KOREA

U.S. EFFORTS TO SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION FROM KOREA; THE QUESTION OF THE INTRODUCTION OF ADVANCED WEAPONS INTO KOREA

1. Editorial Note

The failure of the Geneva Conference of 1954 to produce an agreed political settlement of the Korean conflict left the Armistice Agreement, signed as a temporary measure on July 27, 1953, as the instrument governing relations between the two opposing sides in the conflict. Implementation of the Armistice Agreement was monitored by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, a four-nation panel composed of representatives of Switzerland, Sweden, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, which was established for that purpose. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission employed permanent inspection teams at stipulated ports of entry in Korea and had a mandate to investigate suspected violations wherever they occurred. In practice, however, the operations of the inspection teams were limited by the military sensitivity of the contending Korean Governments, and violations of the Armistice were difficult to prove. Increasingly, the United Nations Command and the Republic of Korea came to believe that the military balance in Korea was being upset by the clandestine introduction of advanced military equipment into North Korea in violation of the Armistice Agreement. To restore the military balance upon which they believed the security of Korea depended, U.S. officials determined that the Armistice provisions should be altered to permit an upgrading of military forces south of the demilitarized zone to match that which was occurring in the north. A necessary change, in the opinion of U.S. and South Korean officials, was the elimination or curtailment of the functions of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. For prior documentation on this and other problems relating to U.S.-Korean relations in the post-Armistice period, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, volume XV. For documentation on the Korean phase of the Geneva Conference, see ibid., volume XVI.
2. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Korean Ambassador (Yang), Department of State, Washington, January 7, 1955

SUBJECT
Meeting with the Korean Ambassador

Ambassador Yang handed the Secretary two envelopes, one for the Secretary and one for President Eisenhower, each containing a set of stamps issued by the Republic of Korea commemorating the conclusion of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea. He also gave the Secretary a letter from President Rhee to President Eisenhower, which he asked be delivered to the President. The Ambassador explained that the letter was rather lengthy and indicated that there were some differences of opinion between the Republic of Korea and the United States with respect to implementation of the rehabilitation program. The expression of these differences in opinion, however, was sincere and they were minor in view of our agreement on the basic rehabilitation objective.

The Secretary expressed his feeling that in recent months there had been a betterment of relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea. The Ambassador concurred, but stated that the Republic of Korea was worried about implementation of the rehabilitation program in view of the delays that had developed during the past difficulties and hoped that every effort would be made to implement it fully before the fiscal year ended. In this connection, he said that he had been assured by Mr. Stassen that every effort would be made to carry out the program. In response to the Secretary's question, the Ambassador replied that there had been an enormous economic buildup in North Korea and that this was one reason the President seemed so intransigent in his position on the need for developing industries.

Ambassador Yang stated that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC), that is the Polish and Czech members, were causing a lot of trouble and some, the Republic of Korea believe, are really Russians who have boldly taken pictures and even distributed leaflets. In relation to the problem, he expressed concern at "tremen-
dous numbers" of Communists, narcotic smugglers, and saboteurs coming in by land and sea. It was impossible, he said, to police the entire land front and that agents as well as refugees continue to cross the military demarcation line. The Republic of Korea had proof that agents disguised as fishermen had also entered.

On the question of the NNSSC, Mr. Jones pointed out that General Taylor had placed the Czechs and Poles on that Commission under virtual house arrest and thus reduced, if not eliminated, their potential for espionage. In addition, he explained to the Ambassador that an approach had been made to the Swiss and Swedes in an effort to induce them to withdraw their personnel on the NNSSC, thus making it possible to eject the Czechs and Poles, and that we expected to have an answer soon. The Ambassador agreed that action initiated by the Swiss and Swedes was the most desirable way to handle the problem.

Ambassador Yang urged the Secretary to visit Korea during his trip to Bangkok. The Ambassador emphasized the boost to the morale of the Korean people and the value of talks between the President and the Secretary which would result from such a visit. The Secretary explained that his schedule was very tight indeed, but that he would give serious consideration to the Ambassador's request.

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4On behalf of the 16 nations whose forces made up the U.N. Command, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France made a joint approach to Sweden and Switzerland in December 1954. The effort was prompted in part by continuing complaints by the Republic of Korea concerning the operations of the NNSSC in South Korea.
5See Document 7.

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3. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, January 8, 1955—2 p.m.

757. Department please pass FOA for Tyler Wood and DA. Tokyo pass General Hull. During meeting with President Rhee yes-

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95B/1-855. Secret. Repeated to Tokyo.
2C. Tyler Wood, Economic Coordinator on the Staff of the U.N. Commander in Chief in Korea. His responsibility was to coordinate the various aid programs for Korea under economic and fiscal policies established by him, and to advise the Republic of Korea on its fiscal and economic policies. To facilitate coordination with the Re-
terday afternoon he brought up question of scheduled third auction next week of $2,500,000 to provide hwan for UNC, declaring this method obtaining local currency "is ruining our economy" and that he is again considering presenting proposal to General Hull that monthly requirements of hwan be advanced by Bank Korea and repaid "at any rate Hull considers fair—300, 400, 500 or even 600 to 1."

There follows recital along familiar lines of adverse effect on economy of fluctuating rate which Rhee still convinced is principal cause of inflation. During conversation President resurrected plan referred to last November (Embtel 583, November 17 Tokyo 400) providing for presidential declaration that only permissible rate is 180 to 1 (which Rhee considered might after trial period, have to be slightly raised) with all transactions of every kind to be fixed by fiat at 180 to 1 and heavy penalties imposed on any company or individual exchanging hwan at any other rate. Rhee also spoke of writing letters outlining this project to whom unspecified, and said he had pigeon-holed plan two months ago greatly against better judgment but that ROK economic situation so impaired by exchange rate fluctuation, especially as promoted by auction UNC dollars, that this arrangement not to be endured any longer.

I believe I succeeded in talking him out of immediate action but it is obvious from Rhee's remarks that he is as unreconciled to exchange provisions of agreed minute as he was prior to initialing thereof and that we shall have to contend further with this attitude at early date (if not in connection with forthcoming third auction). The President's plan is of course economically fantastic and situation complicated by fact that he honestly and sincerely committed to views outlined above. He is however aware that his plan would violate agreed minute, hence this reference to "writing a letter" which would request modification of minute. His attitude also bears directly on prospects of obtaining Rhee's support for various ROK collateral economic measures that must soon be taken pursuant to minute if program is to succeed. For example, during same conversation with

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3There was no fixed exchange rate for dollars and hwan in January 1955. In an Agreed Minute of Understanding between the United States and the Republic of Korea, covering the entire range of U.S. Korean relations, signed on November 17, 1954, it was agreed to move toward a more "realistic" exchange rate by allowing the United States to sell dollars through the Bank of Korea to obtain the hwan necessary to meet the operating needs of U.S. forces. In the first dollar auction held on November 29, 1954, all the bids were rejected as too low. In the second auction, held on December 12, $1,958,000 were sold at an average rate of 426 hwan to the dollar. (Intelligence Report No. 6956, June 16, 1955, prepared in the Office of Intelligence Research; Department of State, FE Files: Lot 56 D 679, Korean Econ)

President, Mrs. Rhee made point that ROK budget being prepared on basis 180 to 1, which if true, indicates difficulties ahead on that front also.

Likewise of interest in connection with foregoing, Governor Kim of ROK recently informed Embassy in confidence of his unsuccessful efforts auction 3 million dollars of ROK funds at time of December UNC auction. As reported today Weeka 1 rumors in trade circles indicate similar plan under discussion at present but judging from my conversation with President there is small chance such auction can materialize unless without Rhee’s knowledge.

CINCUNC telegram C-71034, January 7, to DA, and received after this telegram drafted, likewise bears on same subject.

Briggs

5Kim Yu’-taek, Governor of the Bank of Korea.
6Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00(W)/1-755)
7This telegram also dealt with the hwan-dollar exchange rate problem. The conclusion drawn within the staff of CINCUNC was that maximum efforts should be directed to the successful implementation of those aspects of the Agreed Minute which dealt with the question. (Department of Defense Files)

4. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State


SUBJECT

Proposed Revision of NSC 170/1

The attached letter to you from Mr. Hensel (Tab B) requests Department of State concurrence in a proposed revision of sub-paragraph d of Annex A to NSC 170/1, which is the basic NSC policy paper on Korea. Annex A is the sensitive attachment to the Korea policy paper which states the courses of action to be taken to attempt to prevent unilateral action by the Republic of Korea in violation of the Armistice. The sub-paragraph in question charged General Hull with resort to martial law if necessary to enable new leader-

1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/1–1255. Top Secret. Drafted by Robert J. G. McClurkin, initialed by Robertson, and sent through Robert R. Bowie and Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State.
3Not found in Department of State files.
ship to assume power "if Rhee initiates or is about to initiate unilateral action". General Hull has pointed out that the withdrawal of all but two of his divisions from Korea has removed his capability for taking this action. He has therefore requested that he be relieved of this responsibility.

The proposed revision calls for the United States to select and encourage covertly the development of new leadership and, in the event of unilateral action, to assist such new leadership to assume power without overt United States participation unless it is necessary and promises to be decisive. Tab C shows the exact language of the revision proposed.4

I understand that the CIA staff have drafted a reply which would accept the revision but point out that CIA [1 line of source text not declassified] would have to rely upon appropriate guidance from the Department of State in the selection of south Korean leadership.5

I believe that the proposed revision is acceptable to the Department of State and that you should support it when it comes before the NSC.

Recommendation

That you sign the attached letter to Mr. Hensel, concurring in the proposed revision. (Tab A)6

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4Not found attached. Another copy gives the language of the proposed revision as follows:

"To select and encourage covertly the development of new South Korean leadership prepared to cooperate in maintaining the armistice, and if Rhee initiates or is about to initiate unilateral action, to assist such new leadership to assume power by means not involving overt U.S. participation until and unless U.S. overt support is necessary and promises to be decisive in firmly establishing such new leadership."

(Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, Korea)

5A copy of this letter from Allen W. Dulles to Hensel, January 17, was sent for information to Secretary Dulles. (Ibid., Central Files, 795B.00/1-1755)

6On January 20, a letter was sent from Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr., to Hensel indicating Department of State concurrence in the proposed revision of Annex A to NSC 170/1. (Ibid., 795B.00/1-2055)
5. Letter From the Acting Secretary of Defense (Anderson) to the Secretary of State


Dear Mr. Secretary: I refer to a letter from this Department to you, dated 17 September 1954, concerning the steps which might be taken to abolish the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea. The reference letter forwarded Department of Defense concurrence in a proposed Joint Chiefs of Staff course of action to abolish the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and requested your concurrence in a draft message to CINCUNC from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

On 5 November 1954, at a State-Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting, it was agreed to adopt a proposal by the French Government, subject to favorable comment by CINCUNC, which called for the 16 nations having forces in Korea to agree to a tripartite approach (US-UK-Fr) to the Governments of Sweden and Switzerland to withdraw their representatives on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to the demilitarized zone as the first step in the eventual dissolution of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. CINCUNC commented favorably on this approach. In the meantime, the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s recommendation for unilateral course of action on the part of the United States was placed in abeyance.

Latest developments in the French plan are not encouraging, as indicated in Embtel Stockholm 475, dated 14 December 1954, which mentions, in part, the development of differences between the Swiss and Swedish Governments on this question. In addition, Department of State to AmEmbassy, Stockholm, 498, dated 30 December 1954, advises as to the difficulties in obtaining agreement with the French and British for further tripartite approach to the Swiss and Swedes on behalf of the 16 nations. At the same time, President Rhee has continued to be more and more dissatisfied with the situation as pertains to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. On 22 November and again on 22 December, the Provost Marshal of the Korean Army issued threatening statements regarding the Czech and Polish members of the Commission. The United States, and more

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/1-1355. Top Secret.
2Not printed. (Ibid., 795.00/9-1754)
3A memorandum on the substance of discussion at this meeting is Ibid., State-JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417.
4Not printed. (Ibid., Central Files, 795.00/12-1454)
5Not printed. (Ibid., 795.00/12-954)
6The warnings issued to the NNNSC by the Provost Marshal, General Won Yung-Duk, were reported to the Department in telegram 602, November 22, and telegram 708, December 22, from Seoul. (Ibid., 795.00/11-2254 and 795.00/12-2254, respectively)
particularly the United Nations Command, will face a very serious problem indeed should the Republic of Korea resort to violent action.

In view of the obvious reluctance on the part of the Swiss and Swedish Governments, and the now doubtful prospects of securing a favorable solution to the problem on the present basis, it is believed that consideration must be given to the adoption of a more effective course of action. While it is realized that the present plan must be adhered to at least until after the return of Mr. Hammarskjöld from Peiping\(^7\) in order not to jeopardize his mission, it is nevertheless felt that the United States Government must be prepared to move in a direction which will secure positive results.

From the viewpoint of the Department of Defense, the only suitable course of action remaining open should the current plan fail is to follow the recommendations contained in our letter to you of 17 September on this subject. In order for us to be in a position to implement this plan at the appropriate time, it is suggested that the matter be placed on the agenda for an early meeting of the National Security Council.

Sincerely yours,

R. B. Anderson

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\(^7\)Reference is to the effort made by U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld to negotiate the release of U.S. Air Force personnel held by the People’s Republic of China.

### 6. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)\(^1\)


**SUBJECT**

U.S. Courses of Action in Case Present U.S.-ROK Problems Remain Unresolved

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the recent proposals made by Ambassador Briggs, General Hull, and Mr. Tyler Wood concerning an integrated plan embracing political, economic, and military measures to cope with President Rhee’s continued unwillingness to cooperate with U.S. policy in Korea, such as his delay in

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signing the "Agreed Minute" and his obstructionism in the dollar-
hwan controversy.  

2. The integrated plan contains four series of actions of increasing severity designed to develop mounting pressures on the ROK Government. Each of the actions contains economic, military and political measures which would be implemented to the extent and at the rate necessary to induce ROK cooperation with U.S. policy.

3. The specific military measures recommended in order of increasing severity are as follows:

   a. Slow-down of military program, including cessation of any further expansion.
   b. Announce consideration of redeployment of the remaining U.S. forces from Korea and discussion of withdrawal of other UN units with their respective governments, and continuation of military aid on minimum basis consistent with the United States interests.
   c. Withdrawal of all U.S. and UN forces from Korea except KMAG.
   d. Withdrawal of KMAG as a last resort.

4. As a result of the signing of the "Agreed Minute" on 17 November 1954 and the successful dollar auctions on 13 December 1954 and 10 January 1955, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the situation in Korea has altered to the extent that it would be inappropriate to approve a series of measures for future action which, should the need arise, in all probability would have to be reconsidered in detail in the light of the conditions then existing.

5. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you obtain the concurrence of the Secretary of State and the Director, Foreign Operations Administration in the attached draft message to CINCUNC, Ambassador Briggs and Mr. Wood jointly, and that it be dispatched as a joint State–Defense–FOA message.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arthur Radford
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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These proposals were conveyed to the Army Chief of Staff in telegram C–70208 from CINCUNC, November 8, 1954; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. xv, Part 2, pp. 1911–1914.

See footnote 3, Document 3.

Attached but not printed. It is a joint State–Defense–FOA message which indicated that there was no current need to adopt the measures which had been proposed in telegram C 70208 cited in footnote 2 above. The draft message was approved by the Department of State and the Foreign Operations Administration and sent to CINCUNC.

Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
7. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea**


Both governments indicate preference signatories Armistice terminate activities NNSC. Suggest as alternative sizeable reduction personnel 4 delegations. Indicate prepared transmit interested governments practical proposals for reduction personnel.

ROK Embassy informed receipt above notes and cautioned not connect any way with tripartite approach behalf 16.5 Hope ROK Government can be persuaded handle matter with great discretion in order minimize adverse Communist propaganda and permit us take next steps more readily. Department not giving notes contents to press. Swedish press statement indicates Swiss and Swedish Governments made renewed representations American and Peiping Governments respectively (earlier representations made in April 1954) with view obtaining reappraisal their membership on NNSC. In addition they gave substance Aide-Mémoire to press. Copies Aide-Mémoire being pouch.6

**Dulles**

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2In telegram 828 from Seoul, January 27, Ambassador Briggs suggested that the Republic of Korea should be informed as quickly as possible about the notes being delivered in Washington by the Swiss and the Swedes. (Ibid.)

3Copies of the aides-mémoire are attached to a combined memorandum of conversation by McClurkin covering the visits to the Department on January 27 of Felix Schnyder, Counselor of the Swiss Legation; Count C. L. Douglas, Minister of the Swedish Embassy; and Philip Han, Minister of the Korean Embassy. (Ibid.)

4In notes delivered to the Department of State on April 14, 1954, the Swiss and Swedish Governments stated that if the Geneva Conference failed to produce a political settlement of the Korean conflict, thus creating the possibility that the functions of the NNSC would be prolonged indefinitely, the two governments would have to reconsider the question of their continued participation. (Ibid., 795.00/4–1454)

5The memorandum by McClurkin, cited in footnote 3 above, covers this conversation with Korean Minister Han.

6At the Embassy’s request, the Department transmitted the text of the Swedish aide-mémoire in telegram 484 to Seoul, January 28, rather than by pouch. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/1–2855)
8. Letter From President Eisenhower to President Rhee


Dear Mr. President: There is much food for thought in the views which you have expressed in your letter of December 29, 1954. And because we all respect your judgment about the problems facing Korea, we have given most careful consideration to all that you have said.

Your letter makes it clear that you feel that Korea is caught between the threat of Communist aggression and a danger of renewed efforts by the Japanese to dominate Korea. In response, I want to assure you that it is the policy of the United States to do everything within our power to preserve the independence of the Republic of Korea. What the United States and other nations have done in the past few years, and are pledged to do in the future, should also serve to reassure you and the Korean people.

When the Armistice was concluded in Korea, the Sixteen Nations who fought side by side with your own forces, in repelling the aggression issued a Declaration which made it clear that they would not tolerate a renewal of Communist aggression. More recently, we have brought into force a Mutual Defense Treaty between our two countries. This Treaty evidences the deep concern of the United States for the security of your country against aggression from whatever source. Taken together, the Joint Policy Declaration and the Mutual Defense Treaty constitute clear and positive warning to any potential aggressor. I do not believe this warning will be taken lightly.

In addition, the extensive economic and military assistance the United States has given and is continuing to give the Republic of Korea is a substantial investment in the future of your country. The United States is making this investment because it has confidence in the future of the Republic of Korea.

You mention certain underlying factors which cause your people great concern. You fear that some Americans have doubts as to the strategic value of the Korean Peninsula and that these doubts were the main reason for withdrawal of the Headquarters of the United States Far East Air Force. Nothing could be further from the case.

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1Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 204, Eisenhower/Dulles Correspondence with Rhee. No classification marking. Drafted in NA by Jones and sent to Seoul in telegram 498, February 4. (Ibid., Central Files, 611.95B/2-455) Ambassador Briggs transmitted the letter in a letter to President Rhee on February 7. (Ibid., Seoul Embassy Files: Lot 59 F 180, 350 Korea 1955)

2See footnote 3, Document 2.

3The text of the Sixteen-Nation Declaration on Korea, issued at Washington on July 27, 1953, is printed in Department of State Bulletin, August 24, 1953, p. 247.
intend to continue to do all that we can to prevent Korea from falling prey to Communist aggression whether that aggression is by open acts of hostility or by subversion. The lives of the Americans who died defending Korea, our mutual security programs, our mutual defense treaties, the Manila Pact—all of these bear witness to the depth and breadth of our concern for the security of the Republic of Korea and other free nations.

You assert that the belief is widespread in Asia, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, that the United States bases its military and diplomatic policies for the Far East primarily upon the preservation of Japan as the chief center of resistance to Communism. Those who hold this belief are mistaken, although there is no question that it is of the greatest importance that Japan continue to be indissolubly linked to the Free World. The security of the whole area—including the safety of Korea—would be seriously threatened if the Communists were to succeed in subverting Japan.

But this fact does not derogate from the importance of Korea’s position or the position of any other country of the Free World. This Government believes that the threat of Communism in Asia is so great that each of the free countries of Asia needs to contribute what it can in human or material resources to the collective effort to resist that threat. But these resources can be used effectively only if cooperation among the free nations transcends all lesser differences of opinion.

Therefore, I am very glad to be assured that you share our interest in the restoration of a feeling of genuine harmony and friendship between Japan and Korea. In this connection, the suggestion you make for a tripartite treaty between Japan, Korea, and the United States seems to me to be well worth further exploration. I am asking Ambassador Briggs to discuss this matter with you so that we may have a fuller explanation of your ideas about such a treaty.

With respect to the aid program I want to express my appreciation of your indication of intent to abide strictly by the new arrangements we have recently made and to continue to work cooperatively with the United States in the spirit of utmost sincerity. I, in turn, want to reaffirm that it is the intention of the United States to do the same. Doubtless new problems will continue to arise. My hope is

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4The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, signed in Manila on September 8, 1954. (6 UST 85)
5Reference is to the Agreed Minute of Understanding cited in footnote 3, Document 3. Beyond the exchange rate provisions previously discussed, the Agreed Minute stipulated U.S.-Korean cooperation in military and economic aid programs totaling a maximum of $700 million for fiscal year 1955, programs designed to spur the recovery of the Korean economy and to support Korean military forces totaling 720,000 personnel.
that these problems can be worked out without an adverse impact on the aid program. I am anxious that the funds which the United States Congress has appropriated for the Korean aid program should be spent in the way which will most efficiently promote the economic and military strength of your country. I am convinced that the arrangements we have jointly agreed to in the Minute of Understanding, if carried out in letter and spirit, will insure that the aid funds will be spent in a manner which will achieve that objective.

In conclusion, I want to express my personal pleasure that you came through your recent operation so successfully. I trust your period of convalescence will be short and your recovery complete. Mrs. Eisenhower joins me in sending warm greetings to you and Madame Rhee.

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

9. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Jones) to the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Anticipated Difficulties in Carrying out Annex B of Agreed Minute of Understanding with ROK Government

Indications that difficulties are arising in carrying out the provisions of the confidential annex of the Agreed Minute of Understanding with respect to planned strength of the ROK Army were clarified by officers working on Korean Affairs in Operations Division of G-3 in their briefing of Mr. Norred on January 28. These officers asked that the information they provided be closely held.

Standing in the way of establishing ten reserve divisions by the end of 1955 are construction difficulties, arising from the extremely ambitious plans for the reserve submitted by the theater command. According to these plans, each division would have a permanent cadre of about 2,000 on active duty and approximately 2,000 more per division on active duty for training at any given time. Barracks and other necessary buildings alone reportedly would cost approximately $255,000 per division, despite the cheap cost of construction in Korea. Other costs would be correspondingly heavy.

\(^1\)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.5/2-155. Secret.
A second major problem is developing out of efforts to reduce the size of ROK military forces on active duty. United States Army officers are already encountering opposition from the ROK military to the new TO and E for a ROK "reinforced" division, inasmuch as it entails substantial reduction of transport and other special units. According to the plan of the theater command, even this "reinforced" division TO and E would apply only to reserve divisions. Divisions on active duty would use a TO and E "standard" division, entailing another heavy reduction. The "standard" division would have only six infantry battalions. The missing elements, including three battalions, needed to fill the "standard" division out to form a "reinforced" division, would be put in reserve, but would be earmarked for particular divisions and kept separate from the reserve divisions. The theater command plan calls for a ROK Army at the end of 1957 consisting of nine "standard" divisions on active duty, reserve "augmentations" for those divisions, and twenty-one "reinforced" divisions in the reserve.

The ROK surely will be exercised by these delays and reductions. Moreover, Operations Division of G–3 is having great difficulty in defending the theater command's plan from cuts by other Army agencies, and is not itself trying to justify the plans in entirety. The Army elements of the plan alone would require close to a billion dollars over a two to three year period. There appears to be much feeling in the United States Army agencies, shared in part by the officers in Operations Division, that the ROK Army is far out of proportion to those of more powerful states. It was pointed out also that over half of the United States Army advisory personnel throughout the world are in KMAG. The recent transfer of police advisory functions from KMAG to KCAC was the beginning of an effort to cut KMAG down to a normal military advisory group.

I think we should make every effort we can to emphasize the importance of developing and maintaining ROK military strength. While my layman's estimate of the military requirement would lead me to place this emphasis on military grounds, we probably should base our official views on the serious political and moral repercussions in the ROK of a shortcoming in meeting our commitments. To permit administrative difficulties to impede the establishment of the ten reserve divisions would be a breach of faith with the ROK which I hope we will not incur. We should urge that every effort be made to carry out our commitments and that the reserve divisions be created at least on paper and that strong efforts be made to make them real reserve units by the end of the year. Particular emphasis on building the reserve is needed because of the clear implication in the Agreed Minute that divisions will not be removed from active duty until a trained reserve has been prepared. The ROK Army is now a
highly effective military instrument, developed by nine years of advisory activity by the United States and three years of heavy fighting side by side with United States and other Western forces, and we should certainly be slow to dissipate its strength in these critical times.

Recommendation:

That a letter be drafted to Secretary of Defense Wilson for Secretary Dulles’ signature, emphasizing the political importance of carrying out our military commitments in this respect with the ROK and expressing the hope that he will lend every effort to see that this is done.\(^2\)

\(^{2}\)A marginal notation on another copy of this memorandum indicates that no such letter was sent. (Ibid., NA Files: Lot 60 D 680, ROK-US Agreed Minute 1954–58)

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10. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Abolition of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the Swiss and Swedish aides-mémoire\(^2\) and the message from the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), C 71309 (DA IN 115020),\(^3\) and agree with CINCUNC that the aides-mémoire create a political atmosphere favorable for positive action to dissolve the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) along the lines previously recommended by CINCUNC and concurred in by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and repeated in the message from CINCUNC referred to above. This recommendation is that CINCUNC be authorized to take action in the following sequence:

a. Propose in an early meeting of the Military Armistice Commission\(^4\) that, in view of twice-expressed dissatisfaction by the Swiss

\(^{1}\)Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, Korea. Top Secret.
\(^{2}\)See Document 7.
\(^{3}\)Dated January 31. (Department of Defense Files)
\(^{4}\)The Military Armistice Commission, which met periodically at Panmunjom, was the channel of communication established under the Armistice to provide for face-to-face discussion of the functioning of the Armistice. The Military Armistice Commis-
and Swedes with the present situation, and in view of its history of ineffectiveness, the NNSC be dissolved and the provisions of paragraph 13C and 13D of the Armistice Agreement\(^5\) that the NNSC was created to enforce be revoked by mutually agreed amendment to the Armistice Agreement. Such proposal to be worded so as to make it clear that the United Nations Command (UNC) will not entertain any proposals aimed at strengthening the NNSC or retaining the NNSC at a reduced strength.

b. If the Communists reject the UNC proposal to dissolve the NNSC, or if no definitive reply is made within a reasonable period of time, the UNC then declare null and void the provisions of the Armistice Agreement which pertain to the NNSC, together with the provisions of paragraph 13C and 13D that the NNSC was created to enforce.

2. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you discuss this matter in an early meeting of the National Security Council with the view to obtaining approval of the President in the draft message to CINCUNC, attached hereto,\(^6\) and authorization for its dispatch by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arthur Radford\(^7\)

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

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\(^{5}\) Paragraph 13c of the Armistice Agreement signed on July 27, 1953, prohibited the introduction of "reinforcing military personnel" into Korea. Rotation and replacement of personnel was permitted but the aggregate totals of military personnel for each side were fixed at what they were at the time of the Armistice. Paragraph 13d prohibited the introduction into Korea of "reinforcing combat aircraft, armoured vehicles, weapons, and ammunition," unless it was to replace damaged or worn-out equipment, and then only "on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type." The Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission were given broad scope, under the Armistice, to monitor the flow of military personnel and equipment into Korea. For text of the Armistice Agreement, see TIAS 2782; 4 UST 234–235.

\(^{6}\) Not found attached. For the discussion of the issue at the February 3 NSC meeting, see infra.

\(^{7}\) Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1-5.]

6. Abolition of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea (Progress Report, dated December 30, 1954, by the Operations Coordinating Board on NSC 170/1)

Mr. Cutler read appropriate portions of the recent Progress Report on U.S. policy in Korea as they related to the reference subject, and indicated that Secretary Wilson had requested him to mention a memorandum which the Secretary had received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicating the urgency of removing the NNSC at once from South Korea. Mr. Cutler read portions of the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary Wilson, but pointed out that the problem was complicated and had received no staffing as yet except in the Department of Defense.

Admiral Radford indicated that the concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stems from the fact that the UN Commander, General Hull, feared an incident in South Korea which might endanger the lives of the Communist members of the supervisory teams, or might lead to an armed clash between U.S. and South Korean forces. To illustrate his point, Admiral Radford read passages from a recent message to himself from General Hull, indicating the desirability if necessary of unilateral U.S. action to settle the problem.

Mr. Cutler said he was aware of the reasons for the concern expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but pointed out that the State Department had insufficient notice that this item was to be brought up for discussion at this meeting of the Council, and was therefore not prepared to discuss it. Secretary Hoover confirmed Mr. Cutler's statement.

The President asked why the Swiss and the Swedes simply did not quit. Admiral Radford said they feared to do so because of anticipated Communist pressures on their governments if they did. The President then asked why we did not accord the same treatment to these teams in South Korea which the Communists gave to the teams in North Korea.

Mr. Cutler suggested that this issue might well be taken up in the first instance at the meeting between the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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3Supra.

4Apparent reference to CINCUNC telegram C-71309; see footnote 3, supra.
and the State Department scheduled for Friday morning. It could then be scheduled for consideration by the Council at its meeting next week. The President suggested, however, that the State Department get together with the Joint Chiefs as early as they could, and bring their recommendations to him directly.\(^5\) He said he would approve anything that was reasonable to get this problem settled.

*The National Security Council.*\(^6\)

a. Noted and discussed the situation with respect to the subject, and the views regarding the subject of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
b. Noted the President’s directive that the Departments of State and Defense submit to the President as promptly as possible recommendations for further U.S. action with regard to the subject.

*Note:* The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense.

S. Everett Gleason

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\(^5\)Representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State met on Friday, February 4, to consider the NNSC problem. Under Secretary of State Hoover submitted the recommendations that emerged from that meeting to the President on February 7. See Documents 13 and 15.

\(^6\)Paragraphs a and b and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 1322. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

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12. **Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State**\(^1\)

*Seoul, February 4, 1955—6 p.m.*

868. Tokyo for CINCUNC, CG AFFE/Army Eight and CAG. Reference Deptel 488, repeated Tokyo 1529, Bern 1927, Stockholm 567.\(^2\) Summary follows of confidential letter February 3\(^3\) which I received from Foreign Minister Pyun referring my conversation January 28 concerning Swiss Swedish NNSC aides-mémoire: (Embtel 836, repeated Tokyo 568, Stockholm 15, Bern 16)\(^4\)

\(^1\)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/2-455. Confidential. Repeated to Stockholm, Bern, and Tokyo.

\(^2\)In telegram 488 to Seoul, February 1, the Department concurred that Foreign Minister Pyun Yung Tai should be informed concerning the substance of the aides-mémoire received on January 27 from Sweden and Switzerland. (Ibid., 795.00/1-3155)

\(^3\)Not found in Department of State files.

\(^4\)In telegram 836 from Seoul, January 28, Ambassador Briggs reported that he had emphasized to Foreign Minister Pyun the importance of restraint and discretion in the *Continued*
Begin summary.

President Rhee was informed immediately. ROK Government will certainly refrain from making statements likely to make action difficult pending results, but can't keep quiet indefinitely if acts friendly governments fail obtain desired results.

ROK has certain misgivings regarding possible developments stemming from proposal to discontinue NNSC. Assuming Communist refusal, Swiss and Swedes may next withdraw their representatives. Communists would probably condemn such action as arbitrary or illegal, refuse to do same and insist on stationing their representative on locations named armistice.

ROK main objection has never been against NNSC itself but against spying propagandizing Communist members. It would be travesty of what was intended should developments be departure Swiss and Swedes while Communist remain.

If we succeed cooping Communists up in DMZ they will still have sanctuary for espionage and propaganda through clandestine channels. So, that is no perfect solution. Only dissolution NNSC giving Communists no excuse for remaining South Korea is perfect solution.

ROK Government will wait patiently to see what friendly nations can bring about, but nothing short dissolution NNSC will ever perfectly satisfy ROK Government, which, therefore reserves right take appropriate steps eradicate all possibility Communist members NNSC continuing espionage endangering security ROK, if and when all other means fail.

End summary.

Today after receipt above letter I called upon Pyun and gave him in confidence for information ROK Government substance Swiss-Swedish aides-mémoire and emphasized again importance restraint and discretion in making statements. Also informed him I would inform him in advance substance U.S. reply and procedure when decided.

Strom

Korean response to the Swiss and Swedish aides-mémoire. Pyun agreed. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/1-2855)

13. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at the Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Washington, February 4, 1955, 11:30 a.m.¹

[Here follows a list of 27 persons present.]

I. NNSC

Mr. Murphy stated that the raising of the question of the NNSC by Defense at the NSC meeting on February 3, without prior consultation with the Department of State, had put the Department on the spot. He did not exactly understand why the matter had been so unexpectedly raised, particularly in the light of the fact that, as the JCS was aware, the subject of NNSC had been set up for discussion at the State-JCS meeting on February 4. Because there had been no prior State-Defense consultation on the NSC discussion, the Acting Secretary had not been prepared at the Council meeting, and therefore was not in a position to present the political aspects of the question.

Admiral Radford replied that he was convinced that it was the time to get down to work on the problem of the NNSC, and that it was sufficiently serious to be brought to the attention of the President. He thought the President should know about the differences of opinion between the two Departments, and the importance which Defense attaches to the matter. Admiral Radford recalled that at a State-JCS meeting in early December, Mr. Murphy had promised some substantive action within a week.²

Mr. Murphy rejoined that he was not aware of having made any such commitment, and noted that you could not order the Swiss and the Swedes around like a battalion. He pointed out that what we hoped to avoid during December was any action which would result in a debate on Korea in the General Assembly, and that we had clearly stated that we preferred to postpone action until the General Assembly had adjourned. Mr. Murphy emphasized that the operation in Korea was a United Nations, and not a United States proceeding. We had pressed the Swiss and the Swedes, Mr. Murphy recalled, to take on this responsibility under the Armistice.

Admiral Radford stressed that there were two salient aspects of the question: (1) the security of UN military personnel; and (2) continued delay means increasing Communist build-up of military forces to the relative disadvantage of our own side. Under the Armistice agreement, Admiral Radford said, we were unable to introduce improved matériel: all we can do is replace period hardware already on the spot, and this was becoming increasingly difficult because the matériel, particularly aircraft, which was in Korea at the time of the

²Reference to informal notes of the State-JCS meeting of December 4 (the only such meeting between November 20 and January 14) do not reflect any such commitment on the part of Mr. Murphy, or any other State Department representative at the meeting. In fact, the tenor of the discussion was that the operation, which the State Department favored as essential under existing political considerations, would take time. [Footnote in the source text. A memorandum on the substance of discussion at the State-JCS meeting of December 4, 1954, is ibid.]
Armistice, had largely become obsolete. He said the question was: how long can we go on with this increasing danger from a military point of view?

Mr. Murphy said that Mr. Robertson would have some comments to make, and that following him Mr. Phleger, the Department’s Legal Adviser, would go into certain legal considerations.

Mr. Robertson said that the Department appreciated fully that the situation was an unnatural one, that there were repeated Communist violations to the agreement with respect to the NNSC, and that the work of the NNSC in North Korea was being completely vitiated by Communist action. But it was essential, he continued, that we have the expressed concurrence of the 15 other nations with which we were associated in this UN operation in any interference with the terms of the Armistice. He pointed out that we had been in continual communication with the 15 on the matter, and that it was only after long weeks of discussion with the British and the French that a tripartite démarche\(^3\) had been made to the Swiss and the Swedes which had resulted in the aides-mémoire\(^4\) from those two governments, copies of which were already in the hands of the JCS. Mr. Robertson said that we recommend that we call a meeting of the 16 to tell them the situation and suggest: (1) that they accept the proposal that the UNC introduce into the Military Armistice Commission (MAC), for discussion during a period not exceeding about two weeks, the Swiss and the Swedes preferred alternative that the NNSC be liquidated and the MAC assume those functions of the Commission dealing with the Armistice; (2) that the Swiss and the Swedes simultaneously be informed of this action as well as our doubts concerning its success, and that we ask the Swiss and the Swedes to tell us their practical proposals for a substantial reduction in personnel of the NNSC; (3) that if the Communists do not agree to the liquidation of the NNSC, and if the Swiss and Swedish practical proposals for reduction in personnel envisage a cutback to no more than two inspection teams (to be stationed in the demilitarized zone for the purpose of spot inspections where required), these proposals should then be introduced into the MAC, while we simultaneously seek a reasonable period to persuade the Swiss and the Swedes unilaterally to withdraw from the NNSC, or to reduce their personnel to this level and station them in the demilitarized zone if the Communists fail to agree; and (4) that if these steps fail, we convene another meeting of the 16 to discuss further courses of action.

Mr. Murphy interjected that the State Department fully recognizes the military aspects of the problem, but is aware also that it has

\(^{3}\)See footnote 4, Document 2.

\(^{4}\)See Document 7.
important political implications. All steps should be taken in consultation with the 16, he said. It would be fool-hardy to take military action without consulting the others.

Admiral Radford again emphasized that General Hull was seriously concerned about the possibility of an incident occurring in South Korea involving the NNSC. Mr. Murphy said we were fully aware of that. Admiral Radford went on that the other 15 powers do not have the same concern that we do. The Admiral asked Mr. Murphy if the State Department did not recognize the seriousness of the situation. Mr. Murphy again stressed that the Department certainly does, to which Admiral Radford replied that nevertheless the matter had been dragging on for six months. Mr. Murphy concurred, but also pointed to the fact that the armistice negotiations, in which the Department of Defense had indicated keen interest, had gone on for a much longer time. He said that we would want to explore fully any possible action in the Security Council of the United Nations. Again Admiral Radford emphasized that both General Hull and Ambassador Briggs were very concerned, and well they might be since it is the U.S. which has the responsibility for the United Nations command. Once again Mr. Murphy made it quite clear that there was no lack of awareness in the Department of the risks involved. Mr. Robertson pointed to the repeated efforts made by the Department to encourage early action by the Swiss and the Swedes.

Mr. Murphy then called on Mr. Phleger to go over certain legal aspects of the situation.

Mr. Phleger said that the role of a lawyer was to give legal advice. He asked Admiral Radford if what he wanted was to be relieved of certain restrictions in the armistice agreement. Admiral Radford said that was right. Mr. Phleger noted that the armistice agreement in Korea was of a kind which seemed to be coming more and more popular in international affairs (a general armistice without a termination date, which was almost in the nature of a treaty of peace) but he added that it was also a political document. It was a contract, he continued, which, if broken by one side, brought into play certain rights on the part of the other side. The other side could either (1) terminate the agreement or (2) attempt to enforce the provisions which have been violated. Specifically, if we unilaterally terminated paragraphs 13(c) and 13(d) of the armistice agreement (those prohibiting the introduction of reinforced personnel or weapons), the other side could say that we had abrogated the agreement.

Mr. Phleger stressed that any provision to delete certain articles in an agreement must follow the same procedure as was followed when the articles were drawn up, and it must be done in the context of the same authority.
Admiral Radford inquired if Mr. Phleger thought General Hull did not have authority to take the action the JCS favored. Mr. Phleger replied that in general the UN commander did not have such authority, though he did not want to be misunderstood: although UNC cannot terminate the agreement, there is a certain area in which he has a certain latitude—for instance, as to the specific logistic services offered to inspection teams, or as to the speed with which inspection trips are complied with—areas in which the armistice might in fact be affected.

Mr. Bowie asked Admiral Radford if his principal concern was to avoid an incident. Admiral Radford said that was General Hull’s principal concern. He said that General Hull wanted to bring violations of the agreement with respect to the NNSC to the attention of the MAC as grounds for abrogating the articles in the Armistice agreement pertaining to that Commission.

Again Mr. Phleger noted that any abrogation of the agreement could only be accomplished legally under the authority which had given rise to the agreement in the first place.

Mr. Murphy said that was why we felt that a preliminary meeting with the 16 was necessary.

General Ridgway asked if it was correct that Mr. Phleger believed that General Hull had no authority to withdraw the NNSC teams from South Korea without permission of the UN. Mr. Phleger said yes.

Admiral Radford then read General Hull’s signal of January 315 outlining his great concern over the problem. Admiral Radford added that it was hard for anyone to understand the feeling of concern on the part of a commander in the field who is under such constant risk.

Mr. Murphy asked the Admiral to define the risk, and the Admiral did so by reading from General Hull’s message. The Admiral highlighted the threats previously made by President Rhee, the fact that the situation was so serious that the teams had to be moved by helicopter in order to avoid having to have them proceed overland with the increasing chances of an incident, etc. General Hull had indicated, the Admiral said, that the risk was critical now and was bound to increase as U.S. troops were withdrawn and progressive responsibility were turned over to the ROK.

Mr. Murphy pointed out that this risk had always existed from the very beginning, and that without the provisions for the NNSC we would have had no armistice agreement at all.

Mr. Robertson suggested that his recommendations be approved and that we present a well documented case to an early meeting of the 16.

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5Reference is to CINCUNC telegram C-71309; see footnote 3, Document 10.
Admiral Radford reverted to what had been told President Rhee during the latter's visit to the U.S. some months ago, namely, that we would make every effort to find a timely solution to the problem.

Mr. Murphy pointed out that we had made every effort. Did the JCS feel that there had been any omission? If so, what were the omissions?

Admiral Radford said he realized that efforts had been made, but that there was extreme danger in the situation: it was full of dynamite. Mr. Murphy patiently reiterated that the State Department was well aware of the danger. Admiral Radford said that he did not know how many messages there had been from General Hull on this subject. That was why, he said, Secretary Wilson had been asked to take the matter up at an early meeting of the NSC. It was felt that the President should be informed of the situation.

Mr. Murphy said that, of course, the State Department was delighted to have the matter brought up in the NSC, but would have liked to have had our representative informed that the matter was to have been discussed. In that way, the President would have had a far better understanding of the problem. Continuing, Mr. Murphy stated that he does not recall having said last December that we would have an answer within a week; what he had said, as he recalled it, was that we hoped to have an answer from the Swiss and the Swedes within a week on our proposal.

Admiral Radford said that he might very well have been mistaken, but that he had understood otherwise.

Mr. Murphy reviewed the recommendations specified by Mr. Robertson, and asked the JCS if they concurred in the proposal to take the matter up with the 16 as indicated.

Admiral Radford said that such a procedure would at least have the effect of letting the ROK know that we were trying to do something.

Admiral Carney interjected to echo the view that it was a very dangerous situation. The plan which had been presented to the JCS would probably not work. Discussions could go on and on. We were permitting ourselves to be talked out of what we knew to be right. What we propose does not correct the existing situation, or alleviate the danger.

Again Mr. Murphy said that the danger had been with us ever since the armistice had been signed. It was not new. Admiral Radford agreed, but repeated that the danger was increasing.

Mr. Phleger asked point blank if the JCS was prepared unilaterally to abrogate the armistice. Admiral Carney said that we were pre-

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pared to terminate the privileges allowed to the NNNS. Mr. Phleger said that it was a question of looking at the balance of the advantages against the disadvantages in the situation, and determining what the consequences of a course of action are, and whether the effect of certain acts were worth the consequences they involved. Mr. Murphy added that if the UN “partnership” were too onerous, perhaps it should be terminated.

Admiral Carney inquired if it was not agreed that UNC was responsible for the security of his own forces. Mr. Murphy readily agreed. He had always had that basic and abiding responsibility. Admiral Radford noted that the UNC position at the time of the armistice was far better than it is now: then we had 8 divisions in the area; now, the problem of security was increasing. General Hull’s precarious position was not fully appreciated. There was a time element involved.

There was some discussion as to whether or not a military armistice was a political matter. It was emphasized by the State representatives in general that the political implications of the Korean armistice could not be completely divorced from the purely military considerations. General Ridgway noted wryly that he recalled very well from his experience in Korea just how much freedom of action he had had as military commander. He suggested the possibility of the U.S. Government authorizing UNC to take the action recommended by General Hull as an interim measure, and then informing the 16.

Mr. Murphy agreed to look at this proposition, but emphasized that we have this partnership and that we must respect it.

Mr. Murphy also suggested that at the projected meeting of the 16, we have someone from JCS present.

Ensuing discussion revolved around the question of whether or not General Hull had been informed of the U.S. Government’s plan. It was not clear that he had.

Reverting to the plan, Mr. Phleger speculated that he did not see how the 16 could object.

General Ridgway said that the question boils down to a definition of the concept of the responsibility of UNC. Mr. Robertson said that General Hull was there as the UN commander. General Ridgway agreed, but noted that the U.S. was the executive agent of the command. Mr. Robertson emphasized, however, that nevertheless he was representing UN.

Mr. Murphy then turned to the recommendation which had originally been made by Mr. Robertson. He asked the JCS if the proposals were agreeable.

Admiral Radford said that he thought we should draft a message to General Hull pointing out the situation and asking him for his
comments, and whether or not he is prepared to take the continuing risk that the program involves. The Admiral repeated that he had given General Hull the impression on his recent trip that he could expect early action on the NNSC.

Admiral Radford said that General Hull was entitled to a clear picture.

Mr. Robertson said that Ambassador Briggs had been constantly informed of developments.

Mr. Murphy agreed that the matter should be discussed with General Hull and that it should also be taken up with the 16.

Mr. Robertson suggested that we ask the 16 if the interim measures contemplated by General Hull are agreeable, and preferable to unilateral action.

Admiral Radford inquired exactly what would happen if UNC acted unilaterally. Again Mr. Phleger pointed out that we have a contract, the armistice agreement, and that while we might be able to take emergency action as a temporary expedient, any substantive change in the contract would have to be agreed upon first by all the parties associated with us in it.

Mr. Murphy asked if it were absolutely necessary to comply with every request of the NNSC investigating teams in South Korea to proceed to this or that place. He asked what the other side was doing in North Korea. Admiral Radford read from General Hull’s message that during the entire armistice period, only one NNSC mobile inspection team in North Korea had been dispatched to an investigation point as requested.

Mr. McClurkin broke in to say that General Hull has the authority to fit his treatment of the NNSC to conform to treatment accorded it in North Korea. (However, ensuing discussion did not bring out that General Hull had been instructed in this sense.)

Admiral Radford then said that his position was that General Hull was entitled to a full presentation of the case. He said that General Ridgway had indicated that the Army was prepared to cooperate in the drafting of a message to General Hull.

Action on the message to General Hull was given to Mr. Sullivan⁷ (OSD), Mr. Stelle⁸ (S/P) and Mr. McClurkin (NA)

Mr. Murphy indicated that we should also draft a statement of the situation for the White House.⁹ Admiral Radford said that the President would be fully satisfied with the information contained in the joint message to General Hull to be drafted by State and De-

⁷Charles A. Sullivan, Director of the Policy Division, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
⁸Charles C. Stelle, member of the Policy Planning Staff.
⁹See Document 15.
and suggested that a copy of the message be made available to the White House.

[Here follows discussion of an unrelated subject.]

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10See telegram DA 975505, infra.

14. Telegram From the Department of the Army to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Hull)\(^1\)

Washington, February 5, 1955—5:59 p.m.

DA 975505. From G3 urmsgs C 71216\(^2\) and C 71309\(^3\) and Seoul’s 868 repeated Tokyo 591.\(^4\) This is a joint State—Defense msg.

1. Your views with respect NNSC and Korean Armistice Agreement as given in ref msgs were thoroughly discussed at State—JCS meeting on 4 Feb 55.\(^5\)

2. Re your recommendation para 2 C 71309 that NNSC be dissolved and that reinforcing provisions of para 13c and 13d of Armistice be rescinded by unilateral declaration if necessary, Department of Defense fully supports your views; however, State says it is politically and legally undesirable to take action you recommend at this time. Armistice Agreement entered into under Unified Command instructions after full consultation with 15 other UN governments participating Korean hostilities and U.S. Govt in issuing instructions was acting as agent of UN. While remedies are available for handling situation in which Communists have violated provisions of Armistice contract, these remedies can be utilized only by following same process consultation under which Armistice was originally negotiated and concluded. Ur recommendation therefore considered unwise, and State and JCS considered other possible courses of action.

3. State recommended following course of action:

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\(^1\)Source: Department of Defense Files. Top Secret. Repeated to Ambassador Briggs and the Senior Member of UNCMAC in Seoul.

\(^2\)In this telegram, CINCUNC reviewed the problems in the continued operation of the NNSC in Korea. The refusal of North Korean authorities to permit the effective functioning of UNNITs in North Korea, the growing military imbalance in Korea caused by the introduction of modern weapons into North Korea in violation of the Armistice, and the increasingly hostile attitude of the South Korean Government toward the Communist members of the NNSC all argued, from the perspective of CINCUNC, for the rapid dissolution of the NNSC. (Ibid.)

\(^3\)See footnote 3, Document 10.

\(^4\)Document 12.

\(^5\)See supra.
a. That Department of State call meeting of sixteen to remind them of our deep concern with respect to reinforcing provisions (para 13d) of Armistice, inform them of result of inquiry to Swiss and Swedes, and ask their agreement to support fol courses of action which we now propose take:

(1) UNC introduction in MAC for discussion during period not exceeding about two weeks of Swiss and Swedish preferred alternative, i.e., that NNSC be liquidated and MAC assume those functions of Commission dealing with Armistice;

(2) Simultaneously inform Swiss and Swedes of this action, express our doubts as to its success and ask them to tell us their practical proposals for substantial reduction in personnel of NNSC;

(3) If Communists do not agree to liquidation NNSC, and if Swiss and Swedish practical proposals for reduction in personnel envisage a cutback to no more than two Inspection Teams to be stationed in Demilitarized Zone for purpose of spot inspections where required, introduce those proposals into MAC. At same time seek for reasonable period to persuade Swiss and Swedes unilaterally withdraw from NNSC or to reduce their personnel to this level and station them in Demilitarized Zone if Communists refuse to agree. Withdrawal Swiss and Swedes or reduction and stationing in Demilitarized Zone would constitute authority CINCUNC removal Polish and Czech members NNITs South Korea to Demilitarized Zone.

(4) If steps in (3) above fail, convene another meeting of Sixteen to discuss further courses of action.

b. That if first Swiss and Swedish alternative is rejected and if second alternative falls short of a(3) above, State-JCS meeting to discuss subsequent courses of action be convened prior to meeting again with Sixteen.

4. However, it is clear that you as CINCUNC have authority to take emergency action to protect security forces under your command or to protect personnel of NNITs if situation in ROK so explosive that their safety is endangered. Such action might include moving of personnel NNITs to Demilitarized Zone as temp and emergency measure to protect them while other arrangements being worked out in MAC in accordance with provisions Armistice Agreement. Desire ur views on implications of exercise of this authority. If emergency conditions force action under this authority, report immediately actions taken and related circumstances.

5. Desire ur comments recommendation para 3 above and ur suggestions any other courses of action which might be taken to deal with problem of NNSC. See infra. State plans to discuss NNSC situation with
Ambassadors of Sixteen Nations 8 Feb. At same time high-level
U.S. military representative will be present to make clear serious
military situation facing UNC as consequence Communists violations
para 13(d) as described ref msgs. Need from you fully documented
case on Communist violations in form which can be made public and
to assure sympathetic response from Sixteen to necessary action solve
problem presented by 13(d).
6. In view of scheduled meeting of Sixteen Nations on 8 Feb,
would appreciate ur answer no later than noon 7 Feb Washington
time with documented case to fol as soon as possible thereafter.

See Document 18.

15. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the
President


SUBJECT
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) and the Korean Armistice

In accordance with your request at the NSC meeting of February
3 representatives of the Department of State met with the JCS on
February 4. State and Defense have been in frequent consultation
on this problem. We agree that the Communist violations of the re-
forcement provisions of the Korean Armistice Agreement and their
frustration of the activities of the NNSC pose serious problems for
General Hull.

However, there are serious political and legal difficulties in-
volving in adopting any course of action leading to unilateral abroga-
tion of any of the provisions of the Korean Armistice, particularly in
the present situation in the Far East. The Armistice was entered into
by CINCUNC under instructions from the United States Government
acting as agent for the United Nations. Our Allies were consulted
and their support sought and obtained throughout the course of the
Armistice negotiations. Despite the reluctance of the Swiss and
Swedes we strongly urged them to serve on the NNSC. Except in a
gave military emergency, any course of action we take with respect

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/2–755. Top Secret.
See Document 11.
to the Armistice and in particular the NNSC must give careful consideration to the views of those whose support we had enlisted.

Taking these factors into account, the Department of State has been actively endeavoring to solve the problem of the NNSC. Recently, we persuaded our sixteen Allies to support an approach to the Swiss and Swedes suggesting that these neutrals withdraw their personnel to the Demilitarized Zone thus making it possible for us to remove the Czech and Polish members of the Commission from the territory of the Republic of Korea. In response to this approach the Swiss and Swedes in recent aide-mémoire asked the Chinese Communists and ourselves to find a way to terminate the activities of the Commission, and if this is impossible to reduce its personnel substantially.

State and Defense have now agreed on the enclosed telegram\(^4\) which we believe will move toward a solution of the problem of the NNSC and the more basic problem of the reinforcing restrictions imposed by the Armistice.\(^5\)

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\(^4\) _Supra_. The copy of telegram DA 975505 that was enclosed for the President's information was undated, apparently leading the President to conclude that it was a draft requiring his approval.

\(^5\) A note on the source text at this point in President Eisenhower's hand reads: "approved DE".

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16. **Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Hull) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff\(^1\)**

_Tokyo, February 7, 1955—7:32 p.m._

C 71413 (DA IN 116727). Ref: A. DA 975505; B. C 71309 Jan.; C. C 71216 Jan.\(^2\)

1. The fol comments are submitted with specific ref to the course of action recm by State and outlined in para 3 of ref A:

   a. The first step of the course of action recm by State, i.e., the introduction of this issue in the MAC, with a view to obtaining agreement on the liquidation of the NNSC, is, in principle, essentially the same as the first step of my proposed course of action in para

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\(^1\) Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/2-755. Top Secret; Operational Immediate. Repeated to Ambassador Briggs and the Senior Member of UNCMAC Korea.

Korea 31

2. ref B. However, I consider that my introducing this extremely sensitive subj for discussion in the MAC without a pre-detm course of action to be fol within a definite pd of time (when the Communists reject such proposal) would be ill advised. The discussions proposed in ref A would presumably be based upon grounds other than Communist violation of para 13 D of the armistice agreement and, in the event such discussions produce no tangible results, we will have seriously weakened our pos for later unilateral action to abolish the NNSC on the grounds of violations not mentioned during such discussions. Moreover, our lack of success in long, drawn out discussions or negotiations would further infuriate the ROKG.

b. Such prior decisions as we make to limt discussions to a pd not to exceed about 2 wk would have no influence whatsoever on the Communists. The MAC is a 2-power body without chmn and placing a time limt on discussions on any subj is depn upon either an agreement to that eff by both sides, or a flat refusal by one side to cont such discussion. If we announce at the outset that we intend to limt discussions of this issue to a definite pd of time, the Communist tactic, with which we have had prev experience, may be to stall such discussions until immed prior to the expiration of such time limt, then come forth with proposals which, if given consideration, would ext the time limt and which, if we refuse to discuss, would result in our being made to appear insincere in this whole issue. If we do not announce a time limt beforehand, yet have no definite course of action of our own, a time limt will be meaningless. I believe that any introduction of this issue in MAC should not be for the purpose of "discussions" of the gen proposal made by the Swiss and Swedes, but should be in the form of a concrete UNC proposal complete with impl docu to dissolve the NNSC by mutually agreed amendment to the armistice agreement.

c. It is apparently acpt by State that the Communists will reject a proposal to liquidate the NNSC, a view which I share. I consider it equally certain that they will also reject any variation or compromise proposal such as a plan for substantial reduction in the str of the NNSC since they have absolutely nothing to gain from acceding to the Swiss and Swedish desire to rid themselves of a distasteful mission. Therefore, regardless of the logic and reasonableness UNC attempts at discussing the Swiss and Swedish proposals that the NNSC be liquidated or substantially reduced in str, the Communists can be expected ultimately to reject such proposals and, in the process, to exploit to the fullest, thru lengthy and apparently sincere negotiations, the opportunity for propagandizing their theme that the UNC is attempting to scrap the armistice. This would present to the UNC the unwelcome alternatives of protracted defensive and counter-offensive negotiations in the MAC, or acceptance of a propaganda defeat.

d. As I have stated on numerous occasions, the preferable approach to this whole problem is for the Swiss and Swedes to withdraw from the NNSC entirely or, as a less desirable but welcome alternative, withdraw their rep from the NNITs to the DZ. Therefore, despite my belief that the Swiss and Swedes are not yet willing to acpt the onus of such action, I concur in the cont attempts to induce it as indc in para 3 a (3) of ref A. I consider it unwise, however, for
the UNC to offer in the MAC the Swiss and Swede alternative that
the NNSC be reduced in str since this offer in itself would not to an
acceptance by the UNC of the Communist refusal to abide by the
armistice agreement.

e. The last step of the State proposal, that of cvn another meet-
ing of the 16 nations in the event of failure in discussions in MAC
and the appeals to the Swiss and Swedes, appears to be merely a
postponement of an inevitable decision since we can foresee failure
in the MAC and need only to reexam the negative results of previous
appeals to the Swiss and Swedes to anticipate failure there. I am
fully aware that the UNC rep the 16 nations and that any action by
this cmd, which involves the far-reaching implications inherent in
this issue, should be taken only after full consultaion with the 16
nations. Therefore, it would appear appropriate that, at the meeting
of the 16 sked for 8 Feb, the strongest possible presentation of this
issue and the urgent need for decisive action be made.

2. With ref to para 4, ref A, I understand clearly my authority
and resp for the protection of NNIT pers and have taken extraordi-
nary meas and precautions to meet such resp (ref C). Indiv NNITs
could be removed temporarily from their respective loc within So
Korea in the face of any foreseen explo situation. However, once re-
moved, they could not be rtn except at the increased risk of armed
clashes by US trp with the ROKG inspired elm which caused their
withdrawal. Furthermore, if the ROKG were able to force the with-
drawal of 1 team, it would attempt to force the withdrawal of all
teams. Yielding to such pressure to the extent of withdrawing all
NNITs to the DZ, which, of itself, would be a violation of the armi-
stice agreement, would amt to an admission of inability or refusal to
carry out my resp for providing full protection to the NNITs. The
result would be the death of the NNSC by default of the UNC, an
alternative which appears far less desirable, politically speaking, than
unilateral action on the part of the UNC based upon the firm moral
and legal ground of righteous indignation over a situation in which
the Communists, with the connivance of the Communist mbr of the
NNSC, have been permitted to violate the provisions of the armistice
agreement since its inception. In this respect, it is believed that pub
recognition within the US and within the other 15 nations, that the
US as exec agent has tolerated the Communists flagrant disregard for
those provisions of the armistice agreement which were designed to
prohibit the reinf of their combat posture in Korea, would have far
reaching political implications. This especially applies if hostilities are
ever resumed.

3. In summary, I recm:

a. That no action be taken in the MAC until an agreement can
be obtained on a phased course of action with the objective of elim
the NNSC in its entirety. In this respect, I consider that my recm
course of action, cntrn in ref B, offers the most dir and justifiable approach to the solution of this problem.

b. That, in the sked meeting of the 16 nations on 8 Feb 55, the US strive to have the other 15 nations recog:

(1). That the Communists have not adhered to that part of the armistice agreement which prohibits the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat mat.

(2). That the NNSC has been unable to perf the functions for which it was estb.

4. With respect to the assy of the fully docu case of Communist violations dir in para 5, ref A, this proj will be compl on or about 9 Feb, and will be forwarded to your hq immed thereafter.

17. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, February 7, 1955—11 p.m.

877. Tokyo pass CINCUNC, CG AF/E Army Eight and CAG. DA 975505 discussed this morning Tokyo. As indicated Embtel 851 rptd Tokyo 580, I envisage harassing delays in procedure outlined para three which may be exploited by Communists and I saw little prospect of MAC action favorable to US. The considerable present risk of explosive situation in ROK (ref CINCUNC 71216 for JCS Jan 24) may be aggravated by delays. Therefore unless Dept able obtain effective withdrawal commitment from Swiss and Swedes UNC should be prepared act along lines para four whenever local situation demands.

Briggs

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/2-755. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to Tokyo.
2Document 14.
3In telegram 851 from Seoul, February 1, the Embassy called attention to CINCUNC telegram C-71309, January 31 (see footnote 3, Document 10). The Embassy agreed that it might prove necessary in the last analysis to declare paragraphs 13c and 13d of the Armistice Agreement invalid, but the first step should be to formulate a U.S. reply to the Swiss and Swedes.
4See footnote 2, Document 14.
18. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea

Washington, February 9, 1955—6:14 p.m.

510. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC. CINCUNC’s C–71216 January 24. Meeting 16 held February 8. Deputy Under Secretary Murphy explained general problem NNSC. Recalled approaches Swiss and Swedes referred current Swiss and Swedish Aide-Mémoire. Reported Swiss Minister’s view we wait until Swiss and Swedes have reply Aide-Mémoire from Peiping and indicated our belief need emphasize concern military authorities feel re NNSC with danger incident between ROK and Czechs and Poles and UNC adherence and Communist violation para 13d Armistice which places UNC at disadvantage. Radford on basis talks Hull and Taylor in Seoul emphasized UNC view increasingly serious situation. Radford read pertinent excerpts paras 2, 3, and 4 CINCUNC’s C–71216 and emphasized danger involved if have to fire on ROKs protect Communists and need soon manufacture spare parts obsolete equipment if continue abide para 13d.

Group sympathetic dual problem faced by UNC and felt desirable consider two aspects separately. Re para 13d Ambassador Speaker pointed out breach Armistice contract by Communists could be cited as relieving UNC of obligation carry out corresponding requirements on its part. Ambassador Makins emphasized need have strong public case present re Communist violations. Others expressed concern about timing any such action and group clearly reserved judgment this step.

Re NNSC Consensus meeting was should wait brief period see how Peiping replies Aide-Mémoire before U.S. responded. Meantime agreed should immediately inform Swiss and Swedes our belief probability Communists will not accept their proposal NNSC be liquidated and ask them tell us now their detailed proposal for reduction personnel if Communists reject preferred alternative. Department will call in Swiss and Swedish representative February 10. Group will also consult governments re more basic problem para 13d Armistice. Agreed hold another meeting February 18 consider Swiss and Swede

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/2–955. Secret. Drafted by Jones; cleared with EUR, UNP, and in substance with the Department of Defense; and approved by McClurkin. Repeated to Bern, Stockholm, and Tokyo.

2See footnote 2, Document 14.

3A memorandum of the discussion at this meeting is in Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00–/2–855.

4See telegram 1086, infra.

5The meeting scheduled for February 18 was not held until February 24; see Document 23.
proposal and if available Peiping response. Decision then to be made re course action. Agreed inform press meeting routine sort held time to time discuss matters interest relating Korea.

ROK was not invited meeting. Minister Han informed in advance and immediately following meeting. Explained this on grounds well known ROK position re Armistice, fact ROK and U.S. see eye to eye on matter and belief most useful if other Allies feel completely free air views. Also gave Han gist letter from Pyun contained your 868 repeated Tokyo 391 Bern 21 Stockholm 20 but did not tell 16.

Dulles

6A memorandum of the conversation between McClurkin and Minister Han on February 8 is in Department of State, UNF Files: Lot 64 D 197, Korea—General Correspondence.
7Document 12.

19. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Switzerland

Washington, February 11, 1955—4:05 p.m.

1066. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC. Our 510 to Seoul repeated Bern 1052 Stockholm 591 and Tokyo 1583. Department officers met separately Swiss and Swedish representatives February 10. Explained Sixteen believed unlikely Communists agree preferred alternative liquidation NNSC but some indication Communists might accept some form reduction personnel. Sixteen therefore hope Swiss and Swedes make available on confidential basis detailed proposals reduction personnel NNSC for discussion with Sixteen February 18. Swiss and Swedish representatives agreed make this request their governments. Also agreed put to their governments question possible desirability asking Chinese Communists reaction aide-mémoire.

Dulles

1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/2-1155. Secret. Drafted by Jones, cleared with EUR and UNF, and approved by McClurkin. Also sent to Stockholm and repeated to Seoul and Tokyo.
2Supra.
3Memoranda of these conversations are in Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/2-1055.
20. Memorandum From the Far Eastern Regional Director, Foreign Operations Administration (Moyer) to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration (Stassen)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Proposed Revision of Korea FY 1955 Program

Problem: To obtain Congressional approval of a proposal for shifting $47.1 million in the FY 1955 Korea program from consumption goods to investment, including agreement to a second fertilizer plant estimated to cost $20 million, subject to finalization of the contract for the first fertilizer plant and to satisfactory action by the ROK Government on economic and financial reforms. This would raise the investment component to $156.8 million, or to 56 percent of a total program of $280 million.

Discussion: This is strongly recommended by the Economic Coordinator, Mr. Wood, and by the U.S. Ambassador. CINCUNC concurs. Representatives of State, Army and Treasury and the Budget Bureau have indicated their approval.

From the beginning of the Korea program it has been U.S. policy to assist in the rebuilding of Korea’s economy to the extent practical, in order to help that country provide a larger part of the cost of its defense establishment from its own resources and revenues. This also has been urgently desired by Pres. Rhee.

Mr. Wood contends that our agreement to increase the investment component in the FY 1955 program would commit the ROK Government to a number of basic reforms including: realistic pricing, private ownership of investment projects, credit reform, suppression of black markets, an improved utilization of ROK foreign exchange, expediting an implementation of the aid program, and the initiation of a national austerity program in the interests of reconstruction. Mr. Wood and the Ambassador see this as a hopeful means of getting maximum ROK self-help, and of establishing relations with the ROK on a more cooperative basis.

Of the $47.1 million to be shifted into investment, $27 million or more can be derived from materials in Army depot stocks valued at $43 million that have been approved for purchase. The balance, of $20 million, would be devoted to a second fertilizer plant.

\(^1\)Source: Washington National Records Center, FOA/ICA Files: Lot W–1444, FRC 56 A 632, Korea. Confidential. Sent through Dennis A. FitzGerald, Deputy Director of FOA. This memorandum grew out of an interagency discussion of the subject on February 14, among working-level officials of the Departments of State, Defense, and the Treasury and the Bureau of the Budget and a large contingent of FOA officials, including Stassen, FitzGerald, and Moyer. A memorandum of the discussion is *ibid.*
This plant, together with the $23 million urea fertilizer plant to be built from FY 1954 funds, will produce only two-thirds of Korea’s nitrogenous fertilizer requirements.

It is recognized that this shifting from consumption goods increases the inflationary danger. This danger will be at least partially offset by advantages gained through ROK self-action. A condition of going ahead with this revision is that if prices rise by more than 25 percent between now and the beginning of FY 1956, the FY 1956 investment program will be reduced.

21. Memorandum From the Acting Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Gleason) to the Secretary of State


SUBJECT

U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea

REFERENCE

Annex A to NSC 170/1

At the suggestion of the Secretary of Defense, concurred in by the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency, the President has this date approved the following revision of subparagraph d of Annex A to NSC 170/1:

"d. To select and encourage covertly the development of new South Korean leadership prepared to cooperate in maintaining the armistice, and if Rhee initiates or is about to initiate unilateral action, assist such new leadership to assume power, by means not involving overt U.S. participation until and unless U.S. overt support is necessary and promises to be decisive in firmly establishing such new leadership."

1Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 170 Series. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Also sent to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

2Regarding NSC 170/1, see footnote 2, Document 4.

3The President’s decision was later noted at the 238th meeting of the NSC on February 24. (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) The revision of Annex A, however, was not quoted or discussed by the NSC, and NSC Action No. 1340 merely records the decision without explaining the nature of the change. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
This revision is being disseminated only to the addressees above, and it is requested that special security precautions be observed in the handling of this memorandum and that access to it be very strictly limited on an absolute need-to-know basis.

S. Everett Gleason

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22. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Meeting with the 16, Thursday, February 24\(^2\)

In accordance with your request, we have called a meeting of the 16. The discussion at the last meeting of the 16 concluded with: (1) the agreement of the 16 to consult with their Governments on the question of paragraph 13d (the reinforcing restrictions of the Armistice Agreement) and our agreement to take no action in this connection pending further consultation with the 16; and (2) a discussion of the problem of the NNSC at which time it was agreed that it would be desirable to delay a reply to the Swiss and Swedes until the substance of the Chinese Communist reply was known.

On paragraph 13d, we have worked together with Defense in an effort to prepare a brief for unilateral action which would be convincing to our Allies and to the public. This brief (now under revision) does make the military case but, unfortunately, the case is not as effective as had been expected. For your information, G-2, curiously enough, apparently had not been consulted on this problem since in working up the brief it was apparent they doubted the wisdom of the course of action the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have urged. In addition, G-3 and Defense in connection with preparation of the brief indicated there was no intention of introducing new weapons or equipment into Korea in the near future, thus undercutting somewhat the urgency of the matter. We have asked Defense, therefore, to have a high-ranking military officer—perhaps Admiral Radford\(^3\)—to attend the meeting in order to make as strong a mili-

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\(^1\)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/2-2355. Confidential. Drafted by Jones and concurred in by FE, IO, and EUR.

\(^2\)See telegram 544, infra.

\(^3\)Radford did attend the meeting.
tary case for action on paragraph 13d as possible. I believe, however, that we should also stress the political case for action. We should make clear to our Allies the undesirability from a political standpoint of continuing indefinitely to adhere to agreements or elements thereof which the Communists violate with impunity. If we continue to adhere to elements of the Armistice Agreement which the Communists have violated, we thereby permit the Communists to perpetuate the myth that they are complying with the reinforcement provisions of the Armistice. However, because of the weakness of the case prepared by the military, and the difficult problem of timing of any action, I believe we should make no recommendations for immediate action in connection with paragraph 13d in this meeting but should (a) let the military present their more detailed case, (b) stress the political problem mentioned above, and (c) listen to the views of our Allies.

With respect to the NNSC, I suggest the group be informed that the UN Command has again charged the Communists in the Military Armistice Commission with violating paragraph 13d of the Armistice Agreement by introducing jet aircraft after the Armistice was signed. The UN Command on February 21, 1954, therefore, requested the NNSC to investigate these charges. While past experiences warrant no hope for an effective investigation, if any, the UN Command will have brought the record of Communist obstruction and frustration of the NNSC investigation functions up to date.

The Chinese Communists have now replied to the Swiss and Swedish Aide-Mémoire. Their reply makes it clear that they will not agree to a liquidation of the Commission because they insist the Commission is working very well and is making a contribution to the peace. The Communists have given lip service to the Swiss and Swedish proposal for reduction in the number of personnel on the NNSC, making it clear, however, that they would not agree to the Commission's being relieved of any of its control functions. Furthermore, they have suggested that the question of reduction of personnel on the NNSC be considered by the four nations with members on the Commission who would then decide upon methods for reduction in personnel. This procedure could delay indefinitely any decision to reduce the personnel of the Commission and in all likelihood would not result in a reduction to the extent we wish.

The Swiss are now pressing us for a reply to their Aide-Mémoire. We are preparing such a reply and believe that before sending

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4UNC action at the 55th meeting of the MAC on February 21 was reported in telegram 957 from Seoul, February 24. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/2-2455)
it we should inform the 16 of what we intend to say. The main points of the reply we propose to make are as follows:

1. The U.S. appreciates the difficulties the Swiss and Swedes have experienced in endeavoring to carry out their functions in the NNSC.

2. These difficulties were referred to in the Swiss and Swedish Aide-Mémoire of April 14, 1954. We understand them to be a result of Communist frustration and obstruction of the Armistice, a situation which was recognized in the May 4, 1954 refutation of the Swiss and Swedish members of the NNSC of Czech and Polish allegations of the UN Command Armistice violations; in the Swiss and Swedish memorandum of May 7, 1954 in which they clearly indicated that the inspection functions of the NNSC had been frustrated in the north by the Communists; and in Ambassador Sohman’s statement of December 1, 1954 before the Political Committee of the UN General Assembly.

3. The U.S. agrees with the Swiss and Swedes that in view of the history of Communist frustration the Commission can no longer serve a useful function and, therefore, that liquidation is the preferred alternative. Nevertheless, the U.S. Government is prepared to agree to retention of an NNSC greatly reduced in personnel which would be stationed in the Demilitarized Zone to receive reports from the two sides.

Also in replying to the Swiss and Swedish Aide-Mémoire, it would be necessary to indicate the manner in which we believe our position on a reduction in personnel of the NNSC should be negotiated. There seem to be two possible courses of action:

1. Have the UN Command raise the issue in the Military Armistice Commission and attempt to get Communist agreement. If within a short period the Communists refuse to agree, or if they refuse to discuss the matter at all in view of their proposal that the NNSC work out recommendations, we would then ask the Swiss and Swedes to take action to reduce their personnel and NNSC activities in accordance with our recommendation. Obtain Allied agreement now that if the Swiss and Swedes will not agree to take such action, we would then announce in the Military Armistice Commission that because of Communist frustration we consider the functions of the Commission to be reduced to receiving reports from the two sides by a small group stationed within the Demilitarized Zone. We would

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5The Swiss and Swedish aide-mémoire is attached to a memorandum of conversation by Allen, April 14, 1954. (Ibid, 795.00/4-1454)
6Excerpts from this May 4 memorandum are printed in Department of State Bulletin, June 21, 1954, pp. 944-947.
7Not found in Department of State files.
8Swedish Ambassador Rolf Sohman’s statement in the First Committee on the Korean question was made on December 2 rather than December 1. In his statement, Sohman pointed out the limiting factors which prevented the adequate exercise by the NNSC of the supervisory functions prescribed by the Korean Armistice Agreement. (U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR. 738)
then request the personnel of the NNSC to leave the Republic of Korea and remove them if necessary.

2. Ask the Swiss and Swedes to negotiate our position with the Czechs and Polish for a period not exceeding three weeks making clear that we have set an absolute limit to that position. If these negotiations fail, take the matter up in the Military Armistice Commission for a short time and follow this action with action to reduce the activities and personnel of the NNSC to those levels we have sought to negotiate. This course of action would almost certainly lead to a situation in which the UN Command will be placed in the position of demanding more drastic action than the Swiss and Swedes will have attempted to negotiate with the Czechs and Poles.

We, therefore, prefer the first of these alternatives, because it avoids a situation in which the public position of the UN Command might be divergent from that of the Swiss and Swedes. It would therefore achieve our objective most surely and rapidly. In any event, we want the agreement now of our Allies to action by the UN Command, if necessary, to reduce the NNSC activities.⁹

⁹A note by Sebald at the end of the source text reads: “I understand that Mr. Phleger does not concur with the above recommended course of action.”

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23. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea¹

Washington, February 25, 1955—7:54 p.m.

544. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC. Meeting 16 originally scheduled February 18 held February 24. Murphy reviewed developments since February 8 meeting and Radford reviewed reasons early action solve problems posed by Communist violations paragraph 13d Armistice Agreement important.

General agreement NNSC and 13d problems be kept separate with immediate attention given NNSC while build strong public case for action on 13d.

Re NNSC agreed U.S. reply Swiss and Swedish Aide-Mémoire of January 27 urging Swiss and Swedes attempt get Poles and Czechs agree substantial reduction NNSC to nominal group stationed DZ

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/2–2555. Secret. Drafted by Jones and Walter H. Drew of NA; cleared with F/E, UNP, P, and in substance with the Department of Defense; and approved by McClurkin. Repeated to Bern, Stockholm, and Tokyo.

²A memorandum of the discussion at this meeting is ibid., 795.00/2–2455.
and indicating belief time limit be set and that Poles and Czechs not be permitted prolong discussion. Also agreed in event failure Swiss and Swedish effort we strongly urge Swiss and Swedes withdraw personnel entirely or reduce to nominal group stationed DZ. Group also felt desirable urge Swiss and Swedes issue statement making clear fact Communist obstruction had prevented effective functioning of Commission.

We intend hand reply Aide-Mémoire Swiss and Swedish representatives Washington Monday February 28.\(^3\) Aide-Mémoire for public release will be supplemented by oral note privately informing Swiss and Swedish representatives Washington we believe negotiations should not extend beyond three week period and that cannot agree lesser reduction.

Re 13d agreed that UNC through charges and publicity should build up record Communist violations 13d in order prepare public opinion appropriate action. Meanwhile U.S. will prepare documented brief for transmittal 15 Governments giving detailed military reasons why abrogation 13d increasingly urgent. Intended that parts of brief be made public to build case for action to equalize situation.

ROK present as observer.

Your 957\(^4\) arrived in time for use at meeting and was most helpful.

Hoover

\(^3\)See Document 26.
\(^4\)See footnote 4, supra.

24. National Security Council Report\(^1\)

NSC 5514


NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON U.S. OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

REFERENCES

A. NSC 170/1

B. NSC Action No. 1340

The enclosed draft statement of policy on the subject, prepared by the NSC Planning Board, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, March 10, 1955.

A Financial Appendix covering Korea will be prepared and circulated for the information of the Council prior to the meeting.

The enclosed statement of policy, if adopted, is intended to supersede NSC 170/1.

It is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosed statement of policy, it be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve it, direct its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, and designate the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Here follows a table of contents.]

Enclosure

DRAFT STATEMENT OF POLICY ON U.S. OBJECTIVES AND ON COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA

Objectives

1. Long-range Objective: To bring about the unification of Korea with a self-supporting economy and under a free, independent, and representative government, friendly toward the U.S. and other countries of the free world, with its political and territorial integrity as-

Coordinating Board reported to the NSC that NSC 170/1 had become “partially obsolete” and should be revised. (For text of NSC 170/1, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. xv, Part 2, pp. 1620–1624.) The Progress Report is ibid., pp. 1942–1956. On January 19, 1955, Assistant Secretary Robertson sent a memorandum to Secretary Dulles recommending that the Department support the development of a new policy paper on Korea. On February 10, the Department of State member of the NSC Planning Board transmitted to the Board a draft paper entitled “U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea,” which was prepared in the Department. The Board Assistant of the Planning Board reworked the Department of State draft and submitted a revised version to the Planning Board on February 18. The final draft printed here was approved for transmittal to the NSC by the Planning Board on February 24. (Copies of Robertson’s January 19 memorandum, the Department of State draft, and the Planning Board draft of this paper are in Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, Korea, U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action)


3Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
sured by international agreement and with armed forces sufficient for internal security and capable of strong resistance in event of attack by a foreign power.

2. **Current U.S. Objective:** Pending achievement of the above long-range objective, (a) to assist the Republic of Korea (ROK) in order to enable it to make a substantial contribution to free world strength in the Pacific area, (b) to prevent more of Korea from coming under Communist domination either by subversion or aggression, and (c) to develop ROK armed forces sufficient for internal security and capable of defending ROK territory short of attack by a major power.

3. To achieve these objectives through peaceful means, if possible to do so without compromising U.S. obligations, principles, or military security.

**Courses of Action**

(The following courses of action are subject to review in the event the U.S. becomes engaged in hostilities in the Formosan area or elsewhere in Asia outside of Korea.)

**The Armistice**

4. Widely publicize the fact that the Communists, with the connivance of the Communist members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, have violated the provisions of the Armistice Agreement since its inception.

5. a. Continue to observe the Armistice except as in b and c below.

b. Take such action as is necessary to deal with the situation caused by Communist violations of the Armistice when it is determined:

(1) That the UNC is at a significant disadvantage because of such violations.

(2) That the advantage of taking such action outweighs the military and political disadvantages thereof, including the possible non-agreement of the UNC allies to such a course. Prior agreement of our UNC allies for this action should be sought, but they should not be given a veto on U.S. action.

c. In the event of unprovoked Communist attack against U.S. military or non-military personnel, aircraft, or vessels outside Communist territory, take action in accordance with paragraph 5–g of NSC 5429/5, even though this may be construed as a violation of the Armistice.

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Preventing or Countering the Resumption of Fighting by the ROK

6. The U.S. should seek to ensure that the ROK does not unilaterally renew hostilities, by:

a. Continuing to make clear to ROK leaders where circumstances necessitate that if the ROK unilaterally initiates military operations against Chinese or North Korean forces in or north of the Demilitarized Zone then:

   (1) UN Command ground, sea, and air forces will not support such operations directly or indirectly.
   (2) The U.S. will not furnish any military or logistic support for such operations.
   (3) All U.S. economic aid to Korea will cease immediately.
   (4) The UN Commander will take any action necessary to prevent his forces becoming involved in the renewal of hostilities and to provide for their security.

b. Continuing to persuade the ROK to maintain its forces under UN Command while that Command has responsibilities for the defense of Korea.

c. Making UN Command plans and dispositions which will reinforce the statements made to ROK leaders under a above and manifest U.S. determination to carry them out, in so far as this is consistent with sound military deployments to cope with a Communist attack.

7. In anticipation of the possibility that President Rhee may order the renewal of hostilities by an attack on Communist forces in or north of the Demilitarized Zone, despite all the actions taken by the U.S. under paragraph 6 above, the U.S. should take the measures stated in Annex A (Annex A to NSC 170/1 amended as reported by NSC Action No. 1340, and circulated only to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence).\(^5\)

8. If ROK forces should renew hostilities unilaterally, the U.S. should, in addition to appropriate actions under Annex A:

   a. Stop all economic and military assistance to Korea.
   b. Discontinue all logistic or other support to the ROK forces.
   c. Take such other military measures as seem feasible and consistent with the security and capability of UNC forces to block ROK offensive action.
   d. Evacuate UN civilians.
   e. Notify the Communists that the UN Command will disassociate itself from the ROK action, but will defend UN Command forces against any Communist attack, and will be prepared, if a Communist counterattack against the ROK threatens the security of UN Com-

\(^5\)For the revision of Annex A, as approved by the President, see Document 21.
mand forces, to undertake such military action as may be necessary for the security of UN Command forces.

f. Renew hostilities with the Communists only if necessary to protect the security of UN Command forces.

g. Promptly seek to obtain the support of the other members of the UN Command and, as appropriate, inform the UN of the actions taken by the UN Command under UN authority to prevent or limit hostilities.

Countering the Resumption of Fighting by the Communists

9. If Communist forces renew hostilities in Korea, the U.S. should:

a. Implement the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty

b. Invoke the Joint Policy Declaration\(^6\) by calling upon the signatories to carry out the commitment that “if there is a renewal of the armed attack, challenging again the principles of the United Nations, we should again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.”

c. Make clear to the world the necessity of expanding the war [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] as the only feasible way of honoring our collective security commitments to the UN and our security commitments to the ROK.

d. Implement the military and diplomatic measures referred to in NSC Action No. 1004, January 8, 1954.\(^7\)

e. Call on other UN members for effective military assistance [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

Achieving a Position of Strength

10. Pending a political settlement and in the absence of a renewal of hostilities, and conditioned upon satisfactory cooperation by the ROK in carrying out its agreements with the U.S., the U.S. should:

a. Accept the division of Korea on the present demarcation line while seeking a satisfactory solution of the Korean problem by the use of other than military action.

b. Continue to develop the ROK as a military ally.

c. Maintain the general security position of the ROK by increasing the combat effectiveness of its active armed forces and developing an effective reserve in order to permit a reduction in the size of its active armed forces at an appropriate time.

d. Seek to continue the military involvement and thus the political interest of other nations in Korea and to give greater force to the Joint Policy Declaration by persuading the other UN members to

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maintain at least minimum armed forces within the ROK in order to preserve the UN Command.

e. Working in and through the organs of the UN where feasible, continue to strengthen the government and democratic institutions of the ROK.

f. Encourage the development of cooperative relations, mutual respect and participation in multilateral activities between the ROK and the other free nations of Asia as a means of lessening the dependence of the ROK upon the U.S. for political and moral support; endeavor to develop a community of interest between the ROK and Japan, and also with the Philippines and the Republic of China through the offer of U.S. good offices to help resolve outstanding problems and by encouragement of joint cooperation; and encourage the conditions necessary to form as soon as possible, and then participate in, a Western Pacific collective defense arrangement, including the Philippines, Japan, the Republic of China, and the ROK, eventually linked with the Manila Pact and ANZUS.

g. Continue to strengthen the ROK economy by implementing the present expanded program of economic assistance in that portion of Korea controlled by the ROK and the UN Command. The program should be designed:

(1) To establish living standards approximating the 1949-50 levels, which the ROK should be able to support with a minimum of future external aid.

(2) To increase the investment component as rapidly as is consistent with economic stability, placing greatest emphasis on projects contributing most immediately to increased productivity.

(3) To permit the ROK to assume an increasingly greater proportion of the cost of supporting its armed forces.

Seeking To Obtain Satisfactory Agreements From the Communists

11. In order to achieve a unified Korea under an independent and representative Government friendly toward the U.S., established through the holding of genuinely free elections under UN supervision for representation in the National Assembly, in which representation shall be in direct proportion to the indigenous population in Korea, the U.S. should be prepared to:

a. Engage in political negotiations between the Communists and the UN side (with the ROK associated with the latter), if it appears such negotiations would be productive.

b. Conclude arrangements with the Communists and such other nations as are concerned to guarantee the political and territorial integrity of a unified Korea.

c. Accept a level of Korean armed forces sufficient for internal security and capable of strong resistance in event of attack by a foreign power.

d. Forego all rights granted to the U.S. under the U.S. ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, and to refrain from stationing U.S. forces and maintaining U.S. bases in Korea, provided no other foreign forces are granted these rights or maintain such forces and bases.
12. Any such agreement should not preclude the provision of U.S. economic and military assistance to Korea.

13. Pending achievement of satisfactory agreements with the Communists:

a. Continue in effect all pertinent instructions to the UN Command involving the maintenance of the security of the U.S. forces in the Korean area.

b. Continue diplomatic efforts to persuade our Allies to accept U.S. courses of action with respect to Korea and to contribute to their support.

[1 paragraph (2-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

25. **Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Hull) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff**¹

*Tokyo, March 2, 1955—11:30 a.m.*

C 71691. Ref: C 71665,² KDCG 2–2. I consider the event reported by ref msg another of the series in which we barely got by without disastrous conflict; it is highly problematic that we can be so fortunate again.

2. In the light of the history of Pres Rhee's violent objections to NNSC activities in the ROK, and his officially aggravated anti-NNIT campaign, it is unexpectedly gratifying that he gave his consent to cooperate in this instance. This consent does not insure that there will be no unfortunate incident but it does reduce the probability of such an incident.

3. I do not believe it is desirable to use military means upon Pres Rhee in the face of his determined opposition. I recommend that in any future similar case I seek Pres Rhee's approval but should he disapprove, I be authorized to respect that disapproval. In such a case, I would refuse to permit the NNIT to visit ROK installations on the basis that such an inspection would be an open encroachment upon ROK sovereignty and a direct personal affront to Pres Rhee. I appre-

¹Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) (2), Secret. Repeated to Ambassador Briggs, CG AFFE/Army Eight, DEPACOMARMY/EIGHT FWD KOREA, Sr Mbr UNCMAC, COMFEAF, and COMNAVFE.

²In telegram C 71665 from CINCUNC to the Ambassador in Korea, February 28, General Hull noted that senior military and Embassy officials in Tokyo were in agreement that it was desirable for the U.N. Command to abide by the terms of the Armistice and accede to Communist requests for NNIT inspections of six military locations in South Korea. Hull requested the Embassy to seek an audience with President Rhee to ask for Rhee's agreement and cooperation. (Ibid.)
ciate the political significance of violating the Armistice agreement by refusing to permit NNSC investigations in South Korea, but I consider US-UN relations with the ROK also a problem of considerable significance, which we must face.

4. I consider it imperative that decision on this matter reach me prior to the next request for an inspection by a MIT in the ROK.3

5. The need of appropriate action at Wash level to eliminate the NNSC as I have recommended on many previous occasions, is urgent.

3In telegram JCS 977312 to CINCFE, March 8, the Joint Chiefs of Staff granted General Hull the discretionary authority which he sought. They added, however, “in view grave political significance this act State and Defense would appreciate opportunity to review situation before action if time factor will permit.” (Ibid.)

26. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea1

Washington, March 2, 1955—6:32 p.m.

554. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC. Murphy and Sebald today talked separately with Swedish Ambassador Boheman2 and Counselor Schnyder of Swiss Legation about NNSC.3 Handed them identical Aide-Mémoire4 in response theirs January 27.5 Aide-Mémoire says US appreciates difficulties encountered in NNSC task undertaken by Swiss and Swedes and is aware obstructionist activities by Communists have made it impossible NNSC perform its task. US therefore believes NNSC should be abolished. Despite Chinese Communist reply and current activities NNSC US believes consistent history Communist obstruction makes it doubtful any useful purpose served by continuing NNSC. Adds US would be interested any results their further consultations.

1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/3–255. Confidential. Drafted by McClurkin and cleared with EUR. Also sent to Stockholm, Bern, and Tokyo.

2Erik Boheman.

3Memoranda of the conversations with Schnyder and Boheman are in Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/3–255.

4Copies of the aides-mémoire are attached to the memoranda of conversations cited in footnote 3 above.

Murphy said we did not plan to make Aide-Mémoire public but Swiss and Swedes could do so if they chose. However also handed them confidential Note Verbale making our position more specific. Note referred various statements by Swiss and Swedes indicating Communist responsibility frustration activities NNSC. While doubting any useful purpose Commission can serve US would be prepared as maximum accept great reduction in NNSC if all remaining personnel stationed in demilitarized zone where can receive reports from two sides. US believes any negotiations undertaken by Swiss and Swedes should not be prolonged beyond three or four weeks. If these negotiations unsuccessful US hopes Swiss and Swedes will withdraw completely from NNSC or reduce personnel as indicated above.

Schnyder made no comment. Boheman indicated his personal view that Swedish position should be to suggest reduction of NNSC to perhaps 10 people from each side all stationed demilitarized zone and if this not acceptable Communists Swiss and Swedes would be compelled withdraw.

Copies Aide-Mémoire and Note Verbale being pouched.

Seoul communicate foregoing information ROK but urge substance Note Verbale be treated confidentially.

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6The Department did, however, make public the text of the aide-mémoire in Department of State Press Release 119, issued on March 3; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, March 14, 1955, p. 429.

7The texts of the notes verbales are attached to the memoranda of conversations cited in footnote 3 above.

8In telegram 993 from Seoul, March 4, Counselor of Embassy Carl W. Strom reported that he had conveyed the substance of the Department's aide-mémoire and note verbale in a memorandum to Foreign Minister Pyun. Pyun expressed dissatisfaction with what he viewed as a further delay in dealing with the NNSC problem, and he stated that his government would not be satisfied with anything but the abolition of the NNSC. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/3–455)

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27. **Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State**¹

Seoul, March 8, 1955—7 p.m.

1010. Tokyo pass CINCUNC, CG AFFE/Army Eight and CAGJ. Re Embtel 993, Tokyo 678, Bern 34, Stockholm 33.² In reply to our

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/3–855. Confidential. Repeated to Bern, Stockholm, and Tokyo.

²See footnote 8, supra.
memorandum of March 4\textsuperscript{a} giving FonOff substance US replies to Swedes and Swiss on NNSC, we have received strongly worked FonOff memorandum dated March 7\textsuperscript{a} setting forth ROK position on NNSC. After expressing satisfaction that in its replies U.S. made it clear that it stands for abolition NNSC, memorandum states that ROK Govt “entirely concur with this American position” and adds that ROK Govt “cannot support any plan or proposal divergent from this position.”

Memorandum continues as follows:

“In fact, so-called Armistice has become a farce by chronic and downright Communist violations. It has become evident that Communists will continue abusing Armistice as shield for their unlawful but undeterred build-up of striking power until they grow strong enough to throw away even this farce of an Armistice for an all-out attack. Armistice has completely lost its raison d’être not only because of continual Communist violations of it but also because it is no longer prelude to peaceful solution of Korean question which deliberate Communist intransigence has rendered time and again an utter failure until now free world is resigned to stark impossibility of unifying Korean nation through peaceful negotiation with Communists.

“There is no fighting not because Communist-disregarded Armistice deserves any regard from free world but simply because no side wishes to reopen hostilities for time being. This Government cannot understand if a certain arrangement other than abolition of NNSC makes it possible for Communist members of commission to remain in South Korea and keep carrying on espionage activities. Any such arrangement will be signal for this Government to take appropriate action to safeguard national security. Such an unsatisfactory arrangement will put an end to patience with which this Government has been waiting for satisfactory result which concerted actions of our friendly allies were expected to have brought. To repeat, any decision of matter reached at long last will at least tell this Government that there is no more need for waiting. If decision is satisfactory to this Government, no action on its part would be needed. On other hand, if decision is unsatisfactory, an attempt on part of this Government to set it right will be naturally expected. This Government trusts that justice will be with it.”

Comment: President Rhee devoted first half hour of each of his two conferences with Governor Stassen\textsuperscript{5} to ROK complaints against NNSC. His insistent demand was for abolition. His theme was: I have shown patience month after month in response your requests. When will this end?

Abolition NNSC will remain firm ROK objective and we are convinced President Rhee will in long run be satisfied with nothing

\textsuperscript{a}See footnote 8, \textit{supra}.
\textsuperscript{4}Not found in Department of State files.
\textsuperscript{5}See \textit{infra}.
less. As last resort, drastic cut in size and restriction all remaining NNSC personnel to DMZ might enable us to deal with him on this subject for a few months longer. We must point out, however, that such a reduction should be considered only a temporary solution and would leave constant source irritation US-ROK relations. Therefore, we continue hope present strategy will result NNSC abolition.

Strom

28. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, March 8, 1955—10 p.m.

1012. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC, CG AFFE Eight and CAG. CINCUNC pass Stassen, Wood. Governor Stassen arrived Seoul eight a.m. March 7;\(^2\) conferences President Rhee two p.m., 7th; ten a.m., 8th; formal dinner Pres Rhee seven p.m., 7th; press conference two p.m., 8th; departure three p.m., 8th.

Participants in conferences besides Governor and members his party: Wood; Strom; Pyun, ROK FonMin; Sohn, Defense; Kang, Commerce and Industry; Lee, Finance; Yuh, Rehabilitation; and Paik Tu-chin, Economic Coordinator.\(^3\) Stage set by ROK for Governor's visit by events following UNC dollar auction\(^4\) February 28: Up to $two million offered; bids totalling $1,068,000 at average price 485 accepted; and on March 2 Paik Tu-chin sent Wood letter\(^5\) impugning U.S. motives in buying less than full amount offered and giving official notice of ROK dissatisfaction with auction plans and formally invoking provision of agreed minute for return to Hwan drawing system (reftel 3–3 Unceb).\(^6\)

In briefing Governor Stassen, progress in program was noted as follows: Substantial increases in agricultural and industrial production; recent decline in level of wholesale prices; reduction in exchange rate for general export dollar following initiation of dollar

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\(^{1}\)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100–ST/3–855. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Tokyo.

\(^{2}\)Stassen was in Korea as part of a month-long tour of Embassies in the Far East and South Asia to review FOA programs. Stassen's trip took him to India, Pakistan, Ceylon, the Philippines, Korea, and Japan before returning to Washington in mid-March. Additional information on the trip is ibid., 033.1100–ST.

\(^{3}\)These Korean officials are: Sohn Won-il, Kang Sung Tae, Lee Joong-chai, Yun Wan Chang, and Paik Tu-chin, respectively.

\(^{4}\)See footnote 3, Document 3.

\(^{5}\)Not found in Department of State files.
auctions: growth of private construction activity, including repair and erection of housing, largely due to massive import of building materials under aid program; initiation of such basic projects as power stations, fertilizer plant, cement plant, and glass factory which will yield substantial return in a few years’ time; general improvement of living standards and standards of health and sanitation; and satisfactory progress on preparing FRS and issuance of PA’s under FY 1955 program.

In next briefing step Wood enumerated ROK failures to honor its minute understanding 6 commitments: first auction had to be thrown out and second was only nominally acceptable; ROK has offered none of its own foreign exchange for sale; in face falling market ROK has held 114,000 tons rice which could have been sold to acquire foreign exchange; ROK has lagged in instituting realistic pricing; Japanese boycott has continued; and ROK has failed to support private business endeavor, specifically in connection army sales salvage goods which are subject to gangster-type interferences.

In discussing failures it was pointed out to Governor most are related to Pres Rhee’s two major fixations on pegged foreign exchange and psychopathic opposition to Japanese, respectively. It was suggested that he will never be persuaded to relinquish these fixations; that measure of success aid program has been due to our success in persuading him to moderate his position on such things as dollar auctions and realistic pricing; and that any future success will depend on our ability to obtain continuation of moderate attitude.

President opened each conference with half-hour recital his grievances against NNSC followed by extensive remarks on relations with Japan and finally lengthy exposition his known views on exchange rates. In each conference he offered advance Hwan for UMC accepting repayment at any rate between 180 and 600 which UNC considered fair. As part of plan he would proclaim rate of 180 for all other transactions and asserted Korean people would accept this rate as part their patriotic duty; however, if after trial it was decided rate could not be held at 180 he would raise it, mentioning in this connection such rates as 220, 300 and eventually 400. He insisted his plan would succeed on six months’ trial; he pointed out that he and other Koreans knew more about their business than others (including ourselves); he would not auction off any of Korea’s foreign exchange; that it was Korea’s sovereign right to peg the rate at 180; and that if ROK actions in handling its foreign exchange problems accordance its best judgment were not acceptable to U.S. and its Congress, U.S. would have to withhold its aid or adjust itself to Korean policy in any way it found it possible.

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In replying at first conference, Governor on behalf U.S. thanked Korea for firm stand against communism; sympathized on NNSC issue and expressed opinion that in this as in many other situations in world today best solution was reached through exercise patience.

In taking up immediate problems connection aid program, Governor first noted improvements effected through program in recent months and then enumerated shortcomings in ROK performance under minute of understanding essentially as outlined in account of briefings given above. He then took up Paik Tu-chin’s letter of March 2 saying letter contained unjustified charges against U.S. and was not on whole kind of letter a government sends to another friendly govt. After some discussion various points Governor raised, conference adjourned about 3:30 pm to resume next morning at ten.

Main features second conference were President’s acrimonious remarks on exchange rate and discussion Paik’s letter. Governor let [led?] President most patiently and firmly through consideration consequences as far as American congressional and public opinion were concerned how ROK failures honor commitments under minute understanding with particular reference failure use its own holdings foreign exchange and discontinuation dollar auctions. He said U.S. also hoped eventually stabilize Hwan but pointed out this stabilizing process in Greece required four years after fighting ceased and in Japan, three and half. He noted the admitted improvement Korea’s last few months and asked for continuation dollar auction system through June 30 with offerings by ROK own foreign exchange to extent $14 million during this period. He promised around June 30 to send top FOA officials to Korea or come himself if possible to review situation and plan subsequent course with reference stabilization currency.

In course discussion Governor made repeated references desirability withdraw Paik’s objectionable letter (which also contained notice discontinuation auctions).

After more discussion President relented and agreed to Governor’s proposal: withdrawal of Paik letter; continuation weekly auction system; and review situation about June 30. Governor reiterated necessity ROK offer some of its foreign exchange for sale but Pres did not specifically commit himself to do it. Conference atmosphere friendly closing on most cordial note.

During past weeks Wood has tried unsuccessfully get Paik agree raising price at which POL enters ROK economy from 350 level agreed in January as transitory step towards more realistic price. Last night after dinner Paik raised question and Wood proposed pricing at 425 for March. Paik countered with 400. Wood advised Paik today that 400 for March and April allocations would be acceptable. Paik agreed subject to clearance by Minister Rehabilitation.
Following Rhee conference today Wood returned Paik’s letter; Wood decided accompany Governor to Tokyo to discuss proposal holding auctions of two million dollars each on March 14 and 21; and Governor held successful press conference. Wood agreed advise Governor if during next two weeks ROK does not arrange auction million dollars of its own on March 28. In that event governor will write Rhee transmitting letter by telegraph pointing out importance this step.

Embassy and OEC consider Stassen visit was instrumental in averting extended crisis and improved President’s psychological attitude sufficiently to permit return to acceptable working relationship with ROK regarding aid program.

Strom

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29. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Switzerland**

   *Washington, March 8, 1955—7 p.m.*

   1210. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC. CINCUNC reports that in view ROK hostility he finds it necessary tighten already stringent security measures protect NNCS personnel. KPA/CPV apparently taking full advantage this opportunity place UNC in poor light by granting NNITS freedom movement in territory over their Command and comparatively luxurious accommodations. CINCUNC further reports Swiss and Swedes becoming restive and he suspects less sympathetic our side problem. View ROK antagonism and threats violence CINCUNC states will continue unable provide freedom movement, privileges, treatment and immunities called for under paragraph 13(j) Armistice Agreement. Expects therefore indictment from NNCS for failure meet these provisions with consequent danger political implications.

   Request you inform appropriate authorities Bern and Stockholm expressing hope Swiss and Swedish members NNCS understand situation and exercise forbearance.

   Dulles

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*Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/3–855. Secret. Drafted by Jones and approved by McClurkin. Also sent to Stockholm and repeated to Seoul and Tokyo.*

*Apparent reference to CINCUNC telegram C 71216, January 24; see footnote 2, Document 14.*
30. Memorandum of Discussion at the 240th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 10, 1955

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1–3.]

4. U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea (NSC 5514; NSC 170/1; NSC Action No. 1340; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 7, 1955)

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the contents of the revised policy paper on Korea (copy of briefing notes filed in the Minutes of the meeting).

The President interrupted Mr. Cutler's briefing with a comment that he would very much like to have General Taylor or General Hull report to the National Security Council on the relative military situation of the UN Command in Korea and the Communists in the north, when General Taylor returned to the United States. The President added that in view of the dangers posed for the UN Command by the constant Communist violations of the armistice agreement, and in view of the difficulties involving the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, he regretfully believed that the United States would have to start violating the armistice itself.

After Mr. Cutler had completed his briefing of the Council with a reference to the acute difficulties encountered in the effort to prepare a Financial Appendix, he called on Admiral Radford.

Admiral Radford explained that he was quite certain that unless there were major changes in the military situation in Korea and the Communists withdrew large forces, it would be absolutely impossible to get the Government of the Republic of Korea willingly to agree to reduce the current level of South Korean military forces. Accordingly, Admiral Radford predicted that we would have to continue to support the existing level of South Korean forces for at least another year.

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2Document 24.
4See footnote 3, Document 21.
5This memorandum enclosed a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, dated March 4, in which the Joint Chiefs expressed their approval of the military aspects of NSC 5514 and recommended that the Secretary concur in its adoption by the NSC. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5514 Series)
6Not printed. The minutes of all National Security Council meetings held during the Eisenhower administration are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File.
Mr. Cutler then asked the Secretary of State if he would not comment on the problem posed by the NNSC. Secretary Dulles indicated that the State Department had found it very hard to get the Swiss and Swedish Governments to do anything at all to remedy this situation lest in so doing they give offense to the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the most the United States could hope to do for the time being was to reduce the size of the NNSC at once to a skeleton or nominal basis. The Communists, of course, did not want any change in the existing set-up, because it was a one-way street for them. They entirely restricted the operation of the teams in North Korea, while enjoying advantages from the relatively unrestricted operation of the teams in South Korea. All in all, said Secretary Dulles, this was a "scandalous" operation, which the State Department had been doing its best to liquidate and to do so in such a way as to avoid resort by President Rhee to liquidation by unilateral action.

Mr. Allen Dulles said he wished to inquire as to the intent of paragraph 4 of NSC 5514, which called on the United States widely to publicize the fact that the Communists had violated the provisions of the armistice agreement since its inception. Did this, inquired Mr. Dulles, call for an official statement by the United States Government? After all, the same problem existed in the violations by the Vietminh in Indochina. It constituted a very delicate problem [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and if any such official statement were to be issued, it would have to be prepared with the utmost care.

Secretary Dulles agreed with Mr. Allen Dulles that the material which we could put into an official U.S. statement would almost certainly exclude much of what we are reasonably sure constitutes evidence of the grossest kind of Communist violations.

Admiral Radford pointed out that at the last meeting of the representatives of the sixteen countries who had participated on our side in the Korean war, it had been agreed that the United States should prepare such a public statement, and, indeed, such a statement was in the course of being prepared. However, the statement would not include material derived from sensitive intelligence sources, but would depend instead on information from overt sources.

Secretary Dulles said that he had not understood that paragraph 4 referred solely to an official U.S. Government statement. Admiral Radford replied that such a statement was necessary in the view of the representatives of the sixteen nations, since it was essential for them to be able to publicize the Communist violations in order to inform public opinion in their respective countries. The President indicated that if he were to write a private letter to the British Prime Minister, it would be perfectly possible to include information about Communist violations, no matter how sensitive the source of information. Furthermore, he believed that such a letter would be very
useful and influential. In this connection, Secretary Dulles made reference to the contents of a communication from the British Chargé in Peiping to the Foreign Office in London, describing a conversation between Trevelyan and Chou En-lai regarding the atrocities which the Chinese Communists had perpetrated on British prisoners captured in the Korean war.

Secretary Dulles then said he wished to comment on paragraph 10–d, of NSC 5514, which called for an effort to persuade other UN members to maintain at least minimum armed forces in the Republic of Korea in order to preserve the UN Command. While, said Secretary Dulles, he did not object to the inclusion of this course of action in the paper, the members of the National Security Council should be clearly aware of the increasing difficulty the U.S. would encounter in carrying out this course of action. Sir Anthony Eden had been pressing him at the recent Bangkok Conference to get the remaining British forces transferred from Korea to Malaya, in order to meet pressing problems in the latter area. Aware of their own increased commitments for the defense of Southeast Asia, the Australians and the New Zealanders were taking the same position. The Filipinos also want out. Perhaps the best case of all could be made by the Thailands, who obviously needed their forces in Korea to protect the home territory. Accordingly, Secretary Dulles said he was far from optimistic as to the probable success of this proposal.

Admiral Radford expressed agreement with Secretary Dulles as to the likelihood of mounting difficulties in retaining these other contingents in Korea. Except for the Turks, however, the other contingents in South Korea didn’t amount to very much from a military point of view. What he found irritating, continued Admiral Radford, was that the very countries which have withdrawn their forces or are contemplating their withdrawal, should continue to throw their weight around on such problems as that posed by the NNSC for the UN Command. Indeed, he was inclined to question whether any nations which withdrew their forces from Korea should properly continue to form a part of the UN Command. As things now were, these countries were able to have their cake and eat it too.

Dulles visited Bangkok February 23–25 for the first meeting of the Council organized under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, later termed the SEATO Council. Secto 12 from Bangkok, February 23, reported on Dulles’ conversation with Eden concerning Malaya, but made no reference to Korea. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 428) Dulles later discussed his conversation with Eden in Bangkok in a telephone conversation with Robertson on March 23. As Dulles remembered it, nothing had been decided concerning the British desire to withdraw troops stationed in Korea. The British wanted troops for the fighting in Malaya and the United States wanted the Commonwealth nations to keep a division in Korea. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)
The President commented that he thought Admiral Radford had made a good point, and that it should be taken up by the Secretary of State.

*The National Security Council.*

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in the reference report (NSC 5514) in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 7, 1955.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5514.

c. Noted the President's request that General Hull, upon his return to Washington, make a brief presentation to the National Security Council of the military situation of the United Nations Command in Korea relative to the Communist military situation in North Korea.

*Note:* NSC 5514, as adopted, approved by the President; and transmitted to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President. The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate action.

[Here follow agenda items 5 and 6.]

S. Everett Gleason

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8Paragraphs a–c and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 1352, approved by President Eisenhower on March 12. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

31. **Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State**


Dear Mr. Secretary: I refer to a request made by the Representatives of the Australian, Canadian, New Zealand and United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff, on 23 March 1955, for concurrence of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in the reduction of Commonwealth forces in Korea to one battalion group, commencing about 1 April 1955.  

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5/3–3055. Top Secret.

2The Commonwealth request was made in a memorandum from the representatives of the Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, and British Chiefs of Staff to Admiral Radford in his capacity as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on March 23. The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense on March 25 in which they recommended that Department of State concurrence be obtained for a...
It is understood that when this problem was discussed initially with the Department of State, the reduction in question was considered as applying only to the Australian forces. However, it is apparent from the request of the Representatives of the Commonwealth Chiefs of Staff that they consider this reduction as applying to other Commonwealth forces. Further, the Canadians have specifically indicated a desire to withdraw their forces from Korea in the immediate future. Inasmuch as the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reported that Department of State discussions with Commonwealth Representatives on this matter during the Manila Pact Conference at Bangkok in February appear to be susceptible to broad interpretation, it is considered that this matter needs clarification.

The Department of Defense considers that the withdrawal of additional UN forces from Korea, though now under study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a view to re-evaluating the requirements of the situation, could not be accomplished at this time without risk of seriously jeopardizing what has been accomplished in Korea to date. This consideration is based upon the fact that U.S. ground forces in Korea have been reduced from three Corps with an approximate total of 300,000, to one Corps with an approximate total of 90,000 personnel; and the fact that UN forces other than U.S. have been reduced from an approximate total of 33,000, to a current approximate total of 14,000 personnel. Certain of the Commonwealth forces including elements of the Canadian and Australian contingents have already been withdrawn which accounts largely for this UN reduction. The United Nations' character of the forces in Korea has thus been greatly reduced with a resultant lowering of the combat effectiveness of the forces opposing the Communists.

I concur fully in the JCS recommendation regarding the necessity for maintaining adequate UN forces representation in Korea, as indicated in the attached JCS memorandum dated 25 March 1955. However, I will defer to the judgement of the Department of State regarding the proposed withdrawal of Commonwealth forces from Korea. If on the other hand the Department of State does not concur in the proposed withdrawal, this Department requests your concur-

[memorandum to be returned to the Commonwealth representatives explaining that the United States could not agree to a further reduction of U.N. forces in Korea. Copies of the Commonwealth request, the JCS memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, and the proposed reply to the Commonwealth representatives explaining that the United States could not agree to a further reduction and weakening of U.N. forces in Korea are attached to the source text but not printed.]

\[\text{See footnote}\ 7, \text{supra.}\]
rence in authorizing the dispatch by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the note attached to the JCS memorandum.\footnote{For the Department of State response to this request, see Document 36.}

Sincerely yours,

C.E. Wilson

\footnote{For the Department of State response to this request, see Document 36.}

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32. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea\footnote{Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/3-3055. Secret. Drafted by Christopher A. Norred of NA and approved by McClurkin. Repeated to Stockholm, Bern, and Tokyo.}**

Washington, March 30, 1955—6:07 p.m.

616. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC. Two notes received March 25 re NNSC.\footnote{The Swiss note summarized in this telegram is attached to the memorandum of the conversation between Deputy Under Secretary Murphy and Swiss Minister Henry de Torrenté on March 25. (Ibid., 795.00/3-2555) The Aide-Mémoire handed by Ambassador Yang to Assistant Secretary Robertson on the same day is attached to a memorandum of their conversation. (Ibid.)}

Swiss note replied U.S. Aide-Mémoire and note March 2.\footnote{Article 40 of the Armistice Agreement stipulated that the number and personnel of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams in Korea could be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission.} Swiss Federal Council envisions negotiations at Panmunjom (date undecided) exclusively concerned with reduction NNSC personnel within Article 40 Armistice Agreement.\footnote{U.N. Adviser Ward P. Allen of the Bureau of European Affairs discussed the Swiss aide-mémoire with Swedish Minister Douglas later in the day on March 25. According to Allen's memorandum of conversation, Douglas described the position taken by the Swiss as "ridiculous" and commented that the Swiss note put back progress on the problem by about a year since the Swiss no longer seemed to be reconsidering the question of their continued participation in the NNSC. The Swedish Government, Douglas said, was still studying the question and could not endorse the Swiss reply. (Memorandum of conversation by Allen, March 25; Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/3-2555)} Accordingly Swiss will not instruct delegate propose stationing all members in DZ although no objection modification of Armistice Agreement by parties to it in this sense. Murphy expressed U.S. extreme disappointment at reply stating we will have consider other possible courses action deal with matter.\footnote{See Document 26.}

Ambassador Yang presented Aide-Mémoire objecting to permission given NNSC "by some American officers" to inspect Chinhae and Korean Navy Yard installations there during March 9 to 13. Aide-Mémoire charged purpose Communist on NNSC was espionage and requests U.S. prevent repetition such incident and states ROK Government will be compelled take counter-measures "under its sovereign right of self-defense" unless prompt attention given this dan-
gerous situation. Robertson pointed out Rhee agreed recent inspections and that in trying effect NNSC termination we do not want take any action that would lead Swiss and Swedes join Czechs and Poles condemning ROK and UNC.

Embassy Seoul requested not inform ROK of Swiss note for present.

Dulles

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33. Letter From the Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)\(^1\)


Dear Walter: Ty Wood's office has recently sent to Washington a carefully prepared presentation of what it is hoped to accomplish under the aid program for Korea in FY 56.\(^2\) The document was drafted in connection with FOA's submission of data and estimates to Congress. Copies should be in Washington this week.

One aspect of this matter gives me some preoccupation. That is the lack of wholehearted collaboration on the part of President Rhee, particularly with respect to the economic side of the program. Instead of helping row the boat, Rhee persists in throwing out anchors. Instead of collaborating in strengthening the dike, Rhee keeps boring holes in it, so that Ty Wood has to engage in a series of emergency plumbing operations at the expense of progress with the main construction. From my telegrams and despatches this situation will of course be familiar to you, and in this connection I refer to Despatch No. 213 of March 16, 1955,\(^3\) entitled "Comments on ROK Performance Under the Minute of Understanding".

In my judgment, unless we can obtain more effective collaboration from the Rhee Government and greater compliance with the commitments contained in the Minute of Understanding of November 17, 1954, our program is likely to founder, regardless of the

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\(^1\)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5–MSP/3–3055. Confidential; Official–Informal. Copies were sent to C. Tyler Wood and General Maxwell D. Taylor.

\(^2\)Not found in Department of State files.

\(^3\)Despatch 213 from Seoul, March 16, transmitted a draft of a letter prepared by Henry Costanzo, Treasury Representative in the Office of the Economic Coordinator, in reply to the March 2 letter from Paik Tu-chin to Wood (see Document 28). The Embassy noted that, in view of the withdrawal of Paik's letter by the South Korean Government, Costanzo's letter was not delivered to Paik. (Department of State, Central Files, 895B.00/3–1655)
amount of American aid which Congress may vote for the economic rehabilitation of Korea. I refer to such specific problems as pricing aid goods into the economy, ensuring realistic exchange rates, and permitting ROK dollars to be used to purchase freely in Japan as elsewhere. In various other areas, such as encouraging private enterprise and creating conditions favorable to the entry of American capital, ROK performance since the Agreed Minute was signed has been almost imperceptible.

Consequently, if I were called upon to comment on the situation at a Congressional hearing in Executive Session, I would have to call attention to the lack of cooperation from the Republic of Korea in the economic field, and perhaps suggest the need for some Congressionally encouraged sanctions to obtain future ROK collaboration, including wise and timely use of Korea's own resources. Otherwise, would it not be well to cease the bickering which has so delayed our program and weakened confidence in it locally, resign ourselves to less ambitious economic goals, and so inform the Congress?

I am not, of course, suggesting that I participate in the presentation of Korean aid to Congress. On the contrary, with a new Ambassador shortly taking over, and with my own transfer to a different area, it might be better that my association with the problem end with my departure from Korea. Nevertheless, because of our difficulties with the Rhee Government over economic aid and my belief that unless those difficulties are resolved our program may fail to measure up to our own hopes and expectations, I felt you would be interested in having these observations filed in the twilight of 30 months of service in this battered and valiant country. I have genuine affection for Korea and for the Korean people, but I recognize it as a fact that some of the policies followed by President Rhee have not been conducive to the success of the efforts of our Government to rebuild Korea, and that if persisted in they will at the least seriously handicap our future efforts.

Sincerely yours,

Ellis

P.S. I enclose an extra copy of this letter should you wish to pass it along to Bill Lacy for his information.

E.O.B.

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4William S.B. Lacy was appointed Ambassador to the Republic of Korea on March 24. Briggs left Seoul on April 12 and Lacy presented his credentials on May 12.

5A marginal notation on the source text indicates that a copy of this letter was sent to NA for Lacy's attention.
34. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 7, 1955

Washington, April 7, 1955.

SUBJECT
New Swedish Position on NNSC

PARTICIPANTS
Count Douglas, Swedish Embassy
Mr. W.P. Allen, EUR
Mr. W.G. Jones, NA

Count Douglas called at his request to advise us of the new instructions being sent to the Swedish NNSC representative in Korea to propose that all fixed inspection teams be abolished and that total personnel be reduced to between 10 and 20 per country, all stationed in the demilitarized zone. His report followed closely the information contained in Stockholm’s 878 of April 6.\(^2\)

We expressed the Department’s appreciation for this constructive and forward step, particularly in the face of the different and timid position presently adopted by the Swiss Government. Douglas felt that his Government’s decision reflected a firm determination to withdraw from the NNSC within a reasonable period and suggested that after the expected failure of the NNSC and the MAC to agree to the Swedish proposals, the Swedish Government would probably advise both sides that it could no longer continue and request that some other country be designated to replace it. He thought that thereafter Sweden would remain on the Commission for a short period to permit undoubtedly fruitless efforts to be made to obtain a substitute. At that point they would withdraw.

Although Count Douglas said his Government thought the Swiss position is perhaps undergoing some moderation, we expressed some concern that the Swiss, while avoiding a vote in the NNSC against the Swedish proposal, might seek to prevent a vote on the substance of the proposal on some procedural grounds.

Count Douglas stated that a copy of the instructions had also been sent to the Swedish representative at the UN, Mr. Thorsing, who would be advising Hammarskjold.

We agreed that it is in our common interest to keep this information strictly confidential.

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\(^1\)Source: Department of State, NA Files: Lot 59 D 407, Memcons (NNSC) 1955. Secret. Drafted by Jones.

\(^2\)Not printed. (Ibid., Central Files, 795.00/4–655)
35. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 11, 1955

SUBJECT
Delivery of Note Concerning the NNSC to the Swiss Minister

PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Henry de Torrente, Minister, Legation of Switzerland
Mr. Felix Schnyder, Counselor, Legation of Switzerland
Mr. Robert Murphy, G
Mr. Ward P. Allen, EUR
Mr. William G. Jones, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs, NA

Mr. Murphy handed the note to the Swiss Minister stating that there had been no change in the United States position with respect to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC). Mr. Murphy pointed out that we had included in the note a reference to the Swedish proposal that inspection teams at the ports of entry be abolished; that total personnel be reduced to between ten and twenty persons per country; and that all remaining personnel be stationed in the Demilitarized Zone. He hoped that the Swiss would find it possible to support the Swedish proposal.

Minister de Torrente then suggested that in view of his understanding that the principal problem with respect to the NNSC was a result of ROK hostilities toward the Czechs and Poles on that Commission, an alternative solution might be to establish headquarters for the NNSC at Panmunjom and to assign Swiss and Swedes as liaison officers with the United Nations Command, presumably to be stationed in the ports of entry in the ROK. Similarly Czechs and Poles could be established as liaison officers in north Korea. The Minister emphasized that he had no instructions on this matter and was speaking quite unofficially and in response to Mr. Murphy's question said he thought his government would prefer a solution such as he had suggested rather than the Swedish solution because it would seem to them to be more legal. Mr. Murphy responded that he found it very difficult to understand this position and that while the Minister's idea would of course be some improvement over the

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1 Source: Department of State, NA Files: Lot 59 D 407, Memcons (NNSC) 1955. Confidential. Drafted by Jones on April 12.

2 A copy of this note is attached but not printed. The note is a response to the Swiss note delivered on March 25 (see Document 32). In the note, the United States sympathized with the difficult situation faced by Switzerland with respect to the NNSC but concluded that the Swiss proposal of March 25 left unsolved "the serious problem created by the presence of any Communist members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in South Korea." After a review of the nature of the problem, the note closed with a reference to the position that Sweden proposed to take in the NNSC, outlined in the memorandum supra, and asked Switzerland to support that position.
present state of affairs, viewing the measure as a whole the United States Government much preferred the proposal made by Sweden.

36. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹


DEAR SECRETARY WILSON: In your letter of March 30, 1955² you expressed opposition to the Commonwealth proposal of March 23³ calling for a reduction of the Commonwealth troops in Korea to a battalion group. You enclosed a memorandum prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on March 25 and have proposed a reply through military channels opposing a reduction at this time and asking the Commonwealth countries to reconsider.

I fully share your concern over the continuing reduction in the contributions of our Allies to the United Nations Command in Korea, and the Department of State has made every effort to persuade other countries to keep contingents in Korea. While I doubt that we can do more than forestall the proposed reduction in Commonwealth forces for the immediate future—and perhaps will be unsuccessful even in this effort—I agree with you that we should transmit a note to the Commonwealth opposing further reduction at this time.⁴

Since I believe that the motivation behind the position of the Commonwealth countries is primarily political, I suggest that the Joint Chiefs of Staff note be expanded somewhat to point up the psychological and political effects of such a withdrawal at this time. I have in mind the effect it will have on the Free World position in Asia, the increased difficulty in persuading the Republic of Korea that the issue of unification should be dealt with by the United Nations, and a possible reaction of the American public toward the Commonwealth which will be interpreted as wanting a voice in northeast Asia without accepting commensurate responsibilities. In view of our action on the issue of the Canadian battalion,⁵ it would

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5/3-3055. Secret. Drafted by Norred and cleared with IO, FE, and Murphy.
²This proposal and the JCS memorandum of March 25 are summarized in footnote 2, Document 31.
³See Document 39.
⁴On March 23, the Canadian military representative who participated in the transmittal to the JCS of the joint Commonwealth proposal to withdraw Common-
seem advisable to answer the Commonwealth request as a matter of urgency.

I have asked Mr. Robertson to have his staff discuss this matter with appropriate officers in Defense who might then work out a somewhat expanded communication indicating our inability to concur at this time in the Commonwealth proposal for both political and military reasons. In working this matter out it may prove desirable that the reply to the Commonwealth come from the United States Government rather than the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles

wealth forces from Korea orally asked the JCS for concurrence and instructions to CINCUNC to allow the departure by April 3 of the Canadian battalion in Korea. The Canadian Embassy supported this request on March 28 in view of the adverse political repercussions which they felt would follow in Canada if Canadians were not permitted to leave Korea at the end of their normal tours of duty. (Telegram 280 to Ottawa, March 29; Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5/3-2955) On March 31, the Department informed the Canadian Embassy that, pending a review of U.N. strength in Korea and a corresponding review of the Commonwealth proposal, the United States was not in a position to concur in the withdrawal of the Canadian battalion from Korea. If, however, the Canadian Government still wished to proceed with the withdrawal, the United States would make the necessary transport available. (Telegram 285 to Ottawa, March 31; ibid. 795B.5/3-3055)

6Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

37. Memorandum From John W. Hanes to the Secretary's Special Assistant (O'Connor)1

Washington, April 19, 1955.

SUBJECT

Ambassador Lacy's views on Korea

Bill Lacy spoke to me concerning the Korean situation, and reported a highly personal and confidential talk he had had with Radford. He asked that Radford be protected on this.

He said that he had bluntly asked Radford what the build-up plans in Korea were, and received the answer that they were "to restore the balance between ourselves and the Communists, by the replacement of old and obsolete equipment with new". Radford made it clear that what he had in mind was primarily airplanes, but also

1Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Strictly Confidential. Top Secret; Personal. Hanes was O'Connor's Special Assistant.
including some small equipment such as mortars. There was a bare possibility that such replacement might include some heavy artillery items. Radford made it clear that our defense in depth was now far back of Korea and even back of Japan to Okinawa. Lacy commented that it was clear that the “restoration of balance” to which Radford referred was in no sense a local balance in Korea, but, if anything, a balance in the whole area.

Lacy made the following points:

1. He felt that this information was different than that on which the Secretary was basing his plans and proceeding, and that the Secretary should be informed.

2. If this concept is accepted (and it is apparently the clear and present working concept of the Defense Department), Lacy felt that we should review our own present activities in relation to the abolishment of the NNSC and of Article 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement. He said that, even under these conditions, he still felt it was advisable to get rid of the NNSC, because of its internal Korean implications. However, he felt that we definitely should not go through the agony of negotiating with our allies to abolish Article 13(d) when our plans (as outlined above) do not envision anything which cannot be accomplished under 13(d).

38. Memorandum of Discussion at the 245th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 21, 1955

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1 and 2.]

3. Presentation by General Hull (NSC Action No. 1352-c)

Mr. Dillon Anderson introduced General Hull while the Service Secretaries and the Chiefs of Staff entered the Cabinet Room.

General Hull indicated that he would first discuss briefly the military situation in the Far East generally, and would follow this with a description of the specific military situation in Korea occasioned by the armistice and the activities of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC). Using a map indicating military dispositions and a chart indicating the strength of Communist and friendly forces in the Far East, General Hull proceeded to make his presentation.

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2See footnote 8, Document 30.
He dealt first with the opposing forces in the Far East—Soviet, Chinese Communist, and North Korean—by Services. He noted a considerable reduction in total Communist forces in North Korea since the armistice. He estimated that the present total of such forces was in the neighborhood of 780,000, and indications pointed to a defensive rather than an offensive role for these forces at the present time.

General Hull then commented on the ROK and UN forces in South Korea. He listed the total of friendly forces in South Korea at 730,000. General Hull spoke with pride of the development and capabilities of the ROK forces. The chief difficulties were that the highest ranking officers in the ROK armed services were very young and lacked experience in the handling of large forces in the field, especially from the administrative point of view.

General Hull then discussed Japanese military capabilities, which he said he could not rate very high. He described this as our greatest military problem in the Far East at the present time. It was essential to build up Japan’s armed forces. While progress was discernible, it was very slow.

General Hull then analyzed current U.S. strength in the Korean area and in the Far East generally. He described U.S. strength as being approximately at the present time what it was in June 1950, prior to the outbreak of the Korean war. General Hull expressed the belief that the remaining two U.S. divisions in Korea should be redeployed to Japan, leaving only token U.S. forces in Korea.

General Hull then turned to the specific problem occasioned by persistent Communist violations of the armistice. He noted paragraph 13–d of the armistice agreement, which forbade the replacement of old war matériel by new matériel, and indicated that the Soviets constantly violated this provision by avoiding ports of entry where they could be supervised. He said that the United States was dealing with an enemy with a completely different code of ethics than our own. The Communists approved any means which led to the ends they sought. On the contrary, the UN Command had lived up to the armistice faithfully and conscientiously. Accordingly, the longer the armistice continued and paragraph 13–d was in effect, the worse off the U.S. would be. This affected all three of the Services, and General Hull cited illustrations of the effects.

With respect to the personnel on the NNSC inspection teams, General Hull said that the Swiss and the Swedes were truly neutral, while the Poles and the Czechs were completely pro-Communist. Indeed, in private conversations with him General Hull said that the Swiss and Swedish members of these teams invariably described the inspection procedure as a farce. General Hull then indicated serious doubt whether President Rhee could be induced to agree to any
future inspections by NNSC teams in South Korea. We must not only anticipate such refusals, but we must even anticipate the possibility of an incident resulting from a South Korean move to seize and imprison the Communist members of an inspection team. U.S. forces in Korea were not now sufficiently numerous to prevent such an incident, which would, of course, be very embarrassing. Accordingly, General Hull reitered his earlier recommendation that this Government take action at once to put an end to the activities of these inspection teams. General Hull said that he was confident that the Communists would not reopen hostilities if we abrogated this portion of the armistice agreement. He believed that the Communists would reopen the Korean war if and when it suited their plans.

The President inquired of General Hull how he proposed to put an end to the NNSC inspections. Would you, he asked, merely inform the heads of the NNSC that they would no longer be allowed to carry out inspections in South Korea? General Hull replied in the affirmative if no agreement with the Swiss and Swedish Governments was reached to end the operations of the NNSC. In short, said General Hull, the UN Commander should unilaterally abolish the NNSC. General Hull indicated his opinion that the Swiss and the Swedes would be delighted at such unilateral U.S. action, because they do not wish to be put in the position of voluntarily withdrawing. In any case, said General Hull, there were really two possible solutions: First, to abolish the NNSC completely; second, to reduce their numbers drastically and to put an end to further inspections, confining the remaining NNSC personnel within the demilitarized zone.

General Hull further emphasized how essential it was to change paragraph 13-d of the armistice agreement in order that new and modern equipment could be supplied to UN and ROK forces in South Korea. General Hull felt that the United States was "too big" to stoop to imitate the Communist technique of violating the armistice agreement by secretly introducing modern matériel.

The Vice President referred to General Hull's expression of disappointment as to progress being made in Japan's rearmament, and asked General Hull if he would elaborate a little. General Hull replied that his degree of disappointment was relative. He explained Japan's difficulties, both psychological and practical, since her defeat at the end of the war. He indicated that there was no disagreement among Japanese leaders that the nation must rearm. The arguments were occasioned on the matter of the rate of rearmament. This was coming along, though not as rapidly as we would like.

The President then went back to General Hull's statement that the picture of U.S. forces in the Far East was not very different from what it had been in June 1950. On the other hand, said the Presi-
dent, General Hull had high praise for the quality of the ROK forces, and had additionally indicated good capabilities for the Chinese forces on Formosa and the developing strength of Japan’s forces. All in all, said the President, he would therefore conclude that the total picture was actually much brighter than it had been in June 1950. General Hull replied that the President’s point was well taken, and that he had not meant to deny that our general position in the Far East was much stronger than it had been in the spring of 1950. The President then expressed agreement with General Hull’s statement that the United States must keep token forces in South Korea—perhaps in a composite division.

Secretary Humphrey inquired of General Hull whether, if we did away with the the NNSC inspection teams, this wouldn’t mean that each side would be left free to build up its own forces as it liked. General Hull said yes, but both he and the President pointed out that the Communists were already doing precisely this. On the other hand, said the President, in the event the inspection teams were removed, at least the Air Force would not be obliged, as it now is, to keep up maintenance facilities for obsolete aircraft.

Secretary Humphrey then commented that if the abrogation of paragraph 13-d of the armistice agreement would greatly improve the U.S. military position, what possible objection was there to proceeding? The President replied that there was no objection, except, of course, that the State Department had entered into the armistice agreement in good faith, and this would cause them certain difficulties.

Secretary Hoover indicated that the State Department had been putting all possible pressure on the Swiss and the Swedes to get them out of the NNSC. The most recent meeting on the subject had been held on April 20, but he had no report as to the results. The President commented that one would think that self-respect alone would compel the Swiss and the Swedes to get out of the NNSC. After further discussion, the President added that the United States had got to move in on a situation which was really becoming intolerable.

The National Security Council.\(^3\)

Noted and discussed a presentation by General Hull, pursuant to the reference action, of the military situation of the United Nations Command in Korea relative to the Communist military situation in North Korea.

\(^3\)The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1381. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
39. **Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 29, 1955**

**SUBJECT**

Reply to the Commonwealth Proposal for Further Reduction of Their Forces in Korea

**PARTICIPANTS**

Mr. M.G.L. Joy, First Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. R.H. Wade, First Secretary, New Zealand Embassy
Mr. J.J. McCordle, Second Secretary, Canadian Embassy
Mr. Noel Hemmendinger, Acting Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs
Mr. William G. Jones, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs, NA

Mr. Hemmendinger stated he had asked the group to assemble at this late hour Friday afternoon in order to deliver as promptly as possible the reply of the United States Government to the proposal put forward by the Chiefs of Staff of the Commonwealth countries to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. Identical notes were then handed the group. As earlier requested by the Australians, their note was given to Mr. McCordle to deliver to them.

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5/4–2955. Secret. Drafted by Jones.
2See footnote 2, Document 31.
3A copy of the note sent to the Canadian Government is in Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5/4–2955. The note reads in part:

"The proposal of the Commonwealth countries to reduce their forces in Korea at this time, and the probable effect such an action would have on the decision of other participating countries, is a matter of concern to the Government of the United States. In the face of the current tension in the Far East, this Government believes that further reductions in the size of the United Nations Command would have serious adverse impact militarily and politically on the interests of the Free World in Asia. If the Commonwealth forces are further reduced, less powerful and less concerned nations will find it difficult to continue their contributions. Should such reductions continue, the international composition of the United Nations Command would be jeopardized and a point would soon be reached at which the continued existence of the United Nations Command would be in question. It is the view of the Government of the United States that the continued existence of the United Nations Command is important to the maintenance of the Armistice and to stability in the area of Korea by reason of its deterrent effect upon the Communists and the assurance it affords of united policies on the part of the Free World nations toward the Korean problem."

The note concludes with an expression of hope "that the Commonwealth Governments will be disposed to reconsider their proposal and to defer additional withdrawals of their forces."
In response to a question, Mr. Hemmendinger told the group that while the United States Joint Chiefs might also reply, their reply would be only a formality and would refer to the notes just handed out. Furthermore, it was pointed out that since the word "concur", which appeared in the communication of the Chiefs of Staff of the Commonwealth countries, was regarded as unfortunate by some, the use of this word had been carefully avoided wherever possible throughout the note. Attention was then called to the fact that the word "concur" appeared only once—in the first paragraph—but that this was in describing the joint note from the Commonwealth Chiefs of Staff. Mr. McCardle, whose country had felt the note to be a derogation of its sovereignty, said he found no objection to the word "concur" as used in the United States note and thought it perfectly proper in this context. The other members of the group also agreed.

The group felt the note to be very clear and the only point which was elucidated for them was the difficult situation which would be created with respect to maintaining forces in Korea from other countries with less concern in the Far East, and with less capacity to support forces, if the Commonwealth countries were to reduce their forces further.

Mr. McCardle stated that the Foreign Minister planned to make a statement on May 2 in which—among other things—he would announce that in view of discussions looking forward to a further reduction of United Nations contingents in Korea the Canadian Government did not intend to replace its battalion in Korea but would retain there for the time being, a destroyer and an ambulance unit. He was not able to predict what effect the United States note might have on the planned statement.

40. Despatch From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

No. 260


REF

Department of State Circular Telegrams Nos. 559 and 560, dated March 24 [23], 1955.

1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5/4-3055. Top Secret.
2Circular telegram 559 instructed Chiefs of Mission "to have the country team, including representatives from FOA, MAAG (or service attachés), [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] prepare a report on the possibilities and requirements for U.S. assistance in increasing the effectiveness of police-type forces to deal with communist
SUBJECT

Report on the Counter-Subversive Capacity of the Republic of Korea

The joint report on the Counter-Subversive Capacity of the Republic of Korea, attached as Enclosure No. 1, is submitted in accordance with the instructions under reference. It was prepared [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the Embassy, using material also obtained from the Service Attachés, Korea Civil Assistance Command (KCAC), FOA and Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Eighth U.S. Army (Forward).

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Eighth U.S. Army (Forward) does not agree that an increased level of U.S. assistance is necessary to improve the capacity of the ROK police-type forces for combating Communist subversion. His conclusions and views are summarized in Enclosure No. 2, attached.

Carl W. Strom
Chargé d’Affaires, a.i.

Enclosure 1

REPORT ON THE COUNTER-SUBVERSIVE CAPACITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA³

Introduction and Summary

For the purposes of the instructions under reference the Republic of Korea (ROK) is considered to be the type of country in which the primary need for U.S. assistance is in improving the capabilities of police-type forces in order to prevent Communist subversion from making important headway. Greater U.S. efforts, therefore, should be

subversion and, in those countries where communist subversion has reached the stage of actual or potential large-scale insurrection, increasing the effectiveness of the regular armed forces to deal with communist subversion and insurrections." (Ibid., 700.5/3–2355) The purpose of the exercise was to provide the OCB with information necessary to formulate a concept for U.S. assistance in the development of forces adequate to provide internal security in countries vulnerable to Communist subversion.

Circular telegram 560 pointed out that the problem of combating Communist attempts to subvert friendly governments had already received preliminary study by the OCB. Since country team assessments would weigh heavily in the formulation of an NSC decision which could affect future U.S. foreign and defense policy, the 20 Missions addressed were instructed to assign their best officers to prepare the reply, which was to include points of disagreement as well as agreement. (Ibid.)

The country study on the internal security situation in the Republic of Korea, produced by an interagency working group for the OCB on November 16, is printed as Document 99.

³Top Secret.
directed towards improving the overall effectiveness of existing internal security forces. The National Police is the logical organization for development as the major internal security force because of its manpower, its long existence as a police force and its complete coverage of the country. From a manpower standpoint it is adequate, but on the basis of actual performance it does not even approximate an adequate counter-espionage and counter-intelligence service. Korea suffers from a plethora of internal security organizations which are not only countenanced but encouraged and utilized by President Rhee. The two major forces, in addition to the National Police, are the ROK Army CIC and the Joint Provost Marshal Command. All these organizations are used at times by President Rhee for security as well as political actions, and, in addition, the President has his own private police and investigating force known as the Kyungmudae.\(^4\) Police, which is drawn from the National Police personnel. Such a diversity of security and investigative units results in vying for the favor of President Rhee, and generally each unit spends more time watching the others for indications of Presidential favor than in doing the spade work necessary to uncover skillful subversive tactics. Within the ROK, the regular armed forces should continue to have the primary mission of protecting against external attack.

I. State of Development of Threat and Subversion

The threat of Communist control of the ROK through subversion is at present a potential, rather than an actual, danger. North Korean directed Communist guerrilla elements in the ROK have been almost totally annihilated. Such subversion as has been accomplished has resulted from efforts of the Korean Labor Party (KLP), the Communist Party of North Korea. Its organized underground assets in South Korea were destroyed during the war. The KLP must now, therefore, rely upon propaganda and compartmented and low-level espionage agents in attempting to create another underground.

The Korean Government and its people are strongly anti-Communist, and there are at present relatively few manifestations of internal Communist activity in South Korea. A potentially dangerous situation could develop, however, in the event President Rhee dies or becomes incapacitated. His personal rule, his failure to provide for a successor, his policy of playing off officials against each other, and the absence of strongly entrenched traditions of political party responsibilities are some of the characteristics which could provide confusion and disorder when the firm hand of Rhee is removed. Such a situation would be fertile ground for Communist subversive activities.

\(^4\)The Kyungmudae is the Executive Mansion. [Footnote in the source text.]
In these circumstances certain limited North Korean subversive assets which already exist in South Korea in a more or less dormant state could be used to advantage by trained agents to exploit the confusion and disorder that might well accompany a ROK political crisis. The following identifiable groups are assets of this type: Remnants of the former Communist underground in South Korea; other Communists and Communist sympathizers who survived the Korean war in the ROK; relatives and associates of the thousands of Leftist intellectuals who fled to North Korea during the war; approximately two million refugees from North Korea now in South Korea who, although mostly non-Communists, are exploitable because of their friends and relatives in North Korea; and prisoners of war released by the ROK in South Korea.

The counter-subversive facilities and personnel of the ROK security agencies are almost fully occupied in carrying out political tasks assigned by President Rhee and in seeking to combat the large volume of Communist low-level espionage and subversive penetration attempts from North Korea. Even so, subversives apprehended by the ROK probably represent only a fraction of the total number of agents dispatched by the KLP.

It can be assumed that there are high caliber individual agents working at high levels within the ROK whose mission is political subversion. Civil and military security agents do not have a planned, coordinated program to combat this type agent who represents a far greater threat of political subversion than do the low-level type, border crossing agents.

A dangerous situation results from the fact that through its control of coastal smuggling channels between North and South Korea the KLP and its intelligence organization exert a damaging influence on the ROK intelligence efforts. Fifteen Communist front trading organizations have been established in North Korea close to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The ROK positive and counter-intelligence agencies in turn have established cover-type commercial firms in South Korea to deal with these North Korean organizations on the naive assumption that the South Koreans will be able to engage in effective positive intelligence activities against the North. In practice the KLP is able to send commercial goods, subversive agents, funds, instructions and radios through the smuggling channel to the South Korean commercial fronts and through them to other destinations in South Korea. However, the agents and couriers dispatched by the South Korean intelligence services are not permitted to penetrate North Korea beyond the trading firms immediately above the DMZ where they receive information which is prepared and intended for them by the KLP. Competition between the several ROK intelligence
agencies and the corruptibility of their officials are damaging by-products of this trade.

The inadequate salaries of members of the ROK police and military counter-subversive agencies make them susceptible to bribes to augment their salaries. This situation is no doubt exploited by the North Koreans, and as a result some criminals and subversives without proper identification documents can probably evade the law and go undetected.

There are two organizations in Japan, the Minsen (Korean Minority Group of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP)) and the Third Force movement for Korean unification, which should be considered as Communist assets and of potential usefulness in South Korea for Communist purposes. Indicative of Minsen activity is the fact one such political-type agent has been detected and apprehended in Korea in the last five months. The ROK has outlawed the Third Force movement and fought it. The Communists both in North Korea and in Japan engage in extensive smuggling by sea between Japan and South Korea. Profits help finance their operations and the channels are used for courier purposes.

[Here follows a six-page analysis of the adequacy of the countermeasures taken by the Republic of Korea to meet the threat of Communist subversion. The analysis includes a detailed discussion of the strength and mission of the National Police, the Joint Provost Marshal General Command, and the Counter-Intelligence Corps of the South Korean Army.]

III. Analysis of Local U.S. Programs

U.S. programs of assistance and support of the NP or the several intelligence agencies of the ROK Armed Services are presently being carried out by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] KCAC, FOA and Army CIC. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the programs are narrow and specific in scope and are not coordinated by any central U.S. agency in Korea. The programs vary in nature but are limited to theoretical and practical training. U.S. is not rendering logistical support to the ROK intelligence agencies, except for that programmed by FOA, as noted below.

a. [1 paragraph (25 lines of source text) not declassified]

b. Korea Civil Assistance Command (KCAC)

During the military government phases in South Korea following World War II the U.S. directed the NP and rendered limited logistical support. Remnants of that program exist today within the public safety branch of KCAC in the form of a U.S. Advisory Group to the NP, soon to be reduced to only nine U.S. Army officers, with the function of advising the NP in all phases of its operations. No logistical support is included. The U.S. Advisory Group has sponsored the
training of twenty ROK police officials in the U.S. Funds were supplied by the U.S. Department of State. Ten more will probably go to the U.S. during the balance of 1955 on funds furnished by the Department of State and FOA. (In addition, the ROK Government has financed ineffective short-time training in the U.S. for approximately ten more during the last three years.)

c. FOA Program

FOA has extended assistance to the NP in the fiscal year 1954. Six hundred and forty thousand dollars of FOA funds were made available as a grant to purchase cloth for police uniforms. The purchase has not materialized, however, for the ROK has not been willing to buy from Japanese sources, which offered the lowest bids. In addition, a $1,000,000 grant was made the ROK for purchase of communications equipment: $471,000 for radio equipment, which will be delivered in September 1955, and $529,000 for communications wire, now being procured.

Under the Fiscal Year 1955 program, funds made available by FOA through the Bank of Korea are being used by a Korean importer to finance the purchase of a 300-line $25,000 switchboard for the NP.

Two of the ten trainees to go to the U.S. this year from the NP, as noted above, will be financed by FOA.

FOA recently offered to establish and finance a legal center in Seoul with a law library and staff from the American Bar Association. It is understood, however, that President Rhee has declined the offer.

d. Army CIC

[1 paragraph (1-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

IV. Recommendations

This is a joint report prepared by the Embassy [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] which also incorporates material obtained from the Service Attachés, KCAC, FOA and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Eighth U.S. Army (Forward). The conclusions presented and the following recommendations are concurred in by the Embassy, the Service Attachés [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. AC/S, G–2 of Eighth Army (Forward), has taken exception to the report in the manner indicated in Enclosure 2.

It is the joint conclusion of the Embassy, the Service Attachés [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that conditions in the ROK would not justify the diversion of military assistance funds to the internal security forces. The following specific recommendations which may involve the establishment of new programs are based on the assumption that improvement of the ROK internal security forces to meet Communist subversion can be accomplished through carefully
defined projects directed at specific deficiencies. Such an approach might be more acceptable politically to President Rhee than a general overall program. The timing of each suggested recommendation should be subjected to further detailed consideration. The practical implementation of these recommendations should be the subject of further coordinated study by the interested agencies.

It is recommended that:

a. The several interested agencies of the U.S. Government coordinate and adopt a program of assistance for the ROK internal security forces which would consist both of specialized training and limited logistical support.

b. A U.S. training program in counter-subversion and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] techniques be established for the ROK National Police. All training should be on-the-ground and techniques applicable in the United States must be adapted to conditions peculiar to South Korea and to Asia in general.

c. The American military services (Army, Navy Air Force) in Korea train their counterparts in the ROK armed services through on-the-ground training courses devoted to the techniques of counterintelligence and that members of these ROK services participate, as appropriate, in the NP training program.

d. The ROK security agencies be encouraged and assisted in developing procedures for the exchange of all information and in establishing a central information and research center.

e. In addition to extending training to the ROK agencies, American intelligence agencies work, to the extent feasible, with the ROKs in joint counter-subversive activities thus teaching techniques and offering guidance at the same time.

f. Training in the United States be offered to selected members of ROK security agencies.

g. USIA aid effectively in a counter-subversion propaganda program by supplying ROK agencies with a flow of usable [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] information for their use in addressing the people of South Korea. This education-propaganda should include material with respect to overall Communist intents, techniques, propaganda lines and methods, overall strategy and techniques and especially information as to specific Communist targets in the ROK.

h. FOA, or its successor agency, consider the advisability of taking over supervision of the U.S. Advisory Group to the National Police (in order that the group will not be disbanded should KCAC be abolished) and augmenting that program by providing logistical support either through grants in aid or on a reimbursable basis.

i. President Rhee be apprized by the highest ranking U.S. military and civilian officials of the purposes of the proffered training programs and United States limited logistical support. Unless the President’s concurrence is obtained and implemented by his directing ROK agencies to cooperate jointly with the United States, any U.S. program will fail to achieve its objectives. President Rhee’s full cooperation is considered to be essential for the success of any effort to improve internal security in the ROK.
Enclosure 2

SUMMARY OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G–2, EIGHTH ARMY (FORWARD) POSITION

The AC/S, G–2, Eighth Army (Forward) does not agree that an increased level of U.S. assistance to improve the capabilities of ROK police-type forces against Communist subversion is necessary. Its position in this respect is summarized as follows:

a. ROK police-type agencies have handled and are handling the Communist subversive effort effectively. The Communist subversive potential within South Korea has declined in the post-Armistice period.

b. It is agreed that North Korean subversive assets in South Korea are limited (pages 3 and 4) and that the popular anti-Communist sentiment is high (page 3). The experience of the Korean people with Communism makes them a poor field for Communist exploitation. ROK police-type forces are considered adequate to meet the Communist subversive threat as it appears likely to develop.

c. Inefficiency should not be confused with ineffectiveness. The inefficiency of ROK police-type forces is admitted; nevertheless, they are effective due largely to their great numbers, the extensive network of regular and casual informants, and the stress which the Administration puts upon the anti-subversive effort.

d. The political control of police-type forces, rather than weakening the anti-subversive effort, insures that under the Presidency of Rhee the ROK will keep the Communist effort in check. Under Rhee’s successor, the key question will be not what is the capability of these forces but rather in what direction will their efforts be directed. Creating a more efficient police force does not necessarily mean a more effective anti-Communist effort under Rhee’s successor.

e. Political control of police-type forces will limit the extent to which the program under study can be made effective.

If the majority contention for the need of greater assistance to ROK police-type forces is accepted, Eighth Army (Forward) then concurs in the report’s conclusion that the National Police provides the best field for development and in the recommendations as made.

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5Top Secret.
41. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy)¹


SUBJECT

Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC)

The Swiss, Swedes, Czechs, and Poles during the past two or three weeks have been engaged in a discussion of the future of the NNSC at Panmunjom. Before entering these discussions, the Swedes had informed us that they intended to take the position that the NNSC be reduced to only 10 or 20 representatives from each of the four contributing Governments and all of whom would be stationed in the Demilitarized Zone.² We were further informed that if the other members of the NNSC failed to agree to this proposition within a reasonable time, the Swedes would make a similar proposal to the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) strongly implying that if the MAC failed to agree the Swedes would withdraw from the NNSC.

The attached telegram from Seoul³ indicates that the Swedes have settled for substantially less than they set out to achieve and have agreed with other members of the NNSC to recommend to the MAC elimination of two inspection teams in each of the two zones in Korea and a reduction of personnel on the remaining inspection teams so that each of these would have representatives from only one of the neutrals appointed by each side. This position still leaves Polish and or Czechs on Republic of Korea territory and continues the existence of the Commission and thus leaves us in the same difficult position with the Republic of Korea.

We are considering in the Department what position the United Nations Command should take in the MAC on the NNSC proposal and are waiting for recommendations which the United Nations Command has been requested to send to Washington.⁴

Should Ambassador Boheman raise this matter with you today at your 5:00 meeting with him you might wish to indicate that we are very unhappy at the turn of events and are giving the matter our careful consideration. You also might wish to point out that it is

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/5-455. Confidential. Drafted by Jones and cleared with EUR and UNP.
²See Document 34.
³Telegram 1193 from Seoul, May 3, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/5-355)
⁴See Document 44.
doubtful that the situation in which the NNSC proposal would leave us is one which would be tolerable for long, if at all.\footnote{When Ambassador Boheman called on Murphy, he explained that the Swedish Delegation on the NNSC had not been supported by the Swiss Delegation, and had been forced to accept the proposal reported in telegram 1193 from Seoul as the most satisfactory arrangement possible at the time. Boheman added that the Swedish Delegation had made it clear in the NNSC that Sweden could only accept the proposed arrangement as temporary and continued to insist that the NNSC must be abolished or its personnel restricted to the demilitarized zone. In light of Boheman's explanation, Murphy expressed appreciation for the efforts made by the Swedish Delegation and added that the United States had not yet decided what position to take on the proposal in the MAC since it was evident that the proposed reduction did not solve the problem. (Memorandum of conversation by Allen, May 4; Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/5-455)}

\footnote{When Ambassador Boheman called on Murphy, he explained that the Swedish Delegation on the NNSC had not been supported by the Swiss Delegation, and had been forced to accept the proposal reported in telegram 1193 from Seoul as the most satisfactory arrangement possible at the time. Boheman added that the Swedish Delegation had made it clear in the NNSC that Sweden could only accept the proposed arrangement as temporary and continued to insist that the NNSC must be abolished or its personnel restricted to the demilitarized zone. In light of Boheman's explanation, Murphy expressed appreciation for the efforts made by the Swedish Delegation and added that the United States had not yet decided what position to take on the proposal in the MAC since it was evident that the proposed reduction did not solve the problem. (Memorandum of conversation by Allen, May 4; Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/5-455)}

42. Telegram From the Embassy in Switzerland to the Department of State\footnote{Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/5-655. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Stockholm, London, Paris, Ottawa, Seoul, and Tokyo.}{1}

Bern, May 6, 1955—3 p.m.

978. Secretary General Zehnder\footnote{Alfred Zehnder, Secretary General of the Swiss Political Department.} requested me to call and to submit substance of oral communication to my government.

Subsequent to agreement in NNSC on reduction by two of NNITS in North and South Korea with each side represented by one country on each team Sweden and Swiss are signing protocol. Sweden indicating it is not satisfied, Swiss indicating they are only partially satisfied and both reserving right to a second stage (deuxième etape).

Zehnder pointed out whereas up to present Communists had right to maintain 10 delegates in South Korea, that is 2 on each of 5 teams, contemplated arrangement would reduce number of Communist delegates in South Korea to 3. He said this marked considerable progress and although it would not satisfy Rhee Zehnder expressed opinion it might greatly reduce burden of protecting Communist delegates. As it constituted progress toward goal sought Zehnder earnestly expressed hope United States Government although not satisfied would not cause rejection proposed reduction when it comes before MAC. He emphasized that it was merely the first stage. He said at present he could not give outline of second stage or of timing but indicated next step would be on diplomatic level as Swiss see
little hope of further progress in NNSC under present circumstances. Zehnder expressed belief that although Communists not ready to abolish NNSC or withdraw teams to DZ something possible if Swiss approach Chinese on basis Swiss dissatisfaction functioning of NNITS. He indicated he believes ChiComs do not want breakdown of armistice and will therefore yield further if pressed, and that new approach therefore worth a try.

As Swiss already know of our desire for abolition NNSC first diplomatic approach probably to Peking not Washington. Zehnder pointed out that during conversations it would be better to have only 3 rather than 10 Communist delegates in South Korea. This he hoped would be added inducement for United States not to reject NNSC proposal. Furthermore rejection would throw away opportunity for some progress here as acceptance would make possible second step.

Zehnder urgently requested that Swiss views be communicated to my government with earnest request that United States not reject NNSC proposal. He also stated French and Canadian Ambassadors and British Chargé informed of Swiss position and that Torrente ready to give explanations to Department if desired.

Willis

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43. Telegram From the Economic Coordinator in Korea (Wood) to the Foreign Operations Administration¹

Seoul, May 9, 1955.

Tofoa 1535. KATO. Preparations should commence immediately for conference and negotiations with ROKs on subject of exchange rate which Stassen promised President Rhee would take place in June.² President is counting heavily on this conference and expects it to result in agreement on a permanent fixed rate. This was principal subject he discussed with General Taylor on General’s May 3 visit. In addition, Rhee has delayed finalization ROK budget on grounds a budget cannot be adequately developed until agreement is reached on fixed exchange rate. He also issued public statement May 5 on subject. See Tofoa 1529 for text.³ In Korean Republic editorial May 7 welcoming Ambassador Lacy, following appears:

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¹Source: Washington National Records Center, FOA/ICA Files: Lot W–144, FRC 56 A 632, Korea. Confidential. Also sent to CINCUNC, the Department of the Army, and the Embassy in Seoul and repeated to the Department of State.
²See Document 28.
³Not printed.
"We hope sincerely that Mr. Lacy will be able to help us achieve these objectives, or at least to make Washington aware of the great importance that we attach to them." (paragraphs 1 and 2 deleted).

"3. Stabilization of the dollar-Hwan exchange rate at a definite level. This will do more to speed recovery than any other single act."

We can expect major crisis unless we accept fixing of rate for at least one year. No certainty he will not demand permanent rate but indications are he would accept proposal he recently made to Liberal Party Committee, which was indorsed by Committee, that rate be fixed for one year and then revised. On basis of experience last June when we took action to change military conversion rate under then existing agreements, I am apprehensive that major fight may develop at end of year. If we wish to make change at that time no matter what our agreement on subject stated.

If we were to contemplate agreement in June to fix rate for year, I believe President will insist fixing value Hwan far above its present realistic value. Figure of 350 to dollar is so frequently mentioned that it may be he has already decided on this. It would be unwise fix rate even at real value of Hwan at beginning of year since our forecast for FY 1956 indicated substantial degree of inflation.

I fear device of permitting President to fix an "official rate" at an unrealistic level while using various devices to have great bulk of transaction carried on at different rates is no longer open to us since it is clear he will insist that all transactions must take place at rate set and he will insist on enforcing this rate by drastic police action and all other means he can think of. If we accept it, this would mean that all Hwan requirements would be obtained thru drawing system at official rate, aid goods would be priced at that rate and any further progress towards realistic pricing would be impossible. All old evils of greatly stimulated black markets and windfall profits to favorites would return in full force. I see no satisfactory course except face issue on its merits, refuse agree to fixed rate at this time, and be prepared for acrimonious controversy that is bound ensue.

There may be considerable advantage in having negotiations take place in Washington rather than Seoul. This could be suggested by us without potential embarrassment because President stated last month he wished send mission to discuss this and other subjects and our response to him that June might be appropriate time do this. It

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*On March 17, President Rhee told Ambassador Briggs during a discussion of Governor Stassen's visit to Seoul that he would like to send two or three officials of his government "fairly soon" to work on the problem of the exchange rate in preparation for the economic conference in June which had been agreed upon with Stassen. (Telegram 1041 from Seoul, March 17; Department of State, Central Files, 033.95B11/2-1755) The Department responded that such a visit would be premature and the Embassy was instructed to convey an invitation to the Republic of
would be helpful if I could be informed soon concerning your views on location of negotiations, position US should take and person or persons who would represent US.\(^6\) If Seoul to be site of conference, visiting delegation should be headed by man of very considerable rank and stature.

Suggest US position and guidelines for negotiations follow separate message.

Wood

Korea to send senior level officials to Washington in mid-June for the proposed discussions of military and economic aid programs for fiscal year 1956. (Telegram 607 to Seoul, March 26; \textit{ibid.,} O33.95B11/3-2255) Rhee, irritated by the rejection of his suggestion, indicated that he might send a delegation to Washington before June to "be in touch with various of our friends." (Telegram 1086 and 1106, March 31 and April 5; \textit{ibid.,} O33.95B11/3-3155 and O33.95B11/4-555, respectively) Ultimately Rhee waited and sent the delegation to Washington in June in accord with the invitation which had been extended.

\(^6\) In telegram 725 to Seoul, May 26, the Department responded that the discussions would take place in Washington and would cover the exchange rate problem and such related matters as the budget of the Republic of Korea, inflationary factors in Korea, and broad aspects of the aid program. Assistant Secretary Robertson was designated as the senior U.S. representative for the discussions. (\textit{Ibid.,} 795B.5-MSP/5-2655)

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44. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)\(^1\)

\textit{Washington, May 10, 1955.}

SUBJECT

General Taylor's Recommendation for Abolition of the NNSC and Denunciation of Paragraphs 13(c) and (d) of the Korean Armistice\(^2\)

General Taylor has proposed that the plan for reduction of the NNSC which that body approved be rejected in the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) and that he be authorized to counterpropose that the NNSC be dissolved and the provisions of paragraphs 13(c) and (d) of the Armistice Agreement be revoked by mutually agreed amendment of the Armistice. If the Communist Command fails to agree, the United Nations Command (UNC) would declare

\(^1\) Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 70, Korea. Secret. Drafted by Jones.

\(^2\) General Taylor's recommendation was sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as CINCUNC telegram C-72460, May 6. (Department of Defense Files)
those provisions of the Armistice relating to the NNSC and paragraphs 13(c) and (d) null and void.

The Republic of Korea (ROK) strongly resents the presence of the Communist members of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams (NNITs) on ROK territory and has frequently threatened to take unilateral action to eject the Czechs and Poles if a solution is not found to the NNSC problem soon. The ROK attitude on this issue is a constant irritant in U.S.-ROK relations and ever present is the possibility that the ROK may take violent action toward the Czechs and Poles. Despite this situation, Embassy Seoul believes that, if necessary, "we may be able to live for the time being with the NNSC proposal for reduction in personnel in spite of President Rhee’s dissatisfaction providing the U.S. continues to work for abolition of the Commission". 3

General Taylor's solution would have (a) the advantage of removing this irritant in U.S.-ROK relations; (b) make clear to the world the seriousness with which the UNC views Communist obstruction and violation of the Armistice; (c) make possible the modernization of U.S.-ROK armed forces; and (d) it has been argued by Defense that it would help deter the Chinese Communists from attacking Quemoy and Matsu by emphasizing U.S. intent to be prepared to fight on the Korean front if necessary.

Against these considerations must be weighed the basic fact that if we denounce these fundamental provisions of the Armistice, we open the way for complete disregard of the Agreement by the Communist side. Moreover, it is probable that such action would increase tensions in the Far East, jeopardize release of the airmen, 4 and certainly provide the Chinese Communists with an exploitable propaganda issue.

Furthermore, our Allies have thus far been unconvincing evidence we have been able to offer them that paragraphs 13(c) and (d) should be denounced. They do not doubt Communist violations of the Armistice, but are unconvincing that the build-up is of such magnitude as seriously to jeopardize the security of the UNC and the ROK. Moreover, they do not anticipate any renewal of hostilities by the Chinese Communists. They believe strongly that denunciation of these provisions of the Armistice Agreement would increase Far Eastern tensions. Before concurring in such a step, they want to be assured that there will be a positive gain in terms of efforts to counterbalance the Communist build-up, and that an adequate public case

3Quoted from telegram 1211 from Seoul, May 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/5-755)

4Reference is to the U.S. airmen who were imprisoned in the People's Republic of China.
for denunciation can be made. They understand that for both military and political reasons we do not want to permit the Communists to violate the Armistice with impunity, but in the absence of a demonstration that serious military risks are involved, they think that these considerations are transcended by the interest in relaxing tensions in the Far East. With a more convincing public case, and with assurances of intent and immediate need to strengthen our military position vis-à-vis the Communists, there is a slim possibility of obtaining Allied concurrence.

Without the concurrence of our Allies in denunciation of these Armistice terms, the U.S. would have to be prepared to assume sole responsibility for the decision in the United Nations. Our authority under the Security Council Resolution\(^5\) would probably not be regarded as going so far. The result would almost certainly be the effective dissolution of the UNC and the end of the Unified Command. Our Allies would, moreover, be in a position to consider themselves relieved of any obligations under the Joint Policy Declaration. Dissolution of the UNC would free the U.S. from close, frequent, and often troublesome consultation with its Allies on the Korean situation, who in any event are now providing only token military forces. Unilateral action by the U.S., however, could not remove the need for consultation on this policy, and would isolate the U.S. morally, cause further Allied misgivings with respect to U.S. Far Eastern policy, could increase the difficulties of united action by the Free World.

**Recommendations**

1. That General Taylor’s recommendation not be approved at this time.

2. That General Taylor be instructed to state in the MAC that the NNSC reduction proposal is not satisfactory to the UNC, but that the UNC will not object to it being put into effect while reserving the right to reopen the question.

3. That before the UNC takes the above action in the MAC, the U.S. should make a further approach to the Swiss and Swedes after consultation with our Allies urging them to set a definite date for termination of their participation in the NNSC.

4. That General Taylor’s authority to remove the Czechs and Poles to the Demilitarized Zone, if necessary for their safety, be confirmed.

\(^5\)Apparently a reference to the resolution adopted by the U.N. Security Council on July 7, 1950, which established a unified command in Korea under the United States and requested the United States to designate a commander for the U.N. forces in Korea. (U.N. doc. S/1588)
45. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris\(^1\)

*Washington, May 11, 1955—7:02 p.m.*

Tedul 22. For Secretary from Hoover. Pass Admiral Davis.\(^2\)

1. At urgent request of Defense, the Korean NNSC matter was discussed this morning with President. Secretary Anderson, Admiral Radford, Phleger and myself present. The President suggested that a message be sent to you personally concerning problem and his reaction.

2. You will recall that the NNSC in Korea unanimously recommended on May 3 to the Military Armistice Commission that the number of stationary inspection teams be reduced from 5 to 3 in each of the two zones in Korea and that the number of delegations on each of these remaining teams be reduced from two neutrals appointed by each side to one neutral appointed by each side.\(^3\) The United Nations Command must take a position on this proposal, which the Communists will doubtless approve, in the Military Armistice Commission. General Taylor has recommended that this occasion be seized to propose in the Military Armistice Commission that the NNSC be abolished altogether and that the provisions of the armistice with respect to the reinforcement of personnel and equipment, paragraphs 13c and 13d be abrogated by mutual agreement. If this counterproposal were not accepted by the Communists, General Taylor has proposed that the UNC unilaterally announce that these provisions are regarded as abrogated by reason of the Communist violations.

3. At the meeting I pointed out that our allies would not agree to action as proposed by General Taylor and that such unilateral U.S. action would destroy the United Nations structure through which we are operating in Korea and could be used by some of our allies to free them from any obligations under the Joint Policy Declaration. Anderson did not urge General Taylor’s proposal but alternatively suggested that Taylor be authorized as commander in the field to suspend provisionally the unworkable clauses of the Armistice Agreement which relate to the operations of NNSC and the inspection teams on the grounds that clearly inoperative and unworkable provisions of a treaty or agreement may be suspended by either

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\(^1\)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/5-1155. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hennemendinger and Harry Schwartz of S/P; cleared by Murphy, Phleger, and Defense; and approved by Hoover.

\(^2\)Vice Admiral Arthur C. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs. Davis accompanied Dulles, who was in Paris for the North Atlantic Council meetings, May 9–11.

\(^3\)See Document 41.
party pending mutual agreement of the signatories upon satisfactory arrangements for making those provisions workable. This may be done without abrogating the entire Armistice Agreement. There are some precedents in international law to support such suspension of provisions as contrasted with unilateral and absolute abrogation of treaty terms.

4. President believes we must find some way out of difficult situation in which Communists violate armistice while we continue observe it. Re view our allies, he commented they have stake in our collaboration in other areas. He thought that as a first step we should proceed along lines suggested by Anderson and desired that we recommend to you that you speak to Macmillan and Pinay, telling them the "facts of life", and obtaining acquiescence in this course of action.⁴ Thereafter we could take up matter here with Sixteen.

5. Suggest you point out that Sixteen participating nations agreed with us last fall that the NNSC was ineffective by reason of Communist obstruction and that we should make a tripartite approach (British, French and U.S.) to the Swiss and Swedes to persuade them to terminate their participation in the NNSC. The best we have been able to accomplish through this approach after many months of effort was the unanimous agreement cited above of the NNSC. You might point out that in addition to the serious matter of principle involved, it has been only with the greatest of effort and at the cost of very considerable strains on ROK-U.S. relationships that the U.S. has been able to protect the Communist personnel of the inspection teams. While the Swiss and Swedes have assured us that their agreement with the Czechs and Poles represents only a first stage and that they plan (at some undefined point in time) a further step, we believe that we can no longer run the risks involved of a possible conflict between UNC and ROK personnel over the safety of the Czechs and Poles. Moreover we have no assurance that the Swiss and Swedes will be willing in the future to act without the agreement of the Communists and there is no reason to think that the Communists will agree to elimination of the teams altogether.

6. You might also point out that the proposed action relates entirely to the operations of the NNSC and does not involve any impairment of the substantive provisions of the Armistice. For your information, Defense maintained that the harmful results of our continuing fully to carry out provisions of paragraphs 13c and d of the Armistice while the Communists continue to violate them cannot

⁴Dulles' conversation with Macmillan concerning the NNSC is summarized in Dulles 31, infra. Dulles did not discuss the matter with Pinay in Paris, but Murphy raised it with French Ambassador Couve de Murville on May 13; see Document 49.
long be endured. The President said that this was a matter that should be considered later.

Hoover

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46. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State

Paris, May 12, 1955—7 p.m.

Dulles 31. Re Tedul 22.\(^2\) I talked to Macmillan this morning about Korean NNSC. I described to him present situation in detail whereby NNSC is hamstrung in North Korea by Communists whereas in South they have full access due to our strict observance letter and spirit of Korean armistice. Macmillan did not seem fully aware of situation and said he now understood our problem. He promised to look at it again with view to seeing how NNSC might be appropriately wound up and said he assumed we would keep Makins fully informed of our thinking.

I then said to him we had another serious problem regarding replacement of military equipment in South Korea where we would probably have to cut some corners re letter of Korean armistice. Under present circumstances we cannot replace obsolete military equipment which is no longer in production unless we continue production of obsolete equipment. This was particularly applicable to aircraft. I explained that theory of armistice was that it would be quickly followed by political conference leading to replacement of armistice by some form of agreement. We were now faced with situation of indefinite duration where either we replace obsolete equipment with comparable but modern types or we adhere to strict observance of Korean armistice thus permitting defense posture of South Korea to be very seriously impaired.

Macmillan said he was unaware of this problem but was very sympathetic to it. He compared it to someone’s owning 1939 Ford who wished to replace it with new car but was unable to do so unless Ford started reproducing 1939 models. I said to him that we were faced with two possibilities: One was to void the pertinent armistice provisions and other was to simply go ahead and replace obsolete equipment with more modern types. In fact this was what Communists were doing in North Korea where they were continu-

\(^1\)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/5–1255. Secret.
\(^2\)Supra.
ously violating agreed equipment levels by the introduction of jet aircraft and other items which had not been in Korea when armistice was concluded. I said I tentatively leaned toward simply replacing obsolete equipment with more modern types but had reached no firm conclusions. Obviously this is a delicate matter. Macmillan concluded by saying he fully appreciated our problem and hoped we would also keep Makins fully informed of our thinking so that we could have solid common approach.

Dulles

47. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State

Paris, May 12, 1955—10 p.m.

Dulles 39. I raised with Macmillan question of Commonwealth forces in Korea and pled with him not to cut down forces anymore than was absolutely necessary. While recognizing British desire to get ahead with organizing defense of Malaya I pointed out effect on other U.N. powers of substantial reduction of Commonwealth forces in Korea.

Macmillan replied concept of maintaining Commonwealth brigade group no longer made sense now that Canadians had gone and Australians had made it clear that they wished to redeploy their battalion. He mentioned importance of Menzies’ efforts to change Australian policy so that it would be accepted fact that Australian units could be deployed outside of Australia in peacetime. In light of present circumstances U.K. military felt strongly it did not make sense to try to maintain full brigade group headquarters when there was going to be only one battalion and they were anxious to redeploy certain elements of brigade headquarters and supporting elements elsewhere.

He said however he understood our problem and “would try his level best by a bit of showmanship” to make Commonwealth forces look as substantial as possible. He promised to speak to Field Marshal Harding about this. While U.K. are sympathetic our problem I am convinced in my own mind that there is no way we can prevent them from reducing Commonwealth forces in Korea to something just short of a battalion which I think they will make earnest effort

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/5-1255. Secret.
2Field Marshal Sir John Harding, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff.
to portray as being more than a battalion by calling it combat group or some such name.

Dulles

48. Memorandum of Discussion at the 248th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 12, 1955

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1–4.]

5. Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea (NSC Action No. 1322; NSC 5514)

Mr. Anderson said that although this problem had not been scheduled on the agenda, the President had desired to inform the Council of certain developments in connection with the problem presented by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and its inspection teams in Korea. After reminding the Council of the bearing of General Hull’s recent report on this problem, Mr. Anderson briefly described the proposal made by the Swiss and Swedes and likely to be agreed to by the Communists, calling for a reduction in the number of inspection teams and the number of personnel on each team. He then explained that General Taylor had not believed that the Swiss and Swedish proposal offered anything like a satisfactory solution to the problem, but had expressed the opinion that the proposal by the Swiss and Swedes presented the United States with an opportunity to propose in the Military Armistice Commission the complete abolition of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, as well as the abrogation of paragraphs 13-c and 13-d of the Korean Armistice Agreement, which prevented either side in the Armistice from bringing in any new matériel or adding any additional military personnel.

Mr. Anderson said that General Taylor’s proposal and recommendation had been the subject of discussion yesterday between the President and representatives of the Departments of State and Defense. In the course of this discussion two possible courses of action

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2 Regarding NSC Action No. 1322, see footnote 6, Document 11.
3 Document 24.
4 See Document 38.
5 See Document 45.
had emerged. One possible course was unilateral action by the United States to suspend the activities of the NNSC inspection teams while doing nothing about paragraphs 13-c and 13-d of the Armistice Agreement. The second possible course of action was unilateral action by the United States to suspend the activities of the inspection teams and likewise to abrogate paragraphs 13-c and 13-d of the Armistice.

The discussion resulted in a decision by the President to inform Secretary Dulles of General Taylor’s recommendation and of the President’s tentative feeling that it might well be possible for General Taylor to suspend the activities of the inspection teams after Secretary Dulles had consulted with the British and French to ascertain their reaction. Accordingly, today or tomorrow Secretary Dulles would presumably propose to the British and French a suspension of the operations of the NNSC inspection teams in Korea. On the other hand, with respect to the abrogation of paragraphs 13-c and 13-d, Mr. Anderson explained that the President believed that such a U.S. move should await fuller consultation with the sixteen countries who represented the United Nations Command allies in Korea. Mr. Anderson went on to point out that these decisions were wholly consistent with existing U.S. policy, and that our policy on Korea would not require revision unless these proposed actions by the United States involved jeopardizing the UN set-up in Korea.

The President then commented that he had in mind merely to have the Council kept informed of these developments. It appeared to him that the UN commander in the field did have the right to suspend the activities of the inspection teams if such activities jeopardized the security of the UNC forces in Korea.

Secretary Humphrey expressed agreement with the President, and went on to ask if the time was not also approaching when we would have to get rid of paragraphs 13-c and 13-d of the Armistice Agreement. The President replied that this might well be the case, but he felt that the State Department was altogether right in not wishing to take any action at this time which could result in jeopardizing the United Nations Command structure in Korea.

Admiral Radford said that he wished to clear up two important points. It was his understanding, he continued, that if General Taylor suspended any further mobile inspections, he could bring the inspection teams into the demilitarized zone and keep them there. Secondly, it was Admiral Radford’s understanding that General Taylor already possessed the authority to refuse any further requests by the Communists for inspection in South Korea.

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9For a summary of Dulles’ discussion with Macmillan, see Document 46. Dulles did not discuss the problem with the French while he was in Paris.
The President said that in any event it was essential that the Departments of State and Defense have a common understanding as to what we have agreed upon.

Secretary Hoover pointed out his very great doubt whether the British could be expected to do very much about any of these problems until after the conclusion of the general election. The President repeated his warning that we must be sure that we know what we are doing. It was desirable to tell General Taylor to go slow on any refusal of further mobile inspections for at least a week or two.

The National Security Council. The

Noted an oral report by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs that the President, after full discussion with the Departments of State and Defense, had (1) requested the Secretary of State to consult with the British and French regarding the provisional suspension of the clauses of the Korean Armistice Agreement relating to the operations of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission's inspection teams, such action being deemed necessary as a result of Communist obstructions and violations of the Armistice provisions; and (2) indicated that action regarding the provisions of the Korean Armistice Agreement with respect to the reinforcement of personnel and equipment (paragraphs 13–c and 13–d) should be deferred, pending consultation with the United Nations Command allies.

S. Everett Gleason

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3Reference is to the British general election of May 26, 1955.
4The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1399. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

49. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 13, 1955

SUBJECT
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC)

PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Maurice Couve de Murville, French Ambassador
Sir Robert Scott, Minister, British Embassy
Mr. Robert Murphy, G
Mr. William G. Jones, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs, NA
Mr. Ward Allen, EUR

1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/5–1355. Secret. Drafted by Jones on May 16.
Mr. Murphy called in Minister Scott and Ambassador de Murville and in separate conversations explained the President’s suggestion to suspend provisionally the unworkable clauses of the Armistice relating to the operations of the NNSC and the inspection teams on the grounds that clearly inoperative and unworkable provisions of a treaty or agreement may be suspended by either party pending agreement of the signatories upon satisfactory arrangements for making those provisions workable.

Mr. Murphy also stressed the need to do something about paragraphs 13(c) and (d) of the Armistice and expressed the hope that action on the NNSC would be a step in the direction of facing up to the problem posed by Communist violation of the reinforcing restrictions. He explained that the Secretary had discussed the matter with Foreign Secretary Macmillan in Paris and had hoped to be able to discuss the matter with Foreign Minister Pinay. Mr. Murphy requested that urgent consideration be given the President’s suggestion on the NNSC by the French and British Governments and pointed out that we desired to receive their views before discussing the matter with the Sixteen.

Minister Scott said he had seen a copy of a telegram from Macmillan to Eden on the conversations with the Secretary. Macmillan, however, had reported only on the question of paragraphs 13(c) and (d) of the Armistice, and had not mentioned the NNSC. With respect to the former problem, Macmillan had told Eden that in view of the situation created by the Communist violations, if anything were to be done, he saw only two alternatives: that is, either to permit the Command to replace its worn out and obsolete equipment covertly or, and he much preferred this solution, to make a forthright announcement that in view of the Communist violations the UN Command was constrained to announce its intention to replace its equipment as it became obsolete with more modern arms. Minister Scott said the principal difficulty the British found with such action was the problem of public relations and stressed the need for persuasive publicly usable evidence of the extent of Communist violations. Mr. Murphy questioned the need to cite chapter and verse when we were all agreed that the Communists had violated the Armistice, and expressed the feeling that there was a tendency on the part of some of our friends to “sweep the matter under the rug” since the U.S. was, so to speak, “holding the bag”. He stated that this problem was urgent for the U.S. and we were not in a position to have it ignored. By permitting the continuance of the NNSC we were in effect collaborating with the other side to make possible a covering up of Communist violations. While he agreed with Mr. Scott’s statement that there was a tendency to look at the NNSC in the Indochina context, Mr. Murphy pointed out that this cut two ways and that al-
ready the Communists had also broken the agreements in Indochina.\textsuperscript{2}

Ambassador de Murville stated that he had received no word from Minister Pinay on discussions relating to the Korean Armistice with the Secretary. In response to the Ambassador’s question, Mr. Murphy said we were primarily concerned at this time with suspending entirely the operations of the Communists in the Republic of Korea by a decision expressed through the UN Command. While the Armistice has no escape clause there is plenty of precedent for declaring a part of an agreement invalid and inoperative until better arrangements had been worked out by both sides. In response to a further question, Mr. Murphy said that reinforcement of the UN Command and ROK troops with modern weapons would not be accomplished at once but that action taken on the NNSC would, we hoped, lead in that direction.

Ambassador de Murville wondered whether this would be the best solution and asked why, if we had a strong case to make on the question of Communist violations, we didn’t make it public? It was pointed out to the Ambassador that a good deal of publicity had been given these violations, but that only through public statements by the Sixteen and through active efforts on the part of each could the problem really be fixed in the public mind.

Stating that it seemed to him we had two worries, first the danger of an incident between the NNSC teams and the ROK, and second, and more importantly, the fact that article 13 was being violated, the Ambassador asked if the proposal already made by the NNSC might not have substantially reduced the danger of an incident. He also wondered if we shouldn’t discuss the matter with the Communist Governments to find a solution. Mr. Murphy pointed out that while implementation of the NNSC proposal would reduce the danger somewhat, it did not by any means eliminate it. As for political discussions with the Communists on a political level, we already had had those at Panmunjom since the Communist military there were in fact political officers.

Both Minister Scott and Ambassador de Murville promised to ask for the views of their Governments on the NNSC as a matter of urgency.

\textsuperscript{2}Reference is to the Geneva accords which ended the fighting in Indochina in 1954. The agreements were signed on July 20–21, 1954.
50. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, May 17, 1955—6 p.m.

1254. Tokyo pass CINCUNC and CAG. With reference para 5, NSC 5514, there follows Embassy’s current estimate of political advantages and disadvantages of continued compliance with Korean Armistice. This estimate is based exclusively on political considerations and does not treat with military considerations which we recognize may be controlling. Embassy’s political estimate was discussed May 17 with General Taylor who is transmitting through his own channels an estimate of military advantages and disadvantages of continued compliance Korean Armistice. General Taylor agreed with us that in any action concerning NNSC or Korean Armistice, the question of timing was of prime importance.

I. Political advantages of terminating compliance with Korean Armistice Agreement:

1. A decision that the U.S. would no longer comply with provisions of Armistice Agreement would materially contribute to improvement of U.S./ROK relations. President Rhee has consistently taken position that Armistice Agreement is an unwarranted and galling interference with ROK sovereignty. A U.S. decision to stop compliance with its terms would be interpreted by Rhee as the achievement of one of his principal objectives. We would expect an improved climate of opinion in Seoul which might make it easier to reach satisfactory solutions to other outstanding problems in U.S./ROK relations.

2. If the U.S. decision to end compliance with Armistice provisions was implemented by removal of NNSC personnel from ROK territory, danger new incidents involving these personnel would be eliminated. Equally, the possibility of clash between UNC forces and ROK citizens arising out of UNC attempts to protect NNSC personnel would no longer exist.

3. A decision to end compliance with the Armistice would probably make President Rhee even more amenable to maintaining ROK forces under the UNC.

II. Political advantages of continued compliance with Armistice Agreement:

1. The political advantage for US/ROK relations which would accrue from a U.S. decision to stop compliance with the Armistice

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95/5-1755. Top Secret. Repeated to Tokyo.
2Document 24.
3See Document 56.
would, in our opinion, be only temporary. Rhee’s principal objective is unification of Korea in his lifetime. His real objection to Armistice is based upon his belief that this arrangement is an impediment to unification of Korea which he insists can only be achieved by force. He would undoubtedly see the U.S. decision to end compliance with the Armistice as an opportunity to obtain additional military supplies to achieve his objective. In other words, we could expect a series of early requests for large amounts of the most modern weapons and equipment including both jet planes and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. It is our understanding that current American military plans in the Far East do not include the provisions of such supplies to the ROK. In fact, it is understood that the abrogation of paragraph 13d of the Armistice would not materially affect the current U.S. military program for Korea. Therefore, we would have to turn down Rhee’s request for additional armament and equipment without being able at that time to justify such rejections by reference to the Armistice Agreement. As a result, the U.S. and not the Armistice Agreement would become the objective of President Rhee’s irritation. The result might very well be that tensions in U.S./ROK relations would increase to a point beyond which they presently exist.

2. The Armistice and U.S. compliance with its terms have exercised a restraining effect upon Rhee’s objectives of unifying Korea by force. U.S. decision to stop compliance with its terms would undoubtedly be interpreted by Rhee as an indication that the U.S. was in process of modifying its position that Korean unification should only be achieved by peaceful means. This interpretation might very well have immediate significance if military and political situation in rest of Asia deteriorates.

3. Koreans grasped with eagerness the idea of a three-front war in Asia. They saw this as the most likely possibility for assuring U.S. support for unification of Korea by force. As they see it, the U.S. would not be able to withhold support for a drive north if the U.S. had become militarily committed in Formosa area. Recent developments which point away from this possibility have been greeted by Koreans with disappointment and dismay. A decision by the U.S. to end compliance with the Armistice terms would be interpreted by Koreans as firmest evidence so far available that the three-front strategy was still the order of the day.

If as it appears to us here on basis of no very privileged information the U.S. Government has decided to undertake negotiations with the Soviet Union on a broad range of issues affecting world tensions, continued compliance with Korean Armistice terms would appear to contribute towards success of those negotiations. A decision to end compliance with its terms might very well cause our
allies to question the sincerity of U.S. intentions with respect to possible negotiations.

4. A U.S. decision to stop compliance with the Armistice Agreement would have very adverse propaganda effects. North Korean propaganda is based on a heterogeneous collection of claims, assertions and insinuations which have no basis in fact. As a result, credibility is low. A decision to end compliance with the Armistice probably would give a factual basis for North Korean propaganda and would lend credibility to their other unfounded assertions. An action of this kind on part of U.S. would be cited as factual proof of Commie contentions that the U.S. seeks international tension and war. The effect of this propaganda, not only in the Far East, but among large segments of Europeans, should not be discounted.

5. In a broader context, the U.S. position in Asia rests in large part upon Asian appreciation that U.S. policy is based on principles, including observance of the pledged word. In Asian minds this sharply distinguishes U.S. policy from power politics of European nations. Continued observance of this policy may be temporarily disadvantageous, but in long run, it gives us strength and obtains for us Asian respect and cooperations.

Lacy

51. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 21, 1955

SUBJECT
Korean Armistice

PARTICIPANTS
Sir Robert Scott, Minister, British Embassy
M. G. L. Joy, British Embassy
Robert G. Murphy, Under Secretary
Noel Hemmendinger, Deputy Director, NA

Sir Robert came in to give the comments of the British Government on the proposals which had been communicated to him by Mr. Murphy on May 13 with respect to suspension of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC).²

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/5-2155. Confidential. Drafted by Hemmendinger.
²See Document 49.
He spoke from the attached memorandum, which he thereupon handed to Mr. Murphy. Sir Robert indicated that the matter had been carefully considered in London after the Foreign Minister returned from Paris, on the basis of his conversation with the Secretary. They had concluded that the heart of the problem appeared to be military reinforcement, which would not be directly assisted by the present U.S. proposal, and they thought there were most important political objections to any action at this time which tended to weaken the Armistice.

Mr. Murphy said that both the Department of State and our military have felt it would be unwise to take action which would amount to barefaced violation of the Armistice. Sir Robert suggested that the language of the Armistice Agreement was not so explicit that it would not be possible to give a somewhat liberal interpretation, to the word "types", for instance. Mr. Murphy said we thought the language was pretty tight and that the Neutral Nations had given it a tight interpretation which would be difficult now to escape from. Sir Robert suggested that it would be possible for the UN Command to give fewer details from now on to the NNSC on the ground that the other side was not giving details.

Sir Robert also emphasized that the British would not suggest that any action to be taken with respect to introducing more modern equipment be discussed with the other participating nations. He thought that we should discuss at the most with them the proposal made by the NNSC and now pending in the Military Administering Commission.

There was a discussion of whether a public suspension of the operations of the NNSC would cause any serious public reactions in view of the public case we could make. Sir Robert agreed that we could undoubtedly make a case but his Government felt that it would still be unwise to stir up the issue, especially since the proposed action did not meet the military problem.

Mr. Murphy indicated that our military were now considering the public release of further information on violations by the Communists. It was agreed that this was a good thing to do no matter what course of action is decided upon.

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9Not printed. The memorandum lays out in greater detail the argument advanced by Scott that it would be politically unwise for the U.N. Command to take unilateral action to remove the NNSC from South Korea and run the risk of international censure for violation of the Armistice Agreement. [1 line of text not declassified]
Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC)

Discussion

Now that the British have replied negatively (Tab A)\(^2\) to our suggestion that the NNSC be provisionally suspended, it is necessary to consider our next move. The French have not yet replied, but we have an informal indication that they are not favorably disposed toward the proposal.\(^3\)

The British counterproposed that we (1) accept the proposal by the NNSC for a reduction in its personnel and number of teams as the best solution that can be secured at the moment; and (2) permit the Command, without further declaration, to introduce discreetly such weapons as it believes are necessary. While this proposal goes to the heart of the problem as defined by our military, there is serious doubt about the feasibility of either introducing more modern weapons covertly or interpreting the Armistice so as to give us substantially increased latitude, in view of the interpretations already adopted by the NNSC. Since concealment for any period is impossible, and since we have legal grounds, in view of Communist violations, for suspending the military reinforcement provisions, we would be better off before world opinion if we did so openly rather than covertly.

Nevertheless, a proposal regarding the suspension of the obligations of paragraph 13(d) should be considered if Defense can demonstrate that there would be substantial military advantages in relieving the Command of these reinforcing restrictions of the Armistice. So far Defense, despite repeated requests, has disclosed no specific plans for the introduction of new weapons if the Command were relieved

\(^1\)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/5-2755. Secret. Drafted by Jones; concurred in by IO, EUR, FE, and L/UNA; and approved by McClurkin. Sent through Murphy who initialed it.

\(^2\)Not found attached. Apparently a copy of the memorandum and attachment \textit{supra} was attached at Tab A.

\(^3\)This indication was confirmed by Ambassador Couve de Murville on May 31 when he told Murphy that the French Government felt that the Swiss and Swedish proposal to reduce the number of NNITs in Korea should be supported by the U.N. Command in the Military Armistice Commission. A further effort to eliminate the inspection teams, the French felt, could perhaps be made later. (Memorandum of conversation by Murphy; Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/5-3155)
of paragraph 13(d). In a recent message from Seoul (Tab B)\textsuperscript{4} Ambassador Lacy states that it is his understanding that current American military plans in the Far East do not include the provision of modern weapons to the Republic of Korea (ROK) and that abrogation of paragraph 13(d) would not materially affect the current U.S. military program for Korea.

In Tab C\textsuperscript{5} Embassy Seoul previously stated that if necessary "we may be able to live for the time being with the NNSC proposal for reduction in personnel in spite of President Rhee's dissatisfaction, providing the U.S. continues to work for abolition of the Commission".

With respect to the proposal to suspend the NNSC operations provisionally, it is questionable whether the military advantages of such action would outweigh the disadvantages of doing so over the objection of our Allies.

Recommendations\textsuperscript{6}

1. That Defense concurrence be sought to instruct the United Nations Command (UNC) to state in the Military Armistice Commission that (a) the NNSC proposal is not satisfactory since it does not solve the serious difficulties created for the UNC by the Communists in their obstruction of the operations of this body and by their violations of paragraph 13(d), but that (b) we will accept this proposal provisionally pending a satisfactory solution to this problem.

2. That the Swiss and Swedes be informed of the instruction to the UNC and that we again urge them to find a more satisfactory solution.

3. That when plans for the introduction of new weapons are prepared and ready for implementation the positive support of our Allies be vigorously sought for openly suspending the provision of paragraph 13(d).

4. That the President's approval to the foregoing courses be sought.

\textsuperscript{4}Not found attached. A note on the source text indicates that telegram 1254 from Seoul, was attached at Tab B. Telegram 1254 is printed as Document 50.

\textsuperscript{5}Not found attached. A note on the source text indicates that telegram 1211 from Seoul, May 7, was attached at Tab C. In telegram 1211, the Embassy assessed the recommendation made by General Taylor which is outlined in Document 44.

\textsuperscript{6}These recommendations were ultimately adopted, but only after extended debate within the government. Regarding Dulles' decision with respect to the reduction of the NNSC, see Document 81.
53. Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Taylor)¹

Washington, May 27, 1955—11:43 a.m.

JCS 982226. From JCS.

1. It is desired to avoid, particularly during the next 2 or 3 months, any incident involving United States and Communist aircraft in peripheral areas. At the same time, there is no desire to defer or restrict air operations required to secure essential military information.

2. It appears from recent experience that USAF fighter patrols flown for general surveillance purposes along the eastern and western coasts of North Korea are a likely cause of such incidents.² There is no question of the basic authority to operate over international waters as long as restrictions regarding approaches to Communist-held territory are observed. However, there is a question of the actual military return obtained from flights of fighter aircraft which closely approach Communist territorial waters and therefore run the risk of involvement with Communist aircraft.³

3. It is directed that operations of aircraft in the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea be so conducted as to minimize involvement with Communist aircraft. It is important to emphasize that this proscription is not designed to inhibit necessary ECM, weather, photographic or shipping surveillance missions, but all flights which have the aspect of baiting Communist fighter aircraft should be avoided.

4. Previous communications which directed fighter escort of essential photographic reconnaissance flights in areas in close proximity to Communist territory continue in effect.

5. If in your opinion this directive would operate to seriously limit your essential military operations, your comments are requested.⁴

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795A.5411/6–1455. Top Secret. Priority. Repeated to COMPEAF Tokyo, and COMNAVFE Japan.

²Concern over these patrols in Washington grew out of incidents which occurred on February 5 and May 10. In both cases, U.S. planes flying reconnaissance missions along the coast of North Korea and Manchuria were challenged by MiG aircraft. In the ensuing air battles U.S. planes violated North Korean and possibly Chinese Communist airspace. U.S. officials were particularly concerned to avoid unnecessary incidents along the Chinese coast, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had issued instructions on March 3, 1955, prohibiting aerial reconnaissance within 12 miles of the Korean coasts. (Memorandum from Sebald to Murphy, May 18; ibid., NA Files: Lot 58 D 184, Korea Military)

³This issue was discussed in a State–JCS meeting on May 20. (Ibid., State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417)

⁴In telegram C 72924 from Tokyo, June 11, CINCPE responded that the restrictions outlined in JCS telegram 982226 would not seriously limit essential military operations. (Ibid., Central Files, 795A.5411/6–1455)
54. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, May 30, 1955—9 p.m.

1307. For Robertson. Reference: Embtel 1306. There follows text of my memorandum to General Taylor, dated May 25, containing our views on political and economic factors relating to proposal force reduction goals for the ROK:

“The Korean military establishment is undoubtedly the strongest single stabilizing force in Korea. It is at the same time a highly significant political factor in the general Far Eastern situation.

“As the strongest Allied military force in the Far East, although by necessity confined to Korea, the ROK Army’s existence is a powerful, if not a determining, factor in shaping Korean relations with Far Eastern countries. It appears also as a goal towards which the other free Asian countries, especially in Southeast Asia, aspire, as we wish them to do. The ROK military establishment is a power factor of great import in the Far East and, as the largest and most effective standing army in the area on our side, will continue to be so for some time. Therefore, a move to reduce its size will have repercussions throughout the Far East. If such a reduction follows a general reduction of tensions in this area, including the withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces from North Korea, the readjustments which would necessarily accompany the reduction could be contained and exploited for the achievement of US policy objectives. If knowledge of proposals looking towards the reduction of the ROK military establishment should precede a general lessening of tensions, the effect in Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines and other Far Eastern countries would be extremely harmful to morale in these countries.

“Within Korea, ROK leaders and especially President Rhee feel that the ROK armed forces should be larger than the contemplated twenty active and ten reserve army divisions. Any suggestion of a reduction below this level would be pure political dynamite here, striking as it would at Rhee’s principal objective, i.e., unification of Korea during his lifetime, and at his fundamental assumption, i.e., that unification can only be accomplished by armed force. Knowl-

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5/5-3055. Top Secret; Priority.
2In telegram 1306 from Seoul, May 30, Ambassador Lacy reported that he had been unable to reach agreement with General Taylor on a recommendation concerning the scope of the impending talks between officials of the United States and the Republic of Korea in Washington. General Taylor felt that the question of a reduction in size of the armed forces maintained by the Republic of Korea should be introduced into the economic discussions if the overall economic problems facing South Korea were to be dealt with successfully. Ambassador Lacy and the Embassy staff disagreed. (Ibid., 795B.5-MSP/5-3055)
edge at this time of plans for a future reduction of the ROK armed forces would make our relations with the ROK Government exceedingly difficult. Our influence in the affairs this country would be seriously reduced, including the restraint we have been able to exercise on the President's objective of unifying Korea by force. With the removal of this restraint the possibility of a unilateral attack north in presidential dismay and desperation should not be discounted. One of the principal aspects of this restraint has been the relationships which have been built up between American civilian and military officers and individual ROK military leaders. It is extremely doubtful that these relationships would survive in face of armed forces reduction proposals.

"American influence and restraint on ROK civilian and military leaders have also been exercised through the Unified Command. Withdrawal of ROK armed forces from the UNC might be an immediate result of ROK knowledge of plans to reduce those forces, especially if such action was accompanied by a further phase-out of US and other UN forces. (Under these circumstances, the question of the basis for continuing the UNC itself might well be raised.)

"Plans to reduce the ROK armed forces would undoubtedly severely shake ROK morale at all levels of society, especially among ROK leaders. President Rhee could be counted on to react even more vigorously than he did last summer to the phase-out of US forces. At that time we were able to make the point that his overall military position would not be weakened since US divisions would be replaced by accruing ROK strength. In spite of this, withdrawal of US divisions caused a violent reaction. Mention to him of plans for reduction of ROK armed forces even before they have been built up to the promised strength will to President Rhee presage a catastrophe.

"The effect on the stability of the Rhee regime would be very direct since success in obtaining US military assistance has been one of the main sources of the President's great political strength. The immediate effect of putting into question the stability of the present regime would be political confusion which would be exploited by Rhee's opponents (including the Communists), none of whom have his stature or appeal in the country. In this connection, the forthcoming Presidential election which will take place probably in the summer of 1956 should not be overlooked. Within the military establishment itself which is, as stated, the strongest single stabilizing force in Korea a reduction in force proposal would have most unsettling effects.

"From a purely economic point of view, there is no question whatever that the Korean military establishment is far larger than the economic resources of the country can support and that even a reduced establishment, say by 50 percent, would require very substan-
tial US assistance and support. This point is axiomatic and requires no elaboration. We are prepared to discount, on Mr. Wood's advice, the importance of the problem of integrating the released from the army into the civilian economy; Mr. Wood suggested the possibility that the expanding nature of the Korean economy under the aid program would accommodate this accretion to the labor force. Of great importance, however, is the uncertainty and instability which would result from a force reduction proposal. This would undoubtedly have most serious effects on the confidence both of foreign and domestic capital in the future of Korea.

"If international tensions, particularly in the Far East, are reduced to a point which would justify a reduction in the Korean military establishment, there still remains the question of timing and, in this connection, the developments leading up to the Korean Presidential elections in the summer of 1956 and the elections themselves will be crucially important. It may not be too much of an over-simplification to say that, as the situation seems today, the individual nominated to run as candidate for Vice President with Rhee will be of key importance to the achievement of US long range objectives in Korea. A US decision on Korean force goals and the timing of the disclosure to ROK officials might very well be the controlling factor in this selection. These statements are intended to signal this question as one which deserves serious and continuing consideration at the highest levels of our government.

"It is of immediate concern that US representatives in the forthcoming US-ROK economic discussions in Washington should by all means avoid giving the Korean representatives any indication that the US is thinking about a reduction in the ROK armed forces or a further phaseout of US troops below the two division level. Introduction of this subject into the Washington talks would jeopardize the success of these talks. Presumably these talks will coincide with intensified preparations for a Big Four meeting, if not with the meeting itself, and we can expect ROK suspicions already being emphasized in official discussions and in the press to increase. Therefore, even if we could discount the political effects of a force reduction described above, we could not expect a rational reaction if the proposal was raised in the Washington talks. At the least, the ROKs would not hesitate to label such a proposal as part of the price the US was prepared to pay during the Big Four negotiations.

"In conclusion, it is essential to US-ROK relations and to the achievement of US objectives in Korea that no suggestion of plans to

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reduce the ROK military establishment reach ROK officials now. The importance of the timing of the disclosure of this information cannot be over emphasized. When it is decided that conditions in the Far East and in the rest of world justify this step our collective best judgement must be mobilized to determine the most effective way of presenting it to the ROK in the light of conditions existing at the time. On this point one thing seems clear even at this distance, we should avoid being put in the position we found ourselves in when we told only President Rhee of our plans concerning the 1954 phase-out of US troops."

Lacy

55. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)\(^1\)

Washington, June 1, 1955.

SUBJECT

Instructions from President Rhee to Ambassador Yang in Washington and Minister Kim in Tokyo\(^2\)

Summarized below is the combined gist of an instruction (Tab A)\(^3\) to Ambassador Yang and a letter (Tab B)\(^4\) to Minister Kim.

1. If the U.S. does not wish to repeat the 1950 tragedy it must give the ROK more arms. If the U.S. will not strengthen ROK forces it should withdraw American troops from Korea as the ROK does not want friends helping in Korea to be destroyed.

2. Korea has to establish a fixed exchange rate, which all Koreans and foreigners will then be required to observe. In working this out the ROK may have to agree to a higher rate than 180/1.

3. Asiatic nations will receive 2/3 of the $3,500 million allocated by the U.S. for foreign aid. The allocation for the ROK—$900 million—is less than the amount to which the ROK is entitled.

4. Rhee suspects a large share of Asian aid funds will go to Japan in line with "Secretary Dulles’ policy”.

5. Ambassador Yang is urged to talk to editors, commentators, U.S. officials, Congressmen, and Senators and advise them of ROK

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\(^1\)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/6–155. Secret. Drafted by Jones. Also sent to Sebald.

\(^2\)Kim Yong-sik.

\(^3\)Footnote [7 lines of text] not declassified.

\(^4\)Footnote [4-1/2 lines of text] not declassified.
feelings in order to assure that an undue amount of aid funds do not go to Japan.

6. Rhee urges Minister Kim to publicly repeat Japan's claims of 85 percent ROK property and states that if the U.S. continues to keep silent "on this preposterous claim" some Koreans will begin to suspect a secret agreement between Japan and the U.S. as in 1905.5

7. While it is well to keep in touch with fair-minded men such as Mr. Inagaki,6 one must never trust them too much. When American officials offer to mediate Korea-Japan problems, remind them that our experiences regarding fishing line7 taught us that we cannot count on America's fairness in these matters.

8. Japan is preparing to stand with the Communists against the U.S. The ROK should raise its voices against establishment of trade relations between Japan and Russia and Japan and Communist China.

9. With a larger number of Americans opposed to yielding to Communist demands, it is time for the ROK to publicize widely its grievances.

5Reference is to the Taft-Katsura Agreement signed by Secretary of War William H. Taft and Japanese Premier Taro Katsura on July 29, 1905. By the terms of this "agreed memorandum," the United States recognized Japan's dominant position in Korea and Japan disavowed "any aggressive designs" on the Philippines.

6Presumably reference to Heitaro Inagaki, President of Japan Neon Co., Director of Yamato Aviation Co., President of the Japan Foreign Trade Society, and former Minister of Trade and Industry in the third Yoshida Cabinet in 1949.

7Reference is to South Korean efforts to establish a boundary line in the Sea of Japan which Japanese fishing vessels could not transgress.

56. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Taylor) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff1

Tokyo, June 2, 1955—4 p.m.

C 72818 (DA IN 143961). Ref: A. Tokyo 870;2 B. C 72805.3

1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/6-255. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to the Embassy in Seoul exclusive for Ambassador Lacy.

2Printed as telegram 1254 from Seoul, Document 50.

3In telegram C 72805 from Tokyo, June 10, CINUNC analyzed the disadvantages of continued compliance with the Korean Armistice and indicated the wide variety of advanced military equipment which would have to be introduced into Korea in order to repair the deficiencies identified by the subordinate commanders in the field. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/6-155)
1. The predictable political and military disadvantages of long-term compliance with the armistice agreement, as seen by Amb Lacy and me, were reported to you by refs A and B, respectively.

2. As indicated in ref B, I believe that anticipatory planning for meeting the predictable deterioration of US/UN military capabilities in Korea, and consequently in the FE, is a matter of urgency. The dissolution of the NNSC and the elimination of para 13D of the agreement would provide some relief. The withdrawal of US/UN forces from Korea and their concentration elsewhere in FEC would free them from the restrictions of the armistice on their modernization as well as provide a sounder strategic distribution of force to meet US commitments in the FE. The view of this hq on both of these courses of action are a matter of record. However, it appears timely to take a broader look at the situation and to re-examine the entire armistice agreement to determine its suitability for long-term application to the situation in Korea.

3. The armistice agreement was never intended to apply for an indefinite period of time in the manner of a treaty or a mutual defense pact. Its highly restrictive provisions were acceptable to the UNC as a means of insuring that the Communists did not use the period of respite provided by the cease-fire to reinforce and re-equip its forces. In this respect, the armistice agreement has been an utter failure. In fact, the only substantive provision of the agreement which has been strictly observed by both sides is the cease-fire. It would appear desirable, therefore, for the 16 nations to recognize that the present agreement has, except for this essential element, outlived its usefulness and should be discarded in recognition of a de facto condition of peace in Korea. Since the replacement of the present agreement by a more suitable negotiated instrument offers only the prospect of an interminable period of fruitless wrangling with the Communists, a more promising course of action should be sought. As a final thought on this important subject prior to relinquishing the position of CINCUNC, I advance the following suggestions for terminating the Korean armistice agreement by the end of FY 56.

a. The US would call a council of the 16 nations which have contributing forces in Korea for the purpose of appraising the current military-political situation in Korea. As a result of this appraisal, it would be recognized that aggression against the Republic of Korea has been defeated. The council would take formal note of the fact that the armistice agreement had as its principal objective, following the cease-fire, the ultimate withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question; and that al-

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*On June 30, General Taylor became Chief of Staff of the Army; he was replaced as CINCUNC and CINCFE by General Lyman L. Lemnitzer.*
though no formal political settlement has been effected there exists a de facto state of peace. Without prejudice to the long-term objective of unifying Korea, the 16 nations would accept the fact that Korea is divided for the time being and that its unification must await future political developments.

b. The council would also consider the effectiveness of implementation of the armistice and take formal note of the fact that it has been flagrantly violated by the Communists and made to operate contrary to the intentions of its signers. If the NNSC or para 13c and d are still in existence, they should be cited as particularly objectionable parts of the armistice which make the instrument unacceptable.

c. As an outcome of its considerations, the council would then:

(1) Recognize a de facto condition of peace in Korea.
(2) Declare the intention of the UNC to continue to observe the cease-fire in the absence of a renewal of hostilities by the Communists.
(3) Announce the termination of the effective period of the armistice.
(4) Offer to withdraw UN forces from Korea if the Communists do likewise.
(5) Seek Communist agreement to the foregoing.

d. If the Communists reject these proposals, or if no definitive reply is received after a reasonable period of time, the UNC would then withdraw from Korea, except for a token force to be left as long as Chinese forces remain in North Korea and would henceforth disregard all portions of the armistice except the cease-fire.

e. In any event, the 16 nations would reiterate the joint policy statement, return the responsibility for the defense of Korea to Rhee, and maintain the UNC headquarters in the FEC outside Korea from whence it would continuously watch the situation in Korea.

4. I am aware of the obstacles to such a program, particularly in the difficulties of obtaining agreement among the UN elements and cooperation from Pres Rhee. However, the steady attrition of participating UN forces in Korea and the deterioration of our overall military strength reported in ref B present as the only alternative to positive action leading to the dissolution of the armistice, the eventual loss of the UN complexion of our action in Korea and the progressive atrophy of the military strength of the FEC.
57. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, June 3, 1955

 PARTICIPANTS

Department of Defense—
Admiral Radford
Colonel Throckmorton

Department of State—
The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Mr. Phleger
Mr. Robertson
Mr. McClurkin

Admiral Radford referred to the incoming telegram from General Taylor concerning the equipment which would be introduced into Korea if the restrictions of paragraph 13(d) were removed. He said that nothing of this sort was now in contemplation for the Republic of Korea forces although eventually it might be necessary or desirable to give them some of this equipment. He thought that the British proposal indicated that they had not fully understood what Defense suggests. Defense had not intended to suspend the reporting provisions or to abolish the NNSSC. Rather, Defense wanted to suspend the NNSSC until more satisfactory arrangements were made but meanwhile to continue reporting.

In answer to questions from the Secretary he said that the primary objective at the moment was not to put in the new equipment but to get the NNSSC teams out of the ROK and into the demilitarized zone. The 13(d) problem could be handled later. He said that this is consistent with the Presidential decision.

The Secretary said that so far as 13(d) is concerned he could not see that there is a very serious problem. The Armistice was never intended to last forever. The United States should avoid getting caught up in legal maneuvers designed to abolish provisions of the Armistice. Instead we should give a reasonable interpretation to the provisions of the Armistice and simply go ahead and put into Korea the equipment we need to put into Korea and tell the NNSSC that we are doing so.

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/6-355. Secret. Drafted by McClurkin. A Department of Defense summary of this conversation was sent by Admiral Radford to the Deputy Secretary of Defense in a June 6 memorandum. (Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 60 A 1025, 387.4 Korea).

2 Colonel John L. Throckmorton, member of the staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

3 Reference is to telegram C 72805; see footnote 3, supra.

4 See Document 51.

5 See Document 45.
Mr. Phleger said that the United States could not very well take that action alone but should get the agreement of the Sixteen.

The Secretary said that we should simply inform the Sixteen as to what we plan to do. The basic intent of the Armistice was to maintain military power commensurate with the other side. It is necessary to make a choice between a literal interpretation or a practical interpretation of the Armistice—between the spirit and the letter of the agreement. The Communists are already interpreting it to allow them to put in new models and there is no reason why we should not simply do so, citing the Communists' example. This is much better than getting into a legal argument or an effort to renegotiate the Armistice.

Mr. Phleger pointed out that it would be necessary to report to the United Nations.

Mr. Robertson said that he was not sure that the Canadians and some of our other allies would be willing to let us go ahead on this basis. He added, however, that if we took some such action with respect to reinforcing material our problem with the ROK would be considerably eased, and we might therefore have less difficulty in coping with their resistance to having NNSC teams stationed in ROK territory.

Mr. McClurkin commented that we would need to tell our allies on a confidential basis exactly what equipment we would plan to put into Korea under this interpretation of 13(d).

It was agreed that Mr. Phleger would prepare a statement of the interpretation of the Armistice which could be made first to the Sixteen and then reported to the United Nations.

It was also agreed that for the present we would not take summary action with respect to the NNSC but would let the NNSC go ahead with the agreed reduction, indicating that this in our view did not solve the problem but that we had no objection to their proceeding with the contemplated reduction.

Robert J.G. McClurkin

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6Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
58. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea

Washington, June 13, 1955—6:21 p.m.

769. Sebald today told Yang US Government very concerned about riots in front Embassy Seoul.\(^2\) After recounting circumstances he said demonstrations like this always likely get out of hand and effect is damage relations between two governments. Hope ROK will take steps see such incidents not repeated. He added Ambassador had discussed riots with President Rhee who had expressed own concern.

Yang recounted numerous Japanese overtures toward north Korea and other Communist countries as reason for ROK feeling. Sebald said US just as interested as ROK in having Japan remain anti-Communist but demonstrations like this are dangerous. Yang agreed, said he sure ROK could and would prevent recurrence, promised write President Rhee.

In view Joint Weeka mention Rhee apology to Lacy\(^3\) no press statement made here after foregoing interview.

Hoover

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\(^1\)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/6–1355. Confidential. Drafted by McClurkin and approved by Sebald.

\(^2\)Reference is to anti-Japanese demonstrations in Seoul on June 8 and 9. On June 8, a large group of Korean school children and disabled veterans belonging to the Patriotic War-Participants Brotherhood Association gathered in front of the U.S. Embassy in Seoul to demand that the United States cease support of Japan. At one point, the crowd burst through police lines toward the Embassy and had to be driven back with rifle butts. Police kept the demonstrators away from the Embassy on June 9. The Embassy reported the situation to the Department in telegram 1354, June 8. (Ibid., 795B.00/6–855) A more complete summary of Sebald’s conversation with Yang is in a memorandum of conversation by McClurkin, June 13. (Ibid., Seoul Embassy Files: Lot 59 F 180, 350.2 Demonstrations–1955)

\(^3\)In Joint Weeka 23, June 11, a weekly summary of significant occurrences in Korea, the Embassy reported that President Rhee, on his own initiative, had apologized to Ambassador Lacy for the incident at the Embassy the previous day. (Ibid., Central Files, 795B.00(W)/6–1055)
59. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 18, 1955

SUBJECT
Security of the Republic of Korea

PARTICIPANTS
General Chung II Kwon, Republic of Korea Army Chief of Staff
Brigadier General Hu Rak Lee, Republic of Korea Military Attaché
Mr. Robert J.G. McClurkin, Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs
Mr. William G. Jones, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs, NA
Lt. Colonel Helmuth O. Froeschle, U.S. Army, Escort Officer
Mr. Christopher A. Norred, Jr., NA

Mr. McClurkin asked about progress in the activation of the reserve divisions, and General Chung replied that eight of the ten had been activated. The only problem remaining in the reserve program is weapons and equipment, which thus far have been supplied by drawing them from the active divisions.

General Chung said that Communist military power in North Korea has increased in five respects: (1) jet planes, (2) airfields, (3) number of tanks, (4) firepower, particularly in mortars and artillery, and (5) movement of Chinese Communist forces into reserve positions, with the North Koreans assuming responsibility for the front-line areas. He said ROK estimates of North Korean strength differ slightly from ours, in that they include service troops in their estimate of about 400,000, of which 330,000 are combat units. Combat units of the ROK Army, he said, number about 300,000. The ROK is not concerned about the North Korean forces, which they believe they could easily handle, and which are inordinately large relative to the population, but it is troubled by Communist China.

Mr. McClurkin commented that ROK security in the final analysis, as has often been pointed out, is based on the Joint Policy Declaration of 1953 and subsequent policy statements indicating that the United States and its Allies would react vigorously to renewed aggression in Korea and would not confine their counter-action to the Korean area. General Chung agreed, but said that as a military commander of forces directly confronting the Communists he is troubled by evidences of Western disunity and reduction of forces as a result of the Communist peace or co-existence offensive. He believes the Communists are steadily increasing their strength, and that their leaders, unlike those of the West, can launch an aggression at any time without regard for public opinion. He urged that ROK forces be kept at their present strength as a front-line for United States de-

1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5/6-1855. Secret. Drafted by Norred.
fense and in order to buy time in the event of Communist atomic attack. He said that he learned while he was an officer in the Japanese forces fighting the Russians in Manchuria that the Russians do not spend much of their military budget on such things as food. He expressed fear that the Communists may be closing the gap in atomic weapons, citing in particular a Japanese magazine article on atomic activity in western China. Mr. McClurkin said that those in a position to know say that contrary to sensational stories in the newspapers we still are maintaining preponderance in the atomic field.

General Chung said that his experience in China and Manchuria in World War II impressed him greatly with the effectiveness of Communist techniques of control. For propaganda purposes he says much to his troops about the implications of the refusal of the great majority of the Chinese Communist prisoners in Korea to be repatriated, but he must say candidly to us that he believes that Communist China is steadily increasing its internal controls and military power. During his recent visit to Taipei, he talked with many high-ranking officers in the Chinese Nationalist Army whom he has known for many years, and believes that Nationalist China already has a serious morale problem in its military forces.

General Chung expressed concern about Japanese policies toward the ROK and toward trade with the Communists. He said that the ROK is too often blamed for the lack of progress in ROK-Japanese negotiations, inasmuch as the Japanese negotiate in tricky fashion and apparently want to build up Japan's strength before bringing the negotiations to a conclusion. He strongly criticized Japan's trade with the Communists, and urged that the United States press Japan not to form ties with Communist China and North Korea. Mr. McClurkin pointed out that Japan's trade interests are heavily in the free world, and that this will inevitably influence Japan's policies. General Chung said that he came to know much about Japanese psychology as one of the two Korean cadets in the Japanese military academy, and he feels that there is danger for the West in Japan's current trend toward independent policies. He mentioned the possibility that the Hatoyama\(^2\) government might be succeeded by a leftist government strongly inclined toward relations with the Communists, and urged the United States to exert pressures now so that the new generation of leaders would not drift in that direction. Mr. McClurkin assured him that the United States has seen some dangers in trends in Japan and is working on them in its own fashion; only time will tell if we will succeed.

General Chung urged that ROK forces not be reduced, estimating that reductions would have an irreparable effect on public

\(^2\)Ichiro Hatoyama, Japanese Prime Minister.
morale. In closing, he said that the ROK is “putting everything in one boat,” piloted by the United States, and must and will follow after United States leadership. Mr. McClurkin said that the United States is constantly aware that the United States and ROK have identical aims in the struggle against Communism and that we can rely on them fully.

Mr. McClurkin gave General Chung an autographed picture of President Eisenhower, which General Chung had requested in correspondence addressed to the President’s military aide.

60. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea

Washington, June 21, 1955—6:35 p.m.

797. Pass CINCREP. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. First meeting Korean talks today.² Robertson extended warm welcome indicated talks originated Stassen’s conversation Rhee⁴ be oriented toward exchange rate and related matters. Explained unable discuss volume aid FY 1956 since appropriations which on world-wide basis still to come. If appropriations less than request real possibility amount aid available Korea less than illustrative figures submitted Congress and informally conveyed Koreans.⁴ Once appropriations received and executive branch allocations made problem be determination most efficient utilization. This best done in Seoul where both governments have technicians. Indicated need only amend Agreed Minute cover

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¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5—MSP/6-2155, Official Use Only. Drafted by Howard L. Parsons, Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs in the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, and approved by McClurkin. Repeated to Tokyo.
²The talks took place in the Department of State between a U.S. Delegation headed by Assistant Secretary Robertson including representatives of the Foreign Operations Administration, the Department of Commerce, and the Departments of Defense and the Treasury; and a Korean Delegation headed by Economic Coordinator Paik Tu-chin and including Minister of Defense Admiral Sohn Won-il and Vice Minister of Finance Kim Yong Chan.
³See Document 28.
⁴The illustrative aid figures for fiscal year 1956 which were submitted to Congress and conveyed informally to South Korean officials included $220 million for the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, $180 million for Direct Forces support, and $280 million for Defense support. The figure for Defense support remained at the level approved in fiscal year 1955, while the figure for Direct Forces support was reduced by $45 million from the approved 1955 level. The figure for MDAP was increased by $25 million over what it had been for 1955. The net effect was a proposed aid program for the Republic of Korea for fiscal year 1956 of $680 million as compared with 1955 totals of $700 million. (Memorandum from McClurkin to Robertson, June 21; Department of State, FE Files: Lot 56 D 679, Korean Econ)
items obsolete due passage time. Pointed out progress production, investment and military capability under Agreed Minute. But pricing aid goods resulted in figure too low thus bringing unnecessary inflationary financing Korean budget.

Discussions will divide into two subcommittees. One headed Moyer deal with exchange rate and related issues. Other headed by Defense review military program, discuss problems that have arisen, look ahead next fiscal year extent possible.  

Paik expressed knowledge United States appropriation mechanism. Indicated need more aid Korea for military and economic purposes, might warrant raising question whether could request funds larger than original Mutual Security Bill. Expressed real economic problem Korea need achieve self-sufficiency shortest possible time enable reduce burden United States tax payer. To accomplish this need establish several more factories. Had hoped could reach understanding volume aid required accomplish economic objectives and then discuss exchange rate. Indicated thought situation FY 1956 required $100 to 200 million more aid than illustrative figure furnished Congress.

Robertson indicated United States fiscal problems causing sufficient concern Congress that not possible obtain additional aid for Korea regardless our desires. Pointed tremendous burden United States has assumed during and following World War II with $80 million assistance furnished other countries.

Sohn indicated Korean position basically different United States position since former really front line. Korea would not have time mobilize case attack but United States sufficiently distant permit mobilization. He too pointed need give sufficient aid now enable improvement economic situation decrease aid future.

In conclusion Minister Han who chaired Korean delegation since Ambassador out town expressed hope subcommittees could complete deliberation within 10 days.

Hoover

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5 The discussions of these two subcommittees continued until agreement was reached in August to amend the Agreed Minute of November 17, 1954. Documentation on the meetings of the subcommittees is *ibid.*, Central Files 798B.5-MSP and 895B.00; FE Files: Lot 56 D 679; and Seoul Embassy Files: Lot 59 F 180, 320.1 Washington Discussions 1955, and 500 Economic Sub Committee 1955. For text of the amendment signed on August 12, see Document 78.
61.  Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea


Paik indicated joint objective reconstruction requires large investments and necessitates constant exchange rate as inducement invest. Korean foreign exchange said to be $34 million of little assistance reconstruction particularly since unable earn foreign exchange result inability sell rice Japan and tungsten United States. Reconstruction job more difficult because heavy drain ROK military establishment. Consequently need more foreign aid.

Paik unable estimate size military force viable Korean economy able support. Indicated best course expeditious development production potential in Korea. Korean delegation pointed ROK responsibilities include austerity, heavy taxes, efficient utilization Korean foreign exchange and maximum utilization available hwan resources. Quickly pointed out however their conclusion these responsibilities completely fulfilled by ROK making additional aid essential.

Chief complaints mentioned Paik include failure United States implement Tasca recommendations.2 This failure includes insufficient aid, insufficient investment and slow delivery. Paik cited examples critical and unfair treatment ROK by United States press. Emphatically indicated central core all difficulties since 1945 has been “realistic pricing”.

Have repeatedly impressed upon ROK delegation improbability any aid above illustrative figures submitted Congress if that much.

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 79SB.5-MSP/6-3055. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Parsons and Lieutenant Colonel Jack P. Napier, Deputy Chief of the Economic Division in the Office of the Chief of Civil Affairs and Military Government, Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army; cleared with FOA; and approved by McClurkin. Repeated to Tokyo.
2In April 1953, a Presidential mission headed by Dr. Henry J. Tasca went to Korea to survey the economy and make recommendations as to the amount of external aid necessary for Korea to achieve self-support. The mission included representatives of the Departments of State, Defense, and the Treasury, and FOA. The report of the Tasca Mission, submitted in June 1953, stated that U.S. assistance of $1 billion over a 3–5 year period would enable the Republic of Korea to become self-supporting, except for military end-item assistance, assuming reduced force levels on the part of the Korean armed services. With minor revisions, the Tasca Mission report was adopted by the National Security Council as NSC 156/1, “Strengthening the Korean Economy,” on July 17, 1953. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. xv, Part 2, pp. 1384–1394.
Have expressed problem in terms obtaining maximum benefits available resources rather than obtaining additional aid.

Future meetings will discuss specific problems. Exchange rate first item. Will follow position and strategy included position papers forwarded Embassy. Initial position maintenance present system except for higher value aid goods pricing.

The Military Subcommittee has been organized on a Joint Services Group basis with all Services and staffs represented as appropriate. Acting for Department Defense, Major General Marquat chairs both the United States Joint Services Group and the ROK/United States Military Subcommittee. The procedure has been agreed as follows:

1. Consideration items proposed discussion by ROK.
2. Consideration items proposed discussion by UNC representative and Department Defense, including ROK adjustment to possibility aid less than anticipated.
3. Determination from above items of (a) matters which are within the area of responsibility CINCUNC, and (b) matters which are appropriate for Washington discussions.
4. Notification to ROK representatives of areas which can be discussed here and areas which ROK should take up with responsible local agency.
5. Military subcommittee decisions and conclusions where possible.
6. Reference to plenary session of ROK/United States conference of Military Subcommittee findings and policy recommendations.

Discussion still going on. ROK initial subjects are:

1. Equipment of ROK Reserve Divisions.
2. Review of Implementation of FY 1955 Programs.
3. Cross-servicing ROK Forces.
4. Reductions proposed by CINCUNC in ROK Military Budget.

First indication had been that subcommittee discussions would be concluded in ten days. It now appears this target will not be met.

Dulles

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3Not found in Department of State files.
4General William F. Marquat, Chief of the Office of Civil Affairs and Military Government, Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army.
62. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea

Washington, July 1, 1955—5:56 p.m.

3. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Seoul pass OEC. Subject is Economic Subcommittee Talks. In June 30 and July 1 meetings came to grips with rate problem. ROK specific proposal is to increase 180 rate to 270 because wholesale price index increased 51% from December 53 when 180 rate established through December 54. This rate would apply all transactions and ROK desire make it permanent although on latter point Paik little ambiguous since he acknowledged principle that rate should move accordance movements price level.

US proposal laid before ROK as follows: US believes rate flexibility essential since stability not achieved nor in sight. Believe that arrangement contained in Agreed Minute satisfactory but desirable expand auction principle to increase volume aid goods priced in this manner and to reduce multiplicity of rates.

Paik does not appear be pressing his view as vigorously as anticipated and has expressed apparent impatience return Korea. However so far no reconciliation two positions.

Next meeting scheduled July 5.

Dulles

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5-MSP/7-155. Confidential. Drafted by Howard F. Smith of NA, cleared with ICA and the Department of Defense, and approved by McClurkin. Repeated to Tokyo.

63. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 5, 1955

PRESENT

The Secretary
Mr. Murphy
Mr. Phleger
Mr. Robertson
Mr. McClurkin

Under Secretary Anderson
Admiral Radford
General Taylor
Admiral Davis
Colonel Junkermann

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1Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 56 D 679, Korea. Secret. Drafted by McClurkin. The source text indicates the conversation took place in Dulles’ office.

2Colonel Howard C. Junkermann.
Secretary Anderson delivered a letter to the Secretary which essentially made the case in Telegram C-73136 of June 30. The letter recommended provisional suspension of the inspection provisions of the Armistice Agreement and removing the NNSC teams to the demilitarized zone. This would be done after informing the Sixteen and the United Nations. Having done this we would then proceed to introduce modern weapons as military circumstances dictate.

Mr. Robertson briefly summarized the meeting of June 3 and the decision which had been taken as to correcting the military imbalance after reporting to the United Nations on our interpretation of the Armistice Agreement. He said it had also been understood that we would accept the reductions proposed in the NNSC as a stop-gap measure.

Secretary Anderson went back to a meeting that he, Admiral Radford, Mr. Hoover and Dillon Anderson had had with the President to discuss this problem. At that meeting there had been an emphasis on the problem created in the Republic of Korea by the NNSC. Defense had suggested that the military commander should say in the Military Armistice Commission that the inspection system does not work. Until it was possible to agree with the Communists upon means to make it work, the United Nations Command was going to suspend the operation of the NNSC in the ROK on a provisional basis and move the teams to the demilitarized zone. The President thought that that might be an adequate solution but suggested that they talk with the Secretary of State. He had added that if this measure was taken surely the military commanders were ingenious enough to take care of their own best interests in Korea, but it was clear that they could not do it with the NNSC looking over their shoulders. Secretary Anderson went on to say that clearly there was a problem which was not taken care of by the Department of State proposal which would continue reports to a diminished NNSC. He said that, for example, we could not introduce 280 mm. cannon into Korea and give the Communists the right or opportunity to inspect the cannon. In addition, there is an even wider consideration in that the Soviet Union is already proposing machinery for general disarmament which would be roughly comparable to the NNSC. If we deal publicly with the NNSC in Korea in a way which emphasizes its ineffectiveness, the inherent weakness of the USSR proposals will be exposed.

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3 A copy of this letter is in Department of State, FE Files: Lot 56 D 679, Korea.
5 See Document 57.
6 Reference is to the May 11 meeting; see Document 45.
Admiral Radford said that our great concern at the moment is not the early introduction of new weapons, which would be even some disadvantage to us. The right to introduce them would cause us a little difficulty since the ROK would want some of them and we do not want to give them to the Republic of Korea.

General Taylor said that the importance of the equipment needs in Korea varies from service to service and type to type. The Air Force has been hurt the worst and has had to move units out of Korea. However, the situation is not now critical, although a year from now it will be. He emphasized that it is not realistic to divide the problem of the NNSC and Paragraph 13(d) unless the NNSC could be handled first.

Admiral Radford pointed out that President Rhee will not allow any more mobile inspection teams in South Korea.

Mr. Robertson cited Ambassador Lacy's telegram\(^7\) indicating his belief that the action proposed with respect to 13(d) would be greeted with enthusiasm by President Rhee and would make it possible to live for a while with the NNSC situation.

Admiral Radford said that he did not agree with Ambassador Lacy and thought that he hadn't been there long enough to understand the situation.

Mr. Phleger commented on the way this problem has been switched back and forth two or three times between handling the NNSC and 13(d) but said that after the last meeting we had worked out our proposal reflecting what we thought had been agreed. He pointed out that the problem of 13(c) is entirely different from that of 13(d) and that linking the two problems simply because these were the two kinds of things the NNSC could inspect created difficulties. On the general problem of inspection, if the Communists have refused to carry out the intent and spirit of the inspection provisions something can be worked out to relieve the UNC of an unfair burden.

The Secretary said that he does not like the idea of blindfolding the inspectors so that we can violate the Armistice. To do so leaves us in a very bad position. As he had said in the earlier meeting, he prefers the device of putting a reasonable interpretation upon the Armistice.

Mr. Anderson said that he agreed completely and would be glad to have our position on the introduction of weapons handled publicly, but he believes that we must get rid of the inspection people first.

Mr. Phleger and Mr. Murphy asked why it was necessary to raise the issue of 13(c).

\(^7\)Telegram 1452 from Seoul, June 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/6-2955)
Admiral Radford said that it was only because (13(c) is one of the two kinds of inspections to be performed by the NNNS.

Mr. Phleger said that it was not necessary to attack the problem from this angle. It could be attacked from the point of view of lack of fulfillment by the Communists of their NNNS obligations under the Armistice Agreement.

The Secretary said that there is one new thought which had been advanced by Defense. Namely, that they apparently want to put into Korea some highly sensitive new equipment which they don’t want anyone to have the right to inspect.

Admiral Radford and General Taylor pointed out that it was not necessarily true that they wanted to do so right away but that this was in the cards, for example, with F860’s or new tanks.

The Secretary said that from the political standpoint this question has some of the same implications as the great debate about Yalta. The question had been whether we should denounce the Yalta Agreement. It had been decided not to do so but to keep ourselves in a flexible position under which we could continue to say that the Communists are violating the Yalta Agreement. If we had denounced it, the Communists could go ahead with any violations and we would have no more case against them. On the whole question of inspection he wants to be in a position at Geneva to point out constantly to the Communists the violations they have committed. He still thinks that all Defense wants to do can be accomplished without losing our trading position by giving the Armistice Agreement a reasonable interpretation.

Secretary Anderson asked if we still would not have our trading position if we handled the NNNS as Defense suggested. He said that we could say that the NNNS has not worked. We could offer to sit down across the table with the Communists and try to work out means of making it work more effectively, but that meanwhile we could suspend the operations of the NNNS in the ROK.

[Here there ensued a give and take on the question of Communist violations—the MIG incident and the abortive inspections in North Korea, a comment by Secretary Anderson on what General Hull had heard from the Swiss and Swedish members of the mobile inspection teams who had gone north (including marks of tires of aircraft on runways at airfields which had no aircraft to be seen) and the Communist jet aircraft activity as seen on our radar.]

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9The incidents discussed in footnote 2, Document 53, led to NNIT inspections in North Korea in response to UNC insistence that MIG patrols were being flown from North Korean airfields.
10All brackets are in the source text.
General Taylor pointed out that as long as the NNSC continues to operate we will be faced with a serious problem of ourselves having to violate the Armistice at the point at which the NNSC wants to perform a special inspection in the ROK because President Rhee has said he will not allow any more such inspections.

The Secretary said that he wants to study the problem a little bit more and have Mr. Phleger and Mr. Robertson look into it to see whether we can accomplish what Defense wants to accomplish without placing ourselves in the position of violating the Armistice. He said this position of "clean hands" will be particularly valuable to us in the next few weeks. He still believes that we can perhaps accomplish what we want to accomplish by interpretation. He suggested that perhaps there might be merit in playing with the idea of cutting down or eliminating the activity of the NNSC in the ROK until the NNSC in the north had "caught up" in number of inspections or kinds of activity.

Admiral Radford pointed out that we have conclusive proof of Communist violations in the north.

The Secretary asked whether we could get this conclusive proof in specifics rather than generalities, adding that we need to know the facts in order to stimulate our own imaginations as to solutions which might be possible.

Secretary Anderson asked the other representatives from Defense to see whether a list of specifics could be delivered, perhaps being divided into things which could be made public and things which must be kept confidential.

Admiral Radford pointed out that there was a serious problem of compromising sources of information if we used some of the material which we have.

[After the meeting, Colonel Junkermann told Mr. McClurkin that Defense is going to try by July 11—after communicating with the field—to provide State with the requested "list of specifics".]

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11On July 14, Admiral Davis sent a letter to Secretary Dulles enclosing summaries prepared by CINCUNG, UNCMAC, and the Department of Defense that detailed Communist violations of the Armistice Agreement. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/7–1455)
64. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea

Washington, July 11, 1955—6:27 p.m.

23. Seoul pass OEC. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Following written proposal presented ROK mission July 11:

"Effective August 1 paragraph 1 Appendix Agreed Minute between Government United States and Republic Korea signed November 17 amended read as follows:

1. U.S. aid furnished Republic Korea for importation goods and services into Korea (except coal U.S. origin, which will continue be priced CEB, commodities for non-revenue producing projects and relief supplies) will as of date this amendment be priced into Korean economy at exchange rate 700 hwan to 1 U.S. dollar. Special temporary pricing arrangements may be necessary in case fertilizer. Purchases hwan by United Nations Command will be effected at rate applicable such goods and services. This rate 700 hwan to 1 U.S. dollar shall remain in effect unless at any time after September 1 Seoul wholesale price index as presently constituted shall have changed 25% or more as compared with level that date. In event such change in above-mentioned index and as soon as practicable but no case later one week after such change occurred exchange rate referred to above shall be changed same percentage and direction as change price index. Following such adjustment exchange rate adjusted shall remain in effect unless additional adjustments should become necessary because further changes in Seoul wholesale price index at least 25% compared level effective date last preceding exchange rate adjustment. In this case such further adjustments shall be made same manner as case initial adjustment referred above. All other foreign exchange transactions Government Korea and its agencies shall be conducted at rate referred to above. Operation existing agreements with respect hwan drawings by United States will be suspended long as foregoing arrangements work out in practice to mutual satisfaction both Governments."

Paik expressed astonishment and shock at proposal. Stressed need for secrecy U.S. proposal in view "disorder" it would produce in Korea if known. Finally Paik suggested subcommittee experts discuss day or two facts relevant realistic rate.

Hope strongly avoid any press leaks this question.

Dulles

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5-MSP/7-1155. Secret. Drafted by Smith, approved by McClurkin, and cleared with ICA and the Department of Defense. Repeated to Tokyo.
65. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, July 15, 1955—1 p.m.

65. Tokyo pass CINCUNC, CG AFFE/Army Eight, CG FEAF and CAG. Re Embtel 392 repeated Tokyo 11, Bern 1, Stockholm 1. At 61st meeting MAC July 14 KPA/CPV took initiative and as expected agreed NNSC May 3 reduction proposal.3 However in so doing Communists emphasized:

(1) NNSC would retain right inspect at discontinued ports; and
(2) Reduction would be of temporary nature. UNCMAC considers reply infers Communist view NNSC permanently linked with Armistice Agreement and can not be dissolved. UNC side merely “noted” KPA/CPV agreement and returned to attack on Communist violations Armistice and ineffectiveness NNSC begun at 60th MAC meeting.4

KPA/CPV pressed for UN reply regarding NNSC reduction, suggested recess until July 15 and accepted UNC counter proposal that next MAC meeting be held July 16, 1030 hours KDST.

UNCMAC of opinion that unless UN side gives reply on NNSC reduction at meeting 16th Communists will call another meeting early next week in continuing effort attempt embarrass UNC with Swiss and Swedes. Embassy understands UNCMAC has not yet received instructions reflecting US/UN decision on acceptability May 3 reduction proposal.

Lacy

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/7-1555. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Tokyo and priority to Bern and Stockholm.

2 In telegram 39 from Seoul, the Embassy reported that it had received information from UNCMAC that the KPA/CPV side in the Military Armistice Commission had called a meeting for July 14 to discuss the NNSC proposal of May 3 for the reduction of NNIT units in Korea. (Ibid., 795.00/7-1155)

3 See Document 41.

4 At the 60th meeting of the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom on July 5, General Harlan C. Parks made a lengthy statement specifying what he charged were continuing and extensive violations of the Armistice Agreement by the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers. He made particular reference to the introduction of MIG aircraft into North Korea and to the efforts made to conceal the presence of such aircraft. The full text of General Parks’ statement is printed in Department of State Bulletin, August 1, 1955, pp. 191–196.
Memorandum From the Chief of the Office of Civil Affairs and Military Government, Department of the Army (Marquat) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹


SUBJECT

Final Report of Military Sub-Committee, US–ROK Conferences

1. The work of the Military Sub-Committee of the US–ROK conferences has been completed.

2. The Military Sub-Committee was organized to include staff and technical experts in all aspects of the ROK–US military relationships, drawn from Command and Staff in the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and assisted by representatives from the Department of State and the International Cooperation Administration.²

3. Between 22 June and 18 July 1955, daily conferences were held and subordinate sub-committees discussed problems proposed by U.S. and ROK representatives. Matters requiring Washington level policy decisions were disposed of in discussion or referred with appropriate recommendations to responsible agencies here for decision. Matters within CINCUNC's province, including the details and procedures of implementation of existing policies and agreements, were referred to CINCUNC through his representative on the Committee. Solutions mutually satisfactory to the U.S. and the ROK conference were reached on most problems. The following six matters, of which the first five were raised by the ROK, were not resolved:

a. Small Arms Authorization for ROK Army Reserve Divisions.


c. Request of ROKN for three additional LSTs.

d. Policies concerning local procurement under DFS funding.

e. Computation of ROK Forces FY 1956 strength figure.

f. Adjustments which would be made by the Republic of Korea if Congressional action makes it impossible to allocate the amount of FY 1956 aid contained in the illustrative program.

4. These problems have been disposed of by the Military Sub-Committee as follows:

The questions of small arms equipment for the ROK reserve division and acceleration of the F–86–F delivery schedules have been brought to the attention of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.³


²The Foreign Operations Administration was abolished on June 30 and its functions were transferred to the International Cooperation Administration which was established on July 1 as a semi-autonomous agency within the Department of State.

³A note on the source text indicates that small arms authorization for Republic of Korea Army Reserve Divisions had been "ok'ed."
The request of the ROK Navy for three additional LSTs, and policies concerning local procurement under DFS funding are being worked out in the normal operational relationships between the field and concerned Washington agencies. Decision to handle the LST problem in this manner is based upon the recommendation of the Chief of Naval Operations. Decision for further study through normal channels of the matter of local procurement was reached upon the joint recommendation of the Military and Economic Sub-Committees.

The ROK Forces FY 1956 strength figure is basic to all other significant problems of the Republic of Korea. This problem, which is whether ROK Forces remain at 720,000 during FY 1956, and whether KATUSA and reservists on active duty other than regular cadre personel should be included in this strength figure, is now under study.

Both the ROK Delegation and CINCUNC were requested to indicate the categories in which reductions could be made with least damaging effect if adjustments were necessary to reflect lower than the illustrative amounts of U.S. FY 1956 aid. The ROK Delegation could not agree to discuss category reductions. CINCUNC has indicated that he is giving the matter most serious consideration.

5. Transmitted herewith are verbatim minutes of the several meetings of the Military Sub-Committee, together with a summary report thereof.4

W.F. Marquat
Major General, USA

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4Not printed. Copies of these documents are also in Department of State, Seoul Embassy Files: Lot 59 F 180, 320.1—Washington Discussions, 1955.

67. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Washington, July 29, 1955, 11:30 a.m.¹

[Here follow a list of 26 persons present and the first two agenda items. Admiral Radford, General Twining, General Taylor, and Admiral Donald B. Duncan, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, attended for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Department of State offi-

cials included Murphy, Robertson, and McClurkin. General Cabell attended the meeting on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency.

3. Future Status of the NNSC

Mr. Murphy mentioned Swedish and Swiss concern over delays in facing up to the problem of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and their desire to move toward complete abolition of the Commission by a first step of cutting down on the number of inspection teams in Korea, as had been recommended to the Military Armistice Commission by the NNSC. He and Mr. Robertson pointed out that there has as yet been no answer to the April 9 proposal to this effect and that the communists in MAC have accepted it. They pointed out that both the Swiss and the Swedes wanted to get rid of the NNSC in toto just as we do, but that they are not unmindful of the fact that their reputation and good name are involved in their participation on the Commission; and they consider it better to handle the problem in stages.

Admiral Radford remarked that the President had approved the decision to bring about the end of the NNSC. He said that he was strongly in favor of moving ahead with vigor to get the job done in one sweep. He expressed the view that the U.S. has not had the cooperation it deserves from the Committee of Sixteen and that it was up to this Government to put additional pressure on the Sixteen to agree now to dismantling the Commission. He and General Taylor pointed out that the danger of action by the ROK against the inspection teams is not removed merely by reducing the number of teams. Admiral Radford stressed that the main problem was with the ROK, and that we must at all costs avoid creating a situation in which we would have to shoot ROK forces in order to protect the NNSC. He pointed out that the U.S. is the only nation which has any real stake in Korea and expressed strong doubts that the Sixteen, having agreed only to reduce the number of inspection teams, would then two months later agree to abolish the teams entirely. Admiral Radford and General Taylor thought that we must bring the problem to a head and that we have already continued too long with the present unsatisfactory basis.

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3In telegram 83 from Bern, July 21, the Embassy reported that the Swiss Government had inquired "on numerous occasions" concerning the U.S. reply to the urgent Swiss request that the United States not reject the May 3 NNSC proposal. The Embassy in Stockholm reported in telegram 84, July 26, that the Swedish Government was similarly impatient for a U.S. response to the Swedish proposal. (Ibid., 795.00/7-2155 and 795.00/7-2655, respectively)

3The Swedish proposal was conveyed to the Department on April 7 by Count Douglas; see Document 34.
Admiral Radford said he liked the idea of suspension of NNSC operations and suggested that that announcement be made by the U.S. Mr. Murphy pointed out that any such announcement would be a unilateral action on the part of the U.S. and would enable the other side to charge us with violating the armistice. He continued that some of the countries in the United Nations would make a great deal out of such unilateral action on our part. Mr. Murphy asked for JCS views on how to bring more pressures on the Sixteen in the matter and Admiral Radford suggested that they just be told what we intend to do.

General Taylor suggested another tactic: to propose that both the Chinese Communists and the United Nations withdraw entirely their forces from Korea. He said he was prepared to do this but could not speak for the other Chiefs. Admiral Radford appeared skeptical over this idea.

Mr. Murphy suggested that the Sixteen are not as worried as we over the imbalance of forces in South and North Korea, and Mr. Robertson mentioned Secretary Dulles’ view that we should build up openly. Admiral Radford remarked that this plan was unacceptable, since we don’t want the NNSC inspecting our modern equipment.

Admiral Radford remarked that the JCS just do not believe in the two-stage approach and the timing proposed by the Swedes. Mr. Robertson replied that the Swedes do feel the matter could be accomplished in the way they proposed and reiterated the desire of the Swedish Government to be rid of the whole affair.

With respect to violations of the armistice by the North Koreans, Admiral Radford and General Taylor expressed the JCS view that there had been a long line of violations which everyone knew about and that feeling in the Sixteen relative to terminating NNSC was not getting any better but that the Sixteen could be expected rather to grow more complacent from now on. That was another strong reason for taking vigorous action now to terminate the NNSC. Admiral Radford expressed the view that there should be another meeting with the President on the matter to arrive at a decision as to U.S. policy.

Mr. Murphy said that we were left with little alternative but to inform the Swedish Government that its proposal is not acceptable. He thought it would be wiser to go forward with their proposal but would report the JCS objection to the Secretary of State and recommend that the problem be raised again with the President.⁴

⁴On August 3, Robertson sent a memorandum to Dulles in which he summarized the discussion on July 29 with the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the problems relating to the Korean Armistice. Robertson noted the strong desire of the military to abolish the NNSC and concluded:
Letter From President Rhee to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)  

Seoul, August 1, 1955.

My Dear Friend, Mr. Robertson: Ambassador Yang has informed me of your discussions, concerning certain editorials in the Korean Republic regarding the dollar exchange rate. To tell you the truth, I have no time to read that paper or any other newspaper personally, but someone reads me a daily summary of important items of the press, some editorials and general information.

Now that this has been brought to my attention, I have requested the Korean Republic’s editors to refrain from using such language and expression and to remember our friendship with the US Government. The truth may be told without hurting friendly feelings, in a constructive and amicable way.

Public sentiment regarding the problem of the spiral rates of exchange has been boiling because everyone knows that they have been the main cause of our nation’s economic suffering during the past eight years. It seems quite clear to me that the high authorities in Washington do not realize how seriously the constant raising of the dollar exchange, since, and even before the operation of ECA, has affected the Government and people of this country. Beginning with a rate of 15 Won to a dollar in the American Military Government days, the ECA officials raised it constantly every 2 or 3 months, doubling a doubled rate and so on, until in 1953 it went as high as 600-1 and they demanded it be raised to 23,000. Each time the dollar price doubled, the market prices doubled also. In Korea the market price of all items goes up, according to the price of the US dollar.

“Our best prospect still seems to be to accept promptly in the MAC the reduction proposed by the NNSC. Then we should go ahead with your suggestion that we report to the United Nations our practical interpretation of the Armistice and proceed openly as necessary to introduce the weapons which we need to introduce. The NNSC can then be allowed to wither on the vine. Defense’s problem that it does not want any opportunity for the NNSC to inspect some of our new weapons can probably be met through the operation of the time factor since, as we understand it, it is not immediately intended to introduce these new weapons and the NNSC may well have died a natural death through Swedish and Swiss action before the necessity arises.”

Robertson therefore recommended that Dulles hold another meeting with Defense representatives to discuss the subject and to urge immediate acceptance in the MAC of the proposed reductions in the NNSC. If agreement could not be reached in such a discussion, Robertson proposed that the matter should be put up to the President for decision. Dulles indicated on the memorandum that he approved of Robertson’s recommendations with the exception of the recommendation to put the matter, if necessary, up to the President. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/8-355)

1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5-MSP/8-155. No classification marking.
The Government has to set a budget for twelve fiscal months, but each time the dollar price increases the Government is unable to meet its expenditures. Furthermore, how can the people make a living with their earnings, while the prices keep on rising. Naturally, they ask why the United States Government forces us to raise the dollar price, when the rate in Japan and other countries is fixed.

They presume it is because the United States Government wishes to build up Japan’s economy with the funds given to Korea for reconstruction of Korea’s economy. Our Government has no answer to that. Each time we have asked that the price be pegged as in other countries, the answer has been that we must have a realistic rate, otherwise we may not receive the aid funds.

I do not wish to undertake to explain how the Korea aid funds earmarked for Korean economy have been handled, so as to use as many dollars as possible for Japan. Enough to say that the State Department announced more than once that Korea’s aid funds are to be used twice over. This means simply that with the money and materials given for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Korean economy, Japanese products are imported for the immediate relief of the suffering Korean people, thereby helping Japan’s economy. Why then do Korea’s aid fund administrators not tell us that the United States aid funds are solely for the immediate relief of the Korean people and not for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the Korean economy. How can Korea answer later when the American people ask us what we have done with the aid they have given to make Korea a self-supporting nation?

We would like to invite all fair-minded people to come and see what industries we have reconstructed with all the aid funds and materials we have received. We want to show them the demolished factories and plants of which only parts of walls and broken chimneys remain, having stood all these years since the Communist invasion of 1950. No aid funds have renovated any of them.

In answer to our requests to rebuild some as a basis for reconstructing Korean economy we were told to buy from Japan some of the supplies we needed, such as fertilizer, cement, coal and other items, for that would be cheaper than producing them ourselves. If that is true, how can we ever expect to make Korea a self-supporting nation?

If, by building up Japan, the United States might win her as a permanent loyal ally, it could be different. But can any thinking persons in America or anywhere else believe for one moment that Japan will be a dependable friend and ally? Has she not already shown herself to be lining up with the Soviets, Red China and North Korea?

Since 1953, we have started on a small scale to reconstruct some of our basic industries, such as fertilizer, cement and power plants.
We are hoping that by continuing to reconstruct many other essential industries, we may once again be a self-supporting nation, with our people reaping the benefit of the generous contributions given Korea for its economic independence.

We believe that to build up our economy, the most important and urgent problem is to stabilize our currency, otherwise economic disaster cannot be avoided. I know you will do all you can to save this situation, as you know that this United States policy of continual “doubling up” of the dollar rate leads to disaster. If a change of policy is not possible we see no alternative but to ask our delegates to return home.

Mr. Paik Too Chin has been instructed to present our final request and I earnestly beseech you to look it over.

Now that our best hope, the United States, is turning towards Russia, Red China, India and Japan for co-existence, which we cannot support, we have to depend upon ourselves for better or worse. We feel forced to take this sad stand and disappointed, but will try to remain grateful to the United States for all the sacrifice it has made in defense of our common cause, the defense of democracy. 2

With my personal regards.
Sincerely,

Syngman Rhee

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2Robertson replied to Rhee on August 13 in a letter in which he expressed confidence that the economic conference in Washington had been “productive not only of a definite agreement but also of a better understanding of our respective views on the methods and courses of action necessary to accomplish our common economic objective.” He went on, however, to express concern over the demonstrations which had begun in South Korea against the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams. Mob action, Robertson argued, “only serves the interests of our common foe, and makes a satisfactory solution of the problem all the more difficult.” (Ibid.) For the first report on the demonstrations that began on August 6, see Document 71.
69. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, August 4, 1955—7 p.m.

152. State pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCUNC and CAG. Reference Department’s 78 sent Tokyo 217. This is a joint message from Amb Lacy and Gen Lemnitzer. Gen Lemnitzer and I called on President Rhee this afternoon and conveyed to him the substance of our joint instructions as given in ref tel.

In response to a direct question concerning his intention to use force in obtaining the return of the areas below the 38th parallel, including Kaesong and the Ongjin Peninsula, the President replied that the Govt’s announcement, which had been cleared by him, made no mention of the use of force and that he did not intend to use force in connection with it. He said that the Communists must recognize they had no right to this area which was below the 38th parallel. After describing the circumstances under which they had obtained possession of it, the President said that in all fairness they must give it back. When asked if he believed they would return it as a result of the Govt statement, he muttered rather incoherently that that would depend on whether or not the US and UN Command backed up his request. Gen Lemnitzer asked if he had given any consideration to the possibility of the Communists raising a question concerning the areas the ROK hold above the 38th parallel now that he had asked for the return of areas held by the Communists below the parallel. He replied impatiently that our men had fought, bled, and died for the area held above the parallel and in any event the ROK had a right to all the area north of the parallel.

The President was less categorical about his intention to use force in evicting the Czechs and Poles on the NNIT. However Gen Lemnitzer stated clearly that the protection of the NNIT and the guarantee of the physical safety was an integral part of his mission as CINCUNC and that he could not and would not tolerate any in-

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/8–455. Secret; Niact. Repeated priority to Tokyo.

2Telegram 78 to Seoul, August 2, instructed Ambassador Lacy to join with General Lemnitzer in calling on President Rhee to express astonishment at the announcement that the Republic of Korea had demanded the withdrawal of the NNSC from Korea and ordered the withdrawal of Communist forces from south of the 38th parallel. Lacy and Lemnitzer were instructed to tell Rhee that the Unified Command had an obligation to maintain the Armistice line and to protect the members of the NNSC and intended to carry out those obligations. (Ibid., 795.00/8–255)

3On August 2, the Republic of Korea Office of Public Information issued a press release which demanded the withdrawal of the NNSC from Korea and ordered the withdrawal of Communist forces from Kaesong, Ongjin, and the northern portion of the Han River. (Telegram 139 from Seoul, August 2; ibid.)
terference with them. The President repeated his familiar complaint against the presence of "Czech and Polish spies" in the territory of the ROK and recalled again the Secretary's promise to him in Washington last July in the presence of American and Korean officials that the problem of the NNSC would be solved to his satisfaction and, he said, "with all possible speed". Both Gen Lemnitzer and I assured him that tremendous efforts had been made and were being made at the very highest levels in our Govt for the solution of this problem. I stated that it was my conviction that great progress had recently been made in this regard.

The interview this afternoon lasted half an hour. The President was relatively restrained in his statements but left no doubt concerning his impatience with the delay in resolving the problem of the NNSC. It was apparent from our conversation that the statement that was issued by the Govt on Sunday has not been communicated directly to the North Korean Govt. ROK Govt appears to consider its publication of the statement constitutes an official communication on its part to the Govt of North Korea.

It is our opinion that that Govt's statement stems from the President's dissatisfaction with progress on the resolution of the problem of the NNSC and from his growing bewilderment and frustration as he sees world tension relaxing and the opportunity to unify his country by the use of force fading away. He may well have had the intention when the announcement was made on Sunday to use force both in recovering the Kaesong area and in ejecting the Czechs and Poles. However, reliable intelligence reports show that in ROK conferences subsequent to the announcement the President's own military leaders were reluctant or unwilling to follow his leadership in any measures that would involve the use of force in either connection. His statements reviewed above undoubtedly reflect his present attitude on the use of force but do not necessarily reflect his intent at the time the statement was issued.

Lacy

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70. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, August 6, 1955—1 a.m.

157. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. At approximately 9:30 a.m. August 6 Lt Col Choi, ROK member of UNCMAC Advisory Group, delivered the following letter from the ROK Government to the Swiss-Swedish Secretariat of NNSC and later furnished a copy to the senior member UNCMAC:

"I have the honor to notify, on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Korea, you of the following:

Whereas the large military build-up in North Korea unequivocally proves the loss of the raison d'être of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; whereas the Communist military menace to the Republic of Korea is ever increasing; whereas, under the circumstances, the existence of the Communists engaging in espionage activities in the territories of the Republic of Korea poses a grave danger to the national security of Korea; and whereas the Government of the Republic of Korea cannot but take measures to safeguard the national security by exercising the right of self-defense of a sovereign nation; now, therefore, the Government of the Republic of Korea demands the members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to withdraw from the territories of the Republic of Korea no later than 2400 hours of August 13, 1955. And the Government of the Republic of Korea declares that it cannot assume any responsibility for any incident occurring to the members of the Commission who fail to comply with the demand set forth above. Chung W. Cho, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Honorable Members Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission."

This emphasizes yet again the imperative necessity of reaching a decision which will lead to a solution of this vexatious and dangerous problem.

It will be recalled (ref Embtel 152, sent Tokyo 665), that on the occasion of our visit to President Rhee, the President’s categorical assurances to General Lemnitzer and myself that he would not use force in attempting to revoke control of the Kaesong area, etc. we in no way matched by analogous assurances with respect to the use of force against the NNSC. It can be expected that "spontaneous demonstrations" by "civilians" will take place in the principal centers in ROK during the coming week and these may well lead to serious consequences.

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/6–655. Confidential; Niat. Repeated to Tokyo.
2 Foreign Minister Pyun resigned on August 1.
3 Supra.
Whatever action is decided upon will probably appear at this stage to have been forced upon US and UNC as a result of this demand by ROKG.

Lacy

71. **Telegram From the Commanding General, Eighth Army (White) to the Department of the Army**

*Camp Zama, Japan, August 7, 1955—3:29 p.m.*

FM 912420 (DA IN 158511). Ref FM 912417. DTG 0605147. ROK activities on 6 Aug included series of demonstrations at Kunsan, Pusan, Kangnung, and Incheon. Demonstrations reportedly to continue daily until NNIT leaves. If NNIT do not leave by 14 Aug, ROK military reportedly will take action. Reportedly mass demonstration planned in Taegu for 7 Aug. Police and ROKA pers reportedly to participate in civilian clothes. Between 7–14 Aug at least 1000 people are to demonstrate at KMAG compound Taegu and throw rocks and lighted oil rags into compound. Anti-NNSC committee of police and political leaders has been selected. On 6 Aug ROKG delivered ultimatum to CINCFE and Swiss-Swedish NNSC secretariat stating NNSC must withdraw from ROK territory no later than 2400 hours 13 Aug. ROKG stated it cannot assume responsibility for any incidents involving NNSC members who fail comply. On 24 Jul Rhee reportedly directed all major decisions concern military be referred to Speaker Assembly Yi Ki-Pong. Presumably this would coordinate the military and the assembly to give impression full support of the ROK govt and people in any planned military action. On 30 Jul Chairman ROK JCS, Gen Yi Heung-Kun, reportedly conferred with Maj Gen Kim Sok-Pom, CG ROK Marine Corps. Gen Yi, in compliance with orders by Rhee, began preparations recover areas south 38 parallel by discussing such an operation with Gen Kim. It was decided 2 regiments First ROK Marine Div would attack through

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2. In telegram FM 912417, August 6, Eighth Army Intelligence reported the first indications of an organized anti-NNIT campaign. An anti-NNIT demonstration had been held at Kunsan on August 5 by labor union members, and reports indicated that similar demonstrations would be held at Incheon and Kangnung on August 6. (Department of Defense Files)

3. Reported in telegram 157, supra.
Kanghwa-Do and across Han River. Another regiment would be landed on southern portion Ongjin Peninsula. Gen Yi reportedly intended discuss these operations with JCS prior to Rhee's announcement; however, announcement made 1 Aug instead 5 Aug. As previously reported, CG, First ROK Marine Div attended JCS meeting on 2 Aug.

Comment: ROK demonstrations expected to grow in intensity as ROK deadline for NNSC withdrawal approaches. Failure of NNSC to comply with ROK demands and unsatisfactory conclusions of current US-ROK economic negotiations could result in physical action against the NNSC. Unilateral military action against Communists in areas south 38 parallel not considered likely at this time. Possibility of ROK-created DMZ incidents to provoke Communists exists.

4Apparent reference to the August 2 statement issued by the Office of Public Information; see footnote 3, Document 69.

72.  Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Far East (Lemnitzer) to the Department of the Army1

Tokyo, August 8, 1955—9:31 p.m.

C 73571 (DA IN 158591). References: A. DA 986322;2 B. C 73540;3 C. DA 975505;4 D. State 2327 to Tokyo passed to CINCUNC.5

1Source: Department of State, NA Files: Lot 59 D 407, Defense Cables Aug-Dec 1955. Secret; Priority.

2This telegram, dated August 7, confirmed CINCUNC's authority to remove the NNITs to the DMZ if the situation became dangerous. (Department of Defense Files)

3In telegram C 73540 to the JCS, August 6, Lemnitzer transmitted the letter he had received that day from the Foreign Ministry which outlined South Korean objections to the continued operation of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and indicated that the Republic of Korea had demanded the withdrawal of the Commission from South Korea by August 13. Lemnitzer reported that he had responded with a letter urging patience and forbearance, but that demonstrations had begun at the compounds which housed the NNITs and he feared that the NNITs might have to be removed to the demilitarized zone. (Department of State, NA Files: Lot 59 D 407, Defense Cables Aug-Dec 1955)

4Document 14.

5In telegram 2327 to Tokyo, a joint State-Defense message for CINCUNC, May 12, General Taylor was instructed to attempt to delay requests for mobile NNIT inspections in South Korea without taking action which would deny such requests or lead to the expulsion of the inspection teams by the Republic of Korea. (Department of State, Central Files, 695A.0024/5-1255)
1. My authority under reference C and D to take emergency action, to include removal of NNITs to DMZ, to protect security forces under my command or to protect personnel of NNITs is clearly understood.

FYI. I have directed that UNC forces providing security for NNITs at 5 ports of entry in South Korea be quietly reinforced to deal effectively with developing situation. I have no intention whatsoever of permitting present threats and “hooligan” tactics of ROK to attain their obviously desired ends i.e., to force removal of NNITs from South Korea by UNC prior to 2400 hours on 13 August, the threatened “deadline” established by ROK in letters referred to in reference B. President Rhee and ROKG might just as well find out now as later that true allies do not give ultimatums to or set “deadlines” for one another, and in this instance the UNC has no intention to be “deadlined” by the ROKG. To do otherwise would only encourage ROK to repeat this tactic in the future each time they have a demand to present.

73. **Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Lemnitzer) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

Tokyo, August 9, 1955—8:24 p.m.

C 73590 (DA IN 158816). References: A. DA 986392 (S). B. C 73586 (S).

Pursuant to instructions contained in ref A and as reported in ref B, I dispatched the following letter to Pres Rhee, at 091800I Aug.

“It is with the deepest personal regret that I find the UNC and the ROK, both of whose armed forces fought shoulder to shoulder for over three years against a common enemy, now in a state of vio-

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2Telegram DA 986392 to CINCUNC, August 9, instructed Lemnitzer to inform President Rhee that the U.N. Command rejected his ultimatum to the NNNS and would hold the Republic of Korea responsible for any interference with the operation of the armistice. If the danger of violence to the NNITs became serious, Lemnitzer was authorized to remove them to the demilitarized zone. (Ibid.)

3Lemnitzer indicated, in telegram C 73586 to the JCS, August 9, that he planned to visit Rhee on August 10 to reinforce the letter transmitted in C 73590. He added that he had just received another letter from Acting Foreign Minister Cho in which Cho argued that the Republic of Korea was forced to act to expel the NNNS because the United States had failed to live up to previous promises to help eliminate the problem of the NNNS. Lemnitzer felt that the letter had been drafted by Rhee, was offensive in language, and did not merit a reply. (Ibid.)
lent disagreement over the manner in which to accomplish a mutual objective. The tragic aspects of this situation stem from the fact that we have no actual disagreement in principle. We have both striven to bring about a satisfactory solution of the problems which must be overcome if the ROK is to attain security and viability as a nation.

"On 6 Aug 55, you caused to be delivered to the NNSC a letter\(^4\) which contained an ultimatum to that body to withdraw prior to 14 Aug 55 its representatives from the ports of entry in the ROK established under the terms of the AA. This letter was delivered without informing me in advance that such an action was even contemplated.

"Subsequent to the delivery of the letter referred to above, there began a series of government-inspired terroristic demonstrations and actual attempts by elements of the ROK forcibly to enter UNC military installations for the declared purpose of killing, injuring or obtaining custody of persons when this command stands pledged under the terms of the AA to protect. These actions have already resulted in a number of injuries to US military personnel and the destruction of property belonging to the US.

"In the face of these events, Mr. President, I am compelled to lodge a vigorous protest and to inform you that:

\[\textit{a. The UNC rejects any ultimatum, expressed or implied, which the ROK has directed to the NNSC and to the UNC.}\]
\[\textit{b. The UNC will hold the Pres of the ROK and his govt strictly responsible for any interference with the operation of the AA.}\]
\[\textit{c. The UNC is determined to protect to the full extent of its abilities and resources the lives and property entrusted to its care.}\]

"Sincerely".

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\(^4\)See Document 70.

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74. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Switzerland\(^1\)**

*Washington, August 10, 1955—3:54 p.m.*

264. Re Deptels Bern 259 Stockholm 133 London 705 Paris 508.\(^2\)
Murphy and Robertson reviewed NNSC situation with Swedish

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\(^1\)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/8-1055. Secret. Drafted by Allen and approved by Murphy. Also sent to Stockholm, London, and Paris and repeated to Seoul and Tokyo.

\(^2\)This telegram informed the Embassies that CINCUNC had been instructed to reject the South Korean ultimatum to the NNSC and that the Department intended to call a meeting of the Sixteen to explain the situation. (*Ibid., 795.00/8-955*)
Chargé and Swiss Minister separately August 9 advising them of CINCUNC's instructions refel and determination UNC take necessary steps protect NNNSC personnel, including if ultimately necessary, removal to DZ. He stated that while Department would have prepared accept May proposal\(^3\) for partial reduction, military authorities (including General Taylor and others, speaking with authority of first-hand experience) felt strongly that acceptance such partial reduction wrong and if made several months ago would have led ROK Government to precipitate sort of riots now occurring. Murphy said military continue feel strongly definitive solution, either in one stage or two, must be found now. Asked Swedish and Swiss Governments review matter light present situation to see if further steps possible.

Swedish Chargé referred previous hints that if NNNSC proposal accepted Sweden would have moved to second stage of complete withdrawal about October and tho he doubted Government would now be disposed produce new plan or withdraw under apparent ROK pressure, promised consult Government re possibility they would be able assure us definitely, at least privately, that second stage of complete withdrawal would be carried out this autumn if in return UNC would accept NNNSC proposal as first stage. Swiss Minister suggested that with general diminution of tension best solution might be negotiate with ChiComs revision of Armistice Agreement to replace NNNSC with some other arrangement, which Murphy pointed out not practical as would lead to protracted negotiations and would provide no solution present problem.

**Dulles**

\(^3\)See Document 41.

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75. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea\(^1\)**

*Washington, August 10, 1955—6:24 p.m.*

92. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC. Department held meeting Sixteen August 10 and discussed NNNSC.\(^2\) Nature and seriousness of

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\(^1\)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/8-1055. Secret. Drafted by Jones and approved by McClurkin. Also sent to London, Paris, Stockholm, Bern, and Tokyo.

\(^2\)A more complete summary of the discussion at the meeting is in a memorandum of discussion prepared by Jones on August 11. (*Ibid.*, 795.00/8–1155)
demonstrations explained. Texts of letters ROK to NNSC August 6\(^8\) and Lemnitzer to Rhee August 9\(^4\) read group. Wholehearted support received for Lemnitzer’s action. Group told of pros and cons re advisability acceptance May 3 NNSC proposal which have precluded final U.S. Government decision. Belief expressed acceptance this proposal possibly more difficult now view undesirability appearing yield under duress. Said U.S. has asked Swiss and Swedes reconsider problem in light circumstances.\(^5\) Canada and France expressed fear if became necessary remove NNITs in face mob violence would have adverse effect their position Indochina. Group discussed advisability public or private, individual or collective, representations ROK but agreed be best wait and see how Rhee reacts Lemnitzer’s letter.

Group asked keep substance discussion confidential and in answer press inquiries agreed state meeting was for purposes consultation current situation.

Dulles

\(^8\)See Document 70.
\(^4\)See Document 73.
\(^5\)See telegram 264, supra.

76. Editorial Note

At a news conference at the Department of State on August 10, Secretary Dulles expressed sympathy for the Republic of Korea’s concern over the continued presence in South Korea of the Communist members of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams. He added, however, that the United Nations Command had an obligation to protect the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams and stressed that the Republic of Korea should not try to challenge that obligation by force. In response to a question, Dulles stated that the United States had no intelligence reports to bear out the Republic of Korea’s contention that renewed Communist aggression in Korea was dangerously near. (Department of State Bulletin, August 22, 1955, pages 298–299)

On the following day in Seoul, Dr. Hongkee Karl, spokesman for the Republic of Korea, issued a press release in which he rejected the assertion that the Republic of Korea was using force in its efforts to expel the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission from Korea. Referring to the demonstrations taking place against the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, Karl stated that, if any violence had occurred, it was due to the use of weapons by U.S. military forces.
77. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Lemnitzer) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Seoul, August 11, 1955—6:35 p.m.

KA 70512 KCG (DA IN 159505). References: A. DA 986392; B. C 73540; C. C 73586; D. C 73590.

1. I called on President Rhee at his residence in Seoul at 1000 Thursday 11 Aug to discuss situation arising from ROK demand for members of NNSC to withdraw from ROK no later than 2400 hours 13 Aug. For reasons indicated in par 3 below I had, in requesting an appointment with President, indicated that I desired to talk with him privately with no one else present. The President's secretary informed me that meeting had been arranged as I requested.

2. Upon arrival at Kyung Mu Dai I found President in hallway talking loudly and excitedly to Major Kim of Seoul and two unidentified men. I proceeded to reception room where I waited several minutes while above mentioned conversation took place in Korean just outside door.

3. To my surprise, and notwithstanding my request for a private meeting, President entered room with acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho. After exchange of greetings I informed President that I had requested private meeting with him in view of experience following our last meeting when others, including Cho, were present. I related that in press conference following this meeting Cho was quoted as saying that General White and I had "agreed in principle" with ROK proposal to regain Kaesong, Ongjin Peninsula and section of Han River estuary south of 38th parallel. I stated that this statement was not based on fact, as every one present at that conference knew, it had been extremely embarrassing to both General White and myself and had provided valuable propaganda material for Communists. (Note: Cho statement appeared only in Korean Times of 8 Aug. No notice of statement was taken by American news services and no in-

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2See footnote 2, Document 73.

3See footnote 3, Document 72.

4See footnote 3, Document 73.
inqueries regarding it were received at Hq FEC or AFFE/Eighth Army. Although I considered issuing a denial, the fact that it had received so little attention convinced me that to do so would only do more harm than good by giving it world-wide circulation and generating widespread interest in issue, as ROK probably desired.) Cho said that he had issued a correction but I informed him that it was poorly worded and technical in nature and did not adequately correct the substance of the original release or erroneous impression it has created. I felt that only a clear-cut retraction on his part would solve the problem. Whereupon Rhee turned to Cho and angrily demanded that he take necessary action at once to correct situation. Cho seemed bewildered at nature and intensity of Rhee’s remarks. I then informed President that under the circumstances I would not object to Cho’s presence but hoped there would be no repetition of the previous unfortunate incident. (Note: Following conference I received an apology from President’s secretary for Cho’s presence, and he attributed it to an error by one of his colleagues.)

4. We then shifted to discussion of substance of my recent letter (see ref D) which was delivered to him at 0830 10 Aug. I reiterated points covered in my letter, particularly my determination to carry out my assigned responsibilities under the armistice agreement. Rhee said he was surprised at some of things said in that letter, particularly that he was “inspiring” the demonstrations against the NNSC. I corrected him by pointing out that my letter had stated that the demonstrations were “government inspired”. He said this was not so—they were the product of spontaneous popular resentment against having “Czech and Polish spies” in ROK. I told Rhee that I hoped he did not consider that I was so naive as to believe that demonstrations, of the size and intensity of those occurring in five widely scattered places at the same time were results of “spontaneous popular feelings” and furthermore I had concrete evidence that they were not. He then changed the subject.

5. He next questioned reference in my letter to people being killed. I told him that again he was misquoting from my letter and my statement was that demonstrations were for “declared purpose of killing, injuring or obtaining custody of persons whom this command stands pledged under the Armistice Agreement to protect.” He questioned accuracy of my quote which I verified by showing him a copy of my letter which I had with me. I told him that mobs, particularly at Pusan, by placard and voice, had so indicated such intentions.

6. He next questioned reference to “injuries to United States military personnel”. He said that his information did not indicate that people were being injured. I told him that he was misinformed because a considerable number of United States personnel had in fact been injured by stones, sticks and bottles thrown by the demonstra-
tors and that reports to that effect have been widely circulated and were common knowledge. He repeated that he did not believe that there had been any violence or destruction of property to date. I then cited the example where two large trucks filled with demonstrators had crashed through gates of Hialeah Compound at Pusan and that some personnel aboard were armed with burp guns.

7. After persistently denying that there had been any violence, injuries or damage to date he blandly and without warning justified and rationalized everything he had just been denying by the statement “but General, your American soldiers are protecting Communist spies” and that “Koreans also had been injured”. I told him that the Korean demonstrators had only themselves to blame for any injuries they had received since they were aggressors.

8. I then expressed my concern lest the present demonstrations get further out of control as the “deadline” of 2400 hours 13 Aug approached and more violence occur. Whereupon he shouted that he had given strict orders that there would be no violence. I told him that I was greatly relieved to hear it but that I had not been informed about such an order, and I was certain that it had not reached the local level at places where demonstrations were taking place. I urged that he insure that this be done soonest. He called loudly for his secretaries and asked if his orders for no violence had been published in the press. They told him that information on non-violence orders had already appeared in Korean language press but that there had not been sufficient time for them to appear in Korean English language papers. He directed them to expedite their publication in English.

*Note:* Korean OPI issued statement this afternoon as follows: “Seoul, Aug 1—(OPI)—President Syngman Rhee today made public through his official spokesman, Dr Hong Kee Karl, that he regards public demonstrations by citizens aroused by the continued presence of Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission members on Korea soil as a normal expression of their spirit of patriotism.

“The President made it clear, however, that he strongly objected to any violence. He said the spirit of 1919, when Korean independence from Japan was declared quietly and without military force, should prevail.”

9. The President then said he proposed to release to the press my letter to him and Cho’s two letters to me. I told him that I strongly recommended against such action because it would do more harm, particularly to ROK, than good. I pointed out that Cho’s second letter (see ref C) was extremely unfair and unjustifiably critical of the United States which had stood by ROK for many years and had spent much blood and treasure in its defense.
10. I then told Rhee that I had not come this morning to argue details but to express my conviction and deep concern that the course of action upon which he had embarked with regard to elimination of NNSC was:

a. The wrong way of achieving its announced object.

b. Doomed to failure.

c. Highly prejudicial to United States-ROK relationships and particularly to ROK interests. I described how, because of recent events, news representatives (including press reporters, broadcasters and photographers) (both still and movie) were converging on ROK to give fullest possible news coverage to present current happenings. I told him that American and free world public would find it difficult indeed to understand such treatment of American troops who were only doing their duty. I stated that I could think of nothing more unfortunate or damaging to ROK interests than for pictures to appear in United States press and on movie and TV screens showing American troops being attacked by ROK mobs. In addition, I told him that such demonstrations could not help but raise a doubt in the minds of the thousands of United States and United Nations troops who were here in Korea on the main battle positions to protect the ROK, the citizens of which were attacking their comrades at NNIT compounds in five ports of entry in ROK. I reviewed in detail what United States had already done for ROK since World War II and particularly since 1950. I reviewed expenditures of thousands of lives and billions of dollars during Korean war and enumerated many programs currently underway, continuation of which was being jeopardized due to feeling being generated by current demonstrations. To my surprise Rhee listened patiently to this review and at the conclusion admitted that America has indeed been Korea's strongest friend and ally. "But why", he asked, "do you continue to protect Communist spies in South Korea".

11. I reiterated my gratification to Rhee that he was issuing instructions that there should be no violence and urged that his views in this regard be immediately transmitted to responsible persons in areas where demonstrations were taking place. Believing that it was time to conclude the conference I made a move to leave but he asked me to remain and discuss the most important issue of all, i.e., getting the Communists to withdraw from Kaesong, Ongjin Peninsula and Han River area south of 38 parallel. He spent 20 minutes reviewing strategic importance of the area to ROK and reasons why Communists should leave. He urged that UNC and United States support him in his claims to this area.

12. Conference lasted one hour and 40 minutes. Except for several brief periods Rhee was quite excited and spoke in a much louder tone of voice than usual. At least once every ten minutes throughout entire conference he said he felt that United States was embarking on a course of peaceful coexistence with the Communists (among whom he included Russia, Communist China, North Korea, Japan and
India) and that Korea would be forgotten. Several times during the conference he kept repeating “no one understands us”.

13. I have reported this conference in much more detail than usual because I felt that by so doing it would assist those who read this report and are working on this problem better to appreciate the atmosphere in which it was conducted.

14. Tomorrow, Friday 12 Aug, I shall visit the NNIT compounds at Inchon, Kunsan, Kangung, Taegu and Pusan to talk to commanders and troops and to inspect the security plans and arrangements at each.

78. Editorial Note

On August 12, Ambassador Yang and Assistant Secretary of State Robertson signed an amendment to the November 17, 1954, Agreed Minute between the United States and the Republic of Korea. The amendment established an official exchange rate of 500 hwan to one dollar, applicable to all exchange transactions between the two governments, with certain minor, specified exceptions. The text of the amendment is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, August 29, 1955, pages 356–357. A confidential annex to the amendment, however, was not released. The text of the annex, as transmitted to Seoul in telegram 98, August 12, reads as follows:

“(a) Official exchange rate referred to in amendment dated August 12, 1955 to Appendix A of Agreed Minute between Governments USA and ROK of November 17, 1954 will continue in effect through September 30, 1956.

“(b) At end this period unless and until new rate for fixed period time mutually agreed upon:

“(1) Rate referred to in amendment dated August 12, 1955 shall continue in effect unless for month September 1956 average level Seoul wholesale price index as presently constituted is more than 25% higher or lower than average level this index for September 1955 in which case exchange rate will be adjusted no later than October 15, 1956 in same percentage and direction as change in index.

“(2) Rate established under (1) above shall remain in effect unless during last month of any quarterly period starting October 1, 1956 average level of above-mentioned index has changed by 25% or more as compared to its level during
month on which previous adjustment was based or September 1955 whichever is later. In event such change exchange rate will be adjusted by same percentage and direction effective no later than 15th day of following month.” (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/8–1255)

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79. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea

Washington, August 12, 1955—7:27 p.m.

103. On instructions from Rhee Ambassador Yang asked Robertson 12 August if US would give date on which NNSC activities in ROK would be terminated. Robertson said impossible. Explained subject has received great and continuing attention but necessary act in way taking account positions our allies and Swiss and Swedes who accepted responsibilities upon our request. Strongly protested demonstrations which create much more complicated situation. Emphasized neither we nor Swiss and Swedes will act under threat and UNC will take all necessary action protect teams. Robertson suggested Yang tell President we agree completely teams should be eliminated and working best our ability to do so, that Secretary has not forgotten his remarks to Rhee, that we have worked hard to accomplish result and will continue to do so, but essential demonstrations be stopped.

Dulles

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/8–1255. Confidential; Priority, Drafted by Hemmendinger and Robertson. Repeated priority to Tokyo with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.

2A memorandum of this conversation, drafted by Hemmendinger, is ibid.

3Rhee did not stop the demonstrations, but on August 14 he issued a statement indefinitely extending the deadline given the NNSC to withdraw from Korea and counseling the demonstrators to conduct the demonstrations in a patient, nonviolent manner. (Telegram 197 from Seoul, August 14; ibid., 795.00/8–1455)
80. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (O’Connor) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)\(^1\)

*Washington, August 16, 1955.*

The following extract from the memorandum of the Secretary’s conversation with the President on August 14, 1955,\(^2\) is forwarded to you for your information.

"I referred to the events in Korea, saying that I had not troubled the President about them because I thought we would come through all right, but that the situation had been a bit nervous at times."

"The President expressed the view that we should take a more vigorous policy now in trying to clean up the NNSC situation, which he thought had no further justification under present conditions."

**Roderic L. O’Connor\(^3\)**

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\(^1\)Source: Department of State, NA Files: Lot 59 D 407, Memcons (NNSC) 1955. Secret. Also sent to Robertson and David W. Wainhouse, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.

\(^2\)The full text of the memorandum of Dulles’ conversation with Eisenhower is in Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Memoranda of Conversation with the President.

\(^3\)Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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81. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald) to the Secretary of State\(^1\)

*Washington, August 19, 1955.*

**SUBJECT**

Termination of NNSC Activities in the Republic of Korea

We have given careful consideration to various courses of action which might be taken to terminate NNSC activities in the territory under UNC control. Among the courses and variations thereof which we have considered, the three set forth below seem worth your consideration. In adopting one of these courses, we will need Defense concurrence, and we should then inform the Sixteen of our decision.

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\(^1\)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/8–1955. Secret. Drafted by Jones and concurred in by Wainhouse of IO, Assistant Secretary of State Livingston T. Merchant of EUR, and Assistant Legal Adviser John M. Raymond. Sent through Murphy.
Course A

1. Inform the Swiss and Swedes that we are instructing the UNC to state in the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) in the immediate future that the proposal of the NNSC for its reduction in size is unacceptable and announce the UNC decision to terminate the Commission’s activities in the territory under UNC control for the following reasons:

   (a) Two basic guarantees of the Armistice are full and accurate reporting to, and effective inspection and supervision by, the NNSC. The demonstrable failure of the Communist side to report and the prevention of effective inspection and supervision by Czech and Polish members have resulted in obstruction and frustration of the Commission’s activities in the area north of the Demilitarized Zone.

   (b) It has become increasingly problematical that the UNC can insure the safety of the Communist members of the Commission in the midst of an understandably hostile populace.

   (c) The continued existence of the Commission tends to foster the false belief among some that it is an effective mechanism and in so doing serves only the Communist propaganda purpose.

2. Express to the Swiss and Swedes our appreciation of their eminently fair approach to the problem and of their strenuous efforts to persuade the Communist members to permit the Commission to function effectively.

3. Express our hope that the Swiss and Swedes will concur with the propriety of the UNC announcement and will instruct the Swiss and Swedish representatives to withdraw from the Commission accordingly.

4. Authorize the UNC to announce in the MAC as soon as possible the termination of the NNSC activities south of the Demilitarized Zone and to request the Czechs and Poles to leave the territory under UNC control, forcibly ejecting them if necessary.

Course B

1. Instruct the UNC to state in the MAC as soon as possible that it has no objection to carrying out the reduction proposed by the NNSC on May 3; that it regards this, however, as a temporary measure; and that the Communist obstruction and frustration of the Commission have made its abolition the only satisfactory solution to the problem.

2. One week later\(^2\) send notes to the Swiss and Swedes which make the following points:

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\(^2\)Dulles crossed out the phrase “One week later” and wrote in “Shortly thereafter” to replace it.
(a) We have accepted what we understand was intended as a first step toward achieving their final objective, i.e., complete dissolution of the Commission.

(b) We would appreciate being informed of any plans they may have for a second and final step which we are hopeful could be taken before October 15, 1955 and which would result in the Commission’s dissolution.

3. If the Swiss and Swedes fail to give reasonable assurances that they will take a second and final step by October 15, 1955, instruct the UNC to act at once to terminate NNSC activities within ROK territory and to limit those activities to receiving in the Demilitarized Zone reports from the UNC.

Course C

1. Instruct the UNC to state in the MAC that it has no objection to implementation at this time of the reduction proposal of the NNSC; that it considers continuation of the Commission even with such reduction, however, reasonable and proper only if the terms of the Armistice were being fully complied with by the Communist side; and, therefore, that it can countenance the continuation of the NNSC even in reduced form only if:

   (a) the Communist side within two months has complied fully with the reporting provisions of the Armistice including the submission of complete reports on the military reinforcements introduced from the inception of the Armistice; and

   (b) has provided full facilities to the NNSC to make possible adequate checking of both delinquent and current reporting; and

   (c) the Communist members of the NNSC cease to obstruct and frustrate the work of the Commission.

2. Inform the Swiss and Swedes of this proposed action expressing the hope that this fully meets their approval and that if the Communist side fails to comply with these reasonable conditions the Swiss and Swedes will lend support in their public statements to the action by the UNC to terminate NNSC activities within the area under UNC control.

Discussion

Course A has the advantage of terminating NNSC operations promptly and would probably meet Defense approval. Our Allies would consider this an unwise step to take at this time but would probably be understanding in view of our position with the ROK. The Swiss and Swedes would probably be glad to see the Commission’s activities abolished without having to share the responsibility for such action. The U.S. would be criticized in some circles for
having yielded, as it will appear, to pressure from the ROK and also for its failure to carry out a provision of the Armistice Agreement.

Course B has the advantage of greater acceptability to our Allies and, if the Swiss and Swedes should decide to withdraw completely within two months, it would be the most effective way to solve the problem in terms of our public position. It has the disadvantage of prolonging the Commission for perhaps two months and thus of renewed violence in the ROK. It is doubtful whether the Swiss and Swedes will give the desired assurance that they will withdraw within two months, although the Swedes have indicated that this would in fact be their intention.

Course C has the advantages of reasonableness as a public position, probable acceptability to our Allies, and the virtual certainty of a termination date for the NNSC since compliance by the Communist side could be only at the impossible cost of admitting continual violations. While there seems to be almost no possibility of Communist compliance with the conditions set forth above, there is the possibility that the Communist side may be able to make gestures in the direction of compliance which would tend to obscure the issue when the UNC acted to terminate the NNSC operations in its area.

In adopting any one of the above courses it would be important to place the full onus for the UNC action on the Communist side and the Communist members of the NNSC. As soon as a course is decided on and concurred in by Defense, we should, therefore, make every effort, through our official statements and through such media as USIA, to establish the fact of Communist frustration and obstruction of the Commission's functions as evidenced in the NNSC record and by the fact of continued Communist violation of the Armistice.

Action under any one of the above three courses almost certainly would take place during or just before the General Assembly Session beginning September 20. Consequently, it will be necessary to prepare as strong a statement as possible to present to the Assembly of our reasons for action. It will also be necessary to develop maximum support for our position among the Sixteen and other members of the United Nations.

Recommendations

1. That you approve Course B as the most acceptable procedure at this time;

2. That a high-level meeting be called where Defense concurrence would be sought; and
3. That following Defense concurrence, the Sixteen be informed of the selected course and their cooperation requested.\(^3\)

\(^3\)Dulles initialed his approval of the recommendations. The Department of Defense concurrence was obtained in the telephone conversation between Sebald and Gray, summarized infra.

On August 26, McClurkin briefed representatives of the Sixteen concerning Dulles' decision. He pointed out that October 15 was not a "magic date" but was useful as a date for reference. A summary of the discussion at this meeting is in Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/8–2655.

82. **Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Gray) and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald), Washington, August 24, 1955\(^1\)**

**SUBJECT**

Termination of NNSC Activities in the ROK

Pursuant to instructions from the Secretary, I called Gordon Gray for the purpose of obtaining Department of Defense clearance to Course "B" in the attached paper\(^2\) which had been approved by the Secretary. I told Mr. Gray that the Secretary had approved the proposal (a copy of which had been informally sent to him previously) and that we desired to have his concurrence so that we could move ahead with implementing this policy.

Mr. Gray questioned some of the language but, in the light of a previous conversation which I had had with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Vice Admiral Arthur C. Davis, said that he would not make a point of insisting upon any language changes—providing paragraph 3 of the proposal means that the NNSC will be given notice to terminate its activities no later than October 15, 1955. Additionally, he wished to be assured that the proposal was not contingent upon agreement by the sixteen other countries and that the United States was now prepared to move ahead unilaterally, if necessary. One additional request which he wished to make was that the Swiss and Swedes be informed of our desire that they endeavor to

\(^1\)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/8–1955. Secret. Drafted by Sebald.

\(^2\)Not found attached. A note on the source text indicates that the paper was the memorandum supra.
prevent any request being made by the NNSC for spot inspections in South Korea before October 15.

I told Mr. Gray that the date October 15, 1955 did, in fact, represent the terminal date by which time the NNSC would terminate its activities in ROK territory. Secondly, although we would inform The Sixteen of the action to be taken, the proposal was not contingent upon concurrence by The Sixteen. Finally, I agreed that we would endeavor to carry out the request regarding the prevention of spot inspections but would, necessarily, have to make this in the form of a suggestion rather than a request.

Mr. Gray said that he was satisfied with these replies and was glad to give his concurrence. He felt that we had come a long way to meet the wishes of the Department of Defense and hoped that this troublesome problem would soon be ended.

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83. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 26, 1955

SUBJECT

NNSC

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Schnyder, Counselor, Swiss Legation
Mr. Caillat, Third Secretary, Swiss Legation
Mr. von Sydow, Counselor, Swedish Embassy
Count Bielke, Second Secretary, Swedish Embassy
Mr. Robert J.G. McClurkin, Director, NA
Mr. William G. Jones, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs, NA
Mr. Lancaster, EUR:WE
Mr. Crowley, BNA

In separate meetings with the Swiss and Swedes Mr. McClurkin informed them that the UN Command was being instructed to state in the Military Armistice Commission early next week that it had no objection to carrying out the NNSC proposal for reduction.² It would

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/8–2655. Confidential. Drafted by Jones.

²The instruction to the Senior Member of UNCMAC was sent to CINCUNC for action in Department of Defense telegram DEF 987536, August 26. (Ibid., NA Files: Lot 59 D 407, Defense Cables Aug–Dec 1955) At the same time, the Embassy in Seoul was informed of the steps being taken to facilitate the termination of the NNSC. The Embassy was instructed to inform President Rhee of these steps on a confidential basis and to ask Rhee to stop the anti-NNSC demonstrations in Korea, since their continuation would make it difficult for the Swiss, the Swedes, or the U.N. Command to take further action under apparent duress. (Telegram 144 to Seoul, August 26; ibid., Central Files, 795.00/8–2655)
be necessary, however, for the Command to go on and say that it regards this step as a temporary measure and that Communist frustration and obstruction had made dissolution of the Commission the only satisfactory solution.

Both the Swiss and Swedes appreciated being kept informed and stated that their Governments would be pleased to hear that this action was being taken. Mr. McClurkin was appreciative of the manner in which the Swiss and Swedes had attempted to carry out a difficult task at considerable expense and under unpleasant circumstances.

Mr. Schnyder asked how it had been possible to persuade Defense to accept the NNSC proposal. Mr. McClurkin pointed out that Defense still regarded the NNSC as a serious problem and that they had feared that acceptance of the proposal at an earlier stage would have created exactly the situation which recently developed in the ROK. We had no intention, however, of acting under duress and we felt the present situation to be most awkward since we, like the Swiss, sympathize with the ROK in their attitude toward the Czechs and Poles. Mr. Schnyder said that the Swiss did not expect this situation to last forever and believed that Bern would feel it easier to take the next move after reduction had been accomplished.

Mr. von Sydow said that he hoped there would be no more talk about abolition of the Commission until after (perhaps a week or so) the NNSC proposal had been accepted. He then asked about the general situation in the ROK with respect to the demonstrations. Mr. McClurkin said that following the firm action which we had taken things had quieted down somewhat and that after the NNSC proposal has been accepted we will point out to the ROK that continued demonstrations make further action very difficult.
84. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, September 5, 1955—5 p.m.

301. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Ref Embtel 299, Tokyo 195. The following letter dated Sept 3 was delivered to me today via Presidential messenger:

"Dear Mr. Ambassador: It was kind of you to transmit to me a memorandum expressing the views of your esteemed Secretary of State and I would appreciate it if you would forward to His Excellency the following:

Your memorandum dated August 29 was appreciated. My reply has been delayed to permit a careful survey of public sentiment throughout the country to ascertain the consensus of opinion regarding cessation of the current demonstrations which the American Ambassador has indicated you desire.

We have found an overwhelming public demand for the continuance of peaceful, orderly demonstrations until there is positive assurance the critical situation will be remedied. The feeling is widespread that the security of the nation and the citizenry is in imminent danger and the people want the rest of the free world to know that their anxiety will not permit them to rest. They do not want to be caught unprepared as was the case five years ago.

We have received assurances that the demonstrators will adhere to the spirit of non-violence which is a long-established tradition in Korea. However no one can guarantee that the general public will always manage to restrain each participant's actions under extreme provocation though every effort to this end will be made. But people alarmed over threats to their survival as a nation and as individuals are not always docile or good-natured and we hope an early solution will avert any possible mounting of tension.

On the whole, I have looked with sympathy on the manifestations of inward concern by the people over their future, and I believe the people in friendly nations are taking into consideration that their legitimate demands are their inalienable right. Protracted demonstrations might create, it is true, problems related to retaining the public's spirit within bounds.

Our people had thought that by their demonstrations, they were rendering a service to the United States since Korea and the United

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/9-555. Confidential; Priority. Repeated priority to Tokyo.

2In telegram 299 from Seoul, September 3, the Embassy reported that during the 7 days since the Republic of Korea was asked to stop the anti-NNIT demonstrations, South Korean spokesmen had stated on several occasions that the demonstrations would continue. (Ibid., 795.00/9-358)

3A signed copy of Rhee's letter to Lacy is ibid., Seoul Embassy Files: Lot 59 F 180, 350.2—Demonstrations—1955.

4Not found in Department of State files. Apparently the memorandum conveyed to President Rhee a request to stop the anti-NNSC demonstrations. The Embassy was instructed to make such a request in telegram 144 to Seoul, August 26, summarized in footnote 2, supra.
States have identical views and policies regarding democracy as opposed to Communism. The only force the demonstrators sought to exert was a moral force, a peaceful appeal to the world conscience. They were crestfallen and amazed to face American tanks and war weapons arranged against them to protect enemy spies whom you had promised more than a year ago to have removed. My people remember this promise, made in the presence of President Eisenhower and others, and it was expected that the United States would cooperate with us. As for the use of force, the idea had not entered the minds of the people of Korea. In spite of this, some officials and the press in the United States still insist on calling Koreans mobsters, rioters, and terrorists. This is not the way to calm the feelings of a wronged and wounded people.

I review these things in the hope that you will better understand our position and help others become aware of our good intentions.

I should add one point of utmost importance. In addition to the dissolution of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as soon as possible it is imperative that we regain possession of three strategic and vital areas of Korea south of the 38th parallel now occupied by our enemies without our consent or concurrence. This situation gives them a death grip on our throat and our people cannot rest in peace with destruction so threatening and ever-impending.

I deeply believe that even for the best interests of America’s honor and prestige the infamous armistice should be declared at an end. Such a step has full legal, moral and military basis. You are aware, I am sure, that Korea is no longer under any obligation with regard to the Armistice Agreement.

It is my conviction that if you stand firm on this point the Communists will accept it because they want to demonstrate their “sincerity” in this “peace offensive”. Even if they should not, the United States has the absolute right to declare the Armistice null and void by reason of the Communist violations which began the day the document was signed and have continued with contemptuous boldness.

As for the implication that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission will not withdraw its members under “duress”, let me say we have nothing but respect for this sense of national honor. However, we ask our friends to compare the possible loss of our lives with the possible loss of face involved in retreating from an awkward situation, and I believe the matter will be seen in its proper perspective. Furthermore, if the truly neutral nations represented on the Commission view their passivity in the face of Czech and Polish betrayals of their task in the light of being an accessory after the fact, it will be admitted steps for immediate dissolution of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission are obligatory. If the truly neutral members of the Commission are duly sensitive to the ignominious treatment they have suffered so long from thousands of their Communist colleagues, they should rather draw moral support from public manifestations of indignation instead of being tempted to construe them as an intended “duress”. Failure to act will mean greater dishonor while heeding to the just demands of my wronged people will go toward reestablishing honor and dignity which cannot stand divorced from justice.
In the final analysis, publishers who acquaint their readers with their views are doing a civic duty and a praiseworthy one, yet few persons regard the resulting editorials as a form of duress. The man on the street who writes a letter which appears in a newspaper is exercising a right no right-thinking person will challenge. And when the public at large, lacking means of letting their wishes be known other than by personally marching in the streets together with others of like mind, so express themselves it seems prejudicial to brand such action as ‘duress’. Sincerely yours, Syngman Rhee.”

Lacy

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85. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Sweden

Washington, September 6, 1955—6:19 p.m.

275. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC. September 2 delivered aide-mémoire2 Swiss and Swedish representatives NNSC stating 1) U.S. agreed March 2 aide-mémoire3 with Swiss and Swedes desire abolish NNSC 2) UNC accepted NNSC proposal for reduction on August 29 as temporary measure but stated only satisfactory solution was dissolution NNSC 3) in aide-mémoire to Swedes recalled reservation which accompanied Swedish agreement reduction NNSC and stated from this and other indications had clear impression Swedes planned further action. Expressed hope to both Governments that they had plans for further action leading at least to withdrawal personnel to DZ. Asked be informed any such plans and hoped action can be taken before October 15, 1955. Aide-mémoire concluded with expression appreciation sincere efforts Swiss and Swedes make Commission work, regretted partisanship and lack cooperation Communists and expressed belief Swiss and Swedish representatives had done all that might reasonably be expected make Commission effective.

Swedes asked if U.S. awaiting Swedish proposal aimed at dissolving Commission and expressed view October 15 little early for

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/9—655. Confidential. Drafted by Jones and approved by McClurkin. Also sent to Bern and repeated to Seoul, London, Paris, and Tokyo.

2Memoranda of separate conversations which Murphy had on September 2 with Swiss Minister de Torrenté and Swedish Chargé von Sydow, drafted respectively by B.M. Lancaster of WE and G.G. Hilliker of BNA, are ibid., 795.00/9—255. A copy of the aide-mémoire referenced here is attached to the memorandum of conversation between Murphy and de Torrenté.

action terminate Commission. Informed we understood recent reductions would be first step and that concept further step under discussion long enough to counter charges action too abrupt if taken October 15.

Swiss concerned with legal position and said delivery present note made further action more difficult. They informed Swedes already satisfied legal basis for withdrawal firmly established, U.S. delivering aide-mémoire and not note and had no intention making this public. Gave Swiss Minister substance Zehnder's views in Bern's 230.4

Voluntary nature membership NNSC emphasized and explained while Swiss and Swedes have neither authority nor obligation end NNSC they could decide withdraw in light unanticipated prolongation Commission.

Hoover

4In telegram 230 from Bern, September 1, Ambassador Willis reported that Secretary General Zehnder was formulating a proposal for a "second step" in the reduction of the functions of the NNSC. Zehnder envisioned the withdrawal of the NNITs to the demilitarized zone, where they would remain for lack of requests for mobile inspections. Zehnder hoped that the United States would not ask the Swiss Government to terminate the NNSC since it would be difficult for a neutral nation to comply with such a request. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/9-155)

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86. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Lemnitzer) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff1

Tokyo, September 14, 1955—8:50 p.m.

C 74014 (DA IN 167042). 1. I recently returned from an inspection trip to Korea during which I visited NNIT compounds at Pusan, Kunsan and Inchon and later discussed demonstration situation with President Rhee.

2. At NNIT compounds situation was as follows:

a. Pusan: 1500–2000 school children. They were in mass formations of 400–500 each, lined up in front of the main gate to Hialeah compound.

b. Kunsan: 300 men in mass formation at each of 2 gates of K–8 airfield.

c. Inchon: 250 men and women in mass formation in front of gate at end of causeway leading to Wolmi-Do Island.

3. All demonstrations were orderly. Commanders informed me that with few exceptions, number of demonstrators and activity then in progress at each compound were typical of demonstrations during last 2 weeks. A group of demonstrators is usually relieved as a unit and replaced by another group of similar size. Groups stay in position from 2 to 8 hours during daylight and early evening hours. Small groups of 30 to 50 demonstrators occasionally remain near the gates throughout the night. Frequently no demonstrators are present during hours of darkness. Activity usually consists of singing songs or following directions of leaders chanting in unison “Czech and Polish spies must go”, etc.

4. Later I called on President Rhee and, after recalling Ambassador Lacy’s meeting with him regarding NNSC and demonstrations (as reported in Seoul 264). I told him of my visit to NNIT compounds and my disappointment in finding demonstrations still in progress. I explained that continuing the demonstrations would only make it more difficult to eliminate the remaining NNITs from ROK. I urged that, if he were really sincere in his desire to get rid of the NNITs, he would take the necessary action to terminate the demonstrations as soon as possible.

5. The President reviewed his meeting with Ambassador Lacy, following which he stated his position and defended demonstrations by repeating almost verbatim the contents of his letter to Ambassador Lacy on this subject (see Seoul 301). I told him that I did not agree with many of the things he had said and reiterated the importance of stopping demonstrations if the ROK really wished to help UNC solve problem of NNITs.

6. I then told President that aside from demonstrations making it more difficult for UNC to solve NNIT problem, there were certain features of demonstrations that were extremely objectionable to me, as follows:

   a. They made it necessary for me to divert valuable US forces from the main battle position and from their primary mission of defending ROK.

   b. From psychological point of view it was regrettable and, in my opinion poor taste, for school children to be participating in the demonstrations. I told him that they were not only losing valuable

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\(^2\) Ambassador Lacy reported in telegram 264 from Seoul, August 29, that he had called on President Rhee as instructed and requested that Rhee stop the anti-NNSC demonstrations. Rhee repeated his complaints about Czech and Polish "spies" and gave no indication that he would suppress the demonstrations. (Ibid., Central Files, 795.00/8-2955)

\(^3\) Document 84.
school time but their participation would inevitably arouse antago-
nisms in their minds against US forces who had only recently saved
them and ROK from Communist aggression.

c. With regard to his statement that “We have found an over-
whelming public demand for continuance of the demonstrations,” I
told him it evident that my information indicated quite the contrary;
that they were directed demonstrations in which laborers, farmers
and school children were forced to participate or provide funds to
support them. I told him that families in Pusan, Kunsan and Inchon
were required to provide a member to participate in the demonstra-
tions frequently or pay 100 hwan to hire someone to represent them.
I cited the case of an American supported orphanage which, on being
unable to provide personnel to participate in demonstrations, had
been assessed 500 hwan to support demonstrations. When money
could not be produced, the canvassers kicked a hole in the door of
the orphanage. Upon hearing of this incident, President became very
angry and demanded that he be provided with detailed information
so that he might take corrective action. I told him that for me to
reveal names and places would only result in retaliatory attacks
against individuals and agencies concerned, but I was certain that if
he desired, he had ample means to obtain the same information as I
had.

d. I told the President that in flying over demonstration areas, I
observed that demonstrators were being hauled back and forth from
adjacent villages and cities by trucks and buses. I regarded this use of
scarce motor transportation and consumption of large quantities of
fuel for such purposes to be extremely wasteful and totally unjusti-
fied particularly when ROK was requesting, and US was providing
ROK with, motor vehicles and POL under current aid programs.
Again President became angry and said that he would promptly put
a stop to such use of transportation.

7. Recent intelligence reports indicate that at Rhee’s direction in-
structions have now been issued by ROK Government to stop use of
motor transportation in connection with demonstrations. This was
confirmed in a conversation I had with General Chung II Kwon,
Chief of Staff of the ROK Army, who is presently in Japan visiting
US logistical installations. He informed me that the instructions were
issued by the President early this week before Chung departed from
Seoul. If these instructions are strictly enforced, it will become in-
creasingly difficult for ROK to maintain present scale of demonstra-
tions since participants will be required to walk long distances to
reach demonstration areas. Use of motor transportation to move
demonstrators will be checked frequently by compound commanders.
If demonstrations continue or if instructions on use of motor trans-
portation are not enforced, I shall again bring the matter to President
Rhee’s attention on my next trip to Korea.

8. The foregoing is submitted for information purposes and as
background against which to view the present situation in Korea.
87. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State


SUBJECT

Reduction in Commonwealth Forces in Korea

We have received similar notes from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom (the Canadian note is Tab A) stating that the Commonwealth have carefully considered our representations of April 29, but that they find themselves unable to abandon their proposal to make reductions in their forces in Korea. However, they have modified their original plans to retain only a battalion group and will now retain a Brigade Headquarters with a force of all arms under command, including one infantry battalion.

While I believe a reduction in their forces in Korea would be an unfortunate step further reducing the international composition of the United Nations Command, the Commonwealth have made it clear that their decision is firm. The Commonwealth have suggested that the detailed implementation of the proposed reduction in their forces be worked out in discussions between the United States and Commonwealth military representatives in Washington.

Recommendation

That I inform the Department of Defense that the Department of State believes further protest against the Commonwealth decision would be unavailing, and suggest that the appropriate United States military authorities work out arrangements with the Commonwealth representatives to carry out the proposed reduction.

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5/9-1655. Secret. Drafted by Jones.

2Not printed. Copies of the British, Australian, and Canadian notes, each dated September 16, are *ibid*. The New Zealand note has not been found in Department of State files.

3See Document 39.

4A handwritten note on the source text by Robertson indicates that Dulles approved the recommendation in person to Robertson. See Document 39. In a September 22 memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Admiral A.C. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, noted that the Department of Defense concurred that "there is no point in reopening the discussion with the Commonwealth and that the only remaining problem is working out the details of the reduction." (Washington Federal Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 60 A 1025, 370.5 Korea)
88. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Minister of the Korean Embassy (Han) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald), Department of State, Washington, September 26, 1955

SUBJECT

U.S.-ROK Relations

Mr. Sebald asked Minister Han to come in on such short notice because he felt the question which he wished to discuss was so important that the quicker he could see Minister Han the better. Korea, he said, had no better friends than Mr. Robertson, himself, and their associates, who were continually striving to do everything they could to help Korea overcome the enormous problems which it faced. Thus, he was speaking with the greatest of sincerity and from the heart.

Mr. Sebald wanted to tell Minister Han of our genuine concern about the anti-American atmosphere being created in Korea. We seemed unable to do anything right as far as the ROK were concerned and we were criticized on every hand. This criticism which has appeared in the ROK press seems officially inspired and designed for purposes which we are unable to understand. Perhaps some of the President's advisors thought this was the way to get results. The things which have been said, however, are extremely distasteful to us and we feel that this constant criticism of the U.S. is poisoning our relations and certainly is counterproductive. We have been accused of being soft toward Communism, and yet we came to Korea's aid at considerable loss of American lives to save Korea from Communism. We have been charged with intent to wreck the Korean economy and yet we are expending hundreds of millions of dollars to aid the economy.

While not intending to go into detail on these matters, Mr. Sebald wanted the Minister to understand that he was speaking frankly and out of genuine concern for Korea when he said that the poisoning of American-Korean relations was self-defeating. When Minister Han pressed for details, Mr. Sebald said that the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs would be glad to present them to Minister Han later on this week. He did wish, however, to give Minister Han one example of the dangers in the situation. Recently, he had occasion to see a letter received in the Department from Dr. Milton Eisenhower. Dr. Eisenhower had stated that reports reflecting Ameri-

1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95B/9-2655. Confidential. Drafted by Jones on September 27.
2Not found in Department of State files.
can-Korean relations had shown such animus against the U.S. he wondered if it would not be better if he resigned from the American-Korean Foundation, as he was doubtful he could be of any further service. Mr. Sebald recommended that he not resign from the American-Korean Foundation but that he remain in his present position in the hope that we could persuade our Korean friends of the great mistake in their public attitude toward the U.S.

Minister Han was genuinely moved by Mr. Sebald’s reference to Dr. Eisenhower’s letter and expressed hope that Dr. Eisenhower would not resign from the American-Korean Foundation. He argued, however, that there was no anti-Americanism being created in Korea, that President Rhee was firmly pro-American, and that any statements which might have been made merely expressed legitimate differences of opinion. The only recent problems which Mr. Sebald might have reference to, he thought, were those associated with the demonstrations against the NNSC and the current dispute over taxation of American businessmen.\(^3\) On the first count, he argued that the feelings of the people were so strong about the NNSC that the demonstrations could not be helped. As far as the tax dispute was concerned, there were, he thought, legitimate differences in view. Minister Han said he talked with ICA people a few weeks ago and they expressed great satisfaction with the improved atmosphere in Korea following the economic negotiations in Washington.

Mr. Sebald again stated he did not wish to discuss details and that he was describing an atmosphere—a trend—which gave us deep concern. He asked that the Minister reflect on the matter and hoped he would faithfully report to his Government the concern of Mr. Robertson, himself, and their staff. He expressed the hope that there would be some reversal in this trend.

\(^3\)Extensive documentation on the dispute over the application by the Republic of Korea of a retroactive business tax to American businessmen in Korea is in Department of State, Central File 895B.11.
89. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Switzerland

Washington, October 6, 1955—7:16 p.m.

624. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC and CAG. Department called in Swiss and Swedish representatives October 5 and again urged our desire be informed soonest next step Swiss and Swedes intend take on NNSC and when they intend take it. Swiss had no information recent developments NNSC at Panmunjom or on plans Swiss Government for next step. Did reiterate their longstanding desire see NNSC terminated but found continued ROK demonstrations increased difficulty further action. Swedes indicated in great confidence Swiss unwilling move before October 15 because unhappy about setting date in Aide-Mémoire. Swedes described discussion between Swedish representative and Communists Panmunjom stating that when Swedes proposed withdrawal teams DZ Communists while not agreeing did not disagree. Swedes wanted follow up this conversation but Swiss uninstructed and no action yet taken. Swedish Ambassador assured Department he would urge his Government do utmost near future bring about movement all NNSC personnel DZ. Swedes believe fairly good prospects success since Communists attach importance retaining NNSC some form. Swedes made clear they will not stay indefinitely NNSC and question is of timing and agreement with Swiss on action to be taken.

View Petitpierre statement Ambassador Willis (Bern's 248) he hoped give his Government's position by end September request Chargé call soonest high level Swiss Government to follow up Petitpierre-Willis conversation and Robertson-Schnyder talk urging joint Swedish-Swiss action at early date to achieve NNSC agreement withdrawal all teams to Demilitarized Zone. Chargé should add US

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2Memoranda of Robertson's conversations on October 5 with Swedish Ambassador Boheman and Swiss Counselor Schnyder, drafted by McClurkin and Jones, respectively, are ibid., 795.00/10–555.
3The aide-mémoire is summarized in Document 85.
4Max Petitpierre, President of the Swiss Confederation.
5In telegram 248 from Bern, September 7, Ambassador Willis reported that President Petitpierre did not feel that Switzerland should take the initiative to terminate the NNSC. Petitpierre hoped to be able to formulate a Swiss reply to the most recent U.S. aide-mémoire before the end of September. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/9–755)
would appreciate confidential indication date on which Swiss and Swedes believe discussions this matter could begin in NNSC.6

Dulles

6Roy M. Melbourne, Counselor of Embassy in Switzerland, saw Secretary General Zehnder on October 10 to urge Swiss action along the lines outlined. Zehnder responded that, according to his information, the Communist members of the NNSC would not relinquish the right to maintain inspection teams in at least one port of entry in each half of Korea. Accordingly, Zehnder felt that Switzerland might consider proposing the withdrawal of all inspection teams to the demilitarized zone except for one team assigned to a port of entry in South Korea and another assigned to a similar port in North Korea. (Telegram 364 from Bern, October 10; Ibid., 795.00/10-1055)

90. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson), Washington, October 7, 1955, 5:22 p.m.1

TELEPHONE CALL TO MR. ROBERTSON

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]
R. wanted to speak re the NNSC. We have a real thing heading up here. Defense has given instructions if nothing is done by the 15th then they are to take these people up to the zone. The Swedes are cooperative with us. They are proposing to move people to the demilitarized zones. The Swedes think there is a good chance of doing it. We can’t allow our military people to step in this way. R. referred to an August memo2 and read from it. The Sec. said he did not think it is correct that he approved this. R. said it is too rigid to be like the Sec. R. said if we can get the Swiss and Swedes to get them into the zone, it will be better than our doing it arbitrarily. The Sec. said he better reverse himself if that memo is right. R. said Gray has gone to Paris. The Sec. will write a letter3 requesting him to not to take such action until we can consult together. R. said Pentagon thinks they have an agreement from State that unless something is

2Document 81.
3Deputy Under Secretary Murphy telephoned Gray on October 8, eliminating the need to send a letter. Murphy sent a summary of his conversation with Gray to Robertson in an October 10 memorandum: Gray was reluctant to reconsider the deadline of October 15 as the final date to “wash up” the problem of the NNSC, but he added that the Department of Defense would not insist on anything unreasonable. (Department of State, FE Files: Lot 56 D 679, Korea)
done by the 15th, that order goes out. R. will write a letter for the Sec.’s signature. The Swiss and Swedes agree. The Australians are upset about it.

[Here follows discussion of an unrelated subject.]

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91. **Telegram From the Economic Coordinator in Korea (Wood) to the Department of State**

*Seoul, October 8, 1955—7 p.m.*

Toica 716. Subject: Meeting with ROK Officials 8 October 1955.

1. Hollister, Wood and staff held meeting October 8 with Korean Economic Coordinator and Ministers of Reconstruction, Finance, Commerce and Industry and Defense. Paik opened with plea for additional aid to maintain 500–1 exchange rate. He made following points:

   a. Disturbed by *Christian Science Monitor* article early September quoting statements by American officials that ROK officialdom inefficient, incompetent.
   
   b. Present volume aid inadequate maintain 500–1 exchange rate.
   
   c. Mentioned $5 billion war damage and 2 million unemployed examples Korea’s problems.
   
   d. Only major physical evidence industrial development due to American economic aid to date power plants and fertilizer plant. Korea needs more hydroelectric power plants, fertilizer plants, cement plants, mining and fisheries facilities.
   
   e. Probably food shortage as result of anticipated poor crops, resulting need for large PL 480 program on grant basis.
   
   f. Requested maximum participation in regional fund to develop port, transportation and communication facilities.
   
   g. Minister Reconstruction prepared memo on aid program, which pass to Hollister who stated would study later.

2. Hollister commented as follows:

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1Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 59 D 95, CF 538. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to the USOM in Taipei.

2John B. Hollister, Director of the International Cooperation Administration, was visiting Korea with Under Secretary Hoover as part of a tour of several Far Eastern countries during October. Documentation on the Hoover–Hollister trip is *ibid.*, Central Files, 110.12–HO and Conference Files: Lot 59 D 95, CF 534–541.


4Apparent reference to the President’s Fund for Asian Economic Development, which was established by Congress in August 1955.

5Not found in Department of State files.
a. They should not be disturbed by newspaper statements, but understand they are often irresponsible. Statement attributed President Rhee this morning’s press re technical aid a thoroughly irresponsible example.

b. Described Congressional and public relation problems of administering aid program.

c. Pointed out feeling of many Congressmen magnitude general aid program should be reduced rather than increased.

d. Mentioned competing demands all countries and feeling in each country their aid program could not be reduced.

e. Covered history of regional fund and tentative position of some that regional fund be used only for projects directly aiding 2 or more countries. Said he would make full statement at Singapore.

f. Emphasized need for attracting foreign capital and commented on fact that some recent developments were discouraging to foreign capital.

3. Finance Minister made following comments:

a. FY 56 budget now shows deficit 50 billion Hwan which requires $100,000,000 additional aid to cover.

b. Present aid cannot be used this purpose, but must be devoted entirely to reconstruction.

c. At least 80% counterpart of PL 480 funds should be given Korea and none of any remainder should be used by US forces in Korea.

d. In contrast to Paik’s remarks stated food shortage due to increased population not poor crop.

e. Korean Government willing settle taxation issue with American businessmen on basis satisfactory to both sides, currently working with American Embassy. Disturbed by Chamber Commerce cables to Congressmen. Hollister stated he did not wish discuss details of complicated tax situation, but concerned about effect controversy on US public and Congressional opinion and that State and ICA giving full support to Embassy in its efforts promote fair settlement of issue.

4. Defense Minister made following comment:

a. Mentioned difficulties maintaining armed strength with present resources and adverse effects of recently reduced pay rates.

b. Urged more local procurement military items Korea.

5. Wood emphasized need for ROK take initiative in attracting foreign capital as best long range solution to Korea’s economic problems.

6. In conclusion Hollister pointed out purpose trip to meet officials and see program in action. Not prepared to make any promises any points covered. Did promise consider all problems carefully light of mutual benefit ROK and US and worldwide program.

Wood
92. **Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State**

*Seoul, October 9, 1955—10 a.m.*

Secun 22. For Secretary from Hoover. Upon arrival Seoul I reviewed thoroughly major aspects Korean situation with Ambassador, General Lemnitzer, Wood, and key members American staff. I was therefore ready when I saw President Rhee to take strong position on major questions at issue between our governments.

However, during entire period interview which lasted over an hour all that President Rhee did was exchange pleasantries and talk in lofty terms of ideals and philosophical problems of modern world. There was no approach to any substantive problem whatsoever.

Lacy states tenor conversation almost completely incomprehensible in light Rhee’s recent actions. We can only assume President must have sensed firmness and unanimity which obviously present between all of us on US side.

At large luncheon October 7, I was guest of Yi Ki-bung, Speaker National Assembly, who probably frankest confidant of Rhee. After prior consultation with Lacy I told Yi that I had been most impressed with courteous and sympathetic meeting with President but had been deeply shocked few minutes after leaving him to read excoriating and inflammatory articles in latest editions Rhee’s own newspaper including provocative editorials against US. I said it was most difficult for me to reconcile conflicting attitudes.

Yi appeared greatly worried and we pursued subject no further.

Yi then read speech obviously written for him by someone in Rhee’s immediate entourage complaining that US must change its “weak and vacillating policy of coexistence with Communist bloc.” In brief reply I merely said I was glad have opportunity visit Korea and exchange views with government leaders and that we had come only to learn and listen not to carry on negotiations. I then proposed a toast to President Rhee after which Speaker Yi hurriedly rose and proposed a somewhat embarrassed response to President Eisenhower.

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.12-HO/10-955. Secret; Priority.
2 President Rhee’s resentment of U.S. policy with respect to the hwan-dollar conversion issue, the pace of the withdrawal of the NNITs from South Korea and the consequent demonstrations, and the dispute over the taxation of American businessmen in the Republic of Korea focused on Ambassador Lacy. By the time of the Hoover–Hollister visit to Seoul, Lacy had determined that he could not discharge his responsibilities effectively in such an atmosphere. He therefore asked to be relieved of his responsibilities for reasons of health, and Hoover concurred. In passing the recommendation on to Dulles, Hoover expressed his complete confidence in Lacy. (Telegram 460 from Seoul, October 9; *ibid.*, 123–Lacy, William) Additional documentation on Ambassador Lacy’s situation is *ibid.* Documentation relating specifically to the taxation question is *ibid.*, 895B.11.
Later in the afternoon I attended heartening briefing by ROK General Staff on their defense organization. At conclusion Army Chief of Staff General Chong addressed me directly in presence of entire group saying that Korean Army remembers that we trained together, fought together and died together. This produces strong and lasting bond between us. We look to US for guidance and advice. We pledge to US complete loyalty and cooperation of ROK military establishment.

I replied that we were all deeply moved by this presentation; that they could rely upon our support and cooperation and that American people have highest admiration for what ROK Army has achieved and for its courage.

At that time we felt this had no greater significance than exchange amenities. Later in evening, however, Chong told Cameron,3 Embassy First Secretary, that he had intended in his remarks to make a definite point of special relations ROK Army to US and that he wished to convey a real pledge of loyalty of ROK Army to US in contrast to attitude of politicians which he said was damaging ROK-US relations.

In late afternoon I had meeting with American Chamber of Commerce and released statement (Secun 18)4 supporting Embassy stand on local tax situation, placing special emphasis on Department backing of position.

At dinner in evening Rhee was again most courteous and friendly but no substantive issues were discussed.

I am visiting US front with Lemnitzer this morning, returning Seoul shortly before our party leaves for Taipei.

Lacy

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3Turner C. Cameron, Jr.
4Secun 18 from Seoul, October 7, transmitted the text of the statement released to the press that day in which Hoover indicated that the United States would continue to work for a fair solution to the business tax dispute. (Department of State, Central Files, 110.12-HO/10-735)
93. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 10, 1955

PARTICIPANTS
Admiral Davis
Mr. Murphy
Mr. Robertson
Mr. Sebald
Mr. Jones

The meeting was held in order to reach State–Defense agreement as to the course of action which should be taken on the NNSC at this time.

Mr. Murphy mentioned that he had spoken with Secretary Gray and asked Admiral Davis whether Secretary Gray had briefed him on the NNSC problem.

Admiral Davis said that he had the impression from Secretary Gray that we should not be too rigid in adhering to the October 15 date. Secretary Gray was willing to agree to a reasonable delay as long as it was not a first step toward doing nothing.

Mr. Murphy and Mr. Robertson assured Admiral Davis that the Department was as interested as Defense in seeing NNSC activities in the ROK terminated as quickly as possible. The Swedes, Mr. Robertson said, were also keen on taking action.

Admiral Davis recalled the conversation between Secretary Gray and Mr. Sebald which seemed to have resulted in a firm agreement that if the Swiss and Swedes had not taken action by October 15 the UN Command would be instructed to terminate NNSC activities in the ROK.\(^2\)

Mr. Robertson pointed out that the Swiss and Swedes had been the first to propose abolition of the NNSC. They wanted very much to get out of this unpleasant task and failing to get agreement to terminate the Commission they had proposed the recent reduction as a first step. We had been four months in accepting the proposal for a reduction because General Taylor had felt that such a reduction would not settle the problem.

Admiral Davis said that both Defense and the Command had feared that if they accepted the proposed reduction it would be the last step taken.

Mr. Robertson said the Swedes were earnest about getting out of the NNSC and that they did not regard the recent reduction as a last

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\(^1\)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/10–1055. Secret. Drafted by Jones. The source text indicates the meeting took place in Murphy’s office.

\(^2\)See Document 81.
step. The Commission was a drain on them and their problem was to get out as gracefully as possible in view of their neutral position.

Mr. Murphy pointed out that both the Swiss and Swedes had diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communists and did not want to jeopardize those relations by too hasty action.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that when we had finally gone along with the proposed reduction we had sent a note to the Swiss and Swedes expressing the hope that an additional step might be taken by October 15. The Swiss had taken umbrage at the October 15 date and Swedish Ambassador Boheman had told Mr. Robertson confidentially that the Swiss felt that October 15 smacked too much of an ultimatum. Ambassador Boheman had informed us that the Swedes were engaged right now trying to persuade the Communists at Panmunjom to agree to withdraw the NNSC teams to the Demilitarized Zone. They, of course, did not want to withdraw from the ROK under duress by either the ROK or the U.S. If the Swedes do manage to get the NNSC to agree to withdraw to the Demilitarized Zone it will be the best possible way of accomplishing our objective.

Admiral Davis asked whether the Swiss would go along.

Mr. Robertson said they also wanted out. He had already told them in as strong diplomatic terms as possible of our need to have something done soon. The Swedes feel they can work the matter out with the Swiss and the Communists, given a little time. The Swiss and Swedes are not dragging their feet on the matter; the only question with them is the matter of tactics.

Admiral Davis pointed out that the more time that passed the greater the risk of recurring riots in the ROK. He wondered whether the October 15 date had leaked to the ROK. He pointed out that he had understood the October 15 date was also the position the Secretary regarded as favorable.

Mr. Murphy said the Secretary had not felt the date was that categorical, but rather looked at it as a target date.

Mr. Robertson said there was no question but what the language of the agreement between State and Defense was airtight on the question of the October 15 date. However, Mr. Robertson had talked with the Secretary and the Secretary had stated his intention to write a letter to Secretary Wilson saying that we ought not to regard this date as too firm, but rather give the Swiss and Swedes a little more time to carry out their desired course of action.

Mr. Murphy pointed out that the Australians were worried about the possibility of the UN Command taking unilateral action.

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*Summarized in Document 85.*
Mr. Robertson stated that this worry was principally fear that such action would place us in a bad public position, one where we might be made to look like violators of the Armistice Agreement.

Admiral Davis said Secretary Gray had agreed that a reasonable delay would be all right and asked how much time the Swiss and Swedes would take to complete their action.

Mr. Robertson said that on the basis of his conversations with Ambassador Boheman it was hard to pick out a particular date. The Swedes had made a proposition to the Communists to withdraw the teams to the Demilitarized Zone. The Communists were finding this proposal difficult to turn down and the Swedes were pressing hard hoping to get a reasonably prompt response. Ambassador Boheman had informed us that if the Swedes were not able to get such a response by October 15 the UN Command could, of course, ask the Swiss and Swedes to get out and they would go. However, this would place the Command in the possible position of violating the Armistice.

Admiral Davis asked if the Swedes might not prefer to be moved out.

Mr. Murphy pointed out that the Swiss would like very much to have us tell them to get out.

Mr. Robertson said the Swedes would not mind being moved out but then we would have to bear the onus of such action.

Mr. Murphy agreed with the point Admiral Davis made that there now was somewhat of a lull in the demonstrations in the ROK and that this was the time to act.

Mr. Sebald said he had appealed to Minister Han very strongly on this matter pointing out that the demonstrations had tied our hands and made it difficult for the UN Command or the Swiss and Swedes to act.4

Mr. Murphy asked Mr. Robertson how the matter had been left with Ambassador Boheman.

Mr. Robertson said that he had told the Ambassador that October 15 was not an ultimatum. However, there had to be a termination of the NNSC at some time and the UN Command had felt that they wanted to know by October 15 what the Swiss and Swedes were going to do if anything so that they could act accordingly.

Admiral Davis asked why the Communists should agree to withdrawal of the teams to the Demilitarized Zone.

Mr. Robertson said Ambassador Boheman felt that the Communists were fearful the Swiss and Swedes would walk out altogether; they wanted very much to maintain the facade of inspection. Thus they might settle for something rather than nothing.

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4See Document 88.
Admiral Davis said he thought we should take this occasion to tell the Swiss and Swedes that there was a comparative lull in the demonstrations in the ROK and that there was a certain awareness in the ROK that the NNSC operations there should be wound up shortly, and thus if we do not manage this soon, we will find ourselves in a very difficult position again.

Mr. Robertson said he would tell the Swiss this when they came in to report Bern’s attitude on the problem.

Admiral Davis said that he presumed whatever is done State will simply inform the Sixteen and not ask their permission to take action.

Mr. Murphy and Mr. Robertson agreed that this was so, but pointed out that if we were forced into unilateral UN Command action our position with our Allies would be very bad.

Admiral Davis said Defense could not accept the responsibility of having the demonstrations build up again.

Mr. Murphy said it was hard to tell what the ROK will do, and said that what we should try to do now was to smoke out the Swiss.

Mr. Sebald asked whether the Command should not be notified.

Mr. Robertson said that he understood the Command did not have instructions to take action. He thought, however, it would be well to inform the Command in a joint State—Defense message that the Swedes were working on the problem, and that they felt it best to wait the outcome of their negotiations with the Swiss and the Communists because this would incur only a relatively short delay in achieving our objective.

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Sent to CINCUNC as telegram 773 to Tokyo, October 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/10–1055)

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94. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Switzerland**¹

*Washington, October 12, 1955—5:02 p.m.*

673. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC and CAG. Your 364.² Zehnder’s suggestion Swiss might consider proposing next step on NNSC

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²See footnote 6, Document 89.
which leaves one inspection team at one port entry each in north and south Korea would not solve problem. Therefore request you see Zehnder pointing out we appreciate active consideration Swiss giving matter but believe strong Communist desire retain at least facade NNSC in DZ gives Swiss and Swedes if they present alternative complete withdrawal NNSC sufficient bargaining position secure agreement removal all teams DZ.\textsuperscript{3} Retention one team in each zone Korea appears have no practical justification since its coverage would be so limited in scope. Believe Communist purpose insisting one team remain each zone is to perpetuate problem UNC faces with ROK.

Swedish Ambassador informed Swiss position as outlined your 364 and asked urge his Government stand firm on removal all teams DZ and press Swiss join them this stand.\textsuperscript{4}

Dulles

\textsuperscript{3}In telegram 383 from Bern, October 14, the Embassy reported that the Swiss Government continued to incline toward a "prudent" course of action with respect to the NNSC, despite the arguments conveyed by the Embassy as instructed in telegram 673 to Bern. The Swiss felt that Sweden was also hesitant to force the issue of the NNSC and this reinforced Swiss caution. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/10-1455)

\textsuperscript{4}A memorandum of Robertson's conversation with Boheman on October 12 is \textit{ibid.}, 795.00/10–1255.

95. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)\textsuperscript{1}

\textit{Washington, October 18, 1955.}

SUBJECT

Korean Tax Controversy

After your visit to Seoul President Rhee asked Mr. Strom to come in for a discussion of the tax problem (Seoul's 492, Tab B).\textsuperscript{2} The President declined to listen to an explanation of the tax problem and said that the only feature that concerned him was the public attack by the Chamber of Commerce which had shamed Korea before the world. The President said, and several times repeated, that

\textsuperscript{1}Source: Department of State, Central Files, 895B.11/10–1855. Secret. Drafted by Hemmendinger.

\textsuperscript{2}Not found attached. Telegram 492 from Seoul, October 16, is \textit{ibid.}, 895B.11/10–1655.
the businessmen responsible should be sent out of Korea at least for a time, and asked the Embassy to assist in identifying the persons responsible.

Ambassador Lacy’s resignation was announced after this interview. He thinks (Seoul’s 497, Tab C) that a strong statement is required to dissipate the impression that his resignation implies a change of U.S. policy. He has drafted, and requests authority to send and to make public, a lengthy note to President Rhee reviewing the U.S. position on the tax controversy.

I think that Ambassador Lacy’s concern is justified, but I also think his draft note would not help solve the tax controversy and that there may be better means of making the point that President Rhee cannot dictate U.S. policies. I recommended to the Secretary on October 15 (Tab D) that before Lacy departs he should on instructions of the Department return the offensive letter of September 24 from the Acting Foreign Minister. The Secretary was reluctant to approve this recommendation because he did not like to stir things up, but he said that he was willing to consider the question further. The return of that letter seems to me to be the best way to make our point.

Recommendations:

1. That you approve the attached telegram to Embassy Seoul (Tab A) instructing the Deputy Chief of Mission to reject orally the President’s proposal and ask that negotiations quietly continue, rather than send the proposed note.

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3 Ambassador Lacy left Seoul on October 20. Walter C. Dowling was appointed Ambassador to the Republic of Korea on May 29, 1956; he presented his credentials on July 14.
4 Not found attached. Telegram 497 from Seoul, October 17, is in Department of State, Central Files, 895B.11/10-1755.
5 This memorandum, not found attached, was apparently the memorandum from Sebold rather than Robertson to Secretary Dulles, October 15, which described the campaign mounted by the South Korean Government against Ambassador Lacy. (Ibid., 611.95B/10-1555)
6 In telegram 402 from Seoul, September 25, the Embassy transmitted the text of a September 24 letter to Ambassador Lacy from Acting Foreign Minister Cho. The letter concerned the dispute over the proposed taxation of American businessmen in Korea and contained language that the Embassy and the Department considered unacceptable. The letter was also released to the Korean press. (Ibid., 895B.11/9-2555)
7 Not found attached. In telegram 289 to Seoul, which Hoover approved, the Embassy was informed that the Department felt that the solution to the tax controversy should be sought in negotiation rather than public statements and exchanges of letters. Consequently the Department did not approve the note that Lacy proposed in telegram 497 from Seoul. The problem of countering the impression that Ambassador Lacy had been forced from his post was met by returning Cho’s September 24 letter. (Ibid., 895B.11/10-1755)
2. That you recommend to the Secretary that Lacy be instructed before his departure to return the offensive Korean letter of September 24 (Tab D).\(^8\)

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\(^8\) Hoover initialed his approval of the recommendations on October 19.

96. **Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Hemmendinger) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)\(^1\)**

*Washington, October 24, 1955.*

**SUBJECT**

Forthcoming JCS Recommendations on Future Force Levels for the ROK Army

A member of NA has been shown privately a September 6, 1955 letter from General Lemnitzer to the Army Chief of Staff\(^2\) presenting CINCFE’s recommendations for future force levels of the ROK Army. Defense, (ISA), has action on it, and it is expected to be acted on favorably by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the near future.

General Lemnitzer says that the military situation in Korea does not require permanent maintenance of a force of twenty active and ten reserve divisions, and recommends a stage-by-stage cut-back, reviewed every six months. The tentative force levels he recommends are: July 1957, twenty active, ten reserve (as at present); January 1958, seventeen active, thirteen reserve; July 1958, thirteen active, seventeen reserve; January 1959, nine active, twenty-one reserve. He says that he requires a lead time of eighteen months to retire a group of divisions, allowing time for locating a site and constructing facilities, and asks for immediate approval of this tentative schedule and approval of the necessary construction funds so that the ROK can be informed of the necessity for some cuts at the earliest possible moment and necessary preparations can be made for an orderly retirement. Presumably General Lemnitzer has in mind notifying the ROK about next January.

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\(^1\) Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/10–2455. Secret. Drafted by Norred on October 21. Also sent to Sebald.

\(^2\) Not printed. (Enclosure to JCS 1776/542; National Archives and Records Administration, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)(2))
Comment and Recommendation

The Agreed Minute of Understanding of November 1954 states that “the trained reserve strengths are obtained, the total number of active military personnel will be adjusted accordingly.” In negotiating the Agreed Minute it was made clear to the ROK that the United States believed the ROK had neither the manpower nor economic resources to support its present armed forces indefinitely. General Lemnitzer’s recommendation is moderate in terms of its timing and is in line with the Agreed Minute. The only real difficulty that I can see at this time is the furor which will be created in the ROK on announcement of such plans despite their signature of the Agreed Minute.

The JCS and Defense are now considering General Lemnitzer’s recommendation and we are not yet called upon for our views. My preliminary thought is to concur in these recommendations but to examine carefully the timing and methods of informing the ROK. Probably it would be best to approach the ROK only on the first stage of the reduction and to do so at the working level where an examination would be made of the manpower resources of the ROK and the status of the reserve program on the assumption that the Agreed Minute establishes the general policy.

Ellipsis in the source text.
In a November 2 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that they had approved in principle a future reduction in active ROK army forces, but they did not specifically approve the final number of divisions and did not specify the date at which the reduction would be feasible. The Joint Chiefs concluded that conditions in Korea remained sufficiently tense so that “any reduction of forces at this time could cause a deterioration of the Far East situation which would be detrimental to U.S. interest in that area.” (Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 60 B 1025, 091.3 Korea)

97. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Gray) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)


Dear Mr. Robertson: Reference is made to our agreement of 24 August 1955 with Mr. Sebald of your office relating to a solution of

1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/11-555. No classification marking.
2See Document 82.
the NNSC problem, in which it was agreed that October 15th would be the deadline date for terminating NNSC activities. In a telephone conversation with Mr. Murphy on October 8, I agreed to extend briefly the time beyond the deadline of October 15 to provide every opportunity for the successful achievement of the termination of NNSC activities in the Republic of Korea by the Swiss and the Swedes. I am aware from various conversations with you and Mr. Sebald that there have been further negotiations this week with them, but that no final reply has been received.

As you may know, I depart today for the Geneva conference and feel impelled to record my views at this time, inasmuch as I shall be away from Washington for perhaps two weeks or more.

More than two months have elapsed since our August 24 agreement, and we find the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, currently facing more exasperating problems caused by the NNSC than he has faced at almost any time during the Armistice. The Department of Defense for the past two years has been patient while diplomatic efforts were being made to solve the NNSC problem. I appreciate the political aspects of the problem, but political efforts directed towards it have not achieved the desired results.

I feel strongly that we should not share in responsibility for the predictable results of indefinite delay: Pressure for action by the Koreans by resumption of violent demonstrations while we are unable or unwilling to take action under such pressure.

Although I agreed to an extension of time beyond our agreed deadline of October 15 to permit the Swiss and the Swedes more time to take their second step, I do not believe I can conscientiously permit our agreed deadline to extend indefinitely. It is, therefore, urgently requested that steps be taken by the Department of State to permit the Department of Defense to instruct the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to remove the NNSC teams to the Demilitarized Zone on November 21, unless the purpose has been accomplished by other means in the meantime.

Sincerely,

Gordon Gray

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*See footnote 3, Document 90.

*In separate conversations with Swiss Counselor Schnyder and Swedish Ambassador Boheman on November 1, Robertson learned that the Swiss and Swedish representatives on the NNSC had jointly proposed the withdrawal of all inspection teams to the demilitarized zone, but that the Polish and Czech members on the commission had rejected the proposal. Neither Schnyder nor Boheman knew what steps their governments planned to take after the rejection of their joint proposal. (Memoranda of conversations by McClurkin; Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/11–155)

98. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)¹

Washington, November 9, 1955.

SUBJECT

President Rhee

You requested comments on the situation in Korea in the light of several recent reports.

1. In your pencilled memorandum to Bob Murphy² you state, “At present we have the ROK Army with us, but for how long?” As you know, the present leaders of the Army are friendly to us and it is our belief that they will not act against our interests even under orders from Rhee. The chief significance of the most recent report on Rhee’s demand for military plans for a move north is that it was brought to us by General Yi Hyung-keun. We have thought him to be unreliable in the past, but he has been moving closer to us lately—perhaps with his eye on General Chung’s position as Chief of Staff of the ROK Army, which becomes vacant by rotation in February.

2. President Rhee’s age is beginning to tell and at times he appears irrational and irresponsible. There is a possibility that as their terms expire he might gradually replace the present military leaders with men who are willing to do his bidding and then take some rash action. There is no evidence, however, that he is preparing to do so. In my opinion, Rhee is fully aware of his complete dependence upon the United States, economically and militarily, and that despite his sword rattling from time to time he will not risk losing our support by unilateral action of a serious nature. This has been my conviction since my talks with him in June–July, 1953. During one of his most belligerent periods, the Secretary protested what seemed to us to be a particularly rash statement. Rhee replied, with an enigmatic smile, “We can’t let the enemy be too sure of us.”

3. So far as the possibility of military action by Rhee is concerned, I think it is clear that he cannot act over the objections of his commanders and that his present commanders will continue to refuse. With respect to the possibility of fabricating an incident as justification for a military move, the ROK military is probably in position to prevent this, and our Eighth Army is very much on top of the situation. However, there can be no absolute guarantee that

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/11–955. Top Secret. Drafted by Hemmendinger and Robertson and sent through Murphy.
²Not found in Department of State files.
President Rhee could not succeed in fabricating an incident if he is determined to do so.

4. General Chung’s despondency (Seoul Embtel 512, Tab B attached) raises the question whether something might soon happen which would cause him to conclude, along with others, that it was necessary to remove the President from active office. This would be contrary to Chung’s expressed belief in constitutional processes but could conceivably come about because the President created a military incident or threatened to do so, because his interference in Army matters became unacceptable, because the President threatened to remove his present commanders from power, or because of a general conviction that the President had ceased to be able to govern effectively. Any such action by General Chung would probably not be with the design of setting himself up as the ruler in Korea but in concert with Yi Ki-pung as the civilian leader. [7-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

5. In sum, I think that we have to continue to live with Rhee until something happens, and while this entails risks and inconvenience, that it is the most sensible course open to us.

I attach as Tab A a brief summary of the recent reports.4

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3Not found attached. Telegram 512 from Seoul, October 21, contained a report of a conversation between South Korean Chief of Staff General Chung Il-kwon and First Secretary Turner C. Cameron. Chung told Cameron that he and President Rhee had had a “dreadful fight” over the lines of authority in the South Korean Army and that Rhee had again complained of the Army’s unwillingness to drive North Korean forces from the Kaesong-Ongjin area. Chung was discouraged by his exchange with Rhee, and he repeated that the United States could always count on the loyalty of the Republic of Korea military establishment. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/11-955)

4Not printed. The summary dealt with Cameron’s conversation with Chung, summarized in footnote 3 above, and with a report that General Yi Hyung-keun, Chairman of the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff, had told President Rhee again that the use of force to retake the remaining area south of the 38th parallel was impossible.
99. Staff Study Prepared by an Interdepartmental Working Group for the Operations Coordinating Board¹


ANALYSIS OF INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION IN REPUBLIC OF KOREA (PURSUANT TO NSC ACTION 1290-d) AND RECOMMENDED ACTION²

I. Subversive Forces and Their Activities

1. Communist subversion in the ROK is a potential threat rather than an immediate danger. There are no known organized subversive forces or activities. The ROK Government and its people are strongly anti-Communist. Non-Communist opposition to the ROK Administration is weak in number and its capabilities are limited by internal disunity and the strict watchfulness of the Government.

2. However, there are limited potential Communist subversive assets in the ROK which under certain conditions might be exploited and developed. These include: remnants of the former Communist underground in South Korea; other Communists and Communist sympathizers who survived the Korean war in the ROK; relatives and associates of the thousands of Leftist intellectuals who fled to North Korea during the war; approximately 2 million refugees from North Korea now in South Korea who, although mostly non-Communists, are potentially exploitable because of their friends and relatives in North Korea; prisoners-of-war released by the ROK in South Korea; and some dissatisfaction with the authoritarian regime and with the economic situation.

¹Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Korea—1953 to Date. Top Secret. The working group was chaired by Landreth M. Harrison of the Office of the Under Secretary of State, and included representatives of the Department of Defense, [less than 1 line of text not declassified], ICA, and the OCB.

²Regarding the 1290-d exercise by the OCB, see footnote 2, Document 40. On November 16, the OCB considered the study printed here, prepared on the basis of dispatch 260 (Document 40); concurred in the analysis and recommendations; and noted that overall responsibility for the implementation of the program rested with the International Cooperation Administration which had coordinating responsibility for the Mutual Security Program. (Covering note attached to the study)

On November 23, the OCB completed a full “Report to the National Security Council Pursuant to NSC Action 1290-d.” (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430) The NSC considered the report at its 269th meeting on December 8. (NSC Action No. 1486; ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) On January 13, 1956, Under Secretary Hoover instructed Carl W. Strom, as Chargé in Korea, to supervise the implementation of the 1290-d program for Korea as outlined in the paper approved by the OCB on November 16. (Ibid., Central Files, 795.5/1–1356)
3. The ROK Administration has firm internal control over both civil and military activities, but it is in effect authoritarian and corrupt by Western standards. Because of President Rhee’s dominant role, his death or incapacitation might result, although not necessarily, in a period of confusion and chaos. Furthermore, the ROK economic situation is precarious and the economy is largely dependent upon substantial aid from the U.S. Should this economic situation deteriorate substantially, or should a chaotic political situation develop, the Communists might be able to exploit their potential assets for subversion.

4. Externally, the threat to the ROK Government is the proximity of the north Korean and Chinese Communists and to a lesser extent the Communist-influenced Koreans in Japan. Available evidence indicates that Communist infiltration through the well-guarded Demilitarized Zone is limited at present to low-level espionage and possibly to the smuggling of funds. Agents, funds, supplies and direction may be infiltrated via coastal smuggling and it is also possible that high-level agents, whose mission is political subversion, may come into South Korea through devious routes (via China and Japan). There is, however, little evidence that these channels are being utilized for subversive operations at the present time. Of the 600,000 Koreans in Japan, 400,000 are believed to be sympathetic to the General Federation of Koreans Resident in Japan (Soren), a Korean Communist front group. About 10,000 of these are considered to be hardcore Communists. To some extent the smuggling activities of the members of Soren provide funds for Communist operations and channels for courier use.

[Here follows a three-page analysis of South Korean internal security and military forces.]

III. Evaluation of Internal Security Situation

18. The ROK Government at this time is not imperiled by Communist internal subversion. While the external threat to ROK security is serious, it serves to generate active opposition to Communism internally. Thus unless there is a serious internal deterioration in the ROK for other reasons, this external threat does not add to the danger of subversion.

19. Circumstances could arise in the ROK, however, that might permit the development of a serious internal Communist threat. Such circumstances would include (a) political struggle over the succession to President Rhee, (b) substantial economic deterioration, (c) in the long range, serious deterioration of public confidence in the effectiveness of the administration. Even in these circumstances, however, Communist exploitation could not immediately create a serious inter-
nal threat and some time would be required for the Communists to build up their strength and influence.

20. If confronted with a serious internal Communist threat, the internal security agencies could be expected to devote greater attention to the problem. Whether they would be able to cope adequately with a serious threat is questionable in view of their inefficiency and lack of training; in which case the armed forces—which are designed to enable the ROK to resist external aggression as well as maintain internal security—would be more than adequate to maintain internal security.

[Here follows an inventory of existing U.S. assistance programs bearing on the internal security problem.]

V. Political Factors

27. As a consequence of the experience with the Communist aggression of 1950, the ROK Government, political leadership, and populace are intensely anti-Communist. Thus the ROK Government is thoroughly aware of the potential danger of Communist subversion, and would be receptive to aid from the U.S. in the internal security field. However, it would urge that the aid be in form of equipment and possibly financial subsidies for the existing internal security organizations and would insist upon full control of all such aid. Diversion of presently programmed economic and military aid to strengthen the internal security program would surely be opposed strongly by the ROK.

28. Political activity in the ROK is characterized by conspiratorial tactics. This is a consequence of the revolutionary background of the political leaders, the immaturity of the parties and democratic procedures, and police-state practices of the administration. False allegations of secret alliance with the Communists have often been made by one group against another for political reasons.

29. The system of competing internal security organizations is reflected in the conspiratorial character of ROK politics. Competition among the agencies serves to prevent Communist infiltration of any one of them or of political factions identified with any one of them and serves also to restrain the tendency to use false allegations. A case in point is the current "seditious documents" case, in which one group of agencies made public the efforts of the JPMGC to deliver Communist documents to Assembly members, allegedly to test them but possibly to trump up charges against them. Although the ROK has from time to time made moves toward coordinating the internal security agencies, thus far these efforts have not produced significant improvements. It is doubtful that in the present situation the ROK Government will make genuine efforts to reorganize the individual
internal security agencies or to unite or coordinate their activities closely.

30. The ROK Government almost certainly will continue to rely on several competing internal security organizations. The police, who now conduct most routine Communist investigations and could serve as the main anti-Communist agency, might be given increased responsibilities if the U.S. pressed for it, but military agencies probably could not be precluded from broad roles in non-military investigations. In time of serious internal emergency, the military investigative agencies almost certainly would exercise greater authority and wider responsibilities than the police.

31. Because of the political considerations, U.S. aid in the internal security field in the ROK probably will have to stress the development of an effective security leadership through training in the existing organizations. It seems unlikely that it could be used as a lever to effect a reorganization for closer coordination of the existing agencies.

VI. Conclusions and Recommendations

A. Conclusions:

32. The threat of Communist subversion in the ROK is at present a potential rather than an actual danger. Unless a chaotic political situation develops, or economic conditions deteriorate, the limited Communist assets (internal and external) are not likely to become effective instruments of subversion.

33. In addition to corruption and maladministration there are the following deficiencies in the ROK internal security forces:

(a) [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
(b) No coordination between various countersubsversive agencies and between various elements within individual agencies.
(c) No central files or registry on subversives.
(d) No understanding of security requirements in [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] operations.
(e) Lack of adequate technical equipment.

34. The armed forces since they are designed to be able to defend ROK territory short of attack by a major power are more than adequate to maintain internal security.

B. Recommendation:

35. Seek to develop within the National Police a specific element trained in and responsible for the countersubsversive [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] function. To this end:
(a) Establish a small (approximately 5-10 man) U.S. police advisory group to the NP to replace the present KCAC Army Advisory group. This group would be responsible for developing an NP training program, advising and training Korean personnel responsible for its conduct, including training in [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] techniques for selected personnel. The U.S. advisory group would work to instill the concept of police activities as public service functions; and would assist in developing better national coordination between police and military forces. In addition, it would be available for advice on such matters as police organization, officer development, and the installation of a career police service.

Responsible Agency: ICA
[1 line of source text not declassified]
Timing: As soon as practicable.
Cost: Approximately $100,000, not presently programmed.

(b) Provide limited technical equipment, particularly those types of equipment associated with CE/CI operations and those types necessary to provide for police communications and mobility.

Responsible Agency: ICA
[1 line of source text not declassified]
Timing: Coordinate with needs under recommendation (a) above.
Cost: $150,000, not presently programmed.

(c) Offer police training in the U.S. to additional selected members of NP.

Responsible Agency: ICA
Timing: As soon as possible.
Cost: $50,000.

100. Editorial Note

On November 22, the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly completed 11 days of debate on “the Korean question” and drew up a report for submission to the General Assembly. The debate was based in part upon the annual report of the U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea which was submitted on September 7 and covered the period from August 17, 1954, to September 7, 1955. (U.N. doc. A/2947) The debate also ranged over the problem of the former prisoners of the Korean war, which India, as chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, was eager to resolve. In addition, the debate included a sharp exchange between the Polish Representative, J. Katz-Suchy, and Jacob Blaustein of the U.S. Delegation on the question of which
of the contending sides in the Korean conflict were violating the letter and spirit of the Armistice Agreement with respect to the functioning of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. First Committee debate on the Korean question is recorded in U.N. docs. A/C.1/S.R.783 through A/C.1/S.R.793. The exchanges between Katz-Suchy and Blaustein are in U.N. docs. A/C.1/S.R.790 and A/C.1/S.R.792.

At its 549th plenary meeting on November 29, the General Assembly accepted the recommendations of the First Committee and adopted resolutions reaffirming the intention of the United Nations to seek an early solution to the Korean question, requesting member states to assist in the resettlement of former prisoners still resident in India, and requesting the Secretary-General to place the Korean question on the provisional agenda of the Eleventh Session of the General Assembly. (A/PV.549)

101. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Gray)¹


Dear Gordon: I refer to your letter of November 5, 1955² with reference to moving the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission teams in South Korea to the Demilitarized Zone on November 21, 1955 unless this had been accomplished by other means and to our telephone conversation yesterday afternoon on this exceedingly difficult question. We greatly appreciate your patience and your cooperation.

The only justification for a postponement of the action you recommend is our earnest belief that we should avoid the appearance of acting unilaterally if it is at all possible to achieve our objective in some other way. As you know, the Czechs and Poles have rejected the Swiss and Swedish proposal to move their teams to the Demilitarized Zone, but Ambassador Boheman of Sweden came to see me a few days ago³ and told me very confidentially that Sweden had indi-

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/11–555. Secret. Drafted by Norred and Robertson and cleared with EUR, IO, and L/UNA.
²Document 97.
³A memorandum by McClurkin of Boheman’s conversation with Robertson on November 16 is in Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/11–1655.
icated to the Chinese Communists in Peiping that it did not see how it could otherwise continue its membership on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. He said that his Government was endeavoring to persuade the Swiss to adopt the same position. There is at this time, therefore, a possibility that our purpose can be accomplished through negotiation and the Department of State believes that the Swiss and Swedes should be given the opportunity to complete their negotiations. While it has been two months since we agreed to a reduction in the teams, we delayed four months in giving our approval. I am convinced that both the Swedes and Swiss are actively endeavoring to use all of the bargaining leverage that they have in trying to persuade the Czechs and Poles to agree to eliminate the stationary teams.

The Department of State also believes it would be highly undesirable for the United States to take unilateral action on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission issue while the United Nations General Assembly is still in session. Such timing would provoke general debate in which a great many nations, other than the Communist nations, would in all probability severely criticize the United States action and would damage the general conduct of United States efforts in the General Assembly. On the other hand, we have used the opportunity afforded by a speech by the Polish representative which had numerous misrepresentations about the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and have replied at some length, setting the record straight. The Department of State considers that we must inform our fifteen allies beforehand and proposes that this be done about the middle of December. We are prepared to work with the Department of Defense in drafting a notification and explanation to be given the United Nations when the action is taken.

Sincerely yours,

Walter S. Robertson

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4See the editorial note, supra.

5In a November 30 letter to Robertson, Gray accepted January 1, 1956, as the date by which the NNRC would have to take action to withdraw the NNRCs to the demilitarized zone or CINCUNC would be authorized to remove them. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/1-3055)

6Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Report Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board


PROGRESS REPORT ON U.S. OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA (NSC 5514)*

(Policy Approved by the President March 12, 1955)

(Period Covered: November 18, 1954 through November 30, 1955)

(Including actions under NSC 170/1 for the period November 18, 1954 through March 11, 1955)

[Here follow a two-page summary of U.S.-Korean relations since the approval of NSC 5514 and a two-page evaluation of progress made in implementing NSC 5514.]

C. Emerging Problems and Future Actions

Armistice

15. Continued violation of the reinforcing restrictions of the Armistice has resulted in a substantial strengthening of the relative Communist military potential, particularly with respect to the introduction of more and newer weapons and the development of an air force based in Korea of 300 to 400 planes, most of which are jet fighters. The UN Command is in a precarious situation and it may be necessary within the next year to declare that in view of Communist violations and of the responsibility of the UN Command to "insure the stability of the Military Armistice", the UN Command will replace old and worn out weapons with such new weapons and in such quantity as it may deem necessary to maintain the relative military strength of the two sides as envisaged under the Armistice Agreement. Such a step will require considerable diplomatic efforts with our Allies—who have already been partially prepared—if we are to have their support and we will have to state the military requirements frankly.

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1Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5514 Series. Top Secret. Prepared for the National Security Council by an OCB working group composed of representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, ICA, USIA, CIA, and the Department of the Treasury. A covering note indicated that the report was approved by the OCB on November 30 for transmittal to the NSC. A financial annex is not printed.

2Document 24.
16. As stated in paragraph 2. above, efforts toward a satisfactory solution of the NNSC problem continue.

Political

17. President Rhee's willingness to strain U.S.-ROK relations both by threats of unilateral military action and by general intransigence will continue to present problems.

18. During the coming year, it is entirely possible that President Rhee may die or become disabled. Possibilities for an orderly succession are fairly good, but the situation could become chaotic. Much may depend on who is elected Vice President in the elections to be held sometime in 1956. It is also possible that progressive deterioration in Rhee's alertness and judgment and fear of possible developments could induce persons now close to the President to attempt to seize power. The attitude of the U.S. in such eventuality would probably be decisive.

19. In view of the gradual exodus from Korea of the forces of various of the 16 nations, more positive efforts should be taken than heretofore in an effort to persuade the ROK to broaden its representation and to persuade other countries to recognize it. Relations between Japan and the ROK will continue to present serious problems for the U.S. It continues to seem advisable, however, for the U.S. to refrain from active intervention but to be available should both parties request our good offices and should there appear real possibilities of settling issues.

Economic

20. It may be anticipated that there will continue to be major differences of opinion between the ROK and the U.S. with respect to the size, composition and implementation of the U.S. economic aid program. These issues again will include the exchange rate (including the pricing of aid goods into the Korean economy), utilization of the ROK's own resources, and the general control of program and expenditures.

Military

21. Although the Agreed Minute of Understanding contains an understanding with respect to the timing of retirement of active ROK Army divisions to reserve status, it may be anticipated that the ROK will violently object to such a shift. The politico-military situation in Korea should be reviewed to determine whether it is necessary and feasible to continue to support current ROK force levels.
103. Letter From the Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons) to the Chargé in Korea (Strom)¹

Washington, December 2, 1955.²

Dear Carl: Although belated, I want to express my sincere thanks to you and your staff for the tremendous efforts and great help on my behalf during my recent stay in Korea.³ I particularly enjoyed and learned much from the many penetrating and thought provoking conversations which I was able to have with you. I have found that my experience in Korea has been exceedingly helpful since my return to Washington as I participated with our many colleagues in the Department and ICA in many difficult decisions which have been made during the last month.

I have talked to many people, including Mr. Robertson, Bob McClurkin and others, about the difficulties which our longer term position in Korea seems to hold. As a result of these conversations, I am still convinced that thought provoking analyses from the Embassy could serve highly useful purposes within the Department. Of course you know the question of current consideration of any reduction in the arm [armed] strength of the Republic of Korea, even when considered in relation to economic development or economic stabilization objectives, is out of the question at the present time. I know from conversations with Turner Cameron that the Embassy is strongly opposed to such action partly because of the internal political implementations [implications?] that even such a rumor could have. Over and above this, as you are aware, there are overriding factors in the total Far East position of the United States. There is concern here, however, and this has been expressed by almost all the members of Under Secretary Hoover's party as a result of their visit to Korea, with the question of the success of our current economic program in Korea. Members of the Hoover party, particularly Mr. Hollister and Mr. Prochnow,⁴ are advocating a "high powered" survey or study team to Korea to appraise and make recommendations for improving the nature and implementation of our economic aid program. Perhaps unfortunately, and certainly unwittingly, I added some fuel to this fire when I reported to Mr. Robertson that I had observed two somewhat disturbing factors in the Korean situation. First, I mentioned an apparent lack of conviction on the part of both Americans and Korea-

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²The December 2 date is handwritten on the source text.
³Parsons visited Korea, October 27–November 7, to inspect the economic aid programs in Korea.
⁴Herbert V. Prochnow, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.
ans that it is completely possible to achieve a viable economy in South Korea. My purpose in mentioning this point was to demonstrate the need for increased incentive, particularly among the Koreans, to work harder toward maximizing the benefits that can be derived from our aid program in Korea. Secondly, I alluded to the fear, which I had expressed both to you and Ty Wood, that there is a need for more adequate understanding of the more or less specific project lines which should be followed in further development of the industrial sector in Korea. I, of course, indicated that a large share of responsibility in this field has been assumed by UNKRA and that their performances have not been particularly exemplary. I also indicated that there is a conscious awareness of the need for getting on top of the planning aspects of the industrial sector not only in the Embassy and OEC, but also on the part of several Koreans with whom I talked; I certainly did not talk to the Koreans in these terms, but the questions raised by Chang⁵ in the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Chong⁶ in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, certainly indicated a deep probing on their part. I further indicated that recent high caliber additions to Ty’s staff will expedite the handling of the planning task by OEC. Bob has been arguing with his usual expertness that now is not the time for something which the Koreans might think is “just another survey”. Instead, if there is to be a study it should be arranged in such a manner that there is full participation by competent Koreans. This would mean, for the first time, the development of an end-product which the Koreans could feel was their own and should provide an incentive for the Koreans using the product of such a study rather than merely providing another “dustcatcher”.

We feared for a while that it would not be possible to get action on Ty’s request for additional funds for Korea for FY 1956 until some survey mission had been able to write a report. Fortunately, it looks as though our fears were unfounded since it is probable that an additional $25 million will be made available in the near future with the consensus that the situation will be further reviewed about March 56 with a view to determining the desirability of extending an additional $25 million at that time. This may be your first knowledge of this possibility. I would suggest that you handle the information very carefully since the decision is still not quite final. I had a letter from George Barbis⁷ in California which stated, among other things,

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⁵ Apparent reference to Yoo Wan Chang, Korean Minister of Reconstruction.
⁷ George M. Barbis, Third Secretary and Economic Officer in the Embassy in Korea.
that Lane\(^8\) has arrived in Seoul and Will Brown\(^9\) has left. He also indicated that both he and Will will probably arrive in Washington early in February. Needless to say, we are looking forward to the arrival of both of them to get the benefit of their latest information on the situation in Korea. Also, Will Brown’s arrival will be most welcomed since Ed Cronk’s\(^10\) departure has increased my burden to a point which could well stand some relief.

Again, I wish to express my thanks and would appreciate your forwarding them to all the members of your staff whose time I consumed during my stay.

With a most heartfelt wish for a happy holiday season, I am,

Sincerely,

Howard L. Parsons\(^11\)

\(^8\)Samuel O. Lane, Second Secretary and Economic Officer in the Embassy in Korea.
\(^9\)Willard O. Brown, First Secretary and Economic Officer in the Embassy in Korea.
\(^10\)Edwin M. Cronk, formerly Chief of the Japanese Finance and Trade Section of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs. He took up his new duties as Economic Officer and First Secretary of Embassy in Korea on January 2, 1956.
\(^11\)Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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104. **Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Swedish Ambassador (Boheman) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson), Department of State, Washington, December 7, 1955\(^1\)**

**SUBJECT**

Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

Ambassador Boheman came in at his initiative. He said that Mr. Robertson would recall that the Swedish Government had recently talked with the former Chinese Communist ambassador to Stockholm before he returned to China. They had urged upon the Chinese Communists the necessity for finding a solution to the problem of the NNSC which would move all the teams to the Demilitarized Zone, or else the Swedish Government did not see how it could continue on the NNSC. Subsequently, they had talked to the Swiss to

\(^1\)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/12-755. Confidential. Drafted by McClurkin.
urge them to take the same line with the Chinese Communist ambassador there.

Ambassador Boheman said that at Panmunjom the Polish member of the NNSC had hinted that the question might now be a subject for diplomatic negotiations. Consequently, a few days ago the Swedish Government had instructed its envoys in Prague and Warsaw to tell the Czech and Polish Governments that the only condition on which they could count on continued Swedish participation in the NNSC is the early removal of all the teams to the Demilitarized Zone. He said there is as yet no response to this approach.

Mr. Robertson thanked him for the information and stressed our appreciation for Swedish cooperation on this whole problem.

105. Editorial Note

At its 269th meeting on December 8 the National Security Council discussed the problems posed for the economy of the Republic of Korea by the inflationary pressures created by a large military establishment supported by American aid. The consensus of the members of the NSC was that while the South Korean economy was not strong enough to support the military forces which the South Korean Government considered necessary, it would not do to urge a sudden reduction in the level of South Korean military forces. As Secretary Dulles put it: "Sudden action of this sort might well break the morale of South Korea." Secretary Wilson noted, however, that the United States was putting into the South Korean economy each year a sum equivalent to the gross national product of South Korea, and he added that it was no wonder that inflation was running at a 25 percent pace in Korea. The long-term solution to the problem, the Council felt, was to convince the Republic of Korea that security actually depended upon the deterrent power of the striking force of the United States, and that South Korean forces could be reduced with safety to a level supportable by the South Korean economy. The full text of the memorandum of discussion by the NSC on December 8 of a "Review of Military Assistance and Supporting Programs" is printed in volume X, pages 44-64.
Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)


SUBJECT
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

Seoul's 640 (attached) indicates that President Rhee has agreed to call off the demonstrations against the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams for three months upon an undertaking by the Zablocki Subcommittee to do its best to get the teams withdrawn within that time. Seoul's 641 (also attached) reports that the Federation of Patriotic Organizations publicly called for a halt of the demonstrations "until the end of the year pending an answer from the United Nations to the Federation's demand for complete withdrawal" of the teams. This development, taken in conjunction with the fact that the Swedes in particular and the Swiss to a slightly less degree are taking positive steps to bring about the withdrawal of all the teams to the Demilitarized Zone, seems to me to make it in our interest not to act promptly on January 1 as you had agreed we would do in your letter to Gordon Gray.

I know the difficulty this causes in our relations with Defense, since we backed away from an earlier "firm" date. However, I do think that these new telegrams from Seoul have created a considerably different situation. The strongest arguments Defense has had for prompt movement have been that the continuing demonstrations create an ever present problem of serious conflict between our soldiers and the ROK citizens and that it is necessary to act during a relative lull in the demonstrations in order to avoid the appearance of

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/12-855. Confidential.
2In telegram 640 from Seoul, December 8, not found attached, the Embassy reported that, in separate visits on December 7, Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker (supported by General Lemnitzer and Under Secretary of the Army Hugh M. Milton II), and Congressman Cement J. Zablocki (supported by a Congressional group which included Walter H. Judd and Robert C. Byrd) had urged President Rhee to end the anti-NNIT demonstrations still taking place in South Korea. Zablocki was Chairman of the Far East Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and he and the other members of his subcommittee, who were in Seoul as part of a tour of the Far East, succeeded in winning from Rhee a promise to "do my best" to try to stop the demonstrations for 3 months to allow the United States to promote a solution to the NNSC problem. (Ibid.) Documentation on the Far Eastern tour of the Zablocki congressional party is ibid., 033.1100-ZA.
3In telegram 641 from Seoul, December 8, not found attached, the Embassy reported that the Federation of Patriotic Organizations had called a halt on December 7 to the anti-NNSC demonstrations. The Embassy noted that the chronology of developments suggested that the decision to call a temporary halt to the demonstrations was made before the visit of the Zablocki group. (Ibid., 795.00/2-855)
acting under duress. If the demonstrations are in fact called off for three months as President Rhee has now said he would "do my best" to do, these arguments lose their force.

It is clearly so much in our interest to have the action taken by the Swiss and Swedes rather than by ourselves that I recommend that you call Gordon Gray and discuss the subject with him and see whether under the new circumstances he will not agree to allow more time for the Swiss and Swedes to work out a solution in the NNSC. I understand that he is scheduled to leave for the NATO meetings soon, so that you would probably need to call him tomorrow.4

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4Robertson initialed his approval.

A note on the source text in Robertson's handwriting, dated December 12, reads: "I discussed with Gordon Gray and have written him in confirmation." In his letter to Gray, also dated December 12, Robertson reviewed the optimistic developments which showed signs that the Swiss and the Swedes would solve the problem if given a little more time. He also noted that the 3-month moratorium on demonstrations virtually eliminated the danger of incidents involving U.S. soldiers and South Korean civilians for that period, and created the possibility of a solution without apparent duress. (Ibid., 795.00/11-3055)

107. Telegram From the Embassy in Switzerland to the Department of State1


643. FPD official informed Embassy officer Zehnder told Polish Minister (Embtel 623, December 14)2 pressure of Swiss parliamentary and public opinion for termination of participation in NNSC was reaching proportions Swiss Government could no longer disregard. To Minister's comment that "something had changed" since their last previous interview, Secretary General replied that parliamentary committees had met in meanwhile and that their attitude convinced government additional delay in settling matter would be unaccept-

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/12-1955. Confidential. Repeated to Stockholm.

2In telegram 623 from Bern, December 14, the Embassy reported that, according to a Swiss official, the Swiss Minister in Warsaw had emphasized Swiss interest in the elimination of the fixed NNITs, and Secretary General Zehnder was expected to take the same line with the Polish Minister in Bern. The indications in Bern were that the Swiss were prepared to wait until January 10 for a Communist reply to the Swedish proposal concerning the NNSC. (Ibid., 795.00/12-1455)
able. He also told Polish Minister that if Swedes withdrew from NNSC there could be no question of Swiss remaining.  

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A note on the source text in an unknown hand reads in part: “According to a Canadian report Zehnder told Pole he had until January 1 to make a decision.”

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108. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)


SUBJECT

Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

Our Chargé, Mr. Strom, asked Admiral Moore, the Senior Member of the UN Command representation on the Military Armistice Commission, to inform the Swiss and Swedish Senior Members of the NNSC of President Rhee’s statement to the Zablocki Subcommittee that he would do his best to have the anti-NNSC demonstrations suspended while the Subcommittee endeavored to secure the withdrawal of the NNITs at least to the Demilitarized Zone. Admiral Moore subsequently informed the Swiss and Swedes that President Rhee had promised U.S. Congressmen confidentially that he would attempt to have ROK demonstrations suspended for a three-month period. Admiral Moore pointed out that the suspension afforded an ideal time for the Swiss and Swedish members of the NNSC and perhaps their governments to pursue actively the subject of withdrawal from the NNSC or at least to the Demilitarized Zone.

It is unfortunate that the Swiss and Swedes were informed that the duration of the suspension of the demonstrations was three months. Now that this has been done, however, I think we could readdress the situation somewhat if you would speak to the Swedish Ambassador and the Swiss Minister telling them about the conversation between President Rhee and the Zablocki group and emphasizing that we cannot regard the three-month period as firm by any means. President Rhee might at any time decide that progress toward removing the fixed inspection teams was inadequate and might then

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/12-28455. Secret. Drafted by Jones and concurred in by William B. Dunham, Officer in Charge of Swiss-Benelux Affairs.
permit resumption of the anti-NNSC demonstrations. Thus the time in which some action might be taken without the appearance of doing so under duress, is far more limited than three months. We are very much encouraged by the active Swiss and Swedish efforts to have the inspection teams withdrawn to the Demilitarized Zone and would hope that in view of the limited time we feel is available, these efforts will be continued vigorously.

If you agree, we will make arrangements to have the Swiss and Swedish representatives come in to see you on Thursday or Friday of this week.²

²Robertson initialed his approval. Memoranda of his conversations with Ambassador Boheman and Ministre de Torrenté on Friday, December 30, are ibid., 795.00/12–3055.

109. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 6, 1956¹

PARTICIPANTS

Defense
Mr. Gordon Gray
General Taylor
General Fox

Department of State
Mr. Robert Murphy, G
Mr. Walter S. Robertson, FE
Mr. Herman Phleger, L
Mr. Tapley Bennett, G
Mr. Noel Hemmendinger, NA
Mr. William G. Jones, NA

Mr. Murphy opened the meeting by suggesting that Mr. Gray might wish to make a statement.

Mr. Gray said he felt there was no point in rehashing the history of the NNSC problem since those present were even more familiar with that history than he was. The occasion of the meeting, Mr. Gray said, was to discuss the recent telegram in from General Lemnitzer—DA IN 190875.² Mr. Gray was disturbed by the tone of frus-

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/1–556. Secret. Drafted by Jones on January 10 and initialed as correct by Robertson. The source text indicates the meeting took place in Murphy's office.

²In telegram 75143 from CINCUNC for Army Chief of Staff Taylor, December 31, 1955 (DA IN 190875), Lemnitzer expressed his frustration at the continuing lack of authorization to remove the NNTs in South Korea to the demilitarized zone, despite the fact that first October 15 and then January 1 had been established as deadlines by which such action would be authorized. He was increasingly concerned about the deterioration of the combat capability of the U.N. Command forces in Korea under the restrictions imposed by the Armistice and he was also concerned about the growing
tration in the telegram, by the apparent deterioration in the military position of the UN Command, and by a gross error, he said, he himself had made. He felt that in the last ten days in December when it was apparent that State was not eager to go ahead with instructions to CINCUNGC to remove the inspection teams on January [1], he should have informed General Lemnitzer. He now wanted to review the situation. It was said that President Rhee promised a cessation of the anti-NNSC demonstrations for three months in conversations with Congressman Zablocki’s group. General Lemnitzer, he pointed out, had no conviction about the duration of this period.

Mr. Robertson said that he believed there was no dispute on the facts in the situation as presented by General Lemnitzer in his message. We had, however, understood in the past that the military establishment did not contemplate bringing in any special new equipment to replace that which had become obsolete. The imminent need to do so was a new fact. Mr. Robertson then briefly reviewed the negotiations between the Swiss and Swedes and the Czechs and Poles at Panmunjom and in Prague and Warsaw designed to get agreement on moving the inspection teams to the Demilitarized Zone. The Swedes, he pointed out, had made it clear that if the Communists did not agree to this proposition they would have to withdraw from the Commission. Ambassador Boheman had told Mr. Robertson that the Swedes had taken a position which made it impossible for them to back out. The Swiss Counselor, whom Mr. Robertson said he had just seen, stated that the Swiss Government was hopeful the problem could be solved. He Government had indications that made them optimistic, but did not believe the matter would be solved before the latter half of this month. By then they hoped to get action. The Swiss were critical of the four-month delay in the acceptance of their earlier proposal for a reduction in the size of the NNSC. They emphasized that they were doing what they thought was right and hoped that no pressure of any kind would be placed on them. Mr. Robertson said that it was difficult to exaggerate the complications which would arise if we were to take unilateral action in removing the teams to the Demilitarized Zone.

Mr. Murphy said the Department felt particularly unhappy about the delay which was involved in dealing with the NNSC. He did feel that had the proposal for a reduction in the size of the Commission been accepted promptly we would now be rid of the NNSC.

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friction between the United States and the Republic of Korea over the NNSC issue. (Ibid., Seoul Embassy Files: Lot 61 F 98, NNSC)

3 A memorandum of Robertson’s conversation with Swiss Counselor Schnyder on January 5 is ibid., Central Files, 795.00/1–556.
As it was, he thought it was best to hold off a few weeks more and allow the Swiss and Swedes time to work the problem out.

General Taylor said that several months ago the issue of replacing obsolete equipment had not been so urgent. Now he felt it was a matter of urgency. This was particularly true of the need to introduce new all-weather fighters.

Mr. Murphy said he had understood from Admiral Radford that there was no intention to base any large number of planes in Korea since these would be too close to the front in the event of a surprise attack.

General Taylor said that now they would base some planes in Korea if they could. These would not be in large number. Nevertheless, it was felt very important that the Command be able to move the planes back and forth freely between Japan and Korea. He also said there were new tanks and new types of artillery which would be introduced into Korea if it were not for paragraph 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement. In particular, he mentioned the possibility of introducing the 280 mm atomic cannon.

Mr. Murphy said he believed the Sixteen were generally sympathetic on the question of replacing obsolete equipment. The British had said last year that they thought we ought to go right ahead and replace obsolete equipment where the Command thought it necessary.

General Taylor then said that if the inspection teams were eliminated from the Republic of Korea by Swiss and Swedish actions, General Lemnitzer had suggested two ways in which to handle the introduction of new equipment—first by suspension of paragraph 13(d) and second by simply announcing the fact and explaining it on the basis of an interpretation of paragraph 13(d).

Mr. Phleger said there was no particular connection between what happened to the inspection teams and the replacement of obsolete equipment with new equipment in Korea. If you suspended paragraphs 13(c) and (d), he said, this would pretty well emasculate the Armistice Agreement. It would leave only an agreement not to fight. If this was done, Mr. Phleger thought it should be done in the proper way with proper notification to our Allies. It was a political and not a military decision. The inspection teams were merely incidental and would have no function if you took away paragraphs 13(c) and (d). He suggested that Defense might want to work up an analysis to bring out the reasons justifying the action to suspend paragraphs 13(c) and (d).

Mr. Gray suggested that it might be best to begin discussion with the Sixteen on the question of paragraph 13(d) now.

Mr. Phleger pointed out that if discussions were held with the Sixteen prematurely and the Swiss and Swedes learned of this, we
could not expect the Swiss and Swedes to take favorable action on
the NNSC by the end of January.

Mr. Hemmendinger pointed out that General Lemnitzer had sug-
gested two distinct ways of dealing with the question of paragraph
13(d). One of these was to suspend the paragraph and the other was
to reinterpret the paragraph. He pointed out that a good deal of work
already had gone into the preparation of a draft report to the United
Nations which would explain the reasons for action by the UN Com-
mand to introduce new equipment.

Mr. Robertson read General Lemnitzer’s second alternative and
asked whether the group thought this was the best solution.

General Taylor said that either would be all right, although he
preferred suspending paragraph 13(d).

Mr. Murphy said he thought it was much easier to handle para-
graph 13(d) by interpretation.

General Taylor then asked what clearances would be necessary.

Mr. Murphy said he would call in the Sixteen and tell them
what we would propose to do.

Mr. Gray again asked if this could not be done now.

Mr. Phleger said no, he thought not. The teams were to be
moved to the Demilitarized Zone on entirely different grounds. It
would be best to follow this action somewhat later by action on
paragraph 13(d).

Mr. Robertson pointed out that discussion with the Sixteen now
would ruin our chances of getting rid of the inspection teams
through Swiss and Swedish action. He could say with assurance that
the Swedes would much rather we adopt General Lemnitzer’s pro-
posal to dissolve the Commission or remove the teams since they
would like nothing better than to get out from under the problem.
He referred to the importance of keeping the Armistice Agreement,
pointing out that as long as we had the agreement if the Communists
violated it there were Sixteen nations who would be ready to retal-
iate and had made a solemn declaration to this effect.

Mr. Murphy then asked about the timing on action on para-
graph 13(d).

Mr. Robertson said he thought we ought to let the dust settle on
the NNSC problem for a few weeks or a month before taking any
action on paragraph 13(d). The Swiss, he pointed out, were very
touchy on the matter and would not want the actions to be so close
as to indicate that they might have been connected with the second.
He then explained, in answer to General Taylor’s question, the Swiss
and Swedish position again.

Mr. Gray asked whether a message might not be gotten out to
General Lemnitzer which:
(1) apologized for the failure to adequately and promptly keep General Lemnitzer informed;
(2) outlined in some detail what the Swiss and Swedish actions have been;
(3) explained the postponement of deadlines for action on the NNSC;
(4) concurred with General Lemnitzer’s request that in paragraph 10(b) of his cable that he be authorized to introduce new equipment; and
(5) suggested that when the NNSC problem has been met he might expect to be authorized thereafter to make a statement in the Military Armistice Commission and then proceed to replace obsolete equipment.

General Taylor said he would still like to handle the two problems together and that if he had the power of decision he would do just that.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that if the two problems were handled simultaneously we would build the action up into a significance which it would not otherwise have. He said he thought the idea of a message to General Lemnitzer along the lines Mr. Gray suggested was a good idea.

Mr. Murphy said the message might conclude by asking General Lemnitzer whether this contemplated action would meet his needs.

Mr. Phleger suggested it would be a good idea to have worked up a general schedule with appropriate timing for replacement of obsolete equipment so that it could be shown that this was planned and based on genuine replacement needs.

Mr. Robertson said he wished to be sure that everyone understood that we would not call the Sixteen in to discuss paragraph 13(d) until the teams were removed to the Demilitarized Zone.

Mr. Murphy assured the Defense representatives that it would be possible to call in the Sixteen on very short notice, since they are right here in Washington.

Mr. Robertson suggested to Mr. Gray that the State Department would be glad to prepare a draft reply to General Lemnitzer which could then be gone over with Defense.4

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4On January 11, a joint State–Defense message summarizing the sense of this meeting was sent to General Lemnitzer as telegram DA 995198. The telegram, signed by Gray, reviewed the state of negotiations with the Swiss and Swedes and concluded that it remained “highly desirable” for the NNITs to be removed by the NNSC rather than the UNC. As a consequence, the January 1 target date for the removal of the NNITs to the demilitarized zone was postponed for at least a month. With respect to the proposed suspension of paragraph 13–d of the Armistice Agreement, Lemnitzer was informed that “State believes this action should be taken approximately one month following elimination fixed teams”, but the two problems should not be linked. (Department of Defense Files)
110. Memorandum From the Legal Adviser (Phleger) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)  


SUBJECT

Korean Armistice

In the conversations between State and Defense upon the general line of reply to the recent telegram from General Lemnitzer (C-75143), a special problem was referred to but not thoroughly considered—the possible future introduction of "Honest John" to Korea.

We are of course in no position to assess the future prospects of military need for such a move. It is not foreshadowed by the Lemnitzer telegram. Nor would it seem to fit the rationale of Defense's 983878 of June 24, 1955, in the same way that replacement of obsolete by contemporary aircraft would do. Moreover, its legal, political and propaganda implications would appear to raise novel and important questions which could lead to charges that vital clauses of the Armistice Agreement had been denounced by the United States. The political as well as legal repercussions from the introduction of nuclear weapons into Korea would be very great.

It should be understood that any future recommendation for such a move must receive most searching scrutiny at the highest level of the Government.

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/1-1256. Top Secret.
2Supra.
3See footnote 2, supra.
4A missile with nuclear capabilities.
5In telegram DEF 983878 to CINCUNC, a joint State-Defense message, a proposed report from the U.N. Command to the United Nations concerning the growing problem of a military imbalance in Korea was sent to CINCUNC for comment. The tenor of the report was that the clandestine introduction of combat matériel into North Korea, in contravention of the Armistice, was making it impossible for the UNC to fulfill the injunction established by the Armistice to "insure the stability of the Military Armistice so as to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement." To restore the necessary military equilibrium in Korea, the report proposed the replacement of obsolete and worn-out weapons by the UNC "in such a manner as to give full effect to its responsibilities under the resolutions of the UN and its obligations under the AA." (Department of State, NA Files: Lot 59 D 407, Defense Cables In and Out NNSC 1956) The proposed report was not submitted to the United Nations.
111. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 25, 1956

SUBJECT
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC)

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Erik Boheman, Swedish Embassy
Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
Mr. William G. Jones, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs, NA
Mr. William Nunley, RA

Ambassador Boheman said that he had just received information from Stockholm on the progress on the negotiations between the Swedes and the Communists with respect to the removal of the inspection teams to the Demilitarized Zone. The Swedish Chargé in Peiping recently had been called in by the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister. The Minister had expressed his appreciation of Swedish efforts on the NNSC and said that serious consideration had been given to the Swedish proposal to remove the inspection teams to the Demilitarized Zone. There were, however, practical difficulties involved, the Foreign Minister had said, and he therefore proposed to reduce the inspection teams from three to one in each Zone. In the north the remaining team would be stationed at Sinuiju and in the south either at Inchon or Pusan. He also proposed to substantially reduce the size of the mobile teams and the NNSC personnel in the Demilitarized Zone. The Swedish Minister in Poland had been given the same proposal, but in addition the Poles had emphasized that if this proposal was not satisfactory to the Swedes they wished to continue the conversations on the subject.

Ambassador Boheman said the Swedes had decided to tell the Chinese and Poles that they would accept the Communist counter-proposal provided the remaining inspection team in each Zone was also removed. Instructions to this effect had gone out to Peiping and Warsaw, but the Swedish representatives had been instructed not to act until further advice from Stockholm. The Ambassador said the purpose in this delay was to give the Swedes time to consult with the Swiss. In this connection, he pointed out that the Swedes were in fact carrying on the negotiations although the Swiss were concurring in the Swedish positions. The Ambassador said Bern now had been

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/1–2556. Secret. Drafted by Jones on January 26 and initialed by Robertson as correct.

2Robertson also discussed the NNSC problem with Swiss Minister de Torrenté on January 25. De Torrenté indicated that he had not received any recent information from Bern on the subject but offered to inquire. On January 30, de Torrenté saw Robertson again and told him that Swiss representatives in Beijing, Warsaw, and Prague
informed of the Swedish position and he thought that the instructions to Peiping and Warsaw to inform the Communists of the Swedish position would go out in a day or two.

Mr. Robertson said that he was gratified at the progress being made, but he was concerned at the amount of time that these actions were taking. He said he wished to clarify the Swedish position in his own mind. As he understood it, the Swedish position as made clear to the Communists was that the inspection teams stationed in the north and south should be removed to the Demilitarized Zone, and if the Czechs and Poles refused to agree to this proposal the Swedes would be unable to continue on the NNSC. Mr. Robertson said he wished to know whether this position was negotiable or not.

Ambassador Boheman replied that everything he knew indicated that the position was not negotiable. Certainly it was the Swedish belief that the Czechs and Poles were clearly under this impression. From the manner in which the Peiping counter-proposal had been made and the manner in which the Poles had reiterated that proposal with emphasis on their desire to continue the negotiations if necessary, the Swedes believed that there was a good possibility the Communists would accept the removal of all the inspection teams to the Demilitarized Zone. The Ambassador believed that it was important that the original Swedish position be maintained. To leave one team in each Zone, he told Stockholm, would be a constant source of irritation from the Swedish point of view. The Swedes in these circumstances would continue to have some responsibility for the figures submitted by the two sides without the capability of checking these figures. Leaving but one team in each Zone would be a sham and it would be most undignified for the Swedes to take part in such an operation.

Ambassador Boheman said that he recently had had a long conversation with Admiral Radford, and that the Admiral had confirmed the impression which the Ambassador had gained from Mr. Robertson that anything short of removal of the inspection teams to the Demilitarized Zone would be unsatisfactory.

Mr. Robertson said this was certainly so. If the teams had been allowed to function properly, it might have been another matter. They were not allowed to function properly, however, and to leave

had received the same response to the Swedish and Swiss proposal to remove the NNIITs to the Demilitarized Zone that Ambassador Boheman had outlined to Robertson on January 25. The Swiss Government was disappointed in the Communist reply, but again counseled that results could only come with time and patience. Robertson dismissed the Communist counter-proposal as a sham and urged the Swiss to press for the withdrawal of the NNIITs to the Demilitarized Zone before demonstrations resumed in South Korea. (Memoranda of conversations; ibid., 795.00/1-2356 and 795.00/1-3056)
one team in each Zone would, as the Ambassador had said, be a perfect sham, and would place the Swedes in the worst possible position. Ambassador Boheman said that not only would this be an irritant from the Swedish point of view, but also an irritant because of the ROK concern with the Communists stationed on their territory. In addition, the Ambassador said that he understood that the U.S. felt that there was an absolute necessity to strengthen the military matériel of the UN Command in the south and that it might be necessary to inform the Military Armistice Commission that new matériel will be introduced.³

Mr. Robertson emphasized the difficulties with respect to aircraft. The UN Command aircraft were antiquated, and spare parts for these planes were no longer manufactured. It was thus impossible to replace aircraft in Korea with identical types. This was a practical difficulty and while there was a problem of technicalities, replacement of these planes with more modern aircraft would not violate the spirit of the Armistice Agreement. One of the purposes of the NNSC was to preserve the military balance between the two sides. This, however, had been impossible to do in view of the Communist violations of the Armistice, and their obstruction of the inspection functions of the Commission. Ambassador Boheman, while suggesting his thought might be somewhat out of order, nevertheless said he thought it would be most advisable from a public opinion point of view to produce tangible proof that the Communist forces in fact had strengthened themselves with more modern weapons. Mr. Robertson pointed out that the reports of the Swiss and Swedish members of the NNSC show that the teams had not been allowed to inspect properly in the north. He pointed out that the Communists had introduced some 450 planes into North Korea, of which over 250 were jet aircraft.

Mr. Robertson again expressed concern with the slowness with which the negotiations with the Communists were going. He pointed out that we had hoped to get something done on the NNSC by October, and now it was almost February. Ambassador Boheman said that he felt the only thing that could be done was to repeat what the

³On January 24, Ambassador John M. Cabot wrote to Robertson from Stockholm to warn that the Secretary General of the Swedish Foreign Office, Arne Lundberg, was irritated by reports from Washington that seemed to suggest that the United States was prepared to act unilaterally to satisfy Rhee's grievances concerning the NNSC, and that U.S. interest in removing the NNITs from South Korea related to a desire to introduce modern weapons into Korea in violation of the Armistice Agreement. Lundberg referred to a conversation between Ambassador Boheman and Admiral Radford in which Radford pressed for a solution to the NNSC issue because of the weapons problem, and he also made reference to a promise allegedly made by Eisenhower to Rhee that the NNSC would be abolished or withdrawn. Cabot expressed doubt that Eisenhower had made such a promise. (Ibid., 795.00/1-2456)
Swedes had already told the Communists—namely, that if the Communists refused to agree to the Swedish proposal the Swedes would leave the Commission. The Ambassador's impression was that if the Swedes stick to this position they will gain what they want.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that the Communist delay in reaching a conclusion in the negotiations with the Swedes was a deliberate tactic and one with which he was all too familiar. He then described to Ambassador Boheman the difficulties in attempting to negotiate with the Chinese at Geneva, particularly their delaying tactics and lack of good faith in adhering to even formal public commitments. In response to Ambassador Boheman's question, Mr. Robertson confirmed his impression that there was no necessary relationship between what happened to the inspection teams in Korea and what might happen to the inspection teams in Indochina. He pointed out that in Indochina as in Korea the Communist member of the inspection teams, a Pole, had been able to effectively block the functioning of these Commissions. While the Canadians had made commendable efforts to hold the teams together, the Indian member under Nehru's instructions had been reluctant to take a position against the Pole. The Ambassador was glad to have this confirmation. The Canadians, he said, asked the Swedes "every second month" not to do anything about the NNSC because of the influence they feared such action would have on the Commission in Indochina.

Ambassador Boheman concluded the meeting by saying that he felt the Communists, in view of the promptness of the Swedish reply to their counter-proposal, were aware that the Swedes desired a quick conclusion of the negotiations. Nevertheless, he said he would send a cable out suggesting that his Government make clear to the Communists the urgency with which the Swedes regarded the matter.

112. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Gray)¹


DEAR GORDON: On January 25 I asked the Swedish Ambassador and the Swiss Minister to come to see me hoping to be brought up to

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/1-3056. Secret. Drafted by Jones.
date on the progress of their negotiations with the Communists with respect to the removal of the inspection teams to the Demilitarized Zone. The Swiss Minister had not been informed by his Government of recent developments, but the Swedish Ambassador had a good deal to say which on the whole was most encouraging.

The Swedes have taken the lead in the negotiations with the Communists, and in my judgment have made very substantial progress. The Chinese Communists and the Poles have replied to the Swedish proposal that all inspection teams be withdrawn to the Demilitarized Zone with a counter-proposal that all but one team in the north and one in the south be withdrawn and that the mobile teams and other Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission personnel in the Demilitarized Zone be substantially reduced. The Poles emphasized their desire to continue negotiations if the Swedes found the counter-proposal unsatisfactory. The Swedes are replying that they can accept the Communist proposal provided that all inspection teams are withdrawn to the Demilitarized Zone.

The Swedish Government believes that the manner in which the Communists replied to the Swedish proposal indicates that there is a good possibility they will accept the removal of all inspection teams to the Demilitarized Zone. I asked the Swedish Ambassador whether the Swedish position—including the Swedish threat to withdraw from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission entirely if the Communists did not agree to elimination of the inspection teams—was subject to negotiation. He replied that everything he knew indicated the position was not negotiable and it was the Swedish belief that the Czechs and Poles were clearly under this impression.

In response to my concern over the delays in these negotiations, the Swedish Ambassador said he would suggest that his Government make clear to the Communists the urgency with which the Swedes regarded the matter. The Swedes may have a reply to this reaffirmation of their position by the end of this month, but it seems to me to be unlikely. In view of the exchange between President Rhee and Congressman Zablocki's group early in December, however, I feel quite confident there is no serious danger of a renewal of the anti-Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission demonstrations in Korea before the first week in March. Taking account of the political and legal difficulties involved in action by the United Nations Command to remove the inspection teams, the success of the Swedish efforts thus far and their determination to accomplish withdrawal of the teams or to withdraw themselves from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, I believe we should allow the Swedes a little more time before we instruct the United Nations Command to take action.

I understand, of course, how strongly Defense and CINCUNC feel about the removal of the inspection teams to the Demilitarized
Zone. I and most of my colleagues in the Department of State share this view. It seems to me, however, that the Swedes are on the brink of success in persuading the Communists to agree to withdrawal of the inspection teams. This is particularly true since the Communists are faced with a much less desirable alternative from their point of view, namely, elimination of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission entirely. I am hopeful, therefore, that you will agree that we should allow the Swedes a little more time to accomplish their objective.

A copy of the memorandum of my conversation with the Swedish Ambassador is enclosed for your information. 2

Sincerely yours,

Walter S. Robertson 3

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2 Not found attached. The memorandum is printed supra.
3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

113. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Lemnitzer) to the Department of the Army

Tokyo, January 30, 1956—10:15 p.m.


1. With respect to ref A, I consider that the soundest course of action which the United Nations Command could take in obtaining an early solution to the immediate problem of the Armistice Agreement would be to dissolve the NNSSC and suspend paras 13c and 13d in a single action as indicated in para 9 of ref B. If it is impossible to obtain governmental authorization of this preferred course of action, then I recommend that the alternative course of action indicated in para 10 of ref B be approved and implemented without delay.

2. While I agree that it is desirable from a political point of view for the Swiss and Swedes to effect the withdrawal of the NNITs from South Korea and recognize that the ideal solution to this problem would be reached if the Swiss and Swedes withdrew from the

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/1-3056. Top Secret; Priority.
3 See footnote 2, Document 109.
4 See footnote 5, Document 110.
commission itself, I doubt that they will accomplish either of these goals within the next few months. As previously reported to you in ref B, I have been given no assurance by Pres Rhee that he will suspend the anti-NNIT demonstrations for any specified period of time. Even if Pres Rhee carries out the promise he made to the Zablocki Committee to stop the demonstrations for 3 months, only 5 weeks remain before 3 month period will have elapsed. We must assume, and current intelligence supports this assumption, that the demonstrations will be resumed in the near future if positive action is not taken in the interim. If we fail to take advantage of this respite by removing the NNITs from the ROK, the UNC will have gained nothing and lost much. It will be decidedly to our advantage, and likewise to the advantage of the Swiss and Swedes in attaining their professed desires, if positive remedial action now. Therefore, I recommend that, if the Swiss and Swedes fail to obtain agreement on withdrawal with the Poles and Czechs by 15 Feb 56, I be authorized to carry out my recommendations referred to in para 1 above, and in the order of preference indicated.

3. In either case, I feel that the argument and the basis indicated in ref C will provide the means for the replacement of obsolete equipment. However, with respect to para 13d, I feel that it is preferable to suspend it completely rather than “in part” since complete suspension would offer 1 less justification for the continued existence of the NNSC. In this connection, it is not clear to me how 13d could be opened “in part” as mentioned in ref A.

4. Action on the foregoing appears to create a most opportune time to make a similar decision with respect to para 13c and for the same reasons.

5. While noting State-Defense preference in ref A for solving the 2 problems separately which involve the NNITs and paras 13c and d, I still believe as I have previously reported, that it would be a better course of action to treat these matters in a single action. Separating the solutions of these 2 problems (removal of NNITs and suspension of paras 13c and d) would invite Communist accusations that we effected the removal of the NNITs from the ROK to enable ourselves to violate the Armistice Agreement by the introduction of equipment and personnel reinforcements.

6. In accordance with your request contained in ref A, the major items of combat matériel which I propose to introduce into Korea as replacements to restore depleted combat effectiveness of UNC forces are as follows:

A. Air Force

(1) For all-weather air defense, the F-86D would replace the F-94B. The F-94B’s were withdrawn for modification and are no longer
available for reintroduction into Korea. Currently, the United Nations Command has no all-weather fighter interceptor capability in Korea and cannot, therefore, engage an intruding enemy aircraft during the hours of darkness or during inclement weather. Approximately 25 F-86D’s would be stationed in Korea to provide a deterrent to intrusion and a capability for interception under adverse weather conditions.

(2) For tactical bombardment, the B-57 will replace the B-26. I propose to introduce the B-57’s into Korea for short periods of TDY and for mobility exercises. The B-26 light bombers have provided the UNC with its only offensive capability for night intruder missions and for tactical bombardment under all weather conditions. Because of their age and obsolescence, they are currently being returned to the ZI as the B-57’s arrive in the theater. Those units equipped with B-57 need to gain the experience of operating from bases in Korea in order to insure their ability to perform their tactical missions and to support such missions logistically.

(3) For reconnaissance missions, the RF-84F and RF-100 would replace the RF-80, and the RB-57 would replace the RB-26. These units would be introduced into Korea for short periods of TDY on a rotation basis, for mobility exercises and for staging. Units equipped with these acft also need to gain the experience of operating from bases in Korea. Moreover, to augment my limited theater reconnaissance capability, these short-range acft must stage through Korea in order to increase their effective operational radius. (It is recommended that the presence of the RF-100 in this theater not be divulged to other nations.)

(4) As other new types of acft become available to this theater they too should be introduced into Korea for reasons similar to those outlined above.

B. Army.

(1) Gun, 280mm T131, with carriage.
(2) Gun, 75mm, T83 Skysweeper.
(3) Gun, twin 40mm, self-propelled M-42.
(4) Gun, 155mm, self-propelled M-44.
(5) Launcher, rocket, 762mm.
(6) Rifle, recoiless, 106mm.
(7) Latest surface-to-surface and surface-to-air guided missiles.
(8) Ammunition for above weapons.
(9) Tank, 76mm gun, M-41.
(10) Tank, 90mm gun, M-48.
(11) Tank, flamethrower, T-67.
(12) Armored personnel carrier, M-59.
(13) Tractor, cargo, medium, M8A1 (M8E2).
C. Justifications for introduction of the foregoing Army combat matériel are as follows:

(1) To replace obsolescent equipment and matériel. The current restrictions imposed by even the most liberal interpretation of para 13d of the Armistice Agreement are developing a situation that will attain a most critical stage prior to June 1958. As of that date, practically all the major items of combat matériel presently in the hands of US forces in Korea will be obsolescent or will require replacement.

(2) There are certain standard non-obsolescent items of equipment whose component parts have been redesigned or adaptations developed. The redesigned or adapted component parts cannot be introduced into Korea under the restrictions currently imposed. Thus the standard non-obsolescent items available here are less effective than those supplied elsewhere.

(3) In order to alleviate partially the imbalance of potential strength existing between the opposing forces in Korea, it is highly desirable that Army weapons possessing an atomic delivery capability be introduced into Korea by United States forces.

(4) The nature and destructive capabilities of the 762mm rocket, 280mm gun, 75mm Skysweeper and surface-to-air guided missiles dictate that their employment be coordinated with all echelons of the field Army they support. Such employment involves communication and command control that can be mastered only by training, by tests, and frequent exercises with the supported combat units.

(5) A sound military program envisaged stockpiling of equipment adequate to meet emergencies. The stockpile should be so located as to be immediately available and not be dependent upon air and/or sea delivery.

(6) There is a growing inability to replace equipment destroyed, evacuated or expended due to discontinuance of manufacture of the equipment. Additionally maintenance of such equipment is becoming increasingly difficult because of the lack of spare parts which are no longer being manufactured. Already many different models of equipment serving the same purpose are in the hands of troops in Korea. This is serious enough in peacetime, but under combat conditions would be intolerable.

(7) The credits set up in accordance with the Armistice Agreement are out of balance with levels known to have existed at the close of the Korean conflict. This has been occasioned, especially during the early days of the Armistice Agreement, by equipment and material being cannibalized, destroyed, evacuated or expended without complete notification to the agency maintaining such credits to effect deletion of the item from stock records.
(8) Many items of controlled combat matériel have been turned over to the ROK Army. These items cannot be replaced for use of US forces as they do not come within the purview of "destroyed, evacuated or expended."

(9) Many US replacements arriving in Korea have been trained on modern equipment and must be retrained here on the obsolescent equipment available to our units. The adverse impact on the effectiveness and morale of the Eighth Army is obvious.

D. Navy

There is no requirement for introduction into Korea of major items of Naval combat matériel at this time.

114. **Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State**

*Seoul, February 3, 1956—5 p.m.*

822. Tokyo pass CINCUNC and CAG. I support the recommendations with respect to the NNSC and Article 13 (c) and (d) of the Armistice Agreement which have recently been made by General Lemnitzer.² Consequently, I recommend that he be authorized to act unilaterally to remove the NNSC teams to the DMZ and to take necessary action with respect to Article 13 (c) and (d). I suggest further that instructions be sent to him within near future so that he can make plans effect this combined action no later than February 15, but permitting him flexibility of timing to avoid juxtaposition of action to any new Korean propaganda outburst. Although an interpretation of Article 13 (c) and (d) designed to meet his requirements might preserve more of the facade of the Armistice Agreement, it is my opinion (1) that needs of the Command should be the controlling criteria and (2) any interpretation would almost inevitably be considered such a transparent device that it might be more desirable propaganda-wise to meet the issue frankly and clearly. Since unilateral removal of teams to the DMZ will almost surely evoke Communist charges that we are preparing to violate the terms of Article 13 (c) and (d), I believe there is little to be gained in separating these problems. Simultaneous action on these two problems would produce only one occasion for Communist propaganda. To separate them

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¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/2–356. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated priority to Tokyo.

would provide two occasions, on the second of which we could
expect the Communists to revive the charges which had been made
when the teams were removed and to link these developments. Con-
sequently, I recommend simultaneous action to resolve these two
problems.

I recognize that these recommendations are contrary to those
which the Embassy has previously made on this subject. I base this
reversal on the following considerations: (1) I have found General
Lemnitzer’s argument concerning the military necessity for taking
action with respect to the NNSC and Article 13 (c) and (d) entirely
convincing. (2) I do not feel that we can delay any longer in carrying
out the assurances first made to President Rhee more than 18 months
ago in Washington that the NNSC problem would be solved to his
satisfaction. (3) Rhee’s suspension of the demonstrations for 90 days,
a period which ends March 10, affords us the first opportunity since
August 1955 to solve these problems without the appearance of
duress. (4) Our reading of the telegrams from Bern and Stockholm
convinces us that the Swiss-Swedes cannot be expected to dispose of
the NNSC problem in a way satisfactory to us by March 10. (5) I
feel, therefore, that we, ourselves, must take advantage of this ab-
sence of duress and meet the issues squarely and satisfactorily. (6)
There is in my judgment no possibility that Pres Rhee would agree
to a prolongation of this suspension and that we must, therefore,
assume that the demonstrations will be resumed with increased vigor
when the suspension period ends if no solution has been achieved
during it. (7) In fact, Sam-il Day March 1 (anniversary 1919 revolu-
tion usually celebrated with oratorical extravagances) provides an ex-
cellent earlier opportunity to resume the demonstrations which Rhee
may not overlook.

Strom

115. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at the
Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting,
Washington, February 4, 1956, 11:30 a.m.¹

[Here follows a list of 23 persons present, including Joint Chiefs
of Staff Admiral Radford, General Twining, General Taylor, and Ad-
miral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations. Assistant Secre-
tary Gray also represented the Department of Defense. The Depart-

¹Source: Department of State, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret. A
note on the title page reads: “State Draft. Not cleared with any of participants.”]
ment of State officials included Murphy, MacArthur, and Robertson. General Cabell attended the meeting for the CIA and S. Everett Gleason represented the NSC.]

1. Status of the NNSC

Mr. Robertson reported on recent developments on the NNSC problem in Korea. He said that both the Swedes and the Swiss are now definitely committed to the policy of withdrawing the inspection teams and are endeavoring to get communist agreement. There might have to be a compromise on keeping one team in the demilitarized zone, but the Swedes and the Swiss are determined to get the teams removed from the territory of the Republic of Korea. He emphasized again that they felt strongly about working this out on their own responsibility in an orderly way and would not act if it seemed they were doing so under duress.

Admiral Radford remarked that this was good news and said that he had told Syngman Rhee on his recent visit to Korea that he thought the teams would be out by the end of February. Mr. Robertson expressed the hope that that deadline would be met. Admiral Radford went on to say that the real problem now involves Clause 13 (d) of the Armistice Agreement, concerning the introduction of new equipment into Korea. He stressed the run-down state of present matériel and spoke of the need to have new planes going in on a rotation basis. Mr. Robertson said the Department of State agrees thoroughly with the JCS position on the need for new equipment but suggested there would have to be some time lag between the solution of the NNSC problem and action on Clause 13 (d).

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

116. Editorial Note

A contemporary intelligence estimate on probable developments in the Republic of Korea through mid-1957 opens as follows:

"The Problem

"To analyze the present strengths and weaknesses of the Republic of Korea and to estimate probable developments and trends.
Conclusions

"1. President Rhee, now over 80, will retain his absolute political control as long as he is physically able to hold office. (Para. 18)

"2. His primary objectives will remain the unification of Korea under ROK control, maintenance of US aid and support, and opposition to Japanese resurgence. Economic development will remain a subordinate objective. (Para. 48)

"3. Rhee will probably continue to exploit, and even generate crisis situations in an attempt to maximize US support for his objectives. (Paras. 49-50)

"4. The chances of a Rhee-initiated attack on the North appear to be slight during the period of this estimate. Principal ROK field commanders would almost certainly stall, but would probably not be able to avoid some implementation of a Rhee order to march north. Rhee retains the capability to initiate armed action designed to provoke general hostilities. (Paras. 52-53)

"5. Maintenance of the ROK armed forces depends almost entirely on US support. The ROK army is superior in both offensive and defensive capabilities to the North Korean army alone, but the ROK air force is inferior. Because of the greatly superior strength of available Communist forces in northeast Asia, ultimate ROK security will continue to rest on its Mutual Defense Treaty with the US. (Paras. 40, 44, 46-47)

"6. If US aid is continued at approximately present levels an appreciable increase in production and some increase in consumption is likely. Nevertheless, the ROK has only a limited capability for economic development. Even were there no military establishment, maintenance of the present low level of economic activity would require substantial foreign assistance. Rhee will probably continue to be uncooperative at times with the US in the administration of US aid and unwilling to take many steps which could improve the ROK's financial and international trade position. (Paras. 25-38, 57-58)

"7. Rhee's departure from office would usher in a period of increased political instability. However, the formal constitutional succession will probably be observed, with de facto leadership probably passing to Rhee's chief lieutenant at the time, currently Yi Ki-pung. Although the possibility of a coup and one-man rule will remain, a more moderate and less authoritarian regime will probably emerge capable of governing substantially as effectively as Rhee. (Paras. 19-21, 59)

"8. Regardless of who succeeds Rhee, the principal objectives of the ROK government are not likely to change substantially. However, a successor regime would probably be more cooperative with the
US, less intransigent in its dealings with Japan, and more likely to accept the status quo in Korea. (Paras. 60–61)  

The remainder of the document is not printed and was not presented for declassification.

117. Memorandum of Discussion at the 276th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 9, 1956

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1–5.]

6. U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea (Progress Report, dated November 30, 1955, by OCB on NSC 5514 and NSC 170/1)

At the conclusion of Mr. Anderson’s briefing of the contents of the reference Progress Report, the President inquired about the size of U.S. forces currently stationed in Korea. Admiral Radford replied that this force consisted of two divisions. The President then inquired how much money we were putting into Korea annually, both in economic and military assistance. Director Hughes replied that this amounted to approximately $1 billion a year. The President said that South Korea was getting to be a pretty expensive plaything. He then asked whether we were keeping the twenty ROK divisions in active status, and Admiral Radford replied in the affirmative.

Secretary Humphrey then inquired whether there was any conceivable way out of this terrible dilemma. Are we to be saddled with payments of $1 billion annually to South Korea from now on out indefinitely?

The President replied that the crux of the problem was Communist China. After referring to the problem of having had to fight an “unwinnable” war in Korea, he added that to retreat from Korea now would cost the United States its entire position in the Far East. He desperately wished, nonetheless, that there were some way for the United States to extricate itself from this swamp of spending. If Red China, speculated the President, should finally get out of North Korea, release our prisoners, and act decently, how in the world could the United States continue to avoid recognizing Communist


2Document 102.

3Rowland R. Hughes, Director of the Bureau of the Budget.
China? It was a real problem, and the President repeated his belief that all our Far Eastern problems focused up in Korea.

Secretary Dulles said that with respect to the problem of President Rhee’s death, this could conceivably end up in a situation which would enable the United States to deal more rationally with the problem of Korea. In point of fact, the South Koreans should be willing to depend far more completely on the deterrent power of our atomic capabilities. We are well aware that we possess this capability, but President Rhee is not satisfied with anything less than seeing military power in place along the armistice line. Of course, this was understandable in the light of President Rhee’s own bitter experience. If, however, Rhee should die and we could get through the immediate crisis which would follow, we might end up with a better situation. Until then, it was hard to see what else we can do in Korea than what we are doing.

Secretary Humphrey said that he was somewhat reluctant to raise so explosive a matter, but it was part of the same general problem. Now that we are under less terrific pressure from Communist China, was any thought being given to the problem of what we will do about Quemoy and the Matsus?

Secretary Dulles indicated that Secretary Humphrey was quite mistaken in his assumption that we were under less pressure at the moment from Communist China with respect to the offshore islands and Taiwan. In point of fact, the pressure was so severe that the talks which were going on in Geneva at the Ambassadorial level might well be broken off this very day. The Chinese Communists were insisting on their right to take Taiwan, and proposed to take it by force if necessary. We have tried desperately to get them to change this position, but we had failed. Accordingly, this was far from a quiescent period with respect to the problem.

Secretary Robertson brought up the problem of inducing the teams of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to withdraw to the demilitarized zone. He said that there were encouraging indications that the Swiss and the Swedes will withdraw their members by the end of February. If this did not occur, Secretary Robertson warmly recommended unilateral action by the United States to this end.

In support of Secretary Robertson’s position, Admiral Radford noted that President Rhee’s moratorium on South Korean demonstrations against the teams was scheduled to end on the 9th of March. He and General Lemnitzer felt so strongly about the necessity of getting rid of these teams that they had called on President Rhee recently and informed him that he could probably count on the withdrawal of the teams to the demilitarized zone before the 9th of March. Ad-
Admiral Radford stated his belief that it was essential to get the teams into the demilitarized zone by that date.

Admiral Radford then turned to the problem of those provisions of the Korean Armistice Agreement which prevented the United States from sending into South Korea any new military matériel. This was getting to be an increasingly grave problem, especially for the Air Force, which could send in no new planes in replacement of old ones that had worn out. The Army was also beginning to feel the pinch. New troops sent to Korea as replacements had to be retrained in the use of the old equipment which they had to use in Korea.

Admiral Radford then stated his conviction that unless Korea was reunited there was no hope whatever for a viable Korean economy. Accordingly, he recommended that in any forthcoming disarmament negotiations with the USSR, we should press them to permit the unification of Korea.

Admiral Radford concluded his remarks by paying tribute to President Rhee, whom he believed more of an asset to the United States than a liability. For all his faults, Rhee was the George Washington of Korea, and the people of Korea strongly supported him. There was no alternative to his forceful control of the country except, perhaps, military control.

Secretary Humphrey observed that Admiral Radford had painted a very dismal picture.

Dr. Flemming said he wished to put a question to the Secretary of State. If the negotiations at Geneva with the Chinese Communists were in fact broken off, was it likely that the Chinese Communists would move promptly against Quemoy and the Matsus?

Secretary Dulles replied that available intelligence indicated no immediate likelihood of such a Chinese Communist move. Nevertheless, the Chinese Communists were continuing to develop their capabilities for such an operation, and Secretary Dulles believed that they could amass sufficient forces in a matter of a couple of weeks to seize these offshore islands if they decided to do so. He did not think, however, that they would resort to force in the near future, even if the negotiations were broken off. It was more likely that they would continue to go on as they have been, although with more threatening noises.

The President observed that in a couple of private conversations with Sir Anthony Eden during the latter's recent visit, the Prime Minister had said in effect that he lived in terror that a situation might arise in which the United States found itself obliged to go to war and that he, Eden, would be unable to come to the support of

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4 Arthur S. Flemming, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization.
5 Prime Minister Eden visited the United States, January 30–February 3.
the United States because of British public opinion. The President wondered whether these remarks were a back-handed reference to Quemoy and the Matsu's.

Secretary Dulles thought that the President's surmise was quite likely to have been correct. He pointed out, however, that in their propaganda the Chinese Communists persistently and carefully avoided any suggestion of taking Quemoy and the Matsu's except within the total picture of their determination to take Taiwan by force if necessary.

Secretary Humphrey said that he nevertheless believed it likely that if the Chinese Communists finally decided to try to seize Taiwan, they were quite likely to move against Quemoy and the Matsu's first. If they stopped there for a while they would certainly put the United States on the spot.

Governor Stassen wondered whether the Chinese Communists might not seek a meeting between Secretary Dulles and Chou En-lai during the course of the Secretary's forthcoming visit to the Far East.

The National Security Council.⁶

Noted and discussed the reference Progress Report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board.

[Here follows agenda item 7.]

S. Everett Gleason

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⁶The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1519. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

118. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea**¹

    **Washington, February 9, 1956—6:20 p.m.**

    536. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC and CAG. Your 822² repeated Tokyo 431. Fully understand and appreciate views set forth your 822. Nevertheless continue believe highly desirable avoid unilateral action NNSC as long as reasonable hope of Swiss and Swedish success. This period limited by possibility ROK resumption demonstra-

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¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/2-356. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Jones, cleared with L/UNA, UNP, and BNA, and approved by Robertson. Repeated to Tokyo.

²Document 114.
tions but hope every effort made avoid such demonstrations during next few weeks. Department convinced Swiss and Swedes intend adhere to proposition made Communists that all teams be removed to DZ or they withdraw entirely. Swedish Ambassador assured Assistant Secretary Robertson January 29 Swedish position not subject negotiation. Bern's 807 repeated Seoul 9 Tokyo 7 made Swiss position clear. Question is timing. Swedes particularly impatient get matter settled. Believe odds favor eventual Communist acceptance this proposition. Department assessment is world opinion find action by Swiss and Swedes far more acceptable than action by UNC however justified. Furthermore Communists clearly suffer propaganda wise from complete withdrawal Swiss and Swedes while likely gain if UNC takes action.

Robertson explained in State-JCS meeting February 3 Swiss and Swedish progress NNSC problem and State view necessity allow them more time.

Department will inform Seoul and Tokyo promptly any development in Swiss-Swedish negotiations. Request Department be kept informed any indications renewal demonstrations. In event emergency develops you should remind Rhee his three-month commitment Congressmen and authorized tell Rhee your Government strongly feels problem must be solved near future.

Dulles

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3The conversation took place on January 25 rather than January 29; see Document 111.

4In telegram 807 from Bern, February 2, the Embassy reported that a Communist proposal to reduce the fixed inspection teams to one each in North and South Korea and to reduce the number of mobile teams was unacceptable to the Swiss and the Swedes. Minister Zehnder stated that the Swiss opposition to fixed inspection teams had become a matter of principle. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/2-256)

5The meeting was on February 4; see Document 115.

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119. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Gray) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹


Dear Walter: Thank you for your very informative letter of 30 January 1956² in which you enclosed a copy of your memorandum

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/2-956. Secret.
²Document 112.
of conversation with the Swedish Ambassador and the Swiss Minister\textsuperscript{3} on the progress of their negotiations with the Communists with respect to the removal of the NNIT’s to the Demilitarized Zone.

I am seriously concerned about the time phasing of the removal of the NNIT’s to the Demilitarized Zone. I note also that you and your colleagues in the Department of State are no less concerned. I fully agree that the easiest method of accomplishing this objective is through the proposed action of the Swedish and Swiss Governments. It is imperative, however, in my opinion, that whatever action is taken be accomplished without concurrent demonstrative pressure from the Government of South Korea.

Several deadlines have passed without the amelioration of what you and I agree is a bad situation. The uncertainty, as I have previously pointed out has been troublesome to us and has had an unsettling effect upon CINCUNC in dealing with this problem in the field. It is not unlikely that the Communists will seek to prolong the current situation in the hope that CINCUNC, under pressure from President Rhee, will unilaterally remove the teams to the Demilitarized Zone and thereby afford them an opportunity to exploit such an action as a violation of the Armistice Agreement.

Accordingly, I feel that the Swedes and the Swiss should be under the same compulsion of time, and that it would not be in the best interest of their reputation as Neutral Nations to be forced into a solution of the NNNSC problem by publicly acknowledged pressure either from the United States or the Republic of Korea. For that reason, I believe that the Swedes and Swiss should communicate a date of February 25th to the Poles and Communists, prior to which mutual agreement with these two Governments must be reached, and that they should give us assurances that if mutual agreement is not reached by such a date, they would unilaterally withdraw their NNNSC members out of Korea or at least to the Demilitarized Zone. Such a plan, in my opinion, may very likely be acceded to by the Communists, rather than accept elimination of neutral inspection machinery. It would appear that this date should allow ample time for the United States to take the necessary measures to accomplish the desired result should action by the Swedes and Swiss fail to materialize.

It is the position of the Department of Defense that any action should comfortably precede 8 March, the terminal date of the period of grace afforded by the Zablocki commitment.\textsuperscript{4} I feel it unnecessary

\textsuperscript{3}A copy of the memorandum of conversation with Swedish Ambassador Bohe-\textsuperscript{man} on January 25 was attached to the January 30 letter. The memorandum of conversa-\textsuperscript{tion} is printed as Document 111.

\textsuperscript{4}See Document 106.
to belabor the point that this commitment was, in a sense, a quid pro quo, and that our half of the bargain was to do our utmost to accomplish a solution to problems during the period of suspended demonstrations. It is probable that if steps are not taken which will assure definite results we will ultimately face the same problem after it has deteriorated from bad to worse.

On behalf of the Department of Defense, I feel that due to the time element, the proposal made herein should be implemented at the earliest practicable moment. 5

Sincerely yours,

Gordon Gray

5 Robertson responded with letters to Gray on February 13 and February 15. In the first, he noted that the Swiss and the Swedes seemed to be making progress in their efforts to achieve the removal of the inspection teams to the demilitarized zone. In light of the progress being made by the Swiss and the Swedes, Robertson felt that “we should hold up any unilateral action for the time being in order to permit these negotiations to come to a head.” (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/2-1356) In the February 15 letter, Robertson referred specifically to Gray’s proposal that the Swiss and the Swedes be encouraged to set February 25 as the deadline for a settlement of the issue. The United States, Robertson noted, had never pressed Sweden and Switzerland to issue an ultimatum to the Communists. To do so, he argued, would be counterproductive. There was little prospect of obtaining agreement from the Communists to such an ultimatum, and the Swiss and the Swedes would be certain to resent an attempt to dictate to them from Washington. (Ibid., 795.00/2-956)

120. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Gray) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) 1


Dear Walter: I have your letters of February 13 and February 15, 2 and I am glad to be brought up to date on the negotiations with respect to the removal of the NNIT in Korea to the Demilitarized Zone.

Addressing myself first to the last paragraph of your letter of February 15, I do not know what would lead us to believe that President Rhee would notify us of a proposed renewal of demonstrations. I would expect any demonstrations to be initiated without our knowledge. In such circumstances if the policy we adopted in the past prevailed, we would be inhibited from taking any action to

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/2-1856. Secret.

2 See footnote 5, supra.
remove the teams. It is clear to me that we cannot again allow ourselves to be put in such a position.

I wish to remind you that President Rhee’s commitment to the moratorium on demonstrations will end on about March 8. The Department of Defense is firmly of the view that the teams cannot continue as they are beyond this date.

I agree with you that we should emphasize to the Swiss and Swedes our continued and urgent interest in a prompt solution. I also believe, however, that whatever we say to the Swiss and Swedes, if they have not accomplished the purpose through diplomatic negotiations by the first of March, we should on that date take unilateral action. I see no reason why they should not be informed of our intention and plan, but would defer to your judgment in respect to that particular matter.

You will recall that we were assured that the Swiss-Swede approach would get results in the latter half of January. Nevertheless, we find ourselves in the latter half of February without definitive action.

In view of our conviction that the teams must be removed by March 1 by one means or another, I suggest that our respective staffs meet immediately to make such preparations as may be necessary for unilateral action, if that be required.

Sincerely,

Gordon Gray

P.S. As you may know, I depart this afternoon for the NATO meeting in Paris. I should appreciate your dealing with Lt. General Alonso P. Fox, who is the responsible officer in connection with this matter in my absence.

121. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea

Washington, February 24, 1956—6:24 p.m.

576. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC. Your 865. You authorized see Rhee and in strict confidence inform him:


2In telegram 865 from Seoul, February 16, Strom asked for authority to tell Rhee, if the need arose, that a resumption of demonstrations made no sense in that the Swiss
1. Considerable progress toward removal teams DZ being made Swiss and Swedes in negotiations with Czechs and Poles.

2. Swiss and Swedes proposed withdrawal all inspection teams DZ. Czechs and Poles countered with proposal reduce personnel substantially in DZ but leave one inspection team north and one south. Swiss and Swedes replied this proposal unsatisfactory.

3. Swiss and Swedes taking very firm position with Communists that all teams must be moved DZ soon and pursuing matter vigorously.

4. In view firm position Swiss and Swedes believe good possibility they will succeed in negotiations Communists. They have expressed appreciation cessation demonstrations which have facilitated their negotiating efforts and expressed hope period quiet in ROK might obtain while longer in order permit them achieve their objectives.

5. Swiss and Swedes have asked their efforts be kept strictly confidential otherwise impossible for them act.

6. U.S. has been able press Swiss and Swedes vigorously during period since anti-NNSC demonstrations ceased and will continue do so. Believe Swiss and Swedish efforts likely succeed if demonstrations not renewed in ROK. U.S. urges therefore continued patience on matter.³

In your discretion can also tell Rhee Swiss and Swedes continue feel action impossible if appears under duress.

For Your Information. Believed undesirable make flat statement Swiss and Swedes prepared withdraw NNSC unless Czechs and Poles accept current proposal removal all inspection teams DZ. Bern’s 901⁴ repeated Seoul 13 indicates Swiss not prepared say at this juncture they withdraw from NNSC entirely under these conditions. Believe in view earlier reports from Bern, also available Seoul, Swiss determined accomplish withdrawal fixed teams DZ. Swedes indicated in conversations with Department could say in addition above points that Swedes ultimate goal is get out NNSC. Swedes believe best pursue this goal step by step but will not stop efforts until ultimate

and the Swedes had reached the final stages of their negotiations with the Czechs and the Poles over the withdrawal of the NNITs to the demilitarized zone, and were prepared to withdraw from the NNSC unless the Czechs and the Poles agreed to the removal of the inspection teams. (Ibid.)

³Stern reported in telegram 903 from Seoul, February 28, that he and Cameron had called on Rhee that morning to give him an aide-mémoire embodying the contents of numbered paragraphs 1–6 of telegram 576 to Seoul. Rhee rehearsed his case against the NNITs and stated that he felt that the failure of the United States to take action against the NNSC was associated with “softness against communism,” but he agreed to wait a while longer for a solution to the problem. (Ibid., 795.00/2–2856) A copy of the aide-mémoire given to Rhee is ibid., Seoul Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 69, 321.9 NNSC Jan.–April 1956.

⁴Dated February 23. (Ibid., Central Files, 795.00/2–2356)
objective reached. Swedes want no reference however their proposed second step and Swedish officials Washington indicate their conversations this matter with Department officials gave U.S. more information than their instructions authorized. End FYI.

Defense informed.

Dulles

122. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Gray)¹


Dear Gordon: Upon my return to the office this morning after a week’s absence, your letter of February 18² was brought to my attention.

You indicate that the Department of Defense is firmly of the view that the inspection teams cannot continue as they are beyond March 8, a date which marks the end of the three-month period during which President Rhee assured Congressman Zablocki’s subcommittee that he would “do his [Rhee’s]³ best” to stop the anti-Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission demonstrations in the Republic of Korea. You suggest that if the Swiss and Swedish negotiations have not brought about withdrawal of the inspection teams to the Demilitarized Zone by March 1, the United Nations Command should take unilateral action to remove these teams from the Republic of Korea.

As you know, we have pressed the Swiss and Swedes to bring their negotiations on this matter to a speedy and satisfactory conclusion. My letter to you of February 16⁴ reported their progress thus far. Personally, I have been encouraged by the progress that has been made.

In view of the possibility pointed out by Chargé Strom (Seoul’s telegram No. 865)⁵ that the patriotic demonstrations in the Republic of Korea which take place on March 1, Korean Independence Day, might be used as an occasion for the renewal of anti-Neutral Nations

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¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/2-1856. Secret. Drafted by Jones and cleared with L/UNA, EUR, and UNP.
²Document 120.
³Brackets in the source text.
⁴The letter is dated February 15; see footnote 5, Document 119.
⁵See footnote 2, supra.
Supervisory Commission demonstrations, we have again discussed the situation with the Swiss and Swedes.\(^6\) We have told them that we thought the only way we could forestall anti-Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission speeches and demonstrations on March 1 would be to make a report of the substantial Swiss and Swedish progress to President Rhee. The Swiss and Swedes have agreed that we may make such a report, but have urged that they be given a little more time to bring their negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion. Following our conversations with the Swiss and Swedes, we instructed Chargé Strom in Seoul to see President Rhee and to report that the Swiss and Swedes have rejected the Communist counterproposal to leave one fixed team in the north and one in the south and are standing firm on their proposal that all inspection teams be removed to the Demilitarized Zone. We have also suggested that President Rhee be told that the Swiss and Swedes had asked that a little more time be given them and that the cessation of the anti-Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission demonstrations in Korea had greatly facilitated their negotiations with the Czechs and Poles.

I understand that our staffs have already been working on such preparations as may be necessary for unilateral action, should that action be required, and that considerable progress has been made. I cannot agree, however, that it would be wise to instruct the United Nations Command to take action on March 1. As I have said previously, such action in our view would incur serious political and propaganda disadvantages for the United States. On the other hand, successful action by the Swiss and Swedes leading to removal of the teams to the Demilitarized Zone would have positive political and propaganda advantages for the United States.

Of course, I believe that we must keep this matter constantly under review. President Rhee’s reaction to Chargé Strom’s report of Swiss and Swedish progress will presumably give us a clearer picture of the problem facing us.\(^7\)

Sincerely yours,

Walter S. Robertson\(^8\)

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\(^6\)On February 21 and 23, Deputy Assistant Secretary Sebald discussed with Swedish Minister Douglas the question of authorizing Strom to brief President Rhee on the progress of the negotiations to withdraw the NNITs to the demilitarized zone, and to assure Rhee of Swedish determination to see the negotiations succeed. The Swedish response is summarized in the final paragraph of telegram 576, supra. The Swiss response to a similar request was conveyed to the Department in telegram 901 from Bern and is also discussed in telegram 576. Memoranda of Sebald’s conversations with Douglas are in Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/2–2356.

\(^7\)See footnote 3, supra.

\(^8\)Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
123. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Switzerland

Washington, March 6, 1956—4:31 p.m.

1541. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC.

1. You instructed see appropriate official Swiss Foreign Office morning March 8 and subject paragraph 2 below make following statement re NNSC.

(a) U.S. has serious doubts danger serious incident in ROK arising presence Czech and Polish members NNSC can be contained much longer.

(b) Appreciate Swiss and Swedish efforts effect removal inspection teams DZ and we fully realize difficulty this task.

(c) Essential we know now whether Swiss and Swedes in fact will take action which will result in removal all inspection teams DZ. Need firm idea time element involved.

(d) Secretary will be confronted March 17 by Rhee with NNSC question. We must be prepared say with virtual certainty our part but without specifying means problem will be solved shortly. Would appreciate Swiss and Swedish response our query next few days.

(e) In requesting this information no intent place pressure on Swiss and Swedes. We have been and should continue be patient and helpful every way possible in affording them opportunity solve difficult problem their own way. However cannot predict future ROK behavior particularly if cannot assure ROK of certainty our part teams will have gone in short time nor can we disregard measures such behavior or its imminence may require of us.

2. Prior making above statement suggest you remind Foreign Office their expectation reported your 844 reply from Communists forthcoming about now and state you instructed inquire whether reply yet received and how Swiss propose answer. If Swiss have not received Communist reply and/or if Swiss proposed reply indicates no definite progress re removal teams make démarche outlined para 1 above. If Swiss received Communist reply and are now prepared take definite course action which your judgment probably will lead termination inspection teams ROK at definite time near future do not make démarche outlined para 1 above. Either event, or if impossible arrange morning appointment request you communicate niact by telephone if necessary Department in order results your meeting Swiss be available Washington not later than 2:00 p.m. March 8 Washington time. Department plans see Swedish Ambassador after 3:00 p.m. March 8 Washington time make parallel démarche.

1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/3-656. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Jones; cleared with L/UNA, UNP, EUR, and by Murphy; and approved by Sebald. Repeated to Stockholm, Seoul, and Tokyo.

2Not found in Department of State files.

3See the memorandum of conversation, infra.
3. Recognize Swiss and Swedes may react approach outlined para 1 above by abandoning own efforts but have concluded risk must be taken.4

Defense informed.

Hoover

4The Embassy in Bern responded in telegram 960, March 7, that Zehnder was prepared to press for an early reply from the Communist governments, and had suggested a further discussion with Embassy officials on March 12. Therefore, the Embassy decided not to make the démarche outlined in telegram 1541 to Bern. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/3–756) In telegram 1564 to Bern, March 8, the Department instructed the Embassy to make the démarche outlined in telegram 1541 without further delay. (Ibid.)

124. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 8, 19561

SUBJECT
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Boheman, Swedish Embassy
Mr. William J. Sebald, Acting Assistant Secretary, FE
Mr. William G. Jones, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs, NA
Mr. William T. Nunley, EUR

Mr. Sebald opened the meeting by asking Ambassador Boheman if he had heard anything new with respect to the Swiss and Swedish negotiations with the Communists to obtain agreement on the withdrawal of all NNSC inspection teams to the Demilitarized Zone.

Ambassador Boheman said there was nothing very much new, but that his Government, two or three days ago, had made another démarche to Peiping asking for a reply to the Swedish rejection of the Communist counterproposal to retain one inspection team each in the north and south. The Ambassador said that the Swedish démarche had implied that the Swiss and Swedes would not remain on the NNSC if the Communists did not agree to the proposal to withdraw all inspection teams to the Demilitarized Zone.

Mr. Sebald pointed out that today ended the three-month period during which President Rhee had agreed to call off the anti-NNSC demonstrations. We felt, therefore, that this issue was likely to come

1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/3–856. Secret. Drafted by Jones on March 12 and initialed as correct by Sebald.
to a head. We were gravely concerned that it may become increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to avoid a serious incident because of the continued presence of the Czechs and Poles on Republic of Korea territory. Time was now of the essence and we felt that we had to know with some degree of certainty just where we stand on the matter. We needed to know whether there would be progress toward the solution of this problem and if so when a solution could be expected. This was particularly important in light of the Secretary's visit to Korea on March 17, and in order to get information to him by that time it would have to be in our hands by March 15.

Mr. Sebald said that about ten days ago, and following our conversations with the Swiss and Swedes, we had reported for the first time to President Rhee in general terms the progress being made by the Swiss and Swedes on the problem of the inspection teams.\(^2\) President Rhee feels that he has been eminently patient and reasonable. It is important now that the Secretary be able to say with a degree of certainty, although not specifying the means, that the Czechs and Poles will be removed shortly. If the Secretary can give President Rhee such definite assurances, we perhaps can hold the line a little while longer. Mr. Sebald emphasized the appreciation of the U.S. for the Swiss and Swedish participation on the NNSC and our gratitude for their recent efforts to find a solution to this difficult problem. In stating our position to Ambassador Boheman, we were not trying to place pressure on the Swedes. We felt that in view of our close and friendly relations we could explain this situation openly and frankly. Ambassador Willis had been asked to make a similar approach in Bern.

Ambassador Boheman said that the Swiss and Swedes were pushing as hard as they could and that it was his impression from his Government and from conversations with the Swiss that if the Communists failed to reply favorably in a short time, the Swiss and Swedes will remove their members from the inspection teams. The Swedes were very anxious to get out. The idea of retaining one team in each Zone was absolutely ridiculous, and the Swedes did not want to continue to have responsibilities which they were unable to carry out.

Mr. Sebald asked whether it would be possible for the Ambassador to get from his Government a fairly definite idea of the time element involved in their negotiations and the course of action his Government might take in the event no favorable reply is received from the Communists. In view of the strength of President Rhee's feeling on this matter, the Secretary would have to be able to speak with considerable certainty and definiteness.

\(^2\)See Document 121.
Ambassador Boheman clearly understood the U.S. need to give President Rhee a more definite understanding. He said he would cable his Government and urge they try to get an answer from the Communists. Failing that, he would suggest his Government tell the U.S. by March 15 more definitely about their concept of the timing and the course of action they would follow in event of no favorable answer by the Communists.\(^3\)

\(^3\)In telegram 879 from Stockholm, March 12, the Embassy reported that Sweden had made another approach to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the People's Republic of China to reiterate that Sweden could not accept the proposal to leave one inspection team each in North and South Korea. According to a Foreign Office official, however, Sweden did not request a reply by a specific date, nor imply unilateral action if the Swedish position was not accepted. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/3–1256)

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### 125. Telegram From the Embassy in Switzerland to the Department of State\(^1\)

**Bern, March 10, 1956—1 p.m.**

972. In compliance with Deptel 1564, March 8,\(^2\) Zehnder given complete statement of points A through E in paragraph 1 Deptel 1541, March 6. Emphasis placed on need to know within next few days that Swiss (and Swedish) action would result in removal of all teams to Demilitarized Zone.

Zehnder in reply made two principal points:

1. Swiss not prepared to say in advance of receipt of Communist reply that Swiss and Swedish action would result in withdrawal all teams to Demilitarized Zone.

2. Telegram had already been received from Swiss Legation Peking reporting that request for reply to Swiss aide-mémoire of February 7 made and Chinese had indicated reply could be expected within matter of days. Zehnder promised to let me know as soon as he had anything further.

Zehnder stated if Swedish and Swiss proposal accepted by Communists, no problem. If Communist answer negative, might be accompanied by compromise counter proposal. Swiss had given no indication whatever they would be disposed to accept compromise. If Communists offered to withdraw teams “provisionally” to Demilita-

\(^1\)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/3–1056. Secret; Priority. Also sent to Seoul and Tokyo and repeated to Stockholm.

\(^2\)See footnote 4, Document 123.
rized Zone with inspections to be carried out by agreement of both sides Swiss might consider such compromise as it would in fact achieve withdrawal of teams to Demilitarized Zone. There would never be agreement of both sides to an inspection, therefore teams would remain in Demilitarized Zone. By “provisional” withdrawal of teams, principle of existence of teams would be preserved and terms of Armistice maintained.

Swiss understand fully and sympathize difficulties of our situation and need to meet March 17 deadline. Zehnder stated to date Swiss had avoided setting fixed date for reply but if nothing forthcoming would consider requesting answer by given date.

In view worldwide advantage to US of having Swiss and Swedes achieve withdrawal of teams to Demilitarized Zone, I again urge maximum cooperation to that end.

Willis

126. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in China

Washington, March 15, 1956—7:24 p.m.

Tosec 83. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC. Démarches Swiss and Swedes outlined paragraph 1 our 1541 Bern repeated Stockholm 937 Tokyo 1915 Seoul 598 Karachi Tosec 31 have led no definite conclusions thus far. Both countries March 6 or 7 requested Communist reply to Swiss and Swedish rejection Communist counterproposal retain one inspection team each north and south. Neither requested reply by specific date. Swiss expected reply within matter days and said if not received would consider setting deadline for Communist reply. Swedes felt Communist reply unlikely before March 17 and Ambassador Boheman following telephone conversation his Government March 15 reported his Government doing everything it could but unable set deadline for Communist agreement. Believe démarches made twice in last week have had effect impel Swiss and Swedes

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/3-1556. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Jones; cleared with EUR, UNP, and by Murphy; and approved by Sebold. Also sent to Seoul and repeated to Bern, Stockholm, and Tokyo.

Dulles was visiting the Republic of China as part of a tour of Asian countries undertaken after the SEATO meeting in Karachi, March 6–8. His trip took him to India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. Documentation on the post-SEATO trip is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 675–683.

2Document 123.
somewhat more rapid action. Sebald conversation with Swiss and Swedes March 15\(^3\) led to impression Swiss and Swedes continuing efforts obtain Communist agreement remove all inspection teams but impossible determine when efforts will succeed or whether failing Communist agreement will withdraw their own personnel.

U.S. course action appears depend on ability persuade Rhee allow little more time for success Swiss and Swedish efforts. Ambassador Boheman suggested telling Rhee Swiss and Swedes doing utmost and their patience running out. May wish in discussion with Rhee indicate you extremely concerned re delays and will personally look into matter immediately upon your return and will communicate him further. Any event appears best not commit U.S. to deadline or to unilateral action until after consultation our Allies.

Hoover

\(^3\)Copies of memoranda by Jones of Sebald’s conversations with Swedish Ambassador Boheman and Swiss Counselor Schnyder are in Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/3-1556.

127. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State\(^1\)

_Seoul, March 18, 1956._

969. Tokyo pass CINCUNC and Tokyo pass Macomber. Following is summary of Secy’s meetings with Rhee and Cabinet Ministers.\(^2\)

Pres Rhee gave the Secy a very cordial reception for which the Secy expressed his appreciation. The Secy reviewed briefly the situation in the countries he had recently visited. Rhee told Secy that he would not raise any problems, that the ROK Ministers would present them at subsequent meeting, but that if the Secy wanted to raise any problems he would be glad to discuss them. The Secy continued to speak in general terms about the countries he had visited.\(^3\)

\(^1\)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/3–1856. Secret. Repeated to Tokyo.

\(^2\)The Secretary arrived in Seoul on the morning of March 17, met with President Rhee and four Cabinet Ministers that afternoon, and left for Tokyo the following morning.

\(^3\)No separate memorandum of Dulles’ conversation with Rhee has been found in Department of State files. Dulles summarized the conversation in his letter to the President, _infra._
The Secy then met with the Acting Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, Finance Minister, and ROK Economic Co-ordinator (Paek Tu-jin) at the office of State Council. Actg FonMin Cho opened the conference by referring to the Secy’s visit in 1950 and recalled that Secy had said to the National Assembly that “You are not alone”. Cho said ROK was conscious and appreciative of the fact that the Secy had lived up to his 1950 statement, and that the ROK acquired renewed strength from the Secy’s current visit. Cho said the Ministers would present certain of their basic problems to the Secy. He added that he was asking the Secy to share with ROKs their problems and anxieties. Cho himself concluded by saying that the major problem with which he was concerned was described in a memorandum which he was giving to the Secy (this memorandum concerns ROK-Japan relations).

The Finance Minister then briefly outlined the following three questions. (1) Use of counterpart funds—an increased proportion of which he hoped could be devoted to reconstruction purposes. (2) Need for additional aid in fiscal year 1956 to avoid budgetary deficit. (3) Desirability of a long range US aid program. (He also gave Secy memorandum.)

Minister Son then presented ROK request for substantial increase in military assistance amounting to $329,800,000 in FY 1957. This amount of additional aid would permit an increase of approximately 45 percent in ROK military strength above that prescribed in the agreed minute. (Memorandum containing details also presented.)

Paek Tu-jin referred to extensive devastation during war, need for reconstruction, and said ROKs were working on a five-year plan of economic reconstruction which would involve expenditure $2.4

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4 A detailed memorandum of the Secretary’s conversation with the four Korean Cabinet Ministers is in Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

5 Copies of this memorandum and the memoranda given the Secretary by the Finance Minister and the Defense Minister are attached to the memorandum of conversation cited in footnote 4 above. The memorandum, dated March 16, noting the difficulties in relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan, contained a request that the Secretary “accord understanding and assistance to the Republic of Korea in solving the problem with which it is confronted as a result of the intransigence of the Government of Japan.”

6 The memorandum on U.S. economic aid to Korea, dated March 16, reviewed the history of Korea’s economic problems and requested the United States to make a concrete economic aid commitment on which the Republic of Korea could base a 5-year development plan. Attached to the memorandum as an appendix was a memorandum addressed to Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dealing with the claims of the Republic of Korea for supplies furnished to the U.N. Command.

7 The request for additional military aid was based, according to the memorandum presented to the Secretary by Minister Son, upon a survey of “the growing threat of communist attack” and an assessment of the “inadequate free world defenses in Korea.” This memorandum was also dated March 16.
billion. Paek pointed out this plan did not take into account military requirements. He said that plan would be presented through proper channels.

In responding Secy said he recalled vividly his words which he had spoken to first meeting of ROK National Assembly. He said that he had always tried to be faithful to sentiment that ROKs do not stand alone. The United States was a firm and continuing friend of Korea. He commented that he would study the requests and have them carefully examined by experts.8

Then the Secy said it was necessary for the ROKs to understand certain basic concepts of US foreign and military policy. He outlined the difference in mission between forces in the front line and those in the strategic striking reserve. He pointed out that the answer to the combined Russian and Chinese forces operating with interior lines of communication was a strategic reserve with mobile striking power which is a deterrent and can be quickly employed against an attack at any point along the Communist periphery. The UALI [Secy?] said that in the event of Communist aggression this force was committed for common defense in the NATO Agreement, the SEATO Agreement and our various mutual defense treaties, including the one with Korea.

With respect economic aid, the Secy asked the ROK Ministers to bear in mind that he had received on this trip a total of requests which if met would destroy the soundness of the United States economy. He said that the amount of available US aid was limited by economic and political realities. He likened American economic aid to ammunition which must be rationed, which was not accorded on basis friendship, but as contribution to winning cold war. He said each country should quite properly present its case. He emphasized that the United States would weigh ROK needs in the light of the overall requirements and then allocate available American aid where it would best contribute to relieving our worldwide objectives. He added that the Korean aid program has been our largest one and that the amount of US assistance to Korea is a measure of the importance which we have felt Korea has had in the cold war.

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8On May 16, the Department instructed the Embassy in CA-9072 to respond to the military and economic memoranda given to the Secretary on March 17. With respect to additional military aid, the Embassy was instructed to respond that the United States "considers present forces, backed by U.S. striking power, adequate for the security of Korea." With respect to the request for a long-term commitment of economic aid, the Embassy was instructed to remind the Rhee government that the executive branch of the U.S. Government was unable to enter into long-term commitments involving future appropriations of the Congress. The Korean plan would be carefully considered, however, as a basis for future planning for implementation of aid funds as they became available. (Department of State, Seoul Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 69, 320.1 Secretary's Meetings with Rhee)
Macomber bringing copies of three memoranda mentioned above. Additional copies being transmitted as enclosures to memorandum of conversation of Secy’s meeting with ROK Cabinet Ministers.

Cameron

128. Letter From the Secretary of State to the President¹

Tokyo, March 18, 1956.

Dear Mr. President: My visit to Korea was marked by placidity on the part of Syngman Rhee, and a popular welcome generally estimated to be more widely participated in with more genuine enthusiasm than any of the many which have taken place there. All the length of the six miles from the airport to the residence was lined with people, often five or six deep, waving flags and cheering. On my return to the airport this morning in a cold rain, there were still large numbers the length of the route.

I realize that these things are largely synthetic, but having been similarly received now three times, I feel that I am somewhat expert in appraisal.

Rhee showed evidence of having greatly aged. He said he did not want to talk about business because he knew that we would then quarrel and he wanted the atmosphere to be one of friendship. I tried to give him some of the impressions of my trip, but he showed little interest, and he did not follow what I was saying.

I talked briefly with the Foreign Affairs, Finance and Defense Secretaries, who presented requests for additional military and economic aid. I gave them a brief talk on the mission of local defense in relation to strategic striking power and also a picture of the multiple demands made upon us from many quarters and the need for maintaining the soundness of our own economy. I hope that this may help to cushion future disappointments.

On the whole relations seem calmer than they have been for the past three years. I am particularly struck with the fact that nothing was said to me about the elimination of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission although Rhee’s “deadline” for its elimination

¹Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret. Transmitted to Washington in Dulte 36, which is the source text, with the instructions: “Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary for President.”
was March 17, the date of my arrival. I do not, however, mean by this to imply that this is a dead issue.

Dulles

\[^2\]Dulles 36 bears this typed signature.

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129. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Hemmendinger) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)\(^1\)

Washington, March 27, 1956.

SUBJECT

Problems of the Korean Armistice

There have been no developments on the NNSC since your visit to Seoul on March 17. In view of the inconclusive results of our recent démarches to the Swiss and Swedes,\(^2\) it now seems appropriate to take another look at the alternative courses of action open to us. In so doing I believe we should consider the problem of paragraph 13(d), the reinforcing restrictions of the Armistice, in conjunction with our consideration of the NNSC problem.

Of these two issues, the NNSC and paragraph 13(d), the latter is of far more fundamental importance. The importance of the NNSC is in the context of an irritant to U.S.-ROK relations. The importance of action on paragraph 13(d) is the rectification of the serious military disadvantage in which the UN Command has been placed. Our position on these issues has been to follow action by the Swiss and Swedes on the NNSC with UN Command action a month later to permit replacement of obsolete equipment. In my memorandum to you of February 29,\(^3\) I suggested a possible alternative, namely, that if it were determined that unilateral action should be taken by the UN Command to remove the Czech and Polish components of the inspection teams it might be best to take simultaneous action on the question of paragraph 13(d).

I now would like to suggest a third course of action which I believe is even more desirable. This course of action would involve: (1)
continued efforts to persuade the Swiss and Swedes to take action on
the NNSC, but recognition of the possibility that they may be very
slow in doing so; (2) giving highest priority to the question of para-
graph 13(d), move as rapidly as possible and independently of action
on the NNSC to permit the UN Command to introduce more modern
conventional type weapons. We would, of course, need to inform the
Sixteen of our plans to take action on paragraph 13(d) and should
seek their concurrence, although not make their concurrence a nec-
essary prerequisite to our action. This course of action has the follow-
ing advantages:

(1) It deals first with the most fundamental problem and the
problem most understandable to our Allies.

(2) This course of action could be explained to President Rhee in
such a way as to forestall a renewal of demonstrations against the
NNSC for several months, thus permitting the Swiss and Swedes to
continue their efforts to reach agreement with the Communists. He
could be told that we have decided to deal with the most fundamen-
tal problem first and that in view of this contemplated action we feel
strongly we must let the NNSC issue coast a while longer.

(3) We should inform the Swiss and Swedes of our contemplated
action on paragraph 13(d) as soon as we have informed the Sixteen
making clear to them we cannot delay any longer in the introduc-
tion of more modern weapons. They almost certainly will claim that
action on reinforcement will render more difficult the task of work-
ing out an NNSC agreement. However, the prospect of this action as
well as the action itself will probably add to the discomfort of their
position and may, therefore, have the ultimate effect of stimulating
them to either reach agreement with the Communists or withdraw
themselves to the Demilitarized Zone.

(4) From a propaganda standpoint, action to replace obsolete
weapons would be more acceptable, if action by the UN Command
to remove the inspection teams was delayed for several months, as
this would underline the open-and-above-board nature of our action.

(5) This course of action should be acceptable to Defense, since
they are genuinely concerned with strengthening the arms of UN
Command forces in Korea.

Before embarking on the above course of action, and indeed in
any event, I believe it would be useful and appropriate to call in
Ambassador Boheman and tell him that in view of the démarches we
had recently made and of the Swiss and Swedish second request of
the Communists for a reply you felt it would be useful to exchange
notes with him on the subject of the NNSC.

Tab A is a series of points which I think you might want to use
in talking with Ambassador Boheman.4 I believe Ambassador Willis
should be instructed to make a similar approach in Bern.

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4Not found attached.
Recommendations

1. That you approve setting up a meeting with Ambassador Boheman in order to inform him along the lines set forth in Tab A, and that Ambassador Willis be instructed to carry out a similar approach in Bern.

2. In a letter to Secretary Gray—which we will prepare—you suggest that we consider taking action on paragraph 13(d) first and delay action on the NNSC.5

5Robertson initialed his approval of recommendation 1 and his disapproval of recommendation 2.

130. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 9, 1956

SUBJECT
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC)

PARTICIPANTS
Count Douglas, Minister Plenipotentiary, Swedish Embassy
Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
Mr. Christopher A. Norred, Acting Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs, NA
Mr. Edwin D. Crowley, BNA

Mr. Robertson said that approximately one month has passed since the Swiss and Swedes handed their latest note to the Communists on the NNSC, and that the U.S. is concerned because the Communists appear to be delaying solution of this problem.

Count Douglas said he had asked the Swedish Foreign Office late last week whether any reply had been received and had been told there had not. He agreed that approximately one month had elapsed since the Swiss and Swedes had presented a so-called “compromise” proposal. The Communists had previously suggested that the fixed inspection teams be reduced to one in each zone. The Swiss-Swedish “compromise” proposal was in effect the original Swedish position: It suggested that the proposals be compromised by withdrawing all teams to the Demilitarized Zone after which teams

1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/4–956. Secret. Drafted by Norred.
might be sent out as agreed within the Commission. Count Douglas explained that the Swedish intention was that no fixed teams would hereafter be agreed to.

Mr. Robertson said he believes the Communists are simply drawing out the negotiations. He cited the experience of Ambassador Dean in negotiations to arrange a Korean political conference, and his own experience in the China truce negotiations. He said the Communists would try to avoid accepting the Swiss-Swedish proposal until they were confronted with an unacceptable alternative. The Communists clearly desire that the NNSC continue in existence. Now that the Swiss and Swedes have stated their position firmly it would be desirable for them to press the Communists to accept it by giving the alternative of Swiss-Swedish withdrawal from the NNSC. We persuaded President Rhee to halt the demonstrations for a time in order to facilitate the Swiss and Swedish negotiations with the Communists, but this situation cannot endure indefinitely. An incident might occur at any time which would upset the tranquillity now existing in Korea. None of us wants to see this happen except the Communists, who may in fact be protracting the negotiations for this very purpose.

Mr. Robertson asked that Count Douglas communicate to the Swedish Government on an urgent basis the U.S. request to press the Communists for a reply in this manner. Count Douglas said that he would do so.

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2This is the first report that the Swedish démarche contained such a compromise proposal. Previous information indicated merely that the Swedes pressed for a reply and implied they would be forced to withdraw if the Communists did not agree to movement of the inspection teams to the Demilitarized Zone. [Footnote in the source text.]

3The Department sent a summary of this conversation to Stockholm in telegram 1086, April 10, and instructed the Embassy to emphasize to the Swedish Government the "desirability confronting Communists with alternative of Swiss-Swedish withdrawal." (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/4–1056)

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131. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 12, 1956

SUBJECT

Chinese Communist Note on the NNSC and Korean Issue

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/4–1256. Confidential. Drafted by Norred.
PARTICIPANTS

Mr. E.P. Youde, Second Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. Christopher A. Norred, Acting Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs, NA
Mr. George M. Barbis, NA

Mr. Youde left for study by the Department of State copies of a note (copy attached) received by the United Kingdom Chargé in Peiping on April 9.

With respect to the Chinese Communist request in paragraph 3 of the note that the United Kingdom and the other governments of the UN Command call a conference of the nations concerned to discuss withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea and peaceful unification of Korea, the British Government suggests that the Chinese Communist proposal be conveyed formally to the other governments of the UN Command through the normal mechanism of the meetings of the Sixteen in Washington. The British Government asked the views of the British Embassy and the Department of State on procedures of handling the Chinese Communist note.

Mr. Norred asked whether the views of any of the other governments of the UN Command had been sought on this question. Mr. Youde said that he understood the Canadians knew of the note and that he believed that it had not been conveyed outside the Commonwealth countries, and possibly not even to Australia and New Zealand.

Mr. Norred indicated that he was receiving the note so that the Department might study it to exchange views with the British Government on procedures in handling it and that the British should not consider that they have formally conveyed it to the U.S. as the Chinese Communists requested in paragraph 3 of the note.

Mr. Youde said that he was sure that this was what the British Government contemplated at this stage. He said that he would provide further information about British consultations on the note, and that he would await reply as to the views of the United States.²

²In telegram 1799 to Bern, April 13, the Department instructed the Embassy to convey the substance of the Chinese note to the Swiss Government. The Swiss and Swedish Foreign Ministers were meeting in Bern at the time. The Embassy was instructed to add that the United States considered that the note indicated that there was no longer any prospect that the Communist governments would accept the Swiss and Swedish NNSC proposals. (Ibid., 795.00/4–1356) The full text of the Chinese note was conveyed to the Swiss and Swedish Embassies in Washington on April 16. (Ibid., 795.00/4–1656) The British Embassy sent copies of the note to the members of the Sixteen in Washington, and the Department cabled the text to interested Embassies. (Circular telegram 732, April 20; Ibid., 795.00/4–2056)
Attachment

TEXT OF A NOTE RECEIVED BY H.M. CHARGÉ D’AFFAIRES IN PEIPING ON APRIL 9th

Korea

Following is text [grp. undec.] after the compliments.

The Governments of Sweden and Switzerland have, on many occasions, stated to the Chinese Government the practical difficulties which they have encountered in their work in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea and have expressed the hope that a settlement could be reached. The Chinese Government sympathizes [grp. undec. ? strongly] with the position of the Governments of Sweden and Switzerland and have endeavoured unceasingly to try to mitigate their difficulties. Recently the Swedish Government proposed that the whole of the six neutral observation teams, which are at present stationed in designated ports in south and north Korea, should be withdrawn for the time being and that observation teams should be despatched temporarily only when the need arose, while the Swiss Government proposed that the existing neutral observation teams in the six designated ports should be eliminated and that mobile observation teams only should be retained. The Chinese Government hold that a fundamental solution to the practical difficulties which the Governments of Sweden and Switzerland have repeatedly raised, can only be reached when a solution has been reached on the question of peaceful unification of Korea and first of all on the question of withdrawing all foreign forces from Korea.

2. Since the Geneva conference on Korea in 1954, Korean and Chinese sides have consistently advocated that a conference of the Nations concerned should be called to discuss the question of withdrawal from Korea of all foreign forces and the peaceful unification of Korea. The Chinese Government are, moreover, convinced that if all parties concerned are genuinely desirous of seeking a settlement a reasonable solution to these questions could be reached.

3. In the light of the above considerations, the Chinese Government, both in their own name and by authorization of the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, propose to the Government of the United Kingdom and through the Government of the United Kingdom to all other Governments of the United Nations Command, to call a conference of the nations concerned to discuss the question of the withdrawal from Korea of all foreign forces and of the peaceful unification of Korea. The Governments of Korea and

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*Also printed in Department of State Bulletin, June 11, 1956, p. 970.
*All brackets in the source text.
China request the Government of the United Kingdom to transmit this proposal to all other Governments of the United Nations Command. The Governments of Korea and China hope that the Government of the United Kingdom and all the other Governments of the United Nations Command will give active consideration to this proposal and that they will reply as soon as possible.

132. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Washington, April 13, 1956, 11:30 a.m.¹

[Here follow a list of 28 persons present and discussion of unrelated subjects. Attending were Joint Chiefs of Staff members Radford, Taylor, Burke, and General Randolph McC. Pate, Commandant of the Marine Corps. General Lemnitzer was in Washington and also represented the Department of Defense. The Department of State officials included Murphy, MacArthur, Robertson, and Hemmendinger. Frank Wisner, Deputy Director for Plans, represented the CIA, and Gleason represented the NSC.]

Korea

General Lemnitzer said that he feels it is most important for the U.S. to carry out the promises it has made to get the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission activities out of South Korea. These groups are not neutral, are providing intelligence information to the communists and are causing great concern to Korean and U.S. military authorities. He said that the Korean demonstrations last August against the neutral inspection teams had been very serious and had been restrained only with great difficulty. Recurrence of such demonstrations could be very dangerous for the safety of U.S. military elements in Korea. General Lemnitzer added that he did not know about latest developments in negotiations with Sweden and Switzerland but was not optimistic that these negotiations would be successful. Mr. Robertson summarized the contents of the latest Chinese Communist note² on Korea which proposed an international conference. Mr. Robertson and General Lemnitzer agreed that this note was one more propaganda stratagem by the Chinese Communists. Mr. Robertson also said that he had had a number of discussions with


²Supra.
Swedish and Swiss representatives but that effective results had not been forthcoming; the Swedish Ambassador in Washington talks a lot more resolutely than his government is willing to act. General Lemnitzer said that he had just talked to some Senators about this matter and they found it impossible to understand why we put up with this situation. He noted that the communists are bringing in substantial military equipment in violation of the armistice, while we are hamstrung by armistice provisions prohibiting introduction of new weapons. We are thus not able to maintain the balance of strength in Korea envisaged by the armistice agreement. Our weakness is particularly serious in the case of aircraft, such as all-weather planes. Admiral Radford commented that the situation in Korea is a perfect illustration of what the communists mean by inspection and that if the U.S. ever agrees to disarmament arrangements involving inspection, this is exactly the kind of situation we would face. He said we would be foolish to get into this situation.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

133.  Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State

Washington, April 20, 1956.

SUBJECT

Chinese Communist Note of April 9 on Korea

The Chinese Communist note (Tab A) proposes a conference on troop withdrawal and Korean unification. It states that until these problems are solved, the NNSC problem cannot be solved. The note is designed to halt Swiss-Swedish negotiations on the NNSC and to place the U.S. in a bad propaganda position if we eliminate the NNSC teams.

Despite possible serious repercussions, I believe the UN Command must now act unilaterally in removing Czech and Polish NNSC members from the area on the grounds that Communist obstruction of the NNSC and violations of the reinforcement provisions of the Armistice have suspended our obligation to permit their activities south of the Demilitarized Zone (DZ). It seems pointless to press the

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/4-2056. Secret. Drafted by Norred and concurred in by Murphy, Phleger, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Francis O. Wilcox, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Jacob D. Beam.

2Not found attached; see Document 131.
Swiss and Swedes further. Our main objective now should be to secure the support of our Allies for such action. Reply to the note, which the British can send in behalf of the 16 participating Nations, must include the NNSC problem, although we would make the detailed announcement in the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) and report it to the United Nations.

Our Allies probably will support rejection of the conference proposal on the ground that it would serve no useful purpose and will accept also our views on the NNSC if we press our views strongly. The problem of replacement of obsolete matériel should not be raised at this stage because it would confuse the discussion on the NNSC problem, although action will be required on it in the near future.

Recommendations

That after consultation with Defense:

1. We meet with the 16 April 26 after preliminary discussions with key countries, indicate solution of the NNSC problem can no longer be deferred, and propose attached reply (Tab B) to the Communist note.

2. We inform the Swiss and Swedes that we are consulting with the 16 to determine our course of action on the NNSC.

3. Simultaneously with delivery of the note we announce in the MAC and report to the UN, suspension of our obligations to permit Czech and Polish operations south of the DZ, and move the Czechs and Poles to the DZ.3

[Attachment]

DRAFT REPLY TO CHINESE COMMUNIST NOTE OF APRIL 19, 19564

We have long regarded the frustration of the hopes of the Korean people for unification of their country as the basic problem in Korea. At Geneva we set forth in detail our position with regard to a just settlement of this problem in conformity with the objectives of the United Nations. This position was reiterated at the past two sessions of the General Assembly, where it was endorsed by an overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations.

With regard to the Communist proposal for a conference on the withdrawal of foreign troops and the unification of Korea we are not aware of any change in the Communist position which would render such a conference fruitful. Until the Communist side is prepared to

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3 Dulles initialed his approval of the recommendations.
4 Secret.
negotiate sincerely on the basis of the United Nations objectives, another conference would only bring about a repetition of the deadlock which resulted at Geneva. For our part we remain ready to discuss the unification on the basis of the United Nations objectives. If the Communist side has concrete proposals for a settlement of the Korean question in conformity with the objectives of the United Nations, we are prepared to give such proposals every consideration.

We do not regard the problem of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as linked in any way with the question of the unification of Korea. Pending agreement on unification, the Armistice Agreement remains in force in Korea, and all parties concerned should endeavor to maintain the effectiveness of the Armistice and to correct problems that arise regarding it. We wish to reaffirm our support of the Armistice Agreement and our intention to contribute to peace in the area.

The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission has long since ceased to fulfill its functions under the Armistice Agreement because of Communist obstruction. We believe the proposals of the Governments of Switzerland and Sweden to withdraw all Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission personnel to the Demilitarized Zone are reasonable. They present a practical solution to this problem, given the attitude of the Communist side toward their reporting responsibilities and the obstacles they have presented to effective supervision by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission north of the Demilitarized Zone. The Communist side has now rejected the proposals of Switzerland and Sweden and it is evident from the Chinese Communist note of April 9, 1956, that the Communist side does not intend to agree to a solution of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission problem. Under these circumstances, the activities of the Czech and Polish components of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission south of the Demilitarized Zone are an inequitable burden on the United Nations side. The United Nations Command will announce its position on this matter fully in the Military Armistice Commission.
134. Telegram From the Embassy in Sweden to the Department of State

Stockholm, April 25, 1956—4 p.m.

1018. Lind Foreign Office Bureau Chief informed us today Chinese answered Swedish démarche of month ago suggesting conference of 16 nations as reply Swedish proposals. Swedes now propose reply this communication after Swiss approval stating: (1) regret Chinese would not accept Swedish compromise proposal (that teams might be sent out when need arose upon decision of NNSC); (2) repeating basic Swedish position favoring abolition all NNSC teams; (3) Sweden still willing accept its compromise, however (4) lacking such compromise and absence any new agreement prepared for time being accept proposal made earlier by Chinese reducing number teams from 6 (3 on each side) to 2 (1 on each side) with NNSC retaining right despatch teams to places from which other two teams withdrawn in case of need.

Lind volunteered he did not think US would be pleased by proposed Swedish reply but saw two advances: it would reduce number teams, thus relative improvement, and it showed Sweden did not accept Chinese reply linking matter to proposal for conference. Emphasized Sweden unable pull out NNSC because importance it placed on its international responsibilities. Speculated if Chinese accept Swedish proposal all well for time being so far Sweden concerned, although recognized temporary nature solution. If Chinese do not accept, which he did not think likely, claimed Swedish Government would take dim view, but emphasized speculative nature this phase discussion. Stated Ambassador Boheman informed about proposed Swedish reply. Swedes of course do not know if Swiss will accept.

Other Foreign Office source states Unden approved above in past 24 hours. Swedish Chargé Washington being informed but no instructions given him.

Cabot

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/4–2556. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Tokyo, London, Bern, Paris, and Seoul.
2Bo Östen Unden, Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs.
135. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Sweden¹**

*Washington, April 26, 1956—7:03 p.m.*


Request Embassy Stockholm inform Swedes earliest (1) Point 4 your 1018 would not reduce our difficulties with NNSC and could create new problems. No reason believe Communists would not continue ignore ports entry provisions of Armistice. We would either be forced focus all movements in one port of entry or be subjected frequent inspection movements by Czechs and Poles; (2) US suggests Swedes hold up any reply along lines refel pending result consultations US now beginning with Allies to determine suitable course action.

Embassy Bern requested inform Swiss Government earliest US beginning consultations with Allies and would appreciate advance notice any Swiss action NNSC problem.

Dulles

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/4–2556. Confidential. Drafted by Norred; approved by Sebald; and cleared with EUR, UNP, and L/UNA. Also sent to Bern and repeated to Seoul, London, Paris, and Tokyo.
²*Supra.*

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136. **Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions and Consular Offices¹**

*Washington, April 26, 1956—7:36 p.m.*

749. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC. Geneva for Johnson. Department's Circular 732.² Following for information only. Department discussed Communist note and NNSC April 26 with representatives Embassies U.K., N.Z., Canada, Australia and France³ preliminary to

²See footnote 2, Document 131.
³A memorandum by Norred of a conversation among representatives of the British, French, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand Embassies and Departmental officials including Sebald is in Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/4–2656.
meeting 16 about May 2. U.S. gave them U.S. draft reply\(^4\) to be sent by 16 through UK: (1) declining convene conference although assuring careful consideration any concrete proposal in accord UN objectives (2) stating NNSC problem not related unification Korea and (3) asserting in view Communist violations Armistice and rejection Swiss-Swedish proposals NNSC activities of Czech and Polish members NNSC are inequitable burden on U.S. side. U.S. stated belief we entitled treat as suspended right of Czech and Polish members conduct activities in UN Command area and that U.S. proposes at time of reply to make statement in Military Armistice Commission on NNSC fully describing UN Command position and immediately thereafter move Czechs and Poles DZ.

Group expressed some misgivings over U.S. proposals on NNSC. Meeting same group scheduled April 30.

**Dulles**

\(^4\)Attached to Document 133.

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137. **Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 30, 1956\(^1\)**

**SUBJECT**

Chinese Communist Note of April 9, 1956, on Korea

**PARTICIPANTS**

Sir Hubert A. Graves, Minister, British Embassy  
Mr. George P. de T. Glazebrook, Minister, Canadian Embassy  
Mr. James J. McCardle, Second Secretary, Canadian Embassy  
Mr. D. G. Lloyd White, Counselor, New Zealand Embassy  
Mr. Hunter Wade, First Secretary, New Zealand Embassy  
Mr. F. J. Blakeney, Counselor, Australian Embassy  
Mr. Pierre Millet, Minister, French Embassy  
Mr. William J. Sebald, Acting Assistant Secretary, FE  
Mr. Niles Bond, Director, UNP  
Mr. Noel Hemmendinger, Acting Director, NA  
Mr. William Nunley, EUR  
Mr. Ralph Clough, Deputy Director, CA  
Mr. C.A. Norred, Acting Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs, NA

Mr. Sebald said that he had talked with the Korean Chargé in the morning, and had given him a general outline of our thinking.

\(^1\)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/4-3056. Secret. Drafted by Norred.
The Chargé was pleased, but had no instructions. Mr. Sebald said he had expressed appreciation for the restraint shown on the NNSC problem by the ROK in recent months, and had asked their continued forbearance. He had also asked and received assurance that the Chinese Communist note and our thinking on it, would not be publicized. Mr. Sebald said that the U.S. has learned that the Swedes have received a reply from the Chinese Communists merely referring to the Chinese Communist note of April 9 to the 16 proposing a conference. The Swedish Chargé has not approached us about it, and we have not called him in. Mr. Sebald then asked the representatives of the Embassies to report the views of their governments on the proposals we presented on April 26.2

The British Minister said his Government made no comment on the first three paragraphs of the U.S. draft reply to the Chinese Communist note. The British Government suggested, however, that in the fourth sentence of the fourth paragraph the words "has now rejected" be replaced by "has not accepted." They further suggested, with respect to the last sentence of the draft reply, that there must be an opportunity to consider the Communist reaction to the announcement the U.S. proposes the UN Command make in the Military Armistice Commission, and proposed, therefore, that there should be further consultation on the exclusion of the NNSSC teams from south Korea. In response to questions by Mr. Sebald, the British Minister explained that his Government concurs with the U.S. proposals except that after the announcement in the Military Armistice Commission that the teams would be removed from Korea, there should be an interval and consideration of the Communist reaction before executing such action.

The Canadian Minister said that the Canadian Foreign Minister is now on the way to Europe, and he had received only preliminary comment. The Canadian Government agrees to the rejection of the conference proposal on the grounds the U.S. proposes. The wording of the rejection probably should be redrafted, however, to give a fuller statement of the UN objectives and to use a factual phrasing with less temperature than the U.S. draft. With respect to the NNSSC, the Canadian Government is not yet in a position to agree to the U.S. action. The employment of observers' teams has been valuable in Korea and Indochina, and is a device we may wish to use in the future. It is not suggested that the present situation in Korea should go on indefinitely. In Indochina, however, the observers' teams will not be stabilized until a transfer is made in July from French to Vietnamese authorities, and elections are held in Vietnam. The Canadian Government, therefore, suggests we postpone the Korean move,

2Summarized in circular telegram 749, supra.
which would have undesirable repercussions, and try to solve the NNSC problem in gradual stages. First, we could urge the Swiss and Swedes to accept the Chinese Communist proposal for the time being, leaving one inspection team in each zone. Then we could propose in the Military Armistice Commission a modification of the terms of reference of the inspection teams. Later on, we could see to removing the remaining team.

Mr. Sebald asked confirmation by the Canadian Minister of his understanding that the Canadian Government's views consisted primarily of a relation of the Korean situation to that in Indochina and a recommendation that the suspension of the NNSC operations be deferred. The Canadian Minister agreed. Mr. Sebald said that the U.S. sees no necessary relationship between the Korea and Indochina situations, and believes that the Korea case should be considered on its own merits. The concept of a solution through stages of action in our opinion has been overtaken by developments. We have tried hard with the Swiss and Swedes. The Communists are giving us a run-around, and we want to stop this merry-go-round.

The New Zealand Counselor said the New Zealand Government considered the U.S. draft reply acceptable in its first three paragraphs. They suggested, however, that the opening sentence of the third paragraph be rewritten as follows:

"In the absence of Communist willingness to negotiate on the basis of the UN objectives, the NNSC problem can and should be separated from the problem of unification."

With respect to the NNSC, the New Zealand Government is worried about the UN Command taking responsibility for the action. Despite Communist violations, it is important we not expose ourselves to charges of infringement of the agreement before all means are exhausted. New Zealand suggests a strong statement of support for the Swiss and Swedish proposals, which might encourage the Swiss and Swedes to withdraw, and in any event would make UN Command action more palatable.

The French Minister asked whether we wished to support the Swiss or the Swedish proposal. The French Government understood that the Swiss wished to leave one inspection team in each zone. He was referred to the first paragraph of the Communist note, which indicated some difference between the Swiss and Swedish positions but agreement on withdrawal of all fixed inspection teams to the Demilitarized Zone.

Mr. Hemmendinger asked whether the New Zealand Government suggested approval of the Swiss and Swedish proposals in a public statement or in a diplomatic note. The New Zealand Counselor said that it should be published, but could be written into this
note. Mr. Hemmendinger pointed out that the Swiss and Swedes have urged us not to issue statements associating them with us in the Armistice problems, because of their desire to preserve their neutral status. The New Zealand Counselor said we might explore the possibility with the Swiss and Swedes. He said he interpreted his instructions to indicate that the New Zealand Government reserved its position on action by the UN Command against the NNSC.

The Australian Counselor said he had received only preliminary comment from his Government. The Australian Government agreed with the first three paragraphs of the U.S. draft reply, although believing they might require some redrafting. On the NNSC issue, the Australian Government is anxious to avoid the appearance of unilateral action, which would give the Communists good propaganda material. We must make abundantly clear the Communist responsibility for the breakdown. Tying action against the NNSC with rejection of the Communist conference proposal makes it even more undesirable. The Australian Government suggests that it is better to avoid in our reply any implication action will be taken immediately in the Military Armistice Commission, and defer the action until some later time. The Australian Counselor suggested rephrasing the last paragraph of the draft reply to define the nature of Communist responsibility for the NNSC problem.

Mr. Hemmendinger questioned whether we should load our reply with propaganda on the NNSC, and referred to the contemplated statement in the Military Armistice Commission and past statements we have made there.

The French Minister said the French Government considered the U.S. draft reply acceptable on the whole. They suggest a need for caution in our action against the NNSC because of the situation in Indochina, and that we avoid giving the impression that the UN Command is violating the Armistice Agreement. The French Government suggests the last paragraph of the U.S. draft reply be written in more moderate language. A last approach to the Swiss and Swedes also would be desirable. And finally, when action is taken, it should be taken against the Swiss and Swedes as well as the Czechs and Poles.

Mr. Sebald said that on the whole he was disappointed by the response of the five governments. He said the U.S. has been carrying the main burden in Korea, and has lived with the NNSC problem long enough. We do not wish to go over old ground. We want to solve the problem and create a cleaner situation in the Armistice. We are proposing not the abolition of the NNSC, but merely the provisional suspension of the observation activities within areas under our control. He said he would like to reach closer agreement with the five countries first before approaching the 16. The French Minister
pointed out that the note had long been in our hands, and that others of the 16 would be puzzled by the delay. Mr. Sebald said, however, that he felt a further brief delay would be worthwhile.

Mr. McCardle of the Canadian Embassy inquired concerning the legal grounds for the UN Command action, and was assured our legal case was well-based. Mr. Sebald discussed analogies to contracts in civil law. The British Minister expressed the view that the action was legally well-based. Mr. McCardle said they would be interested in our legal studies on such action. The French Minister suggested we separate our reply into two parts, dealing first with the conference and later with the NNSC. The British Minister said he felt this would play into the Communists' hands. The French Minister suggested that we might make parallel démarches to the Swiss and Swedes as we did in the past. Mr. Sebald commented that they are concerned about their neutral posture, and pressures will not help. The French Minister suggested talking to them without pressures.

Mr. Hemmendinger said that today's meeting seemed to indicate that we are allowing the Communist note to do exactly what was intended—to throw the Allied camp into confusion and delay solution of the whole question of the NNSC. We all agreed this was the Communist purpose, and failure to deal with the NNSC issue in the reply would be to fall into the trap. Mr. Sebald endorsed this statement. He suggested another meeting of the same group should be held before a meeting of the 16, and Mr. Bond concurred. The time set for the next meeting was 3:30 p.m., May 2.³

³The same group met on May 2 and, while Canada and Australia put forward revised drafts of the proposed reply to the Chinese note of April 9, there was little change in the positions taken by the various representatives in the meeting on April 30. (Memorandum of conversation by Norred, May 2; Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/5-256)

138. Telegram From the Embassy in Switzerland to the Department of State¹

Bern, May 1, 1956—10 a.m.

1162. Because of misunderstanding connected with request for appointment first made Saturday morning, saw Petitpierre and Zehnder together 6 a.m. April 30. Explained that consultations among

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/5-156. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Stockholm, Seoul, and Tokyo.
sixteen on reply to Communist Chinese note were in progress and we hoped Swiss would give us advance notice any contemplated action on NNSC (Deptel 1879, April 26).\footnote{Printed as telegram 1145 to Stockholm, Document 135.}

Petitpierre replied Swiss Minister Peking had been given copy Chinese note to be regarded as reply to Swiss approach (Embtel 884, February 17).\footnote{In telegram 884 from Bern, the Embassy reported that the Swiss had delivered an aide-mémoire relating to the NNSC to the Chinese Foreign Ministry in Peking. Zehnder told Willis that the Swiss note was firm in tone, but he did not expect a reply until March. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/2-1755) }

He continued Swiss intend indicate

(1) That proposal for conference is matter outside competence of Swiss,

(2) That although Swiss not satisfied with reduction of fixed teams to one in north and one in south, will agree on practical grounds as it is in line with desire of Swiss to reduce NNSC activities, but

(3) Swiss reserve right to reopen consideration of problem.

I pointed out reduction no solution from United States point of view and had disadvantages described in Deptel 1879.

Arguments failed sway Petitpierre, although he and Zehnder fully cognizant our difficulties. He stated further reduction would be in line with previous efforts of Swiss. Swiss, as they indicated two years ago, would like to have their task in NNSC terminated but they were not prepared to wreck armistice (faire sauter l’armistice) by withdrawing from commission or stipulating that if fixed teams not abolished or stationed in demilitarized zones, Swiss would withdraw. He appeared convinced that accepting proposal to reduce fixed teams to one in north and one in south would constitute further step in direction Swiss seeking proceed.

Petitpierre indicated information conveyed to me would probably be given Communists first through diplomatic channels.\footnote{In telegram 1169 from Bern, May 1, Willis reported that Petitpierre was willing, in light of the conversation reported in telegram 1162, to delay instructions to the Swiss Minister in Beijing for a week or 10 days. (Ibid., 795.00/5-156) } Details of reduction would require later discussion in NNSC and unless acceptable to MAC reduction presumably could not be implemented.

Willis
139. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Sweden

Washington, May 1, 1956—7:25 p.m.

1157. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC. Stockholm's 1028\(^2\) repeated Bern 28 London 68 Paris 72 Tokyo 22 Seoul 20. Bern's 1162\(^3\) repeated Stockholm 40 Seoul 21 Tokyo 20. Request Embassies Stockholm and Bern reiterate U.S. views on Communist counterproposal given our 1145\(^4\) to Stockholm 1879 to Bern and elaborate as follows:

(1) If ports of entry reduced one each side this would require complete reorganization UN Command logistical activities at considerable expense and ultimately result in inefficient, if not altogether unworkable, logistical arrangements easily susceptible to breakdown. Logistical system based on one port of entry would make UNC highly vulnerable in event Communists renew hostilities with air attack. If U.S. continued some use of other ports Communist side and Communist members NNSC obviously would demand frequent inspections and moving teams would create more difficult problem than present fixed teams. (2) For foregoing reasons U.S. would regard action based on ChiCom proposal as unacceptable. (3) Since ChiComs instead of replying to Swedes and Swiss addressed their latest proposal to 16, U.S. sees no reason Swedes and Swiss associate themselves with unacceptable ChiCom proposal before 16 have replied. (4) Urge Swiss and Swedes delay action until 16 decide on reply. (5) We plan inform them of position of 16 before reply to ChiCom's made.

Dulles

\(^1\)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/5-156. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Norred; cleared with UNP, EUR, and L/UNA; and approved by Sebald. Also sent to Bern and repeated to Seoul, Tokyo, London, and Paris.

\(^2\)In telegram 1028 from Stockholm, April 28, the Embassy reported that the Swedish Government continued to hope that the United States would support the proposal to reduce the NNITs to one team each in North and South Korea. (Ibid., 795.00/4-2756)

\(^3\)Supra.

\(^4\)In telegram 1145 to Stockholm, April 26, the Department instructed the Embassy to inform the Swedish Government that the proposed reduction of NNITs to one each in North and South Korea would not eliminate existing problems with the NNSC but would create new problems. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/4-2556)
Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the President

SUBJECT

New Weapons for our Forces in Korea

You asked whether the time has not come when we should publicly announce that we will equip our forces in Korea with the newest types of weapons, because of the impossibility of supplying spare parts and maintenance for the older types.

We think the time is near when this should be done. General Lemnitzer has said that July 1 is the critical date. First, however, we have to solve the problem of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and its teams. The Department of State is informing the other Governments participating in the United Nations action in Korea on May 4 that the United Nations Command plans to suspend provisionally those provisions of the Armistice relating to the operations of the Supervisory Commission and its teams in the south because of the flagrant Communist violations. Some of our important allies with whom we have been consulting are not happy about this course, and we have to make sure that our friends will be prepared to support us when this action by the United Nations Command is considered in the United Nations. Soon after the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams are expelled from the area under the control of the United Nations Command, it will be time, we think, to begin the introduction of new weapons for our forces. We think this can be done as a matter of interpretation of the Armistice Agreement in the light of the actions of the other side. Since the international developments, and in particular the reactions to our expulsion of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, can not altogether be foreseen, we shall have to make a final assessment of the situation before the introduction of new weapons is begun.

Herbert Hoover, Jr.

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.11-El/5-256. Secret. Drafted by Hemmendinger.

2On May 2, President Eisenhower sent a memorandum to Acting Secretary Hoover in which he solicited Hoover’s comments on a number of international problems, including Korea. Eisenhower’s memorandum reads: “With respect to the military disadvantages we are suffering in Korea because of the Armistice and of our failure to have the Armistice Commission removed from Korea, I wonder whether the time has not come when we should not [now?] publicly announce our intention of keeping our forces there equipped with the newest types of weapons, because of the impossibility of supplying spare parts and maintenance for the older types.” (Ibid.)

3Infra.

4Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.
Mr. Murphy recalled that the group had discussed the NNSC problem in 1954 after it became apparent that the Armistice might last indefinitely, and again in 1955. At that time it was hoped the Swiss and Swedish members of the NNSC might negotiate a solution with the Communists, although we recognized that their concern not to jeopardize their neutrality made it unlikely that they would press

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/5–756. Secret. Drafted by Elizabeth A. Brown on May 7.
the Communists to agreement by making clear their intention otherwise to withdraw. Mr. Murphy stated that the only result thus far of the Swiss-Swedish efforts was a reduction of the teams in each zone from five to three, to which the UNC agreed in August 1955. In October 1955 the Swiss and Swedish members proposed removal of these three remaining teams to the Demilitarized Zone, but the proposal was rejected by the Communists with the counterproposal in January 1956 that the teams be reduced from three to one in each zone.

Mr. Murphy recalled the demonstrations in the Republic of Korea last year against the NNSC. The United States had successfully persuaded the Republic of Korea to halt these demonstrations to facilitate the Swiss-Swedish negotiations. However, he emphasized, the Republic of Korea, directly affected by the NNSC operations, could not be expected to bear with the situation indefinitely. Moreover, the United States, as the Unified Command, felt strongly action to eliminate the onerous inequity of the NNSC operations could not be postponed indefinitely.

Mr. Murphy informed the group that on April 9 the British Chargé in Peking had received a note from the Chinese Communists addressed to the Sixteen, copies of which had already been distributed to them. This note was intended obviously to halt negotiations on the NNSC. The United States had prepared a draft reply, which was circulated at the meeting, which rejected the Communist proposal for a new conference on Korea but made clear our willingness to consider any Communist proposals consistent with UN objectives. The United Kingdom, he noted, was willing to transmit the reply on behalf of the Sixteen.

Mr. Murphy pointed out that the draft reply, among other things, described the inequities of the NNSC situation and stated that the UNC would announce its position in the MAC. He emphasized the importance of dealing with this issue in our reply to the note.

Mr. Murphy went on to say that we now had information that the Swiss and Swedish members of the NNSC had reached a firm decision not to withdraw from the Commission without agreement of both sides, and that they intended to accept the Communist proposal to reduce the teams to one in each zone and permit this team to visit the other two ports of entry as required. In his view these facts spoke for themselves as to the practicality of any further approach to

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3See Document 85.
4See Document 89.
5See Document 111.
6See Document 131.
6Attached to Document 133.
the Swiss and Swedes other than to offer them a final choice between withdrawing voluntarily now or doing so when the UNC escorts the Czechs and Poles to the Demilitarized Zone. Mr. Murphy explained that we had requested the Swiss and Swedes to delay their reply to the Communists until after our consultations with the group. However, we had already informed them that the Communist proposal would be unacceptable to us because (a) it would not reduce our difficulties and would create new problems; (b) there was no reason to believe that the Communists would not continue to introduce matériel and personnel without reference to the ports of entry provisions of the Armistice Agreement; and (c) the UNC would be forced either to close all but one port of entry, at considerable expense with the result a less efficient logistical system susceptible to breakdown and highly vulnerable in the event of a Communist renewal of hostilities with air attacks, or to be subjected to constant demands for inspection of the other ports.

Mr. Murphy informed the group that the United States, at approximately the same time as the reply of the Sixteen was delivered to the Chinese Communists, proposed that the UNC make a statement in the MAC reciting the history of the NNSC problem and the exhaustion of all means to remedy it and announcing that it will no longer permit, as long as the Communists are in default, activities of the NNSC within the territory under its control. Therefore, the teams will be moved to the Demilitarized Zone where they can continue to receive reports. Mr. Murphy stated that our action would be based upon Communist violations and obstructions of the Armistice Agreement, particularly its reporting and inspection provisions, and will be stated to be a provisional suspension of our performance under the provisions of the Armistice Agreement governing NNSC operations in our area, while the Communist side remains in default. In the view of the United States these actions constituted legal relief to which we are entitled and was the minimum necessary.

Mr. Murphy recognized that those present would wish to consult their respective governments. However, the matter was urgent, and he suggested the group meet again May 9, at which time he hoped they would have received instructions. He also noted the possibility of press inquiries concerning the present meeting and suggested that nothing be said beyond stating that the meeting was a routine one to review the Armistice situation. Mr. Murphy requested any immediate comments.

Sir Hubert Graves (UK) asked whether the group agreed it would be appropriate for a single note to be addressed to Peking by the UK Chargé on behalf of the Sixteen. There was agreement on this procedure. He noted another procedural problem arising on notes addressed to the Chinese Communists. The United States draft re-
ferred to the "Communist side" and to the "Chinese Communists".
His Government's experience was that, for the note to be accepted,
the reference must be to the "Government of the People's Republic
of China". In place of the reference to the "Communist side" he pro-
posed the phrase "the Chinese and the North Korean side".

Mr. Murphy recognized these problems, expressed tentative
agreement with the British suggestions, but noted the need to con-
sider Taipei in this regard. He thought a satisfactory form of words
could be found without too much difficulty.

Sir Hubert circulated to the group the attached summary of
HMG's views on the Chinese Communist note.\(^7\)

Mr. Murphy inquired whether all agreed there should be no
conference. Mr. Baydur (Turkey) expressed doubt that a conference
would be helpful. Mr. Muller (Belgium) concurred. Mr. Glazebrook
(Canada) likewise considered that a conference would not be fruitful.
Canada was concerned, however, by a problem to which it had pre-
viously drawn attention, the possible relationship between the NNSC
and the Control Commission in Indo-China, for which Canada had a
certain responsibility. Mr. Millet (France) also doubted whether a
conference would serve any useful purpose. At the same time he
noted two considerations regarding the proposed NNSC action: its
possible influence on the situation in Indo-China, and the necessity
of not giving the impression that the UNC is violating the armistice
and of making clear that only a temporary suspension is involved.
France, he indicated, wished to see a last effort made in Bern and
Stockholm to persuade the Swiss and Swedes to leave, although he
agreed with Mr. Murphy's comment that the record showed no pros-
pect for the success of such a move.

Mr. Han (ROK) expressed appreciation for Mr. Murphy's com-
ments regarding the forbearance of his Government. He regarded the
present situation as a very dangerous one; the ROK objected strongly
to the continued presence of the NNSC in its territory and opposed
any further delay in achieving a solution.

Mr. Murphy asked whether Mr. Glazebrook or Mr. Millet would
elaborate on the possible relationship between the ICC in Indo-China
and the NNSC. Mr. Glazebrook suggested that similar principles
were involved. The situation in Viet-Nam was transitional and deli-
cate. The two armistices had been built up over a considerable period
and neither was 100 percent satisfactory. The issue was whether

\(^7\)Not printed. The note expressed the British view that a conference on Korea
"would clearly be abortive and might do more harm than good". In framing a reply to
the Chinese note, the British Government suggested that "it should suggest a willing-
ness to consider concrete proposals, provided there is some indication of a readiness on
the Chinese-North Korean side to come towards the United Nations position".
acting on the unsatisfactory aspects of the Korean Armistice might tend to derogate from the support of the other.

Mr. Muller stated that Belgium opposed any unilateral action on the NNSC problem that appeared to depart from the Armistice Agreement. Mr. Han rejoined that the real question was whether we could permit one side to continue indefinitely to violate the Armistice.

In reply to Mr. Muller’s question whether withdrawal of the teams to the Demilitarized Zone implied complete liberty for the UNC to do as it pleased, Mr. Murphy indicated that our intention was to deal exclusively with the NNSC teams. He repeated that we proposed simply to suspend provisionally our performance under the provisions of the Armistice Agreement governing the NNSC, while the Communist side remains in default. As in all contracts this represented the minimum relief to which we were legally entitled in the face of continued deliberate violations by the other side.

Mr. White (New Zealand) stated his Government agreed a conference would serve no useful purpose. It also recognized the unsatisfactory NNSC situation, but he was without instructions as to how this problem might be handled. He asked whether by referring in the note to the NNSC problem it was intended that all Sixteen would be taking common responsibility not only for the note but also for the proposed NNSC action. Mr. Murphy replied that all the governments contributing to the UNC would mutually share the responsibility. The issue was one of mutual concern.

Baron van Voorst (Netherlands) agreed that the conference proposal should be rejected but questioned the proposed NNSC action on the ground that some kind of control should continue. Mr. Sebald pointed out that our proposal involved merely suspension of the presence of the teams in the south but retention of the existing system in principle. Mr. Blakeney (Australia) likewise felt a conference would not be useful but was concerned as to the methods and tactics on the NNSC problem.

Sir Hubert inquired as to the planned timing and asked specifically whether it was intended to remove the teams simultaneously with the announcement in the MAC or later. Mr. Murphy expressed the view that the actions should be more or less concurrent but requested views on this point.

Mr. Murphy asked again whether all present agreed there should be no conference. Mr. Calingo (Philippines) said he had received no instructions. Mr. Cavalierato (Greece) stated that his Government saw no point in a conference.
It was agreed to meet again May 9.8

8Minister Han remained after the meeting to tell Sebald that he had instructions to inform the United States and the members of the Sixteen that the Republic of Korea considered that the NNSC should be dissolved, and that the proposal to withdraw the NNITs to the demilitarized zone was, therefore, unacceptable. Sebald sympathized with the point of view advanced by Han, but he noted that anything beyond the solution proposed would meet with “irrevocable opposition” among the Sixteen. (Memorandum of conversation by Hemmendinger, May 4; Department of State, NA Files: Lot 59 D 407, Memos and Memcons NNSC 1956)

142. Letter From the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)1


DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Your letter of April 26, 19562 to the Secretary recommending early action to remove the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams from south Korea and to introduce new military equipment into Korea arrived just as the Department of State had begun, with Department of Defense concurrence, a new course of action intended to resolve the inspection team problem along the lines of your recommendation.

We have proposed to officers of the Embassies of the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and France that we respond to the Chinese Communist note of April 9, 1956 not only by rejecting the proposed conference on Korean unification, but also by announcing in the Military Armistice Commission that under the circumstances the United Nations Command proposes provisionally to suspend performance of its obligations to permit operations of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and Neutral Nations Inspection Teams in the area under the control of the United Nations Command. In suspending performance of certain of the duties laid upon us under the Armistice Agreement, we would act with full regard for the provisions of the Armistice Agreement and in reliance on the facts of Communist violations and obstruction. We plan to present this same course of action this week to the officials of the Embassies of all the countries which contributed troops to the United Nations Command.3 It seems clear to the Department of State that

1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/4–2656. Secret. Drafted by Norred and cleared with UNP, L, EUR, and by Murphy.
2Not printed. (Ibid.)
3See the memorandum of conversation, supra.
the Swiss and Swedish negotiations with the Communists have come to an end, and we are hopeful that our Allies can be convinced of the necessity for taking action to resolve the problem. We are doing all in our power to bring the matter to a successful conclusion quickly.

The Department of State concurs in your recommendation that within a reasonable period of time after the resolution of this problem General Lemnitzer be authorized to replace obsolete and worn out equipment by appropriate replacement. The Department of State considers that this can be accomplished legally within the terms of paragraph 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement as a matter of interpretation of the Agreement in the light of the actions of the other side, and should be announced when it is done. It will still be necessary, however, to continue reports on matériel as well as personnel to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. It appears most advisable to inform our Allies beforehand of our contemplated action in view of its political implications. Since the international developments cannot altogether be foreseen, we shall have, of course, to make a final assessment of the situation before the introduction of new weapons is undertaken.

Sincerely yours,

Herbert Hoover, Jr. 4

4Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

143. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions and Consular Offices1

Washington, May 10, 1956—7:16 p.m.

777. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC. Geneva for Johnson. Department’s Circular 749. 2 At May 9 meeting 16 3 Deputy Under Secretary Murphy emphasized US continues believe we can no longer delay action correct prevailing inequitable NNSC situation. He informed


2Document 136.

3A memorandum of conversation at this meeting, prepared by Brown, is in Department of State, UNP Files: Lot 64 D 167, Gen Corresp.
group US had learned Sweden willing postpone reply latest Communist proposal leave one team each side until after 16 decided course action. Murphy then requested views on US proposal (Circular 749).

Australian continued oppose conference as useless but, while recognizing necessity unilateral action on NNSC, questioned whether US proposal best way proceed. He proposed modifying note to Chinese Communists by expanding description inequities in present NNSC situation and possibly detailing Communist violations to demonstrate complete frustration of effective NNSC supervision by Communists. Australia opposed indicating in reply intention take NNSC action and proposed UNC first give notice in MAC of intention suspend provisions Armistice re NNSC, allow time assess reactions Communists and public opinion generally and subject assessment situation then prevailing then remove teams.

Canadian reiterated concern re possible implications proposed NNSC action on situation Indochina and possible effect on existing détente Asia. Canada favored delay between statement in MAC and actual expulsion teams.

Ethiopians and Belgians without instructions. Korea urged complete abolition NNSC. Colombia absent.4

UK took position MAC announcement should not be made until after reply Chinese note transmitted and thereafter Chinese and north Koreans should be given opportunity state views before action taken to eject NNSC teams from south thus giving 16 time for consultation.

Philippines Thailand Turkey and Greece supported US proposal. Dutch also agreed generally but indicated would not oppose delay proposed by Commonwealth since Dutch believed action should be taken with tact and flexibility. Luxembourg supported Dutch views.

New Zealand agreed conference proposal should be rejected but was concerned by possibility UNC might be accused taking precipitate action contrary Armistice obligations in proposing expulsion NNSC. Therefore favored as first step Swiss and Swedish acceptance Communist proposal leave one team each side and stressed need avoid unfavorable reaction from world public opinion.

French expressed concern over possible implications NNSC actions for Indochinese situation, inclined agree with Australian pro-

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4 The Union of South Africa was also without representation at the meeting. Earlier in the day the South African Ambassador, Dr. J.E. Holloway, had informed Murphy that his government had decided to withdraw from participation in the Sixteen. It was agreed, however, that it would be a silent withdrawal, and that no reference to South Africa’s absence would be made at the meeting later in the day. (Memorandum of conversation by Hemmendinger, May 9; ibid., Central Files, 795.00/5–956) Although general reference continued to be made to “the Sixteen,” there were, after May 9, only 15 participants in the discussions which took place in Washington among members of the U.N. Command.
posal and considered Swiss and Swedes should be asked once again withdraw.

Commenting on above Murphy emphasized strong US view announcement on NNSC and action expel teams should be practically simultaneous and pointed out obvious disadvantages giving Communists time in which make propaganda against UNC and possibly rally neutral opinion against proposed course action. He considered 24–48 hours might be permitted elapse between reply Communist note and announcement in MAC and virtually concurrent expulsion teams.

Next meeting of 16 May 16.

Dulles

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144. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom**

*Washington, May 11, 1956—7:50 p.m.*

6833. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Our Circular 777. Complete agreement NNSC action blocked primarily by desire some our Allies for interval between serving notice in MAC and actual removal teams from south Korea for purpose assessing Communist reaction. Department discussing further with UK and Canadian Ambassadors here. Request Embassies discuss at appropriate levels foreign offices along following lines not as formal démarche but as support for consultations Washington: (1) U.S. gratified Allies have reached general consensus recognizing necessity UNC action on NNSC problem. (2) We see nothing to be gained and much to be risked in piecemeal action. Single carefully planned action such as we propose will of course bring Communist charges of violation of Armistice and much protest and propaganda but these would be greatly magnified by piecemeal action giving appearance of equivocation and indecisiveness. Communists would try arouse other governments who might well counsel us against executing action and then be offended if we proceeded anyway. Moreover once announcement had been made we would probably have no alternative but proceed in end regardless reaction under greater difficulties. We have been assessing situation almost three years now and if we are all agreed action necessary

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/5-1156. Secret. Drafted by Norred; cleared with L/UNA, EUR, and UNP; and approved by Murphy. Also sent to Canberra, Wellington, and Paris and repeated to Seoul and Tokyo.

2*Supra.*
seems clear this is one of those situations where you can act or do nothing but are lost if you act indecisively.

Interval would magnify potential of ROK demonstrations and disorders particularly if interval lengthy or indefinite.

Note that U.S. is proposing provisional suspension UNC performance of certain provisions Armistice while Communists remain in default.

For Wellington and Paris and use at discretion by other posts:
Swiss and Swedes never willing confront Communists with alternative their withdrawal and thus have no hope securing Communist agreement. They willing accept Communist suggestion reduce to one team. We deeply appreciative their efforts but consider further approaches useless. However we keeping Swiss and Swedes informed generally our consultations and when course action definitely agreed we would inform them beforehand giving them alternative of acting themselves.

Dulles

145. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 14, 1956

SUBJECT
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Boheman, Embassy of Sweden
Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary
Mr. Hemmendinger, Acting Director, Northeast Asian Affairs
Mr. Crowley, BNA

Ambassador Boheman, who came in at his suggestion, said that he had just returned from Stockholm. He had been startled upon arriving there to find that the Swedish and Swiss Governments were proposing to accept the Communist proposal to reduce the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams to one in each zone. He had been instrumental in persuading the Foreign Office that this was not a good idea and he was quite sure that this idea had now been dropped. He could assure the Department of State that no reply to the Communists would be made until the Sixteen had replied to the Chinese Communist note. If he understood the situation correctly, that reply

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/5–1456. Official Use Only. Drafted by Hemmendinger.
would be negative on the question of a conference and would indicate that the participating nations were not content with the NNSC situation. He thought, the Ambassador continued, that this would put the Swedish Government in position to renew the proposal that the teams be withdrawn altogether to the Demilitarized Zone, and he was personally of opinion that the Communists would then accept this proposal.

Mr. Robertson asked what reason there was to believe that the Communists would accept this proposal, since they had not done so in the past and it was difficult to see what would impel them to do so now. The Ambassador said that there had been a conversation with Chou En-lai and the new Swedish Ambassador in Peiping in connection with the Chinese Communist note to the Sixteen, and while there may have been some problems of translation of what was said, the substance of it seemed to be that Chou En-lai had said he realized that the conference proposal would probably be rejected and that if that happened, the Chinese Communists would have to consider what to do next. Mr. Robertson said that our information from Bern and from Stockholm had been that the Swiss and Swedish Governments were definitely unwilling to say that they would withdraw from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission if the proposal to withdraw the teams to the Demilitarized Zone was not accepted. The Ambassador confirmed that his Foreign Office remained unwilling to go that far.

Mr. Hemmendinger referred to the recent conversation between Mr. Sebald and Count Douglas,² in which Count Douglas had been informed that the United States had placed a proposal before the Sixteen that the United Nations Command announce in the Military Armistice Commission the provisional suspension of the operation of the provisions of the Armistice relating to the activities of the NNSC in our zone. Ambassador Boheman professed ignorance of this proposal and said that if this were done it would, of course, end the matter so far as his Government was concerned. Mr. Hemmendinger raised the question whether knowledge through press sources that such a proposal was made might lead the Communists to accept the Swiss and Swedish proposals to withdraw to the Demilitarized Zone. He pointed out that there had been a report in a Zurich newspaper that the United States had proposed unilateral action to the Sixteen and that the Communists might have picked up this information. The Ambassador commented that it was not certain what the Communist reaction would be, that it might be against accepting the Swiss and Swedish proposals in that case.

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²A memorandum of the conversation between Sebald and Douglas on May 4, drafted by Hemmendinger, is *ibid.*, 795.00/5–456.
The Ambassador mentioned that when he was in Stockholm he had brought personally to the attention of the Foreign Minister a little book published by a Swedish member of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, which had graphically described the precautions which it had been necessary for the United Nations Command to take in protecting the members of the teams.

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146. Editorial Note

On May 15, presidential elections were held in the Republic of Korea. Syngman Rhee was reelected President with a popular majority of 55.6 percent. Rhee's principal opponent, Democratic Nationalist Party leader Sin Ik-hui, died shortly before the election. In a closely-contested election, Democratic candidate Chang Myon was elected Vice President over Liberal Party candidate Yi Ki-pung.

After the election, President Rhee reorganized the government and upper levels of the military establishment. Yi Ki-pung continued as Liberal Party Chairman and Speaker of the Assembly, but Yi Ik-hung replaced Kim Hyong-gun as Home Minister. Kim Yong-u replaced Admiral Sohn Won-il as Defense Minister; In Tae-sik was appointed Minister of Finance; former Finance Minister Kim Hyon-chol became Minister of Reconstruction and Economic Coordinator; and Paek Tu-chin, the former Economic Coordinator, was dropped from the government. In the upper ranks of the military, the most significant change was the appointment of General Yi Hyung-kun to the post of Chief of Staff of the Army. General Yi replaced General Chong Il-kwon, who was appointed to Yi's former position as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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147. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 22, 1956

SUBJECT

Chinese Communist April 9 Note, and NNSC

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/5-2256. Secret. Drafted by Nes.
PARTICIPANTS

Sir Hubert Graves, Minister, British Embassy
Mr. Youde, Second Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. William J. Sebald, Deputy Assistant Secretary, FE
Mr. David G. Nes, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs, NA
Mr. Charles Runyon, L/UNA

Mr. Sebald said that he had asked Sir Hubert to come in in order to advise him of our decision with respect to the differences of views which remained following the last meeting of the Sixteen. The differences involved an interval between the announcement in the Military Armistice Commission of the United Nations Command's intention to remove the NNSC teams from south Korea and the implementation of that decision. Mr. Sebald said that reluctantly, but in order to achieve as great a unanimity as possible on the proposed NNSC action, we had agreed to Sir Hubert's proposal that a "few days" intervene between the announcement and the action. We interpreted a "few days" to mean seven. Also in accord with the desires of the United Kingdom we would make available to the Sixteen the report of the Military Armistice Commission meeting immediately and the time interval would run from the receipt of this report. Mr. Sebald expressed the hope that all of this was satisfactory to the British and suggested that Sir Hubert might talk to the Commonwealth countries prior to the next meeting of the Sixteen and endeavor to obtain their concurrence also.

Sir Hubert confirmed that our proposed course of action was acceptable and said he would do his best to bring along the Commonwealth, but could not, of course, guarantee agreement by all of them.

Mr. Youde asked whether as a matter of mechanics the Military Armistice Commission report would be circulated before or at a meeting of the Sixteen. Mr. Sebald agreed that the report could be distributed to the interested embassies as soon as received in the Department and that then a meeting of the Sixteen could be called three or four days later to discuss it. This would permit the embassies to get in touch with their governments.

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*The third meeting of the Sixteen to consider a reply to the Chinese note of April 9 took place in the Department on May 16. Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and France favored a delay of at least a few days between the announcement in the MAC of the intention of the UNC to remove the NNSTs from South Korea and their expulsion. Murphy replied that the Department must consult with the military and emphasized that the UNC would be obliged to act immediately in the event of a rapid and serious deterioration of the situation following the MAC announcement. A drafting committee of the United States, United Kingdom, and Thailand was established to draft a reply to the Chinese note. A memorandum of conversation at this meeting, prepared by Brown, was circulated to 22 Embassies in CA-9315, May 23. (Ibid., 795.00/5-2356)*
Sir Hubert asked whether we expected him to talk to the French also, and Mr. Sebald agreed that he should appropriately limit himself to the Commonwealth countries.

Mr. Sebald then raised the question of our reply to the Chinese Communist April 9 note, and said that we had two ideas and in both had incorporated the Australian suggestions. The reply could consist of our original draft, plus the Australian paragraphs and refer to the Communists and north Koreans as "Communists" or could take the form of a British note replying on behalf of the United Nations Command. Sir Hubert said that his Government was also prepared to support the Australian suggestions or their amalgamation into our draft and that his Embassy had also prepared several alternatives. He then passed copies of the British and Australian drafts. The British draft took the form of a short covering note transmitting on behalf of the United Nations Command a memorandum expressing their views.

Mr. Sebald said that at first glance he liked the British form, but that we would naturally desire an opportunity to go over both drafts prior to a meeting of the drafting committee.

It was agreed that an attempt would be made to set up a meeting with the drafting committee at 2:30, May 23, and that if agreement could be reached on a draft reply a meeting of the Sixteen would be called for Friday, May 25.

Mr. Sebald expressed the hope that agreement could be reached at this meeting of the Sixteen both on an NNSC course of action and the text of a reply to the Communist note.

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3Not found attached.
4The drafting committee met in the Department on May 23 and agreed upon the text of a draft reply to the Chinese note. (Memorandum of conversation by Nes, May 23; Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/5-2356) A copy of this draft, which was ultimately adopted by the Sixteen, is ibid., Seoul Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 69, 321.9-NNSC Vol. II-May, June 1956.
5See Document 149.
148. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at the Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Washington, May 23, 1956, 3:30 p.m.¹

[Here follow a list of 23 persons present and discussion of unrelated subjects. Attending for the Joint Chiefs of Staff were Radford, Twining, Burke, and Pate. Vice Chief of Staff General Williston B. Palmer represented the Army. The Department of State officials included Murphy; Loy W. Henderson, Deputy Under Secretary for Administration; Leo G. Cyr, Director of the Office of African Affairs; and William R. Tyler, Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs. Robert Amory, Deputy Director for Intelligence, attended on behalf of the CIA.]

5. NNSC

Mr. Murphy described the current status of discussions with the fifteen powers participating in the UN command. He said that agreement to the withdrawal of the neutral teams from South Korea had been reached but that there had been some difference over the time interval to be permitted between the announcement in the Military Armistice Commission and the actual removal of the teams. At a meeting on May 25 the U.S. believes that it will get general agreement to a seven-day interval. Admiral Radford commented that this seemed to be all right; it would give the neutral teams time to pack their clothes at least. He asked whether General Lemnitzer and the ROK are being kept informed. Mr. Murphy replied that an ROK representative has been attending the meetings in Washington and that General Lemnitzer is being kept informed by telegram.

Admiral Radford inquired about Article 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement, noting that we are taking great risks because we are not able to keep the military efficiency of our forces in Korea at the necessary level. The Admiral suggested that perhaps we could get the Japanese to agree to lengthen runways in Japan if we could tell them that we were in a position to pull our air forces out and send them to Korea. He noted that General Taylor feels July 1 is the target date for favorable action on Article 13(d).

Mr. Murphy said he thought it would be inadvisable to raise this matter with the UN group. Admiral Radford agreed and said that he thought the UN commander in the field should take the necessary action as a military matter and that the subject of 13(d) should not be raised formally with other UN representatives. Mr. Murphy agreed and said we might use the theory that time had overtaken

this aspect of the agreement. He added that the possibility exists that the communists might denounce the Korean Armistice Agreement if we should take any formal action on Article 13(d). Admiral Radford said that he did not think this would be the result if we went ahead and brought in military equipment as necessary. Admiral Radford and Mr. Murphy agreed that it would probably not be advisable to make reports of new equipment brought in to Korea.

Mr. Murphy said the Department would look into the problem of Article 13(d).

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

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149. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions and Consular Offices¹

Washington, May 25, 1956—5:39 p.m.

823. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC. Geneva for Johnson. Agreement reached meeting Sixteen May 25² proceed as follows in replying Communist note and removing NNSC south Korea.

1. British Chargé Peiping will deliver note replying on behalf Sixteen on or about May 28. Reply will reject conference proposal, state NNSC inequitable burden on UN side and that UNC will announce its position MAC.

2. Upon receipt confirmation British note delivered UNC will be instructed call MAC meeting and announce that it will provisionally suspend during time Communist side continues in default performance of those provisions Armistice governing operations UNC area of NNSC and NNIT and that this suspension will be put into effect in about one week.

3. UN Command to be instructed telegraph report MAC meeting including full coverage Communist reaction. Four or five days following distribution this report to representatives Sixteen Washington Sixteen will meet consult re Communist reaction.

4. NNSC will be removed from UN Command Zone seven days following distribution MAC report Sixteen.


²A memorandum of conversation at the May 25 meeting, drafted by Brown on May 28, is ibid., UNP Files: Lot 64 D 167, Gen Corresp.
5. We intend inform Swiss and Swedes of reply Communist note and impending NNSC action same time note delivered Peiping. We will inform them Communist MAC reaction at same time Sixteen informed.

Dulles

150. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea

Washington, June 1, 1956—6:24 p.m.

778. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC. Your 1209. Text UK note follows:8

"1. On instructions from Her Majesty’s Principal Secretary State for Foreign Affairs, I have to refer to Your Excellency’s note April 9 concerning difficulties NNSC in Korea and proposing a conference on withdrawal foreign forces from Korea and unification of Korea.

"2. Her Majesty’s Government in the UK, in accordance with request in Your Excellency’s note April 9 has transmitted that note to other Governments of UNC, who, after consultation, have requested Her Majesty’s Government reply on their behalf.

"3. Governments of UNC have long regarded frustration of the hopes of the Korean people for unification their country as basic problem in Korea. At Geneva they set forth in detail their position with regard to just settlement this problem in conformity with objectives of UN. This position was reiterated at past two sessions GA, where it was endorsed by overwhelming majority of members of UN.

"4. With regard to proposal of People’s Republic of China and north Korean regime for conference on withdrawal foreign troops and unification of Korea, Governments of UNC not aware any change in position People’s Republic of China and north Korean regime which would render such conference fruitful. Governments of UNC remain ready discuss unification on basis UN objectives. If People’s Republic of China and north Korean regime have concrete proposals for settlement Korean question in conformity objectives UN, they are prepared give such proposals every consideration.

"5. In absence willingness People’s Republic of China and north Korean regime negotiate on basis UN objectives, NNSC problem can and should be separated from problem unification. Pending agreement unification, Armistice Agreement remains in force Korea, and

1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/6–156. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Nesi and approved by Hemmendinger. Repeated to Tokyo.
2In telegram 1209 from Seoul, June 1, the Embassy asked for a copy of the note. (ibid.) The text of the note is also printed in Department of State Bulletin, June 11, 1956, p. 970.
8The British Chargé in Beijing delivered the note on May 28.
all parties concerned should endeavor maintain effectiveness Armis-
tice and correct problems that arise regarding it. Governments UNC
wish reaffirm their support Armistice Agreement and their intention
contribute peace in the area.

"6. Governments UNC cannot accept statement in note of April
9, 1956 that People’s Republic of China and north Korean regime
have 'endeavored unceasingly try mitigate', difficulties encountered
by Governments Sweden and Switzerland their work in NNSC, since
these difficulties have in fact been created by the conduct of Chi-
nese-north Korean side itself. Proposals of Swiss and Swedish Gov-
ernments referred to [in] note of April 9, 1956 (which governments
UNC regard as reasonable and which have their full support) were
made necessary by policy of systematic frustration of functions of
NNSC which Chinese-north Korean side has followed ever since Ar-
mistice Agreement first signed. Chinese-north Korean side has per-
sisted introducing military personnel and supplies into Korea through
other points entry than those provided for Armistice Agreement, and
has failed report these introductions NNSC. Through obstruction of
Czech and Polish members NNSC the UNC has been effectively pre-
vented from having its charges of such introductions investigated. In
short, Chinese-north Korean side has completely frustrated any ef-
fective supervision by NNSC in area north DZ. Under these circum-
stances, activities of Czech and Polish components NNSC south of
DZ are an inequitable burden on UN side. UNC will announce its
position this matter fully in MAC. 4

"7. In light foregoing and having regard attitude Chinese-north
Korean side with respect its obligations toward NNSC, as shown by
its conduct in practice, governments of UNC believe that no evidence
has been shown of good faith which alone could enable any new
conference to serve useful purpose. Until Chinese-north Korean side
prepared negotiate sincerely on basis UN objectives, Governments
UNC believe that another conference would only bring about repeti-
tion of deadlock which resulted Geneva 1954."

Two copies above pouched Seoul May 26.

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4At the 70th meeting of the Military Armistice Commission, May 31, General
Robert G. Gard, Senior UNC Member of the Commission, made a statement reviewing
the failure of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to function as intended.
General Gard ascribed full responsibility for the failure of the NNSC to lack of coop-
eration on the part of the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers
in North Korea, and to obstruction by the Czech and Polish members of the NNSC.
Because the NNSC was prevented from performing its intended function, he conclud-
ed, “the United Nations Command is now notifying your side and the Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission and its subordinate teams at Inchon, Pusan and Kunsan that
the United Nations Command will provisionally suspend, during the time that your
side continues in default, performance on its part of those provisions of the Armistice
Agreement governing the operations in the area under the control of the United Na-
tions Command of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the Neutral Na-
tions Inspection Teams”. He added that the suspension would be put into effect “in
about one week” and that the U.N. Command would expect withdrawal of the teams
to be effected by that time. (UNCMAC telegram MAC 6–5–41 to CINCUNC, May 31;
Department of State, Seoul Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 69, Military Armistice Commission
Jan–June 1956)
151. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 4, 1956

SUBJECT

Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC)

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Arthur J. de la Mare, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Youde, Second Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. Noel Hemmendinger, Acting Director, NA
Mr. David G. Nes, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs, NA

Mr. de la Mare referred to a report received from the British Chargé at Peiping over the week end indicating that the Chinese Communists were now ready to accept the Swedish proposal, namely, that the NNSC be withdrawn to the Demilitarized Zone, but that mobile inspection teams continue to operate on request in both north and south Korea. From today’s press reports it appeared that the Communists had in fact made this proposal in the MAC meeting early today. If this were the case, his Government considered this a “most satisfactory outcome”. On instructions from the Foreign Office, Mr. de la Mare stated that his Government desired us to authorize the UN Command to accept in principle the Communist proposal, to take no action to expel the NNSC teams from south Korea, and to begin negotiations within the MAC toward the withdrawal of the NNSC to the Demilitarized Zone and toward provision for the future operation of mobile teams. Mr. de la Mare repeated that until all of this was explored his Government hoped that the UN Command would take no further action toward removing the NNSC. From today’s press reports Mr. de la Mare gave as his opinion that General Gard had rejected the Communist compromise “out of hand” and had placed us “on the hook” since in our reply to their

1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/6-456. Confidential. Drafted by Nes.

2Telegram FE 201951 from CINCUNC to the Secretary of Defense for Assistant Secretary Gray, June 4, conveyed a verbatim transcript of the 71st meeting of the Military Armistice Commission on June 4. The KPA/CPV representative opened the meeting with a prepared response to the UNC statement by General Gard at the previous meeting. (See footnote 4, supra.) In his statement, the KPA/CPV representative denied responsibility for the difficulties experienced by the NNSC, ascribed such difficulties to the UNC, called its announcement that the NNITs would be withdrawn to the demilitarized zone a violation of the Armistice Agreement, and demanded that the announcement be withdrawn. In the charge and countercharge that followed, the KPA/CPV representative also noted that his “side” was prepared to accede to the proposal made by Sweden in March to withdraw the NNITs to the demilitarized zone, while reserving the right to despatch mobile teams as needed. General Gard rejected this proposal as unacceptable. (Department of State, NA Files: Lot 59 D 407, Defense Cables In and Out NNSC 1956)
April 9 note we had said that we supported the Swedish proposals. Now a few days later we were rejecting them.

Mr. Hemmendinger in reply stated that Communist acceptance of the old Swedish proposals did not cure the defect with respect to the operation of the NNSC and its teams which was the primary reason for our action. That action consisted of provisionally suspending NNSC operations in South Korea until such time as the Communist default had been rectified. Accordingly, if press reports were accurate General Gard acted correctly since anything else he might have done would have greatly weakened our position with respect to the Communist defective performance.

It was agreed that further consideration of the situation must await an accurate report of today's MAC meeting and, in particular, a report of the true substance of the Communist proposal. Mr. Hemmendinger suggested that the Sixteen meet as scheduled tomorrow at which time the report from Panmunjom should have been received.

152. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions and Consular Offices

Washington, June 4, 1956—12:55 p.m.

845. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC. Geneva for Johnson. Stockholm's 1125. Embassies Bern and Stockholm should confirm to Governments intention UN Command continue reporting entry and departure South Korea personnel and combat equipment to MAC and NNSC.


2In telegram 1125 from Stockholm, Ambassador Cabot reported that he had informed the Swedish Foreign Minister about the UNC decision to remove the NNTs to the demilitarized zone. The Foreign Minister seemed "almost relieved" and asked if the NNSC would continue to receive reports in the demilitarized zone. (Ibid., 795.00/5-2956)

3In a memorandum to Murphy on June 1, Robertson posed the question of whether the U.N. Command should continue to make reports to the NNSC in the demilitarized zone. Robertson proposed a meeting on June 4 to discuss the question. A marginal notation in Hemmendinger's hand on a copy of the memorandum indicates that Murphy, Robertson, Phleger, Bond, and Hemmendinger were the principal participants at the meeting held on June 4, and that it was agreed at the meeting that reporting should continue, and that new equipment should be introduced into South Korea as a matter of "interpretation". (Ibid., NA Files: Lot 59 D 407, Memos and Memcons NNSC 1956)
Sixteen informed May 4 meeting NNSC would continue receive UN Command reports in DZ and if question raised other Embassies may confirm this as U.S. position.

Hoover

153. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea

Washington, June 5, 1956—8:22 p.m.

788. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC. Meeting of 16 June 5 considered reports by UN Command of MAC May 31 and June 4 meetings. In June 4 meeting Communists indicated willingness agree temporary withdrawal of teams DZ provided right retained despatch teams ports of entry on request. Information received Swedish Ambassador Washington communicated 16 that Swedish Government instructing Chief Delegate NNSC propose immediately in NNSC with regard situation resulting UNC removal notice that teams withdraw provisionally DZ from south and north Korea. If this proposal not accepted by NNSC, Swedish Delegate instructed order Swedish representatives proceed DZ. Sixteen further informed basis information from Swedish Ambassador that Chinese Communists gave Swedish Government written reply June 2 accepting March 16 Swedish proposal withdraw temporary DZ but reserving right of NNSC send teams north and south Zones as need arose. Meeting had no authoritative information Swiss position but was informed of report meeting of NNSC had been called by Swiss and Swedes for June 5.

In light above British have taken position UNC action remove NNSC and NNITs to DZ should be delayed pending full clarification Swiss and Swedish intentions. British hope removal can be accomplished voluntary basis rather than by UNC. British also pointed out their May 28 note says 16 fully support Swedish proposal.

U.S. said could not accept any change in schedule for removal June 9 but pointed out several days remain for further study situation and suggested 16 meet June 6 or 7 when further information Swiss and Swedish intentions should be available. Group assured removal not to be effected by Command until further instructions from Washington.

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/6-556. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Nes and Hemmendinger; approved by Jones; and cleared with WE, UNP, and L/UNA. Also sent to Bern, Stockholm, London, and Tokyo.

2See footnote 4, Document 150, and footnote 2, Document 151.
Report niant any information results NNSC June 5 meeting or Swiss and Swedish intentions.3

Embassies Stockholm and Bern may inform Governments we still intend proceed with removal June 9 and would naturally welcome voluntary withdrawal part NNSC or Swiss and Swedes acting independently prior that date, but will have to stand by our MAC statement re conditions re-entry.

Dulles

3In telegram 1221 from Seoul, June 6, the Embassy reported that UNCMAC had received a letter dated June 5, signed by all of the members of the NNSC, in which the NNSC unanimously recommended that the MAC agree to provisional withdrawal of the NNITs to the demilitarized zone. The NNSC considered the withdrawal to be provisional in the sense that it did not change the legal status of the NNSC. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/6-656)

154.  Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions1

Washington, June 8, 1956—7:29 p.m.

860. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC. British Minister acting on Foreign Office instructions made official démarche June 82 on decision UNC as result June 7 MAC meeting proceed on basis May 31 announcement (CINCUNC message FE 202012)3 and U.S. refusal thereafter delay notification to NNSC. June 74 and 8 British requested we instruct UNC defer notification to NNSC to withdraw in attempt obtain voluntary withdrawal based on MAC authorization, and asked


2A memorandum of conversation among British Minister Graves, British Counselor de la Mare, Hemmenbinder, and Nes, prepared by Nes, is ibid.

3Telegram FE 202012, June 7, from CINCUNC to the Secretary of Defense for Assistant Secretary Gray, conveyed a verbatim transcript of the 72d meeting of the MAC on June 7. The KPA/CPV representative agreed, in light of the unanimous recommendation by the NNSC, that the NNITs should be temporarily withdrawn to the demilitarized zone, but insisted that the NNSC retain the authority to despatch mobile teams as necessary. General Gard refused to accept the conditions for agreement, and the meeting adjourned on Gard's observation that the UNC intended to effect the withdrawal as announced on May 31. (Ibid., NA Files: Lot 59 D 407, Defense Cables In and Out NNSC 1956)

4A memorandum of a telephone conversation between Graves and Hemmendinger, prepared by Hemmendinger, is ibid., Central Files, 795.00/6-756.
for meeting Sixteen to consider situation. Both requests were declined.

British position contains following main points:

1. In May 28 reply Communist April 9 note, 16 including U.S. supported proposal NNSC withdrawal to DZ while retaining right despatch teams to designated ports when need arose.
2. During June 4 and 7 MAC meetings Communist side accepted withdrawal on this basis.
3. In rejecting this offer UNC took position inconsistent 16's May 28 note and thereby precluding voluntary withdrawal by agreement all parties.
4. HMG if questioned would be forced say that although had approved UNC action in principle had not been fully consulted by U.S. re manner implementation.

In oral reply Department maintained:

1. UNC action from start based on Communist violations Armistice and our legal right take action protect our interests. Therefore impossible agree to right NNSC send teams back south Korea while Communists continued in default.
2. Swiss had never agreed to withdrawal with conditions and Swedes themselves had withdrawn from their original proposal.
3. NNSC itself recommended to MAC unconditional withdrawal which we accepted and Communists rejected.
4. To have accepted Communist conditions during June 4 and 7 MAC meetings would have required abandonment entire May 31 position and support something now unacceptable both Swiss and Swedes.
5. No purpose could have been served by delaying UNC action further following June 7 MAC meeting since then clear agreement not possible on basis NNSC recommendation and we could not accept Communist conditions.
6. Within time limits dictated by Communists we made every effort consult with 16 and UNC action entirely in accord instructions made known to 16 on June 6.5

French and Netherlands expressed views similar British also under instructions.6 Australians and Canadians discussed matter with

5Hemmendinger explained to representatives of the Sixteen that the U.N. Command intended to proceed with the announced withdrawal, to be accomplished by June 9. The Australian, New Zealand, and Netherlands representatives argued for flexibility rather than a firm deadline, but Hemmendinger gave no indication that the United States considered the matter open to further discussion. (Memorandum of conversation by Brown, June 6; ibid., UNP Files: Lot 64 D 167, Gen Corresp)

6Minister Millet informed Hemmendinger on June 8 that the French Government was concerned over the "hasty" decision to proceed with the removal of the NNSC teams from South Korea, and felt that the action should be held up briefly. (Memorandum of conversation by Norred, June 8; ibid., Central Files, 795.00/6-856) Netherlands Minister Baron S.G.M. van Voorst also called on Hemmendinger on June 8 to state that he had received instructions from his government to inform the Department that the Netherlands felt that the United States had not used the possibilities open to
Department primarily from standpoint explaining U.S. position to Foreign Offices.

British fear lest Communists exploit our endorsement Swedish proposal May 28 note while rejecting same proposal June 4 MAC meeting.

FYI: British reply Chinese Communist note said 16 supported Swiss and Swedish proposals referred to in that note thus permitting interpretation 16 supported proposal NNSC withdraw while retaining right send teams military zones. This resulted from inadvertence in joint drafting. Actually Swiss never supported such conditional withdrawal and such conditional withdrawal cannot be reconciled with position taken by UNC in MAC on May 31 of which 16 fully informed at time note to Peiping approved. End FYI.

Apparent inconsistency May 28 note and positions May 31 MAC announcement discussed with Allies here but should not be discussed publicly. If necessary explain you should say British note expressed situation before UNC statement in MAC and before unanimous NNSC recommendation to MAC that all teams be withdrawn without conditions attached.

Department expressed hope to British they would not publicly indicate difference this issue.  

Dulles

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it to get the Swedish proposal accepted. He asked that CINCUNC be instructed to delay removal of the NNITs and seek to secure agreement on withdrawal of the teams. (Memorandum of conversation by Norred, June 8; ibid.)

7On June 9, the U.N. Command removed the 16 remaining NNSC personnel from the Republic of Korea to Panmunjom without incident. (Telegram 1237 from Seoul, June 9; ibid., 795.00/6–956) The British Government did not indicate publicly that it considered the UNC action to be precipitate.
155. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs in the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Ockey) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Economic Affairs (Jones)¹

Washington, June 8, 1956.

SUBJECT

Report on Korea to the Prochnow Committee²

Attached is a summary report on the findings and recommendations on aid programs in Korea for the Prochnow Committee.³ You will recall that the Prochnow Committee was established to conduct a thorough review and analysis of the aid programs in certain countries where unusually heavy military and economic aid programs are involved. The Prochnow Committee will consider the attached report and submit it to the NSC.⁴

You will note that the report does not make a specific recommendation on the course of action to be followed in Korea. Rather, the basic alternative courses of action are outlined. The findings and recommendations are outlined below:

Findings:

1. A continuation of the present military establishment and economic development program in Korea will cost the U.S. from $650 million to $900 million annually for the next five years, at which time Korea will not be appreciably less dependent upon external aid than is now the case.

2. The morale, training, and capability of the ROK military forces to conduct a short, successful defense are good. However, the military forces are suffering from growing obsolescence of military equipment. The cost of maintaining the present military force in Korea will be roughly $650 million a year indefinitely, consisting of

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.5-MSP/6-856. Secret. Drafted by Smith of NA.

²The Prochnow Committee, formally An Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programs, was established by the NSC on December 8, 1955, to prepare reports on the coordination of military and economic aid programs in Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Vietnam, the Republic of China, and Korea. The committee was headed by Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Herbert V. Prochnow and consisted of representatives of the Departments of State, Defense, and the Treasury, the Bureau of the Budget, ICA, and CIA.

³Not printed.

⁴After receiving and approving the assigned country reports, including the report on Korea, which were prepared by interdepartmental drafting groups, the Prochnow Committee submitted a final composite report to the NSC on August 3, 1956. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5610 Series) This report was discussed by the NSC at its 301st meeting on October 26, 1956, and the question of economic and military aid was referred to the Planning Board for further study.
$500 million in dollar aid and $150 million local currency which must be met indirectly with U.S. aid.

3. Although the economy has for the most part been reconstructed and prewar consumption and production levels have been reached, there appears to be no prospect for Korean economic viability.

Recommendations:

The recommendations are stated in the form of 4 alternative courses of action:

1. Continue the existing policy with its implication of an annual cost to the U.S. of from $650 million to $850 million indefinitely. Even with this aid military equipment will become obsolescent and the economic situation will be unsatisfactory.

2. Increase the economic aid. The possibility of increasing the rate of economic development, however, seems limited.

3. Reduce military costs. While this seems to be the most possible alternative to the present course of action it is fraught with serious political and military risks.

4. Reduce the economic aid program. This would result in a reduction of consumption or investment and would create political problems with the ROK.

156. Memorandum From Charles Runyon of the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs to the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Bond)¹

Washington, June 14, 1956.

SUBJECT

Korean Armistice

As you know, our inflexibility has led us to lose chances to come out of the NNSC matter with agreement on removal to the DZ and a simple reservation of the position of all concerned on special inspections from the DZ. Our allies have protested our actions in this matter.

While we might still, in a General Assembly debate, be able to rely on the support of the “16” for the May 31 statement,² and their

¹Source: Department of State, UNP Files: Lot 64 D 167, Gen Corresp. Secret.
²See footnote 4, Document 150.
silence on its execution, the type of official leaking rather strongly evidenced by the Leviero story on page 1 of today's New York Times\(^3\) will make our case most difficult.

As Defense has advised the UNC, our plan regarding obsolescence has been to authorize replacement on the theory that paragraph 13 (d) does not require the strained construction that "same" type and effectiveness means identical designation, vintage, and absolute qualities. In construing paragraph 13 (d) in accordance with the purposes and aims of the Armistice Agreement and with regard for the practical construction put on it by the other side, we can act lawfully and with a proper regard for our responsibilities as a nation that respects the law and its own promises.

I do not know that measures you can or might wish to recommend to the Secretary or Mr. Murphy regarding the Leviero story, and, more fundamentally, Defense’s penchant for defying the law and the sensibilities of our allies; it must be borne in mind that both sides can violate an agreement, and that reinvocation of the protected sanctuary argument is not likely to win a case in the United Nations General Assembly.

In short, the legal implications of the situation are that unless Defense and State immediately agree to abide by the previously projected U.S. position on full reporting and a reasonable and conscientious interpretation and application of Article 13 (d), the United States will have been guilty of violating the Korean Armistice by measures going well beyond any mere suspended performance warranted by past Communist violations. If Defense considers this an incorrect reading of the law, it would be possible to put the question to the International Court of Justice for advisory opinion, as the General Counsel's Office of Defense itself suggested regarding the NNSC, although I would question the propriety of considering the ICJ as the forum to settle a State-Defense difference when there is an excellent chance in the present situation of having our actions soundly criticized by that tribunal.

I attach in the form of a draft letter a suggestion of the position we should take with Defense.\(^4\)

\(^3\)The article by Anthony Leviero was run under the headline “Korea Arms Curb Held Unfair to U.S.” Leviero pointed out that Pentagon officials were concerned about the deteriorating position of the U.N. Command in Korea, hampered by the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, while North Korean forces were being reinforced in violation of the Agreement.

\(^4\)Not printed. The letter proposed by Runyon would have called on the Department of Defense to avoid any further linking of the NNSC withdrawal with the replacement problem. The letter proposed by Runyon was not sent, but see the letter from Murphy to Gray, infra.
157. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Gray)\(^1\)

Washington, June 17, 1956.

Dear Mr. Gray: You have doubtless read an article in the "New York Times" of June 14, 1956 by Mr. Anthony Leverto (page 1, column 5),\(^2\) which purports to state the views of the Department of Defense on the Armistice Agreement in Korea, and particularly the problem of obsolescence of weapons.

I am concerned about the central thesis of this article that the Armistice Agreement precludes the replacement of obsolete material and that therefore the United States should not slavishly observe the terms of the truce. This view is not in accord with the views of the Departments of Defense and State, as set forth in a telegram to CINCUNC on June 24, 1955 (Defense message 983878),\(^3\) stating that the problem of obsolescence can be met by a reasonable and conscientious construction of the Armistice Agreement. Acting Secretary of State Hoover restated this view in his letter to Secretary of Defense Wilson on May 5, 1956.\(^4\)

It is important that the Departments of State and Defense follow a consistent line, and make publicly clear that the United Nations Command will continue to observe the Armistice Agreement and that we believe the problem of obsolescence of equipment can be met within the terms of the Armistice Agreement. It is suggested that officers of our two Departments state the United States' position accordingly in background briefings of the press or in response to questions.

The Department of State will be prepared to consult soon with the Department of Defense upon the timing of the introduction of new types of weapons as agreed to in our letter of May 5, and we will have to consider further at that time our public position with respect to the action taken.\(^5\)

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\(^1\)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/6-1556. Secret. Drafted by Norred and cleared with L/UNA, UNP, and EUR.
\(^2\)See footnote 3, supra.
\(^3\)See footnote 4, Document 110.
\(^4\)Document 142.
\(^5\)Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Perkins McGuire responded for Gray in a letter to Murphy on June 27. McGuire agreed that it was important to follow a consistent line in dealing with the press and indicated that the appropriate offices in the Department of Defense would be instructed to adhere to the view that "the resolution of the problem of obsolescence can be accomplished legally within the terms of paragraph 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement as a matter of interpretation of the Agreement in the light of the actions of the other side." He added that the Department of Defense would be prepared early in July to indicate the type and number of new weap-
Sincerely yours,

Robert Murphy

...ons to be introduced into South Korea and to draft joint instructions to CINCUNC to that end. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/6-2756)

*Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.*

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158. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 26, 1956

SUBJECT
Discussion of Far Eastern Matters

PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Perkins McGuire, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
General Lemnitzer, Commander-in-Chief, Far East
Captain Robbins, USN
Mr. Murphy, G
Mr. Bennett, G

After an exchange of amenities, General Lemnitzer said that he had wanted to come in to express his appreciation to Mr. Murphy for the Department's long efforts and final success in obtaining agreement on the part of the 16 nations included in the United Nations command in Korea to the removal of the neutral nations inspection teams from the territory of the Republic of Korea. General Lemnitzer expressed satisfaction over the smooth manner in which the actual removal of the teams had been accomplished and spoke of the great pleasure which this action had given President Rhee and the Korean Government. General agreement was expressed that the action had been accomplished with a minimum of adverse comment from other nations and that not even the Chinese Communists had made any great efforts to exploit the issue.

Now that that phase of the problem has been accomplished, General Lemnitzer said that he wanted to talk about his difficulties under Section 13(d) of the armistice agreement with respect to the introduction of new equipment. He said that, as the commanding general responsible for the military security of the area, he is in a most difficult position with respect to obsolete material and equipment. He is prevented from bringing in up-to-date equipment due to...

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*Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/6-2656. Secret. Drafted by Bennett.*
our strict interpretation of and adherence to the armistice agreement. He simply is not able to ensure the necessary protection for the area. He declared that he is making every effort to avoid inappropriate publicity and unauthorized statements with respect to the introduction of new equipment but that he would very much like to know the Department’s present position and possible changes with respect to action under Section 13(d).

Mr. Murphy replied that there had been no decision on this as yet by the Secretary of State. He continued that the matter is under active study by the Legal Adviser, Mr. Phleger, but that no final decision has been reached as to the Department’s position. There followed a discussion as to our present method of reporting to the NNSC under Section 13(d), and it was suggested that perhaps our reporting in the past has been over meticulous. Instead of reporting on each type of aircraft with respect to the specific model, for instance, it might be possible to merely report a new bomber replacing a worn-out bomber and a new fighter in place of an old fighter rather than getting into the details of an F-86D for an F-86B. Mr. Murphy suggested that, after all, the “Honest John” is in essence an advanced artillery development and perhaps a new system could be devised which would merely report so much new artillery replacing artillery being retired. There was further discussion of the desirability of greater flexibility in reporting under Section 13(d), assuming we would continue to honor this clause of the armistice, and Mr. McGuire agreed to address a letter\(^2\) to the Department formally requesting the Department’s views on the matter and on certain proposals for greater flexibility which the Defense Department might wish to suggest.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

\(^2\)See footnote 5, supra.

159. Editorial Note

A contemporary intelligence estimate on probable developments in North Korea over the next few years opens as follows:
"The Problem

"To analyze the present strengths and weaknesses of the North Korean regime and to estimate future developments and trends over the next few years.

"Conclusions

"1. The Korean Communist regime will almost certainly retain firm control of North Korea through 1960, and the USSR will probably retain its predominant influence over North Korea's internal and external policies. Communist China probably will continue to make a substantial economic contribution to North Korea and its military forces will continue to be available for the defense of North Korea. Although Communist China will continue to play an important part in the formulation of Bloc policy toward North Korea, we believe it will not attempt to dislodge the USSR as the dominant power there. (Paras. 50-51)

"2. The objective of the Communists continues to be the gaining of control over the entire Korean peninsula. We believe that they will not resort to force to obtain this objective, at least so long as the US remains committed to the defense of the ROK. However, the Communists will continue their attempts to undermine the ROK through overt and covert political, diplomatic, economic, and propaganda appeals to South Korea for economic, political, and cultural contacts, and for 'Korean' measures to bring about unification. We believe that in present circumstances the Communists will probably not make substantial progress in these efforts. However, either in the event of the death of Rhee or a decline in US economic and military support, their unification tactics are likely to be accelerated and much more effective. (Paras. 53-54)

"3. The Communists will probably continue to press for the withdrawal of UN/US forces, and for international negotiations on Korean unification, but they almost certainly will not make any concessions which would weaken their firm hold on North Korea. In fact they would probably accept serious military risks to maintain their position. (Paras. 52-53)

"4. Despite reductions in over-all strength since the Armistice, Communist armed forces in Korea could still launch a limited attack with little warning. The Chinese Communists will continue to have the unopposed capability to reinforce units in contact along the demarcation line with a maximum of six armies in from 10 to 14 days after the initiation of movement from present assembly areas. North Korean armed forces now include a re-equipped and reorganized army of some 350,000 men and an air force with 310 jet fighters..."
(Fagots) and 65 light jet bombers (Beagles). Although the North Korean ground force is well below the strength of the 650,000-man ROK army and may undergo a strength reduction of 80,000 this year, North Korean air force strength is far superior to that of the ROK. (Paras. 40, 42, 48-49)

"5. The Chinese Communists have steadily reduced their troop strength in Korea and now have less than 300,000 men in the area. The chances are about even that Chinese Communists will complete the withdrawal of their troops within the next year or so in order to enhance the independent appearance of the North Korean regime and to increase pressure on the US/UN command to complete its withdrawal. However, the Chinese Communists may wish to retain some troops in North Korea in order to maintain political influence in the area and a rough parity of ground force strength with the ROK.¹ (Paras. 44, 52)

"6. Although living standards remain extremely low in North Korea, rehabilitation of the severely damaged industrial and agricultural industries is well advanced. With substantial material and manpower assistance from the Bloc, industrial output is rising and will probably reach 1949 levels in most sectors by the end of 1956. By 1961 the North Korean economy will probably be able to make a modest contribution to the Bloc's economic potential in the Far East in the fields of metals, chemicals, and electric power. However, a serious manpower shortage, lagging production in agriculture, and lack of adequate consumer goods industry will continue beyond 1956 to hamper efforts to raise living standards and to increase the regime's appeal in the ROK. (Paras. 27-29, 33-38)" ([Document title, number, and date not declassified] Department of State, INR-NIE Files)

The remainder of the document is not printed and was not presented for declassification.

According to a note on the cover sheet of the document, "The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff." All members of the Intelligence Ad-

¹The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, believes that the factors impinging on a Chinese Communist military withdrawal from Korea are so uncertain as to make it impossible to estimate that the chances are about even that complete withdrawal will occur within the next year or so. Although such a move would conform with the Communists' current 'peaceful' pose, such factors as Chinese Communist interest in maintaining influence in North Korea, Chinese Communist commitment of military labor in Korea as a contribution to North Korean rehabilitation, possible Soviet uneasiness about the strength of the North Korean forces at this stage of development, and the desirability of timing a military withdrawal in such a way as to gain maximum political advantage may militate against complete withdrawal in the immediate future." [Footnote in the source text.]
visory Committee concurred on July 3, except for the Atomic Energy Commission representative and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside of their jurisdiction.

In a memorandum dated July 5 to Special Assistant for Intelligence W. Park Armstrong, Deputy Assistant Secretary Jones referred to this estimate as "an estimate on North Korea which highlights the intelligence deficiency with respect to non-military developments in North Korea." FE, he noted, had long been concerned by the deficiency of such intelligence, and he suggested that the CIA be encouraged to expand its role in reporting and processing intelligence on North Korea. (Ibid., FE Files: Lot 58 D 3, Korea 1956)

160. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Counselor of the British Embassy (de la Mare) and the Acting Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons), Department of State, Washington, July 3, 1956

SUBJECT
Replacement of Obsolete Equipment into Korea

Mr. de la Mare said that his Foreign Office had noted the Levinson article in the New York Times on the introduction of new military equipment into Korea and desired that the following views be brought to our attention:

1. The Foreign Office sympathized with our anxiety over the growing obsolescence of equipment.
2. The Foreign Office accepted a year ago the necessity for introducing new equipment provided it were carried out with maximum discretion.
3. As a result of the reaction following the removal of the NNSC from South Korea it was feared, however, that any introduction of new equipment at the present time would have serious repercussions.
4. If any move were afoot therefore to introduce new equipment the Foreign Office thought it advisable to wait several months and to take every possible step to assure the minimum publicity.
5. Since consultation or discussion of this question with the Sixteen would inevitably result in "leaks" the Foreign Office preferred that the Sixteen not be approached in advance.

1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5621/7-356. Confidential. Drafted by Nes.
2See footnote 3, Document 156.
Mr. Parsons confirmed that the problem of new equipment is being actively studied and assured Mr. de la Mare that when action was taken it would be done in the most natural possible way. He said that the military were also in agreement that no publicity would be given.

Mr. Nes said that he really did not feel a problem of timing now existed since a month had already passed since the NNSC action and additional time would be required before equipment would actually arrive in Korea even though a firm decision were taken in the near future.

With regard to consulting with the Sixteen Mr. Parsons said that we were studying this question also, and that two factors were involved. First our natural desire is to keep this a United Nations operation and accordingly to bring the Sixteen in on any new steps; secondly, the likelihood and danger of leaks were the Sixteen consulted.

Mr. de la Mare then raised the matter of reporting the recent NNSC action to the United Nations. If our report is to be purely factual, the Foreign Office have no views to express. However, if the report were likely to stimulate United Nations debate, the British would like an opportunity to comment on the draft. Mr. de la Mare said he thought the submission of a report was likely to raise all sorts of questions and both the Foreign Office and the British United Nations Delegation suggested that its submission be delayed for several months.

Mr. Parsons asked whether this would not in fact tend to highlight the report and encourage United Nations debate since it would be received that much closer to the meeting of the General Assembly. In any event we would be asking for the advice of our United Nations Delegation both on the text of the report and on the time of its submission.

In leaving, Mr. de la Mare asked whether the introduction of new equipment might not encourage President Rhee in his desire to unify Korea by force. He wondered whether the United States could control Rhee.

In reply Mr. Parsons said that one should look at the record of the past three or four years from which it would appear that Rhee would not take any precipitate action and that the receipt of new equipment would not be expected to upset the present status quo.
Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Nes) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons)  

Washington, July 12, 1956.

SUBJECT

Despatch 432 from Seoul

I believe you will wish to read this advance copy of Carl Strom’s “swan song” written in collaboration with the Chiefs of the Political and Economic sections, the PAO, and Don MacDonald.

The despatch summarizes our commitment in Korea and the consequences of failure to meet our responsibilities. Korea is characterized as “a nation adrift, whose people are disillusioned and uninspired”. The Communist danger, it is pointed out, remains as a potential danger which “increases day by day as President Rhee and his Government fail to offer believable national goals . . .”.

In discussing President Rhee’s role a number of weaknesses in his policies are exposed and it is said that he “thus far seems to be ignorant of, or has failed to understand, the public dissatisfaction manifested in the election”. “In sum, President Rhee’s role in domestic affairs since 1948 has achieved the short-range goal of preserving order, but he has not furnished the country the constructive leadership necessary for the development of a viable society and therefore for the achievement of American objectives in Korea”.

In conclusion, the despatch states “we must continue to support President Rhee while he lives,” but must also demonstrate to him the “overriding importance of a constructive national program”. We must recognize that in addition to being an expression of popular dissatisfaction the May election was “also a major political overturn” which could lead to the Opposition’s inheriting power. Continued support of the ROK military as a stabilizing force in domestic affairs is required.

There is little new in the despatch and it does not show us any clear way out of our Korean dilemma, but it does point up, as did the Prochnow report, the urgent need for a reappraisal.

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95/6–2956. Secret. Drafted by Barbis and Nes.
2Dated June 29. (Ibid.)
3Chargé Strom left Korea after Ambassador Dowling presented his credentials on July 14. Strom was subsequently appointed Ambassador to Cambodia in October.
4Donald S. MacDonald, Second Secretary of Embassy in Korea.
5Ellipsis in the source text.
6See Document 146.
7See Document 155.
162. Progress Report Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board


PROGRESS REPORT ON U.S. OBJECTIVES AND COURSES OF ACTION IN KOREA (NSC 5514)

(Policy approved by the President March 12, 1955)

(Period Covered: December 1, 1955 through July 18, 1956)

A. Summary of Operating Progress in Relation to Major NSC Objectives

1. Adequacy of present policy: The OCB does not recommend review at this time of U.S. policy towards Korea as set forth in NSC 5514. The policy statement in NSC 5514 has been reviewed and is not in conflict with the Basic National Security Policy as set forth in NSC 5602/1.  

2. Although U.S. objectives in NSC 5514 remain valid the means for their achievement are being reviewed within the Executive Branch in the light of changed conditions.

3. In respect to the long-term U.S. objective—unification of Korea with a self-supporting economy and under a free, independent and representative government friendly toward other countries of the free world—change occurred during the period under review to indicate prospects more favorable than in the past for its achievement. The policy statement provides for continued observation of the Armistice and review of the courses of action in the event the U.S. becomes engaged in hostilities in the Taiwan area or elsewhere in Asia; this has not occurred during the reporting period.

4. The judgment of the OCB in respect to progress achieved in relation to the current objectives of NSC 5514 follows:

a. To assist the Republic of Korea (ROK) in order to enable it to make a substantial contribution to free world strength in the Pacific area:

(1) Military: During the period U.S. military assistance has maintained substantial ROK military capability. The ROK
Army is almost twice the size of the North Korean army. It has sufficient individual equipment, is well trained and is combat ready. It is superior to the North Korean Army in heavy weapons and artillery. The ROK Navy is clearly superior to that of North Korea which is attributed no combat capability. The ROK Air Force is inferior to that of North Korea. Despite weakness in the air, the ROK, given adequate logistic support, could repel an aggression by North Korean forces alone. However, against aggression by combined Chinese Communist and North Korean forces the ROK would be incapable of conducting a sustained defense without prompt military assistance from the United States.

(2) Economic: Production increases during the past six months were more moderate than in preceding periods, reflecting the gradual transition of the aid program from rehabilitation, where quick gains were possible by restoring previously existing facilities, to new economic development where progress inevitably is slower. In general both production and consumption levels now equal or exceed those of 1949–50, heavily dependent, however, on massive U.S. aid. The rate of implementation of the development program was slowed by lack of effective action by the ROK in fiscal policies and program operations, which lack of action resulted in a continuing shortage of local currency including counterpart funds. Prices have recently resumed their upward climb and have exceeded their previous peak.

(3) Political: In the past the political situation within the ROK—the largely unopposed, frequently authoritarian, policies of President Syngman Rhee—have proven a sharply limiting factor on the acceptability of the ROK in its relations with much of the free world. The concrete demonstration of Korean democracy in the May 15 elections may well contribute to increasing its political acceptability. This favorable development may be offset, however, if controversy between the President and the Vice President becomes acute and causes political or administrative deterioration in the ROK. Information and educational exchange programs have made a significant contribution to efforts to strengthen the government and democratic institutions of the ROK, although much remains to be done. At present the probability of a larger measure of ROK-free world cooperation appears somewhat improved.

b. To prevent more of Korea from coming under communist domination either by subversion or aggression: A study on internal security in the ROK* has been completed pursuant to NSC Action No. 1290–d and steps are being taken to improve police organization, training and equipment. Communist capabilities other than those of direct aggression are estimated to be small, a situation which has prevailed since the end of hostilities. While the objective of preventing further communist domination has been achieved to date, the tensions inherent in an armed truce persist.

*Document 99.
c. To develop ROK armed forces sufficient for internal security and capable of defending ROK territory short of attack by a major power: The ROK armed forces are sufficient for internal security and are estimated to be capable of at least strong initial defense, short of attack by a major power.

5. Progress in meeting commitments and program schedules: U.S. commitments of $420 million for military aid under the "Agreed ROK-U.S. Minute", November 17, 1954,⁵ will have been met by July 31, 1956 (cf Financial Annex).⁶ Secretary Dulles, in August 1953, signed a Joint Statement⁷ with the Korean President announcing a three-four year program for rehabilitating the economy which contemplated a $1 billion expenditure by the U.S. Total aid under ICA programs since then, including the one proposed for FY 1957, surpasses this amount. If FY 1956 DFS and non-military aid supplied by the Army were included, the billion dollars will have been made available by the end of 1956.

B. Major Problems or Areas of Difficulty

6. The continuing volume of U.S. expenditures in Korea for military and economic aid coupled with evidence of changing communist posture and tactics with respect to Korea⁸ presents a major problem. The Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programs (Prochnow committee) completed a study⁹ on the implications of the military and economic aid programs in Korea and will submit its findings to the National Security Council.

7. Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. The action taken by the United Nations Command, unilateral removal of the NNSC inspection teams to the Demilitarized Zone, will be debated in the UN General Assembly. The communist bloc will accuse the U.S. of violating the Armistice Agreement, and some other countries as well probably will censure the action. Support of our associates in the UN, and particularly of our Allies in Korea, will be needed. It is hoped that support will be forthcoming as a result of the consultations of the Sixteen preliminary to, and on the execution of, the UN Command action. The ROK has renewed agitation for complete abrogation of the Armistice Agreement, and will in particular continue to demand the return of Kaesong, Ongjin Peninsula and Han River Delta areas it held before 1950.

⁶Not printed.
⁷For text of the Joint Statement issued in Seoul on August 8, 1953, at the conclusion of talks between President Rhee and Secretary Dulles, see Department of State Bulletin, August 17, 1953, p. 203.
⁸Footnote in the source text [less than 1 line of source text] not declassified; see Documents 116 and 159.
⁹See Document 155.
8. **Obsolete Weapons.** The UN Command’s literal compliance with the provisions of paragraph 13d of the Armistice Agreement, which requires replacement of combat equipment on a piece-by-piece basis of equal effectiveness continues to handicap its efforts to maintain military readiness. The UN Command will move ahead soon to introduce new weapons to replace obsolete ones through a more flexible interpretation of the Armistice Agreement. The problem of interpretation of 13d was not discussed with our Allies in the recent consultations on the NNSC problem; some adverse reaction to the introduction of new equipment is anticipated from our Allies.

9. **The difficulty in providing spare parts** for the maintenance of the now obsolete F-51 aircraft loaned to the ROK Air Force by the Far East Air Force will become more critical. The current difficulty has resulted in a request from the Chief of Staff of the ROK Air Force, now under consideration by Defense, for an additional fighter bomber wing of jet aircraft (75).

10. **Settlement with members of United Nations Command.** Settlements of obligations for logistical support furnished by the U.S. to non-ROK forces under the UNC, during and after the Korean hostilities, have not been made with all countries concerned. A study is being made to determine the capability of each country concerned to meet its obligation. There is no authority to seek settlements at less than full value where necessary, in the absence of a change in policy with respect to the right of the U.S. to claim reimbursement in accordance with agreements or understandings concluded earlier with countries receiving such logistical support. This problem is in part related to the retention of international complexion of the United Nations Command.

11. **Syngman Rhee.** The meaning of the Presidential Vice-Presidential elections of May 15 and their significance in future ROK policy are not yet entirely clear and it is premature to attempt any prediction on the wide range of issues involved. It can be said, however, that the election clouds the succession issue and foreshadows increased unrest if the President continues to ignore the apparent popular desire for change indicated by the substantial degree of popular discontent with the Rhee Administration shown in the election.

12. **Economic Aid**

   a. With respect to economic matters there will most probably continue to be differences of opinion between the ROK and the U.S. in respect to the size, composition and administration of the U.S. economic aid program. The exchange rate is to be reviewed in September 1956, and if prices have changed more than 25% over those of September 1955, the exchange rate under the existing U.S.-ROK agreement will have to be adjusted accordingly. Such a price rise could occur by September 1956. The required upward adjustment of the exchange rate would probably be objected to by the ROK.
b. Current recovery of the proceeds of sales of commodities imported under the aid program is lagging, making the probable short-fall of hwan for implementing the program a serious problem. The ROK has indicated that in FY 1957 it wants proceeds from the saleable commodities supplied under the aid program used solely for investment projects, rather than for both military budget support and investment projects. Accordingly, the collection and use of counterpart funds and the financing of the local currency cost of the military budget will continue to be a problem.

C. Listing of Major Developments During the Period

13. Political

a. Although relations with the Republic of Korea improved on the surface, the ROK did not change its position on specific U.S.-ROK differences, e.g., Japan-ROK relations.

b. The re-election of President Rhee and the election of Chang Myon as Vice President on May 15, 1956 are of major importance as political events in the ROK. According to current indications, specifically post-election cabinet changes, Rhee does not plan to change his policies.

c. The U.S., continuing to observe the Armistice but unable to secure full communist compliance with the Armistice terms, removed the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission’s inspection teams to the Demilitarized Zone June 9, following consultation with our Allies.

14. Military

While the overall strength of the UN Command remained constant its international character further deteriorated during the period as a result of reductions by the Commonwealth countries and Ethiopia.

15. Economic

a. The ROK wholesale price index resumed its climb in April and by the end of June had risen almost 17% above the September 1955 average.

b. $25 million in additional aid was allocated to the Korean Defense Support Program in December 1955 for anti-inflation purposes, and another $25 million in June 1956 for the same purpose.

c. A conference held in Seoul in January 1956\textsuperscript{10} resulted in several limited procedural improvements, and better understanding of aid procedures on the part of the ROK Government.

\textsuperscript{10}The conference involved senior officials of the South Korean Government concerned with economic and military aid and a team of Embassy and ICA officials led by Economic Coordinator Wood. The purpose of the brief conference was to review the implementation of the agreement arrived at as a result of the economic conference which took place in Washington during the previous summer. For text of the economic agreement signed by Ambassador Yang and Assistant Secretary Robertson on August 12, 1955, see Document 78. The conference held in Seoul in January was limited in objectives and results. Documentation on this conference is in Department of State, Central File 795.5-MSP.
d. See Financial Annex for PL 480 Agreement.\textsuperscript{11}

16. Informational and Cultural

a. There was an increase in information activities in support of the U.S. economic aid program.

b. The ROK continued to receive generally unfavorable publicity in the world press.

c. FY 1957 appropriation requests provide for a moderate expansion of the information program and a major expansion of the educational exchange program.

\textsuperscript{11}Not printed. The annex lists the dollar amounts and hwan proceeds involved in the provision and sale of such commodities as tobacco, cotton, wheat, barley, and dairy products under P.L. 480.

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163. Letter From the Acting Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons) to the Counselor of Embassy in Korea (Strom)\textsuperscript{1}

Washington, August 1, 1956.

\textbf{Dear Carl:} We in NA have all read your despatch No. 432 of June 29,\textsuperscript{2} with great interest and understand that Mr. Robertson has read it as well. Our thinking is that the despatch is of great value in clarifying the Korean problem. We sincerely hope that the Embassy and the OEC can use your despatch as a point of departure for making specific suggestions regarding positive action which the United States Government can take to bring about a better and more hopeful situation in Korea. The prevailing attitude in Washington, particularly within the Department of State, with regard to the United States posture and courses of action in Korea can best be described as one of puzzlement: we cannot indefinitely maintain our present posture in Korea, but what else can we do that really makes sense? We in NA are repeatedly having the finger pointed at us to come up with positive proposals. I can assure you that help from your quarters will be highly welcomed.

I should like to make a few specific comments about your despatch:

1. Your description of the situation in Korea, and particularly of the Korean Government and the way it operates would probably

\textsuperscript{1}Source: Department of State, NA Files: Lot 58 D 643, KP-3.1 U.S.-Korea Political 1955-1956. Secret; Official-Informal.

\textsuperscript{2}Summarized in Document 161.
need to be revised only slightly to fit the situation in a great many other countries with which the United States has close working relations.

2. It appears to us that one of the most significant factors in our difficulties in moving ahead in Korea is the point which you make at the bottom of page 3, where you say “Korea does not have the heritage of a working economic system”. This is complicated for the United States in trying to work with the Koreans to think through the necessary stages of development planning, since there is little in history which bears on the problem in question. South Korea as an independent political and economic entity is new in the history of Korea. Consequently, it is not possible to depend to any great extent upon past events in arriving at conclusions with respect to the most logical future course. It seems to us that it is this phenomenon as much as any other that precludes the Korean officials themselves from being very helpful, even with the best of working relationships between the United States and the Republic of Korea, in providing ideas of maximum usefulness to the United States in our own planning.

3. At the bottom of page 4 you say that “the potential danger, however, remains and it increases day by day as President Rhee and his Government fail to offer believable national goals, and to put forward a positive, imaginative program to promote general welfare”. Although we agree that President Rhee and the Korean Government have devoted their attention to other matters and have not furnished a positive program in this connection we think it may be too much to expect, in any case, that Rhee and his Government could really accomplish this task for the reasons spelled out in the immediately preceding paragraph.\(^3\) It is on this very point where the greater knowledge of economics, politics and managerial requirements on the part of Americans should prove most helpful in working with the Koreans to blueprint jointly the kind of goals which are most needed in the situation. To date we have been so fully occupied with the problems of reconstruction and day-to-day exacerbations in our relations with the Koreans that we have not been able to turn our energies in sufficient quantities to the matter of helping the Koreans to develop national goals. It seems to us that the Korean people possess an element of strength, which enabled them to maintain their ethnic identity during many centuries of foreign hegemony and to stand firm against the Communists and which can be expected to serve as

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\(^3\)In the cited paragraph in despatch 432, Korean social problems are viewed as a natural consequence of the domination of the Korean peninsula by China and Japan during recent centuries. As a result, Strom felt, “The Koreans so far have not been able to construct a cultural or ideological base elastic or durable enough to survive the prodigious upheavals they have suffered.”
the drive required to bring about changes in the Korean political, economic and social picture that would permit the growth needed to move toward more self-sufficiency in the present situation. We hope that your continued search, supplemented by our own work, will bring forth the necessary programs for utilizing this strength which should be turned to good use in helping to solve the Korean problem.

We are in need of all the constructive ideas that can be produced. Accordingly, we hope that your 432 is merely one in a series of helpful and constructive appraisals and recommendations dealing with US-ROK relations.

Sincerely yours,

Howard L. Parsons

P.S. Noel is away for a few days. We discussed this letter and the wording in it thoroughly before he left. So it’s really a joint product.

*Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.*

164. Editorial Note

On August 15, the Representative at the United Nations conveyed to the Secretary-General a report submitted by the Unified Command on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea. Attached to the report were the text of the note received by the British Chargé in Beijing on April 9, the text of the note delivered by the British Chargé in Beijing on May 28, and copies of the statements made by the U.N. Representative in the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom on July 5, 1955, July 14, 1955, and May 31, 1956. The report by the Unified Command presented the decision taken on May 31 to provisionally suspend the performance of those provisions of the Armistice Agreement governing the operations of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as a “remedial step” taken by “one party to a contract with certain provisions of which the other party has failed to comply”. The suspension would last, the report emphasized, “during the time the Communist side continued in default”. The Command took note of the Chinese proposal of April 9 to treat the problem of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as an aspect of the overall problems of the unification of Korea and the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea, but dis-
missed the suggestion as an attempt "to close negotiations for solution of the Neutral Nations Supervisory problem". Under the circumstances, the United Nations Command argued that it "was left with no alternative but to assert its rights". The report and attachments were circulated to the General Assembly on August 16 as U.N. doc. A/3167.

165. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)¹


SUBJECT

Introduction of Modern Combat Equipment into Korea

The Department of Army, with the consent of Air Force and Navy, has presented to Defense a list (Tab B)² of the new items of equipment that should be introduced into Korea to replace obsolete equipment. Defense, in accordance with recent exchanges of letters between Mr. Wilson and Mr. Hoover,³ has given the list to us informally in order that we may formulate an agreed State-Defense position.

State and Defense, as indicated in Tab C,⁴ have long been of the view that the replacement of obsolete combat equipment can be effected through a reasonable interpretation of paragraph 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement which calls for replacement on a piece-for-piece basis of the same type and effectiveness.

Tab B includes major new items of ordnance and their introduction must be carefully considered. The introduction of atomic weapons presents a particularly serious problem. Present broad policy is that such equipment shall be supplied to United States forces everywhere. So long as the Communists have not introduced such equipment into Korea, however, there is serious question whether we

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.56/8–2256. Secret. Drafted by Norred and concurred in by L, EUR, and IO.
²Not found attached.
⁴Not found attached. A note on the source text indicates that Defense telegram DEF 983878, June 24, 1955, was attached at Tab C. Telegram DEF 983878 is summarized in footnote 5, Document 110.
should do so because of the action such a move would arouse and because L considers it would lack legal justification.

Tab A\(^5\) recites the existing agreement in principle to the replacement of obsolete combat equipment and requests certain information and the views of CINCUNC and Ambassador Dowling concerning important procedural and timing considerations, the introduction of weapons of atomic capabilities, and the problem of reporting.

**Recommendation**

That you approve the draft telegram, Tab A, for transmittal to Defense as a State draft.\(^6\)

\(^5\)Tab A, not printed, was the text of the draft telegram.
\(^6\)Murphy initialed his approval of the recommendation.

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166. **Letter From the Ambassador in Korea (Dowling) to the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Hemmendinger)**\(^1\)

*Seoul, September 3, 1956.*

DEAR NOEL: Enclosed herewith are copies of memoranda of conversations which Bill Jones held with Vice President Chang Myon on August 28\(^2\) and on September 1, 1956.\(^3\) Some two weeks before the inauguration Bill was asked by Dr. Chang if he would be his contact with the Embassy.

\(^1\)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.12/9-356. Secret; Official-Official.

\(^2\)Not printed. According to the memorandum for the record, drafted by First Secretary Jones on September 1, Vice President Chang Myon told Jones on August 28 that he feared that Liberal Party leaders were planning to “eliminate him from the scene.” This might be done, Chang felt, by amending the Constitution to deprive him of his right to succeed to the presidency, by organizing demonstrations to build up public antipathy toward him, or, if necessary, by assassinating him. Chang asked whether he could count on sanctuary in U.S. installations if the threat to his life increased.

\(^3\)Not printed. In another memorandum for the record dated September 1, Jones reported he saw Chang again on September 1 to respond to his question about possible sanctuary. Jones told Chang that Ambassador Dowling, while sympathetic, did not believe that Chang’s life was presently in danger. Dowling also felt, Jones told Chang, that Chang’s political career would be irreparably damaged by an attempt to seek refuge in an American installation, and that the position of the United States in Korea would also be damaged. Jones assured the Vice President, however, that if a genuine threat to his life developed, the United States would not be indifferent and would exert influence to try to prevent such a development.
As you will find on reading the memoranda, the Vice President is quite concerned for his personal safety. He feels that the Liberal Party is determined to remove him from the scene. The Vice President attributes no small part of his difficulty to an unfortunate article which appeared on August 16 and was based on an exclusive interview which Jack Boyer of United Press had with the Vice President. (Our Despatch No. 66 of August 30 deals with this article as well as with the Vice President’s inaugural statement.) The Vice President has asked for our assurances that we would provide him sanctuary within American installations if things became worse and he felt he was in imminent danger of assassination. This request, as the Vice President himself recognized, posed a difficult problem for us. To provide him sanctuary, even if this were possible, would lead to the most obvious interpretations or misinterpretations by the President and Liberal Party leaders.

While we in the Embassy could not say categorically that the Vice President is in no danger, we do believe that it is quite unlikely that an organized attempt would be made to assassinate him at least as long as there are other and legal means of preventing his succession to the presidency. The amendment to the Constitution certainly remains a distinct possibility. Accordingly, I asked Bill to make the statement to the Vice President contained in the first paragraph of the Memorandum of Conversation held on September 1, 1956. This seems to me to be the best procedure at present, and I believe the Vice President fully appreciates our problem although he undoubtedly would like a more positive solution.

If the Department has objections to this course of action or has alternative courses of action to suggest, I would appreciate your sending them on to me as soon as possible.5

4In despatch 66 from Seoul, the Embassy reported on Chang Myon’s inauguration statements of August 15. Chang was not given an opportunity to deliver his address at the inauguration ceremony so he released it through the Office of Public Information. The statement was critical of the South Korean domestic situation but emphasized a desire for cooperation in the national interest. Chang expanded upon his inaugural statement in an interview the same day with Jack Boyer of United Press. According to Boyer’s report, Chang planned to “speak out” in his drive to make the Republic of Korea more democratic, to act independently of President Rhee on domestic matters, to seek normalization of relations with Japan, to “keep a sharp eye” on inefficiency in government, and, in his role as “spokesman of the people,” to apprise the President of “the true state of affairs” and to offer “constructive suggestions” as needed. The Boyer article appeared in the Seoul press on August 17, and the Embassy reported that it prompted fierce denunciation of the Vice President in the National Assembly and in pro-government newspapers. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.12/8-3056)

5Assistant Secretary Robertson responded, in a letter to Dowling on September 20, that the line taken by Dowling in response to Chang’s request was “exactly right.” Robertson had no additional guidance to offer beyond recognizing that, if things took a serious turn, the Ambassador might have to make decisions which could not be reported in advance. (Ibid., 795B.12/9-356) On September 28, an attempt was made to
Sincerely yours,

Red

assassinate Vice President Chang Myon in Seoul. Chang was shot in the hand. The Embassy was not drawn into the incident. (Telegram 321 from Seoul, September 28; ibid., 795B.12/9-2856)

167. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Hemmendinger) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)

Washington, September 11, 1956.

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Gordon Gray and Admiral Radford at 2:30 Today, on the Introduction of Modern Combat Equipment into Korea

The JCS have reacted strongly against sending to CINCUNC the draft telegram (Tab A) proposed by State, which solicited the views of General Lemnitzer and Ambassador Dowling on certain procedural and timing details regarding the introduction of modern combat equipment.

In a top secret memorandum to Secretary Wilson, shown in confidence to David Nes, Admiral Radford takes the position that: (1) in view of the lapse of time since the expulsion of the NNSC from Korea on June 9, modernization of our equipment in Korea to include atomic capability should be effected without delay; (2) reports of such introduction should not be made to the NNSC; (3) the suspension of paragraphs 13(c) and (d) of the Korean Armistice Agreement is consonant with NSC 5514; and (4) no similar action is contemplated for the ROK forces.

Admiral Radford then recommends that CINCUNC be authorized to begin the introduction of modern combat equipment, including items of atomic capability immediately and that such equipment not be reported to the NNSC. As a planning basis a list of items which is identical to that attached to my August 22 memorandum

1Source: Department of State, NA Files: Lot 59 D 476, NA Top Secret File. Secret.

Drafted by Nes.

2For a record of this meeting, see the memorandum, infra.

3Not found attached; see Document 165.

4Not found in Department of State files.

5Document 24.
(Tab B)\(^6\) is proposed. A copy of this draft (Tab C)\(^7\) instruction to CINCUNC is attached.

In our discussions of the NNSC problem with the Sixteen, in our statements in the Military Armistice Commission, and in the August 15 Unified Command Report to the United Nations\(^8\) we have consistently and unequivocally maintained that the UN Command would continue to report honestly and fully to the NNSC and the MAC in the Demilitarized Zone and that the provisional suspension of the right of the NNITs to operate in south Korea would in no way affect the continued full adherence of the UN Command to all other paragraphs of the Armistice Agreement.

Defense was party to the instructions along these lines issued to UNCMAC and cleared the Unified Command Report. Likewise Defense has been fully conversant with our view that new equipment could be introduced within the terms of paragraph 13(d) as a matter of interpretation thus obviating any necessity to “suspend” this article.

Defense concurrence with this view was contained in Mr. McGuire’s letter of June 21 to Mr. Murphy\(^9\) and appropriate instructions (Tab D)\(^10\) were subsequently issued within Defense and to CINCUNC.

The procedure now advocated by Admiral Radford is therefore contrary to the understandings previously reached between State and Defense on this question and would constitute a violation of the Armistice Agreement. It would maximize the adverse repercussions among our Allies and provide the Communists with the greatest possible propaganda ammunition. In addition were we to commence the introduction of modern equipment for U.S. forces without some similar provision with respect to ROK forces, very considerable adverse political repercussions can be expected in Korea.

With respect to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] L feels strongly that their introduction would constitute a direct violation of the Armistice. While the legal rationale behind this view is doubtless sound you may, in the light of certain practical considerations, wish to discuss this issue again with Mr. Phleger prior to your meeting with Gordon Gray.

**Recommendations**

1. That you discuss with Mr. Phleger the position to be taken with Gordon Gray and Admiral Radford on the question of introduc-

\(^{6}\)Not found attached; see Document 165.  
\(^{7}\)Not found attached.  
\(^{8}\)See Document 164.  
\(^{9}\)See footnote 5, Document 157.  
\(^{10}\)Not found attached.
ing [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] into south Korea at this
time;
2. That you reiterate to Gordon Gray and Admiral Radford our
views on using an interpretation of paragraph 13(d) rather than its
suspension in introducing new equipment and on the necessity to
continue reporting to the NNSC;
3. That in the light of the tenor of the discussions you endeavor
to obtain Defense concurrence to soliciting the views of General
Lemnitzer and Ambassador Dowling along the lines of State’s draft
instructions; and
4. That you ask for Defense intentions with respect to providing
the ROK forces with some modern equipment.

168. Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting, Washington,
September 11, 1956

PARTICIPANTS

Defense
Admiral Radford
Gordon Gray
Captain Robbins²
Captain Moote
Mr. Leigh³

State
Mr. Walter S. Robertson
Mr. Francis O. Wilcox
Col. John M. Raymond
Mr. Charles Runyon
Mr. Howard L. Parsons
Mr. David G. Nes

In opening the discussion Mr. Robertson proposed that the
group address itself to clear a telegram of instructions to CINCUNC
along the lines proposed in a State Department draft.⁴

Mr. Gray interrupted to say that in his opinion four major and
very basic issues were at stake and should be dealt with: (1) Do we
suspend paragraph 13(d) or introduce new equipment under a liberal
interpretation; (2) do we report the new items or not; (3) do we pro-
ceed with the introduction of new equipment immediately or do we
ask for the views of General Lemnitzer and Ambassador Dowling

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/9–1156. Secret. Drafted by
Nes on September 14 and initialed as accurate by Robertson.
²Captain Berton Robbins, USN, Regional Director for the Far East, Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
³Monroe Leigh, Assistant General Counsel for International Matters, Department
of Defense.
⁴See Document 165.
first; and (4) what do we do about [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

Admiral Radford contended that the entire question was a matter of reducing the cost of our military commitment in Korea, and that this could only be done by modernizing the forces there to include weapons of atomic capability.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that State and Defense had already agreed that new weapons would be introduced through an interpretation of paragraph 13(d) and that they would be reported to the NNSC. State had also supported the replacement of obsolete and worn out equipment with roughly equivalent items. The question raised by Admiral Radford was thus “Are we to implement policy already agreed upon or are we to set a new policy”?

Admiral Radford stated that he was not familiar with the policy outlined by Mr. Robertson with respect to interpretation and reporting, considered such a policy entirely unsatisfactory, and firmly believed that if such were the policy it should be changed. The Admiral maintained that it was impossible to do what had to be done under an interpretation of paragraph 13(d), and that so long as we were committed to replacing weapons with their equivalents, we could not reduce either the Korean forces or the American contingent.

Mr. Gray gave as his opinion that we could do what we wanted to through a liberal interpretation of paragraph 13(d) and by reporting in general terms.

Mr. Robertson proceeded to read from the August 15 Unified Command Report to the United Nations⁵ and from Secretary McGuire’s letter to Mr. Murphy of June 27,⁶ both of which he stated reflected Defense agreement with State on the basic questions involved.

Saying that the JCS had never considered the exchange of correspondence with State satisfactory, Admiral Radford contended that the policy was not definitive.

Mr. Gray asked whether there was anything inconsistent in the list of proposed weapons with the previous policy decision, and it was agreed that this question would have to be determined by Defense and State lawyers.

Mr. Robertson reviewed State’s position and contended that we had always thoroughly recognized the intolerable situation created in Korea by Communist violations of the Armistice Agreement and that our purpose had been to find a formula for achieving a balance with the Communists while avoiding the onus of breaking the Armistice Agreement. We would, therefore, be very reluctant to take any

⁵See Document 164.
⁶See footnote 5, Document 157.
action which would manifestly subject the U.S. to legitimate charges of having broken the Armistice.

In maintaining that the time had come for a new policy, Admiral Radford said that the removal of the NNST was only the first step required and that the second was logically a suspension of paragraph 13(d).

Mr. Gray reiterated his view that perhaps the necessary action could be accomplished through an interpretation of paragraph 13(d) and said he was convinced that any agreement Defense had in the matter with State excluded any bar to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Accordingly, if State's interpretation of the policy excluded [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a new policy was needed.

After Admiral Radford had read a September 1 JCS memorandum to Secretary Wilson on this subject, Mr. Robertson pointed again to the statements we had already made within the Military Armistice Commission and to the United Nations. How could we, in their light, now say something entirely different only a month later?

Admiral Radford again maintained that he had not known of the State-Defense decision, was not familiar with the Unified Command Report, and did not consider the position referred to therein as satisfactory. Mr. Gray interrupted stating that while Defense did clear these papers it did not think the position taken would preclude the introduction of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

Mr. Wilcox asked whether Defense assumed that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] could be introduced and unreported without becoming generally known. Admiral Radford admitted that the Koreans would probably announce such introductions.

In response to Mr. Robertson's question as to how the weapons we wished could be introduced under paragraph 13(d), Admiral Radford said that they could not. In his view, paragraph 13(d) is very specific and precludes the introduction of anything but equivalent matériel. Mr. Robertson interrupted to say that previously State and Defense had agreed that a liberal interpretation of paragraph 13(d) would be adequate.

Mr. Gray said that reduced to the simplest terms the JCS felt that "modernization" of forces in Korea required [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

7In this memorandum, entitled "Modernization of Forces and Equipment in Korea," the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed their concern that modernization of military equipment in South Korea had not been authorized despite the fact that the NNSTs had been removed to the demilitarized zone in June. The Joint Chiefs argued "that the need for modernization of the United Nations Command's matériel including an atomic capability is sufficiently critical to justify positive action without delay." They added that, under a broad interpretation of the Armistice Agreement, such action could be taken without reporting the introduction of modern weapons to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. (Department of Defense Files)
source text not declassified]. The question was then whether this could be
done under any reasonable interpretation of paragraph 13(d). If not,
our previous policy must be reconsidered.

Referring to the question of interpretation, Mr. Leigh brought up
the fact that the actions of the other side were relevant.

At this juncture, Admiral Radford had to leave for the White
House, but prior to his departure he confirmed that Defense intend-
ted to introduce [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] weapons of atomic
capability into south Korea, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

Mr. Wilcox said that with reference to the United Nations prob-
lem, he hoped that if the decision was made to introduce [less than 1
line of source text not declassified] it could be shown not to violate the Arm-
istice and would not be undertaken until after the next General
Assembly.

Mr. Gray agreed with the suggestion that State and Defense had
never really discussed the types of weapons to be included in a mod-
ernization program and that it was now time to come to grips with
this problem. In his opinion, Mr. Gray said he felt the most trouble-
some angle was that of reporting. This might be resolved through re-
porting in very general rather than specific terms.

At this point Mr. Robertson again reiterated his previous agree-
ment with the philosophy of maintaining a military balance in Korea,
but said the suspension of paragraph 13(d) and cessation of reporting
after our previous commitments to the Sixteen and to the United Na-
tions, would antagonize our allies and play into the hands of Com-
munist propaganda which has all along been portraying the U.S. as
violators of the Armistice Agreement.

Mr. Wilcox pointed out that while from a legal point of view,
abrogation of an agreement by one party does entitle recourse to
similar violations by the other party, it would nevertheless be ex-
tremely difficult to justify, especially in Asia, our introduction of [less
than 1 line of source text not declassified] based on Communist violations as
we thus far knew them.

After discussing various possible lines of action, Mr. Gray and
Mr. Robertson agreed that the next step was to get State and De-
fense lawyers together to decide what items could be introduced
under a liberal interpretation of paragraph 13(d) and in what manner
we should report such items.\(^8\) Once that determination is made by

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\(^8\)Immediately after this meeting, Monroe Leigh, Captain Robbins, and Captain
Moote of Defense met with Colonel Raymond of L and Charles Runyon of L/UNA to
formulate the legal opinions required by Robertson and Gray. According to a memo-
randum prepared by Runyon, September 11, the lawyers reached a tentative consensus
that the only items that would create problems under a liberal interpretation of para-
graph 13d of the Armistice Agreement were weapons with atomic as well as conven-
tional capability: the 280-mm. gun, the Honest John, and Nike. [4-1/2 lines of text not
Continued]
the legal experts then the policy question can be faced—"Does the United States want [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in Korea"?

In terminating the meeting, Mr. Robertson raised the question of modernizing the Korean Army and pointed out the adverse repercussions in Korea which would result from our forces receiving new weapons with no comparable provision with respect to the Republic of Korea Army. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

declassified] On the question of reporting to the NNSC, Defense representatives indicated that the Department of Defense wanted the reporting of new weapons to be very general in nature, and they agreed to discover what Communist practice on reporting had been. (Department of State, UNP Files: Lot 64 D 167, Gen Corresp)

169. Memorandum of Discussion at the 297th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, September 20, 1956

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1–4.]

5. U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea (NSC 5514; Progress Report, dated July 18, 1956 by the Operations Coordinating Board on NSC 5514)²

Mr. Jackson said that he would omit the usual summary of the Progress Report on our policy in Korea because the members of the Council were doubtless familiar enough with it. He pointed out that perhaps the essence of the problem with respect to this country was the large size of the U.S. assistance programs. These amounted to some 800 million dollars in Fiscal Year 1957. In closing he reminded the National Security Council of its directive to the NSC Planning Board to review U.S. policy toward Korea in the light of the findings of the Prochnow Committee.³

The President commented with a sigh that we were surely spending an awful lot of money in Korea. Secretary Wilson added that he had very much hoped to reverse the direction of our spending in Korea downward instead of upward. Indeed he had had the level down to 700 million in 1955 but the levels were now pushing up again. Admiral Radford reminded Secretary Wilson that the small

²Documents 24 and 162.
³See Document 155.
reduction in 1955 was accounted for by the fact that the ROK armed forces were then living off military matériel which we had given to them. We knew nevertheless that when this matériel was gone, the levels of our expenditures in Korea would again have to go up.

Secretary Wilson then alluded to the success of the ROK reserve program. The success of this program, he thought, might enable us to cut back a little on the size of the regular forces of the Republic of Korea and thus ease the burden on the Korean economy.

Turning to Admiral Radford the President inquired whether he and his people in the Pentagon had taken a look at the situation in Korea lately. Admiral Radford replied that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had this situation constantly under review. In point of fact, the ROK authorities did not wish to cut back in any military area. They are even now complaining that they need to modernize their air force, to acquire additional naval vessels and even to modernize their army.

Secretary Hoover then cited the problem posed by Section 13–d of the armistice agreement in Korea. He warned that in sending armaments to Korea we were stretching to the absolute limit the definitions under Paragraph 13–d. Certainly we could not augment the size of the South Korean armed forces or give these forces entirely new weapons without a plain violation of Section 13–d. Such a violation was bound to cause trouble with our allies and with the UN. Accordingly, we should certainly not try to follow such a course of action without a very careful look at the consequences.

The President observed that it seemed to him that the poorer a country was, the larger the army it seemed to want. It was high time to remember the words of wisdom of people like Clausewitz. The strongest limits to the desire of a man to go to war were set by the forces at his disposal. We have really got to sit down and determine the likelihood of an armed attack on South Korea. While it was obvious that the United States must keep token forces in South Korea, the President believed that Syngman Rhee was insisting on too large forces.

Secretary Wilson said that certainly if the South Koreans now set out to obtain a large air force, it would really “bust them” financially. Admiral Radford pointed out that the North Korean air force was already very large and modern. The President said of course someone else was providing the North Koreans with their air force. Admiral Radford went on to say that the North Koreans were maintaining their pressure on the Republic of Korea very successfully. There was indeed a great deal of infiltration into South Korea. On the other side of the picture, said Secretary Wilson, the South Koreans are not above working on the United States in every way to induce us to shell out more money.
Governor Stassen reminded the Council that the power plants which had been developing since the end of hostilities were now about ready to function. This would mean a great boost to South Korean industry and would enable industry to absorb the manpower of a number of South Korean regular divisions. He therefore suggested that in the course of the next year we should be able to cut down the size of the regular South Korean army by some five divisions putting these divisions into reserve and allowing the manpower to be diverted to industry.

The President said he thought Governor Stassen’s idea sounded very good. Secretary Wilson observed that at any rate we must not allow the United States to get frozen in its position with respect to Korea. He added that there was no real way to cut U.S. expenses except by reducing the size of the armed forces of South Korea. Secretary Wilson also believed that we should try to get more of our own U.S. forces out of Korea although we should probably have to leave one U.S. division there.

The President then said to Admiral Radford that this was a problem for him and his people to take a hand in and to look at in terms of what we could profitably have there by way of force levels. Our views might have to be modified later by what we could get the South Koreans to agree to but the first step was to determine what we ourselves should do from the standpoint of our own advantage. Admiral Radford replied that of course one problem involved here was keeping our control of the very large armed forces in South Korea. There was now very little of a UN flavor to these forces. Recently the South Koreans had asked that a South Korean be named as Deputy UN Commander. This problem would of course be aggravated if we now reduced our own U.S. contribution to the armies in South Korea. The President agreed that this indeed was a problem. He pointed out that in addition to our own troops we were also putting 800 million dollars into South Korea each year. We could certainly expect that as a result the South Koreans could go along with us in solving some of these problems.

Secretary Wilson stated that there was yet another piece to the overall problem. A recommendation had recently been received from General Taylor to move the U.S. forces out of Korea and station them in Japan. This recommendation had appealed neither to Secretary Wilson nor to Admiral Radford. In point of fact, of course, the Japanese want us to remove our forces from Japan. At this point the President once again re-emphasized his view on the unfortunate repercussions which were bound to occur when we stationed our forces for long periods in foreign countries. The result was only hatred. The President added that he was more disposed to get our U.S. forces out of Japan than out of Korea. Admiral Radford pointed out that as of
the present time, we have practically nothing but service troops in Japan. The First Cavalry Division was so split up that it could hardly be described as a fighting unit. To make matters worse, said Secretary Hoover, we are encountering a great difficulty maintaining our position in Okinawa. The President said he too was very much afraid that the Okinawa situation would soon rise up to smack us in the face. He then repeated his desire for a report from the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommending what we should do about Korea over the next two years. This should set forth what we conceive to be the minimum forces which our interests dictate we should keep in Korea even though we should later on have to modify this figure. The President said he was personally convinced that we did not need as many men as were now under arms in South Korea. Our policy might well fall of its own weight if we were obliged to put 800 million dollars each year into a single small country like Korea.

Secretary Wilson repeated his view that in the case of Korea the United States was backing a loser. Secretary Hoover informed the Council that the State Department was presently considering the possibility of converting some of the South Korean troops into work battalions as an intermediate step. Secretary Wilson inquired what these battalions would work at? Secretary Hoover replied, on roads, hospitals, public works and the like. Secretary Wilson asked whether the United States would be expected to put up the money for such projects?

Governor Stassen then introduced the problem of total overseas dollar expenditures and the balance of payments situation which he said was becoming very serious for the United States.

Secretary Humphrey warned that when Admiral Radford and the Joint Chiefs of Staff took their look at the Korean situation, they could not look at it in a vacuum. It was costing the United States a billion dollars annually to support our forces overseas and we had got to find some way to cut a billion dollars off of our overseas expenditures very soon. It was this sum which was dragging us down. Nevertheless, what we needed to do here with respect to Korea must also be considered in the light of what we want to do in other parts of the world. Certainly we were getting to the point where we have got to take a look at where all this money was going. Secretary Humphrey insisted that we could not control domestic inflation simply by recourse to a tight money policy if we continue to spend a billion dollars a year in support of our overseas forces. We were actually going to be faced soon with serious inflation. While the rest of the world was getting better with respect to its financial situation, the United States was getting steadily worse. This problem was extremely serious and it had been neglected by the Administration.
Secretary Wilson insisted that not all of this expenditure was to be laid at the door of the Defense Department. Secretary Humphrey agreed that not all of it but only about three-fourths of it was the responsibility of Defense. Secretary Wilson replied that nevertheless this expenditure was going to rise still higher if we did not change our policies with respect to Korea and similar places. Secretary Humphrey went on to insist that this problem had a monetary aspect as well as a foreign policy aspect. The United States must retain its economic strength at home if it ever expected to keep its friends and allies abroad. These people stick only with a winner. If we seem to be a loser, they will run away from us so fast we won’t be able to see them. We are now living in a fool’s paradise and have been doing so for the last six, eight or ten months.

The President expressed the opinion that we were spending a lot more money abroad two years ago than we are now spending. Secretary Humphrey denied this and said there was not much difference. The deficit had been pretty consistently a billion dollars each year. Speaking not in terms of authorization but of actual money “taken out of your pants” there wasn’t a difference of more than perhaps a 100 million dollars a year between the Eisenhower Administration and the last Truman year.

Governor Stassen expressed the opinion that both the President and the Secretary of the Treasury were right in their contentions. The Free World was greatly in need of some of our gold back in 1953. It was now, however, getting too much of a claim on it and it was time to reverse directions.

Mr. Jackson assured Secretary Humphrey that the Council recognized the problem which he had set forth but he said he wished to put a question to Secretary Humphrey. How do we proceed to try to deal with the problem of our military and economic assistance? Should we deal with it on a specific area basis or do we try to deal with it first on a world-wide basis? Secretary Humphrey replied that in his opinion the way to proceed was to agree on the precise amount of money that we can afford to spend overseas and then adjust individual area programs in terms of this overall amount. Instead of this procedure, what we are now doing is simply spending what we think it is nice and useful to spend overseas. Mr. Jackson again pressed Secretary Humphrey for an opinion as to the right governmental procedure with which we ought to tackle this problem. Secretary Humphrey repeated his opinion that we should start with what we think we can afford and work backward from this point. This is the way you run a private business or a family financially.

The President pointed out to Secretary Humphrey that of course if your very existence was at stake, you would pay out a lot more money than you estimate you could afford. This was true even in the
case of a private family. The President went on to say that Korea would provide a very good laboratory case to assist us in determining what we should do about our expenditures on a world-wide basis. In fact he felt that the specific area approach was about the only effective way to try to solve the problem of our expenditures overseas. Secretary Humphrey commented that we had still got to balance what we did in Korea with what we propose to do in Indo-China and other such places. The President said that our target at any rate should be to try to reduce our overseas expenditures by the sum of one billion dollars.

Secretary Wilson then expressed his willingness to take on the assignment that the President had requested and said that he would kick up a good enough paper for the Council to talk from.

Governor Stassen closed the discussion by stating his opinion that the National Security Council should have before it a study of the balance of payments problem. He pointed out that we had been giving a lot of consideration recently to the problem of the Federal budget. We had not given enough time and thought as to how we should handle the problem of our world balance of payments.

The National Security Council.4

a. Noted and discussed the reference Progress Report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board.

b. Noted the President’s request that the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepare a report to the Council as to the minimum level of U.S. and Republic of Korea forces which it would be in U.S. interests to maintain in Korea over the next two years.

c. Noted that the NSC Planning Board, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1486-e,6 would review the policy on Korea in NSC 5514, in the light of the study on that country by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programs circulated in NSC 5610,8 and of the report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff pursuant to b above.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

S. Everett Gleason

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4Paragraphs a–c and the Note constitute NSC Action No. 1607, which was approved by President Eisenhower on September 25. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)


6NSC 5610, “Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programs,” August 3, 1956, is in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5610 Series, and ibid., OFD Files: Lot 59 D 620.
170. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Nes) to the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons) ¹

Washington, October 1, 1956.

SUBJECT

Level of Korean Forces

In the September 25 [20], 1956, meeting of the NSC ² the President directed the JCS to report on "the minimum level of U.S. and ROK forces which it would be in U.S. interests to maintain in Korea over the next two years". This report, together with the Prochnow study, ³ is then to provide the basis for a review by the Planning Board of NSC 5514. ⁴

According to the Prochnow report the continued maintenance of 20 Korean infantry divisions, 10 reserve divisions, 1 Marine division, and present Naval and Air Forces, a total strength of 720,000 men or 3.2 percent of the population, will cost approximately $500 million annually in military aid and direct forces support. In addition, $150 million annually in local currency is required, making the total cost of the ROK military establishment $650 million per annum. These expenditures do not provide for any "modernization" so that a gradual deterioration in combat effectiveness through obsolescence is to be anticipated. The cost of maintaining two U.S. infantry divisions and supporting units in Korea is likewise very great.

If we direct our attention to the ROK forces a number of interdependent factors bear directly upon a determination of the level best designated to promote both short- and long-term U.S. interests. In addition to obvious Korean defense requirements, political and economic justifications have been used to support the continued maintenance of such a sizeable Korean military establishment at such tremendous cost both to the U.S. and to the Korean Government. In view of the President's directive to the JCS, here are the views of NA/K on the arguments heretofore used to defend the present level of forces.

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¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5/10–156. Secret.

²See supra.

³See Document 155.

⁴In a memorandum to Assistant Secretary Robertson dated October 3, Assistant Secretary for Policy Planning Bowie noted that the NSC Planning Board had been directed, "on an urgent basis," to review NSC 5514 in light of the forthcoming JCS report and the study prepared by the Prochnow Committee. Bowie suggested that the staffs of FE and S/P begin to consider revision of NSC 5514 without waiting for the JCS report. (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, Korea, US Objectives and Courses of Action (NSC 5514))
1. To Deter and Repel Aggression

NSC 5514 states as a current U.S. objective in Korea “to develop ROK armed forces sufficient for internal security and capable of defending ROK territory short of attack by a major power”. This has generally been interpreted as calling for adequate defense against the renewal of aggression by north Korean forces alone, but not against intervention by Chinese Communist and/or Soviet forces. The July 25, 1956, Progress Report on NSC 5514 states that the ROK Army “is almost twice the size of the north Korean Army” and “is superior to the north Korean Army in heavy weapons and artillery”. It concludes that “despite weakness in the air, the ROK, given adequate logistic support, could repel an aggression by north Korean forces alone”. “However, against aggression by combined Communist and north Korean forces the ROK would be incapable of conducting a sustained defense without prompt military assistance from the U.S.”

In brief, the U.S., at a cost of $500 million per annum is maintaining south Korean armed forces adequate to repel aggression by north Korean forces alone, i.e., a repetition of the 1950 invasion, but inadequate to defend south Korea against Communist Chinese and/or Soviet aggression. Since the equipment and weapons of the ROK forces have been limited under the Armistice Agreement to conventional types of 1950 vintage, any far reaching modernization of the north Korean forces, signs of which are already reported, could result in the inability of the ROK Army to put up a successful defense even against those forces though inferior in numbers and acting alone.

A deterrent to renewed Communist aggression, far more effective than any military strength which is or could be maintained in south Korea, exists, however, in the guarantees embodied in the Joint Policy Declaration of July 27, 1953, and the U.S.-Korean Mutual Defense Treaty of October 1, 1953. Under these agreements any Communist attempt to attack south Korea by armed force would bring to Korea’s immediate defense not only the U.S., but fifteen other members of the UN. It has been made clear that in any such eventuality Manchuria and Communist China would not again be “privileged sanctuaries”.

In view of the limited effectiveness of present ROK forces against an invasion by the Communists, unless pursued solely by the north Koreans equipped with 1950 weapons, a highly unlikely development, and in the light of the positive guarantees contained in the Joint Policy Declaration and Mutual Defense Treaty it is extremely difficult to make out a strong case, purely on the grounds of defense,

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5The July 18 Progress Report is printed as Document 162.
to support the necessity of maintaining present south Korean forces either as a deterrent to aggression or as an effective instrument to repel aggression.

The most recent [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], 6 concludes that "the USSR will probably retain its predominant influence over north Korea's internal and external policies" through 1960 and that the Communists "will not resort to force" to obtain their objective—control over the entire Korean peninsula—"at least so long as the U.S. remains committed to the defense of the ROK". The estimate also states that "the chances are about even that the Chinese Communists will complete the withdrawal of their troops (from north Korea) within the next year . . .". 7

From a strictly military standpoint the following assumptions, basic to the question of determining the appropriate size of the ROK forces, emerge:

(a) A renewal of aggression by north Korean forces acting alone and equipped according to 1950 standards, is extremely unlikely, especially in view of the role played by the Soviet Union in directing north Korea's external policies.

(b) So long as the Joint Policy Declaration and perhaps more important the U.S.-Korean Mutual Defense Treaty, are in effect the Chinese Communists and/or Soviets will not utilize military force in Korea short of a decision to embark on global war.

(c) Present south Korean forces would not only prove inadequate against a massive Chinese Communist-Soviet onslaught but were the Communist potential in air power and nuclear weapons brought to bear would probably be destroyed before U.S. and UN intervention could become effective.

If the above assumptions are considered valid then justification other than defense, i.e., to deter or repel renewed Communist aggression, must be found for maintaining a Korean military establishment of present size, character, and dollar cost. Forces greatly reduced in size but more modern in organization and equipment could perform this role.

2. Political Justification

As a newly independent country, inexperienced in self-government, thwarted in its desire for unification, recently torn by invasion, occupation, and war, Korea is faced with the ever present threat of political instability and Communist subversion. Both have thus far been held successfully at bay by an authoritarian, semi-"police state" regime dominated by President Syngman Rhee. One of the principal instruments for assuring stability and sustaining the will of the

6See Document 159.
7Ellipsis in the source text.
Korean people to remain non-Communist and independent is the ROK Army. As a visible and concrete force ready at battle stations to repel renewed aggression, it provides the Korean people with a tangible guarantee of continued free and independent existence enabling them to concentrate on the reconstruction of their country and the development of some sort of democratic political framework. Were the armed forces to be cut drastically one immediate effect would probably be a loss of confidence in the future on the part of the Korean people and a break in their will to resist Communist subversion from within and Communist blandishments on the unification issue from without. Such adverse repercussions might largely be avoided, however, were a reduction in forces accompanied by the arrival of "new" weapons thus sustaining or augmenting their present defensive capabilities.

Apart from the internal political importance of the ROK Army, its existence through U.S. support as the largest, best-trained, and equipped, and battle-tested non-Communist force in the Far East may have considerable symbolic significance throughout the area. Its reduction in strength might in the eyes of many be interpreted as a reflection of Western and particularly U.S. disinterest in maintaining Korea as a non-Communist enclave on the Asiatic mainland and as an anchor in the defense line running through Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Again were "new" weapons to be provided to counterbalance force reductions these adverse psychological repercussions would undoubtedly be largely avoided.

In summary, any drastic cut in the ROK Army without the parallel introduction of modern weapons might not only endanger Korea's internal political stability and weaken the morale and anti-Communist convictions of her people but could undermine the will to resist Communism elsewhere in the Far East.

3. Economic Justification

The armed forces numbering 720,000 men are perhaps the greatest single factor in the Korean economy. A military establishment of this size not only provides direct sustenance and technical training to a large segment of the population, but indirectly furnishes a stimulus to many economic activities. Any sizeable cut back would undoubtedly result in intensifying the present unemployment problem. In addition, the fact that the Korean troops now enjoy a standard of living considerably above the general civilian population and have become accustomed to a more "modern" and more "Western" way of life adds to the difficulty of assimilating those who are released. Complications are already being experienced with officers and men demobilized in accord with normal rotational procedures. In many cases, these men having achieved certain skills and having become accus-
tomed to the standards established by American training, equipment, and supply return to their villages and farms, find a resumption of their former way of life unattractive and thence congregate unemployed and discontented in the towns and cities.

Should the military establishment be drastically cut over a short period of time, the problem of assimilating hundreds of thousands of ex-soldiers could only be met by a vast public works program, perhaps far more costly to establish and maintain than military units of comparable size. In brief, reducing the Korean Armed Forces to any great extent would not necessarily reduce internal governmental costs or total U.S. contributions and might be expected to create serious social and economic problems.

Another aspect of a reduction of forces involves senior officers. At the present time, neither private business and industry nor the national and local governments could absorb a large number of young, intelligent, vigorous, highly educated, rank conscious general officers. These officers suddenly retired or released would in fact have no place to go outside of politics and through force of circumstances would undoubtedly be swept up in political maneuvers perhaps of a revolutionary nature.

Conclusions

The maintenance of a military establishment in Korea consisting primarily of large ground forces organized and equipped along World War II lines and costing the U.S. $500 million annually cannot be justified on purely military grounds. Certain political and economic factors do tend to support their continuation, however.

Were these forces gradually reduced with parallel "modernization" both in organization and equipment their military utility would not only be vastly increased, but the adverse political repercussions of such a reduction would be minimal. The economic difficulties of a reduction could probably be overcome by a large public works type program.

The cost of "modernization" and of such public works programs would in the short run exceed that of maintaining the armed forces at their present levels. In the long run, however, the overall cost of the Korean military establishment should be materially less, the Korean economy would benefit by the additional skilled and semi-skilled labor released from the armed forces, and our military posture in south Korea would be such as to offer reasonable opportunities for defense against a Communist attack even though spearheaded by Manchurian based air power and nuclear weapons.

With respect to U.S. forces suffice it to say that their presence at current strength in Korea serves as a deterrent to renewed aggression and contributes greatly to the defensive capabilities of the UNC.
Likewise they support materially in troop expenditures, local purchases, and employment of local labor, the Korean economy. As a symbol of U.S. determination to preserve Korean independence they foster the will to resist Communism not only in Korea but elsewhere in the Far East. As in the case with the ROK Army, however, U.S. ground forces in Korea could undoubtedly be reduced without endangering their several roles were they at the same time to be modernized and provided with weapons of nuclear capability.

The level of both U.S. and ROK forces is, therefore, inseparable from the question of "modernization". Unless and until we are able to evolve a formula with respect to the Armistice Agreement permitting the introduction into Korea of new weapons including those of nuclear capability, NA/K feels that a reduction in either or both U.S. and ROK force levels would tend to compromise U.S. objectives in Korea and to weaken the U.S. position there and in the Far East.\footnote{In a marginal notation on the source text, Parsons observed, in part, "I think your conclusion makes a lot of sense".}

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171. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)\footnote{Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.56/10-356. Secret. Drafted by Nes. Also sent to Sebald.}


SUBJECT

Introduction of Modern Combat Equipment into Korea

Following your meeting with Gordon Gray and Admiral Radford September 11,\footnote{See Document 168.} the "legal experts" of State and Defense reached the following tentative conclusions with respect to the list of equipment proposed by the JCS for introduction into Korea. (Tab B)\footnote{Not found attached.}

1. Under a liberal interpretation of paragraph 13(d) the only items which might cause difficulty are the 280 mm gun, Honest John, and Nike. These are instruments of dual capability. At the time of the Armistice we had no such weapons in Korea.

2. In the absence of concrete evidence that the Communists have brought weapons of atomic capability into north Korea, it would not
be legally possible to construe paragraph 13(d) as permitting their introduction into South Korea.

In view of the above, I suggest we propose to Defense that:

(1) CINCUNC be authorized to bring in all items on the JCS list except the 280 mm gun, Honest John, and Nike and so inform the Sixteen.

(2) The views of CINCUNC and Embassy Seoul be solicited regarding the problem of timing and of reporting to the NNSC and the Military Armistice Commission although perhaps in a less detailed and specific fashion.

(3) A vigorous attempt be made to determine whether sufficient evidence is at hand to substantiate a charge that the Communists are bringing atomic weapons into North Korea.

(4) A decision as to how we proceed with respect to the controversial items will then be reached in the light of the results of (3) above.

Tab A, a draft State-Defense instruction to CINCUNC embodies the above proposal. L has approved this course of action and the draft instruction provided we first obtain from Defense an expansion of the information contained on the JCS list of new items to include (1) description of piece being replaced, and (2) assurance that new item is "the closest approximation in type and effectiveness in current use by our forces". L feels that this data is essential on all new items in order to justify their introduction under an interpretation of paragraph 13(d) and in accord with the principles established in Tab. C.

The course of action outlined in (1)-(4) in paragraph 2 has been discussed informally with Gordon Gray by his staff and while he has indicated that he might be willing to agree to it and to endeavor to obtain Admiral Radford’s concurrence, Defense at the working level has indicated that neither Gordon Gray nor the JCS could agree to provide the additional information desired by L, which would require time consuming research and numerous exchanges with CINCUNC, as a prior condition to moving forward in the manner outlined. Defense would probably be willing to try to get this information once the program is underway. NA does not feel that L’s conditions are reasonable or that we should press Defense further with respect to them.

Recommendations

1. That you approve the draft instruction (Tab A) to CINCUNC.

2. That you endeavor to obtain Mr. Phleger’s agreement to propose formally to Defense the course of action outlined and the draft

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*Not printed.
*Not found attached.
instruction on the understanding Defense will be requested to supply the additional information desired on this and subsequent lists as soon as administratively possible, but not as a prior condition to getting "modernization" underway. 6

6Robertson initialed his approval of the recommendations. He put forward the course of action outlined in an October 17 memorandum to Phleger. (Department of State, FE Files: Lot 58 D 3, Korea 1956) Officials of NA and L subsequently met and agreed upon a revised version of the draft telegram to CINCUNC. The revision made introduction of new weapons into Korea dependent upon receipt of a report from General Lemnitzer containing additional information desired by L. (Memorandum from Parsons to Robertson, October 19; ibid., Central Files, 795B.56/10-1956)

172. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) 1

Washington, October 11, 1956.

SUBJECT

U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 27 September 1956, subject: "U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea," 2 and to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 22 September 1956, subject: "Modernization of Forces and Equipment in Korea." 3 The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the initial step which must be taken prior to a realistic determination of the minimum

1Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5514. Top Secret. Wilson sent this report to the NSC under cover of a memorandum to Executive Secretary Lay. The report was circulated to the NSC under cover of a memorandum from Lay, October 12. Both memoranda are attached but not printed.

2In this memorandum, also addressed to the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, Deputy Secretary Robertson noted the action taken by the NSC with respect to Korea on September 20 and directed the Joint Chiefs to prepare a report on the minimum level of U.S. and Republic of Korean forces which it would be in U.S. interests to maintain over the next 2 years. (JCS 1776/560; Department of Defense Files)

3This document was a covering memorandum used by Assistant Secretary Gray to forward an undated memorandum directed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff which was awaiting Secretary Wilson’s signature. Gray noted in his covering memorandum that he was forwarding the attached memorandum to the Joint Chiefs for their information in Wilson’s absence. The attached memorandum, dealing with modernization of forces and equipment in Korea, reviewed the conclusions relating to modernization reached by lawyers from the Departments of State and Defense on September 11. For a summary of these conclusions, see footnote 8, Document 168. [7 lines of text not declassified]
levels of U.S. and ROK forces in Korea is to modernize U.S. forces and equipment to include atomic capable forces. Regardless of the numerical ratio between the UN command forces and the Communist forces, the capability of the UN command to indefinitely deter a renewal of hostilities in the face of the Communist modernization is dependent on the replacement of obsolete and obsolescent equipment.

2. Despite reductions in over-all strength since the Armistice, Communist armed forces in Korea could still launch a limited attack with little warning. The Chinese Communists will continue to have the unopposed capability to reinforce units in contact along the demarcation line with a minimum of six armies in from 10 to 14 days after the initiation of movement from present assembly areas. North Korean Armed Forces are now estimated to include a reequipped and reorganized army of about 350,000 men and an air force consisting principally of 310 jet fighters (50 Frescoes, 245 Fagots, and 15 Midgets), 70 jet ground attack (Fagots), and 75 light jet bombers (Beagles). The Chinese Communists now have about 290,000 men in North Korea. (For detailed breakdown of Communist forces, see Appendix "A" hereto.)

3. The combat elements of the ROK Army and the ROK Marine Corps are well trained and combat ready, but their capability to conduct sustained defensive action would be hampered by a lack of logistical experience and the deficiencies of their automotive equipment. (A continuous action is being taken to correct the latter.) The amphibious capability of the ROK Marine Corps is 1 Reinforced Regimental Landing Team. Similarly, the ROK Air Force is restricted to daylight, fair weather, air to ground operations by one F-51 Fighter Squadron and one C-46 Transport Squadron. The three F-86F squadrons, which are now in a training status, will give the ROK Air Force a daylight VFR, Air Defense, and Counter Air Capability. A continuation of the current modernization program of the ROK Air Force to include all six of the fighter-bomber squadrons will be necessary. The effectiveness and capability of the ROK Navy is adversely influenced by a limited number of minesweepers, gun fire support restricted to three-inch guns, and effective fire power well below U.S. standards. Although by U.S. standards the effectiveness and capability of the ROK Navy is limited, it is considered ample for its currently assigned mission. The personnel strength of the Korean Armed Forces on active duty is about 720,000 with a reserve strength of about 450,000. (For detailed breakdown of friendly forces, see Appendix "B" hereto.)

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4Not printed.
4. The U.S. forces presently deployed to Korea consist of two infantry divisions and one fighter-bomber wing with necessary support forces. The total U.S. personnel strength in Korea is 50,000. The present strength of UN forces other than U.S. and ROK forces is 7,600.

5. In our memorandum for you, dated 2 November 1955, subject: "Planning Force Bases for Korea—FY 57–59," we stated that, prior to the initiation of a reduction of ROK Armed Forces the following three conditions must be achieved:

   a. The enemy situation be such as to permit reduction in ROK active forces.

   b. Adequate and effective reserve forces be attained.

   c. The physical plant required for the accommodation of the divisions converted to reserve status be in being.

6. The present status with respect to the above conditions is:

   a. The enemy situation will permit a phased reduction in UNC forces if the U.S. forces and equipment in Korea are modernized.

   b. The first cycle of the reserve training objectives for the first two ROK reserve divisions will be met by March 1957. In addition, total individual reservists expected to be trained in CY–56 is 206,690. The three cycles of the training objective for the ten reserve divisions presently authorized by the U.S.-ROK Agreed Minute are scheduled for completion in the period March–July 1959.

   c. As of August 31, 1956, construction of accommodations for the ten reserve divisions authorized by the U.S.-ROK Agreed Minute was 98 per cent complete. Construction of facilities for additional reserve divisions will require 18 months from the time detailed planning is initiated.

7. However desirable the redeployment of all U.S. forces from Korea may be from a military point of view, the implications of such a move require that the following be considered:

   a. The possibility that President Rhee may take risks to reunify Korea by force and thereby involve the United States in a renewal of hostilities.

   b. A major problem may arise during Korean selection of a successor government if President Rhee should pass from the scene.

   c. The redeployment of major U.S. forces from Korea would probably result in the withdrawal of the ROK Armed Forces from the operational control of the U.S. commanders.

8. In the light of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the minimum levels of ROK and modernized U.S. forces in Korea which should be maintained over the next two years are:

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5Not printed. (JCS 1776/544; Department of Defense Files)
a. U.S. Forces (Including atomic capable forces)
   2 U.S. Infantry Divisions
   1 Fighter Bomb Wing

b. ROK Forces
   (1) Army
      16 Infantry Divisions
      14 Reserve Divisions
   (2) Navy
      Approximately 61 combatant ships
      1 Marine Division
   (3) Air Force
      6 Fighter Bomber Squadrons
      1 Transport Squadron
      1 Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron
      1 Tactical Control Squadron

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Arthur Radford ⁶
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

⁶Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

173. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, October 12, 1956—8 p.m.

356. Re Deptel 260 Oct 10.² As now shaping up, military program calls for twenty active plus ten reserve divisions; two jet fighter

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¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5/10-1256. Top Secret; Priority; No Distribution Outside Department.
²In telegram 260 to Seoul, the Department requested the Embassy’s views on the following questions:
   “1. What would be political and psychological effects of reduction US forces? ROK forces?
   “2. What would be economic effects of such reductions? Can economy absorb? Would rate economic growth be affected?
   “3. To what extent would reduction ROK Army endanger political stability?
   “4. To what extent would provision of US forces with more modern weapons lessen or counterbalance adverse political and psychological repercussions of possible US and ROK force reductions? [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].” (Ibid., 795B.5/10-1056)
bomber wings plus one tactical control squadron and one tactical reconnaissance squadron, and navy of seventy-nine ships. Costs are projected at $580.6 millions for FY 57 and $672.8 millions for FY 58 plus substantial increases in ROK military budget. Latter can be met only by further drain on DS counterpart funds, to serious detriment economic development program.

If program outlined above adhered to, funds as set forth essential. Otherwise, we may end up with large but ineffective force. Factors inherent in military establishment which may lead to serious detriment if not corrected are reduced training, equipment obsolescence, low pay, and long service.

In this situation, I believe best course is return to general intent Agreed Minute. Any reduction in present Army forces must for political-psychological reasons be accompanied by measures which clearly demonstrate increased striking power of reduced forces. To accomplish this, I propose reduction Army forces to ten active plus ten reserve divisions by end FY 59. This reduction to be accompanied by replacement worn-out transport and communications equipment, introduction weapons of atomic capability (i.e., Honest John and Nike); addition one jet fighter-bomber wing plus one tactical control squadron and one tactical reconnaissance squadron; maintanance Navy and Marine Corps at present effective strength.

Reduction in active divisions should be phased over three-year period beginning FY 57 in step with measures to enhance military effectiveness of smaller force. Ground must be prepared by negotiations to obtain consent ROK Government and careful attention paid to impact public disclosure of new measures.

Foregoing seen as only way avoid increases in both MDAP and economic aid levels. Savings effected by reduction in active divisions over three-year period will be absorbed by expenditures for new military equipment and increased economic expenditures, i.e., labor intensive projects to provide employment discharged soldiers. These latter projects would of course accelerate economic development. By FY 60, reduction present levels both MDAP and economic aid should be possible. In any event, it is imperative to avoid realignment of present programs on crash basis if we are not to endanger achievement United States objectives in Korea and indeed throughout Asia.

Replies specific questions reference telegram follow:

1. a. U.S. forces.—I do not believe it advisable to reduce United States military strength in Korea at this time. To do so would have an adverse psychological and political effect, creating in ROK public the feeling of gradual United States abandonment. Without United States forces on frontlines, military defense treaty and joint policy declaration do not convey to general public—and even to government—sense of United States commitment to ROK defense. This
sense of security essential to success of our political-economic-military program in Korea. Furthermore, reduction in level of U.S. forces inevitably will reduce our control over, and guidance of, ROK forces.

Foregoing arguments do not apply to reductions in personnel achieved through streamlining of forces and modernization of weapons. Essential point is maintenance U.S. troops on front lines.

1.b. ROK forces.—A reduction in active ROKA forces and transfer discharges to reserve status as foreseen in Agreed Minute would not have adverse effect on public opinion, if carried out gradually, in agreement with ROK Government, and coupled with measures to increase military effectiveness ROK forces already contemplated in FY 57-58 MDAP programs. There is resistance to military conscription and many ROKA personnel who have been in service four or five years would welcome opportunity return civilian life and families.

It will of course be necessary to persuade President to accept reduction in ROKA and to explain it in terms that will not impair public morale. Active opposition of President Rhee might lead him to desperate unilateral moves, and would in any event have serious unsettling effect on ROK internal situation.

2. Substantial reduction in ROK forces would have significant economic effects. Cut of ten divisions in active army strength permitting discharge roughly 300,000 men, would result net reduction forces approximating 275,000. This assures one month active reserve training for men released; cadres for TF reserve divisions already in being. Estimated annual budget savings after completion reduction, assuming budget of 125 billion hwan based on current strength, would approximate 40-45 billion. This estimate based on 35-40 percent saving pay and allowances and food and 20-25 percent reduction all other costs. Savings would be in proportion phasing of reduction over three-year period and would accrue in July after FY-59. Other things constant, United States funding military deficit would be reduced same amount.

In view current unemployment and underemployment problem, not all men released could be immediately integrated into economy. Many soldiers have acquired skills which are in demand and could be readily absorbed by industry. Others would rejoin family units on farm despite existing underemployment. Assuming as many as 125,000 could be absorbed in these and other pursuits during period FY 57-59, 150,000 would lack livelihood after FY 59. Shift in emphasis economic aid program would be needed to ease transition during period reduction forces and perhaps for additional two or three years during which these men could be gradually absorbed in economy. We think this could be accomplished best through development projects in fields reclamation, irrigation, road and bridge construction, erosion control and reforestation all labor intensive involving little
direct dollar costs. Road and bridge construction could be planned to meet military needs. Cost of supporting such program in peace year (FY 60) estimated roughly equivalent to savings military budget (210,000 hwan per man per year in wage for 150,000 man plus 10-15 billion for other local currency cost). These costs probably would have to be financed with counterpart to avoid inflationary financing by government. Direct dollar import costs would be small, probably not more than $10 million for program this nature and magnitude. Concentration on labor intensive projects in rural areas would also have favorable political effect by increasing public awareness our aid.

While these calculations necessarily rough, our conclusion is that initially there would be little or no net savings in DS program (estimated at $335 million in FY 58); resulting from reduction troop strength, but shifting resources from military to economic purposes would increase rate economic development and improve prospects for later reduction economic aid.

Reduction ROK forces would also reduce need for consumables financed under DFS.

Reduction United States forces would not have appreciable effect on Korean economy. Dollar purchases of hwan and employment Korean civilians and Korean service corps would be reduced; reduced coal and oil purchases for KNR might save some dollars; port and rail congestion would be relieved somewhat. All these effects would have only marginal impact overall.

3. Political stability. Any reduction in ROK forces without adequate preparation and consent ROK Government could adversely affect political stability in three ways: (1) by release into economy of large number ex-soldiers who could not be integrated into civilian life; (2) by damaging position of armed forces as stabilizing element and guarantor constitutional processes; (3) by undermining public confidences in United States support President Rhee and thus intensifying opposition to point of possible civil disorder. Reduction carried out in orderly manner and with cooperation ROK Government should have no adverse effect on political stability.

4. Modernization of weapons. Supplying US forces with more modern weapons might permit moderate reduction these forces, and would undoubtedly lessen adverse reactions thereto. Equipping US forces with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], if publicly disclosed, would, I believe, have such favorable effects as to permit drastic reductions, 7 to 1 division, for example. Such action would also facilitate reduction ROK forces but would inevitably bring in wake insistent clamor for provision similar weapons to ROK. If we deny these weapons to ROK forces while boasting their provision to United States forces, we must face charges of treating ROK forces not as allies but as mercenaries.
These comments do not of course take into consideration possible reaction Asia elsewhere free world to cut back ROKA forces; problem presented by armistice provisions; nor repercussions equipping United States forces with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would have in other Asian countries.

Dowling

174. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie)

Washington, October 18, 1956.

SUBJECT

JCS Report of October 11, 1956 on Korean Force Levels

The JCS concludes that based on current U.S. objectives in Korea (NSC 5514) the enemy situation and the status of the ROK reserve divisions are now such as to permit a reduction of UNC forces. Were the U.S. forces and equipment in Korea to be “modernized,” and it is clearly stated that such modernization would include “atomic capable forces,” the reduction contemplated would consist essentially of a shift of four ROK infantry divisions to reserve status.

When the JCS report is considered by the Planning Board, the following questions should be raised:

1. The extent of ROK force reduction recommended from a military viewpoint if U.S. troops are not given atomic capability. The effect of such a reduction on the will to resist Communism within South Korea, and throughout the Far East must, of course, be considered.

2. The initial cost of “modernizing” the UNC forces (U.S., ROK, Turkish, British Commonwealth, etc.) to include within the U.S. forces atomic capability. Future maintenance costs are also pertinent.

3. The net saving to the U.S. in military aid and defense support and to the ROK military budget of a shift in four ROK divisions to reserve status. The problem and cost of providing employment for those released, perhaps through U.S. financed development projects, should also be considered.

4. The crucial and fundamental question raised by the JCS recommendation involves the decision as to whether the U.S. is pre-

1Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, Korea, US Objectives and Courses of Action (NSC 5514). Top Secret. Drafted by Nes and cleared with L, UNP, and EUR.

2Document 172.
pared to introduce [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] into the Republic of Korea. This matter is not only of major significance but overshadows all other aspects of the JCS recommendations. Accordingly, it would be desirable to have this question settled before giving fuller consideration to the other parts of the report and before we proceed to consider revision of NSC 5514—which was suggested in your memorandum to me on October 3, 1956.3

The force levels set by the JCS, if accompanied by the proposed JCS "modernization" would, I believe, be acceptable to the ROK and would not result in any serious or adverse political, economic, or psychological repercussions within the Republic of Korea. (Ambassador Dowling concurs in this appraisal.)4 This, however, raises the very fundamental issue of our policy with respect to continued adherence to Article 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement. It has consistently been L’s opinion that the introduction of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] into south Korea would be a clear violation of the provisions of this Article. Reaction throughout the world and in the UN is an even more important factor to be considered. Introduction of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] must in the end depend, among other things, upon its effect on U.S. world-wide policies, objectives, and position. In my opinion, the introduction of such weapons could be justified only were we to possess incontrovertible evidence of a similar violation on the part of the Communists. To my knowledge, such evidence is not at hand. The Department has already in principle concurred in “modernization” of forces in Korea, short of atomic weapons, under a liberal interpretation of Article 13(d).

3See footnote 4, Document 170.
4See telegram 356, supra.

175. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Washington, October 19, 1956, 3:30 p.m.1

[Here follow a list of 25 persons present and discussion of item 1. Attending for the Joint Chiefs of Staff were Admiral Radford, General Twining, General Taylor, and Admiral Burke. The Marine Corps was represented by Assistant Commandant General V.E.

Megee. Assistant Secretary Gray also represented the Department of Defense. The Department of State officials included Murphy, MacArthur, Phleger, Robertson, Bowie, Parsons, and Bennett. Gleason attended for the NSC.

2. Equipment for Korea

Admiral Radford inquired as to whether there are any new developments with respect to Clause 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement in Korea and mentioned his understanding that the question had been turned over to the lawyers for interpretation. Mr. Robertson replied that the lawyers have now given their opinion that the U.N. forces can move in anything they want to with the exception of two categories ([less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and jet aircraft). Admiral Radford commented this was not enough from the military point of view and remarked humorously that he had expected this opinion, and that is why he had not wanted in the first place to have the issue referred to the lawyers.

3. Personalities in Korea

General Taylor spoke on this item on which discussion had been requested by the JCS. General Taylor spoke of recent correspondence received from General Lemnitzer regarding the internal political situation in Korea. He said unfortunately General Yee, Chief of Staff of the Army, was living up to the poor expectations we had had of him. He said that there was a close alliance between General Yee and the new Minister of Defense, Kim. The two had been intriguing to get General Chong, Chairman of the Korean JCS, out of the country as the Korean representative on the United Nations Military Committee until finally Ambassador Dowling and General Lemnitzer had to intervene with President Rhee to keep Chong there. General Yee had made a demagogic public speech on October 1 calling for the unification of Korea by force, and he has also been reported as saying that he was sick and tired of General Lemnitzer’s opposition to his political views. Many changes are being made down the line to put pro-Yee men into positions of influence. General Taylor remarked that it is a very sobering thing to have a man of General Yee’s views in charge of the ground troops in an area of such importance to us. Admiral Radford commented that General Yee is the most dangerous man in the Korean picture today, and Mr. Robertson agreed with this view. General Taylor asked whether it would not be possible for Ambassador Dowling to have a frank talk with President Rhee and

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2 General Yi Hyung-kun.
3 Kim Yong-u.
4 General Chong Il-kwon.
point out frankly that the retention of General Yee in a position of such importance will inevitably affect US-Korean relations and the extent that the US is able to cooperate with the Korean armed forces. Mr. Robertson agreed that this step should be taken, although he pointed out that President Rhee is a very old man and in many ways is a virtual prisoner of the forces around him. He said that he did not know how such a conversation would turn out. He agreed that Dowling should talk to the President but stressed that it was a delicate and difficult situation. General Taylor suggested that the excesses of General Yee’s October 1st speech might be used as a basis for approaching the President. Admiral Radford and Admiral Burke referred to the position of Admiral Sohn.⁶ They recognized that he had lost out for the present in a test of strength with Yee but thought there was a possibility that he would come back from his round-the-world tour with the full confidence of President Rhee and this might lead to his moving back into the center of the picture. All agreed that enhancement of Sohn’s influence would be in US interests, but Mr. Robertson was less optimistic than Admiral Radford over the possibility of Sohn’s return to a position of preeminence. In that connection, Mr. Robertson spoke of his satisfaction over the fact that President Rhee has great confidence in both Ambassador Dowling and General Lemnitzer. He expressed the view that President Rhee has perhaps more trust and confidence in Dowling than in any American representative during his (Robertson’s) tenure as Assistant Secretary. He emphasized that Dowling and Lemnitzer make an extraordinarily fine team to represent US interests in Korea.

Admiral Radford said that the deteriorating internal situation in Korea, together with our frustrations over Section 13(d) of the Armistice, left him with two major preoccupations: (1) the status and safety of our forces in Korea and (2) the position of President Rhee and how far we can go with him. General Taylor said that we could not overlook the fact that, as things are going in Korea now, we might one of these days be faced with an outbreak of civil war in the South; he raised the question whether we want to be there with our forces if that should happen. Mr. Murphy interposed to remark that, if large scale trouble should break out in Korea, we would be better off to have forces there than to have removed them. Mr. Robertson asserted that the presence of our forces in Korea is a major factor in ensuring that there will not be a civil war. Admiral Radford agreed with Mr. Robertson, and Admiral Burke foresaw that, if there should be civil war or chaotic political conditions in the Republic of Korea, the communists would inevitably increase their influence and would almost surely take over as an aftermath of the situation. General

⁶Admiral Sohn Won-il, former Minister of National Defense.
Taylor pointed out that at one time we were so organized in Korea as to enable us to exercise tight control over Korean gas and oil stocks; now we do not have that control. Admiral Radford called attention to the fact that we would not have any control at all if we should move out of Korea but went on to declare that the problem raised by General Taylor offers another strong reason for getting rid of General Yee. General Taylor referred to the proposal to invite Defense Minister Kim to the US for a visit. He said that he was opposed to inviting Kim here as long as he was not a proved friend on our side.

[Here follows discussion of the remaining items.]

176. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

Washington, October 24, 1956.

SUBJECT

JCS Report of October 11, 1956, on Korean Force Levels²

Mr. Bowie opened Monday’s Planning Board consideration of the JCS report by pointing out that no estimate had been included of the force reductions, if any, which might be undertaken were [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] not introduced into south Korea. The JCS representative referred to paragraph 1 of the report and said force levels could not be determined until a decision on introducing [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was reached. He then confirmed that if [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] are not to be introduced, the JCS recommend no change in present force levels, either U.S. or ROK. This was contested by Mr. Bowie on the grounds that the conditions set by the JCS in November, 1955 for ROK force reductions³ had now been met.

Gordon Gray indicated that he was not at all happy with the JCS report and that Secretary Wilson felt the very minor reduction in ROK forces recommended was not worth the difficulties inherent in giving U.S. troops in Korea nuclear capability and would so inform the NSC. Furthermore, Secretary Wilson would not concur in Defense agreement to any future force levels in Korea, either U.S. or

²Document 172.
³These conditions are outlined in Document 172.
ROK until the completion of a world-wide review due in mid-December.

Asked where this leaves us, Mr. Jackson directed that work on a new Korean paper proceed, nevertheless. NA is working on a draft of a revised paper which will be submitted for your approval in a few days.

*William H. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President.*

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177. Editorial Note

A contemporary intelligence estimate on probable developments in the Republic of Korea through 1957 reads as follows:

"The Problem"

"To evaluate recent political developments in South Korea and to estimate their probable political significance through 1957; and to estimate the probable reactions in Korea assuming US support were to be reduced."

"Conclusions"

"1. President Rhee continues to be dominant in South Korea. Despite widespread popular dissatisfaction with his regime, his position will probably not be seriously challenged at least during the next year.

"2. The recent election as Vice President of Chang Myon from the opposition Democratic Party has been followed by considerable reshuffling in the cabinet and in the military leadership and by unrest in the Liberal Party. These developments make the presidential succession somewhat uncertain. However, we believe that on Rhee's death the constitutionally designated successor will take office, even if, as is possible, the constitution is amended to bar Chang. Even an orderly succession would almost certainly be followed by a period of political instability, and the possibility of violent disorders cannot be excluded. Any successor is likely to be less intransigent than Rhee both on domestic and foreign issues.

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1"The present estimate does not consider possible repercussions of the assumed US action outside South Korea, nor does it consider longer run consequences of US action within South Korea." [Footnote in the source text.]
"3. If US military or economic assistance were substantially reduced, or if the US made a major reduction in its forces in Korea, President Rhee would be vehement in his objections and would seek by threats, pressures, or possibly the creation of incidents to raise US fears of renewed hostilities in Korea. However, we believe it unlikely that Rhee would in fact launch a unilateral attack north.

"Discussion

"4. The presidential election in South Korea in May 1956 revealed stronger popular opposition to President Rhee and the Liberal Party than had been evident up to that time. Even though the major opposition candidate died before election day, President Rhee, who had received 74.6 percent of the total vote in 1952, polled only 55.6 percent. Moreover, Yi Ki-pung, the Liberal Party vice presidential candidate, was defeated by Chang Myon, the nominee of the opposition Democratic Party. Although the election has apparently not fundamentally shaken Rhee’s domination of the ROK government, it has revealed deficiencies in the apparatus of his control, and has been followed by a number of changes. As a result the political situation in South Korea has become considerably more obscure.

"Postelection Political Developments

"5. The President has shifted Chong Il-kwon, former army chief of staff, to the chairmanship of the joint chiefs of staff, a position of less military influence, and replaced Admiral Son Won-il as Minister of National Defense. President Rhee probably took these actions partly because of concern over the failure of certain elements of the army to give its full support to him and the Liberal Party in the May elections, and because of the potential challenge to his position inherent in the close relationship between General Chong, Admiral Son, and Yi Ki-pung. Another action tending to reduce the influence of General Chong was a major reshuffle of army general officers initiated by the new army chief of staff, General Yi Hyong-kun, and approved by President Rhee. This resulted in the transfer of many of Chong’s supporters from key posts.

"6. President Rhee’s selection of General Yi Hyong-kun as the new army chief of staff probably enhanced Rhee’s control of the army. General Yi has shown himself less amenable to US guidance than was his predecessor, and is probably more responsible to Rhee’s wishes. Although General Yi is known to have had friendly relations with Chang Myon and Lee Bum Suk, he is not known to have developed an association with any political party. General Yi’s future political leanings are uncertain but he will probably remain loyal to Rhee during the latter’s lifetime.
"7. Rhee has probably increased the responsiveness of the National Police Force to his orders by appointing as its new chief 'Tiger' Kim, who is noted for his brutal application of force when so ordered. The army's CIC, the other major internal security force, remains under Rhee's direct control as do the Provost Marshal General Command and some small semi-official strong-arm groups.

"8. President Rhee has made little progress in strengthening the Liberal Party. He has forced the party to accept Yi Ki-pung's continued nominal leadership despite the latter's defeat in the elections. He probably continues to favor Yi—an ineffective political leader—because he represents no real challenge to Rhee's power. Rhee has continued to resist party participation in the determination of government policy. Moreover, he has done little to improve the position of the Liberal Party in the face of the possibility that a member of the Democratic Party will succeed to the presidency. This is a matter of concern to many party members and some are probably considering a switch in their political affiliation. As a result, Rhee is under increased pressure to modify his dominant position in the government and in the party. However, though he may make concessions on particular issues, he will probably not accept any significant modification of his personal control of the government. Furthermore, unless Rhee is physically incapacitated, the majority of the Liberal Party will probably not seriously challenge his control, at least during the next year.

"9. The Democratic Party is attempting to cope with the implications of its unexpected success. The party has in the past suffered from factionalism, and the sudden death of Sin Il-hui (its presidential candidate and principal leader) seemed to open the door to greater disunity. However, since the election factional leaders have shown a willingness to maintain basic party unity and Chang's position within the party has been strengthened. Both of these trends were probably further enhanced by the recent unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Chang.

"10. Despite the widespread popular dissatisfaction with his administration, President Rhee will probably be able to continue in his dominant role. Even though there is little improvement in internal conditions, Rhee can probably continue to count on the support of the army, the internal security forces, the majority of civil servants, and the bulk of the Liberal Party.

"The Problem of Succession

"11. The election of a vice president from the opposition and subsequent political developments have introduced considerable uncertainty into the presidential succession. President Rhee has made it evident that he is opposed to Vice President Chang as a successor,
and it is possible that Rhee, during the next year, will call upon the National Assembly to amend the constitution to prevent Chang’s succession. The shifts in army leaders, the maneuvering of many politicians, and the continued factionalism in the various parties are additional factors which contribute to the unsettled political situation.

"12. Despite these circumstances, we believe that on Rhee’s death, the succession will be in accordance with constitutional provisions whether or not the constitution has been amended to bar Chang. These estimates are based on the following considerations:

"a. Many political and military leaders fear the consequences of a collapse of constitutional government.

"b. Almost all Korean political and military leaders recognize that US support is essential to any ROK regime and believe that the US would view unfavorably any unconstitutional seizure of power.

"Even an orderly and constitutional succession would almost certainly be followed by a period of political instability, owing to the removal of President Rhee’s strong leadership and to the factionalism characteristic of Korean politics.

"13. However, there are possible developments during the next year which could seriously complicate the situation and might cause violent disorders. One possibility would be an attempt by Rhee to force through a constitutional amendment to deny the presidency to Chang. Another might be a prolonged illness of Rhee during which his capacity to govern was brought into question. In such an event, leaders of the administration and the Liberal Party would probably seek to prevent Chang from assuming power in accordance with constitutional provisions. Another possibility is the assassination of Rhee or Chang. Should Rhee be the one assassinated, chances favoring Chang’s succession would be less. Finally, the possibility will continue to exist that a group may seek to exploit the confused situation at the time of Rhee’s death by attempting a palace coup. Regardless of the cause, we believe that should violent disorders break out, either before or after Rhee’s death, the army would probably intervene to restore order and might assume political control.

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\[Footnote \text{in the source text.} \]
"Probable ROK Reactions to a Reduction in US Support"

"14. President Rhee and some military leaders (including General Yi Hyong-kun) have considered the problem of modernizing the ROK military forces. They apparently have been thinking in terms of an over-all force reduction, compensated for by the introduction of modern weapons. In this connection they probably assume a continuation of US assistance, at least at the present level, to take care of the increased cost of modern arms, particularly jet aircraft.

"15. Should the US propose a substantial cut in military aid, President Rhee would oppose it with vehemence and would seek to raise US fears of a renewal of hostilities in Korea. This he might do by generating border incidents designed to give the impression of hostile Communist intent, and by threatening to withdraw his forces from the UN command or to march north on his own. He would probably also threaten to seek a rapprochement with the North Korean Communist regime. Concurrently he would probably attempt to bring indirect pressure on the US government by taking action prejudicial to the interests of the US business community in Korea and by increasing the ROK anti-Japanese campaign. He would probably also become increasingly uncooperative in the implementation of the US aid programs.

"16. If US military aid were reduced substantially despite ROK protestation, Rhee might attempt to maintain his forces at existing levels by deficit financing and, perhaps, by diverting some ROK funds from other uses. Although he would know that the ROK would not have sufficient foreign exchange to purchase equipment and supplies and that therefore ROK military capabilities would decline, nevertheless he might take this action hoping to force the US to reconsider the cut in military aid rather than accept the possibility of an economic collapse in South Korea. He might also withdraw his forces from the UN command. It is not likely, however, that he would seek a rapprochement with the North Korean Communist regime.

"17. The ROK probably would consider a major reduction of US forces in Korea a more serious indication of an adverse trend in US policy toward Korea than a reduction in military assistance to the ROK, and hence Rhee would be more likely to withdraw his forces from the UN command than in the circumstance discussed in paragraph 16 above. From the Korean point of view the presence of a substantial force of US troops in Korea is a visible and more dependable guarantee of continuing US interest in Korea than the existence of a security treaty.

"18. However, in either case we believe that Rhee is unlikely to launch a unilateral attack on North Korea. Rhee and ROK military
leaders generally recognize that the ROK alone cannot achieve unification through military action. They also probably believe that under present world circumstances the chances of embroiling the US in renewed hostilities would be slight. However, the possibility of a unilateral ROK attack or of generated incidents which might precipitate fighting will remain, at least as long as Rhee retains power. The danger of a ROK attack would be most critical during the period immediately following a US decision to reduce assistance or to reduce its own forces. Even some of the military leaders who have in the past been a restraining influence would be persuaded that military action was necessary before the military situation in South Korea had deteriorated.

"19. The large scale US economic aid since mid-1953 has been essential to South Korea's survival and rehabilitation. A substantial reduction in US economic assistance would not only reduce the availability of counterpart funds for support of the ROK military budget, but would also almost certainly reduce the already low living standards and increase opposition to President Rhee and his administration. Popular unrest might develop into civil disorder which would probably have an anti-American complexion. The North Korean and other Communists would also seek to exploit this situation. Accordingly, President Rhee would react almost as vigorously to a US proposal for a substantial reduction in economic assistance as to a proposal to reduce military assistance.

"20. It is likely that any successor to Rhee will be less fully in control of the Korean political situation and less intransigent. Accordingly, his successor would probably be more amenable to a reduction in US military assistance, particularly if the US continued to furnish a high level of economic assistance.” [Document title, number, and date not declassified] Department of State, INR–NIE Files

Lee Bum Suk (referred to in paragraph 6) was a former Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea. Kim Chong-won (referred to in paragraph 7), popularly known as “the Tiger of Paektusan,” was Chief of Police of South Cholla before his promotion to the position of Director of the Bureau of Internal Security after the May 15 elections.

According to a note on the cover sheet of the estimate, “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.” All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on October 30, except for the Atomic Energy Commission representative and the Assistant
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside of their jurisdiction.

178. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

Washington, November 1, 1956.

SUBJECT

Robert Macy’s Report on Korea²

Mr. Robert M. Macy, Bureau of the Budget, has returned from his month’s visit to Korea and has provided us with the attached report,³ the principal observations, conclusions, and recommendations of which are:

Observations

1. Considerable progress has been made since 1953—consumption has returned to the 1949–50 levels, the economy is more stable and the ROK Army has developed into an effective fighting force.

2. Many of our activities, nevertheless, are still based on the assumption that Korea is an “active theater of war.”

3. The objectives of the present program for the ROK forces are not clear. There are widely divergent views among our own military as to the objectives and capabilities of these forces.

4. There is great dissatisfaction among the Americans in OEC due to their inability to bring their dependents to Korea and poor housing.

Conclusions

1. There is no agreed economic plan for South Korea.

2. Economic “viability” is not possible in the foreseeable future.

3. The ROK forces are too weak in the air to meet the U.S. objective of being “capable of defending ROK territory short of attack by a major power.” On the ground they are stronger than necessary to preserve internal order and provide border defense.

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/11–156. Secret. Drafted by Nes.
²Robert M. Macy, Chief of the International Division, Bureau of the Budget. A marginal notation on the source text by Sebald reads: “Long, but well worth reading”.
³Not found attached. A copy of the report, dated October 25, is in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, Korea, U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action (NSC 5514).
4. The danger of a new Communist attack is no greater in Korea than in a number of other spots around the world.

5. Chang Myon will succeed to the presidency if he is not assassinated meanwhile.

6. Unless ROK forces are sharply curtailed, military expenditures will rise over the next few years.

7. The dollar trade gap is tending to widen rather than decrease.

8. NSC review of Korean policy is urgently needed.

Recommendations

1. There should be a conscious shift in our programs from concentration on defense to greater emphasis on the internal situation.

2. More emphasis should be placed on small business and especially on restoration of full commercial relationships with Japan.

3. The objectives of the military forces in South Korea should be restated in more specific terms after which their levels and character can more easily be determined.

179. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)\(^1\)

Washington, November 2, 1956.

SUBJECT

U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea

1. With reference to my memorandum of 12 October 1956,\(^2\) subject as above, I have on further consideration concluded that the difficulties involved in introducing [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] into Korea would not be warranted merely to effect the transfer of four ROK active army divisions to reserve status while at the same time maintaining U.S. forces at their present level.

2. However, I prefer not to formalize my views with respect to the JCS memorandum until mid-December since, at that time, the Department of Defense will have made certain decisions with respect to U.S. overseas deployments. Obviously, decisions as to such deployments are inseparable from the size of the ROK forces we should support, and I believe it would therefore be premature and

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\(^1\)Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5514. Top Secret. Circulated to the NSC under cover of a memorandum by Lay, November 6.

\(^2\)See footnote 1, Document 172.
unwise to decide at this time either the U.S. force deployments in Korea or the closely related problem of the size of the ROK forces.  

C. E. Wilson

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Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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180. Letter From the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons) to the Ambassador in Korea (Dowling)


Dear Red: You are doubtless curious as to the motivation of our telegram 260 and developments on the level of forces question subsequent to your comprehensive and well thought out reply, Embassy telegram 356.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff report requested by the President came forward October 11, 1956, and stated in the first paragraph that "The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the initial step which must be taken prior to a realistic determination of the minimum levels of U.S. and ROK forces in Korea is to modernize U.S. forces and equipment to include atomic capable forces." The paper then estimated that if our forces in Korea were provided atomic capability, a reduction in ROK strength, consisting of a shift of four infantry divisions to reserve status, could be effected. No reference was made to the possibility of any reduction in the event U.S. troops are not given atomic capability nor were any cost estimates included on "modernizing" U.S. and UNC forces. The net saving, if any, to the U.S. in military aid and defense support and to the ROK military budget of a shift in four ROK divisions to reserve status was likewise omitted.

When the NSC Planning Board met on October 22 to consider the Joint Chiefs of Staff report, the Department's representative asked the JCS representative whether from a purely military point of view any reduction in ROK forces was possible in the event [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] are not introduced into south Korea. The answer was a flat "no" at which point Gordon Gray said that Secretary Wilson would shortly send his comments on the JCS report to the NSC and would give as his opinion that a mere transfer of...
four divisions to reserve status was not worth all the difficulties inherent in the introduction of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Furthermore, Defense was not prepared to agree to any decision on level of forces in Korea, either U.S. or ROK, until a world-wide survey was completed about mid-December.

As you know, it has consistently been L’s opinion that the introduction of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] into south Korea would be a clear violation of Article 13(d) of the Armistice. FE believes that reaction throughout the world and in the UN is a highly important factor to be considered. Introduction of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] must in the end depend, among other things, upon its effect on U.S. world-wide policies, objectives, and position. It is FE’s opinion that the introduction of such weapons could be justified only were we to possess incontrovertible evidence of a similar violation on the part of the Communists. As far as we know here, such evidence is not at hand.

Where all this leaves us I don’t exactly know at this point except that the Planning Board still desires a new policy paper on Korea which is certainly difficult to prepare until a decision is made on this important policy question. At the same time, DRF is preparing estimates on the economic implications within the ROK of force reductions and on world-wide reaction to the introduction of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Out of this “new look” at Korea may come a revised NSC paper, revised, that is, in format and perhaps courses of action but with the same long and short-term objectives.

This whole exercise has, of course, been inspired by a growing concern that the Congress can at some future date reduce our various foreign commitments in the interest of the domestic Defense budget which apparently is steadily growing as a result of new weapon developments. Korea, involving the largest sums of money, is the first on the list for review at the NSC level and will be followed by Formosa, Viet-Nam, Pakistan, and Turkey.

In connection with the force level problem, you will be interested in some insights into the thinking in JCS and Army acquired at a recent State–JCS meeting which I attended. Admiral Radford reported that General Lemnitzer was disturbed about General Yi Hyong-kun. At another point in the State–JCS meeting they said they did not wish to cut U.S. troops in Korea since they are important from the viewpoint of internal political stability until such time as the succession question is finally settled.

On the succession question, we have recently received a number of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports which we found

4See Document 175.
particularly interesting, and apparently reliable. We summarized two
to them in a memorandum to Mr. Robertson.6 These two reports ran
as follows: The first, dated early October [less than 1 line of source text
not declassified] reported that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in
the event of President Rhee’s death, Chang and the Democratic Party
would receive the support of the police, students, and general popu-
lace. The Liberal Party would disintegrate, and the Army under its
present leader would support Chang but would try to control him.
The second report, also dated early October, [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified] says that the Liberals could not oppose Chang’s suc-
cession because they had favored the constitutional amendment in
1954. His succession, however, would mean their end, unless they
staged a coup d’état, which would be highly uncertain of success.

[4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] AFPE/8 Army also reported
on the effects of the assignments. From a careful reading of the data
and analysis in these reports, we can secure no clear-cut picture of a
new line-up within the Army.

We have been inclined to read these various reports as indicating
an increasing probability that the succession will be more or less un-
eventful. Thus, in the short run things look better. However, the fre-
quent references to the possible disintegration of the Liberal Party
tend to give pause. It is possible that in a relatively short time a one-
party system, under Chang Myon, would lead to difficulties in U.S.-
ROK relations of a character similar to those we have experienced
with President Rhee. At the same time, we can share some of the
military concern over Yi Hyong-kun. Certainly in their view a
smooth working relationship between the ROK military and UN
forces (including U.S.) is essential for maintaining a unified UN
Command. Such a relationship, no doubt, tends to decrease the prob-
ability of ROK forces being used for internal conflicts. There can be
no doubt that such a relationship makes it more difficult for Presi-
dent Rhee to use force for purposes that could lead to excessive em-
brassment of the U.S.

The thoughts of the Embassy on these questions: “if succession,
then what?”, “how about Yi Hyong-kun?”, “what’s happening to the
UN Command relationship with the ROK command?”, and the many
related questions would be more than welcome.

With warm personal regards,
Sincerely yours,

Howard

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6Not found in Department of State files.
181. Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)\textsuperscript{1}


SUBJECT

Introduction of Modern Combat Equipment into Korea

The draft State–Defense telegram on the introduction of modern combat equipment into Korea (Tab B),\textsuperscript{2} which you approved October 22, was delivered to Defense the following day. Almost simultaneously a report\textsuperscript{3} was received from CINCUNC which, together with information extracted by further research, has enabled Defense to supply the information which L has regarded as necessary before authorization to introduce the equipment should be given. Consequently, Defense and NA officers prepared the attached draft State–Defense message (Tab A),\textsuperscript{4} incorporating the desired data in paragraph 2,\textsuperscript{5} and authorizing CINCUNC to introduce the new equipment. Approval is still withheld, pending further determination in Washington, on introduction of the 280 mm gun and the Honest John. The introduction of the Nike has been authorized in view of Army assurances that this model does not have an atomic capability. In all other respects, the attached draft is substantially the same as that you approved on October 22 and was cleared by L/UNA, UNP, EUR, and Miss Bacon. Since you had already approved the despatch of an authorizing instruction to CINCUNC provided L was satisfied with the information provided by Defense, the attached message has been proposed to Defense. With reference to paragraph 9,\textsuperscript{6} a separate talking paper and covering memorandum are now being cleared for notification of the Sixteen.

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\textsuperscript{1}Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5/11–756. Secret. Drafted by Nes and concurred in by UNP, L/UNA, EUR, and FE.

\textsuperscript{2}Not found attached. A note on the source text indicated that the memorandum from Parsons to Robertson, summarized in footnote 6, Document 171, was attached at Tab B.

\textsuperscript{3}Not found in Department of State files.

\textsuperscript{4}Not found attached. A copy of the draft message is attached to a copy of this memorandum in Department of State, NA Files: Lot 59 D 407, Problems of Para. 13d of Armistice Agreement 1956.

\textsuperscript{5}Paragraph 2 of the draft telegram listed the equipment which the Department of Defense proposed to introduce into Korea.

\textsuperscript{6}Paragraph 9 of the draft telegram indicated that the introduction of new equipment into Korea would be discussed with the Sixteen some time prior to the arrival of the first shipment in the Republic of Korea.
182. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, November 14, 1956—8 p.m.

466. I had two hour discussion international situation with President Rhee this morning along lines Deptel 335 Nov 10.² (I have not yet seen Army FM 918066,³ which Hqrs 8th Army not received.)

In conversation, I used arguments set forth ref tel, except that I thought best to make no reference in first presentation to possibility of ROK unilateral action or US reaction thereto outlined para A NSC 5514.⁴ I also referred to responsibilities faced by UNGA, and our hopes for further progress there in settlement current problems, and expressed hope he would do what he could to maintain calm atmosphere here.

In reply, President said he was disappointed, since "US appeared to be continuing policy of peace at any price," whereas he had hoped we would take advantage of present opportunity, evidenced primarily by Hungarian revolt and restiveness other satellites, to re-assert our support captive peoples, force Soviets to back down, and thereby regain world leadership. He went on to set out, in vague terms what he thought should be done at this juncture. Basing his position on premise that UN must help Hungary, he said if US would only speak out other nations would follow lead and UN would become such moral force that USSR would be constrained follow its decisions rather than face dishonor of being expelled, always provided UN made it plain there was no other alternative. He argued that free world was entirely too fearful of USSR, and that this fear was inhibiting adoption of firm attitude which was essential if Communist threat is ever to be eliminated. He seemed to feel, in other words, that threat of force would be sufficient to cause Soviet withdrawals everywhere, and that they could be kept in line thereafter by code of sanctions if free nations were prepared to apply them againstgressions.

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11-1456. Secret; Priority.
²In telegram 335 to Seoul, the Department instructed Ambassador Dowling to explain to President Rhee that the United States was working to effect peaceful solutions to the Middle Eastern and Eastern European crises, and that agitation and aggressiveness on the part of the Republic of Korea could undermine these important efforts. (Ibid., 684A.86/11-1056)
³In telegram 918066 from the Eighth Army Command at Camp Zama, Japan, to the Department of the Army, Eighth Army Intelligence, reported on a South Korean Cabinet meeting on November 10 during which President Rhee reportedly instructed his ministers and generals to plan to accomplish the unification of Korea at the earliest possible time. (Department of Defense Files)
⁴Document 24.
I naturally endeavored to point out certain fallacies in his arguments, pointing out that in my view US was exercising leadership, that actions by other UN members in response that leadership in recent weeks was most encouraging, and that there was great hope US policies would continue to meet with growing success. I added that it seemed to me we were on way to accomplishing basic objectives he had in mind, i.e., eventual elimination of Communist threat and enduring peace. I fear, however, that I made little impression on him, although I have found in past that he has sometimes gradually come to an acceptance of our views.

When conversation turned from international plane to Korea, President said in response my query that he had given much thought to earlier proposal by some members of govt that North Korean revolt be encouraged by covert distribution of leaflets and by other means such as radio broadcasts, and had finally decided against it. He could not, he said, encourage North Koreans to risk their lives unless South Koreans were able to come to their aid, and this, he added, could not be done without US support. He made this latter statement factually, and without apparent emotion or rancour. I then asked if he had any ideas as to discussion of Korean unification in UNGA, saying I assumed we must above all insist on withdrawal of Chinese forces in North Korea and holding of free elections. He agreed, adding that essential point was withdrawal of Chinese; hard core of Korean Communists would withdraw too, as they knew true temper of North Korean people, including Army, and unification would then come about almost spontaneously.

In connection Chinese forces North Korea, he said he had high hopes that discontent was rising in Red China, and confided that Chinese Nationalists had told him they would invade mainland next year. He went on to say that he had reached agreement with Generalissimo three years ago that if one moved other would do likewise, but avoided saying he would join Chinese next year.

In conclusion, he said he had thought of writing President Eisenhower his ideas re international situation, but hesitated to bother him.

I replied that I knew President would be glad to have his views and any constructive suggestions, as frank discussions between allies could only be helpful.

In sum, my impression remains that President, as reported my 440 Nov 8, is searching for some further means to unite free world.

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6Ambassador Dowling reported in telegram 440 that President Rhee had reviewed the world situation in a conversation with General Lemnitzer and Dowling on November 7 and concluded that what was needed was a program to call "Communist aggressors" to account. Rhee argued that if the United States would take a firm stand, the
against communism, in hope eventually achieving longed-for goal of
unification, but that unilateral ROK action is not being considered at
present. This may yet happen, but from evidence now available, nei-
ther he nor ROK military leaders appear to have any illusions re suc-
cessful action without US logistic support at least, and are aware
such support would not be forthcoming under present circumstances.

Dowling

rest of the world would follow the American lead. Dowling concluded that Rhee was
attempting to formulate "an action program," but he did not feel that Rhee would act
without prior consultation with CINCUNC. (Department of State, Central Files,
684A.86/11–856)

183. Memorandum of Discussion at the 304th Meeting of the
National Security Council, Washington, November 15,
1956

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meet-
ing.]

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

Mr. [Allen] Dulles indicated that in Korea we had recently had
some concern after a jocular statement by President Rhee to our Amb-
assador to the effect that now that the U.S. elections were over, he,
Rhee, was planning to cause us a little trouble. 2 The latest reports,
however, indicate that this is a flash in the pan and Rhee does not
seriously contemplate meddling in North Korea.

Displaying extreme irritation over President Rhee's behavior, the
President indicated his belief that we must make clear that we will
not be blackmailed. He added that he was thoroughly fed up with
these "penny ante dictators", and that it was high time to tell Rhee
off.

[Here follow discussion of unrelated subjects and the remaining
agenda items.]

S. Everett Gleason

1Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by
Gleason on November 16.

2The statement by Rhee to which Dulles referred was made to Ambassador
Dowling and General Lemnitzer on November 7, and was reported in telegram 440
from Seoul, November 8. Telegram 440 is summarized in footnote 5, supra.
184. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)\(^1\)


**SUBJECT**

CINCUNC Views on NNSC and Paragraph 13(d) of the Korean Armistice Agreement

In a routine report dated November 16 (attached)\(^2\) on the MAC meeting of November 10 concerning the F–51 incident, CINCUNC estimates that the KPA/CPV will attempt to use the incident to reopen the NNSC issue, and recommends positive action on CINCUNC’s past recommendations for dissolution of the NNSC and suspension of paragraph 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement. Although the telegram is routine and not signed from General Lemnitzer to Assistant Secretary of Defense Gray or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense or CINCUNC may follow it up with new requests to the Department of State.

The Swiss and Swedish members of the NNSC on November 16, subsequent to this telegram, rejected the KPA/CPV request that a Neutral Nations Inspection Team inspect the wreckage of the ROK F–51 shot down November 7 north of the Demilitarized Zone. We do not believe the KPA/CPV will press the issue further, lest they encourage the Swiss and Swedes to withdraw, which would in effect dissolve the NNSC.

The reminder by CINCUNC of past recommendations to dissolve the NNSC is surprising. The ROK has not pressed us further since our action of May 31, 1956, suspending our performance of those provisions of the Armistice Agreement governing the operations of the NNSC in our area. We see no real basis for concern about the NNSC in the future. The Swiss and Swedes may ultimately withdraw. Meanwhile, its continued existence seems to be doing no harm to us. Our Allies would surely see no justification for further action on our part. Moreover, for procedural reasons, it is difficult to understand what CINCUNC’s recommendation amounts to. Formal dissolution of the NNSC would require agreement of the NNSC members, including Poland and Czechoslovakia, and the agreement of the KPA/CPV. Our only real power to act unilaterally in the situation would be through such indirect and questionable tactics as ending transportation and logistic support of the Swiss and Swedes.

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\(^1\)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/11–2056. Secret. Drafted by Norred and cleared with UNP, L/UNA, EUR, and FE.

\(^2\)Not found attached.
On the 13(d) problem, our recent correspondence with Defense has effected a tentative agreement that the problem of obsolescence of equipment would be solved through a liberal interpretation of paragraph 13(d), and an authorizing telegram to CINCUNC to introduce new equipment awaits the approval of Admiral Radford. We do not understand CINCUNC’s continued insistence on suspension of the paragraph. Early in 1956, CINCUNC did indicate his opposition to reporting the new types of equipment we planned to bring in and indicated also that, due to inaccuracies shortly after the Armistice, we have not maintained our credits on destroyed and worn-out equipment as we should have. From our point of view, however, paragraph 13(d), which governs introductions of combat equipment and prohibits reinforcement, is except for the cease-fire provisions the most important part of the Armistice Agreement. Its suspension would permit the Communist side legally to introduce without reporting any amounts and types of combat equipment they wish. Suspension of the paragraph would seem required only if the Communists were staging a sharp build-up in Korea and we needed to augment greatly our own combat equipment, which is not now the case. The stated requirements of Defense can be satisfied by interpretation of paragraph 13(d), and there seems to be no justification for suspension of the paragraph at this time.

Our action on the NNSC problem in May and consideration of action on the 13(d) problem seem to have encouraged Defense and CINCUNC to seek further modification of the Armistice Agreement. In taking the NNSC action, however, we stated that “the UNC continues to regard the Armistice Agreement as in force and limits its action to the particular suspensions described . . .”8 If we should follow the courses of action recommended by CINCUNC, our Allies and world opinion would almost surely consider that our action of May, 1956, and our general posture toward the Armistice Agreement show bad faith.

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8 Ellipsis in the source text.
185. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Acting Secretary of State


SUBJECT

Review of Policy with Respect to Korea (NSC 5514)

In response to the National Security Council request that our Korean policy be reviewed in the light of the Joint Chiefs of Staff report on force levels and the Prochnow Committee report on aid programs, my staff has completed a comprehensive study of the problem based on a number of recent intelligence estimates and research studies on Korea together with the views and recommendations of the Ambassador at Seoul and the Economic Coordinator. I should be glad to make these papers available to you should you so desire.

The conclusion reached as a result of this comprehensive study is that the objectives and courses of action of NSC 5514 (Tab A) remain valid and the paper, therefore, does not require revision with the possible exception of paragraph 8, which deals with the courses of action to be pursued by the United States in the event of south Korean aggression against north Korea. My views on this section of the current NSC paper will be forwarded to you separately.

The over-all objectives and dimensions of the military and economic aid programs likewise do not, in my opinion, lend themselves to any major modification at this time and I believe, therefore, they must be continued at present levels (Prochnow Committee alternative 1). (Prochnow Committee Report—Tab B)

FE is convinced that substantial reductions in military or economic aid (alternatives 3 and 4 of the Prochnow Committee’s Report on Korea) would weaken our military and political posture in Korea, to the serious detriment of United States interests there and elsewhere in the world.

Since the Cairo Declaration, United States policy has been directed toward the establishment and maintenance of a free, inde-

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1Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, Korea, U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action (NSC 5514). Top Secret. Drafted by Nes and Norred and cleared with Jones and Sebald. Hoover was serving as Acting Secretary during Secretary Dulles’ convalescence from surgery. Dulles remained in Walter Reed Hospital until November 18, after which he convalesced in Key West, Florida, until December 2.

2Not found attached. NSC 5514 is printed as Document 24.

3Not found attached. Regarding the Prochnow Committee report, see Document 155.

4The Cairo Declaration was the joint communiqué issued on December 1, 1943, at the conclusion of the conference in Cairo of President Roosevelt, Prime Minister...
pendent and unified Korea. We fought a major war to prevent Communist compromise of this objective by military aggression and in the fighting suffered thousands of casualties. Although a cease-fire was effected in 1953, the armies remain deployed in the field under an armistice and the threat of renewed aggression is a very real one. The American public and the Congress, in my opinion, fully appreciate this special situation and as a consequence, little difficulty has been experienced when requests are made for aid to Korea. It is widely appreciated that the United States was at fault prior to the opening of the Korean hostilities in having withdrawn its tactical forces, in having failed to create adequately trained and equipped forces in south Korea, and in having failed to make clear that it would not countenance Communist aggression. Since the signing of the Armistice, we have entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty with Korea, supplementing the Joint Policy Declaration of the Sixteen, and we have assisted in the development of a larger and more effective Korean military establishment. Nonetheless, our position is not altogether secure; the most recent North Korean [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] gives the north Koreans a marked superiority in the air and a capability of launching a limited attack without warning. It also points out that Communist forces in Korea could be reinforced from Manchuria within eight days by at least six Chinese Communist armies.

I believe our military objectives in Korea are well stated in paragraph 2 of NSC 5514: to create Republic of Korea (ROK) armed forces capable of maintaining internal security and of defending ROK territory short of attack by a major power. On the basis of our experiences in 1950–1953, and subsequent analysis of world-wide Communist bloc policy, we know that it is unlikely that north Korea alone will attack the ROK provided appreciable military preparedness is maintained. An attack from north Korea, if it came, would be backed by Communist China and possibly the USSR. We know from experience that we could not rely on any forewarning of the reinforcement of the north Korean forces by Chinese Communist forces. Although we cannot create ROK military forces capable of a sustained defense against Communist China and the USSR, we should maintain there ROK forces capable of making the foreign involve-

Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The communiqué pledged joint military operations against Japan and liberation of all territories conquered by Japan. The statement focused on China, but also noted that the leaders were “mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea,” and “determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.” For text, see Department of State Bulletin, December 4, 1943, p. 393.

5See Document 159.
ment apparent and of affording time for the United States and its Allies to intervene effectively.

The force levels of the ROK armed forces also have an important bearing on United States military and political posture in Korea and in the Far East. There is every reason to believe that any reductions would have widespread and adverse repercussions in Korea and throughout the non-Communist world. A report prepared by the R area of the Department (IR-7367, November 1, 1956)\(^6\) states that the south Korean populace might become more susceptible over a period of time to the Communist line for rapprochement between north and south Korea were military strength reduced. It has been fortunate for us that the south Koreans have been so universally and firmly anti-Communist. A weakening of their opposition to Communism, in their exposed position, would be a serious matter. The R paper, in considering the effects of a reduction of ROK forces on the non-Communist countries of the Far East, estimates that unless reassurances were made through collateral actions these countries would doubt the long-range intentions of the United States in the Far East, and the mainland Southeast Asian states probably would move closer to the Communist bloc, thereby weakening the SEATO structure. A reduction of ROK forces would be regarded by interested countries as a move in the direction of exclusive reliance on a strategy of massive retaliation, thus forcing them to reassess their security ties with the United States.

The Prochnow Committee Report presented as the last of its four alternatives a cut in economic aid. Less study has been given to this alternative than to reducing military aid, partly because the level of economic aid is set in large part by the magnitude of ROK military forces. Moreover, reductions in economic aid would stimulate inflation, to the detriment of stability in Korea, would lessen the present rate of investment, thus prolonging the need for outside assistance, and would in many respects work to the immediate detriment of United States interests in Korea. Mr. Warne has analyzed the effects of a cut very thoroughly in a recent telegram supporting his recommendations for a fiscal year 1958 Korean Defense Support and Technical Assistance Program totaling $335 million (Toica 1052, CINCREP Seoul, November 6, 1956—Tab C).\(^7\)

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\(^6\)A copy of this report, entitled “Probable Local and International Repercussions of Various Possible Courses of US Policy in Korea,” is in Department of State, INR Files.

\(^7\)Not printed.
Recommendations:

1. That there be no weakening of our military position in Korea, either the number of United States troops or the size of ROK forces, since this would seriously endanger not only United States objectives in Korea but United States interests throughout the Far East and, in fact, elsewhere in the non-Communist world.

2. That economic assistance be continued at least at present levels in order to support the ROK military establishment, to control inflation, and to provide the investment resources essential to economic development.\(^8\)

\(^8\)There is no indication on the source text of Hoover’s response to the recommendations. According to a marginal notation on a memorandum from Bowie to Hoover on the same subject, also dated November 20, Hoover was absent at the time and Bowie’s memorandum went to Deputy Under Secretary Murphy. Bowie argued in his memorandum that, in order to prepare a report for the President reviewing U.S. programs of military and economic support for the Republic of Korea, it was essential to examine a wide range of alternatives, despite FE’s conclusion that no change be made in the military and economic programs for Korea or in the size of the Korean force levels. The marginal notation on the S/P memorandum indicated that Murphy approved the course of action outlined by Bowie. (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 487, Korea)

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186. Letter From President Eisenhower to President Rhee\(^1\)


DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have read with great interest your letter of November 16 [15], 1956,\(^2\) and have considered most carefully the suggestions you have made. I share your views on the importance of international justice for all states, large and small, and the right of self-determination.

It is impossible for me to accept, however, the thesis that because grave violations of these principles have occurred we should now abandon the position that outlawing the use of force is a means of bringing about world peace.

\(^1\)Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Eisenhower/Dulles Correspondence with Rhee. Confidential. The text of this letter was sent to Seoul in telegram 376, November 23, for delivery to President Rhee. The telegram indicated that the signed original would follow by pouch. Ambassador Dowling reported in telegram 513, November 27, that he had delivered the letter to President Rhee that morning, and that Rhee, after reading the letter, commented that he supported the policy outlined in the message but remained skeptical that Soviet leaders were capable of responding to moral forces. Copies of both telegrams are ibid.

\(^2\)Not printed.
On the contrary, this is the very moment when the potential of the United Nations as an instrument of world opinion has been demonstrated.

In the recent developments in Eastern Europe we now see cracks in the Soviet Empire. The gallant Hungarian people have shown that the spirit of freedom is still alive, despite years of Communist oppression. I am convinced that moral force brought to bear on the Soviet Union through the United Nations will assist to an ever increasing degree in moderating and ultimately bringing to an end Soviet oppression. I believe that these moral forces can bring nearer the day of unification and freedom in Korea also.

In the present crises, there have been terrible injustices and sufferings. War, which is itself an instrument of injustice, is not the remedy. We continue to look to the United Nations as providing the best alternative to global war and the disaster to victor and vanquished alike which would follow in this day of modern weapons. The actions which the free world must, therefore, pursue should be directed toward supporting and strengthening the United Nations so that it may secure justice and peace through law.

May I take up, now, with the utmost frankness your views on expelling the Soviet Union from the United Nations and then reorganizing that body. This course of action has been suggested by others during the past few weeks and has been thoroughly considered.

Although I fully recognize that on numerous occasions the Soviet Union has been guilty of defying every principle of the Charter of the United Nations, we must realize that as a practical matter, the veto power of the Soviet Union would prevent its expulsion. Instead of a new organization, I believe the world should work to strengthen the United Nations so that it can effectively impose its collective will for peace.

Let me assure you that neither the United States Government nor the American people have any illusions whatsoever regarding the nature and objectives of Communist imperialism. The United States has assisted the free countries in developing and maintaining their political, economic and military strength to thwart the Communist objective of world domination. We have clearly demonstrated our willingness to make use of force as a last resort in individual and collective self-defense against aggression. These are times of grave world tension, in which we in the free world must act with calmness and high principle. I have, therefore, welcomed the manner in which you have encouraged a calm resoluteness on the part of your people and your military establishment.

I am pleased that you have felt free to write to me on a confidential and personal basis, and I do not plan to give any publicity to our correspondence. I would like to suggest that you treat our com-
munications in the same way so that we may be at liberty to exchange views from time to time with complete frankness.

Sincerely,  

*Printed from an unsigned copy.*

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### 187. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, November 28, 1956

**SUBJECT**

Defense proposal to authorize the introduction of “Honest John” and the 280 millimeter gun in Korea

**PARTICIPANTS**

*State*
- Mr. Herman Phleger, the Legal Adviser
- Mr. John M. Raymond, Acting Deputy Legal Adviser
- Mr. Nes, NA
- Mr. Runyon, L/UNA

*Defense*
- Mr. Mansfield D. Sprague, General Counsel
- Admiral Chester Ward, Judge Advocate General, Navy
- Mr. Monroe Leigh, Assistant General Counsel
- Captain Mott, Navy
- Captain Robbins, ISA

Mr. Sprague opened the meeting by quoting the piece-for-piece of same type and effectiveness provision of paragraph 13(d) of the Korean Armistice Agreement and stating that in Admiral Radford’s view and the view of the Defense Department, it would be impossible in the long run to construe these words strictly. Modernization of combat matériel would inevitably produce more effective weapons and weapons of dual capability. The case of aircraft is a good example in that they have developed and changed since the agreement was made and they clearly possess atomic capability. Similarly, “Honest John” and the 280 mm. gun have both conventional and

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1. Source: Department of State, NA Files: Lot 59 D 407, Problems of Para. 13d of Armistice Agreement 1956. Secret. Drafted by Runyon. A memorandum for the files of this conversation was also prepared on November 28 by Monroe Leigh. According to Leigh’s memorandum, “Mr. Phleger stated that he had no legal objection to including the 240 mm [sic] cannon and the Honest John in the list of modern weapons to be introduced into Korea. He thought the question was purely one of policy determination.” (Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 60 A 1339, 388.3 Korea)
atomic capability. While the President would have to decide whether atomic warheads might be introduced into Korea, the Army in the meantime should have the latest types possible and should be permitted to have weapons of dual capability. At Mr. Phleger's request, Mr. Runyon briefly outlined the legal position taken by the State Department, as set out in Defense telegram 983878, June 24, 1955,2 and concurred in previously by Defense.

Mr. Phleger asked why Defense had not gone ahead with the introduction of modern equipment consistently with the earlier agreed position. He stated that the time element is an important matter and suggested that the passage of time might eventually make necessary the introduction of equipment not covered by the original agreement. He stated his view as a lawyer that the introduction of "Honest John" and the 280 mm. gun would be a violation of paragraph 13(d) and could not be justified as a matter of liberal interpretation, pointing out that the introduction of these weapons would create an imbalance contrary to the overall purpose of paragraph 13 of the agreement, especially inasmuch as we could not establish that there have been similar introductions on the Communist side. He thought this would also be the view of the United Nations. In the last analysis the decision whether to introduce "Honest John" and the 280 mm. gun must therefore involve a weighing of the political factors including the political consequences of a violation on our side which could be considered by the Communist side to permit them to treat the Armistice Agreement as abrogated. Mr. Phleger made it clear that he would not maintain that we should forever be bound by an armistice agreement when its terms became outmoded and impossible to live with, but we must be prepared to take the consequences of violating it. He also pointed out that the Communists had breached the agreement, and we were therefore entitled to terminate or suspend it, but if we did so, the Communists would not be bound by the agreement.

A general discussion ensued in which the representatives of Defense emphasized the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the introduction of the two weapons referred to is essential from a military viewpoint, that it might be argued that Communist violations of paragraph 13(d), especially with respect to aircraft, free us to disregard its restrictions, and that in any event, the weapons should not be regarded as atomic since, when unaccompanied by atomic warheads, such use would be potential and not actual. Mr. Nes stated that, legal considerations aside, the psychological factor is an important one. The "Honest John" and the 280 mm. gun are publicly known as atomic weapons, and an Intelligence survey3 recently com-

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2See footnote 5, Document 110.
3See footnote 6, Document 185.
pleted in the State Department shows that their introduction into Korea would have serious repercussions among our allies; the reaction in Japan and Australia, for example, would be strongly adverse, and a similarly adverse reaction could be anticipated among the so-called neutral nations and among the members of SEATO. Admiral Ward stated that in his view SEATO members would respond favorably to steps by us emphasizing our strength and our determination. Mr. Leigh made the point that we might justify the introduction as a suspension of paragraph 13(d). Col. Raymond had earlier referred to the statement which the United Nations Command made in the Military Armistice Commission, and reiterated in its report to the United Nations, in which it recited all past Communist violations and affirmed its intention to limit remedial action to the suspension of those provisions of the armistice relating to the operations of the NNSC south of the demilitarized zone.

Summing up, Mr. Phleger stated our view as lawyers that introduction of the two weapons could not be successfully supported as a matter of liberal interpretation, would upset the balance established under the agreement, and would generally be regarded as a violation of the agreement under existing circumstances. He reaffirmed that the agreement should not, however, stand in the way of any action which it might be considered necessary and wise to take, now or in the future, in view of the military and political situation, and with full awareness of all the consequences. Such a decision, he indicated, would of course have to be taken at a high political level. He again invited the attention of Defense to the desirability of moving ahead with respect to all the other weapons upon which agreement had already been reached. He suggested to the Defense representatives that the matter be discussed with Mr. Murphy.

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4 See Document 164.
5 See footnote 4, Document 150.
188. Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)\(^1\)

Washington, December 5, 1956.

**SUBJECT**

Disagreement with Defense on Action with Respect to Paragraph 13(d) of the Korean Armistice Agreement

On November 7, FE proposed to Defense a draft joint State–Defense instruction to CINCUNC (attached)\(^2\) authorizing the introduction of new equipment into Korea to replace obsolete equipment, under a liberal interpretation of paragraph 13(d) of the Korean Armistice Agreement.

The State draft was subsequently cleared in Defense and by all the services, with only minor change, but Admiral Radford declined to concur unless it provided for introduction of the Honest John and the 280mm gun. The State draft deferred authorizing the introduction of these weapons, \[less than 1 line of source text not declassified\] which, according to L, the United States could not justify within the terms of the Armistice Agreement. Moreover, the introduction of such weapons, particularly at this juncture, would almost surely create serious controversy, in which the United States would undoubtedly be censured not only by the Communists and neutralist countries, but also by the Swiss and Swedes and many of our Allies in Korea.

We have made a number of concessions to Defense on this issue, recognizing that it is important to find procedures for replacing obsolete equipment. Except for the Honest John and the 280mm gun, we have accepted at face value the Defense statement that the new weapons are as close in effectiveness and type to the obsolete ones as is consistent with modern standards and production, even though to a layman some of the new types appear far removed from those being replaced. A number of the weapons listed for introduction have atomic capabilities: we have taken exception only to those whose atomic capability is widely regarded as the primary feature of the weapon. I do not believe it would be wise for us to agree with Admiral Radford that the Honest John and 280mm gun should be introduced, particularly in this time of world tension. We have attempted to justify our position and have explained the political and legal issues in detail during numerous discussions with Defense. Following a meeting between Mr. Phleger and Mr. Sprague of Defense

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\(^2\)Not found attached, but see footnote 4, Document 181.
on November 28, 1956, Defense indicated that Admiral Radford would approach you directly in the near future in a further attempt to obtain State concurrence to the addition of the 280mm gun and Honest John to the list of weapons authorized for introduction.

Recommendation:

That in any discussion of paragraph 13(d) with Defense officials you state that the Department of State will not agree to the introduction of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] such as the Honest John and the 280mm gun because such action would generally be regarded as a violation of the Armistice Agreement, and the Department of State does not believe the United States should expose itself to such charges for the sake of these specific items of equipment.

3See supra.

189. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Gray) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)1

Washington, December 6, 1956.

Problem:

To establish a Government policy with respect to the introduction of atomic ground delivery systems in connection with the modernization of U.S. equipment in Korea.

Discussion:

Paragraph 13 d of the Korean Armistice Agreement provides that the opposing sides shall "cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition; provided, however, that combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up during the period of the Armistice may be replaced on the basis of piece for piece of the same effectiveness and the same type". (The full text of paragraph 13 d is set forth at Tab A.)2

Very soon after the Armistice went into force, it became apparent that the Communists had introduced jet aircraft into North

1Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 60 B 1339, 400 Korea, Top Secret.
2Not found attached.
Korea, whereas they had no such aircraft there prior to the Armistice. Moreover, no report of such introductions was made to the Military Armistice Commission. The United States at this time construed the Agreement quite strictly and accused the Communists of violating the Armistice Agreement in this respect.

The United States has always adhered to a very strict and literal interpretation of paragraph 13 d. It has only introduced exact equivalents and it has reported all such introductions. As time has gone by U.S. weapons in Korea have become increasingly obsolete. Our commanders in the Far East have strongly recommended that they be permitted to introduce modern weapons and this recommendation has been under consideration for many months within the Government. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have strongly supported, from the military point of view, the recommendations of the field commanders.

It should be recalled that the State and Defense Departments agreed provisionally to suspend performance of our obligations to permit the operations of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams in the UN Command area. This action was taken because of the flagrant disregard by the Communists of this provision of the Armistice insofar as it applied in the Communist area of Korea. This action, moreover, was taken with the concurrence of our British Commonwealth Allies in Korea as is made quite clear in a letter dated May 5, 1956 from the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense. In the same letter, it is stated that the Department of State concurs in the recommendation that General Lemnitzer be authorized to replace obsolete and worn out equipment by appropriate replacements on the theory that this can be accomplished legally within the terms of paragraph 13 d of the Armistice Agreement "as a matter of interpretation of the Agreement in the light of the actions of the other side". It was further agreed that the UN should report all introductions made.

Following this understanding between the two Departments, a proposed replacement list was prepared in the Defense Department and submitted to the State Department in the form of a suggested cable to General Lemnitzer. A copy of the proposed cable is attached at Tab B. The list of replacement items and the theory on which the replacements would be made have been agreed between the two Departments in all respects except that the State Department is unwilling to agree to the introduction of the Honest John and the 280mm gun. The two items in dispute are dual purpose weapons which can accommodate either conventional or atomic shells. The Defense De-

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3Document 142.
4Not found attached.
partment is not at this time seeking to have atomic warheads introduced.

The objections of the State Department are political and legal. It takes the position that these weapons are identified in the minds of the people of the world as atomic weapons and that their introduction—and the report thereof—at this time) would produce serious adverse reactions against the United States throughout the world and would open the way for the Communists to accuse the UN Command and the United States of breaching the Armistice. On the legal side, the State Department lawyers take the position that the introduction of the two disputed items could not be regarded as legally justifiable under Article 13 d unless it could be demonstrated that the Communists had done the same thing on their side of the line. In response to a specific request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum of October 19, 1956 stated "There is no evidence to substantiate the reports of the existence of atomic warheads or atomic ground delivery systems in North Korea. However, since the signing of the Armistice, the Communists have introduced modern arms and equipment into North Korea. Communist aircraft having atomic delivery capability and additional atomic delivery systems could be deployed to North Korea on short notice." The Defense Department General Counsel considers that the introduction of the two disputed items could be legally justified at this time. Under all the circumstances, paragraph 13 d must be given a practical interpretation. In view of the fact that we will have to live with the Armistice for the indefinite future, it would be self-defeating to insist on an interpretation which required a 1953 model weapon to be replaced in 1956 or even in 1966 with a weapon no longer in current production.

It is important to note that both the Legal Adviser of the State Department and the General Counsel of the Defense Department are in complete agreement that this problem is not one to be determined on the legal issues. Instead, they both consider that the decision to be made is a political and military one. They have recommended that the problem be resolved on this basis at the highest level.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as this office, view with the utmost concern the fact that a considerable period of time has now passed without any practical steps having been taken toward modernization of the forces in Korea. The situation of the Far East commander is becoming increasingly disadvantageous and in time will become intolerable. Under the circumstances, we believe it is imperative that modern weapons be introduced even though they have an atomic capability. In this respect, the 280mm gun and the Honest

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8Memorandum from Radford to Wilson, October 19. (Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 61 A 1672, 320.2 Korea)
John are not different from the Century series aircraft which are already approved by the Department of State in the undisputed portion of the list. We further believe the legal justification for the introduction of the whole list is sound and the possibility that the Communists will charge a breach should not deter the United States from moving because such a charge is probable if we modernize at all regardless of whether the Honest John and the 280mm gun are on the list.

Recommendations:

Accordingly, it is recommended that—

A. The Secretary of Defense approve the introduction of all the weapons on the attached list on the ground that such action is legally permissible as a matter of interpretation under paragraph 13 d.

B. The Secretary of Defense recommend to the President that the Department of Defense position be adopted as Government policy and that the introduction of all the modern weapons on the list be authorized for the modernization of United States forces in Korea.

Concurrences:

The General Counsel for the Department of Defense.

190. Letter From the Ambassador in Korea (Dowling) to the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons)\textsuperscript{1}

\textit{Seoul, December 6, 1956.}

\textit{Dear Howard:} Your letter of November 7, 1956,\textsuperscript{2} refers to several of the questions which I would have hoped to discuss with you in person this month, had the world behaved itself. None of them, to my mind, is susceptible of ready presentation or analysis, and I still hope it may be possible for me to get back to the Department for a brief consultation sometime after the first of the year—which is another way of saying that I feel very much the need of talking things over with you and others in the Department and of having your guidance on some of these matters. I am delighted that we are to have Walter Robertson and Howard Jones here even for a brief

\textsuperscript{1}Source: Department of State, Seoul Embassy Files: Lot 64 F 22. Top Secret; Official–Informal.

\textsuperscript{2}Document 180.
visit, but I fear that time will not permit raising all the questions on which I need the Department’s views.

With this wordy introduction, here are my comments on the points in your letter.

1. I find myself somewhere between the Department and Defense on the weapons issue, although I feel the difference is primarily of an optical nature. I should have explained that my plug for Honest John or Nike batteries was based on the popular acceptance in most countries of these weapons as simply guided missiles without regard to their atomic capability. I assume this has something to do with our rather off-hand publicity about missiles, whereas there is considerably more hush-hush treatment (at least by the uninitiated, like me) of the “atomic bomb.” At any rate, it seems to me possible that we might equip our own forces here with the missiles—with conventional warheads—without too much public outcry from anyone except the Communists. And the latter are bound to make the most of any change in the present situation, be it in a musket or in the addition of the latest [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] weapon. I would think that much might depend upon our advance publicity, and how we built up to an announcement of our ultimate decision.

I admit that I could be wrong about this, of course.

2. On the level of forces, I feel that it would be inappropriate for me to go on record at this time with any recommendation more concrete than that given in my despatch 128. General Lemnitzer will argue for every division he now has, and I should do the same in his case—at least until I was sure there was no possibility of getting the necessary funds for their maintenance. There was some difference of opinion on this subject in the Pentagon when I was last in Washington, but I take it from your letter that at least the JCS have reached an agreed view.

Having said as much, I should like to make it clear—informally—that I would be opposed to the maintenance of the present force levels even if adequate MDAP and economic aid funds were available under existing procedures. I would have no argument against the present levels if it were possible in some manner for us to assume

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3Robertson and Jones visited Seoul, December 18–19, as part of a tour of Far Eastern posts.

4Despatch 128, October 25, drafted by Dowling and the senior members of the Embassy staff, was a 12-page assessment of U.S. economic and military programs in Korea. With respect to force levels in Korea, Ambassador Dowling and his aides recommended the maintenance of U.S. forces “at substantially their present strength until unification has been achieved.” For economic reasons, however, they recommended a gradual but steady reduction in the size of the South Korean armed forces by conversion of active into reserve units. (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, Korea, Objectives and Courses of Action (NSC 5514))
the burden of supporting them, less a modest, fixed sum in hwan assessed against the Korean budget for defense purposes, and could thus sterilize the present unhealthy impact on the Korean economy. As I see it, the existing aid laws and regulations were not drawn up with a Korean-type situation in mind, and their application here is bringing results which we had certainly not intended. To illustrate, let’s take the items of “saleables” in the economic aid program, the composition of which has, I fear, been determined as much by what the economy can absorb so as to generate hwan to cover the military budget deficit as by essential import requirements of the economy. I should add, in fairness, that another criterion has been their effect in combatting inflation, but I believe the economists agree that the military budget itself is a major factor making for that inflation.

I do not argue for a change in the laws and regulations to fit our situation here. That, I know, is hardly practicable. Hence my conclusion that we must reduce the force levels, while changing their composition to get the most effective defense possible for the funds which can be made available. My rationalization is that while this may not supply all the defense needed, it will give us all we can afford if we are to have any chance of developing the Korean economy, and that the situation is now sufficiently stabilized for us to take this calculated risk. So long as U.S. forces stand on the front here, I do not believe we shall see aggression against us unless it be part of a global offensive. In this latter case, we should be in a most untenable position here, even with the present forces.

To me, the fundamental decision is whether we shall have here merely an armed camp, or if it is to be our purpose to strike a balance between military and political economic security, and do the best we can in both fields through a judicious apportioning of the available resources.

3. On the question of succession, I agree that as things now stand, the constitutional processes would be followed, and Chang Myon would take over. There would no doubt follow some months of political confusion, but I do not believe it would result in any serious difficulty for us or the Koreans; this would, in my opinion, be nothing more than the realignment of forces which must be expected.

I should, however, like to sound one note of caution: the Army, on which we have counted as a major element of stability, may not function as we have planned. I am disturbed by the high degree of factionalism which is now rife (the Air Force and Navy seem as yet to be singularly free from this virus), and I am ready to confess that I haven’t the slightest idea how it will all end. As I see it, the infection is fed by the fact that the build-up having been completed, the Army is now finding time heavy on its hands (lack of funds for
training, etc.), and especially is this true of the officers who have attained the highest or next highest military rank at such early ages. It is perhaps natural, in this situation, that a realization should dawn of the imposing influence which could be wielded by one controlling the Army, and that dreams of power should follow in the wake of this realization. The struggle seems to be on, in any event, and it may or may not do damage. I can only say that I view with alarm.

One further thought on succession. The Liberal Party is endeavoring to rebuild after the shock of the last national elections, and have demonstrated better organization in several by-elections recently. If they succeed in this reconstruction program, and especially if they should sense that they are re-gaining the confidence of the electorate, they will almost surely attempt to change the rules and exclude Chang Myon from the Presidency. This is something on which we can only wait and see.

As I said at the beginning of this letter, these matters are not susceptible of ready presentation or analysis. After reading over my comments above, I should perhaps amend that statement to say that I am not capable of presenting or analyzing them coherently. There is a great deal more I could say, and I might well want to amend or clarify some of my statements in the light of your questions. But I hope that what I have given you will be of some use.

With best wishes,
Sincerely yours,

Walter Dowling

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5Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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191. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons) to the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald)

Washington, December 18, 1956.

SUBJECT

Introduction of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] into Korea

During an NSC Board Assistants meeting this afternoon, the Defense representative, Colonel Sockton, stated that the President had

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/12-1856. Top Secret. Drafted by Nes and Parsons.
just approved a Defense recommendation calling for the reduction of the present United States ground forces from 19 to 17 divisions, with the modernization of these 17 divisions to include [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The two divisions presently stationed in south Korea would come within this overall program. Mr. Nes, who attended the meeting, states that with respect to Korea this decision would result in the introduction of the Honest John, the 280 mm. gun, the Corporal and the Redstone. You may wish to mention this at the Secretary's staff meeting.²

We have so far not been able to obtain L clearance on our letter³ from the Secretary to Secretary Wilson on Paragraph 13(d). L has no problem with the letter; it is just a matter of time, since so many people are required to clear it.

²There is no indication in the notes taken at the Secretary's Staff Meetings through the end of December that the matter was raised in the meetings.
³Not found in Department of State files.

192. Memorandum of a Conversation, Seoul, December 18, 1956¹

SUBJECT

Dr. Syngman Rhee's Views on the Armistice Agreement, the U.S. Position vis-à-vis the Communist Orbit, and ROK-Japanese Relations

PARTICIPANTS

President Syngman Rhee
Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State
Dr. Cho Chung-hwan, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Walter Dowling, Ambassador
Mr. Howard P. Jones, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Mr. Eliot Weil, Deputy Chief of Mission

Mr. Robertson called on President Rhee at the Kyung Mu Dai at 4:15 p.m. December 18. In the course of the conversation, which lasted approximately ninety minutes, Dr. Rhee expressed his views on three principal subjects—the desirability of denouncing the Armistice; the position of the United States vis-à-vis Communist expansion and brutality; and Japanese-ROK relations.

For ten minutes or so after Mr. Robertson's arrival, the President indulged in small talk. He appeared hesitant about introducing sub-

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/12–1856. Secret. Drafted by Weil.
stantive topics. Eventually, he said he had many questions to ask and wished Mr. Robertson could remain for a week during which these questions could be discussed. When urged by Mr. Robertson to proceed, Dr. Rhee declared the time had come to denounce the Armistice. He said the Koreans' hands were tied; unification had not been achieved; the Communists were building up their forces in the North; the ROKs were prevented from strengthening their forces because the United States adhered to the Armistice Agreement. He said Admiral Radford had told him the United States had the weapons needed to strengthen the ROK forces but was prevented from turning over these weapons by strict adherence to the Armistice Agreement.

Dr. Rhee stressed the dangers inherent in the location of the truce line. He said Communist forces were so close to Inchon that in case of hostilities Seoul could be quickly encircled. He spoke at length of the brutality and ruthlessness of the Communists; said the population of North Korea had been substantially reduced because people who did not accept the regime were killed. He reminded his listeners of the savagery of the Communist troops when they invaded South Korea, and mentioned Communist violations of the Armistice Agreement.

Mr. Robertson asked Dr. Rhee what he thought would happen if the Armistice Agreement were denounced. Dr. Rhee said the ROK would not go to war "the day after", but having been freed from the restrictions of the Armistice Agreement would see what could be done about unification.

Mr. Robertson pointed out the advantages of abiding by the Armistice Agreement. He reminded Dr. Rhee that in view of the United States-ROK mutual security arrangements the Communists would not attack South Korea until such time as they were prepared to fight the United States and 15 other UN nations who were pledged to come to the aid of the ROK. Mr. Robertson asked what, in view of these circumstances, could be gained by a denunciation of the Agreement. Dr. Rhee then launched into a discussion of the worldwide threat of Communist power, and said the Communists were counting upon the fact America would not fight. Mr. Robertson reminded him that many Americans had died in Korea in defense of the liberty of his country.

Dr. Rhee discussed at length his view that Communist power was extending itself in many parts of the world without effective opposition from the United States. In this connection, he mentioned current developments in the Middle East and asked why the Russians were being allowed to crush the Hungarian revolt without interference by the United States. He said people were being murdered
in Hungary but the United States simply said, "You are very brave," and offered money for relief.

Mr. Robertson reminded Dr. Rhee of what the United States was doing to deter Communist expansion; that we had mutual security treaties with more than thirty nations threatened by Communist power—including Korea, Vietnam and the Chinese Republic; that we had put the Communists on notice that if they attacked these countries the United States would come to their assistance. Mr. Robertson told Dr. Rhee that the horrors of thermo-nuclear warfare defied imagination; that people who would not be killed by explosions would likely be killed or maimed by the fall-out; that anyone who had attended a briefing on thermo-nuclear weapons realized that a thermo-nuclear war could literally destroy civilization. Mr. Robertson said our President would never be responsible for starting such a war.

Dr. Rhee said he wished he could talk to the President. He said he felt the President had an opportunity to assume a position of strong moral leadership. With reference to a remark by Mr. Robertson to the effect that Communist power is deterred by fear of the atomic superiority of the United States, Dr. Rhee asked why the President did not utilize fear of American power to stop the Communist powers from threatening the countries on their borders, and from treating people the way they were treating the Hungarians. He said that as a result of its present policy the United States was losing prestige throughout the world.

Mr. Robertson said the United States was fully aware of the evils of Communism and hated Communism just as much as Dr. Rhee, but the President hoped to solve the problem by peaceful means. Mr. Robertson pointed out that Communism was so evil that it carried the seeds of its own destruction and eventually would destroy itself. He said there were already cracks in the Communist structure. Dr. Rhee repeated his fear that if the United States simply stood by while the Communists behaved as they pleased, and hoped that some day the Communist orbit and the rest of the world would be friends, the Communists would win the struggle. Mr. Robertson made it clear that the United States was not counting on the Communist orbit's becoming friends, and was well aware of their goal of world domination. He reiterated the fact that the President believed his present policy was best for the Free World, and reminded Dr. Rhee that we expected our Allies to make every effort to solve their problems peacefully.

In this connection, Mr. Robertson told Dr. Rhee that if the ROK started hostilities it could not expect the support of the United States and other United Nations. He reminded Dr. Rhee that when the British and French resorted to hostilities in Egypt, the United States re-
fused to support them. He said the British and French had mounted their attack without any consultation with the United States; and that we could not allow ourselves to be forced by our Allies into actions which we would not have approved had we been consulted.

Dr. Rhee said the British were a treacherous nation, and always had been, and added that the Japanese were treacherous. He said they wanted to reconquer Korea, and they were even worse enemies than the Communists. He complained that the United States allowed them to go ahead and re-establish relations with Soviet Russia.

Mr. Robertson said the United States did not make a practice of telling other nations what to do—that it was not our policy to try to dictate to other countries.

Dr. Rhee cited his familiar grievances—real and imagined—against the Japanese. When he alleged that the Japanese were building a new military machine with American aid, Mr. Robertson pointed out that while the presence of American troops in Japan had brought certain economic advantages, Japan was not receiving any economic aid from the United States and, furthermore, seemed unwilling to appropriate funds for anything resembling a substantial military establishment. When Dr. Rhee condemned the Japanese for claiming “85% of Korean assets”, Mr. Robertson said that in so far as he was aware the Japanese had not made such a claim. When Dr. Rhee asked why the United States did not see to it that the Japanese lived up to the San Francisco Treaty and why it did not assume a position on Japanese claims, Mr. Robertson and the Ambassador reminded Dr. Rhee that the United States had taken a position, and that this had been communicated to the ROK Government. Dr. Rhee then asked why the United States did not make this position public.

Mr. Robertson asked Dr. Rhee why the Koreans and the Japanese could not sit around a table and settle their differences. Dr. Rhee alleged that the Japanese were unwilling to do so.

At this point the Ambassador reminded Mr. Robertson that a briefing by certain Cabinet members had been scheduled for five o’clock. As Mr. Robertson left, Dr. Rhee exhibited the same cordiality which was evident at the beginning of the conversation.

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2After leaving President Rhee, Robertson, Lemnitzer, Dowling, and Jones met with Acting Foreign Minister Cho Chung-hwan, Defense Minister Kim Yong-u, and Minister of Reconstruction Kim Hyon-chol. A South Korean Army officer conducted a briefing designed to point out the growing danger of attack from North Korea and the need to strengthen the armed forces of the Republic of Korea. The Minister of Reconstruction proposed denunciation of the Armistice, and Robertson responded, as he had with President Rhee, with a discourse on the dangers of nuclear war. (Memorandum by Weil, December 19; ibid., FE Files: Lot 58 D 209, Korea 1956)
Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)


SUBJECT

U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 7 November 1956, subject as above, and to a memorandum for you by the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 11 October 1956, on the same subject.

2. The military reasons for the retention of significant U.S. forces in South Korea are:

   a. To assist in the defense of South Korea in the event of a renewal of hostilities by the Communists.

   b. To constitute the major element of the United Nations Command (UNC), other than ROK forces.

3. An effective UNC in Korea is essential until the present Armistice Agreement is replaced by a more permanent arrangement. In addition, the operational control exercised by the UNC over the ROK is a deterrent to Communist aggression as well as to ROK unilateral military action. If the UNC were to lose control over the ROK forces, its usefulness as an influence in Far Eastern affairs would be drastically reduced. The retention of an effective UNC, and consequent control over the ROK forces, requires a sizeable U.S. force in Korea.

4. In your memorandum of 7 November you requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the minimum level of forces in Korea under the assumption that neither (a) the maintenance of internal political stability, nor (b) the element of precipitous action by the Korean Government are involved. It is impossible to separate economic and political factors from military considerations when the United States is responsible for providing practically all the equipment and supplies and for training and guidance of the ROK forces.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the upheaval and disruption which may very well occur during the choice of a successor to President Rhee could, and probably would, open Korea to internal strife and to infiltration by the Communists, thus placing the U.S.

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1Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)(2). Top Secret. A covering note, of the same date, from the Secretary to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General R. D. Wentworth, indicates that this memorandum was derived from JCS 1776/566, "Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea," December 26, a copy of which was attached to the source text but is not printed.

2Not found.

3Document 172.
position, not only in Korea but throughout the Far East, in jeopardy. A firm control over the ROK forces during this period, such as is currently provided by the United Nations Commander, is mandatory from a military viewpoint in order to safeguard U.S. interests. Although it is possible that unilateral ROK military action is sufficiently remote as to be assumed out of consideration, this does not eliminate the grave military danger to the United States should such an action take place. For the above reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that safeguarding against the two possible situations outlined above is of sufficient military importance to demand full consideration in the establishment of any force levels for Korea.

6. From a long-range viewpoint, it is not militarily feasible to reduce the deterrent force in South Korea until an atomic equipped U.N. Command is in being in South Korea. However, when it is feasible to support the ROK Army with a U.S. atomic capable ground force, it may well be that further reductions in ROK and U.S. forces in Korea will be possible.

7. In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that their previous recommendations on the minimum level of U.S. and ROK forces which U.S. interests require be maintained in Korea are still valid. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, reaffirm their previous recommendations to you on this subject.

8. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, did not participate in the action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined in this memorandum.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arleigh Burke²
Chief of Naval Operations

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²Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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194. Editorial Note

On January 8, 1957, the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly completed 6 days of debate on the Korean question. Debate on the question developed along well-established lines, with a general tendency to deplore the lack of progress toward Korean unification, but with no new proposals to break the stalemate established by the Armistice Agreement. The Representatives of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Soviet Union condemned the May 31 decision of the Unified Command to remove the NNSC teams to the demilitarized zone, but the decision and the August 15 report by the
U.N. Command concerning the decision did not become the focus of debate on the Korean question.

At the conclusion of debate, the First Committee, by a vote of 57–8 with 13 abstentions, adopted a draft resolution submitted by the United States which provided that the General Assembly would continue to pursue the goal of a unified, independent, and democratic Korea; would endorse the continuing work of UNCURK in Korea; and would request the Secretary-General to place the Korean question on the agenda for the twelfth session of the General Assembly. (U.N. doc. A/3490) First Committee debate on the Korean question is in U.N. docs. A/C.1/SR.814 through A/C.1/SR.820. On January 11, the General Assembly, by a vote of 57–8 with 9 abstentions, adopted the report of the First Committee as Resolution 1010 A (XI).

195. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)†

Washington, January 10, 1957.

Dear Charlie: I think I mentioned to you that when we were in Paris Senior Lloyd told me that economic conditions in the United Kingdom were such that they had practically made up their mind to take the U.K. troops out of Korea. I asked him to delay any decision.

If you or the Joint Chiefs have any arguments which you think would be persuasive, I suggest that you let me have them promptly. However, I feel that basically their decision has been taken, although no timing has as yet been set.

Sincerely yours,

Foster

†Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/1–1057. Secret.

‡Dulles was in Paris for the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, December 11–14, 1956.
NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE MILITARY PROGRAMS FOR KOREA

REFERENCES
A. NSC 5514
B. NSC 5610
C. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea", dated October 12, 1956
D. NSC Actions Nos. 1486, 1560, 1607 and 1624

The enclosed draft report on the subject, prepared by the NSC Planning Board, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, January 24, 1957. A Financial Appendix is also attached for the information of the Council.

The enclosure is intended as the first step in the review by the Planning Board of the scope and allocation of military and non-military aid for Korea called for by NSC Action No. 1624-c. In the light of Council discussion of the enclosure as to the choice among the alternatives, the Planning Board will subsequently prepare for Council consideration appropriate revisions in NSC 5514, "U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea", in accordance with NSC Action No. 1624-c.

James S. Lay, Jr.

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1Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5702 Series. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence.
2Document 24.
3Entitled "Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programs," August 3, 1956. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5610 Series)
4See footnote 1, Document 172.
5Regarding NSC Action No. 1486, see vol. x, p. 62, footnote 14. Regarding NSC Action No. 1560, see vol. xix, p. 310, footnote 5. Regarding NSC Action No. 1607, see footnote 4, Document 169. Regarding NSC Action No. 1624, see vol. x, p. 133, footnote 14. The record copies of all of the NSC Actions cited here are in Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council.
6Not printed.
7Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
[Enclosure]

EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE MILITARY PROGRAMS FOR KOREA

General Considerations

1. The Republic of Korea depends on U.S. support for its military defense, but does not consider the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Joint Policy Declaration sufficient assurance that the United States will in fact defend South Korea in the event of an attack from the North. Koreans remember the U.S. withdrawal from South Korea shortly prior to the attack in 1950, and believe that sizeable U.S. combat forces and strong ROK military forces must be maintained in South Korea to deter a new attack by Communist forces and to assure the defense of the area in case of attack.

2. With little complaint, the Koreans have made heavy sacrifices, in the form of taxation and conscription, in support of their military forces. The Korean will to resist is universally high; indeed the Korean political and military leaders would have continued or re-opened hostilities with North Korea had not U.S. officials frequently reminded them that U.S. logistical support, essential to successful military action, would not be forthcoming. However, the Korean will to resist can be expected to remain high only as long as the Korean people and their leaders are convinced that the United States is supporting them fully and that they have the military capacity to resist.

3. However, Korean faith in the U.S. defense commitment is not necessarily related to any particular U.S. or ROK force level, provided the South Koreans believe that joint U.S.-ROK capabilities are sufficient to give assurance of an intent to resist aggression and to permit effective outside assistance to be brought to bear.

4. If ROK forces are placed on the 3-year rotation basis in the near future, it may be difficult to maintain present active strength unless the number of personnel deciding to make a career of military service increases greatly. The ROK Army has already returned most of its personnel with combat experience to civilian life and currently is having almost no success in persuading junior officers and enlisted men to make a career of the military service. The lack of a core of experienced professional soldiers in the ROK Army places severe limitations on its future ability to use and maintain the more advanced and complex weapons which soon will be indispensable for effective military operations.

5. In November, 1954 the United States and the ROK initiated an Agreed Minute in which it was stated that as the training load
diminishes and ROK trained reserve strengths are attained, the total number of active ROK military personnel will be adjusted accordingly.

6. Korean confidence in the U.S. commitment to the ROK will also be affected by the extent of U.S. economic aid available for economic development. The Korean economy is recovering from war devastation, but only limited progress is being made in economic development; in the long run this could pose a serious threat to political stability. A commitment to continue the current level of economic development aid or an increase therein would probably be considered by the Koreans as a good indication that the U.S. Government has confidence in the future of the ROK. While a simultaneous major reduction in both economic development and military assistance to the ROK would no doubt have very serious and adverse repercussions in Korea, particularly since the Koreans believe that Communist capabilities have been increasing since the Armistice was signed, a military reduction under the applicable proviso of the Agreed Minute could probably be compensated in part, but only in part, by a long-term economic aid commitment or an increase in economic aid.

7. ROK and U.S. military forces in South Korea are a major symbol of U.S. determination to resist further Communist expansion in the Far East. Other symbols include U.S. commitments in SEATO, the Republic of China and the Philippines; U.S. aid to non-Communist Asian countries; U.S. military capabilities and commitments in the Taiwan area, the Philippines, Japan and Okinawa; and the fact of U.S. participation in the Korean war. Moreover, the Free World through the Sixteen Power Declaration and UN Command in Korea is committed to resist renewal of Communist aggression against the ROK.

8. The objective of the Communists continues to be to gain control over the entire Korean peninsula. They probably will not resort to force to obtain this objective, at least so long as the United States retains forces in South Korea and remains committed to the defense of the ROK. On the other hand, the Communists almost surely will not yield in any significant respect in maintaining their control over North Korea, thus continuing a situation of tension and instability. Although the Communists might reduce their active forces in Korea following any major reduction in ROK forces, they would retain the capability quickly to rebuild their strength to present levels by the mobilization of trained reserves and by the introduction of Communist forces from outside Korea.

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Footnote in the source text [2 lines of source text] not declassified; see Document 159.
Statement of Alternatives

9. The remainder of this report will evaluate the probable political, economic and military consequences of the following four alternative military programs for the Republic of Korea. The term "dual conventional-nuclear weapons," as used in this statement of alternatives and the following evaluation does not include storage of nuclear warheads in Korea.

Alternative A is the present military program, consisting of the following forces as currently equipped:

1. 20 active and 10 reserve ROK Army Divisions;
2. 3 ROK jet fighter-bomber squadrons in training, and plans for converting the 3 remaining ROK fighter squadrons into jet squadrons;
3. 1 ROK Marine Division and coastal Navy;
4. 2 U.S. Divisions, and 3 fighter-bomber squadrons.

Alternative B (JCS minimum military requirements over the next two years reported to the NSC on October 12, 1956) would involve the following changes in Alternative A:

1. Providing U.S. forces in Korea with dual conventional nuclear weapons;
2. Converting 4 of the 20 active ROK divisions into reserve divisions, and converting the 3 remaining conventional ROK fighter squadrons into jet squadrons (making a total of 6 jet squadrons).

Alternative C would involve the following changes in Alternative A:

1. Converting 10 of the 20 active ROK divisions into reserve divisions over a 3-year period;
2. Providing remaining active ROK forces with additional limited dual conventional-nuclear weapons of types already in Korea and increased training in the use of these weapons; and converting the 3 remaining conventional ROK fighter squadrons into jet squadrons;
3. Providing U.S. forces in Korea with additional limited dual conventional-nuclear weapons of types already in Korea, and increased training in the use of these weapons.7

Alternative D would involve:

1. Converting 10 of the 20 active ROK divisions into reserve divisions over a three-year period;
2. Providing ROK forces with jet air strength (under present conditions approximately 12 squadrons of fighters and fighter-bombers) sufficient generally to offset North Korean air strength; and providing the ROK Army with equipment comparable to that of the North Korean Army, which under present circumstances would in-

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7Thus excluding such weapons as the 280 mm. gun, the Honest John, Corporal and Redstone. [Footnote in the source text.]
volve measures such as an increase in artillery strength but not the provision of dual conventional-nuclear weapons;
(3) Providing U.S. forces in Korea with dual conventional-nuclear weapons.

Evaluation of Alternative A

Political and Psychological

10. Continuation of the ROK military establishment and U.S. forces in Korea at present levels would continue to satisfy the ROK leaders of U.S. intentions to defend the ROK. This involves no violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement. Although present U.S. programs involve replacement of obsolete equipment, the ROK leaders want an army and an air force at least equivalent in size and equipment to Communist forces deployed in North Korea, and they would continue to press for such improvements.

11. U.S. allies in Asia would interpret this policy as an indication of continued U.S. determination to maintain a strong anti-Communist position in Asia. The Asian neutrals would continue to contend that U.S. policy misinterprets the real threat to Asian stability and security by over-emphasis on military aid and under-emphasis on economic aid.

12. The Communists would continue to believe that the United States would commit its forces to defend the ROK.

Economic

13. The South Korean economy would probably be in trouble today even if there were no ROK military force. It seems clear, however, that the need for very large sums of local currency for this force has (1) contributed to the very heavy inflationary pressures which divert businessmen from productive enterprises to speculation, (2) forced a larger use of economic aid for military purposes, and (3) by requiring heavy imports, promoted artificially high levels of consumption. Local currency costs are increasing and will continue in future years to increase due to greater maintenance and replacement needs to keep the ROK military force in top condition, increased food prices, particularly rice, and higher military pay. The future may bring greater pressure on the end-use of local currency generation as between military and investment to the detriment of the latter unless total economic assistance is increased. So long as present military programs are continued, therefore, it is likely that there will be no acceleration in the rate of Korean economic development and thus no reduction in South Korean unemployment and no prospect of an assumption by the ROK of a greater share of its military and economic support. The annual requirement for U.S. aid is, therefore,
growing rather than diminishing. The cost of ROK forces, however, is only a fraction of the cost of equivalent U.S. forces.

Military

14. This alternative precludes complete modernization of U.S. forces in Korea. U.S. units in Korea cannot be reorganized to conform with the organizational structure of other comparable U.S. units, which are acquiring a dual conventional-nuclear capability. As a result, U.S. forces in Korea are forced to adhere to certain outmoded tactical concepts. This has an adverse effect upon the morale of troops assigned to Korea and denies the most efficient and effective utilization of U.S. military manpower.

15. The Republic of Korea Army, with 20 active and 10 reserve Army divisions and other listed forces, would be capable of maintaining internal security. ROK and U.S. forces in Korea would be capable of resisting aggression by North Korea alone. A military force of this strength would also be a deterrent to any Communist attack unless such an attack were part of an over-all Communist plan for world-wide military operations. Such a force, with limited U.S. air, naval and logistic support, could conduct a successful holding operation against an attack by those North Korean and Chinese Communist forces now estimated to be in North Korea. Against the combined Chinese Communist forces now in Korea, Chinese Communist forces immediately available in Manchuria and Northeast China and the North Korean forces, the forces would be incapable of conducting a sustained defense without prompt military assistance from the United States. The small ROK Air Force is capable only of limited air support for ground operations. Its aircraft strength is markedly inferior to that of the North Korean Air Force.

Evaluation of Alternative B

Political and Psychological

16. The ROK would almost certainly object to a cut of approximately 20 percent in their active military force levels regardless of a simultaneous modernization of U.S. forces in Korea to include dual purpose weapons. A 20 percent cut in the ROK Army could have sharp effects within the ROK if it were interpreted as merely an initial step in U.S. reductions in the Far East. However, these effects would be somewhat reduced by an increase in U.S. military capabilities in Korea. Modernization of U.S. forces would lead to increased ROK pressure for modernization of their forces. ROK objections to a 20 percent cut in their force levels might be further reduced if some of the funds saved in military aid were switched to economic aid
programs. This would help meet the ROK objection of increased economic hardship and additional unemployment resulting from military force reductions.

17. Our Asian allies’ assessment of U.S. policy and intentions will depend on over-all U.S. policy and military posture in Asia as well as on changes in levels of U.S. defense aid to South Korea. On balance, our Asian allies would approve any modernization of U.S. forces in Korea reconcilable with the Armistice Agreement. They would interpret such action as an indication of continued U.S. determination to resist Communist advances in Asia. However, if “modernization” were to be carried to a point which they would consider a significant violation of the Armistice Agreement, there would be adverse reactions. In Japan there would be a particularly serious reaction to the equipping of U.S. forces in Korea with what would be regarded as atomic weapons.

18. The United States would be strongly censured for violation of the Armistice Agreement by the Swiss and Swedish members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and by many of the signatories of the Joint Declaration, as well as by Asian neutrals. These immediate reactions would weaken the U.S. position substantially in the United Nations and in relations with allies and neutrals alike.

19. The Communists would react to the introduction of any additional types of dual purpose weapons by launching a major propaganda campaign which would include charges that the United States was violating the Armistice, was seeking to increase tensions in the Far East, and was planning to use again atomic bombs on Asians. The Communists might supplement their propaganda campaign and seek to increase pressure on the United States to withdraw its forces from South Korea by withdrawing the Chinese Communist troops from North Korea, which they could do without critically weakening their military position. The Soviets may introduce dual purpose weapons into North Korea, either overtly or covertly.

Economic

20. The direct financial savings which would result from reduction of any given number of ROK divisions is at best a rough estimate, since little information from the field is available. On the basis of past budgets such savings are averaged for this purpose at $9 million per division in dollars and $7.5 million in hwan. This figure of $16.5 million may be overstated since it does not include the cost of conversion of active to reserve divisions. Conversely, this figure may be understated since it does not take into account the current sharply rising trend in maintenance costs. However, using this figure, Alternative B would result in gross financial savings of $65 million ($35
million in MAP, $30 million in local currency support). This estimate of savings does not take account of the cost of providing U.S. forces with dual purpose weapons, which are to be purchased in any case.

Military

21. This course of action enables U.S. forces to be reorganized in accordance with latest approved doctrines. It also authorizes the equipping of these forces with modern equipment and with weapons possessing both a conventional and atomic capability. This would result in the most efficient and effective utilization of U.S. military manpower in Korea, and would bolster the morale of U.S. troops assigned to Korea.

22. The Republic of Korea Army, with 16 active divisions and 14 reserve divisions, would be capable of maintaining internal security. Provided the present U.S. forces in Korea are modernized and the 14 reserve divisions reach and maintain their strength and training goals, the forces projected would be superior in both offensive and defensive capabilities to the North Korean forces alone. Therefore, they would be capable of successfully resisting North Korean aggression. They would provide a very strong deterrent to combined North Korean-Chinese Communist aggression unless this aggression was part of a much broader Communist plan. They would be capable, with limited U.S. outside support, of conducting a successful holding operation against the combined Chinese Communist forces and North Korean Army forces now estimated to be in North Korea. Should the Communists exercise their estimated reinforcing capability with Chinese Communist troops immediately available from Manchuria and Northeast China, the forces considered under this alternative could not maintain a successful resistance without immediate and substantial U.S. military assistance.

Evaluation of Alternative C

Political and Psychological

23. The reaction of the ROK leaders to this alternative would be more vigorous than that under Alternative B. ROK objections to this cut in their ground forces might be somewhat reduced if some of the funds saved in military aid were switched to economic aid programs. As under Alternative B, this would help meet the ROK objection of increased economic hardship and additional unemployment resulting from military force reductions. ROK leaders would probably argue that North Korea would still be superior in the air and that the 50 percent reduction in active ROK ground force levels would not be fully compensated by modernization [4 lines of source text not declassified].
The ROK leaders would seek to delay reduction of their ground forces to agreed levels and there would be increased danger that they might undertake unilateral action to breach the Armistice before the reductions could become effective.\textsuperscript{10}

24. This Alternative would not violate the Armistice Agreement. The reaction of Asian neutrals and certain political groups in other non-Communist Asian countries, particularly Japan, would be adverse but not as strong as in Alternative B above.

25. The Communists would probably react less sharply than in Alternative B above, but the possibility would remain that they would introduce dual-capability weapons into North Korea.

\textit{Economic}

26. Potential direct gross savings, based on the same calculation as under Alternative B, would be $165 million annually ($90 million in MAP and $75 million in local currency support). Initially, savings in military aid would be partly offset by the cost of providing the ROK with additional equipment and weapons, including dual-capability weapons. When a program of troop reduction and matériel and weapons build-up is completed, annual maintenance costs should be reduced as compared with existing maintenance costs.

27. The savings in local currency support could be employed in a variety of ways toward greater economic development of Korea, or could be retained by the United States as savings, or could be divided between the two purposes. In the first case, after a short period of possible labor dislocation, greater than now exists, development in Korea might proceed at a somewhat faster pace than now and might in the long run reduce the need for external economic assistance while building an economically stronger Korea.

\textit{Military}

28. This alternative, as an objective for ROK forces, after completion of Alternative B, is feasible. The continued limiting of the modernization of U.S. forces would have the same disadvantages as are stated in paragraph 14.

29. The forces, as proposed under this alternative, would be capable of maintaining internal security. They would be capable of resisting North Korean aggression. They would be capable, with U.S. air, naval and logistic support greater than that required under Alternative B, of conducting a successful holding operation against the

\textsuperscript{10}CIA would add at this point: However, Rhee and the ROK military leaders generally recognize that the ROK cannot achieve unification alone and that the chances of embroiling the United States through unilateral action would be slight. Accordingly, the ROK would probably acquiesce in the proposals and continue to refrain from unilateral military action. [Footnote in the source text.]
combined Chinese Communist forces and North Korean Army forces now estimated to be in North Korea. Should the Communists exercise their estimated reinforcing capability with Chinese Communist troops immediately available from Manchuria and Northeast China, the forces considered under this alternative could not maintain a successful resistance without immediate and substantial U.S. military assistance.

Evaluation of Alternative D

Political and Psychological

30. Although pleased by the increase in air strength, ROK leaders would not consider that the acquisition of an air force roughly comparable to that of North Korea would offset the reduction of ground forces. ROK capability and temptation of breaching the Armistice would be increased over Alternative A.\(^\text{11}\) As under Alternative C, increased economic aid would partly, but only partly, mitigate the adverse ROK reaction to reduction in ground force levels.

31. U.S. allies in Asia would probably react favorably to this program and would probably ask for similar increases in their own air forces. The reaction of the Asian neutrals would be similar to that described in Alternative B above.

32. Communist reaction would be similar to that described in Alternative B above, and in addition, the Soviet Union would probably seek to increase the capabilities of the North Korean armed forces, especially their air strength.

Economic

33. The savings would be similar to Alternative C, although on the dollar side they would be offset by the cost of providing additional jet air strength rather than providing dual-capability weapons.

Military

34. Alternative D, decreasing ROK ground capabilities and increasing ROK Air Force capabilities, is not consistent with present U.S. military strategy in the Far East which provides for indigenous ground forces to be supported initially by U.S. air and naval forces.

35. These forces, together with modernized U.S. forces, would be capable of maintaining internal security. Because of the additional air

\(^{11}\) CIA would add at this point: However, Rhee and the ROK military leaders generally recognize that the ROK cannot achieve unification alone and that the chances of embroiling the United States through unilateral action would be slight. Accordingly, the ROK would probably acquiesce in the proposals and continue to refrain from unilateral military action. [Footnote in the source text.]
strength available, these forces would be better equipped to deal
with the initial air battle stages of a surprise Communist attack and
could resist an attack by North Korean forces alone. They would be
able with limited U.S. air, naval and logistic support to conduct a
successful holding operation against attack by those North Korean
and Chinese Communist forces now estimated to be in North Korea.

197. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, January 17, 1957

SUBJECT
Korean Exchange Rate

PARTICIPANTS

Korean Government
Mr. Kim Hyun-chul, ROK Reconstruction Minister and Economic Coordinator
Mr. Pyo Wook Han, Minister of Korean Embassy
Mr. Chun Bung-ku, Vice Minister of Finance

United States Government

Department of State
Mr. Robertson—Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Mr. Parsons—NA
Mr. Davenport—NA
Mr. Weintraub—NA
Miss Milne—FN
Mr. Giltman—FN

Treasury
Mr. Diehl
Mr. Hirschtritt

Commerce
Mr. Baran
Mr. Camelio

ICA
Dr. Moyer
Mr. Williams

1Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 59 D 19, MC-Koreans 1957. Confidential. Drafted by Weintraub.
2Philip M. Davenport, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs.
5William W. Diehl, Chief, Far Eastern Division, Office of International Finance.
6Saul Baran, Chief, Japan-Korea Section, Bureau of Foreign Commerce.
7Justin Williams, Chief, Korea Division.
Mr. Stettner
Mr. Costanza
Defense
Captain Robbins

Mr. Robertson noted that the existing rate of 500 hwan per dollar has been in existence since August 1955 and that during this period there has been some rise in the Korean price level. Many people within the U.S. Government, he said, believe that the exchange rate should be raised. At the same time, he said, the United States appreciates the efforts made by the Republic of Korea to maintain financial stability and the cooperation which has existed towards this end between officials of Korea and the United States. Mr. Robertson said although economists might argue about some of the adverse consequences which can result from not having a realistic exchange rate, it is the view within the U.S. Government, taking into account all pertinent considerations, including the proposals of Korea regarding the exchange rate, and the excellent record and efforts of Korea to maintain financial stability during the past year, that the U.S. will agree to continuation of the 500 to 1 rate for 1957. At the end of the year, he said, should the wholesale price index show a change of 25 percent or more either upwards or downwards as compared with the September 1955 average of the index, the exchange rate would be adjusted in the same direction. Thereafter, he said, the U.S. believes the exchange rate should be reviewed every six months. Mr. Robertson said that it seems advisable to continue the 500 to 1 rate for 1957 in view of past Korean efforts to maintain its validity, and that its further continuation similarly will depend principally on Korean actions.

Minister Kim said that Korea certainly would do its best to maintain financial stability and will cooperate fully with the U.S. in this regard. He said that Korea considers 1957 a critical test year. He noted that since August 15, 1955, when the 500 to 1 rate went into existence, until a few months ago, the price structure remained rather steady; in recent months due to a bad rice crop the price structure started to climb. However, since it has become known that Korea would get grains under P.L. 480, rice prices already have started to decline, and, he said, he believed they would decline further if rice shipments arrived in Korea expeditiously.

Mr. Robertson said that inflationary pressures will exist in Korea as long as the country has to support an army of 700,000 men. The inflation, he said, really was a by-product of this military operation and not due to the exchange rate. He said that it was in Korea's own interest, after taking another look at the 500 to 1 rate, to make an

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8Walter F. Stettner, Deputy Director, European Program Division.
adjustment in the future if this is required since it was impossible by fiat to make any exchange rate stick. The United States and Korea both, he said, are taking a calculated risk. The U.S. objective in Korea, he said, is to get the most viable economy possible and the establishment of any particular rate should not be interpreted as an advantage to either one side or the other. The U.S., he said, is abdicating its doubts in view of the excellent results obtained in Korea during the last 15 months.

Minister Han expressed appreciation on the behalf of Korean Ambassador Yang. He said that he was pleased that the U.S. was going ahead with the 500 to 1 rate extension despite some doubts and that this speaks well of the United States and Korea as working as a team. He said that he thought Korea had done well in the last 15 months and that he believed the Korean Government could in the future be kept on a sound footing. He stressed what he said was the psychological importance to the population of Korea of maintaining the existing exchange rate. He noted that Korea must maintain its army as long as existing dangers continue, but that some day he hoped there could be an over-all solution. Minister Han said that he appreciated the willingness of the U.S. to concur with the extension of the existing rate, and that he is sure Korea will prove worthy of the confidence placed in it.

Mr. Robertson left the meeting.

Dr. Moyer noted that he and several other persons present had attended the exchange rate discussions in 1955 and that as a result he took an unusual interest in the successful Korean effort to improve its inflationary situation. He said that much soul searching was involved in agreeing to the present exchange rate continuation and that many persons in the U.S. are questioning whether this really is the wisest course for Korea in its own national interest.

Dr. Moyer said that grain prices are an important element in Korea’s price structure and that he was pleased that Minister Kim felt Korea could control these prices with the help of grain supplied under P.L. 480. He noted that Korea was also thinking of purchasing rice from commercial sources. He said he hoped, should the grain situation threaten the entire price structure in Korea, that Korea would cooperate with the U.S. in reprogramming of aid supplies where necessary. Minister Kim responded that there was no question but that the Korean Government would do everything possible to keep the grain prices under control since such action was in its own best interests.

Mr. Parsons said that the decision on the exchange rate must, of course, be formalized. He noted that the U.S. Embassy in Seoul re-
ceived a letter dated August 29, 1956\(^9\) from Acting Foreign Minister Cho of Korea in which the latter asked for extension of the rate through December 1957 and proposed certain actions which the ROK on its part would take. Mr. Parsons said that the matter could be formalized either by instructing the Embassy in Seoul to answer Minister Cho’s letter or that an instrument could be drawn up for finalization here. In the latter case, he said, the Embassy would at some future date acknowledge Minister Cho’s letter merely noting that the action requested had been completed.

Minister Han said that Minister Kim has full authority to sign any agreement. It was arranged that a draft of the proposed U.S. note would be given informally on January 18 to the Korean Embassy for possible signing on January 23 when Minister Kim returned from New York to Washington.

Mr. Parsons reviewed the pertinent portions of the U.S. note: 1) extension of the current $500 to $1 rate to December 31, 1957; 2) at the end of 1957 the average of the Seoul wholesale price index for the period July 1–December 31, 1957 would be compared with the average of the index for September 1955; 3) if the July–December 31, 1957 average index was 25 percent or more at variance with the September 1955 base there would be an automatic adjustment of the exchange rate as of January 20, 1958 unless some other course of action were mutually agreed upon; 4) following 1957, the average of the index for the six months ending June 30 and December 31 of each year would be compared either with the September 1955 average or the six month average of any subsequent period on which an exchange rate revision had been based, whichever were later. The 25 percent cutoff would be used for such comparisons.

It was agreed that there would be no publicity until action is formalized.

\(^9\)Not found in Department of State files.

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198. Record of a Meeting, Department of State, Washington, January 18, 1957, 3 p.m.\(^1\)

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary John Foster Dulles
Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy

\(^1\)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/1-1857. Secret. Drafted by Parsons on January 23 and initialed by Robertson as correct. The source text indicates the meeting took place in Secretary Dulles’ office.
Legal Adviser Herman Phleger
Assistant Secretary Walter S. Robertson
Director, Northeast Asian Affairs, Howard L. Parsons

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Secretary Charles E. Wilson
Deputy Secretary Reuben B. Robertson
Assistant Secretary Gordon Gray
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral W. Radford
Assistant to Admiral Radford, Captain W. C. Mott
(Military Liaison Committee) General Loper

SUBJECT

Introduction of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] into Korea

Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson opened the meeting by pointing out the fact that the United States Government is spending about one and one-quarter billion dollars a year in Korea. In connection with the desire of the Department of Defense to reduce the volume of this expenditure, the Department of Defense has been anxious to place the most modern weapons in Korea. It is hoped that in the long run this will make it possible to reduce the size of the Korean military forces, thereby enabling the reduction of United States expenditures. Mr. Robertson made the additional point that the type of weapons which had been under discussion between the two departments in connection with Korea is furnished to all United States forces, both inside and outside the United States, except the two divisions in Korea.

Admiral Radford followed with a statement that the Communists have repeatedly violated the terms of the Armistice Agreement, and by such action had thrown the comparative effectiveness of the forces in north and south Korea out of balance. To correct this situation, Admiral Radford indicated that it was necessary to introduce for the use of United States military personnel in Korea modern weapons such as the Nike, the Honest John, 280 mm. guns and the Corporal and Redstone missiles.

Department of State representatives, particularly Mr. Robertson and Mr. Phleger, agreed that the north Koreans have violated the Armistice. However, the evidence which is convincing to the Departments of State and Defense is not in a form which can be used to convince the Swiss and Swedes, who are members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, the fifteen countries who sent troops to Korea during the hostilities in addition to the United States, and the United Nations generally.

Secretary Wilson expressed the concern that the United States would be in a most undesirable position if the United States did in fact lay itself open to criticism by our Allies and the neutral nations
without fully preparing the groundwork through discussions with such countries. He proposed that it would appear to be desirable to ask some country to make a statement in the United Nations or some other forum pointing out the grossness of the violation of the Armistice by the Communists.

It was agreed that the Department of Defense would, on a top priority basis, pull together all available evidence of Communist violation of the Armistice in a form which could be used in discussing the matter with the Swiss and Swedes, the fifteen nations and the United Nations. When the Department of Defense has pulled this information together, representatives of the Departments of State and Defense will join to put the material in a form which is considered to be convincing to the countries in question.

199. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

Washington, January 24, 1957.

SUBJECT

Evaluation of Alternative Military Programs for Korea—NSC 5702² (C)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views on the alternatives set forth in paragraph 9 of NSC 5702.

2. Alternatives A, B, C, and D in the subject document set forth four different military programs for Korea. Alternative B reflects the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff previously expressed in their memorandum to you on 11 October 1956³ as their minimum requirement. The Joint Chiefs of Staff still adhere to the program outlined in Alternative B for the reasons advanced by them in the above-mentioned memorandum.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the military programs expressed in Alternatives C and D are inadequate to the present political-military situation existing in Korea. They are of the opinion that prior to consideration of such major modification of ROK forces as proposed in those Alternatives, there must be demonstrated progress toward the solution of the many and varied problems that aggravate the unsatisfactory conditions perpetuating the division of Korea.

¹Source: Department of State, S/S—NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5702 Series. Top Secret. Circulated to the NSC on January 30 under cover of a note from Executive Secretary Lay, as background for the NSC meeting of January 31.
²Document 196.
³Document 172.
Therefore, in the interest of achieving this goal, they urge further efforts to this end.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the foregoing form the basis of the Department of Defense position on NSC 5702.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Arthur Radford*4
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

*Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

200. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State¹


SUBJECT

NSC Consideration of Korean Force Levels

On January 31, 1957, the NSC is scheduled to consider the paper in which the Planning Board has set forth the psychological, political, military, and economic evaluation of four alternative force levels for the ROK military establishment. This Planning Board paper is attached (Tab A).²

I have studied the alternatives most carefully. Since my recent visit to Korea, I am even more firmly convinced that in my memorandum of November 20, 1956, to Mr. Hoover (Tab B)³ that it would be a serious mistake to sanction any weakening of the present ROK defensive strength so long as the Communist capabilities and intentions in the area remain unchanged. The situation in Korea is now one of armed truce with the Communist side continually augmenting, in violation of the Armistice Agreement, its military capabilities in north Korea through the introduction of a formidable jet air force, modern armor and artillery greater in quantity and fire power than existed in 1953. Were we to bring about a cut in ROK military strength now, or in the absence of any change in the Communist position in the future, we would in my opinion, be clearly repeating the mistakes of 1948–1950. At the very least, such a move would

¹Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5702 Series. Top Secret. Drafted by Nes and Norred and approved by Sebald.
²Not found attached. Reference is to Document 196.
³Not found attached. The memorandum is printed as Document 185.
strengthen Communist determination to obstruct a Korean political settlement on other than Communist terms, i.e., the extension of Communist domination over all Korea.

FE is not satisfied generally with the discussion of the alternatives in the Planning Board paper. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of November, 1956, on which much of the Planning Board paper is based, was objected to by State as inadequate. As a result it carries a footnote which reads "The present estimate does not consider possible repercussions of the assumed U.S. action outside south Korea nor does it consider longer run consequences of U.S. action within south Korea." This largely invalidates the estimate.

The paper presented by the Planning Board demonstrates, in my opinion, the unacceptability of alternatives B, C, and D; each of which involve cuts in ROK force levels. In the face of a continued aggressive posture by the Communists a cut in forces would be considered a step toward heavier cuts, thus undermining the U.S. position and the resolve to restrain Communist aggression not only in Korea but the entire Far East. Alternatives B and D provide for the introduction of new [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. In the absence of a demonstrable case that the Communists have violated the Armistice in a like manner, the introduction of these weapons would excite protests from many of our Allies as well as neutrals on the grounds that the U.S. had violated the Armistice.

I am not contending that the size of the Korean armed forces, and the ratio among the individual ROK services should remain a fixed matter indefinitely. The Agreed Minute of Understanding of 1954 provides for a phased reduction of active forces as reserve divisions are created. Such a reduction, if and when made, must take full account of the security situation not only in Korea but also in the Far East generally. I believe many of our agencies are working on this problem under the misapprehension that the security situation in Korea has eased because of the withdrawal of some of the Chinese Communist forces, which after all can easily re-enter from Manchuria in massive strength with no warning. The security situation has, in fact, worsened as a result of increases in Communist aircraft and firepower.

Recommendation:

That you support strongly Alternative A in the NSC discussion of alternative Korean Military Programs.5

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4See Document 177.
5In a memorandum to the Secretary, also dated January 29, Assistant Secretary Bowie recommended that alternative C of the options outlined in NSC 5702 should be
201. Memorandum of Discussion at the 311th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 31, 1957

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Evaluation of Alternative Military Programs for Korea (NSC 5514; NSC 5610; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea", dated October 12 and November 6, 1956; NSC Actions Nos. 1486, 1560, 1607 and 1624; NSC 5702; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 30, 1957)

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the background of this agenda item, calling their attention in particular to the tabular summary of the four possible alternative military programs and to the Financial Appendix. He concluded his lengthy briefing of the Council by summarizing the four alternatives in terms of the financial support required of the United States in each case. (A copy of Mr. Cutler's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting.) He then requested the Director of Central Intelligence to comment briefly on the Korean order of battle. Mr. Dulles complied with this request, making use of a chart which provided the data on order of battle for both North Korea and the ROK as of the date of the Armistice (July 1953) and at present.

Upon the conclusion of Mr. Dulles' briefing, Mr. Cutler called on Admiral Burke to present the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the alternative military programs for Korea. Admiral

adopted as the goal of U.S. policy. Bowie argued that alternative C would save the United States approximately $165 million annually in aid to Korea, would ease the military burden on the Korean economy, and would facilitate Korean economic development. Bowie did not feel that the adoption of alternative C would significantly increase the risk of a breach of the armistice by the Republic of Korea. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5702 Series)

2 Regarding NSC 5514, NSC 5610, the October 12 memorandum by Lay, and the NSC Actions, see footnotes 2-5, Document 196.
3 See footnote 1, Document 172 and footnote 1, Document 179.
4 See footnote 1, Document 199.
5 Reference is to a two-page tabular summary of NSC 5702, prepared by the NSC Staff, circulated to the NSC Planning Board on January 16 under cover of a note from the Director of the NSC Secretariat. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5702 Series)
6 Not printed.
7 The minutes of all National Security Council meetings held during the Eisenhower administration are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File.
Burke indicated that the Chiefs of Staff felt that we must not only be ready for a possible aggression against the ROK from the north, but that we must also be prepared to deal with the possibility of internal disturbances in the Republic of Korea. In the light of these considerations, Admiral Burke believed that a reduction beyond certain limits of the force levels in the ROK would endanger South Korea. As the result of a considerable build-up in the North Korean armed forces, there was a definite shift in the power balance to the advantage of North Korea. This power shift had not yet reached a significant point, but the direction was plain. Admiral Burke noted that of course the North Koreans were violating the provisions of the Armistice, while we in turn were observing the Armistice. If we undertook to violate the Armistice, we could introduce into South Korea new and greatly improved weapons which would enable us to reduce over-all force levels.

Admiral Burke then reminded the Council that President Rhee was a very old man, who was engaged in running a “one-man democracy” at the present time. There was very likely to be chaos when Rhee died, and the Communists might at this juncture make a try for full control of Korea. Thus, since we feel that our forces in Korea must be ready for any contingency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that Alternative B of NSC 5702 constitutes the most prudent program.

Mr. Cutler asked Admiral Burke if he would explain briefly to the members of the Council the nature of the “dual nuclear conventional capability” which is to become “standard” in the armed forces of the United States in the future. Admiral Burke replied that this term was to be defined as covering such weapons as “Honest John” rockets, 8-inch Howitzers, and missiles [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Mr. Cutler commented that this was the essence of our problem.

Secretary Wilson put the question as to whether the Council was now going to make a definite decision as to which alternative to choose, or whether the Council was merely engaging in a discussion, after which things would wait for a while before a final decision was made. Secretary Wilson stated that he had a position with respect to a desirable military program for Korea which was essentially his own and which differed in some respects from the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said, however, that he did agree with the proposal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reduce the number of active ROK divisions from 20 to 16. He would not, however, go so far as to reduce the ROK active divisions to 10. Such a move would be too sudden and would involve too great a dislocation.

Secretary Wilson went on to state his opinion that war was not going to start up again in Korea or places like that, because there
would be insufficient advantage to the Communists in merely acquiring Korea at such a cost. He believed that we should certainly "get loose" from Korean-like situations, both in Korea and elsewhere in the world, in order that we might concentrate our resources and capabilities on more vital areas. Secretary Wilson continued with a statement that the introduction of our new weapons did involve a very serious psychological problem. He believed that it would be wisest to keep these new weapons for the time being in [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], since there would be more loss than gain for us if we should put these new weapons into Korea itself. While such problems were largely in the field of the Secretary of State, Secretary Wilson said he felt that he wished to give his own view for what it might be worth. At any rate, he concluded, he would begin to untangle the United States from its present situation vis-à-vis such areas as Korea. British and Commonwealth troops were all shortly to get out of Korea, and the United States would, of course, be left holding the bag.

Mr. Cutler then suggested that Secretary Dulles speak next, pointing out in so doing that Alternatives B and C were the likely ones that the United States would adopt if we should reach a decision to change our present program (Alternative A).

Secretary Dulles commenced his statement by pointing out that the choice of a military program in Korea involved two major problems. First, the matter of the internal situation within Korea, and secondly, the matter of our compliance with the terms of the Armistice, which involved our world position. He then went on to say that of course the real deterrent to a renewed Communist attack on South Korea was the nuclear power which the United States had [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and our ability to use this power to destroy the bulk of Chinese Communist industry. Nevertheless, the situation in the Republic of Korea itself is such that the area could be lost through subversion rather than through external aggression if the United States were to take action which appeared to indicate that we were abandoning South Korea. The South Koreans, like many other nations in a similar situation, want visible evidence of military strength on site, even though we may feel that they should rely on our capacity for retaliation. To the South Koreans, our capability for massive retaliation is not immediately visible and always remains to some degree uncertain. It is the prevalence of such a point of view in large parts of the world which is causing us so much trouble with our military aid programs. In any event, a considerable reduction of visible military strength in South Korea would have very serious internal repercussions. The course of action which would provide the greatest reassurance to the South Koreans would doubtless be the introduction of atomic weaponry, even though such a move might be
largely symbolic. If we followed such a course of action, the South Koreans might agree to the reduction of the levels of their own forces.

On the other hand, continued Secretary Dulles, this course of action would mark a departure from the terms of the Armistice; that is, if we were to put such weapons in Korea as are not there now—for example, Honest Johns. You could put in all the 8-inch Howitzers you wanted to, because they are already there, but the introduction of other new weapons would certainly be the occasion for a greatly stepped-up Communist propaganda campaign. More serious (since the Communist propaganda campaign was already on) would be the interpretation given to such a course of action by the neutral nations and by some of our allies, who would consider it an unjustified violation of the Armistice terms by the United States. Apropos of this point, Secretary Dulles alluded to a recent conversation with Duncan Sandys, the British Defense Minister. In a kind of a way, Secretary Dulles pointed out, the British face a problem in Germany not unlike the problem we face in Korea. For this reason, Secretary Dulles had thought that Sandys and British officials generally would be sympathetic to a proposal for the introduction of new weapons. Nevertheless, Sandys felt that to do this would constitute so extreme a violation of the Armistice terms as to make him personally doubt the wisdom of the proposal and to question whether the United Kingdom would be likely to support this course of action. Secretary Dulles added that Sandys had not categorically refused support for such a proposal, but had given him reason to doubt that such support would be forthcoming. While, said Secretary Dulles, there wasn’t the slightest doubt that the Communists have consistently violated the Armistice agreement, the evidence of violation is of such a character that the United States would find it difficult to make use of a great deal of this evidence. Accordingly, we might not be able to satisfy world opinion as to the scale of Communist violation of the Korean Armistice. While the United States would certainly not want to treat the Korean Armistice as wholly void, it might be possible to separate out paragraph 13–d and void its provisions.

In summary, concluded Secretary Dulles, from the standpoint of our foreign relations, avoiding the introduction of these new types of weapons while at the same time securing a reduction in the level of ROK forces, would obviously be the best solution. However, if the United States felt that it could not afford this course of action, Secretary Dulles indicated that he would choose to take the risks involved in a violation of the Armistice agreement rather than to elect a course of action which drastically reduced the levels of ROK military forces.

Secretary Wilson commented that a shift of four ROK divisions from an active to a reserve status would probably improve the ROK
internal situation a little bit and, accordingly, save the United States a little money, but certainly not very much. It was, of course, possible that if the ROK force levels were reduced, the North Koreans would respond by reducing their forces. Perhaps the best thing was to start this reduction in a gradual way, so that the least protest would be aroused in South Korea.

The President indicated that he was extremely weary of the blackmail which seemed constantly to be practiced against the United States, but that he had a couple of questions that he wished now to put before the Council. He said he believed that all of us agreed that the danger of war does not arise from the intrinsic value to the Communists of the Korean peninsula, but rather derives from the prestige which the Communists would enjoy if they succeeded in destroying a nation (South Korea) set up and maintained by the United States. In short, South Korea had become a symbol throughout the world. Of course, if the South Koreans state that they wish to go Communist and do so, the practical harm to the United States would not amount to very much. Accordingly, the President said, he was not greatly worried about the internal situation in South Korea, but more concerned with what was necessary to deter an attack from North Korea.

Secretary Dulles observed that the pattern we face in Korea was also the pattern we faced in Formosa. The great danger seemed to be that unless we continued to pay the blackmail costs, the situation in Formosa might go to pot, especially if South Korea fell to the Communists first. There would be obvious repercussions in Japan likewise.

On the subject of blackmail, Secretary Wilson commented that the next time we pay it he would like to be sure for once that we got something in return.

Mr. Cutler stated that he believed the Council should try to look upon the present paper as illustrating ways and means of making savings in U.S. resources not only in Korea but elsewhere in the world. In these difficult areas the Council had already acted on Pakistan. Next week Iran would be before the Council for consideration. It was essential, however, not to overlook the injunction which the Council had given to the Planning Board to try to find, if possible or feasible, means to discover ways of saving U.S. resources. It appeared to Mr. Cutler that Secretary Wilson was prepared to go along with a reduction of the ROK active forces by four divisions. We should remember, however, that in this alternative (Alternative B) some of the savings which would result from the reduction in the number of active ROK divisions would be reduced by the added costs arising from the introduction of additional jet aircraft. After citing the relevant financial figures, Mr. Cutler speculated as to whether Alterna-
tive B would be acceptable to the South Koreans if jet aircraft were given to them instead of the new weapons for which they had been clamoring.

Admiral Burke said he doubted whether this substitution would be acceptable to the South Koreans, because what they really wanted was visible evidence of their ability to meet an attack. Admiral Burke agreed that there was no significant danger of an attack from North Korea at the present time; but if the ROKs came to feel that their military strength was going to be significantly reduced in the near future, it would be all the harder to get them to accept any further reductions later on.

Secretary Humphrey felt that Secretary Wilson had raised two important points to which the Council should give careful thought. In the first place, there was the question as to whether the Council was proposing to make a decision today, or whether the current discussion on military programs in Korea was exploratory in character and that no decision on a military program in Korea would be made until the Council was also ready to reach some decisions with respect to suitable military programs for other areas than Korea. It was Secretary Humphrey's view that the Council must face up to the general problem of our military aid programs rather than to deal seriatim with individual countries. In any case, the Council must clearly realize that the United States cannot go on for another ten years, as it had for the past ten years, spending our resources on military aid programs currently in effect. Such a course would be suicidal for the United States. Accordingly, if we are going to change to a real "new look policy" for the world as a whole, the sooner we decided to do so, the better. Accordingly, he would recommend that the Council fit Korea into a general program which would notably reduce the size and expenditures for our military assistance programs world-wide. In other words, we must look this problem full in the face. The United States was rapidly being left with the task of defending the whole free world. We must decide, therefore, what kind of a defense of the free world we are prepared to make on the assumption that we alone must bear the costs. In Secretary Humphrey's opinion, the answer was clear, and that we should depend on our massive retaliatory capability. Reliance on this capability was in his opinion the sole feasible means by which the United States could get itself in a position of being able to defend the free world. It was perfectly clear that the United Kingdom and France were not going to be able to give us significant help. So we must go it alone, and in so doing concentrate our resources on maintaining our retaliatory power rather than dissipating our strength in small amounts all over the world. Such dissipation of our powers might very well lose us our massive retaliatory capacity. In summary, therefore, Secretary Humphrey said he would
recommend that the Council pigeonhole this agenda item until we could reach a decision involving the whole world as to how we should defend ourselves. After making the general decision, we could deal with the individual cases.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that the Council and the Planning Board had been trying to approach the general problem outlined by Secretary Humphrey by analyzing the situation in each of the so-called Prochnow countries. He went on to say that the Planning Board (and he subsequently changed “Planning Board” to “I” as more accurate) thought that if the Secretary of State could bring himself to swallow the pill of a significant U.S. violation of the Korean Armistice, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had put up a relatively attractive package in Alternative B. Moreover, adoption of Alternative B at this time might lead to reductions over and above the four divisions contemplated in Alternative B as proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. Brundage said that he had a significant point to make. As he understood it, Alternative B was a two-year program, while Alternatives C and D were spaced over a period of three years. Would it not be possible for the Council to decide to start with Alternative B and move later to Alternative C and still further reductions? In Mr. Brundage’s opinion the savings to be achieved by the adoption of Alternative B were not significant enough in themselves to be the stopping point in the reduction process.

With respect to the savings which might flow from the adoption of Alternative B, Dr. Flemming inquired whether it was proposed to devote the savings from the reduction in the military program to increasing the economic assistance which the United States would give to South Korea. Mr. Cutler replied that no increase in the level of economic aid was being proposed, because we had been informed that for a period at least the South Korean economy could not absorb additional economic aid. Secretary Wilson also registered strong opposition to any proposal to increase our economic assistance to South Korea by the way of any savings from a reduction in our military assistance program. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Contrary to the proposals of Secretary Humphrey, Secretary Dulles expressed the hope that the Council could make some progress toward a solution of the South Korean situation without waiting to deal with the over-all situation with respect to our military assistance programs. He pointed out that four years ago basically we had agreed that our massive retaliatory capability was going to be the chief deterrent to war. Accordingly, our trouble is not, as Secretary Humphrey suggested, any lack of a basic policy, but perhaps

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8Korea, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Vietnam, and the Republic of China.
9Percival F. Brundage, Director of the Bureau of the Budget.
stemmed from the fact that we have not applied our basic policy in the necessary way. In any event, we could not successfully deal with our situation if we suddenly and drastically reduced all our military assistance programs world-wide as the Secretary of the Treasury had suggested. Instead, we should deal with each country in terms of its merits and the peculiarities of its individual situation. It would be much too great a shock to make a world-wide decision to reduce and then proceed promptly to carry it out. We must deal certainly with the ROK situation in terms of a gradual rather than a sudden reduction for, after all, we are not sure that even the modest reduction set forth in Alternative B will not be too much of a shock for the South Koreans.

Secretary Humphrey replied that the point that he was really making is that a mere $65 million annually, which was the amount we could anticipate if Alternative B were adopted, was no great shakes. While he did not advocate drastic reductions all at once, he did believe that we should know where we were going ultimately before we started down any path.

The President indicated his sympathy with the position on this issue taken by Secretary Dulles and his belief that it was essential to apply a general principle to each particular country. Secretary Humphrey replied that he was not advocating the application of reductions all at once and all over the world. He did believe, however, that the National Security Council should agree on a generally reduced program of military assistance world-wide, and gradually apply this general program to one country after another until our objective of a general reduction in costs has been achieved.

In response to this proposal, Secretary Dulles commented briefly on the very great difficulty we would face in selling our friends and our allies on the point of sole reliance on the retaliatory capability of the United States in their defense against Communism. Secretary Humphrey repeated that he was not recommending that we now take action on a general reduction of our military assistance program, but that we agree on a plan of action; and certainly any plan which results in saving this country only $65 million a year is pretty nearly worthless. The savings must be a great deal larger, both in Korea and everywhere else in the world.

Secretary Wilson explained to the Council the difficulties which could be anticipated if we proposed a very sudden reduction in the force levels for Korea. He said he knew this by his own bitter experience. Secretary Humphrey still insisted that, at the very best, Alternative B represented a timid beginning in reducing the drain on U.S. resources.

Admiral Burke took the position that if we adopted Alternative B we might succeed in convincing the South Koreans that the United
States had the military power on hand in South Korea to defend them and accordingly Alternative B might be the first step in a series of further reductions. He warned, however, lest we follow a course of action which might cause the South Koreans to lose confidence in our willingness and ability to defend them.

Secretary Humphrey argued that, after all, the United States had a few rights in the world and it was high time that we gave some thought to our own rights and interests. Secretary Dulles immediately pointed out that we were not defending countries like South Korea out of any particular affection for them, but because it was in the national interest of the United States to defend them. He repeated that we could not deprive these countries of all the visible on-site signs of their capability to defend themselves. However, if we have got to risk a course of action which will involve some kind of real shock to the world, he would rather endure the shock as a result of the introduction of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] into Korea than by drastically reducing ROK force levels. Secretary Dulles said he believed this all the more valid inasmuch as reliance on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] will have to become the long-term policy and program of the United States. It was not improbable that we could persuade at least some of our allies to accept this proposition. Secretary Humphrey commented that this was certainly the kind of program he felt the United States should embark on, but in any case let us not stop at a reduction of only four divisions in the active forces of the Republic of Korea.

At this point in the discussion the Secretary of State rose from the table and said that he was obliged to leave the meeting in order to keep an appointment with King Saud. Mr. Cutler then quickly called attention to the need for Council discussion on the next item of the agenda, namely, the Indian request for withdrawal of funds from the International Monetary Fund, and invited the Secretary of the Treasury to make his report while Secretary Dulles could still hear it. (Discussion of the Indian request will be found under Item 2 of this memorandum.)

Resuming discussion of the Korean alternatives, the President observed that behind all the remarks that Secretary Humphrey had made relative to the costs of our military assistance programs and also the use that India was likely to make of funds withdrawn from the International Monetary Fund, lay our estimate of how acute was our difficulty in trying to keep the free world free. Accordingly, the level of our military and other assistance to free nations was not merely a matter of how much the United States could afford to pro-

King Saud of Saudi Arabia arrived in Washington on January 29 for a State visit.
vide these nations by way of assistance. If we lose important areas of the free world to Communism the repercussions on ourselves would be very grave.

Secretary Humphrey repeated his views on the very serious financial situation that the United States might soon face. We are now somewhat concerned with inflation, but things could change very abruptly, and we may soon be worrying about deflation. Secretary Humphrey insisted that he could see certain signs indicating the deflationary process already, and he warned that things could shift very quickly if the people of the United States lost confidence in their government. To this, the President said that we would have to decide which we were most frightened of at the present time—international Communism or our own internal situation. Secretary Humphrey answered that in point of fact for the last four years we have been wrestling with the attempt to find the correct balance between these two dangers. The President said that he certainly agreed that we could not approach this problem from any one single point of view. Our only course was to seek the correct balance between our internal demands and the demands of our military defense. Secretary Humphrey warned that in his opinion we could not take much more out of our economy than we are taking now. Indeed, he felt we could not afford to support our present military programs at their present levels. We have simply got to find some way of getting more defense for fewer dollars.

Secretary Wilson said that he strongly supported the gradual approach to the reduction in our military assistance programs and, as a matter of fact, he for one was not prepared to sneer at a $65 million annual savings. The President interrupted to say that he was a little astonished to find Secretary Humphrey speaking of $65 million in such an offhand fashion. Secretary Wilson went on to say that he was much troubled at what the country was going to face in defense costs in Fiscal Year 1959. He counseled that we go carefully bit by bit.

In order, said Mr. Cutler, that the Council should not lose momentum on the solution of these problems, he would suggest that the Planning Board now be directed by the Council to prepare a revised policy on South Korea, the military portion of which would be based on Alternative B but which would include plans and suggestions for a possible further reduction in the ROK active divisions from four in the direction of ten. Secretary Wilson agreed that it would be wise to adopt Alternative B, while at the same time exploring the possibilities of further reductions. He could certainly go along with this recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff if the Secretary of State were not too worried about this course of action; but he believed that we should not talk to President Rhee about reducing the
active divisions of the South Korean army from 20 to 10. The President merely commented that Rhee must be an idiot to want to support 20 active divisions. He simply was unable to understand Rhee's reasoning. The Vice President commented that the $65 million annual saving was in a way more significant than the mere dollars would indicate, because it might pave the way for other and greater savings, both in Korea and elsewhere in the world. Its real significance was in the establishment of a pattern of reductions and savings.

Secretary Humphrey said he wanted a footnote to be added to indicate that he certainly did not disdain $65 million (laughter).

The National Security Council:  

a. Noted and discussed the draft report on the subject contained in NSC 5702, prepared by the NSC Planning Board; in the light of a study prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff pursuant to NSC Action No. 1607–b (transmitted by the reference memorandum of October 12, 1956), the comments of the Secretary of Defense (transmitted by the reference memorandum of November 6, 1956), the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on NSC 5702 (transmitted by the reference memorandum of January 30, 1957), and an oral briefing on the subject by the Director of Central Intelligence.

b. Directed the NSC Planning Board to prepare for subsequent Council consideration a new statement of policy on Korea, to supercede NSC 5514, incorporating therein a military program for U.S. and ROK forces in Korea based upon the initial adoption of Alternative B in NSC 5702, with planning for gradual further reductions in ROK forces in the longer range.

[Here follow agenda items 2–4.]

S. Everett Gleason

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111 Paragraphs a–b constitute NSC Action No. 1660, approved by President Eisenhower on February 4. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
202. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for International Organization Affairs (Walmsley) to 
the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning 
(Bowie)¹

Washington, March 1, 1957.

SUBJECT

NSC Planning Board Memo: U.S. Policy Toward Korea

IO did not receive the revised version of the paper on "U.S. Policy toward Korea"² in time to prepare comments that could be useful for the Planning Board meeting this afternoon. While the revision certainly improves upon the first draft, it does not succeed entirely in meeting the various points which we believe must be taken into account in setting forth a revised policy statement on Korea based upon the adoption of Alternative B.³ I understand that the Legal Advisor’s office also has some problems in this regard. On the assumption that further changes will be made in the paper as a result of its consideration today by the Planning Board, I should like to suggest that representatives of FE, IO and L meet with a representative of S/P early next week to discuss the paper with a view to preparing a revised draft satisfactory to us all.

Since it is understood that the purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of the adoption of Alternative B rather than to carry out a decision already made, it seems to IO the paper should deal with the possible repercussions of the adoption of Alternative B upon other aspects of the Korean problem. For example, would our allies in the UNC regard themselves as still bound by the Joint Policy Declaration? Would our departure from the letter of the Armistice Agreement build up pressures that already exist for a settlement in Korea to an extent that might bring about a renewal of negotiations on unification under terms currently unacceptable to the U.S.? Is the U.S. prepared to meet proposals for adjudication of the legal question whether the action contemplated in Alternative B can be reconciled with the terms of the Armistice Agreement? What will be the effect

¹Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, US Policy Toward Korea (NSC 5702, 5702/1, 5702/2). Top Secret.
²In response to NSC Action No. 1660 (see footnote 11, supra), a draft statement outlining "US Policy Toward Korea," prepared by the Department of State, was submitted to the NSC Planning Board on February 21, under cover of a note from Marion W. Boggs, Director of the NSC Secretariat. This draft was discussed by the Planning Board on February 25. On February 28, a revised draft statement of "US Policy Toward Korea," prepared by the Planning Board Assistants in light of the Planning Board Discussion of February 25, was submitted to the NSC Planning Board under cover of another note from Boggs. (Both in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, US Policy Toward Korea (NSC 5702, 5702/1, 5702/2))
³See Document 196.
on support for U.S. positions in the General Assembly and Security Council where, as in the Middle East, we may wish to insist on the scrupulous observance of Armistice Agreements? These are only some of the questions which must be answered before we can approach the next series of questions which would relate to timing, tactics and methods of presentation.

203. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Bowie)\(^1\)

Washington, March 1, 1957.

SUBJECT

February 28 Draft of Policy Paper on Korea\(^2\)

My comments and recommendations on this draft are:

1. I am particularly concerned by the effort being made by Treasury and the Bureau of the Budget to modify the language in paragraph 1,\(^3\) which sets forth our long-range objective in Korea. Their desire to substitute “limited initial” for “strong” resistance here and in paragraph 24c\(^4\) with respect to the desired capability of the ROK armed forces strikes at the very heart of our objectives and intentions in Korea and, in fact, in the entire Far East area.

In Korea, at tremendous expense and effort, we have created the largest, most effective and most reliable military force in the Far East.

\(^{1}\)Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, US Policy Toward Korea (NSC 5702, 5702/1, 5702/2). Top Secret. Drafted by Nes and Parsons.

\(^{2}\)See footnote 2, supra.

\(^{3}\)The agreed portion of paragraph 1 of the February 28 draft reads: “1. Long-range Objective: To bring about the unification of Korea with a self-supporting economy and under a free, independent, and representative government, friendly toward the United States and other countries of the Free World, with its political and territorial integrity assured by international agreement and with.” A majority of the Planning Board Assistants felt that the paragraph should conclude with the following language: “armed forces sufficient for internal security and capable of strong resistance in event of attack by a foreign power.” The representatives of the Bureau of the Budget and the Department of the Treasury proposed concluding language which would permit a greater reduction in American aid: “sufficient strength for internal security and limited initial resistance in event of attack by a foreign power.”

\(^{4}\)The majority version of paragraph 24c of the February 28 draft indicated that, in order to achieve a unified, democratic, independent, and friendly Korea, the United States should be prepared, inter alia, to “accept a level of Korean armed forces sufficient for internal security and capable of strong resistance in event of attack by a foreign power.” The representatives of the Bureau of the Budget and the Department of the Treasury proposed the substitution of the phrase “limited initial” for the word “strong” in the language of paragraph 24c.
This force serves and will serve not only as a positive deterrent to a renewal of Communist aggression in Korea but at the same time ties up large Communist forces in north Korea and Communist China, which otherwise would be free for deployment and possible aggression elsewhere.

The will to resist Communism is stronger in Korea by far than in any other Far Eastern country. This will to resist depends largely on the confidence of the Korean people in the ability of their own armed forces successfully to hold renewed Communist aggression in check until outside assistance on their behalf can be brought to bear. Understandably, such resistance must be capable of preventing the Korean peninsula from being overrun as was the case in 1950. It is my understanding that our own military planning is also based on the maintenance of sufficient ROK armed strength to prevent the loss of the peninsula until our own retaliatory measures can be brought to bear against the aggressor.

I consider it extremely important, therefore, that the present language in paragraphs 1 and 24c be retained and that State vigorously support the majority view on this point at today's Planning Board meeting.

2. I also feel we should support the majority in the split with Defense on paragraph 15b. ROK expenditures for national defense are approximately 80% of the ROK revenues in the General Account Budget. A larger contribution would be financially and economically unsound and would only tend to retard the economic development and to increase the inflationary pressures.

3. With respect to paragraph 19c, I recommend that "and the Secretary of Defense" be inserted after "Secretary of State".

4. In paragraph 23, I believe subparagraphs e and f, which come from the old paper, NSC 5514, are unnecessary and should be deleted. Paragraph 23e is particularly bad. It is inconceivable to me that the United States or the United Nations would inform the Commu-

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5The majority version of paragraph 15b called for the United States to encourage the Republic of Korea, through economic and technical aid programs, to "continue to provide support for its military force." The Department of Defense version of the same paragraph looked for the Republic of Korea to "assume an increasingly greater proportion of the cost of supporting its armed forces."

6In paragraph 19c, the Secretary of State was given responsibility for determining the timing and the rationale for the contemplated modernization of American forces in Korea.

7Paragraphs 23e and 23f dealt with a hypothetical situation in which the Republic of Korea, despite American restraints, unilaterally renews hostilities in Korea. Paragraph 23e contemplated the open dissociation of the U.N. Command from the South Korean action, with the caveat that the U.N. Command would be prepared to defend its own forces. Paragraph 23f stipulated that, in the circumstances contemplated, the United Command would renew hostilities with Communist forces only if necessary to protect the security of U.N. Command forces.
nists of any decision regarding the extent to which south Korea is to be defended. To take such action would put the Communists in an advantageous position vis-à-vis the free world and would be most unwise.

204. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)\(^1\)

*Washington, March 4, 1957.*

**SUBJECT**

Progress Report on Korea (NSC 5514)\(^2\)

A draft of the semi-annual Progress Report on Korea, which will be considered by the Operations Coordinating Board at its meeting on March 6, 1957, is attached.\(^3\)

The report states that the OCB does not recommend any revisions in NSC 5514 except for those required to accommodate the recent NSC decision on force levels. The report, in evaluating progress during the past six months, concludes that:

1. There has been no significant improvement with respect to the long-term United States objective of unification.
2. United States assistance has succeeded in maintaining a large and effective ROK military force and in making substantial progress in the rehabilitation of the economy to prewar levels, but fundamental economic problems remain.

Among the major problems listed are the replacement of obsolete weapons, the lack of effectiveness and stability of the ROK Government, the continuing inflationary pressures, the need to shift emphasis from rehabilitation to economic development, the current food shortage, and the bringing of the present organizational arrangements in Seoul into conformity with Executive Order 10575.\(^4\)

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\(^1\)Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Korea–1953 to Date. Top Secret. Drafted by Nes and Barbis.

\(^2\)Document 196.

\(^3\)Not found attached. A copy of the report, which was adopted by the Operations Coordinating Board with minor changes on March 6, is in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5514. A summary of the OCB consideration of the report on March 6 is *ibid.*, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Preliminary Notes on Luncheon Meetings.

\(^4\)Executive Order 10575, issued by President Eisenhower on November 6, 1954, provided for administration of the foreign aid programs authorized by the Mutual Security Act of 1954. For text of Executive Order 10575, see Department of State Bulletin, December 13, 1954, pp. 914–917.
Paragraph B 11, "Korean Obligations," was put in at the strong insistence of Treasury and the Bureau of the Budget. FE does not consider these problems of sufficient significance to warrant inclusion but was unable to convince the representatives of the other agencies. The FE representative made it clear that we would not concur in applying "sanctions" against the Republic of Korea to collect these bills.

The other major interagency difference involves paragraph 10(a) relating to the organizational setup in Seoul which Defense has asked be deleted on the grounds that it does not constitute an operational problem.

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Paragraph B 11 of the Progress Report reads: "There continue to be areas in which the Korean Government has not yet met its obligations, such as local currency interest payments on the surplus property and rentals for the use of U.S. Government-owned commercial vessels."

Paragraph 10a of the report dealt with the question of responsibility for the supervision and coordination of the economic assistance program which was being administered by the Economic Coordinator as CINC REP under CINC UNC. The Department of State wanted this function brought within the Ambassador's overall area of responsibility, as was the usual practice at other posts. The Department of Defense opposed such a move, but the report expressed the hope that "normal administrative arrangements" could be organized by July 1, 1957. July 1 was the date established for the separation of the CINC FE and CINC UNC Commands, at which point the CINC UNC Command was to be transferred to Seoul.

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205. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Bowie)


SUBJECT

March 13 Draft of Statement of Policy on Korea

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1Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, US Policy Toward Korea (NSC 5702, 5702/1, 5702/2). Top Secret. Drafted by Nes and cleared in draft with IO and L.

2The March 13 draft statement outlining "U.S. Policy Toward Korea" was the third revision by the NSC Planning Board Assistants of the initial Department of State draft which was circulated to the Planning Board on February 21. The initial draft and the first revision are discussed in footnote 2, Document 202. The second revision of the paper, dated March 4, was prepared in light of Planning Board discussion on March 1. The Planning Board considered this version at a special meeting on March 5, and the March 13 draft was prepared in light of the discussion at that meeting. Copies of the draft statements on "U.S. Policy Toward Korea" circulated to the Planning Board under cover of memoranda by the Director of the NSC Secretariat on March 4.
This draft, which is to be considered by the Planning Board March 15, perhaps for the last time before reference to the Council, brings into sharp focus in the bracketed portions of paragraphs 9(a), 11, and 19 the split between State on the one hand and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense, Treasury and Bureau of the Budget on the other on the question of providing United States forces in Korea with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

You will recall that during a discussion of this problem on January 18, 1957 with Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford, the Secretary reluctantly agreed to go along with a military program calling for the introduction of such weapons on the specific assurance that publishable evidence was at hand confirming comparable Communist action in north Korea. Thus far, the Department has not been provided with the promised Joint Chiefs of Staff Report containing such evidence. FE, IO, and L are convinced that, particularly in view of the clear provisions of the Korean Armistice Agreement, it would be disastrous to our position with our Allies and in the United Nations were we to proceed and equip our forces in Korea with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in the absence of demonstrable and compa-

and March 13 are in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, US Policy Toward Korea (NSC 5702, 5702/1, 5702/2).

9Paragraph 9a of the draft dealt with the continued deployment of two U.S. Infantry Divisions and one fighter-bomber wing in South Korea. The paragraph specified that all U.S. forces in Korea would be modernized with dual conventional-nuclear weapons. The two bracketed portions of the paragraph, proposed by the Department of State, qualified the authorization to modernize U.S. forces by stipulating that nuclear warheads could not be stored in Korea, and that the timing of the introduction of dual capable weapons would depend upon the establishment and publication of evidence of comparable violations of the Armistice Agreement by Communist forces in North Korea.

11Paragraph 11 of the draft called for continuing efforts to maintain the support of the other members of the United Nations for the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Korea. Specifically, the United States would seek to preserve the Unified Command, assure support for the Joint Policy Declaration, and continue the military involvement of participants in the U.N. Command. The paragraph closed with a bracketed sentence which, according to a note on the source text, the Defense and JCS representatives proposed to delete: "In so doing the U.S. must continue to give due weight to the effect on other UN members of any decisions it may take as the Unified Command, particularly any actions implementing paragraph 9a above."

19Paragraph 19 stipulated that the United States should continue to observe and support the Korean Armistice Agreement. To that end, the Department of State proposed implementing language in paragraphs 19a and 19b which the Department of Defense wanted to have deleted. In paragraph 19a, the bracketed sentence reads: "Seek, as a matter of priority, to establish through adequate evidence, the nature and scope of any violations of the Armistice Agreement by the Communist side, especially with respect to Article 13(d)." In paragraph 19b, the bracketed sentence read: "The timing of the introduction of dual conventional-nuclear weapons under paragraph 9a shall be decided upon by the Secretaries of State and Defense, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, only after they shall have determined that publishable evidence establishes the Communist introductions comparable in nature and extent."

6See Document 198.
rable Communist action. We have, therefore, endeavored to build into the new Korean policy paper, which, at National Security Council direction embodies Alternative B of NSC 5702, what we consider essential safeguards in the implementation of Alternative B by giving due consideration to the timing of such action and the bearing it will have on other sectors, not only of our Korean policy but of our policy towards our Allies and in the United Nations. I understand that during Planning Board and Board Assistants consideration of the paper, these safeguards were vigorously attacked and that the majority view at the last Board Assistants meeting, with State strongly dissenting, was that the National Security Council in selecting Alternative B of NSC 5702 had decided without conditions in favor of giving our forces dual conventional nuclear weapons, thus permitting a reduction in ROK forces, and that our policy should, therefore, be directed toward the immediate implementation of that decision.

I believe you will agree that since the Secretary’s concurrence in Alternative B was based on Admiral Radford’s assurances with respect to certain evidence of Communist actions, we must, in the absence of such evidence, require adequate safeguards in the new policy paper. I do not think, therefore, that State can agree at this juncture to a paper which excludes in substance the bracketed portions of paragraphs 9(a), 11, and 19 of the March 13 draft.

With respect to the bracketed word “strong” in paragraphs 1 and 24(c), FE feels that its omission from the new paper can only be construed as a change in our objectives with respect to future ROK force levels in a manner calculated to pave the way for their reduction to a status of impotence insofar as capacity to resist or deter renewed Communist aggression is concerned. ROK capability to resist strongly is not only essential in the preservation of the will to fight in the Korean people and hence their ability to resist Communist subversion and to remain independent and free but has great symbolic and psychological importance throughout the Far East.

The desire of other agencies to eliminate the bracketed portion of paragraph 15 is difficult to understand since the policy set forth

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7In paragraph 1 of the draft statement, the Department of State proposed that the concluding language should read that the Republic of Korea’s armed forces should be “capable of strong resistance in event of attack by a foreign power.” The word “strong” was bracketed in the draft, indicating a divergence of opinion among the Planning Board Assistants. The word “strong” was similarly bracketed and indicated as a Department of State proposal in paragraph 24c, which reads that, in order to promote Korean unification, the United States should: “accept a level of Korean armed forces sufficient for internal security and capable of [strong] resistance in event of attack by a foreign power.”

8The bracketed portion of paragraph 15 reads: “Encourage the conditions necessary to form as soon as possible, and then participate in, a Western Pacific collective defense arrangement, including the Philippines, the Republic of China and the ROK, eventually linked with ANZUS and SEATO.”
therein is a basic element both in NSC 5429\(^9\) and the Japanese paper, NSC 5516/1.\(^{10}\) It is, in fact, an integral part of United States policy in the Far East and should be referred to in the Korean paper.

Our reasons for desiring the insertion of "consider" in the introductory sentence of paragraph 23\(^{11}\) have been previously explained, the intention being to make it clear that an ill-advised irrational act on the part of President Rhee will not automatically result in our initiation of actions whose end result might very possibly assure a Communist take-over of south Korea.

I also believe we should push for the inclusion of "maximum" before "rate" in the first line of paragraph 2(b)\(^{12}\) as a reflection of our desire to enable the ROK to become more self-sufficient.

Both Howard Parsons, Director of Northeast Asian Affairs, and David Nes, Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs, plan to attend the March 15 Planning Board meeting and will be glad to discuss State's position in more detail at your convenience prior to the meeting. Officers of IO and L would also be available if you so desire.


\(^{10}\)For text of NSC 5516/1, "U.S. Policy Toward Japan," April 9, 1955, see vol. xxiii, Part 1, pp. 52–62.

\(^{11}\)The introductory sentence of paragraph 23 of the draft statement reads: "If, despite the actions taken under Annex F ROK forces should renew hostilities unilaterally, the United States should [consider]."

\(^{12}\)Paragraph 2b of the draft statement indicated that it should be a U.S. objective to assist the Republic of Korea by: "Enabling the Republic of Korea to achieve a rate of economic development compatible with a reasonable degree of stability."

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206. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sprague)\(^1\)


I am writing to you with reference to the discussion yesterday in the Planning Board relative to the March 13 draft of the new U.S. Policy toward Korea.\(^2\)

In paragraphs 9–a and 19,\(^3\) there is a very sharp split between Defense–JCS and State. The split relates to whether the U.S. will

\(^1\)Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, US Policy Toward Korea (NSC 5702, 5702/1, 5702/2). Top Secret.

\(^2\)See footnote 2, supra.

\(^3\)See footnotes 3 and 5, supra.
proceed to adopt a new policy to modernize and equip its forces in Korea with dual conventional-nuclear weapons. Under the paper, such modernization and equipment are related, in a package deal, to the proposed reduction in active ROK divisions and the conversion of three ROK squadrons to jets. In paragraph 19-b, the State position is that the timing of such modernization and equipment of U.S. forces shall be decided by the Secretaries of State and Defense, in consultation with the DCI, "only after they shall have determined that publishable evidence establishes Communist violations sufficient to warrant such action by the U.S." This paragraph sets up no standard to guide the determination (such as "comparable in nature and extent"), but I understand the underlying intention of State to relate to Communist violations (subsequent to the withdrawal of the NNSC into the demilitarized zone) of such a nature as to require the U.S. to take such action as it feasibly can to "redress the balance."

In this ardent discussion, it was stated that Defense-JCS had promised to supply to State information relative to all Communist armistice violations but that such information had not yet been furnished. I think that this information should be promptly furnished and discussed between Secretaries Dulles and Wilson, in order that the Council Meeting can proceed on the basis of such discussion (and agreement, if any) having occurred.

The Korea paper is scheduled on the Council agenda for April 4. It is urgent, therefore, that the above mentioned information be furnished and discussed by the two Secretaries before the paper is presented to the Council. Otherwise, we shall possibly be wasting the President's time. I, therefore, want you, Farrell, and Bowie to do your best to accomplish this meeting sometime before April 4.

Turning to the splits in paragraph 9-a of the March 13 draft, the Bureau of the Budget graciously agreed to eliminate its double-starred proposal. The Budget's alternative proposal had been that the U.S. should now introduce as many [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] as the armistice would permit and later—when publishable evidence was at hand—proceed to introduce the balance of the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. It was felt that this proposal would fuzz-up the very clear and serious split in the paper and might seem to permit under its first clause going ahead with the ROK reduction in active divisions and jet plane substitution (contrary to the package deal). I understand that State and JCS will present a list for use by me at the NSC meeting of those [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] which under a liberal interpretation of the armistice can now be introduced without awaiting a determination as to publishable evi-

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4General Francis W. Farrell, Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for National Security Council Affairs.
dence and those [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] which State believes should not be introduced until the publishable evidence is determined.

Robert Cutler

^5Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

207. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the Secretary of State^1


SUBJECT

U.S. Policy toward Korea

REFERENCES

A. Annex A to NSC 170/1^2
B. Memo for Addressees from Executive Secretary, NSC, subject: "U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea", dated February 18, 1955^3
C. NSC 5702/1^4

The enclosed Annex F to NSC 5702/1, which incorporates the revisions made in Annex A to NSC 170/1, as transmitted by the reference memorandum of February 18, 1955, is transmitted herewith for use in considering NSC 5702/1.

This Annex is being disseminated only to the addressees above, and it is requested that special security precautions be observed in the handling of this Annex and that access to it be very strictly limited on an absolute need-to-know basis.

James S. Lay, Jr.^5

^1Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, Korea, US Policy Toward (NSC 5702, 5702/1, 5702/2). Top Secret; Eyes Only. Also sent to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

^2See footnote 2, Document 4.

^3Document 21.

^4Not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5702 Series) For text of the policy statement as adopted, see Document 240.

^5Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
ANNEX F

(Reference: Paragraph 22 of NSC 5702/1, "U.S. Policy toward Korea")

In anticipation of the possibility that President Rhee may order the renewal of hostilities in Korea by an attack on Communist forces in or north of the demilitarized zone despite all actions taken by the United States and the UNC, the United States should take all possible measures, both overt and covert:

a. To secure prompt warning of any decision by Rhee to order ROK forces to attack;
   b. To prevent the issuance of any such order, if decided on, or its receipt by ROK military commanders in the field;
   c. To reduce the likelihood that ROK field commanders would carry out such an order if received; and
   d. To select and encourage covertly the development of new South Korean leadership prepared to cooperate in maintaining the armistice, and if Rhee initiates or is about to initiate unilateral action, assist such new leadership to assume power, by means not involving overt U.S. participation until and unless U.S. overt support is necessary and promises to be decisive in firmly establishing such new leadership.

6Top Secret; Eyes Only.
7Paragraph 22 of NSC 5702/1 reads: "In anticipation of the possibility that President Rhee may order the renewal of hostilities by an attack on Communist forces in or north of the Demilitarized Zone, despite all the actions taken by the United States under the preceding paragraph, the United States should take the measures stated in Annex F (not reproduced herein; to be circulated only to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence)."

208. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Counselor of the British Embassy (de la Mare) and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald), Department of State, Washington, March 29, 1957

SUBJECT
United Kingdom forces in Korea

1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/3–2957. Secret. Drafted by Parsons.
Mr. de la Mare came to the Department to deliver a diplomatic note informing the United States Government of the decision by the United Kingdom to withdraw its forces from the United Nations Command in Korea, except for a small liaison group, by October 1957. A copy of this note is attached. Mr. de la Mare pointed out that the Foreign Office had asked the Embassy to call particular attention to the fact that this decision was taken purely for economic reasons and is to be interpreted in no way as a diminution of United Kingdom support for the Republic of Korea or the objectives of the United Nations in working for a united, independent and democratic Korea.

Mr. de la Mare added that Canada, Australia and New Zealand had been informed of the decision. He did not know whether these three countries would follow the lead of the United Kingdom and remove their forces. He pointed out, however, that the forces of the three countries are so intimately tied in with the United Kingdom forces, it is doubtful that they can remain without the United Kingdom forces.

Mr. Sebald stated that what disturbs the United States with respect to this decision is that it could have a chain reaction and have repercussions on the entire United Nations operation in Korea. We are indeed sorry to see the United Kingdom unit pull out.

Mr. de la Mare alluded to the fact that the United Kingdom is reviewing its operations and its military strength for the entire area. In connection with this review, it had been pointed out that the troops which they have maintained in Korea are the most expensive, on a per capita basis, which the United Kingdom has in any part of the world.

Mr. de la Mare concluded the conversation by referring to the fact that the Republic of Korea has been urging the United Kingdom for some time to raise its Legation in Seoul to the status of an Embassy. The decision has now been made by the United Kingdom to exchange ambassadors with the Republic of Korea, if that is still the wish of the Koreans. Mr. de la Mare explained that the Korean Government will be informed of this decision at the same time the United Kingdom Chargé in Seoul passes on the information about the withdrawal of forces. It is the hope of the United Kingdom that

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2 Not printed.

3 Similar indications of intent to withdraw all, or virtually all, of their remaining military units from Korea were conveyed to the Department by the New Zealand Embassy on April 3, by the Australian Embassy on April 5, and by the Canadian Embassy on April 26. An April 3 memorandum by Parsons regarding the New Zealand decision is in Department of State, Central Files, 795.5/4–357. Memoranda by Nes, dated April 5 and April 26, regarding the Australian and Canadian decisions respectively, are ibid., 795.00.
this action will decrease the possible dissatisfaction by the Republic of Korea with the decision to reduce their forces.

209. Memorandum to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler)\(^1\)

*Washington, March 29, 1957.*

**SUBJECT**

New Equipment for U.S. Forces in Korea

1. In response to your letter of March 16, 1957\(^2\) we attach a list of proposed new equipment for U.S. Forces in Korea.

2. The Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that, in consonance with U.S. policy to provide U.S. Forces with a selective and flexible [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] capability, all items on the attached list should now be approved for the modernization of U.S. Forces in Korea. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

3. The Department of State believes that under a liberal interpretation of Article 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement we may replace obsolete and worn-out equipment with new items “as close in effectiveness and type as consistent with modern standards of production”. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Accordingly, the Department has been willing to approve all items on the attached list except two: the 280 mm “Atomic Cannon” and the 762 mm “Honest John” atomic rocket.

Robert R. Bowie\(^3\)
Assistant Secretary of State

Mansfield D. Sprague
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

F.W. Farrell
Lt. General, USA

Special Assistant to the JCS for NSC Affairs

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\(^1\)Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, Korea, US Policy Toward (NSC 5702, 5702/1, 5702/2). Secret. Drafted by Leonhart of S/P.

\(^2\)Reference is to Document 206.

\(^3\)Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures.
LIST OF NEW EQUIPMENT FOR U.S. FORCES IN KOREA

Air Force

All-weather fighters (F-86Ds) (F-102)
Tactical Bombers (B-57) (Jet)
Reconnaissance (RF 64F)
Jet Fighters F-100
Cargo Aircraft C-130

Army

280 mm gun
155 mm gun (Self-propelled) (M-53)
75 mm AA gun (Skysweeper with tractors) (May be deleted on the basis of obsolescence and possible replacement by other wpns at a date not yet determined.)
Twin 40 mm (M-42) (Antiaircraft)
Armored Personnel Carrier M-59
762 mm rocket (Honest John)
Nike-1
Recoilless Rifle, 106 mm (M-40)
Tractor M8A1
Helicopters H-21

4Secret.

210. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)


SUBJECT
U.S. Policy Toward Korea (NSC 5702/1)2 (C)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their comments and recommendations with respect to the subject draft statement of policy prepared by the NSC Planning Board. This paper is scheduled for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, 4 April 1957.

1Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5702 Series. Secret. Circulated to the NSC on April 2, under cover of a memorandum from Lay. (Ibid.)

2See footnote 4, Document 207.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the draft statement of policy on Korea, as modified below, is acceptable from a military point of view. Their comments on paragraphs 9, 19, and 23,\textsuperscript{8} in which diverse views are expressed, are set forth below. The basic issue underlying the diverse views is whether or not the United States should continue to accept the risk of adhering to paragraph 13d of the Korean Armistice Agreement in view of the evidence available of the increased combat capability of Communist forces in Korea, attained through violation of this agreement.


Reason: (1) The ability of U.S. forces to attain the objectives set forth in paragraph 2d\textsuperscript{4} of the draft statement of policy is predicated upon the modernization of U.S. forces in Korea, including equipping them with dual conventional-nuclear weapons. This is provided for in Alternative B of the Evaluation of Alternative Military Programs for Korea (NSC 5702).\textsuperscript{5} NSC Action 1660 (b)\textsuperscript{6} directed the preparation of a new statement of policy on Korea incorporating a military program for United States and ROK forces based upon the adoption of Alternative B noted above.

(2) The combat capability of Communist forces in Korea has been substantively increased, since the signing of the Armistice in 1953, primarily through the introduction of additional artillery weapons and high performance aircraft, in violation of paragraph 13d of the Korean Armistice Agreement. Evidence of these violations was forwarded to you in a memorandum, dated 1 March 1957.\textsuperscript{7}

b. Paragraph 9a, page 4, last sentence. Recommend deletion of entire sentence.

Reason: In their memorandum to you, dated 6 February 1957,\textsuperscript{8} the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated the requirement for the [1 line of source text not declassified].

c. Paragraph 23, page 12, first sentence. Recommend deletion of bracketed word.

\textsuperscript{3}See footnotes 3, 5, and 11, Document 205.
\textsuperscript{4}Paragraph 2d of NSC 5702/1 stated, as a policy objective, that the United States should assist the Republic of Korea to make a contribution to “free world” strength in the Pacific by “maintaining ROK forces capable of assuring internal security, and, together with U.S. forces in Korea, capable of (1) deterring or successfully resisting aggression from the North Korean forces alone, and (2) deterring aggression by North Korean forces and Chinese Communist forces now estimated to be in North Korea, or, with limited U.S. outside support, conducting a successful holding operation against such forces.”
\textsuperscript{5}Document 196.
\textsuperscript{6}See footnote 11, Document 201.
\textsuperscript{7}Footnote [3-1/2 lines of text] not declassified.
\textsuperscript{8}Footnote [7-1/2 lines of text] not declassified.
Reason: To provide positive and timely guidance to military commanders concerned prior to initiation of hostilities.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that, subject to the foregoing, you concur in the adoption of the new statement of policy on Korea.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Arthur Radford⁹
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

⁹Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

211. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 2, 1957.

SUBJECT

Statement of Policy on Korea (NSC 5702/1)

The National Security Council, having considered alternative military programs for Korea [NSC 5702 (Tab C)]² on January 31, 1957, directed that a new statement of policy on Korea be prepared to supersede NSC 5514 (Tab D) and to be based on the initial adoption of Alternative B in NSC 5702 with planning for gradual further reductions in ROK forces in the longer range [NSC Action 1660 (Tab B)].³

The new statement, NSC 5702/1 (Tab A), which the NSC will consider on April 4, 1957, calls for no major changes in the objectives and courses of action enumerated in NSC 5514, but brings into sharp focus in the bracketed portions of paragraphs 9(a)⁴ and 19(a) and (b)⁵ the present split between State on the one hand and the JCS,
Defense, Treasury, and the Bureau of the Budget on the other [1 line of source text not declassified].

FE, EUR, IO, and L are convinced that, particularly in view of the clear provisions of Article 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement and of our assurances to the Sixteen and to the UN as recently as last summer that we would continue to abide by its terms, it would be disastrous to our position with our Allies and in the UN were we to proceed [2 lines of source text not declassified]. We have, therefore, during Planning Board discussion of the Korean paper endeavored to assure the inclusion of what we consider essential safeguards [7-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] and the bearing such action will have on other aspects of U.S. policy, not only in Korea but towards our Allies and in the UN.

FE, EUR, IO, and L do not feel, therefore, that the Department can agree to a Korean paper which excludes the safeguards provided in the bracketed portions of paragraphs 9(a) and 19(a) and (b).

With respect to the bracketed word “consider” in the introductory sentence of paragraph 23, FE’s intention was to make it clear that should ROK forces, despite our admonitions (paragraph 21) and actions (paragraph 22), “march north,” we would not necessarily and automatically initiate actions whose end result might very possibly be of great and perhaps decisive assistance to the Communists through the abandonment of 22 million people. We have in mind, of course, a situation comparable to the Hungarian revolt wherein the ROK moved as a result of a massive uprising by the north Koreans against the Communist regime. Perhaps this could be further clarified by the insertion before “consider” of “in the light of the situation then pertaining in Korea.”

Recommendations:

1. That you require the inclusion in the paper of the bracketed portions of paragraphs 9(a) and 19(a) and (b).

2. That you suggest the amplification of “consider” in paragraph 23 by inserting “in the light of the situation then pertaining in Korea.”

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6 See footnote 11, Document 205.
7 Paragraph 21 of NSC 5702/1 called for the United States to seek to ensure that the Republic of Korea did not unilaterally renew hostilities in Korea by making it clear that United Command forces would not support such an action, and that U.S. logistical and economic support would cease in such an event.
8 See footnote 7, Document 207.
212. Memorandum of Discussion at the 318th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 4, 1957

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1–3.]

4. U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea (NSC 5514; Progress Report, dated March 6, 1957, by OCB on NSC 55142)

Mr. Cutler briefly summarized the highlights of the Progress Report on the subject, and suggested that the Council consider them in connection with the next item on the agenda.

The National Security Council.3

Noted the reference Progress Report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board.

5. U.S. Policy Toward Korea (NSC 5514; NSC 5610; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea”, dated October 12 and November 6, 1956; NSC Actions Nos. 1624 and 1660; NSC 5702; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Evaluation of Alternative Military Programs for Korea”, dated January 30, 19574; Progress Report, dated March 6, 1957, by OCB on NSC 55145; NSC 5702/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Policy Toward Korea”, dated April 2, 19576)

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council at some length on the contents of NSC 5702/1, emphasizing the differing views of the Departments of State and Defense with respect to the introduction of certain dual conventional-nuclear weapons in connection with the modernization of U.S. forces in Korea. He pointed out that the difference in view was most apparent in paragraph 19-b of NSC 5702/1, reading as follows:

“[b. The timing of the introduction of dual conventional nuclear weapons under paragraph 9-a shall be decided upon by the Secretaries of State and Defense, in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, only after they shall have determined that publishable evidence establishes Communist violations sufficient to warrant such action by the United States.]”

“State proposal.”

1Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on April 5.
2See Document 204.
3The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1694, approved by the President on April 5. (Department of State, S/S—NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
4See footnote 1, Document 199.
6Brackets in the source text.
(A copy of Mr. Cutler’s briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

At the conclusion of his briefing, Mr. Cutler called on Secretary Dulles. Secretary Dulles stated that he had long been quite sympathetic to the point of view of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to modernizing the U.S. forces in Korea by the introduction of new weapons, including some which had dual conventional-nuclear capabilities. Indeed, he said, he had already gone a long way toward meeting these views. Reluctantly, however, he had been forced to conclude that he could not go all the way desired by the military, because he believed that if we introduced the two disputed items (280 mm guns and 762 mm rockets), the political disadvantages of such a course of action would be greater, in his mind, than the military advantages. (At this point Mr. Cutler distributed to the members of the Council a “List of New Weapons for U.S. Forces in Korea”,7 copy of which is filed in the minutes of the meeting.) Secretary Dulles went on to state that there was no doubt that the Communists had substantially violated the terms of the Armistice in introducing new weapons into North Korea. Secretary Dulles said he had gone over all of the available evidence, both the classified evidence which, of course, could not be publicly revealed, and the unclassified evidence, which could be. The sum total of all this evidence did not, however, in Secretary Dulles’ view, actually prove and demonstrate violations of the Armistice by the Communists of the magnitude which we in this country believe has actually occurred. He repeated that he did not doubt that these violations had been on a very large scale, even if the United States was not in a position to demonstrate this fact to the world. On the other hand, continued Secretary Dulles, there was no evidence of the Communist introduction of weapons with atomic capabilities into North Korea, and he personally doubted that this had happened, because he thought it very unlikely that the Soviets would entrust atomic weapons to the Communist Chinese or to the North Korean armed forces.

Secretary Dulles thought it was also germane that most of the evidence that we have of Communist violations of the Armistice had been obtained prior to August 1956, when the activities of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission had been curtailed. At the time that we succeeded in curtailing these NNSC activities, we had informed the United Nations that this was the only alteration in the Armistice Agreement that the United States was seeking, and that we

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7Presumably the list attached to Document 209.
proposed to adhere to all the remaining portions of that Agreement. In sum, not only was the publishable evidence of Communist violations rather meager, but also, in a sense, the United States was stumped from making use of the evidence, since we had informed the UN last August that we sought no other changes in the Armistice terms beyond the change relative to the NNSC teams.

Secretary Dulles then pointed out the feeling of the State Department that the introduction of the 280 mm guns and the Honest John 762 mm rockets, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would cause serious repercussions around the world. Most of our friends and allies would feel that the United States had violated its own solemn agreement to observe the Armistice terms. Likewise, we should become a focal point for a tremendous Soviet propaganda campaign. The effect on our friends and allies would be considerable. In support of this thesis, Secretary Dulles revealed that he had last December mentioned to Macmillan that the United States was proposing to modernize its forces in South Korea. The Prime Minister, whom Secretary Dulles described as a pretty hard-headed man, expressed himself as strongly in favor of the modernization of U.S. forces, [2 lines of source text not declassified].

Secretary Dulles also pointed out the serious effect of such a course of action on the announced willingness of the sixteen nations to join with us again to resist aggression in Korea in case the Communists resumed hostilities. Secretary Dulles thought that this was an important commitment on the part of the sixteen allied nations in Korea, and that we should do everything we could to keep the commitment alive. The proposed course of action also was certain to stir up serious repercussions in Japan. Secretary Dulles therefore asked the question whether it was really worthwhile to be regarded by our friends and allies as violators of a solemn international agreement simply in order to get these two particular weapons in the hands of our forces in Korea. After all, there was a considerable list of other new weapons which would go far to modernize U.S. forces in Korea despite the absence of the 280 mm gun and the Honest John rocket. To add these last two items, Secretary Dulles repeated, would bring us to the point where the situation was positively disadvantageous, [4 lines of source text not declassified]. In this contingency, Rhee might well use the violation of the Armistice Agreement as a pretext for launching his much-desired march into North Korea. All these were the reasons which explained the State Department position.

At the conclusion of Secretary Dulles' remarks, Mr. Cutler called on the Acting Secretary of Defense, but Secretary Robertson\(^8\) requested that Admiral Radford be invited to speak first.

\(^8\)Acting Secretary of Defense Reuben B. Robertson.
Admiral Radford said that he first wished to say that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been very concerned about the violations of the Armistice terms by the Communists and the need for U.S. countermeasures, and had been pressing ever since 1954 for some sort of solution. Indeed, the matter had been discussed several times with the representatives of the sixteen nations, and Admiral Radford said that he personally had made two presentations to these representatives. He had come away on both occasions with a strong belief that the representatives of the sixteen nations were absolutely content with the status quo in Korea, and were in no way moved by his presentation of the actualities. Admiral Radford explained this attitude of satisfaction as a result of the fact that there was no pressure on the military forces of these allied nations because there were practically no forces left in Korea except those of the ROK and of the United States. In any event, Admiral Radford doubted very much that the sixteen-nation agreement mentioned earlier by Secretary Dulles was of any great military significance, though perhaps it had political value. He reasoned here that if fighting were resumed by the Communists in Korea, the United States would have to bear most of the brunt.

With particular respect to paragraph 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement, Admiral Radford pointed out that it was so strictly worded that the United States would get into just as much hot water if it introduced the other new weapons proposed for the U.S. forces in Korea as it would if the 280 mm guns and the Honest John rockets were also included. That is, if we were going to meet difficulty in introducing any new equipment into Korea for our forces, we might just as well go the whole hog and introduce the entire list, including the two disputed items.

Admiral Radford said that the Joint Chiefs also felt that as far as the military people around the world were concerned, there was general agreement that the Communists had not observed the Armistice. Indeed, their violations had been of an extreme type, even though Admiral Radford agreed with Secretary Dulles in doubting that the Communists had introduced atomic weapons into North Korea. There was no particular reason why they should at this time, because Soviet planes capable of carrying atomic bombs could be got very quickly to the Yalu River in the event that they were needed. In summary, Admiral Radford stated that the Joint Chiefs believed that from the military point of view anything short of the total proposal submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the package deal in South Korea, would be inadequate to meet a surprise attack by the Communists on South Korea.

Secretary Robertson observed that in addition to the strong views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as stated by Admiral Radford, he
would like to add another consideration—namely, one from the domestic political point of view. First, however, he pointed out that the Defense Department did not share the apparent view of the Department of State that once we had secured the removal of the NNSC teams the United States would seek no further change in the Armistice Agreement and in particular with respect to paragraph 13(d) of these terms. Returning to his initial point, Secretary Robertson indicated that a number of prominent members of Congress, as well as distinguished citizens like Dr. John Hannah,9 had recently been to Korea and had come back with very strong views about the inadequacy of our defenses. Secretary Robertson warned that as a result the Administration would be exposed to very difficult questions as to why it was not affording our troops in Korea the maximum possible protection.

Mr. Cutler observed that the discussion up to this point had made very clear the breadth of the disagreement between State and Defense. It appeared to him that the Joint Chiefs' attitude on the modernization of U.S. forces was, so to speak, an all-or-nothing attitude. Admiral Radford confirmed Mr. Cutler's impression.

Secretary Dulles replied to the views earlier expressed by Admiral Radford and Secretary Robertson by repeating his belief that if we proceeded to modernize our forces with all the weapons suggested except the 280 mm gun and the Honest John rocket, such a course of action would not constitute a breach of the Armistice Agreement, but could be regarded rather as an interpretation of paragraph 13(d). With respect to the problem of Congressional criticism, Secretary Dulles believed that we could point out to our critics that we were using a whole lot of new weapons to modernize our forces apart from the two types which we were presently withholding.

At this point the President inquired whether at any time in the history of the United States this country had deliberately broken the terms of an international agreement. Turning to Admiral Radford, the President observed that the Admiral appeared to be carrying matters to extremes when he stated that paragraph 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement made it possible for the United States to send in a new type of weapon, such as a jet aircraft with nuclear capabilities, as a replacement for a weapon that was no longer in production in the United States. Such a course of action did not appear to the President as a violation of the Armistice Agreement.

Admiral Radford replied that weapons like the 280 mm guns, which were primarily defensive in character, were really more important to our forces in Korea than was the stationing of squadrons of

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9John A. Hannah, President of Michigan State University and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel, 1953–1954.
atomic capable jet aircraft in South Korea. In point of fact, the Defense Department was not contemplating the permanent stationing of squadrons of jet-atomic aircraft in Korea, but instead wished to rotate squadrons to South Korea from Japan and elsewhere in order to provide familiarity with the terrain. In any event, he repeated that weapons like the 280 mm guns would be vital to the defense of cities like Seoul which were close to the North Korean border.

Thereafter, Mr. Cutler directed the Council's attention to paragraph 19, as quoted above, and said that this seemed to put the question to the President in clear terms. Mr. Cutler pointed out that the arrangements for the new military program in Korea constituted essentially a package deal. The active divisions of the ROK Army were to be reduced in phase with the modernization of U.S. forces in Korea. It seemed to Mr. Cutler to be the view of the Defense Department that it would be undesirable to go forward with a portion of the U.S. modernization program unless the program was complete and included the 280 mm guns and the Honest John rockets. Also, Defense presumably doubted the willingness of the ROK to reduce the number of active divisions unless these two important items were included in the U.S. modernization program.

Admiral Radford commented that the two disputed items seemed more important to the Department of Defense than all the rest put together, and he doubted very much whether the South Koreans could be brought to agree to reduce their active divisions unless the U.S. modernization program included these two items.

The President stated that of course it was the responsibility of the Department of State to gauge the political effects of a military course of action. He tended to agree, he said, with Secretary Dulles that this particular moment, [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. However, the President did speculate as to whether, if the 280 mm guns and the Honest John rockets were introduced along with other weapons, the fact of their introduction would ever be observed by the Communists or the Armistice Commission. Admiral Radford pointed out at once that it was necessary to report each item of replacement, which was why he had felt that some of the military items which the State Department had felt it would be appropriate to introduce would leave the impression of being as great a violation as the two items questioned by the State Department.

Secretary Dulles observed that public reactions are not always based on the pure logic of the situation. Whatever the logic, the fact was that we would get a hell of a repercussion around the world if we gave our forces the 280 mm gun and the Honest John rocket. He again repeated that he had made every effort to accommodate himself to the position of the Department of Defense. In fact, in the course of his briefings in the State Department in preparation for this
meeting, he had argued vigorously in favor of the Defense Department position, but in the last analysis he had failed to convince himself that these two items should be included.

Secretary Robertson inquired of Secretary Dulles what further evidence the latter thought would be required in order to convince our friends and allies of the large-scale Communist violation of the Armistice terms. Secretary Dulles doubted if any further evidence would so convince them, and repeated that the State Department was still firmly of the opinion that the changes in the weapons for our forces in Korea should be made as an interpretation of the terms of the Armistice rather than being based on a breach of the Armistice terms. Perhaps it was true that we could not induce Rhee to approve our package military programs and reduce his active divisions unless these two disputed weapons were included. This, however, was no reason to go along with Rhee, because essentially Rhee wanted to see the Armistice Agreement completely destroyed. Secretary Dulles added that the position he was taking today on this dispute was not to be interpreted to indicate that we could not, perhaps in a year or two, find it possible to add the 280 mm guns and the Honest John rockets to our modernization program for the U.S. forces in Korea.

Mr. Cutler turned to the President and said that the President seemed to agree with the Secretary of State. The President replied in the affirmative, [5 lines of source text not declassified]. There was a job of education to be done, and he accordingly doubted the wisdom of agreeing with the proposed action of the Department of Defense. He therefore suggested that Council action on this paper be held in abeyance until we could talk this issue over with some of our reliable allies, particularly our NATO allies. Admiral Radford pointed out to the President [2 lines of source text not declassified]. The President replied that even so, we still needed our alliances, and we must therefore move cautiously. It would be better if Secretary Dulles and Mr. Allen Dulles and Admiral Radford discussed this matter with the Standing Group of NATO.\textsuperscript{10}

Admiral Radford repeated his view that the publicly available facts on Communist violations of paragraph 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement were just as effective [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. He said, however, that there was a meeting of the Military Committee of NATO next Saturday,\textsuperscript{11} and an approach to the problem might be made at that time. Secretary Dulles added that he would feel much more secure if even one solid ally like Great Britain could

\textsuperscript{10}The Standing Group of NATO consisted of the United States, United Kingdom, and France. The Standing Group was the executive agency for NATO, responsible for strategic guidance in areas in which NATO forces operated.

\textsuperscript{11}April 6.
be brought to see this matter as we saw it and agree on the wisdom of introducing the 280 mm gun and the Honest John rocket.

The National Security Council: 12

a. Noted and discussed the draft statement on policy on the subject contained in NSC 5702/1, prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 1660–b; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of April 2, 1957.

b. Deferred action on NSC 5702/1 pending consultation with selected allies (particularly NATO allies) by the Departments of State and Defense.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for appropriate action.

6. Reimbursement for U.S. Logistic Support of Other UN Forces in Korea (NSC Action No. 858 13)

The National Security Council: 14

Noted and concurred in the view that the request for legislation required to carry out the policy on the subject in the reference NSC Action, should be postponed until the next session of Congress.

S. Everett Gleason

12Paragraphs a–b and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 1695, approved by President Eisenhower on April 4. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)


14The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1696, approved by President Eisenhower on April 8. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

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213. Record of a Meeting, Department of State, Washington, April 23, 1957, 3:30 p.m. 1

SUBJECT

Modernization of United States Forces in Korea

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/4-2357. Secret. Drafted on April 25 by Nes and initialed as accurate by Robertson.
PARTICIPANTS

Embassies
United Kingdom—
Sir Harold Caccia, Ambassador
Mr. A. J. de la Mare, Counselor
Admiral Sir Michael Denny, UK Representative of UK Chiefs of Staff, B.J.S.M.
Brigadier H. M. Liardet, Chief of Staff and Deputy Head of Mission, British
Army Staff, B.J.S.M.
Group Captain J. R. Wilson, UK-U.S. Planning Liaison Officer, B.J.S.M.
Canada—
Mr. J. R. Maybee, First Secretary
Major General H. A. Sparling, Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff
New Zealand—
Sir Leslie Munro, Ambassador
Mr. G. D. L. White, Counselor
Air Commodore T. F. Gill, Armed Forces Attaché
Lieutenant Colonel J. A. Poutney, Assistant Armed Forces Attaché
Australia—
Mr. M. R. Booker, Counselor
Mr. J. R. Rowland, First Secretary
Lieutenant Colonel R. A. Hay, Military Attaché
State
Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
Ambassador Walter C. Dowling
Colonel John M. Raymond, Acting Legal Adviser
Mr. William Leonhart, NSC Planning Board Assistant, S/P
Mr. John W. Hanes, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary, IO
Mr. William T. Nunley, United Nations Adviser, EUR
Mr. Howard L. Parsons, Director, NA
Mr. David G. Nes, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs, NA
Defense
Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Mr. Mansfield D. Sprague, Assistant Secretary, OSD/ISA

Mr. Robertson explained the problem facing the United States Government with respect to its forces in Korea along the lines of the attached talking paper2 stressing that the Communist side from the beginning had had no intention of abiding by the terms of the Korean Armistice Agreement. With respect to Korea the Communists' intention was to saddle the United Nations Command (UNC) with an agreement designed to hold their forces static while providing their own forces an umbrella for a military buildup. The result of the subsequent deliberate evasions of the Armistice terms had been the creation of a situation whereby there was now greater Communist military strength in north Korea than at the time of the signature of the Armistice and, consequently, a weaker position for the UNC Allies at any future conference table.

Admiral Radford, assisted by charts and photographs, then re-

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2Not printed.
viewed in some detail the various ways in which the Communists had evaded or violated the Armistice terms. He referred specifically to the frustrations met by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC), the failure of the Communists to report their equipment introductions, the rebuilding of destroyed airfields, and the introduction of a modern airforce as evidenced by photographs, radar tracks, Communist admissions, and the reports of defectors. The Admiral mentioned the growing pressure of the American public, press, and Congress against the continuation of a policy which placed American troops in grave jeopardy in Korea. He said there was no doubt in his mind or on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or military leaders in the field but that the United States must either modernize its forces in Korea or face the consequences of disastrous military defeat there. Admiral Radford then reviewed a list of weapons which the Joint Chiefs of Staff desired to authorize CINCUNC to introduce.

In concluding the United States’ presentation, Mr. Robertson said that the military problem was obvious and that he fully recognized that there was also a most difficult political problem on which he desired the best advice and counsel of the governments represented at the meeting.

A discussion led by Ambassadors Caccia and Munro then ensued. The principal point around which the remarks of the four Embassy representatives concentrated was the need to have, more specifically, the United States plan both as to the timing and as to the presentation to world opinion of the action contemplated. Ambassador Caccia referred to the recent talks in Washington with the British Defense Minister and repeated the British attitude at that time that the United Kingdom would approach the problem in the spirit of obtaining an equitable and sensible result. In brief, what were the best arguments to employ to win the battle? Should the UNC take the initiative with a public statement or a letter to the United Nations Secretary General, or should it say nothing and await the inevitable Communist challenge? Ambassador Caccia then pointed out that the methods and timing proposed would have a very material bearing on the position which his Government would take.

Ambassador Munro agreed that some knowledge of the timing and methods contemplated was essential in order to obtain his Government’s position. For example, whereas Admiral Radford had produced charts to demonstrate Communist violations, how could these be proved to the satisfaction of world public opinion at large? In re-

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9Attached but not printed; the list is identical to the attachment to Document 209.
sponse to Ambassador Caccia's inquiry, Admiral Radford said that some of the material he had used could be made public.

When Mr. Robertson repeated that the objective of the meeting was to present the problem and to solicit any ideas the Commonwealth representatives might have as to how to proceed, Ambassador Caccia asked whether the use of a liberal interpretation of Article 13(d) in order to maintain the military balance had been discarded. Mr. Robertson confirmed that it had not, and expressed the view that two methods were worthy of consideration, namely, a liberal interpretation of Article 13(d) or its suspension. There were advantages and disadvantages to both.

Ambassador Munro, expressing his personal view, said he thought surely there must be some way whereby one side to an agreement, following a breach of part of the agreement by the other party, would have some recourse without nullifying the agreement as a whole. Specifically, he was certain his Government would wish to know when the United States intended to introduce the new equipment and in what quantities. He was particularly fearful as to the timing. Were the action to be deferred until just prior to the September United Nations General Assembly, he felt that the United States would be in for serious trouble. Mr. Booker agreed that were the action taken just prior to or during the General Assembly, it would have undesirable consequences. He said his Government, too, would wish to know more specifically the United States' plans for proceeding. Mr. Maybee agreed that this would also be the case with the Canadian Government. It would wish to know, for example, what was envisaged for the NNSC.

Ambassador Caccia then asked Admiral Radford whether in the latter's opinion the action contemplated might not provide the Communist side a pretext for abandoning the Armistice and renewing hostilities. Admiral Radford replied "definitely not," and said that on the contrary a continuation of weakness would encourage a Communist attack.

Ambassador Munro stressed again the necessity of coming up with a definite date as to timing and, in response to Mr. Sprague's request for clarification, pointed out that were the UNC to proceed with a "fait accompli" there would at least be time for feelings to quiet down before the September General Assembly. Were the action to be taken then, the reaction might be undesirable.

Mr. Booker asked whether the idea of proceeding surreptitiously had been ruled out and Mr. Robertson replied that nothing had been ruled out but that in his personal view he felt that the action should be taken honestly and above board. Mr. Booker said that his Government was committed to this course.

The meeting closed with agreement that the views of the Gov-
ernments concerned would be obtained on the method of introducing modern weapons and that, meanwhile, the United States Government would begin preparation of a specific plan as to the timing and method of presentation for further discussion.

214. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Ockey) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)\(^1\)

*Washington, April 30, 1957.*

**SUBJECT**

Modernization of United States Forces in Korea

At the request of the Commonwealth representatives at the April 23, 1957 meeting,\(^2\) we undertook to prepare for their further consideration a specific plan as to the timing and method of presenting the introduction of new weapons into Korea. The State and Defense lawyers were subsequently asked to recommend the best legal rationale for our action.

NA believes that the action contemplated is fully justified legally and morally and can best be implemented and defended if we take the initiative and proceed in a perfectly open and above-board manner. I believe this is also in accord with your views.

NA, in consultation with IO and S/P, therefore, suggests the following course of action.

1. No later than June 1, 1957, the Senior United Nations Command Representative in the Military Armistice Commission will make a statement at Panmunjom to include these points:

   a. Communist weapon introductions and failure to report accurately to the NNSC or to permit inspection by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams has constituted flagrant violation of Article 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement.

   b. In contrast, the performance of the UNC has been in strict conformity with Article 13(d).

   c. Due to the passage of time it is now impossible for the UNC to replace its worn-out equipment with items of the same effectiveness and type, such items no longer being in production or available.

   d. In consequence of a, b, and c, the military balance which the Armistice was designed to preserve is being upset in favor of the Communist side.

   e. The UNC intends to continue to adhere to the Armistice and desires to preserve the military balance it was designed to assure.

\(^1\)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/4–3057. Secret. Drafted by Nes and cleared in draft with EUR, IO, S/P, and FE.

\(^2\)See supra.
f. As one party to a contract, some of the provisions of which the other party has violated, the UNC has a legal and moral right to redress with respect to these provisions.

g. (Based on a legal rationale now being worked out by the State–Defense lawyers.) The UNC intends, therefore, to begin the introduction of certain new items of equipment.

2. Simultaneous to the MAC statement, a joint State–Defense statement based on it would be issued in Washington.

3. As soon thereafter as possible, the Republic of Korea should announce the inactivation of four divisions.

4. No later than July 1, 1957, the Unified Command would transmit a full report of the action taken and reasons behind it to the United Nations Secretary General.

IO, in particular, feels that it is essential that the action be taken, announced, and reported to the United Nations at least two full months prior to the next United Nations General Assembly now scheduled for September. Alternatively, it should be deferred until after the General Assembly.

Another important element in the timing is the desirability of our being prepared to present President Rhee prior to General Lemnitzer’s departure July 1, 1957, with a military package involving a four-division reduction in his ground forces counterbalanced by a jet wing increase in his air strength and supported also by the announcement of the decision to provide U.S. forces with increased air power through new weapons.

If you concur in the above plan, NA, in cooperation with L and IO, will prepare a Military Armistice Commission statement which we can propose to our Allies along with the timing arrangements outlined above.

Recommendation:

That you approve the course of action outlined.4

4Robertson initialed his approval of the recommendation, adding that his approval was “subject to approval by L and Defense.”

215. Editorial Note

At a press conference on May 14, Secretary of State Dulles indicated that the United States was considering the introduction of “more modern, more effective” weapons into the Republic of Korea. Secretary of Defense Wilson amplified those remarks later in the day
by indicating that these new weapons might include "dual capability" weapons such as guided missiles. The statements by Dulles and Wilson received prominent coverage in the South Korean press, and President Rhee praised the U.S. decision to modernize its arsenal in South Korea as a "bold stroke" against the Communists.

On May 15, Minister of National Defense Kim Yong-woo wrote to Secretary Dulles to express "extreme pleasure" over the United States decision to send nuclear-capable weapons to Korea. "I sincerely congratulate you," he wrote, "on your sound and timely decision to bring up-to-date the fifth largest army in the entire world."

The transcript of Dulles’ press conference on May 14 is printed in Department of State Bulletin, June 3, 1957, pages 894–901. Wilson’s statement on May 14 and Rhee’s statement on May 17 were reported in The New York Times, May 15 and May 18, respectively. A copy of Kim Yong-woo’s May 15 letter to Dulles is in Department of State, NA Files: Lot 59 D 407, Problems of Para 13d of Armistice Agreement 1957.

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216. Record of a Meeting, Department of State, Washington, May 16, 1957¹

SUBJECT

Modernization of United States Forces in Korea

PARTICIPANTS

Embassies
United Kingdom—
Sir Harold Caccia, Ambassador
Mr. A.J. de la Mare, Counselor
Canada—
Mr. S.F. Rae, Minister
Mr. J.R. Maybee, First Secretary
Australia—
Sir Percy Spender, Ambassador
Mr. M.R. Booker, Counselor
New Zealand—
Sir Leslie Munro, Ambassador
Mr. G.D.L. White, Counselor
Mr. N.V. Lough, First Secretary

State
Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/5-1657. Secret. Drafted by Nes.
Colonel John M. Raymond, Acting Legal Adviser
Mr. William Leonhart, NSC Planning Board Assistant, S/P
Mr. John W. Hanes, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary, IO
Miss Elizabeth A. Brown, IO
Mr. John W. Jones, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
Mr. William T. Nunley, United Nations Adviser, EUR
Mr. Howard L. Parsons, Director, NA
Mr. David G. Nes, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs, NA

Defense
General Nathan F. Twining, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Mr. Mansfield B. Sprague, Assistant Secretary, OSD/ISA
Mr. Robert Deckert, General Counsel
Captain W. C. Mott

Mr. Robertson, referring to the previous meeting on this subject, April 23, 1957, during which the problem of modernization had been presented, said that he now wished to propose for consideration an outline plan as to the timing and presentation should it be decided to introduce new weapons into Korea. Such a plan had been requested by the Commonwealth representatives at the last meeting. Mr. Robertson then read from a talking paper (copy attached).

Ambassador Caccia opened the discussion of the proposed plan by saying that as the Department knew, the British Government viewed the problem sympathetically, and wished to be as helpful as possible. According to all indications, the British Government would be able to go along with the procedure suggested but would hope that the following points could be met:

1. In any public presentation, detailed material should be presented to substantiate a charge of Communist violation of paragraph 13(d) of the Armistice.
2. The United Nations Command should make it clear that it had no intention of denouncing the Armistice as a whole.
3. With respect to timing the United Nations should be informed by an official report as soon after the Military Armistice Commission announcement as possible and the full Sixteen should be informed of

see Document 213.

Not printed. According to the talking paper, Robertson explained that the Senior U.N. Command Representative in the Military Armistice Commission would make a statement at Panmunjom, no later than July 1, in which he would review Communist violations of the Armistice Agreement and draw the conclusion that, in view of Communist violations of paragraph 13d, the U.N. Command considered that it was entitled to be relieved of corresponding obligations under the Armistice until the relative military balance was restored and the Communist side had demonstrated a willingness to comply with the provisions of the Armistice. To restore the military balance, the U.N. Command intended to replace existing weapons with new weapons currently available. In so doing, however, the UNC did not intend to start an arms race, would deploy new weapons only for defensive purposes, and intended to observe all provisions of the Armistice Agreement other than those from which it was relieved by Communist violations of the agreement. The Unified Command would transmit a full report on the action to the United Nations no later than August 1.
the action contemplated before the announcement, as should the Swedes and Swiss.

Mr. Robertson expressed the view that each of these points was, in fact, covered in the plan outlined or paralleled the Department’s ideas as to the proper procedure to be followed. The Department planned to consult France, Turkey, and Thailand and to notify the full Sixteen, together with the Swiss and Swedes, of the decision and plans for implementation prior to any public announcement.

Ambassador Munro said he was in substantial agreement with Ambassador Caccia’s remarks but, in particular, desired express assurances that the ROK forces would not be given any dual-capable weapons. He, furthermore, would not like any impression given that the idea was to match Communist violations. With respect to the language of the draft plan, he did not like characterizing the Communist violations as “striking at the very heart of the Agreement.” This made it appear that the ultimate intention was to abrogate the Armistice as a whole. He would hope also that the report to the United Nations could be transmitted much earlier than August 1. With respect to notifying the other Allies, Ambassador Munro pointed out the difficulty of differentiating between Allies. In conclusion, he asked whether the U.S. was thinking of a simultaneous reduction in ROK forces.

Responding to Ambassador Munro’s points, Mr. Robertson assured him that no consideration was being given to atomic weapons for the ROK forces. We were thinking in terms of a reduction of ROK forces which was one of the purposes of providing U.S. forces with new weapons. Reaching agreement with the ROK might take some time, however. At this point, Mr. Sprague said that it was the hope of Defense to begin negotiation with the ROK immediately following the Military Armistice Commission announcement with a view to reducing their forces, but that agreement would take time. Continuing in reply to Ambassador Munro Mr. Robertson, referring to more extensive consultation with the Allies, said that he wished to make it clear that the U.S. had no intention of submitting the issue to the United Nations for permission to go ahead, thus enabling a veto by those who have no stake in Korea.

Ambassador Spender voiced general agreement with the proposed plan. Pointing out that in 1953 the Armistice Agreement was designed to freeze the status quo, he suggested that this be so stated rather than relying solely on the idea of “preserving the military balance.” With respect to the final paragraph of the proposed Military Armistice Commission statement, he questioned the language used since it seemed to imply much wider suspensions of obligations than merely under paragraph 13(d). Supporting Ambassador Caccia, Am-
bassador Spender said that this was essentially an exercise in public relations and that it was extremely important to prove the breach. Finally, Australia could never countenance giving dual-purpose weapons to the ROK forces. In response to Ambassador Spender, Mr. Robertson said that, subject to approval by the lawyers, he was perfectly agreeable to a change of language suggested for the final paragraph of the proposed Military Armistice Commission statement.

Mr. Rae, speaking informally, confirmed that the Canadian Government understood the problem, was sympathetic toward the United Nations Command position, and also wished to be helpful. He was in full support of the feeling of his colleagues that it was essential that specific documentation of Communist violations be made public. Also, he thought it advisable that the United Nations Command reaffirm its adherence to the cease fire. Would it not also be desirable for the United Nations Command to state that it had no intention of increasing its forces above the 1953 level? The Canadian Government would also wish to know whether the United Nations Command intended to continue to submit reports to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Finally, had any thought been given to the possibility of renegotiating paragraph 13(d) with the Communists?

Mr. Robertson agreed that it would be desirable to make it clear that the United Nations Command intended to continue to abide by the cease fire. The United Nations Command could not, however, give assurances that its forces would not be increased unless the Communists gave like assurances. With respect to renegotiating a part of the Armistice, such a course was unthinkable. The Communists still held American prisoners in China, in violation of all their agreed undertakings; 450 American soldiers remain unaccounted for. Of the four principal provisions of the Armistice, namely a cease fire, exchange of prisoners, maintenance of the military balance, and a political settlement, the Communists had refused to adhere to three. Only with respect to a cease fire had they performed their obligation under the Armistice. What advantage would there be in making a new agreement to replace one which the Communists had flagrantly violated?

A discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of continuing to report to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission followed. Mr. Deckert expressed the view that it was not the intention of the U.S. Government to continue to report and that in being relieved of its obligations under paragraph 13(d) by the Communist violations of the paragraph, reporting responsibilities were included. Captain Mott said that some thought had been given reporting perhaps in more general terms. General Twining expressed the view that Admiral Radford did not wish to be bound by reporting. Mr. Deckert pointed
out that should reporting continue, the Communists would have a propaganda opening. Mr. Robertson said he had always felt that in suspending obligations under paragraph 13(d), reporting was included.⁴

In response to Ambassador Munro’s request, Mr. Robertson agreed to give the Ambassadors present copies of the proposed plan. He also assured them that the text of any Military Armistice Commission statement would be provided in advance of its presentation at Panmunjom.⁵

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⁴On June 21, on the same day that General Litzenberg announced in the MAC that the U.N. Command would no longer consider itself bound by paragraph 13d of the Armistice Agreement, General Lemnitzer reported in telegram FE 805482 from CINCUNC that his view was that relief from the obligations under paragraph 13d should “automatically” include relief from any further reporting on controlled combat matériel. On June 24, telegram DEF 925153, a joint State-Defense message for Lemnitzer and Dowling, was sent to Tokyo and Seoul concurred in Lemnitzer’s view that it was no longer necessary to report under paragraph 13d. Copies of both telegrams are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)(2).

⁵On May 20, Robertson covered the same ground in a discussion with Thai Ambassador Pote Sarasin and Turkish Chargé Ilhan Savut, and in a separate discussion with French Chargé Jacques Vimont. These discussions were summarized in telegram 3785 to Bangkok, May 20, which concluded with an assessment of the Thai, Turkish, and French reactions: “Both Thai and Turkish representatives expressed understanding situation. Former observed emphasis should be on Communist violations rather than production difficulties replacing old equipment. French expressed opinion world would understand U.S. action taken as response Communist violations but would want to be assured that U.S. not going beyond Communist actions as to character of items to be introduced. French indicated would obtain Government’s reaction soon as possible.” (Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/5–2057)

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217. Memorandum From the NSC Planning Board Assistant on the Policy Planning Staff (Leonhart) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Bowie)¹

Washington, June 4, 1957.

SUBJECT
Korea (NSC 5702/1)

1. At the NSC Planning Board meeting yesterday, General Cutler asked whether State and Defense were now in agreement on the split paragraphs in NSC 5702/1; and, if so, whether they could present for

¹Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, Korea, US Policy Toward (NSC 5702, 5702/1, 5702/2). Secret.
Planning Board consideration Friday, June 7, the agreed versions of the paragraphs in question (Nos. 9-a–19-a–19-b–23). The Korea paper is on the NSC agenda, Thursday, June 13.

2. Mr. Sprague stated that the joint consultations with our allies were completed, that State and Defense were in full agreement on both the procedure and timing of modernizing U.S. forces in Korea, that we could easily have new language by Friday to cover these points, and that the non-modernization splits could be quickly ironed out in the Council.

3. I was sorry that I was not able to confirm this arrangement. So far as I had been advised, the current status of the problem was contained in the FE memorandum which I had read to the Planning Board on May 24. This stated that the Department was still awaiting the official reactions of the governments we had consulted. (Memorandum attached)² Moreover, in putting up its position papers for the talks with our allies, FE had emphasized that the proposed plan was merely a procedural outline of our actions should there be a subsequent decision to proceed with all or part of modernization. (See Mr. Robertson’s memorandum of May 21, 1957, attached)³ So far as I knew, the Secretary had not yet been asked to make a decision on the merits. I would of course consult whether we would be in a position to proceed by June 7.

4. However, I understood that a [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is in preparation addressed to the specific problem [2 lines of source text not declassified].⁴ Mr. Amory confirmed that the report would be directly material to the Korea issue, and that the IAC would consider it on Monday, June 10. It would be available before the Council meeting on June 13. This seemed to me to raise a question whether we should seek a decision two days prior to publication of the relevant intelligence estimate.

5. General Cutler asked us to advise him as soon as we could whether we will be able to present an agreed State–Defense position to the Planning Board on June 7. I undertook to do so.

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²Not found attached.
³Not found attached. A copy of this memorandum is in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, Korea, US Policy Toward (NSC 5702, 5702/1, 5702/2).
⁴Footnote [18-1/2 lines of text] not declassified.
218. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State


SUBJECT

Modernization of United States Forces in Korea

In accord with NSC Action 1695 and General Cutler’s memorandum of April 4, consultations were held with representatives of the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, France, Turkey and Thailand to ascertain their views on equipping United States forces in Korea with weapons on the list discussed in the NSC.

In presenting the problem and the desire to introduce these weapons, I also outlined a proposed plan (Tab B) on timing and public presentation should the decision to do so be made. This proposed plan included (1) a statement in the Military Armistice Commission, no later than July 1, 1957, pointing out that Communist violations relieve the United Nations Command from continued observance of paragraph 13(d) while redressing the military balance and (2) a report to the United Nations prior to August 1.

The response of the Embassy representatives was sympathetic, with general agreement that modernization of United States forces in Korea should be undertaken. The following are their principal observations upon advice of their governments:

1. It is desirable that the maximum possible publishable evidence establishing the Communist violations of paragraph 13(d) of the Armistice be presented.

2. It was the unanimous hope that it would be made clear that the United Nations Command firmly intends to continue to support the Armistice as a whole and to observe the cease-fire.

3. Any action should best be taken as far in advance of the next session of the United Nations General Assembly as possible.

4. Australia, New Zealand and France were particularly anxious that no dual-purpose weapons be given the Koreans. All countries

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/6-557. Secret. Drafted by Nes and cleared with L, EUR, IO, and FE.
2See footnote 12, Document 212.
3In this memorandum, Cutler summarized the discussion on Korea by the NSC on April 4. (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up)
4Not found attached; apparent reference to the talking paper summarized in footnote 3, Document 216.
5In telegram FE 805272 from Tokyo, June 5, General Lemnitzer pointed to what he saw as the danger that the Chinese and North Koreans might seize the initiative on the question of paragraph 13d, and he urged that the UNC decision to suspend the provisions of paragraph 13d be announced in the Military Armistice Commission no later than June 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)(2))
requested consultation, should the United States at some future date desire to furnish such weapons to Korea.

If a decision favorable in principle to providing United States forces in Korea with dual-purpose weapons be reached, it is highly desirable that it be announced in the Military Armistice Commission well in advance of July 1, 1957:

1. This would provide maximum opportunity for any world reaction to the MAC announcement to die away before the next UN General Assembly meeting and permit submitting the report to the UN as far in advance as possible of the General Assembly meeting.

2. This would enable Ambassador Dowling and General Lemnitzer to begin negotiations for ROK force reductions as part of a package which would include the strengthening of United States forces with dual-purpose weapons prior to the departure of General Lemnitzer, who is being replaced as CINCUNC July 1, 1957.

In view of the lack of opposition among those of our Allies thus far consulted, and the timing factors involved, I believe we should push toward National Security Council reconsideration of the Korean paper (NSC 5702/1) at the earliest possible date so that in the event a decision favorable to providing United States forces in Korea with dual-purpose weapons is reached, the steps incident to its implementation may be gotten under way prior to July 1, 1957.

With respect to the bracketed portions of NSC 5702/1, I suggest that we offer to substitute for "[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] will not be stored in Korea" under paragraph 9(a) the following language: "The decision as to whether and when [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] should be stored in Korea will be made by the President after consultation between the Secretaries of State and Defense." I believe we can agree to the deletion of the bracketed portion of paragraph 19(a) and would further propose the alteration of 19(b) to read: "In view of the necessity to present a convincing public case and to retain the support of our principal Allies in the face of inevitable and continuing Communist, and probably neutralist, propaganda maneuvers, the timing and method of public presentation of the announcement and introduction of dual conventional nuclear weapons under paragraph 9(a) shall be determined by the Secretaries of State and Defense taking into consideration the views of our principal Allies."

Recommendations:

1. That you request early National Security Council reconsideration of NSC 5702/1 with a view to reaching a decision on the Korean weapons problem.

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6See footnotes 3 and 5, Document 205.
2. That our representative at the Planning Board be authorized to propose the language suggested above for the bracketed portions of paragraph 9(a) and 19(b) and agree to delete the bracketed sentence in paragraph 19(a) of NSC 5702/1.7

7Assistant Secretary Bowie also addressed a memorandum on the same subject to the Secretary on June 5. Bowie reiterated his opposition to the introduction of dual-purpose weapons into Korea, and stated, as his opinion, that the United States should limit itself to the replacement of obsolete equipment in Korea with current models as necessary. There is no indication of the Secretary’s reaction to Robertson’s or Bowie’s recommendations. A copy of Bowie’s memorandum to the Secretary is in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, Korea, US Policy Toward (NSC 5702, 5702/1, 5702/2).

219. Memorandum From the NSC Planning Board Assistant on the Policy Planning Staff (Leonhart) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Bowie)1

Washington, June 7, 1957:

SUBJECT

Obsolescent Modernization for Korea

1. It might be well to have in mind just what sort of weapons Defense is talking about when it uses the diminutives of “eight-inch”, “762 mm” rocket, “280 mm” cannon. An article in today’s NY Times (attached) by Hanson Baldwin2 describes the first two, and I’ve looked into the third:

a) the eight-inch howitzer: weight 16 tons; range 10 1/2 miles; impedimenta—trucks, tractors, ammunition, crews.

b) the Honest John 762 mm rocket: weight 16 tons; [range about 15 miles—WL];3 impedimenta, trucks, tractors, launching vehicles, ammunition, crews.

c) the 280 mm [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] cannon: this little beauty must not only be towed by one heavy tractor, but pushed by another: total weight 86 tons; length about a city block; range about 20 miles.

2. The question arises whether it is now possible to move the 86-ton [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Cannon north from Inchon to within 10 miles of the 38th parallel (presumably at least

1Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, Korea, US Policy Toward (NSC 5702, 5702/1, 5702/2). Secret.


3Brackets in the source text.
half its range should be directed at North Korea). If the road beds
can be suitably strengthened, I am informed a Class C Pontoon
Bridge, rated at 60 ton capacity, can be especially augmented for the
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Cannon. It would naturally be
of interest to know what sort of road and bridge program we are
buying to emplace these weapons in fixed positions on the Armistice
Line. And how long the construction period will take.

3. These difficulties can be [no?] doubt solved, at some delay
and expense. There is more uncertainty about the Defense–JCS claim
that the Honest John and the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
Cannon are needed in Korea because we cannot maintain two differ-
ent kinds of divisions: one obsolesely conventional, the other mo-
dernly [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. "We must standardize,
or we can't rotate the troops." If, as Baldwin suggests, these weapons
are already acknowledged unsuccessful and are now being replaced,
the standardization claim seems specious.

4. The real reason for the Defense–JCS insistence on these weap-
op may reside in their characteristics. They are too limited in range
for use in continental defense. They are too bulky and cumbersome
for maneuver in Europe, and we do not have a NATO border front-
ing on the Soviet Union within the range of these weapons. Korea
may, in fact, be the only place in the world where these two devel-
opal prototypes can be buried without public admission of a
wasteful and futile effort to make the Army competitive with the Air
Force in atomic delivery.

5. In sum, these two bulky, cumbersome, obsolescent weapons
have little significance for "modernization" of our forces. They have
even less for "standardization" of our defenses. Modernization of our
forces in Korea should and can be sought in improving air-atomic ca-
pabilities. The introduction of the 280 and the Honest John seem justi-
tified only as an attempt to facilitate or to finance their replacement
by more efficient models at home. The political costs in such an at-
tempt seem wholly exorbitant.

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220. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Macomber) to the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Howe)  

Washington, June 10, 1957.

The Secretary has now reviewed the attached material regarding modernization of U.S. forces in Korea.

The Secretary said that he had never been satisfied that there was a military necessity for introducing dual-purpose weapons into Korea. He said that in his judgment the deterrent power of the U.S. is adequately taken care of through the U.S. capabilities in Okinawa and Japan. He said that the only reason he would favor introducing dual-purpose weapons into Korea would be to bring about the reduction of expense of U.S. military assistance in Korea. In other words, he is thinking of it in terms of a budgetary money saving operation rather than in terms of a strategic military operation. The Secretary does not get the impression from reading Mr. Robertson’s paper that the budgetary consideration has been the primary factor leading to the recommendation.

The Secretary said that he would not be prepared to approve the introduction of dual-purpose weapons into Korea unless it could be shown to him that such a step was essential in order to bring about the reduction of Korean forces and the expense of military assistance in Korea, and would, in fact, lead to this result.

William B. Macomber, Jr.  

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221. Memorandum of Discussion at the 326th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 13, 1957  

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1–2.]

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1Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, Korea, US Policy Toward (NSC 5702, 5702/1, 5702/2). Secret.
2Not found attached. A note on the source text indicates that Document 218 was attached.
3Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
3. **U.S. Policy Toward Korea** (NSC 5514; NSC 5610; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea”, dated October 12 and November 6, 1956; NSC Actions Nos. 1624, 1660 and 1695; NSC 5702; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Evaluation of Alternative Military Programs for Korea”, dated January 30, 1957; NSC 5702/1; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Policy Toward Korea”, dated April 2, June 10, and June 12, 1957;[3] [document number not declassified][4])

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on NSC 5702/1, with particular reference to the revised paragraphs 9, 10 and 19-b,[5] copies of which were handed out to the members of the Council. (Copy of briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting.) Mr. Cutler also distributed the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on these and other paragraphs in NSC 5702/1. After indicating that it had still proved impossible for the Planning Board to present agreed recommendations on the

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3In the June 10 memorandum to the NSC, Lay transmitted the revised pages of NSC 5702/1, prepared by the NSC Planning Board in the light of consultation by the Departments of State and Defense with selected allies pursuant to NSC Action No. 1695-b. The revised pages incorporated amendments to paragraphs 9 and 19 of NSC 5702/1 and were circulated for insertion in the extant copies of NSC 5702/1. Copies of Lay’s covering memorandum, without the enclosure, are in Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5702 Series, and ibid., S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5702. The revised pages are in the copy of NSC 5702/1 in the S/P Files cited above.

5A copy of this June 12 memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense was circulated to the NSC under cover of a memorandum from Lay, also dated June 12. The Joint Chiefs recommended that the Secretary concur in the proposed revisions to paragraphs 9, 10, 11, and 19 of NSC 5702/1, provided that the Defense-JCS positions on paragraphs 9c and 19b were adopted. Approval of the Department of State position on those paragraphs, they felt, would “sanction continued delays and postponements in implementing a required security program.” (Ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5702 Series)

4See footnote 4, Document 217.

5The revised portions of these paragraphs continued to reflect the divergence of views between the Department of State and the Department of Defense-Joint Chiefs of Staff that had existed since the beginning of the policy review A basic difference involved paragraph 9c. The Defense-JCS version of paragraph 9c stipulated that U.S. forces in Korea should be equipped with modern weapons, such as Honest John rockets and 280 mm. atomic-capable cannons. The State version of the paragraph qualified the authorization to introduce such weapons by stipulating that the action must be based upon “reasonable support” from the principal allies of the United States, and must result in desired reductions in military assistance for Korea and in Republic of Korea force levels. The Defense-JCS position on paragraph 10, which related to force level reductions on the part of the Republic of Korea, was that such reductions should be undertaken only if the Defense-JCS position on paragraph 9c was adopted. In paragraph 19b, the Department of State proposed that if atomic-capable weapons were introduced into Korea, the timing and method of the public presentation of the announcement and the introduction should be determined by the Secretaries of State and Defense, taking into account the views of principal allies. The Defense-JCS position was that the paragraph should be deleted.
modernization of U.S. forces in Korea, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Mr. Cutler first called on Secretary Dulles for comment.

Secretary Dulles said that the State Department agreed that at the earliest possible date a statement should be made to the appropriate UN authority that, in view of Communist violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement, the United States proposed henceforth to exercise greater flexibility in the armaments maintained in South Korea. On this point, at least, there was no dispute between State and Defense. Thereafter, however, we come to the second phase: What, precisely, do we do to implement the policy set forth in the initial statement referred to above? We in the State Department, continued Secretary Dulles, were inclined to feel that it would be much preferable if we could confine our [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in Korea to dual-purpose weapons (both conventional and nuclear), [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. For when you begin to put into foreign territory very conspicuous weapons [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] there was bound to be a great degree of difficulty. In particular, Secretary Dulles said he had in mind these huge 280 mm. guns, for which it was necessary to rebuild roads and bridges so that the guns could be transported. He could not understand why in the world it was essential that we be able to haul these great monsters around. In any case, to advertise the existence of such huge weapons as these would be bound to cause very serious repercussions for the United States throughout Asia. Sending such weapons to Korea would be resented throughout Asia because such [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] were identified with the West and with the hated doctrine of white supremacy, quite apart from the weapons effects themselves. [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (18-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Cutler pointed out that as a result of the proposed package deal, the United States would save $127 million in costs to South Korea over a period of four years. Again citing the figures in the Financial Appendix to support his argument, Secretary Dulles reiterated his belief that the savings that we would realize from the introduction of the complete list of modern weapons (copies of which had been distributed to the Council members) would scarcely compensate for the political and propaganda liabilities which would be thrust upon us. Indeed, said Secretary Dulles, he was not even sure that there was a necessary interdependence between the introduction of these modern weapons and the reductions in ROK armed forces.

In summary, Secretary Dulles stated his feeling that the proper way to proceed in this program was, first of all, to serve the notice of our intentions that he had spoken of initially; and thereafter sit

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6Printed as an attachment to Document 209.
down and negotiate with the ROK authorities in order to determine what we can do to induce the desired reduction in ROK active forces. He expressed the hope that we could achieve the desired reduction in ROK forces by providing dual-purpose weapons for modernizing U.S. forces in South Korea, but avoid paying the higher price of introducing such monster weapons as the 280 mm. guns and the Honest John rockets.

The President inquired whether the 280 mm. gun really was so clumsy and so immobile a weapon. He added that in general he had very little confidence in immobile weapons. Admiral Radford replied that he didn't think the 280 mm. gun was quite as bad as it had been depicted, but at any rate we were not manufacturing any more. However, we had five or six such guns in Germany, and they were proving useful, even though they were now five or six years old and would gradually be replaced. Secretary Quarles added that in a technical sense both the 280 mm. gun and the Honest John rocket could be described as dual-purpose weapons; [2 lines of source text not declassified].

Governor Stassen passed a note to Secretary Dulles, who then pointed out the possible threat of some counter move by the Soviets or the Chinese Communists if such weapons were introduced.

Secretary Quarles commented that the position of the Department of Defense could be summarized in the following terms: The Department felt that we must move into this situation very promptly if any changes were to be made in the existing levels of the ROK armed forces. Far from wishing to reduce their active divisions, the ROKs wish to increase their active divisions. Accordingly, it would be wise for the United States to possess a free hand in modernizing its forces in South Korea with all available weapons, if we hope to bargain successfully with the ROK for a reduction of their own forces.

Secretary Humphrey said that what really concerned him was what we thought we saw down the road in Korea. Did we propose to go on spending $600 million a year in assistance to South Korea for the rest of our natural lives? Secretary Quarles replied that the outlook was certainly not very promising, but that he did not see any better course of action until and unless some unforeseen break should occur.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that the reduction in ROK active divisions, as set forth in the package deal in NSC 5702/1, was only the first step. It was hoped that further reductions could be achieved later and, in any event, acceptance by the ROK of this package deal would result in savings for the United States of $127 million over a period of four years. Both Secretary Dulles and Secretary Humphrey
commented that they did not believe this saving in itself to be of very great significance.

Admiral Radford expressed surprise that Secretary Humphrey would scorn a saving of $127 million. Admiral Radford then went on to state that the Council might be somewhat confused as to precisely what the Joint Chiefs of Staff had in mind in suggesting the package deal set forth in NSC 5702/1. The United States, he pointed out, has some 60,000 troops in Korea, our two divisions rotating on a front line which stretched for 150 miles. Except for a Turkish brigade, there were practically no other UN troops in Korea. While, as the Secretary of State had pointed out, a U.S. nuclear offensive [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would eventually stop any Communist invasion of South Korea, the Communists could not be stopped before they had overrun the 60,000 U.S. troops. Hence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that defensive [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] should actually be in place in South Korea to protect the security of our own U.S. troops and to prevent them from being overrun in the initial phases of a Communist offensive. Moreover, from the point of view of the ROKs themselves, their capital, Seoul, was only 25 miles distant from the front lines; and since this capital had already been overrun three times, the ROKs were only too well aware that it could be overrun once again. Accordingly, the ROKs also would feel much safer if the invasion routes into South Korea were covered by defensive [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] deployed and in place.

Secondly, said Admiral Radford, we do not actually know precisely what the ROK authorities will agree to by way of a reduction of their own forces. We think they will agree to reduce their 20 active divisions by four, and they might be willing to eliminate these four divisions, which would reduce the total ROK forces to 16 active divisions and 10 reserve divisions. We might be able eventually to reduce even more. General Lemnitzer, for example, thought that at some future time we might induce the ROKs to reduce to a level of 10 active and 10 reserve divisions. But in any case, our Number One reason for wanting to introduce the Honest John rockets and the 280 mm. guns for our forces in South Korea, was to provide for the security of these U.S. forces in South Korea.

Thirdly, continued Admiral Radford, he had often discussed these nuclear weapons in the course of his visits to the various countries of the Far East. Most of the military men in the friendly nations of Asia accepted such weapons. The only exception, where there was still a strong hostile feeling toward nuclear weapons, was Japan; and even in Japan many military men and diplomats agreed on the vital necessity of an atomic defense.
Fourthly, Admiral Radford said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were convinced that they could not continue military planning along the lines agreed in our basic policy without being able to count on the use of nuclear weapons.

Finally, Admiral Radford said, there was the related problem of the command of UN forces in Korea. If the United States reduced its forces in Korea much below their present size, we might find real difficulty in retaining a U.S. military man as head of the UN Command. The Koreans would wish to have one of their own nationals as the UN Commander. And if some incident occurred which resulted in a renewal of hostilities between North and South Korea, we might well not ever be able to determine which side was responsible for renewing the war.

In conclusion, Admiral Radford again stressed the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that the Council's decision with respect to the package deal in NSC 5702/1 would be a crucial decision from the military point of view. The Joint Chiefs simply could not see their way to assure the security of U.S. forces in Korea unless we were in a position to equip our forces there with the complete list of modern weapons.

[1 paragraph (12-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Brundage complained that when the Council initiated its study of a package deal for reducing U.S. forces in Korea, we had hoped that we could not only cut the costs of U.S. military assistance to South Korea, but that we could also cut the costs of maintaining U.S. forces in South Korea. At the present time there seemed very little prospect that this latter objective could be achieved. Secretary Humphrey agreed, and said that it was extremely difficult to see what the future would bring, in view of the steadily increasing cost of U.S. defense programs and new weapons.

Secretary Dulles replied that the only answer was to keep working on our objective of convincing all our allies to depend more on the deterrent capacity of our nuclear retaliatory capability, and less on local defenses. There simply was not going to be enough money available to maintain both the U.S. deterrent capability and large military establishments in allied countries throughout the world. We must project into the future for South Korea something that is far less costly than the present area defense system in South Korea. This must move ahead with the deterrent theory, with the theory that the real deterrent to aggression rests in the existence in the United States of a great retaliatory capability. Nevertheless, Secretary Dulles reiterated his feeling that if the Council were to adopt the package deal proposed by the Department of Defense in paragraphs 9 and 10 of NSC 5702/1, we should be incurring a very heavy liability and one for which we would get no adequate return. If we are going to
deploy these particular weapons—the Honest John rockets and the 280 mm. guns—we should insist that the reduction of active ROK forces be much more substantial.

Admiral Radford pointed out that the problem we are thus confronting in South Korea was not confined to that country alone, but applied also to Germany and to all the other areas around the perimeter of the Soviet Union. Everywhere, accordingly, we faced this problem of convincing our allies that we do possess the necessary nuclear deterrent to aggression and that we are prepared to use this deterrent in case these allies are attacked. Most of our allies are still not convinced of this determination, and that is why they insist on seeing military power in being and situated in their own territories which are exposed to Communist aggression.

Secretary Humphrey said that he could not deny the validity of Admiral Radford’s argument, but the real question was—do we want to continue the existence of large local military establishments in Europe, or do we prefer to maintain these local military forces in South Korea? With the rising costs of weapons, we could not do both.

Admiral Radford replied to Secretary Humphrey by pointing out that if the United States lost South Korea it would presently lose its entire position in the Far East. General Lemnitzer had stated that the limit that he can go down to, in terms of active divisions in South Korea, is the number of divisions required to patrol the long front line. He believed that 10 ROK active divisions were too few, but that some number between 10 and 16 active divisions, including the U.S. divisions and the ROK Marine division, might be appropriate.

Secretary Humphrey responded by pointing out that as we looked ahead we must think in terms of U.S. deterrent nuclear power being the answer to the defense of the Free World, and contemplate the redeployment of our U.S. forces from foreign areas. We must not only begin to think in these terms, but we must begin promptly to move our forces out. Our allies won’t like it, but they will in effect have to accept it. It is not necessary for the ROK to agree to the departure of our forces; we will be polite but firm. On the other hand, if we continue with our present deployments overseas and with the costs of new weapons mounting every day, the financial situation will become altogether hopeless.

Admiral Radford answered that the problem outlined by Secretary Humphrey was the problem that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were wrestling with every day. It has long been our policy to redeploy U.S. forces from overseas, but we have simply not been successful in selling this policy to our allies.

Mr. Cutler turned to Secretary Humphrey and asked him whether he was proposing to continue to help the South Koreans or simply
to abandon them. Secretary Humphrey repeated his views on reliance on the U.S. deterrent capability.

The President turned to Admiral Radford and inquired what conceivable reason there was that both of our U.S. divisions in Korea should be located continuously on the front line. Admiral Radford replied that only one at a time was in the front line, but that both U.S. divisions were necessary to defend South Korea against invasion and a sudden overrunning of its territory by the Communists. Governor Stassen pointed out that it would be extremely difficult to get allies like the South Koreans voluntarily to consent to the redeployment of U.S. forces because of the loss of the foreign exchange which accrued through the expenditures of U.S. military personnel. Secretary Humphrey stated that it was still hard for him to see why this should be difficult. Admittedly we must be polite and diplomatic; but the United States hardly needed anyone's consent but its own to the redeployment of its own armed forces. Admiral Radford pointed out that the United States would find it very hard to hold its alliances together if it acted in such matters arbitrarily.

The President turned to Admiral Radford at this point and said that he certainly agreed that the United States should introduce into Korea jet aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons; but if we had these nuclear-capable jet aircraft together with all the other modern weapons in the list, this would certainly constitute a considerable atomic capability ready to use in Korea. Moreover, it was not necessary to inform anybody about the deployment [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in South Korea, except, of course, if you also put in the Honest Johns and the 280 mm. guns. These were so conspicuous that you would have to explain their introduction to the whole world, as Secretary Dulles had pointed out.

Admiral Radford said that in any case we would have to tell the South Koreans what [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] we were introducing. Otherwise we should not be able to convince them of the feasibility of reducing their own forces.

Secretary Humphrey expressed his unalterable opposition to the United States maintaining a battle line all around the world made up of forces equipped with nuclear weapons. The over-all cost of such a course of action would be terrific. It was this that worried him so constantly. Admiral Radford pointed out in response his own view that if in 1950 the United States had maintained the very small forces it had in South Korea, we should probably have avoided the Korean war.

The President looked around at the members of the Council and said that we could continue to talk about this problem for weeks on end, but he believed that in view of the State position we should begin by making the proposed announcement on the introduction of
new weapons for our forces in South Korea. In point of fact we have two very good men representing us in South Korea, in the persons of Ambassador Dowling and General Lemnitzer. Therefore, the second step was to direct them to go and talk to Rhee and see if we can make some kind of an arrangement for reducing ROK forces, but an arrangement that will not include the introduction of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the 280 mm. gun and the Honest John rocket. Admiral Radford pointed out that such negotiations with the ROK were bound to take a considerable time, and that General Lemnitzer was due to come home at the end of the month. The President replied that the sensible thing was to have Lemnitzer stay on for a while. This job was more important for the time being than his job of Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.

Admiral Radford turned to the President and said he was puzzled about one aspect of the problem of the package deal. He had himself taken part in certain of the negotiations which had been directed by the President the last time the Council paper was discussed—the negotiations with the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, etc. So far as Admiral Radford knew, representatives of these allied countries had agreed with our proposal to modernize our forces in South Korea, and they had actually read the list of weapons which we proposed to send to South Korea. The only problem that had come up in the course of these negotiations was whether we envisaged giving the ROK forces nuclear weapons, which of course we had assured them we did not intend to do. These allied representatives have also recommended that if the United States determined on this course of action to modernize our forces, we should do it very promptly. Otherwise we were bound to run into difficulties in the United Nations. It was believed that the introductory date should not be later than June 15.

Secretary Dulles stated that he was ready to move in this matter at once, and to make the announcement of our intention to modernize our forces in Korea by next Monday.

Admiral Radford said that there were still two questions remaining in his mind. The first of these was that we did not wish to agree to report to the Military Armistice Commission the modern weapons which we send into South Korea. Assistant Secretary of Defense Sprague pointed out that the proposed statement as presently drafted did not specify precisely what weapons were to be sent to South Korea. Secretary Dulles agreed that such precise specification was not desirable, and that what we sought was flexibility. We should therefore confine our announcement to stating that we are sending in modern weapons. Thereafter we will go to President Rhee and begin our negotiations with him. Admittedly such negotiations are likely to be very difficult, but it is in the course of these negotiations that we
shall become involved with the question of the types of weapons involved in the modernization of our forces. Secretary Dulles then repeated his view on the vital necessity of educating the world to acceptance of the theory of U.S. deterrent power as the primary safeguard of the Free World against Communist aggressions. He also expressed strong doubt that the North Koreans or the Chinese Communists would ever dare to launch an invasion of the ROK as long as they knew that we would use this retaliatory power to wipe out their entire industrial capacity.

Admiral Radford’s second point consisted in stressing the importance of a final settlement of the Korea problem and the achievement of a free and united Korea. Admiral Radford did not suggest, in answer to questions, how this objective might best be achieved.

At this point Mr. Cutler attempted to suggest an appropriate action by the National Security Council in terms, first, of issuing the proposed announcement that the United States was modernizing its forces in Korea, and secondly, a directive to Ambassador Dowling and General Lemnitzer to begin negotiations with President Rhee looking toward a reduction of current ROK force levels. He was interrupted by the President, who again expressed his dislike of advertising our introduction of modern weapons by including among them such monster weapons as the 280 mm. gun. Secretary Quarles said he understood the problem, but hoped that the Defense Department could be given some clear conception of the degree and kind of modernization of our armed forces which was now being contemplated. The President replied by stating his belief that [8-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

The Vice President pointed out the importance of what was to be said about this course of action at press conferences of the President and the Secretary of State after our announcement had been made public. The press was sure to ask what precisely we meant by modern weapons, and it was important to determine the answer. The President said that we would simply refuse to disclose details of the weapons that we were going to send.

In response to a further question on the nature of the Council action, the President directed, in the first instance, that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense were to agree on a message to Ambassador Dowling and General Lemnitzer outlining the general problem as we saw it here and directing them to see what they could do to convince Rhee of the desirability of reducing ROK active forces in return for the modernization of the ROK Air Force and the modernization of our own U.S. forces in Korea.

Secretary Dulles said he wished to point out that, in a certain sense, the Council was confronted by an entirely new situation in the interval since it had last considered the Korean problem. All the
world now knows that the United States is up against serious budgetary problems. We can therefore go to Rhee and tell him that we simply do not have the money to maintain his forces in the style to which they have been accustomed. We must certainly take a stronger line with Rhee than we have in the past.

Mr. Cutler inquired whether we could direct Ambassador Dowling and General Lemnitzer to begin their negotiations promptly and to report back to Washington not later than July 1. Secretary Dulles replied that there was no chance that such negotiations could be completed by July 1. He did, however, add that he hoped that General Lemnitzer could be held over in Korea for the necessary time, for we should look upon these negotiations as a major operation, as a truly drastic treatment.

Agreeing with Secretary Dulles, Secretary Humphrey said that drastic as the proposal was, it was merely the beginning of an operation which we should have to conduct all over the world. In other words, at long last the New Look has come home to roost with a vengeance.

However, Secretary Dulles concluded the discussion with a word of caution about too rapid redeployment of U.S. forces from overseas, and expressed the thought that, with the development of new tactical nuclear weapons, as outlined by Admiral Strauss earlier, the United States might be able to maintain defenses in foreign areas at minimal cost.

The National Security Council: 8

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5702/1, and the revisions thereof submitted by the NSC Planning Board in the reference memorandum of June 10, 1957; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 12, 1957.

b. Noted the President’s directive that:

(1) The United States should cause to be issued at the earliest possible date the announcement being prepared by the Departments of State and Defense to the effect that, in view of Communist violations in North Korea of the Korean Armistice, the United States was proceeding to modernize the defenses of the UN Command in South Korea.

(2) The Secretaries of State and Defense should agree upon prompt instructions to Ambassador Dowling and General Lemnitzer directing them, in the light of increasing costs of the U.S. defense effort and the deterrent provided by U.S.

7For text of the discussion of agenda item 1, “Types of Nuclear Weapons,” see vol. xix, pp. 524–525.

8Paragraphs a–c and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 1731, approved by President Eisenhower on June 15. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
retaliatory capability, to negotiate with President Rhee for a substantial reduction in active ROK forces, with resultant improvement in the Korean economy, in return for converting the three remaining ROK Air Force squadrons to jets and modernizing U.S. forces deployed in Korea.

(3) Following the announcement in (1) above, U.S. forces deployed in Korea should be modernized; [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

c. Deferred action on NSC 5702/1, as amended by the reference memorandum of June 10, 1957, pending reactions to the announcement and the results of the negotiations referred to in b above.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for appropriate implementation.

[Here follows agenda item 4.]

S. Everett Gleason

222. Record of a Meeting, Department of State, Washington, June 17, 1957, 4 p.m.¹

SUBJECT
Modernization of United States Forces in Korea

PARTICIPANTS
Embassies
United Kingdom—
Sir Harold Caccia, Ambassador
Mr. A.J. de la Mare, Counselor
Canada—
Mr. S.F. Rae, Minister
Mr. J.R. Maybee, First Secretary
Australia—
Sir Percy Spender, Ambassador
Mr. M.R. Booker, Counselor
New Zealand—
Mr. G.D.L. White, Counselor
Mr. N.V. Lough, First Secretary
State
Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
Mr. Jacob D. Beam, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
Mr. Howard L. Parsons, Director, NA
Miss Elizabeth Brown, IO

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/6-1757. Secret. Drafted by Nes.
Mr. David C. Nes, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs, NA

Defense
Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Mr. Mansfield D. Sprague, Assistant Secretary, ISA
Captain Berton A. Robbins, OSD/ISA

Mr. Robertson opened the meeting by providing the Embassy representatives present with copies of the MAC statement. After waiting a sufficient time for them to read the statement, Mr. Robertson asked whether there were any comments.

Sir Percy Spender, saying he had one comment to make, suggested the addition of the words "created by your breach of the provisions of Article 13(d)" after "this situation aggravates the imbalance" at the bottom of page 2. Apart from that, Sir Percy said that the text seemed to be similar to the document discussed before. Mr. Robertson agreed to Sir Percy’s suggested language and confirmed that every effort had been made to incorporate in the text the suggestions made by the Embassy representatives during previous meetings. Sir Harold Caccia agreed with Sir Percy’s suggestions as did Mr. White. As a result of Mr. White’s query as to the timing of the MAC announcement, a discussion ensued during which Admiral Radford stated that the meeting could be held between 24 to 48 hours after the receipt of the instructions by UNCMAC. Mr. Robertson confirmed that prior to the MAC meeting, the remainder of the Sixteen would be informed as would the Swiss and Swedes. In response to a further query from Mr. White, Mr. Robertson said that an attempt was being made to issue the statement at Panmunjom Wednesday or Thursday.

Mr. Rae had no comments to make on the substance of the note but asked what the plan was with respect to continuing to report to the NNSC. Mr. Robertson, reviewing the reasons for discontinuing reporting, said that on balance it had been decided to cease reports to the NNSC.

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3The change suggested by Spender was incorporated in the joint State-Defense instruction sent to Ambassador Dowling and General Lemnitzer on June 17, directing them to arrange for a meeting of the Military Armistice Commission to deliver the message cited in footnote 2 above. (Army telegram DEF 924736, 172257Z June; Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/6–1757)

4Robertson also met separately on June 17 with representatives of the French, Thai, and Turkish Embassies to discuss the impending MAC statement. (Memorandum of conversation by Nes, June 17; ibid., 795B.5/6–1757) On June 18, circular telegram 983 was sent to 27 Embassies, including those in the remainder of the Sixteen as well as Switzerland and Sweden, providing details concerning the MAC statement for use by the Embassies once the statement was made. (Ibid., 795.00/6–1857)

In reply to Sir Harold's question as to informing Secretary General Hammarskjold, Mr. Robertson confirmed that a UNC report would be submitted to the United Nations. Subsequent discussion developed that this report would be submitted as soon as possible after the MAC statement and no later than August 1, 1957.

Sir Harold then asked what plans were being made to inform not just the United Nations but the press and the world at large of the Communist violations of the Armistice. Mr. Robertson said considerable thought had been given to this point but that the Defense Department felt and the Secretary of State concurred that at the MAC meeting it would be inadvisable to submit any supplementary data on violations. A good deal of the information now at hand is classified and would have to be declassified before public use. Furthermore, the Secretary felt very strongly that the release of such information would give the Communists ammunition for their propaganda. We would not, therefore, submit any evidence to accompany the statement. Such evidence had, after all, been presented time and time again and we had charged violations throughout three or four years.

Admiral Radford offered that the Defense Department was working with the White House on a supplementary statement to cover Communist violations which would be ready to use after the announcement broke in Korea.

Sir Percy said there were two aspects to the general problem, presentation to the public in order to make the best first initial impact and second the submission of evidence to the United Nations to support the first general statement. He expressed the hope that in the Defense-White House statement two or three glaring examples of Communist violations could be made. With respect to the United Nations, however, a bit more was necessary and the case should be developed in more detail.

Mr. Robertson said that it would be extremely helpful were the Governments concerned to issue supporting statements following the announcement at Panmunjom. Sir Percy, Sir Harold, and Mr. Rae all agreed but pointed to the necessity of having at hand the U.S. supplementary statement so that there would be "no cross play of cards."

Mr. White suggested that there would be inquiries as to the type of weapons to be introduced and asked how the U.S. would deal with such queries. Admiral Radford said "We are not going to answer that. We are going to say that we are not going to comment on that—that is a military problem and we will not comment." Sir Harold pointed out that this was the first question which would arise and Sir Percy said that it might just be answered by saying that the U.S. forces in Korea were going to be equipped in such a way as to
put them in balance. Admiral Radford said "We can't get too specific, and we might as well let people draw their own conclusions."6 Sir Harold again mentioned that everyone ought to get together on the answer to such a question.

Mr. Rae, referring to the current London disarmament discussions7 said that the question of timing was worrying some Canadian officials because of the relationship between the action in Korea and the talks in London. Admiral Radford expressed the view that "The inference might be drawn that we had better be careful in London. We have been burnt over in Korea, and maybe people realize this will sort of advertise the fact that we made a mistake over there that we don't want to repeat in London." Mr. Robertson said he did not feel the action in Korea would adversely affect the London talks.

The meeting was adjourned without further comment or discussion.

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6In a June 20 memorandum assessing the June 17 meeting on modernization of forces in Korea, William Leonhart called Assistant Secretary Bowie's attention to the possible significance of Admiral Radford's unwillingness to "get too specific": "Admiral Radford and Mr. Robertson met with the Commonwealth Ambassadors on June 17. This meeting produced a further retraction in the position we have previously discussed with them. [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]" (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, Korea, U.S. Policy Toward (NSC 5702, 5702/1, 5702/2))

7The Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission was meeting in London to conduct disarmament negotiations.

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223. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea1

Washington, June 18, 1957—2:57 p.m.

892. Joint State—Defense message for Ambassador Dowling and General Lemnitzer. The President is convinced that a substantial re-

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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/6–1857. Secret; Niac; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Nes, Parsons, and Robertson and cleared in draft by Secretary Dulles, in the Department of Defense by Admiral Radford and Assistant Secretary Sprague, and in the White House by Cutler. Also sent niac to Tokyo with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.

According to a memorandum from Leonhart to Bowie, June 20, the language of the telegram was worked out in a "round-robin" telephone call among Dulles, Radford, Cutler, Robertson, and Sprague. A June 17 note by Cutler indicated that, after formulation, the "Robertson—Radford" draft was sent to President Eisenhower for approval. Cutler ascribed to Dulles the proposal to ask Rhee to agree to a reduction of South Korean ground forces "to about 10 active divisions". Eisenhower directed that the message contain background information for Dowling and Lemnitzer and indica-

Continued
duction of Korean forces is essential to help the economic situation in Korea.

In view U.S. Government decision on modernization U.S. forces Korea and early action to be taken in MAC most important President Rhee be approached shortly in advance MAC statement but not far enough in advance for possible leak to Korean press prior to MAC statement, to inform him contents and time release MAC statement. After informing Rhee of above, gain his acceptance reduction of ROK forces by explaining plans for providing United States forces with more modern equipment.

This matter considered of such importance President proposes, if necessary to achieve agreement, that General Lemnitzer remain after 1 July change of command in capacity special representative of Secretary of Defense.

The following are suggested for use in your presentation:

(1) Statement will be made in MAC shortly on UNC policy with respect being relieved obligations under 13d of Armistice Agreement.
(2) U.S. firmly committed defense ROK against any renewal Communist aggression and to peaceful reunification Korea.
(3) U.S. retaliatory power is a large element in maintaining security ROK.
(4) Necessary re-equip U.S. forces to take advantage more modern weapons and insure U.S. capability meet its obligations. To do this following steps have been decided upon:

(a) U.S. forces will be provided with new weapons including certain ones of dual capability. If questioned you should say these will not include at this time weapons [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] such as the Honest John and the 280mm cannon but will include aircraft capable of carrying atomic bombs.

(b) ROK air strength will be improved through providing jet aircraft for the second wing of ROK fighter-bombers. Ground force equipment will be improved through provision of more transport and communications. This U.S. commitment is dependent on acceptance by ROK proposed reduction of ground forces.

(5) The modernization of U.S. forces and the improvements for ROK forces will strengthen the UNC deterrent position Korea, its defensive combat capabilities, fire power and over-all effectiveness.

(6) Present level ROK forces imposes tremendous drain and burden on Korean economy and resources. Reduction ROK forces necessary to permit greater emphasis economic development and further progress toward viability.
(7) U.S. Government convinced benefits to economy resulting from initial force reduction proposed will in fact strengthen over-all ROK position.

President Eisenhower realizes this will be delicate and difficult negotiation. He does not wish you to give Rhee ultimatum but to use your best judgment as to most persuasive way of obtaining his consent to a substantial reduction of present army forces. For your background information four divisions with no addition to the present 10 reserve divisions by end of U.S. FY 58 is the minimum reduction President Eisenhower is willing to accept now. President feels that with conditions remaining the same, a further reduction may ultimately be made to 11 active divisions including Marines and 12 to 15 reserve divisions but does not want you to press for this at this time. We would prefer not adding to the reserve on account of this deactivation but would apply the 2 to 1 ratio to later reductions.

Dulles

224. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, June 21, 1957—6 p.m.

1080. General Lemnitzer and I met with President Rhee this morning at Chinhae to give him substance Deptel 892 June 19. Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense also present. I had sent word to President Rhee that we wished to discuss modernization US forces Korea and related actions, so he opened conversation by saying he hoped we brought him good news.

General Lemnitzer informed President Rhee of US decision re modern weapons for US forces Korea and read to him statement being made in MAC by US Rep at meeting this afternoon. He then

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/6-2157. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Tokyo with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.

2General Lemnitzer reported on this conversation in telegram FE 805492 from CINCUNC, June 21. He also noted President Rhee’s resistance to any program of reduction for ROK armed forces, “at least until more information was available to him regarding the magnitude and scope of the proposed modernization program, particularly for the ROK Army.” Lemnitzer added that he had had a subsequent conversation with Defense Minister Kim in Pusan, and that Kim had agreed to institute joint U.S.–ROK studies and plans for the reduction of the ROK Army. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)(2))

3Supra.

4See the editorial note, infra.
pointed out modernization was lengthy process, but that program would mean greater capabilities US forces Korea. After outlining first steps to be taken for improvement ROK forces, i.e. additional jet aircraft, transport and communications facilities, and emphasizing resultant greater defensive power UN forces, General Lemnitzer said these actions would allow some reduction in manpower of ROK forces, thus easing financial burden on ROK Government and permitting greater degree economic development.

President Rhee seemed greatly pleased with report generally, and was obviously very happy that sub-paragraph 13d of Armistice Agreement would no longer “tie our hands” as he put it. He was resistant to idea of force reduction, however, saying in effect that this could not be done at present.

In conclusion, I summed up briefly actions outlined refel, and arguments given therein, endeavoring to stress that improvements for ROK forces\(^5\) were dependent upon reduction in acting forces, and pointed to economic considerations involved. I left with President Rhee “talking paper”\(^6\) based on refel.

There was no detailed discussion force reduction, and no figures thereon were mentioned, but Lemnitzer and Defense Minister agreed on staff study of actions which would flow from US decision on modernization.

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\(^5\)The issue of improvements for the armed forces of the Republic of Korea came up more directly in the conversation which Deputy Assistant Secretary Jones had with Ambassador Yang on June 20 to inform the Ambassador of the step being taken in the MAC. Jones explained that only U.S. forces in Korea were to be modernized with atomic-capable weapons, and Ambassador Yang replied that he could not understand such a decision since he had been assured explicitly by Defense Department officials that, in due course, the Republic of Korea Army also would be equipped with such weapons. (Memorandum of conversation by Nes, June 20; Department of State, Central Files, 79S.00/6–2057)

\(^6\)Not found in Department of State files.

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225. Editorial Note

At a June 21 meeting of the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom, General H.L. Litzenberg, Senior U.N. Command Member, made a statement detailing alleged Communist violations of paragraph 13d of the Armistice Agreement and indicating that the U.N. Command would no longer consider itself bound by the limitations imposed by that paragraph “until such time as the relative mili-
tary balance has been restored and your side, by its actions, has demonstrated its willingness to comply." General Jung Kook Rok, Senior Member representing the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers, responded by denouncing the statement made by Litzenberg as an attempt "to wreck the Armistice Agreement and turn South Korea into an American base of atomic warfare". The United Command Report on the 75th meeting of the MAC is enclosed in despatch 128 from Seoul, August 23. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/8-2357)

Repeating the rationale that Communist violations of the Armistice Agreement made the suspension of paragraph 13d a necessity, the United States, in its capacity as the Unified Command, reported the action taken in the Military Armistice Commission on June 21 to the U.N. Secretary-General in a special report dated August 9. (U.N. doc. A/3631)

226. Letter From the Ambassador in Korea (Dowling) to the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons)

Seoul, June 24, 1957.

Dear Howard: In my telegram 1080 of June 21, reporting General Lemnitzer's and my conversation with President Rhee in compliance with the Department's 892 of June 19, I refrained (in agreement with Lemnitzer) from reporting two comments by the old gentleman. The first of these was injected into the conversation as Lemnitzer was first speaking of the decision to bring in modern weapons; President Rhee queried "what good are they unless we have the right to use them?" The second, which came later in the conversation, was an invitation to General Lemnitzer to join him in a "march North," with the suggestion that he was ready to approach Washington with such a demand.

Both Lemnitzer and I felt that to report these remarks in our telegrams on the conversation would lead to misunderstandings on the part of many in Washington not fully familiar with the situation here. President Rhee was, of course, emotionally stirred by the news of the U.S. decision, and I have observed that he is inclined to exaggerated statements on such occasions. As a matter of fact, his com-

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1Source: Department of State, Seoul Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 69, 350-Korea 1957. Secret; Official-Informal.
2Document 224.
3Document 223.
ments were made in a half-joking manner, and when Lemnitzer, in connection with his second comment, said—in the same jocular vein—"Don't upset the apple cart, Mr. President," he rejoined that of course he was only voicing a personal wish, but he nevertheless believed it the only right action.

All in all, I was satisfied with the conversation, except in one particular. In his presentation of the U.S. decision and proposed actions, Lemnitzer referred only in general terms—and not too emphatically—to the reduction in ROK Army forces, and made no effective reply to President Rhee's remark that the ROK forces could only be reduced after unification of the country.

The conversation then drifted off (as conversations with him have a way of doing these days) into a discussion of the need for additional merchant vessels, and President Rhee spent some little time in reminding us that when Korea obtained the CIMA Vls, he was blocked by ECA personnel here, as well as the pro-Japanese State Department, in his efforts to get 10,000 ton ships. This led to an attempt by me to rebut his allegations of pro-Japanese sentiments in the Department, as I feel it unwise, particularly in the presence of other U.S. officials, to allow him to get away with these outrageous statements. As the conversation was breaking up—Mrs. Rhee had summoned us to lunch—I asked for two minutes and attempted—as reported in my telegram—to sum up our proposed actions and the supporting arguments and to make it clear that the measures in support of the ROK Army were dependent upon a reduction in strength. The discussion ended with President Rhee again saying that a reduction could not be carried through at this time, and my insisting that it would be necessary because of the high cost of modern arms and equipment.

Fortunately, I had prepared a "talking paper," which I thought might serve as an informal record of our remarks, and in anticipation that the point on reduction of ROK Army strength might not be adequately stressed, and I was able to leave this with President Rhee. He should, therefore, be in no doubt on this point.

I fear that we may have some little difficulty with the ROKs on this matter, but I feel that we must stand firm. To give in on this would mean storing up grave trouble for ourselves on both economic and military aid programs in the coming year.

With best wishes,
Sincerely yours,

Walter Dowling4

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4Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
227. Letter From President Rhee to President Eisenhower¹

Seoul, June 24, 1957.

Dear Mr. President: A few days ago Ambassador Dowling and General Lemnitzer came to Chinhae to inform me of the decision of the United States to send modern weapons to Korea. Needless to say, I was very gratified to receive this word and I want to express to you my deepest appreciation for the wise influence which you have given to this decision.

In my letter of June 19,² which was sent to Washington before the meeting with Ambassador Dowling and General Lemnitzer, I appealed to you to consider the measures which needed to be taken to remedy the intolerable situation caused by the Communists' complete disregard of the limitations imposed by the Armistice Agreement.

Now an important step has been taken to counterbalance the unfair build up of Communist military strength in the northern part of our country which has been taking place since the day the Armistice Agreement was signed. It would have been a bold stroke for freedom if you had declared the entire Armistice Agreement invalid in view of the repeated violations of the Communist side and we hope that this further step will follow. We cannot emphasize too strongly the influence such action would have in Asia and throughout the world and the encouragement you would have given to all people who are willing to take a courageous stand against the ruthless forces of Communist aggression.

With regard to the reduction of manpower in our Army which was considered in connection with the decision to send newly developed weapons to Korea, I assure you, Mr. President, we will be more than willing to agree to such reduction if this can be accomplished without weakening our ability to achieve the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in Korea which is the essential objective reaffirmed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution of October 7, 1950,³ and the goal for which we have all made great sacrifice. Until this objective is achieved we feel compelled to bear the tremendous burden of maintaining the present level of our defense forces. If the maintenance of the present military strength can be accomplished through the introduction of modern weapons, certainly we will give serious consideration to a reduction of manpower. However, until information is made available

²Not printed. (ibid.)
³General Assembly Resolution 376 (V); U.N. doc. A/1775.
to us concerning the modernization program contemplated and plans are made for the delivery to our forces, the present level of forces must be maintained in the face of the enemy threat that confronts us. We feel this is essential not only for our own sake but for the sake of your great Nation as well.

With kindest regards and best wishes for your good health and good fortune.

Sincerely yours,

Syngman Rhee

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228. Memorandum From the Secretary of the Army (Brucker) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)\(^1\)

Washington, June 27, 1957.

SUBJECT

Introduction of Honest John and 280mm Gun into Korea

1. I should like to express my sense of urgency as to the need of introducing the Honest John rocket and the 280mm gun into Korea. Without these atomic capable weapons, the so-called modernization of our Army forces in Korea following the abrogation of paragraph 13d of the Armistice Agreement is an illusion.\(^2\)

   a. Both weapons are needed for military purposes. The Honest John rocket is an effective area weapon well adapted for use in Korea. It is a major part of the firepower of the new type division (1 battery of 2 launchers for the infantry division) and should be introduced into the 7th and 24th Infantry Divisions when they are reorganized under the Pentomic concept. A military need exists also for the 280mm gun, a precision weapon to cover the critical avenues of approach to Seoul. This weapon provides the commander with a pinpoint means of delivering atomic munitions under all conditions of weather, and it is also an excellent conventional artillery piece. While the road net will impose some limitations on its movements, there is an ample area of maneuver for it on the critical west flank of the line of contact.

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\(^1\)Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 61 A 1672, 471.6 Korea. Secret. A note on the source text indicates that the memorandum was seen by Assistant Secretary of Defense Sprague.

\(^2\)In telegram DA 925255 to CINCUNC/CINCFE, June 25, the Department of Defense authorized General Lemnitzer to modernize U.S. forces in Korea, but noted that no deployment of nuclear-capable weapons or nuclear warheads was authorized pending a further decision on the matter in Washington. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)(2))
b. Apart from military considerations, both the Honest John and the 280mm gun are necessary in Korea to add to the deterrent strength of the Army forces and to reassure our Korean allies. Concern over Communist criticism is pointless as the Communists, regardless of facts, are already charging the United Nations Command with making South Korea an atomic base. Both for military and psychological reasons, it is important that we make the atomic capability of Army forces in Korea a reality without delay.

2. I strongly recommend that the Secretary of Defense urge these considerations upon the Department of State in order to obtain an early authorization of the introduction of the Honest John rocket and the 280mm gun [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

Wilber M. Brucker*3

*3Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

229. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Lemnitzer) to the Department of the Army

Tokyo, June 30, 1957—3:45 p.m.

FE 805592. For Sec Def for ASD/ISA sgd Lemnitzer. References: A. State Dept msg Tokyo 2830 17 Jun 57,2 NOTAL(S). B. FE 805314, 9 Jun 57,3 NOTAL(S).

1. With respect to provisions of reference A, which states that the modernization program for Korea will "not include at this time weapons [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] such as Honest John and the 280-mm cannon," attention is invited to para 4, ref B.4 Had


2Telegram 2830 to Tokyo summarized the briefing given British, Commonwealth, French, Thai, and Turkish representatives on June 17 concerning the U.S. decision to equip U.S. forces in Korea with more modern weapons. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/6–1757)

3In telegram FE 805314 from CINCUNC, an Ad Hoc Korean Armistice Team, sent to Korea by the Department of Defense to report on the extent of the problem posed by Communist violation of the Armistice Agreement, concurred with General Lemnitzer's view that abrogation of the limitations imposed by paragraph 13d was urgent. The team also transmitted a draft statement for use in the Military Armistice Commission to accomplish the recommended abrogation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)(2))

4In paragraph 4 of telegram FE 805314, General Lemnitzer noted his concurrence with the draft statement proposed by the Ad Hoc team "provided it does not impose restrictions upon the introduction of modern military equipment into the Republic of Korea."
hoped that no restrictions whatsoever would be imposed upon the introduction of modern military equipment into the Republic of Korea following suspension of para 13d of the Military Armistice Agreement.

2. I am deeply concerned by the wide press coverage emanating from the United States which indicates a U.S. intention to withhold atomic capable weapons from the Republic of Korea at this time.

3. The Military Armistice Agreement provided for maintaining the relative military balance of the two sides pending a political settlement in Korea. Relief of the United Nations Command (UNC) from compliance with the restrictions contained in the provisions of paragraph 13d permits the UNC to correct the imbalance created by continued Communist violations of the Military Armistice Agreement.

4. In the case of the Republic of Korea, I believe that action to restrict the introduction of weapons is politically and militarily unsound, particularly when such action is publicly announced outside U.S. military channels. Such announcements will greatly increase the difficulties faced by the UNC in its dealings with the ROK particularly since President Rhee cannot be convinced of the logic of such a restriction.

5. I cannot, of course, object to a directive provided me through military channels which prohibits the transfer of the Honest John or 280-mm gun to Korea. I do object, however, to the public announcement of such restriction in the press. The intelligence value to the Communists of such announcements is obvious.

6. Furthermore, President Rhee and other officials of the Government of the Republic of Korea, based on information they see in the press and receive from Washington (probably through Ambassador Yang), have come to believe that there are severe reservations on the part of the United States to providing the optimum modernization of US/UN Forces in the ROK. This causes them deep concern and will complicate the already difficult problem of obtaining the Government of The Republic of Korea’s agreement to a reduction of the ROK Armed Forces, as they consider any reduction in forces to be completely dependent on a program of modernization of their forces which is acceptable to the ROK.

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*In telegram 300645Z from CINCPAC to CNO, July 4, Admiral Stump concurred with General Lemnitzer that “publicity in this case is the essence of evil causing difficult and undesirable relationships between the US and ROK govt.” Stump also agreed “wholeheartedly” that restriction of the introduction of modern weapons was politically and militarily unsound. He argued that “no single step to improve our military posture and to deter the communists from resuming hostilities could be more important at this time than to eliminate any fetters (including those self-imposed) which preclude the introduction of weapons into Korea.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)(2))
230. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) ¹

Washington, July 17, 1957.

SUBJECT

Introduction of 280mm Gun and Honest John into Korea

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 19 June 1957, subject: “U.S. Policy Toward Korea.”² The memorandum directs that once the announcement has been made in the Military Armistice Commission that the United States is proceeding to modernize the defenses of the United Nations Command in Korea, the U.S. forces deployed in Korea will be modernized; [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. This announcement in the Military Armistice Commission was made on 21 June 1957.³

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the introduction of the 280mm gun and Honest John into Korea at this time would have the following advantages to the United States:

   a. It would assist the United States during current negotiations with President Rhee in obtaining agreement to a reduction of the Republic of Korea forces.

   b. It would accomplish complete modernization of U.S. forces in one action thereby denying the Communists another opportunity to exploit United Nations’ action for propaganda purposes.

3. This consideration is based upon the following:

   a. On 30 June 1957, General Lemnitzer stated that President Rhee and other officials of the Government of the Republic of Korea had come to believe that there are severe reservations on the part of the United States to provide the optimum modernization of United States/United Nations forces in Korea. Accordingly, President Rhee could be expected to resist a reduction of Republic of Korea forces.⁴

   b. The modernization of U.S. ground forces in Korea is to be completed by reorganizing the 7th and 24th Infantry Divisions under the “Pentomic Concept” and re-equipment Corps type units. Under this concept each division requires two Honest John launchers to provide long-range fire support on area type targets. The 280mm gun is required at Corps level to supply long-range fire support on preci-

¹Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 61 B 1672, 471.6 Korea, Top Secret. A covering note to Admiral Radford from General Wentworth, Secretary to the JCS, attached to a copy of this memorandum, indicates that it was derived from JCS 1776/578, "Introduction of 280mm Gun and Honest John into Korea." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)(2); JCS 1776/578 attached thereto)

²Not found. A note on a draft of this memorandum attached to JCS 1776/578, cited in footnote 1 above, indicates that a copy of this memorandum was attached to JCS 1776/575.

³See Document 225.

⁴See telegram FE 805592, supra.
sion type targets. Without these weapons the modernization of ground forces in Korea is limited. The weapons are available in the theater for introduction into Korea.

c. Since the United Nations Command has announced its intention to modernize in Korea, it should accomplish the modernization as one action. Treating the introduction of the Honest John and 280mm gun as a separate action would only highlight such action to the Communists as a basis for propaganda.

4. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Secretary of State, take appropriate action to obtain Presidential authorization for the immediate introduction of the 280mm gun and Honest John [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] into Korea.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Arthur Radford⁸
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

⁸Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

231. Letter From President Eisenhower to President Rhee¹


Dear Mr. President: You have written me two letters on June 19, 1957, and June 24, 1957, counseling us to restore the military balance which Communist violations of the Armistice Agreement had upset and thanking us for our recent decision to redress that balance by the introduction of more modern weapons.

I thank you for sending both these letters. I share your confidence that our decision is the right one. You can rest assured, Mr. President, that the security of the Republic of Korea is of deep concern to the United States, as it is to yourself.

It has become imperative for our own budget, Mr. President, that the costs of maintaining the forces of the Republic of Korea at their present combat power be reduced. The modernization of United States forces and the addition of improved equipment for your own,

¹Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Confidential; Priority; Presidential Handling. Transmitted in telegram 67 to Seoul, July 20, which is the source text. Telegram 67 was drafted by R.L. Burns of S/S and cleared in the White House by Goodpaster. The first paragraph of telegram 67 notes that the letter is a reply to Rhee's letters of June 19 and 24; see Document 227 and footnote 2 thereto.
buttressed by the retaliatory power of this country, the Mutual Defense Treaty between our two countries and the Joint Policy Declaration signed by sixteen nations on July 27, 1953, should more than compensate for your reductions. I know that you will welcome the increasing effectiveness of our aid program and the expansion to your own economy and over-all strength which will be consequent on these military reductions.

These considerations, Mr. President, prompted my decision to instruct Ambassador Dowling and General Lemnitzer to lay before you a plan which jointly includes reduction in your armed forces and the improved equipment of the remainder. This plan, in all its aspects, has my wholehearted personal support and must, in my judgment, be accomplished soon for the attainment of our common-held objectives.

The unification of your country of which you spoke remains an important objective of the United States; the plan we have presented will in no way adversely affect its attainment. We shall lose no feasible opportunity to bring about the peaceful unification of a democratic and independent Korea.

With my sincerest personal good wishes,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

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2In telegram 73 to Seoul, July 22, a joint State-Defense message, the Embassy was instructed to emphasize, when delivering the Eisenhower letter to Rhee, that the question of the reduction of Korean forces was not negotiable insofar as U.S. support was concerned. The Embassy responded, in telegram 73 from Seoul, July 24, that the instructions had arrived after the delivery of the President’s letter. The Embassy added that the Minister of Defense had urged that U.S. officials refrain from discussing the question of force reduction with President Rhee until the completion of a study of the matter being undertaken by the South Korean Government. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/6-2157 and 795.00/7-2457, respectively)

3Telegram 67 bears this typed signature.

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232. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, Washington, July 23, 1957, 11 a.m.  

OTHERS PRESENT

General Lemnitzer
General Goodpaster
Major Eisenhower

General Lemnitzer came in to report to the President on the termination of the Far East Command. He said that a turnover ceremony had been held in Tokyo, in which Admiral Stump assumed the United States responsibilities, and another had been held in Korea in which General Decker assumed the functions of the UN Commander-in-Chief. General Lemnitzer said he had also visited with the Generalissimo on Formosa, and had found him somewhat low in spirits and quite worried over the effect that the passage of time is having on the military and political situation of the Chinese Nationalists. General Lemnitzer had also addressed the Ryukyuan legislature in Okinawa, reviewing the progress that had been made since 1945 when they were destitute to the present time.

He then went on to comment on two recent actions which he said were tremendously helpful in the western Pacific. The first was the suspension of Paragraph 13d of the Armistice; this is a great help to maintaining a proper military posture in the area. The second was the issuance of an Executive Order placing the administration of the Ryukyu Islands on a sound basis. He said it was very good to have designated as High Commissioner the same man who was in military command in the Ryukyus. The President interjected that the principle of linking military and civilian responsibility in a single individual is fundamental to his concept of the functioning of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Lemnitzer also reported that the land program is well under way in Okinawa—this is the program by which all land not strongly needed by the military forces is returned to the civilian economy.

General Lemnitzer said that in Korea there is a constant effort from the north to subvert the government in the south, and to push infiltrators across the boundary into South Korea. These carry narcotics and money, in an effort to bribe and buy South Koreans. ROK forces are alert to these attempts and capture a considerable number of these agents. The line of contact is heavily wired and mined, with definite check points for entry into the demilitarized zone, and with limited cleared paths through the zone. He said that the idea of pulling back from the armistice line so as to create a "no man's land" has proved most valuable. He said that the morale of U.S. troops along the front is very high. The young Americans there are doing a fine job and have a fine attitude. They take their responsibilities very seriously. Over the last year or two, much better housing and training facilities have been made available, with little or no loss in combat readiness. He added that President Rhee had sent his warm personal
regards to the President. Reverting later to Korea, he indicated that the presence of our two divisions there is very important—essential in fact to our retaining the command which has tremendous value to our whole position in the area. The President indicated he was not thinking of pulling out either of these divisions. He did, however, insist that with the coming of modern weapons the units can be streamlined, and that divisions should be modernized and reorganized. General Lemnitzer said that the new organization is being placed in effect in Korea, and is proving to be a "shot in the arm." The President said what he is working for is a hard core stable program, with the excess trimmed out, that can be maintained over the years. He wants to cut down on manpower by exploiting weapons possibilities to the full.

General Lemnitzer said there is need for permission to bring the Honest John and 280 mm. guns into Korea. The President asked how this matter stood, and I recalled that it was left to be considered further after the initial suspension of Paragraph 13d had been announced. The President said he felt that on such actions, they should simply be taken without making a great public announcement about them. General Lemnitzer said he strongly supported exactly the same procedure—if people saw new weapons around and asked about them they would be told that specific details as to timing, numbers, etc. were and would remain classified. The President strongly endorsed this procedure.

[Here follows discussion of an unrelated subject.]

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Brigadier General, USA

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233. **Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Decker) to the Department of the Army**¹

*Seoul, July 23, 1957—5:25 p.m.*

UK 97747CG (DA IN 40537). DA as Executive Agent, ASD/ISA for Sprague sgd Decker. This message in 6 parts.

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Part 2. During a call on ROK Defense Minister Kim Chung Yul on 22 July at which Lieutenant General Jae Hung Yu, chairman, ROK JCS was also present, we discussed the matter of reduction in ROK Forces. Kim agreed that some reduction was desirable if it would result in strengthening the ROK economy, but was concerned over any cut in the forces defending the ROK while the present state of suspended hostilities continues and the communists retain their military capability in North Korea. He stated that President Rhee and the Korean people must be convinced that any reduction in conventional forces will not endanger the security of the ROK. He expressed his willingness to work with the US in developing a plan for a phased reduction in manpower provided some other compensating strength was made available. He requested information as to the modern weapons (meaning atomic capable weapons) which the US would make available to compensate for the loss of ground combat power. I informed Minister Kim that I did not know what modern weapons would be made available to defend Korea, or when they could be expected, but that I would attempt to find out. I assured him that the US was firmly determined to defend ROK in the case of renewed commie aggression and that our deterrent power should be taken into account even though most of it was not located in Korea.

Part 3. Both Minister Kim and General Yu made the point that it would be necessary to continue US aid at approximately its present level if the force reduction was to be reflected in the Korean economy. I informed them that this could not be guaranteed since I was dependent on congressional appropriations.

Part 4. When General Lemnitzer discussed this matter with the present Defense Minister’s predecessor, it was suggested that the matter of force reduction be studied jointly by the US Staff and ROK JCS. I have thus far delayed bilateral discussion with ROK JCS pending completion of an estimate of the situation by the US Staff; this estimate has now been completed. One significant conclusion is

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2Document 223.
3In telegram FE 805587 from CINCUNC, June 29, General Lemnitzer noted that the proposed U.S.-ROK joint studies and planning for force level reductions would probably take several months to complete. He therefore questioned plans to designate him as a special representative of the Secretary of Defense to remain in Korea and oversee the planning effort. Lemnitzer argued that to do so would undercut the position of General Decker as CINCUNC after July 1. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)(2))
4See footnote 2, Document 224.
5Not printed.
6Not found.
that in light of present enemy capabilities a minimum of 21 US/ROK Divisions are required initially for defense of ROK. This will involve certain risks and modification of missions; a reduction below this figure cannot be justified from military considerations. The ROK JCS are also unilaterally studying the possibility of force reduction with contemplated completion date 28 July. I have no information as to the tentative conclusions of this study. Obviously, the results of the US study should not be made known to them if they are to be asked to accept a cut below what the US study concludes is a valid requirement. Furthermore, it seems pointless to enter into any bilateral discussion until knowledge is available here as to US plans to provide an acceptable substitute for the proposed loss in ground power. Such information must be quite specific as to type and time to be made available if it is to be used advantageously.

Part 5. In my opinion, if information as to US plans can be furnished the Defense Minister it will be possible to develop jointly with him a plan for a phased reduction in present forces which he will recommend to the President. Conversely, without it, the possibilities of obtaining agreement are not promising. There is no assurance that President Rhee will accept a cut even if recommended by his Defense Minister. However, to obtain the support of the latter, if possible, appeared to be the most logical procedure.

Part 6. It is requested that information concerning US plans and which is releasable to ROK officials be furnished me at the earliest practicable date.

234. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Jones) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)\(^1\)

*Washington, July 24, 1957.*

**SUBJECT**

Modernization Program in Korea

The following is furnished in reply to your request for information on the modernization of United States forces in Korea. The Department has been unable to obtain detailed information on shipping and delivery schedules or complete data on types of equipment and quantities, and the like, from the Department of Defense. The recent

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\(^1\)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/7-2457. Confidential. Drafted by Barbis.
command shifts in the Pacific area, which also involved the move of the United Nations Command from Tokyo to Seoul, may have created some confusion in the implementation of the modernization program which explains the lack of complete and detailed information at this time.

We have been informed that on June 25, 1957 authority was given to the theater command to proceed with implementation of the decision to modernize United States forces in Korea. Under this authority, certain types of equipment available in Japan, which were previously excluded from introduction into Korea, were to be shipped to Korea. Other equipment was to be requisitioned for delivery from depots in the United States. Examples of the equipment involved include the M-47 tank (22 scheduled for delivery per month), the M-75 armored personnel carrier and recoilless rifles. Requisitions for equipment to be delivered from the United States have apparently been initiated. The types and amounts of such equipment is currently being determined by Defense in conjunction with the theater command. It is our understanding that the modernization of United States forces in Korea is being implemented within established priorities in view of the reorganization of all United States divisions which is also currently underway. Defense has requested a full report on the implementation of the modernization program in Korea from the theater command.

The Department has not been kept fully informed on the modernization program. I would like to suggest, therefore, that at the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting you request that a report describing the plans, equipment, weapons, and delivery schedules under the program, be made available to the Department.

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2 On July 1, General Lemnitzer completed his tour of duty as CINCFE/CINCUNC. The theater command structure in the Far East was revised at the same time, and the position of Commander in Chief, Far East was abolished. In a ceremony in Tokyo, Admiral Felix B. Stump, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, assumed the responsibilities previously exercised by CINCFE. In another ceremony in Seoul, General George H. Decker assumed the functions of Commander in Chief, U.N. Command.
Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Korean Ambassador (Yang) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson), Department of State, Washington, July 26, 1957

SUBJECT
Aid Levels and Reduction ROK Army

Ambassador Yang requested an appointment to express his worry about possible cuts in aid appropriations in Congress. He explained that the Korean people are "up in the air" about the matter.

Mr. Robertson responded that he, too, was very much worried, not only with respect to Korea but also in terms of its impact throughout Asia. He added that the United States is helping to support one million eight hundred thousand troops in Asia. These anti-Communist forces represent an important factor in the military balance. Even so, it looks most probable that cuts will be made by the Congress. In this event there is only one way to adjust, and that is to reduce the size of these standing armies. We will want to be sure, however, that such reductions do not reduce military capabilities. The development of nuclear weapons has in fact changed the character of modern defense. However, their cost is astonishingly high. The development of nuclear weapons has given man the power to destroy himself. Mr. Robertson stated that he intends to talk to President Rhee about this matter the next time he sees him. Certainly if there is World War III with nuclear bombs, there would be colossal destruction and the winner will find himself on top of a heap of ruins. This fact may preclude such weapons ever being used.

Mr. Robertson stated that President Rhee must realize the point which was included in the recent exchange of letters with President Eisenhower that there is no way we can continue to furnish the supplies for the present size ROK force. Of course, the decision to reduce the ROK Army lies with the Government of the Republic of Korea. However, with a cut in defense support, a continuation of the present level of ROK forces could have disastrous economic effects in Korea. He explained that we feel that the United States deterrent power, modernization connected with the MAC statement on June 21, 1957, the United States-Korean Mutual Defense Treaty and the Joint Policy Declaration of the Sixteen of July 27, 1953 are the real deterrents to Communist aggression in Korea.

We know that the Communists are being strained. Recently, Mr. Khrushchev complained of the drain on the USSR by Communist

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.5/7-2657. Confidential. Drafted by Parsons.
2See Document 225.
China. The Communists also know that overt aggression on their part in Korea could lead to all-out war.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that in our judgment a reduction of the Korean Army by four divisions would not make the difference between attacking and not attacking on the part of the Communists in Korea. He further pointed out that the modernization of United States forces is a compensating factor for these reductions. In addition, the savings which would be derived from the reduction of four divisions would be good for the Korean economy.

Ambassador Yang expressed the view that President Rhee would be willing to go along with a cut in the ROK forces if the remainder were modernized in a manner similar to that now being undertaken for United States forces. Mr. Robertson explained that the United States Government is not going to reorganize the ROK Army into peninsular divisions. This is being done for no country in the world. However, there will be some modernization of the Korean forces leading to the introduction of much better equipment.

At this point Mr. Robertson referred to a statement attributed to Ambassador Yang to the effect that Defense officials had promised to modernize the ROK forces with nuclear weapons following the completion of this action for United States forces. Mr. Robertson pointed out that this is not the United States policy. Ambassador Yang denied making any such statement.

Mr. Robertson explained that although we were not doing the same for other military forces the type of modernization being undertaken for our own is absolutely essential. Our forces are smaller in numbers in relation to the size and population of the country. Therefore, it is essential that they be the strongest possible.

Mr. Robertson emphasized that President Rhee must realize that our actions and recommendations with respect to the forces in Korea will have the effect of strengthening the defensive position there. Reduction in force levels without weakening the military position, however, will have beneficial effects in the Korean economy.

Ambassador Yang commented that the Koreans do not want to be caught holding obsolete equipment, particularly when the Communists in the north are well-equipped. Mr. Robertson explained that the Korean forces will get much better equipment but we cannot do the same as we are doing for the United States forces there.

Ambassador Yang then asked about the prospects for civilian aid. He added that it is impossible for Korea to take such aid on a loan basis. Mr. Robertson commented that the economic aid is before the Congress and we may well have a cut in that, too. With regard to the question of loans, he explained that he has often pointed out

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8See footnote 5, Document 224.
Korea’s inability to repay loans. However, if it becomes imperative to put such aid on a loan basis, we will have to work out soft terms in recognition of Korea’s absence of repayment capability.

236. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, July 29, 1957.


"In view existing military situation this country any reduction Korean armed forces this juncture considered unwise even dangerous. Any reduction manpower without proper systematic planning can result only terrible disaster not only Korea but entire free world.”

Foreign Minister said “Communist forces outnumber combined ROK-U.S. forces, are equipped with most up-to-date weapons,” and referred to presence large forces across Yalu. “Our economic difficulties, however great, do not justify any move that would create opportunity renewed Communist aggression.”

Citing recent historical consequences military unpreparedness, he concluded: “It only too clear we will be repeating same mistakes if reduce strength ROK forces without providing them and U.S. forces Korea with most modern and effective weapons available today.”

According Tonga Ilbo and Korea Times, Foreign Minister denied ROK received official notification by U.S. of troop reductions but conceded receipt informal notices.

Dowling

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/7–2957. Unclassified.
237. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea

Washington, August 2, 1957—4:03 p.m.

104. Also pass CINCUNC. Your 91. Department annoyed ROK attempt negotiate force reduction in press. Do not believe setting record straight publicly at this point would correct damage of ROK breach confidential nature discussions this subject.

Would prefer your emphasizing to Koreans especially Ministers Defense and Foreign Affairs undesirability revealing through press policy matters under bilateral discussion. Should also be pointed out to them that their public statements not accurate since as they know ROK forces remaining after force reduction will be modernized by improvements cited our 892 June 18, 1957. Further you have given them economic reasons for force reduction together with our conviction over-all strengthening ROK defense position resulting from force reduction, modernization U.S. forces, etc. Attempts influence US decision by discussion in press are not considered by US as part our government to government negotiations and therefore will not be instrumental changing US position. However, they could have effect jeopardizing negotiations.

Herter

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/7-2657. Confidential. Drafted by Barbis, approved by Robertson, and cleared with FE and the Department of Defense.

2In telegram 91 from Seoul, July 26, the Embassy urged that the Department of State or the Department of Defense issue a press release to rebut the “distorted publicity from Korean side re proposed ROK forces reduction.” (Ibid.)

3Document 223.

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238. Letter From President Rhee to President Eisenhower

Seoul, August 2, 1957.

Dear Mr. President: Thank you for your letter of July 19 which I received this week through Ambassador Dowling.

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2Document 231.
While I am aware that there are economic considerations that make a reduction in our armed forces desirable, I seriously question the wisdom of doing so at this time.

Before reaching this conclusion, I called in our Chiefs of Staff, quietly and separately, and they are agreed on the following points:

First, we do not know what modern weapons are coming, nor how many, nor when. Until we have this information, we cannot evaluate the implications of a reduction in our armed forces.

Second, we do not know whether the modernization program will apply equally to the United States Forces in Korea and to the Korean Forces. We have heard that the United States contemplates modernizing only one or more United States Divisions in Korea. Our people are reluctant to believe that the United States will equip only American troops with modern weapons while the troops of her allies in Korea will continue to have obsolete and outmoded weapons and equipment. We have been fighting shoulder to shoulder against a common enemy who is bent upon our destruction and if the United States were now to discriminate in the matter of armaments, please think of the adverse effect it would have, both militarily and psychologically.

It is a tragedy indeed when Asian people and countries turn against America. This must not happen in Korea where the friendly sentiment of the people of America provides one of the strongest bulwarks against the further spread of Communism.

With reference to the Mutual Defense Treaty between our two countries, we are forever grateful for this assurance that America will come to our aid when aggression threatens us. The Communist Chinese are an increasing menace to our security and as long as they are in ruthless control of the northern half of our country we cannot attain a unified, free and independent country which is the goal the United Nations has accepted for Korea.

Added to these concerns is our mounting fear of renewed Japanese expansion. We have reported to you and to your Secretary of State that Japan claims that 85% of the property of Korea belongs to the Japanese. Thus far the United States has done nothing to make the Japanese withdraw this preposterous claim though it is a flagrant violation of the terms of the Peace Treaty.

Moreover, encouragement is being given to Japan's ambitions to have hegemony of all of Asia, and the Japanese are becoming more and more confident that they will once again gain control of other countries in the Pacific area and America's leadership of free Asia will be lost.

The consequences would be disastrous for us. Under America's leadership and with the help and support of the American people, our people have been able to face these past years of trial and stress.
with a growing determination to resist aggression and keep their hard-won freedom. They are aware, as you and I are, that the dangers to their security have not lessened, and they know that to deter our enemies Korea must be militarily and economically strong.

If we remain firm in our resolve to guard against renewed aggression and unify Korea, I am confident we will succeed, and the victory will be a victory for all the free nations of the world as well as for your country and mine.

Sincerely yours,

Syngman Rhee

239. Memorandum of Discussion at the 334th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 8, 1957

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1–6.]

7. U.S. Policy Toward Korea (NSC 5702; NSC 5702/1; NSC Action No. 1731;2 Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Interim Report on Korea", dated July 30, 1957;3 Memos for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, subject: "U.S. Policy Toward Korea", dated August 54 and 7,5 1957)

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2See footnote 8, Document 221.
3This memorandum from Executive Secretary Lay transmitted to the NSC an interim report prepared jointly by the Departments of State and Defense in accordance with NSC Action No. 1731-c. The report assessed the international reaction to the U.N. Command statement on June 21 in the Military Armistice Commission, and the results of discussions with President Rhee concerning a reduction in Republic of Korea force levels. The interim report is undated, but it was conveyed to Cutler under cover
Mr. Cutler briefed the Council at considerable length as Secretary Dulles came into the Cabinet Room and replaced Mr. Reinhardt at the table. Mr. Cutler read in detail paragraphs 9–a, –b and –c in the revised form proposed by the NSC Planning Board, as follows:

"9. a. Continue through the period FY 1958 to deploy in Korea two U.S. infantry divisions and one fighter-bomber wing with necessary support forces.

"b. Replace existing equipment of U.S. forces in Korea, including planes, with improved models of such equipment as and when required for military reasons.

of a memorandum from Leonhart of S/P dated July 29. The July 30 memorandum by Lay and attached report are in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5702 Series. A copy of the July 29 memorandum by Leonhart, with attached report, is ibid., S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, Korea, US Policy Toward (NSC 5702, 5702/1, 5702/2).

"In this memorandum, Lay circulated to the NSC revised versions of paragraphs 9, 10, and 19 of NSC 5702/1. The revised paragraphs were drafted by the NSC Planning Board after consideration of the interim report cited in footnote 3 above. Subparagraphs a, b, and c of paragraph 9 are quoted in the memorandum of discussion printed here in connection with Cutler’s preliminary briefing. Subparagraph 10a is quoted later in the discussion. The language of the revised paragraphs proposed by the Planning Board was adopted in large measure in the policy statement approved on August 9 as NSC 5702/2, infra. The Planning Board revisions differ from the language ultimately adopted in NSC 5702/2 in the following respects: (1) in accordance with a JCS recommendation, the qualifying phrase “a minimum of” was inserted in subparagraph 9a after “to deploy in Korea”; (2) the qualifying clause in subparagraph 9c of the Planning Board revision reads: “provided that weapons [1 line of source text not declassified] shall be deployed to Korea only as and when determined by the President after conferences with the Secretaries of State and Defense”; (3) the word “minimum” was substituted for the word “no” in subparagraph 10a as indicated in the memorandum of discussion printed here. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5702 Series)

On August 7, Lay circulated to the NSC, under cover of an explanatory memorandum, a copy of a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, dated August 6. The memorandum by the Joint Chiefs contained their views on the proposed revisions of paragraph 9 of NSC 5702/1. As noted in footnote 4 above, the change which they proposed in subparagraph 9a was incorporated in the policy statement as finally adopted by the NSC. The other change they proposed, which was to delete all of the qualifying elements in subparagraph 9c so as to reduce it to a simple statement reading “Equip U.S. forces in Korea with modern weapons,” was not adopted by the NSC. The Joint Chiefs felt that the remainder of the proposed revised paragraphs were “acceptable from a military point of view”. (Ibid.)
"c. Equip U.S. forces in Korea with modern weapons, provided that weapons [1 line of source text not declassified] shall be deployed to Korea only as and when determined by the President after conference with the Secretaries of State and Defense."

Mr. Cutler then pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to delete, in subparagraph 9-c, the limitations therein on the deployment to Korea [1 line of source text not declassified]. Instead of the version of subparagraph 9-c proposed by the Planning Board, the Joint Chiefs had asked for language to indicate that the Secretary of Defense should seek the concurrence of the Secretary of State and obtain early Presidential approval for the immediate introduction into Korea of weapons possessing an atomic delivery capability [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

The President inquired whether the older version of these subparagraphs (NSC 5702/1, considered by the Council in March) did not state that the timing of the deployment of such weapons to Korea would be determined by the President. As the President recalled it, the reason for this was our great political need to find out the reaction of our friends and allies to the announcement that we were proposing to modernize U.S. forces in Korea despite Article 13(d).

Mr. Cutler called on Secretary Dulles, but Secretary Wilson interrupted to state that it might be helpful to Secretary Dulles if he, Secretary Wilson, first talked for a moment about the Defense Department position on this issue. He said that his own personal position differed a little from that of many of his colleagues in the Defense Department. While he was quite aware of the military needs for modernizing U.S. forces in Korea, he was also keenly aware of the political and psychological aspects of the problem. Above all, he wished to avoid "heating up" the difficulties in Korea any more than could be helped, and he was also very concerned about the problem of the costs of modernization. Secretary Wilson added that he had, however, received a report from his people only yesterday, stating that if the package deal proposed in NSC 5702/1 were adopted, we would be able to bring home approximately 8000 American military personnel, and we could cut out four active South Korean divisions, which would save us approximately $25 million a year. If such savings could be made, Secretary Wilson believed it would be worth while [1 line of source text not declassified] to modernize U.S. forces there.

Secretary Dulles then took the floor, and stated that the general proposal to countermand the provisions of Article 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement had been pretty well received throughout the Free World. The reason for this favorable reaction to our announcement was that our course of action had been carefully planned and carefully worked out with our allies. [7 lines of source text not declassified]
His second point, continued Secretary Dulles, was that this whole modernization plan was a package deal involving a reduction in the force levels of the ROK forces. Secretary Dulles insisted that the United States was not in a position to sustain the costs of supporting the present level of the South Korean forces to the tune of over $700 million a year. Congress was going to insist on a very sharp cut in our military assistance and defense support programs world-wide. If we continue to try to support the present high levels of the indigenous forces in Korea, we will find ourselves obliged to make drastic reductions in our military aid programs in other parts of the world. Yet, there was so far no evidence whatsoever that we were going to succeed in getting South Korea to agree to a cut in ROK force levels. President Rhee was, as usual, being stubborn and tough in these negotiations. Therefore, Secretary Dulles did not think that it was wise to introduce at this time into Korea weapons [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]—the big ones, such as the Honest John rockets and the 280 mm. cannon—which are primarily psychological in their impact and designed to impress upon the South Koreans the fact that we have really modernized our U.S. forces there.

Secretary Dulles said that the previous argument had been that if our U.S. forces were given such [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Rhee would be induced to agree to reducing the active divisions of the ROK armed forces. On the other hand, if Rhee does not propose to agree to cut his forces, there was no point in now putting in these [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. In any event, the timing for the introduction of such weapons should be determined, as suggested in the proposed subparagraph 9-c, by the President in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense. The decision would depend primarily on the attitude shown by Rhee in negotiations with our people, and on his willingness to reduce South Korean force levels.

Mr. Cutler indicated his agreement with the Secretary of State's position, and said that that was why the Planning Board had drafted subparagraph 9-c in its present form. He then suggested that General Lemnitzer speak to the Council regarding his recent negotiations with President Rhee.

General Lemnitzer indicated that President Rhee had been very pleased indeed with our decision to suspend Article 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement and to proceed to modernize U.S. forces in Korea. However, President Rhee indicated that he wanted more information on the precise character of the modernization of forces which we contemplated and, particularly, what we had in mind with respect to the modernization of the ROK Army. General Lemnitzer and Ambassador Dowling, following their instructions from Washington, had explained as best they could what we had in mind by way of mod-
ernization, but, of course, could not, in accordance with instructions from Washington, make any mention of the 280 mm. cannon or the Honest John rockets.

General Lemnitzer said that President Rhee seemed honestly anxious to be sure that the ROK retained sufficient military power to resist any renewed Communist aggression from the north. Accordingly, General Lemnitzer had come up with the suggestion for a joint study by U.S. and ROK military personnel as to possible reduction in the level of ROK forces in the light of the modernization of U.S. forces in Korea. Actually, continued General Lemnitzer, if you look at the current situation candidly, we are not really modernizing our U.S. forces in Korea as long as the restrictions against the Honest John rockets and the 280 mm. cannon remain in force. Or, at any rate, the ROK authorities do not really believe we are modernizing our forces when they fail to see these atomic-capable weapons. Moreover, General Lemnitzer felt that he must point out that the Honest John rocket and the 280 mm. cannon were not weapons designed to produce a psychological impact. They constitute valuable defensive weapons and will add greatly to our military strength in Korea. Finally, if Communist aggression should recur in Korea, we would find it very difficult to explain to the American people why we had not provided our forces in Korea with the most modern and efficient weapons in our possession.

Secretary Dulles took exception to these last remarks of General Lemnitzer, and said that it was his understanding that the Council had been shown a rather lengthy list of modern weapons which were to be supplied to our forces in Korea, and that of this long list the State Department had taken exception to the deployment of only two types—namely, the Honest John rocket and the 280 mm. cannon. General Lemnitzer replied that he did not deny the accuracy of Secretary Dulles’ statement, but said that the other modern weapons were really not very significant as compared to the Honest John rocket and the 280 mm. cannon. These were the two big weapons.

Secretary Dulles replied that if this were the case, he still could not see why we should now play our trump card—that is, these two big weapons—until President Rhee had agreed to reduce the ROK force levels in exchange for the deployment of these atomic-capable weapons.

Secretary Wilson intervened to point out that the deployment of the Honest John rockets and the 280 mm. cannon was particularly designed to bar the invasion route from North Korea into South Korea.

Mr. Cutler said that it seemed to him that subparagraph 9–c, as proposed by the Planning Board, was admirably designed to settle this question. The President disagreed with Mr. Cutler, and pointed
out that General Lemnitzer was bringing up a different argument—namely, that our U.S. divisions in Korea ought to have the Honest John rockets and the 280 mm. cannon as basic weapons. Secretary Dulles, on the other hand, was arguing that we should not introduce these weapons into South Korea until President Rhee had agreed to reduce ROK force levels. In any event, continued the President, we ought now to be in a position to go to Rhee and state that if he will agree to certain reductions in ROK force levels, we in turn will agree to modernize our U.S. forces in Korea with Honest John rockets and the 280 mm. cannon.

Mr. Cutler commented that this proposal of the President’s was likewise in accordance with the proposed subparagraph 9–c.

Admiral Radford then pointed out that as yet [1 line of source text not declassified]. The President expressed surprise, and said that he thought this proposal had been agreed to when the National Security Council last discussed the Korean policy paper. Mr. Cutler remarked that [2 lines of source text not declassified]. As he understood it, this matter would be handled elsewhere.⁶

At this point, Secretary Dulles read portions of President Rhee’s recent letter to President Eisenhower—portions which indicated Rhee’s concern that the ROK forces should be modernized as well as the U.S. forces. Secretary Dulles warned that it was going to cost an awful lot of money if the United States found itself obliged to modernize both the South Korean and the U.S. divisions in Korea. Admiral Radford pointed out that at least we could pass on some of our older equipment to the ROK divisions as the U.S. forces are progressively modernized with new weapons. Admiral Radford also pointed out that the process of modernizing U.S. forces would carry over a considerable period of time.

Secretary Dulles expressed some frank and unflattering views of President Rhee. President Rhee appeared to him as essentially an Oriental bargainer. In the best of circumstances it was going to be very hard to get him to agree to a reduction of the ROK forces. Indeed, to achieve this we may have to give him a heavy jolt, because he is a master of evasion.

Secretary Wilson suggested that the best way to provide a jolt for President Rhee would be to hold back U.S. funds.

Mr. Cutler said that it seemed to him that General Lemnitzer believed that if, in the course of further negotiations, we could mention the Honest John rockets and the 280 mm. cannon, we could probably bring Rhee to accept the desired reduction in ROK force levels. General Lemnitzer confirmed this view.

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⁶Footnote [16-1/2 lines of text] not declassified.
⁷Supra.
Secretary Dulles then inquired whether it would not be wise to send some kind of communication to our people in Korea after the conclusion of this meeting. The President said that it would be very hard to get all the nuances expressed in a single statement, but suggested that the Secretaries of State and Defense try to formulate a statement and perhaps send qualified personnel to take the statement to Korea.

Admiral Radford once again stressed the fact that one of the major purposes of modernizing U.S. forces in Korea [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was to safeguard the security of our forces there.

Mr. Cutler then went on to say that the remaining revised paragraphs proposed by the NSC Planning Board—namely, paragraphs 10 and 19—were not very controversial. He read subparagraph 10–a, as follows:

"10. With respect to ROK forces through FY 1958:

a. Negotiate with the Republic of Korea for a substantial reduction in active ROK forces (by at least four active divisions at this time, with no increases in reserve divisions); in return for converting the three remaining conventional ROK fighter-bomber squadrons into jet squadrons and providing to ground forces currently programmed improved transport and communications equipment, and taking into account the modernization of U.S. forces in Korea."

The President said he approved of this version of subparagraph 10–a, and stated that we must now be in a position to inform President Rhee of precisely what we propose to do by way of modernizing U.S. forces in Korea.

Secretary Wilson said that with respect to subparagraph 10–a, the Defense Department did not wish to agree that there could be no increase in reserve ROK divisions to compensate for the reduction of four active ROK divisions. After all, said Secretary Wilson, it was much less expensive to support reserve divisions than active divisions. Admiral Radford pointed out that Secretary Wilson's view did not conform entirely to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When the Joint Chiefs had looked into the matter, they had found that the cost of maintaining reserve divisions was still very high.

The President suggested that the language should not be made too restrictive, and that leeway should be given to our people who were negotiating with Rhee. Mr. Cutler then suggested that the word "minimum" should be substituted for the word "no" in the third line of subparagraph 10–a.

In a philosophical vein, the President observed that when you look at this little finger of South Korea sticking out of mainland Asia, you recall that the statement made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
ten years ago is as true today as it was then—namely, the statement that while Korea is of no military importance to us in general war, it is psychologically and politically of such importance that to lose it would run the risk of the loss of our entire position in the Far East. Accordingly, we have got to carry on in South Korea.

Mr. Cutler then pointed out that there remained one more split in NSC 5702/1 which should be resolved. This related to paragraph 23, where a course of action was set forth indicating what the United States should do or consider doing if, despite the actions taken under Annex F, ROK forces should renew hostilities unilaterally. The State Department wished to insert the term that the United States should “consider” these further courses of action; the majority of the Planning Board was of the opinion that, after all the prior steps the United States would have taken to prevent the renewal of hostilities unilaterally by the ROK, we would not merely “consider” these additional courses of action, but would proceed to take them at once.

Secretary Dulles stated that this difference of opinion brought to mind a saying frequently used by the President, to the effect that “Planning is essential, though the plans themselves may not be important.” If war were to start again in Korea, said Secretary Dulles, it was going to be very hard indeed to determine which side had begun the war. Accordingly, while it was desirable to have all these plans of action in mind, it was not going to be easy to determine now, in advance of the event, precisely what courses of action would be mandatory on the United States.

The President commented that the best thing to insert here was what the French had said to the Russians at the outbreak of war in 1914, that is: “France will do whatever is in its own best interests.”

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the proposed revisions of paragraphs 9, 10 and 19 of NSC 5702/1, prepared by the NSC Planning Board and transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 5, 1957; in the light of the Interim Report on Korea (transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 30, 1957), the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 7, 1957), and the comments of General Lemnitzer at the meeting.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5702/1, subject to the following amendments:

(1) Paragraph 9, page 4: Revise to read as follows:

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9Annex F, which is not attached to the copies of NSC 5702/2 found in Department of State files, was handled separately on a restricted basis. It is printed, as circulated, as an enclosure to Document 207.

10Paragraphs a-e and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 1772, approved by President Eisenhower on August 9. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
9. a. Continue through the period FY 1958 to deploy in Korea a minimum of two U.S. infantry divisions and one fighter-bomber wing with necessary support forces.

b. Replace existing equipment of U.S. forces in Korea, including planes, with improved models of such equipment as and when required for military reasons.

c. Equip U.S. forces in Korea with modern weapons; provided that the timing of the deployment to Korea of dual capability (nuclear-conventional) weapons, such as the Honest John and the 280 mm. cannon, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] will be as and when determined by the President after conference with the Secretaries of State and Defense.

(2) Paragraph 10, page 5: Revise to read as follows:

10. With respect to ROK forces through FY 1958:

a. Negotiate with the Republic of Korea for a substantial reduction in active ROK forces (by at least four active divisions at this time, with minimum increase in reserve divisions) in return for converting the three remaining conventional ROK fighter-bomber squadrons into jet squadrons and providing to ground forces currently-programmed improved transport and communications equipment and appropriate U.S. equipment in Korea declared excess to the needs of U.S. forces there, and taking into account the modernization of U.S. forces in Korea.

b. Continue the ROK Navy at its present level of approximately 61 combatant ships and one Marine Division.

c. Plan for gradual further reductions in ROK forces in the longer range. Such planning would take account of the enemy situation, the effect of the initial reductions, and the over-all level of U.S. military assistance programs world-wide.

d. Continue military assistance to the Republic of Korea to carry out these military programs and objectives.

(3) Paragraph 19–a, page 8: Revise to read as follows:

19. In accordance with the U.S. statement issued June 21, 1957 (Annex G), continue to observe and support the Korean Armistice Agreement, and to this end:

a. Establish through adequate evidence, the nature and scope of any violations of the Armistice Agreement by the Communist side, especially with respect to Article 13(D). Continue to publicize to the maximum extent feasible the fact that the Communists, with the connivance of the Communist members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, have violated provisions of the Armistice Agreement since its inception.

(4) Paragraph 19–b, page 9: Delete, and reletter subparagraphs c and d as b and c.

11See Document 225.
(5) Paragraph 23, page 12: Include the bracketed word, and delete the asterisk and the footnote relating thereto.

c. Authorized adding, as Annex G to NSC 5702/1, the United Nations Command Statement of June 21, 1957, to the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom, Korea.

d. Noted the President’s authorization that the United States, in carrying on the negotiations with President Rhee directed by NSC Action No. 1731-b-(2), might refer, at an appropriate time, to equipping U.S. forces in Korea with dual capability (nuclear-conventional) weapons, such as the Honest John and the 280 mm. cannon.

e. Noted the President’s directive that the Departments of State and Defense prepare a summary statement, for guidance to Ambassador Dowling and General Decker in carrying on negotiations with President Rhee, of actions now authorized to be taken with respect to Korea; and consider the advisability of sending qualified personnel to Korea with such summary statement.

Note: NSC 5702/1, as amended, subsequently approved by the President and circulated as NSC 5702/2 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

The actions in d and e above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for appropriate implementation.

[Here follows agenda item 8.]

S. Everett Gleason


NSC 5702/2

Washington, August 9, 1957.

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD KOREA

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5514
B. NSC 5610
C. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea”, dated October 12 and November 6, 1956

1Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5702 Series. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence.
D. NSC Actions Nos. 1624, 1660 and 1731
E. NSC 5702
F. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Evaluation of Alternative Military Programs for Korea”, dated January 30, 1957
G. NSC 5702/1
H. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Interim Report on Korea”, dated July 30, 1957
I. Memos for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Policy Toward Korea”, dated August 5 and 7, 1957
J. NSC Action No. 1772/a

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Special Assistant to the President for Atomic Energy, at the 334th Council meeting on August 8, 1957, adopted the statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5702/1, subject to the amendments thereto which are set forth in NSC Action No. 1772–b.

The President has this date approved the statement of policy in NSC 5702/1, as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith as NSC 5702/2; directs its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and designates the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

By NSC Action No. 1772–c, the Council authorized, and the President has this date approved, adding, as Annex G hereto, the United Nations Command Statement of June 21, 1957, to the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom, Korea.

The Council also (NSC Action No. 1772–d and –e):

d. Noted the President’s authorization that the United States, in carrying on the negotiations with President Rhee directed by NSC Action No. 1731–b–(2), might refer, at an appropriate time, to equipping U.S. forces in Korea with dual capability (nuclear-conventional) weapons, such as the Honest John and the 280 mm. cannon.

e. Noted the President’s directive that the Departments of State and Defense prepare a summary statement, for guidance to Ambassador Dowling and General Decker in carrying on negotiations with President Rhee, of actions now authorized to be taken with respect to Korea; and consider the advisability of sending qualified personnel to Korea with such summary statement.

The above actions, as approved this date by the President, are being transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for appropriate implementation.

The Financial Appendix originally contained in NSC 5702/1 (dated March 18, 1957), with minor editorial revisions, together with

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*aSee footnote 10, supra.

*bAnnex G is not printed. See Document 225.
Annexes A through E and Annex G, are also enclosed for the information of the Council.4

The enclosed statement of policy, as adopted and approved, supersedes NSC 5514.

S. Everett Gleason5
Acting Executive Secretary

[Here follows a table of contents.]

[Enclosure]

STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD KOREA

Objectives

1. Long-range Objective: To bring about the unification of Korea with a self-supporting economy and under a free, independent, and representative government, friendly toward the United States and other countries of the Free World, with its political and territorial integrity assured by international agreement and with armed forces sufficient for internal security and capable of strong resistance in event of attack by a foreign power.

2. Current U.S. Objective: Pending achievement of the above long-range objective; to assist the Republic of Korea to make a substantial contribution to Free World strength in the Pacific area by:

   a. Encouraging the ROK in the further development of stable democratic institutions and of cooperative relations with the other free nations in Asia.

   b. Enabling the Republic of Korea to achieve a maximum rate of economic development compatible with a reasonable degree of stability and present levels of essential consumption.

   c. Preventing more of Korea from coming under Communist domination either by subversion or aggression.

   d. Maintaining ROK forces capable of assuring internal security, and, together with U.S. forces in Korea, capable of (1) deterring or successfully resisting aggression from the North Korean forces alone, and (2) deterring aggression by North Korean forces and Chinese Communist forces now estimated to be in North Korea, or, with lim-

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4Neither the annexes nor the Financial Appendix is printed. The annexes are the Joint Policy Declaration of July 27, 1953; paragraph 5-g of NSC 5429/5; the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea signed on October 1, 1953; NSC Action No. 1004, January 8, 1954; the Korean Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953; and the U.N. Command Statement of June 21, 1957.

5Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
ited U.S. outside support, conducting a successful holding operation against such forces.\(^6\)

e. Influencing the ROK to conduct its foreign relations in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

f. Encouraging the conditions necessary to form, and then participating in, a Western Pacific collective defense arrangement, including the Philippines, Japan, the Republic of China and the ROK, eventually linked with ANZUS and SEATO.

3. To achieve both the long-range and current objectives through peaceful means, if possible to do so without compromising U.S. obligations, principles, or military security.

Major Policy Guidance

4. There is little prospect of Communist agreement on any reasonable formula for establishment of a unified democratic Korean state; but short of unification on terms of a character which the United States has advocated, there can be no settlement of the tensions in the Korean area.

5. U.S. interests are deeply involved in Korea. Unless the United States continues to provide strong political, military and economic support to the Republic of Korea, the Communist bloc probably will ultimately succeed in extending its control over the whole of Korea. Such a development would undermine Free World security in the Northeast Asia area, and (because of the symbolic importance of Korea with respect to alliances and collective security) would be seriously detrimental to U.S. policy of supporting peace and justice through the United Nations and to the general struggle against Communism throughout the Far East.

6. In the light of the above, U.S. objectives should also take into account the importance of reducing Korean dependence on U.S. assistance and making greater progress toward the ultimate goal of a self-supporting economy.

7. The United Nations' role with respect to Korea is an asset in the struggle against Communism. The UN provided the principal legal basis for successful resistance against Communist aggression. Initiatives have come from the United States, but the general support of the United Nations and the allies of the United States is of great psychological force, both with respect to world opinion and the attitudes of the Republic of Korea.

\(^6\)The U.S. and ROK forces envisaged above would need immediate and substantial U.S. military assistance to resist successfully a Chinese Communist-North Korean attack if Chinese reinforcements, immediately available from Manchuria and Northeast China, were moved into Korea. [Footnote in the source text.]
Strengthening the ROK

8. Pending a political settlement, and in the absence of a renewal of hostilities, and conditioned upon satisfactory cooperation by the ROK in carrying out its agreements with the United States, the United States should take the following actions:

Military

9. a. Continue through the period FY 1958 to deploy in Korea a minimum of two U.S. infantry divisions and one fighter-bomber wing with necessary support forces.

b. Replace existing equipment of U.S. forces in Korea, including planes, with improved models of such equipment as and when required for military reasons.

c. Equip U.S. forces in Korea with modern weapons; provided that the timing of the deployment to Korea of dual capability (nuclear-conventional) weapons, such as the Honest John and the 280 mm. cannon, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] will be as and when determined by the President after conference with the Secretaries of State and Defense.

10. With respect to ROK forces through FY 1958:

a. Negotiate with the Republic of Korea for a substantial reduction in active ROK forces (by at least four active divisions at this time, with minimum increase in reserve divisions); in return for converting the three remaining conventional ROK fighter-bomber squadrons into jet squadrons and providing to ground forces currently-programmed improved transport and communications equipment and appropriate U.S. equipment in Korea declared excess to the needs of U.S. forces there, and taking into account the modernization of U.S. forces in Korea.

b. Continue the ROK Navy at its present level of approximately 61 combatant ships and one Marine Division.

c. Plan for gradual further reductions in ROK forces in the longer range. Such planning would take account of the enemy situation, the effect of the initial reductions, and the over-all level of U.S. military assistance programs world-wide.

d. Continue military assistance to the Republic of Korea to carry out these military programs and objectives.

11. Continue to develop the ROK as a military ally by:

a. Developing the military capacities of the ROK military leadership.

b. Cultivating the friendship of the ROK military leadership toward the United States.

c. Impressing upon the ROK military leadership, U.S. views on Far Eastern and global military strategy.
11–A. The United States should seek to maintain the support of United Nations members for the independence and territorial integrity of the ROK. Specifically, it should seek to preserve the Unified Command, assure support for the Joint Policy Declaration, and continue the military involvement of participants in the UN Command.

**Political**

12. Accept the division of Korea on the present demarcation line while seeking a satisfactory solution of the Korean problem by the use of other than military action.

13. Continue to strengthen the government and democratic institutions of the ROK, using UN agencies as feasible.

14. Seek to influence the ROK administration and political leadership to support U.S. views on major foreign policy issues.

15. Encourage the development of cooperative relations, mutual respect and participation in multilateral activities between the ROK and other free nations of Asia, as a means of lessening the dependence of the ROK upon the United States for political and moral support. Endeavor to develop a community of interest between the ROK and Japan, and also with the Philippines, Vietnam, and the Republic of China through the offer of U.S. good offices, if and when it becomes evident that such an offer would help resolve outstanding problems and encourage joint cooperation.

**Economic**

16. Provide economic and technical aid to Korea to:
   a. Contribute to the support of ROK military forces.
   b. Maintain essential consumption at approximately present levels.
   c. Encourage and assist the ROK to:
      
      (1) Complete the rehabilitation of its economy.
      (2) Increase economically sound and diversified agricultural and industrial production, at the maximum rate consistent with the maintenance of a reasonable degree of economic stability and designed to achieve an increasing degree of self-support, emphasizing the goal of relieving unemployment and narrowing its foreign trade gap.
      (3) Make a progressively greater financial contribution to its own development while continuing to provide support for its military forces.
      (4) Develop substantially increased numbers of trained technical, professional, administrative and managerial personnel.

17. Seek to influence the ROK to:
   a. Use external assistance and its own human and material resources more effectively.
b. Adopt and implement sound economic and fiscal policies, taking an increasingly greater responsibility for improving fiscal management.

c. Channel growth primarily into investment rather than into further increased consumption.

d. Provide for increased participation by domestic and foreign private investment in Korean economic development.

e. Stimulate and develop economic self-help measures, particularly in rural areas.

f. Develop a sense of greater responsibility for its own economic future and a lessened reliance on the United States.

18. Encourage the ROK to take the necessary steps toward normal commercial relations with other Free World countries, particularly Japan.

The Korean Armistice

19. In accordance with the U.S. statement issued June 21, 1957 (Annex G), continue to observe and support the Korean Armistice Agreement, and to this end:

a. Establish through adequate evidence, the nature and scope of any violations of the Armistice Agreement by the Communist side, especially with respect to Article 13(D). Continue to publicize to the maximum extent feasible the fact that the Communists, with the connivance of the Communist members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, have violated provisions of the Armistice Agreement since its inception.

b. Take further action as necessary to deal with the situation caused by Communist violations of the Armistice when the United States determines:

(1) That the UN Command is at a significant disadvantage because of such violations, and

(2) That the advantage of taking such action outweighs the military and political disadvantages thereof, including the possible non-agreement of the UNC allies to such a course. Prior agreement of our UNC allies for this action should be sought, but they should not be given a veto on U.S. action.

c. In the event of unprovoked Communist armed attack against U.S. military or non-military personnel, aircraft, or vessels outside Communist territory; take action in accordance with paragraph 5–g of NSC 5429/5.7

20. If Communist forces renew hostilities in Korea, the United States should:

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7See Annex B. [Footnote in the source text. Annex B quotes paragraph 5–g of NSC 5429/5.]

b. Invoke the Joint Policy Declaration by calling upon the signatories to carry out the commitment that "if there is a renewal of the armed attack, challenging again the principles of the United Nations, we should again be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea."

c. Counter any argument designed to establish that a failure of the Unified Command "fully and faithfully to carry out" and "scrupulously observe" the Armistice Agreement has relieved the subscribers to the Joint Policy Declaration of any obligation under the Declaration.

d. If Communist Chinese military power participates in or supports a Communist renewal of Korean hostilities, take direct military action against such participating or supporting power, wherever located, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] as required to achieve U.S. objectives. In such operations make clear our intent to limit Korean hostilities and seek to avoid provoking or inviting Soviet intervention. In addition:

(1) Clarify to all, the necessity of direct military action against Communist China as the only feasible way of honoring our collective security commitments to the UN and our security commitments to the ROK.

(2) Call on other UN members for effective military assistance appropriate to direct military action against Communist China.

21. The United States should seek to ensure that the ROK does not unilaterally renew hostilities, by:

a. Continuing to persuade the ROK to maintain its forces under the UN Command while that Command has responsibilities for the defense of Korea.

b. Continuing to make clear to ROK leaders, where circumstances necessitate, that if the ROK unilaterally initiates military operations against Chinese or North Korean forces in or north of the Demilitarized Zone, then:

(1) UN Command ground, sea, and air forces will not support such operations directly or indirectly.

(2) The United States will not furnish any military or logistic support for such operations.

(3) All U.S. economic aid to Korea will cease immediately.

(4) The UN Commander will take any action necessary to prevent his forces becoming involved in the renewal of hostilities and to provide for their security.

c. Making UN Command plans and dispositions which will reinforce the statements made to ROK leaders under b above and mani-
fest U.S. determination to carry them out, in so far as this is consistent with sound military deployments to cope with a Communist attack.

22. In anticipation of the possibility that President Rhee may order the renewal of hostilities by an attack on Communist forces in or north of the Demilitarized Zone, despite all the actions taken by the United States under the preceding paragraph, the United States should take the measures stated in Annex F (not reproduced herein; circulated only to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence).

23. If, despite the actions taken under Annex F, ROK forces should renew hostilities unilaterally, the United States should consider:

a. Stopping all economic and military assistance to Korea.

b. Discontinuing all logistic or other support to the ROK forces.

c. Taking such other military measures as seem feasible and consistent with the security and capability of UNC forces to block ROK offensive action.

d. Evacuating UN civilians.

e. Notifying the United Nations and the Communists that the UN Command will disassociate itself from the ROK action, but will defend UN Command forces against any Communist attack, and will be prepared, if a Communist counterattack against the ROK threatens the security of UN Command forces, to undertake such military action as may be necessary for the security of UN Command forces.

f. Renewing hostilities with the Communists only if necessary to protect the security of UN Command forces.

g. Promptly seeking to obtain the support of the other members of the UN Command; and, as appropriate, informing the UN of the actions taken by the UN Command under UN authority to prevent or limit hostilities, and requesting consideration of the situation by the United Nations General Assembly, under the Uniting for Peace procedure if the Assembly is not otherwise in session.

Unification of Korea

24. In order to achieve a unified Korea under an independent and representative government friendly toward the United States, established through the holding of genuinely free elections under UN supervision for representation in the National Assembly, in which representation shall be in direct proportion to the indigenous population in Korea, the United States should be prepared to:

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8Reference is to the "Uniting for Peace" resolution approved by the U.N. General Assembly on November 3, 1950, as Resolution 377 (V), U.N. doc. A/1481.
a. Engage in political negotiations between the Communists and the UN side (with the ROK associated with the latter), if it appears such negotiations would be productive.

b. Conclude arrangements with the Communists and such other nations as are concerned, to guarantee the political and territorial integrity of a unified Korea.

c. Accept a level of Korean armed forces sufficient for internal security and capable of strong resistance in event of attack by a foreign power.

d. Forego all rights granted to the United States under the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, and refrain from stationing U.S. forces and maintaining U.S. bases in Korea, provided no other foreign country is granted such rights or maintains such forces and bases.

25. Any such agreement should not preclude the provision of U.S. economic and military assistance to Korea.

North Korea

26. Make clear that the United States does not regard the North Korean regime as a legitimate regime.

27. Encourage the non-Communist states and the UN to continue to refuse to recognize the North Korean regime, and to treat it as a non-legitimate regime condemned for aggression and discourage any non-Communist political or economic intercourse with North Korea.

28. Encourage the people of North Korea to oppose the Communist North Korean regime and to sympathize with the Republic of Korea.

241. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Washington, August 9, 1957, 11:30 a.m.¹

[Here follow a list of 30 persons present and discussion of items 1 and 2. Participants for the Joint Chiefs included Admiral Radford, General Lemnitzer, Admiral Burke, General Pate, and Air Force Vice Chief of Staff General Thomas D. White. The Department of Defense was represented by Assistant Secretary Sprague. The Depart-

¹Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret. Drafted by Richard B. Finn, Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs.
ment of State officials included Murphy, Robertson, and Benson E.L. Timmons, Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs.]

3. Modernization Program in Korea

Mr. Robertson said that representatives of the Commonwealth nations as well as French and Thai representatives had been advised of the desire of the United States to provide its forces in Korea with modern weapons. Admiral Radford said that he had told these foreign representatives that the United States desired to introduce those weapons considered necessary from a military point of view and he had read off to them a list of modern weapons to exemplify United States planning.

Mr. Robertson emphasized that no commitment had been made one way or another regarding nuclear weapons. He said that Mr. Howard Jones had met with other representatives of the 16 nations which had provided forces to the United Nations Command and had indicated to them that we have no plans to introduce nuclear weapons at this time. Mr. Robertson said that he felt there is no obligation to go back to any of these representatives at this time since our position had been made entirely clear. Admiral Radford said that he agreed and that the decision taken at the NSC meeting on August 82 clearly provided the necessary authority for the United States forces to introduce modern weapons in Korea.

Mr. Robertson said that he thought it would be a mistake to send someone out from Washington to discuss a modernization program with President Rhee. General Lemnitzer agreed and said that this would undermine our officials on the spot.

Mr. Robertson stated that he understood Mr. Sprague is preparing a paper regarding negotiations with the Korean Government on the subject of modernization. General Lemnitzer commented that we seem to be making modernization of our forces in Korea contingent upon negotiations with the ROK Government. Admiral Radford said that he thought the President had given clear authority to go ahead on the modernization program for United States forces.

General Lemnitzer said that we are reorganizing our two divisions in Korea on a pentomic pattern with the emphasis on the Honest John as the basic weapon. It is essential that modern weapons be provided to maintain the strength of the divisions. He said that President Rhee is worried about maintaining the strength of his forces if their manpower is to be reduced. The United States has not been able to satisfy President Rhee on this score. Mr. Robertson commented that we have a serious problem of procedure in going

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2See Document 239.
about the modernization of our forces and keeping President Rhee satisfied.

Mr. Murphy asked what we have actually done so far on modernization. General Lemnitzer said that there have been some overflights by modern aircraft and that this has been very helpful although the Koreans well know that the planes are based in Japan and not in Korea. Some other new equipment is going into our forces in Korea but this has not been particularly impressive. Admiral Radford noted that the airfields in Korea are not adequate and that there is only one good one. He said that it is important to rotate air groups into Korea for familiarization and also that all-weather aircraft should be brought in. Admiral Radford said that Mr. Sprague is working on a paper regarding modernization and that for this purpose the programs of the three services must be reviewed. The Admiral expressed the view that we must do a little more to modernize the Korean forces. He noted that if our own two divisions should be over-run in case of attack, the resulting impression would be most unfavorable. Mr. Robertson commented that the presence of substantial numbers of Americans is also very desirable as a form of check on the Koreans.

Both Mr. Robertson and Admiral Radford noted that President Rhee is dissatisfied with the retaliation argument: he thinks it will do his country little good to have retaliation by the United States if a hostile attack has already overlun the nation.

[Here follows discussion of items 4-7.]

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242. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Decker) to the Department of the Army

Seoul, August 10, 1957—1:40 p.m.


Part one.

This progress report reduction ROK forces.

The following met on 9 August to discuss reduction ROK forces:
Ambassador Dowling; General Decker, Chief, PROV/MAAG-K

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5/8-1057. Secret. Sent to the Department of State through the Department of the Army as the executive agent and repeated to Assistant Secretary of Defense Sprague, CINCAPC, CINCUSARPAC, CG USARJ/UNCEA Japan, and the Embassy in Seoul. The source text is the Department of State copy.
(Generals Gard and Griffing); ROK Defense Minister Kim; Lieutenant General Yu, Chairman, ROK JCS; General Paik, C/S, ROKA.

Part two.

Minister Kim opened meeting stating that the three ROK officials present were instructed by President Rhee to prepare a study on requirements of ROK forces. In the course of this study, questions developed and the meeting had been requested to clarify these questions.

Part three.

Minister primarily concerned with:

a. What direct support and defense support will be available from US for ROK in FY 1958?

b. What additional equipment can ROK forces expect to receive?

c. If reduction is accomplished, how much of a reduction must it be and can these savings be utilized for increased pay and allowances of ROK forces?

d. Will reduction in force lead to reduction in financial support from US?

Part four.

Reference paragraph 3a., Minister advised that total US support appropriated for ROK would not be known here for some time, possibly not before December. Further advised that present indications are that appropriations will be less than FY 1957.

Part five.

Reference paragraph 3b., Minister informed additional equipment for ROK forces including additional fighter bomber wing and improved communication and transportation equipment contingent upon reduction of present ROK forces. Minister asked specifically about more modern tanks, additional 105 and 155 howitzers to provide six gun batteries and additional AAA (sky-sweeper and radar). He was informed these not presently programmed but would be considered in development of future programs.

Part six.

Reference paragraph 3c., Minister advised minimum reduction must be four active divisions by end of US FY 1958; that reduction should start promptly; that US not thinking in terms of specific cost or numbers of personnel, but in terms of units. Minister stated that politically he did not feel country or President would accept reduction of four divisions as such. He stated his current thinking was the elimination of battalions and batteries from regimental and battalion size units to effect reduction equivalent to four divisions. He feels that psychologically this would be best approach and would facilitate more rapid reattainment of combat effectiveness. Minister was advised that such a reduction would entail greater reduction in personnel than would outright reduction of four divisions and would re-
quire storage of individual and unit equipment so as to be immediately available to reserve unit earmarked to replace eliminated unit on M-day. With reference to increased pay and allowances for ROK forces, Minister was informed that the need for more adequate pay for ROK military was recognized but could not possibly be provided for present strength. Further, that the overall cost of support to ROK forces and ROK economy was constantly rising, therefore, budget for FY 1957 could not necessarily be used as basis upon which he could assume an actual saving would result in FY 1958. Minister advised that present ROK economy cannot support current ROK forces on a sound financial basis and that it is important that more funds be directed to capital investment in the national economy to provide a sound structure for support of military forces.

Part seven.

Reference 3d., Minister concerned that reduction of forces might be construed to mean decreased effort by ROK and would result in reduction of US financial support. Minister advised this was not the case, that reductions in financial support must be expected but these are worldwide, that US fully aware importance Korea.

Part eight.

Minister also expressed concern that in event of general war, US might withdraw forces from Korea leaving ROK alone; this would leave ROK incapable of defense if forces were reduced.

Part nine.

The matter of equipping ROK forces with atomic capable weapons was not mentioned.

Part ten.

Upon conclusion, Minister Kim suggested subsequent meeting. This was concurred in and it was recommended to the Minister that at that time he be prepared to submit specific proposals of ROK courses of action. Minister Kim agreed to this and stated he would advise when he was prepared for the next meeting. Since it is believed Minister's proposal will be along line indicated in paragraph 6, would appreciate advice of acceptability of this approach. Ambassador and CINCUNC believe it has greater chance of acceptance by President Rhee. CINCUNC considers it desirable from military considerations.
243. Letter From President Eisenhower to President Rhee


Dear Mr. President: Thank you for your letter of August 2, 1957, commenting further on the question of the level of Republic of Korea ground forces. As you know, I have always welcomed the frank exchange of views between us.

My letter of July 19 outlined the position we have taken with respect to the necessity for bringing about a reduction in Republic of Korea ground forces. This matter was given careful and thoughtful consideration by our Government and all factors were taken into account. The plan which resulted, and which Ambassador Dowling and General Decker have been discussing with you and representatives of your Government, was developed by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It has my full support and will, in our opinion, enhance rather than weaken the future security of the Republic of Korea against renewal of Communist aggression.

I sincerely trust that Ambassador Dowling and General Decker, acting within my instructions will shortly succeed in working out with you and your military advisers an orderly and planned reduction in Republic of Korea ground forces. This will enable the remaining forces to take advantage of certain new equipment available within the fiscal year 1958 Military Assistance Program. I would be less than candid if I did not state to you frankly that it will be impossible, because of United States budgetary considerations, to maintain the Korean aid program at present levels. Accordingly, failure to reduce the level of Republic of Korea ground forces at this time would not only result in a serious weakening of their defensive capabilities because of equipment deficiencies, but would also throw an increasingly heavy burden on the Korean economy with attendant inflationary pressures.

With regard to the two specific questions you raise as to the nature and extent of modernization of the Republic of Korea and United States forces, Ambassador Dowling and General Decker are being instructed to discuss this in more detail with you.

May I take this opportunity to reaffirm United States interest in and support of the Republic of Korea, its military security, economic development and eventual peaceful reunification.

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1Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Confidential; Priority; Presidential Handling. Transmitted in telegram 183 to Seoul, August 24, which is the source text. Telegram 183 was drafted in S/S and cleared by the President.
2Document 238.
3Document 231.
With my sincere personal good wishes,
Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

*Telegram 183 bears this typed signature.*

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244. Letter From the Ambassador in Korea (Dowling) to the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons)

*Seoul, September 5, 1957.*

Dear Howard: President and Mrs. Rhee returned from Chinhae on Monday and I had a long talk with him on Tuesday. He had obviously benefited from his unusually long holiday and was more alert and less nervous than when he left Seoul a few weeks ago. I was sorry to see, however, that the rest this time had not done him as much good as had previous vacations at Chinhae; he is beginning to look and act like a very old man.

The talk covered a variety of subjects and as we were leaving President Rhee asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was also present, if he could make some notes on the conversation since there were a number of things he would like to keep in mind. The Minister, appearing undecided as to whether to faint or run from the room, promised that he would. In the entry, as we were leaving the Kyung Mu Dai, he told me he would be unable to make a summary, and asked me to do it. I said I would try my hand and the enclosed is the result.

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*Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95B/9-557. Confidential; Official-Informal.*

*The Presidential Residence in Seoul.*

*3 A note on the source text in Dowling’s hand reads: “It will go to the Kyung Mu Dai as the Minister’s report—probably heavily edited.”

*4 The enclosed notes by Dowling on his conversation with Rhee, not printed, indicated that the conversation dealt with impending visits to Korea by prominent Americans, the question of Korean unification, Korean-Japanese relations, the forthcoming visit to Korea by President Ngo Dinh Diem of Vietnam, and the question of a reduction of the armed forces of the Republic of Korea. On the question of the reduction of Korean force levels, Dowling’s notes indicated that he delivered Eisenhower’s August 24 letter to Rhee (supra), and pointed out that the United States was prepared to supply an additional jet fighter-bomber wing to the Republic of Korea, plus transport and communications equipment, if an agreement could be reached on a reduction in manpower. Rhee responded by asking for more precise information regarding this offer. Dowling indicated that he would consult with General Decker to determine what data was available.*
The two significant points of the conversation concern the reduction in forces, about which I reported in my telegram 204,\(^5\) and the question of Korean-Japanese relations. I have had a subsequent conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs on this latter subject and am endeavoring to try to straighten things out. It seems to me that the problem is composed of about equal parts of suspicion of Japanese motives and of ineptitude on the part of the Minister. The solution, I think, is to find some new wording which will enable him to save face and at the same time not give away the fundamental position of the Koreans, i.e., that they shall have an opportunity to raise their claims at the proposed formal conference with hopes of some success. The question remains whether, as the Berliners say, "the situation is desperate, but not hopeless," or "hopeless but not desperate," as the Viennese used to put it.

I shall write you further about this when I have had a chance to talk to the Minister again.

With best wishes,
Sincerely yours,

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\(^5\)In telegram 204 from Seoul, September 3, Ambassador Dowling reported on the delivery of President Eisenhower's August 24 letter to President Rhee. His report was very similar to, and apparently based on, the notes outlined in footnote 4 above. An additional observation made by Dowling in telegram 204 was that he felt that Rhee now realized, for the first time, the nature of the steps which the United States was prepared to take to modernize the South Korean armed forces if an agreement could be reached on manpower reduction. (Department of State, Central Files, 111.11-El/9-357)

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245. **Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Jones) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)**\(^1\)

*Washington, September 9, 1957.*

**SUBJECT**

Meeting State–Defense September 5, 1957

Attached at Tab A\(^2\) is the agenda of a State–Defense meeting in Secretary Quarles' office, attended by Secretary Dulles and at which

\(^1\)Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 65 D 497, FE 2500–3100. Top Secret.

\(^2\)Not found attached.
I represented FE. I believe a summary of some of the points discussed under agenda items 1 and 2 will be of particular interest to you.

[Here follows discussion of agenda item I.]

**Agenda Item II.**

Defense had prepared a draft joint State-Defense message to Ambassador Dowling and General Decker which was brought up for discussion (Tab C). The Secretary pointed out, "We are honor bound to keep two divisions in Korea if we make this deal with Rhee." Secretary Quarles agreed but observed that changing conditions might justify an alteration in our plans and he said that two divisions would certainly be retained in Korea long enough to fulfill our bargain. Then he added: "As long as the situation continues as it does today, we have just got to keep this kind of force in Korea."

The Secretary then inquired as to whether two more divisions must come out of Europe and Secretary Quarles replied in the affirmative.

Turning to the cable itself, the Secretary thought we should have some caveats in the instruction and that we would have to be more precise on details of modernization of ROK forces. He read the attached cable from Rhee (Tab D) which I had given him to emphasize the point. He then called upon me for any observations I had in connection with paragraph 3 sub-section (1).

I pointed out that we would be faced with two problems which related to timing: (1) Since the proposed action could not be kept secret, it was certain that there would be a thorough airing in the General Assembly of the subject in connection with the discussion of our action under Paragraph 13 (d) of the Armistice Agreement; and (2) that we might have an implied obligation to inform the Sixteen Nations. I understood that Secretary Robertson had shown a list of equipment to representatives of the seven nations which still have military forces in Korea but the remainder of the Sixteen Nations were under the impression that no primary atomic weapons were to be introduced into Korea. I observed that the Dutch had raised this question specifically and had been informed that only dual purpose weapons would be introduced for the time being, and that the Dutch had subsequently asked to be consulted before any further steps were taken.

The Secretary raised the question as to how soon it was planned to move these weapons into Korea and presumed that it would take several months. General Lemnitzer answered that we needed them

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3Not found attached; for the message as sent, see Document 247.
4Not found attached; apparent reference to a cabled copy of Document 238.
now, that they were all ready for shipment and that it would be merely a matter of weeks once the word was given.

The Secretary observed at a later stage in the meeting, in summarizing State’s position, that the point regarding the debate in the General Assembly did not bother him too much, and that as regards the Sixteen Nations, he turned to me and suggested that we talk with the Dutch.

During the discussion, Secretary Quarles said the Army feels that General Decker should have the latitude of going beyond the current NSC policy in the direction of modernization. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

The Secretary queried if we charged the surplus stock which would be transferred to the ROK forces to the Military Security program, what would the cost be? Secretary Quarles reply was that it would amount to $100 million for the first year. He said the total savings as a result of modernization of our own forces would be $60 million during the same period. He further noted that these savings would be wiped out if General Decker had to modernize the ROK forces further but he added that this, of course, would require additional NSC approval.

The Secretary also raised the question as to what we were now planning to supply Koreans by way of modern weapons. He failed to get a clear answer to this question but General Lemnitzer pointed out that the Koreans were anxious to have M 46 tanks some of which would be surplus to our two divisions, and they want recoilless rifles. If we could supply them with these two items, it would go a long way toward meeting their urge for modernization, he said. Modernization in communications and transportation is a weak reed to lean on in selling Rhee the idea of reducing his forces, he emphasized. The ROK knows that this is already programmed. I asked General Lemnitzer how many tanks presumably could be supplied as surplus from two modernized U.S. Divisions. He said it would probably run in the neighborhood of 50. The recoilless rifles would not come out of surplus.

The Secretary finally agreed to go along in general with the draft joint cable but said he thought it should be more responsive to President Rhee’s request for details. The paragraph on equipment should be expanded and there should be a general caveat which would take us off the hook if subsequently we found it necessary to pull out some of our troops. The Secretary then observed that we have just got to go ahead with this program of reduction of ROK forces. “We are not going to get the kind of money that will enable us to spend around a billion dollars a year in Korea”, he concluded.
246. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy), Washington, September 14, 1957, 10:46 a.m.\(^1\)

TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR. MURPHY

Re the telegram on Korea, charging to MAP of equipment.\(^2\) M. said after Reinhardt had spoken to Quarles, he, M., had a further discussion with Quarles and was told that this pricing is a standard formula. Sec said he did not intend to accuse Quarles of trickery, but he was interested in knowing what it would cost. Sec said the purpose of the Korea program was to cut down the charge against our mutual security program. Sec said naturally Defense would prefer to turn over equipment to Korea and get money for it than leave it sitting in warehouses. Sec. said perhaps amount could be cut from 50 million to 25 million; 50 million was quite a bit of money for Korea. M. said 50 million was not a firm figure, there were two items in it which might well be reduced. Sec said he was interested in knowing what the impact would be on other aspects of our military assistance budget, to NATO for example. Sec said you could not deal with one aspect without regard for the other; does our budget take account of

\(^1\)Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Prepared by Carolyn J. Proctor of the Secretary’s staff.

\(^2\)Reference is to telegram 229, infra. In a September 13 memorandum to the Secretary, Deputy Assistant Secretary Jones noted that the Department of Defense had revised the language of the proposed cable to Seoul to meet the suggestions made by Dulles during the September 5 meeting with Quarles (see supra). The Defense position on modernization of South Korean forces was that General Decker could provide what was necessary out of surplus American equipment in Korea. Dulles indicated, in a handwritten note on the memorandum, that he was prepared to clear the cable ‘on assumption that ‘surplus’ to ROK will not unduly burden MSA funds.” Dulles’ reservation prompted another round of discussions between officials of the Departments of State and Defense.

According to a memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary Gardner E. Palmer to Jones, September 14, he took up the Secretary’s reservation with Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Karl G. Harr on September 13. Quarles discussed the cable later in the day with Department of State Counselor G. Frederick Reinhardt; Reinhardt took it up with Murphy; and Murphy, as indicated in the memorandum printed here, secured the Secretary’s authorization to transmit the cable without his prior reservation. Reinhardt informed Harr of Dulles’ approval and Harr responded that Quarles could give his personal assurance that the scope of the proposal would not prejudice the aid program. The message then went to the White House for approval and Cutler took it to the President at Newport, where it was approved on September 16 for transmission. The September 13 memorandum by Jones is in Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/9-1257. The September 14 memorandum by Palmer is ibid., FE Files: Lot 59 D 19, Korea 1957. Cutler’s September 17 memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Defense, indicating the President’s approval, is ibid., S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, Korea, US Policy Toward (NSC 5702, 5702/1, 5702/2).
this. M. said Barnes' office said they can absorb it without damage to other programs. Sec said they had claimed the cut itself would damage the program, and now they say they could take another 50 million. M. said what he wished to emphasize was that this was not an arbitrary price. He said he thought that was what the Sec had been concerned about. Sec said what he was concerned about was that he had been told that in view of the Congressional cut in military assistance program there would be an impact on our ability to modernize NATO, is this still further hitting it and which is more important? M. said Barnes said not, but he would look into it further. Sec wondered whether Bureau of Budget had anything to say. M. said he had not touched base with them and should he. Sec said no. Sec said if people familiar with the impact on NATO, Vietnam, etc., think this is all right, it was all right with him. M. said he would be assured that it was cut down to the very minimum.

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Robert G. Barnes, the Under Secretary's Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs.

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247. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea

Washington, September 16, 1957—7:58 p.m.


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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/9–657. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Assistant Secretary of Defense Harr and cleared by Jones, Palmer, Ockey, and Nes in FE, and in draft by Irwin, Quarles, Secretary Dulles, and President Eisenhower. Also sent to CINCUNC and repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.

In telegram 218 from Seoul, September 6, Ambassador Dowling argued against the withdrawal of the 58th Fighter Bomber Wing from Korea. The 58th Fighter Bomber Wing was the final remaining U.S. Air Force wing stationed in Korea. (Ibid.)

Document 242.

In telegram UK 977207 CC from CINCUNC to the Department of the Army, September 6, General Decker also argued against the removal of the 58th Fighter Bomber Wing from Korea. Decker noted that a major inducement offered the Republic of Korea to facilitate an agreement on the reduction of ROK ground forces was the promise of support for an additional ROK fighter-bomber wing to help offset the air superiority of North Korea. Decker argued that if the United States withdrew the remaining U.S. Air Force wing from Korea at the same time that the additional ROK fighter bomber wing was being created, the Republic of Korea would gain nothing for its agreement to reduce ground forces, and the Ambassador and CINCUNC would appear to have acted in bad faith. (Department of Defense Files)
the following summary statement of actions now authorized to be taken in Korea is submitted for your guidance.

You are authorized to inform President Rhee that in order to effect a reduction of 4 ROK Divisions including supporting units (or the equivalent personnel reduction, should this latter method be deemed by you to be necessary and appropriate) our plans are as follows:

With respect to U.S. Forces in Korea—

(1) The 7th and 24th Divisions will be reorganized into Pentomic Divisions and the 100th Field Artillery Battalion (Honest John) and the 663rd Field Artillery Battalion (280 mm gun) will be introduced into Korea.

(2) U.S. Air Force squadrons will be rotated between Japan and Korea with the equivalent of not less than one wing of aircraft to be in position in Korea.

With respect to ROK Forces—

(1) The planes of the U.S. Air Force F-86F Wing (58th Fighter Bomber) in Korea will be transferred to ROKAF; full support of this ROKAF F-86F-equipped wing will be provided by the U.S.

(2) ROK ground forces will be improved by the provision of currently programmed transport and communications equipment and, as appropriate, other U.S. equipment in Korea declared excess to the needs of U.S. forces, including that excess equipment generated by the reorganization and modernization of the two U.S. Divisions. Within these limits COMUS Korea, in consultation with ROKA as appropriate, is authorized to determine the type and amount of excess material to be made available to the ROKA.

As a fall-back position and if necessary as an incentive, in addition to the above, to obtain the deactivation of four ROK divisions, you are authorized to accept an increase of two ROK Reserve Divisions.

At this time no modernization of ROK ground forces is authorized beyond the measures outlined above. Therefore, further modernization of ROK ground forces must not be discussed with GROK as part of the package. If successful negotiation of ROK ground force reduction subsequently necessitates further incentives, proposals for additional modernization of these forces must be submitted here for determination that such a commitment would be in accordance with U.S. policies and objectives prior to any discussion thereof with GROK.

For your information, the question of deployment of Marine Air Groups 11 and 12 to Korea is still under consideration, but the deployment of these units is not to be included in these negotiations.

Murphy
248. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State

Tokyo, September 18, 1957—7 p.m.

848. Herter-Richards trip. From Herter. Brief stay Seoul developed several interesting points. In morning call on President Rhee found him reasonably alert and generally agreeable frame of mind. During dinner with him in evening found him quite apathetic with mind apparently wandering from time to time. I am told this situation becoming more acute and all official appointments with Rhee now being made for morning sessions. Unfortunately single-man government still continuing with, I believe, substantial loss of confidence by public resulting.

Visit with Vice President which Foreign Office refused to arrange but which Ambassador had arranged for us provided most interesting conversation. Vice President extremely outspoken in his criticism of present government basing criticisms on three major points: (1) Dictatorial form of government; (2) Greatly excessive number of local police who being used essentially for political purposes and to intimidate population; (3) Widespread corruption throughout government due in part to gross under-payment government officials and army personnel and in part to officials of party controlling not only patronage but every type commercial licenses or opportunity for private initiative. Vice President stated that to date his party had confined itself to criticism specific acts of administration but had prepared memorandum copy of which he gave to Ambassador and myself confidentially outlining constructive program. This he expected to have approved by party leadership and to publish in few days. Have made complete report of conversation with the supporting documents but quick study of program indicates mature thoughtfulness and excellent constructive items both domestic and international. Program essentially conservative. I am having

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.12-HE/9-1857. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.
2 Under Secretary of State Herter and Ambassador James P. Richards visited several Asian countries during a trip undertaken primarily to attend the independence ceremonies in Malaya on August 31. In addition to Malaya and Korea, Herter and Richards visited the Philippines, Vietnam, Burma, Thailand, Hong Kong, the Republic of China, and Japan during a one-month period from August 23 to September 22. Documentation on the Herter–Richards trip is ibid., 110.12-HE.
3 The Under Secretary and his party arrived in Seoul on the afternoon of September 16 and departed for Tokyo on the morning of September 18. A more complete report on the visit is in despatch 229 from Seoul, September 30. (Ibid., 110.12-HE/9–3057)
4 A memorandum of Herter’s conversation with Chang Myon on September 17, with an attached copy of the memorandum given to Herter by Chang, is in despatch 341 from Seoul, September 30. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 902)
to confess to Richards that while I thought it would never happen I find myself in sympathy with Democratic Party (Korean, of course). Vice President laid great stress on corruption and gross irregularities in elections and feared same would recur next May when elections for Assembly held unless present Assembly, which apparently somewhat ashamed of boldness of government practices, enacts safeguarding legislation.

Stay in Korea included visit to front and discussions with General Decker. Latter gives me impression of being excellent officer with flexible mind and disposed cooperate fully with Ambassador Dowling. In general situation Seoul has many characteristics situation Formosa with morale army still good, but real danger deteriorating picture.

Question of reduction of forces discussed freely with Minister of Defense, Ambassador and General Decker. Latter personally convinced 21 instead of present 23 divisions essential for defense purposes but is now exploring with Korean defense authorities possibly reducing size Korean divisions rather than deactivating whole divisional units. Believe key to situation lies in making available for American divisions some [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] such as 280 mm. guns and Long John units on which no decision yet reached in Washington.

Perhaps most discouraging part of picture is wastage American funds because unrealistic exchange rate and widespread frittering away available dollars through corrupt practices but feel coming activities of Democratic Party while they may not overturn government may well force some necessary internal reforms. Strength Democratic Party not great in National Assembly, but its importance evidenced by fact that Municipal Council of Seoul has 40 Democratic members to 12 Liberals and I am told proportion almost equally great Municipal Councils other cities Korea.

Now enroute Tokyo with Ambassador MacArthur who came to meet us Seoul. All send you best wishes.

MacArthur
249. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 21, 1957, 11 a.m.\(^1\)

**SUBJECT**

Finance Minister Kim’s Call upon Mr. Robertson\(^2\)

**PARTICIPANTS**

Mr. Kim Hun-chul, Minister of Finance, Republic of Korea  
Mr. C.H. Kim, Governor of the Bank of Korea  
Mr. Philip Han, Minister, Embassy of Korea  
Mr. Lee Hahn-bin, Ministry of Finance  
Mr. William Warne, Director of the Office of the Economic Coordinator in Seoul  
Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs  
Mr. Howard P. Jones, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs  
Mr. William G. Ockey, Acting Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

Minister Kim called upon Mr. Robertson by appointment at 11 a.m., on September 21, 1957. After expressing his appreciation for the opportunity of meeting with Mr. Robertson before Mr. Warne returns to Korea, Minister Kim said that President Rhee had been worrying greatly about the possibility of cuts in United States aid for this year.

Mr. Robertson replied that despite all efforts to have Congress appropriate the full amount requested by the Administration, an over-all cut of about 20% was made. Consequently we must face this reality and adjust the various programs accordingly.

Minister Kim said that in the spring of this year Mr. Warne and he developed a financial stabilization program and that since then financial conditions in Korea have been kept well under control. If there is a large cut in aid for Korea this will hurt what has been done along stabilization lines. He said further that Mr. Moyer of ICA had mentioned a figure of about $200 million for defense support. If this is the actual amount allocated, Minister Kim said he does not see how Korea can survive.

Mr. Robertson replied that he considers the Korean program one of the most important that we have any place in the world. We will do everything we can to make the largest allocation possible for Korea but we do not know definitely what it will be. There will be, however, a cut in the program and our problem is to determine how we can adjust the program to the funds that are available. Mr. Robertson mentioned that Mr. Warne is fully acquainted with the prob-

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\(^1\)Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 59 D 19, MC-Koreans 1957. Confidential. Drafted by Ockey on October 2.

\(^2\)Dr. Kim Myun-chul was in Washington to attend the meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
lem. We have only so much money and there will inevitably be a cut in the Korean program.

Mr. Robertson said that speaking unofficially he wished to point out that one way in which savings can be made is by reduction in the number of men in the Korean military forces. Mr. Robertson explained that he did not mean that we should reduce our combined military strength in Korea. However, we may be able to make a reduction in personnel and at the same time show President Rhee that we are not decreasing over-all military strength. Mr. Robertson emphasized that he was not saying this officially but merely commenting unofficially on the problem.

Minister Kim then asked if a reduction in funds allocated for military purposes meant that economic aid could be increased.

Mr. Robertson replied that the over-all cut means that there will be a reduction in both military and economic aid. However, we have not made a definite decision on the actual amounts that will be available for Korea. Minister Kim said that in 1957 Korea is receiving about $300 million. They know that in 1958 there will be a cut but if the cut is too large it will mean disaster for Korea.

Mr. Robertson commented that he understood there was a large pipeline of aid goods for Korea. Mr. Warne explained that there was approximately $320 million including unexpended funds in the pipeline on June 30, 1957. At the present time there is a total of about $200 million in the project sector. Mr. Robertson then said that the fact that there is a large pipeline will not effect our allocation of aid for the Korean program this year. However, it is a factor that may help in the present problem caused by reduced appropriations.

Minister Kim then turned to the P.L. 480 program. He said that Korea was asking for a total program of about $70 million but the figure now being discussed in Washington is about $50 million. The question of whether rice should be included in the program is now under discussion. His Government would like to have rice excluded this year. However, if the exclusion of rice would reduce the total amount of the P.L. 480 program they would agree to have rice included. Mr. Warne commented that Korea needs the maximum possible P.L. 480 program this year. If the decision is to eliminate rice the total program should not be reduced. The program can utilize rice but normally more barley than rice can be obtained for the same amount of money. Mr. Robertson asked about the rice crop in Korea. Minister Kim replied that they have a good rice crop this year and are not in need of additional rice.

Minister Kim then discussed briefly the uses of local currency arising from the P.L. 480 program. He pointed out that in the past 90% of such proceeds were allocated for support of the Korean
armed forces. If the Cooley amendment\textsuperscript{3} were to be applied to Korea a deficit in the budget would result. The present budget has been calculated on the assumption that 90\% of the proceeds from a new P.L. 480 program would be made available. Consequently, the Minister said, the Cooley amendment should not be applied to Korea at least for the present fiscal year.

Mr. Warne supported the position stated by Minister Kim. He stressed that Korea has been an exceptional case all along and that we have a precedent already set for treating Korea as a special case. Mr. Robertson indicated his agreement that Korea is unique.

Minister Kim then raised the subject of offshore procurement. He said that since aid will be cut offshore procurement in terms of dollars is needed for Korea. It is not possible for Korean suppliers to bid in terms of hwan because such prices are not competitive. Mr. Warne said that there is a possibility of up to $30 million being spent in Korea on offshore procurement. If this total were reached it would help to lessen the effect of a reduction in aid. In response to Mr. Robertson's question as to whether he had discussed these matters in ICA, Mr. Warne said that he intended to do so on Monday, September 30. He had already discussed some of these questions with officials in the Pentagon.

Mr. Robertson commented that about 40\% of the entire aid funds requested of Congress was for the Far Eastern area and about 75\% of the 40\% was for Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam. It is in these three places that the Communists pose the greatest threat. Our aid allocation indicates that we consider these three to be the most important. Consequently, he wanted to assure Minister Kim that what is finally allocated to Korea will represent our best efforts to take care of the Korean program. It is obvious, however, that we cannot cut other programs in order to assure that there will be no reduction in aid for Korea.

Minister Kim expressed his appreciation for the meeting and the party left at approximately 12 o'clock.

\footnote{The Cooley amendment to the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (P.L. 480) was introduced by Representative Harold D. Cooley of North Carolina and adopted by Congress on August 13, 1957. (71 Stat. 345) The amendment stipulated that up to 25 percent of the total sales proceeds of Title I programs should be made available for loans in local currency to foreign and U.S. private investors through the Export-Import Bank. The law prohibited loans for the manufacture of products to be exported to the United States in competition with American products.}
250. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea¹

Washington, October 11, 1957—7:49 p.m.

308. For Ambassador. UK 977291 CC,² Deptel 229,³ your 73.⁴ We are greatly concerned as you know with earliest attainment ROK agreement force reduction in line plan contained Deptel 229. Recognize final decision will be made by President Rhee but that most practical approach may be first to line up ROK Ministry of Defense, JCS and Army support as indicated your 73. Would appreciate your appraisal progress so far made in discussions at Defense Ministry level. Assume for tactical reasons problem has not been broached directly to President Rhee since your June 21 approach at Chinhae.⁵

Herter

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/10-1157. Secret; Limit Distribution; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Gregory Henderson of NA and approved by Jones.
²In telegram UK 977291 CC from CINCUNC to the Department of the Army, October 5, Decker reported that he and Ambassador Dowling had met with the Defense Minister and senior South Korean military leaders on October 4 to transmit the proposals outlined in Document 247. (Department of Defense Files)
³Document 247.
⁴See footnote 2, Document 231.
⁵See Document 224.

251. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, October 24, 1957—7 p.m.

353. I have delayed reply to Deptel 308² until I could speak again with Defense Minister. This I have now done, and he has promised me he will do everything possible to give us ROK proposal on forces reduction next week.

Although President Rhee has mentioned subject in passing several times, and I have had one extended conversation with him on September 3 (Embtel 204),³ I have, as Dept assumes, left discussions with him primarily to Defense Minister in accordance latter’s request.

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/10-2457. Secret; Limit Distribution; No Distribution Outside Department.
²Supra.
³See footnote 5, Document 244.
I am convinced Minister is doing what he can to obtain President Rhee’s consent to reduction, and believe it wise continue to leave matter in his hands for time being. He has expressed appreciation for our patience with him, and has implied that if he is to succeed he must “make haste slowly.”

Although, as Dept knows, President Rhee’s reactions are sometimes unpredictable, and he is frequently inclined to change his decisions, I am reasonably hopeful that we can obtain a satisfactory agreement in course of next few weeks. This will not, of course, provide for elimination of four divisions, but I believe ensure equivalent reduction in manpower, perhaps by inactivation two divisions and certain other support units.

Dowling

252. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, October 30, 1957—4 p.m.

369. Warne and I called on President Rhee this morning to discuss FY 58 aid levels. Finance and Reconstruction Ministers also present.

I told President Rhee I regretted inability to inform him officially of aid program before he read it in press (UP Washington despatch giving full details was received Seoul Oct 26), but that we wished review details with him and ministers. Warne then ran through program as it now stands, and told President Rhee he would work out further details with Song.²

In reply, President Rhee thanked Warne and me for efforts made on aid program, expressed pro forma gratitude for US assistance, although reduced this year, and then launched into extremely bitter anti-American diatribe. He said Korea had followed US lead faithfully and fully (sic),³ but that he had finally and reluctantly concluded US incapable or unwilling lead free world. He described present US policy as “peace at any price,” alleged US ignoring increasing Communist gains, and asserted all would be lost unless Communists stopped immediately. He declared Korea could not exist on US aid and vain hopes and said early reunification was required if Korea is to survive. Instead, he said, US was concentrating on co-existence

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5-MSP/10-3057. Confidential.
²In Sang Song, Minister of Reconstruction.
³As on the source text.
with Communists and on assisting Japan to Asian dominance. Throughout his discourse there ran vein of resentment at Washington for what he obviously sees as neglect of Korea and disregard his own views.

I let President Rhee speak for some thirty minutes without interrupting, having learned through experience that it is fruitless to reason with him until he has completely unburdened himself, and then began as best I could to refute his assertions. I argued my confidence in US policy, and my personal feeling that we were making progress, although slow, in free world’s struggle against Communism; and assured him that his views were fully weighed by US, but pointed to need to reconcile divergent views of our many friends and allies. I agreed that US policy was based on desire for peace, but only with justice, and endeavored demonstrate that war would not resolve our problems, but rather place intolerable burden of reconstruction and even survival on victorious free world. In conclusion, I argued necessity for compromising allied views and maintaining common front, and attempted return to subject at hand.

Although he had calmed down in course my remarks, it became obvious President Rhee was uninterested in any real discussion of aid program. He came back, in more sober manner, to unification question, and asked what was to be done. I replied I could not offer any single effective step, but said series of actions taken and being taken would I thought be ultimately successful. On UNGA vote on Korea membership, I referred to Asian abstentions and said I felt ROK might do more to win support these countries. Conversation ended with agreement President Rhee and I would discuss unification question further next week.

There is, of course, nothing particularly new in President Rhee’s views as set forth above, although vehemence and emotion with which they were expressed was in contrast to more realistic attitude which he had assumed in recent past. My assessment is that he will “cool off” somewhat as his attention is distracted by other matters. I do feel, however, that his attitude, as well as preoccupation Korea public opinion (Embtel 1089 June 25 and despatch 145 August 30)5


5In telegram 1089 from Seoul, Ambassador Dowling proposed that the United States seize the initiative on the issue of Korean unification. He pointed to the impending elections in North Korea as an opportunity to call for “genuinely free elections” under the supervision of UNCURK. Another possible approach, he suggested,
are indications that renewed demonstrations of the obvious (i.e., our continuing efforts for unification) are required. In this regard, I believe it important that discussion Korea question in current GA not appear as pro forma, with problem merely being shelved for another year.

Dowling

would be to agree to an international conference on the Korean problem, if Chinese troops were withdrawn from Korea and the Communist authorities accepted the principle of free elections under U.N. supervision. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/6–2557)

Despatch 145 from Seoul transmitted a summary of editorials and speeches by South Korean officials in connection with the Korean Liberation Day on August 15. The primary theme of the editorials and speeches, according to the despatch, was the necessity of unifying Korea. (Ibid., 995B.61/8–3057)

253. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Decker) to the Department of the Army

Seoul, November 6, 1957—3:52 p.m.

UK 977475. References: A. UK 977291; B. State 229, 16 Sep 57; C. Defense 930475; D. Defense 929966; E. UK 977172. This is joint Ambassador-CINCUNC message.

1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/11–657. Secret. Sent through the Department of the Army as the Executive Agent to the Department of State and to OSD/ISA and repeated to CINCPAC, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, and the Embassy in Seoul. The source text is the Department of State copy.

2See footnote 2, Document 250.

3Document 247.

4Telegram 930475 from the Department of Defense to CINCUNC, October 1, indicated that the proposed reorganization of the 7th and 24th Divisions into pentomic divisions meant that the divisions would be authorized to organize Honest John missile batteries. The movement of atomic-capable units into Korea was timed to begin as soon as the Republic of Korea agreed to the proposed reduction of ROK ground forces. (Department of Defense Files)

5In telegram 929966 from the Department of Defense to CINCUNC, September 21, General Decker was instructed to modify the proposal outlined in telegram 229 to Seoul to indicate that "US Air Force units with greater capability than that possessed by the 58th wing will be rotated into Korea on a continuing basis." (Ibid.)

6In telegram UK 977172 CC to the Department of the Army, August 25, a joint Embassy-CINCUNC message, General Decker and Ambassador Dowling suggested that the reduction of South Korean ground forces should be accomplished by selective reduction within the framework of existing military units rather than by the elimination of four active divisions. Such a reduction, they argued, would reduce the loss of combat forces, would retain a framework for rapid expansion in an emergency, and would be more acceptable to President Rhee. (Ibid.)
Meeting held 5 November with ROK Minister of Defense in connection ROK forces reduction. Following is verbatim ROK reply to US proposals:

"5 November 1957 memo for: The United States Ambassador to Korea, Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. Subject: Reorganization of the ROK armed forces.

1. Based on the letters of the President of the United States, dated 19 July \(^7\) and 23 August 1957, \(^8\) subsequent US-ROK meetings, and the official memo of 4 October 1957 \(^9\) signed jointly by the United States Ambassador to Korea and Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command. The ROK Minister of Defense, under the approval of the President of the Republic of Korea, states the opinion of the Republic of Korea Government and proposes the following actions in connection with the reduction of ROK ground forces.

2. In view of the fact that the North Korean and Chinese Communist forces in North Korea have shown no intention to reduce their strength, the Republic of Korea is determined to prepare herself against any recurrence of the tragedy of June 1950 and to take a vital part in the Free World defense, disregarding the economical burden imposed upon her by maintaining a big armed force.

3. Although the proposed reduction of ROK ground forces is expected to bring unfavorable effect on the ROK defense set-up, the Republic of Korea Government is willing to reduce the strength of ROK forces by 60,000 men considering the actions the United States Government would take in connection therewith as set out in the US memorandum of 4 October 1957. The ROK Government strongly urges that the US Government take action subsequently to provide the matériel as indicated in paragraph 5 below, wishing to cooperate with the United States to readjust the entire defense structure of the free world.

4. The Republic of Korea Government favors the pentomic reorganization of the 7th and 24th US divisions and wishes the displacement of the 100 and 663 field artillery battalions into Korea be expedited.

5. The Republic of Korea Government wishes that the United States Government consent [to?] the following ROK proposals, in addition to the provisions for the improvement of transportation and communication equipment for ROK army and one jet fighter-bomber wing for the ROK air force.

a. For ROK Army: (1) Tanks—present M4A3 and M36 tanks be replaced with M41 and M46 tanks. (2) Artillery—present divisional 105-mm howitzer battalions and non-divisional 155-mm howitzer battalions be reorganized so as to expand the present 4-piece-per-battery system to 6-piece-per-battery system. (3) AAA fire power—1 additional AAA brigade of 3 modern AAA gun groups be activated. (4) Airborne unit. (5) The small arms made excess by the reduction

\(^7\) See Document 231.
\(^8\) See Document 243.
\(^9\) Not found in Department of State files; an apparent reference to a memorandum used to convey to President Rhee the message outlined in Document 247.
should either be turned over to the reserve divisions or stock for use in case of emergency. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] (7) Ordnance and vehicle rebuild capabilities of the ROK armed forces be expanded.

b. For ROK Navy: (1) Two destroyers (DD) be added. (2) Two destroyers (DE) be added. (3) Exchange superannuated vessels with new ones.

c. For ROK Air Force: (1) One all-weather fighter squadron. (2) Activation of AJL engineer battalion.

6. It is proposed that rearrangement of personnel within the ROK armed forces will be executed in the following manner:

a. Scope. Read in 3 columns:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Present Strength</th>
<th>Scope of Adjustment</th>
<th>Strength After Reduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army 658,460</td>
<td>-61,500</td>
<td>596,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine 27,500</td>
<td>-3,500</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy 15,000</td>
<td>+1,600</td>
<td>16,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air 19,040</td>
<td>+3,400</td>
<td>22,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance 720,000</td>
<td>-60,000</td>
<td>660,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. In the reduction of the Army, two (2) infantry divisions and other units or spaces will be reduced.

c. In the reduction of Marines, one (1) battalion and other spaces will be reduced.

d. Convenient time for the deactivation of two (2) Army divisions will be between 1 February and 31 May 1958."

Signed "Kim Chung Yul V T Kim Chung Yul" Typed "Kim, Chung Yul Minister of Defense Republic of Korea"

Ambassador and CINCUNC comments as follows: Re para 4: the ROK does not intend to publicize reduction at this time. However, MND is concerned over public reaction when facts become known. Consequently, he requests early arrival 100 and 663 FA bns to provide tangible evidence to public that ROK combat capability has not been reduced. Re para 5: (a) The major matériel for all ROK forces is a shopping list of items desired by ROK. Each will be considered individually in development of future programs. (b) Re para 5a (4): The airborne unit is a special forces type organization for UW organization. This unit now under consideration jointly by CINCPAC, CINCUNC and ROK. (c) Re para 5a (5): It is assumed here that all equipment made excess by inactivations will be available to ROK for filling shortages in T/E's of active units, or equipping reserve units. (d) Re para 5a [20 lines of source text not declassified]
Ambassador and CINCUNC recommend acceptance of reduction as outlined in para 6 of ROK MND memo since this appears to be as far as we can get ROK to go at this time.\footnote{In telegram 386 from Seoul, November 6, Ambassador Dowling reported that the Defense Minister told him privately that it had been difficult to obtain President Rhee's approval of the proposal detailed in telegram UK 977475. Dowling noted that it was important to move the reinforced U.S. artillery battalions into Korea before knowledge of the Korean force reductions became public, and he repeated his recommendation that the South Korean proposal be accepted as the "best we can do." (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/11-657)}

254. Editorial Note

On November 18, the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly completed 4 days of debate on "the Korean question" and drew up a report for submission to the General Assembly. The debate was based in large part upon the annual report of the U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, submitted on August 14, and upon the August 9 report of the Unified Command dealing with the U.N. Command statement in the Military Armistice Commission on June 21. (U.N. docs. A/3672 and A/3631, respectively)

Representatives of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia condemned the decision of the Unified Command to introduce nuclear-capable weapons into Korea, and United States representative Walter Judd responded that the action taken by the Unified Command was merely "remedial action" designed to offset Communist violations of the Armistice Agreement. First Committee debate on the Korean question is in U.N. docs. A/C.1/SR.899–A/C.1/SR.904.

At its 724th plenary meeting on November 29, the General Assembly accepted the recommendations of the First Committee and adopted Resolution 1180(XII) which reaffirmed the U.N. objectives in Korea and called upon the Communist authorities concerned to accept those objectives in order to achieve a settlement in Korea based on the fundamental principles for unification set forth by the nations participating on behalf of the United Nations in the Korean Political Conference held in Geneva in 1954. The Assembly requested UNCURK to continue its work in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and requested the Secretary-General to place the Korean question on the provisional agenda of the thirteenth regular session.
255. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Herter) to the Secretary of State

Washington, November 22, 1957.

I found from Manny Sprague that the counter-proposal which the Koreans made to our proposals on the reduction of forces has not been accepted because of lack of clarification as to actual numbers involved. The counter-proposal of the Koreans was that they would reduce by two Divisions and the hitch lies in just what this means. If it means what Manny hopes it means, namely, that two Divisions of 15,000 men each are to be deactivated, plus one man in support of each front-line Division man, there would be a total reduction of 60,000 individuals. Manny says that, should this understanding be confirmed, he feels the Korean counter-proposals would be satisfactory, but they would be unsatisfactory if the Koreans are merely talking about two front-line Divisions. He hopes to have the picture clarified early next week and will get in touch with Walter Robertson on the working out of a joint position to present to the Koreans.

C.A.H.

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.5/11-2257. Secret.
2See Document 253.
3See Document 247.

256. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)


SUBJECT
Korean Force Reductions

The ROK Army has a current authorized force level of 720,000 men but an active force level, according to latest figures available to us, of 669,300. In answer to our force reduction proposals, the ROK has proposed force reductions of 60,000 men from the authorized 720,000 level, to consist of the deactivation of two army divisions and other units, including a Marine battalion. If latest figures of

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1Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/11-2557. Secret. Drafted by Barbis.
actual strength are correct, the resulting reduction might be only 9,300 men. We understand that FY 58 Military Assistance Program used a force level of 680,000 men.

The ROK has also proposed that the U.S. consider granting the ROK a list of specified weapons and equipment in connection with force reductions, in addition to the improved transportation-communications equipment, and conversion of one air wing into jet fighter-bombers already offered.

The proposed ROK defense budget for Korean FY 58 (calendar year 1958) did not take into account any force reduction; it is not clear what force level was used as a basis for this Korean defense budget as presented to the National Assembly. The proposed budget envisages a ROK contribution estimated at 71.2 billion hwan and a U.S. contribution of 105.94 billion hwan from PL 480, Section 402 and Direct Forces Support counterpart sources. The proposed budget provides for a 14% increase in pay and allowances. COMUS–Korea estimates that a reduction in 60,000 spaces in ROK forces would result in an estimated saving of 3.5 billion hwan. The Korean Minister of National Defense desires to utilize any funds saved by reductions for additional pay increases above those planned for Korean FY 58 and COMUS–Korea has supported this recommendation.

The ROK is obviously not prepared to accept a force reduction based on the deactivation of four divisions, as proposed by the U.S. It is not clear whether the ROK counterproposal for the deactivation of two divisions and other units, totalling 60,000 spaces, will result in dollar savings equivalent to those anticipated from a four-division reduction. The problem is further complicated by the ROK desire to utilize any hwan savings for additional pay increases and the ROK request for additional weapons and equipment, the cost of which is not known. We likewise do not know the extent to which this new equipment would be included in the surplus U.S. equipment in Korea which we are prepared to give the Koreans.

It is recommended that in your meeting with Mr. Sprague this afternoon you seek to obtain from him clarification on these points. The joint telegram from Ambassador Dowling and General Decker on this subject is attached.²

²A note on the source text indicates that Document 253 was attached.
257. Telegram From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sprague) to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Decker)\(^1\)

*Washington, December 11, 1957—12:57 p.m.*

DEF 933850. This is a joint State–Defense Message in three parts from ASD/ISA signed Sprague. Ref: (A) UK 977475 CC,\(^2\) DTG 060525Z (Nov 57).

Part I. Plans outlined State–Defense 229\(^3\) called for (1) preferably, reduction four active ROKA divisions with their supporting units (i.e. four division slices); or (2) less desirable, reduction personnel equivalent four divisions plus their supporting units; or (3) if absolutely necessary, alternative (1) or (2) and addition two ROKA reserve divisions.

Minimum acceptable plan is reduction by 30 June 1958 of 61,500 men from ROKA actual (as opposed to authorized) strength, listed by field for FY 58 submission to Congress as 618,369, plus such adjustments in other services’ actual strengths as indicated by you in Ref (A). Thus “Scope” (para 6A Ref A) should read:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Present Strength</th>
<th>Scope of Adjustment</th>
<th>Strength After Reduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>618,369</td>
<td>-61,500</td>
<td>556,869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>27,483</td>
<td>-3,500</td>
<td>23,983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>14,810</td>
<td>+1,600</td>
<td>16,410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air</td>
<td>16,333</td>
<td>+3,400</td>
<td>19,733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance</td>
<td>676,995</td>
<td>-60,000</td>
<td>616,995</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^*\) Does not take into account reserve division strengths or adjustments therein. [Footnote in the source text.]

The ROKA reductions are to be made, where feasible, by means of deactivating personnel from those forces assigned to units or installations listed in Format A of FY 59 MAP submission (your estimate of personnel for these units is 524,767).

ROK proposed plan for reduction does not approach this level, would not achieve required budgetary savings, and is therefore unacceptable. ROK works from assumption 720,000 men present strength. US committed maintenance maximum 720,000 ROK military person-

\(^1\)Source: Department of Defense Files. Secret; Noforrn. Also sent to the Chargé in Seoul and repeated to CINCPAC, CINCUSARPAC, and CINCPACAF.

\(^2\)Document 253.

\(^3\)Document 247.
nel during FY 1955 only; these spaces never filled; actual reported ROK strength 676,995. Proposed reductions thus total only 16,995. Similarly within ROKA, strength listed by field for FY 1958 submission to the Congress is 618,369, not authorized strength ROK assume of 658,460; proposed reduction 61,500 men would result actual reduction within ROKA only 21,400. Thus ROKA proposed reductions are approximately 40,100 short of desired goal. Since your FY 59 MAP submission listed total ROKA spaces for which support requested as 647,986 including (1) patients; (2) nonorganizational students; (3) general prisoners; (4) replacements; (5) fillers for reserve divisions; and (6) KATUSA personnel; (1–6 numbering total 123,219), adjusting ROKA support base to 556,869 man level should be obtainable objective in practical terms. Reduction these dimensions essential to achieve subsequent downward adjustments to eleven active ROK divisions, including Marines, and 12–15 reserve divisions eventually contemplated by US policy.

Part II. Since apparent ROK will not agree forces reduction unless tangible evidence US modern weapons adduced you are authorized tell President and MND that (1) US will complete soonest reorganization US 7th and 1st Cavalry Divisions as pentomic units and that Honest Johns and 280 mm. guns will soon be introduced into Korea; (2) equipment generated by reduction and re-equipping above divisions will be considered for programming in regular MAP programs; (3) ROK “shopping list” requests para 5 Ref (A) will be considered in future MAPs but no commitment on these can be made; (4) equipment from ROK deactivated units will be made available for use other ROK units; [1 line of source text not declassified] (6) Washington offices will discuss feasibility provisions AAA under MAP; (7) air wing, communications and other equipment will be introduced as outlined in State–Defense cable 229 of 16 Sept. Modernization ROK forces cannot, however, be undertaken until ROK force reduction agreed to.

Above steps impressive symbols US determination retain requisite strength Korea and fulfill our obligations its defense. Impress on President Rhee, however, that new weapons developments lodge real deterrent to Communist aggression Korea not in massed manpower but in US overall ability retaliate and destroy bases of Communist aggression. This ability rests not near actual frontiers like Korea but in supporting bases and long-range weapons. In enormous task developing such weapons, the US is in fact spending more heavily than ever on defense of ROK.

Cut in total foreign aid appropriations for FY 58 has necessitated decrease economic aid Korea to $215 million. If ROK forces not reduced, deficit financing and consequent economic decline will undermine ROK forces and nation. There is no alternative to force reduc-
tions under these circumstances. To accentuate positive, you may also wish initiate planning to utilize discharges for benefit ROK economy as labor units for reforestation, land reclamation or other public works. Hence, while recognizing serious difficulties you have faced in obtaining ROK agreement, situation does not permit US acceptance ROK counterproposal.

Part III. a. What percent of ROK personnel is proposed "additional units for deactivation," such as security companies, administrative headquarters, schools, and training centers, fall within term "units and installations reported in Format A?"

b. Does ROK proposed date for deactivation of these units fall within deadline date of 30 June?

258. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Decker) to the Department of Defense

Seoul, December 18, 1957—12:15 p.m.


1. MND ROK furnished memo 16 December embodying info contained reference A. He was disappointed that ROK proposal as set forth in reference B was unacceptable. He questioned figure 676,995 used as base for reduction when actual strength at time negotiations began was considerably higher. He also pointed out that soon after negotiations began he purposely allowed strength to decline to avoid large scale reduction at a later date.

2. The following tabulation reflects actual ROK strengths as of dates indicated: read in 6 columns: colm 1, Branch of Service colm 2, 30 Nov 56; colm 3, 28 Feb 57; colm 4, 31 May 57; colm 5, 31 Aug 57; colm 6, 30 Nov 57. Army asterisk 618,369 641,983 624,908 635,306 608,707; Navy 14,810 14,720 14,774 14,971 14,806; Marines 27,456 26,707 26,337 25,773 26,039; Air Force 16,355 16,291 16,295 17,103

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/12-1857. Secret; Priority. Sent to the Department of Defense for OSD/ISA and to the Department of State and repeated to the Department of the Army, CINCPAC, USARPAC, and the Embassy in Seoul. The source text is the Department of State copy.

2 Supra.

3 Document 253.

4 A copy of the December 16 memorandum on "Reorganization of Forces (Korean)" from General Decker and Well to the Minister of Defense is in Department of State, NA Files: Lot 60 D 680, Reduction of Forces (Korean).
17,990; Total 676,990 699,701 682,314 693,153 667,542; Asterisk incl reserves on AD 31,687 33,044 16,763 98 20,440.

3. The 676,995 strength used in reference A as base against which reduction is to be made is reconciled here as reported ROK strength as of 30 Nov 1956.

4. MND has requested that the strength as of 31 Aug 57 (693,153) the end of the quarter during which negotiations began can be used as base figure against which reduction of 60 thous will be made. He was informed that the matter would be referred to you for consideration, but that in the meantime he should proceed on basis info contained reference A.

5. The magnitude of the desired reduction in ROK force as expressed in (Seoul msg 892)\(^6\) TOO 181500Z June 57 was minimum four divisions; State 229, 16 Sep 57,\(^6\) indicated the desired reduction to be four divisions including supporting units (or the equivalent personnel reduction); reference A indicates minimum acceptable plan is reduction of 60 thous against 30 Nov 1956 reported actual strength of 676,995. To avoid confusion as to the objective to be attained and the difficulty of explaining to ROK why the strength as of a certain date rather than another was used as the base for reduction, it is suggested that the magnitude of the desired reduction could best be expressed in relation to the overall authorized strength of ROK forces which is recognized by ROK as 720,000.

6. In the absence of any subsequent agreement, the terms of reference contained in the Agreed Minute of 1954 are used as guidance. It is considered, therefore, that the figures set forth in para 2, reference A do not abrogate CINCUNC's authority under para 1, Appendix B to Agreed Minute of 1954 to authorize adjustments in ROK components within the overall strength ceiling. Such adjustments are essential, for example in connection with Air Force augmentation to provide strength necessary to man the additional fighter bomber wing which will be authorized ROK by State 229. The Air Force strength as indicated in reference A is inadequate to meet this additional requirement.

7. In view of the above it is requested that an overall authorized ceiling strength figure be established to express the magnitude of the desired reduction taking into account the request of the ROK MND in para 4 above.

8. Would appreciate early reply.

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\(^{6}\)Document 223.

\(^{6}\)Document 247.
259. Memorandum for the Record by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Harr)\(^1\)

*Washington, December 23, 1957.*

**SUBJECT**

Reduction of Republic of Korea Army Forces

State—Defense cables 892 of 18 June 1957 and 229 of 16 September 1957\(^2\) transmitted to CINCUNC and the Ambassador a plan for ROK Army force reductions in implementation of a national policy decision on U.S. objectives in Korea.

After consideration of the U.S. plan, officials of the Republic of Korea offered a counter-proposal which was cabled to Washington by CINCUNC on 6 November 1957 (DA IN 689972).\(^3\) During the next two and one-half weeks the Washington staffs of the Departments of State and Defense studied the ROK drafted plan.

On Monday, 25 November, a meeting with Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson, attended by Mr. Irwin, Mr. Harr, Capt. Robbins, and Mr. McCormick of DOD and Mr. Parsons and Mr. Barbis of State, was held to discuss a draft reply, prepared by DOD, which was a response to the ROK counter-proposal.

This DOD draft rejected the ROK reduction plan—which called for a removal of 61,500 authorized spaces, not actual personnel, from a base of 658,460 authorized spaces (as opposed to an actual ROKA strength of only 618,369)—because such a reduction did not meet the requirements stipulated in cables 892 and 229. These two cables had requested a reduction of four ROKA active divisions with their supporting units or an equivalent reduction in personnel. Further, the proposed DOD reply stated the modernization of U.S. forces in Korea was contingent upon the reduction of ROK forces. Mr. Robertson of State took issue with this latter clause because seemingly it gave President Rhee a veto over modernization of our forces. Consequently, the clause was deleted. Secretary Robertson then agreed to review the draft with Mr. Dulles and to advise the Defense Department of State's concurrence or non-concurrence.

Subsequent to this meeting, Mr. Robertson of State and Mr. Sprague of Defense discussed the text of the DOD draft. It now was Mr. Sprague's opinion, after a trip to Korea, that a reduction of 4 division-slices in ROKA forces equated in the draft reply to a 100,000–120,000 men reduction, would not be negotiable; he suggested,

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\(^2\)Documents 223 and 247.

\(^3\)Printed as telegram UK 977475, Document 253.
rather, that perhaps a compromise reduction of 61,500 troops from actual count rather than authorized strength should be the new terms dispatched to the field for presentation to the ROK Government.

As a result of the Sprague–Robertson discussion, State contacted Defense on 10 December, requesting our participation in re-drafting the instructions to the field. Mr. McCormick and Mr. Sweet, both of the OSD/ISA Far East Region, represented Defense in this task. The revised proposal, which expressed the mutually agreed views of Secretaries Sprague and Robertson (1) authorized the field to tell President Rhee the Honest John and 280mm guns soon will be introduced into Korea and (2) informed CINCUNC and the Ambassador that the minimum acceptable plan is a reduction by 30 June 1958 of 61,500 men from ROKA actual strength.

[1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified]

On the morning of 11 December, Mr. Howard Parsons of State, North Asia, Far Eastern Affairs, called Mr. McCormick to advise him that both Secretary Dulles and Mr. Robertson had concurred in the two State–Defense working-group drafts outlined above and had hoped the proposals would be dispatched promptly. Mr. Parsons also agreed that Secretaries Dulles and Robertson’s concurrence in these drafts, coupled with Mr. Sprague’s approval, gave sufficient authority for CINCUNC to take immediate steps to effect introduction into Korea of the Honest John and 280mm gun [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Mr. Parsons further stated that action on the introduction of these weapons is a matter of internal planning and execution by CINCUNC and the Department of the Army.

Accordingly, two cables incorporating the State–Defense positions were prepared for Mr. Sprague’s signature. After receiving his approval, the Far East Region ISA, transmitted the cables (DEF 9338504 and 933889 of 11 December5) to the field as Joint State–Defense messages, signed by Mr. Sprague.

Karl G. Harr, Jr.6

4Document 257.
5Not found.
6Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.
260. Telegram From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Irwin) to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Decker)\(^1\)

*Washington, December 24, 1957—12:52 p.m.*

DEF 934500. This is a joint State—Defense message in two parts from OASD/ISA. Ref: a. Defense 933850 dated 11 Dec 1957;\(^2\) b. UK 977635CC DTG 180315Z Dec 1957.\(^3\)

Part I. The US will assist in supporting following maximum number active military personnel during US FY 59 (see “Active Strength After Reduction” column):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Present Active Strength</th>
<th>Scope of Adjustment</th>
<th>Active Strength After Reduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Army</td>
<td>618,369</td>
<td>-61,500</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^\ast\) Does not take into account reserve division strengths or adjustments therein. [Footnote in the source text.]

The above is same plan, with identical terms, as that outlined in Joint State—Defense cable, reference a, Part I.

Figure for 30 November 1956 of 676,995 ROK active strength considered meaningful because (1) it had been used in FY 58 presentation to Congress as best figure available and (2) ROKA figure of 618,369 was only 6,500 less than active strength reported by you on 27 June 1957 as 624,908, which figure was footnoted with statement as follows: “Includes reserves on active duty and varies with reserve training cycles.”

Re your para 5, referenced cable b: reduction on basis active strength rather than authorized spaces only means effect actual savings. Because the number involved in reduction from actual strength numerically is less than two-thirds that of reduction from authorized strength (i.e. 60,000 vs. 100,000), negotiations on basis of former could be better from public relations viewpoint (see Part II).

\(^1\)Source: Department of Defense Files. Secret; Priority. Also sent to the Chargé in Seoul and repeated to CINCUNC, CINCUSARPAC, and CINCPACAF.

\(^2\)Document 257.

\(^3\)Document 258.
Agree that CINCUNC continues have authority under paragraph 1, Appendix B, Agreed Minute Understanding of 17 November 1954 to authorize adjustments in ROK service components. Should adjustment between ROK Army active strength and Air Force active strength be necessary to accommodate additional ROKAF fighter-bomber wing, you may proceed to make internal change within overall active strength ceiling approximately 617,000.

Part II. If necessary, and without necessitating renegotiation of Agreed Minute of Understanding of 17 November 1954, instead of using procedure outlined in Part I (reduction on basis active strength levels) you can inform MND maximum authorized ceiling ROK armed forces after force reduction, to be supported by US in USFY1959, will be 620,000. In terms over-all authorized strength ROK armed forces, therefore, magnitude desired reduction is 100,000. Scope of reduction would be as follows:

| Scope of Reduction |
|--------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Present Strength Authorized | Scope of Adjustment | Authorized Strength After Reduction |
| Army: 658,460 | -101,500 | 556,960 |
| Marine: 27,500 | -3,500 | 24,000 |
| Navy: 15,000 | +1,600 | 16,600 |
| Air: 19,040 | +3,400 | 22,400 |
| Balance: 720,000 | -100,000 | 620,000 |

261. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Quarles) to the Secretary of the Army (Brucker)¹


SUBJECT

Introduction into Korea of the Honest John and 280mm Gun, [1 line of source text not declassified] (Top Secret)

You hereby are authorized, in implementation of State–Defense cables (1) To Seoul 229, dtd Sept 16, 1957;² (2) DEF 933850, dtd Dec

²Document 247.
11, 1957;³ (3) DEF 933889, dtd Dec 11, 1957,⁴ to introduce into Korea the Honest John and 280mm gun, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] as soon as is feasible under Army deployment schedules.  
Donald A. Quarles⁵

³Document 257.
⁴Not found.
⁵Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

262. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, December 27, 1957—6 p.m.

488. Reference CINCUNC KA 75227 December 20;² publicity on movement of atomic-capable units into Korea, and follow-up cable UK 977648 December 26.³

While aware of Department's problem vis-à-vis other members of the sixteen, I believe advantages of announcing arrival of atomic-capable weapons outweigh disadvantages. Presence of these weapons in Korea is bound to become public knowledge, and announcement would have obvious advantage on emphasizing both to Communists and to ROK our determination to continue participation defense of South Korea. Such announcement would be consistent with frank stand assumed in connection abrogation paragraph 13D.

General Decker and I are, of course, making every effort to obtain ROK acceptance of proposals in DEF 934500⁴ before such time as ROK may learn of definite plans to move atomic-capable units to Korea.

Weil

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5611/12–2757. Secret.
²In this telegram from CINCUNC to the Department of the Army, General Decker also recommended that a public announcement should be made covering the introduction of atomic-capable weapons into Korea. (Department of Defense Files)
³In this telegram from CINCUNC to the Department of the Army, Decker noted that the 100th FA Battalion (Rocket) (Reinforced) and the 663d FA Battalion had been ordered to move to Korea in January 1958. Consequently, Decker asked urgently for guidance on the question of whether public information on the introduction of atomic-capable units into Korea could be released. (Ibid.)
⁴Supra.
263. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, December 30, 1957—1 p.m.

493. New York Times correspondent Foster Hailey, long time friend of President Rhee, told me yesterday that when he visited Chinhae December 28 President was highly emotional in condemnation of armed forces reduction proposed by U.S. Hailey said Presidential Secretary Park Chon II, who met him at airfield and gave him memo on subjects President planned to discuss, seemed genuinely disturbed over possible outcome of President’s bitterness and excitement; and that during his three hours of conversation with President, Mrs. Rhee frequently nodded agreement when Hailey attempted counsel moderation.

Hailey said President talked of re-examining relations with the U.S., of “going it alone”, of “committing national suicide”, of blasting the USG in a public statement. He complained shipment of modern weapons to Korea had been frequently “postponed”; he did not see how he could agree to reduction of forces before such weapons arrived; and wondered whether they ever would arrive. He complained further that soldiers demobilized under reduction plan would constitute additional strain on Korean economy, and USG had not offered funds to help solve this problem. Hailey tried point out impracticability and unwise of taking any drastic steps at this time, and suggested if President Rhee could stimulate Senators and Congressmen to oppose reduction results would probably be more desirable than if President Rhee openly condemned the USG. Rhee argued that soliciting support in the U.S. would be a tedious process but asked Hailey to give him a memo with his suggestions.

During visit with President, Hailey was shown a memo from Min Kim Chong Yul requesting policy guidance on reduction of forces; reminding President that unilateral action would be futile without U.S. logistic support; and expressing view hostilities in Korea were not likely to be renewed unless there was war between U.S. and USSR.

President’s remarks to Hailey indicate he had received report of General Decker’s and my 8:30 am meeting with Defense Minister² in Seoul just prior to Hailey’s arrival Chinhae around noon. Hailey said before conversation ended President seemed to have calmed down; that he actually changed subject and discussed Confucianism.

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/12–3057. Secret; Limit Distribution.
²See infra.
Fact that President asked Hailey for recommendations in memo would seem he was not in mood to take wholly impetuous action. It is to be hoped Mrs. Rhee, Park Chon II, and others will dissuade him from taking any drastic step. President and Mrs. Rhee expected return Seoul December 31.

Weil

264. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Decker) to the Department of Defense¹

Seoul, December 30, 1957—2:18 p.m.

UK 977659. This is a joint Embassy/CINCUNC message. References: A. DEF 934500.² B. UK 977475.³

1. MND ROK given memo⁴ at meeting 28 Dec 1957, stating US position as set forth in part II of reference A. MND requested to reply by 10 January 1958 since that is approximate date when it is planned to advise President Rhee of US plans [1 line of source text not declassified].

2. MND stated that at direction of President Rhee he is undertaking study of long range military requirements of ROK under (1) conditions which prevail today, (2) conditions if Communist threat is lessened. He stated that ROK decision concerning reduction of magnitude proposed would depend on findings and conclusions these studies. He indicated that he would try to establish ROK position by 10 Jan, meanwhile ROK was proceeding with reduction of 60,000 as outlined in reference B.

3. MND was advised that the study mentioned in para 2 above should not be limited to the opposing forces in Korea but should take into account the US capability to strike at the sources of Communist power, as well as the shrinking level of aid available from the

¹Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56395B/12-3057. Top Secret; Priority. Originally sent as a CINCREP message and later corrected to CINCUNC message. Sent to the Department of Defense for OSD/ISA and to the Department of State; repeated to Department of the Army, CINCPAC, and CINCUSARPAC; and passed to the Embassy in Seoul.
²Document 260.
³Document 253.
⁴A copy of the December 28 memorandum from General Decker and Weil to the Minister of Defense on “Reorganization of the ROK Armed Forces” is in Department of State, NA Files: Lot 60 D 680, Reduction of Forces (Korean). In the memorandum, Decker and Weil concluded: “It would appear that elimination of four divisions will be necessary to bring ROKA strength within the reduced ceiling.”
US and the need to balance military requirements against economic resources.

265. Letter From the Chargé in Korea (Weil) to the Ambassador to Korea (Dowling)¹

Seoul, December 31, 1957.

Dear Red: I enclose copies of memoranda dated December 16 and 28² on the subject of reduction of forces, concerning which you will find State–Defense and Embassy–CINCUNC messages in the files. You will also see my telegram of December 30³ reporting President Rhee’s reaction to proposals General Decker and I presented to the Minister of Defense on December 28. In this connection it may be possible to glean some evidence of Dr. Rhee’s current mood at the New Year reception tomorrow.

As you will note, in our joint message of December 30,⁴ Mike Kim told General Decker and me, at our meeting on December 28, that President Rhee and others in the Government were planning to review their policies. He said they would have to decide whether the situation warranted remaining on a war footing with little or no regard for the economy, or whether the military establishment should be cut on the assumption that the cold war would go on for many years. I suggested to Mike that it would be unwise to adopt one assumption or the other—i.e., put all his eggs in one basket; and both General Decker and I urged Mike to advocate the closest approach possible to a golden mean between the two extremes. We tried to convince Mike that under the circumstances this was the only practical solution.

During our meeting on December 28 Mike Kim seemed perfectly calm and businesslike and Paik Sun Yup merely listened. By the time you read this we may have received some indication of the President’s conclusions, but I can’t help feeling that Mike Kim was a little optimistic when he said he would hope to have the answer before January 10. If they appear to be dragging their feet I may, in view of

¹ Source: Department of State, NA Files: Lot 60 D 680, Reduction of Forces (Korean). Secret; Official–Informal. Ambassador Dowling was in Washington for home leave and consultations.
² Regarding the December 16 memorandum, see footnote 4, Document 258. Regarding the December 28 memorandum, see footnote 4, supra.
³ Document 263.
⁴ Supra.
certain information which you will see in the Top Secret file,\textsuperscript{5} discuss with General Decker the advisability of our seeing the President, who returned to Seoul this afternoon.

A letter on other matters follows.\textsuperscript{6}

Sincerely,

T. Eliot Weil\textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{5}The reference is unclear.
\textsuperscript{6}Not found in Department of State files.
\textsuperscript{7}Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.