

German Democratic Republic

U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

265. National Security Council Report

Supplement II to NSC 5803¹

Washington, February 7, 1958.

STATEMENT OF POLICY ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD EAST GERMANY

General Considerations

1. Soviet control over East Germany has added to the power disequilibrium in Europe and thus to the threat to the security of the United States. Moreover, the continued division of Germany creates a serious element of instability in Europe which must be eliminated before a reliable and enduring basis for European security can be established.

2. At the present time all evidence points to the conclusion that the Soviet Union has no intention of abandoning its position in East Germany, or of seriously negotiating on the subject of German reunification. It continues to maintain substantial military forces in the area, while representing minor withdrawals as a significant reduction.

3. East Germany poses special and difficult problems of control for the USSR. While the East German regime has made limited progress in furthering its program, the East Germans are unlikely to accept of their own free will the Communist system which has been imposed upon them. A basic hope that reunification will somehow eventually be accomplished continues to be the main psychological support for the majority of East Germans in their disaffection with the Communist regime. The fact that the main body of the German nation in the Federal Republic has made remarkable advances in political freedom and economic well-being, together with the role played by West Berlin in providing a means of contact with the Free World, also serves to keep alive in East Germany the hope for an ultimate escape from Soviet domination. The situation in East Germany provides a showcase example of Soviet colo-

Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5803 Series. Top Secret.

¹ NSC 5803 is printed as Document 243; regarding Supplement I to NSC 5803, see the source note to Document 243.

nialism and furnishes opportunities for the West to exploit strong popular anti-Communist sentiments. Recently there have been numerous indications of unrest and uncertainty in the lower echelons of the East German Socialist Unity Party as a result of the repudiation of Stalin.

4. However, as long as Germany remains divided, various factors at work in East Germany will operate to weaken the resistance of the population to the regime. These factors include the wholesale Communist indoctrination of youth, the weakening under unrelenting police-state pressure of resistance groups now in existence, and the continuing flight to the West of anti-regime refugees.

5. It is in the national security interests of the United States to oppose Soviet control of East Germany and to seek the elimination of that control by means of the reunification of Germany in freedom. However, the United States is not prepared to resort to war to eliminate Soviet domination of East Germany, nor does attainment of this goal through internal revolutionary means appear likely so long as substantial Soviet forces are deployed in the area. Thus a basic change in Soviet policy toward Germany will be required before a German unification compatible with U.S. security interests can be attained. Until this change occurs, the possibilities for U.S. action vis-à-vis East Germany will remain limited.

6. The process by which a change in Soviet policy toward Germany may occur may be a very complicated one since it is closely related to many other elements in the total relationship between the Soviet Union and the West. However, in respect to Germany one essential line of action is the continued focusing of world opinion on the injustice of a Germany forcibly divided by the imposition of a Soviet-dominated puppet regime. Another essential line of action is the attempt to make more difficult Soviet control in East Germany, and to encourage the development of forces there tending to strengthen resistance to the Communist regime. Moreover, there may be developments, such as the riots of 1953, which offer opportunities for exploitation. Such pressures upon the Soviet Union may lead it ultimately to accept the reunification of Germany in freedom as one of the prerequisites for the relaxation of international tension and as indispensable to the creation of stable and permanent European security.

7. It is essential to this end that the NATO countries and, to the extent possible, non-NATO countries, demonstrate their support for reunification on a continuing basis. The United States will have to contend against the possible interest of certain uncommitted nations in trade connections with East Germany and combat the tendency of some Western European elements to favor political arrangements with the USSR based on a divided Germany.

8. The maintenance by the free world of contact with East Germans is an important element in the stimulation of their resistance to

Communism, confidence in the West, and hope for a reunified democratic and independent Germany. Imaginative and flexible programs will be required, permitting quick adjustment to possible changes in Communist restrictions on the access of the East German population to Berlin and West Germany.

Objectives

9. *Basic:* The reunification in freedom of a Germany enjoying a representative government based upon the consent of the governed and participating fully in the free world community.

10. *Interim:*

a. To place the Soviets on the defensive by measures in support of reunification.

b. To undermine Soviet control over East Germany through exploiting the Western position in the Federal Republic and Berlin.

c. To diminish the reliability of the East German armed forces.

d. To minimize East German contribution to Soviet power and encourage changes in the present East German-Soviet relationship which would weaken Soviet control.

e. To conserve and strengthen the assets within East Germany which may contribute to U.S. interests in peace or war and to the ultimate freedom of East Germany.

Major Policy Guidance

11. Use appropriate means short of military force to oppose, and to contribute to the eventual elimination of, Soviet domination over East Germany and to promote the reunification of Germany in freedom, including, when appropriate, concert with NATO or other friendly powers, resort to UN procedures, and diplomatic negotiations.

12. Seek to increase popular and bureaucratic pressures against the present regime through the exploitation of discontent with political and economic conditions in East Germany.

13. Continue basic opposition to the Soviet-Communist system and continue to state its evils.

14. Encourage democratic, anti-Communist elements in East Germany. Stress the healthy aspects of a common German heritage and cooperate with other forces—such as religious, cultural, social—which are natural allies in the struggle against Soviet imperialism and seek to maintain the morale and will to resist Communist domination.

15. Stimulate and exploit conflicts within the Communist regime in East Germany and between it and other Communist regimes, as appropriate, to the achievement of our policy objectives.

16. Exploit the developing organizations of Western unity (NATO, WEU, OEEC, CSC, etc.) as a force working for a free European community including a reunified Germany.

17. Utilize both public affairs and diplomatic channels to focus world opinion on the injustices of a forcibly divided Germany and the oppressive actions taken by the East German regime against the population. Emphasize that the people of East Germany have been deprived of their right to self-determination by the violation of international agreements by the Soviet Government, particularly the agreement of the Heads of Government at Geneva regarding the reunification of Germany by means of free elections.²

18. Maintain contact with the people of East Germany and encourage resistance to the Communist regime by specific projects (administered by the West German Government through West German and private organizations supported by the United States to the extent necessary and appropriate) designed to (a) maintain a sense of identification with the West and (b) manifest our concern for the hardships of East Germans. This should include the provision of cultural, educational, welfare, and travel opportunities. However, an organized official program for the exchange of persons between the United States and East Germany would be inconsistent with our policy of the nonrecognition of the East German regime.

19. Reassure the East German people of our continued confidence in the eventual reunification of Germany in freedom by evidence of continued strong Western support for Berlin and our determination to remain in Berlin. Hamper Soviet exploitation of East Germany by maintaining Berlin as an example of Western accomplishments and as an island of resistance to consolidation of Communist control in East Germany, and by prompt and clear response to any Communist harassment of the city.

20. Oppose the recognition of the East German regime by other countries, seek to limit its influence, and support the Federal Republic in preventing the admission of representatives of the East German regime to international organizations or meetings.³

² For the Directive of the Heads of Government, July 23, 1955, see *Foreign Relations*, 1955–1957, vol. V, p. 527.

³ On February 7, the President also approved a separate annex to Supplement II which reads as follows:

"1. Encourage the East German people in passive resistance to their Soviet-dominated regime when this will contribute to minimizing East German contributions to Soviet power or to increasing pressures for reunification. Foster disaffection in the East German armed forces.

"2. Avoid incitements to violence or to action when the probable reprisals or other results would yield a net loss in terms of U.S. objectives. In general, however, do not discourage, by public utterances or otherwise, spontaneous manifestations of discontent and opposition to the Communist regime, despite risks to individuals, when their net results will exert pressures for release from Soviet domination. [4 lines of source text not declassified]" (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5803 Series)

266. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Embassy in Germany

Berlin, February 14, 1958, 6 p.m.

899. Ref: ourtels Bonn 878, 873, rptd Dept 937 and 931.¹ Thirty-fifth plenum SED CC actions must be viewed in perspective of general stirrings throughout Eastern European satellites following 20th Party Congress CPSU winter 1956. Charges against Schirdewan–Wollweber specifically refer to their opportunistic interpretation results 20th Party Congress and stressed their advocacy of democratization and relaxation. Removal Schirdewan and Wollweber for reasons given ourtel 878 reveals, however, existence in top SED leadership since Oct 1956 of strong oppositional group animated by ideas emerging in wake 20th Party Congress CPSU. While in Poland oppositional elements led by Gomulka were able establish new regime committed to policies of liberalization, while in Hungary party oppositional elements were unable control course of events resulting bloody repression popular uprising by Sov Armed Forces, while in Czechoslovakia development oppositional forces nipped in bud early summer 1956 by prompt action of Nowotny and Siroky,² fourth variant has taken place East Germany. Oppositional group was formed below surface presumably seeking an occasion bring downfall Ulbricht. Ulbricht's successful suppression Schirdewan–Wollweber group appears mean relative terminal point of SED Party unrest in form stimulated by 20th Party Congress CPSU and Polish-Hungarian events Oct 1956.

Schirdewan and Wollweber held key positions, Schirdewan as party cadre chief and head of party intelligence service, and Wollweber until Nov 1, as Minister for State Security. Selbmann and Ziller were both top level party leaders in the economic sphere. Since charges speak frequently of "others" involved it may be assumed that strong forces within party hierarchy were involved in opposition. If this group was unable to upset Ulbricht, then it is unlikely that any oppositional forces can soon develop within SED able to bring about his downfall, particularly now that Party Secretariat has been packed by vigorous young

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762B.00/2-1458. Confidential. Repeated to Washington, Moscow, Paris, London, Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest and pouched to POLAD USAREUR and DCSI USAFE. The source text is the Department of State copy.

¹ Telegram 878, February 9, summarized in detail Erich Honecker's report to the plenum of the SED on the expulsion of Karl Schirdewan, Ernst Wollweber, and Fred Oelssner from the Central Committee. Telegram 873, February 7, transmitted extracts from the communiqué of the 35th plenum, February 7. (*Ibid.*, 762B.00/2-958 and 762B.00/2-758, respectively)

² Antonin Novotny, President of Czechoslovakia, and Viliam Siroky, Czech Premier.

Ulbricht henchmen. Also we anticipate concentrated effort remove from important positions "others" of Schirdewan–Wollweber group, both in process reorganization economy (ourtel 887 to Bonn rptd Dept 946)³ and in new party elections preliminary to 5th Party Congress July, in order fill party and government positions so far as possible with reliable Ulbricht men.

According to intelligence reports, downfall Schirdewan–Wollweber has had demoralizing effect on middle and lower party functionaries. However, we do not believe these unsettling effects will be of great moment in the near future, but expect party discipline will be maintained under tightened Ulbricht control. Opposition to Ulbricht personally and to his Stalinist policies nevertheless will presumably persist deep underground within party.

Judging by 35th plenum documents, SED leadership under Ulbricht intends intensify communization East Germany thus accelerating course which became discernible last fall. For example, increased pressure on labor, both economic and political, was forecast by Warnke (ourtel to Bonn 882 rptd Dept 942).⁴ Propagation atheism is to be increased. Press is to engage more actively in ideological indoctrination. New measure has been prepared by Politburo to increase party role in East German Army. Honecker reported Politburo desires to transform universities, technical academies and other schools to real Socialist-training institutions and stated "we must more strenuously link and control all forms of art and cultural expression." Further communization may be partially achieved unless, as purged group apparently feels, policies themselves create retardism difficulties or provoke mass popular reaction. Stalinism has not so far been able to win support of East German population and is unlikely to do so in future even with greater controls and isolation from West which regime intends. Solution of domestic economic problems also unlikely through hard course. Present trend is thus likely increase tensions among all groups East German population.

Following are implications Ulbricht victory:

1. Prospect of negotiations regarding reunification or related issues affecting Germany becomes bleaker than ever. One charge against Schirdewan–Wollweber refers to their not wanting understand dangers resulting from illusionary desire bring about German unity at any price. This charge that they were willing compromise essential Communist features of GDR in interest reunification may indicate at least that these

³ Dated February 12, telegram 887 from Berlin to Bonn reported that the Volkskammer had on February 10 begun consideration of a law to reorganize the state economic apparatus. (*Ibid.*, 762B.00/2–1258)

⁴ Dated February 10, telegram 882 from Berlin to Bonn transmitted excerpts from a speech to the 35th plenum by Herbert Warnke. (*Ibid.*, 862B.062/2–1058)

top party leaders were skeptical about intrinsic feasibility endeavor establish separate state in East Germany.

2. In line with current emphasis GDR sovereignty and efforts establish GDR as a real German state, Ulbricht might seek from Sovs opportunities major encroachments on Western position in Berlin. Soviets, however, are specifically able to control Ulbricht regime in these matters. Sov decisions on specific encroachments or general effort against Allied position in Berlin, e.g., by turnover authority GDR, are difficult to foresee, since they would be presumably related over-all Soviet policy considerations.

3. Schirdewan-Wollweber were charged with overestimating difficulties connected with further socialization GDR and dangers of Hungarian-type [revolt?] connected therewith. If Ulbricht, without restraint, presses forward with harsh measures of continued economic exploitation, with raising work norms, etc., with repressive measures against church, and with a doctrinaire Communist line objectionable to masses of population, then there may come a point when an exacerbated East German population despite its memories of June 17, 1953, might attempt rise against regime. Doubtless the Sovs would seek to forestall such a development. But Sov record in dealing with Hungarian party in a similar situation does not give one confidence that Sovs would correctly appraise situation. For these reasons hard Ulbricht course carries with it prospective danger major dimensions.

Gufler

267. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, June 9, 1958, 7:31 p.m.

3139. Bonn for Ambassador or Chargé. Berlin for Gufler. Department endorses procedure being followed by USAREUR to secure return helicopter crew.¹ However, urge that care be exercised to avoid taking categorical position in any statements to press of dealings with Soviets that we will refuse under any circumstances have contact with East Ger-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/6-958. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Creel and Lisle, cleared by Kohler, and approved by Elbrick. Also sent to Berlin.

¹ On June 7, a U.S. Army helicopter mistakenly landed in East Germany. The passengers and crew were initially detained by Soviet officials and then transferred to the custody of East German representatives.

man authorities on matter. We would of course contemplate such action only after exhaustion other available courses but would wish avoid possible embarrassment should developments make it absolutely necessary deal with East Germans to secure crew's release.

Ambassador may wish pass as appropriate to General Hodes.

Dulles

268. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, June 11, 1958, 11:18 a.m.

3156. Bonn for Ambassador, Berlin for Gufler. Bonn's 1366 [3666].¹ Suggest you make, in your discretion, following comments to Chancellor re US action in obtaining release crew and passengers Army helicopter forced down East Germany:

1. Requests for return, including personal letter Gen. Hodes to Gen. Zakharov,² already made in accordance procedures followed since 1945. No reply yet from Soviets.

2. We hope Soviets will arrange for return but becoming clearer and clearer Soviets and East Germans will exploit incident to force some type US-GDR communications or contacts.

3. Public opinion obliges us obtain early release and refusal deal with East Germans this connection will be seen in public eye as "standing on ceremony" particularly in view precedents dealing with Chinese Communists and North Koreans for similar purpose.

4. Under these circumstances, indicating at this stage our readiness deal with East Germans to effect release appears preferable allowing matter to develop into big issue and then being forced to back down.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/6-1158. Secret; Niact. Drafted by McKiernan, cleared by Lisle and Calhoun, and approved by Kohler. Repeated priority to Paris and Berlin.

¹ In telegram 3666 from Bonn, June 11, received in Washington at 6:39 a.m., Bruce reported that he was seeing the Chancellor at 6:30 p.m. that day and wanted the latest information on the helicopter case. (*Ibid.*)

² Dated June 8, this 2-paragraph note requested the return of the helicopter and crew. (SX 4460, DA IN 123007; Washington National Records Center, RG 319, Headquarters Department of the Army, Communication Center Files)

5. Above thinking explains statement which Secretary made to press yesterday.³ (Chancellor should be given verbatim text.)

6. As Secretary indicated, no question of GDR recognition involved.

7. We have not yet worked out next step to be taken if Soviet reply entirely negative. However, we are aware of problem of Communist exploitation of US-GDR contacts and will try to evolve formulas and procedures best suited to maintaining Western position and preventing exploitation adverse to our interests. Our reply might take form asking Soviets to make any necessary arrangements with East German authorities for return crew and plane and offer services personnel (probably from Potsdam Mission) if necessary to facilitate return. This reply might best be through military channels.

8. At moment we still awaiting Soviet reply to Hodes before taking further action.⁴

You may wish inform your UK, French and, at appropriate point, your Belgian colleagues of our position. We are of course bearing in mind relationship to Belgian case.⁵

Dulles

³ For a transcript of Secretary Dulles' press conference on June 10, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 30, 1958, pp. 1085-1090.

⁴ On June 12, General Zakharov replied that the helicopter case was solely within the competence of the German Democratic Republic. (SX 4558, transmitted in telegram 3696 from Bonn, June 12; Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/6-1258)

⁵ On June 12, Bruce reported that he had seen the Chancellor who "was not unduly concerned over helicopter incident," but who hoped it could be settled without direct conversations with the East Germans. (Telegram 3684 from Bonn; *ibid.*)

269. Diary Entry by the Ambassador to Germany (Bruce)

Bonn, June 13, 1958.

Terrible snarl this morning over the famous helicopter. General Hodes had gone ahead and instructed his Colonel McQuail at Potsdam to ask the Soviets to act as intermediaries with the GDR for the return of the craft and crew. If they refuse to do this he instructed McQuail to request the Soviets to place him in contact with an appropriate GDR offi-

cial. When I read these telegrams this morning I called General Willems, Chief of Staff at Heidelberg, Hodes being away in Bremen. I told Willems, who was cooperative, of my misgivings about this procedure and suggested the order should be canceled if possible and we should all await a directive from Washington where I understood the whole affair was being considered at the highest level. (I take it from a telephone conversation I had yesterday with Ray Lisle "highest level" probably means the President himself is involved.) Willems called me back a little later to say that McQuail had already been in communication with the Soviets¹ and was awaiting their answer. I suggested that the General tell McQuail upon receipt of the answer to notify the Russians he would refer it to his headquarters. This was done when the response arrived to the effect that they had refused the first proposal but offered to have one of their officials conduct him this afternoon or tomorrow morning to a conference with one of the two GDR Deputy Foreign Ministers.

As a consequence of these conversations both CINCUSAREUR and ourselves have sent a number of telegrams to Washington in the hope of resolving the procedure to be followed.²

[Here follows the remainder of the diary entry.]

¹ A report on this meeting at 9:30 a.m. was transmitted in SX 4592, June 13. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 762B.5411/6–1358)

² At the end of the day, Willems authorized McQuail to meet with East German officials to effect the release of the helicopter without agreeing to any conditions substantially different from similar releases of U.S. personnel in the Soviet Zone. (SX 4618, June 13; *ibid.*)

270. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, June 14, 1958, midnight.

3725. Bonn relays for your info folg msg fm USMLM Berlin. True DTG 141500Z.

"Sent CINCUSAREUR unnumbered repeated information AmEmbassy Bonn and USCINCEUR unnumbered.

Herewith summary of conference 1000–1130 hours with Deputy Foreign Minister Otto Winzer in Ministry of Foreign Affairs Building, East Berlin. Present: Colonel McQuail, Major McCrory, one interpreter and one note taker for Mr. Winzer.

1. There was no Soviet participation, so that I perforce was forced in the end to the limit of authority granted in paragraph 4E, 1353A.¹ Lt. Vturin first said he must make a phone call. I said I'll wait. He then admitted he had instructions only to guide us to building. I protested and he went upstairs, but the German assistant said the Deputy Minister expected only myself and McCrory. I decided to begin without Vturin, and it later developed in conference that Mr. Winzer had barred Vturin.

2. Reference paragraph 4A, 1353A. I introduced myself and began with Huebner–Malinin agreement,² history of return of personnel, the developments in this particular case including Soviet aid and requested immediate return of personnel and helicopter as representative of General Hodes. (Evaluation: This proved to be wrong approach in view of Mr. Winzer's reactions. Although due to Winzer's reaction I later emphasized my simultaneous role as a representative of the army whose presence in these negotiations was known and approved by United States Army in Washington, I believe now I would have been stronger without this introduction.)

3. The GDR wants a representative with credentials from the government. Winzer finally described the requirements as a protocol or document with a governmental heading from the Government in Washington. (Evaluation: I did not press here too far as to the exact heading as I was afraid it would result in a more definitive statement, perhaps Executive Mansion heading, or State Department. I decided that perhaps it would be desired to use a Department of Army or a Chief of Staff heading, try that, and see how it was accepted at the next meeting. Winzer appeared to be pressing for something like situation in last sentence State 698 June 13,³ 7 pm, but might settle for less as suggested above. Mr. Winzer started out definitely talking about State Department and a State Department representative. He later changed somewhat and finished up using term 'representative of Government' and that army officer

¹ A copy of this telegram, which was transmitted to Washington as SX 4618, June 13, is *ibid.*, 762B.5411/6–1358.

² For text of the Huebner–Malinin agreement, April 5, 1947, which insured the rights of the United States and the Soviet Union to protect the interests of their nationals in the occupation zones of Germany, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, p. 114.

³ It stated that McQuail was not authorized to sign a receipt that indicated the establishment of an intergovernmental relationship between the United States and the German Democratic Republic. (Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/6–1358)

could be this individual if he had proper authority. This leads me to believe he will settle for less than State Department heading on a letter.)

4. The Deputy Minister stated clearly (without query or prompting) that recognition or non-recognition was not involved.

5. I accepted meeting for 1200 hours Monday 16 June at which time representative with written credentials would be present.

6. Winzer said personnel were in good shape and not being treated as prisoners.

7. Winzer stated personnel and helicopter would be turned over at border. He said it would be prompt when decided.

8. Winzer promised to deliver Red Cross box to personnel. He said he hoped more boxes not necessary. Box was delivered at about 1230 hours this date, but my sergeant said person on duty said he would try to deliver, but gave no assurance.

9. Winzer would not admit he had mind made up not to turn over personnel today, but admitted personnel were not in next room and were still at camp. (Evaluation: I believe had no intention of so doing in first conference.)

10. Meeting was cordial, no crowds, reporters or photographers observed.

11. Winzer termed meeting as a great step forward.

12. Mr. Winzer spoke fast, not too loud, and spoke whole paragraphs at a time. He mumbled and spoke so rapidly I could not follow entirely in German. He spoke from brief notes in handwriting of such character I could not read it upside down. The interpreter had a good vocabulary, but provided far from verbatim interpretation. Microphone could have been concealed in cigarette or cigar box on table. These were not touched during conference. Note taker for Winzer took desultory notes. Our notes are good and full. Poor word choice or grammar is result of interpreter not Major McCrory.

13. Detailed notes taken during conference will be forwarded piecemeal as prepared.⁴

14. I await instructions."

Bruce

⁴Transmitted in a four-part unnumbered telegram, June 14 at 3 p.m. (*Ibid.*, 762B.5411/6-1458)

271. Telegram From the Military Liaison Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, June 16, 1958, 3:40 p.m.

161540Z June (Army Message). To Department of State and Department of Defense signed McQuail.

Meeting between Col. McQuail, Major McCrory and Mr. Otto Winzer, Deputy Foreign Minister of GDR at Foreign Ministry, in East Berlin from 1205 to 1240 hours, 16 June 1958.

American officers arrived at Foreign Ministry at precisely 1200 hours. No representatives of press or photographers were in evidence. Officers were met at entrance to Foreign Ministry by an assistant, who escorted them to a waiting room, which is outside the Deputy Foreign Minister's office. After a brief wait for the Minister, American officers were ushered into the same room as they were at previous conference on 14 June,¹ and were seated at the same conference table. Also present were an East German interpreter and recorder. The latter took more complete notes than he did at previous conference, but still did not appear to be taking a verbatim account. Conversations follow:

Col. McQuail: May I say, Mr. Minister, as I did last time, that I am Col. McQuail, Chief of the US Military Liaison Mission to the CINC, group of Soviet forces in Germany, and that having been introduced by an officer from General Zakharov's office, I am here to request speedy return of military personnel and helicopter, and am authorized to sign necessary documents to accomplish this. I hereby respectfully request that we receive the personnel and helicopter as soon as can be arranged.

Mr. Winzer: But, may I ask the question Colonel, if with your superiors, you have discussed the opinion of ours about the personnel and helicopter?

McQuail: I have reported in full on the meeting held Saturday and have received permission to return to this meeting with full authority.

Winzer: You should not think about my stubborn attitude, but on whose authority?

McQuail: On Gen. Hodes' authority. He has informed his superiors, and the authorities in Washington are fully informed of my presence here and my authorization to make the request for the return of personnel and equipment.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/6-1658. Secret; Niact. Sent to CINCUSAREUR and repeated to Bonn, USCINCEUR, and the Departments of the Army, Defense, and State. The source text is the Department of State copy.

¹ See Document 270.

Winzer: If it is up to us, the nine men can be delivered tomorrow morning at 0900 hours at the frontier, under the condition that we come to an agreement that is signed not by a representative of the CINC of your Army, but from an authorized representative of the government. And I keep it open who will be this representative—whether it be an Army officer, or a member of the diplomatic corps. There are two reasons for this, which I explained at the first meeting. There is no basis in international law for agreement between us and your high command. First, there is no agreement between the Government of the US of America and the German Democratic Republic about the movement of troops in Europe. Second, we can't go back to the time of the occupying system. Colonel, to make it clear that we are ready to settle the matter in the quickest way, I hand to you a draft of an agreement² for the signature of the authorized representative of your government and ourselves for the return of the personnel and helicopter. In the draft we put Wednesday morning, but it can be tomorrow morning. I don't know how to go on now. Could you look at the draft and tell us your opinion. It is in German and it may be necessary to translate. (I examined documents, which were easy to translate, but was not sure at this point if I would be able to take copies with me. Thus I played for time by asking for an interpretation into English so that Major McCrory could get down some notes. The interpreter made a good oral translation. Shortly after he began we were told we could take copies. In the interpretation the interpreter did not translate the German word *bevollmächtigen* as plenipotentiary as the State Department representative in Berlin did. The German interpreter used words "authorized representative." As soon as I glanced at the document I realized I could not sign it and so did not even display General Hodes' letter.)³

McQuail: Would you please so I may be sure. (Translation of document followed.)

Winzer: Our experts think it better if an American specialist is present when the loading of the helicopter occurs so that no harm or damage will happen to it. It is so large. Such an expert could come here to our Ministry of Foreign Affairs and be taken to the loading point. The helicopter was somewhat damaged when it landed in the trees. The question which remains is only that the Minister cannot sign an agreement with Colonel McQuail only on the basis that he represents the United States Army, but only if he is a representative of the United States of America. This agreement can be signed anytime today or tomorrow.

² A copy of this three-article agreement was transmitted in telegram 1353 from Berlin, June 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/6-1658)

³ A copy of this letter was transmitted in SX 4633 from Heidelberg, June 15. (*Ibid.*, 762B.5411/6-1558)

McQuail: Would early Wednesday morning be suitable? (I suggested Wednesday since Tuesday is the fifth anniversary of the East Berlin uprising. I thought it would be bad to confer on that day with possibility of unfavorable reaction of West Germans.)

Winzer: Yes.

McQuail: At what hour?

Winzer: 1000 hours.

McQuail: Fine. I would like to say we thank the Deputy Minister for his kindness in receiving the box for transmittal to our personnel. I hope that they are enjoying the contents.

Winzer: The box is on the way. Saturday afternoon all offices were closed, but now it is on the way.

McQuail: Would it be possible for me to visit the personnel in company with one of your officials?

Winzer: It is necessary to consult first, but we think it better if we can settle the matter very soon. If we can bring them to the frontier point soon, it is better.

McQuail: Yes, but it would be nice to say hello to them and give them messages from their wives.

Winzer: But, they will get the box today and see that you are bothering about them. We are interested in settling the affair very quickly, but so far there are no relations between the GDR and a representative of the Government of the United States of America. We are not interested in establishing relations with the United States Army. This is not such a big thing that it cannot be settled in this way. If you come to us on Wednesday morning it can happen that the time has to be changed slightly because the personnel have to be brought by bus from their present location to the frontier. I do not want to create a misunderstanding on this. I hope that we can settle today.

McQuail: I hoped so too, but I do not have authorization to sign this document without further consultation.

Winzer: It remains then to hand our draft to your superiors or if you wish we can translate.

McQuail: We can translate. Thank you.

[Here follow two pages of details on an East German press conference following the meeting.]

272. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, June 17, 1958, 4:22 p.m.

3226. Joint State–Defense message. (A) Unnumbered USMLM tel from Berlin June 16 re McQuail–Winzer meeting; (B) Berlin’s 1353; (C) Bonn’s 3746; (D) Bonn’s 3749.¹

Appreciate Ambassador’s comments Bonn reftel (C) and concur fully (a) that signing bilateral agreement proposed by Winzer would entail serious danger undermining our policy re GDR and (b) that would be preferable rather than accede to agreement to raise return of Army personnel and helicopter again with Soviets in diplomatic channels.

Therefore recommend McQuail be instructed act as follows in June 18 meeting with Winzer:

1. Should begin by reading statement along following lines:

(a) I have documentation from both senior military and senior diplomatic representatives of US in Germany establishing my full authority to deal with this question as representative of US Government. (McQuail should then present both credentials furnished by General Hodes and by Ambassador Bruce; text as suggested Deptel 3208 to Bonn, signature modified as suggested Bonn’s 3733.² FYI. Our only concern re signature was to avoid any reference to Federal Republic.)

(b) I have shown text of your proposed agreement to my superiors and have been instructed to inform you that they regard a document of this nature as entirely unnecessary and abnormal and your insistence on it as an attempt to delay and confuse simple question of returning personnel and aircraft by interjection of procedural difficulties and political issues. Such a document is wholly unacceptable and I have been instructed to refuse to sign it.

(c) I am however ready to meet all normal and reasonable requirements for arranging return of personnel and aircraft. I am today to reimburse here and now and in advance the various items of expense mentioned by you. (Assume arrangements can be made to have McQuail carry cash funds with him and to turn them over to Winzer on

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/6–1758. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Creel and McKiernan; cleared by Lisle, Kohler, L, and the Department of Defense; and approved by Murphy. Also sent niact to Berlin and USAREUR Heidelberg and repeated to Paris, London, and Moscow.

¹ The USMLM telegram is Document 271. Telegram 1353, June 16, transmitted the text of the three-article draft agreement. (Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/6–1658) In telegram 3746, June 17, Ambassador Bruce stated that the point had been reached where the United States should either sign an intergovernmental agreement or break off the discussions and attempt to force the Soviet Union back into the picture. (*Ibid.*, 762B.5411/6–1758) Telegram 3749, June 17, asked for precise instructions on receipt of documentation on the chance that Winzer agreed to accept McQuail’s credentials at their June 18 meeting. (*Ibid.*)

² Dated June 14 and 16, respectively. (*Ibid.*, 762B.5411/6–1458 and 762B.5411/6–1658)

the spot. FYI. This approach designed eliminate basis of Winzer's assertion bilateral agreement necessary to regulate matter. End FYI.)

(d) I or officer receiving personnel at border am prepared give receipt certifying transfer of personnel and aircraft to US control. I have receipt ready. (McQuail should then give Winzer copy of unsigned receipt reading as follows:

"To Whom It May Concern: I hereby acknowledge receipt of one helicopter (insert type, model, etc.) property of the U.S. Army, and of following named personnel of the U.S. Army (insert names).

Signed at _____, this _____ day of June, 1958.

Robert P. McQuail, Col. USA

(or signature any other officer actually accepting turn-over).")

(e) In conclusion I have been instructed to state that I regard these dilatory tactics re return of personnel and aircraft as inexplicable, unjustifiable, and contrary to normal and reasonable procedures in matters of this type. I therefore trust you will arrange prompt return of personnel and helicopter.

2. If wording of receipt becomes issue McQuail should be authorized make changes such as:

(a) Modification of description of helicopter and personnel as appropriate.

(b) Insertion in body of receipt after "I" and/or, following signature, phrase "duly authorized representative of the U.S. Government".

(c) To Otto Winzer (or other named individual) instead of "To Whom It May Concern".

(d) As last resort, and if this is only unsettled issue, use of heading "To Otto Winzer" (or any other name) followed by description of official position such as Deputy Foreign Minister, GDR.

3. If Winzer continues insist on an agreement signed by both sides, McQuail should reiterate any such agreement regarded as unacceptable and unnecessary and should break off discussion without setting date for future meeting.

Ambassador and CINCUSAREUR authorized to modify at their discretion any tactical step within framework above instructions.

We will try inform British French and Germans here today of substance above instructions but since this may not be feasible suggest you inform them as well.

FYI. Consideration being given here to appropriate procedure for raising issue with Soviets in diplomatic channels if McQuail-Winzer discussions do not lead to satisfactory conclusion.³

Dulles

³ McQuail and Winzer met again on June 18 and 19, but failed to reach agreement on release of the helicopter and passengers. Winzer insisted that an intergovernmental agreement be signed to effect the release and McQuail rejected the proposal. McQuail reported on these meetings in unnumbered telegrams, June 18 and 19. (*Ibid.*, 762B.5411/6-1859 and 762B.5411/6-1959)

273. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 20, 1958.

SUBJECT

Delivery of Aide-Mémoire on Helicopter in East Germany Case to Soviet Chargé d'Affaires¹

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Murphy—G

Mr. Sergei P. Striganov, Soviet Chargé d'Affaires

Mr. Anatoli G. Myshkov, Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy

Mr. Lisle—GER

Mr. Murphy told Mr. Striganov, who had called at Mr. Murphy's request, that he wished to take up the case of the helicopter which had been forced down near Zwickau in East Germany. Under the terms of agreements made in the early days after the war between Generals Clay and Sokolovsky and between Generals Huebner and Malinin, there are procedures for the return of personnel of one Force held by other. These agreements have worked well. Within the past year the United States authorities have returned a Soviet soldier and, only three weeks ago, the Soviet authorities returned three United States airmen to American control. Mr. Murphy said he had been asked to deliver an aide-mémoire giving the facts of the case and to ask that it be transmitted to the Soviet Government. He noted that, after days, the United States public is becoming very disturbed.

The Soviet representatives read the aide-mémoire slowly and with evident care.

When they had finished Mr. Murphy said he would be grateful for the transmission of the aide-mémoire. He urged that sympathetic consideration be given to it as the present situation is a most unhappy one.

Mr. Striganov, speaking in Russian translated by Mr. Myshkov, stated that he would send the aide-mémoire to Moscow. However, he wished to note that apparently the helicopter and personnel are on the territory of the German Democratic Republic. As far as he could understand, therefore, the helicopter and personnel were at present within the jurisdiction of the authorities of the GDR. Therefore, it would appear that the question of their transferral to the American authorities was in the hands of the appropriate authorities in the GDR.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/6-2058. Confidential. Drafted by Lisle on June 21 and initialed by Murphy.

¹ For text of the aide-mémoire, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 14, 1958, pp. 52–54.

Mr. Murphy replied that what was ignored in Mr. Striganov's statement was that there are agreements among the Four Powers who have responsibility for Germany. These agreements have been respected and, in fact, recently invoked. Suddenly the Soviets say that they have no responsibilities. This, Mr. Murphy said, he could not understand.

Mr. Striganov replied that he was not familiar with the facts and therefore could not discuss them.

Mr. Murphy retorted that of course Mr. Striganov was not familiar with the facts and that he had assumed Mr. Striganov would not wish to discuss them until he had heard from his Government. However, Mr. Striganov had raised the substantive features of the case and had commented on them and that is why Mr. Murphy had felt he must reply.

Mr. Striganov stated he must emphasize that the helicopter landed in GDR territory and was now within the competence of the GDR authorities. As to the statements made in the aide-mémoire, he was not in a position to discuss them.

Mr. Murphy asked whether Mr. Striganov wished to carry on a discussion now. Mr. Striganov replied that he was ready to discuss the question of the GDR. The helicopter was on its territory, within its jurisdiction, and not in the hands of the Soviets. He knew nothing of the alleged agreements referred to in the aide-mémoire and did not wish to discuss them.

Mr. Murphy replied that he was familiar with the GDR and did not want to discuss it with Mr. Striganov. He did wish to discuss Soviet obligations under their agreements. The Soviet authorities have certain responsibilities and that is why Mr. Striganov had been asked to come in.

Mr. Striganov said he would refer the aide-mémoire to his Government.

In leaving, Mr. Striganov replied in response to Mr. Murphy's question that the ballet troupe would stay one more week in New York. Mr. Murphy complimented him on the troupe's superb performance.

274. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick)

Washington, July 1, 1958, 10:29 a.m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO MR ELBRICK

The Sec asked re the flyers in East Germany—have we dropped any direct efforts with the East Germans. E said yes. We got nowhere when the military went to call on the E German Fonmin—we went back to the Soviets and told them of the difficulties but have had no reply and that is why Murphy is seeing Striganoff now.¹ This does not preclude our working with them at whatever level we might designate. The Belgians did this and it did not cause much concern. The Sec said recognition is a matter of intent. If you sign a piece of paper without intent . . .² E said the legal people have a different view. We have been proceeding on that basis, but it became sticky so we went back to the Russians. We may have to return to the E Germans. They agreed we should coordinate with the Fedrep.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Drafted and initialed by Bernau.

¹ Since no reply had been received to the aide-mémoire of June 20, Murphy called Striganov in again on July 1, repeated the arguments that had been presented on the previous occasion, and gave the Soviet Chargé a second aide-mémoire reiterating the responsibility of the Soviet Union for the helicopter and its passengers. (Memorandum of conversation, July 1; Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/7-158) For text of the aide-mémoire, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 21, 1958, p. 108.

² Ellipsis in the source text.

275. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, July 2, 1958, midnight.

12. Topping, Berlin AP correspondent, was asked suddenly this morning if he wished to accompany East German correspondents to visit detained helicopter crew. Accompanied by eight East German cor-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/7-258. Confidential; Niact. Also sent priority to Bonn and repeated priority to USAREUR, London, Moscow, and Paris.

respondents convoy of four cars proceeded from Berlin direct to Dresden. Prior to press conference there arranged by Alex Gruettner, official East German Foreign Ministry, Topping had opportunity to forewarn group privately large scale press conference was impending, suggested group designate spokesman, warned he would be only American correspondent present.

At subsequent press conference attended by East German news-reel, TV and newspaper correspondents US group spokesman Major Kemper stated: "They are holding us as political hostages. We are being used as tools. We are not being told about what is going on in the political negotiations over us. I can't imagine why we are being held. We got into East Germany accidentally". Said his group voluntarily surrendered to the East German police after their helicopter became lost due to a thunderstorm and landed out of gas. Helicopter damaged in landing. Following surrender to East German police East Germans promptly turned Americans over to Russian Army and they spent first night in a Soviet camp. Next morning the Russians returned them to the East Germans with the pledge that they would be released. Part of group questioned by Soviets first night, subsequently all of group interrogated by East Germans.

At this morning's press conference Gruettner echoed Winzer's statement regarding willingness East Germany release crew provided U.S. deal with East Germany on government to government basis, and avoid implication East Germany still a zone of occupation. Emphasized East Germany a sovereign nation. To this Captain Frank Athanson shouted: "Two of your people in civilian clothes took me to Russian headquarters that night. A Russian officer signed a receipt for me. I stayed under Russian control that night. That is not the action of a sovereign state." East German said this procedure normal under mutual troop stationing agreement between Russia and East Germany. Athanson said: "Yeah. Mutual agreement or were you getting instructions?"

In response to group's complaint that they had no news U.S. efforts in their behalf Topping was able to advise group privately of U.S. concern for them and assure them of high level negotiations going on for their release.

Following Topping's reassurances, group spokesman indicated willingness group to stick it out until release effected.¹

Hillenbrand

¹ Hillenbrand discussed the press conference with Topping on July 3. Topping believed the East Germans were beginning to be embarrassed by the helicopter incident, and that the press conference, which was held to bolster their position, had backfired. (Telegram 17 from Berlin, July 3; *ibid.*, 726B.5411/7-358) General Hamlett also talked with Topping on July 3 and reported along similar lines. (Telegram 18 from Berlin, July 3; *ibid.*)

276. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 11, 1958.

SUBJECT

United States Army Personnel Held in Soviet Zone of Germany

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Menshikov, Soviet Embassy
Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary
Mr. Anatoli G. Myshkov, Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy
Mr. Charles G. Stefan, EE

Mr. Murphy stated that we were still awaiting a Soviet response to the aide-mémoire concerning the American helicopter and its crew in East Germany which had been handed to Soviet Chargé Striganov by Mr. Herter on July 3, 1958.¹ Mr. Murphy observed that public opinion in the United States is becoming increasingly concerned about the failure of the Soviet Government to honor its agreements and about the prolonged and unjustifiable detention of the crew of the U.S. Army helicopter held in East Germany. We cannot accept the patently erroneous contention of the Soviet Government, expressed in the Soviet note of July 2,² that the Soviet authorities have no responsibility in this case. The United States Government continues to hold the Soviet Government responsible for seeing that the men are returned without further delay.

Mr. Murphy stated that the continued detention of the men and their prolonged separation from their families was inhumane. The attitude shown by the Soviet Government and by the local German authorities in the Soviet zone of Germany is difficult to reconcile with the frequent Soviet protestations of desire for better understanding and a relaxation of tensions. Mr. Murphy then observed that we have noted the Soviet statement that arrangements for the return of the men and the helicopter should be discussed with the German authorities in the Soviet zone. However, we would like the Ambassador to remember the action already taken by American military authorities in Germany in this regard. The Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces in Germany

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/7–1158. Confidential. Drafted by Stefan on July 15 and initialed by Murphy.

¹ During his conversation with Striganov on July 3, Herter repeated the U.S. concern about the military personnel and tasked the Soviet Union with living up to its agreements, particularly since the press conference on July 2 revealed that Soviet forces had custody of the soldiers at one time. A memorandum of this conversation and a copy of the aide-mémoire presented to Striganov are *ibid.*, 762B.5411/7–358. The aide-mémoire is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, July 28, 1958, pp. 147–148.

² For text, see *ibid.*, p. 148.

had arranged a meeting between the competent American representative and the local German authorities, who were actually holding our men, in order to discuss arrangements for their return. The American representative had indicated his willingness to comply with all normal and reasonable requirements in arranging the release of our men. Mr. Murphy then pointed out during the press conference organized by local German authorities on July 2 it clearly emerged that our men had originally been turned over by local German authorities to Soviet military authorities at a Soviet camp. Some of the men had even been interrogated by Soviet officers while in Soviet custody.

Mr. Murphy then stated that local German authorities of the Soviet zone have made it clear that they desire to extort some form of political ransom as a condition for the return of the men. Mr. Murphy stated that this was unacceptable to us. Mr. Murphy added that we fail to understand what the USSR expects to gain from a continuation of the situation. On the other hand, the Soviet Government permits the local German authorities of the Soviet zone to attempt to force us to pay a sort of blackmail for the return of the men. Mr. Murphy stated that we would like the Ambassador to know that a continuation of this situation can only worsen the relations of the Soviet Union and the United States to the benefit of neither country.

Ambassador Menshikov stated that he would inform the Foreign Ministry of Mr. Murphy's remarks. He noted that Mr. Murphy had stated that we fail to understand the Soviet position. The Ambassador stated that frankly he did not understand our attitude. He asserted that whether we liked it or not, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) is a sovereign state. Soviet troops were stationed in the GDR in accordance with an agreement between the USSR and the GDR and were not occupation troops. In the opinion of the Soviet side, all the questions connected with the return of the helicopter and its crew ought to be settled with the GDR. The Ambassador noted that Soviet authorities had helped American authorities establish contacts with the GDR because the United States did not maintain relations with the GDR. The Ambassador reiterated, however, that the only way to settle this issue was by direct negotiations with the GDR.

Mr. Murphy stated that the Soviets have agreements with us, which only recently the USSR had recognized by returning three American airmen to us. We, in turn, had recently returned one soldier to the Soviet Union. Suddenly the helicopter case arose and the Soviet Union, in effect, is asserting that it will not live up to the US-Soviet agreement covering this kind of case. Mr. Murphy asked the Ambassador if the Soviet Union has relinquished all of its rights under Four-Power agreements relating to Germany. The Ambassador responded that he did not know about these agreements, but that he was speaking about the agreements

concluded between the USSR and the GDR. Mr. Murphy then asked the Ambassador if he thought that these agreements relieved the Soviet Union of the responsibilities which it had incurred under Four-Power agreements, including arrangements with respect to the status of Berlin. Ambassador Menshikov evaded a direct response to this query, and merely reiterated that the Soviet Government had no responsibility in connection with the return of the helicopter and its crew.

Mr. Murphy concluded by stating that the agreements the Soviet Union had concluded with East Germany were of no concern to the United States and had nothing to do with the current problem. Mr. Murphy said that we assume the Soviet Union would want to honor the earlier agreements with us, particularly if the Soviet Union is really interested in relaxing tensions between the United States and the USSR. He stressed that we look to the Soviet Union for action on this matter, and asked Ambassador Menshikov to make another effort to persuade his Government in this direction.

277. Editorial Note

On June 25, German Minister Franz Krapf suggested to the Department of State that if the Soviet Union failed to intervene to secure the release of the helicopter and military personnel, the United States might consider using Red Cross channels. (Telegram 3328 to Bonn, June 25; Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/6–2558) By the beginning of July, the Department of State had followed up on this suggestion by having the American Red Cross contact the East German Red Cross to facilitate delivery of packages and mail to the men. On July 12, Robert S. Wilson, the Director of Operations in Europe of the American Red Cross, began discussions with Emil Risch, Vice President of the East German Red Cross, concerning their release. Further negotiations on July 14 resulted in the signing of an agreement on July 17 arranging the exchange of the men and helicopter on July 19.

Records of Wilson's conversations with Risch, copies of the agreement, and the texts of the receipts given for the nine men and the aircraft were transmitted in despatch 2 from Heidelberg, July 28. (*Ibid.*, 762B.5411/7–2858) Additional documentation on the support given Wilson's efforts by the Department of State and the U.S. Army is *ibid.*, 762B.5411. For text of the July 17 agreement and the July 19 receipt for the men, see *Dokumente*, III, Band 4, 1958, Zweiter Drittelband, pages 1469–1472.

278. Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research

No. 7775

Washington, August 11, 1958.

**THE FIFTH CONGRESS OF THE SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY (SED)
OF EAST GERMANY, JULY 10-16, 1958: "ADVANCE TOWARD
GERMAN REUNIFICATION THROUGH THE ECONOMIC
BUILDUP AND SOCIALIZATION OF EAST GERMANY"****Abstract**

The Fifth Congress of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) of East Germany, held during July 10-16, 1958, displayed a cohesiveness and a morale higher than of any previous congress. The actions taken and the program announced at the congress indicate that East Germany has become the main area in Europe where Khrushchev's battle of economics and diplomacy with the West will be waged. Ulbricht and the other SED leaders gave every indication that they believe this Soviet decision has greatly improved the prospect for the reunification of Germany on SED terms: that is, as a neutralized confederation of two diverse political, social, and economic systems.

The program drawn up by the congress involves catching up economically with West Germany by 1961, rejecting "revisionism" totally, accelerating the socialization and the ideological indoctrination of East Germany, and undertaking intensified subversion of West German "peace organizations", trade unions, and the SPD. Catching up economically with West Germany will be facilitated by the abolition, effective January 1, 1959, of all Soviet troop support costs, and the receipt of major USSR credits and economic assistance, especially during 1959-60. By 1961, the standard of living in East Germany is expected to have reached a point sufficiently high so that the East German Government will no longer be embarrassed about it. Thereafter, according to the congress, the competition between the two German states would be primarily political, ideological, and psychological.

In the closed sessions, Ulbricht's demands regarding the composition of the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Secretariat were accepted totally. As a consequence, Ulbricht again emerged as the undisputed ruler of the party both ideologically and organizationally.

[Here follow sections I. Introduction, II. Program, and III. Ulbricht's Reshuffling of the Ruling Bodies.]

Summary

The SED, as seen at the Fifth Party Congress, has emerged from the serious ideological and other failings of 1956-57 with remarkable vigor and cohesiveness. The party is dominated completely by Ulbricht, who has a comprehensive grasp of the intellectual and organizational problems with which it is confronted. Because of the essential change in the relations between the GDR and the USSR, which began in late 1957, East Germany expects to receive a volume of credits and other economic assistance from the USSR during 1959-60 sufficient to enable it not only to continue the socialization of agriculture, handicrafts, and the building industry, but also to expand production in all these branches. Industrial output in 1959-60, as a result of the supply of USSR and Soviet-bloc raw materials, is expected to increase by more than DME 6 billion (US \$2.7 billion, at official exchange rates). On the social and cultural front, the party will seek to intensify the indoctrination of the population; "polytechnical" education will be the principal means used with the younger generations. The party is confident that, given its recent internal reorganization, it will ultimately establish control over the population of East Germany and that it will likewise defeat the West German Government in the contest for domination of Germany as a whole.

The actions taken and the programs announced at the congress indicate that East Germany has become the main area in Europe where Khrushchev's battle of economics and diplomacy with the West will be waged. Ulbricht and the other SED leaders gave every indication that they believe this Soviet decision has greatly improved the prospect for the reunification of Germany on SED terms: that is, as a neutralized confederation of two diverse political, social and economic systems. For the first time in its history the SED raised unequivocally to a cardinal position the thesis that the socialization of East Germany does not conflict with the reunification of Germany but rather is a prerequisite for it, since it is the only guarantee that in a reunited Germany conditions would not prevail which would lead to the destruction of the East German Government and the SED.

Though the importance of the SED policy changes is indubitable, it is obviously still too early to predict their eventual impact on both West and East Germany.

279. Paper Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board

Washington, September 3, 1958.

**OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD REPORT ON
GERMANY (EAST GERMANY) (NSC 5803—Supplement II)**

(Approved by the President on February 7, 1958)

(Period Covered: From July 17, 1957 Through September 3, 1958)

A. Summary Evaluation

1. Owing to the continued intransigence of the U.S.S.R., no progress could be made during this period toward achievement of the basic long-range objective of the reunification of Germany in freedom. The Communist regime of the Soviet Zone was able to continue the gradual consolidation of its position within Eastern Germany. Measures for greater control of the church, of universities, and of travel to the West have been effectively instituted. The Communist Party leader, Walter Ulbricht, carried out a successful purge of high-ranking party members who had taken a position at variance with his own program for pushing ahead rapidly with further steps of communization.

2. The regime was successful in gaining a certain measure of international acceptance during this period. It received diplomatic recognition from Yugoslavia in 1957. It also succeeded in bringing official representatives of the United States and Belgium to negotiate directly with it for the release of the crews of aircraft which had strayed into the Zone and in inducing the Belgians to sign a formal governmental agreement with it in this connection.

3. Continued use was made of the Western position in the Federal Republic and Berlin to make these areas appear attractive and the Zonal regime correspondingly unattractive in the eyes of the East Germans. Partially because of these influences, and owing also in part to the broadcasts of RIAS (Radio in the American Sector of Berlin) and to the various joint projects of the German population in maintaining the connections of the East German population with the West, the population of Eastern Germany has continued opposed to the regime though there is no longer any great hope of a resolution of their problems through the reunification of their country in the immediate future.

Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5803. Series. Secret. For the section of this report on Germany (Berlin) see vol. VIII, Document 19. For the section on Germany (the Federal Republic) see Document 246. A Financial Annex is not printed.

4. A review of policy is not recommended.

B. Major Operating Problems or Difficulties Facing the United States

5. *Possibility of Uprising.* The potentially most serious operating problem facing the United States is the possibility of an uprising in Eastern Germany. However, by present indications a widespread uprising in Eastern Germany appears unlikely though it always remains a possibility. Such an uprising might involve direct conflict between Soviet and NATO forces. If it were repressed by Soviet forces, Western prestige would suffer a heavy blow even though the U.S.S.R. would be still further discredited.

6. *Hindering Regime Progress toward International Acceptance.* Another major problem we face is to prevent or slow down further progress of the Zonal regime toward international acceptance. Such acceptance could lead finally to widespread international recognition of the Zone, and thus to the consolidation of the Soviet position in Germany and in its European satellite system. This problem has manifested itself particularly in the three following areas:

a. The U.S.S.R. has attempted to transfer to the Soviet Zone regime its responsibilities for Germany as a whole, for the Soviet Zone and for Berlin under quadripartite agreements and arrangements. Simultaneously, the Soviet Zone regime has attempted to utilize its control over the territory and airspace of Eastern Germany, including the access routes to Berlin, to force the Western Powers, particularly the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic, to deal with it officially and on a high level. The case of the American helicopter whose crew was forcibly retained by the regime in June 1958 (see paragraph 11 of Annex A to this Report) and used as a basis for the attempt to extort recognition from the United States is an excellent example of this process. Such dealings could be pushed further and further up the scale in the direction of diplomatic recognition. Evidence of Western acceptance could be used by the regime to encourage diplomatic recognition from uncommitted countries, particularly in Asia and the Near East, and to demonstrate to the population of the Soviet Zone that further resistance to the regime is futile since even powerful states hostile to the regime have come to accept it as part of the status quo in international affairs.

b. Independent of but related to this process, have been the attempts of the GDR regime to exploit the German desire for reunification by bringing public pressure to bear on the Federal German Government to enter upon closer relations with the regime. There is already a considerable body of opinion in Western Germany which sees such relations as the only way to make progress towards German reunification. Closer official contact with East Germany is a part of the official policy of both

major opposition parties. This trend would be greatly accentuated by further evidence of Western acceptance of the status quo in Germany, whether voluntary or enforced. Closer official relations between the Government of the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone regime, whether through extortion or increased political pressure from within the Federal Republic, would have a considerable effect in undermining the case against international recognition of the Zone and in furthering acceptance of the regime outside Germany. Closer official relations could also be a step toward involvement in a morass of negotiations in which the Soviet Zone regime might be able to influence Federal Republic policy by exploiting the desires of the West German population for an improvement in the living conditions of their East German relatives and friends. The Soviet Zone regime might, for example, pose conditions which would limit the freedom of movement of the Federal Republic in foreign policy questions.

c. The GDR regime has also striven to gain membership or participation in governmental and non-governmental international organizations, to establish trade and cultural missions abroad, and to establish connections between its agencies and institutions in the non-Communist world. Success in any of these efforts can be used as a lever to gain admission into additional organizations and given full exploitation in propaganda addressed to the Zonal population as an indication of world acceptance of the regime and the futility of further opposition to it. A further complicating factor in this context lies in the increasing tendency of Western public opinion to confound the Soviet Zone with countries of Eastern Europe with which it may be in the Western interest to improve relations and to feel that closer relations with the Zonal regime may result in an "evolutionary" development there—an illusory hope in the light of the regime's total dependence on Soviet military support.

7. *Declining Morale.* A gradual worsening of Soviet Zone morale, as the division of Germany continues, remains a severe problem. The regime is likely to take further repressive measures against the churches and within the universities of the Soviet Zone and against travel from the Soviet Zone to the Federal Republic. Such developments, coupled with continued failure of the Western Powers to bring the U.S.S.R. closer to a negotiated settlement of the German question and evidence of increasing international acceptance of the Soviet Zone, may result in increased apathy and an increased tendency to accept the continued existence of the regime as a permanent fact of life. Increases in the pervasiveness of this attitude would naturally assist the regime in further consolidating its position in the Zone.

Note: See National Intelligence Estimate NIE 12–56, dated 10 January 1956, “Probable Developments in the European Satellites Through 1960”.¹

Annex A

ADDITIONAL MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS

8. *Economic Developments.* The regime carried out a currency conversion in October 1957 primarily designed to decrease the amount of money in circulation, but aimed also at private businessmen, the churches and other hostile groups in the population. Food rationing was ended in May 1958. As a result of new arrangements with the USSR, programs to induce higher productivity will almost certainly result in the increases of production necessary to meet the economic goal established by the regime for 1958. An extensive economic reorganization on the Soviet pattern is being carried through. In sum, the immediate prospect is that the economy will continue to make steady progress at a higher rate than in the past.

9. *GDR Trade with Non-Communist Countries.*

a. In January 1958 the GDR Foreign Trade Minister claimed that in 1957 trade with capitalist countries was 23.7% larger than in 1956, indicating a volume of \$537,900,000 at the official ruble/dollar exchange rate. He also stated that GDR trade with capitalist countries was just under 27% of the country's total foreign trade. Trade with the UAR and Sudan was double the 1956 figure and trade with India 70% higher.

b. New trade agreements (between unofficial contracting parties) were concluded with Italy in mid-1957 and Vietnam in March 1958. The unofficial agreement with Yugoslavia was replaced by a government-to-government agreement in October 1957. Trade agreements with non-Communist countries, all unofficial, now number seventeen (including the Federal Republic of Germany). Unofficial trade missions were established on a more or less permanent basis in Argentina, Denmark, Iceland, and Italy, in addition to the officially recognized trade missions in Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, India, and Indonesia, bringing the total to ten in non-Communist countries.

10. *Refugees.* The refugee flow from the Zone continues, with over 260,000 people leaving the area in 1957. The flow has continued high in

¹ For text, see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. XXV, pp. 115–118.

1958, amounting to approximately 96,000 in the first six months of the year. The regime has been suffering from the economic effects of this continual drain of productive manpower and has imposed heavy exemplary prison sentences on persons apprehended while attempting to leave the Zone without permission.

11. *Soviet Evasion of Responsibility.* As indicated above (see paragraph 6. a. of this Report), the obverse of the problem of preventing the acceptance of the GDR regime is that of maintaining the principle of Soviet responsibility in the Soviet Zone. Recently there have been two flagrant instances of Soviet attempts to disclaim such responsibility. On June 7, 1958 a United States Army helicopter mistakenly crossed the zonal border and made a forced landing in the Soviet Zone. Although they were obliged to do so under long-standing agreements and arrangements, the Soviets refused to return the men and the aircraft to United States control, insisting that the matter fell within the competence of the "sovereign" GDR. (The men were returned July 19, 1958 through the mediation of the American and East German Red Cross societies.) On June 18, 1958 an organized mob ransacked the headquarters of the United States Military Liaison Mission to the Soviet Forces in Potsdam.² The Soviets took the position that "such demonstrations are an unalterable right of the population of each sovereign democratic republic". Although vigorous protests were made in each instance, it did not appear that the United States and the other Western Powers would have the means to oblige the Soviets to acknowledge their responsibility.

12. *Fifth SED Party Congress.* The Fifth Party Congress of the Soviet Zone Communist Party, the Socialist Unity Party (SED), took place between July 10-16, 1958, with Khrushchev leading the list of non-German participants from the Soviet Bloc. The main themes of the Congress were (a) that East Germany and the remainder of the Bloc were entering a phase of accelerated economic development and economic interrelationship within the Bloc which would have the result of bringing per capita consumption in Eastern Germany on a level with that of the Federal Republic by 1961; (b) the strength and unity of the Bloc and its inevitable victory over capitalism; and (c) the necessity for relentless eradication of "revisionism" as exemplified by Tito. The Congress criticized Schirdewan, Oelssner, Selbmann and other Party leaders purged by Ulbricht in February of this year, but none was ejected from the Party.

² Documentation on this incident and a similar attack on the British Mission the same day is in Department of State, Central File 762.0221.

280. Despatch From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

No. 520

Berlin, January 28, 1959.

SUBJECT

United States Policy Regarding Non-Recognition of the Soviet Zone Regime

This Mission has recently noted among important American officials and private citizens visiting Berlin an apparent lack of understanding of the U.S. policy of non-recognition of the Soviet Zone regime. Many visitors insistently query, "Why don't we recognize the GDR (German Democratic Republic)? After all, it has been in existence some time. It is a fact. We have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European satellite states, likewise Communist regimes. Why don't we deal with the East German authorities to recover our boys like Lt. Mackin?"¹ The West Germans deal with the East Germans on a lot of matters, they and many other countries do business with East German officials. Why don't we recognize the GDR?"

In reply to such queries Mission officers have in general been making the following points:

1) The so-called German Democratic Republic is a Communist puppet regime, established under Soviet military occupation in the Soviet Zone of Germany. Unlike the Federal Republic in West Germany, which was established by democratic processes and free elections, the GDR lacks popular consent. It would not last more than a few days if the 22 Soviet divisions were withdrawn from East Germany. In the past ten years around 2,500,000 Germans have fled from the Soviet Zone into West Germany. Between 80 and 90% of the remaining population in the Soviet Zone are opposed to the Communist regime and the Communist effort to make a separate state, the German Democratic Republic, out of the Soviet occupation zone. The majority of the East Germans, as well as the West Germans and Berliners, hope for the eventual reunification of Germany and the exercise of national self-determination with respect to their form of government and socio-economic system. These hopes are in large measure pinned to the steadfastness of U.S. policy.

2) Recognition of the so-called GDR would mean acceptance of a permanent division of Germany. This would be in direct contradiction

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62B/1-2859. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, London, Moscow, Munich, Frankfurt, Vienna, Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, and Bucharest.

¹ On December 4, 1958, Lieutenant Richard Mackin bailed out of his airplane and landed in East Germany where he was held by officials of the German Democratic Republic. He was finally released on February 5, 1959, through the efforts of the Red Cross.

to Allied pledges made to the German people at the end of the war concerning restoration of national German unity, and likewise would be in contradiction to the justified desires of the German people for reunification. It would undermine the work of those German political elements supporting inclusion of Germany in an integrated Europe. It would probably ultimately lead to the development in Germany of extreme nationalistic elements, since it cannot be assumed that the German people would ever in the long run acquiesce in this division.

3) The Soviets have been seeking in recent years formal acknowledgment by the West of the status quo in Central and Eastern Europe. To accept the status quo means to accept the expansion of Soviet power into the heart of Europe. Recognition of the GDR would give the Soviets the formal acknowledgement of the status quo that they have been seeking. It would mean the acceptance of Soviet power in Central and Eastern Europe on a permanent and legal basis.

The situation with respect to the GDR is quite different from that of the Eastern European satellite countries whom we do recognize. Our diplomatic relations with the satellite countries antedate the Communist regimes. Continuation of diplomatic relations has positive advantages to the United States. It does not condone the Communist regime and is not regarded as doing so by the satellite peoples. Moreover, despite boundary changes the satellite countries are whole countries, not a small part of a divided country like the GDR. Were the U.S. to recognize the GDR, however, it would be recognizing not a country, but the *partition* of a country.

Moreover, recognition of the GDR would have a damaging effect on the Eastern European satellites. It would signify acceptance by the West of the status quo, not only as regards East Germany but also for all the satellites—would as it were “cork the bottle”, thereby making a major contribution to the stability of the entire Soviet satellite system in Eastern Europe.

4) Most of those in the West who propose recognition are motivated by a desire for a solution which will lessen tensions in Central Europe and promote stability. Recognition of the GDR would not, however, lead to a permanent stability. Not only would there be bitterness among the Germans and a stimulation of German extremist national tendencies, but there would be an increase of insecurity among Western Europeans, who would clearly interpret recognition as a significant advance of Soviet power. Moreover, this gain would be likely to whet the appetite of the Soviets, leading them to pursue their expansionist objectives even more aggressively, with an attendant increased state of instability and tension. Specifically, the Soviets and the East German Communist regime have consistently reiterated that winning control over all Germany is an immediate objective. Recognition would help

stabilize the Communist position in East Germany and facilitate the further use of the Soviet Zone as a springboard for penetration of West Germany directed toward this objective.

5) West Germany deals with East Germany only in non-political matters such as post, railway, inland transport, trade, etc. These relations are carefully kept on a technical level only. They are maintained in the interest of the welfare of the German population, both East and West, and in an effort to preserve some semblance of unity in so far as is possible without compromising the liberties of the free Western part. The West Germans do not recognize the East German government as a legitimate authority. They have constantly opposed the recognition of the GDR by non-Soviet bloc states. The Federal Republic has stated that it will break off diplomatic relations with any country aside from the USSR, which recognized the GDR. The Federal Republic broke its diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia when that country recognized the GDR in October 1957. No Western or non-Communist country has granted diplomatic recognition to the GDR, although many have commercial dealings.

6) The rights of the Western powers in Berlin, and their free access to Berlin, derive from the defeat of Nazi Germany. If the U.S. were to accept the Soviet turnover of their responsibilities to the GDR, if the U.S. were to deal with East German authorities in connection with the access of our armed forces to West Berlin, the U.S. would be permitting the Soviets to cancel a right acquired by American victory in World War II. Control by the East Germans would mean that the victor was submitting to control by the defeated.

Also the United States cannot deal with the East German authorities in such matters as the recovery of American servicemen. The U.S. holds the Soviet authorities responsible under the Huebner-Malinin Agreement for the return of American military personnel from the Soviet Zone. The Soviets are trying to shift their responsibility to the East German authorities. If we were to deal with the East German authorities in such cases, we would be accepting the Soviets' evasion of their responsibility. Moreover, any official U.S. contact with the East German authorities in such cases would be utilized by them in their efforts to claim de facto recognition; the East Germans even endeavor to interpret in such a way the mediation of the American Red Cross in the helicopter case last June.

7) The East German authorities have been stating consistently that the Western Allies no longer have a legal right to remain in West Berlin. Recognition of the GDR would make the presence of Allied forces in West Berlin depend upon the acquiescence of the GDR authorities. It would both legally and technically undermine the Western position in Berlin based, as it is, on a residual occupation regime. If we were to

recognize the GDR we would have to accept as a corollary the withdrawal of Allied forces from West Berlin and the abandonment of the West Berliners, contrary to our solemnly pledged word.

The foregoing points, this Mission recognizes, do not represent a full statement on the U.S. policy of non-recognition but rather indicate the lines of argumentation which we here have used. In view of the recurrent nature of these queries and the concurrent need for a clear understanding of our policy in other posts, particularly at this time, the Department may wish to consider the issuance of a definitive statement similar to the excellent paper on our China policy transmitted under cover of the Department's Circular Airgram No. 1452, August 12, 1958.² If such a statement could be unclassified, as was the statement on our policy regarding non-recognition of the Chinese Communist regime, it would be particularly useful.

Bernard Gufler

Assistant Chief of Mission

² A copy of this airgram is in Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-1258.

281. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, February 1, 1960, 8:34 p.m.

1636. Paris for USCINCEUR, Thurston and Finn. Your 1417; Berlin's 603 sent Bonn 526.¹ Department's initial comments follow: Western

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2-160. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by McFarland; cleared with Hillenbrand, SOV, L/EUR, and the Department of Defense; and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Berlin USAREUR, Heidelberg, London, Paris, and Moscow.

¹ Telegram 603 from Berlin, February 1, reported that new passes had been issued for the Western Military Liaison Missions effective February 15, which incorporated registration of the passes with the German Democratic Republic. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/1-3060) Telegram 1417 from Bonn, January 30, reported that the question of the new passes would be discussed at a tripartite meeting in Bonn on February 2. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/2-160)

On February 2, Herter showed the President a copy of telegram 1636 and discussed with him the problem raised by the new language. (*Ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)

Military Liaison Missions apparently faced with another "Heads they win, tails we lose" situation. Soviets may have decided they can do without their Missions in Federal Republic, relying on military attachés. In final analysis USAREUR must decide how essential continuation of USMLM is to accomplishment its mission; [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. If US (and British and French) decide they can do without these Missions and, if effort through approach to Soviets unsuccessful in obtaining more acceptable form of pass, we prepared to see their withdrawal and to request Soviets withdraw their Missions to Allied Headquarters in Federal Republic accompanied by vigorous protest at violation Huebner–Malinin Agreement. Appropriate public statement should probably follow such decision.

If US, British and French Headquarters not prepared to see Missions withdrawn at once, consequences of their continuation must be studied carefully. While we may be able to live with and teams be able to function on basis new documentation, we must face fact that so doing erodes our position and in long run probably merely postpones final decision.²

If USAREUR asserts USMLM essential we would favor initial tripartite communication to Soviets questioning change in form and wording of permanent passes. If, as is likely, Soviets refuse to alter form or wording of new passes and we have decided continuation Liaison Missions essential, we should probably send tripartite communication to Soviets along following lines:

"Certain changes have been made in the form and wording of the passes issued to USMLM. My Government wishes to make clear that acceptance and use of passes in this altered form by members of its Military Liaison Mission does not constitute any change in its position respecting the so-called German Democratic Republic. My Government, as before, continues to look to the USSR for fulfillment of the provisions of the Huebner–Malinin Agreement of April 5, 1957."

Herter

² At the tripartite meeting on February 2, both the U.S. and French representatives stated that acceptance of the change of language in the new passes might be interpreted as de facto recognition of the German Democratic Republic. [text not declassified] (Telegram 1431 from Bonn, February 2; *ibid.*, 762.0221/2–260)

282. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, February 4, 1960, 3 p.m.

614. Paris for Embassy, USRO, CINCEUR, Thurston and Finn. Ref Dept's G-80 to Bonn, Sept. 28, 1959.¹

Mission is concerned by recent signs of diminution determination within NATO family to prevent or at least deter increase in international acceptance of "GDR". SovZone regime spokesmen have been quick to spot such real or imagined tendencies within Western Alliance to accommodate themselves to "existence of GDR," and ever since GDR participation in Geneva FonMin conference have been repeating to East German population their claims of increasing international recognition. These efforts have not been without some success and most observers of SovZone scene agree growth of resignation in SovZone population has correspondingly accelerated.

Within past months these signs of Western slippage have significantly increased. GDR has made important progress in reported Greek agreement permit semi-scheduled Interflug flights into Athens (our G-167 to Dept),² SAS landings at East German Schoenefeld Airport (ourtel 341 and 497 to Dept)³ and SAS charter Olympic flight from Schoenefeld to Reno, Nevada. Provincial SovZone paper recently announced Danish Government has finally acceded to request from GDR Ministry of Communication for establishment GDR travel bureau in Copenhagen. Italian Government authorized approval issuance visitor's visas to Politburo candidate Kurella and *Neues Deutschland* Chief Editor Axen (ourtel 598 to Dept),⁴ as well as reportedly joining Greek Government in permitting newly purchased, much publicized vacation tour ship *People's Friendship* (formerly the *Stockholm*) to make scheduled stops at Italian and Greek ports en route from Rostock to Black Sea. French Govt was prepared permit GDR MinPres Grotewohl appear on govt controlled TV network until FedRep intervened (ourtel 518 to Dept).⁵ British have acceded to pressure from left-wing Laborite MPs and permitted entrance leading SED propagandists Deter and Brasch in

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762B.02/2-460. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Rome, Athens, Copenhagen, and Oslo.

¹ Airgram G-80 stated that official East German travel abroad was giving the German Democratic Republic increased political standing in some countries and that there was a need for quadripartite discussions to counter it. (*Ibid.*, 033.62B/9-1959)

² Dated December 16, 1959. (*Ibid.*, 962B.9281/12-1659)

³ Dated October 5 and December 5, 1959, respectively. (*Ibid.*, 951.7262A/10-559 and 951.7262A/12-559)

⁴ Dated January 29, 1960. (*Ibid.*, 862A.181/1-2960)

⁵ Dated December 11, 1959. (*Ibid.*, 762B.00/12-1159)

actions which bode ill for interpretation by British of newly achieved tripartite agreement in London on GDR travel. Even we have felt obliged to admit East German officials, such as Rudi Reichert, for Olympic games.

As seen from Berlin, Department's compelling statement in ref message reviewing general question non-recognition of GDR and pointing out urgent need for "forceful reaffirmation Allied policy" is even more pertinent today. Perhaps presentation of tripartite travel agreement to NATO following discussions with FedRep would be appropriate time restate U.S. determination maintain this policy. Regardless of date and place chosen, it seems essential and urgent such a forceful reaffirmation be made in order stop what appears to us as serious slippage in NATO attitudes on this question.⁶

Lightner

⁶ On February 20, the Department of State informed the Mission at Berlin that it shared its concern. After pointing out that there had been no changes in the East German regime to warrant its acceptance, the Department stressed that the Federal Republic, as the most directly affected country, should take more vigorous steps to deal with the problem. (Telegram 1812 to Bonn; *ibid.*, 762B.02/2-460)

283. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, February 5, 1960, 8:14 p.m.

1683. Deliver action officers Bonn, Berlin and Heidelberg eight a.m. Feb. 6. Paris for USCINCEUR Thurston, Finn and USRO. Ref: Deptel 1657 to Bonn, rptd Berlin 372, London 5881, Moscow 1655, Paris 3266; Bonn's 1463; Berlin's 614; Berlin's 616, rptd London 160, Bonn 538, Moscow 179, Paris 173, POLAD USAREUR 71.¹ Joint State-Defense message.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2-560. Secret; Priority. Drafted by McFarland; cleared with Kohler, Merchant, Hillenbrand, Calhoun, BNA, SOV, WE, the Department of Defense, and the JCS; and approved by Merchant. Also sent priority to Berlin and USAREUR Heidelberg and repeated priority to London, Paris, and Moscow.

¹ Telegram 614 from Berlin is Document 282. Telegram 1657, February 3, informed the Embassy in Bonn that instructions would soon be forthcoming on the question of passes. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2-160) Telegram 1463 from Bonn, February 5, transmitted the text of MLM-015-60, February 4 and reported that Soviet officials had stated that the old passes were invalid as of January 30 rather than February 15. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/2-560) Telegram 616 from Berlin, February 4, reported the same information and added that an attempt to use the old passes had failed. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/2-460)

[3 lines of source text not declassified] A projection of this trend together with recent developments, and obvious Soviet intent to force us to acquiesce in political conditions to continue Mission leads to inescapable conclusion that political price is unacceptable.

Defense and State have decided issuance new passes to Western Military Liaison Missions constitutes tactical error on part of Soviets which has presented us with clear issue not involving threat of armed conflict on which we must take firm stand.² No doubt here that acceptance new passes (which acknowledged are still Soviet documents) would put us on slippery slope leading to increased "GDR" interference with function of Missions and concomitant Soviet negation of responsibility for Missions. Agreed present situation, wherein we have not yet accepted new passes, is best in which to take stand. No later opportunity envisaged draw public attention to clearcut distinction between acceptable and unacceptable arrangements.

Department informed British and French today its decision to reject new passes issued January 29-30 and demand revalidation of old passes. We sought British and French support for US position.³

Draft letter being prepared for signature of General Eddleman along foregoing lines being forwarded in next numbered telegram.⁴

For Bonn: Convene tripartite meeting Saturday to outline US position and proposed action.

For Berlin: Inform McQuail, FMLM and BRIXMIS.

For London and Paris: Inform Foreign Office and seek support for US position.

Herter

² A record of the conversation at which this decision was reached is *ibid.*, 762.0221/2-560.

³ A memorandum of Kohler's conversation with Hood and Winckler is *ibid.*

⁴ Transmitted in telegram 1684 to Bonn, February 5, the letter protested the violation of the spirit and letter of the Huebner-Malinin agreement and the interjection of political elements into a strictly military matter, and called for the withdrawal of the new passes and revalidation of the old ones. (*Ibid.*)

284. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, February 9, 1960, 7:54 p.m.

1713. Paris for USCINCEUR, Thurston, Finn and USRO. Deptel to Bonn 1683.¹ Dept (Kohler) informed today by UK Embassy (Hood) of UK views. Hood reports these views also transmitted by UK FonOff to Steel.²

UK does not agree US position. While understanding of political point, consider that problem merely one of "tidying up". Not sure this was meant by Sovs as political test case. Sovs have after all put us on notice that expression "Sov Zone of Germany" inadmissible. [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Accordingly US requested reconsider. UK would propose we make oral *démarche* at military level inquiring purpose new pass. If answer unsatisfactory, then we make written statement at military level saying our acceptance pass in no way changes our position as concerns GDR.

Kohler said we still waiting for French views³ and we would consider UK views but warned we likely come back strongly against UK proposed course action. Danger wrong political judgment in dealing with Sovs was greater danger than possible loss mission. Soviet tactics and careful examination new pass in original languages made clear Sov move purposeful and acceptance likely be cited as precedent to serious injury West position Summit negotiations.

Herter

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2-960. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Vigderman and approved by Kohler. Also sent priority to Berlin and USAREUR Heidelberg and repeated to Paris, London, and Moscow.

¹ Document 283.

² A memorandum of Kohler's conversation with Hood is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2-960. At the same time that Hood was giving Kohler the British view, the Foreign Office called in an official from the Embassy in London and explained the British position. (Telegram 3933 from London, February 9; *ibid.*)

³ On February 10, Lebel informed Kohler that the French were in complete agreement with the U.S. position and that the Foreign Ministry had instructed the French Ambassador in Bonn to assist in obtaining British concurrence. (Memorandum of conversation, February 10; *ibid.*, 762.0021/2-1060)

285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, February 11, 1960, 7:49 p.m.

1736. Paris for USCINCEUR, Thurston, Finn and USRO. Joint State/Defense message. Deptel to Bonn 1729.¹ Soviet move changing form and style of USMLM passes clearly deliberate attempt to measure willingness of Western powers to accept a role for GDR in relationship between Soviet and Western military commands.

Move is to be seen against backdrop of intensive GDR campaign, abetted by Soviets, to enhance status of regime. But present move has additional crucial significance since it suggests Soviets are testing in advance what might happen if one day attempt were made to create role (however minor at beginning) for GDR in connection with allied military travel on routes of access to and from Berlin.

We thus provided with opportunity to demonstrate convincingly that we will not accede to Soviet-GDR moves designed to start us down path of substitution of GDR authorities for Soviets into relationships which stem from rights and agreements between Soviets and ourselves. Moreover, our refusal to acquiesce in this particular gambit does not contain within it risk of precipitating a major crisis. If, in end, Soviets cannot be brought to correct situation they have created, result of our firmness might force closing of our missions, a step we would regret in view their undoubted value. On other hand, risk of making false political move which endangers whole fabric of Western position much more serious.

Our willingness to accept passes in new form would be difficult precedent to discount if similar introduction of GDR role were to be attempted on access routes. Analogy in principle in both cases quite apt, since issue in both cases involves right of movement of allied military personnel through GDR.

Moreover, our posture at summit² would be gravely weakened if Soviets successful in current move. Soviets would have gained wrong impression concerning allied willingness to compromise on question of

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2-1160. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Vigdeman, cleared with Hillenbrand and the Department of Defense, and approved by Kohler. Also sent priority to Berlin and USAREUR Heidelberg and repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

¹ Dated February 10, telegram 1729 to Bonn transmitted the proposed text of a letter to General Zakharov protesting the changes in the passes for the Western Military Liaison Missions. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/2-1060)

² For documentation on the summit conference at Paris in May, see Documents 63 ff.

breaking down existing relationship between Soviets and West in Germany.

We propose US, UK and French military commanders send letter to Zakharov along lines reftel. Next step depends on Zakharov reply. We would refuse a lengthy negotiation with Soviets on form and style of passes, limiting our demand to re-institution of passes in old form. If this not forthcoming, we would restrict movements of Soviet liaison mission personnel.

Depending on nature of reply, we would then consider whether diplomatic *démarches* are indicated prior to taking decision to withdraw Liaison Missions and eject Soviet mission personnel from FedRep. Important consideration here will be to prevent Soviets from maneuvering in a way designed to obscure clear nature of issue presented.

At point at which clear Soviets will not restore passes to old form, we would issue strong statement and launch propaganda campaign to maximize public understanding of issue and advantage gained by demonstration allied firmness.

For London and Paris: Foregoing should be conveyed to FonOff.

For Bonn: Urge British understand that action, to be effective, needs to be taken swiftly.

Herter

286. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, February 11, 1960, 9:05 p.m.

1738. Paris for USCINCEUR, Thurston, Finn and USRO. Our 1729 to Bonn.¹ Following summary based on uncleared memorandum of conversation between Merchant, Caccia and Alphand today on MLM Pass issue:²

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2–1160. Secret; Priority. Drafted by McFarland; cleared with Hillenbrand, Vigderman, and S/S; and approved by Kohler. Also sent to Berlin and USAREUR Heidelberg and repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

¹ See footnote 1, Document 285.

² A memorandum of this conversation, which also included Lebel, Winckler, Hood, Logan, Kohler, Hillenbrand, Long, and McFarland, is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2–1160.

Merchant noted we had sent revised draft Eddleman-Zakharov letter to Bonn. Hoped 3 Western Commanders would send identical or parallel letters leaving no room for Soviet misunderstanding our attitude. Letters draw attention to objectionable characteristics new passes and demand withdrawal. No publicity or indication consequences if our demands not met at this stage to permit Soviet backdown if they desire. Letter, however, drafted with view to eventual publication if necessary. If Soviets fail to back down, we would then move toward restriction of Soviet Missions and their expulsion and withdrawal of our own.

Caccia declared British:

[1 paragraph (1-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

2. Question that Soviets have taken settlement of military problems by commanders out of normal framework and placed them in political field through addition some phrases in German.

3. Wonder whether some other language might be substituted to clear up doubts about character of new pass without necessarily reverting to passes identical with old ones.

Kohler stated language fuzzy. Soviets at later stage such as Summit could hold that registration of pass with GDR is what gives Missions right of travel.

[1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]

Caccia said letter looked all right to him but sought to clarify whether there was not some intermediate stage between possible Soviet refusal to change passes and close out Missions. Suggested negotiations, as means substantially meeting our demands without Soviet retreat.

Merchant replied if our demands "substantially" met through negotiation Soviets would also gain through certain slippage in our position in direction they desired. Lengthy negotiations should not permit Soviet maneuvering to create impression we agree to role for GDR in access control or to obscure clear nature of issue.

British noted new passes being used only for humanitarian purposes at present.

British thought they might want to raise matter to political level before moving to withdrawal.

Merchant agreed that, depending on nature of reply, it might be desirable to consider whether diplomatic *démarche* indicated prior to ordering withdrawal and expulsion of respective Missions.

Herter

287. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Herter

Washington, February 19, 1960.

SUBJECT

Transmitting Suggested Memorandum for the President Reporting Latest Developments Affecting the Western Military Liaison Missions in the Soviet Zone of Germany

Subsequent to your briefing of the President on this subject on February 8,¹ there have been certain additional developments which it seems desirable to bring to his attention. The British have been persuaded, after the exertion of very considerable pressure, to join us and the French in protesting the Soviet action, and calling on the Soviets to correct the situation they have created.

The next move, following the despatch of letters to the Soviet Commander today,² will be up to the Soviets. We have no way of predicting the nature of the Soviet response, but we do not doubt that British reluctance to "rock the boat" will again manifest itself when it comes to the formulation of a common position to be taken to the Soviet response. The British have indicated that the whole question is likely to be brought to the attention of the British Prime Minister, who, in turn, may raise the subject with the President.

The developments of the last week are noted in the attached memorandum which you may wish to sign or use for the purpose of an oral briefing on the subject.

Recommendation

It is recommended that you sign the attached memorandum.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2-1960. Secret. Drafted by Vigderman and initialed by Kohler.

¹ A memorandum of Herter's conversation with the President on February 8, during which he brought Eisenhower up to date on the question of passes, is *ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

² The text of the letter was transmitted in telegram 1579 from Bonn, February 18. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 762.0221/2-1860) The differences between the U.S. and British text were explained in telegram 1578 from Bonn on the same day. (*Ibid.*)

[Attachment]³

Memorandum for the President

Washington, February 20, 1960.

SUBJECT

Unacceptable Documentation for Western Military Liaison Missions in the Soviet Zone of Germany

Since our conversation on this subject February 8, tripartite consultations were pursued here and in Bonn. The United States and France continue to take a very serious view of this obvious Soviet attempt to divest itself of its responsibilities and to create an independent role for the "GDR" in control of Allied movements into and out of Berlin. The British take a different view, arguing that we cannot afford to make an issue of this matter to the point of threatening the continued functioning of the Liaison Missions. After very considerable diplomatic pressure, they have agreed with us that at least letters should be sent protesting the Soviet action and calling on the Soviets to correct the situation they have created. The tone of the British letter, as finally agreed, is only slightly less firm than that of the letters which the United States and French Commanders have sent to Marshal Zakharov.

In an attempt to arrive at a common Western position, we agreed to certain amendments in the draft letters to be sent to make them somewhat less ultimative in character than originally proposed. We have also agreed to give consideration to making a diplomatic *démarche* to the Soviets, depending upon the nature of the reply from Marshal Zakharov.

The US and French are agreed that eventually we must be prepared to order withdrawal of the Soviet Missions from our respective military headquarters in the Federal Republic and to withdraw ours from the Soviet zone if the Soviet authorities refuse to accede to our demand to withdraw the objectionable passes and substitute others in the form and language of those recently cancelled by the Soviets. We do not feel there is room for further slippage in the Western position which would result from the type of protracted, inconclusive discussion the British appear prepared to enter into with the Soviets on this issue. As has been noted, the British have so far refused to be committed to eventual closeout of the Missions.

³ Secret. Drafted by Vigderman and McFarland. A marginal note by Goodpaster on the copy of this memorandum at the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, reads: "22 Feb rptd to President. G."

We will continue to attempt to persuade the British to join with us and the French in taking a firm position in this matter when we have a Soviet response to our letters. It is vital that we not give the Soviets the impression that we might acquiesce in an analogous attempt by them to abrogate, by the substitution of "GDR" for Soviet authorities, their responsibilities with respect to Allied access.

Christian A. Herter⁴

⁴Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

288. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, March 2, 1960, 6 p.m.

4292. Paris for Embassy, USRO, Thurston, and Finn. Bonn's AG to Department G-450 and Deptel 6512.¹ While true that UK during past year has shown itself reluctant to take firm position with respect number of provocative GDR and Soviet actions, Embassy does not believe explanation is to be found in British acceptance of inevitability of "GDR recognition", although it is undoubtedly true that UK attitude toward a divided Germany and concept of "recognition" is different from our own. Point is that British are extremely averse to any Western actions which, in their opinion, could prejudice atmosphere of developing East-West détente. Prime Minister Macmillan is personally deeply committed to idea of consistent and determined Western effort to bring about relaxation of East-West tensions carrying with them danger of nuclear war. He believes that improved East-West atmosphere and agreement on holding of summit conference direct result of his "ice breaking" mission to Moscow in March 1959.²

So far as GDR "recognition" is concerned, Embassy has no info to support thesis that UK Govt is now inclining toward acceptance inevita-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3-260. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bonn and Paris.

¹ Airgram G-450 from Bonn, February 26, reported that since December 1959, the British Embassy in Bonn had acted as if recognition of the German Democratic Republic were only a matter of time. (*Ibid.*, 762.00/2-2660) Telegram 6512 to London stated that the Department of State assumed the Embassy would comment on G-450. (*Ibid.*)

² For documentation on Macmillan's trip to the Soviet Union February 21-March 3, 1959, see vol. VIII, Documents 183 ff.

bility of de jure recognition. UK, however, has shown itself more willing than either US or France to accept situations or actions carrying the implication of de facto recognition. This has been evident for example in UK approach to contingency planning with respect to access to Berlin. UK has also followed visa policy with respect to travelers from GDR which has taken insufficient note of regime's efforts to enhance its international prestige through travel of officials and politically motivated individuals to Western countries. We have repeatedly been told by British officials defending this attitude that Federal Republic has many contacts with East Germany and UK can hardly be expected to be more Catholic than the Pope. Furthermore, relatively poor state of relations between UK and Federal Republic and recurrent controversies and mistrust are not conducive to hard UK line on GDR in defense of what is often viewed by UK as exclusive or predominant Federal Republic interest. Embassy would reiterate, however, that basic explanation of attitude referred to in Bonn's airgram is not acceptance of inevitability GDR recognition but rather desire to avoid anything which would spoil the present East-West atmosphere, particularly on the eve of the summit conference.

Whitney

289. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, March 5, 1960, 2:18 p.m.

1908. Paris for USCINCEUR, Thurston and Finn and USRO. Dept's 1860 to Bonn rptd London 6479, Paris 3601, Moscow 1797, Berlin 426, USAREUR unn, CINCUSAREUR's SX 1932 to Bonn rptd Dept State and Defense, Bonn's 1663 (CINCUSAREUR's SX 1977), Bonn's 1672 rptd Berlin 586 Moscow 233 London 424 Paris 585 USAREUR 210.¹

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/3-360. Secret; Priority. Drafted by McFarland, cleared by Hillenbrand and the Department of Defense, and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Berlin, CINCUSAREUR Heidelberg, London, Paris, and Moscow.

¹ Telegram 1860 to Bonn, February 27, stated that the Department of State was considering restriction of the Soviet Mission, but wanted British cooperation. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/2-2560) SX 1932 has not been found. Telegram 1663 from Bonn, March 2, transmitted the coordinates of an area in East Germany which had been put off-limits to Western personnel. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/3-260) In telegram 1672 from Bonn, March 3, Dowling reiterated his recommendation that the Soviet Mission at Frankfurt be restricted and that if this action elicited no reply, that the Soviet Government be approached. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/3-360)

Informed British and French here today that our position is that Sov Mission to US Forces, Frankfurt should be restricted as of 1100 hours March 11 provided no satisfactory Sov response to Commander's letter Feb. 19² received prior that time.

Restriction Mission should be carried out by order CINCUS-AREUR on basis approval by Embassy Bonn.

Restriction should be accomplished without publicity. Hope be able inform FonOff Bonn and NAC our intentions March 9.

Do not anticipate question legal authority for restriction will arise but if it does suggest ref Article 2 Convention on Relations³ and Huebner-Malinin Agreement which accredits Sov Mission to CINC-USAREUR would be adequate response.

Notice might appropriately be given in form of map (similar to that received by USMLM and BRIXMIS (SX 1977) containing "goose egg" restricting entire area US military responsibility (with exception of area up to "X" kms from Mission quarters) effective immediately and until further notice. If preferable, method notification employed by French would be acceptable.

British Embassy says present position is not to enforce restrictions on Sov Missions but to send severe reminder to Sovs that reply still forthcoming. We urged British to join us in action proposed above and requested that London issue appropriate instructions to Bonn by Monday or as soon as possible thereafter. If British still refuse, request Embassy advise us urgently.⁴

Herter

² See footnote 2, Document 287.

³ For text of the Convention on Relations, signed May 26, 1952, at Bonn and amended October 23, 1954, see *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, Vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 112–118.

⁴ Since no reply was received by the Western Powers to their February 19 letters, the United Kingdom and United States on March 11 restricted the movements of the Soviet Mission. France had previously limited the movement of the Soviet Mission to its headquarters.

290. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, March 14, 1960, noon.

729. Ref Bonn's 1751 to Dept rptd Berlin 609.¹ Serb informed USMLM 12 noon March 14 that Lt. Gen. Vorontsov, Chief of Staff, GSFG, desired meeting 1800 hours March 14 at Potsdam. USMLM insisted any trip must be made without use of pass and was assured Deputy Serb would meet him at Glienicke Bridge and take him through without any formality. French MLM and Chief BRIXMIS also invited.

Meeting took place as scheduled with Chiefs USMLM, FMLM and BRIXMIS present.²

Lt. Gen. Vorontsov referred to Allied Commander-in-Chief's letters regarding new passes noting that Marshal Zakharov had referred this matter to his government in Moscow. In light of upcoming conference and to maintain good atmosphere, Group Soviet Forces Germany was instructed to reinstitute old passes as temporary measure pending solution at summit conference of over-all problems. Vorontsov then asked whether this was clear. When Western MLM's replied affirmatively, Chief Serb interrupted to state that an officer from the Missions should come to Serb at 9:00 March 15 to turn in the new passes and pick up old passes.

After the meeting Chief Serb reissued old passes to three Mission Chiefs and officers accompanying them. Old passes have been validated in ink in handwriting of Col. Kozlovskiy on page 4 as follows:

"Credentials validated. Col. Kozlovskiy 14 March 60."

Normal purple ink stamp has been superimposed on left of handwriting.

Chief USMLM plans to resume operations immediately following issuance of old passes.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/3-1460. Confidential; Niact. Also sent priority to Bonn and repeated to Moscow, London, Paris, and POLAD USAREUR.

¹ Dated March 11, telegram 1751 from Bonn reported that the Chief of the Soviet Liaison Mission had informed the British that Zakharov would reply soon to the Western letters of protest dated February 19. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/3-1160)

² A more detailed account of the meeting was transmitted in airgram G-298 from Berlin, March 15. (*Ibid.*, 762.0221/3-1560)

Radio now carrying ADN (East German news agency) report stating in essence that Vorontsov had conveyed reply to Feb 19 Western note on passes which provided for continuation use of "old passes" for present (*bis auf weiteres*).³

Lightner

³ Following Soviet reissue of the old passes, the three Western Powers on March 15 lifted the restrictions on the movement of the Soviet Missions. (Telegram 1771 from Bonn, March 15; *ibid.*)

291. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

Washington, April 15, 1960, 3:57 p.m.

2221. Bonn's 1905, 1918, 1949, 1972, London's 4998, Moscow's 2498.¹ Following are our views on German suggestion for notes and Summit approaches to Soviets re farm collectivization in SovZone.

We do not think suggested procedure is best way to publicize problem. We note coverage in German press has been excellent and believe, if matter has raised less interest in US, one explanatory factor may be that public had tended to assume that GDR regime more aggressive than it is in fact and that all agriculture in Communist-controlled area already collectivized. In any case we believe most effective publicity can be based on human interest stories re collectivization incidents and effects, on discussion political purposes of collectivization, and on com-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/4-560. Confidential. Drafted by Cash and McKiernan; cleared by Davis, Hillenbrand, Nunley, and Cargo (UNP); and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Berlin, London, Paris, Moscow, and USUN.

¹ Telegram 1905 from Bonn, April 5, transmitted a summary of a draft West German note to the Soviet Union that publicized the troubles of the farmers in the East Zone. (*Ibid.*) In telegram 1918 from Bonn, April 6, Ambassador Dowling supported the idea of sending the note. (*Ibid.*, 762B.00/4-660) Telegram 1949 from Bonn, April 11, transmitted a redraft of the note. (*Ibid.*, 762B.00/4-1160) Telegram 1972 from Bonn, April 13, reported discussion of the note at a quadripartite meeting that day. (*Ibid.*, 762B.00/4-1360) Telegram 4998 from London, April 13, reported that neither the British nor the French was enthusiastic about sending the note. (*Ibid.*) In telegram 2498 from Moscow, April 6, Ambassador Thompson stated that the idea was "most unwise," since it would lead to Soviet demands on the West to suppress militarism and Fascism in West Germany. (*Ibid.*, 762B.00/4-660)

parison productivity of private, versus collectivized, sectors of East German agriculture. Argumentation about legality or violations of human rights in abstract probably has less impact on opinion, whether of informed or of man in street.

We also find two of themes in draft German note rather inconsistent with general German policy. References to GDR "Constitution" permit inference that document is something more than travesty or window dressing for illegitimate regime. Moreover, bringing this isolated aspect of German question to attention UN, if it had any effect, might prompt question whether UN might not play greater role in attempt resolve German question as whole.

We doubt even drafters of note can believe collectivization in Sov-Zone can in itself have prejudicial effect on forthcoming Four-Power negotiations.

Although it is uncertain whether public attention will still be focused on collectivization at time of Summit, we expect it will be necessary at some point in discussions for Western Powers counter Soviet false statements about conditions in FedRep and West Berlin by dwelling on conditions in SovZone. We believe brutality of collectivization can be exploited very effectively in this context and that it would be useful for FedRep to start now assembling factual data which could be cited.

Believe sending notes Sov. Govt will only provoke Soviet rejection and counter charges. Believe it might be more effective for Germans to issue draft note as public declaration and obtain British and French concurrence with us in issuing individual supporting statements.

We would not favor a request for consideration for action on this subject by the Security Council or other UN organs for the following reasons:

(1) While some advantage in drawing world attention to Soviet violations of human rights immediately following hypocritical Soviet diatribe in SC on violation of human rights in South Africa, two cases not sufficiently similar in terms of dramatic quality to place desired degree of opprobrium on USSR and GDR.

(2) Soviet pressures for agricultural collectivization in East Germany not essentially different from measures conducted in other countries of Eastern Europe. No initiative was taken to secure UN action with regard to these equally obnoxious violations of human rights. Many neutral nations might be suspicious of move to single out East Germany for special attack at this time.

(3) In any debate in SC or other UN organ, human rights issue would not be clear-cut. Would be confused by arguments over economic ideology and agricultural methods. A number of neutral nations may have some sympathy with Soviet and Chinese Communist experiments in collective farming. US realizes Soviet and GDR actions involve

injury and death to individuals, but this is difficult to highlight as separate issue.

(4) As general principle, US has some reluctance to see UN become involved in German question at this time unless circumstances compel UN involvement. We have no assurance that UN consideration of East German atrocities could be limited to this subject. Debate might be broadened to include overall status of East German regime, German reunification, and special status of Berlin, which, in turn, might invite certain non-Europeans to put forward irresponsible "compromise" proposals on these subjects which would serve Soviet propaganda interests.²

Herter

² Following further discussion, the Federal Republic decided not to send the note, but to include its information in a publication which was released as a White Book on April 26, entitled *Die Zwangskollektivierung des selbständigen Bauernstandes in Mitteldeutschland*.

292. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, April 22, 1960, 7 p.m.

818. Following summarizes Mission appraisal of attitudes SovZone regime and population as they have evolved in period between Fon Ministers' talks last year and forthcoming summit meeting.

Prior to FonMin talks last year, East German leaders developed an intensive political mobilization campaign inside SovZone during which they revealed expectations of significant and concrete gains from those talks. Cessation those talks without agreement, Khrushchev visit to US¹ and his clear retention of tight control over both policy and policy pronouncement had local effect of pushing GDR into pose of patience and reasonableness vis-à-vis Western Powers. On the other hand, pre-summit period has brought important measure of success to GDR efforts to project Berlin and German problems onto world stage, to undermine world status of FedRep and to enhance status GDR. Although GDR leaders now indicate they do not anticipate early incorporation of West Berlin into GDR, they seem fairly confident summit talks will result in

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762B.00/4-2260. Confidential. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Moscow, London, Paris, POLAD USAREUR, and DCSI USAFE.

¹ For documentation on Khrushchev's visit to the United States September 15–27, 1959, see Documents 11–16.

some kind of new agreement on West Berlin and will set in motion a series of negotiations inevitably leading to decline of Western position in Berlin and Germany.

Although timetable on Berlin desired by SED regime has been slowed down, SED party morale is at high level as a result growing self-confidence within context of bloc claims that international developments are turning in favor of Communism. Also regime successes in such programs as forced collectivization of agriculture have boosted morale of Communist cadres in East Germany. In contrast, morale of East German population has been falling steadily since FonMin talks. Almost without exception, sources including refugees report widespread resignation to seeming permanence of Communist control. Although basic feeling of resignation is accompanied by a deep bitterness and hostility towards Ulbricht regime, prevailing opinion among SovZone inhabitants seems to be their situation is hopeless. Net result is apathy, accompanied by apprehension concerning Western firmness and intentions in summit talks. There is real apprehension that West Berlin, and Western World through West Berlin, may become inaccessible.

Prevailing mood East Germans perhaps best illustrated in following statement contained in anonymous letter Mission just received from SovZone resident. "We Germans in SovZone regard coming summit conference with little hope but with great anxiety."

Lightner

293. Airgram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, May 28, 1960.

G-412. Sov handling C-47 incident (full account reported by USMLM contained in Berlin's G-410, G-411)¹ was marked by restraint,

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/5-2860. Confidential. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Copenhagen, and POLAD USAREUR.

¹ Both dated May 27; G-410 reported on a meeting with Soviet authorities in East Germany on May 24 concerning the release of the crew of a C-47 which had landed in the Soviet Zone on May 20. G-411 transmitted the text of the protocol releasing the crew. (Both *ibid.*, 762B.5411/5-2760)

correctness and polite courteous treatment of American personnel involved. In comparison basically similar helicopter incident two years ago which became cause celebre, Sov handling this time shows how things can go if Sovs do not wish make political issue. In helicopter incident, Sovs decided turn over jurisdiction to GDR authorities. In this case, Sovs kept GDR entirely out of case. It is true that General Jakubovsky's letter concerning release of plane passengers and crew referred to agreement of GDR authorities. (Ref ourtel 883 to Dept rpt 761 to Bonn.)² Also protocol signed by USMLM (G-411) referred to a violation of "German Democratic Republic" air space. However these references were certainly minimal; important is fact that Sovs themselves handled case, without trying shift responsibility to GDR and without any participation of GDR representatives.

We assume from oblique reference in his May 20 address in East Berlin that Khrushchev already knew of C-47 forced landing earlier that day.³ It is likely that direct instructions were given to handle case in this way if C-47 turned out to be innocent plane that strayed from course. Perhaps Khrushchev did not want to distract attention from U-2 case, in UN proceedings and otherwise.⁴ Also in post-Summit letdown if SED regime obliged to wait another six or eight months, there was hardly profit to be obtained by regime from trying exploit such case at this time.

In keeping with Sov handling, East German press has remained remarkably quiet on C-47 incident, carrying only tiny factual news items on forced landing and on subsequent release, without any editorial comment whatsoever.

Burns

² Dated May 24, telegram 883 from Berlin transmitted the text of Yakubovski's letter to Eddelman.

³ For text of Khrushchev's address in Berlin on May 20, see *Dokumente*, Band 4, 1960, Zweiter Halbband, pp. 1060–1068.

⁴ For documentation on the U-2 incident, May 1, 1960, see volume X.

294. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (White) to Secretary of State Herter

Washington, August 12, 1960.

SUBJECT

Military Liaison Missions in Germany

During recent weeks the United States, British, and French Military Liaison Missions to the Soviet Forces in Germany have been subjected to systematic and continuous harassment which has not only made it difficult for them to carry out [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] functions [*1 line of source text not declassified*] but has even raised the question whether the closing of the Mission, probably upon the basis of a request by the "GDR" to the Soviet Forces, may not be anticipated in the near future.

Western Mission tours have been frequently "tailed" and often detained by East German police in plain clothes. There have been incidents in which the East German police have assaulted and arrested Mission personnel. Harassment of the British Mission reached the point where the British found it necessary to suspend travel in the Soviet Zone temporarily. Soviet responses to Allied protests about these incidents have been quite unsatisfactory. Moreover, large areas of the Soviet Zone have been placed "off limits" for Mission travel. At the same time, the East German propaganda media have made much of the intelligence activities of the Western Missions. Ulbricht, for example, has claimed that "aggressive war plans" have been seized from Western Mission personnel.

There seems to be general agreement on the United States side and among the Three Powers that the Missions have sufficient value [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] to warrant their continuation as long as possible. At the same time there also seems to be general agreement that we must make it clear to the Soviets that their Missions will not be permitted [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] privileges in the Federal Republic which the Western Missions do not enjoy in the Soviet Zone.

The British and French had originally suggested a verbal warning to the Soviets, but on the United States side a mere warning was considered inadequate. Ambassador Dowling considered such a warning

weak and thought the only real reprisal would be to restrict the movement of the Soviet Missions, which he felt would entail a risk of the Missions' being closed. General Norstad preferred a reprisal program to a verbal warning and, while he thought there might be an advantage in maintaining the Missions as long as possible, he believed that the Soviets might be preparing to put an end to them.

Meanwhile, General Eddleman had already begun reciprocal harassment of the Soviet Mission in Frankfurt on July 28. On August 4 he reported that he had ceased reciprocal harassment because it already appeared to have had the desired effect. A few days ago, General Cassels, Commander in Chief of the British Army of the Rhine, also began reciprocal harassment of the Soviet Mission accredited to him.

The British Embassy informed us yesterday (August 11) that General Cassels is going to Berlin on August 20 for a short visit and that he may take this occasion to call on the Commander in Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, General Yakubovski. At the Foreign Secretary's suggestion, General Cassels proposes to speak to General Yakubovski along the following lines:

It is dangerous to permit the East Germans to continue to harass the Western Missions, and General Cassels trusts General Yakubovski will do something about the situation. General Cassels has found it necessary to take certain retaliatory measures against the Soviet Mission to his headquarters and, if harassment of the British Mission does not cease, he will have to make retaliation a fixed policy. Although General Cassels is not speaking for the Americans and the French, there has been the closest liaison among the Three Powers on the subject and what he has said is in accordance with American and French views.

The British Embassy has asked for our concurrence in such a statement to Yakubovski. Ambassador Caccia will probably repeat this request when he sees you today.¹

We have informed Defense of the British approach and they tell us they cannot concur with it. Defense believes that there is nothing to be gained by giving the question recognition at the Cassels–Yakubovski level and that making a threat of reciprocal harassment is a weak way to handle the matter. Furthermore, Defense believes that General Yakubovski might take refuge behind the fact the Western Missions have been harassed by East Germans to complain that General Cassels is threatening to act against the Soviet Mission in a way in which the Soviets themselves are not acting against the Western Mission.

Defense believes that it is preferable to resort to actual reciprocal harassment, as necessary, without explanations or threats. Defense therefore suggests that State attempt to obtain British and French agree-

¹ No record of Herter's conversation with Caccia has been found.

ment to authorize the three military commanders in Germany to confer with a view to establishing a coordinated tripartite program of harassment to be implemented by the military commanders on their own initiative as required by the situation at the moment with respect to the Western Missions in the Soviet Zone.

Recommendations

That you reply to Ambassador Caccia (or authorize us to reply to the British Embassy if the Ambassador does not raise the subject) as follows:

1. We concur regarding the need for reciprocal harassment of the Soviet Missions.

2. We see certain disadvantages to making a threat to General Yakubovski as suggested by the British, although we would not object if General Cassels were to do so on behalf of the British only.

3. We believe that the Three Governments should authorize their military commanders in Germany, in consultation with their Ambassadors, to work out a program for reciprocal harassment of the Soviet Missions, in the light of the situation at the moment.²

² Herter initialed approval of the three recommendations on August 12.