

# U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE HORN OF AFRICA AND THE SUDAN; U.S. RELATIONS WITH ETHIOPIA, SOMALIA, AND THE SUDAN

## 41. Editorial Note

A "Special Report on the Sudan," prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board Working Group on the Near East, dated August 18, 1958, stated that in a conversation on July 14 with Ambassador James S. Moose, Jr., and a later conversation with the British representative in Khartoum, Sudanese Prime Minister Abdullah Khalil asked what assistance he could count on from the United States and the United Kingdom in the event of direct or indirect Egyptian aggression against the Sudan. The report summarized discussions on this subject with the British and recommended assuring Khalil that in case of direct aggression, the United States and the United Kingdom would take every feasible step through the United Nations to extend assistance. Concerning indirect aggression, it recommended stressing the U.S. conviction that effective action against subversion was best taken by the country directly concerned. It also suggested possible steps to provide economic and military aid contingent on the Prime Minister's reaction and subsequent Sudanese actions. (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Near East)

At the 377th meeting of the National Security Council on August 21, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Gordon Gray informed the Council of the special report and stated that some of its recommendations appeared to the Operations Coordinating Board to go beyond existing policy guidance. Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter agreed that the Department of State would prepare a policy paper on the Sudan for consideration by the NSC Planning Board and by the Council at its next meeting. (Memorandum of discussion by Deputy NSC Executive Secretary S. Everett Gleason, August 22; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

At the Council's next meeting on August 27, however, Acting Secretary Herter told the Council that the Department of State felt it could take necessary action within the terms of existing national security policy to meet current problems related to the Sudan, and that additional policy guidance was not immediately necessary. Gray asked whether the Planning Board should consider other policies related to the Sudan in connection with its current review of Near East policy,

and Herter replied in the affirmative. (Memorandum of discussion by Director of the NSC Secretariat Marion W. Boggs, August 28; *ibid.*) That NSC review culminated in the approval on November 4 of NSC 5820/1, "U.S. Policy Toward the Near East," which included a section on the Sudan. The text is scheduled for publication in volume XII.

Telegram 361 to Khartoum, September 18, instructed Ambassador Moose to discuss Prime Minister Khalil's request for assurances with him at the same time that he informed him of a newly-approved U.S. aid program. The telegram reads in part as follows:

"While stressing US conviction that most effective action against subversion can best be taken by country directly concerned, you should point out that, as PriMin knows, US role in UN in defense of independence of sovereign nations has been often and unmistakably demonstrated. US actions in Lebanon and Jordan are clear evidence US does not intend ignore appeals of legally constituted governments when independence and integrity of their nations are seriously threatened by acts of indirect aggression. This connection, PriMin's attention should be invited to President's speech before UNGA August 13 in which he said: 'I would be less than candid if I did not tell you that the US reserves, within the spirit of the Charter, the right to answer the legitimate appeal of any nation, particularly small nations.'

"You should make clear to PriMin and in subsequent conversations with SAR and such others as may be considered desirable, our continuing desire to assist Sudan in maintaining its independence and thus moving forward as constructive force for peace and stability in the area. You should point out, however, that practical US support, in terms of economic, military, internal security and other programs, in final analysis only justifiable if it in fact contributes to determination of Sudan Government to protect its independence. We know PriMin himself recognizes that, if Sudan Government does not take action in this direction along lines of which he himself best able judge, US support would then be meaningless and ineffective." (Department of State, Central Files, 745W.5/9-1858)

Ambassador Moose reported in telegram 414 from Khartoum, September 24, that when he met with Khalil on September 23, the Prime Minister expressed satisfaction with the projected aid program and told Moose that he considered the actions taken by the United States in Lebanon and Jordan in recent months "as assurance of U.S. support." He further stated that with such assurances and with Sudan's urgent financial needs met, he foresaw "no difficulty" in maintaining Sudan's independence and integrity. (*Ibid.*, 745W.5/9-2458)

## 42. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 76-58

November 12, 1958.

[Here follows a table of contents.]

### THE OUTLOOK FOR THE HORN OF AFRICA<sup>1</sup>

#### The Problem

To assess current trends in the Horn of Africa and to estimate their effect on the stability and orientation of the region over the next few years.

#### Conclusions

1. The Horn of Africa, one of the most backward areas in the world, is divided by ancient antagonisms, the most significant of which is that between the Coptic Christians who constitute the essential national component of the Ethiopian state and the Moslem populations which surround them. Among the latter the most important are the Somali tribes inhabiting the Ogaden province of Ethiopia as well as the three Somalilands (see Maps 2 and 3). (Paras. 8-10)

2. Ethiopia is ruled by the Christian Amharas (less than 15 percent of the population). The old Emperor is authoritarian, but is endeavoring to modernize the state through programs of gradual economic and political development in spite of opposition from powerful ecclesiastical and feudal elements. He has the internal situation re-

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Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) were interdepartmental reports drafted by officers from agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), approved by the IAC, and circulated to the President, the National Security Council, and other appropriate officers of cabinet level.

A note on the cover sheet reads as follows:

"Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

"Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 12 November 1958. Concurring were The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction."

<sup>1</sup> Ethiopia (including Eritrea), Somalia (formerly Italian Somaliland, now a UN trust territory under Italian trusteeship), British Somaliland, and French Somaliland. [Footnote in the source text.]

sonably well in hand. However, his death or incapacitation is likely to precipitate a struggle for power at the center, possibly complicated by secession movements in Eritrea and in outlying provinces of the empire. (Paras. 13-30)

3. Somalia, the former Italian Somaliland, is scheduled to become an independent state in 1960. The outlook for such a state is extremely unpromising in view of the political inexperience of its people and the inadequacies of its economy. The tenure of the Western-oriented leaders of the Somali Youth League, who now control the government, is rendered precarious by their dependence on Western economic aid, the possibilities for intertribal conflict, and the challenge of the irredentist program of the Greater Somalia League. (Paras. 32-36)

4. The French are likely to be able to retain effective control in French Somaliland at least for the next few years, but the British position in British Somaliland will be difficult to maintain after Somalia attains its independence. The eventual union of that area with Somalia is likely. Such a union would tend to undermine the Ethiopian position in the Ogaden. (Paras. 37-40)

5. The inherent conflict between Ethiopia and growing Pan-Somali nationalism is intensified by virulent Egyptian propaganda directed toward subverting the non-Amhara subjects of Ethiopia and toward inciting the Somalis against the colonial powers and Ethiopia. Ethiopia, alarmed by the threat of hostile Moslem encirclement and subversion, calls on the US for political and military as well as economic support. Ethiopia is also making serious efforts to develop support elsewhere in Africa. The Western Powers will find it increasingly difficult to render aid to either Ethiopia or Somalia without offending the other. (Paras. 41-44)

6. The Soviet role in the area is flexible and subtle. There is no politically significant Communist party activity in the area. However, at the governmental level the USSR, already aiding the Yemen, has recently approached both Ethiopia and Somalia with ostensibly disinterested offers of aid, in accord with its general cultivation of Afro-Asian states. Its immediate objective is the promotion of neutralism. (Para. 43)

7. The British are deeply concerned regarding the political trends and prospects in the Horn of Africa because of their interest in the preservation of a strategic position in the region, including Aden and Kenya. They apparently consider that this interest can best be served by a coordinated Western policy of supporting and encouraging favorably disposed elements in the Sudan and Somalia, leaving it to the United States to prevent, through aid and reassurance, any Ethiopian reaction either toward neutralism or toward aggression against Somalia. (Para. 45)

[Here follow the "Discussion" portion of the estimate (paragraphs 8-45), with sections headed "Introduction," "The Situation in Ethiopia," "The Situation in the Somalilands," and "The Relation of Outside Powers to the Situation," and three maps.]

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### 43. Special National Intelligence Estimate

SNIE 72.1-59

January 6, 1959.

#### OUTLOOK FOR THE SUDAN<sup>1</sup>

##### The Problem

To assess the situation in the Sudan resulting from the recent coup, and to estimate the outlook for Sudanese internal stability and foreign relations.

##### Conclusions

1. The group of senior military officers under General Ibrahim Abboud which took over the Sudanese Government on 17 November will probably provide more effective leadership than its predecessors. In general, the junta leans toward conservatism in domestic affairs. It desires to avoid alignment with any regional or great power bloc, and appears determined to preserve Sudanese independence. (Paras. 5-11)

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Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads as follows:

"Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

"Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 6 January 1959. Concurring were The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction."

<sup>1</sup> This estimate supersedes the political and foreign affairs sections of NIE 72.1-57, "Outlook for the Sudan," dated 6 August 1957. Much of the previous estimate's discussion of basic socio-political, religious and economic conditions in the Sudan remains valid and has not been repeated here. [Footnote in the source text.]

2. In the short run, at least, Abboud's regime can probably maintain its authority through its control of the army and through the support it now enjoys from conservative political and religious leaders, particularly those of the Umma Party and the powerful Ansar sect. In time, however, serious opposition may develop. The regime will find it difficult to satisfy both its conservative Umma/Ansar supporters and the pro-Nasser elements among the junior army officers and in the National Union Party. To the extent that it moves to placate one group, it is likely to antagonize the other. These tensions could lead to splits within the junta which might eventually result in the breakup of the Abboud government. (Paras. 15–21)

3. The new regime will probably make a sincere effort to improve relations with Nasser. In particular, both governments are more likely to undertake serious negotiations for an agreement on division of the Nile waters than Prime Minister Khalil and Nasser were prepared to do. At the same time, Abboud's government will be jealous of Sudanese interests and unlikely to let down its guard against the UAR. It will probably continue Khalil's policy of developing ties with other African states. It is likely to pursue a policy of benevolent neutrality in Arab affairs not directly affecting the Sudan and to avoid association with Ethiopia or Israel in an anti-UAR front. (Paras. 12, 23–25)

4. The regime will seek to continue good relations with the West, though it will almost certainly avoid the outspokenly pro-Western policies of Khalil. It will press for substantial and continuing US and UK aid, while remaining sensitive about any conditions attached to such assistance. At the same time, a gradual extension of Sudanese relations with the Bloc appears almost certain, particularly through Bloc barter deals for Sudanese cotton which the Sudan has trouble disposing of in the West. The government will probably also be more receptive than previous regimes to Soviet economic and technical aid offers. (Paras. 11, 26–29)

[Here follows the "Discussion" portion of the estimate (paragraphs 5–29), with sections headed "Present Situation and Character of the Regime," "Prospects for the Regime's Stability," and "Foreign Affairs."]

**44. National Security Council Report**

NSC 5903

February 4, 1959.

**NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL  
SECURITY COUNCIL ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE HORN  
OF AFRICA**

**REFERENCES**

A. NSC 5615/1<sup>1</sup>

B. NIE 76-58<sup>2</sup>

C. OCB Report, July 9, 1958, on NSC 5615/1<sup>3</sup>

The enclosed draft statement of policy on the subject, prepared by the NSC Planning Board in response to the recommendation in paragraph 3 of the reference Operations Coordinating Board Report, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Monday, February 26, 1959.<sup>4</sup>

Two maps of the area, prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, are also enclosed for information. A Financial Appendix will be circulated subsequently for the information of the Council.<sup>5</sup>

The enclosed statement of policy, if adopted, is intended to supersede NSC 5615/1, "U.S. Policy Toward Ethiopia".

It is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosed statement of policy, it be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve it; direct its implementation by all appropriate Executive Departments and Agencies of the U.S. Government; and designate the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.<sup>6</sup>

**James S. Lay, Jr.**<sup>7</sup>

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Source: Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1. Secret.

<sup>1</sup> "United States Policy Toward Ethiopia," approved November 19, 1956; for text, see *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, vol. xxiii, p. 334.

<sup>2</sup> Document 42.

<sup>3</sup> Entitled "Report on Ethiopia (NSC 5615/1)." (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430)

<sup>4</sup> See Document 45.

<sup>5</sup> The maps and the appendix are attached but not printed.

<sup>6</sup> A memorandum from Lay to the National Security Council, March 2, 1959, stated that the President had that day approved NSC 5903. (Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1)

<sup>7</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

## Enclosure

### THE HORN OF AFRICA <sup>8</sup>

#### General Considerations

[Here follow sections headed "Importance of the Area," "Threats to Peace and Stability in the Area," "Ethiopia," "Somalia," "British Somaliland," and "French Somaliland."]

#### Objectives

23. Denial of the Horn of Africa to Soviet domination and minimization of Soviet influence.

24. So far as consistent with the preceding paragraph, denial of the Horn of Africa to UAR domination and minimization of UAR influence.

25. Unhampered use of important Western sea and air communications in the general area of the Horn of Africa.

26. Access by the United States to such military facilities in the area as it may require.

#### Policy Guidance

27. Cooperate with friendly nations in (a) encouraging the resolution of conflicts and tensions in the area, (b) seeking to deny the area to Soviet domination and to minimize Soviet influence, and (c) so far as consistent with (b) seeking to deny the area to UAR domination and to minimize UAR influence.

28. Strengthen U.S. information and cultural exchange programs in the Horn of Africa, and encourage other friendly Free World nations to take similar action.

29. To strengthen Ethiopia's orientation toward the West, continue to provide Ethiopia with:

a. Technical assistance, with emphasis on education and training programs.

b. Limited economic assistance.

c. Minimum military equipment and training of a kind suitable for maintaining internal security and offering resistance to local aggression, making every effort to avoid a military build-up which would strain the Ethiopian economy, lead to commitments for indefinite U.S. support, or to increased tension within the area.

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<sup>8</sup> Ethiopia (including Eritrea), Somalia (formerly Italian Somaliland, now a UN trust territory under Italian trusteeship), British Somaliland, and French Somaliland. [Footnote in the source text.]



30. Consult with Ethiopia on Middle East and African matters of concern to it. Encourage Ethiopia to maintain an interest in Pan-African affairs and to exercise a moderating influence in such affairs.

31. a. Encourage the resolution of differences existing between Ethiopia and the Somalilands, including border disputes.

b. When feasible, encourage cooperation between Ethiopia and the Somalilands in the development of common economic resources.

c. As appropriate, encourage Ethiopia to accept a merger of British Somaliland and Somalia and to act in such a way as to enhance the possibility of closer Ethiopian-Somali political arrangements.

32. Encourage Italy to continue to exercise a major role in the maintenance of Somalia's stability and Free World orientation. Encourage Italy, the UK, and other friendly nations to provide economic and technical aid, including budgetary and police assistance, to assist Somali leaders favorable to the West to remain in power and to maintain stability in areas under their control. Be prepared to supplement these efforts by providing limited U.S. economic and technical assistance. Encourage the UN to provide technical assistance and to exercise a stabilizing influence on Somalia's internal situation and on its relations with other countries.

33. Study alternative consolidations of countries and territories of the Horn of Africa to determine which would best serve U.S. interest. In the meantime:

a. Encourage Somali leaders to be moderate in advancing the concept of a Greater Somaliland and, to the extent feasible, to consider as an ultimate end closer relationships with Ethiopia.

b. Be prepared to accept moves on the part of French Somaliland to join such a Greater Somaliland, provided this is acceptable to the peoples concerned and is not inconsistent with U.S. security interests.

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**45. Memorandum of Discussion at the 397th Meeting of the National Security Council**

February 26, 1959.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1-3.]

4. *U.S. Policy Toward the Horn of Africa* (NSC 5903; NSC 5615/1; OCB Report, July 9, 1958, on NSC 5615/1; NIE 76–58;<sup>1</sup> Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 18, 1959<sup>2</sup>)

(Copies of the briefing note which Mr. Gray used in explaining NSC 5903 to the Council are filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and are also attached to this Memorandum).<sup>3</sup>

At the conclusion of his briefing Mr. Gray called on Secretary Herter.

Secretary Herter said that he had only one comment to make with respect to U.S. policy toward the Horn of Africa. This was to point out that we are now finding ourselves in real trouble with the Lion of Judah. On the proposition offered by the British of joining British Somaliland with Somalia when the latter area became an independent state in December 1960,<sup>4</sup> the U.S. had supported the U.K. proposal. Haile Selassie had disliked both the British proposition and our support of it and we were now engaged in trying to cool him off and to rid him of the notion that the U.S. had ganged up against him with the former colonial powers, Britain and France.<sup>5</sup>

The President said that if the French still had the strength to hold French Somaliland with the important port of Djibouti, he was inclined to doubt if it was wise to ask them now to give up French Somaliland. That area could be very advantageous to us all from a geo-political point of view as a means of blocking Soviet access.

Agreeing with the President, Secretary Herter said that actually the U.S. had a greater interest in the Horn of Africa from a geo-political point of view than had been indicated in the paper. In response to this statement Mr. Gray called the attention of the Council to the many claims on our resources which came from competing areas throughout the world. The President said he thought Mr. Gray's point was correct and that he was not quarreling with the point of view

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<sup>1</sup> See Document 44 and footnotes 2, 3, and 4 thereto.

<sup>2</sup> This memorandum transmitted a memorandum of February 16 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense stating that they found NSC 5903 acceptable from a military point of view. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5903 Series)

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to a statement made by British Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd in Hargeisa on February 9 indicating British plans for increased self-government in British Somaliland and acceptance of eventual union between the Italian Trust Territory of Somalia and British Somaliland when the two areas became self-governing.

<sup>5</sup> A "Note on Ethiopian-Somali Problem," drafted by Deputy Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs John A. Bovey, Jr., on February 25, summarized this matter. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5903 Series) Documentation concerning this matter is *ibid.*, Central File 645U.75. The French opposed both the Lennox-Boyd statement and the abortive U.S. proposal, although neither concerned French Somaliland.

expressed in NSC 5903 by the NSC Planning Board. He would, however, hate to see the Red Sea completely bottled up at both ends by people who might not necessarily be or remain our friends. Secretary Anderson then stated that he felt that the Council should face up squarely to a significant national security issue which was suggested by the present paper. In Secretary Anderson's view we were heading rapidly into a situation where a lot of little, newly independent countries were coming into being and would inevitably turn to the United States for support. All of these little countries wanted to act like great big countries. This would mean increased demands on the resources of the U.S. for assistance. He greatly feared that sooner or later the bulk of financial support for Somaliland and similar newly developing countries would be expected to come from the U.S. He doubted very much, in turn, whether we could persist much longer in letting the entire world believe that we can and will support all these newly independent countries. This meant to Secretary Anderson that as the U.S. became more reluctant to provide the desired assistance, these newly independent countries would turn to the United Nations instead. On the other hand, if the United States should get into development programs for such countries, this would mean that of course the Soviets would likewise become involved. The Soviets, of course, could afford to undertake kinds of trade and contributions in their currency that the U.S. could not afford to make in dollars. Furthermore, Soviet aid programs through the United Nations or otherwise would result in an infiltration of Soviet agents in the guise of technicians and engineers whose ultimate objectives would be to subvert the government of the countries they were professing to aid. This being the case, Secretary Anderson expressed the opinion that the best recourse for the U.S. was to be found within the framework of the World Bank. Accordingly we may have to go further than we have thus far in increasing the resources of the World Bank so that the Bank would constitute a source to which these small countries could turn in order to foster their desired economic growth. The World Bank was a stable institution and the Russians were not in it. Secretary Anderson believed this to be a very fundamental point.

The President said that he had never been in the area of the Somalilands and inquired what kind of an area it was. Did Somalia consist of wild jungle? Mr. Allen Dulles said that most of the Somaliland area was dry and desert. Some of it was pretty high in elevation. The President then inquired whether the Somalia people were primitive and aborigines. Mr. Dulles replied that a great many of them certainly fell in that category. Mr. Stans pointed out that in the course of his own travels he had encountered Somali natives in Kenya who

were probably much the same as their brethren in the actual Somali areas. They were certainly primitive. On the other hand, the Somali women were said to be the most beautiful in Africa.

The President, citing his experience with primitive peoples in the Philippines, expressed some wonder as to how the natives of Somalia could expect to run an independent nation and why they were so possessed as to try to do so. Mr. Allen Dulles confirmed the President's doubt as to the capability of the Somalis to organize and administer a modern civilized state.

Mr. George Allen called attention to the support which President Nasser was giving to those Somalis who were Moslem as opposed to the Ethiopians who were in many cases Christian. In turn Secretary Anderson called attention to the great importance of the port of Djibouti which he described as a place from which this whole area could be controlled. He added that he would very much like to see U.S. and other private capital go into the Somalilands. This might provide a way out of the dilemma we were encountering with respect to allocating our assistance resources. Apropos of a comment by Admiral Burke that at the present time the U.S. had only three or four destroyers based near the general area, the President said he was certainly getting very weary of watching the U.S. build bases which we were unable to abandon for fear the Russians would presently take them over.

Admiral Burke expressed considerable anxiety over the influence exerted in the Somalilands by Egyptian teachers and others who exerted influences in the area inimical to the interests of the U.S. Admiral Burke thought that a sustained effort should be made to bring to the U.S. young Somali natives who had displayed a potentiality for leadership in the area. He stated that such young leaders should be trained very carefully and at some length in the U.S. and he said that this was perhaps the most important single thing that the U.S. could do to advance its interests in the Horn of Africa area.

Secretary Herter commented that the suggestion made by Admiral Burke would apply equally well to other sections of the African Continent. The President likewise expressed sympathy with the point of view advanced by Admiral Burke.

With respect to the problem of nations about to become independent, Mr. Gray pointed out that the Planning Board would begin next week to discuss a paper on this subject.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Between March and May, the Planning Board considered a series of draft discussion papers on the subject "New Independent Countries and U.S. Policy," the last of which was dated May 6, 1959, but none was sent to the National Security Council. The draft papers and records of the relevant Planning Board discussions are *ibid.*, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>7</sup>

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5903; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of February 18, 1959.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5903.

*Note:* NSC 5903 approved by the President for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

**S. Everett Gleason**

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<sup>7</sup> Paragraphs a and b and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2053, approved by the President on March 2. (*Ibid.*, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

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**46. Editorial Note**

At the 414th meeting of the National Security Council on July 23, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed developments in Ethiopia during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by S. Everett Gleason, July 23, reads as follows:

"In the course of his visit to Moscow, the Emperor of Ethiopia has signed an agreement for a loan of 100 million rubles. The loan was of the usual kind; that is, on a barter basis with low interest rates. It is also said that the Czechs are extending a line of credit to Haile Selassie of twenty million dollars. To these agreements there are rumors of secret protocols of whose content we know nothing. These moves may, however, be the first major attempt of the Communist Bloc to penetrate into the deeper parts of Africa. This could be extremely significant. It was also possible that the Ethiopian Emperor is, in a quiet way, attempting to blackmail the U.S. Some opposition to his agreements has already made itself apparent in Addis Ababa but the opposition groups, who have approached us with the idea of putting the Crown Prince on the throne, have very little popular backing. Mr. Dulles warned that this was a situation which must be followed very carefully by the U.S. because of its obvious implications for Africa as a whole. One unconfirmed report has it that Haile Selassie has ordered the abrogation of the agreement which established the U.S. Base at Asmara. This, if true, could be extremely serious.

"Secretary Gates underlined the great importance to the Navy and to other U.S. Services of the Asmara Base. Admiral Burke added that the Asmara Base would assume even greater importance if we were to lose our bases in Morocco." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

The agreement under reference was signed at Washington on May 22, 1953; for text, see 5 UST 749.

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#### 47. Preliminary Notes of a Meeting of the Operations Coordinating Board

January 20, 1960.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

##### 1. *Operations Plan for the Horn of Africa*<sup>1</sup> (Secret)

Mr. John Root, Deputy Director, and Mr. John Beard of the Office of Northern African Affairs, were present for the OCB consideration of this paper. Mr. Root opened the discussion with a brief résumé of the current situation in Ethiopia with particular emphasis on anticipated Soviet moves as a result of the acceptance by Ethiopia of a four hundred million ruble loan. Mr. Root said the US assistance program to Ethiopia appeared to be basically well conceived and executed and that the US did not plan to outbid the Soviets but that we would move to block Soviet dominance over key sectors in Ethiopia. The Chairman, Mr. Gordon Gray (White House) alluded to paragraph 45e of the Basic National Security Policy<sup>2</sup> (general avoidance of moves to counter every Sino-Soviet bloc offensive action) and said the US plan for Ethiopia appeared to be the first application of that policy.

Mr. Allen (USIA) spoke at some length of his belief that it may be in the interest of the US to attempt to direct Soviet resources into foreign aid projects since once the Soviets began they would be forced to continue foreign aid or be confronted with the problems with which

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Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, OCB Preliminary Notes. Secret.

<sup>1</sup> Reference is to a draft OCB document, January 12, prepared by an interagency working group and approved by the Board Assistants as part of the Board's function of coordinating and overseeing the implementation of NSC policy papers. The final document, "Operations Plan for Horn of Africa," is dated January 27, 1960. (*Ibid.*, Horn of Africa)

<sup>2</sup> NSC 5906/1, "Basic National Security Policy," approved August 5, 1959, is scheduled for publication in volume III.

we are familiar. Mr. Allen was concerned at the public relations effect of the US posture opposing Soviet assistance to underdeveloped countries. Mr. Merchant commented that US countermoves to Soviet assistance to underdeveloped countries were premised on our interest in preventing the Soviets from (1) infiltrating key sectors and (2) bringing about undue dependency by, influencing the policies of and eventually taking over the recipient countries. Mr. Dulles (CIA) said it would be preferable for the underdeveloped nations to "take the apple but not the snake". Mr. Scribner (Treasury) opined that it was impossible for the US to counter the Soviets everywhere, and he counseled that we not undertake to resist Soviet efforts across the board. He said if the Ethiopians wished to go along with Soviet Union's aid proposals in spite of all our assistance, then there was nothing more we could do. Mr. Allen said that while he welcomed Treasury support he was not advocating that the US wash its hands and get out in those instances where underdeveloped nations accepted Soviet aid.

There followed a discussion of the specific problem in Ethiopia of the recently-made Soviet offer to furnish Ethiopia with its petroleum requirements. Mr. Scribner said that "pouring US money in an attempt at preemption was not the solution." In closing the discussion, Mr. Merchant said he wished to make two comments. One was that the State Department had the duty to protect US private as well as public interests abroad; and, two, that expenditures by the US to meet critical problems had by no means all been in vain and that frequently they had resulted in substantial and impressive successes for US interests. Mr. Scribner asked that the Board continue to follow the problem closely. The Plan was approved for implementation by the appropriate agencies.

Action: AF

Copies: AFN, U/CEA, E, P, IO, EE, CU

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters]

48. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy**

April 15, 1960, 8:18 p.m.

3120. Following based on uncleared memo conversation:<sup>1</sup>

During conversation April 14 with Under Secretary, Italian Foreign Minister Segni raised problem of aid to Somalia. Segni stressed that distinction must be drawn between economic and political factors re Somalia aid. While undoubtedly necessary for West, including Italy, assist Somalia in post-independence period<sup>2</sup> factor of overriding importance was need to keep Ethiopia, "one of decisive areas of Africa" firmly linked with West. Actions which Emperor had taken vis-à-vis USSR disturbing and although Italy did not believe Ethiopia would orient itself toward Soviets, essential that Italy and US have consistent political line toward Ethiopia. Segni recalled that Italy's relations with Ethiopia, which on whole very good, had nonetheless been bothered by problems involving Somalia. Italy would try impede Greater Somalia, "for which no natural reason exists."

Re specific measures aid to Somalia, Segni said in recent conversation Rome with member Somalia government exorbitant requests had been made. Italy presently not prepared assist Somalia beyond 2 million dollars banana subsidy, and 2 million dollars other aid. Italy would not agree cover entire budget deficit since Somalia would never make efforts become self-supporting.

Under Secretary stated US interested in Somalia and believed desirable meet with Italian experts to reach joint conclusion on how much and what kind aid Somalia needed. Once such conclusion reached, then decision could be made re division between participating countries. Dillon stressed US could not significantly increase its aid to newly independent African countries in view heavy demands on

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 777.5-MSP/4-1560. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Italian-Australian Affairs Wells Stabler, cleared by Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs William J. Porter, and approved by Director of the Office of Western European Affairs Robert H. McBride. Repeated to Addis Ababa and Mogadiscio.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 396.1-WA/4-1460)

<sup>2</sup> Italy and Somalia had agreed to advance the date of Somalia's independence to July 1, 1960. On December 5, 1959, the U.N. General Assembly approved the conclusion of the U.N. Trusteeship on that date in Resolution 1418 (XIV), cosponsored by the United States; for text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959*, pp. 1139-1141.



our resources and European countries able to help should continue aid to their former territories on same scale as before. In our view proportion Italian to US aid to Somalia should be two to one.

Re Ethiopia Dillon said US shared view re its importance and we would be willing discuss Ethiopian questions, both political and economic, with Italy at same time we discussed Somalia. Re aid to Somalia and Ethiopia Dillon said division of effort unimportant as long as each did fair share. Dillon agreed that West could not indefinitely underwrite Somalia budget deficit. Important to assist in development projects so that Somalia could become self-supporting.

Segni expressed full agreement to hold early meetings at expert level to consider Somalia and Ethiopian questions and also agreed to Dillon's caveat that talks should be conducted without publicity to avoid difficulties with Ethiopia.

**Herter**

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## 49. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 76-60

June 21, 1960.

### PROBABLE TRENDS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

#### The Problem

To assess the outlook in Ethiopia, Somalia, and British and French Somaliland over the next few years, with particular reference to the Soviet-Ethiopian aid agreement and the "Greater Somalia" problem.

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Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads as follows:

"Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

"Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 21 June 1960. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction."

### Conclusions

1. Over the next few years the Horn of Africa is likely to be an area of considerable tension and international maneuvering, with Bloc and UAR influences competing with those of the various interested Western powers, including the US. (Para. 12)

2. The emergence on 1 July 1960 of an independent Somalia, comprising both the present UN trust territory and British Somaliland, will add to the international scene an extremely weak and impoverished country. The outlook for political stability is unfavorable. Moreover, Somalia's extreme poverty will necessitate continuing external subsidies of the order of at least \$10–14 million a year for the foreseeable future. Although the Somalis probably continue to look to Western and UAR sources for their basic requirements, they will probably be receptive to Bloc offers as well. (Paras. 30–35)

3. We see no present threat to the Emperor's authority in the backward feudal state of Ethiopia. However, the death or incapacitation of the 68-year-old monarch would probably lead to a struggle for power, since the Crown Prince commands little respect. Any struggle for power might encourage secessionist movements in Eritrea, the Ogaden, or other outlying provinces. (Paras. 13–15)

4. The Emperor's acceptance of substantial development credits from the USSR and Czechoslovakia marks a significant shift toward neutralism. We do not believe that acceptance of such aid will result in early Bloc domination of Ethiopia, but it is likely to result in increased Bloc influence. (Paras. 17–22)

5. The creation of an independent and enlarged Somalia will almost certainly exacerbate tensions between Ethiopia and the Somali nationalists over the status of the roughly 350,000 Somali tribesmen now ruled by Ethiopia and the several hundred thousand others who regularly seek water and forage in Ethiopia in the course of their seasonal migrations. There are likely to be recurrent border incidents and appeals by both sides for diplomatic support from outside powers. The situation would become particularly acute in the likely event that the Ethiopians carry out their threat to deny access to wells and grazing areas in their territory. They might also take limited military action into the territory of the new Somali state. (Paras. 23–29)

6. The developing situation in the Horn of Africa will provide the Sino-Soviet Bloc with opportunities for expanding its presence and developing its influence in the area at the expense of the West. However, at least over the next few years it is unlikely that the Bloc will achieve a dominant position. (Paras. 36–37)

7. The UAR will probably retain a special position in Somalia, but it is unlikely to achieve a dominant position there. (Para. 39)

8. Although various other powers will remain active in the area, the US will remain the principal non-Bloc target of Ethiopian demands for support and will probably come under similar pressure from Somalia. In this situation, it will be confronted with the constant risk of offending one or both of the interested parties. In any case, the US communications base in Eritrea is increasingly likely to become an important pawn. (Paras. 38-41)

[Here follow the "Discussion" portion of the estimate (paragraphs 9-41), with sections headed "Introduction," "The Outlook for Ethiopia," "The 'Greater Somalia' Problem," "Somalia: Stability and Orientation," "The Role of Other Interested Powers," and "Implications for the U.S.;" three annexes, titled "Soviet and Czech Aid to Ethiopia," "Military and Security Forces," and "Tribal and Political Alignments in Somalia and British Somaliland;" and three maps.]

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**50. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to Secretary of State Herter**

August 10, 1960.

SUBJECT

Horn of Africa: NSC Consideration of OCB Report dated July 13, 1960<sup>1</sup>

The OCB Report dated July 13, 1960 on U.S. Policy Toward the Horn of Africa (NSC 5903) recommends that NSC 5903 (approved by the President March 2, 1959)<sup>2</sup> be reviewed at an appropriate time in the near future. This review is deemed necessary for two main reasons: (1) developments consequent to Ethiopia's acceptance in 1959 of a \$100 million Soviet credit, and (2) the changing situation in the Horn resulting from the independence on July 1, 1960 of the Somali Republic (a union of the former British Somaliland Protectorate and the former Italian Trust Territory of Somalia).<sup>3</sup> A new government has just been formed in the Somali Republic, but numerous constitutional details remain to be worked out. The aggressiveness with which the Somalis will press their expansionist aims (involving French Somaliland, part of Kenya and a large part of Ethiopia) is not yet clear.

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Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5903 Series. Secret. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Northeast Africa Affairs Arthur B. Allen.

<sup>1</sup> Entitled "Report on the Horn of Africa (NSC 5903)." (*Ibid.*, Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5903)

<sup>2</sup> Document 44.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 62.

We are about to agree to increased military assistance to Ethiopia in an effort to improve Ethiopian attitudes, limit Soviet penetration and obtain agreement to additional military facilities. With a view to providing as great an impact as possible, Ambassador Richards' instructions (Tab A)<sup>4</sup> also include authority to reveal economic aid already programmed for Ethiopia. Estimates of cost are contained in Mr. Penfield's memorandum to Under Secretary Dillon (Tab B) of July 27, 1960.<sup>5</sup> On July 19, the President was given a brief report on the proposed instructions to Ambassador Richards (Tab C).<sup>6</sup>

The Ambassador's presentation of our response to Ethiopian requests is expected to be made shortly after his arrival on August 10. While we hope for improvement in our position in Ethiopia as a result of the Ambassador's presentation, it is unlikely that Ethiopian reaction can be accurately assessed before early September and it would therefore seem reasonable to commence the policy review in early October. By this time also the character and policies of the new Somali Republic should be discernible.

*Recommendation:*

That you outline to the NSC the status of our proposed additional aid to Ethiopia and recommend that the policy review be scheduled to begin in October with a view to NSC consideration in November or December 1960.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Not printed. Airgram G-1 to Addis Ababa, July 28, authorized Ambassador-designate Arthur L. Richards to inform the Emperor in an early audience of the U.S. responses to his requests.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

<sup>6</sup> Tab C, a brief, unsigned memorandum, dated July 19, reads in part as follows: The President observed that it was in the US interest to do what we could promptly to meet within reason the Emperor's wishes, especially in view of the less stable situation in most of the rest of Africa. The importance of maintaining an atmosphere in Ethiopia which would assure continued unimpaired use of the key facilities at Kagnew was also remarked upon.

<sup>7</sup> The National Security Council considered the OCB at its August 12 meeting. The brief discussion focused on Ethiopia's interest in engaging an American expert to assist in the operation of its banking system. (Memorandum of discussion by NSC staff member Charles A. Haskins, August 16; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) In NSC Action No. 2279, the Council noted that the NSC Planning Board would undertake a review of NSC 5903 at an early date. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95), Records of Action by the National Security Council)

## 51. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 72.1-60

August 30, 1960.

### THE OUTLOOK FOR THE SUDAN

#### The Problem

To estimate the outlook for the Sudan over the next few years.

#### Conclusions

1. The present Sudanese regime—or something very like it—will probably remain in power for the next few years. However, it will continue to be faced with: (a) pressure from the proscribed political parties for a return to civilian government; (b) an internal Communist potential which is likely to grow as Soviet and Chinese Communist activities in the country expand; (c) possible unrest in the South; and most importantly, (d) dissension and plotting within the military services on which its power rests. At present there is less external meddling in Sudanese politics than two years ago. We believe this situation is likely to obtain for the next few years. It is possible, however, that within the period of this estimate, the UAR, in particular, might make a more active effort to influence internal events. (Paras. 5-14)

2. In the economic field, we believe that the Sudan's present modest prosperity will continue. However, no comprehensive plan for economic development has yet been evolved and the country's relative prosperity will remain vulnerable to all dangers that face a one-crop economy. (Paras. 15-18)

3. The Sudanese Government's chief foreign policy concerns are to maintain its independence, to sell its cotton, and to get funds for economic development. Except where its own particular interests are at stake, it will tend to follow the lead of the UAR and the Arab League on foreign issues. The UK probably has more influence in the

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Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads as follows:

"Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

"Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 30 August 1960. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction."

Sudan than any other Western country. Sudanese relations with the US are likely to remain friendly, though not intimate. Thus far the Sudan has taken no assistance from the Bloc, but relations are likely to expand gradually. Yugoslav influence is likely to grow. The Sudan will seek above all to avoid becoming an active battleground between East and West. (Paras. 19, 21-26)

[Here follows the "Discussion" portion of the estimate (paragraphs 4-26, with sections headed "The Political Situation and Outlook," "Economic Prospects," and "Foreign Affairs."]

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**52. Memorandum From the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Calhoun) to the President's Staff Secretary (Goodpaster)**

September 2, 1960.

SUBJECT

Ethiopian Reaction to U.S. Aid Offers

On May 23 I sent you a memorandum concerning the request of the Emperor of Ethiopia for additional military assistance and our plans for dealing with it.<sup>1</sup> On May 25 we were informed of the President's interest and desire to be kept informed.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, there is below a further status report.

Following a visit of senior Department of Defense officials to Addis Ababa in June to review the Ethiopian request with the Emperor,<sup>3</sup> instructions were prepared for the new Ambassador, Arthur L. Richards, which authorized him to transmit our proposals for meeting the Emperor's request, to reveal our plans for economic assistance in Fiscal Year 1961 and to reaffirm our opposition to threats to Ethiopian territorial integrity. The cost of the additional military assistance was estimated at \$5 million in Fiscal Year 1961. The Ambassador was also instructed to seek agreement in principle to the acquisition of approxi-

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Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Ethiopia. Secret. A handwritten note in the margin reads as follows: "Reported to Pres 12 Sep 1960. JSDE".

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup> In a memorandum of that date from John Eisenhower to Calhoun. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Robert H. Knight met with the Emperor on June 14 and 16. He reported the conversations in telegram 1143 from Addis Ababa, June 15, and telegram 3685 from Cairo, June 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 775.5/6-1560 and 775.5/6-1860, respectively)

mately 1500 acres to augment our key communications facilities in Eritrea. The Ambassador-designate gave the President a brief status report on the above proposals on July 19.

Both the British and French were informed of our plans for responding to the Emperor's request for additional assistance, and on August 29 Ambassador Richards presented our proposals to the Emperor.<sup>4</sup> The Emperor's reaction was quite favorable. The Ethiopian Government issued on August 29 a communiqué (see enclosures)<sup>5</sup> which should help improve the position of the United States in Ethiopia and the Emperor has already taken steps toward granting the additional facilities desired by the Department of Defense.

We expect an unfavorable reaction from the Somali Republic, which views our military aid to Ethiopia as endangering Somali security. We have already taken steps to try to reassure the Somali Government.

**Emory C. Swank<sup>6</sup>**

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<sup>4</sup> Richards reported the conversation in telegram 181 from Addis Ababa, August 29. (*Ibid.*, 775.5-MSP/8-2960)

<sup>5</sup> The enclosures consisted of copies of telegrams 182 and 183 from Addis Ababa, August 29 and 30. (*Ibid.*, 775.5-MSP/8-2960 and 775.5-MSP/8-3060)

<sup>6</sup> Signed for Calhoun by Deputy Director Emory C. Swank.

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### 53. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

New York, September 27, 1960, 11:30 a.m.<sup>1</sup>

#### OTHERS PRESENT

Deputy Prime Minister Aklilou  
Ambassador Mikael Imru  
Secretary Herter  
Assistant Secretary Satterthwaite  
Mr. E.S. Glenn (State Dept.)  
Colonel Eisenhower

The President opened by congratulating Deputy Prime Minister Aklilou on the conduct of Ethiopian troops in the Congo. He expressed his appreciation for the Ethiopian gesture of sending these troops. Mr.

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Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret.

<sup>1</sup> The meeting took place at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel. The President was in New York attending the General Assembly. Another memorandum of the conversation by Satterthwaite is in Department of State, Central Files, 320/9-2760.

Aklilou thanked the President and remarked that sending troops in defense of collective security is a long-standing policy of Ethiopia. He pointed out the action of Ethiopian troops in Korea, as well as the Congo. He promised to transmit the President's good wishes, and gave those of Emperor Haile Selassie.

The President said he had tried to make a conciliatory speech to open the UN General Assembly<sup>2</sup> in the hope that the cold war might be kept out of Africa. He said he thinks the consortium of African nations, which would permit a lightening of the arms burden on all its member nations and develop a sense of solidarity among those nations, would be extremely beneficial, particularly in preventing domination by big powers. Mr. Aklilou said his government had appreciated the President's speech in the General Assembly very much. Important business faces this General Assembly. The speech had been cast at a high level, as befits that body. Ethiopia regrets others have not done the same.

[Here follows discussion of an unrelated matter.]

Mr. Aklilou then said he has two or three points of bilateral business which he would like to report and hopes, of course, that we always work together. These are:

(1) He wished to thank the President for the military and economic help which we have given to Ethiopia and also for our provision of emergency grain.

(2) Negotiations for a university to be located in Addis Ababa are going slowly. The estimated cost of the university would be some \$10 million. It would be desirable to speed up these negotiations since they have been under way since 1954.

(3) Ethiopia and the U.S. have agreed in principle on the provision of a Fourth Infantry Division for that country. Implementation, however, is proceeding slowly.

(4) Haile Selassie desires to retire some 8000 soldiers in the Ethiopian army due to age and ill health. He needs funds to establish these people on farms and cooperatives. The cost here would be some 15 million Ethiopian dollars. He hopes this can be provided under the heading of military support in order to put these people on the farm. It is most difficult for Ethiopia to establish a standard military retirement.

The President said that this last point regarding military retirement is a new one to him. He acknowledged knowing of the Fourth Infantry Division, recognizing that some sectors may need additional protection. He reminded Mr. Aklilou of our requirements that any MAP-supported forces be used for nonaggressive purposes. Mr. Aklilou agreed quickly.

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<sup>2</sup> For text of the President's address to the General Assembly on September 22, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 60-70.



The President expressed great interest in the idea of the university. He feels strongly regarding the need for Africa to develop its own leaders at home. Human understanding is our greatest hope. He reiterated that the idea of a university intrigued him. The President said he is not too much on building of armaments. He feels the U.S. itself has too many although he cannot prove this thesis to his soldiers. The retirement project will pose many difficult problems. The President promised, however, that we will study this proposal.

Mr. Aklilou thanked the President for his sympathetic audience. After further amenities, the meeting adjourned.

**John S. D. Eisenhower**

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**54. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Somali Republic**

October 12, 1960, 8:35 p.m.

174. Following based on uncleared memorandum of conversation:<sup>1</sup>

Italian Foreign Minister Segni and Director General Political Affairs Straneo called on Merchant October 12. Straneo stated GOI feels it very important continuing effort be made keep Somali Republic economically and politically stable. Italy willing help but surprised at recent GSR claim for 37 million Somalos to cover pre-independence deficit. GSR also asking for considerable additional aid.

Straneo referred to US difficulty in connection budget support and asked whether, if UK and Italy shared budget deficit, US would be willing divide total aid burden equally with UK and Italy, each providing one-third.

Merchant referred to importance getting facts from three Ambassadors in Mogadiscio and then holding tri-partite discussions on aid. Mentioning Guinea as example decisive nature transition period immediately after independence, he said USG extremely disturbed by reports apparent financial condition GSR—not only bankrupt but with inheritance unpaid bills—and said we had received impression Italian

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 777.5-MSP/10-1260. Confidential. Drafted by Allen, cleared by Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs Edward T. Long and in draft by Samuel W. Lewis of the Office of Western European Affairs, and approved by Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs William Witman, II. Repeated to Rome and London.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

aid to GSR being held up pending Somali signature bilateral agreements. Agreed we would talk further with UK and Italy after facts clearer.

Straneo stated definitely Italian aid continuing.

Merchant also asked status UK-Italian plans help Somali Army.

Straneo said UK and Italy agreed on sending military mission but provided no details on status matter with GSR. Goal is to satisfy Somalis but provide only defensive arms. Suggested tripartite talks include military aid as well as economic aid. Merchant made no comment.

Pointing out indirect aid also important, Segni stated banana monopoly had recently increased Somali quota.

Straneo asked that GOI be informed nature aid request by Abdullahi Issa (who visiting Department October 13)<sup>2</sup> and nature US response. Merchant agreed.

**Dillon**

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<sup>2</sup> In a meeting with Acting Secretary Dillon on October 13, Somali Foreign Minister Issa stressed the urgency of the Somali need for foreign assistance. Dillon told him that U.S. assistance for development projects was more feasible than for budget support and suggested that the U.S., British, and Italian Ambassadors in Magadiscio might consult with Somali officials, in order to avoid wasteful duplication of effort. (Memorandum of conversation by Allen; *ibid.*, 777.5-MSP/10-1360) A memorandum of a conversation between Issa and Secretary Herter in New York on October 6 is *ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

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## 55. National Security Council Report

NSC 6028

December 30, 1960.

### NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE HORN OF AFRICA

#### REFERENCES

A. NSC 5903

B. OCB report on NSC 5903, dated July 13, 1960<sup>1</sup>

C. NSC Actions Nos. 2215-c and 2279<sup>2</sup>

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Source: Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1. Secret.

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 1, Document 50.

<sup>2</sup> NSC Action No. 2215-c of April 7, provided that the Planning Board should submit for Memorandum Action by the Council revisions in NSC policy papers required for the purpose of bringing them up to date. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscella-

*Continued*

D. NIE 76-20<sup>3</sup>

E. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 30, 1960<sup>4</sup>

The enclosed draft statement of policy on the subject, prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to the recommendation of the Operation Coordination Board that NSC 5903 should be brought up to date (Reference B), is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council.

A revised Financial Appendix will be circulated at a later date.

If adopted and approved, the enclosed statement of policy is intended to supersede NSC 5903.

It is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosed statement of policy, it be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve it; direct its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and designate the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.<sup>5</sup>

James S. Lay, Jr.<sup>6</sup>

## Enclosure

### DRAFT

## STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY ON THE HORN OF AFRICA<sup>7</sup>

### General Considerations

#### *Importance of the Area*

1. An area of geographical and cultural transition between Africa south of the Sahara and the Near East, the Horn of Africa, under friendly control, contributes to the security of Western sea and air communications and offers a strategic position for the defense of Western interests in the Red Sea and nearby African areas. The United

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neous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) Regarding Action No. 2279, see footnote 7, Document 50.

<sup>3</sup> Document 49.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the covering memorandum that transmitted NSC 6028 to the Council and requested that members indicate their approval or disapproval by January 16, 1961.

<sup>5</sup> A memorandum of January 18, 1961, from Lay to the NSC stated that the members had adopted the draft statement of policy in NSC 6028 by Memorandum Action and the President had that day approved it. (Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1)

<sup>6</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

<sup>7</sup> Ethiopia (including Eritrea), the Somali Republic and French Somaliland. [Footnote in the source text.]

States has a military interest in the Horn of Africa, particularly in view of the presence of critically required U.S. communications facilities in Ethiopia which we are seeking to expand.<sup>8</sup>

### *Threats to Peace and Stability in the Area*

2. Internally, the Horn of Africa presents a picture of political fragmentation, ethnic and religious cleavages and marked economic backwardness. The two principal political elements in this situation are: (a) the Ethiopian Empire (with its federated territory of Eritrea) with a population of about 18 million divided between Christian highland farmers and Moslem nomads in the lowland, and in which only the barest beginnings have been made toward national unity; (b) the Somali people, who are divided between the newly independent Somali Republic (population 2 million), French Somaliland (25 thousand Somalis, 40 thousand others), southeast Ethiopia (350 thousand Somalis) and Kenya (60 thousand Somalis). The conflicting aims and aspirations of Ethiopia and the Somalis are a major source of tension jeopardizing prospects for peaceful and orderly progress in the entire area.

3. One of Ethiopia's main objectives, since World War II, has been to ensure that the adjoining Red Sea or Indian Ocean coasts do not become bases for a future attack upon Ethiopia. It has, therefore, sought to acquire control of these regions and in 1952 succeeded through the UN in obtaining the incorporation of Eritrea as a federated territory. Since that time the autonomy of Eritrea has been gradually reduced. The growth of Nasser's influence and the resulting enhancement of the threat of hostile Moslem encirclements led the Emperor of Ethiopia in 1956 to suggest publicly, but without success, federation of the Somalilands with Ethiopia.

4. The development of national consciousness among the Somalis has been accompanied by demands for independence and political unification through the creation of a Greater Somaliland, uniting all the Somali people in one independent country. These aspirations have been partly achieved with the independence of former British Somaliland on June 26, 1960, and its subsequent union with the former Trust Territory of Somaliland when the latter became independent on July 1, 1960. The constitution of the new Somali Republic contains the proviso that the union of the Somali peoples is to be promoted by legal and peaceful means, as well as a repudiation of war as a means of

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<sup>8</sup> The Asmara communications complex in Eritrea consists of Army and Navy facilities. In addition, the U.S. is authorized to use the Ethiopian air base at Asmara for transport and air movement operations and to store POL. Massawa provides important sea support to the Asmara communications facilities. Djibouti, because of its geographic location and existing facilities, is strategically important to the control of the southern approaches to the Suez Canal. [Footnote in the source text.]

solving international disputes. Nevertheless, the Somali drive for unification, in considerable part at the expense of Ethiopia, constitutes an intrinsic threat to Ethiopia's security and territorial integrity.<sup>9</sup> Especially when achievement of Somali expansionist aims by force is advocated by Somali extremists, Ethiopian fears are aroused and Ethiopian antagonism toward the Somalis is increased. For their part, the Somalis interpret earlier Ethiopian suggestions for federation as evidence of an Ethiopian plan to subjugate them, if necessary by force of arms, including those furnished by the United States under its Mutual Defense Assistance agreement with Ethiopia. The periodic use of force by the Ethiopians to maintain order in areas occupied by their Somali subjects as well as the restrictions on nomadic Somalis penetrating Ethiopian territory from the Somali Republic tend to confirm the Somalis in their fears.

5. Ethiopian and Somali leaders lend lip service to the fact that the long-term interests of the countries in the Horn of Africa would be advanced by an accommodation between the Ethiopians and the Somalis. However, the terms upon which each side proposes such an accommodation are not acceptable to the other and have increased the antagonism and suspicion between them. It is open to serious question whether the Ethiopian suggestion for federation, which would increase Ethiopia's internal difficulties through the accession of a very large additional Moslem element, would contribute to area stability. On the other hand, the Somali aspiration for a Greater Somaliland, if realized, would extend, through the acquisition of large increments of territory and population without corresponding gains in economic resources, the grave political and economic difficulties of a non-viable Somali State scarcely past the embryonic stage. Under these circumstances, the United States and other Western nations interested in the area have made little progress in their direct efforts to lessen tensions between Ethiopia and the Somali Republic, but hope for some success in encouraging both Ethiopia and the Somali Republic to look to the UN as a source of their security. However, neither of the protagonists has been willing to accept a U.S. position of neutrality in this dispute.

6. In addition to the threat posed by the conflict between Ethiopia and the Somalis, and the marked reduction in direct Western influence in the Somali Republic, there is a threat to the peace and stability of the area stemming from efforts of the UAR, and USSR and the Chinese Communists to exploit existing antagonisms and weaknesses in order to undermine the Western position in the Horn of Africa and to

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<sup>9</sup> The Greater Somaliland concept envisages incorporation into the Somali Republic of approximately one-fourth of Ethiopia (which includes a grazing area the use of which is vital to the pastoral economy of the Somali Republic); French Somaliland (which controls the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railroad); and a small part of Kenya. [Footnote in the source text.]

expand their influence. In exploiting the Ethiopian-Somali conflict it is possible that the Chinese Communists will give priority to activities in the Somali Republic (either in cooperation with or in competition with the USSR), in view of the existing Soviet emphasis on activities in Ethiopia.

7. Of great concern to Ethiopia is the extension of UAR influence to Northeast Africa. UAR propaganda and subversive activity among the Moslems in the area and limited UAR support of Somali extremists as well as the likely increase of UAR influence in the Somali Republic are all regarded by Ethiopia as a danger. In fact, however, the UAR's support of Somali expansionism will probably continue to be moderated by a desire to avoid too direct a challenge to Ethiopia, at least so long as Haile Selassie remains in power, as well as by the relatively low priority of the Horn as a UAR target.

### *Ethiopia*

8. Ethiopia occupies a commanding position in the Horn of Africa and is the only economically viable country in the area. Although internal stability has been achieved under the authoritarian rule of the Emperor, the feudal nature of the government, the fact that the central government does not exercise effective administrative control over outlying areas, the presence of a large Moslem minority susceptible to UAR and other blandishments and still-extant discontent in Eritrea are serious fundamental weaknesses. The Ethiopian Government has been following a policy of military modernization, economic development of the country's resources, and almost imperceptibly gradual political advancement. Economic stability has been maintained through careful use of internal resources, the long-term expansion of export revenues, and the availability of external financing. The long-range consequences of the attempted coup of December 1960 cannot as yet be predicted. It is unlikely, however, that the Emperor can, even if he wishes, accelerate appreciably the political advancement and economic development of Ethiopia with the human and economic resources available without resorting to forced mobilization of manpower and capital. The situation will probably be kept under control so long as Haile Selassie reigns, but his death or incapacitation is likely to precipitate a struggle for power at the center, possibly complicated by secession movements, especially in Eritrea and the Somali-inhabited areas. Crown Prince Asfa Wossen has suffered from the restraints placed on him by his father, and although publicly exonerated from culpability in connection with the December, 1960 coup attempt, he may be quietly removed from the line of succession. If, however, he remains the legally designated heir, he may be able to succeed to the throne, if only as a symbol, especially should he be supported by the Army.

9. There are no major difficulties between Ethiopia and its western neighbor, the Sudan, and relations between the two states are cordial. However, in the absence of an agreement on the use of the Nile's waters, any developments on the Nile River which might establish "beneficial use" rights for other powers to the detriment of Ethiopia's future use are a source of great concern to Ethiopia and will continue to have an important bearing on its relations not only with the Sudan and the UAR, but also with any other country participating in such projects through financial assistance or otherwise. The Ethiopian Government relies heavily upon the formal assurance in this connection which it received in 1956 from the United States Government "that no action in derogation of Ethiopia's legitimate rights should be taken without Ethiopia's consent."<sup>10</sup>

10. Following World War II Ethiopia adopted a policy of active cooperation with the United States. In 1950, it supported the United Nations in Korea and subsequently followed the U.S. position on many other major international issues. In 1959, however, Emperor Haile Selassie made a state visit to Moscow, accepted long-term credits of \$100 million from the USSR and \$10 million from Czechoslovakia, and embarked on a more neutralist foreign policy. These moves were almost certainly stimulated by the Emperor's discontent with the United States and Western responses to his demands for material aid and diplomatic support, particularly as related to the Somali issue. The Emperor's fear that the U.K., with U.S. assent, was pushing for a "Greater Somalia" had become and remains an obsession affecting Ethiopia's attitude on all other matters. More recently, difficulties and delays in the utilization of Soviet assistance (in part reflecting, as with previously initiated Western aid programs, the administrative and technical difficulties of doing business in Ethiopia), an increase in the U.S. aid program and developments in the Congo (where Ethiopian troops support the UN action) have all tended to disillusion Ethiopia with the USSR. There are indications that the Emperor is pleased that the drift away from the United States has been reduced. Nevertheless, Ethiopian acceptance of the Soviet and Czech aid represents an advance in the Bloc's efforts to undermine Western influence and to expand its own presence and prestige in Africa, provides a framework for further Bloc overtures to Ethiopia itself, and affords greater opportunities for Bloc subversion.

11. Ethiopian armed forces and constabulary total approximately 59,000 men of whom 28,000 are in the National Police, 24,000 are in the Army, and 6,000 in the Imperial Bodyguard. The army is capable

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<sup>10</sup> This assurance was contained in a letter dated May 26, 1956, from the Under Secretary of State to the Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs. [Footnote in the source text.]

of maintaining internal security or repressing border incursions made by any of the military establishments existing in neighboring areas. The economic burden imposed by the maintenance of such an extensive military establishment—defense expenditures constitute 20 percent of budgetary allocations—is being partially offset by the U.S. Military Assistance Program initiated in 1953.<sup>11</sup>

12. U.S. economic aid to Ethiopia under the Mutual Security Program has been granted at the level of \$5 million to \$6 million per year in recent years. The cumulative total of grant MSP economic aid from FY 1952 through FY 1960 was \$38 million. Of this total, \$27 million has been for technical assistance mainly in the fields of agriculture, education, health and surveys of natural resources. The balance has been given as Defense Support or Special Assistance for economic development projects. DLF loans of \$0.5 and \$2 million have been made in FY 1960–1961, mainly to provide lending capital for agricultural and industrial projects. Further loans have been requested primarily for financing improvements in airways and highways.

13. In spite of the expanded Soviet Bloc presence, the United States still occupies a leading position in Ethiopia and remains able to exert considerable influence on Ethiopia's orientation. While the Emperor desires to maintain a substantial Western presence in Ethiopia and to avoid heavy involvement with the Bloc, his aspirations to play an important role in African affairs will cause him to attempt to avoid antagonizing "neutrals" and thus becoming isolated. An example of this attitude was the Ethiopian voting record in the Fifteenth General Assembly (1960) where Ethiopia voted with the Afro-Asians (and against the United States) on numerous occasions.

14. As a result of the Emperor's growing interest in the development of Pan-African cooperation, Ethiopia has participated in Afro-Asian Conferences, although with increasing caution in view of the attempts of the USSR and the UAR to use such conferences to achieve their own objectives. The Emperor's desire to exert a leading influence in Africa is tempered by his fear of a rebuff, damaging to his prestige, from the newer, more radical, African leaders. He has, for instance, openly supported the UN effort to the Congo, without, however, being willing to play an aggressive part in African circles.

### *The Somali Republic*

15. The independence of former British Somaliland on June 26, 1960, and its union with the former Trust Territory of Somaliland when the latter became independent on July 1, 1960, added to the international scene an extremely weak and impoverished country

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<sup>11</sup> U.S. military assistance has gone to the Army and to the Imperial Bodyguard, and some limited assistance has gone to the police. [Footnote in the source text.]



faced, in addition to the problems of resolving tribal rivalries, by major administrative problems involved in combining two formerly separate governmental mechanisms established by the British and the Italians.

16. Post independence developments have to date resulted in a readjustment of internal political alignments and the installation of a government which has advanced a program based on moderation in the political sphere and economic austerity. Faced, however, with major economic and financial problems, the Government is under great pressure to produce tangible improvements in the domestic economic situation and also to obtain sizeable amounts of foreign aid. Moreover, in spite of the official attitude of the Somali Government,<sup>12</sup> Ethiopian actions against Somalis (whether Ethiopian subjects or not and whether within Ethiopian territory or not) and the popular appeal of the Greater Somalia issue are effectively exploited by opposition politicians and anti-Western propagandists. The net result is a strong tendency toward a politically neutralist position in international affairs and toward the acceptance of economic assistance from both Western and Bloc sources.

17. Economically, the Somali Republic faces an extremely difficult period that is expected to continue for some years to come. Lacking any known deposits of petroleum or mineral resources, its future economic growth must depend on economic development in the agricultural sector. Banana production and local handicrafts are virtually the only sources of monetary income. Improvements in agricultural methods and techniques could bring immediate but modest gains in production, particularly in meats and hides and skins. The recent completion of the Inter-River Economic Survey, conducted in the area between the Giuba and Uebi Scebeli Rivers, has provided data which indicate that over the long term economic growth could be obtained through expanding agricultural production and introducing related processing industries.

18. The present economy of the Somali Republic provides a very limited debt servicing capacity and the opportunities for financing economic development of the Republic through external private capital investments appear to be very limited. Accordingly, continuing external subsidies will be required for the foreseeable future both to meet ordinary budget deficits and to finance the limited economic growth which seems feasible.

19. Although the new government has proclaimed policies of reform and austerity, the requirements for external assistance in the period 1961-1965 have been estimated by the Somalis themselves, if somewhat generously, at \$150 million for economic development and

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<sup>12</sup> Both the Constitution and the Government program advocate achievement of Greater Somaliland "by legal and peaceful means." [Footnote in the source text.]

\$50 million to meet deficits in the ordinary budget. These amounts are not based on any rigorous analysis and are clearly beyond the capability of the Somali Republic to absorb.<sup>13</sup>

20. Italy and the U.K. can be expected to continue to provide economic support to the Somali Republic.

a. In the nine and one half years that it administered the former Trust Territory, Italy in addition to providing an assured market for the Somali crop contributed to it an average equivalent of about \$10 million per year. As indicated by its commitment to provide some budgetary aid and to assure a continued banana market, Italy will probably continue a moderate level of economic and technical assistance to the Republic for reasons of prestige and to protect residual private interests.

b. The U.K. contributed the equivalent of \$5 to \$6 million annually to its Protectorate. The British probably hope to retain some leverage for countering Soviet and UAR influence and have promised an annual grant to the Somali Republic. However, they have little hope of occupying a preponderant position in the new state and will probably seek to induce Italy and especially the United States to assume more and more of the burden of support.

c. The United States has programmed economic and technical assistance to the area in recent years at an annual rate of \$1-3 million for a total of \$6.8 million through the end of FY 1960. As early as 1958, the United States gave the Somali Government an assurance that the United States would continue its interest in the area's economic future after independence and would be willing to help, by supplementing the aid provided by other Free World countries subject to the availability of funds.

Other potential sources of economic support for the Somali Republic include the European Common Market fund, from which the Republic is scheduled to receive \$5 million during the next five years; Free World financial institutions (when the Republic joins them); the UN Special Projects Fund; and the UAR, the USSR, and Communist China.

21. Because of the concern of the UN for the political and economic future of the Somali Republic and to provide a "UN presence" to discourage adventures by either the Somalis or the Ethiopians, the UN Secretary General contemplates assigning a personal representative to Mogadiscio. The Somali Government has requested that the UN provide, in addition, high-level experts in the fields of economics, finance, public administration and law. Should this UN group function as hoped, it could make a major contribution to the maintenance of stability in the area as well as providing disinterested expert advice to

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<sup>13</sup> Paragraph 31 of NIE 76-60 (June 21, 1960) states that "total minimum requirements for external assistance will amount to \$10-14 million annually for the foreseeable future." [Footnote in the source text.]

the Somalis on their internal problems. Such a group of experts would be particularly welcome to the Somalis because of the general lack of confidence in some of the Italian experts who occupied high positions in the Somali civil service before, and to some extent since, independence. It has been reported that the low caliber of a great many of these experts has caused great dissatisfaction on the part of the Somalis and has rendered it unlikely that they would agree to accept a corps of permanent Italian advisors.

22. Relations between the Somali Republic and the United States are generally good because of U.S. support for the Somali Republic's independence, past and prospective U.S. assistance, and Somali confidence that the United States has no territorial or other ambitions in the area. However, in spite of reiterated U.S. explanations and statements of support for the Somali Republic's independence, the close ties between the United States and Ethiopia give rise to Somali apprehension that the United States tends to favor Ethiopian designs on them, and through its military and economic assistance is increasing Ethiopia's capability to absorb the Somali Republic by force of arms or otherwise. The U.K. and Italy have agreed between themselves to provide assistance to the Somalis in the military field, including a joint training mission if the Somalis should so request.<sup>14</sup> The UAR has also offered to assist with small arms and training. The United States has informed both the Somalis and the Ethiopians that, while it will continue to help the Somali police, it has no plans to aid the Somali Army. Because of the strong interests of the U.K. and Italy in the area, the United States has closely coordinated with both countries its own action in the Somali Republic, and relies on them to exercise a restraining influence on Somali desires for military expansion.

23. The UAR has made assiduous efforts to identify itself with Somali nationalist aspirations. It will probably retain a special position in the Somali Republic by virtue of its historic rivalry with Ethiopia, its appeal to religious ties, and its readiness to provide some educational, cultural, military and economic assistance. In addition, it will continue some covert meddling in Somali politics. However, most Somali leaders are probably too concerned with the problems of their own state and too much subject to the conflicting pull of Pan-Africanism for the country to fall under preponderant Pan-Arab influence as represented by the UAR.

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<sup>14</sup> The Somali armed forces consist of (1) the police numbering about 3,000 men, (2) the former Somaliland Scouts numbering about 1,000 men and an embryonic Army of about 3,500 men formed by the transfer of the Police Mobile Force to the Army and by recruitment. The stated Somali goal is an Army of 6,000 men. [Footnote in the source text.]

24. Even before independence, Somali representatives had attended Pan-African meetings and at the 1960 All-African Peoples Conference held in Tunis were able to obtain a resolution supporting Greater Somalia. The Somalis are anxious to be regarded as a full-fledged member of the emerging African Bloc and hope to obtain African support for their claims against Ethiopia.

25. Activity in the Somali Republic by the Sino-Soviet Bloc before independence was held to a minimum by the U.K. and Italy. Commencing with the independence ceremonies both the USSR and Communist China have increased their efforts to gain a foothold. The Chinese Communists appear to have made considerable headway with the leadership of the opposition Great Somalia League. The Somalis have agreed to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Communist China. In the light of increased Soviet and Chinese Communist interest in Africa both may be expected to take advantage of any opportunities to establish a foothold in the Somali Republic, although the USSR and its European satellites will be inhibited by the need to avoid jeopardizing their position in Ethiopia.

#### *Somali Areas in Kenya*

26. One of the four areas inhabited by Somalis which is included in Somali aspirations for union is the eastern portion of Kenya's northern Frontier Province. Some efforts have been made by the Somali Republic to persuade the British to cede this area prior to Kenya's independence although the some 60,000 Somalis in Kenya have only recently shown any interest in this question and are divided in their reaction. The British position has been that the question of the secession of any part of Kenya is a matter to be decided when independence arrives, by the British and Kenya governments, who would consider the wishes of the inhabitants. Kenya African leaders do not yet seem to have focused on the problem to any extent.

#### *French Somaliland*

27. France has opposed Greater Somalia, particularly in view of the value of the port of Djibouti, which is the only city in French Somaliland and is considered by the French to be of strategic importance to them. Djibouti is also of great importance as the principal port of entry for Ethiopia and the terminus of the railroad to Addis Ababa. French policy has in the past been one of holding French Somaliland firmly within the Republic,<sup>15</sup> basing this position on the plebiscite of 1958. More recently, however, the French have given the Somalis

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<sup>15</sup> As an overseas territory it is constitutionally an integral part of the French Republic. [Footnote in the source text.]

indications that greater freedom, perhaps even independence, may be possible at some future date. As European-controlled areas in Africa continue to become independent, France will be under increasing pressure to grant French Somaliland its independence. At the same time, Ethiopia will view with great suspicion any steps which might result in Somali control of its sole railway exit from Addis Ababa to the sea and may be goaded by its fear of this eventuality into taking unilateral action to protect its interests.

### Objectives

28. Denial of the Horn of Africa to Soviet Bloc or Chinese Communist domination and minimization of Soviet Bloc and Chinese Communist influence.

29. So far as consistent with the preceding paragraph, denial of the Horn of Africa to UAR domination and limitation of UAR influence to a moderate level.

30. Such military rights and facilities in the area as the United States may require, including the continued use of the Asmara communications facilities.

31. Orderly political, economic and social evolution along lines favorable to cooperation with other Free World countries.

32. Reduction of tensions between Ethiopia and the Somali Republic.

### Policy Guidance

#### *General*

33. Cooperating with friendly nations wherever pertinent and efficacious: (a) encourage the resolution of conflicts and tensions in the area; (b) seek to deny the area to Soviet Bloc or Chinese Communist domination and to minimize Soviet Bloc or Chinese Communist influence; (c) so far as consistent with (b), seek to deny the area to UAR domination and to limit UAR influence to a moderate level; and (d) encourage orderly economic progress.

34. In view of the distinct possibility that the tensions between Ethiopia and the Somali Republic may be seriously exacerbated or result in armed conflict (going beyond border incidents), determine which courses of action by the United States would be feasible and would serve best the long-term interests of the United States in such an eventuality.

35. Strengthen U.S. information and cultural exchange programs in the Horn of Africa, and encourage other friendly Free World nations to take similar action.

*Ethiopia*

36. Consult with Ethiopia on Middle East and African matters of concern to it. Encourage Ethiopia to maintain an interest in Pan-African affairs and to exercise a moderating influence in such affairs.

37. Continue to provide Ethiopia with: (a) technical assistance, with emphasis on education and training programs; (b) to the extent necessary to meet our objectives, limited economic assistance and minimum military equipment and training of a kind suitable for maintaining internal security and offering resistance to local aggression, making every effort to avoid a military build-up which would strain the Ethiopian economy, lead to commitments for indefinite U.S. support, or to increased tension within the area.<sup>16</sup>

38. While recognizing the right of the Ethiopians to trade with and accept assistance from the Sino-Soviet Bloc, seek to meet the challenge posed by Bloc offers of economic and military aid and cultural ties by:

a. Vigorous implementation of the aggregate U.S. programs described above.

b. Seeking to dissuade the Ethiopian Government, wherever feasible and without creating antagonism toward the United States, from:

(1) Accepting assistance from the Sino-Soviet Bloc in particularly sensitive fields (such as the armed forces, internal security, communications and education) of a kind which would be damaging to Ethiopia's security.

(2) Accepting aid or engaging in trade with the Bloc at levels or on terms likely to create undue Ethiopian dependence on the Bloc.

(3) Extensive use of Bloc technicians.

c. To the ends specified in b above, be prepared in particular circumstances to provide further U.S. technical, economic and military assistance if required. Direct counter offers to specific Bloc offers should be considered only as a last resort.

39. Avoid U.S. involvement, insofar as possible, in negotiations on the Nile waters between Ethiopia and other riparian states and, above all, avoid U.S. identification with the position of any riparian state.

40. Consider steps which might be taken to ensure that French plans for the future of French Somaliland take into account the vital Ethiopian interest in maintenance of unhampered use of the Addis Ababa–Djibouti railroad or the provision of an acceptable alternative.

41. Keeping in mind the many advantages of an orderly succession by the legally designated heir, seek to identify and, to the extent feasible, foster, before the death or incapacitation of Emperor Haile

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<sup>16</sup> The Ethiopians consider military aid to be a quid pro quo for our military base. [Footnote in the source text.]

Selassie I, a successor who will prove acceptable to the nation (especially the Army), who will be able effectively to counter the subversive efforts of the Communist and who will be responsive to "modernist" aspirations and pressures.

*The Somali Republic*

42. Encourage Italy and the U.K. to continue to exercise the primary external responsibility for the maintenance of the Somali Republic's stability and Free World orientation.

43. a. Encourage Italy, the U.K. and other friendly nations to provide economic and technical aid, including budgetary, military and police assistance, to assist Somali leaders favorable to the West to remain in power and to maintain stability in areas under their control.

b. Encourage the UN to provide technical assistance.

c. Encourage the Somali Republic to join Free World financial institutions. If the Somali Republic becomes a member of these institutions, encourage efforts by the institutions to promote sound economic and financial policies in the Somali Republic and support loans to the Republic by these institutions where consistent with relevant U.S. policies governing such loans.

d. Be prepared to supplement these efforts as necessary by providing limited U.S. economic and technical assistance, including assistance for police-type units.

44. Encourage Somali leaders to be moderate in advancing the concept of a Greater Somaliland and emphasize to both Ethiopia and the Somali Republic the danger of attempting to alter the existing political situation by force.

45. Encourage the UN Secretary General to take an active role, through a personal representative in the Somali Republic, in attempting to reduce tensions in the area and to find solutions to various conflicts (including border disputes and the future of the Somalis in Kenya and French Somaliland) which are acceptable to the states and peoples concerned.