mission was available to him and to the Korean Government. I could not, however, see my way to placing an American in each ministry with a view to checking and reporting direct to President Rhee what was going on therein. The Koreans would consider the Americans spies and the Koreans would not cooperate with any one under such conditions. I added that Mr. Lady for that very reason was the most despised American in Korea. The President agreed that Americans would be so considered and stated the Koreans hated Mr. Lady because he reported their actions to him.

I made the suggestion that one possibility that occurred to me would be for him to select two or possibly three capable and reputable Koreans and for Dr. Bunce to select two or three of the most competent men he had, to work together as a committee. This committee should be exclusively charged with implementing the control plan outlined in the detailed memorandum (Enclosure 2) accompanying my note (Enclosure 1). This committee could keep in touch with each ministry concerned and report direct to the President its findings and recommendations.<sup>7</sup> The President inquired if I had any Koreans in mind

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

<sup>6</sup> The memorandum on the rice crisis attributed the situation to the failure of the Korean Government to carry out programs which had been agreed upon with the ECA, specifically calling for a rationing program and the export sale of 100,000 metric tons of rice to Japan. The sale of rice had been personally held up by President Rhee in hopes of exacting a higher price.

<sup>7</sup> Despatch no. 96, January 25, from Seoul, not printed, reported on the establishment of the committee under reference, known as the Joint Korean-American Economic Stabilization Committee (895B.10/1-2550).

I could recommend for this purpose. I told him that I considered several of his cabinet members eminently qualified, and that undoubtedly there were other Koreans in the community who could discharge such an undertaking.

Several times during the conversation, the need to decentralize executive authority was stressed; on each occasion the President agreed that he had too much to do and must have responsible men to carry out his (i.e. the President's) ideas. At no time did the President appear to grasp the thought that a Minister should be any more than a "yes" man whose sole purpose was to carry out the President's ideas. The concept of other persons sharing in leadership and being given responsibility was completely missing.

President Rhee concluded the interview at 3:30 o'clock p. m. by saying that he would study the note and the control plan. I expressed the hope that he would send word to me as soon as possible, hopefully by the following day.

I desire to assure the Department that I am personally, in cooperation with Dr. Bunce and his associates, exerting every possible effort to bring the present most unsatisfactory situation under control and shall keep the Department currently informed of developments.

I attach (Enclosure 4)<sup>8</sup> as further reflecting the President's views on inflation, excerpts from a press interview which President Rhee held with foreign correspondents on January 14, 1950, as reported by the United States Information Service.<sup>9</sup>

It is requested that copies of this despatch with enclosures be provided to the Economic Cooperation Administration.

JOHN J. MUCCIO

<sup>8</sup> Not printed.

<sup>9</sup> In the interview, President Rhee was quoted as making the following statement:

"Although Jessup did not say so, it seems some people in America think there might be some big inflation which might cause an economic crash in Korea. I want to say, we do not fear any economic crash. Conditions here are completely under control and we will see that inflation does not get beyond control."

895A.00R/1-2050

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John Z. Williams of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] January 20, 1950.

Participants: John M. Chang, Ambassador of the Republic of Korea  
W. Walton Butterworth, Assistant Secretary of State  
for Far Eastern Affairs  
Mr. Williams

Having been informed that the Secretary was not available for appointments because of his appearance before Congressional Com-

mittees, Dr. Chang called at his request on Mr. Butterworth at 5:30 p. m.

After expressing his concern over the possible reaction in Korea to the failure by the House yesterday to act favorably on the Bill relating to ECA aid for Korea, Dr. Chang asked if the Department could do anything to bring about reconsideration.<sup>1</sup> Mr. Butterworth informed Dr. Chang, in confidence, that the Secretary and the President expected to issue statements soon.<sup>2</sup> It was explained that the Executive branch of the Government could do no more at this point, but it was suggested that the action contemplated might well stimulate favorable Congressional results in one form or another. In reply to Dr. Chang's question, the point was made that no portion of the \$75 million at the disposal of the President for expenditure "in the general area of China" from MDAP legislation could be spent in Korea unless the will of the House, as expressed yesterday, could be overcome. Dr. Chang then said that he had been at a loss to explain to himself, and to reporters who had asked him, the significance to Korea of the line of U.S. interest in the Far East the Secretary had drawn in his recent statement at the Press Club.<sup>3</sup> He said that the fact Korea found itself on the other side of that line, combined with the House action yesterday, appeared to raise the serious question as to whether the United States might now be considered as having abandoned Korea. Mr. Butterworth said he could not share this view. He pointed to the fact that with respect to Korea the United States had associated itself with others of the United Nations in support of Korea's cause and in that sense therefore, Korea's position transcended a definition of interest by a line drawn in any direction.

<sup>1</sup> On January 19, 1950 the House of Representatives by a 193-191 vote defeated legislation authorizing the remaining \$90 million of a \$150 million aid appropriation originally requested for fiscal year 1950 by the President on June 7, 1949; for further details, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1039. A \$60 million authorization for Korea was approved on February 14 under the Far Eastern Economic Assistance Act of 1950 (64 Stat. 5). The amount actually appropriated on June 29 under the Deficiency Appropriation Act was \$50 million (64 Stat. 275), bringing the total appropriation for aid to Korea in fiscal year 1950 to \$110 million. In addition, the Far Eastern Economic Assistance Act had provided for the advancement of up to \$30 million from the RFC to the ECA for Korean aid, provided that no coalition government was formed in the Republic of Korea which included Communists or members of the ruling party of North Korea.

<sup>2</sup> On January 21, President Truman issued a statement calling for Congressional reconsideration of the Korean aid program; he also released a letter addressed to him on the previous day by Secretary of State Acheson. For the texts of these documents, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. II, p. 2527.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Mr. Acheson's address at the National Press Club on January 12, the text of which is printed *ibid.*, p. 2310. In one portion of this speech, referring to the military security of the Pacific area, the Secretary spoke of a U.S. defensive perimeter running from the Aleutian Islands through Japan and the Ryukyus to the Philippines.



Mr. Butterworth commented on the soundness of President Rhee's statement relating to the House action,<sup>4</sup> and said that the press of business had not permitted him to read Dr. Chang's recent communication regarding the financial situation in Korea.<sup>5</sup> Dr. Chang stated that he had communicated to his Government Mr. Butterworth's past expressions of concern regarding the inflationary trends in Korea, and had been informed that strong measures were being taken to combat this development. Mr. Butterworth reminded Dr. Chang that should the Congress finally pass legislation for the remainder of a FY 1950 Korean ECA program, the proposed FY 1951 program would probably be subjected to very critical examination, and that therefore any measures that might be taken to check the inflation could be considered as being doubly important.

Dr. Chang said that reporters were waiting at the door for a statement from him and asked if he could say that he had received assurances that the Department would do something to remedy the unfavorable House action. Mr. Butterworth stressed the fact that such a statement should be avoided as it might create an unwarranted pressure on the Secretary and the President and prejudice the action they contemplate taking. Mr. Butterworth suggested that the usual practice in similar circumstances, and one understood by the press, was for the Ambassador to state that he had expressed his concern, and that he had been accorded a sympathetic hearing. Just before his departure Dr. Chang said that he had been instructed by President Rhee to call upon the Secretary in order to express the confidence of his Government in the Secretary's and the President's good will toward Korea and the faith President Rhee had expressed that Korea would not be abandoned by the United States. Mr. Butterworth mentioned the heavy schedule the Secretary had imposed upon him these days, but assured Dr. Chang he would make every effort to arrange a meeting early next week. Dr. Chang said that he would not expect to occupy the Secretary's time for longer than five minutes.<sup>6</sup>

After leaving Mr. Butterworth, and in his interview with the reporters, Dr. Chang expressed the view suggested by Mr. Butterworth but stumbled into an almost inaudible statement to the effect

<sup>4</sup> In his statement, which was transmitted to the Department in telegram 77, January 20, from Seoul, not printed, President Rhee expressed confidence that upon reflection the U.S. Congress and Government would not fail to extend aid to Korea. On the same day, Secretary Acheson instructed Ambassador Muccio to convey to President Rhee his appreciation for the President's "excellent, temperate statement". (895.00R/1-2050)

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

<sup>6</sup> Ambassador Chang met with Mr. Acheson on January 28, expressing the appreciation of President Rhee and the National Assembly for the Secretary's remarks on Korea in his National Press Club address and for his letter to President Truman on Korean aid (895B.00/1-2850).



that the Department was "going to do something". He caught himself however, and directed the attention of the reporters to President Rhee's statement, saying that copies were available at the Embassy and at the Press Club.

795.56/1-2150

*The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

SEOUL, January 21, 1950.

No. 56

Ref: Embtels 447, Apr. 26, 1949; 931, July 26, 1949; 1295, Oct. 19, 1949; <sup>1</sup> and Embdes 653, Oct. 20, 1949 and 809, Dec. 20, 1949.<sup>2</sup>

Subject: Transmitting Request From President Rhee on Needs of Korean Coast Guard

Transmitted herewith are copies of the texts of a letter, dated January 5, 1950, with attached memorandum,<sup>3</sup> received from President Rhee, setting forth his position with regard to the needs of the Korean Coast Guard, and requesting the further assistance of the United States Government in this respect. These communications from President Rhee may be regarded as the formal request of the Government of the Republic of Korea for additional United States assistance to the Korean Coast Guard.

Also transmitted are copies of memoranda <sup>3</sup> prepared by the Naval Attaché and by the Chief, KMAG, offering comment on President Rhee's request for additional Coast Guard assistance.

The Embassy continues to be of the view that the Republic of Korea's Coast Guard needs can be best and most adequately met by provision of the articles and advisors recommended in the Embassy's telegram no. 1295 of October 19, 1949.

With regard to President Rhee's request for three of the United States frigates recently returned by the USSR, the Embassy adheres to the position set forth in the second paragraph of its Despatch no. 809, December 20, 1949.<sup>4</sup>

Attention is invited to the fact that spare parts, valued at approximately \$250,000, for the YMS now in the hands of the Korean Coast Guard, are expected to arrive in Korea early in February. Moreover,

<sup>1</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 995, 1066, 1088.

<sup>2</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> The position referred to was set forth as follows:

"The Ambassador continues to be of the opinion that the provision of frigates to the Korean Coast Guard should be made only in the event that they will be wholly surplus to United States needs and can be turned over to the Republic of Korea virtually without cost, and in the further event that patrol craft cannot be obtained readily and speedily and at a very low cost." (795.56/1-2150)

all funds (\$344,564) allotted for Coast Guard purposes under the MDAP grant to the Republic of Korea for 1950 are scheduled to be utilized for the acquisition of spare parts for craft already on hand. These considerations are being drawn to the attention of President Rhee.

For the Ambassador:  
EVERETT F. DRUMRIGHT  
*Counselor of Embassy*

795.5/1-2550

*The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State*

SEOUL, January 25, 1950.

SECRET

No. 97

Ref: Embtels 1519, Dec. 17, 1949; 1521, Dec. 19, 1949.<sup>1</sup>

Subject: Transmitting Recommendations for Additional United States Military Aid to Korea During Fiscal Year 1950

The Embassy refers to the visit of Mr. Niles W. Bond, Officer in Charge, Korea Affairs, Department of State, and Lt. Col. Richard Lawson, Plans and Operations Division, Department of the Army, Washington, to Seoul in December 1949, for the purpose of reaching agreement with the Republic of Korea on the fiscal year '50 MDA Program within the framework of a \$10.23 million allocation. As reported in the Embassy's telegram no. 1519, the Korean authorities, including the President, agreed to the program recommended by KMAC and the Embassy, after consultation with Mr. Bond and Col. Lawson, although it is only fair to note that the Korean authorities, and especially the Air Force and the Coast Guard officials concerned, were deeply disappointed by the meager aid allotted to those branches of the Korean Security Forces.

It is also the considered opinion of the Embassy and of KMAC that the \$10.23 million allotment was far from adequate to meet the minimum all-around needs of the Korean Security Forces in the light of the situation existing in this part of the world;<sup>2</sup> accordingly, in

<sup>1</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1112.

<sup>2</sup> The Report of the Survey Team comprised of Mr. Bond and Lt. Col. Lawson, dated January 17, 1950, was issued by the Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee on February 8 as FMACC Document 31. The final paragraph of the Report's conclusions stated that "... the Survey Team was particularly impressed by the uniquely compelling urgency which attaches to the military assistance requirements of the Republic of Korea by virtue of the presence on its very frontiers (and not more than 30 miles from the capital city of Seoul) of an aggressive Soviet-dominated Communist regime which is publicly committed to the destruction of that Republic by armed force, a factor which the Survey Team believes should be given due weight in the determination of relative priorities among MDA recipient countries." (Lot 54D-5 Box 13392)

its telegram no. 1521, the Embassy recommended the supplementation of the \$10.23 million allocation with funds to be provided under Section 303 of the MDA Act,<sup>3</sup> it being pointed out that the strengthening of the defenses of the Republic of Korea would obviously contribute to the accomplishment in the general area of China of the policies and purposes set forth in the MDA Act. The Embassy specifically recommended that urgent and favorable consideration be given to the allocation of funds under Section 303 of the Act sufficient to bring the total funds available for military assistance to Korea, in the fiscal year '50, to a minimum of \$20 million.

In this connection, there are now transmitted the recommendations<sup>4</sup> of KMAg for additional military assistance to Korea scaled down to fall within the approximate dollar limitation of \$9.8 million. Also transmitted is a copy of a covering letter from the Chief, KMAg, setting forth the considerations on which the KMAg recommendations are based.

The KMAg recommendations for additional military aid to the Republic of Korea have been prepared after very careful thought and study and are designed to meet what are regarded as minimum all-around needs of the Korean Security Forces in the light of existing situation in this part of the world.

I concur in the recommendations of KMAg, and I earnestly hope that the concerned policy, defense and MDAP authorities will give full and favorable consideration to the granting of these minimum needs of the Korean Security Forces.

JOHN J. MUCCIO

[Enclosure]

*The Chief of the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (Roberts) to the Ambassador in Korea (Muccio)*

SECRET

JANUARY 7, 1950.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit to you herewith, the recommendations of KMAg for possible additional fiscal year 1950 Military Assistance to Korea.<sup>4</sup>

This recommendation has been compiled with a view toward bringing total logistic support for Korea to the 20 million dollar figure mentioned in your radio Deptel 1521 of 19 December 1949. Recommendations are based on and related to all previous requests for Military Assistance to Korea scaled down to fall within the approxi-

<sup>3</sup> Approved October 6, 1949; 63 Stat. 714.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

mate dollar limitations of \$9,800,000. It is the desire of KMAC that this recommendation, coupled with the approved fiscal year 50 MDAP be considered the only valid recommendations at this time.

The objective of this program is to strengthen the existing Security Forces without providing means for an increase in numerical strength. We have included crew served weapons for the additional 15,000 men previously armed with individual arms only, to bring the total U.S. supported ground forces to 65,000 men. There are also included a limited quantity of tools and maintenance equipment considered necessary to enable the Koreans to maintain the equipment on hand and to protect the U.S. investment in the Security Forces. A limited amount of artillery and 4.2" mortar, with supporting Signal equipment, has been included in an attempt to equalize the range and weight of weapons in South Korea with those known to be in North Korea.

The fighter type aircraft requested<sup>5</sup> are considered by KMAC to be absolutely necessary for the defense of South Korea. Confirmed reports of North Korean air strength indicate a minimum of thirty (30) Yak-3 Russian fighter planes have been transferred to North Korea. The South Korean Security Forces are totally without means of combating this type aircraft.

The Coast Guard portion of this recommendation is based on the assumption that Korea is willing to finance the procurement of three (3) additional US Navy type P. C. vessels in the United States. Experience with the ship *Bak Du San*, recently purchased in New York by Korea, indicates that hull and main engines can be purchased for about \$25,000 and the cost of outfitting, armament and ammunition is approximately \$130,000. To expedite the refitting of Korean purchased vessels KMAC recommends refitting charges be assumed under the attached Program.

To summarize, KMAC recommends the U.S. offer to Korean limited logistic support to include:

a. Equipment for existing Ground Forces to the extent of \$4,574,976<sup>6</sup> including crew served weapons, additional artillery with supporting Ordnance and Signal equipment, and a limited quantity of Engineer items.

b. Minimum essential equipment for an airforce capable of offering combat to high performance aircraft presently in North Korea, and training planes to supplement those which have been purchased by Korea. Total estimated cost is \$3,914,024.

c. Ordnance and Signal equipment necessary to outfit three (3) U.S. Navy type P. C. vessels with necessary shore signal installations,

<sup>5</sup> The request called for 40 F-51 fighter aircraft; see Robert K. Sawyer, *Military Advisers in Korea: KMAC in Peace and War* (edited by Walter G. Hermes), a volume in the *United States Army Historical Series* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 94.

provided the Korean Government finance procurements of hull and main engines.

Attached hereto are preliminary estimates of amount of material required and dollar cost including packaging, handling and transportation charges.<sup>6</sup>

Faithfully,

W. L. ROBERTS  
*Brig. Gen., U.S. Army*

<sup>6</sup> Not printed.

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*Editorial Note*

Under date of January 26, 1950 the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Korea concluded two agreements. For the text of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 2019; *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), volume 1, page 137. The text of the Military Advisory Group Agreement is printed as TIAS 2436; 3 UST 2696. In connection with article IV of the latter agreement, the Embassy at Seoul transmitted to the Department under cover of despatch no. 105, January 28, from Seoul, not printed, copies of an exchange of letters between Ambassador Muccio and the Korean negotiators, Minister of Defense Sihm Sung Mo and Minister of Finance Kim Do Yun, dated January 26, confirming the understanding of the two governments that the United States would exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all criminal offenses that might be committed by members of KMAG (795.58/1-2850).

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123 Jessup, Philip C.

*The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

SEOUL, January 28, 1950.

No. 103

Subject: Ambassador Jessup's Visit to Korea<sup>1</sup>

The Embassy herewith encloses available material bearing on the visit to Korea of Ambassador Philip C. Jessup from January 11th to January 14, 1950 and offers comment on this visit.

The visit of Ambassador Jessup, though brief, was one of the most successful of the visits paid to Korea by American officials in recent months. Ambassador Jessup was well-prepared for his visit; he was quick to absorb the various aspects of the Korean situation and deft

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<sup>1</sup> See also Ambassador Jessup's memorandum of January 14, p. 1.



and forceful in responding to it in the various addresses he made during his visit. Considering the brevity of his stay, Dr. Jessup left Korea with an impression of problems faced that was, to an unusual degree, extensive and balanced.

Ambassador Jessup arrived from Tokyo on the afternoon of January 11th accompanied by Mrs. Jessup; Miss Anderson, his secretary; Mr. William J. Sebald, Acting Political Adviser to SCAP; Mr. William M. Gibson, a Foreign Service officer who is traveling with Dr. Jessup. On his arrival at Kimpo, where he was greeted by numerous Korean and American officials, Dr. Jessup was immediately taken to the Embassy Building for a briefing on various aspects of the Korean situation.

In the course of the briefing, the Ambassador reviewed American policy and outlined recent significant developments—political, military, economic and cultural. The Ambassador was followed by General Roberts, Chief, KMAC, who succinctly described the organization, status and functions of KMAC and went on to paint a generally optimistic picture of the developments of the Korean security forces, especially of the Army. General Roberts expressed the view that the Korean Army had the capability of containing the North Korean forces in being. However, he pointed to the need for additional U.S. aid for the Korean security forces, especially the air force and the coast guard. The Chief of the ECA Mission to Korea reviewed the ECA program, pointing out that much progress had been made in the past year, especially in the field of production. Dr. Bunce also adverted to shortcomings, particularly to the inflationary spiral which threatens the Korean economic well-being and to the reform measures ECA is pressing on a reluctant Korean Government. Mr. Stewart the Public Affairs officer gave a concise account of the USIE program, while the Director of Joint Administrative Services pointed up some of the major functions of his organization. Dr. Jessup listened attentively, taking notes and from time to time directing relevant inquiries to the speakers.

After the briefing, Dr. Jessup, the Ambassador and Mr. Sebald paid a courtesy call on President Rhee where they also had dinner that evening. There was general discussion of Korean problems on these occasions. Following dinner, Dr. Jessup and the President had an extensive private conversation together. No member of the Embassy participated in the conversation.

On Thursday morning, January 12, various officers of the Embassy were introduced to Dr. Jessup and chatted with him. Dr. Jessup then paid a brief call on the Prime Minister followed by a call on the President's office with Ambassador Muccio and Mr. Sebald. On this occasion, the subjects covered in the memoranda given to Dr. Jessup



by the President were discussed (see enclosure 2).<sup>2</sup> The first of these—on American aid to Korea—asked not only that U.S. aid be continued but assurances either that “the United States will not permit the conquest of Southern Korea by the communists” or “that the United States will not support the Republic of Korea against communist invasion.” The second memorandum advocated a Pacific Pact on the model of the Atlantic Pact “with definite features of military alliance”, welcomed Philippine leadership in the pact, but stated that the Government of Korea “does not believe that such a program can be expected to succeed without early American participation.” The statement also looked to the eventual partnership of Japan in the Pacific Pact. The third memorandum envisaged closer future relations with Japan under adequate safeguards, hoping that any possible United States efforts to build up Japan or enter into a treaty of alliance with her would involve proportionate and similar concern with Korea. Dr. Jessup gave the President a detailed exposition of U.S. thinking on the subject of a Pacific association. Discussion with the President covered certain aspects of these problems.

Immediately following this discussion, the party left for a visit to Chairman Shin of the National Assembly. Chairman Shin escorted the group to the Assembly floor. Mrs. Jessup, who had been sightseeing and shopping, joined the group on this occasion and was presented with her husband to the Assembly. Chairman Shin then made a dignified and forthright address (enclosure 3).<sup>2</sup> In it he stressed that the United States should give to democratic nations fighting against communism help equivalent to that given by Soviet Russia to her satellites and ventured the opinion that U.S. help “though sincere, seems rather scattered and weak” compared to “the definite and determined help of Soviet Russia”. Dr. Jessup replied in an excellent extemporaneous speech<sup>2</sup> (enclosure 3) which began with a short review of United States policy toward Korea and ended with well-pointed quotations from President Truman’s State of the Union message<sup>3</sup> which Dr. Jessup then summarized and applied to Korea: “I believe that if the Republic of Korea and the United States of America each are equally successful in holding and maintaining the fundamental institutions of personal freedom, that the two nations can go forward hand in hand towards a better life if it is a cooperative and bilateral progress along the road which I have described. It is not sufficient that either one of us should make these advances.” The speech was well received. Copies of the enclosed text translated by the Embassy’s translation section were distributed subsequently to all Assemblymen by the Assembly Secretary General and have since been quoted on the Assembly floor.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Text in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950*, p. 2.

Following a lunch at Dr. Bunce's residence with certain American and Korean officials concerned with ECA, Dr. Jessup met and had a discussion lasting nearly two hours with over twenty prominent Korean educators: the presidents of the principal universities in Seoul, the deans of the colleges of Seoul National University, the principals of two women's middle schools, several prominent religious leaders, the publisher of the *Tong-A Daily* and a bureau chief in the Ministry of Education. Those participating brought out the many unfortunate financial difficulties faced by educational institutions in Korea, especially stressing the burdens placed on Korean families by the contributions asked of virtually all students' parents by the School's Patrons Association. It was believed, however, that such contributions would be necessary until the Ministry of Education received adequate funds to support education—which it was unlikely to be in a position to do in the foreseeable future. Difficulties in teaching English were also stressed. Dr. Jessup inquired particularly of the law college which proved to be more similar to European than American law colleges. Dr. Jessup was exceedingly pleased with this conference and remarked that the group was unusually articulate and that he had been able to get far more frank information from the participants than he had in a similar conference in Japan. He further remarked that the Korean discussion group was as candid in discussion as any American group.

Thursday ended with a visit by Dr. Jessup to the U.N. delegates and Principal Secretary<sup>4</sup> at the Duk Soo Palace and a buffet dinner at the Ambassador's residence at which large numbers of the principal Korean Government officials, U.N. officials, members of the diplomatic corps, et cetera, were present.

On Friday morning, Dr. Jessup and his party went by train to the town of Uijongbu, 10 miles north of Seoul. At Uijongbu they witnessed an artillery demonstration and visited divisions headquarters where they were briefed on terrain, operations, et cetera. From there they drove to the 38th parallel near Ch'ung-san myun. Numbers of Korean military and Home Affairs officials, including the Minister of National Defense, accompanied the party. The Jessups approached the parallel closely enough to be able to see many installations on either side of the border. Well conducted troop deployments were also observed. A prisoner captured recently by the South Korean Army in that vicinity was hurried up from Seoul to be interviewed by the Minister of National Defense in front of Dr. Jessup. On the

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the Principal Secretary, Bertil Renborg, and the members of the U.N. Commission on Korea (UNCOK).

trip back, Dr. Jessup had a talk with Vice Minister Chang of Home Affairs on the subject of National Security Act and the current trials of the members of the Korean National Assembly. During this talk, he stressed that these Assemblymen should not be tried for holding opinions opposed to those held by the Korean Government. Dr. Jessup subsequently reported that Vice Minister Chang, who has been in the United States, had claimed to "find my English rather difficult".

At 1:30, Friday, Dr. Jessup attended a lunch given by the Korean Chamber of Commerce. On this occasion, the President of the Chamber, Mr. Chun Yong Soon, gave an address (enclosure 5)<sup>5</sup> in which he stressed the necessity of solving the problem of the 38th parallel and expressed hope that the United States would direct its attention to this. He also begged Dr. Jessup to "exert your influence to correct the negative policy of your Government" in the Far East. Dr. Jessup rose to make a "frank" speech;<sup>5</sup> it was also perhaps the most candid speech made by an American official in Korea since the end of the occupation. In it he pointed out that the United States helped countries which helped themselves and in this connection said "you in Korea have made extraordinary progress along certain lines, but there are other things which are within your power which you have not achieved." He emphasized that Korea's problems, like those of the United States, could be solved only with patient and cooperative effort and that the United States did not "believe that war is the only solution to the international problem." Dr. Jessup then flatly disagreed with Mr. Chun's belief that American policy was less affirmative in the Far East than in Europe and urged the Koreans not to "sit back and hope that the United States will cope with the situation alone. The strength of your defense against communism will be based on the strength of your economy and of a fundamental policy of political freedom." The speech ended with a nettle: "In closing, I want to say that I will take with me from Korea many fond memories of Korean hospitality but also memories of those aspects of the situation which you have not conquered."

On Friday afternoon, Dr. Jessup was presented with the honorary degree of Doctor of Law by Seoul National University in a well-conducted ceremony. On this occasion, Foreign Minister Limb delivered a light and graceful speech (enclosure 6)<sup>5</sup> and Dr. Jessup replied in another fluent extemporaneous speech<sup>5</sup> of acceptance stressing the importance of the position of educational institutions in modern society. In them, he pointed out, the urge both for students and for

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

the faculty to seek the truth was fundamental. In order to do this freedom to seek the truth was essential. Dr. Jessup also pointed out the responsibilities which freedom brought with it. On this occasion, the Minister of Education and the Dean of the Graduate School of Seoul National University also delivered brief speeches.<sup>5</sup>

At 5 p. m. the Jessups went to the Chosun Hotel for a tea given them by the numerous Korean alumni of Columbia. Dr. Jessup did not speak at this time but he was visibly pleased with the occasion and was presented with a handsome silver bowl by former Ambassador at the United Nations (and Columbia Ph. D.) Dr. Chough Pyung Ok.

After the gift presentation, Dr. Jessup held a press interview at which he distributed the statement of policy transmitted in this Embassy's telegram 46, January 13 (enclosure 7).<sup>6</sup> He also answered certain questions from the Korean press. Following this interview, the Jessups, their party and many members of the Embassy attended a dinner at Seoul's largest restaurant given by the Foreign Minister. At 9 a.m. Saturday, January 14th, the Jessups emplaned for Formosa.<sup>7</sup>

Ambassador Jessup's arrival had been heralded with high hopes by Koreans and their Government. It had been a signal for a flurry of editorials calling for more aggressive U.S. policy in the Far East and for more aid to Korea in particular (enclosure 8).<sup>6</sup> Koreans did not, of course, get from Dr. Jessup the definite commitments which some had wishfully expected. They were disappointed, however, in no other respect. Koreans everywhere were impressed by the charm and poise of both Dr. and Mrs. Jessup. They could not help noticing the fluency and incisiveness of Dr. Jessup's speeches, many phrases of which have been since quoted and will be long remembered. His very presence and visible, informed interest in Korean problems gave Koreans the self-confidence of knowing that there are American citizens who have broad knowledge of the situation they face and take an interest in them.

The visit bore for the Embassy and President Rhee a subordinate but most welcome result in the presence of Mr. Sebald who provided sympathetic liaison with the problems Korea faces with Japan—the need for which had been long felt on both sides.

For the Ambassador:  
EVERETT F. DRUMRIGHT  
*Counselor of Embassy*

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

<sup>7</sup> Ambassador Jessup and his party proceeded to Formosa by way of Okinawa; for documentation on his talks with officials of the Republic of China, see vol. vi, pp. 256 ff.

795.5622/1-3150

*The Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) to the Director of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Halaby)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 31, 1950.

MY DEAR MR. HALABY: In a message from our Embassy at Seoul, Korea, Ambassador Muccio on December 9, 1949 anticipated the arrival in Korea of ten AT-6 aircraft, recently procured by the Government of the Republic of Korea in Canada through private sources in the United States and shipped to the United States for armament prior to re-transfer to Korea, and recommended the assignment to Korea on a temporary basis of three officer flight instructors, three airplane mechanics, two radio mechanics and one aircraft electrician to serve as advisers for aircraft assembly, maintenance and initial flight training.<sup>1</sup>

It is understood that three of the ten aircraft are now on their way to Korea and due to arrive about February 10, and that the others are expected to arrive shortly thereafter. In this connection, the Air Intelligence Digest, Vol. 2, No. 11 of November 1949 stated, in part, that:

"There is, however, a likelihood that in the absence of competent advisers to assist in transition training, the new aircraft and equipment will be lost to the South Korean government through misuse."

For purposes of compliance with the terms of the Conclusions of NSC 8/2<sup>2</sup> the Department would not consider the furnishing of advisory personnel as a commitment in support of an autonomous Korean air force. That is, the Department does not consider that it is supporting the creation of an autonomous Korean Air Force by suggesting to the Department of Defense that air advisers be assigned to Korea. It is felt, however, that the reports from our Embassy relating to the threat to the defenses of the Government of the Republic of Korea occasioned by the air strength in north Korea cannot be ignored. Our Embassy at Seoul has reported that with these ten aircraft as a nucleus, and forming a part of an air detachment of the Korean Army, the defensive position of the Government of the Republic of Korea would be on a more secure footing.

Under the circumstances, it would be appreciated if, in compliance with Ambassador Muccio's recommendations, urgent consideration could be given to the assignment of Far East Air Force personnel of the above categories to Korea for temporary duty. It is understood,

<sup>1</sup> Ambassador Muccio's recommendations were contained in telegram 1473, December 7, 1949, from Seoul; see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, footnote 4, p. 1106.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 969.



however, that the costs associated with the temporary assignment of these air force advisers are not to be charged against Mutual Defense Assistance Program funds.<sup>3</sup>

Sincerely yours,

JOHN M. ALLISON

<sup>3</sup> For further discussion of this matter, see the memorandum of conversation by Messrs. Bond and Emmons, dated May 10, p. 78.

895.00R/1-1850 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, February 3, 1950—5 p. m.

113. From State and ECA. Gratified and encouraged by reports of vigorous action taken by ECA Mission and Emb to bring inflationary forces under control (Embdes 57, Jan. 18).

In connection Congressional consideration FY 1951 program, we anticipate criticism may be directed against ECA program for failure ROK bring about financial stabilization as provided aid agreement, and especially against recovery projects 1951 program in view inability ROK finance *won* requirements even with counterpart funds. Since expenditures Ministry Natl Defense one of big de-stabilizing factors, we shld be prepared here indicate how such expenditures can be controlled and reconciled with stabilization objectives. In this connection Embdes 75 Jan 21 and especially Embdes 96 Jan 25 have been extremely helpful.<sup>1</sup>

Dept and ECA wld like AMIK prepare fuller statement than has been recd of possibilities controlling and reducing such expenditures, enlisting full cooperation chiefs KMAG and ECA Mission as well as ECA budget consultant. Perhaps it wld be useful for KMAG appoint a senior finance officer to work in cooperation with ECA and Heer<sup>2</sup> to assist in analysis. In this connection wld it not be useful include Rep KMAG and Rep Ministry Natl Defense on joint stabilization comite. Meanwhile wld appreciate such info as you can provide on fol questions:

1. How are expenditures of Defense Ministry divided between (a) regular forces (b) naval and coastal patrol forces, and (c) reserves, Natl Guard, Youth Movement, etc.?

2. Are the additional 25,000 men referred to Encl. One Embdes 96 in addition to 100,000 present basic troop strength?

3. Can an estimate be made by Subcommittee NR 4 of minimum fixed expenditures for a basic security force of 100 thousand men, a police force of 50 thousand, and existing naval forces given the present mil situation. What we have in mind is a benchmark from which to

<sup>1</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>2</sup> Clarence Heer, fiscal consultant to the ECA Mission in Korea.



evaluate desirability of additional expenditures for combat aircraft, heavy weapons, patrol craft, etc., in terms of their internal budgetary costs.

4. What are anticipated budgetary effects of Emb's recommendation Dec 19 that mil assistance funds for Korea be increased from \$10.2 million to \$20 million.

5. What mil expenditures are included in accts of Home Ministry and other govt agencies.

Any other pertinent info will be welcomed as well as further reports on other aspects of inflation and stabilization program. [State and ECA.]

ACHESON

895B.00R/2-1050 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

SEOUL, February 10, 1950—6 p. m.

188. Joint State-KMAG-ECA message Redeptel 113, February 3.

I. After prolonged discussions between KMAG and officials Ministry National Defense, chief of staff Korean Army agreed to limit allocations for fourth quarter Korean fiscal year ending 31 March to 4.37 billion *won* for national defense by eliminating all expenditures for Youth Corps, Reserve Corps, and other irregular forces, except 116 million for training leaders National Defense Corps (National Guard), by deferring maintenance and repair of buildings and by reducing food ration allowance for units from *won* 270 for troops in combat and *won* 220 for noncombat troops to *won* 200 per day. This recommendation has not yet been approved by President and State Council. Joint Economic Stabilization Committee is striving to effect other reductions in order present coordinated recommendation for total expenditures fourth quarter. Present indications are that, despite strongest representations all components American mission, Republic of Korea does not recognize grave consequences continued deficit spending. At recent meeting with Joint Committee President stated he hoped Committee would correct impression that there was financial crisis in Korea. Attitude that there is very little Government can do to correct situation also held by Minister Finance, Governor Bank Korea, and virtually all members State Council. Adherence this attitude in glaring contrast known facts indicates it will be extremely difficult to obtain enforcement by ROK of measures essential to economic stability without extreme pressure from mission. Lieutenant Colonel Ralph R. White, fiscal officer, KMAG, has been designated to serve on Joint Committee. Have suggested ROK designate representative National Defense.

## II. Answers to specific questions URAD follow:

1. Total allotments by Minister National Defense to its units first three quarters ending 31 December 19,048 million *won*. Divided as follows, by quarters: Ministry National Defense, 121 million; Army 16,523 million; Navy 2,154 million; Air Force, 250 million. Allotments to Army included 720 million for all civil components. KMAC is exerting every pressure to reduce expenditures for Youth Movement, National Guard and other civil components to minimum. KMAC strongly feels and has advised Koreans only expense for civil components should be for Leaders' School of National Defense Corps (National Guard), which is made up of National Youth members only. However, many members National Youth are not members of National Defense Corps and receive no support from defense appropriations. Cost of school for FY 50-51 is estimated at 42 million *won*.

2. Original budget current fiscal year calculated on basis average Army strength 75,000 men. Additional 25,000 men referred to inclosure 1 Embdesp 96 are part of present "basic troop strength" of 100,000 men but are in excess strength provided for in appropriations passed to date by National Assembly.

3. Preliminary calculations indicate total authorized strength Army 100,000, Navy 7,500, and Air Force 2,000 can be supported coming fiscal year on total appropriation for Ministry National Defense of 27 billion *won* in contrast to 36 billion *won* included in budget for fiscal year 1950-51 submitted to National Assembly without mission concurrence. This assumes minimum present value of *won* and military situation as it now exists and flow of military aid continuing in future years as at present. In view limitations Korean heavy industry deemed most essential this flow continue. Home Affairs has requested 10.4 billion for police for fiscal year 1950-51. Believe minimum cost police force of 50,000 would be 6.7 billion *won*.

4. Budgetary effects Embassy's recommendation December 19 of raising military assistance funds up to 20 million dollars estimated a 4 billion *won* annually for Air Force (POL, construction new hangars and shops and maintenance) 150 million *won* annually for Army (POL, gun sheds, maintenance) and 15 million *won* annually for coast guard (fuel, lubricants, paint, etc.) *Won* cost POL included since National Defense must reimburse office of supply and use by National Defense will reduce availability POL for sale in general economy. Since date of arrival of equipment unknown above figures are annual and not necessarily cost in fiscal year 1950-51.

5. Appropriations for police current fiscal year to date are as follows by major categories:

Police communication system, *won* 31,340,500.

National Police College, *won* 77,702,200.

District police, *won* 3,958,151,700.

Clothing, *won* 767,100,000.

Temporary expenses for public security, *won* 3,601,452,300.

Total, *won* 8,435,762,700.

About 20,000 men regarded as "combat police" and  $\frac{2}{5}$  above total might be considered direct supplement to military expenditures. In addition to police, Ministry Education has expended 56 million *won* for "youth and student training" and 10 million *won* for "student patriotism movement", both activities regarded by Koreans as quasi-military, but regarded by KMAG as of no military value. Minister Education has requested additional supplemental appropriation 98 million *won* for this purpose, of which mission informed 50 million already obligated.

III. Information on developments affecting stabilization program being forwarded promptly as received by mission.

DRUMRIGHT

895.10/2-1450: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, February 14, 1950—5 p. m.

145. From State and ECA for Muccio (Drumright) and Bunce.  
Subj is inflation.

Refs: Embdes 835, Minutes Food Sub-Committee, 1 Feb, AMIK Report 49, dated 14 Jan.<sup>1</sup>

1. Pres Rhee shld be most candidly informed that passage on 9 Feb of Bill authorizing \$60 mil for Second Period FY 1950<sup>2</sup> is not occasion for relaxation of AMIK-ROK efforts to curb inflation. Pres shld be reminded that authorization legis passed only after ten months concerted, persistent efforts State-ECA; that very serious questions were raised in House as to ability ROK to control inflation; that serious reservations expressed concerning ability and willingness ROK to utilize ECA program effectively and to promote democratic processes in south Korea; that essential condition of authorization was that it did not constitute any commitment beyond 30 June and that Congress will completely reappraise econ situation before authorizing further aid to Korea; finally that funds were authorized only after Korea aid request was joined to China aid request. Clear implication of Congressional attitude is halfway anti-inflationary measures by ROK cld possibly result in ROK receiving no more than \$30 mil to be advanced by RFC total for Second Period.

<sup>1</sup> None printed.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the Far Eastern Economic Assistance Act which was approved on February 14; see footnote 1 to the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Williams, January 20, p. 12.

2. Being fully aware of these very real dangers, State-ECA/W view with great concern and disapprobation (a) apparently unrealistic attitude responsible ROK officials toward inflationary situation and tendency shift blame on ECA or US Govt as exemplified by statement of Min of Food in the Assembly regarding rice situation; (b) official distortion of facts concerning financial situation of ROK as exemplified by memo to Jessup from Pri Min as contained in your desp 103 Jan 29, 1950; and (c) President's act of by-passing ROK-US Stabilization Comite (expressly established to deal with inflation) on 1 Feb in matter of food distribution Seoul and disregarding ECA advice on rationing as reported in desp 123, Feb 4, 1950.<sup>3</sup>

3. Hearings before Fon Affairs and Fon Relations Comites on Korea Aid request for FY 1951 scheduled late Feb. Critically important ECA/W be in position to satisfy these Comites that ROK has demonstrated progress in controlling inflation and rectified administrative weakness resulting in present dangerous situation. Such proof will be required by Congress before authorization FY 1951 aid and demanded by Appropriations Comites when and if FY 1951 aid is authorized. Thus far State and ECA/W in presenting case for Korea Aid can only present to Congressional Comites record of action taken by State-ECA/W and AMIK as proof of action taken by US Govt to make ROK aware of dangerous financial policies tending to undermine Rhee Govt. Record of action taken by ROK thus far and visible effect of such actions not impressive and may be viewed by Congressional Comites with concern. [State and ECA.]

ACHESON

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\* Not printed.

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895.10/2-2150: Telegram

*The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

SEOUL, February 21, 1950—6 p. m.

228. This joint State-ECA message. Bunce and I called on President Rhee this afternoon and orally conveyed to him substance Deptel 145 February 14; left with him for study paraphrase of main points of reftel.

Rhee received message in extraordinarily good heart and gave assurances that he is with us 100 percent in seeking measures to curb inflation.

Opportunity was taken during conversation which lasted more than hour to discuss a number of factors affecting Korean financial situation, especially shaping up of 1951 budget, reduction of military expenditures, etc. Bunce filled Rhee in on recent activities of Joint Stabi-

lization Committee and urged that Rhee carefully consider its findings and recommendations. Rhee promised to do so.

DRUMRIGHT

895B.13/3-1550

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Bond)*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] March 15, 1950.

Subject: 1. Integration of Korean and Japanese Economic Aid Program.  
2. Economic and Political Situation in Korea.

Participants: ECA—Dr. Bunce	State—Mr. Butterworth
Dr. Johnson <sup>2</sup>	Mr. Merchant <sup>3</sup>
Mr. Bunting	Mr. Allison
Mr. Street	Mr. Doherty
	Mr. Bond

[Here follows discussion of subject no. 1.]

2. *Economic and Political Situation in Korea.*

Dr. Bunce said that the question which he was most anxious to discuss with the Department was that arising out of the difficulty which the American Mission in Korea was encountering in dealing effectively with President Rhee and his personal entourage (especially Madame Rhee and Mr. Harold Lady, his personal "economic adviser"). He said that the Mission was seriously concerned with the increasing tendency on the part of President Rhee toward a personal authoritarian type of government backed by police support. As an example, he cited President Rhee's somewhat equivocal conduct in connection with the sale of 100,000 tons of rice to Japan. He added that in this and other analogous transactions the influence of Mr. Lady appeared to carry much more weight with the President than the advice of his own Cabinet Ministers, who customarily supported the position of the Mission. He stated that President Rhee had failed completely to appreciate the nature and the gravity of the inflationary threat in Korea and that, apparently with encouragement from Lady, he had continued to by-pass the provisions of the Constitution with respect to the financing of the Government.

Dr. Bunce referred to the recent defeat of the Constitutional amendment designed to create a system of parliamentary, rather than execu-

<sup>1</sup>The memorandum was codrafted by Mr. Edward W. Doherty, Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs in the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs.

<sup>2</sup>Edgar A. J. Johnson, Director of the Division of Korea Program in the Economic Cooperation Administration.

<sup>3</sup>Livingston T. Merchant, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.



tive, responsibility in Korea,<sup>4</sup> and said that he had been somewhat disturbed by the fact that Ambassador Muccio, in conversations with Korean legislative leaders, had expressed opposition to that amendment. He stated that Clarence Ryee, the Korean Director of Public Information, had gone so far as to issue a public statement to the effect that ECA aid would cease if the Constitutional amendment were adopted, a statement to which the Mission had forced the Korean Government to issue a prompt retraction. Dr. Bunce went on to say that the present police state tendencies of the Government lead him to fear that the elections presently scheduled for May 10 will, if held at all, be dominated by the police and youth groups. In this connection he suggested the desirability of our encouraging the UN Commission on Korea to observe those elections. Mr. Bond said that attention was already being given to this problem.

Dr. Bunce said that he wished to make it clear that he and the Ambassador were in complete agreement on the fundamental issues with which they were confronted in Korea, and that they had both appreciated the support which they had received from Washington, particularly on the question of financial stabilization. He added, however, that it was his own view that the Department might do well to provide the Ambassador with more ammunition with which to fight President Rhee's trend toward personal government. On this point he said he thought President Rhee might be more compliant with our wishes if he were made to feel a little more uncertain about continuing U.S. support. Dr. Bunce went on to say that, while he realized the necessity of relatively optimistic statements for Congressional consumption in connection with consideration of Korean aid bills, he wanted to point out that such statements did create a problem for the Mission by bolstering the President's complacency over the certainty of continuing U.S. aid. He said, however, that the defeat of the Korean Aid Bill in the House in January<sup>5</sup> had had a most salutary effect and had been worth a thousand official statements. Dr. Bunce emphasized once more that the greatest obstacles with which the Mission was confronted in dealing with President Rhee were, first, the President's own incompetence, and second, the influence of Mr. Lady, who was persistently endeavoring to minimize in the President's mind the importance of the inflationary threat.

In response to a question from Mr. Butterworth Dr. Bunce outlined the work of the Joint Economic Stabilization Committee in attempt-

<sup>4</sup> The constitutional changes referred to received approval from a majority of those voting on them in the National Assembly, but failed to gain the required two-thirds vote of the duly elected and seated members of that body; see U.N. document A/1350, p. 21.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 1 to the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Williams, January 20, p. 12.

ing to retard the inflationary trend. He stated that the Stabilization Committee was receiving a gratifying degree of cooperation from all branches of the Korean Government except the defense and police authorities who, despite the efforts of KMAG, continued to expend government funds excessively and irresponsibly within their respective bailiwicks. Dr. Bunce said that the Department's instruction No. 90 (of December 30, 1949)<sup>6</sup> had been a very useful weapon for the Mission and that the Ambassador had talked to President Rhee with great firmness on the basis of that instruction. He added that his own view would be that we should have used instruction No. 90 as an ultimatum, with the threat of publicity. Mr. Butterworth pointed out, however, that such publicity, had we been obliged to resort thereto, might well have sunk the pending Korean aid legislation. Dr. Bunce expressed confidence that the threat of inflation could be licked if the political situation were effectively dealt with and if the anti-inflation program were carried out.

Mr. Street said that he wished to point out that Mr. Hoffman was fully advised of the problems confronting ECA and State in Korea, although it was his feeling that the time had not yet come when all of the circumstances of the situation, as they were being discussed at this meeting, should be made available to the Congress. Mr. Street went on to express the opinion that the problem in Korea was basically a political problem and that the State Department should take steps to bring about a return to "normal democratic processes" in Korea. Mr. Butterworth replied that, in the first place, there is no such thing as "normal democratic processes" in a country such as Korea and that we would be deluding ourselves to think otherwise. He expressed the view also that the problem with which we are confronted in Korea is compounded of both political and economic factors which cannot be separated. Mr. Butterworth went on to point out that the State Department had become concerned as early as last fall with the growing threat of inflation in Korea and with the lack of vigor with which that threat was being combatted, and that it continued to be concerned with both the inflationary situation and the unsatisfactory political situation which, by interacting one upon the other, served to create the present total problem.

Mr. Street then suggested that we might use the termination clause of the Aid Agreement<sup>7</sup> as a weapon vis-à-vis the Korean Government, a course of action which Mr. Butterworth said that he regarded as superfluous. Mr. Bond suggested that the tactics with which we could

<sup>6</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1112.

<sup>7</sup> The agreement relating to economic aid between the United States and the Republic of Korea entered into force on December 14, 1948; for the text, see TIAS 1908, or 62 Stat. (pt. 3) 3780.

best combat the existing unhealthy political and economic tendencies in Korea would in the last analysis have to be determined in the field, and that the Department would certainly be receptive to any suggestions from the Mission as to how it could best backstop such tactics. He expressed the opinion that President Rhee's strongest weapon is his knowledge that the U.S. could not let the Republic of Korea fall without incurring the gravest political repercussions. Mr. Doherty interjected the thought that, if the present trend continued very long, the time might come when the lesser of two evils would be to cut loose and run the risk of incurring such consequences.

Dr. Johnson then suggested the possible advisability of sending to Korea a high level U.S. official (possibly the Deputy ECA Administrator<sup>s</sup>) to impress upon President Rhee and the Korean Government the gravity with which we viewed the trend of events there. Mr. Bond expressed the view that such a mission might have the unintended effect of undermining the authority of the Ambassador and the Chief of the ECA Mission, and that a preferable course might be to recall the Ambassador for consultation and send him back armed with new and stronger representations from the highest quarters of this Government.

Mr. Bond then raised the question of whether any useful purpose would be served by using the threat of stoppage of military assistance as a weapon with the Korean Government. In support of this he suggested that President Rhee, as an old revolutionary, had a more ready understanding of bullets than of capital investments, and that such a threat might get more directly at the heart of the obstacles to stabilization interposed by the defense and police officials.

Mr. Butterworth suggested at this point that a State-ECA working group be set up, while Dr. Bunce was still in Washington, to formulate recommendations. Mr. Doherty asked what the terms of reference of such a group would be, expressing the thought that all the technical and administrative problems had been thoroughly explored by the Economic Stabilization Committee and that the crucial remaining and unsolved problem was the basically political problem of the ability and willingness of the present Korean Government to enforce the measures which had been recommended. Mr. Butterworth repeated that in his view the problem of the inflation was compounded of a number of factors—political, economic and administrative—and that the working group should concentrate on all the steps that could be taken to get the Korean Government to deal in a responsible fashion with this problem.

<sup>s</sup> William C. Foster.

795B.5622/3-1650

*The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

SEOUL, March 16, 1950.

No. 272-bis

Ref: Embtel 318, Mar. 10, 1950;<sup>1</sup> Embdes 777, Dec. 7, 1949,<sup>2</sup> and previous [communications?]

Subject: Request from President Rhee for Excess FEAF Aircraft

The Embassy refers to its telegram no. 318 of March 10, 1950, and to communications cited therein, and encloses, for the Department's information and records a copy of the request from President Rhee, dated March 6, 1950, for the shipment to Korea of FEAF aircraft now reportedly obsolescent.<sup>3</sup>

Upon receipt of this request from President Rhee, the advice of the Chief, KMAC, was sought concerning advisability of procurement of such planes for the Korean Air Force, and there are quoted below pertinent excerpts from the memorandum received from General Roberts under date of 8 March:

"It is obvious that immediate measures must be taken to provide Korea with effective air means of countering the growing air threat from the North. This has consistently been the attitude of KMAC. . . .

"In view of the foregoing, KMAC has sent messages to Washington (ROB 380, 21 Sept 49; ROB 449, 6 Oct 49<sup>4</sup>) and has assisted in the preparation of numerous Embtels requesting that measures be taken to assist the Korean air force with advisory personnel and air materiel. It is understood that this matter has been under discussion in the Department of Defense since last October. . . .

" . . . In order to present the whole problem in one bundle, together with a proposed solution, reference should be made, in forwarding the request, to our numerous proposals for air advisors to insure that if and when air materiel is turned over to Korea it is used efficiently. Further, reference should also be made to FMACC D-6 Revision 1, dated 23 January 1950,<sup>1</sup> subject "Policy with reference to training foreign nationals under MDA Act of 1949." Since one of our proposals contained in ROB 380 of 21 Sept 49 was to train Korean pilot instructors in FEAF installations, and since such training would seem to be contemplated under the MDAA, the present is a logical and propitious time to bring the subject up.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1105.

<sup>3</sup> In his letter to Ambassador Muccio, not printed, President Rhee noted that the Republic of Korea's intelligence sources had stated that the Soviet Union had supplied North Korea with between 70 and 100 fighters and bombers. He went on to say that there would obviously be a disastrous effect on South Korean civilian morale as well as on the military situation north of Seoul if enemy planes could bomb and strafe without any fear of retaliation.

<sup>4</sup> Neither printed, but their content is summarized in telegram 1376, November 8, 1949, from Seoul, in *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1094.

"I am not in a position to comment on the availability or proposed use of obsolescent aircraft now in Japan. It is known that F-84's and F-86's are now being sent to Japan to replace some or all of the F-51's now in FEAF. I feel that aircraft rendered excess by this substitution will, if excess to the needs of the Air Force on a world-wide basis, be used to supply MDAP countries having an air force recognized by the N.S.C. I doubt that they will be "discarded" or "junked" as President Rhee presumes. In any event, I feel that if the planes are to be efficiently and properly used by Korea or any any other country either trained indigenous personnel must be presently available or an advice and training program must be undertaken by the U.S. to produce suitably trained indigenous personnel prior to delivery or use of the aircraft.

"To sum up: I feel that the President's request should be forwarded with a strong statement as to the urgent necessity for a well equipped Korean Air Force; I feel that reference should be made to all our previous requests; and I feel that we should also refer to the language of the FMACC paper referred to above which contemplates training of MDAP country nationals in U.S. installations, either in the ZI or overseas."

The Embassy has reviewed the recommendations set forth in its Despatch No. 777, December 7, 1949, and remains of the view that they are still appropriate with respect to the Republic of Korea's current air needs. If it is a fact that air equipment in Japan is being rendered obsolescent and declared surplus, it is earnestly hoped that such of this equipment as will meet the requirements of the Republic of Korea will be allocated to this country. This is particularly true of fighter, transport and trainer aircraft.

*Action Requested:* It would be appreciated if the Department would inform the Embassy of the action taken, or of such action as is proposed to be taken, with respect to President Rhee's request for United States air assistance, transmitted under cover of the Embassy's Despatch No. 777.

For the Ambassador:  
EVERETT F. DRUMRIGHT  
*Counselor of Embassy*

123 Muccio, John J.: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, March 23, 1950—7 p. m.

278. For Muccio. Info reaching Dept, both from Mission's reports and from conversations with Bunce, Heer, etc, leads Dept believe critical nature problems created by apparent inability or unwillingness ROK recognize and deal effectively with inflation threat, and by ap-



parently increasing anti-democratic tendencies ROK, wld justify your return to Dept for brief consultation. It has also occurred to Dept and ECA that useful purpose might be served were you to issue brief statement prior your departure Seoul to effect your recall for consultation due your Govt's concern over inflationary situation.

Request your views as to usefulness and optimum timing such consultation, as well as advisability issuance statement along suggested lines.

ACHESON

895B.13/3-1550 : Telegram

*The Deputy Administrator of the Economic Cooperation  
Administration (Foster) to the Embassy in Korea*

SECRET      PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, March 27, 1950.

Reference: Ecato 354, Toeca 430<sup>1</sup>

Ecato 395. Eyes only Johnson to Bunce.

Subject is Prime Minister's letter March 4 delivered to Bunce at Airport

Following is full text Hoffman's answer to Prime Minister despatched 23 March. State has concurred.

"Your letter of 4 March to the Chief of the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission in the Republic of Korea,<sup>2</sup> on the subject of inflation, has been shown to me by Dr. Bunce. In recent weeks, as a result of your Government's participation in the affairs of the 'Korean Government—American Mission Economic Stabilization Committee', I had come to feel some assurance that your Government was really determined upon a vigorous anti-inflationary course of action. Your letter deprives me of such assurance.

It is my candid opinion that the appraisal of the present economic situation in the Republic of Korea which your letter sets forth is invalid and that the optimism which the letter seems to reflect is unwarranted. Obviously, certain immediate revenues can be derived from the sale of presently held government stores of rice, cotton and tobacco. This expedient, however, does not come to grips with the central problem, namely, that regular government revenues continue to fall far short of matching present rates of expenditure.

It is a foregone conclusion that unless tax revenues are sharply increased and expenditures are drastically reduced, prices will continue to rise, probably at an accelerating rate. The value of the Korean currency will seriously depreciate, and public confidence not only in the currency but also in the Korean Government will be progressively undermined. Such continuing deterioration in basic economic conditions in Korea will make our efforts to help your country increasingly difficult. It is my real fear that the point will be reached in the not too distant future where our aid would make no further net contribution to the welfare of the people of the Republic of Korea.

<sup>1</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

In view of the thorough-going and detailed examination of all the inflationary forces which has been conducted by representatives of the ECA Mission and representatives of your Government in the Economic Stabilization Committee, I can hardly believe that the true nature of the situation is not known to you. I am, therefore, impelled to raise with you the question of whether your Government has a real intention to deal with the problem of inflation.

It is my duty to make certain that ECA funds are purposefully and effectively utilized in a genuine recovery program. The investment which the United States Government is making in Korean recovery is not an inconsequential amount. Further inflation will jeopardize the entire ECA program in Korea. I have asked Dr. Bunce to keep me personally informed of the progress made by the Government in carrying out the anti-inflationary measures recommended by the Economic Stabilization Committee. I must inform you that stop-gap measures will not be adequate.

It is my duty to remind you that the Government of the Republic of Korea must take such measures as will satisfy the ECA Mission in Korea and will satisfy me that the inflationary problem is being dealt with effectively. I cannot otherwise justify an aid program for Korea of the size and character contemplated for the remainder of fiscal year 1950 and for fiscal year 1951, and unless I am convinced that a forthright, immediate effort will be made to control inflation in Korea, I must consider the advisability of requesting a lesser sum from the Appropriations Committees than the \$60,000,000 authorized by the Congress of the United States. Similarly, I must further review the request of \$100,000,000 which the ECA is making for Korea aid during fiscal year 1951."

FOSTER

123 Muccio, John J.: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

SEOUL, March 29, 1950—4 p. m.

412. Re Deptel 278, March 23. Brief consultation would be most useful and timely. In addition to inflationary situation and political developments I think it desirable to discuss aspects of NSC policy paper,<sup>1</sup> MDAP, future of KMAG and ECA, etc. While there are many disturbing developments in situation here, there are equally a number of favorable developments. Projected elections in late May, how they are conducted and their outcome may mark an important turn in developments. I feel consultation should be at earliest in order I may return here well before holding of elections.

Present time is not propitious for making statement on lack of cooperation ROK for following reasons. While recommendations of Economic Stabilization Committee during past two months have en-

<sup>1</sup> Reference is to NSC 8/2, approved March 23, 1949; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 969.

countered many frustrations and delays, some progress has been attained especially during past two weeks and with constant pushing many other measures may be accepted.

Some of the results to date are as follows:

- a. Food program for current season accepted and now in operation.
- b. Agreement on program for purchase and distribution cereals in 1950/51 also of basic importance to economy.
- c. Agreement on procedure for disposition of vested property.
- d. Passage of measure to implement land reform which Ministry Agriculture says can be gotten underway this season.
- e. Agreement on pricing of aid supplies.
- f. Agreement on proposals for elimination of certain subsidies to Government enterprises.
- g. Agreement on balanced budget for 1950/51 now before the assembly.
- h. Agreement on Dai Han Coal Corporation.

Latter two have been affected greatly in recent days by delaying tactics, but still hopeful they can be passed by this assembly.

Admittedly results, excepting current year food plan, are yet in paper stage. But progress is being made and we have all pushed Korean counterparts as strongly as possible, and almost to breaking point at times.

Therefore, to make statement on lack of cooperation ROK at this moment would in my opinion not serve helpful purpose and, in fact, might react discouragingly on Korean members of ESC who have gone along with us at times under tremendous opposition.

If there should be a serious hitch in implementing propositions already agreed upon by ESC prior to my departure, public statement would be warranted. I propose to inform President Rhee and few keymen in cabinet and in National Assembly in general way reasons impelling Department to call me back to Washington.

MUCCIO

123 Muccio, John J.: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1950—6 p. m.

316. Reurtel 412 Mar 29. T.O. being telegraphed. Pls report dates.

Re suggested statement Deptel 278 Mar 23 did not envisage ref to "lack of cooperation ROK" but merely to our "concern over inflationary situation". Dept still inclined believe statement along latter line might be useful but desires leave this your discretion.

While gratified at results enumerated urtel, Dept and ECA/W inclined to view ltr of Mar 4 from PriMin<sup>1</sup> as more significant indi-

<sup>1</sup>Not printed, but see telegram Ecato 395, March 27, p. 36, and the *aide-mémoire*, April 3, p. 43.

cator of real attitude of ROK toward financial problems than measures upon which agreement reported urltel as having been reached.

On this end fol steps have been or will shortly be taken to emphasize this Govt's concern over inflationary situation :

1. On Mar 23 ECA/W dispatched Hoffman's reply to PriMin's ltr of Mar 4 (text transmitted Ecato 395 Mar 27).

2. On Apr 3 Korean Amb will call Dept (prior his departure fol day on goodwill mission Austral and NZ) and will be handed *aide-mémoire* setting forth Dept's views on inflationary situation, text of which will be telegraphed for transmittal also by Emb to ROK.

3. On same date Korean Amb expected call on ECA Administrator who will express ECA's deep concern over situation and will hand him copy Mar 23 ltr to PriMin.

ACHESON

795B.00/4-150: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

SEOUL, April 1, 1950—6 p. m.

432. Reference Embtels 427, March 31, 431 April 1,<sup>1</sup> and Deptel 317 March 31.<sup>2</sup>

Consider additional comments criticizing attempted postponement elections desirable addition *aide-mémoire*. Should proposed 1950-51 budget, new taxes be voted, but elections postponed as President suggesting, latter would become more serious than economic problems discussed in proposed *aide-mémoire*. Have appointment Monday morning when intend urge President most strongly against this course, but if Secretary of State does not mention same subject Ambassador Chang, might have appearance only Embassy concerned. Therefore suggest following paragraph be added following paragraph 4 of draft *aide-mémoire*.

"Of equal concern to this Government are the reported intentions of the Korean Government, as proposed by the President of the Republic of Korea in a message to the National Assembly on March 31, to postpone the general elections from the coming May until sometime in November. The Secretary of State wishes to draw to His Excellency's attention the fact that United States aid, both military and economic, to the Republic of Korea has been predicated upon the existence and growth of democratic institutions within the Republic. Free, popular elections, in accordance with the constitution and other basic laws of the Republic, are the foundation of those democratic institutions. The holding of the elections as scheduled and provided for by the basic laws

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. Telegram 431 reported that at a press conference on March 31, President Rhee had informed the Chairman of the National Assembly of his intent to postpone the elections for seats in that body, scheduled to be held in May, until some time in November (795B.00/4-150).

<sup>2</sup> This telegram, not printed, transmitted to Seoul the draft text of the *aide-mémoire* to be presented to the Korean Ambassador on April 3.

of the Republic appears to this Government as equally urgent with the taking of necessary measures for the countering of the inflationary forces already discussed.”<sup>3</sup>

MUCCIO

<sup>3</sup> This paragraph was incorporated in the text of the *aide-mémoire* of April 3, see p. 43.

795.00/4-350

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Bond)*

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] April 3, 1950.

Subject: Situation in Korea, With Special Reference to (a) Inflation and (b) Postponement of Elections.

Participants: Mr. Dean G. Rusk, Assistant Secretary [of State for Far Eastern Affairs]<sup>1</sup>  
Dr. John M. Chang, Korean Ambassador  
Mr. Niles W. Bond, NA

The Korean Ambassador called by appointment today to pay his respects prior to his departure on a trip which will take him to Australia and New Zealand on a goodwill mission and to Seoul for consultation. He stated at the outset that he had just been obliged to postpone his departure until April 10, due to certain prior commitments of the New Zealand Foreign Minister, and that he would probably not reach Seoul until about May 10.

In response to the Ambassador's remark that he would thus be arriving in Seoul just about in time for the elections, Mr. Bond stated that it was our present understanding that the latest decision of the President was that the elections should be postponed until November. The Ambassador replied that he was not aware of any final decision to that effect, and that he personally hoped that such a postponement would not take place. He pointed out, however, that if the National Assembly did not act promptly on the budget legislation now before it, the President might have no alternative but to put off the date of the elections. Mr. Rusk said that, whatever the reasons might be, the postponement of the long-scheduled May elections would certainly be widely interpreted as an arbitrary action and one inconsistent with the democratic principles in accordance with which the Republic of Korea had been brought into being. It would in particular, he said, be regarded in an unfavorable light by those nations which, through the instrumentality of the UN General Assembly, had lent their support to the establishment of the Republic. He added that, as the

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Rusk, who had been Deputy Under Secretary of State, assumed his new position on March 28, 1950.



Ambassador well knew, the continuing good will and sympathetic support of those nations was one of the primary sources of strength of the Republic and one which it could not afford to forfeit. Mr. Rusk went on to say that the effect of a postponement of the elections would likewise be markedly unfavorable in terms of American public and Congressional opinion. The Ambassador said that he was in entire agreement as to the unsalutary effect of postponing the elections, and that he would write immediately to his President pointing out that the climate of international opinion and of opinion within the U.S. was not favorable to such a postponement.

Mr. Rusk stated that there was one other subject which he wished to raise with the Ambassador, concerning which he hoped the Ambassador would carry back a strong expression of our views when he returned to Seoul. He said that he had in mind the problem of inflation, which had been causing this Government an increasing amount of concern during recent months. He said that it was our firmly-held belief that the success of the Republic of Korea in maintaining itself as a free nation was at the present juncture dependent in large measure upon its ability to deal effectively with the mounting inflation. Adverting to Mr. Hoffman's letter of March 23 to the Korean Prime Minister,<sup>2</sup> Mr. Rusk explained that the statement to the effect that this Government would have to reexamine its ECA program in Korea if the inflation were not soon brought under control was not intended as a threat, or as a means of forcing the Korean Government to conform to our views of how it should run its economy, but that it represented rather the considered judgment of this Government that continued inflation in Korea would serve to destroy the basis for further American aid—in other words, that continued inflation would bring about a situation in which it was no longer within the power of the United States to provide the "missing component". The Ambassador replied that he fully understood that our strong views on this subject were expressed as those of a friend, and that he would do his best to bring those views forcefully to the attention of his President. Mr. Rusk explained that we had summarized our views on the inflationary situation and on the proposed postponement of the elections in an *aide-memoire* which the Ambassador could take with him, the text of which was being telegraphed to the Embassy in Seoul for informal transmittal to the Korean Government.

The Ambassador said that he wished to express his appreciation for the splendid reception accorded the Chairman of the National Assembly, Mr. Shinicky, and his party during their recent visit to Washington. He added that Mr. Shinicky had been particularly grateful for

<sup>2</sup> See telegram Ecato 395, March 27, to Seoul, p. 36.

the opportunity of being introduced on the floor of the Senate and that he and his party had left Washington thoroughly satisfied with the treatment which they had received.

The Ambassador then raised the question of a Japanese peace treaty,<sup>3</sup> and inquired whether or not any concrete developments could be expected from that quarter. He explained that this was a matter in which Korea, as one of the principal victims of Japanese oppression, was vitally interested. Mr. Rusk said that he had just come from a meeting on the subject of a Japanese treaty and that, while it was not possible at this time to make any predictions concerning the actual convening of a peace conference, he could say that this Government was formulating its views on the subject and might be in a position to discuss those views with other interested governments in the near future.

The Ambassador stated that he did not wish to take leave of Mr. Rusk without expressing the hope of the Korean Government that the American defense line in the Far East could be extended to include south Korea.<sup>4</sup> Mr. Rusk observed that this was not a subject which he was in a position to discuss, but that he did wish to caution the Ambassador against putting too much faith in what he read in the newspapers. Mr. Rusk went on to point out that the so-called "defense line" to which the Ambassador had referred was in actuality merely an enumeration of those sectors in the western Pacific in which the United States had firm military commitments; i.e. our responsibilities as an occupying Power in Japan, our special interest in the Philippines as a former part of United States territory, etc. The Ambassador replied that he realized that no statement could be made on this subject and that he himself had avoided making any such statements which he felt might prove embarrassing. He added that he did wish, however, to impress upon the Department the importance which the Korean Government and people attached to their apparent exclusion from the defense plans of the United States in the Far East. Mr. Rusk replied that the inference that the United States had decided to abandon the Republic of Korea to its enemies was scarcely warranted in the light of the substantial material aid and political support which we had furnished and were furnishing to that Republic. The Ambassador was quick to point out that he was not expressing any doubts of his own, but merely a point of view which unfortunately enjoyed wide currency in Korea. Mr. Bond then made the further comment that, in the case of Korea, it had been the carefully considered judgment of this Government that the most efficacious

<sup>3</sup> For documentation on this subject, see vol. vi, pp. 1109 ff.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3 to the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Williams, January 20, p. 12.

means of defending against Communist expansion was to bring about the creation in south Korea of a strong, self-reliant, Korean government, and that it was to that end that our policy in Korea continued to be directed.

Returning to the subject of his trip, the Ambassador said that the purpose of his visit to Australia and New Zealand was two-fold: (1) to express the appreciation of his Government for the support accorded by those two nations in the UN during consideration of the Korean problem, and (2) to sound out the Australian and New Zealand Governments on their intentions with respect to collective security arrangements in the Pacific. Having been told earlier in the conversation of Ambassador Muccio's projected return for consultation, the Ambassador asked that he be informed of Ambassador Muccio's exact plans at the earliest possible moment in order that he might be able so to arrange his travel as to meet Ambassador Muccio either in Washington or en route.

Attached is a copy of the *aide-mémoire* which was handed by Mr. Rusk to the Korean Ambassador at the conclusion of the foregoing conversation.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> See *infra*.

895B.13/4-350

*The Secretary of State to the Korean Ambassador (Chang)*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Secretary of State wishes to take this opportunity to express to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Republic of Korea, prior to the latter's return to Seoul, the deep concern of this Government over the mounting inflation in Korea. The Secretary of State wishes His Excellency to convey to the President of the Republic of Korea the view of this Government that the communication of March 4, 1950<sup>1</sup> from the Korean Prime Minister to the Chief of the Economic Cooperation Mission in Korea, in which the view was expressed that there is no serious problem of inflation in Korea, but rather a threat of deflation, indicates a lack of comprehension on the part of the Korean Government of the seriousness of the problem and an unwillingness to take the drastic measures required to curb the growing inflation.

It is the judgment of this Government that the financial situation in Korea has already reached critical proportions, and that unless this progressive inflation is curbed in the none too distant future, it cannot but seriously impair Korea's ability to utilize effectively the economic assistance provided by the Economic Cooperation Administration.

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Government expenditures have been vastly expanded by bank overdrafts without reference to limits set by an approved budget. Tax collections have not been increased, aid goods have been under-priced, and governmental subsidies have been expanded. The dangerous practice of voluntary contributions has been used as an inefficient substitute for a sound taxation system. These uneconomic practices have in turn served to expand the currency in circulation, unbalance the Korean national budget, and cause a sharp rise in wholesale and retail prices, thereby strengthening the growing forces of inflation.

The Secretary of State must inform His Excellency that unless the Korean Government is able to take satisfactory and effective measures to counter these inflationary forces, it will be necessary to reexamine, and perhaps to make adjustments in, the Economic Cooperation Administration's assistance program in Korea.

The Secretary of State wishes to inform His Excellency in this connection that the American Ambassador in Seoul is being recalled for consultation within the next few days regarding the critical problems arising out of the growing inflation in Korea.

Of equal concern to this Government are the reported intentions of the Korean Government, as proposed by the President of the Republic of Korea in a message to the National Assembly on March 31, to postpone the general elections from the coming May until sometime in November. The Secretary of State wishes to draw to His Excellency's attention the fact that United States aid, both military and economic, to the Republic of Korea has been predicated upon the existence and growth of democratic institutions within the Republic. Free, popular elections, in accordance with the constitution and other basic laws of the Republic, are the foundation of those democratic institutions. The holding of the elections as scheduled and provided for by the basic laws of the Republic appears to this Government as equally urgent with the taking of necessary measures for the counter-ing of the inflationary forces already discussed.

WASHINGTON, April 3, 1950.

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895B.13/4-450 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

SEOUL, April 4, 1950—6 p. m.

453. Redeptel 320, April 3.<sup>1</sup> Called on President 11 a. m. giving him *aide-mémoire* text Deptel 317 March 31<sup>2</sup> plus additional paragraph suggested Embtel 432, April 1.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. It authorized Ambassador Muccio to convey to the Government of the Republic of Korea the text of the *aide-mémoire* of April 3 (895B.13/4-150).

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2 to telegram 432, April 1, from Seoul, p. 39.

President read aloud, then commented much concern. I expressed belief that with President's earnest backing, following recommendations Economic Stabilization Committee possible establish stabilized financial condition near future, if current delaying tactics overcome. Cited example delaying tactics, specifically recent changing foreign exchange regulations after presidential acceptance committee's program.

I said developments anti-democratic character cause considerable concern, citing retention authoritarian Education Minister, constant improper police arrests, use torture threats by high officials against NA. I said would be impossible explain election postponement by government.

President finally asked what he could do satisfy Secretary and Hoffman. I replied, (1) cause passage laws, budget and taxes, and (2) hold elections before end May.<sup>3</sup>

MUCCIO

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<sup>3</sup> For a report on subsequent developments, see despatch no. 435, April 28, from Seoul, p. 52.

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795B.5622/3-1650

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 13, 1950.

No. 31

The Secretary of State acknowledges receipt of the Embassy's despatch No. 272 of March 16, 1950, on the subject "Request from President Rhee for excess FEAF aircraft". Reference is made to the Embassy's despatch No. 777 of December 7, 1949,<sup>1</sup> on the subject "Transmitting official request from President Rhee for United States air assistance", and to the Embassy's despatch No. 56 of January 21, 1950, on the subject "Transmitting request from President Rhee on needs of Korean Coast Guard".

The Department submitted the requests of the Republic of Korea for air and for Coast Guard assistance to the Department of Defense for consideration. In a memorandum dated April 5, 1950, addressed by the Director of the Office of Military Assistance, Office of the Secretary of Defense,<sup>2</sup> to the Director of Mutual Defense Assistance, Department of State,<sup>3</sup> the tentative views of the Department of Defense on these two requests were expressed, reference being made to the Embassy's despatch No. 97 of January 25, 1950, which recapitulated the Embassy's recommendations regarding an increased

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<sup>1</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1105.

<sup>2</sup> Maj. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer.

<sup>3</sup> James Bruce.



military aid program for the Republic of Korea for Fiscal Year 1950. The text of that memorandum is herewith quoted:

"1. Pending the completion of formal studies within the Department of Defense regarding the proposed increase in the Fiscal Year 1950 MDA Program contained in Ambassador Muccio's despatch No. 97 of 25 January 1950, forwarded by your memorandum dated 16 February 1950,<sup>4</sup> the following is provided as the tentative views of this office:

"a. Based on the existing authority and intent of NSC 8/2,<sup>5</sup> there appears to be no military necessity for an increase in the Fiscal Year 1950 MDA Program for Korea at this time.

"b. In connection with the development of a Korean Air Force, it is pointed out that such a program would be beyond the concept of NSC 8/2, which authorizes "an Army of 65,000 men with air detachments," since by U.S. standards air detachments are normally considered to consist of light aircraft for ground liaison and courier service under Army control. The Korean request, on the other hand, contemplates development of a separate tactical Korean Air Force and includes 25 fighters, 6 long-range reconnaissance and 9 transport aircraft, together with ground support and a U.S. Advisory and Training Mission.

"c. With regard to the Ground Force Program, the present Fiscal Year 1950 Program for the Korean Ground Forces was proposed to provide adequate support for the existing forces in order that they may maintain internal security and protect the Republic of Korea from border incidents. This is in accordance with the provisions of NSC 8/2.

"d. The Coast Guard is established at 4,000 men by NSC 8/2. Vessels are on hand for this number of men and the present program provides maintenance spare parts for these vessels.

"2. If it is anticipated that the Department of State, for political reasons, may recommend the revision of NSC 8/2 to provide for a Korean Air Force, and an increase in Army and Coast Guard strengths, it is requested that this Office be so advised."

The whole question of aid to the Republic of Korea will be reviewed with Ambassador Muccio upon his arrival in Washington within the next few days. In the meantime, for the Embassy's information only, the foregoing is provided in compliance with the request contained in the Embassy's despatch No. 272.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

<sup>5</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 969.

795B.5 MAP/4-2050: Telegram

*The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

SEOUL, April 20, 1950—4 p. m.

550. For Muccio. Approved FY 1950 MDAP has been received by Chief KMAG which with minor exceptions follows program recom-

mended and agreed to by Korean Government in December 1949. Most significant aspect of approved program is scheduled deliveries by which only \$108 of military aid will arrive in FY 1950, two-thirds of total dollar value will be shipped in FY 1951 and remaining third in FY 1952. Impact of this very serious, delay in deliveries is greater than at first appears in that all vehicle and weapons spare parts and all powder and primers for arsenal program are scheduled for delivery in FY 1952. Owing to quick wearing out of weapons and vehicles (a factor of limited equipment used by large number of troops) and due to critical need of supporting Korean arsenal program, it is essential these 2 categories of MDAP arrive Korea soonest. Material wearing out so fast and currently so seriously in need of spare parts that unless prompt shipment of parts can be assured KMAG considers real danger exists. Major items for which needed will be beyond repair by FY 1952. As you know in attempt to stabilize economy, Republic of Korea has cut defense budget substantially. One of first items to be cut was arsenal program (from about 4 billion *won* to 1.2 billion) which results in increased early need for US assistance in form of powder and primers. Early delivery consonant with US desire that Korea balance budget. Year and half delay contemplated in deliveries these categories should not be accepted except as matter of utmost necessity.

Korea now faced with a condition of materially lessened US military supplies with new flow not coming in significant amounts for 9 months versus enemy force north of parallel which periodic reports put at constantly increasing materiel potential.

Telecon between G-4 KMAG and Lt. Colonel Kaufman G-3 DA and Major Geist G-4 DA April 18 indicated there was hope of earlier delivery powder and primers and possibly of other items. General Roberts and I request that you do everything in your power to speed dates of delivery of MDAP materials, especially of critical items such as vehicle and weapons spare parts, powder and primers.

DRUMRIGHT

795B.00/4-2550 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

SEOUL, April 25, 1950—5 p.m.

574. During last weekend Korean Army units broke up organized resistance of remaining band of North Korean guerrillas, numbering more than 600, who had penetrated into Odae Mountain area of Kangwon Province on or about March 25. On April 21 and 22, 70 guerrillas were killed, including leader Kim Mu Hyon, 24 captured. Total result of operations against Kim Mu Hyon group, which lasted intermittently for more than three weeks, were 237 killed, 47 captured, and 172

small arms, 12 automatic weapons and 3 mortars seized. Kim Mu Hyon guerrillas were best trained and equipped Korean Army has yet faced. Fierceness of battles, which took place in very rugged country, attested by fact Korean Army had 57 killed, 164 wounded and 5 missing. Other large band which had simultaneously crossed parallel in area west of Kangnung was routed and virtually destroyed first week in April. Of more than 600 guerrillas who came across in total operation, it estimated not more than 50-75 remain and these are now scattered in small groups.

It perhaps significant these guerrillas had been systematically trained for a year, first at Kangdong Academy and later at other centers. They were far and away best equipped guerrillas yet to come south. It seems clear their mission was to join other guerrillas in north Kyongsang with aim of setting up "liberated area". Communist hopes in this direction have, of course, been utterly dashed.

6th and 8th divisions of KA gave very good account of themselves in these operations, especially 8th, which acted with dispatch and efficiency and with small cost to own forces. Leadership of 6th, especially 8th Regiment, was weak and lacked aggressiveness until past week when new colonel was brought in to assume overall command.

It is understood another force of 500 guerrillas remains just north of parallel in same area. Thus far they have made no effort to come south. With loss during past three weeks of about 500 men and several hundred weapons, North Koreans may be loath to commit more men and equipment to such adventures.

DRUMRIGHT

795.00/4-2750

*Memorandum by Mr. W. G. Hackler of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 27, 1950.

INTERDEPARTMENTAL MEETING ON THE FAR EAST<sup>1</sup>

11:30 a. m., Room 5106

Mr. Merchant opened the meeting and reminded those present that the material presented at these meetings was classified as top secret.

Ambassador Muccio reviewed the history of military government in Korea and the assumption by the Koreans of responsibility for their own government in 1948. He says that the Koreans, although jittery over their security in 1949, had not been willing to accept U.S. advice on economic matters. The *aide-mémoire* and the strong letter from

<sup>1</sup> A list of persons present is attached as an annex.

Washington, which resulted from Ambassador Muccio's suggestion, had jolted the Koreans and recently every recommendation of the Joint Commission on Economic Stabilization has been accepted. Mr. Muccio believes that the balancing of the budget, the raising of taxes and the regulation of foreign exchange presaged an improvement in the economic situation.

He stated that 95% of Korean industries had been owned by the Japanese; the problem now facing the Korean government is one of denationalization. 500,000 Korean families have been given property which previously belonged to the Japanese. 80% of the Korean people live on the land and since they are much better off than they ever were before, they constitute a strong element of stability.

The Korean government is only 21 months old and follows 40 years of Japanese control and 3 years of U. S. military government. The important question in everyone's mind in 1948 was the ability of the Koreans, who had no experience in government, to handle their own affairs. Recent actions of the National Assembly indicate, Mr. Muccio said, a growing sense of responsibility and freedom of action not stifled by the President. Recent favorable developments are the Prime Minister's statement concerning free elections<sup>2</sup> and the request for UNCOK observation of these elections.<sup>3</sup>

Also heartening, Ambassador Muccio reported, is the effective training of the Army. The Korean Army has kept pace with the aggressive actions from the north and has been successful in controlling the constant flow of saboteurs and special agents from North Korea.

Ambassador Muccio said that the Koreans need help in the economic and military fields and since they have the will and the ability to defend themselves, the U.S. should provide the "missing component" which will enable them to hold on to the area. He said that the U.S. had made heavy investments in Korea during the days of military government and only small additional amounts are required to keep Korea on its feet. Korea is a symbol of U.S. interest in Asia, Ambassador Muccio said, and it is important to help the Koreans keep their freedom and independence.

In response to a question from Mr. Merchant, Ambassador Muccio stated that there are too many intangibles involved to make possible an estimate of the length of time that U.S. economic and military aid would be needed. If Korea were unified, South Korea would not require the imports which it does now nor would the military establishment need to be as large. Ambassador Muccio suggested that too many Americans (particularly those in ECA missions) had never lived

<sup>2</sup> See *infra*.

<sup>3</sup> The Republic of Korea on April 21 had invited UNCOK to observe the elections, and UNCOK accepted on May 4; see U.N. document A/1350, p. 23.

abroad before. They went to the Far East and over estimated the needs of the area because they were unfamiliar with Far Eastern standards. Spiritual and mental uplift resulting from confidence in U.S. interest is most important to the Koreans, Mr. Muccio said, and he thought that a Point IV program for Korea would be a tremendous help.

In response to a question from Mr. Zempel, Mr. Muccio said that there were no labor unions in Korea as we understand the term. The SK [LP], or Labor Party, is a political instrument and not a trade union.

In response to a question from Mr. Ogburn, Mr. Muccio said that 2,000,000 Koreans had moved south, whereas none had moved north. The Soviets have moved out of North Korea those persons and groups who had expressed opposition to a police state. As a consequence, rigid police controls and the absence of disaffected persons had kept North Korea quiet, thus making it difficult to estimate the attraction of the present Korean government for the North Koreans. After 40 years of Japanese control the Koreans are determined to resist further interference from outsiders. Mr. Muccio estimated that \$75 million worth of goods have been taken out of North Korea by the Soviets in the form of coal, fertilizer and power.

In response to questions by Mr. Rossiter, Mr. Muccio said that there were not enough textiles for the people but that the supply was steadily increasing. Trade was just getting under way with Japan in the form of exports of rice and imports of spare parts for the Japanese-made machinery which is in use in all of the Korean industries. The Koreans seem to be anxious to trade with Japan but fear the Japanese as being more of an immediate threat than the Soviets and are apprehensive concerning economic engulfment by the Japanese.

In response to questions by Mr. Sprouse and Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Muccio said that it was encouraging that so much interest had been shown in the elections about to be held, with more than 2,000 candidates filing for the 200 positions. Many independents are running for office which indicates that the National Assembly is considered an important body. No Communist party exists in Korea nor are there any organized political parties. The Koreans are not proud of their police force which being Japanese trained uses only force in its operations and is guilty of restricting civil liberties.

In response to a question by Mr. Barnett, Mr. Muccio stated that President Rhee had been a leading figure in the Korean independence movement for 45 years and has considerable support from most Koreans who consider that he has a genuine desire to do something for the Korean people. Detested by many politicians, Rhee has been able to retain power because he is a shrewd manipulator. In the 1880's and



1890's almost all of the younger Koreans were in revolt against the brutal Imperial family. When the Japanese took over control of Korea they instituted an effective program of de-Koreanization. Many influential Koreans emigrated to Hawaii, the United States, Manchuria, Shanghai and other places in the Far East. When they returned to Korea at the end of the war, coming as they did from different environments, the big question was whether they would be able to work together since they had no established patterns in Korea to revitalize and since they had become familiar with so many different traditions during their exile. Fortunately, all signs pointed to continuing success by the Korean leaders in cooperating with each other.

Mr. Bunting of ECA admitted that some errors had been made in ECA operations in the past and asked if \$120 million for the present year and \$100 million for the next year were considered too much. Ambassador Muccio replied that he did not consider that \$182 million was too high because of the large investment the U.S. had made previously. Mr. Muccio explained that his word of caution concerning unrealistic standards did not apply to this figure but was a general remark which he thought it desirable to make to counteract unrealistic estimates of future help which would be needed to make the Korean economy viable.

Mr. Bunting said that the ECA program had not been calculated to provide the Koreans with a high standard of living. He suggested that ECA may be too ambitious in trying to promote capital development and investment in Korea but the plan had been to cut down imports and increase exports. Mr. Muccio said that he did not disagree with the basic ECA program.

In answer to a question by Mr. Young, Ambassador Muccio stated that all Koreans wished their country to be unified and the desire for unity permeates all their thinking. At the present time the only public intercourse between North and South Korea is the delivery of mail every two weeks.

In response to a question by Miss Bacon, Mr. Muccio said that UNCOK was now favorably regarded by the Koreans in contrast to its low prestige last year, which had been caused by the Commission's constant bickering over petty questions of prestige.

In answer to a question by Mr. Hirschtritt, Ambassador Muccio said that the question of disposing of all the property which had belonged to the Japanese was a very difficult one and was not capable of rapid solution because of the huge amount of capital needed.

Mr. Merchant expressed appreciation to Ambassador Muccio for his analysis and again emphasized the Top Secret classification of the discussion.

(List of persons present is attached)

[Annex]

<i>Name</i>	<i>Agency</i>
Kenneth Young	Defense
Arthur W. Stuart	Treasury
Ralph Hirschtritt	Treasury
Fred J. Rossiter	Agriculture
W. I. Ladejinski	Agriculture
Dr. Quincy Adams	Army
Mr. McComb	Army
Edwin D. Arnold	ECA
Frederick Bunting	ECA
Miss Eades	Commerce
Arnold Zempel	Labor
Leo Wertz	Labor
Seymour Weiss	Budget
Mr. Lawson	Budget
Frank D. Collins	SOA
Mr. Merchant	FE
Mr. Hackler	
Miss Bacon	
Mr. Wright	
Mr. Gay	
Mr. Sullivan	
Mr. Sprouse	
Mr. Allison	
Mr. Connors	
Mr. Ogburn	
Mr. Peake	
Ambassador Muccio	
Mr. Johnson	
Mr. Barnett	

895B.13/4-2850

*The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

SEOUL, April 28, 1950.

No. 435

Subject: Reaction to the Secretary's *Aide-Mémoire*

The Secretary of State's *aide-mémoire* to the Korean Ambassador<sup>1</sup> was, after President Rhee caused it to be translated and distributed to the National Assembly, received here as the stern warning which it was intended to be. There was some immediate resentment, outstand-

<sup>1</sup> April 3, p. 43.

ing among which was that of Assembly Vice Speaker Yoon Ch'i Yung, who charged that there was no Korean intention of violating the principles of democracy by delaying elections; Yoon further went on to direct remarks against Dr. Arthur C. Bunce, chief of the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission to Korea, described in a separate report to Washington by Dr. Bunce in Toeca A-25, April 12, 1950.<sup>2</sup> Unofficial censorship kept the contents of the *aide-mémoire* out of the Korean press until press association despatches carried the gist, from Washington, on April 9.<sup>3</sup> Editorial reaction was generally thoughtful, although there was some comment that the tone of the *aide-mémoire* and letter of Economic Cooperation Administrator Paul C. Hoffman to the Korean Prime Minister, of March 23, 1950<sup>4</sup> was sterner than Korea deserved. In this, the press betrayed much the same complacency regarding the seriousness of the situation as was evident in Korean Government circles prior to receipt of the *aide-mémoire* and Hoffman letter. Radio Pyongyang characterized the *aide-mémoire* as "interference of American imperialism" in Korean affairs, although the Communists apparently worked from the confused premise that May elections to provide continuous existence of Parliamentary government in Korea were evil in themselves as well as a scheme of President Rhee to perpetuate himself in power. There was little, if any, comment in newspapers outside the city of Seoul, and after initial editorials in the Seoul papers, the *aide-mémoire* disappeared as a topic of press comment, being overshadowed by the coming election campaign. Anti-administration forces may make use of it in the campaign, however.

*Events subsequent to delivery of the aide-mémoire.* After delivery of the text of the *aide-mémoire* to the President, as described in Embtel 453 of April 4, an officer of the Embassy called on Kim Sung Soo, head of the Democratic Nationalist Party, at present the strongest organized political group in opposition to the President. The conversation, in which other members of the DNP also participated, is described in Enclosure No. 1.<sup>2</sup> The two main points of the *aide-mémoire* were made known to the DNP leaders, and they indicated that they had come to the same conclusions concerning the necessity of passing a balanced budget and holding May elections as scheduled. They were in doubt, however, as to the President's intentions.

It is the Embassy's opinion that the President came to the conclusion the following day, April 5 (which was a Korean holiday, Arbor Day), that he must support May elections, and it is understood that

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> The text had been released by the Department of State on April 7; see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 17, 1950, p. 602.

<sup>4</sup> See telegram Ecato 395, March 27, to Seoul, p. 36.

he ordered translations of the *aide-mémoire* and parts of the Hoffman letter to the Prime Minister made for intended distribution in the National Assembly the next day, when a vote on the vetoed Election Bill was scheduled. This bill, vetoed April 3 by the President, had provided for elections within the last 20 days of May. On that same day, April 5, the President also was visited by the senior Vice Speaker (and Acting Speaker) of the Assembly, Kim Tong Wun, a DNP. According to Kim, the President offered to appear in the Assembly the next day, when the vote on overriding was scheduled. The President, however, did not appear, and by failure of the Office of Administration to deliver the material to the Assembly secretariat in time, translations of the *aide-mémoire* and the Hoffman letter were not distributed in the Assembly that day. Despite reference by some Assemblymen to Government receipt of a strong warning from the United States, the Assembly failed to override the veto. As in the Constitutional amendment voting, abstentions largely by the generally pro-Administration Taehan (Great Korea) Nationalist Party resulted in failure of the measure to obtain the necessary two-thirds affirmative votes.

*National Assembly reaction.* Translations of the Secretary's *aide-mémoire* and parts of the Hoffman letter were distributed in the Assembly shortly after it convened the day following the vote on the vetoed Election Law, April 7. The President himself also made an unscheduled appearance, during which he discussed the possibility of loss or reduction of American aid, suggesting that if Assemblymen had any doubts about Government receipt of United States warnings they "might ask either the ECA or the American Ambassador." After blaming much of the criticism of the Republic of Korea on Owen Lattimore<sup>5</sup> and unspecified Koreans in the United States, the President urged passage of the FY 1950/51 budget<sup>6</sup> and necessary revenue measures without regard to "personal" considerations. He then promised elections sometime between May 25 and 30, excusing his own previous requests for election postponement on the grounds that he had wanted "to enable you (Assemblymen), in leisure, to pass the important bills with an easy mind." Enclosure No. 2<sup>7</sup> summarizes Assembly proceedings for that day.

The President's remarks, and the *aide-mémoire*, produced one immediate, violent reaction, from Assembly Vice Speaker Yoon, leader of the Taehan (Great Korea) Nationalist Party. Yoon, by inference, charged interference in Korean internal affairs, criticizing not only the

<sup>5</sup> Director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University and former editor of *Pacific Affairs*; see footnote 1 to telegram 640, May 5, from Seoul, p. 67.

<sup>6</sup> The National Assembly passed the budget legislation and related revenue measures on April 22.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed.

*aide-mémoire* but previous communication with the Assembly by Dr. Bunce, and likened the situation to a communication written by former Japanese Ambassador to Washington Hanihara during Congressional discussion of Japanese exclusion in the 1920's.<sup>8</sup> "We must be sure," Yoon said in a speech more agitated in manner of delivery than in actual words, "that we do not receive such letters from foreigners again. . . . I am not criticizing our American friends here but I am merely saying it for the preservation of the prestige of (this) civil law country." Speaker Yoon's remarks, translated from the official stenographic record of the Assembly session, are also contained in Enclosure No. 2.

As indicated by Enclosure No. 3,<sup>9</sup> giving details of a later conversation between Yoon and an Embassy officer, Yoon recognized "as did all members of the Assembly, that although Korea was nominally an independent country it was actually dependent upon the United States for its very existence" and that "the question was not one of conforming to United States desires but of saving face as a supposedly independent legislative body of an independent country." A point was made by Yoon that he regretted that the *aide-mémoire* and Mr. Hoffman's letter had been published by the United States Government, and in this connection it may be pointed out that the Korean press did not carry the text of the *aide-mémoire*, although there were newspaper stories describing the President's appearance in the Assembly and his reference to the *aide-mémoire* and Hoffman letter, and Washington despatches later supplied further details.

After Yoon's speech, no other Assemblyman spoke on the subject. Even those who had professed themselves as hoping for a sterner attitude on the part of the United States confessed that they were startled when the warnings actually were delivered and read. Remarks to this effect were made privately by the Independent Assemblyman Cho Heun Yung, a former DNP member, who throughout the last Assembly session has been a consistent spokesman for common sense and attention to the main business of passing necessary fiscal legislation. When Cho, incidentally, on April 11 drew parallels between Greece and Korea in urging Assembly action on tax matters, it drew from Hong Sung Ha, DNP chairman of the Committee on Finance and Economy, a retort that "one talks about foreign aid in private conversation but it is very unpleasant to hear some talking of foreign aid on the rostrum of the National Assembly."

*Newspaper comment.* The leading Seoul newspapers carried comment on the warnings (without the texts themselves) in which the

<sup>8</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1924, vol. II, pp. 375-383.

<sup>9</sup> Not printed.



attitude was one of admitting the faults charged, reservations, and then of counselling determination to make reforms to insure further United States aid. The *Yunhap Shinmoon*, however, which often speaks for the President, commented that it was "sorry that the tone of the note (*aide-mémoire*) was rather severe" and went on to protest that although "our economic system is in bad shape" it was not "so bad as to call for a curtailment of United States aid." The editorial asked that the United States render assistance to small and weak nations by handing out more aid. Enclosure No. 4<sup>10</sup> summarizes the *Yunhap* editorial.

The *Seoul Shinmoon*, reorganized last year under Government direction, suggested that Korea was not the only nation aided by the United States in which inflation was a problem—the *Seoul* pointed to the Philippines—but ended by recognizing the "cold reality" of the situation, advocating doing "our utmost so that our house can be put in order." Enclosure No. 5<sup>10</sup> summarizes the editorial.

The *Kyunghyang Shinmoon*, representing Catholic interests, chided the Administration and the Assembly equally for trying "to pass the buck to each other", and said that "all of us must join hands in assuming responsibility and correcting the defects." The editorial, given in Enclosure No. 6,<sup>10</sup> continued: "We must continually bear in mind the import of Acheson's warning that United States aid to Korea is based on the existence and development of democratic institutions in our country. Days of lip-service . . . are gone."

The *Chosun Ilbo*, an independent, generally middle-of-the-road newspaper, occasionally critical of the Government, said it was "sorry that such a warning had to be sounded" but advised that Koreans had "better seize the opportunity to reflect on ourselves as to why such a step had been taken by our friend who has shown so far nothing but goodwill, and rendered valuable aid." The editorial is summarized in Enclosure No. 7.<sup>10</sup>

The *Tong A Ilbo*, organ of the anti-Administration, conservative DNP, whose stand had been in favor of early budget action and May elections "rather welcome(*d*) this warning because it concurs with our contention . . . that inflation must be curbed and the election be held in May." *Tong A*, whose editorial is summarized in Enclosure No. 8,<sup>10</sup> gave the United States credit for "thus far avoiding any actions which could be interpreted as United States interference in our domestic affairs" and suggested that it "must have pained" the United States to "administer us a stern thrashing, knowing very well that the Soviets and the puppet group up in the North would seize upon the chance and launch vicious propaganda." The *Tong A* warned its readers that

<sup>10</sup> Not printed.

the Administration still had to be watched, to make sure it did its part, and concluded on the note that "Acheson's (*aide-mémoire*) should be an impetus for a new determination on our part."

The Embassy regularly watches provincial newspapers and others outside the city of Seoul, including Pusan, but has seen no comment in them on the *aide-mémoire*. Newspapers outside Seoul did, of course, carry news stories from Washington, as distributed locally from Seoul, with accounts of the United States messages to the Korean Government.

*Other Comment.* The then Prime Minister, Lee Bum Suk,<sup>11</sup> whose letter on the dangers of deflation, rather than inflation, in Korea provoked the Hoffman letter of March 23, commented on the *aide-mémoire* at a press conference April 10. He termed the *aide-mémoire* a "friendly advice" and tried to reconcile differences between views in his (Lee's) letter to the ECA and the *aide-mémoire* as resulting from a difference in viewpoint: Korea he said, was looking at her own situation alone, whereas the United States, in his view, was basing its remarks on "its world economic policy." He admitted Korea's obligation to accept the advice of the aid-giving country. A newspaper account of the interview is contained in Enclosure No. 9.<sup>12</sup>

Enclosure No. 10<sup>12</sup> contains comments by Koreans in Ch'oonchun, capital of Kangwon province, as reported by the Korean manager of the United States Information Service there. In an accompanying note to the director of the USIS in Korea, the USIS branch manager commented that the "memorandum warning the Republic of Korea . . . has aroused a more or less big sensation among the leading people in this town." He enclosed specific comment; a newspaper publisher remarked that the *aide-mémoire* was deserved; a merchant took the same view; a judge dodged the issue although criticizing the Korean Government; a Christian minister said he felt "ashamed" and a candidate for the National Assembly (identified only as a "politician") termed the memorandum "timely", but went on to suggest that fundamental solution of Korean economic problems must await elimination of the division of Korea at the 38th parallel.

As mentioned in the *Tong A Ilbo* editorial above, the North Korean regime did indeed make propaganda use of the *aide-mémoire*. A Radio Pyongyang broadcast of April 9 is given as Enclosure No. 11.<sup>12</sup> The broadcast took the view that President Rhee had intended to hold May elections "with a view to regaining his prestige" but that he had changed his mind several times subsequently, finally taking a position in favor of May elections on receipt of "a United States Department

<sup>11</sup> Prime Minister Lee Bum Suk resigned on April 3 and was succeeded by Defense Minister Sihm Sung Mo who became Acting Prime Minister on April 22.

<sup>12</sup> Not printed.

of State . . . order to Syngman Rhee that the general elections be held in May without fail." The broadcast pictured the President as unwilling "to announce publicly that orders had been received from Washington" but that the President, having no alternative but to do so gave as his "recommendations of the United States." According to Radio Pyongyang, these recommendations "were couched in such brazen and shameless words of suppression against the traitors, and of interference of American imperialism in the internal affairs of the Republic of Taehan (Korea) that they could not but evoke the resentment of even the members of the country-ruining National Assembly." Yoon Ch'i Yung's remarks were then quoted in part, together with the President's brief reply to Yoon.

EVERETT F. DRUMRIGHT

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795B.00/5-150: Telegram

*The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

SEOUL, May 1, 1950—6 p. m.

605. I had long informal talk yesterday with Acting Prime Minister who evinced discouragement over experiences of a harried first week as Acting Prime Minister. He confirmed he had been by-passed by Home Ministry in making top police changes (Embtel 596, April 28<sup>1</sup>) and as result had offered his resignation, but Rhee had rejected it. He said police changes made to date were not decisive, but he expressed fear Home Ministry might be able prevail on President to make further wholesale police changes at county and local levels which could seriously affect course of election. He accordingly, urged me to see President and intimate wholesale police changes would be unwise and should not be made at this time. He indicated he had exerted every effort check further changes but that matter was now beyond his control.

Late yesterday Kim Sung Soo, leader Democratic National Party, also came to see me. He expressed concern over police changes made to date and professed to believe additional changes were imminent which could seriously affect prospects of his party. However, he said DNP candidates had thus far been able to campaign in free atmosphere.

This morning King, AP correspondent, came to see me with report further police changes were rumored which might influence course

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed. It reported the receipt of confidential information from a Korean official that the Home Ministry had transferred a number of senior police officials and dismissed six others, with the sanction of President Rhee but over the objections of Acting Prime Minister Sihm Sung Mo (795B.00/4-2850).

of election. It was agreed that rather than send despatch, King would make informal inquiry of President whether further wholesale police changes were contemplated. Subsequently King came to tell me he had made such inquiry through one of President's secretaries and had received reply that no such changes were in prospect.

I have engagement to see Rhee tomorrow afternoon at which time I propose find opportunity to suggest that if any wholesale police changes are in contemplation, it would seem best that they be deferred until after election, lest impression get abroad that changes are designed to influence course of election. Inform Muccio.

DRUMRIGHT

795B.00/5-250: Telegram

*The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

SEOUL, May 2, 1950—6 p. m.

613. Embtel 605, May 1. Mrs. Rhee telephoned Noble<sup>1</sup> before nine a. m. this morning saying President was sick in bed but would like see him at once. Prior to leaving office Noble discussed with me question of reported police changes. On arrival at residence Noble was met by Mrs. Rhee, who said President decided issue public statement about changes in police force, but she was fearful he might include some unfortunate remarks and had persuaded him to talk with Noble first. Noble went to President's bedroom, where he found President in bed apparently suffering from grippe.

President first gave long background account of situation. He said he considered party fights and factionalism greatest weakness of Koreans politically and fights between factions in US before liberation had done more harm than even Japs had done. Therefore, when he returned to Korea he was determined party politics should be avoided. He had tried to organize a coalition of all national elements in National Society for rapid realization for Korean independence, in which all groups and factions would work together for common cause. In this he had failed. Meanwhile there had developed Democratic National Party and he had maintained friendly relations with it. Indeed most of his good friends had been members. In consequence he had frequently been attacked by foreign correspondents as being a reactionary since DNP was conservative party of Korea. He had to admit, however, that DNP had attracted most of competent and able men in South Korea, wealthy men, local leaders, men of education and leadership. He found DNP would have been willing and in fact was desirous he should be party leader, but DNP wished to monopolize all political power in Korea. Since he did not believe in party politics he would

<sup>1</sup> Harold J. Noble, Attaché at the American Embassy in Seoul.

not accept party position. After assuming Presidency he offered Finance Minister's post to Kim Sung Soo, DNP leader, but Kim had set down as condition of acceptance appointment of majority of DNP members to Cabinet and control of Government by DNP. This he had refused and Kim Sung Soo did not enter Cabinet. Nevertheless he had made extensive use of DNP members in government, including several Cabinet Ministers. In addition, Defense Minister Sihm Sung Mo, in whom President put great confidence, worked closely with DNP. In fact, President had appointed Kim Kyo Suk Home Minister upon Sihm's recommendation.

Rhee told Noble that without his own knowledge or even suspicion, Kim Kyo Suk had proceeded to develop DNP party machine through police chiefs who were members of or attached to DNP. He said this had come to his attention at time of struggle over constitutional amendment when numerous persons had come in from country to complain police were supporting DNP political leaders only and used their power against persons not supporting DNP. He said about fifty members of National Assembly also had called and presented similar charges. He had then called in Kim Kyo Suk and asked him about these charges. Kim had said it was necessary to organize police in order to keep Communists and moderates from being successful in elections and so obtain control of government. President said he considered this meant Kim had actually organized police to advance fortunes of DNP. He had therefore demanded Kim's resignation and had appointed present Home Minister Paek who had no connections with DNP.

After assumption of office, President had directed Paek to make complete shift of police chiefs before election so there could be free elections. He said each police chief would have developed his own organization in his own district, but a new police chief coming in would not be able to take over that organization or have time to develop a new organization in which police influence could be used on behalf of one group of candidates.

Noble replied that whatever facts were, general public impression among Koreans and foreigners was new Home Minister was now engaged in establishing his own police machine in order control elections on behalf of candidates he supported. President's objection this not so, Noble said President had to face not only facts as he knew them but general opinion which even though not based on facts would have very powerful influence. Rhee said he understood this but he was determined there should be free elections and he intended proceed with his program of shifting every police chief to a new district. He continued although there might be suspicion of motives at present time, nevertheless when elections were held everyone would see results had



been beneficial in making free elections possible instead of having police power utilized on behalf of one party.

Noble then said Home Minister had in addition effected dismissal of several senior police officers and this would not appear to be preparation for free elections but elimination of officers who might be in way of setting up of new political machine by Home Minister. President, seemingly concerned, said he had not been told any had been dismissed and wanted to know who they were. Noble replied he would obtain names. President requested he do so, saying if Home Minister had dismissed police chiefs, he would fire Home Minister.

President then said in view of public concern over issue, especially that of foreigners, he wished to make public statement and requested Noble's advice. Noble rejoined there no point in making statement unless it contained all essential facts, specifically who was being transferred, from which post to what post and why, and who was being discharged and why. President then said he would like Noble to talk with AP correspondent and that he had greatly appreciated latter's handling of matter yesterday. Noble rejoined it would seem well to take up matter with correspondent when all facts were available.

Noble stressed current shifts were having bad effect on police morale. Noble then urged that regardless of merits of President's position, because of harmful effect upon public opinion, especially foreign opinion, projected changes be delayed until after election. In reply President indicated he intended go ahead because he wanted free elections. President then asked Noble what was purpose of my projected call this afternoon. Noble replied I was greatly concerned about police changes and wished discuss them with President. He then told Noble he would be glad to see me if I felt I must come this afternoon, but since Noble could now give his views to me, and since he was ill, he hoped I would find it convenient to call another day.

After careful consideration of President's position, I asked Noble to call on President late this afternoon with information about dismissed police and at same time convey to him following facts:

"State that I fully sympathize with his desire that the elections shall be conducted in a free, honest and impartial manner. Inform the President that as a friend and as a supporter of Korea, I earnestly venture to hope that he will consider long and carefully the repercussions and reactions which may be brought about by any wholesale changes in the police chiefs at this time. Say that I have long felt that the police organization needs a thorough overhauling and appropriate training in order to enhance its efficiency and make it more popular with the Korean people, but that I am of the view that such reforms should be undertaken only after thorough study which would have to be after the elections.

"Inform the President that in my view any wholesale or complete shifting of police chiefs at this time will unquestionably expose him to charges of endeavoring to control or rig the elections. Say that in my opinion this will be the general interpretation given such an action not only by people of the friendly nations but by the Korean people, as well. Point out that the repercussions are incalculable. Inform the President it is my feeling that the reaction in US quarters, official and unofficial, is almost certain to be adverse, no matter what explanation may be given for the police changes. Bearing in mind that the US Government suggested an early election, inform the President that this matter could conceivably affect US policy toward Korea, including the voting this very week on the ECA appropriation in the US Senate.<sup>2</sup>

"Say that if the President is convinced of the validity of the charges made against Mr. Kim Kyo Suk, it would have been more convincing if the police changes had been initiated immediately following Kim's removal from office. Say that no amount of explanation more than two months after the appointment of Kim's successor and within thirty days of the holding of the elections is likely to be convincing to impartial persons.

"Inform the President that I share the views which you expressed to him this morning. Say that I am reporting fully by urgent cable to my government".

I fear if notwithstanding our strong advice Rhee goes through with plan to effect wholesale police changes, rift between him and DNP will be seriously widened and existing Cabinet will dissolve, in which case a crisis may ensue. Results of Noble's latest interview will be telegraphed as soon as available.

Inform Muccio.

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<sup>2</sup> On May 5, the U.S. Senate approved the legislation calling for an authorization of \$100 million to the Republic of Korea in fiscal year 1951; this authorization was enacted into law on June 5, 1950 (see 64 Stat. 202). On September 6, 1950, an appropriation of \$90 million for economic assistance to Korea was approved (see 64 Stat. 758).

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795B.00/5-250 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL      PRIORITY

SEOUL, May 2, 1950—8 p. m.

614. Inform Muccio reEmbtel 613, May 2. Noble called on President 5 p. m. this afternoon. Was received again in bed room with Home Minister, Director National Police, Kim Tae-Sun, and President's private secretary present. President instructed Home Minister explain police changes. Home Minister, consulting records, stated since assump-

tion office had changed 34 senior police officers: 5 being required to resign, 29 having posts changed. He gave reasons for requiring 5 resignations, of which Noble felt 3 probably admissible and 2 possibly politically based. President evidenced some dissatisfaction with Home Minister's explanation. Home Minister stated categorically would be no further dismissals in appreciable future. Home Minister explained are now 31 police chiefs vacancies throughout Republic of Korea which he intends to fill. In process filling these vacancies, total about 90 police position changes envisaged through lower promotions since all such posts must be filled by officers presently in police force.

On May 4 all Republic of Korea police chiefs gathering Seoul for conference. At that time certain police inspectors previously sent throughout country by Home Minister will report to board consisting of district police chiefs on possible improper conduct including political activity. In such case board will recommend transfers to other posts.

In Noble's presence, President directed Home Minister must not dismiss any other officers; must not transfer officers excepting for proven political activity; would hold Home Minister personally responsible for execution this order; required all police refrain completely from any political activity during election period and any policeman violating this order would be punished for criminal acts.

During conversation Noble repeated arguments similar to those presented in morning conference against police interference. Subsequent to departure Home Minister, Director National Police and secretary, Noble presented my views orally and then left copy of memo with President.<sup>1</sup> President said he was determined guarantee free elections and would not be deterred by criticism from friends from changing police who did engage political activity. He asked Noble what would be done in US with police officer attempting manipulate elections and said he intended act similarly here. He conveyed his appreciation my expression of views.

Following further discussion problem, President told Noble he had directed Home Minister submit to him name or names of any police officers listed for further transfer and said he would show it to and discuss it with Noble before he permitted transfer to be made.

[DRUMRIGHT]

<sup>1</sup>Not printed, but see the portion within quotation marks of telegram 613, May 2, from Seoul, *supra*.

611.95/5-250

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)*

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] May 2, 1950.

STATEMENTS BY SENATOR CONNALLY<sup>1</sup> REGARDING U.S. POLICY IN KOREA

There is attached an excerpt, consisting of two questions and answers on the subject of Korea, from Senator Connally's interview on "World Policy and Bipartisanship" which has appeared in the May 5, 1950 issue of *U.S. News and World Report*.

It is recommended that you take advantage of your weekly meeting with Senator Connally to express to him the Department's concern over the possible effects of his remarks on this subject, particularly on the Government and the people of Korea.<sup>2</sup> Specifically, the Department's concern arises out of the following considerations:

(1) Senator Connally's reply to the first of the two quoted questions betrays an attitude of defeatism which the Department does not share and which it has consistently endeavored to counteract. The Department's position with respect to the suggestion that we "abandon" south Korea is apparent from the following excerpt from the Secretary's statement of March 7, 1950 before the Foreign Relations Committee,<sup>3</sup> delivered in the presence of Senator Connally:

"There is one further and fundamental question which must be considered: That is the probability of ultimate success of the effort of the Korean Republic to survive. In recent debates a number of members of the Congress have indicated their feeling that the possibility of failure makes them doubt the wisdom of the United States giving a helping hand in this effort. It is my belief that American policy should be based on determination to succeed rather than on fear of the possibility of failure. Despite the problems with which the Republic of Korea is beset both internally and externally, and despite its necessarily limited experience in self-government and paucity of technical and administrative know-how, conditions of stability and public order have continued to improve and the threat of Communist overthrow appears at least temporarily to have been contained.

"There is good reason to hope from progress made thus far that with our assistance, the Republic of Korea can survive and thrive. This cannot, of course, be guaranteed. However, it continues to be true that without our assistance there can be no such hope."

<sup>1</sup> Senator Tom Connally was Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum by Under Secretary Webb, dated May 10, stated that at his meeting with Senator Connally on that date the subject of the Senator's remarks on Korea was not mentioned (795.00/5-1050).

<sup>3</sup> Text in Department of State *Bulletin*, March 20, 1950, p. 454.

(2) Senator Connally's reply to the second of the two questions raises an issue with respect to which the Korean Government is particularly sensitive—i.e. the apparent exclusion of Korea from the American defense line in the Far East. Following the Secretary's reference in his Press Club speech to the Japan-Ryukyus-Philippines "defensive perimeter", the Department was subjected to a barrage of representations from the Korean Government and its representatives designed to elicit from the U.S. a commitment to extend its defense line in the Far East to include South Korea. Inasmuch as this Government is not in a position to provide the Korean Government with such a commitment, any public reference to the Japan-Ryukyus-Philippine line can serve only to undermine the confidence of the Korean Government and people, and consequently their will to resist the ever-present threat of Communist aggression.

For Senator Connally's information, it is being proposed to the Secretary that he reply along the following lines if questioned by the press concerning the views expressed by the Senator with respect to Korea:

"I have had many discussions about Korea with Senator Connally and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, of which he is chairman, and with the House Foreign Affairs Committee. I am confident that there exists between us no difference of opinion or intention.

"The United States is deeply interested in the survival of the Republic of Korea as an independent nation. In order to assist Korea in achieving this goal the United States is providing political support, directly and through the United Nations, as well as economic and military assistance.

"I believe it is perfectly evident from what Senator Connally said that he does not mean that the United States does not consider it a matter of grave importance to the United States that Korea, and, in fact, other Asiatic countries, should remain independent and free from Communist domination. This has been fully recognized by the Congress in appropriations for military assistance and in other ways."<sup>4</sup>

[Annex]

*Excerpt From: "U.S. News & World Report" May 5, 1950*

ARTICLE: WORLD POLICY AND BIPARTISANSHIP: AN INTERVIEW WITH  
SENATOR TOM CONNALLY

Q—Do you think the suggestion that we abandon south Korea is going to be seriously considered?

A—I am afraid it is going to be seriously considered because I'm afraid it's going to happen, whether we want it to or not. I'm for Korea. We're trying to help her—we're appropriating money now to help her. But South Korea is cut right across by this line—north of it

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 1 to telegram 640, May 5, from Seoul, p. 67.



are the Communists, with access to the mainland—and Russia is over there on the mainland. So that whenever she takes a notion she can just overrun Korea just like she probably will overrun Formosa when she gets ready to do it. I hope not, of course.

Q—But isn't Korea an essential part of the defense strategy?

A—No. Of course, any position like that is of some strategic importance. But I don't think it is very greatly important. It has been testified before us that Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines make the chain of defense which is absolutely necessary. And, of course, any additional territory along in that area would be that much more, but it's not absolutely essential.

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795B.00/5-350 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL      PRIORITY

SEOUL, May 3, 1950—1 p. m.

617. Re Embtels 613, 614, May 2. Consider in light yesterday's discussions that while President strongly opposed election any considerable numbers DNP, he also genuinely concerned lest police pressures interfere with free elections, and his only planned moves attempts break up possible DNP organization through police chiefs to influence elections various districts.

President's instructions Home Minister presence Embassy officer, and statements to Embassy officer indicate intention hereafter only transfer police chiefs if evidence secured their misuse posts for political purposes.

President made excellent statement, published in full Korean papers, May 1, on free elections, calling upon populace including police do all possible guarantee rights campaigning, free casting ballots. Text being pouched.<sup>1</sup>

Believe Embassy representations yesterday, plus President's subsequent orders Home Minister, probably have salutary effect.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> For a further report on the situation in the Republic of Korea prior to the elections, see telegram 767, May 27, from Seoul, p. 89.

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795B.00/5-550

*The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State*

RESTRICTED

SEOUL, May 5, 1950—6 p. m.

640. Embtel 623, May 4. Continuing press reaction Connally statement Korea. All Seoul newspapers May 5, carried wire service stories

Secretary of State's clarification Connally statement without comment.<sup>1</sup>

Two May 6 newspapers on street late today (*Seoul, Kyung Hyang*) prominently featured AP story Muccio statement.<sup>2</sup> *Kyung Hyang* editorial captioned "refuting Connally's foolish idea" identified Korea with America's fight against Soviet, emphasized difficulty and determination Korean struggle against Communism. Said Connally's statement did not represent view American people nor US State Department that in view determination Democratic Party and strong Congressional diplomatic policy toward Soviet could not understand Connally's statement since he famous politician and leader Senate Foreign [Relations] Committee. Pointed out US committed aid Korea by international agreement, defense line Japan, Okinawa, Philippines indefensible if Korea Communist.

Secretary of State's statement was received with acclaim and largely vitiated damage resulting from Connally statement. In his weekly press conference with foreign correspondents today President commented saw Acheson's statement "and clarifies Connally statement. I think Acheson referred to failure joint commission.<sup>3</sup> US made every effort get Soviet withdrawal from north but they didn't."

DRUMRIGHT

<sup>1</sup> On May 3, Mr. Acheson held a news conference, a memorandum of which for the record was prepared by Mr. Michael McDermott, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations. The Secretary was asked to comment on Senator Connally's views on Korea and observed that the Department had continuously stressed the importance which it attached to South Korea. "He stated," read the memorandum, "that it [the Department] had recounted its efforts to establish Korea as an independent nation, that it had told how the Soviet Union had made it impossible to unify the whole country and how under the United Nations Commission the United States had gone forward with the other nations in establishing Southern Korea; that the United States had been and was now giving them very substantial economic help, military assistance and advice." Mr. Acheson concluded by saying that he doubted very much whether Senator Connally took a different view from that which the Secretary had just stated.

Secretary Acheson was then asked about Owen Lattimore's recent suggestions that the United States should withdraw from South Korea, which, since this course of action seemed unlikely in view of the Secretary's comments, might be taken to indicate that Dr. Lattimore was not the architect of Far Eastern policy. Mr. Acheson replied that that was a pretty good assumption.

<sup>2</sup> On May 4, Ambassador Muccio, who had paid a visit to President Truman at the White House, was quoted as saying that there could be no doubt of the eagerness of the United States to maintain Korean independence, toward which end the United States was providing political support directly and through the United Nations, as well as military and economic assistance. Ambassador Muccio also expressed optimism about the Korean Government's ability to control inflation and spoke with enthusiasm about the attitude of top Korean officials concerning the upcoming elections.

<sup>3</sup> The joint U.S.-Soviet commission had been established at the Moscow Conference in December 1945 (see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VI, p. 1150) for the purpose of setting up a provisional government for all of Korea. The commission met in 1946 and 1947 but became deadlocked; see *ibid.*, 1946, vol. VIII, pp. 637-638, 679-681, and *ibid.*, 1947, vol. VI, pp. 601 ff.

357.AD/5-550

*The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

SEOUL, May 5, 1950.

No. 474

Ref: Embtel 628 May 5, 1950.<sup>1</sup>

Subject: UNCOK Request to UN SYG Lie To Use Good Offices

The Embassy has received further information on the request of UNCOK to UN Secretary General Trygve Lie to take up certain questions in Moscow,<sup>2</sup> and transmits it for the Department's information.

The more detailed account of the circumstances surrounding the decision to send that letter and a copy of the letter itself (which is enclosed) were supplied to an Embassy officer by a person who did so on condition that the supplier's name would not be made known in any report made by the Embassy. Assurances were given that the informant's anonymity would be protected.

The idea of a request to UN Secretary General Trygve Lie to take up the question of UNCOK contact with North Korean leaders during his visit to Moscow originated with the Principal Secretary, Mr. Bertil Renborg, who easily persuaded the Indian Delegate, Dr. Anup Singh, to assume sponsorship, according to this informant, who is believed to be most reliable.

According to the informant, about April 24, the Indian Alternate Delegate, Mr. Kondapi (Dr. Singh, Indian Delegate still being hospitalized) raised this subject in an unofficial meeting of the Commission in the chairman's office. It was immediately apparent that Mr. Renborg was the author, however, since Mr. Kondapi showed only a superficial knowledge of the subject, whereas Mr. Renborg did most of the talking, and Mr. Renborg urged that the Commission ask Mr. Lie to utilize Mr. Zinchenko, Assistant Secretary General, to exercise good offices for UNCOK. In the following conversation it was obvious, according to the informant's statement, that the members of the Commission, including Mr. Kondapi, were scarcely acquainted with Mr. Zinchenko's name let alone his record and character, but Mr. Renborg described him as a man of outstanding character and ability, a man of the future, Mr. Renborg's personal acquaintance, and a person with whom Mr. Renborg maintained a mutual regard.

At this first discussion, in which it was urged that UNCOK should not lose so excellent an opportunity to try to make contact with Pyong-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed; it transmitted to the Department a summarized version of the material contained in this despatch.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Lie visited the major European capitals including Moscow during a trip (April 22-May 25) in connection with his 20-year program for peace through the United Nations; for related documentation, see vol. II, pp. 371 ff.

yang in the carrying out of their responsibilities, Mr. Jamieson, Australia, is reported to have made no comment. This is said to be Mr. Jamieson's custom when a new subject is raised on which he is without instructions, and on which he wishes to come to a decision in private or to ask his Government's instructions.

Mr. Henri Brionval, France, is said to have raised several questions: (1) How did the Commission know as a fact that Mr. Lie was going to Moscow? (2) Was Mr. Lie going with the support of other leading member states of the UN, or was he acting on his own and contrary to the interests or wishes of member Governments? (3) Was Mr. Zinchenko a proper person for the Commission to use for the suggested purposes?

Dr. Liu, China, is said to have supported Mr. Brionval's questions. Nothing was decided at this time. It is understood that Mr. Brionval informed his Government and asked instructions, following this informal meeting and again following a subsequent one, but received no reply. It is said that Mr. Brionval, who was personally doubtful of the wisdom of this action, considered silence on the part of his Government as indicating lack of objection.

A day or two later the subject was again raised in an informal meeting in the chairman's office. On this occasion Mr. Kondapi presented the draft of a letter to Mr. Lie. The informant was of the opinion that this draft had been prepared originally by Mr. Renborg, although it was possible that Dr. Singh and Mr. Kondapi had made some small changes. Unfortunately, the Embassy has been unable to secure a copy of this original draft.

Mr. Brionval and Dr. Liu are said to have raised questions similar to those of the previous informal meeting, and Mr. Jamieson to have expressed a cautious interest, without making any commitment. Mr. Renborg and Mr. Kondapi continued strongly to urge the proposed action. The group decided, by common consent, following the urgings of Mr. Renborg and Mr. Kondapi, to consider the question, and Mr. Kondapi's draft, at a formal meeting of the Commission.

The account which follows of the two formal meetings of the Commission is taken largely from the summary records of UNCOK for April 27 and April 28, 1950, with the addition of some descriptive information added by the informant, who states that the summary records never clearly show the force or detail of Mr. Renborg's interventions, since these records are prepared by Mr. Renborg's subordinates and then edited by him personally before being approved.

The Commission met on April 27, at 10:30 a. m. In addition to Mr. Jamieson, Australia, Mr. Liu and Mr. Ssutu, China, Mr. Brionval, France, and Mr. Kondapi, India (Alternate), Mr. Renborg and Mr.

Gaillard, Principal Secretary and Deputy Principal Secretary, plus the usual staff, were present.

Mr. Kondapi presented his draft of a letter from UNCOK to UN SYG Lie, asking the Secretary General of the United Nations, if he visited Moscow as the press reported he intended to do, to discuss with the Soviet authorities the difficulties experienced by UNCOK in making contact with the North. Since the Secretary General would have matters of greater importance than the Korean question to discuss in Moscow, Mr. Kondapi proposed that the services of Assistant Secretary General Zinchenko should be made use of, referring to Paragraph 1 (c) of the General Assembly Resolution on Korea of October 21, 1949,<sup>3</sup> as authority for this.

Dr. Liu, China, while approving in principle, said he thought Mr. Lie would be more successful if he were asked to approach the USSR solely in regard to the question of the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces from Korea. Dr. Liu also thought it preferable not to mention Mr. Zinchenko, but to leave to the discretion of Mr. Lie the decision as to whom to use to achieve the objective.

Mr. Jamieson also supported the proposal in principle. He thought Mr. Lie might well be asked to take up matters under paragraph 1(b) as well as on troop withdrawal (paragraph 1(e)). Dr. Liu said his proposal regarding troop withdrawal was intended to make it impossible for the Soviet Government to evade the issue, since this question certainly concerned the USSR, whereas the Soviet Government might claim the matter of unification should be taken up directly with Pyongyang.

Dr. Liu also suggested that the Commission should remember the well-known attitude of the Government of the Republic of Korea which was opposed to making contact with the Northern officials. By limiting the approach to Moscow to the question of troop withdrawal, controversy with the Korean Government would be avoided.

Mr. Kondapi, Indian Alternate, thought stressing the subject of troop withdrawal would unnecessarily irritate the USSR and so cause failure in the primary purpose of making contact with the North.

Mr. Renborg, Principal Secretary, agreed with Mr. Kondapi. He suggested that since subsequent to U.S. troop withdrawal the U.S. had entered into the KMAG Agreement with the Korean Government, the USSR might be asked whether a similar agreement had been entered into between the USSR and the Northern regime. The larger issue of making contact with the North might be raised subsequently to the raising of this question. Mr. Jamieson considered Mr. Renborg's proposal an unnecessary round about means for accomplishment of the intended purpose.

<sup>3</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1091.



Dr. Liu didn't think the Commission need worry about irritating the USSR since by its very existence UNCOK was a continuing source of irritation to the USSR. Since the USSR had claimed to have withdrawn its forces from Korea, an approach along the line he had suggested would be a challenge to the Soviet Government to provide proof of the claim.

Mr. Kondapi considered the question of Soviet troop withdrawal unrealistic, since Russian troops in any case were just across a frontier, while the bulk of U.S. troops were thousands of miles away. Confining the approach in Moscow to troop withdrawal questions might only intensify the Soviets' negative attitude.

Mr. Brionval agreed the opportunity presented by Mr. Lie's reported visit to Moscow should not be missed as a means to contact the North. He suggested, however, that the question of how best to approach Moscow might be resolved by an unofficial suggestion to the Secretary General to take up the Korean problem, leaving to him to use his own judgment as to whether conditions were favorable for so doing. Mr. Jamieson, however, objected, believing that only an official approach to Moscow could have any effect.

Dr. Liu raised the point that this action might be open to an interpretation that UNCOK "recognized" the Northern regime. Both the Principal Secretary and Mr. Jamieson asserted the proposed action could not be so construed. Mr. Jamieson cited the recent case of ECA officials who were released after direct contact had been established by U.S. officials with North Korean officials, although there was no question of U.S. recognition of the Northern regime.<sup>4</sup>

Mr. Jamieson summed up to the effect that all were agreed on the desirability of making every effort to contact the North, but that nothing should be done which implied recognition of the Northern regime. He did not believe, however, that the Indian proposal entailed any such risk.

Mr. Renborg then proposed an *ad hoc* committee to revise the draft letter in the light of this discussion, and such a committee was appointed consisting of Mr. Jamieson and Mr. Kondapi.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the case of Messrs. Alfred T. Meschter and Albert Willis, ECA employees who were aboard the steamship *Kimball R. Smith*, a U.S. vessel on loan to the South Korean Government, when it defected to North Korea on September 22, 1949. The U.S. Government transmitted two notes to the Soviet Government, on October 1 and 29, 1949, requesting information on the fate of the ship and the Americans. The Soviet Government agreed to inform the North Korean authorities of the U.S. request for information and, on November 15, the North Korean Government broadcast its willingness to turn over the two Americans. On December 11, the two men were handed over to a representative of the American Embassy at the 38th parallel. (See *Background Information on Korea. Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs Pursuant to H. Res. 206. House Report No. 2495, 81st Cong., 2d sess.* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 69-70.)

There appears to have been no active decision to adopt the proposal. Dr. Liu and Mr. Brionval simply ceased to interpose objections. Mr. Renborg proposed a committee to revise the letter, and in effect a decision was thereupon made to communicate with Mr. Lie along the lines originally suggested by Mr. Renborg to Mr. Kondapi and by the latter to the Commission, without further discussion.

Dr. Liu had presented the strongest arguments against the Indian proposal, and Mr. Brionval also had raised serious questions as to its wisdom. According to his subsequent account to an Embassy officer, Mr. Jamieson thought the proposal harmless, one which would be rejected by the Soviet Government and yet which would clearly establish the intent and effort of UNCOK to work towards unification. Mr. Jamieson says that after reflection he decided the proposed action fell within his general instructions and therefore he did not ask Canberra for specific instructions.

Dr. Liu's ultimate silent acquiescence in a proposal which he considered unwise is in line with his general conduct in the Commission and is supposed to be related to the difficult position of the Government which he represents. He is said to follow the practice of presenting his views, but of never following through in attempts to get them adopted by the Commission if some other Delegate has strong contrary feelings.

Mr. Brionval likewise is said to have had serious misgivings as to the wisdom of the proposal, but having twice informed his Government by telegraph of what was proposed and having received no reply he is said to have concluded that his Government did not object and so he acquiesced despite his own misgivings.

The Commission met for the second formal meeting on this subject at 10:30 a. m., April 28, and was in session fifty minutes, almost all of which were devoted to consideration of the letter as redrafted by the *ad hoc* committee. It was read paragraph by paragraph, a few minor changes being suggested and made. The draft communication was then approved as amended, by general consent without a vote. (It is rare that the Commission makes decisions by formal vote.) It was agreed that the letter, signed by the Acting Chairman, Mr. Jamieson, should be transmitted by cable and by pouch to Lake Success, to be forwarded to Mr. Lie.

It will be noted that Dr. Liu's suggestions regarding verification of troop withdrawal, combined with Mr. Renborg's suggestion of tying the KMAG Agreement to the question of an analogous Soviet-North Korean agreement was added to the original draft, but not as matters of primary emphasis.

The essential element of the letter, as in the original draft, was a request that the Secretary General, while he was in Moscow, either

personally or through Assistant Secretary General Zinchenko, should use his good offices (in accordance with UNGA Resolution on Korea, October 21, 1949, Paragraph 1(c)) with the Soviet authorities to discover ways and means by which the Commission would be able to enter into discussions with the North, either through a visit to the North or through a meeting in a neutral place outside Korea. The Commission further suggested the possibility of Mr. Zinchenko continuing his journey to North Korea to pursue this question there.

In the Embassy's opinion, the transmittal of this letter in the form adopted has explosive possibilities should knowledge of its contents become known in South Korea. Mr. Brionval's proposal of an informal request to the Secretary General to take up this question in Moscow, and the suggestions by both Mr. Brionval, France, and Dr. Liu, China, that it was unwise to name Mr. Zinchenko, seem to have shown greater awareness of the dangers involved in the form the letter took than was shown by other members of the Commission, and by Mr. Renborg.

The Embassy recognizes that the Commission was entirely within its prerogatives in taking this action and in attempting to carry out its terms of reference in the manner chosen. But such is the emotional antagonism of the Korean Government to the Communist regime in the North and to Communists, including Russians, in general, the Embassy believes the Commission would have shown more practical wisdom in not specifying by name a Soviet citizen as the one to extend good offices, but to have left this decision to the discretion of the Secretary General after he had reached Moscow. Although the proposal itself is a simple one which would not cause controversy in normal times, these not being normal times, as evidenced by the presence of the Commission in Korea and its continued inability to make any contact with the North, considerable controversy may be expected if knowledge of the contents of this letter becomes general at an early date. In the emotional reaction immediately following knowledge of this letter, it is considered even possible that the Korean Government might withdraw or restrict its invitation to UNCOK to observe elections. If the Government did not go so far, at least it would be likely to enter into public controversy with the Commission to the mutual harm of the Government and the Commission.

It is the earnest hope of the Embassy that knowledge of the contents of this letter and its despatch shall remain secret, and that the Russians will not make propaganda capital of it, until well after the elections and until it has become clear that the USSR will not accept Mr. Lie's, or Mr. Zinchenko's, good offices.

In the meantime, it is expected that the Commission will make other efforts to contact the North directly, first by another radio

address by Dr. Anup Singh, India,<sup>5</sup> and second by attempts to transmit a letter possibly addressed to "His Excellency Kim Il Sung, Prime Minister of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea," instead of to "General Kim Il Sung", as was done last year.<sup>6</sup> The adoption of the new address, with the use of the self-claimed name of the Northern regime, if it occurs, will be on the recommendation of Mr. Renborg, who has been urging it upon the Commission for a considerable period of time. While no doubt the Government of the Republic of Korea would find the use of the proposed address for Kim Il Sung objectionable, it is believed that the Government could be persuaded not to react too strongly. The Korean Government's attitude on such subjects has changed materially since last year, the change being largely due to the assumption of responsibility by the Commission, and the consequent elimination of the Secretariat from policy dealings with the Government. The Commission has always been more diplomatic and friendly in its conduct than the Secretariat. The result is that questions which might lead to controversy usually are discussed privately in advance of public decision, and in a tactful manner, by the Chairman of UNCOK with the President or the Foreign Minister. Both these gentlemen have a high regard for Mr. Gulek, UNCOK Chairman, who unfortunately has not returned from Turkey,<sup>7</sup> and for Mr. Jamieson, the *Rapporteur* and currently Acting Chairman. Although Mr. Renborg, Principal Secretary, has rendered himself anathema to the Korean Government, and is himself most antagonistic to that Government and to Koreans in general, in accordance with current Commission practices he is not permitted to deal with the Government on any but administrative matters. Consequently, it can be hoped that the Acting Chairman, Mr. Jamieson, or the Chairman, Mr. Gulek, should the latter return to Korea, would take appropriate steps to allay Korean suspicions by advance conversations before the suspicions actually had been aroused.

In the present instance, however, the transmittal of the letter to Mr. Trygve Lie requesting the good offices of Mr. Zinchenko, since no preparation of Korean Government opinion has been undertaken by the UNCOK Chairman through advance and private discussion, it is feared that disclosure of the contents of the letter would result in very unfortunate controversy.

EVERETT F. DRUMRIGHT

<sup>5</sup> Mr. Singh had made a radio broadcast on May 3 and made a second on May 11; Mr. Jamieson made a broadcast on May 1 (see U.N. document A/1350, p. 17).

<sup>6</sup> No letter was transmitted by UNCOK to the North Korean authorities during 1950.

<sup>7</sup> Kamil Gulek was in Korea from January 26 to March 24, 1950; he did not return from Turkey to Korea.

[Enclosure]

*The Acting Chairman of the United Nations Commission on Korea  
(Jamieson) to the United Nations Secretary-General (Lie)*

SECRET FOR LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

SEOUL, April 28, 1950.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

SIR, As you are aware, one of the major difficulties which confronted the United Nations Commission on Korea last year in the implementation of the General Assembly resolution on Korea insofar as it concerns unification was its inability to establish contact with North Korea. This difficulty confronts the Commission again this year. It is evident that unification by peaceful means cannot be achieved without prior contact with the North. Last year the Commission attempted various approaches. It directed a radio broadcast to North Korea. It despatched a telegram to the Soviet Union through you and subsequently letters to General Kim Il Sung, one by Hong Kong and one by direct mail across the 38th parallel. None of these approaches elicited any response whatsoever from the North.<sup>8</sup>

In its endeavour to implement its terms of reference, the Commission is again this year making similar and other attempts to get in touch with the North and break the deadlock.

It is known to the Commission that you are contemplating a visit to Moscow in the near future for the purpose of discussing problems connected with the participation of the USSR in the work of the United Nations. The Commission does not have any specific information as regards the agenda for your projected discussions at Moscow, but believes that the occasion of your visit to Moscow might be taken advantage of, if circumstances are appropriate, in order to facilitate the task of the Commission in Korea. In this connection, the Commission desires to draw your attention to the following paragraph of the General Assembly resolution of 21 October 1949, "(c) Have authority, in order to accomplish the aims defined under clauses (a) and (b) of the present paragraph, in its discretion to appoint observers, and utilize the services and good offices of one or more persons whether or not representatives on the Commission." The Commission suggests that the good offices of the Secretary-General or of another high official of the United Nations might be utilized by the Commission for the purpose of obtaining contact with the authorities in North Korea. The press informs us that you would be accompanied to Moscow by the Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Security Council Affairs, Mr. C. E. Zinchenko, and it appears to the Commission, subject to your con-

<sup>8</sup> See U.N. document A/936, pp. 7-9.



currence, that Mr. Zinchenko might be a suitable person as contemplated in the above quoted paragraph of the General Assembly resolution. The Commission would like you, yourself, or Mr. Zinchenko to discuss in Moscow ways and means by which the Commission would be able to enter into discussions with the North, either through a visit to the North or through a meeting in a neutral place outside the Korean peninsula. If conditions prove propitious, the Commission suggests that Mr. Zinchenko might continue his journey to North Korea in order to pursue this problem there.

The Assembly resolution of 21 October 1949 further instructs the Commission to "verify the withdrawal of Soviet occupation insofar as it is in a position to do so." The Commission has, so far, not been in a position to undertake this task. It has, as you know, verified the withdrawal of the United States forces from the Republic of Korea. It has further been provided with full information in regard to the agreement between the Republic of Korea and the Government of the United States of America concerning the Korean Military Advisory Group which is functioning on the territory of the Republic. It would be desirable for the Commission to obtain official information from the Government of the Soviet Union, both in regard to the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces which is said to have taken place in the latter part of 1948 or early 1949 and as regards any agreements negotiated and in force between the Soviet Union and North Korea having to do with military training and advice. The Commission would like you to consider whether these matters could also be brought up with the Soviet authorities during your visit to Moscow.

The Commission, in making these proposals to you, has in mind the possibilities of fulfilling some of the tasks entrusted to it by the General Assembly. It is perfectly clear to the Commission that the negotiations which you may undertake in Moscow concern matters of general and vital interest to the future of United Nations. It does believe, however, that in the course of your negotiations with the Soviet Government you may find an opportunity of raising the questions relating to the work of the Commission and thus open the way for the Commission to make progress in the fulfillment of its task.<sup>a</sup>

I have [etc.]

A. B. JAMIESON

<sup>a</sup> Following his return from Moscow, Mr. Lie replied to UNCOK in a letter dated June 19 which reached that body on July 5, after the outbreak of hostilities. The Secretary-General said that he had not been able to satisfy UNCOK's request, since he had concentrated most of his attention on the problem of obtaining continued participation by the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European countries in the work of the United Nations. He stated that the question of Korea had not come up in his conversations, and he had not felt it appropriate in the context to give undue emphasis to the Korean problem. Mr. Lie's letter is quoted in part in Leon Gordenker, *The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea: the Politics of Field Operations, 1947-1950* (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), p. 224.

795B.00/5-1050

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chargé in Korea  
(Drumright)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[SEOUL,] May 9, 1950.

Subject: Pres. Rhee's Comment on Sen. Connally's Remarks on Korea

Participants: President Rhee  
Mr. Drumright

In the course of a conversation this morning with President Rhee, he raised the subject of Senator Connally's recent remarks about Korea. Speaking in a deeply bitter and sarcastic manner, President Rhee said it was very easy for a man several thousand miles away from Korea airily to dismiss Korea and its 30 million people as of no strategic or other importance to the United States. The President went on to say he regarded Senator Connally's remarks as an open invitation to the Communists to come down and take over South Korea. He wondered how any man, in his right senses, not to mention Senator Connally, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, could make such an irrational statement. The President implied that Senator Connally's statement had done much harm and that it could not be easily disassociated from United States policy in view of Senator Connally's close relation to the State Department.

Mr. Drumright reminded the President of the statement made by the Secretary of State following Senator Connally's remarks. He also reminded the President that the United States was continuing to extend military, economic and moral aid to the Republic of Korea. He reminded the President that during the present fiscal year the ECA was spending more than 100 million dollars in Korea and has, perhaps, its largest staff in Korea. Mr. Drumright said that the United States was also continuing to extend military aid and advice to the Republic of Korea. In this connection, Mr. Drumright pointed out that with the possible exception of Turkey, the United States had its largest Military Advisory Mission in Korea.

*Comment:* During the same conversation, the President also commented in bitter terms about what he termed the failure of the United States to provide Korea with air support adequate to meet the North

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch no. 493, May 10, from Seoul, not printed, which drew the Department's attention in particular to the comment in the final paragraph of the memorandum.

Korean air menace (Embtel 662, May 9, 5 p. m.).<sup>2</sup> It seems clear that the President's faith in the determination of the United States to assist Korea in the event of North Korean aggression has been shaken to an appreciable extent by Senator Connally's remarks, by failure of the United States thus far to take any discernible action to meet Korea's request for air support, and by what appears to be the failure of the United States thus far to supply Korea with military supplies and equipment under the terms of the MDA program. The foregoing factors, coupled with persistent "talk" that Korea lies outside the United States' Far Eastern strategic defense zone, is having a decidedly unsettling effect on Korean officials and the public.

EVERETT F. DRUMRIGHT

<sup>2</sup> The pertinent passage of this telegram read as follows:

"President . . . [Rhee] protested what he termed failure of US to respond his request for air support capable of containing rapidly growing North Korean Air Force. Speaking with considerable feeling, he asserted Stalin-aided and trained North Korean Air Force is capable of playing havoc with Korean Security Forces as presently constituted and will continue hold this advantage unless and until existing air disparity is redressed. I replied so far as I knew problem of air assistance to ROK was still under consideration in Washington and Ambassador Muccio had planned discuss it while there." (102.23/5-950)

See also the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Bond, May 10, *infra*.

795B.5 MAP/5-1050

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Bond)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 10, 1950.

Subject: Military Assistance to Korea

Participants: State:	NA—Ambassador Muccio
	Mr. Niles W. Bond
	Mr. Arthur B. Emmons
	S/MDA—Mr. Galbraith
	Mr. Stevens
Army:	Maj. Gen. Lemnitzer
Navy:	Capt. Murdaugh <sup>2</sup>
Air Force:	Lt. Gen. Edwards <sup>3</sup>

Ambassador Muccio opened the discussion by pointing out the extent of American financial aid thus far committed to south Korea and

<sup>1</sup> The memorandum was codrafted by Mr. Arthur B. Emmons of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> Capt. Albert C. Murdaugh, Assistant Director, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense.

<sup>3</sup> Lt. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards, Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, U.S. Air Force.

the necessity of plugging certain "gaps" now existing in the Korean defense picture so that our stake in south Korea could be more adequately protected. These "gaps" included the lack of any defense against possible attack by air, and a similar lack of sufficient coastal patrol facilities, in both of which respects the Koreans themselves, from their own funds, had been endeavoring to provide a remedy.

General Lemnitzer pointed out that the question of military assistance to the Republic of Korea at the present time was essentially a political one, in as much as south Korea was not regarded as of any particular value to the overall American strategic position in the Far East, a point to which the Ambassador agreed. The General continued by saying that the funds to be employed in military aid in this case were therefore a matter of concern principally to the Department of State which should take the initiative in obtaining the allocation of such funds from Section 303 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act or any other source available for that purpose.

Mr. Galbraith pointed out that it continued to be the opinion of S/MDA that there was no provision for the support of an air force in the present NSC directive on Korea, and that a revision of that directive solely on a political basis would have to be made were an air force to be so provided. The Ambassador pointed out that a fully effective air force was not essential but that south Korea should have a few combat planes at least for morale purposes. General Edwards stated, and several times reiterated, that the position of his Department was that the terms of NSC 8/2<sup>4</sup> were intended to cover liaison aircraft only and that a revision of that paper would be necessary to cover combat aircraft. In response to a question from the Ambassador, General Edwards expressed the opinion, however, that the present language might be stretched to include a limited number of transport aircraft, such as C-47's, for logistic support of ground forces.

The Ambassador then emphasized the difficult position in which he had been placed when President Rhee had learned that surplus fighter aircraft, including F-51's, were being "junked" by FEAF in Japan, a thing which the Koreans found very difficult to understand in view of what they regarded as their desperate need for a few such planes. In this connection General Lemnitzer remarked that if F-51's were to be transferred to Korea from Japan, the Air Force would have to be reimbursed for their handling and transportation even though they might be surplus and involve no initial cost of acquisition. The General went on to add that, in his opinion, the Department of State would have to take the policy initiative if it wished to bring about the estab-

<sup>4</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 969.

lishment of a Korean Air Force fighter group, but that the Department of Defense would support such a program if the NSC directive were to be appropriately amended. Since the question was a political one, however, he did not feel that Defense should sponsor such a policy revision.

Mr. Bond then pointed out that the request for combat aircraft comprised only a part of the Mission's recommendations for additional military aid to Korea for FY 1950, well over half of the recommended program being made up of items which fell well within the terms of NSC 8/2 as presently written. Principal among these, he added, were ground forces items designed to bring the total U.S.-supported ground forces in Korea to the level of 65,000 called for by the terms of NSC 8/2; these items, he said, together with the coast guard portion of the proposed additional aid, accounted for almost 5.9 out of a total of 9.8 million dollars. He then urged that prompt action be taken to obtain an allocation of funds to meet this 60% or more of the program which did not involve the question of the transfer of combat aircraft and whose implementation, therefore, should not have to await a decision on that question.

With reference to the question, raised by Mr. Galbraith, of future financial support for a Korean air force program, Mr. Bond suggested the possibility of finding funds for support of the program from within the \$10 million to be allocated for military assistance for FY 1951 or from an increase over and above that amount, to which Mr. Galbraith replied that he did not believe the Bureau of the Budget would be inclined to view any increased expenditures along this line with favor at this time. No conclusion was reached on this matter.

General Edwards agreed that the Air Force would be willing to examine a Korean air force program with a view to going along with it, assuming the State Department would provide a political justification therefor. The Ambassador reiterated his earlier point that a full scale Korean air force was not necessarily desirable, and that what was contemplated was merely a few defensive combat planes, for morale purposes.

The Ambassador then raised the question of the training of Korean ground crew personnel by FEAF in Japan, for which a precedent had already been established in the training of Korean Army officers in FECOM. General Edwards replied that the Air Force would go along with such a proposal insofar as it could, and suggested that the matter might be arranged locally with FEAF. The question was then discussed of sending technical training personnel from FEAF to Korea



for a short period to train Korean personnel in the operation and maintenance of American planes. General Edwards commented that many demands were now being made upon the Air Force to furnish such personnel in many areas in the world, and that it would be difficult to find such personnel who might be available at the present time. In this regard Mr. Bond asked whether State's request for the temporary assignment of FEAF personnel to assist the Koreans with their newly-acquired AT-6's had ever received Air Force consideration. General Edwards did not know that it had. Captain Murdaugh, sitting for Mr. Halaby to whom State's request had been addressed, promised to look into the matter.<sup>5</sup>

The Ambassador then read a telegram from the Embassy in Seoul (No. 662 of May 9, 1950)<sup>6</sup> concerning the reaction of the Korean Government to the request of the U.S. Air Force for a defected north Korean *Stormovik* plane<sup>7</sup> and containing the suggestion of the Chargé d'Affaires that it might be highly desirable for the U.S. to compensate the Koreans with one or more F-51 aircraft. He also asked whether the question of additional advisers under KMAG for the Korean Coast Guard, as requested by the Mission, had been given consideration. General Lemnitzer replied that he did not know what had been done but that he would look up a telegram on this subject which the Ambassador said General Roberts had sent to the Department of the Army some time before.

Adverting to the point which he had raised earlier, Mr. Bond asked whether it would be a proper procedure on the part of State, pending consideration of the question of the revision of NSC 8/2 to permit the transfer of combat aircraft, to request the immediate allocation of funds to cover the other portions of the requested additional aid to Korea, so that the entire program would not have to be held up. General Lemnitzer said that he perceived no objection to that procedure and that such a request would be sympathetically received, particularly in the light of the strong case which Ambassador Muccio had made before both the FMACC and the Deputy Joint Chiefs of Staff. He added that his present thinking was that the necessary funds could be more expeditiously obtained from surplus Title II fund[s] than from funds available under Section 303, but that the final decision on this point would have to be left up to the FMACC.

<sup>5</sup> See the letter from Mr. Allison to Mr. Halaby, January 31, p. 24. No action was taken on this matter prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea (795B.5/6-1450).

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 2 to the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Drumright, May 9, *supra*.

<sup>7</sup> See telegram 683, May 11, from Seoul, p. 84.

795B.5 MAP/5-1050

*Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (Ohly) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 10, 1950.

Subject: Proposed increase of military aid to Korea

I refer to the meeting held this morning at the request of Ambassador Muccio with Major General Lemnitzer, Lieutenant General Edwards and other Defense officers, Messrs. Galbraith and Stevens of S/MDA being present.

In summary, it appears that the Ambassador made the point that, while he does not advocate setting up a full-fledged Air Force for Korea, he does strongly urge that a combat force of anywhere from 20 to 40 fighter aircraft—F-51s being specifically mentioned—be provided.

The decision to approve the Ambassador's recommendation would entail (1) revision of NSC 8/2 (since fighter aircraft are involved) and (2) obtaining funds to cover the costs of providing and maintaining such a force.

On the assumption that NSC 8/2 were modified to permit approval of the Ambassador's recommendation, this office feels answers must be found to the following questions: (a) can arrangements be made to provide the training, maintenance and necessary operational facilities that the furnishing of such equipment makes essential. From General Edwards' comments during this morning's meeting this appeared doubtful. (b) From what source would funds be available to pay for the training, maintenance, spare parts and all the related items and services required to keep the aircraft operational? This question applies both to FY 1950 and to subsequent years. Even though funds for FY 1950 are found (such as from surplus funds becoming available from the Greek program) with which to acquire the aircraft no FY 1951 funds have been requested under MDAP for Korea which would permit support of a force of F-51s. The use of Section 303 funds is highly problematical. (c) According to Gen. Edwards, the supply of spare parts for the F-51s rapidly will become difficult, thus posing another serious problem.

It will be recalled that Defense has maintained, and still maintains that there is no military justification for military assistance to Korea. Consequently, in advancing the proposal that additional military assistance in the form of fighter aircraft be given to the ROK, the justification will have to be wholly on political grounds.

In this connection, the furnishing of additional Army and Coast Guard equipment can, in the view of this office, be justified on other than strictly military grounds. The real question concerns the provision of fighter aircraft to ROK.

This office believes that the first step in giving consideration to the furnishing of fighter aircraft to ROK under the MDAA is a clear cut statement indicating that the political advantages of such action (in disregard of NSC 8/2) outweigh the adverse factors which will arise as soon these craft become non-operational. As indicated above, attention should be called to the fact that the requested funds for military aid to ROK in fiscal year 1951 do not include an allowance for the support and maintenance of these aircraft, assuming spare parts can be obtained. This office would therefore be pleased to learn your views regarding solutions of these problems.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On the question of allocation of combat aircraft to the Republic of Korea, the Department requested further information from the Embassy in Seoul; see telegram 505, May 19, to Seoul, p. 85. With regard to the immediate allocation of funds for proposed additional military aid to South Korea exclusive of combat aircraft, Mr. Rusk sent to Mr. Ohly, on May 19, a memorandum suggesting that the matter be referred to the FMACC for approval (795B.5/5-1950). No action was taken by the FMACC prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

795A.00/5-1150 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State*

PLAIN

SEOUL, May 11, 1950.

675. At hurriedly called conference with foreign correspondents yesterday at 3 p. m., Defense Minister released following statement:

"Arrival of two divisions of Chinese Communist troops in Northern Korea since last August has raised the fully-armed, effective fighting force there to 183,100, the Korean Defense Ministry announced today in making public a carefully calculated estimate of the northern areas military strength.

"With constabulary not counted in the army, youth groups and other quasi-military organizations, the Northern Korea fighting force is estimated at well above 300,000.

"Six divisions of the 'People's Army' and three 'Bo An Dae' brigades number 118,000 men, to which are added approximately 37,000 mixed troops, including the women whom the northern regime recently began to conscript.

"One tank brigade in the North consists of 10,000 men. Naval manpower consists of 15,000 and the air force has 2,500. The air force is being increased by intensive conscription and training.

"Northern mechanized cavalry has 155 medium tanks and 18 small tanks, a total of 173, as well as 30 armored cars and 300 motorcycles.

"In artillery the northern army has 609 76 mm and 122 mm guns, 1,162 82 mm and 122 [120] mm mortars, 54 anti-aircraft guns, 627 anti-tank guns, and 9,728 light and heavy machine guns.

"The northern navy has 32 large and small patrol boats.

"The northern air force has 195 aircraft, comprising a division."

Comment follows.<sup>1</sup>

Sent Department 675; repeated CINCFE.

DRUMRIGHT

<sup>1</sup> *Infra.*

795A.00/5-1150 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

SEOUL, May 11, 1950—6 p. m.

683. ReEmbtel 675, May 11 quoting External Defense Minister's statement on North Korean military strength, Embassy offers following comment.

In contrast figures quoted in statement, following is our current estimate of North Korean security strength. Total armed forces 103,000 including "People's Army", Korean volunteer army returnees from Manchuria, border constabulary, air division, armoured formation and navy. In addition foregoing, provincial police estimated number about 25,000. Only armoured formation in North Korea is of brigade size and composed of estimated 65 tanks, heaviest of which is Soviet model T-34. Estimated number of artillery pieces as follows: 76.2 mm guns and howitzers 224; 122 mm howitzers 72; 82 mm mortars 637; 120 mm mortars 143; 45 mm AT guns 356. Light and heavy machine guns 6,032. North Korean Air Force strength estimated prior defection April 28 of Lt. Lee Kun Soon<sup>1</sup> as follows: 35 yak fighter aircraft; 3 twin engine bombers; 2 twin engine transports; 35 trainer aircraft. Information derived from Lt. Lee evaluated F-3 suggests 100 yak aircraft, including 22 trainers; 70 IL-10 attack bombers; 8 PO-2 reconnaissance and 2 US L-type liaison aircraft.

If Embassy estimates approximately accurate, it follows Korean figures are exaggerated—probably deliberately so. Purpose of exaggeration undoubtedly is to convince friendly powers, especially US, of disparity of strength between North and South Korean forces and thus enlist for additional military aid. In this connection, it perhaps not without significance that during recent conversations with President,

<sup>1</sup> Lieutenant Lee had defected from the North Korean Air Force with a Soviet plane, as mentioned in the memorandum of conversation of May 10, p. 78.

including one today, he has spoken emphatically of need for further military aid.<sup>2</sup>

That Defense Minister's statement was expressly issued for foreign consumption is indicated by fact Korean press excluded from conference with foreign correspondents and was later given much less detailed report of North Korean military strength. Fear specific figures would alarm ROK populace probably dictated exclusion detailed information from Korean press.

Sent Department 683, repeated CINFE.

DRUMRIGHT

<sup>2</sup> On May 12, President Rhee held a press conference, a report on which was sent to the Department in despatch no. 519, May 15, from Seoul, not printed. In regard to the Defense Minister's press conference of May 10, President Rhee was quoted as follows:

"I have heard North Korean troops (are) concentrating near the 38th parallel. A few days ago a North Korean rocket fell in the city of Kaesung. Another shell killed two more soldiers and wounded two civilians who died in the hospital. We can do nothing. We will solve this matter through the UN and the United States. A few days ago one American friend said that if the United States gives weapons to South Korea, she feared that South Korea would invade North Korea. This is a useless worry of some Americans who do not know South Korea. Our present war is not a cold war, but a real shooting war. Our troops will take all possible counter-measures. I think preparing counter-measures is the duty of our soldiers in self-defense. North Korea is concentrating near the 38th parallel. I do not think these North Korean troops are concentrating near the 38th parallel to invade Japan or China. . . . In South Korea the United States has one foot in South Korea and one foot outside so that in case of an unfavorable situation it could pull out of our country. I daresay that if the United States wants to aid our country it should not be only lip-service. General Roberts and Ambassador Muccio have worked to obtain more arms for Korea, but people in the United States are dreaming." (795B.00/5-1550)

795.56/5-1950: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 19, 1950—8 p. m.

505. In connection consideration by interested agencies of Mission's request that combat aircraft (F-51 type) be made available for transfer ROK, Dept desires answers for questions:

1) How is it intended provide maintenance and other ground facilities necessary to keep such planes operational? How wld initial expense such installations be met?

2) How is it intended meet continuing expense of support of such aircraft (avgas, spare parts, etc.) for FY 1951 and thereafter, including internal financing? (No provision such requirements included FY 1951 MDAP.)

3) How is it intended provide adequately trained Korean air and ground personnel, especially mechanics?



In preparing answers foregoing questions it suggested Mission investigate extent to which FEAF facilities cld by utilized to provide servicing and maintenance (periodic engine overhaul for example), equipment and spare parts, and technical training for Korean air and ground personnel.

Although Dept appreciates Mission not advocating estab modern air force for ROK, it nevertheless true that support even small force obsolescent fighters wld require considerable outlay in specialized equipment and trained personnel, none of which Dept understands to be presently available in Korea, as well as considerable continuing financial burden if such force is to be kept operational.

WEBB

795B.5/5-2350 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

SEOUL, May 23, 1950—5 p. m.

744. Deptel 505, May 19. Felt here some confusion exists owing various recommendations sent Department (Randall report,<sup>1</sup> KMAC semi-annual report<sup>2</sup> and others) on proposed air program for ROK. This message concurred in by KMAC and ECA and should be regarded as definitive and authoritative recommended program for support ROK Air Force.

Following aircraft recommended: 40 F-51 aircraft complete with weapons and air signal equipment; 10 T-6 aircraft complete with weapons and air signal equipment; 3 C-47 aircraft complete with air signal equipment. All foregoing aircraft should be delivered complete with adequate stock of spare parts, maintenance equipment and special tools and items of equipment needed to maintain aircraft.

Recommend following air advisors be sent here to be charged against authorized strength to KMAC and to be an integral part thereof:

(a) Officers: One senior air advisor with air command and staff experience to act as tactical advisor. One technical advisor. One service supply and maintenance officer. Three flight instructors. Total six officers.

(b) Airmen: One armament technician. One communications technician. Three airplane mechanics. Two radio mechanics. One depot

<sup>1</sup> Brig. Gen. Russell E. Randall, U.S.A.F., Ret., made a trip to Korea in November 1949 at President Rhee's invitation to give advice on the proposed build-up of the South Korean Air Force; for his recommendations, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, footnote 3, pp. 1102-1103.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the report for the period ending December 31, 1949, which was transmitted to the Department with despatch no. 99, January 26, from Seoul, not printed. In the despatch, Ambassador Muccio called attention to and endorsed the KMAC recommendations for an increase in strength of the Korean Air Force (795.58/1-2650); see also Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, p. 94.

maintenance man. One aircraft electrician. One propeller mechanic. One photographic technician. Total eleven airmen.

Maintenance and other ground facilities adequate to support such aircraft are now in existence as far as air fields and buildings are concerned. Kit of spare parts, maintenance equipment and tools to be delivered to ROK with aircraft should be sufficiently complete to equip ground maintenance installations. Airfields and buildings now in need of limited amount to rehabilitation. Expenditures for this purpose estimated at 400 million *won*. It proposed initial expense rehabilitation such installations to be included in a ROK supplementary appropriation to support expanded air program. Mission will insist ROK raise sufficient additional tax revenues to cover supplemental appropriation. Study indicates first year cost of program including 400 million *won* mentioned above, to be 1,820,809,000 *won*. This sum includes *won* equivalent US \$887,000 estimated cost of POL for expanded program to be procured with Korean foreign exchange; proportion of this cost falling within current fiscal year will of course be dependent on date initiation program.

It is intended to meet continuing cost of program by initial appropriation outlined above plus regular annual appropriations which Mission will insist in each case be offset by taxes or other revenues. Estimated annual cost of program for each year after first will be approximately 50 percent of first year expense for 910 million *won*. Foregoing estimates based on assumption no provision for such requirements exists in MDAP. Assuming NSC 8/2 is revised to provide support for air force,<sup>3</sup> it will be possible revise first estimate of fiscal year—1951 MDAP to provide any equipment FEAF unable supply under this request.

Approximately 60 pilots now in Korean Air Force qualified for transition training to fighter aircraft. In this connection, 10 T-6 aircraft now in use by Korean Air Force being used to maximum extent in preparing pilots to fly fighter craft. Ground personnel now in training on liaison and T-6 aircraft. Comprehensive mechanic school system now in operation. Main reliance for pilot and mechanic training, however, must be on air advisory personnel recommended above.

It felt here reliance should not be placed in FEAF facilities to provide servicing and maintenance (periodic engine overhaul, for example) equipment and spare parts. FEAF reported currently converting jet fighter aircraft and presumably will not be in a position for long to service F-51 aircraft or maintain large supply of parts. In view reported discarding of F-51 aircraft it hoped FEAF will be

<sup>3</sup> Between the time of the receipt of this telegram and the outbreak of hostilities, no effort was made to revise NSC 8/2.

in position supply most complete kit spare parts and maintenance equipment for F-51's. Recommend, however, that a limited number Korean air technicians and mechanics be authorized for training with FEAF.

For description Korean Air Force facilities, attention invited to enclosure Embdes 777, December 7, 1949.<sup>4</sup>

Sent Department 744; repeated info CINCFE.

MUCCIO

<sup>4</sup> The text of despatch no. 777 is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1105; the enclosure is not printed.

611.95B/5-2550

*The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)*

SEOUL, May 25, 1950.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: There is an aspect of the United States Government's pronouncements in general, and that of the Department in particular, which has often caused me concern, and to which I would like to call your attention.

I refer to public statements attributed to the President, the Secretary or other high Government officials in which various countries are named as especial objects of United States interest and concern, but from which the name of Korea very frequently is omitted.

These omissions are always noted here in Korea, and they add to the sensitivity and fear of the Korean Government and Korean citizens that the United States Government is not fixed in its determination to assist Korea and will abandon Korea at the earliest opportunity. The Korean Government, and especially President Rhee, is particularly concerned in noting these omissions following the recent statements by Senator Connally in *United States News and World Report*, and also by the omission of Korea from the Baguio Conference invitation list.<sup>1</sup> Since this Republic is so close to the enemy, and in fact is daily engaged in armed conflict with him, responsible Korean leaders are understandably concerned at what appears to be their extreme isolation and are most sensitive to any hint that the United States Government or officials may be indifferent to their peril.

The most recent examples of that which I have in mind are the AP news stories of the Secretary's comments from London on the Atlantic

<sup>1</sup> Representatives of Australia, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand met at Baguio in the Philippines on May 26. At the conference, they agreed on the desirability of closer economic, cultural, and social cooperation. For related documentation, see volume VI.

Council talks<sup>2</sup> (received here on May 20) and the longer USIS story, from London, dated May 19, on the same subject. Although the Secretary was speaking primarily of U.S. interest in and support of the Atlantic Pact countries, as the AP condensed his statement, "... Acheson promised continued support to Indo-China, Greece, Turkey, Iran and Germany in any struggle for freedom from aggression." The USIS story, while longer and more detailed, makes the omission of any reference to Korea even more noticeable.

I should like to urge that those persons particularly charged with drafting speeches and statements on United States policy have this problem brought to their attention, so that in any listing of Asiatic countries in whose freedom the United States maintains a continuing interest, Korea may always be included.

I think this is especially important now that increasing emphasis is being put on Indo-China and South East Asia generally, so that official comment on U.S. interest in that area is bound to increase. It would be a pity if in the increase of that volume, by omission of reference to Korea, Koreans would come to believe that despite their able and courageous fight to preserve their own independence against Communist aggression they had been written off as expendable.<sup>3</sup>

Sincerely yours,

JOHN J. MUCCIO

<sup>2</sup> Documentation on this subject is scheduled for publication in volume III.

<sup>3</sup> For the text of Mr. Rusk's reply, June 15, see p. 106.

795A.00/5-2750 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

SEOUL, May 27, 1950—3 p. m.

767. Based on personal observation Embassy officers during past ten days all provinces except Cheju, following is situation on eve May 30 general elections:

1. Conduct of election. Election atmosphere generally conceded free. Freer than 1948. With exception those affiliated with National Independence Federation, Korea Independence Party, other lesser groups between left and right (termed "middle-of-roaders" by President and Korean Government) candidates state no official interference encountered, although in some areas (e.g. South Cholla) candidates expressing outspoken criticism government. Candidates everywhere participating "joint lecture meetings" under auspices local election committees with large crowds attending. One provincial governor privately stated received instructions from central government to turn out larger vote than 1948, although reduction by about half in number polling places (as compared 1948) may reduce vote slightly. Can-

didate withdrawals to date total 27, in scattered districts. Arrests by government total about 15, mostly charge Communist connections but some for violations election law, some apparently for severe criticism of government, and one for financial irregularities. Police some areas making daily spot-check popular opinion for relay to Minister Home Affairs. No Communist disturbances election yet reported, and no observable opposition (as in 1948) to holding elections. Government sources expect some guerrilla disturbances North Cholla Province and along parallel, but KMAG G-2 anticipates only minor incidents. Government obviously regards so-called "middle-of-road" candidates and some unspecified independents (see paragraph 3) as actual or potential Communists, several reports received from moderates of petty harassment, arrest campaign workers, anti-moderate public statements by government officials; detention candidates short periods for investigation, and arrests. Election officials apparently have permitted wholesale disregard of election law provisions against organization participation in campaigns by government-sponsored groups such as Youth Corps and National Society but this probably will have little effect on most local elections since fact that competing candidates same district often members same organization tends to split organizational vote.

2. Report which released to Seoul newspapers May 26 disclosed wholesale roundup of North-South-Korea-Labor-Party directed political committee South Korea. Sung Shi Paek, supreme leader North Korea Labor Party group, arrested May 15, with simultaneous confiscation 14,800 US dollars, Korean currency, weapons, motor vehicle documents showing personnel and leaders organization. 112 persons so far arrested in connection case. Mission of organization said to gather political, economic, other information on ROK affairs and report to Pyongyang; obstruct flow US aid Korea; infiltrate UNCOK and foreign diplomatic establishments for espionage; infiltrate Assembly through running Communists as candidates and financing campaigns "middle-of-roaders" and certain rightists. Report named 10 candidates as targets of organization, of whom one, DNP member Kim Seung Wun, allegedly received 1,850,000 *won* for campaign in Poyong County, South Chungchong Province. Others not said received funds and it possible they unaware of activities of net. Examples: Cho So Ang, Socialist Party head, running against Chough Pyung Ok, USAMGIK national police director; Wun Sai Hoon, National Independence Federation member, running against Yun Chi Yung, Assembly vice speaker; Chang Keun Sang (arrested), running against Ryang Han Na, South Kyongsang governor's sister.

Foregoing report of which Embassy had considerable knowledge was released by prosecutors without prior knowledge of OPI director.



3. President Rhee departed May 24 for speaking trip South Korean provinces (Embtel 742, May 23).<sup>1</sup> Speeches generally were impartial, referring to no candidate or group candidates, urged people to vote fairly and wisely. At Chongju, however, President quoted as saying "Communists trying to bring about victory of candidates who are leftist, leftish sympathizers or even critics of government policies no matter how slight." Continues: "While leftists, middle-of-roaders in conjunction placing only one candidate in district, rightists competing with each other. Patriotic citizens should prevent the former from being returned. If election representatives should attempt carry out motions of nature constitutional amendment in National Assembly, I urge voters not hesitate recall them." Information available to Embassy from number of sources, Korean and controlled, indicates Communists may in fact be attempting to bring about election of candidates considered subject to their influence, ideologically compatible, etc.

4. Issues. Virtually all candidates promise action (but omit specific remedies) as regards: (a) economic problems, particularly food problem (this issue made critical by coincidence election period and traditional spring hunger period in Korea); (b) problem of 38th parallel; and (c) education, particularly shortage schools in rural districts. Chorus of agreement that ECA aid must be used wisely, and US often praised for demands such as contained Hoffman letter to Prime Minister and *aide-memoire*. Candidates with US connections (residence, education, USAMGIK positions, etc.) making point of same. Issues less stressed by campaigners: Abolition voluntary contributions, need for judicial reforms (these particularly mentioned in Cholla provinces, where DNP strong), and need for early implementation of land reform law. No demand for enforcement local elections: Existence enabling legislation unknown in rural areas. While Rhee remains sacrosanct and virtually no mention constitutional amendment proposals or other suggestions alteration in form of government, important to note that criticism of administration implicit in platforms most candidates and these criticisms not publicly countered even by known pro-administration candidates. Also should be noted that issues and individual candidates platforms far less important in determining outcome than candidates family connections, personal reputation, organizational support, and size of electorate in place where candidate born and where he has largest group of relatives.

5. Estimate of probable outcome. In intrenched position Cholla provinces, DNP may generally hold present predominance but will probably suffer setbacks elsewhere. Organized party campaigning

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

generally weak, however but "middle-of-roaders" and unidentified "independents" probably will have increased success over 1948. Despite government harassment of them in effort prevent Communists from being elected, psychological effect government personnel changes, police and local civil officials and actions against Communist candidates may give DNP and administration group strength not held organically and may enable them gain some representation though probably not majority. Consequently, it appears election will not prove a decisive victory for any contesting group, and will be followed by realignments and contests in the Assembly similar to 1948. Probably greater part incumbents seeking reelection will be defeated account popular disappointment nonfulfillment 1948 campaign promises.<sup>2</sup>

MUCCIO

<sup>2</sup> For the report of UNCOK on its observation of the elections, see U.N. document A/1350, pp. 23-25. Of the 210 seats at stake in the National Assembly, only 31 were retained by members of the previous body; of the 210 members, 133 were elected as independents.

795B.55/5-2950

*The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

SEOUL, May 29, 1950.

No. 569

Subject: Improvement of Korean Army Logistical Situation

There is transmitted, for the Department's information, a copy of a circular instruction issued by the Chief, KMAC, to the KMAC Advisors on the subject of the logistical situation in the Korean Army, on the steps being taken to improve it, and on the responsibilities resting on KMAC personnel to assist in this endeavor.

The Embassy is glad to report that much attention is currently being paid to the problem of effecting economies in the operations of the Korean Army. Much waste has already been eliminated. Particular attention, on the insistence of KMAC, is being paid to the conservation of vehicles, with a goodly proportion now being put in reserve. Fuel economies have also been marked. Accounting procedures and practices are being revamped to conform to modern efficient methods. Elimination of the vicious system of contributions, voluntary or forced, is also under way.

Persistent and unremitting effort will have to be made, particularly on the part of KMAC, to see to it that logistical reforms are consolidated and retained. Appreciable progress is being made. It is expected that even more progress will be made in the future.

For the Ambassador:  
EVERETT F. DRUMRIGHT  
Counselor of Embassy

[Enclosure]

*The Chief of the United States Military Advisory Group to the  
Republic of Korea (Roberts) to all KMAG Advisors*

CONFIDENTIAL

5 MAY 1950.

Subject: KA Logistical Situation

1. The purpose of this letter is to acquaint all advisors with the logistical situation in the Korean Army, steps that are being taken to improve it, and the ways in which advisors can assist in carrying out these steps.

2. The original U.S. commitment was to supply the Korean Army with an initial issue of equipment and a six months supply of spare parts for a strength of 50,000. Later an additional 15,000 individual weapons were supplied. The result of the increase in strength to 100,000 has been a serious deficiency in major items of equipment. The six months supply of parts is exhausted, and it is estimated that 10 to 15% of the weapons and 30 to 35% of the vehicles are unserviceable. It is tentatively planned by Dept. of Army that the spare parts approved for issue to Korea under 1950 MDAP will not arrive until some time in FY 52. The Korean economy lacks the resources to supply these parts from its own production or from foreign exchange. It is very seriously threatened with continuation of the inflationary spiral which, if it is not halted, may very well wreck the economy entirely. The attempts to control this spiral have necessitated a very limited budget for the Armed Forces for the FY just begun. All items of issue will be in short supply and funds for all services will be deficient. The significance of this situation is that unless prompt, effective and vigorous measures are taken to conserve available resources the Army will be dangerously reduced in fire power, mobility and logistical support. The economy will deteriorate further and be unable to support either the military establishment or the civil and political movement toward a free and democratic country. In short, Korea is threatened with the same disaster that befell China.

3. There are numerous deficiencies and unsound practices which have contributed to the situation outlined above. There has never been established a sound basis in regulations, orders, doctrine and standing operating procedures upon which to build a good logistical system and govern its operation. Allowances of supplies and equipment, instructions for handling them, maintenance procedures, and other logistical matters have been largely prescribed by piecemeal, uncoordinated, inadequate instructions, often in oral form. The result is confusion and ignorance as to proper procedures. To this has been added the deficiencies of Korean practices, personnel and concepts outlined in Inclosure 1.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

4. The Advisory Staff to KA Hqs is taking vigorous action to correct the deficiencies and to improve the logistical situation. There is no doubt that the deficiencies can be corrected. However, to do so will require the utmost efforts of the entire Group working together in close cooperation and coordination. Following is an outline of the steps being taken:

a. The G-4 Section, KA, has been reorganized upon Advisor's recommendations in such a manner as to enable it to function efficiently. Every step is being taken to increase the speed, efficiency and effectiveness of the units and individuals responsible for logistical support of combat units.

b. Strong representations are made at frequent intervals to the U.S. Dept of Army and Dept of State in an attempt to secure additional military aid and to expedite delivery of the approved FY 50 Aid Program. Advisors must understand and the Koreans should understand that the US has many large and important commitments for aid and that therefore some delay is unavoidable in delivery of aid goods. Current efforts to expedite this delivery have already achieved some success, and more success is anticipated.

c. The Embassy and ECA are making constant and vigorous efforts to improve the functioning of the government and the economy and to control the inflationary spiral. The most important device for this purpose is the Stabilization Committee, which contains both Korean and American members. It has made considerable progress toward accomplishing its mission.

d. Existing deficiencies have been repeatedly brought to the attention of the Minister of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, the G-4 and others concerned, and recommendations for their correction have been made. These efforts are beginning to show results. The Koreans have begun to take stern disciplinary measures against offenders. They have reconciled themselves to the fact that they must live within a limited budget and are trying to work out for themselves effective measures for doing so. They have begun to scale down their overambitious ideas about the standard of equipment and living for the Army. They have also begun to adhere more closely to proper channels for supply and to directives concerning supplies. They have instituted a large salvage program and thereby relieved the stagnation in the disposition of salvage which existed a short time ago. Their staff work is becoming better coordinated and more sound. They will stop the allocation of funds to unit and installation commanders except for pay and travel and for purchase of perishable items of the ration. This means that all other goods and services will be procured through the Central Procurement Agency as is proper.

e. In order to hasten the effective implementation of the recommendations mentioned above the advisory staff is preparing comprehensive, detailed plans to guide the Koreans. Some of the major projects are:

(1) A study of the requirements for regulations, manuals, bulletins, tables of allowances, orders, and standing operating procedures to establish a basis for a sound logistical system. These publications will then be drafted and issued.

(2) A program to insure enforcement of the recently prescribed ordnance maintenance system.

(3) A plan to impart to the Koreans a sound understanding of the meaning, scope and importance of supply discipline, to establish high standards of supply discipline, and to insure its enforcement.

(4) A conservation program to insure the most economical use of funds, supplies and equipment and thereby to live within the budget.

(5) A plan to insure that supplies, equipment and funds are handled according to regulations.

(6) Plans to redistribute supplies and equipment so that they are properly balanced and so that an adequate combat reserve may be constituted.

(7) A plan to establish accurate statistical data on logistical matters and an adequate system of logistical reports, and to insure proper rendition of accurate reports.

(8) Continuing formulation of logistical doctrine to be taught at schools and education of Korean officers in proper staff procedure and methods and techniques of planning.

(9) A program of troop housing for the Army.

(10) Plans for logistical support of the Army defense plans.

5. It will require much time and effort to make these plans and place them in operation. The assistance of every member of the Advisory Group will be required in doing so. Following are some of the ways in which each member is expected to assist.

a. Imparting to his counterpart an understanding of the problems and their proper solution, and stimulating him to take vigorous action toward their solution.

b. Educating his counterpart to an understanding of his responsibilities in connection with supply and the means of carrying them out.

c. Reporting violations of sound practices and prescribed procedures promptly and in full detail to the Chief, KMAG, Attention G-4.

d. Devising and practicing every possible means for economizing in the operation of the Army. This means that advisors must be thoroughly conversant with the procedures used by their counterparts for handling of supplies, equipment and funds. They must rigidly control the tendency to hoard, misuse, and misappropriate funds and supplies. They must control the practice of disobeying orders and circumventing orders by devious means such as borrowing and soliciting of funds. The collection of contributions is a particularly vicious and undemocratic practice. Every effort must be made to detect it and all instances will be reported to Chief, KMAG.

e. Preventing the purchase of goods and services by their counterparts. Whenever goods or services are required, recommendations should be made to the chief of the appropriate technical service. He supplies the goods or services if they are available to him. If they are not, he submits a purchase request to the Central Procurement Agency. Goods, when procured, are handled through the supply channels of the technical services and must not bypass these channels. This procedure is most important. The violation of it has resulted in a tremendous waste of funds and must cease absolutely and at once.



f. Preventing the sale or barter of equipment, supplies, and salvage. These absolutely must be disposed of through prescribed channels if a sound logistical system is to be built.

g. Constantly checking on compliance with the recently published directive on ordnance maintenance and taking vigorous action to correct violations. Insuring compliance with forthcoming directives in implementation of the plans mentioned above. Such directives will be issued in both Korean and English.

h. Taking every possible precaution to insure that funds are used in the most effective manner possible and for legal and proper purposes only.

i. Devising and implementing his own methods for establishing and maintaining high standards of supply discipline and maintenance.

j. Rendering accurate reports on logistical matters and seeing that his counterpart does the same. Inaccurate reports have been submitted quite often in the past. They require a great deal of time in investigation and reconciliation with facts, throw the entire logistical system off balance, and prevent concentration on the important planning work which must be done. Reports must be based on facts as nearly as can be determined by thorough and conscientious investigation.

6. The tactical organization and training of the KA has shown gratifying progress. This is not true of the logistical practices and procedures. The best fighting troops are virtually worthless if they cannot support themselves logistically. KMA G will make the solution of the problems outlined herein a major effort. Advisors will place equal emphasis on logistical matters and training, and each will be held strictly responsible for carrying out his part of this effort. Recipients of this letter will insure that it is studied by all KMA G officers under their supervision.

W. L. ROBERTS  
Brig. Gen., U.S. Army

611.95/6-150

*The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)*

SEOUL, June 1, 1950.

DEAR DEAN: The recent letter from John Allison, with your own postscript,<sup>1</sup> suggesting a Korean invitation to John Foster Dulles to visit Korea has reminded me of a subject which has often been on my mind.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> For background information on the visit of John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary of State, to Japan and Korea, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 19, 1950, p. 998, and *ibid.*, June 26, 1950, p. 1061. A memorandum of conversation on his meeting with President Rhee on June 19 is printed on p. 107.

I think it would be very helpful if the Department would adopt a general practice of attempting to persuade more high U.S. officials who make inspection trips to Japan to include Korea in their itinerary. Such visits would be helpful to the men concerned and so to the formation of policy by the Government, and would also be helpful to the Korean people and Government.

Seoul is only about four hours by air from Tokyo, so that almost any visitor to Japan could find the time to stop in Seoul at least over night. The Koreans not unnaturally are continuously concerned at their exposed military position, despite the obvious indications of American determination to continue aid to the Republic of Korea. Their morale would be greatly heartened by periodic visits of high United States officials, especially those connected with the Departments of Defense and State. Unfortunately, in the past such officials have tended to stop in Japan, thereby giving credence to Korean fear and suspicion that the United States is more interested in developing and sustaining their recent enemy than their long friends!

For example, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff visited Tokyo,<sup>3</sup> although the President of Korea invited them to visit Seoul none of them came.

Subsequently, the Army Chief of Staff, General Collins, indicated he would come to Seoul after visiting Tokyo,<sup>4</sup> but he was called home suddenly and so was unable to do so.

Currently, the Secretary of Defense and General Bradley are reported to be about to visit Tokyo,<sup>5</sup> and the Korean Minister of Defense, by direction of the President, has telegraphed Secretary Johnson inviting him to visit Seoul. This morning when I called on the President with General Roberts and Dr. Bunce, the President asked whether Secretary Johnson was coming. General Roberts had just received a message that the Secretary was not coming and told the President so. The President was much distressed. This afternoon an Embassy officer learned from those close to the President that he had become depressed and angered at what he took to be not only a slight to Korea but more important that the U.S. Department of Defense was showing its indifference to the fate of Korea. I understand the President intends to write urgently to General MacArthur to try to get him to persuade Secretary Johnson to visit here.<sup>6</sup>

The visits of the five Senators and ten Representatives to Korea last autumn, and that of Dr. Jessup last January,<sup>7</sup> in my opinion, had an

<sup>3</sup> The Joint Chiefs of Staff had been to Japan in February.

<sup>4</sup> In October 1949.

<sup>5</sup> Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Omar Bradley arrived in Tokyo on June 18.

<sup>6</sup> Mr. Johnson did not visit Korea.

<sup>7</sup> See the memorandum by Mr. Jessup, January 14, p. 1.

excellent effect both in informing the visitors and in affecting Korean judgment about United States intentions and in raising Korean morale.

Every American visitor who has come here appears to have gone away much impressed with what has been and is being done both by the Korean Government and people and by this Mission. I think it is impossible to get a clear picture of the Korea situation from Tokyo. General Hobbs, who was recently detached from FEC for duty in the Philippines, came over not long ago at the suggestion of General MacArthur, before proceeding to Manila. I understand he was reluctant to come, but that he stayed longer than he had intended and went away enthusiastic about the work of KMAG, and the Korean Army, and especially about their antiguerrilla tactics. Yet General Hobbs had been stationed in Japan for a considerable period of time. I think that proves that you have to see it to believe it. Assistant Secretary of Commerce Thomas C. Blaisdell is also a case in point. His three-day visit<sup>8</sup> was profitable both to him and to this Embassy, as well as the Korean Government.

You will have learned before you get this letter of the results of the May 30 elections here. All the ballots have not yet been counted, but the picture is pretty clear that in general the electorate chose those candidates not holding public office. In Pusan two candidates were elected even though they were being held in jail. It seems clear that the voter cast his ballot freely, secure in the secrecy of his voting, and not under intimidation of the Government.

Sincerely,

JOHN

<sup>8</sup> In April.

795B.00/6-950: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State*

RESTRICTED

SEOUL, June 9, 1950—noon.

829. Pyongyang Radio commenced new propaganda campaign June 7 analogous similar one 1949.<sup>1</sup> "Democratic Front" deploring continued division Korea by American-Rhee police state proposes "patriotic parties" and organizations celebrate liberation day August 15 in unison, accordance following principles: (1) from August 5, for eight days,<sup>2</sup> elect "unified supreme legislative organ" throughout Korea; (2) hold first session this legislature Seoul August 15; (3)

<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. VII, Part 2, footnote 2, p. 1064.

<sup>2</sup> The text of the proposal by the North Korean "Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification of the Fatherland" (DFAUF) is printed in U.N. document A/1350, p. 35; it actually called for elections during the period August 5-8.

hold preliminary joint north-south leaders conference Haeju or Kaesong discuss (a) measures peaceful unification; (b) create general election committee for holding elections; (4) exclude UNCOK from work for attainment peaceful unification; (5) make "north and south regimes responsible for public peace and order during period joint meeting and general election (although 'Syngman Rhee, Lee Bum Suk and other criminals' not allowed participate joint meeting)". Three persons to be sent south deliver copies this appeal to various parties and UNCOK.

Comment: Noteworthy first time date set for occupation Seoul, although many previous claims intention do so. Embassy estimates program purely propaganda campaign attempting offset results recent election which portrayed by Pyongyang Radio as complete failure with popular participation only under duress. Possible some border incidents may coincide with "election campaign" but no estimate basic change military situation (unlikely this propaganda much effect South Korea since Communists all underground while "middle roaders" largely supporting ROK).

Methods of meeting this new propaganda campaign now subject informal conversation with ROK and UNCOK officials.

MUCCIO

795B.00/6-950 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

SEOUL, June 9, 1950—6 p. m.

834. ReEmbtel 829 June 9. North Korean "Democratic Front for Attainment of Unification of Fatherland" appeal of June 7 expedite peaceful unification of Korea. Doubtless originated by USSR. Its overt development began June 1, when according Pyongyang radio, Lee Yong, Chairman Central Committee Laboring People's Party (Communist front organization formerly in South Korea), published article in two Pyongyang newspapers proposing that June 27, 1949, appeal DFAUF be reviewed for purpose "expediting peaceful unification" country. Central Committee DFAUF announcing June 5 that at fifth meeting had studied Lee Yong's proposal and "opinions expressed in support thereof by leaders political parties and social organizations affiliated with DFAUF;" that agreement was reached by leaders those parties and organizations; that 11 member committee had been charged with drafting appeal incorporating new agreement; that expanded meeting Central Committee DFAUF would be called June 7. Meeting met as scheduled on June 7 and promptly issued its new appeal.

As political move DFAUF appeal may be lead from weakness as results success May 30 elections and North Korea failure "frustrate" them in any significant measure although in this connection it should be noted DFAUF appeal apparently in process development before May 30. Since NK now lacks capacity push its guerrilla activity in ROK to extent of undermining stability government perhaps present appeal intended serve as substitute therefor.

As propaganda move, however, appeal seizes initiative. Its superficial reasonableness may be attractive to large body South Korea public opinion which still yearns for elimination 38th parallel left unsatisfied by pre-election promises National Assembly candidates. New appeal may be intended tempt some newly elected but as yet unaffiliated middle of road Assembly men, few of whom represent body confused liberal opinion which looked with favor on Nanking [North Korea]-South Korea joint meetings two years ago<sup>1</sup> and still possibly not wholeheartedly antagonistic to Nanking [North Korean] regime.

Fact that specific dates for elections (August 5-13)<sup>2</sup> and first session new all-Korea Assembly in Seoul (August 15) were given may be considered dangerous from viewpoint sound propaganda. These dates, however, conceivably may serve as convenient peg upon which hang argument that increased guerrilla warfare and Communist subversive activity only method by which Korea can be unified. They conceivably might also serve as preliminary step toward all-out civil war, although seems improbable.

Broadcast June 8 stated three persons (one identified here as Korean-Soviet, formerly Red Army Master Sergeant, now Major General, internal security; others unknown) will wait at Yohyun station just north 38th parallel from 10 a. m. to 5 p. m., June 10, deliver 300 copies DFAUF statement.

UNCOK broadcasting 1815 brief statement reiterating deep concern for unification through free elections, desire examine any sincere proposals, welcoming what appears first offer open border at 38th parallel. Understand UNCOK considered, rejected proposal proceed Yohyun tomorrow; rejection based on uselessness going to receive copy letter whose contents already known.

ROK planning broadcasts emphasizing deep concern unification, but insisting must be through free elections UK under UNCOK observation; will repeat portions recent Rhee, Singh, Jamieson broadcasts.<sup>3</sup> Possibly some recently elected "middle roaders" will be put on

<sup>1</sup> See telegram 291, April 30, from Seoul, *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. VI, p. 1184.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2 to telegram 829, June 9, from Seoul, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> Concerning the broadcasts by Messrs. Singh and Jamieson, see footnote 5 to despatch no. 474, May 5, from Seoul, p. 74; the text of a broadcast to the people of North Korea by President Rhee on May 6 is printed in U.N. document A/1350, p. 17.



air telling why reject North Korea and support ROK. General plan emphasize intention unify without making specific reference DFAUF proposals. KA alerted against possible border incidents.

Department pass Moscow, sent Department 834, repeated information Moscow unnumbered.

MUCCIO

795.00/6-1050 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

SEOUL, June 10, 1950—11 a. m.

837. Re Embtel 834, June 9.

Subsequent despatch reference telegram UNCOK reconsidered, decided send Deputy Principal Secretary, John P. Gaillard, Yohyun meet North Koreans. Should he be allowed cross parallel, Gaillard would accept letter from Northerners; give them copies UNGA Korean resolution, October 21, 1949; Jamieson's radio address May 1; Singh's addresses May 3 and 18; Jamieson's address June 9; assert UNCOK's desire assist unification through elections, willingness go north earliest; Gaillard not empowered discuss anything else.

Jamieson broadcast English 1820 June 9, followed by Korean interpretation; latter repeated 4 times same night; included was offer send Gaillard for meeting 1600 today, asking radio reply before 1000. Without reference UNCOK, Pyongyang radio 0800 extended waiting time to 2100, possibly preparatory reply.

Jamieson broadcast, text unanimously agreed by UNCOK, follows, preceded by explanatory statement for South Korea issued to press last night.

"At its 28th meeting on Friday, 9 June 1950, the United Nations Commission on Korea decided to broadcast the following radio message to North Korea in connection with a letter of appeal from North Korean sources concerning unification of all Korea, an appeal repeatedly broadcast over radio Pyongyang on June 7, 8 and 9, 1950. Radio Pyongyang at the same time stated that 3 North Koreans would be present at Yohyun, north of the 38th parallel, on June 10, 1950, between 10 a. m. and 5 p. m. to deliver copies of the appeal to political parties, social organizations and leaders of the southern half as well as to the United Nations Commission. In making this broadcast the Commission does not associate itself in any way with the substance of the proposals contained in the letter of appeal. It is merely utilizing this opportunity to make contact in North Korea with representatives of the North Koreans in line with its previous efforts to reach representatives of the North in order to explore the possibilities of peaceful unification.

"The text of the broadcast follows:

"For almost a year and a half the United Nations Commission on Korea has tried to get in contact with the people in North Korea for the purpose of discussing the possibilities of removing

the barrier at the 38th parallel and achieving peaceful unification of Korea. The terms of reference of the Commission, fixed by the General Assembly of United Nations on 21 October 1949, requests the Commission to make available its good offices and be prepared to assist whenever in the judgment a favorable opportunity arises in bringing about the unification of Korea. In pursuance of the task, I, as chairman of the Commission, on May 1, 1950, made a broadcast to the people of all Korea to appeal for their co-operation in achieving unification. On May 3, and again on May 11, Dr. Singh, chairman of sub-committee one [and?] representative of India, made special appeals to the people of North Korea explaining that the Commission was searching for unity, to break down economic and social barriers and for this purpose was anxious to visit North Korea to carry out its mission. On behalf of the Commission Dr. Singh extended to you in the North, in utter sincerity, its hand of friendship and its offer to visit you in the North. The sole purpose of the Commission is to carry out the mandate of the General Assembly, aiming at unification, which is the fervent desire of all true Koreans.

'The Commission is aware of the broadcasts made from North Korea in the last few days containing an invitation to the Commission to meet representatives of the North Koreans on the other side of the parallel. The Commission welcomes this opportunity to establish contact with some representatives from the North and deputi[z]es Mr. Gaillard, Acting Deputy Principal Secretary of the Commission, to meet you at 1600 hours at Yohyun station on June 10 and convey personally to you the Commission's desire for peaceful unification. I would remind you that we are available for observation and consultation throughout Korea in the continuing development of representative government. On this occasion, however, the Commission has authorized me, as chairman, to explain to you again, people in the North, that the Commission is always ready and willing to meet you and come to the North in order to discuss with you, without prejudice, the possibilities of achieving unification.

'The Commission would appreciate hearing by 9 a. m. North Korean time tomorrow morning whether you are willing to meet Mr. Gaillard at the time specified.'

Department pass Moscow; sent Department 837, repeated info Moscow unnumbered.

MUCCIO

795B.00/6-1150: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

SEOUL, June 11, 1950—11 a. m.

842. Re Embtel 840 to Department.<sup>1</sup> Gaillard, UNCOK Deputy Principal secretary, with Korean interpreter, reached ROK forward

<sup>1</sup> The text of this telegram read as follows:

"Pyongyang Radio off air since 0900 without replying UNCOK; reopens 1200 for two hours. Gaillard, with ROK Foreign Office clearance, and Foreign Office official accompanying, proceeding by jeep vicinity Yohyun await possible clearance. Expects proceed parallel afoot 1600 testing reception." (995B.40/6-1050)

CP closest Yohyun about 1530 yesterday, remained under cover till about 1815. Intermittent exchange rifle, MG fire near by positions since about hour previous arrival, continued till 1800.

AP, UP, Reuters correspondents, Australian military observers with Gaillard at forward CP, remained there able observe conference through glasses after Gaillard crossed parallel. UNCOK Foreign Office clearance for Gaillard not transmitted local commander through military channels, who reluctant permit Gaillard proceed. Accompanying Foreign Office official finally took responsibility, signing document accepting same.

Firing stopped about 1800. Gaillard, Korean interpreter, crossed parallel about 1845 unchallenged, no guards visible. Before reaching Yohyun station Gaillard met three North Korean emissaries as named in broadcast, remained in conference at table on platform till return south about 2020. Gaillard given, signature necessary for, four copies "Democratic Front" communiqué previously broadcast, which includes statement UNCOK not permitted participate unification program. North Korean emissaries refused accept UNCOK documents from Gaillard, stating only messengers, unable act without instructions, in any case thoroughly familiar Jamieson, Singh broadcasts, UNGA Korea resolution. Gaillard still unreturned Seoul; remained Paekchon overnight.

Embassy estimates although North Korean regime able secure some propaganda advantage from incident, claiming officially met UNCOK informing him North Korean desire peaceful unification through elections, without UNCOK participation, major advantage with UNCOK and ROK. First time UNCOK made any contact North Korean regime despite repeated attempts, establishing precedent. Both UNCOK, ROK official positions unification highest desirability, but only through democratic North Korean elections UNCOK observed. ROK propaganda probably able exploit this thesis.

Department pass Moscow; sent Department 842, repeated info Moscow unnumbered.

MUCCIO

795B.00/6-1150: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

SEOUL, June 11, 1950—2 p. m.

843. Re Embtel 842 to Department. Pyongyang radio announced because failure emissaries deliver "Democratic Front" message South Koreans owing firing ROK forces yesterday, Secretariat Central Committee Democratic Front directed same three emissaries pass parallel 1000 today. Fragmentary reports police South Korea Yohyun village these persons did come south, now being held custody. ROK

action uncertain, President out of town; acting Prime Minister-Defense Minister and Home Minister will decide. Initial reaction desirable shoot emissaries, subsequently considered bringing Seoul, jailing; currently considering returning them across parallel.

Department pass Moscow; sent Department 843, repeated info Moscow unnumbered.

MUCCIO

795B.00/6-1250: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

SEOUL, June 12, 1950—5 p. m.

845. ReEmbtel 843, June 11. Three "Democratic Front" emissaries now military detention Seoul, Korean Army G-2 claims all have pre-1948 CIC South Korea subversive records, but facts unclear.

ROK councils re disposition divided but probable will transport to 38th parallel after attempting secure maximum information through interrogations. Some ROK officials hope these men may defect but no such indication yet; others want try them under old charges or for carrying subversive literature.

Embassy advising cautious, gentle handling, avoid supporting North Korea propaganda; after intelligence or counterpropaganda usefulness ended transport to parallel, release, carrying ROK terms for unification.

Department pass Moscow, sent Department, repeated information Moscow unnumbered.

MUCCIO

795A.5/6-1350: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 13, 1950—11 a. m.

576. Pls. clarify urdesp. 456, May 4, 1950<sup>1</sup> stating that "South Korean Army is superior today" to North Korean Army and is better equipped. Intelligence available here as well as most recent KMAC semi-annual report<sup>2</sup> indicate that North Korean airpower and heavier artillery make North Korean armed forces superior and capable of successful operations against South.

ACHESON

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the report for the period ending December 31, 1949, which was transmitted to the Department with despatch no. 99, January 26, from Seoul, not printed (795.58/1-2650).

795A.5/6-1450 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

SEOUL, June 14, 1950—4 p. m.

857. Re Deptel 576, June 13. Phrasing Embdes 456, May 4, 1950<sup>1</sup> stating that "South Korean army is superior today" to North Korean army and is better equipped was intended refer to estimated superiority training, leadership, morale, marksmanship and better small arms equipment, especially M-1s, army of South Korea to that of North Korean army as distinguished from air force.

Embtel 683, May 11, contains good estimate strengths, equipment North Korea. North Korean air power, tanks and heavier artillery, but especially air power, give preponderance strength to North despite estimated inferiority North Korean ground forces compared to South Korean ground forces.

Capacity North Korean forces conduct successful operations against south hinges primarily on capacity north overcome southern infantry superiority by undisputed command of air plus heavier artillery with consequent adverse effect both actual military operations and morale South Korean forces. Embassy believes, and KMAC concurs, should South Korean forces be strengthened by some measure air defense and heavy artillery, superiority or at least reasonable equality would rest with south vis-à-vis North Koreans (USSR or Chinese forces not considered in this estimate).

Apart from strictly military estimate, consider necessary consider psychological effect ROK Government and civilians constantly facing knowledge northern capacity control air at will, including capacity uninterrupted bombing Seoul, as well as general knowledge northern artillery outranges southern artillery while northern army has tanks but none here.

Invite attention fact Brigadier General W. L. Roberts, chief KMAC, departing tomorrow by plane for Tokyo where he will board transport June 23 for San Francisco expecting arrive about July 3 en route new assignment Los Angeles. Suggest Roberts, who extremely conversant this problem, proceed Washington discuss, explain this problem.

MUCCIO

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



611.95B/5-2550

*The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to  
the Ambassador in Korea (Muccio)*

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1950.

DEAR JOHN: In reference to your letter of May 25, 1950, I would like to assure you that I share your interest in ensuring that Korea receives its fair share of publicity in its successful struggle against Communist aggression. I therefore appreciate your calling this problem to my attention and hope that you will do so in any similar cases which may arise.

After studying the USIS story of May 19, the AP news story of May 20 and the reports on the Foreign Ministers Conference, I have come to the conclusion that the omission of Korea from the statements in question was probably not an oversight. All of the statements released from the Atlantic Council talks appear to concern problems discussed by the Foreign Ministers in London and Paris. Since Korea was not the subject of such discussions, its omission from the statements should not be construed as an indication that this Government holds a diminished interest in the Korean problem.

The Departmental officers charged with the drafting of speeches and statements on U.S. policy are, in general, aware of the problem pointed out in your letter and I believe that they are making every effort to emphasize Korea's importance. This, I believe, is evidenced by the enclosed recent statement on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program made by the Secretary before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in which he dealt with the pressures faced by Korea and stressed the importance of continued U.S. assistance.<sup>1</sup>

In order to make sure that continued publicity be given to the Korean problem and that unjustified omissions of Korea be avoided in future statements, I have circulated your letter to our Policy Information Officers for their future guidance.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN RUSK

<sup>1</sup>The text of Mr. Acheson's statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on June 5 was issued in Department of State press release no. 585; it was substantially similar to his statement on June 2 before the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, which is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 12, 1950, p. 940.

795B.00/6-1650: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

SEOUL, June 16, 1950—5 p. m.

873. Re Embtel 845 June 12. Two of three representatives (Lee In Kyu, Kim Tae Hong) "Democratic Front" who brought south "All-

Korea election" appeals June 11, promptly arrested, held army custody Seoul, now having defected, broadcast to North Korea from Seoul 2230 June 15, subsequent repeats; general tenor recantation previous beliefs, stating North Koreans deceived re conditions South Korea, speakers astonished discovery peace, freedom, plenty, that "Father of Country," President Rhee leadership superior, absence US occupation forces contrary Pyongyang broadcasts; advised North Koreans hereafter disbelieve lies propagated Northern regime.

Embassy understands men well-treated, only oral questions, no violence used. Third man, Kim Chae Chang, Secretary "Democratic Front" reportedly also defected but because of family Pyongyang afraid make public announcement. Currently all three being permitted tour Seoul allegedly without guards; expect broadcast again June 18 giving observations local conditions.

Embassy considers ROK able use men's statements successfully discredit Pyongyang "Democratic Front" propaganda campaign; UNCOK possibly, US delegate UNGA probably able use discredit USSR claims re Korea question.

Broadcasts being translated transmitting upon completion.<sup>1</sup>

MUCCIO

<sup>1</sup> The texts of the broadcasts were transmitted to the Department in telegram 879, June 17, from Seoul, not printed (795B.00/6-1750).

795B.00/6-1950

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of North-east Asian Affairs (Allison)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[SEOUL,] June 19, 1950.

Participants: President Rhee  
Mr. Dulles  
Foreign Minister Ben C. Limb  
Ambassador Muccio  
Mr. Allison

President Rhee requested a special unscheduled interview with Mr. Dulles this morning with the apparent objective of impressing upon Mr. Dulles his view that more positive action must be taken to make more difficult the task of the communists in North Korea.

President Rhee was also apparently hoping for some definite commitment of continuing American aid and was seemingly apprehensive least [lest] Korea be left alone while other countries in Asia united in some form of regional association. The President stated that before

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Allison accompanied John Foster Dulles on his trip to Japan and Korea; see footnote 2 to the letter from Mr. Muccio to Mr. Rusk, June 1, p. 96.

the Chinese communists have an opportunity to consolidate their position in China the division of Korea at the 38th parallel must be removed. He also expressed deep concern over the fate of Formosa, saying that its loss would be greatly deplored by Korea. He referred to a report he had received that Chinese, Korean and Japanese communists have recently had a meeting in Japan to discuss ways and means of making trouble for South Korea and went on to say that should Formosa fall to the communists Korea would then be threatened by communist elements from the south as well as from the north. At a later point in the conversation the President did state that his desire for positive action did not necessarily mean action by armed forces but he was insistent that unless something was done the cold war would be lost.

Mr. Dulles went to considerable length to explain that formal pacts, alliances or treaties were not necessary prerequisites to common action against a common foe and that the important thing was for a government to prove by its actions that it was in fact a loyal member of the free world in which case it could count on the support of the other members of the free world against the forces of communism. Mr. Dulles explained that it was the opinion of the best informed minds in the U.S. Government that Soviet Russia did not for the present wish to become involved in a shooting war but that its more likely action would be to foment insurrection, intrigue and sabotage within countries. He pointed out that no country could guarantee another country against the results of a third world war with its potentialities of atomic warfare and that if such a war was precipitated the attack might just as likely come first in New York as in Seoul. However, the other form of indirect aggression which appeared more likely was one in which America could help but it could only help if the governments threatened were themselves taking active steps to create conditions within their countries which would prohibit growth of communism. A true allegiance to the principles of representative government and a real effort to self-control and hard work to create a stable economy and a government which deserved the support of its people would insure the continuation of such additional aid as might be needed. President Rhee had raised the question of the Baguio conference<sup>2</sup> of southeast Asian countries along with the various conferences of the British Commonwealth group and seemed to feel that there should be some such grouping which Korea might join. Mr. Dulles pointed out that neither the United States or Korea had been present at the Baguio conference and that he did not think either country needed to be concerned about what happened there. With respect to the British Commonwealth, this was a good example of a group of countries bound

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 1 to the letter from Mr. Muccio to Mr. Rusk, May 25, p. 88.

together by their mutual allegiance to freedom and democracy rather than because of any written documents. In fact, it was pointed out, the only formal document binding the Commonwealth together, the Statute of Westminster, was a document which gave each member of the Commonwealth the right to go its own way completely independent of the others if it so desired.

With respect to President Rhee's concern over Formosa Mr. Dulles pointed out that this problem was of equal concern to the United States and was under-going constant review within the Department of State. He made clear that economic aid to Formosa was continuing and he explained that just before he left Washington licenses had been issued for the exportation to Formosa of various forms of military equipment. Mr. Dulles asked President Rhee whether or not there was any likelihood of elements of the Nationalist Government wanting to come to Korea for asylum should Formosa fall to the communists and the President replied that while there had been rumors that such might be the case and that while he obviously would want to do what he could for a friendly neighbor it was his opinion that each country should stand on its own feet and not make use of its friends in such ways. Without directly answering Mr. Dulles' question it was apparent that President Rhee did not look with any favor on any requests of high Chinese Nationalists for asylum in Korea.

Mr. Dulles concluded by assuring President Rhee that if the Korean Government continued along the path it is now following it would not need to rely on formal agreements to obtain continuing aid from the U.S. in such measure as possible but that the main thing was for the Koreans to realize that they had the primary responsibility to show that they were really attached to the principles of free representative government.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> For the text of a statement made by Mr. Dulles before the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea on June 19, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 3, 1950, p. 12.

FE Files: Lot 55D275

*Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency\**

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 19 June 1950.

CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF THE NORTHERN KOREAN REGIME

ESTIMATE OF CURRENT CAPABILITIES

The "Democratic People's Republic" of northern Korea is a firmly controlled Soviet Satellite that exercises no independent initiative and

\*Note: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force have concurred in this report. It contains information available to CIA as of 15 May 1950. [Footnote in the source text.]

depends entirely on the support of the USSR for existence. At the present time there is no serious internal threat to the regime's stability, and, barring an outbreak of general hostilities, the Communists will continue to make progress toward their ultimate domestic goals. The Communist regime in northern Korea suffers from a shortage of skilled administrative personnel and from weaknesses in its economy and its official Party organizations. There is widespread, although passive, popular discontent with the Communist government. Despite these weaknesses, however, the regime has, with Soviet assistance, clearly demonstrated an ability to continue its control and development of northern Korea along predetermined political, economic, and social lines.

The northern Korean regime is also capable, in pursuit of its major external aim of extending control over southern Korea, of continuing and increasing its support of the present program of propaganda, infiltration, sabotage, subversion, and guerrilla operations against southern Korea. This program will not be sufficient in itself, however, to cause a collapse of the southern Korean regime and the extension of Communist control over the south so long as US economic and military aid to southern Korea is not substantially reduced or seriously dissipated.

At the same time the capability of the northern Korean armed forces for both short- and long-term overt military operations is being further developed. Although the northern and southern forces are nearly equal in terms of combat effectives, training, and leadership, the northern Koreans possess a superiority in armor, heavy artillery, and aircraft. Thus, northern Korea's armed forces, even as presently constituted and supported, have a capability for attaining limited objectives in short-term military operations against southern Korea, including the capture of Seoul.

Northern Korea's capability for long-term military operations is dependent upon increased logistical support from the USSR. If the foreign supporters of each faction were called upon for increased assistance, there is no reason to believe that Soviet support would be withheld and consideration of proximity and availability of such assistance would greatly favor the northern Korean regime. Soviet assistance to northern Korea, however, probably would not be in the form of direct participation of regular Soviet or Chinese Communist military units except as a last resort. The USSR would be restrained from using its troops by the fear of general war; and its suspected desire to restrict and control Chinese influence in northern Korea would militate against sanctioning the use of regular Chinese Communist units in Korea.



Despite the apparent military superiority of northern over southern Korea, it is not certain that the northern regime, lacking the active participation of Soviet and Chinese Communist military units, would be able to gain effective control over all of southern Korea. The key factors which would hinder Communist attempts to extend effective control under these circumstances are: (1) the anti-Communist attitude of the southern Koreans; (2) a continuing will to resist on the part of southern troops; (3) the Communist regime's lack of popular support; and (4) the regime's lack of trained administrators and technicians.

#### Annex A

#### SOVIET POSITION IN NORTHERN KOREA

The USSR's fundamental strategic concern with Korea is positional. Northern Korea has a short common border with Soviet territory, flanks sea and land communication lines between Vladivostok and Port Arthur, and shares a long, common frontier with Manchuria. Control of northern Korea provides the USSR with an advance fringe of secondary air and naval bases beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Far East. In addition, northern Korea provides a base for eventual extension of Soviet control over southern Korea, which, if accomplished, would give the Soviet Union a further strategic advantage in its positional relationship with Japan and consequently enhance the position of the USSR vis-à-vis the US in the Far East. Of increasing importance at the present time is the area's economic potential, which, although limited, can make valuable contributions to the economy of the Soviet Far East.

To assure continued control and to protect and advance strategic and economic interests in northern Korea, the Soviet Union since 1945 has concentrated on the following objectives: (1) the establishment of a strong, effective, and obedient Communist government and society; (2) the exploitation of economic and human resources, with simultaneous development of a self-supporting, expanding economy within northern Korea; and (3) the exploitation of northern Korea as a base for the penetration and subversion of southern Korea.

Since the establishment of the "Democratic People's Republic" (September 1948) and the withdrawal of Soviet troops (December 1948), the Soviet Union has maintained the fiction of northern Korean independence and has exercised its control through the medium of the Communist-dominated Korean Government and associated political organizations. The Soviet Embassy at the "capital city" of Pyongyang is headquarters for the four- to five-thousand-man Soviet mission in

northern Korea. The Soviet mission, infiltrated as advisers throughout the government, economy, and political organizations, serves as a guarantee of northern Korean subservience and a source of technical assistance.

#### Annex B

### CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION

#### 1. *Indigenous Leadership.*

The "Democratic People's Republic" is under the immediate control of a small group of Korean Communist leaders whose primary qualification for high office is loyalty to the USSR and willingness to accept a subordinate role within the pattern of Soviet control. Thus, Koreans with a Soviet background appear to have been given positions superior to those held by either native-trained Communists or Koreans who received Communist indoctrination in Yen-an and Manchuria, and this Soviet-trained leadership appears to be well knit. The intensity of Soviet control, the leaders' lack of strong personal followings among the Korean people, and the composition of the present southern Korean Government, which makes it unpalatable to possible northern "nationalist deviationists" as an alternative prevents either significant deviations or disruptive factionalism.

Except for their loyalty and subservience to the USSR, northern Korea's leaders possess few qualifications for the responsibility of high government and party office. They have gained no popular support and despite four years in office they still lack requisite administrative and technical skills. Although these weaknesses lower the regime's efficiency and decrease its popular appeal, they do not materially affect the stability of the "People's Republic," since experienced Soviet advisers adequately maintain government efficiency at the top level and the police effectively control the populace.

#### 2. *Government Organization.*

The Government of northern Korea closely resembles that of all other "people's democracies" and a democratic facade obscures its basic totalitarian pattern. Constitutional provisions for a popularly elected representative assembly, a responsible cabinet—actually the key organ in the government—civil liberties and other rights and institutions normally associated with democratic government, are intended to develop popular support for the "People's Republic" not only in northern Korea but in southern Korea as well. Changes gradually being made in the institutions established by the Constitution, however, point to the transformation of the "People's Democracy" into an "orthodox" socialist state of the Soviet type.

### 3. *Party Organization.*

The organization of the Communist Party (officially known as the North Korea Labor Party) (NKLP), which parallels the hierarchical government structure, is similar to the Party in the USSR. Top government positions are all held by NKLP members, and the Party's Politbureau is the regime's major policy-making body. Most of the government's bureaucrats are drawn from the Party ranks. The Party is intended to be the activist element among the politically passive northern Koreans, is responsible for political activities—including elections, demonstrations, and the dissemination of propaganda—and is the nucleus for what will eventually be a one-party system. In the interim, however, the fiction of a multi-party system is maintained. The Front and its organizations, manipulated and controlled by the NKLP leadership, and designed to include every segment of society, support and assist internal indoctrination and control programs and play an even more important role in operations against southern Korea.

Membership in the NKLP is estimated at between five and six hundred thousand, an unusually high percentage of the total population. The Party is controlled by a group of about a hundred, who provide the indigenous leadership in the state apparatus and who subject the several thousand petty officials, intellectuals, and professional men in the middle bracket of the Party (generally less thoroughly indoctrinated Marxists) to the most stringent Party discipline.

The remainder of the Party's membership is four-fifths peasant and one-fifth urban and industrial workers. The support of this vast majority of the Party's members is maintained through preferential treatment and strict discipline. Devotion and loyalty to the Party's leadership, rather than intellectual adherence to Marxism, is required from this Party majority that serves fundamentally as a large base with a vested interest in perpetuation of the regime, rather than as a mature activist element.

### 4. *Methods of Control.*

Both the state organization and the regimentation of Korean society depend on firm control of the people and the maintenance of internal security. The police force is the instrument of primary control. Exclusive of the para-military border constabulary which is still under the Minister of Interior, there are some thirty to forty thousand police agents and uniformed police. The former maintain a constant check on public attitudes and seek out dissident elements. Groups such as former landlords, businessmen, property owners, intellectuals and Christians in the north Korean population are singled out by the

police (as dissident or potentially dissident elements) and are subject to particularly rigid police controls.

As a long-range source of stability, Korea's Communist regime has sought popular support through the use of persuasive techniques, principally propaganda and the conferring of material benefits. Propaganda, disseminated through a wide variety of media, reaches every element of the Korean population. Its main effort is directed at concealing the dictatorial nature of the government, the extent of Soviet domination and similar aspects of Communism in Korea, while creating, on the other hand, the illusion of national independence, representative government, equality with the Soviet Union, and other favorable stereotypes. Material benefits designed to recruit mass support include: reforms purported to correct deep-seated inequities in the Korean social and economic system; the provision of social and public services on much larger scale than under the Japanese; and specific state actions—such as the release of extra consumer goods—timed to counteract public discontent over new economic regulations.

#### *5. Effectiveness of the Political System.*

The "Democratic People's Republic" has established firm control over the northern Korean people. Despite weaknesses, the Communist regime is progressing toward its ultimate domestic objectives of establishing a stable, fully socialized state. Its strength and stability are mainly attributable to: (1) rigid direction exercised through Soviet advisers and loyal Korean Communists; (2) Soviet material aid and technical advice in all fields; (3) comprehensive and highly organized state regulation of political, economic, and social activity, maintained both through government controls and through the actions of Communist-controlled mass organizations; (4) effective police control, supplemented by techniques of persuasion and psychologically bolstered by the proximity of Soviet forces; (5) cohesiveness and loyalty to both the government and the Soviet Union on the part of northern Korea's indigenous leaders, the bureaucracy, the police, the North Korea Labor Party and the more skilled technicians and workers; and (6) the achievement, since 1946, of substantial increases in production, which have raised living standards in northern Korea to a minimum subsistence level.

Despite the strength and stability of the "People's Republic" the regime has a number of important weaknesses to overcome, major among them being: (1) a lack of experienced and competent leaders, administrators, technicians, and dynamic activist strength in the NKLP; (2) the regime's narrow base of popular support, which results from the relatively widespread popular discontent; (3) Soviet

interference and exploitation, which offends Korean desires for complete independence and contributes to the low standard of living, which is a basic cause for popular discontent and a factor contributing to low labor productivity.

The Communist system, itself inherently incompatible with traditional social, economic, and political forms in Korea, assures the existence of discontented groups under the northern regime. In the brief period of Communist control, nearly two million northern Korean refugees have moved to the south; the great mass of the northerners have not yet appeared receptive to a Communist, Soviet-oriented state, and indoctrination in Marxian ideology remains extremely limited. There is believed to be widespread discontent and dissatisfaction among farmers, for example, particularly among those who formerly owned large or medium-sized farms. The forced labor required on community projects, as well as the government's collection of large special crop taxes, moreover, has incurred the resentment of former landless tenant farmers, whose support was actively solicited by means of the 1946 "land reform." The 100,000 or more Christians are strongly anti-Communist, and considerable discontent also exists among the pre-liberation middle classes. This popular discontent appears to be largely passive, however, and in the few known attempts to organize the opposition for action, the groups were quickly broken up by the police.

The low standard of living, although primarily an economic problem, has its political ramifications. The problem is a difficult one because the low standard arises directly and indirectly from other weaknesses in the system and cannot be resolved completely so long as the Soviet Union continues the economic exploitation of northern Korea.

None of these problems, however, is sufficiently critical at present either to threaten the USSR's control over northern Korea or to challenge the northern Korean regime's ability to maintain itself. Northern Korean internal security forces are fully capable of maintaining the regime in power during the period required for the reduction of current weaknesses in administration, leadership and production, and the progressive development of more advanced Communist political forms. Barring a period of internal disorganization, or crises arising from external military pressures, the Communist regime's present lack of popular support does not represent a serious problem. In the long run, living standards probably will be somewhat improved, and the regime's persuasive tactics are likely to gain additional recruits among the younger generation. On the other hand, while these weaknesses do not seriously impair the Communists' ability to control and develop northern Korea, they do materially reduce that regime's current ability to extend and maintain control over southern Korea.



## Annex C

## CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION

1. *Organization of the Economy.*

Koreans were almost completely excluded from ownership and management when Korea's economic system was under Japanese rule. As a consequence, the USSR's introduction of a socialized economy in northern Korea after 1945 proceeded with little internal opposition. The principal Soviet economic objective in northern Korea has been the gearing of the economy to the requirements of the Soviet Far East while developing northern Korean resources to provide the maximum of self-support. The USSR has fostered the development of those industries producing exports required by its economy and has also sought to overcome the existing shortages in consumer goods production and other items presently obtained from external sources. These plans, if successful, would ensure a viable, although low level, economy in northern Korea and would also insure increasing returns to the USSR in their exploitation of the northern Korean economy.

Effective Soviet direction of the northern Korean economy is insured through: (1) the placement of Soviet advisers and Koreans loyal to the USSR in all key positions controlling the economy; (2) the use of Soviet advisers and engineers in all key Korean installations; and (3) the existence of "joint" Soviet-Korean control over northern Korea's foreign trade.

All major economic undertakings in northern Korea are planned, financed, and directed by the responsible government ministries, which are under intensive Soviet supervision. Private ownership is confined to small commercial establishments and trading companies, some mining activities, and agriculture. Even in agriculture, legal title to the land distributed by the Communist regime in the Land Reform Program of 1946<sup>1</sup> still rests with the state, and there is a considerable degree of state control over agricultural production.

2. *Production and Trade.*

By the end of 1946, a combination of Japan's wartime abuses of Korea's arable land and industrial plant, and subsequent Soviet looting and Korean neglect, had reduced northern Korea's economy to a state of near chaos. Recovery has been slow, but by 1949 the industrial plant had achieved a significant level of activity. Today, to judge by the northern Korean regime's published two-year production plan (1949-1950) and by scattered intelligence reports, heavy industrial plant production, while it has increased significantly over 1946, it is still 15-30 percent below the peak 1944 level.

<sup>1</sup> For information and pertinent documentation on land reform in North Korea, see U.N. document A/1881, pp. 59-62.

Postwar production plans have reflected a reduction in the production of some finished heavy industrial items, such as pig iron and aluminum, which formerly was geared to Japanese rather than to domestic absorption capacity. Emphasis has been shifted, instead, to the construction and expansion of plants producing basic and end-use equipment and consumer goods.

The current production of iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, fertilizers, industrial chemicals, and cement is still in excess of the Korean economy's capacity to process and absorb. The resultant surplus is exported both to meet Soviet demands and to obtain needed imports of basic equipment and consumer goods. Although only spotty information is available concerning the degree of recovery in the fields of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, these too have apparently revived to such an extent that selected exports are practicable. As a result of the possession of some industrial and agricultural surplus, and the need for basic and end-use equipment, a relatively large volume of foreign trade is both possible and necessary for the maintenance of the northern Korean economy. Additionally, the area's lack of petroleum and bituminous coal forces the importation of both.

It is believed that northern Korea's balance of payments is unfavorable. This unfavorable balance probably arises largely from Soviet pricing policies which underprice Korean exports and overprice Soviet exports. Exports to the USSR, northern Korea's principal postwar trading partner, are, for the most part, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals and ores, chemicals, lumber, marine products, and grain. Imports are machinery, armaments, coal, and petroleum.

Hong Kong is northern Korea's principal non-Communist trading partner, and a wide variety of imports are sought on that market. Chief among these are textiles, basic machinery, pharmaceuticals, and selected industrial chemicals. Korean exports to Hong Kong consist of cattle fodder, marine products, grains, fats and oils, and chemicals. Less important trade relations are conducted directly with Manchuria, North China, Southeast Asia, and—clandestinely—with Japan and southern Korea.

### 3. *Standards of Living.*

The living standard of the great majority of northern Koreans has shown a significant increase from the below-subsistence level which immediately followed World War II. Rationing of all foods and basic necessities, which has ensured the meeting of the population's minimum requirements, has been a factor in preventing development of the widespread discontent into active resistance.

The shortage of housing in urban areas, harsh working conditions, low wages, the high cost of consumer goods, and the high taxes on agricultural production are all major problems which remain to be

overcome before the present subsistence level of living can be raised. Attempts to this end are evident in the Communist regime's current plans for expansion of consumer goods industries, as well as in the volume of consumer goods imported from Hong Kong in 1949. While Soviet exploitation of the northern Korean economy continues, however, any substantial improvement in living standards will be inhibited.

#### 4. *Limitations on the Economy.*

Several problems will continue to hamper the Communist regime's progress toward self-support. The most important among these arises from the fact that the USSR will continue to support and assist the development of the northern Korean economy only to the ultimate benefit of the Soviet economy. So long as the importation of bituminous coal and petroleum and the operation of the northern Korean merchant marine is under Soviet control, the operation of Korea's economy will remain almost completely dependent on the USSR. A further major problem faced by the northern Korean regime is the internal one of the Korean people's low level of productivity. Since there is a shortage of both skilled and unskilled manpower in the north, low productivity can be expected to continue despite the Communist regime's efforts to improve the situation.

### Annex D

#### CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION

Northern Korea's military forces are still being expanded. So far as the ground forces are concerned, this process involves the integration into the "People's Army" of local recruits and of Korean troops that have seen service under the Chinese Communists in Manchuria, as well as the equipping of this force with small arms, artillery, vehicles, aircraft, and armor from the USSR.

Trained and equipped units of the Communist "People's Army" are being deployed southward in the area of the 38th Parallel. "People's Army" and Border Constabulary units there equal or surpass the strength of southern Korean army units similarly deployed. Tanks and heavy artillery have also been moved close to the Parallel in recent months.

#### 1. *Army.*

Current estimates place the strength of the "People's Army" (PA) at 66,000 men (including 16,000 ex-Manchurian troops) organized into at least three infantry divisions and an independent brigade. The PA's critical arms include: (1) an armored unit, estimated to possess 65 Soviet T-34 tanks; (2) divisional artillery units equipped with 76 mm guns and 122 mm howitzers; and (3) anti-aircraft units in the border

regions. The 20,500-man Border Constabulary (BC), which is also being expanded with ex-Manchurian levies, is nominally a paramilitary police force and was previously armed with Japanese weapons. The BC has been trained to infantry standards, however, and has now been re-equipped with Soviet weapons.

## 2. *Air Force.*

According to current accepted estimates, the "People's Army Air Force" (PAAF) consists of an air regiment of 1,500 men, including 150 pilots, equipped with 35 YAK-9 and/or IL-10 fighters, 3 twin-engine bombers, 2 twin-engine transports, and 35 Japanese or Soviet training planes. This estimate may be subject to an upward revision in the near future.

## 3. *Navy.*

The northern Korean navy performs mainly as a coast guard force. Present navy strength is estimated at 5,100 men. A marine unit, whose exact functions are as yet undetermined, numbers approximately 5,400 men. Northern Korean navy shore installations and ships are of little consequence.

## 4. *Logistics and Manpower.*

The northern Korean armed forces depend almost wholly on the USSR for logistic support. Recent reports have indicated, however, that limited quantities of Soviet-type small arms, munitions, and uniforms are being locally manufactured.

A large segment of the domestic economy is as yet uncommitted to the logistic support of the armed forces and could provide further manpower for expansion of the military machine. However, the Communist regime's military machine already constitutes a drain on the undermanned northern Korean economy. An additional sixty to seventy thousand Koreans who have seen service with the Chinese Communists, furthermore, are believed to be available in Manchuria if needed for integration in or loan to the "People's Army."

## 5. *Training.*

The northern Korean military forces are entirely the product of Soviet planning, and depend heavily on the large Soviet military mission for training at higher command levels and for tactical advice down to the battalion level. The PA's state of training is comparable to that of the southern Korean Army. Air training is probably still in a basic stage, however, and there is no indication that the Air Regiment has attained operational status. The navy has received less Soviet attention.

There is evidence of a continuing program of sending small numbers of ground and air officers to the USSR for advanced training. Soviet

advisers to the PA are believed to number at least 2,000; to the PAAF, 70; and to the Navy, 33. An additional 2,000 Soviet naval personnel are reported to be stationed in major northern Korean ports, to service Soviet naval units and to control port facilities.

#### 6. *Morale.*

The morale of the northern Korean military forces generally appears to be good, and, although factions exist, factionalism is not a significant problem. Troops are subject to continuous indoctrination and surveillance, and their loyalty is further induced by above-average food rations, good wages, and special privileges. At the present time, the northern Korean armed forces are probably psychologically prepared to fight wholeheartedly against southern Korean troops. Their loyalty to the Communist regime and their fighting spirit, however, would vary inversely with the strength of the opposition and the duration of the struggle. In contrast, the ex-Manchurian Koreans, whose loyalty was indicated by the fact of their transfer to the PA, now form a significant percentage of that force. These troops possibly have less feeling of kinship for southern Koreans and therefore may provide a firm backbone for the PA in the event of military operations.

### Annex E

#### CURRENT OPERATIONS AGAINST SOUTHERN KOREA

The ultimate local objective of the Soviet Union and of the northern Korean regime is the elimination of the southern Republic of Korea and the unification of the Korean peninsula under Communist domination. To this end, an open invasion of the Republic by northern Korean military forces has thus far been delayed in favor of a coordinated campaign involving political pressure within southern Korea, subversion, propaganda, intimidation, economic pressure, and military actions by infiltration of guerrilla forces.

To date, this campaign has succeeded in damaging south Korea's economy to a serious extent. The withholding of northern Korean power, fertilizer, coal, iron, and steel from the southern Republic has been offset only in part by large-scale US economic aid. In turn, the Communist-trained guerrillas operating in south Korea, while they have not been successful in developing large concentrations or seriously threatening the Republic's internal stability, have forced the Republic to expend large sums of money in "suppression campaigns," and thus have contributed materially to the dangerous inflationary situation in south Korea. Anti-guerrilla activity, moreover, has prevented the deployment of some Republican Army units along the strategic corridors adjacent to the 38th Parallel.



Communist propaganda, especially that which reiterates the theme of unification, probably has little present appeal to the southern Korean people, since they are basically anti-Communist. The Republic's anti-Communist program has also materially reduced the Communists' ability to infiltrate southern Korean governmental and political organizations.

Although Communist operations against the southern Republic of Korea have not thus far produced decisive results, the Republic has been forced to make serious political and economic sacrifices in order to counter the ever-present Communist threat. At the same time, the cost to the Communists has been relatively slight, and their ability to continue the campaign far exceeds the Republic's capability to continue effective resistance without US aid.

795B.58/6-2350

*The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

SEOUL, June 23, 1950.

No. 660

Ref: WARX-81993, April 20, 1950 to Chief, KMAG<sup>1</sup>

Subject: Transmitting Plan for Reduction of KMAG Personnel

There are enclosed, for the Department's information and consideration, copies of an exchange of self-explanatory communications between the Chief, KMAG and the Embassy on the subject of the proposed reduction in KMAG personnel. KMAG was instructed, by the Department of Army in radio message WARX-81993, April 20, 1950, a copy of which is presumably available to the Department, to submit such a plan after consultation with the Embassy. Following several discussions with General Roberts and Colonel Wright,<sup>2</sup> the reduction outlined in the enclosure to the Chief, KMAG's letter of June 22, 1950 was found acceptable in so far as it related to Army and police advisory duties. The Embassy's views regarding Coast Guard and Air Force advisory personnel, apart from those having been transmitted to the Department in various telegrams and despatches, are set forth in the Embassy's letter of June 23, 1950 to the Chief, KMAG.

Briefly, the proposed plan provides for a reduction in KMAG personnel from a total of 472 to 242 (exclusive of Coast Guard). Officer strength is slated to decline from 181 to 96 and enlisted men from 283 to 139. Despite the severity of this proposed reduction, provision has

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Col. Sterling Wright, who had been Chief of Staff of KMAG, assumed command of the Group pending the arrival of a new Chief following the departure of General Roberts from Korea on June 15. At this time, Colonel Wright was in Japan and Lt. Col. Carl H. Sturges was in temporary command of KMAG. (See Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, p. 119.)

been made for retention of officers and enlisted men in the field at approximately their present strength. In this way close supervision will continue to be exercised over Korean Army units through the regimental level—an essential desideratum if Korean Army units are to be maintained at an efficient level. Under the reduction plan, the Engineer and Ordnance sections of KMAG will be strengthened in order better to handle the expected flow of MDA supplies and equipment, which should reach a high level in the calendar year 1951. Some reduction is envisaged in officers assigned to the various schools, but it is believed that this can now be done without impairing the efficiency of the schools which are now well established and operating under definite curricula. Most of the contemplated reductions will be found in Headquarters personnel. Various logistic functions, such as the motor pool, are being turned over in their entirety to Joint Administrative Services, with the result that officers and enlisted men in such spaces can be spared.

The Embassy, after careful consideration, is of the view that the reductions proposed can be effected after January 1, 1951 without any appreciable impairment of the ROK Security Forces. The Korean Army, in particular, has made enormous progress during the past year; and the systems and institutions set up through the instrumentality of KMAG are now such that reductions in advisory personnel can well be made.<sup>3</sup>

For the Ambassador:  
EVERETT F. DRUMRIGHT  
*Counselor of Embassy*

Enclosure 1

*The Chief of the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (Sturges) to the Ambassador in Korea (Muccio)*

SECRET

22 JUNE 1950.

SIR: In accordance with instructions contained in WARX 81993, dated 20 April 1950, I have the honor to submit herewith for your consideration the detailed plan for the reduction of KMAG.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Under cover of despatch no. 661, June 23, from Seoul, not printed. Ambassador Muccio transmitted copies of the semiannual report of KMAG for the period from January 1 to June 15, 1950, the latter date having been advanced 15 days to coincide with the departure of General Roberts from Korea. The concluding portions of despatch no. 661 read as follows:

"... It is hoped that every effort will be made to expedite the shipment to Korea of items critically needed. It is also hoped that an affirmative decision will be reached regarding the additional fiscal year 1950 MDA program which is now under consideration in Washington.

"The continued progress made by the Korean Security Forces during the first half of the calendar year is yet another indication of the fine performance of KMAG. General Roberts and his staff have worked exceedingly hard and are entitled to the highest commendation." (795B.58/6-2350)

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

This plan envisions a one-time reduction with an effective date of 1 January 1951. Normal attrition, curtailment of extensions and suspension of requisitions will be utilized to achieve a smooth reduction and obviate the necessity for reporting large numbers of officers and men for reassignment to other commands.

Please note that since our last informal discussion of the problem it has been deemed advisable to increase the strength of both Engineer and Ordnance advisory sections each by two officers. This increase has been motivated by consideration of the problems involved in those two sections in handling MDAP supplies and equipment, and in the progress made by the Engineers in affecting major economies. As approximately seventy five (75) percent of the dollar value of the MDAP program for Korea is in ordnance materiel, it is considered essential that the maximum supervision be exercised over this type of equipment. The addition of *two* Engineer officers is justified on the grounds that Engineer advisors are currently achieving remarkable results in saving ROK many millions of *won* by insuring proper utilization of Korean Army engineers in preference to hiring civilian contractors for construction or rehabilitation projects.

It would be appreciated if you would indicate your concurrence at your earliest convenience in order that the proposed Table of Distribution may be submitted to Department of the Army with the least practicable delay.

CARL H. STURIES  
Lt. Col., Sig. C

Enclosure 2

*The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Chief of the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (Sturies)*

SECRET

SEOUL, June 23, 1950.

SIR: I have received your letter of June 22, 1950, with which you submitted a detailed plan, pursuant to instructions contained in WARX 81993, for the reduction of KMAG personnel to take effect from January 1, 1951.

I note that the plan submitted by you corresponds generally with the plan originally agreed upon in consequence of informal discussions with General Roberts and Colonel Wright, except for the changes outlined in the third paragraph of your letter. I fully agree that the Engineer and Ordnance advisory sections should be strengthened in order to handle MDA equipment and supplies to the best effect.

In so far as your plan relates to Army and police advisory duties, it has my full concurrence. I note, however, that the plan includes no provision for Coast Guard advisors who have hitherto been carried as

a part of the KMAG complement. I strongly feel, as I am sure you do, that the United States must retain and even strengthen its Coast Guard advisory personnel. I wish, therefore, to go on record as endorsing the written request which went forward from the Chief KMAG to the Department of the Army, under date of April 1, 1950, for the strengthening of the advisory group to the Coast Guard.<sup>5</sup> The financing of the Coast Guard advisory group is obviously a matter for determination in Washington.

While, under existing policy, the inclusion of Air Force advisory personnel in the KMAG complement would not be proper, I am hopeful that a top-level decision will be taken in Washington, in accordance with the recommendations set forth in the Embassy's telegram no. 744, May 23, 1950, to the Department of State, which will permit of the inclusion of Air Force advisory personnel in the KMAG complement.<sup>6</sup>

Very truly yours,

JOHN J. MUCCIO

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<sup>5</sup> Not printed; the substance of the request is given in Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea*, p. 92.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 3 to telegram 744, May 23, from Seoul, p. 87.