THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON KOREA
April 26–June 15, 1954
I. INTRODUCTION

A. NOTES ON SOURCES AND PRESENTATION OF MATERIAL FOR THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON KOREA

1. The nature of the Conference

Essentially the Geneva Conference on Korea was a two-sided affair with 16 Allied delegations confronting 3 Communist delegations. The Conference did not resolve the Korean question, did not reach any agreed positions, and, indeed, did not even vote on any proposals, since the Conference rules were very loose and informal and incorporated no procedures for voting. The Conference terminated with no agreement save the obvious one of continuing to disagree.

While the Conference was not open to the public, the statements and proposals made in the plenary sessions were for public consumption. Speeches were handed out to the press, as were the various proposals, for maximum publicity. The one restricted session on Korea, held on May 1, was restricted only in the number of nations attending—seven rather than nineteen; otherwise, the restricted session was as well publicized as the plenary sessions.

2. Presentation of the material

Due to the maximum use of publicity by the delegations and the quasi-open nature of the sessions, telegraphic summaries have been used to cover the meetings, with footnote references in each case to the minutes of the various meetings. This has been done in order to avoid repetition and save space in the volume.

The documentation is set forth in strictly chronological order, with no topical break-downs. Where telegraphic summaries of meetings were transmitted some time after the events, the documents have been given an italic heading to show the time of the meetings and have been placed in the compilation at that time.

Printed below are complete lists of the plenary sessions and the meetings of the heads of the 16 Allied delegations. (See sections C and D.)

3. Unpublished sources

The principal source of documentation in the Department of State central files is decimal file 396.1–GE. Some preliminary material is contained in file 396.1–BE (the Berlin Conference file), and some
additional papers are in the main decimal files for Korea 795.00 and 795B.00.

In addition to the decimal files, several lot files are important. The large, consolidated Conference file, lot 60 D 627, contains the best single collection of material on the Conference. Also of considerable value are three retired lot files of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, FE files, lots 55 D 480, 55 D 481, and 60 D 330.

4. Published sources

Overshadowed as it was by the Indochina Conference, the Korean Conference has not been heavily covered in secondary and memoir literature. For overall views of the Geneva Conference with occasional brief references to Korea, one should consult the list of published sources in this volume for the Indochina phase.

Two publications are useful because they reprint most of the statements and proposals made at the Conference on Korea. The first is a British White Paper, Documents Relating to the Discussion of Korea and Indo-China at the Geneva Conference, April 27–June 15, 1954 (Cmd. 9186). The second is The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, April 26–June 15, 1954 (Department of State publication 5609, October 1954). The latter has been used most often for citations to the text of speeches referred to in the telegraphic summaries on the meetings. In addition, some of the statements are printed in appropriate 1954 issues of the Department of State Bulletin.

5. Documentation on United States–People’s Republic of China Contacts

As a result of the presence of the two delegations in Geneva for the Conference, contacts took place informally and apart from the sessions, principally on the matter of nationals detained in each country who wished to return to their homes. For documentation of these contacts not printed here, see volume XIV.

B. LIST OF PAPERS PREPARED FOR THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON KOREA

A Working Group on Korea was set up to prepare position and background papers for the United States Delegation to the Conference. The Working Group was composed mainly of Department of State officials, although the Department of Defense was represented. Below are listed the final versions of the papers prepared for the Conference. Only those five preceded by an asterisk are printed in this compilation; the remainder may be found in FE files, lot 60 D 330.

Primary Papers

GK D–1, March 15, 1954, Organization and Procedures
GK D–2, March 15, 1954, Conference Agenda
*GK D-4b, March 27, 1954, Draft US Proposal for Reunification of Korea
*GK D-4/1e, April 24, 1954, Basic Position Paper on Korean Reunification
GK D-4/2a, April 5, 1954, Variant Methods of Constituting a Korean Reunification Supervisory Commission (KRSC)
GK D-4/4, March 29, 1954, UK, Australian, and New Zealand Views on Korean Reunification
GK D-4/5, April 21, 1954, Further Comments by the Canadian Government on the Problem of Korean Reunification
GK D-4/6, April 8, 1954, The US Views on the Reunification of Korea
*GK D-4/7, April 9, 1954, Draft Initial Proposal for Reunification of Korea (Alternative A)
GK D-4/8, April 12, 1954, Terms of Reference of the Korean Reunification Supervisory Commission
*GK D-4/10, April 16, 1954, Draft Proposal for Reunification of Korea (Alternative B)
GK D-4/11, April 17, 1954, Outline of Argument in Support of Initial Unification Proposal
GK D-5a, March 25, 1954, Possible Proposals on Korea Short of Full, Free Unification
GK D-5/1, April 30, 1954, Possible Alternate Proposals on Korea Short of Full, Free Unification
GK D-6/e, April 9, 1954, Withdrawal of Foreign Forces from Korea
GK D-7/a, April 19, 1954, International Assurances on the Integrity and Security of a Reunified Korea
GK D-8a, March 26, 1954, Non-Repatriated Prisoners of War
GK D-9b, April 9, 1954, Changes in the Armistice Agreement
GK D-10a, April 12, 1954, The ROK Position at the Geneva Conference and US Tactics in Dealing With the ROK
GK D-11a, March 19, 1954, Probable Soviet and Chinese Communist Objectives and Tactics at Geneva With Special Reference to Korea
GK D-12, April 9, 1954, Probable Communist Position at Geneva on Withdrawal of Foreign Troops From Korea
GK D-13, April 26, 1954, Return of UNC Personnel Who Are Still in Communist Custody

Background Papers

GK D-30, April 9, 1954, Contributions of Combat Forces to the UN Command (December 1953)
GK D-30/1, April 19, 1954, Soviet Policy Towards Korea
GK D-31, April 22, 1954, North Korean Constitution

Concerning the background and position papers on Indochina and those dealing with both Korea and Indochina (GI and GKI series),
see the list under the sources dealing with the Indochina phase, page 399.

C. Schedule of the Plenary Sessions on Korea

(Reprinted from The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, pages 26-27.)

April 26. First plenary session, Prince Wan (Thailand) presiding. Statements by Mr. Dulles (U.S.A.) and the chairman. Convened 3:10 p.m., adjourned 3:40 p.m.

April 27. Second plenary session, Mr. Molotov (U.S.S.R.) presiding. Statements by Mr. Pyun (R.O.K.), Nam II (D.P.R.O.K.), and Senor Zuleta (Colombia). Convened 3:05 p.m., adjourned 5:05 p.m.

April 28. Third plenary session, Mr. Eden (U.K.) presiding. Statements by Mr. Dulles and Chou En-lai (C.P.R.). Convened 3:05 p.m., adjourned 5:28 p.m.

April 29. Fourth plenary session, Prince Wan presiding. Statements by Mr. Casey (Australia) and Mr. Molotov. Convened 3:05 p.m., adjourned 4:50 p.m.

April 30. Fifth plenary session, Mr. Molotov presiding. Statements by Mr. Acikalin (Turkey) and Prince Wan. Convened 3:05 p.m., adjourned 3:40 p.m.

May 1. Restricted session, Mr. Eden presiding. Convened 3:30 p.m., adjourned 6 p.m.

May 3. Sixth plenary session, Mr. Eden presiding. Statements by Mr. Pyun, Nam II, Mr. Stephanopoulos (Greece) and Chou En-lai. Convened 3:05 p.m., adjourned 6:30 p.m.

May 4. Seventh plenary session, Prince Wan presiding. Statements by Mr. Pearson (Canada) and Mr. Luns (the Netherlands) and Mr. Heywot (Ethiopia). Convened 3:05 p.m., adjourned 5:03 p.m.

May 7. Eighth plenary session, Mr. Molotov presiding. Statements by Mr. Garcia (Philippines), Mr. Webb (New Zealand), Senor Zuleta. Convened 3:05 p.m., adjourned 5:05 p.m.

May 11. Ninth plenary session, Mr. Eden presiding. Statements by Mr. Molotov, Mr. Spaak (Belgium), and Mr. Pyun. Convened 3:05 p.m., adjourned 7:02 p.m.

May 13. Tenth plenary session, Prince Wan presiding. Statements by M. Bidault and Mr. Eden. Convened 3:05 p.m., adjourned 4:10 p.m.

May 22. Eleventh plenary session, Mr. Molotov presiding. Statements by Chou En-lai, Nam II, and Mr. Pyun. Convened 3:02 p.m., adjourned 6:19 p.m.

May 23. Twelfth plenary session, Mr. Eden presiding. Statements by Mr. Smith (U.S.A.), Senor Urrutia (Colombia), Mr. Acikalin, Prince Wan, Mr. Watt (Australia), and M. Kindynis (Greece). Convened 3:03 p.m., adjourned 5:30 p.m.

June 5. Thirteenth plenary session, Prince Wan presiding. Statements by Mr. Heywot, Nam II, Chou En-lai, Mr. Garcia, Mr. Molotov, Baron Bentinck (the Netherlands), Mr. Pyun, and Mr. Smith. Convened 3:04 p.m., adjourned 7:10 p.m.
June 11. Fourteenth plenary session, Mr. Molotov presiding. Statements by Chou En-lai, Mr. Ronning (Canada), Mr. McIntosh (New Zealand), Nam Il, Mr. Eden, Prince Wan, and Mr. Spaak and M. Bidault. Convened 3:05 p.m., adjourned 7:20 p.m.

June 15. Fifteenth plenary session, Mr. Eden presiding. Statements by Nam Il, Chou En-lai, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Smith, Mr. Casey, Mr. Garcia, Mr. Spaak, Prince Wan and Lord Reading (U.K.). Convened 3:05 p.m., adjourned 8:35 p.m.

D. Schedule of Meetings of the Heads of the Sixteen Allied Delegations

First Meeting, April 26, 1954, 11:10 a.m.—12:55 p.m.
Second Meeting, April 29, 1954, 11:00 a.m.—12:35 p.m.
Third Meeting, May 1, 1954, 10:05 a.m.—10:25 a.m.
Fourth Meeting, May 3, 1954, 11:10 a.m.—12:15 p.m.
Fifth Meeting, May 13, 1954, 10:05 a.m.—11:40 a.m.
Sixth Meeting, May 21, 1954, 10:40 a.m.—12:25 p.m.
Seventh Meeting, June 4, 1954, 11:03 a.m.—12:55 p.m.
Eighth Meeting, June 8, 1954, 11:05 a.m.—12:07 p.m.
Ninth Meeting, June 14, 1954, 11:10 a.m.—1:08 p.m.
Tenth Meeting, June 15, 1954, 11:07 a.m.—12:15 p.m.
Eleventh Meeting, June 15, 1954, 4:50 p.m.—5:15 p.m.

E. List of Participants in the Geneva Conference on Korea

Reprinted from The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, pages 21–26. With the exception of the United States Delegation, here listed first, the delegations of the other countries are not complete and list only the principal officials who played a prominent role in the Conference. The delegation lists are filed in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 299 and CF 302.

United States

United States Representatives

Through May 2—John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
After May 2—Walter Bedell Smith, Under Secretary of State

Deputy United States Representative

Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State

Special Assistants to the United States Representative

Roderic L. O’Connor, Special Assistant to Secretary of State
Richard V. Hennes, Special Assistant to Under Secretary of State
Coordinator
U. Alexis Johnson, American Ambassador to Czechoslovakia

Special Advisers
Theodore Achilles, Minister, Deputy Chief of Mission, American Embassy, Paris
Robert R. Bowie, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Arthur C. Davis, Vice Admiral, U.S.N., Director, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense
Donald R. Heath, American Ambassador to Cambodia and Vietnam and American Minister to Laos
Douglas MacArthur II, Counselor, Department of State
Carl W. McCardle, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Department of State
Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Department of State
Edward Page, Jr., Counselor of Embassy (USRO), American Embassy, Paris
Herman Phleger, Legal Adviser, Department of State
G. Frederick Reinhardt, Counselor of Embassy, American Embassy, Paris

Advisers
John Anspacher, Chief, Program Planning Staff, HICOG, Bonn
Philip W. Bonsal, Director, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State
John A. Calhoun, American Embassy, Seoul
John Daley, Brigadier General, U.S.A., former Chief of Staff, U.N. Military Armistice Commission, Korea
Robert G. Ferguson, Colonel, U.S.A., Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense
Franklin C. Gowen, U.S. Representative for International Organizations and Consul General, Geneva
John Hamilton, Deputy Assistant Director for Policy and Programs, United States Information Agency
Louis Henkin, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State
Donald Kallet, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S.A., American Embassy, Saigon
John Keppel, American Embassy, Moscow
James F. King, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
Edwin W. Martin, Deputy Director, Office of Chinese Affairs, Department of State
Robert H. McBride, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State
Charles C. Stelle, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Charles A. Sullivan, Chief, American and Far East Division, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense
Ray L. Thurston, Deputy Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State
Kenneth T. Young, Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State

Experts

Philip E. Barringer, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense
Robert Blake, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State
Walter Drew, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State
John E. Dwan, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S.A., Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense
Vladimir De Grave, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State
John I. Getz, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State
Milburn N. Huston, Colonel, U.S.A., Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Robert C. Taber, Lieutenant Colonel, Army Attaché, American Embassy, Saigon
Joseph A. Yager, Division of Research for the Far East, Department of State

Press Officer

Henry Suydam, Chief, News Division, Department of State

Assistant

John P. McKnight, USIA, Rome
Edward Savage, USIA, Stuttgart

Secretary of Delegation

Through June 9—Basil Capella, Executive Director, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
After June 9—Henry F. Nichol, Conference Attaché, Geneva

Technical Secretaries

Walter Trulock, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
Christopher Van Hollen, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

Australia

R. G. Casey, Minister for External Affairs
A. S. Watt, Australian Commissioner in Malaya
R. L. Harry, Australian Permanent Delegate to the European Office of the United Nations
T. K. Critchley, Australian Delegate to UNCURK
J. R. Rowland, First Secretary, South-East Section, Department of External Affairs, Canberra

Belgium

Paul-Henri Spaak, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Louis Scheyven, Secretary-General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Vicomte de Lantsheere, Ambassador of Belgium in Berne
Delvaux de Fenffe, Director-General of the Political Department at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Daufresne de la Chevalerie, Minister Plenipotentiary, Head of Cabinet
Roger Taymans, Minister Plenipotentiary
Baron de Gaffier d'Hestroy, Embassy Counsellor

Canada

Lester B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs
Chester Ronning, Canadian Minister to Norway and Iceland
John W. Holmes, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

Colombia

Eduardo Zuleta Angel, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Ambassador of the Republic of Colombia in Washington
Francisco Urrutia Holguin, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Chief of the Permanent Delegation to the United Nations, New York
Luis Gonzales Barros, Minister, Permanent Delegate of Colombia to the United Nations and Specialized Agencies in Geneva
Jaime Polanía Puyo, Minister Plenipotentiary
Julio Reyes Canal de Fregata, Minister Plenipotentiary

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Nam Il, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Paek Nam Un, Minister of Education
Ki Sok Pok, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs
Chang Choon San, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs
Ethiopia
Ato Zade Gabre Heywot, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations
Dedjazmatch Amha Aberra, Adviser to the Ministry of Interior of the Imperial Ethiopian Government

France
Georges Bidault, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Maurice Schumann, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Marc Jacquet, Secretary of State for Relations with the Associated States
Jean Chauvel, Ambassador at Berne
Alexandre Parodi, Ambassador, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Greece
Stéfanos Stephanopoulos, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Jean Kindynis, Minister Plenipotentiary, Director of American and United Nations Affairs at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Nicolas Hadji Vassiliou, Permanent Delegate for Greece to International Organizations in Geneva

Luxembourg
Joseph Bech, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Jean-Pierre Kremer, Counsellor of Legation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Georges Heisbourg, Counsellor of Legation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Netherlands
J. M. A. H. Luns, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chairman of Delegation
A. Bentinck, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Berne, Vice-Chairman of Delegation
C. L. Patijn, Head of the International Organizations Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

New Zealand
T. Clifton Webb, Minister of External Affairs
A. D. McIntosh, Secretary of External Affairs
F. H. Corner, Counsellor, New Zealand High Commission, London

People's Republic of China
Chou En-lai, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Chang Wen-tien, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ambassador of China to the Soviet Union
Wang Chia-hsiang, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs
Li Ke-nung, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs

**Philippines**
Carlos P. Garcia, Vice-President and Secretary for Foreign Affairs
Manuel C. Briones, President Pro-Temпоре of the Senate, Congress of the Philippines
Miguel Cuenco, Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines
Felino Neri, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary

**Republic of Korea**
Y. T. Pyun, Minister of Foreign Affairs
You Chan Yang, Ambassador to the United States of America
Ben C. Limb, Ambassador-At-Large, Permanent Observer to the United Nations
Jin Ki Hong, Vice Minister of Justice

**Thailand**
Prince Wan Waithayakon Krommun Naradhip Bongsprabandh, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Nai Pote Sarasin, Ambassador at Washington
Luang Vichit Vadaikan, Minister at Berne
Prince Pridi-debyabongs Devakula, Thai Delegate, UNCURK

**Turkey**
Cevat Acikalin, Ambassador of Turkey, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Nureddinn Vergin, Minister of Turkey in Lisbon

**Union of Soviet Socialist Republics**
V. M. Molotov, Minister for Foreign Affairs
A. A. Gromyko, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs
V. V. Kuznetsov, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs
L. F. Ilyichev, Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
N. T. Fedorenko, Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
P. F. Yudin, U.S.S.R. Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China
S. P. Suzdalev, U.S.S.R. Ambassador to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
G. N. Zarubin, U.S.S.R. Ambassador to the United States of America
S. A. Vinogradov, U.S.S.R. Ambassador to France
F. F. Molochkov, U.S.S.R. Minister to Switzerland
United Kingdom

Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
The Marquess of Reading, Minister of State, Foreign Office
Harold Caccia, Deputy Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office
W. D. Allen, Assistant Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office
H. Trevelyan, Her Britannic Majesty’s Chargé d’Affaires at Peking
W. G. C. Graham, Her Britannic Majesty’s Minister at Seoul
C. A. E. Shuckburgh, Principal Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
II. PRE-CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS: EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO ATTEND THE CONFERENCE; PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONFERENCE; POSITION PAPERS; PROCEDURAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS (FEBRUARY 16-APRIL 25)

795.00/2-1654: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY BERLIN, February 16, 1954—2 p. m.¹

Dulles 81. Re Tedul 46.² I do not think it wise to inform Rhee at this time of the details of our proposals. I think however, it would be wise to transmit to him a personal message from me along the following lines:

“In reference to the negotiations that we are now conducting in restricted sessions of our meeting here on the Far East, I want you to know that I have taken no position which departs from the statements I made in the plenary sessions, the pertinent parts of which have been transmitted to you.”

If you concur would you authorize Embassy Seoul to pass message along this line to Rhee.³

Dulles

¹ Dulles was in Berlin for the quadrupartite meeting of Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, which lasted from Jan. 25 to Feb. 18, 1954. For documentation on the Berlin Conference, see volume xvii. Although the main business of the Berlin Conference was the German question, on which no agreement was reached, other matters, such as Austria and European security were taken up. In the course of the meetings, the Foreign Ministers also discussed the Far East, and, in particular, the question of an international conference to resolve the Korean problem. It is with Korea that this telegram is concerned.

² The text of this telegram, dated Feb. 13, to Berlin, read as follows:

“Re discussions on Korean Political Conference, we wonder whether you would approve informing Rhee in general way of proposal now under negotiation. Various aspects of proposal have been leaking gradually to press, and we understand DeJean has informed Bao Dai and others re Indo-China aspects. We fear that if Rhee first hears of result your talks through press, we may react in harmful manner. Our recommendation is you authorize us to have Embassy Seoul informally advise Rhee in confidence substance Western proposal, stating it still under negotiation.” (366.1-RE/2-1354)

³ The reply to telegram Dulles 81 was contained in telegram Tedul 56, Feb. 17, to Berlin, which stated:

“Dulles 81. Believe inadvisable transmit personal message now in view of highly offensive letter Rhee has just sent to President and which we are trying to persuade him to withdraw. Would prefer, unless you object, await close of conference before filling him in on Far Eastern discussions.” (795.00/2-1654)

The letter from President Rhee, dated Feb. 4, was withdrawn by Rhee at the request of the Department of State and was not delivered to President Eisenhower. In it, Rhee had stated that Korea saw no hope in the U.S. Government because of the unwillingness of the United States to back the efforts of the Republic of Korea to unify all of Korea, because of the weakness of the United States in the face of Communist intransigence, and because of pro-Japanese policies which the United States pursued at the expense of Korea. (Lot 66 D 204; “Rhee—Eisenhower Correspondence”) For the text of the letter, see volume xv.
TOP SECRET NIACI BERLIN, February 18, 1954—3 a. m.

Dulte 88. For S/S and Phillips. ¹ Limit distribution. Regarding Dulte 51 and 86. ² Following is revised background briefing for USIA and press as to agreement for conference on Korea and Indochina. It should be treated as top secret until Secretary specifically authorizes its use ³ which will be for background only without attribution. Former background briefing should be cancelled.

Verbatim text

I. The United States is committed to do all in its power to try to bring about by peaceful means the unification of Korea as an independent nation free to manage its own affairs under a representative form of government.

To that end the US and the other 15 United Nations members which fought in Korea and the Republic of Korea have been trying to bring into being the political conference which was contemplated by the Korean armistice agreement of July 27, 1953, and which in accordance with the recommendation in that agreement would have been held within three months.⁴

Actually, more than six months have gone by, and no progress whatever has been made. Not a single feature has been agreed to—either place or date or participants. The US sent an important mission to Panmunjom in an effort to break the deadlock by negotiations on the spot, but after months of futile talk, the negotiations have now lapsed.⁵

The US therefore felt that it should make a further effort here at the four power meeting. Item one of the agenda of the four power conference made this topic relevant.

An agreement has now been reached.

¹ Joseph B. Phillips, Acting Director of the Office of Public Affairs, Department of State.
² Dated Feb. 8 and 17, respectively, from Berlin, neither printed. Telegram Dulte 51 contained background information for possible use in connection with developments at the Berlin Conference (396.1—BE/2—854). Telegram Dulte 86 transmitted the text of a Soviet revision of a British draft quadrupartite communiqué on Korea and Indochina (396.1—BE/2—1734). The text in telegram Dulte 86 was substantially the same as that contained in the official communiqué issued on Feb. 18, the text of which is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 1, 1954, p. 317.
³ Authorization was granted in an unnumbered telegram from Secretary Dulles at Berlin transmitted subsequently on Feb. 18 (396.1—BE/2—1854).
⁴ Article IV (par. 60) of the Armistice Agreement called for a conference within 90 days to settle the questions of withdrawal of foreign troops and peaceful resolution of the Korean situation (TIAS 2782; 4 UST 234).
⁵ The U.S. Mission was headed by Arthur H. Dean who had by this time left Panmunjom and returned to the United States. For related documentation, see volume xv.
II. The first paragraph of the agreement commits the four powers to the need for establishing by peaceful means a unified and independent Korea as an important step toward the reduction of international tensions and the re-establishment of peace elsewhere in Asia. It is useful that the Soviet Union should be thus committed to the importance of Korea being unified and independent because of the fact that it seems that Communist China is in effect incorporating North Korea into China as a colonial province.

III. The second paragraph makes provision for a conference of all the countries directly concerned in one way or another in the fighting in Korea, without distinction among them. All the countries which contributed forces to the United Nations Command in Korea pursuant to the UN Security Council resolution of June 27, 1950, would be given an opportunity to take part along with the Communist regimes in China and North Korea, and the Soviet Union.

The composition of the Korean conference will be precisely as we sought it. The agreement would exclude the participation of "neutrals" in the projected conference. It accepts our choice of place, i.e., Geneva, which was our first suggestion.

IV. The third paragraph deals with the extension of the peace conference method to Indochina. Paragraph 3 stipulates that the conference, in addition to Korea, will further discuss the problem of restoring peace in Indochina. On September 2, 1953, Secretary Dulles, in an address before the American Legion, said:

"We want peace in Indochina, as well as in Korea. The political conference about to be held relates in the first instance to Korea. But growing out of that conference could come, if Red China wants it, an end of aggression and restoration of peace in Indochina. The United States would welcome such a development." The Associated States and other interested states including Communist China would be invited to attend this conference in addition to France, the US, the United Kingdom and Soviet Russia.

V. The concluding paragraph of the agreement makes clear that nothing envisaged by the resolution would involve the US in diplomatic recognition of the regimes which govern Communist China and North Korea.

VI. The agreement involves an outright rejection of the Soviet thesis that the regime which governs Communist China should be

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*At this point in the source text, the words "such as India" appeared, but they were lined out in pencil in accordance with instructions received in telegram Dulce 98, Feb. 18, from Berlin, to delete them (386.1–BE/2–1534).

brought into world councils on a general agenda as one of the so-called "five great powers." It makes no mention of Formosa or UN membership. It treats the Communist regime as one which from the US standpoint remains unrecognized, one which is dealt with only on a de facto basis in relation to concrete local problems of war and peace where it is a necessary party. We maintain our refusal to give it any position of preferment, or to contribute to the enhancement of its authority and prestige. We are making an earnest effort to find a peaceful solution in Korea and Indochina. Communist China is offered every opportunity to cancel out her aggression in Korea and to cease her support of rebellion and aggression in Indochina.

VII. The agreement fully sustains the principles which have guided the US in relation to Far Eastern matters. It evidences the US desire to have peace, but not to have peace at the price of concessions of principle. We are not committed to any course at the conference. We have not traded US performance against Communist promises. The outcome gives a heartening demonstration of the unity of the three Western countries, where matters of principle affecting their essential interests are involved. The insistent Soviet demand for inclusion of Communist China in a central group of five great powers to deal with questions affecting many parts of the world was emphatically rejected.

The Foreign Ministers of the United States, France and the United Kingdom were as one in seeking opportunity for honorable settlement by peaceful negotiation of the most pressing issues outstanding in the Far East. They were also as one in their refusal to permit the inclusion of extraneous issues.

Dulles

795.00/2-1854: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, February 18, 1954—11:31 a. m. NIACT

Tedul 59. As soon as agreement on Korea—Indochina resolution confirmed, we would like inform President Rhee. Would propose communicate to him through Briggs and Young\(^1\) text of agreed

\(^1\)Young was in Korea at this time as Deputy U.S. Representative at the talks at Panmunjom concerning the holding of a political conference on Korea; for documentation, see volume xv. These talks were discontinued following the decision at the Berlin Conference to hold the Geneva Conference on Korea.
resolution and points mentioned second para Dulte 87,\(^2\) and would like to send Embassy Seoul for background guidance Dulte 88.\(^3\) Have you any objection?

\(^2\) Dated Feb. 18, from Berlin. The second paragraph read:

"(1) Principle of no five power conference is upheld; (2) there is no promotion of Communist China to position of authority and prestige; (3) we are negotiating with Communist China only on de facto basis in relation to concrete local problems of war and peace where that regime is a necessary party; (4) composition for Korea is as we sought and India is excluded; and (5) our choice of place is accepted." (396.1-BE/2-1854)

\(^3\) Supra.

795.00/2-1954: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

TOP SECRET

BONN, February 19, 1954—1 a.m.

PRIORITY

2615. For Acting Secretary from Secretary. Reference Tedul 59.\(^1\) Suggest informing Rhee as personal message if you desire:

"Gratified that four Foreign Ministers agreed on importance of united and independent Korea, and established conference to achieve this at a place and with a composition which has always been the common desire of our two countries." \(^2\)

\(^1\) Supra.

\(^2\) Telegram 634, Feb. 19, to Seoul instructed the Embassy to communicate to President Rhee the message contained in telegram 2615, which had been sent separately to Seoul by the Department in telegram 658 (795.00/2-1954).

795.00/2-1954: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET

NIACET

SEOUL, February 19, 1954—5 p.m.

810. Repeated information Tokyo, London, Paris unnumbered. From Young. Reference Department telegram 230 to Munsan-Ni.\(^3\) Ambassador Briggs and I briefly saw President early afternoon today just before his departure Chinhae, Pyun also present. We gave President copy Berlin communiqué already delivered to Pyun at noon immediately after receipt in Embassy.

We emphasized to Rhee all points in reference telegram, stressing Berlin agreement on Political Conference along lines US has sought

\(^3\) Dated Feb. 18, not printed. In it, the Department of State directed Briggs and Young to see President Rhee as soon as possible and convey to him the text and significance of the Berlin agreement to hold a Far Eastern conference at Geneva. (396.1-BE/2-1854)
and he has supported, particularly re composition, neutrals, and Geneva.

Rhee expressed appreciation prompt information. His general reaction was perhaps one of "more in sorrow than in anger", though he did not express opposition in principle to arrangements. He showed discouragement over Korea's future and fear his friends and allies were forgetting his country. We stated this was certainly not intention of President and Secretary. Regarding conference itself, he expressed dismay over additional "indefinite delay" unification Korea, concern over probable duration conference, and his long-standing conviction is useless and will fail. However, he repeated what he has said before—that he will go along with it if his American friends insist. He did not indicate specific ROK reaction to its attendance Geneva Conference.

In connection his discouraged mood, Rhee told us with some anger of alleged efforts by certain Americans and Japanese bring about trusteeship in Korea. He said this supported by newspaper articles and editorials in US. Ambassador and I told him we knew of no official backing any such project.

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735.00/2-2054 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

SEOUL, February 20, 1954—3 p.m.

813. Re Deptels 683 and 684. While it would have been helpful had we been able convey Secretary's personal message contained Deptel 683 to President Rhee during Young's and my conversation with him yesterday, reported Embtel 810, time for such message (which reached Seoul only this morning) would appear to have passed. Furthermore, we conveyed substance of message during presentation pursuant Deptel 679. Rhee departed for Chinhae immediately following that conversation and is consequently not immediately available. Meantime, ROK Government spokesmen, including Foreign Minister and Director OPI, have been heaping abuse on Berlin agreement in series of statements and editorials. I, therefore, believe we should reserve authority of Secretary's name for more substantively important message should such message appear necessary in light developments.  

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3 See footnote 2 to telegram 2615, p. 18.

4 Supra.

5 Same as telegram 230 to Munsan-Ni; see footnote 1, supra.

6 The Department of State expressed agreement in telegram 687, Feb. 20, to Seoul (735.00/2-2054).
For further comments of ROK attitude see immediately following telegram.

BRIGGS

795.00/2–2054 : Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY SEOUL, February 20, 1954—3 p. m.

814. Repeated information Tokyo 497, London, Paris unnumbered. Tokyo pass CINCUNC and CAG. It is readily apparent from ROK Government emanations (Embtl 809 OPI statement February 19 and Korean Republic editorial February 20 transmitted by TWX, and Foreign Minister Pyun’s statement quoted Embtl 812)\(^1\) that their immediate reaction to Berlin agreement is one of disappointment, disgruntlement and anger. Korean Republic editorial this morning which accuses big three of (1) acting in secret without consultation with ROK, (2) repudiating armistice agreement providing for conference between belligerents, (3) accepting Russia in nonbelligerent status despite US assurances to contrary and (4) agreeing to bring Red China to conference as sponsoring power, (sic) with ROK invited as afterthought is one of bitterest statements Embassy has seen printed in this government paper. One of principal criticisms by ROK is round-table nature of conference which they allege will permit majority decisions and exclude veto by one of participating sides.

At press conference this morning Foreign Minister elaborated these main points of objection and stated ROK Government will have to study situation and has not yet decided whether to attend. Embassy has been unable to find any evidence to support INS story filed February 19 quoting Foreign Ministry spokesman as stating ROK Government has decided boycott conference.

While Berlin agreement is obviously disappointment and source of resentment to ROK Government one cannot entirely escape conclusion response at least partly motivated by exasperation that conference in fact going to be held. ROK had apparently concluded political conference unlikely and was planning its policy accordingly. On balance Embassy inclined believe they will not boycott conference but possibility some such thoughtless action should not be entirely discounted.

BRIGGS

\(^1\) Neither telegram 809 nor 812 is printed.
Editorial Note

On February 24, the Department of State extended invitations to the Korean Political Conference at Geneva to the Republic of Korea (see infra), Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and the Union of South Africa. In accordance with the agreement reached at Berlin, the Soviet Union was to invite North Korea and the People’s Republic of China. (Press release 97, February 26; Department of State Bulletin, March 8, 1954, page 347)

On the same day, Secretary Dulles delivered a radio and television address to the nation reporting on the results of the Berlin Conference. The text of his remarks is printed ibid., page 343.

396.1 BE/2–2454: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, February 24, 1954—7:03 p.m.

694. Rptd info: Tokyo 1927. Pass CINCUNC. Robertson handed note to Ambassador Yang today inviting ROK attend Geneva Conference. Verbatim text follows:

“Government U.S. refers to proposal agreed upon at meeting Foreign Ministers U.S., France, U.K. and Soviet Union at Berlin February 18, 1954, and announced in enclosed communiqué same date, to convene conference Geneva, Switzerland, April 26, 1954. Foreign Ministers in communiqué express belief ‘that establishment, by peaceful means, of united and independent Korea important factor reducing international tension and restoring peace other parts Asia.’ Purpose conference stated to reach ‘peaceful settlement Korean question’.

“Recalling joint efforts Panmunjom by representatives Government U.S. and ROK arrange political conference recommended paragraph 60 Armistice Agreement and Resolution 711(VII) adopted by UNGA August 28, 1953,1 this Government confident ROK in interest seeking every opportunity achieve peaceful unification Korea will desire participate conference Geneva. This Government intends consult fully with Government ROK before and during conference both procedural arrangements and substantive matters.

“View many administrative and procedural arrangements which must be settled before conference convenes, early reply appreciated.”

Response fears Yang expressed re Geneva conference Robertson stressed: Results at Berlin infinitely better than dared hoped for

1 The resolution welcomed the holding of the political conference recommended in paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement; the text of the resolution is printed in American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents (Department of State publication 6446; (2 vols.) Washington, Government Printing Office, 1957), vol. II, p. 2676.
Panmunjom. Only belligerents participate. Complicating problem neutrals eliminated. Obviously must confer with aggressors but arrangements in no way constitute, and American people would not agree to, recognition Communist China. At Berlin we in effect added to Article 60 Armistice Agreement since at Geneva USSR is full participant and party any agreement. Conference inevitably between two sides. Impossible commit ROK or ourselves to proposal if do not agree. No danger agreement by U.S. to coalition government as solution unification as end result such formula Communist domination. Conferences Indo-China and Korea separate requiring different compositions but might be held simultaneously. U.S. intends participate fully in Indo-China conference just as USSR in Korea conference. Berlin genuine diplomatic triumph over Communists. Intangible important result Molotov divisive tactics was closer stronger working relations U.S., U.K. and France.

Convey foregoing when transmitting substance invitation to ROK participate Geneva since will constitute answer Pyun’s questions.

Dulles

396.1–GE/2–2554: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL    PRIORITY    SEOUL, February 25, 1954—10 p.m.

834. Repeated information Tokyo 511 (pass CINCUNC), London unnumbered, Paris 6, Taipei 86, Saigon 19, Moscow 6. On receipt this afternoon of Deptel 694, February 24 I called on Foreign Minister Pyun to give him copy of official invitation to Geneva conference original of which handed Ambassador Yang in Washington yesterday. Pyun said Yang’s report not yet received. After reading invitation he asked whether I had information responsive to four points raised by ROK Government (Embtel 824, February 23).

I thereupon gave Pyun orally following information regarding which he took notes:

(1) Conference will be of participating powers under sponsorship of four countries meeting at Berlin. In context Panmunjom talks, it

1 The text of this message read as follows:

“At his regular weekly press conference this morning Foreign Minister Pyun declared ROK government decision re participation in Geneva conference cannot be made until it receives satisfactory clarification on following four points:

1. Conference should be between two sides,
2. USSR should participate on Communist side,
3. Freedom of independent decision by nations participating in conference should be assured, and
4. Conference should discuss only Korean problem and not Indochina.

Pyun added he had not received adequate information on these points in his talk with Young and me.” (396.1/2–2554)
will not be “two-sided” conference but as practical matter it will probably develop two-sided aspect as meeting between non-Communist side and Communist side. In that connection I emphasized participants would not include neutrals, thus meeting Korean views re composition.

(2) Status of Soviet Russia. I said Russia was sponsoring power and as such had responsibility with other sponsors for the meeting. That is, full participation, and would be party to any conference agreement. Question whether Russia “neutral” (as Communists had demanded at Panmunjom) or “belligerents” (as our side had desired) is by-passed by Russia being responsible sponsoring participant.

(3) I assured Pyun ROK could not be committed to conference proposal which ROK opposed. I pointed out this point, substantively, is by far most important point his government had raised since it involved sovereign right of any country to declare what it would or would not accept.

(4) As to scope of conference I informed Pyun, as set forth Deptel 694, that conferences on Indochina and Korea were separate with different compositions, but might take place simultaneously.

There ensued considerable discussion of foregoing, especially points one, two and four. One and two disclosed few new ideas (Foreign Minister did not like our answers) but Pyun’s comments concerning simultaneous discussion of Indochina problem seem worth noting since he declared that this would give Red China “incalculable advantage, probably amounting to control of proceedings”. He amplified this by stating that as soon as Korean discussions bogged down because of unacceptable Communist demands, conference would in effect adjourn consideration of Korea and take up Indochina, which would then be discussed at great length while ROK representatives and other participating countries primarily interested in settlement of Korean problem as prerequisite to settlement other matters, cooled their heels and were kept dangling. But since Red China involved in both Korean and Indochina discussion, that would give Communist China de facto control of proceedings. One of “less serious” results of this “capitulation” by three Western powers at Berlin was vastly to increase Red China’s stature, no matter what sort of disclaimers we might make about recognition. What you have done in effect, said Pyun, is to accept five power conference on Asian (as distinct from Korean) agenda, and have given Red China controlling voice in proceedings. Your plan for “simultaneous discussion” is really agreement to “alternate discussion”, which will allow Communists to sidetrack Korea while they make propaganda indefinitely, on their terms, over SEA.

Pyun then declared ROK Government would now have to consider whether in light of understanding implications of Geneva conference, his Government would find it possible to attend.
I replied that decision obviously one which must be taken by Korea in its capacity as sovereign state. Nevertheless as friend of Korea I hoped President Rhee and he would take into consideration fact that announcement of Geneva conference, in circumstances I had described, was being hailed in countries most friendly to Korea, and allied with ROK through 37 months of joint war effort, as important step on road toward Korean unification to which all of us had pledged our best efforts. I said I hoped decision of ROK Government at this important crossroads would strengthen Korea in eyes of her friends.

BRIGGS

396.1-GE/2-154 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

SEOUL, March 1, 1954—7 p.m.

842. Repeated information Tokyo 519. Tokyo pass CINCUNC and CAG. In lengthy written interview with INS President Rhee expressed himself on Geneva Conference and problems facing ROK and free world in battle against Communism. Interview preceded by presidential statement appealing to American opinion to recognize struggle for freedom and unification Korea in fact struggle for freedom America and world.

Tenor of Rhee's comments re prospects for success Geneva conference wholly pessimistic. He reiterated well-known views re ROK willingness to give US and UN chance at peaceful attainment objectives in Korea but stressed conviction Communists will never yield anything in negotiations and force only instrument they understand. Rhee expressed hope continuing Communist intransigency will finally open eyes free world to fact latter gaining nothing and losing much by continuing conferences with enemy. He attacked conditions for proposed Geneva conference strongly, particularly USSR status as inviting power rather than belligerent, alleged move in direction recognition Red China and opportunity provided for Communist stalling. He concluded Geneva merely another trap such as Panmunjom and said US–UN gained only one point at Berlin that was demanded at Panmunjom, namely, conference location; he characterized Berlin agreement as “allied-backed site for Communist-supported conference” and stated it saves Soviets enhanced prestige and escape from censure for responsibility in launching Korean war. Questioned whether he was consulted re Big Three strategy at Berlin he stated Secretary Dulles informed him he was not unmindful of Korea's
interests and cited remarks at Berlin to effect only way to peace was through political conference envisaged by armistice agreement. Rhee added he was startled therefore to learn Secretary Dulles agreed to another type conference and was hailing it as triumph for free world.

Rhee replied at length to inquiry whether ROK would wait to see conference results before taking unilateral action unify Korea. He made no attempt set new deadline but inquired how long must he wait before his allies realize conference merely stalling tactic and there will be no peaceful withdrawal Chinese Communist forces from Korea and no unification through free UN-supervised election. He concluded that if allies continue to ignore Communist strategy of delay ROK will have to resort to action of its own. He pointed out once again plight of people in north and criticized US pull-out of forces from Korea at moment when Reds bringing war matériel into Korea in violation armistice agreement, adding he does not ask US-UN forces to remain if they do not wish to but only that they give equipment and assistance in training ROK forces to carry on free world’s struggle against Communism.

Rhee’s interview, which combines reiteration already-known views on dealing with Communists with their specific application to Geneva conference proposal, is eloquent appeal to American opinion and contains no new clue to whether ROK will accept invitation. It is apparent Rhee is deeply disappointed and dissatisfied with Berlin agreement which he regards as unbaptized off-spring resulting from original sin, that is, 1953 armistice agreement. In this connection local press during last few days has given prominence to reports of US Congressional criticism proposed Geneva conference and it is apparent Rhee watching closely to see whether substantial American opinion might support his continuing to oppose conference.

BRIGGS

396.1-GE/3-154 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

SEOUL, March 1, 1954—8 p. m.

843. President Rhee still in Chinhae where was visited over week end by Foreign Minister Pyun following my conversation with latter described Embtel 834, February 25. At Independence Day ceremony this morning I reminded Pyun of amount of Geneva Conference prepara-
tory work which should be started as soon as possible (Deptel 702, February 27) to which Minister replied:

"First point is whether ROK is going to attend conference. Until that is decided it would be futile for us to discuss conference matters."

Since Rhee and Pyun have apparently decided to play hard to get, suggest we not press them further for present and concentrate on outlining our own strategy and objectives without benefit ROK.

Briggs

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1 The text of this telegram read as follows:

"Korean political Conference at Geneva clearly affects ROK more directly than any other government. We therefore wish soonest possible consult ROK about position to be taken re unification Korea, withdrawal foreign forces and other questions likely arise at conference and also re tactics to be followed. We wish this consultation proceed our tripartite discussions with British and French which we expect take place Washington.

"Please see President Rhee therefore and communicate foregoing to him. Say we would be greatly pleased if he would send Washington soonest whoever will head ROK delegation to conference and other appropriate members delegation prepared for full discussion subjects mentioned above. Earliest notification probable date their arrival Washington will aid our planning." (386.1-GE/2-2754)

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396.1-GE/3-154: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, March 2, 1954—7:59 p.m.

707. Your 834 and 842. Following background information should be used as appropriate in early conversation with Rhee on Korean Political Conference. Three Western Powers at Berlin categorically and explicitly rejected concept of "five power" conference on Asia. Original Soviet proposal on agenda Item one at Berlin Conference envisaged "five power" conference to discuss Korean as well as other unspecified Far Eastern questions and to which other powers were to be invited from time to time by "Big Five", composition depending upon particular question under consideration.

While Soviets thus attempted get at Berlin "Five Power Conference on Asian agenda", they failed completely. Instead Soviets finally agreed to conference at Geneva "for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question" rather than for a general discussion of Asian problems and to composition of conference in conformity with Armistice agreement providing for political conference of two sides including only those participating in conflict—USSR as supplier of logistics is quasi-belligerent. Moreover Soviets dropped demand Red China be one of inviting powers and agreed it be invited

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1 This telegram was repeated to Taipei and Tokyo and pouched to Rangoon, Djakarta, Saigon, and Hong Kong.

2 Dated Feb. 25 and Mar. 1, respectively, pp. 22 and 24.
as participant in Korea hostilities. USSR is not inviting power in sense it joins in extending invitation to all parties—USSR will invite only Chinese Communists and North Koreans. US inviting ROK and other participants.

As to Peiping participation in projected discussions on Indochina this agreed on basis Peiping’s qualifications “as interested party” resulting from its assistance Viet Minh and not on basis of “big power”. In order emphasize fact Red China at Geneva solely because its involvement Korea and Indochina, we insisted despite strenuous Soviet opposition on inclusion clear statement in Berlin resolution barring any implication recognition Red China.

While mindful of possible dangers pointed out by Pyun connection simultaneous discussion Indochina and Korean problem at Geneva, we think that by careful handling situation Pyun envisages can be avoided. You may assure Rhee U.S. does not intend allow Chinese Communist representatives gain de facto control of Geneva proceedings, and we wish consult fully with ROK both before and during conference on tactics to be followed as well as on substance.

SMITH

3961-GE/3-154: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, March 3, 1954—6:55 p.m.

710. Your 843.\(^1\) Not clear your 843 whether you extended specific invitation consult in Washington contained Deptel 702 \(^2\) or whether you desisted in view Pyun’s reply after general reminder from you of need begin preparatory work soon.

If no specific invitation extended to send representatives consult in Washington believe you should do so soonest. Despite current ROK attitude re Korean Political Conference Department believes advisable extend this invitation well before consultations with other allies and conference opening so no possible misrepresentation our clear desire and intention consult early and first with ROK. If invitation already extended concur we should not press them further for time being.

Secretary desires conference be referred to as “Korean Political Conference” not as “Geneva Conference”.\(^3\)

SMITH

\(^1\) Dated Mar. 1, p. 25.
\(^2\) Dated Feb. 27; for text, see footnote 1 to telegram 848, p. 26.
\(^3\) In circular telegram 828, Mar. 24, the Department informed all diplomatic posts that in view of the popular usage of the title “Geneva Conference” the use of “Korean Political Conference” was being abandoned (3961-GE/3-2454).
The Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Soviet Foreign Ministry

[Moscow, March 5, 1954.]

The following are the views of my government with regard to certain matters preliminary to the convening on April 26, 1954 of the political conference in Geneva, Switzerland. These have been discussed with the Governments of the United Kingdom and France and they have expressed their complete accord with these proposals.

It appears that the only conference rooms in Geneva which are adequate for the holding of the meetings are those in the Palais des Nations. While important international agency meetings are now scheduled to be held in that building during the period in which the political conference would meet, it is considered possible to have them postponed or transferred to other sites in the event negotiations are begun promptly with the responsible officials of the United Nations.

The simplest method would be to use United Nations Secretariat personnel to provide interpretation, documentation and translation services, and to use all other available facilities of the United Nations. While the United Nations Secretariat personnel would perform common conference services, they would not have access to confidential materials or operations of the individual sides or delegations. The costs of the common conference services would need be met by the participating states, and the exact method of sharing these costs could be determined prior to the opening of the conference.

It is therefore, suggested that the United Nations delegations of the four powers jointly approach the Secretary General of the United Nations in order to enlist his cooperation in the initiation of the necessary preparations. Since the United Nations Secretariat should be given sufficient time to make the necessary physical arrangements and to prepare an adequate conference staff, it is hoped that you will be able to give a prompt reply.

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1 The source text is that transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 1088, Mar. 18, from Moscow, wherein Ambassador Bohlen stated that he handed it in the form of an aide-mémoire to Soviet Deputy Minister Kuznetsov on Mar. 5.
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

SEUL, March 6, 1954—2 p.m.

861. Repeated information Tokyo 530. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Reference: Embtel 858, March 5. Foreign Minister Pyun has just sent me copy of following letter dated March 3 addressed to the Secretary:


"My dear Mr. Secretary: I should like to remind you that through the visit of you and Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson, the following understandings were reached either orally or in writing: (a) If it becomes clear that the political conference of Korea has failed to agree upon the means of unifying Korea at the end of the three-months period after its convening, the United States and the Republic of Korea will walk out and discuss measures to be taken with a view to effecting the unification; (b) in the political conference, the United States and the Republic of Korea shall be the principal participants on the side of the free world, while Communist China and North Korea play the principal role for the Communist side. As for the other United Nations having military units in the Korean war, they will naturally form consultant body and thus contribute to the position of the United States in the political conference. They will not exercise votes, however, while the United States and the Republic of Korea do; (c) the political conference shall be confined to the Korean question.

"Under these understandings, we agreed to a political conference provided for in the terms of armistice. Due to the Communist intransigence, however, no political conference has been so much as called, although six full months have elapsed since the signing of the armistice. The Panmunjom preliminary talks broke up without being able to agree upon the date or the place for the political conference. We cannot help, therefore, thinking that it is high time that we were discussing other measures to effect our common objective, the unification of Korea. But instead, the four Foreign Ministers conference has agreed upon the Geneva conference, to which we are now invited.

"We appreciate the invitation very much. We feel we ought to be willing to participate in the conference as one of the principal participants. Before we accept the invitation, however, we wish to get clarifications on the following questions:

"(1) Is the proposed Geneva conference a continuation of the Panmunjom preliminary conference?

1 The text of this message read as follows:

"Saw Foreign Minister Pyun this morning with specific reference to Deptel 710, March 3. He said matter in hands of President Rhee who returns to Seoul from Chinhae March 7 or 8. I emphasized we have sought from outset to consult first with ROK with view develop common position on both substantive matters and tactics." (366.1-G/F/3-554)

2 Reference is to discussions held by Robertson in June–July 1953 with President Rhee and by Dulles in August 1953 with Rhee; for documentation, see volume xv.
“(2) Is the Geneva conference to displace the UN-sponsored political conference that was to take up the question of Korean unification only?

“(3) Will our understandings listed above hold good in regard to the Geneva conference?

“(4) If the conference meets on April 26 as proposed, how long is it to be allowed to continue? When will be the deadline?

“(5) If this conference also fails at the end of a given period of time, what steps, peaceful or otherwise, will the United States take to achieve the original objective, unification of Korea?

“(6) Is the Soviet Union not to have more prestige and consequently more weight by being one of the four sponsor-nations than if it had been invited as a neutral? Sponsors of a conference, like charter members of an organization, are usually supposed to enjoy unwritten privileges over ordinary members.

“(7) Is the Communist China not to gain also in prestige or weight by assuming, as a practical matter, the circumstantial status of what may be properly called quasi-sponsor or, at least, a standing member, quite distinct from other members, except the four sponsor-nations, who will be shelved when the other subject, from the discussion of which they are respectively barred, is taken up, again as a practical matter, very much at the pleasure of the five standing members?

“(8) Why is the scope of the proposed Geneva conference to be so enlarged as to include the Indochinese problem? The localization of the Korean War has been so constantly emphasized by the United States as well as by the United Nations. We cannot afford to allow the enemy to shift from the Korean question to the Indochinese one back and forth and gain in his bargaining power.

“(9) The discussion of both the Korean and Indochinese problem in one conference necessarily implies a package deal for the Orient, and the discussion of one problem cannot be entirely free from that of the other, though, from necessity, may be carried on behind the scene. Thus either of the open discussions on two different questions will prove farcical proceedings to justify or implement the secret understandings reached among the five standing members in the course of the other discussion. Can such an arrangement be fair for the Republic of Korea?

“(10) The Communist China, the UN-condemned aggressor, was consulted in the crucial matter of arranging for the Geneva conference while this government was left in the dark. Is it compatible with the often-given pledge that this government will be consulted in advance on all important matters affecting Korea?"

[Here follows the text of the eleventh question which was excluded from this publication at the request of the Republic of Korea Government.]

"Your answers to these questions will be greatly appreciated as helpful to the formation of our decision on participation."
“With warmest regards, yours sincerely, Y. T. Pyun, Minister of Foreign Affairs.”

In his transmitting letter dated today Pyun states his communication “was written some days ago, but owing to fact it needed approval of my official superiors it has just gone out by pouch.”

Briggs

396.1—GE/3—654: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

Seoul, March 6, 1954—7 p. m.

863. Repeated information priority Tokyo 581 (pass CINCUNC). Foreign Minister Pyun’s letter (Embtel 861) is clearly designed to obtain certain additional commitments from US Government in return for ROK agreement participate in Korean political conference. It is familiar tactic this government and should, I believe, be dealt with in light history our negotiations with ROK Government during past year on armistice, political conference, economic aid, etcetera. We should also be prepared for possibility early publication of letter.

Sub-paragraph (a) is fundamentally correct although language omits certain important points in Dulles–Rhee agreement August 8. Sub-paragraph (b) is statement of ROK position and not agreement between US and ROK. To my knowledge we made no commitment that remotely resembles this paragraph. Sub-paragraph (c) is correct insofar as it refers to our understanding of language paragraph 60 of armistice agreement.

Numbered questions in remainder of letter appear to be attempt to establish that conference at Geneva is not political conference provided for in armistice, and therefore ROK has basis for obtaining new and more far-reaching commitments than those given ROK by US last year in connection PC envisaged under article 60.

Paragraph 11 which in effect demands we commit ourselves to resume fighting if conference fails to unify Korea is obviously key commitment desired, as it has been ever since armistice negotiations were resumed in April 1953. Rhee has consistently sought by argument, intransigence and misrepresentation to involve US Government in resumption of hostilities within specified time limit, and present letter is merely continuation same tactics toward identical objective. This has been crux of difficulties in US/ROK relations for past eleven

1 Supra.

2 Presumably, this is a reference to the joint statement issued at Seoul on Aug. 8, 1953 by President Rhee and Secretary Dulles, the text of which is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 17, 1953, p. 208.
months. This has been and remains point of no return in all our recent dealings with Rhee.

With further reference Pyun’s numbered paragraphs, I assume answer to question one negative, and to question two affirmative. Re questions three, four and five I take it we are prepared to confirm that our commitments re Korean PC under article 60 apply generally to conference at Geneva (but not as stated by Pyun in introductory paragraphs a, b and c): Questions six, seven, eight and nine appear to be largely expressions of unilateral opinion to which we can probably make explicit (if to ROK perhaps unpalatable) replies; certainly I assume we do not propose to permit those cracks to go by default. Re question (10) recommend we reply categorically that US, UK and France did not consult in any way with Communist China re arrangements for Geneva conference. While we cannot state ROK was consulted in full detail in advance of Berlin communiqué, points can be made that Secretary furnished information to President Rhee re developing discussions on Asia in Berlin, that communiqué was immediately furnished Rhee by Young and me on February 19, and furthermore that Geneva terms of reference include most important points sought by ROK Government during Ambassador Dean’s Panmunjom talks including absence neutrals, USSR fully responsible participant, no country bound unless it agrees, and place of meeting.

I recommend I be authorized to make early reply to Pyun on behalf of Secretary answering questions to extent Department deems desirable. In addition I think it should be pointed out (1) that as demonstrated by my talk with Rhee on February 19 and on several occasions thereafter with Pyun (Rhee having been absent from Seoul) US Government has sought to maintain closest possible liaison with ROK Government, as witness invitation for head ROK delegation to visit Washington immediately for consultation; (2) what with time passing and ROK failure collaborate, it becomes increasingly difficult follow procedure desired by US of consulting first with ROK, in advance consultation other UN allies; (3) ROK continuing criticism and recrimination is alienating Korea’s friends and benefiting only Communists; and (4) ROK absence from conference would merely deprive it of voice in proceedings bearing directly on ROK future.

Point four above may be key item in our reply, since Rhee is obviously trying to blackmail us into commitments we have hitherto declined to give him, in exchange for ROK agreement to attend. To extent he remains convinced conference cannot be held without his presence, his price may remain high, conversely if he thinks conference can be held without him idea of carping on sidelines instead of donning uniform may become less attractive.

Briggs
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET

Seoul, March 6, 1954—8 p.m.

864. Repeated information Tokyo 532, (pass CINCUNC and CAG). While following ideas were blocked out before receipt Foreign Minister Pyun's letter (Embts 861 and 863) and problems raised by letter are obviously first order of business, this message may be helpful in longer range consideration of our substantive position at Geneva and in approach to problem of consultation with ROK:

With public unmasking Soviet intentions re Europe at Berlin conference fresh in free world's minds believe we should seek to present an imaginative and reasonable proposal at Geneva which might similarly expose Communist intentions in Asia, and specifically in Korea. While there may be scant reason for confidence that free unified Korea likely emerge from Geneva, nevertheless if at very beginning of conference we can present proposal which has free world support and which would put clear onus on Communists for failure reach agreement, we shall at least have achieved one important objective.

Our proposal might follow general pattern of tripartite proposal for Germany at Berlin, with appropriate modification to meet Korean situation. Although there may be no more reason expect Communists will allow its application in Korea than in Germany, it would represent constructive and defensible proposal for solution Korean problem which Communists should find difficult to answer. Main elements of proposal might be: (1) Progressive withdrawal all foreign forces from Korea, to be completed by March 31, 1955, under international inspection with rights of inspecting bodies clearly specified; (2) elections throughout Korea on May 1, 1955 for representatives to National Constituent Assembly, elections to be held under international supervision with preliminary period of three months during which supervisory bodies would be empowered and enabled to determine that conditions of freedom for elections exist throughout Korea; (3) until new Korean Government established ROK Government and North Korean regime would continue exercise jurisdiction North and South of DZ and MAC would retain its authority in DZ; (4) international guarantee of powers represented at Geneva (with right for other states, such as Japan, to adhere) to maintain independence and territorial integrity of unified Korea, with or without buffer demilitarized area on both sides Yalu; (5) renunciation of special privileges in Korea for signing powers but no specific restrictions on freedom of

Both dated Mar. 6, p. 29 and supra.
action of Korean Government with respect to security forces, external aid, et cetera; (6) provision might also be made for formal recognition by new Korean Government of instrument of guarantee and reciprocal guarantee to signing powers against aggression by Korea.

Obviously President Rhee and ROK Government may be most difficult hurdle in reaching agreement on free world side of conference on some such proposal, and I am not overly optimistic Rhee's agreement can be obtained. Nevertheless certain new elements in picture and crystallization of other developing factors may assist us in this task. First, Rhee's principal immediate objective remains ejection of Chinese Communists from Korea and plan would provide specific target date for withdrawal prior to elections. He has, moreover, made public references to possibility of eventual US-UN withdrawal and he may be more resigned to this now. Second, Rhee has in recent months come around publicly to acceptance concept of all-Korean elections, albeit to presidency under ROK constitution rather than to Constituent Assembly, and he might now be more amenable to this additional step on assumption elections, if held under conditions of freedom, would be favorable to anti-Communist elements in Korea. While prospect elections might not retain presidency for him would be difficult pill to swallow, his agreement is not wholly inconceivable if plan offered any real hope for achievement his chief objective of Korean unification and if he thought there was good chance he would be elected to presidency. Third, events since armistice have firmly convinced Rhee that Chinese Communists are in North Korea to stay and to consolidate their power and thus no agreement at PC is possible. This factor, above all else, may persuade Rhee to buy some such proposal as one above on assumption Communists will not accept it and substantial propaganda benefit could be derived from it. Rhee has never been satisfied with propaganda advantages as a substitute for material results, however, and he might seek to elicit in return our agreement to support a military effort to unify Korea if PC fails. This, I assume, we would under no circumstances agree to.

As matter of tactics in presenting ideas to ROKs, I recommend we give them unequivocal assurances we do not contemplate and will not support any proposal for trusteeship for Korea. Recent references in Japanese press to this possibility have raised Rhee's blood pressure and clear assurances on this score might help create attitude more conducive to acceptance our ideas. Idea of neutralization, another major bogey for Rhee, should also be avoided, and case can be made that plan outlined above does not constitute neutralization of Korea. Most difficult psychological block to overcome with Rhee, however, may be his
fear, based on unhappy history of manner in which great powers permitted Japan to take over Korea early in century, that despite paper guarantees great powers may condone absorption of Korea by China or Japan at later date. I believe we should seek to present convincing case that our interest in Korea and support for her is continuing one.

Briggs

795.00/3-1054 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY Caracas, March 10, 1954—10 a. m.

Dulles 29. Re Rhee's inquiries on Korean Conference reported Tedul 86 2 believe we should make clear that while conference procedure will have to be worked out at conference itself, we understand that ROK would not be bound to any matter of substance without its consent. Same would apply of course to US. If ROK and US agree on unification of Korea, it will happen; otherwise not. That is true substance of matter which cannot be altered by voting procedure of conference.

Re relation between Korea and Indochina, believe we should undertake to push Korean matter promptly and not allow it to be bogged down with discussions re Indochina. On other hand, it would only be impertinence on part of ROK to insist that Indochina war in which it is not involved cannot be dealt with by interested nations until Korean matter settled.

Dulles

1 Dulles was in Caracas as head of the U.S. Delegation at the Tenth InterAmerican Conference; for documentation, see volume iv.
2 Not printed. It contained a summary of telegram 895, Mar. 8, from Seoul which stated that President Rhee was anxious to have assurances on two points: first, that Korea would be discussed and a satisfactory agreement reached on the withdrawal of the Chinese Communists and unification of Korea under democratic auspices before Indochina was taken up; second, that a voting procedure would be established allowing one country (i.e., the Republic of Korea) to exercise a veto. (896.1-GE/3-554)

Editorial Note

In telegram 896, March 16, from Seoul, Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs transmitted the text of a letter, dated March 11, from President Rhee to President Eisenhower. The text of the letter was excluded from this publication at the request of the Republic of Korea Government. For the full text of President Eisenhower's reply to Rhee's letter, see telegram 748, March 20, to Seoul, page 44. Regarding Ambassador Briggs'
delivery of the President’s reply to Rhee on March 22, see telegram 926, March 22, from Seoul, page 48.

795.00/3-1654 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

**TOP SECRET**

**NIAC**

**SEOUL, March 16, 1954—midnight.**

904. President Rhee’s March 11 letter to President Eisenhower (Embassy’s telegram 896)¹ is in substance elaboration of question 11 in Foreign Minister Pyun’s March 3 letter to Secretary of State Dulles (Embassy’s telegrams 861 and 863)² and as such represents further attempt use ROK attendance Korean Political Conference Geneva to obtain additional and important commitments from United States.

Most effective way to deal with both letters insofar as they relate to Geneva Conference would in our opinion be delivery to Rhee and Pyun by Embassy of written statement answering broad problems raised in both letters. Our statement might include points suggested Embassy’s telegram 863. We should, of course, make clear United States has not, does not and will not favorably consider alternatives outlined in Rhee letter.

Rhee apparently doubts conference possible without ROK participation and seems correspondingly confident he has us over a barrel. Assuming conference can in fact be held without ROK (query, can it?) it seems important that our reply give Rhee and Pyun no support for belief former’s letters to President Eisenhower will delay our preparations for Geneva. Any indication we proposing offer new concessions as price ROK attendance at conference would probably increase Rhee’s appetite.

Rhee letter can likewise be interpreted as his reply to President Eisenhower’s January 2 letter ³ since Embassy understands Rhee’s

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¹ See the editorial note, *supra.*
² Both dated Mar. 6, pp. 29 and 31.
³ For the text, see volume xv.
first reply (copy unreceived here) was not delivered to President Eisenhower (memo Robertson—Yang February 15 conversation). In that connection I interpret fourth paragraph Rhee letter as notification Rhee now considers himself without obligation give us further notice should he contemplate unilateral action. This does not render unilateral action by Rhee more likely but fact this point included in present letter, while exchange ratification mutual defense treaty still pending, is further example of Rhee's failure to accept United States–ROK relations as two-way street. (Embassy's telegram 903, March 16). With specific reference Rhee's second so-called alternative, creation of 35–40 division ROK army with comparable naval and air developments would self-evidently be impossible burden on ROK economy and manpower even if project were to be underwritten by United States taxpayers. Department will recall this unrealistic proposal was advanced to Army Secretary Stevens by Prime Minister Paik last January (Embassy's telegram 705). Insofar as Embassy aware, our reply is still pending. I also observe that although Rhee states ROK forces would be used "only for purpose of defense" that statement may be interpreted in light his definition ROK territory as extending to Yalu and Tumen rivers.

My recommendation accordingly is that I be authorized deliver statement (rather than letter) setting forth official United States Government position. Suggested statement should clearly set forth United States position in terms sympathetic to objective of unification of Korea while simultaneously leaving Rhee under no misapprehension concerning limits beyond which American Government unprepared to go in underwriting, directly or indirectly, Rhee's objective of unification by whatever means and at whatever cost.

BRIGGS

4 The memorandum of conversation is not printed here; but concerning the undelivered letter from President Rhee, see footnote 8, p. 14.
5 Not printed here. It recommended that the Department of State postpone the exchange of ratifications of the Mutual Defense Treaty in light of Rhee's withdrawal of his assurance of no unilateral military action by the Republic of Korea (796B.5/3–1064). For documentation on this subject, see volume xv.
6 Not printed here. For related documentation, see ibid.
7 On Mar. 17, General Hull, at Admiral Radford's request, forwarded his views on President Rhee's letter. He rejected both alternatives proposed by Rhee, stating that the Geneva Conference must be held and Rhee must not be allowed to feel that he could extort promises from the United States in return for Korean participation at Geneva. (Telegram C–67435, Mar. 17, from Tokyo; 795.00/3–1064) Admiral Radford sent General Hull's telegram to Dulles on Mar. 17, and expressed general agreement except for the extent to and manner in which the United States would reject Rhee's alternative proposal. (JCS files; 091 Korea)
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL NIACI Moscow, March 17, 1954—7 p. m.

1086. Repeated information niact London 157, Paris 216. Following in rough translation is text of aide-mémoire handed to me today at 5 p. m. by Kuznetsov in answer to one I left with him on March 5:¹

"In connection with aide-mémoire of Government of United States of America of March 5 concerning certain questions in preparation for the calling of a conference in Geneva on April 26, 1954, there are transmitted the view of Soviet Government. These views were discussed with Government of Chinese People's Republic which has stated that it shares them.

"The proposal that the conference should be held in the Building of Palais des Nations at Geneva is acceptable.

"Considering the composition of participants of the conference it appears expedient to establish that the official and working languages of the conference should be English, French, Chinese and Russian.

"Furthermore, it should be possible to adopt a procedure whereby the delegates themselves would assure the translation of documents received from other delegates and the dissemination of their own documents in one of the official languages.

"Insofar as oral translation at the sessions is concerned, it should be possible to agree that following the statement of a delegate in one of the official languages an oral interpretation should be made into another one of the official languages and at the same time there would be carried out simultaneously the translation into the remaining official languages using the system existing in the Palais des Nations suitable for simultaneous translation. The question of the order of languages in consecutive translation requires further clarification.

"It would be expedient that the representatives of one of the powers, for example French, should agree on the basis of the above-mentioned considerations, with Secretariat of UN concerning the conditions of use for the conference in Geneva of the Building of the Palais des Nations and its system of simultaneous translation.

"The proposal that the expenses for common services of the conference should be borne by the participating states and that the method of apportioning expenses should be established before the beginning of the conference is acceptable."

Bohlen

¹ Ante, p. 28.
CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, March 17, 1954—7:44 p.m.

739. For Briggs from Secretary. Please deliver following to Foreign Minister Pyun.

"March 17, 1954. My dear Mr. Minister: I have your letter of March 3, 1954,¹ which requests certain answers to a list of questions regarding the Berlin agreement and the forthcoming Korean Political Conference to be opened at Geneva on April 26, 1954. In response to earlier questions, representatives of the United States Government have orally explained to you the nature and significance of the Berlin agreement.

The Korean Political Conference, to which the Soviet delegate reluctantly agreed at Berlin, is precisely the kind of conference which the Republic of Korea and the United States long ago agreed to seek. The participants are identical with those contemplated by President Rhee and me in our conversations of last August providing a clear-cut conference between the two sides which were involved in the fighting, uncluttered by neutrals. The objective remains the same, being now clearly defined as "a united and independent Korea." Geneva was then mutually agreed to be an acceptable place for the conference. The program is consistent with the General Assembly Resolution of August 28, 1953. The results in our opinion are more advantageous to our position than those which Ambassador Dean, with great skill and in close consultation with President Rhee and with you, attempted unsuccessfully to obtain at Panmunjom. We remained firm at Berlin on our basic terms for a political conference. The Communists finally yielded to our position. They accepted a specific date and the location and the actual participants we had long proposed. There will be no neutrals and the Soviet Union will bear a full share of responsibility for the progress and outcome of the conference—a principle we stood for together at Panmunjom.

The U.S.S.R. is not a ‘sponsoring power’ in so far as the Republic of Korea and the nations with forces under the United Nations Command are concerned. The Soviet Government extends invitations only to the Chinese Communist and North Korean regimes. The United States Government, consistent with the General Assembly Resolution of August 28, 1953, invites the participants on our side. This procedure on invitations demonstrates the two-sided nature of the conference.

¹ See telegram 861, Mar. 6, from Seoul, p. 29.
We will go to the Korean Political Conference determined to press constantly and vigorously to achieve agreement there on our common objectives—the independence and unity of a free Korea. I believe that this Conference will provide a splendid forum for the free world to proclaim the principles of justice and freedom for a united Korea and seek to put them into effect. It will also serve usefully to unmask and challenge the wiles and designs of the Communists. In this great endeavor, it is our firm resolve to work closely with the Government of the Republic of Korea. It was in that spirit that I went to Seoul last August to consult personally with President Rhee on a political conference, as well as on the mutual defense treaty.

In the present circumstances, the United States Government, of course, wishes to consult first with the Republic of Korea. Immediately on my return from Berlin and before I went to South America, I directed that an official invitation be extended to your Government to begin consultations with us as soon as possible to enable us to arrive at a commonly agreed position concerning the Korean Political Conference. I regret that it has not yet been possible to begin these discussions. I trust that an acceptance will soon be forthcoming from your Government, as there is much preparation to be completed before April 26, and as we also wish to consult well in advance of April 26 with the other Governments which have sent forces to Korea. I can not emphasize too strongly the indispensability of the greatest possible unity and common purpose on our side before and during the Conference.

Your letter to me refers to certain oral or written understandings which you believe have been reached between representatives of our two Governments. The points contained in the first and third subparagraphs of the first paragraph of your letter apparently refer to the joint communiqué of August 8, 1953, but go beyond it in some respects. The United States adheres to its agreements expressed in the communiqué, but not to any enlargements of it.

We have no understanding—oral or written—between us regarding subparagraph (b) of the first paragraph of your letter. It is, however, my understanding that the United States and the Republic of Korea would be the principal participants on the side of the free world in the sense that any solution of the Korean problem upon which we jointly agree would, in fact, be effective from the standpoint of our side, whereas any solution with which we disagreed could not in fact be effective. Neither of our countries would, of course, be bound except by its own consent. We do not, however, believe that this differentiation which exists de facto should be formalized by attempting to cast other allied nations whose soldiers fought and died in Korea into the role of mere 'consultants.'
As to your list of questions, I would answer them as follows:

1. The Korean Political Conference at Geneva cannot be a continuation of the talks at Panmunjom because those talks dealt only with arrangements, and not with substance. Substantive matters will be the principal concern of the Korean Political Conference at Geneva.

2. The Korean Political Conference at Geneva is the type of conference envisaged by the General Assembly Resolution of August 28, 1953. The Secretary General of the United Nations has declared his belief that the conference agreed on at Berlin is in full accord with that resolution. Furthermore, that resolution set forth the composition for the United Nations and authorized the United States, in whatever manner it deemed appropriate, to arrange the time and place. That we tried to do at Panmunjom, and succeeded in achieving at Berlin.

3, 4 and 5. With regard to the duration, objectives, and results of the political conference, I confirm the understandings contained in the joint communiqué of August 8, 1953, and their validity and pertinence with respect to the position of the United States at the Korean Political Conference at Geneva. It should be the common effort of our side to expedite the proceedings of the Conference. Three months should allow ample time to test and expose the intentions of the other side, as envisaged in the joint communiqué.

6 and 7. I believe that my report by radio to the American people on February 24, 1954, provides a detailed response to these questions, for the answer to both is clearly negative. (A copy of my report is enclosed.)

There is no implication of any kind that any nation will enjoy ‘unwritten privileges’ over any other nation. Certainly, the responsible participation of the Soviet Union in the Conference—and our two Governments have continuously agreed on this essential requirement—is preferable to the Soviet Union’s attendance as a ‘neutral’. There is not the slightest basis for the assumption that ‘as a practical matter’ Communist China is a quasi-sponsor and that it will gain in prestige and weight by reason of its attendance at the Conference. At Berlin I brought the Soviet Union to drop its previous insistence upon acceptance of Communist China as a ‘great power’. Communist China will attend the Conference neither as a great power nor as a government so far as the United States is concerned. The Berlin communiqué says explicitly that neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, the Korean Political Conference ‘shall be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded’. We will deal with the Chinese Communists at Geneva—just as we did at Panmunjom—as the enemy aggressor. The fact that Communist China is involved in two aggressions certainly does not add to its prestige or position in any area outside the Communist bloc.

8 and 9. The Indochina problem is to be discussed at Geneva independently of the Korean problem and by a different group of interested nations. We do not believe that the Government of the Republic of Korea would assume to exercise a veto power over the discussion of Communist aggression in Indochina, where the Republic of Korea is

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1 See the editorial note, p. 21.
not a belligerent. Obviously, the nations which are involved have a right, if they wish, to discuss their own problems. The fact that both problems may be under discussion simultaneously, but independently, does not imply a ‘package deal for the Orient’.

10. The Berlin agreement on the Korean Political Conference did not go beyond the main points on which President Rhee and I had found ourselves in agreement last August. Since the arrangements made at Berlin conform to our understandings in Seoul of last August and the General Assembly Resolution, and with the views of the seventeen (including Korea) meeting in Washington, I did not think it necessary to undertake additional consultations on matters already discussed and agreed upon many times in great detail between our two Governments.

During the course of the Berlin meetings, I asked that President Rhee be kept informed of my statements on behalf of the Republic of Korea and regarding Communist China. The United States representatives in Korea informed you of our shift of effort from Panmunjom to Berlin to obtain the type of conference which both our governments had been seeking. As to your statement that Communist China was consulted regarding the Korean Political Conference at Geneva, I have no knowledge of any such consultations. We have good reason to believe that the Chinese Communist regime is thoroughly dissatisfied with the outcome of the Berlin Conference.

11. The President’s letter of November 4, 1953 to President Rhee deals, we believe, with and provides an answer to this question.\(^3\)

I hope that these answers will be closely studied by your Government.

The opening of the Korean Political Conference is rapidly approaching. We should lose no time in consulting and fixing our common position. Therefore, it is my earnest hope that the Republic of Korea will soon accept the invitation which this Government has extended to attend the Korean Political Conference at Geneva. I also hope that the Republic of Korea will as soon as possible send to Washington whoever will be its chief representative at Geneva, in order to enable us to work closely together on procedural arrangements and substantive positions, and to continue the cooperative relationships to which both Governments have devoted their attention and their energies in the past.

Irrespective of the opinions which we may entertain as to the likelihood of the success of the Korean Political Conference, I do not

\(^3\)In the letter under reference, President Eisenhower cautioned Rhee against unilateral military action in the following terms: “If you should decide to attack alone, I am convinced that you would expose the ROK forces to a disastrous defeat and they might well be permanently destroyed as an effective military force. . . . If you were to plan to initiate military action while the Communist forces are complying with the Armistice, my obligation as to both United States forces and other United Nations forces would be to plan how best to prevent their becoming involved and to assure their security.” (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file) For the complete text of this letter, see volume xv.
believe that it would be understood or easily forgiven if the Govern-
ment of Korea should refuse to take part in a conference to be held
at a place and under circumstances corresponding to its own choice,
designed to bring about 'the establishment, by peaceful means, of a
united and independent Korea'.

With my best personal regards,

Sincerely yours, John Foster Dulles”

Dulles

396.1-GE/3-1854 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, March 18, 1954—2:26 p.m.
PRIORITY

740. Soviet Aide-Mémoire March 17 accepting Palais de Nations
as conference building in Geneva states “considering the composition
of participants of the conference it appears expedient to establish that
official and working languages of the conference should be English,
French, Chinese and Russian.” Aide-Mémoire states views Soviet Gov-
ernment on preparation for conference at Geneva were discussed with
Government Chinese Peoples Republic “which has stated that it
shares them.” Omission any reference to consultations with North
Korean regime and omission Korean as official and working language
is another example Communist attempt mold conference into 5-power
affair. In order forestall this and in view both sides at Panmunjom
included Korean as well as Chinese and English in respect to proposals
for official languages at political conference, Department believes we
should propose addition Korean language.

Department wishes you to advise Rhee and/or Pyun of U.S. view
essential for Korean as working language at Korean Political Con-
ference but that we are not in position propose this provision until
we know whether or not ROK will attend and therefore it most im-
portant we know this soonest. You should point out this is good ex-
ample desirability preliminary consultation and planning by U.S. and
ROK as U.S. suggested sometime ago and repeated Secretary’s letter
to Pyun. Department believes language question chance prod ROKs
into response.¹

Dulles

¹ A response to this message was transmitted in telegram 917, Mar. 19, from
Seoul, which read as follows:

“Foreign Minister Pyun himself having raised question of Korean as conference
language at our meeting this morning (Embtel 913) [trans] I telephoned him on
receipt reference telegram this afternoon. Minister expressed appreciation of
US offer seek acceptance Korean should ROK attend, but indicated attendance
might not be decided until after receipt of reply to President Rhee’s latest letter.”
(396.1-GE/3-1954)
396.1-GE/3-1954: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY SEOUL, March 19, 1954—10 a.m.

913. Re Deptel 739, March 17. Secretary’s letter which I marked confidential delivered this morning to Foreign Minister Pyun who said he would immediately convey it to President Rhee. Only comment Pyun made while reading letter was in regard to third paragraph (re Russia not “sponsoring power” and declaring conference two-sided) with which he apparently disagrees. He also observed it might be “inconvenient” send representative to Washington, assuming Korea decides to attend, and asked why necessary consultation could not be conducted here between him and me.

Briggs

795.00/3-1654: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 20, 1954—12:22 p.m.

748. For Briggs from the Secretary. Please deliver following to Rhee from the President.

“My dear Mr. President: I have received your letter of March 11 ¹ making alternative proposals for United States support in military action to unify your country or in enlarging and strengthening your defense forces.

My letter of November 4 which Vice President Nixon gave you when he talked with you last November expresses the position of this Government with respect to unilateral military action by your Government.² As I then wrote, if you should initiate such military action, my obligation to both United States forces and to other United Nations forces would be to plan how best to prevent their becoming involved and to assure their security. I also said that in my judgment the Republic of Korea cannot alone achieve the unification of Korea by a military decision, and unilateral action by your Government would expose your armed forces to disastrous defeat and possible destruction. I well understand your concern for the misfortune of the people in north Korea living under ruthless communist tyranny, but I believe such an attempt to unify Korea, far from freeing your compatriots in

¹ See the editorial note, p. 35.
² See footnote 3, p. 42.
the north, could only result in needless misery and irrevocable loss to the people of your country.

Therefore, I cannot comply with your request for support in military action to unify your country.

Your alternative proposal for support in the strengthening of your defense forces has several aspects. The United States Government fully subscribes to your desire to assure the Republic of Korea sufficient means for preventing a surprise enemy breakthrough. We will continue to press forward with the program for training and equipping a twenty-division Republic of Korea Army.

However, the real sanction against unprovoked Communist aggression in Korea is the knowledge which is conveyed in the Sixteen-Power Joint Policy Declaration and our Mutual Defense Treaty, when it comes into force, that any future aggressor will meet prompt, resolute and effective resistance. I reemphasize to you our readiness and capacity to react instantly if the Communist forces renew hostilities. United States forces will quickly and in strength come to your assistance and powerfully strike the enemy.

As to your request for the immediate training and equipping of an additional 15 or 20 divisions, the United States Government has been studying this matter pursuant to previous requests from officials of your Government. The United States Government will expect to convey to your Government its final conclusion when full analysis has been made from the political, economic and military point of view. As a preliminary reaction, my advisers and I believe that full compliance with your request would dangerously overtax the human and material resources of your country. However, it may be feasible to develop a joint Republic of Korea–United States program to build a carefully trained and mobilizable reserve in the Republic of Korea. This essential aspect of your security would require additional study by both Governments to determine the prudent scale on which to develop such a reserve. As for the assignment of General Van Fleet, this matter can be considered to determine whether the psychological as well as the practical military benefits to be sought would justify requesting General Van Fleet to undertake such a task.

With reference to the Geneva Conference, it is of course for your Government to decide whether or not it will participate. I can only give you friendly advice based on my sincere and unshaken admiration for your patriotism and my desire that whatsoever differences

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3 Issued at Washington, July 27, 1953; for the text, see the Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 24, 1953, p. 247. For related documentation, see volume xv.

4 For related documentation, see ibid.
may at the moment exist between our two Governments will not alienate our peoples to the serious harm of both.

A political conference to deal with the problem of Korea was one of the armistice provisions, and it was a provision your Government accepted. It has taken us a long time, longer than the armistice agreement recommended, to get the conference set up at a place, with a composition and on terms which would not be in themselves prejudicial. We have finally succeeded. Throughout the world there are many people who sincerely believe that the opportunity thus afforded ought at least to be availed of. Very many in my own country who are dedicated friends of yours and your Government would not understand if after your protestations of desire to unify Korea, you should virtually alone of all the nations on our side refuse to attend a conference, the avowed purpose of which is peacefully to create a unified and free Korea. We can all be skeptical of whether or not the conference will in fact achieve that result. However, none of us can wisely ignore the world opinion which demands that in these matters all peaceful processes should be exhausted, however remote may be the chance for success.

We on our side will of course remain faithful to the understanding, in the agreement reached between you and Secretary Dulles, which dealt with the duration of the conference. It will be our effort jointly with you to bring the issues quickly to a head and if in fact, as we must anticipate, the Communist side is unwilling peacefully to unite Korea on acceptable terms, then we must expose that fact to all of the world.

I do not foresee that our two Governments are likely to have any serious differences with respect to tactics and negotiation at the conference. However, it is important that we should concert our positions promptly. We have been holding up discussing these matters with other participants as we think that throughout there ought to be a basic ROK-US position, but technical arrangements must be promptly settled.

With warm regard,

Sincerely, Dwight D. Eisenhower.”

Original signed letter follows by pouch.

Dulles
Memorandum of a Conversation Held on March 22, 1954 at 11:30 a. m.¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] March 25, 1954.

[Subject:] Arrangements for the Geneva Conference

[Participants:] The Secretary WE—Mr. McBride
C—Mr. MacArthur C—Mr. Galloway
PSA—Mr. Bonsal IC—Mr. Eddy
NA—Mr. Young S/S-O—Mr. Van Hollen
UNP—Mr. Popper S/S-O—Mr. Trulock
EE—Mr. Thurston

1. Secretary-General

Mr. MacArthur said that, since the Soviets had not accepted our proposal regarding a Conference Secretariat, we propose that our side establish a secretariat of its own. The Secretary approved and said that this would help establish the two-sided nature of the Conference. It was agreed that it would be desirable for the British to provide the Secretary-General.

2. Languages*¹

It was agreed that there would be two advantages in having only three official languages (English, French and Russian), plus such working languages as might be required:

a. The use of Chinese and Korean as official languages would present grave technical difficulties.

b. The elimination of Chinese as an official language would remove any “Five-Power” stigma from the Indochina phase of the conference should there be no need for another language such as Annamese.

3. Soviet Statement in their Aide-Mémoire ² that they had consulted the Chinese Communists

Mr. Thurston said that the British Embassy had informed us orally that Eden did not believe we should mention in our reply the Soviet reference to consultation with the Chinese Communists. The Secretary stated that we should include in our draft aide-mémoire a statement which recognized the right of the Soviets to consult whoever they pleased, but emphasizing that we do not accept any special status for the Chinese Peoples’ Republic or any of the other invited powers.

¹This memorandum was drafted by Walter Trulock of the Executive Secretariat.

*Since this meeting, we have agreed with the British and French that 5 official languages should be used in the Korean phase. [Footnote in the source text.]

²See telegram 1086, Mar. 17, from Moscow, p. 38.
4. Seating

In discussing the difficulties involved in having 19 countries represented at the conference table, the Secretary said that while this would be a source of confusion during the first week or ten days, he expected that the conference would “shake down” so that following the opening speeches of the foreign ministers, the smaller countries would accept roles which would place them more in position of observers.

The Secretary stressed the importance of the representatives of the Republic of Korea sitting next to us. He said that we should take a strong line on this and should oppose any purely alphabetical seating arrangement which would make it impossible for us to sit next to them.

In reference to a paper outlining several alternatives for organizing the conference, the Secretary agreed that Mr. MacArthur might broach this problem with the British and French in order to obtain any views they might have.

In connection with three possible seating arrangements in the conference hall, the Secretary favored the alternative which would make it possible for each representative to have one adviser at the table with him with four advisers seated behind.

*Not printed.*

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795.00/3-2254: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

**TOP SECRET**

**PRIORITY**

SEUL, March 22, 1954—6 p. m.

926. Repeated information priority Tokyo 565. Tokyo pass CINC-UNC. President’s letter delivered this morning to President Rhee who received it with equanimity, in great contrast his attitude when last previous communication delivered (Embtel 635, January 6). Rhee read letter slowly aloud in presence Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. After asking me to express his thanks and appreciation to President Eisenhower, Rhee talked in mild vein for 15 minutes approximately as follows:

Rhee said communication called for careful study but that it seems clear to him US now desires reduce American personnel in Korea which Rhee called “understandable”. He referred to advantage from US point of view of substituting ROK for American and other UN personnel observing that he had been greatly impressed by recent Reader’s Digest article by General Van Fleet in which latter discusses

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1 For related documentation, see volume xv.
economy of utilization Korean troops. According to this, Rhee said one American costs as much to put in the field here as 25 Koreans. This led President to rambling observation [garble] possibly of galvanizing Asians themselves to fight Communists, which necessarily is basis his recent activities seeking to bring various Asian leaders together for what he termed informal conference and discussion at Chinhae next month. President also mentioned his impending purchase of powerful radio equipment and expressed disappointment when Prime Minister said it could not be installed and functioning for six months. Shortly thereafter Rhee spoke in almost identical terms during farewell call by Air Force General Weyland 2 which took place after his meeting with me.

President's mood was benign but he appeared unusually vague. He gave no concrete indication of intentions concerning Geneva conference, other than to declare letter would receive his most careful attention.

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*Gen. Otto P. Weyland, who had been Commanding General of the U.S. Far East Air Forces, was leaving to become Commander of the U.S. Tactical Air Command.

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396.1-GE/3-2354 : Telegram

**The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State**

**SECRET** **PRIORITY**

**SEOUL, March 23, 1954—9 p. m.**

930. Repeated information Tokyo 570. Tokyo for CINCUNC. Verbatim text. Reference: Embtel 928,1 Deptel 739.2 Foreign Minister Pyun has requested Embassy telegram text following letter which he

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1 The Department of State file copy of this telegram is dated, apparently incorrectly, Mar. 24, 4 p. m. Presumably, telegram 928 was sent on Mar. 23 from Seoul and was received in Washington, because of the 14 hour time difference between the two capitals, at 1:08 p. m. on Mar. 23. The text read:

"President Rhee informed New York Times correspondent this morning Republic of Korea has decided neither accept, nor reject invitation to Geneva Conference, pending receipt additional clarification which will shortly be sought by Foreign Minister Pyun in further letter to Secretary Dulles.

"At his regular press conference today, Pyun informed press reply received from Washington to his letter regarding Geneva Conference. He stated assurance regarding 90-day time limit, after which US and Republic of Korea would jointly walk out and discuss other measures, was most satisfactory assurance given. He also specifically cited Secretary Dulles statement Republic of Korea a sovereign State cannot be bound by decision against her own interests. Pyun concluded by remarking other points not sufficiently clarified and no decision yet taken whether Republic of Korea will attend Conference." (396.1-GE/3-2454)

2 Dated Mar. 17, p. 39.
has today addressed to Secretary Dulles, signed original of which being transmitted through Ambassador Yang:

*Begin Text*

My Dear Mr. Secretary: I have studied your letter of March 17, 1954 with utmost interest and attention it fully deserves. In connection, however, with answers you gave me orally through Ambassador Briggs to my earlier questions publicly raised and answers you so kindly set forth in your letter in response to batch of fresh questions couched in my letter to you dated March 3, 1954, I should like to say that I would doubt my own loyalty owed to my own nation and to its great and beneficent ally, US, if I were to refrain from frankly reiterating views still persisting unchanged and doubts still remaining unresolved by your kindly and elaborate answers and so warning, at least, against dangers we would face unitedly, if this government should decide to participate in coming conference at Geneva, in which case, by way, I shall have pleasure of letting you know of it through your worthy and able representative Ambassador Briggs.

GA resolution sponsored by fifteen United Nations, seeking, I believe, to preclude certain dangers and pitfalls clearly envisaged and anticipated, insisted on having Soviet Union come in as belligerent, on having it as two-sided conference, not round-table one, on insuring each participant nation freedom not to be bound by any majority-supported resolution or decision, and above all, on confining conference to Korean question.

Now it seems, Mr. Secretary, that all obstacles Communists chose to see in these crucial propositions and fought with all their demoniacal energy and truculence, have been removed at one stroke by Berlin four foreign ministers conference proposing new conference at Geneva freed from all Communist-hated restrictions. In short, we can hardly, I must confess, bring ourselves to agree with you this is type of conference we sought after.

I do not share your view Soviet Union is not sponsoring nation so far as my country is concerned. If Soviet Union is sponsoring nation only in regard to invitation of Communist participants to coming Geneva conference, while US sponsors conference for free nations concerned only, then, where do England and France come in for sponsoring? We understand recent four foreign ministers conference as body sponsored proposed Geneva conference and, therefore, any of four nations represented in Berlin conference is sponsoring nation,

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*a Text in telegram 861, Mar. 6, from Seoul, p. 29.
absolutely and unconditionally, regardless of procedural matter of who issued an invitation to whom.

Your oral answer reaching me through Ambassador Briggs regarding nature of coming Geneva conference was, I remember, that technically it is not two-sided conference but it is as practical matter, for conferees will naturally be divided into Communists and non-Communist groups. This interpretation applies to UN itself, and, for that matter, to any conference or meeting where problem, when taken up, is almost invariably tending to divide members into supporters and opposers of certain proposal on it. I hope you will not be offended to be told we drew little assurance from answer you gave me.

You will agree, I believe, with me in view there is much difference between seeking not to be bound by majority decision with agreed consent of entire assembly making such decision and doing so by simple assertion of national sovereignty, which unfortunately grows odious or even offensive nowadays, so far [as] its possible effect on world opinion is concerned.

As regards proposed Geneva conference handling also Indochinese question, I should like to state unequivocally we do not mean, in slightest, “to exercise a veto power over the discussion of Communist aggression in Indochina,” so long as it is carried on in perfectly independent manner, say, in separate manner, say in separate conference from that dealing with Korean problem. In my previous letter to you, I simply expressed my fear of certain dangers that might develop from same conference handling two different and, as you seem to say, disconnected problems. I need not tell you here these dangers are same dangers UN spokesmen for free cause clearly saw, though they did not all say so as clearly.

I whole-heartedly concur in your view “we should lose no time in consulting and fixing our common position”. I am sorry to say I am in no position give you perfectly satisfactory reply in this connection, since this government has yet to decide on participation in Geneva conference, to which it is invited. I should like to make, however, suggestion here which I hope you will find acceptable and which also happens to represent our best effort to comply with your request under circumstances. How would you consider idea of having pre-Geneva discussions in Seoul between your Embassy here and this government or, if you prefer, between latter and whomever you will designate for occasion? Considering fact we have not all facilities of communication you have, it may be fair arrangement, after all. As to propriety of such a procedure pending our decision on matter of participation, I feel we need not question it at all, for I see only its necessity and no possible harm coming from it. I earnestly hope you will find it workable at least.
I must not pass this occasion, however, without recognizing with much satisfaction and appreciation your confirmed determination to carry out, in reference to Geneva conference, understanding of setting three-month time limit to political conference on Korea as declared in joint communiqué of August 8, 1953. I assure you in advance this heartening assurance from you, along with deep, implicit trust US Government and people have inspired in us that you will not see us betrayed in our fundamental and intrinsic interests, will yet help incline us to take favorable view of our participation in coming Geneva conference, in spite of all its forbidding aspects we seem to descry.

I beg to remain, my dear Mr. Secretary,
Yours sincerely, Y. T. Pyun.

End text.

BRIGGS

396.1-GE/3-2454 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY
SEOUL, March 24, 1954—2 p. m.
931. Repeated information Tokyo 571. Tokyo for CINCUNC. While Foreign Minister Pyun’s March 23 letter (Embtel 930) is couched in less assertive and distorted terms than his March 3 letter, it re-emphasizes fact ROK Government considers its bargaining position stronger so long as it has made no commitment to attend Korean PC Geneva. I interpret Pyun’s last letter as [meaning?] none of considerations still regarded as unsatisfactory by ROK will necessarily be obstacle their attendance once they decide they have obtained maximum possible returns from their dilatory tactics. Consequently, I recommend we reply promptly and briefly without further attempt discuss points reiterated by Pyun.

It is also apparent ROK wishes to use its decision on attendance as bargaining level in substantive discussions and in that connection I recommend we make plain to them that there would be no useful purpose served by commencing substantive consultation until decision on attendance reached. It might even be useful begin substantive discussions with British and French in Washington to demonstrate our intention move ahead on Geneva preparations. I believe it would be helpful, however, to state in our reply that we are agreeable to having consultation, when held, take place in Seoul between Embassy and Foreign Ministry. I believe ROK desire have consultation here is probably sincere, being motivated in part by President Rhee’s real need for Pyun’s assistance in coming weeks, particularly in connection pro-
jected Asian anti-Communist conference, and Rhee’s reported fear Ambassador Yang might be too susceptible US influence if consultation held Washington and Pyun unable be present.

Briggs

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396.1-GE/3-2454: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1954—3:50 p.m.

756. Your 930 and 931.¹ Letter from Pyun partly garbled transmission especially first paragraph beginning “in which case by way I shall have pleasure of letting you know of it through . . .”² However to prevent delay answer please see Rhee and Pyun together taking also Secretary’s letter March 17 (our 739) and President’s letter March 20 (our 748) since we are not sure Rhee has seen Secretary’s letter to Pyun. Inform them behalf Secretary along following lines:

Secretary’s and President’s letters provide best US answers to and positions on various substantive questions raised by Rhee and Pyun in their letters and in reported press interviews. (If it becomes apparent Rhee is unfamiliar Secretary’s letter you may find useful opportunity go over it with him in detail.) We understand and sympathize with ROK concern but believe assurances and answers we have given in our communications make it clear nature, organization and procedures conference will protect ROK interests especially so long as US and ROK work in close concert.

Re consultations we appreciate Pyun’s suggestion but do not believe useful purpose would be served by commencing substantive discussions with ROK until ROK has determined attend conference. Re locale these consultations time and other factors make it impractical consult in Seoul. US positions being currently developed in Washington and chief US participants in conference are here. Also necessary consult with other participating Governments and this can best be done here especially since time factors preclude delays which would arise from long telegraphic exchanges. In August Secretary went Seoul consult with Rhee and Pyun on conference and it therefore appropriate as well as matter practical necessity for Pyun (or whoever is to be chief ROK representative and is able speak with authority for ROK) to come Washington for consultations now.

¹ Ante, p. 49 and supra.
² The text of telegram 930 printed here is a corrected copy of the originally garbled text.
Reemphasize desire consult first with ROK. However within next few days US must begin exchanging views with other allies. Therefore hope ROK representative can come Washington soonest. At minimum we shall try keep ROK informed through Embassy Seoul and we shall be glad to have any views ROK may wish to convey through same channel. But we believe give-and-take of face-to-face discussion is essential to development agreed and effective positions on substantive and procedural questions likely arise at conference.

Dulles

896.1/8–654: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1954—3:51 p.m.

757. Your 864. In preparation for Geneva interdepartmental Korean Working Group discussing several basic questions on which additional views of Embassy Seoul will be appreciated. Questions involve relationship between withdrawal all foreign forces and Korean unification.

(1) What is basis underlying Embassy’s proposals 1 and 2 for putting completion withdrawal prior to elections?
(2) Some difference in emphasis here on extent to which withdrawal US forces from Korea provides us with bargaining leverage vis-a-vis Chinese Communists. What is Embassy’s estimate?
(3) Will ROK Government insist on Chinese Communist withdrawal from Korea as first order business conference and agreement thereon prior discussion or implementation other measures for peaceful settlement Korean question?
(4) Assuming conference agreement on unification acceptable to us impossible will ROK Government favor or insist on agreement at conference on withdrawal all foreign forces?
(5) What would be reaction Rhee and ROK Government to proposal made at Conference for agreement on total or partial withdrawal all foreign forces unrelated to unification agreement?

Realize difficulty answering questions absence consultations with ROKs but Embassy’s reactions would help Korean Working Group here.

Dulles

1 Also sent to Tokyo with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.
2 Dated Mar. 6, p. 83.
3 At this time the Korean Working Group was preparing position papers for the delegation to the Geneva Conference; see the list of papers prepared, p. 4.
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET  PRIORITY  

SEOUL, March 25, 1954—5 p.m.

940. Repeated information priority Tokyo 574. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Substance Deptel 756, March 25,1 conveyed to President Rhee and Foreign Minister Pyun this afternoon at meeting which featured lengthy restatement by President of ROK position. This concluded by Rhee’s asking me thank Secretary on his behalf and to say ROK’s attitude toward Geneva attendance still undecided. As to possibility mentioned Department’s telegram that Rhee perhaps unfamiliar Secretary’s March 17 letter to Pyun,2 it quickly became apparent that President fully informed both as to contents Secretary’s letter and of Pyun’s further letter March 23 (Embtl 930).

Following my presentation of contents Department’s telegram Rhee asked if I would provide him and Pyun with memorandum confirming certain statements made. Memorandum based on fact [last?] two paragraphs Deptel 756 has accordingly been furnished.

As to pre-conference consultation, Rhee and Pyun now understand we are not prepared engage therein until ROK has decided attend conference. This useful point to clarify. It also paves way for us to begin discussions with other allies without further delay should we desire do so. As to Pyun’s going to Washington (assuming affirmative ROK decision on attendance), Pyun remains reluctant and unconvincing, and he reiterated matters ought to be susceptible of handling by discussion through Embassy Seoul. (Please see Embtl 931, March 24; memorandum based on Deptel 756 will I hope be useful in this connection).

Rhee then made long, somewhat rambling, statement recapitulating his letter March 11 to President 3 after which he characterized President’s reply as rejection of Korean views in almost every particular and hence “terribly disappointing.” He noted one exception was statement US still studying Korean alternative proposal re additional ROK divisions; Rhee said that while that pending it might be difficult for him make up his mind on what to do. He declared Korea faces tragic future with no assurance of support by her allies in event of Geneva Conference failure. (What Rhee apparently means is this. He doubts whether conference will unify Korea; we have declined give him assurance of support in seeking unification by forcible means following failure of conference; he regards truncated [garble] possi-

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1 Ante, p. 53. Telegram 756 was transmitted on Mar. 24; because of the time difference, it was received in Seoul on Mar. 25.
2 See telegram 739, Mar. 17, to Seoul, p. 39.
3 See the editorial note, p. 35.
ble situation and hence [garble] defeat; therefore he discounts value of assurance to come to his support, that is rescue, only if attacked.)

As to “saving Asiatic perimeter” as Rhee put it, he spoke pessimistically in regard to future of “Korean free world foothold in Asia”, of Japan, and of Indochina which he declares “free world is now losing”. Finally Rhee referred several times to “US mistake” in not fighting Korean war to victorious conclusion. For him armistice still remains root of evil from which he continues doubt any good can grow.

At conclusion of meeting [Rhee?] stated he and Pyun would discuss situation in light of information I had conveyed to them but for present he unable say whether his government will attend Geneva Conference.

BRIGGS

396.1-GE/3-2454 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, March 25, 1954—6:59 p.m.

597. Reurtel 1125, following is text US draft Aide-Mémoire submitted to French and British representatives Washington March 23 as suggested reply Soviet Aide-Mémoire transmitted your 1086 (March 23 draft is revision original draft submitted March 22):

"With regard to points contained in Aide-Mémoire of USSR dated March 17, Governments of France, United Kingdom and United States are in agreement on the views set forth below. In this connection these governments desire to point out that the fact that the four powers agreed at Berlin on the convocation of the Conference gives them a special responsibility for its organization and creates an obligation for consultation among them. While the USSR is, of course, at liberty to consult with such other powers as it chooses, this is not to be interpreted as indicating that such other powers enjoy a status or responsibility any different from that of the other countries invited to the Conference.

"The Governments of France, the UK and the US are pleased to note that the Government of the USSR finds acceptable the proposal that the Conference be held in the Palais des Nations, that the simultaneous interpretation system of that building be used, and that expenses for common services should be borne by the participants. It is proposed

2 Dated Mar. 24; the text read as follows:

"British Embassy has received text of proposed reply to Soviet aide-mémoire on preparations for Korean political conference worked out and submitted for governmental consideration by tripartite working group Washington together with summary of discussions. In order to avoid last minute rush (which sometimes happens) if reply is to be handled on tripartite basis here, would appreciate text and any other pertinent information on subject.” (396.1-GE/3-2454)
3 Not printed.
that these common expenses be apportioned equally among all the participants. In order to facilitate completion of the technical and related administrative arrangements prior to the Conference, the Governments of France, the UK and the US are shortly sending experts to Geneva where they will be available for liaison with appropriate Soviet officials.

"With reference to the problem of languages, the Governments of France, the UK and US consider that in the light of the four-power agreement at Berlin, the official languages should include French, English and Russian. Since it is the purpose of the proposed Conference to seek a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, Korean should also be made one of the official languages, together with Chinese, for the discussion of the Korean problem.

"It is to be regretted that the USSR does not agree to the proposals made by the three Governments for a common secretariat to be furnished by the UN for all interpretation, documentation, translation, and other Conference services. However, the proposal that each delegation assume the responsibility of translation of documents received from other delegations and the dissemination of their own documents in one of the official languages referred to above is accepted.

"With regard to oral translation, the Governments of France, the UK and the US are prepared to agree that, following the statement of a delegate in one of the official languages, and [an?] oral interpretation should be made in another of the official languages and at the same time a simultaneous interpretation into the remaining official languages, using the system existing in the Palais des Nations. As to the order of languages in consecutive translation, it is suggested that the official languages be used in rotation on successive days. It is suggested that the personnel required for such interpretation for the official languages be recruited from the UN Secretariat to the extent possible, the costs to be shared equally by all the participants.

"The three Governments agree that a representative of the French Government should act on behalf of all four powers in initiating the necessary arrangements with the Secretary General of the United Nations on the foregoing basis."

Foregoing text has been referred UK and French Foreign Offices for approval, after which you will receive appropriate instructions regarding delivery.4

Since Soviets have rejected our proposal that common conference secretariat be provided by UN, we have also raised with British and

4 Telegram 600, Mar. 28, transmitted the following instructions from the Department to the Embassy in Moscow:

"French and British Embassies here have now informed us that their Governments have approved text US draft aide-mémoire transmitted to you Deptel 597 and have agreed to your delivering it to Soviets March 29.

"Please make necessary arrangements for delivery aide-mémoire Kuznetsov date indicated late afternoon Moscow. For your information, Department plans call in representatives of Governments participating in our side in Korean phase Geneva Conference on March 29 at which time they will be informed regarding contents of aides-mémoire already exchanged as well as present one. They will be told you are delivering latter that day." (396.1-GE/3-2854)
French representatives here question of establishment of a separate secretariat to serve common needs of non-communist delegations similar to secretariat three Western powers at Berlin Conference. From attitude British representative UK does not appear anxious. Provide SYG for such purpose. French representative advanced view that secretarial function of Korean and Indochinese aspects should be separate and different personnel should be employed. He also implied that French may insist on having French SYG for Indochina phase. We are giving consideration desirability having non-Big Three nationals act as SYG for Korean phase and have asked British and French for suggestions re such individual.

Another matter taken up with British and French was desirability consulting with representatives other UN countries and ROK soon as possible re conference preparations. It was agreed to call them in after tripartite agreement reached on above draft Aide-Mémoire and fill them in on progress to date.

DULLES

396.1-GE/3-2654: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in South Africa

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 26, 1954—5:58 p. m.

16. FYI. South Africa is only country of the sixteen which participated UN Korean operation which has declined invitation to Korean phase Geneva Conference. It has been and remains US policy not attempt influence decision of any participants this matter. In case of South Africa, South African Ambassador here feels very strongly his country making major mistake in refusing invitation. By participation they have built up close and friendly international relationship with the fifteen other participants which in his eyes has been important as a counter to well-known South African tendency towards isolationism. By refusing invitation he feels his government tossing away this asset and to what purpose. Presumably he has put these views his government but appears doubtful this will result in change of position. His counselor on several occasions has hinted but not requested that perhaps a word from you to Prime Minister on matter might be considerably more effective than his own representations. End FYI.

In light foregoing you are given discretion talk to Forsyth and depending on his reaction again your discretion to Prime Minister.

1 G. P. Jooste.
2 A. A. M. Hamilton.
3 Daniel F. Malan was both Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs.
4 D. D. Forsyth was Permanent Secretary for External Affairs.
along following line: You are speaking with knowledge but not under instructions your Government. You have noted South Africa's decision decline invitation Korean phase Geneva Conference. You note further South Africa is only Korean participant which has declined such invitation. It has been policy U.S. Government not to attempt influence decision of any participant this matter and you are not now attempting do so in case South Africa. You are wondering however whether this decision is really in interest South Africa. By participating in Korean operation South Africa not only struck blow in defense of principles of collective security but from point of view of its own enlightened self interest developed close international relationship with the other participants as evidenced by the frequent Washington and New York meetings of the participants. While we would hope to continue to include South Africa in such meetings almost inevitably from this point on the meetings will be closely tied to Geneva, may be held there and likely result, despite our efforts to contrary, will be that South Africa in time will lose its place in the group. You are wondering therefore if South African declination invitation will not in effect result in South Africa tossing away an asset without as far as you can see obtaining any advantage thereby.

If you decide wise talk as above it should of course be done most informally, be a one-shot operation and you should make it clear U.S. Government not attempting change South African position but that you merely wanted make these observations as a friend of South Africa and solely in interest South Africa.6

DULLES

6 On Mar. 29, Ambassador Waldemar J. Gallman reported that in the morning he had seen Forsyth, who expressed his sympathy for Gallman's position, held out no hope for a reversal of the policy, but urged him to see the Prime Minister. In the afternoon, Gallman met Malan, who stated that the South African decision not to attend the Geneva Conference was merely an extension of the policy announced before the cease fire in Korea that after the fighting ended South Africa would not participate actively in Korean matters. South Africa, having discharged its obligations under the U.N. Charter, would now leave Korean matters to those governments more directly concerned. (Telegrams 43 and 44, Mar. 29, from Cape Town; 396.1–GE/3–2954)

396.1–GE/3–2454 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET

Seoul, March 26, 1954—8 p. m.

946. Repeated information Tokyo 577. Limit distribution. Tokyo pass CINCUNCI and CAG. Deptel 757 repeated Tokyo 2110.1 Following are Embassy comments on numbered questions reference telegram

1 Dated Mar. 24, p. 54.
with emphasis on qualification noted last paragraph thereof namely, estimate of ROK position based on analysis ROK views from information heretofore available and not new consultations with government.

1. In formulating proposals (1) and (2) Embassy was mindful of fact that US Government position has previously been that troop withdrawal should follow rather than precede political unification of Korea, and of security consideration which dictated that position. One important respect however in which present situation differs from that in 1948-50 is that US and its UN allies are now publicly committed to come immediately and forcefully to aid of ROK in event of further Communist aggression, a commitment which did not exist in earlier period and which in our opinion now constitutes even more important deterrent than actual presence US forces in Korea. It amply evident moreover that no chance exists for fair elections in North Korea so long as Chinese Communist forces occupy that area; to this extent President Rhee’s repeated insistence on withdrawal such forces as pre-condition to unification of Korea is entirely realistic. Although withdrawal US-UN forces from South Korea prior to political unification of country would inevitably involve risks from our point of view, it is believed such risks would be substantially reduced by effective international inspection and supervision envisaged those proposals. Although we see little reason to believe Communists would seriously consider solution along these lines which would in fact permit such effective inspection and supervision, and while we believe US should not accept any proposal of this nature which did not embody such safeguards, it is believed proposal along lines that outlined reference telegram would receive wide degree of support and be effective means smoking out Communists and making clear latter’s predatory motivation in this regard.

In addition these general considerations following factors were considered by Embassy in connection proposals (1) and (2):

(a) Impression US-UN forces likely be reduced to token force by next spring anyway and desirability relate this probability to our Geneva position and extract maximum benefit therefrom;

(b) One of principal advantages which has arisen from retention US forces Korea has been their potential effect in influencing ROK Government, but Embassy inclined believe our influence in future likely be about same whether or not we have token force here;

(c) As noted above, Rhee has publicly and privately specified withdrawal Chinese Communist forces as prior requirement for holding elections Korea;

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2 Dated Mar. 6, p. 33.
(d) In addition taking initiative from Communists by incorporating withdrawal all foreign forces in package proposal for Korea, there might be advantage in demonstrating inseparability these two facets Korean settlement and thus strengthening our position in opposing possible Communist proposal for agreement on withdrawal before discussion other aspects problem.

(e) It would be effective demonstration of fact US does not have imperialistic ambitions in Asia;

(f) Presumably by time proposal implemented ROK forces would be built up to presently envisaged maximum strength and would be backed by US power in Japan, Okinawa, etc.;

(g) Such relatively early withdrawal might be embarrassing to Communists if their control North Korea without military forces therein not fully established by that time (altho this seems doubtful); conceivably it might also stimulate Sino-Soviet dispute over domination North Korea.

2. Since one of principal Chinese Communist objectives appears be withdrawal US-UN forces from Asian continent this gives us certain bargaining leverage with them. This tempered however by fact they must already be aware US contemplating withdrawal in view public discussion such withdrawal in US. Even with Communist awareness our general intentions, which seems unavoidable in circumstances, believe we should exploit our agreement withdrawal to maximum in seeking satisfactory package proposal including unification under acceptable conditions. To this extent believe we should avoid public official statements re future withdrawals US forces from Korea for duration Geneva Conference on Korea (Emtbel 841). 3

(3) Seems likely ROK Government will initially insist on Chinese Communist withdrawal from Korea as first order business and may even wish obtain agreement thereon prior discussion other measures but believe they can be brought see advantages using withdrawal US-UN forces as part of package proposal to seek satisfactory unification Korea. This matter primarily of presentation of problem to ROK. While Rhee has stated clearly withdrawal Chinese Communist forces prior elections is essential, he has never to Embassy's knowl-

3 Dated Feb. 28; the text read as follows:

"During my talk with General Hull February 24 he outlined in general terms planning which proceeding in Defense Department re redeployment US Forces Korea. In connection with eventual dissemination this information I urge that Department consider this question in relation to our substantive position on withdrawal forces from Korea at Geneva conference. While as I understand it decision on redeployment can be expected soon, I recommend strongly that information regarding that decision be held as closely as possible. I recognize that it has to be discussed with a number of other governments including that of ROK but would hope that in doing so we should take every precaution to avoid plans becoming public knowledge. It becomes increasingly apparent that major Red Chinese objective at Geneva will probably be to obtain withdrawal foreign forces from ROK. To make known publicly in advance of or during conference fact we are contemplating withdrawal bulk our forces might give Communists substantial tactical advantage at conference table." (795.00/2-2854)
edge specifically rejected idea reaching simultaneous agreement on withdrawal and unification.

(4) Believe ROK position this question may depend on assurances, or absence thereof, from US re measures to unify Korea if Geneva fails do so. On assumption US cannot satisfy Rhee on supporting attainment his objective by military means, whether by affording logistic, naval and air support or otherwise, Rhee’s attitude may be determined by his analysis of likelihood embroiling US in military adventure before our forces actually withdrawn. From this viewpoint he may wish delay our withdrawal unless he concludes such withdrawal essential obtain Chinese Communist withdrawal and considers this objective overriding. In this situation period between conclusion Geneva Conference and final withdrawal US–UN forces would be period maximum risk for US and we may have to be prepared deal firmly with Rhee on this problem.

(5) This question answered partly by preceding paragraph. Rhee would probably consider withdrawal all forces from Korea without unification agreement in relation to his overriding objective Chinese Communist withdrawal and his analysis chances engaging US in unification effort by military means before our withdrawal completed, as discussed above. In other words he probably would not like such agreement but might accept it in light of developments at conference itself. Recommend it not be broached as possible ROK–UN proposal until situation at conference becomes clearer.

BRIGGS

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Ph files, lot 60 D 330, "Position Papers"

Position Paper Prepared for the Korean Phase of the Geneva Conference

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] March 27, 1954.
GK D–4b

DRAFT UNITED STATES PROPOSAL FOR REUNIFICATION OF KOREA

PREAMBLE

The Korean people, who for centuries lived together as one nation, sharing common interests, culture and traditions, desire to be reunited

1 A cover sheet indicated that this was a revision of an earlier version and that it would be forwarded to Secretary Dulles and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Subsequently, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs informed Dulles that document GK D–4b, which had been prepared by the Defense and State Departments in consultation, was considered acceptable from a military point of view by both the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (396.1–GE/4–754)

See telegram 1034, Apr. 19, from Seoul, p. 116, for reference to this document.
under one government, representative of the people and dedicated to the principles of freedom and independence.

In accordance with the objective of the UN, and in express recognition of the wishes of the Korean people, we make the following proposal designed to achieve peacefully and permanently through free elections in Korea the objective of a united, sovereign, and fully independent government representative of the wishes of the Korean people.

METHOD OF REUNIFICATION OF KOREA

The reunification of Korea should be brought about on the following basis:

1. Establishment of a Korea Reunification Supervisory Commission (KRSC);
2. Establishment of conditions for free elections;
3. Free elections throughout Korea for Constituent Body;
4. Convocation of Constituent Body;
5. Adoption of Constitution, formation of reunified government, and transfer of power from predecessor states;
6. International security for a reunified Korea;
7. Completion of withdrawal of foreign military forces from Korea;
8. Dissolution of KRSC;
9. Termination of the Armistice Agreement.

1. Establishment of a Korea Reunification Supervisory Commission (KRSC)

The Reunification of Korea and the withdrawal of foreign forces from that area shall be supervised by an impartial commission. The Commission shall be called the Korea Reunification Supervisory Commission (KRSC), and shall be designated by the Korean Political Conference. The Republic of Korea and the PDK shall have associate but non-voting status. Decisions by the KRSC shall require approval by a majority of its membership. The parties to this agreement shall facilitate the work of the Commission throughout Korea and comply with recommendations made by the Commission within its terms of reference.*

The terms of reference for the Korean Reunification Supervisory Commission (KRSC) shall be as follows:

The KRSC shall be responsible for (a) assuring the existence of conditions which would make possible the holding of free elections;

*It is assumed that the U.N. will be informed of and possibly will be asked to approve this proposal, and that the UNGA would consequently dissolve UNCURK. [Footnote in the source text.]
(b) supervising the implementation of the plan for the reunification of Korea set forth herein and (c) observing and certifying the withdrawal of foreign forces in accordance with the procedures outlined herein. The specific terms of reference of the KRSC shall include the following:

1. Investigating conditions throughout North and South Korea, proposing to the parties the measures necessary to bring about conditions which would ensure free elections throughout Korea, and assuring that these measures are put into effect: these shall include freedom of movement, freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, freedom of association and assembly, freedom of speech, press, and broadcasting, and freedom of political parties to organize and carry out their activities.

2. Preparation of uniform electoral laws in consultation with the ROK and the PDROK.

3. Determination, in consultation with the ROK and the PDROK, of the number of delegates to be elected and the number of election districts which shall be in direct proportion to population distribution in Korea.

4. Supervision over the implementation of the electoral laws, registration of qualified voters, and observance of the elections at national and local levels.

5. Observation of steps leading to the establishment of a reunified government. During the period between the end of the elections and the full assumption of control by the all-Korean Government, the KRSC will remain in operation in order to prevent action after the elections which would impair the conditions of genuine freedom under which they will have been held.

6. Observation of the withdrawal of foreign military forces.

7. Certification of results of elections and troop withdrawals.

The details of these terms of reference shall be worked out subsequently within this framework by the signatories to this agreement and shall come into effect at the same time as this agreement. The KRSC shall have the power to adopt measures not specifically described and which are necessary to carry out their task herein, in so far as they are consistent with this agreement.

The KRSC shall have its primary headquarters in the demilitarized zone and shall report and make recommendations at its discretion to the parties to this agreement.

2. Establishment of Conditions for Free Elections

Preparatory to the holding of free elections throughout Korea for a National Constituent Assembly the KRSC shall, pursuant to its terms of reference, observe political conditions throughout Korea and shall, where it deems appropriate, propose to the parties concerned
the measures necessary to insure free elections and in particular these measures shall include the following:

- Freedom of movement throughout Korea.
- Freedom of presentation of candidates.
- Immunity of candidates.
- Freedom from arbitrary arrest or victimization.
- Freedom of association and political meetings.
- Freedom of expression for all.
- Freedom of press, radio, and free circulation of newspapers, periodicals, etc.
- Secrecy of the vote.
- Security of polling stations and ballot boxes.

3. Free Elections throughout Korea for a Constituent Body

The KRSC shall also draft electoral laws and procedures in consultation with the authorities in both South and North Korea, who shall promulgate these laws and procedures simultaneously. In particular, election procedures approved by the KRSC shall ensure that candidates reflecting varying viewpoints will be permitted to campaign freely; that the electorate will be able to express its choice of candidates freely and without duress or intimidation; and that the election procedures shall be uniform throughout Korea.

Within six months after concluding this agreement, elections shall be held throughout Korea for a National Constituent Assembly on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot. Representation of the Constituent Assembly shall be apportioned on the basis of the population of each election district. The total number of Korean nationals in the ROK and in the PDROK is deemed to be respectively, 22 million and 5 million. In the event that the KRSC shall fail to certify the election of a representative he shall not be seated in the constituent body and new local-by-elections shall be held as soon as possible under KRSC supervision. The vote of a majority of the members of the KRSC shall be required to rule that the election of any candidate is not valid. If two-thirds of the representatives should be certified and seated the Constituent Assembly shall be considered to have been established; otherwise, it shall not be considered established.

4. Convocation of Constituent Assembly

The elected representatives shall meet as a Constituent Assembly in Seoul within 30 days after the KRSC has certified the free election of two-thirds of the designated number of representatives.†

† The Communists have indicated in earlier proposals for joint north-south legislative sessions that Seoul is the appropriate site for reunification talks. If they now demur, Panmunjom could be suggested as an alternative site. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. Adoption of a Constitution, Formation of a Reunified Government and Transfer of Powers from Predecessor States

The Constituent Assembly shall draft and adopt a Constitution for a reunified government as soon as possible. Meanwhile, it may form a provisional all-Korean authority charged with assisting the Assembly in drafting the constitution and with preparing the nucleus of the future all-Korean ministries. As soon as the all-Korean Government has been formed, the Assembly will determine how the powers of the ROK Government and the Korean authorities in north Korea shall be transferred to the all-Korean Government and how the former shall be brought to an end.

These and other acts taken by the membership of the Constituent Assembly in accordance with the Constitution shall be accepted and complied with by the ROK and the PDROK.

6. International Security for a Reunified Korea

On the establishment of the reunified Government of Korea, the signatories to the agreement shall pledge their respect for the territorial and political integrity of Korea in conjunction with a declaration by the reunified Government of Korea to undertake not to use force against any other country except in self-defense in protection of its peace and safety. The reunited Korea shall have the authority to assume the international rights and obligations of the ROK and the PDROK and to conclude such other international agreements as it may wish.

7. Completion of Withdrawal of Foreign Military Forces from Korea

The withdrawal of all foreign forces shall be completed within 12 months after the completion of elections and the establishment of a reunified government. The KRSC shall observe and verify the withdrawal of all foreign forces at all times. The KRSC may submit a report to the General Assembly of the UN that foreign forces have withdrawn from Korea and Korea has been unified.

8. Dissolution of KRSC

Following reunification of Korea under a sovereign and independent government as outlined above and following the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the KRSC shall declare itself dissolved.

9. Termination of the Armistice Agreement

Immediately following the declaration by the KRSC that it is dissolved, the Armistice Agreement shall be considered terminated.
CONFIDENTIAL

Moscow, March 29, 1954—7 p. m.

1161. Repeated information niact London 173, Paris 232, Geneva and Seoul unnumbered. I handed Kuznetsov text aide-mémoire given Deptel 597 5 p.m. (Emtel 1156). Kuznetsov who reads and speaks English quite fluently read aide-mémoire and after saying he would communicate it to Molotov said he would like to make a preliminary comment on sentence which refers to status and responsibility of other powers (third sentence first paragraph dealing with Soviet consultation with other powers). He said that according to communiqué published in Berlin, Geneva Conference was a conference at which two subjects would be dealt with and at which five powers would attend with other interested countries depending on the subject. He felt therefore that sentence in question was at least debatable and not fully justified by Berlin communiqué.

I told Kuznetsov that I had nothing to add to the sentence but having been at Berlin it was perfectly clear that the four powers had assumed responsibility for calling and organizing the conference as evidenced by the fact that all other powers including Communist China had been invited and had in fact been invited by US and Soviet Governments as agreed at Berlin. I said it was difficult to see how there could be any misunderstanding on this point since Soviet Government had taken action to invite Communist China and North Korea in conformity with Berlin agreement.

Kuznetsov did not contest the point in regard to responsibility of the four powers for the invitations and organization of the conference and his subsequent remark to effect that once at Geneva China would be on an equal footing with every other participant seemed to me to indicate that he had somewhat misunderstood the sentence in question. I did not argue this point with him and he showed no further disposition to pursue the subject.

I had rather expected that he would contest inclusion of Korean as an official language but he did not and he merely asked question for clarification in order to assure himself that Chinese would be an official language under our proposal. I explained to him that for the Korean political conference the proposal was to add as official languages both Korean and Chinese, making five in all. He seemed satis-

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1 Telegram 1156, Mar. 29, informed the Department of State that Bohlen had an appointment to see Kuznetsov and would hand him the aide-mémoire contained in telegram 597, Mar. 25, as instructed (396.1-GE/3-2954).
fied with this point but inquired what would be done about languages in regard to Indochinese discussions. He said he assumed that organization of Indochinese phase would be discussed at Geneva. I told him I had no instructions on this point and at present aide-mémoire dealt only with preparations for Korean conference.

Comment: I am inclined to believe, as indicated above, that Kuznetsov misread sentence re consultation with other powers and was interpreting it as meaning that once conference began China and other countries would be on different status than four inviting powers. Without going into that aspect of the matter I believe I convinced him that sentence in question referred to the responsibility of the four powers for calling and organizing Korean political conference.

From Kuznetsov observation I believe that in its reply Soviet Government will stress point that once conference convenes China and all other participating countries will be on equal footing insofar as substantive work of conference is concerned. For Indochinese phase they may interpret Berlin agreement to mean that invitations for other participants to Indochinese discussions will be extended by five powers rather than four. We should therefore be prepared to deal with this point which is not definite in wording of agreement and as I recall was left somewhat unclear at Berlin.

BOHLEN

396.1-GB/4-354 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, April 3, 1954—5:15 p. m.

782. Secretary has authorized consultations with Commonwealth and France on substantive matters Korean phase Geneva Conference. Department plans hold separate meetings April 5 or 6 with UK, then Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and then France through Embassy representatives Washington probably Ambassadorial level. 2

US will present as initial position on unification desirability resuming UN unification program in GA Resolution October 7, 1950 3 as well as previous UN resolutions hold elections North Korea as well as South for unifying country. UN resolutions carried out in South but prevented in North by Communist obstruction and aggression. Principal advantages this position at beginning consultations are: (1) backs up ROK and sacrifices of three years to preserve

1 Repeated for information to Canberra, London, Ottawa, Paris, Tokyo, and Wellington.
2 See telegram 797, Apr. 8, p. 80.
ROK against Communists; (2) upholds UN resolutions on Korean unification and existing Commission which are still valid and operative; (3) is a good tactical position because gives us room for maneuver in discussion with allies, with ROK and at Conference.

Inform Pyun Monday morning 4 Seoul time we beginning consultations with our other allies although still desire consult first with ROK as indicated to him (Deptel 756 and Your 940). 5 Meetings will probably be arranged for Monday or Tuesday. Would be glad have any views Pyun may wish make on substantive questions.

DULLES

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4 Apr. 5.
5 Dated Mar. 24 and 25, pp. 53 and 55.

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396.1-GE/4-554

Memorandum of Conversation, by Noel Hemmendinger of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

SECRET

[WASHINGTON], April 5, 1954.

Subject: ROK Participation in Planning for Korean Political Conference

Participants: Ambassador You Chan Yang, Korean Embassy
Philip Han, Counselor, Korean Embassy
Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
Noel Hemmendinger, NA

Mr. Robertson expressed regret that there was no representative of the ROK present to participate in the consultations with respect to the line to be taken at the Korean Political Conference. He said he could not understand the public position of the ROK in this matter. Mr. Dulles had won a great diplomatic battle in Berlin in getting agreement on a conference which put the aggressors in Korea on one side and the defenders of Korea on the other. This was the kind of conference, with no neutrals present, on which the ROK had insisted. The USSR was not a co-sponsor of the conference, but a sponsor of the Communist side. It issued invitations only to them.

Ambassador Yang said that his government had serious misgivings about the conference. Mr. Robertson said that it was natural for Korea to have misgivings about the future, but that the refusal to consult with its friends was adverse to Korea’s interests and only helped the Communists.

Ambassador Yang referred to the desire of the Korean Government that consultations take place in Korea and said he understood from news reports that the U.S. was consulting in other capitals in Europe.
Mr. Robertson stated that this was untrue and suggested that the Korean Embassy look to him for information on matters of this character rather than to the newspapers. He pointed out that the Secretary had flown to Seoul in the past to consult with President Rhee, and that given the enormous responsibilities which the Secretary was bearing for problems the world over and the necessity to consult with many other countries, it was only reasonable to ask the ROK to consult with this Government in Washington.

Ambassador Yang said that he would telegraph his Government on this matter promptly.

366.1-GE/4-554: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State

OFFICIAL USE ONLY NIACT Moscow, April 5, 1954—4 p.m.

1196. Repeated information niact London 183, niact Paris 243. At 2 p.m., today Kuznetsov handed me following aide-mémoire in reply to that of three Western powers of March 29.1 Immediately following telegram, will give additional observations made by Kuznetsov on delivery.

"In connection with aide-mémoire of Governments of United States of America, France and England of March 29 on question of preparations for convocation Geneva conference, Soviet Government, with agreement of Government Chinese People’s Republic, considers it necessary to communicate following observations:

"In aide-mémoire of Governments United States of America, France and England there is raised question responsibility and status of participants in conference which is being convoked at Geneva. In connection with this, it is considered necessary to call attention of above-mentioned governments to fact that decision taken by Ministers Foreign Affairs of four powers at Berlin regarding convocation Geneva conference provides that this conference shall be conference of representatives United States of America, France, England, Chinese People’s Republic and USSR, which shall take part in discussion Korean question and question of re-establishment peace in Indochina which are on conference agenda, with participation other interested states for appropriate questions. From this it is clear that representatives of all five indicated powers shall take part on equal basis in examination all questions relating to conference.

"In connection with this, on basis agreement reached at Berlin conference it is expedient to establish that English, French, Chinese and

1 Text in telegram 597, Mar. 25, to Moscow, p. 56.
Russian should be official languages during course of whole Geneva conference. At same time it seems natural to establish system whereby Korean language, together with English, French, Chinese and Russian languages, should be considered one of official languages during consideration Korean question.

"There is noted statement of agreement of Governments France, United States of America and England with proposals contained in Soviet Government's aide-mémoire of March 17\(^2\) regarding system of written and oral translations at conference.

"Agreement is expressed with proposal of three governments that official languages should be used in daily sequence for consecutive oral translation. As concerns oral translations into official languages, it is understood that for this purpose there shall be obtained appropriate qualified interpreters by agreement among conference's participants.

"Proposal of three governments that expenditures for common services should be divided equally among all conference participants is acceptable.

"There is noted statement of three governments agreement that representative his government should reach understanding with UN Secretariat regarding conditions of using for Geneva conference, Palais des Nations Building with its system of simultaneous translation."

BOHLEN

\(^2\) Text in telegram 1086, Mar. 17, from Moscow, p. 38.

396.1-GE/4-554 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State*

SECRET NIACI MOSCOW, APRIL 5, 1954—5 p. m.

1197. Repeated information niact London 184, niact Paris 244. After reading contents aide-mémoire when handed me by Kuznetsov I of course noticed reference to agreement with Chinese and sentence concerning equality of Communist China at conference. I said that, as I had pointed out to him previously, Berlin agreement seemed to me, having been present, to be perfectly clear: That four powers and four powers alone assumed responsibility for invitations and organization of conference.

Kuznetsov replied that he understood this and that question of invitations and preparatory work was one thing but he considered that once conference assembled all members would be on equal basis. I answered that, speaking personally, I thought Communist China would be on same basis as other invited powers. (Since I was not aware there was any agreed tripartite position on this point (Deptel
I felt it wise not to pursue subject. Had I been acting solely on behalf US Government I believe reference of Kuznetsov to fact that four powers issued the invitations might have been utilized as occasion to pin him down on Indochinese invitations).

The only other remark of interest made by Kuznetsov was that these measures of preparation were in effect to facilitate work of conference and that conference itself would have ultimate decisions as to languages and matters of this kind. I made no comment on this point for reason given above and also since I recall it was standard US doctrine that in last analysis a conference decides its own procedural and other matters. Having made point re my interpretation of Berlin agreement I told Kuznetsov I would transmit aide-memoire to my government and also to British and French Ambassadors here. As to aide-memoire itself, it will be noted that Russians, while agreeing to Korean as official language for Korean phase, nonetheless sought to give special status to Chinese. Since we are not prepared to deal with Indochinese phase prior to assembly at Geneva, it might be wise to treat present Soviet proposal in effect as acceptance of five official languages for this phase and merely state that problem of languages for Indochinese discussions will be considered at Geneva.

In accordance with past practice, we will merely tell press here that reply to our aide-memoire of March 29 on preparations Geneva conference has been received without disclosing contents.

Bohlen

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1 Not printed; it was a repeat of telegram 4982, Mar. 26, to London wherein the Department of State had stated in strong terms that it would reject any proposal, procedural or otherwise, which would give Communist China a special place or imply a “Five Power” concept. The telegram also stated that it had been made “crystal clear” to the British Embassy that the Department did not consider procedural matters as unimportant and unconnected with the substance of the Geneva Conference. (396.1-GE/8-2254)

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396.1-GE/4-654; Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

Seoul, April 6, 1954—1 p. m.

982. Repeated information Tokyo 593. Tokyo pass CINCUNC and CAG. Following is text of letter dated April 6 from Foreign Minister Pyun to Secretary Dulles which Pyun has requested me to telegraph to Secretary. Signed original being forwarded by pouch through Ambassador Yang.

(Begin Text)

My dear Mr. Secretary: There are strong indications some of Asian neutrals headed by India will get into Geneva conference to be con-
vened on April 26, 1954. Considering fact that, in UN meetings, US delegates openly invited India to any extended discussion of Asian problems other than Korean one, from which they were then seeking to exclude India, and that Indo-Chinese question contemplated to be handled simultaneously with Korean problem in proposed Geneva conference is certainly Asian problem earmarked for extended discussion, it is quite foreseeable neutrals will insist on coming in and succeed in doing so, with no opposition even from US, ostensibly for their participation in discussions of Indo-Chinese question only.

It is true this Government does not feel called to raise any objection to neutrals participation on Indo-Chinese question, if it were treated by separate conference. As it is, Indo-Chinese question will be bundled up with Korean one by being simultaneously handled in same conference. It is, therefore, clear this Government’s opposition to neutral participation stands, unless simultaneous treatment of Indo-Chinese question is replaced by consecutive treatment to be given after Korean question has been dealt with with finality.

Now picture is complete, Mr. Secretary, complete, I am sorry to say, as Communists limned. Communists wanted to have it as round-table conference. And it is going to be round-table conference. Communists wanted to have Soviet Union come in as neutral. And now Soviet Union is coming in as sponsor, a thing never hoped for even by most sanguine of Communists. In addition, Communist China will be only standing member, beside four sponsor nations, thus achieving prestige and status of semi-sponsor. Communists insisted on dealing with Korean and other Asian problems. And here Indo-Chinese question is to be simultaneously handled with Korean one. Communists wanted to let in neutrals to do their errands, and now they are all coming in. Communists disliked freedom of participant nation not to be bound by majority-supported decision it does not endorse. And now principle of freedom is completely ignored.

Furthermore, Mr. Secretary, history will have it that it was Indo-Chinese car of conference hitchhiked by Korea; that political conference on Korea as stipulated in armistice and defined by UN had died at Panmunjom preliminary conference and consequently Geneva conference was one mainly on Indo-Chinese question conducted in a manner satisfactory only to Communists and at time Communists might have chosen themselves; that four sponsoring nations and one other standing member constituted composite tribunal, as it were, before which poor Korea stood as trembling defendant.

In short, Mr. Secretary, scheduled Geneva conference is very likely to prove cruel travesty of what free world wished armistice—pro-
vided political conference on Korea to be. There is every danger and even indication it will all end up in legitimizing loss of Korea and Indo-China to free world and thus virtually handing rest of Southeast Asia over to Communists. I do not believe I am speaking for interests of Korea alone, oblivious to those of free world as whole. For my part, I refuse to alienate destiny of my country from that of free community it belongs to. I likewise refuse to believe that what is fatal to my own nation could be of benefit to rest of free world.

As you already know, we will, however, go along with our allies in matter of Geneva conference, only if we are supported by assurances as to means of counter-balancing enemy build-up meanwhile and thus not endangering our security while being pulled around by conferences. To be more to point, ROK forces should be so expanded and strengthened that we can afford to attend Geneva conference and, for that matter, any conference without fearing of slipping into indefensible military position.

With best regards, My dear Mr. Secretary, I remain, yours sincerely.

(End text)

Briggs

396.1–GE/4–654: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

SEOUL, April 6, 1954—6 p. m.

985. Repeated information Tokyo 595. Tokyo pass CINCUNC and CAG. Reference Embtel 982. Pyun’s latest letter is basically another recital Korean misgivings, real and imagined, re Geneva Conference combined with reiteration of demand for response re expansion ROK forces as basis decision on ROK attendance Geneva. Substance of letter also summarized by Pyun at his weekly press conference this morning although without referring to fact further letter sent. His press comments concluded on note that if US assures increase in ROK military power to status matching military power in North Korea which allegedly being greatly increased daily, ROK Government would attend Geneva Conference.

While I doubt whether further attempts satisfy Pyun on his numerous grievances against Geneva would be particularly helpful, I believe we should seek give Rhee and Pyun early reply re extent to which US prepared support build-up ROK forces (Embtel 951,
March 30). In particular, clarification of naval and air expansion to accompany 20 division program already seems somewhat overdue. I recognize that reply concerning ROK build-up far from easy since it may involve simultaneous consideration such matters as US redeployment plans, question of retaliation should Communists violate armistice, and speculation concerning Geneva Conference results. Nevertheless failure to reply probably capable being seized upon by Pyun as pretext refuse to attend on ground US withholding implementation of Rhee–Dulles agreement last August.

As for 15 to 20 additional divisions, although Rhee’s disappointment when we refuse this request may be considerable, further delay in replying may only raise false hopes and thus aggravate our relations. In other words trouble over this phase perhaps unavoidable in best of circumstances.

Briggs

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396.1–GE/4–654: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, April 7, 1954—3:40 p.m.

792. Your 982 and 985. Secretary wishes you acknowledge his receipt Pyun’s letter April 6 and convey in writing to Pyun earliest opportunity following:

1. Views in April 6 letter were subject several exchange letters between Secretary and Pyun and President and Rhee. Secretary believes previous responses questions Pyun raised earlier fully presented Secretary’s views on points now raised.

2. There will be no neutrals in discussion of Korean question at Geneva.

3. Korea and Indo-China questions will be treated independently. Participants Indo-China phase not even decided yet.

4. Participants in Korea Conference identical those contemplated by Rhee and Secretary in conversations last August, providing a

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1 Both dated Apr. 6, p. 72 and supra.
clear-cut Conference between two sides involved in fighting. Procedure on invitation demonstrates two-sided nature Conference. Soviet Union not “sponsoring power” so far as ROK and nations with forces under UNC concerned. Important to U.S. and ROK that Soviet Union be present at Conference fully sharing responsibility for progress and outcome—a principle ROK, U.S., and Allies stood for at Panmunjom.

5. Defendants at Conference are Communist aggressors and not ROK. Secretary made that clear publicly.

6. Purpose of Conference to obtain by peaceful means political unification of long suffering people whose country divided by intransigence Communist aggressor. This is the position U.S. will take at Conference.

7. Although Conference two-sided in fact, rather than round table, Secretary emphasizes strongly no nation represented our side bound by any decision it does not fully endorse. Each nation has complete freedom decision. U.S. could take no other position at this Conference and would not expect contrary of any other nation.

8. Regret in final period before Korean Conference U.S. and ROK not combining take lead in working out with Allies Conference organization, tactics and strategy. Many questions now arising on which ROK should express views with 16. On battlefield U.S. and ROK stood shoulder to shoulder in repelling aggressor, against greater odds and with larger risks than face at Conference. Now, in diplomatic field, ROK silence difficult for free world understand and compels U.S. proceed in firming up position on Korean question without chief partner. Hope not much longer without assistance from Korean friends through close partnership in seeking Korean independence and unification at Conference. Solidarity in support of ROK demonstrated by U.S. and UN whose nations gave up lives in recent bloody past deserves ROK confidence at Conference.

9. As to assurances of means counterbalance enemy buildup, President's reply Rhee's letter made clear U.S. position. As President then stated “The real sanction against Communist aggression in Korea is the knowledge which is conveyed in the 16 power joint policy declaration and our Mutual Defense Treaty when it comes into force”. President also reemphasized to Rhee our “readiness and capacity to react instantly if the Communist forces renew hostilities”.

10. ROK must make its own decision as to participation in Conference. President and Secretary both indicated hope ROK would

*See telegram 748, Mar. 20, to Seoul, p. 44.*
attend this Conference in which ROK has so much at stake. Secretary assures Pyun that U.S., whether ROK attends or not, will go Conference, determined press consistently and vigorously to achieve agreement on common objectives of U.S. and ROK—the independence and unity of a free Korea.

11. U.S. views on the ROK request for military buildup will be available by early next week.

For your information: While far from meeting ROK demands NSC decision on matter may afford ROK at least some slight modicum of satisfaction, when all factors fully explained ROK.

DULLES

For material relating to the NSC decision, see volume xv.

396.1-GE/4-754 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET NIACt WASHINGTON, April 7, 1954—7:45 p. m.

796. For President Rhee from Dulles.

“My dear President Rhee: As the date for the Geneva Conference approaches, I still await word as to whether or not your Government accepts our invitation to attend. Since the location, composition and subject matter of the Conference are as we had agreed between us, and since it is our continuing purpose if you attend to look upon your Government as our principal associate, I naturally hope that you will be represented. I quite recognize the unlikelihood of a result which would satisfy our two Governments. On the other hand, it would I think be a great mistake if your Government, by its absence, gave the impression that you were responsible for the failure to bring about peacefully the unification of Korea and its freedom from foreign forces as is the purpose of the Conference.

Since the situation with reference to Communist China is becoming more tense, and since I am trying to organize a strong anti-Communist front in relation to Indochina, I believe you would find it to your advantage to be at Geneva. I believe that your Government's voice there would contribute to preventing the Chinese Communists from gaining any political advantage and would help us in our efforts to expose Communist China as the danger that we believe it is. I had hoped that we could be united in this political effort as we were united when our forces came to Korea. Our unity will not, however, achieve maximum effectiveness unless our representatives can talk together in advance and do some planning.

It is now over six weeks since you received our invitation and I
believe that we are at least entitled to the courtesy of a reply so that we will know how to make our plans.

With warm regards to you and Madame Rhee.

Sincerely yours,

Signed John Foster Dulles."

Inform Department when delivered.

Dulles

896.1-GE/4-854 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

SEOUL, April 8, 1954—6 P. M.

990. Re Deptel 792 and 796.† In delivering Secretary’s letter to President Rhee this afternoon in presence Prime Minister Paik and Foreign Minister Pyun, I explained that in addition statement being sent to Pyun later today in acknowledgement his letter April 6. Rhee then read Secretary’s letter aloud and made following comments:

(1) With regard to our being entitled to “courtesy of reply” President pointed out that exchange of correspondence among President Eisenhower, Secretary, himself and his Foreign Minister indicated invitation under active and serious consideration by ROK Government and hence no discourtesy involved;

(2) Rhee said he is completing further letter to President Eisenhower text of which he would shortly ask me to telegraph Washington.† Rhee said letter short and indicates Korean Government prepared attend Geneva Conference if President Eisenhower, in light ROK misgivings, nevertheless still believes it desirable do so. I gather letter also takes up again Rhee desire for assurance on military build-up.

With regard to Secretary’s reply to Pyun (Deptel 792) I said this in form of statement recapitulating points previously set forth, plus indication that ROK request for armed forces build-up is under active study by US Government whose views will be furnished as soon as they are available. (Point 11; I did not say reply likely “next week” since this would almost certainly have guaranteed further Korean delay pending receipt thereof). I also indicated that US Government will attend conference whether or not ROK attends (Point 10).

Although I was with President and advisors for approximately 1 hour during which Rhee covered much familiar ground, no points were developed.

† Dated Apr. 7, p. 75 and supra.

Infra.
Because of short remaining period April 26 opening date, seems
doubtful whether there will be much time for Washington consulta-
tion, even assuming ROK Geneva attendance. In this connection in
addition ROK desire obtain military build-up commitment, Rhee and
Pyun may believe ROK independence of action at Geneva might be
limited by pre-conference consultation.

Briggs

396.1-GE/4-864 : Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State
SECRET PRIORITY
SEoul, April 8, 1954—6 p. m.

991. Repeated information priority Tokyo 599 (Tokyo pass
CINCUCNC). Re Embtel 990, April 8. Following letter dated April 8
from President Rhee to President Eisenhower just received with re-
quest it be telegraphed to Washington.¹

Begin text.
My dear President Eisenhower: Not knowing what to do at this
darkest moment in our fight for survival of Korea, I am appealing to
you once again by asking you to advise me what can be done.

Our friends are urging us to join in Geneva conference. They com-
plain we are not cooperating with them. Have we not cooperated with
US to extent of wasting over eight months, knowing as we did nothing
would come out of Panmunjom or political conferences? What is
result? Our enemies are today in infinitely stronger position than they
ever were and UN Forces are talking about going home. We do not
blame them. They see no reason why they should stay here while there
is no war to fight and while their governments are trying to settle
matters peacefully either one way or other.

Regarding Geneva conference, we were told Russia would not be
admitted as neutral. Now we find Russia is one of sponsors of confer-
ence, sending out invitations. Again we were told positively India
would not be allowed attend conference, but we hear Indian delegates
are already in Geneva. I need not mention other points equally difficult
to understand. [Here follow portions of President Rhee’s message that
were excluded from this publication at the request of the Republic
of Korea Government.]

¹ For President Eisenhower’s reply to the letter quoted here, see telegram 829,
Apr. 16, p. 108.
Allow me to tell Your Excellency, frankly and earnestly, that UN state men do not seem to know what they are doing. They are playing with fire. By trying to resist Armed Forces with talks, they can never save Indochina or Korea or even their own nations. When it is too late, young men of their own countries will pay dearly for it. I am saying this with prayers in my heart. May God Almighty give you wisdom and courage that pass all understanding.

With assurances of my continued friendship and high esteem,

Very sincerely yours,

End Text.²

BRIGGS

² The text of this message was forwarded to President Eisenhower under cover of a memorandum dated Apr. 8 from Secretary Dulles, who stated that a reply was under consideration by the Department of State (396.1-GE/4-854).

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396.1-GE/4-854: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea ¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 8, 1954—6:59 p.m.

797. Afternoon April 7 Robertson presented informal paper ² and discussed general US views on substance and tactics Korean phase Geneva Conference with Australia, Canadian, New Zealand and UK representatives along following lines:

1. Noting we had studied various Commonwealth proposals, Robertson stated US and Commonwealth in general agreement basic objectives seek agreement from Communists on independent, united Korea; withdrawal foreign forces from Korea with adequate safeguards and in connection with Korean unification; maintain strong united allied and UN position; emerge with moral and propaganda victory; and take only positions at Geneva which maintain position of strength for UN in Korea.

2. US proposes seek allied agreement to begin Geneva conference with proposals for resuming UN plans for Korean unification which Communists frustrated by political opposition and aggression. Such plans based on GA resolutions of November 14, 1947, October 7, 1950, December 1, 1950, and August 28, 1953.⁵

3. To preserve legitimacy, sovereignty and integrity ROK, US conceives unification as completion these resolutions by constituent act

¹ Repeated to Canberra, London, Ottawa, Wellington, and Tokyo with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.
² Not printed.
⁵ Text ibid., p. 2676.
in North Korea under UNCURK observation. This would bring area of North Korea by new constitutional act under ROK. Such arrangements would safeguard UNC security requirements in Korea. Such proposal would be combined with phased withdrawal foreign forces staged before and after elections and establishment single national government for Korea. For several legal and practical reasons situation Korea different from Germany in terms applying tripartite unification formula at Geneva automatically to Korea.

4. In discussion tactics US position Robertson emphasized (a) importance principle maintaining integrity ROK and not liquidating it constitutionally without its consent and starting de novo as Commonwealth proposes; (b) no agreement at Geneva valid as practical matter without joint US-ROK endorsement; (c) ROK has primary interest Korean unification and at opening stage would violently oppose Commonwealth generalized plan for elections and new government; (d) in negotiations with Communists dangerous begin conference with final fixed formula since Communists always oppose initial position; and (e) US proposal on Korea in general better to combat possible Communist proposals on Indochina.

5. US Government strongly feels undesirable, dangerous and unwise at this stage anticipate seeking extensive compromises with Communists on any ameliorating arrangements less than unification after failure reach agreement on unification.

Commonwealth representatives indicated their Governments would (a) dislike US approach either as matter of tactics or principle; (b) prefer generalized plan for all-Korea elections which would be defensible to advance at beginning conference and stand on firmly and (c) do not recognize sovereignty or authority ROK in North Korea (and neither does US), and uncertain GA Resolutions cited definitely support preserving and extending ROK integrity by new constituent act.

Robertson emphasized principle safeguarding UN resolutions and ROK integrity and need for earliest possible consultations with ROK if ROK decides go Geneva determine how far it will go towards Commonwealth viewpoint eventually at Conference.

Amembassy Seoul: Foregoing for your information only, at this stage.

US informal paper and memorandum of meeting being pouches.  

*Not printed. On Apr. 9, U. Alexis Johnson met with Jean Daridan, Minister of the French Embassy, and Pierre Millet, Counselor, setting forth for them the U.S. position generally as outlined by Robertson above (396.1-GE/4-954). Johnson, American Ambassador in Czechoslovakia, was previously Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs until late 1953, and had been recalled to Washington to coordinate work on the Geneva Conference.

DULLES
Memorandum by Christopher Van Hollen of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] April 9, 1954.
GK D–4/7

KOREAN PHASE

DRAFT INITIAL PROPOSAL FOR REUNIFICATION OF KOREA
(Alternative A)

The attached paper, drafted by Mr. Drew, NA, contains the initial proposal on Korean Reunification (Alternative A) which the U.S. plans to support at Geneva. This proposal has been drafted to take account of the Secretary's desire that the initial U.S. position should support a resumption of the UN Reunification program set forth in the GA Resolution of October 12 [7], 1950 as well as in previous UN Resolutions.

The draft proposal of the minimum U.S. position (Alternative B) is contained in GK D–4b¹ and the basic U.S. position on the over-all question of Korean Reunification is to be found in GK D–4/1c.²

CHRISTOPHER VAN HOLLEN

[Attachment]

Position Paper Prepared For the Korean Phase of the Geneva Conference

GK D–4/7

DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR REUNIFICATION OF KOREA
(Alternative A)

Preamble

The Korean people, who for 4,000 years have had a common civilization with a common language, culture, and traditions, desire to be reunited under a single government of their own choosing and to resume their traditional peaceful life. Virtually the entire world has long recognized that this is a proper and commendable aspiration, and the United Nations has repeatedly supported measures designed to realize this objective. The United Nations General Assembly adopted resolutions in 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, and 1953 which supported a

¹ Dated Mar. 27, p. 62. Following the drafting of Document GK D–4/10, Apr. 16, p. 106, which presented a new Alternative B, the proposal in GK D–4/b came to be known as Alternative C.
² Document GK D–4/1c is not printed. A subsequent revised version of it, Document GK D–4/1e, Apr. 24, is printed on p. 181.
free, independent, and unified Korean Government, representative of the wishes of the Korean people. The principles enunciated in these resolutions are just and equitable and constitute a broad framework upon which any political settlement for Korea should be based. The fundamental principles are as follows:


2. The Korean question “is primarily a matter for the Korean people itself” and it “cannot be fairly resolved without the participation of representatives of the indigenous population.” (UNGA Res. Nov. 14, 1947).

3. The selection of representatives of the Korean people should be on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot; the number of representatives from each voting area or zone should be proportionate to the population; and the elections should be under the supervision of a United Nations commission of representatives of various non-Korean nations. (UNGA Res. Nov. 14, 1947).

4. The Government of the Republic of Korea was duly established in conformity with the above principles and is the only such lawful Government in Korea. (UNGA Res. Dec. 12, 1948). Subsequent elections in the Republic of Korea have been observed and endorsed by United Nations Commissions as reflecting the will of the electorate.

We therefore advance the following proposal for the reunification of Korea in accordance with the above principles enunciated by the United Nations.

Method of Reunification of Korea.

1. Responsibilities of UNCURK as the Supervisory Commission.
3. Establishment of conditions for free elections.
4. Free elections for representatives to National Assembly of Republic of Korea from areas of Korea not already represented in National Assembly.
5. Action by expanded National Assembly to establish national administration for all Korea.
7. Residual functions of UNCURK after reunification.
8. Supersession of Armistice Agreement.

1. Responsibilities of UNCURK as the Supervisory Commission.

The present United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) was established by a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on October 7, 1950, to (i) assume the functions hitherto exercised by the United Nations Commission in [on] Korea (UNCOK); (ii) represent the United Nations
in bringing about the establishment of a unified, independent and
democratic government of all Korea; (iii) exercise such responsibil-
ities in connection with relief and rehabilitation in Korea as may be
determined by the General Assembly after receiving the recommend-
ations of the Economic and Social Council. The functions hitherto ex-
ercised by the UNCOHK under United Nations General Assembly
resolutions of December 12, 1948, included the responsibility to (a)
le an its good offices to bring about the unification of Korea and the
integration of all Korean security forces in accordance with the prin-
ciples laid down by the General Assembly in the resolution of 14
November 1947; (b) seek to facilitate the removal of barriers to
economic, social, and other friendly intercourse caused by the division
of Korea; (c) be available for observation and consultation in the
further development of representative government based on the freely
expressed will of the people; and (d) observe the actual withdrawal
of the occupation forces and verify the fact of withdrawal when such
has occurred. The principles for bringing about the unification of
Korea embodied in the United Nations General Assembly resolution
of November 14, 1947, include elections under the observation of the
Commission on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot to
choose representatives, which representatives would constitute a Na-
tional Assembly and which may establish a National Government of
Korea, the number of such representatives from each voting area or
zone to be proportionate to the population.

These terms of reference for UNCURK shall be specifically revised
and expanded with the consent of the United Nations General Assem-
by to give UNCURK responsibility for observing and verifying the
withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea as set forth herein and for
supervising the plan for the reunification of Korea as set forth herein.
The specific terms of reference of UNCURK shall include the
following:

(a) Observation and certification of withdrawal of United Nations
forces and forces and nationals of the Central People’s Government of
the [People’s] Republic of China.
(b) Investigation throughout areas of Korea not already duly
represented in the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea of
conditions affecting the holding of free elections, freedom of move-
ment, freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, freedom of asso-
ciation and assembly, freedom of speech, press, and broadcasting,
and freedom of political parties to organize and carry out their
activities.
(c) Preparation of electoral laws for these areas in consultation
with the Republic of Korea and the civil authorities of these areas
concerned.
(d) Determination, in consultation with the Republic of Korea and the civil authorities of the area concerned, of the number of delegates to be elected and the number of election districts, which shall be in direct proportion to the population distribution in Korea.

(e) Supervision over the implementation of the electoral laws and registration of qualified voters, and observation of the elections at all administrative levels.

(f) Certification of results of elections.

(g) Observation of steps leading to the establishment of a reunified government. During the period between the end of the elections and the effective assumption of control over all of Korea by the reunified Korean Government, UNCURK will remain in operation in order to prevent action after the elections which would impair the conditions of genuine freedom under which they will have been held. The details of these terms of reference shall be worked out by the signatories within this framework and shall come into effect simultaneously with this agreement. UNCURK shall have the power to adopt measures not specifically described and which are necessary to carry out their task herein, provided that they do not otherwise conflict with this proposal.

The UNCURK shall have its primary headquarters at Pyongyang and shall report and make recommendations at its discretion to the parties to this agreement. The parties to this agreement shall facilitate the work of UNCURK and comply with recommendations made by UNCURK within its revised terms of reference as set forth above.


The withdrawal of all forces and nationals of the Central People’s Government of the Chinese People’s Republic shall be carried out in pursuance of the February 1, 1951, resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, which calls for such action. This withdrawal shall take place as expeditiously as possible, and shall be completed at the latest within twelve months after the acceptance of this proposal.

The withdrawal of UN forces shall be carried out in pursuance of the October 7, 1950, resolution of the United Nations General Assembly which provides that United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for ensuring conditions of stability in Korea and for the establishment of a reunified government. This withdrawal should be completed within twelve months from the date that UNCURK notes that an effective reunified government of Korea has been established.

UNCURK shall observe and verify the withdrawal of UN forces and forces and nationals of the Central People’s Government of the [People’s] Republic of China, and when appropriate it may submit
reports to the General Assembly of the United Nations that all forces and nationals of the Central People’s Government of the [People’s] Republic of China have been withdrawn from Korea and that all United Nations forces have been withdrawn from Korea.


Preparatory to the holding of free elections in areas of Korea not already duly represented in the National Assembly, UNCURK shall, pursuant to its terms of reference, observe political conditions throughout the areas concerned and shall, where it deems appropriate, propose to the parties concerned the measures necessary to insure that elections are held in a free atmosphere wherein the democratic right of freedom of speech, press and assembly would be recognized and respected. In particular these measures shall include the following:

Freedom of movement throughout the area.
Freedom of presentation of candidates.
Immunity of candidates.
Freedom from arbitrary arrest or victimization.
Freedom of association and political meetings.
Freedom of expression for all.
Freedom of press, radio, and free circulation of newspapers, periodicals, etc.
Secrecy of the vote.
Security of polling stations and ballot boxes.

4. Free Elections for Representatives to National Assembly of Republic of Korea from Areas of Korea not already Represented in the National Assembly.

In consultation with the authorities in the ROK and in the local areas concerned, UNCURK shall draft electoral laws and procedures for areas of Korea not already duly represented in the National Assembly. The civil authorities for all the areas concerned shall promulgate these laws and procedures simultaneously. In particular, election procedures approved by UNCURK shall ensure that candidates reflecting varying viewpoints will be permitted to campaign freely; that the electorate will be able to express its choice of candidates freely and without duress or intimidation; and that the election procedures shall be uniform among all the areas concerned.

Not later than 18 months after concluding this agreement or not later than six months after the withdrawal from Korea of forces and nationals of the Central People’s Government of the [People’s] Republic of China in the event that this is accomplished in less than twelve months, elections for representatives to the National Assembly shall be held on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot in areas of Korea not already duly represented in the National Assem-
bly.* The number of representatives to be elected to the National Assembly from such areas shall be determined according to the size of the population of each election district. It is estimated that not more than six million persons reside in areas not already duly represented in the National Assembly. In the event that UNCURK shall fail to certify the election of a representative he shall not be seated in the National Assembly, and new local by-elections shall be held as soon as possible under UNCURK supervision. The vote of a majority of the members of UNCURK shall be required to rule that the election of any candidate is not valid.

5. Action by Expanded National Assembly to Establish National Administration for all of Korea.

Within thirty days after UNCURK has certified the free election of two-thirds of the number of representatives designated to be elected under its supervision, the National Assembly shall seat the newly elected representatives. After these newly elected representatives have been seated the National Assembly shall take prompt and appropriate action to provide uniform national laws for all of Korea and to render null and void all preceding sectional laws not specifically reaffirmed by the expanded National Assembly. When this action has been taken and effectively implemented a reunified Korean Government shall be considered to have been established.


The reunified Government shall declare its adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and at such time the parties to this agreement shall pledge their respect for the sovereignty and the independence of the reunified Korea. The reunited Korea shall have the right to conclude such international agreements as it may wish.

7. Residual Functions of UNCURK.

Following the establishment of a reunified Korean Government with effective control over all of Korea as outlined above, UNCURK shall note the fact and shall henceforth confine its activities to such responsibilities in connection with relief and rehabilitation as may be determined by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

8. Supersession of Armistice Agreement.

Notification by UNCURK that a reunified Korean Government with effective control over all of Korea has been duly established shall constitute for purposes of supersession of the Armistice Agreement, under Article 62 of that Agreement, “appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides.”

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*This would include areas north of the 38th parallel under UNO control. [Footnote in the source text.]
SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1954—8:11 p.m.

642. Urtels 1196 and 1197 re substantive issue raised second paragraph Soviet aide-mémoire, Department’s view is Soviets should be left no doubt as to views Western powers this regard. We have proposed to British and French, and British have agreed that aide-mémoire be dealt with in two separate exercises: (1) a short tripartite aide-mémoire to be delivered by you with respect to administrative and technical arrangements dealt with in the remainder of Soviet note, text of which being transmitted by separate telegram; and (2) delivery of identic notes to Soviets by three Western Ambassadors on substantive issue. Text of U.S. note follows:

"With reference to the Soviet aide-mémoire of April 5, the Government of the United States points out that the characterization therein of the forthcoming Conference at Geneva as a ‘conference of representatives of the United States of America, France, England, Chinese People’s Republic and USSR which shall take part in discussion Korean question and question of re-establishment peace in Indochina which are on conference agenda, with participation other interested states for appropriate questions’, does not correspond to the letter or the sense of the agreement reached by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Four Powers at Berlin on February 18, 1954.

The concept embodied in the aide-mémoire of April 5 was explicitly rejected at the meeting of the four Foreign Ministers at Berlin.

The Resolution agreed to by the four Foreign Ministers on February 18 does not contemplate a conference limited to five participants as to either the Korean or the Indochinese question. Arrangements concerning the Geneva Conference which are not dealt with equally by all of the participants will be the special responsibility of the governments of the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the USSR."

U.K. have agreed identic text and Ambassador Moscow being instructed coordinate timing and delivery with you and French Ambassador. Hope French Government will issue similar instructions French Ambassador. Have informed French and U.K. that Department does not consider delivery should necessarily be joint but leave manner delivery discretion three Ambassadors Moscow. Tripartite aide-mémoire should not be delivered until French Ambassador instructed deliver note.

Dulles

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2 Both dated Apr. 5, pp. 70 and 71.
3 Infra.
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1954—8:12 p.m.

643. Re Deptel 642 to Moscow. (Take no action until receipt reference.) Tripartite reply to Soviet aide-mémoire of April 5, 1954 follows:

"The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States note from the Aide-Mémoire of the U.S.S.R. dated April 5 that the U.S.S.R. has now agreed on the technical and administrative arrangements for the Geneva Conference.

Although it has been agreed that English, French, Russian, Chinese and Korean should be official languages for the discussion of the Korean problem, the decision on the official languages for the discussions on the problem of restoring peace in Indochina can, of course, only be made after agreement has been reached at Geneva on all the participants for the discussions about Indochina.

With reference to the U.S.S.R.'s proposal that qualified interpreters for oral translations into official languages be obtained by agreement among the conference participants, it is assumed the U.S.S.R. will have at Geneva as soon as possible appropriate officials authorized to discuss the necessary arrangements in this regard as well as other technical and administrative details prior to the conference, with representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States who are now in Geneva."

DULLES

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2 Supra.

396.1–GE/4–1054 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State

SECRET NIAC 1

Moscow, April 10, 1954—3 p.m.

1225. Repeated information priority London 187, priority Paris 249. Reference Deptel 642. From beginning of exchanges with Soviet Government concerning preparations Geneva conference the desirability of not leaving Soviet Union in any doubt on these points has been repeatedly stressed by this Embassy. Furthermore, as reported, I have on every occasion emphasized these points to Kuznetsov, particularly that the four powers and the four powers alone were responsible for

1 Dated Apr. 9, p. 88.
the conference and that Communist China had no different status nor more rights than any other invited power. I am therefore in entire agreement as to desirability of a note on the subject to Soviet Government but I believe note would be more effective and of greater help at Geneva if Western interpretation as given in last paragraph was made somewhat more precise. I feel, as written, it will offer Soviet Union an opportunity for confusing the issue in hope of causing differences between three western powers. First sentence in last paragraph is not strictly accurate since portion of Soviet aide-mémoire of April 5 quoted in first paragraph does not state that conference at either stage should be limited to five participants. Soviet reply would probably pick up this technical discrepancy to our embarrassment. Also, the last sentence is somewhat ambiguous in reference to arrangements "which are not dealt with equally by all the participants". This might provoke an inquiry by Soviet Government as to difference between two types of arrangements contemplated.

It would appear that main point we must seek to establish clearly is that under Berlin Agreement Communist China has no different status than the other invited countries and in no way shares the responsibility of the four for any phase of conference. It seems to me there are two points of substance which must be dealt with in order to safeguard this basic position concerning role of Communist China. One deals with invitations to other participants in Indochinese discussions. While it is true Berlin decision is less precise on this point, its intent, by analogy with Korean phase, is sufficiently clear for us to assert, and at this time, that four powers and four powers alone will agree and invite in their names representatives of the other countries which will participate. For this purpose Communist China could be considered as having already been invited. The second point is the status of participating countries once the conference has convened. Here it would appear that one method of avoiding any possibility of special status for Communist China would be to adhere to principle that all participating powers will be on equal footing once conference has convened. Alternate possibility would be to assert continuing responsibility of four powers as inviting powers from organization and handling of conference business during actual sessions conference.

If we are going to attempt to clarify our position with Soviets at this juncture, and I feel we should, it would be better to meet these points head on rather than leave any obscurity in language which Soviets could seize upon for hair-splitting argument. Something along following lines might therefore be substituted for last paragraph proposed note:
"At Berlin it was agreed that four powers would take the initiative in calling conference at Geneva to discuss, in different compositions, the Korean and Indochinese questions and that for this purpose the four governments would undertake to invite other interested countries to participate. The responsibility for the issuance on invitations, the preparations and other related matters in regard to both phases of the conference rests clearly on these four governments and these four governments alone. In accordance with the Berlin decision, other countries including CPR have already been invited by the four powers to attend the discussion on Korea. The CPR has likewise been invited to attend the discussions on Indochina. Once agreement has been reached by the governments of France, US, UK and USSR as to the other countries to be invited to participate in the discussion on Indochina, invitations will in like manner be extended to them in the name of the four governments. In conformity with accepted international practice, all participating countries, inviting as well as invited, will take part in the work of the conference on a basis of equality."

An alternate for last sentence (but in my view less desirable) could be: "The US, UK, France and USSR in accordance with their position of inviting powers will continue to bear a special responsibility for the arrangements and organization of the conference even after it is convened."  

BOHLEN

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2 The Department of State transmitted the following reply in telegram 646, Apr. 10, to Moscow:

"Your 1225. Department approves substitute final paragraph suggested by you with slightly amended first clause of first sentence reading as follows:

'At Berlin it was agreed that four powers would take the initiative in calling a conference at Geneva to discuss, in different compositions, a peaceful settlement in Korea and the restoration of peace in Indochina, and that et cetera.'

"British and French here have accepted this revised text for identic notes, subject to reference to their Foreign Offices. If and when British and French Ambassadors Moscow receive approval of this text from their Foreign Offices you are authorized to deliver revised note accordance previous instructions." (396.1-GE/4-1154)

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396.1-GE/4-1154 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

Moscow, April 11, 1954—4 p. m.

1234. Repeated information priority London 189, priority Paris 283. Have discussed this morning with British and French Ambassadors method of handling aide-mémoire Deptel 643 1 and proposed note

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1 Dated Apr. 9, p. 89.
Deptels 642\textsuperscript{2} and 646.\textsuperscript{3} French Ambassador has had no word from Paris concerning note at all and British Ambassador has not yet received approval for revised text.

On assumption approval will be received from both Paris, London, we tentatively agreed as follows regarding delivery:

1. I should as separate operation hand to Kuznetsov aide-mémoire. Press would be told, as previously, that I had delivered tripartite answer to Soviet aide-mémoire of April 5 dealing with practical preparations and arrangements for Geneva conference.

2. Method of delivery note concerning interpretation Berlin decision depends primarily on how three governments from point of view public opinion wish to handle subject. If it is desired to make three-power demonstration, emphasizing our interpretation Berlin decisions, preferable method of delivery would be by three Ambassadors personally calling separately on Molotov. It would be difficult if not impossible to keep fact of calls by three western Ambassadors on Molotov secret and it would probably therefore be necessary to reveal to press purpose of calls. This would necessitate statements from three governments in order to insure public understanding of issue involved. On other hand if governments wish merely to keep record clear with Soviet Government without publicity, delivery by messenger as has been done in past without personal call by Ambassadors would offer best chance of keeping matter confidential. French Ambassador favors method of personal delivery since he feels demonstration of western solidarity is enhanced by personal call of Ambassadors whereas British Ambassador is in general more inclined to delivery by messenger. Provided three governments are prepared to deal with publicity on contents of note and difference with Soviet Government on interpretation Berlin agreement, I see considerable merit in personal delivery, but only on that basis. Would appreciate guidance before final decision on method delivery. British and French Ambassadors communicating along similar lines with London and Paris.\textsuperscript{4}

BOHLEN

\textsuperscript{2} Dated Apr. 9, p. 88.
\textsuperscript{3} See footnote 2, supra.
\textsuperscript{4} The Department of State sent the following reply in telegram 647, Apr. 11, to Moscow:

"Your 1234. Department would prefer personal delivery by three ambassadors and for its part would be prepared deal with question of publicity if necessary. However French and British may be reluctant make any public statement at this time. Department would not wish agreement on and delivery of note delayed by question of publicity in connection with delivery of note. Therefore if in judgment of three Ambassadors not possible make delivery without revealing purpose calls and French and or British are not now willing make public statement along lines of note you are authorized agree delivery by messenger."

(396.1-GE/4-1154)

On Apr. 12 and 13, Ambassador Bohlen informed the Department that the British and French Governments preferred delivery of the notes by messenger rather than by a personal call. He also said that he had an appointment to deliver the aide-mémoire to Kuznetsov on the morning of Apr. 14 (telegrams 1241 and 1250 from Moscow; 396.1-GE/4-1254, 4-1354).
Memorandum by the Coordinator for the Geneva Conference (Johnson) to the Acting Secretary of State

(WASHINGTON,) April 12, 1954.

Subject: Position on Korean Unification for Geneva Conference.

The ROKs have not yet indicated their intention to attend the Geneva Conference, however all indications are that they will in fact attend but are deferring any announcement in order to extract maximum concessions from us and to avoid consulting with us prior to the Conference in order to retain a free hand at the Conference.

Over the past weeks we have repeatedly reiterated to the ROKs our desire to honor our commitment to consult with them prior to consulting with anyone else concerning positions to be taken at the Conference and the difficulty of doing so until they have reached a decision on whether to attend. Last week we informed the ROK that in view of the very short time before the Conference we could no longer delay consulting with other members of the Allied side. The ROK expressed no objection and merely asked to be kept informed of the results.

We have thus far carried out preliminary consultations with U.K., the Commonwealth and France. We have made it clear in our consultation that we are not going to permit our Allies to bargain us down on our position prior to Geneva so that we have no "give" by the time we start negotiations with the Communists. We have taken the position that at least the opening Allied position at Geneva should be support of the ROK position which provides for extension of ROK sovereignty over North Korea and the holding of elections under U.N. observation for the seats in the ROK Assembly provided for North Korea under the ROK Constitution. We have attempted to support this position by, among other arguments, stating that it would be a logical completion of the U.N. plans for the unification of Korea interrupted by the outbreak of the Korean War.

The U.K. and the Commonwealth have expressed strong opposition to this position even as an opening tactical maneuver. France has not yet replied, but I expect that its position will be one of somewhat grudging support, or at least not opposition, in the hope of obtaining U.S. support for French positions with respect to Indochina.

The Commonwealth position is that a plan for all-Korean elections to a constituent Assembly should be put forward at Geneva, similar to the Allied plan put forward at Berlin for Germany. While having

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1 Secretary Dulles visited London and Paris, Apr. 11–14, for discussions primarily with regard to Southeast Asia; see pp. 514 ff.
a superficial plausibility, such a plan ignores the great differences between the Korean and the German situation. It in effect places the ROK and the North Korean regimes on the same basis and "starts from scratch" in Korea. Although Rhee and his supporters could be expected to win overwhelmingly any such election, the ROK could be expected violently to oppose the plan, which also ignores the basic U.S. position of the maintenance of the integrity of the ROK.

There is a position upon which I believe we could take a firm stand at Geneva which would be more consistent with basic U.N. resolutions than the present ROK position; which would be entirely consistent with our position on the maintenance of the integrity of the ROK; which I think has a reasonable prospect of obtaining support of Rhee if it is carefully and sympathetically explained to him, and upon which I believe we could obtain a very considerable degree of international support. This position would be to hold an election under international observation for the ROK Assembly throughout both North and South Korea within the framework of the present ROK Constitution, possibly accompanied by a popular election for President. Rhee has previously indicated publicly (with many qualifications) his willingness to have an all-Korea popular election for President.

We are not going to be able to accomplish much in the way of concerting our position with Pyun at Geneva. Therefore it is urgent that an appropriate individual be prepared to go to Korea to see Rhee immediately upon ROK announcing its decision to attend the Geneva Conference.

I discussed the situation with Mr. Robertson and the Secretary along the foregoing lines. As I indicated to you, the Secretary gave his approval to attempting to obtain ROK agreement and to Mr. Morton discussing with Senator Knowland an emissary to Rhee for the purpose.

I am following up the matter with Mr. Morton.

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5 Thruston B. Morton, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.
6 Senator William Knowland, Republican, of California was majority leader in the U.S. Senate.
7 In a memorandum to the Secretary, Apr. 14, Johnson stated that Morton had talked with Knowland about a trip to Korea by Arthur Dean. Knowland's reaction, said the memorandum, was to suggest that General Van Fleet might be more effective, but he—Knowland—would not oppose Dean's going. Johnson indicated his belief that Dean should be sent to Seoul immediately upon Korean announcement of intention to attend the Conference. Under Secretary Smith concurred in the recommendation. On the following day, Secretary Dulles in a brief memorandum to Johnson indicated his agreement to asking Dean to go if Van Fleet also went to Korea. (795.00/4-1454)

During the following week, it was announced that General Van Fleet had been chosen by President Eisenhower as his Special Representative with the rank of Ambassador to make a military survey to the Far East. For further documentation on the missions of Dean and Van Fleet in Korea, additional to that contained in this volume, see volume xv. Concerning the report of the Van Fleet Mission, see volume xii.
SECRET

NIACT

LONDON, April 13, 1954—3 p. m.

4523. Repeated information Paris niact 622. For the Acting Secretary from the Secretary. Paris for Secretary’s party. Following is résumé of my final meeting with Eden this morning:

. . . . . . . . . .

5. Korean phase Geneva Conference.¹

(A) I said we had two basic thoughts: We must carry ROK with us in any proposal which we put forward at Geneva since without their acceptance proposal was meaningless.

(B) We regard Geneva as serious negotiations and while not over hopeful wish to try for settlement involving unification and independence at [of] Korea, therefore we should have some give in our position so that we can make concessions. We should not give up all our trading possibilities. While we would fully consult with other 16, US should have pretty much control of tactics. The Communists at Geneva will show a single will and if all 16 try to quarter-back operation we will get nowhere. Since US seems to have principal responsibility for trying to reach agreement and bringing ROK along we must have a tactical flexibility.

I outlined our view on opening position at Geneva based on UN Commission designed to oversee Korean elections explaining that this Commission’s work had been interrupted by aggression in 1950 and that we could make a plausible and honorable case that it should carry on with the task given it by the UN. I recognized this would not be acceptable to the Communists but felt that we could stand before the bar of world opinion in putting it forward. Eden said that my presentation cast different light on situation, thus far he had only seen reports that we intended to have elections in North Korea and not in South Korea. Propagandawise this would be a very difficult position to maintain and he stressed the importance of carrying not only British but world opinion with us. He said UK had been thinking of a German type formula similar to Berlin. In light of my comments, however, he felt UK might be able to support opening position I had outlined above. He believed Communists would come forward with specious proposals and UK would like to counter with something that

¹ This was the only substantive discussion on the subject that took place during Dulles’ talks in London and Paris.
seemed eminently reasonable but probably would not be accepted by Communists. He had not liked what he heretofore understood US proposal to be since he thought it tactically unsound to put forward a case which would be shot down and then produce another proposal. Now that he understood the proposition we had in mind he felt much better. He asked whether we could spell out for his people our presentation and I told him we would be glad to do so, and could probably discuss it in Paris next week.² (Alex Johnson should draw up draft of US presentation at Geneva for my consideration next Monday).³

Selwyn Lloyd⁴ doubted that we would obtain unified Korea and asked whether we envisaged other measures which might make the armistice safer and more durable. For example, if the neutrals on UN Commission were no longer willing to remain in Korea what would we do and what would replace UN Commission. I said we would also give thought to this point.

[DUlLES]

² See the record of the tripartite meeting in Paris on Apr. 22, p. 127.
³ Apr. 19. The draft referred to is not printed; for Dulles' presentation of the U.S. position at the special briefing meeting on Apr. 20, see the memorandum of conversation by Brown, p. 119.
⁴ Minister of State in the British Foreign Office.

396.1-GE/4-1454: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACt

Moscow, April 14, 1954—1 p.m.

1253. Repeated information niacT London 198, niacT Paris 263. I delivered noon today aide-mémoire (Embel 1251).¹ Kuznetsov read text and had no questions to ask. I then told him that since the Soviet aide-mémoire of April 5 had in second paragraph raised questions involving the interpretation of the Berlin Accord, the three governments would have some observations to make on that subject which would be embodied in separate communications. He asked when this would be done and I told him the notes would be delivered this afternoon. He made no inquiry as to contents of notes and I volunteered none.

¹ Not printed. In it, Bohlen informed the Department of State that he would deliver the U.S. aide-mémoire at noon on Apr. 14 and that the identical notes would be delivered by messenger at 4 p.m. that afternoon (396.1-GE/4-1454).
Kuznetsov did tell me that he expected to go to Geneva and inquired if I was going. I told him I was not since I had no real acquaintance with questions to be discussed.

Bohlen

FE files, lot 60 D 330, "Position Papers"

Position Paper Prepared for the Korean Phase of the Geneva Conference

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 14, 1954.

GK D-4/9

GENERAL UNITED STATES VIEWS ON KOREAN PHASE OF GENEVA CONFERENCE

PURPOSE OF CONFERENCE

1. In accordance with Paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement and the Berlin Communiqué of February, the two belligerent sides are to meet to seek a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, considering that the establishment by peaceful means of a united and independent Korea would be an important factor in reducing international tension and in restoring peace in other parts of Asia. It will be a two-sided conference.

2. We are confident that all the allies are agreed our primary purpose at Geneva is to seek Korea’s unification on terms that would not result in turning Korea over to the Communists and thus lose at the Conference table what we fought so long to prevent in Korea.

OBJECTIVES

1. Maintain position of strength and stability in free Korea, avoid confusion, weakening of morale, or public turmoil within the ROK, and take account ROK fear of abandonment.

2. Maintain the constitutional framework of the ROK State and the validity of past UN resolutions to the greatest extent possible.

3. Maintain a united front at the Conference among the allies, the United States and the ROK in the tactics of presentation and proceedings, and work out suitable procedures for consultations among Allies at Conference.

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1 A cover sheet indicated that this paper was used by Johnson for the oral presentation of the U.S. position at the meeting with the representatives of the 16 nations on Apr. 13 described in circular telegram 362, infra. It was also used by Johnson at Geneva; see telegram Secto 17, Apr. 27, from Geneva, p. 146.
4. Determine whether the Communists will insist on controlling part or all Korea, or renounce any special position in Korea in order to set up “a united Korea for free Koreans”, and unmask Communist intentions.

5. Emerge from the Conference in a strong moral and political position by presenting proposals commending themselves to the world at large and which if not accepted by the Communists will make clear their responsibility for failure to reach agreement at Geneva.

BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

1. The Communists at Geneva will do their utmost to broaden discussions on deceptive lines, such as a general Far East security pact, lessening of tensions and recognition of the independence and security of all states. The Communists will not agree to a “united Korea for free Koreans” or any plan of unification acceptable to us on Korea.

2. Allied proposals must take into consideration the fundamental interests and position of the ROK in the future unification of Korea. The ROK is a sovereign state and not a pawn. Without the endorsement and support of the ROK, proposals or agreements at Geneva on Korea will be ineffective and invalid.

3. It is essential, from the United States point of view, to preserve the framework of legitimacy, sovereignty and integrity of the ROK State in principle. Proposals based on this principle would:

   (a) preserve the integrity of the nation and people which fought, with much allied and United Nations blood and treasure, for three years against Communist aggressors;

   (b) emphasize the interrupted efforts of the United Nations since 1947 in good faith to establish the independence and unity of Korea.

   (c) give voice to the viewpoint of the overwhelming majority of the Korean people; and

   (d) not put the ROK on a par with the North Korean regime.

4. The situation in Korea is substantially different from that in Germany so that the exact parallel of unification plans for Germany do not apply rigidly as a precedent for Korea.

UNITED STATES PROPOSALS

1. Continuation of United Nations Resolutions. We believe we should begin the Geneva Conference with proposals in the general spirit of the United Nations plans for unification of Korea which the Communists frustrated by political opposition and aggression. We have in mind specifically the General Assembly resolutions of November 14, 1947, December 12, 1948, October 7, 1950, December 1,
1950, and August 28, 1953. The principal points of these resolutions are:

(a) The United Nations has frequently attempted to assist the Korean people in re-establishing their freedom, independence and unity which are the urgent and rightful claims and that the Korean question is primarily a matter for the Korean people.

(b) National independence of Korea should be re-established and foreign forces withdrawn thereafter.

(c) Elections should be held on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot and the number of representatives from the voting districts should be proportionate to population; elections should be observed by an international commission with freedom to observe and consult throughout Korea.

(d) The ROK is the only lawful sovereign government in any part of Korea in so far as the United Nations is concerned.

(e) The United Nations has in being a commission with personnel and experience to carry out the terms of reference on Korean unification established in the General Assembly Resolution of October 7, 1950.

(f) The United Nations has in being an agency to rehabilitate all Korea once it is unified.

2. Variant Plans. There are two general formulas for obtaining a free and united Korea by peaceful means:

(a) to carry forward the plans contained in existing UN resolutions by completing the constituent act of elections in North Korea, within the framework of the constitutional structure of the ROK State.

(b) to start completely de novo by holding elections throughout Korea supervised by an international commission to set up a constituent assembly, draft and adopt a new constitution, and form a new national government. The United States favors the first formula. It would (a) avoid turmoil and disorganization in ROK, and (b) provide some negotiating flexibility.


(a) International Commission with authority to move throughout Korea to observe elections and advise local authorities thereon.

(b) Minimum Conditions for Free Elections.

(c) Elections in North Korea, or possibly also in South Korea, in such a way as to retain the constitutional entity of the ROK State.

(d) Establishment of an all-Korea National Assembly on basis proportional to population in South and North Korea.

(e) Assembly would have right and authority by terms of new elections to retain, amend or replace ROK constitution.

(f) Phased withdrawal of foreign forces before and after elections to be completed “X” months after all-Korean Assembly and President elected.

(g) Possible election of President simultaneous with elections for National Assembly.
Circular telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 14, 1954—8:48 p.m.

362. At meeting April 13 of countries that have accepted invitation participate Geneva Conference, group was given briefing on current military situation in Korea, including estimate Communist capabilities, and intelligence estimate overall Communist objectives. Unlikelihood of Communists accepting any proposals dislodging them from Korea emphasized.

Recalling bases from Geneva Conference in Armistice Agreement and Berlin Communiqué, Johnson expressed confidence allies agreed primary purpose Geneva to seek Korean unification on terms that would not result in turning over Korea to Communists, thus losing at Conference what we fought so long to prevent. He emphasized following objectives:

(1) maintain position of strength and stability in free Korea taking account ROK fear of abandonment, not causing confusion, weakening of morale or strong public opposition within ROK; (2) maintain constitutional framework ROK state and, to greatest extent possible, validity of past UN resolutions; (3) maintain united front at Conference, despite mechanical difficulties of coordinating position in fast-moving conference situation with number of participants, which would require study; (4) determine whether Communists willing surrender control over any part Korea, or if not, unmask Communist intentions; (5) emerge from Conference in strong moral and political position by presenting proposals commending themselves to world opinion and which, if rejected by Communists, will demonstrate Communist responsibility for Conference failure.

Basic considerations underlying allied position at Conference enumerated:

(1) Communists would do utmost broaden discussions on deceptive lines (e.g. general Far East security pact) and allies must keep Conference to basic issues; (2) allied proposals must take into consideration fundamental interests and position ROK in future unification since without ROK endorsement and support, proposals or agreements will be ineffective and invalid; (3) ROK is sovereign independent state, not pawn; (4) any proposals put forward must (a) preserve framework of legitimacy, sovereignty and integrity ROK State in

3 Sent to the Embassies in Addis Ababa, Ankara, Athens, Bangkok, Bogotá, Brussels, Canberra, London, Manila, Moscow, Ottawa, Paris, Seoul, The Hague, Tokyo, and Wellington; the Legation in Luxembourg; the U.S. Mission at the United Nations in New York; and by air pouch to Geneva and Capetown, with the following added for Capetown only:

“South Africa was not invited to meeting in order avoid embarrassment with ROK, neither country having accepted invitation to Geneva Conference. However in subsequent interview same day with South African Ambassador, Johnson covered above material.”
principle, (b) emphasize interrupted UN efforts since 1947 establish Korean independence and unity, (c) give voice to views of overwhelming majority Koreans, and (d) not equate ROK with North Korean regime. Johnson emphasized substantial differences between Korean situation and Germany so that German unification plans not rigidly applicable as precedent for Korea.

US believed proposals in general spirit UN plans for Korean unification (GA Resolutions Nov 14, 1947; Dec 12, 1948; Oct 7, 1950; Dec 1, 1950; and Aug 28, 1953) should be submitted at outset. Principal points those resolutions were:

(1) frequent UN attempts assist Koreans in reestablishing their freedom; (2) reestablishment national independence Korea and withdrawal foreign forces thereafter; (3) elections on basis of adult suffrage by secret ballot, numbers of representatives from voting districts proportionate to population, and elections to be observed by international commission with freedom observe and consult throughout Korea; (4) ROK is only lawful sovereign government in Korea so far as UN concerned; and (5) UN has in existence Commission to carry out terms of reference Korean unification established in Oct 7, 1950 GA resolution and agency to rehabilitate unified Korea.

Johnson noted two unification plans generally suggested: (1) carry forward plan within existing UN framework; or (2) start from scratch by holding elections throughout Korea for constituent Assembly to form new government. US favored position conforming to UN resolutions. This would mean elections under international observation in those parts of Korea where UN not previously able observe elections and within framework ROK constitution. Such a plan would not necessitate destroying present ROK constitutional structure and would avoid misunderstanding, turmoil and administrative disorganization within Korea. Johnson cautioned that in considering initial allied position at Geneva important that group not now bargain proposals down between selves to point no flexibility remaining for negotiation with Communists at Geneva. In plan such as US favored, he envisaged phased withdrawal troops from both sides under international supervision but withdrawal would not be completed until after elections held and unification implemented. Important no withdrawal begin until performance at least started by other side. In answer to questions he agreed possible bargaining range within above position lay in extending elections from only North Korea to all Korea, while still preserving ROK constitution. Also pointed out that of course new all-Korean Assembly could amend ROK Constitution.

Johnson said our estimate success achieving this proposal not very high, depending naturally upon whether Communists willing see non-

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Communist Korea. If they are, formula can be found; if not no formula can overcome this fact.

UK representative expressed view his government would largely agree with above proposal, putting great deal stress its flexible aspects. Several mentioned importance avoiding impression North Korea would be placed under South Korea.

In answer inquiry re probable ROK attitude Johnson said US assumed ROK would want (1) complete withdrawal CCF forces; (2) extension ROK administration North Korea; (3) elections NK to fill vacant seats ROK Assembly.

Group also discussed alternative methods sharing allied costs. Several emphasized importance separating Korean from Indochinese expenses. Johnson said US continued favor plan by which US, UK and France would share 50%, and other thirteen would divide remaining 50% equally. Several expressed preference for adoption UN scale, which Johnson said unacceptable to US since would mean US pay approximately 56%. No decision.  

Smith

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396.1-GE/4-1554: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom.  

CONFIDENTIAL Washington, April 15, 1954—8:37 p.m.

5451. Acting Secretary discussed with Makins, Scott and Daridaran today seating arrangements and chairmanship Geneva conference. They were informed that under no condition would US sit at table with Communist Chinese and North Koreans unless seating arrangement provided for two sides, that is Communist countries on one side and allied countries on the other. Also that we could not agree to rotation of chairmanship among 19 countries whereby North Korea and Communist China would preside as chairman.

Acting Secretary further stated that in our opinion Geneva conference was direct outgrowth Korean war and Panmunjom negotiation and therefore US should have some freedom of choice in matter

1 Repeated for information to Paris and Geneva.

2 Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador, and Robert H. Scott, Minister at the British Embassy.
of organization of conference and that unless we can agree on seating arrangement acceptable to US probable we would not attend conference except as observers.

Since UK and France objected two sided seating arrangement and Communist agreement thereto not likely US willing to agree seating plan whereby three rows of tables or ranks of chairs with desks would be arranged in semi-circular fashion. Each row would allow seating 8 delegates with one adviser each. There would be sufficient room between first row and second row and between second row and third row for from 2 to 4 advisers sitting behind each delegate. Third row to provide room for only 3 delegates. US proposing plan on basis UK and France would join in proposing to Soviets Communists take one block of seats arranging selves in any order they desired and allies taking remaining block and also arranging order between selves so that ROK and US adjacent. If Communists refused agree such seating order US willing agree delegations sit according to English alphabet left to right facing rows of chairs or tables so arranged US delegate immediately behind ROK. Rostrum from which delegates would speak would face delegates and be immediately in front of chairman.

Daridan stated he was in favor of this arrangement and believed his government would be inclined to agree. Makins stated that he would report to Foreign Office with observation that although he understood US making seating arrangements matter of principle he did not believe that UK should do so. Acting Secretary requested that respective Foreign Offices instruct their representatives in Geneva directly if they could agree to this plan.

With respect to chairmanship Makins agreed that rotation among 19 countries would be "fantastic". Acting Secretary stated that Spender, Australian Ambassador had suggested that a permanent chairman be Hammarskjold.⁸ US thought this good idea. Makins and Daridan agreed proposal has merit and should be given serious consideration.

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⁸ Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary-General of the United Nations.

396.1–GE/4–1654 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea*¹

SECRET NIACt WASHINGTON, April 16, 1954—1:32 p. m.

829. Following is text of letter from President Eisenhower to President Rhee which you are requested to deliver soonest.

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¹ Repeated to Tokyo with instructions to pass to CINCUNC for information.
"My dear Mr. President: I have your further letter of April 8\textsuperscript{2} expressing renewed misgivings in regard to the Geneva Conference and requesting increased support of the Korean armed forces.

I fully appreciate your expression of misgivings in the situation with which we are confronted. I myself am under no illusions as to the difficulties of negotiating and reaching satisfactory settlements with the Communists. Still it is my deep conviction that we should go to Geneva prepared to exhaust every possibility of obtaining the peaceful unification of Korea. That is fully in keeping with the spirit and terms of the Armistice Agreement and our own previous understanding. Therefore, I want to add my own earnest appeal to that of Secretary of State Dulles, most recently expressed in his message of April 7,\textsuperscript{3} that you join with us and our other allies at Geneva in a concerted and earnest attempt to attain the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem which we all ardently desire. As we had sought all along, Soviet Russia will be at Geneva on the one side flanked by her Chinese Communist and Korean Communist allies. Neither India nor any other neutral nation will attend the Korean Conference. If the Republic of Korea participates we shall be there sixteen strong on our side with determination to strive to the best of our abilities to obtain a satisfactory settlement. In addition, I believe that Korea’s presence at Geneva would be immeasurably helpful in maintaining the unity of the free world at a time when we are attempting to forge a common front to cope with Communist activities.

Once having met at Geneva, should the Communist side stall or act in bad faith, we shall be prepared, pursuant to the understanding reached between you and Secretary Dulles, to consult about what further steps we can properly take to deal with the then existing situation. But you must understand that, for the reasons set forth in my letter of March 20,\textsuperscript{4} I cannot comply with your requests for United States support in military action to unify Korea.

With respect to your desire to strengthen the armed forces of the Republic of Korea, I can assure you of my sympathetic understanding. In studying these requests we have had to consider the whole strategic position of the free world, the necessity placed upon us for supplying equipment to help the forces of the French and the Associated States in their struggle against Communist aggression, and the assistance previously furnished to the Republic of Korea. We have also considered the manpower and budgetary requirements for the program of economic rehabilitation upon which we are jointly engaged, as well as the requirements for the defense of your country.

After weighing the foregoing factors, we are considering the following program for the continuing improvement of ROK forces with additional United States assistance:

1. Continued development of the ROK Army to a field army, capable in itself of sustained combat operations.
2. Continued modernization of the ROK Navy and the addition to it of antisubmarine, amphibious and auxiliary-type vessels including two destroyer escorts.

\textsuperscript{2}Text in telegram 991, Apr. 8, from Seoul, p. 79.
\textsuperscript{3}Text in telegram 796, Apr. 7, to Seoul, p. 77.
\textsuperscript{4}Text in telegram 748, Mar. 20, to Seoul, p. 44.
3. Reorganization of the ROK Marine Corps from a brigade of scattered small units to a combat-capable division.

4. Modernization of the ROK Air Force by reequipping the existing fighter wing with jet-type aircraft, and by the establishment of an efficient tactical control organization. Training of ROK pilots for transition to jet aircraft will begin as soon as practicable.

To this end, I am asking General Van Fleet to go to Korea to consult with you and your military advisers, to study the situation thoroughly, and to develop recommendations in concert with General Hull both as to the future size and composition of the active armed forces of the Republic of Korea and the practicability of a joint United States–Republic of Korea program for Korean reserve forces.

I am confident that if the United States and the Republic of Korea work in close concert to carry out the strengthening of your defense forces and to push forward the program of economic rehabilitation, we can continue to build the position of strength in Korea which we both realize is essential to your interests, to ours, and to those of the free world as a whole.

With personal good wishes and warm regards.”

When delivering foregoing message you should orally inform Rhee final action on any plans for aid to our allies rests in Congress and no such plans can be implemented until Congressional action is completed.

You should when delivering letter plainly intimate to Rhee carrying out of any plans such as those referred to in letter would of course be predicated upon continuing ROK cooperation with US, including ROK attendance at Geneva Conference.

Please confirm when letter delivered and report Rhee’s reactions.

SMITH

FE files, lot 80 D 330, “Position Papers”

Memorandum by Christopher Van Holten of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State

[WASHINGTON,] April 16, 1954.

GK D-4/10

KOREAN PHASE

DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR REUNIFICATION OF KOREA

(Alternative B)

The attached proposal for the reunification of Korea (Alternative B) provides for elections in North and South Korea for the establishment of a Korean National Government within the ROK constitutional structure.
This proposal represents a middle position between Alternative A—administrative incorporation of North Korea into the existing Republic of Korea, (GK D-4/7)¹ and Alternative C which provides for all-Korean elections for constituent assembly, and a new national Government (GK D-4b).²

The basic U.S. position on the over-all question of Korean reunification, together with a brief summary of the three Alternative plans, is contained in GK D-4/1d.³

CHRISTOPHER VAN HOLLEN

[Attachment]

Position Paper Prepared for the Korean Phase of the Geneva Conference

GK D-4/10

DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR REUNIFICATION OF KOREA

(Alternative B)

Preamble

The Korean people, who for 4,000 years have had a common civilization with a common language, culture, and traditions, desire to be reunited under a single government of their own choosing and to resume their traditional peaceful life. Virtually the entire world has long recognized that this is a proper and commendable aspiration, and the United Nations has repeatedly supported measures designed to realize this objective. The United Nations General Assembly adopted resolutions in 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, and 1953 which supported a free, independent, and unified Korean Government representative of the wishes of the Korean people. The principles enunciated in these resolutions are just and equitable and constitute a broad framework upon which any political settlement for Korea should be based. The fundamental principles are as follows:

1. The Korean question “is primarily a matter for the Korean people itself” and it “cannot be fairly resolved without the participation of representatives of the indigenous population.” (UNGA Res. Nov. 14, 1947).

2. The selection of representatives of the Korean people should be on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot; the number of representatives from each voting area or zone should be proportionate to the population; and elections should be under the supervision of a

¹ Dated Apr. 9, p. 82.
² Dated Mar. 27, p. 62.
³ Document GK D-4/1d is not printed. For a subsequent revised version of it, Document GK D-4/1e, Apr. 24, see p. 131.

4. The Government of the Republic of Korea was duly established in conformity with the above principles and is the only such lawful Government in Korea. (UNGA Res. Dec. 12, 1948). Subsequent elections have been held in the Republic of Korea in accordance with its constitution and observed and endorsed by United Nations commissions as reflecting the will of the electorate.

We therefore advance the following proposal for the reunification of Korea in accordance with the above principles enunciated by the United Nations and within the framework of the constitutional structure of the State of the Republic of Korea.

Method of Reunification of Korea

1. Responsibilities of UNCURK as the Supervisory Commission.
2. Establishment of conditions for free elections.
3. Free elections for a President and for representatives to National Assembly of Republic of Korea.
4. Action by expanded National Assembly to establish national administration for all Korea.
5. Phased withdrawal of Foreign Forces.
6. Residual functions of UNCURK after reunification.
7. Supersession of Armistice Agreement.
8. Rehabilitation of all Korea.

1. Responsibilities of UNCURK as the Supervisory Commission.

The present United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), established by the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly of October 7, 1950 is empowered to (a) lend its good offices to bring about the unification of Korea and the integration of all Korean security forces in accordance with the principles laid down by the General Assembly in the resolution of 14 November 1947; (b) seek to facilitate the removal of barriers to economic, social, and other friendly intercourses caused by the division of Korea; (c) be available for observation and consultation in the further development of representative government based on the freely expressed will of the people; and (d) observe the actual withdrawal of the occupation forces and verify the fact of withdrawal when such has occurred.

These terms of reference for UNCURK shall be specifically revised and expanded with the consent of the United Nations General Assembly to give UNCURK responsibility for observing and verifying the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea as set forth herein and for supervising the plan for the reunification of Korea as set forth herein.
The specific terms of reference of UNCURK shall include the following:


(b) Investigation throughout areas of Korea not already duly represented in the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea of conditions affecting the holding of free elections, freedom of movement, freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, freedom of association and assembly, freedom of speech, press, and broadcasting, and freedom of political parties to organize and carry out their activities.

(c) Preparation of electoral laws for these areas in consultation with the Republic of Korea and the civil authorities of those areas concerned.

(d) Determination, in consultation with the Republic of Korea and the civil authorities of the areas concerned, of the number of delegates to be elected and the number of election districts, which shall be in direct proportion to the population distribution in Korea.

(e) Supervision over the implementation of the electoral laws and registration of qualified voters, and observation of the elections at all administrative levels.

(f) Certification of results of elections.

(g) Observation of steps leading to the establishment of a reunified government. During the period between the end of the elections and the effective assumption of control over all of Korea by the reunified Korean Government, UNCURK will remain in operation in order to prevent action after the elections which would impair the conditions of genuine freedom under which they will have been held. The details of those terms of reference shall be worked out by the signatories within this framework and shall come into effect simultaneously with this agreement. UNCURK shall have the power to adopt measures not specifically described and which are necessary to carry out their task herein, provided that they do not otherwise conflict with this proposal.

The UNCURK shall have its primary headquarters in the vicinity of Panmunjom in the demilitarized zone. The UNCURK shall report and make recommendations at its discretion to the parties to this agreement. The parties to this agreement shall facilitate the work of UNCURK and comply with recommendations made by UNCURK within its revised terms of reference as set forth above.


Preparatory to the holding of free elections in areas of Korea not already duly represented in the National Assembly, UNCURK shall, pursuant to its terms of reference, observe political conditions throughout the areas concerned and shall, where it deems appropriate, propose to the parties concerned the measures necessary to insure that elections are held in a free atmosphere wherein the democratic right of freedom
of speech, press and assembly would be recognized and respected. In particular these measures shall include the following:

Freedom of movement within north and south Korea but not between the two areas across the demilitarized zone.
Freedom of presentation of candidates.
Immunity of candidates from arrest or coercion.
Freedom of expression.
Secrecy of the vote.
Security of polling stations and ballot boxes.

3. Free Elections for President and for Representatives to National Assembly of Republic of Korea.

The UNCURK shall advise the authorities in the ROK and in North Korea regarding the establishment of conditions for free elections and assure conformity of electoral laws and procedures to the requirements of the above paragraph 2. In particular, election procedures approved by UNCURK shall ensure that candidates for President and a National Assembly of Korea, who reflect varying viewpoints, will be permitted to campaign freely; that the electorate will be able to express its choice of candidates freely and without duress or intimidation; and that the election procedures shall be uniform among all the areas concerned.

Not later than 12 months after concluding this agreement, elections for representatives to the National Assembly shall be held on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot in Korea. The number of representatives to be elected to the National Assembly shall be determined according to the size of the population of each election district. It is estimated that not more than six million persons reside in areas not already duly represented in the ROK National Assembly. In the event the UNCURK shall fail to certify the election of a representative he shall not be seated in the National Assembly, and new local by-elections shall be held as soon as possible under UNCURK supervision. The vote of a majority of the members of UNCURK shall be required to rule that the election of any candidate is not valid.

4. Action by National Assembly of Korea to Establish Constitution and Basic Laws for all of Korea.

Within thirty days after UNCURK has certified the free election of two-thirds of the number of representatives designated to be elected under its supervision, the National Assembly of Korea shall seat the newly elected representatives. After these newly elected representatives have been seated the National Assembly shall take prompt and appropriate action to accept or amend the Constitution of the Republic of Korea enacted on July 12, 1948. The President shall recommend to the National Assembly, for its consideration and action by
two-thirds majority of those present and voting, uniform basic laws for all Korea. When these actions have been taken and effectively implemented, a National Government of Korea shall be considered to have been established.

5. Phased Withdrawal of Foreign Forces.

The withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces and United Nations forces from Korea shall begin before elections in Korea, shall proceed in accordance with a prearranged schedule and shall be completed within 12 months after the date of the formation of the National Government of Korea as certified by the UNCURK. The detailed schedules for mutually phased withdrawals of both Chinese Communist and United Nations forces from Korea are contained in Annex A to this agreement. The UNCURK shall observe the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea and report to the Secretary General of the United Nations in accordance with Paragraph 2(c) of the Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations of October 7, 1950.

It is agreed that the United States in its capacity as the Unified Command and the Chinese People's Republic shall instruct their respective military Commanders in Korea:

a) to certify to the UNCURK within 7 days after the formation of the National Government of Korea the strength of their respective forces as of that date;

b) to accomplish a phased withdrawal of their forces from Korea through the ports of entry prescribed in the Armistice Agreement and in accordance with Annex A to this agreement;

c) to report to the UNCURK, within 7 days after the end of each phase of the agreed schedule in Annex A, that their forces have been reduced to the agreed level;

d) to certify to the UNCURK upon completion of the withdrawal of their respective forces from Korea that none of their forces remain in Korea.

6. Residual Functions of UNCURK.

Following the establishment of a reunified Korean Government with effective control over all of Korea as outlined above, and the verified withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea in accordance with paragraph 2(c) of the General Assembly Resolution of Oct. 7, 1950, UNCURK shall certify the fact in a report to the Secretary General of the United Nations. Thereafter, UNCURK shall confine its activities to such responsibilities in connection with observation of the independence and security of Korea as may be determined by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Its headquarters shall be moved to Seoul.

The Annex referred to has not been found attached to the source text, nor to any other copy of this Position Paper in the Department of State files.
7. Supersession of Armistice Agreement.

Certification by UNCURK that a reunified Korean Government with effective control over all of Korea has been duly established and that all foreign forces have been withdrawn from Korea in accordance with the agreement thereon shall constitute for purposes of supersession of the Armistice Agreement, under Article 62 of that Agreement, "appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides."

8. Rehabilitation of all Korea.

Upon such certification the United Nations Reconstruction Agency for Korea, established by the Resolution of the General Assembly of Dec. 1, 1950 shall develop and carry out a program of relief and rehabilitation of all Korea. Such a program shall be worked out in close consultation with the National Government of Korea.

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785.00/4–1854: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET

NIAC

SEOUL, April 18, 1954—5 p.m.

1022. Repeated information Tokyo 613, Saigon 30, Taipei 97, Paris 9. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. My immediately preceding message.1 Delivered President's letter at 9 this morning to President Rhee in presence Foreign Minister Pyun and Mrs. Rhee, Pyun and I having traveled from Seoul last night. After reading letter I conveyed orally two points concerning dependence on Congress for funds, and dependence of program on continued collaboration with ROK. Pyun took notes.

Rhee expressed warm satisfaction with contents President's letter insofar as it relates expansion US military aid and forthcoming assignment General Van Fleet. "Please tell President", said Rhee, "that by that alone he has assured us happy Easter in Korea". After further tribute to Van Fleet, Rhee said hoped General could come here soonest and he would like make announcement here simultaneously with Washington. Rhee asked date of announcement be soonest because of favorable effect that would have and also because of speculation and danger of leaks. (I agree sooner announcement made the better.)

President went on to say his satisfaction Van Fleet assignment should not be interpreted as implying lack of confidence in General Hull, referred to by President Eisenhower in connection Van Fleet visit, for whom Rhee said he has highest regard.

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1 In telegram 1021, Apr. 18, Ambassador Briggs reported that he had delivered President Eisenhower's letter to President Rhee in the morning and that the Republic of Korea would announce its intention to attend the Geneva Conference at 9 a.m. on Apr. 19 (396.1–GE/4–1854).
Rhee referred in that connection to his last conversation with Hull on February [April] 14 which he said had been helpful to him in formulating ROK position (see Embtel 1015, April 16). 2

Turning to Geneva, Rhee said Pyun would head delegation and would leave within 48 hours. Rhee still doubts whether any good will come of conference, but he noted President Eisenhower himself had stated in letter he under no illusions about dealings with Communists. Rhee declared Pyun would do his best collaborate with Secretary Dulles and that Rhee appreciates consideration American Government has shown in connection with problems Rhee faces in seeking improve prospects Korea’s future. 3

With regard announcement ROK Geneva participation it was decided this would be made Seoul 9 tomorrow morning, April 19, and Rhee thereupon showed me draft statement prepared day before, of course without reference to President’s letter. Draft was pessimistic, contentious and generally unhelpful, and after reading it I told Rhee effect could hardly fail be unfortunate insofar as Korea’s relations with Allies concerned, and by emphasizing differences among us would certainly give comfort to Communist enemy. I urged ROK statement avoid re-hash past argumentative declarations about Russia as sponsor, conference not two-sided, etc.

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2 Not printed. In it, Ambassador Briggs said that he had talked with Hull prior to the latter’s meeting with Rhee at which time Hull and Briggs agreed that Hull should mention the Geneva Conference to Rhee if a suitable opportunity arose. In view, however, of recent statements by Korean officials as well as Rhee’s comments to Hull, Briggs did not feel that the Republic of Korea would decide on the question of attendance at Geneva until a reply was received to Rhee’s letter of Apr. 8 to President Eisenhower. (785.00/4-1654)

In an unnumbered telegram of Apr. 14, General Hull reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on his meeting with Rhee. Hull said that he had offered Rhee his personal opinion that it would be a serious mistake for the Republic of Korea to refuse to participate in the Geneva negotiations. Hull’s conclusion, after the talk, was that Rhee would agree to participate without further argument if he could find any face saving device in the form of some sort of reassurance from the United States on the matter of further aid to Korea. (Department of Defense files)

3 In telegram 1028, Apr. 19, Ambassador Briggs sent the following message to the Department of State:


With reference to observations made orally in accordance instructions to President Rhee and Foreign Minister Pyun yesterday in connection delivery President’s letter, I considered it desirable confirm in writing statement on dependence of program of assistance on Congressional implementation. I accordingly sent Pyun following confidential letter dated April 18:

‘My dear Mr. Minister: It occurs to me that it may be convenient for you to have written confirmation of an observation which, under instructions from my government, I made to President and you in presenting President Eisenhower’s letter to President Rhee this morning.

‘In that connection I reminded you that final action on plans for assistance to our allies, and specifically projects described in President Eisenhower’s letter, rests in US Congress, so that such plans can only be implemented when Congressional action is completed.

‘I am et cetera. . . . ‘” (396.1-GE/4-1954)
After considerable discussion Rhee agreed and it was left that Pyun and Rhee's American advisor Glenn (chief editorial writer for Korean Republic who drafted original text at Rhee's direction) would return with me to Seoul and prepare revised ROK statement. During trip back, Glenn, Pyun and I accordingly rewrote statement to approximately 50% original length and also toned down contents. Final text, assuming Pyun introduces no more problems, follows separate telegram.

Only other subject raised by Rhee in connection with conference was situation in Indochina regarding which Rhee expressed profound concern, stating that way things now going he discouraged over prospects any settlement short of Communist victory unless French agree to complete independence at very early date to three Associated States. "French," said Rhee, "must go. Unless French leave, I shall be tempted suggest amalgamation of all anti-Communist elements in Indochina in move to get rid of French because so long as French there, problem of colonialism exists, and with colonialism, indigenous effort against Communism will be half-hearted and feeble." He declared population Indochina will not fight to help French or keep French in Indochina. (My interpretation these observations is that Pyun at Geneva is likely plunge into Indochinese question at drop of hat.) Although neither Rhee nor Pyun referred except as above to ROK attitude toward Southeast Asia problems, question of "exclusion" of Korea from possible collective declaration or action will undoubtedly remain sensitive subject. In this connection statements made yesterday to Ambassador Yang (Deptel 835)\(^4\) will be helpful in future talks with ROK officials.

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\(^4\) Not printed. In it, the Department of State reported on a conversation between Ambassador Yang and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far East Affairs Everett Drumright; for the memorandum, see volume xix. In reply to Yang's expressions of concern over Korea's exclusion from collective defense arrangements in Southeast Asia, Drumright pointed out that these were only in a preliminary stage and that Indochina was now a most critical area; he also suggested that Korea indicate more interest in collective action by expressing its intention to attend the Geneva Conference. (790.5/4-1634)

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795.00/4-1854: Telegram

_The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State_

**OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

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SEUL, April 18, 1954—6 p. m.

1023. Repeated information Tokyo 614. Tokyo for CINCUNC. Re Embtels 1021 and 1022.\(^1\) Text follows ROK Government statement re

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\(^1\) Telegram 1022, Apr. 18, _supra_; telegram 1021 not printed, but see footnote 1, _supra_.

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Geneva conference participation, for release 9 a.m., Korean time Monday morning April 19. Foreign Minister Pyun asks Department please pass Ambassador Yang.

Begin text.

"This Government finally has decided to accept the invitation of United States to attend Geneva conference. Some may wish to know why we have delayed acceptance so long. Our reasons are these: (1) We have been highly dubious about achieving any results at Geneva conference; (2) we have been apprehensive lest conference provide Communists with still more time to make preparations for war; and (3) there is risk that conference will be made known all over world as great success, thus making our situation infinitely more difficult of solution.

"While we were waiting during last several weeks, we made every effort obtain definite and positive assurances from United States. We are happy to say that assurances received now are very clear and encouraging, and that they will enable us to go to Geneva with confidence and considerable hope.

"Decision to attend has been made, however, because of desire to show our spirit of cooperation with our great friend and ally, United States. We hope sincerely that should the conference fail, America will have come to realize—finally and conclusively—that further negotiation with Communists would be both futile and perilous.

"For Korea, this conference must represent final time-consuming attempt to attain unification by peaceful means. We obviously cannot continue to sit idly by while Communists exterminate or exile our people of North and make Red Chinese province out of half our country. We hope, therefore, that if and when Geneva conference has failed, United States and our other friends in free world will join with us in employing other means to drive the enemy from our land.

"We shall do our level best to cooperate with United States in seeking peaceful unification. But it is only fair to declare that we can accept no compromise. It must be unification under full democratic auspices, and it must include complete withdrawal from our soil of all Chinese Communist forces.

"The Republic of Korea will be present at Geneva as wholly sovereign nation, and as such it must reserve, at all times, right and duty of following and protecting its own interests. We trust that United States and other countries on our side will do no less, and that Communists thereby will be prevented from making gains and from dividing us among ourselves.
"If reasonable period of time has passed without conference results, we know United States will consult with us, as it has promised to do, on abandonment of discussion as way to peace with Communism and Communists. Once our friends have come to realize how improbable of expecting negotiated settlement, there may be hope for achievement of peace in Korea and elsewhere in world.

"It is in this spirit, and in expression of our friendship for United States, that we shall attend Geneva conference."

[End text.]

Foregoing will be issued in name of President Rhee.

BRIGGS

306.1-GE/4-1954 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, April 19, 1954—12:07 p.m.

839. Following for Rhee from Dulles:

"April 19, 1954. My dear Mr. President: I am gratified to have received from Ambassador Briggs the news that the Republic of Korea has decided to participate in the Conference at Geneva. As the President and I have so often stated to you, we want to stand shoulder to shoulder with you and your Government at this Conference. Some decisions with regard to arrangements for the conference have had to be taken prior to your decision to participate. I am satisfied that you will find that these decisions fully protect the interests of your Government and are in accord with our common view of the Conference. However, many important items remain to be decided and will require decisions during the course of the Conference. I look forward to working closely with your Foreign Minister at Geneva. However, in order that you may yourself have the direct benefit of our latest thinking here, I will make arrangements for our common friend Arthur Dean to proceed immediately to Korea as my personal emissary to you. He can directly explain to you the lines of my thinking and in turn pass on to me your thoughts with respect to the Conference and the problems we will face together there. Sincerely yours, John Foster Dulles."

Inform Department by telegram when delivered and report any significant comments of President Rhee.

DULLES

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1 Repeated to Tokyo for CINCUNC.
2 In his telegram 1026, Apr. 19, from Seoul, Ambassador Briggs forwarded the text of a note from Pyun to Dulles formally accepting the invitation to the Geneva Conference on behalf of the Korean Government. The note stated that acceptance was predicated on the assurance that, if substantial progress had not been made within 90 days of the Conference, the United States would consult with the Republic of Korea on abandonment of further negotiations with the Communists. (306.1-GE/4-1954)
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Seoul, April 19, 1954—5 p. m.

1034. Re Deptel 817.\(^1\) During conversation with Foreign Minister Pyun this morning he requested information regarding probable US position on substantive questions at Geneva. I informed him I understood it to be view of US Government that most logical means of effecting unification of Korea would be to proceed with implementation of existing GA resolutions on Korea by holding UN-supervised elections in those parts of Korea in which UN not previously able observe elections. I added that I believed our thinking on troop withdrawal was that there should be phased simultaneous withdrawal begun before elections and completed within specified time thereafter. I explained however that so far as Embassy aware US had not reached agreed position with its other allies and that until it had done so it would be impossible to know exactly what US position at conference would be.

Insofar as elections concerned, Pyun said US position appeared be entirely compatible with that of ROK. Re troop withdrawal, however, he said position his government was that Chinese Communists, since they were acknowledged aggressors and also since they entered Korean conflict after UN forces, must be withdrawn from North Korea not only prior to elections but also prior to withdrawal UN forces from South. I told Pyun I believed it unrealistic to believe there existed any chance obtaining acceptance such withdrawal plan by either side, and that, whatever timing might be, I believed withdrawal would have to be simultaneous.

From viewpoint ROK cooperation at Geneva, believe it desirable initial US position on unification procedures be along lines alternative A, Document GK D-4/B April 5.\(^2\) Should Communists reject this proposal as anticipated, US could move by gradual stages toward proposal for supervised elections throughout all Korea. ROK likely object vociferously at each modification but might reluctantly accept them as

\(^1\) Not printed. In it, the Department of State had requested the Embassy’s views on what positions the United States should take with the Republic of Korea, if and after the Koreans accepted the invitation to the Geneva Conference (396.1-GE/4-1454).

\(^2\) For the text of Document GK D-4b, dated Mar. 27, see p. 62. This document called for all-Korean elections for a constituent assembly, and a new national government. Following the drafting of subsequent position papers, this proposal became known as Alternative C. See GK D-4/10, Apr. 16, p. 105.

The tenor of the comments here would appear to indicate that the reference should be to Document GK D-4/7, Apr. 9, p. 82, known as Alternative A, which called for elections in North Korea and incorporation of that area into the Republic of Korea.

For Alternative B, see Document GK D-4/10, Apr. 16, p. 105.
only possibility early unification, if convinced US has no intention backing unification by force. From past experience in negotiations with ROK appears we must resign ourselves to bitter bargaining, probably punctuated by irresponsible public outbursts whenever these seem to ROK advantage.

President Rhee's willingness entrust his political fate to de novo elections throughout Korea may to some extent be influenced by outcome May 20 elections, particularly if latter produce clear-cut electoral decision either for or against his supporters.

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Reference is to the elections for the Korean National Assembly. For documentation on related developments, see volume xv.

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396.1-GE/4-1954: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET NIACT

WASHINGTON, April 19, 1954—8:17 p.m.

844. For Ambassador, Deptel 839. Concerning proposal Dean go to Korea, such consultations would be conducted under your auspices and with your advice and guidance. Main purpose convey Secretary’s latest thinking directly and in detail to Rhee, who will formulate ROK position from Seoul during Geneva conference. In lieu consultations here with ROK representative as we suggested to Rhee and Pyun several times, might help US at Geneva if Dean with your guidance per above could discuss with Rhee over period several days detailed background US Government’s views major substantive aspects Korean issue.

As we see it problem is to persuade ROK advance proposals in reasonable form and also help us maintain sufficient flexibility and room for manoeuvre while agreeing with us on certain basic principles. Dean has been working currently with Department and in meetings here on all position papers and problems and is informed regarding Southeast Asian situation and relations to it of various proposals on Korean phase conference. Also familiar with latest thinking reference Geneva our various allies. We believe that this arrangement can supplement difficult task negotiating with ROK satisfactory accord and understanding on strategy and tactics at Geneva.

Secretary has instructed Robertson and Young be in Geneva when Pyun arrives discuss with him opening presentation. Since Korean Embassy says Pyun expected there April 24, hope Dean can begin discussions with Rhee April 23 or 24.

DULLES

1 Dated Apr. 19, p. 115.
Memorandum by the Coordinator for the Geneva Conference (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] April 20, 1954.

[Subject:] Representation—Geneva Conference

It is believed that:

1. It would not be desirable for members of the U.S. Delegation to:
   a. Entertain or be entertained by the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans.
   b. Appear at small social functions such as dinners or luncheons where the Chinese Communists and/or the North Koreans will be present.

2. A concerted effort will be made by “some” to bring together you and representatives of the Chinese Communist and/or the North Koreans outside of the conference room for the purpose of embarrassing you.

3. If the U.S. were to hold a reception in honor of all participants to the conference, except the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans, the USSR would not attend.

It is recommended therefore that:

1. In accordance with normal international practice the U.S. do not during the conference invite the Communist Chinese or the North Koreans to any social function.

2. In accordance with normal international practice the U.S. do not accept any invitation issued by the Communist Chinese or the North Koreans.

3. The allied governments be discreetly informed in the early states of the conference that the U.S. will not accept invitations to dinners, luncheons, or other small gatherings to which the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans are also invited.

4. The U.S. not hold a reception but limit its representational activities to dinners and luncheons.

The U.S. would of course accept invitations to receptions held by participants other than the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans, even though the latter are to be present.

Concurrences:

FE—Mr. Robertson EUR—Mr. Merchant L—Mr. Phleger C—Mr. MacArthur II

1 The source text is a carbon copy, bearing no initials either of Johnson or those listed under “Concurrences” at the end of the memorandum. There is no indication on the source text that Dulles saw or commented on the memorandum.

A typewritten memorandum bearing the designation USAadmin/19, dated Apr. 27, in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 299, which was apparently distributed to members of the U.S. Delegation, incorporates the suggestions in paragraphs 1 a and b and the final 5 paragraphs of the above memorandum. The memorandum of Apr. 27 is titled “Representation—Geneva Conference” and states that all members of the delegation will be governed by the principles set forth therein.
Memorandum of Conversation, by Elizabeth Brown of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] April 20, 1954.

Subject: Special Briefing Meeting, April 20, 1954

Participants:

Australia—Ambassador Spender
  Mr. Allen, Second Secretary
Belgium—Ambassador Silvercruys
  Mr. Muller, Second Secretary
Canada—Ambassador Heeney
  Mr. Campbell, Second Secretary
Colombia—Ambassador Zuleta
  Dr. Chaves, Counselor
Ethiopia—Ambassador Deressa
France—Mr. deJuniac, Minister
  Mr. Pelletier, Second Secretary
Great Britain—Ambassador Makins
  Mr. Scott, Minister
Greece—Ambassador Politis
  Mr. Cavalerato, Counselor
Korea—Mr. Han, First Secretary
Netherlands—Ambassador van Roijen
  Mr. van Baarda, First Secretary
New Zealand—Ambassador Munro
  Mr. Laking, Minister
  Mr. Wade, First Secretary
Philippines—Mr. Abello, Minister
Thailand—Ambassador Sarasin
  Mr. Snidvongs, Second Secretary
Luxembourg—Mr. Le Gallais, EE and MP
South Africa—Ambassador Jooste
  Mr. Hamilton, Counselor
Turkey—Ambassador Erkin
Cambodia—Ambassador Nong Kimny
Laos—Mr. Souvannavong, Minister
Viet Nam—Ambassador Van Kha
  Mr. Tran, Second Secretary
United States—Mr. Dulles, S
  Mr. Johnson, Geneva Coordinator
  Mr. Key, UNA
  Mr. McCord, P
  Mr. Robertson, FE
  Mr. Young, NA
  Mr. Jones, NA
  Mr. Van Hollen, S/S
  Mr. Capella, FE
  Mr. Allen, EUR
  Mr. Henkin, UNP
  Mr. McClurkin, NA
  Mr. Fierst, UNA
  Mr. Sisco, UNA
  Miss Brown, UNP
The Secretary said that he very much appreciated this opportunity to meet to discuss the problems of the Geneva Conference in relation both to Korea and Indochina. He explained that he was planning to leave later in the day for Paris for a meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council and planned to go to Geneva April 24.

Mr. Dulles began by pointing out a number of practical problems which would have to be resolved at the outset of the Conference. These involved such matters as seating arrangements, chairmanship, languages and a mass of similar procedural problems that had not yet been settled and which he supposed would not in fact be settled until the very eve of the conference.  

The Secretary recalled that at the Berlin Conference many such problems remained unsettled until just before the session actually convened when he had spent a few minutes alone talking with Mr. Molotov and agreement was reached. He pointed out that of course it was not as difficult to reach an agreement at Berlin because only four countries were involved, and although Berlin was technically not a CFM meeting, certain CFM practices could be followed. The Geneva Conference would be much more complicated.

Mr. Dulles went on to say that the Soviet Union had manifested a certain tendency in the preliminaries to try to shape Geneva up as a five-power conference and to insist upon physical and other arrangements reflecting this position, thereby placing the other participants in a subordinate capacity; these efforts would have to be countered. He recalled that this had been one of the main disputed issues at Berlin. Just such a Soviet proposal had been stoutly opposed, and the USSR finally accepted the Western objections with the result that the

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1 Agreement had already been reached on some procedural questions. On the previous day, the Department of State informed the Embassy in Seoul of certain of the arrangements that had been made: (1) documentation on the Allied side was to be translated only into English and French; (2) documentation prepared on the Communist side would be translated by the Allied secretariat into English and French—translations into Korean would be the responsibility of the Korean Delegation; (3) costs of services provided by the U.N. for the conference as a whole, such as heat and light, would be shared equally by all 16 participants; (4) costs of services provided by the Allied secretariat for the 16 nations would be shared on a formula not yet determined. (Telegram 843, Apr. 19, to Seoul; 795.00/4-1954)

On the last mentioned point, the Allied side subsequently agreed on a cost-sharing formula for the Allied secretariat based on a proposal by Hughes Le Gallais, Luxembourg’s Minister in Washington, which called for the United States to pay one-third of the costs with the remaining countries paying according to the U.N. formula. The United States had objected to use of the U.N. formula without some adjustment since this would have meant the United States would have had to pay 56 percent of Allied costs. The agreed formula apportioned the Allied costs according to the following percentages: ROK .26; Australia 4.51; Belgium 3.56; Canada 8.5; Colombia 1.06; Ethiopia .26; France 14.82; Greece .54; Luxembourg .15; Netherlands 3.22; New Zealand 1.24; Philippines 1.16; Thailand .46; Turkey 1.68; U.K. 25.25; U.S. 33.33. (795.00/4-1454; 396.1-GE/4-2364, 4-2954)
communiqué containing the invitation to the Geneva Conference was devoid of any suggestion of a five-power conference. That communiqué, the Secretary pointed out, made clear that every state invited would participate on the same level. If the USSR intended to reopen this question on the threshold of the conference, it could cause serious difficulties. Moreover, if the Berlin Agreement were to be thrown over, the general question arose as to whether it was worthwhile to reach agreements at all with the Communists. Mr. Dulles emphasized that this might become a question of considerable importance.

Subject to this qualification, however, he thought that the practical details would probably be worked out. For example, he understood that there was general acceptance of the idea that the seating arrangements would be of the auditorium variety rather than around a table which would create difficult questions as to where different participants would sit. Another difficult problem was the chairmanship. Possibly a chairman might be drawn from some neutral nation, perhaps Switzerland itself. It had also been suggested that Mr. Hammarskjöld might serve in his personal capacity as distinguished from his role as UN Secretary-General.

The Secretary said that it would be necessary to make contact between allied governmental representatives at Geneva quite early and also to arrange a meeting at a fairly high level with the Communists to settle these practical matters. It was our experience that they were never settled at a low level where the Soviet representatives were inclined to dig in on extreme technical positions.

Mr. Dulles believed that the Communists wanted the conference to proceed and did not want another Palais Rose situation at Geneva. He commented that if they intended to have that kind of conference, it would have to be without him.

The Secretary requested suggestions or comments on the technical and procedural matters involved in the Korean phase of the conference.

Referring to the five-power conference issue, Ambassador Politis (Greece) said that he had thought that once the other participants were invited this question was over once and for all. He asked whether the US had any information that the USSR might raise this issue again. Mr. Dulles replied that the Soviet technical representative at Geneva had stated that his instructions were to work out arrangements for setting up a five-power conference.

Turning to substantive aspects of the Korean phase of the Conference, the Secretary said that he was pleased that the ROK would

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2 For documentation on the four-power exploratory talks at the Palais Rose, Mar. 5–June 21, 1951, see Foreign Relations, 1951, volume iii.
be represented at Geneva, observing that it would not be possible to have an effective conference without ROK representation. He expressed the hope that the ROK would take an active and leading part in the presentation of its case since after all it was the country primarily concerned in this matter, representing as it did the only lawful government recognized by the UN and having 75–80 percent of all the Korean people.

The Secretary stated there was one matter of substance which he knew had been considered in previous meetings and which he had discussed in London with Mr. Eden. It went very much to the fundamentals. It was the question whether this conference should be regarded as one which we would try to make succeed in achieving the unity and independence of Korea, or whether as a conference in which we more or less concede in advance that our objective is impossible of achievement and, therefore, look upon it as a conference for propaganda utterances by the two sides.

Mr. Dulles said that the US was disposed to the view that our side should make a really earnest effort to bring about the unity and independence of Korea at this conference. Of course he recognized that the chance of success was not great, and if he were making up a book, he would have to give considerable odds against a successful conference. The ROK, he noted, felt even more strongly on this point. On the other hand, the United States did not feel that the situation should be looked upon as utterly hopeless. We should at least begin the conference with the genuine desire to make it succeed.

In this connection, the Secretary noted a certain gain at Berlin in getting the Soviet Union to agree to include in the resolution constituting the invitation to the conference, the statement that the independence and unity of Korea would be a step that would increase the likelihood of peace and the relaxation of tension generally. In this way the principle of the unity and independence of Korea had already been established in the resolution which was the Charter of the Geneva Conference; in his opinion that represented a substantial advance. Mr. Dulles did not mean that the USSR would necessarily try to bring this about, but it was a step in the right direction; the conference could start out with a concept of recognition on the part of those who extended and accepted the invitation that the unity and independence of Korea is important in the relaxation of tensions and the cessation of fighting elsewhere in Asia. Mr. Dulles noted also the implicit, if not explicit relationship between the unification and independence of Korea to the end of the fighting in Indochina.

The practical significance of approaching the conference on the basis of trying to bring about unification, the Secretary indicated, was that we should not put forward our final position first. He explained that
trading with the Communists was a painful type of proposition, and that it was necessary to have some possibility for compromise or exchange if we expected to get results.

Mr. Dulles went on to say that the general position which the United States had in mind at the beginning of the conference would reflect the fact that the United Nations had already established a program for the unification and independence of Korea that would do precisely what the Berlin communique said should be accomplished. In 1950, the General Assembly had set up a commission to take the necessary steps to achieve unification. Because of the Chinese Communist intervention it had not been practical for the UN Commission to proceed with its task. It therefore seemed logical to suggest, now that the fighting was over and when it was incumbent upon Communist China to purge itself of wrongdoing, that the interrupted UN program should be carried forward.

That program, Mr. Dulles continued, was sound and entirely moral, and it also included certain elements about which we could bargain later if it seemed necessary or desirable to do so. It would mean holding elections in the area not yet covered by UN elections, and in that way completing the task that the United Nations began in 1948.

He appreciated that there were a number of governments, perhaps including his own, who recognized that probably a finally acceptable solution would not be achieved. However, if we were to start out by having traded down our position among ourselves to what might be our final best position, we would have nothing to trade with the Communists later. Our experience with them, Mr. Dulles said, pointed to the desirability of proceeding on a trading basis rather than putting forward a final, ideal position to which we would have to stick. If the conference were solely a propaganda exercise, of course we should begin with a generous, liberal position which the world would regard as fair. If, however, we started on that basis with a non-trading position, we must also assume that the conference could not succeed in achieving Korean unification. It might still succeed as a good propaganda demonstration, but we had to choose between the two theories. Faced with this choice, the United States considered that we should go into the conference with a position that is on the one hand entirely moral, but on the other hand, on which it might be possible to make some concessions.

Mr. Dulles went on to say that he had discussed this general position in London with Mr. Eden who had indicated that the position seemed sound to him. He repeated that we should begin the conference with
a vague and general approach and not burn our bridges behind us until we find out what moves and proposals the other side has in mind.

The Secretary cautioned that what he had said was subject to further discussions with the ROK Delegation at Geneva; there was of course no possibility of accomplishing the desired result except in terms acceptable to the ROK. The conference could not impose a settlement on the ROK which is rejected. As the subject of the conference, the views of the ROK were entitled to carry a great measure of weight.

[Here follows the remainder of the briefing which dealt with Indochina and is printed on page 535.]

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396.1-GE/4-2954: Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State*

**CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY**

PARIS, April 20, 1954—6 p.m.

3960. Repeated information priority Geneva 83, London 944. Re-Deptel 3689, April 15.1 Chauvel and Lacoste, who have just returned from Geneva, sent for Achilles this morning to discuss seating arrangements. Achilles said these discussions going on in Washington and could not be duplicated here, to which they agreed but wished in any event to explain situation with help of plan of Council Chamber they had brought back. Briefly their view was that "auditorium type" arrangement would be difficult and expensive to install, would presumably result in there being only one microphone at rostrum instead of one at each place which would change character of meeting from that of conference to that of an assembly. To avoid this they favored closing fourth side of existing three-sided table.

Achilles reminded them of strength of US position as stated reference telegram that US might attend conference only as observer rather than accept seating arrangement which did not make clear distinction between Communists and other participants. They had not realized we felt so strongly (it was not clear whether French Embassy Washington had softened its report or whether Chauvel and Lacoste had merely not seen it) and indicated considerable concern. They mentioned possibility of assigning one side of square table to Communist bloc and seating remainder around other three sides.

Achilles reiterated strength of our feeling on subject and that it must be negotiated in Washington rather than here but said he would forward their views.

*Dillon*

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1 Same as telegram 5451, Apr. 15, to London, p. 102.
396.1-GE/4-2054: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, April 20, 1954—6:35 p.m.
PRIORITY

3767. For the Ambassador. Please deliver following personal message to Bidault from the Secretary:

"My dear friend: I am very disturbed to learn that you do not find it possible to agree with the proposals that have been made for the physical arrangement of our meeting place in Geneva. As you know, this has been under discussion by our representatives in Geneva and was also discussed with UK and French representatives in Washington by the Acting Secretary on April 15. The UK has agreed to our proposal in this regard, and I had not until today understood that France perceived any objection thereto.

You are of course aware of discussions that have thus far taken place at Geneva between our representatives and the Soviet representative and the determined attempt by the Soviet representative to transform the Geneva Conference into a "Big Five" conference in flagrant disregard of the understanding we reached at Berlin. I am sure that you agree we cannot permit this. In an effort to meet the problem we have suggested a seating arrangement of three rows with eight delegates and advisers in the first two rows and three delegations in the third row seated according to English alphabet left to right, with speakers rostrum facing delegates. There are numerous precedents for such arrangements in conferences of this kind.

I earnestly hope that you will reconsider your decision in the light of the foregoing so that our representatives in Geneva can be appropriately instructed.

If the Conference is to meet April 26, the physical arrangements must be decided and the work undertaken immediately. Since the Soviet representatives at Geneva have shown no disposition to discuss seriously the necessary arrangements with a view to reaching an agreement, I think it is essential that our side agree on instructions to the UN which will permit the Conference to begin on April 26. If this done the Soviets will have to bear the responsibility for any delay in the opening of the Conference arising from a failure on their part to accept reasonable physical arrangements.

I look forward to seeing you Thursday,¹ but I believe this matter to be so urgent it should not await my arrival. Sincerely, John Foster Dulles."²

Dulles

¹ Apr. 22.
² No direct reply from Bidault has been found, nor is it likely that one was sent since Dulles' message probably arrived in Paris early on Apr. 21. By the time of the meeting on Apr. 22, the French Government had agreed to the idea of auditorium seating, but without a speaker's rostrum (see the minutes of the Apr. 22 meeting, p. 127). Documentation in file 396.1-GE indicates that French acquiescence in the US-UK seating plan was transmitted from the Foreign Ministry to Geneva by telephone, so that arrangements could be begun to have the Conference room ready by Apr. 26.
Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State

OFFICIAL USE ONLY  NIACT  Moscow, April 20, 1954—9 p. m.

1286. Repeated information niact Paris 275, niact London 206. Pass Geneva. At 8 p. m. April 20 Soviet "aide-mémoire" (number 22 OSA) was delivered to Embassy by messenger. Translation is as follows:

"In connection with aide-mémoire to [of] Governments USA, France and England of April 14 ¹ regarding question of preparations for convocation Geneva Conference, Soviet Government, in agreement with Government Chinese People's Republic, considers it necessary to state following:

Decision taken by Ministers Foreign Affairs of four powers at Berlin provides that Geneva Conference shall be conference of representatives USA, France, England, Chinese People's Republic and USSR taking part in discussion Korean question and question of re-establishment peace in Indochina which are on conference agenda, with participation other interested states for appropriate questions. It therefore, appears expedient, as has already been indicated in USSR's aide-mémoire of April 5,² to establish that English, French, Chinese and Russian be among (v-chisle) the official languages during course of whole Geneva Conference. It goes without saying that, during discussion of question of re-establishment peace in Indochina, question of other official languages besides those indicated above can be examined in addition."

Bohlen

¹ Text in telegram 643, Apr. 9, to Moscow, p. 89.
² Text in telegram 1196, Apr. 5, from Moscow, p. 70.

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Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State

OFFICIAL USE ONLY  NIACT  Moscow, April 21, 1954—2 p. m.

1289. Repeated information niact London 207, Paris niact 276, Geneva niact unnumbered. Following is translation text of note received this morning in reply to our note of April 14 ¹ on interpretation Berlin agreement:

"Number 23/OSA. In connection with note of Government of USA of April 14 Government of USSR considers it necessary to state following:

Aide-mémoire of Ministry of Foreign Affairs USSR of April 5 in which reference is made to note of Government USA in connec-

¹ See telegrams 642, Apr. 9, to Moscow and 1225, from Moscow, Apr. 10, pp. 88 and 89.
tion with question of composition of participants of forthcoming conference in Geneva, is in full accordance with communiqué of Berlin conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of USA, England, France and USSR.

Assertion in above-mentioned note of Government USA alleging that at Berlin conference agreement was reached concerning special responsibilities of four powers in connection with calling of conference in Geneva does not have any basis since, as is known, at Berlin conference there was no other agreement on question of calling conference in Geneva except that announced in joint communiqué on Berlin conference. Above-mentioned communiqué does not envisage any limitation or concession of any special rights to individual participants in conference. Only distinction between participants conference, according this communiqué, is that representatives of USA, England, France, Chinese People's Republic and Soviet Union will participate on equal basis during consideration at conference of both Korean and Indochinese questions, whereas other states will participate on basis of equality in discussion only of that question in which they are directly interested.

Therefore, statement in note of Government US about special responsibility of four powers in relation to conference in Geneva is arbitrary interpretation of communiqué of Berlin conference and is in contradiction with spirit and letter this communiqué.

In connection with communiqué of Berlin conference, representatives of five powers mentioned above should participate on equal basis in examining all questions pertaining to conference.3

British and French Embassies state similar notes received by them this morning.

BOHLEN

Secretary's memoranda of conversation, lot 64 D 199

United States Minutes of a Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting ¹

[Extracts]

SECRET

PARIS, April 22, 1954—4 p.m.

Reply to Latest Soviet Note on Geneva

M. Bidault opened the meeting by stating that there was no fixed agenda and as the host he would make the first statement. Referring initially to the tripartite reply to the Soviet Note regarding the inviting powers for the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference, M. Bidault read a U.S.-French draft of a reply (See Tab A).² He stressed the need to reply clearly to the false Soviet allegations regarding

¹ Dulles was in Paris at this time for a NATO Ministerial meeting prior to the opening of the Geneva Conference on Apr. 26. The list of participants on the source text indicates that Dulles was assisted by 9 American advisers, Eden by 5 British advisers, and Bidault by 11 French advisers.

² See the annex to this document, below.
composition of the Geneva Conference. He stressed that it had always been understood that special responsibility devolved on the four Berlin powers, and that in any event we should not open the Geneva Conference by violating the basis of the understanding on which the meeting was set up.

Mr. Eden suggested that the last sentence of the draft be put in the positive rather than the negative sense and that it should stress the fact that the Geneva Conference must be held on the basis under which it was established at Berlin. M. Bidault and the Secretary agreed with this thought.

[Here follows the portion of the document dealing with participation in the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference and other matters concerning Southeast Asia, printed on page 544.]

**Seating Arrangements**

Mr. Eden said that unfortunately there were certain procedural arrangements which must be settled today, especially the question of seating, since it was his understanding that otherwise the wiring of the hall at Geneva would not be ready on April 26th. He said he was willing to accept any arrangements that his colleagues wanted, but felt that a decision must be reached.

The Secretary said that it was his understanding, from talking with Geneva by telephone and from a telegram we had received,\(^3\) that substantial agreement had been reached with the Soviets accepting the U.S.–U.K. proposal. He noted that the Soviets had proposed certain changes, including daily rotation of seats. The Secretary said we were opposed to this and favored a fixed seating plan, but would not break up the Conference on this point and would accept the Soviet position if they insisted. The Secretary said that the Soviets wished four seats in the front row and four seats behind for each delegation—an arrangement which required too many seats since the hall only seated a total of eighty-four and there were nineteen delegations.

In conclusion the Secretary said he believed that there was general agreement on seating arrangements, and he believed the outstanding problems were easily soluble. He said we understand M. Bidault's desire to have a microphone before the Chairman of each delegation in order to avoid having every speaker proceed to a rostrum. He said that while the installations might not be everything that we wanted when the Conference opened, they would be ready in a few days. Mr. Eden said that he was gratified to see that we were all in agreement and said that our representatives at Geneva should be informed accordingly.

\(^3\) Not printed.
Chairmanship

Mr. Eden said that he thought we should take a preliminary look at the chairmanship problem, especially if we want help from the outside. He said he favored rotation among the Big Four but realized this was impractical because the Soviets would propose rotation among the Five, including Communist China which was unacceptable. Therefore, he said we must see if there was some other rotation scheme, or if there was one man who could be selected as chairman. With regard to the suggestion that the Secretary-General of the UN be chairman, Mr. Eden stated that he considered this undesirable since the UN had taken a position opposing the aggressor in Korea, and accordingly could hardly be considered an impartial judge in hearing the Korean case.

The Secretary said that we had one other suggestion. He said he agreed with Mr. Eden’s analysis of the problem, including the undesirability of having the UN Secretary-General as permanent chairman, but thought we might find a Swiss personality who could serve as chairman. The Secretary stressed that he would not be representing his Government. M. Bidault agreed that we should explore this possibility. The Secretary listed the names of four people who had been suggested by our Ambassador in Switzerland. M. Bidault agreed that three of the four would be worth examining but that Mr. Stucki, who was one of the candidates, would not be desirable from the French viewpoint because of a book which he had written regarding the Vichy regime. The Secretary and Mr. Eden agreed that Rappart, who was one of the suggested candidates, was probably too old, and too professorial a personality. It was agreed that we would examine carefully the other two candidates, Burckhart and de Salis, both of whom it was thought would be excellent candidates, though it was far from certain whether either would accept.

Other Topics

M. Bidault said that he feared we would have to meet again on Indochina before Geneva since we were faced with many procedural difficulties and still had not settled the participation question.

Mr. Eden said that Mr. Pearson and Mr. Casey had raised with him in London the problem of how to maintain contact with the delegations of the other anti-Communist countries at Geneva. He said he was willing to repeat the formula which had been worked out at Berlin where all of the free-world delegations met together to exchange views at the expert’s level every morning. He said he also thought one meeting of all the Foreign Ministers on our side should be held before the Geneva meeting opened, Sunday afternoon or Monday morning.\footnote{Apr. 25-26.}
M. Bidault stated that France had made certain concessions on arrangements regarding seating, while the U.S. had made a concession regarding the elimination of a rostrum. He said we would, of course, begin with the conference on Korea which we were ready to start talking, but would have to hold parallel talks outside on Indochina on which phase, even though it is a more urgent problem, we were not ready. He concluded saying he did not believe there would be any activity on any item for two or three days after April 26, though we should, of course, get on as fast as possible.

[Here follow three paragraphs which dealt with a brief discussion of a reply to the Soviet note of March 31 concerning a European security pact; for text, see volume V.]

In concluding the meeting, M. Bidault stated that at least we had today agreed to the reply to the Soviet note rejecting the five-power concept for Geneva and had, he hoped, laid to rest that Soviet scheme. It was agreed that the press would be informed only that we had held a preliminary review of preparations for Geneva. It was also agreed that the three Foreign Ministers would meet again on Saturday, April 24 at 4:00 p.m. to continue their talks, and that the press would be so informed.5

[Annex—Tab A]

U.S.-French Draft Reply to Soviet Note of April 21 (As revised on April 22—and delivered on April 23)


“U.S. Government rejects contention of Soviet Government that ‘Chinese People’s Republic’ should enjoy any special position with respect to conference at Geneva. This issue was fully debated at Berlin, and agreement reached between Four Powers represented at Berlin with reference to Geneva Conference clearly excludes any special position for ‘Chinese People’s Republic’. It follows that it will be special responsibility of four sponsoring governments to reach agreement as to States to which invitations will be issued for Indo-China discussions.

“Government of U.S. expects that Berlin agreement will be scrupulously observed and [is not willing] that Geneva Conference [should be predicated upon a violation of the basic agreement upon which Geneva Conference rests]6 shall take place under conditions laid down by that agreement.”7

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5 For a report on the meeting, see telegram Secto 14, Apr. 24, from Paris, p. 139.
6 Brackets in the source text.
7 For further documentation relating to invitations and procedural matters concerning the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference, see pp. 727 ff.
KOREAN PHASE

BASIC POSITION PAPER ON KOREAN REUNIFICATION

The attached paper, revised by Mr. Young, contains the three alternative plans which would each meet the U.S. objectives of a non-Communist, independent and representative government in Korea.

A full description of each of these three alternative plans is contained in the following documents:

Plan A—Administrative Incorporation of North Korea into the Existing Republic of Korea (GK D–4/7)

Plan B—Elections in North and South Korea for Establishment of Korean National Government within the ROK Constitutional Structure (GK D–4/10)

Plan C—All-Korean Elections for Constituent Assembly, New Government and New National Government (GK D–4b)

CHRISTOPHER VAN HOLLEN

[Attachment]

Position Paper Prepared for the Korean Phase of the Geneva Conference

GK D–4/1e

BASIC POSITION PAPER ON KOREAN REUNIFICATION

Problem

To develop a plan for Korean reunification and the withdrawal of foreign forces which will be in consonance with United States national policies on Korea, and which will resolve the different views of the ROK, the United States and our other allies.

Purpose of Conference and Basic U.S. Objective

The Geneva Conference on Korea is called pursuant to Paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement and the Berlin Communiqué, whereby the two belligerent sides are to meet to seek a peaceful settlement of the Korean question considering that the establishment by peaceful means of a united and independent Korea would be an important fac-

1 Dated Apr. 9, p. 82.
2 Dated Apr. 16, p. 105.
3 Dated Mar. 27, p. 62.
tor in reducing international tension and in restoring peace in other parts of Asia.

The general purpose of the United States at Geneva is to seek an agreement to a plan for the reunification of Korea which will establish a non-Communist, independent and representative government constituted by independently supervised elections, and which will provide for the orderly, phased withdrawal of foreign forces synchronized with that plan.

**General Principles and Considerations:**

The United States, the Republic of Korea, and their Allies should:

1. Maintain a position of strength and stability in free Korea which will lessen ROK fear of abandonment, and avoid actions which in the ROK may cause confusion, or public turmoil, leading to a weakening of public morale.

2. Affirm that the ROK is the only sovereign, lawful government in Korea; that it must not be equated with the North Korean regime; that the ROK cannot legally or morally be liquidated without its consent, which it is unlikely to give; and that the ROK has the fundamental and primary interest in the manner of unifying Korea.

3. Seek the unification within the constitutional framework of the ROK State, and in keeping with the spirit and purposes of past United Nations resolutions to the greatest extent possible, recognizing that any constitutional changes desired by the new Assembly can be worked out within the ROK constitution.

4. Maintain a united front at the Conference among the allies, the United States and the Republic of Korea (a) in the presentation and negotiation of the unification of Korea, and (b) in restricting the Korean phase of the Conference solely to Korean matters, despite Communist attempts to introduce broader issues.

5. Assume that the Korean Phase of the Geneva Conference will be a serious negotiation to bring about, if at all possible the independence and unification of Korea. Therefore, maintain some flexibility for maneuver, while at the same time develop a full and common understanding of the basic principles regarding unification and withdrawal on which they will not compromise.

6. Acknowledge that the United States should assume leadership on the allied side in close partnership, if possible, with the Republic of Korea, in view of the heavy sacrifices and commitments made by both the US and the ROK to repel Communist aggression in Korea. Without ROK-US endorsement or support, no proposal will be effective.

7. Determine whether the Communists will (1) insist on controlling part of all Korea, or (2) renounce any special position in Korea and agree to set up "a united Korea for free Koreans"; if the former is the case, recognize that no formula can succeed, and unmask Communist aggressive intentions.

8. Although recognizing that the Communists may not agree to any proposal put forward by our side on Korea’s unification, formulate our plans and proposals in such a way that their implementation would protect and preserve our interests if they were accepted by the Com-
munists and make clear our implementation of such plans will be conditioned on Communist performance.

9. Compose existing differences on various phases of plan for unifying Korea in order to arrive at a common formula that can be strongly and favorably presented and negotiated at the Conference, if the Communists have any intention of entering into real discussions rather than just propaganda.

10. Emerge from the Conference in a strong moral and political position by presenting and negotiating proposals commending themselves as fair, reasonable and workable to the world at large and which, if not accepted by the Communists, will make clear their responsibility for failure to reach agreement on Korea's unification at Geneva.

The Republic of Korea Position

The Republic of Korea will probably subscribe in general to the above objectives and principles.

Specifically, the Republic of Korea will:

1. Oppose any unification plan violating ROK sovereignty and any proposals for a "neutralized Korea", a coalition government or north-south arrangements placing the North Korean regime on an equal basis with the Republic of Korea.

2. Propose first the withdrawal of all Chinese forces from Korea, extension of ROK sovereignty over North Korea, and elections held by the ROK in North Korea to fill the seats in the ROK National Assembly available for representatives from the North.

3. Argue against simultaneous elections in South Korea, but possibly acquiesce in such elections provided ROK sovereignty is preserved.

4. Reject plans for a constituent assembly, new constitution and new government as an initial position and possibly all through the Conference.

5. Accept phased withdrawal of foreign forces, if coupled with reunification.

Position of Other United States Allies

Our other allies, and particularly the Commonwealth, will:

1. subscribe in general to the above principles;

2. go along with the general US position at the beginning of the Conference, but question proposals for elections only in North Korea.

3. prefer a formula for reunification along the general lines of that proposed by the United States, France and the United Kingdom for Germany, i.e., completely fresh start in Korea to form a new government;

4. possibly insist on such a formula as the final Allied position after others fail;

5. object strongly to any proposal that simply provides for incorporation of North Korea into South Korea without some new constitutional act;
6. emphasize the importance of proposals that will appear reasonable and acceptable to world opinion;
7. insist on tactical flexibility at Geneva.

Communist Position

The Communists will probably:
1. Do their utmost to broaden discussions on specious, deceptive lines, such as a general Far East security pact, lessening of tensions and recognition of the independence and security of all states;
2. Oppose any plans that would remove or weaken their control and hegemony in North Korea, and not make real concession that would create a free, united Korea;
3. Propose (a) withdrawal of all armed foreign forces in Korea so that the “Koreans themselves” may bring about their own unification; (b) elaborate measures for the establishment of a provisional government over all Korea designed to give the Communists predominance and based on equal status of the north and south; and (c) national elections to take place at some indefinite time after the establishment of this provisional government and to be carried out “by the Koreans themselves” without any international supervision.

General United States Position

In the light of United States policies in Korea, the ROK attitude, and the Allied position, the United States position should be based on the following two general propositions:
1. Utilization of ROK Constitutional Structure
   A. It is essential, from the United States point of view, to develop proposals within the framework of legitimacy, sovereignty and integrity of the political system, and constitutional structure of the ROK State in principle. This would:

      (1) preserve the integrity of the nation and people which fought with much allied and United Nations blood and treasure, for three years against Communist aggressors;
      (2) give voice to the viewpoint of the overwhelming majority of the Korean people; and
      (3) not put the ROK on a par with the North Korean regime.

2. Continuation of United Nations Resolutions
   A. Our proposals should serve in general to resume the program for Korea’s unification which the UN undertook in 1948–1950 and which the Communists frustrated by refusal to cooperate by North Korean aggression in June 1950 and by Chinese Communist intervention in November 1950. Allied plans for the unification of Korea should apply the general principles of previous United Nations plans for unification of Korea, which are contained in the General Assembly resolutions of November 14, 1947, December 12, 1948, October 7, 1950, Decem-
ber 1, 1950, and August 28, 1953. The principal points of these resolutions are:

(1) The United Nations objective is to assist the Korean people in re-establishing their freedom, independence and unity which are their urgent and rightful claims, recognizing that the Korean question is primarily a matter for the Korean people;

(2) National independence of Korea should be re-established and foreign forces withdrawn thereafter;

(3) Elections should be held on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot and the number of representatives from the voting districts should be proportionate to population; elections should be observed by an international commission with freedom to observe and consult throughout Korea;

(4) The ROK is the only lawful sovereign government in any part of Korea in so far as the United Nations is concerned;

(5) The United Nations has in being a commission with personnel and experience to carry out the terms of reference on Korean unification established in the General Assembly Resolution of October 7, 1950;

(6) The United Nations has in being an agency to rehabilitate all Korea once it is unified.

Specific Plans for the Unification of Korea

1. Generally speaking, there are three possible plans which might bring about a non-Communist, independent and representative government in a united Korea, if the Communists were to cooperate in implementing any one of them. These plans are consistent with the above two propositions in different and varying degrees.

   Plan “A”—Incorporation of North Korea into the Existing Republic of Korea (GK D–4/7).

   1. The key elements of Plan “A” would include:

      (a) free elections to be held only in north Korea for representation in the ROK National Assembly to complete processes carried out under UN supervision in 1948 in the area south of the 38th Parallel. That election was held to effect the unity and independence in Korea and was regarded by the electorate and the Temporary UN Commission as a “step” in reestablishing the independence in Korea. The General Assembly considered it a “further development” of representative Government in Korea.

      (b) the elections should be supervised and observed in north Korea by the UNCURK in a manner similar to the work of the UN Temporary Commission of 1948 with regard to conforming north Korean electoral laws and conditions to the principles of General Assembly resolutions of 1947 and 1950–53 in order to establish at least minimum conditions for free elections during a period of 90 days before elections. UNCURK must have authority to: (1) move and observe freely; (2) propose measures for insuring an atmosphere of free elections; (3) set date for such elections; (4) determine the number of representatives to be elected proportionate to the relative population in north
and south Korea; (5) certify election of valid expression of the will of the people; and (6) make recommendations and observe the orderly transfer of functions and authority from all administrative levels of north Korea where elections in accordance with the foregoing have been properly carried out, to the lawful government of a united Korea.

(c) application of ROK constitutional authority over all Korea after completion remaining constituent act, under UN resolutions, of elections in North Korea, with inherent right of expanded National Assembly to amend constitution as now provided for, if it desired;

(d) withdrawal of foreign military forces before and after convection of expanded ROK National Assembly, observed and verified by UNCURK during stages and on completion;

(e) application by United States of US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty to entire Korean Peninsula;

(f) supersession of the armistice agreement, after UNCURK verifies completion above steps;

(g) rehabilitation of all Korea by the United Nations Reconstruction Agency for Korea.

2. General Comments

(a) Plan A meets the requirement for preserving the ROK constitutional system. The ROK will probably endorse it and would become the government and State for all Korea. Our Allies will only reluctantly support this Plan because it calls for elections only in north Korea. The Communists will certainly reject Plan A.

(b) Plan A is not inconsistent with past efforts of the UN to achieve Korea's unification if it is viewed as additional step to complete the program begun in 1948 in south Korea. However, the General Assembly resolution of October 7, 1950 and its legislative history imply that UNCURK was to set up elections throughout Korea for a government of a united Korea, although under the conditions then prevailing the ROK would have won overwhelmingly in north and south.

(c) If the Communists really complied with the UN Commission's terms of reference to the same extent as U.S. military government and the interim South Korean authorities did in 1948, the elections in north Korea would be free and the results safeguarded. Under such conditions, the ROK would win a large majority.

Plan “B”—Elections in North and South Korea for Establishment of Korean National Government within the ROK Constitutional Structure

1. The key elements of Plan B are:

(a) free elections would be held throughout Korea under the ROK constitution of which Article 32 provides that elections shall be arranged by legislation passed by the Assembly and Article 4 refers to the entire territory of Korea.

(b) Pursuant to the provisions of Chapter IX, Article 98 of the Constitution of the ROK as adopted July 12, 1948, and amended July 4, 1952, the expanded National Assembly would be expected after these elections to meet in its constituent capacity to consider adoption
or amendment of the Constitution in whole or in part, so as to provide a form of constitutional government satisfactory to the entire Korean people. The Constitution may be amended by two-thirds' vote of the National Assembly. This would be consistent with UN resolutions. While preserving the framework of the existing constitution and political system, it would permit the people of a unified Korea to choose their own form of government in accordance with the existing constitution.

(c) Elections to be observed by UNCURK in the same manner as indicated in paragraph (b) of Plan A and in accordance with the 9A Resolution of October 7, 1950. Minimum conditions for free elections to be established and verified by UNCURK in Korea 90 days before election date and to include:

(1) Freedom of presentation and movement of candidates within North and South Korea respectively, but not between both areas;
(2) Immunity of candidates from arrest or coercion;
(3) Freedom of expression;
(4) Secrecy of vote;
(5) Security of polling stations and ballot boxes.

(d) Representation in all-Korea National Assembly to be based on population ratio between North and South Korea.

(e) Convocation of all-Korea National Assembly to consider ROK Constitution and pass basic uniform laws for all Korea.

(f) Election for President for all Korea on basis universal suffrage and secret ballot in all Korea.

(g) Phased withdrawal of foreign forces before and after elections to be completed within 12 months after formation of National Government of Korea and observed and unified by the UNCURK. Withdrawal to start 90 days before election date.

(h) Application by U.S. of U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty to entire Korean Peninsula, coupled with such assurances of Korea's political independence and territorial integrity as are feasible.

(i) Supersession of the Armistice Agreement, after UNCURK has verified above measures have been carried out.

(j) Rehabilitation of all Korea.

2. Comments

(a) Plan “B” is more likely to obtain the approval of both the ROK and our other Allies which is not the case with Plan “A” or Plan “C”. The Communists will probably oppose it.

(b) Plan B contains the essence of our two general propositions. Plan “B” reflects the spirit and the provision of General Assembly resolutions on the unification of Korea more than Plan “A” does. While Plan “B” provides for elections in both North and South Korea for a National Assembly and President, it would do so under the ROK Constitutional system.

(c) In addition to holding elections throughout Korea, the feature distinguishing Plan “B” from Plan “A” is the intention to have the
Assembly act in a constituent capacity to consider the ROK Constitu-
tion. The Assembly could also provide for presidential elections.

**Plan “C”—All-Korean Elections for Constituent Assembly New Government and New National Government**

1. The key elements of Plan “C” are:

   (a) Formation of a new commission to supervise elections and bring
       about new all-Korean government to replace ROK and PDROK.
   (b) Establishment of conditions throughout Korea for free elec-
       tions.
   (c) Free elections throughout Korea for a constituent assembly.
   (d) Convocation of constituent assembly.
   (e) Adoption of constitution, formation of reunified Government
       for all Korea, and transfer of power to such government from
       predecessor states.
   (f) International assurances on the territorial integrity and politi-
       cal independence of a reunified Korea.
   (g) Mutual phased withdrawals of foreign military forces from
       Korea to be completed 12 months after date of formation of new
       national government for Korea, and to be observed and verified by
       the new commission.
   (h) Dissolution of the Commission and supersession of the armistice
       agreement.
   (i) Rehabilitation of all Korea through international contributions
       and international agency.

2. Comments

   (a) The ROK would be strongly opposed to Plan “C” because the
       ROK would be superseded, and it would be on a par with the North
       Korean regime.
   (b) The Commonwealth and general opinion in many countries of
       the world would prefer Plan “C” to Plan “B” on the grounds that
       Plan “C” is more objective and impartial vis-à-vis the present Korean
       authorities, and gives the entire voting population in Korea a chance
       to make a completely new start, and thus fulfill UN resolutions. An-
       other argument for Plan “C” is that the same general plan proposed
       by the three powers for Germany should be applied to Korea. Plan
       “C” does resemble the Eden Plan for Germany.
   (c) The Communists probably would not accept such a plan unless
       they considered it necessary as a precedent for Indo-China.

**United States Courses of Action Regarding Specific Plans:**

To retain initiative and flexibility in an attempt to negotiate an
agreement at Geneva on the unification and independence of Korea, the
United States should:

1. Obtain ROK and allied endorsement to the two propositions and
   the general principles and considerations outlined above;
2. Seek ROK agreement to Plan “B” on the understanding that the
   ROK, if it desires, may present Plan “A” as its opening position at
   the Conference;
3. Limit ourselves, at the beginning of the Conference, to:

(a) a review of the frustrated history of Korean unification and the reasons for holding a conference on Korea, and

(b) an exposure of Communist conduct in Korea, particularly their circumvention of the Armistice Agreement;

4. Manoeuvre to have the Communists show their hand during the Conference before the United States and its allies advance any basic proposals;

5. Arrange with our allies to have the ROK lead off, with our side's general endorsement, with Plan "A", particularly with regard to elections only in North Korea;

6. Have Plan "B" introduced with full allied backing at an appropriate time after the Communist position and the initial ROK position have been hopelessly deadlocked.

7. Keep Plan "C" in reserve possibly for consideration, if it develops that the Communists show signs of desiring seriously to negotiate the peaceful settlement of the Korean question that will provide for the independence and unification of a free Korea;

8. Insist on the coupling of the withdrawal of foreign forces with acceptable plans for Korea's unification, and refrain from any consideration of second-stage plans during the discussion at the Conference of the unification and independence of Korea.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627. CF 241 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

PARIS, April 24, 1954—11 p. m.

Sec 14. Repeated information Geneva 118, London 965, Moscow 320, Saigon 472, Seoul 2. At tripartite meeting this afternoon between Secretary, Eden and Bidault, it was agreed Bidault would transmit note dated 24 April to Eden, Secretary and Molotov, calling for a meeting at Geneva 11:30 a.m. 26 April, to discuss "a certain number of points touching on the organization of the conference with regard to Indochina." It was also decided Eden would request a meeting with Molotov Monday morning to resolve outstanding questions on Korean phase conference. Principal unresolved question now appears to be chairmanship. On chairmanship, it was agreed first position should be rotation chairmanship among US, UK, French and USSR. Any Soviet proposal for rotation among US, UK, France, USSR and Communist China will be categorically rejected and rotation among 19 also be rejected. Second position will be choice of permanent chairman from among delegations eliminating "Big Four" from consideration and rejecting North Korea or Communist China. Will accept

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1 Not printed.
anyone our side putting forward Pearson, Prince Wan, Ambassador Xueleta [Zuleta]. For third position, will suggest Swiss national, Jean de Salis. Are also considering possibility Swedish nationals Ekeberg, President Court of Appeals Stockholm, Richard Sandler and Bertil Ohlin. (Separate telegram being sent Stockholm asking views on these men.) Failing agreement foregoing, suggestion will be made conference meet under provisional chairman (chosen so as exclude any possibility Communist China, North Korea) but with first order business conference selection permanent chairman presumably by majority vote.

Question composition Indochinese phase discussed. Bidault making suggestion three Associated States and three limitrophes states. Eden stated Casey would be "bothered by" inclusion Thailand and Burma and exclusion Australia. Secretary pointed out if Australia invited, probably would have to invite Indonesia and strongly reiterated fact that Communist China had been invited only as it was the source of aggression in Indochina and had in its power the control Indochinese war and not in any "Big Five" sense. Bidault stated French desire keep conference small as possible and difficulties excluding Ho from conference. Three Ministers agreed that initial position on participation would be four plus Communist China and three Associated States.

Bidault made suggestion that French, English, Russian and Chinese be considered official languages for Indochinese phase and that technical arrangements be left to experts in light of Korean phase precedents.

Eden suggested meeting of fifteen allied side prior to opening of conference and Secretary agreed to hold such a meeting at US delegation offices 11 a.m. Monday.⁴

Dulles

⁴ See telegram Secto 9, Apr. 26, from Geneva, p. 143.
Dean discussed with Yang who has shown them to Pyun. 1 Pyun stated he under strict instructions from Rhee first propose unconditional withdrawal Chinese Communist forces before UN withdrawal and unification. Secretary replied such proposal could cause much trouble for our side because Communists will propose simultaneous withdrawal all foreign forces, conference would focus on question withdrawal rather than main issue independence and unity of Korea, and UN withdrawal before unification could weaken our security position in Korea if actually carried out. Secretary used tripartite position at Berlin on German unification as illustration heart of matter should be unification and freedom for Korea as was done regarding Germany in Berlin. Secretary suggested ROK statement emphasize that theme with withdrawal of forces as part larger problem. He also said no objection Pyun including in speech desirability Chinese Communist withdrawal from Korea as evidence purging themselves of aggression but connected with unification and freedom for all Korea. Pyun also raised question general elections in Korea stating he feared Communists would make such proposal in order set precedent for Indochina where they would thereby win control by peaceful means. Secretary replied we fully aware possible consequences for Indochina proposals on Korea, therefore we are proposing as initial position elections only in North Korea. Secretary made clear to Pyun this was not final position. Pyun said since he under rigid instructions from Rhee make above proposal re withdrawal he would have refer Secretary’s views to Seoul.

It was agreed with Pyun that we would also refer matter to you for discussion with Rhee in hope he will change instructions to Pyun to emphasize primary importance seeking unification and freedom Korea rather than unconditional unilateral withdrawal Chinese Communist forces as first order precedence.

Since opening statement might have to be made Monday or Tuesday depending conference developments Secretary wishes you see Rhee soonest.

DULLES

1 The “notes” referred to have not been found in the Department of State files.

396.1-GE/4-2554: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, April 25, 1954—11 p. m.

Secto 5. Repeated information London 65 Paris 111 Moscow 10 Seoul 6. This morning the Soviets proposed slight rearrangement of alpha-
betical order seating so as place Communist Chinese directly front Soviet delegation. Plan also results in slight shift so that ROKs not directly behind North Korea as under previous plan, but remain directly front US delegation. Soviets confirmed agreement to plan at meeting this evening so that question seating now considered resolved.

Eden arriving late this evening and seeking appointment with Molotov early tomorrow morning obtain agreement on chairmanship, and other outstanding issues such as rules of procedure, restricted nature meetings, meeting hours, and speaking order. If agreement on chairman within present tripartite position, that is, four-power rotation, permanent chairman selected from delegation other than Big Four or Communist delegation, or neutral Swiss or Swedish, Eden will state further tripartite consultation required. He will suggest no formal rules procedure be adopted for conference, that speaking order be by inscription with chairman and suggest that Berlin communiqué provides sufficient agenda.

Dulles
III. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE: EFFORTS TO REACH AN AGREED POSITION WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA; MEETINGS WITH OTHER DELEGATIONS; PROPOSALS ON KOREA BY VARIOUS DELEGATIONS; ISSUANCE OF THE DECLARATION BY THE SIXTEEN; CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE (APRIL 26–JUNE 15)

APRIL 26, 1954

396.1 GE/4-2654: Telegram

First Meeting of the Heads of the 16 Allied Delegations, Geneva, April 26, 11: 10 a. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

Geneva, April 26, 1954—3 p. m.

Secto 9. Repeated information Seoul 7, Tokyo 5, Paris 115, London 69, Moscow 11. Department pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Secretary held first meeting with 16 this morning primarily concerning procedural and organizational matters. Eden met with Molotov at 10:30 and came back to report to meeting of 16 delegates. As a result of two meetings, agreements reached on following:

(1) On Chairmanship, Eden and Molotov worked out proposal of rotation among USSR, UK and Thailand. Order will be Thailand today followed by Molotov, then Eden.
(2) Speakers will be listed in order of inscription with chairman.
(3) Understood only with 16 that ROK would be first speaker for our side. Pyun not ready speak today.
(4) No rules of procedure at beginning of conference but question can be taken up later if appears some necessity for having rules, in which case General Assembly rules of procedure will be considered.
(5) Meeting would open today at 3 o'clock and meetings would be held from 3 to 7 six days a week.
(6) Agreements reached also on seating arrangements and on procedures for interpretation. In view of difficulties locating qualified Korean interpreters language of day will be French, Russian, English and then Chinese or Korean.
(7) Understood photographers will be permitted at first plenary session for 10 minutes at opening. Agreed with Molotov and 16 no press thereafter and no observer delegations.

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1 A set of minutes of this meeting (AD Verb Min/1) from which the time of the meeting is taken is in FE files, lot 60 D 330, box 14824. The meeting, at which Dulles presided, adjourned at 12:55 p. m.
2 No record of the Eden–Molotov meeting has been found in Department of State files.
3 The minutes of the meeting indicated that the seating arrangements called for the chairman to face the delegations, which were arranged according to English alphabetical order, auditorium style, in three rows of eight, nine, and three, with a microphone for the head of each delegation.
As to today's business meeting of 16, left it with Eden he would arrange with Molotov for agreement that meeting today be confined to organization.

As to agenda, 11 [16?] concurred position no formal agenda required since conference being held pursuant to Berlin agreement and since Berlin communiqué calls for peaceful settlement Korean question. Eden did not discuss agenda with Molotov.

DULLES

396.1 GE/4-2654 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation

SECRET  NIACI

SEOUL, APRIL 26, 1954—-noon.

10. Sent niac, Department 1064, repeated information niact Tokyo 632. Tokyo pass CINCUNC, For the Secretary and Robertson from Dean. Reference Geneva 5, repeated Department Secto 4, Tokyo 4.† Ambassadors Briggs and Dean saw President Rhee and acting Foreign Minister Cho and had satisfactory preliminary talks this morning. Your telegram 5 came during talk. Emphasized importance stressing unification first and making withdrawal Chinese Communist forces from north as condition thereto. President evidently believes if there are elections north and south, both Soviets and Chinese Communists will want to supervise. He suggested several times as alternative Pyun making very general statement but we stressed importance substance your telegram. Finally without committing himself as to content, agreed draft instructions Dr. Pyun which he will show us later today.‡

BRIGGS

† Dated Apr. 25, p. 140.
‡ See telegram 13, Apr. 26, from Seoul, p. 145.

396.1 GE/4-2654 : Telegram

First Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, April 26, 3:10 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

GENEVA, APRIL 26, 1954—9 p.m.


Prince Wan opened meeting at 3:10 stating he serving by agreement as temporary Chairman. He announced first order business 10 minutes

‡ A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/1) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 267. These minutes have been used to supply wording in brackets in two places in this telegram where the original was garbled.
of press photography. After photographing completed and photographers cleared room Wan [called] for proposals on chairmanship. Secretary proposed rotation between heads delegations Thailand, USSR and UK daily in that order, Thailand beginning today. Since no other proposals Wan declared proposal adopted by conference.

Wan expressed gratitude behalf his government stressing Thailand was Asian country and “conference is called upon to deal with questions relating to Asia—notably the question of Korea.” After expressing greetings to Swiss people and authorities Wan stated task conference was that set by “four inviting powers” and quoted from Berlin communiqué “the establishment, by peaceful means, of a united and independent Korea would be an important factor in reducing international tension and in restoring peace in other parts of Asia.” Wan also read statement of greeting from President Swiss Confederation and said reply would be made in name of conference in due course. He then said each chairman would choose his own assistants and invited Kural and Eddy to sit with him.

Prince Wan then made announcement of agreed procedures:

(a) Meetings daily at three except Sunday; recess at about 5 and aim to finish at 7;
(b) Speakers in order of inscription with list continued from day to day;
(c) Five official languages, language of the day to be in rotation beginning with French today, Russian tomorrow, English the day after and Chinese and Korean to follow;
(d) Meetings would be closed to press and public except as conference itself may determine;
(e) Each delegation [would conduct own] press relations, official communiqués only if conference decides.

Prince Wan then said that today’s meeting was only organizational in nature and that general discussion would begin tomorrow. He announced that ROK has already asked to be inscribed and invited other delegations to do likewise. Meeting adjourned 3:40.

Session went off exactly as agreed and hoped for. It remains to be seen whether things will go as smoothly tomorrow when Molotov is Chairman.

Dulles

396.1 GE/4–2454 : Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation
SECRET NIA CT

SEOUL, April 24 [26], 1954—8 p. m.

18. Sent Department 1068; repeated information priority Tokyo 633. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Geneva for the Secretary and Robertson
from Dean. Further reference your 5 and our 10. President Rhee had delivered by hand this afternoon following message for Secretary Dulles to deliver to Foreign Minister Pyun:

"Dear Dr. Pyun:

The following constitutes my latest instructions in connection with Geneva Conference:

"Our friends want us to make unification the first requirement while we want Chinese Communist withdrawal as first requirement. We will cooperate if our friends will make an agreement to effect that there will be no peace until Chinese Communists have withdrawn from Korea, and that no outside nation will interfere with unification program when we hold elections under United Nations' observation.

"Sincerely yours, Syngman Rhee."

Ambassadors Briggs and Dean then called on President and Acting Foreign Minister Cho and after considerable discussion President agreed on following substituted instructions for Dr. Pyun:

"You should ask Secretary Dulles to give you assurances that he will cooperate with us in bringing about unification by elections held under United Nations' observation without outside interference which shall include Chinese withdrawal. When such assurance is received you may make unification first requirement."

As you will observe, this draft not only represents considerably watered down version of his first demands, but it is result of trading him out of numerous other versions.

President asks you convey final draft (namely paragraph last quoted) to Pyun.

Briggs

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1 Dated Apr. 25, p. 140.
2 Dated Apr. 26, p. 144.

APRIL 27, 1954

396.1 GE/4-2754: Telegram

First Meeting of the Deputy Representatives of the 16 Allied Delegations, Geneva, April 27, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL Graves, April 27, 1954—9 p.m.


1 No minutes of this meeting have been found in Department of State files. The telegraphic summary printed here indicates that the meeting was held in anticipation of the Second Plenary Session on the afternoon of Apr. 27 (see infra).
in general terms U.S. position on substantive questions, following docu-
ment GK D-439 [D-4/9], April 14. Johnson emphasized we should 
not be willing to set forth detailed proposals lest Communists pick on 
details and divert attention from their failure to accept fundamental 
principles.

Allen (U.K.) said his government subscribes general objectives al-
though there might be differences in emphasis and method of ac-
ieving them. He stressed need for treating these objectives as genuine, 
not merely propaganda, and have proposals towards these objectives 
also genuine and appearing reasonable to world opinion. Proposals 
should be difficult for Communists to reject so that if conference fails, 
it will be clear failure due to Communist rejection of reasonable 
proposals.

Watt (Australia), supported generally by Allen (U.K) and La 
Coste (France), stressed desirability of avoiding impression that all 
16 reach identical positions and speak with one voice. He said so long 
as objectives are common, there is virtue in degree of variety in tactics 
and presentation.

Sarasin (Thailand), however, questioned whether it was wise to 
have difference of opinion appear in public and favored common 
approach.

Johnson (U.S.) supported Sarasin, noting Communists will be oper-
ating as one side and no reason why 16 should not work as one side. 
He said that while there would, of course, be no identity of language, 
it is important to avoid appearance that Communists are creating 
differences among us.

In reply to Philippine question, Johnson gave us impressions as to 
probable Communist position. He said they would probably insist on 
withdrawal foreign forces, and unification by joining North and South 
Korean assemblies, which would give Communists large majority in 
Assembly although North Korean population only small fraction of 
ROK. In regard to withdrawal of forces, Johnson said that even if 
Communists carry out in good faith, Chinese withdrawal would be 
only across the Yalu, whence they could come back at any time.

Turning to tactics for afternoon meeting, group agreed with U.S. 
suggestion that if Molotov seeks to bar ROK, which is inscribed as 
first speaker, from speaking first, point of order would be made by 
Colombia, but extended floor fight would be avoided.

Johnson informed group that Secretary inscribed himself so that 
he could speak in event it became necessary to reply to any statements 
Molotov might make as chairman; otherwise he would probably with-
draw his name and not enter debate today.

*Ante, p. 97.*
Johnson also said he anticipates possibility Molotov might raise question of agenda. He noted that Prince Wan had stated yesterday that purpose of meeting was set forth in Berlin communiqué. US believes we should insist on Berlin communiqué as only agenda, but Communists might propose instead paragraph 60, Armistice Agreement.

Yang (ROK), when called upon by Ambassador Johnson to give ROK views, merely took occasion to express gratitude Korean people to 16 nations which came to their aid. In reply to inquiry by Allen (UK) as to what ROK intended to say in opening statement, Yang said that it would be general historical presentation stressing unity of Korean people, North and South, and United Nations action to achieve unification.

Urrutia (Colombia) said his Ambassador will also make general presentation along lines of substantive views expressed by Ambassador Johnson.

DULLES

396.1 GE/4-2754 : Telegram

Second Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, April 27, 3:05 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE GENEVA, April 27, 1954—midnight.


Second Session Korean Political Conference.

Molotov opened meeting 3:05 p.m. and called on ROK representative.

Foreign Minister Pyun said he represented only legitimate Government Korea. Recalling 4,000 years Korean unity, he expressed regret meeting northern brethren here if they belonged to some foreign country. He expressed grief North Koreans going different way against own will under intimidation alien regime. Expressed determination free Koreans and bring deliverance North Koreans. He noted millions North Korean refugees now in ROK as proof those still in north wish cleft to ROK.

He delivered lengthy review Korean events since 1945 along well known lines with emphasis on various UN activities and decisions. He

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1 A set of minutes (US Verb Min/2), comprising 38 double-spaced pages, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 267.

said to open North Korea to UN-observed elections was only way complete UN task in manner compatible with UN resolutions. He described North Korean aggression and UN action repel and punish aggressors, saying Chinese Communist attackers should withdraw from Korea entirely accordance February 1951 UN resolution. He said linking withdrawal UN forces to Chinese departure not justified by facts, and described Communist China as Soviet puppet occupying North Korea. He called on Chinese Communists to resume traditional peaceful Chinese role Korean affairs, but said if they extended their aggression they would be encircled. He added Communists repudiating armistice terms and that if ROK decides armistice terms no longer binding it will be Communists' fault. He concluded ROK had suffered greatly as result Communist attack, but could not buy peace at price of freedom. Accordingly, he recommended cooperation all concerned achieve united, independent and democratic Korea by peaceful means.

Molotov then called representative DPROK.

After statement endorsing Geneva conference, Nam Il described principal task was achieving Korean unity by converting armistice into lasting peaceful reunification Korea on democratic principles. He recalled Korea's long history as free independent nation. He paid tribute role Soviet army in 1945 liberation which he alleged was subverted by US occupation authorities. Mentioned December 1945 Moscow agreement and read paragraph therefrom referring provisional democratic government (he avoided all reference trusteeship provisions, however), blaming US for failure to carry out agreement and for responsibilities division of Korea as well as for holding separate elections under "police pressure" and contrary Moscow agreement.

Nam then quoted from UNTCOK report passage concerning election irregularities and fact election held in only part of Korea. He alleged much progress made in North Korea in agricultural, economic and cultural fields. He contrasted North Korean adherence "peaceful unification" following August 25, 1948 elections with US control "anti-democratic" elements South Korea where no progress made. He reported DPROK had made three unification proposals which ROK failed to answer and that ROK at US instigation had attempted impose its regime North Korea. Three years war blamed on US "intervention," while he paid tribute to Communist China for help against "interventionists" who also threatened China. He continued saying 1953 armistice now opened way to peaceful unification, but said South Korea wants resume hostilities while US pouring arms into ROK with which it has concluded mutual security pact. North Korea POW question ignored but mention made 48,000 Communist

prisoners retained and allegedly impressed into ROK and Chiang armies. Withdrawal all foreign forces essential, he said, within six months, while there should be agreement all-Korea elections establish government representing whole country. He added measures preparing for elections required conference representatives North and South to establish all-Korea committee. He added committee should take measures facilitate contact between North and South. Finally, he made specific proposal Korean settlement text which already telegraphed Department (Secto 18). Molotov then called on Colombian representative (Zulueta) who said Colombia present as logical consequence her response UN appeal help repel Communist aggression Korea. He said basic principles united, independent and democratic Korea embodied four UN resolutions, Cairo declaration of 1943, Moscow agreement of 1945 and Article 60 armistice agreement. Colombia considers method unification clearly outlined November 1947 UNGA resolution which envisaged general election on basis secret vote adult population and set up UNTCOK, subsequent resolution added elections should be held in all Korea. Question remains, he continued, by what means free elections achieved, and concluded UN resolutions binding on this point. Purpose Geneva conference thus essentially to arrange genuinely free elections. These are possible only under auspices and with assistance UNCURK, he said. ROK is only legitimate Government Korea, he said, adding one possible means unification is extending to all Korea free expression will of people as already done that part Korea where UN commission operative. Second possibility is new all-Korea elections. Third possibility that North Korea and ROK decide without third party on formula for elections and unification. If elections based principle representation proportional to population this formula might be useful, he added, if North Korean elections really free. Fourth possibility might be joint North–South commission. This would be effective only if membership reflected difference in population North and South. Colombian representative concluded with following points: (1) solution must assure democratic and representative regime which will represent proportionally trends and groups in Korea, (2) no violation UN resolutions, and (3) supervision by UN. Said Colombia cannot accept premise that UN is one of belligerent powers.

4 Telegram Secto 18, Apr. 27, from Geneva, not printed. The text of Nam II's proposal, along the lines set forth above, is printed in The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, pp. 39-40.
5 Zulueta's statement is printed ibid., pp. 41-45.
Said Colombia represented at Geneva conference solely out of respect for UN decisions.

At end Colombian speech Molotov announced since only remaining speaker was US, which had indicated preference speak tomorrow, he would adjourn meeting unless some delegation objected. Since no response, he adjourned meeting at 5:15.

Comment: Meeting was conducted in extremely quiet atmosphere. Molotov presided in strictly formal fashion merely introducing speakers and making no comment on proceedings at any point. Unlike Prince Wan who summoned Turkish and US representatives to his side, Molotov was flanked by Gromyko and Troyanovsky (interpreter) and announced at outset he would be assisted by Zoldaty (USSR) and Shih Che (Communist China) who sat behind him with Zarubin throughout being consulted. All three speakers were heard passively and with no visible reaction from any other delegate.

DULLES

AUGUST 28, 1954

795.00/4-2854

Luncheon Meeting of Dulles, Eden, and Bidault, Geneva, April 28, 1 p. m.: Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Switzerland (Willis)\(^1\)

TOP SECRET

Participants:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>France</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Bidault</td>
<td>Mr. Eden</td>
<td>Secretary Dulles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Mrs. Bidault)</td>
<td>(Mrs. Eden)</td>
<td>Ambassador Willis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After the luncheon had progressed a few minutes, the Secretary stated that he would like to give consideration to the question of how to get the conference on Korea beyond the preliminary stage. He remarked that at the rate it was going the entire week might be taken up by speeches. Mr. Eden suggested that as he would be in the chair at the afternoon meeting and as no one other than the Secretary had indicated a desire to speak at the meeting, he might suggest a break at 4:00 approximately, when it was anticipated the translation of the Secretary’s speech would be finished. During the break Mr. Eden said that possibly he might consult with the other two Presidents as to what the next step might be. Mr. Eden also tentatively suggested that it might be possible for the Bureau\(^2\) to give consideration to this question.

\(^1\) The meeting took place in Dulles’ suite in the Hotel du Rhone.
\(^2\) Eden’s reference is to the group of 16 Allied nations.
It was agreed that one way to put an end to the introductory speeches would be to rule that no one who was not inscribed before noon of April 29 could speak in the preliminary phase.

The Secretary then indicated that the possibility of negotiation on Korea lay in the fact that if North Korea could be demilitarized and neutralized as a preliminary to unification, the United States would be willing to forego its rights under the treaty with the Republic of Korea to establish bases in the south and to withdraw its troops. He suggested that one way of getting things started would be for him to sound out Mr. Molotov along the above lines. Mr. Eden demurred at this suggestion and came back again to the possibility of getting discussions started in the Bureau. He admitted that that group was also probably too big for satisfactory discussion, but added that an approach there would not be as cumbersome as in the full conference.

The Secretary asked what Mr. Bidault and Mr. Eden would think of having the Five powers, plus the representatives of the two Koreas, meet together and consider ways of making progress. Both Mr. Eden and Mr. Bidault indicated a favorable reaction. The Secretary then asked Mr. Eden if there would be any difficulty in excluding Australia or New Zealand, to which Mr. Eden replied that he would not anticipate any difficulty on that score. The Secretary added that it would be necessary, before adopting such procedure, to clear it with the other Sixteen. It was considered that it might be possible to do this tomorrow (Thursday April 29) and that if the suggestion made earlier that an agreement could be reached that only those inscribed before noon of the 29th would be given the floor to speak in the full conference in this initial stage, then it might be possible at an early date to have a meeting of the Seven.

The Secretary indicated that he wanted very much to make some progress on this matter before his departure. Mr. Bidault replied that he also very much hoped it would be possible to begin to confer on Indochina. The Secretary concurred in this wish.

In the course of the luncheon, the Secretary also described Mr. Molotov's visit yesterday. The Secretary said Mr. Molotov had come and handed him a paper in Russian, which he obviously could not read. As Mr. Molotov merely sat there the Secretary suggested that they might talk about Indochina. Mr. Molotov indicated assent, but said nothing. The Secretary raised the question as to why Mr. Molotov had come, as surely it could not have been merely to deliver the document. Mr. Eden expressed the opinion that possibly the motive had been to obtain the credit for having made a friendly gesture and hav-

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3 For a summary of this meeting, see telegram Dulte 15, Apr. 27, p. 579.
4 The paper in question dealt with atomic energy; for documentation, see volume 11.
ing taken the initiative in calling on the American Secretary. Mr. Bidault said Mr. Molotov’s purpose might well have been to compare what the Secretary said and what he, Mr. Bidault, had said to Mr. Molotov.

In the course of the luncheon, Mr. Bidault was called to the telephone. He returned to the table at 20 minutes past two and said that he had just received information from his press attaché that Mr. Molotov’s press conference, which was to have been held at 1:30, had been postponed for 45 minutes and had therefore kept some 400 to 500 correspondents assembled and waiting impatiently. The story was going around that Mr. Molotov was going to say to them that it was his suggestion that it was agreed that the British, Soviet and Siamese representatives should act as presidents of the conference. Although it was agreed that this appeared far-fetched, Mr. Bidault pointed out that the Communists were apparently determined to give Mr. Molotov the credit for this suggestion as the same report had appeared in Humanité a day or two ago.

It was generally agreed that it was important as soon as possible to find a means of getting the conference down to substantive business.

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396.1 GE/4–2854 : Telegram

Third Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, April 28, 3:05 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Geneva, April 28, 1954—10 p. m.

PRIORITY


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1 A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/3) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 267. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3:05 p. m. and adjourned at 5:28 p. m.

2 The text of Secretary Dulles’ statement is printed in The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, pp. 45–53. In it, he emphasized the authority and responsibility of the United Nations in promoting Korean unification and urged that the solution be found in the U.N. General Assembly resolution of Oct. 7, 1950, which had called for supervised elections in that part of Korea, i.e. the North, where supervised elections had not yet been held.
During course Dulles speech Chinese delegation requested be inscribed and Chou En-lai delivered hour-long speech¹ (with interpretation) following which session broke briefly for intermission and then adjourned following intermission.

Chou opened statement by defining aim of Geneva conference as relaxation tensions and achievement peaceful solution world problems. He specifically commented on fact this first time US, UK, USSR, France and PRC as well as other interested nations have met together to solve important problems Asia. Citing long struggle Asian peoples for liberation from foreign imperialist control he charged influential circles in America with obstructing liberation movement in order enslave Asia. Thus American plans create aggressive bloc and spread war in Asia source of tension there. He followed these statements with lengthy panegyric on achievements PRC in China and declared no force can stop their march to create strong and prosperous China. Chou professed China had no aggressive intent against others and will not tolerate others aggressions.

Observing more than 20 countries recognize PRC, including great friend USSR, he stated others, US first and foremost, still refuse recognition and discriminate against PRC illegally. He stated this attitude hindered peaceful settlement questions and aggravated tension; Geneva conference should therefore lay basis for change.

He then turned to Korean question and summarized familiar Communist version origins Korean war. In this connection and again later in speech he charged US had occupied Taiwan illegally as base for attack on China. Stating US crossing 38th parallel endangered Chinese security by seeking use Japanese plan for Korean base to attack China, Chinese had no choice but come to assistance Korean people. Referring to armistice negotiations Chou charged US and ROK had continually created obstacles to agreement both sides including forcible retention over 48,000 PWs. He stated this question in no way closed and cannot escape attention Geneva conference. Attacking ROK he alleged it and US have openly violated armistice since paragraph 60 explicitly provides for consideration withdrawal forces whereas US and ROK recently concluded mutual defense pact and ROK threatened “march to North”. Cited ROK threats as proof who wants peace and who wants war in Korea.

Chou stated PRC fully supports North Korean proposal Korean unification with provision for all-Korean elections without foreign intervention. Contrasted ROK statement calling for retention US forces Korea as indicating ROK required foreign support maintain

¹The text of Chou’s statement is printed in Documents Relating to the Discussion of Korea and Indo-China at the Geneva Conference, April 27–June 15, 1954 (Cmd. 9186), pp. 14–20. This publication is henceforth cited as Cmd. 9186.
itself. In expressing hope Nam II’s proposal will form basis for settlement Chou said unification matter for Korean people themselves and foreign forces must withdraw.

In his peroration Chou again charged US occupation Taiwan will not be tolerated, cited growing Jap militarism and actions US in Indochina and in attempt create SEA bloc menace peace of Asia. He then demanded that interference in internal affairs Asian countries be stopped, all foreign forces in Asia be withdrawn, all military bases be removed, all economic restrictions dropped. He concluded Dulles’ speech contrary these requirements and therefore government PRC cannot agree with it and considers Asian countries should consult among themselves to solve these problems. Speech concluded with reference to US actions in Europe and in atomic energy field which threaten world peace. He expressed regret certain Asian countries (India, Burma, Indonesia) unable participate and stated conference should consider this problem.

Comment: Chou’s speech ranged over full spectrum Asian and world problems, and, as anticipated, sought create impression five great powers meeting (with other interested states) to solve general problems Asia and world problems. Speech emphasized importance PRC attaches to diplomatic recognition but made no specific mention admission UN. Most of speech was standard CC boiler plate propaganda line in phraseology as well as content contrary to speculation Chou would adopt more sophisticated approach. Speech as whole appeared designed for propaganda appeal in Asia. Specific comments re withdrawal forces from Korea and allegations US occupation Taiwan suggest particular Chinese Communist sensitivity these points. Speech gave no indication any flexibility PRC position.

DULLES

APRIL 29, 1954

396.1 GE/4-2854: Telegram

Second Meeting of the Heads of the 16 Allied Delegations, Geneva, April 29, 11 a. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, April 28 [29], 1954—10 p. m. 1

Secto 40. Repeated information Seoul 17, Tokyo 12, London 92, Paris 146, Moscow 26. Tokyo for CINCUNC. Department pass De-

1 A set of minutes of this meeting (AD Verb Min/2) from which the time of the meeting is taken is in FE files, lot 60 D 330, box 14824. The meeting, at which Dulles presided, adjourned at 12:35 p. m.

2 The file copy of this telegram is incorrectly datelined Apr. 28. It was received in the Department of State at 10:15 p. m. on Apr. 29. There was no meeting of the 16 on Apr. 28.
fense. At meeting chief delegates of 16 today, Secretary emphasized primary issue is purpose and quality of supervised elections in Korea rather than territorial scope of elections. He also raised for consideration moving from plenary sessions into smaller group for more informal negotiations or adopting restricted sessions.

After long discussion both subjects, Ministers agreed set up working committee of ROK, US, UK, Australia, Colombia, France, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey to formulate unification plan present either in smaller group or restricted session or during plenary session after completion general debate. First meeting working group morning April 30.

No final disposition re composition or nature restricted sessions or smaller group. General consensus general debate would end Saturday* for lack of speakers and restricted session could probably take place immediately after plenary session. Only Philippines and Thailand expressed intention participate general debate.

In discussing issue supervised elections in North Korea, Secretary pointed out ROK already subject to test and Communists would probably not accept. He hoped statements would be avoided imply ROK on par North Korean regime since such statements would undermine prestige and authority ROK which we should seek maintain. He said geographical scope elections not really decisive issue as are purposes and auspices such elections.

Regarding restricted or smaller meetings, Secretary suggested sign of weakness move this way too soon because Communists might assume we over-eager. We should be ready make such move when right time comes in order develop any possibility re negotiation. Secretary described bargaining possibilities in particular role which Communists accuse us wanting to play in using Korean bases for attack on China.

Eden several times pressed for termination general debate and presentation an agreed final position within next few days or 48 hours possibly followed by smaller meetings or restricted sessions to get down to business soon. He agreed with Secretary Communists would not accept principle supervised elections and thought this issue should be drawn clearly and soon on basis public position similar to tripartite position on German unification which public can understand. Other Commonwealth representatives supported Eden’s viewpoint that something must be done immediately counter Communist plans and our basic and final terms should be tabled quickly so that positive issue presented to Communists on which conference can break if they reject it as expected.

* May 1.
Secretary several times cautioned Ministers ROK cannot be rushed into deciding on position which is matter life and death for it and when every phrase is vital concern to very existence ROK. Secretary stressed need for time for Pyun consult Rhee and ROK Cabinet.

Pyun accepted proposal working committee with ROK participation, agreed to transmit any tentative plan to Seoul for action ROK Government and reserved its position re plan. Pyun questioned need for haste and cautioned against making concessions to Communists for nothing in return.

Pyun explained to meeting he strongly feels appropriate for ROK rebut allegations of North Korean, Chinese Communist and USSR delegates. Other Ministers acknowledged necessity answer false charges, and Pyun will make such statement Saturday although several Ministers feared might start series of countercharges.

Dulles

386.1 GE/4-2954 : Telegram

Fourth Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, April 29, 3 : 05 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State


Secto 41. Repeated information Seoul 13, Tokyo 13, London 93, Bonn 41, Vienna 12, Oslo 1, pouch Mosco. Bonn and Vienna for PAO; Tokyo for CINCFE. Department pass Defense, CINCPAC, COMSAC. April 29 plenary session opened at 1505 with Prince Wan in chair. There were only two speakers: Casey of Australia and Molotov, each of whom spoke about 30 minutes.

Casey said Australia approached conference in spirit restrained optimism. While fully cognizant of difficulties in reaching solution of Korean problem, solution nevertheless must be found. This is no time for recriminations about the past. Efforts should be directed toward finding solution. Basis for achieving one already present in UN Charter and UN Resolutions. Specifically, following should be elements of solution:

1. Solution must be achieved by peaceful means.
2. Principle of self-determination calls for free elections. While strong case can be made for holding such elections in North Korea only, since UN-supervised elections have already been held in South Korea, Australia hopes ROK will, if necessary, agree to elections throughout Korea as gesture of helpfulness in achieving agreement.

1 A set of minutes (US Verb Min/4) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, OF 287. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3 : 05 p. m. and adjourned at 4 : 50 p. m.
2 Extracts from Casey’s statement are printed in The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, pp. 53–58.
Government to be set up by elections should be based on principle of representation proportionate to population. Free atmosphere both before and during elections should be assured by appropriate guarantees and UN supervision. UNCURK is body already in Korea for express purpose of observing, helping and advising in conduct elections.

Needs of Korean people call for great rehabilitation efforts. Such have been made in past and no doubt will continue to be made. But only stability and security in Korea can assure real progress. To assure these is task of conference.

While North Korean proposals made by Nam II are inadequate from Australia's point of view in a number of important points, proposal deserves careful examination. Clarification, however, should be furnished regarding following points:

1. Is membership in Joint Commission mentioned by Nam II to be made proportionate to populations in North and South Korea? Australia thinks it should be.

2. How can free elections be assured without international supervision? Australia thinks Communist proposal that matter should be handled by Koreans themselves without interference is unrealistic in view bitterness which has grown up between two parts of country.

3. How can long delays in work of Joint Commission be avoided? How can deadlocks be broken? Will time limit be established within which Commission must complete preparatory work for holding elections?

North Korean proposal regarding withdrawal of troops deceptively simple. As Dulles pointed out, Chinese Communists would have much shorter distance to withdraw and could return in much shorter time than UN forces. While all desire early withdrawal, dangers over-hasty withdrawal have been demonstrated. Formula might be found so that withdrawal could begin at early date. Australia believes, however, that some units should stay until elections carried out. Provision could be made to assure that there would be no interference by troops in conduct of elections.

Chou En-lai, in effort to obscure facts of case, repeated charges that aggression in Korean war had been committed by South Korea and US. UN Commission observers on June 24, 1950 made field trip inspecting ROK dispositions along 38th parallel and reported that South Korean forces were not in position to launch wide-scale attack. While Commission unable to observe conditions in North Korea, subsequently captured Communist documents show that preparations for offensive had been made in North prior to attack.

Conference has two tasks before it: Solution of Korean and Indochinese problems. When war in Korea broke out, Communist aggression was already under way in Indochina although at that time of
different sort and on different scale. Hope that Korean war which provided first example in history of enforcement collective security will provide lesson for Communist World.

Molotov then took floor, said: Geneva Conference can be said to be devoted to question of Asia. Both Korean question and that of Indochina are among most essential questions relating to Asia. Cannot help feeling conference hurt by fact that such Asiatic states as India, Indonesia, Burma, Pakistan, and other Asiatic countries not taking part in conference. At same time, shouldn’t underestimate fact that for first time in recent years all great powers, France, Great Britain, US, Chinese People’s Republic and Soviet Union are taking part in conference. Particular emphasis should be laid on fact that great power of Asia, Chinese People’s Republic will be able to contribute.

First problem is to establish by peaceful means united and independent Korea. Stands to reason that solution of Korean problem primarily matter for Korean people themselves. No solution imposed upon Korean people by other countries can satisfy Korean people or contribute to lasting settlement Korean problem.

Korean people’s struggle for independence went on for many years. Japanese imperialists seized Korea and turned peninsula into their principal stronghold for aggression against China and sought spread rule over whole of China and Southeast Asia. Under pretext of struggle against Communism they concluded anti-Comintern pact with Hitlerite Germany and schemed to divide world. Everyone remembers outcome.

Due to circumstances of military nature at end World War II Korea found itself divided into two parts. Problem of creating united, independent and democratic state not solved in immediate postwar years. ROK, however, succeeded in carrying out democratic reforms of paramount importance. This activity interrupted by war imposed from outside and brutal US military intervention under UN flag.

All countries seeking to reduce international tension are interested in peaceful solution Korean question. Cannot fail to notice, however, fact that under pressure exerted upon UN on part some states it adopted one-sided attitude and proved inability to settle Korean problem. False story of Korean events reiterated here by US representative has been repeatedly refuted and its falsity exposed by Soviet representative in UN.

When considering Korean question we cannot fail to take into account recent basic changes in political development Asiatic countries especially those taking place after World War II. For many years Asiatic countries were dominated by non-Asiatic states and other

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*The text of Molotov’s statement is printed in Cmd. 9186, pp. 24–29.*
peoples were deprived of possibility of being masters of own fates. At present failure of attempts to apply old policy of colonization becomes more and more obvious. 1917 Revolution in Russia and formation of USSR which broke with imperialist policy of Tsarism could not fail to encourage other peoples struggling for freedom and independence.

People with old-fashioned views are unable to grasp historical changes which have taken place in Asiatic countries and sometimes regard these developments in entirely false light. They are constantly on outlook for intrigues of Communists, agents of Kremlin, etc.; they attribute to Communism every movement of oppressed people toward freedom and national independence. As for views Soviet people, we make no secret of our sympathies and warm feelings for national liberation movement of peoples including those of Asia. Fundamental changes in Asia have their supreme example in China where democratic regime has been founded and economic, social, and political changes are taking place. Not to take this into account means not to reckon with events of greatest historical importance. Furthermore, who can deny that such country as India . . . has entered historical arena. Importance of countries such as Indonesia, Burma, and others constantly being enhanced although process of establishing real independence not without struggles or difficulties in relations with some states.

No secret that firm and friendly relations have been established between USSR and CPR. Many other countries have also established relations with Chinese People’s Republic. Britain is known to attach great importance to development of its relations with Chinese People’s Republic. Also known that number of other countries have not established normal relations with Chinese People’s Republic for sole reason that they are being prevented from doing so from without.

Open aggressive policy of US in regard to Chinese People’s Republic is affecting whole situation in Asia. After establishment CPR one aggressive act after another has been taken against it. US ruling circles seized Taiwan and remnants Chiang clique masters of the island. They prevent CPR from taking legitimate place in UN, made UN pass resolution imposing embargo on trade with China, are making preparations for establishment Japanese armed forces thereby creating threat to China, charged China with aggression in Korea, are constantly threatening China’s borders with invasion, etc. Under pretext of defending puppet regimes in Indochina, they have recently made plans to form military alliance in Southeast Asia although not one self-respecting Asian state proposes to participate.

* Ellipsis in the source text.
Secretary Dulles' April 16 statement calling loss of China mainland grave disaster and warning that loss of Southeast Asia and Pacific islands would compound this disaster shows how strong is desire follow old worn colonial policy in some circles. His statement does not contain one word about international interest and rights of peoples of China, Southeast Asia, and Pacific islands.

Geneva Conference affords possibility of examining thoroughly those problems of Asia which have been recognized as the most urgent ones at present moment. Conference will be successful if it proceeds from principle that peoples of Asia have full right to settle their affairs themselves. Other states should assist Asian peoples by their friendly efforts.

Chou En-lai spoke about desirability of uniting efforts of Asian countries in securing peace in Asia. Soviet delegation fully in accord with that view. Delegation believes that North Korean proposals can serve as basis adoption [of adequate decision] on Korean question.

DULLES

5 Reference is to a statement made by Dulles on Apr. 15 in Syracuse, N.Y., on his return from London and Paris; the text is in the Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 26, 1954, p. 623.
6 The words inserted in brackets are taken from the minutes of the meeting.

795.00/4-2654: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET

Geneva, April 29, 1954—8 p.m.

Dulles 27. Repeated information Brussels 7, Seoul unnumbered. For Acting Secretary from Secretary. Brussels for the Ambassador, Seoul info Ambassador and Dean. Spaak expressed to MacArthur this morning definite reservations regarding Republic of Korea proposal for elections in North Korea. He said North Koreans had countered with proposal to hold elections in all Korea. While North Korea conditions for such elections were quite unacceptable, Western European opinion would not believe Republic of Korea proposals for elections only in North Korea reasonable and he would not be able rally support for Republic of Korea proposal in Belgian Parliament. His information was that other Allied governments share this view. He felt that unity of non-Communists idea at Geneva was most essential objective of Geneva Conference from Western viewpoint, and expressed strong hope that Republic of Korea could be induced to counter with a proposal for all-Korean elections under effective supervision of United Nations. This would expose Soviet hand and make clear that failure to reach agreement on Korea was fault of Soviets. It would also pre-
serve full Allied unity and prevent Soviets from winning propaganda victory at Geneva.

I, therefore, asked Spaak to lunch with me. I explained to him in detail our problem with Rhee and the United Nations background and basis for the position put forward by Republic of Korea. I told Spaak I believe there is chance of getting Rhee to modify his position along lines of all-Korean elections under effective United Nations supervision, but that this was extremely delicate problem and would require time and most careful handling, in view of Rhee’s oriental mentality and feeling that European countries were willing to sell him down river for advantages they might gain for themselves in Europe. I also explained we had sent Dean, in whom I had great confidence, to Korea to assist in handling Rhee.

Dulles

APRIL 30, 1954

705.00/4-3054

MacArthur–Spaak Meeting, Geneva, April 30, 11:45 a. m.:
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor (MacArthur)¹

TOP SECRET  


I called on Mr. Spaak this morning at 11:45 pursuant to the Secretary’s instructions. I said to Mr. Spaak that the Secretary had asked me to come to see him informally to lay before him a very serious problem and to seek his advice how best it might be met. I then described the problem in the following terms:

The Geneva Conference has been in session almost one full week and thus far not a single Western European country has made any statement at the Conference or attempted in any way to rebut the Soviet thesis. The Plenary sessions, I understood, were scheduled to end very soon. If some of the Western European countries do not make statements rebutting the Communist charges American Congressional and public opinion will most certainly interpret it as meaning that the Western European countries ask us to stand up and be counted with them whenever they are in difficulty and also ask us for all kinds of material and moral assistance, but at the same time they are unwilling to face up to the Soviets when purely European interests are not involved. This is not calculated to inspire confidence among the American people in the determination of Western Europe to stand together with the United States in attempting to prevent the Soviets from taking over not only Asia but also Europe. I thought there would be a direct effect on the Congressional support we could get for our

¹ The meeting took place in Spaak’s suite in the Hotel Beau Rivage.
European policy. It would certainly reinforce all elements in America who wished to withdraw and adopt the "Fortress America" concept.

The second point which I wished to mention was the fact that Chou En-lai, because it is the first time he has spoken in any international gathering of this kind, had largely captured the headlines throughout the free world and also in Asia. If his accusations against the United Nations and general deformation of history were not rebutted, the Soviets would have the cheapest and most extensive propaganda victory in recent years. I felt we should recognize that the impact on public opinion of Geneva Conference would probably be its most important single outcome, just as had been the case of the Berlin Conference. As Mr. Spaak had said yesterday, we could not get agreements with the Soviets because they did not wish to reach reasonable agreements. To accept the Soviet and Chinese Communist declarations and statements at the conference table without rebutting them was certainly not calculated to gain the support of public opinion in the free world for what we were doing.

I said that I was not suggesting that Mr. Spaak get up and make a speech on the South Korean proposal for unification of Korea. I was fully aware of the difficulties which he would have in supporting the opening ROK proposal. What I was suggesting was that possibly himself and other Western European Foreign Ministers make statements attacking the false Soviet and Chinese charges against the United Nations and in general pointing out the total Communist distortion of history in their statements. I felt that both in terms of Western and Asiatic opinion, it was most important to develop the theme of Soviet imperialism which has manifested itself in the Eastern European satellites, East Germany, Austria, and also in North Korea and Indochina.

Mr. Spaak replied that he had not thought about the impact on American opinion of a failure of the Western European countries to stand up and speak. If it was our judgment that there would be such a reaction, it was essential that some of the Western European countries make statements. He had talked with most of his European colleagues including Mr. Eden and he had the strong impression that there was a feeling of lassitude and pointlessness in just a series of speeches rebutting the same old Soviet charges. There was however another point which made them instinctively shy away from making a statement. This was the fact that if they were to make a statement, it should be aimed at the problem which was the establishment of a unified, free, and independent Korea. The ROK had put forth a position which none of the Western countries liked. The North Koreans had countered with a plan calling for all-Korean elections. Actually under the present cir-
circumstances the North Korean plan which came second and could be construed as a counter proposal was really the basis for discussion. It was not in anybody’s interest to have the North Korean proposal the basis of discussion and this was why it was so important to counter with a ROK proposal for all-Korean elections supervised by the UN. Mr. Spaak inquired whether Rhee would agree to such a plan by the beginning of next week. I said in my judgment there was no hope and that it would probably take at a minimum a week to bring Rhee around if indeed he could be brought around. Mr. Spaak said that under these circumstances he could make a speech along the lines which I had outlined, but it would be negative with respect to Korea, which he regretted. He said the problem now is to decide when he should speak. He is obliged to leave for Brussels tonight to meet with the other new Cabinet Ministers tomorrow and Sunday morning, since the new Cabinet will be presenting itself to the parliament next Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday. If the Prime Minister agreed, he could possibly fly back to Geneva Monday morning, make his speech and return to Brussels Monday night. This would be a very difficult thing but he would be glad to see what could be done, and in any event he would be glad to come back next Thursday, May 6, if he could not get away on Monday. The Dutch Foreign Minister, who he said was due to arrive today, had sent him a message that he would not make any statement at Geneva unless Spaak did. The thing now to do was to get the Dutch to make a statement also, and he would be glad to approach the Dutch with us at the conference meeting this afternoon. He asked whether I would make such an approach with him. I said I would be glad to, although I thought the Secretary would wish to talk to him this afternoon and might wish to make the approach with him.

Mr. Spaak then said that he is totally unclear as to what is going to happen here at Geneva next week. Are there going to be restricted sessions on Korea? If there are, what is going to be the basis of the discussion of the Korean problem at such restricted sessions? Restricted sessions are pointless if each side simply rests on its present position, and to be very frank he said that the North Korean position, unless it was exposed for what it really was, was a much sounder position in terms of general public impression than the ROK position. He personally thought it was extremely unwise to have restricted sessions on Korea until the ROK’s had some kind of a better position involving UN supervision for all-Korean elections. This however was simply his own personal thought. I said to him that if the Dutch would come along and we could get some other European countries to

\* Saturday, May 1.
make statements rebutting the Communist charges, we could probably schedule two or three speeches for each day next week, and we might be able to consume several days. Mr. Spaak said that he thought it was better to engage in this process rather than to go into restricted sessions without adequate preparation and the best possible case. He wondered if several days next week could be taken up with procedural questions on Indochina. If this were not possible, maybe it would be preferable to recess for two to three days until we had a better position on Korea. He made clear that none of these were suggestions and that he was simply thinking out loud.

It was agreed that Secretary Dulles would see him at the meeting this afternoon to discuss:

1. When it seemed best for Spaak to speak next week (Monday or Thursday)
2. To approach the Dutch jointly to get them to make a statement
3. To exchange any further ideas which might be forthcoming on how the conference was to be handled next week.

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Dulles–Eden Meeting, Geneva, April 30, 12:15 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

Geneva, April 30, 1954—8 p. m.

Dulles 33. Repeated information London 99. Eyes only for Acting Secretary. For President from Secretary. Eyes only Ambassador. Following is memorandum of conversation I had alone with Eden at his villa in Geneva at 12:15 p. m. on April 30:

I said to Mr. Eden that I was greatly disturbed over the present position and its bearing upon the cooperation of our two countries. We had, I thought, agreed to sit down with other directly interested countries to try to work out a common defense for the Southeast Asia area, but now the British were unwilling to go ahead with the agreement which Eden and I had reached at London. On top of that was the fact that in the face of the vicious attacks by Molotov, Chou En-lai and Nam Il on the United States for what it had done in Korea, there was not a single Western European power which was prepared to get up and say a word in defense of the United Nations or United States position. The only speakers on the non-Communist side had been South Korea, Colombia, the United States and Australia, and no one else was inscribed to speak.

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1 For documentation on this subject, see volume xii.
2 See also the memorandum of conversation by Merchant on his meeting with Lester Pearson, Apr. 30, p. 626.
I said it was particularly galling to the United States to have to accept this attack on it as being an “imperialist” power. I said that the United States was eager to beat the Communists at their own game and to sponsor nationalism in the independent colonial areas, which was in accordance with our historic tradition, but that we were restrained from doing so by a desire to cooperate with Britain and France in Asia, in North Africa and in the Near and Middle East. This, however, did not seem to be paying any dividends because when the chips were down there was no cohesion between us. Here at Geneva we were presenting a pathetic spectacle of drifting without any agreed policy or purpose. The United States had presented a program which, after it had been apparently accepted, had been repudiated and there was no alternative offered.

I said as far as the Korean problem was concerned, we were being forced by our Western Allies to abandon our original position of backing the United Nations resolutions so that Western leaders could show how generous they were at South Korea’s expense. I thought, however, that it was rather pathetic that we had to make our concessions to our Allies before even starting to negotiate with the Communists, where the concessions might have some negotiating value. If the effort to develop a united position with reference to Southeast Asia collapsed, we would be faced by the problem of going it alone. This would probably mean increasing the close relations with Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek, who, whatever their defects, were at least willing to stand strong against the Communists. I mentioned that there was considerable pressure for the United States to complete a mutual security treaty covering Formosa. This had been deferred and I felt that its negotiation at the time of the Geneva Conference and after my proposal for a united defense of Southeast Asia might be embarrassing. However, if there was to be no united defense for Southeast Asia and no agreed program for Geneva, then we would have to consider who there was upon whom we could depend.

I emphasized that despite what I gathered the British might have inferred from Radford’s talks the United States was not seeking either war with China or a large-scale intervention in Indochina. In fact, these were the two things we were seeking to avoid and thought could be avoided if we had a show of common strength.

I greatly feared that if I return to Washington under present conditions and had to meet with the Congressional committees and give explanations as to what had happened, the consequences would be disastrous for the close United Kingdom–United States relations which we wanted to maintain.

For related documentation, see volume XIII.
Mr. Eden then handed me the memorandum, a copy of which is annexed. He said that they had been working very hard to prevent the Colombo Conference from taking a strong anti-Western position, particularly in relation to Indochina, and he felt that they had been quite successful.

I referred to the paragraph in the United Kingdom memorandum calling for immediate and secret joint examination between the United States and the United Kingdom. I said that this might be useful, but certainly it would not be useful if that was all there was, because we had already invited other countries, such as Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand to share in creating a Southeast Asian defense; and the two first had definitely agreed and the two latter were interested. I also said I was confident we could not now rebuff them without serious consequences for the future. They would have to be brought in on some discussions, although probably not those of the intimate nature which were customary between the United States and the United Kingdom. I referred to the fact that the North Atlantic Treaty had developed progressively, the first conception being the Brussels Pact, then the addition of the United States and Canada, then the addition of Scandinavian countries, then the addition of Portugal and Italy, and most recently the addition of Greece and Turkey. I said that surely any Southeast Asian arrangement would have to include at least Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, as well as the United States, the United Kingdom and France, and the Associated States; and I did not see why we could not get started with that nucleus and let it develop as seemed natural. Mr. Eden made no reply.

Mr. Eden then said that he felt that the Western powers had not participated in the general debate because they did not want to get tied to the South Korean election formula. I said that the issues in the general debate far transcended this rather minor technical point—that the burden of the speeches of Molotov and Chou En-lai had been that Asia was for the Asians, and that all Western influence should be eliminated, particularly that of the United States. Also, they had viciously attacked the United Nations, and made the most grotesque falsifications of history. Surely, I said, that presented issues to which the Western powers could address themselves if they believed in the United Nations and believed that the principle of solidarity extended beyond Europe. Mr. Eden said he would give thought to the possibility of his making some speech.

We then discussed the details of the Korean matter. I said I was not hopeless of the possibility of an agreement, because we had an asset to

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4 For the text, see volume xii.
5 For documentation on NATO, see volume v.
use that we had not had in Berlin. At Berlin we could not pull out United States and United Kingdom troops because this would collapse the forward strategy of NATO. In Korea there was no general Allied strategy, and United States troops could be pulled out in exchange for a united Korea, which would have sufficient demilitarization in the North so as to constitute no threat to Vladivostok and Port Arthur. Mr. Eden suggested that we might have a restricted meeting of the Four inviting powers, plus China and North Korea and South Korea to try to get into this matter before I left. I said I would not be indisposed to have such a meeting on Saturday afternoon.

I told Mr. Eden that I was seeing Molotov at 11 on Saturday morning on the atomic energy matter. I was disposed not to seek a joint communiqué which would indicate that the President’s plan had been rejected. I felt that to throw this in the present international situation would greatly aggravate and deteriorate affairs, and would particularly cause a deep resentment in the United States. Mr. Eden agreed to this handling of the matter.

I reminded Mr. Eden that I had had no reply from him with reference to our economic aid to Egypt. He said he would talk to me about this before I left.

DULLES

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5 May 1.
6 For related documentation, see volume II.
7 For related documentation, see volume X.

396.1 GE/4-3054: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation

SECRET

SEUL, April 30, 1954—2 p.m.

29. Sent Department 1093, repeated information Tokyo 646. Tokyo pass CINCUNC exclusive for General Hull. Geneva for Secretary from Dean. Have read with much interest Pyun’s, Nam Il’s, Secretary’s, and Chou En-lai’s speeches and résumé of Johnson’s briefing of second regular meeting deputy representatives of 16.1

1 Telegram Secto 29 from Geneva, Apr. 29, repeated to Seoul for information as telegram 14, reported on the second regular meeting of the deputy representatives of the 16. Extracts from this telegram read as follows:

“At second regular meeting deputy representatives of 16 Johnson opened with analysis North Korean proposal presented yesterday (Secto 18). He pointed up striking similarity between North Korean proposal and Soviet proposal at Berlin on Germany and analyzed reasons it unacceptable, emphasizing equating of North and South Korean Governments and fact equal representation for them gives veto to Communists in unification process.

“Yang (ROK) agreed proposal totally unacceptable and pointed out similarity to Communist proposal June 19, 1950 as well as Berlin proposal. He summarized ROK objections as: (1) It merely creates coalition government which unwork-
Would appreciate being advised as soon as conditions warrant what your current thinking is on our probable alternate proposal for achieving unification and whether we should now be trying to orient President’s thinking accordingly.

At present time he heartily approves of Pyun’s and Secretary’s speech on unification. Despite what Secretary told Pyun, we have hesitated to discuss with President possibility of holding elections for National Assembly in South as well as in North under UN supervision.

In an informal meeting with President on Tuesday he somewhat emotionally and tearfully pleaded for permission to allow Korean delegation to come home and quite apparently is afraid he will be asked to whittle down Pyun’s present position. We were able to change subject without discussing it and emotion passed. Mention only as showing his state of mind and current state negotiations here and reluctance embark in new discussions unless we are fairly clear route we are going, the timing of troop withdrawals, etc.

With May 20 elections for National Assembly approaching and criticism by opposition party and possibly UNCURK of extent to which candidates are free to file and to run, he will probably resist any formula for the holding of elections for Assembly all over again in the South under UN supervision unless he is really convinced all-over national elections in both North and South will really facilitate workable non-Communist unification in best interests of country. Would appreciate guidance along following lines as soon as feasible:

1. Your probable timing on any new or alternate proposal.
2. When we should broach such proposal to President.
3. General lines such proposal may take.

Apart from discussion of your number 5 to Seoul last Monday, want you to know conversations so far have been very general, and to inquire whether you have any suggestions for guidance. Present plans are to leave here next Friday for Tokyo returning by way of Honolulu and San Francisco.

BRIGGS

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(2) Provision for troop withdrawal purposely vague and unrelated unification process; simultaneous withdrawal unacceptable to ROK. (3) Did not provide for UN supervision.

“Yang raised question whether general agreement existed on UN program for unification as basis on our position, to which there was no dissent. In this connection, Johnson observed that we already have plan for unification as presented by Pyun yesterday and it is primarily question of when to table it in more specific form. Meeting agreed heads delegations should meet soon to reach decision this point.”

(396.1 GE/4-2854)

2 Apr. 27.
3 Dated Apr. 26, p. 140.
4 May 7.
Fifth Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, April 30, 3:05 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, April 30, 1954—10 p.m.

Secto 57. Repeated information Seoul 23 Tokyo 15 London 101 Paris 158 Moscow 31 Oslo 2. Tokyo for CINCUNC. Department pass Defense, CINCPAC, COMSAC. Only speakers at short Fifth Plenary Session today over which Molotov presided were Cevat Acikalin of Turkey and Prince Wan of Thailand. In opening speech Acikalin stressed importance UN action Korea in terms upholding principle of collective security and support UN decisions. Pointing out modern science has so shrunk world that security individual nation depends on security all nations, Acikalin said our sons who fought on battlefields of Korea serve not only common cause but also cause of own countries. While sacrifices in Korea resulted goal we set out achieve, “glorious martyred Korea” ruined by war still awaits justice. Our duty is restoration united free and independent Korea in conformity with UN resolutions to which we solemnly committed. Any other approach betrays justice and harms organization which guarantees our own security. Asserting Turkish delegation could not accept proposals by North Korean delegation which disregarded UN authority and would tend create chaotic situation likely bring about communist designs which resolute UN action has prevented, Acikalin expressed hope those who caused the ills have learned the lesson of events and will take the road we are determined to follow.

Stressing Thailand’s firm support of UN as demonstrated its quick response to call for military and economic assistance ROK, Prince Wan declared Thai people understood significance UN action Korea, which turned principle collective security from abstract idealism to living reality. Stating that task of conference was to conclude permanent peace in Korea, Wan quoted from Berlin resolution statement that establishment united independent Korea important factor in reducing international tensions and restoring peace in other parts of Asia. He cited Indochina as part of Asia in which Thailand “particularly interested as close neighbor and adjacent country.”

Stressing that Thailand, particularly as Asian country strongly favored principle that “Asian people should form united independent

1 A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/5) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CE 267. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3:05 p.m. and adjourned at 3:40 p.m.


3 Extracts from Prince Wan’s statement are printed ibid., pp. 59–60.
states not divided in any way or subject to colonialism or imperialism in any form, old or new”, Wan pointed out Thailand has kept independence throughout colonial period because pursued open-door policy granting equal opportunities for all powers and cooperating with them. In apparent but unspoken reference Chou En-lai and Molotov’s speech, Wan declared: “Thailand, no less than other Asian nations, considers that peace in Asia should be ensured, that the independence and sovereignty of Asian nations should be respected and that the national rights and freedom of the Asian peoples should be safeguarded”; but added not necessary that good Asian be exclusive Asian, but to contrary Thai national experience indicated to be good Asian as well as good European, American or African, one has to cooperate peacefully with other nations organized in world community of free nations. Peace is world-wide, one and indivisible. Thus Thailand cooperates with US, UK and French as well as Southeast Asian neighbors with view promoting peace in that part of world. In closing Wan stated key to solution Korean question could be found in adapting and applying to present situation UNGA resolution of October 7, 1950.

Comment: Though short both speeches today gave strong support to principle collective security and to idea solution Korean problem along lines UN resolutions. Thai speech especially effective as answer to Chou En-lai pretense speak for peoples of Asia.

Following speeches, Molotov stated general agreement next plenary session May 3 and that only speaker inscribed was ROK delegate.

DULLES

396.1 GE/4-3054: Telegram
Robertson–Johnson–Pyun Meeting, Geneva, April 30, Afternoon: The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL

22. Repeated information Department Secto 58. For Briggs and Dean. Robertson and Johnson saw Pyun this afternoon with regard to proposal that there be restricted meeting of 7 (US, ROK, UK, and France from our side, and USSR, Communist China and North Korea from other side) to probe Communist intentions with regard Korean settlement. We told Pyun other side had indicated willingness to have such a meeting and we were inclined to feel it would be worthwhile, particularly before the Secretary’s departure, in order make maximum effort determine whether any intent by other side reach settlement acceptable to ROK and US. However, before reaching decision US desired discuss with Pyun. If, as anticipated, others of 16 agreeable, restricted meeting will probably take place afternoon May 1. We told
Pyun that at such a meeting Secretary would expect make it explicitly clear that we could not compromise on principle of elections under UN auspices, while stating we saw no reason that elections need be held other than in North Korea, that question of withdrawal foreign troops subject some scope in negotiations and possibility of demilitarized zone on both sides northern boundaries could be considered. We made it clear to Pyun that Secretary would be speaking entirely for US and would not commit ROK. This presentation would be in very general terms and designed so as to elicit Communist reactions and thus obtain some indication their intent. We indicated to Pyun the necessity for flexible position with respect scope of elections; but he made no comment except the necessity of not making “concessions” except in return for concessions from the other side.

Pyun stated he had no objection to such a meeting and that he “now” had entire confidence US not going to “sell ROK down the river”. Pyun exhibited little interest in presentation Secretary would make at meeting and turned conversation to Indochina disclaiming any ROK interest, but pointing out disadvantages to US in reaching settlement too quickly in Korea, thus closing that front and releasing Chinese forces for use in Indochina.

He expressed view Communists anxious to reach settlement in Korea and professed fear Communists would accept present US–ROK unification proposal, thus forcing us into “premature” settlement in Korea before Indochina question is settled.

Pyun stated he had been approached on two occasions by number two man North Korean delegation in apparent attempt arrange meeting between Pyun and Nam II. Pyun stated he replied that as it was hard to get out beyond the Iron Curtain, North Korean delegation should defect. Pyun stated in speech he proposes to make Monday at plenary, he will offer amnesty to North Koreans. He added he was doing this without authorization from Rhee and that if he could not “deliver” he would quit.

Dulles

396.1 GE/4-3054 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY GENEVA, April 30, 1954—5 p.m.

20. Repeated information Department Secto 48. For Briggs and Dean. As you will have noted from meeting of 16 yesterday (Secto 40, repeated Seoul 17) there is strong feeling basic terms our side

1 Dated Apr. 29, p. 155.
for Korean unification should shortly be presented. In spite its fake aspects, North Korean proposal leading off with call for all-Korean elections, has captured headlines. Other delegations, also giving only very grudging support or keeping silent on proposal for elections only North Korea (Plan A). Working group of 9 met today and engaged in only general discussion, concentrating largely on finally successful dissuasion of Philippines from putting forth plan in speech today providing for “neutral international supervision” of elections for a “constitutional convention”. Philippines has now withdrawn name and plan to speak Monday along more acceptable lines. However, without making commitment at this time on exact timing and method of presentation, believe we should immediately make effort to obtain Rhee’s agreement to “Plan B”, which will probably be tabled in meeting of 9 tomorrow and shortly thereafter transmitted to Rhee by Pyun.

If you have any question on desirability this timing or suggestions for handling from this end, would appreciate receiving soonest.

Dulles

2 See GK D-4/7, Apr. 9, p. 82.
3 A report on this meeting is contained in telegram Secto 59, Apr. 30, from Geneva, not printed (396.1 GE/4-3054).
4 See GK D-4/10, Apr. 16, p. 105.

MAY 1, 1954

396.1 GE/5–154: Telegram

Third Meeting of the Heads of the 16 Allied Delegations, Geneva, May 1, 10:05 a.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Geneva, May 1, 1954—1 p.m.

Secto 60. Repeated information Seoul 25, Tokyo 17, London 104, Paris 161, Moscow 33. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Department pass Defense. This morning Secretary held chief delegates meeting to discuss suggestion for restricted meeting this afternoon of ROK, US, UK, France our side and USSR, Communist China and North Korea other side. Secretary referred to previous discussion among 16 of restricted meeting and repeated purpose would be try put discussion of Korean unification on more realistic basis. Secretary explained we would not present any position at small meeting but would suggest possible breakdowns into several major phases. Purpose of meeting would be discuss what would be most effective consideration these phases which are as follows: (1) Elections to be under UN auspices; (2) scope and character of elections; (3) disposition foreign troops in Korea;

1 A set of minutes of this meeting (AD Verb Min/3) from which the time of the meeting is taken is in FE files, lot 60 D 330, box 14824. The meeting, at which Dulles presided, adjourned at 10:25 a.m.
(4) provision to protect Korean independence, including demilitarization of border area. After further comments by Secretary, Pyun and Eden no objection was expressed to holding smaller session and meeting adjourned.

Re scope elections Secretary said he feels strongly, and hoped 16 would agree, any concessions should be made in negotiations with Communists and not in free world offers. If there is any chance serious negotiation Korean unification and independence as he still thinks there is slight possibility, our side should not bargain away everything at once. However if conference is nothing more than propaganda show then we might put our best position forward first. If there is to be serious negotiation we should keep trading points in reserve as long as there is some hope of having the conference produce formula for unified Korea. Secretary said our two main trading points are scope of elections and removal foreign forces. He feels small group is necessary to feel out whether there is any possibility negotiations produce at Geneva genuine results.

Eden agreed on usefulness of smaller meeting for negotiations. Regarding scope of elections, he said UK would not say anything more about it until we see what happens in restricted meeting.

Pyun said he agreed with all of Secretary’s remarks. ROK is prepared for small compromise in return for compromises from Communists. He emphasized it was not safe to show our hand before other side.

Dulles

396.1 GE/5–254 : Telegram

Restricted Session of the Seven Powers on Korea, Geneva, May 1, 3:30 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Geneva, May 2, 1954—11 a.m.

Secto 69. Repeated information Seoul 31, London 106, Paris 166, Tokyo 19, Moscow 37. Pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCFE. Restricted meeting held yesterday afternoon in small conference room at Palais from 3:30 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. Secretary, Pyun, Bidault, Eden, Nam II, Chou En-lai and Molotov present, each accompanied by three or four

1 A set of minutes of this meeting (SP Verb Min/1) is in FE files, lot 60 D 330, box 14824. The seven powers in attendance were the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Republic of Korea, the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. This was the only restricted session held on Korea.
assistants. General Smith, Robertson and Johnson accompanied Secretary. Secretary suggested and Molotov agreed to Eden as informal chairman on basis his turn chairman of the day. Seating was informal, non-Communist group contiguous.

At opening Secretary expressed satisfaction ability hold informal talks on assumption all were seriously seeking solution to problem faced by conference. Secretary then distributed "memorandum of principal points to be resolved in connection with the creation of a united and independent Korea" containing following:

   (1) Elections to be under UN auspices; (2) scope and character of elections; (3) disposition of foreign troops in Korea; (4) provision to protect Korean independence, including the demilitarization of border areas. The Secretary stated that these points seemed to be controversial aspects which would have to be resolved. In explanation memorandum, stated there seemed to be agreement on election some sort in some area, and it was important they be under auspices of UN. Whether the elections be only in North Korea or be nation-wide in scope was one of points of difference. We thought elections only in North Korea were required.

   Then there was a question of foreign troops in Korea; that is, the UN forces in the south and the Chinese Communist forces in North Korea, and what should be done about them and the timing of their evacuation if they were to be evacuated in whole or in part.

   There was then question of when Korea had achieved unity and independence, how maintenance could best be assured. In this regard might include demilitarization border areas both sides so as prevent any sudden attack and maintenance of no troops in areas having proximity to sensitive areas on either side.

   Secretary then welcomed any suggestions as to whether this useful analysis, questions possibly being discussed in the order suggested, in some other order, or simultaneously in subcommittees.

   Molotov stated he believed would be useful hear views North and South Korea. Nam Il then made long statement along lines his statement in plenary, rejecting any international supervision or observation of elections reiterating North Korean proposal and stressing elections throughout Korea, and withdrawal of foreign forces, stationing of any foreign troops in Korea being "foreign interference", UN and Chinese forces to be withdrawn "simultaneously" within six months. In this statement and several other times during course of meeting he asked how "renewal of war is to be prevented" if foreign troops not withdrawn.

   Pyun stated preferred hear others before making statement. Molotov then made statement referring his speech at plenary and reiterating

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2 Not printed.
support of North Korean proposals, stressing Korean problem should be solved by Koreans themselves. He stated all foreign troops should be withdrawn “at least three months before elections”. Chou En-lai then made statement supporting North Korean proposals saying that “they could become basis for discussion in reaching agreement”. Criticized Secretary’s memorandum on basis did not list divergent views nor include “concrete proposals”. He repeated line on Koreans solving own problems and all-Korean elections, rejecting elections under UN auspices or while foreign forces in Korea. He reiterated Nam II’s statement withdrawal of forces should be within set time limit and simultaneously.

At close Chou statement Bidault asked how volunteers could be withdrawn “when they have not been sent”. Chou replied with some heat Mr. Bidault failed recall armistice was signed on our side by UNC and on other side by DPRK and Chinese People’s volunteers and that if armistice valid, why would agreement for withdrawal troops not be valid?

Molotov then made reference belligerent status UN in Korea and rejected elections under auspices of UN. At this point Secretary referred to draft Soviet resolution October 2, 1950, observing that at that time Soviet Union apparently saw no incompatibility in UN having forces in Korea and its ability observe elections in Korea. Molotov obviously caught by surprise and did not recall resolution. After Secretary passed him our copy there was prolonged huddle in Soviet delegation while resolution being translated for Molotov and discussed. During huddle by Soviets, Eden made statement that while it was inescapable UN was party to dispute in Korea, everybody recognized elections must be supervised. Mentioned precedents for UN supervision and stated there must be UN supervision “in some form or other” if results to commend themselves to world opinion.

During this period Chou reiterated belligerent status UN in Korea, stating Communist China and DPRK “had no relation to UN” and stated if DPRK proposal accepted, question “representation DPRK in UN would not arise until after establishment unified Korea”. During course of meeting Chou several times reiterated “this conference has nothing to do with UN”.

Molotov finally replied Secretary’s query by stating October 2, 1950 Soviet resolution had “provided indispensable participation of states bordering on Korea” and asked whether it was “now a question of such a commission”. In reply Secretary stated question could possibly

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*a* Dulles was referring to U.N. document A/C.1/567; for documentation, see *Foreign Relations, 1950*, vol. *vii*, pp. 835 ff.
be discussed, but in meanwhile Chinese Communist regime had been declared aggressor, and therefore probably disqualified itself for such a role. Molotov replied with some heat branding UN resolution as "shameful, unjust and taken behind back of China", thereby disqualifying UN for any role in elections.

Chou then made flat statement that Korean war started by US, which also occupied Formosa and therefore US was aggressor. Passage of UN resolution had made UN lose moral authority. Eden replied UK could never accept fact disarmed South Korea had attacked North Korea or that US, which had withdrawn its troops from Korea had somehow become aggressor, and former UK Government had voted for resolution because it considered it in accordance with facts.

Pyun then asked whether commission proposed by North Koreans contemplated representation by population ratio or equally between north and south, pointing out population South Korea above 24 million, and asking Nam II for population North Korea. By persistent questioning Pyun finally obtained clear statement from Nam II that representation on commission would be equal between north and south and any decisions would require agreement both sides. Nam II gave no answer on North Korean population.

Toward close of meeting Pyun made careful and reasoned statement reiterating ROK position, to which Nam II and Chou replied and Pyun rejoined, there being considerable fencing as to who would have last word.

Secretary stated meeting had been "enlightening to US" but that he could not say he had been encouraged.

Eden expressed opinion had not gotten very far, to which Molotov replied that there had been "little effort toward getting together".

It was agreed no decision as to any further meeting would be taken until plenary Monday. It was agreed that in pattern restricted meetings at Berlin, no statement would be made to press other than fact meeting had been held and countries attending. Secretary stated Eden would brief other 12 on confidential basis.

Meeting to brief 12 on today's meeting scheduled 10 a.m. Monday. In meantime US liaison officers will, as occasion arises, inform other delegations negative results of meeting.

Comment: No cracks apparent in solid Communist front nor slightest indication any willingness whatever modify their positions. Molotov was obviously sitting back letting Chou and Nam II take the lead.

Dulles

*May 3.*
MAY 2, 1954

396.1 GE/5-254 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation

SECRET NIACt


36. Sent niact Department 1102; repeated information Tokyo 647. For the Secretary from Dean. Re Embtel 1101, May 1. We saw President Rhee early this morning in effort to prepare ground for substantive meeting tomorrow. Mentioned attitude some of our Allies toward necessity simultaneous elections under UN auspices in both North and South, and also interest of Geneva in press reports from here re alleged pressure on local opposition candidates. After much consideration, decided against spending real effort trying to get him to correct present alleged abuses in connection May 20 election on ground if successful we will have militated against his acceptance our Plan B which we intend outline in some detail tomorrow. He plans troop inspection away from Seoul today and believe this morning not propitious.

We also summarized developments fifth plenary (your telegram 23) and told Rhee of plan hold restricted meeting yesterday May 1 (your telegram 22) and that Pyun might be cabling him for instructions. He is very confident complete moral probity own party and complete sinfulness of opposition. Further believes only necessary for US and Korea to stand together. Constantly harps on fact colonialism is over in Asia and French and British are through, so why get excited over what they think. Will do level best to sell him Plan B tomorrow.

Briggs

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1 The text of this message read as follows:

"Re your 20 April 30. Have no question desirability and will arrange see Rhee soonest and do best obtain his approval plan 'B'. He dislikes Sunday conferences so Monday probably earliest." (396.1 GE/5-154)

2 See telegram Secto 57, Apr. 30, p. 170.

3 Not printed; concerning the restricted session, see telegram Secto 69, May 2, supra.

396.1 GE/5-254 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 2, 1954—6 p. m.

32. Repeated information priority Department Secto 72. For Briggs and Dean. Re: Secto 48 (Seoul 20) and Secto 59 (Seoul 24). In view

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1 Dated Apr. 30, p. 172.

2 Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 173.
preliminary discussion among 16 and in working committee on counter
plans, we have drafted tentative proposals along lines plan B. Text
draft paper below. Have not shown to ROK or any other delegation.

Appreciate your views soonest on draft paper. Also if your discus-
sions with Rhee on plan B warrant, suggest you inform him tentative
contents draft paper for his comments and general approval if possible
for developing plan with 16 and using in conference as situation
develops.

Would give USDel strong hand and help us direct and control
negotiating situation if US and ROK together take initiative among
16 on draft papers. Appropriate time and auspices for use such pro-
posals in conference not yet discussed with ROK or other delegates.
Draft paper contains essential principles on UN observation, elections,
and troop withdrawal, but leaves room for changes on formulation of
specifics if negotiations should develop at this stage, we have advantage
UK and French views apparently similar to our plan B. They include
specific reference UNCURK, elections within ROK constitutional
structure, and permissive provision for assembly amend ROK constitu-
tion. Provision for UNCURK not unalterable if other satisfactory
form UN auspices developed. But, UK and French delegates agree
proposals should begin with UNCURK.

Bracketed phrases in part II A\(^3\) of draft paper designed to get ROK
reaction in first instance to questions scope and purpose of elections. If
brackets deleted, believe proposals certain get general allied backing.
USDel as yet still reserve position on these two points pending dis-
cussions with ROK.

Text draft paper follows:

Draft proposals for the establishment of a united and independent
Korea.

In conformity with the United Nations resolutions of peaceful
settlement of Korean question, establishment of united and independ-
ent Korea should be achieved in following manner:

I. Responsibilities for supervision and observation

Establishment of united and independent Korea through holding of
free elections and withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, within
time schedule set forth below, should be observed and certified, in
manner set forth below, by United Nations Commission for Unifica-
tion and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), established by resolu-

\(^3\) Printed as parentheses in the source text which is the copy repeated to the
Department.
II. Free elections in Korea

a. Within period of blank months from adoption of these proposals, during which necessary conditions for free elections should be assured, there should be held (throughout Korea) elections for (the president and) National Assembly of unified Korea.

b. Representation in National Assembly should be in direct proportion to population (of citizenry of Korea).

c. Elections should be based on universal adult suffrage (by all citizens of Korea).

d. Elections should be in secret and held in conditions of genuine freedom (throughout Korea) in Korea.

e. Elections should be supervised and observed and results certified by United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. This Commission should insure that safeguards for free elections are observed and that elections are properly conducted.

Commission should propose, and appropriate authorities in Korea should put into effect, any changes in applicable election laws which Commission considers necessary to assure free elections in accordance with these proposals. Commission should certify that such elections are valid expression of free will of people of Korea.

f. Conditions of genuine freedom and applicable election laws should include following guarantees:

Freedom of movement in Korea;
Freedom of presentation of candidates;
Immunity of candidates;
Freedom from arbitrary arrest or victimization;
Freedom of association and political meetings;
Freedom of expression for all;
Freedom of press, radio and free circulation of newspapers, periodicals, etc;
Secrecy of vote;
Security of polling stations and ballot boxes;

g. All authorities within Korea should cooperate fully in ensuring that elections are properly conducted under necessary safeguards and to that end should provide UNCURK with all necessary assistance and facilities and freedom to move, observe and consult in Korea.

III. Formation of an All-Korean Government

a. Immediately after elections, National Assembly should be convened and government formed for the whole of Korea in accordance with the constitution. Government so formed would then become sole legitimate government of Korea.

b. Constitution of Republic of Korea should remain in force except as it may be superseded or amended by National Assembly acting in constituent session when convened following elections.
IV. Withdrawal of foreign forces

As integral part of reunification of Korea, mutually-phased withdrawal of foreign forces should be completed within twelve months after all-Korean government has assumed authority. Withdrawal will be coordinated with both sides by UNCURK. Withdrawals should begin during a 90-day period immediately prior to holding of elections on date to be announced by UNCURK. Withdrawals, observed and verified by UNCURK, will proceed in accordance with prearranged schedules and will be effected through ports of entry prescribed in armistice agreement.

V. International provision for security unified Korea

At time of formation of all-Korean government countries concerned in this agreement, and countries neighboring Korea, should pledge their respect for territorial integrity and political independence of unified Korea in conjunction with declaration by unified government of Korea to undertake to abide by purposes and principles of United Nations Charter in its international relations. Countries bordering on Korea should work out with government of unified Korea arrangements for guaranteeing security of those borders. Unified Korea should have authority to assume such existing rights and obligations and to conclude such agreements as it may wish.

VI. Rehabilitation of Korea

After formation of all-Korean government in accordance with above provisions, there should be developed and carried out international program of relief and rehabilitation for all Korea to which all countries so desiring may contribute. Such program should be developed in consultation with all-Korean government.

VII. Concluding stages

Armistice agreement should be modified as appropriate to implement the above provisions for establishing united and independent Korea. Armistice agreement should be considered superseded in accordance with paragraph 62 of that agreement when UNCURK certifies that (a) an all-Korean government has been established with effective control over all of Korea as result of free and secret elections expressing valid will of people and (b) all foreign forces have been withdrawn from Korea in accordance with an agreement thereon.

UNCURK should submit final report to General Assembly of United Nations on completion of above stages. Thereafter, UNCURK should confine its activities to such responsibilities in connection with observation of independence and security of unified Korea as may be determined by General Assembly.

Dulles
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Technical Secretary of the United States Delegation (Van Hollen) ¹

CONFIDENTIAL

Participants: The Secretary
Ambassador Johnson
The Under Secretary
Mr. Phleger
Mr. Robertson
Mr. Young

Subject: Guidance on Korea and Indochina Phases of Geneva Conference

Korean Phase

Support for UN—Ambassador Johnson asked the Secretary for guidance on the future of the Korean phase of the Conference, pointing out that all plenary speeches would probably be completed by Wednesday or Thursday ² and that last Saturday’s restricted session had not indicated any flexibility in the Communist position. Although it was hoped that the Allied side would be in a position to put forth a positive position—Plan B—within a short time, it did not appear that there was much likelihood or practicability of continuing the Korean phase for an extended period.

Mr. Robertson said that the Communists would probably press for the “international supervision” of elections in Korea as distinguished from elections under “UN supervision”. He felt it important that we clearly specify to our Allies that we were insistent upon UN supervision, otherwise our Allies would urge us to accept “neutralist” countries as members of a supervisory commission. Ambassador Johnson agreed but pointed out that UN supervision of elections would not necessarily preclude the possibility of the USSR, India, or other similar countries serving on a supervisory commission.

The Secretary stated that we should stand firm on the proposition that the Geneva Conference should not degenerate into a repudiation of the United Nations. Although the Communists would say that the UN had intervened in the war in Korea, that such intervention was outrageous, etc., it was of utmost importance that the UN be upheld.

¹The source text indicates that Van Hollen was the drafting officer for the memorandum, although he is not listed as being one of the participants.
²The meeting must have taken place in the morning of May 3. The minutes of the meeting of 16, cited in footnote 1, infra, indicate that Eden left to bid farewell to Dulles who was leaving Geneva around midday and did not return for the balance of the Conference.
³May 5–6.
In fact, the issue of the UN and the entire concept of collective security was a much bigger issue at the conference than Korea. Should the conference end with a repudiation of the United Nations, the results could be tragic and actually lead to the end of the UN itself. While the Allies might attempt to derogate from the position of the UN, it was important that the US urge its Allies to continue to give strong support to the UN principle.

**General U.S. Position**—The Secretary agreed that the U.S. should adhere to a general position which would provide for the holding of all-Korean elections within the framework of the ROK constitution and under UN supervision. He felt we should take this position and stand on it.

**Allied Proposal**—Pointing out that the French wanted to have each country put up a proposal in its own name with the right of other delegations to comment on or amend such proposals, Mr. Phleger said that it was important that all Allied delegations reach agreement on a single proposal and that they stand together in support of this proposal. With reference to an Allied proposal, the Secretary felt the Communists would reject any supervised elections because of the repercussions of the acceptance of such supervision in Germany. On the question of supervised elections, the Communists would have Germany in mind, while the Allies should keep Indochina in mind.

**Second Phase**—Ambassador Johnson explained that when it is apparent that the unification efforts at Geneva had failed, we would be under considerable pressure, particularly from the British, to enter into some type of “second phase” in Korea. The British have in mind (1) a possible withdrawal of troops from their present positions and the establishment of a 40-50 mile buffer zone; (2) a ROK–North Korean transportation and communication arrangement; (3) customs union. Mr. Young added that if reunification failed at Geneva, the British also were thinking in terms of some type of permanent subcommission, composed of the so-called “Big Five” plus the ROK and North Korea, which would be set up following Geneva in order to ameliorate tension between the two sides. It was generally agreed that such attempts to establish a *modus vivendi* between the ROK and the North Koreans would prove completely unacceptable to the ROK.

Mr. Phleger suggested that rather than say that the Geneva Conference had failed or consider the establishment of a “second phase”, it would be advisable to refer the entire Korean question back to the UN, with an indication that the matter had always been before the UN and was, therefore, simply being sent back to the UN for further consideration.
[Here follows the remainder of the conversation which dealt with the Indochinese phase of the Conference; for the text, see page 670.]

396.1 GE/5-354 : Telegram

Fourth Meeting of the Heads of the 16 Allied Delegations, Geneva, May 3, 11:10 a. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 3, 1954—11 p. m.

Secto 84. Repeated information Seoul 33, Tokyo 20, London 115, Paris 180, Moscow 39. Department pass Defense; Tokyo pass CINC-UNC. Fourth meeting chief delegates held this morning with General Smith presiding. Eden summarized Saturday’s restricted meeting. He pointed out Molotov and Chou very sensitive on point of UN supervision elections; Pyun had successfully elicited Nam II’s views on North Korean proposals; and restricted meeting definitely useful showing clearly where representatives stood.

General Smith said even in light his experience negotiating with Russians he was surprised at vehemence against allies and particularly US at restricted meeting. He emphasized it would be policy US delegation meet false allegations and slander and solicited support other delegations. He also emphasized Secretary’s view Communist assault on UN is serious and grave challenge to its integrity, good faith and future, and he solicited defense of UN from among delegations.

Considerable discussion followed on next steps in Korean conference. Eden pointed out question of future restricted meetings had been left open on Saturday so that matter could be reported back to heads of delegations for their consideration. Consensus of opinion: (1) Communist allegations and distortions should be countered; (2) important formulate definitive allied position soon as possible; and (3) this week’s proceedings might develop with two or three plenary sessions, their [then?] postponement for no speakers until Friday when allied proposals can be laid on line, completion of draft proposals by committee of nine, possibly another restricted small meeting, and possible informal discussion among certain delegations on preparations for Indochina phase.

1 A set of minutes of this meeting (AD Verb Min/4) from which the time of the meeting is taken is in FE files, lot 60 D 330, box 14824. The meeting adjourned at 12:15 p. m.

2 May 7.
Commonwealth delegates and Garcia (Philippines) emphasized lack concrete proposals puts allied delegations in awkward and difficult position. They urged definitive allied position soon as possible. Zuleta (Colombia) pointed out certain consultations were needed before allied proposals could be developed, and suggested committee of nine complete its work, plenary sessions be reduced, and interim be used counter Communist proposals. General Smith agreed weakness our present position is its purely negative character, pointed out time and difficulties faced in concerting among 16 governments, reported consultations proceeding in Seoul, and urged that committee of nine complete its business as rapidly as feasible. Acikalin (Turkey), while agreeing usefulness small restricted meetings to grasp root of other side’s intentions, cautioned against permitting impression question of Korea being dealt with only by great powers and China. General Smith and Eden agreed small meetings consultative only and all allied delegations should make publicly clear big powers not deciding Korean issue. Acikalin endorsed categorical refutation Communist distortions to improve our present position re public opinion.

Pyun said absolutely necessary develop common approach to Korean problem but also essential study Communist proposals item by item to formulate our definite position on which Communist terms we can accept or which not. He suggested plenary sessions could be used analyze Communist proposals. Pyun said ROK would reject North Korean proposals because they (1) set up All-Korea Commission superseding ROK and establishing coalition and (2) eliminate UN altogether by substitution international organization of their own.

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-354

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Calhoun)

CONFIDENTIAL


Participants: Foreign Minister Pyun, ROK Delegation
Ambassador Ben Limb, ROK Delegation
Ambassador Johnson, United States Delegation
Mr. Robertson, United States Delegation
Mr. Young, United States Delegation
Mr. Calhoun, United States Delegation

Subject: ROK Intention to Submit New Proposal to Plenary Session, May 3.

Following a telephone conversation between Mr. Robertson and Foreign Minister Pyun in which Mr. Robertson sought to dissuade
Dr. Pyun from including a specific new proposal in his speech to the Plenary on May 3, the above members of the American Delegation called on Dr. Pyun at his office.

Dr. Pyun opened the discussion by referring to Secretary Dulles' statement regarding the withdrawal of forces from Korea and stressed the necessity for not tying together the withdrawal of Chinese Communist and UN forces. He cited the points he had made in his first statement on this subject and stated that he understood the Secretary supported this view. He said also that the ROK could not retreat from opposition to the proposed all-Korean Commission and must attack the North Korean proposal. He said that failure to attack it would damage the allied cause and he therefore could not keep silent.

Mr. Robertson observed that Dr. Pyun had missed the point which he was trying to make. He emphasized the importance in maintaining solidarity among the 16 allied delegations on the details of any proposals presented, pointing out that the Communists always have full solidarity on their side and we must not weaken our position by taking steps in the conference without advance notification to the other delegations. Any division among the 16 resulting from the submission of a new specific proposal would benefit only the Communists. Ambassador Johnson interjected that he thought there was a misunderstanding and that we were referring only to the six-point proposal with which Dr. Pyun intended to conclude his speech.

Dr. Pyun suggested as a possible solution that following the plenary session on May 3 he would have a press conference and state that the specific proposal in his speech was put forward by the ROK and not by the 16. He mentioned the Australian delegation statements as being another example of failure to consult among the 16 before presenting a new idea to the conference. He said that he did not wish to follow this example. He added that since his first statement the other 15 delegations had not indicated disagreement with the proposal introduced by him in general terms. He added that if we do not attack the North Korean proposal and submit additional proposals on our side, the Communists will think there is no objection to their proposal.

Ambassador Johnson emphasized that we all agreed in rejecting the Communist proposal and will support the ROK position generally. He pointed out that in the meeting of the 16 that morning Dr. Pyun had said nothing about his intention to submit a new proposal.

Following consultation with members of his own delegation, Dr. Pyun agreed to delete the specific proposal from his speech that afternoon.
Sixth Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, May 3, 3:05 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 4, 1954—1 a.m.

Secto 85. Repeated information Tokyo 21, London 116, Paris 183, Oslo 4, Seoul 34, Moscow 40. Tokyo pass CINCUNGC. Department pass Defense, CINCPAC, COMSAC. Following is sixth plenary meeting May 3 summary:

Eden noted receipt of message from Prime Minister Ceylon transmitting extract South Asian Prime Minister’s conference communiqué on Indochina. He then called on ROK representative.

Pyun in long oratory rebutted April 27 Nam II, April 28 Chou En-lai and April 29 Molotov speeches and reiterated unacceptability Nam II unification proposal. Ambassador Yang gave English interpretation.

Pyun began by noting that free world concepts of peace, freedom, democracy, etc., have been perverted by Communists to become covers for own misdeeds. As example described terroristic activities of people’s committees in north following liberation and noted Communists called this “democratic reform”.

Pyun noted Nam II allegation that US failed to live up to 1945 Moscow agreement, planned division of Korea and carried out separate 1948 elections with police interference. Pyun said facts were that in accordance with Moscow agreement of US-USSR, joint commission met for two years but broke down over USSR demand that nationalist elements comprising majority of population be excluded. USSR subsequently refused to permit UN Commission entry into North Korea. On eve 1948 elections in south, Communists attempted violent sabotage. Pyun concluded that Communists claim police interference only when their own terroristic activities are interfered with.

Pyun then directed attention to Nam II’s quotation from 1948 UNCKOK report. Said quoted portion was communiqué which reported biased opinion only of one delegate, Mughir (Syria). According to Pyun, Mughir wanted to delay election until unity with those opposing elections, i.e., Communists, was achieved. Thus communiqué represented biased opinion of one man, not of commission as a whole.

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Footnotes:
1 A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/6) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 267.
2 The meeting of Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan took place in Colombo from Apr. 28-May 2. For the text of the communiqué, see Documents on International Affairs, 1954 (issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs; London, Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 166-169.
In disparaging Nam II’s praise for North Korean achievements, Pyun noted that over four million North Koreans fled over 38th parallel to safety of ROK. Praised ROK land reform program. Said iron curtain precluded expose true conditions North Korea.

Regarding Nam II’s statement on POW’s “forcibly retained by ROK,” Pyun said ROK’s regarded all Koreans, including Nam II, as brethren and as ROK citizens. He noted that not one of thousands of Koreans abducted by North Korean regime during autumn 1950 retreat has been sent back to ROK.

Pyun then asked Nam II whether he still believed in Communism, after Communist China has trampled on Korea’s sovereignty. Communist China now has one adviser beside each nominal North Korean official, and one million Chinese Communist troops live off Korean land. North Koreans are being deported to make room for incoming Chinese peasants. Therefore, Nam II and others should now repent and join ROK, which would “embrace them in warm brotherly love” and offer them all possible assistance.

Characterizing Chou and Molotov statements as lies and distortions, Pyun selected Chou’s charge that US was obstructing Asia’s desire for liberation. Pyun said that fact was imperialist is Red China, or USSR, since Red China is merely stooge of USSR. Cited destruction of nationalism in European satellites. Stated that bloc being formed by US in Asia is defensive, although he personally impatient and regretted present indecisive leadership in free world. Said better to smash python’s head than try to twist its tail.

Pyun then deflated Chou’s assertions that CPR represented Chinese people and that it has made progress, calling it merely satellite cringing at feet of Molotov.

Repeating appeal Communist brethren to return to ROK, Pyun called North Korea a “satellite’s satellite”.

Noting Molotov’s urgings that Koreans evict foreigners and settle own problems themselves, Pyun said he suspected there would be Communists in North Korea for some time regardless of any agreements reached, and ROK had right to keep its own friends around. Referring Molotov’s allegation Americans had intervened in Korea, ROK felt that if what US had done for ROK was intervention it is exactly what ROK desired and only complaint not quite as much as we desire. American intervention does not imply taking things away from native population, but rather assisting them.

Pyun dismissed Molotov’s contention that US was aggressor in Korea and Formosa and asked whether Molotov thought UN should condemn US rather than Communist China. Pyun said USSR used Security Council veto some 50 times including veto ROK admission but complains about US opposition admission Red China to UN.
Pyun said USSR protestations of love of freedom for other nations not persuasive. He said contrary to US position USSR did not propose use of Korean language at Geneva and this shows Communist China and USSR oblivious of North Korean regime as separate entity.

In conclusion, Pyun said Nam II proposal was unacceptable because it (1) provided for an all-Korean government on a coalition basis, means of establishing other Soviet satellites; (2) excludes UN; and (3) provides interference by international body of countries of own choice replacing UN Commission.

During above speech Nam II impassive but slowly wrote notes, presumably changes in his speech, which he passed other members North Korean delegation for comment.

Eden then called on Nam II, who said he would rebut certain other statements made at conference and clarify certain points of his own proposal. Asserted that reference to certain UN resolutions adopted in absence DPROK unacceptable and without foundation.

Nam II then quickly reiterated highlights of his April 27 proposal and launched into explanation of troop withdrawal item saying six months period originally specified, but other times could perhaps be worked out. Said US opposition to simultaneous withdrawal suggests US has intentions to use Korea as springboard for attack on China. Felt troops have a long way to go in event evacuation, Korean people do not look forward to their return.

Nam complained that Secretary Dulles said nothing about point three of his proposal. Stated participating nations must agree on measures to create improved conditions which would prevent renewal of hostilities as a basis of peaceful development of Korea. The great powers should further undertake specific obligations to guarantee independence of Korea and refrain from interference in Korean affairs.

Nam alleged US and other delegations insist elections in only North Korea, under supervision of UN and ROK, while demanding withdrawal of Chinese forces. Asserted Australian representative had admitted justice of DPROK proposal to hold all-Korean elections. Nam then drew on US and UK press stories and UN Commission reports covering period from 1948 elections through summer 1952 ROK political crisis to show that ROK is police state and that original elections invalid.

Nam also attempted historical citations including alleged September 1949 Rhee letter to Oliver and captured map in effort prove US and ROK guilty of 1950 aggression. Stated US intervened militarily in Korea before appropriate UN resolution was passed, and called atten-
tion to Rhee's demand for march to north even after armistice. Nam warned if this was tried "Korean people" would deliver crushing blow. Speech also contained veiled undercurrent of threat to renew hostilities if agreement not reached at Geneva. Nam said preceding Pyun address such slanderous, fallacious, false statement obviously not worthy of rebuttal.

Referring to request of Australian representative for clarification of DPROK proposal for all-Korean mixed commission, Nam II said he had in mind bilateral body which would adopt decisions by mutual agreement of both sides. Organizational procedure and number of members should also be subject to mutual agreement. He said that any difficulties such as Australian representative was worrying about could be easily surmounted by Korean people themselves.

Following break Greek Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos briefly pointed out that forces his government provided in defense of Korea were sent to fulfill obligation to uphold UN Charter and UN principle of collective security. Stephanopoulos stated that he would not support North Korean proposal.\(^4\)

Chou En-lai, who had inscribed himself during Pyun's speech, began by long attack on US insistence upon use of UN resolutions as basis solving Korean question, which was largely rehash his first speech in plenary.\(^5\) Relied heavily on old arguments that resolutions "illegal" and that UN disqualified itself from dealing with Korea because of its belligerency.

According to Chou, US has opposed Nam II's demands for withdrawal of foreign forces on grounds that US forces are of a different character. He said this true, but difference is that US forces are aggressors. Picking up analogy from Nam II speech above, he suggested that US forces should be able to withdraw full 5,000 miles that they had come to engage in hostilities in Korea. Said withdrawal must be simultaneous and within definite period.

Chou then supported point three Nam II's proposal, as clarified, as basis for agreement at Geneva. Chou castigated Foreign Minister Pyun's statement as slanderous ravings uttered for benefit of his master, Syngman Rhee. Said shameless that Pyun's only complaint was that there was not enough US intervention.

Re prisoners of war, Chou asserted that US refusal to abide by repatriation provisions of Geneva convention was root of all difficulties. Recounted alleged US connivance at ROK June 1953 unilateral release of 27,000 prisoners of war, US obstruction of work of NNRC

\(^*\) Stephanopoulos' statement is printed in *The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference*, pp. 63-64.
\(^*\) Chou's statement and proposal are printed *ibid.*, pp. 65-69.
and impressment of POW's in ROK and Chiang Kai-shek armies in violation armistice.

In conclusion Chou put forward proposal, which he stated had DPROK concurrence, providing that:

(1) Measures be taken to return nonrepatriated Korean and Chinese POW's impressed in June 1953 and January 1954;
(2) Commission of US, UK, France, USSR, DPROK and ROK be established to solve this problem;
(3) Joint Red Cross team, representing these nations, be sent to present location of POW's for inspection.

Eden closed meeting at 6:25 p.m. after stating that Canada and Netherlands were inscribed for tomorrow.

Comment: Nam II's statement followed standard Communist line, and centered upon singling out US as aggressor, whereas Chou sought discredit UN role in Korean reunification. Nam II's speech was first admission in nonrestricted session that commission under his plan would have equal number Communist members and would give Communist veto over its decisions.

SMITH

795.00/5–354: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation

SECRET

SEOUL, May 3, 1954—8 p.m.

38. Sent Department 1105, repeated information Tokyo 650. For Secretary from Dean. Ambassadors Briggs and Dean saw President Rhee, Acting Foreign Minister Cho, hour and three-fourths session this morning. Reviewed Geneva's 17, 18, 22, 24, and 25. Explained that you wanted to negotiate within sovereignty constitutional structure and authority of present ROK Government and that you wanted to do everything possible to uphold its prestige, but that it was imperative and essential that present ROK Government should stand before bar of world opinion as an unquestioned constitutional form of government in which elections were freely held in accordance with democratic processes, in which candidates could file their petitions and persons could vote without threats or intimidation. Ventured to suggest possible that President might wish to consider inviting present members of UNCURK to review procedures and methods in forthcoming May 20 elections. Explained that this was primarily domestic

1 Same as telegram Secto 40, Apr. 29, from Geneva, p. 155.
2 Same as telegram Secto 41, Apr. 29, from Geneva, p. 157.
3 Dated Apr. 30, p. 171.
4 Same as telegram Secto 59, Apr. 30, from Geneva; not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 173.
5 Same as telegram Secto 60, May 1, from Geneva, ibid.
question for his determination on which we technically had no right to make suggestions, but since we were supporting ROK Government in every way we could, wanted to make suggestion purely on a friendly basis in order that ROK might stand in best possible light before world.

President made long and somewhat rambling dissertation on lack of confidence of Korean people in DNP and alleged interference of UNCURK in previous elections and seemed particularly grieved and critical about their report to General Assembly in fall of 1952.

Then we emphasized fundamental importance of appearance democratic elections as well as being so in fact.

Then turned to brief review of events of last few days and outlined Casey's public proposal and Cuenco's private proposal made inside group and explained urgent necessity of ROK and ourselves putting forward a plan which would demand unanimous and enthusiastic approval all on our side. Then explained plan B in some detail and said we were confident his government would receive overwhelming approval in south. Explained simultaneous elections in north and south far more convincing evidence of democracy and in accordance UN resolutions, and that it would prove to world that his was a completely free and constitutional government. Emphasized importance that USSR should not be able to point to any division on our side or to any plan on our side which somewhat approximated Nam II's plan to combine north and southern Assemblies in order to bring in new government.

President was very mild and pleasant throughout and said that even under plan A he envisaged as essential to have before elections not only complete withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces but even complete withdrawal of North Korean Communist army or its complete surrender. He said its complete surrender would be followed by immediate pardon for all those who renounced Communism and declared their allegiance to ROK Government and that others would be placed in custody. Further, he said that if thereafter there were elections in north alone under UN supervision he was completely prepared put up to people of both north and south in form of a plebiscite question whether they then wanted simultaneous elections in both north and south for both National Assembly and President, and that if people voted they did in plebiscite he was quite prepared to have elections for Assembly and President in both north and south under UN supervision and that he would in no sense stand in way if people wished to elect a new government or new President.

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Reference is to the Philippine proposal summarized in telegram 20, Apr. 30, from Geneva, p. 172.
Explained that while we had visualized phased withdrawal of Chinese Communist troops together with UN troops in south starting in part before elections, we had not visualized complete withdrawal Chinese Communist forces before election or surrender or handling of North Korean Communist armies as he visualized. He insisted this was only practical way to handle it.

We explained that our plan B, except for timing of troop withdrawal, was same as he outlined above except we would eliminate necessity for plebiscite first. He replied he wasn’t dictator and considered plebiscite essential.

Explained I wasn’t asking for any decision on plan B but was merely discussing it with him in order to get benefit of his judgment for you.

He continued to emphasize futility further negotiations at Geneva and we explained necessity allow all our allies who had contributed troops in fighting to have their complete say and to listen to their proposals, and for our side to put forward entirely acceptable plan with his approval.

He said there was no point to unification if immediately thereafter Communists would come south, and emphasized that if Eisenhower government gave him military divisions and logistical support he needed, he would promise not to attack Communists in north if they did not attempt to come south. He evidently believes he is going to receive such complete promises military support from Van Fleet mission that prospect of total withdrawal of UN forces is unimportant.

Again urged him to give matter thorough and careful study.

As he appeared to be tired ended interview and will see tomorrow. He said he regarded discussion as most constructive and helpful. While have nothing conclusive to report, interview on whole went quite favorably with reasoned discussion and no fireworks.

With reference to criticism of current elections he is issuing statement promising to act immediately if anybody has any evidence of illegality with respect to May elections. Evidence continues to point to very complete police intimidation of opposing candidates, threats to businessmen contributing to opposition, tearing down posters, mass demonstrations to stifle opposition, etc., and news may continue bad. With reference to Department’s telegrams 874, 881, and Geneva’s 21, while fully appreciating importance of world opinion to ROK Government, would like guidance on how strong we should go about making representations concerning necessity of holding free, unsuppressed, and democratic elections on May 20 and urging him to allow

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7 None printed. They dealt with the U.S. Delegation’s and the Department of State’s interest in urging Rhee to invite UNCURK to observe the election campaign and the elections in the Republic of Korea (396.1 GE/4-2954, 5-154, 4-3054).
UNCURK full facilities for observation. For if he follows our recommendations respect May 20 elections and they are regarded by UNCURK as democratic and satisfactory have we not to certain extent hurt ourselves in connection with urging necessity of plan B? Also, if we urge UNCURK to get really active and there is an adverse report with respect to May 20 elections haven't we accentuated publicity?

Re Geneva's 26, Dean will delay departure subject Secretary's further instructions. Please notify office and family.

Geneva's 32 arrived after above-described meeting with President Rhee and comments on that will follow. Plan present that draft to President tomorrow.10

BRIGGS

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6 Dated May 1, repeated to the Department of State as telegram Dulte 38. In it, the Secretary expressed the hope that Dean would remain in Seoul beyond May 7, since the serious talks, which might lead to an acceptable solution and would require Dean's explaining them to Rhee, were only just beginning. (110.11 DU/5-154)
7 Dated May 2, p. 178.
8 On May 4, the Department of State's telegram 886 responded to telegram 1105 stating that the discussion with Rhee had been very salutary and followed exactly the right line in trying to make clear the extent to which the world would be watching the elections and the desirability of a Korean request for UNCURK observation. It left to the discretion of the Embassy in Korea the possibility of further discussions with Rhee on this subject. (795.00/5-354)

MAY 4, 1954

396.1 GE/5-454: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

SEOUL, MAY 4, 1954—11 a. m.

1108. Repeated priority USDel Geneva 40. For Secretary from Dean. Reference Geneva's 32,1 following very preliminary comments:

1. In view our 382 you may wish define "foreign". If procedures as to NNSC under armistice agreement followed, will UNCURK really be allowed supervise withdrawal Communist troops? In interview Dean had with General Mohn last Friday, who succeeded Graffstrom on NNSC, Mohn strongly recommends NNSC's complete abolition under armistice agreement on account its complete unworkability and complete refusal Communists respect any wording except in highly uncooperative technical sense defeating intended meaning

1 Dated May 2, p. 178.
2 Supra.
and hence enormous advantage Communists have with their inspections over US who live up to spirit in south.

2. In view our 38 should we amplify “necessary conditions?”

2. [II] B. Should there be same length of home residence required in one part of Korea as other? What will be definition of “citizens?” Will Chinese Communist immigrants into North Korea be citizens? Will Communists who are not pardoned by ROK be counted as citizens et cetera; namely will ROK decrees depriving Communists of citizenship be recognized for voting purposes?

2. [II] F. Does freedom of movement mean Communists in North Korea can freely come South during elections? Suggest adding freedom to file petitions without molestation or police intimidation of signers, affording proper police protection for meetings. How large do you envisage UNCURK forces in North at time of elections will really be before complete withdrawal Communist forces? Who will house and feed them?

4. [IV] Is not “both sides” hold over from armistice as will be only one all-Korean Government?

Will not Korean Communist forces have to be disarmed and ROK forces recognized as only legitimate army in all of Korea after organization all-Korean Government?

Mohn ridiculed to me “ports of entry” in armistice agreement and said everything came through other nondesignated ports with no way for NNNSC to supervise so might as well rely on Communist good faith, since their ability to inspect our honest records in South gave them tremendous intelligence advantage and therefore we are really kidding ourselves about advantage in North of having any so-called neutral agency do checking.

Do you still plan on recommendation (C) of 7 October, 1950 about cooperation of representative bodies in view previous Communist experience this regard?

Also refer you to recommendation (D).

In II B. presume you mean “X” representatives to “Y” population and not technical system of proportional voting designed to give minorities a voice—would spell out a little more.

II E [D]. Actual voting can be in secret but if Chinese Communist troops not withdrawn voters can be intimidated at homes before voting or threatened or kept from polls or roughed up afterwards so fear may keep many from voting or may sway their vote. Difficult for temporary commission to have much effect.

II E. Who will appropriate authorities be before elections? Will law of North Korea be co-related with those of South Korea before elections?
II F. With government controlled press and radio doesn’t mean much.

II G. This requires collaboration between ROK and Communist North Korean authorities with Rhee recognizing latter for this purpose before elections.

III B. What is meaning “constituent”?

IV. Will be extremely difficult to govern North for a year if Chinese Communist forces are to remain there. In this period what do you visualize relation of present North Korean forces will be?

V. Would unified Korean Government be free to adopt mutual defense pact with US and one or more treaties of alliance with USSR and her satellites now in effect with North Korean Government?

VII B. Would this require US to give up bases and right to station troops under defense pact—in other words unified government won’t be free to extend bases to US as in Spain, Holland, et cetera.

BRIGGS

396.1 GE/5–454 : Telegram

Seventh Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, May 4, 3:05 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 4, 1954—11 p.m.

Secto 102. Repeated information Tokyo 22, London 120, Paris 199, Oslo 5, Seoul 40, Moscow 45. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Department also pass Defense, CINCPAC, COMSAC.

Seventh plenary session May 4 consisted speeches by representatives Canada, Netherlands and Ethiopia. At conclusion session Prince Wan Thailand presiding announced no further speakers were inscribed. Suggested that Wednesday and Thursday could profitably be spent in informal discussions and proposed next plenary session be held Friday, May 7. Proposal accepted.

Pearson, head Canadian delegation, delivered eloquent defense of United Nations and US, attacked Molotov and Chou speeches and dissected North Korean unification proposal. Pearson stated Canada represented at conference because she is UN member and that responsibilities of conference derive solely from decisions taken by UN on Korean question. He stated that Canada has supported and remains

1 A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/T) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 267. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3:05 p.m. and adjourned at 5:03 p.m.

2 Texts of these statements may be found in The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, pp. 69–82.
bound by UN decisions and that Canada will not support any proposal which denies their validity or which would equate moral and political status of UN with aggressors in Korea.

Pearson quoted Molotov’s expression of sympathy with movements for national freedom and expressed hope that any people attaining freedom would do better than Lithuania, Bulgaria or Mongolian People’s Republic. Pearson also observed that right to be free does not include obligation to be Communist. He further remarked that it would be no contribution to Asian peace or prosperity, independence or dignity, if East Asian co-prosperity sphere were exchanged for Chinese East Asian co-Communist empire.

Pearson vigorously defended US against Communist charges of aggressive imperialism, citing Canadian experience with her powerful neighbor as proof of nonaggressiveness of US people.

Pearson explicitly rejected Communist charge that US began Korean hostilities and compared such charges with “those which came out of Moscow and Berlin in September 1939, to prove that peace-loving Nazi Germany had been the innocent victim of aggression by Poland”.

Pearson asked if Chou’s call for removal of foreign troops from Asia included Russians at Port Arthur. With respect to Chou’s injection of POW issue, Pearson stated that it is difficult to understand why Chou raised this issue if he sincerely desired to press forward to a solution of the Korean problem.

Pearson expressed suspicion that North Korean reunification plan includes “words and phrases designed to camouflage a scheme which would bring to Korea the reverse of freedom and independence”. He particularly attacked the proposed all-Korean commission with its built-in Communist veto. He asked several penetrating questions concerning North Korean plan: (1) Would “democratic social organizations” exclude anti-Communist or non-Communist organizations; (2) how would representatives of these organizations be chosen for this all-Korean commission?; (3) does phrase “terror groups” mean anti-Communist political parties?; (4) if no UN or other impartial international supervision, how can free elections be guaranteed in districts where bitter animosities, fears and local tyrannies make impartial Korean supervision quite impossible?; (5) “Does Nam Il really wish us to believe that representatives of North Korea feel they can work amicably and constructively on all-Korean commission with representatives of what he contemptuously calls the ‘Syngman Rhee clique’?”

Pearson stated solution for unification problem must be found in principles of UN resolution providing for union of all Korean people
under government chosen by those people. United Korea, he added, will need some international guarantee against aggression and some international economic assistance to repair destruction of war.

In concluding Pearson referred to Colombo Conference resolution as “an important and constructive effort by group of free Asian states to assist in, and I hope take some responsibility for, peaceful settlement of Asian problems in their part of the world.” In unspoken reference to Chou’s allegation UN had lost moral authority in Asia he called attention to importance attached in Colombo resolution to role of UN. Pearson’s final word was warning that “failure here may well necessitate further collective consideration by those who, as result of such failure, will feel increasingly threatened, of further ways and means to meet that threat.”

Luns, Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, followed with a deliberate defense of the US and UN. He skillfully answered many allegations made by Nam Il and Chou En-lai in their speeches of May 3. He stated that reason Netherlands Government is represented is to maintain principle of collective security and to realize UN ideals that unification in Korea must not be achieved except by will of people freely expressed in secret elections. He reiterated Netherlands Government will “not be found guilty of having failed to confer full justice to this principle.” He likened general statements of Soviet Union, People’s Republic of China, and DPROK to those introduced in eight years of UN debate by representatives of Communist Governments. He expressed surprise that same technique was being used in special conference for establishment of peace in Asia. Luns doubted any agreement could be reached “if everything which is in conformity with a dogmatic blueprint of Communist theory is being labeled as good, and everything which is not fitting in with this blueprint is being condemned in offending terms.”

In answer to the Communist allegations that US was guilty of aggression against Korea, he stated that four years of investigation and endless discussion in UN have made it abundantly clear who was responsible for war.

Referring to Nam Il’s speech on 3 May relating to character of 1948 elections in ROK, Luns expressed amusement that Communist representatives are “lecturing us with regard to democratic processes and freedom of elections.” He pointed out UN investigations found character of ROK elections satisfactory and quoted resolution of temporary commission on Korea adopted by General Assembly on 12 December 1948, which he stated erased all doubts.
Regarding Nam Il’s proposal of April 27 for free and democratic elections, Luns expressed view that such concept sounds democratic but in reality has nothing in common with true democracy nor with free expression of wishes of Korean people.

Referring to Chou En-lai’s vigorous attack on UN of 3 May, he stated that he failed to see what common base is left to this conference for fruitful discussion leading to mutually satisfactory agreements. He made point that if it was Chou’s intentions to split ranks of free world by making it appear that interests of Asian countries lie elsewhere than interests of non-Asian ones, or that countries which recognize PRC are divided on Korea, he desired to remind him of some well-established facts. He then referred to Security Council resolution of June 27, 1950 which determined North Korea as aggressor, supported by India’s vote; to General Assembly resolution of October 7, 1950 which reaffirmed aim of unified, independent and democratic Korea with UN forces remaining until no longer required; and the resolution introduced in Security Council November 10, 1950 calling inter alia for withdrawal of Chinese forces from Korea and assuring China protection its legitimate interests, supported by Norway and the UK. He added fact that this resolution was killed on November 30 by Soviet veto.

Luns also referred to fact that group of 13 Asian states, a considerable number of which had recognized People’s Republic of China, and all members of UN, had appealed to the Peiping Government not to allow its forces to cross 38th parallel. He cited General Assembly resolution of December 14 which brought Ambassador Wu as Chou En-lai’s representative to Lake Success to negotiate an end to conflict in Korea. He emphasized that Wu was ordered to leave by Chou En-lai on December [19,] 1950 and did not meet with UN Commission.

Luns used long Communist delay accepting principles December 3, 1952 General Assembly resolution submitted by India to offset Chou’s argument that US was responsible for delaying armistice negotiations.

Luns expressed hope that this misrepresentation of facts by Communists will not continue.

Ethiopian delegate, Zawde Gabre Heywot, briefly reaffirmed his nation’s loyalty to UN and to principle of seeking establish just and durable peace through collective security. Defined purpose of conference as completion task of unification of Korea by peaceful and democratic means as called for in UN resolutions. Noted that under UN sponsorship representative government had been established in South Korea and referred to ROK as only legal government in Korea. Made only general references to issues before conference. Said problem of elections was where and by what means they should be con-
ducted. In this connection, called attention to fact UN Commission already in existence. Concerning withdrawal problem, merely stated UN had no desire keep troops in Korea indefinitely.

Comment: Net effect day’s session was strengthen picture broad Allied unity which had become somewhat blurred due to failure many friendly delegations respond promptly with strong defenses UN and US and with rebuttal Communist charges. Pearson’s analysis North Korean unification plan and reassertion basic principles of UN resolutions particularly effective.

SMITH

735B.00/5-454: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

SEOUL, May 4, 1954—4 p. m.

1110. Repeated information priority Tokyo 654, priority Geneva 41. Tokyo pass CINCUNC exclusive for General Hull. For the Secretary from Dean. Ambassadors Briggs and Dean called on President Rhee and acting Foreign Minister Cho this morning and delivered copy of tentative draft. In retyping we omitted brackets and left in text words formerly in brackets. In II-D we left in “throughout Korea” and struck out “in Korea”. We also handed President following statement:

“Our draft for establishment of united and independent Korea, if it meets with President Rhee’s approval, would give American delegation and ROK strong negotiating hand versus Communists.

“It would help US and ROK to direct and control negotiating situation at Geneva, and enable US and ROK to take initiative among 16 UN nations contributing troops in proposing sound and constructive plan. An appropriate time and auspice for use such proposals at Geneva conference has not yet been discussed with other delegations. Draft paper contains essential principles on UN observation of elections and troop withdrawal, but leaves room for changes as situation develops.

“Proposed plan is in accordance with UNGA resolution of 14 November 1947, of 12 December 1948, of 21 October 1949, and of 7 October 1950: ‘that all constituent acts be taken, including holding of elections, under auspices of UN, for establishment of unified independent and democratic government on sovereign state of Korea.’

“At this stage of conference we and ROK have advantage of UK and French views which are apparently similar to our tentative plan. These views include specific reference to UNCURK, to elections within the ROK constitutional structure, and to permissive provision for newly elected National Assembly to amend ROK constitution as provided by its terms.”

\(^1\) See telegram 82, May 2, from Geneva, p. 178.
President Rhee read out loud above statement and tentative draft proposal. He asked two specific questions:

(1) Will the Communists accept it?
(2) If he agreed to it could he have the Secretary’s assurances that we would stand on this and that we would not feel compelled to go to some other proposal in order to appear reasonable before the world in relation to the Communists?

He feels that the more intransigent position the Communists take the more we feel we should make concessions in order appear reasonable before the world and since Communists are not impressed by the concessions he wondered whom we were trying to impress. In answer to first question we said that at closed meeting Molotov and Chou En-lai had supported Nam II’s proposal of merging two Assemblies and rejecting UN supervision and at present could not see much real prospect of Communist acceptance. As to second question we said we would ask instructions. President very pleasant and agreeable throughout.

BRIGGS

396.1 GE/5-454: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET NIACR GENEVA, May 4, 1954—8 p.m.

39. Repeated information Department Secto 101. For Briggs and Dean. Appreciate your 38, 40 and 41. With reference 40, will transmit comments soonest. With reference penultimate paragraph your 41, we do not think Communists will accept in view of unequivocal statements of Nam II, Molotov and Chou En-lai. However it is essential that if and when conference fails that US–ROK proposals upon which it breaks enjoy full support not only of 16 nations but of free world opinion. This is not a question of conference tactics but of maintenance of unqualified US public opinion as well as other free world support for ROK in future.

With reference Rhee’s second question, we are prepared to stand firm on basic principles embodied this proposal.

Plenary sessions have been suspended until Friday, May 7. Highly important that by that date ROKs, US and others of sixteen have agreed upon formal proposal embodying plan B.

Pyun saw General Smith today (at his request with no one else present). Stated he had received instructions from Rhee to effect that all-

1 Dated May 3, p. 191.
2 Same as telegram 1108, May 4, p. 194.
3 Same as telegram 1110, supra.
Korean elections could only be accepted if approved by plebiscite. Important Pyun receive instructions which will permit him cooperate with us in working out details proposal along lines plan B.  

Smith

MAY 5, 1954

795.00/5-554: Telegram

Dean–Briggs–Rhee Meeting, Seoul, May 5, Morning: The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation

SECRET  NIACT  

SEUL, May 5, 1954—5 p. m.

45. Sent priority Department 1115, repeated information Tokyo 657. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For the Secretary and Smith from Dean. Ambassador Briggs and Dean called on President early this morning. Acting Foreign Minister Cho, Minister of Defense and Prime Minister present. Reference Geneva’s 39, explained probably intransigent attitude USSR and Chinese Communists at Geneva and apparent small possibility agreement and therefore imperative necessity free world standing together and presenting united front and united proposal which would command unquestioned free world opinion. Told him we were prepared to stand firm on basic principles set forth in plan B and urged him to authorize Pyun accept without necessity of any [troop withdrawal?] as condition to holding of elections in both North and South.

We were interrupted by necessity his going to make scheduled public appearance at children’s festival and will go back at 2 p. m.

They are all sincerely troubled by provisions in plan B which presupposes simultaneous elections in North and South although Chinese Communists in North have only begun to withdraw according I and IV plan B.

Referring to supposed free elections elsewhere, where Soviet troops present, they asked if we seriously believed it would be possible to hold anything like free elections in North so long as Chinese Communist troops still in North or North Korean troops remain unsurrendered. They ridiculed idea of a civilian organization such as UNCURK, even though enhanced by numerous civilian observers, bringing about free elections and again cited experience east European countries.

They cannot understand why, since Chinese Communists are aggressors and UN forces were invited by UN and ROK, there should be any corresponding withdrawal from South as envisaged by IV

1 Supra.
and President insists we are merely paving way for repetition 1949 withdrawal and 1950 aggression. Cites long experience General Hodge \(^2\) in attempting to get Soviets to agree and to carry out anything even when agreed.

They are also fearful that next step after elections in North with Chinese Communist armies present would be demand for coalition government which they say Korean people would never accept. They also feel simultaneous elections somehow constitute reflection on existing ROK Government which they regard as sovereign and as so recognized by United Nations after free elections. (Plan not very clear that ROK constitution remains in effect throughout. Believe II (e) (g) bothers President as presupposes North Korean legislation and cooperation Communists.)

Urged President keep open mind and not to draft anything before we return at 2 p.m. At that time will urge necessity revised instructions to Pyun along line your 39 and that it is an essential favorable American public opinion re ROK that we stand together at Geneva. They have basic fear that plan B is merely first step in whittling-down process. President made long plea for collective security pact for entire Pacific with instantaneous striking power. Fact ROK Government was not included in Secretary's recent discussions still rankles.

Do you think possible amend plan B by making provision for Chinese Communist withdrawal much more specific before elections actually held? Such as: "Before elections are held under observation of UNCURK all Chinese forces shall have been withdrawn from Korea, or such withdrawal shall have taken place to the point where UNCURK shall certify that the remaining Communist troops constitute no threat to the holding of democratic elections free from intimidation", or some similar general provision. Believe President will also want same assurance about North Korean Communist army. Again, since ROK is sovereign and not the aggressor they can't understand why they should be stripped of protection in order to get aggressor out if they desire United Nations forces stay.

Fundamentally, they don't trust any piece of paper either the Soviets or the Chinese or North Korean Communists will sign. They further believe once paper signed, we will urge them to cooperate even though Soviets do not in order satisfy world opinion which will leave them in undefendable position.

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

GÉNEVA, May 5, 1954—1 p. m.

42. Repeated information Department Secto 107. Seoul for Briggs and Dean. Secto 101 (Seoul 39).\(^1\) Wednesday morning Robertson and Young had satisfactory meeting with Pyun, Yang and Limb on draft proposal. As result these discussions following changes made in draft proposal contained Secto 72 (Seoul 32).\(^2\) Pyun emphasized these changes and proposal as a whole discussed on \textit{ad referendum} basis as he required new instructions from Rhee in order accept draft proposal. Pyun will probably telegraph Rhee separately re proposal, referring to changes transmitted this telegram. Pyun requested US send these changes soon as possible Seoul for Rhee and suggested that Rhee might be more likely accept draft proposal if he had these changes suggested by ROK delegation.

1. In paragraph II A insert “six” before “months” and delete words “the President and”. (\textit{Comment}: Pyun urged that question of Presidential election be left to all-Korean National Assembly when convened.)

2. Add to paragraph II B “in accordance with a census observed and certified by UNCURK”. (\textit{Comment}: Pyun stressed importance having accurate census of North Korean population for purpose determining election districts.)

3. In paragraph III A insert in first sentence following “convened” words “in Seoul”.

4. In paragraph V delete from first sentence words “, and countries neighboring Korea,” and delete sentence beginning “the countries bordering on Korea”. (\textit{Comment}: Pyun objected to deleted phrase as possibly applying to Japan and expressed view necessary countries covered by immediately preceding language. He expressed fear provision for working out security arrangements between unified Korea and bordering countries would only lead to interference in internal affairs by China and the USSR. Pyun vehemently opposed idea of demilitarized zone along Korean border and indicated Rhee felt same way.)

As result discussions within US delegation following changes made in draft proposal before discussion with ROK delegation.

1. In preamble insert “and in recognition of right of Korean people to determine through genuinely free elections form and composition of their government,” following first clause.

\(^1\) Dated May 4, p. 201.
\(^2\) Dated May 2, p. 178.
2. In paragraph I first sentence insert "genuinely" before "free elections".

3. In paragraph I change "in manner set forth below" to "in manner provided below".

4. In paragraph II D delete "in Korea".

5. In paragraph II E replace second sentence with "this commission should insure that safeguards for conditions of genuine freedom are observed before, during and after elections and that elections are properly conducted".

6. In paragraph III A insert at end of first sentence "of ROK".

7. In paragraph III B delete "of ROK".

8. In paragraph V delete last sentence. (Comment: Legal adviser stated such provision unnecessary since ROK state continues and language could create difficulties.)

SMITH

795.00/5-554: Telegram

Dean—Briggs—Rhee Meeting, Seoul, May 5, 2 p.m.: The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation

SECRET PRIORITY

SEOUL, May 5, 1954—8 p.m.

48. Sent Department 1119, repeated information Tokyo 659, Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For the Secretary and Smith from Dean. Re Embassy telegram 1115, repeated Geneva 45. Ambassadors Briggs and Dean saw President Rhee, Prime Minister, Acting Foreign Minister Cho and Minister Defense at 2 o'clock. Again presented reasons why we felt essential modify instructions to Pyun and authorize presentation plan B. Their reasons against were (1) plan derogates from sovereignty of ROK Government, (2) no authority to have elections proposed by plan under ROK constitution, (3) announcement of such new elections for Assembly and President would cause great consternation in Korea and cause ordinary people to believe Communists gaining so much this concession was demanded by Communists, (4) in effect we are asking Rhee to resign, (5) utterly impossible to hold elections while Chinese Communist forces in Korea and Soviets constitute mass threat on border and unless ROK gets complete administrative control of North Korea before elections take place.

We again pointed out very important that American public opinion should not believe there is any lack of cooperation between ROK and US at Geneva and essential present plan commanding respect and constitution amendable.

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After much discussion and against arguments of Prime Minister and Defense Minister, President Rhee tentatively agreed following draft:

"(1) Upon the condition that the Chinese Communist forces withdraw from Korea;

"(2) Upon the promise of the Chinese Communists and the USSR that they will not re-enter Korean territory with armed forces and again become aggressors against Korea, then the ROK is willing to undertake that pursuant to ROK constitution and its electoral laws, free and democratic election, without Communist or outside interference for the National Assembly and the President of Korea shall be held in North and South Korea under the observation of the UN".

Term UN rather than UNCURK used because President objects to that organization and we let pass this afternoon in hopes to get an agreement on principle. Also realize USSR not declared aggressors.

After above agreed draft was typed President insisted there should be inserted after "aggressors against Korea" words to following effect "and if US stands by us".

Pointed out that Korea already had military defense pact although Acting Foreign Minister Cho indicated they are somewhat concerned that it had not been formally ratified and published and President indicated there was certain amendments to it which they wish discuss. (See Embassy telegram 1107, May 3.) Did not seem advisable to mention to him joint declaration of July 27, 1953 in Washington of 16 UN members contributing troops to respond in case of aggression but pointed out did not seem appropriate to refer to any agreement with US in proposed presentation of plan B at Geneva or in effect to use language which would appear to commit US beyond precise text mutual defense pact already ratified by Senate. President left matter to Ministers to decide.

Prime Minister and Defense Minister again argued publication of this draft would cause great consternation in Korea and would afford Communists much propaganda. Seemed quite obvious President was trying to extract some further promise and was tiring. So after two hours ended discussions this afternoon and arranged to see him tomorrow. Discussion friendly.

Would appreciate knowing status mutual defense pact and whether any serious discussions for its amendment under way and suggestions above language.

In going over above draft with President, President fully appreciates not in accord plan B I and IV. President is thoroughly familiar

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2 Not printed. For documentation on the mutual defense treaty, see volume xv. The treaty was signed on Oct. 1, 1953, but did not enter into force until Nov. 17, 1954. The text is printed as TIAS No. 3097 in 5 UST 2368.
so-called free elections with Soviet troops present in Europe and extremely difficult, if not impossible to sell them idea of elections in North if Chinese Communist troops present or North Korea Communist troops have not been disarmed. He considers this complete appeasement.

Reference plan B in view President's dislike of UNCURK would suggest elimination last sentence plan. After some unified and sovereign government established in Korea, why should UNCURK function further in Korea?

In IV would suggest using term “unification” rather than “reunification” and standard terminology such as “unified Korea” or “unified government of Korea” throughout rather than “all-Korean Government” which conveys idea of coalition.

In III A suggest revision so as not to indicate ROK government not presently legitimate government in Korea or that new government is necessarily formed.

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Briggs

396.1 GB/5-554 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation


To Sec 75. Sect 72 sent Seoul 32. Department has following suggested modifications draft paper presenting Plan “B”. These take account Ambassador Dean's comments.

1. Use word “shall” instead of “will” or “should” wherever provision is mandatory.

2. Section II A should be revised to read “Within period of blank months from adoption of these proposals and following determination and announcement by UNCURK that necessary conditions for free elections exist, there shall be held throughout Korea at a date selected by UNCURK elections for the president and National Assembly of unified Korea.”

3. Modify first sentence II E to read, “Elections shall be supervised and observed by UNCURK.” Delete second sentence since Commission can not insure these things. Modify final sentence to read, “Results of the elections shall be considered valid expression of free will of people of Korea where Commission has so certified.” This modification makes clear power of Commission to declare results invalid.

1 Repeated to Seoul as telegram 889 and to Tokyo as telegram 2429 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.

2 Dated May 2, p. 178.
4. Section II F. “Freedom of movement in Korea” is ambiguous and in pre-election period presents disadvantage of making possible Communist infiltration South Korea. Prefer elimination of phrase.

5. Rewrite II G as follows to tape down UNCURK’s rights and endeavor avoid NNSC type difficulties:

“All authorities within Korea shall cooperate fully in ensuring that elections are properly conducted under necessary safeguards as determined by UNCURK. The Commission shall have the right to travel freely throughout Korea so as to make such observations and investigations as it deems necessary.”

6. Section IV. Suggest substitute here and throughout paper “non-Korean forces” for “foreign forces”. Phrase “will be coordinated with both sides” should read “shall be coordinated with military commanders non-Korean forces”.

7. Section V. Suggest rephrasing to read as follows:

“Parties to agreement pledge their respect for territorial integrity and political independence of unified Korea. This pledge shall become effective when unified government shall have declared its intent abide by purposes and principles of UN Charter in its international relations. Unified Korea shall have authority assume such existing international rights and obligations and conclude such agreements as it may wish”. Believe could not make provision penultimate sentence mandatory and that last sentence would permit such arrangements without placing unified government under compulsion to enter agreement Communist China. Change in first sentence avoids separate operation to secure pledge of respect for territorial integrity etc. at time unified government comes into existence.

8. Section VI. For consistency, rehabilitation proposal should be under UN auspices as long as UNCURK is proposed as supervisory commission. Communists likely seize on omission UN here to support argument against use UNCURK.

9. In order clarify manner and particulars in which Armistice Agreement shall be amended suggest following as substitute for first sentence Section VII:

“Parties to Armistice Agreement shall direct their military commanders to modify paragraphs blank of Armistice Agreement in order enable UNCURK to carry out above arrangements leading to unification Korea.”

10. Suggest (b) section VII be revised read as follows: “All non-Korean forces have been withdrawn from Korea in accordance with provisions section IV this agreement.”

11. Believe desirable delete last sentence section VII since this involves sovereignty new government.
12. Note that under General Assembly resolution might be argued UNCURK limited to seven representatives and seven alternates. Doubt that this constitutes adequate force for supervision.

13. Endorse Dean’s suggestion Seoul’s 1119 repeated Geneva 48 should use “unification” instead “reunification” in Section IV and “Government of unified Korea” instead “all-Korean Government” in Sections V and VI.

14. Foregoing comments made without reference principal substantive points Seoul’s 1119 or Geneva’s Secto 107 rptd Seoul 42 which just arrived. Will comment those in subsequent message.

Dulles

3 Supra.
4 Dated May 5, p. 204.

795.00/5–554: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1954—8:32 p. m.

893. For Dean and Smith from the Secretary. Re Seoul’s 1119 repeated Geneva 48 Tokyo 659.

1. Congratulate Dean and Briggs on excellent progress in most difficult task.

2. Express to President Rhee personal appreciation Secretary for his cooperation and for time and effort he is devoting these questions.

3. Assume agreed draft Seoul’s 1119 would be Rhee’s instructions to Pyun and would not be incorporated in draft Plan “B” except as position stated would require certain changes in draft Plan “B”.

4. Language in agreed draft paragraph 1 together subsequent discussion seems indicate Rhee might agree withdrawal US and other UN forces as well as Chinese Communist forces if both accomplished before elections. We do not believe feasible propose withdrawal Chinese Communist forces only although recognize logic and force Rhee’s comments as reported Seoul’s 1115 and 1119. Withdrawal both Chinese Communist and UN forces probably wipes out armistice which may not be unbearable for us in view NAC [MAC?] and NNSC difficulties and fact armistice is not the real sanction against renewal aggression. Withdrawal all non-Korean forces of course raises possibility Communists would stall all further implementation elections once they have secured their primary objective which is withdrawal

1 Also sent to Geneva as telegram Tosec 81 and repeated to Tokyo as telegram 2434 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.
2 Dated May 5, p. 205.
UN forces. It might help Rhee's problem somewhat if Section IV Plan "B" were changed to require withdrawal most non-Korean forces before elections take place. If necessary we might also consider possibility total withdrawal before elections which would have distinct propaganda advantage. This position not cleared by Defense. Clearance being sought. Will notify soonest.

5. No objection to substituting UN for UNCURK supervision elections and making appropriate changes in draft of Plan "B".

6. Language at beginning agreed draft paragraph 2 seems apply more specifically Chinese Communists than USSR but we have all along insisted USSR should also be one of guarantors of Korean independence and territorial integrity and draft Plan "B" meant make that clear. Perhaps Section V draft Plan "B" as amended according our suggestion should be further amended to make pledge effective at once.

7. Troubled by language re elections in agreed draft paragraph 2 since it seems imply ROK would run elections with only some minor observation UNCURK-style by UN rather than supervision. Unless Dean certain agreed draft means essential acceptance draft Plan "B" by Pyun and Yang at Geneva he should attempt secure appropriate modification conformity Plan "B".

8. Re Mutual Defense Treaty. Know of no proposal, suggestion or discussion leading to amendment except press report in Seoul's 1107. You may tell Rhee we expect bring Treaty into effect near future by exchange ratifications Washington. It is impracticable to amend Treaty as this would require resubmission to Senate and almost certain delay until next session. Therefore urge Dean and Briggs discourage ROK making any such proposals.

Dulles

*See footnote 2, p. 206.

**Editorial Note**

In the evening of May 5, Eden and Molotov met for dinner, during the course of which substantive discussions on Korea and Indochina took place. Eden gave an account of the meeting to Smith, who reported to the Department in telegram Secto 115, May 6, not printed. The telegram contained the following brief passage on Korea:

"Eden said he was not optimistic over prospects of any settlement on Korea unless Russians could prevail upon Chinese and North Koreans to abandon their wholly unreasonable attitude. He did not envisage this happening but thought continuation of status quo in Korea not too bad. Molotov indicated agreement." (396.1 GE/5-654)
SECRET

The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea

Geneva, May 6, 1954—1 p. m.

44. Sent Department Secto 112 priority. Department pass Defense. Re Seoul 1119 repeated Geneva 48; and Department’s 893 to Seoul, Tosec 81 to Geneva. Am greatly disappointed will not be possible present Plan B proposal at plenary tomorrow. Pressure for presentation some plan along lines “B” mounting among other delegations, and while a few more general debate speeches are anticipated, we cannot get much further until all on allied side have proposal around which they can rally.

Do not understand Rhee’s preference for UN over UNCURK. We cannot expect to have more favorable composition on any UN body than present membership UNCURK. Substitution of unspecified UN body at this stage reopens question of composition of UN commission, and to that extent goes back on past UN resolutions which we insist should be maintained. Insistence on UNCURK at this stage gives us much better bargaining position. Therefore suggest Department will wish modify instructions contained paragraph 5 Tosec 81.

Entirely concur paragraph 7 Tosec 81 on necessity UNCURK supervision rather than simply observation.

While we appreciate Rhee’s point with regard to withdrawal Chinese Communist forces prior to elections, must recognize impracticable without simultaneous withdrawal UN forces and dangers inherent in completing withdrawal UN forces prior to assurance unification plans being implemented in good faith by Communists.

Full protection for ROKs under Plan B lies in (1) recognition ROK only lawful government in Korea; (2) elections under UNCURK supervision only after safeguards for conditions genuine freedom before, during and after elections assured; (3) proportional representation of North Korea in National Assembly.

Important we not get bogged down in drafting details between Geneva, Washington and Seoul, but stick to basic principles in discussions with Rhee. Communists are not going to accept any proposal containing these principles. If through any chance they do accept basic principles, negotiation of agreement would be long process in which details of drafting would be very important and in which closest consultation between Geneva, Washington and Seoul would be essential.

1 Dated May 5, p. 205.
2 Dated May 5, p. 209.
Phrases such as “formation of all-Korean Government”, paragraph III proposal, should be accepted by Rhee as desirable “window-dressing”, the substance of the US–UN position that ROK is only lawful government in Korea.

Will telegraph clean draft taking into account points brought out Washington and Seoul telegrams.

Yang said last night Pyun and ROK delegate had strongly urged Rhee accept proposal with amendments agreed upon with Robertson and Young.

SMITH

795.00/5-654 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation

SECRET    PRIORITY    SEOUL, May 6, 1954—2 p. m.

49. Sent priority Department 1122, repeated information Tokyo 660. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For the Secretary and Smith from Dean. Re Embtel 1119 repeated Geneva 48, Tokyo 659. While we realize UK, Commonwealth, and France have formed and expressed opinion that it is essential there should be simultaneous elections north and south and Plan B so provides, is this necessarily so? While Soviets refused to allow UNTOCK north of parallel in 1948, south cooperated completely, democratic elections were held and UN recognized ROK as only legitimate government in Korea even though it only recognized it south of parallel in UNGA 21 October 1949. Now because of wording UNGA resolution 7 October 1950, it is said correct interpretation thereof demands simultaneous elections north and south and such elections also necessary command respect free world opinion.

Whereas, really all that necessary is to have Communist forces withdrawal in order that free elections may be held in north under UN observation in connection with unification.

Understand UK–Commonwealth attitude motivated in part by unfavorable reports by former Australian member UNCURK as to extent of democracy in ROK Government. Some UNCURK members seem to take for granted complete lack of freedom of elections in Communist north but compare rather turbulent workings of new Asian democracy in south to theoretical maximum ideals of textbook Anglo-Saxon democracy and to concentrate almost entirely on criticizing admitted faults of present ROK regime.

If Communist armies remain in north and North Korea Communist regime remains in power during elections there, despite UNCURK observation, don’t see how we can avoid having but one Communist

1 Dated May 5. p. 205.
slate with nothing but Communist assemblymen elected in north followed by demand for coalition government. This fact and apparent harmful result does not seem to bother advocates of simultaneous elections, but they balk at accepting forthcoming May 20 elections of admittedly sovereign government as sufficient even though faulty in some respects.

As practical matter under Plan B don't see how you can operate national elections under one electoral law in north and ROK's in south. Somehow can't visualize North Korea Assembly at request of UNCURK ever adopting ROK election law. Will south therefore have to enact Communist election law in south in order to have unified electoral law?

Believe Rhee shrewd enough to know UK and Commonwealth do not think highly of his government. Casey's speech about necessity for simultaneous north and south elections in order to impress free world does not move him but rather he regards such demand as vote of lack of confidence in his government. He asks how many times ROK must be certified as sovereign and assuming ROK really is sovereign, what business UNCURK has to observe working of ROK election laws and whether UNCURK authority will be same in north and south and precisely what its authority will be.

Shall continue to use all persuasive powers to convince him necessity for simultaneous elections but thought you might be interested in his thinking and hard practicable nature of his questions.

Briggs

795B.00/5-754 : Telegram

Dean–Briggs–Rhee Meeting, Seoul, May 6: The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET NI A CT

Seoul, May 7, 1954—2 a. m.

1125. Repeated information Tokyo 663, information niact Geneva 52. Geneva for Smith. Tokyo for CINCUNC. For Secretary from Dean. Ambassadors Briggs and Dean saw President Rhee, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and acting Foreign Minister Cho after social visit of General Van Fleet had ended.

Told President was your plan formally to conclude ratification defense pact within next few weeks and since it had been consented to by Senate it would not be possible to make any changes therein unless whole matter was put off for year or more which would be unfortunate. President said Korean pact could be denounced by either party on one year's notice whereas Japanese treaty had longer life and he wanted same benefits without "discrimination". We said without
making any commitment would investigate but considered essential
Korean defense pact be promulgated as signed and consented to.

Said considered urgently important that all free world nations
should agree upon pact for unification of Korea which could be an-
nounced at Geneva tomorrow. Suggested section IV plan B be modified
to provide that withdrawal of substantially all North Korean forces
shall be completed or substantial progress made thereon in manner
satisfactory to UNCURK during a blank day period immediately
prior to holding of elections on date to be announced by UNCURK.
Prime Minister did not like word “substantially” and President ob-
jected to mutually-phased withdrawal, maintaining in any event it
was unconditionally essential (a) that Chinese Communist and North
Korean Communist forces should be withdrawn or surrendered in
north in such manner as absolutely to ensure free elections in north
and did not like idea of leaving this to judgement of UNCURK, (b)
insisted it was unalterable requirement that there be no cooperation or
collaboration in any form between his government and Chinese or
North Korean Communist Government, which presumably goes for
cooperation on electoral laws, (c) declared there must be assurances by
Chinese Communists and Soviets there would be no actual or threat-
ened interference with elections in north, (d) insisted nations on
UNCURK had never had ROK approval and that matter had to be
administered by United Nations itself. We assured him you saw logic
of his insistence that Chinese Communists be withdrawn before elec-
tions in north but that only practical way of getting Chinese Commu-
nists to withdraw was to phase coordinated withdrawals of United
Nations forces in south and to require substantial withdrawals but to
give UNCURK some such discretion as outlined above.

Prime Minister and Defense Minister both gagged at only requir-
ing substantial withdrawal before free election.

Rhee insisted no strings could be attached to absolute requirement
of Communist withdrawal as precedent to elections and requirement
of no interference by Soviets and no requirement of collaboration by
his government with Communists. He further said his offer to have
elections in both north and south for assembly and presidency after
free elections in north if people so demanded by plebiscite were only
his personal views.

Minister of Defense then handed President statement he had written
out last night in which he expressed fear that elections in north and
south would bring about degeneration of morale in ROK armed
services and possible disorders. Minister insisted situation would be
comparable to that during US-Soviet conferences 1946 and 1947 and
that requirement have election for presidency with possibility of re-
placement of chief executive would throw consternation into ranks of ROK Army. They evidently fear solid Communist bloc in north with coalition of opponents of Rhee’s Liberal Party in the south.

Again urged necessity of complete unity between US and ROKs at Geneva and essential no nation on free side should present plan different from our presentation and absolute necessity of not having Geneva talks fail because of lack of unity between US and ROKs and called attention to news stories that West was paralyzed at Geneva and essential this situation be corrected.

President finally said only solution was to have General Van Fleet make such commitments as would augment ROK armed forces to such an extent that they could freely move north and annihilate Communist forces.

President was obviously extremely tired after Van Fleet welcoming ceremonies at airport and President’s house this afternoon and we suggested postponement further discussions until 8:30 tomorrow morning.

At dinner later this evening explained to Minister Defense in some detail necessity of our presenting combined constructive plan which would command instant respect. He replied he had already spoken what he sincerely believed and if President and ourselves worked out program he would interpose no further objection though Prime Minister inclined to believe President’s position final. However, will push on tomorrow.¹

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¹ The following subsequent message was sent to the Department as telegram 1126, May 7, from Seoul, repeated to Geneva as telegram 53: “For Secretary from Dean. Geneva for Smith. Re Geneva’s 44 to Seoul repeated Department Secto 112 [dated May 6, p. 211]. Relfel received after despatch our 1125. Absolutely no difference in thinking between you and ourselves and will do utmost to urge Rhee’s prompt acceptance in talks this morning. Arrival other mission has to some extent complicated timetable but will iron out. Briggs” (795B.00/5—754)

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MAY 7, 1954

795B.00/5—754: Telegram

Dean—Briggs—Rhee Meeting, Seoul, May 7, Morning: The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation

SECRET PRIORITY

Seoul, May 7, 1954—2 p. m.

54. Sent Department 1127, repeated information Tokyo 665. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For Smith from Dean. Reference your 44.¹ Ambassadors Dean and Briggs saw President Rhee, Prime Minister, Min-

¹ Dated May 6, p. 211.
ister of Defense, and acting Foreign Minister Cho one hour this morning. On broad general principles outlined as forcefully as possible basic reasons why we should present united plan soonest at Geneva. President seeing General Van Fleet at 2:30 and obviously wants to see what he can get out of him before making any final commitments. Have always stayed on basic principles and have not discussed drafting changes with President. However, they have been so continually insistent on complete and total withdrawal Chinese Communist forces and surrender North Korean Army before elections can be held and complete unwillingness to leave this to determination of UN CURK. We have suggested "such substantial withdrawal" Chinese Communists as in opinion of UN CURK would permit free elections and this morning suggested "such preponderant and substantial withdrawal, et cetera", but President and Prime Minister rejected all of this as mere phraseology and insisted on unconditional withdrawal. Pointed out on basis of phased withdrawal this would require complete UN withdrawal also before elections. Again President is so positive he is going to get his entire asking price for complete build-up of Korean divisions this does not bother him in slightest and in fact he looks forward to day. He spoke with great bitterness fact he had not been allowed to move because we had locked up "ammunition and gasoline". He is basically and fundamentally unreconciled to armistice and to its inconclusive nature and spoke with great fervor on that subject.

He insists constitution does not permit him to agree to hold elections for Assembly immediately after the impending May 20 elections for National Assemblymen four-year term. He also insists he has no right to agree to hold new elections for President and claims that his idea of plebiscite in all Korea by people is correct after elections in north.

We pointed out constitution could be amended by two-thirds National Assembly and suggested he undertake to recommend to National Assembly that the constitution could be amended to permit elections desired.

Prime Minister and Defense Minister strongly objected on grounds if such elections held in south would cause consternation and confusion and insisted Communists would argue they had forced Rhee's abdication and that ROK Government though sovereign, had been placed by Geneva on par with Communists.

Reference fifth paragraph subdivision (1) your 44, until elections are held under Plan B in north and south, North Korean Communist
Government there remains in power in north and must adopt electoral laws requested by UNCURK. Rhee takes violent exception to this. Further if free elections are held President repeatedly asks me if I can guarantee present ROK Government will be returned to power and Rhee elected President.

After President had turned me down flatly, at least six times, we again urged interest US–ROK relations he cooperate with allies to present something at Geneva we regard as fundamental. He still bitter against Casey’s speech and Philippines proposal and past critical reports of his government by UNCURK and every time UNCURK mentioned he objects and insists on UN.

Would it be appropriate to use some such language as “United Nations or appropriate commission thereof” in order to avoid specific use of UNCURK?

My suggestions wording Plan B were in response for request for them but unless specifically noted in cables have not discussed them with Rhee.

At conclusion my strong plea for action President asked me to put suggestions in writing and to send them over. President also asks if he did agree to what we were requesting whether I could promise in writing there would be no further demands for concessions of any kind and if he would get build-up ROK Army he desires; I of course replied had no such authority and question ROK Army entirely within province General Van Fleet.

They are extremely allergic to first sentence IV Plan B and if we do agree complete withdrawal before elections this would of course disappear.

They cannot understand why having supported them on Plan A we are now moving to Plan B in order to achieve unity at Geneva when we do not believe Communists will accept Plan B. All efforts to persuade them essential to preserve unity of free nations have fallen flat. President extremely bitter about our announcement proposed Southeast Asia pact against Communists which includes European nations but excludes Korea and Nationalist China. He considers we stole his idea and then left him out and are including weak sisters and colonial powers.

Would appreciate instructions soonest and whether Defense clearance mentioned Washington 893 subdivision 4 obtained.

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*2 Dated May 5, p. 209.
The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL NIACI GENEVA, May 7, 1954—9 a.m.

Secto 127. Repeated information Tokyo 25, Seoul niact 50. Department pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Following revised draft proposal for establishment united and independent Korea:

"In conformity with UN resolutions on peaceful settlement Korean question and in recognition of Korean people determine through genuinely free elections form and composition their government, establishment of united and independent Korea shall be achieved following manner:

I. Responsibilities supervision and observation.

Establishment united and independent Korea through holding genuinely free elections and withdrawal all non-Korean forces from Korea within time schedule set forth below shall be observed and certified in manner provided below by UNCURK, established by resolution UNGA October 7, 1950.

II. Free elections in Korea.

a. Within period six months from adoption this agreement and following determination and announcement by UNCURK that necessary conditions for free elections exist, there shall be held throughout Korea at date selected by UNCURK elections for President and National Assembly of Unified Korea.

b. Representation in National Assembly shall be in direct proportion to population citizenry Korea accordance census observed and certified by UNCURK.

c. Elections shall be based on universal adult suffrage by all citizens Korea.

d. Elections shall be in secret and held conditions genuine freedom throughout Korea.

e. Elections shall be supervised and observed by UNCURK. This Commission shall ensure that elections properly conducted and safeguards for conditions genuine freedom observed before, during and after elections until government Unified Korea established. Commission shall propose, and appropriate authorities in Korea shall put into effect, any changes in applicable election laws which Commission considers necessary assure free elections accordance these proposals. Results elections shall be considered valid expression free will people of Korea where Commission has so certified.

f. Conditions genuine freedom and applicable election laws shall include following guarantees: Freedom of movement; freedom of presentation candidates; immunity candidates; freedom arbitrary arrest or victimization; freedom association and political meetings; freedom expression for all; freedom press, radio and free circulation newspapers, periodicals, etc.; secrecy vote; security polling stations and ballot boxes.
g. All authorities within Korea shall cooperate fully ensuring elections properly conducted under necessary safeguards, as determined by UNCURK. Commission shall have right travel freely throughout Korea so as make such observations and investigations it deems necessary and to that end all authorities Korea shall provide UNCURK all necessary assistance and facilities.

III. Formation Government Unified Korea.

a. Immediately after elections, National Assembly shall be convened Seoul and government formed for whole of Korea accordance constitution Republic of Korea. Government so formed will then become sole legitimate Government Korea.

b. Constitution shall remain in force except as it may be superseded or amended by National Assembly acting constituent session when convened following elections.

IV. Withdrawal non-Korean Forces.

As integral part unification Korea, concurrent withdrawal all non-Korean Forces from Korea shall be effected as follows:

a. Concurrent withdrawal non-Korean Forces shall be observed and verified by UNCURK all stages accordance schedules prearranged with UNCURK pursuant this agreement, and shall be carried out through ports entry prescribed armistice agreement July 27, 1953.

b. Concurrent withdrawals shall begin 60 days from date this agreement.

c. By date elections herein provided for, no more than total 150,000 non-Korean troops shall remain North Korea and South Korea respectively.

d. All residual non-Korean Forces shall be withdrawn from Korea within three months after UNCURK certifies Government Unified Korea has been established with effective control over all Korea.

V. International provision for security Unified Korea.

Parties this agreement hereby pledge their respect for territorial integrity and political independence Unified Korea. Government Unified Korea shall undertake abide by purposes and principles UN Charter in its international relations.

VI. Rehabilitation Korea.

After formation Government Unified Korea accordance above provisions, there shall be developed and carried out under auspices UN international program relief and rehabilitation all Korea to which all countries so desiring may contribute. Such program shall be developed consultation Korean Government.

VII. Concluding stages.

Parties to armistice agreement shall direct their military commanders modify appropriate paragraphs that agreement order enable UNCURK carry out above arrangements leading to unification Korea. Armistice agreement shall be considered superseded accordance paragraph 62 that agreement only when UNCURK certified (a) Korean Government has been established with effective control over all Korea.
as result free and secret elections expressing valid will of people and (b) all non-Korean Forces withdrawn from Korea accordance provisions section IV this agreement.

UNCURK shall report to General Assembly UN when implementa- tion this agreement completed.

VIII. Implementation agreement.
There shall be annexed hereto detailed agreements for implemen- tation above provisions which shall constitute integral part this agreement."

Paragraph IV above sent separate telegram for comment and guidance.¹ Would appreciate knowing soonest from Department and Seoul when we can consider text draft proposal approved for further use here.

SMITH

¹ See telegram Secto 128, infra.

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396.1 GE/5-754: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL NIAC T

GENEVA, MAY 7, 1954—10 A.M.

SECTO 128. REPEATED INFORMATION TOKYO 26, NIAC T SEOUL 51. TOKYO PASS CINCUNC; DEPARTMENT PASS DEFENSE. RE PARAGRAPH 4 TOSEC 81 REPEATED SEOUL 893,² SUBMIT FOLLOWING REVISION PARAGRAPH IV DRAFT PROPOSALS FOR COMMENT:

"WITHDRAWAL OF NON-KOREAN FORCES. AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE UNIFICATION OF KOREA, CONCURRENT WITHDRAWAL OF ALL NON-KOREAN FORCES FROM KOREA SHALL BE EFFECTED AS FOLLOWS:

"A. THE CONCURRENT WITHDRAWAL OF NON-KOREAN FORCES SHALL BE OBSERVED AND VERIFIED BY UNCURK AT ALL STAGES IN ACCORDANCE WITH SCHEDULES PRE-ARRANGED WITH UNCURK PURSUANT TO THIS AGREEMENT, AND SHALL BE CARRIED OUT THROUGH THE PORTS OF ENTRY PRESCRIBED IN THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT OF JULY 27, 1953.

"B. CONCURRENT WITHDRAWALS SHALL BEGIN SIXTY DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT.

"C. BY THE DATE OF THE ELECTIONS HEREIN PROVIDED FOR, NOT MORE THAN A TOTAL OF 150,000 NON-KOREAN TROOPS SHALL REMAIN IN NORTH KOREA AND SOUTH KOREA, RESPECTIVELY.

"D. ALL RESIDUAL NON-KOREAN FORCES SHALL BE WITHDRAWN FROM KOREA WITHIN THREE MONTHS AFTER UNCURK CERTIFIES THAT GOVERNMENT OF A UNIFIED KOREA HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH EFFECTIVE CONTROL OVER ALL KOREA."

This revision provides that bulk non-Korean forces, particularly Chinese, will be withdrawn from Korea by time elections held. This designed help Rhee's problem as Department suggests. Revision also provides that nucleus UNC Forces would remain in Korea after elec-

² DATED MARY 5, P. 209.
tions for contingency Communists stall or circumvent implementation political plans.

Negotiating problem is whether we want to put forward in our first detailed public formulation troop withdrawal issue proposal for telescoped time span and bulk withdrawal prior to elections. Would it be better with Rhee's agreement and understanding leave paragraph on withdrawal non-Korean forces substantially as is and amend it if necessary at later stages along above lines. Communists are pressing for total simultaneous withdrawal prior to elections. Time span and scheduled phases might better be held in reserve rather than initially take position close to or same as Communists.

Admiral Davis has seen above revision and concurs subject Defense concurrence. Would appreciate comments Department and Seoul.

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-754: Telegram

Smith–Pyun Meeting, Geneva, May 7, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 7, 1954—9 p. m.

54. Repeated information Department Secto 137 Tokyo 27. Re Secto 127, repeated niact Seoul 50.\(^1\) Went over revised draft this morning with Pyun and Yang and expressed increasingly difficult position here Geneva lacking ROK decision agree on draft proposal. Pyun and Yang said they had sent several telegrams urging President Rhee accept draft. Re elections for President in addition for National Assembly in paragraph II–A revised draft, believe we should delete elections for President. Pyun and Yang said ROK del strongly opposed as reported Secto 107.\(^2\) We note from Seoul's 52 \(^3\) to Geneva, Defense Minister has expressed fear election for President would greatly affect morale ROK armed forces. Robertson told Pyun we fully prepared delete elections for President if ROK desires.

Only other change suggested by Pyun is in paragraph III–A where he asked insert “unified” in second sentence to read “government of unified Korea”.

Explained paragraph IV on withdrawal non-Korean forces tentative. Pyun and Yang both liked revision.

Yang informed us privately Pyun sending message today to President recommending deletion presidential elections and acceptance revised draft proposal.

SMITH

\(^1\) Dated May 7, p. 218.
\(^2\) Same as telegram 42, May 5, from Geneva, p. 204.
\(^3\) Same as telegram 1125, May 7, from Seoul, p. 213.
The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 7, 1954—2 p. m.

Secto 131. For the Secretary. Inability obtain Rhee’s agreement plan B facing us with increasingly difficult situation here. If Rhee’s agreement not obtained shortly we must, in spite our best efforts here, anticipate probability some delegation will come forward with proposal calling for all-Korean elections under UN supervision and simultaneous phased withdrawal foreign forces which will command support from all others on allied side (and I believe, majority US public opinion) facing us with decision whether we continue stand with ROKs on plan A and bring about open break with our other allies. Allies of course recognize that without US-ROK agreement no plan can be implemented, and we will do utmost bring home to them possibilities Communist exploitation such a move on their part would create. However, pressure so strong probably cannot indefinitely continue prevent allied side from putting forward “reasonable” proposal. In any event we can expect virtually no support for breaking negotiations on our present position.

It is probable Rhee estimates by holding out agreement on plan B he can, in light of Van Fleet mission, improve bargaining position for obtaining commitment increased forces. Therefore suggest Van Fleet be instructed discuss situation with Dean and to give Dean full support his negotiations, emphasizing the urgent necessity of submitting reasonable proposal without further delay. Also suggest Hull discuss with Rhee military implications this position on troop withdrawal.

I would also appreciate your instructions tactics we should pursue here if Rhee remains adamant. That is, do we (a) join with other allies in putting forward proposal along lines plan B, facing Rhee with decision as to whether he will at that point walk out of conference, or as we would hope, refrain from public opposition to plan pending Communist reaction, or (b) do we continue stand with ROK on plan A to extent if necessary joining ROK in walkout from conference? I recommend course (a) after informing ROK we cannot stand with them on position which would not receive support from any of our allies, US public opinion, and public opinion elsewhere in free world.¹

SMITH

¹ In telegram 897, sent niact to Seoul on May 7, the Department of State repeated the text of Secto 131 and asked for Dean’s comments with particular regard to the tactics to be pursued at Geneva in the event that Rhee failed to accept Plan B (396.1 GE/5-754).
Eighth Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, May 7, 3:05 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 7, 1954—9 p.m.

Secto 138. Repeated information Tokyo 28, London 135, Paris 218, Moscow 49, Oslo 6, Seoul 55. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Department pass Defense, CINCPAC, COMSAC. Today’s plenary session (eighth) most satisfactory presentation so far of general Allied position. Summary texts being transmitted in clear to Seoul and Department as Secto 139. Philippine, New Zealand and Colombian representatives spoke strongly for:

1. Authority and integrity of UN as basic issue in view of Communist challenge UN has no authority in Korea or Asia and conference has nothing to do with UN. Consensus of today’s speakers was UN members have no business at conference if Communists reject UN.
2. Conformity of proposals on Korea with UN resolutions and particularly resolution of October 7, 1950.
3. General proposals on Korean independence and unification including (a) supervision and observation by UN; (b) assurance of proportional representation of basis population ratio between north and south; (c) free elections and adequate safeguards for conduct of elections; (d) adequate assurance of stable conditions and unification of Korea prior to withdrawal all UN forces from Korea.

These three basic concepts and three speeches today highlight ROK Allied case at Geneva in clear, uncontrovertible, eloquent terms.

Molotov failed to give speech although apparently had prepared text in front of him. All Communist delegates left Palais immediately after session without usual mixing in lounge and without any of usual jocular exchanges with free world delegates.

Molotov announced as no speaker inscribed for Saturday, no plenary that day. No date set for next plenary.

For Embassy Seoul: All our subsequent actions and words here should bolster this strong position which previous speeches on our side have reflected and which Secretary keynoted in his address to conference. Consider it important complete US-ROK cooperative effort concert on draft proposal so that we are prepared as soon as

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1 A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/8) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3:05 p.m. and adjourned at 5:05 p.m.
2 Not printed.
3 The statements of the New Zealand and Philippine representatives, Webb and Garcia, are printed in The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, pp. 82–90.
4 May 8.
possible introduce it with appropriate timing and auspices for best effect. Themes of today’s speeches will form excellent setting for proposal.

SMITH

396.1 GE//5-754: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, May 7, 1954—7:23 p.m.

Tosec 97. Re Secto 127, 128 repeated Seoul 50 and 51 Tokyo 25 and 26; Secto 131 repeated Seoul and Tokyo by Department; Seoul’s 1127 and 1133 repeated Geneva 54 and 58 Tokyo 665 and 668. Re revised draft proposal Secto 127 repeated Seoul 50 Department approves but makes following comments:

Para II A. Do not propose change but point out difficulties taking census and holding elections within 6 months. Assume in your thinking that 6 months period sets final deadline for elections despite UNCURK actions but that desirable slightly blur situation.

Para II G. Last sentence prefer changing after UNCURK to read “such assistance and facilities as UNCURK may request.” This strengthens UNCURK’s hand.

Para IV. Re force withdrawal Department approves formulation. If Rhee agrees Department also much prefers delegation’s tactical suggestion Secto 128 retain previous formulation in first presentation of Plan B to conference then utilize new draft in subsequent negotiations as bargaining factor since troop withdrawal still seems to be primary Communist aim re Korea. Hope therefore Dean and Briggs can persuade Rhee agree this tactic. Defense position this question not available until receipt CINCUNC’s comments expected May 8.

Re Geneva’s 131 and Seoul’s 1133. Defense wishes Van Fleet talk soonest with Dean and Briggs re Geneva Conference and authorizes him cooperate to fullest with them in endeavoring persuade Rhee authorize Pyun support Plan B. In persuading Rhee authorize use first para Secto 131. Pending outcome approach, Department suggests for Seoul and Geneva consideration and comment alternative course action. Dean and Briggs might tell Rhee we endeavor have one or more

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1 Also sent to Seoul niact as telegram 899 and repeated to Tokyo as 2455 with the instruction that it be passed to CINCUNC.
2 Both dated May 7, pp. 218 and 220.
3 Dated May 7, p. 222.
4 Printed as telegram 54, May 7, p. 215.
5 Not printed. It was directed to Geneva as telegram 58, May 7, to inform Smith that Dean and Briggs were seeing Rhee the following morning in hopes of getting a general statement which would provide the United States with the desired freedom of movement. It was sent in response to telegram Secto 128, which had been repeated to Geneva as telegram 51. (Conference files, lot 60 D 827, CF 274)
our allies introduce Plan B. We convinced Communists will promptly reject. Therefore Rhee has nothing to lose if he instructs Pyun say nothing, reserving his position. US would withhold open support temporarily as some our allies have done re proposals made by Pyun and Secretary. If Communists query whether plan acceptable all 16 and especially ROK our public posture will be insist Communists give answer to reasonable proposal and if they willing accept and sign on dotted line that will be fine and we perfectly willing start preparing document for signature. However, we would try avoid this difficulty by having series supporting speakers lined up until one or more Communist side inscribed to speak.

This position clearly undesirable but believe it preferable to abandoning ROK, or having one of our allies put forward proposal which would wipe out constitutional structure ROK, or abandoning conference, which are only alternatives suggested Secto 131.

Request Geneva view possibility stalling at Geneva until middle next week to allow more time for persuasion Rhee to accept Plan B, and Seoul view usefulness this additional time.

Dulles

795B:00/5-754: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET NIACT

WASHINGTON, MAY 7, 1954—7:23 p. m.

898. Re UN Supervisory Body, Seoul's 1127, repeated Geneva 54. 1

1. In discussions use UNCURK suggest you stress:

a. Composition UNCURK much more favorable ROK interests than any new body now likely be established. Believe much more difficult exclude Communist or neutralist representation in any new UN body, although probable we could assure anti-Communist majority. (If Rhee brings up possibility conference recommending addition Communists to present UNCURK membership, suggest you indicate we would not consider this unless necessary to secure Communist agreement on otherwise acceptable plan.)

b. Even if UN rather than UNCURK referred to, will be necessary explain what is in fact intended.

c. If Rhee thinking of UN supervision by secretariat personnel, rather than by representatives of governments designated by Assembly, consider such body wholly inadequate for purpose.

2. If Rhee nevertheless refuses specify UNCURK in proposal, believe we should agree refer to supervision by UN, provided Rhee understands allies would at least initially propose in discussions that

1 Repeated to Geneva as telegram Tosec 98.
2 Dated May 7, p. 215.
UNCURK be used. This would not require ROK indicate advance approval UNCURK.

Dulles

396.1 GE/5-754 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 7, 1954—10 p.m.

57. Repeated information Department Secto 140, Tokyo 29. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For Briggs and Dean. Seoul’s 52 to Geneva sent Department 1125.¹ Suggest you inform Rhee re points B and C third paragraph reference telegram: (1) paragraph V of draft proposal would provide specific assurances from Chinese Communists and Soviets re respect for integrity and independence of Korea; (2) proposal does not contemplate direct consultation or cooperation between ROK and North Korean regime on electoral laws, or other matters connected holding free elections throughout Korea. On contrary, proposal envisages UNCURK would deal with ROK on one hand and with North Korean authorities on other re establishment conditions for elections, electoral laws, conduct of elections and withdrawal non-Korean forces. One of purposes this proposal to avoid dealings between North and South Korean authorities which might lead to type of joint arrangements envisaged in Communist proposal.

Smith

¹ Dated May 7, p. 213.

MAY 8, 1954

795B.00/5-515 : Telegram

Dean–Briggs–Rhee Meeting, Seoul, May 8, Morning: The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET NIAC

SEOUL, May 8, 1954—3 p.m.

1134. Repeated information Tokyo 668, niact Geneva 59. Tokyo for CINCUNC. For Secretary from Dean. Drafted following message and handed to President in two and one-half hour conference this morning at which Prime Minister and Acting Foreign Minister Cho also present.

"If the Communist aggressors will withdraw from my country, so that genuinely free elections can be held throughout Korea, under UN supervision and observation, I, Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea, pledge my complete cooperation and will recommend
to the National Assembly the adoption of such amendments to the constitution as may be necessary to have national elections for the National Assembly and the Presidency.

But there must be no repetition of the Communist aggression of 1950, after the peaceful withdrawal of the United States forces in 1949. Therefore, as President of the Republic of Korea, I plan to ask the United Nations to allow UNC forces to remain in Korea until after the elections in order to ensure that the Communist promises with respect to genuinely free elections shall this time be honored and observed, and a truly united free and independent Korea shall come into being."

Told President we considered situation exceptionally grave and that he must not consider we were merely trying please English and the French, but that we must make proposal which will command universal free world respect and command majority American public opinion, and that it was imperative administration command broad American public opinion support not only for its proposals at Geneva, but in order to get public support for appropriation for continued Korean rehabilitation and build-up ROK forces.

Emphasized phased withdrawal UN forces in south was not because we had lost interest or because we no longer desired to have American boys fight but was essential condition to obtain withdrawal Chinese Communist forces in north.

While talking to President, your 897 1 was handed me. Summarized provisions first paragraph to him, stated you regarded joint action along lines Plan B imperative and would be extremely difficult hold allies in line if not made.

He at first said he was not going to make any commitments until he had received all the commitments from General Van Fleet which he expected.

Pointed out our initial philosophy was to stand by and not to abandon him, but psychologically abandonment is uppermost in their minds. Believe they think we are using phased withdrawal as excuse to do what we want to do anyhow. Assured him our basic philosophy was to build-up ROK divisions as UNC forces withdrawn and was sure he and General Van Fleet would work everything out in harmony but that mission was essentially fact-finding, and decision today on Plan B was imperative and could not wait. Stated further we were allies and must act together and we would not be urging him to go forward on Plan B unless we thought it was in best interests Korean people. He stated he would not issue statement unless we guaranteed to resume

1 See footnote 1, p. 222.
fighting in Korea if Communists refused to withdraw. Pointed out UN not compelled to withdraw if Communists do not and that I had been authorized state to him mutual defense pact would be promulgated and he therefore had that treaty in the event of renewed Communist aggression.

For some time he held out for guarantees by President Eisenhower Korea would be united and US should take full responsibility therefore, because he claimed it was through our original mistakes in allowing Soviet troops in north that country was divided.

Reviewed our response to aggressors, number of American lives lost, and terrific over-all American expenditure in Korea.

Contrary to Geneva’s 54, President read aloud to us telegram from Pyun in which Pyun denounced Plan B in scathing terms, termed it unmitigated surrender to Communists and urged President to stand firm on Plan A. Again pointed out disaster such procedure and stated Plan must be accepted by Communists in whole, and not in part, and doubted whether Communists would accept because our insistence UN supervision elections. President replied that argument was often used on him in connection with armistice and eventually Communists always accepted. Prime Minister and Acting Minister Cho both urged President to stand on Plan A.

Said failure endorse Plan B most disastrous US-ROK relations and Communists would regard lack of unity between us at Geneva as great victory.

Fall of Dien Bien Phu announced while we were there and President made long statement to effect we made big and resounding promises about fighting Communists but could not keep them because of American and Congressional opinion against use of American troops in Asia.

Again made strong plea to him to issue statement and he promised to discuss and call me later today. Explained possible strategy outlined Geneva’s 51 and reasons therefore but he still unalterably opposed any Chinese Communist troops remaining in north before elections, demands complete surrender North Korean Communist forces, and insists ROK electoral laws must be used in elections.

With respect to above quoted statement, explained we preferred leave in words “and the Presidency” but that he could omit in his discretion.

Briggs

5 Dated May 7, p. 221.
6 Same as telegram Secto 128, May 7, p. 220.
CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

SEOUL, May 8, 1954—4 p.m.

60. Sent Department 1135, repeated information Tokyo 670, Geneva for USDel. Tokyo for CINCUNC. From Dean for Smith. Reference Geneva's 50. Following preliminary comments for your guidance only; not discussed with Rhee except as previously noted substantively.

Assuming present ROK electoral laws were originally drawn up by UN Commission, would simplify if II E provided such laws were to govern in north. This would eliminate necessity Rhee working with North Korean Communists on new electoral unified law and hence recognizing them as an "authority".

If change made, make appropriate changes in II F and twice in G.

IV A. Since according to General Mohn, Communists are not using ports of entry in north but are using other ports of entry which NNSC not now free to inspect, he points out such provisions completely inoperative in north as far as we are concerned but provisions bind us to great detail in south with which provisions we are frequently in technical violation.

Would IV D require withdrawal US training forces, educational pilots, technicians, et cetera; and would this prevent investigatory mission such as Van Fleet current one? Realize language must be reciprocal.

II F. Understood freedom of movement from north to south was to be eliminated. In any event this provision cannot come into operation while armistice agreement remains in effect. See particularly movements in and across DMZ.

Since you don't expect Communists to accept would greatly reduce irritation here if you could use UN or appropriate agency thereof in lieu of UNCURK but in view Washington 898 suggest leave UNCURK for present.

Assume you consider impracticable make any provision for disarming North Korean Communists as long as ROK forces remain under arms but believe non-provision for this as well as provision for even residual Chinese Communist forces remaining here till after election will continue to be substantial barrier acceptance here since in their minds implies aggressor has right to remain.

Don't follow why second paragraph D applies more specifically to Chinese than UN forces.

BRIGGS

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1 Same as telegram Secto 127, May 7, p. 218.
2 Dated May 7, p. 225.
SECRET  PRIORITY

THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

GENEVA, MAY 8, 1954—4 P. M.

Secto 149. Repeated information Seoul 58, Tokyo 81. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For the Secretary from Smith. Following are comments on Tosec 97 [98] (to Seoul 898)\(^1\) and Seoul’s 54 to Geneva:\(^2\)

1. Recommend against alternative course action suggested final paragraphs Tosec 97\(^3\) except as last resort. To follow such course at this time would show up allied disunity and place us in highly vulnerable position. Doubtful Communists would fail realize and exploit situation, as at Panmunjom, where Communists, ignoring our proposals, were beginning capitalize on fact ROK not supporting our position when Dean broke off talks. Believe preferable delay presentation allied proposal until agreement reached within 16 even if means stalling until some time next week.

2. Speeches Eight Plenary Session leave us in stronger position for time being with three clear-cut issues but do not believe possible stall more than few days at best. While opening Indochina phase may divert attention away from problem Korean negotiations Seoul as well as Geneva, we about run out of speakers for general debate on Korea. We reaching stage of repetition general themes or presenting proposals on basis general position thoroughly developed in general debate. Can anticipate only one or possibly two more plenary sessions general debate on Korean problem. Can count on Allied Delegates again speaking in support general principles when we in position submit proposal. Accordingly, our immediate tactic is (1) obtain firm 16-nation endorsement draft proposal, but (2) not present it to Communists at this time unless they indicate willingness accept UN role in Korea. However, plan would in any event be tabled in plenary session before adjournment conference.

3. Therefore believe should complete work not later than Tuesday\(^4\) on US–ROK agreement draft proposal. We should inform Rhee we consider we must be ready present plan B proposal within next few days. His refusal to go along with it will have serious adverse effect our relations and may require re-examination (1) whether mutual defense treaty should be brought into effect and (2) extent our mili-

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\(^1\) Dated May 7, p. 225.
\(^2\) Dated May 7, p. 215.
\(^3\) Dated May 7, p. 224.
\(^4\) May 11.
tary and economic aid programs. Recommend this strong line only because convinced ROK interests fully protected by our proposal and failure present some such proposal would have extremely bad effect. Moreover, Pyun and other members ROK delegation appear convinced desirability ROK backing our proposal.

4. Hope arguments outlined Tosec 98 will convince Rhee desirability proposing UNCURK in first instance as UN body in Korea. Further point which should be considered and advanced to Rhee is fact his opposition might play into Communist hands by giving them reason propose new body perhaps including neutralist nations and even one including Communist China (see Secto 150 repeated Seoul 59, Tokyo 32 re Chinese reactions at press briefing on UN question). We would anticipate that if serious negotiations commence here on proposal we would be prepared agree creation suitable new UN commission but from tactical viewpoint seems best insist initially on UNCURK. Rhee's objection to UNCURK does weaken our negotiating position, particularly since Communists will oppose UNCURK but may as concession later be willing accept UN commission with composition favorable Communist interests. Nevertheless, if Rhee adamant, we would reluctantly agree to phrase such as "appropriate UN commission".

5. In order stem impatience growing among some Allied Delegations we are considering meeting of working group of nine, probably Monday, to discuss draft proposal for first time, whether or not we have Rhee's approval by then. ROK Delegation would, of course, participate on ad referendum basis.

SMITH

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5 Infra.

396.1 GE/5–854 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 8, 1954—4 p.m.

Secto 150. Repeated information Seoul 59, Tokyo 32, Hong Kong 9. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. In Chinese Communist press conference following May 7 plenary spokesman Huang Hua reacted sharply to three speeches, particularly with respect to speakers attacks on Chinese Communist denunciation UN role in Korea. Reiterating Chou En-lai's charge UN belligerent in Korea and its resolutions illegal, Huang
equated idea UN supervision Korean elections with supervision by “US occupation forces”.

Referring Webb’s comments on inconsistency Chou attack on UN activities Korea and Peiping demands admission UN, Huang praised UN Charter and professed desire uphold UN prestige. He quoted as saying:

“...We consider UN Charter good one leading to establishment peace and security ... China is one of sponsors UN. Tung Pi-wu, official PRC, was one of signatories ... it is precisely for purpose of upholding prestige UN that illegal resolutions adopted in past should be eliminated ... it was also because these illegal resolutions could not carry UN any further that Geneva Conference was arranged through other quarters ... after Chiang, who was kept and supported by US, was thrown out and Chinese people had chosen government of its own—PRC—it is natural that this government should secure its rightful position UN.”

Comment: While Huang’s charges against UN role in Korea follow familiar pattern, there is possibility his statement designed hint Communists will agree UN supervised elections provided Peiping admitted UN. This possibility indicated by (a) alleged support UN Charter; (b) claim Peiping regime (through Tung Pi-wo) somehow responsible for charter; (c) implication UN resolutions though illegal in past could be legal in future provided Peiping regime in UN; (d) claim that convening of Geneva Conference demonstrates UN impotent (in absence Peiping membership) deal matters such as Korea and Indochina; (e) equating UN supervision with supervision “US occupation forces,” leaving door open to acceptance provided US troops withdraw and Peiping admitted UN.

While Huang statements may have simply been effort offset telling points made by speakers in plenary session, they highlight danger of Communist maneuver gain admittance UN by accepting principle UN election supervision as quid pro quo. Perhaps greatest deterrent Communist making such counter-proposal would be necessity abandonment principle elections held only under supervision North Korean ROK Commission with both parties represented equal footing. But whether Communists actually make counter-proposal or not continued emphasis by 16 on UN responsibility Korean settlement does involve danger Chinese Communists countering at least with strong implication they agreeable so long as Peiping is member. Countries recognizing Peiping might be receptive such appeal even though it would be case UN performance in return Communist promise.

Smith

1 The ellipses in the quoted paragraph are in the source text.
SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1954—4:41 p.m.

To Sec 108. Re Geneva Secto 128, repeated Tokyo 26, Seoul 51. Understand Defense transmitting through military channels concurrence revised paragraph IV Plan B with certain comments most important of which are:

1. In setting date consideration should be given time required CINCUNC accomplish orderly withdrawal personnel and equipment. CINCUNC has requested nine to eleven months.

2. Approval conditioned on understanding will be possible under agreement for US to have MAAG in Korea after establishment unified government.

Dulles

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1 Also sent priority to Seoul as telegram 903 and to Tokyo as telegram 2466 with instructions to pass it to CINCUNC.

2 Dated May 7, p. 220.

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation

SECRET

SEOUL, May 8, 1954—5 p.m.

62. Sent Department 1137, repeated information Tokyo 672. Geneva for USDel. Tokyo for CINCUNC. For Smith from Dean. Acting Foreign Minister Cho called in person and handed us following authorized message dated May 8 from President Rhee for transmission our government.

"After the Communist aggressors have withdrawn from my country so that genuine free elections can be held throughout Korea under UN observation I will recommend to the National Assembly the adoption of such amendments to the constitution as may be necessary to have national elections for the National Assembly.

The withdrawal of Chinese troops should be completed and the Korean Communist Army should either leave the country or surrender to the ROK Government and the USA should pledge to act on the USA-ROK Mutual Defense Pact immediately if Communist forces invade Korea again.

There should be no repetition of the Communist aggression of 1950 which took place after the withdrawal of the USA forces in 1949."

(With respect to foregoing statement President adds parenthetically that although no reference to elections for the presidency are to be included, when proper time comes he will personally ask National Assembly to amend constitution to include election of president, and "I may be willing run for re-election").

Pointed out to Cho first this wording would presumably require phased simultaneous withdrawal in south of all UN forces before
election; second, along lines Deptel 898\(^1\) said would prefer use UNCURK since no Communists on present commission appointed 7 October 1950 resolutions and other side would certainly insist on Communists if Secretary General appointed today; and third, in view our conversation with President Rhee this morning, was my clear understanding if this message satisfactory to our government, President Rhee would authorize Pyun to have plan B, modified along these lines, presented at Geneva.

Cho confirmed this was his understanding of his conversations President Rhee; stated President Rhee did not wish issue instructions Pyun until sure this statement satisfactory our government.

Assume you can devise appropriate language with respect to action on Defense Pact. Sorry about inclusion surrender North Korean Communist Army but without this I am afraid can get no statement whatsoever and further believe necessary avoid rupture after plan is announced.

Sincerely hope this statement which really represents maximum effort our part and pushing President to limit can be used to put forward plan B at Geneva promptly with full approval our allies and we can iron out essential details later.

General Van Fleet has been south on inspection trip all day and will have no opportunity discuss messages with him until probably very late tonight or tomorrow morning. Fully recognize his tremendous influence but hope you won't push President too far or he apt to ask firmer commitment on ROK build-up.

Hope you appreciate the suggested statement sent Embtel 1134\(^2\) drafted not only to accomplish practical result we want but so drafted that when public statement issued here will receive public approbation.

BRIGGS

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\(^1\) Dated May 7, p. 225.
\(^2\) Dated May 8, p. 226.

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795B.00/5–854: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1954—4:41 p. m.

902. Seoul’s 1137 repeated Geneva 62, Tokyo 672.\(^2\) Appreciate herculean efforts put forth endeavor persuade Rhee accept Plan B

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\(^1\) Also sent to Geneva as telegram Tosec 107 and to Tokyo as telegram 2465 with instructions to pass it to CINCUNC.
\(^2\) Supra. Because of the time difference between Seoul and Washington, telegram 1137 was received in the Department of State at 8:31 a. m. on May 8.
and doubt but leave your discretion whether or not desirable press him further just now.

However re proposed statement recognize great difficulty persuading our allies adopt modification Plan “B” which would call for withdrawal or surrender North Korean Army. In addition Defense which has not yet received CINCUNC’s comments is not willing accept total withdrawal all non-Korean forces before elections. Consequently do not see how we can say proposed statement is satisfactory US Government. If Delegation Geneva believes possible our allies would accept proposed statement or some suitable variation as basis introduction appropriately modified Plan B and recommends we do so Department will again query Defense re possible acceptance from military viewpoint of total withdrawal before elections. However believe consideration might also be given alternative course of action proposed Department’s Tosec 97 repeated Seoul 899 and Tokyo 2455.\(^2\) Desire Geneva and Seoul comments.

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\(^2\) Dated May 7, p. 224.

**MAY 9, 1954**

795B.00/6-954 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Department of State*

**TOP SECRET NIAC**  
**G**eneva, M**a**y 9, 1954—1 p. m.

\> Dulte 58. Eyes only for Secretary. Latest message from Seoul, particularly Dean’s Department 1134, Geneva 59\(^1\) and Department 1137, Geneva 62,\(^2\) leave me completely mystified. I do not wish to be critical but if our people in Seoul actually drafted the statement quoted in Department 1134, it is about as bad as Rhee’s counterdraft and would certainly make our position here much more difficult. Cannot imagine our representative in Seoul proposing to Rhee that he make such a statement without consultation either with Department or Geneva, let alone making a strong plea for Rhee to issue it. I appreciate all the difficulties of situation there but it seems to me there is an element of unrealism in these discussions which may require a personal word of caution from you.

**S**mith

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\(^1\) Dated May 8, p. 226.

\(^2\) Dated May 8, p. 233.
The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET    PRIORITY

GENEVA, MAY 9, 1954—1 P. M.

SECTO 156. SENT PRIORITY SEOUL 60, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY
TOKYO 38. TOKYO FOR CINCCE. COMMENTS RE TOSOC 107, REPEATED SEOUL
902 1 AND SEOUL'S 59 2 AND 62 TO GENEVA: 3

1. Delegation Geneva considers entirely unlikely allies accept propo-
osal for surrender North Korea Army to ROK and in effect automatic
extension ROK sovereignty over North Korea. US would be put
in ridiculous untenable position to suggest or support such proposal.

2. Paragraph 1, Secto 149, repeated Seoul 58 4 gives delegation's
views on proposal Secto 57. 5 Delegation suggests question now is have
we reached this last resort and when should we proceed develop plan B
with other 14 and without ROK if, as seems probable, Rhee insists on
impossible terms. Believe unrealistic assume ROK can be persuaded or
expected remain silent. They will probably take stand along lines
Rhee's views, as Pyun was about to do in plenary last Monday. 6 This
alternative means (a) we reverse our policy of US-ROK collaboration,
but we see no alternative if Rhee adheres extreme, unrealistic views
and if Pyun is deceiving or completely misleading us here re plan B,
and (b) Rhee will end up as appearing be cause for failure of confer-
ence, not Communists, which will be major Communist victory.

3. We urge Rhee be faced with choice of (a) presenting united front
at conference which fully protects his and ROK position and which
will result in Communists bearing responsibility for failure confer-
ce; or (b) isolate ROK from allies which will result in relieving
Communists of onus for failure of conference. We would, of course, in
fact do maximum here avoid such a situation (although we should not
tell Rhee this) by attempting obtain all possible support for maintain-
ing present situation in which issues are primarily Communist failure
accept UN role and proportional voice of North Korea population, and
if possible bring about break-up of conference on these issues.

SMITH

1 DATED MAY 8, P. 234.
2 SAME AS TELEGRAM 1134, MAY 8, FROM SEOUL, P. 226.
3 DATED MAY 8, P. 233.
4 DATED MAY 8, P. 230.
5 THE REFERENCE IS APPARENTLY INCORRECT; IT SHOULD BE TO TELEGRAM TOSOC 97,
MAY 7, TO GENEVA, P. 224.
6 MAY 3.
SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, May 9, 1954—2 p. m.

Tosec 111. Secto 149 and 156 sent Seoul 58 and 60 and Tokyo 31 and 38.

1. Department has no objection proposed meeting working group in Geneva to discuss draft Plan B (Secto 149).

2. Unless Rhee is prepared accept Plan B shortly suggest Dean and Briggs tell him ROK appears to be faced with alternatives cited paragraph 3 Secto 156. United States Delegation on basis full and regular discussions other allied delegations is convinced of necessity presenting Plan B and is therefore moving ahead with preparations do so at appropriate time. We believe it in best interests ROK to cooperate in development and presentation plan.

3. Once this choice is presented to Rhee it may be desirable refrain from pressing him further for few days while following Delegation’s suggestion of concentrating at Geneva on Communist failure accept United Nations role and obtaining common acceptance Plan B.

4. If as last resort it becomes necessary present Plan B without Rhee’s support Department believes it desirable minimize so far as possible appearance of open break between ROK and US. This might be achieved by (a) having Rhee agree not openly oppose until Communist position becomes clear and (b) having some other delegation such as Philippines put plan forward and having other allies speak in support of it first.

DULLES

1 Also sent to Seoul as telegram 904 and to Tokyo as telegram 2468 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.
2 Dated May 8, p. 280.
3 Supra.

SECRET NIACT

SEOUL, May 9, 1954—midnight.

1139. Repeated information niact Geneva 64, Tokyo 673. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For the Secretary from Dean. Reference Geneva 50, 1

1 Same as telegram Secto 127, May 7, p. 218.
51, 58, 59; Department 897, 898, 899, 902, 903; CINCUNC C-67984; Department of Defense 961278. We have reviewed situation here in detail with Van Fleet and McNeil and suggested Van Fleet accompany us to put seriousness situation to President Rhee and recommend his cooperation. As alternative volunteered have Van Fleet go alone if he thought that preferable. He has been most generous with time and has given thoughtful consideration to problem but on balance declined and recommended we continue.

We have also reviewed strategy and tactics of our approach to Rhee and invited Van Fleet's frank criticism. He thinks general line we are following of soliciting Rhee's complete cooperation on basis of friendship as his ally is best possible approach, and Van Fleet does not recommend threats or ultimatum.

Before you break publicly with ROKs at Geneva and support program of 16 and solicit ROK silence or risk Communist taunts on question of ROK support, all here agree we should approach Rhee again and outline distinct advantages to him for military defense standpoint in event sudden Communist attack of retaining some UN forces until after elections at same time getting him to eliminate specific demand for North Korean surrender or withdrawal.

Had pleasant lunch with President today, Sunday, but decided better not mention problems. Will see him Monday morning. Sorry haven't delivered so far, but believe auspices reasonably favorable; for example, he expressed to Van Fleet great satisfaction negotiations so far. Will comment greater detail last two paragraphs 897 and subdivision 3, Geneva 58 if necessary following conference tomorrow.

Reference Geneva's 58, having previously pursuant to cable authority and in order to sell him phased withdrawal told Rhee we would unconditionally bring mutual defense treaty into effect, plan use general tactics outlined 58, but question advisability raising issue of implementation defense treaty unless you so instruct. He does not react well to threats or ultimata or retraction of promises but does to strong, friendly pressure. Van Fleet agrees these tactics. If he were choosing, Van Fleet would stand with Rhee on plan A, rather than go with

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2 Same as telegram Secto 128, May 7, p. 220.
3 Same as telegram Secto 149, May 8, p. 230.
4 Same as telegram Secto 150, May 8, p. 231.
5 See footnote 1, p. 222.
6 Dated May 7, p. 225.
7 Same as telegram Tosec 97, May 7, p. 224.
8 Dated May 8, p. 234.
9 Same as telegram Tosec 108, May 8, p. 233.
10 Not printed. This message and the immediately succeeding reference pertained to the work of the Van Fleet Mission in Korea; for documentation, see volume xv.
11 Not printed.
12 W. J. McNeil, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, was a member of the Van Fleet Mission.
Allies on plan B, because he considers friendship Rhee here more important than to stand with them. He frankly concedes he is not sufficiently familiar with over-all picture to attempt make decision. We mention this only as indicating his frank thinking. It would be helpful if Pyun and Yang would really wire what they tell you, rather than what they actually wire, including strong criticism Philippine position whom they consider under our domination.

As to UN and UNCURK, believe we can sell Rhee UNCURK for reasons you have advanced.

Statements of Judd, criticizing omission Nationalist Chinese and ROK from proposed Southeast Asian pact prominently featured here, including criticism inclusion colonial powers. Fully understood reasons for such omission, but might be helpful if we could orient Rhee to your thinking. Could we also orient him on current de-emphasis military aid to Japan, or is this still secret? His apprehensions, based on lifetime struggle for united independent Korea, are: (1) fear of abandonment based on American publicity regarding return on US divisions; (2) fear we plan to use Japan as spearhead; (3) fear UNCURK will give only nominal attention to elections in north because of pressure from remnants of unwritten Chinese Communists and North Korean Communist army; (4) fear his government and Communist aggressors are being put on a parity; (5) fear solid Communist bloc in north will unite with DNP in south against him.

We have found it best to use tactics of partnership with Rhee, rather than to use “or else” tactics, and while former perhaps so far not too successful, hesitate to change at this point.

If we have to unite with 16 allies on plan B (without Rhee) and Communists then turn it down, and we have thereby antagonized Rhee, won’t we be in somewhat difficult position in reference to our practical operations here?

If you disapprove present tactics would appreciate guidance. Will try improve batting average.

Briggs

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13 Representative Walter Judd of Minnesota, member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

MAY 10, 1954

795B.00/5–1054 : Telegram

Dean–Briggs–Rhee Meeting, Seoul, May 10, Morning: The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET  NIACT  SEOUL, May 10, 1954—2 p. m.

1140. Sent niact USDel Geneva 65, repeated information Tokyo 675. Department for Secretary, Geneva for Smith from Dean. Tokyo
pass CINCUNC. Ambassadors Briggs and Dean saw President Rhee, Prime Minister and acting Foreign Minister Cho this morning.

Explained that demand for complete withdrawal Chinese Communist forces would be accompanied by demand for phased withdrawal all UN troops and if sudden Communist attack occurred such complete withdrawal might permit Communist penetration considerably south of Seoul-Inchon line whereas if number of troops suggested could remain until after elections were completed, we could probably hold approximately present line until aid brought in from Okinawa.

President said whatever the military consequences to his country or people he could not agree to one single Chinese Communist soldier remaining in Korea before elections, that we should demand Communist aggressors get out of Korea and we should not agree phased withdrawal which constitutes surrender to aggressors.

We explained alternatives faced at Geneva, cited substances paragraph 3 Geneva's 58, but did not tell him which one we favor but did say Plan B without US and ROK support or Plan A with only US and ROK support would be tremendous victory for Communists at Geneva and that we were carefully considering necessity putting forward Plan B.

We suggested we should put forward Plan B with the other 15 nations and if ROK could not agree they should maintain silence. President said he would maintain silence provided we agreed secretly in writing that if Communists accepted our proposal rather than rejected as we expect, we would join ROK in attack on Communists. We said that was out of question. Note, if they do maintain silence and Communists were to accept what do we do then?

As to withdrawal or surrender North Korea Communists, he visualizes moment agreement reached at Geneva to hold free elections that his army will be able to go north and take surrender North Korea Communist army. We explained why we did not think this could occur but nothing we could say would deter him from that position. Otherwise he regards elections as complete farce with Communist Government remaining in north. What, he asks, would ever induce them to surrender and how can we govern even if elections are held?

We told him we had discussed with Generals Van Fleet and Taylor and they concurred Plan B should be put forward with ROK approval. He again flatly refused and said we were recognizing Communist Government in north.

General Hull has offered to come over tomorrow to discuss military situation with him if that will help. We may go Tokyo confer with him.

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1 Same as telegram Secto 149, May 8, p. 230.
2 Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor was Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army in Korea.
President said he had cabled to Pyun statement he gave Saturday (Embtel 1137, repeated Geneva 62)\(^3\) and Pyun was authorized to negotiate with American delegation within framework that statement and to wire his recommendations to Rhee. Gained impression President would like to get strong wire from Pyun and believe if considerable pressure placed on Pyun he might be induced to wire support Plan B which would help materially or at minimum to maintain silence when that plan put forward though consider latter not very realistic. Definitely believe Rhee wants promise ROK build-up.

Explained great regret our inability to arrive agreement and explained fear such disunity at Geneva would materially affect American public opinion, seriously jeopardize what we were trying to do in cooperation with Korea and encourage Communists.

President launched into long speech that we did not have courage to fight Communists and therefore he would have to stand alone and free world would fall. Commented only that our plans would defeat Communists and must stand together. President very firm and said his position was final and no further discussion could change him although indicated again he would like Pyun’s recommendations.

Dean would like to leave in any event not later than Friday\(^4\) this week and unless you instruct contrary plans to leave earlier if possible in connection urgent matters at office.\(^5\)

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\(^{3}\) Dated May 8, p. 233.

\(^{4}\) May 14.

\(^{5}\) In telegram 906, May 10, to Seoul, Secretary Dulles asked Dean to stay on until Friday by which time agreement might be reached on Plan B. Dean replied in telegram 1158, May 12, from Seoul saying that he would stay on at least through Friday. (795.00/5-1054, 5-1254)

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396.1 GE/5-1054 : Telegram

_The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation_

SECRET \(\text{NIAC} \) WASHINGTON, May 10, 1954—11:48 a. m.

Tosec 114. Department’s Tosec 111 sent Seoul 904 and Tokyo 2468;\(^1\) Seoul’s 1139\(^2\) and 1140\(^3\) repeated Geneva 64 and 65 Tokyo 673 and 675. Department has reconsidered and does not desire discussion Plan B with working group in Geneva mentioned in paragraph 1 reference Department telegram.

\(^{1}\) Dated May 9, p. 237.

\(^{2}\) Dated May 9, _ibid._

\(^{3}\) _Supra._
Increasing seriousness Indochina situation underlines undesirability open break with Rhee over presentation Plan B which we like him recognize has serious practical difficulties if Communists were to accept. Efforts persuade him agree to presentation Plan B should continue along lines already indicated. Especially desirable have Pyun recommend it from Geneva if not already done.

Dulles

796.00/5-1054 : Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

Seoul, May 10, 1954—6 p.m.

1145. Repeated information Tokyo 679, priority Geneva 68 for USDel. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Reference Geneva 60. While we believe Plan B best practical under all circumstances and have done level best to sell it, cannot it also be attacked as ridiculous and untenable position to suggest or support by persons hostile to our position.

Consider following questions and answers. (1) Question. How do we unite Korea? Answer. By getting Chinese Communist armies to withdraw some 60 miles across Yalu while leaving well-staffed, well-organized, well-equipped North Korean Communist army behind which will be kept in order by UNCURK clerical staff. (2) Question. How will elections be made genuinely free with this large Communist army in North Korea which can threaten and intimidate the populace? Answer. Because UNCURK says they are to be. (3) Question. If we have such free elections and unite North and South Korea, how do we get North Korean Communist army to disband so that the Republic of Korea can govern the unified country and so its commands will be obeyed? Answer. After elections UNCURK politely asks North Korean Communist army to leave or to surrender.

Briggs

1 Same as telegram Secto 156, May 9, p. 236.

396.1 GE/5-1054 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

SECRET PRIORITY

Washington, May 10, 1954—7:47 p.m.

Tedul 52. Personal from Secretary to Under Secretary. For the first time today, I have had a chance to give thought to Korean phase of Conference. The general lines of my thinking are:

1 The file copy indicates that this telegram was drafted by Dulles. It was repeated for information to Seoul as telegram 907 and to Tokyo as telegram 2481 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.
1. We should not attempt coercive pressures on Rhee to compel him to accept a plan which he with some justification feels might jeopardize the non-Communist status of the Republic of Korea. I am quite aware of the fact that there is very little chance that Plan B would be acceptable and that therefore to propose it is a good gamble. However, it is one thing to gamble with something affecting one's own country but another thing to force a gamble on the government of the country which is itself at stake.

2. Am suggesting that the present impasse might be overcome by dropping out of Plan B the provisions dealing with the withdrawal of forces and suggesting paragraph to general effect that obviously the free elections will require withdrawals of foreign forces and such disposition of domestic forces as will insure non-intimidation and that this will be dealt with at a subsequent stage.

At the Berlin Conference, the Western allies ducked the question of troop withdrawals, as proposed by Molotov, and I see no reason why the Western allies should not permit Rhee to do the same.

3. In view of our desire to develop a strong anti-Communist position, with particular relation to Indochina, and the prospect that we might still intervene there and that this might involve a clash with Communist China, I think it important that we basically follow a line which will keep the confidence of our anti-Communist allies in Asia rather than seem to be working against them with a view to winning favor of Western European countries which are not disposed to be very helpful to us in Asia.

4. Am disposed to proceed with exchange of ratifications of Korean Treaty, as I told Pyun, and as was indicated to Rhee when he agreed to send delegation to Geneva. I doubt whether we should get in position of trying to get him to try to buy same horse twice.

DULLES

396.1 GE/5-1054 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

SECRET        PRIORITY        WASHINGTON, May 10, 1954—9:19 p.m.

Tosec 124. With reference Secretary's telegram re Korea this date to Under Secretary 2 suggest your consideration following modifications Plan B:

Section I. Eliminate phrase "and withdrawal of all north Korean forces from Korea".

1 Repeated for information to Seoul as telegram 909 and to Tokyo as telegram 2485 with instructions to pass it to CINCUNC.
2 Supra.
Section IV. Eliminate.
Section VII B. Eliminate.
Section VIII. Following word "provisions" add phrase "and for withdrawal and disposition of non-Korean and Korean military forces".

Believe this might be more acceptable Rhee since it will put basic issue of free elections up to Communists thus gaining propaganda objectives without incurring risks Rhee fears. In doubtful event Communists accept principle free elections troop issue of course would then be dealt with in drafting agreement this subject.

Possible but less desirable alternative would be new paragraph under II indicating appropriate arrangement for withdrawal and disposition non-Korean and Korean military forces would have to be made subsequent reaching agreement general plan in order ensure elections genuinely free and without coercion.

Defense clearance being sought.\textsuperscript{3}

\textbf{Dulles}

\textsuperscript{3}Telegram Tosec 141, May 12, to Geneva, also sent to Seoul as telegram 917, stated that the JCS indicated no objection from the military viewpoint to the proposed modification of Plan B with regard to troop withdrawal (795.00/5-1264).

\textbf{MAY 11, 1954}

795.00/5-1154 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

\textbf{TOP SECRET} \textbf{NIACG} Seoul, May 11, 1954—11 a. m.

1155. Repeated information priority Tokyo 685, niact Geneva 72. Geneva for Smith; Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For the Secretary from Dean. Head other mission \textsuperscript{1} said this morning he conceived mission to be (1) to get more effective military service for less money, (2) to train and equip more Asians so as to permit withdrawal from Asia American divisions to US mainland in order permit more maneuverability, (3) to teach Asians how to use simpler weapons in order to utilize greater Asian manpower and not necessitate matching our excessively expensive standards, (4) to match our withdrawals with greater number ROK troops but with lighter weapons or equipment.

Said further in interviews with KMAG and ROK commanders he found them copying our tables of organization and expensive equipment to last detail whereas Eighth Army was emphasizing cutbacks, and greater number of tighter divisions, with fewer men and less equipment. Further, our generally publicized statements of fighting communism to the limit in Far East and supporting ROKs were therefore

\textsuperscript{1} Reference is to General Van Fleet.
somewhat inconsistent with our daily practices in Korea and current inquirics into possible cut of expenses and men. Therefore all this was leading to progressive lack of confidence by President Rhee in our government and its over-all policies and to a sense of Korean discouragement. Rhee told him he gets similar feeling from Formosa, Burma, Vietnam and Thai and that somehow they think they are not being treated fairly.

In reply, we said we were trying to put forward basic formula at Geneva which would preserve US-ROK allied unity and put onus for failure on Communists but that Rhee refused to consider anything as purely propaganda formula reputedly not acceptable to Communists but insisted rather on looking through formula to what active practical operating results in Korea would be if Communists actually accepted formula.

Said further that based on eastern philosophy Rhee believed something was either right or wrong and you could not confuse fundamental principles of strength and weakness and of pushing and yielding. For to Rhee Chinese Communists were aggressors and must be so labelled.

But under our plan B, part of aggressors could stay in north during elections, plus 350,000 North Korean Communist soldiers and to Rhee Communists were Communists whether Chinese or North Korean and our program for alleged free elections under UNCURK which Rhee regarded as having totally inadequate civilian manpower and without army support of communications and transportation in north together with substantial withdrawal of troops and facilities in south before elections was completely unrealistic.

Rhee says such program would force him publicly to backtrack on statements that he would never deal or cooperate with Communists, and result our program was nothing but bringing into play coalition government with Communists which we were trying to force down his throat just as General Marshall had attempted with Chiang Kai-shek and end would be the same, i.e., complete loss of Korea to the Communists.

Further Rhee asks, if we are sincere about helping Indochina, why do we not bomb factories and supply lines on Chinese mainland from advanced air bases in Korea rather than from Philippines, Okinawa or Japan and if we are going to pull our forces out of Korea we must therefore be getting ready to abandon Korea to her fate just as we did in 1949, assuming, of course, phased withdrawal means we can’t come back later and use bases under mutual pact.

Rhee’s questioning raises doubts in our minds whether we could use Japanese bases to drop atomic bombs on China mainland or USSR,
and whether Japan might deny or withdraw such bases use for such purpose in which doubt General Hull and Ambassador Allison\(^2\) concur. If we withdraw from Korea and concentrate on Okinawa question arises whether that base might not be knocked out, and doesn’t that warrant re-examining question of having unquestioned right to use advanced Korean air bases even though we don’t wish to fight a war in Korea?

Inasmuch as our economic rehabilitation program has had hard work getting off the ground, and have not outlined it to Rhee in its entirety, and we are still antagonizing him by forcing Korea to buy in Japan if latter is low bidder which according to Rhee builds up a Japanese economy already relatively prosperous from Korean war, while Korea, our ally, is still struggling along in some cases from our own bombing, we have no tangible visible proof of our aid to Korea.

For all these reasons Rhee is getting increasingly allergic to talk that does not promise some immediate, definite tangible result, and he cries out against any more general talk.

To solve problem reference plan B acceptance believe there are at least two alternate solutions:

1. In order obtain Rhee’s acceptance plan B, believe we should think out immediately at highest level basic principles of our over-all military security program in Far East on a unified rather than bilateral basis for Formosa, Philippines, Okinawa, Korea and Thailand with concentration on Asian ground forces backed up by atomic weapons immediately available which forces can be moved from one place to another as needed and as needed supplemented by our Navy and Air Force. Not necessary or advisable bring Japan in such open-ended program for moment. This, of course, assumes armistice ended by plan B or otherwise we are restricted as to weapons by its terms.

Work out immediately for Korea its precise relationship to the whole program and give Rhee soon as possible definite principles for building up ROK divisions and total dollar value equipment we plan for him to have on a truly realistic basis and tell him very plainly that there is not going to be any more.

Explain precisely why 20 divisions just about limit he can man and pay for and we supply with available equipment and that we and he cannot possibly man and pay for and we equip 35 divisions. Explain we will give him artillery that is interchangeable conventional weapon and atomic cannon but presently would not supply atomic ammunition. To demonstrate effectiveness of latter we would put on demonstration for him at Okinawa.

Tell him precisely what we will do over next few years in the way of economic aid on a hard realistic basis with no nonsense about it and just how it is going to be administered by the US including Japan purchases and why in both North and South Korea if plan B put into effect and Korea unified.

\(^2\) John M. Allison, Ambassador in Japan.
Explain precisely the function of our military pact and when it will and won't work.

Or if he won't take plan B,

2. Tell him frankly that without any attempt at political settlement with the Communists we will work out independently a mutually phased timetable for withdrawal of our own troops and the Chinese Communists, reduce economic aid to ROKs to a minimum, reduce our military aid to him to the minimum, bearing in mind there may be possible Korean strikes or sabotage and active interference with our troop and equipment withdrawal. We would then denounce mutual defense pact, assuming it is promulgated.

Tell Rhee he then free to work out any political basis he pleases with the Communists which we will examine but with no commitment to aid or recognize.

Further that if the Communists unprovokedly attack him we will come to his aid in accordance mutual defense pact while in effect. But tell him in no uncertain terms we won't aid him if he attacks or provokes attack.

Tell him this is high-level long term program which will not be changed under pressure and must have his approval to whole plan and promise of cooperation.

Believe we should also tell him frankly about our Japanese program and that he has nothing to fear. Since we have explained this Japanese program to Commonwealth believe we should tell Rhee so he can be fully informed on our thinking and he can stop worrying about our rearming Japan.

Rhee can then take his choice of cooperating with us on proposed plan B or not if that's what we still want.

Rhee and ROK generals are intelligent enough to know that if we fight in Indochina, the important Chinese bombing targets are from Peiping northwestward to Anshan, Mukden, Harbin and Vladivostok for which neither Philippines nor Okinawa bases are as suitable as Korea and with Okinawa knocked out and Japan bases possibly forbidden for that purpose we must be really withdrawing from Far East if we are willing to give up Korean bases in complete withdrawal. For if Communists can't come back, can we maintain right to use bases in Korea under mutual pact?

To attempt to carry out plan B without ROK cooperation will not seem realistic to Communists and hence its announcement without ROK's blessing will not be very convincing.

Believe we must have something definite and basic to tell Rhee which will arouse his continuing interest and allay his fears of abandonment.

In this event believe there is excellent chance of getting his cooperation.
If he refuses then without question we should be prepared without wobbling to carry out alternative two above and its consequences should be carefully considered before making statement to Rhee.

Even our top military commanders and ambassadors have not been briefed on our overall thinking in Far East and hence small wonder Rhee dismayed by piecemeal briefing, newspaper accounts of withdrawal and vague rumors of cutbacks without specific information believe there is enough general information in Washington to formulate such basic principles immediately without waiting several months for detailed report of current mission and believe serious danger deterioration US-ROK relations which can set in very fast if something is not done promptly or if we announce plan B without ROK concurrence.

Whoever is authorized to brief Rhee should make sure these basic principles after being formulated at high level will be carried out without any further backing or filling or it will do no good to adopt this program.

Such a program could make American manpower much more mobile, would permit doing job with Asian ground forces supplemented by US Navy and Air Force and use the atomic cannon and other weapons as need be.

Foregoing outlined generally today at meeting in Tokyo with Generals Hull and Taylor and Ambassadors Allison, Briggs and Dean after extended discussion. Except for Briggs and Taylor, others have not seen actual text this message but they concurred in its formulation and advisability and necessity of its presentation. General idea also discussed head of other mission.

BRIAGGS

396.1 GE/5-1154 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET PRIORITY

GANEVA, May 11, 1954—1 p. m.

63. Repeated information Department Secto 168, priority Tokyo 43. Tokyo for CINCUNC. For Briggs and Dean from USDel. Reference Geneva 68 it is incontestable that UNCURK can exercise only such powers as are delegated and permitted by mutual agreement. This would be as true of Plan A as Plan B. If Communists accept B we are not unaware of difficulties inherent in implementation as they have bad record for keeping agreements. If Communists reject B we would at least be in position before world of having made honest effort to negotiate reasonable settlement without sacrificing either ROK or

1 Same as telegram 1145, May 10, from Seoul, p. 242.
UN. On other hand it is difficult to see how we can, with straight face, join Rhee in seeking to impose terms of a conqueror—unconditional withdrawal Chinese Communist troops, surrender North Korean Army to ROK, leaving ROK in military control of North Korea before elections and unification. Little more could be demanded if we had won military victory rather than stalemate.

SMITH

396.1 GE/5-1154 : Telegram

Ninth Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, May 11, 3:05 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL


Secto 177. Repeated information Tokyo 48, London 151, Moscow 63, Paris 241, Oslo 7, Seoul for information 66. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Department pass Defense CINCPAC, COMSAC. Ninth plenary session Korean phase May 11 consisted speeches by Molotov (USSR), Spaak (Belgium), and Pyun (ROK). At conclusion four-hour session Eden presiding announced understood Indochina meeting scheduled tomorrow and that Secretariat would inform delegates time next Korea session.

Molotov propaganda speech lasting nearly two hours flatly rejected UN role Korean unification claiming all UN activities in Korea from beginning 1947 illegal. Other two chief points were status Communist China as one of Big Five and vague statement on desirability collective security arrangement for all Asian peoples.

Molotov attack on UN role Korean unification developed from lengthy historical review Korean problem 1945 to present. Noteworthy specific charges included alleged US proposal of trusteeship for Korea for 1945 Moscow agreement, lack of competence under Article 107 of Charter to deal with Korean problem 1947–1949, and Asian nations' reluctance participate UN military intervention 1950 and non-independent status those which did.

Following historical commentary he concluded that UN, as result of illegal Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, became a belligerent in Korea and thereby deprived itself of competence to serve impartially in solving Korean problem. Asserted Geneva conference had no relation to UN and that Communist China clearly belongs on Security Council as one of Big Five, this status being shown

1 A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/9) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3:05 p. m. and adjourned at 7:02 p. m.

2 The transmittal time indicated on the source text, noon, is obviously in error.

by its position as one of only five powers participating both phases Geneva. Made somewhat plaintive note of fact that while “torrents of speeches filled with excessive and persuasive praise of US” no word said by any non-Communist power on “seizure of Formosa”. He specifically attacked October 7, 1950 UNGA resolution establishing UNCURK, saying it was intended to impose South Korean regime on North Korea. Also asserted UNCURK membership composed primarily of interventionists and colonial powers.

Recapitulated Nam II proposal and added that USSR prepared to cooperate in implementing paragraph 3 concerning peaceful development of Korea. Replying to criticism of all-Korean commission he said agreement by both sides is essential to any solution Korean problem and DPROK cannot be asked subordinate itself to South Korean regime. Then described the virtues of DPROK regime in improving welfare of people and contrasted alleged defects in South Korea. Said all-Korean Commission would preserve DPROK achievements and that plans based on extension of undemocratic and corrupt South Korean regime to North Korea are unacceptable.

Saying US attitude is key to solution of Korean problem Molotov led into attack on US hostility to Communist China and plans of US and others to form aggressive military bloc in Southeast Asia. Comparing situation with Western Europe he said all Asian States should unite to ensure collective security arrangements for all peoples of Asia.

Spaak outstanding brief address on high note reminded conference that problem before it was Korea, not world or even Asia. Rebutted Communist aspersions on UN collective security efforts in Korea and on alleged US imperialism. Noted inconsistency Chinese Communist desire for admission to UN at same time it condemned UN. Said everyone apparently agrees goal is united, free and democratic Korea and that everyone also advocates free elections. He said point at issue is whether (1) there should be no international supervision and foreign forces should be withdrawn before elections. (2) There should be no prior withdrawal foreign forces and elections should be under international supervision and under UN auspices. He supported latter. Closed with appeal for moderation and a little mutual trust among conference participants.

Pyun’s speech largely rebuttal to previous Communist speeches although fundamental importance UN role in solving Korean problem emphasized throughout. Challenging professed Communist desire prevent any international intervention in Korean unification, Pyun rejoined that point 3 of Nam II proposal calls for intervention by “appropriate states” and concluded Communists wanted only foreign
intervention by nations they chose. He again attacked Nam Il proposal for All-Korean Commission as “legislatural [legislatorial] coalition”. Chiding Chou En-lai on professed concern over security of China from Korea, Pyun asserted ROK has no aggressive intentions and went on to describe Chinese Communist imperialism in North Korea, mentioning mass deportation North Koreans and forcible marriage of Korean women to Chinese men. Rebuitting Chou accusation of aggressive US intervention in China (Formosa), Pyun said that US intervention in China prevented Japanese conquest and thereby saved base of operations for Chou.

Saying that Korea “terribly eager for success” of conference, Pyun said important in case conference fails that people of world know Communists are to blame. Defined fundamental question as whether Communists would lower iron curtain in North Korea and permit free elections under UN auspices. State ROK had held four elections and May 20 elections are under “close and direct observation of UN”. “Whole problem of unification would be solved” if UN could observe elections NK. Left somewhat obscure whether talking about single nation-wide elections or separate elections NK.

Reiterated earlier statement 45,000 anti-Communist Korean and Chinese mentioned by Communists are no longer POWs but citizens recovered from illegal Communist domination. Then proceeded to make long eloquent plea that Communists permit International Red Cross send representatives behind iron curtain to find, assist and repatriate civilians abducted from South Korea in 1950.

In additional comments drafted during meeting in response Molotov address Pyun defended October 7, 1950 UNGA resolution, said if aggressive USSR military bloc dissolved other blocs would disappear also, and deprecated Soviet role in defeat of Japan. Castigating uncomplimentary references by Molotov to President Rhee, Pyun repeatedly called Molotov a liar.

Smith

396.1 GE/5–1154 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL NTACT

GENEVA, May 11, 1954—4 p. m.

64. Repeated information Tokyo 45, Department Secto 170. Department pass Defense. Toyko for CINCUNC. For Van Fleet and Hull from Smith. Rhee’s refusal agree so far on draft proposal apparently based primarily on his attitude re withdrawal non-Korean forces creating increasingly difficult situation here. Key point is his insistence Chinese Communist forces be withdrawn and North Korean forces
demobilized before elections. This position totally unrealistic since neither ROK nor United Nations in position victor in Korea. Rhee must realize insistence on total Chinese Communist withdrawal can only mean concurrent total UN withdrawal.

It is possible that part his tactic is to use this position as bargaining lever to get commitments on further military assistance. He has not perhaps fully considered dangers to ROK in complete United Nations withdrawal before testing Communist performance on unification Korea, assuming any agreement here and implementation of agreement possible.

I would appreciate anything you may be able to do to explain frankly to President Rhee from military standpoint problems involved withdrawal all non-Korean forces before elections.

In addition point outlined above, following considerations might be advanced:

1. Our basic objective here is to challenge Communists with constructive workable plan for achieving free unified Korea which Communists probably will never accept.

2. We do not consider total Chinese Communist withdrawal before elections as crucial element in unification plan if we obtain acceptance principles outlined paragraph II our draft proposal. Later provisions designed to insure, among other things, safeguards against interference by foreign forces in elections.

3. In reality we are compelled choose between total simultaneous withdrawal before elections, with danger Communists upsetting situation after United Nations withdrawal, or concurrent phased withdrawal before and after elections to protect against non-performance by Communists but with danger Communist forces might frustrate free elections.

We have accordingly sought formula along lines paragraph IV draft proposal which would require withdrawal bulk Communist forces before elections but would leave UNC in south, although reduced in size, during and after elections in event Communist failure implement unification agreement.

SmiTh

795.00/5-1154: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET  NIACT

GENEVA, May 11, 1954—4 p. m.

Dulte 62. Personal for Secretary. The following represent my personal views after reading Tedul 52. The staff here is working on a coordinated opinion. I am convinced that you are right in not wishing to attempt coercive pressures on Rhee. The talks I have had here

1 Dated May 10, p. 242.
with the Koreans have made it very clear that while they are willing to admit that Plan B is a gamble, they still think it is a gamble which the Communists might accept. Ducking the question of troop withdrawals will be more difficult here than at Berlin, here we have to convince 14 other nations of the logic and correctness of our proposals, limited though they may be. All are aware that the basic objection of Communist diplomacy is to get troops out of Korea, but they will find it very difficult to rationalize Rhee’s demands, and we will have to answer questions as to how the troop withdrawals might be handled. As a first thought, it seems to me we might suggest that as our own withdrawals will take considerable time and it would be undesirable unduly to postpone political action leading toward unification, the Chinese Communist troops might be withdrawn to concentration areas at the ports of entry on the Korean side of the Yalu, while United Nations troops would withdraw to concentration areas in the vicinity of our base ports. The foreign troops could, under the supervision of the international authority, be insulated from any effect on elections. The North Korean and ROK troops would, as at present, be deployed facing each other along the neutral zone, and could likewise be insulated. If the international authority were unable to carry out its functions, or were interfered with, presumably the United Nations troops would reassume their previous positions and we would again be faced with the present situation.

I am beginning to believe that our suspicion that Pyun and Yang were saying one thing to us and another to Syngman Rhee is unjustified. They are sending another message to Rhee urging acceptance of at least the basic principles of Plan B, which I think we can modify in accordance with your suggestions. I have had some trouble avoiding an early meeting of the 16, but we are scheduling it for Thursday, and it cannot be put off longer than Thursday, with a Korean plenary probably on Friday. Eden has agreed to this and I think the others will cooperate. Spaak speaks this afternoon and is dining here tonight.

SMITH

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2 May 13.
3 On May 13, the Department of State sent the text of this message to Seoul in telegram 918 and to Tokyo for CINCUNC in telegram 2511 (795.00/5-1154).

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795.00/5-1154 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

SEOUL, May 11, 1954—6 p. m.

1169. Repeated information Tokyo 694, USDel Geneva priority 76. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For Secretary and Smith from Dean. Re De-
partment's 909. Proposed addition to VIII draft plan B would, of course, give UNCURK supervision or right to make recommendations with respect disposition of ROK Forces in South Korea as well as Korean Communist Forces North Korea which may annoy Rhee but may be useful. Believe we have germ of good idea. For example, suppose to offset proposed surrender North Korean Army we suggest Pyun that Communists or neutrals will demand liquidation ROK Army or neutralization Korea and exceedingly dangerous their future position as government for them to demand complete withdrawal Chinese and surrender Korean Communists before elections. Instead of putting onus on Communists at Geneva such a demand might pin aggressor label on Rhee and might be very difficult for us to continue give ROK Army present generous support.

Might also tell Pyun we very disturbed about withdrawal Cho's candidacy and arrest members opposition for criticizing chief executive.

BRIGGS

\footnote{Same as telegram Tosec 124, May 10, p. 248.}

396.1 GE/5–1154: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, MAY 11, 1954—9 p.m.

Secto 176. Repeated information Seoul 65, Tokyo 47. Tokyo pass CINUNC.

1. Robertson and Young met with Pyun, Yang, Limb and Hong May 10. Robertson said seemed be complete misunderstanding Seoul re position ROK delegation here with reference proposed plan B. Robertson told Pyun we shocked and surprised, in view Pyun’s and Yang’s statements to us supporting plan B, receive report from Dean, Rhee had received telegram from Pyun denouncing plan as surrender to Communists and urging Rhee stand firm against it. Yang and Limb seemed taken completely by surprise. In embarrassed and ambiguous response Pyun implied he did not wish discuss matter nor contradict President and left impression no such telegram had been sent. Following subsequent private conversations with Yang we have reason believe ROK delegation and Oliver \footnote{Robert T. Oliver, an American adviser to President Rhee, was in Geneva assisting the Korean Delegation.} have been urging Rhee’s approval plan B. Yang told us evening May 10 ROK delegation had sent another telegram to Rhee recommending consideration proposal with ROK dele-
gations changes including deletion presidential elections which Pyun and Yang strongly desire. Yang also informed us in confidence Oliver had sent another such telegram. (Text of Oliver’s first message sent Secto 123.2)

2. In conversation May 10 Robertson stressed (a) we had not shown or discussed plan with any other delegations because we wished collaborate and reach agreement first with ROK; (b) plan would represent real victory for ROK and US if our allies support it because it would put to Communists challenge to repudiate their rejection of UN and genuinely free elections; and (c) again stressed need for general constructive positive proposal. Pyun said ROK Government has not yet accepted proposal on simultaneous withdrawal foreign forces and simultaneous elections in North and South Korea. Pyun and Yang asked for couple days to consult by telegram with Rhee before holding meeting of 9 or 16. Told Pyun we were holding off increasing pressure on us for such meeting and did not see how we could postpone meeting of 9 beyond Wednesday.3 Meeting ended with understanding that they would communicate with Rhee and we with Briggs and Dean with view clarifying whether US–ROK agreement on plan B possible. Left it with Koreans there would probably be meeting of 9 or 16 on Wednesday or Thursday.

3. Pyun has also made suggestion ROK agree accept plan B on express condition that Communists accept it in toto or otherwise ROK free revert to original position. Pyun indicated in above conversation he had made this suggestion to Rhee.

4. Delegation suggests that Briggs and Dean be sure Rhee understands US delegation has not shown draft proposal to any delegation but ROK, because of our long-standing practice consult first such matters with ROK.

5. Johnson and Young explained problems in US–ROK negotiations to Allen (UK) and Lacoste (France) on May 10 and 11. Today they informed us French and UK delegations respectively recognize great dangers in any break with ROK and are agreeable continuing US efforts find common ground with ROK which other allies can accept. Accordingly, both delegations have relaxed pressure for tabling counter proposal and for proceeding without ROK if necessary.

6. Agreed with UK and French representatives desirable have meeting of 16 on Thursday subject to confirmation after discussion with ROK delegation.

SMITH

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2 Not printed.
3 May 12.
MAY 12, 1954

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Young)

CONFIDENTIAL

Participants: Dr. Pyun, ROK Delegation
Ambassador Yang, ROK Delegation
Ambassador Limb, ROK Delegation
Mr. Hong, ROK Delegation
Mr. Walter S. Robertson, US Delegation
Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., US Delegation

Geneva, May 12, 1954. ¹

After congratulating Dr. Pyun for his speech in the Plenary, May 11, Mr. Robertson said he wished to inform the ROK Delegation that it would be advisable to hold a meeting of the 16 on Thursday morning. Among other reasons, Mr. Eden had to return to London over the weekend and hoped there could be such a meeting before his departure.

Dr. Pyun indicated no objection and asked whether we intended to table our draft proposal with the 16. Mr. Robertson replied that we would not, since the United States and the Republic of Korea are not in agreement.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that Dr. Pyun should be prepared for questions from other delegations as to whether the ROK is ready with a counter proposal. Mr. Robertson suggested that Dr. Pyun make the following two general points, in view of the lack as yet of US–ROK agreement on Plan B:

(1) Reiterate, from his speech of May 11, that the issue is whether the north Koreans will agree to free and fair elections under supervision of the United Nations.

(2) Take the position that, until the Communists concede on the fundamental issue, our side should not make concessions on a detailed proposal which would be based upon UN supervision.

Mr. Robertson assured Dr. Pyun that the United States Delegation would take this same position in the meeting of the 16. The ROK Delegates expressed particular satisfaction and complete agreement with this approach. They said they would meet with certain other delegates today to develop the above position.

During the course of the discussion, Dr. Pyun proposed to make to the 16 tomorrow the six-point proposal which he had intended to present to the plenary on May 3 but had deleted at our urgent suggestion. He also said he might mention President Rhee’s willingness to

¹ The memorandum was drafted by Young on May 14.
hold a plebiscite in the south to determine whether the people would agree to nation-wide elections in the south as well as the north. Mr. Robertson strongly urged Dr. Pyun not to mention either idea because it would create great confusion and underscore the lack of agreement among the 16. Moreover, it would be completely impractical for the Conference to wait indefinitely for a plebiscite to decide whether there should be elections. Ambassadors Yang and Limb concurred. Dr. Pyun agreed not to mention these matters in view of his complete endorsement of the above approach.

Ambassador Yang informed Mr. Young privately after the meeting that the ROK Delegation had received a telegram from President Rhee insisting on complete withdrawal of all Chinese forces and, in effect, not accepting Plan B. Because of this message and continued lack of US–ROK agreement on a proposal, Ambassador Yang said the ROK Delegation would adhere to the general approach outlined above as the only possible tactic under present circumstances.

366.1 GE/5–1254 : Telegram

Smith–Eden–Bidault Meeting, Geneva, May 12, Noon: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, May 12, 1954—5 p. m.

Secto 182. Repeated information Seoul 68, Tokyo 50. Tokyo for CINCUNC. At meeting of heads of Big Three delegations this noon, General Smith explained futility of engaging in endless attempt to work out details of plan with Rhee when any solution we proposed must be based on authority of UN, which Molotov had yesterday categorically rejected. He explained why we should not press Rhee too hard, including need for Congressional support on Indochina. He also mentioned possibility of suggesting, in restricted meeting of seven, regrouping of Chinese and UN forces prior to elections. We had reached an impasse and there would be no communist concessions. Pyun was right that North Korea had become a Chinese province. It had gone and we were not going to fight global war for it. Issue should be joined on whether or not communists would accept UN authority.

Eden said he wanted to speak next plenary in reply to Molotov and particularly to discuss question of where freedom was found in Asia. He would also like to speak on principles. It was agreed that Bidault would speak first in general terms, that Eden would then follow up with statement of principles and that Asian representative, presumably Philippines, would if possible obtain 16 agreement present specific proposal on principles. Smith suggested it be put to communists on
basis that if they accepted, there would be further discussion in restricted sessions, otherwise, there would seem to be no further point in continuing Korean discussion.

Smith

795.00/5-1254 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation

SECRET NIGCT

SEOUL, May 12, 1954—1 p. m.

74. Sent Department 1160; repeated information Tokyo 688. Tokyo for CINCUNC. For Smith from Dean. Reference Geneva’s 63, 64.

We are in complete and wholehearted agreement logic, weight, force and everything else you say and have attempted make every persuasive argument we know to convince Rhee extreme folly both his position and failure to cooperate. Offered Monday to bring Hull to Seoul to convince him danger to Korean people and to his government of complete UN withdrawal if he persists in insisting complete Communist withdrawal.

His only answer is that we are appeasers and should fight and we are now reaping whirlwind harvest of armistice. Said further since we were going to get out anyhow why not get out now and leave him fight alone.

Pyun wired urging Rhee not to agree with us but to appear to give authority to Pyun.

Rhee wants either full commitments for 35 divisions and equipment and UN withdrawal so he can attack alone or by using every artifice at his command he wants to evoke situation designed to bring about unprovoked attack by Communists; in which event, we are bound come to his aid. He not only appreciates but wants danger to occur. Following my last talk, he issued statement repeating all demands and saying they are unalterable.

Delighted to have Hull see President if you think desirable. Have been awaiting Defense clearance Department’s 909 before approaching him again on Plan B as further modified Subdivision 2, Department’s 907.

For your information, UNCURK has seven delegates including alternate, two observers, three in foreign administrative personnel, four Korean interpreters and 15 vehicles. Rhee constantly contrasts UNCURK civilian staff with Chinese and Korean Communist soldiers

1 Dated May 11, p. 248.
2 Dated May 11, p. 251.
3 Same as telegram Tosec 124, May 10, p. 243.
4 Same as telegram Tedul 52, May 10, p. 242.
in North and asks what they will do in North without UN Army communications and support or in South with UN units in state of withdrawal.

Do not think we do not appreciate extreme seriousness situation and full force your arguments. Have kept Van Fleet and Taylor constantly posted. Again reviewed strategy and tactics Van Fleet last night and asked his advice and counsel. Had no suggestions except we must under no circumstances antagonize Rhee and would stand with Rhee at Geneva rather than other 14. He left for Formosa this morning just as your 64 arrived and has copy.

BRIGGS

MAY 13, 1954

795.00/5-1354 : Telegram

Fifth Meeting of the Heads of the 16 Allied Delegations, Geneva, May 13, 10:05 a.m.: ¹ The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY GENEVA, MAY 13, 1954—4 P. M.

Secto 194. Repeated information Seoul priority 71, Tokyo 56, London 158, Paris 251, Moscow 67. Department pass Defense; Tokyo pass CINCUNC. At fifth meeting of chief allied delegates held this morning at Palais with Kural presiding, it was agreed that, in lieu of a detailed plan, the committee of nine (US, UK, France, ROK, Thailand, Australia, Colombia, Philippines, Turkey) should meet tomorrow at 10 a.m. to begin effort to draft an agreed set of general principles upon which allied side could stand. It was obvious that all in group except ROK’s and ourselves strongly felt that for propaganda reasons and because of domestic public opinions, it was highly desirable such general principles include support of all-Korean elections. Pending formulation such principles was agreed no need hold plenary sessions unless two or more allies prepared speak or unless plenary called by Commies. Also no indication other members 16 desired another restricted session unless apparent Commies ready to make some new proposal.

General Smith opened meeting by reporting that, despite complete cooperation Pyun, we were unable to reach agreement on detailed plan. Felt this not particularly regrettable, however, in view Molotov’s speech yesterday ² which crystallized two issues on which we could

¹ A set of minutes of this meeting (AD Verb Min/5) from which the time of the meeting is taken is in FE files, lot 60 D 330, box 14824. The meeting adjourned at 11:40 a.m.

² The speech was made on May 11; see telegram Secto 177, May 11, from Geneva, p. 249.
stand firm: (1) Absolute necessity uphold authority of UN; (2) requirement that free elections reflect honest will of people and that representation be directly proportionate to population. Said that while inadvisable present detailed counterproposal at this time, it would be helpful if we could present set of basic principles which had been developed by allies in plenary to date and upon which there was general agreement among allies.

In response to question from Garcia (Philippines) who pressed Pyun as to whether Rhee categorically rejected all-Korean elections and as to whether any flexibility ROK position, Pyun replied ROK position reflected by General Smith’s opening remarks that allies should not explore detailed controversial points but rather wait to see whether Commies change their position re UN and free elections. Added Rhee would be ready accept all-Korean elections provided that voters so desired. Admitted such procedure would take time but pointed out all-Korean elections created constitutional problem for ROKs.

Spaak (Belgium) agreed unwise to go into details at this time but emphasized we must present a set of clear simple principles in order extricate ourselves from difficult propaganda position resulting from specific North Korean proposal. As example such principles, cited general all-Korean elections, UN supervision, withdrawal foreign forces. During discussion which followed, Eden and Commonwealth representatives, Turks and Colombia supported Spaak. Eden, after paying tribute Pyun, said that while Molotov’s repudiation UN made allied task easier, we should still be in position to put up three or four point general proposal and stand on it. Said he planned to outline certain general principles in plenary speech this afternoon but would fuzz question of whether elections in both North and South Korea. Lacoste added Bidault also planned to talk general principles this afternoon although did not specify what Bidault planned to say re elections.

Pearson, while supporting Spaak and Eden, went further by saying did not want to be placed in position at home of supporting only North Korean elections or withdrawal only Communist troops prior to election. Stressed importance of maintaining united front lest Communist charge that conference broke down over allied disagreement, but hinted that if general approval allied proposal not obtained might be necessary for several allied representatives to voice objections to such proposal either at Geneva or at home.

General Smith agreed need for allied unity on simple formula but urged that if agreement unattainable on general principles we should be prepared to stand on question UN authority and free elections based on representation in National Assembly proportionate to population. He also pointed out ROK Government and constitution only ones rec-
ognized by UN as legal and valid. However, no support expressed for our position we could stand on these two points in event disagreement. Instead, general consensus as stated by Watt (Australia), McIntosh (New Zealand), Zuleta (Colombia), Acikalin (Turkey) was that we must somehow reach agreement on basic principles and that such principles must contain more than broad generalities.

For Washington and Seoul.

Telegram follows on Robertson, Young conversation with Pyun following above meeting and delegation’s suggestion on set of principles to be discussed urgently with Rhee. We do not plan to table any proposal in committee of nine, without prior effort at obtaining ROK agreement on text.

SMITH

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3 Telegram Secto 196, May 13, infra.

396.1 GE/5-1354: Telegram

Robertson–Pyun Meeting, Geneva, May 13, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 13, 1954—6 p. m.

Secto 196. Repeated information Seoul 73, Tokyo 57. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Following meeting of 16 this morning, Robertson and Young met with Pyun and Republic of Korea delegation to discuss meeting of May 9. Robertson stressed:

(1) Both delegations should refrain from getting involved in details, but support general principles on which can all agree.

(2) Communists here are trying alienate United States away from its Allies by attacking only United States and not any other country.

(3) It would be playing right into Communist hands if United States put in position of agreeing only with Republic of Koreans, and not with Western Allies.

(4) United States has major problems, as well as other alliances to consider in critical areas around the world and must resist Communism wherever possible as the only country with the power and resources to lead in this effort along with other Allies.

(5) United States Government would be in difficult position with United States public opinion if we can not find common ground on basic principles with other Allies.

(6) United States delegation stressing Republic of Korea only Constitutional authority and that elections should take place under Republic of Korea Constitution.

(7) Other delegations here agree with United States on central issue United Nations supervision and drafting common set general principles, instead detailed plan which they would prefer. This is great advantage for United States, since many delegations not agree
with initial position introduced by Republic of Korea and United States delegations on elections only in North Korea and Chinese Communist withdrawal first.

(8) Molotov's second speech is such an unequivocal rejection of principle United Nations supervision that Communists undoubtedly can never repudiate it which gives United States and Republic of Korea opportunity for great political victory in free world over Communists, if we can now seize opportunity by stating general issues on which 16 insist Korean unification be based and leave Conference on that positive note when Communists reject them.

Pyun and Republic of Korea delegation concurred in desirability drafting general principles and leaving details for later development in unlikely event Communists should accept statement principles. Pyun and Yang asked United States to draft such principles and discuss with them later today which we will do.

Principles already drafted in subsequent telegram.¹

SMITH

¹See telegram 74, May 13, p. 264.

396.1 GE/5-1854 : Telegram

Tenth Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, May 13, 3:05 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 13, 1954—9 p.m.

Secto 203. Repeated information Tokyo 59, London 162, Moscow 70, Paris 259, Oslo 8, Seoul 75. Tokyo for CINCUNC; Department pass Defense, CINCPAC and COMSAC. Tenth plenary session Korean phase May 13 consisted of two brief speeches by Bidault and Eden,² with Prince Wan in chair. Following Eden's speech, Prince Wan announced adjournment—no session May 14 in view scheduled Indochina meeting. Next Korean session, he said, would be announced through Secretariat.

Bidault said he would not review the well-known history of the Korean problem already done well by Mr. Dulles. Communist version is contrary to facts.

Turning to Nam Il's proposal, he said proposal does not contain guarantee for establishment of unified government genuinely free and genuinely democratic. Minimum principles to be met are (1) representation must be proportional to number of citizens in both parts of

¹A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/10) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3:05 p.m. and adjourned at 4:10 p.m.

²The texts are printed in The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, pp. 109–113 and 118–117.
country and (2) elections must be held in conditions of freedom and certified by neutral observers with adequate authority. Communists have hitherto rejected these principles but it is hoped that they would reconsider and agree to place elections as well as withdrawal or movement of troops under international control. Most qualified organism to supply such control is UN.

Bidault attacked Communist accusation that UN is accomplice in aggression. This, he said, is not merely false but its repetition is dangerous to all and would threaten very existence of UN.

Bidault rejected suggestion US was aggressor in Korea and showed that facts hardly consistent with any imperialism on part US.

In apparent allusion to Indochina phase, Bidault stressed “this Geneva Conference which should be a peace conference and which we firmly continue to hope to see become truly a peace conference”. Later he said “it is already much that an armistice has been signed we are the first to recognize it, we who wish to see the contagion of peace spread to all Asia”.

Bidault ended on a note expressing hope that constructive efforts will yet bring Korea the unity and liberty which it deserves.

Eden also said he would avoid going into past history but stressed that UN did its duty in Korea and if US bore majority share it is measure not of US imperialism but of its loyalty to UN and deserves tribute. He also expressed regret that Communist China found it necessary to raise PW question which for UK has been settled some time ago in accordance with armistice agreement and Geneva Convention.

Alluding to charge of imperialism in Asia against UK, Eden stressed that facts are that UK has contributed to advance of national liberation, citing India, Pakistan and Burma. He referred to Asian members of UK Commonwealth which continues in close voluntary relation to UK, and asked whether real freedom was in Colombo or in Ulan Bator, in New Delhi or Pyongyang. Communists appeared unable to recognize concept of voluntary and equal association founded on cooperation and not compulsion. He also cited Colombo plan with participation other Asian countries and working hand in hand with UN and US technical assistance.

UK belief in freedom, Eden said, underlies its insistence that Korea shall have freedom—that freedom must be genuine and methods achieving it fair and practical. Nam II’s proposal could not lead to desired results since it does not recognize numerical disparity between North and South and could not lead to agreement, there being no provision even for neutral chairman or arbitration tribunal. Also, withdrawal with country divided under plan which can only lead to deadlock would result in chaos, and perhaps renewal of hostilities. Eden
noted similarity to Molotov’s Berlin proposal and said in both situations elections would either not be free or would not take place at all. Communist proposal for packed commission, for elections free in name but rigged in fact.

Unacceptability of Communist proposal, Eden said, does not mean that last word has been said. He stressed general agreement on following points: (a) Desire for peaceful settlement; (b) unification; (c) after unification no foreign interference in Korean affairs; (d) appropriate guarantee for Korean integrity by other nations; (e) common desire to withdraw forces as soon as can be without again endangering peace. In light of this area of agreement, Eden suggested desirability of agreement on following basic principles: (1) Elections for all-Korean Government; (2) elections should truly reflect will of people taking into account distribution of population between North and South; (3) universal adult suffrage and secret ballot, as soon as possible under conditions of freedom; (4) elections to be under international supervision, in UK view should be under UN but members need not be chosen from among Korean belligerents but could be panel acceptable to Geneva Conference; (5) program must include withdrawal of forces as soon as international peace and security achieved, as provided for UN forces in GA resolution, October 7 in General Assembly.

Eden concluded by saying that if there could be agreement on these principles then conference could get down to terms and stages, perhaps in restricted session then reporting back to conference as a whole.

SMITH

396.1 GE/5—1354: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT GENEVA, May 13, 1954—9 p. m.

74. Repeated information Tokyo 58, niact Department Secto 200. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Seoul for Briggs and Dean. Re Secto 196.¹ Following is draft basic proposal for unification of Korea:

1. In conformity with UN resolutions on question Korean independence, unification of Korea under single democratic and independent government for all of Korea shall be achieved by people of Korea in free elections throughout Korea to National Assembly of unified Korea. These elections shall be held under conditions of genuine freedom and in accordance with constitutional processes of ROK.

2. Representation in National Assembly shall be in direct proportion to population of all Korea, and based on secret ballot and univer-

¹ Dated May 13, p. 261.
sal adult suffrage free of political or other obstacles or discrimination with respect to qualifications for voting or for candidature.

3. In order fulfill above requirements effectively and assure that conditions of freedom exist before, during and after elections, commission established by UN shall observe and supervise elections, which should be held soon as possible. UN commission shall have full freedom movement and operation in all electoral areas and its recommendations and requests for facilities shall be binding on authorities concerned.

4. UN commission shall certify when government of unified Korea has been established with effective control over all Korea. Constitution of ROK shall remain in effect except as it may be amended or superseded by action of National Assembly following above elections.

5. Withdrawal from Korea of non-Korean forces shall be agreed upon, and shall be observed and verified by UN commission in order to ensure that elections and establishment of government of unified Korea are accomplished under conditions of genuine freedom.

6. Parties accepting these principles shall cooperate in carrying out this proposal, and shall pledge their respect for territorial integrity and political independence of unified Korea. Government of latter shall undertake to abide by purposes and principles of UN Charter.”

Above draft being shown ROK Del this afternoon and substance will be discussed in working group of 9 Friday morning. 

Please discuss draft with Rhee, emphasizing following points:

1. As pointed out Secto 116, Molotov’s repudiation of principle UN supervision gives us opportunity for political victory in free world over Communists. It was consensus of 16 delegates at meeting today that we should now capitalize on this fact to present basic principles on which 16 insist unification must be based.

2. Draft emphasizes cardinal importance UN as basis progress for unification Korea through reference UN resolutions and requirement for supervision of elections and withdrawal forces by impartial UN body.

3. It provides that elections will be held in accordance with constitutional processes of ROK which would permit Rhee request amendment constitution for this purpose which he pointed out would be required if elections held subsequent to May 20 Assembly elections. Proposal also provides for continuation in effect of ROK constitution, another important ROK requirement.

4. It provides for representation in proportion to population throughout Korea, thus, rejecting concept of parity between North and South Korea contained North Korea proposal.

5. In accordance Tedul 52 (Seoul 907) formulation of provision re withdrawal forces generalized to avoid difficult question whether Chinese Communists should withdraw first or whether there should be concurrent withdrawal UN and Communist forces. (We are still

2 May 14.

3 This reference is incorrect, since telegram Secto 116, May 6, from Geneva, dealt with Indochina. Presumably, the reference should be to telegram Secto 196, May 13, p. 261.

4 Dated May 10, p. 242.
considering language this paragraph in proposal and may wish modify it. Suggest you emphasize to Rhee that this language still tentative.) In generalizing language re withdrawal forces, we are seeking sidestep present differences between Rhee and us for purposes presentation proposal to conference and in conference discussion of proposal we intend insist that agreement must be reached first on method unification, i.e., UN supervision elections and representation related to population distribution before discussing detailed agreement re withdrawal since latter meaningless if no agreement on unification. In presentation to Rhee this strategy should be stressed as basis on which we can hope overcome present differences and yet agree on more positive allied note.

SMITH

MAY 14, 1954

396.1 GE/5-1454 : Telegram

Meeting of the Allied Working Group of Nine, Geneva, May 14, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 14, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 210. Repeated information Seoul 77, Tokyo 60. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Re Sectos 194, 196, 200. Johnson opened Korean working group meeting of nine this morning with statement purpose to seek agreement on basic position which sixteen delegations can stand on and give full support too. He enumerated following points as his understanding principles to be agreed: (1) Korea to be unified state; (2) UN role in Korea must be maintained; (3) elections to be held under UN supervision; (4) representation in body elected proportionate to total population in Korea; (5) legitimacy of ROK must be maintained; (6) following unification and achievement stability in Korea non-Korean forces to be withdrawn (does not preclude commencement withdrawal earlier); (7) UN to certify unification accomplished; (8) assurances to be given for territorial integrity of unified Korea. He emphasized these should be spelled out somewhat but would be advantage in keeping statement principles short. If agreement reached in conference on principles then would have basis for negotiating detailed agreements.

Philippines (Briones) stated delegation had proposal to make which contained following points: (1) ROK and DPRK to unite under one government and constitution; (2) constitutional convention to be elected by Korean people on basis one representative per 200,000 population; (3) convention would approve and ordain new constitution;

1 Dated May 13, p. 259.
2 Dated May 13, p. 261.
3 Same as telegram 74, May 13, from Geneva, supra.
(4) election laws to be agreed by Geneva conference; (5) elections to be supervised by UN body; (6) subsequent elections under constitution also to be supervised by UN body; (7) non-Korean forces would remain in Korea but avoid interference in elections and withdraw after establishment of government. (This proposal similar to that suggested by Philippines earlier in conference at meeting of sixteen.)

ROK (Pyun) attacked proposal vigorously emphasizing ROK Government for all Korea, constitutional convention runs counter to principles enumerated by Johnson, particularly maintenance legitimacy ROK. He stated he would study Philippine proposal but it contrary principles his government accepted. He then criticized point four Eden's statement principles in plenary yesterday (Secto 203), stating this would open path for Communists to suggest neutral members on commission to supervise elections. Following considerable discussion this point, during which Johnson pointed out only UN itself can make decision on body to perform functions in Korea and its present decision is for UNCURK, it was generally agreed that "UN supervision" was essential point on which we must stand, without getting into specific question whether UNCURK or not.

Meeting then turned to Philippine proposal and lively triangular exchange among US, ROK and Philippine delegates ensued, including lengthy historical lectures by Philippines. ROK supported by US pointed out proposal for constitutional convention destroyed UN resolutions and actions on Korea. Johnson stressed fact proposal counter to legitimacy ROK principle and observed latter recognized by UN and some thirty countries and nation for which we have all been fighting. He pointed up danger of playing into hands of Communists, who wished to equate North and South Korea, by any proposal which wipes out ROK. He also observed Communists have not raised this issue since North Korean proposal provides only for elections to National Assembly. Philippines then posed direct question to ROK as to whether it ready accept principle general elections throughout Korea and stated Philippines would accept concept general elections throughout Korea under effective UN supervision if ROK would. Discussion ended on this note which seemed to indicate Philippines using their proposal chiefly as rather crude tactic to push ROK into acceptance general elections throughout Korea.

At Secretary General Kural's suggestion it was agreed at conclusion two-hour meeting that US and ROK delegations would seek to draft statement principles for consideration other fourteen delegations.

Smith

*Dated May 13, p. 262.*
Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

Seoul, May 14, 1954—6 p.m.

1178. Repeated information Tokyo 698, priority Geneva 81. Geneva for Smith USDel; Department for the Secretary; Tokyo pass CINCUNGC. Geneva 74 received too late for appointment President today. Seeing him 11:30 tomorrow at which time plan stress points you suggest and to point out different from previous Plan B in that revision emphasizes broad general plan of elections North and South under UN supervision and leaves details of withdrawal Communist forces to subsequent drafting and offers best possible chance smoking Communists out.

Statements attributed to President in current issues Korean Republic and replies submitted to questions submitted by Reuters’ correspondent indicate rather intransigent attitude President and continuing reversion to general theory armistice was mistake, etcetera.

Reference Geneva 68, second and third sentences. Reasons stated somewhat cryptic and if possible would appreciate amplification.

Reference Geneva 70, believe ROK Geneva delegation encouraging President stand firm, not to make further concessions and that US Geneva delegation concurs unwise to do so until Communists have agreed to UN supervision of elections both North and South.

Therefore think President believes we here are urging on him necessity further concessions which US Geneva delegation do not think necessary.

Reference last sentence Geneva 70 sub-division 1. What are further concessions referred to?

For your information approximately 4,000 polling places all Korea of which about 1,200 in North. In conversation Swedish General Mohn NNSC he believes UNCURK supervision either purely symbolic or would have to set up completely autonomous body several thousand men with own authority and communications system which could function North and South at least month both before and after elections. Even so in view local customs, et cetera, such supervision unlikely be effective in absence prior withdrawal Communist forces. He suggests possibility withdrawal both Chinese Communist and North Korean Communist forces to far North but we regard this as neither practical or acceptable.

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1 Dated May 13, p. 264.
2 Same as telegram Secto 182, May 12, p. 257.
3 Dated May 12, not printed, it summarized the conversation described in Young's memorandum of May 12, p. 256. It was sent to the Department of State as telegram Secto 187 (396.1 GE/5-1254).
Reference our 1155. At our suggestion Taylor, CG Eighth Army, has drafted further military comments and forwarded to Hull for transmittal Defense if approved.

For your own confidential use approximately half divisions on front North demilitarized zone are now North Korean in contrast approximately one-sixth at time armistice signed and movements continue.

Am trying keep situation here fluid as possible.

Dean will stay over until after Wilson visit which ends Seoul May 18.\footnote{Dated May 11, p. 244.}

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BRIGGS
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\footnote{Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson visited several Asian countries in the course of his trip, which dealt basically with questions of regional defense; for documentation, see volume xii.}

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795.00/5-1454: Telegram

\begin{center}
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea\footnote{Also sent to Geneva priority as telegram Tosec 164 and repeated to Tokyo for information as telegram 2532.}
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WASHINGTON, May 14, 1954—6:37 p. m.

923. Geneva’s Secto 200 sent Seoul 74 Tokyo 58.\footnote{Dated May 13, p. 264.} Seoul’s 1178 sent Geneva 81 Tokyo 698.\footnote{Supra.} Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Department assumes Secto 200 represents U.S. delegation’s considered judgment minimum necessary get unanimous consent of 16. Therefore hope Dean can persuade Rhee go along with it.

Possible modification which might help with President Rhee without disturbing rest of 16 too greatly would be add at end first sentence paragraph 3 of proposal, “after UN commission has determined conditions existing in Korea make possible genuinely free elections.”

It could be explained to Rhee “conditions” include problem north Korean forces and UN commission thus given power defer elections until some satisfactory solution reached

Another possibility which would provide further safeguard would be modify paragraph 5 to read “Specific arrangements for withdrawal from Korea of non-Korean forces shall be agreed upon by parties accepting these principles, and withdrawal shall be observed, etc.”. This would ensure ROK participation in consideration specific arrangements and might also help emphasize any discussion withdrawal must come after acceptance principles in earlier paragraphs.
Do not wish confuse issue with drafting changes. Clearly if Rhee will accept principles as given Secto 200 there need be no further changes. However changes suggested above may be useful if Rhee has difficulty with Plan in Secto 200. Geneva comment directly Seoul if considered necessary.

Dulles

396.1 GE/5–1454: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 14, 1954.¹

78. Repeated information Department Secto 211, Tokyo 61. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Re Secto 196,² 200.³

1. After plenary session May 13 Young discussed draft basic proposal with Pyun and ROK delegation. As they were disturbed and even angry over Eden’s five points and especially his fourth point (Secto 203 ⁴), their initial reaction was critical:

(a) Pyun and other delegates objected to phrase “throughout Korea” in first paragraph draft. He said scope of elections should be left unspecified in basic principles. He repeated ROK would agree to general elections in Korea if Chinese Communists withdrew completely from Korea prior such elections;

(b) ROK delegation strongly preferred specific reference to UNCURK instead of to United Nations Commission. Their insistence on this point reflected their deep concern over the vagueness Eden’s proposal for a commission composed of a “panel acceptable to Geneva conference”. ROK delegation interprets Eden’s phraseology possibly include neutrals such as India and Communists United Nations members such as Czechoslovakia and Poland. Pyun and ROK delegates said any such commission totally unacceptable. Young referred to Rhee’s objections to UNCURK as reported by Briggs and Dean. Pyun said he would persuade President insist on UNCURK since its composition satisfactory.

(c) Pyun considered any reference to question withdrawal non-Korean forces, even such vague wording as paragraph 5 draft proposal, should be omitted. Young pointed out impracticability no reference this matter.

ROK delegation reacted negatively to draft proposal in contrast to affirmative reaction draft of plan B. Their initial criticism explained

¹ The file copy indicates no time of transmittal. It was, however, received in Washington at 7:28 p.m. on May 14.
² Dated May 13, p. 261.
³ Same as telegram 74, May 13, from Geneva, p. 264.
⁴ Dated May 13, p. 262.
largely by concern over Eden’s remarks and also Philippine proposal for constitutional convention repeated again in meeting of 16 May 13.

2. Following meeting of working group of 9 on May 14 Pyun told us again present position ROK Government is general elections must be conditioned on prior total withdrawal Chinese Communist forces.

3. Oliver told Young May 14:

(a) Several days ago Rhee sent telegram Pyun suggesting ROK public statement Seoul and Geneva that ROK not opposing general elections but insisting on prior total Chinese Communist withdrawal. Purpose to offset impression in United States press ROK preventing agreement among allies by opposing generalizations. Pyun replied such statement inadvisable because it would create confusion in Geneva and force division among allies; and

(b) He and ROK delegation have discussed proposal for withdrawal bulk but not all foreign forces from Korea prior to elections and he thinks Rhee might be persuaded accept this along with fundamental principles on United Nations supervision and genuinely free elections. Said he would try draft telegram to Rhee on such lines.

SMITH

MAY 15, 1954

396.1 GE/5-1554: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL           PRIORITY          GENEVA, May 15, 1954—3 p. m.

80. Repeated information Department Secto 216, priority Tokyo 63, Seoul for Briggs and Dean, Tokyo pass CINCUNC.

1. Re Tosec 164 repeated Seoul 923 and Tokyo 2532 ^1 USDel concurs two suggestions strengthen text and will insert if they will help negotiations with Rhee.

2. Re Seoul’s 81 to Geneva (to Department 1178 and Tokyo 698 ^2) second sentence Geneva’s 68 ^3 to Seoul based on paragraph three Tedul 52 ^4 repeated information Seoul 907 and Tokyo 2481.

Third sentence Geneva’s 68 (sent Washington Secto 182) refers very tentative idea Chinese Communist troops might be withdrawn to agreed areas of concentration in vicinity ports of entry near Yalu while UNC troops would move to concentration areas near our base ports. Washington views not yet formulated on this. Purpose would be insulate foreign forces from election processes to extent possible and would be under observation and verification UN Commission. This

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^1 Dated May 14, p. 269.
^2 Dated May 14, p. 268.
^3 Same as telegram Secto 182, May 12, p. 257.
^4 Dated May 10, p. 242.
tentative idea could be included within wording paragraph five basic proposal.  

In Secto 200 (sent Seoul 74) or as revised in Tosec 164. Such arrangements would be developed only if Communists accepted basic principles.

3. Re Geneva’s 70 (sent Washington Secto 187) USDel considers draft basic proposal Secto 200 and plan B Secto 149 2 different ideas. Plan B is detailed counter proposal. As long as Communists repudiate UN authority, UN supervision and genuinely free elections so categorically at Geneva, 16 have agreed inadvisable proceed with any detailed plan for peaceful unification Korea, particularly since agreement on such plan not yet possible among allies. On basic issues we can be in solid position and have strong case free world opinion as USDel has noted several telegrams. Presentation detailed counter proposal such as plan B would give Communists chance move from defensive to offensive attack and distortion of secondary issues in any detailed plan rather than fundamental issues. Basic principles on other hand do not represent specific plan or concessions bring about unification, but fundamental requirements free and orderly establishment of unification and independence Korea. If 16 could agree on them, particularly on general elections, set of positive principles thus would present to world single position all 16 and determine whether basis exists for subsequent detailed negotiations. If Communists accept principles, negotiations would be necessary on detailed implementation which would be worked out only with ROK concurrence. However 16 consider Communist rejection basic principles most likely. This would achieve political result here of great value in world wide struggle against Communist bloc.

4. By concessions Pyun seems to mean ROK changing position from proposing elections only in North Korea to accepting general elections with constitutional amendment determine will of people. He also may have in mind some modification ROK position on total withdrawal Chinese Communist forces prior elections.

5. USDel cannot overemphasize importance Rhee’s agreement. It would solidify allied support in many forms for ROK and demonstrate firm unity of 16 which Communists trying to fracture.

Smith

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6 In telegram Tosec 184, May 17, to Geneva, repeated to Seoul as telegram 928, the Department of State Indicated that Defense had rejected the idea of concentration of non-Korean forces in specified areas together with insulation of ROK and North Korean forces along a neutralized zone as being militarily impractical. The Department, therefore, believed that it was inadvisable to go further with the proposal unless developments at Geneva should warrant seeking reconsideration from Defense. (396.1 GE/5-1654)

6 Dated May 13, p. 264.

7 See footnote 3, p. 263.

8 Dated May 8, p. 280.
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

SEOUL, May 15, 1954—4 p.m.

1182. Repeated information Tokyo 700, Geneva 83. Geneva for Smith; Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For the Secretary from Dean. Reference Geneva 73 and 74; sent Department 196, Secto 200, Tokyo 57 and 58; also Department 923, repeated Geneva Tosec 164, Tokyo 2532. Ambassadors Briggs and Dean called on President Rhee, Prime Minister and acting Foreign Minister at 1:30 p.m. Stressed necessity all 15 nations on our side being able unite and present broad statement of general principles and emphasized we could work out details later. Further emphasized very important both world American and Congressional opinion we stand together at Geneva in order be able fulfill our commitments elsewhere in world and carry out appropriate overall survey ROK army now under discussion. After going over Geneva 74 draft and suggested changes contained Department 923 explained, we prefer 74 text but that Secretary considered unanimous agreement on general principles very important and so were prepared agree to these changes if satisfactory to President. President read draft and riders carefully and we explained general theory and emphasized ROK one of parties. Very little discussion; President very amiable. Said would study and let us know. President occupied all morning US Armed Forces Day. Do not believe they had as yet time digest contents Pyun's report transmitted Geneva 76. In presenting matter stressed urgent desirability of immediate agreement on principles so that they can be submitted Geneva soonest.

BRIGGS

1 Dated May 13, p. 261.
2 Dated May 13, p. 264.
3 Dated May 14, p. 269.
4 This reference is apparently in error; no copy of a telegram 76 from Geneva to Seoul has been found in Department of State files. Possibly, the allusion is to the conversation with Pyun covered in telegram 78, May 14, from Geneva, p. 270.

The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 15, 1954—8 p.m.

82. Repeated information Department Secto 222, Tokyo 64. Tokyo pass CINCUNC.

1. Robertson and Young had long discussion with Pyun and Republic of Korea delegation Saturday afternoon regarding draft basic

1 May 15.
proposals (Secto 200\textsuperscript{2}). Pyun gave us 14-point draft proposal for establishment United Independent Democratic Korea drafted by Republic of Korean delegation. Republic of Korean draft much more detailed than envisaged by meeting of 16 on May 13 and committee of nine May 14. Points one to nine contained in points one to four, Secto 200.

2. Question at issue is withdrawal foreign forces. Republic of Korean draft proposed Chinese Communist troops complete withdrawal one month in advance election date, phased withdrawal United Nations forces start before election, but not finish before effective control over entire Korea achieved by Unified Government of Korea, certified by United Nations.

3. Robertson told Pyun and Republic of Korean delegation essential United States and Republic of Korea, in accordance with understanding reached in committee of nine, be ready next few days if possible with common United States-Republic of Korean draft proposal general principles. Pointed out paragraphs on withdrawal would prevent agreement among 16. Told Republic of Korean delegation we would study their draft. UNCURK problem not mentioned by Republic of Koreans, nor United States during conversation.

4. Informed Republic of Korean delegation substance Seoul’s 83 to Geneva, repeated information Department 1182,\textsuperscript{3} Tokyo 700. Robertson again stressed urgent desirability agreement among 16 on common principles, along lines Secto 216, sent Seoul 80.\textsuperscript{4}

Smith

\textsuperscript{2} Same as telegram 74, May 13, p. 264.
\textsuperscript{3} Supra.
\textsuperscript{4} Dated May 15, p. 271.

MAY 16, 1954

705.00/5-1654 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY Seoul, May 16, 1954—2 p. m.

85. Repeated information Department 1185, Tokyo 702. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For Smith from Dean. Sent following letter by hand to President Rhee early this morning in effort get them off dead center and not wait outcome May 20 elections or Van Fleet mission.

"In the proposed draft statement of principles I handed you yesterday you will note the words in paragraph 3 ‘by the United Nations (or UNCURK)’.

"In one of our earlier conversations you will recall you objected to supervision by UNCURK so I suggested to Geneva, in order to meet
your views, the use of some phrase such as 'United Nations or an appropriate committee or commission thereof.'

As you know the existing membership of UNCURK is made up of representatives from Australia, Chile, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and Turkey, all of whom constitute members of the free world.

If we get away from UNCURK and use another agency of the UN, the Communists or nations somewhat more friendly to them than to us may demand representation.

So in our own interests let's stick to UNCURK.

Nothing in this world is perfect but the draft of principles we left with you Saturday enjoys us to proclaim the free world solidarity against communism and you affirm your moral willingness to let the people of all Korea decide under UNCURK supervision. Further we maintain the ROK constitution and sovereignty, a cardinal article of our faith.

Time is running out. It is important that we issue this statement of principles promptly at Geneva. We can work out the details later.

While I have no authority to make commitments to you with respect to your army or its equipment, it seems to be quite apparent there must be no rupture in the US-ROK relations here or at Geneva if we are to get the most propitious results from the Van Fleet mission when its recommendations are announced at home so you will be in a position to repel any attack within the framework of our mutual defense pact.

And in view of our other commitments against communism in the free world, it is essential we and you have no break with the rest of our allies at Geneva.

As Benjamin Franklin said. 'If we don’t hang together, we will all hang separately.'

'I will be glad to call any time you wish to see me.'

Since drafting letter, Geneva’s 80 (to Department 216)\(^1\) received. Appreciate clarification. Very helpful.

Reference subdivision 5, dispatched letter in attempt to overcome Rhee’s previous irritation at Eden and Philippine suggestions, and his insistence complete withdrawal prior to elections. Local military consider withdrawal toward ports somewhat dubious. Will continue press hard as we dare.

BRIGGS

\(^1\) Dated May 15, p. 271.

MAY 17, 1954

790.00/5–1754 : Telegram

Dean–Briggs–Rhee Meeting, Seoul, May 17, Morning: The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

Seoul, May 17, 1954—8 p. m.

1191. Repeated information Tokyo 705, priority Geneva 89. Tokyo for CINCUNC. For the Secretary from Dean. Geneva for Smith.
Reference Department’s 923\textsuperscript{1} and Geneva’s 74.\textsuperscript{2} After Secretary Defense Wilson and his party left President Rhee this morning Ambassadors Briggs and Dean conferred with President and acting Foreign Minister Cho on a Presidential redraft of the proposal left with President Saturday which redraft Ambassador Dean received from President this morning. Considerable progress made but President insisting members Communist Party and its members shall have no right to vote, new immigrants from China be excluded voting, UNCURK to have no right “to interfere in the elections,” objects to UNCURK making any certification with respect to when unified government has been established, and added clause in which he insists no specific mention of North Korean Government can be made which in effect provides that neither the ROK nor its western and northern Communist neighbors will invade or infiltrate the other or interfere in any way with the internal affairs of the other and in case of a military attack UN parties to the statement of principles shall at once take steps to end the aggression. In modification paragraph 5 suggested in Department’s 923, President changed “non-Korean forces” to “aggressor forces”.

Succeeded this morning in arguing him out of number of points and he suggested we redraft proposal and bring back this afternoon.

After combined group from National War College had called on him, Ambassadors Briggs and Dean again stayed and submitted revised draft substantially in line with draft submitted Saturday except changed his new paragraph to read “ROK and its immediate neighbors shall agree not to invade nor to infiltrate the other and not to interfere in any way with the internal affairs of the other. In case of a military attack the UN parties to these principles shall at once take adequate steps to end the aggression in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter.” Struck out specific exclusion Communist Party and its members and provided right to vote should be in accordance with the appropriate electoral laws and struck out provision UNCURK could not interfere with elections and again provided supervision should be in accordance with appropriate electoral laws.

He took our draft for reading but then launched into exceptionally long criticism of our entire economic aid program, requirement Korea must buy from lowest bidder which in practice often means Japan, failure of Congress to appropriate all money promised, criticism of provisions of proposed power contract with Bechtel organization and tirade against Japan’s actions in connection proposed resumption Korean-Japanese negotiations. (During 3 weeks of negotiations this is first time Rhee has raised issue of aid program.)

\textsuperscript{1} Dated May 14, p. 269.
\textsuperscript{2} Dated May 13, p. 264.
In view urgency getting agreement on declaration of principles, we made no reply his statements but again urged him give prompt consideration draft we left this afternoon and again outlined urgency.

As we left acting Foreign Minister Cho explained President wanted Minister Defense to see revised draft before committing himself.

Will see later this evening. Hope to obtain substantial agreement your draft but it is hard uphill going all the way and won’t be easy.

BRIGGS

396.1 GE/5–1754: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 17, 1954—9 p. m.

83. Repeated information Department Secto 238 Tokyo 66. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Department pass Defense.

1. Afternoon May 17 Young at Robertson’s request met with Pyun and ROK delegation sound them out on making revision, more acceptable to ROK, re language on withdrawal of foreign forces in basic proposal (Secto 200). Young suggested deleting paragraph V and adding language at end paragraph I such as “and with subsequent agreement on withdrawals foreign forces and such disposition of domestic forces as will ensure non-intimidation of the electorate”. Also suggested as alternate following two sentences added end paragraph I: “The holding of full elections will necessitate agreement on withdrawals of foreign forces and such disposition of domestic forces as will ensure non-intimidation of the electorate. Specific arrangements in regard to these forces shall be agreed upon as soon as all parties accept these principles.” Language based on paragraph 2 of Tedul 52 repeated Seoul 907, Tokyo 2481.

2. ROK delegation rejected suggestions as well as paragraph V language. Pyun reiterated ROKs opposed to “ambiguity” on withdrawal question. They insist on explicit provision for complete withdrawal Chinese Communist forces prior elections (see Secto 211, repeated Seoul 78 Tokyo 61). Pyun said his instructions and ROK position so firm on this point he is not free to suggest modifications to Rhee.

3. Pyun said he has about decided at end of week or early next week ask for plenary session present 14-point proposal showed us Saturday afternoon (Secto 222 repeated Seoul 82 Tokyo 64). He and ROK delegation believe ROK must now in plenary make explicit demand

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2 Same as telegram 74, May 13, from Geneva, p. 264.
3 Dated May 10, p. 242.
4 Dated May 14, p. 270.
on Chinese Communist withdrawal question as well as enumerate various points on UN supervision and free elections.

Young pointed out such action by Pyun would be contrary charter of 16 to committee of 9 to formulate general principles and understanding among 14 as well as committee of 9 US and ROK presently engaged in such endeavor. Pyun replied if committee of 9 agrees on set of principles such as US has submitted to ROK, his delegation would disassociate itself completely and publicly, and he would be even more inclined proceed with plenary speech giving his proposal.

4. Pyun and ROK delegation objected strongly any reference to "disposition domestic forces" and insisted that no reference be made to this idea in any draft on withdrawal question. They said it would put ROK forces on par with North Korean forces and would open door for Communists demand dissolution ROK forces.

5. Pyun has received no word from Rhee regarding draft basic proposal, and specifically on generalized language concerning withdrawal foreign forces. Obvious Pyun's reactions on this question based on unchanged instructions. Stumbling block for us with ROK delegation would accept proposal general elections if conditioned on prior withdrawal Chinese Communist forces.

SMITH

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396.1 GE/5-1754: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET

GENEVA, MAY 17, 1954—11 p.m.

84. Repeated information Department Secto 239, Tokyo 67. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Following is text ROK 14 point draft proposal for establishment united independent democratic Korea given us by Pyun Saturday. (See Secto 222 sent Seoul 82.)

1. With view to establishing united, independent and democratic Korea, free elections shall be carried out under UN supervision in accordance with previous UN resolutions thereon.

2. Free elections shall be held in North Korea which has not been accessible to such elections and in South Korea also, provided that majority of the people residing in South Korea wish them.

3. Elections shall be held within 6 months from adoption of this proposal.

4. Before, during and after elections, UN personnel connected with supervision of elections shall have full freedoms of movement, speech, etc. to observe and help create conditions of free atmosphere throughout entire area for election. Local authorities shall give them all possible facilities.

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1 Dated May 15, p. 278.
5. Before, during and after elections candidates, their campaigners and their families shall enjoy full freedom of movement, speech, etc. and other human rights such as are recognized and protected in democratic countries.

6. Elections shall be conducted on the basis of secret ballot and universal adult suffrage.

7. Representation in all-Korea legislature shall be in direct proportion to population of entire Korea.

8. With view to apportioning numbers of representatives in exact proportion to populations in election areas, census shall be taken under UN supervision.

9. All Korea legislature shall be convened in Seoul immediately after elections.

10. Following questions, among others, shall be left to enactments of all Korea legislature:

(a) Whether president of unified Korean Government should be newly elected or not;
(b) Concerning amendments of existing constitution of ROK;
(c) Concerning disbandment of military units.

11. Existing constitution of ROK shall remain effective until it is amended by all Korean legislature.

12. Communist Chinese troops shall complete withdrawal from Korea one month in advance of election date.

13. Phased withdrawal of UN forces from Korea may start before elections, but must not complete (sic) before effective control over entire Korea be achieved by unified government of Korea and certified by UN.

14. Integrity and independence of unified, independent and democratic Korea shall be guaranteed by UN.

SMITH

MAY 18, 1954

3061 GE/5-1854: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 18, 1954—8 p.m.

86. Repeated information Department Secto 250, Tokyo 70, Seoul for Briggs and Dean; Tokyo pass CINCUNC.

1. Robertson and Young had long unproductive talk ROK delegation May 18. While their discussion with US most friendly on personal basis their mood has become brittle, apprehensive and even very antagonistic to UK since Eden’s May 13 speech in plenary on Korea.

2. Pyun reiterated rejection any generalized language on withdrawal question and continued insist on explicit provision prior total withdrawal Chinese Communists before elections in any basic principles. He again informed us he has had no word from Rhee on draft basic proposal.
3. Conversations with ROK delegation May 17 and 18 clearly indicate Pyun has no leeway and adheres to letter Rhee’s instructions last week re total prior Chinese Communist withdrawal. He appears unwilling to suggest to Rhee any changes in ROK position this question. He will not accept proposition that Allies can agree on generalized provision withdrawal foreign forces leaving ROK freedom of action concur or non concur subsequent negotiations on withdrawal and other questions as we pointed out paragraph 3 Secto 216 (repeated Seoul 80, Tokyo 63). Robertson stressed this point over and over again today with still no positive reaction from ROK delegation. Believe this argument could be used with Rhee if you agree.

4. Re Pyun’s 14 points (Secto 239 repeated Seoul 84, Tokyo 67 2), our impression is ROK delegation has not yet transmitted ROK draft to Seoul for Rhee. Robertson told Pyun today we prefer our shorter version which Briggs and Dean discussing with Rhee past few days. We have also studied his 14 points and made some changes which we showed him in the redraft. Chief changes were few editorial revisions paragraphs 1 and 2 conform US draft proposal, deletion paragraph 10 and substitution our paragraph 5 (Secto 200 3) as two sentences for 12 and 13. Pyun and Yang objected to our wording on withdrawal for familiar reasons.

5. Robertson made strong case ROK seemed prefer clear break now with US and other Allies on general principles which Communists most likely reject rather than accept principles in 16-nation endorsement and break some indefinite future date with Communists on withdrawal question should they accept general principles. He stressed again importance US–ROK agreement and 16-nation endorsement single basic proposal on Korea. Also stressed Congressional and public opinion would react sharply if ROKs could not even agree with US and Allies on general principles which might have adverse effect on Congressional consideration appropriations for Korea.

6. Nevertheless Pyun said he saw no harm present ROK point of view inasmuch as other delegations and particularly Eden had done so on their own without concerting with ROK or 16. All ROK delegates joined in bitter attack on Eden and UK. They are obviously smarting over Eden’s speech which we believe cut ground from under progress we had made in developing close collaboration and identity of view with ROK delegation here.

7. ROK delegates are contacting other delegations to support ROK thesis on Communist withdrawal. ROK delegation argues million Chinese Communists in north will allow Communists manipulate Eden’s

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1 Dated May 15, p. 271.
2 Supra.
3 Same as telegram 74, May 13, from Geneva, p. 264.
commission proposal, infiltrate South Korea, cause widespread chaos, overturn free elections for Communists and destroy ROK. (USDel is informed by other sources ROKs have approached Belgians, Canadians, and Netherlands all of whom reacting negatively ROK thesis.) ROK delegation particularly uncommunicative with us on details this matter.

8. Robertson pointed out US and ROK have responsibility report something to committee of nine before taking any unilateral action. ROK delegation agreed with us at least on that.

9. It is apparent ROK delegation is adhering standing instructions and we can expect make no further headway here on question withdrawal foreign forces unless and until Rhee can be persuaded change ROK position.

SMITH

70520.00/5-1854: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation

SECRET  NILACT    SEOUL, May 18, 1954—10 p. m.

93. Sent Department 1202, repeated information Tokyo 710. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For Smith from Dean. President at Wilson review all morning. Sent him revised text statement and pointed out extreme urgency unanimous action at Geneva.

Ambassadors Briggs and Dean saw President Rhee, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, and Acting Foreign Minister Cho for two hours this afternoon. Finally persuaded them to eliminate clause excluding Communist Party and its members from voting by inserting after “candidates” in subdivision 2 “in accordance with the appropriate electoral laws then in effect” and pointed out they could amend electoral law.

They strongly insist on providing for withdrawal Chinese Communist aggressors and North Korean Communist Army and not UN forces. We said must have proposal commanding unanimous agreement and commanding respect at home and not too insulting Communists. President asked if we must please Communists on our side, then why not omit them from statement and if we are sure Communists will not accept why not draft the statement the way we want it.

We pointed out subdivision 4 did not necessarily require phased withdrawal and as ROK is one of parties, they must agree to specific arrangements for withdrawal.

President again offered to agree if I would make secret arrangements to support them in fighting if North Korean army refused to disband and, I of course, refused.
Again carefully reviewed all arguments and President said they would give the statement thoughtful consideration.

Tried best sell absolute necessity for action today, but President obdurate. Said morale commonwealth forces bad which was affecting morale of Korean forces and they had better go home.

Following is the text with corrections we left with them today. Took their changes insofar as not affecting substance.

"1. In conformity with the UN resolutions on the question of Korean unification and independence, the unification of Korea under a single democratic and independent government for all of Korea shall be achieved by the people of Korea in free elections throughout Korea to the National Assembly of a unified Korea. These elections shall be held under conditions of genuine freedom and in accordance with the constitutional processes of the Republic of Korea. The Constitution of the Republic of Korea shall remain in effect except as it may be amended or superseded by the action of the National Assembly before the above elections. After the election the Constitution may be amended in accordance with its terms.

"2. The representation in the National Assembly shall be in direct proportion to the indigenous population of all Korea, and shall be based on secret ballot and universal suffrage free of political or other obstacles or discrimination with respect to qualifications for voting or for candidature, in accordance with the appropriate electoral laws then in effect.

"3. In order to fulfill the above requirements effectively and to assure that conditions of freedom exist during elections, in accordance with the appropriate electoral laws then in effect, the UNCURK shall supervise and observe the elections, which shall be held as soon as possible after the UNCURK has determined that conditions existing in Korea make possible genuinely free elections. The UNCURK in accordance with the appropriate electoral laws then in effect shall have full freedom of movement and observation in all areas, with no interference of any kind, and its recommendations and requests for facilities including safe conduct shall be binding on the authorities concerned.

"4. Specific arrangements for withdrawal from Korea of non-Korean forces before the election shall be agreed upon by the parties accepting these principles, and withdrawal shall be observed and verified by the UNCURK in order to ensure that elections are accomplished under conditions of genuine freedom.

"5. The parties accepting these principles shall cooperate in carrying out these proposals, and shall pledge their respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of a unified Korea. The government of the latter shall undertake to abide by the purposes and principles of the UN charter.

"6. UNCURK shall submit its report to the United Nations when the government of a United Korea has been established with effective governmental control over all Korea.

"7. The Republic of Korea and its immediate neighbors shall agree not to invade nor to infiltrate the other, and not to interfere in any way with internal affairs of the other. In case of a military attack, the
UN parties to these principles shall at once take adequate steps to end the aggression in accordance with the principles of the UN charter."

In subdivision 4 we could probably settle for Chinese Communist aggressors and United Nations forces in lieu of "non-Korean forces" although they object violently to putting forces on a parity.

Claim we are asking them to sacrifice principles.

President considers we are somehow binding him to coalition government merely to have unity at Geneva which he considers nonsense. Says British and French will never support us and we had better get on bandwagon with Formosa and Korea and stop diplomatic maneuvering. Also fears by signing this statement he starts a new ninety day period running before he is free to walk out at Geneva.

We are not familiar precisely with what was said to him about any ninety day period at Geneva.

Message follows.

BRIGGS

795.00/5-1854: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation

SECRET NIACI

SEOUL, May 18, 1954—midnight.

94. Sent Department 1208, repeated information Tokyo 711. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For Smith from Dean. Re: My immediately preceding message:

Since drafting foregoing message, Ambassador Dean received following letter dated May 18 from President Rhee:

"Reference is made to our discussion of this afternoon and to the proposals set forth in a secret document submitted to me, dated 18 May 1954.

"As a result of this discussion, it is agreed by the Republic of Korea Government as follows:

"To paragraph 2 of this document, following the words, 'in accordance with appropriate electoral laws' should be added the words 'then in effect' as suggested by you.

"From paragraph 3 after the words 'the UNCURK shall' the words 'supervise and' should be omitted.

"Paragraph 4 is accepted in its entirety. However, it should be understood between our two governments that to safeguard against any future misunderstanding regarding this agreement, this government will exercise its own sovereign rights without any foreign interference in bringing the North Korean Communist Forces or any other subversive elements into submission, by force if necessary before the elections. I would like to receive your agreement to this understanding.
Paragraph 6 is entirely unnecessary and we request its deletion. To all other proposals we agree.

Propose reply expressing gratification his acceptance, subdivision 4 and recognizing that his government is of course sovereign to extent already recognized by UN and our government, and to extent ROK chooses to exercise sovereign authority within its recognized jurisdiction, or extent to which ROK Government agrees to specific arrangement for withdrawal non-Korean forces within terms of paragraph 4 above, that is entirely within ROK's province.

We, on the other hand, are parties to the armistice agreement and are bound by its terms and cannot now be bound by a secret agreement with the ROK which would derogate from our publicly expressed obligations.

In order to be free to agree with ROK on the hoped for augmentation of the ROK army in accordance with the as yet unannounced recommendations of the Van Fleet investigatory mission and be free to introduce new equipment into Korea, we must be legally and appropriately freed from armistice provisions and to that end believe essential to achieve unity at Geneva.

In addition, we cannot agree to any terms which would bind our government beyond the terms of the publicly announced mutual defense pact.

But within these limits, we are gratified he has accepted provisions of subdivision 4 as set forth above and express our appreciation thereof and that consequent freedom to announce this statement of principles at Geneva will redound to our mutual benefit.

While we would much prefer inclusion of subdivision 6, which ROK wishes omitted, nevertheless if now omitted, could its provisions not be worked out later as pragmatic matter?

Reference Geneva's 83. Would hold up further drafting changes there suggested pending further negotiations here. If you deem wise, suggest you advise Pyun hold up 14-point proposal pending result of negotiations here.

Briggs

1 Dated May 17, p. 277.

MAY 19, 1954

795.00/5-1954: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation

SECRET N I A C T

SEOUL, May 19, 1954—3 p.m.

95. Sent Department 1204, repeated information Tokyo 712. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For Smith from Dean. Acting Foreign Minister Cho called early this morning to see if we had received letter from Presi-
dent delivered last night, text of which is in Embtel 94, repeated Secretary of State 1203, Tokyo 711. Ambassadors Briggs and Dean called on President Rhee, Prime Minister, Acting Foreign Minister Cho at 11 a.m. Ambassador Dean delivered to President Rhee following letter:

"My dear Mr. President:

"On behalf of my government permit me to say I am deeply grateful at the very distinct progress we have made in discussing the proposed joint statement of principles.

"In the statement made by you as President of the ROK and John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State of our government, on July 27, 1953, you jointly said:

"There are no other agreements or understandings stated or implied resulting from these consultations other than those herein contained'.

"The 'herein' referred to draft mutual defense treaty between our two governments. That treaty has since been consented to by our Senate and is about to be formally published and ratified between our two governments.

"When Secretary of State Dulles was testifying before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs he was asked if there were any secret agreements or understandings and he repeated the paragraph quoted above. The consent of the US Senate followed.

"We again recognize the inherent sovereignty of the ROK to deal with its own affairs in the territory now under its administrative control or hereafter recognized by our government as lawfully brought under its administrative control.

"In agreeing to the 'specific arrangements for the withdrawal of non-Korean forces' to which you must agree in subdivision 4 of the proposed statement of principles you will, of course, be exercising your own sovereign power, in so agreeing.

"As you know we are a signatory to the armistice agreement of July 27, 1953, and until it is lawfully superseded we must abide by its terms with which you also agreed to [sic] in the joint statement above referred to, to the extent therein set forth.

"We are also a signatory to the 'declaration of the 16 nations' relating to the armistice of July 27, 1953, in which we affirm that if there should be a renewal of armed attack against your government, challenging the principles of the UN, we will be prompt to resist.

"We believe the achievement of unity of Geneva on the basis of the statement of joint principles will enable us to command the respect of the free world and public opinion at home and will enable us promptly to carry into effect the recommendations of the Van Fleet investigation mission now in the Far East to the end that your army will be equipped to repel any attack.

"In addition you will have the mutual defense treaty. As to the elimination of subdivision 6, your government has already been rec-

1 Supra.
ognized by the UN in its declaration of December 12, 1948, as the only sovereign government in Korea. The extension of your administrative control in North Korea will, of course, have to be established to other governments’ satisfaction and subdivision 6’s inclusion is useful, but I leave that to your good judgment.

“I am very sure it will not be in your or our interest to make the further commitment you suggest in your letter of May 18, 1954, but if you will agree promptly to the ROK being a party to the joint statement of principles at Geneva it will greatly encouraged the free world and redound to the joint benefit of our respective governments and permit us jointly to go forward on the tasks envisioned by you and President Eisenhower.

“I again urge the necessity of prompt action as the opportunity for us to act at Geneva may pass from our hands.

“With renewed admiration and respect, I am, Mr. President, Faithfully yours, Arthur H. Dean. Special Ambassador to Korea”.

President Rhee read letter out loud. President in substance said again had to have guarantee of US in secret letter from Ambassador Dean that if he marched north against the North Korean Communist Army after withdrawal of Chinese Communist Army we would support him, or we had to insert “North Korean Communist Army” in subdivision 4 as well as non-Korean forces.

We again explained tremendous advantage our side issuing joint statement of principles promptly and utter impossibility of having any secret agreements or understanding.

President Rhee said Secretary Dulles had assured him among our basic objectives was to bring about united and free Korea. He asked could we honestly and realistically believe we could have free elections in north if Chinese Communist Army remained or that he could ever extend his jurisdiction to north if that Army remained?

We again pointed out what the situation would be if no joint statement issued at Geneva with possible slow disintegration UN forces, grumbling American opinion at lack of unity and difficulty such fact imposed on administration in maintaining ROK Army at appropriate level capable of resisting attack.

President very amicable and reasonable aside from renewed attack on economic aid program and Japanese. He said we were really wasting our time in further discussions unless we were either prepared (a) to bring about withdrawal North Korean Communist Army or (b) back him in a military move.

We again urged him essential necessity his cooperation in order that we could continue our cooperation and continued to emphasize his position made our ability to act much more difficult.
Finally President said he would discuss further with his Cabinet officers and expressed appreciation for the good nature with which the discussions had been conducted on both sides.²

BRIGGS

² The following additional information was imparted in telegram 97 from Seoul to Geneva, also sent to the Department of State as telegram 1206, May 19:

"In description meeting with President Rhee this morning contained Embtel 1204 neglected to state with reference to Rhee's desire delete from paragraph three words 'supervise and', we this morning agreed to this deletion with insertion however of reference to 1950 UNGA resolution. Phrase in question now reads, 'UNCURK shall observe the elections in accordance with UNGA resolution of 7 October 1950, which shall et cetera'." (785.00/5–1954)

386.1 GE/5–1954: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL  PRIORITY  GENEVA, MAY 19, 1954—7 P. M.

87. Repeated priority information Department Secto 256, Tokyo 72. Department pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For Briggs and Dean. Re Seoul's 93 and 94.¹

1. USDel deeply gratified progress your efforts and hopes confirmation Rhee's acceptance will come soon. Russians have been pressing for plenary on Korea today or Thursday ² which we managed stave off. Doubt we can hold off beyond Saturday, possibly not beyond Friday. Urgent have US–ROK final agreement draft basic proposal Friday at latest. Our position on being unable present single proposal backed by 16 is becoming increasingly untenable. Unless we can do so by next plenary, situation likely deteriorate to point where we will have abandon all hope united support for single proposal. World opinion would then say we could not agree with Communists because we could not even agree among ourselves. In meantime, we will hold off further discussions with ROK delegation or others and schedule no meetings committee of 9 or 16 pending confirmation Seoul and Washington on revised text.

2. ROK delegation is so upset by Eden's speech (as noted our previous telegrams), which they interpret as sinister device obtain UN commission similar in composition to NNSC or NNRC, that they may reverse previous recommendations to Rhee. Eden has assured us several times ROK delegation completely misunderstood and misinterpreted his position and that no such inferences should be drawn from his fourth point of May 13 speech in plenary on Korea. Important Rhee understand in view our experience concerning implementation

¹ Both dated May 18, pp. 281 and 283, respectively.
² May 20.
armistice agreements, US would join with ROK in refusing accept any such commission.

3. USDel has following comments on Seoul’s redraft basic proposal:

(a) Last two sentences paragraph 1 seem confuse constitutional action necessary before elections provide for them again in ROK territory and possible constitutional action after elections on amendment or supersession ROK constitution by expanded National Assembly. Suggest ending paragraph after “National Assembly” in next to last sentence, but can take paragraph as is if necessary.

(b) We regret deletion “supervise and” in paragraph 3 because undercuts Allied reiteration in plenary as well as in one restricted session on Korea genuinely free elections require UN supervision. This is what Communists have unequivocally rejected. However, last clause second sentence, paragraph 3, is supervision in effect.

(c) Insertion phrase “before the election” in paragraph 4 concerns USDel. Instead complete ambiguity in timing of withdrawals before and after elections, paragraph can be interpreted only mean 15 UN members committed make specific arrangements for withdrawal all UN forces as well as Chinese Communist forces before elections. If true, appears conflict with present US policy and JCS views favoring retention some UNC forces Korea until after elections. USDel hopes you can still change this key wording by (1) deleting phrase “before elections” and making withdrawal plural so as to not imply total withdrawal or (2) in addition (1) reinserting phrase “and establishment of government of unified Korea”, as in Secto 200, or (3) substituting “the establishment of government of unified Korea” for the words “the election” after “before”. Changes would give us needed flexibility on UN forces remaining Korea after elections and not appear commit US general principle total withdrawal in advance any negotiation on arrangements.

(d) USDel agrees delete paragraph 6. Such report to UN is part commission’s terms reference laid down in resolution October 7, 1950 as well as prior GA resolutions on Korean independence.

4. Re final paragraph Seoul’s 93, if it would help your discussions with Rhee, inform him USDel opposes coalition of any sort with Communists in Korea. This idea of Rhee’s is nonsense. In all meetings here as well as Washington prior Geneva, US Government has strongly supported sole legitimacy and sovereignty of ROK in Korea and necessity maintain constitutional structure ROK state. As we indicated in our 57 to Seoul repeated Secto 140 and 29 to Tokyo our proposed plan B deliberately avoids collaboration between Communist puppets in North and legal sovereign Government of ROK. All safeguards for free elections and representation on basis population should ensure non-Communist results elections precluding any coalition. Same is

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3 Same as telegram 74, May 13, from Geneva, p. 264.
4 Dated May 7, p. 226.
true basic principles. USDel confident Allied delegations here will continue support these views. As far as USDel concerned, ROK agreement basic proposal and presentation with Allied endorsement has nothing to do with any 90-day period. If Rhee signs statement question then is one of discussion in 9 and 16 to obtain their endorsement draft proposal and then its presentation for maximum advantage our side Geneva.

5. Re proposed reply described Seoul’s 94 USDel concurs, subject comments paragraph 3(c) above.

SMITH

795B.00/5-1954: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, May 19, 1954—7:33 p.m.

982. Seoul’s 1202, 1203 and 1204 sent Geneva 93, 94 and 95 and Tokyo 710, 711 and 712. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Language para 4 proposal Seoul’s 1202 clearly implies withdrawal all non-Korean forces before elections. This is not acceptable Defense. See Deptel 902 to Seoul sent Geneva Tosec 107 and Tokyo 2465. Reluctant request Defense reconsideration since still no assurance proposal as whole will be acceptable President Rhee and since both here and in Delegation Geneva considerable doubt exists concerning desirability proposing total withdrawal before elections. Original formulation Secto 200 sent Seoul 74 and Tokyo 58 was blursed in order avoid posing this issue and do not see how can be accepted when phrase “before the election” makes it explicit. Can that phrase be dropped?

As pointed out in Seoul’s reference telegrams, supplementary secret understanding proposed by Rhee is of course completely unacceptable.

Also concerned over deletion “supervise and” in para 3 of proposal since this is major substantive change. Effective UN supervision is essential ingredient which all Allied delegations have emphasized in their speeches and on which our present position rests. Addition of reference to UN resolutions as suggested Seoul’s 1206 sent Geneva 97 and Tokyo 714 does not help since they call only for observation and consultation.

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1 Also sent priority to Geneva as telegram Tosec 213 and repeated to Tokyo as telegram 2566 for information.
2 Dated May 18, p. 281.
3 Dated May 18, p. 258.
4 Dated May 19, p. 284.
5 Dated May 8, p. 234.
6 Dated May 13, p. 264.
7 See footnote 2 to telegram 95, p. 287.
Central issue at moment appears to be question of withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces and disposition North Korean forces. Possibly undesirable raise problem re supervision in para 3 unless some satisfactory formulation can be found for question withdrawal in para 4. However leave this Seoul’s discretion. If Rhee should accept proposed para 4 in Seoul’s 1202 and if Delegation Geneva agrees Department will ask Defense reconsider question total withdrawal before elections. If Rhee and we can agree on some formulation re withdrawal non-Korean forces, perhaps issue re supervision can be handled through drafting discussions at Geneva with subsequent presentation this single issue to Rhee.

We recognize this still leaves issue of North Korean forces unsettled and may therefore not solve Rhee’s problem as clearly stated concluding portions Seoul’s 1204. Nevertheless believe this is problem which we cannot solve and which must be fuzzed over if there is to be agreement among 16 on proposal embodying basic principles for unification.

Department believes it clear 90-day period began on April 26 and knows of no oral or written statement to anybody which would imply new 90-day period starts running with introduction new plan or proposal at Conference.

Dulles

795.00/5-1954 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea

secret priority

WASHINGTON, May 19, 1954—7:33 p.m.

933. Seoul’s 1204 sent Geneva 95 Tokyo 712. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Department concerned about paragraph in Dean letter to Rhee which begins “We believe the achievement of unity at Geneva” and closes “to the end that your army will be equipped to repel any attack”. This paragraph implies that if Rhee accepts statement basic principles for presentation at Geneva US will implement recommendations Van Fleet mission whatever they are. It also implies object buildup ROK forces is enable them repel any attack which goes beyond NSC policy.

You should therefore in some appropriate way correct these statements for record. Defense concurs.

Dulles

1 Repeated for information to Geneva priority as telegram Tosec 214 and to Tokyo as telegram 2567.
2 Dated May 19, p. 284.
SECRET

99. Sent Department 1208; repeated information Tokyo 716. Geneva for Smith; Tokyo for CINCUNC. From Dean. At 5:15 this afternoon, special messenger from Prime Minister’s office left with Ambassador Dean statement in exact form cabled in Embassy telegram 1202 except in subdivision 4 they changed “non-Korean forces” to “all foreign forces including North Korean Armed Forces” and instead of adding “in accordance with the resolution of the UNGA 7 October 1950” as agreed this morning in lieu of “supervise and” in subdivision 3, they added after “observe elections” words “consult regarding them”.

Exact text of letter from Prime Minister to Ambassador Dean follows:

“After consultation with the President and Vice Foreign Minister, I present to you this final copy of the Republic of Korea Government statement of principles.

In paragraph 3, we accept your suggestion that “the UNCURK will observe and consult regarding the elections”. I believe this will be satisfactory to all concerned. If reference to the UN resolution of 7 October 1950 is made, some other questions and discussion may unnecessarily arise.

In paragraph 4, we have inserted the five words, “including North Korean Armed Forces”. We believe that this insertion is essential because the mere absence of foreign forces does not ensure free elections. The withdrawal of “foreign” forces alone does not mean anything to us unless the Communist forces also withdraw from Korea or completely surrender to the Republic of Korea Armed Forces. Under no circumstances can we change this unless there is some clause included whereby we have a guarantee that we are protected against any eventuality resulting from the non-withdrawal of the North Korean Armed Forces.

We will be pleased to sign this document in this form and have it released simultaneously.

Thank you for your cooperation.”

You will note reference of “final copy” and that they cannot change unless a guarantee that they are protected against any eventuality arising from non-withdrawal of North Korean forces is added.

This seems to be stumbling block of substance which they are just unable to surmount. Unless there is some clause we can accept, am afraid this is their final answer and further negotiations futile.

Have hesitated to suggest Rhee must accept existing situation as “fait accompli” until West is in stronger position to move against North Korea for fear we would have explosion and charge of breaking

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1 Same as telegram 93, May 18, p. 281.
Cairo declaration et cetera and string of abusive public statements which would not be very palatable at home following fall of Dien Bien Phu.

We are sending separate cablegram outlining arguments which might possibly be made along these lines but frankly don't believe Rhee will buy at least at this time.

In view delicate balance negotiations, have hesitated suggest any further possibilities without prior approval and text.

Await instructions.

BRIGGS

795.00/5-1954 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

SEOUL, May 19, 1954—10 p. m.

1210. Repeated information Tokyo 718, Geneva 101. Priority for the Secretary and Under Secretary from Dean. With meeting this morning described in Embassy telegram 1204,\(^1\) negotiations with President Rhee appear to revolve about one single apparently unsoluble topic with Rhee continuing demand commitment to support him in march north as price for agreeing to general principles favoring overall elections with prior withdrawal North Korean Communist Army.

In discussing matter with Briggs, we agree only ammunition this far unused, if it be ammunition, is to inform Rhee politely but firmly, that our government does not propose to resume Korean war for purpose unifying Korea. We could state that unification of Korea under Republic of Korea still remains our basic objective and we intend work sincerely toward that objective by every means short of war. This, of course, may mean shorter or longer period during which Korea remains un-united and, in fact, actual unification may have to await some broader settlement between Communist and non-Communist world than settlement limited to Korean Peninsula alone. While we have most profound sympathy for all Rhee's views concerning unification, fact remains to seek it once more by force of arms is not consonant with our present global and strategic responsibilities.

Such presentation, if deemed advisable, might perhaps be accompanied by suitable explanation our Asian strategy and expectations in immediate future, stressing that we shall continue to support Republic of Korea as long as that government really works with us, maintains mutual security pact as insurance against renewed Communist aggression, and seeks to rebuild Republic of Korea economy, as well as to

\(^1\) Same as telegram 95, May 19, p. 284.
assure Republic of Korea military establishment capable of resisting armed aggression, pending arrival United States support.

At some stage of this presentation it might be necessary to describe position of Japan in Far East strategy and necessity for Republic of Korea taking steps toward settlement outstanding difficulties with Japan, though currently this issue and necessity foreign aid purchase in Japan are highly explosive ones with Rhee.

It must be clearly realized that this kind of approach to Rhee without some definite quid pro quo as outlined our 1155,² although perhaps overdue in our discussion with him, will in all probability not be well received at end of over three weeks of daily negotiations, even though it must be made some day. It is outlined here so that you may follow our current thinking, and as possible solution admittedly difficult situation. We really believe, however, Rhee’s fear of Communist infiltration from north is so basic, we must either find some solution, or admit inability obtain agreement.

BRIGGS

² Dated May 11, p. 244.

MAY 20, 1954

795B.00/5–2054 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation

SECRET NIAC T


104. Sent Department 1214, repeated information Tokyo 722. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For Smith from Dean. Assuming Rhee would be willing to issue statement of principles satisfactory to us eliminating added words in subdivision 4 (Seoul 1208)¹ and assuming further Communists were to accept principles, the Chinese Communist armies were to withdraw, free elections are held and UNCURK certifies there is united government for all Korea and then North Korean Communist armies refuse to disband so that ROKs cannot effectively extend their civilian government to north, have we not then stopped ourselves from coming to his aid? For under UN Charter would seem conflict then would be internal problem and not an act of aggression or an international dispute. Or after such theoretical unification would not conflict between South and North Korea alone be a matter of domestic jurisdiction and pursuant Article 2 subdivision 7 therefore outside of UN Charter?

Am assuming, of course, we cannot give guaranty mentioned Prime Minister’s letter (Embtel 1208, repeated Geneva 99) as we would in

¹ Same as telegram 99, May 19, p. 291.
effect be guarantying to rid North Korea of Communist armies. But assuming we are thinking of some such guaranty, wanted to call foregoing your attention.

BRIGGS

396.1 GE/5-2054: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET PRIORITY GENEVA, May 20, 1954—3 p. m.

89. Repeated information Department [Secto] 264, Tokyo 76. For Briggs and Dean. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Department pass Defense. Part I—re Seoul’s 99, sent Department 1208, repeated information Tokyo 716.¹

Note May 19 letter from Prime Minister to Dean proposes simultaneous release statement of principles.

Hope you can impress on President Rhee and Prime Minister on suitable occasion that such release procedure highly undesirable since would diminish impact on world opinion and would evade US–ROK responsibility coordinate with other 14 delegations at Geneva. Proper procedure following US–ROK agreement on statement would be referral to group of nine at Geneva, which would in turn report to meeting of 16, which would then coordinate presentation statement at plenary conference meeting to assure maximum effect.

Part II—re Secto 258, sent Seoul 88, repeated information Tokyo 74.²

At Saturday³ Korean plenary Chou En-lai inscribed to speak first.

SMITH

¹ Dated May 19, p. 291.
² Not printed. It said that there would be a plenary session on Korea on Saturday and that the delegation hoped there would be a meeting of the group of nine on Friday. (396.1 GE/5–1954)
³ May 22.

795B.00/5–1954: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea¹

SECRET NIACt WASHINGTON, May 20, 1954—4:11 p. m.

934. Seoul’s 1208 repeated Geneva 99 Tokyo 716;² Geneva’s Secto 256 sent Seoul 87 Tokyo 72.³ Tokyo pass CINCUNC.

¹ Also sent to Geneva niac as telegram Tosec 219 and repeated to Tokyo for information as telegram 2571.
² Dated May 19, p. 291.
³ Dated May 19, p. 287.
1. Following suggestion may help resolve impasse over question North Korean forces and enable agreement upon principles to present to Conference.

2. Can Rhee be persuaded agree delete all reference explicit or implicit to withdrawal of forces from proposed statement principles Seoul’s 1202 sent Geneva 93 Tokyo 710? 4

3. It would be understood that ROK would agree speak in support proposal as thus modified but could go on to point out difficulties securing free elections so long as aggressor Chinese troops remain in North Korea and so long as North Korean Communist army remains in position influence elections despite any efforts UNCURK can put forth. Emphasis could be on difficulties securing genuinely free elections under such conditions but willingness ROK go ahead with elections which could in fact be free.

4. As an alternative to approval by Rhee of any detailed statement of principles perhaps it might be possible get Rhee send Pyun general instructions authorizing him agree some formulation basic principles along lines already extensively discussed between ROK and US but with complete omission question withdrawal forces on understanding Pyun could speak along lines indicated preceding paragraph and Allied delegations could say it obvious some satisfactory specific arrangements re withdrawal forces must be made in order assure genuinely free elections.

5. If Delegation Geneva considers foregoing course action may possibly meet its problem at Conference it should so notify Seoul niact so Dean and Briggs can approach Rhee along this line.

6. While it seems desirable stick to proposed statement principles already agreed with Rhee except for withdrawal provision Department would have no objection use Pyun 14 point draft contained Secto 239 sent Seoul 84 and Tokyo 67. 5 We do not know whether Rhee has seen it but except for South Korean plebiscite provision paragraph 2 and withdrawal provisions paragraphs 12 and 13 it seems preferable statement principles Seoul’s 1202.

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Dulles

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4 Dated May 18, p. 281.
5 Dated May 17, p. 278.

795.00/5-2054 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIAC 1

SEUL, May 20, 1954—5 p. m.

1216. Repeated information Tokyo 723 and niact Geneva 105. Tokyo pass CINCUNGC. For the Secretary from Dean. Geneva for Smith.
Discussed Embtel 1155 with General Anderson, Commander, Fifth Air Force, who had also discussed with General Taylor. Anderson feels very important we retain air bases in Korea and quite skeptical of wisdom our agreeing to full withdrawal UN forces if that also includes Air in order to obtain only theoretical unification Korea.

At General Anderson’s suggestion mentioned matter to General Partridge, Commander, Far East Air Force[s], Tokyo, and said would be most interesting to have his comments.

General Anderson has furnished us with following comments from General Partridge and authorizes us transmit Department.

"Personal Anderson from Partridge.

"This message in eight parts. Reference last night’s conversation with Dean and you regarding his message to State dated 11 May, his entire dispatch not currently available and I rely on exclusive for Ridgway from Hull dated 13 May for basic provisions upon which to comment.

"Part 1. Based on acceptance of plan B. (a). Agree completely with thought US must deal with overall security program in Far East rather than on bilateral basis, (b). Agree we should tell Rhee where he stands with respect to military and economic aid. . . .

"Part 2. Dispatch mentions military and economic considerations, but program must go far beyond this point. Weight of political and psychological factors is so great that these aspects of US relationships with ROK are primary. Our overall program should be founded on a strong educational plan which as by-product will indoctrinate the young people of Korea in US ideologies.

"Part 3. With respect to rejection of plan B, any thought that we can work out a mutually phased time table involving both the withdrawal of our own troops and those of the Communists is unrealistic. Mention is made also of denouncing the Mutual Defense Pact. It would appear impractical to denounce a pact once it is made. A better course, by far, would be to reject such a pact prior to its promulgation. Since the Koreans provide the only native forces in the Far East ready and willing to fight in support of Western ideals, the latter course certainly should be adopted only as a last resort.

"Part 4. With regard to implementation of a mutual defense pact based on who makes the first attack, the proposed course of action may be a good talking point, but from the military and political point of view, it is difficult to decide upon at the critical moment. At the outset of hostilities, it is extremely difficult to determine which side is actually the aggressor. Although we probably should not tell Rhee so, I feel strongly that we have a moral obligation to support the ROK whenever it gets in trouble and until such time as it is proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the ROK forces are the aggressors. With respect to permitting Rhee to take his choice between cooperating with us under proposed plan B or acting otherwise, it seems highly desirable that we adopt a course of action which will insure South Korean

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1 Dated May 11, p. 244.
support over a long term. In other words, we should avoid pushing Rhee to point of decision between two courses, neither of which is optimum from our point of view.

"Part 5. Agree that important Chinese bombing targets lie from Peiping northward, but feel that paragraph regarding bases for offensive operations against these targets is overdrawn. Our pacts with Korea and Japan must without fail include authority to operate from their bases. Moreover, capacity of Russians to knock out Okinawan bases is doubtful unless atomic weapons are employed in massive attacks. Such enemy action would touch off World War III in which case Air Force is prepared to carry out atomic strikes from other islands of Pacific as situation demands. (a) Much more important to military position of US in Far East than availability of Korean bases for US air operations is implication of possible use by Communists of air bases in South Korea. Presence of Communist air forces in these fields would jeopardize security of Japanese home islands. (b) Agree with statement that attempt to carry out plan B without ROK cooperation will not seem realistic or convincing and, in fact, believe this is putting the situation too mildly. I fail to see how plan B could be implemented without the fullest cooperation of the ROK's, and, furthermore, without some assistance from the Government of North Korea.

"Part 6. With respect to last paragraph above, and portion of message saying that top military commanders are not up to date on the overall thinking in the Far East, believe time has come to accept down-to-earth position on status quo in Korea. It is my opinion that Korea can be re-united only by force of arms, a course of action Rhee would applaud, but which would raise the most serious objections on the part of our allies as well as the people of the US. Realistically, therefore, we must accept the status quo and work out the best solution possible under existing circumstances. Although it will come as a blow to Rhee, I consider that the only solution is to arrange a mutual defense pact with the ROK, withdraw our military forces from Korea as rapidly as feasible, and leave there only ROK forces. These military forces should have sufficient strength to exert pressure on North Koreans and provide cushion in point of time in which US could come to the aid of South Korea before it is overrun.

"Part 7. US should not attempt to match strength in ground forces with combined North Korean and Chinese Communist armies, but should leave Rhee a ground arm of less than 20 divisions yet capable of executing delaying action against North Korean Army alone. He will not like this suggestion, but to do otherwise invites him to attack northward on his own initiative.

"Part 8. Major emphasis in US effort should be placed on economic, political and psychological stabilization of Korea and on a program of realignment of Korean sympathies toward Japan and its other neighbors outside Communist orbit in Far East rather than on military considerations. This statement is predicated on fact that the military force available to the US is of order of magnitude far exceeding anything previously visualized and that immediate prospect exists for hundred-fold amplification of even this new military power. We
should start on long-term program to cure the causes of our Far East troubles and give this cure the full weight of our effort.

All military commanders here seem to accept view no way actually to unite Korea except by force of arms and coalition government might possibly cost us use of bases in south with army commanders well satisfied about hundred per cent withdrawal ground troops as ROK army reaches strength. ROK Air Force, of course, not equal to North Korean.

BRIGGS

396.1 GE/5-1554 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, May 20, 1954—5:34 p.m.

888. For Secretary Wilson from the Secretary. Re Tokyo’s 2808 repeated Geneva Tosec 170, Seoul 925. Appreciate your valuable suggestion. Have transmitted it Geneva for information US delegation there.

So far as Korea is concerned our present problem is to secure some statement basic principles upon which ROK, US and rest of allied delegations can all agree. There seems little likelihood achieving any political settlement disturbing present status quo on any basis which would be acceptable to us and prevent communist domination all Korea. Nevertheless it may be useful at some point incorporate provision of nature your suggestion in order demonstrate more clearly to world opinion our effort achieve settlement.

DULLES

1 Repeated for information to Geneva as telegram Tosec 220, to Seoul as telegram 935, and to Tokyo as telegram 2576. The file copy indicates that this message was drafted by McClurkin and approved for transmission by Drumright who signed for Dulles.

2 Dated May 15, not printed. In it, Secretary Wilson suggested inclusion in any proposal for unification of Korea of a provision for personal amnesty for all individuals; he indicated that Ambassador Allison agreed with him. (396.1 GE/5-1554)

396.1 GE/5-2054 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY GENEVA, May 20, 1954—6 p.m.

90. Repeated information Department Secto 266, Tokyo 77. For Briggs and Dean; Tokyo pass CINCUNC; Department pass Defense.

1. Morning May 20 Pyun sent us text statement proposes make next plenary. Contains same 14 points transmitted to Seoul in our 84 re-
peated Secto 239 Tokyo 67. Subsequently Robertson and Young met with Pyun and ROK delegation. Explained to Pyun next plenary probably Saturday and that Chou En-lai inscribed. Pyun said he desires present his 14 points as ROK proposal when next plenary held. Indicated proposal not ROK final position and they might accept changes later.

2. Again explained Pyun we regret his insistence making unilateral proposal because we are missing tremendous opportunity formulate and present single proposal all 16 can endorse. Pyun urged USDel endorse his 14 points which we said would be difficult in view his paragraph 12 and 13 on withdrawal although many points acceptable. Made strong efforts persuade Pyun delete proviso in paragraph 2 of his proposal and substitute "in accordance constitutional processes ROK". Pointed out his language not only would be ambiguous to US and free world but also appears ignore ROK constitution, ROK Government and particularly functions National Assembly. ROK delegates seemed convinced this argument but Pyun disinclined make revision presumably because his language conforms with instructions from Rhee regarding plebiscite or special vote whether new elections should be held in South Korea for unification purposes. We still have impression Pyun has not transmitted 14 points to Rhee since Pyun omits reference North Korea forces which Rhee is so emphasizing.

3. Re Seoul's 1208 to Department repeated Geneva 99, Tokyo 716 and Seoul's 1202 to Department repeated Geneva 93 Tokyo 710 USDel would point out Pyun's proposal better than 6 points Rhee has worked out; namely (a) Pyun provides for UN supervision in his first point; (b) requirement UN withdrawal prior elections but instead formulation in his paragraph 13 like US views; (c) no mention of North Korean armed forces; (d) his paragraph 14 simpler than Rhee's last paragraph.

4. We are concerned that if text Pyun's 14 points made available to Rhee, he will instruct Pyun to amend less acceptable form. Therefore, while continuing efforts here obtain minor changes, we inclined accept Pyun's 14 points as best formulation obtainable from ROK at this time. We would hold meeting 16 Friday giving Pyun opportunity present and defend his proposal to group. We estimate most of group will be willing give general support to all except Pyun's points 12 and 13. We would in meeting 16 and private conversations urge others give wide degree support as possible, focusing on points most acceptable to them and remaining silent on others. We would expect give general support by speech in following plenary.

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1 Dated May 17, p. 278.
2 Dated May 19, p. 291.
3 Dated May 18, p. 281.
5. Under circumstances USDel reluctantly sees no alternative for time being but proceed to Pyun’s 14 points in plenary because:

(a) He is wedded to them and determined present proposal in plenary to extent he now refuses make revisions in already mimeographed statement;

(b) Except for paragraphs 12 and 13 proposal4 satisfactory in principle5 and even paragraphs on withdrawal have merit from negotiating point of view of ROKs putting tough position up to Communists, particularly if ROK delegation willing amend position later;

(c) Pyun’s proposals represent some progress and take pressure off USDel and other 14 for making some move on Korea after long delay and as long as US and ROK have not resolved difficult problem withdrawal in 6-point proposal;

(d) Going ahead as outlined paragraph 4 does not preclude also continuing attempt formulation single proposal 16 can endorse and present at a later date. This will take more time in view problem resolving paragraph 4 of 6 points, (Tosec 213 repeated Seoul 932 and Tokyo 25666) and need for other delegations here consult governments when and if US and ROKs table joint proposal in committee of 9 or 16. Also conceivable after Chou’s speech Saturday we may have clearer picture how proceed in general situation.

SMITH

4 At this point, the word “probably” is handwritten on the source text.
5 At this point, the words “majority of Allies” are handwritten on the source text.
6 Dated May 19. p. 289.

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Editorial Note

In telegram Dulite 92, May 20, 6 p. m., from Geneva, Smith transmitted to Secretary Dulles for his eyes only an appraisal of the duration of the Geneva Conference. Most of the message dealt with Indochina; for the complete text, see page 864. The following extract, however, dealt with Korea:

"On Korea there is nothing whatever to be expected from them [the Communists]. Dean’s latest message indicates that it will be impossible to produce proposals agreed to by all 16. Best we can hope to do is avoid open opposition by our side when Pyun produces his 14 points. Others of the 16 will possibly then present proposals of their own or speak in support of Eden’s points. We will continue, and try to induce others to continue, to hammer as hard as possible on repudiation by all Communist delegations of authority and moral force of United Nations. World public opinion seems becoming conditioned to negative results. Unless something unexpected happens the Korea phase will drag along with an occasional plenary session while Indochina discussions go on." (396.1 GE/5-2054)
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET   PRIORITY   SEOUL, May 20, 1954—8 p.m.

1217. Priority Geneva 106, repeated information priority Tokyo 724. Re Deptel 933, repeated Geneva Tosec 214, Tokyo 2567. Following letter sent today to President Rhee from Dean:

"With respect to my letter to you dated May 19 I have been requested by my government to advise you of a fact, of which I am sure you are well aware; i.e., that recommendations of Van Fleet investigation mission now in Far East will of course have to be approved by my government in Washington before they can be put into effect.

"I have been further asked to advise you that while we of course with your cooperation hope to train and equip ROK Army so that in event of an attack it can hold enemy until such time as US forces pursuant to terms of mutual defense pact can come to your aid, nevertheless use of phrase in my letter of May 19 'to end that your army will be equipped to repel any attack' is too broad.

"I am sure you understood use of these phases in light of our general conversations but in accordance with my further instructions from Washington and in order that there may be no confusion about matter I am taking this opportunity to make matter clear."

BRIGGS

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1 Dated May 19, p. 290.

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET   PRIORITY   SEOUL, May 20, 1954—10 p.m.

1219. Priority Geneva 108, repeated information priority Tokyo 726. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. From Dean. Reference Geneva 87, repeated Department Secto 256, Tokyo 72, Subdivision 3a. Under existing ROK constitution elections being held today to National Assembly are for 4-year term. President Rhee insists if we are going to have new north and south elections present ROK constitution must be amended before such elections to curtail term of currently successful candidates and then after elections constitution can of course be amended by its terms in order to permit Assemblymen from north and from south to choose appropriate form of government by constitutional process within framework ROK constitution. Since he was adamant about inclusion of words "before the above elections" at end of penultimate sentence in paragraph one, obtained his permission insert last sentence.

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1 Dated May 19, p. 287.
Reference subdivision 35 we only agreed delete "supervise and" when President agreed insertion "in accordance UNGA resolution 7 October, 1950" which agreed upon change later yesterday deleted in letter from Prime Minister quoted Embtel 99, repeated Department 1208, Tokyo 716.²

No matter what we say President adamant there must not be a single Communist soldier in North Korea at time elections are held. When discussing our draft statement principles which provided for withdrawal only Chinese Communists, pointed out to him on numerous occasions his insistence such complete withdrawal would also require UN forces complete withdrawal before elections which was contrary to our wishes. His consistently repeated answer is that since UN forces were invited and Communists are aggressors and since we expect Communists to reject statement, why are we compelled to agreed phased withdrawal our forces and not just demand withdrawal Chinese Communist forces? Not only is there nothing we can say on this question which seems convince him but for some reason assuming ROK armies are built up he looks forward to withdrawal of UN forces, perhaps for reason that he will then be free to march north. It is becoming more and more difficult to carry on reasoned discussions with him on this and related issues.

Reference subdivision 4, have made arguments therein set forth many times. Reference Geneva 86⁴ have made arguments outlined to subdivision 5 in carefully reasoned way several times with Rhee and went over whole matter yesterday pointing out extreme difficulty he would face even with build-up ROK army if he did not have continuous pipeline to US and that without it he probably would be defeated by North Koreans alone in several months. Have also repeatedly made arguments Geneva 86 subdivision 3 with same results you describe. In passing, this particular provision worries General Taylor on ground it may give Rhee veto power over withdrawal of our forces which has already been determined upon by JCS even without phased withdrawal Chinese Communists.

Fully realize utmost importance unanimous declaration at Geneva but for your information, in reviewing situation separately with Generals Taylor, Partridge and Anderson they each wonder whether advantage joint declaration at Geneva, if accepted by Communists, may not be unduly restricting our freedom military movements and whether would not be better retain such freedom and accept proposition that Korea cannot be united except by force of arms and do best we can with South Korea as presently constituted.

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² Dated May 19, p. 291.
³ Dated May 18, p. 279.
Deem wise not to approach President until receive instructions as requested Embtel 99. We have feeling confirmed by Prime Minister's letter President is holding out for definite commitment from us which we have no authority to make.

Briggs

MAY 21, 1954

396.1 GE/5-2154 : Telegram
Smith—Robertson—Pyun Meeting, Geneva, May 21, 9:45 a.m.:  

The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET NIACI

GENEVA, May 21, 1954—4 p.m.

92. Repeated information Department Secto 276, Tokyo 78. For Briggs and Dean. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Department pass Defense.

1. Before meeting of 16 this morning Smith and Pyun discussed and agreed on handling of meeting and Pyun's presentation his 14 points. Smith and Robertson strongly urged Pyun amend his second point along lines our paragraph 2, telegram 90 to Seoul, Secto 266, Tokyo 77. Pyun agreed ask instructions delete language after "also" and insert "in accordance with the constitutional processes of the ROK".

2. His request to Rhee presumably encoded in USDel's 91 to Seoul.

3. Several speakers in meeting of 16 for same reasons also urged same suggestion re second point and urged Pyun get approval from Rhee and revise point before he makes speech Saturday. Except for points 12 and 13, US and other 14 find second point only real difficulty in Pyun's proposal. If Rhee approves Pyun's suggested change above, Allies will be able give general support all Pyun's points but 12 and 13 on which they still have reservations and need time consult home governments.

4. Accordingly urgent have favorable Rhee reply before Pyun makes speech so he can change second point. USDel would appreciate speedy processing telegram 91 to Seoul and any reply to Pyun if that could come back by State channels niact if ROK Government so desired and mentions this matter to you. Suggest might be useful in your discretion you deliver encoded text in our 91 personally to Acting Foreign Minister Cho with whatever use of above points you feel advisable recognizing delicacy referring to private communication

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1 A memorandum from Johnson to Smith, not printed, dated May 21, indicated that Pyun's appointment with Smith was set for approximately 9:45 a.m. (795.00/5-2154).
2 Dated May 20, p. 298.
3 Not printed.
4 See infra.
5 May 22.
between Pyun and Rhee and possibility Rhee may not have full text 14
points. However in view importance this matter USDel hopes dead-
line noon Saturday Geneva time can be met if Rhee’s response
favorable.*

SMITH

*The following message was sent niact to Geneva for Smith from Dean in tele-
gram 16 from Tokyo, also sent to the Department of State as telegram 2882,
May 22:

“Your 92 to Seoul reached us Tokyo. Pursuant suggestion your 90 did not show
or discuss Pyun’s 14 points with Rhee. Since Rhee has always insisted on plebiscite
believe might be better rely on Pyun’s direct request, but would make abundantly
clear you are not accepting 12 and 13. If Pyun’s statement put forward and
Communists don’t just reject, gives you basis further modification.
“Briggs returning Seoul Sunday. Dean leaves late Sunday afternoon for Wash-
ington.” (396.1 GE/5-2254)

396.1 GE/5-2154: Telegram

Sixth Meeting of the Heads of the 16 Allied Delegations, Geneva,
May 21, 10:40 a.m.: The United States Delegation to the Depart-
ment of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY GENEVA, May 21, 1954—7 p.m.

Secto 277. Repeated information Tokyo 79, priority Seoul 93,
London 196, Paris 314, Moscow unnumbered. Department pass De-
fense; Tokyo pass CINCUNC.

1. Sixth meeting of chief Allied delegations held this morning at
Palais with Kural presiding, was devoted entirely to consideration sub-
stance and tactics of Republic of Korea 14-point proposal (contained
to [in] Seoul 84, repeated information Secto 239, Tokyo 67) which
Pyun plans present plenary tomorrow and which he circulated at to-
day’s meeting. Generally cordial atmosphere prevailed. All delega-
tions, except Philippines recognized that Republic of Korea proposal
best obtainable under circumstances, in view Pyun determination to
speak tomorrow. No delegation ready to give wholehearted support
Pyun proposal because of language in point two, requiring South Ko-
rean referendum approving election principle (to Seoul 92, repeated
information Secto 276, Tokyo 78) and obvious difficulty all have with
points 12 and 13 regarding total withdrawal only Chinese Commu-
nists troops before election. However, general consensus was that
Republic of Korea proposal was far better than one presented by

1 A set of minutes of this meeting (AD Verb Min/6) from which the time of the
meeting is taken is in FE files, lot 60 D 330, box 14824. The meeting adjourned at
12:25 p.m.

2 Dated May 17, p. 278.

*Supra.
North Koreans because Republic of Korea had agreed to principle of all-Korean election.

2. General agreement reached on Pearson (Canada) proposal that:

(a) Republic of Korea make clear that it was presenting proposal only in own name with understanding none of 16 would take exception to any points at tomorrow’s plenary.

(b) Next week members of 16 could indicate general support Republic of Korea proposal while possibly recommending certain changes in detail.

(c) If Communists showed any willingness negotiate, consideration should be given next week either to (1) proposing in plenary that Republic of Korea 14-point proposal and North Korean proposal be referred to subcommittee of plenary where possibly 16-nation agreement could be reached, or (2) continuing efforts to get agreement among 16 for general proposal which would be presented in plenary without necessitating use of subcommittee.

3. Smith opened meeting by saying that the Republic of Korea felt it necessary to present some proposal at plenary on Korea tomorrow, since Chou En-lai inscribed to speak and since other delegations our side had put forward proposals. Added that Republic of Korea proposal would be presented without prejudice to formulation of set of general principles in future on which 16 could agree. Smith said that in general Republic of Korea principles seemed to recommend themselves to us and that we planned give them general support at the first plenary after Saturday’s. Although we had some reservation as to language on withdrawal of forces, we saw certain merit in proposing withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces first as negotiating tactic.

4. Pyun made a good presentation his proposal pointing out he was restricted by his instructions, but had attempted to develop his proposal within the broad general framework previously accepted by 16. During ensuing discussion, all delegations focused on point two proviso that elections could be held in South Korea “providing that the majority of the people residing in South Korea wished them” and on language in points 12 and 13 requiring total withdrawal of Chinese Communist troops prior to elections. In connection with point two, Pearson, supported by Eden, felt that some better phrase might be worked out which would not leave impression that Republic of Korea was still maintaining built-in veto over election proposal. Smith explained we had suggested alternate phrase “in accordance with constitutional processes of Republic of Korea” be used and that Pyun had agreed to ask for instructions. Pyun, after emphasizing the Con-

*Twelfth Plenary Session held May 28; see telegram Secto 337, May 28, p. 322.*
stitutional problem for Republic of Korea, confirmed he had agreed
to substitute wording suggested by Smith and that he had cabled
Rhee for authority to use suggested language tomorrow.

5. During discussion withdrawal question Pearson, supported by
Eden and Acikalin (Turkey) stressed importance of trying to modify
language regarding withdrawal to prevent Communists from being
in position to reject proposal flatly. Eden said frankly was unhappy
with two points as presently written, since hoped would be in position
to talk about phased withdrawal on both sides, thus maintaining strong
propaganda position. Zuleta (Colombia) proposed that since all
delegations were agreed on Pyun's points one through eleven (assum-
ing point two amended), Pyun should propose only those points, ex-
cluding all reference to withdrawal of troops. Pyun replied that
Republic of Korea agreement on all-Korean elections premised on:
(1) requirement that Republic of Korea Constitution be adhered to,
and (2) agreement that Chinese Communist troops be withdrawn first.
Smith, while agreeing with Eden that we would have preferred
language referring to phased withdrawal of forces on both sides, said
fact remained that Pyun desired to speak tomorrow and could not
delete present withdrawal language without specific authorization of
his government. Stressed importance that withdrawal not distract us
from upholding principle of United Nations authority, and free elec-
tions based on representation proportionate to population.

6. Garcia, (Philippines) maintained interrogatory attitude through-
out meeting, closely questioned Pyun on details of his proposal and
contended that Pyun’s unilateral presentation proposal was contrary
to the earlier agreement by 16, that effort be made to put forward an
agreed 16-nation proposal. Recommended that Pyun postpone state-
ment until 16 reached agreement, but obtained no support this posi-
tion. (Obvious Garcia considerably rankled because we talked him out
of presenting earlier Philippine proposal and also because he himself
had hoped to be one to put forward an agreed 16-nations proposal.)

Smith

795B.00/5—2154 : Telegram

Dean–Briggs–Rhee Meeting, Seoul, May 21, 2:30 p.m.: The
Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT

1226. Repeated information Tokyo 728, niatc Geneva 111. Tokyo
pass CINCUNC. For the Secretary from Dean. Geneva for Smith.
Reference Deptels 932, 933, 934, and Geneva’s 84, 87, 89 and 90. Ambassadors Briggs and Dean called on President Rhee, Prime Minister and Acting Foreign Minister Cho at 2:30 p.m.

We tried to get President Rhee change subdivision 4 of draft statement principles to read as follows: “Before the elections specific arrangements for withdrawal from Korea of non-Korean forces shall be agreed upon by the parties accepting these principles, and withdrawal shall be observed and verified by the UNCURK in order ensure that elections are accomplished under conditions of genuine freedom”.

Thought this would accomplish purpose Deptel 932. Emphasized to President with this proposed language that before elections were held ROK as one of the parties would have to be satisfied with the specific arrangements.

President replied that he had given matter great thought and would never under any circumstances be satisfied unless we stated in so many words that (a) all the Chinese Communist armies had to be withdrawn from Korea before the elections and (b) North Korean Communist army would either have to withdraw or surrender before election. We emphasized this was not in our mutual best interests.

Reviewed again that we were missing unique opportunity at Geneva to formulate and present before the world single proposal all 16 Allies could endorse in order to command world respect, retain Allied unity, put onus on Communists, win American public opinion and congressional support for economic aid program, and Van Fleet proposals. Pointed out Communists were gleeful at division among Allies at Geneva.

Further emphasized by agreeing on principles ROK had complete details in their control and by refusing they were risking lack of unity with US which might have serious repercussions at home whereas if they accept principles break with Communists could come in course of negotiations on details and power to break lies with ROK Government.

President stressed the fact he was afraid US was losing battle against communism. had already lost China and was in process of losing not only Indochina but all Southeast Asia and that he was not prepared to accept idea that Korea must remain divided. Insisted time to fight in North Korea was now.

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1 Dated May 19, p. 289.
2 Dated May 19, p. 290.
3 Dated May 20, p. 294.
4 Dated May 17, p. 278.
5 Dated May 19, p. 287.
6 Dated May 20, p. 294.
7 Dated May 20, p. 298.
We pointed out proposed strengthening of ROK army and proposed withdrawal UN forces would mean greater mobility and add greater strength to our military power and with military pact would enable us help them better than if we stayed and did not build up ROK army.

President insisted he would never permit elections while any Communists remained in country.

Outlined in forceful terms as we dared without making any threats disastrous consequences of President’s stand and offered to add in subdivision 4 after “non-Korean forces” following words “and for the restoration of peaceful conditions in North Korea” pointing out that before elections could be held this gave him right to have voice in what conditions in North Korea must actually be before elections could be held.

President again insisted that this would postpone matters for many months, insisted conditions were deteriorating in north and again begged me to support him in march north and use personal influence to get him necessary arms and ammunition required.

We flatly declined. Told him such course would spell his defeat and even if he were victorious would take many months or years to win.

President definitely promised not to go beyond the Yalu but told him such course was utterly out of question and complete folly on his part.

Rhee was exceptionally pleasant, cordial and philosophical and when Ambassador Dean informed him he was leaving for home tomorrow, President expressed great regrets and thanked him for cordial and constructive conversations and understanding heart.

Ambassador Dean again made strong plea for cooperation now and expressed his complete confidence US ability to win war against communism and its ability to work in close harmony with staunch Allies such as Korea, but President said he had made decision and could not in good conscience accede to Ambassador Dean’s request.

Ambassador Dean then urged he permit Foreign Minister Pyun to support at Geneva statement of principles without any provision on withdrawal but to outline conditions essential for free elections but President said it was essentially the same thing.

Did not mention Pyun’s 14 points in view Geneva’s 90.

In view President’s very firm and unyielding attitude seemed clear to both of us that further discussions would be unproductive and that President was holding out for some commitment, we did not have, so at 4:30 p.m. we said cordial goodbyes to President and Mrs. Rhee and Cabinet Officers present and President expressed regret at departure, wish for early return, et cetera.
Sincerely sorry could not influence him. His stand has noticeably hardened since fall of Dien Bien Phu and he constantly wonders if USA is on winning side.

Dean leaving for Tokyo 8:30 Saturday morning.

BRIGGS

MAY 22, 1954

396.1 GE/5-2254: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, May 22, 1954—11 a. m.


1. Re Tosec 213 sent Seoul 932 repeated information Tokyo 2566:¹ We feel Defense reconsideration of question total withdrawal before elections not desirable. In view third paragraph Seoul’s 108 to Geneva. repeated Department 1219 and Tokyo 726,² we are uncertain this would further help persuade Rhee amend paragraph four or assist in getting ROK deletion in paragraph four reference to North Korean forces. Also see no need consider total simultaneous withdrawal both Chinese and UN forces before Communists give any evidence intention negotiate and agree on unification proposals acceptable to US. ROK and Allies.

2. Re Tosec 219, repeated Seoul 934 Tokyo 2571:³ Believe suggestion may be overtaken by events particularly after Pyun makes points 12 and 13 of his 14. Colombian representative suggested it in meeting of 16 today,⁴ but Pyun rejected it. USDel has been examining same idea paragraph two reference telegram for some time and has mentioned it informally to certain members other delegations. Consensus has been omission in presentation plenary any reference withdrawal would probably flag problem and likely Communists would focus attack on omission to sidestep issue UN and free elections. Generalized language such as Secto 200⁵ would deprive Communists this advantage. Most other delegations have mentioned withdrawal in plenary speeches. However, in view probable difficulty resolving impasse with Rhee despite great efforts Seoul, see no objections trying it out on Rhee in discretion Embassy. Conceivable Korean sessions might develop in

¹ Dated May 19, p. 289.
² Dated May 20, p. 301.
³ Dated May 20, p. 294.
⁴ Reference is to the meeting of the 16 held on May 21; see telegram Secto 277, May 21, p. 304; there was no meeting on May 22.
⁵ Same as telegram 74, May 13, from Geneva, p. 264.
such way desirable and possible 16 nations later present single final proposal minus withdrawal paragraph. Another possibility is later work out among 16 generalized substitute for Pyun's points 12 and 13.

Smith

396.1 GE/5-2254 : Telegram
Eleventh Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, May 22, 3:03 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL


Secto 286. Repeated information Seoul 96, Tokyo 82, London 203, Paris 318, Moscow 81. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Department pass Defense. Eleventh Korean plenary with Molotov in chair opened with speech by Chou En-lai,² most significant aspect of which was proposal, later supported by Nam Il, that all-Korean elections be supervised by Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Chou proposed following "supplement" to Article I of Nam Il's April 27 proposals:

"In order to assist the all-Korean Commission in holding all-Korean elections in accordance with the all-Korean electoral law, in free conditions which preclude foreign intervention, a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission be formed to supervise the all-Korean elections."

In putting forward proposal, Chou acknowledged that war had "left deep scars upon relationship between North and South Korea" and consequently "necessary that neutral organization be set up to render assistance to Korean machinery in charge of holding all-Korean elections". Rejecting United Nations as supervising agency because "a belligerent", Chou said "neutral organization should be composed representatives from neutral nations to be agreed upon by Conference, that did not participate in Korean war".

After submitting foregoing proposal Chou concluded speech by drawing attention his proposal of May 3 on non-repatriation prisoners of war, again asking Conference give it serious consideration since question of prisoners of war "can not be considered closed".

In opening part of speech, Chou replied various attacks on his previous statements, particularly those relating Asian aspirations, attitude toward United Nations, and North Korean proposals. Reacting sharply to speeches by other delegations criticizing his pretentions speak for Asians, Chou denied Chinese Communists claim monopoly

² A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/11) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3:02 p.m. and adjourned at 6:19 p.m. This message was transmitted in two sections.

³ The text is printed in Cmd. 9186, pp. 54-58.
as “champions national aspirations in Asia”, but at same time attacked “delegates of some Asian States” who “sang praises of United States aggression”, claiming they constitute tiny fraction of minority among Asians. Said this “handful of people” typified by Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee cliques. Chou alleged overwhelming majority Asians would never agree Colonial policy United States aggressors and still less formulation military blocs using “Asians fight Asians”.

Calling Nam II proposals “reasonable beyond dispute”, Chou again stated they should serve as basis for reaching agreement and warned that continued insistence, or “illegal” United Nations Korean resolutions at Conference “will not be able to settle anything”. Referring to criticism that Chinese Communist denunciation United Nations, Korean resolutions and request to join United Nations, self-contradictory, Chou then made definite in statement Peiping’s attitude on its admission to United Nations: “The question is not that the People’s Republic of China asks to join the United Nations, but that the right which the People’s Republic of China should have to participate in United Nations has been deprived and hence the rightful place of People’s Republic of China in United Nations should be restored”. Claiming such deprivation of People’s Republic of China “rights” constituted “flagrant violation United Nations Charter and seriously damaged vestige of United Nations”, Chou indicated People’s Republic of China absence made United Nations Korean resolution illegal and rendered United Nations incapable dealing with Korean question. He cited Colombo powers as supporting Peiping’s seating in United Nations.

Turning to procedure for unifying Korea, Chou said “not impossible find common ground” and that he had not heard opposition to principle question of unification should be settled by Koreans themselves. He again called for withdrawal of all foreign forces prior elections and within “specified period of time”, alleging presence United States troops Korea “not only threatens peace in Korea and security of China, but will inevitably lead interference in Korean domestic affairs”.

Referring next to criticism of all-Korean Commission proposed by Nam II, Chou said same delegates “utilized principle of proportional representation to oppose principle of mutual agreement between two sides”, but this nothing but “attempt impose will of one side on other” and cited Nehru May 18 statement that unity cannot be imposed by one side on another. He said proportional representation problem for

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Reference is to a statement made on that date by Indian Prime Minister Nehru in the Council of States.
electoral law and no question its application to composition all-Korean Commission.

Nam II, who had inscribed shortly before the meeting opened, followed Chou with a long discursive speech apparently intended as general refutation of past Allied speeches, discreditment of Republic of Korea, and endorsement Chou’s new proposal. Speech contained usual themes on illegality of United Nations resolutions, charges that United Nations was under complete domination of United States, and that it was impossible for United Nations to maintain an impartial position on the Korean question, since United Nations was one of the belligerents. Called for a rapid withdrawal of all foreign forces, and demanded right of Koreans to exercise all sovereign rights in internal affairs without outside influence. Alluded briefly as had Chou, to prisoners of war question, saying that over 48,000 prisoners of war, of whom 34,000 were North Korean, still held in South Korea in violation of Armistice Agreement. Contention of Canada and United Kingdom that prisoners of war question already resolved was contrary to facts.

Pointing out that United Kingdom, Australia and Colombia had already called for all-Korean elections, Nam II said that ROKs, being subservient to United States, were afraid to give people opportunity to express their will. Then spun out series of allegations that May twenty ROK election was held under conditions of violence, police persecution, terrorism, et cetera, and cited number of press despatches to prove that both candidates and voters deprived of democratic rights. Followed this with lengthy discourse comparing political, social and economic conditions in North Korea with those in South Korea during which North Korea emerged as land of milk and honey while Rhee’s realm pictured on verge of bankruptcy and starvation.

As clarification of what he contended was distortion of earlier North Korean position on proportional representation, Nam II distinguished between all-Korean commission, which would be composed of equal number representatives North and South Korea with the subsequent all-Korean National Assembly, which would have representation based on population. Opposed proportional representation in electoral commission by saying such an arrangement completely unacceptable because would enable South Korea to impose its demands on North Korea.

In endorsing Chou’s proposal for neutral nations commission for supervision of all-Korean elections, Nam II used rationale that exist-

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*Extracts from Nam II’s speech are printed in The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, pp. 117–123.*
ing tensions between North and South Korea made rapprochement and unification difficult and therefore nothing should be overlooked which might make task of all-Korean commission easier. Recognizing he was on poor wicket because of earlier statements, added that it was understood that the establishment of such international supervision would not violate Communist principle that there be no intervention of "foreign states" into the internal affairs of Korea.

Pyun made relatively short statement directed primarily at refutation of Nam Il's speech and proposal of April 27 and Molotov's supporting statement of May 11. At conclusion, tabled 14-point proposal (contained in Seoul 84, repeated information Secto 239, Tokyo 67*) with last phrase in point two amended, as we had hoped, to read "... in accordance with the constitutional processes of the Republic of Korea." (Pyun informed USDel that Rhee had cabled approval revised wording.)

In statement, Pyun exposed Communist 50-50 electoral commission as device designed to permit infiltration and subversion entire country and pointed out that, while Nam Il proposal contained time limit for withdrawal of foreign forces, it avoided specifying time for elections. Defended UNCURK and US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty and charged that Communist-proposed security guarantee was aimed at communication of entire country. Pyun also charged that Chinese Communists were puppets of Moscow, that there were "tens of thousands" Soviet advisers in Communist China and that ROKs would seriously consider a Soviet guarantee only if USSR ordered Chinese invaders out of North Korea. Answered Molotov's statement that Communist China, as one of 5 great powers, was entitled permanent membership on Security Council, by pointing out that Nationalists still occupied permanent seat and that Communists could not shoot way into United Nations with "guilty hands all red with its victims' blood."

After completion prepared text, Pyun made impressive refutation of Nam Il's charges about May 20 election, emphasizing that: (1) 91 percent of the registered voters turned out for election in which 2,000 candidates were contesting 203 seats; (2) the Liberal Party elected only 131 members of Assembly; (3) two of Rhee's strongest opponents (P. H. Shinicky, Chough Pyong Ok) had won in their districts despite widely-heralded charges of police intervention against them. Ended saying that the world outside the Iron Curtain was content to await

* Dated May 17, p. 278.
UNCURK’s unprejudiced and factual report on election, and challenged Communists to permit similar election under UNCURK’s observation in North Korea.⁷

No definite date for next plenary set.

⁷ UNCURK’s report on the elections is contained in U.N. document A/2711, pp. 7–10. According to the report, the Liberal Party of President Rhee won 115 seats, the DNP 15, two minor parties 3 seats each, and Independents 67. The Liberal Party candidates won 55.3 percent of the total vote, the DNP 7.9 percent, and the Independents and minor parties 36.8 percent.

396.1 GE/5–2254: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

Geneva, May 22, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 280. We have been considering possible alternative methods, and timing, for termination of Korean phase, on assumption continuing impasse.

Method of termination: Delegation continues to believe that at appropriate time Korean phase should be terminated completely and unconditionally. In doing so Allies could make statement of referral problem to UN which in any event would inevitably be considering question, presumably at 9th GA. (Department will recall August 28 Resolution GA already calls for report by Allied side on Geneva Conference.)

Complete break off at Geneva would reflect total lack of agreement and emphasize Commie refusal to accept reasonable proposals. Together with referral to UN it would help maintain UN character of Korean action. It will also contribute to Communist uncertainty re ROK–US military plans concerning Korea. It would avoid giving false impression such as Communists tried to give free Germany that there has been reduction of tension.

Efforts in this direction might get some resistance from Allies, particularly if there has been no agreement on firm Allied proposal on Korea. It may also run into pressure for “second stage” agreements on less than unification such as UK suggested before conference, but there have been no indications as yet of any move in this direction from Allies at Geneva, although Communist statement and Nam Il plan might be interpreted as hinting to some such measures which would formalize the division of Korea.
Prince Wan has suggested to USDel establishing continuing negotiating body, perhaps seven countries (Big Four, ROK, North Korea, Chinese Communists) to resume negotiations whenever prospects improve. USDel believes this has disadvantages chiefly, it might seem to establish “Big Five” machinery (with Korea attached) as quasi-substitute for UN Security Council where Chinese Communists not admitted. ROK would probably not agree such proposal, though Allies might prefer it as softer way of ending Conference, keeping alive hope and forum for negotiation, and perhaps assisting in keeping Rhee from unilateral action.

Timing: Time of break off might be either shortly after Communists reject new Allied proposal (or if none introduced after probable Commies rejection of Eden principles of May 13.) Alternatively, Korea phase can be continued in slow tempo and minor key pending Indochina developments. Prompt termination would please ROK, remove Korean question as factor which Communists might exploit, in timing as well as substance, in connection Indochina negotiations. It would reduce strain on other delegations who have little to do in Geneva and might also sharpen propaganda effect of rejection of reasonable Allied proposal by Commies. Key Allies however will resist termination at least until Indochina phase clarifies, fearing adverse effect on Indochina. Also, from our point of view, if Indochina phase develops in manner not satisfactory to us it might be desirable to have Korean and Indochina phase end together to improve total effect.

Timing of break off should also take into account Van Fleet mission and post-Conference consultations with ROK.

Delegation tends to believe decision on timing should await clearer picture as to how Indochina is going, and developments in Korea.

Department’s comments and guidance requested.

Smith

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*Editorial Note*

On the evening of May 22, following dinner at Molotov’s residence, Smith and Molotov held a long conversation dealing with Indochina and a range of other subjects. Smith reported the meeting to the Department of State in telegram Dulte 101, May 23, from Geneva: for the complete text, see page 895. The portion of the telegram dealing with the Korean phase of the Conference follows.

“I then mentioned Korea, pointing out that discussion in plenary session today had again emphasized deep cleavage and bitterness of feeling between North and South Korea. Molotov agreed and said that this was obviously a matter which would require a great deal of time.
to produce a solution. He thought that political settlement in Korea would come about possibly as a result of some years of living together. I mentioned a recent statement of Nehru’s, saying that while I did not by any means subscribe to most of his statements, his recent one regarding Korea had interested me. Mr. Nehru, I understood, had said, in effect, that he did not expect a political solution for Korea to arise from Geneva conference, but that it might be that some loose association as a result of trading together would, after a period of time, reduce the tension and produce some form of agreement. The interpretation I gave this was, I now understand, a good deal different from what Nehru actually proposed. Molotov repeated that a period of “living together” and some form of commercial or other contact over a period of time might reduce the bitterness and permit some political solution. He obviously expects none here.” (751G.00/5-2354)

MAY 24, 1954

396.1 GE/5-2454: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 24, 1954—2 p. m.

98. Repeated information Department Secto 289, Tokyo 84. For Briggs.

1. Our position has improved on Korea as result ROK proposals. ROK Government and delegation in favorable and advantageous position vis-à-vis free world opinion and allied delegations here. However, USDel is concerned lest Rhee or ROK Government take any action reverse situation.

2. Suggest you let it be known to Rhee and ROK Government ROK proposals well received by allied delegations. They particularly appreciated change authorized by Rhee point 2. Following Pyun’s speech allied delegations viewed ROK proposals generally as useful constructive contribution to conference as basis discussion although still reserved on points 12 and 13. ROK proposals made front page most US Sunday papers with favorable comment.

3. Pyun’s proposals are entirely different from 6-point draft. He and ROK delegation drafted 14 points themselves. We had nothing to do with them. We repeatedly asked Pyun to withhold making them. Instead he went ahead and he rejected changes in 14 points except in point 2. Nevertheless, results better than we dared hope and we can now capitalize better situation than before.

4. Accordingly, USDel arranging for plenary Wednesday \(^1\) and will make strong statement fully supporting ROK proposals and urging their most serious consideration. Urging other delegations do

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\(^1\) May 26. The plenary session was not held until Friday, May 28.
same and now expect short statements from Turkey, Colombia, probably UK and others.²

Smith

²Secretary Dulles responded to this message in telegram 851 to Geneva, May 24, 7:59 p.m., which read as follows:

"For Under Secretary from Secretary. Your Secto 289. Share your satisfaction at ROK proposals and consequent better free world opinion. We plan exchange ratifications Korean Security Treaty Wednesday morning." (396.1 GE/5-2454)

The exchange of ratification, however, did not take place on May 26, but was delayed until Nov. 17, 1954. For related documentation, see volume xv. See also telegram 1247, May 26, from Seoul, p. 319.

MAY 25, 1954

396.1 GE/5-2554

Memorandum by Arthur H. Dean to the Secretary of State ¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 25, 1954.

Reference Secto 280 ² without reference to effect termination of Korea phase might have on Indo-Chinese phase, following would seem to be optimum conditions for termination of Korean phase.

While we were negotiating the Armistice in 1953, JCS decided we no longer needed to maintain bases on the mainland of Asia and that we were quite prepared with or without phased withdrawal Chinese Communists to withdraw our troops in South Korea down to a corps, while at the same time strengthening ROK army so it could hold in event of attack until we could return.

But since then, the problems we face in Indo-China, location of strategic bombing targets north of the Yalu and uncertainty of availability of Japanese bases make essential re-appraisal of JCS's opinion of Korea in spring and summer of 1953.

If we are to accept that there is no practical method of getting Communists to withdraw from North Korea short of resuming hostilities, should we not again review whether our real objective is to obtain withdrawal of Chinese Communists from North Korea in consideration of phased withdrawal UN forces from South Korea or whether we are not prepared to accept fait accompli of divided Korea and to decide to stay or not to stay in South Korea solely in our own discretion without necessity of having to withdraw ground troops or air forces pursuant to some definitive schedule under approval of some commission comparable to NNSC.

In view of our possible entry into the Indo-Chinese situation and in view of current conditions in Japan requiring complete review of con-

¹The source text indicates that the memorandum was dictated and approved in draft by Dean.
²Dated May 22, p. 314.
ditions for use of Japanese bases, and inability without use of force or co-equal phased withdrawal to obtain withdrawal Chinese Communist forces from North Korea, it consequently seems better to recognize, however regrettable, that North and South Korea must remain separated. We must then strengthen ROK forces or at least increase our share of military cost of ROK army operations and enter into program of economic aid designed to alleviate continued severance of North and South Korea.

Assuming allies will agree to a clean-cut break on Korean phase and assuming further Communist rejection Pyun’s proposal, we will have clean-cut method of breaking. The result will in fact give us opportunity of either (a) maintaining military status quo in South Korea indefinitely, or (b) withdrawing ground troops down to a corps in our discretion and maintaining all or part Fifth Air Force in our discretion, without reference to any “phased withdrawal” of our and Chinese Communist armies. Moreover, “phased withdrawal” of Chinese Communist armies does not really solve problem if augmented North Korean Communist armies remain.

If we agree with Prince Wan’s proposal of establishing negotiating body of perhaps seven countries we (a) tend to by-pass the UN, (b) blur the clean-cut nature of Pyun’s proposal and the Communist rejection, (c) afford the Communists a talking point with which to confuse issues and possibly persuade allies to make concessions, and (d) irritate Rhee, possibly leading to South Korean withdrawal from Geneva Conference, thus evidencing lack allied unity.

Against the foregoing we might cite (a) possible inability to get allies to agree to clean-cut break, (b) possible greater publicity value of setting up some continuing body rather than announcing clean-cut break, and (c) greater facilities for airing problem in sixteen than in UN.

After weighing the foregoing, the balance would seem to be in favor of a clean-cut break on the Korean phase and we should therefore attempt to persuade as many of our allies to agree to it as possible. (a) to make the break plausible in world opinion and (b) to get as much support as possible for maintaining the status quo on Korea when the matter comes up in the UN.

Further, we should endeavor to persuade the Swiss and the Swedes to withdraw from the NNSC, and give wide publicity to the futility of the NNSC, thus undercutting the Communist hints that some such allegedly neutral body, rather than the UN, might be acceptable for working out all-Korean election laws, overseeing all-Korea elections, etc. Once the NNSC has been abolished, we should also explore the legal possibility, because of Communist violations, of freeing our-
selves from the restrictions of the armistice, though we have no intention of resuming hostilities.

This series of moves—clean-cut breaking off of the negotiations, abolition of the NNSC, possibly freeing ourselves from the restrictions of the armistice, exchange ratification of the Mutual Defense Treaty, implementation of the Van Fleet mission report—by demonstrating a hard position in the Korean situation may help our bargaining position vis-à-vis Indo-China.

This is my thinking before we hear from the Communists on Wednesday—depending on what they say it may have to be revised.

I am sending copies to FE and UNA requesting they send you their comments.

ARTHUR H. DEAN

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9 See footnote 1, supra.

*No memoranda from the two bureaus mentioned have been found in the Department of State files.

MAY 26, 1954

785.00/5-2654 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY Seoul, May 26, 1954—5 p.m.

1247. Repeated information Tokyo 739, priority Geneva 127, Geneva for USDel. Tokyo for CINCUNC. Department inform Ambassador Dean. Re Embassy telegram 122 to Geneva, repeated Department 1239, Tokyo 734. Following ceremony honoring General Anderson Commanding General Fifth Air Force this morning President Rhee asked me to remain and we had conversation re Geneva developments. In contrast attitude yesterday described reference telegram, President today pessimistic and spoke bitterly of futility of continuing talk with Communists since only way to deal with them is to employ forces. Attitude this morning duplicated during most of Ambassador Dean conversations as reported his telegrams during past few weeks. I told Rhee again of satisfaction USDel with reception Pyun’s May 22 proposals (Geneva telegram 98, repeated Department 289, Tokyo 84) whereupon Rhee, again in contrast attitude yesterday, said that as for unity, that is “only paper proposition among talkers”, and as for Pyun, Rhee had been on point of recalling him from Geneva for fail-

1 Dated May 25, not printed. In it, Briggs said that he had found Rhee in good spirits on May 24 and 25, expressing satisfaction with Pyun’s presentation on May 22. In turn, Briggs told Rhee that the United States appreciated the emendation of point 2 and felt that, despite differences over points 12 and 13, Allied disunity had not developed and the Republic of Korea was in a relatively strong position at Geneva. (033.1100/5-2554)

2 Dated May 24, p. 316.
ure include in 14-point proposal provision covering surrender or withdrawal of North Korean Communists. Rhee said that even if Chinese Communists withdraw unless there is included provision covering North Korean Communists, North Korean territory will be infiltrated with Communists, both Koreans brought in from Manchuria and Chinese disguised as Koreans, with result absolutely impossible hold fair election. Hence President said he wanted us to know he views Pyun’s proposal as something Rhee has accepted “with mental reservations”. However, rather than withdraw ROK delegation from Geneva, which President admitted would have rocked boat, he was taking no action for time being.

I told Rhee that withdrawal ROK delegation would have had deplorable effect particularly at time when ROK proposal apparently receiving gratifying support from our friends and furthermore at time when Communists have not yet expressed themselves regarding it. My impression from this part of conversation is that although Rhee evidently much annoyed when he first read Pyun’s text he unlikely at moment go beyond possible reprimand of his Foreign Minister. (If Rhee had seen text in advance he would unquestionably have changed it to cover North Korean Communists).

President next turned to mutual defense treaty (please see Embassy telegram 95 to Geneva, 1204 to Department, 712 to Tokyo, May 19) informing me of message from ROK Chargé d’Affaires Washington who said State Department preparations now completed for exchange ratifications and promulgation. In this connection Rhee again asked whether it would be possible modify text in two particulars. First a termination clause similar to US-Japan treaty (I assume Article IV although Rhee did not specify) and second “an aggressor clause” which would cover US assistance in ROK military action to eject Communist aggressors from north. After considerable conversation reminiscent Rhee’s efforts obtain secret letter from Dean, Rhee agreed not insist now on second modification. But he declared Korea must have improved termination clause lack of which he described as discrimination.

I pointed out any modification or amendment of treaty would have to follow same Washington procedure as treaty itself including Senate approval and that delay probably until next session would be caused by attempt to modify present already approved text. Also said executive of course not in position guarantee Senate approval.

Rhee then said he desired to have statement from State Department approving desired termination provision and agreeing to recommend such provision to Senate. Rhee asked if I would give him such letter.

\(^3\) *Ante,* p. 284.
and if not would I request one from Secretary Dulles. Whether Rhee plans instruct Chargé d’Affaires to defer exchange ratifications until this point clarified remains to be seen.

I gave Rhee no encouragement Secretary would accept different termination clause, much less Rhee’s proposed “aggressor clause”.

Lastly Rhee brought up question of Ambassador Dean’s last letter to him to which he said he wished reply “for the record” and that he would shortly send me reply with request it be telegraphed Washington. I find letter in question (dated May 20) not previously transmitted Washington. Text in following telegram.4

BRIGGS

4The text of the letter, as transmitted in telegram 1248, read as follows:

“My Dear Mr. President: In Prime Minister’s letter to me dated May 19, 1954, I was sincerely sorry to note you had thought it necessary to add the five words ‘withdrawal of North Korean forces’ in paragraph 4 of proposed statement of general principles.

Our inability to agree on a statement of principles at Geneva will, I believe, have an exceptionally unfavorable effect on public opinion in United States and of Congressional opinion, and be extremely detrimental to the purpose of cooperative effort in working out of an economic aid program and your military forces build-up to combat the Communist menace which we both have in mind.

Faithfully yours, signed Arthur H. Dean, Special Ambassador to Korea”. (795B.5/5-2654)

In telegram 1249, also dated May 26, Ambassador Briggs sent the following further message to the Department of State:

“Inform Ambassador Dean. If we wish to do so I think we can legitimately interpret President’s Rhee’s remarks today re defense treaty (Embtl 1247, repeated Geneva 127, repeated Tokyo 739) as basis for further postponing exchange of ratifications, at least until Rhee has received and considered Secretary’s reply to request for commitment on future amendment of termination clause.” (795.00/5-2654)

MAY 27, 1954

396.1 GE/5-2754: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 27, 1954—8 p. m.

101. Repeated information Department Sector 320, Tokyo 90. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Re Seoul telegram 127, repeated Department 1247. Tokyo 639 [739].1

1. Re Rhee’s views on Pyun, USDel has been emphasizing as much as possible with other delegations and press that 14 points are “ROK” proposals and not Pyun’s proposals. Believe has advantages of avoiding increasing Rhee’s antagonism and making any ROK repudiation 14 points somewhat more difficult.

2. USDel concurs your statement first part second paragraph. Several delegations including Australia and possibly UK planning give

1 Supra.
general support ROK proposals Friday plenary and additional delegations will do so in subsequent plenary. We are using excellent New York Times editorial May 24 “The Korean Proposal” with other delegations here in effort strengthen their position.

3. Re Communist attitudes assume Embassy has received summary or text violent attacks of Pyongyang and Peiping radios on Pyun personally and 14 points. Would be extraordinary for Rhee take any action re his Foreign Minister in face such crude vitriolic Communist attacks.

4. On Friday suggest you inform President Rhee General Smith is speaking on ROK proposals along substantially following lines; if you deem advisable so inform him before statement appears in public:

“USDel has studied proposals which delegate of ROK presented to us last Saturday. We find them clear moderate and reasonable. They are within framework of basic principles which vast majority of us here have publicly endorsed. It seems to USDel that these proposals represent an important and significant act of faith in UN and in genuinely free elections. These are proposals of a nation which conducts its elections under observation of a UN Commission, which has fought with enormous sacrifice and great bravery against aggression, and which has demonstrated its dedication to principles of liberty and freedom.

USDel supports proposals of ROK and recommends their acceptance”.

SMITH

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2May 28.
3On May 31, Ambassador Briggs made the following comment in telegram 1269 from Seoul, repeated to Geneva as telegram 138:

“Reference: Geneva’s 101, repeated Department Secto 320, Tokyo 90. In line with paragraph 4 reference telegram, I have sent President Rhee 2 letters: On May 28, informing him that General Smith would support ROK 14-point proposal and May 30 conveying text of address by General Smith at May 28 plenary. I spent May 29 with Rhee on trip to island off Inchon where he made speech warmly endorsing American aid and supporting allied unity at Geneva. Since details of ROK 14-point proposal not yet under debate at Geneva, I concluded no useful purpose served at present moment by taking up other Geneva questions with President.” (396.1 GE/5-3154)

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MAY 28, 1954

396.1 GE/5-2854: Telegram

Twelfth Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, May 28, 3:03 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, May 28, 1954—10 p.m.

Secto 337. Repeated information Tokyo 98, London 220, Moscow 95, Paris 353, Seoul 103. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Department pass

1A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/12) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3:03 p.m. and adjourned at 5:30 p.m.
Defense. Twelfth Korean plenary May 28, Eden presiding, opened
with speech by General Smith (see USIA Wireless File for text) 2 up-
holding role of UN in solution in Korean problem and endorsing ROK
May 22 proposals.

Colombian delegate Urrutia spoke next. 3 He complimented ROK
delegation for his “spirit of conciliation” and for his “truly remarkable
spirit of understanding and cooperation”, without directly endorsing
ROK proposals of May 22. Urrutia in rather legalistic analysis de-
clared North Korean reunification plan unacceptable, emphasizing
that any acceptable plan must recognize authority of UN.

Turkish delegate, Acikalin, then delivered short attack on North
Korean proposals and defended authority of UN in Korean problem.
He concluded by characterizing ROK proposals as “an excellent work-
ing basis upon which, with aid of reason and good will, it may be pos-
sible to erect edifice whose achievement is purpose of our conference.”

Prince Wan of Thailand delivered brief defense of principle of
collective security as embodied in UN. He noted that both ROK and
North Korean proposals admitted need for some external supervision
of Korean elections and some external guarantee for Korea. Stated
essential difference in two proposals lies in fact that Communists pro-
pose (1) neutral nations supervisory commission to supervise elec-
tions, and (2) guarantee by the great powers, while ROK proposes UN
for both supervision of elections and guarantee. Wan stated Thailand
“wholeheartedly supports 14-point proposal of ROK as basis for
discussion”.

Fifth speaker was Watt (Australia) 4 who dismissed May 24 Chou
En-lai proposal for neutral nations organization to assist all-Korean
commission as academic since unworkable all-Korean commission still
keystone of formula. After reasserting authority of UN and principle
of collective security re Korea, he offered general support to ROK 14
points as workable formula which “conference should examine care-
fully”. Reserved detailed comment 14 points until “later stage of
discussion”.

Kindynis (Greece) 5 spoke last. Like Watt, he examined May 22
Chou proposal and ROK 14 points. Based rejection of Chou proposal
on failure to recognize proper role of UN in solution Korean problem.
Unequivocally endorsed ROK 14 points in toto as democratic and con-
sonant with UN responsibilities in Korea and as only way to restore

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1 For the text, see The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, pp. 124–130.
2 For the text, see ibid., pp. 132–135.
3 For Watt’s statement, see ibid., pp. 135–137.
4 For the text of Kindynis’ statement, see ibid., pp. 130–131.
Korea’s unity and independence. Specifically endorsed ROK point 12 on withdrawal Chinese Communist forces before elections as “very natural.”

Eden then said no more names on list and noted Indochina meeting tomorrow. Said next Korea meeting would be announced later.

Comment: Day’s speeches gave further evidence of strength of opposition non-Communist delegations to Communist unification plan and support for UN authority in connection Korean problem.

SMITH

MAY 30, 1954

396.1 GE/5-3054 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACI GENEVA, May 30, 1954—3 p. m.

Dulte 134. Personal for Murphy.

[Here follows the first paragraph of this message, dealing with Indochina; for text, see page 981.]

We will also within the next two days be squarely up against the final phase of Korea. There are two ways of meeting this issue.

One is to stand and break squarely on the basic issue of the United Nations, without another closed session, and probably with only one more plenary. This presents a clear-cut issue but exposes us to the charge of intransigence and unwillingness even to explore for a few points of agreement in principle.

The second way is to have a closed session and consider the North and South Korean proposals. The result of such a session might be a report to the following plenary that the two sides had been able to agree in principle:

a. That Korea should be reunited;
b. That there should be elections in the North and in the South;
c. That CC and UN troops should be withdrawn;
d. That both sides agreed that they could not agree on method, timing, supervisory authority, details of procedure, et cetera.

If this were done it would not slam the door entirely and would, I believe, automatically return the problem to the UN, at least as far as we are concerned. It would also avoid the charge of obstruction and intransigence which we are likely to get from Britain and some of the Dominions, particularly India. I recommend it, with some diffidence, as I note my most recent recommendations have not been received with great enthusiasm. But I must know at the earliest possible moment, and
certainly before Wednesday, which line of action the Secretary considers preferable.\(^2\)

[Here follows the remainder of the message, dealing with Indochina; for text, see page 981.]

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\(^1\) June 2.

\(^2\) On May 21, Smith sent to the Department of State his telegram Dulles 138, marked personal and eyes only for Dulles. It concerned termination of the Conference and related mainly to Indochina; for the text, see p. 992. The brief portion dealing with Korea read:

"I think we should wind up Korea during the next week or ten days, depending on your decision regarding the two alternative lines of action suggested in my Dulles 134 of May 30 to Murphy, and during this period the senior members of the sixteen will be drifting out. Some have already gone." (396.1 GE/5-3154)

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MAY 31, 1954

396.1 GE/5-3154: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

SECRET

SEUL, May 31, 1954—3 p. m.

1270. Repeated information Tokyo 753, Geneva 139. Geneva pass USDel, Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Re Deptel Tosec 298, repeated Seoul 963, information Tokyo 2651:\(^1\) and Geneva's Secto 280, repeated Seoul as Deptel 964 and information Tokyo 2652.\(^2\) It appears from here that time to terminate Korean phase of conference is whenever we can do so with clear cut demonstration of issues involved, maintaining unity now prevailing and placing onus for break on Communist intransigence.

Issue on which we should not hesitate to break, namely authority of UN, was defined in early allied argument. By characterizing UN as belligerent, Communists have given us exceptionally wide target. Furthermore, unity among allies on 14 points is probably now near maximum (and might disintegrate in debate. over point 12 for example).

Agreement on new detailed allied proposal before breaking off seems unnecessary unless Communists shift position drastically, and might result in obscuring fundamental issues. While some other allies may argue that break-off on Korea would imperil Indochina discus-

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\(^1\) Dated May 28, not printed. In it, the Department of State indicated that it had been considering the questions of timing and method in terminating the Korean phase of the Conference. Dean's memorandum of May 25 on this subject was being forwarded to Geneva. The telegram also stated that a recommendation would be presented to Dulles by June 2. The message said that at a meeting of the 16 on May 27, the Colombian representative at the Department's request had made a strong case for terminating the Conference over the issue of the Communist challenge to the U.N. role in Korea, which would help the Allied side to win a public opinion victory. (396.1 GE/5-2254)

\(^2\) Dated May 22, p. 314.
sion, it is not clear to us here that it would do so. In any event, I do not see how we can tie termination of the Korean discussions with termination of Indochina discussions without impairing Korean prospects.

Prince Wan’s formula would probably exacerbate rather than improve our relations with Rhee.

I think Korean termination should be complete and in terms stated at opening of Secto 280.

BRIGGS

793.00/5-3154 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

SECRET NIAC WT WASHINGTON, May 31, 1954—5:27 p.m.

Tosec 316. For Smith from Murphy. Re Korean portion Geneva’s Dulte 134. Also Secto 280. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. We are giving our comments on Korean portion your Dulte 134 subject to Secretary’s views. He will see this message on Tuesday and we will let you know immediately whether he concurs.

We agree desirability early termination Korean phase conference. Longer it continues more chance there is Communists will exploit difficulties our position by attempting appeal to our allies through some formula which will attempt evade basic issue of UN role in Korean settlement. If possible we should break off discussions before this issue is blurred. Break-off should be on UN issue and should be accomplished in such way as to maximize our propaganda gains. On importance UN issue see also Tosec 298. In whatever way break-off accomplished it seems clear under GA August 28, 1953 resolution we and others would be obligated inform UN of outcome Conference. Thus Korean issue will certainly be aired in GA. We would hope avoid it until Ninth GA but we might be faced with Korean question in resumed session Eighth GA.

Since timing and tactics for accomplishing break-off with satisfactory propaganda results depend so heavily upon developments at Geneva both from Communist side and our own I believe Delegation

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1 Repeated for information to Seoul as telegram 968 and to Tokyo as telegram 2658.
2 Dated May 30, p. 324.
3 Dated May 22, p. 314.
4 June 1.
5 See footnote 1, supra.
should have widest area discretion subject following general comments:

(1) Key to successful break-off from our viewpoint is maintenance unity among all 16 Allied side. Simplest and cleanest means achieving break-off while maintaining reasonable degree Allied support will probably serve our purpose best.

(2) We have no objection per se to another closed session to consider proposals for Korean unification now before Conference. However we are concerned about agreement you envisage as possibly coming out of it. Propaganda aspects would require exceedingly careful handling. As presented Dulte 134 UN issue might well be lost and general impression created that agreement reached on principles but both sides wrangling over relatively unimportant details. In addition ROK likely object this arrangement which seems imply their proposal and that of North Koreans about equally good. If (a) closed session is necessary in your judgment maintain Allied unity, (b) ROK willing to go along and (c) through handling of closed session report in subsequent plenary session importance of Communist refusal accept UN role can be reemphasized so that world will understand both that issues mentioned your subparagraph d on which agreement not reached are vital and also why they are vital, then we would not object to your proposal. Perhaps it would be possible to have closed session without coming to agreement on principles listed your a through c.

(3) We assume Delegation will oppose any suggestions for so-called “second stage” agreements re Korea.

(4) Prince Wan’s proposal for continuing negotiating body has number of disadvantages including especially (a) probability ROK will vigorously oppose as suggested Seoul’s 1270 repeated Geneva 139 6. (b) its composition which would be interpreted by Communists and much of world press as Big Five plus ROK and North Korea, and (c) it is not in keeping our effort emphasize UN role. However this proposal may be made by Communists especially since it is now public knowledge. In that case if ROK is willing to go along with it you may want to try to have composition of group modified (perhaps to include Thailand which first suggested it and others) but emphasize United States would only agree meet with such group if and when Communists accept UN role in Korea. Do not see how we can accept continuing group with composition suggested by Prince Wan.

* Supra.

795.00/5-3154 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

SECRET

Seoul, May 31, 1954—6 p. m.

1272. Repeated information Tokyo 755, Geneva 140. Geneva for USDel; Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Reference Embtel 1247, May 26, re-
peated Geneva 127, Tokyo 739. President Rhee in accordance conversation has today sent me letter dated May 29 addressed to Ambassador Dean. Text follows.

"My Dear Mr. Ambassador:
I have received your two letters of May 20.

One of the matters you mention is the Van Fleet mission and the build-up of ROK armed forces. As you say, General Van Fleet’s investigating mission has to be approved by the US Government, but I am sure you are fully aware that the planned increase of ROK armed strength is very much in the interests of the US as well as Korea.

I would like to point out that, in the years of 1948-1950, if the US Government had granted our request to build-up ROK armed forces, the war, with all the American casualties, might have been avoided.

The State Department of the US declared, more than once, that Korea had no strategic value to the US and therefore was not included in the American defense perimeter which extended only to Japan and the Philippines. Later events proved this judgment an error. America sent its troops to help defend Korea, demonstrating that Korea had some value for America. Meanwhile, General Van Fleet quietly trained and equipped Korean manpower which now holds nearly two-thirds of the front line. I believe the authorities in America have come to realize that the ROK defense forces are of inestimable value and help in fighting the Communist aggressors and President Eisenhower has seen the wisdom of strengthening such forces.

[Here follow several paragraphs of the source text which were excluded from this publication at the request of the Republic of Korea Government.]

With regard to the proposed Geneva statement of general principles we asked you to insert in paragraph four the words 'including the North Korean armed forces'. Our Foreign Minister, Doctor Pyun, without approval, (due to the delay in exchange of messages), presented a proposal which was made public. I could, of course, recall him and announce that he had exceeded his authority, but my further thought is to let the matter ride until such time as circumstances may force us to make our position public. I am sure our friends will agree with us that as long as any Communist armed forces remain in Korea, either Korean or Chinese, free elections will be impossible.

With personal regards. Yours sincerely, signed Syngman Rhee".

Briggs
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Young)

SECRET

Participants:  Dr. Y. T. Pyun, ROK Delegation  
Ambassador Yang, ROK Delegation  
General Walter Bedell Smith  
Mr. Walter S. Robertson  
Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr.

Dr. Pyun and Ambassador Yang came in this morning at their request and spent an hour with General Smith discussing the final phase of the Korean Conference. Since they were greatly disturbed over press reports of Prince Wan's idea for a committee of 7 to meet indefinitely in Geneva to discuss the Korean question after the conclusion of the Geneva Conference, most of the discussion revolved around this matter.

General Smith emphasized and reiterated that, firstly, the United States Delegation had absolutely no foreknowledge whatsoever that Prince Wan was going to disclose any such idea to the press without consulting with the United States or with the Sixteen, which we deplored as much as the ROK Delegation did; and secondly, that the United States Delegation does not like the idea and would not join in supporting it. Prince Wan had broached this idea informally to a member of the United States Delegation a couple of weeks ago, but General Smith said neither he nor Mr. Robertson had ever discussed it with Prince Wan. When he had first heard of the idea, General Smith said it had so many disadvantages that he was against it. And so was the State Department.

However, he had just been discussing the idea with Mr. Robertson and Mr. Young in an effort to anticipate subsequent stages of the Korean question in the United Nations after the Geneva Conference ended. General Smith pointed out that both the United States and the Republic of Korea must recognize as a real possibility that the Communists or certain other delegations may seriously propose some sort
of a standing committee, whether we like it or not. While we would try
to discourage such a proposal from being put forward, General Smith
said that we are now wondering among ourselves if it might not have
one advantage, if it is unavoidably raised. The existence of such a
committee, even if it met only a few times and recessed indefinitely,
might head off any invitation from the General Assembly to the
Chinese Communists and the North Koreans to sit as observers during
consideration of the Korean question, if as seems likely, the General
Assembly resumes debate on Korea. Such a motion might eventually
create very great difficulties for the United States in view of the fact
that the marginal majority opposing such invitation has been decreas-
ing, and could reach a point where it might even turn into a majority
for bringing in the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans. That
could bring about a crisis in the United Nations, if the Republic of
Korea declined an invitation and if the United States had to abstain
or absent itself. But if there were some sort of post-conference ma-
achinery including the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans, we
could argue that an invitation to them was unnecessary and inap-
propriate, particularly in view of the fact that they had categorically
rejected and repudiated the authority of the United Nations in Korea.

If, by some chance, a proposal for such a committee were under
serious discussion, General Smith stated that the United States would
insist on adding Thailand, the Philippines and Australia.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that, if there were such a committee, the
Republic of Korea and the United States would have the same full
sovereign powers as at the Geneva Conference, and that neither could
be out-voted, nor could any decisions be made binding if either the
Republic of Korea or the United States opposed them. Mr. Robertson
also pointed out several times to the ROK Delegates that, under the
terms of the resolution of August 28, 1953 of the General Assembly, the
fifteen United Nations members on our side at the Geneva Conference
are obligated to report back to the United Nations. Accordingly, sub-
sequent consideration of the Korea question by the General Assembly
is practically automatic. That is an additional reason for considering
the question of a post-conference committee along the lines of General
Smith's suggestion.

Making clear he had no current instructions from President Rhee,
Dr. Pyun completely opposed the idea of a committee of 7 as suggested
by Prince Wan. Not only would it serve no useful purpose, it would be
harmful in that it would give the Communists just the means they
want in order to prolong indefinite talks on Korea, as, Dr. Pyun said,
they were trying to do on Indonesia [Indochina]. All in all, he thought
it was an extremely bad idea. He suspected that the "chicanery" of
other delegations, and particularly the United Kingdom, had put Prince Wan up to this idea for some ulterior purpose. He regretted that Prince Wan had made the suggestion public before consulting with the ROK or any other Delegation or in the meeting of the sixteen. Dr. Pyun said that he was glad to receive General Smith’s clarification of the United States attitude toward this idea. He agreed to General Smith’s suggestion to see Prince Wan as soon as possible to express the opposition of the ROK to the idea of a standing committee.

With respect to the United Nations, Dr. Pyun opposed the referral of the Korean question to the United Nations as vehemently as he did the idea of a permanent committee. His arguments were that the United Nations had nothing to do with the Geneva Conference and that it had not sponsored the Geneva Conference. Therefore, it would be wrong for the matter to be returned to the United Nations. He said he was sure his government would oppose this.

Towards the end of the conversation, Dr. Pyun stated very frankly that it was the understanding of the ROK Government that there would be no further negotiation or discussion of the Korean question after the Geneva Conference if it did not succeed in arriving at an agreed upon solution. That was the fundamental reason for his rejection of Prince Wan’s idea or referral of the Korean question to the United Nations. His Government was opposed to indefinite talk, and wanted it terminated once and for all. In that connection, he suggested that the United States should be more inclined to ignore public opinion in the allied countries as well as the opinion of its allies, except the ROK.

General Smith told Dr. Pyun very frankly that the United States has allies to a far greater extent than does the Republic of Korea and that some of these allies do not appreciate or support the ROK nearly as much as the United States does. He hoped that Dr. Pyun would understand how different the position of the United States is in this respect from the Republic of Korea and what a difficult time the United States has in carrying along all its allies.

Dr. Pyun and Ambassador Yang inquired as to how long General Smith thought the Korean phase of the conference would last and how it should be terminated. General Smith replied that in the opinion of himself and the United States Delegation the conference should end fairly quickly on the question of the United Nations authority which was a clear-cut issue for our side. There might be a restricted session to put the question directly to the Communists as to whether or not they would accept the authority of the United Nations in Korea. If they continued to reject this principle, as we fully expect them to,
then there could be a final plenary session for each side to state its case, after which the conference would adjourn *sine die*. General Smith explained that this was just the view of the United States Delegation, that we were waiting for the final instructions from the Secretary of State, and that other delegations might not share this view. Dr. Pyun and Ambassador Yang both responded favorably to the suggestion for a restricted session followed by a final plenary with United Nations authority as the principal issue.

General Smith emphasized that the final phase of the Korean Conference would require the most careful planning and the closest possible cooperation between the United States and the ROK Delegations. Dr. Pyun concurred wholeheartedly. General Smith went on to say that he wanted to compliment Dr. Pyun for the effective way in which he had presented his government's point of view at this conference. General Smith told the ROK Delegates that at the beginning of the conference many of our allies had been skeptical over ROK intentions and convinced that the ROK would be completely intransigent. However, they had been considerably surprised and gratified over the 14 points which Dr. Pyun had put forward for his government. The allied delegations now have a very favorable attitude towards Dr. Pyun and his delegation, which, it is important to maintain. For that reason also, General Smith emphasized, it is essential to plan the conclusion carefully so as to leave the conference on that basis.

During the course of the conversation, General Smith also mentioned Krishna Menon's idea of agreeing to disagree, which General Smith said in his opinion contained some merit; the tendency of some of our allies and particularly the United Kingdom to prefer mediation and discussion as long as possible in an effort to reach a combination; and his anticipation in the restricted session on Indochina yesterday, before they made it, of the Communist proposal for a supervisory commission similar to the one that is working so poorly in Korea.

During the course of the conversation, Dr. Pyun expressed great alarm over the Colombian suggestion in the plenary May 22 on changing the composition of the Supervisory Commission in the United Nations. Dr. Pyun said this was an extremely dangerous idea and hoped the United States Delegation would talk the Colombians out of it. Dr. Pyun also produced a clipping from *The New York Times* of May 28 on Korea which he believed "showed how the wind was blowing in Geneva". Dr. Pyun became extremely agitated over this clipping until General Smith told him that it was quite inappropriate for him to come in to discuss with the United States Delegation one single newspaper article and that if he, as chief of the United States Delegation, spent his time on inaccurate press stories nothing would ever
get done. General Smith asked Dr. Pyun why he did not pay more attention to the very favorable New York Times editorial on the Korean proposals instead of getting upset over one correspondent's story. After replying that the editorial was indeed very satisfactory, Dr. Pyun put the clipping back in his pocket, as much as to say he was dropping the subject.

396.1 GE/6–154 : Telegram

Smith–Eden–Bidault Meeting, Geneva, June 1, Noon: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET  

Dulles 138. Eden asked for a private meeting this noon with Bidault and myself. After apologizing for passing out "the usual British bit of paper", he handed each of us the following, saying at the same time that "British would support the position of France in Indochina and would go along with Americans in Korea".
[Here follows Part I of the British paper which dealt with Indochina; for text, see page 993.]

"II. Korea.
"1. Are we agreed that the next meeting (or two) should be in restricted session, and that we should seek there

"(A) To explore the possibilities of further negotiations and
"(B) Failing that to agree upon a few general principles?

Hand over our draft.
"2. Do we agree that this move would be preparatory to the winding up of the Korean part of the conference at a subsequent plenary session?

"3. Can this idea be pursued further with Molotov and Chou En-lai (and Prince Wan)? What may be said to Chou En-lai tonight?"

[Here follows a portion of the telegram which dealt with discussion of Part I on Indochina; for text, see page 993.]

With regard to Korea, I presented the views of the Department, stating that we had in the question of UN authority a clean-cut issue that would be understood by our own public opinion and that of practically all of our associates. We would not oppose a restricted session, but at this session the first and basic question would be the acceptance or rejection of the UN authority in Korea. None of us felt the Communists, after having taken publicly a firm stand on this matter, would now recede, and that the answer would be that there was rejection on their part of UN authority. The British are extremely
unhappy that we cannot follow their suggestion of agreeing upon a few general principles, but their major concern, like ours, is what may happen later in the UN. They do not wish the issue of Communist Chinese participation to be raised in the UN at this time, since they understand our difficulties and desire to avoid a proposal on which we might be voted down. We see in Prince Wan’s suggestion, probably as modified by our own ideas with regard to the inclusion of Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, a formula which might prevent the issue from arising in the UN. Eden will not discuss this with Chou En-lai tonight, as it is not of such urgency as the matter of Indochina. He understands that our final position cannot be arrived at until possibly day after tomorrow.

SMITH

795.00/6-154: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

SECRET   NIAC  WASHINGTON, June 1, 1954—3:28 p.m.

Tedul 145. Foregoing dictated prior to receipt by Secretary of Dulles 137. For Undersecretary from Secretary in New York. Have just read Tosec 316. I feel break-off should be on UN issue and that this should be our final position. The entire Korean War was fought to establish UN principle of collective security. Korea happened to be the symbol. Since we are not going to get at this time any unification of Korea, it would seem to me most unfortunate not to keep the UN symbol to the forefront. This would be a tremendous gain for the Communist side which has throughout sought to obtain a virtual western repudiation of the UN at least in its Korean role. It seems to me that if the Communists succeed in this they will have gained at Geneva a repudiation of the very principle for which so many UN members made great sacrifices. We have to our own people justified their sacrifices on the ground that it was worthwhile for Americans to fight and die to establish for the first time in history the workability of an organization for collective security. Those representations will sound hollow if in the end we should seem virtually to repudiate that organization by compromising with the Communist view that the UN must be ignored as itself a tool of aggression.

1 Repeated for information to Tokyo, Seoul, and New York, as telegrams 2658, 970, and 616, respectively.
2 Infra.
3 Dated May 31, p. 326.
I have at this length indicated my own reaction because it may suggest to you the most effective line of presentation which you of course will use or adapt at your discretion.

Murphy

396.1 GE/6-154: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY GENEVA, June 1, 1954—11 p. m.¹

Dulte 137. Repeated priority Seoul 107. Further to Dulte 134² re Korea. There is a third possibility which would combine some of each of two outlined reference telegram.

We could have one restricted meeting to see if there is any room for compromise by Communists on UN issue. We could also propose to Communists that conference consideration of Korean question be reported to UN for its further consideration, in view inability to reach agreement here on issues of UN auspices and supervision. Communists would probably reject these proposals. We would have made an effort seek agreement. We could then go into a final plenary for each side to state its case. We could propose agreement among 16 on having conference adjourn sine die on UN issue as far as we are concerned.

Under this third possibility I would not propose that restricted session report any agreement in principle along lines of 4 subparagraphs Dulte 134. That might avoid possibility Communists would suggest addition of agreement in principle on measures and obligations for “insuring peace in Korea” along lines their point 3 of April 27 proposals, which would create difficulties for us particularly in Seoul. But this third possibility of combining a restricted session with a final plenary both on UN issue might satisfy many other delegations and offset any charge US intransigence.

I see no particular problem with other allied delegations except ROK on question of final phase of Korea. Anything less than complete and unconditional termination will probably create major problems for US with ROK. ROK Government will no doubt oppose any compromise formula to end conference in such a way as not to register complete disagreement and which would make possible, at least in theory, later consideration of Korean question. ROK may even be opposed to UNGA consideration, as Pyun has already expressed apprehension over New York Times story Friday May 28 on UN referral Korean question. ROK delegation is informally talking in terms leav-

¹ Received in the Department of State at 7:16 a. m. on June 1.
² Dated May 30, p. 324.
ing Geneva when Communists reject ROK 14-point proposal. Phasing out of Korean conference will require particularly careful planning and handling on our part with ROK.

Views Embassy Seoul this problem would be helpful.3

\[\text{Smith}\]

3The Department of State sent the following message in telegram Tosec 321 (repeated for information to Seoul as telegram 973), June 1, to Geneva:

"Dulte 137 repeated Seoul 107. Followup from Secretary on Deptel 316 repeated Seoul 968 emphasizes break be made on UN issue. Believe your proposal Dulte 137 excellent tactic consistent with concept of break on UN issue." (396.1 GE/6-154)

396.1 GE/6-154: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State*

TOP SECRET NIAC'T

Seoul, June 1, 1954—midnight.

1278. Repeated information Tokyo 758, niact Geneva 144. Re Geneva's 107 (Dulte 137 to Department).1 In existing circumstances I agree that anything short of "complete and unconditional termination" at Geneva will probably create major problem with ROK. That, however, has been inherent in Rhee's attitude ever since last year when we insisted on armistice, against his passionately held conviction that stalemate on battlefield would not lead to unification of his country within predictable time. All Rhee's views—toward POW exchange, toward neutrals and neutralism, toward Communist advance into Southeast Asia, toward fall of Dien Bien Phu, and now toward his exclusion (as he sees it) from forthcoming Washington military talks2—derive in substantial measure from Rhee's hatred of armistice and his belief that whatever develops from deadlock created by armistice, time is running out.

If we ever had any doubts on that score, four weeks of almost daily negotiations with Rhee while Ambassador Dean was here ought to have dissipated them.

As Rhee views it from Seoul, clean break at Geneva with no leftovers and no cold salad gathering mould in UN icebox is least unproductive result likely to follow conference deliberations. Moreover, anything that Rhee interprets as temporizing or appeasement will multiply possibility he may publicly denounce Geneva thereafter withdrawing ROK delegation.

Foregoing is not intended to imply that clean break at Geneva would solve problem of ROK post conference behavior. Fuzzy ambi-

1Supra.

2For related documentation, see volume xii.
ous break would, however, make Rhee more difficult to deal with in immediate future than clean one.

Deptel 968 (to Tokyo 2656, to Geneva Tosec 316) 3 just received. I concur with views expressed therein especially introductory paragraphs and numbered paragraphs 1, 3 and 4.

BRIGGS

3 Dated May 31, p. 326.

JUNE 2, 1954

396.1 GE/6-254 : Telegram

Smith-Bidault Meeting, Geneva, June 2, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, June 2, 1954—10 p. m.

Secto 363. Repeated information London 236, Paris 373, Seoul 109. In conversation with Bidault this morning we outlined considerations contained Tedul 145 1 and stressed these represented Secretary’s strong personal views. Bidault stated that if we did not adhere to these views whole principle collective security would dissolve. He then referred to Eden’s proposal (Dulte 138 2) that the conference agree to a few general principles on Korea. This proposal reads as follows:

“The conference reached agreement on the following principles:

“(a) Korea, within its historic boundaries, should be unified as a free, independent and democratic state.
“(b) To this end, elections should be held throughout Korea to establish a single, truly representative government for the whole of Korea.
“(c) The elections should be held in conditions of genuine freedom under international supervision.
“(d) The settlement of the Korean question should provide for the withdrawal of foreign forces.

“2. The conference has not been able to agree on the timing or methods or procedure for carrying out these principles and concludes that further discussion of the Korean question cannot usefully be pursued at the present time.”

Bidault, while agreeing that fundamental issue was UN principle collective security, wondered whether reconciliation could not be made between this and Eden’s principles. We took firm position that this would obscure basic issue. Bidault did not press point and concluded by stating that as US bearing main burden Korea as France was in Indochina, he would readily yield to our position. He also agreed we should endeavor arrange meeting of “16” on June 4 to be followed by

1 Dated June 1, p. 334.
2 Dated June 1, p. 333.
restricted meeting of “7” on June 5 and final plenary session on Korea next week.

SMITH

396.1 GE/6-254 : Telegram

Robertson-Wan Meeting, Geneva, June 2, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, June 2, 1954—12 p. m.

Secto 365. Repeated information Seoul 110, Tokyo 105. Tokyo for CINCUNC.

1. Re Prince Wan’s idea of standing committee of seven after conference as reported in the press, Robertson and Young met with Prince Wan this morning to find out what his ideas really are. He said press stories were entirely inaccurate and misleading. He had made no such proposal and did not intend to. He is only “thinking” along following lines:

a. The 16 should meet decide on the next stages regarding Korean question;

b. He believes there should then be one or more restricted meetings of committee of seven to determine whether further negotiations are possible; whether Communists will modify their repudiation of UN competence and authority; and in order convince world opinion we have “exhausted” every possibility for trying get agreement;

c. He agrees 100 percent with Secretary’s views (Tedul 145 repeated information Seoul 970 and Tokyo 2658 2) on UN issue;

d. If Communists reject UN authority in restricted sessions there will be no need for further meetings. He agreed with us there should be final plenary and conference should conclude on clear-cut issue of UN;

e. If Communists by chance modify their position on UN it might be useful to have controversial details deferred to committee of seven possibly enlarged by Thailand, Australia and Philippines. Its existence would divert debate on Korea in special session eighth GA or in ninth. If conference breaks off, he is sure India will push for resumption Korean question in GA which he believes would be “bitter and futile”. If committee were set up along lines he envisages, he hopes that Korean question can stay out of GA until tenth session in fall 1955. He agreed to suggestion any such group of seven should be expanded to Asian countries participating in Geneva conference. We mentioned Thailand, Philippines and Australia. He said he had discussed his views fully in detail with Pyun and Yang yesterday afternoon and would do so again this evening at dinner. Pyun and Yang agreed to meeting of 16 and restricted session but opposed standing committee or referral Korean question back to UN.

2. Re ROK attitude Pyun and Yang came in to see General Smith Tuesday morning 2 highly disturbed over Prince Wan’s idea as re-

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1 Dated June 1, p. 334.
2 June 1; see the memorandum of conversation by Young, p. 329.
ported in press. Pyun said his delegation would oppose it since in his opinion such committee would serve no useful purpose, and fit into Communist plans to prolong talking on Korea indefinitely, and since his government had assumed there would be no more discussion or negotiation on Korea question after conclusion Korean conference. He also said he opposed referring Korean question to UN. Clear from his remarks he wants Korean conference terminate completely, although he pointed out he is without current instructions these matters. General Smith told him we had no foreknowledge Prince Wan's disclosure to press of his idea and informally discussed matter with Pyun along lines paragraph 3 below. Stressed to Pyun great importance most careful planning and closest cooperation between US and ROK regarding final phase Korean conference. He concurred. Smith also stressed importance ROK help wind up conference in helpful way in order conserve good-will and support ROK delegation has created among other 14 who came Geneva sure ROK would be completely intransigent and difficult. Also mentioned to him possibility closed session on Korea to put question to Communists whether or not they will accept UN authority, with final plenary to follow for closing statements on clear issue of UN. Pyun and Yang responded favorably to this suggestion.

3. Much appreciate Tedul 145 and Tosec 321. Have proposed to UK, French, Canadian, Australian, Thai, Netherlands and Colombian delegations (1) UN issue must be clear final position, (they agree and are much impressed with Tedul 145) (2) Meeting of 16 on Friday (3) No objection to restricted meeting of committee of seven next week if other Allied delegations desire it, (4) Final plenary on UN issue if Communists intransigent and (5) Some form of report to UN by 15 UN members here. Representatives these delegations concurred. Commonwealth, Thailand (and possibly Netherlands and Belgium) favor at least one restricted session.

Smith

3 Dated June 1: see footnote 3, p. 336.

JUNE 3, 1954

396.1 GE/6–354: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT GENEVA, June 3, 1954—3 p. m.

Dulte 143. For Secretary from Smith. Our messages cross rather often. Believe this summary will help to clarify:

a. Tedul 145.1

I did not reply directly to Tedul 145 because I accepted this as your instruction, in which, incidentally, we concur unanimously. We as-

3 Dated June 1, p. 334.
sumed Tosec 321 to approve the tactical line suggested in Dulte 137, and have proceeded accordingly.

We are lining up 16 and they will meet tomorrow. Most will accept the Secretary's view as indicated in Tedul 145, and others will go along, although British are still covertly shopping around with Eden's "points of agreement" covered in our Secto 363, which I have rejected and persuaded Bidault to reject, although as stated in previous message he would like to salvage a little of it. Most of the 16 will want one restricted session on Korea for sake of appearances, and this may take place Monday. We expect to restrict discussion to basic issue covered in your Tedul 145 and to make this the real breaking issue. The Korean plenary which follows will have to come later in the week, as some of the 16 will wish to consult their governments.

[Here follows the remainder of the message which dealt with Indochina; for text. see page 1014.]

SMITH

See footnote 3, p. 336.

Dated June 2, p. 337.

June 7.

110.11 DU/6-354: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 3, 1954—8 p. m.

Dulte 147. Repeated information Seoul 111. Molotov asked for Korean plenary tomorrow saying North Koreans wanted to speak and Indochina plenary Saturday. After discussion with Bidault who feared Communist efforts at Indochina plenary influence Tuesday's Assembly debate, Eden proposed Molotov agree to Korean plenary Saturday, possibility Korean restricted Monday, and Indochina plenary Tuesday.

With respect to Korea, there have been two developments.

1. I understand Menon has returned to Geneva, although he has not yet asked to see me.

2. Eden says he has had hint from British left wing sources in touch with North Koreans that next meeting North Koreans will probably "touch their hat to the United Nations". It is our guess that they may present proposal somewhat along the lines of Eden's points (see Secto 363 2). My opinion, Eden's points probably framed by Menon, who may have induced North Koreans present something along these lines which will have considerable appeal for some members sixteen.

1 June 5.

2 Dated June 2, p. 337.
We are holding meeting of sixteen Friday morning and will make every effort influence them hold the line. At meeting sixteen we will propose restricted meeting seven for Monday at which we would squarely put up to Communists, issue of United Nations authority. If they reject, we would plan final plenary sometime next week with speeches from our side in support of United Nations principle, and authority in Korea along lines Tedul 145. This, of course, may be subject to change in light of whatever success North Korean presentation may have in dividing and confusing sixteen.

I have told Eden that his points are entirely unacceptable to us and he seems to have accepted position set forth Tedul 145.

SMITH

\[\text{\textsuperscript{3}}\text{ Dated June 1, p. 334.}\]

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396.1 GE/6-25/4: Telegram

_The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation\textsuperscript{1}_

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1954—8:32 p.m.

Tosec 341. For Under Secretary from Secretary. Secto 363 and 365.\textsuperscript{2} I concur in course of action outlined in paragraph three Secto 365 and congratulate you on excellent job in steering Korean phase on right road despite numerous obstacles.

I hope that prior to termination of Korean phase Communists can be led to full rejection of Pyun fourteen point proposal and especially to clear unwillingness to accept any UN role in Korean settlement. Once foregoing aim is accomplished I would favor earliest termination Korean talks.

DULLES

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\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\text{ Repeated to Seoul as telegram 983 and to Tokyo as telegram 2687 with instructions to pass to CINCUNC.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{2}}\text{ Both dated June 2, pp. 337 and 338, respectively.}\]

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396.1 GE/6-35/4: Telegram

_The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea_

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 3, 1954—9 p.m.

113. Repeated information Department priority Secto 369, priority Tokyo 107. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. For Briggs.

1. Following lunch with ROK delegation which again stressed our suggestions on procedure for Korean phase in conference Pyun informed Robertson later this afternoon he had just received urgent in-
structions from Rhee not to attend any restricted session Korea. Apparently Rhee has become very much upset by published accounts of the so-called Wan proposal which would provide for continued restricted meetings to consider Korean question. Pyun and Yang agree to our proposed procedure and are cabling Rhee requesting new instructions. They suggested that we inform you of situation to get your help in obtaining Rhee’s approval. We think it advisable inform Rhee of their suggestion to you.

2. Request you see Rhee soonest clarify purpose restricted meeting and plenary as outlined paragraphs one and three Secto 365, repeated information Seoul 110 and Tokyo 105,\(^1\) as well as Tedul 145, repeated information Seoul 970 and Tokyo 2658.\(^2\) In our view, purpose of restricted meeting and subsequent plenary would be to put question of UN authority directly to Communists and to conclude our participation in this conference on basis of UN issue as Secretary stated Tedul 145. Believe we should stress to Rhee this procedure is most effective way to put question to Communists and dramatize UN issue. USDel does not wish issue to become blurred or lost sight of and believes that strong moral and political victory can still be won over Communists and Allied unity maintained if all delegations united solidly behind above issue and conference procedure.

3. Revised schedule of Korean and Indochina meeting and reactions Allied delegations on Korean phase follows in subsequent telegrams.\(^3\)

Smith

\(^1\) Dated June 2, p. 338.
\(^2\) Dated June 1, p. 334.
\(^3\) Not printed.

JUNE 4, 1954

396.1 GE/6-454: Telegram

Seventh Meeting of the Heads of the 16 Allied Delegations, Geneva, June 4, 11:03 a.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State\(^1\)

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY GENEVA, June 4, 1954—8 p.m.

Secto 378. Repeated information Seoul priority 114, Tokyo 109, London 244, Paris 385, Moscow unnumbered. Department pass Defense; Tokyo pass CINCUNC.

1. Seventh meeting heads 16 Allied delegations this morning June 4 at Palais with Kural presiding was devoted to consideration next steps

\(^1\) A set of minutes of this meeting (AD Verb Min/7) from which the time is taken is in FE files, lot 60 D 330, box 14824. The meeting adjourned at 12:55 p.m.
Korean phase, particularly relative emphasis on elements of question to be put to Communists in restricted session.

2. Under Secretary began discussion by noting general debate has made clear that Communists reject authority UN to take collective action to resist aggression and to supervise restoration of peace and security in Korea. Said under circumstances we could only lose by allowing conference to drag on, permitting Communists to obscure basic issues, and therefore we should terminate talks on these UN issues and tell Communists we continue to desire unification under UN principles and will make further efforts to that end when they accept competence and authority UN. Under Secretary presented Secretary's views (Tedul 145) on importance UN issue and continued avoidance of any action which would permit Communists obscure this issue or fact of Communist aggression and their obstruction UN efforts unify Korea since 1947 and aggression.

Under Secretary noted that Plenary tomorrow June 5 called at request Nam Il, who might make some spurious gesture toward UN in expectation we seeking restricted session to bring fundamental UN issue to head. Stated would be desirable have Allied speakers tomorrow.

3. Under Secretary then outlined proposed tactics for restricted session of seven at which substance of question would be asked "Are the Communists prepared to agree to unification of Korea on the basis of free elections and the condition of genuine freedom under the control and supervision of the United Nations?" This restricted meeting would be followed by another meeting of 16 and then by final Plenary late next week in event Communists said no, or spurious "yes" which in fact meant no.

General agreement all delegations on sequence restricted session followed by meeting of 16 to determine tactics for final Plenary. Also general agreement to ask Communists above question. Eden backed by other Commonwealth delegations said free elections would be key element of question put to Communists. Under Secretary, supported by Philippines (Garcia), Netherlands (Bentinek), ROK (Pyun), Turkey (Aciakalin), Belgium (De La Chevalerie) and Greece (Kindynis) emphasized that UN role in Korea an essential element. Prince Wan (Thailand) saw problem as which of two linked issues should be given primary emphasis. Under Secretary stated no difficulty if both elements kept together, as in case with his proposed question to Communists. Ronning (Canada) agreed asking Communists question as originally worded but stated re UN issue, he was under instructions to stand fast against Communists only on specific issue of supervision

2 Dated June 1. p. 334.
acceptable to UN rather than general principle of UN role Korea. New Zealand supported Canadians. Kural stated appeared to be general agreement and adjourned meeting.

4. Urrutia (Colombia) during above discussion raised question of form and timing of report to UN. Kural stated next meeting of 16 would be appropriate place to consider.

5. Pyun (ROK) early in meeting stated present instructions did not permit ROK participation another restricted session of seven. Said was asking Seoul for authorization attend but in event not forthcoming might cause some embarrassment. Under Secretary noted restricted meeting could always be postponed if necessary. Australia (Watt) wondered if timing of restricted meeting for Monday perhaps too tight, especially if Nam Il should present unexpected proposal tomorrow.

6. Bidault proposed, in event failure reach settlement here on Korea, 16 should issue "collective statement" on two basic elements of UN authority and free elections under UN supervision. Prince Wan agreed.

SMITH

795.00/6-454 : Telegram

Briggs-Rhee Meeting, Seoul, June 4, Afternoon: The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation

SECRET NIACT

SEOUL, June 4, 1954—midnight.

156. Repeated information Department niact 1303, Tokyo 773. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Re Geneva's 111 and 113 (repeated Department Dulte 147 and Secto 369)\(^1\) also Department telegram 983 (repeated Geneva Tosec 341, to Tokyo 2687).\(^2\) Saw President Rhee for one hour this afternoon with reference Geneva developments. (Reference telegrams arrived after my meeting with Rhee this morning described Embassy telegram 1297.\(^3\))

I summarized views of Secretary set forth Department telegrams 970\(^4\) and 983. I said despite all roadblocks and difficulties created by Communists we now in excellent position Geneva and have reached point where we can consider early ending Korean phase, this to be accomplished through public demonstration Communist unwillingness accept UN role in Korean settlement, and also through Communist rejection ROK 14-point proposal. I said Communists have already

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\(^1\) Both dated June 3, pp. 340 and 341, respectively.

\(^2\) Dated June 3, p. 341.

\(^3\) See footnote 1, p. 328.

\(^4\) Same as telegram Taul 145, June 1, p. 334.
denounced UN, and if Communists now reject ROK proposal, that rejection in judgment Secretary and USDel Geneva should provide opportunity for clean break, with Allied unity intact, and should demonstrate to world opinion Korean unification impossible because of Communist intransigence.

With these elements in mind, timetable has been prepared by USDel Geneva envisaging restricted meeting Monday June 7, possibly followed by additional restricted meetings if progress appears to have been made on Monday. If Communists reject, we shall then seek final plenary session on Korean issue before end of next week.

Rhee listened but showed no enthusiasm.

I then said these matters already fully discussed between USDel on one side and Foreign Minister Pyun and Ambassador Yang on other side, and I had been instructed to see Rhee on urgent basis, to clarify purposes of forthcoming meetings and to express confidence we could count on ROK to help us conclude Korean phase of conference soon as possible, on above lines.

I said our delegation understands Pyun may require authorization from President Rhee to attend so-called restricted meetings, which authorization I was sure in light my discussion Rhee would telegraph to Pyun.

Rhee expressed satisfaction at Secretary's views and especially Secretary's intention terminate Korean phase soon as possible. Rhee then entered into lengthy declaration about futility of dealing with Communists, this his standard "I told you so" line, concluding that only way to end present "dealing with nonsense" is to end it, and that Rhee is accordingly considering ordering ROK delegation to return to Korea. Rhee said he could see no profit in "any special, or restricted, or any other kind of Geneva talks or meetings. Therefore, Rhee continued, he could not see his way clear to authorize Pyun to attend proposed June 7 meeting. Rhee declared this or any further meetings of same futile character would play directly into Communist hands by giving them heaven-sent opportunity to give impression of acceptance (or even partial acceptance) of 14 point plan, plus "some polite if insincere reference to UN" which would then be seized upon by neutralists ("like UK, now under domination of Nehru") as proof that Communists intend to cooperate.

Seems from this part of Rhee's remarks that he apprehends Communist effort, with some chance of success, may be made to smoke out UK and France in meeting June 7, who may admit pending ROK proposal is not supported in toto by other 15. Therefore, Rhee reiterated, it would be better for ROK to withdraw from Geneva now, if possible with US support, but in any case withdrawal which would be
“dramatic demonstration” of inability free world do business with Communists.

I then found it necessary to remind Rhee that his statements concerning dealing with Communists were not news to us and that we certainly had never been under any illusion as to difficulties facing us at Geneva in our dealing with Communists. I said it was precisely for that reason Secretary Dulles last August had agreed with Rhee on withdrawal from conference, in specified circumstances, at end of 90 days. I reminded Rhee that less than half of 90-day period has elapsed, and I said we are coming to Rhee now to tell him that in our opinion Korean phase should be terminated as promptly as possible, on terms he must recognize as favorable to us. Whether that can be accomplished within next few days, as we hope, remains to be seen. We cannot guarantee it. But surely it would be tragically unfortunate if Korea after having maintained with US and our Allies for past six weeks stalwart and impressive unity, should suddenly take unilateral action to abandon Geneva, thus destroying all we had gained at Geneva since April 26.

Unilateral ROK action of that sort I told Rhee would be impossible for my government to reconcile with Dulles–Rhee August 7 agreement.

Rhee then dropped subject of ROK withdrawal, but resumed attack on idea of ROK delegation attending any further meetings except “one final plenary called for purpose ending conference”.

After much further discussion, during which I continued to emphasize how foreign to ROK’s real interests Pyun’s boycott of restricted meetings would be, Rhee finally said he would telegraph Pyun and authorize him to attend June 7 “restricted meeting” on understanding that such meeting constitutes “regular part of Geneva conference machinery” (which I assured Rhee it was). Rhee said on that understanding he would telegraph instructions to Pyun in time for him to attend on June 7 restricted meeting.

During this conversation, also was able to set Rhee straight on Prince Wan’s views (Geneva’s 110, repeated Department Secto 365. Tokyo 105\(^5\)). I said newspaper report on this project had obviously been distorted, to which Rhee replied he had nevertheless been disturbed thereby. (Press account of Wan’s proposal probably contributed to Rhee’s state of mind as reflected this afternoon’s conversation.)

While I hope as result this meeting with Rhee, Pyun may receive instructions satisfactory to us, it is clear that if Communists either at tomorrow’s plenary (Saturday) or if they on Monday come up with some soft attractive answers, and some of our Allies are beguiled thereby, we shall find Rhee harder each day to handle, and perhaps more and more difficult to keep in line.

\(^5\) Dated June 2, p. 338.
My views on this remain as stated Embtel 1278, June 1. From Rhee’s point of view, worst possible Geneva outcome would be any sort of standing committee arrangement, gathering UN conversational mould, while ROK perishes.

Briggs

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Smith-Menon Meeting, Geneva, June 4, Evening: Editorial Note

For the complete report on this meeting, which dealt mainly with Indochina, see telegram Dulte 154, June 5, from Geneva, page 1038. Smith, who met with Menon at the latter’s request, summarized as follows Menon’s comments on Korea:

“Principal burden of his remarks, again was that in interest of reducing world tensions and to avoid complete failure of international conferences, we should not have a break here on Korea, but should announce a few points of agreement on principle and then agreement to disagree, et cetera.” (110.11 DU/6-554)

JUNE 5, 1954

396.1 GE/6-554: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIAC

Dulte 152. I may be borrowing trouble but think you should know in advance my personal estimate what may develop during this afternoon’s Korean plenary, asked for by Nam II. View of British and Dominions was expressed very clearly at yesterday’s meeting of sixteen. This view is that the issue of free elections is paramount, and that this, and not the principle of the authority of the United Nations, should be emphasized. Eden’s tentative memo on “possible points of agreement” sent you by Secto 363 omitted any reference to the UN. Both Watt (Australia) and McIntosh (New Zealand) have had very definite instructions from their governments to emphasize the “free election” principle and not the UN principle which I wish to make the clear-cut issue, and both of them had to a certain extent to “interpret” their instructions in order to give us a measure of support.

I am sure that the Chinese and North Koreans are well aware, via Menon, of this difference in emphasis and think it probable that at this afternoon’s plenary Nam II may try to intensify difference by some form of proposal for “free elections under international supervision acceptable to the UN side” which, though spurious to us, could seem

1 Dated June 2, p. 337.
plausible to some of our allies. As I informed you, Eden told me yesterday he had “heard that Nam II would touch his hat to the United Nations”. If this happens, it could put us in a very difficult position, as many of the sixteen will take the view that if the purposes of the UN are unifying Korea by free elections can be accomplished it would be unreasonable to frustrate them by insisting that Communists make here a public acknowledgment of UN authority which we have been unable otherwise to impose on them and which they have publicly repudiated, particularly since the UN itself has branded them as unfit for membership.

Many of our sixteen associates now take the view that the UN itself is actually a belligerent, regardless of the form and purpose of the resolution which made it so. We have two possible speakers for this afternoon, and I have a statement in reserve quoting the statements of the Swiss and Swedish members of the NNSC which can be used as a stopgap. Phleger, Robertson and I believe that we may want to delay Monday’s planned restricted session on Korea until later in the week, in order to allow time for you more accurately to assess possibilities.

Smith

396.1 GE/6-554: Telegram

Thirteenth Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, June 5, 3:04 p. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL


Secto 391. Repeated information Tokyo 114, London 250, Moscow 108, Paris 391, Seoul 115. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Department pass Defense. Korean plenary Saturday, June 5, opened with Prince Wan (Thailand) in chair. First speaker was delegate of Ethiopia who rejoiced that the principle of collective security had been upheld in Korea through efforts of those nations contributing forces and other assistance, and stated that with signing of armistice military objective of UN had been achieved. Went on to comment on proposals of North and South Korea delegations. Referring to North Korean proposal, stated that it intentionally denied role of UN in supervision of elections, thus undermined UN authority, did not insure proportional representation, instituted power of veto in commission, was not workable and thus was not acceptable to Ethiopian delegation. Reference South Korean proposal, stated it was reasonable, provided a basis for discussion and had support of Ethiopian delegation because provided for

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1 A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/13) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3:04 p.m. and adjourned at 7:10 p.m.
all-Korean elections and UN supervision thereof. Urged all delegations to accept in principle role of UN and stressed necessity that public in all countries understand that this conference has not abandoned UN.

Nam II then took floor and in long speech of primarily propagandistic content attacked ROK 14-point proposal and supported Chinese Communist proposal for NNSC as good basis for settlement. According to Nam, DPROK proposal re all-Korean commission good since it makes it impossible for one side to impose its will on other side. ROK proposals, on other hand, represent attempt extend authority Rhee regime to North Korea. ROK proposal that supervisory commission be under UN authority is unacceptable since UN was belligerent in Korean war. Supervision in Korea should be carried out by neutral nations, i.e., states which did not take part in Korean conflict. ROK proposal shows that ROK fears free elections since it provides for election to be held in South Korea prior to withdrawal US forces. Simultaneous withdrawal of US forces and Chinese Peoples Volunteers necessary to insure truly free election. DPROK not in principle against phased withdrawal foreign troops but considers that such withdrawal must be proportional. As already stated, DPROK delegation willing to negotiate re date by which withdrawal must be completed. ROK proposal for UN guarantee of Korea security is unacceptable and represents attempt drive conference away from proper course. Conference should not wait until unification achieved to undertake definite decision on method of guaranteeing maintenance of peace and security in Korea. As previously stated, DPROK favors guarantee by states most interested maintenance, peace and security in Far East.

Saying basic Korean law was matter for future all Korean assembly to decide and thus not within competence of Geneva conference, Nam then stated ROK proposal provided for spreading authority of ROK constitution to North Korea, and launched into long attack on allegedly anti-democratic, anti-popular nature ROK constitution, ROK failure carry out land reform, exploitation industrial workers, police terror, etc.

Chou En-lai then took floor² and referred to three proposals put forward by Nam II which were supported by USSR and CPR. Stated these provided broad possibilities for Korean unity through free elections. Added that on 22 May CPR made supplementary proposal that elections be supervised by neutral nations commission. Chou then referred to ROK 14-point proposal also submitted 22 May which he said

²For the text of Chou's statement, see The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, pp. 137–141.
sought unified Korea with support of foreign armies. Said this no basis for peace and condemned attempt of US and other delegations to seek support for ROK proposal by invoking illegal resolutions UN. Contended must seek other solution and common ground could be found. Further contended peaceful settlement Korean question could be found through free elections in accordance with principles of proportional representation. Re withdrawal of foreign forces, stated only few delegations differ in principle on this point. Cited Eden’s statement that common ground could be found and that conference should not despair of agreement. Claimed some delegations wanted to delay withdrawal of foreign forces, but stated there must be no delay since Korean settlement related to peace in Far East. To this end urged conference find concrete solution and not let ROK proposal stand in way.

Next section Chou speech devoted to attack on ROK and on Rhee regime. Denied assertion that ROK represents all Korean people. Charged that since it does not it fears free elections and opposes joint North-South Korean organ for all-Korean elections. Charged ROK still wants to dominate all Korea and impose its constitution while opposing withdrawal of UN, chiefly US, forces. Asserted Korean people should be enabled to settle Korean question themselves and cited NY Times article 28 May in support of charge that this issue being obscured by ROK and others.

Chou then continued in support of Nam II proposal that free elections be prepared and held by commission composed by two sides. Further stated that because Korea divided for years and strained situation exists, necessary to have elections supervised by neutral nations commission saying that UN supervision untenable because UN a belligerent party which had lost its competence and moral authority to deal impartially with situation. Referred to successes of Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in supervising Korean armistice. Asserted that armistice formula for neutral (nation not participating in Korean hostilities) should be adopted. Said NNSC played positive role in armistice supervision, that it had worked out effective procedures in rotation of personnel and military equipment, has established regular inspections in North and South Korea. and has conducted specific investigations as requested by both sides. Stated that although commission has met with difficulties its contributions and achievements cannot be denied, thus no reason why neutral nations commission cannot carry out supervision Korean elections.

Further stated withdrawal all foreign forces prerequisite for holding free elections. Stated CPR and DPROK have stood for withdrawal foreign forces whereas ROK and US unwilling withdraw UN forces
simultaneously. This is proof they plan to keep troops in Korea to interfere with elections.

In concluding, Chou cited statements several UN delegates (New Zealand, Australia, and UK) who expressed common desire withdraw forces Korea as soon as would be done without endangering peace. Stated to prevent recurrence fighting in Korea nations most interested in peace in Far East should assume obligation for peaceful development Korea and saw no reason why conference could not agree on withdrawal of foreign forces and guarantee peaceful development Korea by nations most interested in peace in Far East.

Philippine representative then made eloquent speech criticising Communist spokesman for disregard UN authority in proposals for Korean settlement, strongly supported UN authority, validity its resolutions, etc., and expressed “hearty approval and support” for 14-point ROK proposal.

After recess Molotov took floor. Outlined following principles on which he said agreement could be reached now in principle and submitted draft resolution, adoption of which he indicated would be favorable influence on further work of conference:

“Participants in Geneva conference have agreed on following fundamental principles in regard peaceful settlement of Korean problem:

1. With view to unifying Korea and to establishing united, independent and democratic Korean state, free elections shall be held throughout territory Korea.

2. Elections shall be held within six months after conclusion of present agreement.

3. Elections shall be conducted by secret ballot and universal suffrage.

4. Representation in all-Korean legislature will be in proportion to population of Korea as whole.

5. With view to preparing and conducting free all-Korean elections and to facilitating rapprochement between Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Republic of Korea, all-Korean body shall be set up composed of representatives of Democratic People's Republic Korea and Republic of Korea.

6. Composition and duties of this body shall be subject of further examination.

7. All foreign forces shall be withdrawn from Korea within specified periods.

8. Periods and phases for withdrawal of all foreign forces from North and South Korea prior to holding of free all-Korean elections shall be subject of further examination.

9. An appropriate international commission shall be set up to supervise holding of free all-Korean elections.

For the text of the speech, see The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, pp. 141-142.

For the text of Molotov’s statement, see ibid., pp. 143-149.
“Composition of this supervisory commission shall be subject of further examination.

5. Recognizing importance of preventing any violation of peace in Korea, it is deemed necessary for states most directly concerned in maintenance of peace in Far East to assume obligations for ensuring Korea's peaceful development, so as to facilitate settlement of problem of Korea's national unification.

“Question of which states are to assume obligations regarding ensuring of Korea's peaceful development and of nature of these obligations shall be subject of further examination.”

Molotov then noted outstanding differences of views expressed so far in conference and said importance of these should not be minimized. In particular in this connection mentioned difference concerning all-Korea commission and withdrawal foreign forces. Conference, he said, should proceed to detailed and concrete examination of these differences in effort to reconcile them.

Molotov then launched violent propaganda attack on United States whose representative on May 28, he said, had tried to present United States in light of defender principles of United Nations Charter, human rights, peace and security when “facts” showed that United States had undertaken aggression contrary to principles UN Charter, and even now while settlement Korea problem still under discussion was taking action in Southeast Asia which constituted new threat to peace and security. In conclusion, Molotov in current standard Soviet propaganda language drew contrast between UN actions allegedly undermining UN authority and alleged Soviet support for principles collective security, citing in latter connection Soviet policy prior World War II, Soviet European security proposals, offer to join NATO, and support for Chinese Communist proposals regarding maintenance of security in Far East.

Netherlands delegate spoke next. Noted that conference has been under way for six weeks and that positions are still far apart on some issues. Expressed belief of his delegation that common ground does exist. Cited as example that both North and South Korean delegations propose all-Korea elections. Found it encouraging that Nam Il agrees with principle of proportional representation but emphasized that central problem is how to organize free elections.

Cited DPROK proposal that elections should be organized by all-Korea commission and said Netherlands delegation believes this impractical and unrealistic. This conference convened because North and South Korea could not solve their problem. How then can we expect these parties to agree on the organization of elections? Said in his view conference cannot afford to give election commission responsibilities it never will be able to carry out.
Further cited Chou En-lai's admission of necessity for assistance in elections supervision from outside referring to Chou proposal for neutral commission, but noted this commission would take action only after all-Korea commission had agreed on conditions for free elections. Stated it doubtful that such all-Korea commission could ever reach stage of necessary agreement.

Then referred to ROK proposal for unification. Stated that Netherlands delegation feels it presents excellent possibilities for solution and that most important part of proposal is role attributed to UN in conduct of elections. Noted that several delegates had attacked and discredited UN as aggressor. Said he would not take up these allegations since Netherlands Foreign Minister previously dealt with them.

Labelled collective security cornerstone UN and principle that commands loyalty of peace-loving nations. Referred to action in Korea as ray of hope for freedom and peace of mankind. Stated that free elections were way to goal of settlement Korea problem, agreed assistance from outside essential, and that this should be provided by UN.

In conclusion, stated that Netherlands delegation listened to USSR proposals made earlier in session and stated that Netherlands delegation will study them with care in light of statement just made.

Pyun, ROK, then took floor and spoke from notes for purpose refuting view Communist fallacy which, he said, appeared in Nam Il's statement today among many old lies and distortions. Pyun took heated issue with effort Nam Il had made to support principle of equal representation in all-Korea commission (in spite of seven to one population ratio) by drawing analogy with US and Swiss historical precedent. Pyun emphasized division of Korea not administrative one like US states or Swiss cantons, but one brought about by foreign imposition.

General Smith spoke last. Verbatim text sent USIA for Wireless File. Although past 7 p. m., chairman permitted Chou make brief statement saying that views re NNSC quoted by General Smith had only been those of Swedish and Swiss members; that he would distribute letters from Polish and Czech members to delegations, and reserve his right to reply to other parts of General's speech.

For the text, see The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, pp. 149-153. In his statement, Smith criticized the Communist proposal for an all-Korean commission to prepare for elections in Korea, since, he said, North Korea would have equal representation on such a body, despite the disparity in size between the two Koreas, and hence would have a built-in veto on proposals for genuine, free elections. He also sharply opposed the Chinese advocacy of a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to monitor the elections, stating that the NNSC agreed on for the Korean Armistice had been a dismal failure because of Communist trickery and insincerity. Finally, he emphasized that genuinely free elections in Korea could only be held under the supervision of the United Nations.
Comment: Communist speeches seemed designed partly for immediate internal propaganda consumption, partly (in pretending to outline rational way for conference to pursue its work toward agreement) so that contrast could later be drawn between “sincere” Communist efforts achieve agreement and anticipated desire of other delegations to terminate Korean phase. In addition, Communist speakers, especially Nam II, seemed to imply that security guarantees for Korea should be established whether or not agreement achieved on unification.

SMITH

JUNE 6, 1954

396.1 GE/6–554: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT GENEVA, June 6, 1954—2 p. m.

Dulte 155. Yesterday’s plenary session on Korea until Molotov’s speech was everything we could have asked for. Nam II and Chou En-lai repeated with vehemence all of the charges, spurious allegations, and unacceptable proposals which they had advanced previously, and gave no indication of the slightest willingness to compromise in any direction. They also categorically rejected the ROK proposals. At the time of the five o’clock break practically all of our associates were convinced that our case had been made for us, and even the Canadian delegate told us that he had no further concern about his public opinion nor did he think there was any need to proceed further.

During the last hour of the session, however, Molotov spoke in an attitude of sweet reasonableness, presented and circulated the proposals sent you in Secto 391.\(^1\) However, he concluded with a vicious attack on thesis. As we analyze these proposals, they are a combination of some of Krishna Menon’s “principles” combined with a rephrasing of the unacceptable North Korean formula, together with acceptance of the idea of international supervision. This latter, which of course is spurious, as well as the all-Korean body are sugar-coated with the phrase that “composition and duties are to be examined further”

While we have not yet talked with our 15 associates, we greatly fear that Molotov’s proposals may have destroyed the chance of an immediate clean break, in full association with the other 15, on the issue of the United Nations.

\(^1\) Supra.
To those of the 15, headed by Britain and the Dominions, who wish to return home with the report of an "area of agreement on principle and relaxation of tensions" the Molotov proposal will probably make a strong appeal.

I had believed until the last hour yesterday that it would not even be necessary to hold a restricted meeting, as the issues then seemed very clearly drawn. My estimate now is that we will have to have such a meeting to examine the Molotov proposal in order to satisfy a number of the 16. It will not be possible until tomorrow afternoon to give you any accurate estimate. Our present plan is to wait until the last minute tomorrow and then call off the restricted meeting on Korea which had been announced as probable. The only one to whom I have talked about this is Bidault and he concurs, as it gives him another day to avoid an Indochina plenary. I would also prefer not to have a meeting of the 16 tomorrow, as we need time to ascertain by private contact what the various individual attitudes are, and plan our tactics. Doubt if we can avoid a meeting of the 16 Tuesday morning.²

As reported in our Secto 378,³ our present differences are in emphasis. We wish to emphasize any break on the United Nations issue. All of our associates except the Commonwealth bloc will in the end support us, not because all of them agree, but because they accept our leadership. The Commonwealth bloc prefers to emphasize the issue of free elections. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have quite definite instructions in this regard.

I asked Eden to give us a little help with the Dominions, saying that actually we had the same song with two verses, and it didn’t make much difference which verse we sang first, as long as we all sang the same song. He agreed, and said that both would be sung with equal loudness as far as he was concerned. But this was before Molotov.

The UN role in Korea has been vigorously rejected by the Communist bloc. The Molotov proposal ostensibly offers a negotiating basis for the views expressed by the Commonwealth bloc. Our dilemma is how to go along with the Commonwealth bloc in exploring the Molotov proposals without compromising our position that the UN role in resisting aggression and its authority and competence in establishing the peace is basic to all of the other issues involved. I would be extremely grateful for your thoughts and suggestions to reach me by Monday evening, as we may really need them on Tuesday.

Smith

² June 8.
³ Dated June 4, p. 342.
The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation\footnote{This telegram was drafted by Dulles. It was repeated to Seoul as telegram 962 and to Tokyo as telegram 2708.}

SECRET  NIAC\footnote{Supra.}  WASHINGTON, June 7, 1954—11:30 a.m.

Tedul 166. Ur Dulte 155.\footnote{Dated June 4, p. 344.}

1. My feeling is resolution forwarded by Molotov should be rejected on the ground that it gives spurious sense of accomplishment although in reality it does not resolve any major issue except that of proportionate representation. This, however, is itself illusory until there is agreement as to the supervision of elections which will determine composition of all Korean legislature.

2. With respect to composition and duties of preparatory body; with respect to withdrawal of foreign forces; with respect to supervisory commission; and with respect to states assuming obligations to insure greatest peaceful Korean development, all “subject to further examination”. The Berlin communiqué agreed that there should be “the establishment through peaceful means of a united and independent Korea”. The Molotov resolution, using many words to create the illusion of progress, in fact does little more than repeat what was agreed to at Berlin. I feel it would be a fraud upon the peace-loving peoples of the world who are eager to see Korea peacefully united if a resolution were adopted which would inevitably lead to subsequent disillusionment if, as we assume, the communist bloc adhere to their view that the United Nations must be publicly humiliated by being excluded from any role in consummating its program first undertaken in 1947 to create an independent and united Korea.

3. The position of the 16 has too many unresolvable difficulties to allow any of us to play this dangerous game of Molotov’s. President Rhee has gone as far as he is likely to go and is becoming very restive. Only an excellent piece of persuasion by Briggs induced him to authorize Pyun to attend a final restricted session (Seoul’s 1303 sent Geneva 156 Tokyo 773\footnote{Dated June 1, p. 334.}). He may at any point call the ROK delegation home. Our position before world opinion is certainly much better if we break off the Conference now while we are united than if we pursue a mirage of negotiation until we are divided from each other.

4. We have two good issues. I have already emphasized the prime importance of the UN issue in my own thinking. (Tedul 145.) This
is one that free world opinion will understand. The other is the issue of genuinely free elections. I see advantages if the Commonwealth will emphasize this issue if they will also speak in support of the UN. We can also cover both points with some difference of emphasis. And I hope in talking about Molotov’s proposal there will be less note of welcome and more tone of regret that he gives no evidence of real willingness to yield on the fundamentals.

Dulles

June 8, 1954

396.1 GE/6-854: Telegram

Eighth Meeting of the Heads of the 16 Allied Delegations, Geneva, June 8, 11:05 a. m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

Geneva, June 8, 1954—9 p. m.


1. Eighth meeting of 16 morning, June 8 conference reflected gratifying consensus opinion and agreement on situation and tactics among all delegations.

2. Smith confidentially informed group he had explored question composition of body to supervise Korean elections informally with Molotov last night, and latter made it quite clear Communists would agree only to supervisory body consisting equally Communists and non-Communists, i.e. complete counterpart of NNSC established under armistice agreement. Smith said this only confirmed our feeling that Saturday’s plenary session had clarified and sharpened issues between 16 and Communists. Communists entirely firm in rejecting our fundamental principles of free elections and UN supervision. Smith quoted at length Secretary’s views (Tedul 166 information Seoul 992 and Tokyo 2708) that these two are very strong issues on which all 16 agree even if some would emphasize one of issues more than other, and that Secretary felt also too many minor points of difference among us which might be revealed if we were dragged into exploring Molotov proposal and it is much better to stand firm and united on major issues.

1 A set of minutes of this meeting (AD Verb Min/8) from which the time is taken is in FE files, lot 60 D 330, box 14824. The meeting adjourned at 12:07 p. m.

2 For a record of this meeting, see the memorandum of conversation by Page, p. 1059.

3 Supra.
as 16 now are. It would be highly desirable for other delegations to address themselves to Molotov’s speech emphasizing disagreement on fundamentals and expressing regret that he gave no evidence of willingness to yield on basic issues.

3. Turning to tactics, Smith said we believe that after Saturday’s session it no longer necessary to have restricted session in order to clarify and sharpen issues with Communists. Indeed restricted session would be undesirable now since it might give impression that we consider Molotov’s proposal genuine and were anxious to negotiate on basis of it. Our side should now concentrate on exposing Molotov’s proposal in plenary. It might be better, however, wait little while see if Communists take initiative in requesting next Korean plenary as they might do in view of Chou En-lai’s statement Saturday he reserves right to make full reply to Smith’s speech.

4. Other delegations (UK, Canada, ROK, Philippines, Australia, Netherlands, Thailand, Colombia, Turkey) expressed agreement points made by Smith. It was generally recognized that Molotov’s speech contains no concession on fundamentals but was superficially attractive and might confuse public opinion. They agreed restricted session now unwise and desirable to have plenary to expose Molotov’s proposal. They agreed it would be desirable to have few days to consult governments, and let Communists take initiative in demanding next Korean plenary, but it would be undesirable to wait too long and leave Molotov proposal before public without having additional replies to it. Pyun (ROK) preferred sponsor plenary session for our side make “clinching statement and wind it all up”.

5. Garcia of Philippines suggested that at next plenary some delegations might wish to ask Communists directly question it had been intending to put to them in restricted session i.e. whether Communists would accept authority of UN.

6. UK, Netherlands, Australia, however, reserved position on desirability of restricted session in light developments at next plenary.

7. Group agreed that nothing should be done until Thursday morning. If by then Communists had not requested plenary, Kural would make contact with them and inquire whether they desire plenary in view of Chou En-lai’s expressed intention of speaking again. He would suggest plenary on Friday and if Communists refuse would insist on having one Saturday.

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*June 10.*
CONFIDENTIAL  PRIORITY

SEOUL, June 10, 1954—9 p. m.

1326. Repeated information Tokyo 785, priority Geneva 166. Geneva for USDel; Tokyo pass CINCUNC. President Rhee has just sent me following message via Acting Foreign Minister Cho:

"Informed that at Geneva today 16 nations agreed that Communist proposal offered no encouragement and must be rejected. They also agreed time has come end Korean negotiations. US and some countries want break emphasizing UN issue while England and her sister countries want to stress free election issue."

Cho said President would appreciate it if I would convey this most urgently to Secretary Dulles and USDel Geneva emphasizing his belief Korea phase should be terminated without further delay or parley otherwise Communists will succeed in obscuring issues and dividing allies.

I reminded Cho that President had expressed approximately the same thoughts at our last talk re Geneva (Embtel 1303, June 4, repeated Geneva 156, Tokyo 773) and that his views are accordingly already a matter of record. I said I should be glad nevertheless to telegraph again as requested by Rhee.

I also told Cho that I hoped instructions to Dr. Pyun would give latter sufficient leeway to permit him continue for at least a few days more, should that be necessary in order preserve united front UN side.

My conversation with Cho underlines views expressed Embtel 1307, June 7 (repeated Geneva 158, Tokyo 775) that we are likely have great trouble keeping Rhee in line unless Geneva phase ends very soon. While I shall continue do my best dissuade Rhee from ordering his delegation home, unless there is something definite I can tell him prospect unpromising.

BRIGGS

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1 Dated June 4, p. 344.

2 Not printed. It stated that at their meeting on June 4, Rhee had spoken to Briggs of withdrawal of the Korean Delegation from Geneva. Rhee had not made any threat to recall Pyun, said Briggs, but the Ambassador wished the Department of State not to overlook the possibility of early withdrawal of the Republic of Korea from the Geneva Conference. (795.00/6-754)

3 Telegram 1327, June 11, 1 a. m., from Seoul conveyed the following message from Ambassador Briggs:

"Later conversation with Acting Foreign Minister Cho this evening [June 10] indicates that message from President Rhee to me quoted reference telegram [1326] probably originated in Geneva from Pyun and that Rhee seeking capitalize thereon to support his thesis that Geneva Korean phase should be ended soon as possible." (795.00/6-1154)
SECRET    PRIORITY

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

GENEVA, June 10, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 418. Repeated information priority Seoul 120, Tokyo 123. Tokyo pass CINCUNC.

1. Korean plenary has been scheduled for Friday afternoon. The UK, New Zealand, Canada and possibly Thailand will speak for our side. Hope also for Sapa and short statement from Garcia.

2. Thereafter, USDel tentatively plans to lay following tactical recommendations before meeting of 16 Saturday June 12. Believe good possibility general acceptance by 16. Communist tactics are the problem.

A. Basic Considerations.

1. Our tactics should be based on probability that unlike Berlin, the Communists will not agree to any termination formula. They will make major propaganda issue out of our “breaking up” or “wrecking” conference, while they still wish negotiate. They will maneuver to keep Korean phase conference going.

2. Continued sessions will only renew possibilities for confusing the basic issues, for creating differences among 16, and for propaganda which may have some effect on our respective public opinions. Nothing more can be achieved since Communists have shown no slightest intention to compromise on basic issues.

3. Therefore, Allies will probably have to terminate conference unilaterally, but on issues which will stand up before world opinion.

B. Preferable Plan.

1. We should hold no more meetings either plenary or restricted. Such meetings would invite further Communist delaying tactics such as elaboration Nam Il’s point 3.

2. Representatives 3 Allied inviting powers (US, UK and France) could send joint written memorandum to Molotov informing him, as representative 4th inviting power, that they, and their 13 associates, are agreed that the 2 basic issues on which they insist, i.e., authority of UN and provision for genuinely free elections, have been repeatedly rejected by other side. Therefore, 16 are agreed that further consideration and examination Korean question by conference would serve no useful purpose as long as Communist delegations reject these two basic requirements.

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1 June 11.
2 The meeting of 16 was not held until June 14.
3. The 16 could issue joint declaration drafted broad terms simultaneously with delivery letter to Molotov. Letter and joint declaration could be issued soon as necessary consultations between delegations of 16 and their governments can be completed preferably by Tuesday June 15.

Eden may wish first see Molotov in attempt obtain his agreement to no further meetings. Some of other 16 would probably support this. This would probably not be successful and in that event we should be prepared promptly to implement foregoing plan. If it is successful, the letter from the 3 on our side could be eliminated.

4. General outlines of a report to UN by 16 should be agreed to if possible at meeting of 16 June 12, and detailed drafting should be referred to working group of 15 in Washington.

C. Alternative Plan.

1. As a less desirable alternative to above procedure in event some of 16 insist on another meeting, we should tell rest of 16 we would be willing have one more plenary or one more restricted meeting.

2. At close such meeting, letter to Molotov would be delivered and declaration of 16 would be issued.

3. Would appreciate Department’s comments soon as possible.  

SMITH

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The Department of State’s response was conveyed in telegrams Tosec 396 and 397, June 11, to Geneva, which indicated a preference for the plan set forth in paragraph B2 but stated that there was no objection to the plan in C2 if Smith thought it desirable in order to maintain Allied unity. The Secretary concurred in this judgment. (396.1 GE/6-1054)

JUNE 11, 1954

396.1 GE/6-1154: Telegram

Fourteenth Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, June 11, 3:05 p. m.:

The United States Delegation to the Department of State ¹

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 11, 1954—midnight.

Secto 425. Repeated information Tokyo 128, London 269, Moscow 217, Paris 421, Seoul 128. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Department pass Defense. Fourteenth Korean plenary Friday June 11, Molotov presiding, opened with speech by Chou En-lai. Chou stressed desirability of noting those points on which conference has already achieved agreement and those points where agreement may be possible. Then conference should proceed to discuss points of differences so as reach agreement. He proposed that conference adopt Molotov’s June 5 proposals as basis for further discussion and he went on to rehash argu-

¹A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/14) is in FE files, lot 55 D 481. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3:05 p.m. and adjourned at 7:20 p.m.
ments for all-Korean commission. Claimed US opposed to commission because US wants to impose ROK will on DPROK, which failed to do in war.

PROC cannot accept UN supervision since UN is a belligerent. It would be "inconceivable" that PROC or DPROK could agree to this.

NNSC has had its problems. These have been caused, not by Polish and Czech representatives, but because US has violated armistice on many occasions. US not only wants to prevent agreement on Korea, but wants to disband NNSC so that the US can proceed with arming ROK. Moreover, US objects to an NNSC in Indochina so as to keep war going there.

He closed by stating that peaceful settlement of Korea was closely related to peace in entire world. He claimed conference already achieved agreement on several points and no reason why conference should not continue. World opinion would not permit conference to break off.

Ronning of Canadian delegation devoted opening part his speech to answering "challenge" of Communist delegation to authority of UN. Voicing Canada's unqualified support of UN as "preeminent international agency for making and keeping peace", he expressed belief any agreement on Korean unification must be in accordance UN principles. If conference cannot reach agreement on procedure for unifying Korea, UN will continue effort with Canadian support. Ronning then stressed danger of agreement on generalized principles when there remain serious questions as to meaning and details. Canada would like to be able to agree to Molotov's proposals, but this would be dishonest, since so many essential questions of detail are unresolved. In long run, it is more important to register actual disagreement on fundamental points than to fool people of world by indicating agreement on broad and fuzzy principles.

New Zealand delegate then spoke, pointing out spirit of give and take was lacking in Communist delegation, especially on issues vital to cause UN members pledged to uphold. He continued in much same vein as Ronning. Although could agree with platitudinous statements of Molotov, free world has learned to examine such statements for their real meaning. It would be of little service to world if agreement was reported on these broad principles when there exists, in fact, fundamental disagreement on the basic issue of the preparation for and conduct of free elections. NNSC was an experiment in international cooperation—one that did not work, may have been disastrous and is not likely to be repeated. By abandoning their perverse attitude toward

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2 For the text, see The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, pp. 154–161.

3 For the text of McIntosh's statement, see ibid., pp. 161–165.
the UN, the PROC could open up way for a settlement of Korean
problem and for wider settlement of Far Eastern problems. By deliber-
ate design Communists have made acceptance versus denial to UN
key issue both for Korean settlement and for the reconciliation of
China with majority of nations.

Nam-II followed with comparatively short speech which (a) em-
phasized that there was general agreement many questions of prin-
ciple; (b) endorsed Molotov draft resolution of June 5; and (c) re-
piled to General Smith’s indictment of NNSC. In supporting Molotov
resolution, Nam-II reiterated Communist position on all-Korean com-
mission, withdrawal foreign forces prior election, international super-
visory commission and guarantee peaceful development Korea by
interested states. Blaming US military authorities for difficulties
NNSC in Korea, Nam-II alleged North Koreans had completely co-
operated while UN command violated armistice and obstructed work
of commission.

Eden then spoke, pointing out two fundamental issues before con-
ferece are authority of UN and question of free all-Korean elections.
In Korea UN demonstrated its worth as organization for implement-
ing collective security. Only by carrying out purpose and principles of
UN charter can conference find solution to Korean question. Far from
having lost its moral authority by its actions in Korea, UN by defend-
ing ROK against aggression, strengthened its authority.

While all say we agree must unify Korea by free elections, we do
not agree on methods and procedures. This is same difference in prin-
ciple which we faced in Berlin. Impartial international supervision
essential for truly free elections. Supervisory commission must be so
composed that it can take effective decisions and must have authority
carry them out. UN is most appropriate body from which to choose
impartial international commission. If all-Korean commission which
gives veto to North Korean Communist minority, has main responsi-
bility for elections result would be no elections or elections which not
free. Communist proposal for NNSC supervision not only leaves un-
altered all-Korean commission, but is same type which already
unsatisfactory.

How does Molotov’s draft resolution help since it is just on methods
of application where we differ. UK stands on principles UN au-
thority and free elections. If no way found resolving differences on
these two issues, must admit conference unable complete its task. As
UN members we should then report back that organization. This
would insure search for political settlement in Korea could be resumed
at right moment.

*For the text, see The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, pp. 165-168.
Thai delegate in brief speech expressed view UN supervision over free elections was essential. Draft resolution of Soviet delegation is unacceptable because it is a “skeleton” rather than plan for settlement. Thai delegation cannot agree to establishment of commissions without their composition and duties being known beforehand.

Spaak then made eloquent extemporaneous speech with much dramatic force. He noted that conference had come to “decisive” stage. Molotov’s speech was of considerable importance, but was too optimistic in its claims of agreement on many issues. Agreement possible in principle, but so many matters of detail remain unsettled that there are still many important divergencies. If UN ignored in Korean settlement it would doom both concept of collective security and UN organization. Among 60 member countries in UN it would be possible find panel of impartial nations acceptable to both sides. At close of speech Spaak said he had tried to put his thoughts in writing and read following:

“In order to prepare and to organize free general elections throughout Korea, the UN shall appoint a commission, members of that commission will be selected impartially in order to enjoy the trust from both sides involved. That commission shall act in close cooperation with the representatives of the ROK and with those of the DPROK. The questions pertaining to the final constitution and other terms of reference of that body shall be the subject of a supplementary consideration.”

He said if Molotov could embody such text in his proposal Geneva conference would make decisive step forward. If not, then we must face conclusion expressed by Eden today.

Bidault who had not previously indicated he was going to speak and inscribed himself late in the session spoke last. He pointed out France could not subscribe to attacks on UN. He noted that Molotov’s proposal was designed to obscure disagreement on fundamental issues. Emphasized that French delegate was moved by a spirit of reasonableness and desire to compromise in both facets of conference. He closed by stating his delegation “adheres in principle to ideas enunciated by one of our presidents, which may be summed up as follows:

“1. Korea, within her historical frontiers, should be united as a free, independent and democratic state.
2. To this end, elections should be held throughout the territory of Korea to establish a single and really representative government for the whole of the country.
3. The elections should be carried out under conditions of true freedom under international supervision.

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5 For the text, see The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, pp. 168–173.
6 For the text, see ibid., pp. 173–174.
4. The settlement of the Korean question should make provision for
the withdrawal of foreign forces.
5. When once the unification has been carried out under number
maximum conditions, the UN would be called upon to give their san-
tion to this settlement thus reached.

Comment: Communists may seize on Bidault’s closing statement as
invitation to continue Korean phase. Bidault’s 5 points bear close re-
semblance to Eden’s statement of “basic principles” in May 13 Korean
plenary, although 5th point seems to be Bidault’s very own. USDel
had no prior knowledge contents French speech.

SMITH

396.1 GE/6-1154: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET NIACFT

GENEVA, June 11, 1954—7 p. m.

Secto 424. Repeated information priority Seoul 121, Tokyo 126.
Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Reference Secto 418. Following is draft
declaration by 16 which we will begin discussing tomorrow with UK
and possibly some other key delegations with view introducing in
meeting 16 Monday. Would appreciate Department’s comments. De-
partment will, of course, appreciate that delegation will require some
negotiating flexibility on final text in order quickly obtain agreement
all 16.

Draft declaration by the 16.

“Pursuant to the resolution of August 28, 1953, of the United Na-
tions General Assembly, and the Berlin communiqué of February 18,
1954, we, the 16 nations who contributed military forces to the United
Nations Command in Korea, have been participating in the Geneva
Conference for the purpose of establishing a united and independent
Korea by peaceful means.

We have made a number of proposals and suggestions in accord
with the past efforts of the United Nations to bring about the unifica-
tion, independence and freedom of Korea; and within the framework
of the following two principles which we believe to be fundamental:

1. The United Nations, under its Charter, is fully and right-
fully empowered to take collective action to repel aggression, to
restore peace and security, and to contribute its good offices to
seeking a peaceful adjustment in Korea.

2. There should be established a united and independent Korea
through the holding of genuinely free elections under the supervi-
sion of an appropriate United Nations body, for representatives
in the National Assembly, in which representation shall be in
direct proportion to the indigenous population in Korea.

1 Dated June 10, p. 360.
2 June 14.
We have earnestly and patiently searched for a basis of agreement which would enable us to proceed with Korean unification in accordance with these fundamental principles. We have failed.

The Communist delegations have rejected our every effort. The principal issues between us, therefore, are clear. We accept and assert the authority of the United Nations. The Communists repudiate and reject the role of the United Nations in Korea and have labelled the UN itself the tool of aggression. We desire genuinely free elections. The Communists, while asserting a corresponding desire, insist upon procedures which would make free elections, as we understand them, completely impossible. It is only too apparent that the Communist states will not accept impartial supervision of free elections. Plainly, they have shown their intention to maintain Communist control over North Korea. They have persisted in the same attitudes which have frustrated United Nations’ efforts to unify Korea since 1947.

However attractive it might be to state that some agreement in principle had been reached at this point, we believe that in the long run it will be better if we squarely face the facts of our disagreement and acknowledge them than to delude ourselves with false hopes and lead the people of the world to believe that there is agreement when there is no real agreement.

In the circumstances, we have been compelled reluctantly and regretfully to conclude that, so long as the Communist delegations reject the two fundamental principles which we consider indispensable, further consideration and examination of the Korean question by the conference would serve no useful purpose. We reaffirm our continued support for the objectives of the United Nations on the establishment of a united and independent Korea.”

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396.1 GE/6-1154: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Embassy in Korea

SECRET PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 11, 1954—11 p. m.

122. Repeated information Department Secto 426, Tokyo 127. Tokyo pass CINUNC.

1. Re Seoul’s 1326 to Department repeated information Geneva 166 and Tokyo 785 with respect last sentence Rhee’s message to you.

Please inform him at appropriate opportunity that UK, Commonwealth and all other delegations agree we have two good issues, as Secretary stated in his Tedul 166 to Geneva, repeated Seoul 992 and Tokyo 2708. There was general agreement on these issues at eighth meeting of 16 June 8 as we have previously reported. UK, Commonwealth and others stressed these issues today’s plenary.

2. We fully appreciate likelihood of increasing difficulty with ROK if Korean phase not wound up soon. Conditional on Department’s

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1 Dated June 10, p. 359.
2 Dated June 7, p. 356.
comments, suggest you inform Rhee general lines Secto 418 repeated information Seoul 120 and Tokyo 123 if you consider useful. You also might convey to Rhee that UK, Commonwealth, US and other Allies are in complete agreement on necessity for quickly bringing Korean phase to end in appropriate manner. However, we all realize here difficulties Communists will give us in trying to make “clean break”. Pyun has told us he has discretion on exactly when and how terminate which he hopes will be immediately. He also has agreed a 16-nation statement at end of conference would be advisable.

3. Plan meeting of 16 on Monday discuss termination tactics in detail.

SMITH

3 Dated June 10, p. 360.

JUNE 12, 1954

396.1 GE/6-1254 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

Geneva, June 12, 1954—1 p. m.

Secto 429. Department pass USUN as Geneva’s 16; repeated Usun 16. Urrutia called on Smith by appointment pursuant to instructions and exchanged views on Korean phase at Geneva and next steps. Following points were made:

1. Smith outlined proposed tactics for termination, along lines Secto 418. Urrutia agreed that this was reasonable and indicated he would support. He had some doubt, however, as to whether we could avoid an additional meeting if Communists asked for one but in any event he said if we have our position agreed, we could break off and issue declaration immediately following such further meeting. Urrutia stressed need for time to bring around public opinion in European and LA countries to recognize fundamental Communist responsibility for failure conference. He also expressed satisfaction with Spaak speech June 11, particularly since it emphasized we prepared to accept new UN commission not necessarily UNCURK, since latter generally discredited.

2. Smith outlined proposed declaration along lines Secto 424. Urrutia reacted favorably. He approved particularly idea that declaration would leave talks in the penumbral state, i.e., not necessarily adjourned with implication that if Communist accepted fundamental principles they could resume. He thought this would help us with Rhee

1 Dated June 10, p. 360.
2 Dated June 11, p. 365.
since we could argue conference not fully broken off and therefore no action of other kind should be considered. He thought also it would help us postpone consideration of Korea in UN until Ninth session. In this connection, he suggested proposed report to UN should be addressed specifically to Ninth session. If we announced this intention it would make it easier for us to resist having Korea come up earlier, e.g., if GA meets to consider Thailand appeal.

3. Urrutia raised question paragraph 62 Korean Armistice Agreement. Smith confirmed that armistice is in effect perpetual and that armistice is really more than merely a military agreement. He said however that it is not necessarily desirable to emphasize this publicly since there are advantages in keeping Communists guessing as to what our intentions in Korea are. Smith expressed personal view that Rhee's threats to march north are largely bluff.

4. Urrutia urged necessity for full consultations before Korea comes up in GA again and suggested desirability of having preliminary talks on this aspect take place here before 16 depart. He stressed particularly need for UK-US agreement on positions and timing UN consideration.

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396.1 GE/6–1154: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

SECRET NIACI WASHINGTON, June 12, 1954—2:09 p.m.

Tosec 407. Secto 424 repeated Seoul 121 Tokyo 126. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC. Secretary read Secto 424 and thought in general furnished satisfactory basis for discussions other delegations. He confirms you should have negotiating flexibility you request.

Department has following comments on draft declaration:

1. First paragraph delete “the 16” and substitute “as”, thus taking account fact South Africa also contributed forces.

2. Think numbered paragraph 1 needs strengthening and suggest rewrite as follows: “UN under its charter has duty to take collective action repel aggression and restore peace and security. It likewise fully and rightfully empowered seek peaceful settlement.”

3. In paragraph beginning “We have earnestly” delete last sentence “We have failed” as possibly tending place onus on us.

4. Penultimate paragraph delete “however attractive it might be to state that some agreement in principle had been reached at this point”

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1 Repeated for information to Seoul as telegram 1010 and to Tokyo as telegram 2774.

2 Dated June 11, p. 365.
since it tends too strongly confirm Molotov line agreement in principle has been or can be reached. This will necessitate minor changes rest same paragraph.

5. Change beginning final paragraph to read “In circumstances we have been compelled reluctantly and regretfully to conclude that conference has failed reach agreement on Korea. So long as Communist delegations etc.”

DULLES

366.1 GE/6-1254 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET    PRIORITY

Geneva, June 12, 1954—5 p. m.

Secto 431. Repeated information priority Seoul 124, priority Tokyo 130. Tokyo pass CINCUNC priority. Reference Secto 418 ¹ and Secto 424.² Following is draft of proposed letter to be addressed to Molotov and signed by Bidault, Eden and Smith. Would appreciate Department’s comments soonest:

“The Korean phase of the Geneva Conference has now been in session for more than seven weeks. No progress has been made toward a solution of the Korean problem, and it is now quite clear that your government, the PRC, and the PDROK are not disposed to agree to the unification of Korea on a basis consistent with the principles of the UN and the views of the Korean people and of the free peoples of the world.

The principal issues between us are clear. We accept and assert the authority of the UN. The delegations of the USSR, PRC and PDROK repudiate and reject the authority of the UN. We desire genuinely free elections. Those delegations fear and reject free elections.

In the circumstances, the sixteen governments participating in the Korean conference pursuant to our invitation, have concluded that further meetings will serve no useful purpose. They have therefore decided to adjourn further meetings. They remain ready to make further efforts to achieve the unification of Korea by peaceful means whenever the USSR, PRC and PDROK make clear their willingness to accept the principles which we consider fundamental.

A further statement of the reasons which compelled us to this step is set forth in a declaration which is being released to the public, a copy of which is attached.”³

SMITH

¹ Dated June 10, p. 360.
² Dated June 11, p. 365.
³ For text of the draft declaration transmitted in telegram Secto 436, June 14, see p. 372.
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the United States Delegation

SECRET       PRIORITY

SEOUL, June 12, 1954—7 p. m.

170. Sent Department 1331, repeated information Tokyo 792. Geneva for USDel. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Re Geneva Secto 418\(^1\) and 424\(^2\) (Seoul 120 and 121, Tokyo 123 and 126). Saw Rhee briefly this afternoon. Having in mind his morning departure for probable week's visit in Chinhae, considered it desirable bring him up to date with respect to our Geneva efforts this week-end obtain agreement on draft declaration.

I told Rhee we hoped stress two principles, viz. (1) united Korea through genuinely free elections and (2) authority of UN. I said it was proposed spell out these principles with sufficient detail so world would understand issues and put blame on Communists for blocking solution. Indicated we hoped draft might also contain reaffirmation of continued UN support after conference toward establishment united and independent Korea. I did not discuss text contained Secto 424 since that might have confused issue by eliciting specific suggestions or demands from President. Moreover no matter what text is adopted he will probably think it should have been stronger. For instance he will undoubtedly object to any phraseology he interprets as apologetic or appeasing in tone.

Rhee thanked me for information and remarked albeit cheerfully that "quicker we end this Geneva thing, the better". His general attitude was one of satisfaction and barring some further delay or altercation among allies leading to weak draft, I do not believe he is at the moment contemplating withdrawing ROK delegation. However this must still be reckoned as increasing possibility should anything retard our contemplated schedule for ending Korean phase.\(^3\)

Briggs

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\(^1\) Dated June 10, p. 360.
\(^2\) Dated June 11, p. 365.
\(^3\) In telegram 1011, June 12, to Seoul, the Department of State indicated that the action reported in telegram 170 constituted effective carrying out of the recommendation made in telegram 122, June 11, from Geneva to Seoul, p. 366. (396.1 GE/6-1154)

JUNE 13, 1954

795.00/6-1354 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation

SECRET     NIACT

WASHINGTON, June 13, 1954—12:39 p. m.

Tosec 411. Geneva's Secto 431 repeated Seoul 124 Tokyo 130.\(^1\) Tokyo also pass CINCUNC. Secretary has not seen reference telegram. Department believes it constitutes good basis for discussion with other

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\(^1\) Dated June 12, p. 369.
delegations. Pyun may have trouble with undertaking next-to-last paragraph make further efforts if Communists accept fundamental principles but hope you can convince him.

Since Communist proposals have paid lip service to "free elections", suggest might be clearer and more pointed revise last sentence second paragraph to read "The Communist delegations fear and reject any elections conducted under conditions of genuine freedom."

DULLES

396.1 GE/6–1454 : Telegram

Smith–Eden–Chauvel Meeting, Geneva, June 13, Evening: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACIT GENEVA, June 14, 1954—10 a.m.


[Here follows the main portion of the telegram which dealt with Indochina; for text, see page 1132.]

Eden indicated full agreement with our draft 16-nation declaration on Korea, but expressed some doubts about proposed letter from three to Molotov. He is inclined to feel, and I agree, Communists likely to insist on another plenary on Korea and that in this case best tactic might be let them talk, following which two or three Allied delegates would make brief statements, pointing out no change in Communist position. Immediately following close such session, 16-nation declaration would be issued.

SMITH

JUNE 14, 1954

396.1 GE/6–1454 : Telegram

Ninth Meeting of the Heads of the 16 Allied Delegations, Geneva, June 14, 11: 10 a.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State ¹

SECRET NIACIT GENEVA, June 14, 1954—3 p.m.


1. Ninth meeting of 16 held Monday morning to discuss termination tactics and text 16-nation declaration.

¹A set of minutes of this meeting (AD Verb Min/9) from which the time is taken is in FE files, lot 60 D 330, box 14824. The meeting adjourned at 1:03 p.m.
2. Tactics agreed as follows:

During meeting UK delegation reported Molotov had just told Eden Soviet delegation requesting plenary on Korea Tuesday 2 afternoon. If 16 can agree in time on draft declaration, we will agree to Tuesday plenary; otherwise try postpone until Wednesday. Whether plenary held Tuesday or Wednesday, after Communist speakers, Eden as chairman will recess session brief interval. Sixteen will caucus and return to plenary. Two or three allied delegations will then make concluding statements along lines Communist speakers have added nothing new, fundamental issues remain unresolved and no need further consideration of examination by conference of Korean question. Whether or not Communists speak again at plenary, Eden and Wan as co-chairmen immediately after plenary will see Molotov to tell him 16 believe conference is ended and give him copy 16-nation declaration which would be made public simultaneously.

3. Re draft declaration, 16 set up drafting committee to meet this afternoon composed of: US, ROK, UK, Thailand, Canada. Text generally acceptable but several drafting changes suggested of no particular difficulty except re description of body supervise free elections. General Smith urged quickest possible action complete draft acceptable to all, although compromise on some particular points of view. Suggest all posts urge importance agreed text in time Tuesday plenary session in order avoid postponement plenary which US and several other delegations consider undesirable. Will transmit drafting committee’s text soon as possible.

SMITH

2 June 15.

396.1 GE/6–1454: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL NIAC/ GENEVA, June 14, 1954—7 p.m.


Following is draft of declaration by 16 resulting from 3-hour meeting drafting committee this afternoon. It does not fully meet every point of view, but in our best judgment should be satisfactory to all.

1 Supra.
points of view. In view of press leaks on 16 meeting this morning disclosing this project, believe it essential that full agreement on text be reached at meeting 16 Tuesday 11 a.m. so that it may be subscribed to by all and issued immediately following Korean plenary same afternoon.

Word “appropriate” first sentence, second principle, is still under discussion and will require resolution at meeting 16 Tuesday. ROK insist on deletion “appropriate” and Commonwealth delegations wish delete “UN” in supervision of elections but will probably agree on following text if “appropriate” included. USDel agreeable to either formulation but in order maintain maximum allied unity, believe preferable “appropriate” be included. Request action addressees determine soonest whether instructions Del here sufficient to permit immediate agreement on this text and if not see Foreign Minister or other appropriate official urging that necessary instructions be transmitted in time permit maintenance foregoing schedule and thus permit termination conference under conditions most advantageous UN side.

Text follows:

“Pursuant to the resolution of August 28, 1953, of the United Nations General Assembly, and the Berlin communiqué of February 18, 1954, we, as nations who contributed military forces to the United Nations Command in Korea, have been participating in the Geneva Conference for the purpose of establishing a united and independent Korea by peaceful means.

We have made a number of proposals and suggestions in accord with the past efforts of the United Nations to bring about the unification, independence and freedom of Korea; and within the framework of the following two principles which we believe to be fundamental:

1. The United Nations, under its Charter, is fully and rightfully empowered to take collective action to repel aggression, to restore peace and security, and to extend its good offices to seeking a peaceful settlement in Korea.

2. In order to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea, genuinely free elections should be held under (appropriate) UN supervision, for representatives in the national assembly, in which representation shall be in direct proportion to the indigenous population in Korea.

We have earnestly and patiently searched for a basis of agreement which would enable us to proceed with Korean unification in accordance with these fundamental principles. We have failed.

The Communist delegations have rejected our every effort to obtain agreement. The principal issues between us, therefore, are clear. Firstly, we accept and assert the authority of the United Nations. The Communists repudiate and reject the authority and competence of the United Nations in Korea and have labelled the United Nations itself as the tool of aggression. Were we to accept this position of the Communists, it would mean the death of the principle of collective secu-
rity and of the UN itself. Secondly, we desire genuinely free elections. The Communists insist upon procedures which would make genuinely free elections impossible. It is clear that the Communists will not accept impartial and effective supervision of free elections. Plainly, they have shown their intention to maintain Communist control over North Korea. They have persisted in the same attitudes which have frustrated United Nations efforts to unify Korea since 1947.

We believe, therefore, that it is better to face the fact of our disagreement and not to raise false hopes and mislead the peoples of the world into believing that there is agreement where there is none.

In the circumstances, we have been compelled reluctantly and regretfully to conclude that so long as the Communist delegations reject the two fundamental principles which we consider indispensable, further consideration and examination of the Korean question by the conference would serve no useful purpose. We reaffirm our continued support for the objectives of the United Nations in Korea.

In accordance with the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations of August 28, 1953, the member states parties to this declaration will inform the United Nations concerning the proceedings at this conference.”

SMITH

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Editorial Note

At 8:50 p.m. on June 14, the Department of State transmitted to Geneva telegram Tedul 196, drafted by Secretary Dulles. The message dealt mainly with Indochina; for the text, see page 1146. With regard to Korea, the Secretary indicated his approval of the termination of the Conference along the lines of the last paragraph of telegram Dulite 179, June 13, and telegram Secto 435, June 14. (396.1 GE/6-1454)

JUNE 15, 1954

396.1 GE/6-1554: Telegram

Tenth Meeting of the Heads of the 16 Allied Delegations, Geneva. June 15, 11:07 a.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

GENEVA, June 15, 1954—3 p.m.


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1A set of minutes of this meeting (AD Verb Min/10) from which the time is taken is in FE files, lot 60 D 330, box 14824. The meeting adjourned at 12:15 p.m.
text 16-nation declaration. Discussion centered on draft declaration by 16 (Secto 436 *) and particularly use word “appropriate”. Pyun remained adamant to his insistence on its exclusion. Other participants generally urged him accept it for sake unanimity, stressing that phrase would refer to UNCURK in present circumstances though no one could bind UN as to body it might consider appropriate in future.

Finally Prince Wan suggested that since ROK finds word “appropriate” insurmountable obstacle, solution might be to omit word from declaration, but in text of report to UN which UN members will be sending, this word could be included.

Deadlock broke when Canada in prepared statement said that though they would prefer inclusion word “appropriate” as umbrella to cover those who had expressed different views on appropriate composition supervisory commission, declaration is on this subject basically contrary to Canadian position regardless of inclusion or exclusion word “appropriate”. Canada prepared to accept declaration as is and would not make any public statement derogating from unanimity. It wanted its friends to know, however, that it reserved its position for the future, and whenever issue properly arose would feel free to take position that important question was impartiality and effectiveness of supervision whether or not it is strictly supervision by UN.

Smith said that we would have preferred inclusion of “appropriate” for opposite reason, i.e., there might theoretically be some kind of UN supervision we would consider inappropriate. For sake of unity, however, we are prepared accept text without this word.

McIntosh (New Zealand) who had supported Canada’s position said that his government would not wish to remain sole holdout and will go along, but reserved its position for future along lines Canada.

Text draft declaration approved, therefore, without word “appropriate” and with deletion sentence “we have failed”, end fifth paragraph. Subject unforeseen developments, it will be signed this afternoon and issued immediately following close plenary tonight.

Group was informed that Nam II and Molotov inscribed and probably Chou En-lai would speak also. Smith suggested that in accordance with agreed tactics yesterday’s meeting, no member of 16 should inscribe. Communists would be allowed to speak before recess, and after recess form caucus of 16, Garcia and Spaak would sum up for our side.

Smith warned, however, that Nam II might propose establishment joint North-South Korean commission which we did not think conference should deal with. UK reported Molotov indicated Nam II

* Dated June 14, p. 372.
would raise question of continued validity of armistice. Smith said that if this happened, he would ask to speak before recess for caucus and would on behalf UNC assert that validity of armistice is not an issue at conference, that it continues in accordance paragraph 62, and there is no need for conference to deal with question. Canada supported need for making such statement.

Pyun said that he hoped none of 16 would make statements which would in effect promise Communists we would continue abide by armistice even if Communists violate it. He warned that it might be necessary for him to speak on this subject. Smith reminded him that ROK was not party to armistice and that US would speak for UNC and for all UN members and would have declaration on armistice which would accord with our commitments under it.

SMITH

396.1 GE/6-1654 : Telegram

Fifteenth Plenary Session on Korea, Geneva, June 15, 3:05 p.m.: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY GENEVA, June 16, 1954—1 p.m.


Nam II was first speaker. In statement leading to a six-point proposal (full text sent Secto 449), Nam II noted that US and countries

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1 A set of minutes of this meeting (US Verb Min/15) is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627. The minutes indicate that the meeting convened at 3:05 p.m. and adjourned at 8:35 p.m. Eden presided at the meeting. This message was transmitted in three sections.

2 The text of Nam II's proposal as transmitted in telegram Secto 449, June 15, from Geneva, read:

"Nam II Proposal. On the insurance of peaceful conditions in Korea. The States (which are) participants in the Geneva conference agree that they shall continue their efforts with a view to reaching agreement on the peaceful settlement of the Korean question on the basis of creating a united, independent, and democratic Korean state. In the interests of insuring peaceful conditions in Korea (it is agreed)

1. To recommend to the governments of the appropriate states that measures should be taken to withdraw from the territory of Korea all foreign armed forces as soon as possible with the observation of the principle of proportionality. The time limit for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea is subject to an agreement by the participants in the Geneva conference.

2. To reduce, within the period not exceeding one year, the strength of the troops of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, establishing the limit of troop strength for each of the states not exceeding 100,000 men.

3. To form, from the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, a commission to consider the question of creating conditions for gradual liquidation of the state of war, of transition of the
subject to it rejected the June 5 proposals of the USSR, and that

differences of opinion existed among the delegates primarily on ques-
tion of Korean elections, but that nevertheless it was necessary to
reach agreement on other questions since peoples of Korea and of
world demanded lessening of international tensions. He asserted that
conference should reach some agreement leading to peace in Korea.
He went on to charge South Korea with continuing to threaten re-
sumption of hostilities under US orders by having increased its army
from 16 to 20 divisions and planning to add an additional 15 divisions.
He claimed that if the US and South Korea really want to preserve
peace, conference should make provisions for transition from the
armistice situation to peaceful rapprochement between North and
South Korea, withdrawal of foreign forces, reduction of domestic
forces, and end of US blockade of North Korea. To this end, he said,
his delegation tabled proposal.

Chou En-lai was second speaker. He regretted that US and other
delegates following its lead had rejected constructive Nam Il April 27
and Molotov June 5 proposals and obstructed any agreement on peace-
ful unification of Korea. Said that ROK and some US leaders trying
to undermine armistice and that ROK-US mutual defense treaty not
"permissible". Said remaining job was consider ways to convert pres-
ent war situation in Korea to peace. Specifically endorsed today's Nam
Il proposals and recommended conference go into restricted session of
seven (China, USSR, UK, US, France, DPRK and ROK) to con-
sider "peaceful development of Korea".

Molotov [said] \(^3\) Soviet delegation shares UK view desirability of
arriving at agreement on basic principles which would be step forward
in restoration Korean unity. Urged adoption Soviet delegation's pro-
sals. Noted that Soviet delegations proposals concurred in by

\(^3\) For the text of Molotov's statement, see The Korean Problem at the Geneva
Conference, pp. 176-182.
DPROK and ROK and chided UN side for failing to submit constructive proposals of their own.

In referring to Canadian delegate’s statement June 11, Molotov accused him of giving up attempts to reach agreement on some subjects while at the same time ignoring the USSR proposal which attempted to do just that. Continued by chiding French delegate for statement also on June 11 adhering to views of Canadian delegate while submitting five-point proposal of his own which was more or less similar to the Soviet and UK proposals. Referred to Spaak’s reference that Soviet proposal mortal for UN and said Spaak forgets Geneva conference set up without help of UN and this not considered inadmissible by delegations here. Even Eden, he continued, did not refer on June 11 to his own earlier five-point proposal and was preoccupied only with the questions of elections and formation of a UN commission. Contended that authority of UN can be defended in several ways not all of which strengthen UN, and cited as example use of UN as cover for Korean aggression.

Molotov then went on to reiterate Soviet delegation’s views in support of all-Korea body to set up conditions for free elections, and registered his support for proposals of DPRK which would be first step in direction Korean unification. Specifically stated support of Soviet delegation for withdrawal of foreign forces within shortest possible period, reduction troop strengths in North and South Korea, formation of all-Korea commission to consider question of bringing about conditions for transition from state of war to peace and abolition by US and others of blockade and embargo of Korea. Called on conference to recommend that existence of treaties of a military nature between North and South Korea and other countries is incompatible with interests of Korean unification mentioning US–ROK mutual defense treaty specifically as means by which US planned using Korean territory as springboard for new military adventures. Stated that Soviet delegation supports formation of all-Korea commission for development of economic and cultural relations between North and South Korea. Concluded by submitting draft declaring: For possible adoption by conference (full text sent Secto 449 4).

Chairman (Eden) noting no further speakers inscribed at moment was in process of calling for short recess when Garcia (Philippines)

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4 The text of Molotov’s proposed draft declaration, as sent to the Department of State in telegram Secto 449, read:

“'The States participating in the Geneva conference have agreed that, pending the final settlement of the Korean problem on the basis of the establishment of a united, independent and democratic state, no action shall be taken which might constitute a threat to the maintenance of peace in Korea.

“'The participants in the conference express their confidence that both the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea shall act in accordance with the present declaration in the interests of peace.”
arose and moved for recess. See Secto 447 for account meeting 16 during recess.\(^5\)

Following recess, General Smith made statement rebutting Molotov proposal, noting that existing armistice agreement is formal definitive arrangement with more force than declaration suggested by Molotov could have. (Full text follows in Secto 450.\(^6\))

Casey (Australia) made short trenchant rebuttal of today's Nam II and Molotov proposals.\(^7\) Said proposals designed to mislead public opinion from understanding that Communist obstruction reason why conference cannot reach agreement. Nam II proposals equate aggressive North Korean regime and lawful, legitimate ROK. Molotov's proposed resolution would reduce ROK defense strength to same level as North Korea which has only one-third population and would deny ROK treaty access to its friends while asking UN believe DPROK has no such link with Peiping. Noted in particular second paragraph Molotov resolution expresses confidence DPROK and ROK would act in interests of peace and that while we confident ROK will do so we have no such confidence about DPROK. Concluded that Communist statements today offered nothing new and nothing which could serve as basis further discussions.

Garcia (Philippines) then took floor and in an impassioned statement\(^8\) summarized the fundamental differences existing between Communist and non-Communist delegations, charging that Communist accusations against UN as belligerent in Korean war designed to be rejected, and concluded that after two months Communist position fundamental issues unchanged. He reaffirmed faith of Philippine delegate in UN and support for two basic principles upheld by non-Communist delegates. Maintained continued willingness to continue negotiations but asserted no purpose would be served unless Communists accept fundamental principles of free elections and control there-
of by appropriate UN body. Said Philippine delegation wanted unified Korea but not at price of destruction of UN.

Spaak (Belgium), speaking fluently from notes, expressed hope that after conciliatory UN delegation speeches Friday and Eden’s grave warning headway could be made but hopes again dashed after Communist statements in first half of session. He referred to three charges made by Molotov:

1. That non-Communist delegates wanted to subject North Korea to South Korean enslavement;
2. That certain delegations wanted to end conference; and
3. That non-Communist delegates had not seriously considered his proposals. In refuting these charges, Spaak said:
   1. We desire democratic elections in Korea wherein Korean people can express themselves freely;
   2. It is not our desire to end conference but cause of peace will not be gained by interminable speeches; and
   3. We have seriously considered Molotov proposals and commented on them last session. Further asserted Communists today had made no reply to fundamental questions asked of them in last session. Reiterated previous thought that if UN considered to be aggressor this would mean destruction of UN. In referring to Nam II statement, said this no better than his earlier statement and dealt only with withdrawal of forces.

Spaak then mentioned that one delegation will read a final statement; that this delegation not most powerful among them which demonstrates principle equality of states. Said statement not intended to end discussions on Korea and referred to necessity of reporting back to UN on results since conference convened pursuant to UN resolution. Spaak then referred to supplementary proposal of Molotov which he thought would have good effect and to which he could give support except that, as General Smith had said, armistice agreement serves same purpose and states case better. Spaak cautioned against expressing same idea in two ways since this leads to confusion. Nevertheless, he said he was glad to note the text and its spirit and he was sure all were in agreement with it. The time had come, he continued, to separate, but in doing so all should realize that nothing was lost. When time has passed and passions have subsided parties can meet to discuss and reach agreement. He emphasized that conference work not useless and hoped all could meet again, re-examine situation, and establish conditions for unified, democratic, independent Korea.

Pyun (ROK), who inscribed during Spaak statement, briefly and cogently dissected Communist statements today on peaceful develop-

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*June 11.
ment of Korea as scheme for infiltrating ROK and diverting attention from primary subject of conference.

Prince Wan (Thailand) after short introduction read text 16-nation declaration on behalf of 16. Full text sent Tousi 79.11

Molotov, who inscribed while Wan reading declaration, then delivered relatively long and intemperate, partly extemporaneous, attack on 16, saving severest invective for ROK which he called “rotten, semi-Fascist, etc.” Apparently speaking largely for benefit domestic Communist audiences, he denied “questions” posed by 16 had not been answered and asked whether 16 had hidden their previous proposals under their tables. Said only conclusion to be drawn from conference was that the 16 had tried to impose Rhee regime on DPROK through Geneva discussions, but failed and, therefore, obstructed any agreement and took clear initiative in ending talks. He specifically accused 16 of not studying today’s 16 [6]-point proposal of Nam II, characterized Casey’s rebuttal of Nam II as saying in effect that nothing which would strengthen peace in Korea is acceptable, and said Smith’s expression of surprise at resolution proposed today by Molotov to guarantee peaceful development of Korea inappropriate in view of talk coming from “Syngman Rhee regime” and elsewhere about crusade to conquer [DPROK by] war. In conclusion, said USSR now as always on the side of democratic forces and that USSR would continue fighting for them.

Chou En-lai spoke next, stating he could not agree with position in 16-nation declaration, repeated view that conference had nothing to do with UN and besides China denied rightful place in UN. Expressed regret 16-nation declaration announced determination to end conference. Chou went on to support Molotov proposal that states participating in conference issue declaration on Korean question and regretted even such a simple expression of common desire was rejected by Smith. Stated that despite differences of opinion conference has objective reaching certain agreements on unification of Korea and for this reason made following proposal, the rejection of which, he said, could only have an unfavorable effect on future international conferences:

“The states participating in the Geneva conference agree that they will continue their efforts toward achieving an agreement on the peaceful settlement of the Korean question on the basis of establishing a united, independent and democratic Korea.

As regards the question of the time and place for resuming appropriate negotiations, it shall be decided separately by the states concerned through negotiation.”

Nam II then spoke deploiring 16-nation declaration which said that conference should be ended. He recalled initial proposal of DPROK

11 For the text of the Declaration by the Sixteen, see infra.
and his subsequent acceptance of Chou En-lai proposal on formation neutral commission to supervise elections. Referred also to DPRK acceptance Molotov proposal re agreement by conference on major questions of principle and noted that ROK and its supporters had rejected these proposals. Said that today ROK and its followers again turned down new proposals for establishment of peace in Korea thus showing other delegates trying to disrupt conference. Concluded by supporting proposal made by Chou En-lai earlier in session.

Prince Wan then addressed brief remarks with dignity and effectiveness to Molotov’s charge that the 16 were taking the initiative in breaking up conference. This, he rejected and denied saying Thailand and others of 16 will continue to work for unification of Korea on basis two fundamental principles set forth UN declaration.

Spaak then again intervened extemporaneously and stated that there appeared to be a misunderstanding. The proposals of Molotov and Chou En-lai, he said, did not contradict the declaration of the 16. None of the 16, he said, consider that their action calls into question continuation of armistice agreement or leads to resumption of hostilities. 16 appeared to differ with Molotov proposal in that they believe his idea is already in armistice agreement and that the same applies to Chou’s statement. If we separate now, he continued, we do not abandon Korean problem. Therefore, it was his opinion that disagreement should not be interpreted as rejection of initial Molotov and Chou proposals and that disagreement existed simply because these ideas were already embodied in armistice agreement and in 16-nation declaration.

In a brief intervention, Molotov registered support of USSR delegation for Chou En-lai proposal.

At this point, Lord Reading (UK) spoke in support of Spaak. He regretted conference had not made more progress but as 16-nation declaration said we have done everything possible. However, he continued, if we fail here we still do not abandon hope for the future. Spaak’s views, he thought, reflected those of signatories of 16-nation declaration.

Chou En-lai then asked for floor by raising PROC sign. Belgian Foreign Minister, he said, stated proposal of PROC was included in armistice agreement. This assertion was groundless. There is no provision in armistice agreement for calling on participants in Geneva conference to attempt settlement of Korean question. He said he had brought spirit of negotiation and conciliation to this, his first international conference, and if his proposal was rejected by “UNC side” he would regard fact with greatest regret and peace-loving people of world would pass own judgment.
Rising to Chou's bait Spaak again intervened stating he feared Chou had not listened carefully to what he had said. He did not say Chou's proposal was included in armistice agreement but simply that it conformed to spirit of 16-nation declaration and also with his previous statement that if Geneva Conference met with no success conference should be prepared to seek a settlement at later date. UK delegate and others, he thought, shared this sentiment.

Chou En-lai then continued the exchange with Spaak and stated that if sixteen-nation declaration and proposal of PROC shared common desire then declaration of 16 is only one-sided statement. In Geneva Conference there are 19 states represented. Why not express desire of all in common statement. If not even this much agreement could be reached, he added sadly, he regretted to have had to learn this at the first international conference. Having risen to the bait Spaak then bit with a short statement expressing readiness to accept either a vote on or affirmation by the conference of Chou En-lai's proposal.

Molotov then immediately intervened stating that the conference was about to wind up its consideration of the Korean question. It could do so by a one-sided or a joint decision. He then asked rhetorically if the conference was ready to make its decision reflect the views of all.

Eden, from the Chair, apparently realizing that the exchange had already gotten out of hand then asked somewhat unhelpfully if he could accept as the [sense of] the delegates that the proposal of PROC expressed spirit of the conference.

General Smith immediately took the floor with statement (repeated in Secto 450)\(^\text{12}\) to effect that this conference could not accept responsibility for settlement of Korea question indefinitely since it is not a permanent body. He was not prepared accept Chou's proposal and 16-nation declaration made clear conditions to be made by Commies for any resumption negotiations.

Eden then seemed to recover his footing and remarked from the Chair that conference has no procedure for voting and that it acts simply on common agreement. He pointed out that conference would not be able to reach agreement on any of the various texts as part of record of conference. If that were possible he stated he would add that further progress appeared impossible and hoped that day would come when task conference had set itself could be carried to successful conclusion.

Molotov spoke next saying conference had heard statement from Chair to effect all should take note of statement of Belgian delegate in support of PROC proposal inasmuch as Chou proposals reflected

\(^{12}\) For the text of Smith's statement, see The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference, pp. 190–191.
views of conference and that since another statement had been made US delegation conference could also take note of it.

Chou En-lai then said he was pleased to note spirit of conciliation shown by Spaak and noted chairman asked for consent of conference for proposal of PROC delegation. He then referred to immediate opposition US delegation had stipulated and asserted this showed how US delegation has been obstructing conference and preventing it from arriving at even minimum agreement. Asked that this statement be noted as part of record of conference. Pyun then made a vigorous impromptu remark referring to 16-nation declaration and stating that if Communists wish to make a similar statement or one with the same content they are free to do so but that a joint statement is “not right”. The Belgian delegation, he said, does not represent all of the 16 and specifically does not represent the ROK.

Eden from the Chair again remarked that the conference does not vote but that it was his understanding that the conference could take note of views expressed and in so doing does not implicate delegates any more than they want to be implicated.

Casey then spoke in helpful manner supporting statement of US delegate and of Chair. He reminded conference that 16 were not here in their individual capacities but as those who resisted aggression in Korea. He did not believe that second paragraph of Chou proposal could be accepted since it appeared to make 16 a “chance collection of countries”. Any revival of conference should be done in UN context.

Molotov then asked for floor and said conference had heard [proposal] to effect that it should take note of statements made today. Therefore, he concluded, it was necessary to take note that Belgian delegation joins with views of PROC delegation and that former believed those views expressed sentiment of conference. Spaak replied, attempting to extricate himself from deteriorating situation, that he understood Chou proposal to mean Chou hoped discussions on Korea were not ended. Spaak said he agreed with that but would add that any further discussions must be within framework of UN. Spaak said he meant he did not oppose future discussions, for to do so would be serious and unfortunate. Chou then asked if he could interpret what had been said to mean that PROC would be excluded from future discussions on settlement of Korea question. If this were so, he added, agreement on Korea question would seem impossible.

Eden from Chair concluded lengthy session by suggesting conference could not adopt any drafts as representing collective agreement but that such drafts and statements of delegates formed part of record of conference. This he thought was only thing conference could do since there was no procedure for voting. He asked if there were any objec-
tions and there were none. He then expressed the personal hope that the
day would come when “our joint task” could be carried through to
successful conclusion. Meeting adjourned at 2035.

Smith

396.1 GE/6-2554

DECLARATION BY THE SIXTEEN, GENEVA, JUNE 15, 1954

Pursuant to the Resolution of August 28, 1953, of the United Na-
tions General Assembly, and the Berlin Communiqué of February 18,
1954, we, as nations who contributed military forces to the United
Nations Command in Korea, have been participating in the Geneva
Conference for the purpose of establishing a united and independent
Korea by peaceful means.

We have made a number of proposals and suggestions in accord
with the past efforts of the United Nations to bring about the unifica-
tion, independence and freedom of Korea; and within the framework
of the following two principles which we believe to be fundamental:

1. The United Nations, under its Charter, is fully and rightfully
empowered to take collective action to repel aggression, to restore peace
and security, and to extend its good offices to seeking a peaceful settle-
ment in Korea.

2. In order to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea,
genuinely free elections should be held under United Nations super-
vision, for representatives in the National Assembly, in which represen-
tation shall be in direct proportion to the indigenous population
in Korea.

We have earnestly and patiently searched for a basis of agreement
which would enable us to proceed with Korean unification in accord-
ance with these fundamental principles.

The Communist delegations have rejected our every effort to obtain
agreement. The principal issues between us, therefore, are clear.
Firstly, we accept and assert the authority of the United Nations.
The Communists repudiate and reject the authority and competence of
the United Nations in Korea and have labelled the United Nations
itself as the tool of aggression. Were we to accept this position of the
Communists, it would mean the death of the principle of collective
security and of the United Nations itself. Secondly, we desire genu-
inely free elections. The Communists insist upon procedures which
would make genuinely free elections impossible. It is clear that the
Communists will not accept impartial and effective supervision of free

1 The source text, a signed original of the Declaration, was transmitted to the
Department of State under cover of despatch Secto 4, June 25, from Geneva.
elections. Plainly, they have shown their intention to maintain Communist control over North Korea. They have persisted in the same attitudes which have frustrated United Nations efforts to unify Korea since 1947.

We believe, therefore, that it is better to face the fact of our disagreement than to raise false hopes and mislead the peoples of the world into believing that there is agreement where there is none.

In the circumstances we have been compelled reluctantly and regretfully to conclude that, so long as the Communist delegations reject the two fundamental principles which we consider indispensable, further consideration and examination of the Korean question by the Conference would serve no useful purpose. We re-affirm our continued support for the objectives of the United Nations in Korea.

In accordance with the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations of August 28, 1953, the member states parties to this declaration will inform the United Nations concerning the proceedings at this Conference.

GENEVA, June 15, 1954.

For Australia:
R. G. CASEY

For Belgium:
P. H. SPAAK

For Canada:
C. A. RONNING

For Colombia:
FRANCISCO URRUTIA

For Ethiopia:
Z. G. HEYWOT

For France:
JEAN CHAUVEL

For Greece:
JEAN KINDYNIS

For Luxembourg:
J. STURM

For The Netherlands:
A. BENTINCK

For New Zealand:
A. D. MCINTOSH

For The Philippines:
CARLOS P. GARCIA
For The Republic of Korea:
    Y. T. PYUN

For Thailand:
    WAN WAITHAYAKON

For Turkey:
    M. C. ACIKALIN

For The United Kingdom:
    ANTHONY EDEN

For The United States of America:
    WALTER BEDELL SMITH
IV. POST-CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS: VIEWS ON THE RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE; CONSIDERATION BY THE ALLIED SIDE OF A REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS (JUNE 16–JUNE 23)

396.1 GE/6–1654: Telegram

Meeting of the Representatives of the 16 Allied Delegations, Geneva, June 16, Morning: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, June 16, 1954—4 p. m.


Ambassador Johnson opened discussion with suggestion that 16-nation declaration (Tousi 79) form outline and substance report to UN and that report be brief as possible. Recommended detailed drafting be done by representatives of 15 in Washington.

Urrutia (Colombia) noted important to delay submission report to UN until late August or early September. Recommended subcommittee be established immediately Geneva to begin preliminary drafting in order give appearance work in progress. Subcommittee would subsequently pass recommendations to representatives of 15 in Washington, probably about end July. Washington representatives could then take month to refer draft to respective governments and get concurrence.

After general discussion Urrutia proposal it was agreed 6-nation (Canada, UK, Colombia, US, Thailand, France) subcommittee under chairmanship Kural should meet for several days beginning morning June 17 to consider mechanics of transmission and substance of report. Yang (ROK) asked whether report would contain recommendations. Consensus replies given him was that recommendations inappro-

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1 No minutes of this meeting have been found in Department of State files.
2 For the text of the Declaration, see supra.

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priate and therefore probably could not be included, at which he indicated gratification. He also expressed ROK desire be kept informed progress of drafting and was assured that while ROK could not serve on subcommittee since it not signatory it like other 16, welcome attend Geneva drafting sessions. Following meeting US delegations assured Yang we would keep ROK fully informed subsequent steps preparation report.

SMITH

396.1 GE/6-1654 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET


Dulles 185. Personal for Secretary from Under Secretary. My personal reactions on final Korean plenary may interest you and supplement our report Secto 451.¹ In first place, preparatory missionary work and drafting by our own people here was superbly done. It was like herding a flock of rabbits through a hole in a fence, and there were causes for extreme exasperation, but everyone remained patient and persuasive, and it paid off. We had most unusual degree of cooperation from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand even though their basic views on some important matters differed from ours. It might be worth while if you sent a brief and very personal message to Webb and Pearson expressing appreciation. You can thank Casey personally when in Washington. He is not the world’s most brilliant statesman, but he loyally stepped into the breach at last minute when some loss of control of conference by Eden in Chair and bad blunder by Spaak seemed likely to leave the US alone in declining without further instructions to associate itself with a final resolution which as we saw it would in effect have made the Geneva Conference a self-perpetuating body outside the UN but including Red China.

Until Spaak allowed himself to be baited, the session went very much as planned for most of the more than six hours, and though the final exchanges between Spaak, Pyun, and others on our side furnished the Communists a good deal of amusement and an excellent propaganda line, the real issues on which the Allies are in some disagreement never came to the surface. On the whole it was about as good as could be expected, though not as good as I had hoped from the unusual success we had during the preceding two days in holding the sixteen together on tactics and wording of final declaration.

We have operated under one great disadvantage. The Communists knew, and indeed the whole press knew almost within minutes, every-

¹ Dated June 16, p. 376.
thing that transpired in the meetings of the sixteen, and on the last day particularly were cocked and primed and ready for us. Considering this, I am well satisfied.²

SMITH

²Dulles sent the following reply in telegram Tedul 209, June 16, 8 p.m., to Geneva:

"From Secretary for Under Secretary, Re Dulte 185. I congratulate you on bringing Korean matter to so satisfactory a close. Please also extend my thanks to your associates on our Delegation. I shall, as you suggest, cable to Webb and Pearson and thank Casey when he is here.

"In view of fact that I shall probably have a very strenuous time with possible trips to Brussels and Montevideo during the latter part of this month and the first of July, I am hoping to get away from Saturday to Monday, returning Washington Tuesday morning. I may therefore miss your arrival which I greatly regret but which I hope you will excuse.

"As you have doubtless heard the President will want to have a group of Congressional leaders at the White House after you get back to hear your report. This may be set up for Wednesday morning [June 23]." (396.1 GE/6-1654)

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Eden–Chou En-lai Meeting, Geneva, June 16: Editorial Note

Smith reported on this meeting, which took place at Chou’s request, in telegram Secto 463, June 17, from Geneva; for the complete text, see page 1170. The sole paragraph of the telegram dealing with Korea read:

“Eden said that Chou was obviously shaken over conclusion Korean conference, particularly rejection his final resolution, which he interpreted as slamming door any possibility Chinese participation any further Korean discussions. Said that “he could not stand” another rebuff of his efforts at conciliation and was concerned over Indochina situation. Eden said that with respect Korean situation he had replied Chou had thrown curved ball at conference, particularly at US, by his resolution, and that the US obviously could not agree to perpetuating Geneva Conference set up. It did not mean that China would necessarily be excluded from any further consideration Korean problem.” (396.1 GE/6-1754)

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396.1 GE/6-1754: Telegram

Young–Pyun Meeting, Geneva, June 16: The United States Delegation to the Department of State

SECRET

GENEVA, June 17, 1954—4 p.m.


1. In conversation with Young Wednesday Pyun confirmed his answers to questions in press conference he called. ROK no longer felt

¹June 16.
obliged to abide by Korean armistice, collapse of Geneva talks means armistice “invalidated” and ROK now feels free to take any action it wants when time comes. He also said that either Chinese Communists in North Korea should leave of their own free will or be forced to go. He turned down UN taking up Korean question, as UN has “no competence” judge it. Other delegations are disturbed and feel such remarks in public contradict 16-nation declaration.

2. In recent conversations with USDel and in meetings of 16, Pyun has expressed strong view that as far as ROK concerned, armistice should not be perpetuated, Geneva Conference is last on Korea, matter should not be referred to or taken up in UN, and report to UN by 15 should contain no recommendations. Pyun in drafting committee on declaration also objected strongly to all suggestions insert phrase “by peaceful means” in connection UN objectives Korea.

3. Pyun’s remarks prompted in large part by his deep distress and consternation over Spaak’s and Eden’s acceptance Chou En-lai proposal closing hour final plenary. Pyun felt Spaak had “betrayed” 16 nation declaration. He explained his press remarks were no different those he had made in meetings of 16 and represented his firm convictions. Young pointed out his personal regret and disappointment such statements made public day after closing plenary characterized by good measure allied solidarity in declaration and successful efforts beat back clever Communist tactics obscure issues and prolong conference. Young pointed out Pyun’s public statements would be interpreted as running counter to General Smith’s statement in plenary on armistice which had successfully neutralized and turned back proposals of Molotov and Nam Il. Also pointed out to Pyun his statement was already being interpreted by press and other delegations as contradicting and undercutting declaration of 16. Pyun hoped answers to press would be helpful and not harmful.

SMITH

396.1 GE/6-1754: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

GENEVA, JUNE 17, 1954—6 p. m.

Secto 466. Repeated information Ottawa 9, London 299, Tokyo 147, Bogota 6, Paris 453, Bangkok 28, Seoul 134. Re Secto 454.¹

1. Drafting committee of 6 met today, June 17, and completed first working draft report to UN. Belgian, Ethiopian, Netherlands, Philip-

¹ Dated June 16, p. 388
pine representatives also present. ROK delegate out of town. USDA
twill pouch draft ² to McClurkin.

2. Agreed to following procedure:

(a) No further meeting in Geneva;
(b) Working draft will be sent 6 respective governments for
comments;
(c) Representatives of 6 will then meet in Washington finish prepa-
ration of report;
(d) It will then be submitted to full committee of 15 and their
governments for consideration and approval;
(e) Completed report will be submitted to SYGUN at suitable
time, i.e., 9th GA session.

Group felt this procedure might help keep 8th GA or special session
Thailand resolution ³ from taking up Korean question.

3. Principal point today’s discussion was armistice agreement. All
representatives expressed considerable concern over Pyun’s press re-
marks Wednesday on invalidation armistice. Owing to these remarks,
Urrutia (Colombia) proposed and others supported adding General
Smith’s statement in 15th plenary (Secto 450 ⁴) to report itself. They
all stressed important report contains some reference to continued
validity and effect of armistice agreement. Young reported briefly on
Pyun’s explanation and circumstances underlying his remarks (Secto
464 ⁵) which had been made sharper in press versions than he had
apparently intended. However, Young suggested and group agreed
possible addition Smith’s statement or short reference to armistice
should be referred to delegations or governments, because it involved
several important matters, before being incorporated in working draft
at later stage.

4. Group also suggested ending report with hope expressed by Eden
as chairman last plenary that day may soon come when task of con-
ference can be carried through to successful conclusion. Agreed that
this question, like one above, should be referred to delegations or gov-
ernments of six and taken up later by Washington working group.

SMITH

² Not printed.
³ For related documentation, see pp. 727 ff.
⁴ Not printed, but see footnote 6, p. 379.
⁵ Supra.

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Smith–Molotov Meeting, Geneva, June 18, Evening: Editorial Note

This meeting, which was held at Smith’s request, was reported to
the Department of State in telegram Dulte 202, June 19, from Geneva.
Most of the discussion dealt with Indochina; for the complete text of
the telegram, see page 1189. Concerning Korea, Smith made the following brief comment:

"With regard to Korean phase, I had only to say that in reserving our position final Chinese proposal had not implied to exclude Communist China from future discussions on Korean question. As matter of fact, China was belligerent there against UN and for practical reasons would have to be party to settlement." (396.1 GE/6–1954)

Memorandum by Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 23, 1954.

OUTLINE OF GENERAL SMITH'S REMARKS TO THE PRESIDENT AND BIPARTISAN CONGRESSIONAL GROUP, 8:30 A.M.

1. General Smith spoke first of the Korean phase of the Geneva Conference, in which the US was as one of the belligerents a principal. He said that the US had maintained its principal positions:

1. The authority of the UN.
2. Good relations with the ROK.
3. Good relations with the other UN nations participating in Korea.
4. Demonstration that the failure to reach agreement was the fault of the Soviets.

He expected that the US would report to the UN, and that the existing situation would continue until some further conferences were held.

[Here follows the remainder of the document which dealt with Indochina; for text, see volume XIII.]

1 The source text is a copy of the memorandum forwarded to Smith at the request of Cutler by Robert Bowie, Director of the Policy Planning Staff.

Editorial Note

On November 11, 1954, the 15 member nations contributing to the United Nations effort in Korea (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Columbia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States) submitted their report on the Geneva Conference to the Ninth Session of the United Nations General Assembly. The text of the report is in United Nations document A/2786. It reiterated the points made in the Declaration of the Sixteen on United Nations authority and the need for free, supervised elections in Korea, noted
that the Communist delegations rejected these points, and stated that
the Geneva Conference should be regarded as the political conference
referred to in Article 60 of the Korean Armistice Agreement and in
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 711 (VII) of August 28,
1953. The report also specified that the failure of the Geneva Con-
ference to solve the Korean question did not prejudice the armistice
in Korea, which remained in effect. After debate, the Assembly adopted
by a vote of 50 in favor (including the United States) to 5 opposed
(Byelorussian S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian S.S.R.,
U.S.S.R.), with 4 abstentions (Burma, India, Indonesia, and Syria),
Resolution 811 (IX), December 11, 1954, sponsored by the 15 powers,
which approved the report on the Korean Political Conference.
For documentation on the report and its adoption by the United
Nations General Assembly, see volume XV.