U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION; EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ALLIANCE THROUGH CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION ON POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY MATTERS; U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL MEETINGS AND DEFENSE MINISTERS CONFERENCES

131. Editorial Note

The Defense Ministers of the 15 NATO countries met in Paris April 15–17, 1958, to discuss military matters of mutual concern. The conference was held in response to decisions made at the NATO Heads of Government Meeting in Paris December 16–19, 1957. Paragraph 22 of the communiqué issued at the end of that conference reads:

"Recognising the rapidly growing interdependence of the nations of the free world, we have, in organizing our forces, decided to bring about closer co-ordination with a view to ensuring that each NATO member country makes its most effective contribution to the requirements established by the Alliance. Better use of the resources of the Alliance and greater efficiency for its forces will be obtained through as high a degree of standardisation and integration as possible in all fields, particularly in certain aspects of air and naval defence, of logistic support and of the composition and equipment of forces. We have agreed that a military conference should be held at Ministerial level in the early months of 1958 to discuss progress made in these fields in the light, in particular, of the results of the 1957 Annual Review." (Department of State Bulletin, January 6, 1958, page 14)

The U.S. Delegation to the Defense Ministers Conference was headed by Neil H. McElroy, Secretary of Defense, and W. Randolph Burgess, Permanent NATO Representative. A full list of the U.S. Delegation, including advisers, is in Topol 3507 to Paris, April 2. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/4–258)

The proceedings of the conference are summarized in Polto Circulars 22, April 15; 23, April 15; 24, April 16; and 25, April 17, from Paris. All are ibid., Central File 740.5. No formal agenda has been found, but these telegrams contain references to the following agenda items:

MC-70 presentations and comments by delegations;
coordination of defense;
closer coordination of research, development, and production of weapons;
progress report on IRBM's and the allied stockpile plan to support MC-70 weapons;
the welding of NATO air defense into one integrated system of various national forces and command by SACEUR in peace and war;
a European Spare Parts Agency; and
infrastructure program.

Much of the discussion centered on MC-70, "Minimum Essential Force Requirements, 1958–1963," which was prepared by the Military Committee of NATO in early 1958 as guidance and a yardstick of progress in the 1958 and successive Annual Reviews. MC-70, a copy of which is at NATO headquarters in Brussels, has not been declassified. Subsequent discussion of MC-70 in the NAC is summarized in Documents 132 and 134.

A summary of the highlights of the conference prepared by Department of State advisers to the U.S. Delegation is printed as Document 133.

The final communiqué of the conference is printed in Department of State Bulletin, May 5, 1958, pages 729–730.

---

132. Telegram From the Mission at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State

Paris, April 23, 1958, 8 p.m.


Chairman¹ asked Council to accept MC-70 recommendations.

Belgium could not approve until written reply received to Belgian question regarding inclusion certain national command minesweepers in MC-70 requirements.² SICRep said it would be very difficult include these vessels in force tabs but Cinchan will include them in guidance to

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/4–2358. Secret. Transmitted in three sections. Repeated to Ankara and the NATO capitals.

¹ Beginning in 1957, the Secretary General of NATO served as chairman of all NAC meetings. Secretary General of NATO was Paul-Henri Spaak.

² At the Defense Ministers Conference April 15–17, Belgium endorsed MC-70 as a minimum force level but questioned the delegation of Belgian minesweepers by the Standing Group. Belgium asked for inclusion of a note that Belgium would maintain 42 minesweepers under national command which would perform NATO missions, and quoted the Netherlands as agreeing with this view. (Polto Circular 24 from Paris, April 16; Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/4–1658)
Belgium and Netherlands and will take them into account during annual review. Belgium said would forward this to Brussels when written statement received.

Canada accepted recommendations, noting that all countries have some questions regarding country breakdowns. Denmark did not have final instructions but felt sure MC-70 would be accepted “in light statements made by Danish Defense Minister at Defense Conference”. France accepted MC-70 recommendations reminding Council of statement by French Defense Minister at Defense Conference that MC-70 accepted for planning purposes only and France could not commit itself at this stage to meeting requirements placed on her. Germany would not have final instructions until April 30. Noted that German acceptance would surely repeat reservations on MC-70 made by German Defense Minister during Defense Conference. Greece authorized accept MC-70 for planning purposes but specifically reserved right raise questions during annual review. Italy had not received final authorization accept MC-70 but felt it would likely be forthcoming. Luxembourg saw no difficulty in accepting document. Netherlands had same difficulty as Belgium and needed to await further instructions. Norway accepted MC-70 recommendations. Portugal did not have final authority but anticipated no difficulty accepting MC-70 recommendations. United Kingdom “happy” to accept MC-70 recommendations “in light Sandys’ statements at Defense Conference”. United States expressed regret NAC could not approve MC-70 recommendations today. Enormously important get this document accepted. United States prepared agree completely to MC-70 and expects to fulfill requirements as well plan ahead. Hoped this discussion could clear away doubts and differences so that

---

3 At the Defense Ministers Conference, Denmark reported it was reorganizing its defense structure to achieve a better balance between force goals and economy. It stated that it was unlikely to reach MC-70 goals, which were far in excess of reality and were not feasible from a political or economic viewpoint. These views are summarized in Polto Circular 24.

4 French views at the Defense Ministers Conference are summarized in Polto Circular 24.

5 German reservations at this conference included problems arising from the large numbers of missiles in Germany. Specifically, questions of land and technicians could not be attained without hindering the German buildup. Germany also felt that technical innovation required constant examination of the types of missiles deployed. These views are summarized in Polto Circular 24.

6 In addition to his queries at the Defense Ministers Conference concerning naval warfare, as summarized in Document 133, Duncan Sandys, British Minister of Defense, commented that it was difficult to determine just how strong the NATO shield should be. He added that the demands of NATO must not be allowed to restrict the buildup of the Baghdad Pact and SEATO. He felt MC-70 would be “clearly exceedingly expensive,” and the Defense Ministers must distinguish between the essential minimum and the militarily desirable forces. His comments are summarized in Polto Circular 24.
at next meeting NAC could give formal ratification to what is done today.

[18 paragraphs (4-1/2 pages of source text) not declassified]

Burgess

133. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick) to Secretary of State Dulles

April 24, 1958.

SUBJECT

NATO Defense Ministers Conference

Following in accordance with your request is a summary of the highlights of the April 15-17 NATO Defense Ministers Conference. Mr. Timmons and Mr. Fearey of the Department attended as members of the U.S. Delegation.

The conference was held pursuant to the Heads of Government decision last December that “a military conference should be held at the Ministerial level in the early months of 1958.” The meeting was of a non-decision taking character and consisted (1) of briefings by the major NATO Commanders on their missions and force requirements as set forth in MC 70, “The NATO Minimum Essential Force Requirements”; 2 (2) of discussion of MC 70 in light of these briefings; (3) of discussion of the most effective means of coordinating research, development and production of modern weapons in Europe; and (4) of a progress report by General Norstad on the introduction of IRBMs in Allied Command Europe and establishment of the NATO Atomic Stockpile.

The most pointed of the questions following the Commanders’ briefings were put by U.K. Defense Minister Sandys, reflecting doubt on

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/4-2458. Secret. Drafted by Robert A. Fearey and Benson E.L. Timmons, III, of the Office of European Regional Affairs, on April 24. Transmitted through the Executive Secretariat and initialed by John A. Calhoun, Director of the Executive Secretariat. The initials “CBE” in Elbrick’s handwriting appear on the source text, and another notation by Phyllis Bernau reads: “Sec saw, pdb”.

1 No request from the Secretary asking for a summary of the highlights of the conference has been found.

2 Not found.
his part as to the utility of a major portion of NATO naval forces in the face of modern weapons systems and the probable short duration of a general war. Admiral Wright, Supreme Commander Atlantic, maintained in reply that the USSR could be expected to deploy its naval vessels in advance of a conflict, which the Soviets would of course initiate, so that they would not be likely atomic targets. The Soviet Navy would thus be in a position to continue sea warfare for a considerable period regardless of retaliatory damage to the Soviet homeland. If the sea war were lost it was doubtful whether NATO could carry on the war on land successfully, with the result that even though NATO forces might have devastated the Soviet homeland the Soviets would win the war.3

The exchange of views on MC 70 indicated a positive attitude on the part of most Defense Ministers toward achievement of MC 70 force requirements. The U.S. made a forthright statement in support of the document.4 There was general agreement among the Defense Ministers that MC 70 should be approved for planning purposes for the period 1958–1963, and that the country breakdowns set out in the document should be accepted as guidance for the 1958 Annual Review, covering the period 1959–61.

The discussion of modern weapons research, development and production coordination was somewhat inconclusive. Secretary McElroy stated that the U.S. had no objection to the matter being proceeded with through small groups of NATO nations, such as WEU and the French-Italian-German collaboration, provided that the work is carried out under the aegis of NATO. In that event the U.S. would be able to furnish technical and certain financial assistance.5

In his progress report on the deployment of IRBMs and establishment of the NATO Atomic Stockpile, General Norstad noted progress in preliminary discussions with the French military authorities on the establishment of IRBM in France; said that exploratory conversations with representatives of several other countries had not yet progressed to a point where detailed reports were appropriate; and stated that the attitudes displayed in the discussions which had been held led him to believe that requirements for IRBM in Allied Command Europe would be met. With respect to the NATO Atomic Stockpile, Norstad reported that

---

3Sandsy's questions and Admiral Jerauld Wright's replies are reported in Polto Circular 22 from Paris, April 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/4–1558)

4Reference is apparently to the "prepared statement" of Secretary of Defense McElroy, which he presented to the afternoon plenary session on April 15. (Ibid.) The statement has not been found.

5The discussion of modern weapons research, development, and production, including McElroy's comments, is reported in Polto Circular 25 from Paris, April 16. (Ibid., 740.5/4–1758)
detailed plans for the Stockpile had been prepared at SHAPE and were now under study by subordinate NATO Commanders. He expressed confidence that development of the stockpile system would keep pace with nuclear delivery systems deployments.⁶

In general the Conference had a firm, encouraging tone and should provide a good basis for the work that lies ahead in implementing the broad decisions taken at the Heads of Government meeting, which can be summarized as maintaining the strength of NATO's defenses and equipping NATO forces with modern weapons.

A copy of the Communiqué issued at the close of the Meeting is attached.⁷

---

⁶ Norstad's progress report is summarized ibid. No written progress report has been found.
⁷ The communiqué, not attached, is printed in Department of State Bulletin, May 5, 1958, pp. 729–730.

---

134. Telegram Polto 3531 From the Mission at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State

Paris, May 1, 1958, 9 p.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/5–158. Secret; Niact. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

---

135. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles

May 2, 1958.

1. I spoke of the forthcoming NATO meeting. I said that I thought that the two important issues that might come up were (1) "parity at the
Summit" and (2) Algeria. I explained to the President why we opposed "parity" and the President indicated his complete concurrence. I said that it was possible, although I thought unlikely, that the French might demand an expression of NATO solidarity behind French policy in Algeria. The President thought that it would be quite impractical to give any such blank check. We wanted a French policy that would succeed and we could not be bound to endorse elements of a policy which seemed to be failing.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

JFD

---

1 In a memorandum of telephone conversation between Matthew J. Looram, Jr., Office of Western European Affairs, and Charles E. Lucet, Minister of the French Embassy, April 30, Lucet said that France would not raise the subject of Algeria at the NATO meeting in Copenhagen, May 5-7, because the Felix Gaillard government had fallen and felt it could no longer raise the Algerian issue in that forum. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-6/4-3058) Algeria was not discussed at the Copenhagen meeting, although Secretary Dulles discussed the question privately with British officials in Copenhagen and with French officials during his visit to Paris following the meeting. See footnote 1, Document 150.

---

136. Editorial Note

The Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, held in Copenhagen May 5-7, was attended by the Foreign Ministers and NATO Permanent Representatives of the 15 member countries. The U.S. Delegation was headed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and included advisers from the Departments of State and Defense. A list of the delegation is printed in Department of State Bulletin, May 26, 1958, pages 851–852.

Secretary Dulles and his party left Washington on May 2; his departure statement is printed ibid., page 851. After a stop in New Hampshire to deliver an address, he arrived in Copenhagen at 6:25 p.m., May 3. At 10:15 p.m., Dulles met with C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and G. Frederick Reinhardt, Counselor, to discuss the possible Soviet insistence on the principle of "parity" for representation at a forthcoming Summit meeting. No record of this conversation has been found.

The most extensive body of documentation on this NATO Ministerial Meeting is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF
Briefing papers are in CF 997; press releases and NATO committee reports are in CF 998. Copies of the verbatim records of the NAC meetings are in CF 999–1000 and CF 1011–1012; no summary records of the sessions have been found. CF 1001 contains Orders of the Day for the May 2–12 period. Copies of the Secretary’s speeches are in CF 1002. CF 1003–1005 contain miscellaneous administrative materials. CF 1006 contains a complete set of memoranda of conversation between the U.S. and other NATO Delegations during the Copenhagen meetings. CF 1007–1008 contain, respectively, copies of the Secto–Tosec and Dulte–Tedul telegrams. CF 1009–1013 contain a chronological record of meetings for the period May 2–7, additional copies of memoranda of conversation, and collections of telegraphic exchanges between the Secretary’s party and the Department of State. CF 1013 also contains copies of the draft communiqué and the final communiqué. Reports and documents discussing preparations for the meeting and summarizing the proceedings are ibid., Central Files 396.1, 396.1–CO, and 740.5.

On Sunday, May 4, Reinhardt, who served as coordinator for the Ministerial Meeting, met with Ambassador Burgess and other members of the delegation to prepare for a meeting with the Secretary which was to follow. A memorandum summarizing this meeting is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1010. At 11:25 a.m., Dulles met with Burgess, Reinhardt, Peterson, and members of the delegation; no record of the meeting has been found. Following lunch, Dulles and Burgess met with NATO Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak at 4:20 p.m. A memorandum of their conversation (USDel/MC–1) is printed as Document 137.

At 5 p.m., Dulles, Burgess, and members of the delegation met with British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd and members of the British Delegation to discuss matters of mutual concern; see Document 138. Separate memoranda of their conversations on the situation in Lebanon (USDel/MC–2), British-Libyan aid discussion (USDel/MC–3), parity at the Summit (USDel/MC–4), atomic testing (USDel/MC–6), the British-Icelandic fishing dispute (USDel/MC–7), relations with UAR President Nasser (USDel/MC–8), Algeria (USDel/MC–9), Cyprus (USDel/MC–10), Buraimi (USDel/MC–11), Yemen (USDel/MC–12), U.S. aircraft for Iraq (USDel/MC–13), Indonesia (USDel/MC–14), and the tripartite declaration on Berlin (USDel/MC–32) are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1006 and 1010. Dulles’ memorandum for the record of his conversation with Lloyd on the tripartite declaration on Berlin is ibid., CF 1010. His conversation with Lloyd on British proposals for disengagement and European security was reported in Secto 12, May 5. (Ibid., Central Files, 740.5/5–558)

On Monday, May 5, Dulles and Elbrick met with Italian Foreign Minister Giuseppe Pella and Adolfo Alessandri, Secretary General of the Italian Foreign Office. A memorandum of their conversation on Ital-
ian participation in a summit meeting (USDel/MC–5) is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1006 and 1011. At 9:50 a.m., the opening ceremonies of the NATO Ministerial Meeting began. They were summarized in Secto 19, May 5. (*ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1–CO/5–558) Copies of speeches at the ceremonies by Danish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Hans Christian S. Hansen, Luxembourg Foreign Minister Joseph Bech, and Spaak are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1011. The first plenary session, which began at 10:15 a.m., is summarized in Document 139. At 12:40 p.m., Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., Deputy NATO Representative, conducted a debriefing for members of the U.S. Delegation; no record of this debriefing, or subsequent ones, has been found. Secretary Dulles, Burgess, Elbrick, and Jacques J. Reinstein, Director of the Office of German Affairs, had lunch with German Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano and other German officials at 1 p.m. A summary of their conversation on a possible summit meeting and the reunification of Germany (USDel/MC–31) is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1006 and 1011. Their conversation on Dulles’ forthcoming visit to Berlin was reported in Secto 18, May 5. (*ibid.*, Central Files, 110.11–DU/5–558)

The afternoon session of the Ministerial Meeting convened at 3:30 p.m.; see Document 140. Nolting conducted a debriefing for the U.S. Delegation at 5:30 p.m. At some point during the day, Dulles met with Sidney E. Smith, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, to discuss grant aid to Lebanon. Their conversation was summarized in Secto 13, May 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 411.83A41/5–558) The conversation between an unnamed member of the U.S. Delegation and A. Ross of the British Delegation on Cyprus was reported in Secto 16, May 5. (*ibid.*, 747C.00/5–558) Their conversation on Italian post-independence aid to Somalia was reported in Secto 17, May 5. (*ibid.*, 865.0077/5–558) A conversation between members of the U.S. Delegation and Danish Chief of Defense Admiral Erhard J.G. Qvistgaard on Danish requirements under MC–70 was summarized in Secto 15, May 5. (*ibid.*, 759.5–MSP/5–558) The Secretary’s message to the President reporting on the day’s events is printed as Document 141.

On Tuesday, May 6 at 9:45 a.m., Dulles and other members of the delegation met with Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rüstü Zorlu and other members of the Turkish Delegation. Memoranda of their conversations on Lebanon (USDel/MC–16), aircraft for Iraq (USDel/MC–17), Turkish financial difficulties (USDel/MC–18), and relations with Nasser (USDel/MC–19) are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1006 and 1012. The morning session, which started at 10 a.m., is summarized in Documents 142 and 143. At 12:10 p.m., Nolting held a debriefing session for the delegation. The May 6 afternoon session began at 4 p.m.; see Document 144. At 6:15 p.m., Nolting held a de-
briefing session for the delegation. Dulles’ message to the President on the day’s events is printed as Document 145.

At 7:15 p.m., Dulles met with Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador to the Soviet Union; no record of their conversation has been found. At 8 p.m., Dulles, Elbrick, and Thompson attended a dinner at the U.S. Embassy with British and French guests. Dulles’ conversation with Lloyd and Jean J. Laloy, Director of European Affairs in the French Foreign Ministry, on the decision to support Camille Chamoun, President of Lebanon, was reported in Dulcè 10, May 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/5–658) Memoranda of Dulles’ conversations with Lloyd on U.S.-British relations in Iraq (USDel/MC–20), recent developments in Indonesia (USDel/MC–21), Prime Minister Macmillan’s proposal for a Cyprus condominium (USDel/MC–22), the possibility of Lloyd accompanying Macmillan to Washington in June (USDel/MC–23), the suspension of nuclear testing (USDel/MC–24), U.S.-British relations (USDel/MC–25), Duncan Sandys’ paper on comprehensive disarmament (USDel/MC–26), and Lloyd’s proposed trip to Poland (USDel/MC–27) are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1006. A copy of Sandys’ paper is ibid. Dulcè 17, May 7, transmitted Dulles’ message to the President on his reactions to the paper. (Ibid., Central Files, 740.5611/5–758)

On Wednesday, May 7, Dulles met with the U.S. Delegation at 9:30 a.m.; no record of the meeting has been found. The morning session of the Ministerial Meeting, which began at 10:30, is summarized in Document 146. During the session, Dulles and Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph M.A.H. Luns privately discussed Indonesian designs on West New Guinea. A memorandum of their conversation (USDel/MC–30) is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1006) Dulles participated in the final afternoon session, which began at 4:30 p.m. No verbatim record of the plenary session has been found. Secto 51, May 7, briefly noted that the session began at 4:30 p.m. and was devoted entirely to the revised draft communiqué. The communiqué was agreed to at 6:15 p.m. and the meeting concluded. (Ibid., Central Files, 396.1–CO/5–758) Secto 50, May 7, transmitted a joint press statement by the U.S., British, and French Foreign Ministers recognizing the possibility of including other countries, such as Italy, in a summit conference. (Ibid.) A transcript of the Secretary’s press backgrounder beginning at 6:45 p.m. was transmitted in Secto 55, May 8. (Ibid., 396.1–CO/5–858) At some point during the day on May 7, Dulles met with Lloyd on British support costs in Germany; see Document 147. Dulles also met with Greek Foreign Minister Michael Pesmatzoglou regarding a possible visit by Nasser to Greece. A memorandum of their conversation (USDel/MC–29) is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1006. A summary analysis of the Copenhagen Ministerial Meeting was
transmitted in Secto 63, May 10. (Ibid., Central Files, 396.1–CO/5–1058)
The final communiqué, May 7, is printed in Department of State Bulletin,

On Thursday, May 8, Dulles and his advisers went to Berlin. Documenta-
tion on this visit, including a collection of telegraphic correspond-
ence between the party and the Department of State, is in Department of
State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1014. Dulles spoke at a recep-
tion given in his honor by the Berlin city government on May 8; for text
of his speech, see Department of State Bulletin, May 26, 1958, pages
854–857. Documentation on Dulles’ visit is printed in volume VIII.

On the evening of May 8, Dulles left for Paris where he attended the
Western European Chiefs of Mission meeting which was held May 9–13.
Dulles attended the meetings on May 9 and 10. Documentation on the
meetings is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF
1015–1016. CF 1015 contains an agenda and typescripts of remarks of
Secretary Dulles and Llewellyn E. Thompson. CF 1016 contains memo-
randa of conversation between Dulles and French officials on various
matters of mutual concern. Regarding the Chiefs of Mission meeting,
see Document 21.

Secretary Dulles left Paris on the evening of May 10, stopped in
Minneapolis, Minnesota, and returned to Washington on May 12. Docu-
ments on his Minneapolis trip are in Department of State, Conference
Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1017.

The following documents are arranged in the order in which the
meetings took place.
137. Memorandum of Conversation

USDel/MC-1 Copenhagen, May 4, 1958, 4:20 p.m.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE 21ST MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Copenhagen, Denmark, May 5-7, 1958

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary
Ambassador Burgess

Paul-Henri Spaak

SUBJECT

Nuclear Testing—Summit Meeting—NATO Ministerial Meeting

Secretary Dulles congratulated and thanked Mr. Spaak for all he had been doing. He realized that the U.S. had not been able to move as rapidly as Mr. Spaak at times wished, but he hoped Mr. Spaak would keep on pressing for action. It was his business to do so.

Secretary Dulles outlined some of the difficulties in arriving at definite positions and cited the question of testing. The U.S. had considered an announcement ahead of the Russians but many contrary agreements were raised against it. Both the British and the French were opposed to cessation—at least before the passage of the new Atomic Energy legislation. The Secretary proposed to pursue the matter further.

Mr. Spaak said there was great need for wider public understanding on this point to dispel a tendency to put the blame on the U.S.

Secretary Dulles said in the U.S. there were growing doubts both on the part of the government and the public about a summit meeting. The recent Soviet veto of the Arctic proposal was especially discouraging as the U.S. was very hopeful and eager that this proposal should succeed.

Spaak questioned the reasons the U.S.S.R. had made so many such mistakes recently.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1006. Secret. Drafted by Burgess. The meeting was held in the U.S. Embassy Residence.

1 A proposed amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 permitting the transfer of nuclear materials and information to other nations passed Congress and was signed by the President on July 2, 1958. (72 Stat. 276)

2 Reference is to the Soviet veto in the U.N. Security Council on May 2 of a U.S. proposal for the establishment of an international inspection zone against surprise attack north of the Arctic Circle.
Secretary Dulles felt Khrushchev was very dangerous for he was not as careful or calculating as his predecessor—more moved by emotion.

Mr. Spaak inquired if we thought many people in Russia were against Khrushchev.

Secretary Dulles said undoubtedly.

Secretary Dulles developed further the point that the U.S. was not happy about the summit meeting idea. The Democrats were lined up against it; a high percentage of the Congress opposed the idea of the President's becoming involved.

Mr. Spaak said he thought the pressure for a meeting was lessening in Europe.

Secretary Dulles said he was worried about the "parity" principle. It assumed the negotiation was between two blocks.

Secretary Dulles expressed his concern about France and Algeria—the danger of a repetition of Indo-China. Mr. Spaak confirmed this concern.

It was agreed that Secretary Dulles would be prepared to open the discussion under topic II of the program with a presentation of the work of the three countries in negotiating with Russia. He would want later to discuss some other questions under this topic such as Arctic Inspection.³

Secretary Dulles said he would propose that Mr. Spaak and his staff be asked to draft the communiqué.

³ Secretary Dulles' statements to the NATO Ministerial Meeting under agenda item II, Current International Situation, are reported in Document 140.
138. Memorandum of Conversation

USDel/MC–15

Copenhagen, May 4, 1958, 5:15 p.m.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE 21ST MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Copenhagen, Denmark, May 5–7, 1958

PARTICIPANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Secretary</td>
<td>Mr. Selwyn Lloyd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambassador Burgess</td>
<td>Sir Frank Roberts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Reinhardt</td>
<td>Sir Anthony Rumbold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Elbrick</td>
<td>Sir Roderick Barclay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Porter</td>
<td>Mr. Denis Laskey</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SUBJECT

Support Costs for UK Forces in Germany

1. Lloyd referred to the recent agreement between the UK and Germany on support costs and to an addendum to that agreement made by the German Defense Minister Strauss. Strauss had inserted a condition in the agreement which stipulated that there would be no reduction in British Forces in Germany without a corresponding increase in combat efficiency. Lloyd said that the British would be able to maintain their forces at the 55,000 man level through the present calendar year. In 1959 these forces would have to be reduced to 45,000 men unless NATO could find the money to finance the difference of 10,000 men. In 1960 the total would have to be reduced to 45,000 men in any case, unless conditions permitted the reduction of forces in other areas where the U.K. had commitments, or unless British forces elsewhere could be counted as part of the NATO force. On the other hand, it would be possible to maintain a level of 45,000 men in Germany indefinitely and by 1960 combat efficiency will have increased to the point where it would more than balance the reduction in actual numbers.

2. Mr. Burgess inquired particularly whether the British planned to delay asking permission from NATO and WEU to reduce their forces until nearer to the time when the reduction would take place. Lloyd re-

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1006. Secret. Drafted by Elbrick. The meeting was held in the British Embassy Residence.

1 The agreement in principle between the United Kingdom and West Germany regarding the support costs for British military forces in Germany was reported in Polto 3218 from Paris, April 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/4–1458)
plied that they would delay if they saw that funds were available for the year 1959. Lloyd referred to Secretary McElroy’s recent conversation with Sandys in Paris and his suggestion regarding the possible additional financing. The British Government would be interested in knowing whether there was any possibility of working something out along these lines. If there is not, the Government will be obliged to make a statement in July regarding the ultimate reduction of forces to 45,000 men.

---

2 Highlights of a conversation between McElroy and Sandys at the Defense Ministers Conference in Paris on April 14 were reported in Polto 3231 from Paris, April 15. (Ibid., 740.5/4-1558)

---

139. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State

Copenhagen, May 5, 1958, 2 p.m.

Secto 20. Paris for USRO and Embassy.

1. Upon conclusion opening ceremony, First Plenary Session NATO Ministerial Meeting opened 10:15 a.m. May 5 with Spaak in chair.

2. Spaak opened discussion agenda item 1—Report by Secretary General and Annual Political Appraisal—with brief comments on his report. Report is first pursuant recommendation 3 Wise Men. Points out

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-CO/5-558. Secret. Repeated to Paris and pouches to the NATO capitals and Moscow.

1 The public ceremony opening the NATO Ministerial Meeting was summarized in Secto 19 from Copenhagen, May 5. (Ibid.)

2 The verbatim (C-VR(58)31) record of this session, dated May 5, is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1000.

3 Spaak’s report, “Annual Political Appraisal,” C-M(58)72, April 25, is ibid., CF 998.

4 Regarding the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO, which the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Paris approved on December 13, 1956, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. IV, p. 137. Text of this report is printed in Department of State Bulletin, January 7, 1957, pp. 17–28. To strengthen the process of consultation in the Alliance, the report called for the Foreign Ministers at each spring meeting to appraise the political progress of the Alliance, and for that purpose the Secretary General should submit an annual report, which analyzed the major political problems of the Alliance, reviewed the extent to which member states had consulted and cooperated on such problems, and indicated the problems and possible developments requiring further consultation.
two weak points: (A) Coordination of economic policies of Alliance, particularly question assistance to underdeveloped areas. (B) Information program—how can NATO get across its positions (which are good)? Basically national problem. Bigger NATO budget information needed.

3. Strong points noted in report are:

(A) Defense cooperation—Defense Ministers’ Conference was good and situation fairly satisfactory.
(B) Scientific cooperation—“New chapter in NATO opened”.
(C) Production new weapons—Countries will have to give their representative proper political directives.
(D) Political cooperation—Spaak said this worked almost perfectly, mentioning disarmament, replies to Bulganin, preparations for possible summit. Major countries have spoken frankly and accepted comments and criticism. On balance, state of Alliance is good, although problems remain.

4. Lange (Norway) congratulated Spaak on report and said it showed expectations 3 Wise Men fully justified. Paid tribute willingness “great powers” to consult. They bear heavy responsibilities for all of NATO. Warned that NATO must not allow obligation to consult to hamper quick reactions, which sometimes needed. Cited U.S. proposal for Arctic inspection zone.5 Continuous process consultation allows quick reaction by one member to be taken in light known views other members. Supported Spaak on information program. Must pay more attention presentation Western positions. They should be simplified.

5. Brentano (Germany) praised report and said that public not sufficiently conscious that NATO more than military alliance. Spaak must have assistance of highest order, in terms rank and appropriate salaries. While secrecy on certain matters needed, better publicity on NATO also required, so as to convince public of value NATO.

6. Zorlu (Turkey) in lengthy speech said NATO must coordinate efforts in political field so as contain Soviets. Reviewed developments since World War II. Soviets now pushing disengagement idea, which dangerous. Soviets have made progress in development nuclear weapons, and this makes shield forces still more vital. They must be strengthened. Spoke of need for economic and scientific cooperations, mentioning OEEC and FTA. West must meet Soviet economic expansion with solidarity and own expansion program. More efficient appli-

5 The U.S. draft resolution on an Arctic inspection zone (U.N. doc. S/3995 as amended), which was introduced in the U.N. Security Council on April 28, is printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. II, p. 1005.
cation Article II needed, especially as regards efforts outside NATO area.

7. Lloyd (UK) congratulated Spaak and endorsed Lange’s points on political consultation. On economic matters, said he believed in deterrent (citing strategic power, shield forces, and will to resist) but felt battle of ideas will decide contest with Soviets. This battle greatly influenced by economic consideration. Said NATO must feel way to greater economic cooperation. Political cooperation good and expanding. Re Paras 32 and 33 Spaak report, said assumed decision on introduction IRBM’s would be submitted to NAC, as he questioned commons on this.

8. Secretary spoke next. Remarks as taken from unedited verbatim record being sent immediately following telegram.7

9. Pella (Italy) added his thanks and expressed agreement with Secretary’s point. Italy hopes European economic integration will be starting point for economic cooperation in Atlantic community. Spaak would lead this movement. Stressed need for continuing military cooperation.

10. Cunha (Portugal)8 congratulated Spaak on excellent report and work it reflects. Stressed need better publicity, both by NATO and national governments. Need show NATO unity to world.

11. Smith (Canada) endorsed remarks of others re Spaak report and said Article II has even greater importance today in view of economic recession. “We must not export our economic troubles to others”. Economic groupings must not be restrictive. Must put special effort into economic cooperation, both within Alliance and vis-à-vis underdeveloped areas. If national policies fashioned with regard to Article II, they will automatically bear NATO label. Referred to Canadian food stockpile, offer at NATO DefMin Conference9 and endorsed parliamentarians’ resolution on NATO 10th anniversary Congress.10 Governments should exchange views on this.

---

6 Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides that the member states promote further development of friendly international relations and conditions of stability and well-being, and seek to eliminate conflict in international economic policies and would encourage economic collaboration.

7 Secto 21 from Copenhagen, May 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–CO/5–658)

8 Paulo A.V. Cunha, Portuguese Foreign Minister.

9 Polto Circular 24 from Paris, April 16, briefly mentioned that Canada suggested the NAC should reexamine food stockpile proposals in light of the danger to North American ports by missile-bearing submarines which constituted a serious threat to NATO supply lines. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/4–1658)

10 Reference is presumably to the conference of NATO Parliamentarians in Paris November 11–16, 1957. The resolutions of this conference have not been found.
12. Pesmatzoglou (Greece) spoke briefly, referring to Greece’s attachment to NATO, and need more cooperation in information, defense and economic field.

13. Luns (Netherlands) said Dutch consider common market only starting point for wider economic cooperation. Uppermost in their minds is political argument for FTA.

14. Pineau (France) agreed Spaak’s analysis two weak points. Soviets are having some effect Western public opinion. NATO should look again at economic section 3 Wise Men’s report and see if matter needs further study. On April 15 Gaillard had said France would speak of Algerian problem at Copenhagen, since this problem, affecting area covered by treaty, of interest to all. Present political circumstances in France had however prevented France from putting Algeria on agenda. Perhaps it would be raised later by new government.

15. Krag (Denmark) spoke of economic problems. Recession in U.S. causing serious concern. U.S. efforts counteract it of great importance to us all. If it spreads, will hurt common case and adversely affect defense capabilities. Said it essential that FTA negotiations be brought successful conclusion.

16. Larock (Belgium) took up economic discussion and asserted “absolute will” of Community of Six to broaden common market and make it into FTA.

17. On information problem, said U.S. “clean bomb” statement on Soviet test suspension did not go down well in Western Europe, but U.S. proposal for Arctic inspection zone was excellent reply to Soviet charges. Supported larger NATO information budget.

18. Spaak paid tribute to Permanent Council and international staff. Noted general agreement on NATO’s weak points and asked for “bold and liberal” attitude on economic problems.

19. First plenary session adjourned 12:30 p.m.

Dulles

---

11 Michael A. Pesmatzoglou, Greek Foreign Minister.
12 Christian Pineau was French Foreign Minister in the Gaillard government, which fell on April 15, 1958. Pineau was serving as caretaker Foreign Minister until a new French government could be formed.
13 Reference is to Gaillard’s speech on the Algerian problem to the French National Assembly on April 15.
14 Jens Otto Krag, Danish Minister of Foreign Economic Relations.
15 Victor Larock, Belgian Foreign Minister.
16 Reference is presumably to the statement by President Eisenhower on March 26 that the United States would conduct nuclear tests that summer to demonstrate the reduction in radioactive fallout from the nuclear explosions. (Department of State Bulletin, April 14, 1958, p. 601)
140. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council
Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State

Copenhagen, May 6, 1958, 3 p.m.

Secto 23. Paris for USRO and Embassy. Following is summary sec-
second secret session NATO Ministerial Meeting afternoon May 5.\(^1\) Sum-
mary Secretary's remarks on Arctic zone and summit meeting cabled
separately.\(^2\)

Session opened with Secretary reading text tripartite statement re
Moscow negotiations as approved by US–UK–France in Washington.\(^3\)

There being no comment on tripartite report Spaak called on Bren-
tano.

German Foreign Minister, after expressing doubt re Soviet desire to
negotiate and concluding Soviets merely looking for propaganda suc-
cess, said NATO should nevertheless try to work for summit meeting
since Western peoples desire it. He pointed out Soviets however were
beginning by trying to ignore Geneva Agreements\(^4\) and accordingly
there was probably little hope they would proceed seriously. Brentano
thought summit meeting would not solve many problems but would
demonstrate if Soviets willing negotiate.

Brentano thought disarmament most likely field for agreement. He
said careful preparations were required and we should probe Soviet in-
tentions during preparatory work. We must take Geneva as point of de-
parture and not permit them "disengage" from Geneva Agreements. He
said German problem could not be left out of future conference. Recent
press statements to contrary had misinterpreted German position. He
said Chancellor had never said discussion of Germany at major confer-
ence could be renounced.

Brentano added we must seek general political solutions. There
was organic and indissoluble tie between Germany and European se-
curity. He said superficial détente which hardened status quo was

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–CO/5–658. Secret. Transmitted in
two sections. Repeated to Paris and pouch to the NATO capitals and Moscow.

\(^1\) The verbatim (C–VR(58)32) record of this session, dated May 5, is \textit{ibid.}, Conference
Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1000.

\(^2\) Sectos 22 and 29, May 6. (\textit{Ibid.}, Central Files, 330.13/5–658 and 396.1/5–658, respectively)

\(^3\) Reference is to the tripartite statement that the British, French, and U.S. Ambassa-
dors in Moscow presented to the Soviet Government on May 3; for text, see Department of

\(^4\) Reference is to the agreements reached at the Heads of Government Meeting in Ge-
unacceptable. Germany must necessarily be discussed at summit meeting. European security and disarmament were also linked.

Brentano gave analysis Mikoyan visit noting Blankenhorn had given report to NAC.\textsuperscript{5} He said Mikoyan statements had given no reason hope for any change in well-known Soviet attitudes such as allegation German problem could only be solved by "two Germanies".\textsuperscript{6} He said even SPD had rejected Mikoyan views. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

German Foreign Minister thought some cultural ties with Soviets along lines US–USSR agreement desirable.\textsuperscript{7} He concluded disarmament should be dominant theme any summit meeting. August 29 proposals remaining although we might rephrase them to make them more difficult for Soviets to reject. He thought any idea of small zones was unacceptable but that if Soviets proposed large zone we should study carefully. He ended saying Soviets must show willingness negotiate on political problems before we could make any progress.

Lloyd spoke next analyzing Soviet motives re summit meeting. He concluded real reason for Soviet desire hold such session was belief this forum best served their interests. They could muzzle public opinion at home and at same time appeal to opinion in free world through vague generalities, while simultaneously avoiding any real commitments.

British Foreign Secretary added Soviet positions had hardened recently especially since West met April 17 deadline for talks in Moscow following which our position had improved.\textsuperscript{8} He said he favored summit meeting if it would provide something useful and this meant preparation, during which we must not abandon positions of strength without compensation.

Lloyd stressed heavily need maintain tie between conventional and nuclear armaments in light great Soviet conventional superiority. Reliance on nuclear disarmament would be fatal. He also hoped Soviets

\textsuperscript{5} The report to the NAC of Herbert A. Blankenhorn, German Permanent Representative to NATO, on the visit of Anastas Mikoyan, First Vice Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, to Germany April 25–28 was summarized in Polto 3475 from Paris, April 28. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.55/4–2858)

\textsuperscript{6} Mikoyan’s views on the role of the two Germanies in reunification were reported in The New York Times, April 27, 1958, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{7} For text of a joint communiqué containing the agreement on exchanges in the cultural, technical, and educational fields between the United States and the Soviet Union on January 27, 1958, see Department of State Bulletin, February 17, 1958, pp. 243–247.

\textsuperscript{8} The Soviet aide-mémoire of April 11 called for an exchange of views with the United States, United Kingdom, and France beginning on April 17 in Moscow on preparations for a meeting of Foreign Ministers. This aide-mémoire and the British, French, and U.S. reply of April 16 acceding to the Soviet request are printed \textit{ibid.}, May 5, 1958, pp. 727–728.
could be kept on defensive in propaganda field and referred to UK proposals to Soviets in cultural domain as useful in this context.

Lloyd said West was right not break with Soviets on procedural issues. Separate meetings of three Ambassadors with Gromyko in Moscow was ridiculous procedure and possibly somewhat humiliating but we were correct in accepting it. On parity he said English opinion saw little difference if satellites were present in 4-4, 5-5 or some other ratio. Soviet Union had its parrots already in UN and their presence here would merely be nuisance. Furthermore it was uncertain if Soviets really gained from presence their satellites. He concluded he was not pronouncing a view on parity today since UK had not made up its mind.

He concluded we should start with study of controlled disarmament agreement. We could adopt one of three methods—we could revert to comprehensive UK-French proposals of 1954-1956, we could stick to "partial comprehensive" project of August 1957 or we separate some element from 1957 package. He concluded essential point was not permit wedge to be driven on separating conventional and nuclear weapons.

Pineau reported DeJean had received two letters from Gromyko one to be published May 6. Second note of 20 pages would be circulated in NAC tomorrow but at first glance appeared contain little new. He then summarized French position. We were correct in not stressing procedural questions which public understands badly. We could not complain too much because we had got Soviets to accept concept of preparatory work up through Foreign Ministers' meeting. He agreed Soviet motives were complex and that they had created many more obstacles recently.

With regard to disarmament French Foreign Minister said August 29 proposals still valid and he regretted Soviets had flatly rejected them even though we had never said we would not be willing amend them. He also repeated French position that link between cessation nuclear

---


10 Reference is presumably to the Soviet aide-mémoire and a 14- (not 20) page document, "Proposals of the Soviet Government on Questions Put Forward for Consideration at the Conference With the Participation of the Heads of Government," which Gromyko handed to the British, U.S., and French Ambassadors in separate interviews in Moscow on May 5. Maurice DeJean was the French Ambassador in Moscow. The Soviet Government published its aide-mémoire on May 5. The two documents were transmitted to the Department of State in telegrams 1918 and 1926 from Moscow, May 5. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5-558)
testing and nuclear weapons production must be retained. Greatest danger was not nuclear testing but nuclear war. Disarmament which did not include Soviet territory would merely crystallize status quo and destroy existing security balance in Europe. Political problems also cannot be neglected and no arrangement which might lead withdrawal NATO troops from Continent would be acceptable.

After Secretary’s statement (reported separately) Dutch Foreign Minister stated West needed to make known its views more effectively and admitted Soviets had made propaganda gains. He said European forces must have nuclear weapons. Soviets wished prevent this and would make particular efforts in this direction. He said not only Rapacki Plan but Western disengagement ideas were highly dangerous in absence political settlements. No European security system was possible in light existing political situation. Disengagement was obviously dangerous militarily and carried heavy political risks as well. Fact forces were facing each other in Europe was symptom not cause of tension. Tension could be reduced by strengthening shield forces but few nations seemed desire incur cost involved. Risk of war caused by incident under existing situation was minor compared to danger of vacuum in Europe. Luns said political antagonisms might cause Soviets to start war. War could be caused by upheavals in satellites. Disengagement therefore would only be safe in event basic improvement political situation. He admitted difficulty making convincing case to public in event balance conventional forces proposed for Rapacki-type zone but pointed out obvious danger since Soviet forces could withdraw behind their frontiers still posing as great threat as ever.

Luns concluded agreeing with Spaak re Moscow talks that “3” were not political directorate of NATO but were acting as spokesmen for NATO views, and in light their special responsibilities. He noted these responsibilities could devolve on other NATO members in other situations.

Final speaker was Greek Foreign Minister who said he had no comment on procedure. However he wished stress nuclear menace now existing. In light this threat we must seek talks with Soviets and at same time ensure that public opinion does not lose sight real Soviet policies. He believed disarmament best place to start but both sides must make

---

11 See footnote 2 above.
12 The Rapacki Plan, first proposed by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly on October 2, 1957, subsequently renewed through diplomatic channels, called for the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and the Federal Republic of Germany. For text of Rapacki’s address, see Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. II, pp. 889–892.
concessions in order reach agreement. He thought our present policies should continue steadfastly since Soviets might not be able afford arms race indefinitely.

It was agreed meet again 10:00 a.m. May 6. Spaak and International Staff will prepare first draft communiqué.

Dulles

141. Telegram From Secretary of State Dulles to the Department of State

Copenhagen, May 5, 1958, 8 p.m.

Dulles 7. Eyes Only Acting Secretary for President from Secretary.

Dear Mr. President: We have just finished the first day’s NATO session, the principal activity from my standpoint was my report on behalf of France, UK and US on the diplomatic negotiations with the Soviet Union in Moscow, and then a narrative of the events which led up to the Soviet veto of our Arctic proposal; my discussion of the possible implications of the “principle of parity” and a brief recapitulation of our attitude toward a summit conference. 1 I think I made clear the genuine and bitter disappointment we felt at the refusal of the Soviet Union at least to begin talks about inspection in the Arctic area. I may say that on all sides there is commendation of the way we handled this Arctic matter. So far as the other speakers were concerned, the most significant development was the strong insistence by Selwyn Lloyd, backed up by Luns of the Netherlands, that we must not divorce nuclear weapons from conventional weapons. Lloyd called on the Council to take a clear decision in this sense. 2

Yesterday afternoon I spent two hours and more with Selwyn Lloyd going over the different positions in the world where we are working together, notably Libya and Lebanon. 3 The British have great concern about both of these positions. They themselves are doing a little more than expected in Libya and want us also to do a little bit more. They are particularly anxious to have us do something for Lebanon. I

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-CO/5-558. Secret.

1 See footnote 2, Document 140.

2 Lloyd’s and Luns’ comments are summarized in Document 140.

3 See Document 136.
told Lloyd of our thinking about a possible gift of grain. Also I mentioned this to Smith, the Canadian Foreign Minister, because I wanted him to understand why we might be doing it as they would normally react adversely to “dumping” wheat in their possible markets. He seemed to take the prospect calmly.4

I met Pella, the Italian Foreign Minister, privately before the meeting and heard his urgent appeal for inclusion in a summit conference or Foreign Ministers’ conference as something that would influence, according to him, five million votes in the forthcoming elections.5 I am not yet clear as to what we can do to help him.

Von Brentano and others of the German Delegation lunched with me today and we went over the problem of German reunification as to which there had been some confusion, particularly with reference to the reporting of Hearst’s interview with the Chancellor.6 Actually the German Government holds to the view that the reunification of Germany must be discussed, but he did not want to make a solution of the German problem a condition precedent to progress in disarmament. The Foreign Minister made a statement this afternoon which, if adequately published and properly interpreted, should clear up misunderstanding on this point.7

Tonight we dine with the Prime Minister at the Tivoli Gardens, and I face, I fear with inappropriate equanimity, the prospect of some more good Danish food.

Faithfully yours, Foster.

Dulles

---

4 No record of this conversation has been found.
5 A memorandum of Dulles’ conversation with Pella on May 5 is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1011.
6 A memorandum of Dulles’ conversation with von Brentano on May 5 is ibid. Hearst’s interview with Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, has not been found.
7 Not further identified.
142. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State

Copenhagen, May 6, 1958, 10 p.m.

Secto 32. Paris for USRO and Embassy.

1. Third plenary session NATO Ministerial Meeting opened 10 a.m., May 6, continuing discussion of agenda item II—Current International Situation.

2. Pella (Italy) believes exchange of views in Permanent Council on problems of East-West relations has great value. Italy insists that any summit meeting must be preceded by careful preparation and must lead to positive results. Without careful preparation such meeting would only benefit Soviets. But West should not be negative or take rigid attitude on procedure. Agenda is not question of procedure but substance. NAC must consider carefully. Italy has welcomed statements by US and others that Western countries conducting preparatory talks are not necessarily only ones which would attend Foreign Ministers’ meeting or summit conference. Disarmament seems to Italy key question. Agrees with Lloyd on danger separating nuclear and conventional disarmament questions. Re disengagement, agrees with Pineau on dangers such proposals. West stand on these principles: (A) it must not weaken its military position; (B) proposals for “special areas” in Europe must be considered in framework overall agreement between East and West; and (C) there must be effective controls. Italy considers German reunification and European security closely linked, and welcomed Brentano’s remarks this subject yesterday that GFR continues consider these subjects “strictly connected”. On economic and cultural exchanges, summit should only lay down general directives for later detailed negotiations.

3. Hansen (Denmark)—Danish public opinion looks to reduction tensions, whether by summit meeting or otherwise. Soviets appear want summit. Agrees on need careful preparation, and hopes publicity can be avoided, so as not freeze positions. No grounds for optimism but West

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–CO/5–658. Secret. Repeated to Paris and pouches to the NATO capitals and Moscow.

1 The verbatim (C–VR(58/33)) record of this session, dated May 6, is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1000.

2 Secto 50 from Paris, May 7, transmitted a joint statement given to the press by the U.S., British, and French Foreign Ministers recognizing the possibility of including other countries, such as Italy, in a summit conference. (Ibid., Central Files, 396.1/5–758)

3 The views of Lloyd and Pineau are summarized in Document 140.

4 See Document 140.
must persist. Hopes West can make constructive proposals and take initiative away from Soviets. Re Rapacki Plan, some NATO countries say plan too limited to provide any secure basis. But he would like explain views Nordic countries. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Should limit and reduce conventional forces, so as to eliminate disparity between East and West. If after study these points should be put forward, would be constructive initiative. Soviets scored point on test suspension. Asked Secretary what countermeasures are possible. Disarmament problem complex but might be possible start with limited measures and go on by stages. Denmark supported disarmament proposals by Western Four last August, and does not believe UN should be abandoned as organ for dealing with disarmament matters.

4. Smith (Canada) said exchanges of letters with Soviets has not led us closer to agreement. Need establish basis for confidence but Soviets do nothing to increase confidence. Cited Soviet veto US Arctic proposal. Praised coordination in Permanent Council as of great value to Canada and to unity whole Alliance. Soviet letters need quick responses and NATO consultation should not slow up such responses. NATO must be prudent and not take Soviet pronouncements at face value, but Soviets may really want relax tensions. NATO must not jeopardize its security. Soviet initiatives having profound effect Western public opinion. Western governments must show patience and sometimes “roll with punch”. Mentioned Diefenbaker’s views on desirability nuclear test suspension under international supervision. Thought Western disarmament package might be broken up to some extent. Welcomed US proposal on Arctic zone.

5. Smith then turned to discussion relation between preparations for possible summit and NATO military planning. Canada fully agreed December HG decisions on NATO’s need achieve most effective pattern defense, with availability most modern weapons. Like Lloyd he assumes NAC will in due course be seized with questions NATO stockpile and IRBM’s, bilateral negotiations on which are under way. NATO must keep these decisions and their timing under continuing political review. Flexibility must be maintained otherwise opportunity for substantive agreement might be lost. NATO strategy and defense is basic to possibility of meaningful negotiations with Soviets, and Soviet leaders are aware NATO’s determination take whatever measures are neces-

5 Regarding NATO support for disarmament proposals of the four Western powers, see Polto 310 from Paris, August 2, 1957; telegram 1162 from London, August 15, 1957; and Dulles’ memorandum to Stassen, September 27, 1957, in Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XX, pp. 687, 705, and 723, respectively.

6 See footnote 2, Document 137.

7 John G. Diefenbaker, Prime Minister of Canada.
sary. We have thus placed ourselves in favorable negotiating position. First steps toward relieving tensions may have been small ones. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Supported UK ideas for agenda possible summit meeting. Hard see any possibilities for agreement with Soviets. Perhaps if a summit occurs it could be portrayed as second such meeting and group could be set up to examine possibilities of further agreements and report to future summit meetings. Stressed that present is time for complete unity and solidarity in NATO, as we approach negotiations with Soviets.

6. Remainder discussion third plenary session contained imme-
diately following telegram.\textsuperscript{8}

Dulles

\textsuperscript{8} Document 143.

143. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State

Copenhagen, May 7, 1958, 6 p.m.

Secto 33. Paris for USRO and Embassy. Ref immediately preceding telegram on 3rd plenary session NATO Ministerial Meeting May 6.\textsuperscript{1}

1. Lange (Norway) said since December main focus NAC work has been how break deadlock with Soviets, particularly on disarmament. From standpoint public opinion in NATO countries and uncommitted areas West must make clear willing adopt any reasonable procedure to have real negotiations with Soviets. Glad three powers have begun diplomatic discussions with Soviets and are showing flexibility. Said could see at some stage desirability “dialogue” between two powers (meaning U.S. and USSR) if this would elicit real intentions of Soviets. Idea summit meeting has caught imagination peoples of world and pressure for it will increase in months ahead. Norway supports

\textsuperscript{1} Document 142.
Western Four disarmament proposals, but package perhaps too comprehensive and too complicated explain as a package. Agreed with Lloyd time has come consider breaking it up. It was good idea take U.S. Arctic zone proposal out of package and propose it separately. Another measure that may be ripe for singling out is to suspend testing after U.S. and U.K. complete present series tests. Soviets could then be pressed on control and cessation production. European security another problem at forefront. Norway agrees necessity keep German reunification in freedom as major policy aim. But does not seem necessary exclude all security measures in Europe unless solution reunification problem achieved at same time. Agreed with Hansen there is good reason consider possibility of limiting military action in certain areas Central Europe. But must not upset security balance or create special status for one member of Alliance. West must use imagination in developing proposals that will appeal public opinion. Agreed with Lloyd any such proposals must not be based on distinction between atomic and conventional weapons. To single out nuclear weapons would give advantage to Soviets. We do not know whether Soviets want relaxation. Must probe intentions. In view slackening of economic activity in West, Soviets may be tempted put off summit meeting for several months or year until West in crisis and Soviet negotiating position stronger. If West wants good posture at FM or summit meeting, must agree on coordinated ways set our economics on road renewed expansion. Soviets will not negotiate seriously if they can split NATO unity. Norway attaches greatest importance to work Permanent Council in coming months, in order reach agreed negotiating posture. Must maintain military strength. Need new ideas and initiatives in political field, in order not just react to Soviets. Norway not satisfied by work of NATO preparatory committees to date. Permanent Council must weigh conclusions of committees from political standpoint. Agreed with Smith NATO must consider implementation defense measures in light progress toward solution outstanding issues.

2. Cunha (Portugal) said negotiations with Soviets number one problem. Does not have any hopes for results but West in situation where must do all in power demonstrate we intend go to summit if careful preparation made. Opposes parity but we should not take rigid position now, as we may have accept satellites or appear have caused failure summit meeting.

Re agenda, should include disarmament and German reunification. Need more continuous consultation in Permanent Council. More imagination needed, such as U.S. Arctic proposal, which excellent. Must maintain our defenses. Supported increased economic cooperation.

3. Larock (Belgium) agreed with those who now see more clearly dangers and difficulties of possible summit meeting. In view what we know of Soviet intentions, cannot expect any success from such a meet-
ing. Khrushchev wants consolidate Soviet power and appear as champion of peace. "Illusory expect real negotiations from him." Read excerpts from long report from Belgian Amb Moscow reporting talk with Khrushchev, in which latter dwelt on U.S. "provocations" and made absurd charges. Permanent Council must establish common position on issues that would be discussed at summit. Vis-à-vis world public opinion West should say we want a well-prepared summit but that Soviets must make such a meeting possible. West must stress control of armaments, which is strong position for West but weak one for Soviets.

4. Spaak summed up discussion as follows. Little enthusiasm shown in discussion for summit but we are being led there by Soviets. There is pressure by Western public opinion; however much less in U.S. than in Europe. Some pressure abandon status quo and show imagination. However, we should not say unkind things about status quo, which has preserved peace and freedom in NATO area. Precarious balance better than no balance at all. Recently Soviets losing some of propaganda advantage. Clear that Khrushchev wants tete-a-tete with President Eisenhower, for internal and external prestige reasons. Khrushchev knows now he cannot have badly-prepared summit and he probably less desirous having summit at all. Spaak worried by German position. Soviet and Western positions entirely divergent. Soviets won't discuss at summit. Can West accept such position? No, must decide how state and present German question. West's political and legal position strong, in view 1955 Geneva decisions. Must not allow Geneva to be cancelled. At same time must avoid having Western public opinion say German question prevents progress on disarmament and European security. Spaak suggested first West should make clear what it not prepared do. We not prepared reduce our forces and upset military equilibrium. Can't accept policy leading to withdrawal U.S., U.K. and Canadian forces from Europe. This would be fatal consequence Rapacki, Kennan Plans. "Disengagement" unacceptable. Cannot allow neutralization of Germany, which would also lead to withdrawal U.S. forces. Perhaps a summit meeting could be presented as a first attempt reach some agreement. Summit could be focused on disarmament. West should consider extracting some proposals from disarmament package, such as cessation testing. Spaak supported link between cessation testing and cessation of production. Noted possibility non-aggression pact not discussed by Ministers. Re participation, said Secretary's statement.

---

2 Not found.

3 The ideas of George F. Kennan on disengagement in Central Europe were presented in the Reith Lectures in London in late 1957. Kennan's account of these lectures and the reactions to them are contained in his Memoirs, 1950–1963. He initially published his proposal in his book, Russia, the Atom, and the West.
on parity correct but perhaps some extension participation would have be accepted. But West should not accept participation neutrals, which would only encourage and seem reward neutralism. Asked Ministers to think about what should be said in communiqué. Meeting adjourned until 4 p.m.

Dulles

---

144. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State

Copenhagen, May 7, 1958, 1 p.m.

Secto 37. Paris for USRO and Embassy.

1. Fourth plenary session opened 4 p.m., May 6 with Spaak in chair.¹

2. Pineau summarized Soviet agenda proposals as contained in USSR note delivered to DeJean. Apparently identical with those in Tosec 31.²

3. General tone and contents of communiqué then discussed in informal session with no verbatim record. Secretary stressed communiqué would be most important act of meeting and that it should be effective declaration and recalled all Ministers seemed to feel stronger, clearer public opinion required.

4. Lloyd presented personal suggestions leading with observa
tion Soviets have been put somewhat on defensive in past few weeks and we would risk losing this advantage if tone was too violent. Sugges
ted stressing growth of political consultation within Alliance. Eco
nomic matters should be mentioned while making clear NATO not an instrument of economic action but a way of seeing that there is economic cooperation within Atlantic Community. Point should be made that de
terrent depends not only on capability for strategic air strike but also on shield and on our determination to meet aggression. He next suggested

---

¹ The verbatim (C-VR(58)34) record of this session, dated May 6, is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1000.
² Regarding the Soviet note, see footnote 10, Document 140. Tosec 31 to Copenhagen, May 5, concerns unrelated matters.
reference to interdependence in military field and to progress in coordination military research and production. Communiqué should point out that NATO countries have duties and responsibilities to rest of world not just to Europe. Something should be said about the summit and the need for proper preparations. Detailed discussion of substance inappropriate but disarmament, European security, and Germany should be mentioned as summit agenda items. No need to mention disengagement though it might be discussed privately by Ministers on following day. Finally it should be stressed that summit not only place to do business and we are ready to enter into negotiations at other levels.

Smith supported desirability of positive tone avoiding recrimination. Thought reference to economic cooperation should also be positive in spirit. Expressed unwillingness to say now we would not accept principle of parity since not really clear what Soviets mean by parity. Referred to importance of inspection and control for all measures of disarmament. Suggested the NATO technical advisory group on disarmament set up following December Heads of Government meeting might begin study of inspection measures even though Russians refused to join in United Nations studies. NATO group might undertake pilot inspection project in the Arctic or possibly in Europe.

Lange agreed that communiqué should refer to progress in political consultation, to economic matters, and to summit but questioned other Lloyd items because not discussed in this meeting. Agreed main problems for summit would be disarmament, European security, and problem of Germany although last would have to be carefully phrased. Supported Smith suggestion of inspection studies by disarmament technical group and suggested possibility of offer to USSR to join in.

Zorlu stressed need for balanced communiqué. USSR has not changed and we should not enter negotiations expecting good faith on other side. We must keep up our defense effort. Communiqué must restate the danger and the need for continued military, economic and political efforts, mentioning summit as only one possibility of no greater importance than other steps to be taken by Alliance. Summit is effective phase of Soviet peace offensive. Western concessions to Soviet Union at summit would have undesirable effect on public opinion, particularly in Asia and Africa. These other areas are watching for signs of shift in power balance and are just waiting to join the stronger side. We should not show ourselves too ready to make concessions. Expressed relief that Von Brentano has clarified German position on German reunification and summit agenda. Concluded we must not expect anything from summit and thus we should not pay a price to go to the summit.

Smith said that we should try to put across idea that summit meeting would be summit number 2. We might thus decrease extraordinary, fantastic hopes of many people and avoid subsequent letdown. If we en-
visage subsequent summit meetings then only a little headway on some items need be expected. Some machinery of diplomatic activity might be set up to go on between summit meetings.

Pineau said that he thought the communiqué might take following 7 points:

1) Strengthening political unity of Alliance.
2) We move toward summit or toward any other negotiations with Russians in perfect unity. We should note recent hard Soviet attitude and express regret that it hinders progress.
3) We are flexible as to procedure but cannot renounce principles of UN Charter. Pineau thought this best way to deal with parity question.
4) Inspection and control are essential for any partial or total disarmament.
5) Cessation of nuclear tests is inseparably linked to stopping production of nuclear weapons materials under effective controls.
6) No agreements should be reached which would imperil security of Alliance or prevent German reunification. Former point refers to presence U.S., UK and Canadian troops on Continent and latter was commented on by Pineau as proper way to deal with German reunification in communiqué.
7) Economic cooperation.

Secretary said he liked many of suggestions made. Urged particularly emphasis on remarkable achievement of making NATO a focus for peace-time consultation among independent nations.

Suggested discussion of economic cooperation might look beyond Europe. He recalled the higher tariffs, quotas, and other nationalistic moves of early 1930's which in Japan and Germany were contributing causes to World War II. Important maintain liberal economic policies on world-wide basis not just within NATO. Otherwise economic nationalism may result and lead again to political nationalism.

Suggested reaffirmation of support of NATO military strategy and MC-70 as endorsed by Defense Ministers. Point should be made again that NATO is more than a military alliance. Soviet Union accuses us of being aggressive military bloc and says all foreign troops in Europe are bad. Actually Alliance such as NATO is instrument for applying collective security on international basis just as individuals rely on collective security within each country: of course collective security should be universal but Soviet Union has blocked this in United Nations. We must reiterate that collective security is modern enlightened way for nations to protect themselves. We must not let neutrals believe Western collective security alliances are aggressive but instead show that they are natural and right.

Secretary said it is totally false to feel one can only negotiate at level of heads of government. There are many ways to negotiate and any one who refuses to negotiate elsewhere is putting obstacles in way of normal
manner for nations to do business. It is thus Soviet Union which is blocking preparations for summit. However, in summit preparations we have to some extent given encouragement to dangerous popular expectation of substantive decisions at summit. 1955 Geneva meeting was not intended to solve problems but only to formulate directives to Foreign Ministers to work out solutions. This time matters have been turned around and preparatory talks are trying to identify for prior foreign ministers meeting matters on which decisions might be taken by heads of government. Secretary said little progress so far in talks. They should continue for while but seems unlikely we will find any matters on which agreement can be reached unless the West reverses its positions. Perhaps it will prove necessary to return to approach of 1955 summit meeting. Time is coming when we will have to decide what the nature of a summit meeting will be if there is to be one.

Pella said he thought Pineau's list and Lloyd's arguments could be conveniently combined. Agreed that nature of deterrent should be reiterated. Statement on economic cooperation should be limited to need for liaison between economic organs of Atlantic Community.

Spaak said staff had sufficient guidance for drafting communiqué except on proposal for technical disarmament studies. He asked whether intent was to invite Russians to join. Lange recalled Eisenhower letter of April 8 pointed out such invitation would simply endorse what US had more than once said to Soviet Union with negative response. Smith said his thought was that NATO should go ahead in face of Soviet rejection. A specific study of Arctic inspection zone or European area might be undertaken. This would be a positive note in communiqué. Secretary asked whether practical effect would be to activate technical advisory group called for at December NATO meeting. Smith said that while committee work might be the start he hoped that a pilot inspection project might develop.

Spaak stated will have draft communiqué for distribution to delegations 8:30 a.m. following morning. Every effort would be made to avoid press leaks of communiqué. Spaak said press briefing today would be confined to statement Ministers held confidential discussion of essential problems facing NATO.

[5 lines of source text not declassified] Ministers and Permanent Representatives meet in private without staff at 10:30 Wednesday to discuss Middle East and the draft communiqué.

Dulles

---

145. Telegram From Secretary of State Dulles to the Department of State

Copenhagen, May 6, 1958, 9 p.m.

Dulte 9. Eyes Only Acting Secretary for President from Secretary.

Dear Mr. President: We have finished the second day, our labors being interrupted by a very pleasant luncheon given by the King and Queen\(^1\) at one of their country places. They both sent their remembrances and best wishes to you. The day was largely spent in further exchanges of views about a possible summit conference, and also with views as to what should be in our final declaration. Plenty of views were expressed but it may take a stroke of genius to make anything coherent out of them.

[1 paragraph (17 lines of source text) not declassified]

I go to dinner now with Ambassador Thompson, who has just gotten here from Moscow bringing the latest tidings. Selwyn Lloyd is joining us for dinner and also Laloy of the French Foreign Office.

Faithfully yours, Foster.

Dulles

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–CO/5–658. Secret.

\(^1\) Frederik IX and Ingrid.

146. Telegram Secto 49 From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State

Copenhagen, May 7, 1958, 11 p.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–CO/5–758. Secret. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]
147. Memorandum of Conversation

USDel/MC-28

Copenhagen, May 7, 1958.

UNITED STATE DELEGATION TO THE 21ST MINISTERIAL
MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Copenhagen, Denmark, May 5–7, 1958

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The Secretary

United Kingdom
Foreign Secretary Lloyd

SUBJECT

United Kingdom Support Costs in Germany

Mr. Lloyd brought up the question of support costs. He said that they were going to carry through at the 55,000 level through this calendar year but that unless some more money could be found somewhere they would have to begin on the first of the year to cut down to the 45,000 level and that the decision in this respect would have to be taken sometime between July and October at the latest. He hoped very much that perhaps some way could be found for the U.S. to help the U.K. out financially so that they could keep to the 55,000 level.

The Secretary replied that this was primarily a matter for Defense and that he did not think that the State Department could possibly get from Congress any additional funds for this purpose. The Department might even be criticized for not having pressed hard enough to get funds of our own from the Germans for the current year. The Secretary said that it might perhaps be possible for the Defense Department to squeeze out some money in respect of certain aspects of their program with resultant benefit to the U.K., but that he could not speak in any way for Defense in this respect. The Secretary said that we would raise the problem with them when he got back, but that he could do no more.¹

¹ In subsequent negotiations between Burgess and Frank Roberts, British Permanent Representative to NATO, the United States agreed to make available $25 million for the mutual weapons development program in the United Kingdom for fiscal year 1958–1959 for projects offering promise of value to the Alliance. This financial assistance permitted the British Government to announce in mid-October that it would be able to maintain 55,000 British troops in Germany through calendar year 1959. Eisenhower’s letter to Macmillan, July 19, authorized Burgess to discuss with Roberts “the problem of the financial gap and to see whether a solution to the problem can be found.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File) Documentation on these negotiations and the handling of publicity concerning the British announcement is in Department of State, Central File 740.5.
148. Letter From President Eisenhower to Secretary of State Dulles

May 7, 1958.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–CO/5–758. Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

149. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, May 9, 1958, 11 a.m.

Dulte 19. Eyes Only Acting Secretary for President from Secretary.

Dear Mr. President: I am now back in Paris after a heavy day yesterday which started out in Copenhagen, included several hours in Berlin and then dinner in Paris with Houghton and Norstad.

I feel that our NATO declaration¹ was good and in line with our thinking. Contrary to some press reactions the declaration took this form not under any pressure from me but quite spontaneously. If there was any pressure it came from Spaak.

Preceding the adoption of the declaration there was discussion about Iceland which indicated obvious tension. I hope that the result of the discussion will be that Iceland will move somewhat more deliberated and with less haste than had been planned.

This Iceland problem and the problem of maintaining the disarmament package unbroken were the two areas where there was difference underlying the unanimity expressed in the declaration.

The Berlin experience was very moving. The enthusiasm and good will of the Berlin people were clearly in evidence and the proceedings in

¹For text of the final communiqué issued on May 7, see Department of State Bulletin, May 26, 1958, pp. 850–851.
the Rathaus at which speeches were made by the governing Mayor, the President of the Berlin Senate and myself were impressive. It ended with us all standing in silence while the Freedom Bell was tolled. My reaffirmation of the Berlin Declaration of 1954 and the statement that it was made with your personal authority evoked extended applause.

On the flight from Berlin to Paris I studied a memorandum on disarmament which Adenauer had prepared for me giving his views. It shows I fear a rather disturbing lack of grasp of the realities of the problem. There is, I gather from Bruce, considerable dissension within the Cabinet on this matter and the Chancellor is somewhat a minority of one. However, in his case one overshadows the many.

Norstad has left for the Minnesota celebration which I shall join on Sunday. We had however a good talk last night about his problems.

I am now about to attend our regional conference of Ambassadors with an interlude of a luncheon with Pineau which I fear will be more conducive to sleep than to work during the afternoon.

Faithfully yours, Foster.

Dulles

---

2 Documentation on Dulles’ visit to Berlin on May 8 is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1014.

3 Reference is apparently to a memorandum prepared by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of his conversation with David K.E. Bruce, Ambassador to Germany, on May 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/5-658)

4 Bruce presumably briefed Dulles on the views of the German Government during the Secretary’s visit to Berlin, but no record of their conversation has been found.

5 Dulles attended the centennial celebration of Minnesota statehood beginning on May 11.

6 No record of this conversation has been found.

7 See Document 21.
150. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles

May 12, 1958.

1. I reported briefly on the Copenhagen Conference, making two particular points:

(1) That the passion for a Summit conference seemed to have cooled down and that it was now being appraised as something to be judged on its own merits rather than as something which emotionally must be accepted;

(2) The strong feeling of the Europeans that we should not “break the package” to the extent of disassociating nuclear from conventional armament.

The President indicated that while he thought that from the standpoint of the United States, and indeed of the world, the elimination of nuclear weapons, if it could be accomplished, would itself be a great step forward, probably we should take account of European sensibilities in this matter.

2. I spoke briefly of my trip to Berlin and of the stimulating atmosphere, and also of my stop in Paris and the talk with Faure about Algeria.¹

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

JFD

¹ A memorandum of conversation between Secretary Dulles and Maurice Faure, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, May 10, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1016.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President: Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Secretary Dulles.

151. Telegram 6147 From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, June 24, 1958, 7 p.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/6-2458. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]
152. Memorandum of Conversation

Paris, July 5, 1958, 6 p.m.

SUBJECT
Report to Mr. Spaak on Conversation with General de Gaulle

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Mr. Paul Henri Spaak, Secretary General, NAC
Ambassador W. Randolph Burgess, U.S. Representative, NAC
C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary of State

Following his conversation with Foreign Minister Couve de Murville earlier in the afternoon,¹ the Secretary received Mr. Spaak at the Embassy residence. At this meeting the Secretary went over much of the ground covered in the morning conference with General de Gaulle with particular reference to de Gaulle’s conception of the role which France should play in world affairs.² He said that we may have some difficulties with General de Gaulle in the future, citing the General’s firm intention of gaining for France a dominant role in world affairs. He said that he had informed the General it was possible in times past for two or three countries to set themselves up to run the world but this was no longer the case. While there is room for France to exert more influence, this can only be done if confidence in France is restored as a result of economic and financial reforms and a settlement of the Algerian problem.

The Secretary said that the General had expressed the thought that the NATO area should be enlarged to include North Africa and the Middle East and that the command structure of NATO should be revised. The Secretary had said that it was not through a revision of the command structure but through increased consultation and persuasion that France should exercise its influence. NATO must be more than a mere military alliance. It is not an easy thing to increase consultation with our NATO partners to the extent which we have in the recent past, particularly because it reduces one’s maneuverability and freedom of action. Nevertheless, the Secretary continued, it is our considered view that consultation of this nature is essential. While he had so informed General de Gaulle, he did not feel that he had made an immediate convert.

¹ Dulles was in Paris July 3–5 for talks with French leaders; see Part 2, Document 33.
² See Part 2, Document 34.
As for de Gaulle’s emphasis on a “triumvirate” the Secretary had pointed out the dangers of such a course. He thought that de Gaulle was apt to take the Germans, particularly, for granted. Certainly nothing of the nature of “tripartism” should be established as a formal institution.

General de Gaulle had deprecated recent achievements and trends in the supra-national field. However, he had been calm and on the whole the Secretary felt that he had demonstrated great wisdom. He was not in any sense arrogant, but rather inclined to be conciliatory. The Secretary felt that while we may have our awkward moments with the General, on the whole it is very fortunate that he has been called to his present position.

[1 paragraph (11 lines of source text) not declassified]

The Secretary had placed some emphasis in his conversation with de Gaulle on the subject of Germany. He said that he could envisage three roles for Germany: 1) as a part of the Soviet orbit; 2) as a neutral; and 3) as allied with the Western countries. The first is out of the question and the second would leave Germany free to blackmail both sides. Our only course, therefore, is to see that Germany is tied closely to the West and to pursue our objective of achieving German reunification. General de Gaulle, however, had indicated that the continued division of Germany would not bother him particularly.

Spaak said that despite the fact that there may be awkward moments in our dealings with de Gaulle, the General was the only chance for France. He felt that we must be patient while the General “reconciled himself with realities”. Spaak wondered what influence, if any, people like Mollet, Pinay and Pfimlin have on the General. He spoke particularly of the recent reply to Khrushchev’s note.³ The Secretary said that this may put the United States in a difficult position. There are responsible persons in the United States who think that we have advanced to the point where we should suspend testing. If nothing is done on this subject before the United Nations General Assembly meets in the Fall we may be under some pressure at that time. The British are now in favor of suspending testing because of the recent amendments to the Atomic Energy Act.⁴ Spaak said that he supposed that the French would wish to be excluded from any proposals for a suspension in view of their announced intention to proceed with a nuclear program.

Spaak mentioned the new Soviet proposal regarding the technical talks on the question of surprise attack.⁵ The Secretary said this pro-

---

³ Not further identified.
⁴ See footnote 1, Document 137.
⁵ This Soviet proposal is contained in Khrushchev’s July 2 letter to President Eisenhower, which is printed in Department of State Bulletin, August 18, 1958, pp. 279–281, or Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. II, pp. 1084–1087.
posal held some promise though there are certain aspects that are unac-
ceptable. For example, the proposal presupposes a summit meeting. We
would welcome a study since we felt that there was no other way to
bring about a reduction of armaments except through measures that
would guard against surprise attack. For one thing, it would save the
United States a great deal of money. At the present time the Strategic Air
Command is on a 15-minute alert.

Spaak said that the Soviet antics have been extraordinary lately but
he failed to understand their motives. The Secretary said that the situa-
tion in Eastern Europe obviously worries the Soviet Union which be-
lieves that a summit meeting, if it should be held under conditions
acceptable to the Soviet, would show that the West accepts the status
quo.

With respect to the Lebanon, the Secretary said that there is a prob-
ability that the situation may be worked out without Soviet intervention.
Intervention, he said, could have disastrous consequences, particularly
in peripheral areas such as Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. He very much
hoped, therefore, that an internal solution is possible. The Secretary said
that he expected to lunch with Hammarskjöld on Monday.6 [7 lines of
source text not declassified]

6 Dag Hammarskjöld, U.N. Secretary-General, met with Secretary Dulles at the De-
partment of State on Monday, July 7, 1:20-3:20 p.m. (Princeton University Library, Dulles
Papers, Daily Appointment Books)

153. Memorandum of Conversation


SUBJECT

Secretary's Meeting with de Gaulle—Nuclear Stockpiles and NATO

PARTICIPANTS

M. Louis Joxe, Secretary General of the French Foreign Office
Mr. Matthew Looram, WE

At the Embassy Residence before dinner on the evening of July 5,
Mr. Looram raised with M. Joxe two of the questions that had arisen
during the Secretary's meeting with General de Gaulle that morning.1

1 See Part 2, Document 34.
Mr. Looram stated that as he had understood the conversation, General de Gaulle had made it clear he would insist on the French having control over the custody and disposition of all nuclear weapons located on French soil and that this would apply to weapons that might be stored in France for the NATO stockpile or to weapons possibly stored in France for the use of United States forces. The U.S. would share in the control, but our role would presumably be secondary. M. Joxe confirmed this understanding; he said it was perhaps better to say France would insist on "primary responsibility" for custodianship and disposition of the weapons. Under these circumstances, Mr. Looram pointed out, given the limitations of U.S. legislation which precluded us from turning over weapons to foreign powers, it would be absolutely impossible to have any nuclear weapons stored in France. He hoped that this was fully understood by the French authorities. M. Joxe stated that he understood this, however, he thought that the important thing was to make General de Gaulle feel that France was playing a significant role in world strategy. If he had this feeling, M. Joxe thought that other matters, such as this nuclear problem, could probably be satisfactorily resolved.

Mr. Looram asked what General de Gaulle had in mind when he talked of extending the NATO area to the Middle East. It was difficult to conceive just how this could be done, given the many problems, to name Egypt but one. M. Joxe admitted that it was difficult to explain de Gaulle's concept in detail and how it could be put into effect, but he thought that the over-all concept had merit.

---

2 The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended on July 2, 1958, permitted the transfer of special nuclear materials to foreign nations that had made substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons but prohibited the transfer or export of actual atomic weapons to foreign nations. (72 Stat. 276)

154. Editorial Note

At its 373d meeting on July 24, the National Security Council agreed to NSC 5810/1, "Basic National Security Policy," which the President approved on July 28. (Department of State, S/S—NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) A memorandum of discussion on this subject at the July 24 NSC meeting and the text of NSC 5810/1 are scheduled for publication in volume III. The fifth sentence of paragraph 18 of NSC 5810/1 reads as follows:

"The United States should consider the long-term development of a NATO nuclear weapons authority to determine requirements for, hold
custody of, and control the use of nuclear weapons in accordance with NATO policy and plans for defense of NATO areas."

On August 14, Acting Secretary of State Herter wrote a letter to Secretary of Defense McElroy in which he suggested "that the Defense and State Departments should, together with the Atomic Energy Commission, undertake a responsible study of the feasibility and desirability of establishing a NATO nuclear authority, along the lines set forth in NSC 5810/1." He also noted that Gerard Smith, Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning, would be the Department's representative for this study. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/8-1458) Deputy Secretary of Defense Quareshi's reply to Herter, August 30, has not been found, but Herter's letter to Quareshi, September 16, noted Quareshi's agreement to the study and the designation of Lieutenant General Alonzo P. Fox, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, as the Defense representative on it. (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers) Attached to this letter is a copy of Herter's letter to John A. McConc, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, September 16, requesting his cooperation in this study.

No subsequent documentation on the activities of this study group has been found. As late as August 13, 1959, the minutes of a Policy Planning Staff-JCS Joint Staff Meeting on the subject of the status of planning for NATO nuclear authority noted: "Those present were unaware of any current planning on this subject." (Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, State-Defense Relationships)

The study group, if it ever met, was apparently superseded by the actions of the National Security Council. At its 415th meeting on July 30, 1959, the National Security Council adopted NSC 5906/1, "Basic National Security Policy," which the President approved on August 5. (Ibid., S/S—NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) NSC 5906/1 superseded NSC 5810/1. Paragraphs 24—a and —b of NSC 5906/1 noted that the United States should discourage the development or acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities by additional nations, but if that did not succeed and if the President determined that it was in U.S. security interests to do so, "the United States should enhance the nuclear weapons capability of selected allies by the exchange with them or provision to them as appropriate of (1) information; (2) materials; or (3) nuclear weapons, under arrangements for control of weapons to be determined." The next sub-paragraph stated that "the United States should now urgently consider within the Executive Branch plans for the development of NATO arrangements for determining requirements for, holding custody of, and controlling the use of nuclear weapons." The memorandum of discussion of the NSC meeting on this subject, July 30, 1959, and the text of NSC 5906/1 are scheduled for publication in volume III.
155. **Telegram Polto 670 From the Mission at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State**

Paris, September 12, 1958, 8 p.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56341/9-1258. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]

---

156. **Memorandum of Conversation**

New York, September 26, 1958.

**SUBJECT**

Current NATO Problems

**PARTICIPANTS**

The Secretary of State

General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Mr. Joseph N. Greene, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

Mr. Ray L. Thurston, SHAPE/L

The conversation opened with a review of French problems. The Secretary referred to the communication he had just received from General de Gaulle in which the latter proposes the establishment of a mechanism of consultation between France, the U.S. and the U.K. on problems throughout the world, and the extension of the area to be covered by the NATO Treaty to African and Asian areas as far as the Indian Ocean. The Secretary wondered exactly what General de Gaulle had in mind, particularly since there were no French territories in these regions. General Norstad said that he did not believe that de Gaulle had really given any thought to the implications of his proposal and that, given the kind of relations that existed between de Gaulle and his subordinates, it was doubtful that the latter would be able to throw any real light on how

---

Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Thurston on September 29. The meeting was held at the Waldorf Astoria.

1 Dulles was in New York to give a speech.

2 See Part 2, Document 45.
General de Gaulle planned to work this matter out. General Norstad expressed the view that any attempt to extend NATO responsibilities along the lines suggested by General de Gaulle would seriously weaken NATO which, as now constituted, affords a strong community of interest.

There was some discussion of the Secretary’s talks with de Gaulle of last July,\(^3\) [4 lines of source text not declassified]. The Secretary asked how the Adenauer–de Gaulle conversations\(^4\) had gone, and General Norstad replied that, from the information available to him, they had gone very well indeed.

The Secretary related recent conversations with the British in which they had taken the position that they would maintain their force levels in Germany at the 55,000 level in 1959 with the understanding that in 1960 they would have to reduce to 45,000.\(^5\) The Secretary asked General Norstad’s opinion on this question. The General replied that in his view to agree to the formula offered by the British would be just as bad from the viewpoint of the NATO military effort as agreeing to an immediate reduction to 45,000 men. The General strongly expressed the hope that we would not make a commitment to the British on this point, and that the question of British troop levels in 1960 be kept open for review at a later date.

General Norstad brought up the subject of Cyprus, and recounted his recent trip to Turkey and Greece and his talks with the military and political leaders there.\(^6\) He said that he thought the Cyprus question had now reached a truly critical stage and hoped that the United States would take a strong hand in reaching a solution. The Secretary alluded to past efforts on the U.S. side to help out in this matter and to our continued willingness to mediate in this problem, if the parties directly concerned would agree to our playing this role. He indicated that uppermost in his mind at this time was the critical importance of our relations with the United Kingdom, and that this had to be taken into account in connection with any U.S. initiatives on the question of Cyprus. While agreeing with the Secretary that whatever was to be done would have to be worked out in cooperation with the British, General Norstad concluded by again expressing the hope that we would move in on this one urgently.

---

\(^3\) See Part 2, Document 33.

\(^4\) At de Gaulle’s invitation, Adenauer came to France on September 14 to discuss questions of common interest to the two nations. For Adenauer’s account, see Erinnerungen, pp. 436–439; for de Gaulle’s account, see Mémoires, pp. 184–190.

\(^5\) See Document 138.

\(^6\) Norstad visited Turkey and Greece in late August. No record of his talks with military and political leaders there has been found in Department of State files.
157. Memorandum of Conversation

MC-9

Boston, September 27, 1958, 5:30 p.m.

SECRETARY’S TRIP TO BOSTON

PARTICIPANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>NATO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Secretary</td>
<td>Secretary General Paul Henri Spaak¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambassador Burgess</td>
<td>M. St. M’leux</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Greene</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Compton</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SUBJECT

General de Gaulle’s views on NATO

M. Spaak told the Secretary that General de Gaulle had given him a copy of the memorandum which the General had sent to President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan on September 17.² M. Spaak expressed his concern that if de Gaulle presses his proposal it will be the end of NATO. The Italians and Germans would not tolerate it. M. Spaak thought it important to raise for discussion some of the issues General de Gaulle presented but he heartily disagreed with the idea of trying to revise the North Atlantic Treaty. Also he wholly disapproved of the idea in the de Gaulle memorandum of injecting the military standing group into what should be political consultations—if any.

The Secretary said he had found in general one good element and one bad in the de Gaulle memorandum. Since it is a fact that the ability of the United Nations to deal with serious issues is deteriorating with the proliferation of membership, it is legitimate for the members of NATO to consider how best they may deal with such issues, on a global basis. Consultation within NATO, of the sort which M. Spaak had just been discussing, and the contacts which M. Spaak had initiated with his counterparts in other regional organizations, might be viewed in this context. But the idea of a “world directorate” comprising the United States, Britain and France is wholly unacceptable to the United States.

---

¹ Spaak paid an unofficial visit to the United States September 26–28. He and Secretary Dulles were in Boston to address the Atlantic Treaty Association on September 27. For texts of their speeches, see Department of State Bulletin, October 13, 1958, pp. 571–574, and October 20, 1958, pp. 607–611.

² Part 2, Document 45.
M. Spaak shared these views.

The Secretary noted that he had told Ambassador Alphand and Couve de Murville, as well as Selwyn Lloyd,\(^3\) that de Gaulle’s memorandum raised serious issues which would have to be carefully studied in the United States Government. The Secretary said that he thought this study would take quite some time.

\(^3\) A memorandum of Dulles’ conversation with Couve de Murville and Alphand is printed in Part 2 as Document 46. On September 26 at 11 a.m., Dulles met with Lloyd, informed him of the contents of de Gaulle’s letter, and told him the United States wanted to consult with the United Kingdom about a reply. He asked Lloyd to send him the British views after speaking to Macmillan. (Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)

158. Memorandum of Conversation

Boston, September 27, 1958.

PARTICIPANTS

M. Paul-Henri Spaak, Secretary-General to NATO
M. Andre Saint-Meleux, Assistant to the Secretary-General
Gen. Alden K. Sibley, U.S. Host to M. Spaak in Boston
The Secretary of State
Ambassador W. Randolph Burgess, U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO
Mr. Joseph N. Greene, Special Assistant to the Secretary
Mr. Arthur A. Compton, Special Assistant to the Director, EUR/RA

SUBJECT

Political Consultation in NATO

In the course of a conversation on a number of subjects of concern to NATO (reported on in a separate memorandum of conversation),\(^1\) M. Spaak stressed the importance of further developing the practice of political consultation in NATO. He expressed appreciation for the great United States contribution to this activity during the past year, citing especially the United States statement on the Lebanon crisis as a good example of advance consultation.\(^2\) Although M. Spaak felt that in the case

\(^1\) Presumably Document 157.
\(^2\) Not further identified.
of the North Atlantic Council discussion on Lebanon general agreement had been reached that United States intervention might become necessary, it appeared later that not all NATO countries had the same impression.

M. Spaak said this leads to the question of the meaning of "diplomatic silence" on the part of other representatives, during discussions of important policy statements on the part of one or more North Atlantic Council members. If greater harmonization of important political policies of NATO Governments is to result, there must be fuller discussion in the North Atlantic Council. He said this was not an immediate but a long-range problem of considerable importance.

The Secretary commented that perhaps one problem in this connection was that many Permanent Representatives lacked authority to speak for their Governments on these issues. Ambassador Burgess pointed out that the North Atlantic Council discussion of the most recent United States statement regarding the Formosa Straits situation showed that when encouraged to do so many Permanent Representatives are prepared to speak up and a worthwhile discussion ensues.3

M. Spaak referred to the successful consultation in the North Atlantic Council regarding notes to the Soviets by member countries, again complimenting the United States on having submitted all its proposed replies to Soviet notes on matters of concern to NATO for consultation before their delivery. He recognized that speed was of the essence if such consultations were to continue successfully and said it now appeared possible to accomplish such consultation within a 48-hour limit.

The Secretary said the United States would see what could be done to make consultation more profitable, emphasizing other members must be prepared to speak up more frequently. He noted that in his recent talks with the Belgian Foreign Minister the latter did not appear to be fully familiar with the discussions which had been taking place in NATO.4

M. Spaak agreed improvement could be made in a number of countries to assure that information on NATO political consultations is made available to the highest officials in member Governments.

---

3 Reference is apparently to a statement released by the White House at Newport, Rhode Island, on September 20; see Department of State Bulletin, October 6, 1958, pp. 530-531. No record of NAC discussion of that statement has been found.

4 No record of a meeting between Dulles and the Belgian Foreign Minister has been found.
159. **Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State**

Bonn, October 9, 1958, 7 p.m.

777. Ref: Deptel 3587 to London rptd 729 Bonn. I have just seen Von Eckardt after departure Macmillan. He told me that talks had gone off very well and that atmosphere had been cordial. Von Eckardt raised subject de Gaulle memorandum and said Chancellor was greatly concerned lest matter leak to press. [7 lines of source text not declassified] Von Eckardt stressed importance coordination statements to be made Washington, London, Bonn, Rome in event leak to press. British Under Secretary State Information Ralph Murray arriving Bonn Friday connection forthcoming Heuss visit London and Von Eckardt plans discuss matter with him. Said that Chancellor planning send personal letter de Gaulle immediate future stressing and explaining his concern implications and consequences proposals. Macmillan told Chancellor he instructing Ambassador Jebb Paris suggest to de Gaulle he write another letter Spaak setting forth his ideas with regard extension area and scope NATO and omitting reference concept tripartite directorate. Macmillan felt this move might obviate necessity reply by British and ourselves to original letter, particularly with regard latter point which both acceptable and explosive.

I feel Von Eckardt's recommendation re coordination lines public statements in event press discussion well founded and would like suggest this be done soonest Washington. Although Von Eckardt did not mention French, consider equally important Paris be prepared make statement consistent with line followed by four other capitals.

Von Eckardt's comments, which undoubtedly reflect Chancellor's views, confirm importance we avoid reacting to de Gaulle memorandum in way which would lend credence to idea we prepared grant French special position comparable with that enjoyed by British. Even

---


1 Telegram 3587 to London, October 8, summarized an informal discussion with British Embassy officials in Washington regarding de Gaulle's memorandum on the reorganization of NATO. The discussion explored courses open to the United States and the United Kingdom but no commitments were made. (Ibid., 740.5/10-858)

2 Felix von Eckardt, Head of Press and Information Department, Federal Republic of Germany.

3 Macmillan visited Bonn October 8-9 for informal discussions with Adenauer on matters of common concern.

4 Part 2, Document 45.

5 Dr. Theodor Heuss, President of West Germany, visited the United Kingdom October 20-22, 1958.
semblance justification such suspicion could cause grievous damage to German attitudes and relations with French and ourselves.

For this reason I believe we should avoid substantial interim reply of de Gaulle even along lines suggested by British, which might be taken by Germans imply our willingness discuss, in sense proposed by French, many problems raised by basic revision NATO. On other hand, I see danger allowing matter rest too long without some reaction by us, since Germans would tend suspect secret consultation behind their backs, and whole issue might be aired public press with unhappy consequences. Therefore, I support suggestion informal tripartite meeting Washington in fairly near future, as means opening de Gaulle’s eyes major problems and dangers inherent his proposal. From our viewpoint, condition success such meeting would be full confidential briefing Germans (as well as Italians) on discussions and that French be aware this.

Bruce

---

See Part 2, Document 50.

160. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Spaak

October 10, 1958.

MY DEAR FRIEND SPAAK: I have reread several times your statesmanlike speech at Boston. I have put a copy in the hands of President Eisenhower for him to read. It is significant in relation to the De Gaulle thinking.

I feel that some of your reflections are more pertinent to the European members of NATO than to the United States. The United States, at least in recent years, has seen the problem as world-wide and has attempted to deal with it on this basis. I recall that in 1949, when the North Atlantic Treaty was before the United States Senate, I, then a private citizen,

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/10–1058. Personal and Confidential. Drafted by Dulles and cleared by Elbrick. In a covering note attached to this letter, Dulles asked Burgess to deliver this letter to Spaak unless he had objections. Dulles added: “I think it would be well if you emphasize to him the desirability of treating my letter as personal and not one to be dealt with as an International Staff matter. It would be unfortunate if knowledge of my letter were at this stage to reach other governments.” A handwritten notation on this note says that the letter was sent to Paris on October 11.

1 See footnote 1, Document 157. No record of President Eisenhower’s receipt of a copy of Spaak’s speech has been found.
zen, testified in relation to it before the Foreign Relations Committee. I pointed out then the great danger in drawing geographical lines to meet a threat that was world-wide. I expressed fear that doing this would encourage the Communists "to feel that they can do anything they like in the rest of the world" and that the Pact might "lead to aggression outside of those areas, which may make war more likely. That", I said, "is the big problem, as I see it: the political problem that flows from the Pact. . . . While we decrease the risk of war from events within the Atlantic area, we may increase the risk of war from events outside of those areas". Actually, in a year the Korean War began.

I have no doubt whatever that today it is essential to make what you call a reappraisal of NATO to adapt it to current Communist offensives.

As you know, the President and I suggested at the December 1957 meeting of NATO the establishment of liaison with other groupings. I am not sure that that is the answer. But also I doubt that the answer is to be found in General De Gaulle's suggestion; or in attempting to make NATO into a means of reincarnating Western dominance of the world. I do not see clearly how we should move. But I do feel that you and General De Gaulle have raised issues which call for a response which is positive and which may well become the most critical matter to be dealt with in the next Ministerial meeting in December.

If you have any further thoughts on this matter, I would appreciate having them at this time when we are giving thought on how to answer General De Gaulle.

Sincerely yours,

Foster Dulles

---

2 Dulles' testimony on May 4, 1949, is printed in North Atlantic Treaty: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 81st Congress, 1st Session, pt. 2, pp. 339–376.

3 Ellipsis in the source text.

4 Dulles' statement on December 16, 1957, is printed in Department of State Bulletin, January 6, 1958, p. 10.

5 In Polto 986 from Paris, October 15, Burgess reported that he delivered Dulles' letter to Spaak the previous night. "He was appreciative and said it fitted in with his own thoughts." Spaak also showed Burgess the first draft of his response to de Gaulle's proposal, which Burgess called a "generally good supporting examination by NATO within present charter of problems of wider area but vigorously opposed to the triumvirate." Spaak promised Burgess a copy of this draft. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/10–1558) Burgess subsequently transmitted this draft letter (in French) from Spaak to de Gaulle in Polto 991 from Paris, October 15. (Ibid.) No other draft of Spaak's reply to de Gaulle has been found, but Spaak later summarized his response, October 15, in his memoirs. He added that de Gaulle did not respond to this reply. (Spaak, Memoirs, pp. 315–318)

6 Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.
161. Telegram From the Mission at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State

Paris, October 15, 1958, 5 p.m.

Polto 992. Eyes Only for Secretary from Burgess. Following is text Spaak reply to your letter October 10.

"Dear Mr. Dulles: I have received your letter of October 10. I thank you particularly for your kind reference to my Boston speech.

When Mr. Burgess gave me your letter I was able to have him read the first draft of a note which I intend to have transmitted to General De Gaulle and of which I am sending you a copy."

You will once again note, and this pleases me, that our reactions follow the same pattern.

Like you, I think that the problem posed by General De Gaulle is important and real; like you, I think that the proposed solution is not a happy one and that it might even be dangerous; lastly, I feel as you do that the real procedure to be followed is to discuss the problem at the Ministerial meeting in December.

For this meeting I intend to circulate a note on the political consultation in NATO during the past year and to avail myself of the opportunity thus given me to take up the matters which are giving us concern.

It is obvious that the subject is vast and complicated, and that we must be very careful not to destroy, on the pretext of improvement, that which has already been accomplished and which is, after all, a considerable achievement.

The note I am transmitting to Mr. Burgess contains only my first reactions. I intend to go into this work thoroughly, and shall inform you of the development of my ideas since you are good enough to show an interest in them.

If the Government of the United States thinks it necessary to answer General De Gaulle soon, I believe that without antagonizing him, that is, while agreeing to discuss the idea of the problems posed by him, it would be necessary to indicate how uncertain, and at the same time dangerous, the solution of a tripartite organization would be.

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/10–1558. Secret; Niac; Official Translation. A copy of this message in French is ibid., 396.1–PA/10–1558.

1 Document 160.

2 See footnote 5, Document 160.
Chancellor Adenauer, who is greatly disturbed by all of this, has begged me to come to see him in Bonn. I shall pay him a visit on October 24.

Please accept, dear Mr. Dulles, the assurance of my high consideration. P.H. Spaak."

Burgess

162. Telegram 1553 From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, October 27, 1958, 8 p.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/10–2758. Secret; Limited Distribution. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

163. Memorandum of Discussion at the 390th Meeting of the National Security Council

December 11, 1958.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1 and 2.]

3. December 1958 NATO Ministerial Meeting

Mr. Gray said he understood that Secretary Herter was prepared to talk briefly about the forthcoming NATO Ministerial Meeting in Paris. Governor Herter replied in the affirmative and said that he believed the NATO meeting would develop three main themes. The first of these

was a military theme and would involve discussion of the MC-70 Plan.\(^1\) The U.S. would be obliged to fudge a little its own position in such a discussion. We will find it somewhat awkward to urge the other NATO Powers to fulfill their obligations to the letter while we ourselves may not plan, after Calendar 1959, to fulfill our own. Under the circumstances, we would have to do the best we could.

Speaking very vigorously, the President inquired of Secretary Herter whether it ever occurred to his people that it was their duty to make the representatives of the other NATO nations realize that their national security cannot always and completely depend on the U.S. After all, when we deployed our six divisions to NATO, the deployment was never intended to be permanent and we informed Congress that this was a temporary measure, particularly related to the build-up of West German forces.

Secretary Herter said that the second theme of the meeting would consist of De Gaulle's attitude toward the NATO alliance. He reminded the members of the Council of De Gaulle's effort to set up in NATO a kind of directing triumvirate consisting of France, the U.K., and the U.S. De Gaulle seemed to be very insistent on this point and there have already been two meetings in Washington between the Secretary of State and the French and British Ambassadors to discuss the matter.\(^2\) In spite of the two meetings, we are still uncertain what De Gaulle really wants. Moreover, in the meeting yesterday the French came up with two further questions to ask of the U.S. Government while providing no answers to the questions which our Government had asked earlier. Secretary Herter added the further thought that this issue would be taken up with De Gaulle and with the Foreign Minister, Couve de Murville, in Paris this weekend. Meanwhile, many of the other NATO powers were very worried indeed over the possibility of some kind of tripartite domination of NATO.

Secretary Herter said that the third theme of discussion at the Paris meeting would be the situation in Berlin. This he described as still constituting a complicated and uncertain picture. As yet no firm policy positions had been taken by the four responsible powers, the U.S., the U.K., France, and the Federal Republic. There was still much soul searching for alternatives. One such alternative was, of course, simply to insist on maintaining the status quo. Such an alternative would require most careful planning. Another alternative was whether to open up the Berlin situation so that it involved a complete review of the German problem in its entirety. At the moment, thought Secretary Herter, with this NATO

---

\(^1\) Regarding MC-70, see Document 131.

\(^2\) See Part 2, Documents 77 and 78.
meeting coming up, no one here wants to get into an absolutely fixed position. The views of other NATO powers must be safeguarded.

The President said that he wished to talk with Secretary Herter and certain other officials on the Berlin problem at a meeting in his office after the conclusion of the Council meeting.\footnote{For notes of the meeting with the President on Berlin, December 11, see vol. VIII, Document 97.}

Secretary Anderson inquired of Secretary Herter whether the latter believed that there was any link between the De Gaulle proposals on NATO on the one hand and the common market and free-trade area on the other? Secretary Herter doubted that there was any such link and said that he felt that De Gaulle's attitude represented a throwback to the days when De Gaulle held a position inferior to that of Roosevelt and Churchill. In other words, it was a matter largely of prestige, with De Gaulle determined really to be one of the Big Three.

The President strongly agreed with Secretary Herter's view and reminisced about some of De Gaulle's past actions in which he had been involved, concluding that De Gaulle had always been restive under the knowledge that he did not, in fact, constitute one of the Big Three.

Mr. Gray turned to Secretary Herter and said that as far as MC–70 was concerned, he believed that we had certain commitments under the plan through Calendar Year 1959. The question, therefore, was what we do over the longer range. At the NATO meeting would we simply confine our discussion to this single year or would we be drawn into longer-range discussions of our commitments? Secretary Herter replied that MC–70 was, of course, subject to review at regular intervals. He thought that the basis of discussion of MC–70 would be that the other NATO powers could not or would not live up to their agreed commitments to MC–70.

The President, again speaking with considerable warmth, emphasized that the U.S. ought to insist that we will not always be the permanent foundation stone of the whole NATO alliance. Our original contribution of divisions and other forces to NATO was supposed to be temporary in character. Now we seem to be stuck with it permanently. We should ask when the hell these other people are going to do their duty. We have got to get tougher with them and it is on this subject that he wished to talk with the Secretary of State. These other NATO powers cannot go on forever riding on our coattails. After all, the Belgians, who originally had a period of two years of compulsory service for their newly drafted military personnel, have now got it down to twelve months and are agitating for even less. The same was true of the Danes.
All of these nations seem to be trying to figure out how little they themselves can do and how best to leave us to do the rest of the job.

Secretary Quarles pointed out that through the next calendar year our U.S. commitment to MC-70 is firm and we will be able to meet this commitment. Down the road farther, however, the U.S. will fall substantially short of its MC-70 goals and the other NATO nations will fall even more short of their goals. The problem, as Secretary Quarles saw it, was really that the political elements of power in the NATO nations have not fully accepted the military requirements and the strategic concept on which the MC-70 was based. Accordingly, we must seek a political meeting of the minds in order to obtain agreed military requirements. Otherwise glaring short-falls are bound to occur in the future.

Secretary Herter observed that De Gaulle was really seeking a complete re-assessment of the entire NATO defense concept. The President said he understood this and that De Gaulle really wanted to broaden NATO to include all the world where Western interests were at stake. This was just a little crazy. NATO really had a specific mission if the member nations would just buckle down and carry it out.

The National Security Council: 4

a. Noted and discussed the subject in the light of an oral presentation by the Acting Secretary of State.

b. Noted the President’s statement that the European Members of NATO must realize that they must increase their share in European defense. The President stated that he would speak to the Secretary of State about this matter prior to the Secretary’s departure for Paris.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

S. Everett Gleason

---

4 Paragraphs a and b and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2017, approved by the President on December 12. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
164. Memorandum of Conversation

December 12, 1958, 2:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Secretary
The Under Secretary
General Goodpaster
Major Eisenhower
Mr. Greene

1. I showed the President the draft of the statement which I proposed to make following our discussion, and with the changes in the last two paragraphs shown on the attached copy, he approved it.¹ (Mr. Hagerty was present for this item.)

2. The President expressed discouragement at the level of the efforts the other NATO countries are making to the common defense and expressed the belief that at the forthcoming Ministerial Meeting in Paris I should chide them a bit. He suggested that the other NATO Governments be reminded that the United States is maintaining the principal deterrent power and, through the Mutual Security Program a great portion of the expense of the defense posture of the free nations around the periphery of the Sino Soviet bloc. Notwithstanding this, the President felt that our allies are not manning their own fronts.

There was some discussion, in which Mr. Herter participated, of the extent of the shortfalls of the NATO countries' defense efforts. Mr. Herter noted that these are expected to some extent in all the European countries and noted that while the United States might have to transfer two battle groups from existing divisions to the status of service troops to man the NATO atomic stockpiles, during 1959, this did not contemplate reduction in our overall force strength in Europe. The President recalled that when he first went to SHAPE, there had been talk that the United States assistance to the NATO countries' defense efforts would be for a "maximum" of five years. Since then the NATO countries have come to depend overly on the United States; the President reiterated

¹Not printed. For the approved draft as released to the press on December 12, see Department of State Bulletin, December 29, 1958, pp. 1040–1041.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles. The time of the meeting is taken from another memorandum of this conversation, prepared by Major Eisenhower on December 15. (Ibid., Whitman File, DDE Diaries) Major Eisenhower's memorandum apparently served as the basis for his recollections of this conversation, printed in Strictly Personal, pp. 216–217.
that it is time for us to begin to wean our allies from overdependence upon us and to encourage them to make better efforts of their own.

In this connection I showed the President Ambassador Burgess’ estimate (Polto 1646) and General Norstad’s message to me (ALO 1111). The President expressed his agreement that we should not back down from the commitments undertaken in MC 70, and approved our adhering to those goals for calendar year 1959. The President alluded to the pressures on the U.S. fiscal position and the difficult problem this posed for our budget. I said that notwithstanding these, I thought it important that we take this position because among other reasons it would be dangerous if we allowed the impression of great United States strength to be dissipated.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

JFD

---

2 Polto 1646 from Paris, December 11, contained Burgess’ summary and comment on the agenda of the forthcoming NATO Ministerial Meeting in Paris. Burgess added:

“Despite present shortfalls in some countries I believe the goals set by M.C. 70 are attainable. There will be strong voices in support, including, I expect, Norstad, Staf, Spaak, Brentano, Zorlu, and others, but attitude expressed by U.S. will have enormous weight.” (Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-DU/12-1158)

3 Not found.

---

165. Editorial Note

The Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, held in Paris December 16–18, was attended by all Foreign Ministers and NATO Permanent Representatives of the 15 member countries. The U.S. Delegation was headed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and included Permanent NATO Representative W. Randolph Burgess, Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy, and Under Secretary of the Treasury Fred C. Scribner, Jr. A list of the principal members of the delegation is printed in Department of State Bulletin, December 29, 1958, page 1041. Secretary Dulles’ December 12 departure statement is ibid., pages 1041–1042.

The Secretary and his party arrived in Paris on December 13. On December 14, he met with the Foreign Ministers of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom to discuss Berlin. An account of this meeting is printed in volume VIII, Document 106. The text of the communiqué issued by the Foreign Ministers on December 14 is in Department of State Bulletin, December 29, 1958, pages 1041–1042.
The most extensive body of documentation on this NATO Ministerial Meeting is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1161–1179. Briefing papers are *ibid.*, CF 1161–1164. CF 1165 contains miscellaneous administrative materials, including documentation on pre-conference arrangements, the Berlin situation, and the Geneva disarmament talks. CF 1166 contains Orders of the Day for the December 12–19 period. Miscellaneous documents are in CF 1167. Summary and verbatim records are in CF 1168 and 1176–1178. CF 1169 contains a set of memoranda of conversation among U.S. officials and between U.S. and foreign officials. Copies of Tosec–Secto, Topol–Polto, and Tedul–Dulte telegrams are in CF 1170, 1171, and 1179, respectively. CF 1172–1178 contain a chronological record of meetings from December 12 through 18. Telegrams and documentation on this Ministerial Meeting are *ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1–PA.

At 4 p.m. on Saturday, December 13, Secretary Dulles met briefly with Burgess, Reinhardt, and Livingston T. Merchant; no record of this conversation has been found. At 4:14 p.m., he met with Secretary General Spaak to discuss the Berlin situation. A memorandum of this conversation (USDel/MC/2) is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1169 and 1173. At 5:10 p.m., he met with McElroy, Scribner, and other U.S. officials to discuss Berlin. The memorandum of this conversation (USDel/MC/7) is *ibid*. At 5:15 p.m., Woodbury Willoughby, Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs and member of the U.S.–Canada Permanent Joint Board for Defense, and Philip J. Farley, Special Assistant for Disarmament and Atomic Energy Affairs, joined the meeting to discuss plans for the first meeting of the U.S.–Canada Permanent Joint Board for Defense, scheduled for the morning of December 15. A one-sentence memorandum for the record of this meeting is *ibid.*, CF 1173. Burgess, General Norstad, and other officials next joined to discuss MC–70; see Document 166. At 6:20 p.m., Ambassador Bruce, Legal Adviser Loftus E. Becker, and other advisers joined the meeting to discuss Berlin. The memorandum of this conversation (USDel/MC/7) is printed in volume VIII, Document 105. Meanwhile, Merchant talked with Ambassador Alphand on the Algerian resolution in the U.N. General Assembly. The memorandum of this conversation (USDel/MC/1) is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1169 and 1173. Merchant also talked with Douglas Dillon about the Algerian resolution at 7:10 p.m.; no record of this conversation has been found. At 7:15 p.m., McBride met with Ambassador Alphand on the Algerian resolution. The memorandum of conversation (USDel/MC/4) is *ibid*.

On Sunday, December 14, at 10:30 a.m., Dulles met with Merchant, Reinhardt, Becker, and Director of the Office of German Affairs Martin J. Hillenbrand to discuss the Berlin situation; no record of this conversa-
tion has been found. At 11:45 a.m., Merchant and Bruce met with German Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano. The memorandum of this conversation (USDel/MC/5) is printed in volume VIII, Document 107. At 12:15 p.m., Dulles met with John Hay Whitney and Greene. They were later joined by Reinhardt, Bruce, Houghton, and Merchant; no record of this conversation has been found.

After lunch, at 2:30 p.m., a tripartite meeting on the Berlin question convened, attended by Dulles, Lloyd, and Couve de Murville and their advisers. This discussion was reported in Secto 10, December 14; see *ibid.*, Document 108. A quadripartite meeting of the Foreign Ministers on the Berlin question began at 4:30 p.m. The meeting was reported in Secto 9 and Secto 6; see *ibid.*, Document 109. A verbatim record of this four-power meeting is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1174. Following this meeting, Dulles discussed the Israeli-Syrian situation with Lloyd. Their conversation was reported in Secto 7, December 14. (*ibid.*, Central Files, 684A.86B/12–1458)

On Monday, December 15, the U.S.-Canadian Ministerial Committee on Joint Defense met at the Canadian Embassy Chancery at 9:30 a.m.; see Document 292. At 10:30 a.m., Hillenbrand met with Willy Brandt, Mayor of Berlin, concerning Brandt's possible visit to the United States. The memorandum of this conversation (USDel/MC/12) is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1169 and 1175. At 12:05 p.m., Dulles met with General Norstad. Memoranda of their conversation on Berlin (USDel/MC/8), de Gaulle (USDel/MC/9), the U.S. defense posture (USDel/MC/10), and IRBMs in Germany (USDel/MC/11) are *ibid*. Regarding USDel/MC/8, see volume VIII, Document 111. Regarding USDel/MC/9, see Part 2, Document 80. Regarding USDel/MC/10, see footnote 2, Document 166. Dulles summarized this meeting in a message to President Eisenhower; see Part 2, Document 82.

At 3 p.m., a meeting of the full U.S. Delegation was held; no record of this meeting has been found. At 3:45 p.m., Dulles met with McElroy, Burgess, and other members of the delegation. According to the delegation's chronology, the first part of the discussion was on McElroy’s statement for the NATO Ministerial Meeting; the second part was on the Secretary’s forthcoming meeting with de Gaulle. No further record of this meeting has been found. At 4:15 p.m., Joseph J. Wolf, Director of Political Affairs at USRO, met with J.A. de Ranitz, Alternate Dutch Permanent Representative to NATO, and discussed Berlin, Indonesia, and military defense. The memorandum of their conversation (USDel/MC/6) is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1169 and 1175. At 4:30 p.m., Dulles called on de Gaulle; see Part 2, Document 81. Dulles summarized this meeting in a message to President Eisenhower; see Part 2, Document 82. At 5 p.m., McElroy and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs John N. Irwin, II, met
with British Defense Minister Duncan Sandys and Sir Richard Powell, Permanent Secretary in the British Ministry of Defense.

On Tuesday, December 16, Irwin met with Dutch Defense Minister Staf at 9:30 a.m. Their discussion was summarized in Polto 1721, December 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5612/12-1758) At 9:45 a.m., Dulles met with Italian Prime Minister Fanfani. Memoranda of their discussion of the free trade area (USDel/MC/19), the Middle East (USDel/MC/17), and IRBMs for Italy (USDel/MC/16) are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1169 and 1176. For a memorandum of their discussion on the de Gaulle memorandum, see Document 166.

The opening plenary session of the NATO Ministerial Meeting began at 10:15 a.m.; see Document 168. The restricted session began discussion on Berlin at 10:30 a.m. A summary of this session was transmitted in Polto 1718, December 17, printed in volume VIII, Document 112. At 12:50 p.m., Secretary Dulles met with Lloyd. Sector 16, December 17, summarized their conversation on Archbishop Makarios. (Department of State, Central Files, 847C.413/12-1758) Sector 17, December 17, summarized their attitudes on de Gaulle and tripartite talks. (Ibid., 762.00/12-1758) Sector 24, December 17, contains a summary of the whole conversation. (Ibid., 756D.5622/12-1758) At 1:20 p.m., Timmons conducted a debriefing, presumably for the U.S. Delegation, on the opening session, Hillenbrand on the Berlin situation; no record of this debriefing, or subsequent ones, has been found.

At 3:15 p.m., the NATO Ministerial Meeting reconvened to discuss Spaak’s Report on Political Consultation and review of the international situation; see Documents 169 and 170. Dulles summarized the first day’s session in a message to President Eisenhower; see Document 171. During the afternoon, Dulles also met with Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Wigny to discuss the possibility of “rationalizing” the European organizations. The memorandum of this discussion (USDel/MC/13) is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1169 and 1176. At 7:20 p.m., Timmons and Wolf conducted a debriefing session on Spaak’s report and review of the international situation.

On December 17, Dulles met with Couve de Murville at 9:30 a.m. Memoranda of their discussion on Berlin (USDel/MC/20), Indonesian arms (USDel/MC/21), and de Gaulle’s memorandum (USDel/MC/22) are ibid., CF 1169 and 1177. For USDel/MC/20, see volume VIII, Document 114. The plenary session of the NATO Ministerial Meeting opened at 10:27 a.m. to discuss the NATO military effort; see Document 172. At 1 p.m., Russell Fessenden, Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, conducted a debriefing on this session. Meanwhile, Dulles met with Couve de Murville and discussed nuclear submarines.
The memorandum of this conversation (USDel/MC/14a) is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1169 and 1177.

At 3 p.m., Secretary Dulles and McBride met with Norwegian Foreign Minister Lange. Memoranda of their conversation on the free trade area (USDel/MC/23) and a proposed merchant marine policy conference (USDel/MC/24) are ibid. The plenary session of the Ministerial Meeting reconvened at 3:30 p.m.; see Documents 173 and 174. At 5:30 p.m., discussion on the review of the international situation resumed; see Document 175. At some point during the day on December 17, Becker met with Icelandic Permanent Representative to NATO Andersen to discuss the Iceland-United Kingdom fishing dispute; see Document 176. At 7:07 p.m., Dana B. Orwick of USRO and Timmons conducted a debriefing on the day’s sessions. Dulles summarized the sessions in a message to the President; see Document 177.

On Thursday, December 18, at 9:15 a.m., the Secretary met with Becker; no record of their conversation has been found. At the same time, Merchant met with von Brentano on the coal situation. Their conversation was reported in Secto 27, December 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 862A.2552/12–1858) At 9:28 a.m., Dulles met with Dutch Foreign Minister Luns on the Indonesian situation. The memorandum of their conversation (USDel/MC/25) is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1169 and 1178. Dulles reported on this conversation in Secto 26, December 18, scheduled for publication in volume XVII. Dulte 6, December 18, contains Dulles’ appraisal of the Soviet Ambassador to the Netherlands. (Department of State, Central Files, 601.6156/12–1858) At 10:15 a.m., the restricted session of the NATO Ministerial Meeting convened to discuss the review of the international situation, other business, the NATO tenth anniversary meeting, and the present status of the NATO military effort; see Documents 178–180. At 1:15 p.m., Fessenden conducted a debriefing of the morning session.

At 2:30 p.m., Dulles met briefly with Becker, Merchant, Greene, and Hillenbrand to discuss the quadripartite reply to the November 27 Soviet note (see Department of State Bulletin, January 19, 1959, pages 81–89). The restricted session of the NATO Ministerial Meeting resumed at 3 p.m.; see Document 181. Dulles then held a press background at 6:30 p.m. The transcript was transmitted in Polto 1760, December 19. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–1958) Dulles’ summary of the session is printed as Document 182.

Dulles and his party returned to Washington at 12:15 a.m. on December 19. His departure statement at Paris is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1178.

The following documents are arranged in the order in which the meetings were held.
166. Memorandum of Conversation

USDel/MC/3

Paris, December 13, 1958, 5:30 p.m.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Paris, France, December 16–18, 1958

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary
Mr. Reinhardt
Mr. Merchant
Amb. Burgess
Mr. Timmons
Mr. Smith
Mr. Greene

Secretary McElroy
General Twining
Mr. Irwin
General Norstad
Mr. Haskell
General Guthrie
Admiral Boone
Mr. Scribner

SUBJECT

MC 70

Mr. Irwin read the draft of Secretary McElroy's presentation to the Ministerial Council, which Secretary McElroy had not previously seen. He found it rather too anodyne and said he was unwilling to give our allies any blank check on what we will do in the military field. He strongly felt the occasion calls for tough talk designed to jack up the European countries' defense effort, including the threat that if they do not do better on their part, we will take another look at our own defense effort. Later in the discussion he withdrew the suggestion for threat.

General Norstad and Ambassador Burgess agreed on the necessity for stimulating the European NATO countries but felt it better done privately and bilaterally than in the Ministerial Council. General Norstad warmly defended the concept and content of MC 70.

Mr. Irwin noted that the Executive Branch compromised figures on the U.S. defense budget for FY 1960 will enable us to hold the present line for that year but not in the next two years and after. He cannot, therefore, afford to give a "business as usual" impression.

Secretary Dulles said that the President wants, to the extent it can be done without disrupting the alliance at this time of the Berlin crisis, to

---

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1169. Top Secret. Drafted by Greene. The meeting was held at the U.S. Embassy Residence.

1 McElroy's draft statement has not been found. Regarding the statement as delivered on December 17, see Document 172 and footnote 2 thereto.
make plain that we feel we have been carrying more than our fair share of the defense effort and that our allies in Europe should increase their efforts. One difficulty in stimulating our allies is that in a year or two we may find ourselves unable, for fiscal and budgetary reasons, to meet our share of the goals of MC 70. He thought we should not be too eulogistic of MC 70 and should not keep citing it as the minimum necessary defense effort. For the present we should confine our presentation to the question of the annual review and indicate that we will meet the goals assigned us by MC 70 for calendar year 1959.2

General Norstad thought that in doing so we could refer to the obvious limitations of decreasing availabilities of funds and note that the United States Congress will not be disposed to keep appropriations at a high level unless it has the impression that our allies are doing their fair part.

---

2 In a memorandum of conversation between Dulles and Norstad on December 15 on the U.S. defense posture (USDel/MC/10), the Secretary “described in some detail the tightening in the United States fiscal and budgetary position, as this bears on our own ability to maintain a large and expensive military establishment and on MC 70.” (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1169)

---

167. Memorandum of Conversation

USDel/MC/18 Paris, December 16, 1958, 9:45 a.m.

UNIVERSAL STATES DELEGATION TO THE MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Paris, France, December 16–18, 1958

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The Secretary of State
Mr. Merchant
Mr. McBride

Italy
Prime Minister Fanfani
Mr. Manzini

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1169. Confidential. Drafted by McBride on December 16. The meeting was held at the U.S. Embassy Residence.
SUBJECT

DeGaulle Memorandum

The Secretary said that in his talk with deGaulle yesterday, the latter had continued to be insistent regarding the creation of a tripartite body for worldwide strategy. He had told deGaulle that the US was prepared to discuss with France as with others what our policies were in non-NATO areas; however we could not accept a new organism superimposed on the existing arrangements. We had held two tripartite meetings in Washington as the Italians had been informed. These had not been very satisfactory to anyone. We were not averse to explaining our policies anywhere in the world to our friends but we would not agree to an organism which had authority and perhaps a veto power. As a result there had not been a meeting of the minds in his talk with deGaulle yesterday.

Fanfani said that deGaulle had not mentioned this issue to him yesterday at all, so Fanfani had not raised it either, though deGaulle had talked to him about it in August. Fanfani said his objective in this context was not to cause trouble, and accordingly he had not believed it wise to raise the matter yesterday. He said his hope had been that the General would forget about this idea. The Secretary said that unfortunately deGaulle has not forgotten about it, and indeed was more emphatic and explicit yesterday than he had been on any previous occasion. Fanfani said Adenauer had told him that deGaulle had not raised this problem with him either.

---

1 See Part 2, Document 81.
2 See Part 2, Documents 77 and 78. A memorandum of McBride’s conversation with Carlo Perrone-Capano, Counselor of the Italian Embassy in Washington, December 4, summarized McBride’s briefing of the December 4 tripartite talks. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/12–458) Topol 2009 to Paris, December 13, noted that the Italians had been briefed on the December 4 tripartite talks. (Ibid., 740.5/12–1158)
3 No record of Fanfani’s meetings with de Gaulle in Paris August 7–8 or December 15 has been found.
168. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State


Polto 1716. From USDel.

1. NATO Ministerial Meeting opened in secret plenary session at 10:15 a.m. December 16. Foreign Minister Luns (Netherlands) in capacity as President of NAC delivered brief opening speech (summarized below). Council then went into secret restricted session to discuss Berlin as first topic under Item II of agenda (Review of International Situation). Morning’s discussion devoted entirely to Berlin, at conclusion of which drafting group set up to prepare draft NAC communiqué on Berlin. At end of morning session Council decided to meet at 3:00 p.m. to discuss agenda Item I (Spaak Report on Political Consultation), and to take up draft communiqué on Berlin at 5:30 p.m. Berlin discussion at morning session will be reported in separate telegram.

2. In opening plenary speech Luns spoke of important problems before NATO at this time. December meetings provide occasion for “examination of conscience”, principal touchstone in this respect being annual review, which must be considered in light of NAC decision accepting MC-70. Also, annual review results must be projected against background of evaluation of Soviet threat. Said that background documents prepared for this meeting confirm that Soviet menace still as great as year ago, when Russian scientific achievements prompted important decisions taken by NATO heads of government. Berlin issues illustrates Soviet threat in its most crude form. Soviet threat to Berlin is new effort in long series of attempts to impose disengagement, deatomization and demilitarization of central Europe and thus dissolve NATO’s defensive build-up in Europe. In reply to this challenge NAC must take clear firm stand.

3. Luns then briefly listed some of NATO's accomplishments, mentioning first increased strength shield forces, and welcome progress in German build-up. Said practice political consultation has good progress to show. Termed Spaak’s report excellent and lucid. Added wished draw one consideration to Council’s attention: “Once a certain

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-P/12-1658. Secret. Repeated to London, Bonn, and The Hague and pouch to the other NATO capitals and Moscow.

1 The verbatim (C-VR(58)60) and summary (C-R(58)60) records of this session, both dated December 16, are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1168.

2 Not found.

3 Polto 1718, December 17, is printed in volume VIII, Document 112.
coordination has been reached, no change should be brought about without further consultation with all partners". This particularly important in those cases where vital interests small powers are at stake. Spoke of some progress in NATO coordinated defense production (mentioning hope start Hawk production). Expressed regret that NATO has not made much headway on question of effective measures to counter Soviet economic offensive.

4. In conclusion, Luns said that long-lasting and unrelenting Soviet threat may lead to a certain indifference and fatigue in West, and a propensity to underestimate its gravity. Such a development could threaten our readiness to make indispensable sacrifices for keeping enemy at bay. NATO governments must impress upon their peoples true nature and magnitude of continuing Communist challenge in order convince peoples of necessity maintain and pursue NATO military effort.

---

4 Early in 1958, Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands accepted the U.S. proposal to use U.S. Government-owned property rights and to facilitate industrial contracts for the European manufacture of the Hawk, a U.S. Army surface-to-air missile system. The NAC in June 1959 created the NATO Hawk Production Organization, which administered and controlled the production program.

169. Telegram from the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State

Paris, December 17, 1958, 4 a.m.

Polto 1719. From USDel.

1. NATO Ministerial Meeting reconvened in secret restricted session 3 p.m. December 16¹ to discuss Agenda Item I (Spaak's interim report on political consultation).

---

¹ The verbatim (C–VR(58)62) and summary (C–R(58)62) records of this session, both dated December 16, are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1168.
2. Secretary opened discussion by expressing strong approval of activities reflected in Spaak report. Said that under Spaak’s leadership there have been great strides in development of NAC as valuable organ of consultation. There remains much to do, but can take satisfaction in development that has already taken place. Secretary stated that U.S. policies regarding possible use of force are quite well known, as they are embodied in published documents, such as treaties. U.S. is prepared to expound all of its policies in NAC and to heed reasoned advice and counsel our partners concerning them. Stressed that work of a consultative body must be done primarily in advance of events calling for action, since in latter case action is required and it may well be impossible consult in advance of taking action. Emphasized that through consultation undertaken in spirit partnership and cooperation, NATO members can come to know each others’ policies and weigh them in advance. This unique process is making NATO more than military alliance. NATO has made enormous progress this direction since report of Three Wise Men under Spaak’s wise and vigorous leadership. Secretary expressed to Spaak appreciation of U.S. Government for these developments.

3. Wigny (Belgium) expressed appreciation his government for Secretary’s generous statement. He then developed at some length thesis that aggression may be result of events outside NATO area, and that NATO nations might be drawn in war as result such aggression. Political consultation cannot be confined to NATO area. Must try achieve common policies and make advance plans to counter Soviet initiatives. Suggested there might be “regional groups” within NATO, comprising countries most concerned with particular areas of world, with SecGen represented. These would consult with full Council.

4. Lange (Norway) joined with others in congratulating Spaak on his report. Definite progress in implementing report Three Wise Men. Much remains be done however. NATO is developing habit of consultation, which is time-consuming process. Problem not primarily one of machinery. Consultation cannot be limited to NATO area but must remember NATO created defend particular geographical area. Primary purpose consultation is to arrive at agreed position on primary task of Alliance, which is to defend NATO area. Cannot expect identity of views among NATO nations on other areas, since no identity of interests. Consultation not exclusively NATO function, since there are bilateral consultations in capitals and inside other organizations, such as UN. NATO cannot be “directorate” over other bodies such as SEATO,

---

2 Text of the Secretary’s remarks on the activities reflected in Spaak’s report is *ibid.*, CF 1176.
3 Regarding the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO, see footnote 4, Document 139.
but should be kept informed. Welcomed Secretary’s statement on discussing U.S. policies in NATO. Warned against too many expert committees or “bureaucracy” in consultation field. Perhaps a member country could prepare position paper on particular subject for discussion in NAC.

5. Krag (Denmark) welcomed strengthening political consultation and Secretary’s statement. Agreed with emphasis on timely consultation before events occur.

6. Smith (Canada) said he valued opportunity for really private consultation in NATO. “Middle powers” like Canada do not have responsibilities and interests of major powers but all share burden of risk in modern world. Welcomed Secretary’s statement and opportunity express views in NAC. Silence in NAC does not necessarily mean assent or indifference. Sometimes views best expressed other channels. Common policies not always aim of consultation, and lack of agreement in certain cases does not mean failure of consultation those cases, since disclosure attitudes can serve most useful purpose. Expression of views in NAC involves some responsibility, but not military or political commitments beyond NATO treaty.

7. Couve (France) said France supports political consultation, success of which does not depend on machinery but rather on habits and traditions. Essential thing is spirit in which undertaken.

8. Fanfani (Italy) made point NATO faces direct and indirect risks. All important situations concern NATO and all members have interest in having such matters discussed in NATO. Content of a situation, not geographical location, should be criterion for deciding what matters to be discussed in NAC. Recognized consultation must not be factor of delay in urgent situations. Results of restricted discussions should be submitted to full Council for consultation. Said powers with wide responsibilities should participate in all ad hoc committees. Did not favor Atlantic Study Institute. Spoke of need coordinate NATO’s “political orientation” and also work in information field. Suggested Spaak sum up this discussion on Agenda Item I in document which Ministers could approve December 17 as directive to Permanent Council.

9. Zorlu (Turkey) supported wide political consultation, particularly as regards Middle East.

10. Lloyd (United Kingdom) said agreed with almost everything already said. Purpose consultation is to obtain reactions other countries

---

Footnote: Reference presumably is to various proposals for creation of an Atlantic Institute, which an Atlantic Congress subsequently organized by the Conference of NATO Parliamentarians in London June 4–10, 1959, recommended. The Atlantic Institute with provisional headquarters in Milan, Italy, was founded in January 1961 and moved to permanent headquarters in Paris in November 1961.
and harmonize policies. Agreed consultation should extend beyond NATO area, mentioning United Kingdom and Turk interest in consultation on threat in Middle East. Certain limitations on NATO consultation, such as question time in Commons and speed of events. Subject these reservations, the more consultation the better. Agreed Spaak should produce a formal summing-up as guide to future.

[3 paragraphs (26 lines of source text) not declassified]

14. Averoff (Greece) speaking of Cyprus, said crisis is over, thanks to efforts of Spaak and Permanent Council. Went on to say Spaak report on political consultation admirable and progress in past year is encouraging. Stressed necessity bring matters to Council on timely basis. Sometimes it has seemed major powers submit questions as a formality. However, does not ask for too much in one fell swoop. Was worried that ad hoc committees might hamper consultation in Permanent Council.

15. Spaak, in conclusion, said things were going well in field political consultation. He needed time consider discussion under this agenda item. Noted that his report was only interim report and suggested he might, in April, draw up another progress report. Meanwhile, this meeting could note in communiqué progress made in political consultation and desire member countries continue and improve process.

16. Discussion this subject ended at 5 p.m.

---

170. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State

Paris, December 17, 1958, 4 a.m.

Polto 1720. Subject: Continuation of discussion of agenda Item II, NAC ministerial meeting review of the international situation.

Discussion this item resumed at 5 p.m. December 16, following discussion Item I. It was interrupted at 5.45 p.m. to receive report of drafting committee on communiqué on Berlin problem.¹

Highlights: Greece and Turkey joined in presenting issue of strengthening economic resources of alliance, and these two, supported

---

¹ For text of the NAC Declaration on Berlin, released to the press on December 17, see Department of State Bulletin, January 5, 1959, p. 4.
by Norway, referred to importance of success of OEEC talks for alliance. Spaak stressed wiser not to reopen this contentious issue in NAC but said communiqué could express desire for solution. Zorlu (Turkey) then gave appreciation of Middle East situation. End summary.

Greece referred to importance of strengthening economic resources of alliances and said they collaborating with Turkey to present paper on this subject. Referred to importance of OEEC talks and vital need for successful outcome.

Norway intervened to express concern at critical phase FTA talks have reached. Hoped that will shown on all sides at OEEC meeting last night will continue in multilateral negotiations and lead to not only short-range solution of immediate problems but solution of basic problems as well. Stressed solution essential as political unity and solidarity in defense field impossible if alliance falls apart in economic field. Soviet programs for coordinating economies of all countries Soviet bloc makes positive action by alliance all the more essential. Alliance cannot afford economic civil war.

Denmark supported Norway. Turkey commended Greek delegation for raising importance of economic strength, and for this reason had agreed to collaborate with Greeks in preparing paper on mobilizing economic resources especially for dealing with under-developed countries. Emphasized OEEC negotiations had not been successful and supported Norwegian presentation. Economic collaboration of two sorts necessary: (1) Liberalization of trade; (2) more importantly, full-scale mobilization of resources, as Soviets do.

Spaak pointed out no one wanted to reopen OEEC debate in NAC. Said communiqué can express strong desire for solution. Urged Greece and Turkey to get together and present their proposal to permanent council. Said that in communiqué, can find appropriate form of words to express ideas presented.

[5 paragraphs (2 pages of source text) not declassified]

---

2 The Greek-Turkish paper has not been found.
171. Telegram From Secretary of State Dulles to the Department of State

Paris, December 16, 1958, 11 p.m.

Dulles 4. Eyes Only Acting Secretary for President from Secretary.

Dear Mr. President: We have just finished our first day of formal NATO meetings, morning and afternoon. These were devoted almost exclusively to Berlin. The atmosphere on the whole was good. I made a statement which seems to have been well received. I emphasized with a map the area which the forces under your command gave up to the Soviets in order to comply with the 1944 agreement which the Soviets now denounce. Most of the statements made were strong and vigorous, the only exception being the Canadians who were rather soft.¹ Most of the afternoon session was devoted to drawing up a communiqué on Berlin. You can well imagine that this was a rather harrowing experience with each one of the fifteen foreign ministers doing an editing job. The result is, I think, effective although anyone alone could have done it better. Tonight Couve de Murville is giving a dinner for the foreign ministers which I am foregoing in the interest of my digestion. Unfortunately, McElroy has been knocked out all day, but my doctor is caring for him and expects him to be in shape tomorrow when his statement will be due.

Faithfully yours, Foster.²

¹The Canadian statement is summarized in Polto 1718 from Paris, December 17, printed in volume VIII, Document 112.
²Dulles 4 bears only this typed signature.
172. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State

Paris, December 18, 1958, 3 a.m.

Polto 1741. From USDel. Subject: NAC discussion of Agenda Item III: Present status of the NATO military effort.

Below is report on NAC Ministerial discussion of Item III, which began 10:15 a.m. December 17 and was recessed at 12:45 p.m., to be resumed at 3:30 p.m.

Highlights: Statements by SACEUR, SACLANT and SG chairman of military views, with strong appeals for maximum effort on MC–70 and special appeal by SACEUR on integrated air defense and common financing for infrastructure for new weapons. Dutch called for greater coordination and integration of NATO defense effort, with proposal that PermReps prepare specific program by April Ministerial meeting. British laid heavy emphasis on importance nuclear deterrent and proposed using International Staff as agency for civilian “screening” of military requirements before their presentation to NAC. Secretary McElroy made statement of United States position on NATO defense effort, reported fully in separate cable. Canadians emphasized integrated air defense of North America as contribution to NATO. Norwegians supported Dutch proposal for more integration NATO defense effort. Turks called for additional military aid for Turkey and common financing infrastructure requirements for new weapons.

Spaaak opened meeting by statement that military authorities would first be called upon to present situation, with ministerial discussion to follow.

Chairman SG (Admiral Denny) led off with oral intelligence briefing, following text contained in SGWM–633–58.
SACEUR began by paying tribute to example of strength and unity given by ministers in firm stand on Berlin. NAC NATO military authorities. [sic] Primary basis of NATO military policy is deterrent, which consists three elements: a) strategic retaliatory forces; b) shield forces to hold forward line and contribute to deterrent; and c) will to use our forces so that there will be no danger of war arising from a mistake in judgment by the enemy that we lack the determination to act. Objectives of NATO strategy are three-fold: a) in event of attack, either accidental or deliberate, force enemy to pause for reconsideration; b) take advantage of pause to make enemy take a conscious decision to go to war; c) ensure that aggressor, in making this decision, is fully aware that we would use all our forces. Shield forces especially well-suited for these purposes. Although they have classic task of defending territory, most important function is contribution to deterrent by forcing enemy to pause and make conscious decision in light of all forces, including retaliatory which could be used on our side. Recent threat to Berlin makes very clear importance shield forces. Although we also place heavy reliance on strategic deterrent, most direct and immediate deterrent are shield forces deployed in forward areas.

MC–70 is designed meet these requirements. Have now had first AR submission on MC–70. Whereas some countries have done well, in general results frankly unsatisfactory, not only because forces inadequate, but also because insufficient action indicated to meet goals.

Certain other problems not considered in AR must be mentioned. Introduction new weapons not proceeding at satisfactory rate and help by ministers is essential in moving program forward. Common financing has been recommended for infrastructure requirements of new weapons because a) financial burden is thereby equitably distributed; and b) NATO character of forces equipped new weapons is made [garble]. Defense is second matter of vital importance on which Council’s help is needed. There are many facets to problem. One important aspect, early warning system, has finally gotten under way, after much delay. Forward scatter communications system, although approved two years ago, is only now beginning move ahead after many difficulties. Record has not been good and help of Council is needed in ensuring better rate of progress in future. Necessary to take matter out of hands of technicians and put it in hands of those who are capable of evaluating larger interests involved. Fact today is that individual countries cannot today meet their air defense requirements separately. This recognized by military authorities of all countries. Therefore strongly hope that will be possible for all member countries agree promptly so as to enable moving ahead.

SACEUR said in conclusion that some may feel that military authorities are putting pressure on political authorities. This is true and
it is their responsibility to do so. However it is primary responsibility of
governments themselves to make effort required to achieve MC–70
goals, upon which security of Alliance depends.

Admiral Wright followed with presentation of SACLANT prob-
lems. Began by stressing grave dangers to Alliance of Soviet submarine
threat. Virtually entire naval effort of SACLANT directed against this
threat. Perfectly natural for European countries to regard Soviet subma-
rine threat to sea lanes as less important than direct threat to European
land areas, but must be recalled that Soviet submarine fleet has but one
purpose: isolation of Europe from North America and hence destruc-
tion of unity of our defenses. Fruitless to try to assess relative priorities;
fact is that defense of Europe, of North Atlantic and of North America
are interdependent. Modern sophisticated naval weapons required to
meet Soviet submarine threat place additional strain on already limited
defense budgets. However vitally important that our forces be balanced
to deal with various forms of threat and ministers should give fullest
consideration in drawing up defense budgets to balanced collective
force structure to deal with threat on sea as well as on land and in air.

Three major problem areas facing SACLANT:

(1) Meeting of MC–70 naval requirements. This most important.
Must have national allocations to fill in deficiencies. As long as deficien-
cies continue enable establish forward naval “defensive shield” at
points where Soviet submarines enter North Atlantic area. We are also
unable guard against Soviet missile-bearing submarines which is all the
more important because Soviet missile-bearing submarines will prob-
ably soon be able to threaten coast of Europe. Anti-submarine require-
ments must also be met protect vital oil shipments through South
Atlantic if Suez Canal and pipelines cut. Therefore absolutely essential
countries allocate minimum naval forces called for under MC–70.

(2) Naval infrastructure. Most SACLANT naval forces now have
resources only in North America. Absence of resources elsewhere in
North Atlantic area greatly inhibits SACLANT operational effectiveness.

(3) Increased stocks. Essential that stockpiles be built up to cover
up to time first convoys can arrive in Europe.

Chairman SG (Admiral Denny) summed up for military authori-
ties. Stressed point made by SACEUR that requirements set forth in
MC–70 were result of complete cycle of very thorough study by NATO
military authorities and in sense are culmination of eight or nine years of
continuous study by NATO military authorities. Under no circum-
stances should MC–70 be considered as providing perfect defense.
MC–70 is based on assumption that all forces will be modernized, will
be in place and on time, and will be furnished with full logistic support.
Even if all these conditions are met, MC–70 still represents maximum
acceptable military risk. Short-falls today, themselves not alarming, can
however become very serious if there is further slippage. Two main
causes of concern are delay in modernization and infrastructure construction lag. Causes of delay are beyond control of military. Individual deficiencies may not be serious, but aggregate is very serious indeed. If some time in 1959 there is not promise of improvement, NATO military authorities will be forced to ask for new guidance.

Dutch (Staf) expressed thanks for "inspiring but alarming" statements by military authorities. Trend toward short-falls in MC-70 is grave situation which must be faced up to. Spaak had written letter to all governments prior to meeting urging consideration of possible further action by governments.5 Netherlands Government, for its part, prepared to say that it is prepared to study the recommendations made to it during AR examination and to reconsider positions it adopted.

If we merely hoped to meet MC-70 must assure our parliaments that all waste, inefficiency and duplication have been eliminated. This can only be done through greater coordination and integration of our joint NATO military efforts. Netherlands had called for action along these lines two years ago, but with little result.6 Heads of Government meeting last year in final communiqué had again called for progress toward integration and coordination, but without significant result.7 The time has now come to take concrete action. Technical developments in such fields as air defense make it imperative. Therefore propose Perm Reps study as matter of urgency what specific programs can be undertaken in such fields as air defense, logistics, balanced collective forces and training. Perm Reps should strive to work out proposals which can be approved at April 1959 Ministerial meeting. Aim should be concrete results by December 1959.

United Kingdom (Sandys) pointed out that in approving MC-70 at April Defense Ministers meeting8 British had agreed MC-70 goals were militarily desirable, but were not prepared to say they were minimum goals. United Kingdom had also pointed out MC-70 likely to raise serious financial and economic problems and that, if force plans could not be met, we must set priorities. In deciding priorities we will need assistance military authorities but, as SACEUR had said, decisions cannot be left to military alone. Pointed out that setting up national forces is three-step operation: 1) military draw up requirements; 2) civilian Ministry of Defense screens these requirements; and 3) cabinet decisions are fi-

5 Not found.
6 The Dutch call for greater coordination and integration of the NATO military effort at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in December 1956, was reported in Polto 1398 from Paris, December 12, 1956; see Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. IV, p. 116.
7 See Document 131.
8 See Document 133.
nally taken. Step 2 is missing in NATO procedure. Military authorities' statements of requirements go direct to NAC, which serves as cabinet. Therefore proposed that International Staff fulfill for NATO job performed by civilian authorities in Ministries of Defense. International Staff could recommend appropriate adjustments in forces before their presentation to NAC. United Kingdom also supported Netherlands proposal for urgent study of integration.

United Kingdom may not be able meet all MC-70 requirements, but will do utmost. Certainly firmly intend do fair share. United Kingdom presently spends 8 per cent GNP on defense, much more than most. Furthermore, United Kingdom has many other obligations, such as SEATO, Baghdad Pact, dependent territories, etc., requiring 100,000 men in Far East and Middle East. These forces vitally important to defense of free world, since cannot defend Europe in Europe alone. Recent United States-United Kingdom actions in Lebanon and Jordan highlight this.

United Kingdom must also take into account heavy drain of its strategic military program, 200,000,000 pounds being spent on research and development of weapons. United Kingdom bomber command also has vital role. In case of all-out war first counter-attack would be United States-United Kingdom planes from bases in Europe and North Africa, with actual majority of first planes from RAF.

Must stress importance nuclear deterrent. Yesterday Council adopted firm position on Berlin. This could never have been done without immense nuclear power of United States. Only two ways in which nuclear deterrent could be undermined: 1) Soviet ability to destroy United States strategic retaliatory force by surprise attack; and 2) indication of lack of will to use deterrent by United States. Soviet ability to destroy retaliatory force by surprise attack likely to be eliminated by new underground missile installations. United States will to use nuclear weapons made movingly clear by Secretary Dulles yesterday. In spite statements by certain politicians, Generals and Admirals, there should be no question of United States determination to use its retaliatory power. However, irresponsible talk questioning credibility of deterrent may cause Soviets to make fatal mistake. Therefore believe NATO communiqué should reaffirm NATO willingness use deterrent.

Coordinated production of weapons is field in which NATO should now make real effort to move ahead. There has been too little progress to date. Must be realized by all concerned that cooperation in this field is two-way street, with sacrifices required by all. Quite likely

---

9 See footnote 1, Document 170.
10 See Document 169.
that United Kingdom, with biggest armaments industry in Europe, will have to make heavy sacrifices.

Sandys concluded by saying that disruption of NATO remains one of principal Soviet aims. United Kingdom will continue to play its full part in strengthening NATO.

Secretary McElroy, after complimenting SG, SACEUR and SAACLANT on their excellent presentations, gave statement reported separate cable.

Canada (Pearkes) pointed out that Canadian contribution to NATO defense is of dual nature: contribution to shield in Europe and contribution to North American defense. Latter is vital part of over-all NATO defense, especially now that direct attack against North America possible.

United States and Canada have developed integrated air defense system, consisting three early warning chains, with seaward extensions. Eventually intended to link this system with SACEUR's. This whole system jointly controlled, manned and operated by Canada and United States. Integrated air defense is important question in Europe; Canada and United States have already in being highly successfully integrated air defense system. Canada's general defense situation difficult at moment because of uncertainty as to types of weapons to be used: ie, manned aircraft or missiles. Canadian policy towards its forces in Europe is to meet MC-70 force goals. Re-equipment and modernization of forces are major problem, however, with difficult decisions in process of being taken. Defense expenditure next year will remain at same level as 1958. Unable predict beyond that largely because of uncertainties as to type of armament. Canada will make every effort reach MC-70 goals.

Norway (Handal)\(^\text{11}\) noted that Annual Review had indicated considerable further effort in defense was required. Increasing resources for defense virtually impossible and changing Political Directive undesirable.\(^\text{12}\) Best solution therefore for every country to ensure maximum efficiency in its effort. Norway has shifted some of its forces, having found that some were not contributing to NATO purposes. Norway shares view of Dutch that greater coordination for integration required.

Turkey (Zorlu) emphasized gravity of Soviet threat. Stressed importance not relying on nuclear deterrent alone. MC-70 force goals are not ideal but merely bare minimum. He pointed out that military authorities have recognized need for additional Turkish forces but hesi-

\(^{11}\) Nils K. Handal, Norwegian Minister of Defense.

\(^{12}\) The Political Directive to the NATO Military Authorities from the North Atlantic Council was approved by the NAC on December 13, 1956. A copy of the Directive (C-M(56)138(Final)) is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 822.
tated to recommend increases because of financial limitations. Turkey therefore hopes that other countries, acting in spirit of Alliance, will be able provide financial support. Turkey strongly supports new common financing of infrastructure for new weapons. National financing contrary to NATO “spirit” and imposes unfair financial burdens on certain countries where majority of installations are located.

173. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State

Paris, December 18, 1958, 3 a.m.

Polto 1742. From USDel. Subject: NAC discussion Agenda Item III: Present status of NATO military effort.

Following is report on NAC Ministerial discussion of Item III resumed at 3:30 pm December 17.¹

Highlights: Council approved, without specific comment on text, resolution on 1958 Annual Review (C-M(58)150 (revised)).² Requested International Staff draft further resolution appropriately based on the debate on future action on NATO defense effort. Latter to be internal and not in communiqué and to be discussed by Ministers Thursday³ prior to action on final communiqué. Statements in afternoon session by Italy, Belgium, Germany, France and Greece.

Spaak summed up discussion stating military situation vis-à-vis USSR certainly has not improved. Must face fact of Soviet military growth. From Annual Review must recognize gap between military requirements and what nations ready to do. Military authorities consider this already serious but hope future efforts of members of Alliance will be greater. If not, military authorities say present unsatisfactory tendency could become very grave. Spaak stated understood economic and financial justifications for failures, but must be noted economic situation

---

¹ The verbatim (C-VR(58)64) and summary (C-R(58)64) records of this session, both dated December 17, are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1177.
² See Document 174.
³ December 18.
in most countries improving. Unlimited defense increases not being requested.

Spaak drew attention great powers to views of smaller countries (on further integration of effort). Stated common infrastructure for atomics, integration of air defense, integration in general, all important and urgent. NAC should do something. It would avoid its responsibility if, having heard these problems, it postponed them another year. This would be bad end for best debate in years.

Spaak then proposed IS draft resolution pulling together ideas presented including resolution prepared by Benelux\(^4\) not yet seen by all countries.

Italy led off afternoon discussion stating recognized MC–70 figures as minimum NATO military requirements. Stated internal security forces also needed to meet national responsibilities. Latter included five 2nd echelon divisions, 68 small tonnage craft and 58 aircraft. Stated division between NATO and national authority responsibilities should be freely studied as frontiers now artificial. Italy has developed long term plan of reorganization. Made welcome statement that defense expenditures to be increased 4 percent per year for next five years. This together with economies in forces will meet, at least in part, requirements. Expressed hope conventional type equipment still in short supply may yet be provided. Stated 25 billion lire to be spent during next five years for civil defense. Stated hope other countries also do something as this only guarantee of survival.

Belgium, in rambling discourse, said yes, no and maybe. Said gaps and deficiencies outlined in AR are serious concern and worry. Major concern is how and by what method reach goals. Alternatives are either devote more and more of national resources to military or make better use of means at our disposal. Must do both. There are financial and manpower limits; smaller countries can arrive quickly at end of resources. Latest Belgium estimate is that approximately 30–40 percent increase over 1956 budget required to meet MC–70, so Belgium must make better use of resources. Only by organization and rationalization can small country attain sufficient security.

He appealed to allies to mutualize efforts; lack of standardization places heaviest burden on smallest. Urged pooling and integration of efforts in every field possible. If this not done could prevent smaller, and perhaps all, doing what is needed. Welcomed Sandys’ idea;\(^5\) said agreed must apply political decisions to military requirements. Political control through SecGen is needed. Uncoordinated national efforts too

\(^4\) Not found.

\(^5\) See Document 172.
wasteful. Should get report by April what measures necessary to meet MC-70.

Germany (Strauss) stated accepted MC-70, approved 1958 AR report and would examine recommendations with greatest care. Welcomed proposal by Sandys to check implications and consequences in detail. Recited difficulties, in build-up of forces, of land acquisition, obtaining personnel, provision of training, selection of types of equipment, etc.; stated incredible delays involved in infrastructure procedures; welcomed review of bidding procedure; international competitive bidding could be eliminated in interest of speed.

Cited problem of providing airfield infrastructure requirements. NATO standards called for one squadron per field. Germany must assign two squadrons for next 4 or 5 years, hence additional infrastructure a German responsibility. This involved not only financial burden but many procedural delays. Urged allocation of lump sum for certain categories of infrastructure in line of individual screening of project authorization.

Re new weapons systems, said needed from allies good cost estimates and opportunity study data on all future and present systems. Weapons so costly can’t afford bet on wrong horse. Strauss urged full integration of NATO air defense (both high and low level) immediately in peacetime. Referring to GFR need of space to train airmen, urged SACEUR coordinate use of all training areas. Favored joint production of certain weapons. Hoped Hawk experiment might be model. Armaments Committee should harmonize bilateral and multilateral efforts of members. Must have jointly established military requirements. Said new committee for military requirements essential to permit coordinated production of equipment. Suggested should be within Military Committee framework.

Strauss said agreed with Sandys and McElroy that nuclear deterrent necessary. Two parts are: 1) strategic, 2) tactical to make “gapless” shield.

Said for second year urged IS take up question of psychological defense.

German Finance Minister Etzel outlined financial burdens stemming from Berlin, refugee problem, other social expenditures resulting

---

6 A copy of the Report of the 1958 Annual Review, C–M(58)141, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1161.
7 See footnote 4, Document 168.
8 Reference may be to Strauss’ statement at the NATO Defense Ministers Conference on April 16 in which he emphasized the danger of gradually growing neutralism and the psychological effort to convince the citizenry of the need for vigilance and preparedness. (Polto Circular 24 from Paris, April 16; Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/4–1658)
from special German position. Stated must maintain good economic condition and internal stability. Germany had given cautious response to IS request for increased defense expenditures. Too early to assess cost and not possible to forecast for long period. Felt Germany would do all it can within financial possibilities to reach MC–70 goals.

France (Guillaumat) stated government must remain uncertain re MC–70 commitments because of recent situation, especially Algeria. Said any failure in North Africa would permit Soviet influence to spread over Mediterranean to Atlantic.

France to undertake reorganization plan providing new army units more mobile and equipped to deal with subversive attacks; air force to be missile equipped and mobility increased; navy to be provided new weapons and nuclear propulsion. Also referred to research efforts. Timing of reorganization depends on many things, especially financial. Stated government devoting 9 percent of GNP to defense; second highest in Alliance. Said taxes now high and likely to be higher in toto. Had to balance obligations within and outside Alliance. This led to choices and priorities, but France not disregarding NATO but following path of sacrifice and hardship.

Greece repeated previous suggestion that wide publicity be given SGN facts and figures to counteract Soviet propaganda and gain needed greater monetary support from parliaments. Stated obsolescence and replacement requirements coupled with introduction new weapons created heavy burden. Said would do best possible with outside help but in view of weak economy must be careful. Urged that coordinated production plans utilize industrial capacity of all small countries.

After Spaak summary, General Norstad reported on progress on IRBM and atomic stockpile plans. SACEUR activity re IRBM’s had been in two areas: 1) deployment, and 2) determining military requirements for second generation IRBM having solid fuel and advanced performance. With respect to presently available Thors and Jupiters, there had been discussions and broad agreement on principles between NATO authorities and Italy, followed by Italian-US technical discussions. Result was expected operational capability one squadron Thors by early summer. Said would not refer by name to other countries where deployment under negotiation. On second area of activity, desired future development military characteristics had within month been circulated to appropriate authorities, including Meili. Briefly outlined

---

9 Presumably a reference to the Greek statement on strengthening economic resources of NATO at the December 16 session; see Document 170.
10 Ernest Meili, Assistant Secretary-General for Production and Logistics, International Staff/Secretariat, NATO.
characteristics. Expressed hope second generation could be operationally available not later than 1963.

On atomic requirements, Norstad said Ace Plan dated 12 September 1958 had been distributed concurrently within NATO and to MOD's. This plan gave requirements to mid-1960 and studies now being made to carry it to 1963. Hoped to develop minimum number of stockpiles to support delivery units of forces and in accordance MC-70 requirements. Would keep to minimum by doubling up and sharing use among several units. Summed up general yearly requirements estimated. He stated Admiral Wright had developed phased requirements thru 1963 for SACLANT and CHANCOM. SHAPE would act as agent for SACLANT required sites in Europe.

No questions were addressed to Norstad.

Spaak then raised question of adoption of AR resolution (CM(58) 1505 (Revised)) and, in absence anyone desiring to comment, stated it adopted. Sandys commented hoped future resolutions could be drafted in simpler form. Stated was sure he in agreement but couldn't entirely follow meaning.

11 Not found.

174. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State

Paris, December 18, 1958, 3 a.m.

Polto 1744. From USDel. Below is verbatim text of 1958 Annual Review approved at NAC Ministerial Meeting December 17:

"The North Atlantic Council:

Having considered the Report on the 1958 Annual Review and document MC (39)10 containing the Military Committee's comments thereon, 2

Having noted:

That the Review has been directed not only towards a critical examination of the status of forces of member countries and the indication

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-1858. Secret. Repeated to the other NATO capitals.
1 See Document 173.
2 See footnote 6, Document 173.
of the improvements which can be worked into each country's defense programme for the period beginning in 1959, but also to the analysis and to the preparation of comments on the first reaction of NATO countries to the minimum forces requirements of MC 70 for the period 1959-1963;

That the 1958 Annual Review cannot be considered as having produced final decisions as regards countries' intentions on the full implementation of the requirements of MC 70 and of MC (55);³

That the NATO Military Authorities consider that 'unless present unfavourable trends in the building up of NATO forces and support structure are corrected, the military posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will, by 1961, be deficient to the extent that the military security of the NATO area will be in serious jeopardy and that the over-all defense planning of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will require major review.'

1. Brings to the attention of all NATO countries the serious impact of the shortfall of forces reflected in the 1958 Annual Review on the capability of the major NATO Commanders to carry out their assigned missions and tasks during the period through 1961;

Having taken cognisance of the force plans for 1959, 1960 and 1961 (firm, provisional and planning) indicated by countries in their reply to the 1958 Annual Review Questionnaire and recapitulated in the statistical annexes to the Country Studies;⁴

2. Takes note of the country force plans for 1959 summarized in the annexes to the Country Chapters, to the implementation of which each country has firmly committed itself, under the conditions set out in its reply to the questionnaire.

3. Recommends that countries should endeavour to meet the force levels laid down for 1959, 1960 and 1961 by the NATO military authorities for the Army and Air Forces, and those for 1962/63 for the Navy.

4. Urges Governments —

(a) To meet at least their firm commitments with respect to 1959;

(b) To deploy the maximum effort both individually, and through closer co-operation between member countries, to carry out the recommendations of the NATO military authorities and of the International Staff contained in the Country Chapters, in order to remedy present serious deficiencies in the military posture of NATO, as reported in MC 39/10, and to correct adverse trends highlighted therein;

(c) To make known, as soon as possible, their clear intentions as regards the implementation of these recommendations for the period through 1961 and their general intentions with respect to the 1963 MC 70 minimum essential force requirements;

---

³ Not found.

⁴ The 1958 Annual Review Questionnaire has not been found. The Country Chapters and statistical annexes comprised Part II of the Report of the 1958 Annual Review (C-M(58)141), a copy of which is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64D 560, CF 1161.
(d) To maintain close consultation with the NATO Military Authorities in the implementation of recommendations and before making only changes in their NATO forces."

175. Telegram Polto 1739 From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State

Paris, December 18, 1958, 3 a.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12–1858. Secret; Limit Distribution. 7 pages of source text not declassified.]

176. Memorandum of Conversation


[Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1169. Secret. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]

177. Telegram From Secretary of State Dulles to the Department of State

Paris, December 17, 1958, 11 p.m.

Dulite 5. Eyes Only Acting Secretary for President from Secretary. Dear Mr. President: This morning and most of the afternoon were devoted to the military aspect of NATO. It was on the whole a protestation of desire to support the present MC-70 program. However Duncan Sandys indicated that he did not think that it could be successfully accomplished and that therefore the military should be asked to establish "priorities".¹ This would of course mean that everything but the

¹ See Document 172.
priorities would be sloughed off. I do not think that this idea will be accepted. On the whole the spirit was one of encouraging greater effort to meet the agreed goals.

After the military discussion ended about five p.m., we resumed political discussions. [12-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Lloyd saw De Gaulle this afternoon and told me that he got the impression which confirms my own that De Gaulle feels that the present NATO might as well be scrapped and a fresh start be made under triumvirate auspices.²

I had a private talk with Couve de Murville this morning from which I get the impression that none of De Gaulle’s advisers share his rather extreme views about the triumvirate and NATO.³ [3 lines of source text not declassified]

I greatly appreciated your message.⁴
Faithfully yours. Foster.

Dulles

² See Part 2, Documents 81 and 83.
³ See Part 2, Document 81, footnote 10.
⁴ See Part 2, Document 82, footnote 5.

178. Telegram Polto 1754 From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State

Paris, December 18, 1958, 9 p.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–1858. Secret. 7 pages of source text not declassified.]

179. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State

Paris, December 18, 1958, 10 p.m.

Polto 1757. From USDel. Subject: Ministerial Meeting on defense resolution under Item III of agenda, December 17 [18].

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–1858. Secret. Repeated to London and pouches to the NATO capitals.
After conclusion Item II of agenda, morning session turned to IS draft resolution (copies pouchd addresseees).\(^1\)

**Summary:** After disclosure of differences between United Kingdom on one hand, and United States and some others re proposed British amendment implying favorable consideration of Sandys’ proposal for political level review of NATO military requirements, debate adjourned until afternoon. Only solution to U.S.–U.K. split was proposal not to have any resolution, which was unacceptable to Benelux, so compromise language proposed by Italy accepted by Council. Full text final resolution sent separately.\(^2\) End summary.

Spaak explained IS draft. Council accepted first and third paragraphs without debate.

Issue focused on paragraph 2, with Sandys (U.K.) leading off with statement that IS text too broad and failed mention some proposals made.\(^3\) Sandys referred to his own suggestion to improve methods by which Permanent Council examines requirements put forward by military authorities. Too little opportunity for civilian and political examination of requirements at busy Ministerial meeting. Unable to discuss, e.g., priority between SACEUR and SACLANT requirements. Since there are difficulties in meeting all requirements, essential examine them more closely and make most economic use of resources. He therefore preferred alternative text for paragraph 2 (pouched).\(^4\)

**Germany supports U.K. Dutch, however, pointed out alternative draft left out phrase “strengthen NATO defense effort”, and it is imperative to tell parliaments that this is purpose of whole exercise. Suggested Permanent Council agree Defense Ministers prepare NAC Ministerial meetings as reply to Sandys’ complaint. Strongly preferred original draft.**

U.S. (Secretary McElroy) made strong statement regretting necessity disagree with U.K. Much concerned at alternative proposal. Alternative seems to imply lack of confidence by governments in military requirements established by MC–70 at time when should be very clear particularly in light Berlin that our emphasis is on belief in soundness of requirements. Must not now add to doubts that military forces can be kept in being. Ministers yesterday gave clear evidence efforts being made by all to meet requirements. Secretary particularly praised Italy. Much better to stand fast so far as requirements go, give Secretary General approval to make trips to capitals, and observe whether situation

---

\(^1\) Transmitted in Polto A–410 from Paris, December 19. (Ibid., 396.1–PA/12–1958)

\(^2\) See Document 180.

\(^3\) [Text not declassified]

\(^4\) [Text not declassified]
may not be more favorable before any decision taken. Alternative draft implies that military requirements be reviewed under political auspices.

Belgium said U.S. arguments changed their minds and they now felt U.K. proposal adulterated text. U.K. idea gives more stress to questioning needs of Alliance and fails to meet Belgium point of yesterday re special problem for smaller countries.  

Canada proposed adding to IS draft that part of U.K. alternative language “to study ways of improving the methods for the examinations by the Council of the military requirements submitted to it”.

Portugal supported, but U.S. said same question still remained.

After some give and take on this issue, Belgium then proposed to drop reference to “coordination” in paragraph 2 of IS draft, saying that since “integration” unacceptable (to French) word “coordination” should not appear as it might preclude consideration of integration. Canadian solution reflected in re-draft (RDC58/443 Revised) (pouched) which was before Council afternoon recess.

3 p.m. session 7 opened with U.S. statement that in order to resolve conflict re paragraph 2, and since Canadian idea implied doubts as to MC-70 validity at time when strength of Alliance under test, and since SecGen already has authority to make visits and Permanent Council authority undertake any studies without ministerial direction, U.S. and U.K. proposed no resolution be issued. Dutch opposed strongly, saying they must tell story of NATO action on their proposal to parliament. Urged Canadian amendment be deleted. Ministers should direct Council.

Sandys said that while question of procedure and examination of military requirements by Permanent Council of great importance, it need not go into resolution. However, could not just omit this one point and refer to others in resolution. Belgium strongly supported Dutch. Turkey said that if suggestion of one minister included, suggestion of all should be included. U.K. then proposed that in lieu of paragraph 2, resolution invite Permanent Council to examine and report on suggestions made by different delegations in debate. U.S. replied that would be too general to meet U.S. views, and believed U.S. alternative suggestion which might be put forward would certainly not meet U.K. views.

---

5 See Document 173.
6 RDC58/443 Revised has not been found but is presumably the same as the revised text of paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, which was placed before the December 18 afternoon session. [text not declassified]
7 The verbatim (C-VR(58)67) record of this session, dated December 18, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1178. No summary record of this session has been found.
Therefore proposed Council return to original paragraph 2 or drop resolution.

Spaak supported having resolution. Spaak said MC-70 was not in question as it was already accepted by yesterday’s resolutions. But no one had said could carry requirements out and military situation is serious and we cannot close eyes to problems.

Italians proposed to delete all detail from paragraph 2 and merely invite Permanent Council to pursue actively study of measures to strengthen NATO defense efforts in light of statements made by ministers.

Spaak asked U.S. what danger it saw. Secretary McElroy replied issue very simple. MC-70 and military requirements for future should be prepared by qualified military experts. Proposal indicates to us that there would be imposed on top of that a political judgment of individuals who with the best intent in the world have no similarly military capability to pass judgment.

Spaak recognized question whether Alliance could follow pattern of individual nations in having political review of military statement of requirements was very important, but felt it would be mistake to indicate system could not be improved. Sandys said he wished to make clear U.K. had no doubts as to validity of MC-70. Spaak again referred to text of AR resolution in which nations had committed themselves to do best possible to meet MC-70. Council then accepted Italian formula.

180. Telegram From the Mission at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State

Paris, December 18, 1958, 9 p.m.

Polto 1756. Following is text resolution on defense as adopted Ministerial meeting December 18 (see cable reporting December 18 discussion under Agenda Item III).¹

Begin Verbatim Text:

The North Atlantic Council

Having discussed in their various aspects the problems facing the Alliance in the defense field, in the light of reports by the NATO military

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–1858. Secret. Repeated to London and pouch to the other NATO capitals.

¹ Document 179.
and civil authorities on the present status of the military effort of the Alliance; and having adopted the resolution on the 1958 Annual Review;  

(1) Invites the Secretary General, in agreement with member governments, and if necessary through visits to NATO capitals, to follow up in the new year the problems involved for each NATO country in the implementation of the recommendations put forward by the military authorities and the International Staff during the 1958 Annual Review.

(2) Invites the Permanent Council to pursue actively the study of measures to strengthen the NATO defense effort in light of the proposals made by ministers during the discussion.

(3) Invites the Secretary General to submit to the Council at the Ministerial meeting in April 1959, a report on the progress made in implementation of this resolution.

Burgess

2 See Document 174.

181. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State

Paris, December 18, 1958, 10 p.m.

Polto 1759. From USDel. NATO Ministerial Council, meeting in restricted session afternoon December 18, after completing action on defense resolution (reported separately), turned to draft communiqué. Communiqué was agreed and text is being transmitted separately.  

At conclusion of meeting Secretary expressed appreciation of Council to Spaak for manner in which latter had guided Council's fruitful deliberations. Secretary also thanked International Staff for their

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–1858. Confidential. Pouched to the other NATO capitals.

1 The verbatim (C–VR(58)68) record of this session, dated December 18, is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1178. No summary record of this session has been found.

2 See Document 180.

3 The draft communiqué has not been found. For text of the final communiqué, December 18, see Department of State Bulletin, January 5, 1959, pp. 3–4.
work. Secretary said that spirit of unity displayed by NATO at this Min-
isterial meeting was best guarantee that peace would continue to be
maintained.

Meeting ended at 6 p.m.

182. Telegram From Secretary of State Dulles to the Department
of State

Paris, December 18, 1958, 8 p.m.

Dulles 8. Eyes only Acting Secretary for President from Secretary.

Dear Mr. President: The NATO conference is now over, the last
three hours being devoted to the usual linguistic battle about the com-
muniqué. In a sense the session has been anti-climactic in that the most
important pronouncement was made on Sunday by the Three plus Ger-
many. Then there came the NATO Council back-up of their statement
and that left not much of significance for the remainder. However, the
final communiqué is, I think, creditable although not spectacular. I am
about to have a background press conference1 and then go straight to
the airport where I look forward to the luxury of your Columbine and its
wonderful crew. We expect to go through to Jamaica with the plane then
returning at once to Washington. I look forward to a few days of relaxa-
tion and what I hope will be sunshine and perhaps a little swimming. I
shall probably not be back before Christmas so I now send Best Wishes
of Janet and myself to Mamie and yourself for the Christmas season.
Faithfully yours, Foster.

Dulles

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-DU/12-1858. Confidential.

1 The transcript of the Secretary’s background press conference was transmitted in
Polto 1760 from Paris, December 19. (Ibid., 396.1-PA/12-1958)
183. Telegram Polto 1863 From the Mission at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State

Paris, January 6, 1959, 2 p.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/1–659. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

184. Telegram 2479 From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, January 8, 1958, 7 p.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/1–859. Secret; Limit Distribution. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

185. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles

January 8, 1959, 10:35 a.m.

[Here follows discussion of an unrelated matter.]

2. I discussed with the President the attitude of General de Gaulle toward NATO and our problems. I referred particularly to the memorandum of conversation between General de Gaulle and Selwyn Lloyd which indicated resentment that France was in effect under United States control through NATO whereas U.S. military power was entirely independent.¹ I mentioned the tripartite talks which we had planned and my hope that this might alleviate the situation.²

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

JFD

¹ See Part 2, Document 83.
² See Part 2, Documents 77 and 78.
186. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, January 23, 1959, 7 p.m.

1576. Paris pass Thurston, USRO and CINCEUR. Subject: Quarles–Strauss discussion, Jan 21. After usual amenities Secretary Quarles initiated discussion by reporting US will meet all MC–70 goals, but that tight budget will require continuation low level grant military aid, that certain quarters in US felt pace of German buildup could be quickened. Sec Quarles stated that US has no plans to pull out its forces but it can reasonably be expected that they cannot remain here forever.

Min Strauss initiated his remarks with reference to helpfulness of MAAG and expressed hope that US units would remain in West Germany. He pointed out that both were useful in training the West German forces. Strauss said also that it was too bad that the French could not maintain their strength in Europe. Strauss then proceeded to raise cluster of problems revolving around central problem of release military information to FedRep. He expressed recognition much had been done recently but hoped that still more could be done and in this connection stated that FedRep would like to send to US in March or April small group officers and scientists, cleared for top secret, who could obtain desired information including top secret. He explained that this team could work into entire range of problems connected with German decisions to acquire more advanced weapons, particularly missiles and supersonic aircraft. He said on basis this group’s investigations he and his military planners could then determine which missiles best suited for German requirements. Also added that FedRep, either alone but preferably with European partners would like to institute real R & D program on these newer weapons, but that they wanted to start “from where you are now, so that we can avoid preliminary research that has already been done in US”.

Sec Quarles encouraged Min Strauss in any endeavors to secure needed information to make decisions and stated that he would give his attention to the making of proper arrangements. He encouraged them to move ahead on some of these second generation missiles (the lesser


1 Highlights of Quarles’ discussions with European defense leaders during his trip through Western Europe January 8–29, based on official and informal reports received in the Department of State from Embassies, were contained in a memorandum from Merchant to Secretary Dulles, January 30. (Ibid., 102.202/1–3059) See also Part 2, Document 283.
complicated ones) and expressed US desire to work with Fed Rep to this end.

[1 paragraph (7 lines of source text) not declassified]

Min Strauss proceeded by stating that Germany wanted to meet all of its MC–70 goals and to this end had increased its Nike Battalions to a total of six, three more to be added in the period of 1960–61. He stated that in addition they were planning a total of nine Hawk battalions, six of which would be integrated with the fixed Nike system, and three with three German corps. In response to his assertion that they were interested in ascertaining whether Hawk can be used on naval craft, Sec Quarles indicated that this would require a great deal of work but that he would welcome any effort the FedRep might make in this direction. Strauss indicated his interest in Mace and Sec Quarles discussed the merits of Mace types A and B at some length.

Min Strauss indicated his desire to have “instant and complete information” on the Sidewinder with a view not only to buying some but to producing it. He stated that the dimensions of this weapon were such that the WEU restrictions would not apply. He also expressed a desire to have information on certain radar systems for ground environment control.

Min Strauss then asked Sec Quarles to what extent the US was prepared to provide spare parts support to the German forces in the event of war. He asked whether if the war extended beyond 90 days or if the 90-day reserve stocks were knocked out early in combat whether the US would supply them or perhaps the FedRep should buy spare parts and store them in, for example, Spain or the US. Sec Quarles said he would look into the matter. Min Strauss then expressed his hope that the US would station some F–104 units in Europe. Sec Quarles agreed to consider it. Min Strauss asked if some arrangement could be worked out whereby German pilots could have combat training in US. Sec Quarles indicated that the US favored the maximum of training of GAF pilots in US schools. Strauss also hoped that the US Air Force would help German Air Force in the test of equipment involved in modification of the F–104. Sec Quarles indicated his appreciation that this was a tremendous problem and that when the technical team comes to the US both sides should be prepared to go into this problem at length.

[1 paragraph (8 lines of source text) not declassified]

In closing Minister Strauss indicated that as far as the Defense Ministry was concerned, they foresaw no financial troubles this year, next year or the following year.

Bruce
187. Memorandum From Secretary of State Dulles to President Eisenhower


Yesterday the French Ambassador came to see me under instructions from General de Gaulle. Among other things he spoke of the commitment of French forces to NATO. He said that De Gaulle did not presently propose any change of the status as far as related to the arrangements affecting Western Europe. He did, however, insist that, insofar as the Mediterranean was concerned, the French naval forces should be as free as were the U.S. Mediterranean forces, notably the Sixth Fleet. I said that while this was a matter for all of NATO to consider, we would, of course, give consideration to his position and indicate our attitude in the near future.

JFD

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret. The source text bears the President’s initials.
1 See Part 2, Document 89.

188. Letter From President Eisenhower to Secretary of State Dulles

January 26, 1959.

DEAR FOSTER: This note refers to your memorandum of your conversation with the French Ambassador. This whole question raises again—this time from the other side—the doubt that I have so frequently expressed that the command structure involving our United States Naval Forces in the Mediterranean is properly devised.

In short, I believe that the United States forces should be primarily assigned to SACEUR in the Mediterranean, but with the proviso that

1 Document 187.
such forces can be used by the United States government for diplomatic
and other special missions as required.

The agreement should specify that prior notice would be given to
SACEUR.

I have previously spoken to Secretary McElroy about this matter.²
The receipt of this message from de Gaulle through his Ambassador in-
dicates that we should do some thinking on this business. Possibly you
and McElroy, and maybe even some of the other Defense officials,
should have a little conference on the subject.

As ever,³

---

²No record of this conversation has been found.
³Printed from an unsigned copy.

---

189. Telegram 2793 From the Embassy in France to the
Department of State

Paris, January 30, 1959, 8 p.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5/1-3059. Secret;
Priority; Limited Distribution. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

---

190. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

February 9, 1959, 10:30 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT
General Twining
Major Eisenhower

General Twining opened by telling the President of the visit of Gen-
eral Norstad, who had been in Washington for the week end. The pur-

---

pose of his trip had been to testify before the Mahon Subcommittee (Defense) of the House Appropriations Committee. On Saturday morning General Norstad met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The subject at time had been the current U.S. position on contingency plans for Berlin, which General Norstad had thought was very fine. To this the President added Secretary Dulles had had a successful trip to Europe and had reported that the French are taking a much more positive view on the Berlin question. (The Secretary had pointed out, however, that despite their resolution, the French have very little capability available in Europe itself.)

General Twining then mentioned the idea of a military representative to the tripartite meetings which are being held in Washington between Alphand, Caccia and Murphy. (These are being held in response to De Gaulle's desire for tripartite discussions within NATO.) Specifically, Admiral Dennison had been present at the first meeting, held recently, to brief the subject of the Far East. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to terminate this procedure of providing a military representative at first chance, fearing that too many political problems will be pushed off on the military. General Twining promised that he would see Mr. Murphy on the subject. He added, however, that at the meeting between Secretary Dulles and General De Gaulle it had been helpful to the Secretary to be able to state that we provided a military representative to this tripartite meeting. General Twining believes that he has now arrived at an estimate of what De Gaulle wants. Primarily, he desires to have a veto over the use of our Strategic Air Command.

General Twining then brought up the matter of personnel changes in Europe. General Norstad had voiced the desire to remain in his present job to the end of this Administration; specifically, he feels he should wait until after the 1960 election. General Norstad had pointed out that he desires to retire rather than continue on active duty, since his investment in the European job is so heavy as to practically cut him off from any terms of reference of a job in the U.S.

The President was in general agreement with General Norstad's desires, although he feels that late summer of 1960 would be a preferable time for the switch. He stated that he would like to make the change about three or four months before the end of the Administration. He

---

1 Norstad's testimony has not been found.
2 February 7.
3 Regarding Dulles' trip to Europe February 3-9, see Part 2, Document 94.
4 See Part 2, Documents 92 and 93.
5 Admiral Robert L. Dennison, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.
would like General Norstad to remain on active duty after his return to the U.S.; but he fully realizes the difficulty in readjusting from a position of SACEUR to any other. He asked General Twining to request General Norstad to come and visit him next time he is in Washington.

As to the timing of a departure by General Norstad, the President sees no problem. General Schuyler’s changeover will occur in June 1959. His replacement will eventually become SACEUR. This will make June 1960 the first time in which General Schuyler’s replacement could take over from General Norstad, since it would require at least a year for an officer in the Chief of Staff position to “sell himself” to the European nations. The President pointed out that he had followed this procedure with General Gruenther, and that only in the case of General Ridgway had an officer been sent in from another area to take over that command.

General Twining then stated that General Norstad would favor General Taylor as his replacement, although they all realize that General Taylor has completed his tour as Army Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense thinks it unwise to appoint him for a third term. Accordingly, General Twining feels that General Taylor could take over the position of Deputy CINCEUR, now held by General Palmer. On this the President reviewed some names of officers he would nominate for this position. He agrees with the difficulties in the appointment of General Taylor, but feels (and General Twining agrees) that the officer should come from the Army. Specifically, the President mentioned General Decker, General Davidson, and General Lemnitzer. In response to General Twining’s statement that General Lemnitzer is slated to be Chief of Staff, the President answered that that officer should be groomed for General Twining’s position, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Some discussion of individual officer qualifications then followed, with General Twining expressing the view that if SACEUR is to be an Army officer, then the position of Deputy CINCEUR, presently held by General Palmer, should be held by an Air Force officer. He also stated that Gen-

---

7 General Matthew B. Ridgway, SACEUR, 1952–1953.
9 In a memorandum of conversation between the President and McElroy on March 6, prepared by Goodpaster on March 10, McElroy reported that he had spoken to General Taylor regarding possible assignments aimed at his assuming the post of SACEUR, and Taylor had told him he did not wish to continue in service for that purpose. McElroy added that General Moore (presumably Lieutenant General James E. Moore, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations) would be sent to succeed General Williston Palmer who would retire in June, and either General Charles D. Palmer, Commanding General, Headquarters Sixth U.S. Army, or General Davidson would be sent as a replacement for General Schuyler. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)
General Norstad is making every effort to consolidate some Army headquarters in Europe. To this the President responded with enthusiasm.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters]

John S. D. Eisenhower

---

191. Telegram From the Mission at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Regional Organizations to the Department of State

Paris, March 2, 1959, 5 p.m.

Polto 2449. Spaak has just given us account visit de Gaulle.¹ No discussion French fleet proposal in view no firm information and de Gaulle did not mention.

Spaak used what had been arranged some days previously as courtesy call for half-hour general review relation France to Alliance. Began with Berlin, on which de Gaulle very firm on giving no ground. Then discussion French holding up NAC program in several areas, especially air defense and Italian IRBM's.

De Gaulle most concerned about necessity French having voice in use nuclear weapons which would bring on world war. Extended discussion this subject. Spaak said France defeating own ends in leaving IRBM as wholly bilateral arrangement by which France surrendered at least in part participation in decisions.

De Gaulle courteous and said would give consideration Spaak arguments.

No evidence thus far today of presentation French notice as to fleet.

Burgess

¹ According to telegram 3137 from Paris, February 28, Spaak’s interview with de Gaulle took place that morning. (Ibid., 740.5/2–2859)
192. Memorandum for the Record by the President's Assistant Staff Secretary (Eisenhower)


REFERENCES
Memorandum 1/23/59 from the Secretary of State to the President in regard to Commitment of French Forces to NATO and the President's response 1/26/59.

1. At 9:30 AM on the above date, I visited Colonel William B. Rossen (Army member, Chairman's Staff Group, Joint Chiefs of Staff). Also present were Colonel Edward H. Nigro, USAF, Captain James W. O'Grady, USN, and Major John J. Hennessey, USA.

2. The purpose of this visit was to clarify the NATO command arrangements with respect to peacetime assignment of forces to SACEUR.

3. NATO Command Arrangements in the Mediterranean

In time of peace, U.S. and U.K. naval forces remain technically under national command, except during training exercises when they may be placed under SACEUR's operational command. The Sixth Fleet becomes available to SACEUR between D-Day and D+2. Its title becomes STRIKEFORSOUTH, and at this time it comes under the operational command of CINCSOUTH, a subordinate commander under SACEUR. U.K. naval forces become available to SACEUR over a thirty-day period, from D-Day to D+30, while almost all of the French naval forces are planned to become available on D+2.

The actual command arrangements are somewhat complicated. Naval forces in the Mediterranean actually come under two major headquarters, CINCSOUTH, as mentioned above, and AFMED, both of which report to SACEUR. STRIKEFORSOUTH, the purely U.S. command comprising the Sixth Fleet, is under CINCSOUTH and constitutes his only naval component. AFMED, commanded by a British Flag Officer, is primarily responsible for maintenance of Mediterranean LOC's, and is composed of naval forces of the U.K., France, Italy, Greece and the U.S. (a few submarines and naval aircraft).

4. Status of the French Fleet

The status of the French Fleet has come to the fore because of the impending threat of withdrawal by General de Gaulle. Essentially, de Gaulle's allegations that the French Fleet does not enjoy the same free-
dom as the others is unfounded. There is, however, a technicality which he is able to play upon.

In October of 1954, a nine-power conference made extensive revisions in the NATO setup. One of these revisions was the arrangement to include Germany in NATO. One of the other revisions had to do with assignment of forces to SACEUR. Significant to the question of assignment of forces to SACEUR are the following:

(1) "All forces of NATO countries stationed on the Continent of Europe shall be placed under SACEUR, with the exception of those which NATO has recognized or will recognize as suitable to remain under national command.

(2) "The location of such forces shall be determined by SACEUR after consultation and agreement with the National Authorities concerned.

(3) "Such forces shall not be redeployed on the Continent nor used operationally on the Continent without his (SACEUR's) consent, subject to appropriate political guidance from the North Atlantic Council."

The wording in (1) above was revised significantly in the North Atlantic Council's resolution to implement the nine-power actions. Instead of the words "on the Continent of Europe," the implementation resolution utilized "in the area of Allied Command Europe." It went on to specify that this includes forces in the Mediterranean as well as on the Continent, but further stated that the change does not "alter the present status of U.S. and U.K. forces in the Mediterranean."

SACEUR's Revised Terms of Reference are derived from this Council Resolution, and they do, in fact, place peacetime restrictions on French, Italian and Greek forces in the Mediterranean which are not placed on U.S. and U.K. forces. As a result of these restrictions, the French must obtain SACEUR's consent to locate, redeploy or use her forces operationally within the Mediterranean.

The provisions of the terms of reference and their implementation above have been largely nullified by a resolution subsequently adopted by the North Atlantic Council. This resolution, adopted on October 5, 1955, provides that if a government feels compelled to withdraw units which are committed to NATO to meet an emergency elsewhere, "it shall at once inform the appropriate NATO military authorities, and the Council, at the first opportunity." In effect, this provision gives each nation license to withdraw units which have been committed to NATO at their own volition without the concurrence of SACEUR, provided that the country involved considers it an emergency. It is noteworthy that the emergency is determined by the country involved and not by SACEUR. For all practical purposes, this provision puts all NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean on a co-equal basis. As a matter of practice,

---

2 Not found.
the U.S. informs SACEUR of any intended movement of U.S. forces committed to his command.

In the light of this 1955 resolution, it becomes obvious that: (1) For all practical purposes the French Fleet under existing arrangements is as responsive to national control as are the Fleets of the U.S. and U.K. Accordingly, General de Gaulle, as a matter of French national pride, is belaboring a technicality when he claims the French Fleet does not have adequate freedom. (2) If U.S. naval forces were assigned to SACEUR in peacetime, they could still be legally withdrawn without undue difficulty to perform unilateral U.S. missions. The psychological impact on NATO of such an action under these conditions and the advisability of altering this arrangement is another matter.

John S.D. Eisenhower

---

193. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, March 3, 1959, 9 p.m.

3172. While Embassy officer was seeing Laloy at Foreign Office this afternoon on other business, Laloy received telephone call from Jansen, Counselor German Embassy Paris, concerning French decision re Mediterranean Fleet. Judging from Laloy’s remarks on phone to Jansen, latter had impression that decision affected all French Fleet, not only Mediterranean Fleet. Laloy said this not case, that decision had little military significance, since French Fleet in Mediterranean would continue cooperate with NATO forces, and that decision was largely political one influenced by French pacification effort in Algeria. Also, Laloy told Jansen that French decision stemmed from de Gaulle memorandum of last September concerning his views on NATO Alliance. Laloy went on to tell Jansen that it appeared de Gaulle wished put French Mediterranean Fleet in situation similar to that of British Fleet. He stressed to Jansen that decision was not “dramatic” and should not be overplayed.

Following telephone conversation, Laloy remarked to Embassy officer that French decision on Mediterranean Fleet was obviously very

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/3-359. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution; Noforn. Repeated to Bonn.
serious matter which, he feared, would have far-reaching repercussions. However, he had felt it advisable to play matter down to Jansen, who would be reporting to Adenauer tonight on French decision for Adenauer’s background in talks with de Gaulle March 2 in Paris.¹

Laloy said that General Ely had done his utmost to persuade de Gaulle not to take step re Mediterranean Fleet, but his efforts had been unavailing. Laloy observed that de Gaulle’s decision on Fleet was “direct result of United States abstention on Algerian problem in United Nations.”²

[1 paragraph (less than 1 line of source text) not declassified]

Message Unsigned

¹ Adenauer’s meeting with de Gaulle at the latter’s hunting lodge at Marly-le-Roi on the outskirts of Paris took place on March 4, not March 2.

² On December 13, 1958, a U.N. General Assembly resolution, introduced by 17 Asian and African nations, which purported to recognize the right of the Algerian people to independence and urged negotiations between France and the provisional government of Algeria, was defeated by a vote of 32 to 18 with the United States and 29 other nations abstaining.

---

194. Memorandum of Conversation


SUBJECT
French Fleet Withdrawal from NATO

PARTICIPANTS
The Acting Secretary
Ambassador Hervé Alphand, French Embassy
M. Charles Lucet, Minister, French Embassy
M. Pierre Landy, Counselor, French Embassy
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, EUR
Mr. Robert H. McBride, WE

The Acting Secretary said that the Secretary had told the French that we would consider a proposal from them if they had any specific

suggestions regarding the status of the French Mediterranean fleet. We had heard nothing specific from them at all until we were now presented with a fait accompli by their decision to withdraw their Mediterranean fleet from NATO entirely, both in peacetime and in wartime. He stressed that we viewed this development seriously. In the first place, if there were a leak the psychological effects would be extremely bad. It would inevitably give the impression that the alliance was breaking up just at a time when unity was needed, especially because of the Berlin crisis. Furthermore, the effects on the other NATO members would be most unfortunate and might even cause the disintegration of the alliance.

Ambassador Alphand said that he had mentioned this matter to the Secretary he believed on January 22 and had said that the French wished to change the status of their Mediterranean fleet to give it a national status.\(^1\) He said that practically this meant very little change. The Acting Secretary stated that we are particularly distressed because of the psychological effects of their action and noted that we were extremely upset about this matter.

Ambassador Alphand said that the principal reason for the French action was also psychological. He believed that the French action stemmed primarily from concern over the Algerian situation and the fact that France and the US had different policies in North Africa. As a result of this difference in policy it was necessary for France to have national control of her fleet. He added that in peacetime the fleet would continue to join in NATO maneuvers and would cooperate with her allies in wartime. He said the French believed they had already indicated these changes were to be made.

The Acting Secretary said that this matter had indeed been discussed but that it had been our clear understanding that if the French wished to change the status of the fleet they would make a proposal in this sense to the appropriate NATO commander. He said it was difficult to understand this action which had been taken with no consultation.

The French Ambassador said that there had been broad consultation on this subject both here and between the Secretary and General deGaulle in Paris.\(^2\) He thought we knew this development would occur even if we did not know the exact timing. He said France was certainly not thinking of leaving NATO. He added this latest move was a reflection of the fact that France preferred "cooperation" to "integration". The Acting Secretary noted that there had not been much cooperation in this

\(^1\) See Document 187.
\(^2\) See Part 2, Document 95.
particular instance. Ambassador Alphand said he meant cooperation between the fleets.

The French Ambassador said he would report the Acting Secretary's statements to Paris. He said he thought the problem was mainly one of form and presentation rather than substance.

The Acting Secretary said we had been shocked when we had heard of the French decision. He said this raised a question as to whether tripartite talks should be continued. He said these talks, although they had been spaced out over the past months, had, he thought, added to our over-all relationship with France. He thought the most recent French action was the antithesis in spirit of tripartism.

Mr. Merchant added that we had no idea that the French intended to withdraw their fleet from NATO in wartime. He said that when Prime Minister Debré called on General Norstad in January the latter had asked the Prime Minister to submit to the NATO authorities any suggestions which the French might have for changing the status of their fleet. We had thought that they wished to change it to something like the status of the US Sixth Fleet and not to remove it from NATO entirely. He thought there had been agreement that this was a complex question which should be discussed in NATO. The Acting Secretary stressed again that there had been no specific French proposal made to us or to NATO.

The French Ambassador said he thought that the basic cause of this had been the profound personal shock to General deGaulle of the US abstention in the UN debate on Algeria.

The French Ambassador said he had asked Paris to withhold delivery of the letter reporting the French decision at least until a report of his conversation with the Acting Secretary had reached Paris. He said he would cable the Acting Secretary's views at once and concluded on this subject noting that this action did not mean French unwillingness to cooperate in NATO.

---

3 See Document 198.
4 See footnote 2, Document 193.
5 Immediately following this meeting, McBride met with Alphand who, according to McBride, 'was considerably upset.' Alphand said that his government had agreed to delay delivery of the French letter withdrawing the French fleet from NATO until after receipt of the report of his conversation with Herter. He thought that further delay of the letter would be possible if he could report that the status of the French fleet could be discussed on a tripartite basis in Washington. McBride replied that he believed the French proposal should first be made to NATO. After checking with Merchant, McBride later told Alphand that the matter should be referred to NATO. He reiterated what Dulles had told de Gaulle in Paris that the United States would give sympathetic consideration to any French proposal but first should discuss the matter with NATO. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/3–359)
195. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Herter to President Eisenhower

March 4, 1959.

SUBJECT
Status of French Mediterranean Fleet

In a memorandum of February 28 we told you of the French intent to inform NATO that as of April the French Mediterranean fleet would no longer be earmarked for assignment to SACEUR in time of war.\(^1\) Since that date we have been advised by the French Permanent Representative to NATO that this action would take place imminently, perhaps March 4. As of this moment, however, the French have not taken this step.

In anticipation of the French action I called in Ambassador Alphand yesterday to tell him that the United States viewed the proposed French action in NATO with great concern.\(^2\) I said that I thought that the French were presenting us with a fait accompli rather than a proposal which we could study sympathetically. I stressed that the psychological and political repercussions, rather than the military implications, were most important, saying that an unfortunate impression would be created that the Western alliance was breaking up at a moment when unity is so vital because of the Berlin crisis. I also said long-term effects on NATO could be unfortunate. The proposed French action, I continued, raised the question of whether we should continue the tripartite talks we have been holding together with the British in Washington. Later I had Ambassador Alphand informed that I thought that implementation of this French decision would seem to remove the legislative justification for cooperation in the nuclear field, particularly with reference to a nuclear propulsion reactor for a submarine, which the French have requested.\(^3\)

---

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret. The source text bears the President’s initials.

\(^1\) A note attached to the source text from John A. Calhoun, Director of the Executive Secretariat, to Goodpaster, March 4, states that the memorandum of February 28 is the one he sent Goodpaster containing information on the status of the French Mediterranean fleet. The February 28 memorandum contains a short report on the status of the French Mediterranean fleet and recent relevant telegrams from and to Paris on the subject. (Ibid., Staff Secretary Records, NATO)

\(^2\) See Document 194.

\(^3\) Telegram 3195 to Paris, March 3, which summarized Herter’s talk with Alphand, March 3, also reported that later that day Herter had Merchant call Alphand to say that the execution of the French decision on the fleet matter would appear to remove legislative justification for a nuclear submarine and make congressional approval unlikely. “We felt French should be forewarned.” (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/3-359)
We have instructed our chargé Chargé in Paris to take the same line with Prime Minister Debre. 4

The fact that the French have not submitted their paper to NATO may indicate that they are seriously considering the warnings we have given them. We know, however, that General de Gaulle’s decision to go ahead with this project was taken by him alone against the counsel of his political and military advisers. We dare not, therefore, be too optimistic.

We are consulting with the British on this matter. We have also passed on considerable information on this subject to our German allies inasmuch as Chancellor Adenauer is presently in Paris to see General de Gaulle and Prime Minister Debre. 5

Christian A. Herter

4 In telegram 3185 to Paris, March 3. (Ibid.)
5 See footnote 1, Document 193.

196. Telegram From the Mission at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State

Paris, March 6, 1959, 7 p.m.

Polto 2536. Reference: Polto 2535. 1 Following text French note: 2

"In accordance with the procedure established in the Resolution of October 5, 1955, of the North Atlantic Council (Document C–M (55)82), 3 I have been instructed by my Government to apprise you of its decision to effect an important change in the status of the French naval forces in

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/3–659. Secret; Niat; Official Translation.

1 Polto 2535 from Paris, March 6, reported that the French note had just been delivered, after last-minute efforts to hold it up had failed. (Ibid.)
2 The French text, attached to the source text, is not printed.
3 Not found, but see Document 192.
the Mediterranean, which are earmarked, for the year 1959, for assignment to NATO.

In time of peace, and still more in time of war, the essential mission of the French naval forces in the Mediterranean is, in addition to the defense of the French and North African coasts, to ensure freedom of communication between the two shores of the Mediterranean.

Whether it be a question of transports rendered necessary by the exigencies of the struggle to pacify Algeria, whether it be a question of the defense of the community, or whether it be a question subsequently of the supply-line for the oil from the Sahara, the importance of this mission does not require demonstration. It can have no other character than that of a national mission, especially in the absence of any real solidarity with respect to the fundamental problems of Algeria and North Africa in general. The French fleet in the Mediterranean must be assigned to it on a priority basis, which is why the French Government is led to resume control, in time of war, over its naval forces in the Mediterranean.

Such a decision will not have any consequences in time of peace, in as much as the French units in the Mediterranean are under French command exclusively. It means that in time of war France must cope with its own national tasks. The French Government, for its part, considers these tasks of prime importance for the Alliance as a whole.

Moreover, it goes without saying that the French naval forces in the Mediterranean will be able to cooperate in time of war with the Allied naval forces in the implementation of the plans of the Alliance, on condition that such plans do not conflict with the execution of the said principal mission assigned to the French fleet by the French Government. The French military authorities are prepared henceforth to examine the ways and means of effecting such cooperation.

An identical communication is being addressed to the Standing Group and to the Supreme Command of the Allied Forces in Europe.

I am addressing the same letter to the Secretary General and to the other Permanent Representatives.

Please accept, Mr. Ambassador and dear Colleague, the assurances of my high consideration.”

Burgess
197. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, March 7, 1959, 1 p.m.

3241. Last night after dinner at British Embassy Joxe, Jebb and I had long conversation regarding French action in withdrawal their Mediterranean Fleet from NATO. Halfway through conversation we were joined by Spaak.

Joxe was obviously not at all happy at action which had been taken. He thoroughly appreciated arguments put forward by Jebb and me regarding poor timing of move on eve of Berlin, fact that knowledge of step bound to leak, to dangerous precedent for other NATO members.

"Yes, it looks as if we are sabotaging NATO," Joxe admitted, but insisted this was not de Gaulle intention.

Joxe said Couve de Murville was lunching with de Gaulle today and Joxe hoped very much that following this French would come up with formula for solution to problem. He would have preferred to have complied with my suggestion of several days ago that notification to NATO be held up,¹ but as this had not been possible, he considers that France now has "obligation" to come forth with some definite explanation of exactly what she wants. He had favored having Debre give memorandum to Norstad. Regarding this as first step, he now realizes all of us are without concrete indication of just what France wants.

He referred to such a paper being submitted for tripartite consideration in first instance but was not definite on this. I said I assumed matter would be discussed by Macmillan and de Gaulle Monday,² and both he and Jebb agreed that it would.

Spaak said frankly that in his opinion the French move had no military significance whatsoever, but incalculable psychological significance. He indicated that he would take a quiet week-end and do nothing regarding the notification for a few days. He inquired of Joxe exactly what was basis French action, adding that he thought it was control of the bomb. Joxe said no, it was integration of forces that General de Gaulle opposed. Joxe still seems to think some change in Mediterranean

¹No specific record of Burgess’ suggestion has been found, but in Polto 2525 from Paris, March 6, he reported that he had asked de Lusse “again” if there was any possibility of holding off the French letter. (Ibid., 740.5/3–659)
²Macmillan met with de Gaulle in Paris on Monday and Tuesday, March 9–10. No detailed record of these conversations has been found, but for Macmillan’s brief summary, see Part 2, Document 359.
command set-up could solve this problem. We all agreed that in that case a solution was possible.

Joxe emphasized that de Gaulle is definitely not trying to destroy NATO, nor playing any game with Soviets. He had long since abandoned his "bridge" idea. However, Joxe did not feel that package attempt to solve IRBM, atomic storage, integrated air force problems all at one swoop with de Gaulle would be possible, but Joxe did think this specific Mediterranean matter could be worked out satisfactorily.

Spaak emphasized fact that normal NATO formula for consultation had been ignored by France in this instance and also that smaller nations would not concur in French claim that this was purely French national matter. Joxe understood all this.

At one point Joxe said US abstention on Algerian vote was root of whole matter, for it still rankled de Gaulle, who frequently brought it up.

I asked Joxe what France would want from her allies with respect to Algeria but received no clear reply.

He did emphasize, however, at this juncture that he hoped matter would get little publicity for French public opinion could become very worked up against NATO easily as result of repressed frustrations over Algerian war and widespread belief that France’s allies not sufficiently understanding of sacrifices she making, etc., and widespread support of anything which de Gaulle proposes at this juncture.

I remarked that Adenauer–de Gaulle talks two days ago\(^3\) had strengthened alliance, but France’s action today had very definitely weakened it.

As matter probably will be discussed Monday between Macmillan and de Gaulle, I would suggest that if Department has any further views they be transmitted London or here before then.

Reference Department’s 7948 to London, rptd Paris 3246,\(^4\) I trust Department will take no final decision with respect tripartite talks until there has been more time for reflection of exactly what French move means to all of us and what in our own best interests is most efficacious method of dealing with problem French action presents.

---

\(^3\) See footnote 1, Document 193.

\(^4\) Telegram 7948 to London, March 6, noted that the Department of State did not favor tripartite talks on the French fleet problem because it directly involved NATO. The fact that the French had just announced their decision to NATO raised the question put by Herter to Alphand on March 3 as to the possibility of continuing the talks, since the French action appeared to be the "antithesis in spirit to their expressed desire for closest collaboration with British and ourselves." No U.S. decision had yet been taken on this issue. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/3-559)
198. Telegram From the Mission at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State

Paris, March 9, 1959, 8 p.m.

Polto 2570. Spaak tells me the following:

On Saturday Spaak was present at a luncheon given by de Gaulle and after lunch de Gaulle pulled him over to a corner and told him about his conversation with Vinogradov, de Gaulle saying that he had taken a very firm line with him.

Spaak then raised the question of financing of IRBMs and the French Fleet, and asked General de Gaulle if, in opposing the infrastructure financing of IRBMs, he was not in effect raising question of control of atomic weapons, and whether in withdrawing Mediterranean Fleet he was not really raising question of the chain of command.

De Gaulle’s reply was that this was true. The conversations in Washington have not been getting results and so it was necessary to take the questions directly to NATO.

At same time de Gaulle said he was strongly in favor of NATO and wished to do nothing to injure it. Spaak told him it was difficult to help him because he had not made clear exactly what he wanted.

Spaak reviewed with me how to handle these questions in Wednesday meeting and said he wanted first to raise question of procedure, which is not clear in French statement because they start by saying they are following procedure in CM(55)82 but at same time they indicate a decision has been reached. Spaak told me, however, that de Leusse had told St. Mleux that decision was fait accompli. Official document, however, is sufficiently ambiguous so that one is justified in raising this question.

Spaak then referred to difficulty in discussing this matter in full Council on Wednesday and said he wanted to invite de Leusse, Frank Roberts and me for a preliminary meeting tomorrow at 11:30 to clear up this question of procedure and ask de Leusse if French could not clarify what they really wanted.

In reviewing course discussion might take on Wednesday, Spaak had particular reluctance with respect to possible discussion of conditions of use of IRBMs.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/3–959. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution.

1 March 7.
2 Sergey Aleksandrovich Vinogradov, Soviet Ambassador to France.
3 Not found, but see Documents 192 and 196.
I said I would cable home about it, but thought preliminary meeting would be useful.

I have in mind fully danger of this bordering on tripartite discussion, but I think it can be kept in nature of private consultation with Spaak at his instigation. Of course I shall be there primarily to listen and, if I speak, it will be without guidance and on personal basis.

It seems to me Spaak’s initiative has chance of being useful and should be encouraged.

Burgess

199. Telegram From the Mission at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State

Paris, March 10, 1959, 5 p.m.

Polto 2583. Spaak, Frank Roberts, de Leusse and I met at 11:30 this morning.

Spaak began by somewhat lengthy statement of position as he saw it in relation to French paper on withdrawal of fleet.\(^1\) He said it raised three sorts of questions: question of procedure, question of substance of withdrawal of fleet to national mission, and question of Algeria.

With respect to procedure, he said there was ambiguity because paper was submitted under CM(55)82 which called for advance consultation but on other hand appeared to record a decision.

On matter of withdrawal of fleet, this was seriously embarrassing to Alliance and raised many difficult questions. Assignment to NATO did not mean that a military unit no longer had responsibility for national defense, which was indeed one of duties of Alliance.

With respect to Algeria, he said these questions had never been submitted to NATO.

Spaak then referred to conversation with General de Gaulle\(^2\) which indicated to him that questions French had raised were not the real

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/3-1059. Secret; Nialt. Repeated to London.

\(^1\) See Document 196.

\(^2\) Reported in Document 198.
questions, but real questions were rather control of atomic weapons and the chain of command.

He said this made discussion in NATO Council extremely difficult because there was really no use in discussing details of the superficial questions when the underlying questions were the real problem and those questions were extremely embarrassing and difficult to discuss, partly because French had not provided any specific indication of what they wanted.

With respect to procedure to be followed at Wednesday's meeting, he said he thought next step was to refer question of fleet to the military authorities for their recommendations. He said this frankly had advantage of gaining some time, during which he hoped French would try to give us some more specific indications of what were their real desires.

De Leusse said he expected they would have some specific suggestions in few days which they might submit to tripartite group in Washington. I pointed out certain of their suggestions should be made directly to NATO.

Spaak turned to me for comment and I simply said that I agreed in general with analysis he had made of situation; that we were greatly troubled by situation which was very serious and holding up work of Alliance at time when I was sure French were just as anxious as we were to have strength and solidarity; that we did not like idea of having quarrels before Council and would welcome indication by French of exactly what their recommendations were.

Frank Roberts also stated general agreement with Spaak's summary and went on to say that British had been giving careful study to question of line of command, were not frozen in fixed ideas on this score, and were willing to consider possible changes.

[1 paragraph (11 lines of source text) not declassified]

In reference to infrastructure financing of IRBMs, Spaak also referred to difficulties about forcing action into bilateral channels, which had effect of giving Alliance less control of situation. I picked that thought up also and said there were two general ways of conducting operations here: one was by bilateral undertakings and the other was using Alliance just as fully as possible. We had tried in our operations to utilize Alliance and share our responsibilities with it. We thought in that way it gave all members of Alliance better opportunity to participate in decisions.

With respect to tomorrow's meeting, Spaak indicated he would suggest referring to the military French paper on fleet without inviting any substantial discussion by Council. Spaak agreed that our meeting this morning should be completely secret.
After we left Spaak, the three of us agreed that we must avoid having us set up here anything parallel to tripartite group in Washington and that our meeting this morning was strictly ad hoc. I also pointed out again some questions were more appropriately taken up directly with NATO authorities.

Burgess

200. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations**

March 10, 1959, 8:30 p.m.


1. Dept appreciates report contained ref tel A, from which we assume that de Leusse did not today clarify status of French action in relation to C–M(55)82 procedure.

2. Re ref tel B, Dept concurs with line you took with Spaak that there should be some NAC discussion before reference of matter to military. As already indicated\(^3\) we consider that in NAC meeting March 11 US should, in measured terms, indicate seriousness with which US views French action. It likely that de Gaulle’s decision taken in part at least in pique at US, and for this reason it appears desirable pattern our attitudes and possible actions so as to prevent further deterioration US–

\(^{1}\) Document 199.

\(^{2}\) In Polto 2582 from Paris, March 10, Burgess agreed with referring the French fleet issue to the military, but he also wanted to give U.S. reaction to the NAC. Spaak and Dutch Permanent Representative to NATO Dirk Stikker agreed. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/3–1059)

\(^{3}\) Topol 2995 to Paris, March 9, instructed that Burgess’ statement in the NAC on March 11 should leave no doubt that the United States viewed seriously the French decision to remove its Mediterranean fleet from NATO command. (Ibid., 740.5/3–959)
French relations and, indirectly, further actions possibly of damage to NATO. We know you agree that Spaak and others should take lead in NAC discussion. A firm but restrained attitude by US would seem to be posture to assume at this time, while we await any explanations French may offer, as well as reactions and views other countries.

3. US Element has advised Dept that SGN is awaiting SACEUR's comments (which we understand are being prepared urgently) as first step in preparing estimate of military effects of French move for transmission to NAC in accordance paragraph 8 (c), C-M(55)82(Final).

Herter

---

201. Memorandum of Conversation

March 11, 1959.

SUBJECT
French Fleet

PARTICIPANTS
M. Herve Alphand, French Ambassador
M. Charles Luce, Minister, French Embassy
Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Mr. Alfred G. Vigderman, GER

Ambassador Alphand had requested an appointment with Mr. Murphy to discuss Germany. After a few remarks on this subject he switched to the French fleet action.

He said he had discussed this subject with the Secretary several weeks ago. The French fleet does not have a new status as the result of the recent action. The situation in peace-time is not affected; an agreement could be reached on war-time cooperation. What the French have done is not against the spirit of the alliance. France has taken this action only because of its special national interests on the borders of the Medi-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/3-1159. Secret. Drafted by Alfred G. Vigderman, Officer in Charge of German Affairs, and L. Dean Brown, and initialed by Merchant.

1 Reference presumably is to Alphand's conversation with Dulles on January 22; see Document 187.
terranean. Recently, the Acting Secretary in a discussion of the French action had referred to the tripartite talks [7 lines of source text not declassified].

Mr. Merchant replied that it is not ready for initialing.

Mr. Murphy asked about the NATO status of the French fleet action. Mr. Merchant said it would go to the Council today and be referred to the military committee for discussion.

Mr. Murphy asked what was the rationale of the French move. He understood the national interests of the French, but did not understand why they do not seek to achieve these within the NATO framework. This was a particularly awkward moment to bring this subject forward, and the public reaction was to be greatly feared.

Ambassador Alphand suggested that there had been a leak from somewhere.

Mr. Murphy replied it was vain to hope that the matter could be kept from leaking. It is bound to become public. We dread the day when the news becomes public. He then reverted to the question, what is the purpose of the French move?

The Ambassador said it is related to the special responsibilities of the French in Algeria. U.S. policy in Algeria is not the same as the French. France needs the fleet as a first priority to protect the lines of communication between France and Algeria. This does not mean that the fleet cannot cooperate with NATO. France is ready to make arrangements.

Mr. Murphy said it is obvious that U.S. policy is not the same as France's, vis-à-vis Algeria. Algeria is a French problem. The U.S. is happy to stay out of it. Through the years the U.S. has voted with France in the U.N. (Alphand interrupted to say, except once.)² Mr. Murphy then went on to say that the U.S. has leaned over backwards in the hope that France would work out the problem. We hoped that General de Gaulle would seize and settle the question. We would be glad if France would find a solution. We have the impression that General de Gaulle is angry with the U.S. as concerns Algeria.

The Ambassador replied that this was a wrong conception. French problems are different, and the French need these ships.

Mr. Murphy asked why association in NATO should block the use of these naval units for this purpose.

The Ambassador said if they are under NATO command the French would have to have NATO authority to use them.

Mr. Murphy said the question of the use of the fleet in war-time is serious. General Norstad had said that we could be reasonable and per-

²See footnote 2, Document 193.
haps give the French fleet a status similar to the U.S. Sixth Fleet. But, in
time of war the U.S. fleet is at the disposition of NATO. The French are
taking their fleet away. This is a serious blow to the alliance.

The Ambassador said the total tonnage involved was only 40,000
tons. This would not, he said, change the efficiency of the alliance.

Mr. Murphy then asked, if this is so, what is the purpose of the
change? Nobody has it in mind to prevent the free use of the French fleet
if the French wish to use it.

[6 paragraphs (17 lines of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Merchant pointed out that we had an agreement on the carrier
Belleau Wood. It had been loaned for a specific purpose—anti-submarine
warfare, and it had been earmarked for NATO. This created a practical
problem.

The Ambassador said we are ready to talk at any time about the
problem raised by this carrier.

Mr. Murphy said that the French fleet action raised unnecessary
problems. Suppose, he continued, we took our five Divisions out of Ger-
many and earmarked them for use in the Far East, in the time of war, for
example.

The Ambassador rejoined that the French action was based on the
reasons given. The U.S., as well as the U.K., had forces under national
command. He pointed out that what had been done did not affect any-
thing outside of the Mediterranean. He asked what he was to say to
Paris on the link.

Mr. Murphy said no decision has been made, that we were watch-
ing the evolution in NATO.

The Ambassador said that, if there was a leak to the press, the
French would say that some units of the Mediterranean fleet only were
affected, that the efficiency of the alliance was not affected, and that the
action was taken because of the special responsibilities of France in
North Africa.

Mr. Murphy replied that the French have had these responsibilities
in North Africa for years. It would be very awkward to try to explain the
reason for the French action. He pointed out that the contemplated ac-
tion had never been mentioned in the tripartite talks.

The Ambassador said he had mentioned this matter several times
but not in the tripartite talks.

Mr. Murphy said the matter should have been mentioned in the tri-
partite talks.

The Ambassador replied that everyone knew that General de Gaule
would make changes in NATO, not of a fundamental character.
The present change shouldn’t be permitted to snowball.
Mr. Murphy said he did not understand the General’s philosophy about NATO.

Ambassador Alphand said the General wanted to have a strong alliance, but there had to be more of a concept of national responsibility. Soldiers had to be imbued with the idea that they were defending their own soil. It was not good to ask a man to fight exclusively defending others.

Mr. Murphy replied that one doesn’t strengthen forces by pulling them out. He suggested there could be a French command for the affected vessels. We were ready to discuss this, but the timing of the French action was very bad, citing the Berlin crisis.

Ambassador Alphand said he had mentioned this on January 22nd. The French action was not related to the Berlin crisis.

Mr. Merchant said that the Ambassador had only talked about a rearrangement of command and had said nothing about a change in the war-time earmark of the fleet.

The Ambassador said the U.S. has exaggerated the importance of the French action. If the U.S. stopped cooperating on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] tripartite talks, he did not know where we would go. The U.S. was, in fact, stopping action which had been going on and he concluded that the U.S. had taken the decision to stop things, at least temporarily.

Mr. Murphy replied that we want to see where you are going.

[1 paragraph (2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Ambassador Alphand said the General has a lot of things in mind: the organization of theatres of operation for the whole world, decisions about the employment of nuclear force, and a reorganization of NATO. General de Gaulle is, however, closely allied with the Western position.

Mr. Merchant asked then whether the French fleet action was one step in a program.

Ambassador Alphand said it was.

Mr. Murphy said that we should know what the complete pattern is, if it is intended to make basic changes in the nature of the alliance. He pointed out that the French fleet action would have repercussions on the other members of the alliance. The Belgians, for instance, had just reduced the period of conscription. He then asked whether the French were, in fact, stopping with the withdrawal of these 40,000 tons. The Ambassador replied that we should not construe the French action as something fundamental.

Mr. Murphy replied the other side will know how to construe the French action. The news will get out; people will talk. The prospect of keeping this secret once NATO knew about it was very small. The U.S.
has not, however, taken any decision on the link question mentioned by the Ambassador.

The Ambassador said that the U.S. has decided to interrupt what has been going on. The French wanted a tripartite discussion of Africa and would have been ready on March 16 to cover the entire African problem. M. Lucet added that the French were drafting an agenda and that views have already been exchanged on it.

Mr. Merchant said we had not received any agenda, and Mr. Murphy invited the French to hand over their agenda. Mr. Merchant said, in any event, we wouldn’t be ready by the 16th. (There was then some discussion as to exactly what would be discussed; the Horn of Africa talk was mentioned, including the possible participation of Ethiopia and Italy.)

Mr. Murphy then said it is important not to unsettle the alliance, noting that alliances are always in a delicate state.

Ambassador Alphand said one must understand de Gaulle who does not oppose the alliance, but is a nationalist. If, he continued, the U.S. makes a link, he feared the worst. The General would be furious and there would be a chain reaction.

Mr. Murphy said that apart from the U.S. there was no question that other NATO members would react to what the French had done.

Ambassador Alphand intimated this was not important.

Mr. Merchant said that it wasn’t clear to him whether the French were making an announcement of something they had done or something they intend doing through the regular way in NATO.

Mr. Murphy said we were suspending judgment until we see how this matter shook down.

The Ambassador reiterated that the U.S. had taken a decision.

Mr. Merchant replied that our decision was only to examine what the French action means. He reverted to the *Belleau Wood* problem. We obviously don’t want to withdraw the carrier, but we were bound by law on this subject and might have to seek Congressional legislation.

Ambassador Alphand said the agreement contemplates special use of the carrier for other purposes. In any case, the French were ready to talk on this subject whenever the U.S. was ready.

Mr. Murphy said he was optimistic that the French fleet problem would be solved because we have to work it out.

The Ambassador said that if he cabled Paris on the present situation it would be psychologically terrible.

Mr. Murphy asked him to cable the facts, leaving out any suppositions.
202. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

March 12, 1959, 8:50 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Quarles
General Twining
General Goodpaster
Rear Admiral Francis J. O’Beirne
Colonel G. W. Mason, USA
Captain F. H. Schneider, USN
Captain Aurand
Colonel Littleton C. Selden
Major Eisenhower
QM 1C Durezzo

Colonel Selden\(^1\) opened the briefing by a quick rundown of Army and Air Force force assignments to SACEUR. These forces, which comprise the Seventh U.S. Army and the air forces assigned to USAFE are assigned to CINCEUR and simultaneously to SACEUR in time of peace as well as in time of war.

Captain Schneider\(^2\) then took the floor to brief on the subject of naval forces available to SACEUR. These forces have become a matter of considerable concern in recent weeks because of the professed intention on the part of General de Gaulle to withdraw the French fleet from NATO in time of war as well as in time of peace. Captain Schneider’s briefing may be summarized along the following lines:

(1) The command arrangements under which naval forces in the Mediterranean exist in peacetime differ from those which would be in effect in the event of a NATO war. In peacetime, U.S. forces, namely, the Sixth Fleet, will remain under the operational command of USCINCEUR and earmarked for, but not assigned to, SACEUR. In the event of a NATO war, they will become available to SACEUR. The British fleet in the Mediterranean observes the same command arrangements. The peacetime assignment of naval forces in the Mediterranean poses no particular problem.

(2) Command arrangements under wartime conditions, in which the NATO chain of command will be in effect, are considerably more complicated. In fact, there are two major headquarters, both directly subordinate to SACEUR, who command the naval forces in the Mediterranean. These commands are CINCSOUTH (commanded by a U.S. Flag

---


\(^1\) Not further identified.

\(^2\) Assistant Head, National Command Matters, Strategic Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
Officer, and including the Sixth Fleet under the name of STRIKEFOR-
SOUTH) and AFMED (commanded by a British Flag Officer and com-
prising an extensive grouping of sub-areas commanded by Flag Officers
of the U.K., France, Turkey, Greece and Italy). This combined command
arrangement grew out of an early divergence in view between the U.S.
and Great Britain as pertains to the role of Mediterranean fleets. In the
U.S. view, the Mediterranean constitutes the right flank of NATO. In the
British view, the Mediterranean comprises a lifeline to the Middle East.
Accordingly, CINCOUTH and AFMED both control naval forces of
different characteristics patrolling the same waters.

(3) The present status of the U.S., U.K. and French fleets has grown
out of SACEUR’s terms of reference of 1955. This agreement specified
that forces of all participating countries in the area of Allied Command
Europe were to be assigned in peacetime to SACEUR. However, it in-
cluded an “exclusion clause,” which specified that in peacetime the
fleets of the U.S. and the U.K. should remain in their former command
status, i.e. under national command. This placed the U.S. and U.K. fleets
in a somewhat privileged status, responsive to national needs, whereas
the French, Turkish, Greek and Italian fleets could be moved only with
the approval of SACEUR. In 1956 this exclusion clause was, in effect, ex-
tended to all other fleets, but it was agreed that any nation, in case of
emergency, might withdraw their forces from NATO command for na-
tional use. (For a complete treatment of this subject, see Memorandum
for Record dated March 3, 1959, NATO file. This Memorandum for Re-
cord has been briefed in toto to the President.)

(4) There is much evidence to establish that the French government
had misunderstood the command arrangements under which the U.S.
and U.K. fleets had operated prior to their decision for unilateral with-
drawal. This is indicated primarily by a French statement of January
23rd. Actually, the Sixth Fleet operates under CINCEUR, who is the
same person as SACEUR. Furthermore, in the year 1958, eleven NATO
exercises were conducted in which the Sixth Fleet participated under
SACEUR. Finally, as has been mentioned, the exclusion clause of 1956
gave the French fleet essentially the same privileges as the British and
American.

(5) Secretary Dulles, on his trip to Europe, discussed the matter of
the French fleet with General de Gaulle. He expressed the U.S. determi-
nation to study the French problem sympathetically and requested de
Gaulle to deal in NATO channels on this matter. In a recent conversa-
tion with General Ely, General Norstad was informed that it would not be
sufficient for French purposes to place their Mediterranean fleet on the
same status as that currently held by the U.S. and U.K. fleets. The

---

3 Reference is presumably to the NAC resolution (C-M 5582) adopted on October
5, 1955; see Document 192.
4 This 1956 agreement has not been further identified.
5 Document 192.
6 Not further identified.
7 See Part 2, Document 95.
8 An undated memorandum from Norstad to Twining summarized the former’s
conversation with Ely on March 5. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NATO)
French fleet must be completely responsive to national needs in peace as well as war. The seriousness of the situation lies totally in a psychological impact. Actually, the French have only seventeen ships and twenty-two patrol aircraft in the Mediterranean.

At the end of the briefing Secretary Quarles expressed the view that we have two major points in question on this whole matter. First is the distinction in wording between the status of Army and Air Force forces which are assigned to SACEUR in peace time, and the status of U.S. and U.K. fleets which are not assigned but "earmarked." This is an important point and was spelled out in the 1955 terms of reference for SACEUR. The second point is that when General de Gaulle found out that restrictions actually did exist on the U.S. fleet, he still refused to accept such restrictions as to give him a situation parallel to ours. He withdrew his fleet entirely as a unilateral action. This leaves the outcome in doubt.

The President then remarked that our main difficulty is that the people dealing with de Gaulle in such matters were not sufficiently acquainted with his temperament. General de Gaulle is not by nature a reasonable man when he is dealing in such terms as Glory, Honor and France. In the President's view, it was obvious that for prestige purposes it would be inadequate for de Gaulle to go on the same basis as the U.S. and the French—he would have to go further. The President added that he had been urging the Department of Defense to place our fleets on the same status as the others. However, the fat is now in the fire and we must see what can be done in the light of the existing situation.

The President voiced one slightly optimistic note which is that Macmillan, in a cable which the President had received the night before, had expressed the belief that he had made a dent in de Gaulle's intransigent attitude.

[2 paragraphs (25 lines of source text) not declassified]

The President admitted to a special interest in the NATO command arrangement in the light of the full command which he personally had enjoyed as SACEUR. He remarked that in the discussion of these matters in 1959 [1949], Admiral Forrest Sherman had, at a point of particular intensity, secured an hour of recess. During this recess the then General Eisenhower had gone to President Truman and in a brief conversation had secured full command of all forces. This represented the only time in his career in which he placed a "condition" on his services, that is, said he would serve only if certain arrangements were effected.

---

9 Not found.
Turning back to the matter of the French fleet, the President stated that we may be witnessing a beginning of a crumbling of NATO in this French action. He admits that we should probably not disturb the CINCEUR/SACEUR relationship for the time being, but stated that we must find a way to deal with the withdrawal of the French fleet.

Captain Schneider and Mr. Quarles expressed the view that in the event of Soviet attack, CINCEUR would probably begin the fighting on the principle of the inherent right of a commander to defend his forces. Mr. Quarles also took note of the erosive effect of the agreement of 1956 which gave each nation authority unilaterally to withdraw its fleets for "emergency use." The President agreed.

This ended the informational briefing.

John S. D. Eisenhower

203. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, March 16, 1959, 9 p.m.

3385. I delivered President's letter to General de Gaulle at seven this evening. He read it through quickly and courteously thanked me for it but made no further comment.

In accordance Merchant-Houghton telecon² I informed him that I had been told a second letter would be forthcoming soon.³ He acknowledged this also without comment.

At this point I remarked that I had only returned from Africa the middle of last week and found myself in some confusion as to whether

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/3–1659. Secret; Priority; Presidential Handling.

¹ Eisenhower's March 14 letter to de Gaulle is printed in volume VIII, Document 223.
² According to a memorandum for the record prepared by Merchant on March 16, Houghton called him that morning to tell him that he had not yet delivered Eisenhower's letter to de Gaulle because of no mention therein of the French fleet withdrawal. Merchant told Houghton that a second letter would be sent exclusively on that subject. After talking with Herter, Merchant called Houghton back and authorized him to inform de Gaulle of a forthcoming letter on the fleet question. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.5/3–1659)
³ See Document 204.
undated letter regarding withdrawal of French Mediterranean fleet from NATO was a fait accompli or rather a declaration of intention (see Embtel 3360). After brief hesitation he replied that it would be a fait accompli in the event of war. He proceeded to say that France had to look after its African interests and that inasmuch as this not a NATO responsibility France had to assume that responsibility herself.

Finally he is of the opinion that he outlined this move to Secretary Dulles and under the impression that Secretary appeared sympathetic and somewhat in accord.

In this connection, Lyon’s informal notes of February 6 conversations with de Gaulle read as follows:

Secretary: “The French Ambassador raised recently with me the status of the French naval forces in the Mediterranean. We are quite prepared to see a review of that situation, both as to the French forces and our own. However, it is a highly technical matter and should be carried out in NATO. Our own position is, however, that we look on such a review with sympathy.”

Debre: “It is not merely a technical question, and a political aspect could evolve therefrom which is linked with the transportation for French forces in the Mediterranean. Algeria is such a part of France’s domain and the Algerian problem means so much to us that it is a fundamental political question. The French Mediterranean fleet is so linked up with France’s vital interests that we cannot share it without sharing our problem. We are either backed up in our policy or must keep separate.”

At this point de Gaulle calmed down Debre and said that the matter was of great importance for “our Algerian policy, and as we do not have a common policy for North Africa and as NATO doesn’t cover North Africa we have a problem to discuss at Washington. If there is war the French fleet will of course rush to NATO and become a part of NATO forces.” Thereupon the Secretary replied: “We see the force of what you say. However, disengagement of the French fleet in the Mediterranean would affect contractual arrangements.”

Houghton

---

4 Telegram 3360 from Paris, March 16, reported that Joxe told Houghton the previous day that the omission of a date in the French note on the fleet question was significant, and that this French note was not an ultimatum but a declaration of intent, about which details for implementation would follow. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.51/3–1659)

5 For Dulles’ brief summary of this February 6 conversation, see Part 2, Document 95.
204. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France

March 19, 1959, 6:10 p.m.

3470. Following is text of letter from General de Gaulle re French Mediterranean fleet.¹ The President has directed this be shown to General Norstad to be sure it does not create great difficulties for him. Following this consultation with Norstad² letter should be delivered soonest to General de Gaulle. Advise date time delivery.

"March 19, 1959,

Dear General De Gaulle:

As I said in my letter to you of March fourteenth, ³ I continue to attach the greatest importance to maintaining the strength of our military posture through the fullest and closest cooperation in NATO. As you are aware, I have long had a deep and natural interest in this common effort, because of my conviction that the fate of France and of Free Europe is of incalculable importance to my own country. Since assuming the office of the Presidency, I have earnestly supported the concept of the NATO 'shield' as an indispensable element of Western security. Because of your long association with Western military cooperation and planning, I know that you too have a particular interest in these subjects.

I believe that in NATO we have the best guarantee of mutual defense. Through it, additionally the Federal Republic of Germany has been brought into close political and military union with the West. NATO has become a flexible instrument, as is well illustrated by the growth of political consultation within its framework in recent years.

In light of these views, I believe I would be remiss if I did not inform you of the concern caused us by the letter from the French Government.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret; Presidential Handling. Drafted by Timmons, McBride, and Brown and cleared with the White House.

¹ This letter was based on a draft that Herter sent to the President. In a memorandum to the President, March 16, attached to the draft, Herter wrote:

"We do not propose to the General that we withdraw the communication to the Council. Our letter may serve, however, to cause him to reflect on this decision perhaps to change its emphasis so as to make it a declaration of intent rather than an ultimatum. There are some indications that French officials are trying to take this line, as the enclosed telegram suggests." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File) The enclosed telegram was telegram 3360 from Paris; see footnote 4, Document 205.

² Telegram 3484 from Paris, March 20, reported that the letter was "enthusiastically approved in every word" by Norstad. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.11-EI/3-2059)

³ See Document 203 and footnote 1 thereto.
regarding the withdrawal of its Mediterranean fleet from its earmark for assignment to NATO in time of war. I do not consider the NATO structure as unalterable; it is an organism which must grow to survive. We have long sought to improve and perfect it. It was in this spirit that I asked Secretary Dulles to talk to you on this subject when he was in Paris in February and to tell you that the United States would view sympathetically a French request to NATO for greater status within NATO for the French naval forces in the Mediterranean.

I cannot hide from an old friend my fears that the action of your Government has had unfortunate psychological and political repercussions. As you said in your letter of March twelfth, Western solidarity in the critical Berlin and German issue is of paramount importance. I fear that the unilateral action of the French Government may give the impression of divisions within our alliance, divisions which I am convinced do not exist on fundamental issues.

It is my hope that the military command structure of NATO will always be such as to deserve support of all the member nations. Specifically, I believe that in this respect the Mediterranean fleets of the United States, United Kingdom and France should be on equal footing. For the present, the most logical status for all three would appear to be that held at present by the fleets of the United States and the United Kingdom, that is, under national control during peacetime, earmarked for NATO in the event of war. I further hope that, as we have said before, France will impart to NATO her thoughts on such arrangements. I am sure NATO would view such action with sympathy and would give the most careful consideration to France’s views. The result of such consultation in NATO would, I am sure, contribute to the strong and united posture which we all desire in this crucial period.

Please accept, Mr. President, the expression of my highest consideration and sincere friendship. Dwight D. Eisenhower⁴.

Observe Presidential Handling.

Herter

---

⁴ Regarding de Gaulle’s letter to Eisenhower, March 11 (delivered on March 12), see Part 2, Document 100.
205. Telegram 3499 From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, March 21, 1959, 5 p.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/3–2159. Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

206. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France

March 22, 1959, 1:06 p.m.

3515. 1. We are equally concerned with possibility extensive elucidation by de Gaulle at next week’s press conference of his views of NATO “shortcomings” and with possible suggestions for re-organization free world’s defenses which could have divisive effect, especially during this crucial period. We also fear unjust criticism would create undesirable atmosphere for NATO Tenth Anniversary Meeting.

2. We have taken series of steps counter this possibility.

(a) After initial hesitation as result French Mediterranean fleet decision, we have suggested having tripartite talk on Africa at first opportunity, e.g., immediately after NATO Ministerial meeting. We have told French here we willing hear their views on any subject at any time and intimated this could be done in tripartite forum.

(b) President has replied to General de Gaulle’s private letter in terms which express appreciation of French stand on Berlin.1

(c) President’s second letter on fleet2 expresses concern at manner action taken and makes suggestions as to how we could all deal with problem in manner aimed at minimizing its possible effects. Tone is moderate and friendly.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/3–2259. Secret. Presidential Handling. Drafted by Brown on March 21; cleared with McBride, Turner C. Cameron of the Office of Western European Affairs, Timmons, Merchant, and Thomas J. Dunnigan of the Executive Secretariat; and approved by Murphy. In an attached memorandum to Merchant, March 21, Timmons expressed his doubts about clearing the telegram, since he felt that giving way to de Gaulle even in the limited way recommended in the telegram would only “feed his ego.” He also believed that Norstad, who had taken a strong stand that NATO command problems affecting him should first be discussed with him, would be unhappy with the telegram. (Ibid.)

1 Reference is to President Eisenhower’s March 14 reply to de Gaulle’s March 11 letter; see Document 203 and footnote 1 thereto and Document 204 and footnote 4 thereto, respectively.

2 See Document 204.
3. We believe following are actions which we should take in immediate future:

(a) We hope Ambassador may be able to see de Gaulle personally before press conference despite recent talk on occasion delivery President’s first letter. Meeting should be arranged so as to permit substantive talk with General on broader subjects than merely French fleet.

(b) If it is realized it may be impossible see de Gaulle but believe attempt should be made in view of fact de Gaulle himself will make ultimate decisions as to tenor and content his news conference. Failing this, Ambassador should try to see both Couve and particularly Debre and ask them to pass on US views to de Gaulle on urgent basis.

(c) Embassy officers, being guided by general tone and content of President’s letters but not mentioning their existence, should see selected influential French before de Gaulle press conferences. These approaches should be discreet and aimed both at Gaullists close to General and at strong supporters NATO such as Mollet, Pflimlin, and Pinay.

(d) Now that second letter delivered, we will make same points here with French Embassy. We are not convinced however that this channel is best one to get across to French Government and specifically to General de Gaulle and Prime Minister Debre, exactly what our views are. We therefore think steps mentioned in points (a) through (c) immediately above should be taken.

4. In preparing to discuss this general subject with French we wish draw Embassy’s attention to Deptl 3321 in which we stated we should not reject out-of-hand French attempts put forward their ideas on various subjects in tripartite forum. We also recall Secretary’s expressed willingness during December meeting with de Gaulle to talk freely and frankly with French. Appears to us therefore time may have come turn this to more positive approach. We make this analysis in recognition of possibility that unilateral and public declarations by de Gaulle on matter affecting whole alliance pose greater danger than that which could be caused by their introduction into tripartite forum. We would of course prefer French to take their views on NATO to NATO itself. DeGaulle however seems disinclined do this and now appears ready air controversy publicly.

5. We are willing therefore, authorize Ambassador say to de Gaulle that French will find door open in Washington to propositions

---

3 Regarding presentation of de Gaulle’s ideas on various subjects, telegram 3321 to Paris, March 11, reported that because de Gaulle appeared to be dissatisfied with the progress of the tripartite talks, he might create difficulties within NATO by trying to secure his objectives through NATO channels. Thus it might be better not to reject any French ideas put forward in the tripartite framework. “An indication by us that we would listen would additionally force French to spell out their thinking, outlines of which remain most murky.” (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/3-759)

4 A memorandum of conversation between Dulles and de Gaulle, December 15, is not printed. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1169)
they may wish make. We continue believe we cannot institutionalize Washington discussions but believe they can provide forum wherein any of three parties can introduce matters of concern and importance of which other parties can take note. This is, of course, without commitment, and on certain topics our response would doubtless be that these matters should be raised with SACEUR or in other NATO forums, as appropriate. Finally, we believe private exposition French views and French concerns is wiser course to take, given possibility press and public misinterpretation on both sides of Atlantic and spirit of tripartite talks themselves.

6. Ambassador will of course wish to draw this message urgently to General Norstad’s attention.

Observe Presidential Handling.

Herter

---

207. Memorandum of Discussion at the 400th Meeting of the National Security Council

March 26, 1959.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1 and 2.]

3. Long-Range NATO and Related European Regional Problems (NSC 5433/1; Memo for NSC, subject: “North Atlantic Treaty Organization”, dated January 22, 1957; NSC 5810/1; NSC Action No. 2017; NIE 20–58; NIE 100–59; Memos for NSC, subject: “Long-Range NATO and Related European Regional Problems”, dated March 11 and 23, 1959)¹

---

Mr. Gordon Gray briefed the Council on the Discussion Paper\(^2\) pointing out early in his briefing the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they could not find in the Discussion Paper a clear requirement for a separate policy on the subject although they thought a broadening of the issues might develop a requirement for an NSC policy on long-range NATO and related problems.

(A copy of Mr. Gray's briefing note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is appended to this Memorandum).\(^3\)

Mr. Gray then posed the first of the four major policy issues for discussion. The first issue was: "What should the U.S. seek as the NATO military posture for the 1960's? Will there be a requirement for a change in the current NATO sword and shield concept?"

After explaining the nature of the issue, Mr. Gray invited General Twining to give his views as to the answer.

General Twining did not reply directly to Mr. Gray's question but instead repeated the written views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the effect that most of the policy issues raised in the Discussion Paper related to internal problems of the NATO countries. If we were to have a policy paper on NATO, that paper should be very much broader in character than seemed to be indicated by the issues raised in the Discussion Paper this morning.

Secretary Herter expressed himself as in agreement with the views just provided by General Twining. He also said that with respect to the Discussion Paper, there had not been sufficient time to staff the paper out in the Department of State. Accordingly, he felt himself obliged to reserve judgment as to the necessity for a policy paper on NATO. In any event, the posture of NATO at the present time was good despite the actions of President de Gaulle. The main consideration before us at present was the task of maintaining the unity and solidarity of NATO. Moreover, at the forthcoming April 2–April 4 NATO meeting in Washington, there would be no discussion of the military aspects of NATO. What we hoped to achieve at this meeting was a reiteration of the solidarity of NATO in the face of the Soviet threat. The State Department people have been very busy dealing with this problem and they feel that the military issues and questions will require more extended discussion with General Norstad.

In reply to the views of General Twining that a NATO paper if there were to be one, should address itself to broader problems than those in-

\(^2\) See footnote 1 above.

\(^3\) Not printed. The minutes of all National Security Council meetings held during the Eisenhower administration are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File.
dicated in the Discussion Paper, Mr. Gray invited the Council’s attention to the note on Page 5 of the Discussion Paper which pointed out that the possibilities inherent in East-West agreements, our mutual troop withdrawals, regional arms inspection, and limited bans on nuclear weapons were separate questions under study by the working groups on the Berlin crisis and for that reason were not considered in this Paper. Mr. Gray then said that he would at least run over briefly the other three issues even though the Council was not disposed to discuss them at this time. He concluded his comments by stating that the Discussion Paper had been put up to the Council, not with the objective of securing the Council’s answers to the basic issues raised, but to determine whether or not the Planning Board should proceed to formulate a statement of policy on NATO and related European regional problems.

When Mr. Gray had completed his statement, the President turned to General Twining and inquired how much the Joint Chiefs of Staff had done by way of reviewing the entire world posture of the U.S. The President said that he did not wish to appear rigid but that when we had originally worked out the concepts on which we had based the deployment of U.S. Forces in Europe back in 1951, these concepts had been very realistic. Were we still being realistic in our concepts about the role of U.S. Forces or had we diverged? Back at this time it was clear, said the President, that the U.S. had in mind three major missions for U.S. Forces deployed overseas. The first of these missions was the obvious one of deterring Communist aggression. The second was to help friendly nations around the world to keep these outposts defended with their own ground troops. The third mission was to provide for the ground forces of the outpost nations a degree of mobility; that is, U.S. naval and air strength would be used to reinforce local ground forces in the outpost countries.

Specifically, said the President, the six U.S. divisions which we had deployed to the NATO area were originally intended to be our response to an emergency situation. These divisions were sent in order to encourage the European nations to become the first line of their own defense against the Soviet Union. Since that time we seemed to have abandoned this realistic concept. Now these Western European countries and others were calling for more and more U.S. Forces to be deployed. Yet we must not be so dispersed in our military deployments that we cannot act promptly to meet an emergency. What we need for an emergency is not

4 The other three issues as listed in Gray’s briefing note were as follows: How can the NATO countries support the defensive forces required for the 1960s? How should the United States deal with the problems raised by the desire of other NATO nations for an independent European nuclear capability? In general, how should the broader Atlantic Community of NATO be related to the Western European integration movement in the years ahead?
a dispersal of U.S. military forces but on the contrary a concentration of
them. We should try to bring pressure all around the world so that the
local forces in all these countries constitute the first line of defense, a line
of defense which we can assist with our mobile reserve forces. This was
the concept that we were all talking about back at the time of the New
Look in 1953.

General Twining commented that the MC–70 Plan\textsuperscript{5} was a precise
illustration of what the President was complaining about. We were now
stuck with our role in the MC–70 Plan.

Speaking quite forcefully, the President continued his exposition,
noting that General de Gaulle shows no hesitation in telling us what he
proposes to do here and there with French military forces. This illust-
trated, said the President, his point that many of these countries have
lost any sense of their own responsibility for the defense of Europe. The
President admitted that he did not know how we were going to get out
of the responsibility represented by the deployment of our troops
abroad but he certainly knew that we had strayed far from our original
concept of the purposes our troops abroad were to serve. These U.S.
Forces abroad were now looked upon as permanent features of local de-
fense.

The President then indicated that he would like to see the whole of
this matter talked about or studied about by a staff which was not com-
mitted to a Service point of view. General Twining replied that while the
Joint Chiefs of Staff had no such study in hand at the present time, they
could certainly start one.

The President repeated his view that we always seem to start out on
one of these moves in an emergency and when we wake up our emer-
gency deployment has become a permanent U.S. policy.

Secretary Herter said that the preliminary report of the Draper
Committee\textsuperscript{6} had raised some of the questions which bothered the Presi-
dent. The latter replied by stating that giving $400 million to the NATO
countries to improve their own military defense would in the long run
be much cheaper than maintaining all these U.S. divisions in the NATO
area.

Mr. Gordon Gray then stressed the importance of the question of
what the U.S. was going to say with regard to this recommendation for
$400 million in the Draper Report. The President replied facetiously that

\textsuperscript{5} See Document 131.

\textsuperscript{6} President Eisenhower appointed William H. Draper, Jr., on November 24, 1958, as
chairman of a special committee to undertake an analysis of the military assistance aspects
of the Mutual Security Program. (Department of State Bulletin, December 15, 1958, p. 954)
The preliminary report has not been found.
we should tell the NATO countries that this is our problem. The President then went on to observe that once the U.S. has achieved a certain level of military security, the Mutual Security Assistance becomes more important than Military Assistance. If we are going to allocate more and more money for weapons and cut down on other kinds of assistance to friendly countries, we would soon find ourselves in very bad shape.

Secretary Herter said that it appeared to him that there were two aspects to the problem under discussion. The first aspect was what kind of U.S. presence in Europe was necessary in order to provide an adequate military deterrent to the Soviets. The second aspect was what kind of U.S. presence was required in Europe in order to give NATO the requisite political and psychological support and cohesion. The determination of the latter phase of the problem was particularly ticklish.

The President thereafter commented as follows with respect to the question posed by the Discussion Paper; namely whether or not we should proceed to develop a policy paper on long-range NATO and related European regional problems. The President said that he did not believe that at this moment it would be wise to put too much of our talent on this problem. In the near future we would be in too much of a state of flux. Accordingly, he would not suggest doing the NATO paper at this time. To do it now would be to build on shifting sands, at least over the next few months. It might, he said to Mr. Gray, be a good idea to give his people a week's rest.

Mr. Gray then indicated his concern whether Secretary Herter felt that he had sufficient guidance with respect to what to do about the Draper Report to handle the matter at the NATO meeting. In reply Secretary Herter again pointed out that no military matters were on the agenda for discussion at the NATO meeting on April 2 and that he felt that he did have sufficient guidance to deal with the political issues which would be discussed at the meeting.

Secretary Quarles warned that it might prove very difficult at the forthcoming NATO meeting to confine the discussion to purely political issues.

The President then commented that he thought that in the end he would support the recommendation of the Draper Committee for the additional $400 million. This would of course, he admitted, raise severe budgetary problems and we must try to find some way to scale down some of our more costly domestic programs. Mr. Stans observed that speaking from the standpoint of the Bureau of the Budget, he very much hoped that no commitments would be made at the NATO meetings with respect to the recommendations of the Draper Committee. The Bureau of the Budget would very much prefer first to go through the regular review process. Secretary Quarles stated that the Department of Defense felt that it must submit a bill of particulars with respect to the
recommendations of the Draper Committee. Such a bill of particulars was being prepared in Defense and when completed it would be sent to both the Bureau of the Budget and the State Department. Even though this problem was not on the agenda of the forthcoming NATO meeting, Secretary Quarles expressed the conviction that this Government must be ready soon to move in on the problem. He therefore suggested a discussion of the Draper Report at an early Council meeting.

_The National Security Council:_


b. Noted the President's view that the preparation of a policy on long-range NATO and related European regional problems should be deferred for the time being.

_Note:_ Immediately preceding this NSC meeting, the President met with the Vice President, the Acting Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State Merchant, and the White House Staff Secretary and Assistant, to discuss policy issues related to German reunification, European security, and Berlin, involved in preparation for negotiations with the USSR.

S. Everett Gleason

---

7 Paragraphs a and b and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2062, approved by the President on March 31. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by National Security Council)

8 A memorandum of this conversation with the President is printed in volume VIII, Document 245.

---

208. Editorial Note

The Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, held in Washington April 2–4, was attended by all Foreign Ministers and NATO Permanent Representatives of the 15 member countries, except for Foreign Ministers Averoff of Greece and Gudmundsson of Iceland. The U.S. representative to this meeting was Acting Secretary of State

An opening commemorative ceremony marking the tenth anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was held on the morning of April 2. Remarks on the occasion by President Eisenhower, Acting Secretary Herter, Honorary President of the Council Joseph M.A.H. Luns, and Paul-Henri Spaak are printed ibid., pages 543–553.

The most extensive body of documentation on this NATO Ministerial Meeting is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1228–1239. Briefing papers are in CF 1228–1230. CF 1231 and 1236–1238 contain verbatim records of the sessions. No summary records for this Ministerial Meeting have been found. Miscellaneous documents are in CF 1232 and 1233. CF 1234 contains Orders of the Day. CF 1235 contains a set of memoranda of conversation among U.S. officials and between U.S. and foreign officials. A chronological record of meetings between April 2 and 4 is in CF 1236–1238. Copies of telegrams from the delegation are in CF 1239. Telegrams and documentation on this Ministerial Meeting are in Department of State, Central File 396.1–WA.

Many of the discussions during the Ministerial Meeting related to the problems of Berlin and Germany and the prospect of a forthcoming Foreign Ministers meeting with the Soviet Union in Geneva to discuss these matters. On March 31, Herter, Couve de Murville, and Lloyd met to review the Four-Power Working Group Report on Germany and Berlin and to consider the responsibility of the three Foreign Ministers to report to the NATO Foreign Ministers on contingency planning regarding the Berlin situation. A memorandum of the discussion (USDel/MC/15) is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1235. Foreign Minister von Brentano then joined the three. A memorandum of that discussion (USDel/MC/16) is ibid.

At 11 a.m. that day, Herter met with Couve de Murville to discuss several subjects. Memoranda of their conversation on negotiations with the Soviets on Germany and Berlin (USDel/MC/19), Spanish membership in NATO (USDel/MC/20), COCOM (USDel/MC/21), SEATO (USDel/MC/22), tripartite talks (USDel/MC/23), and representatives in the United States of the Algerian Front for National Liberation (USDel/MC/24) are ibid. USDel/MC/23 is also printed in Part 2 as Document 106. At 2:30 p.m., Herter, Murphy, Merchant, and Deputy Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs William N. Dale met with Lloyd and his advisers. Memoranda of their conversation on the U.S. draft report to NAC on contingency planning (USDel/MC/5), the new French paper on contingency planning (USDel/MC/6), and a recent high-altitude flight by a U.S. military plane through the Berlin corridor (USDel/MC/7) are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1235. At some point during the day,
Douglas Dillon met with Lloyd to discuss military aspects of SEATO. A memorandum of their conversation (USDel/MC/4) is *ibid*.

On the morning of April 1, Herter, Couve de Murville, Lloyd, and von Brentano met again. Memoranda of the morning session (USDel/MC/17) and the afternoon session (USDel/MC/18) are *ibid*. At 5:30 p.m., Eugene Schaus, Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, paid a courtesy call on Herter. A memorandum of their discussion (USDel/MC/3) is *ibid*. At 5:45 p.m., Herter met with Dutch Foreign Minister Luns. Memoranda of their discussion on Dutch views on the need for NATO solidarity (USDel/MC/1) and Indonesian nationalization of Dutch properties (USDel/MC/2) are *ibid*. USDel/MC/1 is printed as Document 209.

On Thursday, April 2, before the opening commemorative ceremony, which began at 10:10 a.m., Herter discussed Berlin with Spaak. A memorandum of their conversation (USDel/MC/8) is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1235. Herter met separately with Italian Foreign Minister Pella to discuss Italian interest in symmetry. A memorandum of that conversation (USDel/MC/9) is *ibid*. At 3:30 p.m., the first restricted session of the North Atlantic Council began, summarized in Topol 3313 to Paris, April 2 (*ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1–WA/4–259), and circular telegram 1151 (see volume VIII, Document 252). At 6 p.m., Benson E.L. Timmons conducted a debriefing session on the day’s events.

On Friday, April 3, Herter and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs William M. Rountree met with Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rustu Zorlu to discuss the situation in Iran and Iraq. A memorandum of their conversation (USDel/MC/10) is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1235 and 1237. The Ministerial Session, which began at 10 a.m., was reported in circular telegram 1149, April 3; a summary is printed in volume VIII, Document 253. At 1:30 p.m., Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., Deputy Representative to NATO, conducted a debriefing session. The afternoon Ministerial Session began at 3:30 p.m.; see Document 210. Fessenden held a debriefing session at 7 p.m.

On Saturday, April 4, Herter, Merchant, Bruce, and Hillenbrand met with von Brentano and German Ambassador Wilhelm Grewe at 9 a.m. A memorandum of their conversation (USDel/MC/11) is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1235 and 1238. The Ministerial Session, which began at 10 a.m., was briefly summarized in circular telegram 1152, April 4. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1–WA/4–458) At 11:45 a.m., Merchant, at the Department of State, received a telephone call from Carlo Alberto Straneo, Director of Political Affairs of the Italian Foreign Office, who argued for stronger language in a tripartite draft regarding Italian participation in the Foreign Ministers meeting at Geneva the following month. A summary of this conversation is in a
memorandum from Merchant to Herter, April 4; *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1238. At 3 p.m., Herter and Lloyd and several of their assistants met. A memorandum of their conversation on the Geneva nuclear test negotiations (USDel/MC/12), the situation in Iraq (USDel/MC/13), and King Saud's message on Iraq (USDel/MC/14) are *ibid.*, CF 1235 and 1238.

The following documents are arranged in the order in which the meetings were held.

---

209. Memorandum of Conversation

USDel/MC/1 April 1, 1959, 5:45 p.m.

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

April 2–4, 1959

SUBJECT
Dutch Views on Need for NATO Solidarity

PARTICIPANTS
Dr. J.M.A.H. Luns, Foreign Minister of The Netherlands
Dr. J.H. van Rotijen, Ambassador of The Netherlands
Mr. D.U. Stikker, Netherlands Permanent Representative to NATO
The Acting Secretary
Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Turner C. Cameron, Jr.—WE

Foreign Minister Luns opened the conversation by saying that he believed the NATO Ministerial meeting was coming at a very opportune moment since it would provide an important demonstration of continuing Western unity in the face of Soviet threats. He said that he thought it was well that world public opinion should be reminded that NATO was a continuing organization with well-defined objectives. This had been important throughout the history of NATO but it seemed to him to be of even greater significance at the present moment. Earlier in the year he had been concerned by signs of disagreement among the Western nations. He commented that Prime Minister Macmillan's talks in Paris, Bonn and Washington had, in his opinion, done much to clear the air and to create a situation where NATO unity could be again dem-

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1235. Confidential. Drafted by Cameron and approved by Herter on April 6.
onstrated. The Acting Secretary said that he, of course, agreed with the Foreign Minister’s emphasis on NATO solidarity. He commented that Mr. Macmillan’s talks had indeed been helpful and had taken place in a friendly atmosphere.

Foreign Minister Luns said that he was in the very fortunate position of being able to speak for a country which was entirely united on taking a firm stand on East-West questions. He added that the Dutch Labor Party strongly supported the Government in these matters. There was, however, he commented, a slight feeling that in developing the West position the views of the smaller allies had not received a sufficient hearing. This was an additional reason for welcoming the NATO meeting.

Referring to the forthcoming Foreign Ministers’ meeting, Foreign Minister Luns said that if the US, UK and France agreed to Italian participation, the Dutch believed that Benelux should also be given a place at the table. He recalled that the Netherlands had been one of the original allies in World War II and that Italy had joined the Alliance a little later. He pointed out that the Netherlands was not one of the weaker allies. Its military contributions were significant, and its position on political questions was firm. The Acting Secretary said that we welcomed the firmness of Dutch public opinion on East-West matters. He added that, as the Foreign Minister knew, public opinion in the United States was also very solid on these questions. As for possible Benelux participation in the Foreign Ministers’ meeting he said that we preferred the four-power formula. Moreover we did not know how this matter would turn out since in their note of March 30 the Soviets left the question of Czechoslovakian and Polish participation to be decided in the Foreign Ministers’ meeting itself.

Recalling his last visit to London, Foreign Minister Luns said that British political leaders had asked him what the Dutch would do in case a crisis developed over Berlin. The Foreign Minister said that he had replied that the Dutch would instantly mobilize. This was the position of the Dutch Government which had the full support of the Dutch people. He added that the Dutch were firmly united on the position that the

---

1 Regarding Macmillan’s talks in Paris and Bonn, see footnote 2, Document 197. For documentation on Macmillan’s talks in Washington March 19–24, see Part 2, Documents 355 ff.

2 Documentation on the Foreign Ministers meeting in Geneva May 11–August 5 is in volume VIII.

3 The March 30 Soviet note to the United States and the United Kingdom calling for a Foreign Ministers Conference and a Summit Conference is printed in RIIA, Documents, 1959, pp. 33–34. A similar but not identical note was sent to France.
West should not give in on Berlin or accept disengagement. He believed that any action along these lines would only increase the danger of war.

The Foreign Minister said that the Dutch Government was most unhappy about the French withdrawal of their Mediterranean fleet from wartime commitment to NATO. He was particularly concerned about the political and psychological implications of this move which struck directly at NATO unity and solidarity. He was also disturbed by the effect of this action on the continued integration of NATO forces in which the Dutch believed strongly. The Foreign Minister asked whether the Acting Secretary thought it would be desirable for the Dutch to raise this matter at the forthcoming NATO meeting. The Acting Secretary replied that the United States had also been seriously disturbed by the French action for much the same reasons which the Foreign Minister had mentioned. Although we did not wish to minimize in any way our concern at the French action, we were trying to play it down and do not believe that it would be desirable to raise it in the forthcoming sessions of the NATO Ministerial meeting. We thought it better to emphasize NATO unity in these sessions. In reply to a question, the Acting Secretary said that the French Foreign Minister had told him that the French Government contemplated no further moves against the NATO command structure in the near future.

Foreign Minister Luns asked whether the Berlin situation had not recently become more tense because of the C–130 incident. The Acting Secretary explained that the flight of the C–130 had been designed as a demonstration of our right to fly into Berlin at any altitude. Our military had been anxious to reaffirm this principle. Our new jet transports attain their maximum efficiency at an altitude of approximately 25,000 feet. We had, of course, never recognized a ceiling on the altitude at which our planes could fly. There had been protests from the Soviets but the discussion was still at the technical level. Foreign Minister Luns asked whether the Acting Secretary did not believe that it might be desirable to take certain military precautions in Europe. The Acting Secretary replied that we had indeed already made some moves in this direction. Certain of our military units had been strengthened. These moves had been taken in such a way that the Soviets would become aware of them. We did not intend to publicize these actions since we did not wish to increase uneasiness in Western Europe.

---

4 On March 27, three Soviet fighters repeatedly “buzzed” a U.S. Air Force C–130 airplane, which was flying to Berlin at a height of 25,000 feet. The Soviet Government maintained that the Western Allies were not entitled to fly above 10,000 feet to Berlin.
210. Circular Telegram From the Delegation to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to Certain Embassies

April 4, 1959, 6:14 p.m.

1155. From U.S. Del NATO. NAC Ministerial session afternoon April 3 \(^1\) covered following subjects under Agenda Item I:

(1) procedures for further Four Power consultation with NAC on Berlin and Germany; \(^2\)
(2) discussion of Middle East situation;
(3) Icelandic fisheries.

Session also covered Agenda Item II: Secretary-General’s report. Following is summary each subject:
[Here follows discussion of item (1); see volume VIII, Document 253, footnote 5.]

[9 paragraphs (3 pages of source text) not declassified]

4. US opened discussion Item II (Secretary General’s Annual Political Appraisal). \(^3\) (Acting Secretary’s statement reported in full in separate airgram repaid all addressee posts.) \(^4\)

Member speakers then commented on report, each paying tribute to Sec Gen and his contribution to Alliance.

Netherlands stressed importance it attached to meeting Sino-Soviet economic offensive and expressed earnest hope there would be follow-up action in this field. Serious weaknesses in defense field very dangerous for Alliance. Recalled discussions of last Ministerial meeting \(^5\) and stated should be made possible for Secretary General to carry out tasks given him by providing staff.

Italy recalled importance increased military effort, noting four percent annual increase over five-year period in Italian defense spending. Officially informed NAC of US-Italian IRBM agreement \(^6\) and technical

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–WA/4–459. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Fessenden, cleared with Nolting and Alan G. James of S/S, and approved by Timmons. Sent to the NATO capitals, Berlin, Moscow, and CINCPAC for POLAD.

\(^1\) The verbatim (C–VR(59)15) record of this session, dated April 3, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1237.

\(^2\) Documentation on the Four-Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin, which convened in Washington on February 4 and reconvened in Paris on March 9 and in London on April 13, is printed in volume VIII.

\(^3\) Not found.

\(^4\) Not printed. (Circular CG–517, April 4; Department of State, Central Files 396.1–WA/4–459)

\(^5\) See Document 172.

\(^6\) On March 30, the United States and Italy signed an accord providing for U.S. missile sites in Italy and the delivery of IRBMs to Italian forces. For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959*, p. 512.
agreement with SACEUR, in implementation of Heads of Government decision December 1957. Stressed importance of maintaining security re details IRBM agreement and not informing press. Expressed willingness, however, inform NAC of details.

UK praised Sec Gen's report as realistic document, with its stress on harmonization of policies rather than common policies. Spaak and NAC role in Cyprus settlement much appreciated. Increased emphasis on meeting Sino-Soviet economic offensive important, using trade, not aid, to underdeveloped areas and avoiding NATO label. On December Defense Resolution, hoped for good results, but process taking longer than desired.

Germany (von Brentano) expressed importance practical approach political consultation. Should not be further institutionalized. Emphasis must be on developing habit consultation. Africa study, good example; hoped apply this approach other areas.

Greece joined in tribute to Spaak for Cyprus role. Confident that Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities would be inspired by will to cooperate.

France (Couve de Murville) made brief statement expressing satisfaction with consultation process.

Turks also joined in expressing gratitude to Spaak and NAC re Cyprus and referred to joint Greek-Turkish memo on economic development.

Norway stressed need not lose sight requirement for consultation within NATO of expansion economies of member states.

Spaak summarized as follows:

1. Political—Consultation generally in favorable state. Habit of consultation well established. Flexibility necessary.
2. Economic—Spaak emphasized great danger of Soviet economic offensive. NATO has important role to play in helping to develop an economic policy to meet this threat, although not necessary for NATO itself to carry out economic programs.
3. Defense—US-Italian IRBM agreement cause for satisfaction. Serious gap remains between military requirements and economic capabilities. To be hoped that questions of military organization not still outstanding can be solved.
4. Technical and Scientific—Special plea for further support scientific technical cooperation especially in view Soviet progress this area.

---

8 See Document 180.
9 Not further identified.
10 Not found.
211. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations

April 19, 1959, 2:38 p.m.

Topol 3478. 1. Spaak called on Acting Secretary Murphy afternoon April 17 for general discussion, highlights of which summarized this message.¹ Saint-Mleux, Burgess and Timmons also present.

2. Spaak has requested that account of substance of talk be passed privately to Acting SecGen Casardi, which Nolting is authorized to do orally soonest. Burgess returning Paris April 20 and can amplify if necessary following summary.

3. Talk turned first to developments since closed NATO meeting regarding preparations for Foreign Ministers meeting with Soviets May 11. Murphy said that in London Working Group discussions British were showing themselves reticent on basic question of Germany, although not with respect Berlin. Concept of “zone” was not popular with Germans. British position on zone remains obscure, although they say they want no disengagement nor Rapacki Plan.² Spaak reiterated his basic view that key question is how “package” is to be presented, specifically whether there could or should be any agreement on European Security measures without firm link to German reunification. In response to question from Spaak, Murphy said he thought eventually German reunification will be possible (definitive statement on Eastern frontiers might make fundamental difference), and West should avoid saying reunification impossible, although obviously talks with Soviets immediately ahead may not produce any results. Spaak inquired how long Murphy thought conference would last. Murphy said as a guess perhaps three weeks, based prior experience with Soviets.

4. Spaak inquired whether would discuss first whole German question or Berlin. Murphy thought it logical discuss entire German problem first. Spaak agreed, reverting to relationship between reunification and European security. He pointed out that if reunification occurred, conditions affecting European security problem would change, citing Western offer, provided reunified Germany joined NATO, not take military advantage as result withdrawal Soviet forces.

¹ Following the Ministerial Meeting in Washington April 2-4, Spaak participated in a group tour with foreign NATO officials of several U.S. cities and military installations before returning to Washington.

² See footnote 12, Document 140.
5. Murphy said that Adenauer strongly opposed to confederation, believing it would be bar to reunification. Spaak said he agreed with Adenauer. Thought Germans, in sending to Soviets their note of last November 17, had gone quite far. Murphy agreed. In response question from Murphy Spaak said thought raising of Berlin question only pretext and that basically Soviets hope obtain recognition status quo in Eastern Europe.

6. Spaak said West must maintain troops in West Berlin. This is heart of matter. Went on say that most NATO countries (specifically mentioned Norway, Denmark, Belgium) were firmer on Berlin than he thought they would be. All NATO countries agreed military and civil communications between Berlin and West must be maintained. Real question, however, is with whom freedom of access would be discussed, i.e., if Soviets turn over to East Germany and leave, West cannot insist Soviets stay. Considerable discussion of legal aspects ensued, during which Murphy expounded "tenancy in common" principle, which is good legal base whereby Western powers would inherit Soviet rights if latter leave. Both agreed however that at base Berlin was political rather than legal question.

6. Discussion turned to question high altitude flights Berlin. Murphy filled Spaak in on number and type of flights that have taken place, and on U.S. position regarding such flights, indicating we do not and have never recognized any limitation on right fly at any altitude in corridors. Spaak thought both NATO and public opinion need more education this subject.

7. Re tripartite talks Murphy briefed Spaak on recent discussions regarding Africa (see separate Topol message referencing Deptel 3916 to Paris) and said U.S. anxious better understand main lines French policy on Algeria, Maghreb, and French Community. Spaak inquired concerning status de Gaulle letter last September, particularly re suggested global directorate. Murphy indicated Secretary Dulles had made clear U.S. could not accept directorate. Spaak said understood de Gaulle disappointed over lack "response" from Washington, and it appeared that there might be continuing difficulties in NATO from French

---

3 For text, see Moskau Bonn, p. 459.
5 Topol 3470 to Paris, April 18, reported that on April 17 Murphy briefed Spaak on the tripartite talks on Africa along the lines of telegram 3916 to Paris. (Department of State, Central Files, 110.13-MU/4-1859) Telegram 3916 to Paris summarized the Department's briefing of Italian Embassy officials on the tripartite talks on Africa on April 16 and 17. (Ibid., 770.00/4-1759) Regarding the April 16-21 talks on Africa, see Part 2, Document 107.
6 Part 2, Document 45.
side until French obtained some kind of “satisfaction” (not necessarily directorate). Murphy said Joxe had recently told him he (Joxe) believes de Gaulle understands NATO better than he did.\(^7\) Spaak commented that French fleet action was purely political question. Spaak said it “ridiculous” not have integrated air defense in NATO Europe and added how impressed he had been with NORAD briefing,\(^7\) which showed clearly integration indispensable. Spaak also commented that it dangerous for French make case on their national naval mission in Mediterranean, for some day Germans may do likewise in Central Europe regarding ground forces. Murphy agreed. Murphy said French may intend make some suggestions on NATO Mediterranean command. If so Ambassador Burgess will be informed and he in turn will keep Spaak advised.

8. Discussion closed with general reflections on overall African situation, including Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. Spaak and Murphy agreed de Gaulle best hope for a solution in Algeria. Spaak also referred to heavy demands on France created by Algeria, i.e., both pacification and economic development. Problems confronting West in Africa need examination by all NATO countries. Said that in EEC economic development fund there is beginning of common policy.

9. After meeting Spaak asked see summary of NATO discussion on Germany, Berlin and European security prepared for use of London Working Group.\(^8\) After reading it said he thought it “very well done”.

Murphy

---

\(^7\) Not further identified.
\(^8\) Not found.

212. Memorandum of Conversation

April 17, 1959.

SUBJECT

Discussion between Mr. Murphy and Mr. Spaak

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.13–MU/4–1759. Secret. Drafted by Timmons and initialed by Murphy.
PARTICIPANTS

U.S. Side
Robert Murphy, Acting Secretary of State
W. Randolph Burgess, U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO
B.E.L. Timmons, Director EUR/RA

NATO Side
Paul-Henri Spaak, Secretary-General of NATO
Andre St.-Mieux, Directeur de Cabinet to the Secretary-General

Except for a few points, the full substance of Mr. Spaak’s talk with Mr. Murphy, which lasted about 45 minutes, is reproduced in Topol 3478\(^1\) which was prepared and dispatched to Paris before a formal Memorandum of Conversation was written, since Spaak wished to have USRO convey the substance of the talk to the Acting Secretary-General of NATO, M. Casardi, as soon as possible.

The points made by Spaak and not reflected in Topol 3478 are as follows:

a) In discussing General de Gaulle’s attitude toward NATO, and the difficulties that this has caused, Spaak said “Not only is de Gaulle himself not doing anything for NATO, he is preventing other members from making progress.”

b) In speaking of de Gaulle’s evident desire for tripartite global strategic planning, Spaak said it was far easier to talk about such planning than it was actually to do it.

c) In discussing the French withdrawal from NATO of their Mediterranean fleet, Spaak said frankly that he thought this was a French reaction against the U.S. vote on the Algerian question in the last UN General Assembly.

d) In discussing the problem of creating an integrated air defense for NATO Europe, Spaak said he thought it would be very good if de Gaulle could come to the United States and hear the same briefing that he, Spaak, and the NATO Permanent Council had just received at NORAD, which demonstrated very clearly that under modern conditions individual countries could not provide an adequate air defense on a national basis.

e) In discussing the problems of North Africa, Spaak said that it was perfectly clear that the French did not wish to discuss the problem of Algeria in the North Atlantic Council.

Mr. Murphy directed M. Spaak’s attention to the fact that the French had unilaterally extended the NATO area by an average of 100 kilometers to the South when they created the present 15 Departments of Algeria in the place of the former 3 Departments. Spaak said he had not been aware that the area covered by the present 15 Departments is larger than that covered by the old 3 Departments. There was also some discussion of the question as to the status vis-à-vis NATO of Hawaii after statehood is attained.\(^2\)

---

1 Document 211.
2 See Document 230.
213. Memorandum of Conversation

June 8, 1959.

SUBJECT

French Problems

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State
General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Mr. Roy D. Kohler, Acting Assistant Secretary, EUR
Mr. Ivan B. White, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
Maj. General John S. Guthrie, Director, European Region, OSD/ISA
Mr. Robert H. Knight, Deputy Assistant Secretary, OSD/ISA
Mr. B.E.L. Timmons, Director, EUR/RA
Mr. Robert H. McBride, Director, WE
Mr. Alfred G. Vigderman, Acting Director, GER
Mr. Russell Fessenden, Deputy Director, EUR/RA

Aid Policy Towards France. There was general agreement to follow General Norstad’s recommendations regarding Tartars: i.e., there should be specific understanding that the ship being equipped with Tartars would be earmarked for assignment to NATO and that the equipment would remain with the ship only so long as it continued to be so earmarked. It was agreed that this could be accomplished in the customary way through an exchange of letters between the Chief of MAAG, France, and the appropriate French authorities.

On the question of nuclear-capable delivery weapons, there was general agreement with General Norstad’s recommendation that there be a specific reassurance that French forces in Germany equipped with such weapons remain NATO-committed or recoverable by the U.S. should the unit be withdrawn. In discussing his second condition (for specific French agreement that NATO atomic stockpile arrangements are accepted for supplying and servicing this equipment in Germany) General Norstad said that this requirement was actually fully endorsed by the French at a high level. General Norstad also said that similar conditions are not required for nuclear-delivery equipment for other NATO countries, since the equipment for other countries is serviced by NATO stockpile arrangements. [8-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Mr. Murphy commented that we would appear to be bound to make the conditions for our aid clear to the French in a clear and “businesslike” manner.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/6-859. Secret. Drafted by Fessenden and approved by Murphy on June 22. The meeting took place in Murphy’s office in the Department of State.
Bizerte. General Norstad said that he agreed there were advantages in providing for an exception in the case of Bizerte if this would be helpful in bringing about Franco-Tunisian settlement of the Bizerte question. His concern was that he not have to play a role which would require him to "perjure" himself in the light of the French Mediterranean fleet withdrawal. He would therefore prefer a solution which would provide for extension of the infrastructure credits for Bizerte without, however, requiring an initiative by him.

Redeployment of Nine Squadrons. General Norstad said that the die was cast on the nine squadrons.1 The Strip-Alert measures are already being put into effect, with a total of 36 aircraft now in Germany and 18 more to go. He has told General Everest of USAFE2 to start discussing with the U.K. immediately redeployment details. The permanent redeployment will require about six months to carry out and will have the net effect of putting nine more squadrons into the U.K. Any permanent net increase in squadrons in Germany is not possible in view of the lack of facilities there. The permanent redeployment can be carried out in phases and in a manner that will not affect the military effectiveness of our NATO forces.

General Norstad said that the redeployment of the nine squadrons will have no real effect on de Gaulle's attitude. Only the passage of time and the gradual education of General de Gaulle in NATO will change his attitude. There are some signs that this favorable process may have already begun, since General de Gaulle is showing signs of real concern about the effect on French forces of his NATO policies. The basic difficulty with de Gaulle, as is well known, is that nobody is really able to talk with him. General Norstad finds full support in the French Government for his problems all the way up the line to de Gaulle, but there runs into a complete road block.

Mr. Murphy commented that our basic problem is perhaps in this instance to let it be understood that, as much as we value French cooperation, if the conditions are too adverse their real estate is not always indispensable.

1 Reference is the redeployment of nine U.S. Air Force squadrons from France; see Part 2, Documents 121 ff. Norstad's report on the problem to the NAC on June 11 was summarized in Polto Circular 45 from Paris, June 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56351/6-1159) The U.S. announcement to the NAC on July 8 of its decision to redeploy the squadrons was summarized in Polto 62 from Paris, July 8. (Ibid., 711.56351/7-859)

214. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

June 9, 1959, 2 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

General Norstad
Major Eisenhower

General Norstad began this informal meeting by giving the President his estimate of the situation in France. In General Norstad’s view, the situation shows no improvement. There is nothing new and no signs of a new attitude. The one optimistic note lies in General Norstad’s belief that de Gaulle is beginning to learn. He is becoming aware of the effects of his actions on France. This information, General Norstad says, comes from de Gaulle’s official family, in particular, Debre. With respect to the difficulties in provision of atomic warheads for the nine fighter squadrons, Debre had made every effort to secure special permission to accede to our wishes, particularly in view of the present tensions in Berlin. As a matter of fact, Debre had believed at one time that de Gaulle had agreed to his urgings. After de Gaulle had reversed himself, Debre had made one more effort. This prompted the letter from de Gaulle to the President, which was written personally by him.¹ At the time of the composition of this letter, de Gaulle had stated that he had lost confidence in his people since they had tried to soften his attitude on this matter. General Norstad believes that de Gaulle will not relax this attitude since it is all part of a long-range plan.

To cope with this situation in France, General Norstad recommended that the U.S. present a calm, pleasant, orderly front. Meanwhile, we should do what we must to provide for our security. Every effort should be taken to avoid an appearance of anger or excitement. We should be considerate and thoughtful, but do what is right. General Norstad concluded that the President might be in for a shock in the event he met with de Gaulle in the near future. The French are counting on such a meeting and this fact could present a considerable problem. The President then discussed his own acquaintance with de Gaulle. He stressed de Gaulle’s obsession with the honor, strength and glory of France. All his actions contribute toward the promotion of these goals. Such a small matter as the timing of a call is calculated within this framework. The President then reviewed incidents of the past which threw light on de Gaulle’s character, such as the difficulty of arranging a meet-

¹ For text of this May 25 letter, see Part 2, Document 117.
ing when de Gaulle visited Paris in 1952 and refused, on the basis of his prior position, to visit with the President at SHAPE. He recalled that from early 1944 on, both Churchill and Roosevelt had washed their hands of de Gaulle and had told the President, then Supreme Commander, that he must do the dealings. In fairness to de Gaulle, however, the President pointed out that in many of the issues which are being discussed, we would react very much as de Gaulle does if the shoe were on the other foot.

General Norstad expressed the view that de Gaulle actually wants a veto power over the use of our Strategic Air Command. He does not believe that de Gaulle has the capability of wrecking NATO because of the strong reaction against his policies among the other NATO nations at this time. As an example, General Norstad cited the speech which the French General, Billotte, had made to the Atlantic Council meeting. His demands that nuclear weapons be made available to France evoked strong negative reaction in that body. The President noted that we are willing to give, to all intents and purposes, control of the weapons. We retain titular possession only. General Norstad agreed and expressed the view that if we decide to give weapons away, we will find ourselves in trouble around the world. He himself had been questioned on this point in Norway. He had thrown the question back to the Norwegians and had asked them whether they recommend the sharing of nuclear capability with other nations on the part of the U.S. After a period of silence, the Norwegians had answered “no.” General Norstad regards the whole situation as quite unfortunate. A strong France is absolutely necessary. The confidence of the other nations, however, in France has been seriously damaged. He continued with an assessment of the de Gaulle action in withdrawing the French fleet from NATO command. From a military viewpoint, the forces removed were insignificant. What was harmful was the gesture, obviously an effort at retaliation for our position in Algeria. In the matter of air defense, the French are presenting particular difficulties. Here the French are withholding their air forces from NATO command although the vote is against them by 14 to 1. All this is part of the pressures for a tripartite status in the world. It is impossible to satisfy de Gaulle's appetite. General Norstad reiterated his opinion that the answer to this problem is in the education of de Gaulle who

---

2 General Pierre Billotte, President of the International Movement for the Atlantic Union, backed de Gaulle's demand for control over nuclear arms stored in France in a speech to the Atlantic Congress, organized by the Conference of NATO Parliamentarians, in London on June 9.

3 Despatch 835 from Oslo, June 3, is a report on General Norstad's visit to Oslo May 21–22. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/6–359)

4 See Document 213.
is an intelligent man and appears to be learning. He commented favorably on Debre and Ely although he noted that Ely is incapable of even talking to de Gaulle. In such meetings de Gaulle lets forth with a series of pronouncements which do nothing but discourage the conversation.

The President said that de Gaulle merely wants to make France the first nation of the world with himself the first Frenchman. Under the present circumstances de Gaulle would be courteous to the President himself, but would maintain the reservation that any concessions made would be on a personal basis, given by de Gaulle himself. The conversation which Secretary Dulles held with de Gaulle last winter, while most satisfactory, produced very little.5

General Norstad pointed out the contradictions in de Gaulle's character. He told of a ceremony at the Arc de Triomphe where de Gaulle had taken special pains to make a grand gesture on Norstad's behalf and gave his best wishes to him and to his country. Norstad feels that de Gaulle harbors a true respect of the U.S. and is fond of the President personally. This fondness, far from being a comforting matter, can be extremely troublesome. In the event of a meeting, he hopes that the President will confine discussion to matters which have been handled by respective staffs and which therefore could promise agreement on some issues. He cautioned that one should not confuse the French people with the personality of de Gaulle. The cabinet has been with us in most of our conversations. In particular, General Norstad singled out Debre and Ely as being friendly to our viewpoints. The President said that the French have been "feeling their oats" ever since they had been making such great economic progress with the help of the International Monetary Fund, primarily since Suez of 1956. The President spoke warmlyly of Pinay and Pleven, which are two of his favorites. He mentioned an unpleasant incident which had occurred in North Africa when de Gaulle had broken up the meeting between the President and Giraud6 and himself when Giraud had dared to mention such an internal matter as their replacement problems in the French army.

The primary concern of the President right now, however, is that other NATO nations will finally become weary with de Gaulle's attitude and lose enthusiasm for the organization. Here General Norstad expressed hope that such would not be the case. So far the effect of French intransigence is to strengthen the resolution of the other allies. Among other measures being taken is the moving forward right now of a second eighteen fighters from the French airfields to strip alert in Germany. In

5 See Part 2, Document 95.
a couple of weeks another eighteen will be moved forward, making a
total of fifty-four aircraft displaced from France to Germany. In addi-
tion, General Norstad is discussing the permanent movement of some
squadrons into the U.K. In answer to the President’s question, General
Norstad replied that Holland is not a feasible area for deployment due
to the high costs involved.

In essence, General Norstad’s redeployment scheme is to move
three of the fighter squadrons now located in France forward to Ger-
many. These squadrons will replace other squadrons, since he does not
desire to overload Germany. The three reconnaissance squadrons so
displaced will be moved to the U.K. In addition, two additional fighter
wings, comprising six squadrons total, will also be moved to the U.K.,
resulting in a total increase in fighter and reconnaissance planes of nine
squadrons in the U.K.

The President cautioned General Norstad that he does not desire at
this time to present a threatening appearance to the Soviets. He is con-
cerned lest such a front would destroy Geneva, although he expressed
the view that Geneva is probably destroyed anyway. He then asked the
basis on which we plan to retain possession of the airfields from which
these squadrons will be moved. General Norstad answered that we will
leave caretakers behind since these airfields are our NATO property.
His primary airfields are three bases of wing capacity, each located in
the vicinity of Nancy. The nine squadrons are deployed as three wings,
one on each of three bases. General Norstad added that he anticipates
this move to take six months. The purpose of this deliberate approach is
to maintain an atmosphere of calm and to avoid annoyance. The Presi-
dent agreed with this approach. He cited one more experience he had
had with de Gaulle, which involved his threat to withdraw French
forces from SHAEF command at the time of the threat to Strasbourg
during the Bulge. The President’s own stated intention to deprive de
Gaulle of all supplies had been made in the presence of Churchill, who
was apparently dumbfounded.

After some informal personal conversation, the meeting ended.

John S. D. Eisenhower

---

7 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
215. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Countries

July 10, 1959, 7:58 p.m.

41. Paris for Embassy and USRO, Thurston and West 1 for info. A. Polto 27, rptd info Athens 3. B. Athens’ 41, rptd info Paris Topol 1. 3

1. We have noticed evidence of certain misgivings in Europe, besides those mentioned in reflets, concerning US readiness use atomic weapons in defense of another NATO country if US itself is not attacked. Such misgivings are often based on theory that, now that USSR has ability to deliver nuclear weapons on US homeland, an atomic stalemate has been reached. According to this theory US is not likely to defend NATO territory by counter attack using US nuclear weapons because in so doing US would be inviting nuclear counter attack on itself. Thus, again according to theory, threat of US deterrent power is no longer protection for NATO area and Soviets know it. If use of large-scale nuclear weapons in European conflict is thus practically eliminated, Soviets, with greater conventional forces, would have advantage. Foregoing reasoning obviously also leads to loss of confidence in NATO defensive strategy of “sword and shield” since, it is argued, retaliatory “sword” is illusory.

2. Variation of foregoing is that indications of US or NATO plans for limited war in Europe prove thesis. [I-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

3. Following sentence from Secretary’s testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee April 21 has been cited as confirming

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/7-1059. Secret; Limit Distribution; Verbatim Text. Drafted by John Y. Millar, EUR/RA; cleared with Fessenden, Murphy, Merchant, and OSD/ISA; and approved by Herter. Pouched to Geneva.

1 George L. West, Counselor of Embassy in France.

2 Polto 27 from Paris, July 4, reported that in response to a request from Spaak’s office, USRO sent him the text of Herter’s statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 21 regarding the resort to nuclear war, and added that because of concern on this matter the Department might wish to make a statement dealing with this subject. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.2/7-459) For text of Herter’s statement, see Nomination of Christian A. Herter: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Sixth Congress, First Session, on the Nomination of Christian A. Herter To Be Secretary of State, April 21, 1959 (Washington, 1959).

3 Telegram 41 from Athens, July 3, reported that Averoff told the U.S. Chargé that former Prime Minister George Papandreou and other Greek leaders [text not declassified] had expressed misgivings concerning Herter’s April 21 statement on nuclear war to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Averoff sought clarification of Herter’s statement. (Department of State, Central Files, 660.0012/7-359)
thesis: "Reducing that question to responsible individuals, I can't con-
ceive of the President of the United States involving us in an all-out nu-
clear war unless the facts showed clearly that we are in danger of
devastation ourselves, or that actual moves have been made toward
devastating ourselves." This statement was made in context of series of
questions dealing with hypothetical possibility whether deliberate
shooting down of a US aircraft might be considered reason for precipi-
tating nuclear war, time factors involved, and role of US Congress in
declaration of war. Within context do no believe this passage should
cause confusion. (Text being pouched to all addressees.) Of course inter-
pretation that it confirms a reservation on part of US is wholly foreign to
Secretary's views and intent. Foreign officials may be so assured, as di-
rected by the Chief of Missions.

4. In attempting to allay such doubts regarding US intentions, it is
obviously undesirable to contend that the US will, under hypothetical
circumstances, adopt a given military course of action. Type of action to
be taken under given circumstances is matter for Presidential determi-
nation.

5. If queried, US officials authorized by Chief of Mission should
thus avoid conjecture regarding specific nature of US military response,
but should emphasize US determination to honor its NATO commit-
ments. Most authoritative statement of US position is that of President at
December 1957 Heads of Government meeting:

Begin Unclassified Verbatim Text.

"This is our resolve: Speaking for my own country, I assure you in
the most solemn terms that the United States would come, at once and
with all appropriate force, to the assistance of any NATO nation sub-
jected to armed attack. This is the resolve of the United States—of all
parts and of all parties.

Equally, I do not doubt that each of your nations would similarly
respond should the United States or another NATO member be at-
tacked. This, then, is the core of our partnership—an attack against one
is an attack against all. In order to live in peace together, we are resolved
to defend ourselves together if need be." 4 End Unclassified Verbatim Text.

6. In addition, authorized US officials may refer to US record since
World War II (i.e. Truman doctrine, Berlin airlift, Korea, US stand in Tai-
wan Straits, Beirut landings), as well as to physical presence large num-
bers US forces in NATO area, as clear evidence our determination stand
by allied countries subjected to armed aggression or threat of force.

Herter

---

4 For full text of Eisenhower's statement, December 16, 1957, see Department of State
216. Telegram From the Mission at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State

Paris, July 17, 1959, 5 p.m.¹

Polto 135. Geneva for Merchant.² Reference: Polto 132 and 133.³ Spaak gave me this morning a more complete rundown of his conversations with De Gaulle.⁴

After Spaak had indicated his desire to explore questions relating to present French blockages of NATO operations, De Gaulle indicated he was not opposed to NATO and did not want to do anything to hurt it. He felt it had a useful function to perform within its area.

He said he was troubled by three things about NATO: Its relation to their pressing African problem; the problem of atomic capability and operations; and integration.

With respect to last point, integration, he said he did not think it represented a realistic and desirable program but he was in favor of cooperation. This was not discussed at any length. Though Spaak indicated that he thought this was partly a question of words.

With respect to Africa, De Gaulle said this was a central problem for them upon which they needed the help of other countries. He did not see how NATO as such could help them effectively.

Atomic questions then became major topic of conversation. The General recognized that with respect to secrets there were legal limitations which he deplored but understood. He laid special emphasis on the desire for assuring adequate consultation before the initiation of atomic war. In reply to Spaak's questioning as to the mechanism for carrying this out, [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. He put forward no

¹ The date on the source text, July 18, is incorrect, since the telegram was received in the Department of State on July 18 at 9:03 a.m., or, even with the time difference between Paris and Washington, before it could have been transmitted. The telegram is also numbered in sequence with other Poltos for July 17, not July 18. See also footnote 3 below.
² Merchant was in Geneva as a member of the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting May 11–August 5.
³ Polto 132 from Paris, July 16, transmitted Spaak's oral report to Burgess of his conversation with de Gaulle that afternoon, at which Spaak left his memorandum on relations between France and NATO. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/7–1659) Polto 133 from Paris, July 16, transmitted the text of Spaak's memorandum. (Ibid.) Extracts of this memorandum are printed in Spaak, Memoirs, pp. 320–322.
⁴ Another account of this conversation is printed ibid., pp. 323–324.
clearcut ideas as to the mechanism which might be used for this purpose.

Spaak reviewed with him some of the ideas in his memo (Polto 133) and left the memo with De Gaulle, asking him to review it and indicated what things he thought were sound and what he did not. He hopes this will lead to further conversations.

I commented the conversation opened interesting channels. [3 lines of source text not declassified] Before leaving I handed him a full copy of the text of Secretary Herter’s statement yesterday at Geneva so that he would be sure to read it.5

Burgess

5 There was no meeting of the Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva on July 17, nor has there been found a record of a statement by Herter on that date. The reference is probably to Herter’s statement on Berlin at the 21st plenary session of the Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva on July 16.

217. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France

July 18, 1959, 2:23 p.m.

Topol 141. Poltos 132 and 133.1 Dept fully concurs that Spaak memorandum disturbing document and wishes prompt action taken to bring to Spaak’s attention our concern. Memorandum referred to Polto 132 not yet received here.2 In interests prompt action, Dept transmitting comments below on major points which cause us concern. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

Following are points which cause us principal concern:

1. Nuclear cooperation with France. Spaak’s statement that he understands US ready to offer France same treatment as UK in military

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/7-1659. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Fessenden; cleared with Cameron and Brown (WG), Miller (S/S), White (EUR), and Farley (S/AE); and approved by Murphy. Repeated to Geneva.

1 See footnote 3, Document 216.

2 Reference is to Burgess’ proposed memorandum, transmitted in Document 218.
nuclear cooperation entirely incorrect and likely give de Gaulle dangerously inaccurate ideas concerning US policy and Congressional attitudes, both of which were made very clear last year at time of hearings on amendments to Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and during just concluded hearings on supply enriched fuel to France. Joint Committee Atomic Energy in its July 14 report on NATO Atomic agreements reaffirmed its strict definition substantial progress and its concern over possibility spread nuclear weapons capability.

US of course always ready to consult on our policies and actions to maximum extent which circumstances permit, but believe unnecessary and undesirable to create new machinery for this purpose. NAC already serves as forum for consultation on crises in other parts of world.

3. Global Planning. US has long favored NAC consultation on problems of other areas (and has indeed been leader in this), but we conceive that such consultation should be for purposes of: (a) keeping Alliance fully informed of problems outside NATO area (b) obtaining better mutual understanding each others policies, and (c) harmonizing policies of individual countries with respect to such areas to maximum extent possible. Any effort to go beyond this to establishment of formal NATO machinery for developing common NATO action programs toward other areas undesirable both because of greatly varying degrees of interest of NATO countries in these areas and because of effect in other areas of common NATO programs.

Dillon

---

3 Regarding the applicability of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended on July 2, 1958, to France, see Part 2, Document 39.

4 The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, in transmitting its report to the Senate on July 14 (the same report was transmitted to the House of Representatives on July 15), reaffirmed its definition of “substantial progress” regarding the transfer of nonnuclear parts of atomic weapons, which it had adopted the previous year in connection with the amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 enacted on July 2, 1958 (72 Stat. 276). (U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Proposed Amendment to Agreement for Cooperation with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Proposed Agreements for Cooperation with the Republic of France, Canada, Turkey, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany and Greece on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes, 86th Congress, 1st session, Report No. 513, pp. 11–12)
218. Telegram From the Mission at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State

Paris, July 20, 1959, 7 p.m.

Polto 165. Geneva for USDel. Reference: Topols 141 and 155. Following is our suggestion for text of memo for delivery to Spaak re his memo (Polto 133). We have drafted it having in mind possibility it will get into French hands, as we indicated Polto 125. Rather than quite properly critical nature of Dept’s talking points (Topol 141), we think this memo would be most effective as objective statement of US position, and it is that line we have tried to take.

[1 paragraph (7 lines of source text) not declassified]

Please telegraph us key excerpts July 14 report of JCAE, and pouch us 10 copies thereof, as well as 10 further copies of report of JCAE on last amendments to Atomic Energy Act.

Begin Verbatim Text.

A. Use of atomic weapons.

On April 23, 1954, in a private session of the Ministers of the North Atlantic Council, Secretary Dulles spoke at some length on this problem. His remarks included the following statements of policy:

“...In short, such weapons must now be treated as in fact having become ‘conventional.’ As I have said, these weapons are vital to the common defense of us all. Our main effort must be to see that our military capability is used to achieve the greatest deterrent effect. In order to achieve this, it should be our agreed policy, in case of war, to use atomic weapons as conventional weapons against the military assets of the enemy whenever and wherever it would be of advantage to do so, taking account of all relevant factors. These include non-military, as well as military, considerations.”

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/7-2059. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to Geneva.

1 Topol 141 is printed as Document 217. Topol 155 to Paris concerns an unrelated subject; reference may be to Topol 144 to Paris, July 19, in which the Department agreed to wait for USRO comments on Spaak’s memorandum to de Gaulle before presenting further U.S. views to Spaak. (Department of State, Central Files, 640.5/7-1959)

2 Polto 125 from Paris concerns an unrelated subject; reference may be to Polto 155 from Paris, July 19, which noted that in drafting a memorandum for Spaak “we will need to bear in mind our thoughts will get to French in one form or another.” (Ibid., 740.5/7-1959)

3 See footnote 4, Document 217.

"The United States intends, of course, to consult with its allies and to cooperate with them fully to this end. That is the essence of collective security. Consultation is an important means for insuring that our military strength, in case of any aggression, shall be used to the best advantage for the common defense. By the same token, we must make sure that the methods of consultation serve that common purpose and do not themselves stand in the way of our security. Under certain contingencies, time would not permit consultation without itself endangering the very security we seek to protect. So far as feasible, we must seek understanding in advance on the measures to be taken under various circumstances. In these ways, our joint capacities will be best calculated to deter aggression against any of us and to protect us in case it should occur."

The North Atlantic Treaty creates a framework within which sovereign nations unite for the common defense. NATO is thus an alliance of sovereign nations, and is not a supra-national organization.

For this very reason, the treaty does not require unanimous consent to the taking of action in response to armed attack. Each member has its own obligations to all other members, and takes its own decision as a sovereign in light of its pledge to consider an armed attack on one as an armed attack on all and to assist, individually and in concert with the other members, the one attacked.

There is no question that, under the treaty, decision is reserved to govts. This is expressly recognized in the political directive and all other NATO doctrine.

Within this essential political framework, it is clear that only common planning and common action can provide a real defense. Modern weapons have introduced a new factor of terrible speed with which an attack can come. This requires the ability to respond with speed.

NATO must thus go as far as possible to plan for speedy collective response. In some cases, such as air defense, a prior delegation of authority may be required because of this factor of speed. Such a delegation of authority is simply a recognition of the fact that in the event of all-out attack, all of NATO will have to be fighting with all it has, and can only hope to prevail if it does so as a unit. This is the sort of "understanding in advance" which Secretary Dulles spoke of.

[1 paragraph (5-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

In cases where time and circumstances permit, it therefore follows that the only way in which the common interest of all members of the Alliance can be taken into account is through consultation in the North Atlantic Council. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

In any cases where circumstances permit of NATO consultation, the decision will depend on a judgment based on knowledge of all of the political and military factors. It is impossible, in advance of the development of an actual situation, to foretell what those political and military factors would be. It is only in light of events as they actually develop that
judgments could be made. It is not possible to develop in advance “solutions a tiroir” since the day-to-day aspects of the situation will control. Pre-planned solutions would provide only a Maginot Line procedure.

Moreover, the development of rigid procedures might be compromised and could lead to the destruction of the entire value of the deterrent, which is based upon the ability of the West to respond to Russian actions at the will of the West.

The answer lies within the doctrine of consultation with all NATO members in the North Atlantic Council if circumstances permit. If all govs are kept continually apprised of how the situation is developing, the confidence and unity of the Alliance can be maintained.

In this respect, all of the members of NATO whose forces or territory would be involved in the action proposed to be taken would have equal justification to be consulted.

[1 line of source text not declassified]

The US, for its part, is always ready to consult in NATO on our policies and actions to the maximum extent which circumstances permit. The North Atlantic Council itself has already been used as the forum for consultation on crises in other parts of the world. It is the Council itself which should remain the forum for that consultation. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

C. Assistance to the French military atomic production program.

The Congress of the United States in 1958, fully appreciating the growing Soviet strength in nuclear weapons, relaxed the previous law and permitted the transfer of info of this nature to countries which already had a “substantial” atomic capability. Even so, such agreements could be disapproved by the Congress when submitted to it.

The Congress made it perfectly clear that the purpose of this provision was to prevent additional countries, friendly or otherwise, from obtaining an independent nuclear capability. The Congress, which reflects the opinion of the American people, thus gave expression to the profound belief of the United States of the grave risks for the world which could stem from the increase in the number of nuclear powers.

US policy and congressional attitudes on this are clear and were repeated in the recently concluded hearings before the Congress on the supply of enriched fuel to France. In its July 14 report on the NATO atomic info agreements, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy reaffirmed its strict definition of “substantial progress” and its deep concern over the possibility of the spread of nuclear weapons capability.

It will be recalled that Secretary Dulles in an exchange with Foreign Minister Pineau spoke at length on the seriousness of this risk at the Ministerial meeting at Bonn in April 1957. He pointed out that the risk
involved lay not only with the question of a “fourth” country, but with the question of still other countries that might be involved.\footnote{Pineau's statement on atomic weapons for NATO forces at the NAC Ministerial Meeting in Bonn in May (not April) 1957 is summarized in Secto 10 from Bonn, May 3, 1957. Text of Dulles' response was transmitted in Secto 22 from Bonn, May 3, 1957. (Both Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/5-357)}

On this very important issue, as to which there admittedly are conflicting considerations, it is the belief throughout the United States that the course chosen by Congress is wise. It is believed that this is a conviction shared by a number of peoples and govs elsewhere in the world. It is our view that this national attitude is not likely to change.

D. Global strategy.

[1 paragraph (4-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] NATO consultation on serious situations in other areas is a matter which the US has not only supported but in which it has taken the lead. We think it important to keep the Alliance fully informed of problems outside the NATO area, to obtain a better mutual understanding of each other's policies and thinking, and to harmonize these policies to the maximum extent possible. This is of course doubly true in cases where hostilities outside the NATO area could lead to involving other NATO members. This was done last year in both the Middle East and Far East.

But insistence upon common NATO action would not only be impracticable in light of the great varying degrees of interest of the NATO countries in these areas, but would risk arousing serious hostility in the areas affected.

It is therefore considered that the continuing exchange of views within NATO, in order that all NATO members be kept fully informed of developments in the world which affect them, is the way to proceed. \footnote{In Topol 170 to Paris, July 22, the Department of State reported that Polto 165 was a generally useful and objective statement of the U.S. position and wanted Burgess to draw on it in his follow-up discussion with Spaak, but the response to Spaak should remain informal and oral. Burgess should “avoid being drawn into using Spaak as channel of communication with de Gaulle or French officials on substantive issues such as those raised in his memorandum.” (Ibid., 740.5/7-2059)}

End Verbatim Text.

Burgess
219. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

Pierre de Leusse, Permanent Representative of France on the North Atlantic Council
Ambassador W. Randolph Burgess

At luncheon with Pierre de Leusse, I asked him what guidance he could give us with respect to the President's forthcoming conversation with General de Gaulle, [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

He said that he thought the key to the whole business was in the participation of France in decisions as to the use of atomic weapons; that if there could be a better understanding on this point everything else would fall into place.

[2 paragraphs (14 lines of source text) not declassified]

He emphasized that this was not a question of being given secrets in the manufacture of atomic weapons, that Couve de Murville had made a statement on that score, and that they understood the law and the limitations in that matter. The question related to the use of the weapons.

[8 paragraphs (1-1/2 pages of source text) not declassified]

We both agreed that this was an area of conversation which was appropriate for two soldiers to discuss.
220. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Shuff) to the President's Assistant Staff Secretary (Eisenhower)

August 14, 1959.

SUBJECT

European Country Assumption of Burdens of Troop Maintenance in NATO

Reference is made to your memorandum of 4 August 1959 addressed to Assistant Secretary of Defense Irwin, on the subject above.¹ For the sake of clarity in providing the data requested, the following will deal with: first, what we have done to induce greater European country efforts; and second, to what extent the individual countries have assumed or plan to assume such burdens.

In December 1956 the NATO countries were put on notice by Secretary of Defense Wilson that the U.S. would concentrate its military assistance efforts upon advanced weapons, requiring them to assume increasing or complete responsibility for their own recurring force maintenance and conventional matériel requirements.² Subsequent military assistance programming has emphasized this policy and some of the more significant steps taken to induce greater European country effort include: (a) termination of MAP grant matériel aid for the U.K. and Germany in FY 1956; (b) progressive cutoffs of spare parts aid; (c) vigorous measures to stimulate country participation in coordinated European development and production of advanced weapons and aircraft, using their own resources. Since the adoption of the NATO minimum essential force objectives in MC 70,³ we have strongly urged country force adjustments, as a means of generating savings to meet remaining troop maintenance costs.

The success of these programs, though gradual and unspectacular, may be outlined as follows: (1) all NATO countries except Greece and Turkey have assumed responsibility for substantial portions, and in some cases all of their spare parts requirements, previously required as grant aid; (2) Germany pays cash for all matériel and training, except limited special training sponsored in the U.S. interest, which is cost-

Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, Defense Department III, Secret.

¹ Not found.
³ See Document 131.
shared; (3) the U.K. pays for all but limited U.S. training, and certain matériel costs associated with IRBM (Thor) missiles in accordance with a special U.S.–U.K. agreement; (4) Belgium and Luxembourg are now excluded from grant matériel aid except for certain advanced weapons, and a Department of Defense recommendation of the same status for France is currently under inter-departmental consideration; (5) Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Norway and Portugal still receive decreasing amounts of matériel assistance, in both the conventional and advanced weapons categories; and (6) Greece and Turkey are the only NATO countries still requiring full grant military assistance, as well as Defense Support (Economic) assistance.

Italy and Germany are now producing the G–91 NATO lightweight fighter aircraft with their own funds; Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands are purchasing and jointly financing European production of the Hawk missile; and several NATO countries are preparing to produce the Sidewinder missile. Beyond this, some encouragement may be found in the fact that Belgium recently announced an 11% increase in its 1960 defense budget, and Italy has committed itself to increase its defense budget 4% each year for the next five years.

While the foregoing gives some cause for optimism, much remains to be accomplished, particularly in Denmark, France, Italy, Norway and the United Kingdom. It is our intention within the Department of Defense to continue to press for increasing European assumption of the economic burden, including encouragement of cost-sharing of U.S. produced equipment and increasing European financed production.

Charles H. Shuff

---

4 Reference presumably is to the agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom providing for the supply of IRBMs to the United Kingdom, February 22, 1958; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 627–629.

5 For text of the NATO announcement of the establishment of a new NATO agency to supervise the coordinated production in Europe of the Hawk missile, June 18, see ibid., 1959, pp. 523–524.

6 Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.
221. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

August 24, 1959.

OTHERS PRESENT

General Norstad
General Goodpaster

The President said the purpose of his meeting with Khrushchev is to bring about some lessening of tension, try to find some step toward disarmament, and bring some measure of confidence and relief to the minds of our people. Progress in these discussions has been miniscule to date, with only the Austrian Treaty to our credit. Some conflicts have been resolved over the last few years around the world, but generally not through negotiation. The President thought he personally might make an appeal to Khrushchev in terms of his place in history, point out that if he wants to gain such a place through making a change to improve the international climate, the President is confident that something can be worked out. If he does not wish to make such a change, then there is not much use in talking further. The President said by such a discussion he could try to satisfy his own conscience.

The President recalled that he had initially thought the other Western nations would recommend a Western summit, and in fact they did initially. De Gaulle then opposed it, however, saying it would look like a preparation for the President to speak for all of them. As a result he is having to visit the capitals singly. In addition de Gaulle is making his visit to France a State visit, in order to build up French prestige.

General Norstad said that de Gaulle is counting a great deal on this visit. He added that Adenauer wants the United States to give some gesture of support to France. He added that Adenauer’s thinking seemed to be confused on the matter of a “tripartite directorate for the free world.” Initially Adenauer said he supported de Gaulle’s demands. When told that there exists no established joint organization between the United States and the United Kingdom, Adenauer changed his position. The President said he is ready to tell Adenauer and de Gaulle that we are quite ready to have the same consultations with the French as we do with the British. General Norstad expressed opposition to a tripartite organization. He felt that de Gaulle would not push this too hard. Norstad said he had had a good talk with Joxe, and had stressed to Joxe that the


1 Khrushchev visited the United States September 15–27.
meeting between the President and de Gaulle should be one of discussion and not demands by de Gaulle. He added that Joxe and others of the French hope that the President will take the opportunity to give de Gaulle a lecture on the true meaning of collective security and its application on a worldwide scale. De Gaulle apparently has no conception of the need for integration of forces. In fact, his military thinking stopped with World War II. The President said he intends to stress that we are all partners in this operation, and that no one is trying to dictate to others.

General Norstad suggested a theme that we have two aims—first to work with France, and second to do this without detracting from our relations with other countries. He said the outstanding item on de Gaulle’s list is the Algerian situation. There are indications that de Gaulle is toying with the idea of making an explicit statement of his program for Algeria. He is going there on August 27th to take the pulse of the people and especially the young officers, and also to try to recondition their thinking away from “peace by force” and toward a liberal solution. General Norstad said he hoped that the State Department could find something the United States could say to support the French; however, first we must know what their policy and program are for Algeria.

The President recalled that the French want to walk out of the United Nations General Assembly on the grounds that Algeria is an internal affair, but they want us to stay in the Assembly and fight their case for them. General Norstad said there is great bitterness that we are “helping France’s enemies” as the French term it, by allowing the presence of Algerian representatives in the United States. He suggested the President might say that the American people have put great effort and expense into strengthening peace in the world, that they support the rule of law and accommodations through negotiation and that the United States is not supporting the use of force in Algeria.

The President recalled that Ambassador Dillon and others have stated that we would support France in anything peacefully agreed with its colonies. However, they must understand the depth of our anticolonialism. There is the question of how to “square” the actions of French troops in Algeria with these statements. It can be said that they are there to maintain peace and order, but that the final solution must be a peaceful one.

General Norstad thought that the French would lay less stress on atomic questions than had earlier seemed likely, perhaps merely expressing regret rather than making demands for such weapons. He said that he personally thought that giving NATO atomic weapons might be

---

2 No record of this talk between Norstad and Joxe has been found.
a very good step although the French would not be keen on this, since
they want them on a national basis.

General Norstad said he understood why the President is not going
to NATO on this trip, since Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers
would then come in and make a Roman holiday of the meeting. He said
the Permanent Council would be most appreciative of a visit, however.
The President said he would turn over in his mind the possibility of lim-
iting his talk with Luns and Spaak to about thirty minutes and then go-
ing over with them to the Palais de Chaillot. He asked me to talk to Mr.
Herter about this. As the President thought about it he said he liked the
idea very much but there could be absolutely no advance notice.

The President then commented that we have stocks of soft curren-
cies in many countries, including France, Germany, Belgium and others.
He is very anxious to find ways of carrying on our overseas activities
without draining our own gold reserves. He asked me to check with
Treasury and Defense if they are finding every possible way to use these
funds and save a drain on U.S. gold.

The President next told General Norstad that he felt there is strong
reason for the United States to start pulling some of its forces out of
Europe. We went there in 1951 to cover the period until the Europeans
could form forces of their own. He thought the British, Germans and
others are taking advantage of us. General Norstad said he hoped this
could be started within the next few years, probably in connection with
disarmament steps. If effective control and inspection existed we could
safely contemplate pulling some forces back. We sent our divisions to
Europe to help them over an emergency. Now if we talk about taking
out one division they claim we are deserting them. He said we are
spending too many billions all around the world without the Europeans
taking a commensurate load. General Norstad thought it would be quite
appropriate for the President to stress this to de Gaulle. The President
said he intends to talk to Adenauer also as to why the Germans are being
so slow. He does not want to wait for disarmament. He thinks some of
the countries should take some responsibility. General Norstad agreed
with all of this but said it will be a most difficult job to carry out. The
President said we must do something along these lines, since the United
States lost $4.3 billion in gold last year.

G.

Brigadier General, USA
222. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/30 Paris, September 3, 1959, 9:30 a.m.

PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO EUROPE

August–September 1959

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. NATO

The President Paul-Henri Spaak, Secretary
The Secretary General of NATO
Ambassador Burgess J.M.A.H. Luns, Dutch Foreign
Minister, in capacity as
Mr. Merchant President of the North Atlantic
Col. Walters, Interpreter Council
Mr. Nolting, Reporting Officer

SUBJECT

President Eisenhower’s meeting with Foreign Minister Luns and Monsieur Spaak

The President opened by referring to his talks with President de Gaulle, saying that the most important thing from NATO’s point of view was the warm endorsement given to NATO by de Gaulle.¹ De Gaulle had said he had no intention of weakening the Alliance. The President remarked that that’s good as far as it goes; but of course they would have more conversations on this subject.

Concerning Algeria, the President said the US position conveyed to de Gaulle was that we would look at the program when it is made precise by de Gaulle and see if we could support it. The President remarked that heads of other French Community governments were apparently influencing de Gaulle towards a more liberal policy in Algeria. Later on, he said that he had suggested to de Gaulle that French Community leaders could be very helpful to him in popularizing a liberal program for Algeria, inasmuch as they could view such a program from an objective point of view and some of them had certain ties with the Arabs. De Gaulle thought this suggestion an interesting one. Re the UN aspect of Algerian problem, the President said de Gaulle had stated he would

¹ Regarding Eisenhower’s talks with European leaders during his trip, see Part 2, Document 129.
not allow French representatives to participate in the UN debate but he will outline his plan and program for Algeria and say what he has done there already. The President characterized this as a move in the right direction.

Touching upon conversations in Bonn, the President said there was nothing new to report, that everything went fine.

On London talks, the President said Macmillan is inclined to the position that, regardless of substantive progress or lack of it, there must be a summit meeting. The President said that Adenauer and de Gaulle agree with him that there must be some prospect of substantive achievement at a summit meeting before such a meeting should be laid on. He said that other problems discussed in the UK were mainly "local", but that of course both the UK and Germany support NATO strongly.

The President said his trips had given him an opportunity to say again that he was not intending to negotiate with Khrushchev, but that he was frankly trying to "soften him up a little". He emphasized that the exchange of visits did not indicate any new US policy.

The President said that Adenauer seemed vague on what to do next concerning German reunification and Berlin problems. The President said that he felt it necessary at some point to find ways to eliminate the need for occupation forces in Berlin, but as of now the US is going to stand firm.

Reverting to his talks with de Gaulle, the President said he personally thinks de Gaulle's program for Africa and his Community plan are good and deserve US support. De Gaulle had talked about the principles of the French Community as (a) self-government (excluding foreign affairs and defense); (b) economic and social improvement; (c) a "fixed commitment" concerning the right to independence. He had said that he would see whether the same problem could not be applied to Algeria after pacification. The President added that he was not given further details as to how de Gaulle expected to do this, and appreciated his political difficulties in spelling out his program.

Foreign Minister Luns said it was necessary to agree on what Spaak and he could tell NATO Council regarding the President's talks with others as summarized above.

Secretary Herter thought that no specifics should be given. Mr. Spaak agreed that he and Luns should be very cautious in informing the Council of what the President had told them.

Luns said that the Netherlands were worried lest the French links with North Africa should be cut as a result of failure to solve the Algerian problem and were looking for ways to help.

The President said that the US, he believes, will be in a better position in the next two or three weeks to evaluate the French program for
Algeria. He can't be sure as to how this will evolve but feels better about the problem as a result of his meetings with de Gaulle. He said that if the US sees a reasonable proposition of the French, we will support.

Luns said he does not see how, given the political situation and the position of the army in France, de Gaulle can spell out his program. The President said if de Gaulle can lay out a reasonable plan before the UNGA opens, friends of France can do much to support. That's as far as he can go as of now.

On the Khrushchev visit, Luns said the vast majority of NATO countries endorse the President's position that there must be clear signs of progress before a summit meeting should be laid on. The President said that he was frankly not optimistic about what he would get out of Khrushchev. He remarked that Khrushchev himself had said that in a war both sides would be destroyed, and that this marked a recognition of the facts which in itself was something. The President further remarked that Khrushchev was bringing most of his family with him, and he supposed that a man who was intent on making trouble would not bring his family along.

Spaak, reverting to NATO, said that the only serious problem in NATO is the French problem. The French Government has taken a very difficult attitude and has blocked many things, mostly in the military field, which the other members consider necessary. It is difficult to know what the French want. On Algeria, Spaak said that it was impossible and unreasonable to expect the US to give the French a blank check. Mr. Luns indicated his agreement. Both Mr. Luns and Mr. Spaak emphasized the importance of having the French program for Algeria set forth in specific terms. But Spaak stressed his view that it will continue to be very difficult in NATO if NATO members cannot give the French "some support" on the Algerian problem. De Gaulle is the only man who can bring off a liberal solution, but he has a difficult political situation and Spaak was not sure that he would make a clear statement of liberal policy. Spaak said that on the general question of handling relations between the East and West, NATO's attitude was good and solid. Spaak stressed, however, that a clash in the UN on Algeria will be a very bad thing for NATO.

The President said that de Gaulle had brought up the subject of the NATO command, saying that the NATO command structure was "amorphous" and not good for instilling a national patriotic spirit in the people and troops. The President had told him that he had foreseen this point of view many years before, and had said at the outset of NATO that he believed the greatest patriot was the greatest supporter of NATO; further that de Gaulle's thought if pushed to a logical conclusion would fracture all alliances. The President said de Gaulle understood but apparently did not agree. On this point the President said de Gaulle
said that “for a country such as ours” his diagnosis was correct. The President replied that “we are talking about Western Europe”, implying that strictly national defense is impossible. The President said he had pointed out to de Gaulle that he was supporting European integration in economic fields; why not in the military as well?

Luns interjected that integration means to the French France’s leadership. This is true in the economic field, and he believes the same would be true in the military; i.e., if the French have a great share of NATO leadership things will be okay from their point of view. Spaak said that he felt we shouldn’t get into a battle of semantics between “close cooperation” and “integration”. The President agreed but pointed out that it was de Gaulle who had raised the problem.

The President said the discussion of NATO led to a discussion regarding the nuclear position. He described to de Gaulle how US forces are built around nuclear power but said it was a false assumption that any fight would start a nuclear war. The President repeated that de Gaulle seemed to him vague on what he wants concerning global strategy. The President said he told de Gaulle that the only basis for keeping US divisions in Europe is NATO. The main purpose of NATO strategy is to deter war. The President said that while in his view de Gaulle hasn’t thought through the problem clearly, he undoubtedly wants a bigger voice. The President said he thinks these difficulties can be ironed out. Algeria is the main problem. Spaak asked what de Gaulle means when he asks for a bigger voice. The President replied that he meant a bigger voice in the formation of global policy. He said he had told de Gaulle that we are perfectly willing to discuss, but will not “talk NATO affairs outside NATO”. We would talk Africa or New Caledonia, but not NATO affairs. The President said de Gaulle first wanted an institution, an organization, to direct global strategy, but that now he seems to have abandoned this idea. The Secretary agreed that the French position on a tripartite directorate has shifted. Luns hit at a three-power directorate as unacceptable to NATO, and returned to Algeria as the main point where satisfaction might be given to the French, stressing Debré’s strong view in this matter.

The Secretary gave clear warning against giving details of the Eisenhower–de Gaulle conversations to the North Atlantic Council. He added that de Gaulle’s problem on Algeria was how to translate his broad principles into a program.

The President summed up by saying that he was encouraged by his talks with de Gaulle. He had thought de Gaulle would make great demands upon him, but he hasn’t done so as yet.
The President then said he wanted very much to make his "bow" to the North Atlantic Council; and that he was going to assure them that there was no inner circle or coalition trying to run NATO.

It was agreed between Spaak and Luns that they should report this conversation to NAC only in general terms, leaving the impression no great or insuperable difficulties have been encountered by President Eisenhower on this trip.

---

223. Memorandum of Conversation

September 25, 1959, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Second-Generation IRBMs for Europe

PARTICIPANTS

Department of State

The Under Secretary
Robert Murphy, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Livingston T. Merchant, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
G. Frederick Reinhardt, Counselor
Gerard C. Smith, Assistant Secretary for Policy Planning
Ivan B. White, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
James Wilson, U/MSC
John W. Tuthill, EUR/RA
Robert N. Magill, EUR/RA
Raymond Courtney, S/AE
Graham Martin, U

Department of Defense

John N. Irwin, II, Assistant Secretary for ISA
Robert H. Knight, Deputy Assistant Secretary for ISA
Brig. General James F. Whisenand, Special Assistant to Chairman, JCS
Brig. General James H. Polk, ISA
Major General John A. Dabney, ISA
William M. Leffingwell, ISA
Alvin G. Waggoner, Special Assistant for Guided Missiles and Space Operations
Colonel Charles Billingslea, Deputy Director, European Region, ISA

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Magill and approved by Dillon on October 1. The meeting was held in the Department of State.
Mr. Irwin cited the President's offer at the NATO Heads of Government Meeting in December 1957 to provide United States assistance for coordinated NATO development and production of IRBMs.\(^1\) He observed that this offer represented a United States commitment and that an early decision was needed as to how we should go about implementing this commitment. Mr. Irwin set forth the range of political questions involved in this decision. Those included the question of NATO versus independent national control of the IRBMs, [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Mr. Irwin referred to the recent conversation that he and Secretary Gates had had in London with Sir Richard Powell on this subject, and said that Powell had expressed serious reservations regarding any program that might lead to an independent German IRBM force, or even to the deployment of IRBMs in Germany under NATO control.\(^2\) Powell had indicated that the UK would be satisfied, on the other hand, with a dual control over IRBMs in Europe similar to that obtaining with respect to the Thors in the UK. When Mr. Irwin had suggested that the UK might help by placing their Thors under NATO, Powell had said that, while the position of the Thors was negotiable, such a move would raise questions about the status of the UK V-bomber force and that there could be no question of assigning this force to NATO. Mr. Irwin described the Germans as (a) being willing to participate in an IRBM program, but (b) reserving their position on the question of deployment in Germany. He observed that a German requirement for deployment would undoubtedly develop in due course and he thought General Norstad probably had German deployment in mind for second-generation IRBMs. Mr. Irwin said that the French quite clearly were determined to proceed independently, if not within NATO, on an IRBM program, and that they, along with the British, would be insistent on having an independent IRBM capability in addition to whatever IRBMs might be placed under SACEUR's control. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Mr. Irwin then pointed out that, leaving aside the political questions, there were three concrete approaches available to us. The first was the Meilli plan, which called for U.S. technical assistance for a long-term, indigenous European development and production program, under which the first increment of IRBMs (estimated by Meilli but not confirmed by Norstad at approximately 100) would be assigned to NATO, with production over and above that figure for independent national requirements. Such a program would probably take from 8 to 10 years.

---

\(^1\) For text of the U.S. proposal on IRBMs at the 1957 NAC Heads of Government Meeting, December 16, 1957, see Department of State Bulletin, January 6, 1958, p. 9.

\(^2\) No record of this conversation between Irwin and Powell, which probably took place during the President's visit to the United Kingdom, has been found.
Mr. Waggoner said that if such a program were not based on an existing U.S. missile design, the development cost to the Europeans would range between $500,000,000 and $1,000,000,000, depending on the extent to which they undertook to develop a new type of missile and on the extent of U.S. technical assistance. The second approach would be to sell or grant Polaris missiles solely for the purpose of meeting SACEUR's 1963 requirements, with the Europeans to produce the ground support equipment. General Norstad favors such an approach. He has also indicated that he would not support a long-term European production program geared to the French range requirements of 2,500 to 3,000 nautical miles, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The third approach would be a variation on the first two. Mr. Irwin indicated that this might be accomplished along the lines of a proposal which he has been informed will be made shortly by the NATO International Staff. This proposal reportedly will provide for meeting SACEUR's requirements through U.S. provision of 30 to 50 Polaris missiles and technical assistance, with the balance of requirements, both NATO and national, to be met from European production.

Mr. Waggoner estimated that $100 million would cover the cost of U.S. technical assistance and 30 to 40 missiles, while the cost to the Europeans for achieving an initial operational capability would be on the order of $400–$500 million (exclusive of production costs). He indicated that such a program could meet SACEUR's requirements in the time frame from 1963 to 1965. In response to Mr. Dillon's questions, Mr. Waggoner said that this assumed European production of Polaris without significant modification. He said any significant modification of Polaris would involve time slippage and increased cost to the Europeans. U.S. provision of full technical assistance, special tooling and a few sample missiles for a European Polaris production program (without providing any missiles for deployment), would cost about $50,000,000 and the program could be completed by 1966 or 1967. If we did not provide some portion of the Polaris missiles for deployment, the Europeans might be expected to modify the design somewhat rather than to produce a "Chinese copy" of Polaris. Mr. Waggoner indicated that the scope of U.S. technical assistance could be varied considerably and that the cost to the Europeans would depend on the scope of this assistance. He emphasized that the estimates he had cited were "in the ball park".

Mr. Dillon asked how the question of country deployment would be handled, and Mr. Irwin said that he thought this should be worked out by SACEUR on the basis of a prior general commitment by the participating countries to accept deployment. Mr. Dillon observed that he thought this was a question that might have to be worked out carefully in advance, with reference also to non-participating countries in which deployment might be desirable. He also asked whether any considera-
tion had been given, in consultation with General Norstad, to the impact that the various approaches might have on the meeting of MC 70 requirements.\textsuperscript{3} Mr. Irwin observed that either a long-term, indigenous European program or a Polaris program should undoubtedly involve some diversion of resources and consequent cut-backs in the achievement of MC 70. He added that he thought General Norstad would be willing to accept some delays in achieving MC 70 goals if the IRBM program were developed to meet his time-phased requirements.

[5 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Dillon observed that our decision should take into account the prospects for reaching a disarmament agreement and the question of whether the building of independent strategic nuclear forces prejudice the possibility, or the implementation, of such an agreement. [8-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Mr. Smith asked what consideration had been given to hard sites versus mobility in deployment of the IRBMs, and was informed that any early deployment would probably have to be with hard sites. Mobility would be more expensive and could only be developed for later deployment; the cost and time scale of mobile deployment would depend on whether it involved railroads, or barges, or was designed for general cross-country mobility.

Mr. Dillon asked what position Defense would like to have the Department take, and Mr. Irwin said that he would like State approval of an offer of U.S. technical assistance for the NATO program. He said that such an offer would honor our commitment and would enable progress to be made in practical arrangements. Mr. Dillon asked what the timing should be and what procedure would be used in making the offer. Mr. Irwin thought the offer should be made as soon as possible and through NATO Assistant Secretary General Fiske\textsuperscript{4} to the Working Group.\textsuperscript{5} Mr. Dillon suggested that there were a number of political conditions that would have to be attached to the offer. [6 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Irwin observed that implementation of our technical assistance could be used as an effective lever in the development of acceptable political arrangements, and Mr. Dillon added that the extent of our political leverage would depend on the magnitude of our aid. Mr. Merchant asked whether a failure by the U.S. to provide technical assistance would be regarded by the Europeans as defaulting on our December

\textsuperscript{3} Regarding MC–70, see Document 131.

\textsuperscript{4} Robert B. Fiske succeeded Meili as Assistant Secretary General for Production and Logistics, International Staff/Secretariat, NATO, in June.

\textsuperscript{5} Documentation on the NATO Working Group on IRBMs, which was created in late January, is in Department of State, Central Files 740.56, 740.5611, and 740.5612.
1957 offer. Mr. Irwin said he thought the French in particular would consider this to be a major policy reversal.

Mr. Dillon concluded the discussion by saying that the Department would make every effort to reach an early decision, but that he thought whatever agreed State-Defense position was worked out should probably be reviewed by the President.

Mr. Irwin said that meanwhile Defense would undertake to draft a telegram indicating their views on what the instructions to USRO should be.6

6 Not found.

224. Memorandum of Conversation

October 24, 1959.

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary of State
Secretary of the Treasury Anderson
Secretary of Defense McElroy
Deputy Secretary of Defense Gates
Mr. John Irwin II, Defense
Mr. Reinhardt, State

The Secretary began by stating that the President was worried about the financial implications of our foreign commitments and was impatient with the lack of any movement toward resolving European problems.1 The Secretary felt that a Western Summit meeting which

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5/10-2459. Top Secret. Drafted by Reinhardt.

1 According to a memorandum of conference on October 16, drafted by Goodpaster on October 22, among the President, Hertter, Reinhardt, Merchant, and Kohler, Eisenhower noted that "he would have no objection to new measures in Berlin and Germany. He commented that, for example, it is time to pull out some of our forces now located in Europe. He cited the balance of payments difficulty the United States is experiencing at the present time. He thought we should get tough with Britain, Germany and France to get them to take up more of the load. Mr. Hertter said there is some indication of British thinking of shifting from emphasis upon missiles and aircraft back toward conventional forces, although he doubted that they would increase their forces on the continent of Europe. The President suggested for example making the Europeans furnish the Commander for the European NATO Command, and simply leaving one of our divisions there. He commented that the United States, after all, paid for most of the air bases and other infrastructure, and has paid the whole cost of atomic weapons. He thought we should put no more military assistance into Europe. They are now able to support themselves." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)
might come off would be the best place initially to raise these questions and, in fact, if any changes were to be made, the ground should be prepared before the December NATO meeting. The Secretary hoped that if something has to be done in terms of reducing our forces abroad, we could make a virtue of necessity and do it in such a manner that it would not appear to be sign of weakness.

Mr. Gates referred to the proposal to withdraw 14 air squadrons from NATO\(^2\) and commented that as far as the balance of payment issue was concerned the greatest contribution that Defense could make to the problem was in the pay of manpower and dependents abroad. Mention was made of the original understanding regarding the stationing of U.S. forces in Europe and the Secretary observed that the President and General Norstad had different concepts as to present requirements. The President did not believe that limited war was possible in Europe and thought that the NATO shield could be symbolic and did not require the present five plus divisions. Norstad, on the other hand, had reacted violently to the suggestion of any reduction.\(^3\)

The Secretary referred to the possibility of getting the Germans to pay something for the support of U.S. forces there. This would be preferable to an increase in planned German strength which most European countries would not want.

Mr. Irwin said that irrespective of budgetary and balance of payment problems there was a grave situation developing with respect to NATO. We had no missile defense and the growing Soviet capability meant that all fixed installations could eventually be taken out by surprise missile attack. This in effect meant that you had no offense. [9 lines of source text not declassified]

The Secretary noted that the U.K. was worried about what they called the five-year gap and that Admiral Mountbatten\(^4\) had expressed the personal view that Polaris was the answer to the problem.

Mr. Gates said that Defense thinking is toward larger expenditures for hardening Atlas and Titan sites and to pushing Minute Man which, however, would not be ready until 1963. It was also proposed to offset this in part by some weakening of continental defense.

---

\(^2\) In a letter to Herter, October 8. Acting Secretary of Defense Gates indicated that in the proposed fiscal year 1961 Air Force budget "it may be necessary to approve some, if not all, of the proposed squadron reductions. Accordingly, we have advised General Norstad of the possibility of shortfalls and have requested his views on their impact on NATO as well as his recommendations on how we can best mitigate the international political ramifications involved in any such force reductions in Europe." (Department of State, Central Files, 375/10–859)

\(^3\) No record of Norstad's reaction has been found.

\(^4\) Admiral Louis Mountbatten, British Chief of the Defense Staff and Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee.
Mr. Gates said that present plans were to go ahead with the development of the B-70 which was a Mach 3 aircraft. The other services did not agree, but this plan had side implications that were important in terms of transport and non-military aviation development. The B-58 was not in the Air Force budget. Two and one half billions had been spent on this project and did not yet have an airplane. He noted that this project was practically the total business activity of Fort Worth. There were no fighters in the Air Force budget but there were some in the Navy. Mr. Gates said that we soon would be in a position which would result in the Army, Navy and Marine Corps having limited war capability and the Air Force being wholly occupied with the strategic deterrent. Mr. Anderson questioned the virtue of diverting so many resources to the B-70 if in five years hence any war would be fought solely with missiles. Mr. McElroy had joined the meeting by this point and replied by stressing the necessity of having more than one string to the bow if the deterrent was to be effective. A multiplicity of offensive systems complicated the enemy’s defensive requirements.

Mr. McElroy commented that as long as the U.S. was committed to the principle that any war with the Soviet Union was general war, the need for NATO defenses diminished. He thought there was a need to modify the shield and sword concept.

The Secretary inquired from what point of view Defense had studied Norstad’s plan for regional inspection. Mr. Irwin said that the last time he had talked with him the General was against any disengagement but was for an inspection system. Mr. Gates said that German Defense Minister Strauss had recently spoken very strongly against anything that would neutralize all or part of Germany and Adenauer had much the same view. The Secretary observed that Germany was the subject of immobilism and wanted nothing but to maintain the status quo. He said the President was annoyed at the absence of flexibility on the part of both France and Germany who simply wanted to sit tight. Mr. Irwin reported that General Schuyler, after his recent visit to the U.K., had said that the British were definitely going to withdraw 10,000 men from the Continent and that de Gaulle had told Schuyler that France would not change its position on NATO issues pending some more global arrangements.

The Secretary said that the only quid pro quo he could see in connection with a force reduction was a similar reduction on the Soviet side, coupled with a zone of inspection agreement, but considering the size of the Soviet forces in Germany, this would not appear very significant.

---

5 See vol. IX, Document 132.

6 No record of General Schuyler’s discussions in the United Kingdom or with de Gaulle has been found.
Mr. McElroy thought we should have enough ground troops in Europe up close to make it clear that in the event of any Russian action we would be committed. Additionally, we were committed to supply the deterrent in a missile era in which it was difficult to keep the deterrent up close unless it was mobile. The increasing accuracy of missiles would make questionable within five years any fixed installation. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] He suggested the possible usefulness of Mace as a mobile weapon for NATO countries.

In reply to the Secretary's question regarding what flexibility there might be in the budgetary aspect of this discussion, Mr. McElroy said that the budgetary aspect was only part of the question and he could not say that there was not sufficient flexibility and time to permit the Secretary of State to take whatever preparatory actions he might find necessary. The budget would probably be about the same as now though some 28 million might be taken out of the Air Force. The basic problem was that there was more military manpower than could be equipped with modern weapons under the present budget. The balance of payment aspect was tougher and this of course was a subject for Mr. Anderson to talk to. The Army said it could not reduce under present overseas requirements and wanted to pull the battalion out of Iceland. Everyone agreed that it was not possible to reduce in Korea and this left only Europe where a substantial reduction might be made. Mr. McElroy thought that our limited war weakness lay in the size of the strategic reserve in the United States. It would be better if two or three more divisions were here. It was urgent to change our deployments in Europe, but this should not be done in an atmosphere which allowed no time to take necessary preparatory action. The Secretary observed that this pointed up the need for the President to be ready to talk to de Gaulle and Adenauer on this subject.

Balance of Payments and Budget.

Mr. Anderson started by saying that the foreign financiers, who were recently in Washington, went away rather pleased with the situation. This was because our budget appeared to be balanced, there was no change in the money managers, the economy was good and the steel strike at that time seemed likely to be settled. The biggest problem of course was that the Treasury owed so much money and the recently oversubscribed loan had made a good impression on the visitors. In short, the financiers seemed to have more confidence than a year ago.

---

7 Reference is probably to the Boards of Governors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund, and the International Finance Corporation, all of which held their annual meetings in Washington September 28–October 2.
Mr. Anderson said our commercial balances had been less adverse recently than in the first six months of the year, but there were so many intangible and invisible items that the subsequent gain was canceled out. He noted that there had recently been a heavy exchange of U.S. and foreign securities, the significance of which had not yet been possible to evaluate. In any event, there would be between 4 and 4-1/2 billion dollars adverse balance of payment this year. In strict confidence Mr. Anderson said that the U.K. was going to repay its Export-Import Bank Loan but that this fact was being held in complete secrecy until the U.K. was ready to make it known.

Mr. Anderson continued that what worried him was not just the balance of payments but the possible sequence of events. In the past the U.S. had always had some cushion to fall back on if called. He did not think that any one development alone could destroy confidence but a sequence of events could. As an illustrative example: (1) The budget would probably wind up in deficit this year which would lead public opinion to say the government had not achieved its aim. (2) Only the price of food had saved the economy from a rising cost of living. Should there be a few more floods or a heavy freeze, the result could well be an appreciable rise in the cost of living. (3) The probable increase in the price of steel as the result of strike. (4) A 4 to 4-1/2 billion dollar adverse balance of trade. It was Mr. Anderson's view that somewhere along the line in such a sequence of events, confidence could slip. He recounted that Mr. Pinay had suggested the U.S. could find a system whereby in the case of devaluation it would guarantee the profit to dollar holders abroad, and Pinay had also suggested that the U.S. should transfer its funds from Fort Knox into the International Monetary Fund. This was an interesting demonstration of the direction in which European thinking was moving. In this connection, Mr. Anderson referred to the different ways in which European countries traditionally held their reserves. He thought that any change in this pattern would impair confidence.

Mr. Anderson thought we could live with some adverse balance of payments but that we must reverse the present trend. The logical way out was of course to increase exports but this took considerable time; the removal of U.K. and French restrictions would also be to the good but that too would take time. December would probably be the fateful month since it would be necessary to announce the budgetary deficit before the end of the calendar year and one could expect that this would be followed by a renewed debate on the Hill on the subject of debt management. As a matter of interest, Mr. Anderson noted that the Canadian cabinet had recently reached the conclusion that the U.S. could no longer afford PL-480. Actually this was not a large item in our adverse

---

balance. There was discussion of the changed attitude of U.S. exporters who, as a result of rising labor costs, instead of concentrating on developing specific items for export to specific areas, were now looking for global markets and tending to build plants outside the U.S. Mr. Anderson quoted the London *Economist* as having editorialized that it was more important to have some dollars of constant value than more dollars of inconstant value. Mr. Anderson expressed the view that if a decision could be reached to reduce forces in Europe and bring dependents home, this would make a great difference in the balance of payments. At this point, the Secretary inquired whether figures were available on what precisely this would mean. Mr. McElroy said that no precise figures were available but that he had asked Mr. McNeil\(^9\) to get up such figures and would propose to have ready by Monday\(^10\) for Messrs. Hertel and Anderson an estimate of the benefit which should accrue from the return from Europe of two divisions and a comparable reduction in air forces. There was some discussion of the relative importance in this context of support troops and dependents in Europe and the question was raised whether more local employees could be used for logistical support. Mr. McElroy admitted that efforts to date to cut back on Army surplus activities in Europe had not been fully successful.

Mr. Gates pointed out the great problem for the Secretary that a leak on this subject would bring. Mr. Irwin stressed the importance of a military reassessment of the strategical effect on NATO of such a move. He pointed out that irrespective of budgetary and balance of payment requirements, there was in fact need for a review of MC-70 and such a review could be used for a rationale for any changes decided upon. Mr. McElroy said that one should speak to the President before asking the Joint Chiefs of Staff for such a study. Mr. Irwin said that by moving air strength out of Europe, we would limit U.S. capability for responses to problems in the Middle East, and in the Far East would reduce flexibility to meet local situations there. He thought there was a suggestion of schizophrenia in at one and the same time moving in the direction of nuclear test suspension and pursuing a trend toward increased development and dependence on nuclear weapons as a result of budgetary and balance of payment pressures.

There was some discussion of our growing dependence on nuclear weapons in limited war situations during which Mr. McElroy expressed his belief that the use of tactical nuclear weapons would not necessarily start a general nuclear war.

---

\(^9\) W. J. McNeil, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

\(^10\) October 26.
Mr. McElroy said that his Department was taking the line that a decision to reduce overseas deployments must be taken even if the implementation of such decision had to be postponed. Mr. Anderson said he would like to see a decision taken that overseas deployments would be reduced, that timing should be the function of various requirements, but that action would be taken as soon as possible. Mr. Anderson agreed with the Secretary's suggestion that he, Mr. Anderson, did not want balance of payments given as a reason for any such decision but rather that there be a review of our military posture with conclusions that were militarily desirable. Mr. Gates said he did not see how we could balance our budget unless we completely revolutionized our military strategy. Mr. Anderson observed that this would require higher taxes to which Mr. Gates retorted that perhaps that would be the courageous thing to do. The Secretary commented that unless it were possible to obtain the agreement of General Norstad and other military people to a revision of NATO strategy, it would blow NATO higher than a kite.

225. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith) to Secretary of State Herter

October 29, 1959.

SUBJECT
Force Cuts Discussion with DOD on October 24, 1959

I have read the memorandum of the conversation which you had on October 24 with Secretaries Anderson, McElroy and Gates about the possibility of force cuts abroad.¹

Having given a good deal of attention for some years to the subject matter of that conversation, I thought that a few observations might be of some use.

I gather that the real argument for force withdrawals is based on economic pressures and that the military arguments given are more or less rationalizations. If economic factors require us to weaken American

¹ Document 224.
military influence abroad, I think it is most important that we not fool ourselves by rationalizing such retraction as being warranted by the military situation.

Secretary McElroy is reported as having commented "... that as long as the US was committed to the principle that any war with the Soviet Union was general war, the need for NATO defenses diminished." ²

You are aware that the principle relied on by Secretary McElroy has in the past several years come under increasingly heavy fire. Almost two years ago Foster Dulles on a number of occasions told the Secretary of Defense and the President that he believed this principle was obsolescent and that we should be developing a new strategic concept and military posture to implement it.

The drift of Secretary McElroy's thinking seems to be that it is in the US security interest to more and more depend on the total war nuclear deterrent. For example, Secretary McElroy is reported as saying that "there is a need to modify the shield and sword concept."

This can only mean that he favors a modification in the direction of the "trip-wire" concept which requires fewer conventional forces and places a heavier deterrent burden on the general war strategic bombing capability. The NATO military authorities believe just the opposite. They are pressing for a build up of the shield forces.

This problem is directly related to your efforts during the past year to reduce America's dependence on the total war threat and to restore some balance in our military establishment. As a result of your efforts, a small advance in this direction was made in Basic National Security policy this year.³ I believe that any move which will increase our dependence on the strategic bombing deterrent would be contrary to the new emphasis on maintaining balanced forces which the President approved only a few months ago.

I am struck by the likely effect of the force cuts on our limited war capability. Irwin touched on a very sore point indeed in stating "by moving air strength out of Europe, we would limit US capability for responses to problems in the Middle East, and in the Far East would reduce flexibility to meet local situations there." Such limitation is completely at odds with the policy which you have urged many times of beefing up our capability to meet limited situations.⁴

---

² Ellipsis in the source text.

³ Reference is to NSC 5906/1, "Basic National Security Policy," approved by the President on August 5; it is scheduled for publication in volume III.

⁴ In the margin next to this paragraph is the notation in what appears to be Secretary Herter's handwriting: "With this I concur."
I think there is a good deal of sense in Irwin's point that there is a degree of "schizophrenia in at one and the same time moving in the direction of nuclear test suspension and pursuing a trend toward increased development and dependence on nuclear weapons as a result of budgetary and balance of payment pressures."

The statement on page 7 of the report referring to "our growing dependence on nuclear weapons in limited war situations" seems to fly in the face of the recent Presidential decision calling for greater "balance" in our military establishment.\(^5\)

There is no comfort in Secretary McElroy's stated belief that in a limited war situation the "use of tactical nuclear weapons would not necessarily start a general nuclear war." If there is even a 50-50 chance that their use would start a general nuclear war, I would think that they would be completely ruled out as limited war weapons by the dictates of common sense.

I share Tom Gates' expressed feeling that perhaps the courageous thing to do would be to raise taxes rather than permit budget considerations to reduce our military power.

There seems to me to be no greater problem facing this Government than whether or not to warp our military doctrine and stunt our military establishment to meet temporary economic pressures. We face the alternative of whether to run an uncertain risk of some loss of confidence in the dollar or the certain risk of loss of confidence in America's determination to make common cause with its allies and maintain a rational and credible deterrent to communist aggression. If this happens, the standing of the American dollar and a great deal more besides will inevitably be prejudiced.

I hope that you will urge this line vigorously upon the President. It seems especially important that American military influence abroad not be reduced at this time of pre-Berlin negotiation and post-Khrushchev visit.

---

\(^5\) Reference is to the President's approval on August 5 of NSC 5906/1. In the margin of this paragraph is the notation in what appears to be Herter's handwriting: "I agree."
226. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

November 4, 1959.

OTHERS PRESENT

General Norstad
General Goodpaster

General Norstad said that after the President’s meeting with General de Gaulle there was an immediate reaction in the French Government—a noticeably warmer attitude and a stronger desire to tackle knotty problems. He saw this in Joxe, Debre, Couve de Murville and the Defense Minister. While the atmosphere was good, no progress was made on solutions. De Gaulle has not changed a bit in his judgment, and is still a pressure operator. General Norstad said that because de Gaulle is not a team player, he would suggest that the President play very heavily on the NATO Council, not catering to de Gaulle but getting others with us and leaning over backwards to keep the other thirteen nations on our side.

General Norstad reported Mr. Spaak’s suggestion to defer the NATO meeting, and have Couve de Murville or Herter report to the NATO Council after the Western Summit.¹ The President said he opposed any idea of a NATO Heads of Government Meeting. He commented that de Gaulle had agreed not to call for a change in command arrangements in NATO for the present. To his question, I replied that de Gaulle had based this on the fact that France does not have the forces that would warrant such changes at the moment. General Norstad said there had been a very heated North Atlantic Council Meeting regarding the Western Summit Meeting in Paris, with other countries challenging the tendency of the four powers, and particularly France, to prejudge issues of interest to all.² They are fearful that de Gaulle is getting his way and denying them a consultative role.

With regard to the suspension of nuclear testing, General Norstad said he had talked in the United Kingdom with Admiral Mountbatten who had indicated that the position of the British Chiefs is not the same as that Macmillan has held up to this time. The British Chiefs favor a

¹ Text of Spaak’s suggestion, which was circulated to the NATO Permanent Representatives on October 31, was transmitted in Polto 757 from Paris, October 31. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1—PA/10–3159)

² Reference is to the October 28 NAC meeting, summarized in Polto 723, October 28. (Ibid., 740.00/10–2859)
suspension of testing in the atmosphere or wherever testing can be detected, without a suspension elsewhere, but with a continuation of work in the latter area. He said he thought their position is very close to our own.

General Norstad next turned to the subject of a possible reduction of U.S. forces in NATO. He said this had been badly handled. A month ago he had been told that our Government within a week would announce a reduction of fourteen squadrons. He protested violently because there had been no chance to prepare the ground for this announcement. He said that, right at this moment, two European countries are increasing their defense budgets, and two are studying ways to increase their budgets. If we decrease our forces, following the Khrushchev visit, this action will be taken as a deal with the Soviets, removing the need for security and the Europeans will cut back. His thinking has been to wait for a change in the situation and to reduce after this.

The President said that for five years he has been urging the State Department to put the facts of life before the Europeans concerning reduction of our forces. Considering the European resources, and improvements in their economies, there is no reason that they cannot take on these burdens. Our forces were put there on a stop-gap emergency basis. The Europeans now attempt to consider this deployment as a permanent and definite commitment. We are carrying practically the whole weight of the strategic deterrent force, also conducting space activities, and atomic programs. We paid for most of the infrastructure, and maintain large air and naval forces as well as six divisions. He thinks the Europeans are close to “making a sucker out of Uncle Sam”; so long as they could prove a need for emergency help, that was one thing. But that time has passed.

General Norstad said he thinks there is a way out of this. The British are increasing their defense forces a little this year, although perhaps not on the continent. The real way out is in another field—through establishing inspection and control and then cutting the forces on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

The President said he does not think we can wait on this. Every time some emergency comes up, the Europeans ask what the United States is going to do. He said he agreed with de Gaulle that some action is necessary to bring up the sense of responsibility and the morale of the Europeans in behalf of their own defense. He said he had heard from Mr. McElroy what would have to be done to stay within a level budget and the actions are severe. He said it would take every ounce of strength he had to keep the NOA below $82 billion for FY–61. Our gold is flowing out and we must not weaken our basic economic strength. He thought
our military people must look three to four years ahead and adjust accordingly.

General Norstad said he had asked the Secretary of Defense how much would be saved if we made a substantial cut in our forces in Europe. Mr. McElroy said the figure would be in the order of $200–300 million. If these cuts are made, the European countries will not ask the United States to carry their load. They will say the United States does not think it is necessary to keep up our defense strength, and will cut themselves. The President said he had had a difference with Mr. Dulles over this point. Mr. Dulles said the European morale would never become high enough to permit us to withdraw our forces.

General Norstad said that the UK and Germans are off military assistance. France can go off as soon as we have met our firm commitments. Some small countries can also go off. In addition, we can move away from giving dollars to others, and spend the money at home. OSP can be practically terminated. He thought we could begin to tell our allies that as far as our forces are concerned it is increasingly difficult to maintain them there. The United States people are insistently demanding their return. He said, however, it would kill the strength of NATO if we were to go to conferences having made such cuts.

The President said he saw no reason why Germany should be limited to twelve divisions. Their dollar balances are rising. If they were to give us $250 million a year to meet the local costs of our troops he might take a different view. General Norstad said the United States should not have to pay 42% of infrastructure. Also, he thought that France may prove to be part of the salvation of the problem. De Gaulle has made statements that NATO is important to France and that he thinks France should not be the smallest contributor.

The President said that when the NATO nations enlarge their defense forces deployed in their home countries they suffer only a budgetary problem. For us the problem is one that is both budgetary and involves the flow of our gold. He said he would like to see the Europeans make a voluntary move to recognize that the U.S. is carrying too much of the burden. General Norstad said that some one of the Europeans might come out with a statement along these lines.

The President commented that General de Gaulle stressed that he has 600,000 troops in Algeria. The President has a concern that de Gaulle will make concessions to the Soviets in order to get them to support France on Algeria. De Gaulle thinks the Soviets are not going to attack, and that he can safely rely on U.S. power, whatever concessions he makes.

The President agreed however that we cannot take ruthless actions simply for financial reasons. General Norstad reiterated that we should
try to install an inspection scheme and then cut our forces. The President agreed that this would provide a good basis. He thought the Western Europeans should come forward and say that they would take over certain responsibilities and let the U.S. cut back. He said it is vital that they develop a greater sense of responsibility.

General Norstad suggested efforts to get the Europeans to increase their defense budgets. He said this would help a great deal with our Congress. The President said it is not merely a matter of Congress which does not show enough concern over our economic situation. The problem is one of keeping ourselves sound. This he said is his major effort. Other than himself, he thought no one else is taking the problem seriously enough.

General Norstad said that Generals Lemnitzer and White, while feeling that we are cutting the heart out of important projects, are trying to carry out the President's budgetary desires. The President commented that for the first time the Chiefs seem to be giving attention to the threat to our economy. He then commented that the steel strike has now run 109 days, with great loss of production, income, profits and taxes. If the Supreme Court were to declare the Taft–Hartley procedures unconstitutional, he said he would think of applying for Mexican citizenship. He did not think a special session to pass new legislation would be what is needed, but rather action to put through a constitutional amendment, probably amounting to a shift from a Jeffersonian to a Hamiltonian type of government.

In concluding their discussion, General Norstad suggested that the President, while in Paris, make a gesture to the North Atlantic Council as he did on his last visit by going to the Palais de Chaillot. He said he might do this for ten minutes or so. He stressed that there must be no advance announcement of it at all.

 Brigadier General, USA
227. Telegram From the Mission at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State

Paris, November 10, 1959, 7 p.m.

Polto 833. For Ambassador Burgess. Following is letter to Secretary from Spaak, handed to us today:

*Verbatim Text.*

Dear Mr. Herter: I shall see you in Washington next week. As I have many things to tell you, I wish to set forth to you in writing certain of the problems that I should like to take up with you, in order that you may have an opportunity to think about them.

I. *Coordination between the NATO meeting and the Conference of the Four.*

I have received your letter and have found your arguments pertinent. I shall therefore propose to the Council that no changes be made in the dates originally fixed, with the understanding that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs will agree to make a report to the Permanent Council on the result of the Four-Party talks.

This appears to me to be essential. I am convinced that that report will not give rise to any difficult discussion, but that, on the contrary, the unity of NATO will be strengthened by this series of meetings.

I can foresee serious difficulties if this report were not given, or even if it were postponed. A feeling of uneasiness prevails among the allies other than the big powers. They believe they are not consulted sufficiently. They would be keenly disappointed if advantage were not taken of the facilities afforded by their presence in Paris to inform them fully.

If the procedure I advocate were not followed, the conviction that a political directorate is in process of being formed would take shape, and such a belief would, in my opinion, be the beginning of a serious crisis within the (North) Atlantic Organization.

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/11–1059. Secret; Limit Distribution; Official Translation. Transmitted in two sections.

1 Herter’s November 5 letter to Spaak conveyed the Secretary’s concern about the difficulties in arranging the schedule for the NATO Ministerial Meeting in relation to the December 19 meeting of the Heads of Government. (Topol 819 to Paris, November 5; *ibid.,* 396.1–PA/11–559)

2 Apparently the sentence ends here, although there is no punctuation at this point in the French text. (Translator’s note.) [Footnote in the source text.]
And so it is actually a decision of principle that must be taken. In view of the oft-repeated affirmations by United States leaders on the importance of NATO, I am certain that the possible error I have pointed out will not be committed.

It appears from my trip to London and Bonn that Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and Mr. Von Brentano are prepared to attend a meeting of the Permanent Council after the conclusion of the meeting of the Four.³

II. Political consultations within NATO.

Whereas in 1958 and the first months of 1959, the situation with respect to political consultation was constantly improving, it is evident that there has been a serious set-back during the past few months. Several important decisions have been adopted without any actual discussion in the Permanent Council. This is the cause of the uneasiness and irritation I have pointed out. There must be serious effort to correct this situation. I consider that a good position concerning the two December meetings would constitute a good beginning, but I think more must be done. In my opinion, discussion about certain problems concerning territories not covered by the Washington Treaty⁴ should be systematized. I am thinking of Africa and the Middle East in particular.

It is no longer possible to isolate European problems from those arising elsewhere. NATO must be adapted to the new forms of the Communist threat.

For several countries their interests in Africa or the Middle East are of vital importance. These countries tend to neglect NATO to the extent that the Organization proves to be incapable of giving them the aid they expect.

It must be admitted also that there is some basis for the argument that calls for establishing strategy on a world-wide basis. This need could be at least partially satisfied, if, within committees, limited in number, created in the organization, the political, economic, and military (problems?)⁵ of Africa and the Middle East could be thoroughly discussed in order to coordinate the individual positions.

Naturally, the general principles of consultation as recommended by the “three wise men” would continue to govern.⁶

---

³ Spaak visited the United Kingdom and Ireland November 2–5 and Bonn November 6. Spaak refers here to a proposed report by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany to the NAC immediately following the Heads of Government meeting in Paris scheduled for mid-December.
⁴ I.e., the North Atlantic Treaty.
⁵ Translator’s note: One or more words are missing from the French text at this point. [Footnote in the source text.]
⁶ See footnote 4, Document 139.
This seems to me to be a point of capital importance for the future.

III. Economic problems.

In my opinion, if the present discernible evolution of international policy continues, economic problems will take precedence.

It is primarily in the economic sphere that the Communist challenge will have to be accepted. Mr. Khrushchev leaves us no doubt regarding this.

I make no secret of the fact that although I am sincerely happy to see the danger of war fade, I am nevertheless disturbed to note that the West is not at all prepared for its new tasks.

It seems to me that the time is at hand when the United States ought to take a strong initiative in this regard.

The United States saved the free world with the Marshall Plan and NATO. Twice it has found the exact answer to the Communist menace as this presented itself.

The miracle must be repeated a third time.

The economic problems are many and they are interrelated: Relations between the Six and the Seven; economic and commercial relations between the United States and Europe; American aid; coordinated policy with respect to certain underdeveloped countries.

All this is a subject in which I confess I am far from being an expert, but I feel that it is in this sphere that action must be taken, and taken quickly and spectacularly. As the danger of war becomes apparently less imminent, it will be necessary, in order to maintain cohesion among the free nations, to give them new objectives in addition to those of their common defense.

The authors of the Treaty of Washington understood this perfectly. This explains Article 2 of the Treaty. Now that the possibility that was foreseen is materializing, a joint course of action must be mapped out.

Only the United States can take such an initiative. I can assure you that it would be very well received in Europe, where the best minds are keenly aware of the problems before us and await only bold leadership.

Accept, sir, the assurances of my highest and most devoted consideration. Signed P. H. Spaak.

End Verbatim Text.

---

7 See footnote 6, Document 139.
We are puzzled by what Spaak may have in mind under paragraph III. Will try to find out and report.\(^8\)

Nolting

\(^8\) Polio 850 from Paris, November 13, reported that in private conversation the previous day Spaak did not present any detailed plan regarding paragraph III, but emphasized that the West did not have adequate coordinating machinery in the new era of "peaceful coexistence" to compete with Communist penetration of emerging independent states outside the NATO area. Spaak did not think the United States would need to shoulder a larger proportionate share of the costs of any long-range NATO plan but felt that U.S. imagination and leadership in developing such a plan were indispensable. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/11-1359)

In a November 12 letter transmitted in Topol 869 to Paris, November 12, Herter thanked Spaak for his letter and suggested that Spaak should be prepared to discuss his views on the NATO defense effort during his visit to Washington. (Ibid., 740.5/11-1059)

---

228. Memorandum of Discussion at the 424th Meeting of the National Security Council

November 12, 1959.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

2. Issues of U.S. Policy Regarding the Defense Posture of NATO (NSC 5433/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "North Atlantic Treaty Organization", dated January 22, 1957; NSC Action No. 2017; NIE 20-58; NIE 100-59; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Long-Range NATO and Related European Regional Problems", dated March 11 and 23, 1959; NSC 5906/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Issues of U.S.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Boggs. In another memorandum summarizing the highlights of this meeting, prepared on November 11, Gerard Smith wrote: "I think this discussion was the most useful NSC discussion of my experience. In returning, both Dillon and Merchant expressed great satisfaction with the outcome." (Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Europe 1959)
Policy Regarding the Defense Posture of NATO", dated November 5, 1959)¹

Mr. Gray said the President had recently indicated that he wanted to have the Council discuss major policy areas from time to time without necessarily attempting to arrive at decisions on specific proposals. In response to an inquiry, the President had agreed that NATO was one of the appropriate policy areas for Council discussion. Accordingly, a Discussion Paper on the defense posture of NATO, prepared by the Department of State, was before the Council this morning.² In the interest of getting the subject in front of the Council at the earliest possible time, the Planning Board had agreed to this unilateral submission by State. Mr. Gray then called on Mr. Merchant to summarize the Discussion Paper.

Mr. Merchant said that the Discussion Paper prepared by the Department of State after consideration of the subject by the Planning Board was concerned only with policy issues bearing on the defense posture of NATO. The Paper noted the threat to NATO, discussed the "trip-wire" strategy and the "shield" strategy, took up the U.S. contribution to the NATO Shield, and considered the effects of a reduction in the near future in the combat strength of U.S. NATO-committed forces in Europe. Mr. Merchant felt that our NATO allies, in the light of their improved economic capabilities, could do more than they are doing at the present time. The problem is how to induce them to increase their defense effort, to remedy their own short-falls, and to help the U.S. reduce its contribution to NATO. The Paper before the Council was a discussion of that problem against the background of our own budgetary and balance-of-payments problems. The NATO alliance was in a condition of malaise, as reflected in recent communications regarding the Western Summit Meeting. The causes of this malaise included De Gaulle's attitude and actions, Khrushchev's campaign of sweetness and light, news stories regarding prospective reductions in the U.S. contribution, and the knowledge that U.S. military aid will be reduced. Mr. Merchant felt that two major considerations were involved in the NATO problem:

(1) U.S. force commitments for Calendar Year 1960 in relation to the commitments and incentives of our allies;

(2) The impending negotiations with the USSR on disarmament and Berlin.

Mr. Merchant said the problem was: how can the U.S. effectively exercise leadership without discouraging our allies or causing them to

¹ Regarding NSC 5906/1, see footnote 3, Document 225. Lay's November 5 memorandum enclosing a Department of State discussion paper on "Issues of U.S. Policy Regarding the Defense Posture of NATO" is in Department of State, PFS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Europe 1959. For the remaining references, see footnote 1, Document 207.

² See footnote 1 above.
panic? how can the U.S. deal with these matters in a fashion which will not risk dissipating our bargaining position vis-à-vis the USSR? In his view, earnest consideration should be given to reducing U.S. combat forces committed to NATO only in return for Soviet force reductions or withdrawal in Central Europe. Finally, Mr. Merchant noted that the Discussion Paper presented the factors in the NATO problem from the political point of view and that it made no suggestions as to tactics or timing.

Mr. Gray then called on Ambassador Burgess, who said he would make a few remarks to supplement Mr. Merchant’s exposition. The Annual Review of NATO force goals, just completed, showed that NATO had made substantial progress in the last year toward achieving its force goals. The German build-up was going forward steadily, although non-commissioned officers were still a limiting factor; German expenditures for defense were rising rapidly; Italian expenditures for defense were increasing at a rate of about four per cent a year; Belgium’s defense expenditures had risen some; and it was hoped that Danish expenditures would go up. Progress was being made in connection with training, coordination, and infra-structure. Weapons research was moving ahead promisingly. Mr. Burgess noted that U.S. aid had already been reduced substantially. In his opinion the cuts were too drastic. The U.K. and Germany were on a cash basis; i.e., they were receiving no military or economic aid, and France was practically on a cash basis. In fact, in the European area U.S. aid was going to “the under-developed countries of Europe”—Greece, Turkey and Scandinavia. The European Gross National Product had doubled per capita in the last ten years, but was still only one-half to one-third of the U.S. GNP. A study of European tax rates would show that the European tax burden was heavier than ours. Ambassador Burgess felt that the NATO goals were not completely out of reach; that with some effort on the part of the Europeans and some participation on the part of the U.S., the alliance could come close to achieving its goals. Manpower problems remained serious however. Twelve German divisions were needed and two French divisions should be returned from Algeria at the earliest possible moment; indeed the Algerian conflict should be resolved. In order for NATO goals to be fully achieved, U.S. assistance at the rate of $2 billion a year for two years would be required. Action was being taken to induce the European countries to make more rapid progress toward NATO goals; we were attempting to “apply the heat.” This, however, was a slow and difficult process. With respect to our balance-of-payments and budgetary problems, we had proposed a number of things the European countries might do, e.g., expanded trade, tourist expenditures, more European aid to underdeveloped countries. It would be necessary for us to select
which of these various proposals we were most interested in; the European countries could not attempt them all.

Secretary Herter said he wished to call attention to two facets of the NATO problems:

(1) The concept of the Sword and the Shield appeared to be a generally acceptable concept.

(2) The psychological impact of a withdrawal of U.S. forces and shift of the burden to European countries would be tremendous. The psychological impact of anything we did with respect to NATO was very important and must be watched with great care.

Secretary Herter then asked whether Mr. Dulles would be willing to summarize the recent Special National Intelligence Estimate on “Special Aspects of the NATO problem” (SNIE 100-10-59).³

Mr. Dulles pointed out that the SNIE was limited to the probable impact of a substantial unilateral reduction within the near future of U.S. NATO forces in the European area on: (a) the political attitudes and defense policies of European NATO members and (b) the overall Western negotiating position on Berlin, Germany, and disarmament. The Estimate was unanimously agreed on by the intelligence community except for Air Force reservations on two points. The Estimate concluded that:

(1) Any substantial unilateral reduction of U.S. NATO forces in Europe within the next few months would be regarded as an abrupt withdrawal from firm commitments to NATO.

(2) Diplomatic preparation could mitigate the bad effects of a unilateral US reduction.

(3) In any event, a U.S. decision to reduce its forces in Europe substantially would be widely interpreted as reflecting growing U.S. preoccupation with domestic economic concerns and a decreased sense of urgency about European security.

(4) A substantial unilateral reduction in U.S. forces would reduce popular willingness in Europe to support contributions to NATO at their present level and would intensify the underlying strains in the alliance, although not leading to a major split.

(5) A substantial and unilateral reduction of U.S. forces in Europe at this time would weaken the Western bargaining position on Berlin, Germany, and disarmament.

Secretary Anderson said that outstanding in the Discussion Paper was the argument that MC-70 goals require the U.S. to increase rather than decrease aid to NATO in order to hold the alliance together. He felt that no one had supported NATO more strongly than he, but wished to point out that the argument in the Paper was based on certain question-

³SNIE 100–10–59, November 10, summarized below, is not printed. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files)
able hypotheses such as: (1) the Soviet threat to NATO has increased; (2) MC-70 is a bare minimum; (3) the Europeans feel we are committed to provide armed forces over a period of some years; (4) Europeans do not have the capability to make progress on MC-70 goals unless we increase our aid; and (5) the withdrawal of U.S. forces would threaten the political cohesion of the alliance.

Over the years, Secretary Anderson continued, it had been agreed in this government that at some time U.S. forces committed to NATO would have to be reduced, but no time seemed to be a good time for this reduction to take place. Some event always stood in the way, e.g., trouble in France, an election in the U.K., or the prospect that Germany would join NATO. It was also generally agreed that there could be no limited war in Europe; if this were so, one might question the size of the Shield. Our allies had indicated an unwillingness to meet MC-70 goals so that we constantly have to “prod” them. If the Europeans believed MC-70 to be essential to their security, we would not have to prod. Secretary Anderson was also worried about the implications in the Paper that we are committed for years to come. He did not wish to weaken Free World security, or the cohesion of the alliance, but he asked the Council to remember that every European country has been preoccupied with its own problems constantly, so that the U.S. should not worry overmuch about being preoccupied with its own problems. Balance-of-payments and budgetary problems were troublesome things with which the U.S. could not compromise, and the satisfactory solution of such problems was just as vital to the world as it was to the U.S.

The President felt that there had been too much talk about reduction of U.S. forces committed to NATO. For years we had talked about making our allies see the problem as we see it. When he was first assigned to SHAPE in 1951, he was told by President Truman that the commitment of U.S. forces to Europe was an emergency measure to induce a rise in European morale and to provide land forces to help meet an aggression in Europe. The President had recently been told that, although he went all over Europe in 1951 representing our commitment of forces to NATO as an emergency measure, no U.S. political authority had ever emphasized the emergency character of the mission. Consequently, the U.S. had maneuvered itself into a greater position of responsibility than was necessary. The President felt we should not ever admit that the 220 million people of Europe could not provide the ground forces necessary for their defense. Nevertheless, we should not talk about reducing our forces committed to NATO until we are able to educate our allies as to the facts of life. When we talk of U.S. troop redeployment, everyone misinterprets our meaning. We must make a political effort to let the people of Europe see that we want to be fair. At present we are bearing a large share of the infra-structure cost, we are
bearing almost all the cost of the deterrent, and we are maintaining a large navy to keep the seas free. The President noted incidentally in this connection that Khrushchev was inclined to laugh at the U.S. for having a surface navy, and had recently canceled construction of some Soviet cruisers even though such construction was rather far advanced. This government, the President continued, must decide what is needed in NATO and must obtain the political agreement of our allies. If responsibility for defending the world is to be imposed upon us, then perhaps we had better rule the world; he was tired of having the whole defense burden placed on U.S. shoulders. In connection with the GNP which had been mentioned a while ago, he would like to say that our GNP was composed of some things we needed no more than a dog needs two tails. The fact is, we are putting money into elements of common defense, such as the deterrent, that our allies must be brought to appreciate. However, nothing could be more fatal than to withdraw our troops from Europe or to say we are about to withdraw them. It was high time that the thinking of Europe was reoriented and made more realistic before the NATO situation is further crystallized; it was high time that the population of Europe did its part with respect to ground forces. However, the U.S. could not initiate a definite scheme for the reduction of U.S. forces, and in the absence of agreement by Europe, say this and only this is what we are going to do.

Mr. Gray said that in its discussion of the subject, the Planning Board had raised some questions about various sections of the Discussion Paper. The Paper, for example indicated that the Soviet threat to NATO had broadened and increased since 1949.

The President, interrupting, asked Mr. Gray to record one minority vote against that view.

Mr. Gray, resuming his briefing, said that the Planning Board had raised the following questions:

(1) Even though Soviet capabilities have increased since 1959, are not NATO military capabilities also greater?
(2) Isn’t it true that Soviet intentions are less threatening than in 1949?
(3) Are all forces committed to MC-70 really necessary to an effective Shield strategy? For example, does every NATO nation have to have army, navy and air forces? Are NATO nations maintaining in

---

4 As a result of NSC Planning Board discussion on November 6, a revised version of the November 5 Department of State discussion paper, dated November 9, was transmitted in a memorandum from the NSC Executive Secretary to the NSC, November 10. (Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Nat. Sec. Affairs Records, NATO) According to NSC Action No. 2149 (see footnote 6 below), it was this revised version that Merchant summarized at the outset of this NSC meeting. The record of the meeting of the NSC Planning Board, November 6, merely notes the discussion of the Department of State discussion paper. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC Planning Board Minutes 1959)
Europe national forces which aren't part of MC-70 and which could be reduced to help meet MC-70?

(4) Is it true that the U.K. and French Governments maintain that they must have independent nuclear deterrent forces to offset doubts that the U.S. strategic forces would respond to a Soviet offensive in force against Europe?

(5) Is the U.S. morally committed to support MC-70 strategy through 1963?

Mr. Herter said that prior to the adoption of MC-70 goals of 30 divisions by 1963, the force goals for NATO had been 70 divisions. Accordingly, MC-70 was supposed to represent a real reduction in NATO forces. The U.S. was committed to MC-70 to the extent that it took the lead in 1957 to get each NATO country to do its proportionate share in MC-70. The Annual Review provided for under MC-70 is an opportunity for a revision of MC-70, but in the minds of the Europeans we are committed to MC-70 goals to be achieved by 1963.

Mr. Gray asked whether the U.S. must keep 5-1/2 divisions in Europe through 1963. Mr. Herter said the number of divisions we must keep in Europe was a military question which he would not attempt to decide. He could only speak from the psychological point of view; but from that point of view we were committed in the minds of the Europeans.

The President believed that any changes in our commitment to NATO should not be taken up in connection with the Annual Review, but should be agreed to by the NATO Governments in bilateral negotiations. The President asked the Council to look at the 1914–1939 forces maintained in Europe. Western Germany appeared to be having difficulty in raising 12 divisions, but it had had no difficulty in raising a great many more divisions than twelve before World War II. The President thought we would be in bad shape if we did not get a better understanding of our duties and responsibilities on the part of the European countries.

Secretary Herter said the news of our preoccupation with certain economic matters had produced tremendous repercussion in Europe. The Europeans had begun to think of our budgetary and balance-of-payments problems very seriously. The Secretary also felt that before we approached European governments about reducing our forces committed to NATO we should have an understanding with General Norstad, who had worked his heart out on the problem. Any proposal to reduce U.S. forces would mean a new military assessment by all our allies.

The President felt that a new military assessment was not the gist of the problem. In his view we would not be much stronger or weaker than
MC-70. He was arguing that Europe had never done its full duty in connection with NATO.

Secretary Herter said that General Norstad had suggested a “thin-out” of NATO forces, but with a compensatory Russian “thin-out”. This suggestion presented difficulties, however, because Germany was fearful of being pushed to the East; any feeling that we are weakening NATO automatically makes Germany uneasy. The President said we were not talking about reducing forces or about withdrawing forces, but about getting the NATO governments to understand our problems. He remarked incidentally that the late Secretary Dulles had always been reluctant to approach the NATO governments with this problem. Moreover, the President continued, he saw no reason why the U.S. should apologize for being preoccupied with its financial situation. The European countries were constantly preoccupied with their own problems and were inclined to say “If you won’t, we won’t.” He liked the suggestion that the Germans might do more. However, this idea would probably be unpopular in Europe, which had been obsessed with the idea that Germany should not have too many armed forces. The French had always been afraid of the German forces; when he was at SHAPE, he had had to go to the French and say “Who is your enemy—Germany or Russia?” The French had never given him a satisfactory reply. The President did not believe that we could possibly take the FY 1961 budget for NATO and reduce it in any way. This, he added, was a blow to him, because he had thought that the Europeans would volunteer to assist us in the light of our budgetary and balance-of-payments problems.

Mr. Gray remarked that the Council had been dealing with matters within the purview of the Department of Defense, but had not yet given Secretary McElroy an opportunity to speak.

Secretary McElroy said that he and his associates had devoted a great deal of thought to the question of the budget. All their work on the FY 1961 military budget made it apparent that if we are to have forces with modern weapons, we must reduce the numerical strength of those forces. It would be possible to increase military expenditures if the national interest required, but a level budget of about $41 billion would not permit the purchase of modern hardware. Our overseas deployments were an extravagant use of forces compared to the possibility of maintaining our forces in the U.S. Secretary McElroy agreed that a discussion with our NATO partners was needed, but care must be taken to see that such a discussion was not interpreted as a U.S. opinion that the threat had decreased. In his view, in the future, the threat of aggression would be more serious in the Middle East, Southeast Asia and the Far East than in Europe. Only the U.S. and the U.K. would be able to oppose aggression in Southeast Asia, for example, and the U.K. was being coy about that. He would not reduce the U.S. overall effort in behalf of the Free
World, but he would be inclined to recognize a shift in the threat away from Europe and toward regions where our allies cannot carry a share of the burden. What, then, should the U.S. continue to contribute to the defense of the NATO countries?

Secretary McElroy felt that our number one contribution to NATO should be the maintenance of our deterrent nuclear retaliatory forces. The U.K. would be able to help us repel local aggression, but would be increasingly unable to help with the deterrent. Our second contribution to the defense of NATO should be an adequate number of troops in Europe—say two divisions—to establish the fact that the U.S. is committed to use its deterrent forces in the event of an attack on the ground in Europe. Secretary McElroy supported the views of the Secretary of State and the President that the present was no time to state that we will reduce our ground forces in Europe. To do so would lead the Europeans to feel that we were reneging on our commitments and would throw away our bargaining position vis-à-vis the USSR. The President could decide on a reduction of our forces committed to NATO, as well as on the creation of a political climate to make reduction possible, without engendering the feeling that we were running away from our responsibilities. This could be accomplished affirmatively without a sacrifice of the Sword or the Shield. On the ground, we should work toward the understanding that Germany, France, and others might each put up another division. Secretary McElroy asked whether General White wished to say anything. General White said he had nothing to add.

Mr. Stans said that the requirements of our NATO forces were a significant budgetary demand but only one among many such demands. He wished to present two sets of figures which had a bearing on the NATO problem. At the present time we had 700,000 men and dependents in the NATO countries, in Spain and in Morocco. The cost of this deployment was $2-1/2 billion exclusive of construction, pipeline, large equipment, back-up in the U.S., and $900 million in assistance for NATO. This figure had a $1,200,000,000 effect on the balance-of-payments. The total cost of our NATO commitment was $4 billion a year, not including the cost of the Sixth Fleet. Mr. Stans said that the possibility of balancing the FY 1960 budget has now disappeared. A $1 billion deficit was in prospect and a miracle would be required to bring the budget back into balance. Moreover, the FY 1961 budget will have built-in increases over the FY 1960 budget of about $2-$2-1/2 billion. Mr. Stans' second set of figures referred to the savings which could be achieved by eliminating or deploying U.S. divisions now in Europe. $400 million would be saved the first year and possibly more thereafter by eliminating two U.S. divisions now in Europe. $200 million would be saved the first year by redeploying to the U.S. two U.S. divisions now in Europe. Mr. Stans concluded that the cost versus the benefits of various
levels of strength of U.S. forces committed to Europe should be compared. Moreover, he believed the arguments presented in the State Department Discussion Paper against the "trip-wire" strategy were not particularly strong. If the arguments against the "trip-wire" strategy are not strong, are the alternative strategies worth what they cost? Referring to the assertion that the tax burden is higher in Europe, Mr. Stans pointed out that governmental expenditures of the European countries are devoted to considerable extent to "cradle to the grave" social benefits and state socialism. The U.S. devotes 60 per cent of its budget to defense as against 30 per cent for its NATO allies. Ten and one-half per cent of the U.S. GNP is devoted to defense against five per cent of the NATO countries' GNP. Mr. Stans felt that if the Council endorsed the conclusions of the State Department Discussion Paper, such endorsement would amount to a budgetary decision which would affect the budgets for Fiscal Years 1961, 1962, and 1963. He associated himself with the points made by the Secretary of Treasury and the questions posed by Mr. Gray, and agreed with Secretary McElroy's suggestions. Finally, Mr. Stans remarked that political and economic considerations govern the amount of money the European countries are willing to spend for defense; our defense expenditures should also be governed by political and economic considerations.

Secretary McElroy asked whether Mr. Stans' figures meant that in order to save $2 billion or even $2.1 billion all our forces committed to NATO would have to be eliminated. Mr. Stans replied in the affirmative.

The President asked what effect the elimination or redeployment of troops would have on the balance-of-payments.

Secretary McElroy said the variables were so enormous that any estimate was really a guess, but in his view a reduction of three U.S. divisions committed to NATO would give us a $300 million "pick-up" in the balance-of-payments. Mr. Stans agreed with this estimate.

Secretary Anderson asked whether it would be practicable to modify our dependents policy if it were decided not to reduce U.S. forces committed to NATO.

Secretary McElroy said the dependents policy was being carefully examined, but it should be remembered that if all dependents were brought home, additional cost would be incurred because of the need for more rapid rotation of our forces. He said that if we decided to pursue MC-70 goals without change, then he would take a careful look at our dependents policy; but if redeployment were decided upon, he would wish to keep the present tour of duty in force. Mr. Stans said we had about one dependent overseas for each soldier.
The President said that despite his budgetary anxiety he did not believe that in the NATO field we could make any great move this year, and probably not next year, without losing more than we would gain. However, we must not drift. We should bring our problems to the attention of Europe bluntly and clearly, and should perhaps develop a better way of doing so. He was pleased that everyone now believes we ought to do something about our forces committed to NATO. He had been saying for a long time that something should be done, but heretofore had been unable to get anyone else interested.

Secretary Herter said the U.K. was considering our situation and desired to send a mission to the U.S. to talk to the Secretary of Defense about a more effective joint utilization of resources. The President suspected that the British want to be relieved of some of their nuclear expenses. Secretary Herter said that the British were willing to contribute more manpower to joint defense. Apropos of nuclear expenses, the President remarked that General de Gaulle wants to spend a great deal of money in order to produce an insignificant explosion in the Sahara.

Mr. Gray raised the question of the relationship of the Draper Committee recommendations to NATO. Secretary Herter said he had not covered this question in his remarks because he understood that the Council would be discussing the Mutual Security Program on November 25.

The President said the Draper Committee recommendations could be taken as a Bible if someone were able to suggest how we might reduce expenditures other than those recommended by the Draper Committee, or how we might raise taxes. He would not be a party to financing everything by the issuance of bonds. He felt that the Draper Committee had gone far beyond its charter and should have completed the job by recommending compensatory cuts in the budget.

Ambassador Burgess said that the Draper Report had suggested an increase in military assistance to Europe over actual appropriations, but no increase over the current rate of spending.

Secretary Anderson pointed out in this connection that provision of equipment to foreign countries has as much effect on the budget as the provision of money, but that the balance-of-payments effect of the provision of equipment is not as great.

Secretary McElroy said that 85 per cent of our military assistance did not affect the balance-of-payments.

---

5 The recommendations of the Draper Committee are contained in Composite Report of the President’s Committee To Study the United States Military Assistance Program, August 17, 1959 (Washington, 1959), vol. I, and Supplement to the Composite Report of the President’s Committee To Study the United States Military Assistance Program, August 17, 1959 (Washington, 1959), vol. II.
The President said he would like to see prepared a combined paper indicating how we should approach the NATO countries, what our objectives should be, what we would like to emphasize and to de-emphasize. If we could formulate our own policy, we would know how to educate the Europeans.

Mr. Gray said that NSC 5915, "U.S. Policy toward Cyprus", was on the agenda this morning, but that there would not be sufficient time to consider it, inasmuch as a Cabinet meeting was scheduled to begin in five minutes.

The National Security Council:  

a. Discussed the subject, based upon the Discussion Paper prepared by the Department of State after discussion by the NSC Planning Board (transmitted by the reference memorandum of November 10, 1959), as summarized orally by Deputy Under Secretary of State Merchant; in the light of an oral report by Ambassador Burgess, and an oral summary by the Director of Central Intelligence of SNI 100-10-59, "Special Aspects of the NATO Problem".

b. Noted the President's request that the Departments of State and Defense prepare for Council consideration a report analyzing and recommending U.S. policy regarding the future roles and contributions of the United States and other NATO nations with respect to the collective defense posture, as a basis for consultation with other NATO governments. The President stated that such a report should provide guidance as to the main factors that should be taken into account, and what aspects should be emphasized or de-emphasized in the future. The President also stressed the importance of recommendations which are plausible to NATO allies as well as sound from the U.S. viewpoint.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for appropriate action.

The President decided that there would be no significant cuts in Calendar Year 1960 in the forces committed to NATO for that year, unless agreed to through negotiations.

Marion W. Boggs

---

*Paragraphs a and b and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2149, approved by the President on November 17. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) Before the President approved this action, he had another meeting with McElroy and others on military and NATO matters on November 16; see Document 229.*
229. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Augusta, Georgia, November 16, 1959, 8:30 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Sec. McElroy
Mr. Gates
Gen. Twining
Mr. Sprague
Gen. Randall
Gen. Persons
Mr. Gordon Gray
Dr. Kistiakowsky
Gen. Goodpaster

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

Mr. McElroy said that to relieve the budget further, he would like to pull a number of our Air Force units out of NATO. He said this matter had become an issue between the State Department and the Defense Department, centering on the record of action of the last NSC meeting. In view of the fact that the French denied us bases from which to conduct attack operations with these Air Force units, he thought we were justified in planning to pull them back. The President supported this general view, commenting on the fact that we have in NATO the equivalent of 6 divisions, which we never intended to keep there permanently. The reason we have them there is the NATO allies are almost psychopathic whenever anyone suggests removing them. Gen. Twining commented that the Air Force would like to pull these air units out. Gen. Norstad is vehemently opposed to this idea. The President commented that we cannot pull out committed forces suddenly. We break faith with our allies. Mr. Gray said that we are committed for the calendar year 1960 with respect to these forces but not beyond. Mr. McElroy said he would like not to be rockbound with regard to these forces. The denial of bases in France has obliged us to put our forces in crowded areas in Great Britain. After further discussion of the matter, the President said we should not prepare our budget on the basis of pulling these units back. We must get the word gradually to NATO that we are going to reduce them. He said we must keep them there in the meantime, even if this costs us extra money. Mr. McElroy said the Air Force would try to rework their budget so as to keep these units there.


1 See footnote 6, Document 228.
The President then asked, what about the Sixth Fleet? He said he is getting very doubtful regarding the value of having this Fleet sitting in the Mediterranean. The British and French have strength there, and this has traditionally been an area of their responsibility. In fact, they want to exercise greater influence there now. Our fleet gives us in fact only two groups of aircraft. He is very doubtful regarding its value in a big war. Mr. Gates said that he shared the doubt that the Sixth Fleet should be kept in the Mediterranean. He said the Navy argues that its presence there holds together our cold war allies. Again it would take a lot of political preparation to be able to remove the fleet from the Mediterranean. The President commented that this was an area in which he and Mr. Dulles had divergent views. Mr. Dulles had practically a phobia against raising the question of reduction of these forces. The President said he was certain we should make the Europeans do more. However, he did not see much use talking about the NATO force in relation with the current budget. He recognized that reduction in some fields in NATO might however prove possible. Mr. McElroy asked if it would be acceptable to take these questions up with NATO. The President said it would, adding that we should go to NATO and tell our allies that the time has come for us to backtrack a bit. He added that we should not get this question into an emotional stage before we have had private talks with our major allies one at a time. We should stress that what we are seeking to do is keep our economy strong—on which all of NATO depends—and at the same time be faithful to our commitments. He repeated that we cannot make a budget for FY '61 that contemplates a pullout. We must find other ways. Mr. McElroy said this means that we must pay another year of the NATO bill. He thought that work should start at once to change the political base for our procedure by which these commitments are made. The present one was made in mid-1959 without Bureau of the Budget and NSC consideration. Mr. McElroy said this should be a matter of authorization by the President before annual commitments are made. The President stated that he would bring this matter up with Macmillan, Adenauer and De Gaulle, and would point out that we have a special burden—of keeping up the over-all deterrent. He recognized that they would say that we of course have to do this anyway, so it is not a commitment to NATO. Gen. Twining said he did not think the NATO allies would be as surprised as some people visualized. Several have indicated to him that they are surprised that we have stayed as long as we have.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

G.

Brigadier General, USA
230. Memorandum From Secretary of State Herter to President Eisenhower

November 23, 1959.

[Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series. Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

231. Memorandum of Conversation

November 24, 1959, 8:30–9:10 a.m.

SUBJECT

NATO Problems

PARTICIPANTS

President Eisenhower
M. Paul-Henri Spaak
Secretary Herter
Ambassador Burgess

M. Spaak began by saying that in Europe today there is some hesitation and doubt with respect to our general policies toward the Soviets. The United States must be very firm and clear at the December meeting in explaining the American position. There is a feeling that we are moving toward peaceful coexistence step by step. There is danger that Europe will think all problems have been settled, and therefore the military effort can be reduced.

M. Spaak said that in his view no problems are settled at the present time. The Soviets could return to the cold war, and therefore the American position in the military field is very important. It is right that the

Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, NATO. Secret. Drafted by Charles Sedgwick, interpreter, and Fessenden. The meeting was held at the White House. Attached to the source text is a memorandum of transmittal from Calhoun to Goodpaster, December 3. Another copy of this memorandum of conversation indicates that the White House approved it on December 7. Attached to this copy is a verbatim transcript of the conversation prepared by Sedgwick. (Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Europe 1959)
United States should say that Europe must bear a fair share of the effort. However, there is a danger that, if Europe thinks the United States wants to diminish its effort, some countries might use this as a pretext for diminishing their own.

The President replied that he has been trying to explain to the larger countries that they are not doing their full duty. When he had visited the NATO capitals in January, 1951, he had thought that, as far as American troop strength was concerned, we were carrying out nothing more than a stop-gap, temporary operation. The Marshall Plan was already working at that time, although its full effect had not yet been felt. We knew, of course, that European military strength could not be instantly increased because those countries had had a hard time, but we thought that in due course they would carry their full weight. After all, there are fifty million people in Italy, something like forty-five million in France, about fifty-five million in West Germany, plus the people of the Low Countries and Scandinavia. That makes a total population of around 175 to 200 millions, without counting England, and those are skilled, cultured people.

It is true, of course that France has detached 600,000 troops and sent them south, but there are still a great many people in Western Europe. We ought to strengthen NATO and not weaken it, and in this way we can gain the stability and confidence we need. What the European countries seem to feel is that, ten years from now, the same United States strength will be deployed in Europe as exists today. The United States provides the nuclear bombs and the missiles, which are frightfully expensive. It provides much of the air force and the free world's navy, including the submarines. Europe benefits by all this without the expense. Why, therefore, shouldn't Europe get more inspiration from our example? The President said that, in 1951, he had never thought that the United States command of NATO forces would last as long as it has. He had thought that, in eight years' time, an Englishman or a Frenchman would be in command, although he recognized it would be difficult for Europe to agree on the choice of a commander. In any case, the United States plays too big a part in it all. The President said that he certainly did not mean that the troop strength should be reduced, but at the same time we must make absolutely sure that Europe accepts its responsibilities.

M. Spaak said that he agreed completely. Europe is recovering economically, and therefore new discussions of the problem are needed. It would be dangerous, however, if the United States were to take a unilateral decision. The United States has a duty to explain conditions to

---

1 Eisenhower visited the NATO capitals January 7-26, 1951.
Europe and to the world. The United States can point out that the United Kingdom is in a good situation, and so is Germany, and the smaller countries. The United States should speak very firmly to some of the smaller countries. M. Spaak said that, as Secretary-General, he finds it hard to discuss this openly, but the truth is that Norway, Denmark and Belgium are not making a useful military contribution. Their effort is declining year by year. The United States should initiate multilateral discussions on this matter. If the European countries suddenly come to the conclusion that the United States is going to withdraw its troops without discussion, they will think that the world situation is better, and will reduce their forces.

The President said that we must not put the cart before the horse. We must do things in the proper sequence. However, the fact remains that the other countries are not accepting their responsibilities.

M. Spaak said that the United States is too kind, too indulgent. Sometimes it is necessary to speak out with full strength. Otherwise the Europeans will think that the rich, strong United States will always be there to help. If however, the United States speaks clearly and firmly, saying that this situation cannot go on forever, and that Europe must provide for its own defense, it will be extremely useful.

The President remarked that he has been urging this policy for the past five years, but every year some new crisis arises, and people think that this is not the year for us to open our mouths.

At first Belgium had a two-year military service, but, when they saw that other countries had only 14 or 16 months’ service, they decided to reduce their own. There should be some country besides the United States that is ready to do its full share. There should be a government—not just an individual—which is ready to say: This is what we must do.

M. Spaak asked whether the United States will withdraw all its troops from Europe some day. The President replied that we absolutely would not do this.

M. Spaak noted that there is another problem—the position of de Gaulle—which is a great source of trouble for us in NATO. All that de Gaulle says about armaments is wrong. De Gaulle’s ideas are those of Merovingian times, but war has vastly changed since the days of the Merovignians. His attitude is extremely dangerous.

The President said that de Gaulle feels that an Army can have no morale unless it is defending its own country, yet in the Second World War, when a lot of us were fighting on foreign soil, it seemed we had good morale.

The President said that never in our lifetime will all our troops be withdrawn from Europe because it is important to carry the flag. We are contributing about 40 per cent of the infrastructure requirements. Our
fleets are in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. There is a question as to the usefulness of the Sixth Fleet in a general war. Perhaps it is exercising a calming influence, but the United Kingdom and France should take on more responsibility in that area.

We must strengthen NATO by making Western Europe more self-dependent, but throughout our lifetime, we shall have token forces over there. We will have some naval strength, some ground installations and missile bases. We will contribute to the infrastructure requirements. But now we ought to say to Europe: You should be ashamed to have our troops over there.

M. Spaak commented that perhaps it would be well to say that in 1949 the situation was such that the United States had to undertake a large share of the effort. That was what was also said later in Lisbon. But since that time the countries of Europe have made great progress, and therefore their share in the defense of NATO must be increased, and this is a problem which requires study.

The President said there is the matter of the way we approach the problem. We must do it diplomatically. We must tell governments that they must do more and give our reasons. Then governments can give instructions to their representatives as to the attitude they should take in NATO. If the representatives in NATO do not understand the situation, there will be complete confusion.

Secretary Herter said that the Europeans are beginning to understand our position. We must proceed by consultation, and not unilaterally.

The President said that he agreed. He added that one country, Turkey, is strained to the limit. Germany on the other hand, is holding back. M. Spaak said that Greece and Italy are making an effort. France is a special case. Germany is making slow progress, but is improving. Their position is strong, but the percentage of their income devoted to defense is small.

M. Spaak said some have suggested that perhaps it might be a good idea to ask the experts or the "Wise Men" to study the question, as had been done before Lisbon.

The President said that perhaps this could be done. We might present our position to governments, with a Wise Men’s report, and then have the NATO Council debate the matter.

M. Spaak returned to the question of the international situation. Some think that a new situation has arisen.

The President said that, with the Indian situation what it is, he had decided to visit India, as he had been wanting to do for the past four or

---

2 The NAC Ministerial Meeting was held in Lisbon February 20–25, 1952.
five years. He hopes to awaken the countries that are not members of NATO to the need for unity. This is desirable because we had not merely to keep Moscow in a state of tension, but because we want to defend the same human values as they do, and to obtain coherence. The President hoped that this effort will be well received in NATO, and that NATO, instead of giving way to divisive influences, will be more solidly unified. However, de Gaulle’s strong position in France and his antiquated ideas on alliances are not good or healthy because French representatives must reflect de Gaulle’s views. We must reach the people. This is a big task, which will remain just as long as the Communist Manifesto remains and just as long as Russia and China pose a threat.

M. Spaak said that it is difficult to convince de Gaulle with arguments, but he is an intelligent man and a realist. If he is confronted with hard facts, he becomes more flexible. If in NATO the United States takes a decisive lead, all the other countries will follow, and France will stand completely alone. If de Gaulle refuses to agree, we shall act alone. There is no possibility of convincing de Gaulle.

The President commented that the problem still remains that de Gaulle is capable of making fantastic decisions. He might say that France would withdraw its forces from NATO and limit its military effort to Algeria.

M. Spaak said this is not the policy of France, but of de Gaulle. In France there is no Parliament; there is no Government; there is only de Gaulle, and his ideas are not those of France.

On the general international situation, the President said that, since the very beginning, he has been saying that we cannot negotiate from weakness, but only from a position of strength. There has been no change except that Khrushchev is not so belligerent as he was earlier, or as Stalin was. It is very bad if people are lulled into the belief that the Communist goal has changed just because there is a sweeter smile in the Kremlin. This is something we must counteract. On the other hand, if we are to seek fruitful negotiations with the Soviets, we must not indulge in name-calling. We must observe the normal decencies of diplomatic language. We cannot speak of Khrushchev’s hands dripping with Hungarian blood. It is, in fact, true, but we cannot speak about it.

M. Spaak agreed, but added that people are very fond of wishful thinking. In December there must be a firm statement, pointing out that nothing fundamental has changed, but that we must take advantage of the better atmosphere to try to improve our position. We cannot reduce our military effort before success has been achieved.

---

3 Eisenhower visited India December 9-14.
The President agreed that nothing could be worse. The United States has a two-year military service. It is fair to ask why Western Europe cannot do the same.

M. Spaak said that it is unfortunate that the EDC was rejected because Europe must accept the rule of uniformity. If one country has a two-year period and another only one, it is hard for the first country to maintain the longer period. Each Government should spend the same percentage of its income for the common effort. There should be standardization. This was the goal of the EDC, and it is a pity that it was rejected.

The President said that, in the spring of 1952, he swore, prayed, almost wept for the EDC. It was initialed, but after the French Parliament was through with it, there was nothing left.

Americans complain that we have our divisions over there, in addition to our other commitments, and yet Europe does nothing. England has cut down its effort and wants to cut it even more, although she might reconsider her cuts.

M. Spaak commented on the danger that Belgium may withdraw its troops from Germany. That would be foolish; NATO should strongly oppose the idea. There is no use in Belgium’s having two divisions in Belgium.

The President said that he agreed with Mr. Spaak. Our problem is how to accomplish this without causing alarm. The Secretary of State has been asked to explain the problem to governments, to explain how they are shirking their duty. Then we can speak of the great need of maintaining our strength. We must reinforce success, and not failure.

M. Spaak said that the NATO countries should be kept informed of what is planned. The arrangements for the December meeting are good, but the countries should be kept informed. The small countries in particular appreciate this sort of thing.

The President commented that you cannot negotiate with the Communists except from a position of strength. They respect you more if you are strong. We do not need to be belligerent or chauvinistic because we are strong. Quite the contrary. We can afford to make concessions if we are strong. M. Spaak agreed that there can be no success if little concessions are made to the Communists. We must keep our position very firm on the basic principles. M. Spaak asked if we expect success at the Summit Meeting, on the Berlin question. The President replied that Khrushchev might say that he will do nothing sudden in Berlin, that he will present no ultimatum. This would be a half-way retreat. He may give some pledge on Berlin which will not be wholly satisfactory, but which will allay fears. As far as nuclear tests are concerned, Khrushchev is worried by the cost of armaments. He says he wants to disarm, but that
he can't convince the United States to disarm on his terms. He has given much emphasis to "mutual trust," but we will agree only if there is an adequate system of inspection and control.

The President agreed with M. Spaak's comment that, if armaments are so very expensive for the United States, they must be so for the USSR also. The expense to the USSR is about half what it is to us, but the relative effort is about the same. The President stated that all this was foolish. Khrushchev says that there is a lot of talk about peace in the world, but what do the Russians do? Sometimes Khrushchev hints that he might agree to mutual inspection, but then he retreats. It may be agreed that we reduce the armaments burden, the President said, but he recalled what happened in 1922 in the Nine Power Treaty. Under Mr. Coolidge and Mr. Hoover we observed the letter of the law. We did not even elevate our guns, but all the time the Japanese were building ships. We cannot afford to repeat that experience.

The President concluded by agreeing with M. Spaak that we must strengthen NATO. There can be no security in any region unless the people of that region are determined to make the necessary effort. The United States cannot do the job all by itself, even with 40 Divisions. We can import troops, but we cannot import a heart, and people lose heart if they feel that everything depends on us. We must not minimize the over-all seriousness of the situation.

M. Spaak agreed that the President must be very severe in NATO. (The conversation was concluded at 9:10 a.m.)

---

4 Reference should be to the Five-Power Treaty of 1922, which established naval ratios for capital ships of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Japan, and Italy. The Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 provided for the reaffirmation of the Open Door in China.

232. Editorial Note

In November 1959, the United Kingdom decided not to reduce its troops in Europe. Secretary Herter was notified of this decision on December 1, at the conclusion of a conference in Washington on the peaceful uses of Antarctica. In a memorandum for the record, December 2, Herter wrote:

"After the signing ceremony of the Antarctic Treaty yesterday, Ambassador Caccia showed me a memorandum from the Foreign Office in
London, obviously dictated by Selwyn Lloyd, in which it was stated that the British Government had decided not to go to the WEU with respect to a possible reduction of British troops in Europe from 55,000 to 45,000. The document indicated that Selwyn Lloyd had promised to keep me advised as to decisions of the British Government in this matter and that he thought I would be gratified to learn of this decision, even though it had been reached by the British Government with great reluctance.” (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers)

In a message to Lloyd, December 10, Herter wrote: “I deeply appreciate your courtesy in letting me know through Harold Caccia of the British Government decision not to reduce its troops in Europe. I feel this is most helpful and will contribute considerably to easing our discussions next week in Paris.” (Telegram 4579 to London, December 10; Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/12–1059)

233. Text of Statement by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Twining)


“Since the end of World War II, United States policy has firmly supported the concept of collective security as the basis for defense of the free world. The major collective security arrangement in which the United States is involved is, of course, NATO.

“While great strides have been made, through our past efforts, toward creating an effective NATO defense, there are, at the present time, several obstacles—or impediments—to further progress. These obstacles can and should be removed. Those countries responsible for the lack of progress in certain critical areas which I shall discuss are weakening the entire defense of NATO and are thereby increasing the possibility of war. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff are deeply concerned with respect to several of these issues.

“First, we are concerned with the lack of progress, with respect to certain nations, in necessary arrangements for the accommodation of nuclear weapons and nuclear strike forces. Some NATO nations appear
to feel that they are doing the United States a favor in making such arrangements. They desire the security which can be provided only through atomic capable forces, but they want none of the responsibility for accommodating weapons, and in some cases strike forces, on their own soil. From a military viewpoint, our collective defenses are obviously weakened by such governmental attitudes.

"The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff are also deeply concerned over the redeployment from France of certain strike forces. The United States investment in manpower, training, and dollars in these squadrons will not now produce the defense dividends which could have been achieved. The congestion of aircraft on a more limited number of air fields is tactically unsound, and the operational difficulties engendered by these moves must force the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff to re-examine the future deployment and use of these squadrons.

"The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff are also deeply concerned by the failure to make progress in the development of a unified air defense organization for NATO Europe. The resources and assistance granted by the United States government to help establish an effective air defense for NATO cannot be justified or long continued on the basis of the present unsatisfactory situation. It will be militarily unsound to make any United States investment, of any kind, in the air defense of Europe under present circumstances. The resources can be used better in other ways.

"As a last point, the unilateral action which was taken with respect to the French fleet is of great concern to United States military planners. The entire principle of collective security which we have followed—as opposed to a "fortress America" concept—seems jeopardized by this action. I would hope that an early solution satisfactory to SACEUR can be arrived at within the near future.

"I know that these are all difficult problems, and I feel that the military authorities of the governments concerned would change some of these circumstances if they were permitted. My only positive suggestion would be that you military representatives insure that your political superiors are aware of the seriousness with which the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff view these problems. Our resources are not unlimited, and, from a military viewpoint, we have a right to expect a maximum return on all defense efforts which we undertake. I recommend that you keep working on these problems vigorously and that you attempt to establish an understanding that, under certain circumstances, political judgements of governments should be modified or changed on the basis of military realities."

"In conclusion, I wish to state that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff are firm in their support of NATO. We believe strongly in the NATO concept of unified defense and we shall continue to recommend
to our government that we carry our fair share of the burden in our common defense. We feel that many of the NATO nations are also carrying their fair share of responsibility—and we hope that those governments which have policies of no-cooperation, in certain areas, will adjust these policies in the near future.”

234. Editorial Note

The Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, held in Paris December 15–17, was attended by all Foreign Ministers and NATO Permanent Representatives of the 15 member countries. The U.S. Delegation was headed by Secretary of State Christian A. Herter and included Permanent NATO Representative W. Randolph Burgess, Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson, and Secretary of Defense Thomas A. Gates, Jr. A list of the principal members of the U.S. Delegation is printed in Department of State Bulletin, December 28, 1959, page 935.

The most extensive body of documentation on this NATO Ministerial Meeting is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1549–1568. CF 1549 contains the index of papers prepared for this Ministerial Meeting as well as a set of memoranda of conversation between U.S. and foreign officials. CF 1550–1552 contain copies of Topol–Polto, Tosec–Secto, and Tocah–Cahto telegrams for the December 12–22 period. A post-conference file for December 19–21 is in CF 1553. The Secretary’s briefing books are in CF 1554–1556. CF 1557 contains Orders of the Day for the December 15–17 and 22 dates. Summary Records of the Ministerial Meetings of the North Atlantic Council are in CF 1558; the Verbatim Records are in CF 1559 and 1565–1568. The administrative file is in CF 1560; substantive miscellaneous papers are in CF 1561; and administrative miscellaneous papers and letters are in CF 1562. CF 1563 contains a chronological record for December 12 and 13; CF 1564–1568 contain a chronological record for meetings for December 14–17 and 22. Telegrams and documentation on this Ministerial Meeting are *ibid.*, Central File 396.1–PA.

The December 15–17 Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council preceded the Meeting of the Western Heads of Government in Paris held December 19–21 (see Documents 92 and 93) The NAC Ministerial Meeting reconvened on December 22 and was briefed on the results of the Heads of Government Meeting.
Secretary of State Herter and his party arrived in Paris on December 13 after a day in London. For text of his arrival statement, see Department of State Bulletin, January 4, 1960, page 3. At 4 p.m., he met with Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon at the Embassy Residence, and at 5 p.m. they were joined by Gates and Anderson; no memoranda of these conversations have been found. In the evening, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Livingston T. Merchant and Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to Secretary Herter, met with Louis Joxe, Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry. Memoranda of their discussion on the French estimate of Soviet intentions (US/MC/1), the U.N. resolution on Algeria (US/MC/3), and General Twining’s speech (US/MC/5) are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1549 and 1563. Regarding Twining’s speech, see Document 233.

At 9:30 a.m. on December 14, the delegation held a meeting, of which no record has been found. One hour later, Herter, accompanied by Ambassador Houghton, Merchant, and Counselor of the Embassy in France Randolph A. Kidder, called on French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville. A memorandum of their conversation on General Twining’s statement is printed as Document 235. Memoranda of their conversations on the U.S. position at the United Nations on Algeria (US/MC/8), Italian participation in preparations for the East-West summit and disarmament talks (US/MC/9), and NATO and Western summit meetings (US/MC/10) are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1549 and 1564. At 11:30 a.m., Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak called on Secretary Herter; see Document 236. At 12:15 p.m., Herter, Burgess, and Merchant met with General Norstad; no record of their conversation has been found. A memorandum of John W. Tuthill’s conversation on European integration with Sir Anthony Rumbold, Assistant Under Secretary in the British Foreign Office (US/MC/2), during a luncheon, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1549 and 1564.

At 2 p.m., Herter began talks with British leaders on a wide range of issues. His discussion with Lloyd on the Common Market was summarized in Secto 6, December 15. (Ibid., Central Files, 440.001/12-1559) Their discussion on nuclear testing and disarmament was summarized in Secto 8. (Ibid., 700.561/12-1559) Their discussion on SEATO and contingency planning was summarized in Secto 22. (Ibid., 790.5/12-1759) Memoranda of their conversation on disarmament (US/MC/11), nuclear testing (US/MC/12), NATO Ministerial Meeting (US/MC/13), Laos and contingency planning (US/MC/14), and summit conferences (US/MC/15) are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1549 and 1564.

The ceremonial opening session of the Ministerial Meeting took place in the new NATO building on Tuesday, December 15, at 10:15 a.m.
French Prime Minister Michel Debré’s statement presenting the new building to NATO and the statement of acceptance by Halvard Lange, President of the North Atlantic Council, are ibid., CF 1565. At 10 a.m., the Ministers convened the first restricted session; see Document 237. Secretary Anderson and Derick Heathcoat Amory, British Chancellor of the Exchequer, discussed matters of trade and aid during a luncheon. Their discussion was reported in Polto 1167, December 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 400.002/12-1659) At 3:30 p.m., the Ministerial Meeting resumed; see Document 238. At 4:50 p.m., McBride discussed with Mr. Pansa of the Italian Foreign Ministry Italian participation at the forthcoming Western summit meeting. The memorandum of their discussion (US/MC/4) is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1549 and 1565. From 6:30 to 7:45 p.m., Secretary Gates, General Twining, and other Department of Defense officials met with British Defense Minister Harold A. Watkinson, Admiral Mountbatten, and other British officials to discuss a variety of military defense issues. The memorandum of conversation is ibid., CF 1565.

On Wednesday, December 16, the Ministerial Meeting resumed at 10:15 a.m. The session was summarized in Polto 1168, December 17. (Ibid., Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–1759) The highlights of the meeting were summarized in Polto 1169 (ibid.); a longer summary is in Document 239. The session resumed at 3:30 p.m.; see Document 240. At 7 p.m., Herter, Merchant, Kohler, and Hillenbrand met with German Foreign Minister von Brentano. The memorandum of their discussion on German vested assets (US/MC/6) is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1549 and 1566.

On Thursday, December 17, the Ministerial Meeting opened at 9:45 a.m.; see Document 241. At 12:45 p.m., Herter talked with Greek Foreign Minister Evangelos Averoff concerning the question of including some road construction projects in Greece in the NATO infrastructure program. The memorandum of conversation (US/MC/16) in is Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1549 and 1567. At 1 p.m., Herter made a telenews recording at the NATO television studio. The transcript is ibid., CF 1567. A debriefing session was held at 1:15 p.m.; no record of the session has been found. Herter had a working lunch with Merchant, Bohlen, and Kohler; no record of the discussion has been found. At 3:30 p.m., the session resumed; see Document 242. For text of the communiqué issued on December 17, see Department of State Bulletin, January 4, 1960, pages 3–4. At 11:05 p.m., the Secretary left for Toulon to meet President Eisenhower, who was arriving to attend the Heads of Government Meeting.

During the Western Heads of Government Meeting in Paris, December 19–21, U.S. officials held numerous side talks with foreign officials, some of which touched on NATO matters. A record of a meeting
between Presidents Eisenhower and de Gaulle on December 20 is printed in Part 2 as Document 151. A memorandum of conversation between President de Gaulle and Secretary Herter on Algeria, NATO, nuclear weapons, and the EEC on December 20 is printed in Part 2 as Document 152. A memorandum of President Eisenhower's discussion with Prime Minister Debré on military integration on December 21 is printed as Document 244. Later that day, Herter met with Dutch Prime Minister Jan E. DeQuay on several issues. A memorandum of their discussion on European integration and NATO problems (US/MC/13) is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1569 and 1578. This meeting was followed by a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers where they discussed the report to the NATO Ministerial Council and the next phase of preparatory work for the East-West summit. The memorandum of that discussion (US/MC/16) is *ibid*.

Following the Western Heads of Government Meeting, the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council reconvened at 9:30 a.m. on December 22; see Document 245. For text of the communique issued at the close of this session on December 22, see Department of State Bulletin, January 11, 1960, pages 44–45. At 2 p.m., Secretary Herter held a background press conference for U.S. correspondents, reported in telegram 2834 from Paris, December 22. (Department of State, Central Files, 911.61/12–2259)

On December 21 and continuing on December 22 at 3:30 p.m., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs John N. Irwin, II and Department of Defense officials met with Minister Joxe to discuss U.S.-French relations, particularly as they related to military defense. The memorandum of conversation is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1568.

The following documents are arranged in the order in which the meetings were held.
235. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/7

Paris, December 14, 1959, 10:30 a.m.

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

Paris, December 15–17 and 22, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary of State
Ambassador Houghton
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Kidder

France

The French Foreign Minister
M. Jacques de Beaumarchais

SUBJECT

General Twining’s Statement to the Military Committee

The Secretary, after discussing our abstention on the Algerian item at the UN (see separate memorandum),1 turned to NATO and said he assumed that the Foreign Minister was referring to the statement made by General Twining. This statement, he said, was made by a military man in a military committee and it was a quite proper one.2 The line followed by General Twining was the same as that used by the President in his talks with General de Gaulle in Paris.3 The Secretary said we have a real problem which must be decided. He added he was sorry that it came out as it did in the military committee. Had it been raised from a political point of view, we would have said it differently. The Secretary then outlined three areas of difference as follows: (1) Mediterranean Fleet, (2) atomic stockpile, and (3) question of integrated command.

The Foreign Minister commented that perhaps there had been a leak (of the Twining statement). He said he wasn’t there and couldn’t know himself but he could not but believe that a leak had been made on

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1549. Secret. Drafted by Kidder and approved in S on December 19. The meeting was held at the Quai d’Orsay.

1 US/MC/8 is not printed. (Ibid.)

2 See Document 233. According to Polto 1134 from Paris, December 12, Spaak pointed out at NAC that morning that Twining had said nothing very new or radical, but the difficulty was that his statement became public. Burgess remarked that Twining’s statement represented the opinion of the U.S. JCS, and that USRO had tried to make clear to the press that Twining did not mention de Gaulle and gave a military, not political, statement. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/12–1259)

3 See Part 2, Documents 129 ff.
purpose. In any case, the public interpretation is that there has been an American initiative to put the French “in the box”—to make France “the black sheep of NATO”. The Foreign Minister then added that he does not know if that is our intention. He said that General Twining’s statement goes a little far. He then read the section from the Twining statement which expresses the view that the activities of those countries which are not doing their full share in NATO increase the possibility of war. This, the Foreign Minister said, is going a little far even for a military man. The Minister then read the section from the Twining statement in which the General recommended that the audience keep working on the problem so that political decisions could be changed on the basis of military reality.

The Foreign Minister continued by saying that he knows from past talks that there are always the three problems (presumably those three mentioned by the Secretary). However, he doesn’t think that these problems really change the position of the Alliance nor make war more likely. These are not anything like basic differences and they do not affect the overall world position, which is what interests the French. What are worse than the military difficulties are the political difficulties. This political aspect is especially pertinent during the so-called détente and in view of the talks we are going to have with the Soviets. He commented nevertheless that we are disunited in Africa and the Soviets know it. The Soviets played their hand very cleverly in the GA on the Algerian item by saying nothing.

The Secretary intervened at this point to say he does not think that the Minister can properly say that we are disunited. He emphasized that we have supported General de Gaulle and France all along.

The Foreign Minister commented that he did not want the Secretary to misinterpret what he meant. He was not talking about the substance of the problem but about the interpretation by the public which is what matters. He said he is aware of the American position and knows it has not changed. It is the public impact which concerns him. The Twining statement is another step giving the public the idea that the situation is deteriorating. We must face the realities of the situation. In the five years to come, NATO is going to change in one way or another. The Americans have their problems and the French have theirs. He added he hopes the Algerian problem will be solved and that French troops will come back to France. The Germans, he hopes, will complete their military programs.

The Secretary said that we must be flexible but the important thing is not to weaken the NATO military posture at this time.

The Foreign Minister, referring to the Twining statement, said there were two aspects of it which concerned him. First, it was presented in a dramatic way, and second, it became public which gives it a different
interpretation. It makes it appear that there is a basic crisis within NATO where he, in fact, does not believe such is the case. The Secretary agreed that there is not a real crisis but pointed out that whether there is or isn't, in any given case the press will always build it up as though there were. The Secretary then informed the Minister that on the US side a thorough review had been made to attempt to find out whether an American might have been responsible for the leak. The results have been negative.

---

236. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State

Paris, December 15, 1959, 3 p.m.

Polto 1156. From USDel. Secretary Herter's meeting with Spaak, December 14.¹

Spaak began by referring to General Twining's statement in Military Committee,² expressing view that, while leak to press deplorable, large majority NATO members, and he himself, thought statement a good one and points needed to be made. Said most NATO ambassadors had told him this.

Secretary remarked that Couve, whom he had just seen,³ seemed reasonably moderate on this subject, and thought that it would come up in Ministerial Meeting on Wednesday⁴ (in discussion of military matters) rather than on Tuesday. Said Couve hoped Guillaumat respond.

Spaak said even if we are entering a détente, it is necessary to keep up NATO defenses; the French are definitely standing in way of progress in this field, and there is a sentiment of revolt against this situation in NATO. Burgess noted that there is a similar sentiment among French military and in much of French press. Spaak said in his judgment de

---

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/12-1559. Secret. Transmitted in two sections.

¹ According to the chronology for December 14, Burgess, Merchant, and Nolting were also present. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1564)

² See Document 233.

³ See Document 235.

⁴ December 16.
Gaulle isolated on his defense policy. Spaak added he did not know whether Debre would raise question of Twining statement when he addresses NATO opening session, but rather felt that he would.

Secretary and Spaak than discussed briefly recent vote in UN on Algerian question. Noted French were disturbed by United States abstention, but Secretary pointed out six members of NATO abstained, and final vote was undoubtedly influenced by fact that United States did not reveal its position before-hand. Said language of revised resolution was almost identical with views expressed by President and Secretary previously, and therefore we could not vote against resolution. Lodge had made statement explaining United States position. (Spaak later said he thought it would be very helpful in NATO if text of Lodge statement were circulated by United States.)

Conversation turned to military situation in NATO, and Secretary raised question of what procedure should be followed to face up to NATO’s defense problem. Spaak said same question worried him. Remarked that last year’s defense resolution had not yielded sufficient results, and that customary annual review resolution was no good unless vigorously followed up. His tentative idea was that small “wise men’s” committee should be asked to examine problem, but we would have to make sure that this did not impede efforts which NATO military are making to get more defense contributions. Said we must gain some time. Thought main question is—what is United States going to do? Is United States going to re-examine its strategic concept for NATO area? Spaak then said that in his opinion requirements of M.C.–70 will not be obtained; the gap is too big. He added that it is important to set a political background at ministerial meeting in light of which military problem should be frankly discussed. Reverting to timing, Spaak said he was not sure whether it was wise to re-examine defense problem right now. Burgess said he thought it would be dangerous to re-examine now, and agreed United States must formulate its own views first although we should not act unilaterally. Spaak said Belgians particularly need to be prodded; they have adopted a “stupid policy”, and United States must speak to them. Secretary told Spaak that United States has already done so on several occasions, but they persist in bringing in Congo as a possible drain on defense resources. This discussion of follow-up on defense matters was inconclusive. Spaak said he would try to summarize after Council discussion but would do so carefully, bearing in mind necessity

---

5 For the text of Lodge’s statements on Algeria in the United Nations to Committee I on December 2 and to the plenary session of the General Assembly on December 12, see Department of State Bulletin, January 18, 1960, pp. 100–102.

6 See Document 180.
to avoid proposal for dramatic re-assessment. Thought best to have matter studied in Permanent Council.

There was further discussion of French attitude in NATO. Spaak said that up until now NATO countries had tried to be patient with French preoccupations and tried to be helpful on Algeria but that now majority are losing patience. French say that NATO must be reformed, but they do not participate in NATO and do not make their views clear with respect to reformation. He added that French think leak of Twining statement was deliberate on part of U.S. He referred to de Gaulle’s speech at Ecole Militaire, remarking that line taken by de Gaulle was entirely inconsistent with that of NATO. Said he thought there must be a frank discussion in ministerial meeting on air defense and on introduction of atomics. Scandinavians would explain their special position on latter.

Question of rooms for NATO meetings came up. Spaak thought suggestion that military meeting might begin in large conference room, and then be shifted to smaller room if necessary, was good one. He said Lange would make his full speech in opening public session. Debre will probably say something concerning Alliance (Spaak didn’t know what) but he had promised to show his speech to Lange before-hand. Meeting concluded with thought that this would be a very lively three day meeting. Spaak felt that, in addition to NATO pressure on French concerning defense policy, it would be most helpful if the President would address this problem in his private talks with de Gaulle. Spaak repeated that French are “completely isolated” on their defense policy and that even Germany would certainly choose NATO and U.S. in preference to tripartitism.

---

7 In de Gaulle’s speech to the Ecole Militaire, November 3, he said that the system called “integration” had outlived its usefulness and that in any war France would have to act on its own in pursuit of its own aims, although it might fight along with allies, each fulfilling its own role. Copies of telegrams 1978 from Paris, November 4, and 2003 from Paris, November 5, which summarize the speech, and a transcript of the speech are in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series.

8 See Part 2, Document 150.
237. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State


Polto 1160. From USDel. Ministerial Council of NATO convened at 10:15 a.m. in open plenary session for dedication of new NATO building. 1 After presentation statement by Debre and acceptance by Lange, 2 Council began discussion of agenda item I in restricted session. Spaak introduced discussion with general commentary reflecting his questionnaire regarding détente 3 and with reference to record of Washington consultations on summity. 4 Following Spaak, general statements were made by Secretary, Wigny, and Lange. Meeting recessed at approximately 1:00 p.m. to be continued in afternoon.

Debre's presentation statement (which released to press by NATO) was brief appeal for cooperation in overcoming internal difficulties of Alliance in order insure political and military solidarity and for rejuvenation of NATO. Lange's acceptance statement (also released) was expression of appreciation for French contribution of building site and other cooperation in creation "permanent home" for NATO in Paris.

Spaak called for discussion under agenda item I to concentrate on his questionnaire regarding détente (PO(59)1615) and on record of Washington consultations in preparation for summit meetings. He indicated agenda for East-West conference uncertain but would probably include disarmament, Berlin and general question of Germany, general East-West relations, and perhaps problem of relations with underdeveloped countries. Invited Ministers seize opportunity express their views on these subjects. Said particularly important to consider maintenance of political consultation in NATO re planning for East-West negotiations, observing that consultative process had been somewhat less than satis-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396. 1–PA/12–1559. Secret. Repeated to London and Bonn and pouch to the other NATO capitals.

1 The verbatim (C–VR (59)43) record of this open session, dated December 15, is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1559. There is no summary record of this session. The verbatim (C–VR (59)44) record of the restricted session beginning at 11 a.m., dated December 15, is ibid., CF 1559. The summary (C–R (59)44) record is ibid., CF 1558.

2 Texts of Debré's and Lange's statements are ibid., CF 1565.

3 Not found.

4 Record of Washington Consultations Preparatory to a Meeting of the Heads of Government or Chiefs of State of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States summarized the views expressed during meetings between Secretary Herter and the British, French, and German Ambassadors in Washington November 4–December 9 on matters relating to summit meetings. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1567)
factory since last Geneva Conference.\textsuperscript{5} Noted that scope of possible agenda for East-West summit is considerably greater than scope of Geneva Conference and involves subjects which clearly of equal concern to small and great powers. Spaak expressed some dissatisfaction with phraseology of reference in record of Washington consultations to consultation with NATO.

Spaak urged that Ministers address themselves to question of whether we have entered new phase of international politics and cautioned care in analysis this question. Drew sharp distinction between Soviet concept “peaceful coexistence” and Western desire for cooperation. Urged that Soviet concept of competition by all means short of overt aggression be clarified so that Western public opinion will understand that Communist threat not reduced in period of apparent détente. Warned against Soviet efforts to play off Western Allies against each other and stressed great importance of Western unity and danger of relaxing Western defense in view fact Soviets could resort again to cold war at any time. Suggested full discussion by Ministers of these considerations in order provide adequate background for defense discussions tomorrow.

Returning to political consultative process, emphasized importance of consultation regarding problems in other areas of world, such as Asia, which are becoming center of East-West struggle. Challenged Council to go beyond general acknowledgments of importance such broader application of political consultation and to consider what such consultation should really mean for organization of NATO.

Spaak concluded with appeal for effort by NATO to bring order into economy of Atlantic Community, and referred to problems of Six and Seven, and of continued U.S. aid to Europe that has recovered economically. Stated solution these problems required if NATO to deal effectively with less developed areas. Warned against false distinction between political and economic problems and asserted NATO concerned with basic policy aspects of economic as well as political problems, although accepted judgment that NATO should not assume operational responsibilities in economic field.

Secretary’s statement dealt with U.S. approach to East-West negotiations, estimate of Soviet threat and tactics, stressed importance of augmenting NATO’s military strength, gave assurance of continued U.S. commitment to collective security and support for NATO defense, urged greater European defense effort and aid to less developed areas, and proposed that NAC undertake planning for NATO’s role over next

\textsuperscript{5} Reference is to the Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting May 11–August 5. Documentation is printed in volume VIII.
decade in fields of political consultation, defense, science and technology, and East-West information and cultural exchange. (Full text being transmitted by separate message.)

Wigny warned against relaxation under apparent détente. Urged probing of Soviet disarmament proposals with emphasis on conventional arms in which Soviets have greatest strength. Western tactics in this field should be designed to draw Soviets out fully and get them off balance. Repudiated concept of disengagement as obsolete in view modern weapons developments. Suggested flexibility in Western approach on Berlin and Germany and emphasized importance of advance agreement on what West should refuse, and consequences thereof, as well as what should be accepted. Urged NATO consultation on basic policies toward less developed areas. Suggested possibility of special study re information exchange with USSR. Concluded with commen-
dation of Secretary’s proposals re NATO planning for future.

Lange cautioned against unqualified acceptance of détente. Acknowledged some progress made but emphasized basic East-West conflicts remain. Anticipated long process of negotiation with uncertain outcome. Stressed that fundamental Soviet hostility toward West will not soon be abandoned, and that West should not make concessions that imperil its security and democratic institutions. Asserted that, despite these reservations, there is wide range of possibilities for negotiation. Urged initiative and imagination in dealing with new East-West relationships, particularly by probing fully Soviet intentions re disarmament, but warned against unilateral Western disarmament. Suggested possibility of large scale joint East-West program of aid to less developed areas under U.N. auspices.

Lange emphasized importance of NATO political unity and cohe-
sion. Commended NATO arrangements which have inevitably involved some limitations on sovereignty. Warned against inward looking tendencies (e.g. Six’s and Seven’s) that might tend divide Europe and weaken ties between Europe and North America. NATO must be focal point of all endeavors.

Lange indicated gratification at Secretary’s proposal re long-range planning and expressed hope determined effort would be made in this direction.

---

6 Polto 1159 from Paris, December 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–1559)
238. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State


Polto 1161. From USDel. Subject: Ministerial NAC meeting afternoon December 15: continuation Item I: Review of international situation.1

Germany (Brentano) said firm reaction of NATO last year impressed Russians but NATO cannot rest on laurels or underestimate threats still facing it. Soviets rejected Western peace plan at Geneva out of hand and are still prepared to talk concessions only from West.2 Aims and methods of Russians unchanged. NATO should contribute to efforts to seek real détente. But West must avoid danger of wishful thinking or of letting down. Soviet soft line makes position all the harder.

Recognized dangers of Soviet efforts to gain influence in newly emergent states and welcomed Dillon’s emphasis on this at Bonn.3 It is duty of NATO to coordinate interests of members.

Regarding summit, solidarity of West is essential as Russians trying to split Alliance, particularly destroy German ties with Allies. Disarmament should be first agenda item. In long run German question must be resolved if tension to be reduced, by self-determination of whole German people. Final solution of Berlin problem only possible within solution German question, not separately. Present guaranteed status of Berlin must not be endangered.

Brentano appealed to Allies to reaffirm principles of December 17 declaration of last year.4 He welcomed Spaak and Herter’s emphasis on fact that West cannot relax, and agreed with Herter on Germany and Berlin.5 Germany will do its best to give greater help to underdeveloped countries. Welcomed Wigny rejection of disengagement.5 Said that there was opportunity to improve relations between economic groups within Alliance if questions discussed openly and frankly.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1—PA/12—1659. Secret. Transmitted in three sections. Repeated to London and Bonn and pouch to the other NATO capitals and Moscow.

1 The verbatim (C–VR (59)45) record of this session, dated December 15, is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1559. The summary (C–R (59)45) record of this session, dated December 15, is ibid., CF 1558.

2 For text of the Western peace plan, May 14, see Department of State Bulletin, June 1, 1959, pp. 779–781.

3 Dillon visited Western Europe December 7–14; see Documents 80 ff.

4 See footnote 1, Document 170.

5 See Document 237.
Greece (Averoff) expressed hope for real détente, saying poor country with delicate situation such as Greece naturally wants relaxation. But must not underestimate Russians who only recently have subjected little Greece adjacent to Communists, with threats from outside and interference internally.

This proves Moscow only changing tactics. Forces of Alliance holding at about same level but cohesion is less, and this is dangerous. Must keep up efforts until disarmament agreement reached and avoid idea of "moral disarmament" which would lead to unilateral disarmament.

Solidarity within Alliance raises point of low GNP per capita in Greece. Programs for undeveloped countries unfortunately do not speak of NATO members. Greece too has needs.

In summity, Greece advocates controlled general disarmament but not limited zones. Strongly in favor of non-intervention in internal affairs, and we should strike out at radio broadcasts which violate that line. Any agreements must be cleared with all members of Alliance in advance. Must not give up any rights in Berlin. Averoff praised Secretary's proposal for ten-year plan.6

Portugal (Mathias) doubted Russians meant détente. "No use to try to straighten shadow of a twisted stick." Praised Herter proposal for ten-year plan.

United Kingdom (Selwyn Lloyd) denied stories that NATO in crisis. Praised Herter ten-year plan idea as clarifying long-range intentions of United States to NATO. Stressed need for concentration and harmony regarding summity.

Lloyd then summarized Four-Power Working Group [Report] circulated yesterday.7 Stressed no decisions taken, but issues were date and place, scope of agenda, and methods of further preparatory work, for which United Kingdom suggests Washington as site. Pledged progress reports to NAC on regular and automatic basis. Believed Western Five should meet soonest possible to coordinate position on disarmament, and 10-Power Disarmament Committee should meet soonest and

---

6 Toward the end of his statement at the morning session, December 15, Herter proposed a cooperative long-range planning effort for the 1960s, which would put into better perspective the problems with which NATO was wrestling. He believed this effort would provide NATO "with affirmative objectives towards which we could strive over the years that lie ahead—in our relations with each other, in our relations with other free nations, and in our relations with the Communist powers." He then detailed how such planning "could be addressed to the various components of our political, military, arms control, scientific and economic programs to the extent that they bear upon NATO." (Polt 1159 from Paris, December 15; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-1559)

7 See footnote 4, Document 237.
before summit.6 Stressed West must educate public opinion not to expect too much from summit.

Lloyd then expressed his views on EEC along well-known lines, saying it should not be exclusive or would lead to trade war. Danger of economic split which could lead to military and political split in Alliance must be avoided.

Military effort must be on more closely knit basis than in past. Generally supported Herter statement of this morning. Spoke in favor of interdependence. Defense Minister would speak of inability of individuals to meet force goals tomorrow. On East-West relations believes there is "beginning of a détente." Major task of 1960 is to consolidate and improve it. There has been a change. Four reasons for Khrushchev attitude are: (1) fear of nuclear war; (2) pressures within Russia for better life, competing with high cost of arms; (3) Khrushchev concept of his personal importance; and (4) fact that détente involves no doctrinal heresy since Marx never said world domination had to be gained by war.

West must maintain present military balance. Cannot negotiate from weakness. Attack on West must be made unattractive. Must employ resources correctly so as to also deal with Soviet economic and political penetration. Should not be on defensive or afraid of greater contacts.

At summit, should tell Russians that Soviet change in tactics is move in right direction but does not go far enough. Should then try to explain our views of détente, cold war, and co-existence, establish differences of views, and educate Russians. Should give impression we want real détente if proven by action but intend to maintain defenses.

Arms control most fruitful topic for summit since common interest on both sides. Summit can only give general direction to long negotiations in Ten-Power Committee. Soviet disarmament proposals show a change as they move conventional disarmament to first stage and liquidation of bases to end of first stage. United Kingdom thinks nuclear and conventional disarmament must be treated pari passu.

On Germany and Berlin it follows from Khrushchev desires to avoid war that he wants to remove heat from Berlin crisis. But cannot assume that heat may not be turned on again, as prestige deeply involved. We should stand on Geneva formulas.

---

6 The United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union issued a four-power communiqué on September 7, in which they agreed to set up a Ten-Power Disarmament Committee, and a U.N. Disarmament Commission Resolution (U.N. doc. A/4209) unanimously approved this communiqué on September 10. For text of the communiqué and resolution, see Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. II, pp. 1441–1443.
Denied any interest in disengagement, but favored geographic areas for inspection and limitation of arms citing Antarctica.

NATO only proper forum for discussion of questions leading to action on problems of concern to whole Alliance. Period of freer diplomatic play requires closest consultation on all these matters. Supported Herter proposal ten-year planning.

Canada (Green) thought situation better than a year ago but no reason to relax vigilance. One year of quiet is no proof their policy is less aggressive. We should encourage détente to eliminate risk of actual war, such as at Berlin. Should be optimistic but not unduly so and be careful of public opinion.

Progress will be slow and should avoid unilateral concessions, Canada favors series of well prepared summits. NATO consultation on summitry should be improved.

Must be closest NATO consultation on disarmament. There is no inconsistency between high state of preparedness and seeking to reach agreement.

Greece proposed that NATO help prepare Western disarmament position, suggesting it organize its political and military staffs to contribute to study. Asked Permanent Council to consider what kind of group should be brought together to let NATO deal in positive way with disarmament.

Praised Herter 10-year plan idea.

Italy (Pella) said firmness of West would aid in making a real détente. Cannot relax defense efforts until Russians give concrete proof of change. Urged closer consultation in NATO on summitry, indicating not satisfied with recent past. Unable to comment on Four Power report, as it was just received.

Welcomed Herter statement indicating United States more united with Europe for long period for defense, as well as in other fields of cooperation.

All should participate proportionately in defense effort, but 4 percent progressive 5-year increase Italy has pledged is maximum it can do at present, taking account of other problems, particularly development needs in south Italy.

NATO should coordinate policies and efforts regarding underdeveloped countries, but not be operating agency. It should also provide economic cooperation within Alliance for members with special problems.

Disarmament most propitious field for summit. Is optimistic about solution of problem between Six and Seven. Need is for close cooperation of all countries of OEEC including United States and Canada.
Dutch (van Houten)\(^9\) stressed Soviet objectives unchanged, and tactics could be switched easily. Even if Soviets do not use armed force for attack, they will use it for political pressure. Military strength must be preserved and maximum effort made to build up shield until disarmament not only agreed upon but actually in effect.

Warmly welcomed Herter announcement United States troops would stay long time to come, and 10-year plan idea. More coordination and unity needed, and Permanent Council should consider measures to be taken.

Preparatory talks on summitry vital, all through next ensuing months, as well as during East-West summit.

Should give no concessions on Berlin and Germany beyond Geneva proposals.

Must keep public opinion informed of need to keep up defense effort.

France (Couve) noted change from last year, when we had three crises, while this year none. Attributed this to firmness of Alliance on Berlin.

Noted no change for better in ChiCom attitude.

On summit, we should not give up anything essential nor be fooled by appearances. On disarmament, West should show it is serious, but question of control very difficult. West should raise non-intervention as a cold war problem, raising questions of both arms delivery and economic aid by Soviets. Russians seek to maintain split of Germany, and to detach Germany from West and neutralize it under Soviet direction, putting Russia on the borders of the Rhine, which might be a threshold to war. Berlin is tied to German problem. Russians will try to get acceptance of peace treaty and Berlin agreement. Agreed with Wigny Western position should take up at end of Geneva.

Indispensable to maintain balance of power, including United States forces in Europe for defense of Europe.

When France last year suggested NATO policy should include not only Europe, some shock was caused, but now seems acceptable defense must be total as problem is global. This extension particularly important for France regarding Africa where has special responsibility.

Military adaptations of Alliance also necessary; subject is delicate, but changes in weapons and state of world, and greater health of Europe means some adaptations necessary. Couve said he understood Herter allusion to United States preoccupation on sharing of defense Berlin. There also could be changes in organization and responsibilities “in the sense of each taking its own responsibility.”

\(^9\) Hans Rudolf van Houten, Dutch Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Special ties such as United States–Canada, Scandinavian group, Benelux, etc not bad but useful as reinforcing strength of individuals, small groups, and all.

Unity extremely important at present time.

Denmark (Hansen) was hopeful about disarmament, favored many summits, urged united Western front with consultation in NATO, favored early meeting of 10-Power Disarmament Committee, and urged reconciliation between Six and Seven; North America should not worry about economic effects of European developments. Supported Herter 10-year plan idea.

Luxembourg (Schaus) called for deeds not words from Russians. Soviet dogma unchanged and strength intact, while subversive effort undermine had. West should negotiate, though reticently. Stressed unity of Alliance, and organizing for dangerous period ahead.

Turkey (Zorlu) expressed suspicion of Communists and distrust of détente; Soviet take-over of Eastern Europe had occurred without force in period of détente. Russians seek relaxation now for chance to do same thing. Détente should be global, not local.

Zorlu strongly criticized French proposal to discuss economic aid for underdeveloped countries with Russians as dangerous move. Also did not like idea of continuing series of summit meetings, which gave Russians far too much stature above the salt in public mind. We should sit tight on our position on Germany.

Zorlu struck out at idea of extending long-term credits to Russians, particularly because Greece and Turkey unable to obtain such credits from European partners. NATO must study this problem, which has political as well as economic implications.

Spaak then proposed NAC consider issuance of two communiqués: one on Thursday, which would be basically military and only slightly political, and a further one next Tuesday which would carry the real political message. Spaak proposed on Thursday to take up Four-Power Working Group report for discussion paragraph by paragraph.

---

10 December 17.
11 December 22.
239. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State

Paris, December 18, 1959, 1 p.m.

Polto 1177. Subject: Ministerial NAC meeting morning December 16: Item II (Military).

The NATO Ministerial Council convened at 1015 in the large council chamber to discuss Agenda Item II (Military).¹

Guillaumat (France) responded briefly to General Twining’s Military Committee statement and objected both to substance and to the press leak.² Discussion was deferred to the restricted session.

The intelligence briefing was given by Admiral Boone,³ Chairman of the Standing Group, and the Military Progress Report (MC 5/14)⁴ was noted without comment. The meeting then adjourned for a restricted session in conference room.

Secretary General Spaak opened the discussion and introduced Secretary Gates who delivered his statement (text sent separately).⁵

Visser (Netherlands)⁶ stated that the Annual Review⁷ makes clear that military force requirements cannot be achieved by the efforts which member countries are making. Commenting on the need for a strong shield as a credible deterrent he cited unsatisfactory past experience in making quantitative reductions on the ground of quality improvements

¹ The verbatim (C–VR (59)46 and C–VR (59)47) records of this session, dated December 16, are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1559. The summary (C–R (59)46 and C–R (59)47) records of this session, dated December 16, are ibid., CF 1558.


³ Admiral Walter F. Boone.

⁴ Not found.

⁵ No record of the transmission of Gates’ speech has been found. A copy of his speech is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1566.

⁶ S.H. Visser, Dutch Minister of Defense.

⁷ The text of the draft resolution on the 1959 Annual Review noted the possibility of progress toward the achievement of MC–70 requirements, called attention to “the unfavorable trends” in the 1958 Annual Review and still present in 1959, and considered that “unless further corrective measures are implemented without delay, the defense posture of the alliance in relation to Soviet strength will continue to deteriorate.” It further adopted as firm goals the force plans for 1960 and urged “member countries to make every effort to attain the required force levels and qualitative standards in accordance with the guidance and recommendations of the NATO military authorities for the 1959 Annual Review.” (Polto 1073 from Paris, December 8; Department of State Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–859) On December 9, the NAC agreed to submit the text of this resolution to the NAC Ministerial Meeting. (Polto 1089 from Paris, December 9; ibid., 396.1–PA/12–959)
which actually did not sufficiently compensate. He noted that defense systems make sense only if they ascend individual frontiers.

A fundamental study is needed on ways to reach the goals of greater efficiency and economy and further integration of defenses; faster progress is needed on integrated production and logistics. The problem of integration should be reactivated in all fields. We should proceed in areas already begun and frankly face the political problems in other areas, such as air defense. The Permanent Council should study plans to integrate defenses. Visser recommended that a small select group make such a study, or that perhaps the Council might wish to use the Annual Review Group. The first problem is to achieve MC–70 goals; but this requires a further concept which, for the Netherlands, means greater integration.

Watkinson (U.K.) stressed the need for strengthening NATO and keeping up its defenses, particularly in the light of the intelligence briefing. Our governments should negotiate from a position of strength in disarmament talks. He noted that Britain was contributing by not reducing the British army of the Rhine—which presented problems in view of Britain’s other world-wide requirements.

Strauss (Germany) indicated that there was no reason to abandon NATO’s appraisal of the military situation or change the military goals. He noted that there probably would be an increase in Britain’s next defense budget.

In view of the need to take account of new weapons, he welcomed the addition of special agenda items on weapons developments. Watkinson supported Gates on expanding the NATO family of weapons; he regretted that the United Kingdom has not always been able to join NATO production in the past but he stated that Britain will welcome discussions in this area for the future and suggested that 2 or 3 countries join together to make specific proposals to the NATO Armament Committee. Watkinson stressed that all countries must make concessions.

NATO should reinforce present first phase forces as a deterrent, and must maintain the ability to retaliate in every type of aggression. Watkinson questioned whether we do not merely weaken ourselves by lengthy debating of types of weapons. He stressed that Britain was re-equipping its forces in smaller numbers, but with greater striking power and mobility. He concluded with three recommendations: (1) to do all possible to strengthen the Alliance and assure that national responsibilities are not incompatible with strong support for NATO; (2) to make new attempts to broaden the NATO family of weapons; and (3) to stress increasing NATO’s strength for the first phase of a war, with both conventional [and] nuclear capabilities, rather than on follow-up forces.
Strauss (Germany) indicated that there was no reason to abandon NATO’s appraisal of the military situation or change the military goals. Balanced collective forces are necessary to meet high costs. Strauss regretted that there had been no positive decision on interrelation of air defenses and logistics.

He stressed the importance of equipping the shield forces with dual capability weapons and of storing atomics in Europe. Noting that Germany accepts the burden and the risks, although this was not easy when others do not permit nuclear storage, Strauss requested other countries to re-examine their attitude.

Strauss then covered in detail plans for the German force buildup, indicating the goals and progress to date in all services, and expressed Germany’s determination to fulfill the military requirements of MC-70.

Strauss noted that there were three major problems for Germany: the lack of long-term volunteers for military service, the difficulties of procuring land for military purposes, and the lengthy procedures required for technical decisions on more weapons systems. The present tour of service is not long enough; and, as disarmament publicity has had some psychological effect on the public, the need for continued military forces must be made clear. NATO infrastructure procedures are too complicated and should be revised, particularly as to real estate and the logistics system. Strauss expressed appreciation for French willingness to make training facilities available.

Strauss mentioned the need for adjustments in German MC-70 requirements in order to choose among parallel weapons systems. They have decided to concentrate for the time being on two types of weapons systems—Honest John and Sergeant.

Other problems included: land acquisition for surface-to-air missiles, the need for air defense systems on destroyers, [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Strauss questioned the value of manned fighter units in air defense, and indicated his intention to stress multi-purpose capabilities in combat aircraft.

Strauss then made several specific proposals: the Annual Review should be maintained but with greater flexibility and more of a forward look; infrastructure procedures should be more concise and shorter; the international staff should provide a brief appraisal of each country to be discussed in detail at ministerial meetings; a strong psychological potential should be developed, perhaps with a small psychological warfare staff in SHAPE especially in view of Soviet propaganda on the “spirit of Camp David.”

---

8 Reference is to the talks between President Eisenhower and Khrushchev at Camp David, Maryland, September 25-27, at the conclusion of Khrushchev’s 13-day visit to the United States.
Strauss urged that uniform requirements be set for NATO military matériel and a reasonable distribution of production tasks be worked out with less emphasis on industrial pressures and national prestige factors. He proposed a technical committee on basic military requirements to work under the Military Committee.

On the question of the Baltic, Strauss emphasized that the time has come to solve the long-standing problems. Noting that there are many questions which seem beyond the competence of either the Chiefs of Staff or the Foreign Ministers alone, Strauss proposed that such political-military problems should be discussed by Defense Ministers, Chiefs of Staffs, and Permanent Representatives together. He concluded by stressing that NATO must give an impression of solidarity and strength, and expressing appreciation for the United States statement on keeping forces in Europe.

Etzel, the German Finance Minister, then discussed the German economic and financial situation. In 1958, Germany spent 3.6 percent of its GNP on defense, and if expenditures on Berlin and stockpiling costs are added, the percentage of GNP would reach 4.1 per cent. Etzel noted, however, that Germany was still divided and had continuing obligations for refugees. He stressed again Germany's intent to meet MC-70, and to increase defense expenditures to the limit of its possibilities, as well as continuing to contribute to under-developed countries.

Themelis (Greece) noted the increased Soviet propaganda designed to provoke tension in NATO. He stated that MC-70 goals are minimums but that even if they are met, Greece will have the smallest force in the Balkans except for Albania. Greece is trying to replace old equipment and will make maximum efforts; but the program is dependent on the mutual aid program. The Greeks have increased the percentage of GNP devoted to defense as GNP increased, but as the GNP is very low, Greece has one of the largest military burdens of the Alliance in proportion to her economy. Greek efforts depend on Allied cooperation; if, for example, the Allies buy her products, it will help the Greek economy and hence her defenses. Themelis concluded by commending NATO achievements in production of equipment and weapons.

Andreotti (Italy) warned that the gaps in NATO defenses were serious, but could be overcome if all members of the Alliance exerted maximum efforts. He stressed that the saving of the Alliance depended on its unity and cooperation. Italy has made considerable sacrifices to meet MC-70 goals: her defense budget will increase by 20 per cent over five years; Italy has arranged for introduction of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a NATO stockpile; she has established IRBM's and pro-

---

9 George Themelis, Greek Under Secretary of National Defense.
vided for an integrated defense. Andreotti concluded by expressing
pleasure at the United States reassurances that it would continue to con-
tribute its share in NATO and stated that Italy will continue to do all
possible to meet its goals.

Mr. Spaak then appointed a communiqué committee, following
which the morning session was adjourned.

240. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council
Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State

Paris, December 18, 1959, 5 p.m.

Polto 1192. Dept pass Defense and Treasury. Subject: Ministerial
NAC meeting, afternoon, December 16, continuation of Item II (Mili-
tary).\(^1\)

Chairman announced President’s request for relief of Adm. Wright
and President’s offer to nominate successor.\(^2\)

Spaak praised the performances of Admiral Wright and of General
Parker (Standing Group’s Representative to the NAC) and expressed
regret at their departure. In inspiring farewell speech, Admiral Wright
made the following points: SACLANT’s mission of controlling the At-
lantic for NATO is vital; NATO organization must adjust to technologi-
cal changes and other developments; and the MC 70 goals are the
absolute minimum for naval forces. After commenting on the lag in
the infrastructure program, Admiral Wright noted several accomplish-
ments, such as the application of atomic fission to submarine propulsion
and anti-submarine weapons, the research center at La Spezia, and com-
bined naval planning and operations. He concluded by expressing the
importance of the unified NATO defense as a deterrent to aggression.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/12-1859. Secret; Priority.
Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to London and Bonn and pouch to the other
NATO capitals and Moscow.

\(^1\) The verbatim (C-VR (5948)) record of this session, dated December 16, is \textit{ibid.}, Con-
ference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1559. No summary record of this session has been found.

\(^2\) The suggested text of the message Herter recommended President Eisenhower
send Spaak concerning the release of Admiral Wright from his assignment as SACLANT,
effective February 29, 1960, was transmitted in Topol 1144 to Paris, December 11. \textit{Ibid.},
Central Files, 740.5/12-1159)
Pearkes (Canada) noted that Canada’s efforts in behalf of North American defense are part of her contribution to NATO. He indicated that Canada had decided to re-equip its air squadrons in Europe but because of the high costs of modern weapons, could not contemplate additional commitments beyond those accepted by the government. He also noted that the changing threat had increased Canada’s maritime responsibilities in view of the need to provide escorts and maritime aircraft for the Pacific coast as well as the Atlantic.

Moniz (Portugal) noted that Portugal’s defense budget for next year would contain some increases which were significant in terms of Portugal’s resources. He emphasized Portugal’s overseas responsibilities, particularly in Africa.

Gilson (Belgium) outlined the reorganization of the Belgian Army, and then turned to a discussion of the problem of maintaining economic and social stability and the need for aid to under-developed countries, particularly in the light of Belgium’s responsibilities in the Congo. He emphasized the necessity for the smaller countries to achieve a greater integration of defenses and a pooling of production.

Handal (Norway) also stressed the need of the smaller countries for cooperative NATO efforts especially in coordinating the development and production of naval vessels. He indicated that in view of the importance of the close integration of European air defenses, his government was prepared to recommend to Parliament that the measures proposed in MC 54 be implemented. In view of the relatively small changes in Annual Review procedures over the past eight years he urged consideration of the suggestions put forward by the Norwegian Delegate for reforming the Annual Review process.

Krag (Denmark) apologized for the absence of the Danish Defense Minister who was presenting the Danish defense budget to Parliament. He expected that the decisions now under consideration would show an increase in Denmark’s defense budget.

Zorlu (Turkey) reiterated the dangers of a détente and endorsed the need for overcoming the defects in NATO’s defenses pointed out by the military authorities. He underscored the need for actions in the logistic field. He noted Turkey’s progress in the installation of an IRBM squadron and endorsed the importance of an integrated air defense. He expressed appreciation for the assurances of the United States, Great Britain and Germany. He noted that like Greece, Turkey had a low national income and continued to devote a relatively high share of her resources to defense. He indicated that Turkey had decided to increase its

---

3 Arthur Gilson, Belgian Minister of Defense.
4 Not found.
subsequent defense budgets by three percent but that continued assistance of the other members of the Alliance would be necessary.

Averoff (Greece) concluded the general discussion by reiterating that even the minimum requirements as set forth in MC 70 had not been achieved; Greece is particularly aware of the danger because of its geographical position between Albania and Bulgaria. He stressed that we must all increase our defense efforts and noted that despite the low per capita national income, Greece is spending 6 percent of it for defense. He again cautioned on the need to obtain the essential military strength and to meet our responsibilities in view of the danger to NATO.

General Norstad then gave a presentation on atomic weapons in Europe. He expressed satisfaction with the support given to MC 70, but indicated that deeds were necessary as well as words. He stated that little had been accomplished on achieving a collective balance of forces, but noted the possibilities open to the Benelux countries in the field of collective balanced forces and requested them to set an example for the rest of NATO.

[3 paragraphs (1-1/2 pages of source text) not declassified]

Next agenda point was then taken up on status of air forces. General Norstad reviewed development of air defense in Allied Command, Europe, since 1951 outlining need for centralized authority for integration of air defense and concluded that, in view of weapons developments, it was absolutely essential from military standpoint. He then discussed meaning of integration, emphasizing that it applied at highest level, and indicated many important functions which would be performed as national responsibilities. Guillaumat expressed hope that a formula could be found to reconcile military and political factor and that France was prepared to discuss technical aspects of air defense.

General discussion followed on question of air defense, in which Strauss strongly and convincingly supported Norstad's view on serious implications of a further delay in decision on unified air defense system. Watkinson affirmed support of his government for principle of unified command, and indicated willingness to reconsider disposition of Britain's squadrons if this would help in removing present deficiency. He was followed by Visser who stated that it was right and just to give Supreme Commander responsibilities and powers which he needs to carry out task assigned to him.

Secretary Herter made statement which emphasized requirement for instantaneous ability to react; this cannot be obtained, under modern time-space relationships, through loose cooperation of coalition. He also pointed out that continued support of NATO is going to depend upon assurance that funds contributed are being utilized to maximum, and that air defense was case in point.
Andreotti indicated Italy's support for integrated air defense of Europe, following which Pearkes cited Canada's experience with integrated air defense system in NORAD. He indicated that, speaking from definite experience, any misgivings about loss of individual sovereignty through integrated air control were unfounded.

SecGen then summarized questions of nuclear weapons and integration of air forces, concluding that we need to know precisely what specific issues divided members. After further discussion, it was agreed that France would examine and comment on papers submitted by General Norstad, and that after discussions between SHAPE and French Government, report would be made in two months on what problems could not be solved and reasons therefor. Norstad emphasized that next move (i.e., definitive comments by French on his proposals) was up to France, since SHAPE could not offer any further technical ways around what had now become political problem. This was clearly understood by all and explicitly accepted by Guillaumat.

Remaining discussion was devoted to question of what statements would be made to press (agreed to say no more than fact military matters were discussed) and to arrangements for next day's meeting.

241. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State

Paris, December 18, 1959, 1 p.m.

Polto 1178. From USDel. Subject: Private Ministerial Meeting December 17: morning session.¹

Meeting received comments on Four-Power Working Group report to Heads of Government.² At Couve's suggestion, agreed International Staff would prepare summary which would be attached to Working Group report for consideration of Heads of Government. Highlights follow.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-1859. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Rome and pouch to the other NATO capitals.

¹The verbatim (C-VR(59)49) and summary (C-R(59)49) records of this session, dated December 17, are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1559 and 1558, respectively.

²See footnote 4, Document 237.
Italy noted paper did not yet represent views four governments and this comment confirmed by United Kingdom and France. Agreed Permanent Council would decide level of NATO meeting with four Foreign Ministers April 19. Belgium and Turkey commented that section on “stated purposes” was so broad as to leave door open to Russians to bring up anything. Stressed it important West know what it wanted to take up. Turkey worried about bringing up secondary subjects on which Russians might make concessions while failing to yield at all on matters of primary concern to NATO. Italy noted that paper did not prejudge matters re subsequent summit meetings. On section on “continued Western consultation” Italy insisted could not decide now how working groups would be organized, and stressed need for full consultation with NATO in terms of paper.

Re psychological factors Greece stressed problems already existing of false détente for countries bordering Soviet bloc which have Communist Party present. Urged West stop deluding itself. Belgium urged that West take bold initiatives in order affect Western opinion. United Kingdom agreed with both, and Spaak supported Greek caution. Theme of West taking initiative also pushed by Italy, who suggested we can force Russians on offensive on issue of non-intervention. Greece agreed.

Belgium, saying political issues will not see much progress, urged we exploit intellectual and economic collaboration as subject for discussion. Denmark agreed, and also urged Council to give negotiating powers flexibility they would need on tactics as distinguished from substance. United Kingdom pointed out we have agreed positions on Germany, Berlin, disarmament and cultural contacts but economically need a good deal more preparation on Western position.

Norway spoke in favor of 10-power disarmament meeting before summit to prepare issues for summit discussion. Secretary Herter responded that for a while we had thought East-West summit might occur before 10-power disarmament talks early next year, and had feared latter would have only just begun at time of East-West summit and thus result in confusion. He recognized difference of opinion in Working Group, thanking Lange for his views, and said United States wanted to adjust to the type of suggestion that had been made. Italy supported Norway on this point. Dutch pointed out danger in having 10-power group and thus have opportunity to propagandize it at summit before West could have disposed of it.
Italy raised question of interpretation of section on disarmament, urging there was no difference between procedure and substance, thus trying once again to obtain a role in disarmament preparation for summit. Couve pointed out Working Group bound no one, words may not be most happy ones and stressed substance of disarmament should be considered in Western Five. Canada urged 10-powers meet before summit. Spaak confirmed that it was understood Western Five would work in consultation with NATO and Canada urged NATO set up disarmament groups, both political and military, to study matter and give advice to Western Five. Spaak said Permanent Council could consider this later.

On Germany and Berlin, Germans pressed for free elections, no isolated solution of Berlin, which would prejudice solutions of German question and need for guaranteed liberty and access for Berliners. Spaak pointed out document really told us nothing on these subjects and urged consultation before East-West summit if any change of policy. Secretary pointed out this would be studied in ensuing months in closest contact with NATO in order to dovetail ideas. Taking positions before eve of next meeting could result in leaks. Decisions could be taken later in complete consultation with NATO.

Turkey spoke against aiding Russians economically, through credits or otherwise. Belgium urged that in preparing position of West on aid to underdeveloped countries, necessary foundation was resolution of economic problems within West in order to establish unity. Industrialized powers must improve trade between themselves if they are to help underdeveloped. While implementation of any program should be in OEEC or ad hoc group, NATO should establish cohesion and basis for political decisions.

West should not ask Russians to join in aid program but should ask them to develop programs of their own in coordination with West. Italy doubted should go that far in bringing Russians into aid programs and Greece and Turkey also cautioned strongly against dangers involved. Norway felt Permanent Representatives should discuss economic problems within Alliance and the underdeveloped felt that aid programs under United Nations contained ample safeguards to protect West from dangers of Russian abuse and urged United Nations method be used. Italy felt NATO should consider aid to underdeveloped, and pointed out OEEC going to undertake this. Link should be established between NATO and OEEC. Spaak pointed out NATO could not administer aid

---

3 Regarding disarmament, the Four-Power Working Group report stated:

"Discussion of substantive disarmament matters and the coordination of Western positions for forthcoming disarmament negotiations would appear to be within the province of the Western members of the ten-nation group."
programs for underdevelopeds but there were many political problems for discussion in NATO. Lange proposal should be considered in NATO. There is political need for common policy as inspiration for action. NATO could ask OEEC to collaborate. Turkey urged problem be studied within NATO, since OEEC contained neutrals. Pointed out Russians continually offer aid to Turkey. Secretary recognized that doubts had been expressed on advisability of taking up aid to underdevelopeds at summit in light lack of agreement in Council on major elements thereof. Said Lange proposal needs consideration. Referring to his 10-year planning proposal, Secretary urged today’s communiqué refer thereto leaving implementation to Permanent Council.

Spaak urged communiqué state that political aspects of economic problems be dealt with by NATO, and with Lange’s support said technical matters could then be taken up in OEEC.

Meeting adjourned to 3:30 p.m. to consider draft communiqué and defense resolution Spaak preparing.

---

4 See footnote 6, Document 238.

---

242. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State

Paris, December 18, 1959, 5 p.m.

Polto 1179. From USDel. Subject: Ministerial NAC meeting afternoon December 17:1 action on Admiral Wright, resolution on defense, time and place of next meeting, other business, and communiqué.

Council adopted resolution accepting Admiral Wright’s resignation and requesting United States designate successor which Spaak anticipated might be named to NAC December 22.2

AR resolution3 was superseded by resolution on defense prepared by IS at Spaak’s request. Defense resolution attempted take account of

---

1 The verbatim (C-VR (59)50) and summary (C-R (59)50) records of this session, both dated December 17, are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1559 and 1558, respectfully.

2 The undated draft resolution accepting Admiral Wright’s resignation and requesting nomination of a U.S. officer to be his successor is ibid., CF 1567.

3 See footnote 7, Document 239.
interventions made previous day. Text of defense resolution as approved being transmitted separate message.\textsuperscript{4} Paragraph 3 accepted by Belgium in light of Belgian statements made during AR examination. Language paragraph 5 represents compromise, after considerable NAC discussion.

United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Denmark insisted they must have some flexibility make changes, and Denmark made clear for record that it was developing new defense system and could accept language paragraph 5 as approved only if understood that Denmark might reduce size of forces on condition appropriate NATO authorities agreed no loss effectiveness involved. Strauss and Spaak both warned strongly against exploitation of such flexibility to make unilateral reduction in NATO commitments under facade of alleged maintenance combat effectiveness.

Defense Ministers' meeting anticipated for next March in paragraph 8 primarily intended consider report (described previous message)\textsuperscript{5} on discussions between SACEUR and French Government regarding nuclear weapons and air defense. Spaak made it clear that Permanent Council would arrange timing and terms of reference Defense Ministers' meeting.

\textsuperscript{[3 paragraphs (20 lines of source text) not declassified]}

Wigny read statement on Belgium aid to and political objectives in Congo,\textsuperscript{6} described political conflicts in area, and referred to Belgium's growing financial burden in this area. Circulated pamphlet on Congo to Council.\textsuperscript{7} Expressed confidence Belgium has NAC support for program and objectives in Congo.

At invitation of Turkish Government it was agreed that next Ministerial session of Council will take place in Istanbul in May 1960.

\textsuperscript{4} Document 243.
\textsuperscript{5} Not further identified.
\textsuperscript{6} Wigny's statement has not been found.
\textsuperscript{7} Not found.
243. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council
Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State

Paris, December 18, 1959, 5 p.m.

Polto 1180. From USDel. Following is resolution on defense
(C-M(59)24) adopted by Ministerial NAC on December 17, 1959:

Begin Text.
The North Atlantic Council

1. Having taken cognizance of the report on the 1959 Annual Re-
view and of the Military Committee’s comments on the results of the
review contained in MC 39/11;

2. Considering that any deterioration in the current military pos-
ture of the Alliance would jeopardise the security of member countries;

3. Adopts as firm goals the force plans for 1960, indicated by coun-
tries in their replies to the 1959 Annual Review Questionnaire (1) and
recapitulated in the summary force tables (2), to which each country has
committed itself;

4. Having noted the provisional goals for 1961 and the planning
goals for 1962 indicated by member countries in their replies to the 1959
Annual Review Questionnaire, emphasises that the firm, provisional
and planning national goals frequently fall short of the minimum forces
required by the NATO military authorities;

5. Takes note that some countries have indicated an intent to re-
examine their force plans for 1960 with a view to possible improvement,
and that each member country has committed itself to refrain from
measures of any kind which might either reduce the size or modify the
quality of the contribution which it has firmly undertaken to make to the
Alliance during 1960, except by agreement with the appropriate Allied
authorities;

6. Agrees that the overall evaluation of the results of the military
studies which are being carried out in support of the resolution on de-
fense C-M(58)170 should be completed and forwarded to the Council
for consideration not later than 1 May 1960 and to this end invites mem-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-1859. Secret; Priority. Re-
peated to London and Bonn and pouchcd to the other NATO capitals.

1 See Document 242.

2 See footnote 7, Document 239. MC-39/11 has not been found.

3 The 1959 Annual Review Questionnaire and summary force tables have not been
found.

4 See Document 180.
ber countries to complete their discussions of the studies with the major commanders as early as possible;

7. Invites the Permanent Council to examine the various proposals put forward by Ministers during the course of the present meeting with a view to increasing the effectiveness of NATO defence;

8. Resolves that the results of this examination shall be submitted to the Ministers of Defence who might meet for this purpose during March 1960. End Text.

244. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/20

Paris, December 21, 1959, 9:30 a.m.

MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

Paris, December 19–21, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The President
Ambassador Houghton
Lt. Col. Vernon Walters

France

Prime Minister Michel Debre

SUBJECT

Military Integration

In the course of a conversation with the President on another matter Mr. Debre said that he wanted to talk to the President about military integration. In recent years France had been threatened with disappearance as a national entity in the European Defense Community and some other concepts of Western European unity. This had given the word "integration" a bad connotation. The President jokingly said "like

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1569. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Walters and approved by the White House on March 24. The meeting was held at the U.S. Embassy Residence.

1 Eisenhower and Debré discussed the Algerian resolution in the United Nations. A memorandum of their conversation is ibid.
collaboration” and Mr. Debre smilingly said “Not quite as bad as collaboration”. Mr. Debre also said that he wished to report to the President something General de Gaulle had previously said to him, namely that the military commanders must have a sense of responsibility toward their own country and not have this feeling completely diluted. The President said that he had been in touch with officers serving in integrated forces for many years and he knew of no case where this service had in any way lessened their sense of duty towards their own country. Certainly in the case of our own officers this service had not in any degree lessened their loyalty and sense of responsibility towards the United States. Mr. Debre said that in these technical and operational matters where close coordination was required there would be no difficulty on the part of the French. It was only where this sense of responsibility toward one’s own country was concerned that they had reservations.

The President then spoke at length concerning the changed face of war, the speed at which events would move and the absurdity of thinking there would be one air battle on the Rhine and a completely different one in France. He wished to assure Mr. Debre that no one was more mindful of the prestige, interests and future of France than he was. His strong feelings on this matter were not merely the result of his experience as a soldier but also the result of his long friendly and close interest in France and her future.

Mr. Debre said that all French people recognized this.

The President then said that he would be very happy if General Norstad were given an opportunity to explain the technical details of his air defense plan. Mr. Debre said that for the next 15 days he had a very rough time ahead with his Parliament and Ambassador Houghton could confirm this, but he would be happy to see General Norstad in January and discuss these matters with him. The President said he would be very happy if General Norstad were given this opportunity of presenting this plan to General de Gaulle and to Mr. Debre.²

²In a memorandum for the record, prepared on December 29, Goodpaster wrote that he called Norstad on December 21 at the President’s request to ask him to arrange an appointment with de Gaulle at which time he would present “a specific and detailed exposition of integrated air defense.” Later he called Norstad again after the President’s meeting with Debré to say that the latter had asked that Norstad see de Gaulle and himself in January. (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, France, Vol. II)
245. Telegram From the Mission at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State

Paris, December 22, 1959, 9 p.m.

Polto 1215. Following are highlights of NATO Ministerial Meeting Dec 22. Full report later.¹

After exposition by Couve on behalf of four of positions and actions taken in last three days,² meeting was marked by strong expression from majority smaller NATO countries warning against political directorate being assumed by four or three major powers. While satisfactory NATO communiqué³ finally adopted after reassurances by US, UK, and France, meeting reflected strong small-power opposition to French-inspired idea of tripartitism. Principal point of objection centered in language of letters sent to Khrushchev suggesting series of summit meetings to discuss main problems affecting attainment peace and stability in world.⁴ To a number of Ministers not members of four, this suggested a precedent for discussion, and perhaps negotiation, of major world problems affecting all countries by four major powers. In addition, it was pointed out that this concept marked a new departure in giving respectability to USSR as an arbiter in world affairs. Another point objected to was concept of an open agenda for East/West summit, which some members considered dangerous.

Communiqué on new economic proposals issued Dec 21 also came in for criticism, principally with respect to composition of informal meeting to be held in Paris in near future.⁵ As result pressure on this score, France (Couve) finally stated that meeting proposed for Jan 13 would be a working party and one-shot operation to consider proposals to put before OEEC Ministerial meeting on following day.⁶

---

¹ The "full report" may refer to the verbatim record (C-VR (59/51) which is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 60, CF 1568.
² Reference is to the Western Heads of Government Meetings in Paris December 19–21.
³ For text of the communiqué, December 22, see Department of State Bulletin, January 11, 1960, pp. 44–45.
⁴ Eisenhower’s letter to Khrushchev, December 21, stated that he, de Gaulle, and Macmillan "agreed that it would be desirable for the four Heads of State or Government to meet together from time to time in each other’s countries to discuss the main problems affecting the attainment of peace and stability in the world." (Ibid., p. 44)
⁵ For text of this communiqué, which called for a special meeting in Paris to consider trade and aid to less-developed nations, see ibid., p. 43.
As result pressure for more thorough consultation and coordi-
nation of policies NATO-wide in preparation for summit it was agreed, on
motion by Greece, that all WG reports would be submitted to NAC be-
fore decisions finalized; also it was agreed that NATO I.S. Rep should be
observer on WG for East/West relations.

Throughout meeting, reassurances by US and UK, with France a re-
leuc tant third, were received with expressions of confidence in purposes
and objectives of Western four, but without relinquishing point that
public and parliamentary opinion in smaller countries requires closest
consultation and coordination throughout period of summit prepara-
tions in order to achieve essential unity of Western position at summit.

Will submit suggestions on handling economic matter tomorrow.

Burgess

246. Letter From the Permanent Representative to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional
Organizations (Burgess) to Secretary of State Herter


DEAR CHRIS: Since the spirited debate in the Ministerial Meeting on
last Tuesday morning¹ we have been taking stock and getting further
reactions, though most of our colleagues are now out of town.

It would be easy to interpret this “revolt” as merely an expression
by the smaller powers of NATO of a desire for greater prestige through
participation in Summit preparations. There was, of course, some of that
psychology, but comments we have received along with the full report
of the meeting show that it had much deeper sources.²

First, I think the reaction was touched off by fear of de Gaulle’s “tri-
umphirate”. They are deeply afraid that we may fall in step with this idea,
and the communiqué of the Big Four meeting³ sounded like that to

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–2659. Secret; Official–Informal.
² See Document 245.
³ See footnote 1, Document 245.
⁴ For text of the final communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Heads of State and
Government meeting on December 21, see Department of State Bulletin, January 11, 1960,
pp. 43–44.
them, particularly the commitment to a series of meetings and the breadth of the agenda, both of which went beyond proposals submitted for consultation.

Second, there is clear evidence that these countries were reflecting their own political problems.

It is noteworthy that Greece and Turkey took the lead in the debate. Greece is carrying a very heavy defense burden for her in face of strong left-wing and communist opposition. Communist guerrillas are on her frontier. Any flavor of détente or implication of lack of importance of Greek efforts could bring a fall in government.

Turkey is constantly tempted by Soviet approaches on credit or trade. To stand up against these takes much political courage. The Turks felt that the broad proposals in the letter to Khrushchev ran the risk of undermining this position.

The Belgian government, as we know, has a very serious political problem in getting appropriations to support their NATO commitments.

Certainly, we have always taken the internal German political problems very much into consideration with regard to anything concerning Germany. What the smaller allies were reflecting was similar problems, which it is all too easy to overlook unwittingly. Retaining the firm support of these “committed” countries is, we all know, as important as an appeal to the “uncommitted.”

The request for closer consultation, put forward so strongly, is one which we should take very seriously. I would hope that the United States would take the lead in insisting on the fullest and frankest prior NATO consultation on preparation for the Summit.

As to the techniques for consultation, there should of course be regular reports. This, I believe, should be supplemented by personal contacts. Some of the sub-committees might well meet in Paris. There should be visits of people between this mission and the working groups.

Please forgive me if I also suggest that at the next Western Summit this mission should be tied in more closely than it was this time. We should be able to identify and help avoid some of the rocks in the road.

Sincerely yours,

Randy
247. Letter From the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Norstad) to President Eisenhower


DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I was delighted to see you looking not only well, but extremely well, when you were here in Paris just before Christmas. After your strenuous trip you had reason to be tired, but certainly gave no appearance of it. Believe me, this was reassuring to everyone.

You will recall that just before your taking off we discussed briefly a meeting between President de Gaulle and myself on the question of air defense.\(^1\) I followed this up immediately after your plane left by talking to Debre, who indicated that his office would take the initiative in setting up the meeting and that it would probably take place about the 8th or the 9th January.

I understand that it is now de Gaulle's plan to return to Paris about the 15th of January, at which time he will be briefed by Mr. Guillaumat, the Minister of Defense. Shortly after that there will be a major meeting of the Defense Council. From this schedule it appears unlikely that I will meet with the President before the 20th of January or even later. While this does not follow the schedule which I think you had in mind at the time we talked, it is perhaps best to permit a normal foundation to be established on the French side.

Air Defense was highlighted at the December Ministerial meeting of NATO not because it is the only problem or the greatest military problem of the Alliance, nor even the most urgent, but rather because it was a symbol of the principle of collective security. It is important and it has an urgency, it is true, and thus it makes an extremely useful foundation for a discussion on a somewhat broader basis. I propose, therefore, to give to President de Gaulle a rather complete picture of the NATO military status, but to do so on the basis of providing a context in which to consider the problem of air defense.

I am sure you have been told that at the Ministerial meeting the French agreed to consider the Air Defense technical papers now current\(^2\) with a view to seeing whether they provide a basis for a higher degree of unification in the Alliance. The NATO Council charged the French authorities with doing this promptly and directed that a report be submitted to the Council not later than two months after the adjournment of the meeting. From what I have heard informally, the French

---

\(^1\) No record of this conversation has been found, but see footnote 2, Document 244.
\(^2\) Not found.
authorities are giving considerable attention to air defense at the present
time and, at least on the Ministerial level, seem to hope for a fair measure
of success. I must admit that I find no basis for any great optimism. You
may have noted that just within the last few days Couve de Murville,
speaking for the Assembly, said: "... To give, both in peacetime and in
war, over the entire French territory, the authority—meaning in particu-
lar the right to open fire—to a Commander-in-Chief who is not directly
under the orders of the French Government, for purposes as vital as Air
Defense, that is a matter which poses for our government a problem the
seriousness of which I ask the Assembly to understand. Great Britain
faced that question under similar conditions, and a solution was found
for her. The solution for France is more difficult, considering her geo-
graphical situation. I hope that the discussions which are going to take
place will enable a solution to be reached."

This language would appear to express a hope, but at the same time
Couve may be destroying the foundation on which such a hope must be
based. I remind myself, however, that the speech was made in answer to
some of the strongest criticism that has been directed against the present
French administration and it was made, of course, for political pur-
poses.

Rest assured that I will do my best to contribute to removing this
source of irritation. I cannot promise success, but I will at least not aggra-
vate the situation further. You will be kept informed of the meeting with
President de Gaulle and of any other significant developments.

With warmest regards and respects,

Sincerely yours,

Larry

P.S. In connection with another Franco-American-NATO problem,
the Mediterranean Fleet, you may be interested in reading the enclosed
copy of a letter which I have just sent to the Chairman of the U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff.

---

3 Ellipsis in the source text. Couve de Murville made these remarks in the National
Assembly on December 29.

4 In the enclosed letter to Twining, January 7, Norstad referred to a recent French
proposal tabled in the NATO Standing Group on the French fleet in the Mediterranean.
Norstad believed that "the French may be moving toward a proposal to take the Medi-
terranean, or the Allied forces in the Mediterranean, out of the NATO context." He further
believed that "the present Fleet question can be settled quietly within about 30 days of the
time the Standing Group releases it to me for action or the problem passes to me in default
of a Standing Group decision."
DEAR LARRY: Thank you very much for your letter of the seventh.¹ I think that in replying I can do no better than to give you a brief record of the impressions I formed after my talk with General De Gaulle on the subjects that your letter brings up.²

The item that the General and I discussed at greatest length was that of coordinating the air defense in the NATO area. I told him that, as far back as World War II, I found it was necessary to develop a system for effective coordination in this field. I pointed out that with the improvement of weapon systems, both interceptors as well as the ground to air weapons, and with the reduction of the time element, single control was far more important than ever before. I said that unless we had a single control in this vital field, it would be impossible to concentrate available defensive forces at the point of greatest danger; for example, if France were the principal target, we could not, without pre-arranged defense plans under single control, concentrate available forces from other nations to help in the battle.

To this kind of presentation he countered with the hypothetical case that Italy might be attacked, and then all of the French aircraft would be sent to that place, leaving the whole of France defenseless. I argued that a commander responsible for operations along a great front had two things to do: to keep in place those formations that would always be necessary for local defense, particularly his short-range interceptors and air defense missiles, and secondly, to keep abreast of all intelligence so as to concentrate in timely fashion at the point most seriously threatened.

Beyond all this, I talked to him about the great need for coordination between the missile and the interceptor. I think that as far as technique is concerned, he knows that the theory of a single command is correct; he commented that operation conducted under the authority of a “Council of War” had always been inefficient.

His great preoccupation is the glory and prestige of France. He argued, among other things, that no man in uniform can develop real enthusiasm for serving in any such amorphous organization as an “Allied command.” He said that patriotism and morale are built around nationalistic considerations. Because of this he said that the “defense of France

¹ Document 247.
² See Part 2, Document 150.
is a French responsibility." Finally, he argued that what you were asking in what he called your "new" plan of air organization was something in addition to what you already had. He said that he was quite ready to let the matter stand as it is now arranged; he was objecting, however, to any further integration of French forces into NATO.

In this matter as well as in that of the Fleet, I argued that all nations and forces should be on an equal footing. I pointed out that American forces were in Europe as a result of a multilateral treaty providing for common defense. Unless we had a coordinated defense system, it was rather silly for American forces to be in Europe.

I urged that France take action tending to solidify NATO's determination, morale and organization, and should, by no means, do anything that would tend to set up centrifugal forces, which would inevitably work toward the weakening or even the destruction of the alliance.

I asked him to see you personally. He said that this he could not do until some time around the middle of January because of a very heavy schedule involving different types of work. Debre told me the same.3

In any event, I hope you can make some impression on him but I must admit that he seems to be singularly blind to the fact that if each nation is going its own way, this automatically destroys NATO. I am quite sure he would not want that—at least he says he does not so desire. He is, on the other hand, very keen on promoting the closer union and ties with Germany. It is possible that his objective in this line may be diminishing his respect for NATO. In any event, good luck.

Give my warm greeting to Isabelle,4 and, of course, all the best to yourself.

As ever,5

---

3 See Document 244.
4 Norstad's wife.
5 Printed from an unsigned copy.
249. Memorandum of Conversation


PRESENT

General de Gaulle
General Norstad
Colonel de Rougemont
Lt. Colonel Vernon Walters

General Norstad thanked the President for receiving him and stated that this conversation arose as a result of talks between General de Gaulle and President Eisenhower during which it was felt that it might be useful if General Norstad talked to him on air defense and other matters. General de Gaulle then asked whether it was merely on air defense questions or on other things.

General de Gaulle said that the Atlantic Alliance was not in question, that it must be maintained as long as the Soviet threat endures, and especially now just before the Summit meetings we must not be divided.

General Norstad said he knew that General de Gaulle had been briefed by his own authorities, and he would like to touch on air defense matters, but also perhaps enlarge the picture.

General de Gaulle then said he would like to say a word about air defense himself. He said that there were two possibilities regarding war: first, there was general, strategic, nuclear war; and, secondly, something less than this which would involve fighting in Germany. The French were willing to give all the means and forces in this forward area for the battle in Germany, but if this battle were lost, the countries of Europe, France and Great Britain would still have to defend themselves. The first battle in Germany would be integrated and the second would not. There might not be much left and it might involve partisan-type fighting against occupation; but the governments should not be completely deprived of means to fight. They must preserve the national entity; and that was all.

General Norstad replied that SHAPE’s policy was to preserve this national entity at the highest possible level. He discussed in general terms the organization of A.C.E., pointing out that integration was at the level of the largest national units, that is, Army or Corps; and that, simi-
larly, the ATAF's contained very large national components, such as 1st CATAF and Seventeenth Air Force. General Norstad then said that the most effective part of any air defense was, of course, the strike against the sources of enemy air power, such as airfields and missile-launching sites. He indicated in a general way some of the delivery systems and indicated that France would contribute both in aircraft and in missiles, and outlined the types of missiles that would be found in A.C.E. in 1963.

General de Gaulle asked whether the range of the Redstone was 250 miles.

General Norstad then spoke of the weapons situation in general terms, giving some orders of magnitude of availability of nuclear weapons and discussed SACEUR's atomic strike plan and means by which targets would be attacked.

General de Gaulle expressed considerable interest in this and commented that it was extremely well planned. He asked a number of questions relating to this matter.

General Norstad said that if at some later date General de Gaulle has some time available he would be happy to give him a further briefing on this subject, and General de Gaulle nodded.

The General spoke of aircraft on the alert and said he would like to come now to the air defense situation. [3 lines of source text not declassified] He then showed General de Gaulle a chart of the speed of penetration into the area of A.C.E. of enemy fighters flying at speeds of Mach 1 and Mach 2. General Norstad explained the function of the early-warning system and indicated that automatic or semi-automatic data-transmission equipment would be required, and one French-built system was under study; it was interesting because it used transistors rather than tubes, [8-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

General de Gaulle then asked about the status of the British Fighter Command, and General Norstad replied that this was under SHAPE, but that the fighters could not be transferred outside the area of the United Kingdom without national agreement, and that this would also be true for the DAT.

General de Gaulle pointed out that the British had a different situation and were more independent. He asked under whom the DAT commander would serve, and was told that it would be under AIRCENT. He asked who AIRCENT was, and was told that it was Air Marshal Broadhurst. He said that the British enjoyed their own special line of command and that he would want exactly what the British had.

General Norstad said that to do this would be an offense against judgment inasmuch as it would split the battle in the middle and did not

---

1 Sir Harry Broadhurst.
make military sense. However, he understood that there might be political or other considerations that made this expedient for General de Gaulle and if he needed it, General Norstad would be willing to accept this and support it before the Military Committee, if this was what General de Gaulle wanted. He explained that he did not like the system because it was not the most effective one, but if General de Gaulle felt that he had to have this, General Norstad felt that, with the cooperation of the French Air Forces, something satisfactory could be worked out that he could support.

General de Gaulle said that this would still be different from what the British had and they had certain special advantages. General Norstad replied that there were none that the French could not have, that he had negotiated this matter himself, [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

General Norstad pointed out that CINCAIRCENT was directly under General Valluy, a French officer, who would certainly wish to insure coordination of this matter. Furthermore, CINCAIRCENT had a Deputy of Air Defense. None of these positions in NATO were assigned by countries, but generally they were given to officers of the same nationality, and for four years this Air Defense Deputy had been a French General Officer, and was currently General Pelissie of the French Air Force.

General Norstad then said that another French Officer, General Valluy, controlled a very large percentage of the nuclear weapons available to A.C.E. in time of war. General Norstad also pointed out that if an intrusion took place, basically, the decision to engage the intruder would be made by the sector controller, and if this took place over France, this sector controller would be a Frenchman under the DAT; but it was essential that all of the information, data and means for the air defense of Europe be employed as a whole in order to insure their most effective use.

General de Gaulle then asked, “Why was this not settled before I arrived, and why is it so important to you? After all, the French contribution is not large, and why do you attach so much importance to this question?”

General Norstad said that all of the other countries had agreed that the best defense can be furnished by NATO by defending it as a unit, that the French contribution to NATO was not critical, but that the defense offered by NATO to France was critical and that maximum effect would be obtained in air defense if all of the available forces were used as one. He explained that General Eisenhower, in his original terms of reference, had been assigned responsibility for air defense in the zone of the land battle. This had meant, in effect, Germany. Germany at that time was not a part of the Alliance and did not have much to say. Subsequently, in 1955, General Gruenther had been assigned responsibility
for the coordination of air defense from a planning point of view. General Norstad stated that when he had been at Fontainebleau he had endeavored to obtain Netherlands, Belgian and French agreement to place at least a forward part of their areas under a common air defense set-up and they have agreed to do so. Although there had been some difficulties, due to national sensibilities, particularly as between the BENELUX countries and France, these had been surmounted. With the shrinkage of time due to the increases in aircraft speeds, the problem has become more acute, and last year he had felt obligated to accept the responsibility for an integrated air defense, an additional load he did not particularly wish to assume.

General de Gaulle then asked under whom the U.K. Fighter Command would operate, and General Norstad answered under SHAPE and that if General de Gaulle desired that this be the case with the DAT he would be willing to do it on this basis.

General de Gaulle nodded and said, “We will see what we can work out.”

General de Gaulle asked General Norstad what he thought of the recent Russian missile launchings into the central Pacific. General Norstad stated that this was an impressive achievement and that they had fallen quite close to the target, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. General de Gaulle asked whether they had been fired from the Caspian Sea area, and General Norstad indicated that he believed they had been fired from a range just north and east of the Caspian.

General Norstad then recalled the President’s recent statement concerning the reliability and accuracy of the last 15 Atlas firings. General de Gaulle said he has no doubt concerning this. He was just inquiring to get a general idea of what the Russians had done.

General de Gaulle thanked General Norstad very warmly for coming and talking to him about these matters.

General Norstad again repeated that he would be available to give General de Gaulle a fuller briefing on the Strike Plan at a later date, if the General so desired, and General de Gaulle nodded. General Norstad said he understood that General de Gaulle did have problems. General de Gaulle said that he did indeed have problems, and that they were moving quickly. General Norstad said he hoped they were not too difficult, and General de Gaulle nodded rather sadly and said that they all wound up the same way.

---

2 Reference presumably is to Eisenhower’s annual budget message to Congress on January 18, in which he noted that the Atlas ICBM was now operational.
He then walked to the door with General Norstad, thanking him again for this explanation, and saying again how impressed he had been with the thoroughness of the organization of the Strike Plan.

Subsequently, in an adjoining room, General Norstad said to Colonel de Rougemont that his offer was firm to place the DAT directly under SHAPE and separate the DAT from the forward area in Germany, even though this ran counter to his judgment and split the battle in the center; if this was what General de Gaulle wanted, he would accept it, defend it before the Military Committee, and attempt to work it out on this basis. He stated that he desired that his firmest language be recorded for the French minutes in this respect. He also said that he would re-work MC 54/1 in such a way as to eliminate the expression “integration” and substitute some other phrase, such as “unification” or “centralization.” He asked that Colonel de Rougemont note this in speaking with the French national authorities.

\[3\] Not found.

---

250. Memorandum of Conversation


PRESENT

Prime Minister Debre, Mr. Guillaumat, General Ely, General Puget, Col de Villemain, Mr. Racine, LtCol Walters, Major ____________

After a pleasant lunch during which no substantial matters were discussed, while coffee was being served the Prime Minister said he understood that General Norstad had seen General de Gaulle two days before and had talked with him concerning air defense. General Norstad said that he had, in fact, had a good talk with General de Gaulle concerning Air Defense matters and he had also discussed SACEUR’s atomic strike plan with him, and that this had seemed to interest General de Gaulle very much.

On the subject of Air Defense, General de Gaulle had indicated that he would like to have for the French DAT a status analogous to the

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Norstad. Top Secret. Drafted by Walters. The meeting was held in the Prime Minister’s office.

1 General André Puget, French Deputy of the Air Staff.
2 As on the source text. General Norstad was also present.
3 See Document 249.
status of the British Fighter Command. General Norstad said that he had told General de Gaulle that this was an offense against judgment, splitting the battle in the middle, but that if General de Gaulle for other considerations felt that this was necessary, he, General Norstad, was prepared to accept this, to support it, and to make it work. Under such a status the DAT would be directly under SHAPE instead of under AIRCENT and, therefore, CINCENT, who was a French officer. At the present time AIRCENT's air defense deputy was and has been for the last four years a French officer. While these posts were not fixed by nationality, generally they went to officers of the same nationality, and presumably this officer would continue to be French in the future. Mr. Debre inquired whether AIRCENT was a British officer and was told he was. He said the thinking of the French Government was that they should retain at least some element of air defense under national control. General Norstad pointed out that under MC 544 national identities were retained, and that certain safeguards were included, namely, aircraft could not be brought into or diverted out of areas such as Fighter Command or DAT without prior national consent. General Norstad stated that he was thoroughly acquainted with this arrangement with Fighter Command because he, himself, had negotiated it with Mr. Macmillan. He had written a letter on this subject concerning Fighter Command's arrangement, and had given it to General Beaufre for circulation to the French authorities.5 There were no other arrangements for advantages other than those mentioned in MC 54/1.4 General Norstad repeated that the solution desired by General de Gaulle was not the best militarily, although it could be made to work and pointed out that it would diminish French influence in the Central European area and in the whole question of air defense. That at the present time, the air defense deputy to AIRCENT was a Frenchman. If the French were not in the Air Defense setup, it would be difficult to retain a Frenchman in this job and it would probably pass to some other nationality. Mr. Debre then inquired as to the measure of General Norstad's control over Fighter Command. The General explained this and indicated that the same could be done for DAT. General Puget at this point said that in point of fact Fighter Command does deal with Central Europe for coordination. General Norstad indicated that aircraft flying at speeds of Mach 2—which is a present capability—would be over Paris 15 minutes after crossing the iron curtain, and with the time space element this indicated, one could not fight a series of battles, but rather a single battle. Mr. Debre stated that he under-

4 Not found.
5 Norstad's letter to General André Beaufre, Deputy Chief of Staff, SHAPE, has not been found.
stood this. General Norstad then said that he had understood that General de Gaulle desired to have a status for the DAT similar to Fighter Command and that it would be directly under SHAPE. However, there was an intermediate solution between what was proposed in MC 54 and what General de Gaulle had asked for, which might be even more acceptable to the French, and this would be for him as Supreme Commander to delegate his authority for coordination between a new 5th Region that would be created for the DAT and Air Defense in the forward areas of Germany to CINCENT, who was a French officer, General Valluy. This would also be more effective from the military point of view than trying to put General Norstad's headquarters into detailed coordination work, upon which they should really not be engaged.

General Norstad said he felt they should not get into technical details at this time before obtaining broad agreements on basic principles, and he was prepared to send a letter to Mr. Guillaumat or to General Ely, in which he would set forth his ideas on how this matter could be handled in a manner which would be acceptable both to the French and himself, and which could be militarily effective. General Ely said that the French were thinking of designating General Jouhoud\(^6\) to discuss these matters with General Norstad. The General said he felt that it would be helpful if they could get general agreement before going into detailed negotiations. General Ely said that this would be quite acceptable to him and that he would await Gen. Norstad's letter.

Mr. Debre then asked whether the General had discussed the question of the Mediterranean fleet with General de Gaulle. General Norstad replied jokingly that his admission ticket to General de Gaulle had read "Air Defense" so he had not felt that it would be appropriate to take up other matters unless General de Gaulle had raised them, which he did not. Mr. Debre then asked whether it would be possible for the French Admiral in the Western Mediterranean to wear two hats, as a NATO Commander and one as a National Commander. General Norstad said that he felt this could be done and added, smilingly, that some Frenchman might hold him to an offer he had made previously, namely, to place MEDOC directly under SHAPE as a major subordinate command, and the MEDOC Admiral could also have a French national. He likewise offered to write a letter to General Ely on this subject and the French agreed that this would be useful. General Norstad then said that there was one additional matter which put him in an extremely difficult position and which he hoped they would not regard as a form of pressure on his part, and this matter was Bizerte. He had extended the period for the use of ten million pounds of infrastructure funds for six

---

\(^6\) General Louis Jouhoud, Chief of the French Air Staff.
months. This had expired on the 31st of December. There was another month’s extension under way. If a solution could be reached on the Mediterranean, it would give him a plausible justification for a further extension of the time period for the use of these funds. If there were no French forces in the Mediterranean under NATO, it would be difficult for him to certify that a NATO requirement existed for the expenditure of these funds. He hoped that they would not regard this as pressure on his part to influence their decision, but rather to influence the timing of their decision, inasmuch as he had to make a recommendation on the employment of these funds in the near future. Mr. Debre stated that he understood this and that they would await General Norstad’s proposals. He said he felt that this conversation with General Norstad had been a very good and very useful one. He said that he had problems at the present time but felt he would surmount them. He stated twice “February will be a very good month.” He thanked General Norstad for what he had told them, and General Norstad then left.

Outside the conference room General Ely indicated to General Norstad that the French did not expect Admiral Barjot to live a great deal longer and would like to replace him with Admiral Ortoli, but that for human reasons no mention should be made of this at this time. General Norstad said that he hoped no mention would be made because it would certainly crush Admiral Barjot. However, if he had no French naval forces under him, it would be difficult for him to justify a French Naval Deputy, but that if a solution to the present Mediterranean problem could be found, he would be happy to accept any flag officer the French wished to designate for the post of Naval Deputy. General Ely said, confidentially, that the problem did not lie with Mr. Debre, who had made proposals even more favorable to SACEUR, but with General de Gaulle, and he hoped that General Norstad’s conversation had served to clarify General de Gaulle’s thinking. General Norstad then left the Prime Minister’s office.

7 Admiral Pierre Barjot, Naval Deputy, Allied Command, Europe.
8 Vice Admiral Paul A. Ortoli, French Military Adviser to the SEATO Council.
251. Letter From the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Norstad) to President Eisenhower


DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The meeting with General de Gaulle took place last Thursday afternoon,\(^1\) lasted for an hour and 20 minutes in a friendly and constructive atmosphere, and appears to be leading to some concrete results. It seemed to me that he really wanted to reach an agreement or to arrive at an accommodation of views which would put an end to further dissension on the question of air defense. His attitude throughout was very good.

Rather than confuse the subject by writing another memorandum of the meeting, I am enclosing herewith a copy of Colonel Walters’ notes,\(^2\) which give quite an accurate impression of what took place. You will note that General de Gaulle spoke of two battles: the over-all strategic atomic exchange, and what he referred to as the “battle of Germany.” In discussing the latter, he spoke of the development of that battle and the aftermath, which would lead to the battle of Britain and the battle of France, and ultimately, to guerrilla warfare, very much in terms of 1939–1945. For this reason, I was particularly pleased to have with me some charts and other information on our NATO weapons resources and a general outline of the NATO Atomic Strike Plan.\(^3\) He was clearly extremely interested in the subject, and I believe that it served the purpose of broadening his idea of “the battle.” I must say that I spoke to him with the utmost frankness and at one time felt required to ask that he restrict the information to himself alone, not even passing it to members of his Cabinet. I felt this part of our talk was quite useful.

As stated in Walters’ notes, toward the end of my presentation de Gaulle stated that he would like a solution for the French air defense, the DAT, parallel to that provided for the U.K. Fighter Command. I agreed that this could be accomplished. However, I did consider it necessary to point out that militarily such a solution was unsound, a point with which I feel he agreed. Since both of us knew that I was meeting with Debre just two days later to discuss this subject more in detail, we did not work out between us any of the details.

---

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. Top Secret. The source text bears the President’s initials.

\(^1\) January 21.

\(^2\) Document 249.

\(^3\) Not further identified.
I am also inclosing a copy of Walters' notes on the meeting with Debre on 23 January, which continues with the subject and raises the question of the French Mediterranean Fleet. A copy of my letter to General Ely in response to Debre's request is also enclosed. All in all, I think we are making substantial progress on the question of air defense. In fact, we are doing considerably better than I anticipated.

I am obligated to send a memorandum on a possible solution to the Mediterranean Fleet question, but I am still tossing this around in my mind. It is not impossible, given the present attitude, that we may find a formula whereby the French Fleet may be returned to the previous status of commitment to NATO, in exchange for at least the appearance of a little more independence and a somewhat more important role. I will keep you advised of any success we have in this direction.

To sum up the meetings with de Gaulle and Debre, I think your words to these two gentlemen when you were here in December may very well prove extremely productive. I will keep you posted on the progress we make. I must say, also, that Colonel Walters was an indispensable aid, since he had a good background on the subject and this fact, together with his talents as an interpreter, permitted us to avoid the heavy atmosphere that normally characterizes a discussion which must be carried on in two languages with complete and independent interpretations. He did an extremely fine job.

The situation in Algeria is still uncertain, although I believe that de Gaulle will inevitably win. I remember Pug Ismay remarking that there once was an officer who was so stupid that even his fellow cavalymen noticed it. I think that this remark may apply to the Massu case, since the timing and the nature of his action was so gross that even the Paratroopers must surely understand why the Government had to take the action it did. If the Government can hold control in Algiers, what now looks like a revolt may become merely an incident, and the air may be cleared as a consequence. Unfortunately, the FLN is apt to take advantage of this rift between Frenchmen and thus possibly delay further the next step toward a solution of the Algerian problem.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Larry

---

4 Document 250.
5 Not found.
6 Baron Hastings Lionel Ismay, NATO Secretary General, 1952–1957.
7 Critical statements of de Gaulle by General Jacques Massu, commander of French troops in the Algiers sector of Algeria, and his subsequent recall by de Gaulle on January 22 precipitated a short-lived revolt among elements of the French Army in Algeria opposed to de Gaulle's Algerian policy.
Since writing the above, the failure of the Army to deal promptly
with the situation has caused a serious deterioration. Every hour of inac-
ton on the part of the authorities makes the problem a more difficult
one. LN

8 The postscript is in Norstad’s handwriting.

252. Editorial Note

The Defense Ministers of the 15 NATO countries met in Paris
March 31–April 1 to discuss military matters of mutual concern. The
conference was held in response to the defense resolution (C-M(59)24)
adopted by the Ministerial Meeting on December 17, 1959; see Docu-
ment 243.

The U.S. Delegation to the conference was headed by Secretary of
Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr., and Permanent Representative at NATO
W. Randolph Burgess. Other U.S. participants included John N. Irwin,
II, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and
Ivan B. White, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.
No full list of U.S. participants has been found.

Documentation on the Defense Ministers Conference is in Depart-
ment of State, Central File 396.1–PA.

On March 30, the North Atlantic Council confirmed the agenda
items and sequence as follows: A. Logistics in Peace and War; B. Coop-
eration in Research, Development and Production; C. NATO Defense
Plans; D. Meeting the Defense Burden; and E. Other Business. (Polto
1954 from Paris, March 30; ibid., 396.1–PA/3–3060)

The proceedings of the conference were summarized in Poltos 1973
and 1974 and Polto Circular 10 from Paris, all dated April 1. (All ibid.,
396.1–PA/4–160) Secretary Gates’ statement on MRBMWs at the morning
session on April 1 is summarized in footnote 6, Document 254. For text
of the conclusions on the first four agenda items, which the Defense
Ministers agreed upon as an internal document, see Document 253. The
Conference also issued a two-paragraph communiqué at its conclusion,
printed in Texts of Final Communiqués, 1949–1970: Issued by the Ministerial
Sessions of the North Atlantic Council, the Defense Planning Committee, and
the Nuclear Planning Group, page 122. Secretary Gates’ oral report on this
NATO Defense Ministers meeting to the National Security Council on
April 7 was summarized in an NSC memorandum of discussion. (Eisen-
hower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)
253. **Telegram From the Mission at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State**

Paris, April 1, 1960, 8 p.m.

Polto 1984. Department pass Defense. Following is text of conclusions agreed by Defense Ministers as internal document:¹

*Begin Verbatim Text.*

**I. Logistics in Peace and War**

The Ministers of Defense of the NATO countries, after discussion of document C–M(60)24,² submitted by the Federal Minister of Defense, recognize that in modern warfare which is decisively influenced by material and technical factors, operational control and logistical control are inseparable, and consider therefore that new concrete measures should be taken to improve the logistics situation.

To this effect the Defense Ministers:

(1) Invite the NATO military authorities:

(A) In consultation and cooperation with the appropriate national authorities, to study the logistic and training problems referred to in the memorandum by the Federal Republic of Germany, C–M(60)24, in particular:

(I) The logistic and training requirements needed to raise, train and maintain in time of peace, the NATO forces at the level determined by the North Atlantic Council,

(II) The logistic requirements needed for the subsequent phases of a war. The study in each case should in addition to quantitative factors cover the organization of logistic support and training facilities.

(B) To report on the above lines to the North Atlantic Council in permanent session within two months, thus enabling the Council to discuss the ways and means by which the logistic and training requirements thus defined might be met. In particular, the report should contain the conclusions and recommendations of the NATO military authorities on the following measures:

(I) Creation of integrated logistical centers within the major allied commands,

(II) Common storage, logistical support, spare parts stocks and maintenance for all “advanced weapons”,

---

¹The Defense Ministers Conference met March 31–April 1; see Document 252.

²None of the NATO documents cited in this telegram has been found.
(III) An integrated depot infrastructure on a NATO-wide basis,

(IV) Arrangements for the joint use of training facilities.

(2) Invite the German Federal Republic to inform the Council within 3 months on the progress of the bilateral or multi-lateral negotiations, which their NATO allies have agreed to conduct with them, for additional training and storage facilities required for the German forces. This report should bring out the problems which remain unresolved.

II. Co-operation in Research, Development and Production

The Defense Ministers:

1. Propose that the Armaments Committee should draw up a list of approximately twenty projects either at the research and development stage or at the production stage, should take the necessary steps to implement the projects which are selected and should report to the Council on this matter every six months.

2. Agree that an attempt should be made to eliminate duplication at the research and development stage and that for this purpose a system of regular exchanges of information should be introduced to ensure a wider knowledge of the efforts undertaken by each country and propose that, to this end, exchanges of information on research and development be intensified, under the guidance of the Armaments Committee, if necessary by organizing special study groups.

3. While recognizing the value of the suggestion put forward by the Federal Republic of Germany (C-M(60)23) note that the creation of a technical-military agency under the Standing Group is not at present feasible, and therefore propose that this suggestion should be reconsidered when the Armaments Committee and the NATO military authorities have tried out during 12 months the procedure established by the Council (C-M(59)82).

4. Propose that the Armaments Committee should meet whenever necessary at the level of the senior national officials responsible for armaments matters.

III. Defense Planning

The Defense Ministers invite the Military Committee to examine the paper submitted by the United Kingdom Defense Minister on NATO defense planning C-M(60)29, and the remarks and suggestions made during the discussion of this document, and to submit a report to the Council before 1st July with their conclusions in particular as regards the consequences which the implementation of the principles contained in that document may have and their recommendations thereon.
IV. Sharing of the Defense Burden

The Defense Ministers:

After reviewing the various proposals on procedure put forward in the course of discussions with regard to follow-up action on document C–M(60)27 submitted by the United States Secretary of Defense on the subject of meeting the defense burden, recognize the need for a more effective effort and invite the Permanent Council to consider specific measures and programs for obtaining further support for the defense effort as may be submitted by NATO members, to study the most appropriate solution and to report at the Ministerial Meeting of December 1960.

End Verbatim Text.

Burgess

254. Letter From the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Norstad) to President Eisenhower


DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: You will recall that when we talked early in March I promised to send you word on the status of some of the NATO-French problems. I have waited until the last moment in order to have the benefit of opinion on latest developments and attitudes here in Paris. I must admit at the outset that the situation has not changed significantly since I saw you.

You will recall that after your reference to the air defense problem in your discussions with de Gaulle in December, I talked to him and subsequently discussed the problem also with Debre, the Defense Minister, the Chiefs of Staff and other political and military authorities of France. This led to agreement in principle that a plan should be worked out on the basis of Metropolitan France being a separate air defense region under SHAPE, with the relationship between this Headquarters and the French DAT being essentially the same as that with the British Fighter

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series. Top Secret. The source text bears the President’s initials.

1 A memorandum of Eisenhower’s March 11 conversation with Norstad is ibid., DDE Diaries.

2 See Documents 249 and 250.
Command. The technical authorities of this headquarters and the French military establishment worked together and arrived at a mutually satisfactory solution, carrying their work to the point of preparing the actual amendments to the paper in question, MC 54/1. I forwarded this technical agreement to the French Government on 5 March 1960, indicating my general approval. Since that time the paper has been in the office of the Prime Minister who, I understand informally and quite unofficially, has personally agreed to it, as have the other French authorities. I am informed, again very unofficially, that Debre has raised this subject twice with de Gaulle, on the 4th and again on the 8th of this month, and that each time de Gaulle has indicated that he will consider the matter later. As far as I can learn—my information may not be complete on this point—de Gaulle has not yet given real consideration to the specific proposal.

Since you were the one who really got him into this subject, it would be useful if you could apply a little pressure at this time. My suggestion is that you merely ask the status of the problem and again indicate your personal interest in the matter.

There have been no developments whatsoever on the Mediterranean Fleet question, although Debre assured me about three weeks ago that the French authorities were considering a further proposal. I believe I told you that a suggestion was made by France about two months ago which we could not accept as a basis for further consideration. Unofficially, even the French military agreed that it was not a useful proposal. I am waiting for France, but in the meantime no pressure is being applied. It is my suggestion that you not raise this point with de Gaulle and show interest but not anxiety if he raises the matter in discussions with you.

The problem of stocking atomic weapons in France is dormant as far as I know, and I believe that it would not be useful for the United States to take the initiative in reopening the subject at this time. By moving the nine squadrons out of France last summer and fall, we relieved the pressure on NATO and the U.S., and the pinch now comes on the French Forces themselves. I regret this, of course, but I think this difficulty will be resolved faster and with less acrimony if we let the French interests apply the pressure on the French Government. I hope that in the long run this matter can be settled, since bases and stockpiling in France would give us great advantages in flexibility, in depth of defense, and in the safety of critical units by virtue of wider dispersal.

---

3 Not found.
4 De Gaulle was scheduled to visit Washington April 22–26; see Part 2, Documents 165 ff.
The question of the medium-range ballistic missiles has preoccupied the French military authorities for some time, but I doubt if de Gaulle himself will raise this matter with you at this time. In the statement made by Secretary Gates at the Defense Ministers meeting in March, I believe the United States has taken a position with which it can live at least until there are some further developments on this side.\(^5\) I believe that there should be no bilateral discussions on this subject or bilateral arrangements with France or any other country until NATO has discussed it and taken, or at least indicated, an opinion or an attitude.

On atomic weapons cooperation, there has been, if anything, an increasing interest since the explosion of the two atomic devices in the Sahara, but it has not to my knowledge been of the high pressure type.\(^6\) The subject is normally raised on the basis that now that the French have exploded the weapons, some of the prestige requirements for independent action have been met and the development of an atomic weapons system will be extremely expensive in time, effort and money, which could be applied better to other things. The French state that conversion of this effort to other defense projects, for instance, would be possible if the United States could see its way clear to cooperate. Up to this time they seemed to have accepted the existence of the American law as a practical barrier to this type of cooperation in the near future, and by near future I mean at least the next year and a half or two years.\(^7\) John McConé was the last one to talk to de Gaulle on this particular subject,\(^8\) and from my conversations with John after his meeting, I gather that his reaction is not inconsistent with mine. He is, of course, the best witness on this point.

\(^5\) At the morning session of the NATO Defense Ministers meeting on April 1, Secretary Gates set forth two alternative U.S. proposals on MRBMs for NATO for the 1963–1965 period. The first, which he preferred, called for U.S. production of MRBMs for deployment under SACEUR control. The second alternative envisioned U.S. assistance to European multilateral production of MRBMs under NATO aegis to meet SACEUR requirements. The United States would share on a limited basis the cost of technical information, technology, and certain items necessary to initiate an MRBM production capability in Europe. The text of Gates’ statement was transmitted in Polto 1970 from Paris, March 31. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5612/3–3160) Changes in the text as actually delivered by Gates were reported in Polto 1978 from Paris, April 1. (Ibid., 740.5612/4–160)

\(^6\) The first two French nuclear explosions took place in the Sahara on February 13 and April 1.

\(^7\) Reference is to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended on July 2, 1958; see Document 217.

\(^8\) No record of this conversation has been found. McConé had a meeting with French atomic energy officials on April 11; see Part 2, Document 163.
Gleanings from the Paris press and conversations with individuals suggest that the public feels two subjects will be given particular attention in Washington. One is the matter of atomic cooperation, and the other is the fundamental obsession with the tripartite directorate. When my contacts are asked if they look for any dramatic progress in these fields, they say very abruptly, “No.”

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

Sincerely,

Larry

---

In a letter to Norstad, April 29, Eisenhower thanked him for this letter. He said there “was no good opportunity to press the matter of air defense organization” during de Gaulle’s visit but he did discuss with him several times the idea of an inspection zone. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Norstad)

---

255. Editorial Note

The Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, held in Istanbul May 2–4, was attended by all Foreign Ministers and NATO Permanent Representatives of the 15 member countries. The U.S. Delegation was headed by Secretary of State Christian A. Herter and included Permanent NATO Representative W. Randolph Burgess and advisers from the Departments of State and Defense. A list of the principal members of the U.S. Delegation is printed in Department of State Bulletin, May 23, 1960, page 842.

The most extensive body of documentation on this NATO Ministerial Meeting is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1650–1661. CF 1650 contains a set of memoranda of conversation between U.S. and foreign officials. Copies of Tosec and Secto telegrams are located in CF 1651 and 1652, respectively. Copies of Tocah and Caltl telegrams are in CF 1653. CF 1654 contains administrative and miscellaneous papers. Substantive and miscellaneous papers, including copies of statements, text of the communiqué, and talking papers, are in CF 1655. The Verbatim Records are in CF 1656; no Summary Records of this Ministerial Meeting have been found. CF 1657 is an administrative file concerning conference and delegation arrangements, procedures, and schedules. CF 1658 and 1659 contain briefing books. Orders of the Day
for May 1–4 are in CF 1660. CF 1661 contains a chronological record for meetings of the April 30–May 4 period. Telegrams and documentation on this Ministerial Meeting are ibid., Central File 396.1-IS.

The May 2–4 Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council was preceded by the Ministerial Council meeting of the Central Treaty Organization at Tehran, Iran, April 28–30, which Secretary Herter attended. He left Tehran on April 30 and arrived in Istanbul at 6 p.m. For text of his arrival statement, see Department of State Bulletin, May 23, 1960, pages 840–841. At a dinner that evening hosted by British Foreign Secretary Lloyd, Herter discussed the postponement of the meeting on the Four-Power Working Group Report on the East-West summit. The discussion was reported in Secto 45, May 1. (Department of State, Central Files, 398.00/5–150)

At 10 a.m. on May 1, Herter and Livingston T. Merchant joined the British, French, and German Foreign Ministers in restricted session to discuss summit purposes and tactics. The memorandum of discussion (US/MC/3) is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1650. Meanwhile, at 10:30 a.m., Theodore C. Achilles, Counselor of the Department, met with Monsignor F. Lardone, Apostolic Delegate in Istanbul, to discuss the Turkish political situation. The memorandum of that discussion (US/MC/5) is ibid.

Following their restricted session, the Foreign Ministers, including Secretary Herter, discussed preparations for discussion of Berlin at the forthcoming summit. Foy Kohler and Merchant also participated for the United States. The memorandum of discussion (US/MC/7) is ibid. At noon, Herter, Merchant, Philip J. Farley, and Charles C. Stelle, Deputy Representative to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee, met with Frederick M. Eaton, Representative to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee; and at 3 p.m., Secretary Herter, Merchant, Kohler, Achilles, Nolting, and Fessenden met with Ambassador Burgess. No record of these conversations has been found. At 3:30 p.m., Secretary General Spaak called on Secretary Herter; Burgess, Merchant, Kohler, Nolting, and Fessenden participated. The meeting was reported in Secto 49, May 2. (Ibid., Central Files, 396.1-IS/5–260) At 5 p.m., Herter met with the British, French, Canadian, and Italian Foreign Ministers to discuss disarmament, reported in Secto 48. (Ibid.) An assessment of the Secretary’s conversation with French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville during and after this meeting on a possible French proposal at the forthcoming summit on the control of nuclear delivery vehicles was transmitted in Secto 52. (Ibid.) The report of the five Western delegations to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee, dated April 28, is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1665.

The Four-Power Working Group on Germany met at 5 p.m. U.S. participants were Kohler, Martin J. Hillenbrand, John M. McSweeney,
Acting Director of Soviet Union Affairs, and Colonel J.H. Scofield, a German expert at the Department of Defense. A U.S. memorandum concerning Berlin, dated May 1, prepared for this meeting is *ibid.* No record of the discussion at the meeting has been found. At 8 p.m., the U.S., British, and French Foreign Ministers held a dinner meeting; other U.S. participants were Merchant, Kohler, and McSweeney. Memoranda of Kohler’s conversations with his British and French counterparts on summit procedures and briefing of the Germans (US/MC/1) and on summit preparations and discussion of tactics with the Germans (US/MC/4) are *ibid.*, CF 1650.

On Monday, May 2, German Foreign Minister von Brentano called on Secretary Herter; other U.S. participants were Merchant and Hellenbrand. A memorandum of their conversation on the Norstad inspection plan (US/MC/8) is *ibid.* At 10 a.m., the opening ceremony of the Ministerial Meeting began. Copies of the welcoming address by Turkish Foreign Minister Fatih Zorlu and a speech by Council Chairman Halvard Lange are *ibid.*, CF 1655. A telegraphic summary of their statements was transmitted in Secto 53, May 2. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1–IS/5–260) The Ministers then discussed item I(a) of the agenda, disarmament. (A copy of the agenda (C–A 60) is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1658.) Herter opened the morning session by reading a message from President Eisenhower; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, May 23, 1960, pages 839–840. Lloyd, as spokesman for the five Western nations on the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee, summarized the Western plan on disarmament for the forthcoming summit meeting as well as the Geneva disarmament talks. A general discussion of the Western position followed. A telegraphic summary of the session was transmitted in Secto 54. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/5–260) The Verbatim Record (C–VR 60) is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1656. At 11:30 a.m., immediately after the morning session, Merchant talked to Canadian Foreign Minister Howard Green concerning the Norstad plan. The memorandum of discussion (US/MC/2) is *ibid.*, CF 1650.

The Ministerial Meeting resumed at 3:15 p.m. to discuss agenda item I (b), Germany and Berlin. Discussion centered on aspects of the Four-Power Working Group Report, especially the proposal for a plebiscite for Germany and Berlin, which had been presented to the North Atlantic Council on April 20. The text of Herter’s opening statement on Germany and Berlin was transmitted in Secto 56, May 3. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1–IS/5–360) A telegraphic summary of discussion of this agenda item was transmitted in Secto 55. (*Ibid.*)

Discussion of agenda item I(c), East-West relations, occupied the latter part of May 2 and Tuesday morning, May 3. This discussion was summarized in Secto 68, May 4. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–IS/5–460) During the ses-
sion, it was agreed that the NAC would rework the draft declaration of principles contained in the Four-Power Working Group Report, possibly for issuance by NATO on the eve of the East-West summit, although no decision was taken on the best way to exploit it. There was continued widespread opposition to the idea of attempting to obtain at the summit an agreed position with the Soviets on aid to underdeveloped countries and arms shipments restriction. Spaak pressed for continued consultation and commitment not to undertake new initiatives without NATO concurrence. The Verbatim Records (C–VR (60)19 and C–VR (60)20) of the May 2 afternoon and May 3 morning sessions are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1656. At 9 p.m., Foreign Minister Zorlu hosted a dinner for the delegations. Memoranda of conversation between Merchant and Norman A. Robertson, Canadian Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, on Bomarc, disarmament, Skyshield, and Law of the Sea (US/MC/6) and the Korea situation (US/MC/9) are *ibid.*, CF 1650.

On Tuesday, May 3, Norwegian Foreign Minister Lange called on Secretary Herter at 9:15 a.m.; Merchant also attended. A memorandum of their conversation on the Common Market and the Free Trade Area was transmitted in Secto 69, May 3. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 374.800/5–460) At 11 a.m., the Ministerial Meeting resumed its discussion of agenda item I(c), summarized in Secto 68. (*Ibid.*) At 1 p.m., Merchant met with Canadian Foreign Minister Green to discuss the Canadian desire to hold the Centenary World’s Fair in 1967. The memorandum of that discussion (US/MC/10) is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1650. At 3:15 p.m., the Ministerial Meeting resumed for discussion of agenda items II and III, the Secretary General’s report on the Annual Political Appraisal and a review of the international situation. A telegraphic summary of discussion of item II was transmitted in Secto 67, May 4. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1–IS/5–460) A copy of Secretary General Spaak’s report (C–M(60)40), which was the basis for the discussion, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1658.

Secretary Herter offered his observations on Spaak’s report in the following areas: the future summit meetings and arrangements for NAC consultation, economic cooperation, and long-range planning. Herter noted the association of a NATO observer with the Working Group on East-West relations and said “we should seek to improve constantly on our consultation procedures, building on past experience as we go along.” He also hoped for a new organization for economic cooperation and development, which would carry on the most useful activities of the OEEC. All 15 members of NATO would be members of the new organization, but no organizational arrangement had yet been decided. The full text of Herter’s statement was transmitted in Secto 66. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1–IS/5–460)
The ensuing discussion on agenda item II was summarized in Secto 77. (Ibid.) Discussion initially focused on the Political Advisers Report on the Situation in the Middle East (C-M(60)37), a copy of which is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1659. [text not declassified] The Verbatim Record (C-VR(60)21) of this afternoon session is ibid., CF 1656. At 7:15 p.m., Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph M.A.H. Luns called on Secretary Herter to discuss Dutch military reinforcements for Western New Guinea; Kohler and Fessenden also attended. (US/MC/11; scheduled for publication in volume XVII) At 7:30 p.m., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Andrew H. Berding gave a backgrounder to U.S. correspondents; a copy of the transcript is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1655.

During the evening, Secretary Herter sent a message to President Eisenhower which briefly summarized the meetings of May 2–3. It reads in part:

"Insofar as the NATO meeting itself is concerned, it has on the whole gone extremely well due largely to the fact that there had been a prior distribution of most of the working papers prepared in advance for the summit, and the very special efforts at consultation which had been carried out in the past few weeks. The only discordant notes have arisen over differences of opinion regarding some of the rather vague French proposals for topics to be discussed at the summit, such as joining with the Soviets in aid to underdeveloped countries, discussion of trade matters, et cetera." (Cahrt 11 from Istanbul, May 3; ibid., Central Files, 396.1-IS/5–360)

On Wednesday, May 4, the Ministerial Meeting resumed at 10:30 a.m. to discuss agenda item VI, the communiqué. (There was apparently no discussion of items IV and V.) No summary of the discussion has been found beyond noting agreement on the final communiqué, which was transmitted in Secto 78, May 4. (Ibid., 396.1-IS/5–460) The text of the communiqué is printed in Department of State Bulletin, May 23, 1960, page 840. Following adjournment of the meeting, Secretary Herter met with Foreign Minister Zorlu on board Turkish President Bayar’s yacht; no record of the conversation has been found. Herter and his party left for Athens at 6:20 p.m.; for text of his departure statement, see ibid., page 841. For a summary of the entire Ministerial Meeting, see Document 256.

On his arrival in Washington on May 6, Herter made a brief statement summarizing his impressions of the CENTO and NATO meetings; see Department of State Bulletin, May 23, 1960, pages 841–842. Merchant made an oral report to the National Security Council at its May 9 meeting on preparations for the forthcoming summit meeting, including a full debriefing on the NATO Ministerial Meeting; the memorandum of discussion is printed in volume IX, Document 149.
256.  Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State

Athens, May 5, 1960, 1 a.m.

Secto 81. Department will issue instructions re use this message SEATO, CENTO, and certain other addressee capitals. 1 Summary—NATO Ministerial Meeting Istanbul, May 2-4.

North Atlantic Council meeting at Istanbul May 2-4 focused primarily on West positions to be taken at forthcoming summit conference. Council also examined Secretary General’s annual report on working of Alliance 2 and reviewed briefly international situation in various parts of world. As reflected in communiqué of May 4, 3 Council approved line to be taken by three Western negotiating powers at summit and expressed satisfaction with manner in which NATO system of continuous consultation has developed.

Council welcomed prospect of negotiations with Soviet Union at forthcoming summit as offering possibility of improved international relations. Emphasized continuing strength and unity of Alliance as necessary condition of progress toward this objective. In view current Soviet attitudes and positions, however, generally emphasized Western opinion should be under no illusion as to possibility of positive achievements at summit.

Council agreed disarmament is major topic for discussion at summit and stressed Western aim of general and complete disarmament to be achieved in states under effective control. Expressed full support for Western position as formulated in Western plan filed at Geneva March 15, 4 which is still sound and should not be abandoned because of Soviet rejection. Also agreed April 26 statements of Western principles made by Jules Moch 5 clearly reflected Western aim of general and complete disarmament with effective controls and that West negotiations should continue to focus on specific measures of disarmament outlined in April

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-IS/5-560. Secret. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and Taipei, Bangkok, Tokyo, Seoul, and Moscow.

1 Circular telegram 1407, May 6, provided a briefer summary of the NATO Ministerial Meeting. (Ibid., 700.00 (S)/5-660)

2 Regarding Spaak’s report and the other agenda items, see Document 255.

3 For text of the final communiqué, see Department of State Bulletin, May 23, 1960, p. 840.

4 For text of the Western paper (U.N. doc. TNCD/3), submitted to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee on March 16, see Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 68-71.

5 For text of the Western proposal (U.N. doc. TNCD/5), submitted by French Representative Jules Moch to the committee on behalf of the Western delegations on April 26, see ibid., pp. 81-82.
28 statement by United States representative at summit. Council expressed hope summit conference would produce directive to Geneva negotiations to turn their attention to these specific measures.

Council consideration of Germany and Berlin problems as subjects for discussion at summit resulted in unanimous view solution of German problem must be sought in reunification on basis of self-determination. Council generally felt West peace plan put forward at Geneva in May 1959 still valid as basic approach to German settlement. Consensus favored proposal for holding plebiscite in two parts of Germany as constructive and practical measure for consideration at summit. Council also endorsed position occupation rights of Western powers in Berlin should be maintained in absence of any other formula capable of protecting freedom and liberties of Berlin population. Recalled Council declaration of December 16, 1958.

Council also considered various topics which might be discussed at summit in general framework of E/W relations. Generally agreed increased cultural exchanges with Soviets are in interest of West. Spaak cautioned against any extensive discussion of economic exchanges at summit, since these matters of special concern to all NATO countries. In this connection, Secretary General warned against any grant of extensive credits to Soviets. Consensus in Council was opposed to any discussion of joint program with Soviets in aid to under-developed countries, although there was some suggestion Soviets might be diverted to more extensive participation in United Nations projects.

Council emphasized NATO cannot be satisfied with formula of peaceful co-existence under cover of which Soviets continue to attack individual members of Alliance. Council unanimously condemned efforts of Soviet propaganda to discredit Federal Republic of Germany and other NATO governments as inimical to Alliance and inconsistent with expressed Soviet desire for improvement of international situation. In connection with Soviet campaign for peaceful co-existence, Council agreed declaration of principles governing relations between nations should be prepared for possible use at summit or for issuance as West statement prior to summit.

In its review of Secretary General's annual report on working of Alliance, Council stressed importance of continuing development of NATO cooperation in various fields. Secretary General and various

---

6 Not found, but at the NAC Ministerial Meeting on May 2, Lloyd read a list of specific measures on disarmament contained in the April 28 statement. (Secto 54 from Paris, May 2; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/5–260)

7 For text of the Western peace plan, May 14, see Department of State Bulletin, June 1, 1959, pp. 779–782.

8 For text of the declaration, see ibid., January 5, 1959, p. 4.
governments emphasized especially need for increasing consultation on political aspects of economic problems. Council expressed appreciation for President Eisenhower's message communicated by Secretary Herter at opening session and welcomed its emphasis on need for long-range planning and for strengthening NATO community effectively to meet Communist challenge in years to come. Council emphasized importance of making real progress in ten-year planning suggested by United States at last December meeting and agreed to review progress in this matter at next December Ministerial meeting.

In brief review of international situation, Council heard reports by Turkey on Mid East situation, by Belgium on Congo developments, and by the United States on Cuba and Korean developments.

Herter

---

9 Regarding Herter's proposed 10-year plan, see footnote 6, Document 238.

257. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Embassy in Portugal

Paris, May 19, 1960, 6 p.m.

77. Eyes Only for Merchant. Personal for the President.

"Dear Mr. President:

"I have just returned from a two-hour session with the North Atlantic Council in which Couve, Selwyn and I delivered a full report on the events of the past days. After our report practically every member of the Council rose to express a solidarity with us and particularly to voice in the most glowing terms their appreciation for the dignity and restraint which you showed in the face of provocation together with just the right combination of determination and conciliation. The support was unanimous and you will have seen the communiqué which the Council on its own initiative decided to issue confirming this."

"Faithfully yours, signed: Chris."

Herter

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/5-1960. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to the Department of State as Cahto 11 from Paris, which is the source text. President Eisenhower was in Lisbon. Another copy of the telegram bears the notation "President saw" in Goodpaster's writing. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles--Herter Series)

1 Reference is to the summit conference in Paris May 16-17, which collapsed when President Eisenhower refused to apologize to Khrushchev for U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union.

2 For text, see Department of State Bulletin, June 6, 1960, p. 907.
258. Memorandum of Conversation

June 13, 1960, 3–4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT
NATO Long-Range Planning: Views of NATO Secretary-General Paul-Henri Spaak

PARTICIPANTS
M. Paul-Henri Spaak
M. Andre Saint-Mleux
Ambassador Burgess
EUR—Mr. Kohler
S—Mr. Bowie

S/P—Mr. Smith
S/P—Mr. Owen
RA—Mr. Fessenden
RA—Mr. Tobin
DOD/ISA—Mr. Haydn Williams


After introductory pleasantries, Mr. Kohler asked M. Spaak to give us the benefit of his views on NATO long-range planning.

M. Spaak opened by saying that this is a difficult problem. The Alliance has existed since 1949 with its primary purpose to stop the communist advance. Whether the Soviet intention is to wage cold war emphasizing military threats or peaceful co-existence stressing economic warfare the ultimate communist aim is the same. No matter how one examines the problem, he comes to the conclusion that an absolute necessity for the Alliance continues to exist. What is needed now is to maintain and adapt NATO to present and future circumstances. It is not necessary to think of altering the Treaty, which would both be very difficult and also unnecessary in view of the flexibility of the Treaty provisions. Actually the effectiveness of the Alliance largely rests more upon the spirit of its members than in strict observance of Treaty obligations.

At the close of his statement, Spaak observed that the 10-year planning report might in its introduction indicate that nothing revolutionary is required, but rather that the Alliance, in setting its course for the next ten years, should determine to continue doing what it is already doing—but to do it more audaciously and more effectively.

Spaak further said it is his intention during the early part of July to call together the Permanent Representatives for a discussion of NATO

Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, NATO. Secret. Drafted by Irwin M. Tobin (EUR/RA). The meeting was held in the Department of State.

1 According to a memorandum from Kohler to Under Secretary Dillon, drafted on June 11, “Spaak’s primary purpose in coming to Washington is to discuss how we should proceed in the NATO Council considering Secretary Gates’ MRBM proposal.” (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5611/6-1160)
long-range planning. He would present to them a memo incorporating his ideas as expressed to us, and asking them in return to submit their governments' views early in September.

In response to a question from Mr. Owen, Spaak said that he intended to urge other countries to make serious preparations for the long-range planning exercise, but that to date only Canada and the UK had been making such preparations.

Mr. Smith observed that the atmosphere for long-range planning should now be better since the non-summit. Spaak responded that the reaction in some ways was improved, but he referred to the very animated discussion of the "directorate" in last Wednesday's Council meeting and to what he considered to be the unsatisfactory Western response to the latest Soviet disarmament note, and implied that some of the ground gained was now being lost.

2. Political Consultation.

The rule to be followed on political consultation, M. Spaak suggested, is that of the most intimate possible consultation in accordance with the recommendations of the report of the Three Wise Men. However, a number of questions are posed:

(a) The geographical boundaries of consultation should be extended as widely as possible. This would involve more cooperation with CENTO and SEATO, but a clear distinction would have to be drawn between the broadening of the Alliance for the purpose of political consultation and any extension of military obligations, concerning which many members are very hesitant.

(b) The form of consultation will have to be decided. There are four alternatives, of which Spaak openly expressed his preference for the first: (1) Standing Committees of the Council set up on a regional basis, as for example, Africa, the Far East and Near East, and having varied composition with the three principal world power members on all committees and two additional members chosen on the basis of regional interest. These committees would exist for the exchange of information, to develop common policies for the respective regions, and to prepare discussion in the Council as a whole. (2) Establishment of a committee along the lines of the UN Security Council composed of the five larger members permanently, that is, the US, UK, France, Germany, and Italy.

---

2 Reference is to the summit meeting in Paris May 16-17; see footnote 1, Document 257.

3 Concerns of Council members about a possible tripartite directorate following a U.S. report on the meeting of the British, French, and U.S. Foreign Ministers in Washington on June 1 were summarized in Polto 2418 and Polto Circular 13, both from Paris, June 9. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-WA/6-960) For text of the Soviet disarmament note, submitted to the Heads of Government on June 2 and to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee on June 7, see Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 100-111. No formal Western response to this proposal before June 13 has been found.

4 See footnote 4, Document 139.
with two other members being elected on a rotating basis. In such a committee, the major powers might be willing to expose their thinking at an early stage since it would be rather more intimate than the Council. The committee also would prepare subject matter for discussion in the Council. (3) A NATO observer in a committee of three (US, UK, France) following the precedent set in the recent summit preparatory period. This might perhaps work out in connection with proposal (1) above. Finally, (4) the notion of a "directorate", which M. Spaak rejects. In the first place, he doubts that there could be such a directorate, since unanimity could not be reached and De Gaulle in particular would not submit to a majority of the other two. Second, because establishment of such a directorate would set in motion a disastrous trend toward neutralism among the smaller members.

Mr. Bowie\(^5\) having raised the impact of the development of the European community on NATO relationships, Spaak responded that until now this has been a conflict between the Six and the Seven which has had no impact on NATO and to which he thinks a solution will be found. In answer to a more pointed question from Mr. Bowie, Spaak stated that the impact of growth of the Six on relations between the US and Europe would depend upon the spirit in which the Six developed. He went on to be more specific with regard to the De Gaulle problem. He was prepared to admit that De Gaulle was not a European in the image of Robert Schuman,\(^6\) but in discussing De Gaulle's policy, as in discussing Khrushchev's, one is very dependent upon hypothesis. Certainly a very great deal depends upon the way in which the US asserts its leadership in the Alliance.

Ambassador Burgess observed that there is now a much better feeling between the Six and the Seven, so that he is fairly optimistic about a reconciliation. He further mentioned as a perplexing factor De Gaulle’s concept of a Europe united from the "Atlantic to the Urals". Spaak responded that it is interesting that this is the second time De Gaulle has used this expression, but this time it is to be found in a different, more historic and theoretical, part of his speech. On the other hand his favorable mention of a Western European confederation appeared immediately after his allusion to the decision of the Six to accelerate.

3. **Military Problems.**

The long-term NATO military problem, in M. Spaak's view, centers on the question of atomic arms. As a general proposition it is clear that national armies of the traditional type are outmoded for European de-

---

\(^5\) Robert R. Bowie was hired by the Department of State during the summer of 1960 to prepare a report on long-range planning in NATO. Extracts from that report are printed as Document 266.

\(^6\) French Foreign Minister, 1948–1953, and author of the Schuman plan for a European Coal and Steel Community in May 1950.
fense, and greater integration, or perhaps better stated cooperation, is needed. We must in fact accelerate the cooperation of member countries. The solution lies in establishing atomic arms under NATO control and with common financing on the same basis as infrastructure. This would facilitate cooperation and avoid inequities in bearing financial burdens. This is not only a military problem but also a political one, which quite frankly has to do with the French problem. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Mr. Smith asked about M. Spaak's references to a common NATO nuclear armament and asked whether M. Spaak's thinking had gone as far as a multinational strike force. Spaak indicated that this was the only possible solution to the problem. Mr. Smith made clear that he was asking about the possibility of a genuinely multi-national force, in which personnel of different nations would be intermingled so that no single country would have a national capability readily at hand—an EDC transplanted to the nuclear field. M. Spaak said that this was how he had understood the question and, provided that the term "EDC" was not used, he believed that was a feasible—as well as necessary—solution. He came back, however, to France as being at the heart of the atomic armaments question, and said he could not envisage a solution to the atomic problem without some solution of the French relationship. He particularly felt that this was so after the briefing of the Council by General Norstad the previous Friday.⁷

[2 paragraphs (21 lines of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Kohler wondered whether, thinking over the next 10 years, we would have to review the NATO Command Structure—a question which De Gaulle has raised.⁸ We had not, of course, envisaged from the beginning that SACEUR would always have to be an American. Spaak replied that most Europeans would not wish any change, that they would like to have an American, but that it would be interesting to know if the NATO Commander could not be divorced from any US command. He thought this an important question but not one involved in the 10-year plan report.

---

⁷ Norstad's briefing of the NAC on the MRBM situation on Friday, June 10, and the ensuing Council discussion were summarized in Polto 2440 from Paris, June 10. As reported in this telegram, Norstad concluded his briefing as follows:

"Filling IRBM requirement is something that must be done. There is no choice. Either this is done or there is no defense within the time period. That is a message to be passed back to governments. If this is not done, there will be no NATO in relatively few years, without saying specifically 1963, '64 or '65 but in the relatively near future this could be so. It is a matter of most vital importance within this Alliance and particularly vital to the European members. He remained ready to discuss the matter later with this group or any other." (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5611/6-1060)

⁸ See Document 198.
4. Economic Cooperation.

Here M. Spaak accented the problems proposed by the creation of the OECD, particularly in relation to aid to uncommitted underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa. A common Western approach is needed, based upon political considerations, and he doubts that such a common policy can be drawn up by an organization like the OECD, which includes a considerable number of neutrals. We must get rid of the complex that NATO is an alliance limited strictly to the military aspect. NATO should become the forum where economic policy, that is political-economic policy, is examined and where "broad directives" can be drawn up, execution being left to technical bodies such as the IBRD. Furthermore, a policy must be adopted for coordination of aid to the five "under-developed" countries within the alliance (including the southern area of Italy) and also the certain countries in Africa which are rather closely linked to the alliance.

Mr. Kohler expressed surprise that Spaak had omitted mention of economic relations and competition with the USSR, with particular reference to the extension of credits to the USSR and the organization of competition, as for example through preclusive buying or the stabilization of prices. Spaak responded that until now he has failed to arouse any interest in implementing Article 2. There is no common approach among the members with regard to credits, and all governments backed away from his suggestion at Istanbul with regard to stabilization of prices. Ambassador Burgess commented that credits would provide a good case study of the alliance capability to work together, and suggested that it would be helpful if the other member governments would raise the level of their representatives in ECONAD and be prepared to instruct their representatives with greater attention to political than commercial considerations. Spaak said that it is interesting to compare the rise in credits from the West to the USSR with the rise in USSR credits to the under-developed areas, and suggested the possible conclusion that the West in this way is financing Soviet penetration of the under-developed areas.


M. Spaak then referred to two remaining fields of cooperation within the alliance, that is, the "common production of certain things"

---

9 Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty provided, among other things, that the parties "will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them."

10 Spaak's suggestion has not been identified.
and science. In both of these fields, he felt that results so far had been meager. He made no further mention of the first of these two, but went on to say particularly with reference to science that the Macmillan–Eisenhower declaration of interdependence should increasingly be translated into deeds.\footnote{Reference may be to the Camp David declaration of March 29, in which Eisenhower and Macmillan agreed to a coordinated research program for improving methods of detecting nuclear tests. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, April 18, 1960, pp. 587–588.} A beginning had been made in the science field, but as Dr. Ramsey\footnote{Dr. Norman F. Ramsey, Scientific Adviser to the NATO Secretary General.} had said at the end of his two years as the first Science Adviser, so far there were only some drops in the ocean. It is hard to know what should be done, but it definitely seems that this is a matter of will in the first place, and then the translation of that will into action.

259. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France

June 15, 1960, 9:01 p.m.

Topol 2492. Paris pass Thurston. Spaak and Acting Secretary discussed MRBM's at length June 13. Covered also problem of tripartitism, reported separately.\footnote{Spaak's conversation with Dillon on June 13, where Spaak reiterated the opposition of most NATO countries to tripartitism, is summarized in Topol 2493 to Paris, June 15. (Ibid., 740.5612/6–1560)}
1. Spaak made strong appeal for his compromise proposal along lines set forth in his paper, Polto 2394. Stressed importance US making gesture of good will by offering sell certain limited number of Polaris missiles (without warheads) to French to induce French to participate in NATO MRBM program. Spaak stressed that he could not guarantee de Gaulle would accept, but felt it had some chance success and could be helpful in bringing about more cooperative French position on NATO matters generally, [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Spaak emphasized everything of course depended on de Gaulle’s own reaction. Spaak added that he had not discussed his suggestion specifically with de Gaulle. Spaak stressed that rejection Gates’ offer would result in failure develop NATO-wide program, which Spaak considered essential. Result would be series of bilaterals. Alliance should rather be moving in direction of greater integration, particularly in developing common nuclear policy.

2. Acting Secretary stressed that US position as set forth in Gates’ offer based on belief that, if we made available national nuclear capabilities for France, result would be harmful to Alliance. [1 line of source text not declassified] Acting Secretary queried whether only alternative to French non-participation was a series of bilaterals. It should be possible to organize multilateral program of interested countries minus France.

3. Spaak felt there would be great reluctance other countries proceed on this basis. Adenauer’s strong ties with de Gaulle and UK reluctance proceed in view of UK-French differences in Six-Seven dispute would make questionable whether Germany and UK would be willing proceed without France. Would also be difficult for Belgium and Netherlands accept MRBM’s if there is to be no French participation. Any chance of Norwegian or Danish cooperation would be further prejudiced. Spaak felt, however, that if US made offer to sell certain limited number to France along lines his suggestion and if France rejected this, would then be much easier to organize multilateral program without France. Other countries would feel that US had made generous effort to meet French desires and that French had nonetheless refused. Given fact that all countries now generally impressed with importance meeting military requirement as result excellent Norstad briefing, would be

---

2 Polto 2394 from Paris, June 4, transmitted the translation of the text of a note from Spaak to the U.S. Government concerning Secretary Gates’ proposal on MRBMs at the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting on April 1 (see footnote 6, Document 254). In his note, Spaak said he was convinced that neither of Gates’ two alternatives on MRBMs would be accepted by all the NATO countries, and the rejection of Gates’ proposal would “bring about real military and political dangers.” Spaak added that “the most certain opposition will come on the part of France, and I must say that I understand it. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5612/6-460)

3 See footnote 7, Document 258.
quite possible proceed. Spaak also stressed that other countries would not be resentful of US offer permit France buy limited number missiles and unlikely that such offer to France would set in motion similar requests from other countries. Other NATO countries, although not at all agreeing with French determination have small independent deterrent, accept French desire for this as fact of life which must be somehow dealt with. WEU Treaty in effect prohibits Germany from independent nuclear weapon program of its own, and BENELUX countries and Italy unlikely press for independent national deterrent.

5. Acting Secretary expressed appreciation for frank exchange of views, cautioned that did not wish give impression that US had changed its position but promised that we would give serious consideration to Spaak’s points. Summarized Spaak proposal by saying that he understood Spaak to mean that US should give some help to French in gaining independent deterrent capability without modifying Atomic Energy Act and that in exchange we would obtain greater French cooperation in NATO.

6. Spaak agreed with this, emphasizing that his proposal involved step which US could take without amendment in Atomic Energy Act. Felt other NATO countries generally would be favorably inclined towards such step by US, but would not want or expect us to go so far as to modify Act to meet de Gaulle point. Spaak emphasized that sole question is what de Gaulle himself will think. Said he could give no guarantee on this score but stressed that pro-NATO elements in France, including French military, would be heartened by such offer from US.

[2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Dillon
260. Telegram From the Mission at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State

Paris, July 5, 1960, 9 p.m.


[1 paragraph (7 lines of source text) not declassified]

I emphasized US agreement with Spaak on importance of developing MRBM program in manner to maintain and increase political cohesion of NATO, and said that essentially what US now required was more time to study certain technical matters which would affect deployment problems, and which might conceivably result in sounder and more feasible way of meeting collectively this requirement. Pending completion of this review, we now felt that question was not yet ripe for further Council discussion. I admitted that this suggestion was a reversal of our statement of June 8 (Depciertel 1514, Polto 2389, Topol 2401) calling for prompt Council consideration of this matter occasioned by new technical studies. In answer to Spaak’s questions, I indicated type

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5612/7-560. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bonn and London.

1 A typewritten notation on the source text indicates that the telegram was passed to the Department of Defense on July 6.

2 Topol 2607 to Paris, June 28, contained the Department of State’s response to Spaak on MRBMs. On the basis of reactions from various sources in France and other countries, the Department concluded that “there is reason to doubt that Spaak suggestion would be accepted by the French as adequate to bring about their adherence to the NATO MRBM proposal.” The Department was reviewing various other features of U.S. propositions but in the meantime did not consider it desirable to modify Secretary Gates’ proposals. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5612/6-2860) Polto 2621 from Paris, June 30, welcomed the general line of Topol 2607 but made suggested changes in four numbered paragraphs so that the U.S. position would not be “subject to misconstruction by Spaak or others who would hear of it.” (Ibid., 740.5612/6-3060) Topol 19 to Paris, July 1, agreed with the rephrasing of the reply to Spaak along the lines suggested in Polto 2621. (Ibid.)

3 Circular telegram 1514 to all NATO capitals, June 2, contained the text of the report of the British, French, and U.S. Foreign Ministers to the NAC on their agreed post-summit positions following their meeting in Washington on June 1. (Ibid., 396.1-WA/6-260) Polto 2389 from Paris, June 3, summarized the discussion of the British, French, and U.S. NATO Permanent Representatives on coordinating the text. Regarding MRBMs, France strongly opposed raising the issue at the NAC meeting on June 3; the United Kingdom would go along if it was made clear these were U.S. views; and Nolting, Acting U.S. Permanent Representative, opposed raising the subject at this time. (Ibid., 396.1-WA/6-360) Topol 2401 to Paris, June 4, indicated that the Department of State preferred to keep a brief reference to MRBMs in the text but would agree to drop the matter if France still strongly objected. (Ibid.)
of studies now going on, but said that I could not predict US conclusions in the matter, which would be based on military and political factors.

[1 paragraph (6-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Nolting

261. Memorandum of Discussion at the 454th Meeting of the
National Security Council

Newport, Rhode Island, August 1, 1960.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. U.S. Force Commitments to NATO (Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Issues of U.S. Policy Regarding the Defense Posture of NATO”, dated November 5 and 10, 1959; NSC Action No. 2149; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Future NATO Commitments”, dated November 20, 1959; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Force Commitments to NATO”, dated July 27, 1960)¹

Mr. Gray briefly introduced the subject to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum.)² Mr. Gray then called on Secretary Douglas³ who said that Assistant Secretary of Defense Irwin would make the presentation.

Mr. Irwin said his remarks would be concerned with the Department of Defense recommendation for the U.S. force figures to be included in the U.S. reply to the Annual NATO Questionnaire.⁴ This


¹ Regarding the November 5 and 10 memoranda and NSC Action No. 2149, see footnotes 1, 4, and 6, Document 228. The November 20 memorandum transmitted the President’s November 16 request that no NATO commitments be made without prior consideration by the NSC. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC 6017) The July 27 memorandum enclosed a memorandum from John N. Irwin, II, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, on U.S. force commitments to NATO. (Ibid.)

² Gray’s briefing note is not printed. The minutes of all National Security Council meetings held in the Eisenhower administration are in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File.

³ James H. Douglas, Jr., Acting Secretary of Defense.

⁴ Reference is to the 1960 NATO Annual Review Questionnaire, which has not been found.
Questionnaire covered major combat force elements of the Army, Navy and the Air Force committed to NATO. Replies to the Questionnaire were due last July 1 in accordance with the regular NATO schedule but last year our reply was not submitted until August 15 and this year apparently NATO does not anticipate a reply until August 15-20. So far, five countries have replied to the Annual NATO Questionnaire. Mr. Irwin felt that no pressure would be exerted on the U.S. because of the tardiness of its reply unless the reply were delayed beyond September 1. Mr. Irwin then explained the meaning of a viewgraph chart showing the Army forces to be supplied NATO by the U.S. to meet MC–70 requirements. He noted that our proposed reply relating to Army forces raised no problems. He anticipated that NATO would adopt our Army figures without discussion since we are substantially meeting MC–70 requirements in this area. Short-falls in Little Johns are compensated for by an overage in Honest Johns; while a short-fall in Redstone missiles is overcome by an overage in Corporal and Sergeant missiles.

Mr. Irwin then explained the meaning of two charts relating to U.S. naval forces committed to meet MC–70 requirements. He said that the information on the chart with respect to cruisers was somewhat deceptive since “Category C” cruisers, i.e. those available after D+30, were actually in mothballs. Substantial short-falls shown on the chart for early warning aircraft were due to the fact that the original MC–70 plans called for some land-based planes which have now been replaced by carrier planes. Thus the short-falls shown on the chart for early warning aircraft have actually been compensated for by an increase in other capabilities. Mr. Irwin anticipated that the U.S. would have no problems in NATO with its reply on naval forces.

Mr. Irwin explained the third chart which related to U.S. Air Force elements committed to NATO. He said the MACE overage of one squadron was deceptive since it represented a splitting in half of one of the squadrons. The chart also showed a shortage in transport aircraft but the transport aircraft actually deployed had the same ton-mile capacity as the MC–70 requirements. The short-fall with respect to reconnaissance aircraft would be partly compensated for by F–105s as replacements for two B–66 squadrons. This substitution had not yet been accepted by CINCEUR but no problem was anticipated. The major problem in connection with air forces committed to NATO, indeed the major problem with respect to the U.S. reply to the NATO Questionnaire, revolved around the short-fall of six squadrons of fighter bomb-

---

5 Neither this chart nor the ones mentioned below has been found, but enclosures attached to Irwin’s July 27 memorandum (see footnote 1 above) contain breakdowns of U.S. MC–70 requirements, including shortfalls and overages, for the Army, Navy, and Air Force for calendar years 1960–1963.
ers in 1962 and 1963. The rationale for reducing our current deployment of twenty-four squadrons by six squadrons lay in the increase of indigenous capabilities, the deployment of IRBMs committed to NATO and the capability of the U.S. Tactical Air Command to transfer tactical squadrons overseas at short notice. If the six squadrons were left in Europe, the cost would be $54 million over the three years 1958–1960 and the personnel cost would be 30,000 spaces. Although the maintenance of U.S. Air Force strength in the NATO area was one of our priority objectives, the Department of Defense had, after much consideration, decided to recommend a reduction in air forces committed to NATO in 1962 and 1963. Such a reduction would permit transfers of personnel and funds to active ICBM squadrons, the addition of a B-52 wing, an increase in SAC dispersal, increased outer space activities, increased efforts to attain the SAMOS capabilities, and improved electronic capabilities. The Air Force had already re-allocated the 30,000 spaces involved.

Secretary Herter noted that Mr. Irwin had been speaking from time to time about reduction in our forces committed to NATO. Secretary Herter felt that the short-falls were not so much reductions as a failure to make planned increases. Mr. Irwin said the short-falls represented failure by the U.S. to meet the goals set for it by MC-70. Secretary Herter wondered whether the short-falls were not a reduction from some figure which it was intended to attain in the future. The President said real reductions were involved since the Defense Department reply to the NATO Questionnaire proposed the elimination of some U.S. forces presently stationed in Europe, e.g. the fighter bomber squadrons.

Mr. Irwin said the principal problem connected with the proposed U.S. reply to the NATO Questionnaire revolved around the short-fall of six fighter bomber squadrons. Secretary Douglas believed this was a difficult political problem. Last year we had proposed a reduction in these forces but had failed to secure proper consideration of the matter in NATO. The twenty-four fighter bomber squadrons now committed to NATO will remain committed through Calendar Year 1961. Mr. Douglas felt this was the point at which we became involved in the "numbers racket." In fact, the capabilities of our forces committed to NATO had substantially increased. [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Douglas said there were now 201 NATO alert fighter bombers of which 145 were U.S. planes; in 1963 there would be 356 such alert planes, 240 of which would be U.S.

The President, turning to Mr. Gray, said that studies and reports should be prepared on the whole concept of NATO, covering the way we became committed to MC-70 requirements and the current problems requiring consideration. We frequently discuss giving more support to our friends all over the world. Everyone seems to be in
agreement that Europe is self-sustaining and is becoming wealthy. The President wondered why the European NATO countries could not defend themselves. Perhaps we had been carrying out our programs of assistance so long that we tended to take these programs for granted. Any studies prepared would of course be primarily for the use of the next administration. Such studies should provide an historical account of NATO, indicate what commitments the U.S. had made, describe how the MC-70 commitments came to be made, and estimate what Europe could do to defend itself. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

Secretary Herter reported that a study on NATO was being prepared in the State Department by Mr. Robert Bowie and would be completed in the next few days. Also, problems relating to NATO would come up tomorrow at a meeting the President was having with General Norstad and other officials. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (13-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Secretary Douglas said the long-range study of NATO was not directly related to the short-fall of six fighter bomber squadrons referred to by Mr. Irwin. Secretary Herter said the six squadrons were a morale factor. Secretary Douglas thought the importance of the six squadrons as a morale factor could be eliminated if their redeployment were properly explained.

Mr. Irwin noted that the NSC agenda contained four related items: U.S. Force Commitments to NATO, which the Council was now discussing; Commitments for Grant Military Assistance to Certain Free World Nations with Well-Developed Economies, the next item on the agenda; Contributions of the U.S. and other NATO Nations to the Collective Defense Posture; and the Future of NATO. The Contributions study had been delayed until the study on the Future of NATO was completed. Perhaps a more orderly procedure would have been to complete all the studies before considering the U.S. reply to the Annual NATO Questionnaire.

Mr. Gray felt that the discussion gave added impetus to the requirement which the Council had previously laid down for a review of the question of making nuclear weapons available to France and also to the broader studies of a multilateral nuclear authority and increased nuclear sharing.

Mr. Gray then said he wished to raise a technical question on the way short-falls were shown on Mr. Irwin’s charts. He wondered why a short-fall was shown in cases where NATO had agreed to accept some other form of force as compensation for a shortage. He had transport aircraft in mind particularly; while we had not provided all the trans-

---

6 The President actually met with Norstad on August 3; see Document 263.
port aircraft shown in MC-70 requirements, we had provided aircraft with the same ton-mile capacity as the requirements. He thought we were putting ourselves in a bad light by showing a short-fall in such a case. Mr. Irwin replied that this was a matter of NATO bookkeeping. NATO follows the practice of showing any shortage from MC-70 requirement as a short-fall unless there is an exchange of written documents indicating General Norstad’s agreement to the substitution of one kind of force for another. Mr. Irwin agreed that it might be preferable to handle the matter as Mr. Gray was suggesting but believed the NATO bookkeeping practices raised no serious problems. Mr. Gray said he had a different view. Whenever the figures show a U.S. failure to provide the complete requirement, the U.S. will be accused of not doing its share. The President suggested that it would be desirable in the future to try to have MC-70 goals expressed in terms of specific items or their equivalents.

[3 paragraphs (28 lines of source text) not declassified]

The National Security Council:7

a. Discussed the subject in the light of an oral presentation by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) on the reply proposed by the Department of Defense to the NATO Annual Review Questionnaire (transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 27, 1960).

b. Agreed on the desirability of exploring the feasibility in the future of expressing MC-70 goals in terms of specific items or their equivalents.

c. Noted that studies on “Contributions of the U.S. and Other NATO Nations to the Collective Defense Posture” and “The Future of NATO” are in preparation by the Departments of State and Defense and will be submitted to the Council for consideration or discussion at an early meeting.

d. Noted the President’s directive that the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, jointly report to the President on the advantages and disadvantages of arrangements which would permit the President, whenever he determines it to be in the U.S. security interest to do so:

(1) Either to sell or otherwise make available nuclear weapons to selected allies; or

(2) To seek creation of multilateral arrangements to assure nuclear efficiency in NATO.

e. Agreed that the study of “A Multilateral European Nuclear Authority” directed by paragraph 24–c of NSC 5906/1, the study of “Possible Nuclear Assistance to France” directed by paragraph 42–a of NSC 5910/1, and the report on “Increased Nuclear Sharing with Allies”

7 Paragraphs a-e and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2274, approved by the President on August 12. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
being prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 2166–b–(9), should be completed promptly.8

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate action.

The action in d above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, AEC, for appropriate implementation.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items. Regarding agenda item 2, see Document 262.]

Marion W. Boggs

---

8 Paragraph 24–c of NSC 5906/1, “Basic National Security Policy,” August 5, 1959, called for development of plans within the executive branch for the development of NATO arrangements for the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons. NSC 5906/11 is scheduled for publication in volume III. Paragraph 42–a of NSC 5910/1, “U.S. Policy on France,” November 4, 1959, noted that the United States should seek French support and participation for a “multilateral European nuclear authority,” and study the possibility of providing France with nuclear information and weapons. (Department of State, S/S–OCA Files: Lot 61 D 385) See also Part 2, Document 144. NSC Action No. 2166 was taken by the NSC on December 16, 1959, and approved by the President on December 23. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

262. Editorial Note

The National Security Council, at its 435th meeting on February 18 and at its 454th meeting on August 1, discussed the subject, “Commitments for Grant Military Assistance to Certain Free World Nations With Well-Developed Economies.” These discussions followed consideration of NSC 58916, “Commitments for Grant Military Assistance to Certain Free World Nations With Well-Developed Economies,” at the 427th NSC meeting on December 3, 1959. A draft of NSC 58916 and the memorandum of discussion at the NSC meeting are printed in volume IV, pages 467–468 and 472–482. Subsequently, on January 30, Secretary of State Herter met with Secretary of Defense Gates, as directed under NSC Action No. 2158–b agreed to at the December 3, 1959, meeting, to develop guidelines on grant assistance for specific well-developed nations. A memorandum of Herter’s conversation with Gates on this matter, prepared by Herter, noted among other things that “we agreed that Defense and State would take identically the same position should the matter come before the President for resolution.” (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Miscellaneous Memoranda of Conversation)

The first periodic report by the Departments of State and Defense, entitled “Commitments for Grant Military Assistance to Certain Free
World Nations With Well-Developed Economies," February 15, was transmitted to the NSC in a memorandum from Executive Secretary Lay on February 17. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC 5916) Earlier, a draft of this report was transmitted in Topol 1443 to Paris, January 29, for comments and recommendations. (Ibid., Central Files, 700.5–MSP/1–2960) The first report was also summarized and discussed at the NSC meeting on February 18. Discussion focused on paragraph 2 of the report, which called for no new commitments for provision of military equipment on a grant basis to the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Austria, and Luxembourg, except in certain instances where U.S. interests might otherwise require. Herter defended this "except clause," citing the need for flexibility. He noted, for instance, differences among European nations over second generation IRBMs in Europe and the possibility that the European nations would agree to accept them only on a shared cost basis, which would not be permitted if the "except clause" was eliminated. Others, especially Under Secretary of the Treasury Fred C. Scribner, Jr., argued that discussions with European nations on financing IRBMs did not involve a commitment and the Department of State, if necessary, could come back to the NSC for decision. NSC Action No. 2187, which the President approved on February 20, revised the second sentence of the second paragraph of the State–Defense report to read as follows:

"As a result thereof steps have been taken to assure that, except in specific instances where the President may determine that U.S. interests otherwise require, no new commitments for the provision of military equipment on a grant basis will be offered to these countries." (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

On August 1, the National Security Council considered a memorandum from Secretaries Herter and Gates to the President, July 8, on the same subject. This memorandum was transmitted by Lay to the NSC on July 20. (Ibid., NSC 5916) Summarized at the NSC meeting by Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon, it covered the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, Belgium, and Japan. Following a country-by-country analysis of the financial and political problems involved, Dillon recommended that the NSC approve proceeding in fiscal year 1961 with the programs of military assistance to these five countries substantially as presented to and endorsed by Congress, subject to such reductions as might be required by congressional reduction of the total military assistance appropriations. He said that he would be ready to present the Mutual Security Program for fiscal year 1962 for full NSC discussion in about 6 weeks.

Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson opposed Dillon's recommendation, saying that the five countries were financially able to pay for their military equipment and that the U.S. economic situation, espe-
cially its balance-of-payments problem and other commitments, required the U.S. Government to give grant military assistance to these nations a low priority. As summarized in the memorandum of discussion, prepared by Marion W. Boggs, President Eisenhower then remarked: "grant military assistance was a difficult problem. His feelings were those of Secretary Anderson but he believed we had got ourselves committed to such an extent that we could not completely eliminate military assistance at this time. He had been struggling with this question for fourteen years." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

After further discussion, the NSC proposed NSC Action No. 2275, which the President approved on August 12. The first paragraph noted the discussion in light of the State–Defense report. Subsequent paragraphs read as follows:

"b. Concurred in the recommendation of the above-mentioned report that steady political pressure should be maintained on the Governments of the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, Belgium and Japan, both bilaterally and multilaterally, to induce them to increase the proportion of their resources devoted to defense in view of the ultimate objective that new commitments for the provision of military equipment on a grant basis should not be offered to nations which are financially able to pay for such equipment.

c. Noted the President's authorization to proceed with the programs of military assistance to the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, Belgium and Japan for FY 1961 substantially as presented to and endorsed by the Congress, subject to such reductions as may be required by Congressional reduction of the total military assistance appropriations.

d. Noted the President's directive that the Governments of the Netherlands and Italy should be informed at an early date that they cannot in the future look forward to the level of grant military assistance they have received in the past; that the Governments of Belgium and Japan should be informed that they must anticipate an eventual decrease in the level of U.S. grant military assistance; and that decisions as to the future grant military assistance program for each country should be taken following notification to that country.

e. Noted that the Council at an early date will give further consideration to grant military assistance for the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, Belgium and Japan in connection with the forthcoming report on long-term military assistance planning, including the levels projected therein for FY 1962." (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

The memorandum of discussion concerning this agenda item and other documentation on long-term military assistance planning is printed in volume IV, pages 504 ff.
General Norstad first recalled that he had last seen the President just before Chancellor Adenauer visited the President. When Gen. Norstad saw the Chancellor after the latter’s visit, to discuss with him the idea of a zone in which to test schemes for the inspection of disarmament, Adenauer said the President had never mentioned it to him. In any event, Gen. Norstad in discussion with the Chancellor got nowhere. The Chancellor was dead set against the scheme. The President recalled that he had forgotten to mention the matter to the Chancellor and, because of this, had called the Chancellor to one side after lunch and raised the matter with him. Gen. Norstad said that it is not unusual for the Chancellor to forget things of this kind, particularly when he is tired, as he gets older.

Gen. Norstad then said that he had visited Turkey on Monday of this week, on the urgent invitation of Gen. Gursel extended last week. He found Gursel to be a steady, honest, dedicated man, capable of running the country. He also met with the “Committee of 38,” young officers who had taken over the government to try to get it on the proper track. Gen. Norstad said that he had reported on this matter to Sec. Herter before seeing the President. He told Mr. Herter he thought the military junta would succeed in the task it has set for itself. He thought these officers would get out of the government before they became corrupted. General Norstad said he thought the attitude of the U.S. toward the Gursel Government should be sympathetic. The President asked me to prepare a note that he might send to Gursel. (I did so, working out exact text


1 A memorandum of Eisenhower’s conversation with Norstad on March 11 is ibid.
2 No record of Adenauer’s conversation with Norstad has been found. Norstad’s plan for an inspection zone has not been found.
3 August 1.
4 On May 27, the Turkish Government was overthrown by a military group headed by Lieutenant General Cemal Gursel, who became President and Prime Minister.
5 On August 2, Norstad met with Herter and Department of State, Department of Defense, and Atomic Energy Commission officials. Memoranda of conversation on the items discussed are in Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
with the State Department; the President approved the note for dispatch later the same day.)

Gen. Norstad next said that he had received a complete “clean bill of health” from the doctors, and has been completely active for the last six weeks. He said his heart specialist was a Colonel Walker, who is to be Mattingly’s replacement at Walter Reed, and is a truly outstanding and fine man. Gen. Norstad next raised the question of succession for himself. He said he is not asking for relief, but can carry on for a reasonable time, such as a year, for example. The President said that he thought it would be a good thing for Norstad to stay for another year. He asked whether Gen. Norstad knows of any foreign government which does not want him to stay on. Gen. Norstad said he was aware of none. The President said Sec. Gates had spoken to him a time or two as to the possibility of assigning Gen. Lemnitzer as SACEUR. The President thought this probably means that Gates would like to have Adm. Burke as Chairman of the JCS. The President does not want this solution, however, and thinks it is time to give the Chairmanship to Gen. Lemnitzer. The President said there is need for stability in the top echelons of our armed services, and said he will tell Mr. Gates that he does not contemplate a change in Europe until Gen. Norstad wants to be relieved, or his health requires relief. Gen. Norstad said that he had put his personal feelings before the Joint Chiefs earlier in the day, and that none had expressed a contrary view.

The President then went on to say that it is not possible to bring a man in “cold” to the position of SACEUR with prospect of success—that there must be a period in which he and the Europeans get to know each other. Gen. Norstad reverted to the point that he has now served about four years as SACEUR, and thinks this is generally about the correct length of tour. He added that if the Government has a better solution, that at any time he is quite ready to turn over the job. The President reiterated that he thought it would be best for Norstad to stay on for a year or so.

The President next raised the point that he has become very dissatisfied regarding our relationships with our allies in the matter of atomic weapons and missiles. The US Government seems to be taking the attitude that we will call the tune, and that they have inferior status in the alliance. He said he recognizes dangers and difficulties in bilateral, or selective arrangements, with only a few of the countries. [4-1/2 lines of

---

6 Eisenhower’s brief message to Gürel was transmitted in telegram 233 to Ankara, August 4. (Ibid., Central Files, 611.82/8-460)
7 Admiral Arleigh S. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations.
8 No other record of Norstad’s conversation with the JCS has been found.
He stressed that we must not treat our allies as secondary in their role, but should solve the problems of the alliance functionally. We must devise arrangements that will prevent untoward developments or misuse. This will, of course, not be easy. He thought Italy, Germany, France and Britain would all want such weapons. They should be handled as NATO weapons, to be utilized in "over-all" or strategic purposes. He thought we should be as generous with our allies in this matter as we think they should be in other questions involving the alliance. He said he had considerable sympathy for the point of view of de Gaulle in this question. He is trying to build up his country, and we persist in treating them as second-rate. The President said this is why he wants the study to be made. He will make his recommendation and then leave the matter to his successor. Gen. Norstad said he strongly favored a multilateral solution, in which the weapons are turned over to NATO as an entity. He thinks bilateral solution would be destructive, and would involve discrimination against the Italians, Belgians, etc., which he thinks it very important to avoid. The President thought this might be accomplished by holding the control of the weapons at or above a certain echelon of NATO command. Gen. Norstad said he thought the problem could be solved on a NATO basis. There would be certain requirements for weapons. The US would make them available to the alliance during its life in its present form. The US could maintain custody, or joint custody, but NATO would exercise the essential control. Specifically, NATO authority would have the power of decision as to their use. The President asked whether Gen. Norstad thought Gen. de Gaulle would accept this arrangement. Gen. Norstad said he might not, but this offer would take away every legitimate complaint that de Gaulle now has.

The President asked Gen. Norstad if he saw any reason why the French should not be helped to build an atomic submarine. Gen. Norstad said he would favor giving them this help. The President commented that the Atomic Energy Act is a very defective and "terrible" law, which has done great harm to the conduct of our relations with our allies. Gen. Norstad commented that the submarine raises an entirely different question with regard to the moral issue. He assumed we are not talking about a Polaris submarine with atomic missiles, and the President agreed. The President thought the allies would be wise to let the US carry the Polaris responsibility. At this point the President asked me to check the status of Gen. Norstad's multilateral proposal of last year, and make sure that the three agencies studying the question give consideration to this proposal. He said the study should also include submarines.
Gen. Norstad asked that I have the Departments involved let Gen. Norstad know what they are doing in the matter.

Finally, Gen. Norstad said it would be useful to him if he could see some of the President’s letters to Gen. de Gaulle. He realized these are very tightly handled. The President commented that it could be embarrassing to him if this very private correspondence were to be circulated. He agreed, however, that Gen. Norstad might receive a memo giving the gist of the questions when a matter affecting SACEUR’s responsibility is involved. General Norstad said that Gen. de Gaulle is invariably extremely friendly in his manner toward him, and in his references to the President. The President said he would like to make some sort of a friendly gesture toward de Gaulle, particularly in light of recent reports that de Gaulle feels US policy is in the doldrums until a new administration comes in. Gen. Norstad confirmed that this is de Gaulle’s view. He added that de Gaulle is making the most of it to some extent to try to seize leadership, in concert with Adenauer.

G. 
Brigadier General, USA

264. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

August 16, 1960.

OTHERS PRESENT
Mr. Robert Bowie, Gen. Goodpaster

Mr. Bowie said he wanted to give a brief oral report on the ten-year study on NATO that he has been making.1 On the military side, he said he sees an urgent need for a new look at the strategy of NATO in light of the Soviet nuclear development. Action is needed respecting, first, a strategic strike capability in the European area, and, second, the “shield” forces.

As to the strategic capability, the Europeans want to have some nuclear weapons under their own control. Mr. Bowie said that the national


1 For an extract of Bowie’s report, see Document 266.
programs now being carried forward are very bad and are having a divisive effect. He suggests instead a multilateral program. As the first stage of such a program, the United States would assign some Polaris submarines with missiles to NATO. The assignment should be irrevocable, with a commitment that we will not pull them out [6-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] As the second stage, we would help the Europeans develop indigenous strike forces of a multilateral, multinational character (even including mixed crews in all probability). We would have to agree on the method of use of such a collective force. It might be that we would keep the warheads in our possession, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

Mr. Bowie said he saw a number of merits for these schemes over the national force approach. Also, he thought the use of the Polaris was much better than proposals for land-based weapons, [2 lines of source text not declassified].

With regard to the shield forces, Mr. Bowie thought that the non-nuclear elements should be enhanced and brought up to something like the 28–30 divisions contemplated in SHAPE plans. These should be equipped for, and capable of, non-nuclear fighting. The Europeans are not drawn with enthusiasm to the prospect of tactical nuclear war on their own homelands. He did not think that there could be a stage of conflict between the non-nuclear and the all-out strategic attack—in other words, there can be no war limited to tactical nuclear war in Europe. Accordingly, he felt we should take a very hard look at our HRBM proposals and our tactical nuclear planning. He thought we should have enough tactical nuclear weapons of up to several hundred mile range to prevent an enemy from being able to mass forces against us. He did not see reason or need to go to a 1,200 mile missile.

At this point the President commented on Mr. Bowie's remarks. He said he was in accord with the first part of Bowie's thesis—about the unsatisfactory state of the alliance insofar as atomic cooperation is concerned. The difficulty in his judgment is not with the Europeans but with our own Congress, which strives to keep in its own hands details of military foreign policy and similar operations. He said the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is unconstitutional in its functions. The President said he agreed that we are not going to have a tactical nuclear war in Western Europe. In fact, he said he cannot see any chance of keeping any war in Europe from becoming a general war. For this reason he thought we must be ready to throw the book at the Russians should they jump us. He did not see how there could be such a thing as a limited war in Europe, and thought we would be fooling ourselves and our European friends if we said we could fight such a war without recourse to nuclear weapons. If massive land war operations such as the Ludendorff offensive in early 1918 in World War I were to occur, he was sure
that nations would use every weapon available to them. Mr. Bowie said
that he did not see the Soviets attempting to mount a massive land attack
in Europe. The point is psychological and political more than military. If
the Europeans think that they are in a situation where they cannot resist
at all if they do not use all-out nuclear attack, the probability becomes
great that they would not resist and accordingly could not prevent So-
viet encroachment. What he is suggesting is that we should be careful
that we would not end up deterring ourselves.

The President said he thinks it is of the greatest importance to have
this kind of thinking. He assured Mr. Bowie he would read his report,
when it is available, most carefully. He noted that the Bowie proposal is
the antithesis of de Gaulle’s line of thought. De Gaulle apparently wants
the atomic weapons completely in his own hands. Only when he has
these things himself will he talk about “collective forces”. He thinks de
Gaulle gives only lip service to the basic idea of NATO. Mr. Bowie ac-
knowledged that these proposals will probably not be acceptable to de
Gaulle. However, one of their merits is that they permit us to go ahead
with the first step. He also noted that officials in the French Government
below de Gaulle do not agree with his approach and philosophy. The
President commented that the ability to carry out the first step seems to
be dependent upon the Congress. Mr. Bowie said this matter is not com-
pletely clear, since the weapons will in fact be retained in our hands, and
the President will say that he will consider SACEUR’s decision as his
own. The President commented that if the Europeans are not willing to
accept the idea of collective defense by multiple rather than national
forces, the whole NATO concept will fall apart. Mr. Bowie agreed with
the qualification that if the four or five big industrial powers will not
work intimately together in the next ten years, we are in trouble.

The President said he has very much on his mind the question as to
how NATO can act in harmony on a world-wide scale. Perhaps a geo-
graphical division of effort would be possible, with the French concen-
trating on their community, the British on the Commonwealth, the
Germans perhaps on the Mid-East, and ourselves elsewhere. This did
not really look like a feasible scheme to him, however. Mr. Bowie said
that the present may be a critical point in time in one respect. The British,
in his judgment, should throw their lot in with the continent. This is an
historical opportunity for them, and perhaps for us to influence them.
He suggested that we put our weight behind this. The President com-
mented that Adenauer seems to be pulling back somewhat from the
European concept. He added he thought it would be good to see Britain
in this grouping. Mr. Bowie agreed that Britain is the key element to the
success of this idea. The President thought it could be presented to them
in terms that they would be going back to the balance of power, contrib-
uting their wisdom, experience and sturdiness to European affairs. Mr.
Bowie thought we should tell them that they have to get into the European grouping in order to make these qualities effective.

The President recalled that he had told Churchill years ago that Britain is faced with three choices and will soon have to adopt one of them: to make the Commonwealth a single nation (which seems impractical); to join up with the continent; or to join the U. S. as several additional states. Mr. Churchill did not welcome the suggestion. Mr. Bowie repeated that the next few months in his opinion are a critical turning point. He thought Adenauer has lost his nerve over the European approach, and that the British are capitalizing on this to try to water down the European Community. He thought it should not be watered down, but should be developed as a strong political grouping.

[3 lines of source text not declassified] It will be more difficult, and possibly impossible, to get around the problem of Commonwealth preference. Mr. Bowie observed that Commonwealth preferences are a wasting asset, both for the British and for the other Commonwealth members. The President commented that the Canadians, for example, are at the moment very Commonwealth-conscious, trying to orient their trade to Britain.

The President said he thought he agreed with all of Mr. Bowie's remarks except the possibility of having a land struggle in Europe. Mr. Bowie said his proposal is that, if we have the capability to conduct some operations of this kind, we will probably not need it. The President said he felt sure we would never see another grinding type of conflict along the lines of World War I. He recognized that perhaps there has been a gap in his own thinking regarding this question. Since the costs of developing and maintaining such a force would be quite large we come to a matter of priorities. Our gold outflow has been such that we cannot take on too much of a burden of supporting the development of conventional forces. Mr. Bowie thought that we should aim at strategic forces up to a couple of hundred missiles. We could cut on tactical nuclear forces and put the savings into the shield. The President agreed that if we have Polaris submarines there should not be a need for so many tactical missiles. He asked me to arrange to have General Norstad come in the next time he is in the States, preferably with Mr. Bowie. I commented that he will be here in mid-September.

The President said the overall question is to face up to the dilemma of how we make ourselves secure in our alliance without destroying the alliance. This is the real problem that de Gaulle has raised. He asked me to set up a "couple of hours" for the discussion he mentioned. He said if the scheme looks reasonable, he would be ready to battle with de Gaulle about it.

G.

Brigadier General, USA
265. Memorandum of Discussion at the 457th Meeting of the National Security Council


[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Increased Nuclear Sharing With Allies (NSC 5906/1, paragraph 24–c; NSC 5910/1, paragraph 42–a; NSC Actions Nos. 2140–b, 2166–b–(9), 2204 and 2274–d and –e; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 23, 1960).1

Mr. Gray began his briefing on the subject by reading the first two sentences of Paragraph 1, all of Paragraph 2, and all of Paragraph 3 of his Briefing Note. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum.)2

The President said that a number of new ideas on the subject of nuclear sharing had been presented to him and he thought that they should be thrown in the hopper. One such idea came from Mr. Robert Bowie, for whom the President had a great deal of admiration.3 Mr. Bowie has been making a study in the State Department of the reorientation of some strategic concepts from the political point of view. [9-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] The President thought that Mr. Bowie’s ideas were sufficiently challenging to old concepts to warrant serious consideration in any discussion of nuclear sharing. The President said that after an hour’s conversation with Mr. Bowie, it had been arranged that Mr. Bowie would return to confer with the President on September 12 together with General Norstad. The President wondered whether it would be profitable to discuss at this meeting the pros and cons of increased nuclear sharing presented in the paper before the Council. The President remarked that Mr. Bowie had convinced him that many current ideas, including some which he (the President) had held, were not sacrosanct.

Mr. Dillon reported that Mr. Bowie is preparing a written report which should be available by the end of the week.


1 Regarding paragraph 24–c of NSC 5906/1, paragraph 42–a of NSC 5910/1, and NSC Action Nos. 2166 and 2274, see footnotes 7 and 8, Document 261. Regarding NSC Action No. 2140, see Part 2, Document 144, footnote 9. NSC Action No. 2204 is not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) The August 23 memorandum transmitted the draft report on nuclear sharing with Allies prepared by the Departments of State and Defense and the AEC. (Ibid., NSC 6017)

2 Not printed.

3 See Document 266.
Mr. Bowie had had a great deal to say about deterring small wars. The President was unable to agree with Mr. Bowie on this point. It seemed to the President that the risk of a small war becoming a general war was so great that we must place our main reliance on strategic deterrence. The President felt so uncertain in his own mind about nuclear sharing that he would like to see the problem restudied.

Mr. Gray remarked that he had exerted a certain amount of pressure in order to have the subject of nuclear sharing discussed at this Council meeting. Some of the agencies concerned were not fully ready for the discussion but he had felt it was desirable to bring the matter up in order that a decision might be made on whether to seek legislation at the present session of Congress. The President remarked that when he had referred to the possibility of seeking legislation on nuclear sharing at this session of Congress (at the August 1 NSC Meeting in Newport), he had not known what the current session of Congress would be like. It was clear by now that the present session of Congress would engage primarily in politics and that no legislation on nuclear sharing could be passed.

Mr. Gray then referred to the problem of nuclear submarine sharing.

Mr. Gray, after expressing a certain amount of surprise that there was no real difference between the agencies on nuclear submarine sharing, wondered whether the Council should not attempt to settle the nuclear submarine problem at this meeting. Secretary Gates felt that the problem of nuclear submarine sharing could not properly be dissociated from the other problems set forth in the paper.

Secretary Gates thought the subject of nuclear sharing had been scheduled on the Council agenda without any intent to arrive at firm decisions at this meeting. He felt some very critical questions were involved, including our attitude toward France, that is, whether we would or would not assist France to achieve a nuclear capability. He believed a decision on this question would be required within the next few months. Secretary Gates did not want to delay recognition of the fact that critical decisions need to be made soon. The main point of the Council discussion today would be to focus attention on the problems of nuclear sharing, to have the Council members understand these problems, and to ask Council members to think over carefully. However, Secretary Gates felt that decisions on nuclear sharing should not be postponed longer than two months.

4See Document 261.
Secretary Gates also felt that the problem of nuclear sharing with France was the key to the entire problem of nuclear sharing. He asked whether General Twining wished to add anything.

General Twining believed that Secretary Gates' remarks had covered the subject. He wanted to be sure that the President understood the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. [19-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

[2 paragraphs (15 lines of source text) not declassified]

Secretary Dillon agreed with Secretary Gates that the nuclear sharing problem was an important one and that decisions concerned with it should not be long delayed. He felt, however, that the way in which the problem had been posed in the paper before the Council for discussion today created difficulties. The problem as stated in the paper was too broad. General Twining had succinctly expressed the views of the State Department. Secretary Dillon agreed that the problem of nuclear sharing was essentially the problem of what to do about France. [51-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Summarizing, Secretary Dillon said the problem of nuclear sharing was really the problem of France and the effect of nuclear assistance to France on our other NATO allies. If U.S. nuclear assistance to France would create jealousy in NATO, then we should be reluctant to give such assistance. In any case, Mr. Dillon believed that the problem stated in the paper was too broadly stated and that it should be narrowed down to focus on France.

[2 paragraphs (25 lines of source text) not declassified]

General Twining remarked that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had known Mr. Bowie for some time. They felt he was a very persuasive individual but they did not always agree with him and they hoped that any proposals which he might make would be passed along to the JCS for comment. The President said the JCS should be present when Mr. Bowie makes his presentation on the future of NATO. Secretary Dillon remarked that Mr. Bowie was preparing a written report which would be transmitted to the JCS.

[2 paragraphs (16 lines of source text) not declassified]

Secretary Anderson noted that the Council had discussed the question of whether MC-70 is still a valid planning document. He pointed out that if any changes were to be made in the MC-70 concept, such changes might have considerable effect on the U.S. budget. Since December would be budget time, he wondered whether State and Defense could accelerate their consideration of the MC-70 requirements.

Secretary Gates did not believe that MC-70 requirements could be changed in time to have any effect on the FY 1962 budget. MC-70 was a plan for the years 1958-1963. However, it would be possible to take a close look at the 1963 MC-70 figures. Mr. McCone asked when the review of MC-70 requirements would come up. Secretary Gates said that
the review was now going on. Secretary Dillon said the fundamental review for 1963 would take place next year. Mr. Irwin pointed out that General Norstad was engaged in an extensive review of MC–70 as it concerned the last two years of the 1958–1963 period. He did not know whether the Norstad review was directed toward a fundamental change in MC–70 or whether it was focussed on extending the MC–70 plan beyond 1963. In any case, the Norstad study which was due to be completed in about two months, would provide a framework for a review of MC–70 within this government. Secretary Gates remarked that thus far General Norstad had been unwilling to reduce any MC–70 requirements.

Secretary Dillon believed that if the U.S. desired a change in MC–70, it should inform the NATO Council that a review is necessary. The U.S. should then suggest that the NATO Council examine the political directive under which MC–70 was prepared and ask the NATO military commanders for a new plan. The earliest time at which we could begin this process would be the NATO Council meeting in December. However, he would not want to suggest to the NATO Council a review of MC–70 unless there was agreement in this government as to the military direction we wished to take in NATO. Mr. McConne felt the development of Polaris since the formulation of MC–70 was a good reason for a review of the MC–70 concept. Secretary Dillon agreed but repeated that he would be reluctant to suggest a complete review of MC–70 before our own military objectives were clarified. Mr. Stans pointed out that both the U.S. and its allies had failed to fulfill MC–70 requirements. Secretary Gates believed that General Norstad would argue that Polaris would only be a substitute for the fighter bombers that he has been losing. General Norstad would probably oppose any fundamental change in the policy reflected in MC–70. Mr. Stans asked whether Mr. Dulles’ report on reductions in Soviet forces had any bearing on a review of MC–70. Secretary Dillon believed the key factor was whether we could develop a new concept as to the ground forces needed on the front line in Europe. If it was determined that thirty divisions were still needed, a reshuffle of forces rather than a fundamental review of MC–70 was indicated. Secretary Anderson felt that an equally important question was whose divisions are needed on the front line. Secretary Dillon believed that if we did not have some of our own divisions there, we would have

---

5 At the preceding meeting of the NSC on August 18, Allen Dulles “indicated that he had intended to brief the Council on Soviet military realignment and force reduction but that he would either postpone this item to a later meeting or would circulate the material.” (Memorandum of discussion, August 25; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) This material, if circulated, has not been found.
to provide military assistance to nations whose divisions were there as long as a level of thirty divisions was considered necessary.

The President felt it was difficult to understand why the European countries could not provide more divisions. He pointed out that France and other European countries had maintained very large armies until 1914. Secretary Dillon said these armies where largely conscripted armies. The President agreed. However, these conscripted armies did not have the wealth of equipment present day armies possess. The President repeated his view that Europe should provide the ground force if the U.S. is to be expected to provide SAC, a navy, and nuclear capability. Secretary Dillon felt the Germans could certainly provide a few more divisions. The President believed the Germans were dragging their feet.

Mr. Gray remarked that the discussion had been a long one in view of the fact that the President had asked for no discussion. He then asked whether or not the JCS should consider the desirability, from a military point of view, of recommending changes in MC-70 in preparation for possible U.S. proposals to the NATO Council in December. Mr. Gray also hoped that the President would set the deadline for resubmission of the report on nuclear sharing to the Council. He wondered whether the President wanted the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, AEC, to prepare a revised report or whether this was a task for the Planning Board.

The President said we would be studying this question in a vacuum until we knew what we would get Congress to do. He felt careful consideration should be given to the problem of consultation with Congress. Mr. McConc said it was clear from the law and from legislative history that not even France at the present time qualified for receipt of U.S. nuclear information or material. We could, of course, endeavor to change the law or reinterpret the legislative history. Secretary Dillon asked when France would qualify. Mr. McConc said that this was a difficult question to answer. From legislative history it was clear that conducting a few nuclear tests did not qualify a country to receive U.S. nuclear information or material under the law.

[1 paragraph (6-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Secretary Gates believed the legislative question should be studied carefully and that the Administration should seek to diminish the influence of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on these matters. The Attorney General felt the law could be reinterpreted if such reinterpretation were believed desirable. He believed such a reinterpretation would be acceptable if we could show Congress that it was in our security interests.

---

6 William P. Rogers.
The President did not favor an attempt to reinterpret the law. He believed we should place our case on nuclear sharing before the military committees of Congress and ask them to secure Congressional endorsement of our program. The defense of the Western world was involved in this question and the President did not want to take up such a question with the Joint Committee. Secretary Gates agreed. The President said Senator Russell and Representative Vinson would give serious attention to Administration proposals. Secretary Gates said we should at least consult the military committees of Congress at the same time we consult the Joint Committee. The President preferred to put the problem where it belonged, that is, with the military committees of Congress. We need not apologize for talking to the military committees about this problem. We might even want to talk to the foreign relations committees. Consulting with the Joint Committee only amounted to letting politicians tell us how to carry out our defense policy. Mr. McConie agreed with the President’s remarks.

Mr. Gray suggested that the President ask the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, AEC, taking into account General Norstad’s views and Mr. Bowie’s recommendations, to prepare a revised report on nuclear sharing. The President believed that the Secretary of Defense together with the Chairman, JCS, should consult with the military committees of Congress. The committees should be made aware of our problem; they should be told that the present pattern is not necessarily the best for purposes of defense and that we could do better in the nuclear field for less money under new arrangements. Secretary Gates agreed that such a procedure would at least dilute the present influence of the Joint Committee.

Secretary Gates then suggested that Mr. Gray should set the deadline for resubmission of the nuclear sharing report to the Council and should make the arrangements for preparation of the report. Mr. Gray said he hoped the President would assign the responsibility to some official or officials. The President said that in talking to the chairmen of the military committees of the Congress, Senator Russell and Representative Vinson, we should present our whole case. Mr. Gray said that the difficulty was that we did not yet know what our case is. He hoped the President would issue a directive concerning future Council consideration of the problem. The President said that Mr. Gray should arrange for preparation and early submission to the Council of a revised report on future nuclear capabilities in the NATO area, including recommendations regarding France.

7 Richard B. Russell, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee; and Carl Vinson, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.
The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the subject in the light of the draft report, prepared by an Interdepartmental Working Group consisting of officials of the Departments of State and Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission, as a response to NSC Action No. 2274--d and --e, and transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 23, 1960.

b. Noted the President's directive that the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs arrange for the preparation, not later than October 15, 1960, of a report on U.S. policy regarding future nuclear weapons capabilities in the NATO area, including recommendations as to whether or under what circumstances it might be in U.S. security interests to enhance the nuclear weapons capability of France. This report should contain suggestions regarding appropriate legislative action, if necessary, to carry out policy recommendations. This report should take into account two studies on NATO, one by Mr. Robert Bowie for the Department of State and the other by the Department of Defense which is being prepared in connection with the joint State--Defense report to the Planning Board and the Council on "The Future of NATO", as called for by NSC Action No. 2219--b, and the forthcoming consultations with General Norstad.

[Here follows the remaining agenda item.]

Marion W. Boggs

---

8 Paragraphs a and b constitute NSC Action No. 2292, approved by the President on September 13. (Department of State, S/S--NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
August 1960.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC NATIONS: TASKS FOR THE 1960’s

CHAPTER ONE: Challenge of the 1960’s

1. Basic Goals (pp. 19–23)

   The Atlantic nations must try, over the long run, both:

   (a) to shape the basic forces at work in the world, so as to create a
   viable world order; and

   (b) to prevent the Sino-Soviet Bloc from undermining that order or
   from dominating non-Communist countries.

2. Major Tasks (pp. 24–25)

   To fulfill this dual goal, the Atlantic nations must:

   (a) assure their defense;

   (b) assist modernization of less developed areas;

   (c) develop a common strategy toward the Bloc;

   (d) mobilize the resources required to accomplish their purposes;

   (e) create a political framework within which they can work to-
   gether to these ends.

This report analyzes these five tasks and the kind of actions which
the Atlantic nations must undertake in order to discharge them. In pursu-
ing these tasks, the Atlantic Community should rediscover the cohe-
sion and sense of purpose which marked its creation over a decade ago.

CHAPTER TWO: NATO Defense

1. The Problem (pp. 27–38)

   During the 1950’s, NATO’s strategy was based on decisive US
   superiority in strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Under these

---

Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, Bowie Report. Secret. The report comprised a title page, table of contents, Bowie’s letter of transmittal to Secretary Herter, a summary, and six chapters. Only the summary is printed here. Herter first proposed such a report at the NATO Ministerial Meeting at Paris on December 15, 1959; see footnote 7, Document 238. Background on the invitation to Bowie, former Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning, 1955–1957, and the kind of study the Department of State wanted prepared is in a memorandum from Ivan B. White to Merchant, February 20. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC 6017)

Attached to the source text is a memorandum from John A. Calhoun (S/S) to Goodpaster, August 29, which noted that the Secretary had not yet seen the report. That memorandum bears the President’s initials. Comments on the Bowie report are ibid.; additional documentation is ibid., Central File 740.5. An October 10 letter from Herter thanked Bowie for preparing the report. (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC 6017)
conditions, the strategy was effective in deterring aggression and maintaining the confidence of our allies.

Growing Soviet missile-nuclear capabilities are now eroding the credibility of the threat of a strategic nuclear response to less than all-out Soviet attack. In consequence, NATO Europe may become vulnerable to threats of both limited aggression and nuclear blackmail: Europeans will fear both an excessive NATO response to limited aggression and the absence of a US strategic response to greater threats. The Soviets may seek to exploit this vulnerability for divisive effects.

1. Basic Approach (p. 38)

A viable NATO strategy for the 1960's must:

(a) enhance the non-nuclear capability of Shield forces to resist attack by Soviet ready forces and substantially lessen their dependence on nuclear weapons;

2. Revised Shield Strategy (pp. 39–51)

The enhanced non-nuclear capability could be based on central front Shield forces somewhere near SACEUR's target of 30 divisions, which will come within reach when the German build-up is completed. These forces must be better trained and equipped and have more adequate reserves. The added costs may be partially offset by some economies, and should be well within NATO capabilities. Our NATO allies should be the more willing to meet these costs, because they would be related to the only kind of strategy that makes sense for European countries.

3. Evaluation (pp. 65–72)

The above Shield and deterrent proposals would be inter-dependent. Together with US strategic power, they would deter Soviet military actions against the NATO area; they would also safeguard against Soviet blackmail for divisive or political purposes, and go far to meet legitimate European concerns.

CHAPTER THREE: The Atlantic Nations and the Less Developed Countries

1. The Problem and the Atlantic Nations' Stake In It (pp. 73–79)

The Atlantic nations have a vital interest in the continued independence, internal cohesion, and stability of the less developed nations. This interest is only likely to be fulfilled if the less developed countries can progress toward modernization under moderate governments and through evolutionary means. The obstacles are formidable; decades or even generations will be required.
Basic responsibility for achieving this progress must rest with the less developed countries. The Atlantic nations can make a significant contribution, however, since they possess most of the needed outside resources.

2. Financial and Technical Aid (pp. 79-86)

Over the next decade, the Atlantic nations should plan to double or triple their financial aid to the less developed countries. If equitably shared, this burden can be reasonably assumed by healthy Atlantic economies.

It will be more difficult to meet the need of many less developed countries for people and institutions capable of effectively launching and prosecuting their own development programs. To do this, they will require the advice and services of outside experts, help in training their own officials and experts, and assistance and encouragement in their self-help efforts.

Bilateral programs by the Atlantic nations will be important in meeting this need. They should be administered for their long-term effect on the less developed countries’ modernization, rather than for short-term political or commercial advantage.

International and private agencies have many advantages in meeting the need defined above: Their intimate participation in nation-building is more likely to be welcome; they are better able to insist on rigorous self-help; and their efforts are less apt to serve as a precedent for Soviet activity. The Atlantic nations should, therefore, make a special effort to enhance the effectiveness of international and private aid to less developed countries.

(a) They should support making the UN Special Fund1 into a key instrument for helping governments of less developed countries plan and organize their over-all development programs. They should favor enlarging the Fund’s scope and resources and giving it policy direction of related UN programs, as necessary to this end.

(b) They should support an increasing role for the IBRD and IMF in advising governments of less developed countries, and an expansion in the resources of the IBRD’s affiliate—the International Development Association.2

(c) They should establish a Development Center to promote (i) two-way contacts between civic, business, and professional and labor groups in the Atlantic and less developed nations; (ii) the recruiting

---

1 The U.N. Special Fund, established on January 1, 1959, assisted less-developed countries to accelerate their economic growth by sponsoring projects designed primarily to facilitate public or private capital investment.

2 The International Development Association, an international agency composed of 15 nations for financing economic growth in the less developed nations, came into being on September 26 as an affiliate of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
and training of young people in the Atlantic nations for service in less developed areas; and (iii) research on key development problems.

3. *Trade With Less Developed Countries* (pp. 87–93)

In view of the dependence of the less developed countries on trade for foreign exchange, the Atlantic nations should:

(a) cooperate in developing feasible methods for mitigating the effects on less developed countries of drastic changes in prices of their primary exports; and

(b) reduce the barriers to these countries’ exports of manufactured products. This reduction might be undertaken simultaneously by all the Atlantic nations, so that its burden could be shared. The domestic impact might be cushioned by compensatory assistance to the groups most directly affected.

4. *Public Order* (pp. 93–97)

The Atlantic nations should seek to enhance UN capabilities for maintaining peace and order in less developed countries. They should be prepared to earmark contingents or transport facilities for use by future United Nations forces, and they should urge other countries to do the same.

The US and some other Atlantic nations should maintain effective forces which could be used, in limited operations, to help less developed countries to maintain order or resist aggression.

CHAPTER FOUR: Relations with the Communist Bloc

1. *Basic Approach* (pp. 99–101)

In concerting their strategy regarding relations with the Bloc, the Atlantic nations must reconcile the requirements of simultaneously competing with and dealing with the Bloc. They need to maintain both:

(a) an unremitting awareness of Bloc hostility, even when the Bloc is following a soft line; and

(b) a continuing desire for useful relations with the Bloc, even when tensions are at their peak.

2. *Economic Relations* (pp. 102–105)

The Atlantic nations should maintain existing limited controls on trade, partly as a stand-by safeguard, and should also agree to hold the annual volume of private credits to the Bloc to approximately the existing level.

3. *Exchanges* (pp. 105–107)

The Atlantic nations should press for widening contacts with the Bloc, and should:

(a) try to agree on common objectives and guidelines for their bilateral exchange programs;
(b) exchange information secured through these programs among themselves.

4. *Psychological Warfare* (pp. 108–109)

The Atlantic nations should seek greater coordination of objectives and actions in psychological warfare against the Bloc, in order to increase its potential impact.

5. *Arms Control* (pp. 109–113)

The NATO countries should seek more actively to develop arms control measures which would serve to reduce the risk of accidental war, to hinder the spread of national nuclear capabilities, to stabilize deterrence, and possibly to enhance regional security in Europe.

In order to facilitate genuine negotiation, the NATO allies should consider allowing the US to negotiate with the USSR in accord with agreed policy. In that case, the US should consult regularly with its NATO partners about the progress of negotiations.

**CHAPTER FIVE: Resources of the Atlantic Community**

The steady growth and effective use of resources in the Atlantic nations is essential for meeting the tasks ahead. To this end:

1. The Atlantic nations, especially the larger ones, should concert their economic policies more effectively through OECD to stimulate more rapid growth. They should be willing to discuss freely all aspects of domestic economic policies and should seek to arrive at a common view of appropriate policy objectives and priorities. (119–121)

2. They should consistently seek to reduce and remove restrictions on trade. The US should take the lead by drastically revising its trade agreement legislation to permit negotiation of substantial tariff restrictions in GATT. The long-range goal should be to move toward free trade, at least among the more advanced nations. (121–127)

3. The US should join a reconstituted European Monetary Agreement. (127–128)

4. The Atlantic nations should make a renewed effort to ensure fuller and more concerted use of their scientific capabilities. (128–134)

5. They should expand research and development to meet NATO’s need for non-nuclear weaponry; and should intensify efforts to secure coordinated production of major military matériel in Europe, and eventually throughout the Alliance. (134–141)

**CHAPTER SIX: Requisite Political Framework**

Concerting of policies and actions by the Atlantic nations, as discussed in prior Chapters, will require a firmer political framework.

1. *Evolving Relations* (pp. 143–148)

The creation of an adequate framework is complicated by the fact that relations among the Atlantic nations are in transition. With boom-
ing recovery, European nations have regained their confidence and aspire to a larger role in the Alliance and in world affairs. Their total potential would justify and support such a role, if effectively marshalled in an integrated Europe. With the existing disparity in strength and influence, however, even the largest of the existing European nations cannot now be an equal partner with the US. Tensions are generated by this conflict between desire and reality and by differing policies for curing it on the part of the British, and the European Community, and among the members of that Community.

2. **Structure** (pp. 149–154)

The most radical answer would be Atlantic Confederation. But whatever its ultimate merits, it would be premature at this stage—a source of division and weakness and not of strength. It should not, however, be foreclosed.

The more practical course is to encourage the European Community to become an effective entity, if possible with Britain as a full member, in the interests of the Atlantic Community and of Britain. With comparable resources, the US and a European Community could become full and equal partners for joint policy and action and could fashion the necessary instruments to give effect to their partnership.

3. **Improving Existing Instruments** (pp. 154–159)

In the meantime, NATO and OECD must be strengthened, especially for the concerting of basic planning and policies of their members. Several measures are suggested:

[1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified]

(b) An Atlantic Planning Group should be created to help develop a consensus on the common Atlantic interests on basic issues. Composed of three to five senior and distinguished men, not representing any nation but speaking as individuals, this group would recommend to NATO Foreign Ministers long-range objectives and policies.

(c) To facilitate NATO–OECD coordination, key member states of both agencies should have a single national delegation to both, under a representative able to speak for his Government and to influence its policy making.

(d) To foster wider public understanding and support, it would be desirable: (i) to expand the NATO and OECD information program; (ii) to develop the role of the NATO Parliamentarians in relation to both NATO and OECD; (iii) to foster the nascent Atlantic Institute, especially as a basis for wider public activity.
267. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

September 12, 1960.

OTHERS PRESENT

General Norstad, Mr. Robert Bowie, General Goodpaster

General Norstad began by saying he brought greetings to the President from Chancellor Adenauer. He had met with Adenauer, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a few days previously for a four-hour discussion on trends and problems in NATO.¹ [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Mr. Bowie recalled that his study on NATO² had brought out, among other things, the need for an increased conventional capacity, the view that there could be no limited nuclear war in Europe, some suggestions for dealing with the problem of a European or NATO strategic deterrent, and the view that a proliferation of individual national deterrents would be catastrophic for the free world. He recalled that he had suggested that a deterrent force of the Polaris type would be valuable, since, being sea-based, it avoids the problem of land bases. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] I added that Mr. Bowie had proposed to hold tactical nuclear weapons to a very small total in Western Europe.

General Norstad said the question is as to how much tactical nuclear capability we should have in Western Europe. He did not understand Mr. Bowie to be recommending that we have none; therefore, the difference is one of degree. He said he is in full agreement that we should not lose sight of the importance of our conventional capability in Western Europe. As to the tactical nuclear weapons, he thought the Chiefs of Staff ought to do some detailed study of how much we should have. He thought there were two other suggestions which it would be very profitable for him and Mr. Bowie to discuss with the President. The first of these relates to the control of nuclear weapons, and the question is how to give the Europeans the amount of control they need in order to keep the alliance effective and sound. There are three theoretical solutions: bilateral arrangements; maintenance of the status quo; or a multilateral system. [6 lines of source text not declassified]

¹ A summary of Norstad’s lunch and discussion with Adenauer, text not declassified, on September 9 was transmitted in telegram 1024 from Paris, September 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 375/9–1060) A copy of the telegram bears a notation in Goodpaster’s handwriting: “12 Sept. 60: Reported orally to President by Gen. Norstad. G.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Norstad)
² Document 266.
The President said that he agrees that a multilateral solution is desirable, but pointed out that de Gaulle is completely obstructionist about such a plan. He suggested that perhaps we ought to take up this plan with the small countries, such as Belgium, initially. General Norstad said he is convinced the Europeans would not want the bilateral form of solution. [15 lines of source text not declassified]

[4 lines of source text not declassified] With regard to a peace-time set-up, our problem is the requirement in the Atomic Energy Act amendments of 1954 that a nation to receive the information involved must itself have achieved “substantial progress” in atomic weapons production. [6-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

General Norstad said his proposal is that the United States should turn over an agreed number of such weapons to NATO. The title would pass to NATO, and there would be agreement that the weapons would not be removed from the NATO area. [8 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Bowie commented that the advantage of Polaris is that it is not necessary to put it on anyone’s soil, since it can be kept at sea. General Norstad said it is important to realize that we are not in fact utterly dependent on France. Even if these are land-based weapons, we can base them satisfactorily elsewhere. General Norstad said we should not look for any relief in our problems with de Gaulle. We will have more trouble with him. [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Bowie said he wanted to make it clear that in the first stage of his Polaris proposal, he thought the weapons should be assigned to NATO. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

General Norstad said there are two linked, but distinct, questions: first is the control of the nuclear weapons, and the second is the question of an MRBM. On this point the President asked how we are to get tactical nuclear weapons integrated into the forces in Europe. He noted that we will not have enough Polaris submarines for several years to form a force of the size we want for our own plans. As long as we have just a handful of these submarines, no American Government could or would turn them over to NATO. Mr. Bowie said it is not so necessary to turn them over to NATO now. If we lay out a program now, we will by this action meet the major political need. [8-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] The President went on to say that he thinks it is just not practicable, and cited experience with de Gaulle in World War II which shows that on matters of great importance a sovereign nation will exercise its sovereignty on a unilateral basis as de Gaulle did when he threatened to remove his forces from allied command in order to have them protect Strasbourg. He added that de Gaulle will not accept a multilateral

---

3 See footnote 4, Document 217.
solution in his opinion. General Norstad said he agreed that it was not at all sure that such a proposal would be accepted in Paris. He stated that he did not feel that General de Gaulle would go so far as to expel the command from French soil, however. There is plenty of evidence that other French leaders in the government do not go as far as de Gaulle does in these matters. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

The President said that what de Gaulle is really aiming at is for the United States and Britain to work with France, on policies affecting Africa, those in Latin America, etc. In addition, if the rest of NATO makes a statement in opposition, de Gaulle thinks the views of the US, UK and France should override. He added that de Gaulle has expounded this theory at great length, asserting that if the leading western nations do not take this action, we will all be lost. General Norstad said he thought these assertions had been effectively answered in the President's last letter to de Gaulle. General Norstad added that, in his opinion, to concede to de Gaulle what he is seeking would destroy NATO. On this matter Mr. Bowie suggested that we ought to take a rather radical position, telling our NATO partners that we dispose of ten times the power of any single one of them, that the United Kingdom and France are not our equals by any stretch of the imagination and that only a unified Europe would be an equal to us. He said it would be very bad for the French to put across the idea that they, we and the British are a special group. He added that he thought it all wrong to have the idea that the British have a special relationship with us, commenting that this is a notion the British continually try to promote. The President indicated some disagreement with this, stating that we have many special relationships with the British. He added that in all the time Macmillan has been in office since Suez, he has never said that they are equal to the United States in power and influence.

[5 lines of source text not declassified] The President noted that General de Gaulle puts the claim for a special status on two bases. The first is the special US-UK-French responsibility in Berlin. The second is that, except for Belgium (and this is doubtful), de Gaulle feels that only these three nations have substantial responsibilities outside of NATO. [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Mr. Bowie observed that de Gaulle, on the issues of nuclear weapons and tri-partitism, has taken hold of a valid, limited segment of the problem, but has turned it into a device for enhancing French prestige. He is entitled to more than has been done on these two matters, but he is not entitled to what he is asking on them. [15-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

---

4 Part 2, Document 197.
General Norstad said he would like to offer a specific recommendation. The first is for a study of the type and level of reaction we should be prepared to make in the event of an incident in Europe. He said that he is in full agreement that we must watch our conventional capability very carefully, and that we must have such a capability. Then he thought the Chiefs of Staff should study in detail how much nuclear strength we should have, and what our non-nuclear strength should be. [7-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

However, he thinks there should be a new missile, mobile on both land or sea, weighing about one-half as much as the Polaris, held as a command reserve in Europe and not assigned to any particular country. He commented that the United States has always been sensitive to any charge that it tends to throw its weight around in the NAC. He thought the time had now come when most of the Europeans would recommend having the United States exercise an influence in NATO more nearly equivalent to the actual power of the United States. In short, he thought we should take a tougher line.

Mr. Bowie thought that the question concerning the more mobile, light-weight missile should be related to the question of tactical nuclear weapons and the two decided together. He did not believe that this decision should be made in the framework of Mr. Gates' reference to the NAC on the MRBM. He thought we should explicitly back away from that proposal. Also, he thought we should not wait for the NATO ten-year planning to show what the need is. General Norstad agreed with this and took the position that we should decide now.

The President said the tough part of this is that his hands are tied by the Congress. He said he could solve this problem quickly if he were given a free hand, as he would be if he were a military commander. Without authority from the Congress, he had no basis on which to begin negotiations. He observed that he had no power to delegate the authority to use atomic weapons in event of attack to an allied officer, and doubted if he could ever get that from the Congress. He stressed his belief in NATO and the collective defense concept. He thought probably the only way Europe will ever really become secure is through the creation of a United States of Europe, but felt that NATO moves in this direction. He said he would be glad to send de Gaulle another suggestion on this matter, commenting that de Gaulle has been requesting a meeting of himself, the President and Macmillan.

With regard to the proposal to limit the tactical nuclear weapons in the hands of the forces of Europe, the President said it must be recognized that this process cannot be carried too far. Otherwise our forces

---

5 See footnote 6, Document 254.
would say they are being left without the most effective weapons for their self-defense. Mr. Bowie said that he feels the essential thing is to get the point across that there can be no thought of conducting a large-scale tactical nuclear war in Western Europe—that it will necessarily become an all-out contest.

The President then said that he has just over four months left in the Presidency. He observed that he has spent many years in the NATO business, and enjoys a certain standing and reputation—that his views receive a certain acceptance. He asked what it was thought he could do in the time he has left in office. Mr. Bowie said he thought the President could put forward a multilateral scheme, either along the lines he had suggested or along the lines General Norstad has suggested. He could throw his weight completely against any acceptance of the national approach. Separate national deterrents do not make political, economic or military sense.

[4 lines of source text not declassified] The President recalled that at the beginning of his administration he had told the Defense Department he would eliminate nuclear weapons from the arsenals of the world if he could. At that time the Defense Department people stormed that this would be dangerous and unacceptable. Now he thought they all agreed he was right, because there is no threat by conventional forces that approaches that of the nuclear weapons. He said Mr. Bowie's presentation leaves one big question—how the Western alliance is to meet the large requirements for conventional forces. Mr. Bowie and General Norstad commented that these requirements are not tremendously large, and that the Western alliance exceeds the Soviet Union and its European neighbors in manpower.

The President expressed his appreciation to General Norstad and Mr. Bowie for the discussion and for the thoughtful studies they each have made.

G.

Brigadier General, USA
268. Memorandum of Conversation

October 3, 1960, 11:45 a.m.–1:15 p.m.

SUBJECT
NATO MRBM Force

PARTICIPANTS
The President
General Goodpastor
Mr. Merchant, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Mr. Kohler, Asst Secy
Mr. Gates, Secy of Defense
Mr. Douglas, Deputy Secy
Mr. Irwin, Assistant Secy

By agreement with Mr. Merchant, Mr. Gates opened the presentation to the President of the proposals for the establishment of a NATO MRBM Force. He pointed out that it was basically a weapons modernization proposal. The project did not involve a revision of existing NATO strategic doctrine though this was also being considered apart from the proposal. A fundamental question was raised by the proposal with respect to the US contribution of five Polaris submarines, specifically, whether these should be new submarines beyond the existing procurement program or just considered as being on loan from the US program with some expectation of withdrawal.

The President commented that the proposal, as respects the US contribution, in a sense would not be fundamentally different than the existing situation as respects US contributions of troops to Europe and other national contributions. Basically the Polaris subs were mobile missile bases.

Mr. Merchant then presented the multinational features embodied in the plan and explained their purposes as being three-fold: first, to provide reassurance to our European allies who were beginning to have doubts, in the era of ICBM’s, as to the dependability from their point of view of a purely US controlled deterrent; second, to prevent the development of independent national nuclear capabilities; and, third, to provide a framework within which we might eventually consider the question of nuclear sharing. He pointed out that the plan would have two phases: first, the initial US contribution and, secondly, the NATO

Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, NATO. Secret.Drafted by Kohler. The meeting was held at the White House. Attached to the source text is a memorandum from Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Director of the Executive Secretariat, to Goodpastor, October 12, noting that Merchant had approved the memorandum and requesting his approval prior to distribution. A note in Goodpastor’s handwriting on Stoessel’s memorandum reads: “28 Oct. 60: Told State OK. C.”
contribution, presumably by the procurement of US Polaris missiles. Mr. Merchant then presented to the President the coordinated paper developed by State and Defense.\footnote{Entitled “NATO MRBM’s”; attached to another memorandum of this conversation, prepared by Goodpaster on October 13. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)}

The President read the proposal through. He commented that it was difficult to see how SACEUR was so interested in targeting so far back from the front lines. Mr. Gates said that basically General Norstad was seeking replacement for his existing air strike force. Norstad needed a missile with a range of 300-1500 miles and had established a requirement for 300 such missiles by 1965 with an initial increment of 80 in 1963. He noted that Polaris is really not suitable for mobile land-based launchers but is the only MRBM available in the time-frame. Mr. Irwin pointed out that on the Soviet side their short range missiles could take out the bases now used by the strike aircraft.

The President then referred to his conversation with Mr. Robert Bowie.\footnote{See Document 267.} He had listened for a long time to Mr. Bowie and had been thinking a great deal about the problem. He agreed with the proposal, and with Mr. Gates’ remarks about Polaris being too big really to be an acceptable mobile land-based missile. He really believed that if Polaris and ICBM missiles were properly coordinated no change would be required in NATO. There ensued some discussion about targeting, and about the attitudes and apprehensions of the European members of NATO. The President commented that the obligation for the US to act under the NATO provisions specifying that an attack on one was an attack on all was clear and that there was no doubt it would be observed by the US. However he recognized that there was a psychological benefit to more specifically reassuring arrangements. He realized and agreed that the five Polaris submarines should be separate from our own established program for Polaris procurement. Secretary Gates then cited the size of the present US program, with nineteen submarines now on order and plans that in fiscal year 1962 five more should be programmed plus five authorizations for lead items. The President said he had understood the whole program was contemplated for about 40 submarines and he thought we should go ahead now with authorizations for up to 40. Secretary Douglas said there was no agreement as yet among the services as between the figures of 25 and 45, with the relation of the Polaris program and other missiles such as the Pershing still to be decided. Secretary Gates stressed that the immediate problem was that of the financing in the FY 1962 budget which was now being developed. In this connection he said he feared there would be a lot of criticism from Congress
about turning over control of these submarines to NATO. The President agreed there might be some difficulties and cited the possibility that there would be some Congressional demand for a stipulation that SACEUR must continue to be an American.

After reflecting for a bit, the President said that he thought by and large the proposal was a good idea. It might help to bridge the differences with de Gaulle if properly handled. Perhaps it would also have a good effect on the Dutch whom the President had always favored as being, along with the British, our staunchest allies. Parenthetically he commented he was also beginning to think that we ought to give the Dutch landing rights on the West Coast for KLM as he would like to help the Dutch. Commenting on this remark, Mr. Merchant pointed out that the submarine in question for the Dutch was not a Polaris sub but one of the Nautilus type, the same in fact in which the French were also interested as well as the Italians. He added that in any event there would be danger in national ownership of Polaris submarines under this program. Mr. Irwin explained further that the contemplated European contribution to the program would not necessarily be in the form of missiles in Polaris submarines but that their contribution might well be placed on coastal vessels instead—a much cheaper method—or other seaborne craft. The five US Polaris submarines would provide a strong base of greater relative invulnerability. This led the President to ask how vulnerable surface vessels would be, to which Secretary Gates replied that they would be vulnerable to air and submarine attack but because of their mobility not to missile attack. He explained further that the European missiles could be placed on coastal ships for a cost of approximately $225 million as against a cost of about $750 million in Polaris submarines.

The President then repeated that he favored the theory of the proposal. He favored the establishment of a multilateral force. He felt it would help pull NATO together and raise the morale of the NATO members. He foresaw that there would be considerable difficulties involving the question of the joint Atomic Energy Committee and the question of financing. In this latter connection he said he assumed that the European missiles would be bought from the United States and, after Secretary Gates had confirmed this, commented that this would please the Treasury in connection with the balance of payments problem.

At this point Secretary Gates pointed out that the most immediate problems were the need to be able to talk about the proposal with Spaak,
who had already arrived here, and to make decisions in the near future as to the FY 1962 Defense budget.

Mr. Merchant then brought up the specific issue disagreed between Defense and State as respects the proposed requirement of mixed manning, summarizing the opposing positions. The President commented that he thought SACEUR would have to establish a multinational school in this connection to train the crews and commented this would be quite a problem. Mr. Merchant replied that the State Department did not think it would be too difficult. He explained that our concept would not be of multinational crews each representing all countries of NATO but rather of selected mixing of crews. The President said this would raise the problem of leadership and discipline. At present this had to be done by the separate laws and regulations by sovereign governments. At sea the captain must really be in charge and have the loyalty and obedience of the crew. He thought we might need a treaty between the member governments if we wanted to establish a NATO discipline.

Secretary Gates then set forth the Defense views, expressing strong opposition to the requirement for multinational manning. This was a very complicated and intricate problem involving questions of national psychology, religious differences and the like. Of course it would be possible to have a few riders of various nationalities on the submarines. On the whole, the Pentagon thought that NATO command and control was sufficient to establish the multilateral nature of the operation, though he said it was true that even the US Polaris subs were overloaded by about 20% for training purposes and that this might be possible with other nationalities.

The President wondered whether if the law were amended to permit the assignment of these submarines to SACEUR it might not in practice be necessary that each submarine have a national crew, so that while they operated under common command one unit, for example, would be Dutch, another German, etc.

Mr. Merchant again repeated that the State Department view did not foresee that each ship be a complete cross section of NATO but

---

3 In a briefing memorandum to the President dated October 2, prepared in connection with Eisenhower's breakfast meeting with Spaak on October 4 (see Document 269), Herter noted that "we invited Spaak to come to Washington for a general discussion of the state of the Alliance." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series)

4 As stated in paragraph 4a of the State-Defense paper on NATO MRBM's (see footnote 1 above), the Department of State preferred the following language: "that the force be developed on the basis of multilateral ownership and control, and with a feasible system of mixed manning designed to guard against the possibility of the force being broken down or diverted into national forces." The Department of Defense preferred the following version: "that the force be developed on the basis of multilateral financing and control, and with mixed manning to the extent considered operationally feasible by SACEUR." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)
rather the selected mixing of relatively compatible nationalities in each crew. In any event he said we should not foreclose the possibility of such mixed manning.

The President turned to the question of ownership. He said that he understood that the title of the five initial submarines would stay vested in the United States. Mr. Gates confirmed this understanding.

Mr. Merchant then returned to the subject of manning and said that the State Department was willing to accept the formulation of Defense to the effect that this manning should be mixed to the extent considered feasible by SACEUR.

The President then repeated that he was in favor of the plan. He commented that we must get it understood in the Congress that we must have faith and confidence between allies if we wished our alliance to work. He said that he would like to see the necessary studies go ahead to implement the project. He referred to his meeting with Spaak the next morning (i.e., breakfast on October 4) but thought he would not discuss this MRBM proposal at this stage. Both Mr. Gates and Mr. Merchant cited the conversations Spaak had already had with Norstad on this general subject and the importance of being able to say something to him during his current visit. The President then agreed that the MRBM proposal could be discussed on a confidential basis with Spaak.

Secretaries Gates and Douglas then turned to the question of the Defense budgetary problems connected with the project and considerable discussion then ensued between them and the President as to whether all five submarines should be added to the FY 1962 budget or whether authorization should simply be sought, whether the procurement was funded in full and related matters. General Goodpaster pointed out in this connection that while authority for the full funding of the Polaris programs had been sought in the past, expenditure actually was stretched out. Summarizing this phase of the discussion the President said that we should go to Congress and show what the full plan involves. It was not sufficient to talk only in terms of the initial US contribution but we must disclose the eventual program including the NATO multilateral concept. We must be completely honest on the subject. He thought we should seek authorizing legislation probably as a separate package.

Mr. Merchant then returned to the matter of State—Defense differences and read the revised formula relating to multilateral ownership,

---

5 One of Norstad’s conversations with Spaak on MRBMs is summarized in telegram 1024 from Paris, September 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 375/9-1060) Parts of this conversation were repeated by Norstad in Document 267. No other record of Norstad’s conversations with Spaak on MRBMs has been found.
financing, control and manning.\textsuperscript{6} Indicating his assent, the President commented that we must explain what is involved in the question of ownership including the matter of who gets the ships at the end of the treaty period. Mr. Merchant agreed that this question should be spelled out clearly. Some inconclusive discussion then ensued as respects the difference between the concepts embodied in the word ownership and those embodied in the word financing. In this connection Mr. Merchant emphasized that multilateral ownership was essential to the concept of a really integrated NATO force as distinct from national ownership.

In conclusion the President directed that the planning should go ahead in connection with the project on an urgent basis. It was important that the case be got ready for the Congress and presented. In the second stage at least he felt we were bound to have to have an amendment of the law. As to financing, he suggested that Defense could perhaps budget for two additional Polaris submarines in FY 1962.

Following the meeting Messrs. Gates, Irwin, Goodpaster, Merchant and Kohler met in General Goodpaster's office to iron out remaining differences in the wording of the paper. (See Mr. Merchant's letter to Mr. Irwin for final text.)\textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{6} The revised version of paragraph 4a agreed to by the Departments of State and Defense, which is attached to a letter from Merchant to Irwin, October 3, reads: "that the force be developed on the basis of multilateral ownership, financing and control, and with mixed manning to the extent considered operationally feasible by SACEUR." (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5611/10-560)

\textsuperscript{7} The revised version of the paper on NATO MRBM's is attached to the letter from Merchant to Irwin, October 3.

\section*{269. Memorandum of Conversation}

October 4, 1960, 8-9:15 a.m.

\textbf{SUBJECT}

NATO Atomic Force

\textbf{PARTICIPANTS}

The President

Paul Henri Spaak, Secretary General of NATO

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Kohler and approved in M on October 7, U on October 8, and the White House on October 12.
Mr. Dillon, Acting Secretary
Mr. Merchant, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Mr. Kohler, Assistant Secretary
Mr. Burgess, Ambassador, USRO
Mr. Glenn, Interpreter

After some general discussion during the breakfast, which touched upon NATO affairs and the current Communist harassment of West Berlin, Mr. Dillon raised the subject of the proposed NATO MRBM Force by reporting on the discussion of the subject which he had had with Mr. Spaak yesterday afternoon.¹

The President said he had been mulling this question over at length. It was clear that the establishment of such a NATO force on the basis of national contributions in ships, men, and matériel would not be satisfactory. In fact, he thought the best way would be through the establishment of a kind of a “Foreign Legion” under exclusive NATO control and financed by contributions of the member states. This was the only manner to do away with nationalism and to prevent the possibility of the withdrawal by any nation of its own units. Only a force loyal exclusively to NATO would be safe from such a danger. Of course, certain difficulties existed before a full integration could be obtained, due among other things to the lengthy training necessary.

Ambassador Burgess added that the question of languages would also present a difficulty but that this did not appear insurmountable.

Mr. Spaak agreed that if a proposal to create a NATO nuclear strike force were made, it could well take the form of the creation of a foreign legion type force. Difficulties might be expected, however, on the side of General de Gaulle. It was extremely important to arrive at the result desired and a means should be found to persuade General de Gaulle to participate in the project. If this could not be done, the big question would arise as to whether or not to proceed without France.

The President said that proceeding without France might well lead, step by step, to a withdrawal of France from the alliance.

Mr. Spaak reiterated that a procedure should be found to obtain French participation. Such participation seemed possible, because France would find herself completely alone if she did not participate in the proposal. One might wonder if the best way might not be a letter from the President to General de Gaulle. At the same time Chancellor

¹ A memorandum of Dillon’s October 3 conversation with Spaak on MRBMs and defense aspects of NATO long-range planning summarized their discussion on a new U.S. proposal on a NATO MRBM force. (Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199) A copy of the U.S. proposal, which contains the same text as the one cited in footnotes 6 and 7, Document 268, is attached to the Spaak–Dillon memorandum of conversation.
Adenauer might be approached and asked to help convince General de Gaulle. The present moment might be opportune, because General de Gaulle had aroused great alarm by his hints that the United States could withdraw from Europe. A proposal to create an integrated nuclear strike force, made at this moment, would reassure the European partners of NATO and receive practically unanimous support. It is certain that Chancellor Adenauer would be happy to cooperate since such an integrated force would solve the problem of Germany and nuclear weapons.

The President agreed that such an approach should be made. However, it would also be necessary to consult the five Congressional committees which would be involved.²

The President explained at this point that this was necessary because Congress had reserved for itself, as far back as 1947, certain prerogatives which should belong in the executive branch. While the President thinks that this is not constitutional, the position has not really been challenged because of concern about appropriations. Congressional concurrence in the idea would therefore be necessary.

Mr. Dillon suggested that Congressional leaders should be contacted before any approach is made abroad. Otherwise there is a danger of leaks and rumors reaching Congress creating misunderstandings and opposition due to an inadequate presentation of the question. The President agreed with this point of view.

Mr. Merchant reverted to the President’s remark that France might withdraw from NATO. While he agreed that France might not accept the MRBM proposal, at least initially, he doubted that de Gaulle would actually withdraw from the Alliance. He cited, in this connection, the modest progress made recently as respects French cooperation in the fields of air defense and atomic stockpile arrangements in Germany³ and the awkwardness of the French position if they isolated themselves completely from their Western European neighbors.

Mr. Spaak then mentioned that another difficulty existed. If the United States turned nuclear weapons over to NATO, who would have the authority to decide on their use?

² Reference presumably is to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
³ In a memorandum to Merchant, September 12, Kohler wrote: “Norstad has just met with Debré and worked out a means for proceeding to settlement of this long-standing issue [of air defense] and permitting NAC approval of the principle of integrated air defense.” (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/9–1260) The NAC approved establishment of an integrated air defense system on September 28. No full record of this NAC meeting has been found, but NAC approval of a statement by the NATO press spokesman on the matter was transmitted in Polto 437 from Paris, September 28. (Ibid., 375/9–2860)
[1 paragraph (9 lines of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Spaak said that there were two types of circumstances under which NATO might want to use its atomic strike forces.

[1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified]

The President said that at the present moment the two opponents are providing their forces with such a variety of atomic weapons that any conflict in Europe which would not involve their use is hardly conceivable, the more so in that European countries are rather small in size and therefore any penetration into their territories would be sufficiently serious to mean an all-out war. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Thus there seems to be no possibility whatsoever of any non-atomic conflict in Europe, though the possibility of a more limited type of conflict could be considered in Middle East countries, such as Greece, Turkey, or Iran.

Ambassador Burgess noted that Iran is not within NATO even though connections between NATO and CENTO do exist. He thought also that the Soviet Union understands that an attack on Turkey would be as serious an undertaking as an attack in Europe.

The President noted that in any case a non-nuclear war in Europe is so improbable as to make the question of who is to decide the use of nuclear weapons somewhat academic. At the present moment the Supreme Commander in Europe is an American and a decision, therefore, could be made under the present law. Mr. Spaak indicated general agreement regarding the improbability of large scale non-nuclear war in Europe.

Ambassador Burgess commented that even now SACEUR is organized somewhat along the lines of a foreign legion because of the presence on the staff of officers of many nationalities. It is entirely possible that the need for decision might arise at a time when the Supreme Commander would be unable to act, in which event the responsibility would fall on his deputy, a non-American.

Discussing the possibility that Congress might seek to stipulate that the post of Supreme Allied Commander be reserved to an American as a condition for providing nuclear weapons, the President said such a condition could not be justified and should not be contemplated.

Mr. Spaak insisted on the enormous political and psychological importance of the proposal under discussion, which would signify closer and more binding ties between the United States and Europe than ever before.

The President spoke of his desire that a start be made promptly, commenting on the many problems which would have to be solved and the difficulties which would have to be surmounted. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
Mr. Spaak said that the chances of convincing the French appear to be enhanced by the fact that General de Gaulle's plan to create a French nuclear strike force is meeting considerable opposition in the French parliament. A proposal such as the one under discussion would undoubtedly receive strong support from the French public opinion and increase the opposition in France against an independent nuclear force and thus pressure on de Gaulle.

[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Spaak raised the question of the attitude of the standing group and suggested that the American representative in the group be instructed to support the Polaris system without too many mentions of competing weapons.

The President mentioned that Polaris was unquestionably the choice for a submarine based weapon, but that cheaper and equally powerful weapons such as the Pershing were preferable for land use, the difference residing in the complexity of the guidance system needed for a weapon fired from a mobile launcher away from all landmarks, as against a launcher with known coordinates.

[8 paragraphs (19 lines of source text) not declassified]
270. Memorandum of Conversation

SecDel MC/105       New York, October 4, 1960, 6 p.m.

SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE FIFTEENTH SESSION OF
THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York, October 3–7, 1960

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.                NATO

The Secretary     Paul-Henri Spaak, Secretary
Ambassador W. Randolph Burgess,    General of NATO
U.S. Permanent Representative to
NATO
B.E.L. Timmons, Advisor, USDel,
UNGA

Andre Saint-Mleux, Special
Assistant to the Secretary
General

SUBJECT

NATO Problems: UN Matters

Mr. Spaak opened the conversation by saying he had had very good
conversations in Washington in the last two days. He had found that the
U.S. Government was preparing important projects for the strengthening
of NATO. They must be tried, in spite of the fact that some difficulties
will arise. Spaak suggested that before the military proposals were
laid before the North Atlantic Council by the U.S., the President should
write to General de Gaulle, Prime Minister Macmillan and Chancellor
Adenauer, explaining the proposals. In addition, the U.S. should pri-
vately approach Adenauer and seek his agreement to support the pro-
posals with de Gaulle.

[1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Spaak said the French position
was becoming more and more difficult. Most other NATO coun-
tries would be favorable to the U.S. ideas, but there would be steps, the
first of which would be the sea-based Polaris. The Secretary remarked
that by beginning in this way, some difficult problems could be avoided.
Spaak said that France’s problem would be eased, as in that stage there
would be no missiles on French soil.

Ambassador Burgess said that last Saturday the French had in-
formed Spaak of the status of negotiations on the atomic stockpile for
French forces in Germany.¹ The Secretary said that when the training

¹ In his October 3 conversation with Dillon (see footnote 1, Document 269), Spaak
indicated that he had only just heard from Couve de Murville about the U.S.–French
NATO stockpile agreement.
agreement was publicly tabled before the Congress, there would undoubtedly be further Soviet attacks on the “arming of Germany”. Spaak said it was important to emphasize that it is the Alliance—not Germany—that is being armed. Germany is an integral part of the Alliance. The Secretary agreed and said that while some in the U.S. Government had favored bilateral agreements, the predominant feeling on the U.S. side had been that such agreements would be a divisive rather than a unifying force. Spaak said he agreed fully.

Spaak commented that the manning of the Polaris squadrons would require specially-trained people, and that he could envision that in time, “as a logical consequence”, this could lead to the creation of a true NATO integrated force.

Ambassador Burgess said Spaak has made an important contribution by his emphasis on the step-by-step approach.

The Secretary inquired regarding the discussions in Washington on other aspects of the proposed NATO Ten-Year plan. Ambassador Burgess said that the Department had given to the Secretary-General an outline piece of paper. Spaak has certain suggestions and the next order of business is to fill in the outline. The Secretary said the question of timing was of great importance. Spaak agreed, saying that preliminary discussion in NAC had not been possible until some U.S. ideas had been made known. These ideas were now taking form. Spaak said he envisaged agreement “en principe” on the military proposals at the December NATO ministerial meeting, and preparatory discussion on other aspects, with decisions thereon at the Spring meeting.

On the political aspects of NATO, Spaak said he thought that the report and recommendations of the Three Wise Men should be reaffirmed, and the process of political consultation continued and developed. Spaak said there had been very good examples of consultation, and also some “not so good”. As an example of the latter he cited the German statement last week on trade with East Germany. Spaak said the Scandinavians, Belgians and Dutch were not enthusiastic. Insufficient time had been allowed for real consultation.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

---

2 The memorandum of Dillon’s October 3 conversation with Spaak indicates that Dillon gave Spaak “a very preliminary paper, containing some of our current thoughts on the non-military aspects of long-range planning.” A copy of this paper, as transmitted in circular airgram 3258 to the NATO capitals, October 7 (Department of State, Central Files, 375/10-760), is attached to this memorandum.

3 See footnote 4, Document 139.

4 In this statement, September 30, the Federal Republic of Germany denounced the interzonal trade agreement with East Germany.
271. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany

October 5, 1960, 3:57 p.m.

628. Deliver following message to Chancellor at earliest opportunity before Debré visit. In delivering message, you should make point that this is of course personal communication between President and Chancellor and that the President knows that Chancellor will treat it accordingly in his talks with the French. FYI. We wish avoid having Chancellor inform Debré that he has received special letter from President on subjects of visit. End FYI.

Begin text.

Dear Mr. Chancellor: General Norstad and Ambassador Dowling have reported to me on their recent conversations with you. I understand from them that you expect to have a full discussion this week with Debré and Couve de Murville on General de Gaulle's views on nuclear matters as well as on NATO and on European integration. I thought it might be useful for you to have some of my thoughts on these matters before your meeting with the French.

On nuclear matters, I have been much impressed with the strong feeling of various European leaders, including yourself and M. Spaak, that the European countries should have an increased role in the nuclear aspect of NATO's defenses. We are considering, under my personal direction, the possibility of a multilateral, NATO-wide means for dealing with the problem.

On NATO matters generally, I want to say first that I have been most impressed by the strong statements you have recently made in support of NATO. As for your meeting with the French, you are of course aware that there is a very wide divergence between myself and General de Gaulle on several basic points. I have pointed out these differences directly to General de Gaulle, and our representative in NATO has made them clear to the Council. In brief, I feel strongly the impor-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/10-560. Secret; Niact; Verbatim Text; Presidential Handling. Drafted by Fessenden; concurred in by White, Hillenbrand, McBride, and U; and transmitted to the President on October 4 for approval. (Memorandum for the President, October 4; ibid.) Repeated priority to Paris for Thurston.

1 French Foreign Minister Debré visited Germany October 7-8.

2 Regarding Norstad's conversation with Adenauer, see footnote 1, Document 267. Dowling talked with the Chancellor on September 30. During the discussion, Adenauer had said: "De Gaulle has deceived me. For two years he talked like a good European and now see what he proposes." (Telegram 491 from Bonn, October 1; Department of State, Central Files, 762A.00/10-160)
tance of integration in the light of modern military technology and strategy. The U.S. has assigned its own forces to NATO on the assumption that they would participate in an integrated defense system for the area. There would be little justification for their continued presence if there were no integrated system.

Although it is clear that my views on how NATO’s defenses are to be organized differ from those of de Gaulle, I should add that we have, on the other hand, recently made limited progress with the French on certain specific NATO defense problems. They have agreed to the concept of integrated air defense in Europe, although insisting on special arrangements for most of French territory. The French have also recently signed a NATO Atomic Stockpile agreement with us for their NATO-committed forces in Germany. It is noteworthy that the French have accepted in this agreement the same provisions for U.S. custody and SACEUR control as appear in our agreement with you and with other countries.

I am heartened by the feeling that your views and mine are very close on these NATO defense matters, and I was most interested to learn from Ambassador Dowling that you intend to speak very forthrightly to Debré and Couve on these questions.

With respect to the political functions of NATO, I have serious reservations about a proposal that suggests the U.S., the U.K. and France as a mechanism for preserving order in other areas of the world, because of the danger that any such structure might take on overtones of a “directorate”. If that should come about, important interests of other NATO countries would be ignored and opposition in other areas of the world would surely occur.

Similarly dangerous to NATO, in my view, would be any Six Nation bloc within NATO, in which separate national states, not moving toward the goal of European unity, acted on political and military matters properly dealt with in NATO.

As a constructive step for improving the political cohesion of the West, I feel that NATO consultation, covering all areas of the world, should be further developed and strengthened. The U.S. has itself sought to make maximum use of the NATO Council for this purpose, and we certainly intend to continue this effort in view of the obvious need to achieve the maximum harmonization of Free World policies in the light of the world-wide Communist threat. It appears to us that the study of means for improving the Alliance is a subject best considered in the discussions of long-range planning in NATO. We ourselves expect to contribute some ideas, and it might be useful to suggest to the French that they also make use of this forum.
Finally, I would like to comment on General de Gaulle’s views on the future development of the Six Country movement. I know that in this field also your views and mine have long been very close indeed. We both regard the Six Country integration movement as of very basic importance to the future of our world. A Europe moving toward real unity will strengthen and reinforce the NATO Alliance as a whole. I think we would both be prepared to support any steps designed to further progress toward the concept of true integration embodied in the Rome treaties. Quite frankly, however, I am not aware of the exact nature of de Gaulle’s proposals in this field. If his proposals clearly will contribute to achieving the goals of integration, then I believe they are deserving of the support of other members of the Six. If, on the other hand, they would be likely to weaken the integration concept, a serious question would arise. While the U.S. has a deep interest, it is not of course directly involved in the discussions of de Gaulle’s proposals; this is primarily a matter which the other Five must work out with France. You yourself obviously are in a most influential position in respect to these developments. Perhaps if you and others of the Six were to put up to de Gaulle specific proposals which will unmistakably contribute to further progress toward genuine integration, de Gaulle’s intentions in this field might well become clearer.

I mean for this letter to confine itself to those matters that may have a direct bearing on your talk with Debré and Couve de Murville. There are, of course, many other subjects, especially affecting Berlin, which are much on my mind these days.

With warm personal regard, Sincerely, Dwight D. Eisenhower. End text.

Observe Presidential Handling.

Dillon

---

3 See Document 120.

---

272. Telegram 569 From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State

Bonn, October 17, 1960, 10 p.m.

[Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret; Priority; Presidential Handling. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]
273. Memorandum of Discussion at the 467th Meeting of the National Security Council

Augusta, Georgia, November 17, 1960.¹

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

2. NATO in the 1960’s (NIE 20–60; SNIE 20–2–60; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Issues of U.S. Policy Regarding the Defense Posture of NATO”, dated November 10, 1959; NSC Actions Nos. 2149, 2204–c, 2274, 2292 and 2323; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Increased Nuclear Sharing With Allies,” dated August 23, 1960; NSC 6017; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “NATO in the 1960’s”, dated November 16, 1960; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Special NSC Meeting”, dated November 16, 1960)²

Mr. Gray briefly explained the background of the report on the subject which was being considered by the Council and asked Secretary Herter if he would like to summarize it.³ Secretary Herter suggested instead that the Council deal with the urgent issues since the paper as a whole would have to be reviewed further before being put to the President for final approval.

¹The source text incorrectly indicates Atlanta as the place of the meeting. In November 21 memorandum to Wilborn B. Persons, Assistant to the President, however, Gordon Gray noted that this NSC meeting took place in Augusta. (Ibid., Staff Secretary Records, Gordon Gray III)

²NIE 20–60, “Problems Affecting the North Atlantic Alliance,” November 1, and SNIE 20–2–60, “NATO Country Reactions to Certain Forms of US Nuclear Assistance,” October 11, are in Department of State, INR–NIE Files. The November 10 memorandum has not been found. Regarding NSC Action No. 2149, see footnote 6, Document 228. Regarding NSC Action Nos. 2204 and 2292, see footnotes 1 and 8, Document 265. Regarding NSC Action No. 2274, see footnote 7, Document 261. NSC Action No. 2323, October 20 (approved by the President on October 26), noted that a report on future nuclear capabilities in the NATO area would be incorporated in a comprehensive report on U.S. policy toward NATO which was being prepared by the Departments of State and Defense and the AEC for consideration by the NSC. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) Regarding the August 23 memorandum, see footnote 1, Document 265. NSC 6017, “NATO in the 1960s,” November 8, was intended to serve as a basis for long-range U.S. planning and guidance for U.S. participation in the preparation of the proposed 10-year plan for NATO. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC 6017) The November 16 memorandum on “NATO in the 1960s” transmitted to the NSC a draft record of action as a basis for discussion at the November 17 meeting. (Ibid., Records of Action by the National Security Council) The other November 16 memorandum is ibid., NSC 6017.

³Reference is to NSC 6017.
Mr. Gray then asked whether there was agreement on the proposal that the U.S. commit itself to maintain available for NATO those nuclear weapons required for approved NATO military plans. After a brief explanation of this proposal by Secretary Herter, no disagreement was expressed to this proposal.

Mr. Gray then turned to the proposal for a NATO MRBM program. He said that there had been a “Convair caucus” of State, Defense, and AEC on the way down and he thought only two splits remained to be resolved.

Secretary Herter said that he thought everybody had the same objective in this matter. He, however, hesitated to put the plan forward as a firm proposal at the NATO meeting on December 15 because he felt that to make it effective, it would require (1) Congressional approval and (2) approval of the incoming administration. He thought it doubtful that you could get clearances on this matter in time. If such clearances could be gotten, he would be delighted but if we are to make specific proposals, these clearances should be obtained during the next two weeks so that our allies could have in the neighborhood of two weeks before the NATO meeting to consider it. The issue was really a question of presentation; namely, how do we answer the question as to whether the U.S. Government will feel the same way six weeks after the NATO meeting. Obviously, we will have to say that U.S. approval would be subject to Congressional action.

Secretary Gates said that, speaking philosophically, he felt that this administration had an obligation and an opportunity to wind up with a firm proposal on this subject with whatever caveats are necessary. Obviously, we cannot deliver because of the need for a change in the law. Besides, there are two separate phases anyway. He thought this was a very imaginative idea and he was afraid that, if we put this only in for discussion at NATO, we will not be clearing up our proper business. The next President may reverse anything we do, but we should present this proposal as the best opinion of the people who have been working in this field all these years.

The President commented that we almost always have to say to our allies that we will have to get legal authority for our proposals. He saw no reason why we should not say that, under certain assumptions, these are the things we think ought to be done.

Secretary Herter noted that the paper under Council consideration says that Congressional action would be required. This could go hand in

---

4 This paper was a revision of the October 3 paper agreed to by the Departments of State and Defense; see footnotes 6 and 7, Document 268.
hand with Executive action and he believed it provided enough of a caveat.

The President said that this administration should not hesitate to say what we think is good for NATO. After all, the next administration may not even agree to the general concept of NATO. Secretary Herter commented that it would not hurt his feelings if the President said we should make this a firm proposal.

Mr. Stans said that there was some ambiguity as to what is intended since the paper glosses over the question of financing. He noted that we are proposing to deploy five Polaris submarines by 1963 and not to withdraw them without North Atlantic Council agreement. Secretary Gates pointed out that our commitment not to withdraw was effective only if NATO agreed to the second phase.

Mr. Stans said that the five Polaris submarines would probably cost about $500 million and then we were proposing 100 additional missiles. Secretary Gates noted that the latter missiles were to be bought by the NATO countries. Mr. Stans said that the paper still did not indicate what was meant by “multilateral financing” in Paragraph 3-a. The President noted that this would still have to be worked out.

Mr. Stans said that he, nevertheless, thought that the cost to us and others ought to be indicated. Secretary Gates said that this was impossible except on the five U.S. Polaris submarines because we do not know the configuration of the remainder and do not know whether they will be land or sea based.

In answer to Mr. Stans’ question as to whether the five Polaris submarines were within the approved Polaris program, Secretary Gates said that he had asked the President this question and did not yet have a definite answer. Secretary Gates thought that we would be producing Polaris submarines at the rate of about five per year for the next few years. He thought we could handle the NATO submarines by lending them as they are ready and then arranging to pay back the U.S. program. We might contribute one at a time and replace it in the budget as we go along. Technically, he admitted that this meant the five submarines were additional to the present program. The President said he agreed with the proposal for the five Polaris submarines being deployed to NATO.

---

5 Paragraph 3-a of the November 16 paper on NATO MRBMs contained separate proposals in brackets by the Departments of State and Defense. State cited the language of the revised version of paragraph 4-a of the October 3 paper on NATO MRBMs, which is quoted in footnote 6, Document 268. Defense preferred the following language: “that the force be developed on the basis of multilateral control. The concept of multilateral ownership and financing of the force should be the subject of examination and negotiation. Mixed-manning should be adopted to the extent considered operationally feasible by SACEUR.”
In answer to Mr. Stans' question as to whether we were agreeing not to withdraw them, Secretary Gates said that there would be no conditions on that deployment (it would be the same as the Sixth Fleet) until NATO goes along with the second phase. Secretary Gates thought that if we could get a NATO MRBM force, we would probably want to be tied up in it.

Secretary Herter said that the basic problem was a fear of NATO that if the Soviets attacks Europe only, we would not join with them. This proposal would give NATO its own deterrent strength.

In answer to Mr. Stans' question as to whether this constituted a precedent, the President commented that there was no precedent in the first phase. He added, however, that he thought it would be a good deal if we could get the second phase force in being down the road. Mr. McConne said that he thought we would have to make a commitment to NATO regarding tactical missiles.

The President said that he had recently been listening to the views of Robert Bowie and others and he thought that we must have the right to sell nuclear weapons to our allies if we feel they needed them. The President asked Secretary Gates as to what the proportion of expense would be in the MRBM program over the years.

Secretary Gates said that we were not committing ourselves in principle until NATO agreed to a 100 missile force and made it subject to NATO control. Only then would we put our five submarines under NATO control. Meanwhile, we have no commitment affecting the freedom of our sovereignty until NATO agrees to the second phase. Mr. Gates admitted that he thinks there is a real question as to whether Congress will ever agree to NATO control as proposed in the second phase because it involves a constitutional issue.

The President said that before we start dealing with the tough French negotiators, we should know what proportion of the cost we will have to bear. Secretary Gates said that at present we were only planning to bear the cost of our own five submarines which will run about $750 million, including the missiles.

[4–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Irwin said that, because there is still a political problem of deploying nuclear weapons on the continent, one solution would be to have them sea based. By 1963 there would only be the Polaris missiles available and the five U.S. submarines would meet General Norstad's [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] requirement by that time. At the same time, we were asking Europe to build 100 missiles, which together with our [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would meet General Norstad's 1964 requirement. The cost of the additional 100 missiles would depend on the type deployed. If they are submarines, they would cost about $100 million.
each. It might be possible, however, to put the missiles on coastal steamers which might then make the cost for the 100 missiles about $300–$400 million.

Mr. McConne asked why there was still a political problem regarding land based nuclear weapons and pointed to the agreed deployment of Redstone missiles on the continent. The President noted that all of these were deployed in Germany and that they had a much more limited range than Polaris. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Secretary Gates said that while General Norstad is not responsible for making political judgments, General Norstad feels that the missiles should be both sea and land based. Mr. Irwin said that General Norstad was thinking that after his [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] missile requirement had been met, there might then be a further requirement for third generation missiles, possibly like the Pershing, a new Polaris, or an entirely new type of missile. Mr. Irwin said that the research and development people estimate that such a third generation missile could be developed by 1964.

Mr. Stans noted that Paragraph 6 of the proposal says that NATO should parallel the MRBM advances with strengthening of other forces.\(^6\) He felt that there was no request for a concession to reduce NATO requirements in any other respect if the MRBM proposal was agreed.

Mr. Irwin said that Defense did think it might be possible to reduce aircraft requirements. He pointed out, however, that NATO has no defense against missiles. If NATO knows that there is no such defense, the European members’ support of NATO will deteriorate if we take the position that they can have no missiles with a 1000–1500 mile range. We would then be saying that they have no defense and no offense and we do not think it necessary for them to have either. Mr. Irwin thought this position would fracture the alliance.

The President said that as he sees it, until there is some basic change in the world situation, there is no escape from the arms race. What we ought to be talking about are the millions that we spend at home which cut into our budget as we strain for an adequate defense. We seem to be licked [locked?] on the need not only for butter and eggs but also champagne while we continue to spend heavily for world defense.

Mr. Stans noted that as we do this, we and others are also being urged to build up our conventional forces. Secretary Gates said that he

\(^6\) Paragraph 6 of the November 16 paper on NATO MRBMs, reads: “The U.S. believes that NATO should undertake to parallel these advances with additional vigorous measures to strengthen its other forces which are equally essential for deterrence in accordance with NATO military plans. It is of great importance for NATO to maintain a flexibility of response. Progress in the MRBM system should not be permitted at the sacrifice of progress in building NATO’s other forces.”
disagreed with any concept that conventional forces were needed for a limited war in Europe. Mr. Stans thought that if the MRBM proposal led to a reconsideration of conventional forces, we might achieve a better balance. He thought the U.S. had still made no judgment as to the effect of the planned Russian demobilization on our requirements. He thought that the Russian demobilization would certainly change their mobilization potential. Secretary Gates thought that there was no real change in the threat to NATO. Mr. Dulles said that the Russian demobilization seemed to be slowing down. Mr. Stans said that if they, nevertheless, go through with it, they will be changing to a nuclear threat to NATO. He still felt we should study the implications of the proposed Russian demobilization.

The President remarked that at yesterday’s press conference, he had been asked if the reduction in dependents overseas indicated that the U.S. was planning any redeployment of forces. He had reminded them that our deployment to Europe was originally considered an interim emergency matter. He thought it was high time that we should say to the Europeans that with their 225 million people, they should do more so that we could bring some of our troops out. The only flaw is the fact that De Gaulle is keeping 600 thousand French troops in Algeria. The President noted that Foster Dulles was always against any reduction in our forces in Europe because he thought it would break up the alliance. That is why the President had been obliged to remind the press conference yesterday that our deployment was originally an emergency measure.

Mr. McConnel thought one way to solve that problem might be to give the Europeans their own nuclear deterrent. After all, they were only spending one-third to one-half of what we are spending on our military forces.

The President stated that he had no objection whatever to the proposed MRBM program. He thought it should be put forward but he thought we should put it in the context that we are going to cut down on some other things.

Secretary Herter said that the Europeans already suspect that we are going to cut down our forces in Europe. The President noted that State and Defense have always said that if we cut our European forces at all, it will result in the neutralization of Europe. Secretary Gates noted

---

7 On January 14, Khrushchev announced that Soviet Armed Forces would be reduced from 3,623,000 to 2,423,000 during the next 2 years and that missiles and submarines would be emphasized.

8 For text of Eisenhower’s remarks at his news conference in Augusta on November 16, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61, pp. 864–865.
that we have recently been putting the pressure on the Europeans to live up to MC-70 and we have been pretty successful in getting them to build up their forces. He agreed with the President, however, that we should not be locked in concrete on our European forces forever. Secretary Herter admitted that he could not visualize a war in Europe which would not lead to the use of nuclear weapons.

Secretary Gates noted that the cost of maintaining U.S. forces at their present level was so high that it left only about $5 billion in the Defense budget for modernization. He thought that there were still too many people in the military services and too many deployed overseas. The President thought that we should figure out a plan which was reasonable over the long term. At the time this was going on, we should also try to cut other expenses in Europe. Secretary Herter expressed the hope that we would not cut our forces while the Berlin threat remained.

The President commented that if Europe was going neutral, we had better find it out now. He said that he did not mean for us to deny our responsibilities because we had established our defense line in Europe but we should not have to do it all. He noted that the Europeans had built up their industry to the point where they can compete very successfully with us.

Mr. Patterson asked whether the MRBM proposal would not put the pressure on the Europeans to put up more forces and Secretary Gates agreed. The President said that this sounded like the theory of giving a spoiled child ten more dollars to do what he should. Secretary Gates pointed out that we would not give up our control of our submarines until NATO agreed to build theirs. In answer to Mr. Stans’ question, Secretary Gates repeated that we would keep U.S. control of those Polaris submarines until the second phase had been agreed upon. Mr. Stans said he thought it was wishful thinking to believe that NATO would also build up its conventional forces.

The President said that he wanted to leave a legacy of the finest ideas and plans this administration could develop. He thought that we must think what is the proper balance during the next six weeks. We should develop programs and plans that we think are feasible and that Congress would not feel it had to cut down.

Mr. Gray asked Mr. McCone if he wished to press the AEC proposal regarding Paragraph 2 of the MRBM paper, that the U.S. should decide under what conditions it would be willing to release the Polaris submarines for NATO use. Mr. McCone said that while he wanted that

---

9 John S. Patterson, Acting Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.

10 Paragraph 2 of the November 16 paper on NATO MRBMs contained a bracketed clause and explanatory footnote, in which the AEC proposed that prior to making an offer, formal or informal, of five Polaris submarines as an interim NATO MRBM force, the United States should decide the conditions under which it would be willing to release for use.
AEC view noted, he was enthusiastic about the MRBM program. He thought that making the use of the submarines subject to North Atlantic Council agreed procedures left the question of conditions open. Mr. Gray pointed out that the bracketed phrase in Paragraph 2 was now to be deleted and Mr. McConé said that this made the proposal O.K. from his viewpoint.

Mr. Gray then asked whether the President felt that representatives of the next administration should be informed before the MRBM proposal is made to NATO. The President thought that we should make clear to NATO that this is what we are suggesting but that the next administration may change it.

Mr. Scribner pointed out that Paragraph 6 says that the U.S. as well as other NATO nations should strengthen its conventional forces. The President said that the first sentence of Paragraph 6 should say that "the U.S. believes that other NATO nations" should strengthen conventional forces.

Mr. Gray then called on Mr. McConé to explain his view about the inadequacy of existing NATO stockpile arrangements. Mr. McConé said that he had recently examined bases in NATO and, realizing our heavy dependence on nuclear weapons, he believed that the procedures do not permit a proper response due to the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act.11 He thought this problem should be re-examined urgently, recognizing that any changes will require amendment of the law.

The President said that his idea was that we must get every single modification in the law that will allow a quick response but not delegate it to someone who would inadvertently start a war. He thought we should get the change in the law and then provide regulations which will prevent unfortunate accidents.

11 According to a memorandum of McConé's conversation with the President on November 8, prepared by Colonel Eisenhower, McConé visited the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and on his way back stopped at NATO (presumably in Paris), a base in the Netherlands, and the Thor and B-47 installations in the United Kingdom. The memorandum also summarized their discussion on the need for further amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)
Secretary Herter noted that the Joint Atomic Energy Committee was going over to Europe and that this trip might prove helpful. He thought, however, that it would be desirable if Mr. McConie could join the Committee on the trip. Mr. McConie indicated that he might be able to do so for a few days.

Mr. Gray suggested that the Record show that Defense and JCS and the Chairman, AEC, should re-examine NATO stockpile arrangements in order to see what changes in the law might be required to give assurance of prompt and proper response. The President agreed and thought we should leave a legacy of thought about all such restrictive laws which we think are very bad. He cited the requirement of notifying the Joint Committee on certain decisions 60 days before they could be put into effect. The President thought possibly Mr. Kennedy could get some of these changed during the "honeymoon" period with Congress.

[13 paragraphs (2 pages of source text) not declassified]

Secretary Herter asked if the MRBM proposal could be worked out and made available to NATO about ten days in advance of the December 15 meeting. The President agreed. General Lemnitzer reported that the Joint Chiefs were in full agreement on the MRBM proposal, nothing that the U.S. in the first phase keeps control of the submarines. General Lemnitzer said the Joint Chiefs feel very strongly that the proposal should be put forward to NATO as a firm proposal.

Mr. Gray then referred to the proposed nuclear submarine cooperation with the Netherlands, France, and Italy. Mr. Gates thought this was agreeable if the other nations were willing to buy and pay for the submarines. He did not think that we should provide any grant aid in connection with it. From his point of view, Mr. Gates said this is just a new propulsion system for any anti-submarine submarines. Mr. McConie said that the AEC objects because it will involve the disclosure of sensitive information.

Secretary Herter read the statement by Secretary of State Dulles in 1957 which offered such nuclear assistance to NATO nations while the President was in attendance.

---

12 Regarding U.S. negotiations with France on nuclear submarines, see Part 2, Documents 71 ff. Documentation on U.S. negotiations with the Netherlands and Italy on nuclear submarines is in Department of State, Central File 740.5611.

13 Reference presumably is to Dulles’ statement to the meeting of Heads of Government of NATO countries in Paris on December 16, 1957, in which he said that the United States planned to seek the necessary legislation to enable the United States “to cooperate with interested members of NATO in the development, production, and fueling of nuclear propulsion and power plants for submarines and other military purposes.” (Department of State Bulletin, January 6, 1958, p. 11)
Mr. Stans said the only question he had was regarding the type of submarines. He noted that the Skipjack was the only type mentioned in the offer. The 100 MRBM plan would need submarines and therefore he wondered why it should not be kept open as to whether the type of submarine should be Skipjack or Polaris. Secretary Gates said that this was really a different subject because the other nations wanted a modern propulsion system for their anti-submarine submarines.

Mr. McConé thought that the important restricted data involved should be retained by the U.S. as long as we can. Also this proposal involves a certification by the AEC that it would assist the mutual defense and security. He thought the AEC believes that the money required could be better spent elsewhere.

The President understood that the Netherlands had withdrawn their request for a nuclear submarine. However, he could not go along at all with Mr. McConé’s view. He thought that this made second class countries of our allies. He did not think we could say to them that we did not trust them with this information when we know that the Russians have nuclear submarines. He did not see any reason for holding back on this proposal if the other nations will pay for the submarines. The President said he thought we were still trying to keep secrets under the same laws as when we thought we had an exclusive nuclear capability.

Mr. McConé said that he only wished the AEC’s view to be reflected here but that if the nuclear submarine plan was part of an overall program involving many matters of vital interest, this might override the AEC view on the nuclear submarine proposal. In any case, Mr. McConé noted that the decision was up to the President.

The President said that he had been over this question for two years and he saw no reason why we should not go ahead with it. The only reason we had delayed in the case of France was because of their change in control of the Mediterranean fleet. The President said, however, that no grant aid should be involved. Secretary Gates thought that we should move forward on this slowly.

Mr. Gray questioned whether the Record should show that there would be no grant aid for the submarines or whether the entire program was dependent on the country receiving no grant aid from the U.S.

Secretary Gates said that he was in a minority with Secretary Anderson in opposing grant aid for these countries. He noted that France was not now getting any grant aid. Mr. Smith reported that the Netherlands was now receiving grant aid at the rate of about $75 million a year.

Mr. McConé noted that if we were to give these countries the propulsion system to be used on the nuclear ship Savannah, no classified data would be involved. The President reiterated his approval of the nu-
clear submarine plan provided the recipient nations were not receiving any significant grant aid from the U.S.

As the President was leaving the meeting, Mr. Gray recommended to him and the President approved that the remainder of the State—Defense report (NSC 6017) be referred to the Planning Board for further study and recommendation.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed certain issues contained in a report on the subject (NSC 6017), prepared by the Departments of State and Defense, in response to the reference NSC Actions calling for reports on (a) The Future of NATO; (b) The Roles and Contributions of the United States and Other NATO Nations; (c) Future NATO Nuclear Capabilities and the Problem of Nuclear Sharing; on the basis of a presentation by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs of certain policy issues (identified by the reference memoranda of November 16, 1960) connected with U.S. planning and guidance required for U.S. participation in the forthcoming North Atlantic Council meetings, as indicated below.

b. Noted the President's approval of the presentation at the forthcoming North Atlantic Council meeting of the following firm U.S. proposals, subject to the caveat regarding necessary U.S. Congressional action:

(1) The United States will make a commitment to keep in the European NATO area (including Turkey), under U.S. custody, such U.S. nuclear weapons as are furnished for the accomplishment of approved NATO military plans.

(2) The NATO MRBM proposal (contained in the enclosure to the reference memorandum on the subject, "Special NSC Meeting", dated November 16, 1960), subject to the following amendments:

(a) Paragraph 2, page 1: Delete the bracketed phrase and the footnotes thereto.

---

14 Paragraphs a–f and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2334, approved by the President on December 17. (Department of State, S/S—NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) Changes in the text that led to the President's approval were in NSC Action No. 2336; see footnote 10, Document 274. Additional changes were made at the December 8 NSC meeting, resulting in NSC Action No. 2340. (Department of State, S/S—NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

15 See NSC Action No. 2336–c for a further agreement on the procedure to be used at the forthcoming NSC meeting. [Footnote in the source text. For NSC Action No. 2336, see footnote 10, Document 274.]
(b) Paragraph 3, page 1: In the third line insert the words “buy and” between “therefore” and “contribute”.\(^\text{16}\)

(c) Paragraph 3-a, page 2: Delete the Defense version; include the State version, deleting the brackets and the footnote thereto; and add a new footnote reading as follows:

"As indicated above, the multilateral financing of the 100 additional MRBMs will be exclusive of U.S. participation."\(^\text{17}\)

(d) Paragraph 3-c, page 2: Delete the footnote thereto.\(^\text{18}\)

(e) Paragraph 4, page 3: Revise the third and fourth lines to read as follows:

"would be prepared to facilitate NATO procurement by sale of Polaris missiles and of the required equipment".\(^\text{19}\)

(f) Paragraph 6, page 3: Revise the first line to read as follows:

"6. The United States emphasizes that other NATO nations should undertake."

In the third line, substitute "their" for "its".\(^\text{20}\)

c. Noted the President’s directive that the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, arrange for a re-examination of present NATO stockpile procedures in order to indicate what legislative changes might be required to give assurance of a prompt and proper response within the short reaction times of missile warfare.

[1 paragraph (9 lines of source text) not declassified]

e. Noted that the President approved the proposal for nuclear submarine cooperation contained in paragraph 90 of NSC 6017, subject to the understanding that any U.S. assistance in the form of submarines or components must be purchased by the recipient government and will be

---

\(^{16}\) The first sentence of paragraph 3 reads: "The U.S. would expect that other NATO governments will want to join in the creation of a NATO MRBM Force and that they would therefore contribute approximately 100 additional MRBMs in order to meet SACEUR’s MRBM requirements through 1964."

\(^{17}\) Regarding paragraph 3-a, see footnote 5 above. The footnote to the Department of State proposal reads: "This is the language which was in the paper approved in principle by the President on October 3 at meeting with Secretary Gates and Under Secretary Merchant, and which was subsequently made known to M. Spak."

\(^{18}\) The footnote to paragraph 3-c, which called for a plan to safeguard the security of the classified design data for the weapons and delivery system, reads: "AEC believes U.S. should decide in advance of the offer whether it would approve multinational custody and access to design."

\(^{19}\) The first sentence of paragraph 4 reads: "If a plan as indicated under paragraph 3 above is developed which is acceptable to the NAC, the U.S. would be prepared to facilitate NATO procurement of Polaris missiles together with the required equipment and vehicles for deployment."

\(^{20}\) Regarding paragraph 6, see footnote 6 above.
made available only if the recipient government is not receiving significant grant aid from the United States.\textsuperscript{21}

f. Referred the subject report (NSC 6017) and related memoranda to the NSC Planning Board for further study and comment on policy issues not covered by the above actions, with particular reference to consideration of studies looking toward a long-term plan to reduce U.S. force deployments and expenditures in Europe.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for appropriate implementation.

The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, JCS, and the Chairman, AEC, for appropriate implementation.

The actions in d and e above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, AEC.

James S. Lay, Jr.

\textsuperscript{21} Paragraph 90 of NSC 6017 reads as follows:

"Nuclear Submarine Cooperation. Present policy authorizing negotiation of nuclear submarine cooperation agreements with NATO allies under certain conditions is satisfactory, and no additional requirements in terms of policy guidance or legislative authorization are foreseen. With respect to the implementation of existing policy, the Executive Branch should initiate action of a more liberal basis toward the Netherlands, France, and Italy in the field of submarine nuclear propulsion for Skipjack-type submarines. An unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States does not appear to be involved if appropriate bilateral agreements, including adequate provision for safeguarding classified information and material, are entered into. Specifically, the United States should:

a. Inform the Netherlands, France and Italy that we would be prepared to open negotiations on the same basis as the present cooperation agreement with the United Kingdom and on the understanding that any submarines built under such cooperation agreements will be committed to NATO for the duration of the Treaty. However, in each case the United States should also suggest that the allied government may wish to reconsider its interest in nuclear submarine cooperation in view of the possibility that the meeting of MRBM and other NATO force goals may represent conflicting requirements in terms of resource allocation.

[b paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified]

"c. Seek the United Kingdom's agreement to commit to NATO any nuclear-powered submarines built by it as a result of U.S. assistance."
274. Memorandum of Discussion at the 468th Meeting of the National Security Council

December 1, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

2. NATO in the 1960's (NSC 6017; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Special NSC Meeting", dated November 16, 1960; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, "NATO MRBM Force", dated November 29, 1960)¹

Mr. Gray called attention to the draft Record of Action of the 467th NSC meeting held in Augusta on November 17.² That draft Record of Action contained a paragraph which stated that "the U.S. will make a commitment to maintain those nuclear weapons required for approved NATO military plans, deployed under U.S. custody in accordance with agreed NATO plans." The President had tentatively approved this paragraph but Defense had requested reconsideration and had suggested the following language as a substitute: "The U.S. will make a commitment to keep in the European NATO area, under U.S. custody, its contributions of nuclear weapons to meet the requirements for the accomplishment of approved NATO military plans."

Mr. Irwin said the Department of Defense did not disagree with the substance of the tentatively approved paragraph but both Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that some "tightening up" of the language would be desirable. The Defense proposal differed from the tentatively approved paragraph in four respects. In the first place, Defense proposed to use the word "keep" instead of the word "maintain". The President said he had no objection to this change. Continuing, Mr. Irwin said that in the second place, Defense proposed to use the phrase "in the European NATO area" in order that the language would be more specific as to the geographical region covered. The President asked whether the five Polaris submarines which the U.S. would commit to SACEUR

¹ Regarding NSC 6017 and the November 16 memorandum, see footnote 2, Document 273. The November 29 memorandum transmitted the paper on NATO MRBMs, as amended at the November 17 NSC meeting, for further NSC consideration. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC 6017) The memorandum of discussion at the November 17 NSC meeting is printed as Document 273.

² Attached to a memorandum of meeting with the President on November 25, prepared by Gray on November 28. (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Meetings with the President)
might not be stationed in international waters. He had not favored the Defense language when it had been shown to him earlier because he had thought it could be interpreted to mean that the U.S. contribution of nuclear weapons would necessarily be stationed within the NATO countries. Mr. Irwin said that the word "European" might be deleted from the Defense proposal. Mr. Gray asked whether the Defense proposal did not refer to weapons other than Polaris submarines. Mr. Irwin said the Defense paragraph referred to the whole nuclear weapons stockpile. The President said that the paragraph could, therefore, include Polaris submarines. Mr. Irwin agreed.

Mr. McConne felt that the paragraph should contain a provision that we could withdraw nuclear weapons from the NATO stockpile. He was becoming alarmed at the projected size of the NATO stockpile. Secretary Dillon said we were committed to keep in the NATO area only those nuclear weapons required for the accomplishment of approved NATO plans. The President wondered whether we should not say that the U.S. would "keep at any time the nuclear weapons to meet the requirements."

[2 paragraphs (43 lines of source text) not declassified]

Continuing his exposition of the differences between the Defense proposal and the tentatively approved paragraph, Mr. Irwin said that, in the fourth place, Defense wished to use the expression "to meet the requirements for the accomplishment of approved NATO military plans" instead of the term "required for approved NATO military plans". The President said it seemed to him that Mr. Irwin's fourth point described a distinction without a difference. Mr. Irwin said that the language in the tentatively approved paragraph, "deployed in accordance with agreed NATO plans", could be interpreted to mean a more specific deployment than was suggested by the Defense change.

The President said he was still disturbed by the expression "NATO area". He did not know how the NATO area would be defined. Mr. Irwin explained that the tentatively approved version of the paragraph did not mention the area at all. Defense thought it was desirable to specify the area in which the U.S. would be committed to keep nuclear weapons. The President suggested that the paragraph might say that we would keep weapons promptly ready for NATO use. He wondered whether that was not the meaning we were trying to express. [13 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (21 lines of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Gray then referred to the draft statement of policy on the NATO MRBM Force which had been revised at the Augusta Council meeting on November 17. After the Augusta meeting Mr. Stans had made a suggestion for a revision of the second sentence of Paragraph 2
of the paper and this suggestion had been tentatively approved by the President. Other agencies had requested reconsideration and under cover of a memorandum dated November 29 the NATO MRBM paper had been circulated to the Council with two versions of the second sentence of Paragraph 2 in parallel columns as follows, the left-hand version being taken from the original paper and the right-hand version being Mr. Stans' proposal.

"The U.S. would consider the five Polaris submarines as a contribution to the NATO MRBM Force, described in paragraph 3 below and, in the event of its establishment, would undertake not to withdraw them from NATO without NAC consent during the life of the Treaty."

"The United States would consider the five Polaris submarines as a contribution to the NATO MRBM Force, described in paragraph 3 below and, in the event of its establishment, and subject to the measures called for in paragraph 6 below, 'would undertake not only to commit them to SACEUR but to agree not to withdraw them from NATO without NAC consent during the life of the treaty.'"

Secretary Dillon called attention to an error in the right-hand version of the sentence which contained the phrase "would undertake not only to commit them to SACEUR". The sentence was intended to refer to our commitment of five Polaris submarines to the NATO MRBM force, a commitment which was not the same as the original commitment to SACEUR referred to in the first sentence of Paragraph 2 of the NATO MRBM paper. The words he had just quoted were confusing because they seemed to be talking about the first phase of the commitment. Mr. Dillon then turned to the expression in the right-hand version, "subject to the measures called for in Paragraph 6". He said this was a difficult question which brought up the problem of how the U.S. proposal on NATO MRBMs would be presented in Paris. Secretary Dillon had no objection to Mr. Stans' suggestion that our contribution of five Polaris submarines to the NATO MRBM Force should be linked to the measures called for in Paragraph 6 as a statement of our own understanding of our objective. However, he felt very strongly that if the U.S. proposal were presented to the NATO countries with our commitment of Polaris sub-

---

4 See footnote 6, Document 273.
5 This sentence, as amended at the November 17 meeting, reads: "As a modification of the proposal made by the United States on April 1, 1960, the United States offers to commit to SACEUR as an Interim NATO MRBM Force, five Polaris submarines which will be operational prior to the end of calendar year 1963."
marines to the NATO MRBM Force linked to the measures in Paragraph 6, the proposal would be unacceptable because we would be asking our NATO allies to provide 100 MRBMs unconditionally while we were willing only to commit ourselves on condition that we were unilaterally satisfied as to the additional measures which these countries would carry out, measures which were not spelled out. Secretary Dillon reported that in Europe last week he had presented the substance of the NATO MRBM proposal orally to Adenauer, Couve de Murville, and Lord Home as well as to Senators Johnson and Fulbright. He discovered there were divergent views as to the substance of the proposal in the three capitals but there was agreement on principle. The Germans had welcomed our proposal as it stood; the French had also welcomed it although not unreservedly. Some of the French officials with whom the proposal was discussed felt that it would provide De Gaulle with an escape from his commitment to develop French national nuclear capabilities. The French had indicated, however, that if we table all the details of this proposal for a multilateral force, they would have difficulty in accepting it. The U.K. had been opposed to the idea contained in the NATO MRBM paper [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. The U.K. hopes that our NATO MRBM proposal will not be presented in any detail. If we should present a detailed scheme, the U.K. would have to mention its reservations. Ambassador Burgess and General Norstad agree that it would be undesirable to present a detailed proposal. Secretary Dillon therefore felt that the concept of a multilateral MRBM Force should be put forward as a concept but that the text of the NATO MRBM paper should not be distributed to the other governments concerned. Chairman Holifield of the Congressional Joint Committee concurred. Secretary Dillon said the Department of State therefore believed that Ambassador Burgess and Secretary Herter should present (1) our stockpile proposal, (2) our specific offer of five Polaris submarines to be used under present NATO procedure for the use of national forces made available to NATO and (3) the hope that other NATO governments would wish to consider a NATO MRBM Force involving 100 additional medium-range ballistic missiles. In connection with the third point, the U.S. would indicate that it would be prepared to consider a

---

6 Memoranda of Dillon’s conversations with Adenauer (US/MC/1), with Couve de Murville (US/MC/12), and with Senators J. William Fulbright and Lyndon B. Johnson (US/MC/22) are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D559, CF 1781. Secretary of the Treasury Anderson accompanied Dillon on this trip and participated in the meetings. Dillon’s briefing of British Foreign Secretary Lord Home was summarized in telegram 2353 from London, November 26. (Ibid., Central Files, 740.5611/11-2660)

7 Congressman Chet Holifield, Vice Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and other Congressmen met with Department officials on November 25. (Memorandum of conversation; Ibid., 740.5611/11-2560)
permanent MRBM Force if NATO could see its way clear to the establishment of such a force. We would further state that we realize the establishment of a permanent force would raise a large number of technical military and political problems as well as problems of ownership which would require discussion. Secretary Dillon said this procedure which he had just outlined would be a substitute for the tabling of a detailed paper which would imply that we have a blueprint ready. He felt it was important to discuss this matter with NATO on an equal basis rather than to confront NATO with a complete scheme. He had talked the matter over with Secretary Gates who had agreed with his idea of presenting the NATO MRBM Force as a concept rather than as a detailed plan.

The President inquired whether Mr. Dillon was indicating that our policy paper on the subject should say what our objective is and should then indicate what our tactical approach to NATO should be in view of the doubts of our NATO allies. Secretary Dillon said that Mr. Stans' suggestion for revision of the second sentence of Paragraph 2 of the NATO MRBM paper was acceptable as a statement of U.S. policy but was not acceptable as a statement of the way we should approach NATO. Mr. Stans said he had no objection to eliminating from his proposal the expression "not only to commit them to SACEUR." He thought the problem of words in the NATO MRBM paper was becoming more important all the time. He had assumed that as we completed the five Polaris submarines and deployed them, there would be concurrent action by NATO to buy 100 MRBMs and also to strengthen MC-70 forces. There was also a question as to whether we were deploying the five Polaris submarines to NATO permanently. The President said the proposal involved two phases. In the first phase we had complete control of the Polaris submarines; in the second phase, we transferred them to NATO.

Mr. Irwin said that with respect to Mr. Stans' desire to make the contribution of five Polaris submarines to the NATO MRBM Force subject to the measures in Paragraph 6 (i.e. additional vigorous measures by the other NATO nations to strengthen their other forces), the Department of Defense had serious problems, not only in connection with the presentation of the NATO MRBM proposal but also in connection with the secret statement of U.S. policy. The NATO MRBM Force was intended to solve some of the political and military problems of NATO, including the problem of multiplicity of nuclear weapons. If we inserted in the proposal a condition which indicates that NATO must proceed to acquire 100 MRBMs, after which we will decide subjectively whether other NATO nations have accomplished enough improvement in MC-70 forces, we would be ensuring defeat of the proposal before it is presented to NATO. Even if the condition suggested by Mr. Stans is
included only in our own policy statement and is not revealed to NATO, the condition three or four years from now will arise to haunt us.

Secretary Dillon suggested that we should tell the other NATO countries that the NATO MRBM Force could not be established at the expense of improvement in MC-70 forces. He agreed with Mr. Irwin that in the presentation of the NATO MRBM proposal, we could not give the other NATO countries the impression that our willingness to commit Polaris submarines to the NATO MRBM Force is subject to our unilateral interpretation as to improvement in MC-70 forces.

Mr. Stans believed that the President’s recent decision to reduce U.S. troop deployments abroad renders it especially necessary to make the MRBM Force contingent on MC-70 improvements. The President remarked that the MRBM paper referred to “the life of the treaty”. He pointed out that if the treaty were denounced, the present discussion would be very academic. We should assume good faith on the part of our allies or we will not have allies. At the same time we must make clear to our allies what we expect of them.

Mr. Irwin said that Defense was satisfied with the NATO MRBM paper. He had been with Secretary Dillon when the latter had presented the NATO MRBM proposal in Europe. He himself had talked with Defense Minister Strauss and to the Defense Ministry in London. Secretary Dillon had presented the proposal during his recent trip to Europe in the manner in which Defense would like to see it presented to the North Atlantic Council. Secretary Dillon spoke to the paper but did not provide a copy of it to the governments with which he discussed it. Mr. Irwin felt there should be both a presentation and a paper. If substantial changes were made in the MRBM paper, Mr. Irwin felt sure the Secretary of Defense would like an opportunity to consider them. Mr. Stans suggested that after the Council meeting those principally concerned might be able to devise some words which would meet the difficulties which had arisen. Secretary Dillon reiterated that he wanted to avoid making a flat, detailed proposal to the NATO countries. The President said he would like to strengthen NATO through the things we do at home in order that we might redeploy some of our U.S. divisions from Europe. He regarded the maintenance of 5-1/2-6 U.S. divisions in Europe as unproductive.

Mr. Gray suggested that the second sentence of Paragraph 2 of the NATO MRBM paper might contain the phrase “and assuming reasonable action under Paragraph 6” as the statement of the condition under

---

8 See footnote 8, Document 273.
9 No other record of Irwin’s talks with Strauss and the British Defense Ministry have been found.
which we would contribute Polaris submarines to the NATO MRBM Force. The President commented that he understood the anxiety expressed by Mr. Stans but he believed the left-hand version of the second sentence of Paragraph 2 of the paper was the most desirable version. Mr. Irwin said the point of Paragraph 6 of the paper was to provide the U.S. with an opportunity to encourage other NATO nations to strengthen their MC-70 forces. Mr. McConic felt that Paragraph 6 should not be made a condition precedent to the contribution of Polaris submarines to the NATO MRBM Force. Mr. Stans expressed anxiety lest the policy in Paragraph 6 not be conveyed to the other NATO countries if the NATO MRBM paper was to remain a U.S. statement of policy and was not to be tabled. Secretary Dillon said the substance of Paragraph 6 could be conveyed in an oral presentation on our proposal. The President suggested we might even put a footnote to Paragraph 2 referring to Paragraph 6 but he did not want to use the phrase “subject to the measures called for in Paragraph 6.” Mr. Gray suggested that in Paragraph 6 the expression “the U.S. should make clear” might be substituted for “believes.” As a counter-suggestion, Mr. Irwin proposed the substitution of “emphasis” for “believes” since the NATO MRBM paper might subsequently be tabled.

Mr. Gray said he had intended to bring up the question of whether the five Polaris submarines would be internationalized in the second phase but he believed this was now a detail and need not be considered.

*The National Security Council:*10

a. Discussed a revised paragraph 2–b–(1) of the draft Record of Actions of the 467th NSC Meeting, distributed at the meeting, and agreed that it should read as follows:

“(1) The United States will make a commitment to keep in the European NATO area (including Turkey), under U.S. custody, such U.S. nuclear weapons as are furnished for the accomplishment of approved NATO military plans.”

b. Discussed the paper on “NATO MRBM Force”, as amended at the NSC meeting on November 17, 1960, transmitted by the reference memorandum of November 29, 1960; and adopted it as a statement of U.S. policy subject to the following amendments:

(1) *Page 1, paragraph 2, second sentence:* Include the version in the left-hand column and delete the version in the right-hand column.

---

10 Paragraphs a–c and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2336, approved by the President on December 17. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) Minor remaining difficulties were resolved at the 469th NSC meeting on December 8, and the resulting NSC Action No. 2340 was approved by the President on December 17. (*Ibid.*)
(2) Page 3, paragraph 6, first line: Substitute the word "emphasizes" for the word "believes."

c. Agreed with the proposal by the Acting Secretary of State that the following procedure should be used at the NAC meeting:

(1) The United States should present as a firm proposal the commitment regarding nuclear weapons (as agreed upon in a above).

(2) The United States should present a concept for a NATO MRBM force and in that context offer to commit five Polaris submarines to NATO as an interim MRBM force. The remainder of the statement of policy on "NATO MRBMs" adopted by b above should link the interim force to the permanent force but generally be presented in terms which make it clear that the establishment of a permanent MRBM force will require study and consideration by NATO and that U.S. participation therein will require Congressional approval.

(3) In making the presentation, the United States should emphasize the great importance it attaches to parallel efforts by the European NATO nations to improve the defensive strength of the Alliance in the ways described in the statement of policy on NATO MRBMs.

Note: The above action, as approved by the President, subsequently reflected in the Record of Actions of the 467th NSC Meeting, and circulated to the National Security Council for appropriate implementation under the coordination of the Secretaries of State and Defense.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

Marion W. Boggs

275. Editorial Note

The Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, held in Paris December 16–18, was attended by all the Foreign Ministers and NATO Permanent Representatives of the 15 member countries. The U.S. Delegation was headed by Secretary of State Christian A. Herter and included Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson, Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr., and Permanent NATO Representative W. Randolph Burgess. For the list of the principal members of the delegation, including advisers from the Departments of State and Defense, see Department of State Bulletin, December 26, 1960, pages 978–979.

The most extensive body of documentation on this NATO Ministerial Meeting is maintained in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot
64 D 559, CF 1802-1813. CF 1802 contains a set of memoranda of conversation between U.S. and foreign officials. Copies of Tochah and Cahto telegrams are in CF 1803. CF 1804 contains copies of Tosec and Secto telegrams; copies of Topol and Polto telegrams are in CF 1805. Briefing books are in CF 1806-1808. Orders of the Day for December 14-19 are in CF 1809. Administrative papers are in CF 1810. Substantive miscellaneous papers, including verbatim records of the Ministerial sessions, are in CF 1811. No summary records of this Ministerial Meeting have been found. CF 1812 contains miscellaneous administrative papers. A chronological record of meetings for the December 12-19 period is in CF 1813. Telegrams and documentation on this Ministerial Meeting are *ibid.*, Central File 396.1-PA.

The Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council was preceded by ceremonies in Brussels, Belgium, December 13-15, surrounding the marriage of Belgian King Baudouin to Doña Fabiola de Mora y Aragon. Herter, who was President Eisenhower’s personal representative at these festivities, Mrs. Herter, and members of his party left Washington on Monday, December 12, at 7 p.m. and arrived in Brussels at 9:45 a.m. the following morning. For Secretary Herter’s departure statement in Washington and his arrival statement in Brussels, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 9, 1961, pages 40-41. Documentation on Herter’s visit to Brussels is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1799-1801.

Herter and members of his party left Brussels on Wednesday, December 14, and arrived in Paris at 11:35 a.m. At 10:45 a.m. the same morning, Livingston T. Merchant and other U.S. officials met with British and French officials. Memoranda of their conversations on procedural arrangements for the forthcoming Ministerial Meeting (US/MC/3) and East-West relations (US/MC/4) are *ibid.*, CF 1802. Following a working luncheon for the U.S. Delegation, of which no record of the discussion has been found, Merchant and other U.S. officials met with British and French officials at 3:30 p.m. Memoranda of their conversations on Africa (US/MC/2), Laos (US/MC/5), and the Caribbean (US/MC/6) are *ibid.*, CF 1802. At some point that afternoon, Herter met with Anderson, Burgess, Generals Lemnitzer and Norstad, and other U.S. officials to discuss the specific wording in the balance-of-payments portion of Herter’s speech to the Ministerial Meeting. Herter’s message to the President reporting their discussion and the changes in wording of his speech was transmitted in Cahto 1, December 13. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-1360)

At 9:30 a.m. on Thursday, December 15, the delegation held a meeting. Minutes of this meeting, which reviewed the planning for the NATO Ministerial Meeting on a number of topics, and list of participants are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1811. A memorandum
of Merchant’s conversation with Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar, British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, at 10:30 a.m. on the role of the Kennedy administration in nuclear arrangements with the United Kingdom (US/MC/25), is ibid., CF 1802. Merchant and other U.S. officials held tripartite talks with British and French officials at 10:45 a.m. Memoranda of their conversations on Africa (US/MC/7), trend of the United Nations (US/MC/8), and Laos (US/MC/9), are ibid., CF 1802. At 3 p.m., Herter met with Secretary of Defense Gates; no record of their conversation has been found. At 4 p.m., Robert H. McBride, Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, met with Henry Davis of the Canadian Delegation to discuss their positions on an Afro-Asian resolution in Algeria in the United Nations. (US/MC/1; ibid., CF 1802) At about the same time, McBride also met with Charles Lucet, Political Director in the French Foreign Ministry, and discussed the attitude of Spain toward the Algerian situation. (US/MC/13; ibid., CF 1802) A memorandum of conversation among McBride, Lucet, Randolph Kidder, Counselor of the Embassy in France, and Hervé Alphand, French Ambassador to the United States, at 4:30 p.m. on Algeria (US/MC/12), is ibid., CF 1802. Herter’s discussion at dinner with French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville on a French atomic bomb test in the Sahara which, Couve de Murville revealed, would probably take place between December 20 and 25 was transmitted in Cahto 3, December 16. (Ibid., Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–1660) Their discussion of a French nuclear reactor for Israel was transmitted in Cahto 4. (Ibid.) The memorandum of a tripartite conversation on the Congo (US/MC/20) is printed in volume XIV, pages 631–635. Memoranda of tripartite conversations on East-West relations (US/MC/21) and Latin America (US/MC/22) are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1802.

On Friday, December 16, the first session of the NATO Ministerial Meeting convened at 10:15 a.m. to discuss item I of the agenda, review of the international situation. (A copy of the agenda, C–A (60) 49, is ibid., CF 1806) Herter opened the morning session by reading a statement from President Eisenhower to the Council. (Secto 8 from Paris, December 16; ibid., Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–1660) For the text of Eisenhower’s statement, see Department of State Bulletin, January 9, 1961, page 39. Herter then initiated discussion on agenda item I with a statement of Soviet policy since the collapse of the summit in Paris in May and the situation in Laos and in Cuba and Latin America in general. In his presentation on specific countries and regions, he often referred to reports prepared by NATO experts by geographical areas. Copies of these reports are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1806. A topical outline of the Secretary’s statement was transmitted in Polto A–235, December 17. (Ibid., Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–1760) Several Foreign Ministers participated in the ensuing general discus-
sion, which the U.S. Delegation summarized in Polto 869, December 16. (Ibid., 396.1–PA/12–1660) During the discussion, German Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano reviewed the NAC’s strong support on Berlin, prompting the following comment in Polto 869: “Brentano clearly bidding for strong statement on Berlin in communiqué.” The Verbatim Record (C–VR (60) 49) of this session is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1811. At 1:15 p.m., Merchant met with Jules Leger, Canadian Permanent Representative to NATO, and discussed U.S.-Canadian relations. (US/MC/11; ibid., CF 1802)

At 3:15 p.m., the Ministerial Meeting reconvened to finish discussion of agenda item I and begin discussion of agenda item II, NATO long-range planning. The discussion on item I at the afternoon session was summarized in Polto 870, December 17. (Ibid., Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–1760) After representatives of all the NATO countries except Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Luxembourg had spoken on the subject, Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak summarized the discussion and offered pessimistic conclusions concerning the lack of Western solidarity and the need to adapt to the new Communist threat. Herter’s opening statement on long-range planning, in which he outlined U.S. proposals on NATO’s mid-range ballistic missiles, is printed as Document 276. The reactions of several Foreign Ministers to Herter’s presentation are summarized in Document 277. The Verbatim Record (C–VR (60) 50) of this session is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1811. At 4:20 p.m., McBride met with Mr. Sensi of the Italian Delegation to discuss the South Tyrol situation and other matters of mutual concern. (US/MC/14; ibid., CF 1802)

On Saturday, December 17 at 10 a.m., Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Segni paid a courtesy call on Secretary Herter; they discussed the U.S. MRBM proposal to NATO and other matters of mutual concern. (US/MC/15; ibid., CF 1802) At some point the same morning, John N. Irwin, II, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, met with Franz-Joseph Strauss, German Minister of Defense, on a proposed increased military assistance procurement program by Germany from the United States. The record of this meeting was transmitted in Polto 872, December 17. (Ibid., Central Files, 762A.5–MSP/12–1760)

The Ministerial Meeting convened at 10:15 a.m. to discuss item III, military questions. This session was summarized in Polto 873, December 18. (Ibid., 396.1–PA/12–1860) Following an intelligence briefing on Soviet military strength and economic and military tactics and the growing danger of Soviet penetration into Africa and the resulting outflanking of NATO, the meeting turned to brief discussion of MC–5/15, the Military Committee’s report entitled “The Military Progress of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” and the 1960 Annual Review.
MC-5/15 (Revised), which is identical to MC-5/15 except for the addition of a cover sheet, and the Report on the 1960 Annual Review (C-M (60)103) are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1807. Secretary Gates' statement on the 1960 Annual Review was transmitted in Polto G-909, December 18. (Ibid., Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-1860) Gates' speech emphasized that meeting NATO long-term force levels required "continued efforts to achieve balanced collective forces, standardization, and integration of command structure and in some cases of logistic systems." He also outlined U.S. research and development programs in outer space which were applicable to NATO security and military assistance programs, especially the U.S. decision to curtail and in some cases terminate grant assistance to NATO governments and the increasing need to use U.S. military assistance to support coordinated research, development, and production of the more complex and costly modern weapons in Europe.

German Defense Minister Strauss then surveyed his government's problems and progress on manpower, infrastructure, and matériel, strongly opposed the redeployment of U.S. forces back to the United States, urged allied support to counteract Communist propaganda, supported the U.S. MRBM proposal, questioned the overemphasis on conventional forces which, he believed, represented some departure from the MC-70 concept, and suggested studies on ways to improve military integration. Strauss' lengthy statement was summarized in Polto 877, December 18. (Ibid., 396.1-PA/12-1860)

Following further general discussion on meeting country force goals, the Ministerial Meeting approved a draft resolution on defense (C-M (60)104) which has not been found. The Foreign Ministers also discussed a paper on cooperation in research, development, and production (C-M (60)110), and approved paragraph 12, which was a report by the Armaments Committee on the subject. C-M(60)110 has not been found. The meeting then adopted in principle a 4-year ceiling of 250 million pounds for a new infrastructure program, which had been outlined in an International Staff paper, the text of which had been transmitted in Polto 865, December 15. (Ibid., 375.75/12-1560) An inconclusive discussion on cost-sharing relating to the infrastructure program was finally referred to a later session for decision. The Verbatim Record (C-VR (60)51) of this morning session is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1811.

At approximately noon, Merchant met with Portuguese Foreign Minister Marcelo D. Mathias. A memorandum of their conversation on the Portuguese reaction to a recent U.N. General Assembly vote on Portuguese territories (US/MC/10) is ibid., CF 1802. Secto 24, December 18, transmitted a summary of a luncheon discussion between U.S. and German officials on the possibility of an early technical agreement on Ger-
man vested assets in the United States. (Ibid., Central Files, 811.10/12–1860)

The afternoon session, which reconvened at 3:15 p.m., resumed discussion of agenda item II. This discussion was summarized in Polto 878, December 18. (Ibid., 396.1–PA/12–1860) Much of the discussion focused on the recommendations in Spaak’s progress report on long-range planning for consultation on problems arising outside the NATO area and in economic matters, such as oil and credits, aid to less-developed NATO member countries, and political aspects of the Soviet offensive in underdeveloped areas, and the relationship of NATO to the United Nations. A copy of Spaak’s Progress Report on Long-Range Planning (C–M (60)111) is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1806. The Verbatim Record, (C–VR (60)52) of this session is ibid., CF 1811. At 4 p.m., Martin J. Hillenbrand, Director of the Office of German Affairs, met with German Foreign Minister Brentano. A memorandum of their discussion of German and Berlin problems (US/MC/16) is ibid., CF 1802. A memorandum of Hillenbrand’s conversation with Wilhelm Grewe, German Ambassador to the United States, on Adenauer and Berlin problems (US/MC/17) at 5:30 p.m. is ibid., CF 1802. Secto 25 from Paris, December 18, transmitted a summary of Herter’s meeting with Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Wigny at dinner on the use of Belgian officers in the army of Moise Tshombé, President of Katanga. (Ibid., Central Files, 770G.00/12–1860)

The final session of the Ministerial Meeting, which convened at 10 a.m. on Sunday, December 18, to discuss agenda items V and VI, was summarized in Polto 879, December 18. (Ibid., 396.1–PA/12–1860) (There was apparently no discussion of agenda item IV.) The Council approved and referred to the Permanent Representatives a Turkish draft resolution regarding ways and means for providing economic aid to less developed NATO countries. The text of the Turkish resolution was transmitted in Polto 880, December 19. (Ibid., 396.1–PA/12–1960) Discussion on the communiqué followed. The Council agreed to defer decision on a NATO Heads of Government meeting in December 1961, retained the word “welcomed” but made other minor changes in the draft communiqué regarding the U.S. pledge on a nuclear stockpile, and omitted specific reference to five Polaris submarines in the U.S. offer on MRBMs. Because of Portuguese objections, no agreement was made on a cost-sharing formula for infrastructure, and the problem was referred to the NATO Permanent Representatives. For text of the communiqué, see Department of State Bulletin, January 9, 1961, pages 39–40. The Verbatim Record (C–VR (60)53) of this session is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1811.

Following this session, Counselor Theodore C. Achilles met with Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard Lange concerning the U.S. MRBM
proposal and Lange’s availability if a new NATO Secretary General were needed. Subsequently, they were joined by Robert Magill, Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, and Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to continue discussion on the U.S. MRBM proposal. (US/MC/18; ibid., CF 1802) At 1:45 p.m., Herter read a statement for television on the NATO Ministerial Meeting. The text of his statement was transmitted in Secto 23, December 18. (Ibid., Central Files, 110.11-HE/12-1860) At 5:05 p.m., Herter met with British Foreign Secretary Lord Home and Couve de Murville to discuss developments in Laos. (US/MC/24; ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1802) At 6 p.m., Herter left this meeting, and Merchant and other U.S. officials discussed the U.N. debate on Algeria with the British and French Foreign Ministers and their advisers. (US/MC/23; ibid.) At 6:15 p.m., Herter held a press backgrounder, a verbatim record of which is ibid., CF 1811. At 7:15 p.m., Herter met with C.L. Sulzberger, columnist for The New York Times, for a background interview. For Sulzberger’s recollections of this interview, see Last of the Giants, pages 714–715.

On Monday morning, December 19 at 10:12 a.m., the Secretary and his party left Paris for Washington where they arrived at 3 p.m. For text of Herter’s departure statement, December 19, see Department of State Bulletin, January 9, 1961, page 41.

276. Airgram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State


Polto A–234. From USDel. Following is text Secretary’s statement under Agenda Item II—“NATO Long-Range Planning”—presented at NATO Ministerial Meeting December 16, 1960:¹

When we met last December, the Council agreed that we undertake long-range planning to define our tasks for the decade ahead.² Since then, a good start has been made to implement this decision.

¹ Herter read this statement to the afternoon session of the Ministerial Meeting on December 16.
² For text of the communiqué issued on December 17, 1959, see Department of State Bulletin, January 4, 1960, p. 3.
Alliance long-range planning does not aim at developing tidy blueprints for future periods. Rather, it involves development of agreed long-range views to guide our year-to-year actions.

An essential step is to define the enduring purposes of the Atlantic Community.

As I see it, these purposes are twofold:

Creatively, to try to shape the basic forces of change toward a viable order, which will accommodate the basic aspirations of free men.

Defensively to prevent the Communist bloc from undermining this nascent order and substituting its own.

The creative task calls both for helping less developed countries, whose “nation building” needs are far more extensive, and for forming ever closer and more complex political and economic ties among the Atlantic nations.

The defensive task calls for an effective NATO defense in an era of mounting nuclear and missile capabilities on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

The Atlantic nations must find common answers to these needs or face the prospect of declining viability and a revival of inadequate and divisive national approaches to what are really common tasks. It is the purpose of long-range planning to provide a basis for agreed action to this end.

I would like first to develop for you the present views of my Government on the principal military aspects of long-range planning for the Alliance.

Our progress in meeting NATO defense requirements over the past decade has been substantial. The task has been not merely to offset Communist manpower and material. It has also involved the creation, for the first time in history, of a coalition of sovereign countries, whose political and military policies have been so harmonized as to constitute a real deterrent to Communist armed attack. Without such unity in the Atlantic Community, the politico-military position of a monolithic Communist system would have created an overwhelming superiority. That is why the Soviets persistently seek to weaken and divide the Alliance. That is why it is so important that we approach the military tasks of the sixties, as we have discharged those of the fifties, in a spirit of common effort and common purpose.

The U.S. welcomes and is prepared fully to participate in the study being undertaken by the Standing Group at the direction of the Military Committee with respect to long-range military planning. We will be particularly interested in the results of the initial studies of the Von
Karman Committee to provide the Standing Group with an estimate of scientific advances, through and beyond 1970, upon which such long-range military planning can be based. Such a truly long range forecast may prove most enlightening and useful. We must also cope of course with certain immediate tasks that have long range implications.

First, there is the need to maintain an effective NATO nuclear capability in the Alliance.

Second, there is the urgent and equally important need to meet other Shield requirements.

I shall take up the nuclear field first. There are three principal areas for consideration here, as General Norstad indicated in his speech to the NATO Parliamentarians.4

First, there is NATO's mid-range ballistic missile requirement.

My Government offers the following concept for consideration by the Alliance as a means of meeting this requirement. We suggest that the Alliance consider creation of a special kind of force to operate this weapons system. As we conceive it, such a force would be truly multilateral, with multilateral ownership, financing and control, and would include mixed manning to the extent considered operationally feasible by SACEUR.

A suitable formula to govern decision on use would have to be developed to maximize the effectiveness of this force as a deterrent and to establish its multilateral character.

Let me say a word about the reasoning underlying this concept, which seems to us a logical extension and development of the consideration which NATO has been giving to this whole ballistic missile question since 1957.

We believe that creation of additional national nuclear weapons capabilities would have a marked divisive effect on the Alliance. It would mean duplication of effort and diversion of resources and tend to stimulate competition within the Alliance in the nuclear weapons field.

We believe, therefore, that the multilateral concept offers the best means of providing a collective basis for the common defense in the MRBM field. Its fulfillment would have immense political significance for the cohesion of the Alliance. My Government believes that this concept offers a rational approach to the problem of the MRBM power of

---

3 Reference is to Dr. Theodore von Karman, chairman of the Advisory Group for Aeronautical Research and Development, NATO. The classified studies of his group on scientific advances are in the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Classified Documents.

4 In a speech to the annual conference of NATO Parliamentarians in Paris on November 21, General Norstad gave the outline of U.S. proposals for the establishment of NATO as the “fourth nuclear power.”
the Alliance and, if successfully fulfilled, might offer a precedent for further moves in this field.

We do not discount the many difficulties involved in creating such a force. The legal, technical, financial, and political problems would need to be carefully considered and jointly resolved by the Alliance. Participation by the United States in a multilateral force would of course require Congressional action, and we assume that parliamentary action would also be required in other NATO countries. But NATO has had successful experience with multilateral approaches, e.g., in our infrastructure programs and our NATO military headquarters. If the other members of NATO should wish to pursue this approach, we would be prepared to explore it with them and believe that the task would be well within the bounds of the possible.

As an initial step, and to meet SACEUR’s MRBM requirements for 1963, my Government offers to commit to NATO before the end of 1963—as an interim MRBM force—five Polaris submarines \( \text{[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]} \). During this interim phase, these submarines would operate in accordance with existing procedures. This step would not only greatly enhance NATO’s military capabilities; it would also reaffirm the continuing U.S. commitment to Europe’s defense by the fact that this newest component of U.S. nuclear striking power will be available as part of that defense. In taking this step, we would expect that other members of NATO would be prepared to contribute approximately 100 missiles to meet SACEUR’s MRBM requirements through 1964, under the multilateral concept which I have already indicated. The U.S. would be prepared to facilitate NATO procurement by sale of Polaris missiles and of the necessary equipment and vehicles for deployment in such a multilateral force. It would seem desirable that this force be deployed at sea. Our concept contemplates that the five U.S. Polaris submarines would be a contribution to the multilateral force upon its establishment and that there would be made available under U.S. custody nuclear warheads for the Polaris missiles.

Decisions on NATO MRBM requirements beyond 1964 and how such requirements should be met should be considered subsequently, taking into account the prospect for new weapons and conclusions reached in the process of NATO long-term planning.

The second point which General Norstad referred to was what he termed the “extremely interesting thought” of a NATO strategic force.

I would merely point out here that the nature of MRBMs gives them a character somewhat different from the delivery systems they are designed to replace. It would seem that SACEUR should plan the targeting for the MRBM force in coordination with the other retaliatory forces of the Alliance, in order to gain the greatest deterrence for the Alliance as a whole. While those MRBMs are required as modernization of the tacti-
cal strike capability, the line between “tactical” and “strategic” capabilities in the nuclear field is becoming ever more blurred.

The third point is the question of broader sharing in the control of nuclear weapons. Creation of a multilateral NATO MRBM force would of course represent a major step in this direction. It appears that there may be a desire for further assurance that the U.S. will continue to make its nuclear weapons, including those for other systems, available for use by other NATO powers when needed to carry out their Alliance obligations. There should be no doubt on this score. It is the firm policy of the United States to keep in the NATO area, under U.S. custody, nuclear weapons contributed by the U.S. to the Stockpile for the execution of approved NATO plans.

Our suggestion for consideration of a multilateral NATO MRBM force does not preclude exploration of the concept of increasing the authority of the Alliance over the atomic stockpile as a whole. As the Council considers a multilateral force, its examination of that possibility will bring into sharper focus the question of increasing Alliance authority over the Atomic Stockpile.

I turn now to the second of the long-range military tasks that we face: the strengthening of other Shield forces.

It is equally urgent that NATO fulfill its established requirements for its other Shield forces as well as for its MRBMs. In case of an attack, NATO forces should be able to meet the situation with a response appropriate to the nature of the attack. In speaking to the NATO Parliamentarians, General Norstad said that “our forces must have a substantial conventional capability,” that they should be “made up of army, navy and air force elements of suitable types and equipped with a balance of conventional and nuclear weapons,” and that “the threshold at which nuclear weapons are introduced into the battle should be a high one.” Unless all NATO Shield goals are substantially achieved, NATO Military Commanders will not have that flexibility of response that will enable them to meet any situation with the appropriate response.

Whether or not the Soviets carry out their announced force cuts, they will maintain large and ready ground, as well as air and missile, forces which will continue to pose a grave threat to the forward areas of NATO. Soviet progress in ballistic missiles may increasingly encourage them to believe mistakenly that they can threaten the forces of NATO without serious danger of general war. Thus, failure to achieve adequate NATO Shield forces in the near future will place our Alliance in growing peril of general war by Soviet miscalculation.

Let us be under no illusion that by deploying MRBMs we can afford to skimp on the equally important task of building up other Shield
forces. The addition of MRBMs to the forces of NATO would not, in any way, substitute for other contributions to the Shield, except that in the case of NATO tactical air squadrons, it is our understanding that the meeting of MRBM requirements should permit some reduction.

We believe that most of the other members of the Alliance now have ample economic and military potential to provide more fully for NATO defense. I can speak frankly here since my Government, in spite of having to carry tremendous financial and technical burdens in other areas vital to Alliance defense, is substantially meeting its MC–70 requirements.

I urge that each of your governments consider, in the course of our long-range planning what increased contribution it can make to this goal, not only in amount, but also in quality, with all that this involves in the way of training, supporting facilities, supplies and reserves.

These then are the two overriding military needs that I believe we must address in the course of long-range planning: the MRBMs and other nuclear weapons needs, and the necessity to meet our other Shield requirements. Action to meet both these needs should be planned and concerted closely as related elements of our long-range military program for the decade ahead.

That program will only be effective if it is mounted by an alliance that is united on basic political—as well as military—issues. The basic purpose of our armed forces is to maintain the security of the NATO area, but these forces will only be effective to the extent that agreement regarding political issues creates the will and determination to use force if and when necessary. Effective consultation and coordination on basic political issues is thus a vital element in the Alliance deterrent.

I would like now to turn briefly to the international payments situation, which has an importance beyond the financial field. For the third successive year, 1960 has been characterized by a large deficit in the international payments of the United States and further large accumulations in gold and dollar resources by a number of other countries. We are closing a three-year period in which the United States has paid out over $10 billion more than it has received, and nearly half of this has taken the form of an outflow of gold. To a very substantial part, the U.S. deficit finds its reflection in the strong surplus position of Western European nations.

Though there have been considerable changes during the course of the past year, the deficit in the U.S. balance of payments for the year as a whole is likely to be close to the $3.8 billion deficit of the preceding year.

I think you will all agree with me that this situation cannot long continue and that you will view in this light the measures which my
government has taken to protect the U.S. dollar which has come to play such a central role in the international payments structure.

The very large gold movements and the growing deficit in our overall payments during the second half of this year have led the United States Government to take more vigorous action in recent months. These measures were taken because we reached the conclusion they were needed to provide early and direct benefit to our balance of payments and to make clear at the same time our determination to maintain the position of the U.S. currency.

The President accordingly issued a directive on November 16, which we believe will contribute significantly toward a basic improvement in the international payments structure. We have also initiated bilateral discussions on measures affecting the balance of payments situation.

Just as our national elections do not affect our profound national commitment to NATO, as I have already indicated, neither do the measures we are taking to correct the imbalance in our payments situation.

We know that this alliance is vital to the security of the United States, no less than to that of the other NATO Allies. We will continue to contribute our fair share to the constructive and defensive tasks that it has assumed.

However, we believe that due account must be taken of certain factors in determining the U.S. share of that effort.

First, despite the strength of the U.S. economy, we must keep in mind the heavy burden which the U.S. bears in providing strategic forces for the defense of NATO and the free world, in mounting costly military space and weapons development programs, and in conducting aid programs of great importance to the free world.

Second, account must be taken of the changed economic relationship between the United States and Europe. In the early years of the Atlantic Community, the European economy was greatly weakened in the aftermath of war. Today, Europe has not only recovered but is surpassing its pre-war economic strength.

Third, there is the large and continuing deficit in the U.S. balance of payments, and at the same time there are continuing European surpluses, leading to an imbalance in the world payment position. I do not think I need to point out to the group assembled here that a sound U.S. balance of payments and a strong dollar are essential to the free world.

---

5 The President issued his directive on the balance-of-payments problem on November 16.
These factors will not induce the U.S. to shirk its fair share of the hard struggle that we are waging for peace.

We wish to continue to make a maximum contribution to Free World security, but, as indicated in our Annual Review submission, we are increasingly concerned with how to allocate our resources in the best manner. As was stated in that submission, some further changes in U.S. force deployments may become advisable as studies of overall U.S. programs progress. In fact, some redeployment may become a necessity unless our balance of payments can be brought into a more reasonable equilibrium. As the President recently stated, “I think we should never want to reduce our forces so far that people would think we had abandoned the area, or we had lowered our Flag in that area. Not at all. But I do think that the time is coming when all of us will have to study very carefully what should be our proper portion of the load.” In reaching decisions about the U.S. contribution to the military and non-military tasks of the Atlantic Community, we look to our Allies to undertake a greater share of the common effort.

In the non-military area of long-range planning, the intimate, frank discussions amongst our Permanent Representatives on this subject have been most valuable. They have pointed the way to the type of consultation, within the bosom of the family, that builds the trust, confidence and understanding upon which true unity within the Alliance can be based.

For the United States, I reiterate our pledge to continue to support the maximum possible development of consultation in the political field within NATO on important international issues, regardless of geographic area.

In the economic field, a major contribution to the unity of the West and to the strengthening of the Free World with particular emphasis upon the less-developed countries, has occurred in the establishment of the OECD. The U.S. intends to help make the OECD a strong organiza-

---

6 Not found, but it is summarized in the country chapter on the United States in the Report on the 1960 Annual Review (C-M(60)103, Part II), in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1807.

7 In a message to the President, transmitted in Cahto 1, December 13, Herter said he had just met with Secretary Anderson, Burgess, Generals Norstad and Lemnitzer, Ambassadors Houghton and Dowling, Dillon, and Irwin, and they agreed on the insertion of this sentence after considerable discussion. (Ibid., Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–1360) A copy of the message bears the President’s initials. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series) The President approved the text of the sentence in a message transmitted in Tocah 6, December 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–1460) The President and Herter also discussed this issue on the telephone. A memorandum of their conversation is in Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations.

8 The quotation is from President Eisenhower’s news conference on November 16; see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61, p. 865.
tion in order to assure that it will be an effective instrument in achieving the economic goals of the Atlantic Community.

For the next decade, we shall have to cope not only with Communist military capabilities, but with a political and economic offensive on their part directed against us and against all other free nations of the world. Communist dogma has forced upon the democracies a struggle by means short of war—a struggle for freedom.

The NATO countries must find the ways to defend our freedoms and to help other countries who need our help to defend their freedom. We will need all our resources—political, economic, psychological—in order to prevail.

277. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State

Paris, December 17, 1960, 1 a.m.

Polto 871. From USDel. NATO Ministerial Meeting—December 16 (afternoon Agenda Item two (long-range planning) taken up in late afternoon and Secy Herter led off with overall statement (see separate tel and full text being pouch). 1

Secy was followed by British, French, Canadian, Italian, German, Dutch, Turkish, Danish, Belgian, Norwegian, and Greek FonMins, all of whom welcomed Secy's "proposals" in military field and promised to study them carefully. Most Ministers expressed particular satisfaction at U.S. offer to commit five Polaris submarines to NATO and at stockpile pledge. All emphasized or referred to complexity in multilateral MRBM force concept. Several also acknowledged importance of balance of payments problem.

Lord Home said UK feels time has come for comprehensive study of purposes, control and deployment of NATO nuclear arms with object giving deterrent maximum effectiveness without waste of resources. Study should include questions of permanent MRBM force and of increasing NATO authority over stockpile in ACE. Should be comprehensive and fundamental and include examination of basic purposes and objectives of NATO military policy and best methods of attaining them. Lord Home observed that balance of payments problem equally difficult for UK, that stability of pound sterling also essential to free world,

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-PA/12-1760. Secret. Repeated to the NATO capitals and Moscow.

1 See Document 276.
and that relation of currency to defense should be considered in long-
range planning.

Couve de Murville expressed great interest in U.S. presentation but
pointed to many problems involved in MRBM force concept, he wel-
comed commitment of submarines and stockpile pledge. Said proposal
must be studied carefully on basis of more precise information which
will presumably be provided in due course. Also took special note of
U.S. emphasis on relation of military costs and balance of payments, and
said French fully appreciated importance and implications this prob-
lem.

Green emphasized need for study of use-control question. Made
strong plea that Council communiqué treat this discussion in low key
and make clear that suggestions merely put forward for study and not
decision. Communiqué should also include statement of willingness ne-
gotiate disarmament while maintaining defensive strength of Alliance.

Secretary responded to Green by making clear that his presentation
on MRBM force had been carefully worded to represent only concept
for consideration. Said U.S. had never thought decisions should or
could be made at this meeting. Referred to his acknowledgment that
congressional action would be required to implement concept and said
he could not commit U.S. Congress in advance.

Segni made positive statement re MRBM’s, but stressed importance
of financial aspects.

Brentano said MRBM proposal would be big step forward.

Welcomed submarines and stockpile pledge as strengthening
NATO and emphasized importance of common NATO policy on nu-
clear weapons. Said matter should be studied in conjunction with mili-
tary authorities.

Luns welcomed U.S. military proposals and stressed importance,
in view Soviet nuclear advances, of continued strengthening all NATO
forces and also equipping them with most advanced weapons. Without
committing his govt, he assured most careful consideration. Said lead
must continue to come from U.S. and hoped new U.S. administration
would follow through.

Sarper expressed particular satisfaction at Secretary’s statement
that MRBM’s should not substitute for other NATO force contributions.

Averoff emphasized urgent need for provision further details by
U.S. and that MRBM program should not reduce conventional forces
which are still deficient.

At conclusion discussion, Spaak found that consensus was for re-
ferral of matter to Permanent Council, with understanding that concept
presented by U.S. would be promptly explored.